Mascarenhas2011 PDF

17
Developing the performance

brain: decision making under
pressure
Duncan R.D. Mascarenhas* Nickolas C. Smith{

*Sport & Exercise Sciences, Glyndŵr University, Wrexham, UK;
{
Department of Sport and Exercise Science, MMU Cheshire, Crewe Green,
Cheshire, UK
CHAPTER CONTENTS Introduction

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245
The study of decision making . . . . . . . . . 245 The physical performance environment contains
Classical decision-making theory . . . . . 246 distinctive, often time-constrained conditions with
Naturalistic decision making . . . . . . . . 247 uncertainties, complexities and dynamics that
What supports effective decision making? . . 248 require participants to make decisions under intense
Knowledge structures and their pressure. A range of paradigms of investigation have
support for decision making . . . . . . . . 248 contributed to the body of knowledge in this area:
Relationship between knowledge and motor control, normative or classical decision making
expertise in decision making . . . . . . . . 249 (CDM) models and naturalistic decision making
How is such knowledge developed? (NDM). Much has been learned about the skills
Practice implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249 and processes that high-performing individuals and
The development of mental models . . . 250 teams use to make effective decisions. This in turn
The development of shared mental has led to training interventions designed to advance
models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251
the process of skilled decision making (DM). This
Stress and decision-making chapter discusses the contribution of research from
performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252
various paradigms to expertise in DM. We will high-
Sources of stress in decision-making light the theoretical underpinnings to the processes
environments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252
Stress, anxiety and performance . . . . . 253 that experts engage in, how stress affects these
Processing efficiency theory . . . . . . . . 257 DM processes and, finally, how they can be trained
Attentional control theory . . . . . . . . . . 258 to allow physical performers such as athletes, coa-
ches, sports officials and dancers, to make effective
The application and training of decision
making: current thinking . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259 decisions under pressure.
Introduction to naturalistic training
approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259
Training high performance sports officials 261
The study of decision making
Developing decision making in rugby
union refereeing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261 The study of factors affecting human DM has a long
Video-based decision-making training and venerable history in psychology (Von Neumann &
with high-performance sports teams . . . 262 Morgenstern 1947). Operationally, DM can be
The use of high-fidelity video scenarios defined as the process of committing to a particular
in decision-making training . . . . . . . . . 262 course of action. Such courses of action can range
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262 from the relatively trivial (e.g. deciding what clothes
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263
ã 2011, Elsevier Ltd.

DOI: 10.1016/B978-0-443-06734-1.00017-1
SECTION THREE Practice
to wear to work) to life-affecting (e.g. a military theory to time-pressured, complex, ambiguous,

combat situation deciding whether a potential target and dynamic situations such as sport may risk misre-
is hostile or friendly). presenting what actually takes place in the real
Two main theoretical viewpoints, CDM and world (Lipshitz 1993). Perhaps the greatest limita-
NDM, have been advanced to explain the processes tions of the CDM approach have been the tenden-
involved in making decisions. These two viewpoints cies to separate characteristics of the DM task from
make quite different assumptions about how DM the context in which decisions occur and also the
should be studied and how ‘expertise’ in DM is failure to consider the expertise of the decision
acquired. maker.
Interestingly, in organizational environments where
there is low time pressure, when DM skills based
Classical decision-making theory on CDM theory have been taught to experts in
business management (Isenberg 1984), financial
According to CDM theory (also referred to as a nor- analysis (Paquette & Kida 1988) and medical diag-
mative DM model), DM is a rather structured, nosis (Alessi 1988), they rarely appear to use them
formulaic process. CDM theorists, such as Ward (Beach & Lipshitz 1993, Means et al 1993), choosing
Edwards (1954) tended to focus on the ‘outcomes’ instead to use more subjective, intuitive factors as
of decisions in terms of their ‘correctness’ and the basis of their decisions (Dreyfus & Dreyfus
assumed that, in all DM settings, correct decision 1980, Isenberg 1985, Roth 1997). Evidence also sug-
options could be identified through a process of gests that such professionals find the prescribed
rational analysis. Within such an account, the most operations cumbersome, time-consuming and ineffi-
effective way to make a decision involves a clear cient in terms of time and resources (Beach & Lipshitz
identification of the problem, the generation of a 1993). So, while normative models of rational choice
range of alternative solutions, a criteria-based evalu- may have theoretical justification, they are often not
ation of these solutions, one against the another and, used, even in situations where they may appear to
finally, the selection of the preferred option (Beach & present an effective solution. Consistent with these
Lipshitz 1993, Cannon-Bowers et al 1996). Within findings is evidence from studies showing that indivi-
this paradigm, decisions are represented as dis- duals often fail to consider all the available options
crete, static, unchanging and self-contained events, before making a decision (Payne et al 1993). Such
often separated from the context in which the deci- research has highlighted that individuals may only
sion occurs. Errors in such settings are assumed to consider potential solutions to a point where they
be due to the failure to consider all the relevant identify one that fulfils the minimum criteria for a
information or to evaluate such information in an desired goal to be achieved, a process that has been
inappropriate manner. Errors can also occur as a termed ‘satisficing’ (Eysenck & Keane 2005, Simon
result of applying inappropriate heuristics or ‘rules 1955). Johnson & Raab (2003) suggest that indivi-
of thumb’ where the decision maker erroneously duals are governed by a goal-driven heuristic that leads
assumes a similarity between the decision problem them to ‘take the first option’, rather than comparing
and one previously encountered. between options. For example, in sport, the decision
Such classical theories have been successfully to pass or shoot (see Bennis & Pachur 2006) may be
applied to structured DM problems, often in situa- driven by the individual’s belief about their role in the
tions where the speed of decision is not critical. team, i.e. a passer or a goal scorer, and such heuristics
For example, someone purchasing a new car might may drive them to short-cut the decision selection
establish a need for something economical, reliable, process. Thus, it is unclear what circumstances actu-
spacious and with safety extras such as air bags and ally ‘prompt’ the evaluation of multiple options in
anti-lock brakes. Based on this information, the pur- many DM tasks.
chaser may draw up a shortlist of different vehicles Payne et al (1993) have pointed out that the the-
that fit the individual’s requirements. Comparing oretically ‘optimal’ decision rule in naturalistic set-
the relative merits of each car – e.g. one has better tings may be far from optimal when the time to
fuel economy but a smaller boot – will lead the indi- decide is limited. These authors also highlight that
vidual to a ‘best choice’ option. This methodical people are capable of adjusting their DM strategies
‘choice-behaviour’ approach may seem appealing in as time constraints vary. Given the apparent reluc-
some decision settings. However, applying CDM tance of experts to use rational choice strategies,
246
Developing the performance brain CHAPTER 17
one might assume that time constraints force them Naturalistic decision making
to use alternative methods, reflecting a form of
speed–accuracy trade-off. There is some evidence Given the limitations of CDM theory as previously
that supports this view. In a series of studies exam- described, researchers have recently focused their
ining DM in gambling, Payne et al (1988) showed efforts on investigating the actual processes that
that professional gamblers changed their DM strate- expert decision makers engage in. Typical of this
gies significantly when performing under unaccus- work have been investigations of expert military
tomed time pressure. In contrast, studies of DM commanders, aviators, firefighters and astronauts
in chess grand masters and experienced aircraft pilots on the NASA space program (see Klein 1997a). Evi-
have shown declines in decision accuracy to be mini- dence tends to confirm the view that in these envir-
mal when decision speed is increased. Calderwood onments experts generally make effective decisions
et al (1988) found that the proportion of tactical without lengthy deliberation over a range of alterna-
errors made by chess masters, as rated by an indepen- tives as predicted by CDM theory (Klein 1997b,
dent grand master, showed no effect of time pres- Orasanu & Connolly 1993, Zsambok 1997).
sure, with error rates of 8% under regulation time Studying DM behaviours in naturalistic settings
(approximately 2.6 min per move) but only 7% has intuitive attraction for those interested in deci-
under ‘blitz’ conditions (moving within 6 s). Inter- sion processes in performance settings. Such settings
mediate players, on the other hand, made more mis- often share many of the contextual characteristics
takes with the introduction of time pressure, with of those mentioned above where performance takes
performance errors increasing from 11% to 25%. place in situations of high uncertainty, under time
Similarly, Stokes et al (1997) showed that, when pressure and, often, for high stakes. The growing
asked to respond under real-time pressure to chal- body of research into naturalistic decision making
lenging situations such as abrupt changes in cockpit (NDM) has led to a clearer definition of this per-
instrument panels, experienced pilots chose the cor- spective, which characterizes human DM as prone
rect answer as their first choice 71% of the time, to error as a consequence of:
compared to 53% correct decisions in less experi-
enced pilots. Since the experts were deemed to have • ill-structured problems;
no greater cognitive advantage or reasoning ability • uncertain dynamic environments;
than their less experienced colleagues (Barnett • shifting, ill-defined or competing goals;
1989), their increased performance was attributed • multiple event–feedback loops;
to their access to ‘aviation-specific’ knowledge struc- • time constraints;
tures held in long-term memory (Stokes et al 1997). • high stakes;
All these findings have been taken to reflect the • multiple players or team members; and
importance of experience and task-specific practice
• organizational norms and goals that must be
within particular domains of achievement. In turn,
balanced against the decision maker’s personal
considerable interest has been generated in the per-
choice (Cannon-Bowers et al 1996, Zsambok 1997).
ceptual and cognitive factors that underpin such
expertise in DM. Central to this area of research Although it has become generally accepted that
has been the study of how experts appear able to only some of these factors need to be present for a
make the correct decision without generating decision to be considered naturalistic (Orasanu &
and deliberating between alternatives. In order to Connolly 1993), often all these characteristics
address such complex issues, alternative approaches feature in performance environments. For example,
to the study of DM have been developed, reflecting goalkeepers in football or hockey have to react to
an important change of emphasis from normative a range of attacking and defensive patterns, often
models that stress ‘making decisions correctly,’ to without formal structure. In these settings they have
real-world investigations that are more concerned to decide whether to come out to challenge the
with ‘making the correct decisions’ (Beach & Lipshitz attacker and risk either being chipped or the attacker
1993). Such approaches place less emphasis on passing the ball to a team-mate. They also have to be
prescriptive processes and greater emphasis on aware of their own team-mates, who may intervene,
contextual factors within the decision environment and make such decisions quickly, often under consid-
and also the level of experience of the decision erable pressure, in the knowledge that a mistake
maker. could cost the team a goal and potentially the game.
247
Consequently, in an attempt to understand the What supports effective

processes that experts actually go through, NDM
researchers have used a variety of different and more decision making?
ecologically valid techniques to examine DM in the
context it occurs. Such an approach has been widely Underpinning most NDM theories is the assumption
advocated within the sport science literature (e.g. that experts possess highly developed, domain-
Williams et al 1999). specific knowledge acquired from extended practice
Contrary to CDM theory, NDM findings suggest in relevant contexts. Such knowledge is organized in a
that, in time-constrained settings, expert decision fashion that enables rapid access and retrieval to help
makers use context dependent pattern recognition guide decisions made in time-constrained and stress-
or framing, based on highly developed ‘mental models’ ful settings (Tenenbaum 2003). The organization of
to generate potential decisions rather than the system- such knowledge in memory is argued to enable
atic evaluation of options. Seminal work investigat- expert performers to represent problems and gener-
ing expert and novice differences in chess (DeGroot ate potential solutions in a manner that allows them
1978, Simon & Chase 1973) revealed grand masters’ to circumvent the normal limitations of information
superior abilities to recognize familiar chessboard processing (e.g. attentional and working memory
patterns. When asked to recall complex, yet realistic limitations).
board configurations, experts were more accurate in
reproducing them than novices, whereas when pre-
sented with random arrays of chess pieces there were Knowledge structures and their
no differences between the two groups. Simon & support for decision making
Chase (1973) suggested that experts perceived the
structured display in terms of highly familiar patterns Attempts to more clearly identify the characteristics
made up of meaningful chunks of information. of the knowledge structures that underpin expert
The research into this structuring of information performance have highlighted some important con-
has elicited an array of terminology to describe the ceptual distinctions. Anderson (1995) suggests that
advantages in recognition performance shown by knowledge can be categorized as either declarative
experts, from chunking (Means et al 1993) into a or procedural in nature. Procedural knowledge sup-
decision type (Cannon-Bowers & Bell 1997) based ports the ‘how to’ aspects of task performance and
on shared characteristics or highly familiar patterns, is manifest in the performance of motor actions
to framing (Tversky & Kahneman 1981), which sug- and sequences. Such knowledge is often closed to
gests experts are better able to parse cues rapidly introspection (i.e. performers cannot always ver-
through the processes of pattern recognition (Means balize the processes involved) and has been exam-
et al 1993) and pattern matching (Klein 1997b) into ined using a range of measurement approaches that
templates (Cannon-Bowers & Bell 1997). employ both cognitive–behavioural measures (e.g.
Despite the potential loss of context-specific recognition paradigms and eye movement behaviours
details when making decisions that are based on a (McLennan & Omodei 1996)) and verbal reports
series of template accounts of the situation (Tolcott (e.g. ‘think aloud’ protocols (Schraagen 1997)).
et al 1989), researchers sanction it as an effective way By contrast, declarative knowledge represents the
of organizing information when time pressure is ‘what and whys’ that support task performance.
inherent. Leaving aside the idiosyncrasies of termi- Declarative knowledge involves knowing that some-
nology, there has been consistent evidence in the thing is the case (e.g. that it is illegal for a back
sport psychology literature of experts’ superior pat- row player to make an attack hit in volleyball from
tern recognition of key features within structured within the front court playing area) and relies
displays (Janelle & Hillman 2003). While differences on access to both episodic and semantic memory.
in pattern recognition may reliably distinguish Episodic memory is a form of long-term memory
between skilled and less skilled performers, recogni- that involves personal memory of experiences that
tion advantages appear to provide a necessary but have occurred in particular places and times. Such
not sufficient overall account of expert behaviour. memory is also important in recalling recent events
Such expert behaviour also appears to rely on a more and the strategies performers used to achieve impor-
complex interplay of perceptual/attentional factors tant goals (i.e. events that are active in working
and underlying knowledge structures. memory). Semantic memory consists of more
248
general knowledge about the world and the relation- Previous findings using similar methods (French &
ships that exist within it (Eysenck & Keane 2005). McPherson 1999) support the view that superior
By way of illustration, in the straightforward performance shown by experts is the result of
task of going for a walk, declarative knowledge will increased elaboration and flexibility of ‘action plan’
tell us that we need to put our shoes on because it and ‘current event’ profiles that experts hold in
is wet outside. The procedural knowledge holds long-term memory and that are accessed rapidly
information to ensure that we put the shoes on during play. Action plan profiles are rule-governed
the correct feet and know how to tie our laces. representations (i.e. stored in prototypical form) that
In the performance environment, taking refereeing are used to link characteristics of the current environ-
as an example, declarative knowledge represents ment to stored visual events or motor actions. In the
the official’s knowledge and understanding of the tennis context, these profiles may represent charac-
laws, players and the environment, and the nuances teristics of an opponent’s court position and shot
on the day (i.e. both episodic and semantic memory). selection, or information on the coordination pattern
Procedural knowledge is seen in the officiating beha- shown by opponents during shot execution. Current
viours the referee uses, such as their use of the event profiles refer to structures in memory that are
whistle, voice and body language. Therefore, the used to monitor and guide more global tactical and
relationship between such knowledge and demon- strategic aspects of play. These draw on information
strated expertise in DM is of central importance in from both past experience and current events to
understanding superior performance across a range form a developing ‘script’ that supports performers’
of achievement settings. ongoing tactical behaviours.
McPherson & Kernodle (2007) used interview
data taken from participants during breaks in play
Relationship between knowledge that was used to compare the immediate recall of
and expertise in decision making the two groups regarding events from the previous
point (i.e. a recall interview) and the problem repre-
While it seems clear that expertise cannot wholly be sentations players showed for the subsequent point
accounted for by differences in task-related knowl- (i.e. a planning interview). Although we must be con-
edge between skilled and less skilled performers, scious of the limitations of self-reports of perfor-
strong support exists that this proposition is partially mance (for a review, see Nisbett & Wilson 1977),
correct. Salthouse (1991) has argued that expert– McPherson & Kernodle showed that advanced begin-
novice differences in performance can largely be ners had relatively poorly developed action plans
accounted for by differences in knowledge between compared to entry-level professionals. They were
such individuals. Unlike expert performers, novices’ also less able to strategically plan for the subsequent
lack of knowledge means they are less able to predict point, based on well developed current event pro-
events, less sure about what information sources to files. In contrast, entry-level professionals showed
attend to, what course of action to take and when elaborate tactical and strategic representations of
to take it, and finally, less knowledgeable about their own and their opponent’s behaviours in both
the relationships that exist between performance- their action plans and current event profiles. These
related variables. A similar view has been expressed findings support the view that sport expertise and
more recently by Ste-Marie (2003), who found that the advantages shown by experts in sport-specific
differences in expertise between skilled and less DM tasks are dependent on highly elaborate knowl-
skilled judges and referees could largely be explained edge structures held in long-term memory that guide
by variations in task-related knowledge. tactical and strategic behaviours.
More direct evidence of differences between
skilled and less skilled performers in their underlying
knowledge structures and the importance of these How is such knowledge developed?
to expert performance comes from the work of Practice implications
McPherson & Kernodle (2007). These authors stud-
ied the verbal reports of advanced beginners and Research suggests that quite specific features of
entry-level professional tennis players obtained dur- the practice undertaken by experts may account
ing actual play to compare differences between the for their superior DM skills. The term ‘deliberate
groups in knowledge and problem representation. practice’ has been used extensively in recent years
249
to describe the form and types of activity that seem

important to the eventual development of expert The development of mental models
status (Ericsson et al 1993, Starkes & Ericsson
2003). Deliberate practice is defined as being effort- Despite the general consensus that skilled decision
ful in nature, with the main goal of personal improve- makers possess highly elaborate knowledge struc-
ment of performance rather than enjoyment, and tures that support DM and expert performance,
is often performed without immediate reward. there is less agreement about how such knowledge
Interestingly for those seeking to understand the structures develop. Perhaps the most cited theoreti-
relationship between knowledge development and cal account, which has also received considerable
expert performance, Ericsson et al argue that experts support outside the NDM literature, suggests that
continually strive to make practice environments experts use mental models to help individual and
progressively more challenging and non-routine in team coordination by forming accurate and meaning-
nature. As a consequence, practice activities are sel- ful expectations and explanations of events (Cannon-
dom, if ever, characterized by mere replication or Bowers et al 1990, Norman 1983). In this regard,
repetition of movement patterns or drills without Rouse et al (1992) suggest that mental models
a progressively more challenging goal in mind. Such provide knowledge of the situation to direct atten-
orientation to practice helps them resist or delay the tion, classify information and form an understanding
automaticity that accompanies the more routine of its meaning. More recently, Endsley (1997) has
practice of cognitive and motor skills. In so doing, argued that mental models also create expectations
this enables the generation of increasingly elaborate regarding future events and provide a link between
and complex mental representations of tasks, factors recognition processes and typical actions. Thus, they
that appear important foundations of subsequent are not only capable of directing attention to incom-
expertise. ing information but also priming potential solu-
The findings that experts use practice strategies tions, through constructive processing (Klein 2000,
that help them remain at the cognitive stage of McLennan & Omodei 1996). Consequently, this
learning (see Chs 13, 14 and 15) has considerable negates the need for deliberation amongst alternatives
relevance to recent research interest in the develop- as prescribed by CDM. The purpose of mental models
ment of metacognitive skills (Barnett & Ceri 2002). is to aid interpretive processes, helping to screen out
Metacognitive skills are those processes used by information in order to prevent overload, a factor that
the learner to monitor and control the learning pro- seems crucial when individuals are performing com-
cess itself (i.e. skills that help learners manage their plex tasks under time pressure. Holyoak (1984,
own learning). Learning strategies that encourage p. 193) defines mental models as ‘a psychological
the development of such skills have close associa- representation of the environment and its expected
tion with ‘mastery-orientated’ learning environments behaviour’ that helps individuals make sense of their
in which the learner’s goal is to focus their atten- surroundings (Klimoski & Mohammed 1994). Such
tion on activities related to the skill acquisition models are used to both represent and organize knowl-
process (e.g. self-monitoring of learning attempts) edge by simulating the important characteristics of
rather than performance outcomes (Kozlowski situations that are to be cognitively mastered and they
1998). Studies of learning activities that encourage do so in such a fashion that complex phenomena
the development of metacognitive skills suggest become manageable (Seel et al 2000).
that two key consequences result. First, the learner Thus mental models provide a conceptual frame-
develops a range of self-regulatory skills that are work for describing, explaining and predicting future
important to eventual expert performance. These system states (Rouse & Morris 1986). Such skilled
self-regulatory skills include both learning-related behaviours have also been argued to form the foun-
(e.g. self-reflection) and motivation/affect-related dation of ‘situation awareness’. Situation awareness
(e.g. the regulation of emotions) outcomes. Second, involves three levels of awareness: (1) perceptual,
as a result of metacognitive skill development, per- (2) comprehension and (3) prediction, which direct
formers often demonstrate higher self-efficacy or the decision maker to an appropriate decision point
task-related competence, an attribute that has been (Endsley 1997). It is the third level of awareness
associated with persistence in challenging practice (prediction) that allows individuals to anticipate
environments and resilience in the face of setbacks the actions of others and adjust their performance
(Kozlowski 1998). accordingly.
250
The shared nature of knowledge between team and the likely needs of other team members. This
members represents an important area of study since allows inferences to be drawn in order to anticipate
both independent and interdependent understanding team members’ actions and make adjustments to
is critical to effective DM in team settings. Thus, maintain overall team coordination (Johnson-Laird
although mental models have been examined more 1983, Rouse et al 1992). Shared mental models guide
extensively at the level of the individual, recently the evolution of ‘same expectations’ and ‘same
there have been considerable efforts to explore these patterns of thinking’ that lead team members to
phenomena at the team or group level (Webber et al respond in a similar manner (Cannon-Bowers et al
2000). 1990). Furthermore, they reflect the shared knowl-
edge, attitudes and behaviours that help to form a
common understanding of a situation. When two
The development of shared or more individuals share this level of understanding
mental models based on the recognition of the situation, compre-
hension of the problem and prediction of future
NDM postulates that, when team members have events, it often leads to the same decision processes
accurate and equally detailed conceptualizations of and coordinated actions (Cannon-Bowers et al 1990).
the problem and the requirements of team function- Such coordinated responses and actions that take
ing necessary to solve it (i.e. common declarative and place without the need for lengthy communication
procedural knowledge), they have developed shared have been referred to as team coherence (Mascaren-
mental models (Cannon-Bowers et al 1990, Noble has 2005). Thus, shared knowledge of task compo-
et al 1987). The earliest reference to the existence nents and the relationships that exist amongst
of a shared mental-model was in Torrance’s (1953) them provided by a shared mental model often leads
report on Second World War military units downed to coherent DM (Rouse & Morris 1986, Rumelhart &
behind enemy lines. In this account, the unit leader Ortony 1977). In the sporting domain, this can lead
took responsibility for communicating information to flawless acts of coordination, where team-mates
to develop a shared understanding of the situation. are able to anticipate each others’ movements and
More recently, and perhaps more appropriately, work fluidly together. Similarly, for elite sports
this has been termed a shared situation-model (see officials, shared mental models, and the collective
Rouse & Morris 1986), mirroring theories on prob- situational understanding they foster, appear to
lem framing and typing, as previously discussed, provide the platform for different decision makers
which subsequently drives the construction of appro- to independently judge situations in a coherent
priate mental models (cf. Tversky & Kahneman manner. Thus, the effective development of collec-
1974, 1981). tive mental models of the situation (Lipshitz & Ben
Conceptualizing problems through explicit and Shaul 1997) is one solution to achieving effective
timely interactions has been identified as a key factor team performance.
in reduced error rates amongst commercial airline However, team coherence in sport is not always
cockpit crews (Means et al 1993). Expert crews have achieved through shared mental models. In fact, as
been shown to communicate their shared goals identified by Brehmer (1992), three types of DM
and adapt to environmental demands through moni- style exist:
toring, feeding back and carrying out backup beha-
viours (Salas & Morgan 1989). Cockpit crews with • Command-based, where each decision is made
lower error rates were shown to spend more time centrally and relayed to the other team-mates
framing problems, justifying their decisions, contin- • By plan, often referred to in the military as
gency planning and managing their shared resources, ‘standard operating procedures (SOPs)’, where
actions that led to the formulation of a shared mental team members act in a predetermined manner
model (Orasanu 1990). without the need to communicate or change
Shared mental models provide the organization of the course of action in response to evolving
experiences that allow the individual to discriminate situation factors
between similar and non-similar experiences, thus • By shared mental model, where team-mates are
providing the link to appropriate (and shared) empowered to respond based on their previous
responses. They provide team members with the experiences of the situation and the decisions
necessary knowledge to predict both future events made by other team members.
251
An example of command-based DM in sport is the as one’s susceptibility to the negative effects of stress
quarterback in American football, who calls the play on DM are linked to individual difference factors
to his team members, who then carry out their roles such as trait anxiety and neuroticism (Muris et al
accordingly. A free-throw in basketball exemplifies 2004), some consideration of these factors is also
a plan-based, SOP DM style, where each defender warranted.
lining up along the free-throw lane ‘boxes-out’ the This section reviews the research that has exam-
player next to them (i.e. puts their body in front ined sources of stress in DM environments and the
of the attacker to prevent them from rebounding performance effects that are typically observed.
the ball), and the defender at the top of the key The principles of stress exposure training are then
boxes-out the shooter. In this example, there is no described. The role of individual differences in mod-
need for communication as this is simply the stan- erating the effects of stress on performance is also
dard operating procedure when a free throw is taken. considered. Subsequently, the cognitive mechanisms
Finally, shared-mental-model-based DM is built that appear to be affected by negative emotional
upon detailed knowledge of the task, the team and states such as anxiety and the pattern of performance
the environment (Kraiger & Wenzel 1997) that disruption that occurs are described. Finally, the sec-
allows team members to function synchronously. tion presents an overview of two influential accounts
This can often be seen in open team sports such as of how performance is affected by anxiety in the
soccer, when players are able to anticipate the move- form of processing efficiency theory (PET) (Eysenck
ments and actions of team-mates and adjust accord- & Calvo 1992) and its theoretical extension in
ingly, resulting in fluid and implicit interactions that attention control theory (ACT) (Eysenck et al 2007).
lead to faultless passages of play (Riley 1993).
All three styles of DM present potential solutions
for coping with the time-pressured and often stress- Sources of stress in decision-making
ful performance environment. SOPs are typically environments
deep-rooted plans that circumvent the need for addi-
tional cognitive processes. The command-based style Numerous attempts have been made in the litera-
similarly reduces the need for multiple players to ture to define the nature of stress (Cassidy 1999).
develop action plans, with one individual typically While many important nuances exist between such
‘calling the shots’. However, these solutions to devel- definitions, most emphasize that stress is the conse-
oping team coherence are limited to a finite range quence of an appraisal process where a situation of
of situations. For example, in the complex and high demand is judged to exceed the performer’s
dynamic open team sports environment events are ability to cope (Nicholls & Polman 2007). Addition-
often completely unpredictable. This may render ally, these situations normally hold high signifi-
the team member responsible for ‘making the call’ cance for the performer (i.e. the outcomes are
with insufficient time to either develop a plan or perceived as highly important), often with consider-
communicate it. So perhaps the most appealing is able uncertainty surrounding the outcome. The psy-
the shared mental model style. Although we have chological significance of such situations is frequently
mentioned some evidence for shared mental models’ heightened by the presence of others (e.g. oppo-
resilience to fatigue, we must first consider the nents, judges or an audience) or by a genuine threat
sources and characteristics of stress in the perfor- (e.g. extreme sports). Unsurprisingly perhaps, these
mance environment before exploring appropriate settings have the potential to generate performance-
decision-training methods. related concerns and worry, alongside physical and
behavioural symptoms of distress (Kerr 1997), and
to disrupt performance.
In DM environments a distinction is often made
Stress and decision-making between ‘task related’ sources of stress (e.g. time
performance pressure, the requirement to monitor multiple infor-
mation sources) and ‘psychobiological’ sources of
No consideration of the factors affecting DM in sport stress (e.g. fatigue, worry based on ego-related threat
would be complete without mention of how the or the risk of physical harm). Task-related stres-
speed and accuracy of such decisions are affected sors are variables that are intrinsic to task perfor-
by emotions and other sources of stress. Similarly, mance, whereas psychobiological stressors can vary
252
depending on a range of dispositional and situational practice is required during training periods to repli-
factors. The effectiveness of DM in stressful environ- cate these demands (see also Ch. 14). Emphasis is
ments will, to a large extent, depend on the degree particularly placed on cognitive control strategies
of practice individuals have in managing the stress during this stage of SET linked to overlearning of
sources in simulated practice conditions. The term the physical techniques involved. These cognitive
‘stress exposure training’ (Driskell & Johnson strategies aim to help performers control dysfunc-
1998) has been used to describe a form of training tional thoughts and emotions that are likely to impair
that aims specifically to help performers main- performance and focus available resources on the
tain effective performance in stressful conditions. task at hand.
Surprisingly, many practice environments in sport The final principle of SET is related to the earlier
often fail to provide performers with the cognitive discussions on mastery-orientated practice environ-
skills needed to perform effectively under pressure, ments (see Chs 13, 14 and 15) and the development
or even the experience for them to evolve their of metacognitive skills. Individuals who are exposed
own. This is perhaps based on the assumption held to such environments during SET and who are
by many coaches that well-structured practice of trained to develop metacognitive skills typically show
the technical and tactical skills of the sport alone greater confidence in their ability to perform under
is sufficient to equip performers with the necessary pressure. They also develop greater ‘trust’ in both
mental skills to cope with the stresses encountered in their own and their team-mates’ ability to perform
the cauldron of competition (Smith et al 2001b). effectively under stress.
The simple message is clear: don’t just expose per-
formers to stressful challenge and leave them to sort
it out; rather, teach skills and systems explicitly to Stress, anxiety and performance
provide the basic skills on which they can build.
Accordingly, a number of ‘brand name’ approaches, Susceptibility to the negative performance effects of
usually combinations of theories and/or techniques, stress has been found to vary between individuals.
have been developed. Evidence suggests that this is the result of both
Stress exposure training (SET) is based on three dispositional and situational factors. As a conse-
underlying principles (Driskell & Johnson 1998). quence, anxiety in both its dispositional (i.e. trait
The first is the notion that benefit can be gained anxiety) and situational (i.e. state anxiety) forms
by becoming knowledgeable about the sources of has become the most widely studied psychological
stress performers will face and their likely effects factor affecting performance in sport (Craft et al
on performance. These include knowledge of the 2003). Trait anxiety is a construct reflected in most
typical physiological, cognitive and behavioural models of personality and refers to a relatively stable
reactions that accompany stressful encounters. In disposition within the individual to judge a wide
addition, knowledge is developed about the typical range of environmental events as potentially threat-
pattern of performance disruption that occurs when ening. Situational stressors prompt increases in
under stress. Such knowledge often enhances feel- state anxiety in the form of worry and concern over
ings of predictability in these settings and heightens performance that are often, but not always, accom-
feelings of personal control. It is also argued that, by panied by heightened physiological activation (e.g.
acquiring knowledge of potential sources of stress, increased heart rate and muscle tension). These
performers are less likely to be distracted by them increases in physiological activation can themselves
if and when they are encountered. Finally, by famil- lead to further performance concerns if athletes
iarization with the typical effects of stress on per- interpret such bodily symptoms as threatening.
formance, individuals are assumed to be better Individuals high in trait anxiety typically view the
able to self-monitor and correct errors as they occur. world as a threatening place, believing that sources
The second principle of SET assumes that indivi- of stress will be frequently encountered and, as
duals should practise regulatory skills highly specific a consequence, react to situational stressors with
to those eventually required in stressful settings. higher state anxiety reactions than those low in trait
For example, if a performer has to make effective anxiety (Weinberg & Gould 2007). Thus, the level
decisions when physically fatigued, facing hostile of experienced anxiety is determined interactively
opponents and dealing with multiple sources of infor- by trait anxiety and perceived situational threat.
mation of varying priority, quite specific simulated The threatening feelings and cognitions commonly
253
felt by anxious individuals often reflect a strong et al 2000). Such tasks include verbal and spatial
‘future focus’ with worry over the potential adverse reasoning, tasks that require the sustaining and
consequences of failure and harm tending to pre- switching of attention and those that place high
dominate. Low trait anxious individuals on the other demand on working memory (Eysenck et al 2007).
hand, tend to judge events in a more benign manner, Why do these changes in performance occur
normally seeing little threat in a wide range of social when individuals become anxious? Early views on
and achievement settings (Weinberg & Gould 2007). this question argued that cognitive anxiety in the
In addition to more stable personality-linked factors, form of worry had two inter-related effects. Firstly,
situational factors in sport that increase context- worrisome thoughts about failure and the adverse
specific perceptions of threat (i.e. the level of state consequences of poor performance serve as a source
anxiety) include such factors as outcome uncertainty of distraction that disrupts DM processes. Anxious
and the potential threat of negative evaluation individuals have been consistently shown to be more
by others. easily distracted from tasks and they also experience
Anxiety is typically considered a multidimensional heightened feelings of self-consciousness (Keogh
emotion with both somatic (i.e. physical sensations) et al 2004). This in turn is reflected in a strong
and cognitive (e.g. worrying thoughts) components. self-focus that makes anxious individuals appear
While these two components share some degree of preoccupied with self-concerns rather than dealing
variance, they appear to have different antecedents with the task in hand.
(Lane et al 1995) and effects on performance (Craft What is clear from individual accounts of athletes’
et al 2003). Factors that elevate the cognitive com- experiences of cognitive anxiety is that it seems very
ponent of anxiety are normally ego-related concerns difficult to ‘disengage’ from worry once it begins to
(e.g. fear of failure and negative evaluation by preoccupy one’s thoughts (Hatzigeorgiadis & Biddle
others), while somatic anxiety appears to increase 2000). In this sense, worry appears to have a dis-
when individuals encounter environmental stimuli tinctive ‘cyclical’ quality that serves to represent
that are present in the performance environment negative thoughts to individuals’ consciousness while
(e.g. the sights and sounds of the actual setting) or also making them particularly vigilant for sources
anticipate physical harm. of threat in the environment (Eysenck, 1997).
In performance terms, cognitive and somatic anx- The second related effect of cognitive anxiety is
iety seem to affect performance rather differently that it also ‘consumes’ processing resources that
(Butt et al 2003). High levels of somatic anxiety have are required for performance itself. The performance
been associated with increases in processing speed on consequences of this effect become more apparent as
simple, reactive tasks (e.g. a start in a 100 m sprint the complexity of tasks increase. Research has
(Parfitt et al 1995), but see also the example dis- provided consistent support for the proposition that
cussed in Ch. 14). However, this gain in speed is the adverse effects of anxiety on performance become
often at the expense of decision accuracy (i.e. more much more apparent as tasks increase in complexity
errors or ‘false-positive’ responses are made, e.g. a (Eysenck et al 2007). This suggests that, on rela-
100 m runner leaving the blocks before the gun). tively simple decision tasks that require few mental
Also, motor actions that require the simple coordina- resources, individuals are able to compensate for
tion of large muscle groups, particularly those requir- the negative effects of cognitive anxiety, when moti-
ing maximal strength or power output, have been vated to do so, by devoting more processing resources
shown to improve in some cases when individuals to the task. As task complexity increases, however,
experience heightened somatic anxiety (Parfitt et al and more information sources have to be attended
1995). While the exact cause of these performance to, a point is reached where no further compensatory
changes is still the focus of debate, it seems likely resources are available to offset the influence of worry
that they are mediated by changes in physiological and performance consequently declines.
factors that affect neuromuscular function.
Performance changes that accompany increases in
cognitive anxiety appear more diverse and complex Decision making in threatening settings
in nature. In studies that have examined the effects More recent accounts of the way cognitive anxiety
of cognitive anxiety on speed and accuracy of DM, affects performance have both refined these early
anxiety has generally been found to slow processing ideas and helped to clarify the specific psychological
speed on a wide range of cognitive tasks (Richards mechanisms involved (Eysenck et al 2007). With
254
specific reference to tasks involving DM, it may be Returning to the function of anxiety as an emotion
useful to return briefly to the topic of situation responsible for priming the detection of threat, it is
awareness that was discussed earlier in this chapter. perhaps understandable that anxious individuals
We argued that situation awareness was an important appear particularly alert to sources of threat when
attribute that contributes to effective DM in both they appear. Thus, in threatening situations it may
individuals and team settings. Situation awareness be appropriate for anxious individuals to allocate
was assumed to involve three key processes: per- attentional resources quite widely in an attempt to
ceptual skills, comprehension and an ability to best identify threatening events when they occur
predict the likely outcome of a developing situation. (Wilson & MacLeod 2003).
Importantly, research suggests that each of these Such an explanation of the attentional effects of
three key contributors appears to be affected by anx- anxiety is in direct opposition to the arousal-based
iety. To understand how this occurs, it may be useful ‘cue utilization’ theory proposed by Easterbrook
to briefly consider the actual function of an emotion (1959). This theory presents an account of how
such as anxiety. arousal affects the range of cues attended to and
The main function of anxiety appears to be the the performance consequences that arise. According
detection of sources of threat in our environment. to Easterbrook’s theory, increases in arousal are
Many centuries ago this may have served a very use- directly associated with an involuntary narrowing
ful evolutionary purpose as the detection, and hope- of attention, which leads to a narrow, but stable focus
fully avoidance, of physical threats may have been on relatively few task features. High levels of arousal
vital for our predecessors’ survival. Fast-forward are predicted to lead to a decline in performance due
many generations and we find that most environ- to important task-related cues being ‘missed’. This
ments we encounter hold little physical threat to effect is predicted to become more apparent in
our wellbeing. The things that stimulate anxiety most complex DM tasks as they are assumed to have a
commonly in 21st century life are often of a more greater number of task relevant cues to attend to.
abstract, psychological nature than the threat posed Easterbrook’s theory has become a widely advanced
by dangerous wild animals. These include situations ‘explanation’ of the effect of arousal on performance.
in which social evaluation is a common feature and This appears to be largely due to the theory’s appar-
in which ego-threat is heightened. Not surprisingly, ent alignment with predictions based on Yerkes &
as an example of such a situation, competitive Dodson’s (1908) inverted-U model of arousal and
sport holds the potential to be perceived as a highly performance.
attractive or highly threatening arena, depending on Despite the evidence that appears to support
the situation and the performer’s disposition. Easterbrook’s attentional narrowing account, closer
Given that the main evolutionary function of scrutiny of the research reveals a number of prob-
anxiety is the detection of threat, anxious individuals lematic findings for the theory. Firstly, extensive
are predicted to be particularly vigilant for sources of support is available that shows anxious individuals
threat in their environment when they appear. As are easily distracted from the task at hand (Janelle
one of the main components of situation awareness et al 1999, Keogh et al 2004). According to Easter-
is perceptual skill, factors that disrupt perceptual brook’s account, anxious individuals, assuming they
processes are of particular interest. Considerable are experiencing high arousal, should exhibit a nar-
research evidence shows that anxious individuals row, but stable focus of attention and thus be less
are prone to distraction (Eysenck 1997). This perfor- susceptible to distraction. Secondly, much of the
mance effect is generally found with a wide range research that has examined Easterbrook’s theory
of distracting stimuli but is particularly marked with has used variants of the dual-task paradigm in which
stimuli of a threatening nature (Keogh & French a central or main task is performed, normally contin-
2001). Anxiety therefore appears to reduce the focus uously, alongside a secondary task that is presented
on the task at hand by affecting the individual’s con- periodically, often in the periphery of the visual field.
trol of the allocation of attention. Thus, in DM tasks Typically the secondary task involves some form of
where the effective monitoring of a complex set of target-detection or probe reaction time task, with
environmental events is crucial to eventual perfor- the latency of detection or the number of event
mance, anxious individuals are particularly prone omissions being the measured variables. In the major-
to errors because of vigilance for, and preferential ity of sport-related studies, arousal has normally
processing of, threatening cues (Mogg et al 2000). been manipulated by a combination of ego-relevant
255
instructions and competition. The main prediction Central executive

based on Easterbrook’s account is that, as arousal
increases, performance on the secondary task should
be impaired to a greater extent than performance on
the main task. Phonological loop Episodic buffer Visuo-spatial
(inner voice) Holds and sketchpad
The general pattern of findings from dual-task Holds information integrates (inner eye)
studies supports the prediction that secondary in a speech- information from Holds spatial and
task performance is impaired under high arousal based form other sub-systems visual information
when the main task being performed is cognitively
Fig. 17.1 • The main components of Baddeley’s model of
demanding and when the secondary task is low in
working memory. Adapted from Baddeley 2001.
salience (Staal 2004). Problems with Easterbrook’s
account arise, however, when the secondary task is
perceived by the performer as equally important. components. As such, it serves a ‘switching’ function
In such situations, when secondary tasks are perceived of resources between task elements as task demands
to be of equal salience or, as in the case of anxious change. It also regulates attentional resources in tasks
individuals, potentially threatening, the available that require selective attention and those where
evidence shows that secondary task performance an inhibitory function is needed to block irrelevant
actually improves under high arousal (see Eysenck or distracting information from entering awareness.
et al 2007 for a fuller discussion). These findings The central executive also serves a goal-directed,
are clearly at odds with Easterbrook’s predictions planning and updating role that requires periodic
and highlight the importance of taking into account checking of the two major support systems (the artic-
the nature of distracting stimuli and how processing ulatory loop and the visuospatial sketchpad). Finally,
priorities change when anxious individuals encounter it has responsibility for coding representations in
distractors that signal threat. Taken together, current memory according to time and place of appearance,
evidence supports the view that the attentional a role that is crucial to the memory of event sequences.
characteristics of anxious individuals reflect a ‘hyper- Supporting the central executive are two main
vigilant’ rather than a narrow attentional state as slave systems that have been termed the ‘inner voice’
would be predicted by Easterbrook’s theory. and the ‘inner eye’ (Eysenck & Keane 2005). These
two systems are responsible for the temporary hold-
ing of speech based and visuospatial information
Working memory, attention control respectively. The final component of the working
and decision making memory model is an episodic buffer, which holds
The two other main attributes of situation awareness the integrated information from the central execu-
are comprehension (or situational understanding) tive in a unitary form.
and prediction. In both instances there is evidence Three functions of the central executive of
to implicate anxiety as a disruptive influence. As well working memory have particular relevance to DM
as biasing perceptual processes towards threat, anxi- (Miyake et al 2000). First, the central executive is
ety also exerts a strong influence on attentional responsible for the control of attention necessary
control. Recent accounts of the effects of anxiety to inhibit the disruptive influence of task-irrelevant
on performance have highlighted the influence of stimuli and thoughts. Second, the central executive
anxiety on attentional control and in particular the shifts processing resources between task components
central executive of working memory. According when performance requires the effective balancing of
to Baddeley (2001), working memory comprises four multiple task demands or operations. Finally, the
components, of which the most important is a lim- central executive is responsible for the monitoring
ited capacity storage system referred to as the central and updating of working memory based on the activ-
executive (Fig. 17.1). ities of its two main ‘slave’ systems (the phonological
Within Baddeley’s conception of working memory, loop and the visuospatial sketchpad). Since situation
the central executive serves a number of functions comprehension and the ability to predict future
crucial to DM. Its major functions have much in com- events as they unfold rely strongly on the operations
mon with those of human attention. It serves as a of the central executive of working memory, it is
control system for the planning, regulation and unsurprising that anxiety has the potential to exert
deployment of attentional resources between task such a strong negative effect on DM performance.
256
Recent attempts to account for anxiety-induced Hardy & Fazey 1987) make explicit predictions that,
changes in cognitive performance have identified under certain conditions, increases in cognitive anxi-
the disruption of attentional processes as the main ety can have beneficial effects on performance
mechanism involved. Given this view, it is unsurpris- (Hardy et al 1996).
ing that the central executive of working memory has PET explains this by highlighting that cognitive
become a particular focus for research into the dis- activity in the form of worry has two main effects.
ruptive effects of anxiety. Two influential theories First, worry takes up processing and storage
that have elaborated on the processes involved are resources in working memory and as a mental activity
processing efficiency theory (Eysenck & Calvo it ‘competes’ with task-relevant thoughts for the
1992) and attentional control theory (Eysenck available resources. Secondly, worry also serves a
et al 2007). strong ‘motivation’ function, with anxious individuals
generally being motivated to avoid the adverse con-
sequences of the threatening situation in which
Processing efficiency theory they find themselves. One strategic response to such
situations is to allocate more processing resources to
Processing efficiency theory (PET; Eysenck & Calvo performance by increases in effort. Increases in effort
1992) seeks to account for the influence of state anx- aim to maintain performance effectiveness, thus
iety on performance from a cognitive/motivational helping to avoid the potential adverse consequences
perspective. The theory is most applicable to tasks of failure.
that place high cognitive demands on performers Anxiety-induced changes in effort deployment
and is therefore particularly applicable to complex in sport have been indexed using a range of mea-
DM tasks. The theory is of additional interest to surement approaches. These include self-report
sport performers as it emphasizes the importance methods (Smith et al 2001a, in a study involving elite
of coping behaviours in potentially aversive settings volleyball players; Wilson & Smith 2007, in a field-
where evaluation and social comparisons form part hockey study involving international standard
of the performance environment. While the theory players), psychophysiological measures (Hardy &
places greater emphasis on the influence of state anx- Hutchinson 2007, in a study of skilled rock climbers)
iety on performance, dispositional factors (i.e. trait and dual-task performance (Wilson et al 2006, in a
anxiety) are also important as, along with situational simulated rally driving task).
threat, they interactively determine the level of state Smith et al (2001a) conducted a season-long study
anxiety experienced. of anxiety and performance in English National
PET makes an important distinction between League volleyball players. Anxiety ratings were taken
performance effectiveness and processing efficiency. from players both before and during matches along
Performance effectiveness refers to the quality with ratings of mental effort. Performance was ana-
of performance in terms of its speed and accuracy. lysed from video records using a computer-based
Processing efficiency is defined as performance effec- volleyball analysis system. Consistent with PET pre-
tiveness divided by the processing resources invested dictions, the authors found that high anxious indivi-
in the task. Thus processing efficiency declines in duals reported higher levels of effort than low
situations where performers maintain performance anxious performers during matches when their per-
levels by investing additional resources in the task. formance levels were comparable. A second predic-
This distinction is central to the theory, as it argues tion of PET relates to the impact of motivational
that anxiety affects processing efficiency more often factors on the performance of high and low anxious
than performance effectiveness. individuals. PET argues that, because high anxious
Why is this distinction between processing effec- performers typically exert greater effort during
tiveness and efficiency important? Despite the performance, motivational incentives designed to
generally held view that cognitive anxiety in the increase effort will have less effect on the perfor-
form of worry exerts a negative effect on per- mance of high compared to low anxious individuals.
formance, findings to support this view have been The Smith et al (2001a) study examined this predic-
inconsistent (Eysenck et al 2007). Indeed, some of tion in games where the ‘criticality’ of sets varied
the more recently developed multidimensional mod- across the course of the match. The authors analysed
els of the anxiety–performance relationship that mental effort and performance effectiveness in sets
have been applied to sport (e.g. Catastrophe theory; where the point-spread between the two teams
257
differed, reflecting the criticality (or closeness) of theory. Recently, Eysenck et al (2007) have pre-
play. Low critical sets were those in which more than sented an extension of the original theory that has
six points separated the teams, moderately critical addressed many of these concerns (for a more com-
sets were those in which between three and six points plete discussion of PET’s limitations see Eysenck et al
separated the teams, finally, high critical sets were 2007). Attention control theory (ACT) attempts to
those in which the margin between the teams was refine and extend the scope of PET by making more
two points (i.e. the minimum point margin). Smith explicit predictions regarding the functions of the
et al argued that these variations in criticality could central executive of working memory that are dis-
be argued to reflect playing conditions in which the rupted by anxiety. The theory also takes account
motivation to exert greater effort (in order to eventu- of recent developments in neuroscience that have
ally win the set) would also vary. Consistent both with begun to identify the neural basis of the mechanisms
this view and the predictions of PET, less anxious per- involved in the control of attention (Miller & Cohen
formers showed greater variation in mental effort 2001). These developments provide support for the
across sets of varying criticality than did highly anx- view that at least two key attentional systems can be
ious players. Of particular importance was the finding isolated that perform different functions during
that, in highly critical sets, dispositionally low anxiety attention-demanding tasks (Corbetta & Shulman
performers continued to improve their performance 2002, Duncan 2006). A goal-directed system is
as they exerted greater efforts, while the performance responsible for the ‘top-down’ control of attention
of highly anxious individuals declined significantly based on current goals and expectations. Located
despite increases in effort. in the prefrontal cortex of the brain, this system
These initial findings have recently been extended interacts closely with the anterior cingulate cortex
in a study of simulated rally driving (Wilson et al to monitor and regulate the attentional require-
2006) and an ecologically valid study of field hockey ments of goal-directed behaviour. A second system,
conducted during international competition (Wilson & described as the stimulus-driven attentional system,
Smith 2007). In the Wilson & Smith (2007) is responsible for the ‘bottom-up’ control of atten-
hockey study, highly critical matches were associated tion. This system is particularly responsive to beha-
with higher state anxiety and effort in high anxiety viourally relevant sensory cues that are salient at
compared to low anxiety individuals. Highly anxious the time. This system is located in the right hemi-
individuals also reported higher levels of effort than sphere of the brain including the temporoparietal
their less anxious counterparts during matches when and ventral frontal cortex.
their performance levels were comparable. ACT argues that anxiety disrupts the coordination
Taken together, the findings from sport-related of these two attentional systems with top-down
research that have tested the predications of PET influences being attenuated in anxious individuals,
provide testimony to its usefulness as a theoretical resulting in less on-line goal direction, with height-
framework for studying the effects of anxiety on per- ened processing priority being given to salient sensory
formance. Recent research findings into the phenom- events. The consequence of this disruption of co-
enon of ‘choking’ in pressure situations also suggests ordination is the prioritizing of the processing of
that PET has greater explanatory power than other, threatening cues observed in anxious individuals
self-focus explanations of performance disruption because of the increased activity of the stimulus-
(Wilson et al 2007). Therefore, while PET may driven system. While it is still in the early stages
appear to have greater relevance to cognitive rather of development, the revised theory mostly focuses
than motor aspects of performance (particularly on two distinct executive functions that appear
attentional factors), the theory offers continued particularly affected. These are described in the
promise as an appropriate framework for studying theory as the ‘inhibition’ and ‘shifting’ functions of
anxiety-induced changes in DM effectiveness. attention. These two main functions have consider-
able significance for DM performance. The inhibi-
tory function of the central executive describes
Attentional control theory attempts to deliberately avoid or inhibit the pro-
duction of highly automated or dominant responses
Despite the usefulness of PET in advancing our that can disrupt performance. As such, inhibition
understanding of the effects of anxiety on perfor- involves the use of attention to resist the disruptive
mance, a number of problems existed with the influence of task-irrelevant stimuli. This function of
258
the central executive appears particularly sensitive formal DM training for referees outside of amassing
to disruption by anxiety, as a considerable body of experience in match officiating (Mascarenhas et al
evidence shows that performance is affected by 2005). However, such amassing of experience does
both neutral and, particularly, threatening dis- not necessarily lead to expert-level performance
tracters. ACT predicts that this occurs as a result (Williams & Davids 1995). The performance envi-
of anxiety directly impairing the efficiency of the ronment alone may not provide a sufficient number
inhibition function of the central executive of work- of varied and challenging scenarios in close succes-
ing memory. Thus, anxious individuals are less able sion to develop expertise (Means et al 1993). Thus,
to inhibit the allocation of attention to potential since effective teams need a number of accurate
threats, which in turn leads to the diverting away mental models to form an understanding and gener-
from the task of essential processing resources. ate predictions about events (Salas et al 1997), pre-
The second function considered by ACT is the senting ‘typical scenarios’ to trainees alongside expert
shifting function of the central executive. Shifting accounts of the factors to consider when reaching
refers to the ability of performers to allocate atten- decisions may present an alternative to on-the-job
tional resources flexibly between multiple tasks learning (Ericsson & Lehman 1996, Stokes et al
(or changing task demands) that are being performed 1997). Such forms of training may hasten the devel-
concurrently. Again, ACT predicts that anxiety opment of pattern recognition skills and more effec-
impairs the shifting function of the central executive tively promote the development of shared mental
and that negative performance effects are likely to be models of typical ‘representative’ situations charac-
observed when the demands of working memory teristic of the specific performance domain (see
are high (e.g. when information load or complexity Cannon-Bowers & Bell 1997, Cohen et al 1997).
is high). While the basic predictions of ACT are Additionally, such training may also help individuals
in the early stages of being scrutinized experimen- develop both the procedural and declarative knowl-
tally, the theory holds considerable promise as a edge required for effective problem solving in situa-
framework that will allow a clearer understanding tions not previously encountered (Seel et al 2000).
of how anxiety disrupts attentional factors central Through such naturalistic training, trainees learn
to DM performance. Perhaps one of the most not only the cognitive skills required to make rapid
intriguing avenues of research is the potential within and accurate assessments of situations through an
the theory for attentional ‘retraining programmes’ understanding of the significance of certain cues,
to be developed that may enable anxiety’s disruptive but also the metacognitive skills relating to the effec-
effects on attentional processes to be avoided (see tive allocation of their mental resources. Evidence in
Chs 14 and 23). This would provide important evi- support of this view comes from the sporting domain,
dence to supplement the following ideas on training where research has shown that novice squash players
high-performance DM. who received structured and knowledge-based
video training improved their anticipatory skills more
than a group who just engaged in physical practice
The application and training (Abernethy et al 1999; see also Ch. 14). Of relevance,
such perceptual and cognitive skills have been shown
of decision making: current to discriminate elite and sub-elite association football
thinking players as early as age 9 (Ward & Williams 2003).
In order to train high-performance DM, less expe-
rienced performers need to recognize what elite per-
Introduction to naturalistic training formers look at (situation awareness – level 1), what
approaches this means and how they weigh this information in a
variety of different situations (situation awareness –
Until recently, in high-performance domains, it was level 2), and the most appropriate solution or action
assumed that the accumulation of many years of to undertake given likely future events (situation
hands-on experience was necessary to develop elite awareness – level 3). Training exercises should be
performance levels. For example, it took nearly developed that challenge performers to provide
3 years to develop the minimum competencies nec- accounts of the factors they considered in reaching
essary to become an air traffic controller (Means et al decisions (i.e. the underpinning reasons for specific
1993). Similarly, in sports officiating, there was little decisions) rather than relying exclusively on outcome
259
measures (Brannick & Prince 1997, Klinger 2000, 1997). For example, imagine a doubles pair in bad-
Langan-Fox et al 2000, Mascarenhas et al 2002). minton, where one’s weighting scale is dominated
by her regard for maintaining consistency and the
Situation awareness level 1: visual other’s is more centred on aggressive attacking play.
perception skills When presented with the same situation they are
unlikely to respond in the same fashion. This
A range of studies has used event occlusion methods
weighting represents a priority system, which
combined with eye movement or gaze behaviour to
Rasmussen (1985) refers to as hierarchical task anal-
identify the critical cues that experts attend to when
ysis, guiding one to the expert’s consensus of what
viewing structured displays (Mann et al 2007). Find-
are the most important elements of the situation.
ings from such studies, in turn, have been used to
However, there is not always a ‘gold standard’ in
help develop training methods that attempt to enable
the weighting scale that represents the ideal option
less skilled performers to emulate the gaze behaviour
in a DM task. For example, a sports player who is
of experts (Adolphe et al 1997).
transferred from one team to another would bring
Much of this research has explored single actor
the previously established weighting scale of their
scenarios performing relatively simple skills, i.e. par-
old team. As a consequence, when asked to make
ticipants attending to only one performer, such as a
a decision, particularly under the time pressure asso-
penalty kicker in soccer (e.g. Williams et al 1994) or
ciated with elite sport, they are likely to use their
a badminton player performing an overhead shot
previous team’s more established weighting scale,
(e.g. Abernethy & Russell 1987). Frequently in team
which may not match the new team’s weighting.
sport environments, dynamic situations have to be
For example, a player from a team who were very
monitored, often with simultaneous events occurring
offensively orientated who moves to a more defen-
on different parts of the field.
sively minded team may well act in a way that
Interestingly, early findings suggest that, even in a
disrupts the flow and synergy of the new team.
relatively simple skill like a football penalty kick,
Furthermore, in addition to differences based on
blanking out different areas of the penalty kicker
team nuances, the situation itself might present
led to experts using compensatory strategies that
the need for different weighting scales to be applied.
proved to be equally successful (Williams et al
For example, a defensively orientated team trailing
1994). In fact, expert sports officials such as rugby
by three goals might alter their weighting scales to
union referees are able to make accurate decisions
become more attack-orientated. Therefore, training
even when partially unsighted or presented with ambig-
should focus on developing the declarative knowl-
uous information (Bettman & Sujan 1987, Mascarenhas
edge of both the team and the situation to ensure
2005). These findings have been taken as evidence that
coherent thinking and DM.
experts have a better sense of the criteria against which
a set of options should be evaluated than do novices (see
Sanbonmatsu et al 1992). Situation awareness level 3: prediction
Furthermore, as conceded by Abernethy & Russell and coordination skills
(1987), while visual fixation data may provide useful
Cannon-Bowers et al (1990) point out that mental
information on the point of gaze, the fixation point in
models alsoinclude inter-positional knowledge of roles,
a task that has widespread cues may only reflect a
allowing team members to anticipate behaviour and the
pivot point for peripheral rather than centrally
information needs of each other more consistently.
orientated perception. Thus, developing an under-
Such knowledge is dynamic and provides information
standing of the information to be gleaned from such
on the likely DM behaviours of other team members,
visual search strategies, as presented in literature on
enabling individuals to respond in accordance with
judgments, may be more important than studying
these predicted actions and to develop backup plans
gaze behaviour alone.
if preliminary solutions fail (Stout et al 1996).
Consistent with this view, Converse & Kahler
Situation awareness level 2: judgement (1992) suggest that mental models are constructed
and comprehension of a declarative mental model that provides informa-
Recognizing the relative significance of the objects tion about the concepts in the domain and relation-
and the events in the environment, known as ‘weight- ships between them, a procedural mental model that
ing’, is crucial to coordinated performance (Endsley provides knowledge of how to respond in order to
260
complete the task, and a strategic mental model that Each video scenario was filmed from the referee’s
includes ‘knowledge of the context and relation- perspective and was taken from real game situa-
ships between team members, actions to be taken tions in order to maintain fidelity in accordance
if the proposed solution fails, and how to respond with NDM theory. The lowest ranked referees in
if necessary information is absent’ (Stout et al 1996). the experimental group (those ranked from 48th
As there is a shortage of research that has specifi- to 65th on the national panel) significantly improved
cally attempted to train DM in expert players, the their percentage of correct decisions, becoming
following section will draw upon interventions that 17.43% more accurate in their decisions post-test.
have been developed to train more effective situation No changes in decision accuracy were found in the
awareness skills in elite rugby union officials, and control group. Qualitative feedback from the training
show how similar strategies might be used to develop such as ‘it’s given me an insight into the thinking of
player performance. a top referee’ and ‘I really have a clear understanding
of my priorities now’ suggested that this group,
Training high performance sports whose original decisions showed widespread inter-
officials official variability, had developed mental models that
were more coherent and in close alignment with the
Referees are often presented with complex, partially expert.
structured displays in which players move at high Since this study, video reviews of tackles (and
speeds and in which game flow and player control other pertinent areas of rugby union refereeing)
issues have to be balanced. In these settings, decisions involving elaborate discussions of declarative and
are made not in isolation but embedded in evolving pat- procedural information have become commonplace
terns of play. Referees are expected to reach decisions among Rugby Football Union referees and are seen
quickly, often under intense media scrutiny, while as a crucial mechanism for developing a shared vocab-
simultaneously processing input relevant to their ulary (Mascarenhas et al 2001), which can aid the
DM from other officials. Additionally, they also have development of shared mental models through prob-
to balance their interpretation of the laws with varia- lem framing (Orasanu 1990). Similarly, findings have
tions in cultural context that guide the ways laws are emerged from studies that have used cross-training
interpreted. Given these complex and potentially con- methods in which team members are asked to per-
flicting demands, such settings present an ideal set- form another person’s role to help develop interposi-
ting in which to explore how DM may best be trained. tional knowledge. The results from such studies
illustrate how cross-training methods can be used
effectively to enhance coherence in DM within
Developing decision making
teams (Volpe et al 1996).
in rugby union refereeing Building on this research, Mascarenhas used the
same principles to train DM in elite rugby league
In Mascarenhas et al’s (2002) study, a group of English and netball referees (Mascarenhas 2006). Results
Rugby Football Union national panel referees, divided from these studies showed that coherent DM
into a control group (n ¼ 15) and an experimental between officials and across sports relied on the
group (n ¼ 41), made a series of decisions on video- development of a shared mental model reflecting
presented scenarios before and after a 6-week training three key characteristics.
programme aimed at developing DM skills. During
• Decision outcome – who the penalty was
the 6-week training period the experimental group
awarded to
studied training tapes consisting of five sets of five
tackles, in each case with an expert providing a declar- • Reason – the point of law (or the rule) that has
atively and procedurally rich interpretation of the been infringed
technical, declarative and procedural knowledge • Explanation – the characteristics of the event that
underpinning correct DM. The control group was fur- determined the prescribed sanction.
ther subdivided into a group who watched the same As mentioned previously, there is a dearth of
video scenarios as the experimental group but without research that has specifically focused on train-
the expert’s interpretation (n ¼ 7) and a group who ing aspects of DM skills in team sport performers
neither viewed the video scenarios nor heard the (Williams & Ward 2003). However, there are some
expert’s commentary (n ¼ 8). notable exceptions.
261
Video-based decision-making a wide range of archetype situations that are

regularly encountered will help to develop
training with high-performance implicit DM skills, so that trainees are able to
sports teams respond automatically
4. Finally, to ensure transfer to the actual performance
Christina et al (1990) used video-based training sce- environment trainees should be asked to participate
narios to develop pattern recognition and DM skills in small-sided games to develop problem solving
in American football. A 16-day video training skills, as well as combination training, which
programme was used where an experienced line- intersperses physically demanding skills with
backer was asked to move a joystick to indicate his cognitively demanding skills (see Ch. 24).
choice of defensive actions in response to a video pre-
senting the movement of a defensive line. The results The use of high-fidelity video
of the training programme showed daily improve-
ments in the number of correct decisions from 25% scenarios in decision-making
on day 2 to over 90% on day 6, as judged by the line- training
backer’s ability to track the tight-end’s movement.
Tentatively interpreted, such findings suggest that Video scenarios can be used to provide officials with
benefits from such decision-training regimes can be realistic and experience-dependent practice oppor-
gained that are of relevance to performance settings. tunities in DM. Used in conjunction with expert
More research in this area with both larger sample sizes commentary, they also provide a vehicle for present-
and appropriate transfer conditions remains a priority. ing clear and timely feedback on DM effectiveness
Mascarenhas and colleagues argue that principles closely aligned to the event itself. Such a method
used in training referee DM can be effectively applied of training has advantages over post-match debriefing
to sport performers. They highlight that the develop- sessions, which often take place sometime after the
ment of shared mental models between team players, incident under scrutiny has occurred (Means et al
and the mutual understanding and coordinated 1993, Williams & Ward 2003).
actions that result, can best be achieved by the Video has been used to assess DM performance
following: (McLennan & Omodei 1996), with structured video
1. Recording a range of typical scenarios from the training providing a useful adjunct to ‘in-game’ train-
performance domain, ideally from the same ing (Starkes & Lindley 1994). Although Starkes &
perspective that the performer will typically Lindley failed to show any conclusive evidence of
encounter. This could involve the use of a head such training affecting game performance, other
mounted camera (see Omodei et al 1998) for researchers have suggested that such transfer will
increased visual fidelity be evident when transfer-appropriate processing
2. These high fidelity video or DVD recordings occurs (Bransford et al 1979). Specifically, transfer
should be presented to the trainees, together with will occur when the presented scenario and
rich descriptions of an expert’s declarative, subsequent response demands the same cognitive
procedural and strategic mental model. This will processes that are required in the real task (Starkes &
include information on all three levels of situation Allard 1993). In addition, the fidelity of the video
awareness, identifying the important cues in the (e.g. the observational perspective from which the
event, what they mean, the corresponding video is filmed and the level of detail presented)
appropriate actions based on the expert’s is important to ensure transfer, particularly when
predictions of future events and the possible training elite performers (Alessi 1988).
interactions with other team members. Such
exposure of the expert’s weighting scale can be Conclusion
extracted via a ‘think-aloud’ process where they
verbalize their thoughts, either during or after the The aim of this chapter was to present a review
event of factors that influence the effectiveness of DM
3. If trainees undertake the training as a group they in pressure situations. We highlighted the impor-
should be encouraged to discuss the scenarios in tance of naturalistic paradigms when studying DM
order to develop a shared vocabulary. Exposure to in real-world settings, given the complexity and
262
Fig. 17.2 • Even when decision

making isn’t time pressured, a shared
mental moment helps confidence.
(c) Lesley-Ingram Brown. Reprinted with
kind permission.
time pressures associated with many performance in anxiety and threat processing was noted, as these
environments. Effective DM was argued to rely on factors exert strong influences on DM performance.
the development of highly elaborate knowledge Current thinking would argue that anxiety states are
structures with both declarative and procedural characterized by a hypervigilant rather than a narrow
elements, and expert behaviour can often be discri- attentional style that prioritizes the processing of
minated on the basis of differences in such knowl- threatening information. The underlying psychologi-
edge. We showed that deliberate practice helps to cal mechanism responsible for performance disrup-
develop this knowledge, together with other meta- tion when individuals are anxious is the control of
cognitive and self-regulatory skills important for peak attention, particularly the inhibition and shifting
performance. It was argued that knowledge struc- functions of working memory, as explained by atten-
tures guide the development of mental models and tion control theory. Also, in reviewing research into
the importance of developing coherent shared men- sports officiating we offered some ideas for improv-
tal models in team situations was highlighted ing team DM through the use of high-fidelity video
(Fig. 17.2). Such shared models hold information training scenarios that focus on all levels of situation
at three levels, each of relevance to the development awareness. Finally, it was noted that while there
of situational awareness; visual perception (SA 1), is a large body of research that has studied DM
comprehension (SA 2) and prediction (SA 3). across a range of settings, few studies have concerned
Evidence that DM performance is affected by sit- themselves with how best to train this key aspect of
uational stress and emotion was considered and the performance. In particular, more research is needed
principles of stress exposure training were explained. on how best to train coordinated team performance
The importance of recognizing individual differences in sport.
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17

Developing the performance

Duncan R.D. Mascarenhas* Nickolas C. Smith{

CHAPTER CONTENTS Introduction

ã 2011, Elsevier Ltd.

to wear to work) to life-affecting (e.g. a military theory to time-pressured, complex, ambiguous,

Consequently, in an attempt to understand the What supports effective

to describe the form and types of activity that seem

instructions and competition. The main prediction Central executive

Video-based decision-making a wide range of archetype situations that are

Fig. 17.2 • Even when decision

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