From Historical Sociology to Theoretical History

Author(s): Gareth Stedman Jones

Source: The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 27, No. 3, Special Issue. History and Sociology
(Sep., 1976), pp. 295-305
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 Journalof SociologyVolume
Britzsh 3 September
e7 ;Number I976

GarethStedmanJones

Fromhistoricalsociologyto theoreticalhistory
During the last fifteen years, the relationshipbetween history and
sociology,at least at a formallevel, has been closerthan at any time
in the past. Not only have there been frequentdiscussionsabout the
desirabilityof breakingdownboundariesbetweenthe two subjects,but,
at a practicallevel, a tendency towardsconvergencehas been en-
couragedby the S.S.R.C., by mixeddegreecoursesat universitiesand
polytechnicsand by the emergenceof sociologyalongsidehistoryas a
secondaryschoolsubject.Leavingasidepiousstatementsof goodintent
and the polite diplomacyof academicconferencesand scholarlyfoot-
notage, it is remarkablehow little serious attention this shift has
provoked.A few conservativehistorians,notably G. R. Elton,l have
cogentlydefendeda traditionalcaseforthe autonomyof historyagainst
the encroachmentsof 'socialscience',but the prevailingview appears
to take it for grantedthat in principleit is desirablethat historyand
sociologyshouldachievesome painlessformof symbiosis.
The latterhas generallybeen regardedas the progressivesolutionto
the problem.But muchof its apparentradicalismis in realityspurious.
Its vision of historically-informedsociologists and sociologically-
informedhistoriansleavesthe conventionaldemarcationbetween the
subjects intact. It challenges neither the traditionalconceptionof
historynor the theoreticalcredentialsof sociology.It fails to question
the standardassumption,commonboth to historiansand their oppo-
nents, that historyis a subjectdevoidof theory.An accepteddivision
of labour continues,even if the builderis advisedto read up some
architecture,and the architectis invited to try his hand at laying
bricks. History remainsthe scholarlyinvestigationof past events-
gewesen(simply,how it really happened)in Ranke's
wie es eigentlich
words-and once this investigationis completed, the task of the
historianas such is over. Theory, on the other hand, remainsthe
propertyof the 'socialsciences',and if the historianis to situate his
work in a theoreticalcontext,it is to these non-historicaldisciplines
that he mustresort.The usualresultof this approachis once again to
elide history with the empirical,and sociologywith the theoretical,
and then to imaginea seamlesssynthesisbetweenthe two.
Such reasoningis basedupon extremelyquestionablepremises.The
problemshouldbe poseddifferently.It mustfirstbe askedwhy history
has been regardedas theoreticallyemptyand whetherthis assumption

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 jtones
Stedman
Gareth
296
history
isjustified.Secondly,if the possibilityof a theoreticallydefined sociological
isconceded, it should then further be asked whether
conceptions of historicaland socialcausalitycould be adequateto the
It
demands of suchan historicalscience.The two problemsare linked.
non-resolution of the scientific
willbe argued that it has been the
content and statusof historythat has led historiansto seeka short-cut
theoretical salvationin sociology.On the other hand, it is the inco-
applied to
herenceof much sociologicalreasoningwhen seriously work
history that mightfinallyconvincethe historian that theoretical
inhistoryis too importantto be subcontracted to others.
of history
It is firstnecessaryto questionthe Rankeanidentification that a
withpre-givenpast events.It is generally upon this foundation
plethora of distinctionshave been constructed,all of whichin one way
with the
oranotheridentifyhistorywith the particularand sociology of history, a
universal. Many historianshave celebrated this definition
a misleading way of looking at
fewhave bemoanedit. But it is in fact an entirely
theproblem.For history,like any other 'socialscience',isin the head.
intellectual operationwhichtakesplace in the present and
of primary
Thefact that the 'past' in some sense 'happened'is not history.
significance since the past is in no sense synonomous with
reconstructs not the past, but the
Firstly,the historianinvestigatesor (literary
residuesof the past which have survived into the present
sources, pricedata,inscriptions,fieldsystems,archaeologicalsitesetc.).
to make
The proper evaluationand use of these residuesin order and
historical statementsare technicalskills of the historian. Secondly,
historian is an active intellectual
moreimportant,the work of the historical
exercisewhich designateswhich of these residuespossess in
significance,and what significance they possess. The historian,
on the basis of an argued
otherwords,constructshistoricalproblems the
casefor their relevanceto historicalanalysis,and then, through attempts
criticaluse of extantresidues(or even a search for new ones),
construction
to providea solutionto them. The criteriaby which the be
of a problemwill be judgedof historical significance will ultimately
theory of social causation. In
dependentuponsomeexplicitor implicit and any
this sense,thereis no distinctionin principle between history
theory
of the other'socialsciences'.The distinctionis not that betweenof the
and non-theory,but between the adequacy or inadequacy
theorybroughtto bear. manyof
Why then has historyappearedso theoreticallyemptyto so and
its practitioners?The answer may be easier if the technicalcon-
moment
theoreticalaspectsof the historian'spracticeare for asector without
sideredapart. For advances are quite possible in one
the other. History as a rigorous discipline in
concomitantadvancesin dates
either sense is a comparativelyrecent innovation.It scarcely intellectual
back to I800. Its claim to scientificstatus rests on two The firstwas
revolutionswhich took place in the nineteenthcentury.

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Fromhistorical
sociology
to theoretical
history 297

technical involvingthe discoveryof criticalproceduresfor the evalu-

ation of past residues,and some acceptedcriteriafor the verification
of certain (relativelysimple) types of historicalstatement.This was
associatedinitially with the work of Niebuhr and Mommsen.The
second, and infinitely more contentious,was theoretical involving
the elaborationof a form of causalityspecificto human history.This
was the unfinishedachievementof Marx.
Clearlya technicalrevolution,howevernecessaryas a precondition,
cannot of itself producea science (althoughhistorianshave confused
the technicalwith the theoreticalin this way). It is also well known
that Marx'swritingsscarcelyimpingeduponthe workofotherhistorians
during the nineteenthcentury, and have only enjoyed partial and
intermittentrecognitionsince. Thus, when as a resultof the spreadof
this technicalrevolutionacrossEurope, there arose a generationof
historians,claiming that their subject was a science, the resulting
definitionsof this sciencewereinevitablyunsatisfactory. There was no
clear conceptionof the necessityof the constructionof a form of
causality,both concordantwith the materialistnatureof scienceand
specificto humanhistory.In the positivisticclimateof the late nine-
teenth century,those most insistentupon the possibilityof an exact
historicalscience analagousto the naturalsciencesprojectednatural
scientificcausality,particularlythat of classicalmechanics,onto human
history.On the otherhand, thosemostinisistentupon the specificityof
humanhistory-a cerltraltenet of the neo-Kantianand neo-Hegelian
movements retreated into an explicitly anti-materialistemphasis
uponhermeneuticalintuitionas the essenceof historicalunderstanding
(historywas not accidentallyentitled a Geisteswissenschaft). But this
secondcurrentmade moreimpact upon philosophersand sociologists
than upon historians,and in England,apart from the odd exception
like Collingwood,the positivisticconceptionpredominated.In this
scenario,once all the 'facts'had been discoveredand assembled(the
really vital workof the historian),they would fall into place, as if of
their own accord, in a chain of events, linked one to anotherin a
mechanicalfashionby relationsof a simpletransitivecausality.
Such a chain might also be conceivedas an evolutionaryprogress
from a lower to a higher state. But despite its obvious ideological
importance,it is misleadingto imply that evolutionistassumptions
werein any seriousway essentialto the workingmethodsof positivistic
historians.Ranke,the firstmajorideologistof the technicalrevolution
in historicalresearch,was determinedlyanti-evolutionist.Every age,
he wrote, 'was equal in the sight of God. In the I960S, Elton main-
tained a secularizedversionof the same proposition:'no argument
exists which successfullyestablishesa hierarchy of worth among
historicalperiodsor regionsas such'.2In the meantime,the riseand fall
of whigor progressive-evolutionisttheoriesof historyhad maderemark
ably little impact upon the way in which historywas actuallywritten

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 298 GarethStedman30nes

It is, therefore,not the changingfashionsfor evolutionist,relativist

or empiricistphilosophiesof history,but the persistenceof positivistic
workingassumptionsaboutcausality,whichhas been at the rootof the
embarrassedand defensiverelationshipbetween historyand theory.
The positivisticcharacterizationof history was not self-evidently
inadequateso long as professionalhistoriansconfinedtheir attention
to the legal,constitutional,administrative anddiplomaticspheres.Itwas
moreoverin theseareasthat the achievementsof the technicalrevolu-
tion were most visible.The incoherenceof mechanicalconceptionsof
social causalityonly began to surfaceas a problem,once the issues
posedby the economicand the socialcouldno longerbe evaded,and it
became clear that the forms of causalitynecessaryto comprehend
changingsocialrelationswere infinitelymore complexthan anything
which historicalpositivismcould encompass.Such rethinkingmight
have been expectedto developduringthe interwarperiod.But, apart
fromthe isolatedcase of Namierwho made an astonishingattemptto
introducepsychoanalysis into historicalexplanation,it did not. There
was impressivework in social and economic history, producedby
Tawney, the Hammonds,Eileen Power, Clapham,Postan and the
Economic HistoryReviewduring its early years. But like the German
generationof economichistoriansand sociologistsof capitalism,which
had precededthem, there was no profoundor sustainedbreakwith
traditionalassumptionsabout historicalcausality. Selected insights
fromMarxmightbe takenover,even by his opponents,but no serious
attentionwas paid to his form of historicalreasoning.None of these
writerswere marxist,indeed most of them were determinedlyanti-
marxist,but the mainreasonwhy Marxwas not studiedas an historical
theorist(as opposedto a prophet,or a seriousbut eccentriceconomic
historian)was that his theorywas also understoodin positivistterms.
Evenhis admirersgenerallymisinterpreted himin a mechanisticfashion
and the result,in practice,was often a dogmaticeconomicdetermin-
ism, which antagonistscould legitimatelyopposeas an a priori imposi-
tion of 'theory'on the 'facts'.
Had there been any generally felt intellectual impasse among
historians,had the resultingconfusionbeen suchthat furtherhistorical
advancewould be renderedimpossible,the resultmight have been a
more profoundrethinkingof the possiblefoundationsof a historical
science. But the relative autonomyof the technical componentof
historicalwork ensuredthat considerableadvancescould continueto
be registered in specialized fields, while central epistemological
problemsremainedin a state of limbo. In the face of the unanswered
questionsposed by historicalmaterialismand psychoanalysis,most
professionalhistoriansretreatedto the one area aboutwhich they felt
reasonablyconfident the solid advanceswhich their disciplinehad
achievedin the techniqueof historicalinvestigation.
It was not in fact until the end of the 'sos that there developeda

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 history
Fromhistoricalsociologyto theoretical 299

widespreadif only half articulateddiscontentboth about the state of

historyas a disciplineand about the way in which it was taught. By
that time, suchintellectualstimulusas historyhad receivedduringthe
interwaryears seemed exhausted.The broad issues opened up in
economic history had lost their generality. Questionsin economic
history had become increasinglyspecializedand technical, and this
tendency had been reinforcedby the growthof separateeconomic
historydepartments,in which majorquestionsof historicalinterpreta-
tion were often abandoned,and historysimplyemployedas a testing
ground for propositionsderived from neo-classicalor Keynesian
economics. In modern political history, the general interpretative
challengerepresentedby the work of Namierhad becomenarrowed
downto rathermonotonousapplicationsofa particularhistoriographical
technique.At the conceptuallevel, theoreticalexperimentand all but
the most innocuousforms of historicalgeneralizationhad been in-
hibitedby a sophisticatedempiricismstrenuouslyurgedby Popperand
his disciples. Questionsposed by marxismor psychoanalysiswere
excludedfromthe outset,sincethey were allegedto be unamenableto
Popperiancriteria of falsification.Outside the dominant academic
establishment,the picturewas by no meansso grey. Muchof the most
creative and pioneeringhistoricalwork during the 1gsos centred
aroundthe Marxist-inspired journal, Past andPresent.But even here,
there had developed a falteringof confidencein the ability of a
marxist-based historyto standon its own feet, and aroundthe end of
the 'sos, the subtitle, 'journalof scientifichistory',was droppedin
favourof the moreanodyne,'journalof historicalstudies'.
It was the malaisein historyaroundthe end of the 'sos which led
historianstowardsa closerrelationshipwith sociology.The discontent
affected both liberal and socialist historians.Among left-inclined
historians,the crisisof 1956 led some to a questioningof what had
passedas marxismduringthe Stalinistera, and to the belief that a
resortto sociologymight help to resolvequestionsto which marxism
apparentlyhad no solution;the emergenceof the 'thirdworld'and the
stabilityof advancedcountriesprobablyreinforcedthesefeelings;and
so, probably,did the claim of sociologyto be a post-ratherthan anti-
marxistpre-occupation. Amongliberalhistorians,a differentand more
tentativepath to sociologycan be traced.The Suez crisis,the incon-
trovertibleevidence of Americanhegemonyand the rapid pace of
decolonizationall threw into relief the parochialismof prevalent
approachesto politicalhistory,whetherof a whig or of a Namierite
zone
kind. In some cases,this led historiansinto the interdisciplinary
of the economicsand sociology of 'development'or the politics of
'modernization'.In other cases, it led from constitutionalor party
historyto Americanelectoralor politicalsociology.It shouldnot be
forgotten,of course,that the bulkof historiansremainedindifferentto
sociology,and an articulateminorityon the right,activelyhostile.But

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3oo GarethStedman3'ones

among those, of whateverpoliticalpersuasion,who felt the necessity

of some change of approach, sociology appeared to promise a
solution.
The relationshipestablishedbetweenhistoryand sociologyat the end
of the I 950S wasverymucha one-wayaffair,andit haslargelyremained
so. There is little evidencethat sociologistshave become noticeably
more 'historical',as E. H. Carrhoped in I960.3 If sociologistsare no
longeras confidentaboutthe solidityof sociologyas they werein I959,
and if someeven speakof a 'crisis'of sociology,it is not becauseof the
interventionof historians.On the other hand, there is now much
greaterevidenceof the influenceof sociologyon historythan therewas
fifteenyearsago. The mostpositiveside of this influencehas been the
immenseincreasein the scope of history.It is hard to imagine the
extent of current historicalinterest in magic, witchcraft,popular
culture, family, urban, rural and oral history without at least the
indirectspurof sociologyand social anthropology.The old restriction
of academichistoryto politics,church,constitutionand diplomacyhas
largelydisappeared,and it is probablythe exampleof sociologywhich
has emboldenedhistoriansto undertakecomparativehistory.But the
negativeeffectsof the relationshiphavebeenat leastequallyprominent.
Attitudes towards sociologicaltheory among sociologicallyinclined
historians,have often verged on the credulous,and although more
criticalsociologistsmight have rejected as naively positivistany dis-
tinction between history and sociologywhich sees the one as 'idio-
graphic'and the other as 'nomothetic',many of thesehistorianshave
behavedin practiceas if they consideredsucha divisionof labourto be
legitimate. Defensive about their own subject and repelled by an
inadequatelyunderstoodmarxismwhichappearedto be the only other
contender,they have lookeduncriticallyto sociologyas a theoretical
storehousefromwhich they could simplyselectconceptsmostservice-
able for theirindividualneeds.
Evenif sociologyhad possessedthe theorywhichhistoryrequired,it
would be difficultto justify the eclectic mannerin which historians
have sometimesshoppedaroundin it. But, in fact, academicsociology
is no morea scienceor even the approximationof one than academic
history.The vague and shiftingcharacterof its object,the inconstancy
of its definitions,the non-cumulativecharacterof muchofits knowledge,
its pronenessto passingtheoreticalfashionsand the tritenessof someof
its 'laws'4suggestthat its theoreticalfoundationsare contestableand
insecure.Againstthe prevalentview, it must be emphasizedthat the
problemof sociologyis not simply that it is insufficiently'historical'.
It is certainlytruethat muchsociologicalconceptualization is decidedly
averseto the detailedanalysisof historicalchange.But it is also true
that sociologistshave made sincerecalls for 'process'or a 'dynamic
sociology'.Nevertheless,the practicalresultshave generallybeen dis-
appointing.Too often, all that is heardis the awkwardgratingnoise

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Fromhistorscal
sociologyto theoretical
history 30I

which accompaniesthe driver'sattemptto find firstgear in a motor

which has only been designedto run in neutral.The primitivenessof
currenthistoricalcategorizationsin sociologyis in effect a symptom,
not a causeof its inadequacy.The problemis that in as far as sociology
definesits objectof investigationas 'society','the socialsystem'or some
suchgeneralunspecifiedsynonym,it deniesitselfany rigorousprinciple
of historicalperiodization;hence,its persistentresortto looselydefined
dyads traditional/modern;pre-industrialfindustrial; Gemeinschaft/
Gesellschaft;status/contract,etc. Society,like Ranke'swie es eigentlich
gewesen,is a descriptivelypre-givenrather than a theoreticallycon-
structedobject. It thus imposesno limits in its applicationor inter-
pretation,no consistentprinciplesof classificationor internaldifferen-
tiation and no form of causality specific to its object. For these
reasons,the type of discourseand method of proof characteristicof
sociologycannot be said to have escapedthe impasseconfrontedby
late nineteenthcenturypositivisticproponentsof a historicalscience
and their historicistopponents.The same antinomy remains. Her-
meneuticsdisciplinedby statisticaltests,of probability(Weber'sidea
of Verstehenand his use of 'ideal types' for example) mergesthe two
approaches,but does not transcendthem. Once it is recognizedthat
historyand sociologyare not dividedby a fundamentalscientificbreak-
through,genuinecollaborationbetweenthe two subjectswill become
easier.
There is no space here to range over the uses and limitationsof
sociologyor to distinguishbetweenthe characteristicemphasesof its
differentschools.But somethingmay be saidof its effectuponthe work
of modernhistoriansin the last fifteenyears.Here the mostnoticeable
phenomenonhas been the importationof sociologicalnotionsof class
and social structure.Because of their own lack of theoreticalself-
confidence, historianshave been prone to accept sociology'sself-
definitionas 'post-marxist'.They have not attemptedto investigate
whether the Weberianincorporationof a 'marxian'notion of class
within a schema of 'class, status and power' is in fact an accurate
renderingof Marx'sconceptionof classes,let alone their operationin
relationto modesof productionand social formations.The effecthas
been disconcerting.The word 'class'has been domesticatedinto the
historian'svocabulary.But the result has been a subjectificationof
social relationsand a form of discussionwhich is pre- rather than
post-marxist.For sociological theories of stratificationhave been
persistentlycharacterized
by the evasionor denialof objectiveeconomic
relationships.At most what is substitutedare differentialsof income,
and the ownershipor non-ownership of property.Classesarenot tied to
the relationsof productionwithin modes of production,and no dis-
tinctionis made betweena modeof productionand a socialformation.
They are only related to similaritiesof 'marketchances'in a social
system.Thusit is not surprisingthat the effectsof a dichotomybetween

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302 jtones
GarethStedman

propertyand non-propertyin a stratificationsystem can simply be

viewedasone of possiblyconflictingbutgenerallysubordinateeconomic
'interests' theseinterestsbeing understoodnot in a marxistbut in a
utilitariansense.Fromthereit is only a shortstepto showthat 'class'in
a 'marxiansense' possessesat most a secondaryimportancein the
operationof a social structure,that it is secondaryto the subjective
assessmentof actorsin a social system,both of their place and of the
place of others.Either'class'is shownto be only one of manyformsof
or, as in Dahrendorf,5
stratification, it is consideredto be only a 'special
case'of a moregeneralconflictconcerningauthority.EversinceWeber
introduced his distinction between 'class, status and power', the
majorityof political sociologists,stratificationtheorists,and now in
theirwake,historians,have been concernedwith 'status' the relative
positionof actorsor socialgroupsin a subjectivelydefinedhierarchyof
honour and prestige.Once social relationsare subjectivizedin this
fashion,the historicalrelationshipbetween classesdisappearsinto a
multiplicity of reciprocal perceptions possessed by hierarchically
orderedstratain a socialsystem,itselfvalidatedpurelyat the level of
perception.Class becomesindistinguishablefrom class consciousness
and it becomesmeaningfulfor one historianto describeeighteenth
centuryEnglandas a 'classlesshierarchy',6and for anotherto under-
stand the late nineteenthcenturyas a periodin which classreplaces
religionas the politicallysalientreferencegroup.7
It is the same kind of approachwhich has informedthe growing
pre-occupationof socialhistorianswith an analysisof 'socialstructure'.
The phraseimpliesa theoreticalpromise.The reproductionof social
relationswithin modesof productionand social formationsoften ex-
hibits long-termhistoricalregularitiesand these are importantand
hithertoneglectedobjectsof study for Britishhistorians.But it is ex-
tremelydubiouswhetherthe adoptionof a sociologicalapproachhas
really advancedthe understandingof such phenomena.Here again,
what is offeredis not the theoreticalconstructionof an objectof study,
but merelythe systematization of predefineddata, originallygathered
primarilyto answerdemographicquestions,i.e., decennialcensusesof
population.Such data can of coursebe used imaginativelyto answer
differentquestions.8But as far as it has been used to designatesocial
structures,the result,so far, is not generallyan anatomyof a complex
system of class relationshipsat a given point in time, but a purely
quantitativehierarchyof discrete groups who exist in no obvious
relationshipto one another.The only distinctionsanalysedare those
deducible from censusenumerators'books.Thus in studiesof nine-
teenth centurytowns,we are likelyto learn muchless aboutrelation-
ships of employment,rent or credit, than about distinctionsbetween
servant-keepingand non-servant-keeping householdsor mere differ-
ences of familysize (quite proper,of course,if the investigationwere
purely demographic),not because this informationis vital to the

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 history
Fromhistoricalsociologyto theoretical 3o3

solutionof importanthistoricalquestions,but simplybecauseit lends

itselfmorereadilyto quantification.
A parallel example of this phenomenonhas been the growth of
historicalelectionstudies.If sociologypioneeredatiitude surveysand
opinionpolls,historianshave begunto poll the dead. Oncemore,when
a problemis not constructedtheoretically,the researcheris liable to
remain at the mercy of his data, and discussionsostensiblyabout
theoretical approach become in fact simply controversiesabout
technique.It is as noticeablein the analysisof voting behaviouras in
the elaborationof a census-definedsocial structurethat, for all the
valuable work that has been done, a symbioticrelationshipexists
betweentype of materialand type of analysis.The confusionof theory
and technique has resultedin a meaninglessbut harmfuldivision
betweenquantitativeand non-quantitative historians,as if this marked
the real boundaryof historicalprogressand reaction. Quantitative
history is obviously invaluable where important problems can be
resolvedby quantitativemeans.But it shouldscarcelyneed to be said
that many historicalproblemsare not amenableto quantificationand
that quantificationitselfwill be no moresignificantthan the questions
which informit. In nineteenthcenturypoliticalhistory,even though
in I9I I, only 60 per cent of adultmaleswercentitledto vote, and even
though, as one historianhas acutely put it,9 the partiesselectedthe
votersratherthan the votersthe parties,therehas been an ever more
unilateralconcentrationupon the act of voting. To have nineteenth-
centuryvotingpatternssystematizedand codifiedis withoutquestiona
majorservice but of a technicalratherthan a theoreticalkind. The
studyof shiftsin popularpoliticsand the apparentlysuccessful'liberali-
zation' of the politicalsystemin the nineteenthcenturystill abounds
with unsolved problems.The place of electionsin this complex of
problemsis not entirely clear, but given the complexitiesof class
relationsand the still as yet largelyunexploredideologicalshifts,it can
by no meansbe assumedthat the politicalbehaviourof differentsocial
groupscan be adequatelydeducedfrom their voting patternsmerely
becausethisis the mostobviousand easiestevidenceto handle.
Once again,the interventionof a conventionalsociologicalapproach
into this generalpolitical-ideological area begs more questionsthan it
solves.Anothereffectof the applicationof Weber'strichotomyof class,
statusand powerhas been a confusingcompartmentalization of'class'
and 'power'in recent historicaldiscussion.Class relations,as Nicos
Poulantzashas pointed out,10are relationsof power. Once class re-
lations are formallydivorcedfrom power relations,a host of falsely
posed problemsbecome the subjectof inconclusivehistoricaldebate.
Mostcommonarethosein whicha subordinategroupdoesnot manifest
any explicit or measurablecollectiveconsciousness of exploitationor
oppression.Insuchasituation,asociologicalapproach is aptto implythat
suchgroupscolludein their subordinatepositionand then to provide

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 3o4 GarethStedman
30nes

psychologisticinterpretationsof their behaviour.Elkins' theory of

slaveryviewsthe questionin thisway,and similartheoriesof deference
(internalizedacceptanceof inferiorityor dependence,rather than
externallynecessitatedcompliance)have been applied to servants,
women,agriculturallabourersand some groupsof industrialworkers.
Such an approachis by no means confined to conservativesocial
theoristsand historians.Other historianshave attemptedto reach
differentanswerswithin tlle same frameworkby resortingto some
notionof socialcontrol.llBut the resultis conceptualconfusion,since
social control is an idea which is inseparablefrom its functionalist
presuppositions.Occasionally,even the Gramsciannotion of 'hege-
mony' has been misappliedin a similarfashionby writersgenuinely
anxious to discover reasons for a non-emergenceof a proletariat
possessingthe revolutionaryconsciousness 'ascribed'to it by Lukacson
the basisof an applicationof the Weberiantheoryof 'idealtypes'.The
lessonof theseattemptsis,onceagain,thathistorians, andforthatmatter
sociologists,cannotaffordto taketheoreticalpropositions on trust.They
must examine the conceptualprovenanceof an apparentproblem
requiringsolution,to see whetherthereis not somethingunsoundin the
theoreticalfoundationsthemselves.l2
What then shouldfinallybe said of the relationshipbetweenhistory
and sociology?How shouldthat relationshipdevelop?What is wrong
with the presentrelationshipis not its existence,whichis in principle
good, but its uncriticalcharacter.The beliefin a theoreticallyempty
historyservicedby a theoreticallyproven sociologyis now perhaps
beginningto be underminedby sociologiststhemselves.But a recogni-
tion by historiansof the need to engagein theoreticalworkthemselves
has still to makeheadway.The processwill be considerablyeasedonce
the pretensionsof sociologyto be an alreadyconstitutedscience are
given up. Once this is accepted,a more modest,but more equal and
more genuinely fruitful,relationshipbetween the two subjectscan
begin. Ultimately,of course,they are only differentaspectsof a single
concern:the constructionof a historicalscience.But a reformulation
of their relationshipand an elaborationof the theoreticalproblems
common to both will not happen of its own accord.Joint work is
necessary;not of a celebratoryor diplomatickind, but of a critical
kind. The historyof historyand sociologyas subjectsmust be treated
as partof a singleideologicalterrain.If sociologyis not to be treatedas
a cumulativescience,then it plainlyrequiresa differenttype of history
fromthat whichis currentlyprovided.A starthas alreadybeen made
on thiswork.Underthe aegisof the HistoryWorkshoj7 jtournal,
a groupof
historians,sociologistsand social anthropologistsare preparingde-
tailedresearchpaperson the historyof sociologyin Britain.l3To redraw
the intellectualmap in a satisfactoryfashion,many suchventureswill
be necessary.The weightof positivisticassumptionsbothin historyand
sociologywill not be removedwithoutactive and constantintellectual

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 sociology
Fromhistorical history
to theoretical 3o5

debate. But the gains could be enormous.Shadow boxing about

demarcationsbetweenthe 'socialsciences'would be relegatedto the
shadeswherethey belong,and the phantomsof Rankeand Comtewho
still hauntsuchproceedingswouldfinallybe accordeda decentburial.
Gareth jrones
Stedman
Cambridge
King'sCollege,
Notes
of History,
I. G. R. Elton, ThePractice D. A. Reader, 'Slums and Suburbs'in
London, I967. H. J. Dyos and M. Wolff (eds.), Ehe
2. Elton, op. cit. p. I3. VistorianCity, London, Routledge &
3. E. H. Carr, Whatis History?,I962, Kegan Paul, I973.
p. 60. 9. Clarke,op. cit. p. 33.
4. For example,see the discussionof IO. N. Poulantzas,PoliticalPowerand
ie propositionthat social interaction, *ocialClasses, London,N.L.B. I973, p. 99.
promotes friendliness (derived from I I. For one ambiguous use of the
Homans)in H. L. Zetterberg,On Theory term in this sense, see my own Outcast
andVerification I954, cited in
in Sociology, London,Oxford University Press, I97I,
W. G. Runciman, Sociolog)s in its Place, p. 252.
Cambridge,CambridgeUniversityPress, I2. It appearsto me that despite its
I 970, pp 32-3 considerableimportanceas a theoreti-
5. R. Dahrendorf, Class and Class cally informedcontributionto historical
ConJZict Society,Routledge & research,John Foster'sClassStr?>ggle
in Industrial and
Kegan Paul, I959, p. I39. theIndustrial (London,Weiden-
Revolution
6. H. Perkin, The Originsof Modern feld & Nicolson, I974), exemplifiesthe
EnglishSociety,I 780I 880, I 972, p. I 3. false problematicthat is set up by an
7. P. F. Clarke, 'The Electoral attemptto marryincompatibleconcepts.
Sociology of Modern Britain', History, The Lukacsian-Weberian notionof con-
I972, p. 42. This article providesa very sciousness,the Leninist conception of
useful survey of the various recent trade union consciousness,the Engels-
attemptsto apply sociologicaltheory to Lenin theory of labour aristocracyand
the analysisof nineteenthcenturyvoting the sociologicalnotions of social struc-
behaviour, and a cogent critique of ture and social controlcan only be tied
John Vincent's interesting attempt to togetherin a dogmaticway. The silences
apply a Dahrendorfianapproach to of the book on certain obvious poirlts,
mid-nineteenthcentury voting patterns despitea massiveapparatusof empirical
in Pollbooks,How the VictoriansVoted, research, would also appear to be a
Cambridge,I967. But his own approach result of the mistakenfashionin which
basedprimarilyon Weber,whichdefines the problemof the relationbetweenhis-
classas materialinterests,while aligning tory and theorywas initially conceived.
consciousnesswith the immaterial'cul- I have examinedsome of theseproblems
tural politics'of status is precludedby in a review article, 'ClassStruggIeand
thisframeworkfromprovidinga coherent the Industrial Revolution', New Left
explanationof the political significance Review,go, I 975.
of industrialconflictduring the period. I 3. It is intended that these papers
The formationby the bulk of the or- will be published,eitherin bookformor
ganisedworkingclassof a politicalparty as a specialnumberof the HistoryWork-
of its own is thus treated as a purely shopjrournal.Also for an approach or
electoral phenomenon,which new lib- similar lines, see Goran Therborn,
eralismbut forWorldWar I wouldhave Science, ClassandSociety:on theFormation
prevented. of Sociologyand HistoricalMaterialism,
8. See for example, H. J. Dyos and London,N.L.B., I976.

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