Submitted by:

Atitiw, Joshua Gawis Abad, Iaxe

Licudine, Dominic Gener, Francess Louise
Llanes, Jezreel Kido, Julie Bernadine
Nicolas, Aristotle James Kilongan, Juliet
Payad, Adrian Carl Perez, Crichelle
Paciteng, Rio Grant Pido, Zoe Nicole
Sumineg, Jerome Tadios, Krisha Jayne

Submitted to:

Atty. Liliybeth T. Sindayen-Libiran

A.Y. 2017 – 2018
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Tanada v. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27 ………………………………………………………………………………1

Tanada v. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446…………………………………………………………………………….2
Basa v. Mercado, G.R. No. L-42226………………………………………………………………………...3
Philippine Assoc. of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Torres, G.R. No. 101279………………………4
Nat’l Electrification Administration v. Gonzaga, G.R. No. 158761……………………………….5
Phil. Internat’l Trading Corp. v. Angeles, G.R. No. 108461…………………………………………6
Ass’n of Southern Tagalog Electric Cooperatives, G.R. No. 192117……………………………..7
Fortuna v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 173423……………………………………………9
Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig, Inc. v. Military Shrine Services – Philippine
Veterans Affair Office, DND, G.R. No. 187587………………………………………………………….11
CIR v. Primetown Property Group, Inc., G.R. No. 162155………………………………………....13
People v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. L-7234-21………………………………………………………………14
D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 137873………………………………………………………….....15
People v. Gasacao, G.R. No. 168445………………………………………………………………………..16
Wong Woo Yiu v. Vivo, G.R. No. L-21076………………………………………………………………..17
Yao Kee v. Sy Gonzales, G.R. No. L-55960………………………………………………………………19
Nedlloyd Lijnen v. Glow Laks Enterprise, G.R. No 156330 ………………………………………20
Del Socorro v. Brinkman Van Wilsem, G.R. No. 193707…………………………………………..22
Aruego, Jr. v. CA, G.R. No. 112193………………………………………………………………………….24
Bernabe v. Alejo, G.R. No. 140500…………………………………………………………………………25
Philippine Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Stockholders of Intercity Savings Bankk, Inc.,
G.R. No. 181556……………………………………………………………………………………………………26
Montanez v. Cipriano, G.R. No. 181089………………………………………………………………….27
Dacudao v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 188056……………………………………………………28
Guy v. CA, G.R. No. 163707…………………………………………………………………………………..29
FF Cruz and Co., Inc. v HR Construction Corp., G.R. No. 187521………………………………30
People v. Morial, G.R. No. 129295………………………………………………………………………….32
Iladan v. Suerte, G.R. No. 203882………………………………………………………………………….33
Mabugay-Otamias v. Republic, G.R. No. 189516……………………………………………………..35
Bernardina v. SSS, G.R. No. 192531………………………………………………………………………..37
CIR v. Primetown Group, G.R. No. 162155……………………………………………………………..38
Magkalas v. NHA, G.R. No. 138823……………………………………………………………………….40
Garcia v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 165835…………………………………………………………….42
Ting v. Velez-Ting, G.R. No. 166562……………………………………………………………………….43
Negros Navigation Co., Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 110398…………………………………………………44
Belgica v. Executive Secretary Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566……………………………………………46
Fulgencio v. NLRC, G.R. No 141600……………………………………………………………………….49
Villanueva v. CA, G.R. No. 142947…………………………………………………………………….… 50
Office of the Ombudsman v. CA, G.R. No. 146486………………………………………………….. 51
Ayala Corporation v. Rosa-Diana Realty and Dev’t Corp., G.R. No. 134284………………. 53
People v. Veneracion, G.R. No. 119987-88…………………………………………………………….. 54
Yao Kee v. Sy Gonzales, G.R. No. L-55960…………………………………………………………….. 55
Ursua v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112170……………………………………………………………. 56
Asaali v. Commissioner of Customs, G.R. No. L-24170……………………………………………. 57
Llorente v. CA, G.R. No. 124371……………………………………………………………………………. 58
Van Dorn v. Romillo, G.R. No. L-68470………………………………………………………………… 59
Bank of America v. American realty Corp, G.R. No. 133876……………………………………. 60
Miciano v. Brimo, G.R. No. L-22595…………………………………………………………………….. 62
Aznar v. Garcia, G.R. No. L-16749………………………………………………………………………… 63
Bellis v. Bellis, G.R. No. L-23678………………………………………………………………………….. 64
Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corp., v. Eusebio Construction, Inc.,
G.R. No 140047………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 65
Industrial Personnel and Management Services Inc v. De Vera, G.R. No 205703….…... 67
Globe Mackay v. CA, G.R. No. 81262………………………………………………………………….…. 69
Univerity of the East v. Jader, G.R. No. 132344…………………………………………………….… 71
GF Equity v. Valenzona, G.R. No. 156841………………………………………………………………. 72
Heirs of Nala v. Cabansag, G.R. No. 161188…………………………………………………………... 74
Go v. Cordero, G.R. No 164703…………………………………………………………………………….. 76
Villanueva v. Rosquetta, G.R. No. 180764……………………………………………………………… 78
Ardiente v. Pastorfide, G.R. No 161921…………………………………………………………………. 80
Philippine Commercial Int’l Bank v. Gomez, G.R. No 199601………………………………….. 81
Custodio v. CA, G.R. No 116100………………………………………………………………….………… 83
Equitable Banking Corp. v. Calderon, G.R. 156168………………………………………….……… 85
The Orchard Golf and Country Club v. Yu, G.R. No. 191033……………………………………. 86
Diaz v. Encanto, G.R. No. 171303…………………………………………………………………………. 87
Nikko Hotel Manila Garden v. Reyes, G.R. No. 154259…………………………………………… 89
Manuel v. People, G.R. No. 165842……………………………………………………………………….. 91
Pe v. Pe, G.R. No. L-17396………………………………………………………………………………..…. 93
Hermosisima v. CA, G.R. No. L-14628………………………………………………………….…….... 94
Galang v. CA, G.R. No L-17248…………………………………………………………………………….. 95
Gashem Shookat Baksh v. CA, G.R. No 97336……………………………………..………………… 96
Wassmer v. Velez, G.R. No. L-20089………………………………………………….………………… 98
Natividad v. Tunac, G.R. No. 143130……………………………………………………..……………… 99
Shinryo Company, Inc. v. RRN Inc., G.R. No 17225……………………………………………… 100
Car Cool v. Ushio Realty, G.R. No. 138088…………………………………………………………. 102
Elegir v. Philippine Airlines, G.R. No. 18195………………………………………………………… 103
Beumer v. Amores, G.R. No. 195670……………………………………………………………………. 105
Hulst v. P.R. Builders, G.R. No 156364……………………………………………………………….. 106
Gonzalo v. Tarante, Jr., G.R. No. 160600……………………………………………………………. 107
Valenzuela v. CA, G.R. No. L-56168…………………………………………………………………….. 109
Concepcion v. CA, G.R. No. 120706…………………………………………………………………….. 110
Padalhin v. Lavina, G.R. No. 183026……………………………………………………………………. 112
Philex Mining Corp. v. CIR, G.R. No. 125704…………………………………………………………113
Willaware Products Corp. v. Jesichris Mfg. Corp., G.R. No. 195549………………….………114
Manantan v CA, G.R. No. 107125………………………………………………………………………….116
Nuguid v. Nicdao, G.R. No. 150785……………………………………………………………………….117
People v. Agacer G.R. No. 177751…………………………………………………………………………..119
Romero v. People G.R. No. 167546………………………………………………………………………..121
Daluraya v. Oliva G.R. No. 210148……………………………………………………………………..…122
People v. Go G.R. No. 168539………………………………………………………………………………123
Calang v. People, G.R. No. 190696………………………………………………………………..………125
People v. Bayotas, G.R. No. 102007………………………………………………………………………126
Cancio, Jr. v. Isip, G.R. No. 133978…………………………………………………………….…………127
Heirs of Guaring v. CA, G.R. No. 108395…………………………………………………….…………128
International Flavors and Fragrances, Inc. v. Argos, G.R. No. 130362…………………..…129
Ruiz v. Ucol, G.R. No. L-45404………………………………………………………………………….…130
Cojuangco v. CA, G.R. No. 119398…………………………………………………………………………131
Manila Electric Company v. Castillo, G.R. No. 182976……………………………………………132
Barredo v. Garcia, G.R. No. 48006……………………………………………………….………………133
Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. v. Tangco, G.R. No. 165732……………………………………134
Beltran v. People, G.R. No. 137567……………………………………………………………………..…135
Merced v. Diez, G.R. No. L-15315………………………………………………………………….………136
Donato v. Luna, G.R. No. L-53642………………………………………………………………..………137
Consing, Jr. v. People, G.R. No, 161075………………………………………………...………………138
Pimentel v. Pimentel, G.R. No. 172060…………………………………………………………………140
City of Pasig v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 125646……………………………….…………………………141
Quimiging v. Icao, G.R. No. 26795…………………………………………………………..……………142
Geluz v. CA, G.R. No. ………………………………………………………………………………….………143
Continental Steel Manufacturing Corp. v. Montano, G.R. No. 182836……………………..144
Catalan v. Basa, G.R. No. 159567……………………………………………………………………….…146
Domingo v. CA, G.R. No. 127540…………………………………………………………………….……147
Mendezona v. Ozamiz, G.R. No. 143370…………………………………………………..……………148
Joaquin v. Navarro, G.R. No. L-5426………………………………………………………...…………149
Marcos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 119976…………………………………………………….……………150
Aruego, Jr. v. CA, G.R. No. 112193…………………………………………………………..……………152
Bernabe v. Alejo, G.R. No. 140500………………………………………………………………..………153
Ancheta v Ancheta. G.R. No. 145370…………………………………………………………….………154
Abadilla v. Tabiliran, A.M No. MTJ-92-716……………………………………………………………155
Dela Rosa v. Heirs of Rustia Vda, de Damian, G.R. No. 155733……………….………………156
Balogbog v. CA. G.R. No. 83598……………………………………………………………………………157
Calimag v. Heirs of Macapaz, G.R. No. 191936………………………………….……………………158
Silverio v. Republic, G.R. No. 174689……………………………………………………………………160
Republic v. Cagandahan, G.R. No. 166676……………………………………………..………………161
Republic v. Albios, G.R. No. 198780…………………………………………………………..…………163
Beso v. Judge Daguman, AM No. MTJ-99-1211……………………………..………………………164
Aranes v. Occiano, AM No. MTJ-02-1390…………………………………………..…………………165
Alcantara v. Alacantara, G.R. No. 167746………………………………………………………………166
Republic v. CA, September 2, 1994………………………………………………………………….……168
Carino v. Carino, G.R. No, 132529………………………………………………………..………………169
Sy. v. CA, 330 SCRA 550………………………………………………………………………………………171
Sevilla v. Cardenas, G.R. No. 167684……………………………………….……………………………173
Abbas v. Abbas, G.R. no. 183896………………………………………………….………………………174
Go-Bangayan v. Bangayan, Jr. G.R. No. 201061……………..………………………………………176
Kho v. Republic, G.R. No. 187462…………………………………………………………………………177
Republic v. Dayot, G.R. No. 175581……………………………………………………….………………179
Manzano v. Sanchez, AM No. MTJ-00-1329…………………………….……………………………180
Ninal v. Bayadong, G.R. No. 133778………………………………………………………………………181
Cosca v. Palaypayon, AM No. MTJ-92-721…………………………………….………………………183
Eugenio v. Velez, G.R. No 85140…………………………………………………………..………………185
Morigo v. People, G.R. No. 145226…………………………………………………………....…………186
Moreno v. Bernabe, AM MTJ-94-963…………………………………………..………………………188
Navarro v. Domagtoy, AM No. MTJ-96-1088……………………..…………………………………189
Vda. De Jacob v. CA, G.R. No. 135216……………………………………………..……………………190
Republic v. Iyoy, G.R. No. 152577…………………………………………………………………………192
Republic v. Orbecido III, G.R. No. 154380…………………………………….………………………194
Lavadia v. Heirs of Luna, G.R. No. 171914………………………………………………..……………195
Van Dorn v. Romillo, G.R. No. L-68470…………………………………………………..……………198
San Luis v. San Luis, G.R. No. 133743………………………………………………………..…………199
Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No 186571……………………………………..……………………………201
Garcia-Recio v. Recio, G.R. No. 138322………………………………………………..………………203
Medina v. Michiyuki Koike, G.R. No. 215723…………………………………………………………205
Atienza v. Brillantes, March 29, 1995……………………………………………………………………207
Diaz-Salgado v. Salgado, G.R. No. 204494……………………………………………………………209
Enriquez Vda. De Catalan v. Catalan-Lee, G.R. No 183622………………………………..……211
Quita v. CA. G.R. No 124862……………………………………………………………………..…………213
Tenebro v. CA, G.R. No. 150758…………………………………………..………………………………214
Jarillo v. People, G.R. No. 1644345………………………………………………………….……………215
Weigel v. Sempio-Dy, G.R. No. L-53703………………………………………………………………..216
SSC v. Azote, G.R. No. 209741………………………………………………………………………………217
Republic v. Nolasco, G.R. No 94053……………………………………………………..………………218
Republic v. CA, 477 SCRA 277………………………………………………………………………………219
Bienvenido v. CA, G.R. No. 111717…………………………………..……………………………………220
Manuel v. People, G.R. No. 165842………………………………………………………………………222
Calisterio v. Calisterio, G.R. No. 136467……………………………………………………….………224
Republic v. Granada, G.R. No. 187512………………………………………………………..…………225
Republic v. Narceda, G.R. No. 182760…………………………………….……………………………226
Republic v. Cantor, G.R. No. 184621……………………………………………………….……………228
Santos v. Santos, G.R. No. 187061……………………………………………………………..…………229
Republic v. Orcelino-Villanueva, G.R. No. 210929…………………………………………………231
Republic v. Sarenogon, Jr. G.R. No. 199194………………………………………………..…………232
Republic v. Tampus, G.R. No. 214243…………………………………..………………………………234
Domingo v. CA, G.R. No 104818…………………………………………………………………..………236
Atienza v. Brillantes, AM No. MTJ-92706………………………………………………..……………237
Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, G.R. No. 138509………………………………………………………….…238
Ty v. CA, G.R. No. 127406……………………………………………………………………………………239
Castillo v. De Leon Castillo, G.R. No. 189607……………………………………………..…………240
Chi Ming Tsoi v. CA and Lao, G.R. No. 119190……………………………………………….………241
Santos v. CA, G.R. No. 112019………………………………………………………………………………242
Hernandez v. CA, G.R. No. 126010……………………………………………………………………….243
Yambao v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 184063……………………………………..…245
Republic v. De Gracia, G.R. No. 171557…………………………………………………………………247
Republic v. CA and Molina, G.R. No 108763…………………………………………………………248
Barcelona v. CA, G.R. No 149498…………………………………………………………………………250
Republic v. Quintero-Hamano, G.R. No. 149498……………………………………………………252
Tongol v. Tongol, G.R. No. 157610………………………………………………………………………..253
Marcos v. Marcos, G.R. No 180668………………………………………………………………………255
Te v. Te, G.R. No 161793……………………………………………………………………..………………256
Azueta v. Azcueta, G.R. No. 180668……………………………………………………………………..258
Agaviador v. Agraviador, G.R. No. 170729………………………………………………………….…261
Marable v. Marable, G.R. No, 178741……………………………………………………………………263
Aurelio v. Aurelio, G.R. No 175367……………………………………………………………….………265
Republic v. CA, G.R. No. 159594………………………………………………………………………..…267
Kalaw v. Fernandez, Gr. No. 166537…………………………………………………………………..…269
Vinas v. Parel-Vinas, G.R. No. 208790………………………………………………………………….270
Republic v. Romero II, G.R. No 2019180……………………………………………………….………271
Del Rosario v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 222541……………………………………………………….…272
Republic v. Encelan, G.R. No. 170022………………………………………………………………..…273
Mendoza v. Republic. G.R. No. 157649……………………………………………………………….…275
Republic v. Galang, G.R. No. 168335…………………………………………………………………….277
Ochosa v. Alano, G.R. No. 167459………………………………………………………………………..279
Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes, G.R. No. 185286…………………………………………………………..280
Toring v. Toring, G.R. No. 165321……………………………………………………………………..…282
Ligeralde v. Patalinghug, G.R. No 168796……………………………………………………….……284
Suazo v. Suazo, G.R. No. 164493…………………………………………………………………….……285
Aspillaga v. Aspillaga, G.R. No. 170925…………………………………………………………………286
Alcazar v. Alcazar, G.R. No. 174451………………………………………………………………………288
Najera v. Najera, G.R. No. 164817………………………………………………………………………..290
Paras v. Paras, G.R. No. 147824……………………………………………………………………………291
Zamora v. CA, G.R. No. 141917………………….……………………………………...…………………293
Perez Ferraris-Ferraris, G.R. No. 162368………………...……………………………………………294
Antonio v. Reyes, G.R. No. 155800…………………………………….…………………………………295
Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco, G.R. No. 158896……………………………………………………296
Villalon v. Villalon, G.R. No. 167206………………………………………………….…………………297
Buenaventura v. CA, G.R. No. 127358……………………………………………………………..……298
Dedel v. CA, G.R. No. 151867……………………………………………………………………………….299
Republic v. Dagdag, G.R. Noo. 109975…………………………………………………………………300
Pesca v. Pesca, G.R. No. 136921……………………………………………………………………………301
Bolos v. Bolos, G.R. No. 186400……………………………………..……………………………………302
Mallion v. Alcantara, G.R. No. 141528…………………………………………….……………………304
Leonor v. CA, G.R. No. 112597………………………………………………………………..……………305
Yu v. Reyes-Carpio, G.R. No. 189207……………………………………………………………………306
Yu v. Lim-Yu, G.R. No. 200072……………………………………………………………………………309
Jualiajvo-Llave v. Republic, G.R. No. 169766…………………………………………………………311
Enrico v, Heirs of Medinacelli, G.R. No. 173614………………………………………..……………312
Ninal v. Bayadong, G.R. No. 133778…………………………………………………………………..…313
Carlos v. Sandoval, G.R. No. 179922…………………………………………………………………..…314
Ablaza v. Republic, G.R. No. 158298……………………………………………………………..………315
Minoru Fujiki v. Marinay, G.R. No. 196049……………………………………………………..……316
Maquilan v. Maquilan, G.R. No. 155409…………………………………………………………..……318
Republic v. Cuison-Melgar, G.R. No. 139676…………………………………………………………320
Malcampo-Sin v. Sin., G.R. No. 137590…………………………………………………………………321
Tuason v. CA, G.R. No. 116607………………………………………………….…………………………322
Corpus v. Ochoterena, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1861………………………………………….…………………323
Pacete v. Carriaga, G.R. No. L-53880……………………………………………………………………..…324
Sevilla Castro v. Castro, G.R. No. 140484 …………………………………………………………….……325
Valdes v. RTC, G.R. No. 122749………………………………………………………………………….……327
Dino v. Dino, G.R. No. 178044…………………………………………………………………..……………328
Anaya v. Palaroan, G.R. No. L-27930…………………………………………………………………..……330
Buccat v. Buccat-Mangonon, G.R. No.47101…………………………………………………………….…331
Almelor v. RTC Branch 254, G.R. No. 179620 ……………………………………………………………..332
Villanueva v. CA, G.R. No. 132955……………………………………………………………………………333
Macarrubo v. Macarrubo, A.C. No. 6148……………………………………………………………………335
Alcazar v. Alcazar, G.R. No. 174451 …………………………………………………………………………..336
Jimenez v. Canizares, G.R. No. L-12790…………………………………………………………………….338
Ong Eng Kiam v. Ong, G.R. No. 15320………………………………………………………………………339
Gaudionco v. Penaranda, G.R. No. 79284…………………………………………………………………..341
Prima Partosa-Jo v. CA, G.R. No. 82606……………………………………………………………………342
Arroyo v. CA, G.R. No. 96602………………………………………………………………………………….343
Ginez v. Bugayong, G.R. No. L-10033……………………………………………………………………….344
People v. Zapata, G.R. No. L-3047……………………………………………………………………………345
De Ocampo v. Florenciano, G.R. No. L-13553……………………………………………………………..347
Matubis v. Praxedes, G.R. No. L-11766………………………………………………………………………348
People v. Schneckenburger, G.R. No. 48183……………………………………………………………….349
People v. Sensano, G.R. No. 37720……………………………………………………………………………351
Benedicto v. De La Rama, G.R. No. 1056……………………………………………………………………353
De Ocampo v. Florenciano, G.R. No. L-13553……………………………………………………………..354
Brown v. Yambao, G.R. No. L-10699…………………………………………………………………………..355
De Ocampo v. Florenciano, G.R. No. L-13553……………………………………………………………..356
Contreras v. Macaraig, G.R. No. L-29138……………………………………………………………………357
Banez v. Banez, G.R. No.132592………………………………………………………………………………359
Lapuz Sy v. Eufemio, G.R. No. L-30977……………………………………………………………………..361
Araneta v. Concepcion, G.R. No. L-9667……………………………………………………………………362
Somosa-Ramos v. Vamenta, G.R. No. L-34132……………………………………………………………364
Pacete v. Carriaga, G.R. No. L-53880………………………………………………………………………..365
Sabalones v. CA, G.R. No.106169……………………………………………………………………………..366
Espiritu and Layug v. CA, G.R. No.115640 …………………………………………………………………368
Lapuz Sy v. Eufemio, G.R. No. L-30977………………………………………………………………….…369
Laperal v. Republic, G.R. No.L-18008……………………………………………………………………….370
Siochi v. Gozon, G.R. No. 169900……………………………………………………………………………..371
Pelayo v. Lauron, G.R. No.L-4089……………………………………………………………………………372
Go v. CA, G.R. No.114791………………………………………………………………………………………..374
Arroyo v. Vasquez-Arroyo, G.R. No.17014………………………………………………………………….375
Ilusurio v. Bildner, Ilusorio, G.R. No. 139789……………………………………………………………..376
Goitia v. Campos Rueda, G.R. No. 11263 ……………………………………………………………………377
Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819…………………………………………………………………………..379
Valino v. Adriano, G.R. No. 182894…………………………………………………………………………..381
Pana v. Heirs of Juanite, G.R. No. 164201………………………………………………………………….382
Arcaba v. Vda. De Batocael, G.R. No. 146683……………………………………………………………..384
Matabuena v. Cervantes, G.R. No. L-28771………………………………………………………………..386
Harding v. Commercial Union Assurance Company, G.R. No. 12707 ……………………………….387
Villanueva v. CA, G.R. No. 143286……………………………………………………………………………388
Tan v. CA, G.R. No. 120594…………………………………………………………………………………….389
Ching v. CA, G.R. No. 124642………………………………………………………………………………….390
Matthews v. Taylor, G.R. No. 164584………………………………………………………………………..391
In re Muller v. Muller, G.R. No. 149615……………………………………………………………………..393
Navarro v. Escobido, G.R. No. 153788………………………………………………………………………394
Imani v. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co., G.R. No. 187023 ……………………….……………………395
Dela Pena v. Avila, G.R. No. 187490…………………………………………………….……………………396
Titan Construction Corporation v. David, G.R. No. 169548……………………………………………398
Tan v. Andrade, G.R. No. 171904……………………………………………………………………………..399
Onstott v. Upper Tagpos Neighborhood Association, Inc., G.R. No. 221047 ……………………..400
Ayala Investment & Development Corportion v. CA, G.R. No. 118305 ………………………………401
Dewara v. Lamela, G.R. No. 179010………………………………………………………………………….402
Heirs of Go, Sr. v. Servacio, G.R. No.157537……………………………………………………………….404
Ros v. Philippine National Bank, G.R. No. 170166……………………………………………………….405
Siochi v. Guzon, G.R. No. 169900…………………………………………………………………………….406
Aggabao v. Parulan, G.R. No. 165803………………………………………………………………………..407
Fuentes v. Roca, G.R. No. 178902…………………………………………………………………………….409
Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. v. Pascual, G.R. No. 163744 ……………………………………………411
Domingo v. Molina, G.R. No. 200274………………………………………………………………………..413
Quiao v. Quiao, G.R. No. 176556………………………………………………………………………………414
Yao v. Perello, G.R. No. 153828………………………………………………………………………………..416
Ocampo v. Ocampo, G.R. No. 198908………………………………………………………………………..417
Barrido v. Nonato, G.R. No.176492…………………………………………………………………………..419
Dino v. Dino, G.R. No. 178044…………………………………………………………………………………421
Maxey v. CA, G.R. No. L-45870……………………………………………………………………………….422
Carino v. Carino, G.R. No.132529…………………………………………………………………………….424
Valdes v. RTC and Valdes, G.R. No. 122749………………………………………………………………..426
Buenaventura v. CA, G.R. No. 127358……………………………………………………………………….427
Gonzales v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 159521 ………………………………………………………………………428
Mercado-Fehr v. Fehr, G.R. No. 152716…………………………………………………………………….430
Salas, Jr. v. Edlen Villena Aguil, G.R. No. 202370………………………………………………………..431
Diaz-Salgado v. Salgado, G.R. No. 204494…………………………………………………………………432
Carino v. Carino, G.R. No.132529…………………………………………………………………………….434
Tumlos v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 137650……………………………………………………………………..436
Francisco v. Master Iron Works, G.R. No. 151967 ………………………………………………………..437
Joaquino v. Reyes, G.R. No. 154645………………………………………………………………………….438
Saguid v. CA, G.R. No. 150611……………………………………………………………………………….…439
Juaniza v. Jose, G.R. No. L-50127-28……………………………………………………………………….440
Adriano v. CA, G.R. No. 124118……………………………………………………………………………..…441
Yasuo Iwasawa v. Gangan, G.R. No. 204169…………………………………………………………….…442
Go-Bangayan v. Bangayan, G.R. No. 201061………………………………………………………………443
Ventura, Jr. v. Abuda, G.R. No. 202932………………………………………………………………….…444
Guerrero v. RTC, 229 SCRA 274………………………………………………………………………………446
Ining v. Vega, G.R. No. 174727…………………………………………………………………………………447
Banguis-Tambuyat v. Balcom-Tambuyat, G.R. No. 202805………………………………………..…449
Hiyas v. Acuna, 500 SCRA 514…………………………………………………………………………………451
Hontiveros v. RTC, 309 SCRA 340……………………………………………………………………………452
Vda. De Manalo v. CA, G.R. No. 129242 ………………………………………………………….…………453
Santos v. CA, 475 SCRA 1……………………………………………………………………………………….454
Mendoza v. CA, 19 SCRA 756…………………………………………………………………………………..455
Trinidad-Ramos v. Pangilinan, G.R. No.185920………………………………………………………….456
Arriola v. Arriola, G.R. No. 177703……………………………………………………………………………457
Modequillo v. Breva, G.R. No.86355…………………………………………………………………………458
Josef v. Santos, G.R. No. 165060……………………………………………………………………………..459
Kelley, Jr. v. Planters Products, Inc., G.R. No.172263 …………………………………………………..460
Gomez v. Sta. Ines, G.R. No.132537…………………………………………………………………………..461
Manacop v. CA, G.R. No. 97898………………………………………………………………………………462
Taneo v. CA, G.R. No. 108532………………………………………………………………………………….463
Fortaleza v. Lapitan, G.R. No. 178288……………………………………………………………………….464
Oliva-De Mesa v. Acero, Jr., G.R. No. 185064……………………………………………………………..467
Surposa Uy v. Ngo Chua, G.R. No. 183965…………………………………………………………………469
De Asis v. CA, G.R. No.127578………………………………………………………………………………….471
Fernandez v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 143256………………………………………………………………….472
Aguilar v. Siasat, G.R. No. 200169……………………………………………………………………………473
Concepcion v. CA, G.R. No.123450…………………………………………………………………………..474
Angeles v. Maglaya, G.R. No. 153798…………………………………………………………………………475
Jao v. CA, G.R. No. L-49162……………………………………………………………………………………476
Babiera v. Catocal, G.R. No. 138493………………………………………………………………………….477
Liyao, Jr. v. Tanhoti-Liyao, G.R. No. 138961………………………………………………………………478
De Jesus v. Estate of Dizon, G.R. No. 142877 ………………………………………………………………479
Geronimo v. Santos, G.R. No. 197099……………………………………………………………………….481
Tijing v. CA, G.R. No. 125901………………………………………………………………………………….483
Cabatania v. CA, G.R. No.124814……………………………………………………………………………..484
Eceta v. Eceta, G.R. No. 157037……………………………………………………………………………….485
Rivero v. CA, G.R. No. 141273………………………………………………………………………………….486
People v. Bayani, G.R. No. 120894……………………………………………………………………………487
People v. Manahan, G.R. No. 128157………………………………………………………………………..488
Alberto v. CA, G.R. No. 86639…………………………………………………………………………………489
Nepomuceno v. Lopez, G.R. No.181258…………………………………………………………………….490
Cruz v. Cristobal, G.R. No. 140422……………………………………………………………………………491
Perla v. Baring, G.R. No. 172471………………………………………………………………………………493
Tijing v. CA, G.R. No. 125901………………………………………………………………………………….494
Agustin v. CA, 460 SCRA 315………………………………………………………………………………….496
Herrera v. Alba, 460 SCRA 197………………………………………………………………………………..497
People v. Vallejo, G.R. No. 144656……………………………………………………………………………498
Estate of Ong v. Diaz, G.R. No. 171713 ……………………………………………………………………….499
Lucas v. Lucas, G.R. No. 190710………………………………………………………………………………500
Guy vs. CA, G.R. No. 163707……………………………………………………………………………………502
Marquino v. Intermediate Appelate Court, G.R. No. 72078……………………………………………503
Tayag v. Tayag-Gallor, G.R. No. 174680…………………………………………………………………….504
Grande v. Antonio, G.R. No. 206248………………………………………………………………………..505
Dela Cruz v. Gracia, G.R. No. 177728………………………………………………………………………..506
Briones v. Miguel, G.R. No. 156343…………………………………………………………………………..507
Republic v. Abadilla, G.R. No.133054…………………………………………………………….…………508
Verceles v. Posada, G.R. No.159785………………………………………………………………………….509
People v. Glabo, G.R. No. 129248……………………………………………………………………………..510
Tonog v. CA, G.R. No. 122906………………………………………………………………………………….511
Mossesgeld v. CA, G.R. No. 111455……………………………………………………………………………512
Silva v. CA, G.R. No. 114742…………………………………………………………………………………….513
David v. CA, G.R. No. 111180……………………………………………………………………………………514
De Santos v. Angeles, G.R. No. 105619……………………………………………………………………….515
Abadilla v. Tabiliran, 249 SCRA 448………………………………………………………………………….517
Republic v. CA, G.R. No. 100835………………………………………………………………………………518
Republic v. Toledano, G.R. No. 94147519…………………………………………………………………..519
Republic v. Alarcon Vergara, G.R. No. 95551………………………………………………………………520
In Re: Petitions for Adoption of Michelle and Michael Jude Lim, G.R. No. 168992 …………….522
Landingin v. Republic, G.R. No.164948…………………………………………………………………….523
Cang v. CA, G.R. No. 105308…………………………………………………………………………………..524
DSWD v. Belen, A.M. No. RTJ-96-1362…………………………………………………………………….526
Republic v. Hernandez, G.R. No. 117209……………………………………………………………………528
Republic v. CA, G.R. No. 103695………………………………………………………………………………530
In re: adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia, G.R. No.148311 …………………………………531
Teotico v. Del Val, G.R. No. L-18753…………………………………………………………………………532
Bartolome v. SSS, G.R. No. 192531……………………………………………………………………………533
Geronimo v. Santos, G.R. No. 197099……………………………………………………………………….535
Lahom v. Sibulo, G.R. No. 143989…………………………………………………………………………….537
Lim-Lua v. Lua, G.R. No. 175279……………………………………………………………………………..539
Lam v. Chua, G.R. No. 131286………………………………………………………………………………….541
Briones v. Miguel, G.R. No. 156343…………………………………………………………………………..542
Quimiguing v. Icao, G.R. No. L-26795 ……………………………………………………………………….543
Francisco v. Zandueta, G.R. No. 43794……………………………………………………..………………544
Santero v. CA, G.R. No. L-61700………………………………………………………………….…………..545
Gotardo v. Buling, G.R. No. 165166 …………………………………………………………………………..546
Mabugay-Otamias v. Republic, G.R. No. 189516………………………………………………………….548
Lacson v. Lacson, G.R. No. 150644…………………………………………………………………………..549
Lim v. Lim, G.R. No. 163209…………………………………………………………………………………..550
Verceles v. Posada, G.R. No. 159785………………………………………………………………………….551
Mangonon v. CA, G.R. No. 125041……………………………………………………………………………552
De Guzman v. Perez, G.R. No. 156013…………………………………………………………………….…554
Mabugay-Otamias v. Republic, G.R. No. 189516…………………………………………………………556
Del Socorro v. Brinkman Van Wilsen, G.R. No. 193707…………………………………………………557
Lacson v. Lacson, G.R. No. 150644…………………………………………………………………………..558
Estate of Ruiz v. CA, G.R. No.118671…………………………………………………………………………559
Reyes v. Ines-Luciano, G.R. No. L-48219…………………………………………………………………..560
Silva v. CA, G.R. No. 114742…………………………………………………………………………………….561
Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr., G.R. No. 204819……………………………………………………………………..563
Tonog v. CA, G.R. No. 122906…………………………………………………………………………………564
Vancil v. Belmes, G.R. No.132223…………………………………………………………………………….565
Bondagjy v. Fouzi Ali Bondagjy, G.R. No. 140817………………………………………………………..566
Sagala-Eslao v. CA, G.R. No. 116773………………………………………………………………………….567
Sombong v. CA, G.R. No. 111876………………………………………………………………………………569
Gamboa-Hirsch v. CA, G.R. No. 174485……………………………………………………………..………571
Pablo-Gualberto v. Gualberto, G.R. No. 154994……………………………………………………..……572
Santos v. CA, G.R. No.113054………………………………………………………………………………….573
David v. CA, G.R. No. 111180……………………………………………………………………………………575
Espiritu v. CA, G.R. No. 115640………………………………………………………………………………..577
Perez v. CA, G.R. No. 118870…………………………………………………………………………………..578
Dacasin v. Dacasin, G.R. No. 168785………………………………………………………………………..580
Caravan Travel and Tours International, Inc. Abejar, G.R. No. 170631…………………………….582
Libi v. IAC, G.R. No. 70890…………………………………………………………………………………….584
Tamargo v. CA, G.R. No. 85044……………………………………………………………………………….585
Aquinas School v. Inton, G.R. No. 184202………………………………………………………………….587
St. Joseph’s College v. Miranda, G.R. No. 182353………………………………………………………..589
St. Mary’s Academy v. Carpitanos, G.R. No. 143363………………………………………………….…590
Amadora v. CA, G.R. No. L-47745…………………………………………………………………………….591
Salvosa v. IAC, G.R. No. L-70458……………………………………………………………………………..592
Philippine School of Business Administration v. CA, G.R. No.84698 …………………………….…593
St. Luke’s College of Medicine-William H. Quasha v. Perez, G.R. No. 222740 ……………………594
Remo v. Secretary of Foreign Affairs, G.R. No. 169202 …………………………………………………596
Yasin v. Judge Shari’a District Court, G.R. No. 94986…………………………………………………..598
In Re Adoption of Stephanie Garcia, G.R. No. 148311………………………………………………..…599
In Re Julian Lin Wang, G.R. No. 159966…………………………………………………………………..600
In Re Change of Name of Maria Estrella Veronica Duterte, G.R. No. L-51201 ……………………602
People v. Estrada, G.R. No. 164368………………………………………………………………………….603
Ursua v. CA, G.R. No. 112170…………………………………………………………………………………..604
Basilio Gan v. Republic, G.R. No. 207147…………………………………………………………………..605
Yasuo Iwasawa v. Gangan, G.R. No. 204169………………………………………………………………606
Baldos v. CA, G.R. No. 170645…………………………………………………………………………………607
Republic v. Coseteng-Magpayo, G.R. No. 189476………………………………………………………..608
Lee v. CA, G.R. No. 118387……………………………………………………………………………………..609
In re Change of Name of Julian Wang, G.R. No. 159966 …………………………………………….…610
Silverio v. Republic, G.R. No. 174689………………………………………………………………………..611
Republic v. Cagandahan, G.R. No. 166676………………………………………………………………….612
Braza v. City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, G.R. No. 181174 …………………………………..613
Republic v. Lugsanay Uy, G.R. No. 198010…………………………………………………………………615
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

CASE BOOK

2017
 Page |1

LORENZO M. TAÑADA v. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA

G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985

FACTS:

Petitioners herein are seeking a writ of mandamus to compel public officials to publish and/or
cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of
instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementation and
administrative orders. Respondents, on the other hand, claimed that this case has no legal
personality or standing. Further, they argued that the publication in the Official Gazette in
necessary for the effectivity of the law where the law themselves provides for their own
effectivity dates.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the presidential decrees in question which contain special provisions as to the
date they are to take effect still need to be published in the Official Gazette.

RULING:

Publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not
provide for its effectivity date, for then the date of publication is material for determining the
date of the effectivity which must be 15 days following the completion of its publication, but not
when the law itself provides for the date when it goes to effect. Article 2 does not prevent the
requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of
its effectivity. The publication of all presidential issuances of a public nature or of general
applicability is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines,
forfeitures, or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose burdens on the people, such as tax
revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to
particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be
published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concern. The Court therefore
declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published, shall
have no force and effect.
 Page |2

LORENZO M. TAÑADA v. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA

G.R. No. L-63915 December 29, 1986

FACTS:

Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number of
presidential decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by law. The
government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was
"otherwise provided," as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become
effective immediately upon their approval. In the decision of this case on April 24, 1985, the
Court affirmed the necessity for the publication of some of these decrees. The petitioners are
now before the court again, this time to move for reconsideration/clarification of that decision.

ISSUE:

Whether the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself.

RULING:

Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that
the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. An example, as pointed out by the
present Chief Justice in his separate concurrence in the original decision, 6 is the Civil Code
which did not become effective after fifteen days from its publication in the Official Gazette but
"one year after such publication." The general rule did not apply because it was "otherwise
provided."
 Page |3

JOAQUIN BASA, ET AL., v. ATILANO G. MERCADO

G.R. No. L-42226 July 26, 1935

FACTS:

Hon. Hermogenes Reyes, Judge of Pampanga CFI, allowed and probated the last will and
testament of Ines Basa, decedent. The same judge also approved the account of the administrator
of the estate, declared him the only heir, and closed the administration proceedings. Joaquin
Basa, et al., filed a motion to reopen the proceedings, alleging that the court lacked jurisdiction
because there was failure to comply with the requirements as to the publication of the notice of
hearing.

They contended that the hearing took place only twenty-one days after the date of first
publication instead of three full weeks. Moreover, the Ing Katipunan where the notice was
published was not a newspaper of general circulation as contemplated by law.

ISSUES:

a) Whether or not there was compliance with the publication requirement.

b) Whether or not Ing Katipunan is a newspaper of general circulation.

RULING:

The language used in section 630 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not mean that the notice,
referred to therein, should be published for three full weeks before the date set for the hearing of
the will. In other words, the first publication of the notice need not be made 21 days before the
day appointed for the hearing.

The records show that Ing Katipunan is a newspaper of general circulation in view of the fact
that it is published for the dissemination of local news and general information; that it has a bona
fide subscription list of paying subscribers; that it is published at regular intervals and that the
trial court ordered the publication to be made in Ing Katipunan precisely because it was a
newspaper of general circulation in the Province of Pampanga.
 Page |4

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC. v. TORRES

G.R. No. 101279 August 6, 1992

FACTS:

As a result of published stories regarding the abuses suffered by Filipino housemaids employed
in Hong Kong, then DOLE Secretary Ruben Torres issued Department Order No.16, Series
of 1991, temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies of Filipino
domestic helpers going to Hong Kong. The DOLE itself, through the POEA took over the
business of deploying such Hong Kong-bound workers. The POEA Administrator also issued
Memorandum Circular No. 37, Series of 1991, on the processing of employment contracts of
domestic workers for Hong Kong. PASEI filed a petition for prohibition to annul the
aforementioned DOLE and POEA circulars and to prohibit their implementation on the grounds
that DOLE and POEA acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of their rule-making
authority in issuing said circulars; that the assailed DOLE and POEA circulars are
contrary to the Constitution, are unreasonable, unfair and oppressive; and that the requirements
of publication and filing with the Office of the National Administrative Register were not
complied with.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Department Order No. 16 and Memorandum Circular No. 37 are valid.

HELD:

Once more we advert to our ruling in Tañada v. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446 that, “Administrative
rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing
law pursuant also to a valid delegation. Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in
nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public,
need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions
issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in the performance of their duties. We agree that publication must be in full or it is
no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the content of the laws. For lack
of proper publication, the administrative circulars in question may not be enforced and
implemented.
 Page |5

NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION ADMINISTRATION v. VICTORIANO B. GONZAGA

G.R. No. 158761 December 4, 2007

FACTS:

On November 13, 2000, respondent Victoriano B. Gonzaga filed his Certificate of Candidacy for
membership in the Board of Directors of Zamboanga Del Sur II Electric Cooperative, Inc.,
District II (ZAMSURECO). Later that day, the screening committee resolved to disqualify
respondent because his spouse was an incumbent member of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Diplahan, Zamboanga del Sur. Based on the Electric Cooperative Election Code (ECEC),
promulgated by petitioner National Electrification Administration (NEA), a candidate whose
spouse occupies an elective government position higher than Barangay Captain is prohibited to
run as director of an electric cooperative. ZAMSURECO‘s by-laws, however, do not provide for
such ground for disqualification. Respondent averred that the ECEC was null and void because it
had not been published. NEA, on the other hand, failed to prove whether the ECEC was indeed
published in a newspaper of general circulation as required by the New Civil Code and the
Administrative Code of 1987.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Electric Cooperative Election Code was null and void for not complying with the
publication requirement.

RULING:

The Supreme Court held that Electric Cooperative Election Code was null and void for not
complying with the publication requirement. It observed that while ZAMSURECO complied
with the requirements of filing the code with the University of the Philippines Law Center, it
offered no proof of publication neither in the Official Gazette nor in a newspaper of general
circulation. Without compliance with the requirement of publication, the rules and regulations
contained in the ECEC cannot be enforced and implemented. Article 2 of the New Civil Code
provides that laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines,
unless it is otherwise provided. Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders
promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly
delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative
rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing
law pursuant also to a valid delegation. The ECEC applies to all electric cooperatives in the
country. It is not a mere internal memorandum, interpretative regulation, or instruction to
subordinates. Thus, the ECEC should comply with the requirements of the Civil Code and the
Administrative Code of 1987.
 Page |6

PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORPORATION v. HON. PRESIDING

JUDGE ZOSIMO Z. ANGELES
G.R. No. 108641 October 21, 1996

FACTS:

PITC issued Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 under which applications to the PITC
for importation from the People‘s Republic of China must be accompanied by a viable and
confirmed export program of Philippine products. PITC barred Remington and Firestone from
importing products from China on the ground that they were not able to comply with the
requirement of the said administrative order. Thereafter they filed a petition for prohibition and
mandamus against the said order of PITC in which the trial court upheld and declared to be null
and void for being unconstitutional. The court contends further authority to process and approve
applications for imports SOCPEC and to issue rules and regulations pursuant to LOI 144 has
already been repealed by EO 133 issued on February 27, 1987. Hence, the PITC filed a certiorari
seeking the reversal of the said decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not PITC‘s Administrative Order 89-08-01 is valid.

RULING:

The Supreme Court held that PITC is empowered to issue such order; nevertheless, the said AO
is invalid within the context of Article 2 of the New Civil Code. The Court cited Tanada vs
Tuvera which states that all statues including those of local application and private laws shall be
published as condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication in the
Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation unless a different effectivity date is fixed
by the legislature. The AO under consideration is one of those issuances which should be
published for its effectivity since it is punitive in character.
 Page |7

ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHERN TAGALOG ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. v.

ENERGY REGULATROY COMMISSION
G.R. No. 192117 September 18, 2012

FACTS:

Petitioners Batangas I Electric Cooperative, Inc., Quezon I Electric Cooperative, Inc., Quezon II
Electric Cooperative, Inc. and Pampanga Rural Electric Service Cooperative, Inc. are rural
electric cooperatives established under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 269 or the National
Electrification Administration Decree. BATELEC I, QUEZELCO I and QUEZELCO II are
members of the Association of Southern Tagalog Electric Cooperatives, Inc. PRESCO is a
member of the Central Luzon Electric Cooperatives Association, Inc. Petitioners are engaged in
the distribution of . On 8 December 1994, R.A. No. 7832 was enacted. The law imposed a limit
on the recoverable rate of system lossthat may be charged by rural electric cooperatives to their
consumers. The Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7832 required every rural
electric cooperative to file with the Energy Regulatory Board on or before 30 September 1995,
an application for approval of an amended PPA Clause incorporating the cap on the recoverable
rate of system loss to be included in its schedule of rates. On 8 June 2001, R.A. No. 9136 or the
Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 was enacted. Section 38 of the EPIRA abolished the
ERB, and created the Energy Regulatory Commission. The powers and functions of the ERB not
inconsistent with the provisions of the EPIRA were transferred to the ERC, together with the
applicable funds and appropriations, records, equipment, property and personnel of the ERB. All
electric cooperatives were directed to implement the PPA in the manner the then Energy
Regulatory Board had prescribed. Subsequently, the ERC issued policy guidelines on the
treatment of discounts extended by power suppliers. Petitioners attack the validity of the 22
March 2006 Order, 16 February 2007 Order, 7 December 2005 Order, and 27 March 2006 Order
of the ERC directing the refund of over recoveries for having been issued pursuant to ineffective
and invalid policy guidelines. Petitioners assert that the policy guidelines on the treatment of
discounts extended by power suppliers are ineffective and invalid for lack of publication, non-
submission to the U.P. Law Center, and their retroactive application.

ISSUE:

Whether the policy guidelines issued by the ERC on the treatment of discounts extended by
power suppliers are ineffective and invalid for lack of publication, non-submission to the
University of the Philippines (U.P.) Law Center, and their retroactive application.

RULING:

The Supreme Court held that publication is a basic postulate of procedural due process. Article 2
of the Civil Code, as amended by Section 1 of Executive Order No. 200, states that "laws shall
take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication either in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise
provided." Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the
President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the
legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and
 Page |8

regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law
pursuant also to a valid delegation. However, there are several exceptions to the requirement of
publication such as an interpretative regulation. It seeks to regulate only the personnel of the
administrative agency and not the general public. The policy guidelines of the ERC on the
treatment of discounts extended by power suppliers are interpretative regulations. The policy
guidelines merely interpret R.A. No. 7832 and it‘s IRR, particularly on the computation of the
cost of purchased power. The policy guidelines did not modify, amend, or supplant the IRR.
Hence, it is exempt from the publication requirement.
 Page |9

SPS. ANTONIO FORTUNA and ERLINDA FORTUNA v. REPUBLIC OF THE

PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 173423 March 5, 2014

FACTS:

In December 1994, the spouses Fortuna filed an application for registration of a 2,597-square
meter land identified as Lot No. 4457, situated in Bo. Canaoay, San Fernando, La Union. The
application was filed with the RTC and docketed as LRC No. 2372. The spouses Fortuna stated
that Lot No. 4457 was originally owned by Pastora Vendiola, upon whose death was succeeded
by her children, Clemente and Emeteria Nones. Through an affidavit of adjudication dated
August 3, 1972, Emeteria renounced all her interest in Lot No. 4457 in favor of Clemente.
Clemente later sold the lot in favor of Rodolfo Cuenca on May 23, 1975. Rodolfo sold the same
lot to the spouses Fortuna through a deed of absolute sale dated May 4, 1984. The spouses
Fortuna claimed that they, through themselves and their predecessors-in-interest, have been in
quiet, peaceful, adverse and uninterrupted possession of Lot No. 4457 for more than 50 years,
and submitted as evidence the lot’s survey plan, technical description, and certificate of
assessment. Although the respondent, Republic of the Philippines (Republic), opposed the
application, it did not present any evidence in support of its opposition. Since no private
opposition to the registration was filed, the RTC issued an order of general default on November
11, 1996 against the whole world, except the Republic.

In its Decision dated May 7, 2001, the RTC granted the application for registration in favor of the
spouses Fortuna. The RTC declared that "[the spouses Fortuna] have established [their]
possession, including that of their predecessors-in-interest of the land sought to be registered, has
been open, continuous, peaceful, adverse against the whole world and in the concept of an owner
since 1948, or for a period of over fifty (50) years." The Republic appealed the RTC decision
with the CA, arguing that the spouses Fortuna did not present an official proclamation from the
government that the lot has been classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land. It also
claimed that the spouses Fortuna’s evidence – Tax Declaration No. 8366 – showed that
possession over the lot dates back only to 1948, thus, failing to meet the June 12, 1945 cut-off
period provided under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529 or the Property
Registration Decree (PRD). In its decision dated May 16, 2005, the CA reversed and set aside the
RTC decision. Although it found that the spouses Fortuna were able to establish the alienable
and disposable nature of the land, they failed to show that they complied with the length of
possession that the law requires, i.e., since June 12, 1945. It agreed with the Republic’s argument
that Tax Declaration No. 8366 only showed that the spouses Fortuna’s predecessor-in-interest,
Pastora, proved that she had been in possession of the land only since 1948.

ISSUE:

Whether PD No. 1073 and the PRD should be deemed effective only on May 24, 1977 and
January 17, 1979, respectively. 
 P a g e | 10

RULING:

It appears, however, that January 25, 1977 was the date PD No. 1073 was enacted; based on the
certification from the National Printing Office, PD No. 1073 was published in Vol. 73, No. 19 of
the Official Gazette, months later than its enactment or on May 9, 1977. This uncontroverted fact
materially affects the cut-off date for applications for judicial confirmation of incomplete title
under Section 48(b) of the PLA. Although Section 6 of PD No. 1073 states that "[the] Decree
shall take effect upon its promulgation," the Court has declared in Tañada, et al. v. Hon. Tuvera,
etc., et al. that the publication of laws is an indispensable requirement for its effectivity. "All
statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition
for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity
date is fixed by the legislature." Accordingly, Section 6 of PD No. 1073 should be understood to
mean that the decree took effect only upon its publication, or on May 9, 1977. This, therefore,
moves the cut-off date for applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title
under Section 48(b) of the PLA to May 8, 1947. In other words, applicants must prove that they
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least 30
years, or at least since May 8, 1947.
 P a g e | 11

NAGKAKAISANG MARALITA NG SITIO MASIGASIG, INC., v. MILITARY SHRINE

SERVICES - PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF
NATIONAL DEFENSE
G.R. No. 187587 June 5, 2013

FACTS:

On 12 July 1957, by virtue of Proclamation No. 423, President Carlos P. Garcia reserved parcels
of land in the Municipalities of Pasig, Taguig, Parañaque, Province of Rizal and Pasay City for a
military reservation. The military reservation, then known as Fort William McKinley, was later
on renamed Fort Andres Bonifacio (Fort Bonifacio). On 28 May 1967, President Ferdinand E.
Marcos (President Marcos) issued Proclamation No. 208, amending Proclamation No. 423,
which excluded a certain area of Fort Bonifacio and reserved it for a national shrine. The
excluded area is now known as Libingan ng mga Bayani, which is under the administration of
herein respondent Military Shrine Services – Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (MSS-PVAO).

Again, on 7 January 1986, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 2476, further amending
Proclamation No. 423, which excluded barangays Lower Bicutan, Upper Bicutan and Signal
Village from the operation of Proclamation No. 423 and declared it open for disposition under
the provisions of Republic Act Nos. (R.A.) 274 and 730.

At the bottom of Proclamation No. 2476, President Marcos made a handwritten addendum,
which reads:
"P.S. – This includes Western Bicutan
(SGD.) Ferdinand E. Marcos"

The crux of the controversy started when Proclamation No. 2476 was published in the Official
Gazette on 3 February 1986, without the above-quoted addendum.

Years later, on 16 October 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino (President Aquino) issued
Proclamation No. 172 which substantially reiterated Proclamation No. 2476, as published, but
this time excluded Lots 1 and 2 of Western Bicutan from the operation of Proclamation No. 423
and declared the said lots open for disposition under the provisions of R.A. 274 and 730.
Memorandum Order No. 119, implementing Proclamation No. 172, was issued on the same day.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the honorable Court of Appeals seriously erred in ruling the Proclamation No.
2476 did not include any portion of Western Bicutan as the handwritten notation by President
Marcos on the said proclamation was not published in the Official Gazette.

RULING:

Considering that petitioners were occupying Lots 3 and 7 of Western Bicutan (subject lots), their
claims were anchored on the handwritten addendum of President Marcos to Proclamation No.
2476. They allege that the former President intended to include all Western Bicutan in the
 P a g e | 12

reclassification of portions of Fort Bonifacio as disposable public land when he made a notation
just below the printed version of Proclamation No. 2476. However, it is undisputed that the
handwritten addendum was not included when Proclamation No. 2476 was published in the
Official Gazette. The resolution of whether the subject lots were declared as reclassified and
disposable lies in the determination of whether the handwritten addendum of President Marcos
has the force and effect of law. In relation thereto, Article 2 of the Civil Code expressly provides:
ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in
the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after
such publication.

Under the above provision, the requirement of publication is indispensable to give effect to the
law, unless the law itself has otherwise provided. The phrase "unless otherwise provided" refers
to a different effectivity date other than after fifteen days following the completion of the law’s
publication in the Official Gazette, but does not imply that the requirement of publication may be
dispensed with. The issue of the requirement of publication was already settled in the landmark
case Tañada v. Hon. Tuvera, in which we had the occasion to rule thus: Publication is
indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual
fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. An example, as pointed out by the present
Chief Justice in his separate concurrence in the original decision, is the Civil Code which did not
become effective after fifteen days from its publication in the Official Gazette but "one year after
such publication." The general rule did not apply because it was "otherwise provided."
 P a g e | 13

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. PRIMETOWN PROPERTY GROUP,

INC.
G.R. No. 162155 August 28, 2007

FACTS:

On April 14, 1998 Primetown Property Group. Inc. filed its final adjusted return. On March 11,
1999 Gilbert Yap, vice chair of Primetown Property Group. Inc., filed for the refund or tax credit
of income tax paid in 1997. However, it was not acted upon. Thus Primetown filed a petition for
review but the Court of Tax Appeals dismissed it claiming that it was filed beyond the two-year
reglementary period provided by section 229 of the National Internal Revenue Code. The Court
of Tax Appeals further argued that in National Marketing Corp. v. Tecson the Supreme Court
ruled that a year is equal to 365 days regardless of whether it is a regular year or a leap year.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent‘s petition was filed within the two-year reglementary period.

RULING:

The Supreme Court held that the petition was filed within the two-year reglementary period
because Article 13 of the New Civil Code that provides that a year is composed of 365 years is
repealed by Executive Order 292 or the Administrative Code of the Philippines. Under Executive
Order 292, a year is composed of 12 calendar months.
 P a g e | 14

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. PAZ M. DEL ROSARIO

G.R. No. L-7234 May 21, 1955

FACTS:

On May 28, 1953, Paz M. Del Rosario committed slight physical injuries. The information was
filed on July 27, 1953. Thereupon, the accused filed a motion to quash the information to ground
that the offense charged had already prescribed in accordance with Article 90 and 91 of the
Revised Penal Code. The municipal court sustained this motion and dismissed the case. Thus,
this appeal of dismissal is made directly to the court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the offense charged to the plaintiff-appellant had already prescribed.

RULING:

The offense have not yet prescribed because the provision in the Revised Penal Code does not
provide the computation of month therefore it must be supplied by Article 13 of the Civil Code
which provides for the computation of years, months, days and nights. According to Article 13 of
the Civil Code a month is a 30-day month not the solar or civil month. Further, the Supreme
Court held that the case took effect on May 28, 1953 after the New Civil Code take effect so the
new provisions should apply.
 P a g e | 15

D.M. CONSUNJI, INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA J. JUEGO

G.R. No. 137873 April 20, 2010

FACTS:

Jose Juego, a construction worker of D.M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance
Tower, to his death. Jose Juego‘s widow then filed a petition for damages in the Regional Trial
Court against the deceased employer. The employer raised the defense that Maria Juego already
availed of the benefits provided by the State Insurance Fund. Considering the ruling in Pacarra v.
Cebu Autobus Company, an injured worker has a choice of either to recover from the employer
the fixed amounts set by the Workmen‘s Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary civil
action against the tort fees for higher damages but he cannot pursue both actions simultaneously.
The Regional Trial Court rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego. On appeal by
D.M. Consunji, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent is prohibited from recovering damages under the Civil Code.

RULING:

No. Respondent is not barred from recovering damages under the Civil Code although she has
already availed the benefits of the State Insurance Fund. The respondent‘s case is an exception
because private respondent was not aware of petitioner‘s negligence when she filed her claim for
benefits from the State Insurance Fund. She was not only ignorant of the facts, but of her rights
as well. The decision of the court is affirmed.
 P a g e | 16

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FLORENCIO GASACAO

G.R. No. 168445 November 11, 2005

FACTS:

Capt. Florencio O. Gasacao was the crewing manager of Great Eastern Shipping Agency, Inc.,
which company was headed by his nephew. On August 4, 2000 appellant and Jose Gasacao were
charged with Large Scale Illegal Recruitment. The appellant was arrested while his nephew
remained at large. The lower court found Capt. Gasacao guilty beyond reasonable doubt of large
scale illegal recruitment. The Court of Appeals also affirmed the decision. Hence, Capt. Gasacao
appealed to the Supreme Court claiming that he can‘t be held liable for illegal recruitment
because he was just a mere employee of the manning agency. He also claimed that he was not
aware of the law against prohibition on bonds and deposits under section 60 of the Omnibus
Rules and Regulations implementing R.A. 8042.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of large scale illegal recruitment.

RULING:

There is no merit in appellant‘s contention that he was just a mere employee of the manning
agency because he was the company‘s crewing manager. As testified by the witnesses, the
accused appellant actively participated in the recruitment process from receiving job
applications, interviewing the applicants, and informing them of the agency‘s requirement of
payment of performance or cash bond prior to the deployment. The Supreme Court held further
that appellants defense of ignorance is not commendable as provided for by Article 3 of the Civil
Code which states that ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith. The
defense of goodwill is neither unavailable because the appellant failed to deploy the
complainants without valid reasons.
 P a g e | 17

WONG WOO YIU alias NG YAO v. HON. MARTINIANO P. VIVO, ETC., ET AL.
G.R. No. L-21076 March 31, 1965

FACTS:

It appears that in the proceedings held before the Board of Special Inquiry sometime in June,
1961, petitioner declared that she came to the Philippines in 1961 for the first time to join her
husband Perfecto Blas to whom she was married in Chingkang, China on January 15, 1929; that
they had several children all of whom are not in the Philippines; that their marriage was
celebrated by one Chua Tio, a village leader; that on June 28, 1961 the Board of Special Inquiry
No. 3 rendered a decision finding, among others, that petitioner is legally married to Perfecto
Blas, a Filipino Citizen, and admitted her into the country as a non-quota immigrant; that this
decision was affirmed by the Board of Commissioners of which petitioner was duly notified by
the Secretary of said Board in a letter dated July 12, 1961; that in a motu proprio decision
rendered by the Board of Commissioners composed of a new set of members dated June 28,
1962 the latter found that petitioner's claim that she is the lawful wife of Perfecto Blas was
without basis in evidence as it was "bereft of substantial proof of husband-wife relationship";
that said Board further held that, it appearing that in the entry proceedings of Perfecto Blas had
on January 23, 1947 he declared that he first visited China in 1935 and married petitioner in
1936, it could not possibly sustain her claim that she married Perfecto Blas in 1929; that in an
affidavit dated August 9, 1962 Perfecto Blas claimed that he went to China in 1929, 1935 and
1941, although in his re-entry declaration he admitted that he first went to China in 1935, then in
1937, then in 1939, and lastly in 1941; and that Perfecto Blas in the same affidavit likewise
claimed that he first went to China when he was merely four years old so that computed from his
date of birth in 1908 it must have been in 1912.

In view of the discrepancies found in the statements made by petitioner and her alleged husband
Perfecto Blas in the several investigations conducted by the immigration authorities concerning
their alleged marriage before a village leader in China in 1929, coupled with the fact that the
only basis in support of petitioner's claim that she is the lawful wife of Perfecto Blas is "a mass
of oral and documentary evidence bereft of substantial proof of husband-wife relationship," the
Board of Commissioners motu proprio reviewed the record concerning the admission of
petitioner into the country resulting in its finding that she was improperly admitted.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the marriage was valid.

RULING:

But it may be contended that under Section 4 of General orders No. 68, as reproduced in Section
19 of Act No. 3613, which is now Article 71 of our new Civil Code, a marriage contracted
outside of the Philippines which is valid under the law of the country in which it was celebrated
is also valid in the Philippines. But no validity can be given to this contention because no proof
was presented relative to the law of marriage in China. Such being the case, we should apply the
general rule that in the absence of proof of the law of a foreign country it should be presumed
 P a g e | 18

that it is the same as our own. The statutes of other countries or states must be pleaded and
proved the same as any other fact. Courts cannot take judicial notice of what such laws are. In
the absence of pleading and proof the laws of a foreign country or state will be presumed to be
the same as our own. In the absence of anything to the contrary as to the character of a foreign
law, it will be presumed to be the same as the domestic law on the same subject. In the absence
of evidence to the contrary foreign laws on a particular subject are presumed to be the same as
those of the Philippines. Since our law only recognizes a marriage celebrated before any of the
officers mentioned therein, and a village leader is not one of them, it is clear that petitioner's
marriage, even if true, cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction.
 P a g e | 19

YAO KEE v. AIDA SY-GONZALES

G.R. No. L-55960 November 24, 1988

FACTS:

Sy Kiat, a Chinese National died on January 17, 1977, leaving behind real and personal
properties here in the Philippines worth more or less Php 300,000. Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales,
Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe, and Rodolfo Sy filed a petition alleging that they are the
children of the deceased with Asuncion Gillego. However, Yao Kee testified that she was
married to Sy Kiat on Jan. 19, 1981 through a Chinese marriage with Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai
Cho, and Chun Yen as their children. Petitioners provided that fact of marriage through
evidences like Yao Kee‘s and Gan Ching‘s testimony, Sy Kiat‘s Master Card of Registration
stating his marriage with Yao Kee, and the certificate by the Embassy of the People‘s Republic
of China affirming the fact of the marriage.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the marriage of Sy Kiat and Yao Kee was valid.

RULING:

Under Article 71 of the Civil Code to establish the validity of foreign marriages the existence of
the foreign law as a question of fact must be proven and the alleged foreign marriage must be
proven by convincing evidence. The petitioners have provided the fact of marriage however the
same do not suffice to establish the validity of said marriage with Chinese Law or custom. In
such absence of foreign law, the doctrine of processual presumption must be applied. The
Supreme Court then held that in the absence of a foreign law it must be presumed as the same as
ours. In the Philippine Laws, a marriage cannot be valid without the presence of a solemnizing
officer; therefore the marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee was null and void.
 P a g e | 20

NEDLLOYD LIJNEN B.V. ROTTERDAM and THE EAST ASIATIC CO., LTD. v.
GLOW LAKS ENTERPRISES, LTD.
G.R. No. 156330 November 19, 2014

FACTS:

Petitioner Nedlloyd Lijnen B.V. Rotterdam (Nedlloyd) is a foreign corporation engaged in the
business of carrying goods by sea, whose vessels regularly call at the port of Manila. It is doing
business in the Philippines thru its local ship agent, co-petitioner East Asiatic Co., Ltd. (East
Asiatic). Respondent Glow Laks Enterprises,Ltd., is likewise a foreign corporation organized
and existing under the laws of Hong Kong. It is not licensed to do, and it is not doing business in,
the Philippines.

On or about 14 September 1987, respondent loaded on board M/S Scandutch at the Port of
Manila a total 343 cartoons of garments, complete and in good order for pre-carriage tothe Port
of Hong Kong. The goods covered by Bills of Lading Nos. MHONX-2 and MHONX-3 arrived
in good condition in Hong Kong and were transferred to M/S Amethyst for final carriage to
Colon, Free Zone, Panama. Both vessels, M/S Scandutch and M/S Amethyst, are owned by
Nedlloyd represented in the Phlippines by its agent, East Asiatic. The goods which were valued
at US$53,640.00 was agreed to be released to the consignee, Pierre Kasem, International, S.A.,
upon presentation of the original copies of the covering bills of lading. Upon arrival of the vessel
at the Port of Colon on 23 October 1987, petitioners purportedly notified the consignee of the
arrival of the shipments, and its custody was turned over tothe National Ports Authority in
accordance with the laws, customs regulations and practice of trade in Panama. By an
unfortunate turn of events, however, unauthorized persons managed to forge the covering bills of
lading and on the basis of the falsified documents, the ports authority released the goods.

On 16 July 1988, respondent filed a formal claim with Nedlloyd for the recovery of the amount
of US$53,640.00 representing the invoice value of the shipment but to no avail. Claiming that
petitioners are liable for the misdelivery of the goods, respondent initiated Civil Case No. 88-
45595 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 52, seeking for the recovery of
the amount of US$53,640.00, including the legal interest from the date of the first demand.

In disclaiming liability for the misdelivery of the shipments, petitioners asserted in their Answer
that they were never remiss in their obligation as a common carrier and the goods were
discharged in good order and condition into the custody of the National Ports Authority of
Panama in accordance with the Panamanian law. They averred that they cannot be faulted for the
release of the goods to unauthorized persons, their extraordinary responsibility as a common
carrier having ceased at the time the possession of the goods were turned over to the possession
of the port authorities.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is absolutely no need to prove Panamanian laws because they had been
judicially admitted. An admission by a party in the course of the proceedings does not require
proof.
 P a g e | 21

RULING:

It is well settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are
not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and
proved. To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply
with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court which read:

SEC. 24. Proof of official record. — The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a)
of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication
thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his
deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such
officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the
certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-
consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in
the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.

SEC. 25. What attestation of copy must state. — Whenever a copy of a document or record is
attested for the purpose of the evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a
correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be
under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court
having a seal, under the seal of such court.

For a copy of a foreign public document to be admissible, the following requisites are
mandatory: (1) it must be attested by the officer having legal custody of the records or by his
deputy; and (2) it must be accompanied by a certificate by a secretary of the embassy or legation,
consul general, consul, vice-consular or consular agent or foreign service officer, and with the
seal of his office. Such official publication or copy must be accompanied, if the record is not
kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that the attesting officer has the legal custody thereof.
The certificate may be issued by any of the authorized Philippine embassy or consular officials
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his
office. The attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a
specific part thereof, as the case may be, and must be under the official seal of the attesting
officer.
 P a g e | 22

NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minor child RODERIGO NORJO
VAN WILSEM v. ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM
G.R. No. 193707 December 10, 2014

FACTS:

Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted
marriage in Holland on September 25, 1990. On January 19, 1994, they were blessed with a son
named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem, who at the time of the filing of the instant petition was
sixteen (16) years of age. Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of
a Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of Holland. At that time, their son was only
eighteen (18) months old. Thereafter, petitioner and her son came home to the Philippines.

According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide monthly support to their son in
the amount of Two Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene (which is equivalent to Php17,500.00 more or
less). However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines, respondent never
gave support to the son, Roderigo.

Not long thereafter, respondent came to the Philippines and remarried in Pinamungahan, Cebu,
and since then, have been residing thereat. Respondent and his new wife established a business
known as Paree Catering, located at Barangay Tajao, Municipality of Pinamungahan, Cebu City.
To date, all the parties, including their son, Roderigo, are presently living in Cebu City.

On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter demanding for support from
respondent. However, respondent refused to receive the letter. Because of the foregoing
circumstances, petitioner filed a complaint affidavit with the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City
against respondent for violation of Section 5, paragraph E(2) of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s
unjust refusal to support his minor child with petitioner. Respondent submitted his counter-
affidavit thereto, to which petitioner also submitted her reply-affidavit. Thereafter, the Provincial
Prosecutor of Cebu City issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an information for the
crime charged against herein respondent.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under Philippine
law.

RULING:

It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son
under Article195 of the Family Code as a consequence of the Divorce Covenant obtained in
Holland. This does not, however, mean that respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son
altogether. In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or
case has the burden of proving the foreign law. In the present case, respondent hastily concludes
that being a national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision
of and capacity to support. While respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing
 P a g e | 23

his position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same. It is incumbent
upon respondent to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands does not impose
upon the parents the obligation to support their child (either before, during or after the issuance
of a divorce decree), because Llorente v. Court of Appeals, has already enunciated that: True,
foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take
judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.

In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the
doctrine of processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved
is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as
our local or domestic or internal law. Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the
obligation to support has not been properly pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is presumed
to be the same with Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of parents to support their
children and penalizing the non-compliance therewith.
 P a g e | 24

JOSE E. ARUEGO, JR. v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 112193 March 31, 1996

FACTS:

In 1959, Jose M. Aruego Sr., a married man, had an amorous relationship with Luz M. Fabian
until his death on March 30, 1982. Out of this relationship were born Antonio Aruego and
Evelyn F. Aruego. On March 7, 1983, a complaint for compulsory recognition and enforcement
of successional rights was filed by the minors, Antonia and Evelyn. However, Jose Aruego Jr.,
and the petitioners also filed a complaint to declare the private respondents as illegitimate
children of their defunct father. The lower court decided that Antonia Aruego is an illegitimate
daughter or Jose Aruego Sr., and Luz M. Fabian and that she is entitled to a share of equal to
one-half portion of share of the legitimate. So the petitioners filed a motion for partial
reconsideration alleging loss of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court over the complaint by
virtue of the passage of E.O. 209 or the Family Code of the Philippines. It was denied, hence this
petition for review.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the provisions of the Family Code be applied retroactively.

RULING:

Private respondent‘s action for compulsory recognition as an illegitimate child was brought
under Book I, Title VIII of the Civil Code on Persons under Art. 285 thereby stating that the
recognition of natural children is brought only the lifetime of the presumed parents except when
the parents die during the minority of the child. Petitioners, on the other hand submit that with
the New Family Code on August 31, 1988, the trial court lost jurisdiction on the ground of
prescription. Further, the Family Code provides that it shall have retroactive effect insofar as it
does not impair the vested right of others. The Supreme Court held that the present law which is
the Family Code cannot be applied retroactively because its application will impair the vested
right of the respondent to have her case decided under Article 285 of the Civil Code which has
vested to her by the fact that she filed her action under the regime of the Civil Code.
 P a g e | 25

BERNABE v. ALEJO
G.R. No. 140500 January 21, 2002

FACTS:

Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary, Carolina Alejo. The son was
born on September 18, 1981and was named Adrian Bernabe. Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe died as well
as his legitimate wife, leaving Ernestina Bernabe the sole surviving heir.

Carolina, in behalf of her son, filed a complaint praying that Adrian be declared an
acknowledged child of the deceased and also be given the share of Bernabe‘s estate. Regional
Trial Court dismissed the complaint and said that the death of the putative father had barred the
action. Further, under the law, an action for the recognition of an illegitimate child must be
brought within the lifetime of the alleged parent to give the latter an opportunity to either affirm
or deny the child‘s filiation.

The Court of Appeals ruled that the rights of Adrian are governed under Article 285 of the Civil
Code which allows an action for recognition to be filed within 4 years after the child has attained
the age of majority and that subsequent enactment of the Family Code did not take away his
right.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Adrian Bernabe may be declared an acknowledged illegitimate son.

RULING:

The Family Code makes no distinction on whether the former was still a minor when the latter
died. Thus, the putative parent is given by the new code a chance to dispute the claim,
considering that ―illegitimate children‖ are usually begotten and raised in secrecy and without
the legitimate family being aware of their existence. Furthermore, the grounds or instances for
the acknowledgment of natural children are utilized to establish the filiation of spurious children.
Hence, the petition was denied and assailed decision was affirmed.
 P a g e | 26

PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION v. STOCKHOLDERS OF

INTERCITY SAVINGS AND LOAN BANK, INC.
G.R. No. 181556 December 14, 2009

FACTS:

The Central Bank of the Philippines, now known as Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, filed on June
17, 1987 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati a Petition for Assistance in the
Liquidation of Intercity Savings and Loan Bank, Inc. (Intercity Bank) alleging that said bank was
already insolvent and its continuance in business would involve probable loss to depositors,
creditors and the general public. The trial court gave it due course. Petitioner Philippine Deposit
Insurance Corporation was eventually substituted as the therein petitioner, liquidator of Intercity
Bank. In the meantime, Republic Act No. 9302 which provides that ―After the payment of all
liabilities and claims against the closed bank, the Corporation shall pay any surplus dividends at
the legal rate of interest, from date of takeover to date of distribution, to creditors and claimants
of the closed bank in accordance with legal priority before distribution to the shareholders of the
closed bank‖. Relying on Republic Act No. 9302 PDIC filed on August 8, 2005 a Motion for
Approval of the Final Distribution of Assets and Termination of the Liquidation Proceedings

ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 12 of RA 9302 should be applied retroactively in order to entitle Intercity
Bank creditors to surplus dividends.

RULING:

The Supreme Court held that Statutes are prospective and not retroactive in their operation, they
being the formulation of rules for the future, not the past. Hence, the legal maxim lex de
futuro, judex de praeterito — the law provides for the future, the judge for the past, which is
articulated in Article 4 of the Civil Code: ―Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the
contrary is provided.‖ The reason for the rule is the tendency of retroactive legislation to be
unjust and oppressive on account of its liability to unsettle vested rights or disturb the legal effect
of prior transactions. Further, a perusal of RA 9302 shows that nothing indeed therein authorizes
its retroactive application. In fact, its effectivity clause indicates a clear legislative intent to the
contrary, Section 28. Effectivity Clause. ―This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following
the completion of its publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2) newspapers of general
circulation.
 P a g e | 27

MERLINDA CIPRIANO MONTANEZ v. LOURDES TAJOLOSA CIPRIANO

G.R. No. 181089 October 22, 2012

FACTS:

On April 8, 1976, Lourdes Tajolosa married Socrates Flores. On January 4, 1983 Lourdes
remarried Silverio V. Cipriano. In 2001, respondent filed a Petition for the Annulment in the
Regional Trial Court in the ground of psychological incapacity as defined in Article 36 of the
Family Code. On July 8, 2003, the marriage was declared null and void. On May 14, 2004,
Silverio‘s daughter filed a complaint of bigamy against Lourdes under Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code. Lourdes then contended that sine her two marriages were contracted prior to the
Family Code, Article 40 cannot be retroactive effect because it will impair her right to remarry
without need of securing a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage. The RTC dismissed the
complaint ruling that the existing law at the time of the second marriage do not require a judicial
declaration of absolute nullity as a condition precedent to contracting a subsequent marriage. The
complainant then filed a motion for reconsideration but the decision rendered was again in favor
of the respondent. Hence, this petition was filed.

ISSUE:

Whether the judicial nullity of a first marriage prior to the enactment of the Family Code is a
valid defense for the crime of bigamy.

RULING:

The Supreme Court held that the subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first
marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime of bigamy had
already been consummated. The Supreme Court ruled further that what is required for a crime of
bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is
contracted. Even the accused eventually secured a declaration that his first marriage is a void ab
initio, the first and second marriage was subsisting before the first marriage was annulled. Also,
Art. 40 should be applied retroactively because it does not prejudice or impair the right of
anyone. The petition is thereby granted.
 P a g e | 28

DACUDAO v. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE

G.R. No. 188056 January 8, 2013

FACTS:

Petitioners were among the investors whom Celso G. Delos Angeles, Jr. and his associates in the
Legacy Group of Companies allegedly defrauded through the Legacy Group's "buy back
agreement" that earned them check payments that were dishonored. After their written demands
for the return of their investments went unheeded, they initiated a number of charges for
syndicated estafa against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Davao
City on February 6, 2009.

On March 18, 2009, the Secretary of Justice issued Department of Justice (DOJ) Order No. 182
(DO No. 182), directing all Regional State Prosecutors, Provincial Prosecutors, and City
Prosecutors to forward all cases already filed against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. to the Secretariat
of the DOJ Special Panel in Manila for appropriate action. Thereafter, the petitioners directly
went to the Supreme Court via petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, ascribing to
respondent Secretary of Justice grave abuse of discretion in issuing DOES No 182. They further
argued that DO No. 182 was an obstruction of justice and a violation of the rule against
enactment of laws with retroactive effect.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the issuance of DOJ Order No. 182 should cover only future cases against Delos
Angeles, Jr., et al., not those already being investigated.

RULING:

The Supreme Court held that as a general rule, laws shall have no retroactive effect. However,
exceptions exist, and one such exception concerns a law that is procedural in nature. The reason
is that a remedial statute or a statute relating to remedies or modes of procedure does not create
new rights or take away vested rights but only operates in furtherance of the remedy or the
confirmation of already existing rights. A statute or rule regulating the procedure of the courts
will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of its passage.
All procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The retroactive application is
not violative of any right of a person who may feel adversely affected, for, verily, no vested right
generally attaches to or arises from procedural laws. Therefore DOJ Order No. 182 can be
applied retroactively in the cases the petitioners filed against Delos Angeles.
 P a g e | 29

MICHAEL C. GUY v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 163707 September 15, 2006

FACTS:

On October 29, 1992, Sima Wei died in Makati City leaving an estate valued 10 million more or
less. His known heirs are his spouse Shirley Guy with their children five children. On June 13,
1997, private respondents Karen Oanes Wei and Kamille Oanes Wei represented by their mother
Remedios filed a petition for letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court alleging
that they are duly acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei. However, petitioner and co-
heirs alleged that private respondent‘s claim had been paid, waived, abandoned, or otherwise
extinguished by Remedios‘ June 7, 1993 Release and Waiver of Claim stating that in exchange
for the financial and educational support received from petitioner, Remedios and her minor
children discharge the estate of Sima Wei and any and all liabilities. The petition was denied in
the lower court and the motion for reconsidered dismissed in the Court of Appeals. Hence, this
petition was made.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Release and Waiver of Claim bar respondents from claiming successional
rights.

RULING:

The Release and Waiver of Claim does not bar respondents from claiming successional rights
because it does not state with clarity the purpose of its execution. It merely states that Remedios
received Php 300,000 and an educational plan for her daughters. The document does not
specifically mention private respondents‘hereditary rights, hence it can‘t be construed as a
waiver of successional rights. The Supreme Court held that under Art. 1044 of the Civil Code
any inheritance left to minors or incapacitated persons may be accepted by their parent or
guardian. Parents may repudiate the inheritance only by judicial authorization. Not having been
judicially approved, the release and waiver claim is null and void. The Supreme Court affirmed
the decision of the Court of Appeals.
 P a g e | 30

F.F. CRUZ & CO., INC. v. HR CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION

G.R. No. 187521 March 14, 2012

FACTS:

Sometime in 2004, FFCCI entered into a contract with the Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH) for the construction of the Magsaysay Viaduct, known as the Lower Agusan
Development Project. On August 9, 2004, FFCCI, in turn, entered into a Subcontract Agreement
with HR Construction Corporation (HRCC) for the supply of materials, labor, equipment, tools
and supervision for the construction of a portion of the said project called the East Bank Levee
and CutOff Channel in accordance with the specifications of the main contract. Pursuant to the
Subcontract Agreement, HRCC would submit to FFCCI a monthly progress billing which the
latter would then pay, subject to stipulated deductions, within 30 days from receipt thereof. The
parties agreed that the requests of HRCC for payment should include progress accomplishment
of its completed works as approved by FFCCI. Additionally, they agreed to conduct a joint
measurement of the completed works of HRCC together with the representative of DPWH and
consultants to arrive at a common quantity. Thereafter, HRCC commenced the construction of
the works pursuant to the Subcontract Agreement. However, before the project was completed,
HRCC pursuant to the arbitration clause in the subcontract agreement filed with the Construction
Industry Arbitration Commission a complaint praying that FFCI pay the overdue application plus
legal interests they have not paid. FFCCI maintained that HRCC failed to comply with the
condition stated under the Subcontract Agreement for the payment of the latter‘s progress
billings, i.e. joint measurement of the completed works, and, hence, it was justified in not paying
the amount stated in HRCC‘s progress billings.

ISSUE:

Whether or not FFCCI is already barred from contesting HRCC‘s valuation of the completed
works having waived its right to demand the joint measurement requirement.

RULING:

The Supreme Court held that FFCCI had waived its right to demand for a joint measurement of
HRCC‘s completed works under the Subcontract Agreement. Further, on account of its failure to
demand the joint measurement of HRCC‘s completed works, had effectively waived its right to
ask for the conduct of the same as a condition sine qua non to HRCC‘s submission of its monthly
progress billings. Basically, the instant issue calls for a determination as to which of the
parties‘respective valuation of accomplished works should be given credence. FFCCI claims that
its valuation should be upheld since the same was the result of a measurement of the completed
works conducted by it and the DPWH.

On the other hand, HRCC maintains that its valuation should be upheld on account of FFCCI‘s
failure to observe the joint measurement requirement in ascertaining the extent of its completed
works. FFCCI admits that in all three instances where it paid HRCC for its progress billings, it
never required compliance with the aforequoted contractual provision of a prior joint
quantification. Such repeated omission may reasonably be construed as a waiver by FFCCI of its
 P a g e | 31

contractual right to require compliance of said condition and it is now too late in the day to so
impose it. Article 6 of the Civil Code expressly provides that ―rights may be waived unless the
waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs‖. The tribunal
cannot see any such violation in this case.
 P a g e | 32

PEOPLE v. MORIAL
G.R. No. 129295 August 15, 2001

FACTS:

Edwin Morial, Leonardo Morial and Nonelito Abinon were convicted of Robbery with
Homicide. During the custodial investigation, Leonardo Morial made an extrajudicial confession
admitting to the crime. However, later on, he recanted his confession saying that the police
tortured him into admitting the crime. On appeal, Morial moved to quash the extrajudicial
confession claiming that such confession was made without the assistance of counsel given him
by the police was not present during the whole interrogation. He left to attend some personal
matters while the interrogation of Morial was still going on. However, said attorney claimed that
he was present when Morial signed the admission.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the extrajudicial confession can be used as evidence against the accused.

RULING:

The extrajudicial confession cannot be used against the accused. An excused under custodial
interrogation must continuously have a counsel assisting him from the very start until the
termination of such investigation. An effective and vigilant counsel ―necessarily and logically
requires that the lawyer be present and able to advise and assist his client from the time the
confessant answers the first question asked by the investigating officer until the signing of the
confessant answers the first question asked by the investigating officer until the signing of the
extrajudicial confession.‖ Section 2A of RA No 7438 requires that ―any person arrested,
detained or under custodial investigation shall at all times be assisted by counsel. In the absence
of any lawyer, no custodial investigation shall be conducted‖. Additionally, there was an invalid
waiver of the right to counsel since this right cannot be waived unless the same is made in
writing and in the presence of counsel. No such written and counseled waiver of these rights was
offered in evidence.
 P a g e | 33

LORELEI O. ILADAN v. SUERTE INTERNATIONAL MANPOWER AGENCY, INC.,

AND DEBBIE LAO
G.R. No. 203882 January 11, 2016

FACTS:

La Suerte is a recruitment agency duly authorized by the Philippine Overseas Employment

Administration (POEA) to deploy workers for overseas employment. On March 20, 2009, La
Suerte hired Iladan to work as a domestic helper in Hongkong for a period of two years with a
monthly salary of HK$3,580.00. On July 20, 2009, Iladan was deployed to her principal
employer in Hongkong, Domestic Services International (Domestic Services), to work as
domestic helper for Ms. Muk Sun Fan.

On July 28, 2009 or barely eight days into her job, Iladan executed a handwritten resignation
letter. On August 6, 2009, in consideration of P35,000.00 financial assistance given by Domestic
Services, Iladan signed an Affidavit of Release, Waiver and Quitclaim duly subscribed before
Labor Attache Leonida V. Romulo (Labor Attache Romulo) of the Philippine Consulate General
in Hongkong. On the same date, an Agreement, was signed by Iladan, Conciliator-Mediator
Maria Larisa Q. Diaz (Conciliator-Mediator Diaz) and a representative of Domestic Services,
whereby Iladan acknowledged that her acceptance of the financial assistance would constitute as
final settlement of her contractual claims and waiver of any cause of action against respondents
and Domestic Services. The Agreement was also subscribed before Labor Attache Romulo. On
August 10, 2009, Iladan returned to the Philippines.

Thereafter, or on November 23, 2009, Iladan filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal, refund of
placement fee, payment of salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of the contract, as
well as moral and exemplary damages, against respondents. Iladan alleged that she was forced to
resign by her principal employer, threatened with incarceration; and that she was constrained to
accept the amount of P35,000.00 as financial assistance as she needed the money to defray her
expenses in going back to the Philippines. She averred that the statements in the Affidavit of
Release, Waiver and Quitclaim and the Agreement were not fully explained in the language
known to her; that they were considered contracts of adhesion contrary to public policy; and
were issued for an unreasonable consideration. Iladan claimed to have been illegally dismissed
and entitled to backwages corresponding to the unexpired portion of the contract, reimbursement
of the placement fee in the amount of P90,000.00, as well as payment of damages and attorney's
fee for the litigation of her cause.

ISSUE:

Whether Iladan's resignation and her execution of the Affidavit of Release, Waiver and
Quitclaim and the Agreement were all voluntarily made.

RULING:

Iladan maintains that she was threatened and coerced by respondents to write the resignation
letter, to accept the financial assistance and to sign the waiver and settlement. Consequently, she
 P a g e | 34

insists that her act of resigning was involuntary. The Court is not convinced as we find no proof
of Iladan's allegations. It is a settled jurisprudence that it is incumbent upon an employee to
prove that his resignation is not voluntary. However, Iladan did not adduce any competent
evidence to prove that respondents used force and threat.
 P a g e | 35

EDNA MABUGAY-OTAMIAS, JEFFREN M. OTAMIAS AND MINOR JEMWEL M.

OTAMIAS, REPRESENTED BY THEIR MOTHER EDNA MABUGAY-
OTAMIAS, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY COL.
VIRGILIO O. DOMINGO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE COMMANDING OFFICER OF
THE PENSION AND GRATUITY MANAGEMENT CENTER (PGMC) OF THE
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
G.R. No. 189516 June 08, 2016

FACTS:

Petitioner Edna Mabugay-Otamias (Edna) and retired Colonel Francisco B. Otamias (Colonel
Otamias) were married on June 16, 1978 and had five (5) children. On September 2000, Edna
and Colonel Otamias separated due to his alleged infidelity. Their children remained with Edna.
On August 2002, Edna filed a Complaint-Affidavit against Colonel Otamias before the Provost
Marshall Division of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Edna demanded monthly support
equivalent to 75% of Colonel Otamias' retirement benefits. Colonel Otamias executed an
Affidavit. On February 26, 2003, Colonel Otamias executed a Deed of Assignment where he
waived 50% of his salary and pension benefits in favor of Edna and their children. The Deed of
Assignment was considered by the parties as a compromise agreement. Colonel Otamias retired
on April 1, 2003. The agreement was honored until January 6, 2006. Edna alleged that the
Armed Forces of the Philippines suddenly decided not to honor the agreement between Colonel
Otamias and his legitimate family.

In a letter dated April 3, 2006, the Armed Forces of the Philippines Pension and Gratuity
Management Center (AFP PGMC) informed Edna that a court order was required for the AFP
PGMC to recognize the Deed of Assignment.

In another letter dated April 17, 2006, the AFP PGMC reiterated that it could not act on Edna's
request to receive a portion of Colonel Otamias' pension "unless ordered by the appropriate
court.”

Heeding the advice of the AFP PGMC, Edna, on behalf of herself and Jeffren M. Otamias and
Jemwel M. Otamias (Edna, et al.), filed a case.

ISSUE:

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the AFP Finance Center cannot be directed to
automatically deduct the amount of support needed by the legitimate family of Colonel Otamias.

RULING:

Article 6 of the Civil Code provides:

Article 6. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public
policy, morals or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.
The concept of waiver has been defined by this Court as: a voluntary and intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known existing legal right, advantage, benefit, claim or
 P a g e | 36

privilege, which except for such waiver the party would have enjoyed; the voluntary
abandonment or surrender, by a capable person, of a right known by him to exist, with the intent
that such right shall be surrendered and such person forever deprived of its benefit; or such
conduct as warrants an inference of the relinquishment of such right; or the intentional doing of
an act inconsistent with claiming it.

In determining whether a statutory right can be waived, this Court is guided by the following
pronouncement: The doctrine of waiver extends to rights and privileges of any character, and,
since the word 'waiver' covers every conceivable right, it is the general rule that a person may
waive any matter which affects his property, and any alienable right or privilege of which he is
the owner or which belongs to him or to which he is legally entitled, whether secured by
contract, conferred with statute, or guaranteed by constitution, provided such rights and
privileges rest in the individual, are intended for his sole benefit, do not infringe on the rights of
others, and further provided the waiver of the right or privilege is not forbidden by law, and does
not contravene public policy; and the principle is recognized that everyone has a right to waive,
and agree to waive, the advantage of a law or rule made solely for the benefit and protection of
the individual in his private capacity, if it can be dispensed with and relinquished without
infringing on any public right, and without detriment to the community at large.

When Colonel Otamias executed the Deed of Assignment, he effectively waived his right to
claim that his retirement benefits are exempt from execution. The right to receive retirement
benefits belongs to Colonel Otamias. His decision to waive a portion of his retirement benefits
does not infringe on the right of third persons, but even protects the right of his family to receive
support.
 P a g e | 37

BERNARDINA P. BARTOLOME, v. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and SCANMAR

MARITIME SERVICES, INC.
G.R. No. 192531 November 12, 2014

FACTS:
               
John Colcol was employed as electrician by Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc. He was enrolled
under the government’s Employees’ Compensation Program (ECP). He died due to an accident
while on board the vessel. John was, at the time of his death, childless and unmarried. Thus,
petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome, John’s biological mother and, allegedly, sole
remaining beneficiary, filed a claim for death benefits. SSS denied the claim on the ground that
Bernardina was no longer considered as the parent of John since the latter was legally adopted by
Cornelio Colcol. As such, it is Cornelio who qualifies as John’s primary beneficiary, not
petitioner. According to the records, Cornelio died during John’s minority.

ISSUES:

a. Whether or not the death of the adopter during the adoptee’s minority results to the
restoration of the parental authority to the biological parents of the latter.
b. Whether or not Bernardina is considered as a legal beneficiary of John.
 
HELD:
 
Yes. The Court ruled that John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s death is a significant factor
in the case at bar. Under such circumstance, parental authority should be deemed to have
reverted in favor of the biological parents. Otherwise, taking into account our consistent ruling
that adoption is a personal relationship and that there are no collateral relatives by virtue
of adoption, who was then left to care for the minor adopted child if the adopter passed away?
The Court also applied by analogy,  insofar as the restoration of custody is concerned, the
provisions of law on rescission of adoption wherein if said petition is granted, the parental
authority of the adoptee’s biological parents shall be restored if the adoptee is still a minor or
incapacitated. The manner herein of terminating the adopter’s parental authority, unlike
the grounds for rescission, justifies the retention of vested rights and obligations between the
adopter and the adoptee, while the consequent restoration of parental authority in favor of the
biological parents, simultaneously, ensures that the adoptee, who is still a minor, is not left to
fend for himself at such a tender age. From the foregoing, it is apparent that the biological
parents retain their rights of succession to the estate of their child who was the subject
of adoption. While the benefits arising from the death of an SSS covered employee do not form
part of the estate of the adopted child, the pertinent provision on legal or intestate succession at
least reveals the policy on the rights of the biological parents and those by adoption vis-à-vis the
right to receive benefits from the adopted. In the same way that certain rights still attach by
virtue of the blood relation, so too should certain obligations, which, the Court ruled, include the
exercise of parental authority, in the event of the untimely passing of
their minor offspring’s adoptive parent.
Yes. The Court held that Cornelio’s adoption of John, without more, does not deprive petitioner
of the right to receive the benefits stemming from John’s death as a dependent parent given
 P a g e | 38

Cornelio’s untimely demise during John’s minority. Since the parent by adoption already died,
then the death benefits under the Employees’ Compensation Program shall accrue solely to
herein petitioner, John’s sole remaining beneficiary.
 P a g e | 39

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. PRIMETOWN PROPERTY GROUP,

INC.
G.R. No. 162155 August 28, 2007

FACTS:

On April 14, 1998 Primetown Property Group. Inc. filed its final adjusted return. On March 11,
1999 Gilbert Yap, vice chair of Primetown Property Group. Inc., filed for the refund or tax credit
of income tax paid in 1997. However, it was not acted upon. Thus Primetown filed a petition for
review but the Court of Tax Appeals dismissed it claiming that it was filed beyond the two-year
reglementary period provided by section 229 of the National Internal Revenue Code. The Court
of Tax Appeals further argued that in National Marketing Corp. v. Tecson the Supreme Court
ruled that a year is equal to 365 days regardless of whether it is a regular year or a leap year.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent‘s petition was filed within the two-year reglementary period.

RULING:

The Supreme Court held that the petition was filed within the two-year reglementary period
because Article 13 of the New Civil Code that provides that a year is composed of 365 years is
repealed by Executive Order 292 or the Administrative Code of the Philippines. Under Executive
Order 292, a year is composed of 12 calendar months.
 P a g e | 40

MAGKALAS v. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY

G.R. No. 138823 September 17, 2008

FACTS:

On March 26, 1978, PD No. 1315 was issued, expropriating certain lots at Bagong Barrio,
Caloocan City. The National Housing Authority (NHA) was named administrator of the Bagong
Barrio Urban Bliss Project. The decree also allowed NHA to take possession, control, and
disposition of the expropriated properties through demolition. During NHA’s survey, it
determined that petitioner Caridad Magkalas property was located in what would be classified as
an area center or open space. This is in compliance with the requirement of having 30% open
space in all types ofresidential development. The NHA even wrote a letter to Magkalas and two
others to explain why they had to leave their lots. The letter also contained the Notice of Lot
Assignment, saying that Magkalas was being assigned to Lot 77, Block 2, Barangay 132. But
even after losing the case in RTC, Magkalas did not dismantle her structure/home. Sometime in
March1994, she was directed to remove her structure in its present lot and transfer to Lot
77. A judicial order was no longer necessary pursuant to PD 1472. At this point, the two others
who appealed to NHA have already transferred to their allocated lots. Magkalas appealed on the
basis of social justice. She also questioned the implied repeal of PD 1472 and PD 1315.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Magkalas could use social justice as a basis to assert permanent residency

HELD:

No. Magkalas cannot use the argument of social justice in her case even if she has lived in her lot
for 40 years already. She argued that the Social Justice clause of the Constitution provided that a
“poor and unlettered urban dweller like her has a right to her property and to a decent living”.
The Constitution, however, provides that such should still be in accordance with law. The SC
also said, “Social justice…should be used only to correct an injustice.” As the eminent Justice
Jose P. Laurel observed, social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity
of interdependence among diverse units of society, and of the protection that should be equally
and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent
with the fundamental and paramount objective of the State of promoting the health, comfort, and
quiet of all persons, and of bringing about, the greatest good to the greatest number.

From a careful reading of the foregoing provisions, we hold that R.A. No. 7279 does not
necessarily repeal P.D. No. 1315 and P.D. No. 1472 as it does not contain any provision which
categorically and expressly repeals the provisions of P.D. No. 1315 and P.D. No. 1472. Neither
could there be an implied repeal. It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals by
implication are not favored. There is no irreconcilable conflict or repugnancy between Section 28
of R.A. No. 7279 and P.D. No. 1315 and No. 1472, rather, they can be read together and
harmonized to give effect to their provisions. It should be stressed that Section 28 of R.A. No.
7279 does not totally and absolutely prohibit eviction and demolition without a judicial order as
in fact it provides for exceptions. Pursuant to established doctrine, the three (3) statutes should be
 P a g e | 41

construed in light of the objective to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed by the
said laws, and they should be given such construction as will advance the object, suppress the
mischief, and secure the benefits intended. It is worthy to note that the three laws (P.D. No.
1315, P.D. No. 1472 and R.A. No. 7279) have a common objective ─ to address the housing
problems of the country by establishing a comprehensive urban development and housing
program for the homeless. For this reason, the need to harmonize these laws all the more
becomes imperative. 
 P a g e | 42

GARCIA v. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 165835 June 22, 2005

FACTS:

This is a petition filed by Clarita Garcia, wife of retired Major General Carlos F. Garcia, with
application for injunctive relief in order issued by the Fourth Division of Sandiganbayan denying
the motion to quash or dismiss Civil Case No. 0193. This is a suit for the forfeiture commenced
by the Republic against petitioner and her immediate family.

The forfeiture suit was to recover unlawfully acquired funds and properties that the Garcias
allegedly acquires and amassed. Then Republic then filed the Sandiganbayan through the OMB a
petition for forfeiture of those alleged unlawfully acquires properties of the Garcias. The case
was docketed as civil case 0193(forfeiture I) and subsequently another case of forfeiture
involving the same parties was filed docketed as Civil Case 0196(forfeiture II). Thus the two
cases were consolidated for convenience and clarity. Before the filing of Forfeiture II but
subsequent to the filing of Forfeiture I, the OMB charged the Garcias with violation of RA
7080(plunder) and the case raffled to the second division of SB. The plunder charge covered
substantially the same properties identified in both Forfeiture I and II.

Petitioner now contends, after denying there motion to dismiss the Forfeiture I case, that the
plunder case and the Forfeiture I case should be consolidated in the second division of SB
pursuan to R 8249. On May 20, 2005, the SB 4th Division denied the motion for the reason that
the forfeiture case is not the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising
from the criminal case of plunder.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over petitions for forfeiture under RA 1379.

RULING:

The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over forfeiture proceedings pursuant to RA 1379. Forfeiture
proceedings are actions in rem and civil in nature. It is a divestiture of property without
compensation in consequence of an offense.
 P a g e | 43

TING v. VELEZ-TING
G.R. No. 166562 March 31, 2009

FACTS:

On October 21, 1993, after being married for more than 18 years to petitioner and while their
youngest child was only two years old, Carmen filed a verified petition before the RTC of Cebu
City for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. She
claimed that Benjamin suffered from psychological incapacity even at the time of the celebration
of their marriage, which, however, only became manifest thereafter.

On January 9, 1998, the lower court rendered its decision declaring the marriage between
petitioner and respondent null and void. The RTC gave credence to Dr. Onate’s findings and the
admissions made by Benjamin in the course of his deposition, and found him to be
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.

On October 19, 2000, the petitioner appealed to the CA, reversing the trial court’s decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the requirement of proof of psychological incapacity
for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code has
been realized

RULING:

No. By the very nature of case involving the application of Article 36, it is logical and
understood to give weight to the expert opinions furnished by psychologists regarding the
psychological temperament of parties in order to determine the root cause, juridical antecedent,
gravity and incurability of the psychological incapacity. However, such opinions, while highly
advisable, are not conditions in granting petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. At best,
courts must treat such opinions as decisive but not indispensable evidence in determining the
merits of a given case. In fact, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding
of psychological incapacity, then actual medical or psychological examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to. The trial court, as in any other given case presented before it,
must always base its decision not solely on the expert opinions furnished by the parties but also
on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of the proceedings.

But where, as in this case, the parties had the full opportunity to present professional and expert
opinion of psychiatrists tracing the root cause, gravity and incurability of a party’s alleged
psychological incapacity, then such expert opinion should be presented and according, be
weighed by the court in deciding whether to grant a petition for nullity of marriage. The petition
for review on certiorari is granted.
 P a g e | 44

NEGROS NAVIGATION CO., INC v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 110398 November 7, 1997

FACTS:

In April of 1980, private respondent Ramon Miranda purchased from the Negros Navigation Co.,
Inc. four special cabin tickets (#74411, #74412, #74413 and #74414) for his wife, daughter, son
and niece who were going to Bacolod City to attend a family reunion. The tickets were for
Voyage No. 457-A of the M/V Don Juan, leaving Manila at 1:00 p.m. on April 22, 1980. The
ship sailed from the port of Manila on schedule.

At about 10:30 in the evening of April 22, 1980, the Don Juan collided off the Tablas Strait in
Mindoro, with the M/T Tacloban City, an oil tanker owned by the Philippine National Oil
Company (PNOC) and the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation (PNOC/STC). As a
result, the M/V Don Juan sank. Several of her passengers perished in the sea tragedy. The bodies
of some of the victims were found and brought to shore, but the four members of private
respondents’ families were never found.

Private respondents filed a complaint on July 16, 1980 in the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 34, against the Negros Navigation, the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC), and
the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation (PNOC/STC), seeking damages for the death of
Ardita de la Victoria Miranda, 48, Rosario V. Miranda, 19, Ramon V. Miranda, Jr., 16, and
Elfreda de la Victoria, 26. In its answer, petitioner admitted that private respondents purchased
ticket numbers 74411, 74412, 74413 and 74414; that the ticket numbers were listed in the
passenger manifest; and that the Don Juan left Pier 2, North Harbor, Manila on April 22, 1980
and sank that night after being rammed by the oil tanker M/T Tacloban City, and that, as a result
of the collision, some of the passengers of the M/V Don Juan died. Petitioner, however, denied
that the four relatives of private respondents actually boarded the vessel as shown by the fact that
their bodies were never recovered. Petitioner further averred that the Don Juan was seaworthy
and manned by a full and competent crew, and that the collision was entirely due to the fault of
the crew of the M/T Tacloban City.

On January 20, 1986, the PNOC and petitioner Negros Navigation Co., Inc. entered into a
compromise agreement whereby petitioner assumed full responsibility for the payment and
satisfaction of all claims arising out of or in connection with the collision and releasing the
PNOC and the PNOC/STC from any liability to it. The agreement was subsequently held by the
trial court to be binding upon petitioner, PNOC and PNOC/STC. Private respondents did not join
in the agreement.

ISSUES:

a. Whether the members of private respondents’ families were actually passengers of the
Don Juan;
b. Whether the ruling in Mecenas v. Court of Appeals, finding the crew members of
petitioner to be grossly negligent in the performance of their duties, is binding in this
case;
 P a g e | 45

c. Whether the total loss of the M/V Don Juan extinguished petitioner’s liability; and
d. Whether the damages awarded by the appellate court are excessive, unreasonable and
unwarranted.

RULING:

First. The trial court held that the fact that the victims were passengers of the M/V Don Juan was
sufficiently proven by private respondent Ramon Miranda, who testified that he purchased
tickets numbered 74411, 74412, 74413, and 74414 at P131.30 each from the Makati office of
petitioner for Voyage No. 47-A of the M/V Don Juan, which was leaving Manila on April 22,
1980. This was corroborated by the passenger manifest (Exh. E) On which the numbers of the
tickets and the names of Ardita Miranda and her children and Elfreda de la Victoria appear.

Second. In finding petitioner guilty of negligence and in failing to exercise the extraordinary
diligence required of it in the carriage of passengers, both the trial court and the appellate court
relied on the findings of this Court in Mecenas v. Intermediate Appellate Court, which case was
brought for the death of other passengers. In that case it was found that although the proximate
cause of the mishap was the negligence of the crew of the M/T Tacloban City, the crew of the
Don Juan was equally negligent as it found that the latter’s master, Capt. Rogelio Santisteban,
was playing mahjong at the time of collision, and the officer on watch, Senior Third Mate
Rogelio De Vera, admitted that he failed to call the attention of Santisteban to the imminent
danger facing them. This Court found that Capt. Santisteban and the crew of the M/V Don Juan
failed to take steps to prevent the collision or at least delay the sinking of the ship and supervise
the abandoning of the ship.

Third. The next issue is whether petitioner is liable to pay damages notwithstanding the total loss
of its ship. The issue is not one of first impression. The rule is well-entrenched in our
jurisprudence that a ship-owner may be held liable for injuries to passengers notwithstanding the
exclusively real and hypothetic nature of maritime law if fault can be attributed to the ship-
owner.

Fourth. Petitioner contends that, assuming that the Mecenas case applies, private respondents
should be allowed to claim only P43,857.14 each as moral damages because in the Mecenas
case, the amount of P307,500.00 was awarded to the seven children of the Mecenas couple.
Under petitioner’s formula, Ramon Miranda should receive P43, 857.14, while the De la Victoria
spouses should receive P97, 714.28.
 P a g e | 46

BELGICA v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OCHOA

G.R. No. 208566 November 29, 2013

FACTS:

This case is consolidated with G.R. No. 208493 and G.R. No. 209251. The so-called pork barrel
system has been around in the Philippines since about 1922. Pork Barrel is commonly known as
the lump-sum, discretionary funds of the members of the Congress. It underwent several legal
designations from “Congressional Pork Barrel” to the latest “Priority Development Assistance
Fund” or PDAF. The allocation for the pork barrel is integrated in the annual General
Appropriations Act (GAA). Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in the
following manner:
a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house; broken down to – P40 million for
“hard projects” (infrastructure projects like roads, buildings, schools, etc.), and P30
million for “soft projects” (scholarship grants, medical assistance, livelihood programs,
IT development, etc.);
b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to – P100 million for hard projects, P100
million for soft projects;
c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to – P100 million for hard projects,
P100 million for soft projects.
The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of funds whereby certain cabinet
members may request for the realignment of funds into their department provided that the
request for realignment is approved or concurred by the legislator concerned.

Presidential Pork Barrel

The president does have his own source of fund albeit not included in the GAA. The so-called
presidential pork barrel comes from two sources: (a) the  Malampaya Funds, from the
Malampaya Gas Project – this has been around since 1976, and (b) the Presidential Social Fund
which is derived from the earnings of PAGCOR – this has been around since about 1983.

Pork Barrel Scam Controversy

Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by allegations of corruption. In July 2013,
six whistle blowers, headed by Benhur Luy, exposed that for the last decade, the corruption in
the pork barrel system had been facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles had been helping
lawmakers in funneling their pork barrel funds into about 20 bogus NGO’s (non-government
organizations) which would make it appear that government funds are being used in legit
existing projects but are in fact going to “ghost” projects. An audit was then conducted by the
Commission on Audit and the results thereof concurred with the exposes of Luy et al. Motivated
by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others, filed various petitions before the Supreme
Court questioning the constitutionality of the pork barrel system.

ISSUES:
a. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is constitutional.
b. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is constitutional.
 P a g e | 47

RULING:

I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional because it

violates the following principles:

a. Separation of Powers
As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the release of funds (power of the
purse). The executive, on the other hand, implements the laws – this includes the GAA to which
the PDAF is a part of. Only the executive may implement the law but under the pork barrel
system, what’s happening was that, after the GAA, itself a law, was enacted, the legislators
themselves dictate as to which projects their PDAF funds should be allocated to – a clear act of
implementing the law they enacted – a violation of the principle of separation of powers. This is
also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the PDAF, the executive will still have to get the
concurrence of the legislator concerned.

b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power

As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in Congress alone. (The Constitution does
grant the people legislative power but only insofar as the processes of referendum and initiative
are concerned). That being, legislative power cannot be delegated by Congress for it cannot
delegate further that which was delegated to it by the Constitution.
Exceptions to the rule are:
(i) delegated legislative power to local government units but this shall involve purely
local matters;
(ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry
out a declared national policy in times of war or other national emergency, or fix within
specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose,
tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or
imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government.
In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual legislator to identify the projects to
which his PDAF money should go to is a violation of the rule on non-delegability of legislative
power. The power to appropriate funds is solely lodged in Congress (in the two houses
comprising it) collectively and not lodged in the individual members. Further, nowhere in the
exceptions does it state that the Congress can delegate the power to the individual member of
Congress.

c. Principle of Checks and Balances

One feature in the principle of checks and balances is the power of the president to veto items in
the GAA which he may deem to be inappropriate. But this power is already being undermined
because of the fact that once the GAA is approved, the legislator can now identify the project to
which he will appropriate his PDAF. Under such system, how can the president veto the
appropriation made by the legislator if the appropriation is made after the approval of the GAA –
again, “Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting which effectively renders the
constitutionally-given power of the President useless.”

d. Local Autonomy
 P a g e | 48

As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage their local affairs. Through their
Local Development Councils (LDCs), the LGUs can develop their own programs and policies
concerning their localities. But with the PDAF, particularly on the part of the members of the
house of representatives, what’s happening is that a congressman can either bypass or duplicate a
project by the LDC and later on claim it as his own. This is an instance where the national
government (note, a congressman is a national officer) meddles with the affairs of the local
government – and this is contrary to the State policy embodied in the Constitution on local
autonomy. It’s good if that’s all that is happening under the pork barrel system but worse, the
PDAF becomes more of a personal fund on the part of legislators.

II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid.

The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the presidential pork barrel is that it is
unconstitutional because it violates Section 29 (1), Article VI of the Constitution which provides:
No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by
law. Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork comes from the earnings of the
Malampaya and PAGCOR and not from any appropriation from a particular legislation. The
Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which created the Malampaya Fund, as well as
PD 1869 (as amended by PD 1993), which amended PAGCOR’s charter, provided for the
appropriation, to wit:
(i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among others, collected from certain
energy-related ventures shall form part of a special fund (the Malampaya Fund) which
shall be used to further finance energy resource development and for other purposes
which the President may direct;
(ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a part of PAGCOR’s earnings
shall be allocated to a General Fund (the Presidential Social Fund) which shall be used in
government infrastructure projects.
These are sufficient laws which met the requirement of Section 29, Article VI of the
Constitution. The appropriation contemplated therein does not have to be a particular
appropriation as it can be a general appropriation as in the case of PD 910 and PD 1869.
 P a g e | 49

FULGENCIO v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION

G.R. No. 141600 September 12, 2003

FACTS:

Petitioners failed to indicate in their petition with the CA the dates showing when they received
notice of the NLRC’s June 16, 1998 decision, and the date when they filed a motion for
reconsideration therefrom, in violation of Section 3, Rule 46 of the Revised Rules of Court, as
amended. Petitioners also failed to include in their petition the required explanation under
Section 11, Rule 13 of the same Rules as to why personal service upon the respondents was not
resorted to; hence, the dismissal thereof by the CA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not strict adherence to technicalities in the application of the provisions of the Rules
of Court impede the cause of justice.

RULING:

Rules of procedure applied in a very rigid, technical sense override substantial justice. It is a far
better and more prudent course of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse the parties a
review of the case on appeal to attain the ends of justice rather than dispose of the case on
technicality and cause a grave injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of speedy
disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage of justice.
 P a g e | 50

VILLANUEVA v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 142947 March 19, 2002

FACTS:

In April 1988, Orly married Lilia before a trial court judge in Puerto Princesa. In November
1992, Orly filed to annul the marriage. He claimed that threats of violence and duress forced him
to marry Lilia. He said that he had been receiving phone calls threatening him and that Lilia even
hired the service of a certain Ka Celso, a member of the NPA, to threaten him. Orly also said he
was defrauded by Lilia by claiming that she was pregnant hence he married her but he now raises
that he never impregnated Lilia prior to the marriage. Lilia on the other hand denied Orly’s
allegations and she said that Orly freely cohabited with her after the marriage and she showed 14
letters that shows Orly’s affection and care towards her.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is duress and fraud attendant in the case at bar.

RULING:

The SC ruled that Orly’s allegation of fraud and intimidation is untenable. On its face, it is
obvious that Orly is only seeking to annul his marriage with Lilia so as to have the pending
appealed bigamy case to be dismissed. On the merits of the case, Orly’s allegation of fear was
not concretely established. He was not able to prove that there was a reasonable and well-
grounded reason for fear to be created in his mind by the alleged intimidation being done against
him by Lilia and her party. Orly is a security guard who is well abreast with self-defense and that
the threat he so described done against him is not sufficient enough to vitiate him from freely
marrying Lilia. Fraud cannot be raised as a ground as well. His allegation that he never had an
erection during their sexual intercourse is incredible and is an outright lie. Also, there is a
prolonged inaction on the part of Orly to attack the marriage. It took him 4 and half years to file
an action which brings merit to Lilia’s contention that Orly freely cohabited with her after the
marriage.
 P a g e | 51

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 146486 March 4, 2005

FACTS:

The enumeration in the Constitution of the impeachable officers is exclusive. The Ombudsman is
only one man, not including his Deputies. Thus, only the Ombudsman, not his deputies, is
impeachable.

On 29 December 1999, twenty- two officials and employees of the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for the Visayas, led by its two directors, filed a complaint with the Office of the
Ombudsman requesting an investigation on the basis of allegations that then Deputy
Ombudsman for the Visayas, herein private respondent Arturo Mojica, committed (1) sexual
harassment against Rayvi Padua- Varona, mulcting money from confidential employees: James
Alueta and Eden Kiamco and (3) oppression against all employees in not releasing P7,200.00 in
benefits of OMB- Visayas employees on the date the said amount was due for release. Fact-
finding investigation was conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman and the report was referred
by the Ombudsman to a constituted Committee of Peers which initially recommended that the
investigation be converted into one solely for purposes of impeachment. However, this
recommendation was denied by the Office of the Ombudsman and following the stand of the
Office of the Ombudsman that the Deputy Ombudsmen and The Special Prosecutor are not
removable through impeachment. On 18 December 2000, despite the expiration of private
respondent Mojica's term of office, the Court of Appeals nevertheless rendered the assailed
Decision on the grounds of public interest. CA ruled that the Deputy Ombudsman is an
impeachable officer. Thus, OMB's appeal.

ISSUES:
a. Whether or not the Ombudsman’s Deputies are impeachable.
b. Whether or not the Deputy Ombudsman may be held criminally and/or administratively
liable.

RULING:

Order of the CA is reversed and set aside. The complaints in Criminal Case No.OMB-0-00-0616
and Administrative Case No. OMB -ADM-0-00- 0316 is reinstated and the Office of the
Ombudsman is ordered to proceed with the investigation relative to the above cases. The Deputy
Ombudsman is not an impeachable officer. Sec. 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution states that
“The President, the Vice- President, the members of the Supreme Court, the members of the
Constitutional Commissions and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment
for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and
corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees
may be removed from Office as provided by law, but not by impeachment”.

Records of the Constitutional Commission, as well as the opinions of leading commentators in

Constitutional Law reveal that the term Ombudsman in Sec. 2, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution refer to the rank in itself. The Ombudsman is only one man, not including his
 P a g e | 52

Deputies. Leading legal luminaries on the Constitution are one in their opinion as to whether or
not the Deputy Ombudsman is impeachable. All of them agree that the enumeration impeachable
officers in Section 2, Article XI of the 1986 Constitution, are exclusive. In their belief, only the
Ombudsman, not his deputies, is impeachable. Thus, where the issue involved was not raised nor
presented to the court and not passed upon by the court in the previous case, the decision in the
previous case is not stare decisis of the question presented.

Criminal and administrative liability of Deputy Ombudsman as to whether or not the private
respondent, then Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, may be held criminally and/or
administratively liable, we likewise resolve the issue in favor of the petitioner. The rule that an
impeachable officer cannot be criminally prosecuted for the same offenses which constitute
grounds for impeachment presupposes his continuance in office. Hence, the moment he is no
longer in office because of his removal, resignation, or permanent disability, there can be no bar
to his criminal prosecution in the courts. Nor does retirement bar an administrative investigation
from proceeding against the private respondent, given that, as pointed out by the petitioner, the
former’s retirement benefits have been placed on hold in view of the provisions of Sections 12
and 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
 P a g e | 53

AYALA CORPORATION v. ROSA-DIANA REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATION
G.R. No. 134284 December 1, 2000

FACTS:

Petitioner Ayala Corporation was the registered owner of a parcel of land located in Alfaro
Street, Salcedo Village, Makati City. On April 20, 1976, Ayala sold the lot to Manuel Sy
married to Vilma Po and Sy Ka Kieng married to Rosa Chan. The Deed of Sale executed
between Ayala and the buyers contained Special Conditions of Sale and Deed Restrictions.
Among the Special Conditions of Sale were: a) the vendees shall build on the lot and submit the
building plans to the vendor before September 30, 1976 for the latter’s approval b) the
construction of the building shall start on or before March 30, 1977 and completed before 1979.
Before such completion, neither the deed of sale shall be registered nor the title released even if
the purchase price shall have been fully paid and c) there shall be no resale of the property.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the deed of restriction can be enforced by Ayala Corporation.

RULING:

Contractual obligations between parties have the force of law between them and absent any
allegation that the same are contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public
policy, they must be complied with in good faith. The party guilty of violating the deed of
restrictions may only be held alternatively liable for substitute performance of its obligation,
that is, for the payment of damages.
 P a g e | 54

PEOPLE v. VENERACION
G.R. No. 119987-88 October 12, 1995

FACTS:

On August 2, 1994, four accused were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape with
homicide of a seven year old girl in the RTC presided by Judge Lorenzo P. Veneracion.
Respondent judge however, refused to impose the corresponding penalty of death and he rather
imposed reclusion perpetua to each of the accused. The city prosecutor filed a motion for
reconsideration praying that the penalty of death be imposed upon the four accused. The
respondent judge refused to act.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent judge can impose penalty lower than that prescribed by law.

RULING:

The Supreme Court mandates that after an adjudication of guilt, the judge should impose the
proper penalty provided for by the law on the accused regardless of his own religious or moral
beliefs. In this case the respondent judge must impose the death penalty. This is consistent in the
rule laid down in the Civil Code Article 9 that no judge or court shall decline to render judgment
by reason of the silence, obscurity, or insufficiency of the laws.
 P a g e | 55

YAO KEE v. SY GONZALES

G.R. No. L-55960 November 24, 1988

FACTS:

Sy Kiat, a Chinese national, died on January 17, 1977 leaving behind properties here in the
Philippines. Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales et al filed a petition for the grant of letters of
administration alleging that they are the children of the deceased with Asuncion Gillego. The
petition was opposed by Yao Kee et al alleging that Yao Kee is the lawful wife of the deceased
whom he married in China. The trial court rendered decision in favor of the opposition. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision, modifying the decision declaring the marriage
of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee as not has been proven valid in accordance with the laws of China. Hence,
both parties moved for reconsideration to which the Supreme Court granted.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the marriage of Yao Kee and Sy Kiat is valid in accordance with Philippine laws.

RULING:

Well-established in this jurisdiction is the principle that Philippine courts cannot take judicial
notice of foreign laws. They must be alleged and proven as any other fact. To establish the
validity of marriage, the existence of foreign law as a question of fact and the alleged marriage
must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. For failure to prove the foreign law or custom
and consequently of the marriage, the marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat in China cannot be
recognized in the jurisdiction of Philippine courts.
 P a g e | 56

URSUA v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 112170 April 10, 1996

FACTS:

Petitioner Cesario Ursua was convicted for violation of Sec. 1 of CA No. 142, as amended by
RA 6085 otherwise known as “An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases” by the RTC of Davao
City which was affirmed by the CA. Allegedly petitioner when asked by his counsel to take his
letter of request to the Office of the Ombudsman because his law firm’s messenger Oscar Perez
had personal matters to attend to, instead of writing his name wrote the name “Oscar Perez”
when he was requested to sign. However, Loida Kahulugan who gave him the copy of complaint
was able to know through Josefa Amparo that petitioner is not Oscar Perez. Loida reported the
matter to the Deputy Ombudsman who recommended that petitioner be accordingly charged.
Petitioner comes for review of his conviction to the SC as he reasserts his innocence.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner Cesario Ursua should be acquitted on the ground that he was charged
under the wrong law.

RULING:

The SC held that petitioner be acquitted of the crime charged. Time and again the SC has
decreed that the statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to be achieved and the
evil sought to be remedied. Thus in construing a statute the reason for its enactment should be
kept in mind and the statute should be construed with reference to the intended scope and
purpose. The court may consider the spirit and reason of the statute, where a literal meaning
would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the law
makers.
 P a g e | 57

ASAALI v. COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS

G.R. No. L-24170 December 16, 1968
FACTS:

At noontime of September 10, 1950, five sailing vessels, from Borneo toward the ports of Tawi-
tawi and Sulu, were spotted and intercepted in high seas by the Custom Patrol Team. The said
patrol team aboard Boat ST-23 found out that the five vessels contained 181 cases of “Herald”
cigarettes, 9 cases of “Camel” cigarettes, and some rattan chairs. The sailing vessels were all
Philippine registered, owned and manned by Filipino residents from Sulu. Petitioners, however,
possessed no permit from the Commissioner of Customs so that they can engage in
the importation of the goods they carry (as required by Section 1363 [a] of the Revised
Administrative Code). Also, the goods the petitioners carry were not covered by RA 426 or the
Import Control Law. The Custom Patrol Team then seized the goods even if they were in the
high seas. Petitioners claim that the interception and seizure of the items were illegal because
they were intercepted outside the territory of the Philippines. Also, the petitioners contend that
they could not have been engaged to the importation of the above-mentioned items to incur the
forfeiture under Section 1363 of the Revised Administrative Code. The Court of
Tax Appeals held that Section 1363 should be applied because all the vessels were all headed to
Tawi-tawi. No import license and permit were carried violating RA 426. Their course, that is—
they are about to enter the Philippine territory, announced loudly that they were about to import
these items in the Philippines.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the interception and seizure by custom officials on the high seas is valid on the
contention that the seizure was affected outside our territorial waters.

RULING:

The SC held that it is a settled doctrine of International Law that a state has the right to protect
itself and its revenues, a right not limited to its own territory but extending to the high seas. The
Revised Penal Code leaves no doubt as to its application and enforceability not only within the
Philippines, its interior waters and maritime zone but also outside of its jurisdiction while on
Philippine ship.
 P a g e | 58

LLORENTE v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 124371 November 23, 2000

FACTS:

Petitioner Paula Llorente was married to a US Navy enlisted serviceman Lorenzo Llorente, in
Nabua, Camarines Sur, on February 22, 1937. Before the outbreak of war, Lorenzo departed for
the US and Paula stayed in the conjugal home in Nabua. Lorenzo became an American citizen on
November 30, 1943. Upon the liberation of the Philippines (1945), Lorenzo was granted by the
US Navy to visit his wife in the Philippines and found out that Paula was living in with
Lorenzo’s brother Ceferino. In December 1945, Paula gave birth to Crisologo with the birth
certificate saying that the child was illegitimate, and the father’s name was left blank.

On February 2, 1946, Paula and Lorenzo had a written agreement, dissolving their marital union,
suspending his support upon her, and waiving his authority to file a case of adultery against her.
Lorenzo returned to the US and filed for a divorce in 1951 which was granted in 1952.On
January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia Fortuno, in the Philippines; after which, they bore
three children: Raul, Luz, and Beverly. In 1981, Lorenzo executed a will, bequeathing all his
property to Alicia and three children. Before the proceeding could be terminated, Lorenzo died in
1985.

On Sept. 4, 1985, Paula filed with the RTC of Iriga a petition for letters of administration over
Lorenzo’s estate, contending that she was Lorenzo’s surviving spouse.In 1987, the RTC granted
her petition, stating that Lorenzo’s divorce decree was void and inapplicable in the Philippines
and therefore his marriage to Alicia was void. The RTC entitled Paula to one-half of their
conjugal properties, and one- third of the estate – the two-thirds would be divided equally among
the illegitimate children. Paula was appointed as legal administrator of the estate.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Paula Llorente was entitled to inherit from the estate of Lorenzo Llorente.

RULING:

Since Lorenzo was an American citizen, issues arising from the case are governed by foreign
law. The CA and RTC called to the for the renvoi doctrine, where the case was referred back to
the law of the decedent’s domicile, in this case, the Philippine law. Most US laws follow the
domiciliary theory. Thus, the Philippine law applies when determining the validity of Lorenzo’s
will. The case was remanded to the RTC for the ruling on the intrinsic validity of the will of the
deceased.
 P a g e | 59

VAN DORN v. ROMILLO

G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985

FACTS:

Alice Reyes Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines who married Richard Upton, a citizen of the
United States in Hongkong. After 10 years of marriage and two children, they got divorced in
Nevada, United States of America, where the petitioner subsequently married Theodore Van
Dorn. One year after, Richard Upton filed a civil case with the Regional Trial Court Branch 115
in Pasay City praying to for the accounting of the business, the Galleon Shop, and to be given the
right to manage the business, on the ground that the business is conjugal property. He further
contends that the divorce is not valid and binding in the Philippines, as it is contrary to local law
and public policy, therefore he has legal standing to claim said property. On her part, the
petitioner filed for dismissal of the civil case contending that the private respondent is estopped
from laying claim on the alleged conjugal property because in the divorce proceedings, by which
the alien spouse is bound, the private respondent agreed that they had no community property.
The RTC denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that the property is located in the
Philippines so the divorce decree has no bearing in the case. Hence, this petition for certiorari
and prohibition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the alien spouse, divorced from the Filipina spouse, has legal standing on the
alleged conjugal assets, in the Philippines?

RULING:

No. Generally, divorce is not recognized in the Philippines as it is against morals, good customs
and public policy. However, aliens may obtain divorce abroad, which the Philippines may
recognize, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in
Nevada, USA is valid, thus, in the spirit of comity, it is recognized as also valid in the
Philippines. Hence, the private respondent, as he is bound by the decision of his own country's
Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate,
he has no legal standing in the Philippine court as husband of the petitioner as the divorce legally
dissolved their marriage. He is further estopped by his own representation before the foreign
Court in the divorce proceedings, from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. To
maintain the petitioner to still be legally obligated to the divorced husband is a discrimination
against her in her own country. Hence, it is only just that the petition be granted. The civil case
against petitioner with the RTC was dismissed.
 P a g e | 60

BANK OF AMERICA, NT AND SA v. AMERICAN REALTY CORPORATION

G.R. No. 133876 December 29, 1999

FACTS:

Petitioner Bank of America NT & SA (BANTSA) is an international banking and financing

institution duly licensed to do business in the Philippines. As borne by the records, BANTSA
and BAIL on several occasions granted three major multi-million United States (US) Dollar
loans to the following corporate borrowers: (1) Liberian Transport Navigation, S.A.; (2) El
Challenger S.A. and (3) Eshley Compania Naviera S.A., all of which are existing under and by
virtue of the laws of the Republic of Panama and are foreign affiliates of private.

As security, the latter mortgaged a property located in the Philippines owned by herein
respondent ARC. ARC is a third party mortgagor executed two real estate mortgages, dated 17
February 1983 and 20 July 1984, over its parcels of land including improvements thereon,
located at Barrio Sto. Cristo, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan, and which are covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title Nos. T-78759, T-78760, T-78761, T-78762 and T-78763.

The debtors failed to pay. Thus, petitioner filed collection suits in foreign courts to enforce the
loan. Subsequently, it filed a petition in the Sheriff to extra-judicially foreclose the said
mortgage, which was granted.

On 12 February 1993, private respondent filed before the Pasig RTC, Branch 159, an action for
damages against the petitioner, for the latter’s act of foreclosing extra-judicially the real estate
mortgages despite the pendency of civil suits before foreign courts for the collection of the
principal loan.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner’s act of filing a collection suit against the principal debtors for the
recovery of the loan before foreign courts constituted a waiver of the remedy of foreclosure.

Ruling:

Yes. In the absence of express statutory provisions, a mortgage creditor may institute against the
mortgage debtor either a personal action or debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage. In
other words, he may pursue either of the two remedies, but not both. By such election, his cause
of action can by no means be impaired, for each of the two remedies is complete in itself. In the
instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter were properly pleaded and
proved in said foreign law would still not find applicability. Thus, when the foreign law,
judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established public policy of the forum, the said
foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.

Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have
for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by
 P a g e | 61

laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign

country. The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded in
our jurisdiction proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of action.

Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable
injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important function
of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental
principles of Conflict of Laws. Clearly then, English Law is not applicable.
 P a g e | 62

MICIANO v. BRIMO
G.R. No. L-22595 November 1, 1927

FACTS:

Joseph G. Brimo, a citizen of Turkey, died and left a partition of the estate. Juan Miciano, the
judicial administrator of the estate left filed a scheme of partition. However, Andre Brimo, one of
the brothers of the deceased, opposed it. Brimo’s opposition is based on the fact that the partition
in question puts into effect the provisions of Joseph Brimo’s will which are not in accordance
with the laws of his Turkish nationality, for which reason they are void as being in violation of
Article 10 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the national law of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary disposition.

RULING:

Joseph Brimo, a Turkish citizen, though he declared in his will that Philippine laws must govern
the disposition of his estate; however, it must not prejudice the heir or legatee of the testator.
Therefore, the testator’s national law must govern in accordance with Article 10 of the Civil
Code.Though the last part of the second clause of the will expressly said that “it be made and
disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine Island”, this condition,
described as impossible conditions, shall be considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice
the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise provide.
Impossible conditions are further defined as those contrary to law or good morals. Thus, national
law of the testator shall govern in his testamentary dispositions.

The Court approved the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator, in such
manner as to include Andre Brimo, as one of the legatees.
 P a g e | 63

AZNAR v. GARCIA
G.R. No. L-16749 January 31, 1963

FACTS:

Edward Christensen was born in New York but he migrated to California where he resided for a
period of 9 years. In 1913, he came to the Philippines where he became a domiciliary until his
death. In his will, he instituted an acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen
(legitimate), as his only heir, but left a legacy sum of money in favor of Helen Christensen
Garcia (illegitimate). Counsel for Helen claims that under Article 16, paragraph 2 of the Civil
Code, California law should be applied; that under California law, the matter is referred back to
the law of the domicile. On the other hand, counsel for Maria, averred that the national law of the
deceased must apply, illegitimate children not being entitled to anything under California law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the national law of the deceased should be applied in determining the
successional rights of his heirs.

RULING:

The Supreme Court deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen said in effect that there
are two rules in California on the matter; the internal law which applies to Californians
domiciled in California and the conflict rule for Californians domiciled outside of California.
Christensen being domiciled in the Philippines, the law of his domicile must be followed. The
case was remanded to the lower court for further proceedings – the determination of the
successional rights under Philippine law only.
 P a g e | 64

BELLIS v. BELLIS
G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967

FACTS:

Amos Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas, and of the United States. By his first wife whom
he divorced he had five legitimate children, by his second wife, who survived him, he had three
legitimate children, and three illegitimate children. Before he died, he made two wills, one
disposing of his Texas properties and the other disposing his Philippine properties. In both wills,
his illegitimate children were not given anything. The illegitimate children opposed the will on
the ground that they have been deprived of their legitimates to which they should be entitled, if
Philippine law were to be applied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the national law of the deceased should determine the successional rights of the
illegitimate children.

RULING:

The Supreme Court held that the said children are not entitled to their legitimes under the Texas
Law, being the national law of the deceased, there are no legitimes.The parties admit that the
decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of
Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the
provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law,
the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.

Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the
decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of
succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of
the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed.

Intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the
amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever
may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be
found.

.
 P a g e | 65

PHILIPPINE EXPORT AND FOREIGN LOAN GUARANTEE CORPORATION v. V.P.

EUSEBIO CONSTRUCTION, INC.
G.R. No. 140047 July 13, 2004

FACTS:

The State Organization of Buildings (SOB), Ministry of Housing and Construction, Baghdad,
Iraq awarded the construction of the Institute of Physical Therapy-Medical Rehabilitation Center
in Iraq to Ayjal Trading and Contracting Company for a total contract price of about $18M.
Spouses Santos, in behalf of 3-Plex International, Inc., a local contractor engaged in construction
business, entered into a joint venture agreement with Ayjal wherein the former undertook the
execution of the entire a project, while the latter would be entitled to a commission of 4%. 3-Plex
not accredited by the Philippine Overseas Construction Board (POCB) assigned and transferred
all its rights and interests to VPECI. The SOB required the contractors to submit a performance
bond representing 5% of the total contract price, an advance payment bond representing 10% of
the advance payment to be released upon signing of the contract. To comply with these
requirements 3-Plex and VPECI applied for a guarantee with Philguarantee, a government
financial institution empowered to issue guarantees for qualified Filipino contractors. But what
SOB required was a guarantee from the Rafidain Bank of Baghdad so Rafidain Bank issued a
performance bond in favor of SOB on the condition that another foreign bank (not Phil
Guarantee) would issue the counter-guarantee. Hence, Al Ahli Bank of Kuwait was chosen to
provide the counter guarantee. Afterwards, SOB and the joint venture of VPECI and Ayjal
executed the service contract. Under the contract, the joint venture would supply manpower and
materials, SOB would refund 25% of the project cost in Iraqi Dinar and 75% in US dollars at an
exchange rate of 1 Dinar to $3.37. The project was not completed. Upon seeing the impossibility
of meeting the deadline, the joint venture worked for the renewal or extension (12x) of the
performance bond up to December 1986. In October 1986, Al Ahli Bank sent a telex call
demanding full payment of its performance bond counter-guarantee. Upon receipt, VPECI
requested Iraq Trade and Economic Development Minister Fadhi Hussein to recall the telex for
being in contravention of its mutual agreement that the penalty will be held in abeyance until
completion of the project. It also wrote SOB protesting the telex since the Iraqi government lacks
foreign exchange to pay VPECI and the non-compliance with the 75% billings in US dollars.
Philguarantee received another telex from Al Ahli stating that it already paid to Rafidain Bank.
The Central Bank authorized the remittance to Al Ahli Bank representing the full payment of the
performance counter-guarantee for VPECI's project in Iraq. Philguarantee sent letters to
respondents demanding the full payment of the surety bond. Respondents failed to pay so
petitioner filed a civil case for collection of sum of money. The trial Court dismissed the case.
Philguarantee had no valid cause of action against the respondents. The joint venture incurred no
delay in the execution of the project considering that SOB's violations of the contract rendered
impossible the performance of its undertaking. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.

ISSUE:

What law should be applied in determining whether the respondent contractor has defaulted in
the performance of its obligations under the service contract?
 P a g e | 66

RULING:

No conflicts rule on essential validity of contracts is expressly provided for in our laws. The rule
followed by most legal systems, however, is that the intrinsic validity of a contract must be
governed by the lex contractus or “proper law of the contract.” Lex contractus may either be the
law voluntarily agreed upon by the parties (the lex loci voluntatis-expressly provided) or the law
intended by them either expressly or implicitly (the lex loci intentionis-impliedly). The law
selected may be implied from such factors as substantial connection with the transaction, or the
nationality or domicile of the parties. Philippine courts would do well to adopt the first and most
basic rule in most legal systems, namely, to allow the parties to select the law applicable to their
contract, subject to the limitation that it is not against the law, morals, or public policy of the
forum and that the chosen law must bear a substantive relationship to the transaction. They failed
to prove the Iraq law, then applying the processual presumption. The laws of Iraq bear
substantial connection to the transaction, since one of the parties is the Iraqi Government and the
place of performance is in Iraq. Hence, the issue of whether respondent VPECI defaulted in its
obligations may be determined by the laws of Iraq. However, since that foreign law was not
properly pleaded or proved, the presumption of identity or similarity, otherwise known as the
processual presumption, comes into play. Where foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is
not proved, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as ours. No demand from the SOB;
even if there was a demand, there was an extension.

The trial court and the Court of Appeals were in unison that the respondent contractor cannot be
considered to have defaulted in its obligations because the cause of the delay was not primarily
attributable to it. The delay or the non -completion of the Project was caused by factors not
imputable to the respondent contractor.   It was rather due mainly to the persistent violations by
SOB of the terms and conditions of the contract, particularly its failure to pay 75% of the
accomplished work in US Dollars.  Indeed, where one of the parties to a contract does not
perform in a proper manner the prestation which he is bound to perform under the contract, he is
not entitled to demand the performance of the other party.  A party does not incur in delay if the
other party fails to perform the obligation incumbent upon him.
 P a g e | 67

INDUSTRIAL PERSONNEL AND MANAGEMENT SERVICES INC (IPAMS) v. DE

VERA
G.R. No. 205703 March 27. 2016

FACTS:

Petitioner Industrial Personnel & Management Services, Inc. (IPAMS) is a local placement
agency duly organized and existing under Philippine laws. Arriola was then hired by SNC-
Lavalin, through its local manning agency, IPAMS, and his overseas employment contract was
processed with the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA).  In a letter of
understanding, dated June 5, 2008, SNC-Lavalin confirmed Arriola's assignment in the
Ambatovy Project. According to Arriola, he signed the contract of employment in the
Philippines. On June 9, 2008, Arriola started working in Madagascar. After three months, Arriola
received a notice of pre-termination of employment, dated September 9, 2009, from SNC-
Lavalin. It stated that his employment would be pre-terminated effective September 11, 2009 due
to diminishing workload in the area of his expertise and the unavailability of alternative
assignments. Consequently, on September 15, 2009, Arriola was repatriated. SNC-Lavalin
deposited in Arriola's bank account his pay amounting to Two Thousand Six Hundred Thirty Six
Dollars and Eight Centavos (CA$2,636.80), based on Canadian labor law. Aggrieved, Arriola
filed a complaint against the petitioners for illegal dismissal and non-payment of overtime pay,
vacation leave and sick leave pay before the Labor Arbiter (LA).

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent Arriola was validly dismissed pursuant to the employment contract
and when should an overseas labor contract be governed by a foreign law?

RULING:

The general rule is that Philippine laws apply even to overseas employment contracts. This rule
is rooted in the constitutional provision of Section 3, Article XIII that the State shall afford full
protection to labor, whether local or overseas. Hence, even if the OFW has his employment
abroad, it does not strip him of his rights to security of tenure, humane conditions of work and a
living wage under our Constitution.

As an exception, the parties may agree that a foreign law shall govern the employment contract.
A synthesis of the existing laws and jurisprudence reveals that this exception is subject to the
following requisites:
1. That it is expressly stipulated in the overseas employment contract that a specific foreign
law shall govern;
2. That the foreign law invoked must be proven before the courts pursuant to the Philippine
rules on evidence;
3. That the foreign law stipulated in the overseas employment contract must not be contrary
to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy of the Philippines; and
4. That the overseas employment contract must be processed through the POEA.
 P a g e | 68

The Court is of the view that these four (4) requisites must be complied with before the employer
could invoke the applicability of a foreign law to an overseas employment contract. With these
requisites, the State would be able to abide by its constitutional obligation to ensure that the
rights and well-being of our OFWs are fully protected. These conditions would also invigorate
the policy under R.A. No. 8042 that the State shall, at all times, uphold the dignity of its citizens
whether in country or overseas, in general, and the Filipino migrant workers, in particular.
Further, these strict terms are pursuant to the jurisprudential doctrine that "parties may not
contract away applicable provisions of law especially peremptory provisions dealing with
matters heavily impressed with public interest," such as laws relating to labor. At the same time,
foreign employers are not at all helpless to apply their own laws to overseas employment
contracts provided that they faithfully comply with these requisites. Lacking any one of the four
requisites would invalidate the application of the foreign law, and the Philippine law shall govern
the overseas employment contract.

The petitioners failed to comply with the first requisite because no foreign law was expressly
stipulated in the overseas employment contract with Arriola. In its pleadings, the petitioners did
not directly cite any specific provision or stipulation in the said labor contract which indicated
the applicability of the Canadian labor laws or the ESA. They failed to show on the face of the
contract that a foreign law was agreed upon by the parties. Rather, they simply asserted that the
terms and conditions of Arriola's employment were embodied in the Expatriate Policy,
Ambatovy Project - Site, Long Term. Then, they emphasized provision 8.20 therein, regarding
interpretation of the contract, which provides that said policy would be governed and construed
with the laws of the country where the applicable SNC-Lavalin, Inc. office was located. Because
of this provision, the petitioners insisted that the laws of Canada, not of Madagascar or the
Philippines, should apply. Then, they finally referred to the ESA. Further, it was shown that the
overseas labor contract was executed by Arriola at his residence in Batangas and it was
processed at the POEA on May 26, 2008. Considering that no foreign law was specified in the
contract and the same was executed in the Philippines, the doctrine of lex loci
celebrationis applies and the Philippine laws shall govern the overseas employment of Arriola.
 P a g e | 69

GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 81262 August 25, 1989

FACTS:

Restituto Tobias, a purchasing agent and administrative assistant to the engineering operations
manager, discovered fictitious purchases and other fraudulent transactions, which caused Globe
Mackay Cable and Radio Corp loss of several thousands of pesos. He reported it to his
immediate superior Eduardo T. Ferraren and to the Executive Vice President and General
Manager Herbert Hendry. A day after the report, Hendry told Tobias that he was number one
suspect and ordered him one week forced leave. When Tobias returned to work after said leave,
Hendry called him a “crook” and a “swindler”, ordered him to take a lie detector test, and to
submit specimen of his handwriting, signature and initials for police investigation. Moreover,
petitioners hired a private investigator. Private investigation was still incomplete; the lie detector
tests yielded negative results; reports from Manila police investigators and from the Metro
Manila Police Chief Document Examiner are in favor of Tobias. Petitioners filed with the
Fiscal’s Office of Manila a total of six (6) criminal cases against private respondent Tobias, but
were dismissed.

Tobias received a notice of termination of his employment from petitioners in January 1973,
effective December 1972. He sought employment with the Republic Telephone Company
(RETELCO); but Hendry wrote a letter to RETELCO stating that Tobias was dismissed by
Globe Mackay due to dishonesty. Tobias, then, filed a civil case for damages anchored on
alleged unlawful, malicious, oppressive, and abusive acts of petitioners. The Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch IX, through Judge Manuel T. Reyes rendered judgment in favor of
private respondent, ordering petitioners to pay him eighty thousand pesos (P80,000.00) as actual
damages, two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) as moral damages, twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00) as exemplary damages, thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as attorney’s fees, and
costs; hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioners are liable for damages to private respondent.

RULING:

Yes. The Court, after examining the record and considering certain significant circumstances,
finds that all petitioners have indeed abused the right that they invoke, causing damage to private
respondent and for which the latter must now be indemnified: when Hendry told Tobias to just
confess or else the company would file a hundred more cases against him until he landed in jail;
Hendry’s scornful remarks about Filipinos (“You Filipinos cannot be trusted.”) as well as against
Tobias (“crook”, and “swindler”); the writing of a letter to RETELCO stating that Tobias was
dismissed by Globe Mackay due to dishonesty; and the filing of six criminal cases by petitioners
against private respondent. All these reveal that petitioners are motivated by malicious and
unlawful intent to harass, oppress, and cause damage to private respondent. The imputation of
 P a g e | 70

guilt without basis and the pattern of harassment during the investigations of Tobias transgress
the standards of human conduct set forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code.

The Court has already ruled that the right of the employer to dismiss an employee should not be
confused with the manner in which the right is exercised and the effects flowing therefrom. If the
dismissal is done abusively, then the employer is liable for damages to the employee. Under the
circumstances of the instant case, the petitioners clearly failed to exercise in a legitimate manner
their right to dismiss Tobias, giving the latter the right to recover damages under Article 19 in
relation to Article 21 of the Civil Code.
 P a g e | 71

UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST v. JADER

G.R. No. 132344 February 17, 2000

Facts:

Romeo Jader graduated at UE College of law from 1984-19988. During his last year, 1st
semester, he failed to take the regular final examination in Practical Court 1where he was given
an incomplete grade remarks. He filed an application for removal of the incomplete grade given
by Prof. Carlos Ortega on February 1, 1988 which was approved by Dean Celedonio Tiongson
after the payment of required fees. He took the exam on March 28, 1988 and on May 30, 1988
the professor gave him a grade of 5.The commencement exercise of UE College of law was held
April 16, 1988, 3PM. In the invitation, his name appeared. In preparation for the bar exam, he
took a leave of absence from work from April 20- Sept 30, 1988. He had his pre-bar class review
in FEU. Upon learning of such deficiency, he dropped his review classes and was not able to
take the bar exam. Jader sued UE for damages resulting to moral shock, mental anguish, and
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, and sleepless nights when he was not
able to take the 1988 bar examinations due to UE’s negligence.

Issue:

Whether UE should be held liable for misleading a student into believing JADER satisfied all the
requirements for graduation when such is not the case. Can he claim moral damages?

Ruling:

Supreme Court held that petitioner was guilty of negligence and this liable to respondent for the
latter’s actual damages. Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the students of their
academic status and not wait for the latter to inquire from the former. However, respondent
should not have been awarded moral damages though JADER suffered shock, trauma, and pain
when he was informed that he could not graduate and will not be allowed to take the bar
examinations as what Court of Appeals held because it’s also respondent’s duty to verify for
himself whether he has completed all necessary requirements to be eligible for the bar
examinations. As a senior law student, he should have been responsible in ensuring that all his
affairs specifically those in relation with his academic achievement are in order. Before taking
the bar examinations, it doesn’t only entail a mental preparation on the subjects but there are
other prerequisites such as documentation and submission of requirements which prospective
examinee must meet. Wherefore, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed with
modification. Petitioner is ordered to pay respondent the sum of Thirty-five Thousand Four
Hundred Seventy Pesos (P35,470.00), with legal interest of 6% per annum computed from the
date of filing of the complaint until fully paid; the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00)
as attorney's fees; and the costs of the suit. The award of moral damages is deleted.
 P a g e | 72

GF EQUITY, INC. v. VALENZONA

G.R. No. 156841 June 30, 2005

Facts:

GF Equity, represented by its Chief Financial Officer, W. Steven Uytengsu, hired Valenzona as
head coach of the Alaska basketball team in the PBA under a contract of employment. He was
tasked to coach at all practices and games scheduled for the Alaska team, coach exhibition
games, coach if invited to participate in any all-star game, attending every event conducted, play-
off games, etc.

He was also tasked to comply with all requirements respecting to the conduct of its team and
players, to implement. He also agreed to report from time to time as fixed by the corporation in
good physical condition, give his best services, loyalty, to be neatly and fully attired in public
and to conduct himself on and off the court according to the highest standards of honesty,
morality, fair play and sportsmanship, and not to do anything detrimental to the best interest of
the corporation.

He also agreed to endorse the corporation’s products in commercial advertising, promotions, will
allow himself to be taken pictures with others for still photographs, motion pictures or TV. For
his services, he will be paid P35, 000.00 monthly, net of taxes, provide him with a service
vehicle and gasoline allowance. The contract was for two (2) years starting January 1, 1988 to
December 31, 1989, with the condition that if at any time during the contract, the coach fails to
exhibit sufficient skill or competitive ability to coach the team, the contract can be terminated by
the corporation. (Paragraph 3)

Before signing the contract, Valenzona consulted his lawyer who pointed out that the contract
was one-sided, but still, Valenzona acceded to the terms of the contract as he had trust and
confidence in Uytengsu who recommended him to GF Equity.

Alaska placed third both in the open and all-Filipino PBA Conference in 1988, he was advised of
the termination of his services by way of a letter dated September 26, 1988, invoking their right
as specified in paragraph 3 of the contract and to return the service vehicle no later than
September 30, 1984. He will still be paid the balance of P75, 868.38 for his services. Six (6)
years after or on July 30, 1994, Valenzona’s counsel demanded from GF Equity payment of
compensation arising from the arbitrary and unilateral termination of his employment. But GF
Equity refused the claim. Valenzona filed before the RTC of Manila a complaint for breach of
contract with damages, ascribing bad faith, malice and disregard to fairness and to the rights of
the plaintiff by unilaterally and arbitrarily pre-terminating the contract without just cause and
legal and factual basis. He prayed award for damages, moral damages, exemplary damages,
attorney’s fees and cost of the suit. He challenged the condition in paragraph 3 as lacking the
elements of mutuality of a contract, a clear transgression of Art. 1308 of the NCC and reliance
thereon did not warrant his unjustified and arbitrary dismissal.

GF Equity maintained that it merely exercised its right under the contract to pre-terminate
Valenzona due to incompetence, and that he was guilty of laches, in any event, complaint should
 P a g e | 73

be instituted before a labor arbiter. The trial court dismissed the complaint on June 28, 1997 and
it declared Valenzona as fully aware of the bargain. The CA reversed the RTC’s decision and
ordered GF Equity to pay him damages. The CA concluded that GF Equity abused its right by
arbitrarily terminating Valenzona’s employment, finding Valenzona’s claim for damages as
valid. The court ordered GF Equity to pay compensatory damages, moral damages, exemplary
damages and attorney’s fees. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not, the CA concluded wrongly from established facts in a manner violative of
applicable laws and established jurisprudence.

Ruling:

GF Equity argued that it entered into a contract protected by law, as it was not contract to law,
morals, good customs public policy or public order, hence, no bad faith. Valenzona is guilty of
laches for his unexplained inaction of six (6) years.

In the case at bar, paragraph 3 gives GF Equity the unbridled prerogative to pre-terminate the
contract irrespective of the soundness, fairness, or reasonableness, or even lack of bass of its
opinion. To validate the paragraph would open the gate for arbitrary and illegal dismissals, for
void contractual stipulations would be used as justification therefor.

Laches applies to equity, prescription applies to law. The claims was filed within the statutory
period of prescription, doctrine of laches cannot be applied. The action was filed for breach of
contract, way well within the prescriptive period of ten (10) years, considering he filed the action
six (6) years from the date of his cause of action.

Valenzona is entitled to recover actual damages, however, award for moral damages, exemplary
damages, must be set aside, as there is no showing that GF Equity acted in a wanton, fraudulent,
reckless, oppressive manner. Attorney’s fees are awarded because GF Equity refused to pay the
balance of Valenzona’s salaries therefore to protect himself, was compelled to litigate.
 P a g e | 74

HEIRS OF NALA v. CABANSAG

G.R. No. 161188 June 13, 2008

FACTS:

Respondent Artemio Cabansag filed a case for damages in October 1991. According to
respondent, he bought a 50-square meter property from spouses Eugenio Gomez, Jr. and Felisa
Duyan Gomez on July 23, 1990. Said property is part of a 400-square meter lot registered in the
name of the Gomez spouses. In October 1991, he received a demand letter from Atty. Alexander
del Prad, in behalf of Purisima Nala, asking for the payment of rentals from 1987 to 1991 until
he leaves the premises, as said property is owned by Nala, failing which criminal and civil
actions will be filed against him. Another demand letter was sent on May 14, 1991. Because of
such demands, respondent suffered damages and was constrained to file the case against Nala
and Atty. Del Prado.

Atty. Del Prado claimed that he sent the demand letters in good faith and that he was merely
acting in behalf of his client, Nala, who disputed respondent's claim of ownership. Nala alleged
that said property is part of an 800-square meter property owned by her late husband, Eulogio
Duyan, which was subsequently divided into two parts. The 400-square meter property was
conveyed to spouses Gomez in a fictitious deed of sale, with the agreement that it will be merely
held by them in trust for the Duyan's children. Said property is covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 281115 in the name of spouses Gomez. Nala also claimed that respondent is
only renting the property which he occupies.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners are liable for damages.

RULING:

Article 19 of the Civil code states that, “Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in
the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and
good faith.” The foregoing provision sets the standards which may be observed not only in the
exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties. When a right is exercised in a
manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to
another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible.
But a right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may
nevertheless become the source of some illegality. A person should be protected only when he
acts in the legitimate exercise of his right; that is, when he acts with prudence and in good faith,
but not when he acts with negligence or abuse. There is an abuse of right when it is exercised
only for the purpose of prejudicing or injuring another. The exercise of a right must be in
accordance with the purpose for which it was established, and must not be excessive or unduly
harsh; there must be no intention to injure another. In order to be liable for damages under the
abuse of rights principle, the following requisites must concur: (a) the existence of a legal right
or duty; (b) which is exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring
another.
 P a g e | 75

In the case, there is nothing on record which will prove that Nala and her counsel, Atty. Del
Prado, acted in bad faith or malice in sending the demand letters to respondent. In the first place,
there was ground for Nala's actions since she believed that the property was owned by her
husband Eulogio Duyan and that respondent was illegally occupying the same. She had no
knowledge that spouses Gomez violated the trust imposed on them by Eulogio and
surreptitiously sold a portion of the property to respondent. It was only after respondent filed the
case for damages against Nala that she learned of such sale. The bare fact that respondent claims
ownership over the property does not give rise to the conclusion that the sending of the demand
letters by Nala was done in bad faith. Absent any evidence presented by respondent, bad faith or
malice could not be attributed to petitioner since Nala was only trying to protect their interests
over the property. Moreover, respondent failed to show that Nala and Atty. Del Prado's acts were
done with the sole intention of prejudicing and injuring him. It may be true that respondent
suffered mental anguish, serious anxiety and sleepless nights when he received the demand
letters; however, there is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the legal
invasion of a legal right while damage is the hurt, loss or harm which results from the injury.
Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not
the result of a violation of a legal duty. In such cases, the consequences must be borne by the
injured person alone; the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does
not amount to a legal injury or wrong. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria.
Nala was acting well within her rights when she instructed Atty. Del Prado to send the demand
letters. She had to take all the necessary legal steps to enforce her legal/equitable rights over the
property occupied by respondent. One who makes use of his own legal right does no injury.
Thus, whatever damages are suffered by respondent should be borne solely by him.
 P a g e | 76

GO v. CORDERO
G.R. No. 164703 May 4, 2010

FACTS:

Sometime in 1996, Mortimer F. Cordero, Vice-President of Pamana Marketing Corporation

(Pamana), ventured into the business of marketing inter-island passenger vessels. After
contacting various overseas fast ferry manufacturers from all over the world, he came to meet
Tony Robinson, an Australian national based in Brisbane, Australia, who is the Managing
Director of Aluminium Fast Ferries Australia (AFFA).

After negotiations with Felipe Landicho and Vincent Tecson, lawyers of Allan C. Go who is the
owner/operator of ACG Express Liner of Cebu City, a single proprietorship; Cordero was able to
close a deal for the purchase of two (2) SEACAT 25 as evidenced by the Memorandum of
Agreement dated August 7, 1997. Accordingly, the parties executed Shipbuilding Contract No.
7825 for one (1) high- speed catamaran (SEACAT 25) for the price of US$1,465,512.00. Per
agreement between Robinson and Cordero, the latter shall receive commissions totaling
US$328,742.00, or 22.43% of the purchase price, from the sale of each vessel.

However, Cordero later discovered that Go was dealing directly with Robinson when he was
informed by Dennis Padua of Wartsila Philippines that Go was canvassing for a second
catamaran engine from their company which provided the ship engine for the first SEACAT 25.
Padua told Cordero that Go instructed him to fax the requested quotation of the second engine to
the Park Royal Hotel in Brisbane where Go was then staying. Cordero tried to contact Go and
Landicho to confirm the matter but they were nowhere to be found, while Robinson refused to
answer his calls. Cordero immediately flew to Brisbane to clarify matters with Robinson, only to
find out that Go and Landicho were already there in Brisbane negotiating for the sale of the
second SEACAT 25. Despite repeated follow-up calls, no explanation was given by Robinson,
Go, Landicho and Tecson who even made Cordero believe there would be no further sale
between AFFA and ACG Express Liner.

On August 21, 1998, Cordero instituted Civil Case No. 98-35332 seeking to hold Robinson, Go,
Tecson and Landicho liable jointly and solidarily for conniving and conspiring together in
violating his exclusive distributorship in bad faith and wanton disregard of his rights, thus
depriving him of his due commissions. Robinson filed a motion to dismiss grounded on lack of
jurisdiction over his person and failure to state a cause of action, asserting that there was no act
committed in violation of the distributorship agreement. Said motion was denied by the trial
court on December 20, 1999. Robinson was likewise declared in default for failure to file his
answer within the period granted by the trial court. As for Go and Tecson, their motion to
dismiss based on failure to state a cause of action was likewise denied by the trial court on
February 26, 1999. Subsequently, they filed their Answer denying that they have anything to do
with the termination by AFFA of Cordero’s authority as exclusive distributor in the Philippines.
On the contrary, they averred it was Cordero who stopped communicating with Go in connection
with the purchase of the first vessel from AFFA and was not doing his part in making progress
status reports and airing the client’s grievances to his principal, AFFA, such that Go engaged the
services of Landicho to fly to Australia and attend to the documents needed for shipment of the
 P a g e | 77

vessel to the Philippines. In any case, Cordero no longer had cause of action for his commission
for the sale of the second vessel under the memorandum of agreement dated August 7, 1997
considering the termination of his authority by AFFA’s lawyers on June 26, 1998.

On May 31, 2000, the trial court rendered its judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against
defendants Allan C. Go, Tony Robinson, Felipe Landicho, and Vincent Tecson. On January 29,
2001, the CA rendered judgment granting the petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 60354
and setting aside the trial court’s orders of execution pending appeal.The case before the
Supreme Court is a consolidation of the petitions for review under Rule 45 separately filed by Go
(G.R. No. 164703) and Cordero (G.R. No. 164747).

ISSUES:

a. Whether petitioner Cordero has the legal personality to sue the respondents for breach of
contract; and
b. Whether the respondents may be held liable for damages to Cordero for his unpaid
commissions and termination of his exclusive distributorship appointment by the
principal, AFFA.

RULING:

While it is true that a third person cannot possibly be sued for breach of contract because only
parties can breach contractual provisions, a contracting party may sue a third person not for
breach but for inducing another to commit such breach. The elements of tort interference are: (1)
existence of a valid contract; (2) knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence of a
contract; and (3) interference of the third person is without legal justification.

The presence of the first and second elements is not disputed. Through the letters issued by
Robinson attesting that Cordero is the exclusive distributor of AFFA in the Philippines,
respondents were clearly aware of the contract between Cordero and AFFA represented by
Robinson. In fact, evidence on record showed that respondents initially dealt with and
recognized Cordero as such exclusive dealer of AFFA high-speed catamaran vessels in the
Philippines. In that capacity as exclusive distributor, petitioner Go entered into the Memorandum
of Agreement and Shipbuilding Contract No. 7825 with Cordero in behalf of AFFA.

The rule is that the defendant found guilty of interference with contractual relations cannot be
held liable for more than the amount for which the party who was inducted to break the contract
can be held liable. Respondents Go, Landicho and Tecson were therefore correctly held liable for
the balance of petitioner Cordero’s commission from the sale of the first SEACAT 25, in the
amount of US$31,522.09 or its peso equivalent, which AFFA/Robinson did not pay in violation
of the exclusive distributorship agreement, with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from June
24, 1998 until the same is fully paid. Respondents having acted in bad faith, moral damages may
be recovered under Article 2219 of the Civil Code.
 P a g e | 78

VILLANUEVA v. ROSQUETA
G.R. No. 180764 January 19, 2010

FACTS:

Respondent Emma M. Rosqueta (Rosqueta), formerly Deputy Commissioner of the Revenue

Collection and Monitoring Group of the Bureau of Customs (the Bureau), tendered her courtesy
resignation from that post on January 23, 2001, shortly after President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
assumed office. But five months later on June 5, 2001, she withdrew her resignation, claiming
that she enjoyed security of tenure and that she had resigned against her will on orders of her
superior.

Meantime, on July 13, 2001 President Arroyo appointed Gil Valera (Valera) to respondent
Rosqueta’s position. Challenging such appointment, Rosqueta filed a petition for prohibition,
quo warranto, and injunction against petitioner Titus B. Villanueva (Villanueva), then
Commissioner of Customs, the Secretary of Finance, and Valera with the Regional Trial Court.
Petitioner Villanueva, Valera, and the Secretary of Finance challenged the injunction order
before the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 66070. On September 14, 2001 the CA issued
its own TRO, enjoining the implementation of the RTC’s injunction order. But the TRO lapsed
after 60 days and the CA eventually dismissed the petition before it.

But the RTC dismissed respondent Rosqueta’s complaint, stating that petitioner Villanueva
committed no wrong and incurred no omission that entitled her to damages. The RTC found that
Villanueva had validly and legally replaced her as Deputy Commissioner seven months before
the Bureau’s centennial anniversary. But the CA reversed the RTC’s decision, holding instead
that petitioner Villanueva’s refusal to comply with the preliminary injunction order issued in the
quo warranto case earned for Rosqueta the right to recover moral damages from him.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in holding petitioner Villanueva liable in damages to respondent
Rosqueta for ignoring the preliminary injunction order that the RTC issued in the quo warranto
case (Civil Case 01-101539), thus denying her of the right to do her job as Deputy Commissioner
of the Bureau and to be officially recognized as such public officer.

RULING:

Under the abuse of right principle found in Article 19 of the Civil Code, a person must, in the
exercise of his legal right or duty, act in good faith. He would be liable if he instead acts in bad
faith, with intent to prejudice another. Complementing this principle are Articles 20 and 21 of the
Civil Code which grant the latter indemnity for the injury he suffers because of such abuse of
right or duty.

But petitioner Villanueva cannot seek shelter in the alleged advice that the OSG gave him.
Surely, a government official of his rank must know that a preliminary injunction order issued by
a court of law had to be obeyed, especially since the question of Valera’s right to replace
 P a g e | 79

respondent Rosqueta had not yet been properly resolved. That petitioner Villanueva ignored the
injunction shows bad faith and intent to spite Rosqueta who remained in the eyes of the law the
Deputy Commissioner.
 P a g e | 80

ARDIENTE v. PASTORFIDE
G.R. No. 161921 July 17, 2013

FACTS:

Ma. Theresa Pastorfide entered a MOA with Joyce Ardiente where the latter sold, conveyed, and
transferred all their rights and interests in the Emily Homes Housing unit to the former. It has
been agreed by the parties that the water bill will remain in the account of Ardiente. On March
12, 1999, Ma. Theresa's water supply was disconnected without notice. She complained to the
Cagayan De Oro Water District (COWD) and she found out that the account has become
delinquent. She paid the three months due and wrote a letter through her counsel to the COWD
to explain why her water supply was cut without notice. The general manager of the COWD,
Gaspar Gonzalez, replied that it was Joyce Ardiente who requested the disconnection of the
water supply. A complaint for damages was filed against Ardiente, COWD and Gonzalez by Ma.
Theresa. The RTC ruled in favor of Ma. Theresa on the ground that the defendants committed
abuse of their rights. The ruling was upheld by the CA on appeal with modification on the award
of the amount for damages. Hence the petition before the SC.

ISSUE:

Are the defendants liable for damages?

RULING:

Yes. The court ruled that the principle of abuse of rights under Section 19 of the Civil Code was
violated. It provides that "every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance
of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith." A
right, although it is legal for being recognized by law as such, may nevertheless become the
source of illegality, when it is exercised in a manner that does not conform with the norms
enshrined in Article 19 and the same causes damage to another. The person exercising an abuse
of right is thus liable for damages caused to another. The herein petitioner is liable for damages
by ordering the cutting of the water supply of the respondent without giving notice about such
intention. The COWD and Gonzalez are likewise liable for damages by disconnecting the water
supply without prior notice and for their subsequent neglect of reconnecting the water supply
even when the respondent already paid the delinquent account. 
 P a g e | 81

PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK v. GOMEZ

G.R. No. 199601 November 23, 2015

FACTS:

Josephine D. Gomez (Josephine) was a teller at the Domestic Airport Branch of the PCIB when a
certain Colin R. Harrington opened an account with said branch in January 1985. The following
day, Harrington presented two (2) genuine bank drafts. The PCIB, on the other hand, alleged that
it was a certain Sophia La'O, as a representative of Harrington, who presented the bank drafts for
deposit. Upon receipt of the bank drafts, Josephine asked her immediate supervisor, Eleanor
Flores, whether the drafts payable to "Servants C/C.R. Harrington" were acceptable for deposit
to the savings account of Harrington. When Flores answered in the affirmative, and after
receiving from the bank's foreign exchange supervision a Philippine Currency conversion of the
amounts reflected in the drafts, Josephine received the deposit slip. Thereafter, the deposits were
duly entered in Harrington's savings account. On two (2) separate dates, a certain individual
representing himself as Harrington withdrew the sums of P45, 000.00 and P5,600.00.
Subsequently, the bank discovered that the person who made the withdrawals was an impostor.
Thus, the bank had to pay Harrington P50, 600.00 representing the amounts of the bank drafts in
his name. On November 14, 1985, the PCIB deducted the amount of P-423.38 from Josephine's
salary. Josephine wrote the PCIB to ask why the deduction was made. After due investigation on
the matter, the PCIB issued another memorandum finding Josephine grossly negligent and liable
for performing acts in violation of established operating procedures. The memorandum required
Josephine to pay the amount of P50, 600.00 through deductions in her salary, allowance,
bonuses, and profit sharing until the amount is fully paid. Josephine filed a complaint for
damages with prayer for preliminary injunction before the RTC of Makati City. She claimed that
the PCIB had abused its right by gradually deducting from her salary the amount the bank had to
pay Harrington.

ISSUE:

Whether or not PCIB is liable for damages.

RULING:

Yes. Article 19 of the Civil Code provides that every person in the exercise of his rights and in
the performance of his duties must act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty
and good faith. The principle embodied in this provision is more commonly known as the "abuse
of right principle." The legal sanctions for violations of this fundamental principle are found in
Articles 20 and 21 of the Civil Code. Both the RTC and the CA found the acts of the PCIB were
in clear violation of Article 19 of the Civil Code and held the PCIB liable for damages. While the
PCIB has a right to penalize employees for acts of negligence, the right must not be exercised
unjustly and illegally. In the instant case, the PCIB made deductions on Josephine's salary even if
the investigation was still pending. Belatedly, the PCIB issued a memorandum finding Josephine
grossly negligent and requiring her to pay the amount which the bank erroneously paid to
Harrington's impostor. When Josephine asked for legal and factual basis for the finding of
negligence, the PCIB refused to give any. Moreover, the PCIB continued to make deductions on
 P a g e | 82

Josephine's salary, allowances, and bonuses. The trial court and the CA also noted that while
Josephine was penalized, other employees of the bank involved in the subject transactions were
not. It was Josephine who was made solely responsible for the loss without giving any basis
therefor. It was emphasized that the subject deposit could not have been received by the bank
and entered in Harrington's savings account without the participation of the other bank
employees. The PCIB could have exercised prudence before taking oppressive actions against
Josephine.
 P a g e | 83

CUSTODIO v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 116100 February 9, 1996

FACTS:

Respondents owned a parcel of land wherein a two-door apartment was erected. Said property
was surrounded by other immovables owned by petitioners, spouses Custodio and spouses
Santos. As an access to P. Burgos Street from the subject property, there are two possible
passageways. The first passageway is approximately one meter wide and is about 20 meters
distant from Mabasa’s residence to P. Burgos Street. Such path is passing in between the
previously mentioned row of houses. The second passageway is about 3 meters in width and
length from plaintiff Mabasa’s residence to P. Burgos Street; it is about 26 meters. In passing
thru said passageway, a less than a meter wide path through the septic tank and with 5-6 meters
in length, has to be traversed. Petitioners constructed an adobe fence in the first passageway
making it narrower in width. Said adobe fence was first constructed by defendants Santoses
along their property which is also along the first passageway. Defendant Morato constructed her
adobe fence and even extended said fence in such a way that the entire passageway was
enclosed. As a result, the tenants left the apartment because there was no longer a permanent
access to the public street. Respondents then filed an action for the grant of an easement of right
of way. The trial court ordered the petitioner to give respondents a permanent access to the
public street and that in turn, the respondent will pay a sum of Php 8,000.00 to the petitioner as
an indemnity for the permanent use of the passageway. On appeal by the respondent to the CA,
the decision of the trial court was affirmed, such that a right of way and an award of actual,
moral and exemplary damages were given to the respondents. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the award of damages is proper?

RULING:

No. To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action for a legal wrong
inflicted by the defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without
damage, or damage without wrong, does not constitute a cause of action, since damages are
merely part of the remedy allowed for the injury caused by a breach or wrong. There is a
material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right;
damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury, and damages are the recompense
or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in
those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. These
situations are often called damnum absque injuria. In order that a plaintiff may maintain an
action for the injuries of which he complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a
breach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff. There must be a concurrence of injury
to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it.
 P a g e | 84

In the instant case, although there was damage, there was no legal injury. Contrary to the claim
of respondents, petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of abuse of right. In
order that the principle of abuse of right provided in Article 21 of the Civil Code can be applied,
it is essential that the following requisites concur: (1) The defendant should have acted in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy; (2) The acts should be willful;
and (3) There was damage or injury to the plaintiff. The act of petitioners in constructing a fence
within their lot is a valid exercise of their right as owners, hence not contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy. The law recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and dispose of a
thing, without other limitations than those established by law. It is within the right of petitioners,
as owners, to enclose and fence their property. Article 430 of the Civil Code provides that
“(e)very owner may enclose or fence his land or tenements by means of walls, ditches, live or
dead hedges, or by any other means without detriment to servitudes constituted thereon.”

At the time of the construction of the fence, the lot was not subject to any servitudes. There was
no easement of way existing in favor of private respondents, either by law or by contract. The
fact that respondents had no existing right over the said passageway is confirmed by the very
decision of the trial court granting a compulsory right of way in their favor after payment of just
compensation. It was only that decision which gave private respondents the right to use the said
passageway after payment of the compensation and imposed a corresponding duty on petitioners
not to interfere in the exercise of said right. The proper exercise of a lawful right cannot
constitute a legal wrong for which an action will lie, although the act may result in damage to
another, for no legal right has been invaded. One may use any lawful means to accomplish a
lawful purpose and though the means adopted may cause damage to another, no cause of action
arises in the latter’s favor. An injury or damage occasioned thereby is damnum absque injuria.
The courts can give no redress for hardship to an individual resulting from action reasonably
calculated to achieve a lawful means.
 P a g e | 85

EQUITABLE BANKING CORPORATION v. CALDERON

G.R. No. 156168 December 14, 2004

FACTS:

Jose T. Calderon is a businessman engaged in several business activities here and abroad, either
in his capacity as president or Chairman of the Board thereon. He is also a stockholder of PLDT
and a member of Manila Polo Club, among others. He is a seasoned traveller, who travels at least
seven times a year in the U.S., Europe, and Asia. On the other hand, Equitable Banking
Corporation is one of the leading commercial banking institutions in the Philippines, engaged in
commercial banking. Sometime in September 1984, Calderon applied and was issued an
Equitable International Visa card. The said Visa card can be used for both peso and dollar
transactions within and outside the Philippines. The credit limit for the peso transaction is
twenty thousand pesos; while in the dollar transactions, Calderon is required to maintain a dollar
account with a minimum deposit of $3,000, the balance of dollar account shall serve as the credit
limit. In April 1986, Calderon together with some reputable business friends and associates went
to Hong Kong for business pleasure trips. Specifically on April 30, 1986, Calderon accompanied
by his friend, Ed De Leon went to Gucci Department Store located at the basement of the
Peninsula Hotel HongKong. There and then, Calderon purchased several Gucci items. The cost
of his total purchase amounted to HK$4,030.00, he used his Visa card to effect payment on the
credit. He then presented and gave his credit card to the saleslady who promptly referred it to the
store cashier for verification. Shortly thereafter, the saleslady, informed him that his Visa card
was blacklisted. Calder sought the reconfirmation of the status of his Visa card from the
saleslady, but the latter simply did not honor it and even threatened to cut it into pieces with a
pair of scissors. Deeply embarrassed and humiliated, Calderon paid cash for the purchases.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Calderon can be indemnify with damages.

HELD:

Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss or harm which results from the
injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered.
Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not
the result of a violation of a legal duty. In such cases, the consequences must be borne by the
injured person alone, the law affords no remedy for the damages resulting from an act which
does not amount to a legal injury. In other words, in order that a plaintiff may maintain an action
for damages, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty with the
defendant owed to the plaintiff- a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility
by the person causing it.
 P a g e | 86

THE ORCHARD GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB V. YU

G.R. No. 191033 January 11, 2016

FACTS:

On May 28, 2000, a Sunday, respondents Ernesto Yu and Manuel Yuhico went to the Orchard
Golf & Country Club to play a round of golf with another member of the club. At the last
minute, however, that other member informed them that he could not play with them. Due to the
"no twosome" policy of the Orchard contained in the membership handbook prohibiting groups
of less than three players from teeing off on weekends and public holidays before 1:00 p.m.,
respondents requested management to look for another player to join them. Because Orchard
were unable to find their third player, respondent Yu tried to convince Francis Montallana,
Orchard’s assistant golf director, to allow them to play twosome, even if they had to tee off from
hole no. 10 of the Palmer golf course. Montallana refused, stating that the flights which started
from the first nine holes might be disrupted. Respondent Yu then shouted invectives at
Montallana, at which point he told respondent Yuhico that they should just tee off anyway,
regardless of what management's reaction would be. Respondents then teed off, without
permission from Montallana. They were thus able to play, although they did so without securing
a tee time control slip before teeing off, again in disregard of a rule in the handbook. As a result
of respondents’ actions, Montallana filed a report on the same day with the board of directors
(the board). In separate letters dated May 31, 2000, the board, through petitioner Clemente,
requested respondents to submit their written comments on Montallana’s incident report dated
May 28, 2000. The report was submitted for the consideration of the board. Subsequently, on
June 29, 2000, the board resolved to suspend [respondents] from July 16 to October 15, 2000,
and served notice thereof on them. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent is entitled for damages.

HELD:

Way different from the trial court’s findings, there is, therefore, no factual and legal basis to
grant moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs of suit in favor of respondents.
The damages suffered, if there are any; partake of the nature of a damnum absque injuria. In
order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he complains, he must
establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the
plaintiff – a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing
it. The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was
injured in contemplation of law. Thus, there must first be the breach of some duty and the
imposition of liability for that breach before damages may be awarded; it is not sufficient to state
that there should be tort liability merely because the plaintiff suffered some pain and suffering.
 P a g e | 87

ELIZABETH L. DIAZ v. GEORGINA R. ENCANTO

G.R. No. 171303 January 20, 2016

FACTS:

Plaintiff-appellant Elizabeth L. Diaz has been in the service of [he University of the Philippines
(U.P.) since 1963. In 1987, she was an associate professor in the College of Mass
Communication (CMC). During the second semester for Academic Year (AY) 1987-1988, she
was a full time member of the faculty and taught 12 units on full load. After 2 to 3 weeks of
teaching, she applied for sick leave effective November 23, 1987 until March 1, 1988. She
returned on March 2, 1988 and submitted a Report for Duty Form. On May 3, 1988, Diaz filed a
letter-application directly with U.P.'s Office of the President (Abueva) for sabbatical leave with
pay for one (1) year effective June 1988 to May 1989, for "rest, renewal and study." Cecilia
Lazaro, Chair of the Broadcast Department, initially recommended to CMC Dean Encanto that
Diaz's sabbatical application be granted. After they discussed the options available to the CMC,
Lazaro, on May 10, 1988, recommended instead that Diaz be granted any leave of absence she
may be qualified for. In her May 2, 1988 letter, Diaz indicated her unwillingness to teach.
Considering the CMC's experience with Diaz who dropped her courses in the previous semester,
Lazaro deleted Diaz's name in the final schedule of classes for the 1st semester of AY 1988-89
beginning June 6, 1988. Incidentally, Diaz received her salary for June 1988, indicating that her
sabbatical might be approved. Thereafter, Encanto referred Diaz's sabbatical application to the
Secretary of U.P., recommending its denial. When requested by (Chancellor) Tabujara, Encanto
transmitted to the former a Reference Slip together with her comments thereon. Meanwhile,
Encanto requested Ermelina Kalagayan to hold Diaz's salary effective July 1, 1988 until further
notice considering that her sabbatical application has not yet been approved and that she did not
teach that semester. Consequently, Diaz's name was deleted in the payroll from September 1988
to January 1989. Meanwhile, on July 18, 1989, Diaz instituted a complaint against the U.P.,
Abueva, Encanto, Tabujara and Abad with the Regional Trial Court, Pasig, Metro Manila
praying that the latter be adjudged, jointly and severally to pay her damages. She claimed, among
others, that [respondents] conspired together as joint tort feasors, in not paying her salaries from
July 1, 1988 in the first semester of academic year 1988-89, for the entire period when her
sabbatical application was left unresolved, as well as the salaries she earned from teaching in the
second semester from November 1988 to May 1989. She likewise claimed moral and exemplary
damages and attorney's fees.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is entitled for damages.

HELD:

Article 19 of the Civil Code "prescribes a 'primordial limitation on all rights' by setting certain
standards that must be observed in the exercise thereof. Abuse of right under Article 19 exists
when the following elements are present: (1) there is a... legal right or duty; (2) which is
exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
 P a g e | 88

Malice or bad faith is at the core of Article 19 of the Civil Code. Good faith refers to the state of
mind which is manifested by the acts of the individual concerned. It consists of the intention to
abstain from taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of... another. It is presumed.
Thus, he who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the same. Bad faith does not simply connote
bad judgment or simple negligence; it involves a dishonest purpose or some moral obloquy and
conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of known duty due to some... motives or interest or ill will
that partakes of the nature of fraud. Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in response to
duty. It implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. Malice is bad faith or bad
motive.
 P a g e | 89

NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN V. ROBERTO REYES

G.R. No. 154259 February 28, 2005

FACTS:

One evening in October 1994, an exclusive party was being held at the Nikko Hotel Manila
Garden. The party was being held for a prominent Japanese national. The person in charge at the
party was Ruby Lim who was also the executive secretary of the hotel. Later during the party,
she noticed Robert Reyes (popularly known as Amay Bisaya). Reyes was not on the list of
exclusive guests. Lim first tried to find out who invited Reyes to the party. When she ascertained
that the host celebrant did not invite Reyes, Lim approached Reyes and told the latter, in a
discreet voice, to finish his food and leave the party. Reyes however made a scene and began
shouting at Lim. Later, a policeman was called to escort Reyes out of the party.
Reyes then sued Lim and Nikko Hotel Manila Garden for damages. In his version, he said that he
was invited by another party guest, Dr. Violeta Filart. He said that while he was queuing to get
his food, Lim approached him and ordered him in a loud voice to leave the party immediately.
He told Lim he was invited by Dr. Filart however when he was calling for Dr. Filart the latter
ignored him. Later, he was escorted out of the party like a common criminal.
The trial court ruled in favor of Lim and Nikko Hotel. However, the Court of Appeals ruled in
favor of Reyes as it ruled that Lim abused her right and that Reyes deserved to be treated
humanely and fairly. It is true that Lim had the right to ask Reyes to leave the party but she
should have done it respectfully.

ISSUES:

Whether or not Lim acted with abuse of rights.

HELD:

No. The Supreme Court found the version of Lim more credible. She has been employed by the
hotel for more than 20 years at that time. Her job requires her to be polite at all times. It is very
unlikely for her to make a scene in the party she was managing. That would only make her look
bad.

Reyes based his complaint on Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Art. 19 which provides:
Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith was not violated by Lim as it
appears that even Reyes testified in court that when Lim told him to leave, Lim did so very close
to him – so close that they could almost kiss. This only proves that Lim intended that only Reyes
shall hear whatever is it that she’s going to tell Reyes and exclude other guests from hearing.
Article 21 on the other hand is commonly known as contra bonus mores: Any person who
willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. This article is likewise not violated.
Lim, as proven by evidence on record, did not demean Reyes. They do not know each other
 P a g e | 90

personally. She has no reason to treat him wrongfully especially so that Reyes himself is a
prominent person.

On the other hand, Reyes brought whatever damage he incurred upon himself. Under the
doctrine of volenti non fit injuria, by coming to the party uninvited, Reyes opens himself to
the risk of being turned away, and thus being embarrassed. The injury he incurred is thus self-
inflicted. Evidence even shows that Dr. Filart herself denied inviting Reyes into the party and
that Reyes simply gate-crashed. Reyes did not even present any supporting evidence to support
any of his claims. Since he brought injury upon himself, neither Lim nor Nikko Hotel can be
held liable for damages.
 P a g e | 91

EDUARDO P. MANUEL v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 165842 November 29, 2005

FACTS:

This case is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of Court of Appeals affirming the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, convicting the petitioner for the crime of
bigamy. Eduardo P. Manuel, herein petitioner, was first married to Rubylus Gaña on July 18,
1975, who, according to the former, was charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned
and was never seen again by him after his last visit. Manuel met Tina B. Gandalera in January
1996 when the latter was only 21 years old. Three months after their meeting, the two got
married through a civil wedding in Baguio City without Gandalera’s knowledge of Manuel’s
first marriage. In the course of their marriage, things got rocky and Gandalera learned that
Eduardo was in fact already married when he married him. She then filed a criminal case of
bigamy against Eduardo Manuel. The latter’s defense being that his declaration of “single” in his
marriage contract with Gandalera was done because he believed in good faith that his first
marriage was invalid and that he did not know that he had to go to court to seek for the
nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina. The Regional Trial Court ruled against
him sentencing him of imprisonment of from 6 years and 10 months to ten years, and an amount
of P200,000.00 for moral damages. Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA where he alleged
that he was not criminally liable for bigamy because when he married the private complainant,
he did so in good faith and without any malicious intent. The CA ruled against the petitioner but
with modification on the RTC’s decision. Imprisonment was from 2 years, months and 1 day to
ten years. Pecuniary reward for moral damages was affirmed.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:

a. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law when it ruled that
petitioner’s wife cannot be legally presumed dead under Article 390 of the Civil Code as there
was no judicial declaration of presumptive death as provided for under Article 41 of the Family
Code.
b. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law when it affirmed the
award of Php200,000.00 as moral damages as it has no basis in fact and in law.

HELD:

1. The petition is denied for lack of merit. The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice
or evil intent when he married the private complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact or good
faith of the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense negates
malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse because everyone is
presumed to know the law. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat. Where a spouse is absent for the
requisite period, the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage only after securing a
judgment declaring the presumptive death of the absent spouse to avoid being charged and
convicted of bigamy; the present spouse will have to adduce evidence that he had a well-founded
belief that the absent spouse was already dead. Such judgment is proof of the good faith of the
 P a g e | 92

present spouse who contracted a subsequent marriage; thus, even if the present spouse is later
charged with bigamy if the absentee spouse reappears, he cannot be convicted of the crime.
The court ruled against the petitioner.

2. The Court rules that the petitioner’s collective acts of fraud and deceit before, during and after
his marriage with the private complainant were willful, deliberate and with malice and caused
injury to the latter. The Court thus declares that the petitioner’s acts are against public policy as
they undermine and subvert the family as a social institution, good morals and the interest and
general welfare of society. Because the private complainant was an innocent victim of the
petitioner’s perfidy, she is not barred from claiming moral damages. Considering the attendant
circumstances of the case, the Court finds the award of P200,000.00 for moral damages to be just
and reasonable.
 P a g e | 93

PE ET AL v. PE
G.R. No. L-17396 May 30, 1962

FACTS:

Plaintiffs are parents, brothers and sisters of Lolita Pe, an unmarried woman 24 years of age.
Defendant, a married man, frequently visited Lolita’s house on the pretext that he wanted her to
teach him to pray the rosary. They fell in love and conducted clandestine trysts. When the
parents learned about this they prohibited defendant from going to their house. The affair
continued just the same. On April 14, 1957 Lolita disappeared from her brother’s house where
she was living. A note in the handwriting of the defendant was found inside Lolita’s aparador.
The present action was instituted under Article 21 of the Civil Code. The lower court dismissed
the action and plaintiffs appealed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the defendant committed injury to Lolita's family in a manner contrary to morals,
good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the New Civil Code.

HELD:

The circumstances under which defendant tried to win Lolita’s affection cannot lead to any other
conclusion than that it was he who, thru an ingenious scheme or trickery, seduced the latter to the
extent of making her fall in love with him. Indeed, no other conclusion can be drawn from this
chain of events than that defendant not only deliberately, but through a clever strategy,
succeeded in winning the affection and love of Lolita to the extent of having illicit relations with
her. The wrong he has caused her and her family is indeed immeasurable considering the fact
that he is a married man. Verily, he has committed and injury to Lolita’s family in a manner
contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the New
Civil Code.
 P a g e | 94

HERMOSISIMA V. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-14628 September 30, 1960

FACTS:

In 1950, Soledad Cagigas, 33 years old (then a school teacher, later she became an insurance
underwriter), and Francisco Hermosisima, 23 years old (apprentice ship pilot), fell in love with
each other. Since 1953, both had a regular intimate and sexual affair with each other. In 1954,
Soledad got pregnant. Francisco then promised to marry Soledad. In June 1954, Soledad gave
birth to a baby girl. The next month, Francisco got married but with a different woman named
Romanita Perez. Subsequently, Soledad filed an action against Francisco for the latter to
recognize his daughter with Soledad and for damages due to Francisco’s breach of his promise to
marry Soledad. The trial court ruled in favor of Soledad. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the trial court and even increased the award of damages. The Court of Appeals
reasoned that Francisco is liable for damages because he seduced Soledad. He exploited the love
of Soledad for him in order to satisfy his sexual desires – that being, the award of moral damages
is proper.

ISSUES:

Whether or not moral damages are recoverable under our laws for breach of promise to marry.

HELD:

No. Breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong per se. The Court of Appeals based
its award of damages on Article 2219 of the Civil Code which says in part that moral damages
may be recovered from seduction. However, it must be noted that the “seduction” being
contemplated in the said Civil Code provision is the same “seduction” being contemplated in
Article 337 and 338 of the Revised Penal Code. Such “seduction” is not present in this case.
Further, it cannot be said that Francisco morally seduced (in lieu of criminal seduction) Soledad
given the circumstances of this case. Soledad was 10 years older than Francisco. Soledad had a
better job experience and a better job overall than Francisco who was a mere apprentice. Further
still, it was admitted by Soledad herself that she surrendered herself to Francisco and that she
wanted to bind “by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of
clergy.”
 P a g e | 95

GALANG v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-17248 January 29, 1962

FACTS:

This is an action against Rodrigo Quinit and his father Maximo Quinit to recover damages
claimed to have been sustained by plaintiff Beatriz Galang for an alleged breach of promise on
the part of Rodrigo Quinit to marry her. In due course, the Court of First Instance of Baguio, in
which the case was originally instituted, rendered a decision sentencing the defendants jointly
and severally to pay the sums of P275.00, by way of actual damages, P5,000.00, as moral
damages, and P500.00, as attorney's fees, apart from the costs. On appeal, taken by the
defendants, the Court of Appeals absolved Maximino Quinit, and accordingly, reversed said
decision insofar as he is concerned, and modified it as regards Rodrigo Quinit, by eliminating the
awards for moral damages and attorney's fees. The case is before us on appeal by certiorari taken
by plaintiff Beatriz Galang. As found by the Court of Appeals, it appears that plaintiff "and
Rodrigo Quinit were engaged, but Rodrigo's parents were strongly opposed to their marriage";
that "from April 27, 1955", plaintiff "and Rodrigo lived as husband and wife in the house of
Adolfo Dagawan located at Colorado Falls, Tuba, Mountain Province, until May 9 when Rodrigo
left and never returned"; that "both were from the same town of Sison, Pangasinan and their love
relations started in the year 1953, the two having exchanged a long series of love letters since
then until they separated", and that "at the time when went to Colorado Falls, both were of age."

ISSUE:
Whether or not Rodrigo and Maximo Quinit are liable for damages due to the alleged breach of
promise to marry.

HELD:

The court of first instance sustained plaintiff's pretense, but the Court of Appeals considered her
evidence unworthy of credence, and, hence, absolved Maximino Quinit. Plaintiff maintains that
the Court of Appeals had erred in the appreciation of the evidence, but the findings of said Court
on the credibility of said evidence are beyond our power of review on appeal by certiorari and,
consequently, conclusive upon us.
 P a g e | 96

GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993

FACTS:

In August 1986, while working as a waitress in Dagupan City, Pangasinan, Marilou Gonzales,
then 21 years old, met Gashem Shookat Baksh, a 29 year old exchange student from Iran who
was studying medicine in Dagupan. The two got really close and intimate. On Marilou’s account,
she said that Gashem later offered to marry her at the end of the semester. Marilou then
introduced Gashem to her parents where they expressed their intention to get married. Marilou’s
parents then started inviting sponsors and relatives to the wedding. They even started looking for
animals to slaughter for the occasion. Meanwhile, Marilou started living with Gashem in his
apartment where they had sexual intercourse. But in no time, their relationship went sour as
Gashem began maltreating Marilou. Gashem eventually revoked his promise of marrying
Marilou and he told her that he is already married to someone in Bacolod City. So Marilou went
home and later sued Gashem for damages. The trial court ruled in favor of Marilou and awarded
her P20k in moral damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
On appeal, Gashem averred that he never proposed marriage to Marilou and that he cannot be
adjudged to have violated Filipino customs and traditions since he, being an Iranian, was not
familiar with Filipino customs and traditions.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct.

HELD:

Yes. Gashem is liable to pay for damages in favor of Marilou not really because of his breach of
promise to marry her but based on Article 21 of the Civil Code which provides:
Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong per se. In this case, it is the deceit and
fraud employed by Gashem that constitutes a violation of Article 21 of the Civil Code. His
promise of marrying Marilou was a deceitful scheme to lure her into sexual congress. As found
by the trial court, Marilou was not a woman of loose morals. She was a virgin before she met
Gashem. She would not have surrendered herself to Gashem had Gashem not promised to marry
her. Gashem’s blatant disregard of Filipino traditions on marriage and on the reputation of
Filipinas is contrary to morals, good customs, and public policy. As a foreigner who is enjoying
the hospitality of our country and even taking advantage of the opportunity to study here he is
expected to respect our traditions. Any act contrary will render him liable under Article 21 of the
Civil Code. The Supreme Court also elucidated that Article 21 was meant to expand the concepts
of torts and quasi delict. It is meant to cover situations such as this case where the breach
complained of is not strictly covered by existing laws. It was meant as a legal remedy for the
untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically
enumerate and punish in the statute books – such as the absence of a law penalizing a the breach
of promise to marry.
 P a g e | 97

The Supreme Court however agreed with legal luminaries that if the promise to marry was made
and there was carnal knowledge because of it, then moral damages may be recovered (presence
of moral or criminal seduction), Except if there was mutual lust; or if expenses were made
because of the promise (expenses for the wedding), then actual damages may be recovered.
 P a g e | 98

WASSMER v. VELEZ
G.R. No. L-20089 December 26, 1964

FACTS:
On August 23, 1954 plaintiff and defendant applied for a license to contract marriage, which
was subsequently issued. Their wedding was set for September 4, 1954. Invitations were printed
and distributed to relatives, friends and acquaintances. The bride-to-be's trousseau, party dresses
and other apparel for the important occasion were purchased. Dresses for the maid of honor and
the flower girl were prepared. A matrimonial bed, with accessories, was bought. Bridal showers
were given and gifts received. And then, with but two days before the wedding, defendant, who
was then 28 years old,: simply left a note for plaintiff stating: "Will have to postpone wedding —
My mother opposes it ... " He enplaned to his home city in Mindanao, and the next day, the day
before the wedding, he wired plaintiff: "Nothing changed rest assured returning soon." But he
never returned and was never heard from again.

ISSUE:

Whether or not breach of promise to marry is an actionable wrong?

HELD:

Mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and
go through all the preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about
to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs
for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 of the
Civil Code.
 P a g e | 99

NATIVIDAD v. TUNAC
G.R. No. 143130 July 10, 2000

FACTS:

Petitioner Elsa Natividad and respondent Ronald Tunac grew up together in Barangay Quiling,
Talisay, Batangas where their respective parents, petitioners Marino and Clarita Natividad and
respondent Eusebio and Elisa Tunac, resided. At age nineteen (19), the two became lovers. One
day, Ronald asked Elsa to go with him to his boarding house in Pasig City to get the bio-data
which he needed in connection with his application for employment. Upon arrival at the
boarding house, they found no one there. Ronald asked Elsa to go with him inside his room and,
once inside, started kissing Elsa until he succeeded in making love with her. Elsa cried at the loss
of her virginity, but Ronald appeased her by promising to marry her.
Their intimate relations continued, resulting in Elsa getting pregnant sometime in June 1992.
Ronald reassured her, again promising her marriage. True enough, on October 31, 1992, Ronald
and his parents, accompanied by several relatives numbering twenty in all, went to Elsa's house
and asked her parents for the hand of their daughter. The two families agreed to have the
wedding in January 1993 as Elsa's sister had gotten married that year, and they thought it was not
good to have two weddings in a family within the same year. Meanwhile, Elsa started living with
Ronald in the house of the latter's family while waiting for the baby to be born. Unfortunately, on
December 19, 1992, Elsa gave birth to a premature baby which died after five (5) hours in the
incubator. After Elsa's discharge from the hospital, the two families decided that Elsa should go
back to her parents so her mother could take care of her during her postnatal period. During said
period, Ronald occasionally slept in Elsa's house. It seems that after Elsa's miscarriage, a marked
change in Ronald's attitude towards the former occurred. In January of 1993, the Natividads
confronted the Tunacs. In that meeting, Ronald informed Elsa that he no longer wanted to get
married to her. Hence, this case. Petitioners succinctly contend they are suing respondents not
merely because Elsa became pregnant but because Ronald reneged on his promise to marry her
after their agreement had already been much publicized in their town.

ISSUES:

Whether or not petitioner is entitled for damages.

HELD:

This contention has no merit. As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, our laws do not
provide for a right to relief for cases arising purely from a breach of one's promise to marry
another, the chapter on breach of promise to marry proposed by the Code Commission having
been deleted by Congress in enacting the Civil Code apparently because of lessons from other
countries, particularly the United States and England, that the action readily lends itself to abuse
by designing women and unscrupulous men.
 P a g e | 100

SHINRYO COMPANY, INC. v. RRN INCORPORATED

G.R. No. 172525 October 20, 2010

FACTS:

Petitioner Shinryo (Philippines) Company, Inc. (hereinafter petitioner) is a domestic corporation

organized under Philippine laws. Private respondent RRN Incorporated (hereinafter respondent)
is likewise a domestic corporation organized under Philippine laws.
Respondent filed a claim for arbitration against petitioner before CIAC for recovery of unpaid
account which consists of unpaid portions of the sub-contract, variations and unused materials in
the total sum of P5,275,184.17 and legal interest in the amount of P442,014.73. Petitioner filed a
counterclaim for overpayment in the amount of P2,512,997.96. The parties admitted several facts
before the CIAC. It was shown that petitioner and respondent executed an Agreement and
Conditions of Sub-contract (hereafter Agreement signed on June 11, 1996 and June 14, 1996,
respectively. Respondent signified its willingness to accept and perform for petitioner in any of
its projects, a part or the whole of the works more particularly described in Conditions of Sub-
Contract and other Sub-contract documents. On June 11, 2002, the parties executed a Supply of
Manpower, Tools/Equipment, Consumables for the Electrical Works-Power and Equipment
Supply, Bus Duct Installation for the Phillip Morris Greenfield Project (hereafter Project)
covered by Purchase Order Nos. 4501200300-000274 and 4501200300-000275 amounting
to P15,724,000.00 and P9,276,000.00 respectively, or a total amount of P25,000,000.00. The
parties also agreed that respondent will perform variation orders in the Project. In connection
with the Project, petitioner supplied manpower chargeable against respondent.
Respondent was not able to finish the entire works with petitioner due to financial
difficulties. Petitioner paid respondent a total amount of P26,547,624.76. On June 25, 2005
respondent, through its former counsel sent a letter to petitioner demanding for the payment of its
unpaid balance amounting to P5,275,184.17. Petitioner claimed material back charges in the
amount of P4,063,633.43. On September 26, 2003, respondent only
acknowledged P2,371,895.33 as material back charges. Thereafter, on October 16, 2003,
respondent sent another letter to petitioner for them to meet and settle their dispute.
On January 8, 2004, respondent sent another letter to petitioner regarding the cost of equipment
rental and the use of scaffolding. Thereafter, on August 12, 2004, petitioner sent a letter to
respondent denying any unpaid account and the failure in their negotiations for amicable
settlement. On September 3, 2004, respondent, through its new counsel, advised petitioner of
their intention to submit the matter to arbitration. Thereafter, their dispute was submitted to
arbitration.

ISSUES:

Whether or not there is an unjust enrichment?

HELD:

Unjust enrichment claims do not lie simply because one party benefits from the efforts or
obligations of others, but instead it must be shown that a party was unjustly enriched in the sense
that the term unjustly could mean illegally or unlawfully. Moreover, to substantiate a claim
 P a g e | 101

for unjust enrichment, the claimant must unequivocally prove that another party knowingly
received something of value to which he was not entitled and that the state of affairs are such that
it would be unjust for the person to keep the benefit. Unjust enrichment is a term used to depict
result or effect of failure to make remuneration of or for property or benefits received under
circumstances that give rise to legal or equitable obligation to account for them; to be entitled to
remuneration, one must confer benefit by mistake, fraud, coercion, or request. Unjust enrichment
is not itself a theory of reconvey. Rather, it is a prerequisite for the enforcement of the doctrine
of restitution.

Article 22 of the New Civil Code reads:

Every person who, through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or
comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall
return the same to him. 

As found by both the CIAC and affirmed by the CA, petitioner failed to prove that respondent's
free use of the manlift was without legal ground based on the provisions of their contract. Thus,
the third requisite, i.e., that the enrichment of respondent is without just or legal ground, is
missing. In addition, petitioner's claim is based on contract, hence, the fourth requisite − that the
plaintiff has no other action based on contract, quasi-contract, crime or quasi-delict − is also
absent. Clearly, the principle of unjust enrichment is not applicable in this case.
 P a g e | 102

CAR COOL PHILIPPINES, INC. v. USHIO REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATION
G.R. No. 138088 January 23, 2006

FACTS:

The spouses Hector and Gloria Hizon Lopez were the original owners of the property involved in
the case at bar. They leased it to Car Cool since 1972. On 1992, they entered into a
Verbal Lease Agreement for two years. On 1995, the spouses informed Car Cool of their
intention to sell the property. They gave the latter the option to buy, however they ignored the
offer. For this reason, the spouses terminated the Verbal Lease Agreement with Car Cool and
gave notice to the company to vacate the property on the last day of August 1995. In the same
month, said property was sold to USHIO. The latter gave an extension to Car Cool to vacate the
same up to the last day of September 1995. USHIO gave their final demand on December 3 and
when Car Cool still ignored the notice, USHIO filed an ejectment case against the petitioner.
Previous to this, Car Cool filed a criminal complaintagainst USHIO for alleged Robbery with
force, Malicious mischief, and grave coercion during the attempt by the USHIO to eject the
former and that tey know that there is an existing contract between them and the Lopezes. They
also filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against the spouses invoking that
they made an advance payment in checks to them as monthly rentals for the years 1995 and
1996. The lower courts rendered judgment in favor of the respondent. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision with modification with regard to the monthly rental period, thus this
petition.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the award of damages to the respondent by way of rentals and attorney’s

HELD:

Records show that the advance payment for rentals made by Car Cool to the spouses Lopez were
never encashed. In fact the latter offered to return the check payments but Car Cool refused.
Thus the sale transaction between Lopezes and USHIO was valid and so the latter is the rightful
owner from August 1995. The award made to USHIO is legal for rentals. There is
unjust enrichment when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a
person retains money or property of another against the fundamental principles of
justice, equityand good conscience. The principle of unjust enrichment under Article 22 of the
Civil Code requires two conditions: (1) that a person is benefited without a valid basis
or justification, and, (2) that such benefit is derived at another’s expense or damage. The
requisites for unjust enrichment are not present on the part of the respondent. There is no
unjust enrichment when the person who will benefit has valid claim to such benefit.
As regards the attorney’s fees, the Appellate Court failed to state explicitly in its decision the
basis for the award, hence it cannot be recovered as part of damages. This is based on the policy
that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate. The basis for its award must be based
from factual, legal and equitable justification.
 P a g e | 103

BIBIANO C. ELEGIR v. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC.

G.R. No. 181995 July 16, 2012

FACTS:

Petitioner Bibiano C. Elegir (petitioner) was hired by Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL) as a
commercial pilot, specifically designated as HS748 Limited First Officer, on March 16, 1971.4
In 1995, PAL embarked on a refleeting program and acquired new and highly sophisticated
aircrafts. Subsequently, it sent an invitation to bid to all its flight deck crew, announcing the
opening of eight (8) B747-400 Captain positions that were created by the refleeting program.
The petitioner, who was then holding the position of A-300 Captain, submitted his bid and was
fortunately awarded the same.5 The petitioner, together with seven (7) other pilots, was sent for
training at Boeing in Seattle, Washington, United States of America on May 8, 1995, to acquire
the necessary skills and knowledge in handling the new aircraft. He completed his training on
September 19, 1995.6 On November 5, 1996, after rendering twenty-five (25) years, eight (8)
months and twenty (20) days of continuous service, the petitioner applied for optional retirement
authorized under the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between PAL and the Airline
Pilots Association of the Philippines (ALPAP), in which he was a member of good standing.
On November 6, 1996, the petitioner went on terminal leave for thirty (30) days and thereafter
made effective his retirement from service. Upon securing his clearance, however, he was
informed that the costs of his training will be deducted from his retirement pay, which will be
computed at the rate of ₱5,000.00 per year of service. In its Reply dated August 4, 1997, PAL
refused to yield to the petitioner’s demand and maintained that his retirement pay should be
based on PAL-ALPAP Retirement Plan of 1967 (PAL-ALPAP Retirement Plan) and that he
should reimburse the company with the proportionate costs of his training. Thus, on August 27,
1997, the petitioner filed a complaint for non-payment of retirement pay, moral damages,
exemplary damages and attorney’s fees against PAL.

ISSUES:

Whether or not there is an unjust enrichment?

HELD:

There is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly retains a benefit at the loss of another, or
when a person retains the money or property of another against the fundamental principles of
justice, equity and good conscience. Two conditions must concur: (1) a person is unjustly
benefited; and (2) such benefit is derived at the expense of or with damages to another. The main
objective of the principle of unjust enrichment is to prevent one from enriching oneself at the
expense of another. It is commonly accepted that this doctrine simply means that a person shall
not be allowed to profit or enrich himself inequitably at another’s expense. The enrichment may
consist of a patrimonial, physical, or moral advantage, so long as it is appreciable in money. It
must have a correlative prejudice, disadvantage or injury to the plaintiff which may consist, not
only of the loss of the property or the deprivation of its enjoyment, but also of the non-payment
of compensation for a prestation or service rendered to the defendant without intent to donate on
 P a g e | 104

the part of the plaintiff, or the failure to acquire something what the latter would have obtained.
Undeniably, the petitioner was enriched at the expense of PAL.
 P a g e | 105

BEUMER v. AMORES
G.R. No. 195670 December 3, 2012

FACTS:

Petitioner, a Dutch national, assails the decision of CA which affirmed the decision of RTC
Negros Oriental. Petitioner and Filipina respondent’s marriage was nullified by basis of the
former’s psychological incapacity. Petitioner thus filed for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership
praying for distribution of the properties acquired during their marriage which include 4 lots of
land acquired through purchase and 2 lots by inheritance. RTC ruled that all parcels of land be
given to the respondent, tools and equipment in favour of the petitioner and the two houses on
Lots 1 and 2142 as co-owned by the parties.

ISSUE:

Is the petitioner entitled to assail the decision of the RTC and CA?

HELD:

The petition lacks merit. Firstly, foreigners may not own lands in the Philippines. However, there
are no restrictions to the ownership of buildings or structures on lands of foreigners. As such, the
two houses on Lots 1 and 2142 are considered co-owned by the parties.  
 P a g e | 106

JACOBUS BERNHARD HULST v. PR BUILDERS INC.

G.R. No. 156364 September 3, 2007

FACTS:

The Petitioner and his spouse, both Dutch Nationals, entered into a Contract to Sell with PR

Builders, Inc. to purchase a 210-sq m residential unit in the respondent's townhouse project in
Batangas. When PR Builder's failed to comply with their verbal promise to complete the project,
the spouses Hulst filed a complaint for recession of contract with interest,
damages and attorney's fees before the Housing and Land Regulatory Board (HLURB), which
then was granted. A Writ of Execution was then addressed to the Ex-Officio Sheriff of the RTC
of Tanauan, Batangas, but upon the complaint of the respondent, the levy was set aside, leaving
only the respondent's personal properties to be levied first. The Sheriff set a public auction of the
said levied properties, however, the respondent filed a motion to quash Writ of levy on the
ground that the sheriff made an over levy since the aggregate value of the properties at P6,500
per sq m is P83,616,000. Instead of resolving the objection of the respondent's regarding the
auction, the Sheriff proceeded with the auction since there was no restraining order from the
HLURB. The 15 parcels of land was then awarded to Holly Properties Realty at a bid of
P5,450,653. On the same day, the Sheriff remitted the legal fees and submitted to contracts of
sale to HLURB, however, he then received orders to suspend proceedings on the auction for the
reason that the market value of the properties was not fair. There was disparity between the
appraised value and the value made by the petitioner and the Sheriff, which should've been
looked into by the Sheriff before making the sale. While an inadequacy in price is not a ground
to annul such sale, the court is justified to such intervention where the price shocks the
conscience.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Sheriff erred in the value that was attached to the
propertiesduring the auction and as well as disregarding the objection made by the respondents?

HELD:

No. According to the Rules of Court, the value of the property levied is not required to be exactly
the same as the judgment debt. In the levy of property, the Sheriff does not determine the exact
valuation of the levied property. The Sheriff is left to his own judgment.
He should be allowed a reasonable margin between the value of the property levied upon and the
amount of the execution; the fact that the Sheriff levies upon a little more than is necessary to
satisfy the execution does not render his actions improper. In the absence of a restraining order,
no error can be imputed to the Sheriff in proceeding with the auction sale despite the pending
motion to quash the levy filed by the respondents with the HLURB. Sheriff’s, as officers charged
with the task of the enforcement and/or implementation of judgments, must act with considerable
dispatch so as not to unduly delay the administration of justice. It is not within the jurisdiction
of the Sheriff to consider and resolve respondent's objection to the continuation of the conduct of
the auction sale. The Sheriff has no authority, on his own, to suspend the auction sale. His duty
being ministerial, he has no discretion to postpone the conduct of the auction sale.
 P a g e | 107

DOMINGO GONZALO v. JOHN TARANTE, JR.

G.R No. 160600 January 15, 2014

FACTS:

After the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) had awarded on July 22, 1997 the
contract for the improvement of the Sadsadan-Maba-ay Section of the Mountain Province-
Benguet Road in the total amount of P7,014,963.33 to his company, Gonzalo Construction,
petitioner Domingo Gonzalo (Gonzalo) subcontracted to respondent John Tarnate, Jr. (Tarnate)
on October 15, 1997, the supply of materials and labor for the project under the latter's business
known as JNT Aggregates. Their agreement stipulated, among others, that Tarnate would pay to
Gonzalo eight percent and four percent of the contract price, respectively, upon Tarnate's first
and second billing in the project. Gonzalo executed on April 6, 1999 a deed of assignment
whereby he, as the contractor, was assigning to Tarnate an amount equivalent to 10% of the total
collection from the DPWH for the project. This 10% retention fee (equivalent to
P233,526.13)was the rent for Tarnate equipment that had been utilized in the project. In the deed
of assignment, Gonzalo further authorized Tarnate to use the official receipt of Gonzalo
Construction in the processing of the documents relative to the collection of the 10% retention
fee and in en cashing the check to be issued by the DPWH for that purpose. The deed of
assignment was submitted to the DPWH on April 15, 1999. During the processing of the
documents for the retention fee, however, Tarnate learned that Gonzalo had unilaterally
rescinded the deed of assignment by means of an affidavit of cancellation of deed of assignment
dated April 19, 1999 filed in the DPWH on April 22, 1999; and that the disbursement voucher
for the 10% retention fee had then been issued in the name of Gonzalo, and the retention fee
released to him. Tarnate demanded the payment of the retention fee from Gonzalo, but to no
avail. Thus, he brought this suit against Gonzalo on September 13, 1999 in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in Mountain Province to recover the retention fee of P233,526.13, moral and
exemplary damages for breach of contract, and attorney fees. In his answer, Gonzalo admitted
the deed of assignment and the authority given therein to Tarnate, but averred that the project
had not been fully implemented because of its cancellation by the DPWH, and that he had then
revoked the deed of assignment. He insisted that the assignment could not stand independently
due to its being a mere product of the subcontract that had been based on his contract with the
DPWH; and that Tarnate, having been fully aware of the illegality and ineffectuality of the deed
of assignment from the time of its execution, could not go to court with unclean hands to invoke
any right based on the invalid deed of assignment or on the product of such deed of assignment.
The CA ruled in the affirmative the decision of the RTC that Gonzalo has unjustly enriched
Tarnate and that the principle of in pari delicto cannot be applied in the case at bar for the
violation of Section 6 P.DNo. 1594 because it will only be applied if the fault of one party was
more or less equivalent to the fault of the other party.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC?

 P a g e | 108

HELD:

The CA did not err in affirming the RTC. According to Article 1412 (1) of the Civil Code,
The guilty parties to an illegal contract cannot recover from one another and are not entitled to an
affirmative relief because they are in pari delicto or in equal fault. The doctrine of in pari delicto
is a universal doctrine that holds that no action arises, in equity or at law, from an illegal
contract; no suit can be maintained for its specific performance, or to recover the property agreed
to be sold or delivered, or the money agreed to be paid, or damages for its violation; and where
the parties are in pari delicto, no affirmative relief of any kind will be given to one against the
other. The letter and spirit of Article 22 of the Civil Code command Gonzalo to make a full
reparation or compensation to Tarnate. The illegality of their contract should not be allowed to
deprive Tarnate from being fully compensated through the imposition of legal interest.

 
 P a g e | 109

VALENZUELA v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-56168 December 22, 1988

FACTS:

Carlos Telosa who is a fisherman and farmer with very limited education acquired a loan from
the Rural Bank of Lucena. In exchange for the granted loan, his property located at Brgy.
Amugeria, Malunay, Quezon, with an area of fifty thousand square metres was mortgaged.
Several months after the said transaction, the Rural Bank of Lucena became a
distressed bank. The Monetary Board later decided to liquidate the Rural Bank of
Lucena. Among the assets inventoried was the mortgaged property of Carlos Telosa. In the
document shown in the records of the bank, it specified that the principal amount owed to them
by Carlos Telosa was P5,000.00. Carlos Telosa fully aware of the fact that the obliged amount
was only P300.00 not P500.00 submitted an affidavit in protest of the demand letter submitted to
him. Claiming that payments did not satisfied the whole balance of P9,032.22, the Central Bank
extra judicially foreclosed the mortgaged property and sell it in a public auction. To restrain the
auction of the mortgaged property, a complaint was filed by the widow and children of Carlos
Telosa before the Court of First Instance of Quezon seeking that the mortgage executed by
Carlos Telosa is null and void.

ISSUE:

Whether the extra judicial foreclosure of the property should continue?

HELD:

The court has ruled that the heirs of Carlos Telosa are entitled to the appeals they have
submitted. Due to the fact that the contract entered upon by Carlos Telosa was anomalous in
nature. This was proved by a receipt which served as evidence showing that the receive amount
was on P300.00, and a testimony of Ponciano Mendoza who was present during the transaction
stating that Carlos Telosa was made to sign blank forms by the Rural Bank of Lucena. This
then proves that the said bank has taken advantage of the limited education of Carlos Telosa.
 P a g e | 110

RODRIGO CONCEPCION v. COURT OF APPEALS and SPS. NESTOR NICOLAS and

ALLEM NICOLAS,
G.R. No. 120706 January 31, 2000

FACTS:

Sometime in 1985 the spouses Nestor Nicolas and Allem Nicolas resided at Pasig City, in an
apartment leased to them by the owner Florence “Bing” Concepcion, who also resided in the
same compound where the apartment was located. Nestor Nicolas was then engaged in the
business of supplying government agencies and private entities with office equipment,
appliances and other fixtures. Florence Concepcion joined this venture. Sometime in the second
week of July 1985 Rodrigo Concepcion, brother of the deceased husband of Florence, angrily
accosted Nestor at the latter’s apartment and accused him of conducting an adulterous
relationship with Florence.

Rodrigo threatened Florence over the telephone that should something happen to his sick mother;
in case the latter learned about the affair, he would kill Florence. As a result of this incident,
Nestor Nicolas felt extreme embarrassment and shame to the extent that he could no longer face
his neighbors. Consequently, he was forced to write Rodrigo demanding public apology and
payment of damages. Rodrigo pointedly ignored the demand, for which reason the Nicolas
spouses filed a civil suit against him for damages. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Nestor
Nicolas, hence this case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in granting damages to Nestor Nicolas and his spouse.

RULING:

According to petitioner, private respondents’ evidence is inconsistent as to time, place and

persons who heard the alleged defamatory statement. The Court finds this to be a gratuitous
observation, for the testimonies of all the witnesses for the respondents are unanimous that the
defamatory incident happened in the afternoon at the front door of the apartment of the Nicolas
spouses in the presence of some friends and neighbors, and later on, with the accusation being
repeated in the presence of Florence, at the terrace of her house. All told, these factual findings
provide enough basis in law for the award of damages by the Court of Appeals in favor of
respondents.

The Court reject petitioner’s posture that no legal provision supports such award, the incident
complained of neither falling under Art. 22, 19, nor Art. 26 of the Civil Code. Damages therefore
are allowable for actions against a person’s dignity, such as profane, insulting, humiliating,
scandalous or abusive language. As stated in the Civil Code, moral damages which include
physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury, although incapable of
pecuniary computation, may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant’s
wrongful act or omission. There is no question that private respondent Nestor Nicolas suffered
 P a g e | 111

mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social humiliation as a proximate

result of petitioner’s abusive, scandalous and insulting language. The decision of the Court of
Appeals is therefore affirmed.
 P a g e | 112

NESTOR N. PADALHIN v. NELSON D. LAVIÑA 

G.R. No. 183026 November 14, 2012

FACTS:

Laviña and Nestor were both Filipino diplomats assigned in Kenya as Ambassador and Consul
General, respectively,In the course of their stay in Kenya, the residence of Laviña was raided
twice.  Prior to the raids, Bienvenido Pasturan delivered messages to the Filipino household
helpers in the ambassador's residence instructing them to allow the entry of an officer who would
come to take photographs of the ivory souvenirs kept therein.
The first raid on April 18, 1996 was conducted while Laviña and his wife were attending a
diplomatic dinner hosted by the Indian High Commission.  Lucy Ercolano Muthua, who was
connected with the Criminal Investigation Division's Intelligence Office of Kenya and David
Menza, an officer in the Digirie Police Station in Nairobi, participated in the raid. Photographs of
the first and second floors of Laviña's residence were taken with the aid of James Mbatia, Juma
Kalama, Zenaida Cabando and Edna Palao, The second raid was conducted on April 23, 1996
during which occasion, the ambassador and his spouse were once again not present and
additional photographs of the residence were taken. On September 27, 1996, Laviña received an
information from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) in Manila that an investigating team
was to be sent to Nairobi to inquire into the complaints filed against him by the employees of the
Philippine Embassy in Kenya, on one hand, and his own complaint against the spouses Padalhin,
on the other.  The investigating team was led by Rosario G. Manalo (Manalo) and had Franklin
M. Ebdalin (Ebdalin) and Maria Theresa Dizon (Dizon) as members.  The team stayed in Kenya
from April 20, 1997 to April 30, 1997.  On April 29, 1997, the team entered Laviña's residence
unarmed with a search warrant, court order or letter from the DFA Secretary.  Laviña alleged that
in the course of the inspection, the team destroyed cabinet locks, damaged furnitures and took
three sets of carved ivory tusks. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Lavina is entitled for damages.

HELD:

The question, therefore, is whether defendant-appellant intended to prejudice or injure plaintiff-

appellant when he did the acts as embodied in his affidavit.
We rule in the affirmative. Defendant-appellant's participation in the invasion of plaintiff-
appellant's diplomatic residence and his act of ordering an employee to take photographs of what
was inside the diplomatic residence without the consent of the plaintiff-appellant were clearly
done to prejudice the latter.  Moreover, we find that defendant- appellant was not driven by
legitimate reasons when he did the questioned acts.  As pointed out by the court a quo,
defendant-appellant made sure that the Kenyan Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Filipino
community in Kenya knew about the alleged illegal items in plaintiff-appellant's diplomatic
residence.
 P a g e | 113

PHILEX MINING CORP. v. CIR

G.R. No. 125704 August 28, 1998

FACTS:

Petitioner Philex Mining Corp. assails the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the Court
of Tax Appeals decision ordering it to pay the amount of P110.7 M as excise tax liability for the
period from the 2nd quarter of 1991 to the 2nd quarter of 1992 plus 20% annual interest from
1994 until fully paid pursuant to Sections 248 and 249 of the Tax Code of 1977. Philex protested
the demand for payment of the tax liabilities stating that it has pending claims for VAT input
credit/refund for the taxes it paid for the years 1989 to 1991 in the amount of P120 M plus
interest. Therefore these claims for tax credit/refund should be applied against the tax liabilities.

ISSUE:

Can there be an off-setting between the tax liabilities vis-a-vis claims of tax refund of the
petitioner?

HELD:

No. Philex's claim is an outright disregard of the basic principle in tax law that taxes are the
lifeblood of the government and so should be collected without unnecessary hindrance.
Evidently, to countenance Philex's whimsical reason would render ineffective our tax collection
system. Too simplistic, it finds no support in law or in jurisprudence. To be sure, Philex cannot
be allowed to refuse the payment of its tax liabilities on the ground that it has a pending tax
claim for refund or credit against the government which has not yet been granted. Taxes cannot
be subject to compensation for the simple reason that the government and the taxpayer are not
creditors and debtors of each other. There is a material distinction between a tax and debt. Debts
are due to the Government in its corporate capacity, while taxes are due to the Government in its
sovereign capacity. There can be no off-setting of taxes against the claims that the taxpayer may
have against the government. A person cannot refuse to pay a tax on the ground that the
government owes him an amount equal to or greater than the tax being collected. The collection
of a tax cannot await the results of a lawsuit against the government.
 P a g e | 114

WILLAWARE PRODUCTS CORPORATION v. JESICHRIS MANUFACTURING

CORPORATION
G.R. No. 195549 September 3, 2014

FACTS:

Jesichris Manufacturing Company the respondent filed this present complaint for damages for
unfair competition with prayer for permanent injunction to enjoin Willaware Products
Corporation the petitioner from manufacturing and distributing plastic-made automotive parts
similar to Jesichris Manufacturing Company. The respondent, alleged that it is a duly registered
partnership engaged in the manufacture and distribution of plastic and metal products, with
principal office at No. 100 Mithi Street, Sampalukan, Caloocan City. Since its registration in
1992, Jesichris Manufacturing Company has been manufacturing in its Caloocan plant
and distributing throughout the Philippines plastic-made automotive parts. Willaware Products
Corporation, on the other hand, which is engaged in the manufacture and distribution of
kitchenware items made of plastic and metal has its office near that of the Jesichris
Manufacturing Company. Respondent further alleged that in view of the physical proximity of
petitioner’s office to respondent’s office, and in view of the fact that some of the respondent’s
employees had transferred to petitioner, petitioner had developed familiarity with respondent’s
products, especially its plastic-made automotive parts. That sometime in November 2000,
respondent discovered that petitioner had been manufacturing and distributing the same
automotive parts with exactly similar design, same material and colors but was selling these
products at a lower price as respondent’s plastic-made automotive parts and to the same
customers. Respondent alleged that it had originated the use of plastic in place of rubber in the
manufacture of automotive under chassis parts such as spring eye bushing, stabilizer bushing,
shock absorber bushing, center bearing cushions, among others. Petitioner’s manufacture of the
same automotive parts with plastic material was taken from respondent’s idea of using plastic for
automotive parts. Also, petitioner deliberately copied respondent’s products all of which acts
constitute unfair competition, is and are contrary to law, morals, good customs and public policy
and have caused respondent damages in terms of lost and unrealized profits in the amount of
2,000,000 as of the date of respondent’s complaint.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is unfair competition under human relations when the parties are not
competitors and there is actually no damage on the part of Jesichris?

HELD:

Article 28 of the Civil Code provides that "unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or
industrial enterprises or in labor through the use of force, intimidation, deceit, machination or
any other unjust, oppressive or high-handed method shall give rise to a right of action by the
person who thereby suffers damage." From the foregoing, it is clear that what is being sought to
be prevented is not competition per se but the use of unjust, oppressive or high handed methods
which may deprive others of a fair chance to engage in business or to earn a living. Plainly, what
the law prohibits is unfair competition and not competition where the means use dare fair and
 P a g e | 115

legitimate. In sum, petitioner is guilty of unfair competition under Article 28 of the Civil Code.
However, since the award of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) in actual damages had been
deleted and in its place Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) in nominal damages is
awarded, the attorney's fees should concomitantly be modified and lowered to Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00).
 P a g e | 116

GEORGE MANANTAN v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 107125 January 29, 2001

FACTS:

In the evening of September 25, 1982, at the National Highway of Malvar, Santiago, Isabela,
George Manantan was driving a Toyota car going home. At that time, he was
with Fiscal Ambrocio, Miguel Tabangin and Ruben Nicolas. Suddenly, a jeepney, coming from
the opposite direction hit the driver side of the car, driven by Manantan. Consequently,
Manantan, Ambrocio and Tabangin were injured while Nicolas died. Trial followed. The lower
court acquitted the accused of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide. The
respondents filed their notice of appeal on the civil aspect of the lower court’s judgment. Even if
the accused was acquitted from his criminal liability, the Appellate Court held him civilly liable
and ordered him to indemnify the aggrieved party for the death of Nicolas.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the acquittal of petitioner extinguished his civil liability.

RULING:

The acquittal was based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. Article 29 of the Civil
Code provides that a civil liability is not extinguished in criminal cases. Therefore, the accused
cannot be exempted from paying civil damages which may only be proven by preponderance of
evidence. Manantan claimed that he was placed on double jeopardy but the courts did not
give merit to this contention. The following elements must be present for double jeopardy to
exist: (1) A first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) The first jeopardy must
have terminated; and (3) the third jeopardy must be for the same offense as the first .In the case
at bar, the initially put into jeopardy but he it was terminated by his discharge. When the case
was elevated to the Court of Appeals, the issue was about the civil aspect of the criminal case.
Thus, there could be no double jeopardy.
 P a g e | 117

EMMA P. NUGUID v. CLARITA S. NICDAO 

G.R. No. 150785 September 15, 2006

FACTS:

Accused Clarita S. Nicdao is charged with having committed the crime of Violation of BP 22 in
fourteen (14) counts. The criminal complaints allege that respondent and her husband
approached petitioner and asked her if they could borrow money to settle some obligations.
Having been convinced by them and because of the close relationship of respondent to petitioner,
the latter lent the former her money. Thus, every month, she was persuaded to release
P100,000.00 to the accused until the total amount reached P1,150,000.00. As security for the
P1,150,000.00, respondent gave petitioner open dated checks with the assurance that if the entire
amount is not paid within one (1) year, petitioner can deposit the checks. Subsequently,
petitioner demanded payment of the sums above-mentioned, but respondent refused to
acknowledge the indebtedness. Thereafter, petitioner deposited all aforementioned checks in the
bank totaling P1,150,000.00. The checks were all returned for having been drawn against
insufficient funds. A verbal and written demand was made upon respondent to pay the amount
represented by the bounced checks, but to no avail. Hence, a complaint for violation of BP 22
was filed against the respondent. The trial court convicted the defendant. The CA reversed the
decision, thus acquitting Nicdao. Petitioner now contends that the civil liability of the defendant
was not extinguished by the acquittal. 

ISSUE: 

Whether respondent remains civilly liable to petitioner despite her acquittal. 

HELD: 

No. From the standpoint of its effects, a crime has a dual character: (1) as an offense against the
State because of the disturbance of the social order and (2) as an offense against the private
person injured by the crime unless it involves the crime of treason, rebellion, espionage,
contempt and others (wherein no civil liability arises on the part of the offender either because
there are no damages to be compensated or there is no private person injured by the crime.  What
gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation of everyone to repair or to make whole the
damage caused to another by reason of his act or omission, whether done intentionally or
negligently and whether or not punishable by law. Extinction of penal action does not carry with
it the eradication of civil liability, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in the final
judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. The basic principle
in civil liability ex delicto is that every person criminally liable is also civilly liable, crime being
one of the five sources of obligations under the Civil Code. A person acquitted of a criminal
charge, however, is not necessarily civilly free because the quantum of proof required in criminal
prosecution (proof beyond reasonable doubt) is greater than that required for civil liability (mere
preponderance of evidence). In order to be completely free from civil liability, a person's
acquittal must be based on the fact that he did not commit the offense. If the acquittal is based
merely on reasonable doubt, the accused may still be held civilly liable since this does not mean
he did not commit the act complained of. It may only be that the facts proved did not constitute
 P a g e | 118

the offense charged. Acquittal will not bar a civil action in the following cases: (1) where the
acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required in civil
cases; (2) where the court declared the accused's liability is not criminal but only civil in nature
and (3) where the civil liability does not arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of which
the accused was acquitted. In this petition, we find no reason to ascribe any civil liability to
respondent. As found by the CA, her supposed civil liability had already been fully satisfied and
extinguished by payment. The statements of the appellate court leave no doubt that respondent,
who was acquitted from the charges against her, had already been completely relieved of civil
liability.
 P a g e | 119

PEOPLE v. AGACER
G.R. No. 177751 January 7, 2013

FACTS:

Cesario was a 55-year old farmer and owner of a ricefield situated in Dungeg, Santa Ana,
Cagayan. On April 2, 1998, at around 9:00 a.m., he was clearing a section of his farm and
preparing the beddings for the rice seedlings intended for the coming planting season. Farm
laborers Genesis Delantar (Genesis), his brother Andy, Rafael Morgado and brothers Roden
(Roden) and Ric (Ric) Vallejo were nearby in a separate section of the same ricefield harvesting
Cesarios palay. According to prosecution witnesses Genesis and Roden, it was at that moment
while Cesario was tending to his farm when appellants suddenly emerged from a nearby banana
plantation and surrounded Cesario. Visibly intimidated, Cesario moved backwards and retreated
to where the other farm laborers were working. However, Franklin set afire the rice straws that
covered Cesarios rice seedlings. This prompted Cesario to return to put out the fire and save his
rice seedlings. At this point, Franklin and Eric started throwing stones at Cesario which forced
the latter to retreat again. Thereafter, Florencio, while standing side by side with Eric, signaled
Cesario to come closer. Cesario obliged but when he was just around five meters away from the
group, Eddie suddenly pulled out a gun concealed inside a sack and, without warning, shot
Cesario hitting him in the left portion of his chest. Almost simultaneously, Elynor took aim at
Cesario with his bow and arrow but missed his mark. As Cesario fell, appellants fled towards the
irrigation canal, where another gunshot rang. Thereafter, a short firearm was thrown from where
the appellants ran towards the direction of Cesarios fallen body. Appellants then immediately left
the scene of the crime onboard a hand tractor and a tricycle. After these events unfolded, Genesis
and the other farm laborers scampered away in different directions. Genesis then
reached Barangay Capanikian and informed Cesarios son, Neldison Agacer (Neldison), of the
death of his father. At around 3:00 p.m., Cesarios friends in said barangay went to the scene of
the crime and retrieved his corpse. During the autopsy, a total of eight entrance wounds were
found, mostly on the chest of Cesarios cadaver. According to the Medico-Legal Officer, the fatal
gunshot wounds were inflicted by the use of a firearm capable of discharging several slugs
simultaneously.

ISSUE:

Whether or not death extinguishes liability.

HELD:

Art. 89.  How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal liability is totally extinguished.

By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability
therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment
It is also settled that upon the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal
action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the
civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished,
grounded as it is on the criminal. While Florencio died way back on February 7, 2007, the said
information was not timely relayed to the Court, such that we were unaware of the same when
 P a g e | 120

we rendered our December 14, 2011 Decision.  It was only later that we were informed of
Florencio's death through the June 8, 2012 letter of the Officer-in-Charge of the New Bilibid
Prison.  Due to this development, it therefore becomes necessary for us to declare Florencio's
criminal liability as well as his civil liability ex delicto to have been extinguished by his death
prior to final judgment.  The judgment of conviction is thus set aside insofar as Florencio is
concerned.
 P a g e | 121

ROMERO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 167546 July 17, 2009

FACTS:

Romero was charged with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide and
multiple serious physical injuries with damage to property for the collision of the bus he was
driving and a taxi. MTC acquitted Romero since it could not ascertain with moral certainty the
wanton and reckless manner by which Romero drove the bus. Romero was, however, held civilly
liable to the heirs of the victims of the collision. Romero contended that his acquittal should have
freed him from payment of civil liability. MTC, RTC and CA dismissed his petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Romero can be held civilly liable even if he was acquitted.

HELD:

Yes, Romero can still be held civilly liable. Every person criminally liable is also civilly liable.
A civil action is instituted for the restitution of the thing, repair of the damage, and
indemnification for the losses. Acquittal of an accused of the crime charged will not necessarily
extinguish his civil liability, unless the court declares in a final judgment that the fact from which
the civil liability might arise did not exist. Romero was acquitted because the prosecution failed
to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. However, his civil liability for the death, injuries and
damages arising from the collision due to his negligence was established by preponderance of
evidence
 P a g e | 122

ANTONIO L. DALURAYA v. MARLA OLIVA 

G.R. No. 210148 December 08, 2014

FACTS:

On January 4, 2006, Daluraya was charged in an Information  for Reckless Imprudence

Resulting in Homicide in connection with the death of Marina Oliva. Records reveal that
sometime in the afternoon of January 3, 2006, Marina Oliva was crossing the street when a
Nissan Vanette, bearing plate number UPN-172 and traversing EDSA near the Quezon Avenue
flyover in Quezon City, ran her over. While Marina Oliva was rushed to the hospital to receive
medical attention, she eventually died, prompting her daughter, herein respondent Marla Oliva
(Marla), to file a criminal case for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide against Daluraya,
the purported driver of the vehicle. During the proceedings, the prosecution presented as witness
Shem Serrano (Serrano), an eye-witness to the incident, who testified that on said date, he saw a
woman crossing EDSA heading towards the island near the flyover and that the latter was
bumped by a Nissan Vanette bearing plate number UPN-172. The prosecution also offered the
testimonies of (a) Marla, who testified as to the civil damages sustained by her family as a result
of her mother's death; (b) Dr. Paul Ortiz (Dr. Ortiz), who presented his findings on the autopsy
conducted upon the body of Marina Oliva; and (c)Police Senior Inspector Lauro Gomez (PSI
Gomez), who conducted the investigation following the incident and claimed that Marina
Olivawas hit by the vehicle being driven by Daluraya, albeit he did not witness the incident.
After the prosecution rested its case, Daluraya filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss (demurrer)
asserting, inter alia, that he was not positively identified by any of the prosecution witnesses as
the driver of the vehicle that hit the victim, and that there was no clear and competent evidence
of how the incident transpired.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is civilly liable.

HELD:

Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. The acquittal of an accused of
the crime charged, however, does not necessarily extinguish his civil liability. The Court
expounded on the two kinds of acquittal recognized by our law and their concomitant effects on
the civil liability of the accused, as follows: Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with
different effects on the civil liability of the accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the
accused is not the author of the act or omission complained of. This instance closes the door to
civil liability, for a person who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission
cannot and can never be held liable for such act or omission. There being no delict, civil
liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted
must be based on grounds other than the delict complained of. This is the situation contemplated
in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt
on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily
established, he is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of
evidence only.
 P a g e | 123

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HENRY T. GO

G.R. No. 168539 March 25, 2014

FACTS:

The Information filed against respondent is an offshoot of this Court's Decision in Agan, Jr. v.
Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. which nullified the various contracts awarded by
the Government, through the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), to
Philippine Air Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO) for the construction, operation and maintenance of
the Ninoy Aquino International Airport International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III).
Subsequent to the above Decision, a certain Ma. Cecilia L. Pesayco filed a complaint with the
Office of the Ombudsman against several individuals for alleged violation of R.A. 3019. Among
those charged was herein respondent, who was then the Chairman and President of PIATCO, for
having supposedly conspired with then DOTC Secretary Arturo Enrile (Secretary Enrile) in
entering into a contract which is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government. On
September 16, 2004, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to
indict, among others, herein respondent for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. While there
was likewise a finding of probable cause against Secretary Enrile, he was no longer indicted
because he died prior to the issuance of the resolution finding probable cause. On or about July
12, 1997, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the late ARTURO ENRILE, then Secretary of the
Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), committing the offense in relation
to his office and taking advantage of the same, in conspiracy with accused, HENRY T. GO,
Chairman and President of the Philippine International Air Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO), did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally enter into a Concession Agreement, after the
project for the construction of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport International Passenger
Terminal III (NAIA IPT III) was awarded to Paircargo Consortium/PIATCO, which Concession
Agreement substantially amended the draft Concession Agreement covering the construction of
the NAIA IPT III under Republic Act 6957, as amended by Republic Act 7718 (BOT law),
specifically the provision on Public Utility Revenues, as well as the assumption by the
government of the liabilities of PIATCO in the event of the latter's default under Article IV,
Section 4.04 (b) and (c) in relation to Article 1.06 of the Concession Agreement, which terms are
more beneficial to PIATCO while manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government of
the Republic of the Philippines.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court a quo gravely erred and decided a question of substance in a matter not
in accordance with law.

HELD:

Respondent contends that by reason of the death of Secretary Enrile, there is no public officer
who was charged in the Information and, as such, prosecution against respondent may not
prosper. It is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile's death, there is no longer any public officer
with whom respondent can be charged for violation of R.A. 3019. It does not mean, however,
 P a g e | 124

that the allegation of conspiracy between them can no longer be proved or that their alleged
conspiracy is already expunged. The only thing extinguished by the death of Secretary Enrile is
his criminal liability. His death did not extinguish the crime nor did it remove the basis of the
charge of conspiracy between him and private respondent. Stated differently, the death of
Secretary Enrile does not mean that there was no public officer who allegedly violated Section 3
(g) of R.A. 3019. In fact, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause
to indict Secretary Enrile for infringement of Sections 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. 3019. Were it not for
his death, he should have been charged.
 P a g e | 125

CALANG v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 190696 August 3, 2010

FACTS:

Petitioner Calang was driving a bus owned by Philtranco when its rear left side hit the front left
portion of a Sarao jeep coming from the opposite direction. As a result of the collision, the jeep’s
driver, lost control of the vehicle, and bumped and killed a bystander who was standing along the
highway’s shoulder. The jeep turned turtle three (3) times before finally stopping at about 25
meters from the point of impact. Two of the jeep’s passengers were instantly killed, while the
other passengers sustained serious physical injuries. The prosecution charged Calang with
multiple homicide, multiple serious physical injuries and damage to property thru reckless
imprudence before the RTC. RTC found Calang guilty beyond reasonable doubt of reckless
imprudence resulting [in] multiple homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to property.
The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Philtranco may be held jointly and severally liable with Calang.

HELD:

No. The RTC and the CA both erred in holding Philtranco jointly and severally liable with
Calang. He was charged criminally before the RTC. Undisputedly, Philtranco was not a direct
party in this case. Since the cause of action against Calang was based on delict, both the RTC
and the CA erred in holding Philtranco jointly and severally liable with Calang, based on quasi-
delict under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code
pertain to the vicarious liability of an employer for quasi-delicts that an employee has
committed. Such provision of law does not apply to civil liability arising from delict.
 P a g e | 126

PEOPLE v. BAYOTAS
G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994

FACTS:

The accused, Rogelio Bayotas, was charged with rape and eventually convicted on June 19, 1991
in a decision penned by Judge Manuel Autajay. Pending appeal of his conviction the accused
died. The findings of the National Bilibid Hospital declared him dead on February 4, 1992. The
Supreme Court in its resolution dated May 20, 1992 dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal
but then required the Solicitor General to file its comment on Bayotas’ civil liability arising from
the crime. In the Solicitor General’s comment, the civil liability hasn’t yet expired. The solicitor
general based its judgment on the case of People v. Sendaydiego. The counsel of the accused-
appellant had a different view; where the death occurred after final judgment the criminal and
civil liability shall be extinguished.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the death of Bayotas extinguished his criminal and civil liability.

RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the accused. According to the Supreme Court, the
controlling statute was Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code. The provision states that death
extinguishes the criminal aspect. In the case at bar, there was no reservation of an independent
civil action against the accused; the criminal and civil aspects are therefore considered as
instituted in the criminal action. Since the civil action was anchored with the criminal case then it
follows that the death dissolves both civil and criminal liability. The Solicitor General’s
dependence on the Sendaydiego case was misplaced. What was contemplated in the Sendaydiego
case was the civil liability arising from other sources of obligation other than delicts. It is
therefore safe to say that what death extinguishes is criminal liability and civil liability arising
from delict only.
 P a g e | 127

CANCIO, JR. v. ISIP

G.R. No. 133978 November 12, 2002

FACTS:

The accused, Emerencia Isip, was charged with 3 counts of violation of B.P. 22, also known as
the Bouncing Checks Law and 3 cases of estafa. One of the B.P. 22 cases was dismissed due to it
being deposited before 90 days from the date written on the check. The other two cases of B.P.
22 were filed with the Regional Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga and were then dismissed due
to the failure of the prosecution to prosecute the crime. Meanwhile the three cases of estafa were
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga. After failing to present its second witness, the
prosecution dismissed the estafa case. The prosecution reserved its right to file a separate civil
action from the said criminal cases. The court granted the reservation. The criminal case of estafa
was then dismissed without prejudice to the civil action. On December 15, 1997, petitioner filed
the instant case for the collection of the sum of money, seeking to recover the amount of the
check subject to the estafa cases. Respondent then filed a motion to dismiss the complaint
contending that the petition is already barred by the doctrine of Res Judicata.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondents can file a separate civil action regardless of the dismissal of the
criminal case of estafa.

RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled that the civil action can prosper. The reservation for civil action was
made by the prosecution on time. According to Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure states that civil liability is deemed instituted with the criminal case unless there is a
reservation of the right to file a separate civil action.

In the case at bar, the complaint is clearly based on culpa contractual. The cause of action was
the breach of the respondent’s breach of the contractual obligation. Evidently, the petitioner was
seeking to make good the value written on the checks in exchange for cash. The case was not
anchored the criminal aspect of estafa but on the civil aspect of culpa contractual. As such, it is
distinct and independent from the estafa case filed against the offender and may proceed
regardless of the result of the criminal proceedings.
 P a g e | 128

HEIRS OF GUARING v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R.No. 108395 March 7, 1997

FACTS:

On November 7, 1987, the car driven by Teodoro Guaring Jr. collided with the Philippine Rabbit
Bus driven by Angelo Cuevas and with a Toyota Cressida Car driven by Eligio Enriquez, along
the North Luzon Expressway in San Rafael, Mexico Pampanga. As a consequence, Guaring died.
The trial court ruled in favor of herein petitioners, but lost in the Court of Appeals where the
accused was acquitted based on reasonable doubt. This was because it was found out that the
deceased was the one who acted negligently. The accused the claimed appealed in the court that
the civil case filed against him be extinguished since the extinguishment of his criminal liability
necessarily follows the extinguishment of his civil liability, since his civil liability aroused from
his criminal liability. The petitioners disagreed on this ground, claiming that the civil case should
pursue. This was then appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the civil liability of the accused is extinguished due to his acquittal.

RULING:

The Supreme Court held that the acquittal of the bus driver was based on reasonable doubt,
which means that the civil case for damages was not barred since the cause of action of the heirs
was based on quasi-delict. Even if damages are sought on the basis of crime and not quasi-delict,
the acquittal of the bus driver will not bar recovery of damages because the acquittal was based
not on a finding that he was not guilty but only on reasonable doubt. Thus, it has been held that
the judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it
includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil
liability is not extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only
preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases; where the court expressly declares that the
liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature as, for instance, in the felonies of
estafa, theft, and malicious mischief committed by certain relatives who thereby incur only civil
liability; and, where the civil liability does not arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of
which the accused was acquitted. Therefore, the Supreme Court ruled that the proceedings for
the civil case of the said incident must continue for the recovery of damages of the victim’s heirs.
The case was remanded to the trial court to determine the civil liability of the accused.
 P a g e | 129

INTERNATIONAL FLAVORS AND FRAGRANCE (PHIL.), INC. v. ARGOS

G.R. NO. 130362 September 10, 2001

FACTS:

Merlin J. Argos and Jaja C. Pineda, general manager and commercial director respectively of the
International Flavors and Fragrances Incorporated (IFFI) filed a libel case against Hernan H.
Costa, the managing director of IFFI after being described by the latter as pesona non grata in his
personal announcement after termination of their services. They later filed a separate civil case
for damages against Costa and IFFI in its subsidiary capacity as employer with the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig wherein IFFI moved to dismiss the complaint. The Regional Trial Court
granted IFFI’s motion to dismiss for respondent’s failure to reserve its right to institute a separate
civil action. Upon a motion for reconsideration, the Regional Trial Court granted Argos and
Pineda’s petition which was later affirmed by the appellate court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Argos and Pineda could sue IFFI for damages based on subsidiary liability in an
independent civil action.

RULING:

IFFI, petitioner contends that respondents did not allege that IFFI was primarily liable for
damages and on the contrary, the complaint was replete with references that IFFI was being sued
for its subsidiary capacity. Article 33 of the New Civil Code provides that in cases of
defamation, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action,
may be brought by the injured party. As ruled in Joaquin v. Aniceto however, article 33
contemplates an action against the employee in his primary capacity. It does not apply to an
action against the employer to enforce its subsidiary civil liability as such liability arises only
after conviction of the employee in the criminal case or when the employee adjudged guilty of
the wrongful act. Thus, the Supreme Court granted IFFI’s petition for dismissal.
 P a g e | 130

RUIZ v. UCOL
G.R. No. L- 45404 August 7, 1987

FACTS:

Agustina Tagaca, laundry-woman for plaintiff-appellant Atty. Jesus B. Ruiz filed an

administrative charge against defendant appellee Encarnacion Ucol, a midwife in the health
center of Sarratt, Ilocos Norte. In an answer to the charges, Ucol alleged that Tagaca was a mere
tool used by Atty. Ruiz to get back to her because of a case filed by Ucol’s husband against Ruiz.
She was also alleged to have made remarks that Ruiz instigated the complaint and fabricated the
charges. The said case was dismissed but Ruiz decided to file his own criminal case against Ucol
based on the alleged libelous portions of Ucol’s answer. After the trial, the lower court rendered
judgment acquitting Ucol on the ground that her guilt was not established beyond reasonable
doubt. Instead of appealing the civil aspects of the case, Ruiz filed a separate complaint for
damages. Ucol moved for a motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata which was then
granted by the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte after being remanded by the Court of
Appeals.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Ruiz is barred by the criminal case of libel from filing a separate civil action for
damages.

RULING:

Ruiz contends that there can be no res judicata in the case, since the decision of the trial court did
not pass upon the civil aspect of the criminal case. Article 33 of the Civil Code which gives an
offended party in cases of defamation, among others, the right to file a civil action distinct from
the criminal proceedings is not without limitations. The Supreme Court found that the appeal of
Ruiz is without merit as records of the trial court manifest that the suit being charged by Ruiz to
be a harassment suit on the following grounds. (1) Ruiz had something to do with the
administrative complaint, (2) Ruiz filed a criminal case for libel against Mrs. Ucol’s answer in
the administrative case after the administrative case’s dismissal, (3) Ruiz acted as a private
prosecutor in the criminal caseactively handling as a lawyer the very case where he was the
complainant, and (4) After Ucol was acquitted, Ruiz pursued his anger at the Ucols by filing a
civil action for damages.
 P a g e | 131

COJUANGCO v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 119398 July 2, 1999

FACTS:

Eduardo Cojuangco is a known businessman-sportsman owing several racehorses which he

entered in the sweepstake races on March 6, 1986 to September 18, 1989. Several of his horses
won the races on various dates, landing first, second or third places, respectively, and winning
prizes together with the 30% due for trainer and grooms. Unfortunately, the winnings were being
withheld on the advice of Presidential Commission on Good Government Commissioner Ramon
A. Diaz. The Chairman of PCSO and the Private Respondent, Fernando O. Carrascoso, offered
to give back the winnings but it was refused by the petitioner for the reason that the matter is
already in court. The trial court held that Carrascoso had no authority to withhold the winnings
since there was no writ of sequestration evidencing the orders of PCGG. Carrascoso feared that if
he did not withhold the winning he would be liable for neglect of duty. Carrascoso maintained
that bad faith did not attend his acts therefore he is not liable for damages. In fact, Carrascoso
stated that he returned the principal amount of the winning evidencing his good faith. Petitioner
begs to differ.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is entitled to damages for the violation of his constitutional rights to
due process.

RULING:

The Supreme Court held that petitioner is entitled for damages in accordance with Article 32 of
the Civil Code. Article 32(6) of the Civil Code provides that any public officer or employee, or
any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstruct, defeats, violates or in any manner
impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to
the latter for damages, in this case the right against deprivation of property without due process
of law. Carrascoso's decision to withhold petitioner's winnings could not be characterized as
arbitrary or whimsical, or even the product of ill will or malice. He had particularly sought from
PCGG a clarification of the extent and coverage of the sequestration order issued against the
properties of petitioner. Although it is true that a public officer shall not be liable by way of
moral and exemplary damages for acts done in the performance of official duties, the Court
nevertheless states that bad faith is not necessary in praying for damages in Article 32 of the
Civil Code. Under the Article, it is not necessary that the public officer acted with malice or bad
faith. To be liable, it is enough that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of petitioner,
even on the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of one's duties. A little
exercise of prudence would have disclosed that there was no writ issued specifically for the
sequestration of the racehorse winnings of petitioner. There was apparently no record of any
such writ covering his racehorses either. The issuance of a sequestration order requires the
showing of a prima facie case and due regard for the requirements of due process. The
withholding of the prize winnings of petitioner without a properly issued sequestration order
clearly spoke of a violation of his property rights without due process of law.
 P a g e | 132

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY v. CASTILLO

G.R. No. 182976 January 14, 2013

FACTS:

Respondents are spouses engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling fluorescent
fixtures, office steel cabinets and related metal fabrication under the name and style of
Permanent Light Manufacturing Enterprise. In the afternoon of April 19, 1994, Joselito Ignacio
and Peter Legaspi , Fully Phased Inspectors of Meralco sought permission to inspect Permanent
Lights electric meter. Ignacio and Legaspi, together with an employee of Permanent Light,
proceeded to check the electric meter. Upon inspection, the MERALCO inspectors noticed that
the electric meter was tampered and right there and then took down the meter. It was found out
that indeed the meter has been tampered with. Permanent Light agreed to pay the deficient bills.
MERALCO installed a new electric meter. The respondents alleged that the electric meter
registered unusually high readings. The petitioners are now requesting that the old electric meter
be re-installed since it shows a more accurate reading. The respondents also pray for damages
since the electric meter was allegedly removed without following the required procedure. The
RTC ruled in favor of respondents entitled to damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision stating that the petitioner abused its rights when it disconnected the electricity of
Permanent Light. The petitioners raise the issue of damages to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not MERALCO is liable for damages in for the violation of the constitutional rights
of the respondent.

RULING:

The Supreme Court held that Permanent Light is entitled to exemplary damages for the violation
of their constitutional rights. The Supreme Court based its judgment on Section 4 of Republic
Act 7832 which provides that taking down of tampered electric meter should be personally
witnessed and attested to by an officer of the law or a duly authorized representative of the
Energy Regulatory Board. MERALCO failed to show evidence that there was an officer of the
law or a duly authorized representative of ERB therefore there is no prima facie evidence that the
meter is tampered and they have no right to disconnect the electric meter. Besides, even if there
is prima facie evidence of illegal use of electricity, Section 6 of Republic Act No. 7832 provides
that even if flagrante delicto, there must be still be a written notice or warning to the owner of the
house or the establishment concerned. In light or the following the Supreme Court awards
exemplary damages to Permanent Light for the recompense of their injured rights. Article 32 of
the Civil Code provides for awards of damages in cases where the rights of individuals, including
the right against deprivation of property without due process of law are violated.
 P a g e | 133

BARREDO v. GARCIA
G.R. No. 48006 July 8, 1942

FACTS:

At about 1:30am on May 3, 1936, Fontanilla’s taxi collided with a horse-drawn carriage thereby
killing the 16-year-old Faustino Garcia. Faustino’s parents filed a criminal suit against Fontanilla
and reserved their right to file a separate civil suit. Fontanilla was eventually convicted. After the
criminal suit, Garcia filed a civil suit against Barredo, the owner of the taxi and the employer of
Fontanilla. The suit was based on Article 1903 of the civil code which provides that negligence
of employers in the selection of their employees can be civilly liable. Barredo assailed the suit
arguing that his liability is only subsidiary and that the separate civil suit should have been filed
against Fontanilla primarily and not him.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Barredo can be civilly liable for the crime committed by his employee.

RULING:

The Supreme Court held that Barredo can be civilly liable. He is primarily liable under Article
1903 which is a separate civil action against negligent employers. Garcia is well within his rights
in suing Barredo. He reserved his right to file a separate civil action and this is more expeditious
because by the time of the SC judgment Fontanilla is already serving his sentence and has no
property. It was also proven that Barredo is negligent in hiring his employees because it was
shown that Fontanilla had had multiple traffic infractions already before he hired him, something
he failed to overcome during hearing. Had Garcia not reserved his right to file a separate civil
action, Barredo would have only been subsidiarily liable. Further, Barredo is not being sued for
damages arising from a criminal act, but rather for his own negligence in selecting his employee
under Article 1903.
 P a g e | 134

SAFEGUARD SECURITY AGENCY, INC. v. TANGCO

G.R. No. 165732 December 14, 2006

FACTS:

On November 3, 1997, Evangeline Tangco went to Ecology Bank, Katipunan Branch, Quezon
City, to renew her time deposit per advice of the bank's cashier as she would sign a specimen
card. Evangeline, a duly licensed firearm holder with corresponding permit to carry the same
outside her residence, approached security guard Pajarillo, who was stationed outside the bank,
and pulled out her firearm from her bag to deposit the same for safekeeping. Suddenly, Pajarillo
shot Evangeline with his service shotgun hitting her in the abdomen instantly causing her death.
Respondent filed a complaint for damages against Pajarillo for negligently shooting Evangeline
and against Safeguard for failing to observe the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
the damage committed by its security guard. Respondents prayed for actual, moral and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner is liable for damages under quasi-delicts.

RULING:

The Supreme Court held that respondent is entitled to damages. It ruled that while it may be
conceded that Safeguard had perhaps exercised care in the selection of its employees,
particularly of Pajarillo, there was no sufficient evidence to show that Safeguard exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of its employee; that Safeguard's
evidence simply showed that it required its guards to attend trainings and seminars which is not
the supervision contemplated under the law; that supervision includes not only the issuance of
regulations and instructions designed for the protection of persons and property, for the guidance
of their servants and employees, but also the duty to see to it that such regulations and
instructions are faithfully complied with.
 P a g e | 135

BELTRAN v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 137567 June 20, 2000

FACTS:

Petitioner was married to Charmaine Felix on June 16, 1973. After 24 years of marriage and
having four children, petitioner filed a petition for nullity of marriage on ground of psychological
incapacity. Charmaine on the other hand filed a criminal complaint for concubinage against
petitioner and his paramour. To forestall the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the criminal
complaint, petitioner filed for the suspension of the criminal case on concubinage arguing that
the civil case for the nullification of their marriage is a prejudicial question.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the civil case for nullity of marriage under psychological incapacity is a
prejudicial question to the criminal case of concubinage.

RULING:

The rationale on the existence of prejudicial questions is to avoid two conflicting issues. Its
requisites are 1) that a civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue in
the criminal action and 2) the resolution of the issue determines whether or not the criminal
action will proceed. In the present case, the accused need not present a final judgment declaring
his marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage
other than the proof of a final judgment. More importantly, parties to a marriage should not be
allowed to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the competent
courts. So long as there is no such final judgment the presumption is that the marriage exists for
all intents and purposes. Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman not his wife risks being
prosecuted for concubinage.
 P a g e | 136

MERCED v. DIEZ
G.R. No. L-15315 August 26, 1960

FACTS:

Petitioner filed a complaint for annulment of his marriage to Elizabeth Ceasar alleging that he
married Elizabeth by reason of force, threat and intimidation upon his persons by Elizabeth’s
relatives. Elizabeth on the other hand filed a criminal complaint alleging that petitioner has been
previously married to one Eufrocina Tan. He now files a petition for the suspension of the
criminal case on grounds of prejudicial question.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an action to annul the second marriage is a prejudicial question.

RULING:

In order that a person may be held liable for the crime of bigamy, the subsequent marriage must
have all the essential elements of a valid marriage, were it not for the subsistence of the first
marriage. One of the essential elements of a valid marriage is that the consent thereto of the
contracting parties must be freely given. Without the element of consent, a marriage would be
illegal and void. Since the validity of the second marriage is in question, subject of the action for
bigamy, cannot be determined in the criminal case and since prosecution for bigamy does not lie
unless all the elements concur, it is necessary then that a decision in a civil action must first be
secured.
 P a g e | 137

DONATO v. LUNA
G.R. NO. L-53642 April 15, 1988

FACTS:

An information for bigamy against herein petitioner was filed. It is alleged that petitioner
married Rosalindo Maluping on June 30, 1978, he however married for the second time with Paz
Abayan on September 26, 1978. Prior to the trial for the criminal case, petitioner filed a motion
to suspend on grounds of a prejudicial question. He claims that the civil case for the nullity of his
second marriage is a prejudicial question.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the civil case for nullity of marriage is a prejudicial question to the criminal case
of bigamy.

RULING:

The issue of the nullity of the marriage in the civil case is not determinative of petitioner’s guilt
or innocence in the crime of bigamy. It is noteworthy that the complaint for annulment of the
second marriage on the ground that her consent was obtained through deceit was filed by Paz
Abayan, the second wife. He who contracts a second marriage before a judicial declaration of
nullity of marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. The case for annulment of
marriage can only be considered as a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused
only if it is proved that the petitioner’s consent to marriage was obtained through duress,
violence or intimidation. Such is not the case at bar. Petitioner merely raised the issue of
prejudicial question to evade the prosecution of the criminal case. Records reveal that prior to
petitioner’s second marriage he had been living with private respondent as husband and wife for
more than five years. He only came up with the story that his consent to the marriage was
secured through force, threat and intimidation one year from the solemnization of the second
marriage.
 P a g e | 138

CONSING, JR. v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 161075 July 15, 2013

FACTS:

Petitioner negotiated with and obtained for himself and his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz (de la
Cruz) various loans totaling P18,000,000.00 from Unicapital Inc. (Unicapital). The loans were
secured by a real estate mortgage constituted on a parcel of land registered under the name of de
la Cruz. In accordance with its option to purchase the mortgaged property, Unicapital agreed to
purchase one-half of the property for a total consideration of P21,221,500.00. Payment was
effected by off-setting the amounts due to Unicapital under the promissory notes of de la Cruz
and Consing in the amount of P18,000,000.00 and paying an additional amount ofÂ
P3,145,946.50. The other half of the property was purchased by Plus Builders, Inc. (Plus
Builders), a joint venture partner of Unicapital. Before Unicapital and Plus Builders could
develop the property, they learned that the title to the property was really TCT No. 114708 in the
names of Po Willie Yu and Juanito Tan Teng, the parties from whom the property had been
allegedly acquired by de la Cruz. TCT No. 687599 held by De la Cruz appeared to be spurious.
On its part, Unicapital demanded the return of the total amount of P41,377,851.48 as of April
19, 1999 that had been paid to and received by de la Cruz and Consing, but the latter ignored the
demands. Consing filed Civil Case No. 1759 in the Pasig City RTC for injunctive relief, thereby
seeking to enjoin Unicapital from proceeding against him for the collection of theP41,377,851.48
on the ground that he had acted as a mere agent of his mother. On the same date, Unicapital
initiated a criminal complaint for estafa through falsification of public document against Consing
and de la Cruz in the Makati City Prosecutor’s Office. Unicapital sued Consing in the RTC in
Makati City (Civil Case No. 99-1418) for the recovery of a sum of money and damages, with an
application for a writ of preliminary attachment. The Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati
City filed against Consing and De la Cruz an information for estafa through falsification of
public document in the RTC in Makati City. Consing moved to defer his arraignment in the
Makati criminal case on the ground of existence of a prejudicial question due to the pendency of
the Pasig and Makati civil cases. On September 25, 2001, Consing reiterated his motion for
deferment of his arraignment, citing the additional ground of pendency of CA-G.R. SP No.
63712 in the CA. On November 19, 2001, the Prosecution opposed the motion. On November
26, 2001, the RTC issued an order suspending the proceedings in the Makati criminal case on the
ground of the existence of a prejudicial question, and on March 18, 2001, the RTC denied the
Prosecution motion for reconsideration. The State thus assailed in the CA the last two orders of
the RTC in the Makati criminal case via petition for certiorari (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 71252). On
May 20, 2003, the CA promulgated its decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 71252, dismissing the
petition for certiorari and upholding the RTC questioned orders. On August 18, 2003, the CA
amended its decision, reversing itself. Consing filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA
denied the motion through the second assailed resolution of December 11, 2003. Hence, this
appeal by petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is an existence of a prejudicial question that warranted the suspension of the
proceedings in the Makati criminal case.
 P a g e | 139

RULING:

No, Consing has hereby deliberately chosen to ignore the firm holding in the ruling in G.R. No.
148193 to the effect that the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 00-120 could not be suspended
because the Makati civil case was an independent civil action, while the Pasig civil case raised
no prejudicial question. That was wrong for him to do considering that the ruling fully applied to
him due to the similarity between his case with Plus Builders and his case with Unicapital. A
perusal of Unicapital complaint in the Makati civil case reveals that the action was predicated on
fraud. This was apparent from the allegations of Unicapital in its complaint to the effect that
Consing and de la Cruz had acted in a "wanton, fraudulent, oppressive, or malevolent manner in
offering as security and later object of sale, a property which they do not own, and foisting to the
public a spurious title." As such, the action was one that could proceed independently of
Criminal Case No. 00-120 pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code. It is well settled that a civil
action based on defamation, fraud and physical injuries may be independently instituted pursuant
to Article 33 of the Civil Code, and does not operate as a prejudicial question that will justify the
suspension of a criminal case. In the instant case, Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages and
Attachment on account of the alleged fraud committed by respondent and his mother in selling
the disputed lot to PBI is an independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. As such,
it will not operate as a prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of the criminal case at
bar. Contrary to Consing’s stance, it was not improper for the CA to apply the ruling in G.R. No.
148193 to his case with Unicapital, for, although the Manila and Makati civil cases involved
different complainants (i.e., Plus Builders and Unicapital), the civil actions Plus Builders and
Unicapital had separately instituted against him were undeniably of similar mold, i.e., they were
both based on fraud, and were thus covered by Article 33 of the Civil Code. Clearly, the Makati
criminal case could not be suspended pending the resolution of the Makati civil case that
Unicapital had filed. As far as the Pasig civil case is concerned, the issue of Consing’s being a
mere agent of his mother who should not be criminally liable for having so acted due to the
property involved having belonged to his mother as principal has also been settled in G.R. No.
148193, to wit: In the case at bar, we find no prejudicial question that would justify the
suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case (the Cavite criminal case).
 P a g e | 140

PIMENTEL v. PIMENTEL
G.R. No. 172060 September 13, 2010

FACTS:

On 25 October 2004, Maria Pimentel y Lacap (private respondent) filed an action for frustrated
parricide against Joselito Pimentel (petitioner) before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the Regional Trial Court of
Antipolo City for the pre-trial and trial of a civil case (Maria Pimentel v. Joselito Pimentel) for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of
psychological incapacity. On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the
proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial
question.

ISSUE:

Whether the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question that
warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against petitioner.

RULING:

No. The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 is whether petitioner is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The issue in
parricide is whether the accused killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with
frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the acts of execution which would have
killed respondent as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of
causes independent of petitioner’s will. At the time of the commission of the alleged crime,
petitioner and respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution of their marriage will have
no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at the time of the subsistence of the marriage.
In short, even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still
be held criminally liable since at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still
married to respondent. We cannot accept petitioner’s reliance on Tenebro v. CA that the judicial
declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the
date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned.
First, the issue in Tenebro is the effect of the judicial declaration of nullity of a second or
subsequent marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on a criminal liability for
bigamy. There was no issue of prejudicial question in that case. Second, the Court ruled in
Tenebro that there is a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void
ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. In fact, the Court declared in that case that a
declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of
absolutely no moment insofar as the State’s penal laws are concerned.
 P a g e | 141

CITY OF PASIG v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 125646 September 10, 1999

FACTS:

On April 22, 1996, upon petition of the residents of Karangalan Village that they be separated
from its mother Barangay Manggahan and Dela Paz, City of Pasig, and to be converted and
separated into a distinct barangay to be known as Barangay Karangalan, the City of Pasig passed
and approved Ordinance No. 21, Series of 1996, creating Barangay Karangalan in Pasig
City. Plebiscite on the creation of said barangay was thereafter set for June 22, 1996.

Meanwhile on September 9, 1996, the City of Pasig similarly issued Ordinance No. 52 creating
Barangay Napico in Pasig City. Plebiscite for this purpose was set for March 15, 1997.
Immediately upon learning of such Ordinances, the Municipality of Cainta moved to suspend or
cancel the respective plebiscites scheduled, and filed Petitions with the COMELEC on June 19,
1996, and March 12, 1997, respectively. In both Petitions, the Municipality of Cainta called the
attention of the COMELEC to a pending case before the RTC of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 74, for
settlement of boundary dispute. According to the Municipality of Cainta, the proposed barangays
involve areas included in the boundary dispute subject of said pending case. Hence, the
scheduled plebiscites should be suspended or cancelled until after the said case shall have been
finally decided by the court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the plebiscites scheduled for the creation of Barangays Karangalan and Napico
should be suspended or cancelled due to a prejudicial question of territory.

RULING:

The Supreme Court held that this is an exception to the general rule of prejudicial questions and
that the suspension or cancellation of the plebiscite be granted. A case involving a boundary
dispute between Local Government Units presents a prejudicial question which must first be
decided before plebiscites for the creation of the proposed barangays may be held. While it may
be the general rule that a prejudicial question contemplates a civil and criminal action and does
not come into play where both cases are civil, in the interest of good order, the SC can very well
suspend action on one case pending the outcome of another case closely interrelated/linked to the
first. A requisite for the creation of a barangay is for its territorial jurisdiction to be properly
identified by metes and bounds or by more or less permanent natural boundaries. Primarily
because territorial jurisdiction is an issue raised in a pending civil case, until and unless such
issue is resolved with finality, to define the territorial jurisdiction of the proposed barangays
would only be an exercise in futility.
 P a g e | 142

QUIMIGUING v. ICAO
G.R. No. 26795 July 31, 1970

FACTS:

The parties were neighbors in Dapitan City, and had close and confidential relations. Defendant
Icao, although married, succeeded in having carnal intercourse with plaintiff several times by
force and intimidation, and without her consent. As a result, she became pregnant, despite efforts
and drugs supplied by defendant, and plaintiff had to stop studying. Hence, she claimed support
at P120.00 per month, damages and attorney's fees. Accordingly, defendant moved to dismiss for
lack of cause of action since the complaint did not allege that the child had been born. The trial
judge dismissed the complaint. Thereafter, plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to allege that
as a result of the intercourse, plaintiff had later given birth to a baby girl; but the court, sustaining
defendant's objection, ruled that no amendment was allowable, since the original complaint
averred no cause of action.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the child is entitled to support?

RULING:

A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own
for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. The unborn child, therefore, has a right to support from its progenitors, particularly
of the defendant-appellee (whose paternity is deemed admitted for the purpose of the motion to
dismiss), even if the said child is only "en ventre de sa mere;" just as a conceived child, even if
as yet unborn, may receive donations as prescribed by Article 742 of the same Code, and its
being ignored by the parent in his testament may result in preterition of a forced heir that annuls
the institution of the testamentary heir, even if such child should be born after the death of the
testator (Article 854, Civil Code).
 P a g e | 143

GELUZ v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-16439 July 20, 1961

FACTS:

Petitioner and Nita Villanueva were lovers. Before they were married Nita got pregnant to which
she had got an abortion from private respondent Oscar Lazo. After Nita’s marriage with plaintiff,
she again became pregnant but due to her work priorities, she again had again had abortion with
the same doctor. She had a third abortion done by the same. The plaintiff now sues an award for
damages against Doctor Oscar alleging that he did not know of, nor gave his consent to the
abortions. He is suing for damages for the unborn child.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an action for damages can be instituted on behalf of the unborn child.

RULING:

No action for damages could be instituted in behalf of the unborn child on account of the injuries
it received; no such action could derivatively accrue to its parents. No transmission of rights can
take place from on due to the lack of juridical personality. Article 40 of the Civil Code limits the
application of the presumptive civil personality by imposing the condition that the child should
be subsequently born alive. However, moral damages could be awarded for the illegal arrest of
the normal development of the fetus on account of distress and anguish attendant to is lost, and
the disappointment of their parental expectations. The records do not bear such case. It is clear
that the husband is only intent on recovering money from the doctor.
 P a g e | 144

CONTINENTAL STEEL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION v. MONTANO

G.R. No. 182836 October 13, 2009

FACTS:

Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation (Continental

Steel) and a member of respondent Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Centro Steel Corporation-
Solidarity of Trade Unions in the Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms (Union) filed a
claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for dependent,
pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). The claim was based on the death of
Hortillanos unborn child. Hortillanos wife had a premature delivery. According to the Certificate
of Fetal Death, the female fetus died during labor. Continental Steel immediately granted
Hortillanos claim for paternity leave but denied his claims for bereavement leave and other death
benefits, consisting of the death and accident insurance. The Union argued that Hortillano was
entitled to bereavement leave and other death benefits and maintained that the CBA did not
specifically state that the dependent should have first been born alive or must have acquired
juridical personality so that his/her subsequent death could be covered by the CBA death
benefits.

On the other hand, Continental Steel posited that the express provision of the CBA did not
contemplate the death of an unborn child, a fetus, without legal personality. Continental Steel,
relying on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code, contended that only one with civil
personality could die. Hence, the unborn child never died because it never acquired juridical
personality. Hence, the term dependent could not be applied to a fetus that never acquired
juridical personality. Furthermore, Continental Steel maintained that the wording of the CBA
was clear and unambiguous. Atty. Montao found that there was no dispute that the death of an
employee’s legitimate dependent occurred. The fetus had the right to be supported by the parents
from the very moment he/she was conceived. Therefore, the fetus was already a dependent,
although he/she died during the labor or delivery.

ISSUES:
a. Whether or not Continental Steel is correct in merely relying in articles 40, 41 and 42 for
the definition of death.
b. Whether or not a person needs to be born before it could die?

RULING:

The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code for the legal
definition of death is misplaced. Article 40 provides that a conceived child acquires personality
only when it is born, and Article 41 defines when a child is considered born. Article 42 plainly
states that civil personality is extinguished by death. Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code on
natural persons, must be applied in relation to Article 37 of the same Code, the very first of the
general provisions on civil personality. Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code do not provide
at all a definition of death. Moreover, while the Civil Code expressly provides that civil
personality may be extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that only those who have
acquired juridical personality could die. Death has been defined as the cessation of life. Life is
 P a g e | 145

not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she
could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution
recognizes the life of the unborn from conception, that the State must protect equally with the
life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child
being delivered, qualifies as death.
 P a g e | 146

CATALAN v. BASA
G.R. No. 159567 July 31, 2007

FACTS:

Feliciano Catalan was discharged from military service due to his psychological incapacity of
schizophrenia on October 20, 1948. He married Corazon Cerezo on September 1949. On June
1951 he donated a parcel of land to his sister Mercedes Catalan. On December 1953 Feliciano
was declared incompetent and BPI was appointed as his guardian. Mercedes sold the properties
to herein respondents in 1979. In 1997, BPI, acting as Feliciano’s guardian filed an action or
declaration of nullity od documents and recovery of possession and ownership alleging that the
donation to Mercedes was void ab initio as Feliciano not of sound mind when he effected the
donation, ipso facto, the sale to herein respondents are void ab initio.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Feliciano’s donation is void for lack of consent due to incapacity.

RULING:

In order for a donation to be valid, the donor’s capacity to give consent at the time of the
donation is existing. There lies no doubt that insanity impinges on consent freely given.
However, the burden of proving such incapacity rests upon the person who alleges it, if no
sufficient proof to this effect is presented, capacity is presumed. The evidence presented by
petitioners was insufficient to overcome the presumption that Feliciano was competent when he
donated the property in question. A study of the nature of schizophrenia will show that Feliciano
could still be presumed capable of attending to his rights.
 P a g e | 147

DOMINGO v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 127540 October 17, 2001

FACTS:

Paulina Rigonan owns three parcels of land. She allegedly sold them to spouses Felipe and
Concepcion Rigonan who claim to be her relatives. In 1966, herein petitioners who claim to be
her closest surviving relatives allegedly took possession of the properties. Petitioners claim that
the sale was void for being spurious as well as lacking consideration.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the sale was void.

RULING:

At the time of the execution of the alleged contract, Paulina Rigonan was already of advanced
age and senile. She died an octogenarian. The general rule is that a person is not incompetent to
contract merely because of advanced years or by reason of physical infirmities. However, when
such age or infirmities have impaired the mental faculties so as to prevent the person from
properly, intelligently and firmly protecting her property rights then she is undeniably
incapacitated. The unrebutted testimony shows that at the time of the execution of the deed,
Paulina was already incapacitated physically and mentally. She played with her waste and
urinated in bed. Given these circumstances, there is sufficient reason to seriously doubt that she
consented to the sale of and the price for her parcels of land.
 P a g e | 148

MENDEZONA v. OZAMIZ
G.R. No. 143370 February 2, 2002

FACTS:

Petitioners own a parcel of land and to remove a cloud on their said respective titles caused by
the inscription thereon of a notice of lis pendens initiated a suit. They ultimately trace their
ownership to a deed of sale executed by Carmen Ozamiz. Respondents are now impugning the
deed of sale, alleging that Carmen Ozamiz was incapacitated at the time of the execution of the
sale.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the deed of sale is void due to the incapacity of the seller.

RULING:

The testimonies on record all made sweeping statements which failed to show the true state of
mind of Carmen Ozamiz at the time of the execution of the disputed document. It has been held
that a person is not incapacitated to contract merely because of advanced years or by reason of
physical infirmity. Only when such age or infirmity impairs her mental faculties to such extent as
to prevent her from properly, intelligently and fairly protecting her property rights is she
considered incapacitated. Respondents utterly failed to show adequate proof that at the time of
the sale on April 28, 1989 Carmen Ozamiz has allegedly lost control of her mental faculties.
 P a g e | 149

JOAQUIN v. NAVARRO
G.R. No. L-5426 May 29, 1953

FACTS:

On February 6, 1945, while the battle for the liberation of Manila was raging, the spouses
Joaquin Navarro, Sr. and Angela Joaquin, together with their children, Pilar, Concepcion,
Natividad, and Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and the latter's wife, Adela Conde, sought refuge in the
ground floor of the German Club. During their stay, the building was packed with refugees,
shells were exploding around, and the Club was set on fire. Simultaneously, the Japanese started
shooting at the people inside the building. The three daughters were hit and fell of the ground
thereafter Joaquin Navarro, Sr., and his son decided to abandon the building. They could not
convince Angela Joaquin who refused to join them but Joaquin Navarro, Sr., his son, and the
latter's wife, and a friend and former neighbor, Francisco Lopez, rushed out of the burning
structure. As they came out, Joaquin Navarro, Jr. was shot in the head. The others lay flat on the
ground in front of the Club premises to avoid the bullets. Minutes later after the incident, the
German Club collapsed, trapping many people inside, presumably including Angela Joaquin.
Joaquin Navarro, Sr., Adela Conde, and Francisco Lopez managed to reach an air raid shelter
nearby and stayed there until February 10, 1915. They fled toward the St. Theresa Academy in
San Marcelino Street, but unfortunately were killed by Japanese Patrols, who fired at the
refugees.

ISSUE:

Whether or not section 69 (ii) of Rule 123 of the Rules of Court, has repealed article 43 of the
New Civil Code applicable in the case.

RULING:

It is the contention of the petitioner that it did not, and that on the assumption that there is total
lack of evidence, as the Court of Appeals said, then Angela Joaquin and Joaquin Navarro, Jr.
should, under article 33, be held to have died at the same time. The point is not of much if any
relevancy and will be left open for the consideration when absolute necessity there for arises. We
say irrelevant because our opinion is that neither of the two provisions is applicable for the
reasons to be presently set forth. It is manifest from the language of section 69 (ii) of Rule 123
and of that of the foregoing decision that the evidence of the survivorship need not be direct; it
may be indirect, circumstantial, or inferential. Where there are facts, known or knowable, from
which a rational conclusion can be made, the presumption does not step in, and the rule of
preponderance of evidence controls.
 P a g e | 150

MARCOS v. COMELEC
G.R.No. 119976 September 18, 1995

FACTS:

Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte on March 8, 1995. Thereafter, private respondent
Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and a candidate
for the same position, filed a "Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" with the
Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for
residency. Private respondent contended that Mrs. Marcos lacked the Constitution's one year
residency requirement for candidates for the House of Representatives on the evidence of
declarations made by her in Voter Registration Record 94-No. 3349772 and in her Certificate of
Candidacy. Consequently, Petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy,
changing the entry "seven" months to "since childhood" of the amended certificate.
Consequently, petitioner filed the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy with the
COMELEC's Head Office in Intramuros, Manila. Petitioner claimed that the entry of the word
"seven" in her original Certificate of Candidacy was the result of an "honest misinterpretation"
which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected
Certificate of Candidacy and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or
residence. In a Resolution promulgated, the COMELEC en banc denied petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration declaring her not qualified to run for the said position.

On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner's proclamation should
the results of the canvass show that she obtained the highest number of votes in the congressional
elections in the First District of Leyte. On the same day, however, the COMELEC reversed itself
and issued a second Resolution directing that the proclamation of petitioner be suspended in the
event that she obtains the highest number of votes. In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May
1995, petitioner averred that she was the overwhelming winner of the elections for the
congressional seat in the First District of Leyte held May 8, 1995 based on the canvass
completed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers on May 14, 1995. Petitioner alleged that the
canvass showed that she obtained a total of 70,471 votes compared to the 36,833 votes received
by Respondent Montejo. A copy of said Certificate of Canvass was annexed to the Supplemental
Petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner satisfies the residency requirement or not.

RULING:

Domicile includes the twin elements of 1) the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed
place and 2) animus manendi or the intention of returning there permanently. Residence implies
the factual relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is the physical presence of a person
in a given area. The essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that residence
involves the intent to leave when the purpose which the resident has taken up his abode ends. If a
 P a g e | 151

person’s intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile. It is thus quite normal for an individual to
have different residences but have only one domicile. These concepts however have evolved in
political law to be used synonymously. When the Constitution however speaks of residence in
election law, it actually means only domicile. An individual does not lose his domicile even if he
has lived and maintained residences in different places. Based on the evidence, petitioner clearly
only had numerous residences, but maintained her domicile to be in Leyte.
 P a g e | 152

ARUEGO, JR. v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 112193 March 13, 1996

FACTS:

Jose Aruego Sr. had an amorous relationship with Luz Fabian out of this were born two children.
Jose died on March 30 1982. After his death private respondents filed a case for declaration of
acknowledgement as illegitimate children. Petitioners herein are challenging such action
interposing that under the Family code the method by which respondents can prove their filiation
has already prescribed, that his while the putative parent is alive.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Family code finds a retroactive application in the case.

RULING:

Respondents are establishing their filiation by “open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child” under the Civil Code which provides for four years before the attainment of age
of majority. The Family Code on the other hand provides that such manner of establishing
filiation can only be brought within the lifetime of the parent. The Family Code cannot be
applied in the case. Retroactive application cannot be applied if a vested right is impaired or
prejudiced in the process. The right of action of the minor child for recognition has been vested
by the filing of complaint in court under the regime of the Civil Code and prior effectively of the
Family Code.
 P a g e | 153

BERNABE v. ALEJO
G.R. No. 140500 January 21, 2002

FACTS:

Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary Carolina Alejo. The son was
born on September 1981. The Fiscal died on August 1993. On May 1994, Carolina in behalf of
Adrian filed a complaint for Adrian to be declared and acknowledged illegitimate son of Fiscal
Bernabe and such entitled to his share in the estate. Petitioners are challenging the petition on
grounds that the action has prescribed on ground that the Family code has retroactive application
and hence, the manner of proving filiation by “open and continuous possession of a status of a
legitimate child” must have been brought within the lifetime of the putative parent.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Family code finds a retroactive application in the case.

RULING:

The right to an action for recognition which was granted by Article 285 of the Civil Code has
already vested to Adrian prior the enactment of the Family Code. A vested right is one which is
absolute, complete and unconditional to the exercise of which no obstacle exists and which is
immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent upon a contingency. Certainly the retroactive
effect of the family code finds no application in this case.
 P a g e | 154

ANCHETA v. ANCHETA
G.R. No. 145370 March 4, 2004

FACTS:

Petitioner and respondent got married on March 1959. They had eight children. On December
1992, respondent left the conjugal home and abandoned petitioner and their children. On January
1994, petitioner filed a separate case for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership and judicial
separation of property with a plea for support and pendent lite. On April 1994 the parties
executed a compromise agreement. Respondent wanting to marry again filed a declaration of
nullity of his marriage with petitioner on ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner was
never served the summons because of misrepresentation. She was declared in default and the
marriage declared void and null. Petitioner now seeks a new trial and nullification of the decision
declaring the marriage void on ground of lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is basis for a new trial.

RULING:

Petitioner was never served the summons; the trial court never gained jurisdiction of her, hence
the decision null and void. Article 48 of the Family Code states that in cases of annulment or
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage the court shall order the appearance of the prosecuting
attorney to avoid collusion and in Rule 18 Section 6 of the Rules of Court, it is expressly stated
that there can be no defaults in actions for annulments of marriage or legal separation. The court
just did the opposite as mandated by the aforementioned provisions of law. Our Constitution is
committed to the basic policy of strengthening the family as a basic social institution. Our family
law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract but a social institution in which
the State is vitally interested. The motion for a new trial is granted.
 P a g e | 155

ABADILLA v. TABILIRAN
A.M. No. MTJ-92-716 October 25, 1995

FACTS:

Petitioner is the assigned clerk of court at the sala of herein respondent Judge. Respondent stands
charged with gross immorality, deceitful conduct and corruption unbecoming of a Judge. It is
alleged that he has scandalously and publicly cohabited with Priscilla Baybayan during the
existence of a previous marriage, represented himself as single in the marriage contract with
Priscilla. He also caused the registration of his three illegitimate children as legitimate.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent is guilty of the charges.

RULING:

Respondent is guilty of gross immorality for having scandalously and openly cohabited with said
Priscilla Baybayan during the existence of his marriage with Teresita Tabiliran. It makes
mockery of the inviolability and sanctity of marriage as a basic social institution. It is not only a
civil contract, but is a new relation, an institution on the maintenance of which the public is
deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans towards legalizing
matrimony. Respondent Judge is dismissed from service.
 P a g e | 156

DELA ROSA v. HEIRS OF RUSTIA VDA. DE DAMIAN

G.R. No. 155733 January 27, 2006

FACTS:

Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado died not only intestate, but they died without descendants.
Guillermo outlived Josefa by two years. Herein petitioners and respondents are their respective
relatives claiming rights to their intestate estate. The alleged heirs of Josefa consist of her half
and fullblood siblings, nephews. On Guillermo’s side, his sisters, nephews and nieces,
illegitimate child and de facto adopted child. The petitioner for letters of administration stated
that Guillermo and Rustia were never married. Josefa Delgado estate claimants are her natural
siblings. Josefa was the daughter of Felisa by one Lucio Ocampo with five other children without
the benefit of marriage. Felisa had another son by way of Ramon Osorio who is Luis Delgado,
one of the claimants in Josefa’s estate. If Luis Delgado is the legitimate child of Felisa she is
barred from inheriting from Josefa by the principle of absolute separation between the legitimate
and illegitimate families.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was a valid marriage between Guillermo and Josefa and between Felisa and
Ramon.

RULING:

Every intendment of the law leans towards legitimizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together
apparently in marriage are presumed to be in fact married. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio.
Always presume marriage. Several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid
marriage existed between Guillermo and Josefa. Their cohabitation of more than 50 years cannot
be doubted. Although a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, its
absence is not always proof that no marriage in fact took place. Once the presumption of
marriage arises other evidences may be presented just as herein. The certificate of identity issued
to Josefa as Mrs. Guillermo Rustia, the passport issued to her as Josefa Rustia, the declaration
under oath of Guilermo that he was married to Josefa buttress the presumption of the existence of
marriage. Guillermo and Josefa are married. Anent the marriage of Felisa by Ramon, the factors
and evidence presented sufficiently overcame the rebuttable presumption of marriage. Hence
Luis Delgado can inherit from Josefa.
 P a g e | 157

BALOGBOG v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 83598 March 7, 1997

FACTS:

Petitioners are the children of Basilio Balogbog and Geneveva Arnibal who died intestate. They
had an older brother named Gavino but he died predeceasing their parents. Private respondents
on the other hand are the alleged children of Gavino with Catalina Ubas and as such are entitled
to inherit from the estate of their grandparents. Petitioners aver that Gavino did not marry hence
barring respondents from inheriting from the estate.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there the presumption of marriage between Gavino and Catalino was successfully
overcome.

RULING:

Under the Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man and a woman conducting themselves as
husband and wife are legally married. This presumption is rebutted only by cogent proof of
which the petitioners failed to do so. Although a marriage contract is considered primary
evidence of marriage the failure to present it is no proof that no marriage took place. Private
respondents proved through testimonial evidence that Gavino and Catalina were married and that
their children were recognized as legitimate children of Gavino. The law favors the validity of
marriage because the State is interested in the preservation of the family and the sanctity of it is a
matter of constitutional concern.
 P a g e | 158

CALIMAG v. HEIRS OF MACAPAZ

G.R. No. 191936 June 1, 2016

FACTS:

Virginia D. Calimag (petitioner) co-owned the property, the subject matter of this case, with
Silvestra N. Macapaz (Silvestra). Respondents are children of Silvestra’s brother, Anastacio
Macapaz, Sr. (Anastacio, Sr.) and Fidela O. Poblete Vda. De Macapaz (Fidela). The subject
property was duly registered in the names of the petitioner and Silvestra under Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 183088. In said certificate of title, appearing as Entry No. 02671 is
an annotation of an Adverse Claim of Fidela asserting rights and interests over a portion of the
said property measuring 49.5 sq. m.

On November 11, 2002, Silvestra dies without issue. TCT No. 183088 was cancelled and a new
certificate of title, TCT No. 221466-7 was issued in the name of the petitioner by virtue of a
Deed of Sale whereby Silvestra allegedly sold her 99-sq.-m. portion to the petitioner for
P300,000.00. Included among the documents submitted for the purpose of cancelling TCT No.
183088 was an affidavit purportedly executed by both the petitioner and Silvestra. It was stated
therein that the affidavit of adverse claim filed by Fidela was not signed by the Deputy Register
of Deeds of Makati City, making the same legally ineffective.

On September 16, 2005, Fidela passed away. Respondents, asserting that they are the heirs of
Silvestra, instituted the action for Annulment of Deed of Sale and Cancellation of TCT No.
221466 with damages against the petitioner and the Register of Deeds of Makati City. In her
answer with compulsory counterclaim, the petitioner averred that the respondents have no legal
capacity to institute said civil action on the ground that they are illegitimate children of
Anastacio, Sr. As such, they have no right over Silvestra’s estate pursuant to Article 992 of the
Civil Code which prohibits illegitimate children from inheriting intestate from the legitimate
children and relatives of their father and mother.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Anastasio, Sr. and Fidela were married, therefore, respondents are legal heirs of
Silvestra.

RULING:

Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than
the marriage certificate. Hence, even a person’s birth certificate may be recognized as competent
evidence of the marriage between his parents. Thus, in order to prove their legitimate filiation,
the respondents presented their respective Certificates of Live Birth issued by the NSO where
Fidela signed as the informant. A perusal of said documents shows that the respondents were
apparently born to the same parents their father’s name is Anastacio Nator Macapaz, while their
mother’s maiden name is Fidela Overa Poblete. The respondents’ certificates of live birth also
intimate that Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela had openly cohabited as husband and wife for a number
of years, as a result of which they had two children the second child, Anastacio, Jr. being born
 P a g e | 159

more than three years after their first child, Alicia. Verily, such fact is admissible proof to
establish the validity of marriage.

In Trinidad v. Court of Appeals, et al., this Court ruled that as proof of marriage may be
presented: a) testimony of a witness to the matrimony; b) the couple’s public and open
cohabitation as husband and wife after the alleged wedlock; c) the birth and baptismal certificate
of children born during such union; and d) the mention of such nuptial in subsequent documents.

Moreover, in a catena of cases, it has been held that, persons dwelling together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter presumption or evidence special to the
case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the
parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the
constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil
Procedure is ‘that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered
into a lawful contract of marriage.’ Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio - Always presume
marriage.”
 P a g e | 160

SILVERIO v. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007

FACTS:

Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio having undergone a sex reassignment surgery, sought to have
his first name changed from Rommel to Mely, and his sex from male to female. He further
alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a
female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood.

Trial court granted his petition. CA, however, upon appeal filed by the Republic of the
Philippines thru the OSG, reversed the trial court decision, holding that there is no law allowing
the change of entries of either name or sex in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Rommel's first name and sex be changed on the ground of sex reassignment.

HELD:

A person’s first name cannot be changed on the ground of sex reassignment. The State has an
interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification. A change of
name is a privilege, not a right. Petitions for change of name are controlled by statutes. In this
connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name. It vests the power and authority to entertain
petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general
concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is
now primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. RA 9048 likewise
provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed. Among the grounds for
change of name which have been held valid are: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or
extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change result as a legal consequence, as
in legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used
and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a
sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and
without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no
showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name
would prejudice public interest. RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground
of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s first name for his
declared purpose may only create grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest.
 P a g e | 161

REPUBLIC v. CAGANDAHAN
G.R. No. 166676 September 12, 2008

FACTS:

Jennifer Cagandahan was registered as a female in her Certificate of Live Birth. During her
childhood years, she suffered from clitoral hypertrophy and was later on diagnosed that her
ovarian structures had minimized. She likewise has no breasts, nor menstruation. Subsequently,
she was diagnosed of having Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH), a condition where those
afflicted possess secondary male characteristics because of too much secretion of male
hormones, androgen. According to her, for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and
emotion, she has become a male person. She filed a petition at RTC Laguna for Correction of
Entries in her Birth Certificate such that her gender or sex be changed to male and her first name
be changed to Jeff.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the correction of entries in her birth certificate should be granted.

HELD:

The Supreme Court brings forth the need to elaborate the term “intersexuality” which is the
condition or let us say a disorder that respondent is undergoing. Intersexuality applies to human
beings who cannot be classified as either male or female. It is the state of a living thing of a
gonochoristic species whose sex chromosomes, genitalia, and/or secondary sex characteristics
are determined to be neither exclusively male nor female. It is said that an organism with
intersex may have biological characteristics of both male and female sexes. In view of the
foregoing, the highest tribunal of the land considers the compassionate calls for recognition of
the various degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial. The
current state of Philippine statutes apparently compels that a person be classified either as a male
or as a female, but this Court is not controlled by mere appearances when nature itself
fundamentally negates such rigid classification. That is, Philippine courts must render judgment
based on law and the evidence presented. In the instant case, there is no denying that evidence
points that respondent is male. In determining respondent to be a female, there is no basis for a
change in the birth certificate entry for gender. The Supreme Court held that where the person is
biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would be
what the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks
of his/her sex. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at
birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed. The
Court will not consider respondent as having erred in not choosing to undergo treatment in order
to become or remain as a female. Neither will the Court force respondent to undergo treatment
and to take medication in order to fit the mold of a female, as society commonly currently knows
this gender of the human species. Respondent is the one who has to live with his intersex
anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to him
should belong the primordial choice of what courses of action to take along the path of his sexual
development and maturation. In the absence of evidence that respondent is an “incompetent” and
in the absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male will harm other
 P a g e | 162

members of society who are equally entitled to protection under the law, the Supreme Court
affirmed as valid and justified the respondent’s position and his personal judgment of being a
male.
 P a g e | 163

REPUBLIC v. ALBIOS
G.R. No. 198780 October 16, 2013

FACTS:

On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married, as evidenced by a
Certificate of Marriage on December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for
declaration of nullity of her marriage with Fringer, alleging that immediately after their marriage,
they separated and never lived as husband and wife because they never really had any intention
of entering into a married state or complying with any of their essential marital obligations.
Fringer did not file his answer. On September 13, 2007, Albios filed a motion to set case for pre-
trial and to admit her pre-trial brief. After the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel, and prosecutor
appeared. Fringer did not attend the hearing despite being duly notified of the schedule.

The RTC declared the marriage void ab initio. The RTC opined that the parties married each
other for convenience only. Albios stated that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to
enable her to acquire American citizenship and that in consideration thereof, she agreed to pay
him the sum $2,000.00. However, she did not pay Fringer the amount because the latter never
processed her petition for citizenship. The OSG filed an appeal before the CA. The CA affirmed
the RTC ruling which found that the essential requisite of consent was lack in.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the marriage contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship
void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent?

HELD:

The marriage between parties is valid. Albios claims that the marriage was made in jest however
a marriage in jest is defined as a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into as a joke,
with no real intention of entering into the actual marriage status, and with a clear understanding
that the parties would not be bound. The parties involved in this case were fully aware of their
intentions to marry in order for Albios to acquire an American citizenship. Although the ideal
cause of marriage is that of love, other reasons like that of convenience are not prohibited as a
reason for marriage. As long as all the essential and formal requisites prescribed by law are
present, it is not void or voidable under the grounds provided by law; it shall be declared valid.
Although fraud is a ground for declaring a marriage void, this situation is not one of the reasons
allowed listed under Article 46 of the Family Code. The court refuses to allow the individuals to
use marriage for their fraudulent schemes for their convenience and also allow them to get out of
it easily due to the inconvenient situation.
 P a g e | 164

BESO v. JUDGE DAGUMAN

A.M. No. MTJ-99-1211 January 28, 2000

FACTS:

Petitioner and Bernardito Yman got married on August 28, 1997 by herein respondent Judge.
They got married in Judge Daguman residence, which is outside the Judge Daguman jurisdiction.
After the wedding herein petitioner was abandoned by her husband hence prompting her to check
with the Civil Registrar to inquire regarding the marriage contract to which it was found out that
the marriage was no registered. She now filed this administrative complaint against herein
respondent Judge alleging that the marriage was solemnized outside of his jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Judge has authority to solemnize the marriage.

HELD:

No, there are only three instances, as provided by Article 8 of the Family Code, wherein a
marriage may be solemnized by a judge outside his chambers or at a place other than his sala, to
wit: (1) when either or both of the contracting parties is at the point of death; (2) when the
residence of either party is located in a remote place; (3) where both of the parties request the
solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place
designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect. The spouses are not one of the instances
provided for by the provision, making judge Daguman not authorize to solemnized the marriage
due to lack of jurisdiction.

Article 7 of the Family Code provides that the Judge can solemnize a marriage within the court
jurisdiction. Considering that the respondent Judge‘s jurisdiction covers the municipality of Sta.
Margarita-Tarangan-Pagsanjan Samar only, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize the
marriage in the City of Calabayog where herein marriage was solemnized.
 P a g e | 165

ARANES v. OCCIANO
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390 April 11, 2002

FACTS:

On 17 February, 2000, respondent judge solemnized petitioner‘s marriage to her late groom
Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which
is outside his territorial jurisdiction. They lived together as husband and wife on the strength of
this marriage until her husband passed away. However, since the marriage was a nullity,
petitioner‘s right to inherit the ―vast properties left by Orobia was not recognized. She was
likewise deprived of receiving the pensions of Orobia, a retired Commodore of the Philippine
Navy.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent judge should be sanctioned for solemnizing marriage with lack of
marriage license and beyond his jurisdiction?

RULING:

Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P.129, the authority of the regional trial
court judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their territorial
jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court. In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of
respondent judge is limited to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing
the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and
subjects him to administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross ignorance of the law for
he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid
liability for violating the law on marriage. The respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding
Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur, is fined P5, 000.00 pesos with a
stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense in the future will be dealt with more
severely.
 P a g e | 166

ALCANTARA v. ALCANTARA
G.R. No. 167746 August 28, 2007

FACTS:

On December 8, 1982, Rosita Alcantara (respondent) and Restituto Alcantara (petitioner) went to
the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a person who could arrange a marriage for
them. They met a person ―fixer who arranged their wedding before a certain Rev. Aquilino
Navarro, a minister of the Gospel of the CDCC BR Chapel. The marriage was likewise
celebrated without the parties securing a marriage license. The wedding took place at the stairs in
Manila City Hall and not in CDCC BR Chapel. However, there was a marriage license obtained
in Carmona, Cavite but neither of the parties is a resident of Carmona, Cavite and they never
went to the said place to apply for a license with its local civil registrar. Petitioner and
respondent went through another marriage ceremony at the San Jose de Manuguit Church in
Tondo, Manila on March 26, 1983 utilizing the same marriage license. The marriage license
number ―7054133 is not identical with the marriage license number which appears in their
marriage contract. There is also a case filed by the respondent against herein petitioner before the
MTC of Mandaluyong for concubinage.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the marriage between the petitioner and respondent is void.

RULING:

The marriage involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of Family Code,
the applicable law would be the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its
celebration. A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil
Code, the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in
relation to Article 53 of the same Code. The law requires that the absence of such marriage
license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a
certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties.
In the case at bar, the marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage
license number. Moreover, the certification issued by the local civil registrar specifically
identified the parties to whom the marriage license was issued further validating the fact that a
license was issued to the parties herein. Issuance of a marriage license in a city or municipality,
not the residence of either of the contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage license despite
the absence of publication or prior to the completion of the 10-day period for publication are
considered mere irregularities that do not affect the validity of the marriage. The court still holds
that there is no sufficient basis to annul their marriage. An irregularity in any of the formal
requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the parties or party responsible for the
irregularity are civilly, criminally, administratively liable. The discrepancy between the marriage
license number in the certification of the Municipal civil registrar, which states that the marriage
license number issued to the parties is No. 7054133, while the marriage contract states that the
marriage license number of the parties is number 7054033. It is not impossible to assume that the
same is a mere typographical error. It therefore does not detract from our conclusion regarding
 P a g e | 167

the existence and issuance of said marriage license to the parties. The authority of the
solemnizing officer shown to have performed a marriage ceremony will be presumed in the
absence of any showing to the contrary. The solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to investigate
whether or not a marriage license has been duly and regularly issued by the local civil registrar.
All the said officer needs to know is that the license has been duly and regularly issued by the
competent official. Lastly, the church ceremony was confirmatory of their civil marriage, thereby
cleansing whatever irregularities or defect attended the civil wedding. The instant petition is
denied for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the RTC
of Makati City is affirmed.
 P a g e | 168

REPUBLIC v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 103047 September 2, 1994

FACTS:

Angelina Castro, with her parents unaware, contracted a civil marriage with Edwin Cardenas.
They did not immediately live together and it was only upon Castro found out that she was
pregnant that they decided to live together wherein the said cohabitation lasted for only 4
months. Thereafter, they parted ways and Castro gave birth that was adopted by her brother with
the consent of Cardenas. The baby was brought in the US and in Castro‘s earnest desire to follow
her daughter wanted to put in order her marital status before leaving for US. She filed a petition
seeking a declaration for the nullity of her marriage. Her lawyer then found out that there was no
marriage license issued prior to the celebration of their marriage proven by the certification
issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence resorted to by Castro is sufficient to
establish that no marriage license was issued to the parties prior to the solemnization of their
marriage?

RULING:

The court affirmed the decision of Court of Appeals that the certification issued by the Civil
Registrar unaccompanied by any circumstances of suspicion sufficiently proves that the office
did not issue a marriage license to the contracting parties. Albeit the fact that the testimony of
Castro is not supported by any other witnesses is not a ground to deny her petition because of the
peculiar circumstances of her case. Furthermore, Cardenas was duly served with notice of the
proceedings, which he chose to ignore. Under the circumstances of the case, the documentary
and testimonial evidence presented by private respondent Castro sufficiently established the
absence of the subject marriage license.
 P a g e | 169

CARIÑO v. CARIÑO
G.R. No. 132529 February 2, 2001

FACTS:

During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, he contracted two marriages; the first
was on June 20, 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cariño, with whom he had two children.
And the second was on November 10, 1992, with respondent Susan Yee Cariño with whom he
had no children in their almost ten year cohabitation starting way back in 1982. In November 23,
1992, SPO4 Santiago Cariño passed away under the care of Susan Yee, who spent for his
medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits
and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies. On
December 14, 1993, respondent filed the instant case for collection of sum of money against the
petitioner praying that petitioner be ordered to return to her at least one-half of the one hundred
forty-six thousand pesos. To bolster her action for collection of sum of money, respondent
contended that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is void ab initio because the same was
solemnized without the required marriage license confirmed by the marriage certificate of the
deceased and the petitioner which bears no marriage license number and a certification dated
March 9, 1994, from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Manila stating that they have no
record of marriage license of the spouses Santiago Cariño and Susan Nicdao Cariño who
allegedly married in the said municipality on June 20, 1969.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the two marriages contracted by the deceased SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño are valid
in determining the beneficiary of his death benefits?

RULING:

Under the Civil Code which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao
and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage and
the absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions, renders a marriage void ab initio. In the case at
bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased does not fall within the
marriages exempt from the license requirement. A marriage license was indispensable to the
validity of their marriage. The records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the
deceased bears no marriage license number and as certified by the Local Civil registrar of San
Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such marriage license. The certification issued
by the local civil registrar enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to
keep a record of all data to the issuance of a marriage license. Therefore, the marriage between
petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased having been solemnized without the necessary
marriage license, and not being one of the marriages exempt from the said requirement, is
undoubtedly void ab initio. The declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage
of the deceased and petitioner does not validate the second marriage of the deceased with
respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains that their marriage was solemnized without first
obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased
void. Hence, the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio.
 P a g e | 170

Under Article 40 of Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial
declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a
second marriage, otherwise, the second marriage would also be void. Considering that the two
marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property regime would not be absolute community or
conjugal partnership of property, but rather, is governed by the provisions of articles 147 and 148
of the Family Code, wherein, the properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint
contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. By intestate succession, the said ―death benefits
of the deceased shall pass to his legal heirs and respondent, not being the legal wife is not one of
them. Conformably, even if the disputed ―death benefits were earned by the deceased alone as a
government employee, Article 147 creates a co-ownership, entitling the petitioner to share one-
half thereof. There is no allegation of bad faith in the present case; both parties of the first
marriage are presumed in good faith. Thus, one-half of the subject―death benefits under
scrutiny shall go to the petitioner as her share in the property regime, and the other half
pertaining to the deceased shall pass by, intestate succession, to his legal heirs, namely, his
children.
 P a g e | 171

FILIPINA SY v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 127263 April 12, 2000

FACTS:

Petitioner Filipina Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy contracted marriage on November 15,
1973 at the Church of our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City. Both were then 22 years old. Their
union was blessed with two children. On September 15, 1983, Fernando left their conjugal
dwelling. Since then, the spouses lived separately and their two children were in the custody of
their mother. On February 11, 1987, Filipina filed a petition for legal separation before the RTC
of San Fernando, Pampanga and was later amended to a petition for separation of property.
Judgment was rendered dissolving their conjugal partnership of gains and approving a regime of
separation of properties based on the Memorandum of Agreement executed by the spouses. In
May 1988, Filipina filed a criminal action for attempted parricide against her husband. RTC
Manila convicted Fernando only of the lesser crime of slight physical injuries and sentenced him
to 20 days imprisonment. Petitioner filed a petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of her
marriage to Fernando on the ground of psychological incapacity on August 4, 1992. RTC and
Court of Appeals denied the petition and motion for reconsideration. Hence, this appeal by
certiorari, petitioner for the first time, raises the issue of the marriage being void for lack of a
valid marriage license at the time of its celebration. The date of issue of marriage license and
marriage certificate is contained in their marriage contract which was attached in her petition for
absolute declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court. The date of the actual
celebration of their marriage and the date of issuance of their marriage certificate and marriage
license are different and incongruous.

ISSUES:

a) Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from the
beginning for lack of marriage license at the time of the ceremony?
b) Whether or not the private respondent is psychologically incapacitated at the time of said
marriage celebration to warrant a declaration of its absolute nullity?

RULING:

A marriage license is a formal requirement; its absence renders the marriage void ab initio. The
pieces of evidence presented by petitioner at the beginning of the case, plainly and indubitably
show that on the day of the marriage ceremony, there was no marriage license. The marriage
contract also shows that the marriage license number 6237519 was issued in Carmona, Cavite
yet neither petitioner nor respondent ever resided in Carmona.

From the documents she presented, the marriage license was issued almost one year after the
ceremony took place. Article 80 of the Civil Code is clearly applicable in this case, there being
no claim of exceptional character enumerated in articles 72-79 of the Civil Code. The marriage
between petitioner and private respondent is void from the beginning. The remaining issue on the
psychological capacity is now mooted by the conclusion of this court that the marriage of
 P a g e | 172

petitioner to respondent is void ab initio for lack of marriage license at the time their marriage
was solemnized.

Petition is granted. The marriage celebrated on November 15, 1973 between petitioner Filipina
Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy is hereby declared void ab initio for lack of marriage
license at the time of celebration.
 P a g e | 173

SEVILLA v. CARDENAS
G.R. No. 167684 July 31, 2006

FACTS:

On 19 May 1969, through machinations, duress and intimidation employed upon him by
Carmelita N. Cardenas and the latter's father, retired Colonel Jose Cardenas of the Armed forces
of the Philippines, Jaime and Carmelita went to the City Hall of Manila and they were introduced
to a certain Reverend Cirilo D. Gonzales, a supposed Minister of the Gospel. On the said date,
the father of Carmelita caused Jaime and Carmelita to sign a marriage contract before the said
Minister of the Gospel. According to Jaime, he never applied for a marriage license for his
supposed marriage to Carmelita and never did they obtain any marriage license from any Civil
Registry, consequently, no marriage license was presented to the solemnizing officer.

On March 28, 1994, a complaint was filed by Jaime O. Sevilla before the RTC. In its Decision
dated January 25, 2002, the RTC declared the nullity of the marriage of the parties for lack of the
requisite marriage license. Carmelita filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. In a Decision
dated 20 December 2004, the Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court. Jaime filed a
Motion for Reconsideration dated 6 January 2005 which the Court of Appeals denied in a
Resolution dated 6 April 2005. This denial gave rise to the present Petition filed by Jaime.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a valid marriage license was issued in accordance with law to the parties herein
prior to the celebration of the marriages in question?

RULING:

Given the documentary and testimonial evidence to the effect that utmost efforts were not
exerted to locate the logbook where Marriage License No. 2770792 may have been entered, the
presumption of regularity of performance of official function by the Local Civil Registrar in
issuing the certifications, is effectively rebutted.

Moreover, the absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof of non-issuance of Marriage
License No. 2770792. It can also mean, as we believed true in the case at bar, that the logbook
just cannot be found. In the absence of showing of diligent efforts to search for the said logbook,
we cannot easily accept that absence of the same also means non-existence or falsity of entries
therein. Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the
validity of the marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds. The courts look upon this
presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is
of great weight. Therefore, the instant petition is denied.
 P a g e | 174

ABBAS v. ABBAS
G.R. No. 183896 January 30, 2013

FACTS:

Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met Gloria, a Filipino citizen, in Taiwan in 1991, and
they were married on August 9, 1992 at the Taipei Mosque in Taiwan. He arrived in the
Philippines in December of 1992. On January 9, 1993, at around 5 o‘clock in the afternoon, he
was at his mother-in-law‘s residence, located at 2676 F. Muñoz St., Malate, Manila, when his
mother-in-law arrived with two men. He testified that he was told that he was going to undergo
some ceremony, one of the requirements for his stay in the Philippines, but was not told of the
nature of said ceremony. During the ceremony he and Gloria signed a document. He claimed that
he did not know that the ceremony was a marriage until Gloria told him later. He further testified
that he did not go to Carmona, Cavite to apply for a marriage license, and that he had never
resided in that area. In July of 2003, he went to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Carmona,
Cavite, to check on their marriage license, and was asked to show a copy of their marriage
contract wherein the marriage license number could be found. The Municipal Civil Registrar,
Leodivinia C. Encarnacion, issued a certification on July 11, 2003 to the effect that the marriage
license number appearing in the marriage contract he submitted, Marriage License No. 9969967,
was the number of another marriage license issued to a certain Arlindo Getalado and Myra
Mabilangan.

In its October 5, 2005 Decision, the Pasay City RTC held that no valid marriage license was
issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite in favor of Gloria and Syed thus
their marriage on January 9, 1993 was void ab initio. Gloria filed a Motion for Reconsideration
dated November 7, 2005, but the RTC denied the same, prompting her to appeal the questioned
decision to the Court of Appeals. The CA gave credence to Gloria‘s arguments, and granted her
appeal. It held that the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar failed to categorically state
that a diligent search for the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was conducted, and thus held
that said certification could not be accorded probative value. The CA ruled that there was
sufficient testimonial and documentary evidence that Gloria and Syed had been validly married
and that there was compliance with all the requisites laid down by law. Syed then filed a Motion
for Reconsideration dated April 1, 2008 but the same was denied by the CA in a Resolution
dated July 24, 2008 hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing and setting aside the decision of the RTC
granting the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage?

RULING:

The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the marriage license of Gloria and
Syed was allegedly issued, issued a certification to the effect that no such marriage license for
Gloria and Syed was issued, and that the serial number of the marriage license pertained to
another couple, Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. A certified machine copy of Marriage
 P a g e | 175

License No. 9969967 was presented, which was issued in Carmona, Cavite, and indeed, the
names of Gloria and Syed do not appear in the document.

As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage to Gloria, it may well be that his
motives are less than pure, that he seeks to evade a bigamy suit. Be that as it may, the same does
not make up for the failure of the respondent to prove that they had a valid marriage license,
given the weight of evidence presented by petitioner. The lack of a valid marriage license cannot
be attributed to him, as it was Gloria who took steps to procure the same. The law must be
applied. As the marriage license, a formal requisite is clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria and
Syed is void ab initio. The petition is therefore granted.
 P a g e | 176

GO-BANGAYAN v. BANGAYAN, JR.

G.R. No. 201061 July 3, 2013

FACTS:

In September 1979, Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. married Azucena Alegre. In 1982, while Alegre was
outside the Philippines, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally Go. Sally’s father
was against this. In order to appease her father, Sally convinced Benjamin to sign a purported
marriage contract in March 1982.

In 1994, the relationship between Sally and Benjamin soured. Sally filed a bigamy case against
Benjamin. Benjamin on the other hand filed an action to declare his alleged marriage to Sally as
non-existent. To prove the existence of their marriage, Sally presented a marriage license
allegedly issued to Benjamin.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the marriage between Sally and Benjamin is bigamous.

RULING:

No. The elements of bigamy are:

1. That the offender has been legally married.
2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent,
the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code.
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage.
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.

In this case, the fourth element is not present. The marriage license presented by Sally was not
authentic as in fact, no marriage license was ever issued to both parties in view of the alleged
marriage. The marriage between them was merely in jest and never complied with the essential
requisites of marriage. Hence, there is no bigamous marriage to speak of.
 P a g e | 177

KHO v. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 187462 June 1, 2016

FACTS:

In May 31, 1972, Raquel Kho’s parents called a clerk in the office of the municipal treasurer to
instruct him to arrange the necessary papers for the intended marriage of their son, Raquel Kho
and Veronica Kho. In June 1, 1972, the two were married at 3 in the morning at a church.
Claiming that he has never gone to the office of the Local Civil Registrar to apply for a marriage
license and had not seen nor signed any papers in connection to the procurement of a marriage
license, and considering the ONE DAY difference between the time the clerk was told to obtain
the papers to the actual moment of the marriage, no marriage license could have been validly
issued, Raquel Kho filed an action for the declaration of nullity of his marriage.

The RTC ruled that the marriage was void due to the lack of the require site marriage license and
ruled in favor of Raquel Kho. Later, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the RTC and
ruled in favor of Veronica Kho. Raquel Kho filed a petition for review on certiorari with the
Supreme Court.

ISSUES:

a. Whether the issues presented by the petitioner in the petition for review on certiorari
are factual in nature and whether it is proper for the Supreme Court to delve into these issues;
b. Whether the certification issued by the local civil registrar who attests to the absence in
its records of a marriage license, must categorically state that the document does not exist in the
said office despite diligent search;
c. Whether the CA erred in disregarding the petitioner’s documentary evidences of the
lack of a marriage license and giving weight to unsupported presumptions in favor of the
respondent; and
d. Whether the CA erred in setting aside or reversing the lower courts judgment declaring
the marriage a nullity for the absence of the requisite marriage license.

RULING:

1. No, the issues in the petition are not factual in nature. However, the rule that a question of fact
is not appropriate for a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is
not without exceptions, which are the following:
(a) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, and conjectures;
(b) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(c) where there is a grave abuse of discretion;
(d) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(e) when the findings of fact are conflicting;
(f) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, when beyond the issues of the case and
the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
(g) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;
 P a g e | 178

(h) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evience on which they
are based;
(i) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners’ main and reply briefs are
not disputed by the respondents; and
(j) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.

In the case, of the RTC and CA on the issue on whether there was a marriage license obtained by
petitioner and respondent are conflicting. Hence, it was proper for the Supreme Court to review
these findings.

2. No, in a previous case (Nicdao Carino v. Yee Carino), the Supreme Court considered the
certification issued by the local civil registrar, that their office had no record of a marriage
license, was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license. In the present case, the petitioner
was able to present a certification issued by the civil registrar attesting that the Office of the local
civil registrar “has no record nor copy of any marriage license ever issued between the parties.”

3. Yes, the CA erred in disregarding the petitioner’s documentary evidences of the lack of a
marriage licence and giving weight to unsupported presumptions in favor of the respondent
because the certification issued by the Civil Registrar coupled with the testimony of the former
Civil Registrar at the time of the wedding is sufficient to prove the absence of the subject
marriage license. Article 58 of the Civil Code (Note: at the time of the marriage, the Family
Code was not effective yet) makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a
license first issued by the local civil registrar. In addition, Article 80(3) of the Civil Code makes
it clear that a marriage performed without a marriage license is void.

4. Yes, the CA erred in setting aside or reversing the lower courts judgment declaring the
marriage a nullity for the absence of the requisite marriage license because the petitioner has
successfully overcome the presumed validity of the marriage by presenting the certification of
the civil registrar which was sufficient to prove the absence of the marriage license. In addition,
the respondent was not able to prove that the marriage as valid as it is she who alleges such
validity. Based on the certification issued by the civil registrar and the respondent’s failure to
produce a copy of the alleged marriage license or of any evidence to show that such license was
ever issued, the only conclusion that can be reached is that no valid marriage license was issued.
Hence, the marriage performed is null and void. The decision of the CA was reversed and set
aside.
 P a g e | 179

REPUBLIC v. DAYOT
G.R. No. 175581 March 28, 2008

FACTS:

Jose and Felisa Dayot were married at the Pasay City Hall on November 24, 1986. In lieu of a
marriage license, they executed a sworn affidavit that they had lived together for at least 5years.
On August 1990, Jose contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual. They were both
employees of the National Statistics and Coordinating Board. Felisa then filed on June 1993 an
action for bigamy against Jose and an administrative complaint with the Office of the
Ombudsman. On the other hand, Jose filed a complaint on July 1993 for annulment and/or
declaration of nullity of marriage where he contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham
and his consent was secured through fraud.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Jose’s marriage with Felisa is valid considering that they executed a sworn
affidavit in lieu of the marriage license requirement.

RULING:

CA indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time
they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. Jose and Felisa started living
together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their marriage on
November 1986. Findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding in the Supreme Court.

The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and
invalidates a marriage. Furthermore, “the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating
to the period of Jose and Felisa’s cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an
exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to
a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties
under oath”. Hence, Jose and Felisa’s marriage is void ab initio. The court also ruled that an
action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible. The right to impugn marriage does not prescribe
and may be raised any time. SC held that an action for nullifying a marriage is imprescriptible. It
may be raised anytime. Jose and Felisa’s marriage was celebrated without a marriage license. No
other conclusion can be reached except that it is void ab initio.
 P a g e | 180

HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO v. JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ

A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329 March 8, 2001

FACTS:

Herminia Borja-Manzano avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having
been married to him on 21 May 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue,
Caloocan City. Four children were born out of that marriage. On 22 March 1993, however, her
husband contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge.
When respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to know that the same was
void and bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were
“separated.” For this act, complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano charges respondent Judge with
gross ignorance of the law in a sworn Complaint-Affidavit filed with the Office of the Court
Administrator on 12 May 1999.

After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the Court Administrator recommended
that respondent Judge be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and be ordered to pay a fine
of P2,000.00, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with
more severely.

Respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating his plea for the dismissal of the complaint.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Respondent Judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law?

RULING:

Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment
impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage null and void. In fact, in his Comment,
he stated that had he known that the late Manzano was married he would have discouraged him
from contracting another marriage. And respondent Judge cannot deny knowledge of Manzano’s
and Payao’s subsisting previous marriage, as the same was clearly stated in their separate
affidavits which were subscribed and sworn to before him.

Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void
and bigamous marriage. The maxim “ignorance of the law excuses no one” has special
application to judges, who, under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, should be the
embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence. It is highly imperative that judges be
conversant with the law and basic legal principles. And when the law transgressed is simple and
elementary, the failure to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.

The recommendation of the Court Administrator is hereby adopted, with the modification that
the amount of fine to be imposed upon respondent Judge Roque Sanchez is increased to
P20,000.00.
 P a g e | 181

NIÑAL v. BAYADOG
G.R. No. 133778 March 14, 2000

FACTS:

Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage
were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24,
1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma
Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed
an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife
for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19,
1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their father's death, petitioners filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void
for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or
invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioner's successional rights. Norma filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are not
among the persons who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the
Family Code.

ISSUES:

a. Whether or not the second marriage is covered by the exception to the requirement of
a Marriage license?
b. Whether or not the petitioners have the personality to file a petition to declare their
father‘s marriage void after his death?

RULING:

The second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a
marriage license; it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element. In this case, at the
time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each other as
husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepito's first
marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty months
had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter
both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that has already lasted for five
years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation
contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but
rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting
marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they
lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The
subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial companionship
between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being
one as "husband and wife". Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper
interested party may attack a void marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects except those
declared by law concerning the properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or
ownership through actual joint contribution, and its effect on the children born to such void
 P a g e | 182

marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and
54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the property regime governing voidable marriages is
generally conjugal partnership and the children conceived before its annulment is legitimate.
 P a g e | 183

COSCA v. PALAYPAYON
A.M. No. MTJ-92-721 September 30, 1994

FACTS:

In an administrative complaint filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on October 5,
1992, herein respondents were charged with the following offenses, to wit: (1) illegal
solemnization of marriage; (2) falsification of the monthly reports of cases; (3) bribery in
consideration of an appointment in the court; (4) non-issuance of receipt for cash bond received;
infidelity in the custody of detained prisoners; and (6) requiring payment of filing fees from
exempted entities. Complainants allege that respondent judge solemnized marriages even
without the requisite marriage license. Thus, these couples were able to get married by the
simple expedient of paying the marriage fees to respondent Baroy, despite the absence of a
marriage license. It is alleged that respondent judge made it appear that he solemnized seven (7)
marriages in the month of July, 1992, when in truth he did not do so or at most those marriages
were null and void; that respondents likewise made it appear that they have notarized only six (6)
documents for July, 1992, but the Notarial Register will show that there were one hundred
thirteen (113) documents which were notarized during that month; and that respondents reported
a notarial fee of only P18.50 for each document, although in fact they collected P20.00 therefor
and failed to account for the difference. Complainants allege that because of the retirement of the
clerk of court, respondent judge forwarded to the Supreme Court the applications of Rodel
Abogado, Ramon Sambo, and Jessell Abiog. However, they were surprised when respondent
Baroy reported for duty as clerk of court on October 21, 1991. They later found out that
respondent Baroy was the one appointed because she gave a brand-new air-conditioning unit to
respondent judge. Finally, respondents are charged with collecting docket fees from the Rural
Bank of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, Inc. although such entity is exempt by law from the payment
of said fees, and that while the corresponding receipt was issued, respondent Baroy failed to
remit the amount to the Supreme Court and, instead, she deposited the same in her personal
account.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Respondent Judge and the clerk of court were responsible of the complaints
charged?

RULING:

The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with the dispensation of
justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy
burden of responsibility. His conduct, at all times, must not only be characterized by propriety
and decorum but, above all else, must be beyond suspicion. Every employee should be an
example of integrity, uprightness and honesty. Integrity in a judicial office is more than a virtue,
it is a necessity. It applies, without qualification as to rank or position, from the judge to the least
of its personnel, they being standard-bearers of the exacting norms of ethics and morality
imposed upon a Court of justice.
 P a g e | 184

On the charge regarding illegal marriages the Family Code pertinently provides that the formal
requisites of marriage are, inter alia, a valid marriage license except in the cases provided for
therein. Complementarily, it declares that the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites
shall generally render the marriage void ab initio and that, while an irregularity in the formal
requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage, the party or parties responsible for the
irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. The Court hereby imposes a
FINE of P20, 000.00 on respondent Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon Jr., with a stern warning that any
repetition of the same or similar offenses in the future will definitely be severely dealt with.
Respondent Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy is hereby dismissed from the service, with forfeiture of all
retirement benefits and with prejudice to employment in any branch, agency or instrumentality of
the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
 P a g e | 185

EUGENIO v. VELEZ
G.R. No. 85140 May 17, 1990

FACTS:

Vitaliana Vargas’ brothers and sisters unaware of the former’s death on August 28, 1988 filed a
petition for Habeas Corpus on September 27, 1988 before the RTC of Misamis Oriental alleging
that she was forcible taken from her residence sometime in 1987 and was confined by the herein
petitioner, Tomas Eugenio in his palacial residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental.

The respondent court in an order dated 28 September 1988 issued the writ of habeas corpus, but
the writ was returned unsatisfied. Petitioner refused to surrender the body of Vitaliana (who had
died on 28 August 1988) to the respondent sheriff, reasoning that a corpse cannot be the subject
of habeas corpus proceedings; besides, according to petitioner, he had already obtained a burial
permit. Petitioner claims that as her common law husband, he has legal custody of her body.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner can claim custody of the deceased.

HELD:

The custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to the surviving brothers and
sisters. Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides: “Persons charged with
duty of burial - if the deceased was an unmarried man or woman or a child and left any kin; the
duty of the burial shall devolve upon the nearest kin of the deceased.

Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and woman not legally
married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public
as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community where they
live may be considered legally married in common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines.

While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that such relationships are present in
our society, and that they produce a community of properties and interests which is governed by
law, authority exists in case law to the effect that such form of co-ownership requires that the
man and woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. In
any case, herein petitioner has a subsisting marriage with another woman, a legal impediment
which disqualified him from even legally marrying Vitaliana.
 P a g e | 186

MORIGO v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 145226 February 6, 2004

FACTS:

Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were board mates at the house of Catalina Tortor at Tagbilaran
City, Province of Bohol, for a period of four (4) years (from 1974-1978). After school year 1977-
78, LucioMorigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact with each other. In 1984, LucioMorigo was
surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete from Singapore. The former replied and after an
exchange of letters, they became sweethearts. In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left
again for Canada to work there. While in Canada, they maintained constant communication. In
1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join her in
Canada. Both agreed to get married, thus they were married on August 30, 1990 at the Iglesia de
Filipina Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol. On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her
work in Canada leaving appellant Lucio behind. On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the
Ontario Court a petition for divorce against appellant which was granted by the court on January
17, 1992 and to take effect on February 17, 1992. On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo
married Maria Jececha Lumbago at the Virgensa Barangay Parish, Tagbilaran City, Bohol.

On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage
in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol to seek the declaration of nullity of accused‘s marriage with
Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place. On October 19, 1993,
appellant was charged with Bigamy in the Information filed by the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran
City, with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol. The RTC of Bohol rendered a decision finding
Lucio Morigo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy. Meanwhile, on October 23, 1997, or
while CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 was pending before the appellate court, the trial court rendered a
decision in Civil Case No. 6020 declaring the marriage between Lucio and Lucia void ab initio
since no marriage ceremony actually took place. No appeal was taken from this decision, which
then became final and executory. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the RTC decision on the
criminal case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Lucio Morigo is guilty of bigamy?

RULING:

The Supreme Court held that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio
and Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage
contract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial court thus held that
the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with Articles 3 and 4 of the Family Code. As the
dissenting opinion in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly puts it, "This simply means that there
was no marriage to begin with; and that such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the
first marriage. In other words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the date of the
declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio to the date of the celebration of the first
marriage, the accused was, under the eyes of the law, never married." The records show that no
 P a g e | 187

appeal was taken from the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 6020, hence, the decision
had long become final and executory. The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the
accused must have been legally married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was
never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the principle
of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never married "from the
beginning." The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to its
logical conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time he
contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the validity of the first marriage
being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said
offense cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must,
perforce be acquitted of the instant charge.
 P a g e | 188

MORENO v. BERNABE
A.M. NO. MTJ-94-963 July 14, 1995

FACTS:

On October 4, 1993, Marilou and Marcelo Moreno were married before respondent Judge
Bernabe. Marilou avers that Respondent Judge assured her that the marriage contract will be
released ten (10) days after October 4, 1993. Complainant then visited the office of the
Respondent Judge on October 15, 1993 only to find out that she could not get the marriage
contract because the Office of the Local Civil Registrar failed to issue a marriage license. She
claims that Respondent Judge connived with the relatives of Marcelo Moreno to deceive her. In
his comment, Respondent denied that he conspired with the relatives of Marcelo Moreno to
solemnize the marriage for the purpose of deceiving the complainant. The Respondent Judge
contends that he did not violate the law nor did he have the slightest intention to violate the law
when he, in good faith, solemnized the marriage, as he was moved only by a desire to help a
begging and pleading complainant who wanted some kind of assurance or security due to her
pregnant condition. In order to pacify complainant, Marcelo Moreno requested him to perform
the marriage ceremony, with the express assurance that "the marriage license was definitely
forthcoming since the necessary documents were complete. In its Memorandum dated January
17, 1995, the Office of the Court Administrator recommended that Respondent be held liable for
misconduct for solemnizing a marriage without a marriage license and that the appropriate
administrative sanctions be imposed against him.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Respondent Judge is guilty of grave misconduct and gross ignorance of the
law by solemnizing the marriage without the required marriage license?

RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled that Respondent Judge, by his own admission that he solemnized the
marriage between complainant and Marcelo Moreno without the required marriage license, has
dismally failed to live up to his commitment to be the “embodiment of competence, integrity and
independence” and to his promise to be “faithful to the law.” Respondent cannot hide behind his
claim of good faith and Christian motives which, at most, would serve only to mitigate his
liability but not exonerate him completely. Good intentions could never justify violation of the
law. Respondent is hereby ordered to pay a fine of P10, 000.00 and is sternly warned that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
 P a g e | 189

NAVARRO v. DOMAGTOY
A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088 July 19, 1996

FACTS:

On September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding between Gaspar A. Tagadan
and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first
wife. It is also alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo
and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court's jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Respondent
judge holds office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-
Burgos, Surigao del Norte. The wedding was solemnized at the respondent judge's residence in
the municipality of Dapa, which does not fall within his jurisdictional area of the municipalities
of Sta. Monica and Burgos, located some 40 to 45 kilometers away from the municipality of
Dapa, Surigao del Norte. Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro filed
a complaint respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy for exhibiting
gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Respondent Judge is guilty of gross misconduct, as well as inefficiency in office
and ignorance of the law?

RULING:

The Supreme Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the law. The legal
principles applicable in the cases brought to our attention are elementary and uncomplicated;
prompting us to conclude that respondent's failure to apply them is due to a lack of
comprehension of the law. The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are
at least, proficient in the law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They
should be skilled and competent in understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that they
be conversant with basic legal principles like the ones involved in instant case. It is not too much
to expect them to know and apply the law intelligently. Otherwise, the system of justice rests on
a shaky foundation indeed, compounded by the errors committed by those not learned in the law.
While magistrates may at times make mistakes in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the
respondent judge exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an area which has
greatly prejudiced the status of married persons. The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and
Arlyn Borga is considered bigamous and void, there being a subsisting marriage between Gaspar
Tagadan and Ida Peñaranda. The Office of the Court Administrator recommends, in its
Memorandum to the Court, a six-month suspension and a stern warning that a repetition of the
same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. Considering that one of the marriages in
question resulted in a bigamous union and therefore void, and the other lacked the necessary
authority of respondent judge, the Court adopts said recommendation. Respondent is advised to
be more circumspect in applying the law and to cultivate a deeper understanding of the law.
 P a g e | 190

VDA. DE JACOB v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 135216 August 19, 1999

FACTS:

Tomasa Vda. de Jacob claimed to be the surviving spouse of deceased Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob and
was appointed Special Administratix for the various estates of the deceased by virtue of a
reconstructed Marriage Contract between herself and the deceased. Defendant-appellee on the
other hand, claimed to be the legally-adopted son of Alfredo. In support of his claim, he
presented an Order dated 18 July 1961 issued by then Presiding Judge Jose L. Moya, CFI,
Camarines Sur, granting the petition for adoption filed by deceased Alfredo in favor of Pedro
Pilapil. During the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Alfredo, the
defendant-appellee Pedro sought to intervene therein claiming his share of the deceased‘s estate
as Alfredo's adopted son and as his sole-surviving heir. Pedro questioned the validity of the
marriage between appellant Tomasa and his adoptive father Alfredo. Appellant Tomasa opposed
the Motion for Intervention and filed a complaint for injunction with damages questioning
appellee's claim as the legal heir of Alfredo. The Regional Trial Court rendered a decision in
favor of Pedro Pilapil and against Tomasa Guison. Such decision was affirmed in toto by the
Court of Appeals.

ISSUES:

a) Whether or not the marriage between the plaintiff Tomasa Vda. De Jacob and deceased
Alfredo E. Jacob were valid?
b) Whether or not defendant Pedro Pilapil is the legally adopted son of Alfredo E. Jacob?

RULING:

The Supreme Court held that the existence of a valid marriage is established. It has been
established that Dr. Jacob and petitioner lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years. An affidavit to this effect was executed by Dr. Jacob and petitioner. Clearly then, the
marriage was exceptional in character and did not require a marriage license under Article 76 of
the Civil Code.The Civil Code governs this case, because the questioned marriage and the
assailed adoption took place prior the effectivity of the Family Code. On the second issue some
considerations cast doubt on the claim of respondent. The alleged Order was purportedly made in
open court. In his Deposition, however, Judge Moya declared that he did not dictate decisions in
adoption cases. The only decisions he made in open court were criminal cases, in which the
accused pleaded guilty. Moreover, Judge Moya insisted that the branch where he was assigned
was always indicated in his decisions and orders; yet the questioned Order did not contain this
information. Furthermore, Pilapil‘s conduct gave no indication that he recognized his own
alleged adoption, as shown by the documents that he signed and other acts that he performed
thereafter. In the same vein, no proof was presented that Dr. Jacob had treated him as an adopted
child. Likewise, both the Bureau of Records Management in Manila and the Office of the Local
Civil Registrar of Tigaon, Camarines Sur, issued Certifications that there was no record that
Pedro Pilapil had been adopted by Dr. Jacob. Taken together, these circumstances inexorably
negate the alleged adoption of respondent. The burden of proof in establishing adoption is upon
 P a g e | 191

the person claiming such relationship. This Respondent Pilapil failed to do. Moreover, the
evidence presented by petitioner shows that the alleged adoption is a sham.
 P a g e | 192

REPUBLIC v. IYOY
G.R. No. 152577 September 21, 2005

FACTS:

Respondent Crasus married Fely on 16 December 1961 at Bradford Memorial Church, Jones
Avenue, Cebu City. As a result of their union, they had five children – Crasus, Jr., Daphne,
Debbie, Calvert, and Carlos – who are now all of legal ages. After the celebration of their
marriage, respondent Crasus discovered that Fely was "hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant."
In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the United States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all of their
five children, the youngest then being only six years old, to the care of respondent Crasus. Barely
a year after Fely left for the U.S.A., respondent Crasus received a letter from her requesting that
he sign the enclosed divorce papers; he disregarded the said request. Sometime in 1985,
respondent Crasus learned, through the letters sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got
married to an American, with whom she eventually had a child. In 1987, Fely came back to the
Philippines with her American family, staying at Cebu Plaza Hotel in Cebu City. Respondent
Crasus did not bother to talk to Fely because he was afraid he might not be able to bear the
sorrow and the pain she had caused him. Fely returned to the Philippines several times more: in
1990, for the wedding of their eldest child, Crasus, Jr.; in 1992, for the brain operation of their
fourth child, Calvert; and in 1995, for unknown reasons. Fely continued to live with her
American family in New Jersey, U.S.A. She had been openly using the surname of her American
husband in the Philippines and in the U.S.A. For the wedding of Crasus, Jr., Fely herself had
invitations made in which she was named as "Mrs. Fely Ada Micklus." At the time the
Complaint was filed, it had been 13 years since Fely left and abandoned respondent Crasus, and
there was no more possibility of reconciliation between them. Respondent Crasus finally alleged
in his Complaint that Fely‘s acts brought danger and dishonor to the family, and clearly
demonstrated her psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Such
incapacity, being incurable and continuing, constitutes a ground for declaration of nullity of
marriage under Article 36, in relation to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the Family Code.

On 30 October 1998, the RTC promulgated its Judgment declaring the marriage of respondent
Crasus and Fely null and void ab initio. The Court of Appeals rendered its decision affirming the
trial court‘s declaration of the nullity of the marriage of the parties.

ISSUES:

a) Whether or not the totality of evidence presented during trial is insufficient to support the
finding of psychological incapacity of Fely?
b) Whether or not Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines is
applicable to the case at bar?

RULING:

The only substantial evidence presented by respondent Crasus before the RTC was his testimony,
which can be easily put into question for being self-serving, in the absence of any other
corroborating evidence. He submitted only two other pieces of evidence: (1) the Certification on
 P a g e | 193

the recording with the Register of Deeds of the Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus
and Fely, such marriage being celebrated on 16 December 1961; and (2) the invitation to the
wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, in which Fely used her American husband‘s surname.
Even consideringthe admissions made by Fely herself in her Answer to respondent Crasus‘s
Complaint filed with the RTC, the evidence is not enough to convince this Court that Fely had
such a grave mental illness that prevented her from assuming the essential obligations of
marriage.

As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the couple
getting married is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was
celebrated. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the case
of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was
still a Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was not established, Fely herself admitted in her
Answer filed before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime after
she left for the United States in 1984, after which she married her American husband in 1985. In
the same answer, she alleged that she had been an American citizen since 1988. At the time she
filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine
laws on family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already
living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce
between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from respondent
Crasus.
 P a g e | 194

REPUBLIC v. ORBECIDO III

G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005

FACTS:

On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United
Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a
son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido. In 1986,
Cipriano‘s wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later,
Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen. Sometime in
2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married
a certain Innocent Stanley. Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to
remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed.
Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Cipriano Orbecido III can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code?

RULING:

The Supreme Court held that for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation
that his wife was naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree
can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Such foreign law must also be proved
as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be
alleged and proved. Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows his
former wife to remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no
evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage. Nevertheless,
we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No.
209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has
been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry.
However, considering that in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on
record, we are unable to declare, based on respondent‘s bare allegations that his wife, who was
naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an
American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made
properly upon respondent’s submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.
 P a g e | 195

LAVADIA v. HEIRS OF LUNA

G.R. No. 171914 July 23, 2014

FACTS:

Atty. Luna, a practicing lawyer up until his death, married Eugenia in 1947. Their marriage
begot seven children, including Gregorio. After two decades of marriage, Atty. Luna and his
wife agreed to live separately as husband and wife, and executed an Agreement for Separation
and Property Settlement” whereby they agreed to live separately and to dissolve their conjugal
property. On January 2, 1076, Atty. Luna obtained a divorce decree of his marriage with Eugenia
from the Dominican Republic. On the same day, he married Soledad.

In 1977, Atty. Luna organized a new law firm with several other lawyers. The new law office
thru Atty. Luna obtained a condominium unit which they bought on an installment basis. After
full payment, the condominium title was registered in the names of the lawyers with pro-
indivisio shares. When the law office was dissolved, the condominium title was still registered in
the names of the owners, with Atty. Luna’s share fixed at 25/100. Atty. Luna established a new
law firm with Atty. Dela Cruz. After Atty. Luna’s death in 1997, his share in the condominium
unit, his law books and furniture were taken over by Gregorio, his son in the first marriage. His
25/100 share in the condominium was also rented out to Atty. Dela Cruz v Soledad, the second
wife, then filed a complaint against the heirs of Atty. Luna. According to him, the properties
were acquired by Atty. Luna and her during their marriage, and because they had no children,
3/4 of the property became hers, 1/2 being her share in the net estate, and the other half
bequeathed to her in a last will and testament of Atty. Luna.

The RTC ruled against her, and awarded the properties to the heirs of Atty. Luna from the first
marriage, except for the foreign law books, which were ordered turned over to her. Both parties
appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals modified the RTC judgment by
awarding all the properties, including the law books to the heirs of Atty. Luna from the first
marriage.

In her petition before the Supreme Court, Zenaida alleged that the CA erred in holding that the
Agreement For Separation and Property Settlement between Atty. Luna and Eugenia (the first
wife) is ineffectual, hence the conjugal property was not dissolved.

In deciding the case, the Supreme Court answered it by way of determining whether the divorce
decree between Atty. Luna and Eugenia was valid, which will decide who among the contending
parties were entitled to the properties left behind by Atty. Luna.

ISSUE:

Whether the divorce between Atty. Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (Eugenia) had validly
dissolved the first marriage following the nationality rule laid down by Art 15.
 P a g e | 196

RULING:

Atty. Luna’s first marriage with Eugenia subsisted up to the time of his death. The Supreme
Court: The divorce between Atty. Luna and Eugenia was void: “From the time of the celebration
of the first marriage on September 10, 1947 until the present, absolute divorce between Filipino
spouses has not been recognized in the Philippines. The non-recognition of absolute divorce
between Filipinos has remained even under the Family Code, even if either or both of the
spouses are residing abroad. Indeed, the only two types of defective marital unions under our
laws have been the void and the voidable marriages. As such, the remedies against such
defective marriages have been limited to the declaration of nullity of the marriage and the
annulment of the marriage.”

No judicial approval of the Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement: “Considering that
September 10, 1947, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains governed
their property relations. This is because the Spanish Civil Code, the law then in force at the time
of their marriage, did not specify the property regime of the spouses in the event that they had
not entered into any marriage settlement before or at the time of the marriage.

Article 119 of the Civil Code clearly so provides, to wit:

“Article 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon absolute or
relative community of property, or upon complete separation of property, or upon any
other regime. In the absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the
system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code,
shall govern the property relations between husband and wife.”

Atty. Luna’s marriage with Soledad was bigamous, and void from the very beginning, hence,
their property relations is governed by the rules on co-ownership: “In the Philippines, marriages
that are bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous are void. Article 71 of the Civil Code clearly
states: Article 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in
force in the country where they were performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in
this country, except bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous marriages as determined by Philippine
law.

Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a second or subsequent marriage before

the first marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings. A bigamous
marriage is considered void ab initio. Due to the second marriage between Atty. Luna and the
petitioner being void ab initio by virtue of its being bigamous, the properties acquired during the
bigamous marriage were governed by the rules on co-ownership, conformably with Article 144
of the Civil Code, viz: Article 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife,
but they are not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by
either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership.
 P a g e | 197

Considering that Zenaida failed to adduce evidence of ownership of the properties subject of the
case, the subject properties were awarded in favour of the heirs of Atty. Luna from the first
marriage. Petition denied.
 P a g e | 198

VAN DORN v. ROMILLO

G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985

FACTS:

The petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen of the United
States; that they were married in Hongkong in 1972; that, after the marriage, they established
their residence in the Philippines; that they begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and
December 18, 1975, respectively; that the parties were divorced in Nevada, United States, in
1982; and that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn. Dated
June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioner's business in Ermita,
Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that
petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that private respondent be
declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the
ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before
the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no
community property" as of June 11, 1982. The Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss in the
mentioned case on the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the
Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is now the subject of this certiorari
proceeding.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the divorce decree affected the property regime of the parties?

RULING:

The Supreme Court held that pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the
husband of petitioner. The case involved a marriage between a foreigner and his Filipino wife,
which marriage was subsequently dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by the latter.
Claiming that the divorce was not valid under Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that his
interest in the properties from their conjugal partnership should be protected. The Court,
however, recognized the validity of the divorce and held that the alien spouse had no interest in
the properties acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce. To maintain, as private respondent
does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private respondent and
still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just.
Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render
support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible
rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the
ends of justice are to be served.
 P a g e | 199

SAN LUIS v. SAN LUIS

G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007

FACTS:

The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis, who was the
former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three
marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born
six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963,
Virginia predeceased Felicisimo. Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry
Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an
American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce before the Family Court of the First Circuit,
State of Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute
Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973. On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo
married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William
Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California,
U.S.A. He had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their
marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992. Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of
their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo‘s estate. On December 17,
1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City. Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death, the
decedent was residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila;
that the decedent‘s surviving heirs are respondent as legal spouse, his six children by his first
marriage, and son by his second marriage; that the decedent left real properties, both conjugal
and exclusive, valued at P30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent does not have any
unpaid debts. Respondent prayed that the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and that
letters of administration be issued to her. On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one
of the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of
improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters
of administration should have been filed in the Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimo‘s
place of residence prior to his death. He further claimed that respondent has no legal personality
to file the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of
his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee. On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same
grounds and joined her brother Rodolfo in seeking the dismissal of the petition. On February 28,
1994, the trial court issued an Order denying the two motions to dismiss. On September 12,
1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held that, at the time of
his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna.
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the orders of the trial
court in its assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998.

ISSUES:

a) Whether or not the venue was properly laid in the case.

b) Whether or not respondent Felicidad has legal capacity to file the subject petition for
letters of administration?
 P a g e | 200

RULING:

The Supreme Court finds that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of
fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition for letters of
administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial Court which has territorial jurisdiction over
Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on December 17, 1993. At that time,
Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches of the Regional Trial Court of the National
Capital Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in
Makati City as per Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. Thus, the subject petition was
validly filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. On the second issue, the Supreme
Court held that respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in the
estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by
petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo‘s capacity to remarry, but
fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A.,
then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code. This provision
governs the property relations between parties who live together as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the property
acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries
shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that the
property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired during
the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the
portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven. The
case therefore is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings on the evidence to prove the
validity of the divorce between Felicisimo and Merry Lee.
 P a g e | 201

CORPUZ v. STO. TOMAS

G.R. No. 186571 August 11, 2010

FACTS:

Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through
naturalization on November 29, 2000. On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent
Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City. Due to work and other professional
commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines
sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was
having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a
petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerbert‘s
petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a month later, on
January 8, 2006. Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another
Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiancée in the Philippines, Gerbert went
to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and
Daisylyn‘s marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the
National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn
still subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable; the foreign divorce decree must first be
judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of
1982. Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or
declaration of marriage as dissolved with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file
any responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court.
She offered no opposition to Gerbert‘s petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar
case herself but was prevented by financial and personal circumstances. She, thus, requested that
she be considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerbert‘s. In its October 30, 2008
decision, the RTC denied Gerbert‘s petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert was not the proper
party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a
naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, in order for him or her to be able to
remarry under Philippine law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the right
to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree?

RULING:

The Supreme Court qualifies its conclusion that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens – with the complementary statement that this
conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert‘s petition before the RTC. In other words,
the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not
necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign
divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the
alien‘s national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a
 P a g e | 202

presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments.

In Gerbert‘s case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien,
recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign
authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires
proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody
of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be
(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
Philippine Foreign Service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office. The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a
copy of the divorce decree, as well as the required certificates proving its authenticity, but failed
to include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce. Under this situation, we can, at this point,
simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it more
appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent
with the Canadian divorce law. The petition was granted and the case is remanded to the trial
court for further proceedings.
 P a g e | 203

GARCIA-RECIO v. RECIO
G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001

FACTS:

Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon,
Rizal, on March 1, 1987.They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989,
a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family
court. On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a "Certificate of
Australian Citizenship" issued by the Australian government. Petitioner – a Filipina – and
respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in
Cabanatuan City. In their application for a marriage license, respondent was declared as "single"
and "Filipino." Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without
prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal
assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in
Australia. On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
in the court a quo, on the ground of bigamy – respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting
marriage at the time he married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of
respondent's marriage to Editha Samson only in November, 1997.The trial court declared the
marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in Australia was valid and recognized in
the Philippines. It deemed the marriage ended, but not on the basis of any defect in an essential
element of the marriage; that is, respondent's alleged lack of legal capacity to remarry. Rather, it
based its Decision on the divorce decree obtained by respondent. The Australian divorce had
ended the marriage; thus, there was no more martial union to nullify or annual.

ISSUES:

a) Whether or not the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven?
b) Whether or not the respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner?

RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled that the divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson
appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian family court. However, appearance is not
sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in
evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had
not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. The trial court ruled that it
was admissible, subject to petitioner's qualification. Hence, it was admitted in evidence and
accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner's failure to object properly rendered the divorce
decree admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia. Compliance with the
quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary; respondent was no longer
bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in
1992.Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the political and
civil rights belonging to a citizen. Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their
former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent
severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine
 P a g e | 204

personal laws. On the second issue, the Supreme Court held that there is absolutely no evidence
that proves respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner. A review of the records before this
Court shows that only the following exhibits were presented before the lower court: (1) for
petitioner: (a) Exhibit "A"– Complaint;(b) Exhibit "B"– Certificate of Marriage Between
Rederick A. Recio (Filipino-Australian) and Grace J. Garcia (Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in
Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija;(c) Exhibit "C"– Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A.
Recio (Filipino) and Editha D. Samson (Australian) on March 1, 1987 in Malabon, Metro
Manila;(d) Exhibit "D"– Office of the City Registrar of Cabanatuan City Certification that no
information of annulment between Rederick A. Recio and Editha D. Samson was in its records;
and (e) Exhibit “E"– Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio;(2) for
respondent: (Exhibit “1”) – Amended Answer;(b) Exhibit "S"– Family Law Act 1975 Decree
Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia;(c) Exhibit "3"– Certificate of
Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio;(d) Exhibit "4" – Decree Nisi of Dissolution of
Marriage in the Family Court of Australia Certificate; and Exhibit "5"– Statutory Declaration of
the Legal Separation Between Rederick A. Recio and Grace J. Garcia Recio since October 22,
1995. Based on the records, the Supreme Court cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a
naturalized Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994.
The Court agrees with petitioner's contention that the court a quo erred in finding that the divorce
decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to
adduce sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal law governing his status; or at the
very least, to prove his legal capacity to contract the second marriage. The case is thus remanded
to the trial court for further proceedings.
 P a g e | 205

DOREEN GRACE PARILLA MEDINA v. MICHIYUKI KOIKE

G.R. No. 215723 July 27, 2016

FACTS:

Petitioner Doreen Grace Parilla (Doreen), a Filipino citizen, and respondent Michiyuki Koike
(Michiyuki), a Japanese national, were married on June 14, 2005 in Quezon City, Philippines.
Their union bore two children, Masato Koike, who was born on January 23, 2006, and Fuka
Koike who was born on April 4, 2007. On June 14, 2012, Doreen and Michiyuki, pursuant to the
laws of Japan, filed for divorce before the Mayor of Ichinomiya City, Aichi Prefecture, Japan.
They were divorced on even date as appearing in the Divorce Certificate and the same was duly
recorded in the Official Family Register of Michiyuki Koike.
Seeking to have the said Divorce Certificate annotated on her Certificate of Marriage on file with
the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, Doreen filed on February 7, 2013 a petition for judicial
recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry pursuant to the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code before the RTC, docketed as Sp. Proc.No. Q-13-
72692.

At the hearing, no one appeared to oppose the petition. On the other hand, Doreen presented
several foreign documents, namely, "Certificate of Receiving/Certificate of Acceptance of
Divorce" and "Family Register of Michiyuki Koike" both issued by the Mayor of Ichinomiya
City and duly authenticated by the Consul of the Republic of the Philippines for Osaka, Japan.
She also presented a certified machine copy of a document entitled "Divorce Certificate" issued
by the Consul for the Ambassador of Japan in Manila that was authenticated by the Department
of the Foreign Affairs, as well as a Certification issued by the City Civil Registry Office in
Manila that the original of said divorce certificate was filed and recorded in the said Office. In
addition, photocopies of the Civil Code of Japan and their corresponding English translation, as
well as two (2) books entitled "The Civil Code of Japan 2000" and "The Civil Code of Japan
2009" were likewise submitted as proof of the existence of Japan's law on divorce.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC erred in denying the petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce.

RULING:

At the outset, it bears stressing that Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence,
our courts cannot grant it. However, Article 26 of the Family Code - which addresses foreign
marriages or mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner - allows a Filipino spouse to
contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by an alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry. The provision reads: “Art. 26. All marriages solemnized
outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited
under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.” Where a marriage between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law. Under the above-highlighted paragraph, the law
 P a g e | 206

confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a
Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the
marriage.

Thus, in Garcia v. Recio, it was pointed out that in order for a divorce obtained abroad by the
alien spouse to be recognized in our jurisdiction, it must be shown that the divorce decree is valid
according to the national law of the foreigner. Both the divorce decree and the governing
personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Since our courts do
not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment, our law on evidence requires that both the
divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven like any other fact.

Considering that the validity of the divorce decree between Doreen and Michiyuki, as well as the
existence of pertinent laws of Japan on the matter are essentially factual that calls for a re-
evaluation of the evidence presented before the RTC, the issue raised in the instant appeal is
obviously a question of fact that is beyond the ambit of a Rule 45 petition for review. Well
entrenched is the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts. The resolution of factual issues is the
function of the lower courts, whose findings on these matters are received with respect and are in
fact binding subject to certain exceptions. In this regard, it is settled that appeals taken from
judgments or final orders rendered by RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction raising
questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law should be brought to the Court of Appeals
(CA) in accordance with Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. Nonetheless, despite the procedural
restrictions on Rule 45 appeals as above-adverted, the Court may refer the case to the CA under
paragraph 2, Section 6 of Rule 56 of the Rules of Court, which provides: “Since the said Rules
denote discretion on the part of the Court to either dismiss the appeal or refer the case to the CA,
the question of fact involved in the instant appeal and substantial ends of justice warrant that the
case be referred to the CA for further appropriate proceedings. It bears to stress that procedural
rules were intended to ensure proper administration of law and justice. The rules of procedure
ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for they are adopted to help secure, not
override, substantial justice. A deviation from its rigid enforcement may thus be allowed to attain
its prime objective, for after all, the dispensation of justice is the core reason for the existence of
the courts.”
 P a g e | 207

ATIENZA v. BRILLANTES
A.M. No. MTJ-92-706 March 29, 1995

FACTS:

Complainant alleges that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro, who are living together at
No. 34 Galaxy Street, Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati, Metro Manila. In December 1991, upon
opening the door to his bedroom, he saw respondent sleeping on his (complainant's) bed.
Thereafter, respondent prevented him from visiting his children and even alienated the affection
of his children for him. Complainant claims that respondent is married to one Zenaida Ongkiko
with whom he has five children, as appearing in his 1986 and 1991 sworn statements of assets
and liabilities. For his part, respondent alleges that complainant was not married to De Castro
and that the filing of the administrative action was related to complainant's claim on the Bel-Air
residence, which was disputed by De Castro. Respondent also denies having been married to
Ongkiko, although he admits having five children with her. He alleges that while he and
Ongkiko went through a marriage ceremony before a Nueva Ecija town mayor on April 25,
1965, the same was not a valid marriage for lack of a marriage license. Upon the request of the
parents of Ongkiko, respondent went through another marriage ceremony with her in Manila on
June 5, 1965. Again, neither party applied for a marriage license. Ongkiko abandoned respondent
17 years ago, leaving their children to his care and custody as a single parent. Respondent claims
that when he married De Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles, California on December 4, 1991, he
believed, in all good faith and for all legal intents and purposes, that he was single because his
first marriage was solemnized without a license.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Article 40 of the Family Code apply to respondent considering that his first
marriage took place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil Code of the Philippines; while the
second marriage took place in 1991 and governed by the Family Code.

RULING:

Under the Family Code, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage
before a party thereto can enter into a second marriage. Article 40 of said Code provides: The
absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for the purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Article 40 is applicable
to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless
of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code, said Article is
given "retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." This is particularly true with Article 40, which is
a rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested right that was impaired by the
application of Article 40 to his case. The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the
litigants' rights may not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. Respondent
made a mockery of the institution of marriage and employed deceit to be able to cohabit with a
woman,who beget him five children. Respondent passed the Bar examinations in 1962 and was
admitted to the practice of law in 1963. It is evident that respondent failed to meet the standard
of moral fitness for membership in the legal profession. The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates
 P a g e | 208

that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to his
performance of his judicial duties but also as to his behavior as a private individual. There is no
duality of morality. A public figure is also judged by his private life. A judge, in order to
promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with
propriety at all times, in the performance of his judicial duties and in his everyday life. These are
judicial guideposts too self-evident to be overlooked. No position exacts a greater demand on
moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the judiciary.
 P a g e | 209

JO-ANN DIAZ-SALGADO & HUSBAND DR. GERARD C. SALGADO v. LUIS G.

ANSON
G.R. No. 204494 July 27, 2016

FACTS:

On September 5, 2003, Luis Anson (Luis) filed a Complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 69611
against Jo-Ann Diaz-Salgado (Jo-Ann) and Gerard Salgado (Gerard) (Spouses Salgado) along
with Maria Luisa Anson-Maya (Maria Luisa) and Gaston Maya (Spouses Maya), seeking the
annulment of the three Unilateral Deeds of Sale dated January 23, 2002 and the Deed of Extra-
Judicial Settlement of Estate of the Deceased Severina De Asis dated October 25, 2002. Luis
alleged in his complaint that he is the surviving spouse of the late Severina de Asis-Anson
(Severina). They were married in a civil ceremony on December 28, 1966. Prior to the
celebration of their marriage, Severina gave birth to their daughter, Maria Luisa on December
30, 1965 while Jo-Ann is Severina's daughter from a previous relationship.

According to Luis, because there was no marriage settlement between him and Severina, the
above-listed properties pertain to their conjugal partnership. But without his knowledge and
consent, Severina executed three separate Unilateral Deeds of Sale on January 23, 2002
transferring the properties covered by TCT Nos. 20618, 60069 and 5109 in favor of Jo-Ann, who
secured new certificates of title over the said properties. When Severina died on September 21,
2002, Maria Luisa executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of Deceased Severina
de Asis on October 25, 2002, adjudicating herself as Severina's sole heir. She secured new TCTs
over the properties covered by TCT Nos. 8478-R, 44637 and 8003. Luis claimed that because of
the preceding acts, he was divested of his lawful share in the conjugal properties and of his
inheritance as a compulsory heir of Severina.

In Jo-Ann's Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, which the trial court considered as the
Answer of her husband, Gerard, Jo-Ann countered that she was unaware of any marriage
contracted by her mother with Luis. She knew however that Luis and Severina had a common-
law relationship which they both acknowledged and formally terminated through a Partition
Agreement executed in November 1980. This was implemented through another Partition
Agreement executed in April 1981. Thus, Luis had already received the properties apportioned to
him by virtue of the said agreement while the properties subject of the Unilateral Deeds of Sale
were acquired exclusively by Severina. The TCTs covering Severina's properties were under
Severina's name only and she was described therein as single without reference to any husband.

Meanwhile, the Spouses Maya corroborated the Spouses Salgado's stance in their Answer, stating
that Maria Luisa is also not aware that Luis and Severina were married. She is cognizant of the
fact that Luis and Severina lived together as common-law husband and wife - a relationship
which was terminated upon execution of a Partition Agreement. In the Partition Agreement, Luis
and Severina were described as single and they acknowledged that they were living together as
common-law spouses. They also mutually agreed to the partition of the properties they owned in
common. Hence, Luis already received his share in the properties and is estopped from denying
the same. After the termination of their cohabitation in 1980, Luis went to United States of
America (USA), married one Teresita Anson and had a son with her; while Maria Luisa was left
under the guardianship and custody of Severina. It was after the death of Severina that Maria
 P a g e | 210

Luisa executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Severina de
Asis on October 25, 2002. The Spouses Maya were also able to obtain a Certificate of No Record
of Marriage (between Luis and Severina) from the Office the Civil Registrar General of the
National Statistics Office.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Spouses Salgado’s marriage is valid.

RULING:

The Spouses Salgado argue that the marriage between Luis and Severina is null and void for
want of marriage license based on the Marriage Contract presented by Luis which has adequately
established its absence. Contrary to Luis' contention, the present petition raises a question of law,
mainly, whether the absence of a marriage license may be proven on the basis of a marriage
contract which states that no marriage license was exhibited to the solemnizing officer on
account of the marriage being of an exceptional character.

In any event, while the jurisdiction of the Court in cases brought before it from the appellate
court is, as a general rule, limited to reviewing errors of law, there are exceptions recognized by
the Court, such as when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the
parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.

Since the marriage between Luis and Severina was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code, the applicable law to determine its validity is the Civil Code, the law in effect at
the time of its celebration on December 28, 1966. A valid marriage license is a requisite of
marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, and the absence thereof, save for marriages of
exceptional character, renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3).

Since there was an unequivocal declaration on the marriage contract itself that no marriage
license was exhibited to the solemnizing officer at the time of marriage owing to Article 77 of
the Civil Code, when in truth, the said exception does not obtain in their case, it is the burden of
Luis to prove that they secured the required marriage license.

However, instead of proving that a marriage license was indeed issued to them at the time of
their marriage, Luis relied mainly on the presumption of validity of marriage. This presumption
does not hold water vis-a-vis a prima facie evidence (marriage contract), which on its face has
established that no marriage license was presented to the solemnizing officer. If there was a
marriage license issued to Luis and Severina, its absence on the marriage contract was not
explained at all. Neither the original nor a copy of the marriage license was presented. No other
witness also testified to prove its existence, whereas Luis is not the best witness to testify
regarding its issuance. He admitted that he did not apply for one, and is uncertain about the
documents they purportedly submitted in the Municipal Hall.
 P a g e | 211

VDA. DE CATALAN v. CATALAN-LEE

G. R. No. 183622 February 8, 2012

FACTS:

Orlando B. Catalan was a naturalized American citizen. After allegedly obtaining a divorce in
the United States from his first wife, Felicitas Amor, he contracted a second marriage with
petitioner herein. On November 18, 2004, Orlando died intestate in the Philippines. Thereafter,
petitioner filed a Petition for the issuance of letters of administration for her appointment as
administratrix of the intestate estate of Orlando. Respondent Louella A. Catalan-Lee, one of the
children of Orlando from his first marriage, filed a similar petition. The two cases were
subsequently consolidated. On the other hand, respondent alleged that petitioner was not
considered an interested person qualified to file a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration of the estate of Orlando. In support of her contention, respondent alleged that a
criminal case for bigamy was filed against petitioner. On 6 August 1998, the RTC had acquitted
petitioner of bigamy. Furthermore, it took note of the action for declaration of nullity then
pending action with the trial court in Dagupan City filed by Felicitas Amor against the deceased
and petitioner. On June 26, 2006, Branch 70 of the RTC of Burgos, Pangasinan dismissed the
Petition for the issuance of letters of administration filed by petitioner and granted that of private
respondent. The CA held that petitioner undertook the wrong remedy. Petitioner moved for a
reconsideration of this Decision. On June 20, 2008, the CA denied her motion.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the divorce is valid.

RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled that under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid
divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality. This doctrine was established as early as
1985 in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. wherein we said: It is true that owing to the nationality
principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the
policy against absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to our concept of public
policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in
the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce
in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law,
under which divorce dissolves the marriage. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive
evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce
obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is
the judgment itself. The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an official body
or tribunal of a foreign country. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a
writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either
(1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the
document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a
certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of
his office. Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not
 P a g e | 212

necessary; respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired
Australian citizenship in 1992. Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing
him with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen. Naturalized citizens, freed from the
protective cloak of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming
an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that
had tied him to Philippine personal laws. Thus, it is imperative for the trial court to first
determine the validity of the divorce to ascertain the rightful party to be issued the letters of
administration over the estate of Orlando B. Catalan.
 P a g e | 213

QUITA v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R No. 124862 December 22, 1998

FACTS:

Fe D. Quita and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on May 18,
1941. No children were born out of their marriage. On July 23, 1954, petitioner obtained a final
judgment of divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. On April 16, 1972, Arturo died leaving
no will. On August 31, 1972, Lino Javier Inciong filed a petition with the RTC for issuance of
letters of administration concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust
Company. Respondent Blandina Dandan, claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo Dandan
and the surviving children, all surnamed Padlan, opposed the petition. The RTC expressed that
the marriage between Antonio and petitioner subsisted until the death of Arturo in 1972, that the
marriage existed between private respondent and Arturo was clearly void since it was celebrated
during the existence of his previous marriage to petitioner. The Court of Appeals remanded the
case to the trial court for further proceedings.

ISSUE:
a. Should the case be remanded to the lower court?
b. Who between the petitioner and private respondent is the proper heir of the decedent?

RULING:

If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or
as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall
be heard and decided as in ordinary cases. No dispute exists as to the right of the six Padlan
children to inherit from the decedent because there are proofs that they have been duly
acknowledged by him and petitioner herself even recognizes them as heirs of Arturo Padlan, nor
as to their respective hereditary shares. Private respondent is not a surviving spouse that can
inherit from him as this status presupposes a legitimate relationship. Her marriage to Arturo
being a bigamous marriage considered void ab initio under Articles 80 and 83 of the Civil Code
renders her not a surviving spouse. The decision of the Court of Appeals ordering the remand of
the case is affirmed.
 P a g e | 214

TENEBRO v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 150758 February 18, 2004

FACTS:

Veronico Tenebro contracted marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas on April 10,
1990. Tenebro and Ancajas lived together continuously and without interruption until the latter
part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain
Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage
contract between him and Villareyes. Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left
the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with
Villareyes. On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a
certain Nilda Villegas. When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes
whether the latter was indeed married to petitioner. In a handwritten letter, Villareyes confirmed
that petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, was indeed her husband. Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint
for bigamy against petitioner. Villegas countered that his marriage with Villareyes cannot be
proven as a fact there being no record of such. He further argued that his second marriage, with
Ancajas, has been declared void ab initio due to psychological incapacity. Hence he cannot be
charged for bigamy.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Tenebro is guilty of bigamy.

RULING:

Individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid
marriage is criminally liable for bigamy notwithstanding the declaration of the second marriage
as void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity. Would the absolute nullity of either
first or second marriage prior to its judicial declaration as being void, constitute a valid defense
in a criminal action for bigamy? Yes. Except for a void marriage on account of psychological
incapacity—void marriages are inexistent from the very beginning, and no judicial decree is
required to establish their nullity. The complete nullity of a previously contracted marriage being
void ab initio and legally inexistent can out rightly be a defense in an indictment for bigamy.
 P a g e | 215

JARILLO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 164435 September 29, 2009

FACTS:

Victoria Jarillo, petitioner, and Rafael Alocillo were married in a civil wedding ceremony in
Taguig, Rizal in 1974. Both newlyweds celebrated a second wedding, this time a church
ceremony, in1975 in San Carlos City, Pangasinan. Out of the union, the spouses bore a daughter.
Jarillo, however, contracted a subsequent marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy celebrated
through a civil ceremony. Thereafter, Jarillo and Uy exchanged marital vows in a church
wedding in Manila. In 1999, Uy filed acivil case for annulment against Jarillo. On the basis of
the foregoing, Jarillo was charged with Bigamy before the RTC. Parenthetically, Jarillo filed a
civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage against Alocillo in 2000. The trial court rendered
the assailed decision, holding Jarillo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy.
Jarillo posits, as defenses, that her marriage to Alocillo were null and void because Alocillo was
allegedly still married to a certain Loretta Tillman at the time of the celebration of their marriage,
that her marriages to Alocillo and Uy were both null and void for lack of a marriage license, and
that the action had prescribed, since Uy knew about her marriage to Alocillo. On Appeal, the CA
confirmed the ruling of the trial court. In the meantime, the RTC where Jarillo filed a civil case
against Alocillo rendered judgement declaring Jarillo’s marriage to Alocillo null and void ab
initio on the ground of Alocillo’s psychological incapacity. Jarillo, in her motion for
reconsideration, invoked the ruling of the trial court as a ground for the reversal of her
conviction. In a Resolution by the CA, the latter denied reconsideration.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Jarillo can be convicted of the crime of bigamy

RULING:

Petitioner’s conviction of the crime of bigamy must be affirmed. The subsequent judicial
declaration of nullity of petitioner’s two marriages to Alocillo cannot be considered a valid
defense in the crime of bigamy. The moment petitioner contracted a second marriage without the
previous one having been judicially declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was already
consummated because at the time of the celebration of the second marriage, petitioner’s marriage
to Alocillo, which had not yet been declared null and void by a court of competent second
marriage, petitioner’s marriage to Alocillo, which had not yet been declared null and void by a
court of competent jurisdiction, was deemed valid and subsisting. Neither would a judicial
declaration of the nullity of petitioner’s marriage to jurisdiction, was deemed valid and
subsisting. Neither would a judicial declaration of the nullity of petitioner’s marriage to Uy make
any difference. As held in Tenebro, since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid
marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for
the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. A plain reading of Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code, therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a
second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.
 P a g e | 216

WEIGEL v. SEMPIO DIY

G.R. No. L-53703 August 19, 1986

FACTS:

Karl Wiegel was married to Lilia Wiegel on July 1978. Lilia was married with a certain Eduardo
Maxion in 1972. Karl then filed a petition in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lilia on the ground of latter’s former marriage.
Having been allegedly force to enter into a marital union, she contends that the first marriage is
null and void. Lilia likewise alleged that Karl was married to another woman before their
marriage.

ISSUE:

Whether Karl’s marriage with Lilia is void.

RULING:

It was not necessary for Lilia to prove that her first marriage was vitiated with force because it
will not be void but merely voidable. Such marriage is valid until annulled. Since no annulment
has yet been made, it is clear that when she married Karl, she is still validly married to her first
husband. Consequently, her marriage to Karl is void. Likewise, there is no need of introducing
evidence on the prior marriage of Karl for then such marriage though void still needs a judicial
declaration before he can remarry. Accordingly, Karl and Lilia’s marriage are regarded void
under the law.
 P a g e | 217

SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION v. AZOTE

G.R. No. 209741 April 15, 2015

FACTS:

In 1994, Edgardo submitted his SSS Form E-4 with his wife Edna and their children as
beneficiaries. When he died in 2005, Edna tried to claim the death benefits as the wife of a
deceased member but it was denied. It appears from the SSS records that Edgardo had another
set of SSS Form E-4 in 1982 where his former wife Rosemarie and their child were designated as
beneficiaries. Edna did not know that Edgardo was previously married to another woman. She
then filed for a petition before the SSS, and notice was sent to Rosemarie but she made no
answer. The SSC dismissed Edna’s petition because the SSS Form E-4 designating Rosemarie
and her child was not revoked by Edgardo, and that she was still presumed to be the legal wife as
Edna could not prove that Edgardo’s previous marriage was annulled or divorced.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Edna is entitled to the SSS benefits as the wife of a deceased member.

RULING:

No. The law in force at the time of Edgardo’s death was RA 8282. Applying Section 8(e) and
(k) thereof, only the legal spouse of the deceased-member is qualified to be the beneficiary of the
latter’s SS benefits. Here, there is a concrete proof that Edgardo contracted an earlier marriage
with another individual as evidenced by their marriage contract. Since the second marriage of
Edgardo with Edna was celebrated when the Family Code was already in force. Edna, pursuant
to Article 41 of the Family Code, failed to establish that there was no impediment or that the
impediment was already removed at the time of the celebration of her marriage to Edgardo.
Edna could not adduce evidence to prove that the earlier marriage of Edgardo was either
annulled or dissolved or whether there was a declaration of Rosemarie’s presumptive death
before her marriage to Edgardo. What is apparent is that Edna was the second wife of Edgardo.
Considering that Edna was not able to show that she was the legal spouse of a deceased-member,
she would not qualify under the law to be the beneficiary of the death benefits of Edgardo.
Although the SSC is not intrinsically empowered to determine the validity of marriages, it is
required by Section 4(b) (7) of R.A. No. 828229 to examine available statistical and economic
data to ensure that the benefits fall into the rightful beneficiaries.
 P a g e | 218

REPUBLIC v. NOLASCO
G.R. No. 94053 March 17, 1993

FACTS:

Gregorio Nolasco filed before the Regional Trial Court of Antique a petition for the declaration
of the presumptive death of his wife Janet Monica Parker, invoking Article 41 of the Family
Code. The Republic of the Philippines opposed the petition through the Provincial Prosecutor of
Antique who had been deputized to assist the Solicitor General in the case. During trial, Nolasco
testified that he was seaman and that he had first met Parker, a British subject, in a bar in
England during one of his ship’s port calls. From that chance meeting onwards, Parker lived with
Nolasco on his ship for six months until they returned to Nolasco’s hometown of San Jose,
Antique in 1980 after his seaman’s contract expired. On January 1982, Nolasco married Parker
in San Jose, Antique. After the marriage celebration, Nolasco obtained another employment as a
seaman and left his wife with his parents in Antique. Sometime in 1983, while working overseas,
Nolasco received a letter from his mother informing him that Parker had left Antique. Nolasco
claimed he asked permission to leave the ship and return home to look for his wife. He testified
that his efforts to look for her whenever their ship docked in England were fruitless, that the
letters he sent to Parker’s address in England were all returned to him, and that their friends
received no news from Parker. He testified that he had no knowledge of her family background
even after the marriage and did not report the disappearance to the authorities. The petition was
granted by lower court and was also affirmed by the appellate court. As such, the republic
appealed to the SC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead.

RULING:

The respondent failed to establish that he had the well-founded belief required by law that his
absent wife was already dead that would sustain the issuance of a court order declaring Janet
Monica Parker presumptively dead. In the case at bar, the Court considers that the investigation
allegedly conducted by respondent in his attempt to ascertain Janet Monica Parker's whereabouts
is too sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable or well-founded belief that she was already dead.
When he arrived in San Jose, Antique after learning of Janet Monica's departure, instead of
seeking the help of local authorities or of the British Embassy, he secured another seaman's
contract and went to London, a vast city of many millions of inhabitants, to look for her there.
The Court also views respondent's claim that Janet Monica declined to give any information as to
her personal background even after she had married respondent 17 too convenient an excuse to
justify his failure to locate her. The same can be said of the loss of the alleged letters respondent
had sent to his wife which respondent claims were all returned to him. Respondent said he had
lost these returned letters, under unspecified circumstances.
 P a g e | 219

REPUBLIC v. COURT OF APPEALS

477 SCRA 277

FACTS:

Alan Alegro, the petitioner, was married with Lea in January 1995. Lea arrived home late in
February 1995 and Alan told her that if she enjoys life of a single person, it will be better for her
to go back to her parents. Lea left after that fight. Allan checked if she went to her parents’ house
but was not there and even inquired to her friends. He went back to the parents-in-law’s house
and learned that Lea had been to their house but left without notice. He then sought help from the
Barangay Captain. For some time, Alan decided to work as part-time taxi driver and during his
free time he would look for Lea in the malls. In June 2001, Alan reported Lea’s disappearance to
the local police station and an alarm notice was issued. He also reported the disappearance in
NBI on July 2001. Alan filed a petition in March 2001 for the declaration of presumptive death
of his wife.

ISSUE:

Whether Alan has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead.

RULING:

The court ruled that Alan failed to prove that he has a well-founded belief, before he filed his
petition with RTC, that his spouse was dead. He failed to present a witness other than the
Barangay Captain. He even failed to present those friends of Lea which he inquired to
corroborate his testimony. He also failed to make inquiries from his parents-in-law regarding
Lea’s whereabouts before filing his petition in the RTC. It could have enhanced his credibility
had he made inquiries from his parents-in-law about Lea's whereabouts considering that Lea's
father was the owner of Radio DYMS. He did report and seek help of the local police authorities
and NBI to locate Lea but he did so only after the OSG file its notice to dismiss his petition in
RTC.
 P a g e | 220

BIENVENIDO v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 111717 October 24, 1994

FACTS:

Aurelio P. Camacho married Consejo Velasco in Manila on October 3, 1942. On February 6,

1962, without his marriage to Consejo Velasco being dissolved, Aurelio P. Camacho contracted
another marriage with respondent Luisita C. Camacho (Luisita) with whom he had been living
since 1953 and by whom he begot a child, respondent Aurelio Luis Faustino C. Camacho (Chito)
born on May 22, 1961. The marriage was solemnized in Tokyo, Japan where Aurelio and Luisita
had been living since 1958. There were instances during Luisita and Aurelio’s marriage when,
because of their quarrels, one or the other left the dwelling place for long periods of time. In her
case Luisita stayed on those occasions at various times in Davao City, Hongkong or Japan. In
1967 Aurelio met petitioner Nenita T. Bienvenido, who had been estranged from her husband,
Luis Rivera. He lived with her from June 1968 until Aurelio’s death on May 28, 1988, he lived
with her, the last time in a duplex apartment in Quezon City. Petitioner’s daughter, Nanette,
stayed with them as did Aurelio’s son, Chito, who lived with them for about a year in 1976. On
April 30, 1982, Aurelio bought the house and the lot on Delgado Street in which they were
staying from the owners, Paz Lorenzo Infante and Suzette Infante-Moñozca. In the deed of sale
and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 288350 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City, issued in
his name, Aurelio was described as single. On November 26, 1984, Aurelio executed a deed of
sale of the property in favor of petitioner Nenita in consideration of the sum of P250,000.00, by
virtue of which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 326681 was issued in petitioner’s name on
January 11, 1985. On September 7, 1988, Luisita and her son Chito brought this case in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, seeking the annulment of the sale of the property to
petitioner and the payment to them of damages. Luisita alleged that the deed of sale was a
forgery and that in any event it was executed in fraud of her as the legitimate wife of Aurelio. In
answer petitioner Nenita claimed that she and the late Aurelio had purchased the property in
question using their joint funds which they had accumulated after living together for fourteen
years, that the sale of the property by the late Aurelio to her was with respondent Luisita’s
consent and that she was a purchaser in good faith.

ISSUES:

a. Whether the marriage of Aurelio and Luisita is valid.

b. Whether the deed of sale between Aurelio and Nenita is valid.

RULING:

1. The burden of proof was on respondents to show that Luisita and Aurelio’s marriage falls
under any of these exceptions in order to be considered valid. They failed to discharge this
burden. Instead the contrary appears. It has been held that the first exception refers to the
subsequent marriage of the abandoned spouse and not the remarriage of the deserting spouse,
after the period of seven years had lapsed. 6 This exception cannot be invoked in this case in
order to sustain the validity of Aurelio’s marriage to Luisita because apparently it was Aurelio
who had left his first wife. At the time of his second marriage to Luisita, he and Luisita had
 P a g e | 221

already been living together as husband and wife for five years. In fact the couple begot a child,
in 1961, even before their marriage in 1962.

2. There is no basis for holding that the property in question was property of the conjugal
partnership of Luisita and the late Aurelio because there was no such partnership in the first
place. The sale to petitioner must be presumed. Petitioner’s ownership is evidenced by a deed of
absolute sale 7 executed with all the solemnity of a public document and by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 326681 issued in due course in her name. Indeed, the property in question was
acquired by Aurelio during a long period of cohabitation with petitioner which lasted for twenty
years (1968-1988). While petitioner knew respondent Chito to be Aurelio’s son way back in
1976, there is nothing to show that she knew Aurelio to be married to Luisita. To the contrary,
Aurelio represented himself to be single. As far as petitioner was concerned, Chito could have
been Aurelio’s child by a woman not his wife. There was, therefore, no basis for the Court of
Appeals’ ruling that Nenita was not a buyer in good faith of the property because she ought to
have known that Aurelio was married to Luisita.
 P a g e | 222

MANUEL v. PHILIPPINES
G.R No. 165842 November 29, 2005

FACTS:

On April 22, 1996, Baguio City, Philippines, Eduardo P. Manuel, respondent, contracted a
second marriage with Tina Gandalera-Manuel, complainant, in RTC of Baguio City. It so
appeared in the marriage contract that Manuel was “single”. Eduardo P. Manuel was previously
legally married to Rubylus Gana without the said marriage having been legally dissolved before
the second marriage. Tina Gandalera-Manuel did not know the existence of the first marriage of
the respondent to Rubylus Gana. On July 28, 1975, Makati, Eduardo was married to Ruby. On
January 1996, Eduardo met Tina in Dagupan City. Afterwards, Eduardo went to Baguio to visit
her and he proposed assuring her that he was single. Starting 1999, Manuel started making
himself scarce and went to their house only twice or thrice a year. Sometime in January 2001,
Eduardo took all his clothes, left, and did not return. He stopped giving financial support.
Sometime in August 2001, Tina learned that Eduardo had been previously married. Eduardo
testified that he declared that he was single because he believed in good faith that his marriage
was invalid. He said he did not know he had to go to the court to seek for nullification of his
first marriage before marrying Tina. Ruby was jailed and he had not heard from her for more
than 20 years. On July 2, 2002, RTC found Eduardo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy
under Article 349 of the RPC, and sentenced him an indeterminate penalty of from six (6) years
and ten (10) months, as minimum to ten (10) years, as maximum, and directed to indemnify the
private complainant, Tina Gandalera, the amount of P200,000 by way of moral damages, plus
costs of suit. Manuel appealed the decision to the CA. He insisted that conformably to Article 3
of the RPC, there must be malice for one to be criminally liable for a felony. He posited that the
RTC should have taken into account Article 390 of the New Civil Code.

On June 18, 2004, the CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of the RTC with
modification to indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of
prision coreccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor as maximum, and
affirmation in all other respect, as to the penalty of the accused. It ruled that the prosecution was
able to prove all the elements of bigamy. Contrary to the contention of the appellant, Article 41
of the Family Code should apply.

ISSUES:

a. Whether or not the CA committed reversible error of law when it ruled that petitioner’s
first wife cannot be legally presumed dead under Article 390 of the Civil Code as there
was no judicial declaration of presumptive death as provided for under Article 41 of the
Family Code; and
b. Whether or not the CA committed reversible error of law when it affirmed the award of
P200,000 as moral damages as it had no basis in fact and in law.

RULING:
1. No. The petitioner’s sole reliance on Article 390 of the Civil Code as basis for his acquittal
for bigamy is misplaced. The presumption of death of the spouse who had been absent for seven
years, is created by law and arises without necessity of judicial declaration. However, Article
 P a g e | 223

41, of the Family Code, which amended the foregoing rules on presumptive death, provides that
for the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage (under its preceding paragraph), the spouse
present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in the Court for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent
spouse.

2. No. The Court rules against the petitioner. The petitioner is liable to the private complainant
for moral damages under Article 2219 in relation to Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code.
The Court thus declares that the petitioner’s acts are against public policy as they undermine, and
subvert the family as a social institution, good morals, and the interest, and general welfare of
society. Because the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioner’s perfidy, she
is not barred from claiming moral damages. Even considerations of public policy would not
prevent her from recovery as held in Jekshewitz v. Groswald.
 P a g e | 224

CALISTERIO v. CALISTERIO
G.R. No. 136467 April 6, 2000

FACTS:

Teodorico Calisterio, husband of Marietta Calisterio, the respondent, died intestate in April 1992
leaving several parcel of land estimated value of P604, 750.00. He was the second husband of
Marietta who was previously married with William Bounds in January 1946. The latter
disappeared without a trace in February 1947. 11 years later from the disappearance of Bounds,
Marietta and Teodorico were married in May 1958 without Marietta securing a court declaration
of Bounds’ presumptive death. Antonia Armas y Calisterio, surviving sister of Teodorico filed a
petition claiming to be the sole surviving heir of the latter and that marriage between Marietta
and his brother being allegedly bigamous is thereby null and void. She prayed that her son
Sinfroniano be appointed as administrator, without bond, of the estate of the deceased and
inheritance be adjudicated to her after all the obligations of the estate would have been settled.

ISSUE:

Whether Marrieta and Teodorico’s marriage was void due to the absence of the declaration of
presumptive death.

RULING:

The marriage between the respondent and the deceased was solemnized in May 1958 where the
law in force at that time was the Civil Code and not the Family Code which only took effect in
August 1988. Article 256 of the Family Code itself limit its retroactive governance only to cases
where it thereby would not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the
Civil Code or other laws. Since Civil Code provides that declaration of presumptive death is not
essential before contracting marriage where at least 7 consecutive years of absence of the spouse
is enough to remarry then Marrieta’s marriage with Teodorico is valid and therefore she has a
right can claim portion of the estate.
 P a g e | 225

REPUBLIC v. GRANADA
G.R. No. 187512 June 13, 2012

FACTS:

Cyrus and Yolanda Granada, both employees of Sumida Electric Company, got married in 1993.
In May 1994, when Sumida Electric Philippines closed down, Cyrus went to Taiwan to seek
employment. Yolanda claimed that from that time, she did not receive any communication from
her husband, notwithstanding efforts to locate him. Her brother testified that he had asked the
relatives of Cyrus regarding the latter’s whereabouts, to no avail. After 9 years of waiting,
Yolanda filed a Petition to have Cyrus declared presumptively dead with the RTC Lipa City. On
February 7, 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision declaring Cyrus as presumptively dead. On 10
March 2005, OSG, filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that Yolanda had failed to exert
earnest efforts to locate Cyrus and thus failed to prove her well-founded belief that he was
already dead. The motion was denied. The OSG then elevated the case on appeal to the Court of
Appeals. Yolanda filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the CA had no jurisdiction over
the appeal. She argued that her Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death, based on Article
41 of the Family Code, was a summary judicial proceeding, in which the judgment is
immediately final and executory and, thus, not appealable.. Petitioner moved for reconsideration,
which was denied. Hence, the present petition under Rule 45.

ISSUE:

Whether the order of the RTC in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death
is immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties and, hence, is not subject to
ordinary appeal.

RULING:

Yes, the declaration of presumptive death is final and immediately executory. Even if the RTC
erred in granting the petition, such order can no longer be assailed. .
 P a g e | 226

REPUBLIC v. NARCEDA
G.R. No. 182760 April 10, 2013

FACTS:

The present case stems from a Petition for Review filed by the Republic of the Philippines
praying for the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing the appeal filed by
the petitioner for lack of jurisdiction to decide on the matter. The subject matter of the appeal
was the decision of the RTC of La Union declaring the presumptive death of respondent’s wife
final and executory. Robert P. Narceda married Marina on 22 July 1987. A reading of the
Marriage Contract he presented will reveal that at the time of their wedding, Marina was only 17
years and 4 months old. According to respondent, Marina went to Singapore sometime in 1994
and never returned since. There was never any communication between them. He tried to look
for her, but he could not find her. Several years after she left, one of their town mates in Luna, La
Union came home from Singapore and told him that the last time she saw his wife; the latter was
already living with a Singaporean husband. In view of her absence and his desire to remarry,
respondent filed with the RTC on 16 May 2002 a Petition for a judicial declaration of the
presumptive death and/or absence of Marina. The RTC granted respondent’s Petition in a
Decision dated 5 May 2005. Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General appealed the
foregoing Decision to the CA. According to petitioner, respondent failed to conduct a search for
his missing wife with the diligence required by law and enough to give rise to a "well-founded"
belief that she was dead. The CA dismissed the appeal ruling that the hearing of a petition for the
declaration of presumptive death is a summary proceeding under the Family Code and is thus
governed by Title XI thereof. Article 247 of the Family Code provides that the judgment of the
trial court in summary court proceedings shall be immediately final and executory. The OSG
filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was likewise denied through the CA’s 29 April 2008
Resolution.

ISSUES:

a. The Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the Petition on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.
b. Respondent has failed to establish a well-founded belief that his absentee spouse is dead.

RULING:

As explained in Republic v. Tango, the remedy of a losing party in a summary proceeding is not
an ordinary appeal, but a petition for certiorari, to wit: By express provision of law, the judgment
of the court in a summary proceeding shall be immediately final and executory. As a matter of
course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial court's judgment in a summary proceeding
for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family
Code. It goes without saying, however, that an aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari
to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in
the Court of Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if
the Court's original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and the
Court of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted freedom of
choice of court forum. From the decision of the Court of Appeals, the losing party may then file
 P a g e | 227

a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with the Supreme Court.
This is because the errors which the court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely
errors of judgment which are the proper subject of an appeal. When the OSG filed its notice of
appeal under Rule 42, it availed itself of the wrong remedy. As a result, the running of the period
for filing of a Petition for Certiorari continued to run and was not tolled. Upon lapse of that
period, the Decision of the RTC could no longer be questioned. Consequently, petitioner's
contention that respondent has failed to establish a well-founded belief that his absentee spouse
is dead may no longer be entertained by this.
 P a g e | 228

REPUBLIC v. CANTOR
G.R. No. 184621 December 10, 2013

FACTS:

Sometime in January 1998, Jerry F. Cantor left his wife Maria Fe Espinosa Cantor after a violent
quarrel. After more than four years of not seeing or hearing from Jerry, Maria Fe filed a petition
for the declaration of presumptive death of her husband. She alleged that she conducted a
diligent search for her husband and exerted earnest efforts to find him. The RTC granted her
petition. Dissatisfied with the ruling, the OSG filed the present petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:

Did Maria Fe have a well-founded belief that Jerry was dead in pursuant with Article 41 of the
Family Code?

RULING:

Whether or not one has a “well-founded belief” that his or her spouse is dead depends on the
unique circumstance of each case and that there is no set standard or procedure in determining
the same. Maria Fe’s alleged “well-founded” belief arose when: 1) Jerry’s relatives and friends
could not give her any information on his whereabouts; and 2) she did not find Jerry’s name in
the patient’s directory whenever she went to a hospital. It appears that Maria Fe did not actively
look for her husband in hospitals and it may be sensed that her search was not intentional or
planned. Her search for Jerry was far from diligent. Were it not for the finality of the RTC ruling,
the declaration of presumptive death should have been recalled and set aside for utter lack of
factual basis.
 P a g e | 229

SANTOS v. SANTOS
G.R. No. 187061 October 8, 2014

FACTS:

On July 27, 2007, the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City declared petitioner Celerina J. Santos
(Celerina) presumptively dead after her husband, respondent Ricardo T. Santos (Ricardo), had
filed a petition for declaration of absence or presumptive death for the purpose of remarriage on
June 15, 2007. Ricardo remarried on September 17, 2008. In his petition for declaration of
absence or presumptive death, Ricardo alleged that he and Celerina rented an apartment
somewhere in San Juan, Metro Manila; after they had gotten married on June 18, 1980. After a
year, they moved to Tarlac City. They were engaged in the buy and sell business. Ricardo
claimed that their business did not prosper. As a result, Celerina convinced him to allow her to
work as a domestic helper in Hong Kong. She allegedly applied in an employment agency in
Ermita, Manila, in February 1995. She left Tarlac two months after and was never heard from
again. Ricardo further alleged that he exerted efforts to locate Celerina.He went to Celerina's
parents in Cubao, Quezon City, but they, too, did not know their daughter's whereabouts. He also
inquired about her from other relatives and friends, but no one gave him any information.
Ricardo claimed that it was almost 12 years from the date of his Regional Trial Court petition
since Celerina left. He believed that she had passed away. On November 17, 2008, Celerina
filed a petition for annulment of judgment before the Court of Appeals on the grounds of
extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. She argued that she was deprived her day in court when
Ricardo, despite his knowledge of her true residence, misrepresented to the court that she was a
resident of Tarlac City. Celerina claimed that she never resided in Tarlac. She also never left and
worked as a domestic helper abroad. Neither did she go to an employment agency in February
1995.21 She also claimed that it was not true that she had been absent for 12 years. Celerina also
argued that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over Ricardo's petition because it had never
been published in a newspaper. She added that the Office of the Solicitor General and the
Provincial Prosecutor's Office were not furnished copies of Ricardo's petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subsequent marriage entered into by Ricardo Santos is valid.

RULING:

No, the subsequent marriage entered into by Ricardo Santos is not valid. A bigamous subsequent
marriage may be considered valid when the following are present: 1)The prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years; 2)The spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead; 3)There must be a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absent spouse; and 4)There is a court declaration of presumptive death
of the absent spouse. However, a subsequent marriage contracted in bad faith, even if it was
contracted after a court declaration of presumptive death, lacks the requirement of a well-
founded belief that the spouse is already dead. The first marriage will not be considered as
validly terminated. Marriages contracted prior to the valid termination of a subsisting marriage
are generally considered bigamous and void. Only a subsequent marriage contracted in good
faith is protected by law. The party who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith is also
 P a g e | 230

not immune from an action to declare his subsequent marriage void for being bigamous. The
prohibition against marriage during the subsistence of another marriage still applies.
 P a g e | 231

REPUBLIC v. ORCELINO-VILLANUEVA
G.R. No. 210929 July 29, 2015

FACTS:

Edna and Romeo were married on December 21, 1978, in Iligan City. In 1992, Edna worked as
domestic helper in Singapore while her husband worked as a mechanic in Valencia City,
Bukidnon. In 1993, Edna heard the news from her children that Romeo had left their conjugal
home without reason or information as to his whereabouts. Thereafter, Edna took a leave from
work and returned to the country to look for Romeo. She inquired from her parents-in-law and
common friends in Iligan City. Still, she found no leads as to his whereabouts or existence. She
also went to his birthplace in Escalante, Negros Oriental, and inquired from his relatives. On
August 6, 2009, Edna filed before the RTC a petition to declare Romeo presumptively dead
under Article 41 of the Family Code. During the trial, Edna was presented as the lone witness. In
its October 8, 2009 Order, the RTC granted the petition on the basis of her well founded belief of
Romeo's death.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC decision granting the petition of Edna to have
her husband be declared presumptively dead under Article 41 of the Family Code.

RULING:

Yes, Article 41 of the Family Code provides that before a judicial declaration of presumptive
death may be granted, the present spouse must prove that he/she has a well-founded belief that
the absentee is dead. In this case, Edna failed. The well-founded belief in the absentee's death
requires the present spouse to prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable
efforts to locate the absent spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes
that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It necessitates exertion of active
effort (not a mere passive one). Mere absence of the spouse (even beyond the period required by
law), lack of any news that the absentee spouse is still alive, mere failure to communicate, or
general presumption of absence under the Civil Code would not suffice.
 P a g e | 232

REPUBLIC v. SARENOGON, JR.

G.R. No. 199194 February 10, 2016

FACTS:

Sarenogon filed a petition before the RTC to declare the presumptive death of his wife Netchie.
He testified that they got married and lived together as husband and wife for a month only
because he left to work as a seaman while Netchie went to Hongkong as a domestic helper. For 3
months, he did not receive any communication from Netchie and had no idea about her
whereabouts. While still abroad, he tried to contact Netchie’s parents, but failed. He returned
home after his contract expired, then inquired from Netchie’s relatives and friends about
her whereabouts. They also did not know where she was. Because of these, he had to presume
that his wife Netchie was already dead. He filed the Petition before the RTC so he could
contract another marriage pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code. Jose’s testimony was
corroborated by his older brother, and by Netchie’s aunt. These two witnesses testified that
Jose and Netchie lived together as husband and wife only for one month prior to their leaving the
Philippines for separate destinations abroad and added that they had no information regarding
Netchie’s location. The RTC found that Netchie had disappeared for more than four years,
reason enough for Jose to conclude that his wife was indeed already dead. The OSG questioned
the RTC ruling via Rule 65 before the CA for the RTC’s error in its misappreciation of evidence.
The CA saw no error in the RTC judgment and further held that Rule 65 is the wrong recourse in
elevating a declaration of presumptive death judgment from the RTC.

ISSUES:

a. Whether or not Rule 65 is the proper recourse to question the RTC ruling
b. Whether or not Dante should be declared presumptively dead

RULING:

1. Yes. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy to question the RTC’s
decision in a summary proceeding for declaration of presumptive death. Under Article 247 of the
Family Code, the RTC’s decision on a petition pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code is
immediately final and executory. Thus, the CA has no jurisdiction to entertain a notice of
appeal pertaining to such judgment. However, an aggrieved party may file a certiorari under
Rule 65 to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be
filed in the CA in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. From the decision of the
CA, the aggrieved party may elevate the matter to SC via a petition for review under Rule 45.

2. No. Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be shown that
the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the present spouse had a well-
founded belief that the prior spouse was already dead. Under Article 4119 of the Family Code of
the Philippines (Family Code), there are four (4) essential requisites for the declaration of
presumptive death: (1) that the absent spouse has been missing for four (4) consecutive years, or
two (2) consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the
circumstances laid down in Article 391 of the Civil Code; (2) that the present spouse wishes to
remarry; (3) that the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and (4)
 P a g e | 233

that the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of
the absentee. The "well-founded belief in the absentee's death requires the present spouse to
prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts to locate the absent
spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the
circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It necessitates exertion of active effort, not a
passive one. As such, the mere absence of the spouse for such periods prescribed under the law,
lack of any news that such absentee spouse is still alive, failure to communicate, or general
presumption of absence under the Civil Code would not suffice. In this case, Nilda testified that
after Dante's disappearance, she tried to locate him by making inquiries with his parents,
relatives, and neighbors as to his whereabouts, but unfortunately, they also did not know where
to find him. Other than making said inquiries, however, Nilda made no further efforts to find her
husband. She could have called or proceeded to the AFP headquarters to request information
about her husband, but failed to do so. She did not even seek the help of the authorities or the
AFP itself in finding him. Considering her own pronouncement that Dante was sent by the AFP
on a combat mission to Jolo, Sulu at the time of his disappearance, she could have inquired from
the AFP on the status of the said mission, or from the members of the AFP who were assigned
thereto. To the Court's mind, therefore, Nilda failed to actively look for her missing husband, and
her purported earnest efforts to find him by asking Dante's parents, relatives, and friends did not
satisfy the strict standard and degree of diligence required to create a "well-founded belief of his
death.
 P a g e | 234

REPUBLIC v. TAMPUS
G.R. No. 214243 March 16, 2016

FACTS:

Respondent Nilda B. Tampus was married to Dante L. Del Mundo on November 29, 1975. Three
days thereafter, or on December 2, 1975, Dante, a member of the AFP, left respondent, and went
to Jolo, Sulu where he was assigned. The couple had no children. Since then, Nilda heard no
news from Dante. She tried everything to locate him, but her efforts proved futile. On April 14,
2009, she filed before the RTC a petition to declare Dante as presumptively dead for the purpose
of remarriage, alleging that after the lapse of thirty-three (33) years without any kind of
communication from him, she firmly believes that he is already dead.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Dante should be declared presumptively dead.

RULING:

No. Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be shown that the
prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the present spouse had a well-
founded belief that the prior spouse was already dead. Under Article 4119 of the Family Code of
the Philippines (Family Code), there are four (4) essential requisites for the declaration of
presumptive death: (1) that the absent spouse has been missing for four (4) consecutive years, or
two (2) consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the
circumstances laid down in Article 391 of the Civil Code; (2) that the present spouse wishes to
remarry; (3) that the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and (4)
that the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of
the absentee.

The "well-founded belief in the absentee's death requires the present spouse to prove that his/her
belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts to locate the absent spouse and that based
on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is
already dead. It necessitates exertion of active effort, not a passive one. As such, the mere
absence of the spouse for such periods prescribed under the law, lack of any news that such
absentee spouse is still alive, failure to communicate, or general presumption of absence under
the Civil Code would not suffice.

In this case, Nilda testified that after Dante's disappearance, she tried to locate him by making
inquiries with his parents, relatives, and neighbors as to his whereabouts, but unfortunately, they
also did not know where to find him. Other than making said inquiries, however, Nilda made no
further efforts to find her husband. She could have called or proceeded to the AFP headquarters
to request information about her husband, but failed to do so. She did not even seek the help of
the authorities or the AFP itself in finding him. Considering her own pronouncement that Dante
was sent by the AFP on a combat mission to Jolo, Sulu at the time of his disappearance, she
could have inquired from the AFP on the status of the said mission, or from the members of the
AFP who were assigned thereto. To the Court's mind, therefore, Nilda failed to actively look for
 P a g e | 235

her missing husband, and her purported earnest efforts to find him by asking Dante's parents,
relatives, and friends did not satisfy the strict standard and degree of diligence required to create
a well-founded belief of his death.
 P a g e | 236

DOMINGO v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 104818 September 17, 1993

FACTS:

Roberto Domingo married Delia Soledad in 1976 while being married with Emerlina dela Paz.
He has been unemployed and completely dependent upon Delia, who has been working in Saudi
Arabia, for support and subsistence. Delia only found out about the prior marriage when
Emerlina sued them for bigamy in 1983. In 1989, she found out that Roberto was cohabiting with
another woman and he was disposing of some of her properties without her knowledge and
consent. In May 1991, Delia filed a petition for judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage to
Roberto and separation of property.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary. If in

affirmative, whether the same should be filed only for purpose of remarriage.

RULING:

Yes. A declaration of the absolute nullity of marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause
of action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to
be invoked for purpose of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for the
said projected marriage be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous
marriage void. The requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the
protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again.
With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who marries
again cannot be charged with bigamy. Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant
clause denotes that final judgment declaring the previous marriage void need not be obtained
only for purposes of remarriage. A person can conceive of other instances other than remarriage,
such as in case of an action for liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of property
between the spouses, as well as an action for the custody and support of their common children
and the delivery of the latter’s' presumptive legitimes. In such cases, however, one is required by
law to show proof that the previous one was an absolute nullity. Marriage is an “inviolable social
institution, is the foundation of the family;” as such, it “shall be protected by the State. As a
matter of policy, there should be a final judgment declaring the marriage void and a party should
not declare for himself or herself whether or not the marriage is void.
 P a g e | 237

ATIENZA v. BRILLANTES
A.M. No. MTJ-92-706 March 29, 1995

FACTS:

This is a complaint by Lupo A. Atienza for Gross Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety
against Judge Francisco Brillantes, Jr. Complainant alleged that he has two children with
Yolanda De Castro with whom respondent Judge was cohabiting with. Complainant claimed that
respondent is married to one Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has 5 children. Respondent alleges
that while he and Ongkiko went through a marriage ceremony (1965) before a Nueva Ecija town
Mayor, the same was not a valid marriage for lack of a marriage license. Upon request of the
parents of Ongkiko, respondent went through another marriage ceremony with her in Manila.
Again, neither party applied for a marriage license. Respondent claims that when he married De
Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles, California in 1991, he believed in all good faith and for all
legal intents and purposes that he was single because his first marriage was solemnized without a
license. Respondent also argues that the provision of Article 40 of the Family Code does not
apply to him considering that his first marriage took place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil
Code of the Philippines; while the second marriage took place in 1991 and governed by the
Family Code.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Article 40 of the Family Code is applicable to the case at bar.

RULING:

Yes. Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code
on August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the
Family Code, said Article is given “retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.” This is particularly
true with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested right
that was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his case.
 P a g e | 238

MARBELLA-BOBIS v. BOBIS
G.R. No. 138509 July 31, 2000

FACTS:

On October 21, 1985, respondent Isagani Bobis contracted a first marriage with one Maria Dulce
B. Javier. With said marriage not yet annulled, nullified or terminated, on January 25, 1996, he
contracted a second marriage with petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis and a third marriage with a
certain Julia Sally Hernandez. On February 25, 1998, Imelda Bobis filed bigamy. Sometime
thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his
first marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a marriage license. Petitioner argues
that respondent should have first obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage
before entering into the second marriage. After petitioner sued for bigamy, it’s just when the
respondent filed a declaration of absolute nullity.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a previous
marriage constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy

RULING:

A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved therein.3It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate
from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the
accused. Its two essential elements are: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately
related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines
whether or not the criminal action may proceed In Article 40 of the Family Code, respondent,
without first having obtained the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage, cannot be
said to have validly entered into the second marriage. In the current jurisprudence, a marriage
though void still needs a judicial declaration of such fact before any party can marry again;
otherwise the second marriage will also be void. The reason is that, without a judicial declaration
of its nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent was
for all legal intents and purposes regarded as a married man at the time he contracted his second
marriage with petitioner. Any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that
respondent entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a
decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is,
therefore, not a prejudicial question Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for
themselves its nullity, only competent courts having such authority. Prior to such declaration of
nullity, the validity of the first marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts a second
marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
 P a g e | 239

TY v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 127406 November 27, 2000

FACTS:

Private respondent, Edgardo Reyes, was married with Anna Villanueva in a civil ceremony in
March 1977 in Manila and subsequently had a church wedding in August 1977. Both weddings
were declared null and void ab initio for lack of marriage license and consent of the parties.
Even before the decree nullifying the marriage was issued, Reyes wed Ofelia Ty herein
petitioner on April 1979 and had their church wedding in Makati on April 1982. The decree was
only issued in August 1980. In January 1991, Reyes filed with RTC a complaint to have his
marriage with petitioner be declared null and void. AC ruled that a judicial declaration of nullity
of the prior marriage with Anna must first be secured before a subsequent marriage could be
validly contracted. However, SC found that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be
retroactively applied to the present case for doing so would prejudice the vested rights of the
petitioner and of her children.

ISSUE:

Whether or not damages should be awarded to Ofelia Ty.

RULING:

The Court is in the opinion of the lower courts that no damages should be awarded to the wife
who sought damages against the husband for filing a baseless complaint causing her mental
anguish, anxiety, besmirched reputation, social humiliation and alienation from her parents.
Aside from the fact, that petitioner wants her marriage to private respondent held valid and
subsisting. She is likewise suing to maintain her status as legitimate wife. To grant her petition
for damages would result to a situation where the husband pays the wife damages from conjugal
or common funds. To do so, would make the application of the law absurd. Moreover,
Philippine laws do not comprehend an action for damages between husband and wife merely
because of breach of a marital obligation. Hence, the petition was granted. Marriage between Ty
and Reyes is declared valid and subsisting and the award of the amount of P15,000 is ratified and
maintained as monthly support to their 2 children for as long as they are of minor age or
otherwise legally entitled thereto.
 P a g e | 240

CASTILLO v. DE LEON CASTILLO

G.R. No. 189607 April 18, 2016

FACTS:

On 25 May 1972, respondent Lea P. De Leon Castillo (Lea) married Benjamin Bautista
(Bautista). On 6 January 1979, respondent married herein petitioner Renato A. Castillo (Renato).
On 28 May 2001, Renato filed before the RTC a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage,
praying that his marriage to Lea be declared void due to her subsisting marriage to Bautista and
her psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Lea opposed the Petition, and
contended among others that her marriage to Bautista was null and void as they had not secured
any license therefor, and neither of them was a member of the denomination to which the
solemnizing officer belonged. On 3 January 2002, she filed an action to declare her first marriage
to Bautista void. On 22 January 2003, the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, Branch 260
rendered its Decision declaring that Lea's first marriage to Bautista was indeed null and void ab
initio. Renato countered that whether or not the first marriage of respondent was valid, and
regardless of the fact that she had belatedly managed to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity,
she still could not deny that at the time she entered into marriage with him, her previous marriage
was valid and subsisting.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the marriage between Lea and Renato is valid.

RULING:

Yes, the Court thus concludes that the subsequent marriage of Lea to Renato is valid in view of
the invalidity of her first marriage to Bautista because of the absence of a marriage license. That
there was no judicial declaration that the first marriage was void ab initio before the second
marriage was contracted is immaterial as this is not a requirement under the Civil Code.
Nonetheless, the subsequent Decision of the RTC of Parañaque City declaring the nullity of
Lea's first marriage only serves to strengthen the conclusion that her subsequent marriage to
Renato is valid.
 P a g e | 241

CHI MING TSOI v. COURT OF APPEALS AND LAO

G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997

FACTS:

Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao Tsoi were married in 1988. After the celebration of their wedding,
they proceed to the house of defendant’s mother. There was no sexual intercourse between them
during their first night and same thing happened until their fourth night. In an effort to have their
honeymoon in a private place, they went to Baguio but Gina’s relatives went with them. Again,
there was no sexual intercourse since the defendant avoided by taking a long walk during siesta
or sleeping on a rocking chair at the living room. Since May 1988 until March 1989 they slept
together in the same bed but no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. Because of this,
they submitted themselves for medical examination to a urologist in Chinese General Hospital in
1989. The result of the physical examination of Gina was disclosed, while that of the husband
was kept confidential even the medicine prescribed. There were allegations that the reason why
Chi Ming Tsoi married her is to maintain his residency status here in the country. Gina does not
want to reconcile with Chi Ming Tsoi and want their marriage declared void on the ground of
psychological incapacity. On the other hand, the latter does not want to have their marriage
annulled because he loves her very much, he has no defect on his part and is physically and
psychologically capable and since their relationship is still young, they can still overcome their
differences. Chi Ming Tsoi submitted himself to another physical examination and the result was
there is no evidence of impotency and he is capable of erection.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Chi Ming Tsoi’s refusal to have sexual intercourse with his wife constitutes
psychological incapacity.

RULING:

The abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a

serious personality disorder which to the mind of the Supreme Court clearly demonstrates an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage within the
meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code. If a spouse, although physically capable but simply
refuses to perform his or her essential marital obligations and the refusal is senseless and
constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to
stubborn refusal. Furthermore, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is
to procreate children thus constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the
integrity and wholeness of the marriage.
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SANTOS v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R No. 112019 January 4, 1995

FACTS:

Leouel and Julia were married on September 20, 1986. They were first married before the MTC
in Iloilo. Shortly, they married in a church. They lived with Julia’s parents. Soon, she gave birth
to their first child. Some disagreements of the couple had been the issue of living independently
from Julia’s parents. On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for USA to work as a nurse. Julia, via
phone call, promised to return home upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989. She never
did. When Leouel got a chance to visit the United States, where he underwent a training program
of AFP, he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get in touch with, Julia but all his efforts
were of no avail. Having failed to get Julia to come home, Leouel filed with the RTC a complaint
for voiding their marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. RTC dismissed the
complaint. CA affirmed the dismissal. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

a. Whether or not Julia’s failure to return home or at the very least to communicate with
him, for more than five years are circumstances that clearly show her being
psychologically incapacitated.
b. Whether their marriage can be considered void under Article 36 of the Family Code.

RULING:

1. No. Justice Sempio-Diy opined that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious
such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it
must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. The intendment of the law
has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. The case at bar can, in no measure at all, come close to the
standards required to decree a nullity of marriage.

2. The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the
most serious cases of personal disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This condition must exist at the time
the marriage is celebrated. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even
desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide
all the specific answers to every individual problem. Wherefore, his petition was denied.
 P a g e | 243

LUCITA ESTRELLA HERNANDEZ v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 126010 December 8, 1999

FACTS:

Petitioner Lucita Estrella Hernandez and private respondent Mario C. Hernandez were married
and three children were born to them. On July 10, 1992, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial
Court, a petition seeking the annulment of her marriage to private respondent on the ground of
psychological incapacity of the latter. She claimed that private respondent, after they were
married, cohabited with another woman with whom he had an illegitimate child, while having
affairs with different women, and that, because of his promiscuity, private respondent
endangered her health by infecting her with a sexually transmissible disease (STD). Petitioner
prayed that for having abandoned the family, private respondent be ordered to give support to
their three children in the total amount of P9,000.00 every month; that she be awarded the
custody of their children; and that she be adjudged as the sole owner of a parcel of land located
in Cavite.

On April 10, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision dismissing the petition for annulment of
marriage filed by petitioner. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which, on January 30,
1996, rendered its decision affirming the decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the marriage of petitioner and private respondent should be annulled on the
ground of private respondent's psychological incapacity.

HELD:

In Santos v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held: "Psychological incapacity" should refer
to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There
is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality, disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law
does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual
relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which
considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be
"legitimate."

The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party
being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or
lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code.
If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the
marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code.
 P a g e | 244

These provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these
various circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder,
indicia of psychological incapacity.

Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every circumstance that
may have some bearing on the degree, extent, and other conditions of that incapacity must, in
every case, be carefully examined and evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity
is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and
persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable.

The Court, therefore, find no reason to reverse the ruling of respondent Court of Appeals whose
conclusions, affirming the trial court's finding with regard to the non-existence of private
respondent's psychological incapacity at the time of the marriage, are entitled to great weight and
even finality.

The conclusion we have reached makes it unnecessary for us to pass upon petitioner's
contentions on the issue of permanent custody of children, the amount for their respective
support, and the declaration of exclusive ownership of petitioner over the real property. These
matters may more appropriately be litigated in a separate proceeding for legal separation,
dissolution of property regime, and/or custody of children which petitioner may bring.
 P a g e | 245

YAMBAO v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 184063 January 24. 2011

FACTS:

Petitioner Cynthia E. Yambao and respondent Patricio E. Yambao married on December 21,
1968. On July 11, 2003, after 35 years of marriage and three children raised into adulthood,
petitioner filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, praying the marriage be
declared null and void due to her husband’s psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of
the Family Code. Petitioner claims that her marriage is marred by bickering, quarrels and
recrimination because of the respondent’s difficulty to find a stable job, failure in the family
business, refusal to change children’s diapers while petitioner was still recovering from her
Caesarean operation, insecurity and jealousy towards acquaintances and relatives, eating and
sleeping all day, gambling, and threats to kill her. She then consulted with a psychiatrist who
concluded that the respondent suffered from Dependent Personality Disorder. On February 9,
2007, the Regional Trial Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. On April 16, 2008, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the Regional Trial Court’s Decision; hence, this petition for review
before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the totality of petitioner’s evidence establishes the respondent’s psychological
incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage.

HELD:

No. Though there are existing antecedents, assumptions, predilections, or generalizations, this
case must be treated uniquely, given its facts and idiosyncrasies. For marriage to be annulled
under Article 36 of the Family Code, it must be proven that the incapacitated spouse manifested
mental, not physical, incapacity causing him or her to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants. The spouse must suffer from a mental incapacity so severe that he is and becomes
unaware of his marital and familial obligations. Psychological incapacity must be judged
according to:
(a) gravity,
(b) juridical antecedence, and
(c) incurability.

Article 36 considers incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital
obligations as totally different from mere difficulty, refusal, neglect or ill will in the performance
of marital obligations. Incapacity is defined as:
(a) true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage;
(b) this inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the
conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the
procreation and education of offspring; and
(c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality.
 P a g e | 246

All marriages go through “bickerings, quarrels and recrimination” and rough patches. In this
case, the respondent may not be the ideal husband for petitioner’s exacting standards but they
have gone through 35 years of marriage and have raised 3 children into adulthood “without any
major parenting problems”. Moreover, respondent never committed infidelity or physically
abused the petitioner or their children. These facts do not prove psychological incapacity.
 P a g e | 247

REPUBLIC v. DE GRACIA
G.R. No. 171557 February 12, 2014

FACTS:

Rodolfo and Natividad were married on February 15, 1969 at a church in Zamboanga Del Norte.
On December 25, 1998, Rodolfo filed a verified complaint for the declaration of nullity of
marriage alleging that Natividad was psychologically incapacitated to comply with her essential
marital obligations. Petitioner furthered that he was forced to marry her barely 3 months into
their courtship in light of her accidental pregnancy. He was 21, she was 18. Natividad left their
conjugal abode and sold their house without his consent. Thereafter, she lived with a certain
Engineer Terez. After cohabiting with Terez, she contracted a second marriage with another
man. Dr. Zalsos stated that both Rodolfo and Natividad were psychologically incapacitated
finding that both parties suffered from “utter emotional immaturity”.

ISSUE:

Did the Court of Appeals err in sustaining the RTC’s finding of psychological incapacity?

HELD:

The petition is meritorious. There exists insufficient factual or legal basis to conclude that
Natividad’s emotional immaturity, irresponsibility, or even sexual promiscuity, can be equated
with psychological incapacity. The RTC relied heavily on Dr. Zalsos testimony which does not
explain in reasonable detail how Natividad’s condition could be characterized as grave, deeply-
rooted and incurable within the parameters of psychological incapacity jurisprudence. The
petition is, therefore, granted and the decision of CA reversed and set aside.
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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COURT OF APPEALS and MOLINA

G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997

FACTS:

On April 14, 1985, Roridel Olaviano Molina, respondent was married to Reynaldo Molina at the
Church of Saint Augustine, Manila. From their marriage was borne a child named Albert Andre
Olaviano Molina. After a year of marriage, Reynaldo started exhibiting signs of “immaturity and
irresponsibility”. He preferred to spend more time with the company of his friends and peers on
whom he squandered money, he depended on his parents for aid and assistance; and he was
never honest with the family finances. These circumstances led to frequent quarrels between the
petitioner and respondent. In February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, making
Roridel the sole breadwinner.

On October 1986, they were both estranged from each other. In February 1986, Roridel moved
back to Baguio with her parents and a few weeks later Reynaldo abandoned Roridel and left
Albert in her custody. Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live together as
husband and wife because of Roridel’s strange behavior and insistence to leave his group of
friends eve after their marriage, Roridel’s refusal to perform some of her marital duties like
cooking meals, and Roridel’s failure to run the household and handle their finances. On May,
1991, the Regional Trial Court of Baguio rendered judgment and declared the marriage void. The
Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the Regional Trial Court’s decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not “opposing and conflicting personalities” is equivalent to psychological

incapacity.

HELD:

No. Psychological incapacity must be judged according to: (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence,
and (c) incurability. In this case, there was no clear showing of the psychological incapacity but
the mere showing of difficulty, refusal, neglect and irreconcilable differences and conflicting
personalities which do not constitute psychological incapacity. In this case, it is not enough to
prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons.
Essentially, it must be shown that they are incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not
physical, illness. Although there was evidence that the couple could not get along or are
incompatible with each other, there was no evidence of the gravity of the psychological
incapacity; neither its juridical antecedence nor incurability. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological, not physical.

The following guidelines must be proved in invoking psychological incapacity:

(1) The burden of proof to show nullity of the marriage lies in the plaintiff;
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be
a. Medically or clinically identified,
b. Alleged in the complaint,
 P a g e | 249

c. Sufficiently proven by experts, and

d. Clearly explained in the decision.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of the
marriage.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of
the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of
the same Code in regard to parents and their children.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect
by our courts.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General
to appear as counsel for the state.
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BARCELONA v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 130087 September 24, 2003

FACTS:

Diana M. Barcelona, petitioner, and Tadeo R. Bengzon, respondent were legally married at Holy
Cross Parish after a whirlwind courtship. They established their residence at Quezon City and
begot five children. The couple had frequent quarrels because Diana was from a rich family, was
a disorganized housekeeper and was frequently out of the house playing tennis all day. During a
family crisis where Diana suffered from several miscarriages and during sickness of a child, the
petitioner would withdraw herself and would not talk to the husband. During her pregnancy, she
would insist the husband to offer her more freedom and leave their conjugal dwelling. The
husband would eventually leave and the both of them would eventually become estranged from
each other.

On March 29, 1995, respondent Tadeo R. Bengzon filed a Petition for Annulment of Marriage on
the grounds of psychological incapacity against petitioner Diana M. Barcelona. On July 21,
1995, respondent filed a second Petition for Annulment of Marriage against the petitioner.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the second petition fails to state a cause
of action and that it violated Supreme Court Circular No. 04-49 in failing to state the filing of a
previous petition for annulment of marriage, its termination and status.

On September 18, 1996, in an Order (first Order) Judge Julieto P. Tabiolo deferred resolution of
the Motion until the parties have ventilated their arguments in a hearing. Petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration. However, on January 21, 1997, the trial court through Pairing Judge
Rosalina L. Luna Pison issued an Order (second Order) denying the motion for reconsideration
on the ground that when the ground for dismissal is the complaint’s failure to state a cause of
action, the trial court determines such fact solely from the petition itself. According to Judge
Pison, a perusal of the allegations in the second petition shows that petitioner has violated
respondent’s right, thus resulting to a cause of action. Judge Pison also rejected petitioner’s claim
that respondent was guilty of forum shopping explaining that when respondent filed the second
petition, the first petition was no longer pending and was dismissed without prejudice.

The Court of Appeals affirmed with the Regional Trial Court’s decision that the allegations in
the second petition state a cause of action sufficient to sustain a valid judgment if proven true as
well as the decision that the respondent has not committed forum shopping.

ISSUES:

a) Whether or not the second petition for annulment sufficiently states the cause of action.
b) Whether or not the respondent violated Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-49 in
failing to state the filing of a previous petition for annulment of marriage, its termination and
status.
 P a g e | 251

HELD:

Yes. The second petition states a legal cause of action since it states the legal right of respondent,
the correlative obligation of the petitioner, and the act or omission of the petitioner in violation
of the legal right. After Santos and Molina, the new Rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages provided that expert opinions need not be
alleged, to wit:

SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages – x x x.

d) What to allege. – A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically
allege the complete facts showing that either or both parties were psychologically
incapacitated from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the
time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after
its celebration.

No. The first petition was already dismissed without prejudice. Therefore, there is no litis
pendentia since respondent has already withdrawn and caused the dismissal of the first petition
when he subsequently filed the second petition. Neither is there res judicata because the
dismissal order was not a decision on the merits but a dismissal “without prejudice”.
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REPUBLIC v. QUINTERO- HAMANO

GR No. 149498 May 20, 2004

FACTS:

Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint in 1996 for declaration of nullity of her marriage with
Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of psychological incapacity.  She and Toshio
started a common-law relationship in Japan and lived in the Philippines for a month.  Thereafter,
Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987.  Lolita then gave birth on
November 16, 1987.

In 1988, Lolita and Toshio got married in MTC-Bacoor, Cavite.  After a month of their marriage,
Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his
family.  Toshio sent money for two months and after that he stopped giving financial support. 
She wrote him several times but never respondent.  In 1991, she learned from her friend that
Toshio visited the country but did not bother to see her nor their child.

Toshio was no longer residing at his given address thus summons issued to him remained
unserved.  Consequently, in 1996, Lolita filed an ex parte motion for leave to effect service of
summons by publication.  The motion was granted and the summons, accompanied by a copy of
the petition, was published in a newspaper of general circulation giving Toshio 15 days to file his
answer.  Toshio filed to respond after the lapse of 60 days from publication, thus, Lolita filed a
motion to refer the case to the prosecutor for investigation.

ISSUE:

Whether Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligation.

HELD:

The Court is mindful of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as basic
autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.  Thus, any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.

Toshio’s act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven
to be due to some kind of psychological illness.  Although as rule, actual medical examinations
are not needed, it would have greatly helped Lolita had she presented evidence that medically or
clinically identified Toshio’s illness.  This could have been done through an expert witness.  It is
essential that a person show incapability of doing marital obligation due to some psychological,
not physical illness.  Hence, Toshio was not considered as psychologically incapacitated.
 P a g e | 253

TONGOL v. TONGOL
G.R. No. 157610 October 19, 2007

FACTS:

On August 27, 1967, petitioner Orlando G. Tongol and respondent Filipinas M. Tongol were
married. From their marriage they begot four children.

On August 19, 1996, Orlando filed before the Regional Trial Court, Makati a verified petition for
the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Filipinas on the ground that she is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations.

In his petition, Orlando stated that he and Filipinas’ marriage was objected by the latter’s family.
The continuous interference of Filipinas’ parents, their attempts to break up their union and their
influence on Filipinas made their marriage an unhappy one. Because of the influence of
Filipinas’ parents, she regarded Orlando with contempt. When Orlando started a junk shop
business, he was met with ridicule, instead of encouragement, from his wife. Eventually, his junk
shop business flourished and became profitable enough for Orlando to embark on a new business
venture by putting up a pharmaceutical company.

Filipinas became interested and began to interfere with the operation of the business; however,
the employees of the company were aloof. She also resented that her husband was getting along
with the employees and, as a result, was the subject of their frequent and continued quarrels. She
even suspected Orlando of diverting the income of his business to his relatives. The continued
fighting persisted and affected their children. Filipinas, in her counter-petition claimed that the
marriage was, indeed, fruitless; however, this was the fault of Orlando’s psychological
incapacity. In 1990, Orlando decided to live separately from Filipinas and on May 13, 1994,
Orlando and Filipinas filed a petition for dissolution of their conjugal partnership gains, granted
by the Makati Regional Trial Court.

Evidence for Orlando consisted of his testimony, his sister’s, his employee’s, and Dr. Cecilia
Villegas’ psychological examination of both parties. Meanwhile, evidence for the respondent
only consisted of her testimony.

The Regional Trial Court dismissed the petition. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Regional
Trial Court’s decision in toto.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent is psychologically incapacitated.

HELD:

No. First, psychological incapacity must be more than just “difficulty”, “refusal” or “neglect”.
Second, the personality disorder or psychological incapacity of the respondent must be grave
enough to bring about her disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Third, there
 P a g e | 254

was no evidence that the psychological incapacity is incurable. Fourth, the psychological
incapacity considered in Article 36 must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations,
not necessarily to those not related to marriage like, in this case, the family business. Marriage
obligations must correspond to the management of the household and the provision of support
for the family. Fifth, marital obligations must not only include the spouse’s obligation to the
spouse but also that to her children. No evidence was shown that the respondent was negligent in
the rearing and care of her children as enumerated in Article 220 of the Family Code. Although,
the respondent exhibited Inadequate Personality Disorder, there was no evidence to prove that,
indeed, the respondent was incapacitated or incapable of complying with the essential
obligations of marriage.
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MARCOS v. MARCOS
G.R. No. 136490 October 19, 2000

FACTS:

Petitioner Brenda B. Marcos and respondent Wilson G. Marcos married twice. First was on
September 6, 1982, with Judge Eriberto H. Espiritu as solemnizing officer of the marriage held at
the Municipal Court of Pasig and second was on May 8, 1983 by Rev. Eduardo L. Eleazar,
Command Chaplain at the Presidential Security Command Chapel in Malacañang Park, Manila.
They were both military personnel. They begot 5 (five) children. Wilson left military service in
1987 and started a business that did not prosper. Brenda put up a business until she was able to
put up a trading and construction company. Their frequent quarrels stemmed from the
petitioner’s urges on respondent to be gainfully employed to convince their children that their
father, as the breadwinner, is the head of the family and a good provider. Because of Wilson’s
failure to provide for his family, he began beating the children for slight mistakes and forcibly
having sex with his already weary wife. The tipping point was when they had a quarrel on
October 16, 1994 when she did not want him to stay in their house anymore. Wilson became
violent and inflicted physical harm on her and her mother. The following day, Brenda and her
children sought refuge at her sister’s house. On October 19, 1994, she was diagnosed with
contusions from the bitter quarrel. The Regional Trial Court found respondent to be
psychologically incapacitated. The Court of Appeals negated the Regional Trial Court’s ruling.

ISSUE:

a) Whether or not personal medical or psychological evaluation is a requirement for the

declaration of psychological incapacity.
b) Whether or not the demeanor or behaviors of the respondents determine psychological
incapacity.

HELD:

No. The guidelines in Santos and Molina do not require that a physician examine the person to
be declared psychologically incapacitated even if the root cause be “medically or clinically
identified”. What is most important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the
party’s psychological condition. If the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination is not necessary.

No. Although the respondent failed to provide material support to the family and may have
resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, these do not necessitate psychological incapacity.
The evidence presented do not zero in on the Santos and Molina guidelines on psychological
incapacity. The behaviors can be attributed to the respondent’s loss of employment for a period
of more than six years. It was from this that he became intermittently drunk, failed to give
material and moral support and leave the family home. Therefore, his psychological incapacity
can be traced to this certain period and not before the marriage nor during the inception of the
marriage. Equally important, the condition was not proven to be incurable, especially now that
he is again gainfully employed as a taxi driver.
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TE v. TE
G.R. No. 161793 February 13, 2009

FACTS:

In January 1996, Petitioner Edward Kenneth Ngo Te decided to court Rowena Ong Gutierrez
Yu-Te after seeing her in a Filipino-Chinese association in their college. He decided to court
Rowena after learning that her close friend had a boyfriend. They shared the same angst towards
their families and developed a closeness with each other. In March 1996, Rowena asked Edward
that they elope despite being bickering about being young and jobless. Edward eventually gave
in to Rowena’s plans, left Manila, and sailed for Cebu that month with P80,000 pension. He
provided the traveling money and she purchased their boat ticket. Because of their house
accommodation, daily sustenance and joblessness, their pension lasted for only a month. After
Edward proceeded to his parents’ home, Rowena kept on telephoning him and threatening him
that she would commit suicide. Edward agreed to stay with Rowena at her uncle’s place.

On April 23, 1996, Rowena’s uncle brought the two to court to get married. He was 25 years old
and she was 20. They continued to stay at her uncle’s place but he Edward was being treated like
a prisoner. In one instance, Rowena insisted Edward to claim his inheritance so they could live
independently but this request was angrily denied by his father who insisted that Edward go
home else, he would be disinherited. After a month, Edward escaped from the house of
Rowena’s uncle and stayed with his parents. His family hid him from Rowena when she called.
In June 1996, Edward was able to talk to Rowena but, unmoved by Edward’s persistence that
they live together, she decided that they should separate ways. On January 18, 2000, Edward
filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for the annulment of his marriage
with Rowena on the ground of psychological incapacity.

On August 23, 2000, the Office of the City Prosecutor submitted an investigation report stating
that it could not determine if there was collusion between the parties and therefore,
recommended trial on the merits. Upon the findings of the clinical psychologist of psychological
incapacity of Edward (dependent personality disorder) and Rowena (narcissistic and antisocial
personality disorder), the Regional Trial Court declared the marriage null and void. However, the
Appellate Court reversed and set aside the Trial Court’s decision on the ground that the clinical
psychologist did not examine the respondent and merely banked on the testimony of the
petitioner.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the marriage is null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity given the
petitioner’s totality of evidence.

HELD:

Yes. The courts must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert
opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties. The psychological
assessment adequately, sufficiently and decisively points to Edward’s dependent personality
 P a g e | 257

disorder and Rowena’s narcissistic and anti-social personality disorder. Also, the Regional Trial
Court viewed, at first-hand, the witnesses’ deportment. With Edward’s affliction of dependent
personality disorder, he cannot assume the essential marital obligations of living together,
observing love and respect and rendering help and support because he is unable to make
everyday decisions without advice from others, allows others to make most of his important
decisions, tends to agree with people even when he believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing
things on his own, volunteers to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval from other
people, feels uncomfortable or helpless when alone and is often preoccupied with fears of being
abandoned. The petitioner followed everything dictated to him by the persons around him. He is
insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense of his identity as a person, has no cohesive self to
speak of, and has no goals and clear direction in life. Rowena’s affliction with antisocial
personality disorder makes her unable to assume the essential marital obligations.

This finding takes into account her disregard for the rights of others, her abuse, mistreatment and
control of others without remorse, her tendency to blame others, and her intolerance of the
conventional behavioral limitations imposed by society. Moreover, as shown in this case,
respondent is impulsive and domineering; she had no qualms in manipulating petitioner with her
threats of blackmail and of committing suicide. Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe
and incurable psychological incapacity, the precipitous marriage they contracted on April 23,
1996 is thus, declared null and void, reversing and setting aside the decision of the appellate
court.
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AZCUETA v. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 180668 May 26, 2009

FACTS:

Marietta Azcueta (Marietta) filed a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to
Rodolfo Azcueta (Rodolfo) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Marietta averred that
Rodolfo was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
Marietta complained that despite her encouragement, Rodolfo never bothered to look for a job
and always depended on his mother for financial assistance and for his decisions. It was
Rodolfo’s mother who found them a room near the Azcueta home and paid the monthly rental.
Rodolfo also pretended to have found work and gave Marietta money which actually came from
Rodolfo’s mother. When Marietta confronted him, Rodolfo cried like a child and told her his
parents could support their needs. They had sex only once a month which Marietta never
enjoyed. When they discussed this, Rodolfo told Marietta that sex was sacred and should not be
enjoyed or abused. Rodolfo also told her he was not ready for a child. When Marietta asked
Rodolfo if they could move to another place, he did not agree and she was forced to leave and
see if he would follow her. He did not.

Rodolfo’s first cousin, who at one time lived with Rodolfo’s family, corroborated Marietta’s
testimony that Rodolfo was not gainfully employed and relied on the allowance given by his
mother who also paid the rentals for the room the couple lived in. The psychiatrist who examined
Marietta testified that she found the latter to be mature, independent, focused, responsible, had a
direction and ambition in life, and was not psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties
and responsibilities of marriage. Based on information gathered from Marietta, the same
psychiatrist found Rodolfo to be suffering from Dependent Personality Disorder characterized by
loss of self-confidence, constant self-doubt, inability to make his own decisions and dependency
on other people. The psychiatrist explained that the root cause of the disorder was a cross-
identification with Rodolfo’s mother who was the dominant figure in the family considering that
Rodolfo’s father, a seaman, wasalways out of the house. She added that the problem began
during the early stages of Rodolfo’s life but manifested only after his marriage. She stated that
the problem was severe, because he would not be able take on the responsibilities of a spouse,
and incurable, because it began in early development and had been deeply ingrained in his
personality. She, thus,concluded that Rodolfo was psychologically incapacitated to perform his
marital duties and responsibilities.

Rodolfo failed to appear and file an answer despite service of summons on him. The City
Prosecutor found no collusion between the parties. Based on the evidence presented by Marietta,
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) declared the marriage void ab initio.

The Solicitor General appealed the RTC’s decision, arguing that the psychiatric report was based
solely on the information given by Marietta, and there was no showing that the alleged
psychological disorder was present at the start of the marriage or that it was grave, permanent
and incurable.The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC’s decision. Marietta, thus, brought the
case to the Supreme Court on a petition for review on certiorari.
 P a g e | 259

ISSUE: 

Whether or not Rodolfo is psychologically incapacitated to justify a declaration that his marriage
to Marrieta is void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code.

HELD: 

Rodolfo was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital duties because of his
Dependent Personality Disorder. His marriage to Marietta was declared void ab initio.
Marietta sufficiently discharged her burden to prove her husband’s psychological incapacity. As
held in Marcos v. Marcos [397 Phil. 840 (2000)], there is no requirement that the respondent
spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non
for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. What matters is
whether the totality of evidence presented is adequate to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity. Marietta’s testimony was corroborated in material points by Rodolfo’s close relative,
and supported by the psychiatrist’s testimony linking the manifestations of Rodolfo’s
psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. It is a settled principle of civil
procedure that the conclusions of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses are entitled
to great respect from the appellate courts because the trial court had an opportunity to observe
the demeanor of witnesses while giving testimony which may indicate their candor or lack
thereof. Since the trial court itself accepted the veracity of Marietta’s factual premises, there is
no cause to dispute the conclusion of psychological incapacity drawn therefrom by her expert
witness.

The root cause of Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity was alleged in the petition, medically or
clinically identified, sufficiently proven by testimony of an expert witness with more than 40
years’ experience in the field of psychology and psychological incapacity, and clearly explained
in the trial court’s decision. As held in Te v. Te (G.R. No. 161793, 13 February 2009), “(b)y the
very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making,
must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the
psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.”

Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity was also established to have clearly existed at the time of and
even before the celebration of marriage. Witnesses were united in testifying that from the start of
the marriage, Rodolfo’s irresponsibility, overdependence on his mother and abnormal sexual
reticence were already evident. These manifestations of Rodolfo’s Dependent Personality
Disorder must have existed even prior to the marriage being rooted in his early development and
a by-product of his upbringing and family life.

Furthermore, Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity had been shown to be grave so as to render him
unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage. The Court of Appeals’ opinion that
Rodolfo’s requests for financial assistance from his mother might have been due to
embarrassment for failing to contribute to the family coffers and that his motive for not wanting
a child was a “responsible” realization since he was unemployed, were dismissed by the High
Court for being speculative and unsupported by evidence. The Supreme Court likewise disagreed
with the Court of Appeals’ finding that Rodolfo’s irresponsibility and overdependence on his
mother could be attributed to immaturity, noting that at the time of his marriage, Rodolfo was
 P a g e | 260

almost 29 years old. Also, the expert testimony identified a grave clinical or medical cause
for Rodolfo’s abnormal behavior – Dependent Personality Disorder.

A person afflicted with Dependent Personality Disorder cannot assume the essential marital
obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and
support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions without advice from others, allows others to
make most of his importantdecisions (such as where to live), tends to agree with people even
when he believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing things on his own, volunteers to do things
that are demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feels uncomfortable or helpless
when alone and is often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned. (Te v. Te, supra)
One who is unable to support himself, much less a wife; one who cannot independently make
decisions regarding even the most basic matters that spouses face every day; and one who cannot
contribute to the material, physical and emotional well-being of his spouse, is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the marital obligations within the meaning of Article 36 of the
Family Code.

This is not to say, however, that anyone diagnosed with Dependent Personality Disorder is
automatically deemed psychologically incapacitated to perform his/her marital obligations. The
court must evaluate the facts, as guided by expert opinion, and carefully examine the type of
disorder and the gravity thereof before declaring the nullity of a marriage under Article 36.
Finally, it has been established that Rodolfo’s condition is incurable, having been deeply
ingrained in his system since his early years.
 P a g e | 261

AGRAVIADOR v. AGRAVIADOR
G.R. No. 170729 December 8, 2010

FACTS:

In 1971, Petitioner Enrique A. Agraviador met respondent Erlinda Amparo-Agraviador at a

beerhouse where Erlinda worked. The petitioner was a 24-year old security guard of the Bureau
of Customs while the respondent was a 17-year old waitress. They soon entered a common-law
relationship. On May 23, 1973, the petitioner and the respondent married in a ceremony
officiated by Reverend Juanito Reyes at a church in Tondo Manila. The petitioner’s family was
apprehensive because of the nature of the respondent’s work and that she came from a broken
family. They begot four (4) children. On March 1, 2001, Enrique filed with the Regional Trial
Court a petition of the nullity of his marriage with Erlinda. Petitioner alleged that Erlinda was
carefree, irresponsible immature and whimsical, and refused to do household chores like
cleaning and cooking; stayed away from their conjugal dwelling for long periods of time; had an
affair with a lesbian; did not take care of their sick child; consulted a witch doctor in order to
bring him bad fate; and refused to use the family name Agraviador in her activities. Enrique also
claimed that Erlinda refused to have sex with him since 1993 because she became “very close” to
a male tenant in their house, discovered their love notes, and even caught them inside his room
several times. Respondent denied that she engaged in extra-marital affairs and maintained that it
was Enrique who refused to have sex with her. She claimed that the petitioner wanted to have
their marriage annulled because he wanted to marry their former household helper, Gilda
Camarin. She added that she was the one who took care of their son at the hospital before he
died. The Regional Trial Court ordered to investigate if collusion existed between parties. On
November 20, 2001, the Regional Trial Court then allowed the petitioner to present his evidence
ex parte. The petitioner presented testimonial and documentary evidence as well as a certified
true copy of their marriage contract and the psychiatric evaluation report of Dr. Juan Cirilo L.
Patac which found that respondent was afflicted with mixed personality disorder. The Appellate
Court, however, reversed and set aside the Regional Trial Court’s decision on the grounds that
the psychiatric evaluation report failed to establish that the mental incapacity was serious, grave
and permanent.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the totality of evidence established the respondent’s psychological incapacity.

HELD:

No. The petitioner’s testimony established “difficulty”, “refusal”, and “neglect”. However, it did
not reveal utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
Moreover, Dr. Patac’s psychological report only enumerated the respondent’s behavioral defects
but failed to prove the gravity or seriousness of the psychological incapacity. Psychological
incapacity must be judged according to: (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability. Additionally, the Molina case set stricter guidelines in establishing psychological
incapacity:
(1) The burden of proof to show nullity of the marriage lies in the plaintiff;
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be
 P a g e | 262

a. Medically or clinically identified,

b. Alleged in the complaint,
c. Sufficiently proven by experts, and
d. Clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological, not
physical.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of the
marriage.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of
the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of
the same Code in regard to parents and their children.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect
by our courts.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General
to appear as counsel for the state.
 P a g e | 263

MARABLE v. MARABLE
G.R. No. 178741 January 17, 2011

FACTS:

Rosalino L. Marable and Myrna F. Marable were sweethearts since they were still students at
Arellano University. Later on in their relationship, they eloped from their homes and married
through civil rites before the mayor of Tanay, Rizal. Within the same month after the civil
wedding, a church wedding was celebrated. They had five children. However, after years of
being together, they started to fight verbally and even physically more frequently. This was
aggravated when they encountered problems with their daughter who was transferred from one
school to another because of misbehavior and then later on became pregnant untimely.
Rosalino’s way of spoiling their children also was a cause of quarrels between him and his
spouse, Myrna. Rosalino, who is beginning to get worn out by their unhealthy relationship, had
an affair with another woman. When Myrna discovered it, Rosalino immediately ended the
relationship with his mistress. The quarrels between them unfortunately worsened and this led to
Rosalino’s departure from their home, leaving his wife and children. After some time, he
converted to Islam after going out with many women. Rosalino decided to legally end his
marriage with Myrna so he filed a petition for absolute nullity of marriage on the ground of his
psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. He went to a clinical
psychologist to be examined for the purpose of presenting evidence in court. Dr. Tayag, the
clinical psychologist who examined him, concluded that Rosalino is suffering from “Anti-Social
Personality Disorder” which manifests a pervasive pattern of social deviancy, rebelliousness,
impulsivity, self-centeredness, deceitfulness, and lack of remorse. It was said to be rooted from
Rosalino’s childhood hardships due to a dysfunctional family, deep feelings of rejection, and
constant need for attention. Because of this finding, Dr. Tayag concluded that Rosalino was
psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations. The Regional Trial Court of
Antipolo rendered judgment annulling the marriage of the Marable spouses. However, the Court
of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC upon granting the appeal of the Office of the
Solicitor General which declared the marriage as still valid and subsisting. The Court of Appeals
held that the evidence submitted was insufficient to prove psychological incapacity.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the annulment of marriage of the Marable spouses based on the evidence of
Rosalino’s psychological incapacity is tenable.

RULING:
In cases of annulment of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code, the psychological
illness and its root cause must be proven to exist from the inception of the marriage. Here, the
appellate court correctly ruled that the report of Dr. Tayag failed to explain the root cause of
Rosalino’s alleged psychological incapacity. The evaluation of Dr. Tayag merely made a general
conclusion that petitioner is suffering from an Anti-social Personality Disorder but there was no
factual basis stated for the finding that Rosalino is a socially deviant person, rebellious,
impulsive, self-centered and deceitful. For sure, the spouses’ frequent marital squabbles and
differences in handling finances and managing their business affairs, as well as their conflicts on
how to raise their children, are not manifestations of psychological incapacity which may be a
ground for declaring their marriage void. Rosalino even admitted that despite their financial
 P a g e | 264

difficulties, they had happy moments together. Also, the records would show that the Rosalino
acted responsibly during their marriage and in fact worked hard to provide for the needs of his
family, most especially his children. Their personal differences do not reflect a personality
disorder tantamount to psychological incapacity. Rosalino tried to make it appear that his family
history of having a womanizer for a father, was one of the reasons why he engaged in extra-
marital affairs during his marriage. However, it appears more likely that he became unfaithful as
a result of a general dissatisfaction with his marriage rather than a psychological disorder rooted
in his personal history. His tendency to womanize, assuming he had such tendency, was not
shown to be due to causes of a psychological nature that is grave, permanent and incurable. In
fact, the records show that when respondent learned of his affair, he immediately terminated it.
In short, Rosalino’s marital infidelity does not appear to be symptomatic of a grave
psychological disorder which rendered him incapable of performing his spousal obligations. It
has been held in various cases that sexual infidelity, by itself, is not sufficient proof that
petitioner is suffering from psychological incapacity. It must be shown that the acts of
unfaithfulness are manifestations of a disordered personality which make Rosalino completely
unable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage. That not being the case with Rosalino,
his claim of psychological incapacity must fail. It bears stressing that psychologically incapacity
must be more than just a “difficulty,” “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of some marital
obligations. Rather, it is essential that the concerned party was incapable of doing so, due to
some psychological illness existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. In the intention
of the law is to confine the meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage.
 P a g e | 265

AURELIO v. AURELIO
G.R. No. 175367 June 6, 2011

FACTS:

Vida Ma. Corazon Aurelio filed a petition for the annulment of her marriage to Danilo Aurelio.
“The said petition alleged, inter alia, that both husband and wife are psychologically incapable of
performing and complying with their essential marital obligations. Said psychological incapacity
was existing prior and at the time of the marriage. Said psychological incapacity was
manifested by lack of financial support from the husband; his lack of drive and incapacity to
discern the plight of his working wife. The husband exhibited consistent jealousy and distrust
towards his wife. His moods alternated between hostile defiance and contrition. He refused to
assist in the maintenance of the family. He refused to foot the household bills and provide for his
family's needs. He exhibited arrogance. He was completely insensitive to the feelings of his wife.
He liked to humiliate and embarrass his wife even in the presence of their children. Vida Ma.
Corazon Aurelio, on the other hand, is effusive and displays her feelings openly and
freely. Her feelings change very quickly – from joy to fury to misery to despair,
depending on her day-to-day experiences. Her tolerance for boredom was very low. She was
emotionally immature; she cannot stand frustration or disappointment. She cannot delay to
gratify her needs. She gets upset when she cannot get what she wants. Self-indulgence lifts her
spirits immensely. Their hostility towards each other distorted their relationship. Their incapacity
to accept and fulfil the essential obligations of marital life led to the breakdown of their
marriage. Private respondent manifested psychological aversion to cohabit with her husband or
to take care of him. The psychological make-up of private respondent was evaluated by a
psychologist, who found that the psychological incapacity of both husband and wife to perform
their marital obligations is grave, incorrigible and incurable. Private respondent suffers from a
Histrionic Personality Disorder with Narcissistic features; whereas petitioner suffers from
passive aggressive (negativistic) personality disorder that renders him immature and
irresponsible to assume the normal obligations of a marriage.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not the marriage is void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.

RULING:

Clearly, although not necessarily required, having an expert opinion of a Psychologist to show
the disorder or abnormality suffered by the party. In this case, the husband opposed the petition
and questioned the substance of the petition and alleged that there is no cause of action. The
Court ruled in the following manner: A review of the petition shows that it observed the
requirements in Republic v. Court of Appeals (268 SCRA 198), otherwise known as the Molina
Doctrine. There was allegation of the root cause of the psychological incapacity of both the
petitioner and the respondent contained in paragraphs 12 and 13 of the petition. The
manifestation of juridical antecedence was alleged in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the petition. The
allegations constituting the gravity of psychological incapacity were alleged in paragraph 9 (a to
l) of the petition. The incurability was alleged in paragraph 10 of the petition. Moreover, the
clinical finding of incurability was quoted in paragraph 15 of the petition. There is a cause of
 P a g e | 266

action presented in the petition for the nullification of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code. Whether or not the allegations are meritorious depends upon the proofs to be presented by
both parties. This, in turn, will entail the presentation of evidence which can only be done in the
hearing on the merits of the case. If the Court finds that there are (sic) preponderance of evidence
to sustain a nullification, then the cause of the petition shall fail. Conversely, if it finds, through
the evidence that will be presented during the hearing on the merits, that there are sufficient
proofs to warrant nullification, the Court shall declare its nullity the Court denied the opposition
of the husband since the Petition complied with the requirements of the law. All in all, except
from having the proper grounds of nullity, it is likewise important that the Petition to be
submitted in the court be properly pleaded with all the requirements of law.
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REPUBLIC v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 159594 November 12, 2012

FACTS:

Eduardo De Quintos, Jr. and Catalina Santos-De Quintos were married in civil rites on March 16,
1967. However, the couple was not blessed with a child because Catalina had a hysterectomy
following her second marriage.

Eduardo filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage citing psychological incapacity as a
ground. He alleged that Catalina always left the house without his consent; that she engaged in
petty arguments with him; that she constantly refused to give in to his sexual needs; that she
spent most of her time gossiping with neighbors instead of caring for their adopted daughter; that
she gambled away all his remittances as an overseas worker; and that she abandoned the
conjugal home with her paramour. As support to his claim of psychological incapacity, he also
presented the results of a neuro-psychiatric evaluation conducted by Dr. Annabelle respondents
stating that Catalina exhibited traits of a borderline personality disorder that was no longer
treatable.

Catalina did not appear during trial but admitted her psychological incapacity. She denied flirting
with different men and abandoning the conjugal home.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Catalina was psychologically incapacitated to fulfill marital duties.

HELD:

No. Marriage remains valid. Psychological incapacity is an incapacity/inability to take

cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations, and is not merely the difficulty, refusal or
neglect in the performance of marital obligations.

In Republic v CA (Molina), the Supreme Court has established guidelines involving the nullity
of marriage based on the ground of psychological incapacity. These were not met in the instant
case since the gravity, root cause and incurability of Catalina's purported psychological
incapacity were not sufficiently established.

Catalina's behavior of frequent gossiping, leaving the house without Eduardo's consent, refusal to
do household chores, and take care of their adopted daughter were not established. Eduardo
presented no other witness to corroborate these allegations.

Also, the RTC and CA heavily relied on Dr. respondents' evaluation despite any factual
foundation to support this claim. The report was vague about the root cause, gravity and
incurability of the incapacity. Even the testimony of Dr. respondents stated a general description
of borderline personality disorder which did not explain the root cause as to why Catalina was
diagnosed as such. They did not specify the acts or omissions or the gravity which constituted
the disorder. What was established was that Catalina was childish and immature. Furthermore,
 P a g e | 268

Dr. Respondents had only one interview with Catalina. This lacks the depth and objectivity of an
expert assessment. From the scant evidence presented, it can be adduced that Catalina's
immaturity and apparent refusal to perform her marital obligations do not constitute
psychological incapacity alone. It must be shown that such immature acts were manifestations of
a disordered personality that made the spouse completely unable to discharge the essential
obligations of marriage.
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KALAW v. FERNANDEZ
G.R. No. 166357 January 14, 2015

FACTS:

Tyrone Kalaw and Malyn Fernandez got married in 1976. After the birth of their 4th child,
Tyrone had an affair with Jocelyn Quejano. In May 1985, Malyn left the conjugal home and her
four children with Tyrone. Meanwhile, Tyrone started living with Jocelyn, and they had three
more children. In 1990, Tyrone went to the United States (US) with Jocelyn and their children.
On July 6, 1994, nine years since the de facto separation from his wife, Tyrone filed a petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. He alleged that
Malyn was psychologically incapacitated to perform and comply with the essential marital
obligations at the time of the celebration of their marriage. He alleged that 1) She leaves the
children without proper care and attention as she played mahjong all day and all night; 2) She
leaves the house to party with male friends and returned in the early hours of the following day;
and 3) She committed adultery on June 9, 1985 in Hyatt Hotel with one Benjie whom he saw
half-naked in the hotel room. Tyrone presented a psychologist, Dr. Cristina Gates (Dr. Gates),
and a Catholic canon law expert, Fr. Gerard Healy, S.J. (Fr. Healy), to testify on Malyn’s
psychological incapacity. Dr. Gates explained that Malyn suffers from Narcissistic Personalityu
Disorder and that it “may have been evident even prior to her marriage” because it is rooted in
her family background and upbringing. Fr. Healy concluded that Malyn was psychologically
incapacitated to perform her marital duties. He explained that her psychological incapacity is
rooted in her role as the breadwinner of her family. This role allegedly inflated Malyn’s ego to
the point that her needs became priority, while her kids’ and husband’s needs became secondary.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Tyrone has sufficiently proven that Malyn suffers from psychological incapacity.

RULING:

No. He presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded that
respondent is psychologically incapacitated, but the conclusions of these witnesses were
premised on the alleged acts or behavior of respondent which had not been sufficiently proven.
No proof whatsoever was presented to prove her visits to beauty salons or her frequent partying
with friends.  Malyn’s sexual infidelity was also not proven because she was only dating other
men.  Even assuming that she had an extramarital affair with another man, sexual infidelity
cannot be equated with obsessive need for attention from other men.  Sexual infidelity per se is a
ground for legal separation, but it does not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity.
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VINAS v. PAREL-VINAS
G.R. No. 208790 January 21, 2015

FACTS:

On April 26, 1999, Glenn and Mary Grace, then 25 and 23 years old, respectively, got married
incivil rites held in Lipa City, Batangas.4 Mary Grace was already pregnant then. The infant,
however, died at birth due to weakness and malnourishment. Glenn alleged that the infant’s
death was caused by Mary Grace’s heavy drinking and smoking during her pregnancy. The
couple lived together under one roof. Glenn worked as a bartender, while Mary Grace was a
production engineer.

Sometime in March of 2006, Mary Grace left the home which she shared with Glenn. Glenn
subsequently found out that Mary Grace went to work in Dubai. At the time the instant petition
was filed, Mary Grace had not returned yet.

On February 18, 2009, Glenn filed a Petition5 for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with
Mary Grace. To ease their marital problems, Glenn sought professional guidance and submitted
himself to a psychological evaluation by Clinical Psychologist Nedy Tayag (Dr. Tayag). Dr.
Tayag found him as “amply aware of his marital roles” and “capable of maintaining a mature and
healthy heterosexual relationship.”

On the other hand, Dr. Tayag assessed Mary Grace’s personality through the data she had
gathered from Glenn and his cousin, Rodelito Mayo (Rodelito), who knew Mary Grace way back
in college.

ISSUE:

Whether or not sufficient evidence exist justifying the RTC’s declaration of nullity of his
marriage with Mary Grace.

RULING:

The lack of personal examination or assessment of the respondent by a psychologist or

psychiatrist is not necessarily fatal in a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage. “If the
totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then
actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. In the present case,
the respondent’s stubborn refusal to cohabit with the petitioner was doubtlessly irresponsible, but
it was never proven to be rooted in some psychological illness. x x x Likewise, the respondent’s
act of living with another woman four years into the marriage cannot automatically be equated
with a psychological disorder, especially when no specific evidence was shown that promiscuity
was a trait already existing at the inception of marriage. In fact, petitioner herself admitted that
respondent was caring and faithful when they were going steady and for a time after their
marriage; their problems only came in later.
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REPUBLIC v. ROMERO
G.R. No. 209180 February 24, 2016

FACTS:

Reghis and Olivia were married on May 11, 1972. Reghis at that time was still a student and less
than a year into their relationship he tried to break up with Olivia because he felt that her
demanding attitude would prevent him from reaching his personal and family goals but she
refused. Olivia insisted on staying with Reghis making the former’s conclude that they have
eloped so they made plans to get them married even if Reghis objected.
The couple experienced a turbulent and tumultuous marriage. They become more distant when
Reghis secured a job as medical representative and become engrossed in his career and focused
on supporting his parents and siblings. Then on June 16, 1998 Reghis filed for declaration of
nullity of marriage alleging that he is psychologically incapacitated and unable to comply with
his essential marital obligations.
One Dr. Valentina Nicdao-Basilio submitted that Reghis was suffering from Obsessive
Compulsive Personality Disorder (OCPD) which is the cause of his behavioural disorder of
having a strong obsession for whatever endeavour he chooses, such as his work, to the exclusion
of other responsibilities such as his role as a husband or a father.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Reghis is suffering from Obssessive Compulsive Personality Disorder which
constitutes as psychological incapacity.

HELD:

The Supreme Court was not convinced of the Reghis’ allegations because the requirements of
psychological incapacity were not satisfied. Based on Reghis’ testimony, it shows that he was
able to comply with his marital obligation which therefore, negates the existence of a grave and
serious psychological incapacity. He has also fulfilled his duty to support and take care of his
family, as he categorically stated that he loves their children and that he was a good provider to
them. Moreover, the psychological examination lacked juridical antecedence.
 P a g e | 272

DEL ROSARIO v. DEL ROSARIO

G.R. No. 222541 February 15, 2017

FACTS:

Rachel was 15 years old and Jose was 17 when they met in 1983. In 1988, Rachel went to
Hongkong to work as a domestic helper and had allegedly supported Jose for his college tuition.
They eventually got married on December 28, 1989. Rachel went back to Hongkong again in
1998 to be a caregiver and has worked there ever since. On September 2011, she filed for a
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity of Jose.
She alleged that Jose was hot tempered and violent, he punched her in the shoulder a few days
before their wedding when she refused to pay for the transportation of his parents, he hit his own
father with a pipe, locked her out of the house in the middle of the night sometime in December
2007, and he represented himself as single and flirted openly, and refued to have sexual intimacy
with her.

Dr. Nedy Tayag submitted a psychological report stating that Jose has Anti-Social Personality
Disorder (APD) because he lacks empathy and concern towards Rachel, his irresponsibility and
his pleasure-seeking attitude that catered only to his fancies and his comfort, his selfishness
marked by his lack of depth when it come s to his marital commitment, and lack of remorse of
his wrongs.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Jose is psychologically incapacitated.

RULING:
The Curt denied the petition, The totality of evidence presented there exists insufficient factual
or legal basis to conclude that Jose’s acts constitutes psychological incapacity. The psychological
report does not explain in detail how Jose’s APD could be characterized as grave, deeply rooted
in his childhood, and incurable within the jurisprudential parameters for establishing
psychological incapacity. It failed to show that Jose’s behaviour justifies for the nullification of
marriage.
 P a g e | 273

REPUBLIC v. ENCELAN
G.R. No. 170022 January 9, 2013

FACTS:

Cesar and Lolita Encelan married each other on August 25, 1979.  Out of their union, two
children were born, Maricar and Manny.  To support his family, Cesar went to work in Saudi
Arabia.  While there, he learned that Lolita had been having an affair with a certain Alvin.  Lolita
eventually left the conjugal home and went to live with Alvin.  On June 16, 1995, Cesar filed a
petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lolita on the ground of psychological
incapacity.  During trial, Cesar testified on Lolita’s alleged psychological incapacity and
abandonment; and narrated that he continued to support Lolita and their children even after he
learned of her infidelity.  Lolita denied begin psychologically incapacitated, and averred that her
break up with Cesar was due to irreconcilable differences.  To support his allegation of
psychological incapacity on the part of Lolita, Cesar presented Dr. Fareda Fatima Flores of the
National Center for Mental Health who testified that “Lolita was “not suffering from any form of
major psychiatric illness[,]” but had been “unable to provide the expectations expected of her for
a good and lasting marital relationship”; her “transferring from one job to the other depicts some
interpersonal problems with co-workers as well as her impatience in attaining her ambitions”;
and “her refusal to go with her husband abroad signifies her reluctance to work out a good
marital and family relationship.”

After trial, the RTC granted Cesar’s petition and declared the marriage between them null and
void on the basis of Lolita’s psychological incapacity.  The Office of the Solicitor General
seasonably appealed to the Court of Appeals, which initially granted OSG’s appeal, but later on
reversed itself and affirmed the RTC ruling, on the basis of two circumstances:(1) Lolita’s
unwarranted refusal to perform her marital obligations to Cesar; and (2) Lolita’s wilfull and
deliberate act of abandoning the conjugal dwelling.

The OSG appealed to the Supreme Court. It argues that Dr. Flores’ psychological evaluation
report did not disclose that Lolita had been suffering from a psychological illness nor did it
establish its juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability; infidelity and abandonment do not
constitute psychological incapacity, but are merely grounds for legal separation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not sufficient basis exists to nullify Cesar’s marriage to Lolita on the ground of
psychological incapacity.

RULING:

No. In interpreting Article 36 of the Family Code, the Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed that
psychological incapacity contemplates "downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of
and to assume the basic marital obligations", not merely the refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. The plaintiff bears the burden of proving the
juridical antecedence (i.e., the existence at the time of the celebration of marriage), gravity and
 P a g e | 274

incurability of the condition of the errant spouse.Cesar testified on the dates when he learned of
Lolita’s alleged affair and her subsequent abandonment of their home, as well as his continued
financial support to her and their children even after he learned of the affair, but he merely
mentioned in passing Lolita’s alleged affair with Alvin and her abandonment of the conjugal
dwelling.Sexual infidelity and abandonment of the conjugal dwelling, even if true, do not
necessarily constitute psychological incapacity; simply grounds for legal separation. To
constitute psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the unfaithfulness and abandonment
are manifestations of a disordered personality that completely prevented the erring spouse from
discharging the essential marital obligations.No evidence on record exists to support Cesar’s
allegation that Lolita’s infidelity and abandonment were manifestations of any psychological
illness.

Dr. Flores’ observation on Lolita’s interpersonal problems with co-workers does not suffice as a
consideration for the conclusion that she was – at the time of her marriage – psychologically
incapacitated to enter into a marital union with Cesar. Aside from the time element involved, a
wife’s psychological fitness as a spouse cannot simply be equated with her professional/work
relationship; workplace obligations and responsibilities are poles apart from their marital
counterparts. Dr. Flores’ further belief that Lolita’s refusal to go with Cesar abroad signified a
reluctance to work out a good marital relationship is a mere generalization unsupported by facts.
 P a g e | 275

MENDOZA v. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 157649 November 12, 2012

FACTS:

Arabelle and Dominic Mendoza got married while Arabelle was eight months pregnant. They
lived together but depended on their parents for financial support. Arabelle had different jobs to
support the needs of the family. When Dominic got employed for Toyota in Bel-Air Makati in
1994, he spent his first salary celebrating with his friends. September of the same year, Arabelle
found out of Dominic’s illicit relationship with Zaida, his co-employee. Communication between
them became rare and they started sleeping in separate rooms. In November 1995, Dominic gave
her a car as a birthday present only to find out that he did not pay for it, forcing her to rely on her
father-in-law for the payment of the car. Dominic eventually got fired from his job because of he
ran away with P164,000 belonging to his employer. He was charged with estafa. Petitioner also
found out that he swindled many of his clients some of them threatening her and their family. On
October 15, 1997, Dominic abandoned the conjugal abode because petitioner asked him for
“time and space to think things over.” A month later, she refused his attempt at reconciliation,
causing him to threaten to commit suicide. She and her family immediately left the house to live
in another place concealed from him. On August 5, 1998, petitioner filed in the RTC her petition
for the declaration of the nullity of her marriage with Dominic based on his psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The RTC found that all the characteristics of
psychological incapacity which are gravity, antecedence and incurability, were attendant,
establishing Dominic’s psychological incapacity. The Republic appealed to the CA, arguing that
there was no showing that Dominic’s personality traits either constituted psychological
incapacity existing at the time of the marriage or were of the nature contemplated by Article 36
of the Family Code; that the testimony of the expert witness was not conclusive upon the court,
and that the real reason for the parties’ separation had been their frequent quarrels over financial
matters and the criminal cases brought against Dominic. CA reversed the decision of RTC.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the alleged psychological incapacity of Dominic was established

RULING:

No. The findings of Dr. Samson were one-sided, self-serving and uncorroborated because only
Arabelle was evaluated. Dr. Samson even conceded that there was a need to verify her findings
concerning Dominic’s psychological profile which were colored by Arabelle’s ill-feelings
toward him during her evaluation. Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility cannot be equated
with psychological incapacity. Santos v. Court of Appeals sets the guidelines for psychological
incapacity as characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." These
guidelines do not necessarily require the root cause to be “medically or clinically identified” by a
physician or a psychologist. What is important is that totality of evidence presented is enough to
sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to. Finally, petitioner contends that the Court’s Resolution in
A.M. No. 02-11-10 rendered appeals by the OSG no longer required. On the contrary, the
 P a g e | 276

Resolution explicitly requires the OSG to actively participate in all stages of the proceedings as
seen in its provisions.
 P a g e | 277

REPUBLIC v. GALANG
G.R. No. 168335 June 6, 2011

FACTS:

On March 9, 1994, respondent Nestor Galang and Juvy married in Pampanga. They lived in
Nestor’s father’s house in San Francisco, Mabalacat, Pampanga. Nestor worked as an
artistillustrator at the Clark Development Corporation, earning P8,500.00 monthly. Juvy, stayed
at home as a housewife. Christopher is their only child.

On August 4, 1999, Nestor filed with the RTC a petition for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage with Juvy, under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended. He alleged that Juvy was
psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of marriage because she was a
kleptomaniac and a swindler. The respondent’s testimony showed that Juvy: (a) refused to wake
up early to prepare breakfast; (b) left their child to the care of their neighbors when she went out
of the house; (c) squandered a huge amount of the P15,000.00 that the respondent entrusted to
her; (d) stole the respondent’s ATM card and attempted to withdraw the money deposited in his
account; (e) falsified the respondent’s signature in order to encash a check; (f) made up false
stories in order to borrow money from their relatives; and (g) indulged in gambling.According to
the respondent, Juvy suffers from “mental deficiency, innate immaturity, distorted discernment
and total lack of care, love and affection towards him and their child.” He posited that Juvy’s
incapacity was “extremely serious” and “appears to be incurable.Prosecutor Angelito I.
Balderama formally manifested, on October 18, 1999, that he found no evidence of collusion
between the parties. The RTC set the case for trial in its Order of October 20, 1999. The
respondent presented testimonial and documentary evidence to substantiate his allegations.

Aside from his testimony, the respondent also presented Anna Liza S. Guiang, a psychologist,
who testified that she conducted a psychological test on the respondent. According to her, she
wrote Juvy a letter requesting for an interview, but the latter did not respond.

On January 22, 2001, the RTC nullified the parties’ marriage. On November 25, 2004, the CA
affirmed the RTC decision in toto explaining that Juvy’s indolence and lack of responsibility
coupled with her gambling and swindling undermined her capacity to comply with her marital
obligations. The testimony of psychologist Anna Liza S. Guiang characterized Juvy’s condition
as permanent, incurable and existing at the time of celebration of her marriage with respondent.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the totality of evidence established the respondent’s psychological incapacity.

RULING:

No. The testimony of the petitioner only showed isolated incidents, not recurring acts.
Psychological incapacity must be more than difficulty, refusal or neglect. It is essential that he or
she must be shown to be incapable of complying with the responsibility and duty as a married
person because of some psychological, not physical, illness. In other words, proof of a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person – an adverse integral element in the personality
 P a g e | 278

structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying
with the obligations essential to marriage – had to be shown. The psychological test was
uncorroborated and one-sided; therefore, biased towards Juvy’s negative traits. First, the
psychologist did not identify the types of psychological tests to determine the root cause of
Juvy’s psychological condition. Second, the report failed to prove the gravity or severity of
Juvy’s condition. Lastly, the report failed to prove incurability. The psychologist’s testimony
was totally devoid of any information or insight into Juvy’s early life and associations, how she
acted before and at the time of the marriage, and how the symptoms of a disordered personality
developed. Simply put, the psychologist failed to trace the history of Juvy’s psychological
condition and to relate it to an existing incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
 P a g e | 279

OCHOSA v. ALANO
G.R. No. 167459 January 26, 2011

FACTS:

Jose respondentnaldo B. Ochosa met Bona J. Alano in August 1973 when he was a young
lieutenant in the AFP while the latter was a seventeen-year-old first year college drop-out. They
were married on 27 October 1973 before the Honorable Judge Cesar S. Principe in Basilan.
Their union produced no offspring. In 1976, however, they found an abandoned and neglected
one-year-old baby girl whom they later registered as their daughter, naming her Ramona Celeste
Alano-Ochosa. Sometime in 1985, Jose was appointed as the Battalion Commander of the
Security Escort Group. He and Bona, along with Ramona, were given living quarters at Fort
Bonifacio, Makati City where they resided with their military aides. In 1987, Jose was charged
with rebellion for his alleged participation in the failed coup d’etat. He was incarcerated in Camp
Crame. On one occasion, Bona was caught by Demetrio Bajet y Lita, a security aide, having sex
with Jose’s driver, Corporal Gagarin. Rumors of Bona’s sexual infidelity circulated in the
military community. When Jose could no longer bear these rumors, he got a military pass from
his jail warden and confronted Bona. During their confrontation, Bona admitted her relationship
with Corporal Gagarin who also made a similar admission to Jose. Jose drove Bona away from
their living quarters. Bona left with Ramona and went to Basilan. In 1994, Ramona left Bona and
came to live with Jose. It is Jose who is currently supporting the needs of Ramona. Jose filed a
Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, docketed as Civil Case No. 97-2903 with the
RTC of Makati City, Branch 140, seeking to nullify his marriage to Bona on the ground of the
latter’s psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential obligations of marriage.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the alleged sexual infidelity of Bona is a ground for declarationof nullity of their
marriage based on psychological incapacity.

RULING:

The Court sufficiently convinced, after a careful perusal of the evidence presentedin this case,
that Bona had been, on several occasions with several other men,sexually disloyal to her spouse,
Jose. Likewise, Court was persuaded that Bona hadindeed abandoned Jose. However, Court
cannot apply the same conviction to Jose’sthesis that the totality of Bona’s acts constituted
psychological incapacity asdetermined by Article 36 of the Family Code. There is inadequate
credible evidencethat her “defects” were already present at the inception of, or prior to, the
marriage. Inother words, her alleged psychological incapacity did not satisfy the
jurisprudentialrequisite of “juridical antecedence.” Bona’s alleged psychological incapacity, i.e.,
hersexual infidelity and abandonment, can only be convincingly traced to the period oftime after
her marriage to Jose and not to the inception of the said marriage.
 P a g e | 280

CAMACHO-REYES v. REYES
G.R. No. 185286 August 18, 2010

FACTS:

Petitioner Maria Socorro Camacho-Reyes met respondent Ramon Reyes at the University of the
Philippines (UP), Diliman, in 1972 when they were both nineteen (19) years old. They were
simply classmates then in one university subject when respondent cross-enrolled from the UP
Los Baños campus. Easily impressed, petitioner enjoyed respondent’s style of courtship which
included dining out, unlike other couples their age who were restricted by a university student’s
budget. At that time, respondent held a job in the family business, the Aristocrat Restaurant.
Petitioner’s good impression of the respondent was not diminished by the latter’s habit of cutting
classes, not even by her discovery that respondent was taking marijuana. Not surprisingly, only
petitioner finished university studies, obtaining a degree in AB Sociology from the UP. By 1974,
respondent had dropped out of school on his third year, and just continued to work for the
Aristocrat Restaurant. On December 5, 1976, the year following petitioner’s graduation and her
father’s death, petitioner and respondent got married. At that time, petitioner was already five (5)
months pregnant and employed at the Population Center Foundation. Thereafter, the newlyweds
lived with the respondent’s family in Mandaluyong City. All living expenses were shouldered by
respondent’s parents, and the couple’s respective salaries were spent solely for their personal
needs. Initially, respondent gave petitioner a monthly allowance of P1,500.00 from his salary. In
1989, due to financial reverses, respondent’s fishpond business stopped operations. Although,
without any means to support his family, respondent refused to go back to work for the family
business. respondent came up with another business venture, engaging in scrap paper and carton
trading. As with all of respondent’s business ventures, this did not succeed and added to the trail
of debt which now hounded not only respondent, but petitioner as well. Not surprisingly, the
relationship of the parties deteriorated. Sometime in 1996, petitioner confirmed that respondent
was having an extra-marital affair. One of the last episodes that sealed the fate of the parties’
marriage was a surgical operation on petitioner for the removal of a cyst where respondent
remained unconcerned and unattentive; and simply read the newspaper, and played dumb when
petitioner requested that he accompany her as she was wheeled into the operating room.

As a last resort, petitioner approached respondent’s siblings and asked them to intervene, Adolfo
Reyes, respondent’s elder brother, and his spouse, Peregrina, members of a marriage encounter
group, invited, sponsored and scheduled counseling sessions with petitioner and respondent, but
these did not improve the parties’ relationship as respondent remained uncooperative. In 1997,
Adolfo brought respondent to Dr. Natividad A. Dayan for a psychological assessment; however,
respondent resisted and did not continue with the clinical psychologist’s recommendation to
undergo psychotherapy.At about this time, petitioner, with the knowledge of respondent’s
siblings, told respondent to move out of their house. With the de facto separation, the
relationship still did not improve. Neither did respondent’s relationship with his children..
Petitioner filed before the RTC a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage with the
respondent, alleging the latter’s psychological incapacity to fullfill the essential marital
obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code.

ISSUE:
 P a g e | 281

Whether or not the totality of evidence established psychological incapacity therefore rendering
the marriage null and void.

RULING:

Yes. The lack of personal examination and interview of the respondent, or any other person
diagnosed with personality disorder, does not per se invalidate the testimonies of Dr. Estrella T.
Tiongson-Magno and Dr. Cecilia C. Villegas. Neither do their findings automatically constitute
hearsay that would result in their exclusion as evidence. The clinical psychologists’ and
psychiatrist’s assessment were not based solely on the narration or personal interview of the
petitioner. Other informants such as respondent’s own son, siblings and in-laws, and sister-in-
law (sister of petitioner), testified on their own observations of respondent’s behavior and
interactions with them, spanning the period of time they knew him. Dr. Natividad A. Dayan’s
recommendation that respondent should undergo therapy does not necessarily negate the finding
that respondent’s psychological incapacity is incurable. In sum, we find points of convergence &
consistency in all three reports and the respective testimonies of Doctors Magno, Dayan and
Villegas, i.e.: (1) respondent does have problems; and (2) these problems include chronic
irresponsibility; inability to recognize and work towards providing the needs of his family;
several failed business attempts; substance abuse; and a trail of unpaid money obligations. It is
true that a clinical psychologist’s or psychiatrist’s diagnoses that a person has personality
disorder is not automatically believed by the courts in cases of declaration of nullity of
marriages. Indeed, a clinical psychologist’s or psychiatrist’s finding of a personality disorder
does not exclude a finding that a marriage is valid and subsisting, and not beset by one of the
parties’ or both parties’ psychological incapacity. In the case at bar, however, even without the
experts’ conclusions, the factual antecedents (narrative of events) alleged in the petition and
established during trial, all point to the inevitable conclusion that respondent is psychologically
incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations. In the instant case, respondent’s
pattern of behavior manifests an inability, nay, a psychological incapacity to perform the
essential marital obligations as shown by his: (1) sporadic financial support; (2) extra-marital
affairs; (3) substance abuse; (4) failed business attempts; (5) unpaid money obligations; (6)
inability to keep a job that is not connected with the family businesses; and (7) criminal charges
of estafa. In view of the foregoing, the badges of Bona’s alleged psychological incapacity, i.e.,
her sexual infidelity and abandonment, can only be convincingly traced to the period of time
after her marriage to Jose and not to the inception of the said marriage.
 P a g e | 282

TORING v. TORING
G.R. No. 165321 August 3, 2010

FACTS:

Ricardo was introduced to Teresita in1978 at his aunt’s house in Cebu. Teresita was then his
cousin’s teacher in Hawaiian dance and was conducting lessons at his aunt’s house. Despite their
slight difference in age (of five years), the younger Ricardo found the dance teacher attractive
and fell in love with her. He pursued Teresita and they became sweethearts after three months of
courtship. They eloped soon after, hastened by the bid of another girlfriend, already pregnant, to
get Ricardo to marry her. Ricardo and Teresita were married on September 4, 1978 before Hon.
Remigio Zari of the City Court of Quezon City. They begot three children: Richardson, Rachel
Anne, and Ric Jayson. On February 1, 1999, more than twenty years after their wedding, Ricardo
filed a petition for annulment before the RTC. He claimed that Teresita was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage prior to, at the time of, and
subsequent to the celebration of their marriage. Before the RTC, Ricardo offered in evidence
their marriage contract; the psychological evaluation and signature of his expert witness,
psychiatrist Dr. Cecilia R. Albaran, and his and Dr. Albaran’s respective testimonies.

Ricardo alleged that Teresita was an adulteress and a squanderer – that she was very extravagant,
materialistic, controlling and demanding. He was an overseas seaman, and he regularly sent
money to his wife to cover the family’s living expenses and their children’s tuition. However,
not only did she fail at paying the rent, utilities and other living expenses, she also she incurred
debts from other people and failed to remit amounts collected as sales agent of a plasticware and
cosmetics company. Also, during one of his visits to the country, he noticed that Teresita’s
stomach was slightly bigger. He tried to convince her to have a medical examination but she
refused. Her miscarriage five months into her pregnancy confirmed his worst suspicions. Ricardo
alleged that the child could not have been his, as his three instances of sexual contact with
Teresita were characterized by “withdrawals”; other than these, no other sexual contacts with his
wife transpired, as he transferred and lived with his relatives after a month of living with Teresita
in Cebu. Ricardo reported, too, of rumors that his wife represented herself to others as single,
and went out on dates with other men when he was not around. Thereafter, Teresita was
diagnosed with Narcissistic Personality Disorder by Dr. Cecilia R. Albaran

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred for disregarding the factual findings of the trial court,
particularly the expert testimony of Dr. Albaran, and submits that the trial court – in
declaring the nullity of the marriage fully complied with Molina.

RULING:

Yes. Dr. Albaran’s psychological evaluation merely relied on Ricardo and Richardson’s
testimonies. The mere narration of the statements of Ricardo and Richardson, coupled with the
results of the psychological tests administered only on Ricardo, without more, does not constitute
sufficient basis for the conclusion that Teresita suffered from Narcissistic Personality Disorder.
Other than from the spouses, such evidence can come from persons intimately related to them,
 P a g e | 283

such as relatives, close friends or even family doctors or lawyers who could testify on the
allegedly incapacitated spouse’s condition at or about the time of marriage, or to subsequent
occurring events that trace their roots to the incapacity already present at the time of marriage.
Richardson, the spouses’ eldest son, would not have been a reliable witness as he could not have
been expected to know what happened between his parents until long after his birth. He merely
recounted isolated incidents. The root cause must be alleged and not just the manifestations
during the marriage described as “refusal”, “difficulty” or “neglect”.
 P a g e | 284

LIGERALDE v. PATALINGHUG
G.R. No. 168796 April 15, 2010

FACTS:

Silvino and May got married on October 3, 1984. They were blessed with four children. Silvino
claimed that, during their marriage, he observed that May had several manifestations of a
negative marital behavior. He described her as immature, irresponsible and careless. Her
infidelity, negligence and nocturnal activities, he claimed, characterized their marital relations.
May confessed that she had no more love for him. They then lived separately. With May’s
irresponsible, immature and immoral behavior, Silvino came to believe that she is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. RTC declared
the marriage of Silvino and May null and void. Its findings were based on the Psychological
Evaluation Report of Dr. Tina Nicdao-Basilio. The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not May is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations.

RULING:

No. (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff; (2) the
root cause of the psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified, alleged in
the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in the decision; (3) the
incapacity must be proven to be existing at the "time of the celebration" of the marriage; (4) such
incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable; and (5) such
illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage (Republic v. Court of Appeals). The root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be identified as a psychological illness, its incapacitating nature fully explained
and established by the totality of the evidence presented during trial. An adulterous life is not
tantamount to psychological incapacity as contemplated in Article 36. Petitioner must be able to
establish that respondent's unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered personality, which
makes her completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state.
 P a g e | 285

SUAZO v. SUAZO
G.R. No. 164493 March 10, 2010

FACTS:

Jocelyn and Angelito were 16 years old when they first met in June 1985; they were residents of
Laguna at that time. After months of courtship, Jocelyn went to Manila with Angelito and some
friends. Having been gone for three days, their parents sought Jocelyn and Angelito and after
finding them, brought them back to Biñan, Laguna. Soon thereafter, Jocelyn and Angelito’s
marriage was arranged and they were married on March 3, 1986 in a ceremony officiated by the
Mayor of Biñan. Without any means to support themselves, Jocelyn and Angelito lived with
Angelito’s parents after their marriage. They had by this time stopped schooling. Jocelyn took
odd jobs and worked for Angelito’s relatives as household help. Angelito, on the other hand,
refused to work and was most of the time drunk. Jocelyn urged Angelito to find work and violent
quarrels often resulted because of Jocelyn’s efforts. Jocelyn left Angelito sometime in July 1987.
Angelito thereafter found another woman with whom he has since lived. They now have
children. Ten years after their separation, or on October 8, 1997, Jocelyn filed with the RTC a
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended.
She claimed that Angelito was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, the RTC annulled their marriage and CA affirmed it.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Angelito is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations.

HELD:

No. Both the psychologist’s testimony and the psychological report did not conclusively show
the root cause, gravity and incurability of Angelito’s alleged psychological condition. The
psychologist derived all her conclusions from information coming from Jocelyn whose bias for
her cause cannot of course be doubted. Jocelyn merely testified on Angelito’s habitual
drunkenness, gambling, refusal to seek employment and the physical beatings she received from
him – all of which occurred after the marriage.

Significantly, she declared in her testimony that Angelito showed no signs of violent behavior,
assuming this to be indicative of a personality disorder, during the courtship stage or at the
earliest stages of her relationship with him. She testified on the alleged physical beatings after
the marriage, not before or at the time of the celebration of the marriage. She did not clarify
when these beatings exactly took place – whether it was near or at the time of celebration of the
marriage or months or years after. This is a clear evidentiary gap that materially affects her
cause, as the law and its related jurisprudence require that the psychological incapacity must
exist at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal
to find a job, while indicative of psychological incapacity, do not, by themselves, show
 P a g e | 286

psychological incapacity. Standing alone, physical violence does not constitute psychological
incapacity.

ASPILLAGA v. ASPILLAGA
G.R. No. 170925 October 26, 2009

FACTS:

Aurora Apon and Rodolfo Aspillaga got married in year 1980. They begot two children, but after
the couple have already lived together, Rodolfo claimed their marriage was “tumultuous.” He
described Aurora as domineering and frequently humiliated him even in front of his friends. He
complained that Aurora was a spendthrift as she overspent the family budget and made crucial
family decisions without consulting him. Rodolfo added that Aurora was tactless, suspicious,
given to nagging and jealousy as evidenced by the latter’s filing against him a criminal case
(concubinage) and an administrative case. He left the conjugal home, and filed on March 7,
1995, a petition for annulment of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part
of Aurora. He averred that Aurora failed to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
Aurora, for her part, alleged that sometime in 1991, Rodolfo gave her a plane ticket to Japan to
enable her to assume her teaching position in a university for a period of three months. In
August 1991, upon her return to Manila, she discovered that while she was in Japan, Rodolfo
brought into their conjugal home her cousin, Lecita Rose A. Besina, as his concubine. Aurora
alleged that Rodolfo’s cohabitation with her cousin led to the disintegration of their marriage and
their eventual separation. In May 1992, Rodolfo abandoned their conjugal home to live with
Besina. Aurora claimed custody of the children.

A Psychiatric evaluation by Dr. Eduardo Maaba revealed that both parties suffered psychological
handicaps traced from unhealthy maturational development. Both had strict, domineering,
disciplinarian role models. However, respondent’s mistrust, shallow heterosexual relationships
resulted in incapacitation in her ability to comply with the obligation of marriage. RTC found the
parties psychologically incapacitated. The CA reversed and set aside the decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of the parties’ psychological Incapacity

RULING:

No. As early as 1995, in Santos v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995), it has
been categorically ruled that: Psychological incapacity required by Art. 36 must be characterized
by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or
serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in
marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. In the instant case, Dr.
Maaba failed to reveal that the psychological conditions were grave or serious enough to bring
about an incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Indeed, Dr. Maaba was able
to establish the parties’ personality disorder; however, he failed to link the parties’ psychological
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disorders to his conclusion that they are psychologically incapacitated to perform their
obligations as husband and wife. The fact that these psychological conditions will hamper their
performance of their marital obligations does not mean that they suffer from psychological
incapacity as contemplated under Article 36 of the Family Code. Mere difficulty is not
synonymous to incapacity. It must be stressed that psychological incapacity must be more than
just a “difficulty,” “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of some marital obligations
(Republic v. CA). The intention of the law is to confine the meaning of “psychological
incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage (Tongol v. Tongol,
G.R. No. 157610, October 19, 2007).Psychological disorders do not manifest that both parties
are truly incapacitated to perform the basic marital covenants. Moreover, there is nothing that
shows incurability of these disorders. Incompatibility and irreconcilable differences cannot be
equated with psychological incapacity as understood juristically. As to Rodolfo’s allegation that
Aurora was a spendthrift, the same likewise fails to convince. While disagreements on money
matters would, no doubt, affect the other aspects of one’s marriage as to make the wedlock
unsatisfactory, this is not a ground to declare a marriage null and void. In fact, the Court takes
judicial notice of the fact that disagreements regarding money matters are a common, and even
normal, occurrence between husbands and wives.
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ALCAZAR v. ALCAZAR
G.R. No. 174451 October 13, 2009

FACTS:

Herein petitioner, Veronica Cabacungan Alcazar alleged in her Complaint that she was married
to respondent Rey C. Alcazar on 11 October 200. After their wedding, Veronica and respondent
lived for five days in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, and the hometown of respondent's parents.
Thereafter, the newlyweds went back to Manila, but respondent did not live with petitioner at the
latter's abode at 2601-C Jose Abad Santos Avenue, Tondo, Manila. On 23 October 2000,
respondent left for Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, where he worked as an upholsterer in a
furniture shop. While working in Riyadh, respondent did not communicate with petitioner by
phone or by letter. Petitioner tried to call respondent for five times but He never answered. About
a year and a half after respondent left for Riyadh, a co-teacher informed petitioner that He was
about to come home to the Philippines. Petitioner was surprised why she was not advised by her
husband of his arrival.

Petitioner further averred in her Complaint that when respondent arrived in the Philippines, the
latter did not go home to petitioner. Instead, He proceeded to his parents' house in San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro. Petitioner asserted that from the time respondent arrived in the Philippines,
he never contacted her. Thus, petitioner concluded that respondent was physically incapable of
consummating his marriage with her, providing sufficient cause for annulment of their marriage
pursuant to paragraph 5, Article 45 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code). There
was also no more possibility of reconciliation between petitioner and respondent.
During trial, petitioner presented herself, her mother Lolita Cabacungan (Cabacungan), and
clinical psychologist Nedy L. Tayag (Tayag) as witnesses. The psychologist diagnosed the
respondent to have Narcissistic Personality Disorder. The RTC denied petitioner’s complaint for
annulment of her marriage. The petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied. The CA
affirmed RTC’s decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations.

RULING:

No. Article 46 of the Family Code contemplates an annulment of marriage on the ground
ofincapacity to consummate specifically denoting the permanent disability on the spouses to
perform and complete the act of sexual intercourse. What petitioner was actually seeking was the
declaration of nullity of marriage contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code. Nevertheless,
Article 36should refer, rather, to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed
and discharged by the parties to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by
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(a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. Petitioner’s evidence, particularly her
and her mother’s testimonies, merely established that respondent left petitioner soon after their
wedding to work in Saudi Arabia; that when respondent returned to the Philippines a year and a
half later, he directly went to live with his parents in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, and not with
petitioner in Tondo, Manila; and that respondent also did not contact petitioner at all since
leaving for abroad. These testimonies though do not give us much insight into respondent’s
psychological state. Tayag, in evaluating respondent’s psychological state, had to rely on
information provided by petitioner.
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NAJERA v. NAJERA
G.R. No. 164817 July 3, 2009.

FACTS:
Petitioner Digna Najera and respondent Eduardo Najera are married on January 31, 1988 as
evidenced by their marriage contract. Petitioner claimed that at the time of the celebration of
their marriage, respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of the marriage, and such incapacity became manifest only after marriage. At the
time of their marriage, respondent was jobless, while petitioner was employed as Clerk at the
Special Services Division of the Provincial Government of Pangasinan with a monthly salary of
₱5,000.00. It was petitioner’s brother who helped respondent find a job as a seaman at the
Intercrew Shipping Agency in Manila. On July 30, 1988, respondent was employed as a seaman,
and he gave petitioner a monthly allotment of ₱1,600.00. After ten months at work, he went
home in 1989 and then returned to work after three months. Every time respondent was home, he
quarreled with petitioner and accused her of having an affair with another man. Petitioner
noticed that respondent also smoked marijuana and every time he went out of the house and
returned home, he was drunk. However, there was no record in their barangay that respondent
was involved in drugs.
Psychologist Cristina Gates testified that the chances of curability of respondent’s psychological
disorder were nil. Its curability depended on whether the established organic damage was
minimal -- referring to the malfunction of the composites of the brain brought about by habitual
drinking and marijuana, which possibly afflicted respondent with borderline personality disorder
and uncontrollable impulses.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the totality of petitioner’s evidence was able to prove that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated.
HELD:
In Santos v. Court of Appeals: "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." The foregoing guidelines do not require that a
physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated.
In this case, the Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the totality of the evidence
submitted by petitioner failed to satisfactorily prove that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. The root cause of
respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity was not sufficiently proven by experts or shown to
be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
As found by the Court of Appeals, Psychologist Cristina Gates’ conclusion that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated was based on facts relayed to her by petitioner and was not based
on her personal knowledge and evaluation of respondent; thus, her finding is unscientific and
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unreliable.Moreover, the trial court correctly found that petitioner failed to prove with certainty
that the alleged personality disorder of respondent was incurable as may be gleaned from
Psychologist Cristina Gates’ testimony.
PARAS v. PARAS.
G.R. No. 147824 August 2, 2007

FACTS:
On May 21, 1964, petitioner Rosa Yap married respondent Justo J. Paras in Bindoy, Negros
Oriental. They begot four (4)children, namely: Raoul (deceased), Cindy Rose (deceased), Dahlia,
and Reuel. Twenty-nine years thereafter, or on May 27, 1993, Rosa filed with the Regional Trial
Court a complaint for annulment of her marriage with Justo, under Article 36 of the Family
Code, docketed as Civil Case No. 10613. She was then a student of San Carlos University, Cebu
City. He courted her, frequently spending time at her "Botica." Eventually, in 1964, convinced
that he loved her, she agreed to marry him. Their wedding was considered one of the "most
celebrated" marriages in Bindoy.
Sometime in 1975, their daughter Cindy Rose was afflicted with leukemia. It was her family who
paid for her medication. Also in 1984, their son Raoul was electrocuted while Justo was in their
rest house with his "barkadas." He did not heed her earlier advice to bring Raoul in the rest house
as the latter has the habit of climbing the rooftop. To cope with the death of the children, the
entire family went to the United States. However, after three months, Justo abandoned them and
left for the Philippines. Upon her return to the Philippines, she was shocked to find her "Botica"
and other businesses heavy in debt and he disposed without her consent a conjugal piece of land.
At other times, he permitted the municipal government to take gasoline from their gas station
free of charge. His act of maintaining a mistress and siring an illegitimate child was the last straw
that prompted her to file the present case. She found that after leaving their conjugal house in
1988, Justo lived with Jocelyn Ching. Their cohabitation resulted in the birth of a baby girl,
Cyndee Rose, obviously named after her (Rosa) and Justo‘s deceased daughter Cindy Rose
Paras.
He also denied forging her signature in one mortgage transaction. He maintained that he did not
dispose of a conjugal property and that he and Rosa personally signed the renewal of a sugar
crop loan before the bank’s authorized employee. He did not abandon his family in the United
States. For his part, he was granted only three (3) months leave as municipal mayor of Bindoy,
thus, he immediately returned to the Philippines. He spent for his children’s education. At first,
he resented supporting them because he was just starting his law practice and besides, their
conjugal assets were more than enough to provide for their needs. He admitted though that there
were times he failed to give them financial support because of his lack of income. What caused
the inevitable family break-out was Rosa’s act of embarrassing him during his birthday
celebration in 1987. She did not prepare food for the guests. When confronted, she retorted that
she has nothing to do with his birthday. This convinced him of her lack of concern. This was
further aggravated when she denied his request for engine oil when his vehicle broke down in a
mountainous and NPA-infested area. As to the charge of concubine, he alleged that Jocelyn
Ching is not his mistress, but her secretary in his Law Office. She was impregnated by her
boyfriend, a certain Grelle Leccioness. Cyndee Rose Ching Leccioness is not his daughter.
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After trial or on February 28, 1995, the RTC rendered a Decision upholding the validity of the
marriage. On December 8, 2000, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision in the present
case, holding that "the evidence of the plaintiff (Rosa) falls short of the standards required by law
to decree a nullity of marriage." It ruled that Justo’s alleged defects oridiosyncrasies "were
sufficiently explained by the evidence," Rosa contends that this Court’s factual findings in A.C.
No. 5333 fordisbarment are conclusive on the present case. Consequently, the Court of Appeals
erred in rendering contrary factual findings. Also, she argues that she filed the instant complaint
sometime in May, 1993
ISSUE:
Whether the totality of evidence in the case shows psychological incapacity on the part of Justo.
HELD:
A reading of the Court of Appeals’ Decision shows that she has no reason to feel aggrieved. In
fact, the appellate court even assumed that her charges "are true," but concluded that they are
insufficient to declare the marriage void on the ground of psychological incapacity. Justo's
alleged infidelity, failure to support his family and alleged abandonment of their family home are
true, such traits are at best indicators that he is unfit to become an ideal husband and father.
However, by themselves, these grounds are insufficient to declare the marriage void due to an
incurable psychological incapacity. These grounds, we must emphasize, do not manifest that he
was truly in cognitive of the basic marital covenants that he must assume and discharge as a
married person. While they may manifest the "gravity" of his alleged psychological incapacity,
they do not necessarily show ‘incurability’, such that while his acts violated the covenants of
marriage, they do not necessarily show that such acts show an irreparably hopeless state of
psychological incapacity which prevents him from undertaking the basic obligations of marriage
in the future.
The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts, and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychological -- not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill
to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the
principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological
illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
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ZAMORA v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 141917 February 7, 2007

FACTS:
Petitioner and private respondent were married on June 4, 1970 in Cebu City. After their
marriage, they lived together at No. 50-A Gorordo Avenue, Cebu City. The union did not
produce any child. In 1972, private respondent left for the United States to work as a nurse. She
returned to the Philippines for a few months, then left again in 1974. Thereafter, she made
periodic visits to Cebu City until 1989, when she was already a U.S. citizen.
Petitioner filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage anchored on the alleged
"psychological incapacity" of private respondent, as provided for under Article 36 of the Family
Code. To support his position, he alleged that his wife was "horrified" by the mere thought of
having children as evidenced by the fact that she had not borne petitioner a child. Furthermore,
he also alleged that private respondent abandoned him by living in the United States and had in
fact become an American citizen; and that throughout their marriage they lived together for not
more than three years. On the other hand, private respondent denied that she refused to have a
child. She portrayed herself as one who loves children as she is a nurse by profession and that
she would from time to time borrow her husband’s niece and nephews to care for them. She also
faulted her husband for the breakup of their marriage, alleging that he had been unfaithful to her.
He allegedly had two affairs with different women, and he begot at least three children with
them.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the RTC’s decision dismissing the
declaration of nullity of the marriage.
HELD:
Under Section 2(d) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages provides that:
(d) What to allege. – A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege the
complete facts showing that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from
complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of
marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.
The rule is that the facts alleged in the petition and the evidence presented, considered in
totality, should be sufficient to convince the court of the psychological incapacity of the party
concerned. Petitioner, however, failed to substantiate his allegation that private respondent is
psychologically incapacitated. His allegations relating to her refusal to cohabit with him and to
bear a child was strongly disputed, as the records undeniably bear out. Furthermore, the acts and
behavior of private respondent that petitioner cited occurred during the marriage, and there is no
proof that the former exhibited a similar predilection even before or at the inception of the
marriage.
Thus, based on the foregoing, the Court finds no reason to disturb the findings and
conclusions reached by the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
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PEREZ-FERRARIS v. FERRARIS
G.R. No. 162368 July 17, 2006

FACTS:
On February 20, 2001, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 151 rendered a Decision
denying the petition for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage with Brix Ferraris. It held
that epilepsy does not constitute as psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Civil Code
and that the evidence on record were insufficient to prove infidelity.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the judgment of the trial
court. It held that the evidence on record did not convincingly establish that respondent was
suffering from psychological incapacity or that his "defects" were incurable and already present
at the inception of the marriage. The Court of Appeals also found that Dr. Dayan's testimony
failed to establish the substance of respondent's psychological incapacity; that she failed to
explain how she arrived at the conclusion that the respondent has a mixed personality disorder;
that she failed to clearly demonstrate that there was a natal or supervening disabling factor or an
adverse integral element in respondent's character that effectively incapacitated him from
accepting and complying with the essential marital obligations.
ISSUE:
Whether or not psychological incapacity exists.
HELD:
Simply put, the chief and basic consideration in the resolution of marital annulment cases is the
presence of evidence that can adequately establish respondent's psychological condition. Here,
appellant contends that there is such evidence. We do not agree. Indeed, the evidence on record
did not convincingly establish that respondent was suffering from psychological incapacity.
There is absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already present at the inception of the
marriage, or that those are incurable.
At any rate, Dr. Dayan did not explain how she arrived at her diagnosis that respondent has a
mixed personality disorder called "schizoid," and why he is the "dependent and avoidant type."
The Court finds respondent's alleged mixed personality disorder, the "leaving-the-house"
attitude whenever they quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual
infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support, and his preference to spend more time with his
band mates than his family, are not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but a
mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
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ANTONIO v. REYES
G.R. No. 155800 March 10, 2006

FACTS:
Petitioner Leonilo and respondent Marie met in August 1989 when petitioner was 26 years old
and respondent was 36 years of age. Barely a year after their first meeting, they got married
before a minister of the Gospel at the Manila City Hall, and through a subsequent church
weddingat the Sta. Rosa de Lima Parish, Bagong Ilog, Pasig, Metro Manila on 6 December 1990.
Out of their union, a child was born on 19 April 1991, who sadly died five (5) months later.
Petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to respondent declared null and void under Article
36 of the Family Code. He asserted that respondent’s incapacity existed at the time their
marriage was celebrated and still subsists up to present. Petitioner claims that respondent
persistently lied about herself as she concealed about her illegitimate child as the adopted child
of her family. Moreover, respondent also lied about the people around her, her occupation,
income, educational attainment and other events or things.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner can impose Article 36 of the Family Code as basis for declaring their
marriage null and void.
HELD:
In Republic vs. CA, the Court laid down standards for the declaration of a nullity of marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code. In this case the Court finds that it sufficiently satisfied the
Molina Guideline. First, Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the
psychological incapacity of his spouse. Apart from his own testimony, he presented witnesses
who corroborated his allegations.
Second, the root cause of respondent’s psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically
identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the
trial court’s decision. Third, respondent’s psychological incapacity was established to have
clearly existed at the time of and even before the celebration of marriage. She fabricated friends
and made up letters from fictitious characters well before she married petitioner. Fourth, the
gravity of respondent’s psychological incapacity is sufficient to prove her disability to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. Whatever such circumstance speaks of the degree of
tolerance of petitioner, it likewise supports the belief that respondent’s psychological incapacity,
as borne by the record, was so grave in extent that any prolonged marital life was dubitable.
Fifth, Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations as
embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code. As noted by the trial court, it is difficult to
see how an inveterate pathological liar would be able to commit to the basic tenets of
relationship between spouses based on love, trust and respect. Sixth, the marriage of the parties
was annulled by the Catholic Church. Seventh, the totality of evidence presented by the
petitioner shows that respondent’s psychological incapacity is incurable.
Thus, the Court concluded that petitioner has established his cause of action for
declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The RTC correctly ruled, and the
Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court.
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CARATING-SIAYNGCO v. SIAYNGCO
G.R. No. 158896 October 27, 2004

FACTS:
On 25 September 1997, or after 24 years of married life together, respondent Manuel filed for the
declaration of its nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity of petitioner Juanita. He
alleged that all throughout their marriage, his wife exhibited an over domineering and selfish
attitude towards him which was exacerbated by her extremely volatile and bellicose nature; that
she incessantly complained about almost everything and anyone connected with him like his
elderly parents, the staff in his office and anything not of her liking like the physical
arrangement, tables, chairs, wastebaskets in his office and with other trivial matters; that she
showed no respect or regard at all for the prestige and high position of his office as judge of the
Municipal Trial Court; that she would yell and scream at him and throw objects around the house
within the hearing of their neighbors; that she cared even less about his professional
advancement as she did not even give him moral support and encouragement; that her
psychological incapacity arose before marriage, rooted in her deep-seated resentment and
vindictiveness for what she perceived as lack of love and appreciation from her own parents
since childhood and that such incapacity is permanent and incurable and, even if treatment could
be attempted, it will involve time and expense beyond the emotional and physical capacity of the
parties; and that he endured and suffered through his turbulent and loveless marriage to her for
twenty-two (22) years.
The Regional Trial Court issued it resolution denying Manuel’s petition for declaration of nullity
of his marriage. However, the Court of Appeals reversed its decision relying on Dr. Garcia’s
psychiatric evaluation that finding both petitioner and respondent are psychologically
incapacitated.
ISSUE:
Whether or not psychologically incapacity exist.
HELD:
The Court of Appeals committed reversible error in holding that respondent Manuel is
psychologically incapacitated. The psychological report of Dr. Garcia, which is respondent
Manuel’s own evidence, contains candid admissions of petitioner Juanita, the person in the best
position to gauge whether or not her husband fulfilled the essential marital obligations of
marriage. What emerges from the psychological report of Dr. Garcia as well as from the
testimonies of the parties and their witnesses is that the only essential marital obligation which
respondent Manuel was not able to fulfill, if any, is the obligation of fidelity.49 Sexual infidelity,
per se, however, does not constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the
Family Code. On the other hand, respondent Manuel failed to prove that his wife’s lack of
respect for him, her jealousies and obsession with cleanliness, her outbursts and her controlling
nature (especially with respect to his salary), and her inability to endear herself to his parents are
grave psychological maladies that paralyze her from complying with the essential obligations of
marriage. Neither is there any showing that these "defects" were already present at the inception
of the marriage or that they are incurable.
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VILLALON v. VILLALON
G.R. No. 167206 November 18, 2005

FACTS:
Petitioner Jaime F. Villalon filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage to respondent Ma.
Corazon N. Villalon before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City as he claimed that he is
psychologically incapacitated. According to petitioner, the manifestations of his psychological
incapacity were: (a) his chronic refusal to maintain harmonious family relations and his lack of
interest in having a normal married life; (b) his immaturity and irresponsibility in refusing to
accept the essential obligations of marriage as husband to his wife; (c) his desire for other
women and a life unchained from any spousal obligation; and (d) his false assumption of the
fundamental obligations of companionship and consortium towards respondent.
Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad Dayan, a clinical psychologist, to testify on his alleged
psychological disorder of "Narcissistic Histrionic Personality Disorder" with "Casanova
Complex". Dr. Dayan described the said disorder as "a pervasive maladaptation in terms of
interpersonal and occupational functioning" with main symptoms of "grand ideation about
oneself, self-centeredness, thinking he is unique and wanting to always be the one followed, the I
personality."
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is psychologically incapacitated under Article 36 of the Family Code.
HELD:
The totality of the evidence in this case does not support a finding that petitioner is
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his marital obligations. On the contrary, what is evident is
the fact that petitioner was a good husband to respondent for a substantial period of time prior to
their separation, a loving father to their children and a good provider of the family. Although he
engaged in marital infidelity in at least two occasions, the same does not appear to be
symptomatic of a grave psychological disorder which rendered him incapable of performing his
spousal obligations. The same appears as the result of a general dissatisfaction with his marriage
rather than a psychological disorder rooted in petitioner’s personal history.
In the case at bar, although Dr. Dayan testified that petitioner suffered from Narcissistic
Histrionic Personality Disorder with Casanova Complex even before the marriage and thus had
the tendency to cheat on his wife, such conclusion was not sufficiently backed by concrete
evidence showing that petitioner indeed had several affairs and finds it difficult to be faithful.
Moreover, the Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that petitioner failed to establish the
incurability and gravity of his alleged psychological disorder. it appears that petitioner has
simply lost his love for respondent and has consequently refused to stay married to her.
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BUENAVENTURA v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 127358 March 31, 2005
FACTS:
Petitioner Noel filed for a petition of the declaration of nullity of marriage, on the ground of the
alleged psychological incapacity of his wife, Isabel Singh Buenaventura, herein respondent.
Thereafter, petitioner amended his petition by stating that both he and his wife were
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
On July 31, 1995, the Regional Trial Court promulgated a decision declaring the marriage
between petitioner Noel and respondent Isabel null and void ab initio.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
HELD:
As articulated by the Court of Appeals, the lower court found that plaintiff-appellant deceived
the defendant-appellee into marrying him by professing true love instead of revealing to her that
he was under heavy parental pressure to marry and that because of pride he married defendant-
appellee; that he was not ready to enter into marriage as in fact his career was and always would
be his first priority; that he was unable to relate not only to defendant-appellee as a husband but
also to his son, Javy, as a father; that he had no inclination to make the marriage work such that
in times of trouble, he chose the easiest way out, that of leaving defendant–appellee and their
son; that he had no desire to keep defendant-appellee and their son as proved by his reluctance
and later, refusal to reconcile after their separation; that the aforementioned caused defendant-
appellee to suffer mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched reputation, sleepless nights not only in
those years the parties were together but also after and throughout their separation.
The Court of Appeals and the trial court considered the acts of the petitioner after the marriage as
proof of his psychological incapacity, and therefore a product of his incapacity or inability to
comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
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DEDEL v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 151867 January 29, 2004

FACTS:
Petitioner David met respondent Sharon L. Corpuz Dedel while he was working in the
advertising business of his father. Subsequently, they got married and begot four children.
However, on April 1, 1997 petitioner filed a petition seeking for the declaration of of nullity of
his marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity as defined in Article 36 of the Family
Code.
Petitioner present Dr. Dayan which declared that Sharon was suffering from Anti-Social
Personality Disorder exhibited by her blatant display of infidelity; that she committed several
indiscretions and had no capacity for remorse, even bringing with her the two children of
Mustafa Ibrahim to live with petitioner. Such immaturity and irresponsibility in handling the
marriage like her repeated acts of infidelity and abandonment of her family are indications of
Anti-Social Personality Disorder amounting to psychological incapacity to perform the essential
obligations of marriage.
After trial, judgment was rendered declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent null
and void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the totality of the evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding that
respondent is psychologically incapacitated.
HELD:
In this case, respondent’s sexual infidelity can hardly qualify as being mentally or psychically ill
to such an extent that she could not have known the obligations she was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given a valid assumption thereof. It appears that respondent’s promiscuity
did not exist prior to or at the inception of the marriage. What is, in fact, disclosed by the records
is a blissful marital union at its celebration, later affirmed in church rites, and which produced
four children.
Respondent’s sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by themselves constitute
psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. Neither could her
emotional immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with psychological incapacity. It must be
shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make respondent
completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, not merely due to
her youth, immaturity or sexual promiscuity.
 P a g e | 300

REPUBLIC v. DAGDAG
G.R. No. 109975 February 9, 2001

FACTS:
Respondent Erlinda Matias Dagdag and Avelino Parangan Dagdag were married on September 7
1975 at the Iglesia Filipina Independent Church in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija. A week after the
wedding, Avelino started leaving his family without explanation. He would disappear for
months, suddenly reappear for a few months, then disappear again. During the times when he
was with his family, he indulged in drinking sprees with friends and would return home drunk.
He would force his wife to submit to sexual intercourse and if she refused, he would inflict
physical injuries on her.
On July 3, 1990, Erlinda filed with the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City a petition for
judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code. She presented her sister-in-law, Virginia Dagdag, who testified
that Erlinda and Avelino always quarrelled, and that Avelino never stayed for long at the couple's
house. She knew that Avelino had been gone for a long time now, and that she pitied Erlinda and
the children.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly declared the marriage as null
and void under Article 36 of the Family Code.
HELD:
In Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, the Court laid down the following guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code.
Taking into consideration these guidelines, it is evident that Erlinda failed to comply with with
guideline No. 2 which requires that the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically
or clinically identified and sufficiently proven by experts, since no psychiatrist or medical doctor
testified as to the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband. Further, the allegation that the
husband is a fugitive from justice was not sufficiently proven. In fact, the crime for which he was
arrested was not even alleged. The investigating prosecutor was likewise not given an
opportunity to present controverting evidence since the trial court's decision was prematurely
rendered.
 P a g e | 301

PESCA v. PESCA
G.R. No. 136921 April 17, 2001

FACTS:
Sometime in 1975, Petitioner Lorna G. Pesca and respondent Zosimo A. Pesca met on board an
inter-island vessel bound for Bacolod City. After a whirlwind courtship, they got married.
However, in 1988, petitioner said that she noticed that respondent surprisingly showed signs of
"psychological incapacity" to perform his marital covenant. His "true color" of being an
emotionally immature and irresponsible husband became apparent. He was cruel and violent. He
was a habitual drinker, staying with friends daily from 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon until 1:00
o'clock in the morning. When cautioned to stop or, to at least, minimize his drinking, respondent
would beat, slap and kick her. At one time, he chased petitioner with a loaded shotgun and
threatened to kill her in the presence of the children. The children themselves were not spared
from physical violence. Subsequently, petitioner sued respondent before the Regional Trial
Court for the declaration of nullity of their marriage invoking psychological incapacity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the decision of the trial court declaring
the marriage between petitioner and respondent valid and subsisting.
HELD:
At all events, petitioner has utterly failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and in her
evidence, to make out a case of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent, let alone at
the time of solemnization of the contract, so as to warrant a declaration of nullity of the marriage.
Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot be equated with psychological
incapacity.
The Court reiterates its reminder that marriage is an inviolable social institution and the
foundation of the family that the State cherishes and protects. While the Court commiserates
with petitioner in her unhappy marital relationship with respondent, totally terminating that
relationship, however, may not necessarily be the fitting denouement to it. In these cases, the law
has not quite given up, neither should we.
 P a g e | 302

BOLOS v. BOLOS
G.R. No. 186400 October 20, 2010

FACTS:
On July 10, 2003, petitioner Cynthia Bolos (Cynthia) filed a petition for the declaration of nullity
of her marriage to respondent Danilo Bolos (Danilo) under Article 36 of the Family Code,
docketed as JDRC No. 6211.
After trial on the merits, the RTC granted the petition for annulment in a Decision, dated August
2, 2006. A copy of said decision was received by Danilo on August 25, 2006. He timely filed the
Notice of Appeal on September 11, 2006.
In an order dated September 19, 2006, the RTC denied due course to the appeal for Danilo’s
failure to file the required motion for reconsideration or new trial, in violation of Section 20 of
the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages.
On January 16, 2007, the RTC issued the order declaring its August 2, 2006 decision final and
executory and granting the Motion for Entry of Judgment filed by Cynthia.Not in conformity,
Danilo filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to annul the orders of the
RTC
As earlier stated, the CA granted the petition and reversed and set aside the assailed orders of the
RTC. The appellate court stated that the requirement of a motion for reconsideration as a
prerequisite to appeal under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC did not apply in this case as the marriage
between Cynthia and Danilo was solemnized on February 14, 1980 before the Family Code took
effect. It relied on the ruling of this Court in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli3 to the effect that
the "coverage [of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC] extends only to those marriages entered into during
the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988."
ISSUE:
Whether or not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC entitled "Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages," is applicable to the case at bench.
HELD:
Her stance is unavailing. The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which the Court
promulgated on March 15, 2003, is explicit in its scope. Section 1 of the Rule, in fact, reads:
Section 1. Scope – This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines.
The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The coverage
extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which
took effect on August 3, 1988.The rule sets a demarcation line between marriages covered by the
Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code.
 P a g e | 303

The Court finds Itself unable to subscribe to petitioner’s interpretation that the phrase "under the
Family Code" in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the word "petitions" rather than to the word
"marriages."
 P a g e | 304

MALLION v. ALCANTARA
G.R. No. 141528 October 31, 2006

FACTS:
On October 24, 1995, petitioner Oscar Mallion filed with the regional trial court seeking a
declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent Editha Alcantara on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
The trial court denied the petition. Likewise, it was dismissed in the Court of Appeals.
After such decision, petitioner filed another petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with
the regional trial court alleging that his marriage with respondent was null and void due to the
fact that it was celebrated without a valid marriage license.
Respondent filed an answer with motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata and forum
shopping.
ISSUE:
Is the action of the husband tenable?
HELD:
No. Section 47(b) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court pertains as “bar by prior judgment” or
“estoppels by verdict,” which is the effect of a judgment as a bar to the prosecution of the second
action upon the same claim, demand or cause of action. In Section 47(c) of the same rule, it
pertains to res judicata in its concept as “conclusiveness of judgment” or the rule of auter action
pendant which ordains that issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be
raised in any future case between the same parties involving a different cause of action.
Therefore, having expressly and impliedly concealed the validity of their marriage celebration,
petitioner is now deemed to have waived any defects therein. The Court finds then that the
present action for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of lack of marriage license is
barred. The petition is denied for lack of merit.
 P a g e | 305

LEONOR v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R No. 112597 April 2, 1996

FACTS:
The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari assailing the validity of the judgment of the lower
court. It was shown that she was married to the private respondent and they had three kids. While
her husband was studying and working abroad, he cohabited with another woman. This
prompted her to file for separation and alimony against her husband. Her husband in return filed
a divorce case against her in Swiss Courts, contending that their marriage was void for absence
of valid marriage certificate. The Swiss Court held in favour of the private respondent.
Subsequently the Private Respondent filed a petition for the cancellation of the marriage
certificate in the Philippines. The trial court granted his petition and denied Petitioner’s appeal.
The Petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari in the CA, but the latter denied the same.
She filed this petition with the Supreme Court to assail the validity of CA’s decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower court erred in declaring the marriage null and void?
HELD:
Rule 108 as the basis of the private respondent’s contention is untenable. The Court explained
that the Rule only applies to cases concerning typographical or other clerical errors in the
marriage contract. It does not apply to cases where the status of the parties and their children
shall be affected. The Supreme Court held in favour of the petitioner contending that “A void
judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all.”
 P a g e | 306

ERIC U. YU v. REYES-CARPIO
G.R. No. 189207 June 15, 2011

FACTS:
Eric Yu filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against Caroline T. Yu with the
RTC of Pasig. Judge Suarez on May 30, 2006 issued an order stating that Eric’s partial offer of
evidence dated April 18, 2006 would be submitted for resolution after certain exhibits have been
remarked. But the exhibits were only relative to the issue of the nullity of the marriage of Eric
and Caroline. On September 12, 2006, Caroline moved to submit the case for resolution,
considering that the incidents on custody, support, and property relations (incidental issues) were
mere consequences of the declaration of nullity of the parties’ marriage.
Eric opposed this motion saying that the incident on declaration of nullity cannot be resolved
without presentation of evidence for the incidents on custody, support, and property relations.
Eric added that the incidental issues and the issue on declaration of nullity can both proceed and
be simultaneously resolved. RTC ruled in favour of Eric’s opposition.
Caroline caused the inhibition of Judge Suarez, so that the case was re-raffled to another branch
presided by Judge Reyes-Carpio. While the case was being tried by Judge Reyes-Carpio,
Caroline filed an Omnibus Motion seeking the strict observation by the said judge of the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriage as codified in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, and that
the case on the declaration on nullity be already submitted for resolution ahead of the incidental
issues, and not simultaneously. Eric opposed this motion.
Judge Reyes-Carpio granted the Omnibus Motion, saying that the main cause of action is the
declaration of nullity of the marriage and the incidental issues are merely ancillary incidents
thereto. Eric moved for reconsideration, which was denied by Judge Reyes-Carpio. Eric then
filed for certiorari with the CA under Rule 65. CA affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether the main issue of nullity of marriage must be submitted for resolution first before the
reception of evidence on custody, support, and property relations (incidental issues)
HELD:
It appears in the records that the Orders in question, or what are alleged to have been exercised
with grave abuse of discretion, are interlocutory orders. An interlocutory order is one which
“does not finally dispose of the case, and does not end the Court’s task of adjudicating the
parties’ contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as regards each other, but
obviously indicates that other things remain to be done by the Court. Eric Yu to prove that the
assailed orders were issued with grave abuse of discretion and that those were patently
erroneous. Considering that the requisites that would justify certiorari as an appropriate remedy
to assail an interlocutory order have not been complied with, the proper recourse for petitioner
should have been an appeal in due course of the judgment of the trial court on the merits,
incorporating the grounds for assailing the interlocutory orders.
It must be noted that Judge Reyes-Carpio did not disallow the presentation of evidence on the
incidents on custody, support, and property relations. It is clear in the assailed orders that the trial
court judge merely deferred the reception of evidence relating to custody, support, and property
 P a g e | 307

relations. And the trial judge’s decision was not without basis. Judge Reyes-Carpio finds support
in the Court En Banc Resolution in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. Particularly, Secs.
19 and 21 of the Rule clearly allow the reception of evidence on custody, support, and property
relations after the trial court renders a decision granting the petition, or upon entry of judgment
granting the petition:
Section 19. Decision. – (1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall declare
therein that the decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be issued by the court
only after compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the
Rule on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Properties.
Section 21. Liquidation, partition and distribution, custody, support of common children and
delivery of their presumptive legitimes. – Upon entry of the judgment granting the petition, or, in
case of appeal, upon receipt of the entry of judgment of the appellate court granting the petition,
the Family Court, on motion of either party, shall proceed with the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, including custody, support of common children and
delivery of their presumptive legitimes pursuant to Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code unless
such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
Evidently, Judge Reyes-Carpio did not deny the reception of evidence on custody, support, and
property relations but merely deferred it, based on the existing rules issued by this Court, to a
time when a decision granting the petition is already at hand and before a final decree is issued.
Conversely, the trial court, or more particularly the family court, shall proceed with the
liquidation, partition and distribution, custody, support of common children, and delivery of their
presumptive legitimes upon entry of judgment granting the petition. And following the pertinent
provisions of the Court En Banc Resolution in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, this act is undoubtedly
consistent with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code, contrary to what petitioner asserts.
Particularly, Arts. 50 and 51 of the Family Code state:
Article 50. The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children,
and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in the
previous judicial proceedings.
Article 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common children,
computed as of the date of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered in cash,
property or sound securities, unless the parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved, had
already provided for such matters.
Also, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC clearly allows the deferment of the reception of evidence on
custody, support, and property relations. Conversely, the trial court may receive evidence on the
subject incidents after a judgment granting the petition but before the decree of nullity or
annulment of marriage is issued. And this is what Judge Reyes-Carpio sought to comply with in
issuing the assailed orders. As correctly pointed out by the CA, Eric Yu’s assertion that ruling
the main issue without receiving evidence on the subject incidents would result in an ambiguous
and fragmentary judgment is certainly speculative and, hence, contravenes the legal presumption
that a trial judge can fairly weigh and appraise the evidence submitted by the parties.
Therefore, it cannot be said at all that Judge Reyes-Carpio acted in a capricious and whimsical
manner, much less in a way that is patently gross and erroneous, when she issued the assailed
 P a g e | 308

orders deferring the reception of evidence on custody, support, and property relations. To
reiterate, this decision is left to the trial court’s wisdom and legal soundness. Consequently,
therefore, the CA cannot likewise be said to have committed grave abuse of discretion in
upholding the Orders of Judge Reyes-Carpio and in ultimately finding an absence of grave abuse
of discretion on her part.
 P a g e | 309

YU v. YU-LIM
GR No. 200072 June 20, 2016

FACTS:
Philip Yu and Viveca Lim Yu were married on 1984. However, in 1993, Viveca left their home
together with their children and filed a Petition for Legal Separation against her husband for
repeated physical violence, grossly abusive conduct, sexual infidelity, and attempt on her life.
Philip denied the accusations and prayed in his Counterclaim for the declaration of nullity of
their marriage.
However, in 2007, Philip moved for the dismissal of his counterclaim for nullity of marriage in
the Legal Separation case and was granted by the Pasig RTC. The same court, in 2009, rendered
a decision dismissing the Petition for Legal Separation on the ground that the same became
moot, with the decision of the RTC of Balayan, Batangas declaring the nullity of the parties’
marriage.
Viveca was unaware of the proceedings before the Batangas RTC. Thus, she filed before the CA,
a Petition for Annulment of Judgment of the said RTC’s decision. According to Viveca,
jurisdiction over her person did not properly vest since she was not duly served with Summons.
She alleged that she was deprived of her right to due process when Philip fraudulently declared
that her address was still at their conjugal home, when he clearly knew that she was in the USA.
Philip contends that Viveca was duly served summons by publication and by sending a copy of
the summons to the defendant’s last known address.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Batangas RTC validly acquired jurisdiction when Summons was duly served
to the respondent by publication
HELD:
Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought against him. Through
its service, the court acquires jurisdiction over his person. Under Section 15 of Rule 14 of the
Rules of Court, a defendant who is a non-resident and is not found in the country may be served
with summons by extraterritorial service when the action affects the personal status of the
plaintiff. In such case, extraterritorial service of summons may be effected under any of three
modes: (1) by personal service out of the country, with leave of court; (2) by publication and
sending a copy of the summons and order of the court by registered mail to the defendant's last
known address, also with leave of court; or (3) by any other means the judge may consider
sufficient.
It is undisputed that when Philip filed the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, an
action which affects his personal status, Viveca was already residing in the United States of
America. Thus, extraterritorial service of summons is the proper mode by which summons may
be served. Philip’s contention that the second mode of extraterritorial service of summons
mentioned above was sufficiently complied with, cannot be deemed compliant with the
requirements of the rules and is even tantamount to deception warranting the annulment of the
Batangas court's judgment.
 P a g e | 310

Philip cannot be allowed to feign ignorance to the fact that Viveca had already intentionally
abandoned their conjugal abode and that of all the addresses that Viveca resided at, their
conjugal home is her least recent address. In fact, it may very well be considered as the address
she is least likely to be found considering the circumstances in which she left the same. There is,
therefore, no reason for Philip to assume, in good faith, that said address is in fact Viveca's "last
known address.” As a result, Viveca never had knowledge Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
suit, only finding out when the Pasig City RTC had promulgated its decision on the Legal
Separation case. Because of the service of summons at the erroneous address, Viveca was
effectively prevented from participating in the proceedings.
The SC deems as proper the annulment of the Batangas court's judgment issued without proper
service of summons.
 P a g e | 311

JULIAJVO v. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 169766 March 30, 2011

FACTS:
About 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamanao married Estrellita twice – initially under the
Islamic laws and tradition on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City and, subsequently, under a civil
ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao del Sur on June 2, 1993. In their
marriage contracts, Sen. Tamano s civil status was indicated as “divorced”. Since then, Estrellita
has been representing herself to the whole world as Sen. Tamano’s wife, and upon his death, his
widow.
On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) and her
son Adib Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and in behalf of the rest of Sen.
Tamano’s legitimate children with Zorayda, filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City for
the declaration of nullity of marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for being bigamous.
The complaint alleged that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda on May 31, 1958 under civil rites, and
that this marriage remained subsisting when he married Estrellita in 1993.
ISSUE:
Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamano was bigamous.
HELD:
The civil code governs the marriage of Zorayda and late Sen. Tamano; their marriage was never
invalidated by PD 1083. Sen. Tamano subsequent marriage to Estrellita is void ab initio.
The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in 1958, solemnized
under civil and Muslim rites. The only law in force governing marriage relationships between
Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950, under the provisions of which only
one marriage can exist at any given time. Under the marriage provisions of the Civil Code,
divorce is not recognized except during the effectivity of Republic Act No. 394 which was not
availed of during its effectivity.
As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamano s prior marriage to Zorayda has been severed by
way of divorce under PD 1083, the law that codified Muslim personal laws. However, PD 1083
cannot benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof provides that the law applies to “marriage
and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and
the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the
Philippines.” But Article 13 of PD 1083 does not provide for a situation where the parties were
married both in civil and Muslim rites.
 P a g e | 312

ENRICO v. HEIRS OF MEDINACELI

G.R. No. 173614 September 28, 2007

FACTS:
Spouses Uelogio Medinaceli and Trinidad Catli-medicani were married on June 14 1962. They
had seven children, herein respondents. Trinidad died on may 1 2004 and on august 26 2004,
Eulogio marries petitioner Lolita Enrico on february 10 2005. respondent filed an action for
declaration of nullity of marriage between Eulogio and Lolita on two grounds: that the marriage
was entered into without the requisite marriage license and; lack of a marriage ceremony due to
Eulogio's illness.
Enrico contended that she has been living with Eulogio for 21 years hence exempt from getting a
marriage license under Art. 34 of the Family Code. More importantly, she sought the dismissal
of his action on the ground that it is only the contracting parties while living who can file an
action for the declaration of nullity of marriage pursuant to AM 02- 11-10 SC which provides in
sec. 2 (a) that the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of a void marriage may be filled
solely by the husband or the wife. The heirs invoked the ruling in the case of Ninal vs.
Bayadong.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage between Eulogio and Enrico is exempt from securing marriage
license.
HELD:
Petition is dismissed. Under Art. 34 of the family code, a man and a woman who have been
living together for at least five years without any legal impediments are exempt from securing a
marriage license. The said exemption cannot possibly apply because the second marriage
contracted by Eulogio with Enrico took place barely 3 months after Trinidad dies. Moreover, the
respondent heirs have no standing to assail the validity of the second marriage even after te death
of their father, Eulogio.
While it is true that Ninal vs. Bayadog allowed the heirs therein to file a petition for the
declaration of nullity of the Father's 2nd marriage after the death, the court held that the same
rule cannot be applied for the reason that the impugned marriage therein was solemnized prior to
the effectivity of the family code.Nonetheless, the heirs are not left without remedy. They can
still protect their successional rights as compulsory or intestate heirs of Eulogio by questioning
the validity of his second marriage with Enrico, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity, but
in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate deceased father filed in the regular courts.
 P a g e | 313

NIÑAL v. BAYADOG
G.R. No. 133778 March14, 2000

FACTS:
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage
were born herein petitioners. Pepito resulting to her death on April 24, 1985 shot Teodulfa. One
year and 8 months thereafter or on December 24, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Bayadog
got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an
affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at
least 5 years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license.
After Pepito’s death on February 19, 1997, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
the marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage
license.
ISSUE:
What nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code (now Article 34
of the Family Code) to warrant the counting of the 5-year period in order to exempt the future
spouses from securing a marriage license.
HELD:
The 5-year common law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration
of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage.
This 5- year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should
be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity-meaning no third party was involved at
any time within the 5 years and continuity is unbroken.
Any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and
void, subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved
or annulled.
In this case, at the time Pepito and respondent’s marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived
with each other as husband and wife for at least 5 years prior to their wedding day. From the time
Pepito’s first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about 20
months had elapsed. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with
respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been
separated in fact from his lawful spouse.
The subsistence of the marriage even where there is was actual severance of the filial
companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any
third party as being one as “husband and wife”.
Having determined that the second marriage involve in this case is not covered by the exception
to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such
element.
 P a g e | 314

CARLOS v. SANDOVAL
G.R. No. 179922 December 16, 2008

FACTS:
Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos were brothers who each have three parcels of
land by virtue of inheritance. Later Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by respondents
Felicidad Sandoval and their son, Teofilo Carlos II. Upon Teofilo’s death, two parcels of land
were registered in the name of Felicidad and Teofilo II. In August 1995, Carlos commenced an
action against respondents before the court a quo. In his complaint, Carlos asserted that the
marriage between his late brother and Felicidad was a nullity in view of the absence of the
required marriage license. He likewise maintained that his deceased brother was neither the
natural nor the adoptive father of Teofilo Carlos II. He argued that the properties covered by
such certificates of title, including the sums received by respondents as proceeds, should be
reconveyed to him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not both parties should file for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.
HELD:
The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage must be proved. Neither judgment on
the pleadings nor summary judgment is allowed. So is confession of judgment disallowed.
Carlos argues that the CA should have applied Rule 35 of the Rules of Court governing summary
judgment, instead of the rule on judgment on the pleadings. Petitioner is misguided. Whether it is
based on judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment, the CA was correct in reversing the
summary judgment rendered by the trial court. Both the rules on judgment on the pleadings and
summary judgments have no place in cases of declaration of absolute nullity of marriage and
even in annulment of marriage
A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband
or wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced before the effectivity of A.M. No.
02- 11-10- SC; and (2) Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code. Under the
Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may not be filed by any
party outside of the marriage. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may
be filed solely by the husband or the wife. Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a
petition for annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.
Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The
Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or
intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and, hence, can
only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.
 P a g e | 315

ABLAZA v. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 158298 August 11, 2010

FACTS:
On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cataingan,
Masbate a petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on
December 26, 1949 between his late brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato.
The petitioner alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had been celebrated
without a marriage license, due to such license being issued only on January 9, 1950, thereby
rendering the marriage void ab initio for having been solemnized without a marriage license. He
insisted that his being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had died without any issue
entitled him to one-half of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano before his death, thereby
making him a real party in interest; and that any person, himself included, could impugn the
validity of the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila at any time, even after the death of
Cresenciano, due to the marriage being void ab initio.
ISSUE:
Whether a person may bring an action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage
of his deceased brother
HELD:
Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila was contracted on December
26, 1949, the applicable law was the old Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the marriage as
having the right to initiate the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC had absolutely no application to the petitioner.
Pursuant to the provisions of the old Civil Code, the presence of descendants, ascendants, or
illegitimate children of the deceased excludes collateral relatives like the petitioner from
succeeding to the deceased's estate. Necessarily, therefore, the right of the petitioner to bring the
action hinges upon a prior determination of whether Cresenciano had any descendants,
ascendants, or children (legitimate or illegitimate), and of whether the petitioner was the late
Cresenciano's surviving heir. The petition is returned to the RTC for further proceedings of the
case.
 P a g e | 316

MINORU FUJIKI v. MARINAY

G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013

FACTS:

In January 204, Minoru Fujiki, a Japanese citizen, married Maria Paz Marinay, a Filipino, here in
the Philippines. But in May 2008, Marinay, while her marriage with Fujiki was still subsisting,
married another Japanese citizen (Shinichi Maekara), here in the Philippines. Marinay and
Maekara later went to Japan.

In 2010, Fujiki and Marinay reconciled and decided to resurrect their love affair. Fujiki helped
Marinay obtain a Japanese judgment declaring Marinay’s marriage with Maekara void on the
ground of bigamy. Said decree was granted in the same year. Fujiki and Marinay later went back
home to the Philippines together.

In 2011, Fujiki went to the RTC of Quezon City and filed a petition entitled “Judicial
Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)“. He filed the
petition under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court (Cancellation Or Correction Of Entries In The
Civil Registry). Basically, Fujiki wanted the following to be done:
1. the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized;
2. that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initio
under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines; and
3. for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the
Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and
Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the Administrator and Civil
Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO).

The RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that what Fujiki wanted is to have the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara be declared that under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the “Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages”, a
petition for such may only be filed by the husband or wife or in this case either Maekara or
Marinay only.

ISSUE:

Whether or not it is proper for Minoru Fujiki to be the one to file for a declaration of nullity of
marriage of Marinay and Maekara.

RULING:

A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is not applicable here. What’s applicable is Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court. Fujiki needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more
specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under
Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.
Fujiki may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment through
(1) an official publication or
 P a g e | 317

(2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody of the judgment. If the office
which has custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the certification may be made by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and authenticated
by the seal of office.
 P a g e | 318

MAQUILAN v. MAQUILAN
G.R. No. 155409 June 8, 2007

FACTS:
Herein petitioner and herein private respondent are spouses who once had a blissful married life
and out of which were blessed to have a son. However, their once sugar coated romance turned
bitter when petitioner discovered that private respondent was having illicit sexual affair with her
paramour, which thus, prompted the petitioner to file a case of adultery against private
respondent and the latter’s paramour. Consequently, both the private respondent and her
paramour were convicted of the crime charged and were sentenced to suffer an imprisonment
ranging from one(1) year, eight (8) months, minimum of prision correccional as minimum
penalty, to three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty one (21) days, medium of prision
correccional as maximum penalty.
Thereafter, private respondent, through counsel, filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage, Dissolution and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and Damages on June
15, 2001 with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3 of Nabunturan, Compostela Valley, docketed
as Civil Case No. 656, imputing psychological incapacity on the part of the petitioner.
During the pre-trial of the said case, petitioner and private respondent entered into a Compromise
Agreement. The said Compromise Agreement was given judicial imprimatur by the respondent
judge in the assailed Judgment On Compromise Agreement, which was erroneously dated
January 2, 2002.
ISSUE:
Whether the partial voluntary separation of property made by the spouses pending the petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage is valid.
HELD:
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the civil
registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested
person, with due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice to the
fact of reappearance being judicially determined in case such fact is disputed. Where a
subsequent marriage is terminated because of the reappearance of an absent spouse; while
Article 63 applies to the effects of a decree of legal separation. The present case involves a
proceeding where the nullity of the marriage is sought to be declared under the ground of
psychological capacity.
Article 2035 of the Civil Code is also clearly inapplicable. The Compromise Agreement partially
divided the properties of the conjugal partnership of gains between the parties and does not deal
with the validity of a marriage or legal separation. It is not among those that are expressly
prohibited by Article 2035. Moreover, the contention that the Compromise Agreement is
tantamount to a circumvention of the law prohibiting the guilty spouse from sharing in the
conjugal properties is misplaced. Existing law and jurisprudence do not impose such
disqualification.
 P a g e | 319

Under Article 143 of the Family Code, separation of property may be effected voluntarily or for
sufficient cause, subject to judicial approval. The questioned Compromise Agreement which was
judicially approved is exactly such a separation of property allowed under the law. This
conclusion holds true even if the proceedings for the declaration of nullity of marriage was still
pending. However, the Court must stress that this voluntary separation of property is subject to
the rights of all creditors of the conjugal partnership of gains and other persons with pecuniary
interest pursuant to Article 136 of the Family.
 P a g e | 320

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CUISON-MELGAR

G.R. No. 139676 March 31, 2006

FACTS:
On March 27, 1965, Norma and Eulogio were married before the Catholic Church in Dagupan
City. Their union begot five children. On August 19,1996, Norma filed for declaration of nullity
of her marriage on the ground of Eulogio’s psychological incapacity to comply with his essential
marital obligations. According to Norma the manifestations of Eulogio’s psychological
incapacity are his immaturity, habitual alcoholism, unbearable jealousy, maltreatment, laziness,
and abandonment of his family since December 27, 1985.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the alleged psychological incapacity of respondent is in the nature contemplated
by Article 36.
HELD:
The Supreme Court set aside and reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The marriage
between Norma and Eulogio is valid. The immaturity, habitual alcoholism, laziness, jealousy and
abandonment of respondent do not constitute psychological incapacity. The Court ruled that it is
not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person;
it is essential that he or she must be shown to be incapable of doing so because of some
psychological, not physical, illness. In other words, proof of a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person – an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage – had to be shown. A cause has to be shown and linked with the
manifestations of the psychological incapacity.
 P a g e | 321

MALCAMPO-SIN v. SIN
G.R. No. 137590 March 26, 2001

FACTS:
On January 4, 1987, Florence and respondent Philipp Sin, a Portuguese citizen, were married at
St. Jude Catholic Parish in San Miguel, Manila. On September 20, 1994, Florence filed with the
RTC, Pasig City, a complaint for “declaration of nullity of Marriage” against Philipp. Trial
ensued and the parties presented their respective evidences.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court erred in not ordering a prosecuting attorney or fiscal on behalf of the
State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed.
HELD:
Article 48 of the Family Code states that “in all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to
appear on behalf of the state to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take
care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. The trial court should have ordered the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor-General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification briefly stating
his reasons for his agreement or opposition as the case may be, to the petition. The records are
bereft of an evidence that the State participated in the prosecution of the case thus, the case is
remanded for proper trial.
 P a g e | 322

TUASON v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 116607 April 10, 1996

FACTS:
Maria Victoria Lopez and Emilio Tuason were married on June 3,1972. Lopez alleged that at the
time of the marriage. Emilio was already psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations that became manifested afterwards. The same resulted in violent
fights. Emilio was also said to be using prohibited drugs, he was a womanizer and gave minimal
support to the family. Likewise, he became spendthrift and abusive of his administration of the
conjugal partnership by alienating some of their assets without Victoria’s consent. Attempts for
reconciliation failed because Emilio’s refusal to reform. In the prayer of Victoria for annulment
of marriage, she further prayed for powers of administration to save the conjugal properties from
further dissipation. At variance, Emilio denied the imputation against him. Thereafter, trial
ensued and Victoria presented four witnesses including documentary evidence consisting of
newspaper articles of Emilio’s relationship with other women, his apprehension for illegal
possession of drugs and copies of prior church annulment decree. After Victoria rested her case,
reception for Emilio’s evidence was scheduled. It was postponed and on the reset date, he failed
to appear. The court then declared Emilio to have waived his right to present evidence and
deemed the case submitted for decision.
On June 29, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the nullity of Victoria’s marriage
to Emilio and awarded custody of the children to Ms. Lopez. Emilio filed a petition for relief
from judgment but was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a petition for relief from judgment is warranted under the circumstance of the
case where petitioner was declared in default due to non-appearance during the hearing.
HELD:
Rule 38, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, governs a petition for relief from judgment.
Under the rules, a final and executor judgment or order of the Regional Trial Court may be set
aside on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. In addition, the
petitioner must assert facts showing that he has a good, substantial and meritorious defense or
cause of action. If the petition is granted, the court shall proceed to hear and determine the case
as if a timely motion for new trial had been granted therein. Furthermore, the failure of counsel
to notify his client on time of an adverse judgment to enable the latter to appeal there from is
negligence that is not excusable. Similarly inexcusable is the failure of a counsel to inform the
trial court of his client’s confinement and medical treatment as the reason for his non-appearance
at the scheduled hearings. Indeed, a petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy,
allowed only in exceptional cases where there is no other available or adequate remedy.
 P a g e | 323

MARGIE MACIAS CORPUS v. JUDGE WILFREDO G. OCHOTORENA

A.M. No. RTJ-04-1861 July 30, 2004

FACTS:
Mrs. Macias asserts before the Court that the respondent judge's actuations constitute bias,
partiality and conduct unbecoming a judge. Moreover, according to her, what is more glaring and
conclusive from the records is that the respondent is grossly ignorant of the law and procedure.
For these administrative lapses, Mrs. Macias concludes that the Court should sanction him.
The conclusion is amply supported by the Court of Appeals' Decision which states that the
respondent judge totally disregarded Mrs. Macias' right to due process when he proceeded with
the trial on the merits of the case completely ignoring the fact that her Motion to Dismiss, which
was filed within the 30-day reglementary period, was still pending resolution.
The respondent judge disregarded the provisions of Section 1, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules on
Civil Procedure, which states that: "After the last pleading has been served and filed, it shall be
the duty of the plaintiff to promptly move ex-parte that the case be set for pre-trial." Considering
that the last pleading was Mrs. Macias' Motion to Dismiss, the respondent judge should have first
resolved the motion and then waited for Mr. Macias' motion to set the case for pre-trial.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Wilfredo G. Ochotorena is found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and
incompetence.
HELD:
Under Section 3 in relation to Section 10 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, gross ignorance of
the law is considered a serious offense, for which a penalty of either dismissal from the service
with forfeiture of benefits, suspension from office for more than three (3) months but not
exceeding six months or a fine of more than Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) but not
exceeding Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) may be imposed. With this, Judge Wilfredo G.
Ochotorena is found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and incompetence and is hereby
FINED the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) to be taken from the amount earlier
withheld from his retirement benefits. The Fiscal Management Office of the OCA is DIRECTED
to immediately release to the respondent judge the remaining balance of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00) from the aforesaid retained amount, unless there are other valid reasons for its
further retention.
 P a g e | 324

PACETE v. CARRIAGA
G.R. No. L-53880 March 17, 1994

FACTS:
Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint on October 1979, for the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
between her erstwhile husband Enrico Pacete and one Clarita de la Concepcion, as well as for
legal separation between her and Pacete, accounting and separation of property. She averred in
her complaint that she was married to Pacete on April 1938 and they had a child named
Consuelo; that Pacete subsequently contracted a second marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion
and that she learned of such marriage only on August 1979. Reconciliation between her and
Pacete was impossible since he evidently preferred to continue living with Clarita.
The defendants were each served with summons. They filed an extension within which to file an
answer, which the court partly granted. Due to unwanted misunderstanding, particularly in
communication, the defendants failed to file an answer on the date set by the court. Thereafter,
the plaintiff filed a motion to declare the defendants in default, which the court forthwith
granted. The court received plaintiffs’ evidence during the hearings held on February 15, 20, 21,
and 22, 1980. After trial, the court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff on March 17,
1980.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion for
extension of time to file their answer, in declaring petitioners in default and in rendering its
decision.
HELD:
The Civil Code provides that “no decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a
stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the
court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between parties
exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to
take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.”
The above stated provision calling for the intervention of the state attorneys in case of
uncontested proceedings for legal separation (and of annulment of marriages, under Article 88) is
to emphasize that marriage is more than a mere contract. Article 103 of the Civil Code, now
Article 58 of the Family Code, further mandates that an action for legal separation must “in no
case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition,” obviously in
order to provide the parties a “cooling- off” period. In this interim, the court should take steps
toward getting the parties to reconcile.
The significance of the above substantive provisions of the law is further or underscored by the
inclusion of a provision in Rule 18 of the Rules of Court which provides that no defaults in
actions for annulments of marriage or for legal separation. Therefore, “if the defendant in an
action for annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the
prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not collusion between the parties exists, and if
 P a g e | 325

there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is
not fabricated.
SEVILLA CASTRO v. CASTRO
G.R. No. 140484 January 28, 2008

FACTS:

Lamberto filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of his marriage to Isabelita due to
psychological Incapacity. The sheriff’s return of the service of summons showed that it was
received by Isabelita’s nephew, but the petitioner did not file and answer, hence the trial court
allowed Lamberto to present his evidence ex-parte. Thereupon, Lamberto presented his evidence,
and on August 19, 1998, the RTC rendered judgment declaring Isabelita psychologically
incapacitated and annulling her marriage to Lamberto. Isabelita, however, moved to set aside to
declare the judgement null and void, contending that no valid service of summons was made
upon her as no nephew resided with her. She also alleged that the allegations in the petition were
false, and only intended to free Lamberto to marry his concubine. Lamberto opposed the motion.
The RTC partially granted the petition by allowing Isabelita to present his contrary evidence. On
the first setting, her counsel moved for resetting which the court allowed. However, she again
moved for postponement, to the vehement objection of Lamberto’s counsel. Thus the trial court
issued its order affirming the Decision in earlier rendered. Isabelita moved for reconsideration
upon receipt of the order, which the trial court denied. The trial court affirmed its earlier
decision, and entry of judgment made on October 29, 1999.

Isabelita filed her petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court, averring that no valid
service of summons was made upon her. She also assailed the finding of psychological
incapacity as devoid of merit; as well as the fact that the trial court did not set the case for pre-
trial and allowed Lamberto to present evidence ex parte.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC erred in devlaring Isabelita’s marriage to Lamberto void on the ground
of psychological incapacity.

HELD:

The petition fails. This Court finds no reason to set aside the findings of the trial court. The
records show that petitioner was personally informed of the petition for annulment, and as stated
by the trial court, petitioner received the summons and the petition on July 15, 1998. She
“acknowledged receipt thereof by affixing her signature on the original copy of said summons
dated July 13, 1998.” Petition neither denied nor refuted this.

Petitioner’s claim that she was never informed of the proceedings in unbelievable because she
even submitted herself to a series of psychological examination performed by public
respondent’s expert witness, Regine Marmee C. Cosico, a clinical psychologist.
 P a g e | 326

Petitioner was afforded due process and the trial court acquired jurisdiction over her person.
Even assuming that petitioner did not receive the summons, she was deemed to have submitted
herself to the jurisdiction of the trial court when she filed a motion to set aside or declare
judgment null and void. After the trial court granted her motion and she was given the
opportunity to present contrary evidence, she and her counsel failed to appear on the scheduled
hearings for this purpose. Finally, the trial court’s decision had already become final and
executory, and judgment was entered on October 29, 1000. For this reason and on account of
private respondent’s death on January 14, 2004, the judgement binding on both parties.
 P a g e | 327

VALDES v. RTC
G.R. No. 122749 July 31, 1996

FACTS:

Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971 and begotten 5 children.  Valdez
filed a petition in 1992 for a declaration of nullity of their marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the
Family Code, which was granted hence, marriage is null and void on the ground of their mutual
psychological incapacity.  Stella and Joaquin are placed under the custody of their mother while
the other 3 siblings are free to choose which they prefer.

Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the procedure for the
liquidation of common property in “unions without marriage”.  During the hearing on the
motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing desire to stay with their father. 

ISSUE: 

Whether or not the property regime should be based on co-ownership.

HELD:

The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property
relations of the parties are governed by the rules on co-ownership.  Any property acquired during
the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts.  A party who
did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed
thereto jointly if said party’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family. 
 P a g e | 328

DINO v. DINO
G.R. No. 178044 January 19, 2011

FACTS:

January 1998 petitioner and respondent got married. On May 2001, petitioner filed an action for
Declaration of Niullity of Marriagw against respondent citing psychological incapacity under
article 36. Petitioner alleged that respondent failed in her marital obligation to give love and
support to him, and had abandoned her responsibility to the family, choosing instead to go on
shopping sprees and gallivanting with her friends that depleted the family assets. Petitioner
further alleged that respondent was not faithful, and would at times become violent and hurt him.
The trial court declared their marriage void ab initio.

The court ruled that A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall only be
issued upon compliance with Article[s] 50 and 51 of the Family Code. It later altered it to” A
DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall be issued after liquidation,
partition and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code”

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage
shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties under
Article 147 of the Family Code

HELD:

The court erred. The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City that in a void
marriage, regardless of its cause, the property relations of the parties during the period of
cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.7 Article 147 of
the Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any
impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void, such as petitioner and
respondent in the case before the Court.

For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present:

1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;
2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void

All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article 147 of the Family
Code applies to the property relations between petitioner and respondent.
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to
marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and
45 of the Family Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages
 P a g e | 329

which are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared
void without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties.
Since the property relations of the parties in art 40 and 45 are governed by absolute community
of property or conjugal partnership of gains, there is a need to liquidate, partition and distribute
the properties before a decree of annulment could be issued. That is not the case for annulment of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code because the marriage is governed by the ordinary
rules on co-ownership.

In this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 3615 of the
Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties
owned in common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes, the
Court ruled that the property relations of parties in a void marriage during the period of
cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. The rules on
co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses should be liquidated in accordance with the
Civil Code provisions on co-ownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code, “[p]artition may be
made by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings. x x x.” It is not necessary to
liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of
marriage.
 P a g e | 330

ANAYA v. PALAROAN
G.R. No. L-27930 November 26, 1970

FACTS: 

On 7 January 1954, after one month of marriage to Aurora Anaya, Fernando Palaroan filed a
complaint to annul it on the ground that his consent was obtained through force and intimidation.
The court dismissed the complaint and granted Aurora's counterclaim. While the amount of the
counterclaim was being negotiated, Fernando allegedly divulged that several months prior to the
marriage, he had pre-marital relationships with a close relative of his. Anaya filed suit to annul
the marriage and to recover moral damages. 

Fernando denied having had pre-marital relationship with a close relative and having committed
any fraud against Aurora. He did not pray for the dismissal of the complaint but for its dismissal
"with respect to the alleged moral damages." Aurora replied stating that Fernando had no
intention of performing his marital duties and obligations since the marriage was contracted as a
means for him to escape marrying the close relative that was intimated above. The trial court
dismissed the complaint, holding that Aurora's allegation of the fraud was legally insufficient to
invalidate her marriage. Aurora appealed.

ISSUE:  

Whether or not the non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital relationship with
another woman a ground for annulment of marriage?

HELD: 

Non-disclosure of a husband's pre-marital relationship with another woman is not one of the
enumerated circumstances that would constitute a ground for annulment; and it is further
excluded by the last paragraph of the article, providing that "no other misrepresentation or deceit
as to ... chastity" shall give ground for an action to annul a marriage. While a woman may detest
such non-disclosure of premarital lewdness or feel having been thereby cheated into giving her
consent to the marriage, nevertheless the law does not assuage her grief after her consent was
solemnly given, for upon marriage she entered into an institution in which society, and not
herself alone, is interested. The lawmaker's intent being plain, the Court's duty is to give effect to
the same, whether it agrees with the rule or not. 
 P a g e | 331

BUCCAT v. BUCCAT DE MANGONON
GR No. 47101 April 25, 1941

FACTS:

It was established before the trial court that the Plaintiff met the defendant in March 1938. After
several interviews, both were committed on September 19 of that year. On
November 26 the same year, the plaintiff married the defendant in a Catholic Cathedral in
Baguio. They, then, cohabited for about eighty-nine days. Defendant gave birth to a child of nine
months on February 23, 1939. Following this event, Plaintiff and Defendant separated. On
March 20, 1939 the plaintiff filed an action for annulment of marriage before the CFI of Baguio
City. The plaintiff claimed that he consented to the marriage because the defendant assured him
that she was virgin. The trial court dismissed the complaint. 

Hence, this appeal. Godofredo Buccat (Plaintiff) and Luida Mangonon (Defendant) got married
on November 26, 1938. Luida gave birth after 89 days and on March 20, 1939 Godofredo
filedfor annulment of marriage before the CFI because he was led to believe by Luida that
shewas a virgin. The trial court dismissed the complaint, so Godofredo appealed.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not there was fraud in obtaining the consent of Plaintiff to the marriage?

HELD: 

There is no fraud because: The Supreme Court states that: “We see no reason to overturn

the ruling appealed.” It is unlikely that the plaintiff, Godofredo, had not suspected that the
defendant, Luida, was pregnant. (As she gave birth less than 3 months after they got married, she
must have looked very pregnant even before they were married.) Since Godofredo must have
known that she was not a virgin, the marriage cannot be annulled. The Sacred Marriage is an
institution: it is the foundation on which society rests. To cancel it, reliable evidence is
necessary.
 P a g e | 332

ALMELOR v. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT

G.R. No. 179620 August 26, 2008

FACTS:

Manuel married Leonida in 1989. They are both medical practitioners. They begot 3 children. 11
years later, Leonida sought to annul her marriage with Manuel claiming that Manuel is
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations. Leonida testified that
Manuel is a harsh  disciplinarian and that his policy towards their children are often
unconventional and was the cause of their frequent fight. Manuel has an unreasonable way of
imposing discipline towards their children but is remarkably so gentle towards his mom. He is
more affectionate towards his mom and this is a factor which is unreasonable for Leonida.

Further, Leonida also testified that Manuel is a homosexual as evidenced by his unusual
closeness to his male companions and that he concealed his homosexuality from Leonida prior to
their marriage. She once caught Manuel talking to a man affectionately over the phone and she
confirmed all her fear when she saw Manuel kiss a man. The RTC ruled that their marriage is
null and void not because of PI but rather due to fraud by reason of Manuel’s concealment of his
homosexuality (Art 45 of the FC). The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not the marriage between the two can be declared as null and void due to fraud by
reason of Manuel’s concealment of his homosexuality.

HELD: 

The Supreme Court emphasized that homosexuality per se is not a ground to nullify a marriage.
It is the concealment of homosexuality that would. In the case at bar however, it is not proven
that Manuel is a homosexual. The lower court should not have taken the public’s perception
against Manuel’s sexuality. His peculiarities must not be ruled by the lower court as an
indication of his homosexuality for those are not conclusive and are not sufficient enough to
prove so. Even granting that Manuel is indeed a homosexual, there was nothing in the complaint
or anywhere in the case was it alleged and proven that Manuel hid such sexuality from Leonida
and that Leonida’s consent had been vitiated by such.
 P a g e | 333

VILLANUEVA v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 132955 October 27, 2006

FACTS:

In April 1988, Orlando Villanueva married Lilia Canalita- Villanueva before a trial court judge
in Puerto Princesa. In November 1992, Orlando filed before the trial court a petition for
annulment of his marriage. He claimed that threats of violence and duress forced him to marry
Lilia who was then pregnant. Orlando anchored his prayer for the annulment of his marriage on
the ground that he did not freely consent to be married to Lilia.

He cited several incidents that created on his mind a reasonable and well-grounded fear of an
imminent and grave danger to his life and safety, to wit: the harassing phone calls from Lilia and
strangers as well as the unwanted visits by three men at the premises of the University of the East
after his classes thereat, and the threatening presence of a certain Ka Celso, a supposed member
of the New People’s Army whom appellant claimed to have been hired by Lilia and who
accompanied him in going to her home province of Palawan to marry her. On the other hand
Lilia denied Orlando’s allegations and she said that Orlando freely cohabited with her after the
marriage and she showed 14 letters that shows Orlando’s affection and care towards her.

ISSUE:

Whether the subject marriage may be annulled on the ground of vitiated consent under Article 45
of the Family Code; and

HELD:

The court ruled that vitiation of consent is not attendant in this case. Therefore, the petition for
annulment, which is anchored to his allegation that he did not freely give his consent, should be
dismissed.

The SC ruled that Orlando’s allegation of fraud and intimidation is untenable. On its face, it is
obvious that Orlando is only seeking to annul his marriage with Lilia so as to have the pending
appealed bigamy case [filed against him by Lilia] to be dismissed.

On the merits of the case, Orlando’s allegation of fear was not concretely established. The Court
is not convinced that appellant’s apprehension of danger to his person is so overwhelming as to
deprive him of the will to enter voluntarily to a contract of marriage. It is not disputed that at the
time he was allegedly being harassed, appellant worked as a security guard in a bank. Given his
employment at that time, it is reasonable to assume that appellant knew the rudiments of self-
defense, or, at the very least, the proper way to keep himself out of harm’s way.
 P a g e | 334

For sure, it is even doubtful if threats were indeed made to bear upon appellant, what with the
fact that he never sought the assistance of the security personnel of his school nor the police
regarding the activities of those who were threatening him. And neither did he inform the judge
about his predicament prior to solemnizing their marriage. Fraud cannot be raised as a ground as
well. His allegation that he never had an erection during their sexual intercourse is incredible and
is an outright lie. His counsel also conceded before the lower court that his client had a sexual
relationship with Lilia. Thus, the petition for annulment was granted, but the award of moral and
exemplary damages is deleted for lack of basis.
 P a g e | 335

MACARRUBO v. MACARRUBO
ADM. CASE NO. 6148 January 22, 2013

FACTS:

For resolution is the Petition (For Extraordinary Mercy) filed by respondent Edmundo L.
Macarrubo who seeks to be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys.

The Court disbarred him for having contracted a bigamous marriage with the complainant and a
third marriage with another while his first marriage was still subsisting, which acts constituted
gross immoral conduct in violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Edmundo Macarrubo should be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys

HELD:

Respondent had sufficiently shown his remorse and acknowledged his indiscretion in the legal
profession and in his personal life. He had asked forgiveness from his children by complainant
and maintained a cordial relationship with them as shown by the herein attached pictures.
Records also showed that after his disbarment, respondent returned to his hometown and devoted
his time tending an orchard and taking care of his ailing mother until her death. He was
appointed as Private Secretary to the Mayor and thereafter, assumed the position of Local
Assessment Operations Officer II/ Office-In-Charge in the Assessor’s Office, which office he
continues to serve to date. Moreover, he became a part-time instructor in a University.
Respondent likewise took an active part in socio-civic activities by helping his neighbors and
friends who are in dire need.

Furthermore, respondent’s plea for reinstatement was duly supported by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, Cagayan Chapter and by his former and present colleagues. His parish priest
certified that he is faithful to and puts to actual practice the doctrines of the Catholic Church. He
was also observed to be a regular churchgoer. Records further revealed that respondent had
already settled his previous marital squabbles, as in fact, no opposition to the instant suit was
tendered by complainant. He sends regular support to his children in compliance with the Court’s
directive.

While the Court is ever mindful of its duty to discipline and even remove its errant officers,
concomitant to it is its duty to show compassion to those who have reformed their ways, as in
this case.

After 8 years, he was reinstated to the practice of law.

 P a g e | 336

ALCAZAR v. ALCAZAR
G.R. No. 174451 October 13, 2009

FACTS:

In August 2000, Rey Alcazar and Veronica Cabacungan married each other. They lived together
for three weeks thereafter, Rey went to Saudi Arabia to work. In Saudi, Rey never communicated
with Veronica despite Veronica’s efforts to reach him. In March 2002, Rey returned to the
Philippines but instead of going home to Veronica, he went straight to his parents. He did not
even tell Veronica that he was coming home. Veronica had to learn of his husband’s return from
someone else. Veronica went to Rey’s parents but Rey cannot be found there (hiding).
In August 2002, Veronica filed an annulment case against Rey. Initially, the ground for
annulment was based on paragraph 5, Article 45 of the Family Code or Rey’s failure to
consummate the marriage. But later, the ground was changed to psychological incapacity
(Article 36).

During trial, Veronica presented Dr. Nedy Tayag as expert witness who testified that Rey is
suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder (NPD). Rey was found by Tayag to be having a
grandiose sense of self. He thinks he is too important, too unique, and too special.

Also alleged in the complaint for annulment was Rey’s alleged sexual infidelity because when he
came home from abroad, it was said that he lived with a certain “Sally” in his parent’s
hometown.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the marriage between Veronica and Rey should be annulled.

HELD:

No. First, the Supreme Court noted that it is correct that Veronica abandoned her cause under
paragraph 5, Article 45. The said provision states:

ART. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the
marriage: x x x x (5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage
with the other, and such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; x x x.
Article 45(5) of the Family Code refers to lack of power to copulate. Incapacity to consummate
denotes the permanent inability on the part of the spouses to perform the complete act of sexual
intercourse. Non-consummation of a marriage may be on the part of the husband or of the wife
and may be caused by a physical or structural defect in the anatomy of one of the parties or it
may be due to chronic illness and inhibitions or fears arising in whole or in part from
psychophysical conditions. It may be caused by psychogenic causes, where such mental block or
disturbance has the result of making the spouse physically incapable of performing the marriage
 P a g e | 337

act. No evidence was presented in the case at bar to establish that Rey was in any way physically
incapable to consummate his marriage with Veronica. In fact, Veronica admitted that she and
Rey had sex before and after the wedding. Thus, incapacity to consummate does not exist int his
case.

Second, psychological incapacity was not proven. Tayag’s testimony on Rey’s NPD was not
sufficient to establish psychological incapacity. The case between Veronica and Rey is merely a
simple case of a married couple being apart too long, becoming strangers to each other, with the
husband falling out of love and distancing or detaching himself as much as possible from his
wife. To be tired and give up on one’s situation and on one’s spouse are not necessarily signs of
psychological illness; neither can falling out of love be so labeled.

Lastly, the allegation of sexual infidelity on the part of Rey is a poor attempt to bolster the claim
against Rey. Sexual infidelity per se is not psychological incapacity. Veronica failed to establish
that Rey’s unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered personality, which makes him
completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state.
 P a g e | 338

JIMENEZ v. CANIZARES
G.R. No. L-12790 August 31, 1960

FACTS:

Joel and Remedios are husband and wife. Joel later filed for annulment on grounds that
Remedios is impotent because her genitals were too small for copulation and such was already
existing at the time of the marriage. Remedios was summoned to answer the complaint of Joel
but she refused to do so. It was found that there was no collusion between the parties
notwithstanding the non-cooperation of Remedios in the case. Remedios was ordered to have
herself be submitted to an expert to determine if her genitals are indeed too small for copulation.
Remedios again refused to do as ordered. The trial was heard solely on Joel’s complaint. The
marriage was later annulled.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Remedios’ impotency has been established.

HELD:

In the case at bar, the annulment of the marriage in question was decreed upon the sole testimony
of Joel who was expected to give testimony tending or aiming at securing the annulment of his
marriage he sought and seeks. Whether Remedios is really impotent cannot be deemed to have
been satisfactorily established, because from the commencement of the proceedings until the
entry of the decree she had abstained from taking part therein. Although her refusal to be
examined or failure to appear in court show indifference on her part, yet from such attitude the
presumption arising out of the suppression of evidence could not arise or be inferred, because
women of this country are by nature coy, bashful and shy and would not submit to a physical
examination unless compelled to by competent authority. Impotency being an abnormal
condition should not be presumed. The presumption is in favor of potency. The lone testimony of
Joel that his wife is physically incapable of sexual intercourse is insufficient to tear asunder the
ties that have bound them together as husband and wife.
 P a g e | 339

ONG ENG KIAM v. ONG

G.R. No. 153206 October 23, 2006

FACTS:

William Ong and Lucita Ong have been married for more than 20 years when Lucita filed a
complaint for Legal separation under Article 55 par. (1) of the Family Code. Lucita alleged that
since their third year of marriage, her husband William subjected her to physical violence like
slapping, kicking and pulling her hair  and bang her head against the
concrete wall.and been violent towards their three children. He would scold them using his belt
buckle to beat them.

One day after a violent quarrel wherein William hit Lucita on several different parts of her body,
pointed a gun at her and asked her to leave the house which she did. Lucita’s statements about
William’s abusive behavior were corroborated by her sister Linda Lim. Dr. Vicente Elinzan
whom Lucita consulted the day after she left her conjugal home also testified about her injuries.

The trial court granted  Lucitas petition for legal separation which the  Court of
Appeals affirmed. William then filed this petition for review on certiorari on the decision
denying all of Lucita’s allegations and that he never inflicted physical harm on her or their
children. He also argued that the real motive of Lucita and her family in filing the complaint is to
deprive him of his control and ownership over his conjugal properties with Lucita. That the CA
overlooked some facts of the case which warrant an exception to the general rule that questions
of fact cannot be the subject for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The CA erred in
relying on the testimonies of Lucita her sister and their parents’ doctor Dr. ElinZano since their
testimonies are tainted with relationship and fraud  and since Lucita abandoned the family home
she has also given a ground for legal separation and therefore should NOT- be granted one
pursuant to Art. 56  par. 4 of The family code – Where both parties have given ground for legal
separation

ISSUE:  

Whether or not Lucita Ong should be granted a decree on legal separation

HELD:

The claim that the real motive of Lucita in filing the case is for her family to take control of the
conjugal properties is absurd. Lucita left because of her husband’s repeated physical violence
and grossly abusive conduct. That the physical violence and grossly abusive conduct were
brought to bear upon Lucita have been duly established. He can derive no personal gain from
pushing for the financial interests of her family at the expense of her marriage of 20 years and
the companionship of her husband and children. The assessment of the trial court regarding the
credibility of witnesses is given great respect. Relationship alone is not enough to discredit and
 P a g e | 340

label a witness’  testimony as biased and unworthy of credence. Witnesses Linda Lim and Dr.
Elinzano gave detailed and straightforward testimonies  the court finds that their testimonies are
not tainted with bias.

The abandonment referred to by the Family Code is abandonment without justifiable cause
for more than one year. Lucita left William due to his abusive conduct, such does not constitute
abandonment contemplated in the said provision
 P a g e | 341

GAUDIONCO v. PENARANDA
GR No. 72984 November 27, 1987

FACTS:

Private respondent, Teresita Gandionco, filed a complaint against herein petitioner, Froilan
Gandionco for legal separation on the ground of concubinage as a civil case.  Teresita also filed a
criminal complaint of concubinage against her husband.  She likewise filed an application for the
provisional remedy of support pendent elite which was approved and ordered by the respondent
judge.  Petitioner moved to suspend the action for legal separation and the incidents consequent
thereto such as the support for pendent elite, in view of the criminal case for concubinage filed
against him.  He contends that the civil action for legal separation is inextricably tied with the
criminal action thus, all proceedings related to legal separation will have to be suspended and
await the conviction or acquittal of the criminal case.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not a civil case for legal separation can proceed pending the resolution of the
criminal case for concubinage.

HELD:

Supreme Court ruled that the contentions of the petitioner were incorrect.  A civil action for legal
separation on the ground of concubinage may proceed ahead of, or simultaneously with, a
criminal action for concubinage, because said civil action is not one to enforce the civil liability
arising from the offense, even if both the civil and criminal actions arise from or are related to
the same offense.  Such civil action is one intended to obtain the right to live separately, with the
legal consequences thereof including the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains, custody
of the children, support and disqualifications from inheriting from the innocent spouse.  Decree
of legal separation may be issued upon proof by preponderance of evidence, where no criminal
proceeding or conviction is necessary.

Furthermore, the support pendente lite, as a remedy, can be availed of in an action for legal
separation, and granted at the discretion of the judge.   If in case, the petitioner finds the amount
of support pendente lite ordered as too onerous, he can always file a motion to modify or reduce
the same.
 P a g e | 342

PARTOSA-JO v. CA
G.R. No. 82606 December 18, 1992

FACTS:

The petitioner, Prima Partosa-Jo, is the legal wife of Jose Jo, herein private respondent.  The
latter admitted to have cohabited with 3 women and fathered 15 children.  Prima filed a
complaint against the husband for judicial separation of conjugal property in addition to an
earlier action for support which was consolidated.  RTC decision was a definite disposition of the
complaint for support but none of that for the judicial separation of conjugal property.  Jose
elevated the decision to CA which affirmed rulings of the trial court.  The complaint on the
separation of property was dismissed for lack of cause of action on the ground that separation by
agreement was not covered in Art. 178 of the Civil Code.  Prima contested that the agreement
between her and Jose was for her to temporarily live with her parents during the initial period of
her pregnancy and for him to visit and support her.  They never agreed to be separated
permanently.  She even returned to him but the latter refused to accept her. 

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is abandonment on the part of Jose Jo to warrant judicial separation of
conjugal property.

HELD:

The Supreme Court is in the position that respondent court should have made the necessary
modification instead of dismissing the filed case.  For abandonment to exist, there must be an
absolute cessation of marital relations, duties and rights, with the intention of perpetual
separation.  The fact that Jo did not accept her demonstrates that he had no intention of resuming
their conjugal relationship.  From 1968 until 1988, Jose refused to provide financial support to
Prima.  Hence, the physical separation of the parties, coupled with the refusal by the private
respondent to give support to the petitioner, sufficed to constitute abandonment as a ground for
the judicial separation of their conjugal property.

Wherefore, the petition was granted and in favor of the petitioner and that the court ordered the
conjugal property of the spouses be divided between them, share and share alike.  The division
will be implemented after the determination of all the properties pertaining to the said conjugal
partnership including those that may have been illegally registered in the name of the persons. 
 P a g e | 343

ARROYO v. COURT OF APPEALS 

G.R. No. 96602 November 19, 1991 

FACTS:

A criminal complaint for adultery was filed by Dr. Neri (husband) against Ruby (wife) and
Arroyo (petitioner). After trial, the Regional Trial Court convicted the petitioner and the wife,
based, among others on the wife's admission to her husband that she sex with petitioner Arroyo.
This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The wife later filed a motion for
reconsideration or new trial contending that a pardon had been extended by her husband. The
husband filed a manifestation praying for the dismissal of the case as he had "tacitly consented"
to his wife's infidelity. 

ISSUES:

1. Whether the admission of adulterous conduct by the wife to her husband without the
presence of her counsel is admissible in evidence. 

2. Whether the husband is a competent witness against his wife

HELD: 

1. YES. The husband's testimony relating to the admission of adulterous conduct made by
the wife to her husband is admissible in evidence. The husband was neither a peace officer nor
an investigating officer conducting a custodial investigation. Neither was said testimony
rendered inadmissible by the constitutional provision on the right to remain silent and the right to
counsel of a "person under investigation for the commission of an offense."

The right to counsel attaches only upon the start of an investigation, i.e., when the investigating
officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confession or admissions from
respondent-accused. 

2. Yes. The husband is not precluded under the Rules of Court from testifying against his
wife in criminal cases for a crime committed by one against the other (Section 22, Rule 129,
Revised Rules of Court). In short, the trial court and the Court of Appeals did not err in admitting
Dr. Neri's testimony as he was a competent witness.
 P a g e | 344

BUGAYONG v. GINEZ
G.R. No. L-10033 December 28, 1956

FACTS: 

Benjamin Bugayong, serviceman in the US Navy was married to defendant Leonila Ginez in
Pangasinan, while on furlough leave. After marriage, the couples live with the sisters of the
husband, before the latter left to report back to duty, the couple came to an agreement that
Leonila would stay with Benjamin’s sisters. 

Leonila left the dwelling of her sisters-in-law which she informed her husband by letter that she
had gone to reside with her mother in Pangasinan. Early in July 1951, Benjamin receive letters
from his sister Valeriana Polangco that her wife informing him of alleged acts of infidelity.
Benjamin went to Pangasinan and sought for his wife whom he met in the house of Leonila’s
godmother. They lived again as husband and wife and stayed in the house of Pedro Bugayong,
cousin of the plaintiff-husband. On the second day, he tried to verify from his wife the truth of
the information he received but instead of answering, Leonila packed up and left him which
Benjamin concluded as a confirmation of the acts of infidelity. After he tried to locate her and
upon failing he went to Ilocos Norte. Benjamin filed in CIF of Pangasinan a complaint for legal
separation against Leonila, who timely filed an answer vehemently denying the averments of the
complaint. 

ISSUE: 

Whether or not the acts charged in line with the truth of allegations of the commission of acts of
infidelity amounting to adultery have been condoned by the plaintiff-husband. 

HELD:

Granting that infidelities amounting to adultery were commited by the wife, the act of the
husband in persuading her to come along with him and the fact that she went with him and
together they slept as husband and wife deprives him as the alleged offended spouse of any
action for legal separation against the offending wife because his said conduct comes within the
restriction of Article 100 of Civil Code.
 P a g e | 345

PEOPLE v. ZAPATA
G.R. No. L-3047 May 16, 1951

FACTS:

In the Court of First Instance of Pampanga a complaint for adultery was filed by Andres Bondoc
against Guadalupe Zapata, his wife, and Dalmacio Bondoc, her paramour, for cohabiting and
having repeated sexual intercourse during the period from the year 1946 14 March 1947, the date
of the filing of the complaint, Dalmacio Bondoc knowing his codefendant to be a married
woman. The defendant wife entered the plea of guilty and was sentenced to suffer four months
of arresto mayor which penalty she served. In the same court, on 17 September 1948, the
offended husband filed another complaint for adulterous acts committed by his wife and her
paramour from 15 March 1947 to 17 September 1948, the date of the filing of the second
complaint. On 21 February 1949, each of the defendants filed a motion to quash the complaint of
the ground that they would be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. The trial
court upheld the contention of the defendants and quashed the second complaint. From the other
sustaining the motions to quash the prosecution has appealed.

The trial court held that the adulterous acts charged in the first and second complains must be
deemed one continuous offense, the defendants in both complaints being the same and identical
persons and the two sets of unlawful acts having taken place continuously during the years 1946,
1947 and part of 1948, and that the acts or two sets of acts that gave rise to the crimes of adultery
complained of in both cases constitute one and the same offense, within the scope and meaning
of the constitutional provision that "No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for
the same offense.".

ISSUE:

Whether or not the defendants’ cohabitation should be deemed as one continuous offense.

HELD:

Adultery is a crime of result and not of tendency, as the Supreme Court of Spain has held (S. 10
December 1945); it is a instantaneous crime which is consummated and exhausted or completed
at the moment of the carnal union. Each sexual intercourse constitutes a crime of adultery
(Cuello Calon, Derecho Penal, Vol. II, p. 569). True, two or more adulterous acts committed by
the same defendants are against the same person — the offended husband, the same status — the
union of the husband and wife by their marriage, and the same community represented by the
State for its interest in maintaining and preserving such status. But this identity of the offended
party, status society does not argue against the commission of the crime of adultery as many
times as there were carnal consummated, for as long as the status remain unchanged, the nexus
undissolved and unbroken, an encroachment or trespass upon that status constitutes a crime.

There is no constitutional or legal provision which bars the filing of as many complaints for
adultery as there were adulterous acts committed, each constituting one crime.
 P a g e | 346

In the instant case the last unity does not exist, because as already stated the culprits perpetrate
the crime in every sexual intercourse and they need not to another or other adulterous acts to
consummate it. After the last acts of adultery had been committed as charged in the first
complaint, the defendants again committed adulterous acts not included in the first complaint and
for which the second complaint was filed. It was held by the Supreme Court of Spain that
another crime of adultery was committed, if the defendants, after their provincional release
during the pendency of the case in which they were sent to prison to serve the penalty imposed
upon them(S. 28 February 1906; 76 Jur. Crim. pp. 208-210).

The order appealed from, which quashed the second complaint for adultery, is hereby reversed
and set aside, and trial court directed to proceed with the trial of the defendants in accordance
with law, with costs against the appellees.
 P a g e | 347

DE OCAMPO v. FLORENCIANO
G.R. No. L-13553 February 23, 1960

FACTS:

Jose de Ocampo and Serafina Florenciano were married in 1938.  They begot several children
who are not living with plaintiff.  In March 1951, latter discovered on several occasions that his
wife was betraying his trust by maintaining illicit relations with Jose Arcalas.  Having found out,
he sent the wife to Manila in June 1951 to study beauty culture where she stayed for one year.  
Again plaintiff discovered that the wife was going out with several other man other than
Arcalas.  In 1952, when the wife finished her studies, she left plaintiff and since then they had
lived separately.  In June 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of having illicit relations
with Nelson Orzame.  He signified his intention of filing a petition for legal separation to which
defendant manifested conformity provided she is not charged with adultery in a criminal action. 
Accordingly, Ocampo filed a petition for legal separation in 1955.

ISSUE:

Whether the confession made by Florenciano constitutes the confession of judgment disallowed
by the Family Code.

HELD:

Florenciano’s admission to the investigating fiscal that she committed adultery, in the existence
of evidence of adultery other than such confession, is not the confession of judgment disallowed
by Article 48 of the Family Code.  What is prohibited is a confession of judgment, a confession
done in court or through a pleading.  Where there is evidence of the adultery independent of the
defendant’s statement agreeing to the legal separation, the decree of separation should be granted
since it would not be based on the confession but upon the evidence presented by the plaintiff. 
What the law prohibits is a judgment based exclusively on defendant’s confession.  The petition
should be granted based on the second adultery, which has not yet prescribed.
 P a g e | 348

MATUBIS v. PRAXEDES
G.R. No. L-11766 October 25, 1960

FACTS:

Plaintiff and defendant were legally married in 1943 at Iriga, Camarines Sur. For failure to agree
on how they should live as husband and wife, the couple agreed to live separately from each
other, which status remained unchanged until the present. In 1948, plaintiff and defendant
entered into an agreement, stating the following: (a) that both of us relinquish our right over the
other as legal husband and wife; ( b) That both without any interference by any of us, nor either
of us can prosecute the other for adultery or concubinage or any other crime or suit arising from
the separation.

In January, 1955, defendant began cohabiting with one Asuncion Rebulado who gave birth to a
child, who was recorded as the child of said defendant. It was shown also that defendant and
Asuncion deported themselves as husband and wife and were generally reputed as such in the
community. Alleging abandonment and concubinage, plaintiff Socorro Matubis filed with the
CFI of Camarines Sur a complaint for legal separation and changed of surname against her
husband defendant Zoilo Praxedes.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is standing on the legal separation case filed by petitioners.

HELD:
Article 102 of the new Civil Code provides that "an action for legal separation cannot filed
except within one year from and after the date on which the plaintiff became cognizant of the
cause and within five years from after the date when cause occurred." The complaint was filed
outside the periods provided for by the above Article. By the very admission of plaintiff, she
came to know the ground (concubinage) for the legal separation in January, 1955. She instituted
the complaint only on April 24, 1956. It is to be noted that appellant did not even press this
matter in her brief.

Article 100 of the new Civil Code provides that the legal separation may be claimed only by the
Innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or
concubinage.

The agreement between the spouses is divided in two parts. The first part having to do with the
act of living separately which he claims to be legal, and the second part —that which becomes a
license to commit the ground for legal separation which is admittedly illegal. The condonation
and consent here are not only implied but expressed. Having condoned and/or consented in
writing, the plaintiff now undeserving of the court's sympathy.
 P a g e | 349

PEOPLE v. SCHNECKENBURGER
G.R. No. 48183 November 10, 1941

FACTS:

Accused Rodolfo married the complainant Elena Ramirez Cartagena. After 7 years (due to
incompatibility of characters) they agreed to live separately from each other. Accused without
leaving the Philippines secured a divorce decree from civil court of Juarez, Bravos District of
Chihuahua Mexico. He contracted another marriage with co-accused Julia Medel before the
justice of the peace of Malabon. Because of the nullity of the divorce decree, complainant herein
instituted two actions against the accused, one for bigamy and another for concubinage. Charge
for bigamy culminated in the conviction of accused. Meanwhile, before the trial for the charge of
concubinage commenced, accused interposed the plea of double jeopardy and the case was
initially dismissed; upon appeal, the CA held the dismissal before trial to be premature and
without deciding the question of double jeopardy, remanded the case to the trial court for trial on
the merits. Accused was convicted of concubinage through reckless imprudence.

ISSUE:

Whether the accused should be acquitted of concubinage in view of the agreement executed by
Rodolfo and Elena upon their separation

HELD:

The agreement constituted a consent given by Elena to Rodolfo, hence, Rodolfo should be
acquitted. Judgment is reversed. There is no double jeopardy. The defense of bigamy for which
he was convicted and that of concubinage for which he stood trial in the court are two distinct
offenses in the law Upon the other hand, the accused should have been acquitted of the crime of
concubinage. The document executed by and between the accused and the complainant in which
they agreed , while illegal for the purpose for which it was executed , constitutes nevertheless a
valid consent to the act of concubinage within the meaning of Art. 344 of the RPC. By such
agreement, each party clearly intended to forego the illicit acts of the other

Previously, the court held that the consent which bars the offended party from instituting a
criminal prosecution in cases of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape and acts of
lasciviousness is that which has been given expressly or impliedly after the crime has been
committed. However, in this case, the Court sees this to be a narrow view. As the term "pardon"
unquestionably refers to the offense after its commission, "consent" must have been intended
agreeably with its ordinary usage, to refer to the offense prior to its commission. No logical
difference can indeed be perceived between prior and subsequent consent, for in both instances
as the offended party has chosen to compromise with his/her dishonor, he/she becomes unworthy
to come to court and invoke its aid in the vindication of the wrong Prior consent is as effective
as subsequent consent to bar the offended aprty from prosecuting the offense

An agreement of the tenor entered into between the parties herein, operates, within the plain
language and manifest policy of the law, to bar the offended party from prosecuting the offense
 P a g e | 350

Article 344 of the RPC provides: The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution
without including both the guilty parties, if they are both alive, nor, in any case, if he shall have
consented or pardoned the offenders.

PEOPLE v. SENSANO
G.R. No. 48183 November 10, 1941
 P a g e | 351

FACTS:

Ursula Sensano and Mariano Ventura were married on April 29, 1919. Shortly after, the husband
left his wife to go to the Province of Cagayan where he remained for three years without writing
to his wife or sending her anything for the support of herself and their son. Poor and illiterate,
without relatives upon whom she could call, she struggled for an existence for herself and her
son until a fatal day when she met the accused Marcelo Ramos who took her and the child to live
with him. On the return of the husband (in 1924), he filed a charge against his wife and Marcelo
Ramos for adultery and both were sentenced to four months and one day of arresto mayor.

In the opinion of the court, the husband of the accused has been somewhat cruel in his treatment
of his wife, having abandoned her as he did." After completing her sentence, the accused left her
paramour. She thereupon appealed to the municipal president and the justice of the peace to send
for her husband so that she might ask his pardon and beg him to take her back. At the house of
the president she begged his pardon and promised to be a faithful wife if he would take her back.
He refused to pardon her or to live with her and said she could go where she wished, that he
would have nothing more to do with her, and she could do as she pleased. Abandoned for the
second time, she and her child went back to her co-accused Marcelo Ramos (this was in the year
1924) and they have lived with him ever since.

The husband, knowing that she resumed living with her co-defendant in 1924, did nothing to
interfere with their relations or to assert his rights as husband. Shortly thereafter he left for the
Territory of Hawaii where he remained for seven years completely abandoning his said wife and
child. On his return to these Islands, he presented the second charge of adultery here involved
with the sole purpose, as he declared, of being able to obtain a divorce under the provisions of
Act No. 2710.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the husband has a proper action against the accused.

HELD:

The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both the guilty
parties, if they are both alive, nor, in any case, if he shall have consented or pardoned the
offenders. Apart from the fact that the husband in this case was assuming a mere pose when he
signed the complaint as the "offended" spouse, we have come to the conclusion that the evidence
in this case and his conduct warrant the inference that he consented to the adulterous relations
existing between the accused and therefore he is not authorized by law to institute this criminal
proceeding. The Court cannot accept the argument of the Attorney-General that the seven years
of acquiescence on his part in the adultery of his wife is explained by his absence from the
Philippine Islands during which period it was impossible for him to take any action against the
accused. There is no merit in the argument that it was impossible for the husband to take any
action against the accused during the said seven years.
 P a g e | 352

BENEDICTO v. DE LA RAMA
G.R. No. 1056 March 13, 1907
 P a g e | 353

FACTS:

On July 5, 1902, the Court of First Instance of the Province of Iloilo entered a final judgment in
this case, decreeing a divorce to the plaintiff on the ground of the husband's adultery, as well as
the payment of 81,042.76 pesos due her as her unpaid share of the property belonging to the
conjugal partnership, as well as the sum of 3,200 pesos as an allowance for their support since
the date on which the action was instituted.

From the judgment the defendant appealed to this court, which, on December 8, 1903, reversed
the decree of the Court of First Instance, incorporated in its opinion certain findings of fact, and
ordered judgment absolute that the complaint be dismissed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is mutual guilt on both of the parties which mitigates the action for legal
separation.

HELD:

Under section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure the filing of a bill of exceptions as a stay of
execution. In this case, therefore, the order made by the trial court in the judgment for the
payment of alimony for the period from the institution of the action to the date of such judgment
was suspended by the filing of the defendant's bill of exceptions. The trial court might
undoubtedly, under section 144, have provided that execution should not be stayed as to the
order for the payment of alimony, but it did not do so. The whole matter rested in the discretion
of the trial court. We have no jurisdiction to take any action in the premises.

Nor we have any jurisdiction to grant alimony pending the appeal. The trial court might have
made an order in such terms as to cover the entire period till final judgment, but did not do so.
We cannot revise its action, except as far as it is brought before us for revision in the ordinary
manner, by bill of exceptions.

The right of a wife to the payment of alimony from her husband stands upon no different footing
from any other right created by the law or arising from contract or otherwise, and is to be
enforced by appropriate proceedings commenced in the court having original jurisdiction. Our
jurisdiction in such cases is appellate merely. The motion must be denied.

DE OCAMPO v. FLORENCIANO
G.R. No. L-13553 February 23, 1960
 P a g e | 354

FACTS:

Jose de Ocampo and Serafina Florenciano were married in 1938.  They begot several children
who are not living with plaintiff.  In March 1951, latter discovered on several occasions that his
wife was betraying his trust by maintaining illicit relations with Jose Arcalas.  Having found out,
he sent the wife to Manila in June 1951 to study beauty culture where she stayed for one year.  
Again plaintiff discovered that the wife was going out with several other man other than
Arcalas.  In 1952, when the wife finished her studies, she left plaintiff and since then they had
lived separately.  In June 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of having illicit relations
with Nelson Orzame.  He signified his intention of filing a petition for legal separation to which
defendant manifested conformity provided she is not charged with adultery in a criminal action. 
Accordingly, Ocampo filed a petition for legal separation in 1955.

ISSUE:

Whether the confession made by Florenciano constitutes the confession of judgment disallowed
by the Family Code.

HELD:

Florenciano’s admission to the investigating fiscal that she committed adultery, in the existence
of evidence of adultery other than such confession, is not the confession of judgment disallowed
by Article 48 of the Family Code.  What is prohibited is a confession of judgment, a confession
done in court or through a pleading.  Where there is evidence of the adultery independent of the
defendant’s statement agreeing to the legal separation, the decree of separation should be granted
since it would not be based on the confession but upon the evidence presented by the plaintiff. 
What the law prohibits is a judgment based exclusively on defendant’s confession.  The petition
should be granted based on the second adultery, which has not yet prescribed.

BROWN v. YAMBAO
G.R. No. L-13553 February 23, 1960
 P a g e | 355

FACTS:

Plaintiff and defendant were married in April 5, 1938 by a religious ceremony in Guimba, Nueva
Ecija, and had lived thereafter as husband and wife. They begot several children who are now
living with plaintiff. In March, 1951, plaintiff discovered on several occasions that his wife was
betraying his trust by maintaining illicit relations with one Jose Arcalas. Having found the
defendant carrying marital relations with another man plaintiff sent her to Manila in June 1951 to
study beauty culture, where she stayed for one year. Again, plaintiff discovered that while in the
said city defendant was going out with several other men, aside from Jose Arcalas. Towards the
end of June, 1952, when defendant had finished studying her course, she left plaintiff and since
then they had lived separately.

On June 18, 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of having illicit relations with another
man by the name of Nelson Orzame. Plaintiff signified his intention of filing a petition for legal
separation, to which defendant manifested her conformity provided she is not charged with
adultery in a criminal action. Accordingly, plaintiff filed on July 5, 1955, a petition for legal
separation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the filing of legal separation had already prescribed

HELD:

The husband's right to legal separation on account of the defendant's adultery with Jose Arcalas
had prescribed, because his action was not filed within one year from March 1951 when plaintiff
discovered her infidelity.

As to the adultery with Nelson Orzame, the appellate court found that in the night of June 18,
1955, the husband upon discovering the illicit connection, expressed his wish to file a petition for
legal separation and defendant readily agreed to such filing. And when she was questioned by the
Fiscal upon orders of the court, she reiterated her conformity to the legal separation even as she
admitted having had sexual relations with Nelson Orzame. Interpreting these facts virtually to
mean a confession of judgment the Appellate Court declared that under Art. 101, legal separation
could not be decreed.

DE OCAMPO v. FLORENCIANO
G.R. No. L-13553 February 23, 1960
 P a g e | 356

FACTS:

Jose de Ocampo and Serafina Florenciano were married in 1938.  They begot several children
who are not living with plaintiff.  In March 1951, latter discovered on several occasions that his
wife was betraying his trust by maintaining illicit relations with Jose Arcalas.  Having found out,
he sent the wife to Manila in June 1951 to study beauty culture where she stayed for one year.  
Again plaintiff discovered that the wife was going out with several other man other than
Arcalas.  In 1952, when the wife finished her studies, she left plaintiff and since then they had
lived separately.  In June 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of having illicit relations
with Nelson Orzame.  He signified his intention of filing a petition for legal separation to which
defendant manifested conformity provided she is not charged with adultery in a criminal action. 
Accordingly, Ocampo filed a petition for legal separation in 1955.

ISSUE:

Whether the confession made by Florenciano constitutes the confession of judgment disallowed
by the Family Code.

HELD:

Florenciano’s admission to the investigating fiscal that she committed adultery, in the existence
of evidence of adultery other than such confession, is not the confession of judgment disallowed
by Article 48 of the Family Code.  What is prohibited is a confession of judgment, a confession
done in court or through a pleading.  Where there is evidence of the adultery independent of the
defendant’s statement agreeing to the legal separation, the decree of separation should be granted
since it would not be based on the confession but upon the evidence presented by the plaintiff. 
What the law prohibits is a judgment based exclusively on defendant’s confession.  The petition
should be granted based on the second adultery, which has not yet prescribed.

CONTRERAS v. MACARAIG
G.R. No. L-29138 May 29, 1970
 P a g e | 357

FACTS:

Plaintiff and defendant were married on March 16, 1952 in the Catholic Church of Quiapo,
Manila. Defendant was employed as manager of the printing establishment owned by plaintiff's
father known as the MICO Offset. In that capacity, defendant met and came to know Lily Ann
Alcala, who place orders with MICO Offset for propaganda materials for Mr. Sergio Osmeña,
who was then a Vice-Presidential candidate. After the elections of 1961, defendant resigned from
MICO Offset to be a special agent at Malacañang. He began to be away so often and to come
home very late.

In September, 1962, Avelino Lubos, driver of the family car, told plaintiff that defendant was
living in Singalong with Lily Ann Alcala. When defendant, the following October, returned to
the conjugal home, plaintiff refrained from verifying Lubos' report from defendant in her desire
not to anger nor drive defendant away. All this while, defendant, if and whenever he returned to
the family fold, would only stay for two or three days but would be gone for a period of about a
month. After plaintiff received reports that Lily Ann Alcala had given birth to a baby, she sent
Mrs. Felicisima Antioquia, her father's employee, to verify the reports. The latter saw defendant
was carrying a baby in his arms.

In November, 1963, plaintiff requested the cooperation of defendant's older sister, Mrs.
Enriqueta Majul, and the latter obliged and arranged a meeting at her home in Buendia between
plaintiff and Lily Ann Alcala. Lily Ann said she was willing to give up defendant as she had no
desire to be accused criminally but it was defendant who refused to break relationship with her.
In December, 1963, plaintiff, accompanied by her two children, went to talk to defendant at his
place of work on España Extension in front of Quezon Institute. They repaired to Victoria Peak,
a nearby restaurant, where plaintiff pleaded with defendant to give up Lily Ann Alcala and to
return to the conjugal home, assuring him that she was willing to forgive him. Defendant
informed plaintiff that he could no longer leave Lily Ann and refused to return to his legitimate
family.

ISSUE:

Whether the prescription should start on 1962 or in 1963.

HELD:

After a careful review of the record, We are persuaded that, in the eyes of the law, the only time
when appellant really became cognizant of the infidelity of her husband was in the early part of
December 1963 when, quoting from the appealed decision, the following happened — In the
early part of December, 1963, plaintiff, accompanied by her two children, Victoria and
Alexander, and by Mrs. Leticia Lagronio went to talk to defendant at his place of work on
España Extension in front of Quezon Institute. They repaired to Victoria Peak, a nearby
restaurant, where plaintiff pleaded with defendant to give up Lily Ann Alcala and to return to the
conjugal home, assuring him that she was willing to forgive him. Defendant informed plaintiff
that he could no longer leave Lily Ann and refused to return to his legitimate family.
 P a g e | 358

From all the foregoing We conclude that it was only on the occasion mentioned in the preceding
paragraph when her husband admitted to her that he was living with and would no longer leave
Lily Ann to return to his legitimate family that appellant must be deemed to be under obligation
to decide whether to sue or not to sue for legal separation, and it was only then that the legal
period of one year must be deemed to have commenced.

AIDA P. BAÑEZ v. GABRIEL B. BAÑEZ

G.R. No. 132592 January 23, 2002
 P a g e | 359

FACTS:

The Regional Trial Court of Cebu decided Civil Case No. CEB-16765, decreeing among others
the legal separation between petitioner Aida Bañez and respondent Gabriel Bañez on the ground
of the latter’s sexual infidelity; the dissolution of their conjugal property relations and the
division of the net conjugal assets; the forfeiture of respondent’s one-half share in the net
conjugal assets in favor of the common children; the payment to petitioner’s counsel of the sum
of P100,000 as attorney’s fees to be taken from petitioner’s share in the net assets; and the
surrender by respondent of the use and possession of a Mazda motor vehicle and the smaller
residential house located at Maria Luisa Estate Park Subdivision to petitioner and the common
children within 15 days from receipt of the decision.

Thereafter, petitioner filed an urgent ex-parte motion to modify said decision, while respondent
filed a Notice of Appeal.

The trial court granted petitioner Aida Banez’ urgent ex-parte motion to modify the decision on
October 1, 1996 by approving the Commitment of Fees dated December 22, 1994; obliging
petitioner to pay as attorney’s fees the equivalent of 5% of the total value of respondent’s ideal
share in the net conjugal assets; and ordering the administrator to pay petitioner’s counsel, Atty.
Adelino B. Sitoy, the sum of P100,000 as advance attorney’s fees chargeable against the
aforecited 5%.[4]

In another motion to modify the decision, petitioner Aida Bañez sought moral and exemplary
damages, as well as litigation expenses. On October 9, 1996, she filed a motion for execution
pending appeal. Respondent Gabriel Bañez filed a consolidated written opposition to the two
motions, and also prayed for the reconsideration of the October 1, 1996 order.

After several exchanges of petitions and motions, the CA rendered a decision setting aside the
October 1, 1996 decision and further denying the motions for reconsideration by petitioner.
Hence, she filed the instant case before the SC alleging that the CA erred in setting aside the
questioned order. She further alleged that an action for legal separation is among the cases where
multiple appeals may be taken. According to her, the filing of a record on appeal, pursuant to
Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court,[13] is required in this case. However, since
respondent failed to file the record on appeal within the reglementary period as provided under
the Rules of court (Sec 1-b, Rule 50), the same should be dismissed

ISSUE:

Whether or not multiple appeals may be allowed in an action for legal separation?

HELD:

Multiple appeals are allowed in special proceedings, in actions for recovery of property with
accounting, in actions for partition of property with accounting, in the special civil actions of
eminent domain and foreclosure of mortgage. The rationale behind allowing more than one
 P a g e | 360

appeal in the same case is to enable the rest of the case to proceed in the event that a separate and
distinct issue is resolved by the court and held to be final.

In said case, the two issues raised by therein petitioner that may allegedly be the subject of
multiple appeals arose from the same cause of action, and the subject matter pertains to the same
lessor-lessee relationship between the parties. Hence, splitting the appeals in that case would
only be violative of the rule against multiplicity of appeals.
The same holds true in an action for legal separation. The issues involved in the case will
necessarily relate to the same marital relationship between the parties. The effects of legal
separation, such as entitlement to live separately, dissolution and liquidation of the absolute
community or conjugal partnership, and custody of the minor children, follow from the decree of
legal separation.[19] They are not separate or distinct matters that may be resolved by the court
and become final prior to or apart from the decree of legal separation. Rather, they are mere
incidents of legal separation.[20] Thus, they may not be subject to multiple appeals.

Petitioner’s alternative prayers that in case we do not dismiss the appeal, we return the records to
the trial court and require respondent to file a record on appeal, or we return the records to the
trial court and retain only the pleadings and orders relevant to the appeal, are untenable. If we
grant the first, we are effectively saying that the instant case is one involving multiple appeals,
which it is not. If we allow the second, we are effectively applying by analogy, Section 6, Rule
44 and Section 6, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court, without petitioner showing support therefor in
law or jurisprudence.

LAPUZ-SY vs. EUFEMIO

43 SCRA 177
 P a g e | 361

FACTS:

Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio Eufemio on August 1953. 
They were married civilly on September 21, 1934 and canonically after nine days.  They had
lived together as husband and wife continuously without any children until 1943 when her
husband abandoned her.  They acquired properties during their marriage.  Petitioner then
discovered that her husband cohabited with a Chinese woman named Go Hiok on or about 1949. 
She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal separation, which among others, would order that
the defendant Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits. 

Eufemio counterclaimed for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lapuz-Sy on the
ground of his prior and subsisting marriage with Go Hiok.  Trial proceeded and the parties
adduced their respective evidence.  However, before the trial could be completed, respondent
already scheduled to present surrebuttal evidence, petitioner died in a vehicular accident on May
1969.  Her counsel duly notified the court of her death.  Eufemio moved to dismiss the petition
for legal separation on June 1969 on the grounds that the said petition was filed beyond the one-
year period provided in Article 102 of the Civil Code and that the death of Carmen abated the
action for legal separation.  Petitioner’s counsel moved to substitute the deceased Carmen by her
father, Macario Lapuz. 

ISSUE: Whether the death of the plaintiff, before final decree in an action for legal separation,
abate the action and will it also apply if the action involved property rights.

HELD:

An action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property rights are
involved. These rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source being the decree
itself; without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality of a
decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes during the pendency of
the action, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive
separation; and the expected consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn.
The petition of  Eufemio for declaration of nullity is moot and academic and there could be no
further interest in continuing the same after her demise, that automatically dissolved the
questioned union.  Any property rights acquired by either party as a result of Article 144 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines 6 could be resolved and determined in a proper action for partition
by either the appellee or by the heirs of the appellant.

ARANETA v. CONCEPCION
G.R. No. L-9667 July 31, 1956
 P a g e | 362

FACTS:
Petitioner filed an action against his wife for legal separation on the ground of adultery.
Defendant filed a petition to secure the custody of their three minor children, a monthly support
of five thousand pesos for herself and said children, and the return of her passport, to enjoin
plaintiff from ordering his hirelings from harassing and molesting her, and to have the plaintiff
therein pay for the fees of her attorney in the action.
Plaintiff opposed the petition denying the misconduct imputed to him, alleging that defendant
abandoned the children, committed adultery, unable to give the children the love, respect and
care of a true mother and without the means to educate them.
The respondent Judge resolved the petition, granting custody of the children to the defendant and
a monthly allowance of two thousand and three hundred pesos for support for her and the
children, three hundred pesos for the house and two thousand pesos as attorney’s fees.
Upon refusal of the Judge to reconsider the order, petitioner filed the present petition for
certiorari against the said order and for mandamus to compel the respondent Judge to require the
parties to submit evidence before deciding on the petition. The main reason of the Judge for
refusing the plaintiff’s request that evidence be allowed to be introduced on the issues is the
prohibition contained in Article 58 of the Family Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the determination of the custody and alimony should be given effect?
RULING:
Article 58 of the Family Code provides that “An action for legal separation shall in no case be
tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition.”
It should be noted that since more than six months have elapsed since the filing of the petition,
the question offered may not be allowed. It is, however, believed that the reasons for granting the
preliminary injunction should be given the scope of the article cited may be explained.
It is conceded that the period of six months fixed therein Article 58 of the Family Code is
evidently intended as a cooling off period to make a possible reconciliation between the spouses.
The recital of their grievances against one another, and the lawmaker has imposed the period to
give them opportunity for dispassionate reflection.
The law expressly enjoins that these should be determined by the courts according to the
circumstances. The rule is that all provisions of the law even if apparently contradictory, should
be allowed to stand and given effect by reconciling them if necessary. Thus the determination of
the custody and alimony should be given force and effect provided that it does not go to the
extent of violating the policy of the cooling off period. That is, evidence not affecting the cause
of the separation, like the actual custody of the children, the means conducive to their welfare
and convenience during the pendency of the case. These should be allowed so that the court may
determine which is best for their custody.
 P a g e | 363

SOMOSA-RAMOS v. VAMENTA, JR.

G.R. No. L-34132 July 29, 1972
FACTS:
On June 18, 1971, petitioner filed Civil Case No. 5274 in the sala of respondent Judge against
respondent Clemente Ramos for legal separation, on concubinage on the respondent's part and an
attempt by him against her life being alleged. She likewise sought the issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction for the return to her of what she claimed to be her paraphernal
and exclusive property, then under the administration and management of respondent Clemente
Ramos. There was an opposition to the hearing of such a motion, dated July 3, 1971, based on
Article 103 of the Civil Code. It was further manifested by him in a pleading dated July 16,
1971, that if the motion asking for preliminary mandatory injunction were heard, the prospect of
the reconciliation of the spouses would become even more dim. Respondent Judge ordered the
parties to submit their respective memoranda on the matter. Then on September 3, 1971,
petitioner received an order dated August 4, 1971 of respondent Judge granting the motion of
respondent Ramos to suspend the hearing of the petition for a writ of mandatory preliminary
injunction. That is the order complained of in this petition for certiorari. Respondents were
required to answer according to our resolution of October 5, 1971. The answer was filed
December 2 of that year. Then on January 12, 1972 came a manifestation from parties in the case
submitting the matter without further arguments.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 103 the Civil Code is not an absolute bar to the hearing motion for
preliminary injunction prior to the expiration of the six-month period.
RULING:
A suit for legal separation, however, is something else again. It involves a relationship on which
the law for the best reasons would attach the quality of permanence. That there are times when
domestic felicity is much less than it ought to be is not of course to be denied. Grievances,
whether fancied or real, may be entertained by one or both of the spouses. There may be constant
bickering. The loss affection on the part of one or both may be discernible. Nonetheless, it will
not serve public interest, much less the welfare of the husband or the wife, to allow them to go
their respective ways. Even then, the hope that the parties may settle their differences is not all
together abandoned. The healing balm of time may aid in the process. Hopefully, the guilty
parties may mend his or her ways, and the offended party may in turn exhibit magnanimity.
Hence, the interposition of a six-month period before an action for legal separation is to be tried.
 P a g e | 364

PACETE v. CARRIAGA
G.R. No. L-53880 March 17, 1994

FACTS:

In October 1979, Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of marriage
between her husband Enrico Pacete and one Clarita de la Concepcion, for legal separation
between her and Pacete, and accounting and separation of property.
The defendants were each served with summons. They filed an extension within which to file an
answer, which the court partly granted. Due to unwanted misunderstanding, particularly in
communication, the defendants failed to file an answer on the date set by the court. Thereafter,
the plaintiff filed a motion to declare the defendants in default, which the court granted.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was a grave abuse of discretion in denying the defendants’ motion for
extension of time to file their answer, and in declaring defendants in default?

RULING:

Yes, there was a grave abuse of discretion in denying the defendants’ motion for extension of
time to file their answer, and in declaring defendants in default.

The Civil Code provides that “no decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a
stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. In case of non-appearance of the defendant,
the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between parties
exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to
take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.”

Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further mandates that an
action for legal separation must “in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since
the filing of the petition,” obviously in order to provide the parties a “cooling-off” period. In this
interim, the court should take steps toward getting the parties to reconcile.
 P a g e | 365

SABALONES v COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 106169 February 14, 1994

FACTS:
Sabalones retired as ambassador in 1985 and came back to the Philippines but not to his wife and
their children. He filed an action for judicial authorization to sell a building and belonging to the
conjugal partnership.
The private respondent opposed the authorization and filed a counterclaim for legal separation.
She alleged that the house in was being occupied by her and their six children and that they were
depending for their support on the rentals from another conjugal property. She also informed the
court that despite her husband he had not returned to his legitimate family and was instead
maintaining a separate residence with Thelma Cumareng and their three children.
After trial, it was found that the petitioner had indeed contracted a bigamous marriage on with
Thelma Cumareng. The court thus decreed the legal separation of the spouses and the forfeiture
of the petitioner's share in the conjugal properties, declaring as well that he was not entitled to
support from his respondent wife.
This decision was appealed to the respondent court. Pendente lite, the respondent wife alleged
inter alia that he had harassed the tenant of the property by informing him that his lease would
not be renewed. The petitioner opposed this motion and filed his own motion to prevent his wife
from entering into a new contract of lease over the Forbes Park property with its present tenant,
or with future tenants, without his consent. After hearing, the Court of Appeals, in an order dated
April 7, 1992, granted the preliminary injunction prayed for by his wife.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the pending appointment of an administrator over the whole mass of conjugal
assets, the respondent court was justified in allowing the wife to continue with her
administration.
RULING:
Article 61 states that after a petition for legal separation has been filed, the trial court shall, in the
absence of a written agreement between the couple, appoint either one of the spouses or a third
person to act as the administrator. While it is true that no formal designation of the administrator
has been made, such designation was implicit in the decision of the trial court denying the
petitioner any share in the conjugal properties (and thus also disqualifying him as administrator
thereof). That designation was in effect approved by the Court of Appeals when it issued in favor
of the respondent wife the preliminary injunction now under challenge.
The twin requirements of a valid injunction are the existence of a right and its actual or
threatened violation. Regardless of the outcome of the appeal, it cannot be denied that as the
petitioner's legitimate wife (and the complainant and injured spouse in the action for legal
separation), the private respondent has a right to a share (if not the whole) of the conjugal estate.
There is also, in our view, enough evidence to raise the apprehension that entrusting said estate
 P a g e | 366

to the petitioner may result in its improvident disposition to the detriment of his wife and
children.
 P a g e | 367

ESPIRITU AND LAYUG v COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 115640 March 15, 1995

FACTS:

Reynaldo and Teresita began to a common-law relationship of husband and wife. On August 16,
1986, their daughter, was born. When they went on a brief vacation in the Philippines, Reynaldo
and Teresita got married, their second child was born on January 12, 1988, thereafter.
The relationship of the couple deteriorated until they decided to separate sometime in 1990.
Reynaldo brought his children home to the Philippines and Pittsburgh. He had to leave his
children with his sister, co-petitioner Guillerma Layug and her family.
Teresita claims that she did not immediately follow her children because Reynaldo filed a
criminal case for bigamy against her and she was afraid of being arrested. Teresita filed the
petition for a writ of habeas corpus against herein two petitioners to gain custody over the
children.

The trial court dismissed the petition for habeas corpus. It suspended Teresita's parental
authority over Rosalind and Reginald and declared Reynaldo to have sole parental authority over
them but with rights of visitation to be agreed upon by the parties and to be approved by the
Court. The Court of Appeals, reversed the trial court's decision. It gave custody to Teresita and
visitation rights on weekends to Reynaldo.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals disregarded the factual findings of the trial court.

RULING:

The law is more than satisfied by the judgment of the trial court. The children are now both over
seven years old. Their choice of the parent with whom they prefer to stay is clear from the
record. From all indications, Reynaldo is a fit person, thus meeting the two requirements found
in the first paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code. The presumption under the second
paragraph of said article no longer applies as the children are over seven years. Assuming that
the presumption should have persuasive value for children only one or two years beyond the age
of seven years mentioned in the statute, there are compelling reasons and relevant considerations
not to grant custody to the mother. The children understand the unfortunate shortcomings of their
mother and have been affected in their emotional growth by her behavior.
 P a g e | 368

LAPUZ SY v EUFEMIO
G.R. No. L-30977. January 31, 1972

FACTS:
Carmen O. Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio S. Eufemio, alleging,
in the main, that they were married civilly on 21 September 1934 and canonically on 30
September 1934; that they had lived together as husband and wife continuously until 1943 when
her husband abandoned her; and that she discovered her husband cohabiting with a Chinese
woman. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal separation and would ordered that the
defendant Eufemio S. Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership
profits.
Eufemio S. Eufemio alleged affirmative and special defenses, and, along with several other
claims involving money and other properties, counter-claimed for the declaration of nullity ab
initio of his marriage with Carmen O. Lapuz Sy, on the ground of his prior and subsisting
marriage, celebrated according to Chinese law and customs, with one Go Hiok.
Issues having been joined, trial proceeded and the parties adduced their respective evidence. But
before the trial could be completed (the respondent was already scheduled to present surrebuttal
evidence on 9 and 18 June 1969), petitioner Carmen O. Lapuz Sy died in a vehicular accident on
31 May 1969. Counsel for petitioner duly notified the court of her death and issued the order
under review, dismissing the case.
ISSUE:-
Does the death of the plaintiff before final decree, in an action for legal separation, abate the
action? If it does, will abatement also apply if the action involves property rights?
RULING:
It is apparent that the right to the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains (or of the
absolute community of property), the loss of right by the offending spouse to any share of the
profits earned by the partnership or community, or his disqualification to inherit by intestacy
from the innocent spouse as well as the revocation of testamentary provisions in favor of the
offending spouse made by the innocent one, are all rights and disabilities that, by the very terms
of the Civil Code article, are vested exclusively in the persons of the spouses; and by their nature
and intent, such claims and disabilities are difficult to conceive as assignable or transmissible.
Hence, a claim to said rights is not a claim that "is not thereby extinguished" after a party dies,
under Section 17, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court, to warrant continuation of the action through a
substitute of the deceased party.
A further reason why an action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if
property rights are involved, is that these rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their
source being the decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that
before the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes
during the pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing a more radical
 P a g e | 369

and definitive separation; and the expected consequential rights and claims would necessarily
remain unborn.
 P a g e | 370

LAPERAL v REPUBLIC
G.R. No. L-18008 October 30, 1962

FACTS:
On May 10, 1960, Elisea Laperal filed in the Court of First Instance of Baguio alleging that on
March 24, 1939, she married Mr. Enrique R. Santamaria; that she naturally used, instead of her
maiden name, that of Elisea L. Santamaria; that aside from her legal separation which became
final, she has also ceased to live with him for many years now, it is desirable that she be allowed
to change her name and/or be permitted to resume using her maiden name.
The petition was opposed by the City Attorney of Baguio on the ground that the same violates
the provisions of Article 370 (should be 372) of the Civil Code, and that it is not sanctioned by
the Rules of Court.
In its decision of October 31, 1960, the court denied the petition for the reason that Article 372 of
the Civil Code requires the wife, even after she is decreed legally separated from her husband, to
continue using the name and surname she employed before the legal separation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner can use her maiden name again.
RULING:
There seems to be no dispute that in the institution of these proceedings, the procedure
prescribed in Rule 103 of the Rules of Court for change of name has been observed. But from the
petition quoted in full at the beginning of these opinion, the only reason relied upon for the
change of name is the fact that petitioner is legally separated from her husband and has, in fact,
ceased to live with him for many years.
It is true that in the second decision which reconsidered the first it is stated that as the petitioner
owns extensive business interests, the continued used of her husband surname may cause undue
confusion in her finances and the eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets. This finding is
however without basis. In the first place, these were not the causes upon which the petition was
based; hence, obviously no evidence to this effect had been adduced. Secondly, with the issuance
of the decree of legal separation in 1958, the conjugal partnership between petitioner and her
husband had automatically been dissolved and liquidated. (Art. 106[2], Civil Cod).
Consequently, there could be no more occasion for an eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets.
 P a g e | 371

SIOCHI v GOZON
G.R. No. 169900 March 18, 2010

FACTS:
On 23 December 1991, Elvira filed with the Cavite RTC a petition for legal separation against
her husband Alfredo. On 2 January 1992, Elvira filed a notice of lis pendens, which was then
annotated on TCT No. 5357.
On 31 august 1993, while the legal separation case was still pending, Alfredo and Mario Siochi
(Mario) entered into an agreement involving the property for the price of P18 million. On 29
June 1994, the Cavite RTC rendered a decision which granted legal separation case.
On 22 August 1994, Alfredo executed a deed of donation over the property in favor of their
daughter, Winifred Gozon without annotating the agreement and the notice of lis pendens on
TCT No. M-10508.
On 26 October 1994, Alfredo, by virtue of a special power of attorney executed in his favor by
Winifred, sold the property to Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc. (IDRI) for P18 million. IDRI paid
Alfredo P18 million, representing full payment for the property. Subsequently, the register of
deeds of Malabon cancelled TCT no. M-10508 and issued TCT No. M-10976 to IDRI.
Mario then filed with the Malabon RTC a complaint for specific performance and damages,
annulment of donation and sale, with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction and/or
temporary restraining order.
The Malabon RTC rendered its decision which the Court of Appeals affirmed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the agreement should be treated as a continuing offer which may be perfected by
the acceptance of the other spouse before the offer is withdrawn.
RULING:
Among the effects of the decree of legal separation is that the conjugal partnership is dissolved
and liquidated and the offending spouse would have no right to any share of the net profits
earned by the conjugal partnership. It is only Alfredos share in the net profits which is forfeited
in favor of Winifred. Article 102(4) of the Family Code provides that [f]or purposes of
computing the net profits subject to forfeiture in accordance with Article 43, No. (2) and 63, No.
(2), the said profits shall be the increase in value between the market value of the community
property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its
dissolution. Clearly, what is forfeited in favor of Winifred is not Alfredos share in the conjugal
partnership property but merely in the net profits of the conjugal partnership property.
 P a g e | 372

PELAYO v LAURON
G.R. No. L-4089 January 12, 1909

FACTS:
On the 23rd of November, 1906, Arturo Pelayo, a physician residing in Cebu, filed a complaint
against Marcelo Lauron and Juana Abella setting forth that on or about the 13th of October of
said year, at night, the plaintiff was called to the house of the defendants, situated in San Nicolas,
and that upon arrival he was requested by them to render medical assistance to their daughter-in-
law who was about to give birth to a child; that therefore, and after consultation with the
attending physician, Dr. Escaño, it was found necessary, on account of the difficult birth, to
remove the fetus by means of forceps which operation was performed by the plaintiff, who also
had to remove the afterbirth, in which services he was occupied until the following morning, and
that afterwards, on the same day, he visited the patient several times; that the just and equitable
value of the services rendered by him was P500, which the defendants refuse to pay without
alleging any good reason therefor; that for said reason he prayed that the judgment be entered in
his favor as against the defendants, or any of them, for the sum of P500 and costs, together with
any other relief that might be deemed proper.
As a result of the evidence adduced by both parties, judgment was entered by the court below on
the 5th of April, 1907, whereby the defendants were absolved from the former complaint, on
account of the lack of sufficient evidence to establish a right of action against the defendants,
with costs against the plaintiff, who excepted to the said judgment and in addition moved for a
new trial on the ground that the judgment was contrary to law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not judgment was correct.
RULING:
It is unquestionable that the person bound to pay the fees due to the plaintiff for the professional
services that he rendered to the daughter-in-law of the defendants during her childbirth, is the
husband of the patient and not her father and mother- in-law, the defendants herein. The fact that
it was not the husband who called the plaintiff and requested his assistance for his wife is no bar
to the fulfillment of the said obligation, as the defendants, in view of the imminent danger, to
which the life of the patient was at that moment exposed, considered that medical assistance was
urgently needed, and the obligation of the husband to furnish his wife in the indispensable
services of a physician at such critical moments is specially established by the law, as has been
seen, and compliance therewith is unavoidable; therefore, the plaintiff, who believes that he is
entitled to recover his fees, must direct his action against the husband who is under obligation to
furnish medical assistance to his lawful wife in such an emergency.
Within the meaning of the law, the father and mother-in-law are strangers with respect to the
obligation that devolves upon the husband to provide support, among which is the furnishing of
medical assistance to his wife at the time of her confinement; and, on the other hand, it does not
appear that a contract existed between the defendants and the plaintiff physician, for which
 P a g e | 373

reason it is obvious that the former cannot be compelled to pay fees which they are under no
liability to pay because it does not appear that they consented to bind themselves
 P a g e | 374

GO v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 114791 May 29, 1997

FACTS:

Hermogenes and Jane Ong were married on June 7, 1981, in Dumaguete City. The video
coverage of the wedding was provided by petitioners at a contract price of P1, 650.00. Three
times thereafter, the newlyweds tried to claim the video tape of their wedding and thrice they
failed because the tape was apparently not yet processed. The parties then agreed that the tape
would be ready upon private respondents' return.

When private respondents came home from their honeymoon, however, they found out that the
tape had been erased by petitioners and therefore, could no longer be delivered. Respondents
filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against petitioners before the Regional
Trial Court which granted the damages. Dissatisfied with the decision, petitioners elevated the
case to the Court of Appeals which, on September 14, 1993, dismissed the appeal and affirmed
the trial court's decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not appreciating the evidence presented.

RULING:

Petitioners and private respondents entered into a contract whereby, for a fee, the former
undertook to cover the latter's wedding and deliver to them a video copy of said event. For
whatever reason, petitioners failed to provide private respondents with their tape. Clearly,
petitioners are guilty of contravening their obligation to said private respondents and are thus
liable for damages.

Considering the attendant wanton negligence committed by petitioners in the case at bar, the
award of exemplary damages by the trial court is justified to serve as a warning to all entities
engaged in the same business to observe due diligence in the conduct of their affairs.

Under Article 117 of the Civil Code (now Article 73 of the Family Code), the wife may exercise
any profession, occupation or engage in business without the consent of the husband. In the
instant case, we are convinced that it was only petitioner Nancy Go who entered into the contract
with private respondent. Consequently, we rule that she is solely liable to private respondents for
the damages awarded below, pursuant to the principle that contracts produce effect only as
between the parties who execute them. 
 P a g e | 375

ARROYO v. VASQUEZ-ARROYO
G.R. No. 17014 August 11, 1921

FACTS:

Mariano B. Arroyo and Dolores C. Vasquez de Arroyo were united in the bonds of wedlock by
marriage in the year 1910, and since that date, with a few short intervals of separation, they have
lived together as man and wife in the city of Iloilo until July 4, 1920, when the wife went away
from their common home with the intention of living thenceforth separate from her husband. An
action was initiated by him to compel her to return to the matrimonial home and live with him as
a dutiful wife. The defendant answered, admitting the fact of marriage, and that she had left her
husband's home without his consent; but she averred by way of defense and cross-complaint that
she had been compelled to leave by cruel treatment on the part of her husband, which was
granted.

The trial judge, upon consideration of the evidence before him, reached the conclusion that the
husband was more to blame than his wife and that his continued ill-treatment of her furnished
sufficient justification for her abandonment of the conjugal home and the permanent breaking off
of marital relations with him. The evidence shows that the wife is afflicted with a disposition of
jealousy towards her husband in an aggravated degree; and to his cause are chiefly traceable
without a doubt the many miseries that have attended their married life. The tales of cruelty on
the part of the husband towards the wife, which are the basis of the cross-action, are no more
than highly colored versions of personal wrangles in which the spouses have allowed themselves
from time to time to become involved and would have little significance apart from the morbid
condition exhibited by the wife. The judgment must therefore be recorded that the abandonment
by her of the marital home was without sufficient justification in fact.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Mariano B. Arroyo is entitled to the unconditional and absolute order for the
return of the wife to the marital domicile.

RULING:

The obligation which the law imposes on the husband to maintain the wife is a duty universally
recognized in civil society and is clearly expressed in articles 142 and 143 of the Civil code. The
enforcement of this obligation by the wife against the husband is not conditioned upon the
procurance of a divorce by her, nor even upon the existence of a cause for divorce. Accordingly
it had been determined that where the wife is forced to leave the matrimonial abode and to live
apart from her husband, she can, in this jurisdiction, compel him to make provision for her
separate maintenance and he may be required to pay the expenses, including attorney's fees,
necessarily incurred in enforcing such obligation. From this consideration it follows that
provision should not be made for separate maintenance in favor of the wife unless it appears that
the continued cohabitation of the pair has become impossible and separation necessary from the
fault of the husband.
 P a g e | 376

ILUSORIO v BILDNER-ILUSORIO
G.R. No. 139789 May 12, 2000
FACTS:
On March 11, 1999, Erlinda K. Ilusorio, filed a petition with the Court of Appeals for habeas
corpus to have custody of her husband in consortium. On April 5, 1999, the Court of Appeals
promulgated its decision dismissing the petition. Thus, on October 11, 1999, Erlinda K. Ilusorio
filed with the Supreme Court an appeal via certiorari pursuing her desire to have custody of her
husband Potenciano Ilusorio. This case was consolidated with another case filed by Potenciano
Ilusorio and his children, Erlinda I. Bildner and Sylvia K. Ilusorio appealing from the order
giving visitation rights to his wife, asserting that he never refused to see her. On May 12, 2000,
petition for habeas corpus was dismissed for lack of merit and granted the petition to nullify the
Court of Appeals' ruling giving visitation rights to Erlinda K. Ilusorio. On November 29, 2000,
the Court noted the manifestation and compliance of the parties with the resolution of October
11, 2000. On January 31, 2001, the Court denied Erlinda Ilusorio's manifestation and motion
praying that Potenciano Ilusorio be produced before the Court and be medically examined by a
team of medical experts appointed by the Court. On March 27, 2001, we denied with finality
Erlinda's motion to reconsider the Court's order of January 31 , 2001.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the propriety of a physical and medical examination of petitioner is relevant.

RULING:
Erlinda highlighted that her husband suffered from various ailments. Thus, Potenciano
Ilusorio did not have the mental capacity to decide for himself. Hence, Erlinda argued that
Potenciano be brought before the Supreme Court so that we could determine his mental state.
The Court was not convinced that Potenciano Ilusorio was mentally incapacitated to choose
whether to see his wife or not. Again, this is a question of fact that has been decided in the Court
of Appeals. As to whether the children were in fact taking control of the corporation, these are
matters that may be threshed out in a separate proceeding, irrelevant in habeas corpus.
 P a g e | 377

GOITIA v CAMPOS RUEDA

G.R. No. 11263 November 2, 1916
FACTS:
The parties were legally married in the city of Manila on January 7, 1915, and immediately
thereafter established their residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino, where they lived together for
about a month, when the plaintiff returned to the home of her parents. The pertinent allegations
of the complaint are as follows:
That the defendant, one month after he had contracted marriage with the plaintiff, demanded of
her that she perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs; that the plaintiff spurned
the obscene demands of the defendant and refused to perform any act other than legal and valid
cohabitation; that the defendant, since that date had continually on other successive dates, made
similar lewd and indecorous demands on his wife, the plaintiff, who always spurned them, which
just refusals of the plaintiff exasperated the defendant and induce him to maltreat her by word
and deed and inflict injuries upon her lips, her face and different parts of her body; and that, as
the plaintiff was unable by any means to induce the defendant to desist from his repugnant
desires and cease from maltreating her, she was obliged to leave the conjugal abode and take
refuge in the home of her parents.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the wife can claim support against her husband outside of the conjugal domicile.
RULING:
At least there are strong indications to this effect, for the court says, "should the doctrine
maintained in the appeal prevail, it would allow married persons to disregard the marriage bond
and separate from each other of their own free will." If this be the true basis upon which the
supreme court of Spain rested its decision, then the doctrine therein enunciated would not be
controlling in cases where one of the spouses was compelled to leave the conjugal abode by the
other or where the husband voluntarily abandons such abode and the wife seeks to force him to
furnish support.
The mere act of marriage creates an obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife.
This obligation is founded not so much on the express or implied terms of the contract of
marriage as on the natural and legal duty of the husband; an obligation, the enforcement of which
is of such vital concern to the state itself that the laws will not permit him to terminate it by his
own wrongful acts in driving his wife to seek protection in the parental home. A judgment for
separate maintenance is not due and payable either as damages or as a penalty; nor is it a debt in
the strict legal sense of the term, but rather a judgment calling for the performance of a duty
made specific by the mandate of the sovereign. This is done from necessity and with a view to
preserve the public peace and the purity of the wife; as where the husband makes so base
demands upon his wife and indulges in the habit of assaulting her. The pro tanto separation
resulting from a decree for separate support is not an impeachment of that public policy by which
marriage is regarded as so sacred and inviolable in its nature; it is merely a stronger policy
overruling a weaker one; and except in so far only as such separation is tolerated as a means of
 P a g e | 378

preserving the public peace and morals may be considered, it does not in any respect whatever
impair the marriage contract or for any purpose place the wife in the situation of a feme sole.
 P a g e | 379

IMBONG v OCHOA, JR.

G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014

FACTS:

The Reproductive Health Law violates the right to life of the unborn. According to the
petitioners, notwithstanding its declared policy against abortion, the implementation of the RH
Law would authorize the purchase of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and
injectables which are abortives, in violation of Section 12, Article II of the Constitution which
guarantees protection of both the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.
The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products.
The petitioners posit that the RH Law provides universal access to contraceptives which are
hazardous to one's health, as it causes cancer and other health problems.
The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one's family protected by the Constitution. It is
contended that the RH Law providing for mandatory reproductive health education intrudes upon
their constitutional right to raise their children in accordance with their beliefs.
It is claimed that, by giving absolute authority to the person who will undergo reproductive
health procedure, the RH Law forsakes any real dialogue between the spouses and impedes the
right of spouses to mutually decide on matters pertaining to the overall well-being of their
family. In the same breath, it is also claimed that the parents of a child who has suffered a
miscarriage are deprived of parental authority to determine whether their child should use
contraceptives.
Various parties also sought and were granted leave to file their respective comments-in-
intervention in defense of the constitutionality of the RH Law.
The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive arguments of the petitioners, pray for the
dismissal of the petitions for the principal reasons that 1] there is no actual case or controversy
and, therefore, the issues are not yet ripe for judicial determination.; 2] some petitioners lack
standing to question the RH Law; and 3] the petitions are essentially petitions for declaratory
relief over which the Court has no original jurisdiction.
Meanwhile, on March 15, 2013, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the assailed legislation took
effect.
On March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and arguments raised, the Court issued the
Status Quo Ante Order (SQAO), enjoining the effects and implementation of the assailed
legislation for a period of one hundred and twenty (120) days, or until July 17, 2013.
On May 30, 2013, the Court held a preliminary conference with the counsels of the parties to
determine and/or identify the pertinent issues raised by the parties and the sequence by which
these issues were to be discussed in the oral arguments. On July 9 and 23, 2013, and on August
6, 13, and 27, 2013, the cases were heard on oral argument. On July 16, 2013, the SQAO was
ordered extended until further orders of the Court.
 P a g e | 380

Thereafter, the Court directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda within sixty (60)
days and, at the same time posed several questions for their clarification on some contentions of
the parties.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RH Law violates the provision on the family?
RULING:
The RH Law cannot be allowed to infringe upon this mutual decision-making. By giving
absolute authority to the spouse who would undergo a procedure, and barring the other spouse
from participating in the decision would drive a wedge between the husband and wife, possibly
result in bitter animosity, and endanger the marriage and the family, all for the sake of reducing
the population. This would be a marked departure from the policy of the State to protect
marriage as an inviolable social institution.
Decision-making involving a reproductive health procedure is a private matter which belongs to
the couple, not just one of them. Any decision they would reach would affect their future as a
family because the size of the family or the number of their children significantly matters. The
decision whether or not to undergo the procedure belongs exclusively to, and shared by, both
spouses as one cohesive unit as they chart their own destiny. It is a constitutionally guaranteed
private right. Unless it prejudices the State, which has not shown any compelling interest, the
State should see to it that they chart their destiny together as one family. At any rate, in case of
conflict between the couple, the courts will decide.
 P a g e | 381

VALINO v ADRIANO
G.R. No. 182894 April 22, 2014

FACTS:
Atty. Adriano Adriano, married respondent Rosario Adriano on November 15, 1955. The
marriage of Atty. Adriano and Rosario, however, turned sour and they were eventually
separated-in-fact. Years later, Atty. Adriano courted Valino, one of his clients, until they decided
to live together as husband and wife. Despite such arrangement, he continued to provide
financial support to Rosario and their children.
In 1992, Atty. Adriano died of acute emphysema. At that time, Rosario was in the United States
spending Christmas with her children. Valino took it upon herself to shoulder the funeral and
burial expenses for Atty. Adriano. When Rosario learned about the death of her husband, she
requested Valino to delay the interment for a few days but her request was not heeded. Claiming
that they were deprived of the chance to view the remains of Atty. Adriano before he was buried.
In her defense, Valino countered that Rosario and Atty. Adriano had been separated for more
than 20 years before he courted her. Valino claimed that throughout the time they were together,
he had introduced her to his friends and associates as his wife. Although they were living
together, Valino admitted that he never forgot his obligation to support the respondents. She
contended that, unlike Rosario, she took good care of Atty. Adriano and paid for all his medical
expenses when he got seriously ill. She also claimed that despite knowing that Atty. Adriano was
in a coma and dying, Rosario still left for the United States. According to Valino, it was Atty.
Adriano’s last wish that his remains be interred in the Valino family mausoleum at the Manila
Memorial Park.
ISSUES:
Who between Rosario and Valino is entitled to the remains of Atty. Adriano.
RULING:
It is undeniable that the law simply confines the right and duty to make funeral arrangements to
the members of the family to the exclusion of one’s common law partner. It is clear that the law
gives the right and duty to make funeral arrangements to Rosario, she being the surviving legal
wife of Atty. Adriano. The fact that she was living separately from her husband and was in the
United States when he died has no controlling significance. To say that Rosario had, in effect,
waived or renounced, expressly or impliedly, her right and duty to make arrangements for the
funeral of her deceased husband is baseless. The right and duty to make funeral arrangements,
like any other right, will not be considered as having been waived or renounced, except upon
clear and satisfactory proof of conduct indicative of a free and voluntary intent to that end. While
there was disaffection between Atty. Adriano and Rosario and their children when he was still
alive, the Court also recognizes that human compassion, more often than not, opens the door to
mercy and forgiveness once a family member joins his Creator.
 P a g e | 382

PANA v HEIRS OF JUANITE, SR.

G.R. No. 164201 December 10, 2012
FACTS:
Efren Pana, his wife Melecia, and another person, were charged with murder before the RTC of
Surigao City. On July 9, 1997, the RTC rendered its Decision acquitting Efren of the charge but
finding Melecia and another person guilty as charged and sentenced them to the penalty of death.
The RTC also ordered those found guilty to pay civil indemnity and damages to the heirs of the
victim. The conviction was affirmed of both accused but modified the penalty. Upon motion for
execution by the heirs of the deceased, the RTC ordered the issuance of the writ, resulting in the
levy of real properties registered in the names of Efren and Melecia. Efren and his wife Melecia
filed a motion to quash the writ of execution, claiming that the levied properties were conjugal
assets, not paraphernal assets of Melecia. The RTC denied the motion. On appeal to the Court of
Appeals dismissed the petition. Efren filed the instant petition arguing that his marriage with
Melecia falls under the regime of conjugal partnership of gains, given that they were married
prior to the enactment of the Family Code and that they did not execute any prenuptial
agreement. On the other hand, the heirs argued that the regime of absolute community of
property governs the marriage of Efren and Melecia since the transitory provision of the Family
Code gave its provisions retroactive effect if no vested or acquired rights are impaired, and that
the property relation between the couple was changed when the Family Code took effect in
1988. 
ISSUE:
Whether or not the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Melecia can be levied and executed
upon for the satisfaction of Melecia’s civil liability in the murder case?
HELD:
While it is true that the personal stakes of each spouse in their conjugal assets are inchoate or
unclear prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership of gains and, therefore, none of them
can be said to have acquired vested rights in specific assets, it is evident that Article 256 of the
Family Code does not intend to reach back and automatically convert into absolute community
of property relation all conjugal partnerships of gains that existed before 1988 excepting only
those with prenuptial agreements.
The Family Code itself provides in Article 76 that marriage settlements cannot be modified
except prior to marriage. Clearly, therefore, the conjugal partnership of gains that governed the
marriage between Efren and Melecia who were married prior to 1988 cannot be modified except
before the celebration of that marriage. What is more, under the conjugal partnership of gains
established by Article 142 of the Civil Code, the husband and the wife place only the fruits of
their separate property and incomes from their work or industry in the common fund. This means
that they continue under such property regime to enjoy rights of ownership over their separate
properties. Consequently, to automatically change the marriage settlements of couples who got
married under the Civil Code into absolute community of property in 1988 when the Family
Code took effect would be to impair their acquired or vested rights to such separate properties.
 P a g e | 383

The civil indemnity that the decision in the murder case imposed on Melecia may be enforced
against their conjugal assets after the responsibilities enumerated in Article 121 of the Family
Code have been covered. Article 121 allows payment of the criminal indemnities imposed on his
wife, Melecia, out of the partnership assets even before these are liquidated. Indeed, it states that
such indemnities.
 P a g e | 384

ARCABA vs TABANCURA VDA DE BATOCAEL

G.R. No. 146683 November 22, 2001
FACTS:
Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the registered owners of Lot No.
437-A located at Balintawak St. and Rizal Avenue in Dipolog City, Zamboanga del Norte in
January 1956.
Zosima died in 1980 hence Francisco and his mother in law executed a deed of extrajudicial
partition with waiver of rights, where the latter waived her share consisting of ¼ of the property
in favor of Francisco. Since Francisco do not have any children to take care of him after his
retirement, he asked Leticia, his niece, Leticia’s cousin, Luzviminda and Cirila Arcaba, the
petitioner, who was then a widow and took care of Francisco’s house as well as the store inside.
According to Leticia, Francisco and Cirila were lovers since they slept in the same room. On the
other hand, Erlinda Tabancura, another niece of Francisco claimed that the latter told her that
Cirila was his mistress.
Cirila defen ded herself that she was a mere helper who could enter the master’s bedroom when
Francisco asked her to and that Francisco was too old for her. She denied having sexual
intercourse with Francisco.
Tabancura testified that Francisco’s only source of income was the rentals from his lot near the
public streets.
In January 1991, few months before Francisco died, he executed a “Deed of Donation Inter
Vivos” where he ceded a portion of Lot 437-A composed of 150 sq m., together with his house
to Cirila who accepted the same. The larger portion of 268 sq m. was left under his name. This
was made in consideration of the 10 year of faithful services of the petitioner. Atty Lacaya
notarized the deed and was later registered by Cirila as its absolute owner.
In October 1991, Francisco died and in 1993, the lot received by Cirila had a market value of
P57, 105 and assessed value of P28, 550. The decedent’s nephews and nieces and his heirs by
intestate succession alleged that Cirila was the common-law wife of Francisco.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the deed of donation inter vivos executed by Francisco in Arcaba’s favor was
valid?
HELD:
The court in this case considered a sufficient proof of common law relationship wherein donation
is not valid. The conclusion was based on the testimony of Tabancura and certain documents
bearing the signature of “Cirila Comille” such as application for business permit, sanitary permit
and the death certificate of Francisco. Also, the fact that Cirila did not demand her wages is an
indication that she was not simply a caregiver –employee.
 P a g e | 385

Cohabitation means more than sexual intercourse, especially when one of the parties is already
old and may no longer be interested in sex at the very least; cohabitation is a public assumption
of men and women holding themselves out to the public as such. Hence, the deed of donation by
Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Article 87 of the Family Code.
 P a g e | 386

MATABUENA v. CERVANTES
G.R. No. L-28771 March 31, 1971
FACTS:
Felix cohabitated with, donated to a parcel of land and married the respondent.
After the Felix’s death, his sister, the petitioner, sought the nullification of the donation, citing
Article 133 of the Civil Code that “Every donation between the spouses during the marriage shall
be void.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not the prohibition applies to donations between live-in partners?
RULING:
Yes, the prohibition applies to donations between live-in partners. It is a fundamental principle in
statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as much a part of the law as what
is written. Since the reason for the ban on donations between spouses during the marriage is to
prevent the possibility of undue influence and improper pressure being exerted by one spouse on
the other, there is no reason why this prohibition shall not apply also to common-law
relationships. The court, however, said that the lack of the donation made by the deceased
to the respondent does not necessarily mean that the petitioner will have exclusive rights to the
disputed property because the relationship between Felix and the respondent was legitimated by
marriage.
 P a g e | 387

HARDING v. COMMERCIAL UNION ASSURANCE COMPANY

G.R. No. 12707 August 10, 1918

FACTS:

In February 1916, Mrs. Harding applied for car insurance for a Studebaker she received as a gift
from her husband. She was assisted by Smith, Bell, and Co. which was the duly authorized
representative (insurance agent) of Commercial Union Assurance Company in the Philippines.
The car’s value was estimated with the help of an experienced mechanic (Mr. Server) of the
Luneta Garage. The car was bought by Mr. Harding for P2,800.00. The mechanic, considering
some repairs done, estimated the value to be at P3,000.00. This estimated value was the value
disclosed by Mrs. Harding to Smith, Bell, and Co. She also disclosed that the value was an
estimate made by Luneta Garage (which also acts as an agent for Smith, Bell, and Co).
In March 1916, a fire destroyed the Studebaker. Mrs. Harding filed an insurance claim but
Commercial Union denied it as it insisted that the representations and averments made as to the
cost of the car were false; and that said statement was a warranty. Commercial Union also stated
that the car does not belong to Mrs. Harding because such a gift [from her husband] is void under
the Civil Code.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not Mrs. Harding is entitled to the insurance claim.

HELD: 

Commercial Union is not the proper party to attack the validity of the gift made by Mr. Harding
to his wife.
The statement made by Mrs. Harding as to the cost of the car is not a warranty. The evidence
does not prove that the statement is false. In fact, the evidence shows that the cost of the car is
more than the price of the insurance. The car was bought for P2,800.00 and then thereafter,
Luneta Garage made some repairs and body paints which amounted to P900.00. Mr. Server
attested that the car is as good as new at the time the insurance was effected.
Commercial Union, upon the information given by Mrs. Harding, and after an inspection of the
automobile by its examiner, having agreed that it was worth P3,000, is bound by this valuation in
the absence of fraud on the part of the insured. All statements of value are, of necessity, to a
large extent matters of opinion, and it would be outrageous to hold that the validity of all valued
policies must depend upon the absolute correctness of such estimated value.
 P a g e | 388

VILLANUEVA v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 143286 April 14, 2004

FACTS:

Plaintiff Eusebia Napisa Retuya, is the legal wife of defendant Nicolas Retuya, having been
married to the latter on October 7, 1926. They begot 5 children. Spouses Retuya resided at
Tipolo, Mandaue City. During their marriage they acquired real properties and all improvements
situated in Mandaue City, and Consolacion, Cebu.
Also, defendant, Nicolas Retuya, is co-owner of a parcel of land situated in Mandaue City which
he inherited from his parents. In 1945, defendant Nicolas Retuya no longer lived with his
legitimate family and cohabited with defendant, Pacita Villanueva, wherein defendant, Procopio
Villanueva, is their illegitimate son. Nicolas, then, was the only person who received the income
of the properties. Defendant, from the time she started living in concubinage with Nicolas, has no
occupation, she had no properties of her own from which she could derive income. In 1985,
Nicolas suffered a stroke. Natividad Retuya knew of the physical condition of her father because
they visited him at the hospital. She told defendant, Procopio that their father was already
incapacitated and they had to talk things over and the latter replied that it was not yet the time to
talk about the matter. Plaintiff, then, complained to the Barangay Captain for
reconciliation/mediation but no settlement was reached.
ISSUE:
Whether the court of appeals erred in sustaining the declaration of the trial court that the
properties listed in paragraph 2 of the complaint are conjugal properties of Nicolas Retuya and
Eusebia Retuya although this was not one of the causes of action in Eusebias complaint.
RULING:
Petitioners contention that Eusebias complaint failed to state that the subject properties are
conjugal is absolutely without basis. A cursory reading of the complaint readily shows that the
complaint maintains that the subject properties are conjugal. The same claim is restated and
repleaded throughout the complaint. Petitioners should know better than to clutter their appeal
with useless arguments such as this. The other issues petitioners raise contest in essence the
finding that the subject properties are conjugal in nature. Apart from this, the only other issue
raised is whether prescription or laches bars Eusebias complaint. We shall resolve first the issue
of prescription and laches.
 P a g e | 389

TAN v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 120594 June 10, 1997

FACTS:
The petitioner Ramon Tan, a businessman from Puerto Princesa, secured a cashier’s check from
Philippine Commercial Industrial Bank (PCIB) to P30, 000.00 payable to his order to avoid
carrying cash while en route to Manila. He deposited the check in his account in Rizal
Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) in its Binondo Branch. Relying on common
knowledge that the check was as good as cash, he issued two (2) personal checks in the name of
Go Lak and MS Development Trading Corporation a month after the deposit, both of which
bounced due to “insufficiency of funds.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not a cashier’s check is as good as cash, so as to have funded the two (2) checks.
RULING:
Reliance on the layman’s perception that a cashier’s check is as good as cash is not entirely
misplaced, as it is rooted in practice, tradition and principle. A cashier’s check is a primary
obligation of the issuing bank and accepted in advance by its mere issuance. By its very nature, it
is a bank’s order to pay what is drawn upon itself, committing in effect its total resources,
integrity and honor beyond the check. Herein, PCIB by issuing the check created an
unconditional credit in favor any collecting bank.
 P a g e | 390

CHING v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 124642 February 23, 2004

FACTS:
On September 26, 1978, PBMCI obtained a loan from the ABC. The PBMCI, executed a
promissory note for the said amount promising to pay on December 22, 1978 at an interest rate
of 14% per annum and executed a continuing guaranty with the ABC binding themselves to
jointly and severally guarantee the payment of all the PBMCI obligations owing the ABC. On
December 28, 1979, the ABC extended another loan to the PBMCI in the amount of payable in
eighteen months at 16% interest per annum. As in the previous loan, the PBMCI, through
Alfredo Ching, executed a promissory note to evidence the loan maturing on June 29, 1981. The
PBMCI defaulted in the payment of all its loans. Hence, on August 21, 1981, the ABC filed a
complaint for sum of money with prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment against the PBMCI.
On August 26, 1981, the trial court issued an Order denying the ABC’s application for a writ of
preliminary attachment. Meanwhile, on April 1, 1982, the PBMCI and Alfredo Ching jointly
filed a petition for suspension of payments with the SEC, at the same time seeking the PBMCI’s
rehabilitation. On December 17, 1986, the ABC filed a Motion to Reduce the amount of his
preliminary attachment bond. On March 2, 1988, the trial court issued an Order granting the
motion of the ABC. On November 16, 1993, Encarnacion T. Ching, filed a Motion to Set Aside
the levy on attachment. On December 10, 1993, the Spouses Ching filed their Reply/Opposition
to the motion to expunge records. The trial court issued on December 15, 1993 an Order lifting
the writ of preliminary attachment on the shares of stocks and ordering the sheriff to return the
said stocks to the petitioners.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner-wife has the right to file the motion to quash the levy on attachment on
the 100,000 shares of stocks in the Citycorp Investment Philippines.
RULING:
The petitioner-wife filed her motion to set aside the levy on attachment of the 100,000 shares of
stocks in the name of petitioner-husband claiming that the said shares of stocks were conjugal in
nature; hence, not liable for the account of her husband under his continuing guaranty and
suretyship agreement with the PBMCI. The petitioner-wife had the right to file the motion for
said relief.
 P a g e | 391

MATTHEWS v. TAYLOR
G.R. No. 164584 June 22, 2009

FACTS:
On June 30, 1988, respondent Benjamin A. Taylor (Benjamin), a British subject, married Joselyn
C. Taylor (Joselyn), a 17-year old Filipina. On June 9, 1989, while their marriage was subsisting,
Joselyn bought from Diosa M. Martin a 1,294 square-meter lot. The sale was allegedly financed
by Benjamin. Joselyn and Benjamin, also using the latters funds, constructed improvements
thereon and eventually converted the property to a vacation and tourist resort known as the
Admiral Ben Bow Inn. All required permits and licenses for the operation of the resort were
obtained in the name of Ginna Celestino, Joselyns sister. Joselyn ran away with Kim Philippsen.
On June 8, 1992, Joselyn executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of Benjamin,
authorizing the latter to maintain, sell, lease, and sub-lease and otherwise enter into contract with
third parties with respect to their Boracay property. On July 20, 1992, Joselyn as lessor and
petitioner Philip Matthews as lessee, entered into an Agreement of Lease (Agreement) involving
the Boracay property for a period of 25 years, with an annual rental of P12,000.00. The
agreement was signed by the parties and executed before a Notary Public. Petitioner thereafter
took possession of the property and renamed the resort as Music Garden Resort. Claiming that
the Agreement was null and void since it was entered into by Joselyn without his (Benjamins)
consent, Benjamin instituted an action for Declaration of Nullity of Agreement of Lease with
Damages against Joselyn and the petitioner. Benjamin claimed that his funds were used in the
acquisition and improvement of the Boracay property, and coupled with the fact that he was
Joselyn’s husband, any transaction involving said property required his consent.
The RTC considered the Boracay property as community party of Benjamin and Joselyn, which
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Benjamin was the actual owner of the property since he provided the funds used
in purchasing the same?
RULING:
It is undisputed that Joselyn acquired the Boracay property in 1989. Said acquisition was
evidenced by a Deed of Sale with Joselyn as the vendee. The property was also declared for
taxation purposes under her name. When Joselyn leased the property to petitioner, Benjamin
sought the nullification of the contract o n two grounds: first, that he was the actual owner of the
property since he provided the funds used in purchasing the same; and second, that Joselyn could
not enter into a valid contract involving the subject property without his consent.
The Court finds and so hold that Benjamin has no right to nullify the Agreement of Lease
between Joselyn and petitioner. Benjamin, being an alien, is absolutely prohibited from acquiring
private and public lands in the Philippines. Considering that Joselyn appeared to be the
designated vendee in the Deed of Sale of said property, she acquired sole ownership thereto. This
is true even if we sustain Benjamins claim that he provided the funds for such acquisition. By
entering into such contract knowing that it was illegal, no implied trust was created in his favor;
 P a g e | 392

no reimbursement for his expenses can be allowed; and no declaration can be made that the
subject property was part of the conjugal/community property of the spouses. In any event, he
had and has no capacity or personality to question the subsequent lease of the Boracay property
by his wife on the theory that in so doing, he was merely exercising the prerogative of a husband
in respect of conjugal property. To sustain such a theory would countenance indirect
controversion of the constitutional prohibition. If the property were to be declared conjugal, this
would accord the alien husband a substantial interest and right over the land, as he would then
have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right that the Constitution does not
permit him to have.
 P a g e | 393

IN RE: MULLER v. MULLER

G.R. No. 149615 August 29, 2006

FACTS:
Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut Muller were married in Hamburg,
Germany on September 22, 1989. The couple resided in Germany at a house owned by
respondent’s parents but decided to move and reside permanently in the Philippines in 1992.
Respondent had inherited the house in Germany from his parents which he sold and used the
proceeds for the purchase of a parcel of land in Antipolo, Rizal and the construction of a house.
The Antipolo property was registered in the name of petitioner. Due to incompatibilities and
respondent’s alleged womanizing, drinking, and maltreatment, the spouses eventually separated.
On August 12, 1996, the trial court terminated the regime of absolute community of property
between the petitioner and respondent. It also decreed the separation of properties between them
and ordered the equal partition of personal properties located within the country, excluding those
acquired by gratuitous title during the marriage. With regard to the Antipolo property, the court
held that it was acquired using paraphernal funds of the respondent. However, it ruled that
respondent cannot recover his funds because the property was purchased in violation of Section
7, Article XII of the Constitution.
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered the assailed decision modifying the
trial court’s Decision. It held that respondent merely prayed for reimbursement for the purchase
of the Antipolo property, and not acquisition or transfer of ownership to him. It also considered
petitioner’s ownership over the property in trust for the respondent. As regards the house, the
Court of Appeals ruled that there is nothing in the Constitution which prohibits respondent from
acquiring the same. The dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads:
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is entitled to reimbursement of the funds used for the acquisition for
the property of the Antipolo property?
RULING:
Respondent cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear that he willingly
and knowingly bought the property despite the constitutional prohibition. the finding that his
wife had used her own money to purchase the property cannot, and will not, at this stage of the
proceedings be reviewed and overturned. But even if it were a fact that said wife had used
conjugal funds to make the acquisition, the considerations just set out to militate, on high
constitutional grounds, against his recovering and holding the property so acquired, or any part
thereof. And whether in such an event, he may recover from his wife any share of the money
used for the purchase or charge her with unauthorized disposition or expenditure of conjugal
funds is not now inquired into; that would be, in the premises, a purely academic exercise.
 P a g e | 394

NAVARRO v. ESCOBIDO
G.R. No. 153788 November 27, 2009

FACTS:
On September 12, 1998, respondent Karen T. Go filed two complaints, docketed as Civil Case
Nos. 98-599 (first complaint) and 98-598 (second complaint), before the RTC for replevin and/or
sum of money with damages against Navarro. In these complaints, Karen Go prayed that the
RTC issue writs of replevin for the seizure of 2 motor vehicles in Navarro’s possession. On
October 12, 1998 and October 14, 1998, the RTC issued writs of replevin for both cases; as a
result, the Sheriff seized the two vehicles and delivered them to the possession of Karen Go.mIn
his Answers, Navarro alleged as a special affirmative defense that the two complaints stated no
cause of action. In its May 8, 2000 order, the RTC dismissed the case on the ground that the
complaints did not state a cause of action. On October 16, 2001, the CA denied Navarros petition
and affirmed the RTCs order. The CA also denied Navarros motion for reconsideration in its
resolution of May 29, 2002, leading to the filing of the present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not prior demand is a condition precedent to an action for a writ of replevin.
RULING:
Under Article 108 of the Family Code, the conjugal partnership is governed by the rules on the
contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is expressly determined in this
Chapter or by the spouses in their marriage settlements. In other words, the property relations of
the husband and wife shall be governed primarily by Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains
of the Family Code and, suppletorily, by the spouses marriage settlement and by the rules on
partnership under the Civil Code. In the absence of any evidence of a marriage settlement
between the spouses Go, we look at the Civil Code provision on partnership for guidance. Glenn
and Karen Go are effectively co-owners of Kargo Enterprises and the properties registered under
this name; hence, both have an equal right to seek possession of these properties. Applying
Article 484 of the Civil Code, which states that in default of contracts, or special provisions, co-
ownership shall be governed by the provisions of this Title, we find further support in Article 487
of the Civil Code that allows any of the co-owners to bring an action in ejectment with respect to
the co-owned property. In this case, one spouse filed an action for the recovery of credit, a
personal property considered conjugal property, without including the other spouse in the action.
 P a g e | 395

IMANI v. METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO.

G.R. No. 187023 November 17, 2010

FACTS:
Imani signed a Continuing Suretyship Agreement in favour of Metrobank with 6 other co-
sureties binding themselves to pay whatever indebtedness C.P. Dazo Tannery, Inc. (CPDTI)
incurs, but not exceeding P6, 000, 000.00. CPDTI incurred an indebtedness around P164,000 to
which it defaulted in paying Metrobank. This prompted Metrobank to file a collection suit
against CPDTI and its sureties. Metrobank won, and the sheriff levied a property owned by
Imani and filed to consolidate the title to its name.
Imani opposed, stating that it is part of her conjugal property. The RTC ruled in favour of Imani,
reasoning that the loan proceeds never redounded to the benefit of the family of Imani. RTC
annulled the sale and levy. Metrobank appealed, and the CA reversed the decision of the RTC.
Thus, petitioner appeals to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the RTC.
HELD:
All property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal. However, for this presumption to apply,
the party who invokes it must first prove that the property was acquired during the marriage.
Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua nonto the operation of the
presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. Thus, the time when the property was acquired
is material.
As aptly ruled by the CA, the fact that the land was registered in the name of Evangelina Dazo-
Imani married to Sina Imani is no proof that the property was acquired during the spouses
coverture. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts. It is well settled that
registration does not confer title but merely confirms one already existing. Indubitably, petitioner
utterly failed to substantiate her claim that the property belongs to the conjugal partnership.
Thus, it cannot be rightfully said that the CA reversed the RTC ruling without valid basis
 P a g e | 396

DELA PENA v. AVILA

G.R. No. 187490 February 8, 2012

FACTS:
Antonia obtained from Aguila a loan with interest pegged at 5% per month. Antonia executed a
promissory note and a notarized Deed of Real Estate Mortgage, situated in Marikina City and
previously registered in the name of petitioner  Antonia, “married to Antegono A. Dela Peña”
(Antegono). Antonia executed another notarized Deed of Absolute Sale over the property in
favor of Gemma, for the stated consideration of P600, 000.00. As such Gemma caused the
transfer of the aforesaid property to her name. Gemma also constituted a real estate mortgage
over same property in favor of FEBTC-BPI, to secure a loan facility with a credit limit of P1,
200, 000.00. Antonia filed with the Register of Deeds of Marikina an Affidavit
of Adverse Claim, that she was the true and lawful owner of the property and, that the Deed of
Absolute Sale Gemma utilized in procuring her title was simulated. The Register of Deeds
inscribed the adverse claim. FEBTC-BPI caused an extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate
mortgage constituted over the property due to Gemma’s failure to pay the loan. Antonia and her
son, petitioner Alvin, filed against Gemma the complaint for annulment of deed of sale as the
subject realty was conjugal property, and that the Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage Antonia executed in favor of Aguila was not consented to by Antegono who
was already dead by that time.
The Regional Trial Court held that the subject property was conjugal in nature and that the Deed
of Absolute Sale Antonia executed in favor of Gemma was void as a disposition without the
liquidation required under Article 130 of the Family Code. CA reversed the RTC decision,
stating that the property was paraphernal in nature for failure of the Dela Peñas to prove that the
same was acquired during Antonia’s marriage to Antegono. Furthermore, that the Deed of
Absolute Sale in favor of Avila and the subsequent sale on auction of the subject property to
FEBTC-BPI are upheld as valid and binding. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the RTC holding the house and lot conjugal property of
the spouses Antegono and Antonia Dela Peña.
HELD:
Pursuant to Article 160 of the NCC, all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership, unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
Although it is not necessary to prove that the property was acquired with funds of the
partnership, proof of acquisition during the marriage is an essential condition for the operation of
the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. In the case of Francisco vs. Court
of Appeals, the Court said that the party who invokes the presumption under Art. 160 of the
NCC, must first prove that the property in controversy was acquired during the marriage. Proof
of acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the
presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. The party who asserts this presumption must
first prove said time element. Needless to say, the presumption refers only to the property
 P a g e | 397

acquired during the marriage and does not operate when there is no showing as to when property
alleged to be conjugal was acquired. Moreover, this presumption in favor of conjugality is
rebuttable, but only with strong, clear and convincing evidence; there must be a strict proof of
exclusive ownership of one of the spouses.
As the parties invoking the presumption of conjugality, the Dela Peñas did not even come close
to proving that the subject property was acquired during the marriage between Antonia and
Antegono. Beyond Antonia’s bare and uncorroborated assertion that the property was purchased
when she was already married, the record is bereft of any evidence from which the actual date of
acquisition of the realty can be ascertained.
 P a g e | 398

TITAN CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION v. MANUEL DAVID SR.

G.R. No. 16954 March 15, 2010

FACTS:

Manuel A. David, Sr. (Manuel) and Martha S. David (Martha) were married on March 25, 1957.
In 1970, the spouses acquired a lot located at White Plains, Quezon City. In 1976, the spouses
separated, and no longer communicated with each other. March 1995, Manuel discovered that
Martha had previously sold the property to Titan Construction Corporation (Titan) with which
the previous title registered in the Register of Deeds was replaced. March 13, 1996, Manuel filed
a Complaintfor Annulment of Contract against Titan CC. Manuel alleged that the sale executed
by Martha in favor of Titan was without his knowledge therefore void. He prayed that the Deed
of Sale be invalidated, that the property be returned to the spouses with a new title be issued in
their names.

Titan claimed that it was a buyer in good faith and for value because it relied on a Special Power
of Attorney (SPA) by Manuel which authorized Martha to dispose of the property on behalf of
the spouses. Manuel claimed that the SPA was spurious, and that the signature purporting to be
his was a forgery; hence, Martha was wholly without authority to sell the property.
Subsequently, Manuel filed a Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaintwhich was granted
by the trial court. Thus, on October 15, 1996, Manuel filed an Amended Complaint. Martha
failed to file an answer so she was declared in default.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the deed of sale is null and void.

RULING:

Yes, since the property was undoubtedly part of the conjugal partnership, the sale to Titan
required the consent of both spouses. Article 165 of the Civil Code expressly provides that ―the
husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership‖. Likewise, Article 172 of the Civil Code
ordains that ―the wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the husband‘s consent,
except in cases provided by law‖. Similarly, Article 124 of the Family Code requires that any
disposition or encumbrance of conjugal property must have the written consent of the other
spouse, otherwise, such disposition is void.
 P a g e | 399

TAN v. ANDRADE
GR No. 171904 and 172017 August 7, 2013

FACTS:

Property Relations Rosario Vda. De Andrade was the registered owner of four parcels of which
she mortgaged to one Simon Diu, who foreclosed on the same. When the redemption period was
about to expire, Rosario sought the assistance of Bobby Tan who agreed to redeem the subject
properties. Thereafter, Rosario sold the same to Bobby and her son, Proceso as evidenced by a
Deed of Absolute Sale. Proceso executed a Deed of Assignment, ceding to Bobby his interests
over the properties. The Deed of Assignment was signed by Henry, one of Rosario’s sons,
asinstrumental witness. Bobby extended an Option to Buy the subject properties to Proceso,
giving the latter until 7:00 in the evening of July 31, 1984 to purchase the properties for the sum
of P310,000. When Proceso failed to purchase them, Bobby consolidated his ownership over the
properties, and the TCTs were issued in his name.

On October 7, 1997, Rosario’s children, including Proceso and Henry, filed acomplaint for
reconveyance and annulment of deeds and damages against Bobby before the RTC. They alleged
that the initial transaction between Rosario and Bobby was actually an equitable mortgage which
was entered into to secure Rosario’s indebtedness with Bobby. They also claimed that since the
subject properties were inherited by them from their father, the subject properties were conjugal
in nature, and thus, Rosario had no right to dispose of their respective shares. The RTC dimissed
the complaint. On appeal, the CA upheld the trial court’s ruling.

ISSUE:

Whether the properties belong to the conjugal partnership of Rosario and her late husband and
co-owned by her and her children

HELD:

NO, Pertinent to the resolution of this second issue is Article 160 of the Civil Code38 which
states that "[a]ll property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership,
unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife." For this
presumption to apply, the party invoking the same must, however, preliminarily prove that the
property was indeed acquired during the marriage. As held in Go v. Yamane: x x x As a
condition sine qua non for the operation of [Article 160] in favor of the conjugal partnership, the
party who invokes the presumption must first prove that the property was acquired during the
marriage
 P a g e | 400

MICHEAL A. ONSTTOT v.UPPER NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION, INC.

GR No. 22104 September 14, 2016

FACTS:

Albert, an American citizen, was the registered owner of a parcel of land with an approximate
area of 18,589 square meters, covered by OCT No. (-2645-) M-5565 situated in the Province of
Rizal (subject property). Due to non-payment of realty taxes, the Provincial Government of Rizal
sold the subject property at public auction to one Amelita A. De Sena (De Sena), the highest
bidder, as evidenced by the Certificate of Sale6 dated June 29, 2004. Respondent UTNAI, an
association representing the actual occupants of the subject property, subsequently redeemed the
same from De Sena.

Thereafter, or on March 31, 2008, UTNAI filed a complaint for cancellation of OCT No. (-
2645-) M-556 and for the issuance of a new title in its name before the RTC against Albert and
Federico M. Cas (Cas),

The RTC found that UTNAI •was able to prove, by a preponderance of evidence, that it is the
owner of the subject property after having legally redeemed the same from De Sena

CA found UTNAI's appeal meritorious. Although it found that the March 30, 2009 Decision of
the RTC did not attain finality

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in directing the issuance of a title in favor of UTNAI
notwithstanding the failure to implead his mother, Josephine, as an indispensable party

RULING:

That the RTC Decision was null and void for failure to implead an indispensable party,
Josephine, on the premise that the subject property is conjugal in nature, is likewise specious.

Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband
or to the wife. However, the party who invokes this presumption must first prove that the
property in controversy was acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the
coverture is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of the
conjugal partnership. The party who asserts this presumption must first prove the said time
element. Needless to say, the presumption refers only to the property acquired during the
marriage and does not operate when there is no showing as to when the property alleged to be
conjugal was acquired. Moreover, this presumption in favor of conjugality is rebuttable, but only
with strong, clear and convincing evidence; there must be a strict proof of exclusive ownership
of one of the spouses.\
 P a g e | 401

AYALA INVESTMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP. v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 1185305 February 12, 1998

FACTS:

Petitioner Ayala Investment and Development Corporation (AIDC) granted a loan to Philippine
Blooming Mills (PBM) amounting P50,300,000.00 loan. Respondent Alfredo Ching, Exec. Vice
President PBM, executed security agreements on December 1980 and March 1981 making him
jointly and severally liable with PBM‘s indebtedness to AIDC. PBM failed to pay the loan with
that, AIDC filed a complaint against PBM and Ching.

In the RTC‘s decision it ordered PBM and Ching to jointly and severally pay AIDC the principal
amount plus the interests. RTC issued a writ of execution of pending appeal. Then, deputy sheriff
Magsajo caused issuance and service upon respondents- Ching spouses of a notice of sheriff sale
on three of their conjugal properties. Spouses Ching filed a case of injunction against petitioner
alleging that petitioner cannot enforce the judgment against conjugal partnership levied on the
ground that the subject loan did not redound to the benefit of the said conjugal partnership. Upon
application of private respondents, the RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) to
prevent Magsajo from proceeding with the enforcement of the writ of execution and with the sale
of the said properties at public auction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the loan acquired by PBM from Ayala Investments as guaranteed by Alfredo
Ching be redounded to the conjugal partnership of the spouses.

RULING:

The loan procured from AIDC was for the advancement and benefit of PBM and not for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership of Ching. AIDC failed to prove that Ching contracted the debt
for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains. PBM as a corporation has a personality
distinct and separate from the family of Ching despite the fact that they happened to be
stockholders of said corporate entity. Clearly, the debt was a corporate debt and right of recourse
to Ching as surety is only to the extent of his corporate ownership.

The contract of loan between AIDC and PMB guaranteed by Ching was clearly for the benefit of
PMB and not for the Ching with his family. Ching only signed as a surety for the loan contracted
with AIDC in behalf of PBM. Signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry or
profession. With that, the conjugal partnership should not be made liable for the surety
agreement which was clearly for the benefit of PBM.
 P a g e | 402

DEWARA V. LAMELA
GR No. 17901 April 11, 2011

FACTS:

Spouses Dewara were married before the enactment of the Family Code. Elenita worked in
California while Eduardo stayed in Bacolod. While driving a private jeepney registered in the
name of Elenita, Eduardo hit Ronnie. Ronnie filed a criminal case for serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence against Eduardo. The lower court found Eduardo guilty of the
charge and sentenced him to suffer thepenalty of imprisonment, and to pay civil indemnity. On
appeal, the RTC affirmed the decision of the lower court and it became final and executory. The
writ of execution on the civil liability was served on Eduardo, but it was returned unsatisfied
because he had no property in his name. Ronnie requested the City Sheriff, respondent Alvero, to
levy on a lot in the name of Elenita, Eduardo’s wife, to satisfy the judgment on the civil liability
of Eduardo. The City Sheriff served a notice of embargo on the title of the lot and subsequently
sold the lot in a public auction. In the execution sale, there were no interested buyers other than
Ronnie. The City Sheriff issued a certificate of sale to spouses Ronnie and Gina Lamela to
satisfy the civil liability in the decision against Eduardo. Ronnie then caused the consolidation of
title in a Cadastral Proceeding before the RTC, which ordered the cancellation of the TCT in the
name of Elenita and the issuance of a new certificate of title in the name of respondent spouses.
The above incidents happened while Elenita was working in California. Elenita, represented by
her attorney-in-fact, Ferdinand Magallanes, filed a case for annulment of sale and for damages
against Spouses Lamela and ex-officio sheriff Alvero. Elenita claimed that the levy on execution
of the subject lot was illegal because the said property was her paraphernal or exclusive property
and could not be made to answer for the personal liability of her husband. Furthermore, as the
registered owner of the property, she received no notice of the execution sale.

On the other hand, the Spouses averred that the subject lot was the conjugal property of Elenita
and Eduardo. They asserted that the property was acquired by Elenita during her marriage to
Eduardo; that the property was acquired with the money of Eduardo because, at the time of the
acquisition of the property, Elenita was a plain housewife; that the jeep involved in the accident
was registered in the name of petitioner; and that Elenita did not interpose any objection pending
the levy on execution of the property. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of Elenita. The RTC
declared that said property was paraphernal in nature. It arrived at this conclusion by tracing how
Elenita acquired the subject property. Based on the documentary evidence submitted, Elenita’s
grandfather, Exequiel, originally owned the lot. Upon his death, his children Jesus, Elenita’s
father, Salud and Concepcion, inherited the property, and subsequently a new title on their favor
was issued. As to how Elenita acquired the lot, the RTC gave credence to the testimony of
Elenita on the circumstances surrounding the sale of the property. First, it was sold to her by her
father and her aunt so that the family would remain on the lot. Second, the minimal and
inadequate consideration for the 1,440 sq m property was for the purpose of helping her expand
her capital in her business at the time. Thus, the sale was essentially a donation and was therefore
gratuitous in character. Having declared that the property was the paraphernal property of
Elenita, the RTC ruled that the civil liability of Eduardo, which was personal to him, could not
be charged to the exclusive property of his wife.
 P a g e | 403

On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC. The CA elucidated that the gross
inadequacy of the price alone does not affect a contract of sale, except that it may indicate a
defect in the consent, or that the parties really intended a donation or some other act or contract.
The CA ruled that Elenita and Eduardo acquired the property by onerous title during their
marriage through their common fund. Thus, it belonged to the conjugal partnership of gains and
might be levied upon to answer for civil liabilities adjudged against Eduardo.

ISSUE:

Whether the subject property is the paraphernal/exclusive property of Elenita or the conjugal
property of spouses Elenita and Eduardo

HELD:

The Court ruled that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
Registration in the name of the husband or the wife alone does not destroy this presumption. The
separation-in-fact between the husband and the wife without judicial approval shall not affect the
conjugal partnership. The lot retains its conjugal nature. Moreover, the presumption of conjugal
ownership applies even when the manner in which the property was acquired does not appear.
The use of the conjugal funds is not an essential requirement for the presumption to arise.
 P a g e | 404

THE HEIRS OF PROTACIO GO, SR. v. ESTER L. SERVACIO

G.R. No. 157537 September 7, 2011

FACTS:

Jesus B. Gaviola sold two parcels of land to Protacio B. Go, Jr. (Protacio Jr.). Twenty three years
later Protacio, Jr. executed an Affidavit of Renunciation and Waiver, whereby he affirmed under
oath that it was his father, Protacio Go Sr. (Protacio Sr.), not he, who had purchased the two
parcels of land (the property). Marta Barola Go died wife of Protacio, Sr. Protacio, Sr. and his
son Rito B. Go sold a portion of the property to Ester L. Servacio (Servacio).

The petitioners, Heirs of Go Sr., demanded the return of the property, but Servacio did not follow
their demand in which the petitioners decided to sue Servacio. According to the petitioners, they
contend that with the Protacio Jr.‘s renunciation, the property became conjugal property of the
spouses Go Sr. and his wife. They also contend that the sale of the property to Servacio without
the prior liquidation of the community property between spouses Go Sr. and his Marta was null
and void.

RTC affirmed the validity of the sale declaring that the property was the conjugal property of
Protacio Sr. and Marta, not then exclusive property of Protacio Sr., because the sale includes the
children of Marta, that the participation had been by virtue of their being heirs of the late Marta-
that under Article 160 of the Civil Code. The law states that when the property all property
acquired by either spouse during the marriage is conjugal unless there is a proof that the property
thus acquired pertained exclusively.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the sale by Protacio Sr with some of his children to Servacio was void because it
was made without prior liquidation.

RULING:

No. Since Protacio, Sr. and Marta were married prior to the affectivity of the Family Code. Their
property relation was properly considered as a conjugal partnership governed by the Civil Code.
With Marta‘s death, the conjugal partnership was dissolved pursuant to Article175 (1) of the
Civil Code, and an implied ordinary co-ownership ensued among Protacio, Sr. and the other
heirs of Marta with respect to her share in the assets of the conjugal partnership pending a
liquidation following its liquidation. Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-owner with his
children in respect of Marta‘s share in the conjugal partnership, could not claim title to any
specific portion of Marta‘s share without an actual partition of the property being first done
either by agreement or by judicial decree. Until then, all that he had was an ideal or abstract
quota in Marta‘s share and as a co-owner he could sell his undivided share, he had the right to
freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest, but not the interest of his co-owners.
 P a g e | 405

JOE A. ROS v. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK - LAOAG BRANCH

G.R. No. 170166 April 6, 2011

FACTS:

Joe Ros obtained a loan of P115,000.00 from PNB Laoag Branch on October 14, 1974 and as
security for the loan, petitioner, Ros, executed a real estate mortgage involving a parcel of land
with all the. Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result, PNB instituted
extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged property. After the extrajudicial sale, a
Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of PNB, Laoag as the highest bidder. After the lapse of
one (1) year without the property being redeemed, the property was consolidated and registered
in the name of PNB, Laoag Branch on August 10, 1978.
Estrella Agueta, wife of Joe Ros claims that she has no knowledge of the loan obtained by her
husband nor she consented to the mortgage instituted on the conjugal property. On January 13,
1983, spouses Ros and Agueta filed to annul the proceedings pertaining to the mortgage, sale and
consolidation of the property – interposing the defense that her signatures affixed on the
documents were forged and that the loan did not redound to the benefit of the family. PNB seeks
for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of action, and insists that it was petitioners‘
own acts of omission that bar them from recovering the subject property on the ground of
estoppel, laches, abandonment and prescription.

The Trial Court ruled in favor of the petitioners declaring deed of real estate mortgage Null and
Void and ordered the Register of Deeds to rename the title of the lot to the petitioners. Upon
PNB‘s appeal, the Appellate Court reversed the decision of the Trial Court and dismissed the
complaint of the petitioners. The Petitioner‘s then petitioned for review to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the debt/loan was chargeable to the conjugal property.

RULING:

Yes. At the time of the mortgage the Civil Code was the applicable law. Article 161 of the Civil
Code enumerated the instances of which the spouses-conjugal partnership shall be liable and
paragraph (1) one of the said provision states ―all debts and obligations contracted by the
husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the
same purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the partnership‖. The loan was used for
additional working capital for their family business hence, it is considered that such loan was
acquired for the benefit of the conjugal partnership and not merely for the benefit of Ros.
 P a g e | 406

MARIO SIOCHI v. ALFREDO GOZON

March 18, 2010 G.R. No. 169900

FACTS:

A parcel of land was registered TCT No. 5357 in the name of

AlfredoGozon.On23December1991,Elvira Gozon, Alfredo‘s wife, fileda petition for legal
separation against her husband Alfredo. After a month, Elvira filed a notice of lis pendens, which
was then annotated on the title of the land. While the legal separation case of the spouses was
still pending, Alfredo and Mario Siochi entered into an Agreement to Buy and Sell which was
also annotated on the title of the land. After granting the decree of legal separation, Alfredo
executed a Deed of Donation over the property in favor of their daughter, Winifred Gozon. The
Register of Deeds of Malabon, cancelled TCT No. 5357 and issued TCT No. M-10508 in the
name of Winifred, without annotating the Agreement and the notice of lis pendis on TCT No.M-
10508.

October 26, 1994 when Alfredo sold the property to Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc (IDRI).
Through a Special Power of Attorney executed in favor of Winifred. Subsequently, the Register
of Deeds of Malabon cancelled TCT No. M-10508 and issued TCT No. M-10976 to IDRI. Mario
then filed a complaint for Specific Performance and Damages, Annulment of Donation and Sale
with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order.

ISSUES:

a) Whether or not Mario can invoke his right over the property due to the Agreement to
Buy and Sell he entered with Alfredo.

b) Whether or not IDRI can invoke right over the property due to the Sale entered with
Alfredo.

RULING:

No. Alfredo was the sole administrator of the conjugal property because Elvira, with whom
Alfredo was separated in fact, was unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal
property. Still, Alfredo can‘t sell said property without the written consent of Elvira or given
authority of the court. Without consent or authority, the agreement is void.

No. IDRI is not a buyer in good faith. IDRI had actual knowledge of facts regarding the property
hence it should seek further inquiries about the vendor‘s title to the property. Besides, had IDRI
been more prudent before buying the property, it would have discovered that Alfredo‘s donation
of the property to Winifred was without the consent of Elvira. Under Article 125 of the Family
Code, a conjugal property cannot be donated by one spouse without the consent of the other
spouse. Clearly, IDRI was not a buyer in good faith.
 P a g e | 407

SPOUSES AGGABAO v. PARULAN, JR.

G.R. No. 165803 September 1, 2010

FACTS:

Real estate broker Marta Atanacio offered 2 lots to the spouses Aggabao on January 1991. On
February 2, 1991, the petitioners met up with Elena Parulan at the site of the property and
showed them the following documents: (a.) Owner‘s original copy of the TCT of the 2 lots; (b.)
tax declarations; (c.) a copy of the special power of attorney dated January 7, 1991 executed by
Dionisio Parulan authorizing Elena to sell the property. On March 18, 1991, the petitioners
delivered the final amount of their balance to Elena, who executed a deed of absolute sale in their
favor. However, Elena did not turn over the owner‘s duplicate copy of the TCT claiming that
said copy was in the possession of a relative who was then in Hongkong. She assured them that
the owner‘s duplicate copy of TCT would be turned over after a week.

On March 19, 1991, TCT was cancelled and a new one was issued in the name of the petitioners.
Elena did not turn over the duplicate owner‘s copy of TCT as promised. Thus, on April 15, 1991,
Dionisio commenced an action vs Elena Parulan and the Aggabao spouses praying for the
declaration of the nullity of the deed of absolute sale executed by Ma. Elena, and the cancellation
of the title issued to the petitioners by virtue thereof. In turn, the petitioners, Aggabao spouses
and Elena Parulan, filed on July 12, 1991 their own action for specific performance with
damages against the respondent. On July 26, 2000, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 136,
in Makati City annulled the deed of absolute sale executed in favor of the petitioners.

ISSUE:

Which between Article 173 of the Civil Code and Article 124 of the Family Code should apply
to the sale of the conjugal property executed without the consent of Dionisio

RULING:

The sale was made on March 18, 1991, or after August 3, 1988, the effectivity of the Family
Code. The proper law to apply is, therefore, Article 124 of the Family Code, for it is settled that
any alienation or encumbrance of conjugal property made during the effectivity of the Family
Code is governed by Article 124 of the Family Code.

Article 124 of the Family Code provides: The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal
partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband‘s
decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must
be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision. In the
event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of
the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These
powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written
consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on
the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract
 P a g e | 408

upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is
withdrawn by either or both offerors. Next, according to Article 256 of the Family Code, the
provisions of the Family Code may apply retroactively provided no vested rights are impaired.
Herein, however, the petitioners did not show any vested right in the property acquired prior to
August 3, 1988 that exempted their situation from the retroactive application of the Family Code.
Also, the petitioners failed to substantiate their contention that Dionisio, while holding the
administration over the property, had delegated to his brother, Atty. Parulan, the administration
of the property, considering that they did not present in court the SPA granting to Atty. Parulan
the authority for the administration.
 P a g e | 409

MANUEL FUENTES v. CONRADO ROCA

G.R. No. 178902 April 21, 2010

FACTS:

Sabina Tarroza owned a land in Canelar, Zamboanga City and she sold it to her son, Tarciano T.
Roca (Tarciano) under a deed of absolute sale. Six years later in 1988, Tarciano offered to sell
the lot to petitioners Manuel and Leticia Fuentes (the Fuentes spouses) and eventually they
entered into an agreement. After 6 months, a new title was issued in the name of the spouses who
immediately constructed a building on the lot. Thereafter Tarciano passed away, followed by his
wife Rosario who died nine months afterwards.

Eight years later in 1997, the children of Tarciano and Rosario, namely, respondents
(collectively, the Rocas), filed an action for annulment of sale and re-conveyance of the land
against the Fuentes spouses before the RTC. The Rocas claimed that the sale to the spouses was
void since Tarciano‘s wife, Rosario, did not give her consent to it. Her signature on the affidavit
of consent had been forged. They thus prayed that the property be reconvened to them upon
reimbursement of the price that the Fuentes spouses paid Tarciano.The spouses denied the
Rocas‘ allegations. They presented Atty. Plagata who testified that he personally saw Rosario
sign the affidavit at her residence. All the same, the Fuentes spouses pointed out that the claim of
forgery was personal to Rosario andshealonecouldinvokeit.Besides,thefour-
yearprescriptiveperiodfornullifyingthe sale on ground of fraud had already lapsed.

ISSUES:

a) Whether or not the signature of Rosario representing her consent was forged.

b) Whether or not the Rocas‘ action for the declaration of nullity of that sale to the spouses
already prescribed
c) WhetherornotonlyRosario,the wife whose consent was not had, could bring the action to annul
that sale

RULING:

Yes it was forged as the Supreme Court ruled. A defective notarization will merely strip the
document of its public character and reduce it to a private instrument that falsified jurat, taken
together with the marks of forgery in the signature, dooms such document as proof of Rosario‘s
consent to the sale of the land. That the Fuentes spouses honestly relied on the notarized affidavit
as proof of Rosario‘s consent does not matter. The sale is still void without an authentic consent.

No. Although Tarciano and Rosario got married in 1950, Tarciano sold the conjugal property to
the Fuentes spouses on January 11, 1989, a few months after the Family Code took effect on
August 3, 1988. The Family Code applied for this case. The Family Code took effect on August
3, 1988. Its Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains expressly superseded Title VI, Book I of
the Civil Code on Property Relations between Husband and Wife. Further, the Family Code
provisions were also made to apply to already existing conjugal partnerships without prejudice to
 P a g e | 410

vested rights. Article 124 of the Family Code does not provide a period within which the wife
who gave no consent may assail her husband‘s sale of the real property. It simply provides that
without the other spouse‘s written consent or a court order allowing the sale, the same would be
void. Here, the Rocas filed an action against the Fuentes spouses in 1997 for annulment of sale
and re- conveyance of the real property that Tarciano sold without their mother‘s (his wife‘s)
written consent. The passage of time did not erode the right to bring such an action.

Yes. As stated above, that sale was void from the beginning. Consequently, the land remained
the property of Tarciano and Rosario despite that sale. When the two died, they passed on the
ownership of the property to their heirs.
 P a g e | 411

METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST CO. v. NICHOLSON PASCUAL

G.R. No. 163744 February 29, 2008

FACTS:

Respondent Nicholson Pascual and Florencia Nevalga got married on 1985. During the union,
Florencia bought from spouses Clarito and Belen Sering a 250-square meter lot in with an
apartment standing thereon. On year 1994, Florencia filed suit for the declaration of nullity of
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on part of Nelson under Article 36 of the
Family Code. RTC declared the marriage null and void. Also, it ordered the dissolution and
liquidation of the ex- spouses' conjugal partnership of gains. The spouses weren‘t able to
liquidate their conjugal partnership even after the declaration of their legal separation.

Sometime in 1997, Florencia with Sps. Norberto and Elvira Oliveros obtained a loan from
petitioner, Metrobank secured the obligation several Real Estate Mortgage (REM) on their
properties including one involving the lot bought from Sering and showed a waiver made in
favor of Florencia, covering the conjugal properties with her ex-husband, but did not incidentally
include the lot in question (bought from Sering).

When Florencia and Sps. Oliveros failed to pay their loan due, Metrobank initiated foreclosure
proceedings and caused the publication of auction sale on 3 issues of the REM‘s. Nicholson filed
a Complaint to declare the nullity of the mortgage of the disputed property alleging that the
property, which is conjugal, was mortgaged without his consent. Metrobank in its answer:
Alleged that the lot registered in the name of Florencia was paraphernalia. Metrobank also
asserted having approved the mortgage in good faith. Florencia was declared in default for
failure to file an answer within reglementary period. RTc declared the REM Invalid and
Metrobank is mortgagee in bad faith on account of negligence. The CA affirmed the RTC‘s
decision. Petitioner then appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:

a) Whether or not the declaration of nullity of marriage between the respondents dissolved the
regime of community of property of the spouses.

b) Whether the lot in question was conjugal and rendered the REM over the lot invalid.

RULING:

No. The mere declaration of nullity of marriage, without more, does not automatically result in a
regime of complete separation when it is shown that there was no liquidation of the conjugal
assets.While the declared nullity of marriage of Nicholson and Florencia severed their marital
bond and dissolved the conjugal partnership, the character of the properties acquired before such
declaration continues to subsist as conjugal properties until and after the liquidation and partition
of the partnership.
 P a g e | 412

No. Art. 493 of the Civil Code shall govern the property relationship between the former
spouses, where: Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and
benefits pertaining thereto and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even
substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the
effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the
portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
Florencia has the right to mortgage or even sell her 1⁄2 undivided interests in the disputed party
even without the consent of Nicholson. However, the rights of Metrobank, as mortgagee, are
limited only to the 1/2 undivided portion that Florencia owned. Accordingly, the mortgage
contract insofar as it covered the remaining 1/2 undivided portion of the lot is null and void,
Nicholson not having consented to the mortgage of his undivided half.
 P a g e | 413

DOMINGO v. MOLINA
GR No. 200274 April 20, 2016

FACTS:

In June 15, 1951, the spouses Anastacio and Flora Domingo bought a property in Camiling,
Tarlac, The sale was annotated on the Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 16354 covering the
subject property. Anastacio borrowed money from the respondent spouses Genaro and Elena
Molina. In 1986, Anastacio died. In May 19, 1995, the sale of Anastacio’s interest was registered
under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 272967 and transferred the entire one-half
undivided portion of the land to the spouses Molina.

Melecio, one of the children of Anastacio and Flora, learned of the transfer and filed a Complaint
for Annulment of Title and Recovery of Ownership. Melecio claims that Anastacio gave the
subject property to the spouses Molina to serve as collateral for the money that Anastacio
borrowed. Anastacio could not have validly sold the interest over the subject property without
Flora’s consent, as Flora was already dead at the time of the sale. Meanwhile, the spouses
Molina died during the pendency of the case and were substituted by their adopted son, Cornelio
Molina.

The RTC dismissed the case because Melecio failed to establish his claim that Anastacio did not
sell the property to the spouses Molina. the CA affirmed the RTC ruling in toto.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the sale of a conjugal property to the spouses Molina without Flora’s consent is
valid and legal

HELD:

In the case of Taningco v. Register of Deeds of Laguna, we held that the properties of a
dissolved conjugal partnership fall under the regime of co-ownership among the surviving
spouse and the heirs of the deceased spouse until final liquidation and partition. The surviving
spouse, however, has an actual and vested one-half undivided share of the properties, which does
not consist of determinate and segregated properties until liquidation and partition of the
conjugal partnership.

An implied ordinary co-ownership ensued among Flora’s surviving heirs, including Anastacio,
with respect to Flora’s share of the conjugal partnership until final liquidation and partition;
Anastacio, on the other hand, owns one-half of the original conjugal partnership properties as his
share, but this is an undivided interest.

Thus, Anastacio, as co-owner, cannot claim title to any specific portion of the conjugal
properties without an actual partition being first done either by agreement or by judicial decree.
Nonetheless, Anastacio had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest in the
subject property.
 P a g e | 414

BRIGIDO QUIOA v. RITA QUIAO

G.R. No. 176556 July 4, 2012

FACTS:

Respondent Rita Quiao, the offended spouse, filed a legal separation against the petitioner
Brigido Quiao on October 26, 2000 before the RTC. The decision of the court dated October 10,
2005 declared the legal separation, custody of children to Rita, equal partition on the personal
and real properties, and forfeiture on the part of Brigido the net profits earned from the conjugal
properties in favor of the common children. Neither party filed a Motion for Reconsideration and
appealed within the required period for legal separation. December 12, 2005, Rita filed a Motion
for Execution and was later on granted.

Brigido file a Motion for Clarification on the ―net profit earned‖. The Court defined it asthe
remainder of the properties of the parties after deducting the separate properties of each [of the]
spouse and the debts basing on Articles 63 and 43 of the Family Code. Brigido filed a Motion for
Reconsideration on September 8, 2006. Though the petition was after the required prescriptive
period, the court granted the petition since its purpose was to clarify the meaning of the ―net
profit earned‖. With that on November 8, 2006 the court ordered that the ―net profit earned‖ be
based on the Article 102 of the family Code.
November 21, 2006, the respondent, Rita, filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MR) praying for
the reversal of the Nov. 8, 2006 court order. The Court then granted the MR. Brigido then filed a
Petition for Review questioning the following: dissolution and liquidation of the common
properties, meaning of the ―net profit earned‖, and the law governing the property relation
between him and Rita.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner can question decision by the RTC dated October 10, 2005.

RULING:

No. Brigido wasn‘t able to timely appeal the decision of the court dated October 10, 2005, thus,
the decision on that date is deemed final and executory hence, he had slept on his right to
question.The respondent tied the marital knot on January 6, 1977. Since at the time of the
exchange of marital vows, the operative law was the Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No.
386) and since they did not agree on a marriage settlement, the property relations between the
petitioner and the respondent is the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of
gain. And under this property relation, "the husband and the wife place in a common fund the
fruits of their separate property and the income from their work or industry." The husband and
wife also own in common all the property of the conjugal partnership of gains. the time of the
dissolution of the petitioner and the respondent's marriage the operative law is already the Family
Code, the same applies in the instant case and the applicable law in so far as the liquidation of
the conjugal partnership assets and liabilities is concerned is Article 129 of the Family Code in
 P a g e | 415

relation to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. The latter provision is applicable because according
to Article 256 of the Family Code "this Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other law."
 P a g e | 416

YAO v. PERELLO
G.R. No. 153828 October 24, 2003

FACTS:

The Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) issued a writ of execution for the
satisfaction of its judgment in favor of petitioner and against PR Builders, Inc. and its managers,
which included Pablito Villarin, private respondent’s husband. Pursuant to the writ, the deputy
sheriff levied on a parcel of land registered in the names of spouses Villarin and the property was
scheduled for public auction. Private respondent filed a petition for prohibition alleging that the
subject property could not be levied on to answer for the separate liability of her husband. The
trial court granted the petition and exempted the subject property from execution. Hence, the
scheduled auction sale did not materialize. Consequently, petitioner filed a motion for
intervention, but the same was denied. Hence, this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not lower Court grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s motion for
intervention on the ground that the same was filed late.

HELD:

Petitioner’s claim that he had the right to intervene is without basis. Nothing in the said provision
requires the inclusion of a private party as respondent in petitions for prohibition. On the other
hand, to allow intervention, it must be shown that (a) the movant has a legal interest in the matter
in litigation or otherwise qualified, and (b) consideration must be given as to whether the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties may be delayed or prejudiced, or whether the
intervenor’s rights may be protected in a separate proceeding or not. Both requirements must
concur as the first is not more important than the second.

Moreover, even granting for the sake of argument that petitioner indeed had the right to
intervene, he must exercise said right in accordance with the rules and within the period
prescribed therefor.

As provided in the Rules of Court, the motion for intervention may be filed at any time before
rendition of judgment by the trial court, in this case Petitioner filed his motion way beyond the
period set forth in the rules.
 P a g e | 417

OCAMPO v. OCAMPO
GR No. 198908 August 3, 2015

FACTS:

On September 10, 1990, petitioner Virginia Sy Ocampo (Virginia) filed a Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of her Marriage with Deogracio Ocampo (Deogracio) before Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87, on the ground of psychological incapacity. The decision
became final, since no party appealed the judgment annulling the marriage. On March 31, 1999,
the trial court directed the parties to submit a project of partition of their inventoried properties,
and if they failed to do so, a hearing will be held on the factual issues with regard to said
properties. Having failed to agree on a project of partition of their conjugal properties, hearing
ensued where the parties adduced evidence in support of their respective stand. On January 13,
2004, the trial court rendered the assailed Order stating that the properties declared by the parties
belong to each one of them on a 50-50 sharing.

ISSUE:

Whether respondent should be deprived of his share in the conjugal partnership of gains by
reason of bad faith and psychological perversity.

RULING:

No. The Court held that in a void marriage, as in those declared void under Article 36 of the
Family Code, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed
either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. Article 147 of the Family Code applies
to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract
marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void, as in this case. Article 147 of the Family Code
provides: xxx In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived
together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and
shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not
participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have
contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family and of the household.

xxx This particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal
impediment to marry each other, exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void
marriage or without the benefit of marriage. It is clear, therefore, that for Article 147 to operate,
the man and the woman: (1) must be capacitated to marry each other; (2) live exclusively with
each other as husband and wife; and (3) their union is without the benefit of marriage or their
marriage is void, as in the instant case. The term "capacitated" in the first paragraph of the
provision pertains to the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage. Any impediment to marry
has not been shown to have existed on the part of either Virginia or Deogracio. They lived
exclusively with each other as husband and wife. However, their marriage was found to be void
under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity. From the
foregoing, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry should, therefore,
 P a g e | 418

be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is
prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. Thus, the trial court and
the appellate court correctly held that the parties will share on equal shares considering that
Virginia failed to prove that the properties were acquired solely on her own efforts.

We note that the former spouses both substantially agree that they acquired the subject properties
during the subsistence of their marriage.
The certificates of titles and tax declarations are not sufficient proof to overcome the
presumption under Article 116 of the Family Code. All properties acquired by the spouses during
the marriage, regardless in whose name the properties are registered, are presumed conjugal
unless proved otherwise. The presumption is not rebutted by the mere fact that the certificate of
title of the property or the tax declaration is in the name of one of the spouses only. Article 116
expressly provides that the presumption remains even if the property is "registered in the name of
one or both of the spouses."

Thus, the failure of Virginia to rebut this presumption, said properties were obtained by the
spouses' joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be jointly owned by them in equal shares.
Accordingly, the partition of the former spouses' properties on the basis of co-ownership, as
ordered by the RTC and the appellate court, should be affirmed, and not on the regime of
conjugal partnership of gains

BARRIDO v. NONATO
 P a g e | 419

GR No. 176492 October 20, 2014

FACTS:

Leonardo and Marrieta’s marriage was dissolved by reson of psychological incapacity in 1996,
hence Leanardo filed a complaint for partition over their co-ownership. In her defense, Marrieta
claimed that the property had been sold to their children Joseph Raymod and Joseph Leo. She
also moved for the dismissal of the action for lack of jurisdictionof the part of the MTCC
Bacolod City, the action for partition being an action incapable of pecuniary estimation. Per
decision of the MTXX, it ruled in favour of Marrietta and adjudicated the land to her, being the
spouse with shom the majority of the common children choose to remain. It also awarded moral
damages in favour of Marrieta.

Leonardo appelad the ruling to the RTC, which reversed the MTCC ruling and ordered the
partition of the property, hence Marrietta appealed the RTC decision to the CA by petition for
review. The appellate court denied MArrietta’s appeal, ruling that since the assessed value of the
property is only PHP8,080.00, it clearly fell within the MTXX jurisdiction. Though the RTC
applied ART. 129 instead of ART 147 thereof, it still correctly ordered the partition of the
property.

Marrieta elevated her case to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the honorable court of appeals erred in holding that article 129 of the family code
has no application in the present case, on the assumption

HELD:

The records reveal that Nonatoand Barrido’s marriage had been declared void for psychological
incapacity under Article 3610 of the Family Code. During their marriage, however, the conjugal
partnership regime governed their property relations. Although Article 12911 provides for the
procedure in case of dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, Article 147 specifically
covers the effects of void marriages on the spouses’ property relations. Article 147 reads:

Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively
with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage,
their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by
both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed tohave been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall beowned by
them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the
acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the
acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and
of the household.
 P a g e | 420

Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property
acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after
the termination of their cohabitation.

Here, the former spouses both agree that they acquired the subject property during the
subsistence of their marriage. Thus, it shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint
efforts, work or industry, and shall be jointly owned by them in equal shares. Barrido, however,
claims that the ownership over the property in question is already vested on their children, by
virtue of a Deed of Sale. But aside from the title to the property still being registered in the
names of the former spouses, said document of safe does not bear a notarization of a notary
public. It must be noted that without the notarial seal, a document remains to be private and
cannot be converted into a public document,21 making it inadmissible in evidence unless
properly authenticated.22 Unfortunately, Barrido failed to prove its due execution and
authenticity. In fact, she merely annexed said Deed of Sale to her position paper. Therefore, the
subject property remains to be owned in common by Nonato and Barrido, which should be
divided in accordance with the rules on co-ownership.

ALAIN DIÑO v. MA CARIDAD DIÑO

G.R. No. 17804 January 19, 2011
 P a g e | 421

FACTS:

Petitioner Alain M. Diño and respondent Caridad L. Diño have beenchildhood friends and s
weethearts. They lived together for ten years thenseparated. After two years, they reunited and
later on decided to get married. However, Alain filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of
marriage based on the psychological incapacity (Article 36 of the Family Code) of Caridad.

He alleged that Caridad failed to give him love and support throughout their marriage and was
irresponsible, unfaithful, and prodigal. He also alleged that Caridad tends to be violent toward
him. Extrajudicial service of summons was sent to Caridad who was living in the United Stated
at that time. She did file any answer within the reglementary period. It was also learned that she
already filed a divorce in the United States, which was granted by the Superior Court of
California, and is now married to another man. The prosecutor of Las Piñas declared that there
was no collusion between the two parties.
A psychological report was submitted stating that Caridad was suffering from Narcissistic
Personality Disorder which rooted from her early formative years and which was founded to be
long-lasting and incurable.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage
shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties‘ properties under
Article 147 of the Family Code.

RULING:

Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present: 1. The man and
the woman must be capacitated to marry each other; 2. They live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife; and 3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void.
All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article 147 of the Family
Code applies to the property relations between Alian and Caridad. The Court agrees with Alain
that the trial court erred in ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued
only after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties‘ properties under Article 147 of
theFamily Code. The ruling has no basis because Section 19(1) of the Rule does not apply to
cases governed under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code. Section19(1) of the Rule
provides: Sec. 19.

MARGARET MAXEY v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-45870 May 11, 1984
 P a g e | 422

FACTS:

Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales started living together in 1903. They were united in 1903
in a marriage performed "in the military fashion". During the period of their (Melbourne and
Regina) cohabitation, or in 1911 and 1912, respectively, the late Melbourne Maxey acquired the
parcels of land before their 1919 church marriage. Regina Morales Maxey died in 1919
sometime after the church wedding. The husband remarried and in 1953, his second wife Julia
Pamatluan, using a power of attorney, sold the properties to the respondent spouses, Mr. and
Mrs. Beato C. Macayra.

Plaintiffs, children of Maxey and Morales, instituted the present case on January 26, 1962, before
the Court of First Instance of Davao, praying for the annulment of the documents of sale
covering the subject parcels of land and to recover possession thereof with damages from the
herein defendants-spouses, alleging, among others, that the aforesaid realties were common
properties of their parents, having been acquired during their lifetime and through their joint
effort and capital.

The trial court applied Article 144 of the Civil Code which provide ―When a man and a woman
live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is void from the
beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their
wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.‖ Thus, the property in
question is owned both by Maxey and Morales in which the sale of the property by Maxey alone
was invalid.

The Court of Appeals adjudged that the property was exclusive property of Melbourne Maxey
thus the sale was valid making the buyer, Spouses Macayra, the absolute owner of the land.

ISSUES:

a) Whether or not the military fashion marriage of Maxey and Morales was recognized as valid.

b) Whether or not the property in question is co-owned by Maxey and Morales applying Article
144 of the Civil Code.

RULING:

No. Maxey and Morales were legally married at a church wedding solemnized on February 16,
1919. Since Act No. 3613 was approved on December 4, 1929 and took effect six months
thereafter, it could not have applied to a relationship commenced in 1903 and legitimized in 1919
through a marriage performed according to law. The marriage law in 1903 was General Order
No. 70. There is no provision in General Order No. 68 as amended nor in Act No. 3613 which
would recognize as an exception to the general rule on valid marriages, a so called "Military
fashion" ceremony or arrangement.
 P a g e | 423

Yes. As far as there was no vested right that would be impaired or prejudiced by applying Article
144 then it shall be applied retroactively. The properties were sold in 1953 when the new Civil
Code was already in full force and effect. Neither can this be said of the rights of the private
respondents as vendees insofar as one half of the questioned properties are concerned as this was
still open to controversy on account of the legitimate claim of Regina Morales to a share under
the applicable law. The disputed properties were owned in common by Melbourne Maxey and
the estate of his late wife, Regina Morales, when they were sold. Technically speaking, the
petitioners should return one-half of the purchase price of the land while the private respondents
should pay some form of rentals for their use of one-half of the properties. Equitable
considerations, however, lead us to rule out rentals on one hand and return on the other.

SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑO v. SUSAN YEE CARIÑO

 P a g e | 424

GR No. 132529 February 2, 2001

FACTS:

SPO4 Santiago CAriño married petitioner Susan Nicdao on June 20, 1969, with whom he had
two children, Sahlee and Sandee. On November 10, 1982, SPO4 Cariño also married respondent
Susan Yee. In 1988, SPO4 Cariño became bedridden due to diabetes and tuberculosis, and died
on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee who spent for his medical and burial
expenses. Both Susans filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance from various
government agencies pertaining to the deceased. Nicdao was able to collect P146,000 from
MBAI, PCCVI, commutation, NAPOLCOM and Pag-ibig, while Yee received a total of P21,000
from GSIS burial and SSS burial insurance.
On December 14, 1993, Yee filed for collection of money against NIcdao, praying that Nicdao
be ordered to return to her at least one-half of the P146,000 NIcdao had collected. For failing to
file her answer, NIcdao was declared in default.

Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the subsistence of and without
first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage between Nicdao and Cariño. But
she claimed good faith, having no knowledge of the previous marriage until at the funeral where
she met Nicdao who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased. Yee submitted that Cariño‘s
marriage to Nicdao was void because it was solemnized without the required marriage license.

ISSUES:

a) Whether or not the subsequent marriage is null and void.

b) Whether or not the wife of the deceased is entitled to collect the death benefits from
government agencies despite the nullity of their marriage.

RULING:

No. Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such marriage void.
Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes
of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to
be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. However,
for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an
absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship,
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a
criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the
death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of
said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. Under the Civil Code
which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner and the deceased was solemnized in
1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, and the absence therof, subject to
certain exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio.
 P a g e | 425

No. It does not follow, however, that since the marriage of Nicdao and the deceased was void ab
initio, the death benefits would now be awarded to Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40 of the
Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity
of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage; otherwise,
the second marriage would also be void. One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of
marriage is the separation of the property of the spouses according to the applicable property
regime. Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property regime
would be not absolute community nor conjugal partnership of property, but governed by the
provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code, on Property Regime of Unions Without
Marriage.

ANTONIO VALDES v. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT

 P a g e | 426

G.R. No. 122749 July 31, 1996

FACTS:

Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971 and begotten 5 children. Valdez
filed a petition in 1992 for a declaration of nullity of their marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the
Family Code, which was granted hence, marriage is null and void on the ground of their mutual
psychological incapacity. Stella and Joaquin are placed under the custody of their mother while
the other 3 siblings are free to choose which they prefer.
Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the procedure for the
liquidation of common property in ―unions without marriage‖. During the hearing on the
motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing desire to stay with their father.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the property regime should be based on co-ownership.

RULING:

Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the
property relations of the parties are governed by the rules on co-ownership. Any property
acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint
efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as
having contributed thereto jointly if said party‘s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of
the family.

NOEL BUENAVENTURA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

 P a g e | 427

G.R. Nos. 127358 & G.R. Nos. 127449 March 31, 2005

FACTS:

Noel Buenaventura filed a position for the declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground that
both he and his wife were psychologically incapacitated. The RTC in its decision, declared the
marriage entered into between petitioner and respondent null and violation ordered the
liquidation of the assets of the conjugal partnership property; ordered petitioner a regular support
in favor of his son in the amount of 15,000 monthly, subject to modification as the necessity
arises, and awarded the care and custody of the minor to his mother. Petitioner appealed before
the CA. While the appeal was pending, the CA, upon respondent‘s motion issued a resolution
increasing the support pendants. The CA dismissal petitioner appeal for lack of merit and
affirmed in to the RTC decision. Petitioner motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this
petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not co-ownership is applicable to valid marriage.

RULING:

Yes. Since the present case does not involve the annulment of a bigamous marriage, the
provisions of article 50 in relation to articles 41, 42 and 43 of the Family Code, providing for the
dissolution of the absolute community or conjugal partnership of gains, as the case maybe, do
not apply. Rather the general rule applies, which is in case a marriage is declared void ab initio,
the property regime applicable to be liquidated, partitioned and distributed is that of equal co-
ownership.

Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court a quo were found, both by the RTC
and the CA, to have been acquired during the union of the parties, the same would be covered by
the co-ownership. No fruits of a separate property of one of the parties appear to have been
included or involved in said distribution.

BARRETO GONZALES vs. GONZALES

 P a g e | 428

G.R. No. 159521 March 7, 1933

FACTS:

The plaintiff & defendant were both citizens of the Philippines, married & lived together from
January 1919 until Spring of 1926. After which they voluntary separated & have not lived
together as man & wife, they had 4 minor children together. After negotiations, both parties
mutually agreed to allow Manuela Barreto (plaintiff) for her & her children‘s support of P500
(five hundred pesos) monthly which to be increased in cases of necessity & illness, and that the
title of certain properties be put in her name.

Shortly after the agreement, Augusto Gonzales (defendant), when to Reno, Nevada & secured in
that jurisdiction an absolute divorce on the ground of desertion dated November 28, 1927. On
that same date he went through the forms of marriage with another Filipino citizen as well & had
3children with her. When Gonzales left the Philippines, he reduced the amount he had agreed to
pay monthly for the support of Manuela Barreto & her children & has not made the payments
fixed in the Reno divorce as alimony. Gonzales came back to the Philippines in August 1928 and
shortly after, Barreto brought an action at the CFI-Manila requesting to confirm & ratify the
decree of divorce issued by the courts of Nevada & invoked sec 9 of Act 2710. Such is requested
to be enforced, and deliver to the Guardian ad litem the equivalent of what would have been due
to their children as their legal portion from respective estates had their parents died intestate on
November 28, 1927, they also prayed that the marriage existing between Barreto & Gonzales be
declared dissolved & Gonzales be ordered to pay Barreto P500 per month, counsel fees of P5000
& all the expenses incurred in educating the 3 minor sons. The guardians of the children also
filed as intervenors in the case.

After the hearing, the CFI-Manila granted the judgement in favor of the plaintiff & intervenors,
but reduced the attorney‘s fees to P3000 instead & also granted the costs of the action against the
defendant, Hence, this appeal by Gonzales saying that the lower court erred in their decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not any foreign divorce, relating to citizens of the Philippine Islands, will be
recognized in this jurisdiction, except it be for a cause, and under conditions for which the courts
of the Philippine Islands would grant a divorce.

RULING:

No. The lower court erred in granting the relief as prayed for on granting the divorce, because:
The court said that securing the jurisdiction of the courts to recognize & approve the divorce
done in Reno, Nevada cannot be done according to the public policy in this jurisdiction on the
question of divorce. It‘s clear in Act No. 2710 & court decisions on cases such as Goitia VS.
Campos Rueda that the entire conduct of the parties from the time of their separation until the
case was submitted praying the ratification of the Reno Divorce was clearly a circumvention of
the law regarding divorce & will be done under conditions not authorized by our laws. The
matrimonial domicile of the couple had always been the Philippines & the residence acquired by
 P a g e | 429

the husband in Reno, Nevada was a bona fide residence & did not confer jurisdiction upon the
court of that state to dissolve the matrimonial bonds in which he had entered in 1919.

Art 9 & Art 11 of the Civil Code & The Divorce Law of the Philippines does not allow such to
be done, the effect of foreign divorce in the Philippines says that litigants cannot compel the
courts to approve of their own actions or permit the personal relations of the Citizens of the
Philippines to be affected by decrees of divorce of foreign courts in manner which out
government believes is contrary to public order & good morals.

MERCADO-FEHR v. FEHR
G.R. No. 152716 October 23, 2003
 P a g e | 430

FACTS:

In March 1983, after 2 years of long-distance courtship, Elna left Cebuand moved in with Bruno
in Manila. They had their first child in December thesame year. They purchased a condominium
unit (Suite 204) at LGCcondominium by a contract TO sell dated July 26, 1983. They got
married inMarch 1985. In 1998, trial court declared the marriage between Elna and Bruno,void
ab initio under FC 36 and subsequently ordered the liquidation of theirconjugal partnership. The
court found Suite 204 to be exclusive property of Bruno because it was purchased on installment
also divided into 3 (1/3-Elna;1/3-Bruno; 1/3-2 children).

ISSUE:

Whether or not Suite 204 is Bruno‘s exclusive property

RULING:
……………………………………………………
No. The Family Code, Article 147 applies in this case because 1) both of them were capacitated
tomarry each other; 2) they lived exclusively as husband and wife; and 3) theirunion is without
the benefit of marriage or their marriage is void. Evidenceshows that the property was acquired
during their cohabitation and in applyingFC 147, the rules on co-ownership should govern. Suite
204 must be consideredas common property of Elna and Bruno. 3-way partition of properties
does not apply also. Property regime should be divided in accordance with the law on co-
ownership

SALAS v. AGUILA
 P a g e | 431

GR No. 202370, September 23, 2013

FACTS:

On September 7 1985, Juan Sevilla Salas Jr. and Eden Villena Aguila were married. Aguila gave
birth to their daughter on June 7 1986. Five months later, Salas left their conjugal dwelling.
Since then, he no longer communicated with Aguila or their child. On October 7, 2003, Aguila
filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage citing psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code. The petition states that they “have no conjugal properties
whatsoever”. On May 7, 2007, RTC nullify their marriage and further provides the dissolution of
their conjugal property, if any. On September 10, 2007, Aguila filed a manifestation and motion
stating that she discovered 3 properties registered to Juan S. Salas, married to Rubina C. Salas.

However, Salas alleged that Aguila waived her rights to the Discovered Properties in
consideration of other properties waived by Salas in favour of Aguila. Thus, he contends that
conjugal properties were deemed partitioned. RTC directed Salas and Aguila to partition by
proper instruments of conveyance the discovered properties. CA affirmed the decision of the
RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the discovered properties are acquired during the marriage of Salas and Aguila,
thus a conjugal property and subject for partition between them.

RULING:

Yes. Aguila proved that the Discovered Properties were acquired by Salas during the validity of
their marriage. The phrase “married to” in the title is merely descriptive of the civil status of the
registered owner, Salas. Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the union of parties who are
legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage
is declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code. Under this property regime, property
acquired during marriage is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through the couple’s
joint efforts and governed by the rules of co-ownership. Thus, the Discovered Properties should
be partitioned on the basis of co-ownership.

JO-ANN DIAZ-SALGADO AND HUSBAND DR. GERARD C. SALGADO V

LUIS G. ANSON
 P a g e | 432

G.R. No. 20449 July 27, 2016

FACTS:

On September 5, 2003, Luis Anson (Luis) filed a Complaint5 docketed as Civil Case No. 69611
against Jo-Ann Diaz-Salgado (Jo-Ann) and Gerard Salgado (Gerard) (Spouses Salgado) along
with Maria Luisa Anson-Maya (Maria Luisa) and Gaston Maya (Spouses Maya), seeking the
annulment of the three Unilateral Deeds of Sale6 dated January 23, 2002 and the Deed of Extra-
Judicial Settlement of Estate of the Deceased Severina De Asis dated October 25, 2002.

Luis alleged in his complaint that he is the surv1vmg spouse of the late Severina de Asis-Anson
(Severina). They were married in a civil ceremony on December 28, 1966. Prior to the
celebration of their marriage, Severina gave birth to their daughter, Maria Luisa on December
30, 1965 while Jo-Ann is Severina's daughter from a previous relationship. According to Luis,
because there was no marriage settlement between him and Severina But without his knowledge
and consent, Severina executed three separate Unilateral Deeds of Sale on January 23, 2002
transferring the properties covered by TCT Nos. 20618, 60069 and 5109 in favor of Jo-Ann

On July 23, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision in favor of Luis, holding that the marriage
between Luis and Severina was valid. On November 17, 2008, the RTC rendered another
Decision44 which ordered the "ANNULMENT, VOIDING, SETTING ASIDE and
DECLARING OF NO FORCE AND EFFECT the Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of
the Deceased Severina De Asis. The RTC also ordered the cancellation of new TCTs issued by
virtue of the said Deeds.

The CA sustained the ruling of the RTC for the simple reason that the Spouses Salgado did not
present and formally offer any testimonial and documentary evidence to controvert the evidence
presented by Luis.

ISSUE:

Whether the CA committed reversible error in affirming the RTC decision which declared the
marriage between Luis and Severina valid and the subject lands as conjugal properties.

HELD:

As there is no showing that Luis and Severina were incapacitated to marry each other at the time
of their cohabitation and considering that their marriage is void from the beginning for lack of a
valid marriage license, Article 144 of the Civil Code,89 in relation to Article 147 of the Family
Code, are the pertinent provisions of law governing their property relations. Article 147 of the
Family Code "applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any
impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like
absence of a marriage license."90 "Under this property regime, property acquired by both
spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership.
Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through
their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall still be
 P a g e | 433

considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party's 'efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family household."'

Accordingly, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code shall apply in the partition of
the properties co-owned by Luis and Severina. It is stated under Article 1079 of the Civil Code
that "partition, in general, is the separation, division and assignment of a thing held in common
among those to whom it may belong. The thing itself may be divided, or its value." As to how
partition may be validly done, Article 496 of the Civil Code is precise that "partition may be
made by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings x x x." The law does not
impose a judicial approval for the agreement to be valid. Hence, even without the same, the
partition was validly done by Luis and Severina through the execution of the Partition
Agreement.

Moreover, Luis admitted the existence, due execution and authenticity of the Partition
Agreement. It also remains uncontroverted that he already received his share as stipulated in the
Partition Agreement. As such, the Court finds no reason to have the said agreement declared null
and void or annulled, in the absence of any circumstance which renders such contract invalid or
at least, voidable.

SUSAN NICDAO-CARINO v. SUSAN YEE CARINO

GR No. 132529 February 2, 2001
 P a g e | 434

FACTS:

SPO4 Santiago CAriño married petitioner Susan Nicdao on June 20, 1969, with whom he had
two children, Sahlee and Sandee. On November 10, 1982, SPO4 Cariño also married respondent
Susan Yee. In 1988, SPO4 Cariño became bedridden due to diabetes and tuberculosis, and died
on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee who spent for his medical and burial
expenses. Both Susans filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance from various
government agencies pertaining to the deceased. Nicdao was able to collect P146,000 from
MBAI, PCCVI, commutation, NAPOLCOM and Pag-ibig, while Yee received a total of P21,000
from GSIS burial and SSS burial insurance.
On December 14, 1993, Yee filed for collection of money against NIcdao, praying that Nicdao
be ordered to return to her at least one-half of the P146,000 NIcdao had collected. For failing to
file her answer, Nicdao was declared in default. Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased
took place during the subsistence of and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of
the marriage between Nicdao and Cariño. But she claimed good faith, having no knowledge of
the previous marriage until at the funeral where she met Nicdao who introduced herself as the
wife of the deceased. Yee submitted that Cariño‘s marriage to Nicdao was void because it was
solemnized without the required marriage license.

ISSUES:

a) Whether or not the subsequent marriage is null and void;

b) Whether or not, if yes to above, the wife of the deceased is entitled to collect the death
benefits from government agencies despite the nullity of their marriage.

RULING:

Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such marriage void.
Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes
of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to
be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.

However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a
marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of
heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property
regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even
after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the
validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case.

Under the Civil Code which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner and the
deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, and the
absence therof, subject to certain exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio. It does not
follow, however, that since the marriage of Nicdao and the deceased was void ab initio, the death
 P a g e | 435

benefits would now be awarded to Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family Code, for
purposes of remarriage, there must be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous
marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage; otherwise, the second
marriage would also be void.

One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the property.

GUILLERMA TUMLOS v. SPOUSES MARIO FERNANDEZ and LOURDES

FERNANDEZ
 P a g e | 436

G.R. No. 137650 April 12, 2000

FACTS:

On July 5, 1996, the said spouses alleged that they are the absolute owners of an apartment
building located at ARTE SUBDIVISION III, Lawang Bato, Valenzuela, Metro Manila; that
through tolerance they had allowed Guillerma, petitioner, Toto and Gina Tumlos to occupy the
apartment building for the last seven (7) years, since 1989, without the payment of any rent; that
it was agreed upon that after a few months, defendant Guillerma Tumlos will pay P1,600.00 a
month while the other promised to pay P1,000.00 a month, both as rental, which agreement was
not complied with by the said defendants.

She averred therein that the Fernandez spouses had no cause of action against her, since she is a
co-owner of the subject premises as evidenced by a Contract to Sell wherein it was stated that
she is a co-vendee of the property in question together with Mario Fernandez.

Mario Fernandez and Guillerma had an amorous relationship, and that they acquired the property
in question as their love nest. It was further alleged that they lived together in the said apartment
building with their two (2) children for around ten (10) years, and that Guillerma administered
the property by collecting rentals from the lessees of the other apartments, until she discovered
that Mario deceived her as to the annulment of his marriage.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner Guillerma Tumlos is the co-owner of the property by virtue of
cohabiting with Mario Fernandez who is legally married to Lourdez Fernandez.

RULING:

In the present case Article 148 of the family Code shall apply. Article 148 states that ―In cases
of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of
the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned
by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the
contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule
and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall
accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage.‖
Guillerma Tumlos fail to present an evidence of her actual contribution to the purchase of the
property. In Article 148 did not include also administration of the property as contribution, it is
unsubstantiated.

JOSEFINA C. FRANCISCO v. MASTER IRON WORKS

G.R. No. 151967 February 16, 2005
 P a g e | 437

FACTS:

On January 15, 1983, Eduardo and Josefina Francisco got married. On August 31, 1984, Josefina
purchased two parcels of lands. The Registry of Deeds issued Transfer Certificate of title in the
name of ―Josefina Castillo Francisco married to Eduardo G. Francisco‖. On January 13, 1986,
Josefina mortgaged the said property to Leonila Cando. It appears that Eduardo affixed his
marital conformity to the deed.

On June 11, 1990, Eduardo bought 7,500 bags of cement from Master Iron Works and
Construction Corporation (MIWCC) but failed to pay the same. The court issued writ of
execution levying the two parcel of land as for payment to MIWCC.

On July 3, 1994, Josefina executed an Affidavit of Third Party Claim over the two parcel of land
in which she claimed that they were her paraphernal property, and that her husband had no
proprietary right or interest over them as evidenced by his affidavit of waiver, a copy of which
she attached to her affidavit.

Before she could commence presenting her evidence against MIWCC, Josefina filed a petition to
annul her marriage to Eduardo in the RTC of Parañaque, on the ground that when they were
married on January 15, 1983, Eduardo was already married to one Carmelita Carpio.

On September 9, 1996, the RTC of Parañaque rendered judgment, declaring the marriage
between Josefina and Eduardo as null and void for being bigamous.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subject properties were paraphernal property of Josefina and cannot be held
liable for the Eduardo‘s personal obligations.

RULING:

No. The subject properties are not the paraphernal property of Josefina and can be held to answer
the liabilities of Eduardo.

Even though Eduardo and Josefina‘s marriage is bigamous, the properties cannot be held
conjugal, Josefina failed to adduce preponderance of evidence that she contributed money,
property or industry in the acquisition of the subject property and hence, is not a co-owner of
such. Also, the Court doubted that when she acquired the property at 23 years of age, she had
enough funds to pay for it. Her claim that the funds for the property were provided by her mother
and sister, the Court believed, was just an afterthought.

MILAGROS JOAQUINO A.KA. MILAGROS J. REYES v. LOURDES REYES ET. AL

G.R. No. 154645 July 13, 2004
 P a g e | 438

FACTS:
Before Rodolfo died, he was he was employed at Warner and Barnes Company wherein he
received a sizeable amount of income and retirement benefits. Lourdes was his widow yet he was
also cohabiting with Milagros. A Deed of Sale of Property, a house and lot, was executed in
favor of Milagros where respondent alleges that the funds used to purchase the said property
came from the conjugal funds and earnings of her late husband.
Petitioner contends that she has also contributed in the purchase of the property using her own
funds as it was only for convenience that Rodolfo has facilitated the same through mortgage.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the disputed property belongs to the conjugal ownership of Lourdes and Rodolfo
or it is exclusively owned by Milagros, or co-owned by Rodolfo and Milagros.
HELD:
The Court ruled that because the property was bought during the marriage of Rodolfo and
Lourdes, it is therefore conjugal. The loans obtained were used to pay for the property, and the
same were paid from his salaries and earnings which are, under the Civil Code, conjugal funds.
Petitioner’s argument that she has contributed in the purchase of the property lacks proof that she
was gainfully employed and be financially capacitated on her own.
Moreover, the registration of the property in petitioner’s name is an act of donation by Rodolfo
but Article 87 of the Family Code also prohibits donations between persons living together as
husband and wife without a valid marriage hence, the property is conjugal even if acquired in a
common-law relationship during the subsistence of a valid marriage.
Under Article 1456, a constructive trust is created because the registration of the property was
under petitioner’s name that she cannot be because it is a deprivation of right ownership of the
legal spouse and heirs. Milagros is deemed to hold the property in trust for them.

JACINTO SAGUID v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 150611 June 10, 2003
 P a g e | 439

FACTS:
Gina S. Rey was previously married when she met petitioner. They cohabited and built a house
on a lot owned by the latter’s father. Jacinto was a patron of their fishing vessel while Gina
worked as a fish dealer and later decided to work in Japan as an entertainer. Soon they decided to
end their relationship. Gina filed for Partition of Recovery of Personal Property with
Receivership because she claimed that because of her work as an entertainer, she was able to
contribute P70,000.00 in the completion of the house. Furthermore, she also said that she has
acquired personal properties such as appliances and household effects from her earnings as a fish
dealer with a value of P111, 375.00; she prayed for reimbursement of these amounts.
Petitioner argued that the expenses for the construction of their house were solely borne through
his income and that Gina did not work continuously in Japan but only for six months each year.
He alleged that she did not contribute in the expenses.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is correct in claiming for partitions over the contributions she claimed
to have made in the building of their house and in the total amount of the said personal
properties.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held the case at bar according to Article 148 of the Family Code, wherein it
states that properties acquired by both parties through actual joint contribution of property …
shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. However, in
the case at bar, Gina failed to prove how much was the exact amount she has contributed hence,
it shall be presumed to be equal. The disputed properties aggregates to P111, 375.00 and which
half is equivalent to P55, 687.50. Private respondent’s extent of ownership of the house only
amounts to P11,413.00 based on the receipts she presented as evidence. She is the declared as
co-owner of the house and Jacinto is ordered to reimburse the former in the amount of P11,413
and P55,687.50 totalling to P67,100.50. Furthermore, the house is subject to public auction.

VICTOR JUANIZA v. EUGENIO JOSE

G.R. No. L-50127-28 March 30, 1979
 P a g e | 440

FACTS:
Eugenio Jose is married to Socorro Ramos and is cohabiting with Rosalia Arroyo. Eugenio, also
the registered owner of a passenger jeepney, was involved in an accident of collision with a
freight train of the Philippine National Railways. The accident caused the death of seven persons
and physical injuries of five of the passengers.
The Court of First Instance of Laguna rendered a decision stating that Eugenio and Rosalia to
jointly and severally pay Victor Juaniza the sum of P1,600.00 plus legal interest, and to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased Josefa P. Leus. Fausto Retrita, Nestor del Rosario Anonuevo,
and Arceli de la Cueva in the sum of P12,000.00.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Rosalia Arroyo be deemed as co-owner of the passenger jeepney and should also
be held liable for the damages with Eugenio.
HELD:
The Court said under Article 144 of the Civil Code that the man and woman living together must
not in any way be incapacitated to marry. However, in the case at bar, respondent is legally
married to Socorro hence he and Rosalia are incapacitated to contract marriage. Rosalia, here
also cannot be held liable for damages because she cannot be deemed as co-owner of the
passenger jeepney such belongs to the conjugal property of Eugenio and Socorro.

ADRIANO v. COURT OF APPEALS

 P a g e | 441

G.R. No. 124118 March 27, 2000

FACTS:
Lucio Adriano was previously married to Gliceria Dorado and has soon separated. Gliceria then
died, and five months after her death Lucio contracted a subsequent marriage with Vicenta Villa.
He executed a last will and testament wherein he assigned all his properties to Vicenta and to all
his children in both first and second marriages.
Petitioners argue that the last will and testament be annulled because it disposes the entire
rightful share of Vicenta. They also alleged that before the marriage of Lucio and Vicenta, the
latter had acquired properties and are part of their conjugal partnership.
But the respondents presented evidence which indicated that the purchase money of the disputed
properties came from the earnings of Lucio in a business partnership during the subsistence of
his marriage to Gliceria. It was obtained from the conjugal fund of his first marriage.
The Regional Trial Court of Lucena City rendered the decision that the last will and testament be
declared as valid and effective. The Court of Appeals affirmed the said decision in toto.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the property covered in the last will and testament constitutes the co-ownership
of Vicenta Villa.
HELD:
Petitioners failed to overcome the presumption of conjugality because respondents presented
sufficient evidence to support their claim. The disputed properties were purchased by Lucio with
proceeds of the conjugal fund of the first marriage. There was no evidence presented to support
that Vicenta actually contributed to the acquisition of the property in question. The Court held
that the property acquired by a man while living with a common-law wife during the subsistence
of his marriage is conjugal property, even when the property was titled in the name of the
common-law wife. According to Article 1456 of the Civil Code, a constructive trust is deemed to
have been created over the property which lawfully pertains to the conjugal partnership of the
subsisting marriage.
 P a g e | 442

YASUO IWASAWA v. GANGAN

G.R. No. 204169 September 11, 2013

FACTS:
Yasuo Iwasawa is a Japanese national and has married Felisa Gangan. After getting married they
went to reside in Japan. On July 2009, respondent confessed to petitioner that her husband has
previously died which the former found out that Felisa was previously married to one Raymond
Arambulo. Petitioner filed for a declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of bigamy.
Petitioner presented to the Court a certificate of marriage between him and respondent, a
certificate of marriage between respondent and Raymond Arambulo, certificate of death of
Raymond, and a certification from the National Statistics Office (NSO) that two marriages of
respondent has been recorded.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the NSO certification is admissible as evidence and should be accorded with
evidentiary weight.
HELD:
The Court ruled in accordance with Article 410 of the Civil Code which provides that, books
making up the civil register and all documents relating thereto shall be considered public
documents and shall be prima facie evidence of facts stated therein hence the NSO certification
is a public document and therefore admissible due to their execution and genuineness. The
marriage was a bigamous marriage hence it is declared null and void as provided for under
Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines.
 P a g e | 443

GO-BANGAYAN v. BANGAYAN, JR.

G.R. No. 201061 July 3, 2013

FACTS:
Benjamin Bangayan Jr. filed for decalaration of nullity of marriage between him and Sally Go-
Bangayan because it was a bigamous one. Benjamin was previously married to Azucena Alegre
and had cohabited with Sally. Petitioner’s father was against the relationship, so to please her
father, she made Benjamin sign a simulated marriage contract.
During their cohabitation, they acquired properties. Sally then file for a criminal case against
Benjamin alleging that he falsified a public document and for contracting a bigamous marriage,
using the simulated marriage contract.
On the other hand, Benjamin alleged that their marriage was bigamous because it lacked formal
requisites of a valid marriage and that he should be the owner of the properties acquired therein.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Benjamin and Sallly’s marriage is bigamous.
2. Whether or not the properties be solely owned by Benjamin or that Sally is also
entitled a part of the partition of the properties.

HELD:
The marriage between Benjamin and Sally is not bigamous rather it is void ab initio.Their
marriage was one made in jest or a simulated one, and it lacked a valid marriage license hence
there was no marriage to speak of in the first place.
The property relations of both parties are governed by Article 148 of the Family Code. They
cohabitated without the benefit of marriage thus only properties acquired by them through their
actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common
proportion to their respective contributions. In the case at bar, Benjamin and his siblings own the
37 properties being claimed by Sally, which were given by Benjamin’s father to his children as
advance inheritance. The other property which was registered in their names as “spouses” is
solely owned by Benjamin because the words “married to” and “spouses” are merely descriptive
of the civil status of the registered owner and do not prove co-ownership. Sally has no proof
either that she had actual contributions to be entitled of co-ownership of the same.
 P a g e | 444

VENTURA vs. SPOUSES ABUDA

G.R. No. 202932 October 23, 2013

FACTS:

In 1952, Socorro and Crispin were married where they had a son Edilberto Sr. who was married
to Leonora. Edilberto Sr. and Leonora are the parents of herein petitioner Edilberto Jr.
(Edilberto). In 1980, Socorro married Esteban even if she had a subsisting marriage with Crispin.
Esteban on the other hand was also married before but the same was dissolved by virtue of the
death of his previous wife. Esteban had a daughter named Evangeline.

Sometime in 1968, Esteban purchased a portion of lot in Tondo, Manila, while the remaining
portion was purchased by Evangeline on her fathers behalf (Vitas Property). In 1978, Esteban
and Evangeline also had small business establishments located in Delpan st. Tondo (Delpan
Property). When Esteban was diagnosed with colon cancer, he decided to sell the properties to
Evangeline.

Esteban passed away on September 1997, while Socorro on July 1999. When Leonora,
petitioners mother discovered the sale sometime in 2000, they filed a petition for annulment of
the sale, claiming that petitioner is entitled to a right or interest over the properties purchased by
Esteban. . Respondents, on the other hand, argued that because of Socorros prior marriage to
Crispin, her subsequent marriage to Esteban was null and void. Thus, neither Socorro nor her
heirs can claim any right or interest over the properties purchased by Esteban and respondents.

The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of respondents, ruling that Vitas and Delpan properties
were not conjugal properties of Socorro and Esteban. CA affirmed the decision, applying Article
148 of the Family Code.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is entitled to any right or interest over the subject properties

HELD:

According to the Family Code, in unions between a man and a woman who are incapacitated to
marry each other, the ownership over the properties acquired during the subsistence of that
relationship shall be based on the actual contribution of the parties
It is necessary for each of the partners to prove his or her actual contribution to the acquisition
of.property in order to be able to lay claim to any portion of it. Presumptions of co-ownership
and equal contribution do not apply.

This is a reiteration of Article 148 of the Family Code, which the CA applied in the assailed
decision:

Art 148. In cases of cohabitation wherein the parties are incapacitated to marry each other, only
the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money,
 P a g e | 445

property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective

contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding
shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of
money and evidences of credit.

Applying the foregoing provision, the Vitas and Delpan properties can be considered common
property if: (1) these were acquired during the cohabitation of Esteban and Socorro; and (2) there
is evidence that the properties were acquired through the parties actual joint contribution of
money, property, or industry.

Edilberto argues that the certificate of title covering the Vitas property shows that the parcel of
land is co-owned by Esteban and Socorro because: (1) the Transfer Certificate of Title was
issued on 11 December 1980, or several months after the parties were married; and (2) title to the
land was issued to "Esteban Abletes, of legal age, married to Socorro Torres."

The title itself shows that the Vitas property is owned by Esteban alone. The phrase "married to
Socorro Torres" is merely descriptive of his civil status, and does not show that Socorro co-
owned the property.The evidence on record also shows that Esteban acquired ownership over the
Vitas property prior to his marriage to Socorro, even if the certificate of title was issued after the
celebration of the marriage. Registration under the Torrens title system merely confirms, and
does not vest title.

Edilberto claims that Esteban s actual contribution to the purchase of the Delpan property was
not sufficiently proven since Evangeline shouldered some of the amortizations.Thus, the law
presumes that Esteban and Socorro jointly contributed to the acquisition of the Delpan property.

Under Art. 1238, it provides that payment made by a third person who does not intend to be
reimbursed by the debtor is deemed to be a donation, which requires the debtor s consent. But
the payment is in any case valid as to the creditor who has accepted it.

Thus, it is clear that Evangeline paid on behalf of her father, and the parties intended that the
Delpan property would be owned by and registered under the name of Esteban.
 P a g e | 446

GUERRERO v. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT

229 SCRA 274
FACT: 

Gaudencio Guerrero and Pedro Hernando are brothers-in-law. Gaudencio filed a case against
Pedro without alleging that earnest efforts were resorted to settle the dispute before the case was
filed. Pedro overlooked such fact and did not file a motion to dismiss, but during the pre-trial, the
judge noticed their relationship, so, he gave five (5) days for Gaudencio to file amend his
complaint. When Gaudencio failed to amend, the judge dismissed the case on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction because of the absence of an allegation of previous efforts towards reconciliation. 

ISSUE: 

Whether or not there is a need for an earnest effort toward a compromise in this case?

HELD: 

There is no need. It has been held in Gayon vs. Gayon, 36 SCRA 104, that the enumeration of
brothers and sisters as members of the same family, does not comprehend brothers or sisters-in-
law; hence, there is no need to exert efforts towards a compromise before filing the present case.
 P a g e | 447

INING v. VEGA
G.R. No. 14727 August 12, 2013
FACTS: 

Leon Roldan, married to Rafaela Menez, is the owner of a 3,120-square meter parcel of land
(subject property) in Kalibo, Aklan. Leon and Rafaela died without issue. Leon was survived by
his siblings Romana Roldan (Romana) and Gregoria Roldan Ining (Gregoria), who are now both
deceased. The first sibling, Romana was survived by her daughter Anunciacion Vega and
grandson, herein respondent Leonardo R. Vega (Leonardo) (also both deceased). Leonardo in
turn is survived by his wife Lourdes and children Restonilo I. Vega, Crispulo M. Vega, Milbuena
Vega-Restituto and Lenard Vega, the substituted respondents. Gregoria, on the other hand, was
survived by her six children. In short, herein petitioners, except for Ramon Tresvalles
(Tresvalles) and Roberto Tajonera (Tajonera), are Gregoria’s grandchildren or spouses thereof
(Gregoria’s heirs). Tresvalles and Tajonera are transferees of the said property. 
In 1997, acting on the claim that one-half of subject property belonged to him as Romana’s
surviving heir, Leonardo filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kalibo, Aklan Civil Case
No. 5275 for partition, recovery of ownership and possession, with damages, against Gregoria’s
heirs.

In their Answer with counterclaim, Gregoria’s heirs (through son Antipolo) claimed that
Leonardo had no cause of action against them; that they have become the sole owners of the
subject property through Lucimo Sr. who acquired the same in good faith by sale from Juan
Enriquez (Enriquez), who in turn acquired the same from Leon, and Leonardo was aware of this
fact.

ISSUE:

Whether Leonardo is entitled to a share in Leon’s estate.

HELD:

The finding that Leon did not sell the property to Lucimo Sr. had long been settled and had
become final for failure of petitioners to appeal. Thus, the property remained part of Leon’s
estate.  Leon died without issue; his heirs are his siblings Romana and Gregoria.  Gregoria’s and
Romana’s heirs are co-owners of the subject property. no prescription shall run in favor of one of
the co-heirs against the others so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership. 

For prescription to set in, the repudiation must be done by a co-owner. The CA held that
prescription began to run against Leonardo only in 1979 – or even in 1980 – when it has been
made sufficiently clear to him that Lucimo Sr. has renounced the co-ownership and has claimed
sole ownership over the property. The CA thus concluded that the filing of Civil Case No. 5275
 P a g e | 448

in 1997, or just under 20 years counted from 1979, is clearly within the period prescribed under
Article 1141. 

Lucimo Sr. is not a co-owner of the property. Indeed, he is not an heir of Gregoria; he is merely
Antipolo’s son-in-law, being married to Antipolo’s daughter Teodora. One who is merely related
by affinity to the decedent does not inherit from the latter and cannot become a co-owner of the
decedent’s property. Consequently, he cannot effect a repudiation of the co-ownership of the
estate that was formed among the decedent’s heirs. 
 P a g e | 449

TAMBUYAT v. TAMBUYAT
G.R. No. 202805 March 23, 2015

FACTS:

Adriano Tambuyat and respondent Wenifreda Balcom – Tambuyat were married on

September 16, 1965.

During their marriage, Adriano acquired several real properties, including a 700 sq. m. parcel
of land located at Brgy. Muzon, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, which was bought on
November 17, 1991. The Deed of Sale was signed by Adriano alone as vendee.

One of the signing witnesses was petitioner Rosario Banguis – Tambuyat, who signed therein
as “Rosario Tambuyat”. All this time petitioner Banguis remained married to Eduardo
Nolasco.

When TCT covering the subject property was issued, it was made under the name of Adriano
M. Tambuyat married to Rosario E. Banguis. When Adriano died intestate on June 7, 1998,
Wenifreda filed a Petition for Cancellation of the subject TCT. She alleged that she was the
surviving spouse of Adriano. That the TCT was erroneously registered and made in the name
of “Adriano M. Tambuyat married to Rosario E. Banguis.” That per annexed marriage
contract, Banguis was still married to Nolasco. Wenifreda prayed that the TCT be cancelled.
That a new certificate of title be made out in Adriano’s name, with her as the spouse
indicated, and that Banguis be ordered to surrender her copy of TCT.

On her defense, Banguis claimed that she and Adriano were married on Sept. 2, 1988, and
thereafter lived together as married couple; that their union produced a son; and that the trial
court has no jurisdiction over the petition for cancellation, which is merely a summary
proceeding – considering that a thorough determination will have to be made as to whether the
property is conjugal or exclusive property, and since she and Adriano have a child whose rights
will be adversely affected by any judgment in the case

ISSUE:
Whether the cancellation of the TCT filed by Wenifreda be granted by the court.
HELD:
Under Section 108 of PD 1529, the proceeding for the erasure, alteration, or amendment of a
certificate of title may be resorted to in seven instances, included are (1) when any error,
omission or mistake was made in entering a certificate or any memorandum thereon or on any
duplicate certificate andwhen there is reasonable ground for the amendment or alteration of title.
The present case falls under the two instances because the RD of Bulacan committed and error in
issuing the disputed TCT, in the name of Adriano M. Tambuyat married to Rosario E. Banguis”
when, in truth and in fact, respondent Wenifreda – and not Banguis – is Adriano’s lawful spouse.
As correctly ruled by the appellate court, the preponderance of evidence points to the fact that
Wenifreda is the legitimate spouse of Adriano. Thus, it cannot be said that Adriano and Banguis
 P a g e | 450

were husband and wife to each other; it cannot even be said that they have a common law
relationship at all.
Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and woman not legally
married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public
as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community where they
live may be considered legally married in common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines.
While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that such relationships are present in
our society, and that they produce a community of properties and interests which is governed by
law, authority exists in case law to the effect that such form of co ownership requires that the
man and woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. that
the provisions of the Civil Code, unless expressly providing to the contrary as in Article 144,
when referring to a “spouse” contemplate a lawfully wedded spouse.
 P a g e | 451

HIYAS v. ACUNA

FACT: 

Alberto filed a case against Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank, Inc., his wife Remedios, and 3 more
defendants. Hiyas filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that Alberto failed to comply with
Article 151 of the Family Code wherein it is provided that no suit between members of the same
family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest
efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. 

ISSUE:  

Whether or not Hiyas invoke the provisions of Article 151 of the Family Code?

HELD: 

 Since the requirement under Article 151 of the Family Code is applicable only in cases which
are exclusively between or among members of the same family, it necessarily follows that the
same may be invoked only by a party who is a member of that same family.
 P a g e | 452

HONTIVEROS vs. RTC

GR No. 125465 June 29, 1999

FACTS:

Petitioner spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros filed a complaint for damages against private
respondents Gregorio Hontiveros and Teodora Ayson.  The petitioners alleged that they are the
owners of a parcel of land in Capiz and that they were deprived of income from the land as a
result of the filing of the land registration case.  In the reply, private respondents denied that they
were married and alleged that Gregorio was a widower while Teodora was single.  They also
denied depriving petitioners of possession of and income from the land.  On the contrary,
according to the private respondents, the possession of the property in question had already been
transferred to petitioners by virtue of the writ of possession.  Trial court denied petitioner’s
motion that while in the amended complaint, they alleged that earnest efforts towards a
compromise were made, it was not verified as provided in Article 151.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not the court can validly dismissed the complaint due to lack of efforts exerted
towards a compromise as stated in Article 151.

HELD:

The Supreme Court held that the inclusion of private respondent Teodora Ayson as defendant
and Maria Hontiveros as petitioner takes the case out of the scope of Article 151.  Under this
provision, the phrase “members of the same family” refers to the husband and wife, parents and
children, ascendants and descendants, and brothers and sisters whether full or half-blood. 
Religious relationship and relationship by affinity are not given any legal effects in this
jurisdiction.  Teodora and Maria as spouses of the Hontiveros’ are regarded as strangers to the
Hontiveros family for purposes of Article 151. In several jurisprudence, the Court already
decided that “whenever a stranger is a party in the case involving the family members, the
requisite showing the earnest efforts to compromise is no longer mandatory”
 P a g e | 453

MANALO v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 129242 January 16, 2001

FACTS:

Troadio Manalo, died intestate on February 14, 1992.  He was survived by his wife, Pilar S.
Manalo, and his eleven (11) children who are all of legal age. At the time of his death he left
several real properties located in Manila and in the province of Tarlac including a business under
the name and style Manalo’s Machine Shop in Manila and QC. Eight (8) of his children filed a
petition with respondent RTC  for the judicial settlement of the estate of their late father and for
the appointment of their brother, Romeo Manalo, as administrator thereof. RTC set the hearing.
Herein petitioners, the mother and three other children, opposed the petition, contending that
such petition is actually an ordinary civil action involving members of the same family and that
there was absence of earnest efforts toward compromise among members of the same family.
Motion denied by RTC. Petition for certiorari denied by CA. Motion for reconsideration
likewise dismissed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals erred in upholding the questioned orders of the
respondent trial court which denied their motion for the outright dismissal of the petition for
judicial settlement of estate despite the failure of the petitioners therein to aver that earnest
efforts toward a compromise involving members of the same family have been made prior to the
filing of the petition but that the same have failed.

RULING:

The Court denied petitioner’s claim. It must be emphasized that the oppositors (herein
petitioners) are not being sued for any cause of action as in fact no defendant was impleaded
therein.  The Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration, Settlement and Distribution of
Estate is a special proceeding and, as such, it is a remedy whereby the petitioners therein seek to
establish a status, a right, or a particular fact.Private respondents herein merely seek to establish
the fact of death of their father and subsequently to be duly recognized as among the heirs of the
said deceased so that they can validly exercise their right to participate in the settlement and
liquidation of the estate of the decedent consistent with the limited and special jurisdiction of the
probate court.

Art 151 of FC which prohibits suit between members of the family absent a compromise, is
not applicable in the case at bar for such is only a special proceeding and not an ordinary civil
action.

                

SANTOS v. COURT OF APPEALS

 P a g e | 454

475 SCRA 1

FACTS:
         
Petitioner Nicanor T. Santos and private respondent Consuelo T. Santos-Guerrero are brother
and sister, born to spouses Urbano Santos and Candelaria Santos, now both deceased. Sometime
in 1956, Nicanor, Consuelo and eight of their siblings, executed a "Basic Agreement of Partition"
covering properties they inherited from their parents.
 
Two years later, Consuelo, joined by her husband, herein respondent Andres Guerrero
(collectively, the "Guerreros"), filed suit with the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal
against petitioner Nicanor and two (2) other brothers, for recovery of inheritance.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Article 222 of the New Civil Code in relation to Section 1(j), Rule 16 of the
Rules of Court has no application

RULING:

A lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than between strangers.  Thus, the
provision making honest efforts towards a settlement a condition precedent for the maintenance
of an action between members of the same family. As it were, a complaint in ordinary civil
actions involving members of the same family must contain an allegation that earnest efforts
toward a compromise have been made pursuant to Article 222 of the Civil Code, now pursuant to
Article 151 of the Family Code.Otherwise, the complaint may be dismissed under Section 1(j),
Rule 16 of the Rules of Court.Admittedly, the complaint filed in this case contains no such
allegation. But a complaint otherwise defective on that score may be cured by the introduction of
evidence effectively supplying the necessary averments of a defective complaint.

MENDOZA v. COURT OF APPEALS

 P a g e | 455

19 SCRA 756
FACTS:

In the complaint, private respondent, Luisa De La Rosa Mendoza averred that she was married to
Cecilio Mendoza on 2 September 1953, that they lived together as husband and wife until 14
July 1954, when the husband departed for the United States to further his studies and practice his
profession. Since then, defendant Mendoza, without justifiable cause or reason deliberately
abandoned and neglected plaintiff and despite repeated demands by plaintiff, defendant has
failed and refused, and still fails and refuses, to provide for the maintenance and support of
plaintiff, who is allegedly to be pregnant, sickly and without any source of revenue, while
defendant (now petitioner) is employed in a hospital in the United States.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the case at bar is covered under Article 151 where earnest efforts toward
compromise should first be made prior the filing of the petition, and invoking Article 222 of the
New Civil Code of the Philippines.

RULING:

Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines requires that before a suit between members of
the same family (in this case between husband and wife) is filed or maintained, it must appear
that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, and the only way to make it so appear
when the suit is filed is by a proper averment to that effect in the complaint. Since the law
forbids a suit being initiated filed or maintained unless such efforts at compromise appear, the
showing that efforts in question were made is a condition precedent to the existence of the cause
of action. It follows that the failure of the complaint to plead that plaintiff previously tried in
earnest to reach a settlement out of court renders it assailable for lack of cause of action and it
may be so attacked at any stage of the case even on appeal.

While the Supreme Court agree that petitioner's position represents a correct statement of the
general rule on the matter, we are nevertheless constrained to hold that the Court of Appeals and
the Court of First Instance committed no error in refusing to dismiss the complaint, for on its
face, the same involved a claim for future support that under Article 2035 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines cannot be subject of a valid compromise, and is, therefore, outside the sphere of
application of Article 222 of the Code upon which petitioner relies. This appears from the last
proviso of said Article 222, future support.

TRINIDAD-RAMOS v. PANGILINAN
 P a g e | 456

G.R. No. 185920 July 20, 2010

FACTS:

Respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against E.M. Ramos Electric, Inc., a company
owned by Ernesto M. Ramos, the patriarch of herein petitioners. The labor arbiter ordered
Ramos and the company to pay the respondents’ back-wages, separation pay, 13th month pay &
service incentive leave pay. The decision became final and executory so a writ of execution was
issued which the Deputy Sheriff of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
implemented by levying a property in Ramos’ name situated in Pandacan.
         
Alleging that the Pandacan property was the family home, hence, exempt from execution to
satisfy the judgment award, Ramos and the company moved to quash the writ of execution.
Respondents argued that it is not the family home there being another one in Antipolo and that
the Pandacan address is actually the business address. The motion was denied and the appeal was
likewise denied by the NLRC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the levy upon the Pandacan property was valid.

RULING:
          
Yes. For the family home to be exempt from execution, distinction must be made as to what law
applies based on when it was constituted and what requirements must be complied with by the
judgment debtor or his successors claiming such privilege. Hence, two sets of rules are
applicable. If the family home was constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or
before August 3, 1988, then it must have been constituted either judicially or extra-judicially as
provided under Articles 225, 229-231 and 233 of the Civil Code. Meanwhile, Articles 240 to 242
governs extrajudicial constitution.

 On the other hand, for family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988, there is no need to constitute extra judicially or judicially, and the exemption is
effective from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries under Art.
154 actually reside therein. Moreover, the family home should belong to the absolute community
or conjugal partnership, or if exclusively by one spouse, its constitution must have been with
consent of the other, and its value must not exceed certain amounts depending upon the area
where it is located. Further, the debts incurred for which the exemption does not apply as
provided under Art. 155 for which the family home is made answerable must have been incurred
after August 3, 1988. In both instances, the claim for exemption must be proved.

In the present case, since petitioners claim that the family home was constituted prior to August
3, 1988, or as early as 1944, they must comply with the procedure mandated by the Civil Code.
There being absolutely no proof that the Pandacan property was judicially or extra judicially
constituted as the Ramos’ family home, the law protecting the family home cannot apply thereby
making the levy upon the Pandacan property valid
ARRIOLA v. ARRIOLA
 P a g e | 457

G.R. No. 177703 January 28, 2008

FACTS:

The RTC rendered a decision ordering the partition of the parcel of land covered by TCT No
383714 (84191) left by Fidel S. Arriola to his heirs John Nabor C. Arriola, Vilma G. Arriola and
Anthony Ronald G. Arriola in equal shares of one-third each. John Nabor Arriola proposed to
sell it though public auction. Vilma and Anthony Ronald Arriola initially agreed but refused to
include in the auction the house standing on the subject land. The respondent then filed a petition
for certiorari and prayed that he be allowed to push through with the auction of the subject land
including the house built on it. The CA granted the petition and ordered the public auction sale of
the subject lot including the house built on it. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but
the CA denied the said motion.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the house built inside the land is considered part of partition.

HELD:

No. Under Article 153 the family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution,
forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by
law. According to Article 159 the family home shall continue despite the death of one or both
spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of ten years or for as long as there is
a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling
reasons therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the
family home.

MONDEQUILLO v. BREVA
 P a g e | 458

GR. No. 86355 May 31, 1990

FACTS:

The sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land located at Poblacion Malalag, Davao del Sur on
July 1988, registered in the name of Jose Mondequillo and a parcel of agricultural land located at
Dalagbong Bulacan, Malalag, Davao de Sur also registered in the latter’s name.  A motion to
quash was filed by the petitioner alleging that the residential land is where the family home is
built since 1969 prior the commencement of this case and as such is exempt from execution,
forced sale or attachment under Article 152 and 153 except for liabilities mentioned in Article
155 thereof, and that the judgment sought to be enforced against the family home is not one of
those enumerated.  With regard to the agricultural land, it is alleged that it is still part of the
public land and the transfer in his favor by the original possessor and applicant who was a
member of a cultural minority.  The residential house in the present case became a family home
by operation of law under Article 153.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not the subject property is deemed to be a family home.

HELD:

The petitioner’s contention that it should be considered a family home from the time it was
occupied by petitioner and his family in 1969 is not well-taken.  Under Article 162 of the Family
Code, it provides that the provisions of this Chapter shall govern existing family residences
insofar as said provisions are applicable.  It does not mean that Article 152 and 153 shall have a
retroactive effect such that all existing family residences are deemed to have been constituted as
family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and are
exempt from the execution for payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the
Code.  The said article simply means that all existing family residences at the time of the
effectivity of the Family Code, are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the
benefits accorded to a family home under the FC.  The debt and liability which was the basis of
the judgment was incurred prior the effectivity of the Family Code.  This does not fall under the
exemptions from execution provided in the FC.

As to the agricultural land, trial court correctly ruled that the levy to be made shall be on
whatever rights the petitioner may have on the land.  Petition was dismissed.

ALBINO JOSEF vs. OTELIO SANTOS

 P a g e | 459

G.R. No. 165060 November 27, 2008

FACTS:
          
In Civil Case No. 95-110-MK, Petitioner Albino Josef was the defendant, which is a case for
collection of sum of money filed by herein respondent Otelio Santos, who claimed that petitioner
failed to pay the shoe materials which he bought on credit from respondent on various dates in
1994. After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Marikina City found petitioner liable to respondent.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court’s decision in Toto.
Petitioner filed before this Court a petition for review on certiorari, but it was dismissed in a
Resolution dated February 18, 2002. The Judgment became final and executory on May 21,
2002.

A writ of execution was issued on August 20, 2003  and enforced on August 21, 2003. On August
29, 2003, certain personal properties subjects of the writ of execution were auctioned off.
Thereafter, a real property located at Marikina City was sold by way of public auction to fully
satisfy the judgment credit.

On November 5, 2003, petitioner filed an original petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals, questioning the sheriff’s levy and sale of the abovementioned personal and real
properties. Petitioner claimed that the personal properties did not belong to him but to his
children; and that the real property was his family home thus exempt from execution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the levy and sale of the personal belongings of the petitioner’s children as well as
the attachment and sale on public auction of his family home to satisfy the judgment award in
favor of respondent is legal.

RULING:

The Supreme Court held that the family home is the dwelling place of a person and his family, a
sacred symbol of family love and repository of cherished memories that last during one’s
lifetime. It is the sanctuary of that union which the law declares and protects as a sacred
institution; and likewise a shelter for the fruits of that union. It is where both can seek refuge and
strengthen the tie that binds them together and which ultimately forms the moral fabric of our
nation. The protection of the family home is just as necessary in the preservation of the family as
a basic social institution, and since no custom, practice or agreement destructive of the family
shall be recognized or given effect, the trial court’s failure to observe the proper procedures to
determine the veracity of petitioner’s allegations, is unjustified.

The same is true with respect to personal properties levied upon and sold at auction. Despite
petitioner’s allegations in his Opposition, the trial court did not make an effort to determine the
nature of the same, whether the items were exempt from execution or not, or whether they
belonged to petitioner or to someone else.
 P a g e | 460

SPOUSES AUTHER G. KELLEY, JR. and DORIS A. KELLEY vs. PLANTERS

PRODUCTS, INC. and JORGE A. RAGUTANA,
G.R. No. 172263 July 9, 2008

FACTS:          

Petitioner Auther G. Kelley, Jr. (Auther) acquired agricultural chemical products on consignment
from respondent Planters Products, Inc. (PPI) in 1989. Due to Auther’s failure to pay despite
demand, PPI filed an action for sum of money against him in the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City. After trial on the merits, the RTC Makati City decided in favor of PPI and issued a writ of
execution. After being belatedly informed of the said sale, petitioners Auther and his wife Doris
A. Kelley filed a motion to dissolve or set aside the notice of levy in the RTC Makati City on the
ground that the subject property was their family home which was exempt from execution.

ISSUE:
         
Whether or not the subject property is the family home of the petitioners.

RULING:
         
Under the Family Code, there is no need to constitute the family home judicially or
extrajudicially. All family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code (August 3,
1988) are constituted as such by operation of law. All existing family residences as of August 3,
1988 are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a
family home under the Family Code.

The exemption is effective from the time of the constitution of the family home as such and lasts
as long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein.  Moreover, the debts for which the
family home is made answerable must have been incurred after August 3, 1988. Otherwise (that
is, if it was incurred prior to August 3, 1988), the alleged family home must be shown to have
been constituted either judicially or extrajudicially pursuant to the Civil Code.

The rule, however, is not absolute. The Family Code, in fact, expressly provides for the
following exceptions: Article 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale
or attachment except: (1) For non-payment of taxes; (2) For debts incurred prior to the
constitution of the family home; (3) For debts secured by a mortgage on the premises before or
after such constitution; and (4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders,
material men and others who have rendered service or furnished material for the construction of
the building.
 P a g e | 461

MARY JOSEPHINE GOMEZ and EUGENIA SOCORRO C. GOMEZ-SALCEDO 

v. ROEL, NOEL and JANNETTE BEVERLY STA. INES and HINAHON STA. INES
G.R. No. 132537 October 14, 2005

FACTS:        
 
Purificacion dela Cruz Gomez (deceased), mother of Mary Josephine C. Gomez and Eugenia
Socorro C. Gomez-Salcedo, entrusted rice land in Nueva Vizcaya to Marietta dela Cruz Sta. Ines.
Josephine and Socorro demanded for an accounting of the produce of said rice lands while under
the management of Marietta and for the return of the Transfer Certificate Title (TCT) of the
property.

Trial court rendered judgment against Marietta and ordered her to deliver the owner’s copy of
the TCT and pay damages. In order to satisfy damages, a writ of execution was issued, by virtue
of which, a parcel of land in Nueva Vizcaya registered in Marietta’s name was sold at a public
auction wherein Josephine was the highest bidder. Marietta’s husband, Hinahon together with
their children, filed a complaint for the annulment of the sale before the RTC of Nueva Vizcaya
on the ground that said house and lot sold during the public auction is their family residence and
is thus exempt from execution under Article 155 of the Family Code. Respondents assert that the
house and lot was constituted jointly by Hinahon and Marietta as their family home from the
time they occupied it in 1972
         
ISSUE:

Whether or not the property can be sold.

RULING:

The Supreme Court held that under article 155 of the Family Code, the family home shall be
exempt from execution, forced sale, or attachment, except for, among other things, debts
incurred prior to the constitution of the family home. While the respondent contends that the
house and lot was constituted jointly by Hinahon and Marietta as their family home in 1972, it is
not deemed constituted as such at the time Marietta incurred her debts.
         
Under prevailing jurisprudence, it is deemed constituted as the family home only upon the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. The complaint against Marietta was instituted
in 1986 to for acts committed as early as 1977, thus, her liability arose years before the levied
property was constituted as the family home in 1988. The liability incurred by Marietta falls
within the exception provided for in Article 155 of the Family Code: debts incurred prior to the
constitution of the family home.
 P a g e | 462

MANACOP v. COURT OF APPEALS

GR No. 104875 November 13, 1992

FACTS:

Florante Manacop and his wife Euaceli purchased on March 1972, a residential lot with a
bungalow located in Quezon City.  The petitioner failed to pay the sub-contract cost pursuant to
a deed of assignment signed between petitioner’s corporation and private respondent herein (FF
Cruz & Co).  The latter filed a complaint for the recovery for the sum of money with a prayer for
preliminary attachment against the former.  Consequently, the corresponding writ for the
provisional remedy was issued which triggered the attachment of a parcel of land in Quezon City
owned by the Manacop Construction President, the petitioner.  The latter insists that the attached
property is a family home having been occupied by him and his family since 1972 and is
therefore exempt from attachment.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not the subject property is indeed exempted from attachment.

HELD:

The residential house and lot of petitioner became a family home by operation of law under
Article 153 of the Family Code.  Such provision does not mean that said article has a retroactive
effect such that all existing family residences, petitioner’s included, are deemed to have been
constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code and henceforth, are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before
the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988.  Since petitioner incurred debt in 1987, it
preceded the effectivity of the Code and his property is therefore not exempt form attachment.
 P a g e | 463

TANEO v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 108532 March 9, 1999

FACTS:

Two of the petitioner’s properties were levied to satisfy the judgement amount of about P5,000.

One was a parcel of land located in Bario Igpit, Municipality of Opol Misamis Oriental and the
other was the family home also located at Igpit, Opol Misamis Oriental. On February 12, 1966,
the said properties were sold at a public auction to the private respondent as the highest bidder.
The petitioners failed to redeem the same so a final deed of conveyance was executed on
February 9, 1968, definitely selling, transferring and conveying said properties to the private
respondent. On November 5, 1985, the petitioner filed an action to declare the deed of
conveyance void and to quiet title over the land with a prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction. They argued that the property was acquired through free patent therefore it is
inalienable and not subject to any encumbrance for the payment of debt, pursuant to
Commonwealth Act No. 141. They further alleged that the Sheriff’s Deed of Conveyance issued
by Deputy Provincial Sheriff Jose V. Yasay on February 1968 in favor of the private respondent
over the subject property including their family home was extrajudicially constituted. Private
respondent refuted the petitioner’s contentions alleging that the lawfully acquired the subject
properties described as Lot No. 5545, Cad. 237 which was a private land, by virtue of a Sheriff’s
Sale on February 12, 1966.Private respondent averred that the subject land was originally owned
by Lazaro Ba-a who sold the land to Pablo Taneo on September 18, 1941, as evidenced by
an Escritura de Venta. Despite it being aprivate land, Pablo Taneo filed an application for free
patent which was made final only in 1979.RTC ruled in favor of Gilig. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the RTC Decision in toto.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the family home is exempt from execution.

HELD:

The house is not exempt from execution. A debt was incurred before the house was deemed a
family home. Before the effectivity of the Family Code, a family home must be constituted
judicially (filing of petition) and extra-judicially (registration). It turns out that the instrument
constituting the family home was registered only in JAN 24, 1966 while the money judgement
was rendered on JAN 24 1964. The family home is not exempt from execution since there was a
debt incurred before the registration of the house as a family home.
 P a g e | 464

FORTALEZA v. LAPITAN
G.R. No. 178288 August 15, 2012

FACTS:

Spouses Charlie and Ofelia Fortaleza (spouses Fortaleza) obtained a loan from spouses Rolando
and Amparo Lapitan (creditors) in the amount of P1.2 million subject to 34% interest per annum.
As security, spouses Fortaleza executed on January 28, 1998 a Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage over their residential house and lot and registered under TCT No. T-412512. Ï‚rνll

When spouses Fortaleza failed to pay the indebtedness including the interests and penalties, the
creditors applied for extrajudicial foreclosure of the Real Estate Mortgage . The public auction
sale was set on May 9, 2001. At the sale, the creditors son Dr. Raul Lapitan and his wife Rona
(spouses Lapitan) emerged as the highest bidders with the bid amount of P2.5 million. Then, they
were issued a Certificate of Sale which was registered and annotated at the back of TCT No. T-
412512. The one-year redemption period expired without the spouses Fortaleza redeeming the
mortgage. Thus, spouses Lapitan executed an affidavit of consolidation of ownership on
November 20, 2003 and caused the cancellation of TCT No. T-412512 and the registration of the
subject property in their names under TCT No. T-535945 on February 4, 2004. Despite the
foregoing, the spouses Fortaleza refused spouses Lapitan s formal demand to vacate and
surrender possession of the subject property.

On August 27, 2004, spouses Lapitan filed an ex parte petition for the issuance of writ of
possession as new registered owners of the subject property. In their opposition, spouses
Fortaleza questioned the validity of the real estate mortgage and the foreclosure sale. They
argued that the mortgage was void because the creditors bloated the principal amount by the
imposition of exorbitant interest. Spouses Fortaleza added that the foreclosure proceeding was
invalid for non-compliance with the posting requirement. The RTC ordered the issuance of a
writ of possession explaining that it is a ministerial duty of the court especially since the
redemption period had expired and a new title had already been issued in the name of the
spouses Lapitan, Spouses Fortaleza moved for reconsideration, claiming that the subject
property is their family home and is exempt from foreclosure sale. The RTC denied their
motion. CA affirmed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subject property is exempt from forced sale because it is a family home

HELD:

The spouses Fortaleza’s argument that the subject property is exempt from forced sale because it
is a family home deserves scant consideration. As a rule, the family home is exempt from
execution, forced sale or attachment.  However, Article 155(3) of the Family Code explicitly
allows the forced sale of a family home "for debts secured by mortgages on the premises before
or after such constitution." In this case, there is no doubt that spouses Fortaleza voluntarily
executed on January 28, 1998 a deed of Real Estate Mortgage over the subject property which
 P a g e | 465

was even notarized by their original counsel of record. And assuming that the property is exempt
from forced sale, spouses Fortaleza did not set up and prove to the Sheriff such exemption from
forced sale before it was sold at the public auction.

As elucidated in Honrado v. Court of Appeals:

While it is true that the family home is constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied
as a family residence and is exempt from execution or forced sale under Article 153 of the
Family Code, such claim for exemption should be set up and proved to the Sheriff before the sale
of the property at public auction. Failure to do so would estop the party from later claiming the
exemption.

As this Court ruled in Gomez v. Gealone:

Although the Rules of Court does not prescribe the period within which to claim the exemption,
the rule is, nevertheless, well-settled that the right of exemption is a personal privilege granted to
the judgment debtor and as such, it must be claimed not by the sheriff, but by the debtor himself
at the time of the levy or within a reasonable period thereafter.

Certainly, reasonable time for purposes of the law on exemption does not mean a time after the
expiration of the one-year period for a judgment debtor to redeem the property. ςrνll

Equally without merit is spouses Fortaleza s reliance on the cases of Tolentino and De Los
Reyes in praying for the exercise of the right of redemption even after the expiration of the one-
year period. In Tolentino, we held that an action to redeem filed within the period of redemption,
with a simultaneous deposit of the redemption money tendered to the sheriff, is equivalent to an
offer to redeem and has the effect of preserving the right to redemption for future enforcement
even beyond the one-year period. And in De Los Reyes, we allowed the mortgagor to redeem the
disputed property after finding that the tender of the redemption price to the sheriff was made
within the one-year period and for a sufficient amount.

The circumstances in the present case are far different. The spouses Fortaleza neither filed an
action nor made a formal offer to redeem the subject property accompanied by an actual and
simultaneous tender of payment. It is also undisputed that they allowed the one-year period to
lapse from the registration of the certificate of sale without redeeming the mortgage. For all
intents and purposes, spouses Fortaleza have waived or abandoned their right of redemption.

Lastly, we agree with the CA that any question regarding the regularity and validity of the
mortgage or its foreclosure cannot be raised as a justification for opposing the petition for the
issuance of the writ of possession. The said issues may be raised and determined only after the
issuance of the writ of possession. Indeed, "[t]he judge with whom an application for writ of
possession is filed need not look into the validity of the mortgage or the manner of its
foreclosure." The writ issues as a matter of course. "The rationale for the rule is to allow the
purchaser to have possession of the foreclosed property without delay, such possession being
founded on the right of ownership." To underscore this mandate, Section 8 of Act No. 3135 gives
the debtor-mortgagor the right to file a petition for the setting aside of the foreclosure sale and
 P a g e | 466

for the cancellation of a writ of possession in the same proceedings where the writ was issued
within 30 days after the purchaser-mortgagee was given possession. The court’s decision thereon
may be appealed by either party, but the order of possession shall continue in effect during the
pendency of the appeal.

"Clearly then, until the foreclosure sale of the property in question is annulled by a court of
competent jurisdiction, the issuance of a writ of possession remains the ministerial duty of the
trial court. The same is true with its implementation; otherwise, the writ will be a useless paper
judgment a result inimical to the mandate of Act No. 3135 to vest possession in the purchaser
immediately."
 P a g e | 467

OLIVA-DE MESA v. ACERO

G.R. No. 185064 January 16, 2010

FACTS:

Araceli De Mesa is married to Ernesto De Mesa.They purcahsed a parcel of land located in

Meycauayan, Bulacan. A house was contracted in the said property, which became their family
home. A year after, Arceli contracted a loan in the amount of P100,000 from Claudio Acero,
which was secured by a mortgage on the said parcel of land and house. Araceli issued a check
for the payment of the loan. When Acero presented the check to the bank it was dishonored
because the checking account was already closed. Acero demanded payment. However, Spouses
De Mesa still failed to pay. Acero filed a complaint for violation of B.P. 22 in the RTC. The
RTC acquitted the Spouses but ordered them to pay Acero P100,000 plus legal interest. A writ of
execution was issued to levy on the said property.

The house and lot was sold in the public auction and Acero was the highest bidder. Acero leased
the property to Juanito Oliva, who defaulted payment for several years. Oliva contends that the
Acero spouses are not the owners of the property.

The MTC rendered a Decision, giving due course to Spouses Acero’s complaint and ordering the
Spouses De Mesa and Oliva to vacate the subject property. Spouses De Mesa contend that they
are the rightful owners of the property. The MTC also stated that from the time a Torrens title
over the subject property was issued in Claudio’s name up to the time the complaint for
ejectment was filed, the petitioners never assailed the validity of the levy made by the Sheriff,
the regularity of the public sale that was conducted thereafter and the legitimacy of Acero’s
Torrens title that was resultantly issued.

Spouses De Mesa filed an action to nullify the TCT issued to Acero. Spouses De Mesa contend
that the subject property is a family home, which is exempt from execution under the Family
Code and, thus, could not have been validly levied upon for purposes of satisfying the writ of
execution. RTC dismissed the complaint. CA affirmed RTC’s decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subject property, as a family home, may be subject to execution in this case.

HELD:

YES, the subject property is family home but is subject to execution.In general, the family home
is exempt from execution. However, the person claiming this privilege must assert it at the time
it was levied or within a reasonable time thereafter.

For the family home to be exempt from execution,distinction must be made as to what law
applies based on when it was constituted and what requirements must be complied with by the
judgment debtor or his successors claiming such privilege.
 P a g e | 468

The foregoing rules on constitution of family homes, for purposes of exemption from execution,
could be summarized as follows:

First, family residences constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or before August
3, 1988 must be constituted as a family home either judicially or extrajudicially in accordance
with the provisions of the Civil Code in order to be exempt from execution;

Second, family residences constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988
are automatically deemed to be family homes and thus exempt from execution from the time it
was constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein;

Third, family residences which were not judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family
home prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, but were existing thereafter, are considered as
family homes by operation of law and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a
family home under the Family Code.

Here, the subject property became a family residence sometime in January 1987 when Spouses
De Mesa got married. There was no showing, however, that the same was judicially or
extrajudicially constituted as a family home in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code.
Still, when the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988, the subject property became a family
home by operation of law and was thus prospectively exempt from execution. The petitioners
were thus correct in asserting that the subject property was a family home.

Despite the fact that the subject property is a family home and, thus, should have been exempt
from execution, Spouses De Mesa should have asserted the subject property being a family home
and its being exempted from execution at the time it was levied or within a reasonable time
thereafter. They are stopped from claiming the exemption of the property from execution.
 P a g e | 469

JOANIE SURPOSA UY v. JOSE NGO, CHUA

G.R. No. 183965 September 18, 2009
FACTS:
Petitioner filed for the issuance of a decree of illegitimate filiation against respondent. She
alleged in her complaint that respondent, who was then married, had an illicit relationship with
Irene Surposa and that the respondent and Irene had two children namely, petitioner (Joanie) and
her brother, Allan. Respondent attended at the birth of the latter instructed that petitioner’s birth
certificate be filled out with the following names: “ALFREDO F. SURPOSA” as father and
“IRENE DUCAY” as mother. Alfredo F. Surposa was the name of Irene’s father, and Ducay was
the maiden surname of Irene’s mother. However, respondent Chua financially supported
petitioner and Allan and even provided employment for her. He and Allan were introduced to
each other and became known in the Chinese community as respondent’s illegitimate children.
During petitioner’s wedding, respondent sent his brother Catalino Chua (Catalino) as his
representative and Respondent’s relatives even attended the baptism of petitioner’s daughter.
Later, Respondent denied that he had an illicit relationship with Irene, and that petitioner was his
daughter.
Hearings then ensued and petitioner presented documentary evidence to prove her claim of
illegitimate filiation. Petitioner had already filed a similar Petition for the issuance of a decree of
illegitimate affiliation against respondent. And latter filed a Demurrer to Evidence on the ground
that the Decision dated 21 February 2000 barred by res judicata. A Compromise Agreement was
made between the two parties prior where petitioner Joanie declares, admits and acknowledges
that there is no blood relationship or filiation between petitioner and her brother Allan on one
hand and the respondent, in exchange the latter paid the Two Million Pesos each. The court ruled
in favor of the respondent hence this appeal
ISSUE:
Whether or not the principle of res judicata is applicable to judgments predicated upon a
compromise agreement on cases enumerated in Article 2035 of the Civil Code of the Philippines;
HELD:
Res judicata is based upon two grounds embodied in various maxims of the common law,
namely public policy and necessity, which makes it in the interest of the State that there should
be an end to litigation and that the hardship of the individual that he should be vexed twice for
the same cause.
The requisites must also concur: (1) there must be a final judgment or order; (2) the court
rendering it must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it must be a
judgment or order on the merits; and (4) there must be, between the two cases, identity of parties,
subject matter, and causes of action.
The court rules held that res judicata does not exist in this case. The compromise agreement is a
contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end
to one already commenced. In Estate of the late Jesus S. Yujuico v. Republic, the Court
pronounced that a judicial compromise has the effect of res judicata. A judgment based on a
compromise agreement is a judgment on the merits. A contract must have requisites and no
 P a g e | 470

according to Article 2035 of the Civil Code, one of the requisites of such to be valid is that the
compromise must not pertain to the Civil Status of a person and the issue of Future Support and
Future Legitime. The agreement in this case is intended to settle the question of petitioner’s
status and filiation, i.e., whether she is an illegitimate child of respondent. In exchange for
petitioner and her brother Allan acknowledging that they are not the children of respondent,
respondent would pay petitioner and Allan P2,000,000.00 each. Although unmentioned, it was a
necessary consequence of said Compromise Agreement that petitioner also waived away her
rights to future support and future legitime as an illegitimate child of respondent. Evidently, the
Compromise Agreement dated 18 February 2000 between petitioner and respondent is covered
by the prohibition under Article 2035 of the Civil Code as espoused in the case of Advincula v.
Advincula. It is settled, then, in law and jurisprudence, that the status and filiation of a child
cannot be compromised. Public policy demands that there be no compromise on the status and
filiation of a child. Paternity and filiation or the lack of the same, is a relationship that must be
judicially established, and it is for the Court to declare its existence or absence. It cannot be left
to the will or agreement of the parties. Being contrary to law and public policy, the Compromise
Agreement dated 18 February 2000 between petitioner and respondent is void ab initio and vests
no rights and creates no obligations. It produces no legal effect at all. The void agreement cannot
be rendered operative even by the parties' alleged performance (partial or full) of their respective
prestations.
 P a g e | 471

DE ASIS v. COURT OF APPEALS

GR NO. 127578 February 15, 1999

FACTS:

Vircel Andres as legal guardian of Glen Camil Andres de Asis, filed an action in 1988 for
maintenance and support against the alleged father Manuel De Asis who failed to provide
support and maintenance despite repeated demands.  Vircel later on withdrew the complaint in
1989 for the reason that Manuel denied paternity of the said minor and due to such denial, it
seems useless to pursue the said action.  They mutually agreed to move for the dismissal of the
complaint with the condition that Manuel will not pursue his counter claim.  However in 1995,
Vircel filed a similar complaint against the alleged father, this time as the minor’s legal
guardian/mother.  Manuel interposed maxim of res judicata for the dismissal of the case.  He
maintained that since the obligation to give support is based on existence of paternity between
the child and putative parent, lack thereof negates the right to claim support. 

ISSUE: 

Whether or not the minor is barred from action for support.

HELD:

The right to give support cannot be renounced nor can it be transmitted to a third person.  The
original agreement between the parties to dismiss the initial complaint was in the nature of a
compromise regarding future support which is prohibited by law.  With respect to Manuel’s
contention for the lack of filial relationship between him and the child and agreement of Vircel in
not pursuing the original claim, the Court held that existence of lack thereof of any filial
relationship between parties was not a matter which the parties must decide but should be
decided by the Court itself.  While it is true that in order to claim support, filiation or paternity
must be first shown between the parties, but the presence or lack thereof must be judicially
established and declaration is vested in the Court.  It cannot be left to the will or agreement of the
parties.  Hence, the first dismissal cannot bar the filing of another action asking for the same
relief (no force and effect).  Furthermore, the defense of res judicata claimed by Manuel was
untenable since future support cannot be the subject of any compromise or waiver.
 P a g e | 472

FERNANDEZ v. FERNANDEZ
G.R. No. 143256 August 28, 2001

FACTS:
Dr. Jose K. Fernandez and Generosa de Venecia owns a parcel fo land located at Dagupan City
which consists if 194 sq. meters and two-storey building constructed thereon. They were
childless but it was discovered that they bought a baby and was later identified as Rodolfo
Fernandez. Jose died and left the properties to his wife’s care.
On August 31, 1989, a Deed of Extra-judicial partition dividing and allocating to themselves the
land and the residential house. On the same day, she also executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in
favor of appellant’s son.
But the nephews and nieces of the deceased of Jose contested the Extra-judicial Partition of the
estate and the Deed of Absolute Sale because they alleged that it is motivated by greed and
malicious acts to deprive plaintiffs, and taking advantage of Generosa’s physical and mental
incapacity.The defendant conteded that he is their son and has been acknowledged during their
lifetime.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Rodolfo is their legitmate child.
RULING:
First, the action filed was only to annul two documents and not to impugn one’s legitimacy.
According to Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of the said child by;
1. It was physically impossible to have sexual intercourse with his wife within 120 days of the
300 days, 2. For biological and scientific reasons, he is not his child, 3. That if conceived through
artificial insemination, the written authorization or ratification was made through mistake, fraud,
violence, intimidation, or undue influence.
The Court found that it is necessary to pass to the spouses the relationship between them and
Rodolfo for the purpose of determining his legal right. Due to their findings, Rodolfo is not a
child by nature of the spouses Fernandez and not a legal heir of Dr. Jose Fernandez, thus the
subject deed of extra-judicial settlement of the estate of Dr. Jose Fernandez between Generosa
and Rodolfo is null and void insofar as Rodolfo is concerned.puruant to Article 1105 of the New
Civil Code.
 P a g e | 473

AGUILAR v. SIASAT
G.R. 200169 January 28 2015

FACTS:
Spouses Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar (the Aguilar spouses) died, intestate and
without debts, on August 26, 1983 and February 8, 1994, respectively.  Included in their estate
are two parcels of land (herein subject properties) covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
T-25896 and T-(15462) 1070 of the Registries of Deeds of Bago and Bacolod (the subject titles).

In June 1996, petitioner filed with the RTC of Bacolod a civil case for mandatory injunction with
damages against respondent and alleged that the former is the only son and sole surviving heir of
the Aguilar spouses; that the petitioner discovered that the subject titles were missing, and thus
he suspected that someone from the Siasat clan could have stolen the same.

In her Answer, respondent claimed that the petitioner is not the son and sole surviving heir of the
Aguilars, but mere stranger who has raised by the Aguilar spouses out of generosity and kindness
of heart; that petitioner is not a natural or adopted child of the Aguilar spouses; that petitioner is
not a natural or adopted child of the Aguilar spouses; that since Alfredo Aguilar predeceased his
wife, Candelaria Siasat- Aguilar, the latter inherited the conjugal share of the former; that upon
the death of he latter, her brothers and sisters inherited her estate as she had no issue; and that the
subject titles were not stolen but entrusted to her for safekeeping by Candelaria who is her aunt.

ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner can not prove filiation to the Spouses Aguilar who is the owner of the
land due to the lost of his Certificate of Libe Birth and Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS Form E-1 is a
mere proof of pen and continuous possession.
HELD:
The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the record of
birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation
in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In
the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous possession of the
status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws. The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a
court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of
the child, and no further court action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just
a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a
separate action for judicial approval. Where, instead, a claim for recognition is predicated on
other evidence merely tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record or an authentic writing, judicial action within the applicable
statute of limitations is essential in order to establish the child’s acknowledgment.
 P a g e | 474

CONCEPCION v. COURT OF APPEALS

GR No. 123450 August 31, 2005

FACTS:
Gerardo Concepcion, the petitioner, and Ma. Theresa Almonte, private respondent, was married
in December 1989 and begotten a child named Jose Gerardo in December 1990. The husband
filed on December 1991, a petition to have his marriage annulled on the ground of bigamy since
the wife married a certain Mario Gopiao sometime in December 1980, whom according to the
husband was still alive and living in Loyola Heights, QC. Trial court ruled that the son was an
illegitimate child and the custody was awarded to the wife while Gerardo was granted visitation
rights. Theresa argued that there was nothing in the law granting “visitation rights in favor of the
putative father of an illegitimate child”. She further wanted to have the surname of the son
changed from “Concepcion to Almonte”, her maiden name, since an illegitimate child should use
his mother’s surname. After the requested oral argument, trial court reversed its ruling and held
the son to be not the son of Gerardo but of Mario. Hence, the child was a legitimate child of
Theresa and Mario.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that Jose Gerardo is a legitimate child of
Mario and not petitioner Gerardo.

HELD:
Considering that Theresa’s marriage with Gerardo was void ab initio, the latter never became the
former’s husband and never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of the child. Theresa’s
contention was to have his son be declared as not the legitimate child of her and Mario but her
illegitimate child with Gerardo. In this case, the mother has no right to disavow a child because
maternity is never uncertain. Hence, she is not permitted by law to question the son’s
legitimacy. Under Article 167 of the Family Code, “the child shall be considered legitimate
although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an
adulteress”. Having the best interest of the child in mind, the presumption of his legitimacy was
upheld by the Court. As a legitimate child, the son shall have the right to bear the surnames of
Mario and Theresa, in conformity with the provisions of Civil Code on surnames. Gerardo
cannot then impose his surname to be used by the child, since in the eyes of the law, the child is
not related to him in any way.
 P a g e | 475

BELEN SAGAD ANGELES v. ALELI ANGELES MAGLAYA

G.R. No. 153798 September 2, 2005

FACTS:

Corazon Angeles-Maglaya, herein respondent, filed a petition for letters of administrator and her
appointment as administrator of the intestate estate of Francisco Angeles. She claims that she is
the sole legitimate heir of Francisco Angeles and Genoveva Mercado, and together with Belen
Angeles, herein petitioner and 2nd wife of Francisco, they are the surviving heirs of the decedent.
Franscisco died intestate in 1998 leaving behind 4 parcels of land and a building. Belen opposed
this petition and prayed that she, instead of Corazon, be proclaimed the administrator of
Francisco‘s estate. After establishing the circumstances of her marriage to Francisco(i.e. married
before a Judge and ratified two months later in religious rites; Francisco presented himself to be
single that time, Belen attacked the legitimacy of Corazon, saying that her birth certificate was
not signed by Francisco. She has also failed to present the marriage contract between her parents,
Francisco and Genoveva. Furthermore, Belen averred that she and Francisco legally adopted
Concesa Yamat during their marriage. Trial court dismissed petition for lack of proof of filiation
as legitimate child, but the Court of Appeals reversed this on the grounds that petitioner‘s motion
being a demurrer (under Sec 1, Rule 33) thereby waived her right to present opposing evidence,
and that respondent has sufficiently established her filiation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Corazon is a legitimate child of Francisco and Genoveva.

HELD:

The court ruled in the negative. Presumption of legitimacy may only be availed upon proof of the
factual basis that child‘s parents were legally married and that his/her conception of birth
occurred during the marriage. In the case at bar, there is no absolute proof of the decedent’s
marriage to respondent‘s mother Genoveva. No marriage certificate or contract was offered in
evidence. No solemnizing officer was called to witness. Also, respondent never questioned what
would necessarily be a bigamous marriage between Belen and Francisco. In fact, in her petition,
she alleged that petitioner is the ―surviving spouse‖ of the decedent. Respondent also filed a
petition against the adoption of Consesa Yamat, alleging that as the legitimate child of Francisco,
she should have been notified of the adoption proceedings. Since the lower court has ruled with
finality that she is not legitimate since no proof has been given as to the marriage of her parents,
this petition has become moot and academic. On the matter of administration, it should be noted
that the surviving spouse is preferred over the next of kin of decedent. Next of kin refers to the
heirs.
 P a g e | 476

JANICE MARIE JAO v. COURT OF APPEALS AND PERICO JAO

G.R. No. L-49162 July 28, 1987

FACTS:

In 1968, Janice Jao, a minor represented by her mother Arlene filed a case for support against
Perico Jao. It seems from evidence that Perico Jao was introduced to Arlene in a club. After
which, they had sexual intercourse. Jao accompanied Arlene to a hospital for a check-up, Jao
paid the rentals in the hospital. Arlene then gave birth to Janice on August 16,1968. Arlene said
that they had intercourse on November 30, 1967 but Jao contested that they had consummated
the act on January 18 1968. The NBI, upon order by the court, conducted a blood grouping test
which results say that Janice could not have been the offspring of Perico Jao and Arlene Salgado.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Perico Jao is the father of Janice Marie.

HELD:

The court ruled in the negative. There could only be compulsory recognition when the child was
conceived during the time when the mother cohabited with the supposed father. Janice should‘ve
been conceived between November 20, 1967 to December4, 1967 according to the court.
However, Arlene herself said that they only started to cohabit on December 16, 1967. Hence,
Janice was NOT conceived during cohabitation. Moreover, Arlene cohabited with 2 other men.
Lastly, the blood grouping test which showed that Janice could not have been a child of Perico
and Arlene is conclusive on non-paternity. Hence, it cannot be said with certainty that Perico Jao
is indeed the father.
 P a g e | 477

TEOFISTA BABIERA V. PRESENTACION B. CATOTAL

G.R. NO.. 138693 June 15, 2000

FACTS:
Presentacion B. Catotal filed with the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte, Branch II, Iligan
City, a petition for the cancellation of the entry of birth of Teofista Babiera in the Civil Registry
of Iligan City. Presentacion asserted that she is the only surviving child of the late spouses
Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariñosa, who died on May 26, 1996 and July 6, 1990
respectively. Presentacion alleged that a baby girl was delivered by a ‘hilot’ on September 20,
1996 on , in the house of the spouses, by their housemaid Flora Guinto, who without the
knowledge of the parents of the petitioner, caused the registration/recording of the facts of birth
of her child, by simulating that she was the child of the spouses Eugenio, then 65 years old and
Hermogena, then 54 years old, and made Hermogena Babiera appear as the mother by forging
her signature. Presentacion, who was then fifteen, said that she witnessed the livebirth. The
Regional Trial Court found the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, Teofista Guinto
filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that 'the petition states no cause of action, it being an
attack on the legitimacy of the respondent as the child of the spouses Eugenio Babiera and
Hermogena Cariñosa Babiera; that plaintiff has no legal capacity to file the instant petition
pursuant to Article 171 of the Family Code; and finally that the instant petition is barred by
prescription in accordance with Article 170 of the Family Code.' The trial court denied the
motion to dismiss. The CA upheld the ruling of the RTC and held that Teofista is not the
biological child of Hermogena Babiera.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the plaintiff has no legal capacity to file instant petition pursuant to Article 171
of the Family Code.

HELD:
The court ruled in the negative. The court held that respondent had the requisite standing to
initiate the present action. Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, provides that a real party in
interest is one "who stands to be benefited orinjured by the judgment in the suit, or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit. Article 171 of the Family Code is not applicable to the present
case. A close reading of this provision shows that it applies to instances in which the father
impugns the legitimacy of his wife’s child. The provision, however, presupposes that the child
was the undisputed offspring of the mother. The present case alleges and shows that Hermogena
did not give birth to petitioner. In other words, the prayer herein is not to declare that petitioner is
an illegitimate child of Hermogena, but to establish that the former is not the latter's child at all.
Verily, the present action does not impugn petitioner’s filiation to Spouses Eugenio and
Hermogena Babiera, because there is no blood relation to impugn in the first p
 P a g e | 478

WILLIAM LIYAO v. JUANITA TANHOTI- LIYAO ET. AL.

G.R. No. 138961 March 7, 2002

FACTS:

William Liyao Jr., the illegitimate son of the deceased, as represented by her mother Corazon,
filed a petition ordering Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl L. Tan, Tita L. Tan and Linda Liyao to
recognize and acknowledge the former as a compulsory heir of the deceased and to be entitled to
all successional rights. Liyao Jr. was in continuous possession and enjoyment of the status as the
child of the deceased having been recognized and acknowledged as such child by the decedent
during his lifetime. There were two sides of the story. Corazon maintained that she and the
deceased were legally married but living separately for more than 10 years and that they
cohabited from 1965 until the death of the deceased. On the other hand, one of the children of the
deceased stated that her mom and the deceased were legally married and that her parents were
not separated legally or in fact.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner can impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim from the estate
of the deceased.

HELD:

The court ruled in the negative. Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right
of the husband, or in exceptional cases, his heirs for the reason that he was the one directly
confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produced and he should
be the one to decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it in view of the moral and
economic interest involved. Hence, it was then settled that the legitimacy of the child can only be
impugned in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties and within the period
limited by law. Furthermore, the court held that there was no clear, competent and positive
evidence presented by the petitioner that his alleged father had admitted or recognized his
paternity.
 P a g e | 479

JINKIE CHRISTIE DE JESUS ET. AL. v. THE ESTATE OF DIZON

G.R. No. 142877 October 2, 2001

FACTS:

The case involves two illegitimate children who having been born in a lawful wedlock; claim to
be the illegitimate children of the decedent, Juan G.Dizon in order to enforce their respective
shares in the latter’s estate under the rules on succession. Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves
de Jesus got married on August 23,1964 and during this marriage, herein petitioners, Jacqueline
A. de Jesus andJinkie Christie A. de Jesus were born. However, in a notarized document dated
June 07, 1991, Juan G. Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as being his own
illegitimate children by Carolina Aves de Jesus. Subsequently in the following year, Juan Dizon
died intestate leaving behind a considerable amount of assets. Thus, on the strength of his
notarized acknowledgment, herein petitioners filed a complaint for Partition with Inventory and
Accounting of the Dizon estate. On the other hand, herein respondents, the surviving spouse and
legitimate children of the decedent Juan Dizon, including the corporations of which the deceased
was a stockholder, sought the dismissal of the case. They argued that the complaint, even while
denominated as being one for partition, would nevertheless call for altering the status of
petitioners from being the legitimate children of the spouses Danilo de Jesus and Carolina de
Jesus to instead be the illegitimate children of Carolina de Jesus and deceased Juan Dizon. But,
the trial court denied their motion to dismiss as well as their motion for reconsideration, which
prompted the respondents to elevate the issue before the Court of Appeals but still the latter
upheld the decision of the lower court and ordered that case be remanded for further proceedings.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioners are indeed the acknowledged illegitimate off springs of the decedent.

HELD:

The court ruled in the negative. The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is
established by (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2)an
admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open
and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by
the Rules of Court and special laws. The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of
birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a
consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is required. In fact,
any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a
voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval. Where,
instead, a claim for recognition is predicated on other evidence merely tending to prove
paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or an
authentic writing, judicial action within the applicable statute of limitations is essential in order
to establish the child’s acknowledgment. However, based on the records presented, they showed
that petitioners were born during the marriage of their parents. The certificates of live birth
would also identify Danilo de Jesus as being their father. In an attempt to establish their
 P a g e | 480

illegitimate filiation to the late Juan Dizon, petitioners would impugn their legitimate status as
being children of Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus. This step cannot be aptly done
because the law itself establishes the legitimacy of children conceived or born during the
marriage of the parents.
 P a g e | 481

GERONIMO v. SANTOS
G.R. No. 197099 September 28, 2015

FACTS:

Rufino and Claridad died intestate leaving a property consisting of one half of the parcel of land.
Eugenio and Emiliano Geronimo who are the brothers of Rufino executed a document
entitled Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman declaring themselves as the only heirs of the spouses
and adjudicating to themselves the property. They took possession and were able to transfer the
tax declaration of the property to their names. Karen Santos, claiming to be the only child of
deceased Rufino and Caridad Geronimo filed a complaint for annulment of document and
recovery of possession against the defendants Eugenio and Emiliano Geronimo. Eugenio and
Emiliano denied the allegation that plaintiff was the only child and sole heir of their brother.
They disclosed that the deceased Rufino and Caridad Geronimo were childless and took in as
their ward the plaintiff who was in truth, the child of Caridad’s sister. They claimed that the birth
certificate of the plaintiff was a simulated document. According to Eugenio, when Rufino’s wife
could not bear a child, the couple decided to adopt the plaintiff who was Caridad’s niece from
Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur. It was in 1972, 13 years after the marriage, when Karen joined her
adoptive parents’ household. Eugenio was able to obtain a copy of the plaintiff’s alleged birth
certificate. It had irregular features, such as that it was written in pentel pen, the entry in the
box date of birth was erased and the word and figure April 6, 1972 written and the name Emma
Daño was superimposed on the entry in the box intended for the informant’s signature. Basing
on the secondary evidence of Karen’s open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child, both the RTC and CA ruled in favor of respondent Karen

ISSUE:

Whether or not the mere registration of a child in his or her birth certificate as the child of the
supposed parents, even if she is not a natural child of the latter, is a valid adoption.

HELD:

No. A mere cursory reading of the birth certificate of respondent would show that it was
tampered specifically on the entries pertaining to the date of birth of respondent and the name of
the informant. Using pentel ink, the date of birth of respondent – April 6, 1972 – and the name of
the informant – Emma Daño – were both superimposed on the document. The appellate court
itself ruled that the irregularities consisting of the superimposed entries on the date of birth and
the name of the informant made the document questionable. The corroborating testimony of
Arturo Reyes, a representative of the NSO, further confirmed that the entries on the date of birth
and the signature of the informant are alterations on the birth certificate which rendered the
document questionable. To be sure, even the respondent herself did not offer any evidence to
explain such irregularities on her own birth certificate. These irregularities and the totality of the
following circumstances surrounding the alleged birth of respondent are sufficient to overthrow
the presumption of regularity attached to respondent’s birth certificate. Finally, we also find that
the concurrence of the secondary evidence relied upon by both courts a quo does not sufficiently
 P a g e | 482

establish the one crucial fact in this case: that respondent is indeed a child of the deceased
spouses. Both the RTC and the CA ruled that respondent is a legitimate child of her putative
parents because she was allowed to bear their family name "Geronimo", they supported her and
her education, she was the beneficiary of the burial benefits of Caridad in her GSIS policy,
Caridad applied for and was appointed as her legal guardian in relation to the estate left by
Rufino, and she and Caridad executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Rufino as his
legal heirs.

Of great significance to this controversy was the following pronouncement:

But definitely, the mere registration of a child in his or her birth certificate as the child of the
supposed parents is not a valid adoption, does not confer upon the child the status of an adopted
child and the legal rights of such child, and even amounts to simulation of the child's birth or
falsification of his or her birth certificate, which is a public document. Furthermore, it is well-
settled that a record of birth is merely a prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein. It is
not conclusive evidence of the truthfulness of the statements made there by the interested
parties. 
 P a g e | 483

SPOUSES TIJING v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 125901 March 8, 2001

FACTS:

Petitioners are husband and wife with 6 children, the youngest is Edgardo Tijing, Jr. On August
1989 Angelita Diamante went to her house to fetch her for an urgent laundry job; she made
Bienvenida wait while she went to the market and left her 4-month-old son Edgardo, Jr. under
the care of Angelita. When she returned, both Angelita and Edgardo Jr. were gone. On October
1993, Bienvenida read in a tabloid about the death of Tomas Lopez, allegedly the common-law
husband of Angelita, and whose remains were lying in state in Hagonoy, Bulacan; Bienvenida
went to Bulacan and allegedly saw Edgardo, Jr. for the first time in 4years. She claims that her
son was already named John Thomas Lopez. Bienvenida avers that Angelita refused to return the
boy to her despite her demand. Bienvenida and Edgardo filed their petition for habeas corpus.
Two witnesses, Vasquez, who assisted in the delivery of Edgardo, Jr.; and Benjamin Lopez,
brother of Tomas Lopez, testified that his brother couldn‘t have possibly fathered John Thomas
Lopez as the latter was sterile and that Tomas admitted to him that John Thomas Lopez was only
an adopted son. Angelita claimed that she is the natural mother of the child and at 42years old,
she gave birth to John Thomas Lopez on April 27, 1989. The birth of John Thomas was
registered by her common-law husband, Tomas Lopez, with the Local Civil Registry of Manila
on August 4, 1989. The RTC concluded that since Angelita and her common-law husband
couldn‘t have children, the alleged birth of John Thomas Lopez is an impossibility. The minor
and Bienvenida showed strong facial similarity and so the court granted petition for habeas
corpus. Subsequently, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Edgardo Tijing, Jr. and John Thomas Lopez are one and the same person and is
the son of the petitioners.

HELD:

The court ruled in the affirmative. Evidences purporting to the fact that John Thomas Lopez is
Edgardo Tijing, Jr. were evident. Angelita could no longer bear children also, Tomas Lopez is no
longer capable of siring a son. It was unusual that the birth certificate of John Thomas Lopez was
filed by Tomas Lopez instead of the midwife 4 months after alleged birth. Additionally, the
strong facial similarities between the child and Bienvenida also point out that they may well be
related. Lastly, clinical records presented by Vasquez were conclusive in proving such filiation.
 P a g e | 484

CAMELO CABATANIA v. COURT OF APPEALS AND CAMELO REGODOS

G.R. No. 124814, October 21, 2004

FACTS:

Controversy stems from a petition for recognition and support filed by Florencia Regodos in
behalf of her minor son, private respondent Camelo Regodos. Camelo Regodos was born on
September 9,1982. Florencia testified that she was the one supporting her child. Florencia
recounted that after her husband left in 1981, he went to Escalante, Negros Occidental to look for
work and was eventually hired as Camelo‘s household help. On January 2, 1982, Camelo
brought her to Bacolod City where they checked in at the Visayan Motel and had sexual
intercourse. Camelo promised to support her if she got pregnant. Florencia claimed that she
discovered she was carrying Camelo‘s child 27 days after their sexual encounter. On suspicion
that Florencia was pregnant, Camelo‘s wife sent her home. But Camelo instead brought her to
Singcang, Bacolod City where he rented a house for her. On September 9, 1982, assisted by a
hilot in her aunts house in Tiglawigan, Cadiz City, she gave birth to her child, private respondent
Camelo Regodos. Camelo Cabatania alleges that the father of the child is Florencia‘s husband
and when they had sex, she was already pregnant. Petitioner refused support, denying the alleged
paternity. He denied going to Bacolod City with her and checking in at the Visayan Motel. He
vehemently denied having sex with her on January 2, 1982 and renting a house for her in
Singcang, Bacolod City.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in its application of Article 283 of the Civil Code on
the compulsory recognition and award of supporting favor of respondent appellee Camelo
Regodos.

HELD:

The court ruled in the negative. Trial court and CA decided that the child was Camelo‘s. The
trial courts finding of a paternal relationship between petitioner and private respondent was
based on the testimony of the child’s mother and the personal appearance of the child. The fact
that Florencia’s husband is living and there is a valid subsisting marriage between them gives
rise to the presumption that a child born within that marriage is legitimate even though the
mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulterous.
The trial court and CA should not have overlooked this fact.
 P a g e | 485

ROSALINA B. ECETA v. MARIA THERESA VELL LAGURA ECETA

G.R. No. 157037 May 20, 2004

FACTS:

Petitioner Rosalina P. Vda. De Eceta was married to Isaac Eceta sometime in 1926. During the
subsistence of their marriage, they begot a son, Vicente. The couple acquired several properties,
among which is the disputed property. Isaac died in 1967 leaving behind Rosalina and Vicente as
his compulsory heirs. In 1977, Vicente died. During his lifetime, however, he sired Maria
Theresa, an illegitimate daughter. Thus at the time of his death, his compulsory heirs were his
mother, Rosalina, and illegitimate child, Maria Theresa. In 1991, Maria Theresa filed a case
before the RTC of Quezon City for "Partition and Accounting with Damages" against Rosalina
alleging that by virtue of her father’s death, she became Rosalina’s co-heir and co-owner of the
property. In her answer, Rosalina alleged that the property is paraphernal in nature and thus
belonged to her exclusively.

ISSUE:

Whether the certified photocopy from a photocopy of the certificate of live birth is competent
evidence to prove the alleged filiation of the respondent as an "illegitimate daughter" of her
alleged father Vicente Eceta.

HELD:

The court ruled in the negative. Notably, what was filed and tried before the trial court and the
Court of Appeals is one for partition and accounting with damages only. The filiation, or
compulsory recognition by Vicente Eceta of Maria Theresa, was never put in issue. In fact, both
parties have already agreed and admitted, as duly noted in the trial court’s pre-trial order, that
Maria Theresa is Rosalina’s granddaughter. Notwithstanding, Maria Theresa successfully
established her filiation with Vicente by presenting a duly authenticated birth certificate. Vicente
himself signed Maria Theresa’s birth certificate thereby acknowledging that she is his daughter.
By this act alone, Vicente is deemed to have acknowledged his paternity over Maria Theresa.
 P a g e | 486

RIVERO v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 141273, May 17, 2005

FACTS:

In behalf of her minor child, Benedick Arevalo, her mother filed a complaint against defendants
for compulsory recognition as the illegitimate child of their deceased father. During trial, Mary
Jane Dy-Chiao De Guzman, one of the sister entered a compromised agreement with plaintiff
whereby she is acknowledging the petitioner as the illegitimate son of her father and pay
petitioner P6M as a share in the estate of their deceased father. RTC granted the compromised
agreement. Meanwhile, the Dy Chiao Brothers represented by their uncle filed for annulment
of judgment and TRO for the writ of execution of judgment and motion to dismiss. CA directed
Mary Jane on the other hand to file a comment on the opposition of her uncle. In her reply, she
question assailed decision of RTC since the illegitimate filiation of Benedick could not be the
subject of a compromise agreement. She further alleged that the parties thereunder did not
recognize the validity of the compromise agreement, as in fact she and the petitioners were
exploring the possibility of modifying their extrajudicial settlement. CA ruled in favor of the
defendants, hence a petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the compromise regarding filiation is valid?

HELD:

The ruling of RTC based on the compromise agreement executed by Mary Jane is null and void.
Article 2035(1) of the New Civil Code provides that no compromise upon the civil status
of persons shall be valid. As such, paternity and filiation, or the lack of the same, is a relationship
that must be judicially established, and it is for the court to determine its existence or absence. It
cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties. Such recognition by Mary Jane , however,
is ineffectual, because under the law, the recognition must be made personally by the putative
parent and not by any brother, sister or relative.
 P a g e | 487

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SGT. MORENO BAYANI

G.R. No. 120894 October 3, 1996

FACTS:

Petitioners filed a petition in their barangay to attempt to settle the case between them and
private respondents, but no settlement was reached. Thus, a Complaint or Annulment of Title
and Damages was filed before the RTC by petitioners against private respondents to recover their
alleged pro-indiviso shares in the subject property. To prove their filiation with the deceased
Buenaventura Cristobal, the baptismal certificates of Elisa, Anselmo, and the late Socorro were
presented. In the case of Mercedes who was born on 31 January 1909, she produced a
certification issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar, attesting to the fact that records of
birth for the years 1901, 1909, 1932 to 1939, 1940, 1943, and 1948were all destroyed due to
ordinary wear and tear. After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a judgment on 11 July
1997, dismissing the case, ruling that petitioners failed to prove their filiation with the deceased
Buenaventura Cristobal as the baptismal and birth certificates presented have scant evidentiary
value and that petitioners’ inaction for a long period of time amounts to laches. Not satisfied,
petitioners sought recourse in the Court of Appeals which ruled that they were able to prove their
filiation with the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal thru "other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws," but affirmed the ruling of the trial court barring their right to recover
their share of the subject property because of laches.

ISSUE:

Whether or not baptismal certificates are valid to prove filiation.

HELD:

The court ruled in the affirmative. The Court granted the petition and recognized and declared as
children of the late Buenaventura Cristobal from his first marriage to Ignacia Cristobal. The
Deed of Partition executed by private respondents is declared not binding upon petitioners who
were not notified or did not participate in the execution thereof. The subject property in the name
of private respondents is ordered to be partitioned and distributed in accordance with the decision
and appropriate certificates of title be issued in favor of each of the recognized heirs of the late
Cristobal Buenaventura. Article 172 of the Family Code provides: “Art. 172. The filiation of
legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the
civil register or a final judgment; or (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document
or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence of the
foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:(1) the open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws. Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and Special Laws, may
consist of the child's baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family bible in which the
child’s name has been entered, common reputation respecting the child's pedigree, admission by
silence, the testimony of witnesses, and other kinds of proof of admission under Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court.
 P a g e | 488

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MANUEL MANAHAN

G.R. No. 128157 September 29, 1999

FACTS:

Teresita Tibigar, 16 years old, worked at the Espiritu Canteen in Dagupan City. Manuel
Manahan is the brother-in-law of Josefina Espiritu, owner of the canteen. His wife Primadonna is
the sister of Josefina Espiritu. Manuel and Primadonna temporarily reside at the canteen together
with the family of Josefina as Primadonna was then pregnant. On 5 January 1995, at about two
o’clock in the morning, Teresita who was asleep was suddenly awakened when she felt someone
beside her. Upon opening her eyes she saw accused Manuel Manahan as he immediately placed
himself on top of her. Manuel Manahan, by the use of force succeeded in having carnal
knowledge over Teresita. Manuel then threatened Teresita’s life in case she will report such
incident. Teresita went home to her parents in Pangasinan. The sexual encounter resulted in her
pregnancy. Afterwards, her parents learned about the incident which led them to the filing of a
criminal offense of rape against Manuel Manahan. On October 2 1995, she gave birth to a
healthy baby girl and christened her Melanie Tibigar. Manuel was convicted by the RTC of
Dagupan on the crime charged.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused can be ordered to acknowledge and provide support for Melanie
Tibigar.

HELD:

The court ruled in the affirmative. On the matter of acknowledgment and support of the child, a
correction of the view of the court a quo is in order. Article 345 of The Revised Penal Code
provides that persons guilty of rape shall also be sentenced to "acknowledge the offspring, unless
the law should prevent him from doing so," and "in every case to support the offspring." In the
case before us, compulsory acknowledgment of the child Melanie Tibigar is not proper there
being a legal impediment in doing so as it appears that the accused is a married man. As
pronounced by this Court in People v. Guerrero," the rule is that if the rapist is a married man, he
cannot be compelled to recognize the offspring of the crime, should there be any, as his child,
whether legitimate or illegitimate." Consequently, that portion of the judgment under review is
accordingly deleted. In any case, we sustain that part ordering the accused to support the child as
it is in accordance with law.
 P a g e | 489

MA. THERESA ALBERTO v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 86639 June 2, 1994

FACTS:

On September 18, 1953, Maria Teresa R. Alberto was born to Aurora Reviva and Juan M.
Albert, both were not married. Then sometime on September 18, 1967, the alleged father of
Maria Teresita, Juan M. Alberto was assassinated and died intestate. His lawful wife, Yolanda R.
Alberto was appointed as administrator of his estate. After the Inventory and Appraisal and the
Administrator’s Accounting approved, the proceedings were closed and terminated. On
September 15, 1978, Maria Teresa R. Alberto filed a motion to leave and to intervene as
oppositor and to reopen the proceedings. The motion was granted by the probate court. Upon
presentation of evidences by both parties, the court was convinced that Maria Teresa R. Alberto
had been in continuous possession of a natural child, thereby compelling the descendants’ heirs
and estate to recognize her as such and allow her to participate in the estate proceedings.
However the Court of Appeals reversed the probate court’s decision, finding no satisfaction in
the degree of proof to establish Maria Teresa R. Alberto as a child of the deceased.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Maria Albert be legally be recognized by the heirs of the estate of Juan
Alberto as a natural child of the latter.

HELD:

The court ruled in the affirmative. The Supreme Court recognized the intent and effort of Juan
M. Alberto to introduce Maria to the family as one of his flesh and blood, by allowing Maria to
use his family name and by giving her mother money to support her support and by openly
introducing her to members of his family, relatives, and friends as his daughter. By the effect of
the operation of Article 285 of the Civil Code, Maria seeking a judicial declaration shall be
recognized as a natural child to enable her to participate in the estate of her deceased father.
 P a g e | 490

BEN-HUR NEPOMUCENO v. ARCHBENCEL ANN LOPEZ

G.R. No. 181258 March 18, 2010

FACTS:

Respondent Archbencel Ann Lopez, filed a complaint for recognition and support of filiation
against petitioner Ben-Hur Nepomuceno. She was represented by her mother, Araceli Lopez. She
assailed that she is the illegitimate daughter of Nepomuceno submitting as evidence the
handwritten note allegedly written and signed by Nepomuceno. She also demanded for financial
support along with filial recognition. On the other hand, Nepomuceno denied the assertions
reasoning out that he was compelled to execute the handwritten note due to the threats of the
National People’s Army. As the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City ruled in favor of
Archbencel, Nepomuceno thereafter proceeded to file a demurrer to evidence which was granted
by the trial court stating insufficiency of evidence as the reason for dismissing the case against
Nepomuceno. The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals and the trial court’s decision was
reversed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the filiation of Archbencel as illegitimate daughter of Ben-Hur Nepomuceno is

established by the handwritten note submitted as documentary evidence.

HELD:

The court ruled in the affirmative. Arhbencel’s demand for support, being based on her claim of
filiation to petitioner as his illegitimate daughter, falls under Article 195(4). As such, her
entitlement to support from petitioner is dependent on the determination of her filiation.
The note cannot also be accorded the same weight as the notarial agreement to support the child
referred to in Herrera for it is not even notarized and Herrera instructs that the notarial agreement
must be accompanied by the putative father’s admission of filiation to be an acceptable evidence
of filiation. Here, however, not only has petitioner not admitted filiation through
contemporaneous actions. He has consistently denied it. The only other documentary evidence
submitted by Arhbencel, a copy of her Certificate of Birth, has no probative value to establish
filiation to petitioner, the latter not having signed the same. At bottom, all that Arhbencel really
has is petitioner’s handwritten undertaking to provide financial support to her which, without
more, fails to establish her claim of filiation. The Court is mindful that the best interests of the
child in cases involving paternity and filiation should be advanced. It is, however, just as mindful
of the disturbance that unfounded paternity suits causeto the privacy and peace of the putative
father’s legitimate family.
 P a g e | 491

CRUZ v. CRISTOBAL
G.R. No. 140422 August 7, 2006

FACTS:

Mercedes Cristobal, Anselmo Cristobal, the heirs of the deceased Socorro Cristobal, and Elisa
Cristobal-Sikat claim that they are the legitimate children of Buenaventura Cristobal during his
first marriage to Ignacia Cristobal. On the other hand, Norberto, Florencio, Eufrosina and Jose
are also the children of Buenaventura Cristobal resulting from his second marriage to Donata
Enriquez. Buenaventura Cristobal purchased a parcel of land with an area of 535 square meters
located at 194 P. Parada St., Sta. Lucia, San Juan, Metro Manila. More than six decades later,
petitioners learned that private respondents had executed an extrajudicial partition of the subject
property and transferred its title to their names. A Complaint for Annulment of Title and
Damages was filed before the RTC by petitioners against private respondents to recover their
alleged pro-indiviso shares in the subject property. To prove their filiation with the deceased
Buenaventura Cristobal, the baptismal certificates of Elisa, Anselmo, and the late Socorro were
presented. In the case of Mercedes who was born on January 31, 1909, she produced a
certification issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar, attesting to the fact that records of
birth were all destroyed due to ordinary wear and tear. The trial court rendered a judgment
dismissing the case, ruling that petitioners failed to prove their filiation with the deceased
Buenaventura Cristobal as the baptismal and birth certificates presented have scant evidentiary
value and that petitioners’ inaction for a long period of time amounts to laches. Petitioners
sought recourse in the Court of Appeals which ruled that they were able to prove their filiation
with the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal through "other means allowed by the Rules of Court
and special laws," but affirmed the ruling of the trial court barring their right to recover because
of laches.

ISSUE:

Whether or not baptismal certificates are valid to prove filiation.

HELD:

The court ruled in the affirmative. The Court granted the petition and recognized and declared as
children of the late Buenaventura Cristobal from his first marriage to Ignacia Cristobal. The
Deed of Partition executed by private respondents is declared not binding upon petitioners who
were not notified or did not participate in the execution thereof. The subject property in the
name of private respondents is ordered to be partitioned and distributed in accordance with the
decision and appropriate certificates of title be issued in favor of each of the recognized heirs of
the late Cristobal Buenaventura. Article 172 of the Family Code provides: “Art. 172. The
filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) The record of birth
appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) An admission of
legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be
proved by: (1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) Any
 P a g e | 492

other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. Any other means allowed by the
Rules of Court and Special Laws, may consist of the child's baptismal certificate, a judicial
admission, a family bible in which the child’s name has been entered, common reputation
respecting the child's pedigree, admission by silence, the testimony of witnesses, and other kinds
of proof of admission under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.”
 P a g e | 493

PERLA v. BARING
G.R. No. 172471 November 12, 2012

FACTS:
Herein respondent Mirasol Baring and petitioner Antonio Perla were neighbors. Eventually, they
became sweethearts. When Mirasol became pregnant, Antonio allegedly assured her that he
would support her. However, Antonio started to evade her.
Mirasol and her then minor son, Randy Perla (Randy), filed before the RTC a Complaint for
support against Antonio. Mirasol and Randy thus prayed that Antonio be ordered to support
Randy. During the trial, Mirasol presented Randys Certificate of Live Birth and Baptismal
Certificate indicating her and Antonio as parents of the child. Mirasol testified that she and
Antonio supplied the information in the said certificates. The RTC rendered a decision ordering
Antonio to support Randy, which was affirmed by CA.

ISSUE

Whether or not the evidence presented is sufficient proof for the illegitimate filiation of Antonio

RULING:

Mirasol and Randys Complaint for support is based on Randys alleged illegitimate filiation to
Antonio. Hence, for Randy to be entitled for support, his filiation must be established with
sufficient certainty. The Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required to establish
paternity and filiation. An order for x xx support may create an unwholesome situation or may be
an irritant to the family or the lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or
filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence. In the case at bar, Mirasol and Randy
failed to establish Randys illegitimate filiation to Antonio. The Certificate of Live Birth and
baptismal certificate of Randy have no probative value to establish Randys filiation to Antonio
since the latter had not signed the same. A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the
putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative
father had a hand in the preparation of said certificate. Also, while a baptismal certificate may be
considered a public document, it can only serve as evidence of the administration of the
sacrament on the date specified but not the veracity of the entries with respect to the childs
paternity. Thus, x xx baptismal certificates are per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of
filiation and they cannot be admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove the same.
 P a g e | 494

TIJING v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 125901 March 8, 2001

FACTS:

Petitioners are husband and wife with 6 children, the youngest is Edgardo Tijing, Jr. On August
1989 Angelita Diamante went to her house to fetch her for an urgent laundry job; she made
Bienvenida wait while she went to the market and left her 4-month-old son Edgardo, Jr. under
the care of Angelita. When she returned, both Angelita and Edgardo Jr. were gone. On October
1993, Bienvenida read in a tabloid about the death of Tomas Lopez, allegedly the common-law
husband of Angelita, and whose remains were lying in state in Hagonoy, Bulacan; Bienvenida
went to Bulacan and allegedly saw Edgardo, Jr. for the first time in 4years. She claims that her
son was already named John Thomas Lopez. Bienvenida avers that Angelita refused to return the
boy to her despite her demand.

Bienvenida and Edgardo filed their petition for habeas corpus. Two witnesses, Vasquez, who
assisted inthe delivery of Edgardo, Jr.; and Benjamin Lopez, brother of Tomas Lopez, testified
that his brother couldn‘t have possibly fathered John Thomas Lopez as the latter was sterile and
that Tomas admitted to him that John Thomas Lopez was only an adopted son. Angelita claimed
that she is the natural mother of the child and at 42years old, she gave birth to John Thomas
Lopez on April 27, 1989. The birth of John Thomas was registered by her common-law husband,
Tomas Lopez, with the Local Civil Registry of Manila on Aug. 4, 1989. The RTC concluded that
since Angelita and her common-law husband couldn‘t have children, the alleged birth of John
Thomas Lopez is an impossibility. The minor and Bienvenida showed strong facial similarity
and so the court granted petition for habeas corpus. Subsequently, the Court of Appeals reversed
and set aside the decision.

ISSUE:

Who among the claimants is the true parent of the subjected child?

RULING:

Bienvenida. She presented sufficient clinical records, presenting the proper and credible
witnesses who assisted her in her child’s birth. Not to mention that it could be readily observed
that Bienvenida and the child have strong similarities in their faces, eyes, eyebrows and head
shapes. Resemblance between a minor and his alleged parent is competent and material evidence
to establish parentage. Whereas, Angelita had been known to have undergone ligation years
before the alleged birth of the child and the admission of Tomas’ own brother that Tomas was
sterile makes it impossible that he and Angelita sired subject child. More importantly, the birth
certificate of the child stated Tomas Lopez and private respondent were legally married which is
false because even Angelita had admitted she is a common-law wife. This false entry puts to
doubt the other data in said birth certificate.

In this case, the Supreme Court made mention of the DNA test for identification and parentage
testing. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and child are analyzed to establish
 P a g e | 495

parentage. The use of DNA test as evidence is still open to challenge, but as the appropriate case
comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on its admissibility. Though it is not necessary in this
case to resort to DNA testing, in future it would be useful to all concerned in the prompt
resolution of parentage and identity issues.
 P a g e | 496

AGUSTIN v. COURT OF APPEALS

460 SCRA 315

FACTS:

Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued Martin‘s alleged biological father,
petitioner Arnel L. Agustin, for support and support pendente lite Arnel supposedly impregnated
Fe on her 34th birthday on November 10, 1999 The baby‘s birth certificate was purportedly
signed by Arnel as the father. Arnel shouldered the pre-natal and hospital expenses but later
refused Fe‘s repeated requests for Martin‘s support despite his adequate financial capacity and
even suggested to have the child committed for adoption. Arnel also denied having fathered the
child Arnel is actually married and has a family of his own at the time he impregnated Fe Arnel
claimed that the signature and the community tax certificate (CTC) attributed to him in the
acknowledgment of Martin‘s birth certificate were falsified. The CTC erroneously reflected his
marital status as single when he was actually married and that his birth year was 1965 when it
should have been 1964 July 23, 2002, Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order directing
all the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing pursuant to Rule 28 of the Rules of
Court.

ISSUES:

Whether a complaint for support can be converted to a petition for recognition; and whether
DNA paternity testing can be ordered in a proceeding for support without violating petitioner‘s
constitutional right to privacy and right against self-incrimination.

RULING:

The petition is without merit. It is undisputed and even admitted by the parties that there existed
a sexual relationship between Arnel and Fe. The only remaining question is whether such sexual
relationship produced the child, Martin. Being the first case where DNA testing was the focal
issue the court examines the history of DNA testing The court opened the possibility of
admitting DNA as evidence of parentage, as enunciated in Tijing v. Court of Appeals In People
where the rape and murder victim‘s DNA samples from the blood stained clothes of the accused
were admitted in evidence. We reasoned that the purpose of DNA testing (was) to ascertain
whether an association exist(ed) between the evidence sample and the reference sample. The
samples collected (were) subjected to various chemical processes to establish their profile The
SC upheld the constitutionality of compulsory DNA testing and the admissibility of the results
thereof as evidence since both Sections 12 and 17 of Article III of the Constitution is simply
against the legal process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It does
not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not incrimination but as part of object
evidence there is no violation of the right of self-incrimination in DNA testing.
 P a g e | 497

HERRERA v. ALBA
460 SCRA 197

FACTS:

On 14 May 1998, then thirteen-year-old Rosendo Alba, represented by his mother Armi
Alba before the trial court a petition for compulsory recognition, support and damages against
petitioner (Rosendo Herrera) Rosendo Herrera denied that he is the biological father of
respondent. Petitioner also denied physical contact with respondent‘s mother Respondent filed a
motion to direct the taking of DNA paternity. respondent presented the testimony of Saturnina C.
Halos, Ph.D who testified that the test is 99.99% accurate Petitioner opposed DNA paternity
testing and contended that it has not gained acceptability. Petitioner further argued that DNA
paternity testing violates his right against self-incrimination trial court and CA granted the
motion to conduct DNA paternity testing.

ISSUE:

Whether a DNA test is a valid probative tool in this jurisdiction to determine filiation.

RULING:

The Court moved from the issue of according official recognition to DNA analysis as
evidence to the issue of observance of procedures in conducting DNA analysis - People v.
Vallejo It all boils down to evidence and its admissibility. Evidence is admissible when it is
relevant to the fact in issue and is not otherwise excluded by statute or the Rules of Court
Evidence is relevant when it has such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its
existence or non-existence. Section 49 of Rule 130, which governs the admissibility of expert
testimony, provides as follows The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special knowledge,
skill, experience or training which he is shown to possess may be received in evidence This Rule
does not pose any legal obstacle to the admissibility of DNA analysis as evidence. Indeed, even
evidence on collateral matters is allowed when it tends in any reasonable degree to establish the
probability or improbability of the fact in issue The court goes on to discuss the Vallejo case on
the caution with the method employed in the actual testing DNA. In assessing the probative
value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among other things, the following
data: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of
the samples, the procedure followed in analysing the samples, whether the proper standards and
procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who
conducted the tests Nevertheless, the petition is dismissed.
 P a g e | 498

PEOPLE v. VALLEJO
G.R. No. 144656 May 9, 2002

FACTS:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88, Cavite City,
sentencing Gerrico Vallejo y Samartino to death and ordering him to indemnify the heirs of the
victim in the amount of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages for the
rape-slaying of a 9-year old child, Daisy Diolola, in Rosario, Cavite on July 10, 1999. The
Information charging accused-appellant Gerrico Vallejo with the crime of Rape with Homicide
alleged: "That on or about the 10th day of July 1999, in Barangay Ligtong I, Municipality of
Rosario, Province of Cavite, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Trial
Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design, by means of force and intimidation, did then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with Daisy Diolola Y
Ditalo, a nine-year old child against the latter's will and while raping the said victim, said
accused strangled her to death."

ISSUE:

Whether or not the DNA samples gathered are admissible as evidence.

RULING:

Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. It ruled that the findings of Dr. Buan are conclusive. The
court reiterated that even though DNA evidence is merely circumstantial, it can still convict the
accused considering that it corroborates all other circumstantial evidence gathered in this rape-
slay case. The Supreme Court also elucidated on the admissibility of DNA evidence in this case
and for the first time recognized its evidentiary value in the Philippines, thus: DNA is an organic
substance found in a person’s cells which contains his or her genetic code. Except for identical
twins, each person’s DNA profile is distinct and unique. When a crime is committed, material is
collected from the scene of the crime or from the victim’s body for the suspect’s DNA. This is
the evidence sample. The evidence sample is then matched with the reference sample taken from
the suspect and the victim. The purpose of DNA testing is to ascertain whether an association
exists between the evidence sample and the reference sample. The samples collected are
subjected to various chemical processes to establish their profile.
 P a g e | 499

ESTATE OF ONG v. DIAZ

G.R. No. 171713 December 17, 2007

FACTS:

This is a petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure
assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 November 2005 and the Resolution of
the same court dated March 1, 2006 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration in CA-G.R.
CV No. 70125. A Complaint for compulsory recognition with prayer for support pending
litigation was filed by minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz, represented by her mother and guardian, Jinky
Diaz, against Rogelio G. Ong before The Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City. In her Complaint,
Jinky prayed that judgment be rendered, ordering defendant to recognize plaintiff Joanne Rodjin
Diaz as his daughter, ordering defendant to give plaintiff monthly support of P20,000.00
pendente lite and thereafter to fix monthly support, ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff
attorney’s fees in the sum of P100,000.00 and Granting plaintiff such other measure of relief as
maybe just and equitable in the premises. As alleged by Jinky in her complaint in November
1993 in Tarlac City, she and Rogelio got acquainted. This developed into friendship and later
blossomed into love. At this time, Jinky was already married to a Japanese national, Hasegawa
Katsuo, in a civil wedding solemnized on February 19, 1993 by Municipal Trial Court Judge
Panfilo V.Valdez.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred when it remanded the case to the court a quo for DNA
analysis despite the fact that it is no longer feasible due to the death of Rogelio G. Ong.

RULING:

As a whole, the present petition calls for the determination of filiation of minor Joanne for
purposes of support in favor of the said minor. Filiation proceedings are usually filed not just to
adjudicate paternity but also to secure a legal right associated with paternity, such as citizenship,
support, or inheritance. The burden of proving paternity is on the person who alleges that the
putative father is the biological father of the child. There are four significant procedural aspects
of a traditional paternity action which parties have to face: a prima facie case, affirmative
defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative father and
child. A child born to a husband and wife during a valid marriage is presumed legitimate. As a
guaranty in favor of the child and to protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family
Code provides: Article 167. The children shall be considered legitimate although the mother may
have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
 P a g e | 500

LUCAS v. LUCAS
G.R. No. 190710 June 6, 2011

FACTS:
Herein petitioner, Jesse Lucas filed a Petition to Establish Filiation with a Motion for the
Submission of Parties to DNA Testing before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Jesse alleged that
he is the son of his mother Elsie who got acquainted with respondent, Jesus S. Lucas in Manila.
He also submitted documents which include (a) petitioner’s certificate of live birth; (b)
petitioner’s baptismal certificate; (c) petitioner’s college diploma, showing that he graduated
from Saint Louis University in Baguio City with a degree in Psychology; (d) his Certificate of
Graduation from the same school; (e) Certificate of Recognition from the University of the
Philippines, College of Music; and (f) clippings of several articles from different newspapers
about petitioner, as a musical prodigy. Jesus learned of this and he filed a Special Appearance
and Comment manifesting that the petition was adversarial in nature and therefore summons
should be served on him. Meanwhile, Jesse filed a Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case
which the RTC found to be sufficient in form and hence set the case for hearing. Jesus filed a
Motion for Reconsideration arguing that DNA testing cannot be had on the basis of a mere
allegation pointing to him as Jesse’s father.
Acting on Jesus’ Motion for Reconsideration, the RTC dismissed the case and held that Jesse
failed to establish compliance with the four procedural aspects for a paternity action enumerated
in the case of Herrera v. Alba namely, a prima faciecase, affirmative defences, presumption of
legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative father and the child. This prompted
Jesse to file a Motion for Reconsideration which the RTC granted. A new hearing was scheduled
where the RTC held that ruling on the grounds relied upon by Jesse for filing the instant petition
is premature considering that a full-blown trial has not yet taken place. Jesus filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was denied by the RTC. He then filed a petition for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals (CA). The CA ruled in favour of Jesus, it noted that Jesse failed to show that
the four significant aspects of a traditional paternity action had been met and held that DNA
testing should not be allowed when the petitioner has failed to establish a prima facie case.

ISSUE:
Whether a prima facie showing is necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing order

RULING:
Yes. Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence merely provides for conditions that are aimed to
safeguard the accuracy and integrity of the DNA testing. It states that the appropriate court may,
at any time, either motu proprio or on application of any person, who has a legal interest in the
matter in litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and notice to
the parties upon a showing of the following: (a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the
case;(b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing now
requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA testing, but the results may require
confirmation for good reasons; (c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique; (d) The
 P a g e | 501

DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new information that is relevant to the proper
resolution of the case; and (e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may
consider as potentially affecting the accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing. This Rule shall not
preclude a DNA testing, without need of a prior court order, at the behest of any party, including
law enforcement agencies, before a suit or proceeding is commenced. This does not mean,
however, that a DNA testing order will be issued as a matter of right if, during the hearing, the
said conditions are established. In the case of Herrera v. Alba that there are four significant
proceduralaspects in a traditional paternity case which parties have to face has been widely
misunderstood and misapplied in this case. A party is confronted by these so-called
procedural aspects during trial, when the parties have presented their respective evidence. They
are matters of evidence that cannot be determined at this initial stage of the proceedings, when
only the petition to establish filiation has been filed. The CA’s observation that petitioner failed
to establish a prima facie case is herefore misplaced. A prima facie case is built by a party’s
evidence and not by mere allegations in the initiatory pleading.
 P a g e | 502

GUY v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 163707 September 15, 2006

FACTS:
The special proceeding case concerns the settlement of the estate of Sima Wei (a.k.a. Rufina Guy
Susim). Private-respondents Karen and Kamille alleged that they are the acknowledged
illegitimate children of Sima Wei who died intestate. On June 13,1997 the minors were
represented by their mother Remedios Oanes who filed a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration before the RTC of Makati City. Petitioner who is one of the children of the
deceased with his surviving spouse, filed for the dismissal of the petition alleging that his father
left no debts hence, his estate may be settled without the issuance of letters administration. The
other heirs filed a joint motion to dismiss alleging that the certification of non-forum shopping
should have been signed by Remedios and not by counsel. Petitioners further alleged that the
claim has been paid and waived by reason of a Release of Claim or waiver stating that in
exchange for financial and educational assistance from the petitioner, Remedios and her minor
children discharged the estate of the decedent from any and all liabilities.The lower court denied
the joint motion to dismiss as well as the supplemental motion ruling that the mother is not the
duly constituted guardian of the minors hence, she could not have validly signed the waiver. It
also rejected the petitioner's objections to the certificate of non-forum shopping. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the orders of the lower court. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a guardian can validly repudiate the inheritance.

RULING:
The Court ruled, no. Repudiation amounts to alienation of property and parents and guardians
must necessarily obtain judicial approval. Repudiation of inheritance must pass the court's
scrutiny in order to protect the best interest of the ward. Not having been authorized by the court,
the release or waiver is therefore void. Moreover, the private-respondents could not have waived
their supposed right as they have yet to prove their status as illegitimate children of the decedent.
It would be inconsistent to rule that they have waived a right which, according to the petitioner,
the latter do not have. The court is not precluded to receive evidence to determine the filiation of
the claimants even if the original petition is for the issuance of letters administration. Its
jurisdiction extends to matters collateral and incidental to the settlement of the estate, with the
determination of the capacity to be an heir included. As held in previous decision, two causes of
action may be brought together in one complaint, one a claim for recognition, and the other to
claim inheritance.
 P a g e | 503

MARQUINO v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

G.R. No. 72078 June 27, 1994

FACTS:
Respondent Bibiana filed action for Judicial Declaration of Filiation, Annulment of Partition,
Support and Damages against Eutiquio. Bibiana was born on December 1926 allegedly of
Eutiquio and in that time was single. It was alleged that the Marquino family personally knew
her since she was hired as domestic helper in their household at Dumaguete. She likewise
received financial assistance from them hence, she enjoyed continuous possession of the status of
an acknowledged natural child by direct and unequivocal acts of the father and his family. The
Marquinos denied all these. Respondent was not able to finish presenting her evidence since she
died on March 1979 but the sue for compulsory recognition was done while Eustiquio was still
alive. Her heirs were ordered to substitute her as parties-plaintiffs.
Petitioners, legitimate children of Eutiquio, assailed decision of respondent court in holding that
the heirs of Bibiana, allegedly a natural child of Eutiquio, can continue the action already filed
by her to compel recognition and the death of the putative parent will not extinguish such action
and can be continued by the heirs substituting the said deceased parent.

ISSUES:
a) Whether or not right of action for acknowledgment as a natural child be transmitted to
the heirs and;
b) Whether or not Article 173 can be given retroactive effect.

RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that right of action for the acknowledgment as a natural child can never
be transmitted because the law does not make any mention of it in any case, not even as an
exception. The right is purely a personal one to the natural child. The death of putative father in
an action for recognition of a natural child cannot be continued by the heirs of the former since
the party in the best position to oppose the same is the putative parent himself.
Such provision of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect so as to apply in the case at
bar since it will prejudice the vested rights of petitioners transmitted to them at the time of death
of their father. Hence, IAC decision was reversed and set aside. Complaint against Marquino is
dismissed
 P a g e | 504

TAYAG v. TAYAG- GALLOR

G.R. No. 174680

FACTS:
On January 15, 2001, respondent, Felicidad A. Tayag-Gallor, filed a petition for the issuance of
letters of administration over the estate of Ismael Tayag. The respondent alleged that she is one
of the illegitimate children of the late Ismael Tayag and Ester Angeles.
On September 7, 2000, Ismael Tayag died intestate, leaving behind two real properties both of
which are in the possession of petitioner, and a motor vehicle which the latter sold on 10 October
2000 preparatory to the settlement of the decedent’s estate. Petitioner allegedly promised to give
respondent and her brothers P100, 000.00 each as their share in the proceeds of the sale.
However, petitioner only gave each of them half the amount she promised.
In a Motion dated August 31, 2001, petitioner reiterated her sole ownership of the properties and
presented the transfer certificates of title thereof in her name. She also averred that it is necessary
to allege that respondent was acknowledged and recognized by Ismael Tayag as his illegitimate
child. There being no such allegation, the action becomes one to compel recognition which
cannot be brought after the death of the putative father. To prevent further encroachment upon
the court’s time, petitioner moved for a hearing on her affirmative defenses. The motion was
denied.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent’s petition for the issuance of letters of administration sufficiently
states a cause of action considering that respondent merely alleged therein that she is an
illegitimate child of the decedent, without stating that she had been acknowledged or recognized
as such by the latter.

RULING:
The appellate court held that the mere allegation that respondent is an illegitimate child suffices.
Rule 79 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for the issuance of letters of administration
must be filed by an interested person. The Court, applying the provisions of the Family Code
which had then already taken effect, ruled that since Graciano was claiming illegitimate filiation
under the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code, i.e., open and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate child, the action was already barred by the death of the
alleged father.
 P a g e | 505

GRANDE v. ANTONIO
G.R. No. 206248 February 18, 2014

FACTS:
Herein respondent, Antonio filed a petition for judicial approval of recognition of the filiation of
the two children with the prayer for the correction or change of the surname of the minors from
Grande to Antonio when a public document acknowledged before a notary public under Sec. 19,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court is enough to establish the paternity of his children. Along with
such petition, He also filed for a judicial conferment of parental authority, parental custody, and
an official declaration of his children’s surname as Antonio.Respondent avers that

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent father could compel his illegitimate children to use his surname

RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled the father could not. the SC voided the implementing rules and
regulations (IRR) of Republic Act 9255 insofar as the IRR makes it mandatory for the
illegitimate child to use the recognizing father’s surname, since this was contrary to the express
permissive wording of Republic Act 9255 amending Art 176 which states: Art. 176. Illegitimate
children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall
be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children may use the
surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by the father through the
record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a public document or
private handwritten instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to
institute an action before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The
legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child.
 P a g e | 506

DELA CRUZ v. GRACIA

G.R. No. 177728 July 31, 2009

FACTS:
Jenie was denied the registration of her child's birth because the document attached to the
Affidavit to use the Surname of the Father (AUSF) entitled "Autobiography," did not include the
signature of the deceased father, and “because he was born out of wedlock and the father
unfortunately died prior to his birth and has no more  capacity to acknowledge his paternity to
the child.”

Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint for injunction/registration of name against Gracia.
The trial court held that even if Dominique, the father, was the author of the unsigned
handwritten Autobiography, the same does not contain any express recognition of paternity.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the unsigned handwritten instrument of the deceased father of minor Christian
can be considered as a recognition of paternity.

RULING:

Yes. Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255, permits an illegitimate child to
use the surname of his/her father if the latter had previously recognized him/her as his offspring
through an admission made in a pubic of private handwritten instrument.

Article 176, as amended, does not explicitly state that there must be a signature by the putative
father in the private handwritten instrument.

The following rules respecting the requirement of affixing the signature of the acknowledging
parent in any private handwritten instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a legitimate or
illegitimate child is made:

1. Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to
prove filiation, there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the same must be
signed by the acknowledging parent; and

2. Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and

competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made
and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such other
evidence.
 P a g e | 507

BRIONES v. MIGUEL
GR. No. 156343 October 18, 2004

FACTS:
On March 5, 2002, petitioner Joey D. Briones filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus to obtain
custody of his minor child Michael Kevin Pineda.The petitioner alleges that the minor Michael
Kevin Pineda is his illegitimate son with respondent Loreta P. Miguel. He was born in Japan on
September 17, 1996 as evidenced by his Birth Certificate. The respondent Loreta P. Miguel is
now married to a Japanese national and is presently residing in Japan. The petitioner prays that
the custody of his son Michael Kevin Pineda be given to him as his biological father and has
demonstrated his capability to support and educate him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the natural father may be denied the custody and parental care of his own child in
the absence of the mother who is away.
RULING:
Having been born outside a valid marriage, the minor is deemed an illegitimate child of
petitioner and Respondent Loreta. Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines explicitly
provides that "illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental
authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code." This is
the rule regardless of whether the father admits paternity.
Parental authority over recognized natural children who were under the age of majority was
vested in the father or the mother recognizing them. If both acknowledge the child, authority was
to be exercised by the one to whom it was awarded by the courts; if it was awarded to both, the
rule as to legitimate children applied. In other words, in the latter case, parental authority resided
jointly in the father and the mother.

REPUBLIC v. ABADILLA
 P a g e | 508

GR. No. 133054 January 28, 1999

FACTS:
Gerson Abadilla and Luzviminda Celestino have been living together as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage. During their cohabitation, Luzviminda begot two children,
Emerson and Rafael. In the Certificates of Birth of these two children, they were registered with
the surname ―Abadilla‖ and the name of their father was entered as ―Herson‖ Abadilla.
Moreover, the entry in the date and place of marriage of the children‘s parents appeared as June
19, 1987 at Dingras, Ilocos Norte.
On February 5, 1997, Gerson Abadilla, Luzviminda Celestino and their two minor children,
Emerson and Rafael,filed a petition for correction of the birth certificates.The petition was
granted. The instant petition for review on certiorari is now being interposed by the Office of the
Solicitor General on the ground that the trial court committed a reversible error when it allowed
the deletion of the ―date and place of marriage of parents‖ from the birth certificates of minors
Emerson C. Abadilla and Rafael C. Abadilla but failed to order the change of the minors‘
surname from ―Abadilla‖ to ―Celestino.‖
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court committed an error in their ruling of the case.
RULING:
Yes. According to Article 176 "Illegitimate children shall use zthe surname and shall be under
the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this
Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one half of the legitime of a
legitimate child.‖Thus, as illegitimate children, Emerson and Rafael should bear the surname of
their mother, Luzviminda Celestino.

VERCELES v. POSADA
 P a g e | 509

GR. No. 15978 April 27, 2007

FACTS:
On November 11, 1986, at around 11:00 a.m., Verceles fetched Clarissa Posada from "My
Brother‘s Place" where the seminar was being held.Clarissa avers that he told her that they
would have lunch at Mayon Hotel with their companions who had gone ahead. When they
reached the place her companions were nowhere. After Verceles ordered food, he started making
amorous advances on her. She panicked, ran and closeted herself inside a comfort room where
she stayed until someone knocked. She said she hurriedly exited and left the hotel. Afraid of the
mayor, she kept the incident to herself. She went on as casual employee. One of her tasks was
following-up barangay road and maintenance projects.
On December 22, 1986, on orders of Verceles, she went to Virac, Catanduanes, to follow up
funds for barangay projects. At around 11:00 a.m. the same day, she went to Catanduanes Hotel
on instructions of petitioner who asked to be briefed on the progress of her mission. They met at
the lobby and he led her upstairs because he said he wanted the briefing done at the restaurant at
the upper floor.
Instead, Verceles opened a hotel room door, led her in, and suddenly embraced her, as he told
her that he was unhappy with his wife and would "divorce" her anytime. He also claimed he
could appoint her as a municipal development coordinator. She succumbed to his advances. But
again she kept the incident to herself.Sometime in January 1987, when she missed her
menstruation, she said she wrote petitioner that she feared she was pregnant.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the filiation of Verna Aiza Posada as the illegitimate child of petitioner was
proven.
RULING:
The letters are private handwritten instruments of petitioner which establish Verna Aiza‘s
filiation under Article 172 (2) of the Family Code. In addition, the arrays of evidence presented
by respondents, the dates, letters, pictures and testimonies, to us, are convincing, and irrefutable
evidence that Verna Aiza is, indeed, petitioner‘s illegitimate child.
Petitioner not only failed to rebut the evidence presented, he himself presented no evidence of his
own. His bare denials are telling. Well-settled is the rule that denials, if unsubstantiated by clear
and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving which merit no weight in law and cannot
be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on
affirmative matters.

PEOPLE v. GLABO
 P a g e | 510

GR. No. 12924 December 7, 2001

FACTS:
One afternoon in October, 1991, 21-year old victim Mila Lobrico, a mental retardate, and her 11-
year old sister, Judith, were summoned by Justiniano Glabo, their maternal uncle, to his house.
He told them to wash the clothes of his wife. After the two sisters finished their chore, accused-
appellant ordered Judith to wash the dishes in the nearby creek, about 200 meters away from his
house. When Judith was gone, accused-appellant dragged Mila from the yard, where she was
hanging the washed clothes, into the house. He pushed her to the floor and made her lie down.
He undressed the victim, and then he inserted his penis into her private organ and made push and
pull motions. Mila was overpowered by accused-appellant‘s brute strength. She shouted for
help, but there were no neighbors nearby.
Suddenly, it started to rain hard, so Judith had to run back to the house for shelter. She went
directly under the house, which was elevated 3 feet above the ground. While underneath the
house, she heard someone crying on the floor above. She looked up through the bamboo floor
and saw accused-appellant on top of her elder sister. Both were naked. Judith went to the
kitchen, and she saw accused-appellant‘s penis as he stood up and raised his briefs.
The two girls went home silently. They did not say a word about the incident. However, the
victim became pregnant as a result of the rape, and after six months her condition could no
longer be concealed. Severino Lobrico, Mila‘s father, confronted her, but she said nothing. It
was her sister, Judith, who told their father that accused-appellant raped Mila. Severino brought
Mila to the police and filed a complaint for rape before the Municipal Trial Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the offspring is illegitimate.
RULING:
Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code provides for three kinds of civil liability that may be
imposed on the offender: a) indemnification, b) acknowledgement of the offspring, unless the
law should prevent him from so doing, and c) in every case to support the offspring. With the
passage of the Family Code, the classification of acknowledged natural children and natural
children by legal fiction was eliminated and they now fall under the specie of illegitimate
children. Since parental authority is vested by Article 176 of the Family Code upon the mother
and considering that an offender sentenced to reclusion perpetua automatically loses the power to
exercise parental authority over his children, no ―further positive act is required of the parent as
the law itself provides for the child‘s status.‖ Hence, accused-appellant should only be ordered to
indemnify and support the victim‘s child. However, the amount and terms of support shall be
determined by the trial court after due notice and hearing in accordance with Article 201 of the
Family Code.

DINAH B. TONOG v. COURT OF APPEALS

 P a g e | 511

G.R. No. 122906 February 7, 2002

FACTS:
Dinah gave birth to Gardin Faith Belarde Tonog, her illegitimate child with Edgar V. Daguimol.
The two cohabited for a time and lived with Edgar's parents and sister. A year after Dinah left for
US where she found work as a registered nurse. Gardin was left in the care of her father and
grandparents. Edgar later filed a petition for guardianship over Gardin and the trial court granted
the petition and appointed Edgar as the legal guardian. Dinah filed a petition for relief from
judgment and the court set aside the original judgment and allowed Dinah to file her opposition
to Edgar's petition. Edgar filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied and the court
issued a resolution granting Dinah's motion for custody over Gardin.
Edgar filed a petition for certiorari before the CA who modified their previous decision and
granted Edgar custody over Gardin. Dinah contends that she is entitled to the custody of the
minor, Gardin Faith, as a matter of law. As the mother of Gardin Faith, the law confers parental
authority upon her as the mother of the illegitimate minor.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Dinah is entitled to the custody of Gardin.
RULING:
No. The general rule is recommended in order to avoid many a tragedy where a mother has seen
her baby torn away from her. The exception allowed by the rule has to be for ―compelling
reasons‖ for the good of the child. A mother may be deprived of the custody of her child who is
below seven years of age for ―compelling reasons. Instances of unsuitability are neglect,
abandonment, unemployment and immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction,
maltreatment of the child, insanity, and affliction with a communicable illness. If older than
seven years of age, a child is allowed to state his preference, but the court is not bound by that
choice. The court may exercise its discretion by disregarding the child‘s preference should the
parent chosen be found to be unfit, in which instance, custody may be given to the other parent,
or even to a third person.
Bearing in mind that the welfare of the said minor as the controlling factor, SC find that the
appellate court did not err in allowing her father to retain in the meantime parental custody over
her. Meanwhile, the child should not be wrenched from her familiar surroundings, and thrust
into a strange environment away from the people and places to which she had apparently formed
an attachment. Moreover, whether a mother is a fit parent for her child is a question of fact to be
properly entertained in the special proceedings before the trial court.

MOSSESGELD v. COURT OF APPEALS

GR. No. 111455 December 23, 1998
 P a g e | 512

FACTS:
Marissa Alfaro Mossesgeld , single, gave birth to a baby boy on December 2, 1989. The
presumed father is Eleazar Siriban Calasan, a married lawyer. The father signed the birth
certificate of the child as the informant, indicating hat the child‘s name is Jonathan Mossesgeld
Calasan. He also executed an affidavit admitting the paternity of the child. The person in charge
at the hospital refused to place the presumed father‘s surname as the child‘s surname in the
certificated of live birth. Thus, petitioner himself submitted the certificate to the office of the
Local Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong for registration.
Again, the municipal treasurer, as officer in charge of the local civil registrar‘s office, rejected
the registration on the basis of the Civil Registrar General‘s Circular No. 4, which provides that
under Article 176 of the Family Code, illegitimate children born on or after August 3, 1988 shall
use the surname of their mother. Upon inquiring about the status of the status of the registration
of his child, Calasan was furnished with a copy of the letter of the Civil Registrar General
denying the registration of the certificate of live birth on the grounds that it is contrary to law.
Calasan, thereafter, filed a petition for mandamus with the Pasig RTC to compel the local civil
registrar to register the certificate of live birth of his illegitimate son using his surname. His
petition was denied. He filed a motion for reconsideration and a motion to for leave to amend the
petition to substitute the child‘s mother as the petitioner. His motion to amen was granted, but
motion for reconsideration was denied. He elevated the petition to the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed the RTC‘s decision
ISSUE:
Whether or not mandamus lies to compel the Local Civil Registrar to register thecertificate of
live birth of an illegitimate child using the alleged father‘s surname where the latter admitted
paternity.
RULING:
No. Local Civil Registrar correctly refused. Illegitimate children must use the surname of their
mother, regardless of whether or not they had been acknowledged by their fathers in their record
of birth. Article 176 of the Family Code effectively repealed Article 366 of the Civil Code,
which gives a natural child the right to use the surname of his/her father where he/she has been
acknowledged by both parents. Article 176 explicitly states that illegitimate children shall use the
surname of their mother, be under her parental authority, and be entitled to support inconformity
with the provisions of the Family Code.

SILVA v. COURT OF APPEALS

GR. No. 114742 July17, 1997
 P a g e | 513

FACTS:
Carlitos E. Silva, a married businessman, and Suzanne T. Gonzales, an unmarried local actress,
cohabited without the benefit of marriage. The union saw the birth of two children: Ramon
Carlos and Rica Natalia. Not very long after, a rift in their relationship surfaced. It began,
according to Silva, when Gonzales decided to resume her acting career over his vigorous
objections. The assertion was quickly refuted by Gonzales who claimed that she, in fact, had
never stopped working throughout their relationship. At any rate, the two eventually parted
ways.
The instant controversy was spawned, in February 1986, by the refusal of Gonzales to allow
Silva, in apparent contravention of a previous understanding, to have the children in his company
on weekends. Silva filed a petition for custodial rights over the children before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 78, of Quezon City. The petition was opposed by Gonzales who averred that
Silva often engaged in "gambling and womanizing" which she feared could affect the moral and
social values of the children.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Father can visit his children.
RULING:
The biological father has visitorial right over his illegitimate children in view of the
constitutionally protected inherent and natural right of parents over their children. This right is
personal to the father; no other person, like grandparents, can exercise this right for him. Silva
(the father) may have won with the Supreme Court‘s upholding of his visitation rights, but this
favorable decision did not prevent Suzanne (the mother) in the exercise of her parental authority
from immigrating to Holland with her two children.

DAVID v. COURT OF APPEALS

GR. No. 111180 November 16, 1995
FACTS:
 P a g e | 514

Daisie David had an intimate relationship with her boss Ramon Villar, who is married, and a
father of 4 children, all grown-up. They first had a son, Christopher, who was eventually
followed by 2 more girls, Christine and Cathy Mae. The relationship became known to Villar‘s
wife when Daisie took Christopher J, to his house and introduced him to Villar's wife. After this,
Daisie‘s were freely brought by Villar to his house as they were even accepted by his legal
family.
Then Villar asked Daisie to allow Christopher J., then 6 years old, to go with his family to
Boracay. Daisie agreed, but after the trip, Villar refused to give Christopher back and had
enrolled him at the Holy Family Academy for the next school year. Daisie filed a petition for
habeas corpus on behalf of Christopher J. which the RTC granted, giving custody to Daisie and
ordering Villar to give temporary support of P3K a month to the 3 kids and to pay the costs of
suit.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not custody should be given to Daisie
RULING:
Yes. CA ruling reversed, custody granted to Daisie and Villar ordered to givetemporary support
in the amount of P3K, pending the fixing of the amount of support in an appropriate action.
Christopher J. is an illegitimate child since at the time of his conception, his father Villar, was
married to another woman other than his mother.
As such, pursuant to Art. 176, FC, he is under the parental authority of his mother, who, as a
consequence of such authority, is entitled to have custody of him. And because she has been
deprived of her rightful custody of her child by Villar, Daisie is entitled to issuance of the writ of
habeas corpus.
Rule 102, Sec. 1 makes no distinction between the case of a mother who is separated from her
husband and is entitled to the custody of her child and that of a mother of an illegitimate child
who, by law, is vested with sole parental authority, but is deprived of her rightful custody of her
child. The fact that Villar has recognized the Christopher may be a ground for ordering him to
give support to the latter, but not for giving him custody of the child. Under Article 213, FC, "no
child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise."

DE SANTOS v. ANGELES
GR. No. 105619 December 12, 1995
 P a g e | 515

FACTS:
On February 7, 1941, Dr. Antonio de Santos married Sofia Bona, which union was blessed with
a daughter, herein petitioner Maria Rosario de Santos. After some time, their relationship became
strained to the breaking point. Thereafter, Antonio fell in love with a fellow doctor, Conchita
Talag, private respondent herein. Antonio sought a formal dissolution of his first marriage by
obtaining a divorce decree from a Nevada court in 1949. Antonio proceeded to Tokyo, Japan in
1951 to marry private respondent, with whom he had been cohabiting since his de
factoseparation from Sofia. This union produced eleven children. On March 30, 1967, Sofia died
in Guatemala. Less than a month later, on April 23, 1967, Antonio and private respondent
contracted a marriage in TagaytayCity celebrated under Philippine laws. On March 8, 1981,
Antonio died intestate leaving properties with an estimated value of P15, 000,000.00.
On May 15, 1981, private respondent went to court for the issuance of letters of administration in
her favor in connection with the settlement of her late husband's estate. She alleged, among other
things, that the decedent was survived by twelve legitimate heirs, namely, herself, their ten
surviving children, and petitioner. After six years of protracted intestate proceedings, however,
petitioner decided to intervene. Thus, in a motion she filed sometime in November 1987, she
argued inter aliathat private respondent's children were illegitimate. This was challenged by
private respondent although the latter admitted during the hearing that all her children were born
prior to Sofia's death in 1967.
The court, declared private respondent's ten children legitimated and thereupon instituted and
declared them, along with petitioner and private respondent, as the heirs of Antonio de Santos.
Hence, she filed the instant petition for certiorari on June 16, 1992, contending that since only
natural children can be legitimized, the trial court mistakenly declared as legitimated her half
brothers and sisters.
ISSUE:
Whether or not natural children by legal fiction be legitimized.
RULING:
Art. 269. Only natural children can be legitimated. Children born outside wedlock of parents,
who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to
marry each other, are natural. In other words, a child's parents should not have been disqualified
to marry each other at the time of conception for him to qualify as a "natural child."
In the case at bench, there is no question that all the children born to private respondent and
deceased Antonio de Santos were conceived and born when the latter's valid marriage to
petitioner's mother was still subsisting. That private respondent and the decedent were married
abroad after the latter obtained in Nevada,U.S.A. a decree of divorce from his legitimate wife
does not change this fact, for a divorce granted abroad was not recognized in this jurisdiction at
the time. Evidently, the decedent was aware of this fact, which is why he had to have the
marriage solemnized in Tokyo, outside of the Philippines. It may be added here that he was
likewise aware of the nullity of the Tokyo marriage for after his legitimate, though estranged
wife died, he hastily contracted another marriage with private respondent, this time here in
Tagaytay, attention must be drawn to the fact that this case has been decided under the
 P a g e | 516

provisions of the Civil Code, not the Family Code which now recognizes only two classes of
children: legitimate and illegitimate. "Natural children by legal fiction" are nothing if not pure
fiction.

ABADILLA v. TABILIRAN
AM No. MTJ-92-716 October 25, 1995
 P a g e | 517

FACTS:
Ma. Blyth Abadilla, a Clerk of Court, filed a complaint against Judge Tabiliran on the grounds of
gross immorality, deceitful conduct, and corruption unbecoming of a judge. With respect to the
charge on gross immorality, she contended that the judge scandalously and publicly cohabited
with Priscilla Baybayan during subsistence of his marriage with Teresita Banzuela. Tabiliran
and Priscilla got married in May 1986. On the other hand, with respect to the charge on deceitful
conduct, petitioner claims that the judge caused his 3 illegitimate children with Priscilla be
registered as legitimate by falsely executing separate affidavits stating the delayed registration
was due to inadvertence, excusable negligence or oversight when in fact, he knew these children
cannot be legally registered as legitimate. The judge averred that 25 years had already elapsed
since the disappearance of her wife in 1966 when he married Priscilla hence the cohabitation was
neither bigamous nor immoral. However, as early as 1970, based on the record, Priscilla had
begotten her 3 children.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the 3 children can be considered legitimate.
RULING:
The 3 children cannot be legitimated nor in any way be considered legitimate since the time they
were born, there was an existing valid marriage between Tabiliran and Teresita. Only natural
children can be legitimated. Children born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the
conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, are
natural.
Under Article 177 of the Family Code, only children conceived and born outside of wedlock of
parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any
impediment to marry each other may be legitimated. Reasons for this limitation: 1) The rationale
of legitimation would be destroyed; 2) It would be unfair to the legitimate children in terms of
successional rights; 3) There will be the problem of public scandal, unless social mores change;
4) It is too violent to grant the privilege of legitimation to adulterous children as it will destroy
the sanctity of marriage; 5) It will be very scandalous, especially if the parents marry many years
after the birth of the child.

REPUBLIC v. COURT OF APPEALS

GR. No. 100835 October 26, 1993
 P a g e | 518

FACTS:
James Hughes, a natural born citizen of the UnitedStates of America, married Lenita Mabunay, a
Filipino Citizen,who herself was later naturalized as a citizen of that country.The spouses jointly
filed a petition with the RTC to adopt theminor niece and nephews of Lenita, who had been
living withthe couple even prior to the filing of the petition. The minors, aswell as their parents,
gave consent to the adoption. The RTCrendered a decision granting the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the spouses can adopt the minors.
RULING:
While James Anthony unquestionably is not permitted to adopt under any of the exceptional
cases, Lenita, however, can qualify. Lenita may not thus adopt alone since Article 185 requires a
joint adoption by the husband and the wife, a condition that must be read alongtogether with
Article 184. Art 185 provides: Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following
cases: (1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or (2) When one spouse
seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other. As amended by Executive Order 91, Presidential
Decree No. 603 had thus made it mandatory for both the spouses to jointly adopt when one of
them was an alien. The law was silent when both spouses were of the same nationality. The
Family Code has resolved any possible uncertainty. Article 185 thereof now expresses the
necessity for joint adoption by the spouses except in only two instances: (1) When one spouse
seeks to adopt his own legitimate child; or (2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate
child of the other. It is in the foregoing cases when Article 186 of the Code, on the subject of
parental authority, can aptly find governance. Article 186. In case husband and wife jointly
adaptor one spouse adopts the legitimate child of the other, joint parental authority shall be
exercised by the spouses in accordance with this Code.

REPUBLIC v. TOLEDANO
GR. No. 94147 June 8, 1994
 P a g e | 519

FACTS:
Spouses Alvin A. Clouse and Evelyn A. Clouse who are aliens filed a petition to adopt the
minor, Solomon Joseph Alcala. They are physically, mentally, morally, and financially capable
of adopting Solomon, a twelve (12) year old minor. Since 1981 to 1984, then from November 2,
1989 upto the present, Solomon Joseph Alcala was and has been under the care and custody of
private respondents. Solomon gave his consent to the adoption. His mother, Nery Alcala, a
widow, likewise consented to the adoption due to poverty and inability to support and educate
her son. The RTC granted the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the spouses can adopt Solomon.
RULING:
Under Articles 184 and 185 of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as "The Family Code
of the Philippines", private respondents spouses Clouse are clearly barred from adopting
Solomon Joseph Alcala.Article 184, paragraph three of Executive Order No. 209expressly
enumerates the persons who are not qualified to adopt, An alien, except: (a) A former Filipino
citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity; (b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate
child of his or her Filipino spouse; or (c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to
adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter. Aliens not included
in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in accordance with the rules on inter-
country adoption as may be provided by law. Private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse, on the other
hand, may appear to qualify pursuant to paragraph three of Article 184 of E.O. 209. She was a
former Filipino citizen. She sought to adopt her younger brother. Unfortunately, the petition for
adoption cannot be granted in her favor alone without violating Article 185 which mandates a
joint adoption by the husband and wife. It reads: Article 185. Husband and wife must jointly
adopt, except in the following cases: (1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate
child; or (2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other. Article 185
requires a joint adoption by the husband and wife, a condition that must be read along together
with Article 184.

REPUBLIC v. ALARCON VERGARA

GR. No. 9555 March 20, 1997
 P a g e | 520

FACTS:
On June 25, 1990, the spouses Samuel R. Dye, Jr. and Rosalina Due Dye filed a petition before
the RegionalTrialCourtofAngelesCity to adopt Maricel R. Due and Alvin R. Due, ages 13 and 12
years old, respectively, younger siblings of Rosalina. Samuel R. Dye, Jr, a member of the United
States Air Force, is an American citizen who resided at the Clark Air Base in Pampanga. His
wife Rosalina is a former Filipino who became a naturalized American. They have two children.
Maricel and Alvin Due, as well as their natural parents, gave their consent to the adoption.
The Republic filed this petition for review on a pure question of law, contending that the spouses
Dye are not qualified under the law to adopt Maricel and Alvin Due. As a general rule, aliens
cannot adopt Filipino citizens.
Samuel Robert Dye, Jr. who is an American and, therefore, an alien is disqualified from adopting
the minors Maricel and Alvin Due because he does not fall under any of the three afore quoted
exceptions in the law. He is not a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by
consanguinity. Nor does he seek to adopt his wife's legitimate child. Although he seeks to adopt
with his wife her relatives by consanguinity, he is not married to a Filipino citizen, for Rosalina
was already a naturalized American at the time the petition was filed, thus excluding him from
the coverage of the exception. The law here does not provide for an alien who is married to a
former Filipino citizen seeking to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by
consanguinity, as an exception to the general rule that aliens may not adopt.
On her own, Rosalina Dye cannot adopt her brother and sister for the law mandates joint
adoption by husband and wife, subject to exceptions. Article 29 of Presidential Decree No. 603
(Child and Youth Welfare Code) retained the Civil Code provision that husband and wife may
jointly adopt. The Family Code amended this rule by scrapping the optional character of joint
adoption and making it now mandatory.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the adoption is valid.
RULING:
Article 185 of the Family Code provides: Husband and wife must adopt, except in the following
cases:
(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; (2) When one spouse seeks to
adopt the legitimate child of the other."
None of the above exceptions applies to Samuel and Rosalina Dye, for they did not petition to
adopt the latter's child but her brother and sister. Accordingly, the law should be construed
liberally, in a manner that will sustain rather than defeat said purpose. The law must also be
applied with compassion, understanding and less severity in view of the fact that it is intended to
provide homes, love, care and education for less fortunate children. Regrettably, the Court is not
in a position to affirm the trial court's decision favoring adoption in the case at bar, for the law is
clear and it cannot be modified without violating the proscription against judicial legislation.
 P a g e | 521

Until such time however, that the law on the matter is amended, we cannot sustain the
respondent-spouses' petition for adoption.

IN RE: ADOPTION OF MICHELLE LIM AND MICHAEL JUDE LIM

GR No. 168992-93 May 21, 2009
 P a g e | 522

FACTS:
Monina Lim, petitioner, who was an optometrist was married with Primo Lim but were childless.
Minor children, were entrusted to them by Lucia, whose parents were unknown as shown by a
certification of DSWD. The spouses registered the children making it appears as if they were the
parents. Unfortunately, in 1998, Primo died. She then married an American Citizen, Angel
Olario in December 2000. Petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty
given under RA 8552 to individuals who simulated the birth of a child. In 2002, she filed
separate petitions for adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court. Michelle was then
25 years old and already married and Michael was 18 years and seven months old. Michelle and
her husband including Michael and Olario gave their consent to the adoption executed in an
affidavit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner who has remarried can singly adopt.
RULING:
Petition was denied. The time the petitions were filed, petitioner had already remarried.
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt except in 3 instances which was not present in the case at
bar. In case spouses jointly adopts, they shall jointly exercise parental authority. The use of the
word ―shall‖ signifies that joint adoption of husband and wife is mandatory. This is in
consonance with the concept of joint parental authority since the child to be adopted is elevated
to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require spouses to adopt jointly. The
affidavit of consent given by Olario will not suffice since there are certain requirements that he
must comply as an American Citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in Sec7 of
RA8552. The requirements on residency and certification of the alien‘s qualification to adopt
cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Sec 7. Parental authority is merely just one of the effects
of legal adoption. It includes caring and rearing the children for civic consciousness and
efficiency and development of their moral mental and physical character and well-being.

LANDINGIN v. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 164948 June 27, 2006

FACTS:
 P a g e | 523

Diwata Ramos Landingin, a US citizen of Filipino parentage filed a petition for the adoption of 3
minors, natural children of Manuel Ramos, the former‘s brother, and Amelia Ramos. She alleged
in her petition that when her brother died, the children were left to their paternal grandmother for
their biological mother went to Italy, re-married there and now has 2 children by her second
marriage and no longer communicates from the time she left up to the institution of the adoption.
After the paternal grandmother passed away, the minors were being supported by the petitioner
and her children abroad and gave their written consent for their adoption. A Social Worker of the
DSWD submitted a Report recommending for the adoption and narrated that Amelia, the
biological mother was consulted with the adoption plan and after weighing the benefits of
adoption to her children, she voluntarily consented. However, petitioner failed to present the said
social worker as witness and offer in evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos to the
adoption. Petitioner also failed to present any documentary evidence to prove that Amelia assent
to the adoption.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a petition for adoption be granted without the written consent of the adoptee‘s
biological mother
RULING:
No. Section 9, par (b) of RA 8552, provides that the consent of the biological parent(s) of the
child, if known is necessary to the adoption. The written consent of the legal guardian will
suffice if the written consent of the biological parents cannot be obtained. The general
requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect the natural parental
relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to
safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption. The written
consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption.
Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child requires that his consent must be obtained before
his parental rights and duties may be terminated and re-establish in adoptive parents. In this case,
petitioner failed to submit the written consent of Amelia Ramos to adopt. Moreover,
abandonment means neglect and refusal to perform the filial and legal obligations of love and
support. Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of others is not
such abandonment. To dispense with the requirements of consent, the abandonment must be
shown to have existed at the time of adoption.

CANG v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 105308 September 25, 1998

FACTS:
 P a g e | 524

Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano who were married on January 27, 1973, begot
three children, namely: Keith, born on July 3, 1973; Charmaine, born on January 23, 1977, and
Joseph Anthony, born on January 3, 1981. During the early years of their marriage, the Cang
couple‘s relationship was undisturbed. Not long thereafter, however, Anna Marie learned of her
husband‘s alleged extramarital affair with Wilma Soco, a family friend of the Clavanos.
Upon learning of her husband‘s alleged illicit liaison, Anna Marie filed a petition for legal
separation with alimony pendente lite with the then Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Cebuwhich rendered a decision approving the joint manifestation of the Cang spouses providing
that they agreed to ―live separately and apart or from bed and board. Petitioner then left for the
United States where he sought a divorce from Anna Marie before the Second Judicial District
Court of the State of Nevada. Said court issued the divorce decree that also granted sole custody
of the three minor children to Anna Marie, reserving ―rights of visitation at all reasonable times
and places‖ to petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner took an American wife and thus became a
naturalized American citizen. In 1986, he divorced his American wife and never
remarried.Upon learning of the petition for adoption, petitioner immediately returned to the
Philippines and filed an opposition thereto, alleging that, although private respondents Ronald
and Maria Clara Clavano were financially capable of supporting the children while his finances
were ―too meager‖ compared to theirs, he could not ―in conscience, allow anybody to strip
him of his parental authority over his beloved children.‖
Pending resolution of the petition for adoption, petitioner moved to reacquire custody over his
children alleging that Anna Marie had transferred to the United States thereby leaving custody of
their children to private respondents. On January 11, 1988, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
City, Branch 19, issued an order finding that Anna Marie had, in effect, relinquished custody
over the children and, therefore, such custody should be transferred to the father. The court then
directed the Clavanos to deliver custody over the minors to petitioner.
ISSUE:
Can minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of a natural parent on the
ground that the latter has abandoned them?
RULING:
This Court finds that both the lower court and the Court of Appeals failed to appreciate facts and
circumstances that should have elicited a different conclusion on the issue of whether petitioner
has so abandoned his children, thereby making his consent to the adoption unnecessary. In its
ordinary sense, the word ―abandon‖ means to forsake entirely, to forsake or renounce utterly.
The dictionaries trace this word to the root idea of ―putting under a ban.‖ The emphasis is on the
finality and publicity with which a thing or body is thus put in the control of another, hence, the
meaning of giving up absolutely, with intent never to resume or claim one‘s rights or interests. In
reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of abandonment imports ―any
conduct of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish
all parental claims to the child.‖ It means ―neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal
obligations of care and support which parents owe their children.
 P a g e | 525

In the instant case, records disclose that petitioner‘s conduct did not manifest a settled purpose to
forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as to constitute
abandonment. Physical estrangement alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not
tantamount to abandonment. While admittedly, petitioner was physically absent as he was then
in the United States, he was not remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and
support for his children. He maintained regular communication with his wife and children
through letters and telephone. He used to send packages by mail and catered to their whims. t
abandoned them.The questioned Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, as well as the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, are SET ASIDE thereby denying the petition for
adoption of Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony, all surnamed Cang, by the spouse
respondents Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano. This Decision is immediately executory.

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND DEVELOPMENT v. JUDGE ANTONIO

M. BELEN
A.M. No. RTJ-96-136 July 18, 1997
 P a g e | 526

FACTS:
Spouses Desiderio Soriano and Aurora Bernardo-Soriano, both of whom are naturalized
American citizens, filed a verified petition for adoption of their niece, the minor Zhedell
Bernardo Ibea. Respondent Judge Belen granted the petition after finding that petitioner spouses
were highly qualified to adopt the child as their own, basing his decree primarily on the "findings
and recommendation of the DSWD that the adopting parents on the one hand and the adoptee on
the other hand have already developed love and emotional attachment and parenting rules have
been demonstrated to the minor." On these considerations, respondent judge decided and
proceeded to dispense with trial custody. He asserted that the DSWD findings and
recommendations are contained in the "Adoptive Home Study Report" and "Child Study Report"
prepared by the local office of the DSWD through respondent Elma P. Vedaña. However, when
the minor Zhedell Bernardo Ibea sought to obtain the requisite travel clearance from the DSWD
in order to join her adoptive parents in the United States, the DSWD found that it did not have
any record in its files regarding the adoption and that there was never any order from respondent
judge for the DSWD to conduct a "Home and Child Study Report" in the case. Furthermore,
there was no directive from respondent judge for the social welfare officer of the lower court to
coordinate with the DSWD on the matter of the required reports for said minor's adoption.
ISSUE:
May a decree of adoption be granted on the basis of case study reports made by a social welfare
officer of the court?
RULING:
No. Article 33 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code provides in no uncertain terms that: No
petition for adoption shall be granted unless the Department of Social Welfare, or the Social
Work and Counseling Division, in case of Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, has made a
case study of the child to be adopted, his natural parents as well as the prospective adopting
parents, and has submitted its report and recommendations on the matter to the court hearing
such petition. The Department of Social Welfare shall intervene on behalf of the child if it finds,
after such case study, that the petition should be denied. Circular No. 12, as a complementary
measure, was issued by this Court precisely to obviate the mishandling of adoption cases by
judges, particularly in respect to the aforementioned case study to be conducted in accordance
with Article 33 of Presidential Decree No. 603 by the DSWD itself and involving the child to be
adopted, its natural parents, and the adopting parents. It definitively directs Regional Trial Courts
hearing adoption cases: (1) To NOTIFY the Ministry of Social Services and Development, thru
its local agency, of the filing of adoption cases or the pendency thereof with respect to those
cases already filed; (2) To strictly COMPLY with the requirement in Article 33 of the aforesaid
decree . . .

The Staff Assistant V. (Social Worker) of the Regional Trial Courts, if any, shall coordinate with
the Ministry of Social Services and Development representatives in the preparation and submittal
of such case study. .The error on the part of both respondent judge and social worker is thus all
too evident. Pursuant to Circular No. 12, the proper course that respondent judge should have
 P a g e | 527

taken was to notify the DSWD at the outset about the commencement of Special Proceeding No.
5830 so that the corresponding case study could have been accordingly conducted by said
department which undoubtedly has the necessary competence, more than that possessed by the
court social welfare officer, to make the proper recommendation. Moreover, respondent judge
should never have merely presumed that it was routinely for the social welfare officer to
coordinate with the DSWD regarding the adoption proceedings. It was his duty to exercise
caution and to see to it that such coordination was observed in the adoption proceedings, together
with all the other requirements of the law.
By respondent's failure to do so, he may well have wittingly or unwittingly placed in jeopardy
the welfare and future of the child whose adoption was under consideration. Adoption, after all,
is in a large measure a legal device by which a better future may be accorded an unfortunate
childlike Zhedell Bernardo Ibea in this case. Treading on equally sensitive legal terrain, the
social welfare officer concerned, respondent Elma P. Vedaña, arrogated unto herself a matter that
pertained exclusively to the DSWD, her task being to coordinate with the DSWD in the
preparation and submission of the relevant case study reports, and not to make the same and
recommend by herself the facts on which the court was to act.
ACCORDINGLY, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future
shall be dealt with more severely by this Court, respondent Judge Antonio M. Belen of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, of Lingayen, Pangasinan is hereby CENSURED for violating
Article 33 of Presidential Decree No. 603 and Circular No. 12 of this Court; and respondent
Elma P. Vedaña, Social Welfare Officer II of the Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial
Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, is REPRIMANDED for violating Circular No. 12.

REPUBLIC v. HERNANDEZ
GR No. 117209 February 9, 1996
 P a g e | 528

FACTS:
The RTC granted the petition for adoption of Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran and simultaneously
granted the prayer therein for the change of the first name of said adoptee to Aaron Joseph, to
complement the surname Munson y Andrade which he acquired consequent to his adoption.
Petitioner opposed the inclusion of the relief for change of name in the same petition for
adoption objecting to the joinder of the petition for adoption and the petitions for the change of
name in a single proceeding, arguing that these petition should be conducted and pursued as two
separate proceedings.
Petitioner argues that a petition for adoption and a petition for change of name are two special
proceedings which, in substance and purpose, are different from and are not related to each other,
being respectively governed by distinct sets of law and rules. Petitioner further contends that
what the law allows is the change of the surname of the adoptee, as a matter of right, to conform
with that of the adopter and as a natural consequence of the adoption thus granted. If what is
sought is the change of the registered given or proper name, and since this would involve a
substantial change of one‘s legal name, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 should
accordingly be instituted, with the substantive and adjective requisites therefor being
conformably satisfied.
Private respondents, on the contrary, admittedly filed the petition for adoption with a prayer for
change of name predicated upon Section 5, Rule 2 which allows permissive joinder of causes of
action in order to avoid multiplicity of suits and in line with the policy of discouraging protracted
and vexatious litigations. It is argued that there is no prohibition in the Rules against the joinder
of adoption and change of name being pleaded as two separate but related causes of action in a
single petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent judge erred in granting prayer for the change of the given or proper
name if the adoptee in a petition for adoption.
RULING:
No. Par (1), Art. 189 of the Family Code provides one of the legal effect of adoption: (1) For
civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters and both shall
acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child,
including the right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters;
The law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation, to bear the surname of the
adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption. It is the change of the adoptee‘s surname to
follow that of the adopter which is the natural and necessary consequence of a grant of adoption
and must specifically be contained in the order of the court, in fact, even if not prayed for by
petitioner. However, the given or proper name, also known as the first or Christian name, of the
adoptee must remain as it was originally registered in the civil register. The creation of an
adoptive relationship does not confer upon the adopter a license to change the adoptee‘s
registered Christian or first name. The automatic change thereof, premised solely upon the
adoption thus granted, is beyond the purview of a decree of adoption. Neither is it a mere
 P a g e | 529

incident in nor an adjunct of an adoption proceeding, such that a prayer therefor furtively
inserted in a petition for adoption, as in this case, cannot properly be granted.
The official name of a person whose birth is registered in the civil register is the name appearing
therein. If a change in one‘s name is desired, this can only be done by filing and strictly
complying with the substantive and procedural requirements for a special proceeding for change
of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, wherein the sufficiency of the reasons or grounds
therefor can be threshed out and accordingly determined. A petition for change of name being a
proceeding in rem, strict compliance with all the requirements therefor is indispensable in order
to vest the court with jurisdiction for its adjudication. It is an independent and discrete special
proceeding, in and by itself, governed by its own set of rules. A fortiori, it cannot be granted by
means of any other proceeding. To consider it as a mere incident or an offshoot of another
special proceeding would be to denigrate its role and significance as the appropriate remedy
available under our remedial law system.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 103695 March 15, 1996
 P a g e | 530

FACTS:
The petition below was filed on September 21 1988 by private respondents spouses Jaime B.
Caranto and Zenaida P. Caranto for the adoption of Midael C. Mazon, then fifteen years old, who
had been living with private respondent Jaime B. Caranto since he was seven years old. When
private respondents were married on January 19, 1986, the minor Midael C. Mazon stayed with
them under their care and custody. Private respondents prayed that judgment be rendered: a)
Declaring the child Michael C. Mazon the child of petitioners for all intents and purposes; b.)
Dissolving the authority vested in the natural parents of the child; and c) That the surname of the
child be legally changed to that of the petitioners and that the first name this was mistakenly
registered as ―MIDAEL‖ be corrected to ―MICHAEL."
The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals reiterating his contention that the
correction of names cannot be effected in the same proceeding for adoption. As additional
ground for his appeal, he argued that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the case for
adoption because in the notice published in the newspaper, the name given was "Michael,"
instead of "Midael," which is the name of the minor given in his Certificate of Live Birth.
On January 23, 1992, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC. The Court
of Appeals ruled that the case of Cruz v. Republic, invoked by the petitioner in support of its
plea that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case, was inapplicable because that
case involved a substantial error. Like the trial court, it held that to require the petitioners to file a
separate petition for correction of name would entail "additional time and expenses for them as
well as for the Government and the Courts."
ISSUE:
Does the trial court have jurisdiction over the present case?
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that the RTC correctly granted the petition for adoption of the minor
Midael C. Mazon and the Court of Appeals, in affirming the decision of the trial court, correctly
did so. With regard to the second assignment of error in the petition, we hold that both the Court
of Appeals and the trial court erred in granting private respondents' prayer for the correction of
the name of the child in the civil registry. Contrary to what the trial court thought, Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court applies to this case and because its provision was not complied with, the
decision of the trial court, insofar as it ordered the correction of the name of the minor, is void
and without force or effect. The trial court was clearly in error in holding Rule 108 to be
applicable only to the correction of errors concerning the civil status of persons

IN RE: ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE GARCIA

G.R. No. 148311 March 31, 2005

FACTS:
 P a g e | 531

Honorato B. Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Astorga
Garcia. He averred that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994; that Stephanie had been using her
mother‘s middle name and surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to be her
adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie‘s middle name be changed to Garcia, her mother‘s
surname, and that her surname ―Garcia‖ be changed to ―Catindig‖ his surname. The RTC
granted the petition for adoption, and ordered that pursuant to article 189 of the Family Code, the
minor shall be known as Stephanie Nathy Catindig. Honorato filed a motion for classification
and/or reconsideration praying that Stephanie be allowed to use the surname of her natural
mother (Garcia) as her middle name. The lower court denied petitioner‘s motion for
reconsideration holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the
surname of his biological mother as his middle name.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle name
when she is subsequently adopted by her natural father.
RULING:
One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of the adapter
for all intents and purposes pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code and Section 17 of Article
V of RA 8557.
Being a legitimate by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights
provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to
bear the surname of her father and her mother. This is consistent with the intention of the
members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the
initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father.

TEOTICO v. DEL VAL

G.R. No. L-18753 March 26, 1965

FACTS:
 P a g e | 532

Rene Teotico, married to the testatrix's niece named Josefina Mortera. The testatrix Josefina
Mortera as her sole and universal heir to all the remainder of her properties not otherwise
disposed of in the will. Vicente Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the will before the CIF
of Manila which was set for hearing after the requisite publication and service to all parties
concerned.
Ana del Val Chan, claiming to be an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, a deceased sister of the
testatrix, as well as an acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a deceased brother of the
same testatrix, filed an opposition to the probate of the will alleging the following grounds.
Vicente B. Teotico, filed a motion to dismiss the opposition alleging that the oppositor had no
legal personality to intervene. The probate court, allowed the oppositor to intervene as an
adopted child of Francisca Mortera, and the oppositor amended her opposition by alleging the
additional ground that the will is inoperative as to the share of Dr. Rene Teotico.
After the parties had presented their evidence, the probate court rendered its decision admitting
the will to probate but declaring the disposition made in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico void with the
statement that the portion to be vacated by the annulment should pass to the testatrix's heirs by
way of intestate succession.
ISSUE:
Whether or not oppositor Ana del Val Chan has the right to intervene in this proceeding.
RULING:
Oppositor has no right to intervene because she has no interest in the estate either as heir,
executor, or administrator, nor does she have any claim to any property affected by the will,
because it nowhere appears therein any provision designating her as heir, legatee or devisee of
any portion of the estate. She has also no interest in the will either as administratrix or executrix.
Neither has she any claim against any portion of the estate because she is not a co-owner thereof.
The oppositor cannot also derive comfort from the fact that she is an adopted child of Francisca
Mortera because under our law the relationship established by adoption is limited solely to the
adopter and the adopted and does not extend to the relatives of the adopting parents or of the
adopted child except only as expressly provided for by law. Hence, no relationship is created
between the adopted and the collaterals of the adopting parents. As a consequence, the adopted is
an heir of the adopter but not of the relatives of the adopter.

BERNARDINA P. BARTOLOME vs. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM

G.R. No. 192531      November 12, 2014

FACTS:
 P a g e | 533

John Colcol was employed as electrician by Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc. He was enrolled
under the government’s Employees’ Compensation Program (ECP). He died due to an accident
while on board the vessel. John was, at the time of his death, childless and unmarried. Thus,
petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome, John’s biological mother and, allegedly, sole
remaining beneficiary, filed a claim for death benefits.

SSS denied the claim on the ground that Bernardina was no longer considered as the parent of
John since the latter was legally adopted by Cornelio Colcol. As such, it is Cornelio who
qualifies as John’s primary beneficiary, not petitioner.

According to the records, Cornelio died during John’s minority.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the death of the adopter during the adoptee’s minority results to

the restoration of the parental authority to the biological parents of the latter.
2. Whether or not Bernardina is considered as a legal beneficiary of John.

HELD:

Yes. The Court ruled that John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s death is a significant
factor in the case at bar. Under such circumstance, parental authority should be deemed to have
reverted in favor of the biological parents. Otherwise, taking into account Our consistent ruling
that adoption is a personal relationship and that there are no collateral relatives by virtue
of adoption, who was then left to care for the minoradopted child if the adopter passed away?

The Court also applied by analogy,  insofar as the restoration of custody is concerned, the
provisions of law on rescission of adoption wherein if said petition is granted, the parental
authority of the adoptee’s biological parents shall be restored if the adoptee is still a minor or
incapacitated.

The manner herein of terminating the adopter’s parental authority, unlike the grounds for
rescission, justifies the retention of vested rights and obligations between the adopter and
the adoptee, while the consequent restoration of parental authority in favor of the biological
parents, simultaneously, ensures that the adoptee, who is still a minor, is not left to fend for
himself at such a tender age.

From the foregoing, it is apparent that the biological parents retain their rights of succession
tothe estate of their child who was the subject of adoption. While the benefits arising from the
death of an SSS covered employee do not form part of the estate of the adopted child, the
pertinent provision on legal or intestate succession at least reveals the policy on the rights of the
biological parents and those by adoption vis-à-vis the right to receive benefits from the adopted.
In the same way that certain rights still attach by virtue of the blood relation, so too
should certain obligations, which, the Court ruled, include the exercise of parental authority, in
the event of the untimely passing of their minor offspring’s adoptive parent. The Court held that
Cornelio’s adoption of John, without more, does not deprive petitioner of the right to receive the
 P a g e | 534

benefits stemming from John’s death as a dependent parent given Cornelio’s untimely demise
during John’s minority. Since the parent by adoption already died, then the death benefits under
the Employees’ Compensation Program shall accrue solely to herein petitioner, John’s sole
remaining beneficiary.

GERONIMO v. SANTOS
G.R. No. 197099 September 28, 2015

FACTS:
 P a g e | 535

Rufino and Claridad died intestate leaving a property consisting of one half of the parcel of land.
Eugenio and Emiliano Geronimo who are the brothers of Rufino executed a document
entitled Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman declaring themselves as the only heirs of the spouses
and adjudicating to themselves the property. They took possession and were able to transfer the
tax declaration of the property to their names. Karen Santos, claiming to be the only child of
deceased Rufino and Caridad Geronimo filed a complaint for annulment of document and
recovery of possession against the defendants Eugenio and Emiliano Geronimo. Eugenio and
Emiliano denied the allegation that plaintiff was the only child and sole heir of their brother.
They disclosed that the deceased Rufino and Caridad Geronimo were childless and took in as
their ward the plaintiff who was in truth, the child of Caridad’s sister. They claimed that the birth
certificate of the plaintiff was a simulated document. According to Eugenio, when Rufino’s wife
could not bear a child, the couple decided to adopt the plaintiff who was Caridad’s niece from
Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur. It was in 1972, 13 years after the marriage, when Karen joined her
adoptive parents’ household. Eugenio was able to obtain a copy of the plaintiff’s alleged birth
certificate. It had irregular features, such as that it was written in pentel pen, the entry in the
box date of birth was erased and the word and figure April 6, 1972 written and the name Emma
Daño was superimposed on the entry in the box intended for the informant’s signature. Basing
on the secondary evidence of Karen’s open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child, both the RTC and CA ruled in favor of respondent Karen

ISSUE:

Whether or not the mere registration of a child in his or her birth certificate as the child of the
supposed parents, even if she is not a natural child of the latter, is a valid adoption.

HELD:

No. A mere cursory reading of the birth certificate of respondent would show that it was
tampered specifically on the entries pertaining to the date of birth of respondent and the name of
the informant. Using pentel ink, the date of birth of respondent – April 6, 1972 – and the name of
the informant – Emma Daño – were both superimposed on the document. The appellate court
itself ruled that the irregularities consisting of the superimposed entries on the date of birth and
the name of the informant made the document questionable. The corroborating testimony of
Arturo Reyes, a representative of the NSO, further confirmed that the entries on the date of birth
and the signature of the informant are alterations on the birth certificate which rendered the
document questionable. To be sure, even the respondent herself did not offer any evidence to
explain such irregularities on her own birth certificate. These irregularities and the totality of the
following circumstances surrounding the alleged birth of respondent are sufficient to overthrow
the presumption of regularity attached to respondent’s birth certificate. Finally, we also find that
the concurrence of the secondary evidence relied upon by both courts a quo does not sufficiently
establish the one crucial fact in this case: that respondent is indeed a child of the deceased
spouses. Both the RTC and the CA ruled that respondent is a legitimate child of her putative
parents because she was allowed to bear their family name "Geronimo", they supported her and
her education, she was the beneficiary of the burial benefits of Caridad in her GSIS policy,
Caridad applied for and was appointed as her legal guardian in relation to the estate left by
 P a g e | 536

Rufino, and she and Caridad executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Rufino as his
legal heirs.

Of great significance to this controversy was the following pronouncement:

But definitely, the mere registration of a child in his or her birth certificate as the child of the
supposed parents is not a valid adoption, does not confer upon the child the status of an adopted
child and the legal rights of such child, and even amounts to simulation of the child's birth or
falsification of his or her birth certificate, which is a public document. Furthermore, it is well-
settled that a record of birth is merely a prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein. It is
not conclusive evidence of the truthfulness of the statements made there by the interested
parties. 

LAHOM vs. SIBULO

G.R. No. 143989 July 14, 2003

FACTS:
 P a g e | 537

A sad turn of events came many years later. Eventually, in December of 1999, Mrs. Lahom
commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 22, of Naga City. In her petition, she averred. That despite the proddings and pleadings
of said spouses, respondent refused to change his surname from Sibulo to Lahom, to the
frustrations of petitioner particularly her husband until the latter died, and even before his death
he had made known his desire to revoke respondent's adoption, but was prevented by petitioner's
supplication, however with his further request upon petitioner to give to charity whatever
properties or interest may pertain to respondent in the future. Respondent continued using his
surname Sibulo to the utter disregard of the feelings of herein petitioner, and his records with the
Professional Regulation Commission showed his name as Jose Melvin M. Sibulo originally
issued in 1978 until the present, and in all his dealings and activities in connection with his
practice of his profession, he is Jose Melvin M. Sibulo.
That herein petitioner being a widow, and living alone in this city with only her household helps
to attend to her, has yearned for the care and show of concern from a son, but respondent
remained indifferent and would only come to Naga to see her once a year. for the last three or
four years, the medical check-up of petitioner in Manila became more frequent in view of a leg
ailment, and those were the times when petitioner would need most the care and support from a
love one, but respondent all the more remained callous and utterly indifferent towards petitioner
which is not expected of a son.
That herein respondent has recently been jealous of petitioner's nephews and nieces whenever
they would find time to visit her, respondent alleging that they were only motivated by their
desire for some material benefits from petitioner.
That in view of respondent's insensible attitude resulting in a strained and uncomfortable
relationship between him and petitioner, the latter has suffered wounded feelings, knowing that
after all respondent's only motive to his adoption is his expectancy of his alleged rights over the
properties of herein petitioner and her late husband, clearly shown by his recent filing of Civil
Case No. 99-4463 for partition against petitioner, thereby totally eroding her love and affection
towards respondent, rendering the decree of adoption, considering respondent to be the child of
petitioner, for all legal purposes, has been negated for which reason there is no more basis for its
existence, hence this petition for revocation,"
ISSUE:
Can the adoption be rescinded?
RULING:
While R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly withdrawn from an adopter a consequential right to
rescind the adoption decree even in cases where the adoption might clearly turn out to be
undesirable, it remains, nevertheless, the bounden duty of the Court to apply the law. Dura lex
sed lex would be the hackneyed truism that those caught in the law have to live with. It is still
noteworthy, however, that an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can
always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing to an
undeserving child. For instance, upon the grounds recognized by law, an adopter may deny to an
 P a g e | 538

adopted child his legitime and, by a will and testament, may freely exclude him from having a
share in the disposable portion of his estate.

SUSAN LIM-LUA v. DANILO Y. LUA

G.R. Nos. 175279-80 June 05, 2013

FACTS:
 P a g e | 539

On September 3, 2003, petitioner Susan Lim-Lua filed an action for the declaration of nullity of
her marriage with respondent Danilo Y. Lua
In her prayer for support pendente lite for herself and her two children, petitioner sought the
amount of P500,000.00 as monthly support, citing respondent's huge earnings from salaries and
dividends in several companies and businesses here and abroad. After due hearing, Judge
Raphael B. Yrastorza, Sr. issued an Order granting support pendente lite. From the evidence
already adduced by the parties, the amount of Two Hundred Fifty (P250,000.00) Thousand Pesos
would be sufficient to take care of the needs of the plaintiff.  This amount excludes the One
hundred thirty-five (P135,000.00) Thousand Pesos for medical attendance expenses needed by
plaintiff for the operation of both her eye[s] which is demandable upon the conduct of such
operation.  The amounts already extended to the two (2) children, being a commendable act of
defendant, should be continued by him considering the vast financial resources at his disposal.
According to Art. 203 of the Family Code, support is demandable from the time plaintiff needed
the said support but is payable only from the date of judicial demand.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, asserting that petitioner is not entitled to spousal
support considering that she does not maintain for herself a separate dwelling from their children
and respondent has continued to support the family for their sustenance and well-being in
accordance with family's social and financial standing. As to the P250,000.00 granted by the trial
court as monthly support pendente lite, as well as the P1,750,000.00 retroactive support,
respondent found it unconscionable and beyond the intendment of the law for not having
considered the needs of the respondent.
On April 12, 2005, the CA rendered its Decision, nullified and set aside and instead a new one is
entered to pay private respondent a monthly support pendente lite of P115,000.00
ORDERING the deduction of the amount of PhP2,482,348.16 plus 946,465.64, or a total of
PhP3,428,813.80 from the current total support in arrears of Danilo Y. Lua to his wife, Susan
Lim Lua and their two (2) children;
The appellate court said that the trial court should not have completely disregarded the expenses
incurred by respondent consisting of the purchase and maintenance of the two cars, payment of
tuition fees, travel expenses, and the credit card purchases involving groceries, dry goods and
books, which certainly inured to the benefit not only of the two children, but their mother
(petitioner) as well.
It also noted the lack of contribution from the petitioner in the joint obligation of spouses to
support their children. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the Court
of Appeals.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the honorable court erred in ordering the deduction of the amount of
php2,482,348.16 plus 946,465.64, or a total of php3,428,813.80 from the current total support in
arrears of the respondent to the petitioner and their children.
 P a g e | 540

RULING:
As a matter of law, the amount of support which those related by marriage and family
relationship is generally obliged to give each other shall be in proportion to the resources or
means of the giver and to the needs of the recipient. Such support comprises everything
indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and
transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family.
Upon receipt of a verified petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage or for
annulment of voidable marriage, or for legal separation, and at any time during the proceeding,
the court, motu proprio or upon verified application of any of the parties, guardian or designated
custodian, may temporarily grant support pendente lite prior to the rendition of judgment or final
order. Because of its provisional nature, a court does not need to delve fully into the merits of the
case before it can settle an application for this relief. All that a court is tasked to do is determine
the kind and amount of evidence which may suffice to enable it to justly resolve the application.
It is enough that the facts be established by affidavits or other documentary evidence appearing
in the record. In this case, the amount of monthly support pendente lite for petitioner and her two
children was determined after due hearing and submission of documentary evidence by the
parties.  Although the amount fixed by the trial court was reduced on appeal, it is clear that the
monthly support pendente lite of P115,000.00 ordered by the CA was intended primarily for the
sustenance of petitioner and her children, e.g., food, clothing,  salaries of drivers and house
helpers, and other household expenses. 
Petitioner's testimony also mentioned the cost of regular therapy for her scoliosis and
vitamins/medicines.
As to the financial capacity of the respondent, it is beyond doubt that he can solely provide for
the subsistence, education, transportation, health/medical needs and recreational activities of his
children, as well as those of petitioner who was then unemployed and a full-time housewife.
The Family Court may direct the deduction of the provisional support from the salary of the
spouse.
Since the amount of monthly support pendente lite as fixed by the CA was not appealed by either
party, there is no controversy as to its sufficiency and reasonableness.  The dispute concerns the
deductions made by respondent in settling the support in arrears.
The amounts already extended to the two (2) children, being a commendable act of petitioner,
should be continued by him considering the vast financial resources at his disposal.

LAM v. CHUA
G.R. No. 131286 March 18, 2004

FACTS:
 P a g e | 541

A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage by Adriana Chua against Jose Lam in the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City (Branch 109). Adriana alleged in the petition that: she and
Jose were married on January 13, 1984; out of said marriage, they begot one son, John Paul Chua
Lam; Jose was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage but said incapacity was not then apparent; such psychological incapacity of Jose
became manifest only after the celebration of the marriage when he frequently failed to go home,
indulged in womanizing and irresponsible activities, such as, mismanaging the conjugal
partnership of gains; in order to save what was left of the conjugal properties, she was forced to
agree with Jose on the dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains and the separation of
present and future properties; said agreement was approved by the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City (Branch 149) in a Decision dated February 28, 1994; they had long been separated
in bed and board; they have agreed that the custody of their child will be with her, subject to
visitation rights of Jose. Adriana prayed that the marriage between her and Jose be declared null
and void but she failed to claim and pray for the support of their child, John Paul.
ISSUE:
Should Jose give the corresponding support?
RULING:
The Pasay RTC should have been aware that in determining the amount of support to be
awarded, such amount should be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and the
necessities of the recipient, pursuant to Articles 194, 201 and 202 of the Family Code. It is
incumbent upon the trial court to base its award of support on the evidence presented before it.
The evidence must prove the capacity or resources of both parents who are jointly obliged to
support their children as provided for under Article 195 of the Family Code; and the monthly
expenses incurred for the sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and
transportation of the child.

BRIONES v. MIGUEL
G.R. No. 156343 October 18, 2004

FACTS:
 P a g e | 542

On March 5, 2002, petitioner Joey D. Briones filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus against
respondents Maricel Pineda Miguel and Francisca Pineda Miguel, to obtain custody of his minor
child Michael Kevin Pineda. On April 25, 2002, the petitioner filed an Amended Petition to
include Loreta P. Miguel, the mother of the minor, as one of the respondents. A Writ of Habeas
Corpus was issued by this Court on March 11, 2002 ordering the respondents to produce before
this Court the living body of the minor Michael Kevin Pineda on March 21, 2002 at 2:00 o‘clock
in the afternoon. The petitioner alleges that the minor Michael Kevin Pineda is his illegitimate
son with respondent Loreta P. Miguel. He was born in Japan on September 17, 1996 as
evidenced by his Birth Certificate. The respondent Loreta P. Miguel is now married to a
Japanese national and is presently residing in Japan. Respondent Loreta P. Miguel prays that the
custody of her minor child be given to her and invokes Article 213, Paragraph 2 of the Family
Code and Article 363 of the Civil Code of the Philippines

ISSUE:

Whether or not as the natural father, may be denied the custody and parental care of his own
child in the absence of the mother who is away.

RULING:

Petitioner concedes that Respondent Loreta has preferential right over their minor child. He
insists, however, that custody should be awarded to him whenever she leaves for Japan and
during the period that she stays there. In other words, he wants joint custody over the minor, such
that the mother would have custody when she is in the country. But when she is abroad, he -- as
the biological father -- should have custody. According to petitioner, Loreta is not always in the
country. When she is abroad, she cannot take care of their child. The undeniable fact, he adds, is
that she lives most of the time in Japan, as evidenced by her Special Power of Attorney dated
May 28, 2001, granting to her sister temporary custody over the minor. At present, however, the
child is already with his mother in Japan, where he is studying,9 thus rendering petitioner‘s
argument moot. While the Petition for Habeas Corpus was pending before the CA, petitioner
filed on July 30, 2002, an "Urgent Motion for a Hold Departure Order," alleging therein that
respondents were preparing the travel papers of the minor so the child could join his mother and
her Japanese husband. The CA denied the Motion for lack of merit. Having been born outside a
valid marriage, the minor is deemed an illegitimate child of petitioner and Respondent Loreta.
Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines explicitly provides that "illegitimate children
shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be
entitled to support in conformity with this Code." This is the rule regardless of whether the father
admits paternity.

QUIMIGUING v. ICAO
G.R. No. L-26795 July 31, 2970

FACTS:
 P a g e | 543

Carmen Quimiguing, the petitioner, and Felix Icao, the defendant, were neighbors in Dapitan
City and had close and confidential relations. Despite the fact that Icao was married, he
succeeded to have carnal intercourse with plaintiff several times under force and intimidation
and without her consent. As a result, Carmen became pregnant despite drugs supplied by
defendant and as a consequence, Carmen stopped studying. Plaintiff claimed for support at P120
per month, damages and attorney‘s fees. The complaint was dismissed by the lower court in
Zamboanga del Norte on the ground lack of cause of action. Plaintiff moved to amend the
complaint that as a result of the intercourse, she gave birth to a baby girl but the court ruled that
no amendment was allowable since the original complaint averred no cause of action.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, the CFI erred in dismissing Carmen‘s complaint.

RULING:

Yes. The Supreme Court held that a conceive child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a
provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article
40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The conceive child may also receive donations and be
accepted by those persons who will legally represent them if they were already born as
prescribed in Article 742. Lower court‘s theory on article 291 of the civil code declaring that
support is an obligation of parents and illegitimate children does not contemplate support to
children as yet unborn violates article 40 aforementioned. Another reason for reversal of the
order is that Icao being a married man forced a woman not his wife to yield to his lust and this
constitutes a clear violation of Carmen‘s rights. Thus, she is entitled to claim compensation for
the damage caused. Thus, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside., the case was
remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings conformable to this decision. Costs
against appellant Felix Icao.
 P a g e | 544

FRANCISCO v. ZANDUETA
G.R. No. 43794 August 9, 1935

FACTS:

Eugenio Francisco, represented by his natural mother and curator ad litem, Rosario Gomez,
instituted an action for support against petitioner Luis Francisco in a separate case, alleging that
he is the latter‘s acknowledged son and as such is entitled to support. Luis denied the allegation,
claimed that he never acknowledged Eugenio as his son and was not present at his baptism and
that he was married at time of Eugenio‘s birth. Despite the denial of paternity however,
respondent judge Francisco Zandueta issued an order granting Eugenio monthly pension,
pendente lite. Luis moved for reconsideration but was denied, hence the writ for certiorari.
Praying to have the trial transferred, counsel of herein petitioner, in compromise, agreed that his
client would pay the monthly pension during the pendency of the case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Eugenio Francisco is entitled to support without first establishing his status as
petitioner‘s son.

RULING:

No. The answer as to whether or not petitioner‘s counsel really agreed to have him pay the
pension during the case‘s pendency is not necessary to the solution of the case. As in the case of
Yangco vs Rohde, the fact of the civil status must be proven first before a right of support can be
derived. The Court ruled that it is necessary for Eugenio to prove, through his guardian ad litem,
his civil status as the petitioner‘s son. As such, no right of support can be given because the very
civil status of son ship, from which the right is derived, is in question. It held that there is no law
or reason which authorizes the granting of support to a person who claims to be a son in the same
manner as to a person who establishes by legal proof that he is such son. In the latter case the
legal evidence raises a presumption of law, while in the former there is no presumption, there is
nothing but a mere allegation, a fact in issue, and a simple fact in issue must not be confounded
with an established right recognized by a final judgment. Additionally, the respondent judge was
without jurisdiction to order for the monthly support in light of herein private respondent‘s
absence of aforementioned status.
 P a g e | 545

SANTERO v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-61700 September 14, 1987

FACTS:

Pablo Santero, the only legitimate son of Pascual and Simona Santero, had three children with
Felixberta Pacursa namely, Princesita, Federico and Willie (herein petitioners). He also had four
children with Anselma Diaz namely, Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina, and Miguel (herein private
respondents). These children are all natural children since neither of their mothers was married to
their father. In 1973, Pablo Santero died. During the pendency of the administration proceedings
with the CFI-Cavite involving the estate of the late Pablo Santero, petitioners filed a petition for
certiorari with the Supreme Court questioning the decision of CFI-Cavite granting allowance
(allegedly without hearing) in the amount of Php 2,000.00, to private respondents which includes
tuition fees, clothing materials and subsistence out of any available funds in the hands of the
administrator. The petitioners opposed said decision on the ground that private respondents were
no longer studying, that they have attained the age of majority, that all of them except for Miguel
are gainfully employed, and the administrator did not have sufficient funds to cover the said
expenses. Before the Supreme Court could act on saod petition, the private respondents filed
another motion for allowance with the CFI-Cavite which included Juanita, Estelita and Pedrito,
all surnamed Santero, as children of the late Pablo Santero with Anselma Diaz, praying that a
sum of Php 6,000.00 be given to each of the seven children as their allowance from the estate of
their father. This was granted by the CFI-Cavite. Later on, the CFI-Cavite issued an amended
order directing Anselma Diaz, mother of private respondents, to submit a clarification or
explanation as to the additional three children included in the said motion. She said in her
clarification that in her previous motions, only the last four minor children were included for
support and the three children were then of age should have been included since all her children
have the right to receive allowance as advance payment of their shares in the inheritance of Pablo
Santero. The CFI-Cavite issued an order directing the administrator to get back the allowance of
the three additional children based on the opposition of the petitioners.

ISSUE:

Are the private respondents entitled to allowance?

RULING:

Yes, they are entitled. Being of age, gainfully employed, or married should not be regarded as
the determining factor to their right to allowance under Articles 290 and 188 of the New Civil
Code. Records show that a hearing was made. Moreover, what the said court did was just to
follow the precedent of the court which granted previous allowance and that the petitioners and
private respondents only received Php 1,500.00 each depending on the availability of funds.
 P a g e | 546

GOTARDO v. BULING
G.R. No. 165166 August 15, 2012

FACTS:

On September 6, 1995, respondent Divina Buling filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Maasin, Southern Leyte, Branch 25, for compulsory recognition and support 460endent
lite, claiming that the petitioner is the father of her child Gliffze. In his answer, the petitioner
denied the imputed paternity of Gliffze. For the parties‘ failure to amicably settle the dispute, the
RTC terminated the pre-trial proceedings. Trial on the merits ensued. The respondent testified
for herself and presented Rodulfo Lopez as witness. Evidence for the respondent showed that she
met the petitioner on December 1, 1992 at the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank,
Maasin, Southern Leyte branch where she had been hired as a casual employee, while the
petitioner worked as accounting supervisor. The respondent responded by filing a complaint with
the Municipal Trial Court of Maasin, Southern Leyte for damages against the petitioner for
breach of promise to marry. Later, however, the petitioner and the respondent amicably settled
the case. The respondent gave birth to their son Gliffze on March 9, 1995. When the petitioner
did not show up and failed to provide support to Gliffze, the respondent sent him a letter on July
24, 1995 demanding recognition of and support for their child. When the petitioner did not
answer the demand, the respondent filed her complaint for compulsory recognition and support
460endent lite. The petitioner took the witness stand and testified for himself. He denied the
imputed paternity, claiming that he first had sexual contact with the respondent in the first week
of August 1994 and she could not have been pregnant for twelve (12) weeks (or three (3)
months) when he was informed of the pregnancy on September 15, 1994. During the pendency
of the case, the RTC, on the respondent‘s motion, granted a P2, 000.00 monthly child support,
retroactive from March 1995.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner should provide support.

RULING:

One can prove filiation, either legitimate or illegitimate, through the record of birth appearing in
the civil register or a final judgment, an admission of filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, or the open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate or illegitimate child, or any other means allowed by the
Rules of Court and special laws. We have held that such other proof of one‘s filiation may be a
―baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family bible in which his name has been entered,
common reputation respecting [his] pedigree, admission by silence, the [testimonies] of
witnesses, and other kinds of proof [admissible] under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Since
filiation is beyond question, support follows as a matter of obligation; a parent is obliged to
support his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate. Support consists of everything indispensable
for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping
with the financial capacity of the family. Thus, the amount of support is variable and, for this
reason, no final judgment on the amount of support is made as the amount shall be in proportion
 P a g e | 547

to the resources or means of the giver and the necessities of the recipient. It may be reduced or
increased proportionately according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient
and the resources or means of the person obliged to support.
 P a g e | 548

MABUGAY-OTAMIAS v. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 189516 June 8, 2016

FACTS:

Edna Mabugay-Otamias and Retired Colonel Francisco Otamias were married in June16, 1978.
They had 5 children. Due to the alleged Francisco’s infidelity they decided to separate and their
children were all in the custody of their mother.Edna, then, filed a complaint against Colonel
Francisco before the Provost Marshall Division of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. She
demanded that they be entitled to75% of the retirement benefits of Col. Otamias as their monthly
support since the children were all living with her.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Colonel Otamias' pension benefits can be executed upon for the financial support
of his legitimate family

RULING:

The Deed of Assignment should be considered as the law between the parties, and its provisions
should be respected in the absence of allegations that Colonel Otamias was coerced or defrauded
in executing it. The general rule is that a contract is the law between parties and parties are free
to stipulate terms and conditions that are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order,
or public policy.The Deed of Assignment executed by Colonel Otamias was not contrary to law;
it was in accordance with the provisions on support in the Family Code. Hence, there was no
reason for the AFP PGMC not to recognize its validity.Further, this Court notes that the AFP
PGMC granted the request for support of the wives of other retired military personnel in a
similar situation as that of petitioner in this case. Attached to the Petition are the affidavits of the
wives of retired members of the military, who have received a portion of their husbands'
pensions.Section 31 of Presidential Decree No. 1638 provides Section 31. The benefits
authorized under this Decree, except as provided herein, shall not be subject to attachment,
garnishment, levy, execution or any tax whatsoever;neither shall they be assigned, ceded, or
conveyed to any third person: Provided, That if a retired or separated officer or enlisted man who
is entitled to any benefit under this Decree has unsettled money and/or property accountabilities
incurred while in the active service, not more than fifty per centum of the pension gratuity or
other payment due such officer or enlisted man or his survivors under this Decree may be
withheld and be applied to settle such accountabilities.
 P a g e | 549

LACSON v. LACSON
G.R. No. 150644 August 28, 2006

FACTS:

The sisters Maowee Daban Lacson and Maonaa Daban Lacson are legitimate daughters of
petitioner Edward V. Lacson and his wife, Lea Daban Lacson. Maowee was born on December
4, 1974, while Maonaa, a little less than a year later. Not long after the birth of Maonaa,
petitioner left the conjugal home in Molo, Iloilo City, virtually forcing mother and children to
seek, apparently for financial reason, shelter somewhere else. For a month, they stayed with
Lea‘s mother-in-law, Alicia Lacson, then with her (Lea‘s) mother and then with her brother Noel
Daban. After some time, they rented an apartment only to return later to the house of Lea‘s
mother. As the trial court aptly observed, the sisters and their mother, from 1976 to 1994, or for a
period of eighteen (18) years, shuttled from one dwelling place to another not their own.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is obliged to give support.

RULING:

Petitioner admits being obliged, as father, to provide support to both respondents, Maowee and
Maonaa. It is his threshold submission, however, that he should not be made to pay support in
arrears, i.e., from 1976 to 1994, no previous extrajudicial, let alone judicial, demand having been
made by the respondents. He invokes the following provision of the Family Code to complete his
point: Article 203 of the Family Code, provides that “The obligation to give support shall be
demandable from the time the person who has a right to receive the same needs it for
maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date of judicial or extrajudicial demand.”
To petitioner, his obligation to pay under the afore quoted provision starts from the filing of Civil
Case No. 22185 in 1995, since only from that moment can it be said that an effective demand for
support was made upon him.
 P a g e | 550

LIM v. LIM
G.R. No. 163209 October 30, 2009

FACTS:

In 1979, respondent Cheryl S. Lim (Cheryl) married Edward Lim (Edward), son of petitioners.
Cheryl bore Edward three children, respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III.
Cheryl, Edward and their children resided at the house of petitioners in Forbes Park, Makati City,
together with Edward‘s ailing grandmother, Chua Giak and her husband Mariano Lim (Mariano).
Edward‘s family business, which provided him with a monthly salary of P6,000, shouldered the
family expenses. Cheryl had no steady source of income. On 14 October 1990, Cheryl
abandoned the Forbes Park residence, bringing the children with her (then all minors), after a
violent confrontation with Edward whom she caught with the in house midwife of Chua Giak in
what the trial court described "a very compromising situation." Cheryl, for herself and her
children, sued petitioners, Edward, Chua Giak and Mariano (defendants) in the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 140 (trial court) for support. The trial court ordered Edward to
provide monthly support of P6,000 pendente lite.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioners are concurrently liable with Edward to provide support to respondents.

RULING:

By statutory and jurisprudential mandate, the liability of ascendants to provide legal support to
their descendants is beyond cavil. Petitioners themselves admit as much – they limit their
petition to the narrow question of when their liability is triggered, not if they are liable. Relying
on provisions found in Title IX of the Civil Code, as amended, on Parental Authority, petitioners
theorize that their liability is activated only upon default of parental authority, conceivably either
by its termination or suspension during the children‘s minority. Because at the time respondents
sued for support, Cheryl and Edward exercised parental authority over their children, petitioners
submit that the obligation to support the latter‘s offspring ends with them.
 P a g e | 551

VERCELES v. POSADA
G.R. No. 159785 April 27, 2007

FACTS:

Respondent Maria Clarissa Posada (Clarissa), young lass from the barrio of Pandan,
Catanduanes, sometime in 1986 met a close family friend, petitioner Teofisto I. Verceles, mayor
of Pandan. He then called on the Posadas and at the end of the visit, offered Clarissa a job.
Clarissa accepted petitioner‘s offer and worked as a casual employee in the mayor‘s office
starting on September 1, 1986. From November 10 to 15 in 1986, with companions Aster de
Quiros, Pat del Valle, Jaime and Jocelyn Vargas, she accompanied petitioner to Legaspi City to
attend a seminar on town planning. They stayed at the Mayon Hotel. On November 11, 1986, at
around 11:00 a.m., petitioner fetched Clarissa from "My Brother‘s Place" where the seminar was
being held. Clarissa avers that he told her that they would have lunch at Mayon Hotel with their
companions who had gone ahead. When they reached the place her companions were nowhere.
After petitioner ordered food, he started making amorous advances on her. She panicked, ran and
closeted herself inside a comfort room where she stayed until someone knocked. She said she
hurriedly exited and left the hotel. Afraid of the mayor, she kept the incident to herself. She went
on as casual employee. One of her tasks was following-up barangay road and maintenance
projects.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is proof of filiation.

RULING:

Articles 172 and 175 of the Family Code are the rules for establishing filiation. They are as
follows: Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1)
The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) An admission of
legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be
proved by: (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) Any
other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. Art. 175. Illegitimate children may
establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate
children.The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except
when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be
brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent. The letters, one of which is quoted above, are
private handwritten instruments of petitioner which establish Verna Aiza‘s filiation under
Family Code. Further, the array of evidence presented by respondents, the dates, letters, pictures
and testimonies, to us, is convincing, and irrefutable evidence that Verna Aiza is, indeed,
petitioner‘s illegitimate child. Petitioner not only failed to rebut the evidence presented, he
himself presented no evidence of his own. His bare denials are telling. Thus, if unsubstantiated
by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving which merit no weight in law
and cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who
testify on affirmative matters.
 P a g e | 552

MANGONON v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 125041 June 30, 2006

FACTS:

On 17 March 1994, petitioner Ma. Belen B. Mangonon filed, in behalf of her then minor children
Rica and Rina, a Petition for Declaration of Legitimacy and Support, with application for support
pendente lite with the RTC Makati. In said petition, it was alleged that on 16 February 1975,
petitioner and respondent Federico Delgado were civilly married by then City Court Judge
Eleuterio Agudo in Legaspi City, Albay. At that time, petitioner was only 21 years old while
respondent Federico was only 19 years old. As the marriage was solemnized without the required
consent per Article 85 of the New Civil Code, it was annulled on 11 August 1975 by the Quezon
City Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court. On 25 March 1976, or within seven months after
the annulment of their marriage, petitioner gave birth to twins Rica and Rina. According to
petitioner, she, with the assistance of her second husband Danny Mangonon, raised her twin
daughters as private respondents had totally abandoned them. At the time of the institution of the
petition, Rica and Rina were about to enter college in the United States of America (USA) where
petitioner, together with her daughters and second husband, had moved to and finally settled in.
Rica was admitted to the University of Massachusetts (Amherst) while Rina was accepted by the
Long Island University and Western New England College. Despite their admissions to said
universities, Rica and Rina were, however, financially incapable of pursuing collegiate education
because of the following: i) The average annual cost for college education in the US is about
US$22,000/year, broken down as follows: Tuition Fees US$13,000.00 Room & Board 5,000.00
Books 1,000.00 Yearly Transportation & Meal Allowance 3,000.00 Total US$ 22,000.00 Or a
total of US$44,000.00, more or less, for both Rica and Rina

ISSUE:

Whether or not Federico is obliged to provide support

RULING:

In this case, this Court believes that respondent Francisco could not avail himself of the second
option. From the records, we gleaned that prior to the commencement of this action, the
relationship between respondent Francisco, on one hand, and petitioner and her twin daughters,
on the other, was indeed quite pleasant. The correspondences exchanged among them expressed
profound feelings of thoughtfulness and concern for one another‘s well-being. The photographs
presented by petitioner as part of her exhibits presented a seemingly typical family celebrating
kinship. All of these, however, are now things of the past. With the filing of this case, and the
allegations hurled at one another by the parties, the relationships among the parties had certainly
been affected. Particularly difficult for Rica and Rina must be the fact that those who they had
considered and claimed as family denied having any familial relationship with them. Given all
these, we could not see Rica and Rina moving back here in the Philippines in the company of
those who have disowned them. Finally, as to the amount of support pendente lite, we take our
bearings from the provision of the law mandating the amount of support to be proportionate to
the resources or means of the giver and to the necessities of the recipient. Guided by this
 P a g e | 553

principle, we hold respondent Francisco liable for half of the amount of school expenses incurred
by Rica and Rina as support pendente lite. As established by petitioner, respondent Francisco has
the financial resources to pay this amount given his various business endeavors.
 P a g e | 554

DE GUZMAN v. PEREZ
G.R. No. 156013 July 25, 2006

FACTS:

Petitioner and private respondent Shirley F. Aberde became sweethearts while studying law in
the University of Sto. Tomas. Their studies were interrupted when private respondent became
pregnant. She gave birth to petitioner‘s child, Robby Aberde de Guzman, on October 2, 1987.
Private respondent and petitioner never got married. In 1991, petitioner married another woman
with whom he begot two children. Petitioner sent money for Robby‘s schooling only twice the
first in 1992 and the second in 1993. In 1994, when Robby fell seriously ill, petitioner gave
private respondent P7,000 to help defray the cost of the child‘s hospitalization and medical
expenses. Other than these instances, petitioner never provided any other financial support for
his son. In 1994, in order to make ends meet and to provide for Robby‘s needs, private
respondent accepted a job as a factory worker in Taiwan where she worked for two years. It was
only because of her short stint overseas that she was able to support Robby and send him to
school. However, she reached the point where she had just about spent all her savings to provide
for her and Robby‘s needs. The child‘s continued education thus became uncertain.

ISSUE:

May a parent who fails or refuses to do his part in providing his child the education his station in
life and financial condition permit, be charged for neglect?

RULING:

The law is clear. The crime may be committed by any parent. Liability for the crime does not
depend on whether the other parent is also guilty of neglect. The law intends to punish the
neglect of any parent, which neglect corresponds to the failure to give the child the education
which the family‘s station in life and financial condition permit. The irresponsible parent cannot
exculpate himself from the consequences of his neglect by invoking the other parent‘s faithful
compliance with his or her own parental duties. Petitioner‘s position goes against the intent of
the law. To allow the neglectful parent to shield himself from criminal liability defeats the
prescription that in all questions regarding the care, custody, education and property of the child,
his welfare shall be the paramount consideration. However, while petitioner can be indicted for
violation of Article 59(4) of PD 603, the charge against him cannot be made in relation to
Section 10(a) of RA 7610 which provides: SEC. 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or
Exploitation and Other Conditions Prejudicial to the Child’s Development. (a) Any person who
shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be responsible for other
conditions prejudicial to the child’s development including those covered by Article 59 of PD
No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the
penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period. The law expressly penalizes any person who
commits other acts of neglect, child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be responsible for other
conditions prejudicial to the child‘s development including those covered by Article 59 of PD
603 "but not covered by the Revised Penal Code." The "neglect of child" punished under Article
59(4) of PD 603 is also a crime (known as "indifference of parents") penalized under the second
 P a g e | 555

paragraph of Article 277 of the Revised Penal Code. Hence, it is excluded from the coverage of
RA 7610.
 P a g e | 556

MABUGAY-OTAMIAS v. REPUBLIC
G.R No. 189516 June 08, 2016

FACTS:

Petitioner Edna Mabugay-Otamias (Edna) and retired Colonel Francisco B. Otamias (Colonel
Otamias) were married on June 16, 1978 and had five (5) children. On September 2000, Edna
and Colonel Otamias separated due to his alleged infidelity. Their children remained with Edna.
On August 2002, Edna filed a Complaint-Affidavit against Colonel Otamias before the Provost
Marshall Division of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Edna demanded monthly support
equivalent to 75% of Colonel Otamias' retirement benefits. On February 26, 2003, Colonel
Otamias executed a Deed of Assignment where he waived 50% of his salary and pension
benefits in favor of Edna and their children. The Deed of Assignment was considered by the
parties as a compromise agreement. The agreement was honored until January 6, 2006 until AFP
decided not to honor the agreement between Colonel Otamias and his legitimate family. Edna, on
behalf of herself and Jeffren M. Otamias and Jemwel M. Otamias (Edna, et al.), filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro, Misamis Oriental an action for support, docketed as
F.C. Civil Case No. 2006-039.

ISSUES:

Whether or not Colonel Otamias’ legitimate family is entitled for support.

HELD:

Section 31 of Presidential Decree No. 1638 provides that the benefits authorized under this
Decree, except as provided herein, shall not be subject to attachment, garnishment, levy,
execution or any tax whatsoever; neither shall they be assigned, ceded, or conveyed to any third
person: Provided, That if a retired or separated officer or enlisted man who is entitled to any
benefit under this Decree has unsettled money and/or property accountabilities incurred while in
the active service, not more than fifty per centum of the pension gratuity or other payment due
such officer or enlisted man or his survivors under this Decree may be withheld and be applied to
settle such accountabilities. Under Section 31, Colonel Otamias' retirement benefits are exempt
from execution. Retirement benefits are exempt from execution so as to ensure that the retiree
has enough funds to support himself and his family.

DEL SOCORRO v. VAN WILSEM

 P a g e | 557

G.R No. 193707 December 10, 2014

FACTS:

Norma A. Del Socorro and Ernst Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland. They were
blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem. Unfortunately, their marriage bond
ended by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of Holland. Thereafter,
Norma and her son came home to the Philippines. According to Norma, Ernst made a promise to
provide monthly support to their son. However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the
Philippines, Ernst never gave support to Roderigo. Respondent remarried again a Filipina and
resides again the Philippines particulary in Cebu where the petitioner also resides. Norma filed a
complaint against Ernst for violation of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to support
his minor child with petitioner. The trial court dismissed the complaint since the facts charged in
the information do not constitute an offense with respect to the accused, he being an alien.

ISSUES:

Does a foreign national have an obligation to support his minor child under the Philippine law?

HELD:

Yes. While it is true that Respondent Ernst is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree
with the RTC that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to whether he
is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so. This
does not, however, mean that Ernst is not obliged to support Norma’s son altogether. In
international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the
burden of proving the foreign law. In the present case, Ernst hastily concludes that being a
national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and
capacity to support. While Ernst pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position
that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same. It is incumbent upon Ernst to
plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands does not impose upon the parents the
obligation to support their child. Foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and
our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be
alleged and proved. Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would
work undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most
important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates
the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws. Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the
Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s obligation to support his child nor penalize the non-
compliance therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in the Philippines because it
would be of great injustice to the child to be denied of financial support when the latter is entitled
thereto.

LACSON v. LACSON
GR No. 150644 August 28, 2016
 P a g e | 558

FACTS:

The sisters Maowee Daban Lacson and Maonaa Daban Lacson are legitimate daughters of
petitioner Edward V. Lacson and his wife, Lea Daban Lacson Not long after the birth of
Maonaa, petitioner left the conjugal home in Molo, Iloilo City, virtually forcing mother and
children to seek, apparently for financial reason, shelter somewhere else. For a month, they
stayed with Leas mother-in-law, Alicia Lacson, then with her (Leas) mother and then with her
brother Noel Daban. After some time, they rented an apartment only to return later to the house
of Leas mother. As the trial court aptly observed, the sisters and their mother, from 1976 to 1994,
or for a period of eighteen (18) years, shuttled from one dwelling place to another not their own.
It appears that from the start of their estrangement, Lea did not badger her husband Edward for
support, relying initially on his commitment memorialized in a note dated December 10, 1975 to
give support to his daughters. As things turned out, however, Edward reneged on his promise of
support, despite Leas efforts towards having him fulfill the same. Lea would admit, though, that
Edward occasionally gave their children meager amounts for school expenses. Through the years
and up to the middle part of 1992, Edwards mother, Alicia Lacson, also gave small amounts to
help in the schooling of Maowee and Maonaa, both of whom eventually took up nursing at St.
Pauls College in Iloilo City. In the early part of 1995 when Lea, in behalf of her two daughters,
filed a complaint against Edward for support before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City,
Branch 33, Maowee was about to graduate. Maowee and Maonaa, thru their mother, averred that
their father Edward, despite being gainfully employed and owning several pieces of valuable
lands, has not provided them support since 1976. Edward alleged giving to Maowee and Maonaa
sufficient sum to meet their needs. Following trial, the RTC rendered on June 26, 1997 judgment
finding for the plaintiff sisters, as represented by their mother. In that judgment, the trial court,
following an elaborate formula set forth therein, ordered their defendant father Edward to pay
them a specific sum which represented 216 months, or 18 years, of support in arrears.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a third party may furnish a support.

HELD:

Article 207 of the Family Code provides that when the person obliged to support another
unjustly refuses or fails to give support when urgently needed by the latter, any third person may
furnish support to the needy individual, with right of reimbursement from the person obliged to
give support. Mention may also be made that, contextually, the resulting juridical relationship
between the petitioner and Noel Daban is a quasi-contract an equitable principle enjoining one
from unjustly enriching himself at the expense of another.

ESTATE OF RUIZ v. CA
G.R. No. 118671 January 29, 1996
 P a g e | 559

FACTS:

Hilario M. Ruiz executed a holographic will naming as his heirs his only son, Edmond Ruiz, his
adopted daughter, private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes, and his three granddaughters,On
April 12, 1988, Hilario Ruiz died.On June 29, 1992, four years after the testator’s death, it was
private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes who filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch
156, Pasig, a petition for the probate and approval of Hilario Ruiz’s will and for the issuance of
letters testamentary to Edmond Ruiz.

ISSUES:

Whether the probate court, after admitting the will to probate but before payment of the estate’s
debts and obligations, has the authority: (1) to grant an allowance from the funds of the estate for
the support of the testator’s grandchildren; (2) to order the release of the titles to certain heirs;
and (3) to grant possession of all properties of the estate to the executor of the will.

RULING:

1. No. Be that as it may, grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support from the funds of
the decedent’s estate. The law clearly limits the allowance to “widow and children” and does not
extend it to the deceased’s grandchildren, regardless of their minority or incapacity.
2. No. No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above-mentioned has
been made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be
fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time as the court
directs.
3. No. The right of an executor or administrator to the possession and management of the real
and personal properties of the deceased is not absolute and can only be exercised “so long as it is
necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses of administration, He cannot unilaterally
assign to himself and possess all his parents’ properties and the fruits thereof without first
submitting an inventory and appraisal of all real and personal properties of the deceased,
rendering a true account of his administration, the expenses of administration, the amount of the
obligations and estate tax, all of which are subject to a determination by the court as to their
veracity, propriety and justness.

REYES v. INES-LUCIANO
GR No. L-48219 February 28, 1979
 P a g e | 560

FACTS:

The private petitioner, Celia Ilustre-Reyes, filed in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Quezon City a complaint dated June 3, 1976 against her husband, Manuel J. C. Reyes, for legal
separation on the ground that the defendant had attempted to kill plaintiff. The plaintiff asked for
support pendente lite for her and her three children. The defendant, petitioner herein, opposed the
application for support pendente lite on the ground that his wife had committed adultery with her
physician.The application for support pendente lite was set for hearing and submitted for
resolution on the basis of the pleadings and the documents attached thereto by the parties. The
respondent Judge issued an order dated March 15, 1977 granting plaintiff's prayer for
alimony pendente lite in the amount of P5,000.00 a month commencing from June 1976.The
petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration reiterating that his wife is not entitled to support
during the pendency of the case, and, alleging that even if she entitled, the amount awarded was
excessive. The respondent Judge reduced the amount from P5,000.00 to P44,00.00 a month in an
order dated June 17, 1977.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is entitled for support regardless of a pending case.

HELD:

The petitioner has still the opportunity to adduce evidence on the alleged adultery of his wife
when the action for legal separation is heard on the merits before the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court of Quezon City. It is to be noted however, that as pointed out by the respondents
in their comment, the "private respondent was not asking support to be taken from petitioner's
personal funds or wherewithal, but from the conjugal property—which, was her documentary
evidence. It is, therefore, doubtful whether adultery will affect her right to alimony pendente lite.
The contention of the petitioner that the order of the respondent Judge granting the private
respondent support pendente lite in the amount of P4,000.00 a month is not supported by the
allegations of the complaint for legal separation and by competent evidence has no merit. The
complaint or legal separation contains allegations showing that on at least two occasions the
defendant, petitioner herein, had made attempts to kill the private respondent. It is thus seen that
the respondent judge acted with due deliberation before fixing the amount of support pendente
lite in the amount of P4,000.00 a month. In determining the amount to be awarded as
support pendente lite it is not necessary to go fully into the merits of the case, it being sufficient
that the court ascertain the kind and amount of evidence which it may deem sufficient to enable
it to justly resolve the application, one way or the other, in view of the merely provisional
character of the resolution to be entered. Mere affidavits may satisfy the court to pass upon the
application for support pendente lite. It is enough the the facts be established by affidavits or
other documentary evidence appearing in the record.

SILVA v. CA
G.R. No. 114742 July 17, 1997
 P a g e | 561

FACTS:

Carlitos Silva and Suzanne Gonzales cohabited without the benefit of marriage and they had two
children. A rift surfaced and the two eventually separated. They agreed that Carlitos would
have the children in his company on weekends. Claiming that Suzanne broke the
agreement, Carlitos filed a petition for custodial rights over the children before the RTC.
Suzanne opposed, alleging that Carlitos often engaged in "gambling and womanizing" which she
feared could affect the moral and social values of the children.
The RTC ruled in favor of Carlitos giving him visitorial rights to his children during Saturdays
and/or Sundays. The court however explicitly stated that in no case should Carlitos take the
children out without the written consent of Suzanne. Suzanne appealed. In the meantime, she got
married to a Dutch national and eventually immigrated to Holland with her children. The CA
reversed the ruling of the RTC and denied the Carlitos any visitorial rights. Carlitos appealed.

ISSUE:

Should Carlitos be denied visitorial rights?

HELD:

No. The visitation right referred to is the right of access of a noncustodial parent to his or her
child or children. There is, despite a dearth of specific legal provisions, enough recognition on
the inherent and natural right of parents over their children. Article 150 of the Family Code
expresses that family relations include those between parents and children. Article 209, in
relation to Article 220, of the Code states that it is the natural right and duty of parents and those
exercising parental authority to, among other things, keep children in their company and to give
them love and affection, advice and counsel, companionship and understanding. The
Constitution itself speaks in terms of the natural and primary rights of parents in the rearing of
the youth. There is nothing conclusive to indicate that these provisions are meant to solely
address themselves to legitimate relationships. Indeed, although in varying degrees, the laws on
support and successional rights, by way of examples, clearly go beyond the legitimate members
of the family and so explicitly encompass illegitimate relationships as well. Then, too, and most
importantly, in the declaration of nullity of marriages, a situation that presupposes a void or
inexistent marriage, Article 49 of the Family Code provides for appropriate visitation rights to
parents who are not given custody of their children. The allegations of respondent against the
character of petitioner, even assuming as true, cannot be taken as sufficient basis to render
petitioner an unfit father. The fears expressed by respondent to the effect that petitioner shall be
able to corrupt and degrade their children once allowed to even temporarily associate with
petitioner is but the product of respondent's unfounded imagination, for no man, bereft of all
moral persuasions and goodness, would ever take the trouble and expense in instituting a legal
action for the purpose of seeing his illegitimate children. It can just be imagined the deep
sorrows of a father who is deprived of his children of tender ages. It seems unlikely that
petitioner would have ulterior motives or undue designs more than a parents natural desire to be
able to call on, even if it were only on brief visits, his own children. The trial court, in any case,
has seen it fit to understandably provide this precautionary measure, in no case can petitioner
take out the children without the written consent of the mother.
 P a g e | 562

IMBONG v. OCHOA, JR.

G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014

FACTS:
 P a g e | 563

Concerned citizens and the Catholic Church had petitioned for the constitutionality of the
Reproductive Health Bill.

ISSUES:

Whether or not right to privacy is impaired.

HELD:

Yes, Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures even with only the
consent of the spouse undergoing the provision (disregarding spousal content), intrudes into
martial privacy and autonomy and goes against the constitutional safeguards for the family as the
basic social institution. Particularly, Section 3, Article XV of the Constitution mandates the State
to defend: (a) the right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious
convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood and (b) the right of families or family
associations to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that
affect them. The RH Law cannot infringe upon this mutual decision-making, and endanger the
institutions of marriage and the family.

TONOG v. CA
G.R. No. 122906 February 7, 2002

FACTS:
 P a g e | 564

Dinah gave birth to Gardin Faith Belarde Tonog, her illegitimate child with Edgar V. Daguimol.
The two cohabited for a time and lived with Edgar's parents and sister. A year after Dinah left for
US where she found work as a registered nurse. Gardin was left in the care of her father and
grandparents. Edgar later filed a petition for guardianship over Gardin and the trial court granted
the petition and appointed Edgar as the legal guardian. Dinah filed a petition for relief from
judgement and the court set aside the original judgement and allowed Dinah to file her
opposition to Edgar's petition. Edgar filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied and the
court issued a resolution granting Dinah's motion for custody over Gardin. Edgar filed a petition
for certiorari before the CA who modified their previous decision and granted Edgar custody
over Gardin. Dinah contends that she is entitled to the custody of the minor, Gardin Faith, as a
matter of law.  As the mother of Gardin Faith, the law confers parental authority upon her as the
mother of the illegitimate minor.

ISSUE:

Is Dinah entitled to the custody of Gardin?

HELD:

No. The general rule is recommended in order to avoid many a tragedy where a mother has seen
her baby torn away from her. The exception allowed by the rule has to be for “compelling
reasons” for the good of the child. A mother may be deprived of the custody of her child who is
below seven years of age for “compelling reasons.” Instances of unsuitability are neglect,
abandonment, unemployment and immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction,
maltreatment of the child, insanity, and affliction with a communicable illness. If older than
seven years of age, a child is allowed to state his preference, but the court is not bound by that
choice.  The court may exercise its discretion by disregarding the child’s preference should the
parent chosen be found to be unfit, in which instance, custody may be given to the other parent,
or even to a third person.Bearing in mind that the welfare of the said minor as the controlling
factor, SC find that the appellate court did not err in allowing her father to retain in the meantime
parental custody over her.  Meanwhile, the child should not be wrenched from her familiar
surroundings, and thrust into a strange environment away from the people and places to which
she had apparently formed an attachment. Moreover, whether a mother is a fit parent for her
child is a question of fact to be properly entertained in the special proceedings before the trial
court.

VANCIL v. BELMES
G.R. No. 132223 June 19, 2001

FACTS:

Petitioner is the mother of Reeder C. Vancil, a Navy serviceman of the United States of America
who died in the said country on December 22, 1986. During his lifetime, Reeder had two
 P a g e | 565

children named Valerie and Vincent by his common-law wife, Helen G. Belmes. Petitioner
commences before the RTC a guardianship proceeding over the persons and properties of minors
Valerie, 6 years old and Vincent, 2 years old. She was appointed legal and judicial guardian over
the persons and estate of said children. The natural mother of the minors, herein respondent,
submitted an opposition to the subject guardianship proceedings asseverating that she had
already filed a similar petition for guardianship. The trial court rejected and denied Belmes’
motion to remove and/or to disqualify Bonifacia as guardian.  The subsequent attempt for
reconsideration was likewise dismissed. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of
the RTC.

ISSUE:

Who between the mother and grandmother of minor Vincent should be his guardian?

RULING:

Article 211 of the Family Code provides that the father and the mother shall jointly exercise
parental authority over the persons of their common children.  In case of disagreement, the
father’s decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary. Indeed, being the
natural mother of minor Vincent, respondent has the corresponding natural and legal right to his
custody. The ruling in Sagala-Eslao v. Court of Appeals is reiterated in this case that of
considerable importance is the rule long accepted by the courts that ‘the right of parents to the
custody of their minor children is one of the natural rights incident to parenthood, a right
supported by law and sound public policy.  The right is an inherent one, which is not created by
the state or decisions of the courts, but derives from the nature of the parental relationship.
Petitioner’s claim to be the guardian of said minor can only be realized by way of substitute
parental authority pursuant to Article 214 of the Family Code which states that in case of death,
absence or unsuitability of the parents, substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the
surviving grandparent. The ruling in Santos, Sr. v. Court of Appeals is reiterated herein that the
law vests on the father and mother joint parental authority over the persons of their common
children.  In case of absence or death of either parent, the parent present shall continue exercising
parental authority.  Only in case of the parents’ death, absence or unsuitability may substitute
parental authority be exercised by the surviving grandparent. Hence, actual custody of and
exercising parental authority over minor Vincent is vested on the natural mother.

FOUZIY ALI BONDAGJY v. SABRINA ARTADI

G.R. No. 140817 December 7, 2001

FACTS:         

Petitioner Fouziy Ali Bondagjy and respondent Sabrina Artadi were married according to Islamic
Law. Unfortunately, the marital union turned sour after a few years. On the ground of neglect or
failure to provide support for her and the family, the Artadi filed a complaint for divorce by
faskh before the Third Sharia Circuit Court at Isabela, Basilan which was dismissed since
 P a g e | 566

the grounds by which she relied upon do not exist and that she does not reside in Zamboanga
City. It was also counter argued he does not neglect his wife and children, these are but
allegations without evidence to support such claims. After almost two years, the Artadi filed for
declaration of nullity of marriage, custody and support before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Muntinlupa City. The petition was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the parties since they
were Muslims at the time of the marriage, hence, regular courts cannot acquire jurisdiction and
on basis of res judicata because of the previous dismissal by Sharia Court. Subsequently, Artadi
again filed for divorce by faskh before the Second Sharia Circuit Court at Marawi City
for neglect and failure of the Bondagjy to provide support and to perform his martial obligations
which was dismissed on the ground of res judicata and failure to comply with the rule on forum
shopping. Artadi appealed to the Fourth Sharia Judicial District Courtof Marawi City which
ruled that res judicata does not apply in the case at bar since the Artadi offered new evidences to
prove that she is indeed entitled to divorce, hence it remanded the case to the Second
Sharia Circuit Court for hearing on the merits.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the doctrine of res judicata is applicable to the case.

HELD:

For res judicata to bar the institution of a subsequent action, the following requisites must
concur: (1) the former judgment or order must be final; (2) the judgment or order must be on
the merits; (3) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter
and parties; and (4) there must be, as between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of
subject matter, and of causes of action. The test of identity of causes of action lies not in the
form of an action but on whether the same evidence would support and establish the former and
present causes of action. If the same evidence would sustain both actions, they are considered the
same and covered by the rule that the judgment in the former is a barto the subsequent action. It
is with respect to the presence of the fourth requisite that the Court finds no such identity of
causes of action. The causes of action are based on different periods during which Bondagjy
allegedly neglected or failed to support his family and perform his marital obligations.

SAGALA-ESLAO v. CA
G.R. No. 116773 January 16, 1997

FACTS:

Maria Paz Cordero-Ouye and Reynaldo Eslao were married of whom two children were
begotten, namely, Leslie and Angelica Eslao. Leslie was entrusted to the care and custody of
Maria, while Angelica stayed with the husband’s mother, Teresita. When Reynaldo died, Maria
intended to bring Angelica with her to Pampanga but Teresita prevailed upon her to entrust the
custody of Angelica to her, she reasoned out that her son just died and to assuage her grief
 P a g e | 567

therefor, she needed the company of the child to at least compensate for the loss of her late
son.  Maria got married to certain Dr. James Ouye and migrated to San Francisco, California,
USA, joining her new husband. Maria then returned to the Philippines to be reunited with her
children and bring them to the United States; she then informed Teresita about her desire to take
custody of Angelica and explained that her present husband expressed his willingness to adopt
Leslie and Angelica and to provide for their support and education. However, Teresita resisted
the idea by way of explaining that the child was entrusted to her when she was ten days old and
accused Maria of having abandoned Angelica.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the mother have the right to the custody of her daughter.

HELD:

The court reiterated its ruling in Santos, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, that parental authority is a mass
of rights and obligations which the law grants to parents for the purpose of the children’s
physical preservation and development, as well as the cultivation of their intellect and the
education of their heart and senses. As regards parental authority, ‘there is no power, but a task;
no complex of rights, but a sum of duties; no sovereignty but a sacred trust for the welfare of the
minor. Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred
or renounced except in cases authorized by law. The right attached to parental authority, being
purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption,
guardianship and surrender to a children’s home or an orphan institution. When a parent entrusts
the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is
given is merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental
authority. Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the same.
Thus, in the instant petition, when private respondent entrusted the custody of her minor child to
the petitioner, what she gave to the latter was merely temporary custody and it did not constitute
abandonment or renunciation of parental authority.  For the right attached to parental authority,
being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption,
guardianship and surrender to a children’s home or an orphan institution which do not appear in
the case at bar.

Of considerable importance is the rule long accepted by the courts that the right of parents to the
custody of their minor children is one of the natural rights incident to parenthood, a right
supported by law and sound public policy.  The right is an inherent one, which is not created by
the state or decisions of the courts, but derives from the nature of the parental relationship.
 P a g e | 568

SOMBONG v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 111876 January 31, 1996

FACTS:

Petitioner was the mother of Arabella O. Sombong who was born on April 23, 1987 in Taguig,
Metro Manila. Sometime in November, 1987, Arabella, then only six months old, was brought to
the Sir John Clinic, owned by Ty located at Caloocan City, for treatment. Petitioner did not have
enough money to pay the hospital bill in the balance of P300.00. Arabella could not be
discharged as a result. Petitioner said that she paid 1,700 for the release even if the bill was only
300. The spouses Ty, who had custody of the daughter, would not give Arabella to her.
 P a g e | 569

Petitioner filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for the issuance of a Writ
of Habeas Corpus against the spouses Ty. She alleged that Arabella was being unlawfully
detained and imprisoned at the Ty residence. The petition was denied due course and summarily
dismissed, without prejudice, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction given that the detention was in
Caloocan.

Ty claimed that Arabella was with them for some time, but given to someone who claimed to be
their guardian.The Office of the City Prosecutor of Kalookan City, on the basis of petitioner‘s
complaint, filed an information against the spouses Ty for Kidnapping and Illegal Detention of a
Minor before the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City. Ty then revealed that the child may be
found in quezon city. When Sombong reached the residence, a small girl named Christina Grace
Neri was found. Sombong claimed the child to be hers even if she wasn‘t entirely sure that it was
Arabella.

On October 13, 1992, petitioner filed a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus with
the Regional Trial Court. The court ruled in Sombong‘s favor and ordered the respondents to
deliver the child. The Appellate Court took cognizance of the following issues raised by
respondent: (1) The propriety of the habeas corpus proceeding vis-a-vis the problem respecting
the identity of the child subject of said proceeding; (2) If indeed petitioner be the mother of the
child in question, what the effect would proof of abandonment be under the circumstances of the
case; and (3) Will the question of the child‘s welfare be the paramount consideration in this case
which involves child custody.

The RTC decision was reversed. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not habeas corpus is the proper remedy for taking back Arabella?

RULING:

Yes but the requisites are not met. In general, the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to
determine whether or not a particular person is legally held. A prime specification of an
application for a writ of habeas corpus, in fact, is an actual and effective, and not merely nominal
or moral, illegal restraint of liberty. ―The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a
speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only
sufficient defense of personal freedom. A prime specification of an application for a writ of
habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus
is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to
relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom
of action is sufficient.

To justify the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the restraint of liberty must be in the nature of
an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. This is the basic requisite under the
first part of Section 1, Rule 102, of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides that ―except as
 P a g e | 570

otherwise expressly provided by law, the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty.‖
In the second part of the same provision, however, Habeas Corpus may be resorted to in cases
where ―the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.‖ Thus,
although the Writ of Habeas Corpus ought not to be issued if the restraint is voluntary, we have
held time and again that the said writ is the proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain the
custody of a minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a third person of her own free will.
It may even be said that in custody cases involving minors, the question of illegal and
involuntary restraint of liberty is not the underlying rationale for the availability of the writ as a
remedy; rather, the writ of habeas corpus is prosecuted for the purpose of determining the right
of custody over a child.

The foregoing principles considered, the grant of the writ in the instant case will all depend on
the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) that the petitioner has the right of custody over
the minor; (2) that the rightful custody of the minor is being withheld from the petitioner by the
respondent; and (3) that it is to the best interest of the minor concerned to be in the custody of
petitioner and not that of the respondent.
Petition is dismissed.

GAMBOA-HIRSCH v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 174485 July 11, 2007

FACTS:

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 which seeks to set aside the decision of the CA
which granted private respondent Franklin joint custody with petitioner Agnes of their minor
daughter Simone.

Spouses Franklin and Agnes started to have marital problems as Agnes wanted to stay in Makati
City, while Franklin insisted that they stay in Boracay Island. When Agnes came to their
 P a g e | 571

conjugal home in Boracay, and asked for money and for Franklin‘s permission for her to bring
their daughter to Makati City for a brief vacation she has an intention not to come back to
Boracay.

Franklin then filed a petition for habeas corpus before the CA for Agnes to produce Simone in
court; CA issued a Resolution which ordered that a writ of habeas corpus be issued ordering that
Simone be brought before said court. CA granted Franklin joint custody with Agnes of their
minor child. Agnes filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion when it granted joint custody in utter
disregard of the provisions of the Family Code, as to minors seven (7) years of age and below.

RULING:

The court held that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it granted joint custody of
the minor child to both parents. The so-called "tender-age presumption" under Article 213 of the
Family Code may be overcome only by compelling evidence of the mother‘s unfitness. The
mother is declared unsuitable to have custody of her children in one or more of the following
instances: neglect, abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug
addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity, or affliction with a communicable disease. Here,
the mother was not shown to be unsuitable or grossly incapable of caring for her minor child. All
told, no compelling reason has been adduced to wrench the child from the mother‘s custody.
Sole custody over Simone Noelle Hirsch is hereby AWARDED to the mother, petitioner Agnes
Gamboa-Hirsch.

PABLO-GUALBERTO v. GUALBERTO
G.R. No. 154994 June 28, 2005

FACTS:

Crisanto Rafaelito G. Gualberto V filed before the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Joycelyn w/ an ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite of their almost 4 year old
son, Rafaello, whom her wife took away w/ her from their conjugal home and his school when
she left him.
 P a g e | 572

The RTC granted the ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite, since the wife failed to appear
despite notice. A house helper of the spouses testified that the mother does not care for the child
as she very often goes out of the house and even saw her slapping the child. Another witness
testified that after surveillance he found out that the wife is having lesbian relations.

The judge issued the assailed order reversing her previous order, and this time awarded the
custody of the child to the mother. Finding that the reason stated by Crisanto not to be a
compelling reason as provided in Art 213 of the Family Code.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the custody of the minor child should be awarded to the mother.

RULING:

Article 213 of the Family Code provided: ―Art 213. In case of separation of parents parental
authority shall be exercised by the parent des granted by the court. The court shall take into
account all relevant consideration, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age,
unless the parent chosen is unfit.No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the
mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. This Court has held that
when the parents separated, legally or otherwise, the foregoing provision governs the custody of
their child. Article 213 takes its bearing from Article 363 of the Civil Code, which reads: ―Art
363. In all question on the care, custody, education and property of children, the latter welfare
shall be paramount. No mother shall be separated from her child under seven years of age, unless
the court finds compelling reason for such measure.

SANTOS v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 113054 March 16, 1995

FACTS:

Petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr., an army lieutenant, and Julia Bedia a nurse by profession, were
married in Iloilo City in 1986. Their union beget only one child, Leouel Santos, Jr. who was born
July 18, 1987. From the time the boy was released from the hospital until sometime thereafter, he
had been in the care and custody of his maternal grandparents, private respondents herein,
Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia.
 P a g e | 573

On September 2, 1990, petitioner along with his two brothers, visited the Bedia household,
where three-year old Leouel Jr. was staying. Private respondents contend that through deceit and
false pretensions, petitioner abducted the boy and clandestinely spirited him away to his
hometown in Bacong, Negros Oriental.

The spouses Bedia then filed a "Petition for Care, Custody and Control of Minor Ward Leouel
Santos Jr.," before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, with Santos, Sr. as respondent. After
an ex-parte hearing on October 8, 1990, the trial court issued an order on the same day awarding
custody of the child Leouel Santos, Jr. to his grandparents, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia. Petitioner
appealed this Order to the Court of Appeals. In its decision dated April 30, 1992, respondent
appellate court affirmed the trial court's order.

Petitioner assails the decisions of both the trial court and the appellate court to award custody of
his minor son to his parents-in-law, the Bedia spouses on the ground that under Art. 214 of the
Family Code, substitute parental authority of the grandparents is proper only when both parents
are dead, absent or unsuitable. Petitioner's unfitness, according to him, has not been successfully
shown by private respondents.

ISSUE:

Who should properly be awarded custody of the minor Leouel Santos, Jr.

RULING:

The minor should be given to the legitimate father. When a parent entrusts the custody of a
minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely
temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Only in case of
the parents' death, absence or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by the
surviving grandparent.

The court held the contentions of the grandparents are insufficient as to remove petitioner's
parental authority and the concomitant right to have custody over the minor. Private respondents'
demonstrated love and affection for the boy, notwithstanding, the legitimate father is still
preferred over the grandparents.

The latter's wealth is not a deciding factor, particularly because there is no proof that at the
present time, petitioner is in no position to support the boy. While petitioner's previous
inattention is inexcusable, it cannot be construed as abandonment. His appeal of the unfavorable
decision against him and his efforts to keep his only child in his custody may be regarded as
serious efforts to rectify his past misdeeds. To award him custody would help enhance the bond
between parent and son. The Court also held that his being a soldier is likewise no bar to
allowing him custody over the boy. So many men in uniform, who are assigned to different parts
of the country in the service of the nation, are still the natural guardians of their children. Also,
petitioner's employment of trickery in spiriting away his boy from his in-laws, though
unjustifiable, is likewise not a ground to wrest custody from him.
 P a g e | 574

DAVID v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 111180 November 16, 1995

FACTS:

Petitioner Daisie T. David worked as secretary of private respondent Ramon R. Villar, a

businessman in Angeles City. Private respondent is a married man and the father of four
children, all grown-up. After a while, the relationship between petitioner and private respondent
developed into an intimate one, as a r esult of which a son, Christopher J., was born on March 9,
 P a g e | 575

1985 to them. Christo pher J. was followed by two more children, both girls, namely Christine,
born on June 9, 1986, and Cathy Mae on April 24, 1988.

The relationship became known to private respondent's wife when Daisie took Christopher J, to
Villar's house at Villa Teresa in Angeles City sometime in 1986 and introduced him to Villar's
legal wife. After this, the children of Daisie were freely brought by Villar to his house as they
were eventually accepted by his legal family.In the summer of 1991, Villar asked Daisie to allow
Christopher J., then six years of age, to go with his family to Boracay. Daisie agreed, but after th
e trip, Villar refused to give back the child. Villar said he had enrolled Christopher J. at the Holy
Family Academy for the next school year. On July 30, 1991, Daisie filed a petition for habeas
corpus on behalf of Christopher J.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Daisie is entitled to the custody of the child.

RULING:

Yes. Daisie in turn filed this petition for review of the appellate court's decision. Rule 102, §1 of
the Rules of Court provides that "the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which any person is d eprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful
custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto." It is indeed true, as the Court
of Appeals observed, that the determination of the right to the custody of minor children is
relevant in cases where the parents, who are married to each other, are for some reason separated
from each other. It does not follow, however, that it cannot arise in any other situation. For
example, in the case of Salvaña v. Gaela, it was held that the writ of habeas corpus is the proper
remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a minor daughter even though the latter be in
the custody of a third person of her free will because the parents were compelling her to marry a
man against her will.

In the case at bar, Christopher J. is an illegitimate child since at the time of his conception, his
father, private respondent Ramon R. Villar, was married to another woman other than the child's
mother. As such, pursuant to Art. 176 of the Family Code, Christopher J. is under the parental
authority of his mother, the herein petitioner, who, as a consequence of such authority, is entitled
to have custody of him. 2 Since, admittedly, petitioner has been deprived of her rightful custody
of her child by private respondent, she is entitled to issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.

Indeed, Rule 1021 §1 makes no distinction between the case of a mother who is separated from
her husband and is entitled to the custody of her child and that of a mother of an illegitimate
child who, by law, is vested with sole parental authority, but is deprived of her rightful custody
of her child.

The fact that private respondent has recognized the minor child may be a ground for ordering
him to give support to the latter, but not for giving him custody of the child. Under Art.213 of the
Family Code, "no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the
court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise."
 P a g e | 576

Although the question of support is proper in a proceeding for that purpose, the grant of support
in this case is justified by the fact that private respondent has expressed willingness to support
the minor child. The order for payment of allowance need not be conditioned on the grant to him
of custody of the child. Under Art. 204 of the Family Code, a person obliged to give support can
fulfill his obligation either by paying the allowance fixed by the court or by receiving and
maintaining in the family dwelling the person who is entitled to support unless, in the latter case,
there is "a moral or legal obstacle thereto."

In the case at bar, as has already been pointed out, Christopher J., being less than seven years of
age at least at the time the case was decided by the RTC, cannot be taken from the mother's
custody. Even now that the child is over seven years of age, the mother's custody over him will
have to be upheld because the child categorically expressed preference to live with his mother.
Under Art. 213 of the Family Code, courts must respect the "choice of the child over seven years
of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit" and here it has not been shown that the mother is in any
way unfit to have custody of her child. Indeed, ifprivate respondent loves his child, he should not
condition the grant of support for him on the award of his custody to him (private respondent).

ESPIRITU v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 115640 March 15, 1995

FACTS:

Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and respondent Teresita Masauding first met in Iligan City where
Reynaldo was employed by the National Steel Corporation and Teresita was employed as a nurse
in a local hospital. Teresita left for Los Angeles, California to work as a nurse. Reynaldo was
sent by his employer, the National Steel Corporation, to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania as its liaison
 P a g e | 577

officer and Reynaldo and Teresita then began to maintain a common law relationship of husband
and wife. On 1986, their daughter, Rosalind Therese, was born. While they were on a brief
vacation in the Philippines, Reynaldo and Teresita got married, and upon their return to the
United States, their second child, a son, this time, and given the name Reginald Vince, was born
on 1988.

The relationship of the couple deteriorated until they decided to separate. Instead of giving their
marriage a second chance as allegedly pleaded by Reynaldo, Teresita left Reynaldo and the
children and went back to California. Reynaldo brought his children home to the Philippines, but
because his assignment in Pittsburgh was not yet completed, he was sent back by his company to
Pittsburgh. He had to leave his children with his sister, Guillerma Layug and her family.

Teresita, meanwhile, decided to return to the Philippines and filed the petition for a writ of
habeas corpus against herein two petitioners to gain custody over the children, thus starting the
whole proceedings now reaching this Court. The trial court dismissed the petition for habeas
corpus. It suspended Teresita's parental authority over Rosalind and Reginald and declared
Reynaldo to have sole parental authority over them but with rights of visitation to be agreed upon
by the parties and to be approved by the Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petition for a writ of habeas corpus to gain custody over the children be
granted.

RULING:

Supreme Court dismissed the writ of habeas corpus petition by the mother and retain the custody
of the children to the father. The illicit or immoral activities of the mother had already caused
emotional disturbances, personality conflicts, and exposure to conflicting moral values against
the children. The children are now both over seven years old. Their choice of the parent with
whom they prefer to stay is clear from the record. From all indications, Reynaldo is a fit person.
The children understand the unfortunate shortcomings of their mother and have been affected in
their emotional growth by her behavior.

PEREZ v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R.No. 118870 March 29, 1996

FACTS:

Ray Perez is a doctor practicing in Cebu while Nerissa, his wife, (petitioner) is a registered
nurse. After six miscarriages, two operations and a high-risk pregnancy, Nerissa finally gave
birth to Ray Perez II in New York on July 20, 1992. Ray stayed with her in the U.S. twice and
 P a g e | 578

took care of her when she became pregnant. Unlike his wife, however, he had only a tourist visa
and was not employed.

On January 17, 1993, the couple and their baby arrived in Cebu. After a few weeks, only Nerissa
returned to the U.S. She alleged that they came home only for a five-week vacation and that they
all had round-trip tickets. However, her husband stayed behind to take care of his sick mother
and promised to follow her with the baby. According to Ray, they had agreed to reside
permanently in the Philippines but once Nerissa was in New York, she changed her mind and
continued working. She was supposed to come back immediately after winding up her affairs
there.

When Nerissa came home a few days before Ray II‘s first birthday, the couple was no longer on
good terms. They had quarrels. Nerissa did not want to live near her in-laws and rely solely on
her husband‘s meager income of P5,000.00. On the other hand, Ray wanted to stay here, where
he could raise his son even as he practiced his profession. He maintained that it would not be
difficult to live here since they have their own home and a car. Despite mediation by the priest,
the couple failed to reconcile.

Nerissa filed a petition to surrender the custody of their son to her. The trial court issued an
Order awarding custody to Nerissa citing the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family
Code which provides that no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother,
unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. Upon appeal by Ray Perez, the
Court of Appeals reversed the trial court‘s order and held that granting custody to the boy‘s
father would be for the child‘s best interest and welfare.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Nerissa has rightful custody of a child?

RULING:

Yes. Aside from Article 213 of the Family Code, the Revised Rules of Court also contains a
similar provision. Rule 99, Section 6 (Adoption and Custody of Minors) provides: ―SEC. 6.
Proceedings as to child whose parents are separated.Appeal. - When husband and wife are
divorced or living separately and apart from each other, and the questions as to the care, custody,
and control of a child or children of their marriage is brought before a Court of First Instance by
petition or as an incident to any other proceeding, the court, upon hearing the testimony as may
be pertinent, shall award the care, custody, and control of each such child as will be for its best
interest, permitting the child to choose which parent it prefers to live with if it be over ten years
of age, unless the parent chosen be unfit to take charge of the child by reason of moral depravity,
habitual drunkenness, incapacity, or poverty x x x. No child under seven years of age shall be
separated from its mother, unless the court finds there are compelling reasons therefor.

The provisions of law quoted above clearly mandate that a child under seven years of age shall
not be separated from his mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.
 P a g e | 579

The use of the word ―shall‖ in Article 213 of the Family Code and Rule 99, Section 6 of the
Revised Rules of Court connotes a mandatory character.

The general rule that a child under seven years of age shall not be separated from his mother
finds its reason in the basic need of a child for his mother‘s loving care. Only the most
compelling of reasons shall justify the court‘s awarding the custody of such a child to someone
other than his mother, such as her unfitness to exercise sole parental authority. In the past the
following grounds have been considered ample justification to deprive a mother of custody and
parental authority: neglect, abandonment, unemployment and immorality, habitual drunkenness,
drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity and being sick with a communicable disease.

It has long been settled that in custody cases, the foremost consideration is always the welfare
and best interest of the child. In fact, no less than an international instrument, the Convention on
the Rights of the Child provides: ―In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by
public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative
bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.

In the case, financial capacity is not a determinative factor inasmuch as both parties have
demonstrated that they have ample means. Nerissa‘s present work schedule is not so
unmanageable as to deprive her of quality time with her son. Quite a number of working mothers
who are away from home for longer periods of time are still able to raise a family well, applying
time management principles judiciously. Also, delegating child care temporarily to qualified
persons who run day-care centers does not detract from being a good mother, as long as the latter
exercises supervision, for even in our culture, children are often brought up by housemaids under
the eagle eyes of the mother.

Although Ray‘s is a general practitioner, the records show that he maintains a clinic, works for
several companies on retainer basis and teaches part-time. He cannot possibly give the love and
care that a mother gives to his child.

DACASIN v. DACASIN
G.R. No. 168785 February 5, 2010

FACTS:
 
Petitioner Herald Dacasin (petitioner), American, and respondent Sharon Del Mundo Dacasin
(respondent), Filipino, were married in Manila in April 1994. They have one daughter,
 P a g e | 580

Stephanie, born on 21 September 1995. In June 1999, respondent sought and obtained from the
Circuit Court, 19th Judicial Circuit, Lake County, Illinois (Illinois court) a divorce decree against
petitioner. In its ruling, the Illinois court dissolved the marriage of petitioner and respondent,
awarded to respondent sole custody of Stephanie and retained jurisdiction over the case for
enforcement purposes.
 
On 28 January 2002, petitioner and respondent executed in Manila a contract (Agreement) for
the joint custody of Stephanie. The parties chose Philippine courts as exclusive forum to
adjudicate disputes arising from the Agreement. Respondent undertook to obtain from the
Illinois court an order relinquishing jurisdiction to Philippine courts.
 
In 2004, petitioner sued respondent in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 60 (trial
court) to enforce the Agreement. Petitioner alleged that in violation of the Agreement,
respondent exercised sole custody over Stephanie.
 
Respondent sought the dismissal of the complaint for, among others, lack of jurisdiction because
of the Illinois courts retention of jurisdiction to enforce the divorce decree.
 
ISSUE:
 
Whether the trial court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of petitioners suit and enforce the
Agreement on the joint custody of the parties child.

RULING:

At the time the parties executed the Agreement on 28 January 2002, two facts are undisputed:
(1) Stephanie was under seven years old (having been born on 21 September 1995); and (2)
petitioner and respondent were no longer married under the laws of the United States because of
the divorce decree. The relevant Philippine law on child custody for spouses separated in fact or
in law (under the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code) is also undisputed: no
child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother x x x. (This statutory awarding
of sole parental custody to the mother is mandatory, grounded on sound policy consideration,
subject only to a narrow exception not alleged to obtain here.) Clearly then, the Agreements
object to establish a post-divorce joint custody regime between respondent and petitioner over
their child under seven years old contravenes Philippine law.

The Agreement is not only void ab initio for being contrary to law, it has also been repudiated by
the mother when she refused to allow joint custody by the father. The Agreement would be valid
if the spouses have not divorced or separated because the law provides for joint parental
authority when spouses live together. However, upon separation of the spouses, the mother takes
sole custody under the law if the child is below seven years old and any agreement to the
contrary is void. Thus, the law suspends the joint custody regime for (1) children under seven of
(2) separated or divorced spouses. Simply put, for a child within this age bracket (and for
commonsensical reasons), the law decides for the separated or divorced parents how best to take
care of the child and that is to give custody to the separated mother. Indeed, the separated parents
cannot contract away the provision in the Family Code on the maternal custody of children
 P a g e | 581

below seven years any more than they can privately agree that a mother who is unemployed,
immoral, habitually drunk, drug addict, insane or afflicted with a communicable disease will
have sole custody of a child under seven as these are reasons deemed compelling to preclude the
application of the exclusive maternal custody regime under the second paragraph of Article 213.

Further, the imposed custodial regime under the second paragraph of Article 213 is limited in
duration, lasting only until the child’s seventh year. From the eighth year until the child’s
emancipation, the law gives the separated parents freedom, subject to the usual contractual
limitations, to agree on custody regimes they see fit to adopt. Lastly, even supposing that
petitioner and respondent are not barred from entering into the Agreement for the joint custody
of Stephanie, respondent repudiated the Agreement by asserting sole custody over Stephanie.
Respondents act effectively brought the parties back to ambit of the default custodial regime in
the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code vesting on respondent sole custody of
Stephanie.

CARAVAN TRAVEL v. ERMILINDA R. ABEJAR

G.R. No. 170631 February 10, 2016

FACTS:

On July 13, 2000, Jesmariane R. Reyes (Reyes) was walking along the west-bound lane of
Sampaguita Street, United Parañaque Subdivision IV, Parañaque City. A Mitsubishi L-300 van
 P a g e | 582

with plate number PKM 195 was travelling along the east-bound lane, opposite Reyes. To avoid
an incoming vehicle, the van swerved to its left and hit Reyes. Alex Espinosa (Espinosa), a
witness to the accident, went to her aid and loaded her in the back of the van. Espinosa told the
driver of the van, Jimmy Bautista (Bautista), to bring Reyes to the hospital. Instead of doing so,
Bautista appeared to have left the van parked inside a nearby subdivision with Reyes still in the
van. Fortunately for Reyes, an unidentified civilian came to help and drove Reyes to the hospital.

Respondent Ermilinda R. Abejar (Abejar), Reyes' paternal aunt and the person who raised her
since she was nine (9) years old, filed before the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque a
Complaint for damages against Bautista and Caravan. In her Complaint, Abejar alleged that
Bautista was an employee of Caravan and that Caravan is the registered owner of the van that hit
Reyes.

Caravan argues that Abejar has no personality to bring this suit because she is not a real party in
interest. According to Caravan, Abejar does not exercise legal or substitute parental authority.
She is also not the judicially appointed guardian or the only living relative of the deceased. She is
also not "the executor or administrator of the estate of the deceased." According to Caravan, only
the victim herself or her heirs can enforce an action based on culpa aquiliana such as Abejar's
action for damages.

Abejar counters that Caravan failed to provide proof that it exercised the requisite diligence in
the selection and supervision of Bautista. She adds that the Court of Appeals' ruling that Caravan
is solidarily liable with Bautista for moral damages, exemplary damages, civil indemnity ex
delicto, and attorney's fees should be upheld. Abejar argues that since Caravan is the registered
owner of the van, it is directly, primarily, and solidarity liable for the tortious acts of its driver.

ISSUE:

Whether respondent Ermilinda R. Abejar is a real party in interest who may bring an action for
damages against petitioner Caravan Travel and Tours International, Inc. on account of
Jesmariane R. Reyes' death

RULING:

Having exercised substitute parental authority, respondent suffered actual loss and is, thus, a real
party in interest in this case.
Article 216 of the Family Code identifies the persons who exercise substitute parental authority:

Art. 216. In default of parents or a judicially appointed guardian, the following persons
shall exercise substitute parental authority over the child in the order indicated:

(1) The surviving grandparent, as provided in Art. 214;

(2) The oldest brother or sister, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified;
and
(3) The child's actual custodian, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or
disqualified.
 P a g e | 583

Whenever the appointment or a judicial guardian over the property of the child becomes
necessary, the same order of preference shall be observed.

Article 233 of the Family Code provides for the extent of authority of persons exercising
substitute parental authority, that is, the same as those of actual parents:
Art. 233. The person exercising substitute parental authority shall have the same authority over
the person of the child as the parents.

Both of Reyes' parents are already deceased. Reyes' paternal grandparents are also both
deceased. The whereabouts of Reyes' maternal grandparents are unknown. There is also no
record that Reyes has brothers or sisters. It was under these circumstances that respondent took
custody of Reyes when she was a child, assumed the role of Reyes' parents, and thus, exercised
substitute parental authority over her. As Reyes' custodian, respondent exercised the full extent
of the statutorily recognized rights and duties of a parent. Consistent with Article 220 of the
Family Code, respondent supported Reyes' education and provided for her personal needs. To
echo respondent's words in her Complaint, she treated Reyes as if she were her own daughter.

We note that Reyes was already 18 years old when she died. Having reached the age of majority,
she was already emancipated upon her death. While parental authority is terminated upon
emancipation, respondent continued to support and care for Reyes even after she turned
18. Except for the legal technicality of Reyes' emancipation, her relationship with respondent
remained the same. The anguish and damage caused to respondent by Reyes' death was no
different because of Reyes' emancipation.

LIBI v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

G.R.NO. 70890 September 18, 1992

FACTS:

On January 14, 1979, Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi died, each from a single gunshot
wound from a revolver licensed in the name of petitioner Cresencio Libi. The respondents,
parents of Julie Ann, filed a case against the parents of Wendell to recover damages arising from
the latter‘s vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The trial court dismissed the
 P a g e | 584

complaint. On appeal, the IAC set aside the judgment of the lower court dismissing the
complaint of Julie Ann‘s parents.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Article 2180 of the Civil Code was correctly interpreted by the respondent Court
to make petitioners liable for vicarious liability.

RULING:

Yes. The petitioners were gravely remiss in their duties as parents in not diligently supervising
the activities of their son. Both parents were wanting in their duty and responsibility in
monitoring and knowing the activities of their son. The petitioners utterly failed to exercise all
the diligence of a good father of a family in preventing their son from committing the crime by
means of the gun which was freely accessible to Wendell Libi because they have not regularly
checked whether the gun was still under lock, but learned that it was missing from the safety
deposit box only after the crime had been committed. The civil liability of parents for quasi-
delicts of their minor children, as contemplated in Article 2180, is primary and not subsidiary.

TAMARGO v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 85044 June 3, 1992

FACTS:

Domestic Adoption Act of 1998; Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of age, shot
Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her death. Accordingly, a
civil complaint for damages was filed with the RTC of Ilocos Sur by petitioner Macario
Tamargo, Jennifer's adopting parent and petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo,
 P a g e | 585

Jennifer's natural parents against respondent spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's
natural parents with whom he was living at the time of the tragic incident.

Prior to the incident, the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt the
minor Adelberto Bundoc in Special Proceedings before the then CIF of Ilocos Sur. This petition
for adoption was granted that is, after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer. Respondent
spouses Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents, reciting the result of the foregoing petition for
adoption, claimed that not they, but rather the adopting parents, namely the spouses Sabas and
Felisa Rapisura, were indispensable parties to the action since parental authority had shifted to
the adopting parents from the moment the successful petition for adoption was filed.

Petitioners in their reply contended that since Adelberto Bundoc was then actually living with his
natural parents, parental authority had not ceased nor been relinquished by the mere filing and
granting of a petition for adoption. The trial court dismissed petitioners' complaint, ruling that
respondent natural parents of Adelberto indeed were not indispensable parties to the action.

ISSUES:

a) Whether or not petitioners, notwithstanding loss of their right to appeal, may still file
the instant petition.
b) Whether the Court may still take cognizance of the case even through petitioners'
appeal had been filed out of time.

RULING:

Supreme Court granted the petition. Retroactive affect may perhaps be given to the granting of
the petition for adoption where such is essential to permit the accrual of some benefit or
advantage in favor of the adopted child. In the instant case, however, to hold that parental
authority had been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with
liability for a tortious act that they could not have foreseen and which they could not have
prevented would be unfair and unconscionable.

Parental liability is a natural or logical consequence of duties and responsibilities of parents, their
parental authority which includes instructing, controlling and disciplining the child. In the case at
bar, during the shooting incident, parental authority over Adelberto was still lodged with the
natural parents. It follows that they are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages. Parents
and guardians are responsible for the damage caused by the child under their parental authority
in accordance with the Civil Code.
 P a g e | 586

AQUINAS SCHOOL v. INTON

G.R. No. 184202 January 26, 2011

FACTS:

This case is about the private school‘s liability for the outside catechist‘s act of shoving a student
and kicking him on the legs when he disobeyed her instruction to remain in his seat and not
move around the classroom. In 1998, Jose Luis Inton (Jose Luis) was a grade three student at
Aquinas School (Aquinas). Respondent Sister Margarita Yamyamin (Yamyamin), a religion
teacher who began teaching at that school only in June of that year, taught Jose Luis‘ grade three
 P a g e | 587

religion class. Jose Luis left his seat and went over to a classmate to play a joke of surprising
him. Yamyamin noticed this and sent him back to his seat. After a while, Jose Luis got up again
and went over to the same classmate. Yamyamin approached the Jose Luis and kicked him on
the legs several times. She also pulled and shoved his head on the classmate‘s seat. She also
made the child copy the notes on the blackboard while seating on the floor. Respondents Jose
and Victoria Inton (the Intons) filed an action for damages on behalf of their son Jose Luis
against Yamyamin and Aquinas before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City in Civil
Case 67427. The Intons also filed a criminal action against Yamyamin for violation of Republic
Act 7610 to which she pleaded guilty and was sentenced accordingly. With regard to the action
for damages, the Intons sought to recover actual, moral, and exemplary damages, as well as
attorney‘s fees, for the hurt that Jose Luis and his mother Victoria suffered. The RTC dismissed
Victoria‘s personal claims but ruled in Jose Luis‘ favor, holding Yamyamin liable to him for
moral damages of P25,000.00, exemplary damages of P25,000.00, and attorney‘s fees of
P10,000.00 plus the costs of suit. They elevated the case to the CA to increase the award of
damages and hold Aquinas solidarily liable with Yamyamin.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA was correct in holding Aquinas solidarily liable with Yamyamin for the
damages awarded to Jose Luis.

RULING:

No. The school directress testified that Aquinas had an agreement with a congregation of sisters
under which, in order to fulfill its ministry, the congregation would send religion teachers to
Aquinas to provide catechesis to its students. Aquinas insists that it was not the school but
Yamyamin‘s religious congregation that chose her for the task of catechizing the school‘s grade
three students, much like the way bishops designate the catechists who would teach Religion in
public schools. Aquinas did not have control over Yamyamin‘s teaching methods. The Intons
had not refuted the school directress‘ testimony in this regard. Aquinas still had the responsibility
of taking steps to ensure that only qualified outside catechists are allowed to teach its young
students. In this regard, it cannot be said that Aquinas took no steps to avoid the occurrence of
improper conduct towards the students by their religion teacher. They showed records,
certificates and diploma that Yamyamin is qualified to teach. There is no question that she came
from a legitimate congregation of sisters. They provided Faculty Staff Manual in handling the
students. They pre-approved the content of the course she wanted to teach. They have a
classroom evaluation program for her unfortunately, she was new, therefore do not have
sufficient opportunity to observe her.
 P a g e | 588

ST. JOSEPH’S COLLEGE v. MIRANDA

G.R. No. 182353 June 29, 2010

FACTS:

While inside the premises of St. Joseph‘s College, the class where respondent Miranda belonged
was conducting a science experiment about fusion of sulfur powder andiron fillings under the
tutelage of Rosalinda Tabugo, she being the teacher and the employee, while the adviser is
Estafania Abdan. Tabugo left her class while it was doing the experiment without having
adequately secured it from any untoward incident or occurrence. In the middle of the experiment,
Jayson, who was the assistant leader of one of the class groups, checked the result of the
experiment by looking into the test tube with magnifying glass. The test tube was being held by
one of his group mates who moved it close and towards the eye of Jayson. At that instance, the
compound in the test tube spurted out and several particles of which hit Jayson‘s eye and the
different parts of the bodies of some of his group mates. As a result thereof, Jayson‘s eyes were
chemically burned, particularly his left eye, for which he had to undergo surgery and had to
spend for his medication. Upon filing of this case [in] the lower court, his wound had not
completely healed and still had to undergo another surgery. Upon learning of the incident and
because of the need for finances, [Jayson‘s] mother, who was working abroad, had to rush back
home for which she spent P36,070.00 for her fares and had to forego her salary from November
23, 1994 to December 26, 1994, in the amount of at least P40,000.00. Jason and his parents
suffered sleepless nights, mental anguish and wounded feelings as a result of his injury due to the
petitioner‘s fault and failure to exercise the degree of care and diligence incumbent upon each
one of them. Thus, they should be held liable for moral damages.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners were liable for the accident.

RULING:

Yes. As found by both lower courts, proximate cause of the Jason‘s injury was the concurrent
failure of petitioners to prevent to foreseeable mishap that occurred during the conduct of the
science experiment. Petitioners were negligent by failing to exercise the higher degree of care,
caution and foresight incumbent upon the school, its administrators and teachers. "The defense of
due diligence of a good father of a family raised by [petitioner] St. Joseph College will not
exculpate it from liability because it has been shown that it was guilty of inexcusable laxity in
the supervision of its teachers despite an apparent rigid screening process for hiring and in the
maintenance of what should have been a safe and secured environment for conducting dangerous
experiments. Petitioner school is still liable for the wrongful acts of the teachers and employees
because it had full information on the nature of dangerous science experiments but did not take
affirmative steps to avert damage and injury to students. Schools should not simply install safety
reminders and distribute safety instructional manuals. More importantly, schools should provide
protective gears and devices to shield students from expected risks and anticipated dangers.
 P a g e | 589

ST. MARY’S ACADEMY v. CARPITANOS

G.R. No. 143363 February 6, 2002

FACTS:

Defendant-appellant St. Mary‘s Academy of Dipolog City conducted an enrollment drive for the
school year 1995-1996. A facet of the enrollment campaign was the visitation of schools from
where prospective enrollees were studying. As a student of St. Mary‘s Academy, Sherwin
Carpitanos was part of the campaigning group. Accordingly, on the fateful day, Sherwin, along
with other high school students were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by defendant Vivencio
Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary School, Dapitan City. The jeep was driven by
James Daniel II then 15 years old and a student of the same school. Allegedly, the latter drove
the jeep in a reckless manner and as a result the jeep turned turtle. Sherwin Carpitanos died as a
result of the injuries he sustained from the accident. The parents of Sherwin filed a case against
James Daniel II and his parents, James Daniel Sr. and Guada Daniel, the vehicle owner,
Vivencio Villanueva and St. Mary‘s Academy before the RTC of Dipolog City and claimed for
damages.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner St. Mary‘s Academy is liable for damages for the death of
Sherwin Carpitanos.

RULING:

The Court held that for the school to be liable there must be a finding that the act or omission
considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because of negligence,
must have causal connection to the accident. There is no showing of such. Hence, with the
overwhelming evidence presented by petitioner and the respondent Daniel spouses that the
accident occurred because of the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, it is not the
school, but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the
death of Sherwin Carpitanos.
 P a g e | 590

AMADORA v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-47745 April 15, 1988

FACTS:

Like any prospective graduate, Alfredo Amadora was looking forward to the commencement
exercises where he would ascend the stage and in the presence of his relatives and friends receive
his high school diploma. As it turned out, though, fate would intervene and deny him that
awaited experience. While they were in the auditorium of their school, the Colegio de San Jose-
Recoletos, a classmate, Pablito Damon, fired a gun that mortally hit Alfredo, ending all his
expectations and his life as well. Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence.
Additionally, the herein petitioners, as the victim's parents, filed a civil action for damages under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code against the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector the high
school principal, the dean of boys, and the physics teacher, together with Daffon and two other
students, through their respective parents. The complaint against the students was later dropped.
After trial, the CIF of Cebu held the remaining defendants liable to the plaintiffs. On appeal to
the respondent court, however, the decision was reversed and all the defendants were completely
absolved.

ISSUE:

Whether or not teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for the death
of Alfredo Amadora.

RULING:

The Court has come to the conclusion that the provision in question (Art. 2180) should apply to
all schools, academic as well as non-academic. Following the canon of reddendo singular singuli,
where the school is academic, responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to
the teacher in charge of such student. This is the general rule. Reason: Old academic schools, the
heads just supervise the teachers who are the ones directly involved with the students. Where the
school is for arts and trades, it is the head and only he who shall be held liable as an exception to
the general rule. Reason: Old schools of arts and trades saw the masters or heads of the school
personally and directly instructed the apprentices. Therefore, the heads are not liable. The
teacher-in-charge is not also liable because there‘s no showing that he was negligent in enforcing
discipline against the accused or that he waived observance of the rules and regulations of the
school, or condoned their non-observance. Also, the fact that he wasn‘t present can‘t be
considered against him because he wasn‘t required to report on that day. Classes had already
ceased.
 P a g e | 591

SALVOSA v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

G.R. No. L-70458 October 5, 1998

FACTS:
Petitioners in this case were impleaded in the civil case for damages filed against Abon. Salvosa
being the (Executive Vice President of BCF).Jimmy Abon was a commerce student of the
Baguio Colleges Foundation. He was also appointed as armorer of the school‘s ROTC Unit. As
armorer of the ROTC Unit, Jimmy B. Abon received his appointment from the AFP. He received
orders from Captain Roberto C. Ungos, the Commandant of the Baguio Colleges Foundation
ROTC Unit, concurrent Commandant of other ROTC units in Baguio and an employee (officer)
of the AFP. On 3 March 1977, at around 8:00 p.m., in the parking space of BCF, Jimmy B. Abon
shot Napoleon Castro a student of the University of Baguio with an unlicensed firearm which the
former took from the armory of the ROTC Unit of the BCF. As a result, Napoleon Castro died
and Jimmy B. Abon was prosecuted for, and convicted of the crime of Homicide by Military
Commission No. 30, AFP.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners can be held solidarity liable with Jimmy B. Abon for damages under
Article2180 of the Civil Code, as a consequence of the tortious act of Jimmy B. Abon.

RULING:
Teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades are liable for "damages caused by their
pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody." The rationale of such
liability is that so long as the student remains in the custody of a teacher, the latter "stands, to a
certain extent, in loco parentis [as to the student] and [is]called upon to exercise reasonable
supervision over the conduct of the [student]." Likewise, "the phrase used in[Art. 2180 — 'so
long as (the students) remain in their custody means the protective and supervisory custody that
the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are
at attendance in the school , including recess time." In line with the case of Palisoc , a student not
"at attendance in the school" cannot be in "recess" thereat. A"recess," as the concept is embraced
in the phrase "at attendance in the school," contemplates a situation of temporary adjournment of
school activities where the student still remains within call of his mentor and is not permitted to
leave the school premises, or the area within which the school activity is conducted. Recess by
its nature does not include dismissal. Likewise, the mere fact of being enrolled or being in the
premises of a school without more does not constitute "attending school" or being in the
"protective and supervisory custody' of the school, as contemplated in the law. Upon the
foregoing considerations, we hold that Jimmy B. Abon cannot be considered to have been "at
attendance in the School," or in the custody of BCF, when he shot Napoleon Castro. Logically,
therefore, petitioners cannot under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code be held solidarity liable with
Jimmy B. Abon for damages resulting from his acts.
 P a g e | 592

PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 84698 February 4, 1992

FACTS:

Carlitos Bautista was a third year student at the Philippine School of Business Administration.
Assailants, who were not members of the school’s academic community, while in the premises
of PSBA, stabbed Bautista to death. This incident prompted his parents to file a suit against
PSBA and its corporate officers for damages due to their alleged negligence, recklessness and
lack of security precautions, means and methods before, during and after the attack on the victim.
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the compliant states no cause of action
against them based on quasi-delicts, as the said rule does not cover academic institutions. The
trial court denied the motion to dismiss. Their motion for reconsideration was likewise
dismissed, and was affirmed by the appellate court. Hence, the case was forwarded to the
Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not PSBA is liable for the death of the student.

RULING:

Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between the PSBA
and Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern. A perusal of Article 2176
shows that obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-contractual
obligations, arise only between parties not otherwise bound by contract, whether express or
implied. However, this impression has not prevented this Court from determining the existence
of a tort even when there obtains a contract. Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the
Civil Code, establishes the rule in in loco parentis. Article 2180 provides that the damage should
have been caused or inflicted by pupils or students of the educational institution sought to be
held liable for the acts of its pupils or students while in its custody. However, this material
situation does not exist in the present case for, as earlier indicated, the assailants of Carlitos were
not students of the PSBA, for whose acts the school could be made liable. But it does not
necessarily follow that PSBA is absolved form liability. When an academic institution accepts
students for enrollment, there is established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral
obligations which both parties is bound to comply with. For its part, the school undertakes to
provide the student with an education that would presumably suffice to equip him with the
necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a profession. This includes ensuring the
safety of the students while in the school premises. On the other hand, the student covenants to
abide by the school's academic requirements and observe its rules and regulations. Failing on its
contractual and implied duty to ensure the safety of their student, PSBA is therefore held liable
for his death. Petition denied.
 P a g e | 593

ST. LUKE’S COLLEGE OF MEDICINE-WILLIAM H. QUASHA MEMORIAL

FOUNDATION v. PEREZ
G.R. No. 222740 September 28, 2016

FACTS:

In February 2010, St. Luke's sent four (4) of its 4111 year medical students to the clinic, namely:
plaintiffs-appellants Spouses Perez's daughter Jessa, plaintiffs-appellants Spouses Quintos'
daughter Cecille, Jerillie Ann Murillo (Murillo) and Miguel Rafael Ramos (Ramos). They were
tasked to complete a four-week clerkship rotation at the clinic and like the previous batches,
ti1ey were housed in the second floor of the clinic.

According to Ramos, he and his groupmates reported for duty at the Cabiao clinic at
approximately 10 o'clock in the morning of February 8, 2010. When their shift ended at 5
o'clock that afternoon, the group went for atojog and returned the clinic at around 7 o'clock in
the evening. They went again out at 9 o'clock in the evening to buy beverages, cooking oil and
other items needed for their breakfast the next day and went to sleep sometime after midnight.
Ramos admitted that one of the beverages they bought was an alcoholic beverage called The
Bar, which consisted of either vodka or gin. He also admitted that only he and Cecille drank the
alcoholic beverage which they mixed with the soda and that they did not consume the whole
bottle.

Ramos was awakened sometime between 3 o'clock and 3:30 in the morning of February 9, 2010
when he heard Murillo shouting from the other side of the room that there was a fire. Ramos
immediately ran to the door which led to the living room and when he opened the same, he saw
thick smoke coming from the left portion of the living room where there was a glow. He also felt
extreme heat, prompting him to run to the bathroom to get a pail of water with which he tried to
extinguish the fire. The girls, who had followed him to the bathroom, stayed behind. When
Ramos' attempt to put out the fire proved to be futile, he went back to the bathroom and poured
water on the girls in an attempt to alleviate the extreme heat coming from the fire.

Unfortunately, the fire resulted in the deaths of the female medical students, including the
daughters of plaintiffs-appellants due to smoke inhalation resulting to asphyxia. As a result of
the deaths, defendant-appellee St. Luke's compensated the parents of the three deceased students
in the amount of PhP300,000.00 each from insurance proceeds.

The Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP) conducted an investigation on the incident, and in a
Certification dated April 18, 2011, it certified that the fire was "purely accidental in nature due
to unattended cooking,".

ISSUE:

Whether or not St. Luke’s is liable for the death of the students.

RULING:
 P a g e | 594

In the case at bar, it is well to remember that the victims were in the Cabiao Community Clinic
because it was a requirement of petitioners. The students were complying with an obligation
under the enrollment contract - they were rendering medical services in a community center as
required by petitioners. It was thus incumbent upon petitioners to comply with their own
obligations under the enrollment contract - to ensure that the community center where they
would designate their students is safe and secure, among others.

As correctly found by the CA, petitioners were remiss in inspecting the premises of the Cabiao
Community Clinic and in ensuring that the necessary permits were in order. These precautions
could have minimized the risk to the safety of the victims. The petitioners were obviously
negligent in detailing their students to a virtual fire trap. As found by the NBI, the Clinic was
unsafe and was constructed in violation of numerous provisions of the Revised Fire Code of the
Philippines. It had no emergency facilities, no fire exits, and had no permits or clearances from
the appropriate government offices. Petitioners additionally aver that the Clinic was built under
the direction, supervision, management and control of the Municipality of Cabiao, and that it
ensured that there was an agreement for the Municipality of Cabiao to provide 24-hour security
to the Clinic.

In the case at bar, it was amply shown that petitioners and the victims were bound by the
enrollment contracts, and that petitioners were negligent in complying with their obligation
under the said contracts to ensure the safety and security of their students. For this contractual
breach, petitioners should be held liable.

REMO v. SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

 P a g e | 595

G.R. No. 1629202 March 5, 2010

FACTS:

While her marriage with Francisco R. Rallonza was still subsisting, Maria Virginia V. Remo
applied to renew her passport which was about to expire on October 27, 2000. With her renewal
application is the request to revert to her maiden name. When her request was eventually denied,
she brought her request to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. The Secretary of Foreign Affairs also
denied her request, holding that while it is not obligatory for a married woman to use her
husband’s name, use of maiden name is allowed in passport application only if the married name
has not been used in previous application. The Secretary explained that under the implementing
rules of Republic Act No. 8239 or the Philippine Passport Act of 1996, a woman applicant may
revert to her maiden name only in cases of annulment of marriage, divorce, and death of the
husband.

The Office of the President also affirmed the Secretary’s ruling when Remo’s case was brought
to it. The CA likewise also affirmed the ruling. Consequently, Remo filed a petition for review
before the Supreme Court. She argued that RA 8239 (Philippine Passport Act of 1996) conflicted
with and was an implied repeal of Article 370 of the Civil Code which allows the wife to
continue using her maiden name upon marriage, as settled in the case of Yasin v. Honorable
Judge Shari’a District Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Remo can revert to the use of her maiden name in the replacement passport,
despite the subsistence of her marriage

RULING:

No. Indeed, Article 370 of the Civil Code provides, and as settled in the case of Yasin v.
Honorable Judge Shari’a District Court, a married woman has an option, but not an obligation, to
use her husband’s surname upon marriage. This means that she is free to either use her husband’s
surname or continuously use her maiden name. This is so because when a woman marries, she
only changes her civil status and not her name. RA 8239 does not conflict with this principle. It
does not prohibit a married woman from using her maiden name in her passport. The Department
of Foreign Affairs (DFA) actually allows a married woman who applies for a passport for the
first time to use her maiden name. Such an applicant is not required to adopt her husband’s
surname.

In the case of renewal of passport, if a woman chooses to adopt her husband’s surname in her
new passport, the DFA additionally requires the submission of an authenticated copy of the
marriage certificate. Otherwise, if she prefers to continue using her maiden name, she may still
do so. The DFA will never prohibit her from continuously using her maiden name.

However, once a married woman opted to adopt her husband’s surname in her passport, she may
not revert to the use of her maiden name, except in the following cases enumerated in Section
 P a g e | 596

5(d) of RA 8239 which are; 1) death of husband, 2) divorce, 3) annulment, or 4) nullity of

marriage. Since Remo’s marriage to her husband subsists, she cannot resume her maiden name in
the renewed passport.
Ppine ass
 P a g e | 597

YASIN v. JUDGE SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT

G.R. No. 94986 February 23, 1995

FACTS:

Hatima C. Yasin filed in the Shari'a District Court in Zamboanga City a "Petition to resume the
use of maiden name” on May 5, 1990. The respondent court ordered amendments to the petition
because it was lacking in form and substance in accordance with Rule 103, Rules of Court,
regarding the residence of petitioner and the name sought to be adopted is not properly indicated
in the title thereof which should include all the names by which the petitioner has been known.
Hatima filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order alleging that the petition filed is
not covered by Rule 103 of the Rules of Court but is merely a petition to resume the use of her
maiden name and surname after the dissolution of her marriage by divorce under the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, and after marriage of her former husband to another
woman. The respondent court denied the motion since compliance to rule 103 is necessary if the
petition is to be granted, as it would result in the resumption of the use of petitioner’s maiden
name and surname.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a woman is required to file a petition for change of name and comply with the
formal requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of court when she desires to resume her maiden
name in the case of annulment, divorce under the Code of Muslim Laws, and her husband is
married again to another woman.

RULING:

No. When a woman marries, she does not need to apply and/or seek judicial authority to use her
husband's name by prefixing the word "Mrs." before her husband's full name or by adding her
husband's surname to her maiden first name. The law grants her such right under Article 370
of the Civil Code. Similarly, when the marriage ties no longer exists as in the case of death of the
husband or divorce as authorized by the Muslim Code, the widow or divorcee need not seek
judicial confirmation of the change in her civil status in order to revert to her maiden name as the
use of her former husband's name is optional and not obligatory for her.

When petitioner married her husband, she did not change her name but only her civil status.
Neither was she required to secure judicial authority to use the surname of her husband after the
marriage, as no law requires it. The use of the husband's surname during the marriage, after
annulment of the marriage and after the death of the husband is permissive and not obligatory
except in case of legal separation.

The court finds the petition to resume the use of maiden name filed by petitioner before the
respondent court a superfluity and unnecessary proceeding since the law requires her to do so as
her former husband is already married to another woman after obtaining a decree of divorce from
her in accordance with Muslim laws.
 P a g e | 598

IN RE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE GARCIA

G.R. No. 148311 March 31, 2005

FACTS:

Honorato B. Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Astorga
Garcia. He averred that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994; that Stephanie had been using her
mother’s middle name and surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to be her
adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie’s middle name be changed to Garcia, her mother’s
surname, and that her surname “Garcia” be changed to “Catindig” his surname.

The RTC granted the petition for adoption, and ordered that pursuant to article 189 of the Family
Code, the minor shall be known as Stephanie Nathy Catindig.

Honorato filed a motion for classification and/or reconsideration praying that Stephanie be
allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (Garcia) as her middle name. The lower court
denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration holding that there is no law or jurisprudence
allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his biological mother as his middle name.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle name
when she is subsequently adopted by her natural father

RULING:

Yes. There is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like
Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mother’s surname, we find no reason why she should not
be allowed to do so.

Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, (An Act Allowing
Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father) is silent as to what middle name a
child may use. Article 365 of the CC merely provides that “an adopted child shall bear the
surname of the adopter.” Article 189 of the Family Code, enumerating the legal effects of
adoption, is likewise silent on the matter.

Republic Act No. 8552, (Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) an legitimate child by virtue of her
adoption, Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without
discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother.
 P a g e | 599

IN RE JULIAN LIN WANG

G.R. No. 159966 March 30, 2005

FACTS:

When Julian was born on February 20, 1998 in Cebu City, his parents were not yet married to
each other. When they eventually got married on September 22, 1998,they executed a deed of
legitimation of their son so that the child’s name was changed from Julian Lin Carulasan to
Julian Lin Carulasan Wang.

Julian’s parents planned to live in Singapore where Julian will study together with a sister who
was born in Singapore, his mother decided to file a petition in the Regional Trial Court seeking
to drop his middle name and have his registered name in the Civil Registry changed from Julian
Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang. The reason given for the change of name sought in the
petition is that Julian may be discriminated against when he studies in Singapore because of his
middle name since in Singapore middle names or the maiden surname of the mother is not
carried in a person's name.

After trial, the RTC denied the petition because the reason given did not fall within the grounds
recognized by law. The RTC ruled that since the State has an interest in the name of a person it
cannot just be changed to suit the convenience of the bearer of the name. The RTC said that
legitimate children have the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother, and there is
no reason why this right should be taken from Julian considering that he was still a minor. It is
only when he reaches majority could he decide whether to change his name by dropping his
middle name.

ISSUE:

Whether the name mother’s surname should be dropped in the instant case because it is a
common practice in Singapore to omit said surname

RULING:

Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a person as well as further
distinguish him from others who may have the same given name and surname as he has. When
an illegitimate child is legitimated by subsequent marriage of his parents or acknowledged by the
father in a public instrument or private handwritten instrument, he then bears both his mother's
surname as his middle name and his father's surname as his surname, reflecting his status as a
legitimated child or an acknowledged natural child. The registered name of a legitimate,
legitimated and recognized illegitimate child thus contains a given name, a middle name and a
surname.

The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of
identification, and that a change of name is a privilege and not a right, so that before a person can
be authorized to change his name given him either in his certificate of birth or civil registry, he
 P a g e | 600

must show proper or reasonable cause, or any compelling reason which may justify such change.
Otherwise, the request should be denied.

To justify a request for change of name, petitioner must show not only some proper or
compelling reason therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official
name. Among the grounds for change of name which have been held valid are: (a) when the
name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the
change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid
confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino
name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase
signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the
surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for
a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.

In the present case, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping his middle name is
convenience. However, how such change of name would make his integration into Singaporean
society easier and convenient is not clearly established. That the continued use of his middle
name would cause confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to
drop it from his registered complete name.
 P a g e | 601

IN RE: CHANGE OF NAME OF MARIA ESTRELLA VERONICA PRIMITIVA

DUTERTE
G.R. No. L-51201 May 29, 1980

FACTS:

On April 28, 1978, petitioner Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte prayed to the Court of
First Instance of Rizal that her name be changed to Estrella S. Alfon. Her parents, Filomeno
Duterte and Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte has been taken care of by Mr. and Mrs. Hector
Alfon. Petitioner and her uncle, Hector Alfon, have been residing in the same house in
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, for twenty-three (23) years. Petitioner has been using the name
Estrella Alfon since her childhood; has been enrolled in the grade school and in college using the
same name; has continuously used the name Estrella S. Alfon since her infancy and all her
friends and acquaintances know her by this name; and she has exercised her right of suffrage
under the same name.

The lower court ruled that, pursuant to Article 364 if the Civil Code which states that
“Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father,” the change
of name of petitioner is not proper and reasonable with respect to the surname. The lower court
further explained that the fact that petitioner has been using a different surname and has become
known with such surname does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to legally authorize
and change her surname to Alfon; the birth certificate also clearly shows that the father of
petitioner is Filomeno Duterte. The lower court granted the petition insofar as the first name is
granted but denied with respect to the surname.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner should have been allowed to change her whole name from Maria
Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte to Estrella S. Alfon

HELD:

The Supreme Court held that the lower court should have fully granted the petition. As held in
the case of Haw Liong vs. Republic, it was stated there some proper or reasonable causes that
may warrant the grant of a petitioner for change of name: (1) when the name is ridiculous,
tainted with dishonor, or is extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (2) when the request for
change is a consequence of a change of' status, such as when a natural child is acknowledged or
legitimated; and (3) when the change is necessary to avoid confusion.

In the case at bar, it has been shown that petitioner has, since childhood, borne the name Estrella
S. Alfon although her birth records and baptismal certificate show otherwise; she was enrolled in
the schools from the grades up to college under the name Estrella S. Alfon; all her friends call
her by this name; she finished her course in Nursing in college and was graduated and given a
diploma under this name; and she exercised the right of suffrage likewise under this name. There
is therefore ample justification to grant fully her petition which is not whimsical but on the
contrary is based on a solid and reasonable ground, i.e. to avoid confusion.
 P a g e | 602

PEOPLE v. ESTRADA
G.R. No. 164368 April 2, 2009

FACTS:

An Information for plunder was filed with the Sandiganbayan against respondent Estrada, among
other accused. A separate Information for illegal use of alias was likewise filed. The Amended
Information reads:

“…to conceal the ill-gotten wealth he acquired during his tenure and his true identity as the
President, represents himself as JOSE VELARDE in several transactions and use and employ the
said alias Jose Velarde which is neither his registered name at birth nor his baptismal name, in
signing documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not Joseph Estrada’s use of his alias Jose Velarde was allowable under banking rules,
despite the clear prohibition under Commonwealth Act No. 142.

HELD:

The Supreme Court held that it was indeed allowable when the act was committed. The Court
cited the decision on Ursua vs. Court of Appeals stating that “A name or names used by a person
or intended to be used by him publicly and habitually usually in business transactions in addition
to his real name by which he is registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute name
authorized by a competent authority.” Thus, the law on illegal use of alias to be applied in the
case at bar is that there must be a sign or indication that the user intends to be known by this
name (the alias) in addition to his real name, and there must be habituality. The repeated use of
an alias within a single day cannot be deemed habitual, as it does not amount to a customary
practice or use.
 P a g e | 603

URSUA v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 112170 April 10, 1996

FACTS:

In 1989, Cesario Ursua was charged with bribery and dishonesty. His lawyer then asked him to
get a copy of the complaint against him from the Office of the Ombudsman. His lawyer asked
him that because the law firm’s messenger, a certain Oscar Perez, was unable to go to the
Ombudsman. Before going to the Ombudsman, Ursua talked to Perez. He revealed to him that he
feels uncomfortable asking for a copy of the complaint because he is the respondent in the said
case. Perez then told him than he can go there as “Oscar Perez” so that he does not have to reveal
his true identity.

At the Office of the Ombudsman, Ursua signed the logbook there as “Oscar Perez”. When he
was handed a copy of the complaint, he signed the receipt as “Oscar Perez”. However, a staff of
the Ombudsman was able to learn that he was in fact Cesario Ursua. The staff then
recommended that a criminal case be filed against Ursua. Eventually, Ursua was sentenced to
three years in prison for violating C.A. No. 142, as amended, otherwise known as “An Act To
Regulate The Use Of Aliases”.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Cesario Ursua’s conviction is proper.

HELD:

No. Ursua should be acquitted. The Supreme Court ruled that a strict application of C.A. No.
142, as amended, in this case only leads to absurdity – something which could not have been
intended by the lawmakers.

Under C.A. No. 142, as amended, save for some instances, a person is not allowed to use a name
or an alias other than his registered name or that which he was baptized. Under the law, what
makes the use of alias illegal is the fact that it is being used habitually and publicly in business
transactions without prior authorization by competent authority. In this case, Ursua merely used
the name “Oscar Perez” once, it was not used in a business transaction, the use of the name was
with the consent of Oscar Perez himself, and even if he used a different name, in this instance, he
was not even required to disclose his identity at the Office of the Ombudsman. When he was
requesting a copy of the complaint, he need not disclose his identity because the complaint is a
public record open to the public. In short, the evils sought to be avoided by the C.A. No. 142 was
not brought about when Ursua used a name other than his name. A strict application of the law is
not warranted. When Ursua used the name of Oscar Perez, no fraud was committed; there was no
crime committed punishable under C.A. No. 142. The purpose of the law is to punish evils
defined therein so when no such evil was produced by Ursua’s act, said law need not be applied.
 P a g e | 604

BASILIO GAN vs. REPUBLIC

G.R. No. 207147 September 14, 2016

FACTS:

Emelita Basilio Gan (petitioner) was born on December 21, 1956 out of wedlock to Pia Gan, her
father who is a Chinese national, and Consolacion Basilio, her mother who is a Filipino
citizen The petitioner's birth certificate, which was registered in the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar (LCR) of Libmanan, Camarines Sur, indicates that her full name is Emelita Basilio.

On June 29, 2010, the petitioner filed a Petition for correction of name with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Libmanan, Camarines Sur. The petitioner sought to change the full name
indicated in her birth certificate from "Emelita Basilio" to "Emelita Basilio Gan." She claimed
that she had been using the name "Emelita Basilio Gan" in her school records from elementary
until college, employment records, marriage contract, and other government records.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petition for correction of name should be granted.

HELD:

The Supreme Court denied the petition. A change of name is a privilege and not a matter of
right; a proper and reasonable cause must exist before a person may be authorized to change his
name. In the case at bar, the reason cited by the petitioner in support of her petition for change of
name, i.e. that she has been using the name "Emelita Basilio Gan" in all of her records, is not a
sufficient or proper justification to allow her petition. In her amended petition for change of
name, the petitioner merely stated that she was born out of wedlock; she did not state whether
her parents, at the time of her birth, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each
other, which would make her a natural child.

The petitioner also failed to adduce any evidence that would show that she indeed was duly
acknowledged by his father. The petitioner's evidence consisted only of her birth certificate
signed by her mother, school records, employment records, marriage contract, certificate of
baptism, and other government records. Thus, assuming that she is a natural child pursuant to
Article 269 of the Civil Code, she could still not insist on using her father's surname. It was, thus,
a blatant error on the part of the RTC to have allowed the petitioner to change her name from
"Emelita Basilio" to "Emelita Basilio Gan."
 P a g e | 605

YASUO IWASAWA v. GANGAN

G.R. No. 204169 September 11, 2013

FACTS:

Petitioner Yasuo Iwasawa, a Japanese national married private respondent on November 28,
2002, in the Philippines. Thereafter, while the couple were residing in Japan, petitioner found out
that his wife was previously married to another man. Petitioner then filed for nullity of marriage
under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. During trial, aside from his testimony, petitioner also
offered the following pieces of documentary evidence issued by the National Statistics Office
(NSO): (1) Certificate of Marriage between petitioner and private respondent; (2) Certificate of
Marriage between private respondent and Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo; (3) Certificate of
Death of Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo; and (4) Certification from the NSO to the effect that
there are two entries of marriage recorded by the office pertaining to private respondent.

The RTC, however, ruled that there was insufficient evidence to prove private respondent’s prior
existing valid marriage to another man on the basis that petitioner’s testimony is unreliable
because he has no personal knowledge of private respondent’s prior marriage nor of Arambulo’s
death which makes him a complete stranger to the marriage certificate between private
respondent and Arambulo and the latter’s death certificate. It further ruled that petitioner’s
testimony about the NSO certification is likewise unreliable since he is a stranger to the
preparation of said document.

ISSUE:

Whether the testimony of the NSO records custodian certifying the authenticity and due
execution of the public documents issued by said office was necessary before they could be
accorded evidentiary weight.

HELD:

The Supreme Court granted the petition. There is no question that the documentary evidence
submitted by petitioner is all public documents as provided in Art. 410 of the Civil Code. As
public documents, they are admissible in evidence even without further proof of their due
execution and genuineness. Thus, the RTC erred when it disregarded said documents on the sole
ground that the petitioner did not present the records custodian of the NSO who issued them to
testify on their authenticity and due execution since proof of authenticity and due execution was
not anymore necessary. Moreover, not only are said documents admissible, they deserve to be
given evidentiary weight because they constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
And in the instant case, the facts stated therein remain unrebutted since neither the private
respondent nor the public prosecutor presented evidence to the contrary.
 P a g e | 606

BALDOS v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 170645 July 9, 2010

FACTS:

Reynaldo Pillazar, alias Reynaldo Baldos, was born on 30 October 1948. However, his birth was
not registered in the office of the local civil registrar until roughly 36 years later or on 11
February 1985. His certificate of live birth indicated Nieves Baldos as his mother and Bartolome
Baldos as his father. Nieves Baldos also appeared as the informant on the certificate of live birth.
 
On 8 March 1995, Nieves Baldos filed in the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City a complaint
for cancellation of the late registration of Reynaldos birth. She claimed that Reynaldo was not
really her son.

ISSUE:

Whether the late registration of Reynaldos birth is valid.

HELD:

Reynaldos certificate of live birth, as a duly registered public document, is presumed to have
gone through the process prescribed by law for late registration of birth. It was only on 8 March
1995, after the lapse of ten long years from the approval on 11 February 1985 of the application
for delayed registration of Reynaldo’s birth, that Nieves registered her opposition. She should
have done so within the ten-day period prescribed by law. Records show that no less than Nieves
herself informed the local civil registrar of the birth of Reynaldo. At the time of her application
for delayed registration of birth, Nieves claimed that Reynaldo was her son. Between the facts
stated in a duly registered public document and the flip-flopping statements of Nieves, we are
more inclined to stand by the former.
 
Applications for delayed registration of birth go through a rigorous process. The books making
up the civil register are considered public documents and are prima facie evidence of the truth of
the facts stated there. As a public document, a registered certificate of live birth enjoys the
presumption of validity. It is not for Reynaldo to prove the facts stated in his certificate of live
birth, but for petitioners who are assailing the certificate to prove its alleged falsity. Petitioners
miserably failed to do so.
 P a g e | 607

REPUBLIC v. COSETENG-MAGPAYO
G.R. No. 189476 February 2, 2011

FACTS:

Born in Makati on September 9, 1972, Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng Magpayo (respondent)
is the son of Fulvio M. Magpayo Jr. and Anna Dominique Marquez-Lim Coseteng who, as
respondent’s certificate of live birth shows, contracted marriage on March 26, 1972. 

Claiming, however, that his parents were never legally married, respondent filed on July 22,
2008 at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City a Petition to change his name to Julian
Edward Emerson Marquez Lim Coseteng. In support of his petition, respondent submitted a
certification from the National Statistics Office stating that his mother Anna Dominique "does
not appear in [its] National Indices of Marriage.” Respondent also submitted his academic
records from elementary up to college showing that he carried the surname "Coseteng," and the
birth certificate of his child where "Coseteng" appears as his surname. In the 1998, 2001 and
2004 Elections, respondent ran and was elected as Councilor of Quezon City’s 3rd District using
the name "JULIAN M.L. COSETENG." 

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petition for change of name involving change of civil status should be made
through appropriate adversarial proceedings. 

HELD:

The Supreme Court held that respondent’s petition to change his name lacks merit. They stated
the grounds on how a person can effect a change of name under Rule 103: (a) when the name is
ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results
as a legal consequence such as legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when
one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was
unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former
alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes
embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent
purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest. 

Respondent’s reason for changing his name cannot be considered as one of, or analogous to, the
recognized grounds. The change being sought in respondent’s petition goes so far as to affect his
legal status in relation to his parents. It seeks to change his legitimacy to that of illegitimacy.
Rule 103 then would not suffice to grant respondent’s supplication. 
 P a g e | 608

LEE v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 118387 October 11, 2001

FACTS:

The petitioners contended that resort to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court was improper
since private respondents sought to have the entry for the name of petitioners’ mother changed
from “Keh Shiok Cheng” to “Tiu Chuan” who was a completely different person.  What private
respondents therefore sought was not merely a correction in name but a declaration that
petitioners were not born of Lee Tek Sheng’s legitimate wife, Keh Shiok Cheng, but of his
mistress, Tiu Chuan, in effect a “bastardization of petitioners.” Petitioners thus label private
respondents’ suits before the lower courts as a collateral attack against their legitimacy in the
guise of a Rule 108 proceeding.

Debunking petitioners’ above contention, the Court of Appeals observed that the proceedings
were simply aimed at establishing a particular fact, status and/or right.  Stated differently, the
thrust of said proceedings was to establish the factual truth regarding the occurrence of certain
events which created or affected the status of persons and/or otherwise deprived said persons of
rights.

ISSUE:

Whether or not clerical or typographical errors in entries of the civil register can be corrected and
changed without need of a judicial order.

HELD:

The Supreme Court cited Republic Act No. 9048 which substantially amended Article 412 of the
New Civil Code, to wit:

“SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name
or Nickname.- No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order,
except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be
corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in
accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.”

The above law speaks clearly.  Clerical or typographical errors in entries of the civil register are
now to be corrected and changed without need of a judicial order and by the city or municipal
civil registrar or consul general.  The obvious effect is to remove from the ambit of Rule 108 the
correction or changing of such errors in entries of the civil register.  Hence, what is left for the
scope of operation of Rule 108 are substantial changes and corrections in entries of the civil
register.  This is precisely the opposite of what Ty Kong Tin and other cases of its genre had said,
perhaps another indication that it was not sound doctrine after all.
 P a g e | 609

IN RE: CHANGE OF NAME OF JULIAN WANG

G.R. No. 159966 March 30, 2005

FACTS:

A petition was filed by Anna Lisa Wang for the change of name and/or correction/cancellation of
entry in the Civil Registry of her son, a minor, Julian Lin Carulasan Wang before the RTC of
Cebu City. Julian was the son of Anna Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe Wang. They were not yet
married to each other when Julian was born. Subsequently, when Julian’s parents got married,
the latter executed a deed of legitimation of their son so that the child’s name was changed from
Julian Lin Carulasan to Julian Lin Carulasan Wang.

The reason for the petition is that since the family plans to stay in Singapore and, since in
Singapore middle names or the maiden surname of the mother are not carried in a person’s name,
they anticipated that Julian will be discriminated against because of his current registered name
which carries a middle name. Also, the spouses’ daughter and Julian might get confused if they
are really brothers and sisters because they have different surnames. Lastly, Carulasan sounds
funny in Singapore’s Mandarin language since they do not have the letter “R” but if there is, they
pronounce it as “L”.

ISSUE:

Whether the name mother’s surname should be dropped in the instant case because it is a
common practice in Singapore to omit said surname.

HELD:

The Supreme Court denied the petition. The Court stated the valid grounds for change of name,
which are: (1) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or
pronounce; (2) when the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (3) when the
change will avoid confusion; (4) when one has continuously used and been known since
childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (5) a sincere desire to adopt a
Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing
anybody; and (6) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the
desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice
public interest.

The only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping of his middle name is convenience.
However, how such change of name would make his integration into Singaporean society easier
and convenient is not clearly established. That the continued use of his middle name would cause
confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his
registered name. In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous foundation on
which his petition for change of name is based, it is best that the matter of change of his name be
left to his judgment and discretion when he reaches the age of majority. As he is of tender age,
he may not yet understand and appreciate the value of the change of his name and granting of the
same at this point may just prejudice him in his rights under our laws.
 P a g e | 610

SILVERIO v. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007

FACTS:

Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio is a male transsexual. He’s a biological male who feels trapped
in a male body. Being that, he sought gender re-assignment in Bangkok, Thailand. The procedure
was successful – he (she) now has a female body. Thereafter, in 2002, he filed a petition for the
change of his first name (from Rommel to Mely) and his sex (male to female) in his birth
certificate. He filed the petition before the Manila RTC. He wanted to make these changes,
among others, so that he can marry his American fiancé.

The RTC granted Silverio’s petition. The RTC ruled that it should be granted based on equity;
that Silverio’s misfortune to be trapped in a man’s body is not his own doing and should not be
in any way taken against him; that there was no opposition to his petition (even the OSG did not
make any basis for opposition at this point); that no harm, injury or prejudice will be caused to
anybody or the community in granting the petition. On the contrary, granting the petition would
bring the much-awaited happiness on the part of Silverio and [her] fiancé and the realization of
their dreams.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the entries pertaining to sex and first name in the birth certificate may be changed
on the ground of gender re-assignment.

HELD:

No. The Supreme Court ruled that the change of such entries finds no support in existing
legislation. Pursuant to R.A. 9048, it should be the local civil registrar that has jurisdiction in
petitions for the change of first names and not the regular courts. Hence, the petition of Silverio
insofar as his first name is concerned is procedurally infirm. Even assuming that the petition filed
properly, it cannot be granted still because the ground upon which it is based (gender re-
assignment) is not one of those provided for by the law. 

This entry cannot be changed either via a petition before the regular courts or a petition for the
local civil registry. Not with the courts because there is no law to support it. And not with the
civil registry because there is no clerical error involved. Silverio was born a male hence it was
just but right that the entry written in his birth certificate is that he is a male. The sex of a person
is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by
examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex
reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not
attended by error, is immutable.
 P a g e | 611

REPUBLIC VS. CAGANDAHAN

G.R. No. 166676 September 12, 2008

FACTS:

Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the Regional Trial Court Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna
a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate of her name from Jennifer B. Cagandahan
to Jeff Cagandahan and her gender from female to male. It appearing that Jennifer Cagandahan is
sufferingfrom Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which is a rare medical condition where afflicted
persons possess both male and female characteristics. Jennifer Cagandahan grew up with
secondary male characteristics.

To further her petition, Cagandahan presented in court the medical certificate evidencing that she
is suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which certificate is issued by Dr. Michael
Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine General
Hospital, who, in addition, explained that “Cagandahan genetically is female but because her
body secretes male hormones, her female organs did not develop normally, thus has organs of
both male and female.” The lower court decided in her favor but the Office of the Solicitor
General appealed before the Supreme Court invoking that the same was a violation of Rules 103
and 108 of the Rules of Court because the said petition did not implead the local civil registrar.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Cagandahan’s sex as appearing in her birth certificate be changed.

HELD:

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. It held that, in deciding the case, the
Supreme Court considered “the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of
intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial.” The Supreme Court made
use of the availale evidence presented in court including the fact that private respondent thinks of
himself as a male and as to the statement made by the doctor that Cagandahan’s body produces
high levels of male hormones (androgen), which is preponderant biological support for
considering him as being male.”

The Supreme Court further held that they give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how
an individual deals with what nature has handed out. That is, the Supreme Court respects the
respondent’s congenital condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life is already difficult
for the ordinary person. The Court added that a change of name is not a matter of right but of
judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons and the consequences that will
follow.
 P a g e | 612

BRAZA v. CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR OF HIMAMAYLAN CITY

G.R. No. 181174 December 4, 2009

FACTS:

Petitioner Ma. Cristina Braza and Pablo Braza Jr. were married. In 2002, Pablo died in a
vehicular accident. During the wake, respondent Lucille Titular and her son, Patrick Alvin
Titutar showed up and introduced themselves as the wife and son, respectively, of
Pablo. Cristina made inquiries in the course of which she obtained Patrick’s birth certificate from
the Local Civil Registrar of Negros Occidental which stated that: (1) Pablo is the father of
Patrick having acknowledged by the father on January 13, 1997;  and, (2) Patrick was
legitimated by virtue of the subsequent marriage of his parents; hence, his name was changed to
Patrick Alvin Titular Braza. Cristina likewise obtained a copy of a marriage contract showing
that Pablo and Lucille were married in 1998.

Cristina and her co-petitioner (her three legitimate children with Pablo) filed before the RTC of
Negros a petition to correct the entries in the birth certificate record of Patrick in the Local Civil
Registry. They contended that Patrick could not have been legitimated by the supposed
subsequent marriage between Lucille and Pablo because said marriage is bigamous on account of
a valid and subsisting marriage between her (Cristina) and Pablo.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the courts may pass upon the validity of marriage and questions on legitimacy in
an action to correct entries in the civil registrar.

HELD:

No. In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of
Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule
on legitimacy and filiations. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court vis-a-vis Article 412 of the Civil
Code charts the procedure by which an entry in the civil registry may be cancelled or corrected.
The proceeding contemplated therein may generally be used only to correct clerical, spelling,
typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil registry. A clerical error is one which is
visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding; an error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a
mistake in copying or writing, or a harmless change such as a correction of name that is clearly
misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of the parent. Substantial or contentious
alterations may be allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in which all interested parties are
impleaded and due process is properly observed. 

The petitioners’ cause of action is actually to seek the declaration of Pablo and Lucille’s
marriage as void for being bigamous and impugn Patrick’s legitimacy, which causes of action
are governed not by Rule 108 but by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on March 15,
2003, and Art. 171 of the Family Code, respectively; hence, the petition should be filed in a
Family Court as expressly provided in said Code. It is well to emphasize that, doctrinally,
validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action
 P a g e | 613

seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack such as the petition filed
before the court a quo.
 P a g e | 614

REPUBLIC v. LUGSANAY UY
G.R. No. 198010 August 12, 2013

FACTS:

On March 8, 2004, respondent filed a Petition for Correction of Entry in her Certificate of Live
Birth. Respondent was born on February 8, 1952 and alleged that she is the illegitimate daughter
of Sy Ton and Sotera Lugsanay.  Accordingly, her Certificate of Live Birth shows that her full
name is "Anita Sy" when in fact she is allegedly known to her family and friends as "Norma S.
Lugsanay." Her school records, Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) Board of Medicine
Certificate, and passport bear the name "Norma S. Lugsanay." She also alleged that she is an
illegitimate child considering that her parents were never married, so she had to follow the
surname of her mother. She is a Filipino citizen and not Chinese, and all her siblings bear the
surname Lugsanay and are all Filipinos. On June 28, 2004, the RTC issued an Order in favor of
respondent. OSG assailed the decision for failure to implead indispensable parties.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is entitled to the correction of entry in her birth certificate.

HELD:

The Supreme Court held in the negative and nullified the decision of the lower courts. If the
subject matter of a petition is not for the correction of clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous
nature, but one involving nationality or citizenship, which is indisputably substantial as well as
controverted, affirmative relief cannot be granted in a proceeding summary in nature. However,
it is also true that a right in law may be enforced and a wrong may be remedied as long as the
appropriate remedy is used. The Supreme Court adheres to the principle that even substantial
errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established provided the parties
aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding.

In this case, it was only the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City who was impleaded as
respondent in the petition. The respondent seeks the correction of her first name and surname,
her status from "legitimate" to "illegitimate" and her citizenship from "Chinese" to "Filipino."
Thus, respondent should have impleaded and notified not only the Local Civil Registrar but also
her parents and siblings as the persons who have interest and are affected by the changes or
corrections respondent wanted to make.

When a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register involves substantial
and controversial alterations, including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation,
or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court is mandated.