South African Monitor 9 - 2018 To 2019

South African Monitor
Assessing and Promoting Civil and Minority Rights in South Africa
Report IX
End 2018 & Beginning 2019
The ANC’s “toxic legacy”,

factional struggles and a
renewed hybrid regime
Assessing and Promoting Civil and Minority Rights in South Africa
RReport IX – End 2018 & Beginning 2019

The ANC’s “toxic legacy”, factional struggles and a renewed hybrid regime
Report researched and compiled by
Dr Heinrich Matthee
Commissioned by South African Monitor
SA Monitor2018 .indd 1 4/11/2019 3:22:19 PM

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South African Monitor aims to assess and promote civil rights in general and minority rights in particular
in South Africa. It provides reliable information on relevant events, analyses significant developments and
signals new emerging trends.
Focus areas include:
• Key dynamics of the executive;

• Democracy and the legislature;
• Order, the judiciary and the rule of law;
• Group relations and group rights;
• Freedom of expression, privacy and the media;
• Socio-economic rights and obligations;
• The political risks to business.
Reports, of which this is the ninth edition, portray the current state of civil and minority rights in South
Africa. All reports can be downloaded free of charge from the website, www.sa-monitor.com.
The website also provides you with an opportunity to subscribe to future updates, as well as download
auxiliary documents and articles relevant to the above-mentioned focus areas.

www.sa-monitor.com
[email protected]
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Table of Contents
List of abbreviations....................................................................................................................................... 8
Executive summary.........................................................................................................................................11
— Key dimensions of the current order.................................................................................................................. 13
— Hybrid regime..................................................................................................................................................... 15
— Some consequences........................................................................................................................................... 16
Part I: “Toxic legacy taints ANC”..................................................................................................................... 19

— A major change in foreign media reporting on the ANC..................................................................................... 19
— “Time to ditch Mandela’s party”: The Zuma era................................................................................................ 21
— Ideas have consequences................................................................................................................................... 22
— New paradigms needed to understand the ANC’s hybrid regime....................................................................... 22
Part II: Violent crime, partisan protection and food insecurity...............................................................................24

— Weak fulfilment of the government’s security function..................................................................................... 25
— Fearful citizens in a putative democracy............................................................................................................. 26
— The impact of major crime on business.............................................................................................................. 27
— Nativism and violent expropriation.................................................................................................................... 27
— Farm murders: Violent crime and rural terrorism............................................................................................... 29
— Strangling rural stability and economies............................................................................................................. 30
— Weakening rural economies............................................................................................................................... 31
— Farm murders lead to a serious loss of job opportunities.................................................................................. 31
— Farm murders damage rural socio-economic orders.......................................................................................... 32
— Farm murders weaken the multiplier effect....................................................................................................... 32
— Farm murders hasten the onset of food insecurity............................................................................................ 33
— The political refusal of protection....................................................................................................................... 33
Part III: A shrinking social contract and a multipolar field of authority..................................................................35

— Partisan privileging............................................................................................................................................. 35
— Racial nationalism and the ANC.......................................................................................................................... 36
— Ethnic politics in the ANC.................................................................................................................................... 37
— New prominent sources of symbolic legitimation.............................................................................................. 38
— Coalitions with traditional authorities and local strongmen.............................................................................. 39
— A shrinking social contract and indigenous cultural groups................................................................................ 40
— New forms of political racism?........................................................................................................................... 41
— ANC breaking the negotiated settlement of 1994.............................................................................................. 42
— A new social contract excluding some citizens................................................................................................... 43
— Middle-class emigration and brain drain............................................................................................................ 44
— An increase in self-help initiatives and authority migration............................................................................... 45
— A multipolar future order................................................................................................................................... 47
Part IV: The shift to a hybrid regime.................................................................................................................48

— From a flawed democracy to a hybrid regime.................................................................................................... 48
— Drivers of a hybrid regime.................................................................................................................................. 49
— ANC intolerance of dissenting views................................................................................................................... 50
— ANC politics “eats the state”............................................................................................................................... 52
— Neopatrimonial factions competing for spoils.................................................................................................... 53
— Party-state separation, cadre deployment and patronage................................................................................. 54
— Patronage politics............................................................................................................................................... 55
— Reshaping markets and the democratic playing field......................................................................................... 55
— Smears of racism against political opponents or economic rivals...................................................................... 56
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Part V: Factional struggles and Ramaphosa’s challenges......................................................................................58

— Intertwined legal and illegal domains................................................................................................................. 58
— Presidentialism and the executive...................................................................................................................... 59
— A deal to elect Ramaphosa?............................................................................................................................... 60
— Political mirrors and the circulation of elites...................................................................................................... 61
— Security agencies to reposition themselves........................................................................................................ 62
— Partisan law enforcement actions?..................................................................................................................... 62
— A fluid transition................................................................................................................................................. 64
— Weakened democratic institutions..................................................................................................................... 65
Part VI: The legislature, elections and violent politics ........................................................................................ 67

— A one-party dominant state................................................................................................................................ 67
— A political culture of impunity............................................................................................................................ 68
— The non-alternation of power in a hybrid regime............................................................................................... 68
— The national elections of 2014........................................................................................................................... 69
— A hybrid regime resting on 35% of eligible voters?............................................................................................ 71
— Local elections.................................................................................................................................................... 71
— ANC to remain in power beyond 2019................................................................................................................ 72
— Political assassinations in a hybrid regime.......................................................................................................... 73
— A climate of fear.................................................................................................................................................. 74
— Threats to provincial and national politicians too............................................................................................... 74
Part VII: The role of politicized security services................................................................................................. 76

— Securitizing politics............................................................................................................................................. 77
— Using state security against civil society watchdogs........................................................................................... 78
— ANC cadre deployment and parallel security networks...................................................................................... 79
— Securocrats to remain powerful......................................................................................................................... 80

Part VIII: The justice system and the judiciary.................................................................................................... 82
— Legal command and rent extraction by ANC cadres........................................................................................... 83
— A politically constrained judiciary?..................................................................................................................... 84
— The judiciary’s agency......................................................................................................................................... 85
Part IX: Universities, the media and attempts at ANC control.................................................................................86

— Pressures on the autonomy of universities......................................................................................................... 86
— Rebellious constituencies................................................................................................................................... 88
— Failed education policies..................................................................................................................................... 89
— Media freedom under pressure.......................................................................................................................... 91
— Strained relations between the ANC and critical journalists.............................................................................. 93
Part X: ANC policies and economic value destruction.............................................................................................95

— Economic value destruction................................................................................................................................ 95
— Political intervention and selective patronage.................................................................................................... 96
— State-owned enterprises (SOEs)......................................................................................................................... 98
— Staggering unemployment and budget pressures.............................................................................................. 99
— Bad business perceptions of the ANC government............................................................................................ 99
— EU businesses concerned about ANC policies.................................................................................................. 100
— Domestic business: Increased distrust and divestment.................................................................................... 101
— Ramaphosa’s limping policy reach.................................................................................................................... 102
— The need to tread carefully............................................................................................................................... 103
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Part XI: The threat to property and investor rights.............................................................................................105

— ANC weakened European investor protection.................................................................................................. 105
— Weakened property rights................................................................................................................................ 107
— Constitutional Court neutralized property rights clause in Constitution..........................................................108
— Disempowered international and South African property owners...................................................................108
— Creeping state ownership in the mining and energy sectors............................................................................ 109
— Increased state ownership and control of the lucrative security industry........................................................111
Part XII: Expropriation without compensation and weaker civil rights..................................................................... 112
— The ANC turns to expropriation without compensation................................................................................... 112
— Racial populism to divert attention from ANC failures..................................................................................... 113
— How will European policymakers and foreign investors respond?...................................................................114
— Economic risks and food insecurity................................................................................................................... 115
— Future scenarios point to lower capital formation........................................................................................... 116
— Infringing civil rights and strengthening the hybrid regime.............................................................................. 116
Part XIII: Foreign patrons, factional struggles and anti-Western rhetoric.............................................................. 118
— Greater reliance on non-Western patrons........................................................................................................ 119
— Looking to China for symbolic and economic leadership.................................................................................. 119
— Voting against human rights measures at the UN............................................................................................ 120
— Choosing Russia against “US sponsored destabilisation”................................................................................. 121
— Anti-Western bias and paranoia....................................................................................................................... 122
— A new Cold War in Africa?................................................................................................................................ 123
— Leaving the International Criminal Court (ICC)................................................................................................. 124
— Anti-Western reflexes?..................................................................................................................................... 126
Part XIV: The political risks to business in the next two years...............................................................................127
Part XV: Rebuilding the private sector and sustainable communities.......................................................................130
About the author..........................................................................................................................................135
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List of Abbreviations
AA - Affirmative Action
ACMS - African Centre for Migration and Society
AFRICOM - United States Africa Command
AG - Auditor General
ANC - African National Congress
AU - African Union
AZAPO - Azanian People’s Organisation
BASA - Banking Association of South Africa
BBBEE - Broad-based Black Economic Empowerment
BEE - Black Economic Empowerment
BITS - Bilateral Investment Treaties
BLF - Black First Land First
BRICS - Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
CASE - Community Agency for Social Enquiry
CEO - Chief Executive Officer
CERD - United Nations’ Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
CIA - Central Intelligence Agency (US)
CID - Crime Intelligence Division
COPE - Congress of the People
COSATU - Congress of South African Trade Unions
CR - Cyril Ramaphosa
DA - Democratic Alliance
DDR - German Democratic Republic
DTI - Department of Trade and Industry
ED(S) - Editor(s)
EFF - Economic Freedom Fighters
EOSA - Enterprise Observatory of South Africa
ESKOM - Electricity Supply Commission
EU - European Union
FBI - Federal Bureau of Investigation (US)
FDI - Foreign Direct Income
FIFA - International Federation of Association Football
FSVTS - Russian Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation
GATS - General Agreement on Trade in Services
GCI - Global Competitiveness Index
GDP - Gross Domestic Product
GDR - German Democratic Republic
GIBS - Gordon Institute of Business Science
GIGA - German Institute of Global and Area Studies
HSRC - Human Sciences Research Council
ICASA - Independent Communication Authority of South Africa
ICC - International Criminal Court
IDASA - Institute for a Democratic Alternative for South Africa
IEC - Independent Electoral Commission
IFC - International Finance Corporation
IFP - Inkatha Freedom Party
IMF - International Monetary Fund
IRR - Institute for Race Relations (formerly known as the SAIRR)
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ISS - Institute for Security Studies

JSC - Judicial Services Commission
KGB - Committee for State Security (Russia)
MEC - Member of the Executive Council
MIT - Massachusetts Institute of Technology
MK - Umkhonto we Sizwe
MP - Member of Parliament
MPLA - The People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola
MPRDA - Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act, 2002
NDC - National Deployment Committee
NDP - National Development Plan
NDR - National Democratic Revolution
NEC - National Executive Committee
NGC - National General Council
NGO - Non-Governmental Organization
NIA - National Intelligence Agency
NIDS - National Income Dynamics Study
NP - National Party
NPA - National Prosecuting Authority
NWC - National Working Committee
PAC - Pan Africanist Congress of Azania
PIRLS - Progress in International Reading and Literacy Study
PPIB - Promotion and Protection of Investment Bill, 2013
PRCA - Public Relations and Communications Association (UK)
R2K - Right2Know Campaign
RSF - Reporters Without Borders
SA - South Africa
SAA - South African Airways
SABC - South African Broadcasting Corporation
SACCI - South African Chamber of Commerce and Industry
SACP - South African Communist Party
SADC - Southern Africa Development Council
SADTU - South African Democratic Teachers Union
SAFRI - Southern Africa Initiative of German Business
SAHRC - South African Human Rights Commission
SAIRR - South African Institute for Race Relations (now known as the IRR)
SANEF - South African National Editors’ Forum
SANDF - South African National Defence Force
SANRAL - South African National Roads Agency
SAPS - South African Police Service
SARS - South African Revenue Service
SC - Senior Counsel
SIA - Security Industry Alliance
SOE - South African State-Owned Enterprise
SONA - State of the Nation Address
SSA - State Security Agency
STATS SA - Statistics South Africa
SWAPO - South West African People’s Organisation
TIMMS - Trends in International Maths and Science Study
UCT - University of Cape Town
UDF - United Democratic Front
UK - United Kingdom
UKZN - University of KwaZulu-Natal
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UN - United Nations
US / USA - United States of America
WTO - World Trade Organisation
ZANU-PF - Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front
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The ANC’s “toxic

legacy”, factional
struggles and a
renewed hybrid regime
political and economic reforms, will remain heavily
Executive summary constrained in the next few years.
Ramaphosa’s limited reach: This report covers There are three major constraints: first, there is a
the main dynamics during the period 2014-2018, limited state capability that would take years to
but with attention to Cyril Ramaphosa’s first year rebuild, due to the longer-term impact of a decade
as president in 2018. of economic value destruction and institutional
decay under the African National Congress (ANC),
The replacement of President Jacob Zuma (2009- and as the population has grown by 20% since the
2018) by Cyril Ramaphosa initially resulted in ANC had taken over power in 1994. Secondly, a
overoptimistic expectations among some media. new symbolic and political order in the shape of a
This report shows that Ramaphosa’s ability to hybrid regime will drive the incentive systems and
move beyond rhetoric to actual longer-term
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rules of the game within which even Ramaphosa for Ramaphosa to curb some of the worst abuses
will have to operate. Thirdly, the ANC on which and cases of corruption. He may even be able
power rests, is deeply factionalized and likely to implement moderate economic reforms.
remain so.
However, Ramaphosa will be leading an ANC
Ramaphosa a co-founder of the hybrid regime: deeply divided and factionalized, with resistance
In the past decade, several key forces and drivers to his incumbency and with his opponents inside
have reached a critical mass and have combined to the ANC enjoying Zuma’s support and strong
form a new political order in South Africa, namely local support bases. Under him, reforms and
a hybrid regime. Under the presidency of Zuma, anti-corruption measures may periodically aim
Cyril Ramaphosa was deputy president (2014- to strengthen the position and opportunities
2018) during the period of worst power abuse of Ramaphosa’s faction, or to weaken those of
and corruption. During Zuma’s presidency, the political opponents, rather than advancing more
locus of politics finally shifted from accountable general interests.
democratic institutions to a field of power in which
weak democratic institutions and non-democratic The current ANC NEC, Ramaphosa’s own support
institutions interact. network, his government’s cabinet and the
dominant forces in the civil and security forces are
This new hybrid regime has effectively replaced also still strongly permeated by non-accountable,
the liberal democratic constitutional order, built non-pluralist and neopatrimonial dynamics. This
on the consensus between the ANC of Nelson state of affairs is reflected in Ramaphosa himself
Mandela, business and the National Party (NP) of being willing to publicly embrace Zuma as part of
F.W. de Klerk in the mid-1990s. As Zuma’s deputy the ANC and the ANC’s election campaign in 2019,
president, Ramaphosa did not actively oppose despite Zuma’s record of incredible power abuse
this shift to a hybrid regime and in fact played an and corruption.
important role in implementing it.
Unexpected shifts and high political risk: As
Ramaphosa has been a member of the ANC’s predicted in the South African Monitor reports
National Executive Committee (NEC) since 2007, of the past four years, business in South Africa
and from 2014 to 2018 had also been in charge remains exposed to significant political risks
of the important ANC National Deployment and uncertain or unpleasant economic policies.
Committee (NDC). The committee implemented Factional struggles within the ANC and between
the ANC’s cadre deployment, its penetration of the ANC and opposition groups will continue to
many domains of the civil service and its weakening generate political turbulence in the next few years.
of the separation of powers, constitutional checks The risk of local flashpoints of intergroup tensions,
and balances, as well as the rule of law. He bears mediatized and abused for political agitation, has
co-responsibility for the years of institutional and risen in many towns and townships in a context
economic value destruction by ANC policies. of ANC misgovernance, a struggling economy and
scapegoat politics.
As the Zuma era demonstrated, the weakened
democratic elements in the hybrid regime are Unexpected major shifts and unforeseen high-
now subject to the whims of the powerful impact events are possible, as has already happened
presidency and entrenched one-party dominant in various forms: the Ramaphosa government’s
rule. Fortunately, there now are several foreign decision in 2018 to promote expropriation without
and domestic incentives for Ramaphosa, already compensation, the electricity and water crises due
a rich businessman, to try and combat the worst to government mismanagement, political protests
corruption and abuses of the Zuma era. and assassinations linked to elections, xenophobic
attacks, destructive student unrest, and actions
A divided and factionalized ANC power base: by the Zuma government that triggered negative
Ramaphosa will aim to increase the regime’s responses by international financial markets
support and reach, and his style and rhetoric will during the period 2015-2017.
be different. As a successor to the most corrupt
ANC leader in office to date, it should be possible International business, cultural and education
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actors, as well as NGOs are advised to take three political assassinations also form part of the new
steps: first, to institute rigorous and robust risk rules of the game, the incentive systems and the
mitigation measures in South Africa; secondly, positioning of actors in dealing with political claims,
to review the timing, form and extent of planned counter-claims and contestation. It is unlikely
new investments and activities in South Africa; that President Ramaphosa, with weakened state
thirdly, to also consider alternative opportunities capabilities, will be able to significantly change
outside South Africa. If considering activities in these dynamics.
South Africa, such actors should pay renewed
attention to two important generators of stability State rests on new coalitions: The third key
and prosperity: the private business sector and dimension is a new, more volatile and fragmented
institutions for sustainable communities in South basis of the state’s authority and power. The
Africa. bureaucracy’s capacity remains limited and
becomes less efficient in service delivery to a
New paradigm needed to understand the diverse and 20% larger population than in 1994. In
future: Many media and analysts have clung to an effort to maintain or regain some control, the
assessments that underestimated the impact of ANC government and its factions are reshaping the
non-democratic, factional and neopatrimonial political order around different local strongmen
dynamics in post-1994 South Africa. As a result, and deals, relationships and settlements. Also
serious risks to business, citizens and communities under Ramaphosa, the ANC government’s active
have been ignored, rationalized away, or realignment with traditional authorities and
minimized. In contrast, the framework of analysis adoption of some radical socialist policies of the
here has provided accurate early warning for Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), a breakaway
several years about the crises currently emerging, from the ANC, are especially noticeable.
the underlying dynamics, as well as the political
opportunities and risks to business. Shrinking social contract: The fourth key
dimension is that the new political order also
promotes a shrinking social contract. The ANC,
Key dimensions of the current order sometimes in conjunction with breakaway groups
like the EFF, or new parties based on former ANC
Shift to a hybrid regime: The first key dimension factions, is driving a stratified and exclusivist
of the new order has been a shift to a hybrid project of nation-building. This project privileges
regime under Jacob Zuma’s ANC since 2009. The some groups of citizens above others, diverging
locus of politics has shifted from accountable from Mandela’s stated goal of neither white
democratic institutions to a field of power in nor black domination in a population of eleven
which weak democratic institutions and non- cultural groups.
democratic institutions interact. It is unlikely that
these dynamics will significantly change during Ironically, the period of this exclusivist project has
the first term of president Cyril Ramaphosa also been the one in which the institutional capital
(2018-present), whose sources of potential for a prosperous multicultural democracy and a
power remains a heavily factionalized ANC and successful model of African liberation has been
a bureaucracy permeated by corruption and squandered. State corruption and unemployment
shrunken capabilities. skyrocketed and the reliance on foreign patrons
grew. The previously strong economy was
Oligopoly of violence: The second key dimension downgraded to junk status or just above junk
is an oligopoly of violence instead of the state’s status, and professionals from all communities
monopoly of violence. South Africa’s violent started emigrating at a previously unheard-of rate.
crime and murder rate now approximates those
of conflict zones. After 25 years of one-party Both the scope and the nature of the relationship
dominant rule, the ANC government clearly does between the governing party and the diverse
not consider a restoration of the security of citizens population have changed. Links and mutual
and businesses to be a state priority. Elections still obligations between some groups and those in
occur. However, intimidation, threats of violence, power, as well as patron-client relationships,
rehearsals for violence, violent protests, and even dominate their understanding of rights and
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entitlements. They also dominate their However, as is visible in the xenophobic tensions
understanding of the South African state, which and attacks, and ANC responses to it since 2008,
is no longer seen as first of all being rooted in the nativist discourse excludes not only indigenous
citizenship, in impartial service delivery, in the Western and Asian Africans, but also foreign
Constitution, and in loyalty to other citizens. Africans and Asians.
Under Zuma, the relationship eventually During the Zuma presidency, Deputy President
included re-racialized politics and authoritarian Ramaphosa did not actively oppose this trend.
and ethnic dynamics in the ANC. Ramaphosa Since he has come to power, Angie Moshekga,
has unfortunately reinforced this approach by the minister of Basic Education, has confirmed
focusing land expropriation policies on white that such symbolic de-Westernization continues
farmers, although farmers from other groups to be a mainstay of education policies. It serves
would also be affected, and by indicating that as a mobilizing tool and to divert attention from
government policies would privilege the political the largely defective South African education
constituencies supporting the ANC. system after 25 years of ANC rule, which has been
unable to prepare huge numbers of citizens for
Non-pluralist exclusion of opponents and the demands of a sophisticated and challenging
minorities: The fifth key feature is a limited job market and world economy.
responsiveness as far as the claims or needs of
political opposition groups and some smaller Resource appropriation: The seventh key
ethnic groups are concerned. This relationship dimension of the new political order is a different
with the diverse population differs from the conception of property rights and the conditions
inclusive non-racialism of the Mandela era. It also of wealth, which often clashes with the existing
serves to legitimize government actions and to liberal Constitution. The selective economic
divert attention from failures in service delivery empowerment of politically-connected actors,
and government performance by scapegoat mismanagement and widespread unproductive
politics. “politics of the belly” have hollowed out state
capabilities and resulted in a weakening of key
The ANC government presents its approach as economic capabilities. The ability of the economy
the sole approach to African liberation in South to ensure a successful model of African liberation
Africa, excluding or silencing other more inclusive, or African modernity for all citizens has been
democratic, federal and social enterprise-based significantly weakened, as Ramaphosa himself
models of African liberation. Its shrinking social admitted.
contract reinforces the limited and partisan
protection of citizens. It also legitimizes scapegoat Policies increasingly aim at gaining access to and
politics by government and non-government control over the socio-economic formations of
actors. During the Zuma presidency, Deputy some indigenous and foreign minority cultural
President Ramaphosa did not actively oppose this groups. The nativist symbolic discourse interacts
trend, and it remains to be seen whether he will with this process and sometimes serves as its
significantly change this approach. legitimization. Both greed and grievance interact.
This dynamic, identified in South African Monitor
Symbolic de-Westernization: The sixth key for several years already, has now become
dimension is the peaceful or violent promotion manifest in the ANC’s policy of expropriation
of de-Westernization in the symbolic domain, without compensation.
political institutions, as well as in academic
institutions. Ironically, the discourses of symbolic Pro-Chinese foreign policy: The eighth key
de-Westernization and post-colonialism often dimension is a foreign policy that clearly privileged
aim at gaining control over Western material China and Russia during the Zuma presidency,
structures and assets, often generated by citizens while being neutral or less favourable to Western
who are political opponents. Nativist identity powers. In addition, an interventionist and
discourses and new combinations of Christianity developmental state and ANC-aligned business
and indigenous African religion are increasingly actors are much more evident in economic
prominent in the domestic symbolic domain. diplomacy and various forms of protectionism.
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Under Ramaphosa, it is expected that China, where democratic and non-accountable actors
rather than Russia, may be privileged, at least and processes interact. This hybrid regime could
initially. Domestic short-term political priorities remain in place for years, irrespective of whether
will probably often be prioritized above Western Zuma, Ramaphosa, or another ANC president is in
foreign direct investment. power.
Self-help initiatives and authority migration: One-party dominance and state capture: One
The ninth key feature is the limited, but robust non-accountable factor is the ANC as a ruling party
evolution of capacity and self-help initiatives after 25 years in a one-party dominant state. It has
within cities, communities, and the private sector. a non-pluralist political culture. Through its policy
This feature will involve authority migration and of cadre deployment, it has captured most state
shape the new political order. institutions and watered down the separation
of powers. State institutions are now largely
Between a modular and a mediated state: politically partisan, and the arena of factional
The new political order already constitutes an struggles.
asymmetric modular state. Organizations and
institutions that do not form part of the central Uneven electoral and economic playing fields: The
state fulfil several state functions in different ways ANC’s capture of the state has allowed the party
in some areas or communities. Although the ANC to become as important a gatekeeper to power as
government theoretically has the capacity to fulfil elections, if not more important. It has expanded
at least some of these functions, it accepts this its hold on key constituencies and the market, also
modular state as part of its governance model. through selective patronage and crony capitalism.
Both the electoral and the economic playing fields
In some areas of South Africa, the dynamics of have been made uneven.
self-help initiatives and authority migration may in
time evolve into a mediated state. In such zones, Limited participation: In elections there has
“rule of the intermediaries” will act as substitute been a marked decline in the registration and
for the rule of the central state. The government participation of eligible voters since 1994. In the
will accept this situation and try to align with these 2014 national elections, the ANC only attracted
actors, not voluntarily, but based on necessity. an estimated 35% of eligible voters’ support,
compared to 54% in 1994. The participation rate
of eligible voters in the local elections of 2016
Hybrid regime was approximately 42%. High levels of emigration
by skilled professionals, managers, upper and
This report finds that during President Jacob middle-class families from all communities at
Zuma’s rule (2009-2018), South Africa moved least partly reflect ANC misgovernance and the
from a flawed democracy to a hybrid regime. This lack of responsiveness to citizens by the existing
transformation is partly reflected in a major shift institutions. A high number of protests constitute
in the international media’s reportage on ANC rule forms of political competition aimed at gaining
since 1994. Current President Cyril Ramaphosa access to power and wealth outside elections.
did not actively oppose this shift during his time
as vice-president under Zuma (2014-2018). It is Unaccountable presidentialism: Another
possible that he will be able to institute limited driver of the hybrid regime is an unaccountable
reform to prevent the worst abuses of such a presidentialism that has exceeded the
system from occurring, but it is considered highly constitutional bounds of the office. For years,
unlikely that he would be able to fundamentally President Jacob Zuma had been held accountable
change the hybrid system as such. by neither his party, nor Parliament in a one-
party dominant state. The media and institutions
New locus of politics: In South Africa’s hybrid like the public protector were unable to identify
regime, the incentive systems and the rules of and admonish examples hereof. However, the
the political game have changed. The locus of democratic checks and balances were unable to
politics is not in the legislature or elections. The restrain the executive. Ramaphosa has further
locus of politics has moved to a field of power increased his political room for manoeuvring by
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promoting a change to the Constitution regarding democratic decline in the next few years: they
property rights. It seems unlikely at present that are intensified factional competition in the run-
he will replicate Zuma’s abuses, but the checks up to the national elections in 2019, a rise in
and balances of the system will remain too weak protest politics and intra-ANC positioning; the
to keep the executive president completely further politicization of the security forces and
accountable. securitization of politics to prop up presidential
rule; as well as the weak and highly inequal
The securitization of politics: The securitization of economy and more limited state resources, while
politics has become a trend in the hybrid regime. the fast-growing population does not experience
A long-standing non-pluralist political culture the solid education or job opportunities needed
in the ANC, combined with increased factional for stabilization.
struggles over positions, access to resources and
opportunities within the ANC and its allies, will
reinforce this development. While Ramaphosa Some consequences
is not a securocrat like Zuma, suspicion and fear
Continued factional struggles: The hybrid regime
will continue to set the tone in the inner circles of
could remain relatively stable. However, factional
power in the near term. This will not necessarily
struggles inside the ANC already increased in the
be visible to the thousands of tourists and
run-up to the 2017 ANC leadership alternation
businesspeople visiting South Africa.
and will continue to play a role at local, provincial
and national politics in the run-up to the 2019
Protests and assassinations: Politics in the hybrid
national elections and thereafter. Unexpected
regime has also acquired a non-democratic tenor,
major political shifts and unforeseen high-impact
often involving limited respect for civil rights,
events resulting from these struggles remain
intimidation and violence. Widespread protests,
possible.
often violent, have been used by communities
and segments of the citizenry as part of intra-
Uncertain or unpleasant economic policies:
ANC struggles over spoils and to gain government
Economic policy swings and delays due to the
benefits. Political protests and assassinations
infighting between different factions will continue
have become an institutionalised part of local
in the next few years. Policy uncertainty will be
political alternation, again illustrated by twenty
experienced most by companies in sectors most
political killings before, during and after the local
exposed to the government’s political priorities
elections of 2016. However, the risk of political
or regulatory and licensing power. Minerals,
assassinations now clearly extends to provincial
energy, security, agriculture, telecoms and
and national politicians, as well as bureaucrats.
pharmaceuticals would be among these sectors.
Opaque decision-making: Opaque decision-
More state interventionism: The ANC has
making, linked to patron-client relations, now
proceeded with several regulations, policy
permeate the executive and bureaucracy. The
initiatives, bills and laws regarding investor
judiciary and media remain spaces of freedom,
protection, expropriation, mining and energy,
but are under pressure.
the security industry, affirmative action and
empowerment issues, land, intellectual property
Democratic decline: The interaction of the above-
and patents, as well as foreign investors in general.
mentioned forces has created a distinctive hybrid
The common underlying policy in all of these is the
regime. They have resulted in democratic decline
same: they greatly increase the ANC government’s
and transformed the political rules of the game,
interventionist powers in the economy and
institutions and incentive systems in South Africa.
provide potential sources for patronage.
The beautiful landscapes, vibrant communities
and business opportunities of South Africa are still
Weaker property rights: Planned and actual
present, but these dynamics will dominate daily
measures will weaken property rights and reduce
politics in the near and medium term.
private-sector autonomy, which would strengthen
the position of crony capitalists with links to ANC
Three drivers: Unfortunately, three drivers will
factions, compared to other businesses. The ANC
reinforce the dynamics of a hybrid regime and
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policy of expropriation without compensation likely to remain high or sometimes even rise.
will affect urban and rural property rights and This state of affairs will continue to have an effect
will strengthen the discretionary power of ANC in many areas of service delivery, such as the
leaders and officials. Attempted land grabs, illegal security of citizens and farmers, electricity supply,
occupations and rent-payer boycotts are also likely water management, waste management, roads,
to remain a phenomenon, depending on the area. education and postal services, and others that
may arise. The impact will differ per province and
Looking for new resources: The high levels of locality, with pockets of adequate or good service
state debt and the needs of the ANC’s patronage delivery in provinces and local areas.
networks will drive efforts to look for new sources
of income, both domestically and internationally. Labour unrest: Factions within trade unions and
The value of some state-run corporations, but also trade unions will compete intensely with each
other assets or opportunities of which it should other for members, networks, power, status and
be the public custodian, could be capitalized or resources. As a result, labour unrest will be a
mortgaged. Beneficiation requirements may also major risk during the next few years. Due to the
be emphasized. Sometimes this will have a knock- context in which it will be occurring, the potential
on impact on existing government undertakings politicization of disputes could occur fast and
towards business. could assume militant forms.
International ANC fundraising: The search for new Local flashpoints: The risk of local flashpoints of
sources of income will coincide with an increased intergroup tensions, mediatized and abused for
effort at economic diplomacy, both formally and political agitation, has risen in many towns and
informally. The diplomacy will be couched in the townships in a context of ANC misgovernance, a
rhetoric of branding, using South Africa’s many struggling economy and scapegoat politics. They
and unquestioned opportunities. However, the may have an unforeseen impact on business
actual results would at least partially strengthen people, assets and operations.
the presidential and partisan ANC networks in
the hybrid regime, rather than the South African Opportunity cost: Many attractive business
state, communities and citizens as a whole. opportunities remain in South Africa. Businesses
and NGOs with a high risk appetite will remain
Integrity and reputational risks: Factional involved or become active in South Africa.
struggles for scarce resources will drive efforts to However, due to the increased political risk of the
increase state income through these measures hybrid regime, some actors will also consider the
and others, which may be more indirect and opportunity cost when comparing South Africa to
informal. Unaccountable presidentialism, local big other markets.
men and patron-client networks will play a role
in this regard. There are different business and Entrepreneurship training a priority: Under the
legal codes of conduct in different jurisdictions; ANC government, parts of the education sector
international business is advised to heed best have become among the worst in the world,
practices regarding integrity and reputational risk. while the autonomy of others is threatened.
International business may find it worthwhile to
Favouritism to some foreign patrons: The conduct corporate social responsibility projects
factional search for more resources in the hybrid that focus on entrepreneurship training and
regime will result in an increased dependency on business education. If the projects involve
foreign patrons like China, Russia or other political cooperation between foreign and South African
and business actors. Foreign patrons may also institutions of public education, strict criteria and
become involved in intra-ANC factional struggles. monitoring to reinforce the remaining spaces of
The field of competitors and the importance of academic freedom are recommended in policy-
specific competitive advantages of business may relevant education and research. However, it is
change suddenly. recommended that business and NGOs focus
on projects involving private and community
Uneven service delivery: The levels of visible education institutions.
state mismanagement and operational risk are
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There is a limited but robust evolution of capacity

and self-help initiatives within cities, communities,
and the private sector. This trend will involve an
authority migration over time which will shape
the new political order. Business and NGOs are
advised to identify potential partners and to use
the opportunities involved.
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Part I
“Toxic legacy taints ANC”
reports on ANC rule during the period covered. In

A major change in foreign media 1994, foreign media praised the coming to power
reporting on the ANC of the ANC under Nelson Mandela. During the
past few years, however, mainstream media in
This report covers the main dynamics during Europe and the United States (US) have become
the period 2014-2018, during which time Jacob much more critical.
Zuma was president and Cyril Ramaphosa his
deputy president. However, it pays attention to The New York Times published an opinion piece
Ramaphosa’s first year as president (2018). There on 12 December 2017, entitled “Jacob Zuma and
has been a major change in the tenor of media the Theft of South Africa”, in which Ivor Chipkin
writes:
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A decade of President Jacob Zuma’s leadership There is an understandable relief at the end of the
has seen Africa’s oldest liberation movement Zuma era and the victory of Cyril Ramaphosa at the
become a caricature of corruption and ANC leadership election conference in December
factionalism.1 2017. However, Gareth van Onselen, political
analyst at the liberal Institute for Race Relations
The Wall Street Journal of 15 December 2017 (IRR), rightly remarks, in an article headed “The
had a report “Killings Shake South Africa’s Ruling greatest trick the ANC ever pulled”:
Party Ahead of Leadership Contest: At least 40
ANC politicians have died violently since last year, The ANC has mesmerised its supporters to
raising questions about the party of Mandela’s forget the horrors it has wrought on South
future; ‘like a pig that is eating its own piglets’.”2 Africa, and see only the new leader with his
The New York Times of 30 September 2018 promises.7
published a report headed “Hit Men and Power:
South Africa’s Leaders Are Killing One Another”, In many media commentaries, Ramaphosa’s own
and stating that contribution to the current state of affairs as
deputy president and senior ANC decision maker
remains under-analyzed or ignored. However, his
the recent increase in killings inside the current performance is being watched closely. The
ANC is a potent reminder of how far the New York Times of 23 January 2019 reported:
party has strayed from creating, in the For now, several political allies of Mr Zuma who
ashes of apartheid, a political order 3
have long been accused of corruption serve in
his cabinet or at the highest levels of the party.
based on the rule of law. And Mr Ramaphosa’s own government has
Thomson Reuters published an interview on 14 been tainted by allegations of the same sort of
November 2018 headed “South Africa’s land self-dealing that led to the ouster of Mr Zuma.
expropriation unnerves investors – World Bank
executive”.4 On 1 January 2019, after almost a year Most prominently, his deputy, David Mabuza,
of the Ramaphosa presidency, The Guardian ran was a longtime leader of a small province
an article by Africa correspondent Jason Burke, where corruption was endemic. Mr Mabuza
headed “Toxic legacy taints ANC as it nears 25- has been accused of siphoning money meant
year rule in South Africa”.5 for education and other services to finance his
meteoric rise in national politics – and deliver
The British Financial Times stated on 4 December the votes that gave Mr Ramaphosa a slim
2017: victory in party elections in December 2017…
Prince Mashele, co-author of The Fall of the ANC In recent years, the ANC, which once inspired
– a best-selling book that one commentator people across Africa and the world, has come
calls a political obituary – says the party is to symbolize deep-rooted corruption. Party
“rotten in its entirety”. But most argue that Mr leaders have stolen tens of billions of dollars
Ramaphosa could curb the worse excess of the meant to lift up poor black South Africans.
Zuma years if only by returning to the milder They have gutted key government institutions
corruption of the pre-Zuma years.6 like the tax agency, to gain better access to
1. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/12/opinion/jacob-zuma-gupta-corruption.html.
2. https://www.wsj.com/articles/killings-shake-south-africas-ruling-party-ahead-of-leadership-contest-1513333801.
3. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/30/world/africa/south-africa-anc-killings.html.
4. http://news.trust.org/item/20181114111607-hsjrq/.
5. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jan/01/toxic-legacy-taints-anc-nears-25-year-rule-south-africa.
6. https://www.ft.com/content/1f9e7a32-d5db-11e7-8c9a-d9c0a5c8d5c9.
7. https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/opinion/columnists/2018-01-31-gareth-van-onselen-the-greatest-trick-the-anc-
ever-pulled/.
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government accounts. They have even taken to On 16 December 2015, The Economist’s report on
eliminating rivals, in Mafia-like assassinations.8 South Africa was entitled “The hollow state”:
Two decades after South Africa’s transition

“Time to ditch Mandela’s party”: to non-racial democracy, its institutions are
The Zuma era being sorely tested by President Jacob Zuma.
Can they hold? A fierce battle is now being
It was during the Zuma era that some Western fought for the survival of that democracy …
media pivoted away from its over-optimistic Yet, after more than two decades in charge, the
reporting on the ANC. Before the May 2014 ANC’s wariness of untrammelled state power
national elections, on 3 May 2014, The Economist has turned into frustration at the checks on
published a report entitled: “Time to ditch it. The party is now undermining some of the
Mandela’s party”. democratic institutions that it fought so hard to
establish …
On 12 October 2013, The Economist had already
written: The distinction between the ruling party and
the state has been eroded. The executive arm
The continent’s biggest democracies, South of government (and its state-owned firms) is
Africa and Nigeria, have not lately been a being corroded into incompetence by corruption
compelling advertisement for representative and cronyism. Independent bodies meant to
government. South Africa, ruled by the African safeguard democracy are being subordinated
National Congress since 1994, is in danger of ... The challenge for democrats will be to
becoming a de facto one-party state.9 protect the independence of the courts and
what remains of other institutions. Mr Zuma
The Canadian Globe and Mail of 21 February has shown an inclination to wreck them. Unless
2014 stated at the end of President Jacob Zuma’s checked, the danger is that when he goes he will
first term in office: “After Mandela, South Africa leave only the husk of a democracy behind.12
has fallen into a leadership vacuum”.10 The new
trend continued in 2014 and 2015 during Zuma’s “Ein toxischer Präsident” (“A toxic president”) was
second term, when Cyril Ramaphosa served as the heading in a report in Tagesanzeiger on 19
his deputy president. “The political crisis in South January 2016.13 On 3 November 2016, its headline
Africa: Country without leadership”, reported Der was “South Africa’s bought government”.14
Tagesspiegel on 5 June 2015.11 However, the ANC as a party, which accepted
Zuma’s leadership for many years, was also
8. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/23/world/africa/south-africa-corruption.html.
9. https://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21587787-too-many-dinosaurs?fsrc=rss.
10. https://www.wsj.com/articles/south-africas-ruling-anc-loses-its-luster-1378507776; https://www.theglobeandmail.
com/globe-debate/south-africas-post-mandela-malaise/article17008078/. Also see http://www.sz-online.
de/nachrichten/wenig-hoffnung-am-kap-2867042.html; http://www.welt.de/wirtschaft/article129386266/
Suedafrikas-weisse-Elefanten-sind-Brasiliens-Horror.html; http://www.ipg-journal.de/kommentar/artikel/20-jahre-
demokratie-in-suedafrika-ein-land-in-der-krise-369/; http://www.fr-online.de/politik/suedafrika-nach-mandela-
ende-der-euphorie,1472596,26950770.html; http://www.tagesanzeiger.ch/ausland/naher-osten-und-afrika/Am-Kap-
der-unerfuellten-Hoffnungen/story/16237015; http://www.kas.de/suedafrika/de/publications/37569/.
11. https://www.ft.com/content/e6e63754-d964-11e4-8ed9-00144feab7de; “Die politische Krise in Südafrika: Land
ohne Führung, Der Tagesspiegel, 5 Juni 2015.
12. http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21684146-two-decades-after-south-africas-transition-
non-racial-democracy-its.
13. http://www.tagesanzeiger.ch/ausland/naher-osten-und-afrika/ein-toxischer-praesident/story/22710192.
14. https://www.nzz.ch/international/aktuelle-themen/korruptionsskandal-um-praesident-zuma-suedafrikas-gekaufte-
regierung-ld.126230.
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criticized. The heading of Financial Times on Many of the best international media were unable
5 December 2017 was “The Zuma years: the to sufficiently understand political dynamics in
fall from grace of South Africa’s ANC”.15 On 16 2016 to foresee the possibility of a Brexit in the
February 2019 its headline stated: “Jacob Zuma’s United Kingdom (UK) or a Trump presidency in the
exit gives ANC a final chance in South Africa: Now USA. It is to be hoped that such clouded vision will
Cyril Ramaphosa must show the ruling party has not be the case in South Africa too. After all, it is
the capacity to tackle corruption and reduce further away from the main international power
inequality”.16 centres and also of less concern to many Western
and Asian policymakers and public audiences.
Ideas have consequences The position of citizens and communities in
African countries is much more vulnerable than
The international media, European business that of policymakers in far-away and largely
people, some diplomats and some policy think sheltered neighbourhoods. To what degree will
tanks already acknowledge the new dynamics foreign policymakers and international business
of a hybrid regime in South Africa. However, – and academic analysts – acknowledge the new
disincentives to acknowledging democratic dynamics of the ANC’s hybrid regime in South
decline still exist in some circles. Stephen Brown Africa?
states that most sub-Saharan African countries are
neither liberal democracies, nor fully authoritarian.
Officials from Western governments that provide New paradigms needed to
assistance to these hybrid regimes often become
apologists for their lack of democracy. Rather than
understand the ANC’s hybrid regime
cogently enquiring why democracy promotion
The framework of a hybrid regime here has
activities should not be a priority, such donor
provided accurate early warning for several years
officials frequently claim either that their host
about the crises that emerged and the political
country is more democratic than it actually is, or
risks to business. Without a paradigm shift away
that it could not be any more democratic for the
from the anchoring biases of the past, foreign
time being.17
business, NGO and policy-making actors will
be unable to understand events. They will also
Some international media have previously clung
continue to be shocked and caught unprepared by
to frameworks of understanding that completely
the political and economic volatility that continues
underestimated the impact of non-democratic,
in South Africa.18
factional and neopatrimonial dynamics in post-
1994 South Africa. New signals and inflection
In December 2017, the hybrid regime in South
points under President Zuma were squeezed
Africa was acknowledged in a study by Jason
into frameworks anchored in the Mandela era,
Sumich of the German Institute of Global and
which ended already more than eighteen years
Area Studies (GIGA):
ago. As a result, serious risks to business, citizens
and communities were ignored, sugar coated Namibia’s South West African People’s
or denied. The costs thereof are borne by those Organisation (SWAPO) and, especially, South
who believed and acted on overly partisan and Africa’s African National Congress (ANC) were
sometimes very outdated analyses. once symbols of the triumph of democracy
15. https://www.ft.com/content/1f9e7a32-d5db-11e7-8c9a-d9c0a5c8d5c9.
16. https://www.ft.com/content/b4d39db6-1308-11e8-940e-08320fc2a277.
17. Stephen Brown, “‘Well, what can you expect?’: Donor officials’ apologetics for hybrid regimes in Africa”,
Democratization, 18(2), 2011. Also see https://2010sdafrika.wordpress.com/2018/12/10/gtai-analysepapier-zu-
suedafrika/.
18. https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/opinion/columnists/2018-01-18-hilary-joffe-overseas-firms-treading-sas-
minefield-need-to-know-what-the-bombs-look-like/.
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against racist oppression, with the ANC’s former The hybrid regime analysed in this report has
leader, Nelson Mandela, attaining the status its roots in the presidency of Thabo Mbeki
of a secular saint. Over the last two decades, and had become entrenched during the two
though, the ANC and SWAPO seem to have presidential terms of Jacob Zuma. The report
joined Frelimo, the MPLA, and the Zimbabwe proposes, especially in Part V, that Ramaphosa
African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU- may introduce some reforms and curtail some of
PF) as examples of “hybrid regimes”, where the hybrid regime’s worst excesses. However, he
governments combine authoritarian rule with will be unable to bring significant change to the
regular elections. While the political lustre of dynamics of the system.
many dominant-party regimes has become
somewhat tarnished, most, with the exception
of Zimbabwe, have experienced prolonged
periods of economic growth. South Africa,
however, did so at a substantially lower rate
than some others; though, the fall of apartheid
allowed it to consolidate its position as the
regional hegemon.19
19. https://www.giga-hamburg.de/de/publikation/der-langsame-niedergang-der-dominant-party-regimes-im-
suedlichen-afrika.
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Part II
Violent crime, partisan
protection and food
insecurity
The replacement of President Jacob Zuma (2009- rebuild, due to the longer-term impact of a decade
2018) by Cyril Ramaphosa initially resulted in of economic value destruction and institutional
overoptimistic expectations among some media. decay under the ANC, and since the population
However, Ramaphosa’s ability to move beyond has grown by 20% after the ANC had taken over
rhetoric to actual longer-term political and power in 1994. Secondly, a new symbolic and
economic reforms will remain heavily constrained political order in the shape of a hybrid regime
in the next few years. will drive the incentive systems and rules of the
game within which even Ramaphosa will have to
There are three major constraints: First, there is operate. Thirdly, the ANC on which power rests, is
a limited state capability that would take years to deeply factionalized and likely to remain so. The
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ANC’s government inability and unwillingness Violent crime has shaped the new democracy and
to provide better security to its citizens and is also shaping the current hybrid regime. Since
communities reflects all three constraints. 1994, more than 400 000 people have died due
to violent crime and hundreds of thousands have
been raped in South Africa. The statistics of crime
Weak fulfilment of the of Interpol have often been much higher than
government’s security function the statistics of the South African Police Service
(SAPS). Police statistics are widely regarded as
According to thinkers from Hobbes to Alan underestimating the situation. Security researcher
Whaites, the provision of security is one of the David Bruce concludes:
state’s survival functions, if not the key one. Yet,
Zuma did not consider the above state of insecurity The implication is that the non-recording of
sufficiently important to address it in depth in his crime is widespread within the SAPS and that
2015, 2016, or 2017 State of the Nation Address this non-recording is responsible for much of
(SONA), nor did Ramaphosa in 2018. The low the reduction in violent crime that has been
government responsiveness to citizen demands reported in statistics over recent years. The
regarding this issue is another dimension of the implication of this, in turn, is that current crime
current political order. statistics cannot be regarded as a reliable
indicator of trends in crime, particularly in
According to Human Rights Watch, violent crime.22
… in 2018, South Africa’s record on respect for The police have lost their grip on serious violent
human rights and the rule of law remained crime in South Africa, despite a budget increased
poor under new president, Matamela Cyril by almost 50% since 2011-2012. According to
Ramaphosa, who took office in February the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), “[o]ngoing
following Jacob Zuma’s resignation. Corruption, political interference at all levels of the SAPS
poverty, high unemployment, and violent has severely weakened the organisation”.23 The
crime significantly restricted South Africans’ attempted recovery under Ramaphosa started
enjoyment of their rights.20 with the permanent appointments of Lieutenant-
General Khehla Sitole as national police
While the government enjoys external sovereignty commissioner in November 2017, Major-General
in the international world, its monopoly of violence Peter Jacobs in charge of crime intelligence in
and ability to protect the population has shrunk March 2018 and, two months later, of Lieutenant-
markedly since 1994. Professor Susan Booysen General and Advocate Godfrey Lebeya in charge
stated after xenophobic attacks in 2015: of the Hawks (South Africa’s Directorate for
Priority Crime Investigation). However, the impact
of years of instability, political pliancy and the
The government has lost authority SAPS’s internecine battles will be felt for quite
over vast tracks of South Africa, over some time.24
the underworld where xenophobia,
21
looting and parading mobs rule.
20. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/south-africa.
21. http://www.iol.co.za/sundayindependent/xenophobia-a-conundrum-for-sa-1.1847245#.VTOqrZUcTIV.
22. David Bruce, Tackling armed violence: Key findings and recommendations of the study on the violent nature of crime
in South Africa (The Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation and The Department of Safety and Security,
2010), pp 5-6, 15.
23. https://issafrica.org/about-us/press-releases/police-not-coping-with-serious-violent-crime.
24. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-09-11-crime-stats-from-hell-brought-to-you-by-years-of-instability-
political-pliancy-and-the-sapss-internecine-battles/.
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Crime statistics released by the government that usually only emerges in areas of armed
show there were more than 20 000 murders in conflict. The reason is that a violent incident can
2017, a 7% increase over the previous year. In the occur anywhere, and at any time, in a completely
past ten years, more than 175 000 people have arbitrary, but brutal manner.28
been murdered in South Africa. These numbers
are higher than the total number of deaths in In this regard, the fear of violent crime against
the Afghanistan War, the Vietnam War, or the oneself and loved ones in private spaces like
bombing of Hiroshima.25 Almost the same number homes plays an important role. Armed house
of attempted murders were reported to the police. robbery involves hold-ups of a home’s inhabitants,
On average, 109 men and women were raped often entailing threats or actions involving assault,
each day, and a total of 22 343 incidents of house rape, torture and murder of children, the elderly,
robbery were recorded, amounting to an average the disabled or women.
of 61.2 per day.26
The SAPS crime statistics of 2018 indicated
Police Minister Bheki Cele said a surge in murders that incidents of many categories of crime have
to 57 murders per day has turned South Africa increased in frequency. Statistics South Africa’s
into a place that “borders on a war zone”. In (Stats SA) Victims of Crime Survey stated that half
the last five years there has been an increase in of the victims do not report their trauma to the
murders after more than a decade of decline. Last police, and in some cases such as house breaking,
year in South Africa, there had been 35.8 murders less than a fifth of the incidents are reported. The
per 100 000 people. In a putative democracy, this difference between the estimates of Stats SA and
is too close for comfort to the actual numbers in crimes recorded by the SAPS might be explained
armed conflicts: in Somalia, where government by the public’s declining trust in the criminal justice
troops backed by the African Union (AU) are system. Over 42% of people believe violent crime
fighting al-Shabab militants, the ISS recorded has increased, up from 39% the previous year, and
5 500 conflict-related deaths in 2017, which is a only 79% of people feel safe during the day, down
rate of 38.4 per 100 000 people. For Afghanistan, from 87%. Only 32% of people feel safe when it’s
there were 14 000 deaths in the conflict between dark, down from 35%. Levels of satisfaction with
insurgent groups and pro-government forces, a the police and the courts have continued to fall
rate of 40.4, and in Iraq, 15 000 conflict-related since 2013/2014. The survey found that “last year
deaths – a rate of 40.3.27 54% of people were satisfied with how police deal
with criminals and 41% are satisfied with the how
courts deal with crime”.29
Fearful citizens in a putative
democracy South Africans are also becoming more scared
to walk on their own in their areas of residence:
When assessing the impact of violent crime on “The feeling of safety when walking alone has
South Africa’s citizens, it is of major importance been declining,” says Stats SA. Around a third of
to take note of the psychological impact of fear. households surveyed do not go to open spaces or
As noted by foreign psychologists visiting South parks due to the fear of crime, while just less than
Africa, in some parts of the country a continuous a quarter would not allow children to play outside
fear of violent crime is prevalent. It is of a nature for the same reason.30
25. https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2018-09-11-crimestats-ten-years-of-murder-in-south-africa-in-one-
terrifying-graphic/; https://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0341/P03412016.pdf.
26. https://www.fin24.com/Finweek/Opinion/the-cost-of-crime-20180815.
27. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-45547975.
28. See the report by Fred de Vries, correspondent for the Dutch newspaper Trouw and author of Rigtingbedonnerd, an
acclaimed book on South Africa at http://www.trouw.nl/tr/nl/4324/Nieuws/article/detail/1354583/2007/01/12/De-
Johannesburgziekte.dhtml and http://soulsafari.wordpress.com/2012/11/05/afrikaners-rigtingbedonnerd-exclusive-
interview-with-fred-de-vries/.
29. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-10-11-crime-is-increasing-and-were-more-fearful/.
30. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-02-14-analysis-south-africa-a-country-of-fear-say-latest-crime-
perception-stats/#.WmpC-6jibIW.
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Citizens have been forced to look after their own any crime report but one hears of it frequently
security, including private home-based measures, from a range of sectors.
neighbourhood watches, community patrols and
private security companies. However, government This cost is not measurable, but is immense ‒
responses to fulfil its protective function have and almost all of these “promotions” are never
remained unable to deal with violent crime against reported. This comes at a cost of pupil’s careers
citizens and communities. and possibilities while allowing politicians to
continue to blame the old order for the current
The impact of major crime on inequality.
Train commuters pay about five times more to
business use taxis and many lose their ability to work
as they cannot afford taxi fees. Suburbia ends
Service delivery and student protests have become up paying more for insurance of vehicles,
a key concern for business owners as protestors household contents and of course security
often resort to malicious damage to property, services. This money could have been spent
which can result in business interruption. In 2018, more productively on other items such as cars
a record high of 1 444 protests were documented, or gardens. The newly built power stations cost
with incidents of property vandalism, the burning more than in other regions, resulting in higher
of vehicles and sometimes violently prohibiting electricity prices. The massive debt accrued
others from accessing the products/services is causing higher interests for government
offered by organisations continuing to rise. The debt as well as downgrades for the country.
level of hijacking/theft by force had also risen Additionally, cable theft causes outages in
sharply. The 2017/2018 National Crime Statistics suburbs, trains don’t run and the internet goes
Report released by the SAPS revealed a 56.6% down. 32
increase in cash-in-transit heists and an alarming
escalation of more than 333% in bank robberies.31
Nativism and violent expropriation
The economist, Mike Schüssler, gave an incisive
South Africa is a young state, just over a hundred
overview:
years old, with shifting political group identities
The damage that crime does is of course not and territorial borders. It is currently experiencing
just an economic question but does increase its fourth political order since 1910. Its current nine
the cost of living and the cost of doing business. provinces, with their distinctive landscapes and
This is my area of expertise and, sticking to my dynamics, are often grafted on previous political
knitting, I think it is important that some points orders: African and European settler societies,
are made. Starting at the cost of government Asian and Khoisan structures, the indigenous
corruption: this was put at about R240 billion chiefdoms, Afrikaner republics, and Matabele and
a year in 2015 due to tenders for the state and Zulu empires of more than five hundred years of
its companies being at least 40% overpriced. history.
Moreover, this excludes irregular expenditure
The position of different groups in this population
which has amounted to more than R100 billion
is currently being recast. The social contract
in the last few years.
between the government and the diverse
Bribes in everyday life, for anything from getting population is shrinking and becoming stratified. In
out of a traffic fine to securing a teaching post, the symbolic domain, the influence of a nativist
are rife. Bribes for jobs are not even measured in mythology that creates new boundaries of the
“nation” is quite high, compared to two decades
31. https://businesstech.co.za/news/business/273971/big-increase-in-hijackings-and-other-crimes-targeting-businesses-
in-south-africa/.
32. https://www.moneyweb.co.za/moneyweb-opinion/soapbox/crime-pays-more-than-honesty-in-
sa/?utm_source=Moneyweb&utm_campaign=b61f1100df-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2018_10_19_03_47&utm_
medium=email&utm_term=0_b106a40770-b61f1100df-213156865&mc_cid=b61f1100df&mc_eid=31a093eb05.
27
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ago.33 The formal democratic institutions, the in his capacity as North West Premier, stated that
neopatrimonial networks and the autocratic foreign nationals who own spaza shops in the
processes and practices of the hybrid regime are province should look for alternative places to do
now combined in racially-focused and exclusivist business.38
nation-building projects.
Widespread attacks targeting foreigners had
These projects differ from the inclusive non- previously taken place in May 2008, killing 62
racialism of the Mandela era. They are also people and making international headlines.
employed to legitimize government actions and Virtually no one has been convicted over past
to divert attention from failures in service delivery outbreaks of xenophobic violence. Another wave
and government performance. In the ANC’s of violence occurred in April 2015, leading to an
competition for support, they also interact with outcry across Africa and the recall of the Nigerian
and respond to the Afro-radicalism and economic ambassador. These were not attacks caused
nationalism promoted by the EFF political party of by small bands of provocateurs or criminals;
Julius Malema.34 evidence suggested widespread participation
in, and support for, the violence in the affected
Often these symbolic politics interact with the communities.39
politics of the belly and the politics of patronage:
nativist mythology is used to legitimize efforts During 2018 there were numerous incidents
to gain access and break up the socio-economic involving threats and violence against refugees,
formations of some indigenous and foreign asylum-seekers and migrants, with looting or
minority cultural groups. destruction of their small businesses and homes.
According to the 2019 report of Human Rights
Afrobarometer’s surveys show that a vast Watch,
majority of South African citizens distrusts (black)
foreigners, wishing to restrict their residence African foreign nationals in South Africa,
rights and prohibit their eventual acquisition of including refugees and asylum-seekers,
citizenship.35 The ANC reinforced or responded continued to face xenophobic violence and
to some of these demands. Gwede Mantashe, threats of violence in 2018 … In August, at least
then the ANC’s secretary general, announced on four people died when xenophobic violence
12 April 2014 that the government would restrict erupted in Soweto, south of Johannesburg.
small foreign-owned businesses from being Mobs of protesting locals beat foreign
opened in the country’s townships and rural areas, nationals, mostly Somalis, and looted their
so as to create opportunities for South Africans.36 shops. The protesters accused foreign nationals
of selling fake and expired food products. A
In January 2015, the minister of Small Business few days after the Soweto violence, a new
Development, Lindiwe Zulu, said that foreign anti-foreigner political group marched in
business owners should share their business Johannesburg, demanding the deportation of
practices with locals if they wanted to live and all undocumented foreigners in South Africa by
trade in South Africa without fear of disturbance the end of the year.40
or violence.37 In March 2016, Supra Mahumapelo,
33. Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, “Africa for Africans or Africa for ‘Natives’ only? ‘New nationalism’ and nativism in
Zimbabwe and South Africa”, Africa Spectrum, 64(1), 2009, pp 76-78.
34. http://africasacountry.com/a-malignant-nativism-threatens-post-apartheid-democracy-in-south-africa/.
35. http://mg.co.za/article/2015-05-06-violence-sets-sa-xenophobia-apart. Also see Loren Landau, “Urbanization,
nativism, and the rule of law in South Africa’s ‘forbidden’ cities”, paper delivered at a workshop, “The promise of
freedom and its practice: Global perspectives on South Africa’s decade of democracy”, Wits Institute for Social and
Economic Research, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa, 17 May 2004.
36. http://www.worldbulletin.net/news/133623/s-africas-anc-to-restrict-small-foreign-businesses.
37. http://www.thedailyvox.co.za/small-business-minister-wants-spaza-shop-trade-secrets/.
38. “North West premier not doing SA any favours”, Business Day, 23 March 2016.
39. http://afrobarometer.org/publications/wp173-explaining-south-african-xenophobia.
40. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/south-africa.
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Professor Loren Landau, director of the African

Centre for Migration and Society (ACMS) at the Farm murders: violent crime and
University of the Witwatersrand, explained the rural terrorism
political dynamics involved:
A particularly serious category of crime, is attacks on
Faced with perennial shortfalls of services, the small community of about 30 000 commercial
dwellings and jobs, local leadership has farmers in South Africa. More than 4 900 farm
allowed and abetted the scapegoating and attacks have been recorded in the period 1990
appropriation of foreign-owned shops, houses to 2017, with a conservatively estimated 1 980
or goods. With new resources to distribute and farmers and farm workers being killed.43 These
a demon to blame, they come out winners.41 attacks are being perpetrated against members
of all groups, including both farm workers and
In January 2018, Shenilla Mohamed, executive farm owners. Most of the victims of such attacks
director of Amnesty International South Africa are Afrikaner farmers and their families, but black
stated: victims constitute a third of the overall numbers.
Many permanent and temporary workers and
There is a lack of political will on the part of their families also lose their source of livelihood
the government to deal with issues of violence as a result of a farmer’s death.44
and xenophobia in a sustainable way, and the
consequence of this inertia has resulted in Farm attacks and brutal farm murders threaten
continuing sporadic bursts of violence which local citizens and foreigners, as well as food
often end in deaths, injuries and damage to security in South Africa. In February 2017, British
property … nothing concrete has been done national Sue Howarth, 64, and her husband,
to combat impunity for xenophobic violence Robert Lynn, 66, were asleep when they were
and other related longstanding human rights attacked in their farmhouse near the South African
violations.42 town, Dullstroom. During the attack, the robbers
burnt her with a blowtorch before shooting her
After 25 years of underperforming one-party and stuffing a plastic bag down her throat.45 In
dominant rule, there is an undercurrent of heated April 2017, Dutch citizen Peet van Es was killed by
rhetoric and volatile scapegoat politics in South five attackers on his farm after being tortured for
Africa. Foreign Africans are excluded, marginalized five hours.46
or not recognized in the nativist discourse. So are
indigenous Western Africans and Asian Africans. Doctor Danny Titus of the South African Human
Rights Commission (SAHRC) stated on 26 August
41. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/05/11/political-rhetoric-and-institutions-fuel-
xenophobic-violence-in-south-africa/.
42. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/01/south-africa-government-must-show-political-will-to-end-
xenophobic-violence/; http://dailypost.ng/2018/01/11/nigerian-owned-guest-houses-burnt-south-africa/.
43. Dirk Hermann, Chris van Zyl and Ilze Nieuwoudt, Treurgrond [Land of sorrow] (Kraal, Pretoria, 2013); http://www.
issafrica.org/iss-today/farm-attacks-and-farm-murders-remain-a-concern; figures provided by crime analyst Lorraine
Claasen, February 2018; AfriForum media statement dated 29 January 2019. These figures are the result of statistics
kept and verified by the Transvaal Agricultural Union and the civil rights organisation AfriForum, also compared to
police statistics. Not all incidents are reported to the police however, and some are excluded because of differing
interpretations of the definition of a farm attck or murder.
44. “Widow pours out her heart”, The Witness, 23 October 2014; “Ixopo farm attackers jailed for life”, Media 24, 31
October 2014.
45. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/02/23/british-woman-killed-south-africa-robbers-torture-blow-torch/;
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/02/28/husband-woman-tortured-south-africa-robbery-speaks-horrific/.
46. https://www.elsevierweekblad.nl/nederland/achtergrond/2017/04/nederlandse-boer-in-zuid-afrika-vermoord-na-
uren-marteling-488961/.
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2016 to Parliament that the criminal justice system citizens against violent crime led to nationwide
did not provide any deterrent to crime. “When we protests on 30 October 2017. On that date, tens of
observe the brutality of the killings it is clear that thousands of people protested peacefully in what
there is no respect for life and that perpetrators became known as “Black Monday”, blockading
operate with impunity,” he said. Titus told the roads in many parts of South Africa. The Black
committee that the perception that violent farm Monday protests were sparked by the murder of
crimes only affected white farmers was not true. farmer Joubert Conradie, the married father of
Black farmers were equally affected, he said.47 two children, on the farm in the Western Cape
where he was born.51. However, despite these and
Farm attackers strike in groups that vary from other protests, the government has not responded
one to as many as thirteen attackers per incident. effectively to the concerns of farmers.52
Attacks are planned in detail and a disturbing
trend is the increasing use of technology by farm
attackers.48 Few of these incidents involve large-
Strangling rural stability and
scale theft. Usually arms, vehicles, mobile phones economies
and cash are stolen, but combined with high levels
of brutality, violence and even torture. Eileen de Then President Nelson Mandela stated at the
Jager and Roelien Schutte, two sisters who clean Summit on Rural Safety in 1998: “Beyond the
up crime scenes nationally, say that they have immediate human suffering, lack of security and
seen a definite increase in extreme violence in stability in our rural and farming community
farm attacks. They are of the opinion that if the causes serious disruption to our economy.”53
public were to realise what actually happens International policymakers and business analysts
during such attacks, it would serve as a wake-up consider agriculture and agribusiness as key
call that would mobilise communities. De Jager sectors in the socio-economic development of
states: many countries of Africa.54 However, its capacity
is often underdeveloped, resulting in it being the
recipient of development aid.
Victims are often tortured before
being dragged behind cars, or they are In the case of South Africa, a unique agricultural
sector has been developed in one of Africa’s
mutilated with boiling water. It is often arid and more challenging countries to
49
beyond insane. farm. The unique value of this historical exception
to the economy has in recent years often been
Food security has dropped in the past five years overlooked due to domestic political agendas and
to include less than 50% of the population, which campaigns.
emphasizes the need to give priority attention to
these key economic actors and this vulnerable For years, the ANC government has been unable
community.50 Public outrage against the inability of to make a committed effort to provide security
the ANC government to protect farmers and other
47. http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/farm-murders-on-the-decrease-parliament-told-20160826.
48. https://www.afriforum.co.za/figures-announced-today-farm-murders-farm-attacks-rise-2016/.
49. http://news.iafrica.com/sa/829892.html.
50. http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Food-security-in-SA-declining-study-20130806.
51. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-10-31-groundup-protesters-march-through-cape-town-against-farm-
murders/#.Wn840kxuLIU; http://www.huffingtonpost.co.za/2017/10/30/genoeg-is-genoeg-farmers-unite-in-black-
monday-protest_a_23260231/.
52. https://www.afriforum.co.za/thousands-march-union-building-farm-murders/.
53. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-03-01-rural-safety-are-farm-murders-being-underplayed-for-
politics/#.WvAo_4iFPIU.
54. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2016/01/22/foresight-africa-2016-banking-on-agriculture-for-
africas-future/.
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to the valuable farming communities. However, goods. The sector has strong linkages with the
reports by Western media55 and responses by rural non-farm economy, which helps to restabilize
senior Australian decision makers condemning the sometimes depopulating or stagnating smaller
the dire situation of farmers in South Africa, towns in the vast areas of South Africa.
indicate that international consciousness about
the problem can no longer be prevented.56 Productivity linkages represent the non-market
linkages between the agricultural and non-
The ANC’s policy of expropriation of farmers’ farm economy. Examples include the positive
land without compensation has reinforced wider effect of lower food prices, which impacts on
concerns about a further weakening of property worker nutrition and productivity. Food security
rights in South Africa, also in urban areas. However, and political stability, the beneficial effects of
there are many ways in which farm murders have knowledge flows that accelerate productivity
a negative effect too, not only on the victims and growth in both agriculture and non-farm
their families and close communities, but also on production, and the beneficial effects of the
the broader economy. agricultural sector on the rural non-farm economy
are also included.
Weakening rural economies 57
The South African agricultural sector does not

The contribution of agriculture and agribusiness play a growth-leading or initiating role in the
to the national economy has been almost 2.5% of economy, due to its relative size. As a result, the
GDP for years. Examples of agribusinesses would growth impact of agricultural exports and linkages
include farming operations, input manufacturers, with the rest of the economy on a national level
input suppliers and co-operatives, food processors, is significant, but limited. However, the sector
distributors, traders and others. Agricultural plays a growth enabling role, by supplying food
linkages can be divided into four main groups, to consumers at the lowest possible price by
namely production, consumption, productivity either producing it domestically or affording food
and factor market linkages. imports with the exchange earned in the export of
agricultural produce.
In terms of national production linkages, the
agricultural sector and the sectors with which it Farm murders lead to a serious
has the strongest linkages represent around 7% of
the total economy. Production linkages represent loss of job opportunities
the backward and forward linkages between the
agricultural sector and rest of the economy. The Factor market linkages represent the impact of
backward linkages arise through the inputs bought agricultural income on the rest of the economy.
by the agricultural sector from the primary and This includes the investment of farm income in
manufacturing sectors, and the forward linkages non-farm investments, and other factor flows,
through the agricultural products supplied to the such the flow of capital and labour to the rest of
manufacturing sector for further processing. the economy.
Consumption linkages represent the spending Statistics on agricultural employment differ

of farm families on locally produced consumer according to definition and source, but it is safe
55. https://www.stern.de/politik/ausland/kriminalitaet-in-suedafrika---weisse-farmer-im--feindesland--7617322.
html; https://www.daserste.de/information/politik-weltgeschehen/weltspiegel/videos/suedafrika-weisse-Farmer-
video-100.html; http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-5610567/South-African-farmers-wife-reveals-thug-shot-
husband-dead-children.html.
56. https://www.sbs.com.au/news/dutton-considering-several-white-south-african-farmer-visa-applications; http://
www.news.com.au/finance/economy/world-economy/thank-you-australia-hundreds-rally-in-brisbane-to-
highlight-the-plight-of-south-african-farmers/news-story/80c20ce7015e12e4de4cf8e49a105d0e; https://www.
thesouthafrican.com/australian-ag-sa-farmers-refugee-status/.
57. This section is based on https://agbiz.co.za/uploads/documents/careers/13_04-thesis_jan_c_greyling_published.pdf.
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to say that the sector employs around 700 000 the brutal murder of the above-mentioned
workers. The agricultural sector is also labour- Western Cape farmer, Joubert Conradie, on 24
intensive, compared to other sectors, because it October 2017. The protests constituted some of
employs about 4.6% of the total labour force. The the largest multiracial protests in South Africa
mining and manufacturing sectors, in comparison, against farm murders and violent crime since
represent 8.5% and 12.5% of the economy, whilst 1994, and included blockades of roads in many
employing only 2.3% and 11.8% of the labour force parts of South Africa.59
respectively. The agricultural sector therefore
uses two units of labour per unit of value added, Farm murders also seriously rupture the social
whilst the ratio is 0.3 and 0.94 for the mining and capital and economies of families and small
manufacturing sectors. communities in several rural areas in the
northern provinces of South Africa, where
This makes the sector one of the biggest underdevelopment and stagnant small towns
employers in the economy. During a period of already present challenges.
high unemployment and underemployment of
about 27% in South Africa, including more than
60% youth unemployment, the stabilizing role of Farm murders weaken the
agriculture in providing jobs cannot be emphasized multiplier effect 60
sufficiently.
The above-mentioned approach of linkages,
though correct, is limited, because it simply looks
Farm murders damage rural socio- at the direct contribution of the sector to GDP. One
economic orders could also use multipliers to estimate the indirect
impact of changes in the sector on the rest of
In some provinces, the impact of farm murders on the economy. These multipliers, calculated from
employment, social capital and the local economy national statistics, show that primary agriculture
is particularly significant. More than 18% of job has a backward linkage of 2,14. This constitutes
opportunities in the Western Cape province are the fifth highest result in a grouping of twenty
in agriculture or agribusiness.58 The Western sectors of the economy.
Cape accounts for about 60% of South Africa’s
agricultural exports. The local manufacturing Thus, a R1 million increase in demand for
sector obtains up to 70% of its inputs from agricultural output will increase the combined
agriculture or agribusiness. output of the other production sectors in the
economy by R2.14 million (inclusive of the original
Dimensions related to agriculture also reinforce R1 million of the agricultural sector output).
the context of local and international tourism. Tens The closely related food, beverage and tobacco
of thousands of German, French, Dutch, British industry, is calculated at 2.3, in the third position.
and other citizens reside in the Western Cape and
elsewhere in South Africa, many of them also as The calculated forward linkage of the sector is
farm-owners. 1.81. If there is a R1 million increase in the cost
of value added in the agricultural sector, then the
The high levels of social capital reflected in the combined value of output of the other sectors in
agricultural sector of the Western Cape played a the economy will increase by R1.81 million as a
major role in the fast mobilization of provincial result of price increases.
urban and rural communities to protest against
58. https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/why-western-cape-agriculture-matters-to-sa-economy-10007415.
59. https://derstandard.at/2000068573136/Debatte-ueber-Morde-an-Weissen-reisst-Suedafrikas-Wunden-auf.
60. This section is based on http://www.grainsa.co.za/a-look-at-the-contribution-of-the-agricultural-sector-to-the-south-
african-economy.
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Agriculture was the best performer across the

first three quarters of 2017 and was the largest The political refusal of protection
contributor to the country’s two percent GDP
Several factors politicize the issue of farm murders:
growth in the third quarter.61
the ANC’s National Democratic Revolution
(NDR) policy, also regarding land possession and
Farm murders hasten the onset of ownership; its cadre deployment, also in the
police; its focus on own patronage rather than on
food insecurity 62
service delivery; its decreasing accountability to

citizens and communities; ANC factions that want
In general, food security is defined as having
the land of many farmers to be transferred to ANC
reliable access to a sufficient quantity of affordable,
cadres; and the fact that many farmers support
nutritious food. According to Stats SA, the typical
political opposition parties.
South African household spends more than 70%
of its food budget on four main food groups: Meat
Farming communities, like many urban
(25%), bread and cereals (26%), milk, cheese and
neighbourhoods, have had to accept that their
eggs (9%), and vegetables (10%).
tax money is spent by the government, but that as
taxpayers and citizens they remain without good
An analysis of the combined net trade (net export
police protection. The Austrian newspaper Der
tons less the net import tons) of the main items in
Standard reported on 28 November 2017 that up
each of the four groups provides a good indication
to 30% of the victims may be black, but the ANC
of the country’s food self-sufficiency status. The
still did not give attention to these killings:
trend is downward over time. South Africa is
currently not self-sufficient in terms of the main
food items consumed since the mid-1990s. A Many politicians of the ruling African
2014 nationally representative survey revealed
that there were 7 million individuals who reported National Congress find it difficult
experiencing feeling hungry.63 to name the acts of violence and to
South Africa’s population has grown by more than
condemn them as such. And not only on
20% since 1994 to an estimated 57 million people. the edges of the former black liberation
It is set to grow much further still in coming years movement does one find those who try
and decades.64 Food security and affordable food
produced by the agricultural sector are already with barely concealed agreement try
under threat. The ANC government’s refusal to to create an atmosphere where such
ensure proper rural protection or to properly 65
assist farming communities in strengthening violence is accepted.

their security will only reinforce the risk of food The Africanist, Professor Patrick Chabal, noted in
insecurity in South Africa. some cases elsewhere in Africa that rulers have
61. https://www.farmonline.com.au/story/5247948/south-african-farmland-grab-could-ruin-economic-stability/.
62. This section is based on http://www.grainsa.co.za/a-look-at-the-contribution-of-the-agricultural-sector-to-the-south-
african-economy.
63. https://www.health24.com/Diet-and-nutrition/Food-security/Food-insecurity-is-a-reality-for-millions-of-South-
Africans-living-in-informal-settlements-20151019; https://africacheck.org/reports/are-there-13-14-or-15-million-
hungry-people-in-south-africa/.
64. https://www.populationpyramid.net/south-africa/2050/.
65. https://www.derstandard.de/story/2000068573136/debatte-ueber-morde-an-weissen-reisst-suedafrikas-wunden-
auf.
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allowed violent crime to restructure the political In the case of farm murders, as well as in the case
environment in its favour.66 Local “big men” have of urban violent crime and xenophobic killings,
often played a role in this regard, sometimes the life stories of the victims, taxpayers and
with tacit support from national leaders. Gareth citizens often get lost in the bigger maelstrom of
Newham assessed the police in South Africa: politics and predation.68 Few foreign governments
and NGOs also show a significant interest in their
infringed civil rights.
The system for a professional ethos
has collapsed and lower level officials
are excluded because they aren’t
politically-aligned. If people are not
seen as a part of the ruling factions
and they are killed, there is little
chance of an investigation. 67
66. Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz, Africa works: Disorder as political instrument (International African Institute,
London, 1999).
67. http://allafrica.com/stories/201310220779.html?page=3.
68. Carla van der Spuy, Farm killings: Victims tell their own stories (Bargain Books, Cape Town, 2014) is an introduction
to the life stories of the first category of victims. To date, newspaper reports are the best sources of information on
victims in the other two categories, but more comprehensive studies are necessary. See also Ernst Roets, Kill the
Boer (Kraal Publishers, Pretoria, 2017).
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PART III
A shrinking social
contract and a
multipolar field of
authority
these vast differences in histories and wealth
Partisan privileging are compressed in a single political order of an
estimated 57 million people.
At present, the economy of South Africa has diverse
socio-economic formations and wealth inequalities
Among them, an estimated 6 million people of all
resembling France and the Francophone region
population groups pay 99% of all personal income
in Africa combined, or the region of Mexico, the
tax. Many, if not most of them, support opposition
Caribbean islands, the United States, and French
parties.69 The social welfare system they help to
and Anglophone Canada combined. However,
fund, supports an estimated 17 million people.
69. Fanie Joubert and Jannie Rossouw, “Lewenstandaard: ŉ ekonomiese perspektief op lewenstandaard in Suid-Afrika”,
Tydskrif vir Geesteswetenskappe, 53(1), Maart 2013, pp 89-103 (on pp 96-97). For lower estimates of the actual
number of taxpayers, see Paul Joubert, “How many taxpayers are there”, Politicsweb, 30 March 2012 and Piet le
Roux, “Taxpayers are getting fed up”, Politicsweb, 19 November 2013.
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The growing informal economy also constitutes a order, will continue in the current hybrid regime.
part of the arena of political competition. One of the results, admitted by Ramaphosa himself
in January 2019, is that “things like corruption
The considerable value destruction of the ANC’s become a way of life”.72
economic policies and corruption under Zuma and
the struggling economy, covered in later chapters,
have intensified resource struggles and intra-ANC
Racial nationalism and the ANC
factionalism. In this context, various forms of both
Historically, the ANC experienced tensions between
peaceful and more vicious identity, urban, rural,
professed non-racialism and racial nationalist
regional and class politics have emerged.
convictions among its leaders and members.73
During its pre-1994 struggle, its international
In the case of South Africa, the public resources
supporters often referred to its non-racial ideals
structure rests on a complex set of relationships
and credentials. However, after 1994, the ANC
between the ANC-controlled state, as well as
also retained the racial classification system of the
emerging black elites in the ANC establishment
population used during the apartheid system to
and large private sector corporations. This set of
impose a new racial order. Ineke van Kessel states:
relationships supports the ANC’s use of a number
of policy levers.70 An exclusive brand of African nationalism, also
labelled “nativism”, seems set to become the
The policy of Black Economic Empowerment new hegemonic discourse … Black nationalism
(BEE), under Zuma also reconfigured as Broad- may indeed provide the glue in securing the
based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE), is loyalty of the ANC’s main constituency, but
often represented as if it constitutes an advance in the process another cherished principle of
for all members of one racial group. However, it the liberation struggle, – non-racialism – is
has become a partisan political programme. In its increasingly under pressure … The demise of
execution in the hybrid regime, it is closely linked the rainbow ideology that guided the UDF is
to the political friends and relatives of one political much regretted by coloured, white, and Indian
organization among others of the racial group, former activists, but is hardly problematized by
namely the ANC. BEE also provides a disincentive my African interviewees.74
to members of the elite to defect and form an
electoral alternative in the hybrid regime. “There is an increasing fervour for racial nationalism
in the ANC’s policies”, the political scientist Nicola
According to Moeletsi Mbeki, a prominent de Jager notes.75 The racial identity politics serves
economist and the brother of former President as a potential unifying discourse among South
Thabo Mbeki, BEE has not benefited black business Africa’s nine major black ethnic groups. It also
people, but in fact has inflicted them a fatal blow. serves as a potential unifying discourse between
He states that those who have benefited are a an emerging middle class and millions of poor
small group of unproductive black capitalists citizens. This form of racial identity politics often
with enormous political influence. Other black tends to racialize and regionalize African identity:
businesspeople have almost had no chance.71 This it marginalizes or even denies the African identities
process, which started in the previous political and contributions of Western and Asian citizens
70. Roger Tangri and Roger Southall, “The politics of Black Economic Empowerment in South Africa”, Journal of Southern
African Studies, 34(3), 2008, pp 699-716 (on p 710) and http://mg.co.za/article/2013-10-25-00-gold-fields-link-to-
duduzile-zuma.
71. http://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaftspolitik/suedafrika-schwarze-buerger-werden-gezielt-bevorzugt-12911281.
html.
72. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/23/world/africa/south-africa-corruption.html.
73. Stephen Ellis, External mission: The ANC in exile, 1960-1990 (Hurst, London, 2012), pp 214-219.
74. Ineke van Kessel, “The changing meaning of change: The legacy of the United Democratic Front in South Africa”,
paper delivered at the Fourth European Conference in African Studies, Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala, Sweden, 15-
18 June 2011, p 6.
75. http://mg.co.za/article/2015-11-03-sa-is-in-danger-of-becoming-a-radicalised-society-again.
36
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in South Africa. Implicitly, it also marginalizes or that special measures should not take the shape
denies the African identities of Berber and Arab of reverse racism.77
North Africans.
John Kane Berman of the IRR has commented Ethnic politics in the ANC
that the victims of the new racially-discriminatory
Zuma’s presidency has clearly reinforced ethnic
legislation include
politics in the ANC. In the case of South Africa, no
single ethnic group dominates numerically in the
… members of minority groups leveraged out
population of more than 57 million. The broader
of jobs because they exceed the relevant racial
population has at least eleven major identity
quota, or denied appointment or promotion on
groups, all of whom are numerical minorities.78
racial grounds. Increasing numbers of these are
“born frees” with no experience of the apartheid
All of these groups have distinctive cultures and
era. Other victims are members of the coloured
languages, sometimes core areas of residence and
and Indian minorities, who were also on the
concentration, and often histories of struggles
receiving end of apartheid discrimination.
against domination by other groups. Each group’s
However, the victims also include people,
members have a spectrum of iterated and
most of them black, heavily dependent on the
negotiated identities and socio-economic class
services of state agencies that don’t function
positions. Many of them also draw from cultural
properly because many of their appointees
repertoires of fervent individualism, ruses and
have been put there for reasons of race or
social mobility, based on the specific dynamics
political allegiance ... In the end the victims of
of their group and locality.79 Compared to some
the ANC’s racial policies are more numerous
other identities available to citizens, the South
than the beneficiaries.76
African identity itself has often been a thin, fluid
and contested national identity for purposes of
In August 2016, the Solidarity Trade Union, after
political mobilization.
widely consulting with civil society actors over time,
made a presentation regarding the government’s
For many years before the ANC came to power
policy of race quotas to the United Nations (UN)
in 1994, Nelson Mandela, an ethnic Xhosa, was
Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of
the leader of the ANC. The ANC always stressed
Racial Discrimination (CERD). Marc Bossuyt, one
its “non-tribalism”. However, Mbeki expanded the
of the committee members and a former judge
number of Xhosas in his cabinet during his tenure
at the Belgian Constitutional Court, stated on 10
as president.80 During this time, most members of
August 2016 that the government’s affirmative
the ANC executive were Xhosas and Zulus speaking
action policy is rigid and its implementation in the
Nguni languages. Zuma was the highest-ranking
private sector, the economy and sport is absurd.
Zulu in the ANC. In 2006, Archbishop Emeritus
In response to the South African government’s
Desmond Tutu warned about a potential “Nguni-
representative, he stated that the use of race
ocracy” in the ANC.81
comes down to old apartheid and is not in line
with the Convention on Human Rights. He stated
76. John Kane Berman, “Race and racism”, Moneyweb, 25 January 2016.
77. http://www.politicsweb.co.za/news-and-analysis/solidarity-lodges-complaint-over-sas-race-quotas-w; https://
solidariteit.co.za/en/sparks-fly-united-nations-solidarity/.
78. See Census 2011 at http://www.statssa.gov.za.
79. Jean-Francois Bayart, “The ‘social capital’ of the felonious state – or the ruses of political intelligence”, in Jean-
Francois Bayart, Stephen Ellis and Beatrice Hibou, The criminalization of the state in Africa (James Currey, Oxford,
1999), pp 34-42.
80. http://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/opinion/2016-10-19-ethnic-nationalism-zumas-style-of/.
81. Yonatan Fessha, Ethnic diversity and federalism: Constitution-making in South Africa and Ethiopia (Ashgate:
Burlington, 2010), p 132; Danielle Resnick, Urban poverty and party populism in African democracies (Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 2014), pp 200-209.
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Zulus constitute the largest minority, at about

22% of the population, with their core historical New prominent sources of symbolic
areas and kingdoms in the eastern KwaZulu-Natal legitimation
province. Zuma is an ethnic Zulu who also upholds
some Zulu cultural traditions. As a result of Zuma’s Recourse to both Christian and indigenous African
skills as a mobilizer since 1994, Zulus have come religions, which also enjoy support among urban
to form the strongest component (almost 25%) of constituencies and leaders, have been used as
the ANC’s increased membership.82 additional sources to legitimize the ANC’s hold on
power. On 5 May 2008, Zuma declared to an ANC
Anthony Butler of the University of Cape Town (UCT) rally in Khayelitsha:
indicated the “skewed composition of the Cabinet,
the KwaZulu-Natal-dominated ANC parliamentary God expects us to rule this country because we
list, the growing nonrepresentativity of important are the only organisation which was blessed by
directors-general and their deputies, and the pastors when it was formed. It is even blessed
composition of parastatal boards and managers” in Heaven. That is why we will rule until Jesus
during Zuma’s presidency. These appointments, comes back. We should not allow anyone to
he argued, indicate “a big shift in the control of govern our city [Cape Town] when we are ruling
resources and power towards people of amaZulu the country.86
descent”. “When a minister comes from a certain
region, so will the officials in that department,” He made similar statements in 2004, 2006, 2009,
former President Thabo Mbeki said in 2014.83 2012, 2014 and 2016.87
Ramaphosa, a Venda with a more personalist Previously, he had said that “only those with ANC
power base, has already reached out to the Zulu membership will go to heaven”.88 In May 2011 he
king84. He will try and prevent a major fissure told voters before municipal elections that those
between the ANC and its Zulu constituencies, who turn their backs on the ANC will face the
also since they are Zuma’s main power base and wrath of the ancestors, a force considered by many
no one from KwaZulu Natal is on the new NEC. citizens to be powerful and actively intervening in
Vast sums of tenderpreneurship winnings are at daily life:
stake in state procurement contracts to the value
of more than $45 billion annually.85 Given the
strong divisions in the ANC, factional politics and I’ve been telling people that if you once
balances of power dominate Ramaphosa’s current belonged to the ANC and you leave, the
selection of people for important positions.
However, regional, ethnic and neopatrimonial ancestors of the ANC will turn their
dynamics and support networks form a key part backs on you and you’ll have continuous
of ANC factional politics. 89
bad luck.
82. Also see William Gumede, “Zuma and Zulu nationalism” (2012) at http://www.pambazuka.net/en/category/
features/85841/print.
83. http://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/opinion/2016-10-19-ethnic-nationalism-zumas-style-of/.
84. https://www.enca.com/south-africa/watch-ramaphosa-dances-with-king-zwelithini.
85. https://monthlyreview.org/2019/01/01/south-africa-suffers-capitalist-crisis-deja-vu/.
86. http://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/anc-to-rule-until-jesus-comes-back-1.398843?ot=inmsa.ArticlePrint PageLayout.
ot.
87. http://www.politicsweb.co.za/politicsweb/view/politicsweb/ en/page71639?oid=326899&sn=Detail&pid=71639;
http://www.news24.com/elections/news/anc-will-rule-until-jesus-comes-zuma-says-again-20160705.
88. http://www.timeslive.co.za/sundaytimes/article895148.ece/God-is-on-the-ANCs-side-Zuma-tells-crowd.
89. http://mg.co.za/article/2011-05-14-zuma-vote-anc-or-face-ancestral-wrath.
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In September 2017, Zuma blamed witchcraft

for the ANC’s failure to beat the DA at polls in Coalitions with traditional
the Western Cape. “I don’t know‚ [maybe] it’s authorities and local strongmen
because of witchcraft; witches practise their craft
in different ways‚” Zuma said. He added that The effective power of the state bureaucracy
nowadays witches even used electricity. “In the has decreased under the ANC government. The
last elections I was satisfied that we are taking the population has expanded by more than 20%,
Western Cape‚ I even said so. What went wrong? I while the hybrid regime, cadre deployment
too can’t tell you. It’s witchcraft – you never know. and selective patronage have “eaten the state”
Maybe even ghosts are voting.”90 and its capabilities. In addition, labour union
allies have become weaker. Up to a third of
Adam Ashforth, Stephen Ellis and Gerrie ter Haar South Africa’s population lives in areas where
all identify a potential legitimacy gap if many traditional authorities are influential. The political
citizens who adhere to Christian or indigenous settlements of 25 years ago are now superseded
African religious views do not see the state by a conscious ANC effort to create new deals
acknowledging and protecting them against the and coalitions that incorporate potential allies like
profound threat posed by evil spirits.91 traditional chiefs and urban strongmen.
Zuma has been able to have recourse to this There are several traditional kings and more than
repertoire and that of the NDR to align with eight hundred senior traditional leaders and more
different constituencies. In this way, he could than five thousand chiefs in the country who get
also gain access to some of the moral authority salaries from the state.94 In the case of traditional
of traditional authorities, increase the political authorities, the ANC and especially former
order’s responsiveness to such constituencies, President Zuma potentially benefited in several
and strengthen the symbolic legitimacy of the ways. Zuma gained access to some of the moral
hybrid regime.92 authority of these leaders, while also extending
the power of the ANC over them where possible.
Ramaphosa took care to align with this discourse He increased the political order’s responsiveness
of legitimation in January 2018 during an ANC to rural constituencies in order to offset the loss
birthday rally. He stated that he had appealed of support in some urban and middle-class black
to higher powers in the previous week during a constituencies. He also strengthened the symbolic
“revolutionary pilgrimage” to the graves of former legitimacy of the hybrid regime in areas where the
ANC presidents. He said that they had been state’s actual penetration, and especially its actual
“shaking the bones of our forebears so their spirits service delivery may be weak.95
and their flesh can rejuvenate the ANC to what it
was”.93 Other discourses are also present, but the It is noticeable that after his election as ANC
search for an African modernity and a selective leader, Ramaphosa specifically visited the Zulu
de-Westernization now dominates the symbolic king, Goodwill Zwelithini, and Xhosa traditional
domain.
90. http://www.heraldlive.co.za/politics/2017/09/08/maybe-witchcraft-made-us-lose-poll-western-cape-says-zuma/.
91. Stephen Ellis and Gerrie ter Haar, Worlds of power: Religious thought and political practice in Africa (Oxford
University Press, New York, 2004), pp 153-154; Adam Ashforth, Witchcraft, violence, and democracy in South Africa
(University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2005); also see http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=10591.
92. http://www.timeslive.co.za/thetimes/2014/01/09/jz-drops-poll-bomb1.
93. https://www.iol.co.za/saturday-star/going-back-to-our-roots-12747604; https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/
article/2018-01-12-ancs-106th-at-the-last-supper-before-the-big-speech-ramaphosa-preaches-unity-in-diversity/#.
WnWV_KjibIU.
94. Zuma attended the recent coronation of the new Xhosa king. http://news.yahoo.com/lion-skins-dancing-xhosa-king-
coronation-africa-181027012.html; https://businesstech.co.za/news/government/218081/how-much-south-africas-
kings-and-queens-will-be-paid-in-2018/.
95. http://www.timeslive.co.za/thetimes/2014/01/09/jz-drops-poll-bomb1.
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leaders, among others.96 Wilmien Wicomb, an game of exclusionary violence” could easily
attorney in the Constitutional Unit of the Legal expand from “outsiders within” to longtime
Resources Centre, commented: insiders, such as Indian South Africans,
coloureds and whites. Retribalisation has been
The effect of the current legislative framework is relatively successfully contained by the ANC
that traditional leaders have almost unfettered and its ally, the South African Communist Party,
power to make, enforce and adjudicate law in public discourse, but it nevertheless simmers
within those communities ... vast areas of the under the surface.99
homeland territories turned out to be rich with
resources … The stakes are very high.97 The editorial of the Mail and Guardian on 17 April
2015 also noted:
As the capabilities of the central government
recedes, the importance of local strongmen in the It would not take much for the groundswell
alliances of rulers will increase. At present, the against foreigners to be translated into
active realignment with traditional authorities is violence against the Indian community,
especially noticeable. Currently or in future, these particularly in KwaZulu-Natal, where there is a
alignments may also involve long and dishonourable tradition of sectarian
hatred. There is now an attempt to paint South
... gang leaders in townships and squatter Africans of Indian origin as “co-conspirators”,
settlements, vigilante-type organisations, by suggesting that foreigners are using their
ethnically-based protection rackets, millenarian warehouses or that “they are working together
religious movements, transnational networks against us, the Zulu majority”.100
of extended family relations, organised crime
or new forms of tribalism … They have the In August 2017, KwaZulu-Natal economic
capacity to exert violence on a large scale development member of the executive council
against outsiders and the capacity to control (MEC), Sihle Zikalala sent a proposal to the National
violence within their respective strongholds.98 Treasury to exclude Asians and brown people
from the advantages of BEE. Zikalala’s proposal
purportedly aims to “benefit black Africans”.101
A shrinking social contract and On 27 April 2015, the political economist Ismail
indigenous cultural groups Lagardien wrote on the ANC’s return to ethnic and
racial politics:
The current political order consists of several
numerical minority groups. After the xenophobic In consultations over the past year or so, and
attacks of 2015, sociologists Heribert Adam and visits to the province, I have found that there
Kogila Moodley wrote: has been a significant anti-Indian sentiment,
on the back of calls for the largest indigenous
Sensitive scholars such as Francis Nyamnjoh community, the Zulus, to take greater control of
have already hinted that the “bizarre nativity KwaZulu-Natal. In the provincial bureaucracy,
96. https://www.enca.com/south-africa/watch-ramaphosa-dances-with-king-zwelithini; https://www.timeslive.co.za/

politics/2018-01-07-ancs-top-leadership-pay-homage-to-zulu-monarch/.
97. http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2016-01-13-a-royal-conundrum-king-dalindyebo-and-the-traditional-
leaders-hot-potato/#.WDl-ZoWcHui. Also see http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/frustrated-south-africans-
lashing-out-at-each-other-irr-20160105.
98. Volker Boege, Anne Brown, Kevin Clements and Anna Nolan, “On hybrid political orders and emerging states”,
Berghof Handbook Dialogue, 8, 2008.
99. http://mg.co.za/article/2015-05-06-violence-sets-sa-xenophobia-apart.
100. https://mg.co.za/article/2015-04-16-editorial-our-hate-grows-shame-on-us-all.
101. https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2017-10-16-mandla-mandela-condemns-call-to-exclude-indians-and-
coloureds-from-bee/.
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“coloured” people are stripped of authority, Several Afrikaner-led organizations saw Zuma’s
and increasingly find themselves marginalised; remarks on history as a delegitimization of the
if not formally and physically, they are ignored position of the Afrikaners, also because of his
and their work is shoved aside.102 silence about their contributions. Their ancestors,
as in the case of America, came from European
In December 2018, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, countries in the seventeenth century, settled in
the leader of the predominantly Zulu Inkatha a region with several competing political orders,
Freedom Party (IFP), felt compelled to condemn created Western republics, and have come to
anti-Indian sentiment and expressed concerns regard themselves as a people rooted in Africa.105
about politicians who paint Indians as settlers
and “as racist and less deserving of the fruits of Many of them and other whites will be forced to
democracy”.103 Professor Brij Maharaj from the leave the country under the current government’s
University of KwaZulu Natal (UKZN) wrote in 2018, policies, former President F.W. de Klerk said on 26
referring to several examples: August 2016:
It is disturbing that racist outbursts are

beginning to permeate government We have to face the unpalatable fact
institutions. A good example would be the case that our present government has
of the Durban Metro. Over the years, it would
appear that an incipient institutional bias has adopted policies that are consciously
been emerging within the higher echelons of directed toward harming the core
the metro that stereotypes and targets South
Africans of Indian descent.104
interests of a section of the South
African population according to their
106
New forms of political racism? race.
On 23 January 2019, De Klerk stated that South
As new political trends and actors emerged in black
Africa was again becoming “a society in which the
politics, Zuma eventually turned to exclusionary
prospects of individuals are once again increasingly
identity politics to maintain and build his support
determined by the colour of their skin rather than
base. “You must remember that a man called Jan
the content of their character”.
van Riebeeck arrived here on 6 April 1652, and
that was the start of the trouble in this country,” Our government has virtually abandoned
he told guests at a fundraising dinner in February the great tradition of promoting racial
2015. “What followed were numerous struggles reconciliation that was exemplified by Nelson
and wars and deaths and the seizure of land Mandela. Instead it now consistently pumps
and the deprivation of the indigenous peoples’ out negative stereotypes of specifically white
political and economic power.” Van Riebeeck’s South Africans, whom it labels with the original
arrival “disrupted South Africa’s social cohesion, sin, whom in some statements it evidently does
repressed people and caused wars”, he said. Zuma not regard as a part of “our people”, whom it
later claimed that the new settlers had stolen the says are not the rightful owners of the land to
land of other resident groups. which they hold legal title, whom it blames for
102. http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2015-04-27-the-re-racialising-and-tribalisation-of-politics-where-will-
we-end-up/#.VXmAcmPALmQ.
103. https://www.iol.co.za/sunday-tribune/news/mangosuthu-buthelezi-gives-land-expropriation-warning-18438760.
Also see https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2015-04-07-a-volatile-case-of-afrikan-vs.-indian-in-kwazulu-
natal/#.VSe7w5UcTIW.
104. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2018-09-10-corrupt-cs-anti-indian-prejudice-in-the-durban-metro/.
105. See Hermann Giliomee, The Afrikaners: Biography of a people (Tafelberg, Cape Town, 2003).
106. https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/many-whites-will-be-forced-to-leave-the-country-fw-de-
klerk-20160826.
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all the continuing problems of the country and In August 2018, Malema’s allegation that “Jews”
to whom it refers to as colonialists, as aliens are training right-wing snipers to kill black people,
who do not really belong in South Africa. was dismissed by the South African Jewish Board
of Deputies. In 2017 and 2018, he also made anti-
Asian remarks directed towards former Finance
It is extremely dangerous when Minister Pravin Gordhan.111 Earlier, he had stated
governments and political leaders that the party would topple the DA opposition
mayor in Port Elizabeth based on his race. “They
in multicultural societies begin will be touched – don’t worry,” Mr Malema told a
to propagate such stereotypes, rally. “We are starting with this whiteness – we are
cutting the throat of whiteness.”112 At a rally on
particularly when such propagators 8 December 2018, Andile Mngxitana, the leader
often believe them with incandescent of the Black First Land First (BLF) movement told
fervour. 107
the audience that they will kill white people. He
stated that “we will kill their women, we will kill
There was “a disturbing escalation of aggressive their children, we will kill their dogs, we will kill
racial rhetoric punctuated by ugly incidents”, De their cats, we kill anything that comes for us”.113
Klerk said, adding that there “is no balance in the
manner in which racist remarks and incidents are
judged. Foolish and unacceptable racist remarks … ANC breaking the negotiated
not intended for public dissemination are treated settlement of 1994
far more harshly than incendiary remarks made in
public by political leaders openly calling for racial The negotiated settlement of the 1990s in South
violence.” According to him, it was imperative to Africa intended to stop decade-long struggles
end South Africa’s slide into “new forms or racism”. between groups trying to avoid domination by
each other. It also tried to reflect the sentiment
De Klerk spoke after the ANC acted against anti- expressed by Nelson Mandela, namely that
black comments made by private individuals on he opposed both white domination and
social media,108 while it did not pursue comments black domination in the diverse country. The
of anti-white racism extolled by Julius Malema, Constitution of 1996 that emerged from the
leader of the EFF. The EFF is a radical socialist ANC settlement, recognized and tried to protect the
breakaway party in Parliament whose policies on rights and equality of all citizens and all cultural
expropriation without compensation and free groups. It also provided for fair redistributionist
education have been adopted by the ANC. In June measures, but with protected property rights.
2018, Malema stated in an interview: “I’m saying
to you, we’ve not called for the killing of white One of the key policy decisions at the ANC
people ... at least, for now. I can’t guarantee the conference in December 2017 was on expropriation
future”.109 In July 2018, he supported calls for anti- of land without compensation. The policy was
white violence made by Louis Farrakhan.110 previously advocated mainly by the radical
107. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-01-24-fw-de-klerk-claiming-space-in-sas-democratic-history-while-
criticising-new-forms-of-racism/.
108. https://city-press.news24.com/News/racism-penny-sparrow-fined-r150k-community-service-for-
theunissen-20160610.
109. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FrrlLQFbVOs.
110. https://www.thesouthafrican.com/violence-against-whites-julius-malema-tweets-in-agreement/.
111. https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/1999850/malema-faces-backlash-for-anti-semitic-rant/; https://
monthlyreview.org/2019/01/01/south-africa-suffers-capitalist-crisis-deja-vu/.
112. https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/we-are-cutting-the-throat-of-whiteness-malema-on-plans-to-remove-
trollip-20180304.
113. https://www.iol.co.za/the-star/news/human-rights-commission-probes-mngxitamas-anti-white-rant-18479839.
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socialist EFF.114 The ANC announced in February De Klerk has stated that it has been clear from
2018 that it planned to expropriate mostly white- 2012 onwards that it has never been the ANC’s
owned farms without compensation. President intention to maintain all the rights contained in
Ramaphosa announced on 31 July 2018 that the the Constitution, including the protection of all
ANC would even try to change the Constitution to cultural groups and languages. He went on to say:
support such expropriation without compensation.
On 22 August 2018, Ramaphosa confirmed that I have come to the conclusion that the future of
urban land would also be covered by the ANC’s the Afrikaner people and all minorities is once
expropriation policies.115 again in our own hands – just as it was so many
times in our turbulent past.118
Former President Thabo Mbeki’s foundation
stated in a leaked internal paper that the ANC has The breaking of the negotiated settlement by the
abandoned its historical values on non-racialism ANC may in time again fuel radicalization among
through its framing of the land-reform debate as members of the newly-marginalized citizens and
one of black versus white.116 Political economist communities, and also new conflicts. A statement
Moeletsi Mbeki also said in this regard: in July 2018 by Goodwill Zwelithini, the king of the
Zulus, which constitute about 22% of the diverse
This is not about land. It is about the loss of votes population of South Africa, encapsulated this risk.
by the ANC. And the ANC and its little son, the
EFF, they think they can bring back the voters According to the news reports, he stated that the
who are abandoning the ANC by attacking the ANC government “should not even think about
white population … Its solution is to attack the taking away land under the Ingonyama Trust or
white population. Malema is leading the ANC’s else face a war with the Zulu nation ...” It was a
election campaign by attacking the white rallying call by the king who continuously warned
population.117 government not to provoke the Zulu nation. He
called on all his subjects to think deeply about how
In the Afrikaans media, F.W. de Klerk referred to this land should be protected and admonished
the negotiations of 1994 in which Ramaphosa them always to remember that wherever they
participated and that resulted in a negotiated are, they are Zulu first, irrespective of whatever
transfer of power to the ANC to achieve inter- profession they may be in. He again threatened
group peace after decades of guerrilla war, as that KwaZulu-Natal is prepared to become its own
follows: state if government were to continue ignoring
their opinion.119
It is now clear with hindsight that the

ANC negotiators deliberately misled not A new social contract excluding
only Afrikaners – but also all non- some citizens
ANC parties – with regards to their When President Ramaphosa announced the ANC’s
intentions over the medium and long policy of expropriation without compensation in
the SONA of 2018, and amending the Constitution
term. based on the negotiated settlement of 1994, he
referred to giving the land back to “our people”.
114. Susan Booysen, Dominance and decline: The ANC in the time of Zuma (Wits University Press, Johannesburg, 2015), p
229.
115. https://www.enca.com/news/urban-land-will-be-expropriated-ramaphosa.
116. https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2018-09-25-thabo-mbeki-decries-divisive-anc-land-approach/.
117. https://www.huffingtonpost.co.za/2018/05/15/experts-how-land-expropriation-could-go-very-very-
wrong_a_23435358/.
118. https://www.netwerk24.com/Stemme/Aktueel/fw-hof-versaak-minderhede-20180121.
119. https://ewn.co.za/2018/07/05/leave-our-land-or-face-a-war-with-the-zulu-nation.
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This statement was interpreted as excluding by the government, while it marginalizes and
citizens from non-black minorities. Mosiuoa delegitimizes the position of others. At least as
Lekota, a former ANC minister of defence and pervasively, inside the ANC and the bureaucracy
leader of the political party, Congress of the stratification and privileging based on political
People (COPE), asked in Parliament: allegiance to factions or a history in the exile
movement have become a reality too.122 It is
Are you going to take the properties of the possible that the new symbolic domain could
great grandchildren of the Indian indentured eventually also stratify black ethnic groups and
labourers who came here? Are you going to result in new claims-making and contestation.123
take the properties of the French Hugenots
and German refugees who came here, running International business and NGOs would ignore the
away from religious wars in Europe? Is it going stratified, ethnicized and racialized understandings
to be the property of great-grandchildren of of citizenship, property rights and entitlements
slaves who came from the Malay peninsula and at their peril. Linked to the hybrid regime, they
Philippines islands? reflect a new symbolic and political domain that
is far removed from that expressed in the formal
In answer to this, the EFF benches and some ANC liberal democratic Constitution of South Africa.124
MPs shouted: “Yes!” EFF leader Julius Malema
rose on a point of order and added: “The answer
is yes.”120 Middle-class emigration and brain
drain
Under Zuma and Ramaphosa, in the context
of factional struggles, politics include new and Middle-class dissatisfaction remains high with
selective claims for belonging and entitlement the government’s lack of proper protection and
versus exclusion under the rubric of “autochthony”. meagre service delivery amid pervasive corruption
Given the history and pattern of socio-economic and mismanagement. Robert Vivian, professor of
formations in South Africa, they increased the Finance and Insurance at the University of the
risk of a “sons of the soil” contestation between Witwatersrand, described the hidden tax imposed
citizens, similar to such politics in some parts of on tax-payers in exchange for few good services
Africa and Asia.121 as follows:
Asians, Afrikaners and South Africa’s Jewish South Africa has a strange situation. Most
community have all been targeted by hostile middle-class taxpayers pay high taxes,
rhetoric and actions from leaders and officials but receive virtually no benefit. They end
from ANC-aligned and ANC breakaway groups. up attempting to purchase the very same
The social contract between the government and services that should have been provided
the population is shrinking, and the identified out of their taxes. Examples include private
population is also becoming stratified: citizens security services, education, and healthcare.
from certain groups are now clearly privileged It is on some of these services that the hidden
120. https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/whose-land-will-you-take-who-is-not-our-people-lekota-20180219.
121. See Jacques Bertrand and André Laliberté (eds), Multination States in Asia: Accommodation or Resistance
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010); Isabelle Cóté and Matthew I. Mitchell, Elections and ‘sons of the
soil’ conflict dynamics in Africa and Asia”, Democratization, April 2015; http://criticalasianstudies.org/issues/vol41/
no4/we-are-sons-of-this-soil.html.
122. http://www.elsevier.nl/Buitenland/achtergrond/2015/5/Anti-blanke-en-anti-Joodse-sentimenten-onder-zwarte-
studenten-1762677W/; http://www.juedische-allgemeine.de/article/view/id/21806; http://www.haaretz.com/
jewish-world/jewish-world-news/1.646235; http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Standing-against-anti-Semitism-in-
South-Africa-380583.
123. http://www.rdm.co.za/politics/2015/04/24/ethnic-cleansing-sure-to-follow-xenophobia.
124. http://www.gov.za/documents/constitution/constitution-republic-south-africa-1996-1.
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Masakhane tax appears … Those who do not every professional immigrating to South Africa,
pay for services are funded by the group that eight professionals are emigrating.129
does pay. One group of private individuals is
forced to subsidise another. The Masakhane
tax falls outside the control and oversight of
An increase in self-help initiatives
Parliament. It is taxation without consent, and authority migration
appropriation or oversight. As such, it is
manifestly unconstitutional.125 Emigration and migration inside South Africa to
regions not controlled by the ANC, has become
In some cases, the economic and political turmoil a significant response by dissatisfied citizens,
has fueled emigration by skilled professionals from taxpayers and members of communities.130
all groups. According to Pew Research, almost Another response has included a limited but
900 000 South Africans, many of them well-skilled, robust evolution of capacity within communities
were living outside South Africa in 2017.126 Over the and subsystems of the state. It occurred in
past three years, there has been a consistent year- response to ANC misgovernance, weak protection
on-year increase in the number of professionals of citizens, weak responsiveness to taxpayers, and
who would consider leaving the country, according the shrinking social contract. Sometimes these
to Advaita Naidoo, chief operations officer at capacities are linked to organizations located in
executive search firm Jack Hammer. In 2018, specific local governments, resulting also in some
86% of top South African executives polled in the authority migration to such actors. Cities like Cape
latest Jack Hammer Executive Report indicated Town, for example, exhibit an own foreign policy
that they would consider an offer to move abroad and governance.131
seriously. The results show that the percentage
of executives willing to relocate abroad has At times these capacities are linked to
significantly jumped from 47% in 2016 and 78% in organizations located in communities. Also in
2017. Of those interested in relocating, 49% were this case, authority migration occurs. Community
black respondents.127 courts and policing occur in several richer and
poorer pro-ANC townships, also in the Western
The trend of senior professionals from all Cape.132 Among Cape Muslims, own institutions
backgrounds willing to consider a future outside and even neighbourhood watches have played
of the country, is likely to persist in coming years. an important role since the 1990s. Traditional
According to property economist Edwin Rode, institutions remain powerful in much of rural
South Africa “is heading for an extended period South Africa and even beyond.
of social upheaval. Apart from the brain drain,
the country is running out of entrepreneurs who Some sections among the Afrikaners have already
can create jobs”.128 The Enterprise Observatory of responded to the increased pressure of non-
South Africa (EOSA) also recently noted that for performing state institutions or targeting by the
125. “The hidden, unconstitutional tax”, Business Day, 25 February 2016.

126. https://businesstech.co.za/news/lifestyle/293908/heres-how-many-south-africans-are-leaving-for-new-zealand-
australia-and-the-uk/.
127. https://www.fin24.com/Economy/brain-drain-86-of-top-sa-executives-would-move-abroad-survey-20181228.
128. https://www.fin24.com/Economy/sa-macro-economic-outlook-bleak-amid-brain-drain-land-reform-
worries-20180911.
129. https://businesstech.co.za/news/business/293526/top-talent-in-south-africa-is-now-shrinking-expert/.
130. https://city-press.news24.com/News/sharp-rise-in-number-of-south-africans-leaving-the-country-20190117; https://
businesstech.co.za/news/lifestyle/293908/heres-how-many-south-africans-are-leaving-for-new-zealand-australia-
and-the-uk/.
131. http://www.bdlive.co.za/opinion/columnists/2015/06/10/cape-town-a-different-universe.
132. http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/vigilante-killings-on-the-field-of-death-in-south-african-township/
article17052460/; http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3054070/Murderers-rounded-burned-alive-vigilante-
mob-South-Africa-beaten-man-death-streets.html; http://news.sky.com/story/1163607/south-africa-gang-
members-lynched-by-vigilantes.
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hybrid regime. The predominantly Afrikaner- Afrikaans language, culture, and institutions.
led Solidarity Movement has mobilized almost For Afrikaners, it constitutes a breach of the
500 000 members, especially in northern areas of 1994 settlement, but for the ruling power elite,
South Africa. As a movement, it includes eighteen it is the implementation of that agreement …
organizations initiating self-help initiatives. The For Afrikaners, the only way out of this cul-de-
movement positions itself as a centre-right sac of radical transformation is to establish
Christian democratic organization favouring forms extensive cultural self-management through
of community federalism for the eleven cultural strong community institutions.136
groups in South Africa.133
In response to the ANC’s land expropriation
The movement’s member organizations include policies, King Goodwill Zwelithini also called on
one of the fastest-growing civil rights groups in Zulus to defend their culture and tribal lands.137
South Africa – AfriForum, founded in 2006. It had Similarly, Khoisan communities are pursuing
reached a membership of more than 215 000 ways of increasing their authority over their own
by the end of 2018. It conducts court cases on cultural affairs.138 Peter Marais, former Cape
constitutional, cultural and municipal issues of Town mayor and former premier of the Western
interest to its members or citizens in general and Cape province, currently the leader of the Brown
manages campaigns where members help local Empowerment Movement, has indicated that
municipalities to provide better services to all he would promote a campaign for the greater
citizens and communities.134 The movement has autonomy or independence of the Western Cape
also created a technical training facility, a private from ANC-ruled South Africa.139
university based on a broader philosophy of
lifelong learning, a community radio station and a
social welfare service.135 Sometimes, the non-state capacities are linked to
actors in the private sector or certain rural areas,
These initiatives sometimes complement, and at suburban neighbourhoods or towns. This trend is
other times substitute state structures. In January visible in the plethora of private security companies,
2018, Flip Buys, the leader of the Solidarity used by an estimated 11% of households who
Movement, stated: are taxpayers, but without receiving proper state
protection. According to Gareth Newham of the
Various events during 2017 highlighted ISS, the growth of the industry has been as a
the fact that the shared vision around the result of the crime situation, but also of people
[understanding] and interpretation of the not believing that they can rely on the police. The
historic settlement of 1994, as recorded in the 2018 Victims of Crime Survey showed that public
Constitution, has come to an end … This time, satisfaction with SAPS has decreased by 8% over
the ruling ideology of radical transformation the past six years, to its current level of 54%.140
and the “national democratic revolution”, In poorer communities, vigilante movements
jeopardise constitutional spaces and target the have emerged.141 In addition, homeschooling and
private education initiatives, healthcare services,
133. https://solidariteit.co.za/en/.
134. https://www.afriforum.co.za/home/.
135. http://akademia.ac.za/; https://helpendehand.co.za/; http://www.sol-tech.co.za/.
136. http://www.politicsweb.co.za/opinion/transformation-ber-alles.
137. https://www.huffingtonpost.co.za/2018/07/02/king-goodwill-zwelithini-zulus-will-not-sit-by-while-their-land-is-
debated_a_23472427/.
138. https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/chief-khoisan-sa-rejects-traditional-and-khoisan-leadership-bill-18785276.
139. https://mg.co.za/article/2019-01-22-marais-makes-comeback-as-ff-western-cape-premier-candidate.
140. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-01-15-as-sa-policing-fails-private-security-steps-in-but-at-a-cost/.
141. https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/11/29/south-africans-are-taking-the-law-into-their-own-hands-vigilantism-
extralegal-justice-police-apartheid-anc-private-security/.
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as well as energy production and distribution Southern Africa continue, while the capacity of
services have expanded considerably in past years. the central state has been hollowed out after 25
years of ANC rule.
Given the empowerment of individuals by
communication and information technology,142 The dynamics of capacity building and authority
as well as trends towards prosumers in the migration will influence the incentives and
renewable energy sectors of other countries,143 preferences of citizens and communities. The
these trends are likely to continue. They will also political dynamics in different neighborhoods,
provide opportunities for considerable innovation zones and regions in South Africa will be very
by business, but also by other organizations, divergent in future. International business and
communities, neighbourhoods and cities. NGOs are advised to pay close attention to the
different regional and local dimensions of political
and economic developments.
A multipolar future order
In some areas of South Africa, the dynamics of
A multipolar field of authority has emerged in
self-help initiatives and authority migration may
South Africa. Diverse and competing authority
in time evolve into a mediated state. In these
structures, sets of rules, and claims to power co-
zones, “rule of the intermediaries” will substitute
exist, overlap, and intertwine.144 Resilient and
the rule of the central state. The government will
fragile processes of state-reformation co-exist in
accept this situation and try to align with these
the new order.145 Organizations and institutions
actors, not voluntary, but based on necessity.146
that do not form part of the central state fulfil
several state functions in different ways in
Overall, the impact of the ANC-ruled hybrid regime
some areas or communities. Although the ANC
on many citizens and communities has often
government theoretically has the capacity to fulfil
become negative. Attempts by diverse actors to
at least some of these functions, it accepts this
achieve greater decentralization and forms of
modular state as part of its governance model.
greater non-territorial and territorial autonomy
within the region of Southern Africa are likely in
During the past 500 years, there have been many
the medium and long term.
political orders in parts of the region currently
designated as South Africa. South Africa as one
political order is almost 120 years old. The current
territory of South Africa is huge, with space for all
of its many political actors, class formations and
cultural groups. Interactions with other actors in
142. On the global rise in individual empowerment, see National Intelligence Council, Global trends 2030: Alternative
worlds (National Intelligence Council, Washington, D.C., 2012).
143. http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421512003473.
144. See Tobias Hagmann and Markus Hoehne, “Failures of the State Failure Debate: Evidence from the Somali
Territories”, Journal of International Development, 21, 2009, pp 42-57.
145. Alan Whaites, States in development: Understanding state-building (Department for International Development,
London, 2008), p 14.
146. Trutz von Trotha, “Der Aufstieg des Lokalen”, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 28-29, 2005, pp 32-38. See also Ken
Menkhaus, “Governance in the hinterland of Africa’s weak states: Toward a theory of the mediated state”, paper
presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, US, 2006.
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Part IV
The shift to a
hybrid regime
Peter Fabricius has stated that solidarity among
From a flawed democracy to a Africa’s former liberation movements bolsters an
hybrid regime undemocratic ethos:
Roger Southall compares the record of the It perpetuates and reinforces the sense of
liberation movements of Southern Africa after entitlement that these liberation movements-
coming to power in Zimbabwe, Namibia and cum-parties all seem to have: the belief that
South Africa. He concludes that even with the they are destined to govern forever. On that
difficult legacies they inherited, their performance basic premise, any democratic opposition or
in power has been deeply disappointing. While criticism is easy to dismiss as manifesting a
they will survive organizationally, Southall states sinister “regime change” agenda.148
that their essence as progressive forces is dying.147
147. See Roger Southall, Liberation movements in power: Party and state in Southern Africa (James Currey, Suffolk, 2013).
148. https://issafrica.org/iss-today/when-democracy-becomes-regime-change.
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Samuel Issacharoff, Reiss professor of In the case of the ANC, the following non-
Constitutional Law at the New York University democratic dynamics are active: the non-pluralist
School of Law, also stated in 2013: political culture of the ANC and the capture of
state institutions by cadre deployment; the ruling
As the founding generation moved off the party of a one-party dominant state becoming
historic stage, however, and as less-broad- the gatekeeper to power; a weaker separation
minded functionaries took the reins of power, of powers; personalised and unaccountable
the heroic ANC emerged as the head of an presidentialism; weak or neutralized checks on the
increasingly one-party state, with all the executive and the uneven implementation of the
attendant capacity for antidemocratic abuse. rule of law to the president; selective patronage
South African democracy entered a period of and corruption; and the increased securitization
what is termed “dominant party” democracy, of politics.
a term that may simply connote the imminent
collapse of real democratic contestation.149 Electoral politics still matter in South Africa,
but they do so in a subservient role to the new
institutional arrangement of the order that
Drivers of a hybrid regime provides the electoral opportunities. In the case
of South Africa, political patronage, intimidation
In 1994, high hopes existed internationally for and violence also form an active dimension of
the new multiparty political order, with Nelson elections.152 Away from the daily lives of most
Mandela as its first president and Thabo Mbeki citizens, these dynamics represent a distinctive
and F.W. de Klerk as its vice-presidents. By 2014, political order: a hybrid regime. The political
after six years of rule by President Jacob Zuma and incentive systems, the rules of the game, and the
twenty years of ANC rule, the one-party dominant field of power differ from that of democracies.
state had transformed into a hybrid regime.150
President Zuma no longer makes an effort to
In political science, a political regime is the disguise his approach in the one party dominant
particular set of institutions that govern a state. On 7 November 2015, he stated at an ANC
country, constitute the incentive systems and conference in Durban:
establish both the formal and informal rules of
a political game.151 A hybrid regime can be many
variants of institutional arrangements, due to the I argued one time with someone who
presence of both democratic and non-democratic
processes and institutions. In hybrid regimes, the said the country comes first and I said
locus of political power is not the legislature and as much as I understand that, I think
elections, and democratic checks and balances on
the executive are weak. The locus of politics shifts
my organisation, the ANC, comes first.
from accountable democratic institutions to a field Because those people, if they are not
of power in which weak democratic institutions part of the ANC and there was no ANC
and non-democratic institutions interact.
they could be misled. They could be
153
under ... oppression forever.
149. Samuel Issacharoff, “The democratic risk to democratic transitions” at http://constitutionaltransitions.org/wp-

content/uploads/2013/09/Issacharoff-Democratic-Risk-to-Democratic-Transitions.pdf, pp 8-9.
150. Also see Oda van Cranenburgh, “Democracy promotion in Africa: the institutional context”, Democratization, 18(2),
2011, pp 443-461.
151. For a major overview of the work on hybrid regimes, see Andrea Cassani, “Hybrid what? The contemporary debate
on hybrid regimes and the identity question”, XXVI Convegno SISP Università Roma Tre – Facoltà di Scienze Politiche
Roma, Roma, Italia, 13-15 Settembre 2012.
152. See Part VI.
153. http://www.bdlive.co.za/national/politics/2015/11/08/the-anc-comes-first-not-the-country-says-zuma?cx_tag=bcuf.
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President Cyril Ramaphosa’s first State of the monial politics of the elites has “devoured” much
Nation Address was an attempt to reassert of the state and its resources. Government-driven
and augment the hegemonic hold the ANC has neopatrimonial politics in the public and private
exerted over South African politics for the last two sector are set to continue and even intensify
decades. It was, thus, heavy on rhetoric and low during times of greater scarcity.
on hard, quantifiable objectives and outcomes.
The extra reserves that would be needed to change
He spoke of a “new dawn”, but acknowledged the system again, this time into a truly democratic
none of the contemporary forces that brought regime, are exhausted. A restructuring around new
about his election – the judiciary, the media, alliances and new emphases has already occurred
civil society, public advocacy and the opposition. since Ramaphosa has become the ANC leader. This
Rather, he drew on the ANC’s history of old, and process will continue if Ramaphosa were to remain
so, by omission, created the impression that the the state president after the general elections of
cause of the country’s decay and decline – the 2019. At best, some democratic institutions may
ANC – was, simultaneously, the cure.154 become more influential relative to the non-
democratic ones on some issues. However, as
Three drivers will reinforce the dynamics of a argued in Part V, Ramaphosa will have to operate
hybrid regime and democratic decline in the next within the dominant dynamics of a hybrid regime.
few years. The first driver is intensified factional
competition for positions and access to state
resources. The resources are scarcer due to
ANC intolerance of dissenting views
years of unproductive and profligate spending,
The Tripartite Alliance comprising the ANC,
pervasive self-enrichment and patronage politics.
the much smaller South African Communist
With Ramaphosa elected as president and ANC
Party (SACP) and the trade union federation,
leader, factional tensions in the ruling alliance
the Congress of South African Trade Unions
have increased and politicians are re-positioning
(COSATU) have won in five national elections in
themselves.
South Africa between 1994 and 2014. While the
ANC participated in elections, its leadership’s
The second driver is the increased securitization
rootedness in an armed struggle still permeated
of politics: intimidation, protests and political
its political culture.
assassinations increasingly form part of local
intra-ANC struggles and opposition politics. As The Economist concludes in its review of the
However, there are clear signs that the risk of study of the ANC in exile by the prominent scholar
political killings now also extends to provincial and in African Studies, Professor Stephen Ellis:
national politicians, which increases the paranoia
among incumbent ANC politicians at all levels.155 The real message of Stephen Ellis’ history of
This state of affairs also continuously draws in the the African National Congress (ANC) in exile
security cluster and politicized top of the security – painfully and palpably obvious between the
forces. The institutions that could restrain the lines – is how the conspiratorial past affects
executive are weaker than in 1994. the ruling party to the present day. It makes
uncomfortable reading, for it goes some way
The third driver is the economy, which is struggling. towards explaining why President Jacob Zuma,
In previous years, the strength of the economy a former head of the ANC’s intelligence service
and built-up infrastructure provided a cushion in exile, and his comrades now running South
for the ANC not to face the consequences of Africa find it so hard to embrace the notion that
neopatrimonial policies. However, the neopatri
154. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-02-17-op-ed-ramaphosas-state-of-the-nation-address-a-weak-speech-
that-follows-more-than-it-leads/.
155. See Mark Shaw, Hitmen for hire: Exposing South Africa’s underworld (Jonathan Ball, Cape Town, 2017) for a good
analytical study.
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a diversity of opinion and tolerance of dissent and a “communist society”. Consistent with
must be at the heart of any functioning, decent this statement, was the council’s adoption of a
democracy.156 declaration reaffirming the party’s commitment
to a NDR.160
William Gumede, Oppenheimer fellow at St
Antony’s College, Oxford, and the biographer of Anthea Jeffery of the IRR, a liberal think tank, is one
former President Thabo Mbeki and Archbishop of the foremost experts on the NDR. According to
Emeritus Desmond Tutu, already noticed during her, as a result of the NDR framework, the ANC
Mbeki’s rule that the ANC’s political style in exile sees itself as a national liberation movement
has become the dominant pattern of the ANC responsible for implementing the NDR and
in government. The ANC’s approach was one of uniquely entitled to rule.161 This approach is
centralised decision-making, unquestioned loyalty, clear in ANC discourse.162 It often marginalizes or
sycophancy, and no public criticism, as opposed denies the contributions of the multiracial United
to the open debate of a dynamic democracy.157 Democratic Front (UDF),163 the predominantly
Padraig O’Malley has indicated how ANC leaders Zulu IFP,164 liberals and reformists from all
in exile have continued to use the paradigm of ethnic groups,165 and the Black Consciousness
exile while being in power, immune to external Movement166 to the struggle against different
criticisms and responsive only to themselves.158 dimensions of minority rule.
The ANC has repeatedly recommitted itself to a A political scientist at the University of Stellenbosch
National Democratic Revolution (NDR) in South in South Africa, Nicola de Jager, writes:
Africa. This has been the case at its national
conferences at Mafikeng (1997), Stellenbosch
(2002), Polokwane (2007) and Mangaung (2012). If you are critical of the ANC-led government or
So has former President Zuma.159 At the Fourth its officials, then you will be branded as disloyal
National General Council of the party in Midrand to South Africa and the future of South Africa ...
in October 2015, Zuma repeated that the ANC and Consequently, there is little room for the voices
the “vanguard” SACP were partners facing in the of opposition parties, since they are portrayed as
“same direction” towards a “socialist revolution” “forces opposed to transformation”. Opposition
156. http://www.economist.com/news/books-and-arts/21569372-how-conspiratorial-past-affects-present-day-good-
guys-were-often-bad and External mission: The ANC in exile, 1960-1990 (Hurst, London, 2012) by Stephen Ellis,
former Desmond Tutu professor in the Social Sciences at the Free University Amsterdam.
157. William Mervin Gumede, Thabo Mbeki and the battle for the soul of the ANC (Zebra Press, Cape Town, 2005), pp
292-301.
158. Padraig O’Malley, Shades of Difference – Mac Maharaj and the struggle for South Africa (Viking, New York, 2007).
159. http://politicsweb.co.za/politicsweb/view/politicsweb/en/page71654?oid=365935&sn=Detail& pid=71654.
160. http://www.bdlive.co.za/opinion/columnists/2015/10/19/wrong-to-ignore-implications-of-ancs-revolutionary-
ideology.
161. http://www.sairr.org.za/sairr-today-1/research-and-policy-brief-the-national-democratic-revolution-ndr-its-origins-
and-implications-31st-may-2012.
162. http://www.politicsweb.co.za/politicsweb/view/politicsweb/en/page72308?oid= 150911&sn=Marketingweb%20
detail.
163. Ineke van Kessel, “Beyond our wildest dreams”: The United Democratic Front and the transformation of South Africa
(University Press of Virginia, Charlottesville, 2000).
164. Nigel Worden, The making of modern South Africa: Conquest, apartheid, democracy (Wiley-Blackwell, West Sussex,
2012); Hermann Giliomee and Bernard Mbenga, New history of South Africa (Tafelberg Publishers, Cape Town,
2007).
165. Hermann Giliomee, The last Afrikaner leaders: A supreme test of power (University of Virginia Press, Charlottesville,
2013); Mohamed Adhikari, Burdened by race: Coloured identities in Southern Africa (University of Cape Town Press,
Cape Town, 2009).
166. Thomas G. Karis and Gail M. Gerhart, From protest to challenge: Nadir and resurgence, 1964-1979 (V): A
documentary history of African politics in South Africa 1882-1990 (Unisa Press, Pretoria, 1997); Daniel R. Magaziner,
The law and the prophets: Black consciousness in South Africa, 1968-1977 (Ohio University Press, Athens, 2010).
51
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is further constrained by the very real threat of and property rights.170 After several years, this
being branded as disloyal to South Africa if one political culture and approach have transformed
is critical of the ANC-led government.167 the multiparty democracy into a hybrid regime.
This reflects the historical institutional dynamics

of the party. The Dutch historian Ineke van Kessel ANC politics “eats the state”
states:
The ANC is already widely in control of the state
As in the 1980s, in my interviews over 2006- institutions, after a deliberate policy of cadre
2008 I often encountered a profound distrust deployment in all centres of power. The party has
in pluralism. ANC officials and representatives captured state institutions, which have on many
often do not see a distinction between party levels become partisan, rather than the impartial
and state and perceive the ANC as the sole bureaucratic organizations of a democracy.
legitimate locus of power … It is alright to have Patrimonial and legal-bureaucratic elements now
the Democratic Alliance in Cape Town, which is co-exist in a neopatrimonial political system.171
perceived as “a thing for whites”, in spite of the Through its control thereof, the ANC is a source
DA’s substantial Coloured support. However, in of jobs and careers. The ANC also mobilises and
one’s own district, municipality or constituency, uses state resources, as well as access to business
rival political parties such as the PAC and opportunities. As a result, it remains the best-
AZAPO ought to be silenced, side-lined or even funded political party and can counter electoral
“crushed”. The distinct historical traditions in initiatives by opposition parties.
different parts of South Africa have produced
different understandings of the concept of A hybrid regime also constitutes a different way
democracy.168 of elite management. The ANC can use its capture
of state institutions and state-based patronage
The ANC, as Jeffery identifies, does not regard to reward allies and punish opponents. It can
itself to be bound by the Constitution of 1996.169 reinforce intra-elite unity, and contain potential
It considers the Constitution to be a tactical defectors that may form viable opposition
compromise to be changed as the balance groups.172
of power shifts in favour of the ANC. Various
constitutional provisions have in practice simply One-party dominance, instrumental individual
been disregarded. These include Parliament’s patron-client relations and more socially-based
duty to hold the executive to account, the need norms and practices of patronage permeate
for a new electoral system after 1999, and the the captured state. They reproduce uncertainty
prohibition of cadre deployment. about the role and behaviour of state agents.173
Neopatrimonial political dynamics also play a
The NDR also means that the ANC has no principled major role in Russia, the Balkans and several Asian
commitment to key constitutional safeguards, and Latin-American states. However, particular
including press freedom, an independent judiciary African and South African historical drivers shape
167. http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_10560-1522-2-30.pdf?070328103113, pp 15, 25.

168. Ineke van Kessel, The changing meaning of change: The legacy of the United Democratic Front in South Africa,
Fourth European Conference in African Studies, Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala, Sweden, 15-18 June 2011, p 8.
169. See the text at http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/constitution/constitution.htm.
170. http://www.sairr.org.za/sairr-today-1/research-and-policy-brief-the-national-democratic-revolution-ndr-its-origins-
and-implications-31st-may-2012.
171. In its use of the concept of neopatrimonialism, the report follows the approach of Gero Erdmann and Ulf Engel,
“Neopatrimonialism revisited – beyond a catch-all concept”, GIGA Research, 16, February 2006, pp 10, 14.
172. See Susan Booysen, The African National Congress and the regeneration of political power, 1994-2011 (Wits
University Press, Johannesburg, 2011); http://mg.co.za/article/2014-10-16-inside-the-ancs-pyramid-scheme.
173. For a good overview, see Jean-Francois Bayart, The state in Africa. The politics of the belly (Longman, London, 1993).
52
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neopatrimonial politics in the ANC’s hybrid regime. The government’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs)
According to Tom Lodge, the ANC historian and such as ESKOM, South African Airways (SAA)
political scientist, neopatrimonial practices have a and the South African National Roads Agency
long history within the ANC. They were restricted (SANRAL) provide a mainstay of ANC patronage.
during its years in exile and began to resurface once The parastatals, with their billions in lucrative
the armed struggle was over. The party’s historical procurement budgets and responsible for huge
ties to criminal networks, pressures arising from losses, have become an important arena of battles
the transition to majority rule, and contemporary over state capture. Questionable, dubious and
electoral politics played a role. Neopatrimonialism very expensive deals have been done at many
also reflected broader tendencies within South parastatals for years.177
African political and economic life.174
Susan Booysen, a political scientist at the

Neopatrimonial factions competing
University of the Witwatersrand, concludes that for spoils
the ANC-in-government is the custodian of high
levels of visible mismanagement and exploitation Approximately 20 million individuals were
of state resources for personal benefit. Activities registered to pay income tax in 2016. However,
in the “dubious but legal” category are tolerated individuals who are paid less than R350 000 a
and emulated. There is little hesitation to pursue year by a single employer, with no other sources
business interests through the state.175 The ANC of income and no deductions, need not submit a
used political power to gain economic clout, tax return. Thus, only 6 367 627 individuals were
which its patrons and networks converted into required to submit tax returns for the 2016 tax
more political power. That power was used to gain year.178 Many of these taxpayers who are paying
even more clout in the market. an estimated 99% of personal tax in South Africa
voted for opposition parties or abstained from
It is well-resourced and ensures that it stays voting. Still, the ANC also used their money to
that way, if necessary through leveraging rebuild an uneven electoral playing field in the
state resources and the movement acting as a hybrid regime.
business operative, often dressed in patriotism
and empowerment. The ANC was the best- Especially since about 2011, the ANC has
resourced party in South Africa. It seamlessly increasingly had to rely on its control of
leveraged state power for financial deals – with government and state institutions for support. This
the state and by the ANC benefactors. The was due to the combined effect of the so-called
ANC’s Chancellor House business operations, liberation dividend becoming thin, compared to
largely veiled from public scrutiny, dealt in the lack of service delivery, more internal factional
mega-scoring business deals with the state. competition for power and positions, as well as
Chancellor House would help guarantee the many new young voters becoming disgruntled
ANC the resources to counter opposition and supporting opposition parties.
advances, including electoral initiatives.176
Alexander Beresford, a specialist in African politics
174. Tom Lodge, “Neopatrimonial politics in the ANC”, African Affairs, 450, 2014, pp 1-23.
175. Susan Booysen, The African National Congress and the regeneration of political power, 1994-2011 (Wits University
Press, Johannesburg, 2011), p 5; Conference, One hundred years of the ANC: Debating liberation histories and
democracy today, 20-24 September 2011 at http://www.sahistory.org.za.
176. http://www.iol.co.za/business/news/sa-slips-down-corruption-index-1.1616304#.VGwZdpUcTIU. Also see Paul
Holden, “Ensuring reproduction: The ANC and its models of party funding”, in Martin Plaut and Paul Holden (eds),
Who rules South Africa? Pulling the strings of power (Jonathan Ball: Johannesburg, 2012), pp 193-202; Roger
Southall, “The ANC for sale? Money, morality & business in South Africa”, Review of African Political Economy, 35
(116), June 2008, pp 281-299.
177. http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-212.html; http://mg.co.za/tag/parastatals; http://mg.co.za/
article/2016-09-02-00-treasurys-bids-to-end-corruption-are-peeling-back-a-curiously-connected-gravy-trail.
178. https://businesstech.co.za/news/finance/218815/this-is-who-is-paying-south-africas-personal-income-tax/.
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at the University of Leeds School of Politics and and in the run-up to the election of an ANC leader
International Studies, talked to former cabinet in 2017 and the national elections in 2019. The
ministers of the Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki split in the ANC-aligned COSATU and the resulting
administrations, and current members of the competition between trade unions, as well as
party’s NEC. He points towards what he prefers to pressure from key potential constituencies like
call “gatekeeper politics”:179 the urban middle class, will reinforce factional
tensions and struggles, sometimes in the form of
The interplay between money and power is violent group struggles or political assassinations.
complex, with each feeding the other, but They will also reinforce the dynamics of a hybrid
Beresford told UJ students that ANC patronage regime in a new symbolic and political order.
has two core elements: the distribution of
the spoils of power, such as control over
developmental project jobs wielded by ANC Party-state separation, cadre
councillors, and the phenomenon of crony deployment and patronage
capitalism, where closeness to the ANC provides
access to market opportunities and tenders. The ANC has adopted “democratic centralism” as
a central policy: this means that the making of all
policy decisions is concentrated in the NEC, the
In both cases that makes those ANC’s highest decision-making body. This policy is
who guard the gates, whether to not only indifferent to the federal structure and
multiple centres of policy-making envisaged by
government money or to those in power, the South African Constitution. In its execution, it
important – and makes the contest for is corroding the democratic checks and balances
the position fierce. “This allows us to built into the Constitution.183
understand the factional politics,” he The ANC pursues democratic centralism by a policy
said. “The struggle for who controls of cadre deployment. This policy entails placing
180 party loyalists in “key centres” of power. The ANC
the gates is extremely intense.” conference in 1997 identified these centres of
Former President Thabo Mbeki has criticized Zuma, power as “the army, the police, the bureaucracy,
but acknowledged that self-enriching ANC cadres intelligence structures, the judiciary, parastatals,
had already been prominent during his own term and agencies such as regulatory bodies, the public
in office.181 Former President Kgalema Motlanthe broadcaster, the central bank and so on”. The
has stated that the ANC’s internal democracy is 2007 ANC Polokwane conference, during which
impaired, and that the ANC is currently made up Jacob Zuma was elected as president of the ANC,
mostly of members and leaders devoid of the kind added the “private sector”.
of political ability and consciousness required to
maintain a united and non-racial society.182 Cadre deployment has been used to quell dissent
and to co-opt potential internal opposition from
There are members and supporters who deplore the ANC’s parliamentary caucus. In addition, the
these dynamics, but they have limited influence. ANC and bureaucratic structures are permeated
As predicted, factional struggles in the ruling by informal, patron-client relationships that
alliance have increased during the local elections often stem from the struggle period, family and
179. http://mg.co.za/article/2014-10-16-inside-the-ancs-pyramid-scheme.
180. http://mg.co.za/article/2014-10-16-inside-the-ancs-pyramid-scheme.
181. “Mbeki blasts Zuma’s leadership”, Times Live, 21 October 2014.
182. http://www.bdlive.co.za/national/2015/11/02/tripartite-alliance-is-dead-says-motlanthe.
183. William Mervin Gumede, Thabo Mbeki and the battle for the soul of the ANC (Zebra Press, Cape Town, 2005), p 305.
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ethnic networks, spiritual advisers, and new who qualify and not only to ANC loyalists. When it
business partnerships.184 Patronage has turned comes to the allocation of housing, contracts and
cadre deployment into a policy that does not certainly recruitment for jobs, there is ample room
only ensure control on the party’s behalf, but has for favouritism, but the social grants system seems
also morphed into a means to ensure the power largely immune from political interference.189
of the presidency. 185 From 2013 to 2017, Cyril
Ramaphosa was both Zuma’s deputy president According to the World Bank, such an approach,
and the chair of the ANC’s NDC in charge of cade combined with a redistributional tax system,
deployment.186 has lifted 3.6 million people out of poverty in
the recent past.190 However, the government has
proved unable to ensure or facilitate a strong
Patronage politics education system. The grants, as Steinberg
remarks, symbolizes the failure of sufficient job
In practice, patronage politics has resulted in the creation.
number of civil servants ballooning. Salaries have
also exceeded the inflation rate. In essence, the The current model has a political effect: it
taxpayers are funding the ANC’s growing cadre- reinforces citizens’ dependence on the ANC-ruled
led patronage machine.187 state. It is also increasingly difficult to sustain, due
to the minority of about 6.3 million taxpayers in
In some areas that may affect political support a population of more than 56 million people and
in the short term, the ANC does provide good rising state debt.191
services, which also serves as a form of patronage.
Housing for the poor has meant that one in five
now lives in a state-provided house. Based on Reshaping markets and the
support from the financial services sector, and
the redistribution of tax money from a small base
democratic playing field
of taxpayers, the state delivers pensions, child-
As the political scientist Kenneth Greene has
support grants and disability payments to more
demonstrated, where there has been a one-
than seventeen million people per month.188
party dominant system for several terms in
office, the dominant party tends to politicize
Van Kessel states that when it comes to social
the government’s public resources. The party
grants, the South African state functions as a
then uses them for partisan purposes. There
bureaucratic state, dispensing its services to those
is no external constraint in the form of possible
184. Stephen Ellis, External mission: The ANC in exile, 1960-1990 (Hurst, London, 2012); Tom Lodge, “Neopatrimonial
politics in the ANC”, African Affairs, 450, 2014; http://mg.co.za/article/2014-10-16-inside-the-ancs-pyramid-scheme.
185. http://www.bdlive.co.za/opinion/columnists/2015/11/02/zumas-control-over-top-salaries-buys-him-loyalty. Also see
http://www.bdlive.co.za/opinion/columnists/2014/11/12/state-of-the-anc-the-big-picture-with-jacob-zuma-in-the-
centre; http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2015-10-20-anc-membership-numbers-what-is-the-significance/#.
VkZSk5qBfmR.
186. https://www.politicsweb.co.za/opinion/cadre-deployment-ber-alles.
187. “The reason for our lack of delivery” (editorial), Financial Mail, 31 October 2014; http://www.bdlive.co.za/opinion/
columnists/2014/10/20/the-disintegration-of-cadre-deployment-under-zuma. Also see http://www.bdlive.co.za/
opinion/columnists/2013/09/08/this-is-the-business-an-orgy-of-jobs-for-bureaucratic-pals.
188. http://www.bdlive.co.za/opinion/2013/05/31/anc-will-deliver-just-enough-to-stay-in-power; https://businesstech.
co.za/news/business/180503/there-are-officially-more-south-africans-on-social-grants-than-people-who-work-irr/;
https://city-press.news24.com/News/57-million-social-grants-to-be-paid-directly-from-april-1-sassa-20180308.
189. Ineke van Kessel, “The changing meaning of change: The legacy of the United Democratic Front in South Africa”,
Fourth European Conference in African Studies, Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala, Sweden, 15-18 June 2011, p 14.
190. http://businesstech.co.za/news/international/72934/south-africa-among-the-most-unequal-countries/ and http://
www.worldbank.org/en/topic/poverty.
191. See Part X on South Africa’s approaching fiscal cliff; https://businesstech.co.za/news/finance/218815/this-is-who-is-
paying-south-africas-personal-income-tax/.
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alternation, and no internal constraint either. Behind closed doors, the Department of Trade
The bureaucracy is politically controlled through and Industry (DTI) is secretly strong-arming
non-merit-based hiring, dismissal, demotion and South Africa’s finest companies to adopt new
promotion. This monopoly also reinforces the BEE regulations under the threat of damage
political dominance of the party. As the scholar of to their reputations. The proposed fines and
Latin American democracy, Guillermo O’Donnell, mandatory prison sentences are one thing;
puts it, executives have submitted to the vertical damage to a firm’s good name is something
accountability of electorates but not to the else entirely. In this hostile milieu, no business
horizontal accountability of other government dares to be accused of racism, whatever the
agencies.192 facts. But the government now consumes 32%
of national income each year. As such, too many
According to Greene, public resources can be businesses are connected to the government’s
used for partisan purposes by appointing party sphere of economic influence to be able to
supporters to senior positions in publicly-owned ignore its directives.195
corporations. In various ways, public resources
are transferred to the party: through politicized International business will periodically encounter
appointments in the bureaucracy to reward similar dilemmas.
party supporters and punish party opponents; by
privileging party-aligned businesses to contract Under attack for having too much influence over
with the state and publicly-owned corporations; Zuma’s decision making, the three Gupta brothers
by contracts for public works contracts and other wanted the help of public relations company
forms of tenders, subsidies, advertising revenue Bell Pottinger, a major player in the global public
and tax breaks to such entities.193 The tools of relations industry. Bell Pottinger was persuaded
repression and electoral fraud need not be relied by Zuma’s son Duduzane and the prospect of high
on in a hybrid regime. People and enterprises fees to run a campaign targeting businesses citical
soon learn that their prospects depend on their of ANC misgovernance.
political connections.194
According to leaked documents, Duduzane said the
campaign should be “along the lines of economic
Smears of racism against political emancipation of whatever” with a “narrative that
opponents or economic rivals grabs the attention of the grassroots population
who must identify with it, connect with it and feel
As South African Monitor predicted in past years, united by it”. A campaign ensued that eventually
when under pressure over bad governance or included the mainstream news outlets, The New
during tough negotiations, the ANC could easily Age and ANN7, as well as social media, generating
resort to conspiracy theories or to smearing tens of thousands of tweets and hundreds of
opponents as “imperialists”, “racists”, “fascists” or Facebook posts since 2016. Its campaign targeted
“colonialists”. wealthy white South African business rivals to
allegedly deflect attention from the Guptas’ close
This may involve different forms of pressure and links to President Zuma.
intimidation. Loane Sharp, an economist, states:
192. See also Guillermo O’Donnell, Horizontal accountability and new polyarchies, Kellogg Institute, 1998 at https://
kellogg.nd.edu/publications/workingpapers/WPS/253.pdf.
193. See Kenneth Greene, Why dominant parties lose: Mexico’s democratization in comparative perspective (Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 2007); “The political economy of authoritarian single-party dominance” at http://
kgreene.webhost.utexas.edu/ greene%20pol%20econ%20auth%201p%20dom.pdf; http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/
article/2012-12-05-the-ancs-deadly-trinity-politics-power-patronage/#. UnK9675gXzA.
194. https://www.businesslive.co.za/rdm/politics/2017-01-04-politics-live-brace-yourself-an-angry-populist-zuma-
in-2017/; https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/inside-the-gupta-heist-20180121-2.
195. http://www.bdlive.co.za/opinion/2015/04/20/why-new-bee-codes-will-pull-the-rug-from-under-business.
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In November 2016, Johann Rupert, chief executive Bank was asked to meet both the ANC, as well as
officer (CEO) of Richemont, announced that Bell the cabinet’s inter-ministerial committee, in an
Pottinger was behind a campaign that was making attempt to exert political pressure on it to reverse
personal attacks on him and that included the its decision. The meeting with the ANC, which
phrase “white monopoly capital”. Bell Pottinger took place at Luthuli House on 21 April 2017,
denied the allegations.196 An investigation by included the then ANC secretary-general and
law firm Herbert Smith Freehills found that Bell Ramaphosa confidante, Gwede Mantashe, Jessie
Pottinger’s work included material that was Duarte, currently the deputy secretary general
“potentially racially divisive and/or potentially of the ANC, and the head of the ANC’s economic
offensive”. Francis Ingham, director of the UK transformation committee, Enoch Godongwana.
industry’s regulator, the Public Relations and In the meeting Standard Bank CEO, Sim Tshabalala,
Communications Association (PRCA), called it the was asked to respond to the accusation “that it
most unethical public relations work he had seen was colluding with monopoly capital to oppress a
in a decade. After investigation, the PRCA expelled black-owned business”.
Bell Pottinger from the PRCA in response to the
accusations that it had stirred up racial tensions, In addition to the meetings, it has also been
and the company collapsed as a result of the revealed that Oakbay had lobbied an international
scandal.197 shareholder of Standard Bank, claiming that it had
illegally colluded with other banks and saying
Local businesses also experienced direct that its motivations in closing the accounts had
government pressure. Standard Bank in December been racist. This was done without informing
2017 filed an affidavit in the High Court in Pretoria, Standard Bank.198 The risk of similar campaigns
appealing for protection against extensive political against recalcitrant negotiating parties, business
pressure it had come under from the ANC, cabinet competitors and political opponents will remain
ministers and the Gupta-linked Oakbay after it considerable.
had closed the company’s accounts. Standard
196. https://www.theguardian.com/media/2017/sep/05/bell-pottingersouth-africa-pr-firm.
197. https://www.biznews.com/undictated/2018/01/08/best-2017-bell-pottingers-gupta-work-unethical-ive-ever-seen-
prca-dg/; http://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2017/09/04/report-slams-bell-pottinger-race-hate-south-africa-
campaign/.
198. https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/politics/2016-12-15-breaking-news-standard-bank-files-explosive-affidavit-
seeking-protection-from-political-interference/.
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Part V
Factional struggles and
Ramaphosa’s challenges
security agencies. As in countries like Mexico and
Intertwined legal and illegal Colombia, these two domains co-exist in the same
domains 199 political system.200 Historically, the legal and illegal
domains are also interlinked in South Africa.201 In
South Africa has a formal conventional economy, the case of the ruling ANC, partnerships of some
which has become strongly entangled with the cadres with drugs and smuggling crime syndicates
ANC political elites. However, there also is an during the years of the political underground and
informal economy, part of which is dominated exile have continued after 1994.202
by crime syndicates with links to politicians and
199. For an analysis of this dimension during the Zuma presidency, see South African Monitor, (8), February 2018, part VII
at https://sa-monitor.com/south-african-monitor-report-8-february-2018/.
200. Jean-François Bayart, Stephen Ellis and Béatrice Hibou, The criminalization of the state in Africa (James Currey,
Oxford, 1999).
201. R.W. Johnson, How long will South Africa survive? The looming crisis (Jonathan Ball Publishers, Cape Town, 2015), pp
18-49.
202. Stephen Ellis, External mission: The ANC in exile 1960-1990 (Hurst, London, 2012), pp 168-170, 273-274. Also see
South African Monitor, (8), February 2018 at https://sa-monitor.com/south-african-monitor-report-8-february-2018/.
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According to R.W. Johnson, the Zuma presidency ministers,208 as well as trusted internal ANC
(2009-2018) has brought about the widespread operators was also clear.209
further criminalisation of the state.203 Ramaphosa
served as the vice-president from 2014-2018. A Over time evidence emerged of the influential role
series of billion-dollar arms trade scandals, referred played by one business network, that of the Indian
to as the “Arms Deal”, reach to the inner core of Gupta family. By the middle of 2013, the South
the ANC and the foundation of the new political African Revenue Service (SARS) was investigating
order. It allegedly involved the then minister of the Guptas for possible tax evasion. In 2014, Zuma
Defence Joe Modise and later Presidents Thabo appointed Thomas Moyane as commissioner of
Mbeki and Jacob Zuma. All the details of the Arms SARS. His predecessor, Oupa Magashula, resigned,
Deal have not been unearthed yet, but much is owing to alleged involvement in nepotism.
already available in the public domain.204 Moyane’s assignment was to restructure
SARS, whose independence and efficiency had
The main political and legal issues at stake in threatened the Guptas and some of Zuma’s allies.
the arms scandal, including Zuma’s alleged Media campaigns formed part of this campaign.
involvement, have not been resolved.205 The High Many cases were put on ice. Especially a few very
Court ruled on 29 April 2016 that Zuma should competent officials were targeted by Moyane.210
face corruption charges over a 1999 arms deal. Investigative journalist Jacques Pauw documented
The charges were dropped just weeks before the campaign by State Security Agency (SSA)
the 2009 election which led to Zuma becoming officers against SARS officials that could threaten
president. The judge said the decision to drop the corrupt business interests of Zuma allies and
the charges was “irrational”. It remains to be seen also of some SSA senior officials.211
whether the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA)
will effectively reinstate the charges.206 The so-called State Capture project of the Gupta
brothers during the Zuma presidency included
their influence on cabinet appointments and state
Presidentialism and the executive contracts.212 Thousands of personal e-mails from
the Gupta family and their associates were released
Unaccountable presidentialism constitutes a key in 2017 in what became known as #Guptaleaks. It
force in the ANC’s hybrid regime. The ANC under exposed Duduzane Zuma, President Zuma’s son,
Zuma used a big cabinet with frequent reshuffles as the key middleman for the Guptas. In exchange
to ensure the support of key constituencies and for being appointed as director of several Gupta
networks.207 The ANC’s top six officials were companies and numerous material benefist, he
influential in President Zuma’s political decisions. ensured that the Guptas’ choice of ministers,
The importance of top security officials and parastatal CEOs and top officials were appointed
203. R.W. Johnson, How long will South Africa survive? The looming crisis (Jonathan Ball Publishers, Cape Town, 2015),
p 45.
204. http://mg.co.za/article/2011-12-02-arms-deal-bell-was-deaf-to-bribes-and-lost-out; http://mg.co.za/specialreport/
the-arms-deal; http://www.armsdeal-vpo.co.za/articles04/told_you_so.html; Paul Holden and Hennie van Vuuren,
The devil in the detail: How the Arms Deal changed everything (Jonathan Ball, Johannesburg, 2011); Andrew
Feinstein, After the party: Corruption, the ANC and South Africa’s uncertain future (Verso, London, 2009).
205. http://mg.co.za/article/2015-07-02-judge-seriti-has-left-the-building.
206. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-36169594.
207. http://www.bdlive.co.za/opinion/columnists/2015/11/02/zumas-control-over-top-salaries-buys-him-loyalty. Also see
http://www.bdlive.co.za/opinion/columnists/2014/11/12/state-of-the-anc-the-big-picture-with-jacob-zuma-in-the-
centre.
208. See Part VII.
209. Susan Booysen, Dominance and decline: The ANC in the time of Zuma (Witwatersrand University Press,
Johannesburg, 2015), pp 69-72. Also see http://mg.co.za/article/2014-05-22-kitchen-cabinet-helps-jz-to-rule.
210. Jacques Pauw, The President’s keepers: Those keeping Zuma in power and out of prison (Tafelberg, Cape Town, 2017),
pp 84-85;123-157.
p 49.
212. http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2016-11-02-analysis-thulis-final-game-changer/#.WCjKuoWcFOx.
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to divert lucrative contracts to some of their eye to the business activities and relationships of
companies.213 The Guptas denied any wrongdoing. the key power brokers in the NEC.
Zuma’s faction has tried for years, also by using Among them are the treasurer-general, Paul
the security services, to prevent the Treasury and Mashatile, and the deputy president, David
Ministry of Finance from opposing their efforts Mabuza, respectively the provincial ANC leaders
to gain more access to patronage via lucrative of Gauteng and Mpumalanga. Both have been
deals and SOEs.214 Since becoming president, very close to private business interests. The ANC
Ramaphosa and those supporting him have chairman, Gwede Mantashe, has been named in
removed several corrupt pro-Zuma ministers tender-related scandals, which have been linked
and high-profile officials. However, Ramaphosa’s to procurement transactions for his wife and
power base in the factionalized ANC has limits, and son. The secretary-general’s office is headed by
he has not yet succeeded in completely stamping two Gupta associates, Ace Magashule and Jesse
his authority on the ANC. Duarte.
According to Roger Southall, professor in

A deal to elect Ramaphosa? sociology at the University of the Witwatersrand,
ANC electoral procedures are deeply corrupted
In the months before the ANC leadership election by money changing hands, personal ambition
of December 2017, its two main factions were and factionalism.217 Richard Poplak described the
locked in a stalemate.215 On 18 December 2017, process that resulted in this outcome in more
Zuma’s deputy president Cyril Ramaphosa was graphic language:
elected as leader of the ANC at the party’s fifty-
fourth elective conference. He narrowly defeated Extra-democratically, out of sight of the 5 000
his rival, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, ex-wife of or so comrades lolling about the Nasrec
President Zuma and supported by Zuma, by 2 440 grounds, the steering committee decided that
to 2 261 votes. This did not compare favourable only 17 of the missing votes would be counted
with Zuma’s 60-40 win over Mbeki in 2008. and that Ace (Magashule), we learned, would
stay on as Secretary General. Regardless of the
Ramaphosa, often referred to as CR in public eventual justifications, this is the very essence
discourse, was elected in 2012 as deputy leader of of corruption. The palace intrigue has become
the ANC and appointed as deputy president under boring – the gruesome quid-pro-quos of this
Zuma from 2014. Since 2014, he had also been the deal will eventually be laid out in a bestselling
head of the National Planning Commission and of book, and good luck to the author. The point,
the ANC National Deployment Committee. however, is that inside a committee run by
Gwede Mantashe, (the ANC’s new national
The election of the ANC’s top decision-making chairperson), Cyril Ramaphosa and his new
body, the NEC, resulted in it again being divided team agreed that it was better to keep Ace as
down the middle, as it had been under Zuma.216 Secretary General than it was to collapse the
Three of the six new NEC members are Zuma conference and re-pantomime democracy.
supporters. Ramaphosa will have to turn a blind
pp 270-271.
214. “Zuma’s empire strikes back hard”, Business Day, 12 October 2016.
215. https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/opinion/columnists/2017-12-20-steven-friedman-the-post-conference-anc--
same-party-with-new-wrinkles/.
216. https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/opinion/columnists/2017-12-19-carol-paton-different-leader-and-different-faces-
-but-same-top-six-split/.
217. https://mg.co.za/article/2017-12-15-south-africa-needs-electoral-reform-but-presidents-powers-need-watching.
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Ramaphosa is expected to be better than Zuma in

Deals, deals, deals and deals. The final practicing a politics of mirrors, using rhetoric to
alignment of the Top Six and the NEC tell the international business and policymaking
constituencies what they want to hear, without
was the result of deal-making, not an necessarily being able to fulfil his promises. Control
elections process. We spent five days in Risks analyst Seamus Duggan rightly cautions:
Nasrec watching an elaborate farce, The current succession politics are being
a giant R6-million-a-day confidence portrayed as Cyril Ramaphosa and reformists
versus Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and
game. What the fuck was the point of traditionalists. The reality is the nature of
any of this? Why not just work it out this succession battle is far more messy. The
over Blue Label and cigars in Luthuli implications for business are not going to
be as clear-cut as portrayed … While under
House, and save us all the trouble? Ramaphosa we are likely to see a more pro-
The ANC Electoral Conference was a scam. business approach from the ANC‚ he’s going to
The policies that result from it – whether neo- struggle to implement this across his divided
liberal or radical – are scams. The Ramaphosa party.220
era will be defined by scammers colluding with
scammers in order to further scam the people In addition, Zuma’s misgovernance and the theft
of South Africa – and whether those scammers he sanctioned have created a series of crises and
happen to be Cyril’s business buddies in political volatility that could take years to stabilize.
Stellenbosch or Mabuza’s gangster pals in As stated by Susan Booysen:
Dubai hardly matters anymore. Some good
The “Cyril factor” is a useful addition to the
may come to the people of South Africa purely
mix – but effective action is all that will count
by accident, and that must be welcomed. But
at term’s end. Talk-talk has run out of steam
can this divided, deal-drunk ANC really pull us
for the ANC, both internationally and with
from the mire?218
the South African electorate. More talk-plus-
walk will be the benchmark after 25 years of
Politics of mirrors and the potholed ANC rule. The Ramaphosa regime will
be held to account substantively on its promise
circulation of elites to “deepen transformation”.221
International media responses have been
In fact, the ANC conference in December 2017
positive and many observers are more hopeful.
announced a raft of quite radical policy decisions
The German business newspaper Handelsblatt
which seemed to favour the Dlamini-Zuma faction,
commented:
rather than the more moderate Ramaphosa side.
It included changing the Constitution to legalise
South Africa has until now been seen as being
expropriation of land from whites to be given
in steady decline. The financial markets are
to blacks without compensation, nationalising
now relying on the new leader of the African
the South African Reserve Bank (now nominally
National Congress, Cyril Ramaphosa. However,
owned by private shareholders), and providing
to see him as a magic healer would be naïve.219
free higher education to the poor.
218. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-12-21-trainspotter-the-ancs-54th-electoral-scamathon-is-finally-
finally-over-and-the-fix-is-in/#.WmzEnbpFxjp.
219. http://www.handelsblatt.com/my/meinung/kommentare/hoffnungstraeger-bei-der-anc-suedafrika-braucht-den-
neuanfang/20740012.html?ticket=ST-1526424-vgiP3HNpZccp9c4kVcKv-ap1.
220. https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/politics/2017-02-28-analysts-put-their-money-on-cyril-ramaphosa-winning-anc-
leadership-battle/.
221. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2018-01-23-south-africas-complex-2018-transition-and-the-zumaist-
occupation/#.WmyATKjibIV.
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For the time being, Ramaphosa will face a deeply of resources, and to prevent law enforcement
divided party and deeply entrenched patronage investigations and court cases against his interests,
networks. He has started to clean out certain allies and partners.
ministries, agencies and state enterprises,
removing key allies of Zuma. However, his support A new government will have to contain the
inside the ANC remains uncertain and he has factional struggle within the security agencies.
struggled to unite the party behind him. Different factions among the securocrats will
try to find ways to make themselves equally
Many of those in a Ramaphosa cabinet have been indispensable to a Ramaphosa government. They
complicit in or quiet about the excesses of Zuma’s will be aided by the fact that Ramaphosa would
time in office. This holds true even for Ramaphosa, have to deal with a rise in political unrest and
who as deputy president only very belatedly protest, internal opponents from the Zuma camp
criticized the nature and extent of corruption in ANC and state structures, as well as strong
around Zuma.222 Retread politicians, previously challenges by opposition parties in the run-up to
complicit in neopatrimonial politics under Mbeki the 2019 elections.
or Zuma, will become part of new rounds of a
circulation of the elites. “Different leader, different Ramaphosa would have to implement rigorous
vision … same broken ANC merry-go-round” was changes in the SSA and military to remove
the heading of Carol Paton’s analysis after the ANC staunch Zuma loyalists. However, some of the
conference.223 securocrats are likely to try and use Ramaphosa’s
selective anti-corruption campaigns to neutralize
In January 2018, the twenty elected members both Ramaphosa’s political rivals and their own
of the ANC’s National Working Committee bureaucratic rivals.
(NWC) were announced. The NWC reflected the
composition of the NEC, with a similar mix of Ramaphosa, who did not very actively oppose it
Zuma and Ramaphosa loyalists, favouring the new in the past, will be unable to substantially reverse
president. Some Zuma loyalists, such as Nomvula the politicization of the security agencies in future.
Mokonyane, Edna Molewa and Bathabile Dlamini, As Michael Bratton and Nicholas van der Walle
also won seats on the NWC. Indeed, the defeated states, in neopatrimonial orders, parallel and
presidential contender, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, unofficial structures may well hold more power
won the biggest vote on the committee. and authority than the formal administration.224
In the case of the ANC’s hybrid regime, such
structures are now involved in the turbulent
Security agencies to reposition factional struggles.
themselves
A key challenge for Ramaphosa will be the role
Partisan law enforcement actions?
of the security agencies during his rule. Zuma As the political scientist Dirk Kotze notes:
as former intelligence head of the ANC had a
particular preference for and competence in using
the security agencies. They actively helped him Over the past 10 years the country’s
in the past decade to maintain his grip on the
factionalizing ANC, to contain domestic political
criminal justice system has been
opponents, to weaken the institutional checks exploited by the government to deal
and balances that hindered his accumulation mainly with internal ANC factional
222. https://mg.co.za/article/2019-01-14-the-state-capture-spectacle-is-back.
223. https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/opinion/columnists/2017-12-21-carol-paton-different-leader-different-vision--
same-broken-anc-merry-go-round/.
224. Michael Bratton and Nicholas van der Walle, Democratic experiments in Africa (Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 1997), p 62.
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As Richard Calland states, this situation presents

dynamics. The country’s Revenue Ramaphosa with an acute political dilemma, since
Service, which also has investigative he has pledged to “rebuild unity” in the ANC:
and semi-judicial powers, has also been Hence, we are likely to see a very high level and
225
drawn into these dynamics. multifaceted blame game. But any attempt
to restore its credibility will probably prove
However, in January 2018, some of the political counter-productive unless the party accepts
brakes on investigations and prosecutions against that some of its biggest fish must be prosecuted
the political allies and business partners of too.227
President Zuma and his family were removed.
According to insiders, this was the result of Cyril Ramaphosa is also experiencing resistance and
Ramaphosa’s victory at the ANC conference in counter-measures by his political opponents or
December 2017. Unfortunately, these events embarassing developments. In her evidence to
also confirmed to what extent the ANC as a party the Zondo Commission into State Capture under
dominates the formal structures of the state in Zuma, the former Public Enterprises Minister
the one party dominant system. Barbara Hogan said that the ANC’s policy of cadre
deployment, whereby appointments were made
Carol Paton, deputy editor of Business Day, according to ANC membership, was counter-
comments: productive.228 As deputy president and head of
the ANC’s deployment committee, Ramaphosa
Then comes the most damaging repeat of the was jointly responsible for those appointments.
dynamic that has shaped ANC politics since Meanwhile, Khotso de Wee, the secretary of
2005 – the use of the justice system to settle the Zondo Commission into State Capture he
scores among one another. Magashule will had appointed, has been put on leave pending
probably be criminally implicated through investigation into claims that he was one of the
the judicial commission of inquiry into state recipients of cash payments related to a tender
capture. While this will not amount to abuse assigned to a Bosasa subsidiary (Bosasa is a South
of the justice system in the way Zuma used it African company specialising in providing services
against Pravin Gordhan, it is very similar to to government, controversial for its involvement
the attempts to prosecute Zuma for corruption in corruption allegations).229
while Thabo Mbeki was president.
It is still up to investigative journalists to uncover
Mbeki may well have been politically complicit the routes by which Ramaphosa, armed with only
behind the scenes in urging the prosecution of political and trade union connections, became one
Zuma. Ramaphosa might not be playing the of the richest men in South Africa upon leaving
same political game. Assuming he allows the politics in 1997. Ramaphosa has also agreed to
law to take its course, the ANC will once again repay a donation of R500 000 (US$36 000) made
be in the thick of a conflict, with top officials to his election campaign in December 2017. The
on opposite sides of the justice system. Just donation was made by a company which has been
like the other problems it has – factionalism, the beneﬁciary of government projects. It also has
entrenched patronage and corruption – there links to his son, Andile Ramaphosa.
will be no avoiding the internecine conflict that
the state-capture inquiry will bring.226
225. http://www.huffingtonpost.co.za/2018/01/27/is-south-africa-seeing-a-return-to-the-rule-of-law-more-evidence-is-
needed_a_23345213/.
226. https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/opinion/columnists/2017-12-21-carol-paton-different-leader-different-vision--
same-broken-anc-merry-go-round/.
227. https://mg.co.za/article/2018-01-22-is-the-net-about-to-close-on-zuma-and-his-gupta-patronage-network.
228. https://ewn.co.za/2018/11/12/barbara-hogan-anc-often-interfered-in-appointing-executives-at-soes.
229. https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/breaking-zondo-commission-secretary-implicated-in-bosasa-
corruption-20190118; https://www.news24.com/Columnists/AdriaanBasson/is-this-why-bosasa-was-never-
prosecuted-20190121.
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Cyril Ramaphosa initially told Parliament, in reply for provincial executives. By all accounts,
to a question by Democratic Alliance (DA) leader he is systematically ensuring that provincial
Mmusi Maimane, that the money had been paid executives are elected that will do the necessary
into his son’s account, but later said that it had when the time comes to recall Ramaphosa after
been paid by a logistics company, Bosasa, now the election.
known as African Global Operations. The payment
was made on behalf of former Bosasa CEO, Gavin Fourth, there is mounting evidence that key
Watson. Correcting his earlier reply, Ramaphosa power brokers within the ANC are encouraging
said he had inadvertently misled Parliament due the growth of smaller parties to ensure that
to a lack of information about the payment. When the ANC’s electoral majority is less than it
Maimane and EFF leader, Julius Malema, called achieved in the previous election when Zuma
for a full investigation into all payments into his was the leader. In the crazy world of shifting
election fund, Ramaphosa said he would repay opportunistic alliances, the EFF seems to
the money and investigate all payments into the be playing ball – they consistently target
election fund account. Ramaphosa and Pravin Gordhan with little
to say about their old “pay back the money”
Professor Mark Swilling recently noted the enemy, Jacob Zuma.
following about the anti-Ramaphosa campaign
inside the ANC: If successful, a reduced majority would
allow Magashule’s ANC provincial executive
First, there is a well-orchestrated campaign to committees to argue that contrary to the hype,
restore Zuma’s image as the “man of the people” Ramaphosa has not been able to reverse the
– including a pop song – who is prepared to electoral losses experienced during the Zuma
lead the populist charge against poverty and years. The message will be simple: if the ANC is
oppression, namely, “white monopoly capital”. in worse shape under Ramaphosa, why should
he remain the leader?
Second, Zuma has returned to his KwaZulu-
Natal base where he knows how to use violence Fifth, there is sufficient anecdotal evidence
and fear as a weapon to secure national power that the majority of ANC members do not
positions – after all, this was why Nelson understand the true nature of State Capture.
Mandela brought him into the NEC, and why Nor is there much grassroots support for the
Thabo Mbeki had to bring him in close as Zondo Commission — many ANC members
deputy president. would welcome its closure. Recent “leaks”
seem to be about discrediting the Zondo
When Zuma used that famous television Commission.230
interview before he resigned to subtly threaten
increased violence if he was displaced, all
he did then was to voice publicly what he’d A fluid transition
always done within the secretive cloak-and-
dagger world of ANC leadership struggles. The The anti-Zuma faction competing for access to
KwaZulu-Natal youngsters who were sent to patronage and the faction against both Zuma and
Moscow to be trained as assassins continue the politics of patronage succeeded in electing
to be very effective implementers of a low- Ramaphosa as ANC leader in December 2017.231
intensity reign of terror. However, one runs a risk in seeing the membership
of factions as being fixed instead of being fluid.
Third, in his capacity as ANC Secretary General, Opponents of a faction sometimes also use their
Ace Magashule controls the election processes opposition to enforce new concessions and later
230. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2019-01-21-the-zuma-power-elite-is-alive-kicking-and-preparing-to-
replace-ramaphosa/.
231. http://businesstech.co.za/news/general/142598/how-zumas-faction-is-starting-to-unravel/.
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incorporation into the dominant faction. Some did in three major metros in the local elections of
members of factions may be pushed out of a 2016. However, intimidation, threats of violence,
faction or to the side and have to bide their time rehearsals for violence, violent protests, and
to return to the inner circles. This will now also be even political assassinations form part of the
the case for some people in the Zuma camp and new rules of the game, the incentive systems and
the EFF, as the Ramaphosa camp becomes more the positioning of actors in dealing with political
powerful. claims, counter-claims and contestation. This
non-democratic tenor had even been noticeable
Selective anti-corruption campaigns under during the transition of leadership in the ANC,
Ramaphosa will continue, especially aimed at when there had been talk of the risk of conflict
removing the support bases of Zuma. Zuma-ist and civil war if the Zuma faction were not to have
networks, still intent on ensuring that Ramaphosa been dealt with respectfully.234
has a one-term presidency, will be attempting to
limit Ramaphosa’s ability to stamp his authority The institutions established with a view
on the whole ANC.232 However, the interaction to a separation of powers and democratic
between strong non-accountable forces and weak accountability have proven to be too weak to
democratic institutions will continue to shape prevent the massive plundering of state resources
politics. The major political dynamics will continue by ANC networks and policies of patronage.235
to be that of a flexible and possibly reformed Politics among the ANC’s core constituencies
hybrid regime. have also clearly shifted towards more demands
for redistributionism and selective (non-material)
de-Westernization. Protest politics by poor
Weakened democratic institutions communities and militant youth politics have
become quite prominent. Simone Schotte of
Whoever becomes president after the 2019
GIGA found significant discrepancies in attitudes
election, will be governing a state that is a far
towards democracy between the downwardly and
cry from the new political system in 1994. The
upwardly mobile strata of the black middle class,
population has expanded by more than 20%, but
which she terms the “anxious” and the “climbers,”
the capabilities of the state apparatus have not
respectively.
kept up with their demands. During one-party-
dominance over decades, the locus of politics has
On the one hand, the “climbers” show the
shifted from accountable democratic institutions
highest generic support for democracy as a
to a field of power in which weak democratic
form of government, whereas the “anxious”
institutions and non-democratic institutions
middle class displays feelings of resignation.
interact. Neopatrimonial dynamics dominate
On the other hand, I find indicative evidence of
much bigger parts of the state institutions. From
a status‐quo bias among the “climbers”. Rather
2013 to 2017, the high point of Zuma’s misrule
than assuming a more demanding or critical
and corruption, Cyril Ramaphosa was both
stance in politics, they allow their political
Zuma’s deputy president and the chair of the
priorities to be at least partly shaped by an
ANC’s NDC in charge of cadre deployment.233
interest in securing and expanding attained
Party cadre deployment and a non-pluralist
living standards; being upwardly mobile is
political culture now permeate state institutions.
even associated with a higher tolerance for
Elections still occur and the ANC has learnt that
government attempts to constrain freedom of
it can be vulnerable and lose its dominance, as it
information, opinion, or expression.236
232. Also see Susan Booysen, Dominance and decline: The ANC in the time of Zuma (Wits University Press, Johannesburg,
2015), p 37.
233. https://www.politicsweb.co.za/opinion/cadre-deployment-ber-alles.
234. http://www.huffingtonpost.co.za/2018/02/04/inside-the-transition-what-zumas-team-is-thinking_a_23352517/.
235. For a general overview, see Jacques Pauw, The President’s keepers: Those keeping Zuma in power and out of prison
(Tafelberg, Cape Town, 2017).
236. https://www.giga-hamburg.de/de/publication/ambivalent-attitudes-towards-democracy-among-south-africas-
middle-class.
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At the end of July 2018, Cyril Ramaphosa addressed hearings and processes on the necessity of such
the nation as ANC president on state television in an amendment process remained under way. The
what is traditionally a slot reserved for the head moment captured the continuance of a one-party
of state, against the backdrop of two ANC flags. dominant hybrid regime.237
He announced that the ANC had decided that
there would be a constitutional amendment to
“clarify” expropriation without compensation and
that the party would finalize the amendment.
This occurred while the parliamentary public
237. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-08-01-political-brinkmanship-vs-governance-ramaphosas-move-to-
amend-sa-constitution-kickstarts-2019-elections-season/.
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Part VI
The legislature, elections
and violent politics
The ANC’s NEC has tremendous power over
A one-party dominant state elected MPs. The system of closed-list proportional
representation assigns legislative seats to
Strict enforcement of ANC party discipline against
candidates based on their relative position on a
ANC MPs has weakened national legislative
party list, and the NEC draws up the ANC’s party
oversight of the executive. Formally, legislative
list. Even elected MPs can be redeployed by the
authority is vested in Parliament, but in practice
ANC’s NEC and replaced by another ANC cadre.
its role has been reduced to approving bills drafted
The non-parliamentary wing of the ANC dominates
by the ANC-led executive. Behind the formal
the parliamentary wing.238
structures and processes, cadre deployment and
the party rule.
238. Soujit Choudry, “‘He had a mandate’: The South African Constitutional Court and the African National Congress in
a dominant party democracy” (2010), at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1651332, pp 17-18,
33-35.
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Unelected party functionaries thus set the national The events in Parliament were one signal among
government’s policy priorities. The public officials many that the ANC’s dominance during five
subject to electoral accountability tend to be national elections had eroded the checks on
subordinated to unelected party functionaries.239 power created by the Constitution, as well as
Politics are pulled out of the elected legislature Parliament’s oversight role. The securitization of
into the party and into processes that lie outside of Parliament during the past few years aimed to
Parliament. Politicians do not need to comply with inhibit a vigorous questioning of President Zuma
the same norms of transparency, participation by opposition parties.242
and accountability. During Zuma’s two terms,
ANC parliamentarians had clearly been unable The 2016 to 2019 SONAs saw increased police
to provide effective legislative oversight of the presence in the parliamentary precinct and a
executive or the ANC. The overall situation is larger contingent of the in-house security.243 On
unlikely to change during Ramaphosa’s rule in the 29 September 2016, the South African Supreme
next few years. Court of Appeal ruled that the security forces’
jamming of cell phones and limiting of the
broadcasting of proceedings during the 2015
A political culture of impunity SONA in Parliament was unconstitutional and
unlawful.244 During the SONAs of 2018 and 2019,
As explained above, specific ANC policies like delivered by Ramaphosa, however, such forms of
“democratic centralism” and cadre deployment securitization was not apparent.
by the party to national and provincial executives
and legislatures have weakened the separation of
powers. During Zuma’s second term as president, The non-alternation of power in a
Ramaphosa himself chaired the ANC NDC (since
2014). The deployment of ANC officials that hybrid regime
participated in corrupt practices happened on his
According to political scientists, democratic
watch.240
consolidation entails not only compliance with
the framework of electoral democracy for political
Also in Parliament, Ramaphosa never supported
competition, but also at least one electoral loss,
the many opposition party attempts to hold
coupled with a transfer of power.245 Political
President Zuma accountable. In 2014 and
competition, including a viable opposition and the
2015, critical opposition parliamentarians were
credible possibility that an election may remove
physically removed from parliamentary sessions
a party from office, lowers the risk of a governing
at the behest of the ANC leaders, whose MPs
party abusing its power.
formed the majority in Parliament. This lead
the liberal former editor of the Rand Daily Mail,
Allister Sparks, to comment: “This is outrageous.
This is no longer democracy”.241
239. William Mervin Gumede, Thabo Mbeki and the battle for the soul of the ANC (Zebra Press, Cape Town, 2005), p 272.
240. https://mg.co.za/article/2019-01-14-the-state-capture-spectacle-is-back.
241. “South African Parliament in Disarray as ANC Protects Zuma”, Bloomberg, 30 September 2014; “Chaos linked to
Zuma’s plan to flex ANC muscles in parliament”, Reuters, 16 November 2014; “Parliament Diary: Scenes of Shame”,
Daily Maverick, 14 November 2014.
242. http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2015-04-06-op-ed-party-loyalty-patronage-and-the-future-of-the-south-
african-parliament/#.VXbwE8sR672.
243. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-02-13-sonamustfall-dont-normalise-zumas-security-creep/#.Wmo-
uqjibIW; https://www.news24.com/Columnists/Pieter_du_Toit/barricades-alsatians-and-fences-sona-shows-up-a-
party-and-government-afraid-of-its-people-20190210.
244. http://allafrica.com/view/group/main/main/id/00046248.html.
245. Adam Przeworski, Michael Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub and Fernando Limongi, Democracy and development:
Political institutions and well-being in the world, 1950-1990 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000); Kenneth
Greene, Why dominant parties lose: Mexico’s democratization in comparative perspective (Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, 2007).
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ANC statements and actions do not reflect an benefited least from the power transition in 1994
appreciation that without the viable option of may continue to support the ANC in the hope that
alternation, a substantial democracy does not the ANC will finally deliver to them. Those who
exist. They rather project a sense of entitlement have benefited most, seem most likely to drive
to never-ending rule, based on the ANC’s history political change.
of armed struggle against the previous political
order. This approach reflects the non-pluralist His explanation is twofold: increases in service
political culture described.246 delivery appear to heighten citizens’ awareness of,
and exposure to, corruption. Those places in which
However, many voters from largely black and there is the greatest improvement in services, are
poorer communities also feel excluded from also the places in which local politicians self-enrich
existing forms of ANC patronage. Many of the most. Secondly, increases in service delivery
them turned to protests as a form of political appear to change voter expectations, ratcheting
participation, often in conjunction with voting them upward. Once voters are provided with
support for the ANC. They vote for the ANC basic services, they may alter their expectations
during elections, while their protests constitute and demands of government, seeking out
political participation and competition between alternative parties. This could occur either
elections over access to positions, resources through changing needs and desires, or through
and opportunities.247 Sometimes, such protests revised understandings of government capacity.251
interlink with parallel systems of governance and As such, they have become part of the politics of
criminal networks.248 a hybrid regime.
There had been more protests in 2018 than Factional struggles within the ANC and between
in any other year since 2005. Municipal IQ‚ a the ANC and opposition groups will continue to
specialised local government data and intelligence generate political turbulence in the next few years.
organisation‚ recorded 237 protests against Urban and rural invasions and urban protests
municipalities across the country in 2018. In 2014, due to overheated expectations are expected to
a general election year, protests were significantly continue to remain prominent in the run-up to the
higher, and this may again be the case before 2019 elections.252 The risk of local flashpoints of
2019’s elections.249 While 50% of the lower intergroup tensions, mediatized and abused for
number of protests in 2007 involved violence, political agitation, has also risen in many towns
more protests have since involved violence. The and townships. Violent scapegoat politics during
policing of protests appears to add another layer such protests, aimed against African foreigners
of violence between communities and authority or different indigenous cultural communities, will
figures.250 remain real during the next few years.
The protests signal alternative ways of

empowerment, voicing disagreement and The national elections of 2014
bargaining. Evan Lieberman, professor in
Elections in South Africa have occurred within
African Politics at the Massachusetts Institute of
the context of a one-party dominant state for the
Technology (MIT), has found that those who have
246. Stephen Ellis, External mission: The ANC in exile, 1960-1990 (Hurst, London, 2012), pp 298-299, 301-302.
247. http://www.issafrica.org/crimehub/public-violence.
248. Susan Booysen, Dominance and decline: The ANC in the time of Zuma (Wits University Press, Johannesburg, 2015),
pp 267, 274.
249. https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2019-01-16-more-protests-in-2018-than-in-the-last-13-years/.
250. http://www.municipaliq.co.za/publications/press/201710241012397864.pdf.
251. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/11/10/in-south-africa-voters-do-not-reward-good-
service/.
252. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-safrica-land-cities/south-africas-cities-hold-key-to-ramaphosas-land-plan-
idUSKCN1J0145; https://ewn.co.za/2018/07/25/reports-of-intimidation-threats-add-to-tensions-in-zwelihle.
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past 25 years. Furthermore, pockets of citizens rendered to them by the Department of Social
live comfortably, while the majority are relatively Development in collaboration with other
poor and a large percentage of the population is departments, such as health and education. …
unemployed. Nicola de Jager, a political scientist [R]ational behaviour under these perilous and
at the University of Stellenbosch, states: precarious conditions means that people hold
on to what they have and the best way of doing
In such an environment, the incumbent’s that is keeping the ANC in power. In this way, the
ability to create jobs, issue tenders, pay for ANC uses the economic needs and anxieties of
advertisements, determine economic policy poor people to influence their voting patterns.
and otherwise influence the movement of
resources is a pronounced advantage ... In South CASE’s research shows that the ANC uses
Africa, the ANC gains an important advantage strategies that go beyond the charm offensive
between elections, as it has the lion’s share of when engaging with the poor electorate that
public funds, access to private funding through makes up its support base during campaigning
party-owned businesses and reaps the rewards periods … It does this, in the short term,
of cadre deployment within government. In this by engaging in disinformation, such as
context, elections might be free, but declaring threatening to stop social security grants and
them to be fair becomes problematic.253 linking government social security delivery to
the provision of services by a political party.
Moreover, efforts to use a combination of Government services are delivered to the poor
mobilization, patronage and intimidation usually in a manner that strengthens the ANC’s political
proceed long before election monitors take to the party support.
field. The Western Cape and Gauteng are the only
two provinces in South Africa where more than The ANC also displays its power and strength
two-thirds of households earn salaries as their in an intimidating manner using huge numbers
main sources of income. In the rest of the country, of its supporters to induce a sense of fear
households rely significantly on grants to get and anxiety among the poor electorate.
by.254 The Community Agency for Social Enquiry This is apart from engaging in direct acts of
(CASE) did field research into the voting of the intimidation, such as controlling campaigning
poor before the 2014 national elections. CASE’s venues and organising marches to disrupt
research points to the increasingly transactional opposition political parties. These big brother
nature of voting in South Africa, where votes bullying tactics target opposing political party
become a transaction currency: a means of buying supporters.256
goods and services from a political elite, and not
just an expression of confidence in the inherent In December 2015 the Constitutional Court ruled
capabilities of a particular party or leader.255 that the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC)
had endorsed rigged local elections two years
According to Mohamed Motale, CASE’s director, earlier.257 According to the liberal IRR, during the
the ANC uses the economic needs and anxieties 2014 elections there had been a 160% turnout for
of poor people to influence their voting patterns: those aged 80 and older.258 It remains to be seen
to what extent the ANC will use such approaches
The only lifeline that poor households have, during the national elections in May 2019.
are social security grants and the services
253. Nicola de Jager, Why elections in Botswana and South Africa can be ‘free’ but not ‘fair’ at http://democracyinafrica.
org/elections-bostwana-south-africa-can-free-fair/.
254. http://www.fin24.com/Economy/only-gauteng-western-cape-dont-rely-on-grants-for-income-20160602.
255. http://allafrica.com/stories/201405010719.html.
256. http://www.iol.co.za/pretoria-news/opinion/why-the-poor-still-vote-anc-1.1680612#.U4iaRmeKDre. Also see http://www.
issafrica.org/iss-today/sa-elections-what-does-the-electoral-code-of-conduct-say-about-the-abuse-of-state-resources.
257. http://www.sabc.co.za/news/a/8c142b804d21ca148856ea93fd523eaa/Opposition-parties-feel-vindicated-by-court-
judgment-20161406; https://www.enca.com/south-africa/concourt-finds-tlokwe-elections-were-not-free-and-fair.
144-145.
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for the ANC decreased to 35%, continuing the

A hybrid regime resting on 35% of steady decrease since its peak at 54% in 1994.261
eligible voters? 259
According to estimates, more than 750 000

The ANC gained the support of about 35% of the black voters did not vote for the ANC, but for
eligible voters in the 2014 national elections. The the opposition DA.262 Most voters among ethnic
group who did not vote was the single biggest constituencies like the Asians, Afrikaners, English-
group, namely 43%. The shrinking base of actual speaking whites and coloureds supported
voter support also reflects how the locus of politics opposition parties.
has shifted from democratic institutions to the
zone of interaction between democratic and non- However, the ANC used political mobilization and
democratic institutions of a hybrid regime. The patronage in rural areas to compensate for some
elections now interact with the non-democratic losses in urban areas.263 During the campaign,
institutions of the hybrid regime. the KwaZulu-Natal MEC, Meshack Radebe, stated
that social grants are only for “ANC supporters”.264
Among the 57% of eligible voters that did vote Actual physical violence was not widespread
in 2014, the ANC won decisively with 62.2% of enough to have significantly influenced the
the national vote.260 The largest opposition party, outcome of the national elections, but it made a
the liberal DA, secured 22.2% of the vote. The difference at local levels. In the six months leading
newcomer, the socialist EFF, established itself as up to the election on 7 May 2014, 76 incidents
the third-largest political party nationally with of election-related violence had taken place.
6.4% of the vote. The other 29 political parties Of these, two-thirds turned violent. Where the
that contested the national elections shared the political affiliation of perpetrators was known,
remaining 9.2%. the main perpetrating party was the ANC (52%),
followed by the EFF (26%).265
Hertzberg comments:
The turnout of registered voters in the 2014

Local elections
elections was 73% … When the turnout is The ANC engaged in a “black operations”
examined as a proportion of the eligible voting- manoeuvre to influence public opinion during the
age population turnout over 20 years, the local elections of 2016. A covert operations room
figures confirm a decline in participation from was set up on behalf of the ANC with a planned
86% in 1994 to 72% in 1999 and 58% in 2004. budget of R50-million to pay people to create
Only in 2009 was there a slight rise to 60%, false narratives favouring the ANC and targeting
but this was again followed by a drop to 57% opposition parties. This included printing fake
in the 2014 elections. It appears that there is opposition posters, which is in violation of the
an increasing number of eligible South African Municipal Electoral Act and the Election Code of
voters who do not cast a vote. Conduct. The story broke when public relations
consultant Sihle Bolani, who worked on this covert
The ANC’s share of the vote declined from 70% campaign, brought a case against the ANC for non-
in 2004 to the lowest percentage yet … As a payment. Bolani had secretly recorded meetings
result, the proportion of eligible voters voting with ANC officials at the party headquarters in
259. http://www.issafrica.org/voter-participation-in-the-south-african-elections-of-2014.
260. By 2015, many supporters considered the ANC to be underperforming regarding crime, corruption and job-creation.
See http://mg.co.za/article/2015-05-21-even-anc-voters-say-the-ruling-party-is-performing-badly#.VWCZFCQrV0M.
261. http://www.issafrica.org/voter-participation-in-the-south-african-elections-of-2014.
262. “DA hails growth among black voters”, eNCA, 9 May 2014.
263. http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/05/04/uk-safrica-election-zulus-idUKKBN0DK04P20140504.
264. http://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/sa-elections-what-does-the-electoral-code-of-conduct-say-about-the-abuse-of-
state-resources; http://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/taking-the-i-out-of-iec.
265. http://issafrica.org/iss-today/what-does-increasing-political-violence-mean-for-the-future-of-south-africas-
democracy.
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Albert Luthuli House. The recordings implicate

the ANC’s general manager Ignatius Jacobs in ANC to remain in power beyond 2019
directing the campaign to take a “dig at [the ANC’s]
opponents” and also confirmed that R50-million About 3.3 million people who usually vote ANC
was the targeted budget for the campaign.266 during national elections, chose neither to vote
for the DA nor the EFF – not even as protest
The results of the local or municipal elections of 3 options. This suggest that they are available to the
August 2016 constituted the worst performance ANC first. This trend of more votes during national
by the ANC since 1994. The ANC obtained 53.9% of elections than during municipal elections has been
the total vote, followed by the official opposition, a constant in ANC election voting patterns. In 2004,
the DA, with 26.9% and EFF with 8.2%. The ANC lost as in 2009, there were more than 3 million votes
its majority in the capital, Pretoria, the industrial not cast for the ANC in local elections, compared
hub of Johannesburg, and the southern port city to national elections. The ANC should be able to
of Nelson Mandela Bay (Port Elizabeth). The ANC safely win, even with a smaller majority, in the
now has an absolute majority in just three of the national elections of 2019: the condition is that
eight main metropolitan areas, down from seven the almost 3 million voters who did not vote in
in 2011. The ANC’s percentage of support has the local elections do what they usually do during
always been smaller in the demographically more national elections, namely to vote again.268
diverse metropolitan areas. The swing was due
to three factors: a small growth in DA support in The results of the local elections in 2016 removed
predominantly black wards; slightly larger but still major potential sources of patronage from ANC
small growth in support for the EFF; and the large control, including large portions of the R287
number of traditional ANC voters in townships billion local government operating budget and
who did not vote. the R57 billion local government capital budget.
The ANC’s outright control of local government
The ANC continues to dominate the 205 smaller operating budgets has declined from 82% in 2011
councils of towns and rural areas, where many to just less than 42% in 2016. Its outright control
residents depend on government services and of local government capital budgets declined
grants. However, also in these areas, there was from nearly 83% in 2011 to about 45% in 2016.269
some swing away from the ANC. It grew only in After the local elections, Zuma continued to
KwaZulu-Natal and by a meagre 1% at that, but focus on consolidating his power and patronage
24% of all of the ANC’s votes came from the machine, also among key provincial and rural
province. The IFP surged to 18.29% in the province. constituencies.270
Nationally, in the smaller cities and towns, a low
turnout combined with a stronger showing by The ANC is entering the national elections as the
the EFF was mainly responsible for the ANC’s firm favourite to win and to continue its one-party
decline. Still, as political analyst Johnny Steinberg dominance of the hybrid regime.271 As Professor
has stated, in provincial South Africa, there is only Susan Booysen commented in January 2019:
one game in town – the public sector – and it is
controlled by the ANC.267 For the ANC to garner enough votes to get an
outright electoral majority, it needs to persuade
voters that it is a new ANC, which encapsulates
266. https://citizen.co.za/lifestyle/1411143/everything-need-know-war-room-whistleblower-sihle-bolani/.
267. http://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/opinion/columnists/2016-04-01-in-small-towns-survival-rests-on-ruling-party/.
268. http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2016-08-10-steven-sidley-this-is-what-the-numbers-actually-say/#.
V64XeZUw_IV.
269. http://www.bdlive.co.za/opinion/2016/08/17/big-money-is-at-stake-if-the-governance-of-metros-flounders.
270. http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2016-08-24-hazard-ahead-anc-wounded-zuma-unpredictable-gordhan-
targeted/#.V8G4vI9OJjq.
271. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-11-04-the-divided-and-fragmented-house-that-is-the-anc-as-it-
approaches-elections-2019/.
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“hope and renewal” (Ramaphosa’s manifest fall short of persuading a cynical electorate.
phrase). Again, the evidence was spread thinly. The electorate’s frequent blind belief in the
Voters see Zuma (no criminal convictions, but ANC’s liberation movement credentials (in this
with an unequalled record of circumventing organisation being virtuous party-politically)
court appearances), along with a host of has been countered both by the Zuma years
corruption-implicated others, on campaign and the tepid Ramaphosa takeover. On grounds
stages and candidate lists, even on the list for of systematic, rational evaluation by the
statesman presidential advisers, in the name of electorate, the ANC is not tipping the scales.
“unity” … the sacrosanct mission in the 2017- Its hope lies in the electorate being persuaded,
2019 quest to survive Elections 2019. To fuel again, to suspend disbelief. 272
popular flames of disbelief Zuma proxy parties
are spewed out, while Zuma tweets beguilingly
– and sabotages crudely the hope-and-renewal
Political assassinations in a hybrid
message. regime
These factors bear on leadership, and also cast National and provincial factionalism will permeate
shadows on the ANC’s credibility in persuading the selection of candidates and the allocation of
the electorate that this is a united, new ANC, pre-election patronage. Apart from patronage,
a party of reconstituted identity, worthy of political intimidation also shape local and
trust, able to renew and forge anti-corruption provincial politics, sometimes in the form of
in government. In the week of the campaign political assassinations. Before, during and after
launch, the electorate was watching from the the August 2016 local elections, at least twenty
wings while senior ANC functionaries on the political candidates had been assassinated.273
ground worked to counter flare-ups of the anti- Already in August 2013, Raymond Suttner, a
Ramaphosa fires. Pro-Zuma chants and the lawyer and honorary professor at the University
need for NEC members to sidestep obstructionist of the Witwatersrand, as well as a former ANC
regional structures in the province illustrated activist and political prisoner, stated:
the persistent obstacles.
The ANC manifesto gives reasonable evidence (W)holesale assassinations have

of some progress in putting across a coherent become a regularised way of deciding on
ideological and policy message. There is
concerted attention to rebuilding the economy, leadership and access to wealth within
274
in trying conditions, creating skills and the ANC and its allies.
opportunities for a more inclusive economy
that is designed to take care of the poor and Motives for other political killings have included
marginalised (albeit in many cases in the long, the silencing of whistleblowers revealing
very long, term). Ambiguities leap off the pages, corruption in the ANC or civil service, the targeting
but there is evidence that Ramaphosa’s vision of political opponents, or competition for
is being carried forward, largely, by the diverse positions in the ANC or civil service that provide
and factional National Executive Committee. access to public funds and cash from firms eager
to buy political influence.275 The trend seems at
Thus, on the three fronts of policy-ideology, the present to be largely concentrated in northern
ANC organisationally, and the ANC in its ability provinces, especially KwaZulu-Natal, but also in
to govern, there are mixed messages that may North West, Mpumalanga and the Eastern Cape.
272. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2019-01-15-elections-the-anc-and-the-suspension-of-disbelief/.
273. http://mg.co.za/article/2016-08-05-00-whether-the-councillor-candidate-is-dead-or-alive-we-still-want-your-vote.
274. http://raymondsuttner.com/2013/08/18/raymond-suttner-government-and-tripartite-alliance-no-pitch-at-marikana-
memorial/.
275. http://www.issafrica.org/crimehub/policy-brief/political-killings-in-south-africa-the-ultimate-intimidation.
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Political killings have also occurred in Gauteng and council is always a life-and-death issue.” That
in the Western Cape provinces. is a stunning admission. For all the pretence
the ANC regularly offers up of South Africa as a
modern, progressive constitutional democracy,
A climate of fear it is in truth a far more crude and violent affair.
The ANC, which is neither a revolutionary
A few provincial cabinet members and senior ANC
movement nor a traditional political party,
officials have been suspected of or involved in
remains caught between the world of armed
such killings. Moss Phakoe, an ANC councillor and
struggle and formal democracy. A culture
whistleblower, was assassinated in March 2009. He
of assassination has inculcated itself into its
had tried to use ANC channels to report corruption
internal political dynamics. At local government
and after his death, a dossier with evidence he had
level, democratic choice and death often sit side
compiled mysteriously disappeared. When police
by side. That is not a picture well-illustrated by
raided the home of Richard Mdluli, the former
the media. It is remarkable how little sustained
head of Crime Intelligence, the dossier was found.
and meaningful attention this aspect of South
As Shaw states, this raises serious questions
African politics receives.279
about the connections between local-government
assassinations and the interests of provincial and
national government politicians.276 Threats to provincial and national
In 2016, Neo Moepi, previously the spokesperson politicians too
for Thandi Modise, the chairperson of the National
Council of Provinces, said that he had to watch his To date, political assassinations have largely
back. “It’s not just me; everyone in this province affected local politicians, even if there may have
is scared”. David Mabuza, Mpumalanga province’s been involvement by politicians at a higher
premier, and the new ANC vice-president, himself level. However, in the past years, there had been
survived an alleged poisoning attempt in 2015.277 reports of provincial and national politicians
fearing attacks. Reports have emerged of one
In July 2017, ANC presidential hopeful Mathews of President Jacob Zuma’s four wives being
Phosa warned that the vote of no confidence implicated in a plot to poison him in June 2014.280
against Zuma had the potential to endanger Alleged assassination plots against former
the lives of some MPs who are suspected to be North West Premier Supra Mahumapelo of the
preparing to vote against party wishes. Phosa said ANC and SACP leader Blade Nzimande have
there had already been ANC corpses due to the emerged.281 Allegations of involvement in political
power struggles and political killings in areas such assassinations also continue to dog Deputy
as KwaZulu-Natal, Mpumalanga, North West and, President David Mabuza.282
more recently, the Eastern Cape.278
To date, the Ramaphosa presidency has not
Analyst Gareth van Onselen commented earlier: changed this situation, nor is it expected that he
will be able to easily curb these trends among
In response to one apparent assassination, a strongly-factionalised ANC in which historical
ANC general secretary Gwede Mantashe said: involvement, mindsets and practices involving
“The reality is that selection of candidates for intimidation and violence in pursuing political
276. Mark Shaw, Hitmen for hire: Exposing South Africa’s underworld (Jonathan Ball, Cape Town, 2017), pp 167.
277. https://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/2016-01-27-i-was-poisoned-mpumalanga-premier-david-mabuza/.
278. https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/zuma-is-sas-worst-president-since-democracy-20170729.
279. Gareth van Onselen, “Corpses pile up in ANC power struggle”, Business Day, 29 February 2016.
280. http://www.timeslive.co.za/sundaytimes/stnews/2016/11/13/Dramatic-sequel-to-Zuma-poison-plot-as-Abrahams-
warns-MaNtuli-Youre-still-a-suspect.
281. http://ewn.co.za/2018/05/06/hawks-confirm-probe-into-supra-mahumapelo-assassination-plot; http://www.
sabcnews.com/sabcnews/sacp-alleges-blade-nzimandes-life-is-at-risk/.
282. https://www.enca.com/south-africa/who-is-david-mabuza.
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aims, still are prevalent at leadership and supporter Political analyst Protas Madlala commented:
levels. In November 2018, Kimi Makwetu, the
auditor general (AG) warned Parliament to expect
an upsurge in violent crimes against members The ANC should not look outside, because the
of the AG team as they traverse the country problem is within the party. They should not
finalising local government audits. Past examples blame anyone but themselves. The question we
included hijackings, death threats, hostage- should be asking is why this is not happening in
taking, threatening phone calls and actual attacks the DA. It is only happening in the ruling party.
on auditors’ cars and auditors.283 The answer is there for everyone to see. The
people killed all had common denominator:
Factional infighting, sometimes involving they were all against corruption.286
intimidation and political assassinations, will
intensify in the run-up to the national elections In order to get the support from key provinces,
in 2019. According to Mark Shaw, if assassination Ramaphosa as new ANC leader and the state
has utility at the local level as a form of political president in 2019 will have to make deals with
control, this may eventually also apply higher up provincial leaders who are corrupt, and perhaps
in the political system.284 even are implicated in political killings in their
areas. The same dilemma will be faced by
The New York Times of 30 September 2018 international companies trying to conclude major
published a report headed “Hit Men and Power: deals in South Africa.
South Africa’s Leaders Are Killing One Another”
and stating that “the recent increase in killings
inside the ANC is a potent reminder of how far the
party has strayed from creating, in the ashes of
apartheid, a political order based on the rule of
law”.285
283. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-11-29-mounting-violent-attacks-on-state-auditors-a-crime-against-
the-state/.
284. Mark Shaw, Hitmen for hire: Exposing South Africa’s underworld (Jonathan Ball, Cape Town, 2017), pp 175-176, 203-
204.
285. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/30/world/africa/south-africa-anc-killings.html.
286. https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/anc-has-itself-to-blame-for-political-killings-18631772.
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Part VII
The role of politicized
security services
The dynamics of the South African security forces but also in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia and
can currently only be understood in the context Zimbabwe:
of a new hybrid system, not by reference to a full
multiparty democracy. In the one-party dominant The form of democracy practised has been
system, the ruling ANC, previously involved in a unable to dislodge the liberation parties in any
guerrilla war (1960-1990), is still permeated by a of these countries. Instead, they have formed
conspiratorial mind-set.287 There is a perception dominant-party-systems based on a de facto
among some analysts and NGOs that while one-party rule. A key feature determining the
elections may occur every five years, politics have political culture in all these states in various
acquired a non-democratic tenor. Henning Melber degrees is the consistent use of structural
of the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation writes with violence to repress and disenfranchise political
reference to the government in South Africa, opponents in order to retain power.288
287. See Stephen Ellis, External mission: The ANC in exile, 1960-1990 (Hurst, London, 2012).
288. Henning Melber, Liberation movements as governments: Democratic authoritarianism in former settler colonies of
Southern Africa (Basler Afrika Bibiographien, Basel, Working Paper 1, 2013), p 3.
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Melber sees a lack of checks and balances, during a guerrilla struggle; the impact of cadre
practices of exclusion and rule by law (as law of deployment on the leadership of the security
the rulers) instead of rule of law, and control over forces; the increased prominence of the security
agencies supposedly tasked to act independently cluster in decision making; and the wave of
from the governing bodies and political authorities, militant strikes and service delivery protests often
as among the manifestations of structurally linked to factional politics.
embedded violence under these parties: “Their
equation that the party is the government and the Ronnie Kasrils, a founding member of Umkhonto
government is the state translates into a specific we Sizwe (MK) and former minister of Intelligence
form of authoritarian rule”.289 (2004-2008), stated in 2011:
My experience as intelligence minister was that

Securitizing politics the security and intelligence community were
hopelessly politicised. This was made worse
Zuma spent most of his time in exile in the by a culture of secrecy, paranoia, conspiracy
ANC intelligence structures. He was the head theory and authoritarianism. The Protection
of counter-intelligence, but he also retained a of Information legislation is an illustration of
distinctive intelligence network in the ANC. This this. My impression is that it has more to do
network and other allies allowed him to outwit with concealing graft and corruption in high
Thabo Mbeki in the ANC leadership contest in places than with national security. Note its
2007.290 According to Professor Jane Duncan, obsession with threats that would emanate
following “a bruising succession battle” inside from whistleblowers and the media with
the ruling ANC to replace President Thabo Mbeki exceptionally heavy sentences.294
in 2008, “we saw the abuse of the intelligence
services in order to advantage one or the other In 2014, Kasrils already stated that the intelligence
political faction”.291 service had become a tool for the ruling party, and
that officers were increasingly working for the ANC
The political heads of the security services were key rather than for the state. However, under Zuma,
actors of Zuma’s administration.292 The minister of the ANC executive did not act upon a report he
Defence, the chief of the SAPS, the minister of State had tabled in 2008 to improve the state of affairs:
Security and the head of National Intelligence, the
so-called “security cluster”, became difficult to call I blew the whistle and I figured out that there
to account by Parliament.293 were (intelligence) agents, that there were
officers who were not working for the state but
Several factors have combined to securitize were doing ... (work) for Luthuli House … They
politics and will continue to do so: some of these don’t want to know anything about that report
are the ANC’s non-pluralist political culture; the because they want the intelligence service to be
mind-set among many of its key leaders formed a tool of Luthuli House and of the president.295
289. Henning Melber, Liberation movements as governments: Democratic authoritarianism in former settler colonies of
Southern Africa (Basler Afrika Bibiographien, Basel, Working Paper 1, 2013), p 9.
pp 73-75.
291. http://www.aljazeera.com/blogs/africa/2015/02/battle-intelligence-south-africa-ssa-spy-cables-guardian-
security-150224170928946.html. Also see http://mg.co.za/article/2015-05-14-rogue-sars-unit-spied-for-zuma.
292. http://mg.co.za/article/2011-12-02-arms-deal-bell-was-deaf-to-bribes-and-lost-out; http://mg.co.za/specialreport/
the-arms-deal; http://www.armsdeal-vpo.co.za/articles04/told_you_so.html; Paul Holden and Hennie van Vuuren,
The devil in the detail: How the arms deal changed everything (Jonathan Ball, Johannesburg, 2011); Andrew
Feinstein, After the party: Corruption, the ANC and South Africa’s uncertain future (Verso, London, 2009).
293. http://www.academia.edu/1798769/Voice_political_mobilisation_and_repression_under_Jacob _Zuma; http://
www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2011-06-16-jane-duncan-on-the-ever-increasing-menace-of-sas-security-cabal.
294. “Q&A with Ronnie Kasrils”, Amandla, 21 October 2011, pp 8-9.
295. http://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/intelligence-service-an-anc-tool-kasrils-1.1676525#.U4id-GeKDrc.
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Before the April 2014 national elections, news According to Nathan, the intelligence community
emerged about a group of former intelligence is involved in unlawful political activity, and some
officers working from the eleventh floor of members of the ANC are using the intelligence
ANC Headquarters at Luthuli House to screen services to gather intelligence for political
ANC parliamentary and provincial candidates. purposes. “Based on the evidence, they are
It was headed by Thabo Kubu, who worked in not interested in oversight of the intelligence
the National Intelligence Agency (NIA). Before community,” Nathan said.
1990, in exile, he worked in the ANC’s Mbokodo
Security Department, allegedly involved in the
torture of dissidents and detainees. Jacob Zuma
Using state security against civil
was Mbokodo’s deputy head from 1986 to 1993. society watchdogs
Some candidates feared that the screening
project, known as Project Veritas, was an attempt Under the Zuma presidency, more frequently than
by Zuma’s supporters to tighten his control over under the Mbeki presidency,299 several incidents
the party’s caucus, and that the information of threats, veiled threats and burglaries targeting
gleaned during the screening process could be civil NGOs occurred.300 Amnesty International’s
used against them.296 report South Africa 2015/2016 states:
In 2015, Ronnie Kasrils again stated that the

SSA had “become totally immersed in the game Harassment of human rights defenders and
of politics and the power politics at play in this organizations and undermining of oversight
country”.297 Laurie Nathan, the director of the bodies by ruling party and state officials
Centre for Mediation at the University of Pretoria, remained a major concern … Surveillance by
saw the statement as proof that the intelligence crime intelligence or state security officers
services had become more involved in domestic against human rights defenders, including
politics than it had admitted to previously. Nathan, journalists and community activists, continued
one of three commissioners in the Mathews to be reported.301
Commission into the intelligence services, stated:
During 2015 to 2017, security officials and the then
State Security Minister David Mahlobo periodically
The trend has been growing for the accused some parliamentary journalists and civil
society organisations of being “foreign agents”
past 20 years. Previously we only knew with a “regime change” agenda.302 R2K responded:
about it through leaks, but now they
are admitting it. 298 The allegations are offered without evidence
or substantiation. No names are named. No
296. http://mg.co.za/article/2014-03-27-spooks-vet-anc-candidates.
297. http://www.aljazeera.com/blogs/africa/2015/02/battle-intelligence-south-africa-ssa-spy-cables-guardian-
security-150224170928946.html.
298. http://www.bdlive.co.za/national/2015/03/06/ssa-losing-sight-of-core-mandate-as-it-chases-its-own-tail-says-
kasrils.
299. For similar conduct under President Zuma’s predecessor, Thabo Mbeki, see William Mervin Gumede, Thabo Mbeki
and the battle for the soul of the ANC (Zebra Press, Cape Town, 2005), pp 298-299.
300. http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/sinister-cases-of-break-ins-document-theft-1419065; http://www.
dailymaverick.co.za/article/2015-04-29-right2know-intelligence-agencies-harass-political-activists-and-civic-
organisations/#.VUC_nZUcTIW; http://www.netwerk24.com/Nuus/Politiek/meeste-mense-nog-in-sa-vanjaar-wettig-
afgeluister-20161216.
301. https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries//africa/south-africa/report-south-africa/.
302. http://amabhungane.co.za/article/2015-10-26-civil-society-urges-national-assembly-to-appoint-suitable-watchdog-
for-the-spies.
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charges have been laid before a court of law.

As a result, they could apply to nobody or ANC cadre deployment and parallel
they could apply to anybody. They cannot be security networks
verified or refuted. An emerging pattern of
paranoia and suspicion in South African politics Due to cadre deployment, key crime intelligence,
and public life makes it impossible to take investigative and prosecutorial services had
the Minister’s claims at face value. There is for years been effectively unable to use their
growing evidence that intelligence structures constitutional powers against senior ANC
monitor and harass activist movements and politicians allegedly involved in corruption,
other civil society formations, as well as including President Zuma. The formal democratic
investigative journalists. We have also seen checks on presidentialism in the hybrid regime
the anonymous leaking of bogus “intelligence were successfully neutralized. This will remain
reports” to advantage or disadvantage certain possible during the rule of President Ramaphosa
political causes and figures, speaking to a sorry or his successor.
history of factionalisation of some sectors of
the intelligence agencies, who have abused The activities of politicized and partisan crime
their powers unconstitutionally to get involved intelligence and state security officials were
in democratic politics.303 noticed among officials.306 The Directorate of
Special Operations (known as the “Scorpions”),
Journalists have provided indications of mysterious was formed in 1999 under then President Thabo
break-ins into the home of opposition politician Mbeki. With a staff of several hundreds, it
Julius Malema’s lawyer and the offices of the investigated Jacob Zuma and his allies on charges
NGOs involved in litigation against Zuma allies, of corruption before he became president. After
like the Helen Suzman Foundation.304 Zuma had become president, Richard Mdluli,
a Zuma supporter, was appointed as divisional
Security agencies and networks have been closely commissioner of the police’s Crime Intelligence
involved in the factional struggles during which Division (CID) effective from 1 July 2009.
Zuma has tried to remove internal ANC opponents
and critical officials. Steven Friedman, director of The appointment procedure occurred without the
the Centre for the Study of Democracy, stated: regular vetting procedures. Mdluli faced criminal
prosecution for a myriad of crimes ranging from
Zuma was head of ANC intelligence and so, murder to corruption.307 It is suspected that this
under his watch, the security cluster in general happened because of Mdluli’s alleged role in
and the spies in particular have much more providing Zuma’s lawyers with the so-called “spy
room to move – and so to meddle in national tapes”. These were used by then acting National
politics, in this case on behalf of the shadowy Director of Public Prosecutions, Mokotedi Mpshe,
public-private networks that have also become to withdraw the 783 counts of corruption, fraud,
a key feature of our national life.305 money laundering and racketeering against Jacob
Zuma, enabling him to become president of South
Africa.
303. http://www.r2k.org.za/2016/11/18/mahlobo-must-go-get-the-securocrats-out-of-democratic-spaces/; http://www.

capetalk.co.za/articles/233352/minister-mahlobo-caught-out-lying; Jacques Pauw, The President’s keepers: Those
keeping Zuma in power and out of prison (Tafelberg, Cape Town, 2017), pp 56-57.
304. https://martinplaut.wordpress.com/2016/03/22/south-africas-mysterious-burglaries/; http://www.dailymaverick.
co.za/article/2016-10-18-the-way-we-are-the-judge-the-opposition-leader-the-tax-settlement-and-the-mysterious-
break-ins/#.WAb7m5Uw_IU.
305. Steven Friedman, “Zuma as a former spy is important in understanding the Moyane-Gordhan battle”, Business Day, 2
March 2016. Also see https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-12-05-the-principal-agent-network-pan-dossier-
zuma-and-mahlobo-knew-about-arthur-frasers-rogue-intelligence-programme/#.WmzVTrpFxjq.
306. http://mg.co.za/article/2012-08-17-00-zuma-why-were-not-laughing-any-more.
pp 300-301.
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Despite being suspended on full pay since 2012, him. Some highly skilled policement were removed
and despite the fact that evidence implicating because they posed a threat to the Mdluli side.
Mdluli in corruption was successfully used to fire Several of the current top generals did not have
his second in command, Solly Lazarus, in May valid security clearances.312
2014, the police seemed unable to fire Mdluli
during the Zuma presidency.308 Shortly after Pauw recounts that, according to his sources,
Mdluli’s appointment, the Scorpions investigating police and the Hawks units, under the leadership
unit was formally disbanded. Advocate Vusi Pikoli, of Hawks General Berning Ntlemeza, had become
former national director of Public Prosecutions, rogue units during Zuma’s rule. They were
alleged in his memoirs, My Second Initiation, that implicated in dirty tricks like break-ins at state
the decision to disband the Scorpions was “aimed institutions, illegal interceptions and intimidation.
at protecting corrupting politicians”.309 They ensured that all sensitive dockets on Zuma
and his allies were stashed away by Ntlemeza.313
The official Directorate for Priority Crime Ntlemeza has been found to be “dishonest” and
Investigations (known as the “Hawks”) replaced lacking “integrity and honour” by a High Court
the Scorpions. In 2011, the Constitutional Court judge for lying under oath.314
also found that it was “insufficiently insulated
from political influence in its structure and Mdluli was only relieved of his duties (and
functioning” to fulfil its functions as an anti- retired with full benefits) in January 2018,
corruption investigation agency.310 The Hawks is after Ramaphosa had won the ANC leadership
vulnerable to political interference as there are struggle.315 Likewise Ntelemeza was only then
two processes by which its head can be removed: retired with benefits.316 In the same week, a
one through the minister of Police and the second major-general of Crime Intelligence involved in
by Parliament, but there is no clarification as to electronic surveillance assignments was found
which process is superior.311 strangled in the back of his car.317 An analysis of
these cases reinforces the conclusion that under
The award-winning investigative journalist, the ANC’s one-party dominance, a hybrid regime
Jacques Pauw, documented in a book first has emerged.
published in 2017 how networks within the Hawks,
Crime Intelligence and the SSA prepared an active
defense of Zuma. As recorded by Pauw, the Crime
Securocrats to remain powerful
Intelligence Division was plagued by infighting,
Factional struggles in and among the ANC, its allies
maladministration and division between the
and breakaway factions are set to continue. This
Mdluli supporters and those who turned against
308. https://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/why-saps-needs-better-crime-intelligence.
309. http://www.legalbrief.co.za/article.php?story=20131024121805632; 1.1594519#.UnKfeb5gXzB; Vusi Pikoli and
Mandy Wiener, My Second Initiation (Picador Africa, Johannesburg, 2013).
310. SAPA, “Hawks law sent back to parliament”, IOL News, 17 March 2011; Andrew Faull, Inside view: Police officials’
perceptions of corruption and integrity management at three Gauteng SAPS stations in 2009 (ISS, Pretoria, 2011);
Andrew Faull, Corruption in the South African Police Service: Civilian perceptions and experiences (ISS, Pretoria,
2011); Gareth Newman and Andrew Faull, Protector or predator? Tackling police corruption in South Africa (ISS,
Pretoria, 2011), pp 20-24.
311. http://www.bdlive.co.za/national/2013/10/15/legislation-does-not-protect-hawks-from-political-interference;
http://www.bdlive.co.za/national/2015/05/07/dirt-piles-up-in-the-polices-house.
pp 297-299.
pp 321-323.
314. http://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/institutions-in-crisis-continued.
315. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-01-17-analysis-the-rise-and-fall-of-richard-mdluli-a-man-who-
damaged-our-society/#.WmyQ_KjibIV.
316. https://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/south-africa/2018-01-17-ntlemeza-mdluli-out-for-good-mbalula/.
317. https://www.msn.com/en-za/news/national/exclusive-crime-intelligence-major-general-found-dead-in-car/ar-
AAuOTUp.
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trend, combined with increased protest politics implicated in the alleged mismanagement of state
and scarce resources in a struggling economy, security funds in The President’s keepers, the book
will reinforce the securitization of politics in a referred to above by Jacques Pauw.320 In May
hybrid regime. A key test period would emerge 2018, Ramaphosa also appointed a committee to
in future if electoral or other developments were review the SSA.321 Crime Intelligence and Defence
to threaten to remove the national, provincial or Intelligence have thus far been excluded from
local hold on power of a dominant ANC faction review, although Peter Jacobs was appointed to
or the ANC as a whole.318 It is also indicative of head Crime Intelligence.322
strong non-democratic dimensions in ANC politics
that insiders had alluded to the risk of conflict However, at least since the Mbeki era, the
and even civil war in the ANC if the leadership politicization of the security services has
transition was not handled well and the Zuma continued. It is unlikely that the culture of
camp was antagonized too much.319 secrecy and corruption of the past decade, or
vulnerability to domestic political factionalism,
Since Ramaphosa have come to power, the will be changed soon under Ramaphosa.323 Zuma
rhetoric of securocrats alleging a risk of regime has induced resignations and used redeployments
change by opposition forces has disappeared. In to maintain his control over the security agencies.
April 2018, Arthur Fraser, a Zuma loyalist, was Ramaphosa has been trying to do the same to
also redeployed as director-general from SSA remove Zuma loyalists or potential opponents.324
to Correctional Services. It happened when the Due to factionalism and the undemocratic tenor
inspector-general for Intelligence, Setlhomamaru of current politics, Ramaphosa will continue to
Dintwe, turned to the courts after Fraser had strongly rely on the securocrats to stay in power
withdrawn his security clearance. Fraser was in the short and medium term.
318. http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2016-08-22-op-ed-does-the-anc-face-defeat-in-2019/#.V8HFIY9OJjp.
319. http://www.huffingtonpost.co.za/2018/02/04/inside-the-transition-what-zumas-team-is-thinking_a_23352517/.
320. https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2018-04-11-ssas-arthur-fraser-has-threatened-me-intelligence-
inspector-general-accuses/.
321. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2018-06-19-state-security-review-panel-will-need-the-wisdom-of-
solomon/#.WyoVbaczbIV; https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-05-20-after-the-abuse-of-zumas-years-
state-securitys-long-journey-to-recovery-starts-but-not-all-is-smooth/#.WwJ05EiFPIU.
322. https://issafrica.org/iss-today/south-africas-damaged-intelligence-system-is-at-a-crossroads.
323. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-05-20-after-the-abuse-of-zumas-years-state-securitys-long-journey-
to-recovery-starts-but-not-all-is-smooth/#.WwJ05EiFPIU.
324. Susan Booysen, Dominance and decline: The ANC in the time of Zuma (Wits University Press, Johannesburg, 2015),
pp 74-75, 309.
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Part VIII
The justice system and
the judiciary
Policy documents of the ANC state unambiguously rights. A second-order approach to tackle the
that the organization wants to deploy its cadres background rules that structure and result from
in the judiciary too. The South African judiciary ANC domination has been largely absent.325
is still generally seen as independent and free of
executive interference. However, this position is At present, as argued by Constitutional Law expert
vulnerable to political pressures. Sujit Choudry, the Constitutional Court lacks an
adequate understanding and the conceptual
Constitutional Law experts Issacharoff and Pildes tools to question the assumption of political
distinguish between first-order and second-order competition and alternation in South Africa’s
approaches to constitutional judicial review. In political order. The Constitutional Court judges do
South Africa, the Constitutional Court has tended not realize that it cannot rely on the risk of losing
to use a first-order approach that gives attention power as a strong check on the ANC’s abuse of
to those consequences of the ANC’s domination power.326
that manifests themselves as violations of
325. Sujit Choudry, “‘He had a mandate’: The South African Constitutional Court and the African National Congress in a
dominant party democracy”, Constitutional Court Review, 2010.
326. Sujit Choudry, “‘He had a mandate’: The South African Constitutional Court and the African National Congress in a
dominant party democracy”, Constitutional Court Review, 2010, pp 5-6, 37-38.
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Under Jeff Radebe as the minister of Justice, new government would gain the right to appoint
legislation affecting the judiciary was introduced members of a new council that would oversee
in 2012. According to Loammi Wolf,327 a legal lawyers. It would also be allowed to dissolve
academic, Radebe had been trained at Karl Marx the council, a power that could be used if its
University in the judicial model of the former members proved to be too headstrong.
German Democratic Republic (GDR/DDR), in the
early 1980s. According to the GDR model, the Critics of the bill have included both Mr Bizos
Constitutional Court would be the apex of the [George Bizos, Nelson Mandela’s defender
court system. Legislation also reconstituted the before his incarceration] and – before he died
Constitutional Court in this way. in 2012 – Mr Chaskalson, who served as chief
justice under Mandela. Mr Chaskalson wrote
In the East German model, subordinate courts that the new bill was “calculated to erode” the
would not be bound by precedent, but also had independence of lawyers and indirectly that of
to adjudicate according to the directives issued by the judiciary.329
the most senior court, which in turn had to reflect
political and socio-economic policies in the state. These ANC government initiatives point to a
Judicial review of legislation or executive action hybrid regime, not a democracy.
was not permitted, as this reflected a “Western”
notion of the separation of powers. The chief
justice would become directly accountable to
Legal command and rent extraction
the political elite. This model is more compatible by ANC cadres
with a hybrid regime than a fully-functioning
democracy.328 The international system confers a juridical
sovereignty on states that may in practice be less
As The Economist reported on 23 August 2014: absolute. Pierre Englebert states that regardless
of the state institutions’ actual capacity, juridical
[C]ritics worry less about the qualifications and sovereignty nevertheless confers legal command
abilities of those who have been appointed, to African states, defined as “the capacity to
but rather express concern that some of the control, dominate, extract or dictate through the
country’s best lawyers have been blocked law”.330
from appointment … Those suspicions have
been buttressed in the few instances when Legal command offers opportunities for rent
the Judicial Services Commission (JSC), which seeking and patronage to the main power holders,
recommends the nomination of judges, has but also local and intermediary actors. Rather
deigned to give reasons ... than being an instrument for limiting the state’s
arbitrary power, it becomes a tool to exercise
A second avenue of attack is through a new power over others and extract rents, ranging from
bill that would end self-regulation of the legal official documents and citizenship to the right to
profession. The bill, which has been passed seize public resources. These authorities embody
but not yet signed into law, would give the the legitimacy of the state, defined in legal terms.
government considerable influence over the As a result, they can extract rents even in the
day-to-day running of the legal profession. The
327. Loammi Wolf, “Jeff Radebe, the judiciary and the East German model”, Politicsweb.co.za, 17 April 2012.
328. See the analysis of Anthea Jeffery at http://news.acts.co.za/blog/2013/10/judiciary-under-attack-from-the-ruling-
party-but-holding-firm.
329. http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21613352-silk-gowns-red-berets-and-struggle-
independent-court-battles. Also see Anthea Jeffrey at http://news.acts.co.za/blog/2013/10/judiciary-under-attack-
from-the-ruling-party-but-holding-firm.
330. Pierre Englebert, Africa: Unity, Sovereignty, and Sorrow (Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 2009), p 62.
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absence of administrative efficiency, coercive Malan concludes that in cases on property

capacities or good public services.331 rights, land reform and affirmative action, the
embeddedness of the judiciary in a political
The emphasis in hybrid regimes shifts from elite and its dominant ideology became quite
“the rule of law” to “the rule by law”. Even if clear. In 2013 in Agri South Africa v Minister of
the hybrid regime impinges significantly on Minerals and Energy (AfriForum and others as
the civil and business rights protected by the amici curiae),334 the Constitutional Court upheld
existing Constitution, ANC actors are likely to use legislative provisions335 that terminated the
justifications based on legal command. mineral rights of mineral rights holders without
proper compensation to such holders. In 2014
in the judgment in South African Police Service
A politically constrained judiciary? v Solidarity abo Barnard336 the Court once again
sided itself with one of the kingpins of the
According to Professor Koos Malan, an expert on
dominant elite’s ideological doctrines, namely the
Constitutional and Public Law at the University of
principle of representivity. Similarly, in December
Pretoria, the judiciary is in fact inherently weak
2017, a Constitutional Court decision on the
and dependent on the support of the political
University of the Free State’s language policy did
branches. It is appointed and financed by the
not implement the language and cultural rights
political branches, devoid of its own resources and
of minorities enshrined in the Constitution. Chief
dependent upon the goodwill and cooperation of
Justice Mogoeng with the majority effectively
the legislature, executive, state administration and
ruled that cultural minority rights were subject to
the public in general to give effect to its rulings. It
the political goal of transformation.337
is also integrated into the ruling elite with whom
they share the same ideological assumptions
In 2016 the Constitutional Court gave judgment in
without any inclination to oppose them. Hence,
the case of Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker
the impartiality of the courts, when it comes to
of the National Assembly and Others; Democratic
politically sensitive issues, is politically relative
Alliance v Speaker of the National Assembly and
and ideologically conditioned:332
Others (the so-called Nkandla-case).338 The case
emanated from findings and directives in a report
On the one hand – because of its weakness –
of the public protector regarding illegitimate
it will be incapable, and on the other hand –
public expenses on the private homestead of
because it is imbedded in a common power elite
President Jacob Zuma in Nkandla in Kwazulu-Natal.
– it will usually be unwilling to pass judgments
The judgment amounted to a heavy rebuke of the
that would disrupt the basic ideology or derail
president and of the caucus of the ruling ANC in
the core goals of the dominant elite. It can
Parliament. Parliament, and more specifically the
make corrections within the framework of the
parliamentary caucus of the ANC, failed to heed
ideological assumptions and policy goals of
to these findings and directives and usurped for
the dominant elite, but it cannot and will not
itself the powers to review and eventually reject
disrupt or frustrate the framework as such.333
the public protector’s report, thus protecting
331. Giulia Piccolini, “Ultranationalism, democracy and the law: insights from Cote d’Ivoire”, Journal of Modern African
Studies, 52(1), 2014, pp 45-68. Also see http://www.bdlive.co.za/opinion/2014/10/17/sa-has-turned-into-a-
predatory-state.
332. Koos Malan, “Reassessing judicial independence and impartiality against the backdrop of judicial appointments in
South Africa”, Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal, 17(5), 2014.
333. Koos Malan, “Reassessing judicial independence and impartiality against the backdrop of judicial appointments in
South Africa”, Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal, 17(5), 2014, especially pp 1989, 1992.
334. 2013 (7) BCLR 727 (KH).
335. The Mineral Land Petroleum Resources Development Act, Act 28 of 2002.
336. 2014 (1) BCLR 1195 (KH).
337. http://www.fwdeklerk.org/index.php/en/latest/news/726-article-subjectivity-and-fallacious-arguments-in-the-
majority-ruling-on-the-ufs-language-policy.
338. 2016 (5) BCLR 618 (CC).
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its own leader and the party itself. The court, cases like those asking for Mdluli’s suspension and
among other things, ruled this conduct to be the removal from the roll of advocates of senior
unconstitutional and rebuked the parliamentary officials in the NPA protecting Mdluli and Zuma,
ANC in sharp terms. the courts have stepped in to decide on issues
usually prevented by good governance or solved
by political and bureaucratic decision makers in a
The judiciary’s agency democracy.340
According to Malan, the impression that the
The different courts and judges are thus able to
court acted here from outside the dominant
recast the field of interaction between democratic
elite and gave a verdict against the elite is in fact
and non-democratic forces and actors in the hybrid
mistaken.339 None of the ruling elite’s ideological
regime. They are only able to do so conservatively
convictions were at stake. The Nkandla-case
and retrospectively, with limited effect due to the
involved a dispute within the dominant elite, that
broader field of power. They do not do so in a
is split about Zuma, about some of his actions,
politically decisive way, but in ways not predictable
and about the protection that he received from
or controllable by one political faction. Ramaphosa
the ANC caucus.
has felt comfortable to wait for the courts to
decide on the fate of some Zuma loyalists in the
This is a correct conclusion. However, the role of
system. The judiciary remains constrained by the
the judiciary does indicate the spaces of freedom
broader ideological and political constellation of
left within the hybrid regime, the current state of
power. Simultaneously, the judiciary has its own
political dynamics, as well as the extent of its own
agency within the hybrid regime and remains an
agency. Even the dominant ANC faction under
important actor co-shaping the symbolic order,
Zuma has been unable to directly or consistently
boundaries and political options of the hybrid
suborn the courts, who have been able to uphold
regime.
some of the values and norms of the rule of law. In
339. Koos Malan, Dié Hof se visie is dieselfde as die ANC, Rapport Weekliks, 1 Mei 2016 by http://www.netwerk24.
com/Stemme/Aktueel/die-hof-se-visie-is-dieselfde-as-die-anc-20160501.
340. https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/npa-to-consider-options-after-nomgcobo-jiba-lawrence-mrwebi-
struck-off-advocates-roll-20160915; http://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/politics/2016-11-17-political-firestorm-is-
raging-in-sas-criminal-justice-system/.
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Part IX
Universities, the media and
attempts at ANC control
for “patriotic citizens”.341 As indicated by the
Pressures on the autonomy of political scientist Nicola de Jager, “patriotism” has
universities become a code word to inhibit criticism of the
ANC, while critics are often smeared as being non-
The non-pluralist political culture of the ANC, patriotic. 342
which does not differentiate between party and
state, is unlikely to respect the autonomy of The former minister for Higher Education and
universities and academic dissenting views. In Training, Blade Nzimande, also is the leader of
September 2014, then President Zuma spoke at the SACP and had been so at the time he served
the Progressive Professionals Forum and called on as education minister. History is very present
South Africa’s universities to become incubators in Nzimande’s speeches. In a speech in 2007,
341. http://www.bdlive.co.za/opinion/columnists/2014/09/08/zuma-patriotism-and-the-nationalist-threat-to-
independent-thought.
342. http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_10560-1522-2-30.pdf?070328103113, pp 15, 25.
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he referred to “The pessimists, those who lost one clause, the minister would need only to have
their will to struggle with the collapse of the “reason to believe”, rather than concrete proof,
Berlin Wall”. His conclusion was different: “It is that intervention is necessary. Years of creeping
possible (and imperative) to press ahead with the control by the state could well endanger the
socialist-oriented transformation in the present existence of an independent public university
right now”.343 It is not clear whether the ANC sector.346
government sent congratulations to the German
government during the twenty-fifth anniversary Universities whose students come from
celebrations of German re-unification on 9 communities that largely support opposition
November 2014.344 parties will face the greatest threat to autonomy
in the next few years. There has been a focused
The ANC government has created a legal base for effort, for example, to weaken the position of
extending the ANC’s capture of state institutions Afrikaans and Afrikaans speakers at certain
to universities. In 1999, the minister was given schools. Similar political pressures, combined
the power to appoint administrators under his with economic pressures, have resulted in new
direct authority to replace university councils university language policies since 2015. These
and vice-chancellors for a period of two years. In policies weakened or removed Afrikaans as a
2000, he was given the power to veto agreements medium of instruction – despite its officially equal
entered into by universities. In 2002, he was given constitutional position and significant numbers
the power to amend the institutional statute of a of students demanding Afrikaans instruction – at
university in certain circumstances; and in 2012, the University of South Africa, the University of
he was given the power to appoint an assessor, Pretoria, the University of the Free State, and the
instead of or even as well as, an administrator, University of Stellenbosch.
with extensive powers over universities.
There are also efforts to increase the ANC
In 2016, Cabinet and Parliament approved the government’s control over these institutions
Higher Education Amendment Draft Bill. This new and their discourses. This campaign has been
law increased the powers of the minister of Higher noticeable, since many of these schools and
Education to intervene in university matters of universities were working well, while the
various kinds.345 Existing education legislation government did not really undertake a concerted
already enables the minister to issue legally effort to also improve the majority of other less
binding “directives” to universities and appoint functional schools and universities in the country
administrators to take over their management. where education is in crisis.347
However, to do this, she is required to provide
proof, for example through audit reports, that the Instead, ideological initiatives are expected to
university has problems to warrant suspending its receive more attention. For example, Angie
independence. Motshekga, the minister of Basic Education, has
renewed efforts to promote the decolonisation
The new legislation allows the minister to change of education, using the lack of clear definitions
processes and mandates of universities and other to privilege pro-ANC perspectives, rather than a
higher education institutions and also empowers broad, critical curricula improving South Africa’s
the minister to withhold funding. According to underdeveloped scientific and mathematical
343. Blade Nzimande, “Dual power – The living legacy of the Great October Revolution” at https://www.
amadlandawonye.wikispaces.com.
344. On the current frosty relations with Britain, see “Zuma’s smoke and mirrors are his own worst enemy”, Rand Daily
Mail, 3 November 2014; Dennis Worrall, “President Zuma, you have to do better”, Polity, 3 November 2014.
345. Also see Department of Education and Training, “Higher Education Act, 1997: Publication of explanatory summary of
the Higher Education Amendment Bill, 2015”, Government Gazette, 605(39384), 9 November 2015.
346. “Bill giving state more say over varsities passed”, Business Day, 25 May 2016; http://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/
controversial-higher-education-amendment-bill-passed-2025767.
347. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-11-16-ucts-law-programme-under-existential-threat/#.WoEL6UxuLIU.
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skills.348 Ironically, African mother-language The surface reasons were clear. The ANC
education, which used to be promoted under government had invested much more generously
white rule, now is again being promoted as part in secondary than in tertiary education over the
of decolonisation. Simultaneously, based on the past two decades. About 12% of the education
selective politics and social contract of the hybrid budget had gone to tertiary institutions, compared
regime, Afrikaans, the one African language in to 20% elsewhere in Africa. The government
which world-class scientific outputs have been allowed university numbers to double in less than
produced, is being marginalized in institutions of twenty years, while underfunding the sector. As a
higher education.349 result, real per capita funding of tertiary education
has dropped by 30%. The cost of servicing tertiary
institutions thus shifted incrementally towards
Rebellious constituencies those trying to get into them in the form of rising
student fees.
The biggest student protests to hit South Africa
since 1994 erupted in October 2015. The students
However, some analysts see a political logic behind
had rejected an earlier government offer to cap the
this government policy. Investment in secondary
increase of study fees at 6%, down from the 10% to
education is an investment in political loyalty; it
12% proposed by the management of universities.
keeps influential organisations such as the South
The demonstrations, often involving intimidation
African Democratic Teachers Union (SADTU)
and violence, closed some of the country’s top
supportive of the ANC. In contrast, investment in
universities. Protest songs were sung, placards
the tertiary sector seems an investment in critical
raised and entrances to campuses barricaded
and independent opposition voices among the
with burning tyres.350 Protests at Parliament in
black urban middle class.
Cape Town turned violent and subsequently the
police used stun grenades and water cannons to
The political order, with its increase in service
stop a group of students breaking into the Union
delivery protests, is becoming more, rather than
Buildings, the seat of government in Pretoria.351
less polarized among the young urban middle
Vandalism and arson destroyed buildings and
class. The ANC leadership is increasingly being
facilities, creating millions of rand in damage. After
discredited by scandals and corruption, selective
an arson incident at the University of KwaZulu-
patronage is obvious, and the economy is unable
Natal in September 2016, firefighters managed to
to improve youth unemployment. Discursive
bring the fire under control‚ but the faculty had
shifts towards assertive black identity politics and
lost priceless material, including rare books dating
radical economic restructuring have occurred
back to the foundations of modern-day South
among black middle-class youth.
African law in the seventeenth century.352
348. https://allafrica.com/stories/201812190202.html; https://mg.co.za/article/2017-03-24-00-baby-steps-to-decolonise-

schools.
349. https://www.litnet.co.za/afrikaans-is-a-major-african-asset-dele-olojede-the-more-we-eliminate-this-diversity-the-
lesser-we-become-says-africas-first-pulitzer-prize-winner/.
350. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-34618724; http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-
africa/21677252-anc-faces-perhaps-its-biggest-challenge-yet-boiling-over; http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/
world/south-african-police-use-stun-grenades-as-students-protesting-tuition-hikes/article26901219/; http://www.
theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/21/riot-police-tear-gas-student-protest-south-africa-university-fees-cape-town;
http://edition.cnn.com/2015/10/27/africa/fees-must-fall-student-protest-south-africa-explainer/; http://sa-monitor.
com/south-africa-barriers-entry-financial-times-25-october-2015/#more-5095.
351. http://www.bdlive.co.za/national/education/2015/10/23/police-fire-stun-grenades-as-tensions-run-high-at-union-
buildings; http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-34618724.
352. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/ukzn-south-africa-university-protests-nazi-style-library-book-
burning-rape-brutality-a7230296.html.
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They blame small group actors in a narrative that not impose unnecessary burdens on the national
portrays the latter to be big and powerful. “This is budget,” the World Bank said.355
just the tip of the iceberg,” says Sinabo Mnqonoiwa,
a 27-year-old postgraduate student at the
University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg.
Failed education policies
“There’s no Rainbow Nation – it’s on paper,
Stats SA’s research paints a bleak picture of failing
we are all free on paper”.353 While scapegoat
policy interventions, particularly in education
politics and resentment surfaces, they ignore the
and youth employment. The percentage of black
agency of the ANC to improve conditions and the
African professional, managerial and technical
ANC’s accountability for corrupt and ineffective
workers aged 25 to 34, has dropped by 2% over
governance.
the past twenty years, leaving this generation less
skilled than their parents – and less skilled than
Both top-down and bottom-up political forces will
every other race and age group, according to Stats
increase pressure on the autonomy of universities
SA. “When parents are better equipped than the
in the near and medium term. As predicted, the
children, it’s a sign of regression,” said former
ANC has tried to instrumentalize the waves of
Statistician-General Pali Lehohla.356
student protests in its effort to strengthen its hold
on universities. Zuma announced free higher-
Despite pockets of excellence, the quality and work
education for students from poor households in
ethic of too many South Africans are pretty poor.
December 2017. This ignored the views of the
All attempts to improve the standards at schools
Treasury, the recommendations of the Zuma-
are countered by SADTU, which is allied to the
appointed Heher Commission and of the Davis Tax
ANC. It has been behind “widespread” corruption
Committee. Free education previously had been a
and abuse. This included teachers paying union
plank in the EFF party programme.354
officials for plum jobs, and positions being sold for
sex, stock or money. The government has done
Since coming to power, Ramaphosa has not
little in response. Perhaps this is unsurprising;
reversed Zuma’s new policy. The ANC’s plan to
most of the senior civil servants running education
spend more funds subsidising higher education
are SADTU members.357
is fiscally unsustainable and is unlikely to supply
more skills to the economy, the World Bank stated
The Economist commented:
on 22 January 2019. The cost of post-school
education and training will more than double to
Government procurement at all levels is now
R172.2 billion ($12 billion) by 2022, or 2.5% of the
riddled with graft. Start with schools. Corruption
GDP, from R65.4 billion in 2017.
Watch, an NGO, says it has received more than
1 000 reports over the past few years relating
The programme’s high cost would likely make the
to crooked school principals, many of whom
target of doubling enrolments by 2030 “elusive,”
have been stealing cash from their school’s
according to the World Bank. “In a fiscally
bank accounts or looting funds intended to feed
constrained environment, it will be critical that
hungry children. Their jobs are now so lucrative
the government’s higher-education policy does
that they are worth killing for. In 2015 one head
353. http://www.bdlive.co.za/opinion/columnists/2015/10/30/pushing-university-funding-not-in-anc-interest; http://

www.timeslive.co.za/local/2015/10/24/Sanef-concerned-about-intimidation-of-journalists-during-FeesMustFall;
https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2016-12-05-op-ed-the-politics-of-spectacle-reflections-on-the-2016-
student-protests/#.WmO1IqjibIW.
229.
355. https://www.biznews.com/sa-investing/2019/01/22/zuma-free-education-blows-hole-growth-world-bank.
356. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2016-04-18-the-great-reversal-stats-sa-claims-black-youth-are-less-skilled-
than-their-parents/#.WFeu3o9OLIU.
357. https://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21713858-why-it-bottom-class-south-africa-has-one-
worlds-worst-education; “Nzimande’s power grab”, Business Day, 12 May 2016.
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teacher was hacked to death and another was Denying a child the chance of a bright future
shot after they refused to make way for people will drive any parent to extreme levels of anger.
who had “bought” their posts. Officials of the Politicians who, with good reason, are afraid
teachers’ union have also been implicated in of the consequences, especially in a politically
selling posts.358 vulnerable province like Gauteng, would
rather that parents did not come to focus on
Judith February, previously executive director things like below 50% pass rates in maths.
of the Democracy and Governance Unit of the Hence the effort made to focus public anger
Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) and also on other issues such as racism and Afrikaans.
head of the Institute for a Democratic Alternative The political formula is easy: make some
for South Africa (Idasa) South African Governance outrageous allegation based on a sliver of truth
Division stated in 2018 that: and appeal to the media’s bent for the pitiful
drama put into motion when the most reptilian
South African pupils have done abysmally in of politicians conspire through half-truths and
global rankings for the Trends in International populist incitement to turn two fundamentally
Maths and Science Study (TIMMS), and even decent but equally desperate racial or ethnic
more distressing is that our Grade 4 pupils communities against each other and threaten
are unable to ‘read for meaning’. South Africa violent disorder. Ferry in a crowd of protesters,
scored the lowest of 50 countries in the Progress make sure some wet-behind-the-ears click-bait
in International Reading and Literacy Study focused junior journalist fresh out of media
(PIRLS). For any other government committed school is there with his or her cellphone to
to the wellbeing of its citizens and economic draw the voyeuristic public into the wretched
growth, this would have been a crisis. For the scenes of the desperate parents fighting for the
Zuma government it was business as usual …359 chance that their children might go to a good
school. Then bring out the riot police, and you
About 6% of South Africa’s GDP is spent on are assured of another week of not having to
education, compared to the average of 4.8% in answer tough questions about the schools your
EU countries. In 2017, South Africa allocated R240 department runs.360
billion, at 17.5%, the largest single portion of its
budget, to basic education. Yet in January 2017, It is expected that populist agitation against some
The Economist contended, “South Africa has one middle-class and Afrikaans schools will continue.
of the world’s worst education systems.” This may result in serious flashpoints in the few
next years. Many in the ANC will try to benefit
ANC decision makers in northern provinces of from it politically.
South Africa have now started using access to
schools to respond to other popular frustrations The ANC’s defective education policies signal its
with non-delivery and as a red herring to divert inability, more broadly, to master the challenge
attention from its bad educational policies. In the of population growth of 20% in the past decades,
process, especially middle-class and Afrikaans including a youth bulge. In 2016, Stats SA estimated
schools, whose parents do not constitute a key the size of the country’s youthful population (14
constituency for the ANC, are being targeted. to 35 years old) to be 20.1-million, or 36% of the
total population.361
Frans Cronje, president of the liberal thinktank,
the IRR, has stated: Such a youth bulge, according to Gunnar Heinsohn,
combined with high expectations, can easily
358. “The hollow state”, The Economist, 20 December 2015.

359. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2018-01-09-on-freedom-fact-and-falsehood/#.WmOb16jibIV.
360. https://www.news24.com/Columnists/GuestColumn/gauteng-education-departments-master-class-in-
delusion-20180123.
361. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-06-15-time-for-south-africa-to-invest-in-its-youth/.
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result in pressures on the existing institutions and the 2014 elections, the SABC was criticised for
resource struggles that can be solved through refusing to air the campaign adverts of two main
peaceful or less peaceful politics.362 In educational opposition parties, namely the DA and the EFF.366
institutions, but also elsewhere in society, the As stated by Nicola de Jager, political scientist at
youth bulge and high unemployment in South the University of Stellenbosch:
Africa are likely to strengthen the forces of political
volatility in the next decade.
Reporters, analysts and others within
Media freedom under pressure the public broadcaster who are
considered to operate out of line are
In post-1994 South Africa, press freedom is
guaranteed by Section 16 of the Bill of Rights.
slowly moved out, examples include
367
Together with parts of the judiciary, the media has Eusebius McKaiser and John Perlman.
been considered to be one the most important
remaining checks on the power of the ruling party, The 2017 Freedom House report concluded:
since the ANC government has largely neutralized
other potentially independent watchdog Nonetheless, concerns about press freedom
institutions through its policy of cadre deployment have grown in recent years amid increasing
and other measures such as intimidation. Freedom government pressure on both state-run and
House stated in its 2018 report: independent outlets. A number of recent
incidents have compromised the credibility and
In 2017, the media played a crucial role in independence of the SABC, the outlet with the
exposing the corruption linked to the Gupta largest reach in the country. The most high-
family and the involvement of British public profile incident came in May (2016), when
relations firm Bell Pottinger in stirring up racial the SABC banned the broadcast of violent
tensions in the country. Nonetheless, concerns protests taking place across the country. The
about press freedom have grown in recent broadcaster’s controversial chief operating
years amid increasing government pressure on officer, Hlaudi Motsoeneng – a political ally
both state-run and independent outlets.363 of Zuma – said it was the role of the SABC to
“educate the citizens”, and that coverage of
However, it is important also to scrutinise the de the unrest could encourage further violence.
facto realities of media freedom in South Africa.364 Critics of the ban alleged that the broadcaster
The South African Broadcasting Corporation had enacted it in order to avoid unflattering
(SABC) is the country’s public broadcaster.365 It coverage for the ANC in the run-up to the
controls most television and radio broadcasting in August local elections. Amid protests against
South Africa. the ban from journalists, civil society, and the
opposition, the Independent Communications
The ANC has used cadre deployment to align the Authority of South Africa (ICASA) ordered its
state broadcaster with the ruling party. During reversal in July.
362. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/effects-youth-bulge-civil-conflicts.
363. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2018/south-africa.
364. http://www.r2k.org.za/; http://fxi.org.za/home/.
365. http://www.sabc.co.za/wps/portal/SABC/SABCARTICLE?id=5c5fc9804c9afedb8cbcff39f3bc9014& page_from=CSI.
366. http://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/2014/04/22/sabc-bans-eff-advert---video; http://www.timeslive.co.za/
politics/2014/04/30/da-cries-political-censorship-as-sabc-refuses-to-air-second-advert.
367. http://paperroom.ipsa.org/papers/paper_10054.pdf.
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Seven SABC journalists and one contracted There’s a great deal of evidence from SABC
freelance journalist were fired by the SABC journalists who’ve spoken out and say they
in July after criticizing the protest ban policy. have been very, very greatly intimidated by
The journalists were reinstated later in the the leadership in the corporation, and even
month following a ruling by the Labour by people in government who have told them
Court in Johannesburg. In June, Motsoeneng directly: Don’t antagonise the president or
reportedly directed SABC staff not to engage don’t write about this. Don’t broadcast about
in tough questioning of Zuma or to cover him that. And so there were plenty of reasons for
negatively.368 him [Zuma] to feel intimidated ...372
Witnesses testifying in December 2016 before Private newspapers and magazines are often
Parliament’s ad hoc committee investigating the critical of powerful figures and institutions and
SABC, painted a picture of intimidation, death remain a crucial check on the government.
threats, ministerial interference, secret meetings, However, government allies own a growing
as well as a cult-like worship that surrounded share of independent media. In August 2013,
Motsoeneng.369 SABC news had become tainted, Independent News and Media was bought by
with politicians, including the former minister of Sekunjalo, a company which belongs to the pro-
Communications, Faith Muthambi, constantly ANC Iqbal Survé. Money for the deal came from
dictating how journalists should cover certain the state-run civil service pension fund, 25%
stories, according to Thandeka Gqubule, one directly, and almost 45% in the form of a loan to
of the eight above-mentioned fired journalists, Survé. Two Chinese state-run companies provided
known as the “SABC eight”.370 The SSA played a 20% of the remaining funding.373
role in what was described as a climate of fear
and intimidation at the SABC. Top SABC finance Due to cadre deployment to the regulatory body,
officials testified how Motsoeneng secretly used ICASA, it has failed to ensure the non-partisan
SSA officials to find incriminating evidence on his nature of the SABC.374 Allegations have emerged
opponents so that he could dismiss them from about ANC attempts to also influence the
the SABC.371 Journalists stated that during the commercial eTV television service.375 In February
2014 elections, they were told that 70% of their 2015 a SABC memorandum of incorporation
coverage of the government had to be positive. emerged that gave the minister of Communications
the power to discipline and remove executive
John Matisonn, author of God, Lies & Spies, notes: managers and board members at the SABC.
Before the emergence of the memorandum, SABC
368. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2017/south-africa.
369. “SABC inquiry: Who’s Hlaudi’s Godfather, members ask witnesses”, Daily Maverick, 11 December 2016; http://
www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/how-hlaudi-sold-the-sabc-20161211-3; http://www.businesslive.co.za/rdm/
politics/2016-12-10-politics-live-wherever-there-is--zumas-corporate-hatchet-man/; http://www.businesslive.co.za/
bd/national/media/2016-12-09-faith-muthambi-forced-hlaudi-on-sabc/.
370. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2016-12-12-sabcmotsoeneng-coup-ad-hoc-committee-wants-minister-of-
state-security/#.WE-X5eZ97IV; https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/media/2016-12-13-sabc-eight-detail-
hlaudi-motsoenengs-reign-of-terror/.
371. https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/media/2016-12-23-secret-purge-hlaudi-motsoenengs-dirty-war-at-
sabc/.
372. http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/listeningpost/2017/02/state-media-zuma-south-africa-170218113247808.
html.
132-135.
374. Prinola Govenden, “Toothless regulator?” A critical analysis of ICASA’s regulation of the SABC so that it functions as a
public service broadcaster (University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 2009).
375. http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2014-10-30-op-ed-minister-patel-and-encas-feel-good-documentaries/#.
VFkHgst0y71.
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board members could be removed through a Direct attacks on journalists have continued,
parliamentary process only.376 including the police harassment of reporters across
the country. They have been subject to wrongful
or illegal arrest, forced to delete photographs
Strained relations between the ANC or barred from entering particular spaces. In
and critical journalists February 2015, the SSA confirmed handing David
Mabuza, the Mpumalanga premier and current
Although no serious incidents regarding deputy president of South Africa intelligence
government authorisation to actively target reports on the lives and movements of journalists
journalists have been reported, the ANC’s in the province.380 In November 2018, Reporters
relationship with the media is generally strained. Without Borders (RSF) deplored the use of threats
Van Onselen distinguishes between several and insults by EFF leader Julius Malema against
phases in the relations. After coming to power in journalists and media outlets covering his party’s
1994, the ideals of a free and independent press alleged involvement in an embezzlement scandal,
were championed and celebrated. However, the and called on the authorities to condemn his
dynamics of governance, mismanagement and attempts to intimidate the press.381
corruption resulted in deterioration of media
relations and the proposal of a media tribunal. In 2017, the South African National Editors’ Forum
Through the state and pro-ANC private capital, a (Sanef) expressed alarm at moves by police
series of existing and new media were remodelled to investigative journalists Jacques Pauw and
and established, generally to be more “positive” Pieter-Louis Myburgh, who have both reported
about and “supportive” of the government of the extensively on President Zuma’s alleged corrupt
day.377 dealings. Media Monitoring Africa’s William Bird
said the reports indicated the politicization of the
Communications Minister Faith Muthambi told police, especially being used by certain people
MPs in April 2015 that they needed to take further for their own agendas. Bird said it was a clear
action on the issue of a regulatory system for and present threat to media freedom, but also a
the print media so that they could achieve the clear attempt to undermine the credibility of the
meaningful transformation agenda of the country. journalists.382
ANC spokesperson Zizi Kodwa confirmed in 2015
that the ANC was sticking to its 2007 resolution to Lizette Rabie, professor of Journalism at the
call for a state-controlled media appeals tribunal University of Stellenbosch, has indicated that the
to regulate the media.378 At the ANC conference alarm bells are ringing.383 Threats against media
in December 2017, during which Ramaphosa freedom are already so severe that a comparison
was chosen as ANC leader, the governing party could be drawn between the media (un)freedom
resolved that its “parliamentarians must have under NP government during a period of internal
enquired whether a media appeals tribunal is conflict and that under a peacetime ANC
feasible”.379 government.384
376. http://sa-monitor.com/minister-defends-sabc-secrecy-times-live-18-march-2015/#more-3351.
377. http://sa-monitor.com/devolution-ancs-trust-media-bdlive-21-september-2016/.
378. http://www.news24.com/Archives/City-Press/Government-moots-return-of-dreaded-media-tribunal-20150429;
http://www.enca.com/south-africa/zuma-takes-swipe-media-over-xenophobia-covera.
379. https://mg.co.za/article/2018-01-10-what-to-expect-in-parliament-in-2018.
380. http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2015-04-28-op-ed-world-press-freedom-day-2015-sa-edition/#.
VUDBT5UcTIX. Also see http://sa-monitor.com/south-africas-rica-process-much-open-abuse-htxt-africa-29-april-
2015/#more-3720.
381. https://rsf.org/en/news/rsf-decries-south-african-politicians-invective-against-reporters.
382. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-12-06-editors-forum-concerned-over-threats-to-arrest-jacques-pauw-
and-news24-journalist/#.Wi92i0qWbIV.
383. See L. Rabie, “Media freedom in South Africa: A luta continua?”, South African Monitor, (5), November 2015, pp 97-
102.
384. P.J. Fourie, “’n Terugkeer na die onderdrukking van vryheid van spraak? Ooreenkomste tussen die apartheidsregering(s)
en die ANC se optrede teen die media”, Tydskrif vir Geesteswetenskappe, 49(1), 2009, pp 62-84.
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According to the 2018 World Press Index by the when it comes to media entities that do not align
international non-governmental RSF, media themselves with ANC objectives and policies.386
independence in South Africa is seen as fragile. The space for freedom of the media will continue
In a global ranking of 180 countries, South Africa to be under pressure in the hybrid regime.
was ranked twenty-eigth, with Norway taking first Both self-censorship and more independent
place as the most media free country in the world. investigative journalism by citizens and business
Regarding South Africa however, RSF also noted: may be the result.
Journalists are harassed and subjected to The impact of the media on changing political
intimidation campaigns if they try to cover dynamics should however not be overestimated. If
certain subjects involving the ruling ANC, the media uncovers questionable conduct by ANC
government finances, the redistribution of land politicians, it depends firstly on the ANC and its
to the black population or the #Guptaleaks factions how it would respond to the revelations.
affair, all which are either off limits or provoke The ANC’s support of Zuma over years, even in
a hostile reaction from the authorities.385 the face of considerable scandals reported in
the media, indicates how strong a role the fear
Still, the media and various actors from civil society of losing jobs and access to resources can play.
have played an important role in maintaining the These dynamics limit the impact of the media and
constitutional space for freedom of the media reinforce the hybrid regime.
and expression against ANC pressure. It is clear
that the ruling party will continue to be suspicious
385. https://rsf.org/en/south-africa.
386. Also see Susan Booysen, Dominance and decline: The ANC in the time of Zuma (Wits University Press, Johannesburg,
2015), p 309.
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Part X
ANC policies and economic
value destruction
pace with its emerging market peers over the past
Economic value destruction decade.388 Doctor John Purchase, Agbiz’s CEO,
has stated that poor ANC governance has already
In the past decade, the ANC has been a prime
made South Africans 25% poorer in the past seven
destroyer of institutional capital and economic
years.389
value in South Africa.387 A report by the Bureau
for Economic Research found that South Africa’s
South Africa slid into recession in the first half of
economy could have been up to 30% larger and
2018 for the first time in nearly a decade despite
created 2.5-million more jobs, had it had kept
strong global growth. Already, the GDP has
387. See https://sa-monitor.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/SAM-8-February-2018.pdf.

388. https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2018-10-17-politics-wreaked-havoc-on-sa-economy-gareth-ackerman/.
389. https://www.farmersweekly.co.za/agri-news/south-africa/sa-lost-r1-trillion-economic-growth-past-seven-years/.
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shrunk to the worst in the past nine years and now in its longest downward business cycle phase
the biggest budget deficit since 2004 remains.390 since 1945.395 According to the IMF, South Africa’s
Unemployment has increased to 27.2%, from capital inflows may become scarcer, costlier and
21.5% in 2008. The National Income Dynamics more volatile in future. This situation would
Study (NIDS) release a report in November 2018 pose risks to South Africa’s external financing: “A
which showed that, in the past two years, the potential pull out of foreign investors, divesting
middle class has shrunk from 20% to 18%.391 their existing holdings of local assets, also poses
risks.”396
Especially since late 2015, according to the
perceptions of investors and international credit
rating agencies, political and economic risks in
Political intervention and selective
South Africa have increased.392 In April 2017 patronage
both S&P Global and Fitch Ratings downgraded
South Africa’s long-term foreign currency rating In August 2012, the Zuma government adopted
to sub-investment grade. The third of the big the National Development Plan (NDP) as South
global agencies, Moody’s, has however kept the Africa’s policy blueprint until 2030. The ANC’s
country’s rating above investment grade. national conference in Mangaung (Bloemfontein)
in December 2012 endorsed the plan, which
Moody’s has historically been the most generous aimed at boosting the economic growth rate to
of the three ratings agencies when it comes to 5.4% of the GDP and generating eleven million
South Africa. It raised the country’s credit rating jobs. These objectives have never been reached,
sooner and higher at the start of the century, but the ANC did proceed with several statutes
and was slower to cut it through the disastrous and bills that greatly increased the government’s
Zuma presidency. While Ramaphosa may be interventionist powers. They clearly prioritized the
committed to domestic reform, the political redistribution of the existing economic pie, rather
space and capabilities for implementation will be than its expansion.397 The main NDP megaprojects
constrained by strong forces: ANC factionalism, were vehicles for corporate collusion and price-
the need for fiscal restraint, tight monetary policy, fixing in construction, but also Gupta or ANC-
ongoing global market volatility and a struggling related kickbacks.398
economy.393
In a report on all business-related legislation since
The IMF in its World Economic Outlook has 2013, the IRR concluded that a common thread
adjusted its low estimate of 1.5% economic through all the bills is that “they weaken property
growth in South Africa in 2018 further downwards rights, reduce private-sector autonomy, threaten
to 0.8%.394 The consequence is that the country is business with draconian penalties, and undermine
390. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-08-30/south-africa-s-july-budget-gap-is-biggest-in-at-least-14-
years.
391. https://mg.co.za/article/2018-10-05-00-the-future-of-the-middle-class-is-bleak.
392. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-05-07/riots-signal-what-is-going-wrong-with-south-africa-s-
economy.
393. https://www.moneyweb.co.za/news/economy/is-a-credit-downgrade-inevitable.
394. http://m.engineeringnews.co.za/article/imf-lowers-south-africas-economic-growth-forecasts-urges-
reforms-2018-10-09.
395. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-09-26/south-africa-business-cycle-in-longest-slump-since-1945-
chart.
396. IMF, South Africa: Selected Issues, 16 June 2016, pp 14-16 at https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2016/
cr16218.pdf; Balance of payments manual (BPM5), (International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C., 1993).
397. Anthea Jeffery, “The ANC govt’s war on economic rationality”, 27 March 2014 at http://www.politicsweb.co.za/
politicsweb/view/politicsweb/en/page71619?oid=579465&sn=Detail&pid=71616; http://www.economist.com/
blogs/baobab/2014/03/property-rights-south-africa.
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investor confidence”.399 Examples during the Under Zuma’s administration, public sector
Zuma presidency include new regulations, policy wages, debt interest payments and welfare
initiatives and legislation regarding investment, grants started accounting for roughly 60% of the
expropriation, mining and energy, the security budget.404 Currently, it accounts for about 70%
industry, affirmative action, black empowerment of the budget.405 In addition, according to South
and land. President Ramaphosa’s support in African chief procurement officer, Kenneth Brown,
2019 for the policy of expropriation without as much as 40% of the country’s R600 billion
compensation continues this trend. budget for goods and services is being eaten up
by inflated prices from suppliers and fraud.406
During their implementation, these laws are Without sufficient new wealth-generating
especially likely to enhance the opportunities activities, investment, savings and productivity, a
for political and bureaucratic decision makers to risk of insufficient state income is looming.
gain access to lucrative positions, or to engage in
selective patronage. The prominent economist, Professor Jannie Rossouw, head of the University
Moeletsi Mbeki, stated that the only agenda of the Witwatersrand’s School of Economics and
of the ANC currently is “it is our turn to eat”.400 Business Sciences, with co-researchers Adele
However, after 25 years of one-party dominant Breytenbach and Fanie Joubert referred to an
rule, the state sources to satisfy important actors approaching fiscal cliff, “the danger that the South
and constituencies have declined. African government might run out of income
to cover growing government expenditure”.407
The ANC’s policies have included the overuse and Social grants, debt interest repayments and state
abuse of civil service employment and SOEs, in jobs together would account for all government
conjunction with profligate spending, corruption revenue by 2026 – assuming a high average annual
and extreme consumption. Over the past decade revenue growth of between 9.7% and 9.9%. It is
the number of civil servants has increased by currently at 1% per year. Even sharp increases in
about 25%. One in five working people, roughly 2.7 personal tax, company tax, fuel levies and excise
million people, now works for the government.401 duties would merely defer the fiscal cliff for two
About 35% of South Africa’s R1.67 trillion budget or three years.
or 14% of the GDP goes towards paying the
salaries of public sector workers.402 The post- Political pressures to raise extra income for the
2000 period has generated a new labour elite in ANC, its cadre networks in the state structures
the labour market, namely the unionised public and key constituencies will also increase in the
sector employee.403 next few years.408 Intense factional competition
in the ANC and its allies, and between the ANC
399. http://www.politicsweb.co.za/politicsweb/view/politicsweb/en/page71619?oid=579465&sn= Detail&pid=71616.

400. Andrew England, “Power failure”, Financial Times, 13 May 2015, p 7.
401. “The hollow state”, The Economist, 20 December 2015.
402. https://www.thesouthafrican.com/public-servants-pay-south-africa/.
403. https://theconversation.com/south-africas-civil-servants-are-the-countrys-new-labour-elite-54269.
404. R.W. Johnson, How long will South Africa survive? The looming crisis (Jonathan Ball Publishers, Cape Town, 2015), p
124.
405. https://ewn.co.za/2018/10/24/sa-govt-warned-over-huge-debt-burden.
406. http://businesstech.co.za/news/government/139193/shocking-levels-of-fraud-and-inflated-prices-cost-south-africa-
r233-billion/.
407. Jannie Rossouw, “South Africa’s fiscal cliff: A different meaning to a well-know concept”, ERSA, 16-17 May 2013; “SA
is headed for a financial cliff”, Financial Mail, 14 October 2014.
408. See for example http://www.bdlive.co.za/business/mining/2015/05/18/chamber-of-mines-comes-to-members-
defence.
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and breakaway political or politicized opponents implements blackouts when it struggles to meet
like the EFF and some trade unions, will reinforce the demand. These measures have had a huge
these dynamics.409 impact on productivity and also on business
morale in South Africa.414
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) The sectors using the most electricity are also the
foreign exchange earners, namely non-ferrous
SOEs with their billions in lucrative procurement
metals; basic iron and steel; non-metallic minerals;
budgets, are already at the heart of the ANC
mining; paper and paper products; and chemicals.
government’s economic policies and political
According to Peter Montalto:
patronage. Eight SOEs, including ESKOM, Transnet,
Denel and SAA have massive debts, funding The problem is not its technical ability, but
restraints, risks, rent extraction and governance the external political and ideological pressure
issues. Especially ESKOM, but also other SOEs, that has slowed the process … As ever, the
came to play a central role in serving as a conduit government seems to have too much time.
to transfer government resources to well- The knowledge to solve the ESKOM problem
connected and corrupt individuals and families.410 is already within the government. Remove the
Questionable, dubious and very expensive deals politics, the tenderpreneurship and the cadre
were being done at many parastatals.411 deployment.415
As a result, the SOEs have become an extreme Similarly, water supplies and water management
liability on the Treasury and one of the chief have become major issues, with water crises
obstacles to the aims of stabilising national debt emerging in Cape Town and elsewhere in the
and government finances.412 Companies like country.416 According to a visiting professor at the
ESKOM and SAA claim that they are working to University of the Witwatersrand, Mike Muller,
be less of a burden. However, prominent financial “the shenanigans in the water sector have little
analysts like Nomura’s Peter Attard Montalto to do with radical economic transformation. They
believe that the implicit exposure of these are more about the ongoing enrichment of a new
companies to the country’s sovereign is much elite”.417
higher than stated.413
Anthony Turton, professor of Environmental
The ANC government did not invest enough in Management at the University of the Free State,
expanding its power generation capacity and says that South Africa had the necessary water
neglected maintenance. It also did not respond skills, providing that institutions remained well-
after earlier crises. ESKOM, which supplies funded and robust. However, there has been
about 95% of the nation’s electricity, has since a systemic failure across the board. “What is
2015 been rationing its supply, because its aging happening in the water sector now as a system is
plants cannot keep up with the demand. ESKOM almost a mirror of the energy sector failures”.418
409. http://today.moneyweb.co.za/article?id=466373&acid= Z254vWXulCUeZeuwhd4cWQ%3D%3D&adid=CxgRuNO6fqM

eZeuwhd4cWQ%3D%3D&date=2015-04-22#.VXbCkssR673; http://sa-monitor.com/anc-youth-league-nationalisation-
call-plunge-mining-deep-pit-bdlive-11-october-2016/.
410. https://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/south-africa/2018-02-04-eskom-the-power-giant-at-the-core-of-south-africas-
state-rot/.
411. http://mg.co.za/tag/parastatals; http://mg.co.za/article/2016-09-02-00-treasurys-bids-to-end-corruption-are-
peeling-back-a-curiously-connected-gravy-trail.
412. http://mg.co.za/article/2016-10-28-00-fiscal-risk-beware-the-parastatals.
413. https://businesstech.co.za/news/government/189946/south-africa-likely-to-be-fully-junked-by-march-2018-analyst/.
414. http://www.bdlive.co.za/opinion/2015/04/14/eskom-lies-will-continue-over-ideology.
415. http://www.bdlive.co.za/opinion/2015/04/14/government-knows-eskom-solution-but-lacks-resolve.
416. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-01-22-analysis-a-drought-of-nature-compounded-by-a-drought-in-
leadership/#.WmyJ4KjibIV.
417. https://mg.co.za/article/2016-12-05-south-africas-water-sector-a-case-study-in-state-capture.
418. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-01-22-analysis-a-drought-of-nature-compounded-by-a-drought-in-
leadership/; https://mg.co.za/article/2018-02-02-00-capes-water-crisis-to-have-ripple-effect.
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The inability to provide basic electricity and water and political implications. Fundamentally, this
services will have a major deterrent effect on reflects the lack of fixed investment spending
many foreign investors. by the private sector, as well as the sustained
low business confidence.420
Congested railways and ports controlled by SOEs
have constrained exports. According to The Ramaphosa’s election as ANC president initially
Economist, this situation removed an estimated provided a boost to local business confidence in
percentage point from South Africa’s low annual the first quarter of 2018, which then dropped in
growth. Ramaphosa has promised to clean up the rest of 2018.421 Unless there are real structural
this state of affairs. However, several drivers improvements, South Africa will not be more
will reinforce economic interventionism by ANC attractive to investors in the real economy and
policy-makers in the next few years. These include sufficient job creation will not occur.422
economic stagnation and shrinking resources,
the loss of access to sources of patronage after
the ANC’s local election losses, related risks and
Bad business perceptions of the ANC
opportunities for current systems of patronage, government
and factional struggles over fewer spoils. The role
of the one-party dominated state in the economy During the ANC rule of 25 years, extensive
is bound to remain strong. de-industrialization has occurred. In 1994,
manufacturing accounted for 23% of GDP, which
is now at about 11%. High wage rates, high strike
Staggering unemployment and rates, a steep decline in labour productivity
budget pressures and policies discouraging foreign and domestic
investment all played a role. R.W. Johnson, liberal
In the first quarter of 2018, Stats SA calculated analyst, now contends that South Africa can
unemployment at more than 38%.419 Earlier in choose to have an ANC government or a modern
2017, Stanlib Chief Economist Kevin Lings stated industrial economy, but not both.423 Ramaphosa
in a company note: has indicated that he wants to reverse this trend.
In addition, the unemployment rate for the This state of affairs is already reflected in foreign
youth younger than 25, using the expanded business perceptions. The World Economic
definition, is a shockingly high 67.4%. Clearly, Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) for
the rate of youth unemployed has become a 2017 to 2018 reflects the perceptions of domestic
national crisis, with significant social, economic and international business.424 In terms of the
419. https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/economy/wef2019-addressing-youth-unemployment-high-on-sas-
agenda-18907651.
420. http://www.fin24.com/Economy/youth-unemployment-in-sa-a-national-crisis-economists-20170807.
421. https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/economy/2019-01-24-consumer-confidence-remains-flat-but-things-might-be-
looking-up/.
422. https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/opinion/editorials/2018-01-12-editorial-south-africas-challenges-are-now-even-
greater/.
423. R.W. Johnson, How long will South Africa survive? The looming crisis (Jonathan Ball Publishers, Cape Town, 2015), p
158.
424. Klaus Schwab and Xavier Sala-i-Martin (eds), “The Global Competitiveness Report, 2017-2018”, World Economic
Forum, https://www.weforum.org/reports/the-global-competitiveness-report-2017-2018, pp. 268-269. Compare
Klaus Schwab (ed), “The Global Competitiveness Report, 2009-2010”, World Economic Forum 2010, p 283 at http://
www.weforum.org/reports/global-competitiveness-report-2009-2010 and Klaus Schwab and Xavier Sala-i-Martin
(eds), “The Global Competitiveness Report, 2016-2017”, World Economic Forum, pp 324-325.
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overall GCI, South Africa ranks quite well, namely they require to operate.426 Nevertheless, both
in position 61 out of 137 countries measured. local and international business have adapted
However, it was a drop in the position from being the forms and extent of their investment in South
in position 56 in 2016 to 2017. The GCI measure Africa accordingly. Foreign direct income (FDI)
of South Africa’s competitiveness is also distorted projects in South Africa plunged by 31% in 2018 to
favourably by its spectacular performance in a reach its lowest level in a decade.427
number of the GCI’s sub-components. These
include aspects strongly shaped by the private
sector, like auditing standards, efficacy of
EU businesses concerned about ANC
corporate boards and the availability of financial policies
services.
The Business Climate Survey 2016: EU Trade and
In GCI sub-indices that measure business Investment in South Africa was published in 2017.
perceptions of the government, South Africa fares This survey highlights several common concerns
very poorly. For four years in a row, South Africa within the EU investor community. The outlook
has had low scores for the diversion of public for South Africa as an investment destination is
funds (position 109), with a major drop in the past rather negative: twice as many firms reported that
year. This is also true pertaining to the perceived they were dissatisfied rather than satisfied. This is
wastefulness of government spending (position a sharp drop in comparison to the results of the
103). In terms of organised crime, it dropped 2012 survey and a continuing trend with the 2014
significantly to position 122 out of 137 countries. results.428
For “business costs for crime and violence”, it is
again in position 133. In terms of the reliability The 2016 survey asked the respondents to identify
of the police, it is in position 118, a further drop the three biggest challenges for investment in
from being in position 102 in 2015. South Africa South Africa. In addition to expressing an overall
ranks in position 114 in terms of “public trust in declining investor confidence in the country, the
politicians”, a further drop after already being key challenges that emerged were rising prices,
in position 65 in 2009. It also is in position 89 in government corruption, and lack of skilled
terms of “the burden of government regulation”. labour combined with BBBEE legislation. Investor
In terms of “favouritism in the decisions of confidence in South Africa is further undermined
government officials”, South Africa dropped to by inadequately functioning government
being in position 127, a huge decline from being institutions. The respondents specifically pointed
in position 69 in 2009.425 to the lack of transparency, inconsistent policies,
as well as corruption.
International media reports revealing self-
enrichment and selective patronage by President Transformation emerged as the most negatively
Zuma and his entourage have reinforced these perceived factor affecting South Africa’s
perceptions. However, given the hybrid regime business climate. The cost and administration of
dynamics, foreign business and local business not compliance with the BBBEE codes (the second
aligned to the ruling ANC are reluctant to publicly biggest barrier to EU investment identified in the
oppose harmful policies and practices. They are 2014 survey) is still expected to continue having
unwilling to jeopardize the government licences a negative impact on foreign investment. EU
425. Klaus Schwab and Xavier Sala-i-Martin (eds), “The Global Competitiveness Report, 2017-2018”, World Economic
Forum, https://www.weforum.org/reports/the-global-competitiveness-report-2017-2018, pp. 268-269. Compare
Klaus Schwab (ed), “The Global Competitiveness Report, 2009-2010”, World Economic Forum 2010, p 283 at http://
www.weforum.org/reports/global-competitiveness-report-2009-2010 and Klaus Schwab and Xavier Sala-i-Martin
(eds), “The Global Competitiveness Report, 2016-2017”, World Economic Forum, pp 324-325.
426. http://www.biznews.com/thought-leaders/2014/11/07/nomuras-peter-montalto-was-concerned-ahead-of-sa-
research-visit-left-gloomier.
427. https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/economy/foreign-direct-investment-in-sa-at-decade-low-18460483.
428. See “Business climate survey 2016: EU trade and investment in Southern Africa” at http://www.euchamber.co.za/
surveys/.
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investors questioned the BBBEE’s overriding focus

on ownership instead of the supply chain or skills In spite of the worsening investment outlook,
development. In addition, the shortage of skilled many EU investors in South Africa have increased
labour in South Africa made compliance with the their turnovers and created jobs in the past
BBBEE management-related rules dificult.429 three years. South Africa continues to present
certain advantages in comparison to other African
“In this respect, members of the EU Chamber have countries and therefore remains a destination of
reported that an increasing number of tenders by choice for regional headquarters and sales offices
the SOEs in SA include a requirement of 51% black of many EU companies with operations in Sub-
ownership for their suppliers,” Stefan Sakoschek, Saharan Africa.432
the chamber’s national executive director said.
He said the chamber had been informed that
“such a discretionary measure lacked sound legal
Domestic business: Increased
basis” as it would require pre-approval from the distrust and divestment
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), based on
appropriate studies examining the skills level and The relations between local business and the
other market dynamics in respective commercial ANC government deteriorated during Zuma’s
sectors. European companies were now faced presidency. In April 2016, Ann Bernstein confirmed
“with surprising new rules” in relation to crucial that
tender procedures. “This has already caused
investments to be put on hold or downscaled”.430 … a dysfunctional relationship between business
and government that manifests failings on both
The emphasis of both Zuma and Ramaphosa sides, but has its roots in deep suspicion about
on radical economic transformation may thus business and markets, flourishes in and around
reinforce the negative outlook of EU investors the governing party. South Africa cannot hope
over time. Two-thirds of respondents expected to achieve growth while simultaneously being
a further deterioration in corruption within anti-business. The slide into crony capitalism
the government and regulatory authorities. makes matters considerably worse.433
Respondents have difficulties with the
government responsiveness and accessibility to The balance between high taxes and an
government oficials. The respondents have largely appreciation of the benefits that this brings, is not
mixed perceptions about issues of investment evident to wealthier South Africans.434 Meanwhile,
protection and taxation with the highest degree the degree of capital flight among short-term
of uncertainty around investment protection and portfolio investors has resulted in Central Bank
local intellectual property rules.431 It remains to be warnings.435 Andrew Rissik, the managing director
seen whether Ramaphosa will be able to overturn of foreign currency trading at Sable Group, a
these negative perceptions. London-based money manager, has linked the
429. See “Business climate survey 2016: EU trade and investment in Southern Africa”, p 30 at http://www.euchamber.
co.za/surveys/.
430. https://www.businesslive.co.za/fm/features/2017-04-21-eu-to-bee-or-not-to-bee/.
431. “Business climate survey 2016: EU trade and investment in Southern Africa”, pp 28-29 at http://www.euchamber.
co.za/surveys/.
432. https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/business-and-economy/2017-03-24-surprising-new-rules-on-empowerment-are-
holding-investors-back-says-eu-chamber/.
433. Ann Bernstein, “Harsh choices await if we continue down the low road”, Business Day, 7 April 2016; http://www.
biznews.com/thought-leaders/2014/11/07/nomuras-peter-montalto-was-concerned-ahead-of-sa-research-visit-left-
gloomier/.
434. https://businesstech.co.za/news/business/218475/taxing-south-africas-rich-will-only-chase-them-away/.
435. “South Africa’s central bank warns of capital flight risk” at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240527023
04518704579520901590608912.
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trend to increasing political risk: “Poor decisions policy is not working and that the process of de-
by (Mr) Zuma and the ruling party triggered a industrialization of past years is continuing.443
widespread urge to move assets abroad”.436
The economist Mike Schüssler also commented:
Since 2016 to 2018, for the first time in many
decades, the value of South African-owned assets One top firm after another is chasing
outside of the country had exceeded the annual opportunity elsewhere. Our top 60 companies
flow of funds into it. Many of its own citizens now earn 70% of their turnover outside of
preferred to send their money out of the country, South African borders. In effect, they have left
rather than to invest locally.437 and South Africa is just another market.444
The University of Johannesburg’s Centre

for Competition, Regulation and Economic
Ramaphosa’s limping policy reach
Development estimates that the top 50 companies
President Ramaphosa’s limited control over the
listed on the Johannesburg stock market are
factionalized ANC will remain the case until at least
sitting on 1.4 trillion rand ($105 billion) of cash
after the general elections of 2019, and probably
– nearly six times the amount in 2005, as the
beyond.445 The limits to his control will also impact
abstention from investment continues.438 Since
negatively on his ability to control the negative
2013, business confidence has been on a declining
fallout, more factional and radical demands, and
trend from above 50 to the current level below 35
land invasions as a result of weaker property rights
in 2017.439
and expropropiation without compensation.
The ANC has either underestimated the degree
As Roger Southall, professor of Sociology,
to which companies have opportunities to go
University of the Witwatersrand, has remarked,
elsewhere than South Africa, or it does not care
the obstacles in the way of Ramaphosa’s path are
too much.440 For many companies, the best
formidable.
opportunities in mining and manufacturing no
longer are in South Africa.441 Major companies
have already considered hiving off their South Ramaphosa is already battling concerted fight-
African assets, or have actually done so.442 Even back by the Zuma crowd, and this is only the
senior government officials have admitted that, beginning … In any case, increasingly the ANC
with some exceptions, South Africa’s industrial has come to function as an extended patronage,
436. “Politics pushes more money out of SA”, Business Day, 13 April 2016.
437. http://www.biznews.com/sa-investing/2016/01/06/capital-flight-plunging-rand-more-sa-owned-assets-abroad-
than-flowing-in/; http://derstandard.at/2000027849282/Praesident-Zuma-als-Belastungsprobe-fuer-Suedafrikas-
Wirtschaft. On the major net outflows of capital since 2014, also see http://unctad.org/Sections/dite_dir/docs/
WIR2017/wir17_fs_za_en.pdf.
438. https://www.ft.com/content/12b8a5d8-78f0-11e7-90c0-90a9d1bc9691.
439. https://mg.co.za/article/2018-01-24-shaking-up-eskom-matters-for-south-africas-economy.
440. Also see http://www.bdlive.co.za/business/trade/2015/05/07/bee-code-change-shocks-industry; http://www.bdlive.
co.za/opinion/2015/04/20/why-new-bee-codes-will-pull-the-rug-from-under-business.
441. http://www.biznews.com/video/2014/07/29/must-watch-invicta-holdings-arnold-goldstone-true-impact-numsas-
strike/.
442. http://www.biznews.com/video/2014/09/11/what-crisis-rob-davies-shrugs-off-sa-corporate-flight-says-foreigners-
investing/. On the issue of company actions to reduce their risk, also see http://www.miningweekly.com/article/
major-south-african-assets-fail-to-make-the-cut-in-bhp-billiton-portfolio-remake-2014-08-15; http://www.reuters.
com/article/2013/02/08/safrica-goldfields-idUSL5N0B86R420130208; http://www.miningmx.com/page/opinion/
columnists/1474694-Selling-SA-gold-mines-is-strategy-of-last-resort.
443. http://m.engineeringnews.co.za/article/south-africa-continues-on-path-of-deindustrialisation-2017-10-05/rep_
id:4433.
444. http://www.moneyweb.co.za/moneyweb-opinion/welcome-to-the-decline-south-africa/#.VkLfDu9ILUc.facebook.
445. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-11-05-anc-necs-major-indecision-and-authority-problem/.
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jobs and cash machine. Hopefully, Ramaphosa In November 2018, rating agency Moody’s warned
and his team will prove capable of cleansing that South Africa faced heightened risks due to
the upper reaches of the state. But, carrying weak institutions, unpredictable domestic politics
the fight downwards, into the provinces and and geopolitical risk. Alastair Wilson, Moody’s
local government, will simultaneously mean managing director for global sovereign risk,
reforming the ANC. That may well prove beyond said South Africa also had below-trend growth
the bounds of practical politics, especially prospects:
given that Ramaphosa himself will need to
maintain his support base for an attempt at a
second term as president. A more likely second South Africa’s vulnerability similarly
option, therefore, is that even if Ramaphosa reflects high reliance on external
does a reasonably decent job, the economy
will at best enjoy only slow rates of growth and capital (though mainly denominated in
improvement. Overall, it will do little more than local currency), set against a context
limp along, if not actually decline.446
of a moribund economy, high inequality
Ramaphosa has tried to restore business and political stasis ahead of the 2019
confidence with a drive to gain investment, a presidential elections. 448
stimulus package and an economic recovery plan

designed to reignite economic growth. However,
the wheels of South Africa’s economy are not
turning and there is simply no money to fund new,
The need to tread carefully
productive investments to stimulate growth. The
Political pressures to raise extra income for the
money markets have not ended the South African
ANC, its cadre networks in the state structures
rand’s slide by 20% in value against the dollar in
and key constituencies will remain high in the next
2018, and economists have remained sceptical:
few years. Factional struggles, political uncertainty
“The true test will be how much of the stimulus
and shrinking resources will reinforce economic
package Ramaphosa will be able to implement,
interventionist measures by ANC policymakers.
how quickly it can be implemented and whether
Under budget pressures, the ANC government
we can get economic growth from it,” according to
will try to raise extra income in the form of taxes,
Citibank economist, Gina Schoeman.
licence fees and other means. Unorthodox actions
and rules of the game may also emerge as a result.
Daniel Silke, director of the Political Futures
Consultancy, has stated that any implementation
Policy incoherence and unexpected twists will
of a stimulus package hinges on whether the
often reflect phases in factional competition and
government is able to run itself. “What is the state
newly-bargained advantages and alignments,
of the bureaucracy? Are there officials within the
rather than ideological vacillation. Policy swings
state that are patronage-focused, rather than
and uncertainty will be experienced most by
performance-focused? How do you clean out that
companies in those sectors most exposed to the
philosophy of patronage to make the state more
government’s political priorities or regulatory
effective? There are still big question marks that
and licensing power. Minerals, energy, security,
remain before talking about a stimulus.” Tanya
agriculture, telecoms and pharmaceuticals would
Cohen, CEO of Business Unity South Africa, has
be among these sectors.
stated that business does not expect the stimulus
package to be a panacea for the country’s
economic shortfalls.447
446. https://ewn.co.za/2018/11/07/opinion-can-the-centre-hold-or-will-south-africa-get-its-own-bolsonaro.
447. https://www.moneyweb.co.za/news/south-africa/why-markets-snubbed-ramaphosas-stimulus-plan/?utm_
source=Moneyweb&utm_campaign=96a6825dcc-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2018_09_25_04_10&utm_
medium=email&utm_term=0_b106a40770-96a6825dcc-213156865&mc_cid=96a6825dcc&mc_eid=31a093eb05.
448. https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/economy/moodys-sounds-warning-alarm-for-sa-emerging-market-
peers-17797452.
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The Gupta scandals have gone global.449 The FBI Business will often have difficulty in establishing
has begun a probe into US ties to alleged corrupt whether extra state revenue is actually spent on
transactions involving the Gupta brothers. In the improving the infrastructure or conditions of all
UK, the Financial Conduct Authority, the Serious citizens, or on subsidizing the ANC’s patronage
Fraud Office and the National Crime Agency are all and reinforcing its one-party dominance in
investigating allegations that HSBC and Standard a hybrid regime … There are different codes
Chartered handled illicit funds. The scandal has of conduct in different jurisdictions, and
entangled some of the biggest multinational international business would need to heed
companies, damaging the reputation of, amongst best practices regarding integrity risk and
others, McKinsey, KPMG and SAP.450 reputational risk.451
South African Monitor reports have given clear This advice will remain valid in the years to come.
advice to international business since 2014:
449. https://www.ft.com/content/707c5560-d49a-11e7-8c9a-d9c0a5c8d5c9.
450. https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/opinion/columnists/2018-01-18-hilary-joffe-overseas-firms-treading-sas-
minefield-need-to-know-what-the-bombs-look-like/; http://www.handelsblatt.com/unternehmen/dienstleister/
korruptionsverdacht-suedafrika-fordert-millionen-von-mckinsey-zurueck/20856860.html.
451. See South African Monitor, (3), 2014, pp 47-49 and South African Monitor reports of 2015 and 2016.
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Part XI
The threat to property
and investor rights
investment”. Foreign diplomats, usually reserved,
ANC weakened European investor have started to voice their concerns in private and
protection in public.452
Since 2013, several ANC-directed business bills Carol O’Brien, executive director of the American
and acts have increased distrust and concern in Chamber of Commerce in South Africa, stated
foreign and domestic business circles. A headline in February 2015 that the plethora of legislation
in The Economist of 27 March 2014 was clear: coming out of South Africa is causing “jitters”
“Bashing business for votes: New legislation may in US businesses with operations based in the
save the ANC votes but will chase away foreign country.453 The chamber represents almost 40% of
452. http://www.economist.com/blogs/baobab/2014/03/property-rights-south-africa; http://online.wsj.com/news/

articles/SB10001424052702303948104579537802749237362; http://www.polity.org.za/article/businesses-brace-
for-transformation-pressures-as-elections-loom-2014-04-08; http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-04-14/anc-
adopts-laws-before-vote-that-may-hurt-south-african-business.html; http://www.bdlive.co.za/business/2014/03/09/
diplomats-break-silence-on-investment-bill.
453. http://www.bdlive.co.za/economy/2015/02/20/barrage-of-new-laws-alarms-us-firms-in-sa.
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the six hundred US companies with operations in of SAFRI to the cancellation encapsulates the key
South Africa. She said that the stream of legislation objections of European business to the policy:
did not send a message that foreign investment
was welcome in South Africa. The Southern Africa 1. Compared to the terminated BIT, the
Initiative of German Business (SAFRI), one of the Promotion and Protection of Investment
main German business associations looking at the Bill (PPIB) does not provide a guarantee for
interests of about six hundred German businesses the fair and equitable treatment of foreign
in South Africa, has expressed dismay over the investment. Changes in the legal framework
direction of economic policy.454 conditions to the disadvantage of investors
are possible at any time and might have the
Following costly arbitration claims brought effect that both the investment protection
against South Africa by European investors, the and possible claims for compensation are
Zuma administration decided in 2010 to stop cancelled.
signing bilateral investment treaties (BITs). The 2. According to the wording of the bill the legal
Department of Trade and Industry has, since protection of investments only comprises such
2012, undertaken a targeted termination of all 13 cases in which there is a direct expropriation.
treaties with European states, replacing them with Measures having an equivalent effect to
the Promotion and Protection of Investment Bill expropriation are, however, not comprised,
(PPIB). The department has not terminated the so that in such cases – contrary to the BIT – a
equally restrictive treaties that protect Chinese claim for compensation is not provided for.
and Russian investors in South Africa.455 3. In contrast to the BIT, compensation
payments in cases of expropriations can be
Where treaties are terminated, the foreign below market value, as the basis for any
investors currently protected by them may have decision is the general provision of fair and
no remedy against damaging policy changes. They equitable compensation, which reflects the
are also likely to receive less than the “prompt, consideration of both public interests and
adequate and effective” compensation promised the interests of the parties concerned, and
by the treaties.456 not the market value.
4. The PPIB envisages the recourse to national
The new Investment Bill or PPIB was approved by arbitral jurisdiction and arbitral tribunals,
Parliament and signed into law by President Zuma whereas the access to international
at the end of 2015. In terms of this law, the rights arbitral tribunals is neither explicitly
of foreign and domestic property owners have mentioned nor allowed. However, for
been much reduced. The PPIB is supposed to apply international investors, the objective and
equally to foreign and domestic investors. “This neutral settlement of disputes according to
bill is part of a worrying trend that South Africa’s international law is an important element in
protection of private property is weakening,” investment decisions.458
stated Carol O’Brien in 2015.457
Foreign companies may in fact receive zero
South Africa is Germany’s most important trading compensation if a taking of property by the state is
partner on the African continent. The response not recognised as an “act of expropriation” under
454. http://www.dw.de/german-corporate-unease-in-south-africa/a-18078269; http://www.badische-zeitung.de/

ausland-1/steinmeiers-vergebliche-visite-am-kap--95122906.html.
455. Ben Winks, “Investors pawns in political power play”, Business Day, 19 April 2016.
456. http://mg.co.za/article/2013-11-01-swiss-govt-reacts-to-termination-of-bilateral-investment-treaty-with-sa; http://
www.bdlive.co.za/business/2014/03/09/diplomats-break-silence-on-investment-bill.
457. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-11-17/south-african-lawmakers-approve-foreign-investment-bill.
458. Southern Africa Initiative of German Business, South Africa: New Legal Framework for Direct Investments, 2014, pp
1-2 at www.safri.de.
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the PPIB. According to Matthias Boddenberg, According to him, several will have a major impact
CEO of the South African-German Chamber of and there is concern over the ambiguous nature
Commerce and Industry, the PPIB would raise the of the legislation.462
investment risk of German companies, as well as
the risk insurance premiums they would need to
pay.459 German exports for the past decade show
Weakened property rights 463
an upward curve. However, German investment

Under the PPIB, signed by President Zuma into
in South Africa remains subdued, largely caused
law in December 2016, expropriated owners will
by the political uncertainties and the general
receive less than market value and will have no right
economic situation.
to damages for consequential loss. One danger in
the law is that domestic property owners will be
Stefan Sakoschek, the executive director of
confined to “just and equitable” compensation
the EU Chamber of Commerce in South Africa,
falling somewhat short of market value. An even
told parliamentarians during public hearings in
greater danger is that such property owners will
September 2015:
receive no compensation at all.
We are aware of a number of projects that
According to analyses of Senior Advocate Martin
are pending due to the degree of uncertainty
Brassey and policy analyst Doctor Anthea
related to the investment framework … The
Jeffery,464 this danger stems from a key clause in
withdrawal of SA’s (bilateral treaties) with EU
the legislation stating that various actions “do
member states has sent an alarming message
not amount to acts of expropriation”. There will
to the EU business community regarding the
thus be no expropriation where the state’s actions
standard of protection of investments. The new
result “in the deprivation of property”, but “the
bill does not sufficiently allay those concerns.460
state does not acquire ownership” and “there is
no permanent destruction of the economic value
In May 2016, Sakoschek stated that the conditions
of the investment”.465
for investing and doing business in South Africa
were “very different”, compared to the period
This situation could arise, for example, where the
when bilateral treaties still protected businesses.
state takes commercial farmland under claim as
According to Sakoschek, political instability and
“custodian” for land claimants, and then invites
regulatory uncertainty was forcing European firms
them to apply to it for licences to use portions
to reconsider investing in the country. The rules for
of this land for specified periods. In these
investing in South Africa appear to be changing too
circumstances, commercial farmers would be
quickly and too drastically.461 In September 2017,
deprived of their property, but the state would
Sakoschek again expressed deep concern over the
acquire it as custodian, rather than as owner –
large number of bills affecting foreign business.
459. http://www.marktundmittelstand.de/zukunftsmaerkte/ppib-deutsche-firmen-fuerchten-um-standort-
suedafrika-1233191/.
460. http://www.bdlive.co.za/economy/2015/09/10/investment-bill-may-cause-investor-flight-eu-firms-warn.
461. “Rules for investing in SA changing too drastically and too quickly”, Moneyweb, 31 May 2016.
462. http://www.ftwonline.co.za/article/126293/Pending-legislation-unsettles-EU-business/66.
463. The analysis of the PPIB’s contents is heavily indebted to the analyses of Doctor Anthea Jeffery of the SAIRR
and Advocate Martin Brassey, SC, as reflected in the sources quoted. Also see http://www.bdlive.co.za/
opinion/2013/06/10/bills-threaten-the-property-rights-of-all-south-africans; http://www.politicsweb.co.za/
politicsweb/view/politicsweb/en/page71639/page71619?oid=579465&sn=Detail&pid=71619.
464. http://www.bdlive.co.za/opinion/2013/06/10/bills-threaten-the-property-rights-of-all-south-africans; http://www.
politicsweb.co.za/politicsweb/view/politicsweb/en/page71639/page71619?oid=579465&sn=Detail&pid=71619.
Also see “Concourt ruling, new Investment Bill could give government sweeping powers to take property without
compensation”, Polity, 19 May 2014; Martin Brassey, “The ANC govt’s property rights grab”, Politicsweb, 22 July
2014.
465. http://www.sabinetlaw.co.za/economic-affairs/legislation/promotion-and-protection-investment; http://www.saiia.
org.za/opinion-analysis/draft-investment-bill-requires-amendment; http://www.bdlive.co.za/opinion/2013/06/10/
bills-threaten-the-property-rights-of-all-south-africans.
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and there would be “no permanent destruction When Chief Justice Mogoeng handed down the
of the economic value” of the land, which would ruling on Sebenza’s rights, two judges of the
continue to be farmed by others. This means Constitutional Court, Johan Froneman and Johann
there would be no “act of expropriation” under van der Westhuizen, disagreed with the majority’s
the principles established by the PPIB. As a result, conclusion that no expropriation had taken place.
no compensation would be payable. They also cautioned against the implications of
Judge Mogoeng’s ruling. According to the judges,
the ruling could lead to “the abolition of the private
Constitutional Court neutralized ownership of … all property” without the payment
property rights clause in of any compensation. “Any legislative transfer of
property from existing property holders” would no
Constitution longer be “recognised as expropriation” if it was
“done by the state as custodian of the country’s
The wording of this provision can be traced back resources”, they said.468
to a majority judgment of the Constitutional Court
in April 2013. This ruling was made by Chief Justice
Mogoeng Mogoeng, an appointee of President Disempowered international and
Jacob Zuma.466 The ruling was concerned with South African property owners
whether expropriation had occurred when an
unused and unconverted private mining right Government could use the PPIB’s rules to take
“ceased to exist” under the Mineral and Petroleum further measures to vest all mining land, mining
Resources Development Act (MPRDA) of 2002. equipment and other mining assets in the
state as the custodian of the nation’s mineral
Judge Mogoeng found that Sebenza Property resources. Simultaneously, it could invite black-
Limited, which used to own the coal mining right owned businesses in particular to apply to the
in issue, had suffered a “compulsory deprivation” Department of Mineral Resources for a licence to
of its right under the MPRDA. In addition, “the use a portion of these assets for a specified period.
custodianship” of this resource was now “vested in If past experience is any guide, the businesses that
the state on behalf of the people of South Africa”. benefit, would usually be tied to supporters of the
However, the state had not acquired ownership ANC, and not to political opponents thereof.
of the mining right. Instead, it was simply a
“custodian” or “conduit” through which “broader Similar measures, intended to generate a similar
and equitable access to mineral resources could outcome, could be taken as regards all other
be realised”.467 “investments” covered by the PPIB. These are
broadly defined to include companies; equities;
The chief justice ruled that since the deprivation land; movables; and intellectual property;
of ownership from Sebenza had not been matched along with mining rights and similar “licences,
by the acquisition of ownership by the state, no authorisations, or permits … to carry out
expropriation had taken place. It followed that no economic and commercial activities”. Moreover,
compensation was payable. Echoing this judgment, the PPIB applies equally to domestic and foreign
a key provision in the PPIB states that various investors, for the need to ensure equal treatment
actions “do not amount to acts of expropriation”. for both categories of investor is a key theme of
Among the actions it lists, are “measures which the measure.469
result in the deprivation of property, but where
the state does not acquire ownership of such
property”.
466. http://mg.co.za/article/2011-08-16-zuma-picks-mogoeng-as-chief-justice.
467. Anthea Jeffery, “The ANC govt’s plan for expropriation on the sly”, Politicsweb, 25 February 2014; Martin Brassey,
“The ANC govt’s property rights grab”, Politicsweb, 22 July 2014.
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The PPIB’s reference to “investors” is also (especially if those who design the scheme
misleading, for it suggests that the new law will are not catastrophically incompetent and/or
apply solely to companies and other commercial dumb)… If the executive was crafty enough,
enterprises. In fact, the law will apply to everyone, and if it was well versed with the Constitutional
including “natural persons” and “regardless of Court jurisprudence (neither of which one
nationality”.470 The law gives the state the power can assume to be the case), it might well
to take measures to acquire property of virtually devise a scheme that would have the effect
any kind as “custodian” for the poor, and without of diminishing the actual pension benefits of
the need to pay any compensation. salaried employees, without falling foul of
section 25(1).473
The Restitution of Land Rights Amendment Act
came into force in July 2014, reopening the land
claims window and causing uncertainty about
Creeping state ownership in the
investment in agriculture. In May 2016, Parliament mining and energy sectors
approved the Land Expropriation Bill, which
indicate the requirements for the state to lay According to a survey published by the Chamber
claim to land for public purposes or in the public of Mines in December 2017, based on 16 member
interest without the owner’s consent. The term companies, the uncertain policy and regulatory
“property” in the Bill was not defined as referring environment had caused the mining industry to
to land only, meaning it was open to interpretation freeze investment on new projects. The estimated
and could lead to movable property like shares planned capital spending of R145 billion in mining
and intellectual property being expropriated. The could increase by R122 billion or 84% in a more
Bill will now be sent to the president to be signed stable and conducive environment, the survey
into law.471 found.474
The ANC is promising that if it is re-elected, the Among the changes has been the amended
government will investigate the possibility of Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development
passing legislation that would require financial Amendment Bill of 2013 (the Mining Bill), which
institutions that invest the pension money of was approved by the National Assembly on
most salaried workers, to invest part of the funds 1 November 2016.475 The Mining Bill also applies to
in “prescribed assets”, presumably government- offshore oil and gas exploration and production.476
controlled assets. If the government would force
retirement funds to “invest” 50% of all retirement The law gives the minister of Mineral Resources
money in failing and corrupt SOEs,472 the question unprecedented discretionary powers in many
arises whether a constitutional challenge to such spheres. It gives the state a 20% “free carried
a move would be successful. interest” (or free stake) in all new ventures of this
kind. It “entitles the state to a further participation
Constitutional Law expert Pierre de Vos stated: interest” of an unspecified percentage, to be
attained either via “acquisition at an agreed price”
The short answer is that it might not be that or through a “production sharing agreement”
easy to succeed with a constitutional challenge obliging the petroleum company in question to
470. “A new Expropriation Bill by another name”, Liberty, 25 February 2014, p 5; http://www.miningweekly.com/article/
top-lawyers-warn-of-mining-bills-devastating-consequences-2013-09-13.
471. http://mg.co.za/article/2016-05-26-parliament-approves-land-expropriation-bill.
472. For the section on SOEs, see Part X.
473. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2019-01-17-is-the-government-coming-for-your-pension-and-would-
this-be-unconstitutional/.
474. https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/economy/2018-01-16-mining-output-accelerated-more-than-expected-in-
november-2017/.
475. http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=e4cc1739-49a3-41e1-98e0-5d97cb86d704; http://allafrica.com/
stories/201612050901.html.
476. http://www.miningweekly.com/article/local-mining-industry-still-in-doldrums-economists-2016-12-08/rep_id:3650.
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“share ... the extracted resource” with the state. BEE targets stipulated in the mining charter shall
An earlier version of the bill put this additional be applicable throughout the lifespan of mines.
interest at 30% and expressly limited the state’s The charter increased the level of capital goods
potential stake to a maximum of “50% per procurement from BEE-compliant companies to
petroleum operation”. Now, the state can demand 60% from 40%.479
as much as an 80% additional share, over and
above its 20% free share. The new Mining Charter III published in 2017
increased the uncertainty in the sector. It
Oil and gas companies will find it difficult to proposed an increase in black ownership targets
negotiate an accurate price. They will be required to 30%; the creation of more onerous ownership
to pay 100% of the costs of developing new requirements for suppliers to the industry;
projects, but will receive only 80% of the profits. and demands that research and development
This means that only projects that can fund the should be focused locally, ideally at previously
government’s 20% free ride will be developed.477 disadvantaged universities.480 The Mining Charter
agreed on in late 2018 indicated a continued
Business Day, the premier business publication in emphasis on black economic empowerment. For
South Africa, previously commented: existing mines however, the minimum of black
ownership now stays at 26% for the duration of
(T)he Mineral and Petroleum Resources existing mine rights. New mining right holders will
Development Amendment Bill allows need 30%. There now is no required increase in
government to “cherry-pick”, forcing producers the final draft if it has met the previous metrics laid
to sell all of their most profitable projects out in the 2010 Mining Charter. A mining project
to the government. They must do this at an that was launched following the publication of the
“agreed price” rather than a market price. 2018 version must meet new, higher standards.
This means companies can never recoup the The option of paying “equity-equivalent” benefits
costs of exploration or of unprofitable projects. to local communities has been added.481
The consequences are obvious. Under such
conditions companies will not explore in South Mining Charter III’s acceptance by the government
Africa. Nor will they develop projects they know in late 2018 was the culmination of months of
the government will nationalise.478 intensive engagements with stakeholders in the
industry, including mining companies, investors,
In April 2016, the Department of Mineral Resources mining communities, labour, financial institutions,
released a revised mining charter that demands a as well as the legal fraternity. The withdrawal of
perpetual minimum of 26% black ownership per the MPRDA Amendment Bill and the ongoing
mining right. The charter was drawn up without development of a separate regime for oil and gas
consultation with the industry. Many companies resources, demonstrated that extensive lobbying
have complied with this requirement, but BEE by business may still improve policy certainty
partners have exited, taking their profits, or the and create an environment that is conducive to
previous BEE partner has transferred shares to a investment.482
non-BEE company. The charter now states that all
477. http://mg.co.za/article/2013-09-13-experts-stakeholders-grill-proposed-changes-to-mining-laws.
478. http://www.bdlive.co.za/opinion/columnists/2014/03/31/a-hard-ask-for-business-to-criticise-government.
479. “Department blindsides miners with new charter”, Business Day, 15 April 2016.
480. https://www.moneyweb.co.za/moneyweb-opinion/soapbox/mining-industry-hopes-that-the-new-broom-sweeps-
clean/.
481. https://www.mining-technology.com/features/the-final-shape-of-south-africas-new-mining-charter/; https://www.
bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-10-02/south-africa-s-latest-mining-charter-what-s-new-and-who-wins.
482. http://www.miningweekly.com/article/policy-certainty-lifts-sentiment-safety-slips-and-a-challenging-2019-
forecast-2018-12-14.
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However, it remains to be seen whether a new ANC less on legislating the companies and more on
government will be able to provide the longer- regulating them as businesses. This would mean
term policy certainty that the mining industry that the sector would be subject to government’s
requires for its projects of long-term investment. “transformation” strategies and discouraging
The investment actions by mining companies foreign investment in favour of South African
reflect that many are doubtful whether current ownership.484 These clauses would be in violation
political dynamics favour such policy certainty. of South Africa’s commitments under the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) of the
World Trade Organisation (WTO).
Increased state ownership and
control of the lucrative security According to Stefan Sakoschek, the director of
the EU Chamber of Commerce and Inustry in
industry Southern Africa, the Private Security Industry
Regulation Amendment Bill currently is a priority
ANC attempts at other forms of creeping concern. “Our concern is that it introduces the
expropriation can be expected in the hybrid topic of nationalisation again. The legislation gives
regime in the next decade. The Private Security power to the minister of Police to expropriate up
Regulation Amendment Bill of 2013 (alias the to 100% of a foreign-owned security company.
Security Bill) was adopted by Parliament in The bill also allows for foreign ownership of local
February 2014 and is to be signed into law. A private security companies to be limited.” He
provision reintroduced in the closing stages of said in terms of the legislation the definition of a
the parliamentary process requires that “at least security company was extremely broad in the bill.
51% of the ownership and control” of security “We have many companies that manufacture and
companies must be “exercised by South African import security products into South Africa and
citizens”. Foreign-owned companies will be forced this bill could impact on them negatively.”485
to sell 51% of their shares to South Africans.
It remains to be seen how Ramaphosa’s ANC
The clause on expropriation speaks of a minimum government deals with this issue. However, as in
of 51% local ownership, but leaves it up to the the other sectors covered in this report, the ANC
minister of Police to decide on a higher figure. is likely to promote extensive local ownership in
Both the South African Chamber of Commerce the security industry, which will also maintain or
and Industry (SACCI) and the Security Industry create opportunities for its politics of patronage.
Alliance (SIA) have requested Zuma not to sign this
bill.483 There are concerns that the bill is focused
483. http://www.bdlive.co.za/national/2014/06/19/business-groups-urge-zuma-not-to-sign-disputed-bill-on-private-
security; http://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/are-foreign-owned-private-security-companies-a-threat-to-south-
africas-national-security; http://www.prweb.com/releases/2014/06/prweb11907317.htm.
484. https://businesstech.co.za/news/business/175651/new-laws-could-mean-the-end-of-private-security-as-we-
know-it-in-sa-report/; http://city-press.news24.com/Business/Private-security-amendment-bill-the-enemy-of-SA-
economy-20151009.
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Part XII
Expropriation without
compensation and weaker
civil rights
sub-committee head of economic transformation,
The ANC turns to expropriation Enoch Godongwana, said the conference agreed
without compensation that the Constitution should be amended to
achieve expropriation without compensation. The
One of the key policy decisions at the ANC National Water Act of 1998 had already made
conference in December 2017 was on the ANC government the “public trustee of the
expropriation of land without compensation. The nation’s water resources”.486 However, the policy
486. https://www.dwa.gov.za/Documents/Publications/NWAguide/part1.pdf.
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had previously been advocated mainly by the

radical socialist EFF, an ANC breakaway party.487 Racial populism to divert attention
from ANC failures
The ANC announced in February 2018 that it plans
to expropriate mostly white-owned farms without Former President Thabo Mbeki’s foundation
compensation. President Ramaphosa announced stated in a leaked internal paper that the ANC has
on 31 July 2018 that the ANC will even try to change abandoned its historical values on non-racialism
the Constitution to support such expropriation through its framing of the land reform debate as
without compensation. On 22 August 2018, one of black versus white. The paper points to
Ramaphosa confirmed that urban land would also comments by former President Jacob Zuma in
be covered by the ANC’s expropriation policies.488 Parliament in February 2018 when he called on
“black parties” to unite to obtain a two-thirds
On 15 November 2018, Parliament’s Joint majority to amend the Constitution to allow for
Constitutional Review Committee adopted a report land expropriation without compensation.
that recommends that the wording of Section
25 of the Constitution be changed to explicitly
allow for expropriation without compensation. Jacob Zuma was advancing a
President Ramaphosa made the announcement perspective about the “resolution of the
re the amend of the Constitution even before the
public participation process about expropriation national question” radically different
without compensation had been finalised.489 A from the long-established and historic
defective consultation process in the run-up to
the report means that any amendments could position of the ANC … as part of this
be challenged in court.490 However, this step also he [Zuma] also made bold to change the
reflected the dynamics of one-party dominant
rule and a hybrid regime.
very nature of the ANC, characterising
it as a “black party”.
The report of the parliamentary committee will
now be referred to the National Assembly for The current position expressed by some leaders
approval, which is likely, given the ANC majority of the ANC on land expropriation without
and support from the socialist EFF. Parliament compensation shows that they have “accepted”
must establish the mechanism for the drafting of to be led by the EFF on the matter.492
the constitutional amendment, be that a special
ad hoc committee, or an existing one, in a process Political economist Moeletsi Mbeki said in this
that would entail further public hearings. It is as regard:
yet uncertain whether this will occur before the
national elections scheduled for 8 May 2019.491
229.
488. https://www.enca.com/news/urban-land-will-be-expropriated-ramaphosa.
489. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2018-07-02-the-farce-of-public-consultation-on-land-expropriation-
without-compensation/; https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/land-the-people-speak-tensions-simmer-
in-pietermaritzburg-20180720; https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/land-the-people-speak-we-are-all-
africans-rustenburg-residents-told-20180719.
490. https://businesstech.co.za/news/government/284258/south-africas-land-seizure-debate-what-farmers-banks-and-
citizens-have-to-say/.
491. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-11-13-expropriation-without-compensation-is-a-done-deal-all-thats-
left-is-the-formalities/.
492. https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2018-09-25-thabo-mbeki-decries-divisive-anc-land-approach/.
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This is not about land. It is about the loss of votes of European businesses and tens of thousands
by the ANC. And the ANC and its little son, the of European citizens in South Africa. Already in
EFF, they think they can bring back the voters September 2017, Stefan Sakoschek, regional
who are abandoning the ANC by attacking the director of the EU Chamber of Commerce and
white population … Its solution is to attack the Industry in South Africa, expressed the Chamber’s
white population. Malema is leading the ANC’s concern over land reform that had also still been
election campaign by attacking the white pending at that stage:
population.493
Again the definitions in the legislation are very
Racial nationalist discourses by the factionalized
broad and if accepted it will have major impact
ANC and the EFF blaming Afrikaners and whites in
on foreigners operating in South Africa. There
general have started to overshadow the non-racialist
are concerns that the bill is aimed at keeping
approach of the Mandela years. However, a senior
foreigners out, but there are worries about the
government panel chaired by former President
expropriation potential that is created.496
Kgalema Motlanthe had already concluded that
the fact that land reform has not succeeded so
In April 2018, members of the European Parliament
far, is neither the fault of the Constitution, nor of
correctly stressed during their meeting with South
white farmers, but of government incompetence
African counterparts that any expropriation should
in dealing with thousands of still outstanding
meet the agreement of the owners in question
claims, four thousand state farms not being used
and that fair compensation should be provided.
for distribution, corruption, misguided policies, an
insufficient 1% of the budget being allocated to
The ANC’s support for expropriation without
the issue, and inefficient government systems, as
compensation has already served as a red light
elsewhere in the economy and security services.494
to many foreign investors. From 2013 to 2017,
FDI inflows into the country had already declined
In fact, according to an Afrobarometer survey in
from US$ 8.3 billion to US$ 1.3 billion.497 On 31 July
November 2018, a “slim majority” of 53% said
2018, the IMF warned in its annual Article IV report
government should maintain the “willing seller,
that the ongoing debate on expropriation without
willing buyer” policy, rather than expropriation
compensation is creating policy uncertainty on
without compensation, with only 26% totally
property rights and discrediting South Africa’s
disagreeing. Half of black South Africans and
stated need for foreign investment.498
51% of ANC supporters supported this principle,
compared to 62% of coloured citizens, 68% of
The South African Reserve Bank stated in
Indians and 73% of white South Africans.495
November 2018 that it foresees a high risk of
lower domestic economic growth in 2019. It
How will European policymakers mentioned uncertainty about land expropriation,
which raised uncertainty about property rights
and foreign investors respond? and could could affect investor sentiment, as
one of the factors causing this.499 “If you create
It remains to be seen how European policymakers
uncertainty of some aspects of your environment,
ensure the protection of the interests of thousands
493. https://www.huffingtonpost.co.za/2018/05/15/experts-how-land-expropriation-could-go-very-very-
wrong_a_23435358/.
494. https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/1933899/anc-admits-land-reform-failure-recommends-security-of-
tenure/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eBkzjji9mkQ; https://irr.org.za/reports/freefacts/files/freefacts-
june-2018-22-06-2018.pdf; https://irr.org.za/reports/occasional-reports/files/irr-in-britain-notes-tc-11-07-18.pdf.
495. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-11-13-expropriation-without-compensation-is-a-done-deal-all-thats-
left-is-the-formalities/.
497. http://www.mondaq.com/uk/x/731134/agriculture+land+law/Expropriation+Of+Land+Without+Compensation+In+S
outh+Africa+May+Breach+International+Law.
498. https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/imf-warns-about-damaging-effects-of-land-policy-16332203.
499. https://businesstech.co.za/news/business/282816/4-things-expected-to-hit-south-africas-financial-stability-in-the-
next-year-according-to-the-reserve-bank/.
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and land tenure is one of them, that is one aspect banks continue to view agriculture as an attractive
that investors will be looking at,” Sérgio Pimenta, sector.502
the vice president for the Middle East and Africa
at the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the According to BASA’s Cas Coovadia, banks have
World Bank’s private investment arm, also stated lent an estimated 10 billion Euro or more to the
on 14 November 2018.500 agricultural sector based on land as collateral.
Several banks and the entire financial system in
Companies and individuals in South Africa may South Africa could be put at risk if that security
find it harder to insure their properties in future, were to be threatened. BASA had stated
as the risk of expropriation without compensation previously that the Constitution already makes
is becoming a real threat for insurers. The latter sufficient provision for expropriation. When
normally cover the risk of expropriation if it the parliamentary committee stated that it had
occurs through a series of cumulative acts by the agreed to an amendment to the Constitution,
government that eventually diminish the value of BASA responded:503
a person’s property. However, they mostly do not
cover legal expropriation done in accordance with An amendment that leaves all property or
a country’s laws.501 specific classes of property – homes, assets,
intellectual property, productive agricultural
property, among others – vulnerable to
Economic risks and food insecurity expropriation without compensation, would be
a real risk to banks and the country’s ability to
Serious disruption of the already challenged
attract both local and international investment,
agricultural sector can have major negative
grow an inclusive economy and create jobs.504
implications for food security in South Africa, as
it has done in Zimbabwe since 2000. Electorates
According to the chairman of the Land and
in Western countries are unlikely to be keen to
Agricultural Development Bank, Arthur Moloto,
support development aid after such deliberate
expropriation without compensation could could
high-risk policies in South Africa.
trigger wide defaults that would translate to a loss
of 41 billion rand to the government if the bank’s
According to the Banking Association of South
right as a creditor were not to be protected.505
Africa (BASA), there has been a decline in
the number of farm transactions and in land
Land is not sufficient for successful farming in arid
prices processed by South African banks since
South Africa. Experience and entrepreneurship,
the proposal to amend the constitution. The
working capital, know-how, machinery, labour,
farming community has adopted “a wait-and-
fuel, electricity, seed, chemicals, feed for livestock,
see approach”. BASA also observed a decrease
security, and water are all essential. Many of the
in capital investment into agricultural properties.
people to whom land has been transferred, have
It warned that “prolonged uncertainty” would
little knowledge of agriculture, with insufficient
significantly reduce property values, although
500. http://news.trust.org/item/20181114111607-hsjrq/.
501. https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2018-09-28-property-insurance-under-threat-in-harsh-land-
expropriation-climate/.
502. https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2018-10-18-fewer-farm-deals-as-farmers-adopt-wait-and-see-
approach/; https://www.thesouthafrican.com/land-expropriation-bosa-concern/.
503. https://www.iol.co.za/ios/news/banks-call-for-clarity-on-expropriation-without-compensation-18134092.
504. https://www.iol.co.za/ios/news/banks-call-for-clarity-on-expropriation-without-compensation-18134092. Also see
https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/economy/banks-weigh-in-on-land-debate-16824559.
505. https://www.moneyweb.co.za/news/south-africa/sas-land-bank-warns-expropriation-could-trigger-default/; https://
www.businesslive.co.za/bt/business-and-economy/2018-08-25-land-bank-boss-tshokolo-nchocho-on-the-dire-
consequences-of-expropriation/.
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development of black commercial farming by the rates and significantly higher unemployment
ANC. will tend to aggravate the security situation
in the country in general. An escalation of
criminal activity can also be expected, which
Future scenarios point to lower will encourage the emigration of highly
skilled people, further eroding the country’s
capital formation international competitiveness.506
A macroeconomic impact assessment of the policy

of land expropriation without compensation has Infringing civil rights and
been undertaken by University of Pretoria Gordon strengthening the hybrid regime
Institute of Business Science (GIBS) academic,
Roelof Botha, and University of Johannesburg In the run-up to the 2019 national elections
professor, Ilse Botha. They compared countries and beyond, investors and policymakers will
that have pursued policies similar to expropriation encounter major ANC propaganda campaigns to
without compensation, including Portugal, Spain, promote the essentially non-democratic notion
Romania, Vietnam, Venezuela, Ethiopia and of expropriation without compensation. These
Zimbabwe. campaigns will periodicially focus on scapegoats,
like cultural minorities, and use racial nationalism
The researchers have found that the ratio to divert attention from the ANC’s governance
of capital formation/GDP in these countries failures while ruling a one-party dominant
declined annually by an average 13.9% after the order.507 It will present the policy drive as one
implementation of such policies. They noted of restoring historical injustice, even though it
that the public debate about land expropriation would involve expropriating the legally acquired
without compensation in South Africa had already and paid property of citizens and communities no
precipitated a decline in real terms of capital longer seen as being within the ANC’s shrunken
formation by more than 7% over the past eleven social contract.
quarters.
Compensation has historically been the most
They describe two scenarios based on important and most substantive brake on abusive
conservatively estimated declines in capital government confiscations. Compensation also is
formation of 5% and 10% a year respectively. In a means of recognising the prior ownership and
both scenarios, economic recession, escalating dignity of the victim of expropriation. As legal
financing requirements for government, higher researcher, Martin van Staden, wrote:
money market and capital market interest rates
and a higher cost of servicing public debt will Without being required to pay compensation,
result. This will “crowd-out” the government’s the process of expropriation for government will
ability to spend funds on poverty alleviation and become significantly easier and opportunities
basic services such as education, health and the for abuse will be magnified tenfold.
maintenance of infrastructure.
Up to now, constitutional property rights
Against the background of the current high level consisted of two dimensions: (1) securing
of socio-political unrest in SA, the combination existing property rights, and (2) expanding
of a prolonged recession, higher interest
506. https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2018-11-12-land-expropriation-without-compensation-spells-economic-
disaster/.
507. https://irr.org.za/reports/occasional-reports/files/empowering-the-state-impoverishing-the-people.pdf.
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property rights to those who were denied

it during Apartheid. Expropriation without
compensation is an aberration and fits into
neither of these two dimensions. It de-secures
existing property rights, which as a result
means any expropriated property transferred
to previously disadvantaged South Africans
will be similarly insecure. After the Constitution
is amended, we will therefore be justified in
asking: Is the Constitution now dedicated to
helping citizens protect their property rights, or
to enabling government to violate them?508
The process of expropriation without compensation

as it relates to land, like the broader trend to state
intervention covered in Parts X and XI, aims at
diluting investor and property rights more broadly.
This would allow the one-party dominant rulers
to seize or extract wealth wherever it is found.509
In the process, it also increases the leverage of
political rulers over citizens and communities,
constraining the development of opposition
politics in a hybrid regime.
508. https://www.iafrica.com/right-to-compensation-central-to-protecting-human-rights/.
509. https://www.news24.com/Columnists/GuestColumn/the-threat-of-expropriation-without-compensation-is-closer-
than-you-think-20190123.
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Part XIII
Foreign patrons, factional
struggles and anti-
Western rhetoric
Strong factions in the ANC feel closer to China, which the diplomats of Germany, the USA, the UK,
Russia, Zimbabwe and Venezuela’s Maduro the Netherlands and Switzerland had listed some
government510 than to the Western powers of the reasons for this somber business mood.
responsible for 75% of South Africa’s foreign trade. The reasons included concerns about property
Their outlook is strongly influenced by political rights and insufficient investor protection after
ties, entrenched ideological roots and geopolitical the ANC government’s unilateral cancellation
positioning. of bilaterial investment treaties. It also included
concerns about the rule of law and regulatory
This outlook was again demonstrated by a predictability.511
diplomatic incident at the beginning of 2019.
The semi-boycott of investment by disillusioned The ANC responded with claims that the Western
foreign businesspeople had been noted for powers were latter-day colonialists and promoting
years by foreign diplomats too. In early 2019, a regime change.512 Wolfgang Drechsler, a foremost
discussion document from mid-2018 was leaked in African expert and journalist, wrote:
510. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-03-01-south-africa-stands-firm-behind-maduro/.
511. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-02-04-investor-countries-june-2018-memo-to-pretoria-sparks-
february-2019-diplomatic-incident/; https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-02-05-the-investors-memo-
anatomy-of-self-inflicted-damage/.
512. https://ewn.co.za/2019/02/05/anc-accuses-5-western-countries-of-pushing-for-regime-change-in-sa.
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How deep the economic and political Foreign actors may also play a role in intra-ANC
dogmatism is entrenched in the ANC, can be factional struggles. Russian decision makers,
seen in the official response to the initiative actively trying to expand Russia’s influence in
of the five embassies. Instead of seriously Africa, may find it easier at present to align with
testing the recommendations to improve the strong Zuma-aligned networks that they have
investment climate, the ANC labelled them as dealt with in the past decade. Russia has been
unacceptable “meddling by former colonialists” conspicuously absent from the list of countries
and an imperialist “pretext to the country’s pledging support for Ramaphosa during his drive
recolonization”.513 for foreign investment in 2018.516
Greater reliance on non-Western Looking to China for symbolic and

patrons economic leadership
Due to political factionalism and economic policy The ANC leadership has come to view China’s
failures, the ANC has become more reliant on Communist rulers as their example. According
foreign patrons. South Africa’s foreign policy has to John Matisonn, confidential sources indicated
clearly pivoted to China and Russia during the that Zuma had told his cabinet members in 2012
Zuma presidency, when Ramaphosa served as already to go to China for political training.517
vice-president. This policy differs dramatically
from the more balanced multipolar approach A Better Africa, the above-mentioned ANC policy
under Nelson Mandela’s presidency. discussion document, concludes:
A Better Africa in a Better and Just World, a China [sic] economic development trajectory
discussion document of the ruling ANC of 2015, remains a leading example of the triumph of
reflected this shift.514 It formed the basis for humanity over adversity. The exemplary role
foreign policy discussions at the ANC’s policy- of the collective leadership of the Communist
making National General Council in mid-October Party of China in this regard should be a guiding
2015. Such discussion documents are often an lodestar of our own struggle.518
early indication of ANC policy directions in the
following five years.515 China now is South Africa’s top trade partner.519
China is also using strategic debt to expand its
At this stage, Ramaphosa is likely to continue the influence. In mid-2018, ESKOM received another
ANC’s strong leaning towards China. It remains to $3.5 billion in loans from the China Development
be seen how he will deal with the USA’s renewed Bank to finish the $15-billion Kusile power plant,
engagement in Africa during the Trump presidency. also with Hitachi/ANC boilers.520 The bank’s prior
The post-Zuma period and divisions in the EU may major loan to South Africa was to Transnet ($5
allow him to repair relations with some European billion) for China South Rail’s and Shanghai Zenhua
actors. Heavy Industries’ corruption-riddled locomotives
513. https://www.fuw.ch/article/aufgefallen-in-suedafrika-ex-kolonie-der-schweiz/.
514. African National Congress NGC 2015 Discussion Documents can be viewed at http://www.anc.org.za/docs/
umrabulo/2015/ngc_disc_docsy.pdf. Chapter 7 of the document, pp 157-193, is entitled “International Relations”.
515. The ANC held its mid-term National General Council (NGC) in October 2015. The NGC is the ANC’s highest
policymaking body in between the quinquennial meetings of its National Conference. Ahead of the NGC meeting,
various subcommittees of the National Executive body released discussion documents.
516. Africa Confidential, 59(20), 12 October 2018, pp 1-3.
517. John Matisonn, God, spies and lies (Missing Ink, Vlaeberg, 2016), p 417.
518. African National Congress NGC 2015 Discussion Documents at http://www.anc.org.za/docs/umrabulo/2015/ngc_
disc_docsy.pdf, p 161.
519. http://www.moneyweb.co.za/news-fast-news/chinas-jinping-pledges-60bn-to-africa-development/.
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and Durban-crane procurement via the Gupta on cooperation related to internet infrastructure
family empire. According to Mills Soko,521 political and cyber-security.525
economist at the University of Cape Town’s
Graduate School of Business, the ANC government
is treating China as a unique strategic partner: Voting against human rights
measures at the UN
The government’s refusal to raise How will these events impact on South Africa’s
tariffs on cheap steel imports from political system? They occurred while Western
powers widely criticized the Chinese record on
China suggests that it will prioritise political pluralism and its limiting of citizens’ access
its relationship with China at the to “undesirable” news from the outside and social
expense of domestic interests. media.526 After protests in the Ukraine, Turkey and
Venezuela, the UN Human Rights Council brought
Doctor Jakkie Cilliers, chairperson of the ISS Board a resolution in 2014 to safeguard the right to
of Trustees in Pretoria, commented: peaceful protest. In March 2014, South Africa led
a group including China, Russia and Saudi Arabia
in proposing several amendments to water down
In exchange for its membership of the BRICS,
the resolution, which prompted criticism from the
South Africa appears to have also given China
UK representative in Geneva and from Human
a licence to de-industrialise the country despite
Rights Watch.527
the fact that the EU, as a bloc, is South Africa’s
major trading partner.522
In November 2015, South Africa voted with Russia
and China against a UN resolution that would
Thus, South Africa’s foreign policy shift reflects a
recognise threats against defenders of human
geopolitical and domestic political reorientation.
rights. In July 2016, South Africa joined China
The ANC persists in seeing Chinese state capitalism
and Russia in voting against a UN resolution on
as its model for a developmental state. This
the “promotion, protection and enjoyment of
remains the case despite South Africa’s strong
human rights on the internet”. The resolution
private sector and despite bad governance of its
was however adopted by most other member
parastatal companies weakening the economy
states and will be used by the UN Human Rights
even further at this stage. In some cases, Chinese
Council. The resolution tried to ensure political
parastatals and other companies are likely to
commitment from member states to protect
enjoy a politically-based advantage over Western
freedom of expression and privacy online, and to
companies.523
refrain from shutting down the internet during key
times such as elections or terror attacks.528
Political and security cooperation have become
closer. The education of higher-level executives at
Conditions for good democracy or criticisms of
South African SOEs and senior ANC party cadres
ANC policies formulated by Western powers,
is conducted in cooperation with the Communist
Western media or domestic opposition groups are
Party of China.524 The ANC government has also
increasingly being portrayed as neo-colonialist.
already signed a deal with the Chinese government
521. http://mg.co.za/article/2015-08-22-sa-and-china-a-love-founded-on-state-control.
522. https://issafrica.org/iss-today/selling-our-future-for-a-bric-time-to-rethink-south-africas-foreign-policy.
523. https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/opinion/editorials/2018-01-15-editorial-why-the-sinopec-deal-is-intriguing/.
524. http://mg.co.za/article/2015-08-22-sa-and-china-a-love-founded-on-state-control; http://www.cnbc.
com/2016/08/24/will-closer-ties-to-china-rescue-south-africas-government.html.
525. http://www.cpifinancial.net/news/post/31624/south-africa-and-china-sign-ict-plan.
526. http://www.giga-hamburg.de/de/publication/zivilgesellschaft-unter-druck-globaler-widerstand-gegen-demokratie-
wächst; http://www.giga-hamburg.de/de/news/media-made-in-china.
527. http://blog.unwatch.org/index.php/2014/04/01/shaky-road-to-important-peaceful-protest-resolution/.
528. http://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/opinion/2016-11-08-states-double-dealing-a-threat-to-rights-in-sa/.
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Some NGOs claim that the Chinese government to enhance its position in Africa and extend its
and the ANC government assist each other in influence in South Africa.533 As Prof Mark Swilling
obstructing or delaying the requests of critical noticed:
NGOs to gain observer status at some UN structures
for NGOs. These NGOs include Freedom Now, a Putin signed a decree in 2007 that provided
US-based group supporting political prisoners of for the consolidation of all nuclear capabilities
conscience, and AfriForum, a South African-based built up during the Cold War into a new civilian
group supporting minority and civil rights.529 nuclear industry with global ambitions. Since
then, Russians have been building nuclear
It remains to be seen to what extent South Africa power plants that are a hybrid between an
under Ramaphosa uses its non-permanent seat on embassy and a military base, often financed off
the UN Security Council during 2019 to promote a state guarantee that effectively gives Russia
human rights selectively or with geopolitical trade- massive leverage over the host country.534
offs. Its freedom of action will be constrained by
the ANC’s internal factionalism, the struggling Relations between Putin and Zuma developed
economy and socio-political challenges, including to both personal and national security interests.
the land reform policy.530 When Zuma believed he had been poisoned in
August 2014, it was to Russia that he allegedly
went to get medical treatment.535 During the same
Choosing Russia against “US- period, news emerged of a mysterious, but major
personal deal on a nuclear energy programme
sponsored destabilisation” concluded in Russia between Putin and Zuma.
Both domestic and foreign considerations play a The nuclear energy deal was in contrast with
role in the ANC’s policy towards Russia. Business energy and economic policies, including the
Day editor Peter Bruce speculated in 2013 that NDP. Major departments in South Africa were
the ANC’s financial troubles would probably not involved in the opaque deal, reputed to be
result in the party returning to its dependence on worth up to $100 billion.536 Zuma also dismissed
foreign funders, especially among non-Western ministers who opposed the deal and did not follow
powers.531 In 2014, reports emerged that the ANC the prescribed procedures. The nuclear deal had
was broke. The ANC denied the reports.532 as much potential for corruption as the arms deal
scandals of the 1990s, in which Zuma’s role has
Putin, a former KGB intelligence officer, used not yet been clarified.537
the opportunity to strengthen Russia’s policy
529. http://mg.co.za/article/2015-08-13-diplomatic-fracas-brews-over-ngo-freedom-now.
530. https://m.dw.com/de/s%C3%BCdafrika-im-un-sicherheitsrat-f%C3%BChrungsqualit%C3%A4ten-
gefordert/a-47093477.
531. http://www.bdlive.co.za/opinion/columnists/2013/11/18/thick-end-of-the-wedge-zuma-is-pretty-well-untouchable-
politically.
532. http://mg.co.za/article/2014-10-30-broke-anc-may-have-to-cut-jobs-for-comrades; http://mg.co.za/article/2014-10-
31-anc-denies-it-is-broke.
533. http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/en/blogs/africasource/russia-s-return-to-africa-an-update.
534. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2019-01-21-the-zuma-power-elite-is-alive-kicking-and-preparing-to-
replace-ramaphosa/.
535. http://www.iol.co.za/pretoria-news/opinion/reliance-on-russia-goes-way-back-1.1903975.
536. http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/08/14/uk-safrica-nuclear-idUKKCN0QJ11T20150814; “Jacob Zuma’s secret nuke
stitch-up”, Mail and Guardian, 26 September 2014; “Less Russia, more speed”, Financial Mail, 4 September 2014;
“SA denies corruption in Russia’s nuclear deal”, Fin24, 1 October 2014.
537. https://mg.co.za/article/2017-10-17-president-jacob-zuma-implements-his-12th-cabinet-reshuffle.
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Since his election as president, Ramaphosa has

indicated that the nuclear deal will not be pursued The ANC is a revolutionary national
immediately. However, in Russia, Vladimir Putin liberation movement which is an
has won the election and will be ruling until 2024.
538
Russia has also increased its efforts to build integral part of the international
influence in Africa, using government-backed revolutionary movement to liberate
security, arms, energy and industrial deals.539 At
present it is unknown whether the ANC-controlled
humanity from the bondage of
543
security apparatus will markedly change their imperialism and neo-colonialism.
policies on Russia.540 Numerous intelligence
officials of South Africa have received training in The text even went so far as to quote the
Russia in recent years.541 In September 2016, the founder of the Soviet Union, Vladimir Lenin, on
deputy director of the Russian Federal Service for the revolutionary transformation of society, and
Military-Technical Cooperation (FSVTS), Anatoly extolled the value of the Russian Revolution in
Punchuk, confirmed that the FSVTS had for the 1917.544 The ANC document does not celebrate
first time proposed to South Africa to engage in the fall of the Berlin Wall a quarter of a century
joint industrial research in the defence sphere.542 ago. Instead, the ANC document actually laments
“the sudden collapse of socialism in the world
According to leaked cables obtained by Al Jazeera, [that] altered completely the balance of forces in
the military intelligence services of both countries favour of imperialism”. This new imperialism has
have been involved in a $100 million joint satellite “plunged humanity in a perpetual socio-economic
surveillance programme covering Africa. The crisis”, and the US stands accused of “effectively
satellite system, known as Project Condor, is using its aggressive foreign policy to advance its
regarded as a significant part of the envisaged national interests”.
strategic cooperation between Russia and South
Africa. The project is also aimed at challenging the Anti-Western bias and paranoia
domination of African arms sales by the US and
France. Outlandish international conspiracy theories
periodically find fertile ground in the ANC,
In the document, the ANC leadership also according to political scientist Anthony Butler
reaffirmed its ideological roots: of the University of Cape Town.545 In September
538. https://www.economist.com/news/europe/21738386-atlantic-alliance-ill-prepared-deter-russian-aggression-russias-
conventional-forces.
539. https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/west-watches-with-concern-as-putin-builds-influence-in-africa-1.3767151.
540. https://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFKBN1FF1JT-OZATP?utm_source=34553&utm_medium=partner.
541. http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Spies-trained-in-Russia-raise-double-agent-fears-20140831.\; https://
www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2018-02-05-ramaphosa-will-need-to-tackle-the-state-security-agency/#.
WngwGqjibIU.
542. https://rbth.com/news/2016/09/13/russia-proposes-to-south-africa-industrial-cooperation-in-defense-
sphere_629635.
disc_docsy.pdf, pp 160, 185-186.
544. http://allafrica.com/stories/201508251340.html; http://time.com/3601968/anc-south-africa-china-communist-
party/. For a similar approach in Zimbabwe, see http://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/the-ideology-of-russia-s-return-
to-africa/.
545. “ANC blame shifting exercise is under way”, Business Day, 26 February 2016.
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2014, Kebby Maphatsoe, the deputy minister of aimed to “plant the seeds of anarchy”. The US
Defence and Veterans, called Public Protector Thuli ambassador to South Africa, Patrick Gaspard,
Madonsela a CIA agent because of her continued pointed out that he had personally invited
investigation of the Nkandla scandal involving Mantashe to recommend young leaders from the
President Zuma. The US ambassador was present ANC for the programme, called the Washington
and lodged an official complaint. Peter Fabricius Fellowship.549
of the ISS commented:
Van Onselen states:
[A]t least [Maphatsoe] did new members of the
diplomatic corps a favour … Many diplomats
still arrive in the country under the naïve Under pressure the African National Congress
impression that they are coming to serve in (ANC) has historically relied on one red herring
the land of Mandela, a rather idyllic rainbow above all others to negate responsibility and
nation in love with itself and the entire world. divert attention from dissatisfaction with its own
Maphatsoe’s crude suggestion … would have performance: a “third force”, be it the Central
been a wake-up call, alerting them to the sort Intelligence Agency (CIA) or white supremacists,
of ideological sentiment that still runs beneath is supposedly the root cause of its many and
the surface here, and sometimes emerges.546 varied problems. Always unseen, never proven
and yet constantly alluded to, its claims to this
When in early June 2015 the news broke that effect are the ultimate abdication of agency
the hosting of the FIFA World Cup in South Africa … The ANC has deliberately manufactured an
in 2010 may have been obtained through a $10 environment in which everything that runs
million bribe to FIFA officials, a similar response against the party or threatens its legitimacy is
emerged from ANC circles.547 In March 2015, blamed on some outside agency … The ANC has
the State Security Agency announced that it was helped engender and augment that reality on
investigating Public Protector Thuli Madonsela, EFF various different levels, least of all by fuelling
leader Julius Malema, former DA Parliamentary an atmosphere of paranoia and conspiracy.550
Leader Lindiwe Mazibuko and head of the
Association of Mineworkers and Construction
Union, Joseph Mathunjwa, as American spies. A new Cold War in Africa?
Claims of a UK military plot against Zuma emerged
in 2016.548 China is strengthening its internal autocracy and
increasingly building its power and influence in
In February 2016, the then ANC Secretary General Africa. The hope that China would evolve into a
Gwede Mantashe, a strong Ramaphosa ally, said: softer, less autocratic and more capitalist guardian
“We are aware of the programme that takes of an international power balance, is gone.551
young people to the US for six weeks, then brings
them back and plants them everywhere in the US policy in Africa currently focuses on security,
campuses”. He said “regime-change elements” geopolitics and trade, not human rights.552 On 13
had gripped South Africa and they (the students) December 2018, John Bolton, the national security
546. http://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/acronymia-nervosa-the-cia-and-the-icc.
547. http://www.bdlive.co.za/opinion/columnists/2015/06/05/thick-end-of-the-wedge-fikile-mbalulas-folly-play-chicken-
with-the-fbi.
548. http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/anc-claims-uk-plotting-to-unseat-zuma-20160516; http://www.vice.
com/read/exclusive-the-british-armys-secret-plan-to-prop-up-south-africas-ruling-party.
549. “South African ruling party official accuses US of plot”, The Washington Post, 21 February 2016.
550. http://sa-monitor.com/top-10-bogus-anc-conspiracy-theories-bdlive-25-may-2016/.
551. https://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21737517-it-bet-china-would-head-towards-democracy-and-market-
economy-gamble-has-failed-how.
552. Africa Confidential, 59(18), 14 September 2018, pp 3-4.
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adviser of US president Donald Trump, announced Boko Haram.557 There are concerns that several
that the USA wants African governments to factors may at some stage converge to increase
choose strategically between support for the the risk of Islamist extremist attacks against
USA or for China and Russia. Trump’s policy was Western or symbolic targets in South Africa. The
especially focused on countering China’s influence extent of political and bureaucratic corruption
in Africa. “They are deliberately and aggressively and factionalism, limited crime intelligence and
targeting their investments in the region to policing abilities, changing dynamics among
gain a competitive advantage over the United extremist groups elsewhere in Africa and the
States,” Bolton said. “China uses bribes, opaque Middle East, as well as alliances between the
agreements and the strategic use of debt to hold governments of South Africa and other African
states in Africa captive to Beijing’s wishes and countries fighting against Islamist terrorist groups
demands”.553 may result in targets in South Africa being selected.
It remains to be seen how South Africa will The ANC has also used anti-Israel policy gestures to
position itself, given its membership of BRICS and reinforce its “revolutionary” credentials. The one
its strong historical pro-China orientation. The foreign policy decision announced during the ANC’s
anti-US position of the ANC has implications for conference in December 2017 was to downgrade
the US Africa Command on the African continent, South Africa’s diplomatic relations with Israel
as is apparent from this excerpt from a National by reducing the embassy in Tel Aviv to a “liaison
General Council (NGC) discussion document in office” – “immediately and unconditionally”.558
2015: At the hundred-and-fifth anniversary celebration
of the ruling ANC in January 2017, Zuma called
The campaign to engage all [African Union] on South Africans not to visit Israel in order to
member state [sic] on the continent not to host show solidarity with “the people of Palestine”.559
these military bases continue [sic]; however, the Ramaphosa has not changed the ANC’s conference
question that should be posed is whether this decision, and while he has addressed meetings of
is still preventable because in certain places on Jewish South Africans, he referred in his speech at
the continent AFRICOM has already established the ANC’s birthday celebrations only to the ANC’s
its footprint in the form of training soldiers and condemnation of occupation and suppression in
other newly devised mechanisms? The ANC has Palestinian territories.560
to deal with these realities and develop new
strategies to take this campaign forward.554
Leaving the International Criminal
There is still active cooperation between South Court (ICC)
African and European and US security agencies on
potential Islamist extremism.555 To date, terrorist The ANC government’s foreign policy often
groups have preferred to use South Africa as diverts from Western powers’ concerns regarding
a sanctuary to gain passports, raise funds and human rights and rule of law. On 15 June 2015,
recruit with relative ease.556 However, two of for example, Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir
the four strongest Islamist terrorist groups in the was allowed to leave South Africa, despite an ICC
world are from Africa, namely Al-Shabaab and warrant for his arrest. On the same day Judge
553. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-national-security-advisor-ambassador-john-r-bolton-
trump-administrations-new-africa-strategy/; https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/13/us/politics/john-bolton-africa-
china.html.
disc_docsy.pdf, p 176.
555. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/04/south-africa-islamist-militant-attacks-us-warning.
556. http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2016-06-06-terror-warnings-is-south-africa-really-an-islamic-state-target/#.
V1T7X5Uw_IV.
557. See https://reliefweb.int/report/world/global-terrorism-index-2018.
558. https://issafrica.org/iss-today/can-ramaphosa-revitalise-south-africas-foreign-policy.
559. https://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/222973.
560. https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/ancmanifesto-read-cyril-ramaphosas-full-speech-18792716.
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President Dunstan Mlambo of the High Court in described as “a betrayal of the victims of atrocious
Pretoria ruled that the ANC government’s failure crimes”.567
to arrest Al-Bashir was inconsistent with the South
African Constitution, that the government was in However, in November 2016 the ANC government
contempt of court and should have arrested and gave notice of its intention to withdraw from the
detained Al-Bashir.561 ICC. “South Africa’s proposed withdrawal from
the International Criminal Court shows startling
Doctor Abiodun Williams, president of The disregard for justice from a country long seen as
Hague Institute for Global Justice, referred to “a a global leader on accountability for victims of the
clear abuse of executive authority by the South gravest crimes,” said Dewa Mavhinga, the NGO’s
African government … Clearly, the Bashir case is Africa division senior researcher.568
not in keeping with Mandela’s ideals”.562 When
the opposition party, the DA, in September 2015 In February 2017, the ANC government’s
brought a motion to impeach President Zuma decision to withdraw from the ICC was ruled
for the government’s handling of the Al-Bashir “unconstitutional and invalid” by the High Court.
visit, the ANC’s response was to state that the DA The court ordered the government to revoke
was acting on behalf of the US and promoting an its notice of withdrawal. In December 2017
“imperialist agenda”.563 At the ANC’s NGC meeting and September 2018, Justice Minister Michael
in October 2015, the latter took the decision to Masutha said the government still intended to quit
ask the ANC government to begin the process of the ICC.569 Ramaphosa defended the government
withdrawal of its membership of the ICC.564 decision to withdraw in 2016 when he was deputy
president570 and he has not yet clearly indicated
In October 2016, after Zuma’s visit to Kenya and a his opposition to South Africa’s withdrawal from
BRICS summit, during which he may have received the ICC.571
guarantees of support, the ANC government gave
notice of its intention to leave the ICC. Shortly In December 2018 the Constitutional Court of
thereafter, Russia also indicated that it would South Africa also found that the Zuma government,
withdraw its support of the ICC, which categorized to the detriment of expropriated Zimbabwean
Russia’s actions in the Crimea as an occupation.565. farmers who had turned to the Southern
“South Africa’s withdrawal would be a huge reversal Africa Development Council (SADC) Tribunal,
of its role as a leader promoting victims’ rights and had unlawfully supported the Zimababwean
the values in its post-apartheid constitution”, was government in suspending the Tribunal in 2011 and
the response by Human Rights Watch.566 Western removing its competences to deal with individual
media and policy-makers expressed their dismay cases when it was reinstated in 2014.572 President
at what the former US ambassador, Stephen Rapp, Ramaphosa, whose government opposed a lower
561. http://www.bdlive.co.za/africa/africannews/2015/06/15/failure-to-arrest-bashir-violated-south-african-constitution-
judge-rules.
562. http://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2015/jun/24/south-africas-failure-arrest-
al-bashir-not-in-keeping-mandelas-ideals.
563. http://www.citizen.co.za/666696/anc-rips-into-colonialist-da-over-failed-impeachment-motion/; http://www.iol.
co.za/news/politics/anc-rips-into-colonialist-da-1.1909728#.VkMy0JqBfmQ.
564. http://www.voanews.com/content/anc-wants-south-africa-out-of-international-criminal-court/3002092.html.
565. http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/22/world/africa/south-africa-international-criminal-court.html?_r=0; https://
www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2016-11-22-view-from-the-hague-the-icc-bleeding-has-stopped/.
566. https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/10/24/south-africa-icc-move-betrays-victims; http://www.fr-online.de/politik/
suedafrika-sabotage-am-strafgerichtshof,1472596,34875228.html.
567. “South Africa to Withdraw From International Criminal Court”, New York Times, 21 October 2016.
568. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-37724724.
569. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-39050408; https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-12-07-south-
africa-confirms-withdrawal-from-icc/.
570. http://ewn.co.za/2016/11/09/ramaphosa-defends-south-africa-s-withdrawal-from-icc.
571. https://mg.co.za/article/2018-06-12-ramaphosa-has-a-rare-chance-to-stop-sa-withdrawing-from-the-icc.
572. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-08-30-south-africas-role-in-the-denial-of-justice-in-southern-africa/.
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court’s similar ruling before,573 was ordered by the interests, including terrorism in Africa. However,
court to remove Zuma’s signature. the tone of ANC statements on Western policies
is largely critical, and is noted by Western
Chief Justice Mogoeng Mogoeng stated in his governments and business.575 Often this occurs
ruling: “It is fundamentally about challenging to cover internal weakness and failures in
the expropriation of land without compensation governance, to compete with internal rivals or to
and the intended removal of the tribunal’s find scapegoats.
jurisdiction to determine the validity of that kind
of land expropriation that was done in terms of The factionalised ANC is now more reliant on
the Constitution of Zimbabwe.” Kallie Kriel, CEO foreign patrons, including China and Russia.
of the civil rights movement AfriForum, that However, the agency of the ANC’s own factions
was one of the applicants, stated that the ANC should not be underestimated.576 Negative
government could be held accountable by the responses by the ANC towards Western powers,
farmers for considerable amounts for trauma and businesses and value systems at crucial moments
dispossession.574 remain likely in the next few years.
Anti-Western reflexes?
Western governments and South Africa naturally
continue to try and find common ground and
cooperate on various economic and security
573. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-09-06-two-court-disputes-test-sas-commitment-to-rule-of-law/.
574. https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/courts/2050479/white-zim-farmers-want-billions-from-sa-after-zuma-ruled-
complicit-in-illegal-sadc-move/; https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/zumas-decision-on-sadc-tribunal-
unconstitutional-unlawful-and-irrational-concourt-20181212.
575. http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2015-08-20-ancs-future-foreign-policy-all-roads-lead-to-china/#.
VeCrx5rALmQ; http://time.com/3601968/anc-south-africa-china-communist-party/.
576. http://www.ascleiden.nl/news/new-asc-infosheet-pivoting-russia-china-and-anti-western-rhetoric-south-africas-
foreign-policy.
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Part XIV
The political risks
to business in the next
two years
South Africa continues to present attractive factional competition in the run-up to elections
business opportunities. High political risk, and the repositioning of the deeply divided ANC;
combined with global economic challenges, the further politicization of the security forces and
have already contributed to a massive decline in securitization of politics to prop up presidential
meaningful foreign direct investment in South rule; as well as the weak economy and more
Africa.577 It is expected that the political risk to limited state resources.
business will remain high in at least the next two
years as the internally diverse Ramaphosa faction The ANC hybrid regime is likely to remain in place
and Zuma faction continue to contest control in the medium term. Ramaphosa’s presidency
over the ANC. Three drivers will strengthen the has meant a continuing recirculation of elites
dynamics of a hybrid regime and democratic and new networks of power and patronage, with
decline in the coming years: they are intensified related changes in rhetoric and policies. However,
577. http://sa-monitor.com/political-risk-affecting-foreign-investment-sa-bdlive-5-september-2016/.
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the Zuma faction and related networks remain The planned and actual measures would weaken
strong at all levels of the ANC. Ramaphosa and his property rights and reduce private-sector
supporter networks have been deeply embedded autonomy. This result would strengthen the
in the current neopatrimonial and one party position of crony capitalists with links to ANC
dominant system for years. They will be unable to factions compared to other businesses. The
significantly change the underlying, and by now ANC policy move to weaken the constitutional
well-established dynamics, rules of the game and protection of property rights constitutes another
the incentive systems described. step in this direction. It also threatens to undo
some of the anchors of the peace settlement
Once state institutions in a one-party dominant of 1994, creating an even more selective social
state have become so permeated with factions, contract and polarization between communities.
patron-client networks, regional and local In addition, the weakening of property rights
strongmen, and unaccountable presidentialism, create more room for executive discretion in
the processes become self-generative. Incumbents decision making and non-accountable dynamics
have too much to lose and too slim chances in the hybrid regime.
of having political or economic alternatives.
Democratic checks and balances on these forces To date, consumption and short-term fulfilment of
will have some partial impact on a case-by-case patron-client obligations, rather than production,
basis, but overall and ultimately they will be state capacity-building or long-term investment,
ineffective. It is unlikely that Ramaphosa will be have dominated the deployment of resources
able to institutionalize democratic checks and and opportunities gained. The political effect of
balances in the hybrid regime to the extent that more ANC resources will be to regenerate the
a future Zuma-like presidency can be prevented. power of ANC factions, since patrons will be able
to cultivate new clients and constituencies and
Faced with new political and trade union sustain relationships with existing ones in the
challengers, the ANC is desperately trying to find hybrid regime. During the competition with new
ways of regaining some of its lost support among political and trade union challengers, such steps
key constituencies. Due to the current levels of could also be presented as populist measures
state debt, ANC factions are under pressure to aimed at improving the lot of the poor.
find economic resources to sustain themselves
and their patron-client networks. The high levels of state debt and the needs of the
ANC’s patronage networks will drive efforts to
Policies for economic growth will remain torn look for new sources of income, both domestically
between different stakeholders and policy and internationally. The value of some state-run
preferences. Policy incoherence and unexpected corporations, but also other assets or opportunities
twists will often reflect phases in factional of which it should be the public custodian, could
competition and newly-bargained advantages and be capitalized or mortgaged. Sometimes this will
alignments, rather than ideological vacillation. have a knock-on impact on existing government
Policy swings and uncertainty will be experienced undertakings towards business. At present, there
most by companies in those sectors most is a real risk of the government inducing major
exposed to the government’s political priorities pension and investment funds to invest in weakly-
or regulatory and licensing power. Minerals, managed or failing parastatals.
energy, security, agriculture, telecoms and
pharmaceuticals would be among these sectors. The search for new sources of income will coincide
with an increased effort at economic diplomacy,
The ANC has proceeded with several regulations, both formal and informal. The diplomacy will be
policy initiatives, bills and laws regarding mining couched in the rhetoric of branding, using South
and energy, the security industry, affirmative Africa’s many and unquestioned opportunities.
action and black empowerment, land, patents, However, the actual results would at least partially
and foreign investors in general. The common strengthen the ANC’s patron-client networks
underlying policy in all of them is the same: in state structures, rather than South African
they greatly increase the ANC government’s communities and citizens as a whole.
interventionist powers in the economy.
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Factional struggles for scarce resources will There is an oligopoly of violence instead of the
drive efforts to increase state income through state’s monopoly of violence. The ANC government
these measures and others. Unaccountable does not consider a restoration of the security of
presidentialism, local big men and informal citizens and businesses as a state priority. Business
patron-client networks may play a role in this and NGOs should review and regularly update
regard. There are different codes of conduct in their risk mitigation measures.
different jurisdictions, and international business
would need to heed best practices regarding The search for more resources in the hybrid
integrity and reputational risk. regime and factional competition could result
in an increased dependency of key decision
The levels of visible state mismanagement makers on foreign patrons like China, Russia or
and operational risk are likely to remain high other political and business actors. The field
or sometimes even rise. This state of affairs of competitors and the importance of specific
will continue to have an effect in many areas competitive advantages of business may change
of service delivery: the security of citizens and suddenly. Western business is advised to actively
farmers, electricity, water management, waste involve their business associations, business
management, roads, education, postal services, media and policy-makers to support their projects
and others that may arise. The impact will differ in South Africa.
per province and locality, with pockets of sufficient
or good service delivery in provinces and local International business may find it worthwhile to
areas. conduct corporate social responsibility projects
that focus on entrepreneurship training and
Based on the internal and external dynamics business education. Given current socio-political
of the ANC government, if interventions do not dynamics, such initiatives should take into
have the required effect, there is a risk that such account the cultural capital and mother-language
a result would not trigger a reassessment of preferences of different groups and the option
the intervention, but rather a stronger form of of private education institutions. If the projects
intervention. involve cooperation between foreign and South
African institutions of public education, strict
Protest politics may have some impact on criteria and monitoring to reinforce the remaining
operations in a specific location, but are likely to spaces of academic freedom are recommended in
be of limited duration. Depending on the locality, policy-relevant education and research.
protest politics may be more prominent during
periods in the run-up to elections, during elections There is a limited but robust evolution of capacity
and shortly thereafter. and self-help initiatives within cities, communities,
and the private sector. This trend will involve an
Factions within trade unions and trade unions will authority migration over time and shape the new
compete intensely with each other for members, political order. Business and NGOs are advised
networks, power, status and resources. As a result, to identify potential partners and to use the
industrial unrest will continue to be a major risk. opportunities involved.
Due to the context in which it will be occurring,
the potential politicization of disputes could be
fast and assume militant forms.
Real or instigated xenophobic, anti-Western or

indigenization sentiments may emerge during
power plays or tough negotiations. When under
pressure over non-democratic or bad governance,
the ANC, as in the past, could easily resort to
conspiracy theories or to smearing credible
critics and political opponents as “imperialists”,
“racists”, “fascists” or “colonialists”. Business may
sometimes be caught in the crossfire.
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Part XV
Rebuilding the private
sector and sustainable
communities
South Africa’s political and economic cultural and education-related institutions and
restabilization increasingly depends on healthy networks, and NGOs could play a major role in this
institutions in the private sector and sustainable regard. If considering activities in South Africa,
communities. During the past few years, the ANC such actors should give renewed attention to two
government has increasingly failed to deliver good important generators of stability and prosperity:
governance. While President Ramaphosa is trying the private business sector and institutions for
to roll back some of the worst abuses of the Zuma sustainable communities in South Africa.
presidency, the hybrid regime and the incentives
and sanctions of the political order will seriously Opportunities: A McKinsey Global Institute report,
constrain any improvement in the near future. South Africa’s big five: Bold priorities for inclusive
growth, identifies five major opportunities: service
New partnerships, new jobs and skills development exports; advanced manufacturing; infrastructure;
will be important to rebuild South Africa’s stability natural gas; and the agricultural value chain. If
and prosperity. There are still opportunities. government and businesses prioritize initiatives
Europe-based small and medium businesses, from these sectors, they could by 2030 increase
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GDP growth by a total of 1.1 percentage points Mpumalanga and Free State provinces. Afrikaans-
per year, adding R1 trillion ($87 billion) to the speaking businesses and NGOs are well-placed
annual GDP and creating 3.4 million new jobs in to partner with European businesses and NGOs
South Africa.578 that want to use developed parts of South Africa
as platform for expansion into other African
Community and private sector alternatives: In countries and markets.
the case of South Africa, the broader population
of more than 57 million people has at least eleven Academic education: Considerable opportunities
major identity groups, often with regional histories exist in private education or community-based
and territories. None of these groups constitute education. Among the Afrikaans-speaking middle
a complete majority, according to South Africa’s classes, as well as the Afrikaans-speaking poor,
Census 2011. Rebuilding South Africa should take access to mother-language tertiary education
both the common and the diverse needs of all is becoming more difficult. Of the thirty-eight
communities and citizens into account. universities in South Africa, six have traditionally
been Afrikaans-medium institutions. Due to a
In this regard, Afrikaans-speaking communities combination of political pressures and market
have not received sufficient attention. Afrikaners demands, the position of Afrikaans has been
constitute about 2.6 million people; coloured seriously weakened at all of them. In the recent
South Africans who speak Afrikaans about 3.4 past, Afrikaans has lost its equal constitutional
million and black people who speak Afrikaans position due to new language policies at the
about 600 000.579 University of South Africa, the University of
Pretoria, the University of the Free State, and
In South Africa’s private sector, Afrikaans-speaking even the symbolically-important University of
citizens and communities play a major role in all the Stellenbosch.
sectors mentioned in the McKinsey report above.
In addition, they and other communities also Already, the Solidarity Movement, with the support
constitute potential partners and markets with from various business, academic and community
specific needs and skills in academic education, stakeholders, has established Akademia with the
vocational education, cultural relationships and declared aim of becoming a small, high-quality
healthcare. university in the next decades. It aims to cater for
the academic needs of the Afrikaans community,
The Afrikaans-speaking language group are spread and foreign partnerships will constitute an
in communities across South Africa. As a group, essential part of its growth.580
they include many of the better skilled and middle-
class population in South Africa, with a history Many young Afrikaans speakers also continue to
of building strong community and educational look for opportunities to travel and work for a
institutions in conditions of adversity. They also period before returning home. While many of this
constitute a key and very strong minority among age group go to the English-speaking world, real
the six million individual taxpayers, nationally and gaps and opportunities exist in German-speaking
locally. and Dutch-speaking countries to establish
mutually beneficial and also longer-term relations.
There are larger concentrations of Afrikaans In the war for talent, and in the establishment of
speakers in Gauteng province and the Western new business ventures outside Europe, young and
Cape, where they form just less than 50% of the skilled Afrikaans speakers represent an overlooked
population. Numerically and socially they are also niche segment.
influential in the Northern Cape, North West,
578. http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/africa/south_africas_bold_priorities_for_inclusive_growth.
579. See Census 2011 at http://www.statssa.gov.za.
580. http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/southafrica/publication/south-africa-economic-update-jobs-changing-
demographics.
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Vocational education: In many poorer urban products and services customized according to
and rural communities, a massive scale-up of demographics and income.
vocational training is needed for technical skills to
support export-oriented industries. The Solidarity Advanced manufacturing: South Africa has a pool
Movement has launched Soltech, a vocational of skilled labour, in which people from Afrikaans-
training facility, and supports various initiatives to speaking communities constitute an important
develop vocational education in South Africa. segment. The country has the potential to
grow into a globally competitive manufacturing
Healthcare: Private healthcare systems and hub focused on high-value-added categories
community-based healthcare systems remain a such as automotive and industrial machinery
potential growth market. South African higher and equipment, and chemicals. To realize this
education systems still produce many health-care opportunity, South African manufacturers
professionals sought after in Europe, but state- will have to pursue new markets and step up
supported health systems in several provinces are innovation and productivity.583
decaying.581
Infrastructure: South Africa is investing heavily
Service exports: Europe as a whole remains the in infrastructure; however, big gaps remain in
most important trading partner of South Africa. electricity, water, and sanitation. According to
Many small and medium-sized businesses run by McKinsey, partnerships between the public
Afrikaans speakers continue to look at business and private sectors could make infrastructure
opportunities with European partners. Many spending up to 40% more productive. This could
of them also draw from cultural repertoires of be achieved by maximizing the use of existing
a strong work ethic, knowledge about Africa, assets and increasing maintenance. In addition,
and flexible improvisation under conditions of prioritizing projects with the greatest impact,
adversity. and strengthening management practices to
streamline delivery, would be needed.584
South Africa has highly developed service
industries. Nevertheless, it currently captures only Many parts of South Africa are arid or becoming so,
2% of the rest of sub-Saharan Africa’s market for and the demand for water management expertise
service imports, which is worth nearly half a trillion and customized systems is set to grow.585 The
rand ($38 billion). With the right investments, expertise developed in South African conditions
service businesses could increase exports to the would stand European companies in good stead
region. In construction, the opportunity ranges if they are able to expand to other countries in
from design to construction management to Africa or Asia.
maintenance services. 582
Energy: South Africa’s electricity shortage has
In financial services, potential growth areas include constrained growth. Despite new capacity,
wholesale and retail banking. Digital opportunities McKinsey forecasts another shortfall between
are especially promising, with an expanding 2025 and 2030. Natural-gas plants can provide an
middle class, quick adoption of smart phones and alternative to diversify the power supply. They are
improved conditions for internet access. South fast to build, entail low capital costs, and have a
African actors are often world leaders in insurance small carbon footprint. McKinsey estimates that
581. http://www.bdlive.co.za/national/health/2015/11/11/report-reveals-healthcare-crisis-in-free-state.
585. Steve Hedden and Jakkie Cilliers, “Parched prospects: The emerging water crisis in South Africa”, Institute for Security
Studies - African Futures, 11, September 2014.
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South Africa could install up to twenty gigawatts for innovation.

of gas-fired base-load power-generation capacity
by 2030. Gas could be provided through imports. Tourism: Cultural, historical, nature and adventure
However, once again, policy and regulatory tourism all constitute major opportunities for
certainty would be a challenge.586 business. Among Afrikaans-speaking citizens,
Europe historically constituted a tourist destination
Afrikaans-speaking and other communities often of high interest. An estimated 300 000 tourists
strive for increased self-sufficiency from unreliable from Germany to South Africa annually and an
government-delivered services. In addition, estimated 100 000 tourists from the Netherlands
among the middle class, there are strong concerns annually indicate the current potential for
about the environment and sustainability. Local partnerships.588
renewable energy systems would be highly
relevant and potentially lucrative in a country with A place for all communities and citizens: The
the climate and sunshine of South Africa. position of citizens from different communities
remains a central challenge for political orders
Raw and processed agricultural exports: in Africa. Solomon Dersso, commissioner of the
Agricultural and food consumption is rising in African Commission on Human and Peoples’
markets throughout sub-Saharan Africa and Asia. Rights, has stated that few African orders and
South Africa could triple its agricultural exports by policies give sufficient recognition to the diversity
2030. This could be a key driver of rural growth, of more than two thousand cultural groups in its
benefiting the nearly one in ten South Africans 54 states.589
who depend on subsistence or smallholder
farming. According to McKinsey, capturing this A new model of African liberation is needed – in
potential will require a strong effort to improve Africa, and in Southern Africa. It should be one
production, productivity, and agroprocessing.587 that allows peaceful co-existence and mutual
However, to achieve this goal, and ensure food recognition in multicultural democracies, not
security for all, the concerns about safety and hybrid regimes with one-party dominant rule,
property rights of the commercial farming sector partisan protection, and threats to civil, cultural
need to be addressed. and property rights.
Cultural relations: Most Afrikaans speakers are Afrikaans speakers of all communities have
very conscious of and positive towards cultural historically made an important contribution to
links with Flanders, Germany and the Netherlands. the creation of key institutions and productive
Some of these links are also historically gains in South Africa.590 Their presence in areas
institutionalized in academia, cultural circles, currently constitute a force for development and
tourism, family acquaintances and local networks. stability during a period of political and economic
fluctuation.
Many community leaders are positive about
strengthening mutually beneficial relationships The turnaround of South Africa’s economic
with cultural institutions in Europe. The cultural decline will be unthinkable without the well-being
sector in general and cultural entrepreneurship of Afrikaans communities and more than 6 million
specifically also currently present opportunities Afrikaans-speaking citizens. As Francis Fukuyama
588. http://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/sa-shares-tourism-success-story-germany; http://www.statssa.gov.
za/?p=4362.
589. Solomon A. Dersso, The human rights system and the issue of minorities in Africa, African Journal of International
and Comparative Law, 20(1), 2012, pp 42-59.
590. See Hermann Giliomee, The Afrikaners: Biography of a people (Tafelberg: Cape Town, 2010); Mohamed Adhikari,
Not white enough, not black enough: Racial identity in the South African coloured community (Double Storey Books,
Cape Town, 2005); Heinrich Matthee, Muslim identities and political strategies (Kassel University Press, Kassel,
2008).
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has noted, the marginalization of such a skilled,

but visible minority would only harm the diverse
population of South Africa.
However, due to the impact of economic

discrimination, concerns about security and
cultural marginalization, hundreds of thousands
of them have already emigrated. Many skilled
professionals from other communities have also
left during the two decades of ANC rule, with
about eight professionals now leaving for every
one professional entering South Africa. This trend
represents a major brain drain and a damaging loss
of job opportunities and value creation generated
by those who are entrepeneurial and skilled.
At present, there already are many foreign

businesses and citizens in South Africa. For
example, there are about 600 German businesses
and 350 Dutch businesses in South Africa, as
well as about 100 000 German citizens living in
the country. A stable environment for foreign
businesspeople and citizens in many areas in South
Africa will often depend on the presence and
well-being of minority communities, businesses
and NGOs. Foreign business and NGOs should
consider the often overlooked opportunities for
mutual benefits, shorter term transactions and
longer term partnerships with them in South
Africa and Africa.
134
SAMonitor
About the author
Doctor Heinrich Matthee is a strategy advisor and political risk analyst for companies and NGOs in the
Middle East and Africa. He has a D Phil in Muslim politics from the University of Marburg, Germany. He
is an associate of the Africa Studies Centre, Netherlands and a member of the South African Academy
of Science and Art. During the Mandela presidency, he was a senior researcher in African security at the
University of Stellenbosch. After 2000, he was a researcher/editor at the Emirates Center for Strategic
Studies and Research in Abu Dhabi, and a Middle East analyst at Control Risks, London. He is the author of
Muslim Identities and Political Strategies (Kassel University Press, Kassel, 2008) and articles on politics and
economics in the Middle East and Europe.
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South African Monitor

Assessing and Promoting Civil and Minority Rights in South Africa

The ANC’s “toxic legacy”,

RReport IX – End 2018 & Beginning 2019

Report researched and compiled by

Commissioned by South African Monitor

SA Monitor2018 .indd 1 4/11/2019 3:22:19 PM

Focus areas include:

• Key dynamics of the executive;

South African Monitor

Part I: “Toxic legacy taints ANC”..................................................................................................................... 19

Part II: Violent crime, partisan protection and food insecurity...............................................................................24

Part III: A shrinking social contract and a multipolar field of authority..................................................................35

Part IV: The shift to a hybrid regime.................................................................................................................48

Part V: Factional struggles and Ramaphosa’s challenges......................................................................................58

Part VI: The legislature, elections and violent politics ........................................................................................ 67

Part VII: The role of politicized security services................................................................................................. 76

Part IX: Universities, the media and attempts at ANC control.................................................................................86

Part X: ANC policies and economic value destruction.............................................................................................95

Part XI: The threat to property and investor rights.............................................................................................105

Part XV: Rebuilding the private sector and sustainable communities.......................................................................130

About the author..........................................................................................................................................135

ISS - Institute for Security Studies

The ANC’s “toxic

There is a limited but robust evolution of capacity

reports on ANC rule during the period covered. In

Two decades after South Africa’s transition

Professor Loren Landau, director of the African

The South African agricultural sector does not

Consumption linkages represent the spending Statistics on agricultural employment differ

Agriculture was the best performer across the

service delivery; its decreasing accountability to

assist farming communities in strengthening violence is accepted.

Zulus constitute the largest minority, at about

In September 2017, Zuma blamed witchcraft

96. https://www.enca.com/south-africa/watch-ramaphosa-dances-with-king-zwelithini; https://www.timeslive.co.za/

It is disturbing that racist outbursts are

It is now clear with hindsight that the

125. “The hidden, unconstitutional tax”, Business Day, 25 February 2016.

149. Samuel Issacharoff, “The democratic risk to democratic transitions” at http://constitutionaltransitions.org/wp-

This reflects the historical institutional dynamics

167. http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_10560-1522-2-30.pdf?070328103113, pp 15, 25.

Susan Booysen, a political scientist at the

According to Roger Southall, professor in

Ramaphosa is expected to be better than Zuma in

As Richard Calland states, this situation presents

The protests signal alternative ways of

for the ANC decreased to 35%, continuing the

According to estimates, more than 750 000

The turnout of registered voters in the 2014

Albert Luthuli House. The recordings implicate

The ANC manifesto gives reasonable evidence (W)holesale assassinations have

My experience as intelligence minister was that

In 2015, Ronnie Kasrils again stated that the

charges have been laid before a court of law.

303. http://www.r2k.org.za/2016/11/18/mahlobo-must-go-get-the-securocrats-out-of-democratic-spaces/; http://www.

absence of administrative efficiency, coercive Malan concludes that in cases on property

348. https://allafrica.com/stories/201812190202.html; https://mg.co.za/article/2017-03-24-00-baby-steps-to-decolonise-

353. http://www.bdlive.co.za/opinion/columnists/2015/10/30/pushing-university-funding-not-in-anc-interest; http://