Imaad Shah Zuberi

Case 2:19-cr-00642-VAP Document 84 Filed 03/17/20 Page 1 of 28 Page ID #:802
1 NICOLA T. HANNA
United States Attorney
2 BRANDON D. FOX
Assistant United States Attorney
3 Chief, Criminal Division
DANIEL J. O’BRIEN (Cal. Bar No. 141720)
4 Assistant United States Attorney
ELISA FERNANDEZ (Cal. Bar No. 172004)
Public Corruption & Civil Rights Section
6 1500 United States Courthouse
312 North Spring Street
7 Los Angeles, California 90012
Telephone: (213) 894-2468
8 Facsimile: (213) 894-2927
E-mail: [email protected]
9 EVAN N. TURGEON (D.C. Bar No. 1010816)
Trial Attorney
10 National Security Division
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Suite 7700
11 Washington, D.C. 20530
Telephone: (202) 353-0176
12 E-mail: [email protected]
13 Attorneys for Plaintiff

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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15 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
16 FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
17 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CR No. 19-642-VAP
18 Plaintiff, GOVERNMENT’S SENTENCING POSITION

RE FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION
19 v. ACT VIOLATIONS; MEMORANDUM OF
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
20 IMAAD SHAH ZUBERI,
Date: May 18, 2020
21 Defendant. Time: 9:00 a.m.
Courtroom: 8A
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1 Plaintiff, United States of America, by and through its counsel
2 of record, the United States Attorney for the Central District of
3 California, hereby submits its position with respect to the
4 defendant’s Foreign Agents Registration Act (”FARA”) violations and
5 his failure to comply with the terms of his plea agreement.
6 An under seal declaration of Assistant United States Attorney
7 Daniel J. O’Brien in support of this position, with exhibits, will
8 be filed concurrently with this document.
9 Dated: March 17, 2020 Respectfully submitted,

10 NICOLA T. HANNA
United States Attorney
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BRANDON D. FOX
Chief, Criminal Division
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14 /s/
DANIEL J. O’BRIEN
16 Attorneys for Plaintiff
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
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I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
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II. ZUBERI’S COULD NOT HAVE DISCLOSED HIS FOREIGN AGENCY WITHOUT
4 ABANDONING HIS LARGER CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE . . . . . . . . . 2
5 III. ZUBERI’S FARA VIOLATIONS WERE PERVASIVE . . . . . . . . . . 5

A. ZUBERI LOBBIED CONGRESS AS AN AGENT OF A
6 BAHRAINI NATIONAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7 B. ZUBERI LOBBIED CONGRESS AS AN AGENT OF THE TURKISH
GOVERNMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
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C. ZUBERI LOBBIED AS AN AGENT OF SELECT MEMBERS OF THE LIBYAN
9 GOVERNMENT AND A SAUDI/UNITED KINGDOM NATIONAL . . . . 13
10 D. ZUBERI LOBBIED CONGRESS AS AN AGENT OF A UKRAINIAN
NATIONAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
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IV. THE SCOPE OF ZUBERI’S FARA VIOLATIONS WERE EXCEPTIONAL . . 22
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V. DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO COMPLY WITH FARA OBLIGATIONS AS
13 REQUIRED BY THE PLEA AGREEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
VI. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
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1 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
2 I. INTRODUCTION
3 The government disagrees with the characterizations of
4 defendant’s Foreign Agents Registration Act (“FARA”) violations set
5 forth by the U.S. Probation Office (“USPO”) in its Presentence
6 Report (“PSR”). The FARA violations in this case were not merely
7 reporting violations, but rather a crucial ingredient of Zuberi’s
8 broader efforts to help foreign governments, entities, and
9 individuals corrupt our public officials, institutions, and
10 democratic processes. Moreover, although the USPO factually recites
11 several examples of Zuberi’s FARA violations, it does not adequately
12 convey their scope, or the pervasive and insidious nature of
13 defendant’s corrupt acts.
14 Nearly the entirety of defendant’s business activities and
15 profits involved trading on his ability to influence U.S. government
16 officials by engaging in concerted lobbying efforts and making
17 enormous campaign contributions that, unbeknownst to the recipients
18 and the public, were funded by prohibited foreign sources. For
19 reasons discussed below, the FARA offenses committed by Zuberi were
20 necessary to execute this criminal scheme. Defendant’s extensive
21 and repeated FARA violations and related nefarious conduct demand
22 substantial punishment.
23 Moreover, the USPO’s valid “concern that our government lacks
24 transparency” and the public’s loss of faith stemming from past
25 failures to interdict clandestine foreign efforts to subvert U.S.
26 democratic processes counsel in favor of a significant sentence in
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1 this case to deter other would-be FARA offenders from seeking to
2 compromise U.S. democracy in exchange for foreign cash.
3 II. ZUBERI’S COULD NOT HAVE DISCLOSED HIS FOREIGN AGENCY WITHOUT
ABANDONING HIS LARGER CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE
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The USPO is mistaken when it characterizes defendants’ FARA
5
violations as a mere failure to comply with reporting requirements.
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Although FARA has reporting requirements, FARA prohibits acting as
7
an unregistered agent of a foreign principal. United States v.
8
Manafort, 318 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2018). Moreover, the USPO’s
9
assertions that “what make his actions illegal is lack of disclosure
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. . . and not the conduct itself” and “he would not have violated
11
FARA if he properly disclosed that he was working [as] an agent”
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fail to consider the reasons why Zuberi concealed his foreign agency
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and made false registration filings. Truthful disclosures would
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have had devastating ramifications to both Zuberi’s “business” and
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his ability to alter U.S. foreign policy.
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First, Zuberi would have been unable secure foreign clients if
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he had filed truthful FARA registrations because secrecy was
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integral to his nefarious scheme. The foreign governments and
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individuals at issue only retained Zuberi because diplomatic,
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transparent, and legal lobbying mechanisms had proved inadequate to
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obtain the results they sought. These foreign entities resorted to
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paying Zuberi—who was not a registered lobbyist—millions of dollars
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for backdoor influence. Zuberi solicited his foreign clients for
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illegal campaign contributions. Zuberi also informed clients that
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he was party to quid pro quo arrangements that involved the exchange
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of money in return for U.S. government action that would benefit
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1 their foreign businesses. One of Zuberi’s clients described
2 Zuberi’s sales pitch as follows:
3 “I’m in charge of fund-raising for [] President Obama.” …

“When you take pictures with [] President Obama … this
4 will open up business for you. Plus, you know, in the
States we have [a saying] that says, ‘I scratch your back,
5 you scratch my back.’” … “You come donate, and you come
take pictures.” … “if you pay, you know, we American[s],
6 we can give you business in Libya, we can give you
business in Kuwait. You know, there are a lot of military
7 work[s] going on. We can help out there a lot of ways.”
8 This criminal enterprise demanded secrecy. FARA requires the
9 identification of all foreign principals on whose behalf the
10 registrant is acting, foreign monies received by the registrant, the
11 dispersal of such funds, political activities (such as lobbying)
12 engaged in by the registrant, and campaign contributions made by the
13 registrant and associated individuals. Truthful FARA disclosures
14 would have revealed defendant’s receipt of millions of dollars from
15 foreign sources, the specific lobbying and public relations efforts
16 performed, and the millions of dollars of political contributions he
17 made to the officials he was lobbying. It would have invited the
18 same scrutiny defendant encountered when a Foreign Policy Magazine
19 article revealed his Sri Lankan lobbying efforts,1 a crime to which
20 defendant has now admitted guilt.
21 Second, secrecy was necessary to Zuberi’s fraud and tax evasion
22 schemes. Zuberi converted client funds. Zuberi didn’t report this
23 stolen money as income nor the money he received from foreign
24 clients in compensation for his lobbying efforts. Truthful FARA
25 registration filings would have revealed defendant’s redirection of
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1 https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/08/28/elite-fundraiser-for-
28 obama-and-clinton-linked-to-justice-department-probe/
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1 client funds to his own personal benefit, undisclosed foreign bank
2 accounts, and multi-million dollar tax fraud.
3 Third, Zuberi could not influence and manipulate U.S.
4 government officials without concealing his foreign agency. Zuberi
5 was “insistent that he didn’t want to be directly linked” to the Sri
6 Lanka lobbying organization because it would interfere with
7 “fundraising for the Democratic party.” As explained by one
8 associate, “if Imaad wasn’t involved in the lobbying effort, then he
9 could then pursue his fundraising and involvement in politics, and
10 the foreign moneys wouldn’t be directly linked.”
11 Moreover, FARA requires that before a registrant lobbies a
12 policymaker in person, the registrant must reveal to the policymaker
13 that he or she is lobbying on behalf of a foreign principal.
14 Abiding by this requirement would have enabled policymakers to
15 consider Zuberi’s lobbying in context. This requirement also likely
16 would have caused policymakers to seek more information on whether
17 Zuberi’s campaign contributions were funded by foreign entities, and
18 to reject any contributions of foreign money.
19 The idea that Zuberi could have simply “properly disclosed” his
20 work as a foreign agent and thereby avoided criminal liability is
21 not a realistic one. Let us assume that Zuberi planned to disclose
22 the true facts to the American public with respect to his Libya FARA
23 violations, discussed below. Zuberi worked on behalf of a faction
24 of the Libyan government and a Saudi national, to release hundreds
25 of billions of dollars of frozen assets, by routing $3 to $5 million
26 in foreign money into U.S. lobbying campaigns, illegal campaign
27 donations, and donations to quasi-political entities, and exerting
28 his influence with the highest elected officials of the United
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1 States, in return for a stake in a five percent commission paid by
2 the Libyan officials into an offshore corporation after the frozen
3 funds were released.2 Would the foreign clients have agreed to this
4 proposal knowing that it would be publicly disseminated? Would our
5 elected officials have unfrozen the funds after such public
6 disclosures? Would the American press deem these matters not
7 newsworthy? Would the electorate vote for these politicians? Would
8 the Department of Justice ignore the Federal Election Campaign Act
9 violations? If the scheme was successful, would the Internal
10 Revenue Service ignore Zuberi’s unreported income?
11 III. ZUBERI’S FARA VIOLATIONS WERE PERVASIVE
12 In addressing the gravity of defendant’s work as a foreign
13 agent, the USPO correctly observes that such conduct “ignites the
14 suspicion that we are vulnerable to influence by … foreign
15 governments” and that “Zuberi’s actions highlight the frailty of
16 democratic integrity.” While true, this statement understates the
17 impact defendant’s FARA violations had on U.S. foreign policy and
18 our democratic institutions.
19 This case does not merely ignite “suspicions.” Public opinion
20 is already rife with suspicions that foreign influence has
21 compromised our elections and confidence in our democratic
22 institutions has weakened.3 The Zuberi case explicitly verifies
23 through evidentiary proof pervasive, corrupt foreign interference
24 with our elections and policy-making processes.
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26 2 Regardless of the success of the endeavor, contingency fee

arrangements are prohibited under FARA. 22 U.S.C. § 618(h)
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3 See https://web.stanford.edu/~tomz/working/TomzWeeks-
28 ElectoralIntervention-2019-08-13i.pdf
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1 Defendant’s entire business model consisted of soliciting
2 foreign governments, entities, and individuals for money -- part of
3 which was earmarked for illegal campaign contributions, part of
4 which was used to engage in unregistered and non-transparent
5 lobbying and public relations activities, and part of which was used
6 to pay Zuberi –- in return for Zuberi wielding influence with
7 members of Congress and the Executive Branch under the false
8 pretense that he acted independently and in the best interest of the
9 United States. Zuberi’s standard consulting contract required him
10 to access government officials in the United States to develop
11 business opportunities throughout the world.4 The prosecution has
12 found no instance in which Zuberi made significant money from
13 sources other than foreign interests, little work that did not
14 depend upon illegal lobbying and public relations efforts, and no
15 instance in which Zuberi truthfully revealed to the U.S. government
16 or to the American public his foreign agency or his pecuniary
17 interest in the outcome of his lobbying efforts.
18 Defendant repeatedly used foreign money to influence U.S.
19 elections (e.g., on behalf of Saudi, Kuwaiti, and Bahraini
20 entities/individuals), perpetrate frauds on the U.S. Congress (e.g.,
21 on behalf of a Bahraini entity/individual), and alter U.S. foreign
22 policy (e.g., on behalf of the Sri Lankan, Turkish, and Libyan
23 governments) in efforts to generate criminal proceeds for himself.
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4 For example, an August 26, 2013 contract stated that “Avenue
26 understands that [Company D] wishes Avenue to approach government
entities, semigovernment entities and private companies/entities in
27 the United States, Asia, Africa and the Middle East, to find,
structure and execute on opportunities for various business
28 transactions . . . .”
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1 This foreign money gave the election campaigns of Zuberi’s political
2 cronies an unfair advantage over opponents. His foreign-financed
3 lobbying efforts resulted in over a dozen Members of Congress
4 falsely condemning one foreign nation for interfering with U.S.
5 foreign investments and the withdrawal of a House Resolution
6 condemning another foreign nation that had actually engaged in
7 objectionable conduct.
8 In addition to the Sri Lankan lobbying activity that forms the
9 basis of defendant’s FARA conviction, the government provides the
10 following additional examples of FARA violations by the defendant to
11 demonstrate the scope and nature of defendant’s criminal activity.5
12 A. ZUBERI LOBBIED CONGRESS AS AN AGENT OF A BAHRAINI NATIONAL
13 As alleged in the Information, Zuberi secretly lobbied the U.S.
14 Congress as an agent of a Bahraini national. This episode amplifies
15 the insidious nature of Zuberi’s FARA offenses. Not only did Zuberi
16 conceal his foreign agency, he constructed a fraudulent artifice
17 that deceived a dozen members of Congress into exerting pressure on
18 the Foreign Minister of Bahrain under false pretenses. In sum,
19 Zuberi concocted a scheme to fool members of Congress into believing
20 that he had invested millions of dollars in a Bahraini development
21 project and that he had been unfairly harassed by the Bahraini
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5 The government disagrees with the PSR’s description of
24 defendant’s repeated FARA violations as “not part of relevant
conduct.” The Sentencing Guidelines include within the definition
25 of relevant conduct offenses “that were part of the same course of
conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction.”
26 U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1(a). See also § 3553(a)(1) (requiring the Court to
consider “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the
27 history and characteristics of the defendant”); § 3553(a)(2)(B-C)
(requiring the Court to consider the need for the sentence imposed
28 “to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct.”
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1 government in such a way that Congress should intervene. A truthful
2 FARA filing would have revealed this artifice to be a sham and that,
3 in reality, Zuberi made no such investment. Rather, a foreign
4 national had paid Zuberi millions of dollars to engage in an anti-
5 Bahrain lobbying effort.
6 In February 2013, the Government of Bahrain froze the personal
7 assets of Person J, a Bahrain citizen, and delayed the continued
8 development of the Al Areen Palace & Spa (“Al Areen”), a resort in
9 which Person J had a financial interest. Throughout 2013 and early
10 2014, in return for approximately $1,500,0006 provided by Person J,
11 Zuberi implemented an elaborate scheme to convince both the Bahraini
12 and U.S. governments that his business, Avenue Ventures, had
13 invested millions of dollars in Al Areen. Zuberi then engaged in an
14 intensive lobbying campaign to convince members of Congress to
15 pressure the government of Bahrain to stop its interference in “U.S.
16 foreign investment.”
17 Zuberi’s fraudulent effort to convince the world of his
18 “investment” in Al Areen ranks high in its level of audacity. Using
19 money supplied by Person J, Zuberi paid a former high-ranking U.S.
20 military official over $150,000 to travel twice to Bahrain, meet
21 with Bahraini officials to demonstrate Person J’s influence in the
22 United States, and participate in an April 29, 2013 publicity stunt
23 in which Avenue Ventures supposedly acquired a 35% stake in Al
24 Areen. The publicity stunt consisted of an event in Los Angeles at
25 which Person J and a representative of Avenue Ventures purportedly
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6 Zuberi received another $500,000 from Person J in connection
28 with Al Areen in 2015.
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1 signed a partnership agreement in which Avenue Ventures acquired a
2 35% stake in the project in return for a multi-million dollar
3 investment. Zuberi hired a public relations firm to distribute news
4 and photographs of the event throughout the world. No such
5 agreement was executed; nor was any such investment ever made.
6 Zuberi’s lobbying effort was extensive. Zuberi tasked the
7 former U.S. military official and other proxies to assist him in
8 enlisting the support of a high-ranking U.S. State Department
9 official posted in Bahrain. In an effort to convey his clout,
10 Zuberi told the State Department official that Zuberi might be
11 accompanied by a “former POTUS as well.” Zuberi, the former U.S.
12 military official, and other proxies of Zuberi lobbied U.S. State
13 Department officials and a members of the House Foreign Affairs
14 Committee (“HFAC”) in Washington, D.C. to convince the U.S.
15 government to exert pressure on Bahrain.
16 In or around December 2013, Zuberi began soliciting members of
17 Congress to write letters to the Bahraini government condemning its
18 interference in Al Areen. Zuberi falsely informed Congress that “a
19 major investment by a US company in Bahrain is experiencing
20 significant interference from Bahraini authorities acting on behalf
21 of a member of the royal family” and that Avenue Ventures “is
22 seeking support from its government for a cessation of interference
23 in its project in Bahrain.”
24 A component of Zuberi’s lobbying effort involved illegal
25 campaign contributions. From December 2013 through April 2014,
26 Zuberi made nearly $225,000 in campaign contributions to eleven
27 members of Congress who were subjects of his lobbying efforts, to
28 their political action committees, and to the national campaign
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1 committees for their political parties. Of this amount, $78,000
2 constituted illegal “conduit” contributions made in the names of
3 third parties. As a result of these undisclosed, fraudulent, and
4 illegal actions, twelve7 Members of Congress wrote letters to the
5 Foreign Minister of Bahrain asking that his government stop its
6 “interference” and “harassment” of “U.S. investors.”
7 B. ZUBERI LOBBIED CONGRESS AS AN AGENT OF THE TURKISH

GOVERNMENT
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Zuberi’s actions at the direction of the Turkish government
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demonstrate how a foreign government may seek to manipulate the U.S.
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Congress to do its bidding by employing proxies willing to violate
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U.S. law. As detailed below, Zuberi concealed from the public his
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orchestration of this attempt to manipulate Congress.
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On May 20, 2015, thirty Members of Congress introduced House
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Resolution 279 (“HR 279”) “urging respect for freedom of expression
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and human rights in Turkey.” The bill cited Turkey’s intimidation
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of the media, exploitation of anti-terrorism laws to target the
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media on questionable charges, and ban of Twitter and YouTube. The
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Resolution called on Turkey to “lift restrictions on freedom of
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expression.”
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On the very same day HR 279 was presented, a high-ranking
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Turkish official requested Zuberi’s assistance in opposing the
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resolution. Seeking free land to engage in property development
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projects in Turkey, Zuberi agreed to use his influence with Members
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of Congress to defeat the resolution. After meeting with other
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7 Zuberi had already made $26,000 in campaign contributions to
27 the twelfth member of Congress, a U.S. Senator, of which $15,600
were illegal conduit contributions made in the names of third
28 persons back in April 2013.
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1 high-ranking agents of the Turkish government, Zuberi personally
2 urged members of the HFAC and several sponsors of HR 279 to first
3 delay the measure, and later, to let it die without receiving a
4 vote. Zuberi not only solicited help from members of the House of
5 Representatives, but members of the Senate Foreign Relations
6 Committee and other powerful politicians as well.
7 On June 1, 2015, Zuberi informed the Turkish official that his
8 efforts had resulted in a delay of the measure:
9 “[Two Members of Congress] told me this will be delayed by

a week 99% because they control the Foreign Affairs
10 Committee. You … push me so hard I pushed [] harder than I
have ever pushed them for anything. Both asked me why I am
11 pushing this hard for Turkey.”
12 The Turkish official responded that the official “owes him one” and
13 that "You can rest assured that this will be the first step towards
14 a mutually beneficial relationship."
15 Zuberi continued his lobbying efforts to defeat the resolution
16 over the following months. On June 2, 2015, after Zuberi privately
17 met with one of the HR 279 sponsors in California and urged him to
18 reconsider his position, Zuberi reported to the Turkish official
19 that he could easily “pick off” that Congressman. On July 1, 2015,
20 Zuberi again personally met that sponsor who told Zuberi that the
21 day after Zuberi sought his help, he went to the leadership of the
22 HFAC and told them that HR 279 should be delayed or he would
23 “withdraw his signature from the resolution." In the end, HR 279
24 never progressed beyond its initial referral to the HFAC.
25 Between the submission of HR 279 and the end of 2015, Zuberi,
26 Person LL, and their spouses funded approximately $150,000 in
27 campaign contributions earmarked for politicians they lobbied to
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1 defeat the resolution.8 Zuberi brought home the connection between
2 some of these contributions and the support he received from members
3 of Congress. For example, on June 23, 2015, he informed a staffer
4 for a Congressman Zuberi lobbied in connection with HR 279 that
5 Person LL gave $33,400 to a national campaign committee on behalf of
6 the Congressman and that the staffer should let the Congressman
7 know.
8 Zuberi’s profit motive, rather than a goal to serve the
9 interests of his country, was demonstrated by his bitter complaints,
10 the following year, about Turkey’s failure to compensate him for his
11 efforts:
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4/23/16 Person LL Please get me an appointment with [Congressman], [Congressman] and a
13 couple of congresman or senator this monday or tuesday
14 4/23/16 Person LL this will make good imppresion on your project
4/23/16 Zuberi No more appointments until we go to Turkey first. Please do not ask me
15 again
…
16 4/24/16 Zuberi I am not interested in calling anyone. You have donated mere fraction of
what I have done. You are taking advantage of all the millions I have
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spent over past 10 years. You have benefited enough from me. I am tired.
18 I will not do anything before I get signal this will work from Turkey…
4/24/16 Person LL imaad. you are wrong. We will go turkey. this people are very senior
19 advisor and working on our project. it will be nice to see them. i just
need you do this for me. i told him that we can have an apoinment for
20 [Congressman] or one or two people.
21 4/24/16 Person LL we can discuss this later. i did not have interest doing this project. I
amnonly talking them for you. yes it takes time. but we make progress
22 …
4/24/16 Zuberi I will ask [Congressman] tomorrow…
23 …
5/2/16 Zuberi I will tell the [Turkish official] this is the last time. I get million times
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more from Saudis for doing less than I have done for Turkey. Enough
25 is enough
…
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8 Zuberi and Person LL also bundled tens of thousands of dollars
28 in contributions during this timeframe.
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1 5/2/16 Zuberi Only come with the [Turkish official] if you want me to be honest with him
because I am going to tell him this. I spent several hours with him and
2 you last year but nothing happened afterwards…
3 5/2/16 Zuberi Please make sure you let the [Turkish official] know that I am not happy
for the one-way relationship I get many times more from people others
4 and do a lot less for them. This one-way relationship need to end or
Turkish side needs to deliver
5 …
5/2/16 Zuberi It is not just Saudi Kingdom but other places as well (more democratic
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than Turkey). Where I do much less than for Turkey but get way more
7 Again, I don’t want to repeat myself but I am getting tired of one-way
street I need to start seeing some benefits otherwise we need to end
8 these Turkish games
9 Zuberi went so far as to threaten Turkish officials if he was
10 not adequately compensated. On May 10, 2016, Zuberi told Person LL
11 that he would block Turkish officials from meeting with members of
12 Congress unless his demands were met, asking if he should “get
13 [Congressman] and [Congressman] for [Turkish official] or you want
14 me to block them." In December 2016, Person LL tried to get Zuberi
15 to pay for a Turkish official’s tickets to the 2017 Presidential
16 Inauguration, saying that it would be a “golden opportunity” for
17 Zuberi to get his construction contracts. Zuberi demanded an
18 apology and told Person LL he would “block” the Turkish official
19 from the Inaugural if his demands were not met.
20 C. ZUBERI LOBBIED AS AN AGENT OF SELECT MEMBERS OF THE LIBYAN

GOVERNMENT AND A SAUDI/UNITED KINGDOM NATIONAL
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Zuberi lobbied members of the HFAC as an undisclosed agent of
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select members of the Libyan Government and Person A, a Saudi/United
23
Kingdom national, in 2015 and 2016. Libya was riven by civil war,
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with two competing governments in Tobruk and Tripoli9 and several
25
militias exercising de facto control over various parts of the
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9 The U.S. government and western powers recognized the Tobruk
28 government.
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1 country. Overseas Libyan assets had been frozen by the United
2 States and other nations pending the establishment of a stable
3 Libyan government.
4 Zuberi, Person A, and select representatives of the Tobruk
5 government negotiated an arrangement through which Zuberi would
6 exert his influence with the U.S. Congress to unfreeze these funds
7 and, if successful, the Libyan government would pay a commission to
8 an offshore entity organized by Person A and a Libyan businessman.
9 The profits generated by this venture would be distributed to
10 various individuals participating in this endeavor. Members of the
11 Libyan delegation and Person A promised to pay Zuberi compensation
12 for his efforts, but the precise source and timing of that payment
13 was a continued source of friction.
14 Zuberi’s lobbying efforts began in January 2015 and included:
15 (1) obtaining a March 26, 2015 letter of invitation to a Libyan
16 delegation from two members of the HFAC and one U.S. Senator, (2)
17 engaging in backdoor channels with Congress and the State Department
18 to obtain visas for the delegation on April 18, 2015 so that they
19 could visit the United States, (3) recruiting a group of individuals
20 in May 2015 to lay the groundwork for the lobbying effort, (4)
21 meeting with the Libyan delegation in Paris in March and May 2015 to
22 convince them of his ability to secure the release of the frozen
23 funds, and (5) fronting money in support of the effort, primarily in
24 the form of payments to retain associates, pay travel expenses, and
25 make campaign contributions.
26 From January 23 through March 9, 2015, Zuberi made $70,300 in
27 contributions to the campaign committees and PACs of the three
28 members of Congress who issued the letter of invitation and to
14
1 another Senator he lobbied in connection with the effort to procure
2 the invitation. Of these contributions, $30,800 were made in the
3 names of third parties, including Person A, a foreign national.
4 From March 19 through October 22, 2015, Zuberi orchestrated a series
5 of contributions totaling $232,300 that appear linked to the Libya
6 lobbying effort, which included contributions to the Hillary for
7 America campaign, the Hillary Victory Fund, and the national
8 congressional campaign committees for both the Democratic and
9 Republican parties. Of these contributions, $120,250 were made by
10 prohibited foreign sources, including Person A, by Zuberi in the
11 name of a third party, or were reimbursed by Zuberi.
12 Zuberi’s demands for money up front reveal that his covert
13 lobbying effort depended upon foreign-funded contributions to
14 political campaigns, corrupt donations to organizations affiliated
15 with politicians, and lobbying activities concealed from the
16 American public:
17
4/15/15 Zuberi I want the Libyans to pay what they promised in Paris...
18 4/15/15 Zuberi Well they will have to do this prior to coming to US
19 4/30/15 [Note: Visas for Libyan delegation approved]
5/1/15 Zuberi I told you these idiots will get their visas. We have done everything they
20 want (a little late because of me). Now we need to see something from
them to continue. Out of all the oil barrels they have promised there
21 needs to be some barrels of oil as down payment now.
5/1/15 Zuberi If the motherfucker [Member of Libyan Parliament] doesn't pay then he
22
should not come or come and we will hold him at the airport. It is called
23 VVVIP treatment. We check everything including cavities, assholes for
hemorrhoids and etc
24 5/7/15 Zuberi The Libyans need to put down payment. Otherwise we are wasting our
time.
25 5/7/15 Person C we said that we should look for someone in the Gulf to put down
26 payment. the libyans will not put a downpayment. What is the next
step?
27 5/10/15 Zuberi I am not going to spend all $3 to $5 million personally so we need to
come up with this. This is the next step. Maybe you and [Person A]
28 don't know how things work in America this is why you guys keep
15
1 asking me to do something which I can't do without everyone

contributing.
2 5/13/15 Zuberi [In response to his receiving FARA registration filing by Qorvis concerning
3 Libya]: Why are we helping them if they are going around talking to other
people? Why don’t we let them talk to everyone and when no one can
4 deliver then they can come to us to get it done.
5/14/15 Zuberi Please make sure you are working on getting people to put in $3 to $5
5 [million] we talked about …
5/14/15 Person C Ok everything but the 3 to 5 [million] is so hard unbelievable
6
5/14/15 Zuberi You want billions unfrozen. This is nothing. Iranians spent $150
7 [million] to get $25 billion released…
5/15/15 Zuberi I am in Washington for our Arab friends. Going to NYC early morning to
8 meet Hillary Clinton. Can you please call me tomorrow to catch up because
I saw people from State at lunch and dinner. We talked about your country.
9 On the way to Washington I read the new book Clinton Cash.10 You
10 must read because it discussed how Indian businessman helped make
US Indian civilian nuclear deal happen via Clinton.
11 5/14/15 Person C Wow
5/14/15 Person C Indians are really smart
12 5/15/15 Zuberi Donations
5/15/15 Person C I agree but you have to teach me how
13
5/15/15 Zuberi Start by the 3 to 5 [million] and work on getting people for Clinton
14 5/15/15 Zuberi Read the book
5/15/15 Zuberi Read the book now
15 …
5/15/15 Person C I already got you 6 [campaign contributions]11 and told me that it is good
16
for this month plus the others…
17
18 10 The book in question alleges that Indian entities and

individuals donated millions of dollars to the Clinton Foundation to
19 ensure Secretary Clinton’s support for the exportation of U.S.
nuclear technology to India. The Clinton Foundation has denied any
20 link between the contributions and Secretary Clinton’s official
acts. See https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/us/Charges-fly-
21 over-alleged-Indian-money-to-Clintons-to-push-nuclear-
deal/articleshow/47116471.cms Between October 2013 and February
22 2014, Zuberi donated over $300,000 to the Clinton Foundation, a
portion of which was reimbursed by a Person LL. The government
23 possesses no evidence suggesting that the Clinton Foundation engaged
in any illegal activity.
24
11 The six contributions were issued by Person A, Person B,
25 Person C, Person D, Person G, and Person H to Hillary for America.
Three of these individuals were foreign nationals and therefore were
26 prohibited from contributing to U.S. election campaigns. Upon
discovery of Person A’s foreign status, Hillary for America refunded
27 his contribution. The government has no information suggesting that
Hillary for America was aware of the illegal nature of the
28 contributions.
16
1 …
5/15/15 Zuberi Hey the book Clinton Cash
2 5/15/15 Zuberi You read and and have Mohammed read it
3 5/15/15 Zuberi This is how America work
5/15/15 Zuberi How Washington work
4 …
5/16/15 Person C [Person A] is talking to the minister and other libyans that they have to
5 consider to pay some amounts
6 5/16/15 Person C However [Person A] is going to Riyadh on monday to discuss with saudi
libyan guy I told you about
7 5/16/15 Person C I think this guy is our best bet.
5/16/15 Zuberi Without this it is no go. If I spend the money and do all the work then I will
8 want 90%
9 By June 2015, a disagreement as to payment resulted in Zuberi
10 threatening to remove himself from the project and block the efforts
11 of his erstwhile partners:
12
5/22/15 Zuberi I haven't heard back from you guys so I am taking it that this is off and
13
canceling everything to do with Libya i.e. letter, visa, appointment and
14 etc. I am a little irritated because I was push hard by both of you to:
• Come meet these guys in Paris earlier in the year. The Libyan-French
15 guy promised which was never delivered
• To get them the letter. Which I did by calling in favors from people.
16 Which will now be wasted
17 • Get these Libyan the US visa. Which I did without them going to the
US Embassy. Usually this is not done. This was a waste
18 • Come to Paris to help them get the presentation done. I flew 3 people
there at my expense more importantly I dropped other project to get to
19 Paris myself because you guys asked
6/5/15 Person C Hi, we are about to finalize the Libyan thing by Tuesday but we are waiting
20 the approval of the Parliament on tuesday and the negotiation is towards 3.5
21 to 4% or it will not fly. This is for your information. I did not discuss it with
any of the 3 guys you brought…
22 6/15/15 Zuberi …please tell the Libyan that this is off
6/15/15 Zuberi I can't work like Libyan do …
23 6/15/15 Person C I think they might have another route to the congress …
24 6/15/15 Zuberi Okay good
6/15/15 Zuberi I will block it
25 …
6/15/15 Zuberi Please tell them they will have to get new visa because these will be
26 cancelled this week
…
27
6/15/15 Person C Take care and thank you for the work you did
28 6/15/15 Zuberi You will be wasting your time because Libyan will be blocked
17
1 6/15/15 Zuberi I will make sure they get nothing

6/15/15 Zuberi They won't even be allowed to enter the country
2
However, in September 2015, shortly after Person A executed an
3
agreement to establish the offshore vehicle through which payments
4
could be made, Zuberi resumed his efforts in support of the
5
endeavor. On September 28, 2015, one of Zuberi’s hirelings prepared
6
a report regarding the location of over $200 billion in frozen
7
assets. On February 2, 2016, Zuberi enlisted the help of an
8
attorney to assist the Libyan delegation in lifting the freeze. On
9
March 1, 2016, Zuberi obtained a second letter of invitation for the
10
delegation from members of the HFAC.
11
Shortly thereafter, another dispute erupted between Zuberi and
12
Person A after a staffer for the HFAC informed Zuberi that the lead
13
member of the Libyan delegation was no longer in office. This
14
resulted in Zuberi disassociating himself from the project. Person
15
A retained another lobbyist and on April 19, 2016, the Libyan
16
delegation met with a HFAC member. Zuberi’s acrimonious emails in
17
response to being cut out of the deal reveal his continued interest
18
in wielding influence on behalf of the Libyan government independent
19
of any arrangement with Person A:
20
21 3/1/16 Zuberi I do not want to be involved in the Libya project after I get you the
22 letter. I do not have the time and I do not want conflict with you. The way
you guys are doing it you have zero chance of getting anything done.
23 Washington is not London or Riyadh or Beirut or Kuwait City. If I didn't
get you the letter there is no way you would have gotten the letter but
24 your attitude suggest otherwise…
4/16/16 Zuberi I am disappointed in your behavior again. I hear from people in
25
Washington about the meetings and what I want them to do? … People
26 have been asking me to help the new coming government in Libya as
oppose to the outgoing which you have signed with contract with. I will
27 be going to Tunisia or Egypt to meet with them
4/16/16 [Note: HFAC Congressman schedules meeting with Libyan delegation for
28 April 19]
18
1 4/18/16 Zuberi …Let’s see what you can accomplish. Having meetings with my friends
means nothing.
2 4/18/16 Zuberi By the way, if you want we can have all the meetings cancelled? Let’s see
3 what your lobbyist can do you reschedule?
4/19/16 [Note: Libyan delegation meets with HFAC Congressman]
4 4/22/16 Zuberi I am not happy with the shady way [Person C] took Libyans to Washington
based on the letter I got for him and the visa my friends arranged. I learned
5 from my friends in Washington that this was happening. Next time
these meetings will be blocked. [Person C] and/or [Person A] (whose ever
6
idea this was) didn't have the decency to tell me even when i was in
7 constant contact the days before with [Person C]
6/4/16 Zuberi There is a letter going out from Washington voiding the letter of
8 invitation to former Libyan [official]. We will not be dealing with them
going forward. We will work with other people in Libya
9
D. ZUBERI LOBBIED CONGRESS AS AN AGENT OF A UKRAINIAN
10 NATIONAL
11 The USPO’s Presentence Report does not discuss the
12 circumstances of another FARA violation committed by Zuberi that
13 involves unregistered lobbying on behalf of a Ukrainian national,
14 Dmitry Firtash. This lobbying effort generated $1 million for
15 Zuberi. It is instructive because Zuberi performed unregistered
16 lobbying activities in tandem with transparent public relations
17 efforts conducted on behalf of Firtash by a FARA registrant. Well
18 aware of the FARA registration requirement, Zuberi and his
19 conspirators parsed out from disclosure those efforts they wished to
20 have concealed from the American public.
21 In late 2014, Zuberi engaged in business discussions with Group
22 DF International, a Ukrainian business conglomerate created by
23 Dmitry Firtash, a Ukrainian oligarch. Firtash is currently under
24 indictment in the United States and facing extradition from Austria.
25 On January 1, 2015, Zuberi issued an invoice to Group DF, which was
26 paid with a $1 million wire transfer on March 27, 2015.
27 Zuberi’s work for Group DF appears to have involved lobbying
28 the U.S. Congress with respect to two issues: (1) Firtash’s criminal
19
1 defense, which largely revolved around the argument that the U.S.
2 prosecution was politically motivated, and (2) the creation, with
3 Congressional support, of a privately funded “Ukraine development
4 fund” that would create business opportunities for Group DF in the
5 Ukraine, after the collapse of its pro-Russian government.
6 In August 2014, Zuberi enlisted a Washington, D.C. lobbying
7 firm to come up with a proposal for Group DF to clean up Firtash’s
8 public image. Zuberi sent the lobbying firm (1) a June 14, 2014
9 FARA registration filing made by another Washington D.C. lobbying
10 firm previously retained to represent Firtash, (2) a press article
11 reporting that Firtash had retained that previous firm to “clean his
12 public record,” and (3) a proposal from a public relations firm
13 entitled "Personal Reputation Management Campaign for Dmitry
14 Firtash." Zuberi informed the lobbying firm that they would be
15 doing the same type of work as that performed by the FARA-registered
16 firm, but the lobbying firm was never retained. However, within
17 four months, Zuberi issued the above-referenced $1,000,000 invoice
18 to Group DF and subsequently received full payment.
19 In September 2014, Zuberi entered into discussions with various
20 employees, agents, and lobbyists associated with Group DF in an
21 effort to promote Firtash’s plan for a Ukraine development fund that
22 would allow Group DF to profit in Ukraine in the wake of the
23 collapse of its pro-Russian government and the United States’s
24 imposition of sanctions against Russia.
25 In January 2015, Zuberi solicited and received from two members
26 of the HFAC letters of invitation addressed to members of the United
27 Kingdom and German legislatures who, according to open source
28 reporting, had previously operated as lobbyists and/or agents of
20
1 Dmitry Firtash. Zuberi forwarded the letters to both the invitees
2 and to two officers of Group DF. Zuberi told the ensemble of
3 characters that the letters would make this “an official trip” and
4 that they should be prepared to discuss not only the "Ukraine
5 rebuilding fund" but also "Eastern European energy needs when you
6 are in Washington." Zuberi promised: "We will call US Energy
7 Department (cabinet administration) and members who deal with these
8 issues in Senate and House to discuss this. US rules and
9 regulations are being changed to make this happen."
10 On February 7, 2015, Zuberi, members of Zuberi’s U.S. entourage
11 and the Group DF representatives traveled to Munich to meet with
12 members of a Congressional delegation attending the annual European
13 Security Conference. The purpose was to meet with members of
14 Congress to encourage them to support the creation of the Ukraine
15 fund. The group met with five Senators and a Congressman for
16 dinner. Zuberi engaged in private discussions with two U.S.
17 Senators. Zuberi reported to the others that the Senators responded
18 that the idea needed more development. Zuberi promised the Group DF
19 representatives, that once the concept was more developed, he would
20 bring it forward to Washington using his contacts and resources to
21 achieve results.12
22
23
24
25
26
12 The HFAC members and two Senators with whom Zuberi met in
27 this instance were the same individuals to whom Zuberi directed
$70,300 in contributions discussed in the section of this brief
28 relating to the Libyan lobbying effort.
21
1 IV. THE SCOPE OF ZUBERI’S FARA VIOLATIONS WERE EXCEPTIONAL
2 The Court’ should consider the sentences of “defendants with
3 similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.” 18
4 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). The most relevant follow:13
5 In United States v. Manafort, No. 1:17-cr-00201 (D.D.C.),
6 defendant pleaded guilty to (1) conspiracy to violate FARA, commit
7 tax fraud, file false foreign bank account reports (“FBARs”), and
8 launder money, and (2) conspiracy to obstruct justice by tampering
9 with witnesses. Manafort worked as an unregistered agent of the
10 Government of Ukraine, the Ukrainian Party of Regions, and former
11 Ukrainian President Yanukovych. The Court sentenced Manafort to 73
12 months’ imprisonment, including the statutory maximum 60 months
13 imprisonment for the conspiracy to violate FARA. Manafort’s
14 parallel sentence for tax and fraud offenses resulted in a total
15 term of incarceration of 90 months’ imprisonment.14
16 In United States v. Vincent et al., No. 1:05-cr-00059
17 (S.D.N.Y), defendant Tongsun Park was convicted at trial for
18 conspiring to violate FARA, to act as an agent of a foreign
19 government without notifying the Attorney General, and to launder
20 money, in connection with a scheme to lobby for easing United States
21 and United Nations sanctions on Iraq and to corruptly influence the
22
23 13 The list of cases includes only those most analogous the

Zuberi matter. Sentences imposed against defendants who received
24 reduced sentences for cooperation (United States v. Gates, No. 1:17-
cr-00201 (D.D.C.) and United States v. Patten, No. 1:18-cr-00260
25 (D.D.C.)) have not been included in this analysis.
26 14 Manafort’s entire sentence equaled 90 months’ imprisonment

because of a 47-month sentence he received in the Eastern District
27 of Virginia for subscription to false income tax returns, failure to
file an FBAR, and bank fraud that ran partially consecutively and
28 partially concurrently to the District of Columbia sentence.
22
1 award and conditions of Oil-for-Food contracts. The Court sentenced
2 Park to the statutory maximum 60 months’ imprisonment.
3 In United States v. Siljander, No. 4:07-cr-00087 (W.D. Mo.), a
4 former U.S. Representative pleaded guilty to (1) acting as an
5 unregistered agent of the Islamic American Relief Agency (“IARA”),
6 to lobby for IARA’s removal from a Senate Finance Committee list of
7 charities suspected of having terrorist ties, and (2) obstruction of
8 justice. His co-defendant, Abdel Azim El-Siddig, pleaded guilty to
9 conspiring to violate FARA by hiring Siljander. The Court sentenced
10 Siljander to one year and one day of imprisonment, and sentenced El-
11 Siddig to two years’ probation.
12 In United States v. Ben Israel, No. 1:13-cr-00572 (N.D. Il.),
13 defendant pleaded guilty to failing to register under FARA as an
14 agent of Zimbabwe. Between late 2008 and early 2010, Ben Israel
15 lobbied U.S. state and federal government officials to lift
16 sanctions on Robert Mugabe and other Zimbabwean government
17 officials. The Court sentenced Ben Israel to seven months
18 imprisonment.
19 In United States v. Chaudhry, No. 1:18-cr-00226 (D. Md.), the
20 defendant pleaded guilty for acting as an unregistered agent for
21 Pakistan. The defendant’s conduct included organizing roundtable
22 discussions with his contacts in the U.S. government and scholars
23 employed by Washington, D.C.-area think tanks to solicit information
24 that could be used to influence U.S. foreign policy and neutralize
25 unfavorable views of Pakistan held by U.S. officials and scholars.
26 The defendant briefed high-level Pakistan government officials on
27 information obtained from his U.S. government and think tank
28
23
1 contacts. The Court sentenced defendant to three years of
2 probation.
3 The breadth of Zuberi’s FARA violations exceeds that of all of
4 the above cases, as summarized below:
6 Defendant FARA Crimes Related Crimes FARA Sentence

Zuberi Sri Lanka defrauded clients
7 Bahrain tax evasion
8 Turkey witness tampering
Libya FECA violations
9 Ukraine
Others
10
Manafort Ukraine bank fraud 60 months
11 tax evasion
witness tampering
12
laundering
13 Vincent Iraq laundering 60 months
Siljander IARA obstruction 12 months
14 Ben Israel Zimbabwe 7 months
Chaudhry Pakistan probation
15
Zuberi’s conduct merits a sentence commensurate with the
16
severity of his conduct.
17
V. DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO COMPLY WITH FARA OBLIGATIONS AS
18 REQUIRED BY THE PLEA AGREEMENT
19 Paragraph four of the plea agreement requires the defendant to
20 “satisfy any and all obligations under FARA prior to sentencing,
21 including registering for any and all activity, past or present,
22 that requires registration under FARA and amending any deficiencies
23 in existing FARA filings.”
24 To date, the defendant has made no such filings. In the event
25 defendant fails make necessary filings prior to sentencing, the
26 government believes the Court should consider this an aggravating
27 factor in determining his sentence.
28
24
1 VI. CONCLUSION
2 Zuberi’s repeated conduct constitutes an egregious series of
3 FARA violations. The offenses involved prohibited activities on
4 behalf of numerous foreign governments, entities, and individuals
5 that transpired over the course of several years. The violations
6 were part of a larger surreptitious effort to route foreign money
7 into U.S. elections and to use it to corrupt U.S. policy-making
8 processes. His crimes not only involved the violation of federal
9 election laws and prohibitions on lobbying, but schemes to deceive
10 the United States Congress as to the actions of another nation,
11 defraud clients, and evade the payment of millions of dollars in
12 taxes.
13 Defendant’s own words, quoted throughout this memorandum,
14 demonstrate his corrupt motives. Defendant explained to his clients
15 that funneling foreign money into U.S. elections and organizations
16 for the benefit of government officials was the “way America works.”
17 The Court can reject that proposition by imposing a sentence
18 announcing that America loathes such schemes and that illegal
19 foreign interference in our policy-making processes must stop.
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
25

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Case 2:19-cr-00642-VAP Document 84 Filed 03/17/20 Page 1 of 28 Page ID #:802

13 Attorneys for Plaintiff

15 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

16 FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

17 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CR No. 19-642-VAP

18 Plaintiff, GOVERNMENT’S SENTENCING POSITION

1 Plaintiff, United States of America, by and through its counsel

2 of record, the United States Attorney for the Central District of

3 California, hereby submits its position with respect to the

4 defendant’s Foreign Agents Registration Act (”FARA”) violations and

5 his failure to comply with the terms of his plea agreement.

6 An under seal declaration of Assistant United States Attorney

7 Daniel J. O’Brien in support of this position, with exhibits, will

8 be filed concurrently with this document.

9 Dated: March 17, 2020 Respectfully submitted,

5 III. ZUBERI’S FARA VIOLATIONS WERE PERVASIVE . . . . . . . . . . 5

1 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

3 The government disagrees with the characterizations of

4 defendant’s Foreign Agents Registration Act (“FARA”) violations set

5 forth by the U.S. Probation Office (“USPO”) in its Presentence

7 reporting violations, but rather a crucial ingredient of Zuberi’s

8 broader efforts to help foreign governments, entities, and

9 individuals corrupt our public officials, institutions, and

10 democratic processes. Moreover, although the USPO factually recites

11 several examples of Zuberi’s FARA violations, it does not adequately

12 convey their scope, or the pervasive and insidious nature of

13 defendant’s corrupt acts.

14 Nearly the entirety of defendant’s business activities and

15 profits involved trading on his ability to influence U.S. government

16 officials by engaging in concerted lobbying efforts and making

17 enormous campaign contributions that, unbeknownst to the recipients

18 and the public, were funded by prohibited foreign sources. For

19 reasons discussed below, the FARA offenses committed by Zuberi were

20 necessary to execute this criminal scheme. Defendant’s extensive

21 and repeated FARA violations and related nefarious conduct demand

23 Moreover, the USPO’s valid “concern that our government lacks

24 transparency” and the public’s loss of faith stemming from past

25 failures to interdict clandestine foreign efforts to subvert U.S.

26 democratic processes counsel in favor of a significant sentence in

1 this case to deter other would-be FARA offenders from seeking to

2 compromise U.S. democracy in exchange for foreign cash.

1 their foreign businesses. One of Zuberi’s clients described

2 Zuberi’s sales pitch as follows:

3 “I’m in charge of fund-raising for [] President Obama.” …

8 This criminal enterprise demanded secrecy. FARA requires the

9 identification of all foreign principals on whose behalf the

10 registrant is acting, foreign monies received by the registrant, the

11 dispersal of such funds, political activities (such as lobbying)

12 engaged in by the registrant, and campaign contributions made by the

13 registrant and associated individuals. Truthful FARA disclosures

14 would have revealed defendant’s receipt of millions of dollars from

15 foreign sources, the specific lobbying and public relations efforts

16 performed, and the millions of dollars of political contributions he

17 made to the officials he was lobbying. It would have invited the

18 same scrutiny defendant encountered when a Foreign Policy Magazine

19 article revealed his Sri Lankan lobbying efforts,1 a crime to which

20 defendant has now admitted guilt.

21 Second, secrecy was necessary to Zuberi’s fraud and tax evasion

22 schemes. Zuberi converted client funds. Zuberi didn’t report this