ADMINISTRATIVE

LAW

Atty. Sahara Alia J. Silongan

A.Y. 2019-2020
Notre Dame University

References: AGPALO. Administrative Law.

2005 ed.; CRUZ. Philippine Administrative
Law. 2007 ed. DE LEON. Administrative Law.
2016 ed.
 Introduction
Administrative Law embraces all the law that
controls, or is intended to control, the
administrative operations of government. It is that
branch of modern law under which the executive
department of the government, acting in a quasi-
legislative or quasi-judicial capacity, interferes with
the conduct of the individual for the purpose of
promoting the well-being of the community, as
under laws regulating public interest, professions,
trades and callings, rates and prices, laws for the
protection of public health and safety, and the
promotion of public convenience.
References: AGPALO. Administrative Law.
2005 ed.; CRUZ. Philippine Administrative
Law. 2007 ed. DE LEON. Administrative Law.
2016 ed.
 Sources of Administrative Law
1. Constitutional or statutory enactments creating administrative bodies.
Examples: Aratuc v. Commission on Elections; Maceda v. Energy Regulatory Board

1. Decisions of courts interpreting the charters of administrative bodies

and defining their powers, rights, inhibitions, among others, and the
effects of their determinations and regulations.
Example: Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, as promulgated by the DOLE

3. Rules and regulations issued by the administrative bodies in pursuance

of the purposes for which they were created.
Example: the awards of the NLRC with respect to money claims of employees

4. Determinations and order of the administrative bodies in the

settlements of controversies arising in their respective fields.

References: AGPALO. Administrative Law.

2005 ed.; CRUZ. Philippine Administrative
Law. 2007 ed. DE LEON. Administrative Law.
2016 ed.
 Origin and development in relation to
the Doctrine of Separation of Powers
• Under the Doctrine of Separation of Powers, all rules of conduct are
supposed to be laid down directly by the legislature, subject to the
(likewise) direct enforcement of the executive department, and the
application or interpretation, also directly, by the judiciary.

• It was felt that the legislative and judicial departments no longer had
either the time or the needed expertise to attend to these new problems,
not to mention the lack of interest, particularly in the legislature, as most
of these problems did not immediately affect the constituents of its
members.

• The obvious solution was delegation of power. The legislature began

authorizing certain specialized bodies to lay down rules for the regulation
of matters entrusted to their jurisdiction and, additionally, to apply these
rules in the adjudication of factual issues relating to these matters.

References: AGPALO. Administrative Law.

2005 ed.; CRUZ. Philippine Administrative
Law. 2007 ed. DE LEON. Administrative Law.
2016 ed.
 Administrative framework
• Government of the Republic of the Philippines: refers to the corporate governmental entity through
which the functions of government are exercised throughout the Philippines.

• Agency: refers to any of the various units of Government, including a department, bureau, office,
instrumentality, or government-owned or controlled corporation, or a local government or a distinct unit
therein.

• Instrumentality: refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the department
framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate
powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This
term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions and government-owned or controlled
corporations.

• Incorporated agencies: sometimes with and at other times without capital stock, are vested by law with a
juridical personality distinct from the personality of the Republic.

Ex: National Power Corporation, Phil. Ports Authority, National Housing Authority. Phil. National Oil
Company

References: AGPALO. Administrative Law.

2005 ed.; CRUZ. Philippine Administrative
Law. 2007 ed. DE LEON. Administrative Law.
2016 ed.
 Administrative framework (cont.)
• Non-incorporated agencies: are those not vested with a juridical
personality distinct from the Republic, endowed by law with some if not
all corporate powers.
Ex: Sugar Regulatory Administration which is not a GOCC but an agency
under the OP.

* Incorporated and non-incorporated agencies or instrumentalities are all

agents or delegates of the Republic of the Philippines.

• Chartered institution: refers to any agency organized or operating under a

specific charter, and vested by law with functions relating to specific
constitutional policies or objectives.

• Administration: refers to the aggregate of those persons in whose hand

the reins of government are for the time being.

References: AGPALO. Administrative Law.

2005 ed.; CRUZ. Philippine Administrative
Law. 2007 ed. DE LEON. Administrative Law.
2016 ed.
 Administrative Agencies
• Administrative agencies, boards and commissions
are public offices.
The term “public office” refers to the right,
authority and duty created and conferred by law, by
which, for a given period either fixed by law or
enduring at the pleasure of the appointing power,
an individual is invested with some portion of the
sovereign functions of the government, to be
exercised by that individual for the benefit of the
public.
A public office is a public trust or responsibility.
References: AGPALO. Administrative Law.
2005 ed.; CRUZ. Philippine Administrative
Law. 2007 ed. DE LEON. Administrative Law.
2016 ed.
• Reasons for creation of administrative
agencies
This field of law is a recent development,
being a consequence of the ever-increasing
complexities of society and the proliferation of
problems of government that cannot readily or
effectively be addressed by the traditional public
agencies or solved by the other disciplines of
public law.
References: AGPALO. Administrative Law.
2005 ed.; CRUZ. Philippine Administrative
Law. 2007 ed. DE LEON. Administrative Law.
2016 ed.
• Creation

The administrative body or public office may be created by the

Constitution or by statute or by an officer or tribunal to which the
power to create the office has been delegated by the legislature.

If created by the Constitution itself, the administrative body can be

altered or abolished only by constitutional amendment.

But where the body was created only by statute, the legislature
that breathed life into it can amend or even repeal its charter, thereby
resulting in its abolition.

References: AGPALO. Administrative Law.

2005 ed.; CRUZ. Philippine Administrative
Law. 2007 ed. DE LEON. Administrative Law.
2016 ed.
• Power to Reorganize

Reorganization is the process of restructuring the bureaucracy’s

organizational and functional set-up, to make it more viable in terms of
economy, effectiveness, and make it more responsive to the needs of
its public clientele as authorized by law.

An administrative body created by law may be reorganized

pursuant to said law providing for its establishment or another law
authorizing said reorganization.

The legislature usually exercises the power to create or abolish by

delegating it to the President or to another executive officer or body.
The means by which the legislature makes the delegation is by
authorizing reorganization.
References: AGPALO. Administrative Law.
2005 ed.; CRUZ. Philippine Administrative
Law. 2007 ed. DE LEON. Administrative Law.
2016 ed.
 Types of Administrative Agencies
1. Agencies created to function in situations wherein government is offering some
gratuity, grant, or special privileges.
2. Agencies created to function in situations wherein government is seeking to
carry on certain governmental functions.
3. Agencies created to function in situations wherein government is performing
some business for the public.
4. Agencies created to function in situations wherein government is seeking to
regulate business affected with public interest.
5. Agencies created to function in situations wherein government is seeking under
the police power to regulate private business and individuals.
6. Agencies created to function in situations wherein government is seeking to
adjust individual controversies because of some strong social policy involved.
7. Agencies created to function in situations wherein government is seeking to
conduct investigations and gather evidence for information, recommendation or
prosecution of crimes.
References: AGPALO. Administrative Law.
2005 ed.; CRUZ. Philippine Administrative
Law. 2007 ed. DE LEON. Administrative Law.
2016 ed.
 CASES

Government-Owned and Controlled

Corporations v. Government
Instrumentality

References: AGPALO. Administrative Law.

2005 ed.; CRUZ. Philippine Administrative
Law. 2007 ed. DE LEON. Administrative Law.
2016 ed.
Manila International Airport Authority v. City of
Pasay (April 2, 2009)
HELD: MIAA is a government "instrumentality" that does not qualify as a "government-owned or
controlled corporation.

A government-owned or controlled corporation must be "organized as a stock or non-stock

corporation." MIAA is not organized as a stock or non-stock corporation. MIAA is not a stock corporation
because it has no capital stock divided into shares. MIAA has no stockholders or voting shares.

MIAA is also not a non-stock corporation because it has no members. Section 87 of the Corporation
Code defines a non-stock corporation as "one where no part of its income is distributable as dividends
to its members, trustees or officers." A non-stock corporation must have members.

MIAA is a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers to perform efficiently its
governmental functions. MIAA is like any other government instrumentality, the only difference is that
MIAA is vested with corporate powers.

** A government "instrumentality" may include a "government-owned or controlled corporation," there

may be a government "instrumentality" that will not qualify as a "government-owned or controlled
corporation."

References: AGPALO. Administrative Law.

2005 ed.; CRUZ. Philippine Administrative
Law. 2007 ed. DE LEON. Administrative Law.
2016 ed.
Funa v. Manila Economic and Cultural
Office and COA (Feb. 04, 2014)
HELD: The MECO is not a GOCC or government
instrumentality.

Government instrumentalities are agencies of the national

government that, by reason of some “special function or
jurisdiction” they perform or exercise, are allotted
“operational autonomy” and are “not integrated within the
department framework.” Subsumed under the rubric
“government instrumentality” are the following entities:
regulatory agencies, chartered institutions, government
corporate entities or government instrumentalities with
corporate powers (GCE/GICP), and GOCCs.

References: AGPALO. Administrative Law.

2005 ed.; CRUZ. Philippine Administrative
Law. 2007 ed. DE LEON. Administrative Law.
2016 ed.
The Administrative Code defines a GOCC:

(13) Government–owned or controlled corporation refers to any agency

organized as a stock or non–stock corporation, vested with functions relating
to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned
by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly, or,
where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least
fifty–one (51) per cent of its capital stock: x x x.

GOCCs, therefore, are “stock or non–stock” corporations “vested with

functions relating to public needs” that are “owned by the Government
directly or through its instrumentalities.” By definition, three attributes thus
make an entity a GOCC: first, its organization as stock or non–stock
corporation; second, the public character of its function; and third,
government ownership over the same.

References: AGPALO. Administrative Law.

2005 ed.; CRUZ. Philippine Administrative
Law. 2007 ed. DE LEON. Administrative Law.
2016 ed.
Possession of all three attributes is necessary to deem an entity a GOCC.

In this case, there is not much dispute that the MECO possesses the first and second
attributes. It is the third attribute, which the MECO lacks.

Organization as a non–stock corporation and the mere performance of functions with

a public aspect, however, are not by themselves sufficient to consider the MECO as a
GOCC. In order to qualify as a GOCC, a corporation must also, if not more importantly,
be owned by the government.

The government owns a stock or non–stock corporation if it has controlling interest in

the corporation. In a stock corporation, the controlling interest of the government is
assured by its ownership of at least fifty–one percent (51%) of the corporate capital
stock. In a non–stock corporation, like the MECO, jurisprudence teaches that the
controlling interest of the government is affirmed when “at least majority of the
members are government officials holding such membership by appointment or
designation” or there is otherwise “substantial participation of the government in the
selection” of the corporation’s governing board.
References: AGPALO. Administrative Law.
2005 ed.; CRUZ. Philippine Administrative
Law. 2007 ed. DE LEON. Administrative Law.
2016 ed.
It is significant to note that none of the original incorporators of the MECO
were shown to be government officials at the time of the corporation’s
organization. Indeed, none of the members, officers or board of directors of
the MECO, from its incorporation up to the present day, were established as
government appointees or public officers designated by reason of their office.
There is, in fact, no law or executive order that authorizes such an
appointment or designation. Hence, from a strictly legal perspective, it
appears that the presidential “desire letters” pointed out by petitioner—if
such letters even exist outside of the case of Mr. Basilio—are, no matter how
strong its persuasive effect may be, merely recommendatory.

Indeed, from hindsight, it is clear that the MECO is uniquely situated as

compared with other private corporations. From its over–reaching corporate
objectives, its special duty and authority to exercise certain consular
functions, up to the oversight by the executive department over its
operations—all the while maintaining its legal status as a non–governmental
entity—the MECO is, for all intents and purposes, sui generis.
References: AGPALO. Administrative Law.
2005 ed.; CRUZ. Philippine Administrative
Law. 2007 ed. DE LEON. Administrative Law.
2016 ed.
 Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. COA
(June 7, 2011)
HELD: The BSP is a public corporation and its funds are subject to the
COAs audit jurisdiction.

Not all corporations, which are not government owned or controlled,

are ipso facto to be considered private corporations as there exists
another distinct class of corporations or chartered institutions which
are otherwise known as public corporations.

Assuming for the sake of argument that the BSP ceases to be owned or
controlled by the government because of reduction of the number of
representatives of the government in the BSP Board, it does not follow
that it also ceases to be a government instrumentality as it still retains
all the characteristics of the latter as an attached agency of the DECS
under the Administrative Code.

References: AGPALO. Administrative Law.

2005 ed.; CRUZ. Philippine Administrative
Law. 2007 ed. DE LEON. Administrative Law.
2016 ed.
Veterans Federation of the Philippines
v. Angelo Reyes (Feb. 28, 2006)
HELD: In the case at bar, the functions of petitioner
corporation enshrined in Section 4 of Rep. Act No.
264031 should most certainly fall within the
category of sovereign functions. The protection of
the interests of war veterans is not only meant to
promote social justice, but is also intended to
reward patriotism. Petitioner VFP is a public
corporation. As such, it can be placed under the
control and supervision of the Secretary of National
Defense, who consequently has the power to
conduct an extensive management audit of
petitioner corporation.
References: AGPALO. Administrative Law.
2005 ed.; CRUZ. Philippine Administrative
Law. 2007 ed. DE LEON. Administrative Law.
2016 ed.
 Philippine Fisheries Development Authority v.
Court of Appeals (July 31, 2007)
HELD: Indeed, the Authority is not a GOCC but an instrumentality of the
government. The Authority has a capital stock but it is not divided into shares
of stocks. Also, it has no stockholders or voting shares. Hence, it is not a stock
corporation. Neither it is a non-stock corporation because it has no members.

The Authority is actually a national government instrumentality which is

defined as an agency of the national government, not integrated within the
department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law,
endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds,
and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. When the law
vests in a government instrumentality corporate powers, the
instrumentality does not become a corporation. Unless the government
instrumentality is organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, it remains a
government instrumentality exercising not only governmental but also
corporate powers.

References: AGPALO. Administrative Law.

2005 ed.; CRUZ. Philippine Administrative
Law. 2007 ed. DE LEON. Administrative Law.
2016 ed.
 Feliciano v. Gison (August 25, 2010)
HELD: The Constitution recognizes two classes of corporations. The
first refers to private corporations created under a general law. The
second refers to government-owned or controlled corporations
created by special charters. Section 16, Article XII of the Constitution
provides:

Sec. 16. The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the
formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations.
Government-owned or controlled corporations may be created or
established by special charters in the interest of the common good and
subject to the test of economic viability.

Economic viability is “the capacity to function efficiently in business.”

To be economically viable, the entity “should not go into activities
which the private sector can do better.” (City of Lapu-Lapu)
References: AGPALO. Administrative Law.
2005 ed.; CRUZ. Philippine Administrative
Law. 2007 ed. DE LEON. Administrative Law.
2016 ed.
The Constitution emphatically prohibits the creation of private
corporations except by a general law applicable to all citizens. The
purpose of this constitutional provision is to ban private corporations
created by special charters, which historically gave certain individuals,
families or groups special privileges denied to other citizens.

In short, Congress cannot enact a law creating a private corporation

with a special charter. Such legislation would be unconstitutional.
Private corporations may exist only under a general law. If the
corporation is private, it must necessarily exist under a general law.
Stated differently, only corporations created under a general law can
qualify as private corporations. Under existing laws, that general law is
the Corporation Code, except that the Cooperative Code governs the
incorporation of cooperatives.

References: AGPALO. Administrative Law.

2005 ed.; CRUZ. Philippine Administrative
Law. 2007 ed. DE LEON. Administrative Law.
2016 ed.
The Constitution authorizes Congress to create government-owned or controlled corporations through
special charters. Since private corporations cannot have special charters, it follows that Congress can
create corporations with special charters only if such corporations are government-owned or controlled.

Obviously, LWDs [referring to local water districts] are not private corporations because they are not
created under the Corporation Code. LWDs are not registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission. Section 14 of the Corporation Code states that [A]ll corporations organized under this code
shall file with the Securities and Exchange Commission articles of incorporation x x x. LWDs have no
articles of incorporation, no incorporators and no stockholders or members. There are no stockholders
or members to elect the board directors of LWDs as in the case of all corporations registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission. The local mayor or the provincial governor appoints the directors
of LWDs for a fixed term of office. This Court has ruled that LWDs are not created under the Corporation
Code, thus:

From the foregoing pronouncement, it is clear that what has been excluded from the coverage of the
CSC are those corporations created pursuant to the Corporation Code. Significantly, petitioners are not
created under the said code, but on the contrary, they were created pursuant to a special law and are
governed primarily by its provision.

References: AGPALO. Administrative Law.

2005 ed.; CRUZ. Philippine Administrative
Law. 2007 ed. DE LEON. Administrative Law.
2016 ed.
 City of Lapu-Lapu v. Philippine Economic
Zone Authority (Nov. 26, 2014)
HELD: The law created the PEZA’s charter. Under the Special Economic
Zone Act of 1995, the PEZA was established primarily to perform the
governmental function of operating, administering, managing, and
developing special economic zones to attract investments and provide
opportunities for preferential use of Filipino labor.

Under its charter, the PEZA was created a body corporate endowed
with some corporate powers. However, it was not organized as a stock
or non-stock corporation. Nothing in the PEZA’s charter provides that
the PEZA’s capital is divided into shares. The PEZA also has no
members who shall share in the PEZA’s profits.

The PEZA, therefore, need not be economically viable. It is not a

government-owned or controlled corporation liable for real property
taxes.
References: AGPALO. Administrative Law.
2005 ed.; CRUZ. Philippine Administrative
Law. 2007 ed. DE LEON. Administrative Law.
2016 ed.
 Republic v. City of Parañaque
(July 18, 2012)
In the case at bench, the Philippine Reclamation Authority is not a
GOCC because it is neither a stock nor a non-stock corporation. It
cannot be considered as a stock corporation because although it has a
capital stock divided into no par value shares as provided in Section 74
of P.D. No. 1084, it is not authorized to distribute dividends, surplus
allotments or profits to stockholders. There is no provision whatsoever
in P.D. No. 1084 or in any of the subsequent executive issuances
pertaining to PRA, particularly, E.O. No. 525,5 E.O. No. 6546 and EO
No. 7987 that authorizes PRA to distribute dividends, surplus
allotments or profits to its stockholders.

PRA cannot be considered a non-stock corporation either because it

does not have members. A non-stock corporation must have members.
Moreover, it was not organized for any of the purposes mentioned in
Section 88 of the Corporation Code. Specifically, it was created to
manage all government reclamation projects.
References: AGPALO. Administrative Law.
2005 ed.; CRUZ. Philippine Administrative
Law. 2007 ed. DE LEON. Administrative Law.
2016 ed.
Investigatory Power

References: AGPALO. Administrative Law.

2005 ed.; CRUZ. Philippine Administrative
Law. 2007 ed. DE LEON. Administrative Law.
2016 ed.
 Power of Investigation
Investigatory or “inquisitorial” power consists in
gathering, organizing, and analyzing evidence, which is a
useful aid or tool in an administrative agency’s
performance of its rule–making or quasi-judicial
functions.
It includes the power of an administrative body to
inspect the records, premises, and investigate the
activities of persons or entities coming under its
jurisdiction, or to secure, or to require the disclosure of
information by means of accounts, records, reports,
statements, testimony of witnesses, production of
documents, or otherwise.

References: AGPALO. Administrative Law.

2005 ed.; CRUZ. Philippine Administrative
Law. 2007 ed. DE LEON. Administrative Law.
2016 ed.
 Purposes
The investigatory powers of some agencies are limited to only
information gathering, as basis to recommend appropriate action by
other government agencies or to focus public opinion on matters of
vital concern, like the CHR.
Other agencies are granted investigatory powers for prosecution
purposes, such as the offices of public prosecutor and the
Ombudsman.
Still others exercise investigatory powers in aid in the exercise of
other powers granted them, like the SEC in the regulation of private
corporations.
Investigations are useful for all administrative functions including
rule-making, adjudication, and licensing, supervising and directing for
determination of public policy, for recommending legislation.
The enabling act defines the extent of such investigatory powers.

References: AGPALO. Administrative Law.

2005 ed.; CRUZ. Philippine Administrative
Law. 2007 ed. DE LEON. Administrative Law.
2016 ed.
 President’s investigatory power
The President’s investigatory power emanates from his
power of supervision and control over all executive
departments, bureaus, and offices; his power of supervision
over LGUS; and his power of appointment of presidential
appointees, which are conferred upon him by the
Constitution.
His investigatory power also comes from powers delegated
to him by the legislature. In the exercise of his investigatory
power, the President may do so thru an executive officer, or
create a body or committee to conduct the investigation,
empower said officer, body or committee to issue subpoena
and subpoena duces tecum for the purpose, and to make
recommendations, on the basis of which he will make his
appropriate action.
References: AGPALO. Administrative Law.
2005 ed.; CRUZ. Philippine Administrative
Law. 2007 ed. DE LEON. Administrative Law.
2016 ed.
 Ruperto v. Torres
(Feb. 25, 1957)
FACTS: A complaint was filed against Ruperto charging him with disloyalty to
service, partiality, favoritism, violation of his oath of office and acquisition of
a big real estate beyond his income received from the government.
The Integrity Board found after hearing that the charges of prosecution
and partiality were sufficiently established and concluded that petitioner had
made use of public office to serve and favor his friends and to prosecute the
enemies of the latter, instead of observing absolute impartiality and fairness
in the performance of his official duties. In view of its findings, the Board
recommended that petitioner-appellee be reprimanded with the warning
that any repetition of any misconduct on his part will be more severely dealt
with.
Ruperto questions the findings of the Board through certiorari.

ISSUE: Was the Integrity Board or its successor, Presidential Complaints and
Action Commission, a board exercising judicial functions?

References: AGPALO. Administrative Law.

2005 ed.; CRUZ. Philippine Administrative
Law. 2007 ed. DE LEON. Administrative Law.
2016 ed.
HELD: No. The Board neither adjudicates upon nor determines the
rights and interests or duties of parties; it is limited to investigating the
facts and making findings in respect thereto. After an investigation by
the Board, the officer that ultimately passes upon and adjudicates the
rights of the parties is the President, not the board, or its successor.
Thus, a special civil action of certiorari "would not lie to challenge
action of the Board. The test of a judicial function is not the exercise of
judicial discretion, but the power and authority to adjudicate upon the
rights and obligations of the parties before it. As the Board lacks the
power and authority to adjudicate upon matters submitted to it for
investigation and make the final pronouncement thereon affecting the
parties, the second requisite for the availability of the action of
certiorari is wanting.

References: AGPALO. Administrative Law.

2005 ed.; CRUZ. Philippine Administrative
Law. 2007 ed. DE LEON. Administrative Law.
2016 ed.
 Evangelista v. Jarencio
(Nov. 27, 1975)
Facts: The President of the Philippines created the Presidential Agency on
Reforms and Government Operations (PARGO) under Executive Order No. 4 of
January 7, 1966. Purposedly, he charged the Agency with the authority to
investigate cases of graft and corruption, among others. The Agency is also
vested with all the powers of an investigating committee under the Revised
Administrative Code, including the power to summon witnesses by subpoena
or subpoena duces tecum, administer oaths, take testimony or evidence
relevant to the investigation.
Sworn statements were filed before PARGO implicating certain public officials
of the City Government of Manila in anomalous transactions. Hence,
Petitioner Quirico Evangelista, as Undersecretary of the Agency, issued to
respondent Fernando Manalastas, then Acting City Public Service Officer of
Manila, a subpoena ad testificandum commanding him "to be and appear as
witness at the Office of the PRESIDENTIAL AGENCY ON REFORMS AND
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS ... then and there to declare and testify in a
certain investigation pending therein.” Instead of obeying the subpoena,
respondent Fernando Manalastas assailed its legality.

References: AGPALO. Administrative Law.

2005 ed.; CRUZ. Philippine Administrative
Law. 2007 ed. DE LEON. Administrative Law.
2016 ed.
Issue: Whether the Agency, acting thru its officials, enjoys
the authority to issue subpoenas in its conduct of fact-
finding investigations.

Held: Yes. When investigative and accusatory duties are

delegated by statute to an administrative body, it, too
may take steps to inform itself as to whether there is
probable violation of the law. In sum, it may be stated
that a subpoena meets the requirements for enforcement
if the inquiry is (1) within the authority of the agency; (2)
the demand is not too indefinite; and (3) the information
is reasonably relevant.
References: AGPALO. Administrative Law.
2005 ed.; CRUZ. Philippine Administrative
Law. 2007 ed. DE LEON. Administrative Law.
2016 ed.
There is no doubt that the fact-finding investigations being conducted by the Agency fall within the
Agency's sphere of authority and that the information sought to be elicited from respondent Fernando
Manalastas, of which he is claimed to be in possession, is reasonably relevant to the investigations.

ISSUE: Is the filing of a complaint required before the investigating body may issue subpoena?

HELD: No. Rightly, administrative agencies may enforce subpoenas issued in the course of investigations,
whether or not adjudication is involved, and whether or not probable cause is shown and even before
the issuance of a complaint. It is not necessary, as in the case of a warrant, that a specific charge or
complaint of violation of law be pending or that the order be made pursuant to one. It is enough that
the investigation be for a lawfully authorized purpose. The purpose of the subpoena is to discover
evidence, not to prove a pending charge, but upon which to make one if the discovered evidence so
justifies.

ISSUE: Is the person being investigated entitled to be informed of the findings and recommendations of
the investigating body?

HELD: No. He is only entitled to be informed of the charges against him, to a hearing of said charges, to
an opportunity to meet the evidence against him, to present his own evidence and to be furnished with
copy of the adminsitrative decision, so that he may, if he so desires, appeal thereform to the CSC within
15 days from notice.

References: AGPALO. Administrative Law.

2005 ed.; CRUZ. Philippine Administrative
Law. 2007 ed. DE LEON. Administrative Law.
2016 ed.
An investigatory body with the sole power of investigation
does not exercise judicial functions and its power is limited to
investigating the facts and making findings in respect thereto.
The test whether an administrative body is exercising judicial
functions or merely investigatory functions is: if the only
purpose of investigation is to evaluate evidence submitted
before it based on facts and circumstances presented to it,
and if the agency is not authorized to make a final
pronouncement affecting the parties, then there is an
absence of judicial discretion and judgment.

There are administrative agencies which are granted only

investigatory powers. Ex: CHR and NBI.
References: AGPALO. Administrative Law.
2005 ed.; CRUZ. Philippine Administrative
Law. 2007 ed. DE LEON. Administrative Law.
2016 ed.
 Cariño v. Commission on Human Rights
(Dec. 2, 1991)
Facts: Hundreds of teachers staged a mass concerted action consisting of staying away
from their classes and attending peaceable assemblies. For their failure to heed the
return-to-work order issued by DECS Secretary, private respondents were
administratively charged. The DECS Secretary thereafter issued a decision dismissing X
from service and suspending ABC for nine months.

The teachers filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC on the ground that they
were denied due process. Said petition was dismissed. They then elevated the matter
to the SC. Meanwhile, they filed a sworn statement before the CHR to complain that
while they were participating in peaceful mass actions, they suddenly learned of their
replacements as teachers, allegedly without notice and consequently for reasons
completely unknown to them.

The DECS Secretary and the School Superintendent of Manila were enjoined by the
CHR to appear before it. Otherwise, the Commission will resolve the complaint on the
basis of complainants' evidence.

References: AGPALO. Administrative Law.

2005 ed.; CRUZ. Philippine Administrative
Law. 2007 ed. DE LEON. Administrative Law.
2016 ed.
Issue: Whether or not the CHR has the power to adjudicate or exercise quasi-judicial
power, as an incident of its power to investigate.

Held: The CHR has no such power; and that it was not meant by the fundamental law
to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less
take over the functions of the latter.

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power
is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards
claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is
not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or
even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and
ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly
speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual
conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the
law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or
determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes
of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does
not have.
References: AGPALO. Administrative Law.
2005 ed.; CRUZ. Philippine Administrative
Law. 2007 ed. DE LEON. Administrative Law.
2016 ed.
Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power
"to investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits"
(adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as
it has announced it means to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a claim
that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in
question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or
political rights had been transgressed. More particularly, the Commission has
no power to "resolve on the merits" the question of (a) whether or not the
mass concerted actions engaged in by the teachers constitute and are
prohibited or otherwise restricted by law; (b) whether or not the act of
carrying on and taking part in those actions, and the failure of the teachers to
discontinue those actions, and return to their classes despite the order to this
effect by the Secretary of Education, constitute infractions of relevant rules
and regulations warranting administrative disciplinary sanctions, or are
justified by the grievances complained of by them; and (c) what where the
particular acts done by each individual teacher and what sanctions, if any,
may properly be imposed for said acts or omissions.

References: AGPALO. Administrative Law.

2005 ed.; CRUZ. Philippine Administrative
Law. 2007 ed. DE LEON. Administrative Law.
2016 ed.
These are matters undoubtedly and clearly within the original
jurisdiction of the Secretary of Education, being within the scope of
the disciplinary powers granted to him under the Civil Service Law, and
also, within the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.
Indeed, the Secretary of Education has, as above narrated, already
taken cognizance of the issues and resolved them, and it appears that
appeals have been seasonably taken by the aggrieved parties to the
Civil Service Commission; and even this Court itself has had occasion to
pass upon said issues.

Thus, the power of the CHR is basically investigatory and informational

in nature. It may refer the results of its investigation to the DOJ for
possible prosecution of crimes involving violations of civil and political
rights.

References: AGPALO. Administrative Law.

2005 ed.; CRUZ. Philippine Administrative
Law. 2007 ed. DE LEON. Administrative Law.
2016 ed.
 NBI
Similarly, the NBI’s functions are merely investigatory and
informational in nature. It has no judicial or quasi-judicial
powers and is incapable of granting any relief to a party. It
cannot even determine probable cause. It is an investigative
agency whose findings are merely recommendatory. It
undertakes investigation of crimes upon its own initiative and
as public welfare may require. It renders assistance when
requested in the investigation or detection of crimes.
However, on the basis of its investigation of a crime, the NBI
may file the corresponding complaint with the Prosecutor’s
Office or with the DOJ for preliminary investigation and, if so
warranted, for filing by the latter of the information in court.

References: AGPALO. Administrative Law.

2005 ed.; CRUZ. Philippine Administrative
Law. 2007 ed. DE LEON. Administrative Law.
2016 ed.
 Principles
1. The power to issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum must
be conferred by statutes upon administrative agencies.
Hence, administrative officers do not have inherent power to
require the attendance of witnesses before them, put witnesses
under oath and require them to testify, or to require the production
of books, papers, and documents or other evidence.
The power given by the statute must be clear and cannot be
inferred from a grant of authority to summon and examine witness.
What to do in case no such power is expressly granted? Compulsion
through judicial process. Apply before the court for subpoena to
enforce obedience or the giving of a testimony before it. The court
may punish contumacy or refusal as contempt.
References: AGPALO. Administrative Law.
2005 ed.; CRUZ. Philippine Administrative
Law. 2007 ed. DE LEON. Administrative Law.
2016 ed.
2. Contempt proceedings. Persons failing to attend,
give testimony, and produce records at an
investigative proceeding may be punished for
contempt. An administrative body, however, cannot
exercise its power to punish a person for contempt
in the absence of any statutory grant, for such
power is inherently judicial in nature.
Of course, before one can apply to the courts for
the punishment of a hostile witness, the agency
must first have the authority to take testimony or
evidence. (Carmelo v. Ramos, November 30, 1962)
References: AGPALO. Administrative Law.
2005 ed.; CRUZ. Philippine Administrative
Law. 2007 ed. DE LEON. Administrative Law.
2016 ed.
3. While hearings may be held, hearing is not a necessary part of an
investigation by an administrative body or official.

4. In administrative proceeding, technical rules of procedure and evidence

are not strictly applied.

5. Right to counsel is not always imperative in administrative investigations

because such inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there are
facts that merit disciplinary measure against erring public officers and
employees. Thus, a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be
assisted by a counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the
respondent’s capacity to represent himself. No duty rests on such body to
furnish the person being investigated the option of engaging the services of
counsel or not. The hearing conducted by the investigating authority is not
part of a criminal prosecution.

References: AGPALO. Administrative Law.

2005 ed.; CRUZ. Philippine Administrative
Law. 2007 ed. DE LEON. Administrative Law.
2016 ed.
Quasi-Legislative Power

(Rule-Making Power)

References: AGPALO. Administrative Law.

2005 ed.; CRUZ. Philippine Administrative
Law. 2007 ed. DE LEON. Administrative Law.
2016 ed.
 Legislative Power
Legislative power is the power to make, alter and repeal laws.
The essential feature of the legislative function is the
determination of the legislative policy and its formulation and
promulgation as a defined and binding rule of conduct.
• The doctrine of separation of power prohibits the
delegation of purely legislative power. (Bar Question) It
does not, however, absolutely prohibit delegation of
legislative power.
• The prohibition does not embrace every power the
legislature may properly exercise. What the doctrine
precludes is the delegation of those powers which are
strictly or inherently and exclusively legislative such as
determining what the law shall be, to whom it may be
applied, or what acts are necessary to effectuate the law.
References: AGPALO. Administrative Law.
2005 ed.; CRUZ. Philippine Administrative
Law. 2007 ed. DE LEON. Administrative Law.
2016 ed.
• In other words, the power to declare whether or not there
shall be a law, to determine the general purpose or policy
to be achieved by the law, and to fix the limits within which
the law shall operate is a power which is vested in the
legislature and may not be delegated.
• The latest in our jurisprudence indicates that delegation of
legislative power has become the rule and its non-
delegation the exception. The reason is the increasing
complexity of modern life and many technical fields of
governmental functions.
• The Constitution itself makes the delegation of legislative
power to the President, the Supreme Court, and the local
government units.
References: AGPALO. Administrative Law.
2005 ed.; CRUZ. Philippine Administrative
Law. 2007 ed. DE LEON. Administrative Law.
2016 ed.
Delegation of legislative power to the
President
The President is permitted in Sections 23(2)
[refers to national emergency] and 28(2) [refers
to fixing and imposition of tariff rates, etc] of
Article VI of the Constitution. The Administrative
Code of 1987 also delegates to the President
certain ordinance powers, in the form of
presidential issuances.

References: AGPALO. Administrative Law.

2005 ed.; CRUZ. Philippine Administrative
Law. 2007 ed. DE LEON. Administrative Law.
2016 ed.
 Ordinance Power of the President
1. Executive Orders. - Acts of the President providing for rules of a general or
permanent character in implementation or execution of constitutional or
statutory powers shall be promulgated in executive orders.

Example: EO No. 102, s. 2019 (January 10, 2020) – Modifying the rates of
import duty on certain imported articles in order to implement the Philippine
Tariff Commitments pursuant to the Free Trade Agreement between the
ASEAN and HK, China.

2. Administrative Orders. - Acts of the President which relate to particular

aspect of governmental operations in pursuance of his duties as
administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative orders.

Example: Administrative Order No. 20, s. 2019 (January 10, 2020) -

Authorizing the grant of gratuity pay for FY 2019 to JO and COS workers in
government.
References: AGPALO. Administrative Law.
2005 ed.; CRUZ. Philippine Administrative
Law. 2007 ed. DE LEON. Administrative Law.
2016 ed.
3. Proclamations. - Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a status or condition of public
moment or interest, upon the existence of which the operation of a specific law or regulation is made to
depend, shall be promulgated in proclamations which shall have the force of an executive order.

Example: Proclamation No. 889 (January 24, 2020) – Creating and designating a building and the parcel
of land on which it stands located in the AFP-RSBS Compound, Km. 12 East Service Road, C5, Taguig City
as Special Economic Zone (Information Technology Center), pursuant to RA 7916 as amended by RA
8748.

4. Memorandum Orders. - Acts of the President on matters of administrative detail or of subordinate or

temporary interest which only concern a particular officer or office of the Government shall be
embodied in memorandum orders.

Example: Memorandum Order No. 41, s. 2019 (Nov. 15, 2019) – Creating a TWG for the establishment
of a military camp in Kapantaran, Marawi City
A special economic zone (SEZ) is an area in which the business and trade laws are different from the
rest of the country. SEZs are located within a country's national borders, and their aims include
increased trade balance, employment, increased investment, job creation and effective administration.
References: AGPALO. Administrative Law.
2005 ed.; CRUZ. Philippine Administrative
Law. 2007 ed. DE LEON. Administrative Law.
2016 ed.
5. Memorandum Circulars. - Acts of the President on matters relating to
internal administration, which the President desires to bring to the attention
of all or some of the departments, agencies, bureaus or offices of the
Government, for information or compliance, shall be embodied in
memorandum circulars.

Example: MC No. 75 (January 13, 2020) on suspension of classes in all levels

in the Province of Batangas on January 14, 2020.

6. General or Special Orders. - Acts and commands of the President in his

capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines shall
be issued as general or special orders.

Example: General Order No. 1 (May 30, 2017) – Implementing Proclamation

No. 216 dated May 23, 2017 placing Mindanao under Martial Law for a period
not exceeding 60 days.
References: AGPALO. Administrative Law.
2005 ed.; CRUZ. Philippine Administrative
Law. 2007 ed. DE LEON. Administrative Law.
2016 ed.
Delegation of legislative power to the
Supreme Court
• The Constitution vests in the Supreme Court the power to
“Promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleadings, practice,
and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of
law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged.
• The power vested in the Supreme Court, as above
provided, empowers it not only to promulgate rules of
procedure but also to repeal procedural laws, such as those
which prescribe the method of enforcing rights or obtaining
redress for their invasion.
• Parts of statutes which deal with procedural aspects can be
modified or repealed by the Supreme Court by virtue of its
constitutional rule-making powers.
References: AGPALO. Administrative Law.
2005 ed.; CRUZ. Philippine Administrative
Law. 2007 ed. DE LEON. Administrative Law.
2016 ed.
 Delegation of legislative power to
local governments
Section 48 of the Local Government Code of
1991 provides that “Local legislative power shall
be exercised by the sangguniang panlalawigan
for the province; the sangguniang panlungsod
for the city; the sangguniang bayan for the
municipality; and the sangguniang barangay for
the barangay.

References: AGPALO. Administrative Law.

2005 ed.; CRUZ. Philippine Administrative
Law. 2007 ed. DE LEON. Administrative Law.
2016 ed.
 Rule-making power of administrative
agencies
Rule-making power of administrative agencies refers to the power to issue
rules and regulations which result from delegated legislation in the
administrative level.
It is the agency process for formulating, amending, or repealing a rule.
• Administrative agencies may exercise quasi-legislative or rule-making
powers only if there exists a law which delegates that power to them.
• An administrative body may implement broad policies laid down in a
statute by filling in only the details which the Legislature may neither have
time nor competence to provide. This is called the Power of Subordinate
Legislation. This is effected by their promulgation of what are known as
supplementary regulations, which have the force and effect of law.
• Vesting administrative agencies with this power is necessary because of
the impracticability of providing general regulations for various and
varying details of management by the lawmakers.
References: AGPALO. Administrative Law.
2005 ed.; CRUZ. Philippine Administrative
Law. 2007 ed. DE LEON. Administrative Law.
2016 ed.
 Tests to determine validity of
delegation
These tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative
authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of
the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.

1. Completeness test: Ideally, the law must be complete in all its terms
and conditions when it leaves the legislature so that when it reaches
the delegate, it will have nothing to do but to enforce it. If there are
gaps in the law that will prevent its enforcement until they are first
filled, the delegate will have the opportunity to repair the omission
through the exercise of the discretion to determine what the law shall
be which, as earlier noted, is essentially legislative.
A statute may be complete when the subject, the manner, and the
extent of its operation are stated in it. It must describe what must be
done, who must do it, and the scope of authority.

References: AGPALO. Administrative Law.

2005 ed.; CRUZ. Philippine Administrative
Law. 2007 ed. DE LEON. Administrative Law.
2016 ed.
 United States v. Ang Tang Ho
(Feb. 27, 1922)
Held: When Act No. 2868 is analyzed, it is the violation of the proclamation of the
Governor-General which constitutes the crime. Without that proclamation, it was no
crime to sell rice at any price. In other words, the Legislature left it to the sole
discretion of the Governor-General to say what was and what was not "any cause" for
enforcing the act, and what was and what was not "an extraordinary rise in the price
of palay, rice or corn," and under certain undefined conditions to fix the price at which
rice should be sold, without regard to grade or quality, also to say whether a
proclamation should be issued, if so, when, and whether or not the law should be
enforced, how long it should be enforced, and when the law should be suspended.
The Legislature did not specify or define what was "any cause," or what was "an
extraordinary rise in the price of rice, palay or corn," Neither did it specify or define
the conditions upon which the proclamation should be issued. In the absence of the
proclamation no crime was committed. The alleged sale was made a crime, if at all,
because the Governor-General issued the proclamation.

Act No. 2868, in so far as it undertakes to authorize the Governor-General in his

discretion to issue a proclamation, fixing the price of rice, and to make the sale of rice
in violation of the price of rice, and to make the sale of rice in violation of the
proclamation a crime, is unconstitutional and void.
References: AGPALO. Administrative Law.
2005 ed.; CRUZ. Philippine Administrative
Law. 2007 ed. DE LEON. Administrative Law.
2016 ed.
2. Sufficient standard test: The law must offer a sufficient
standard to specify the limits of the delegate’s authority,
announce the legislative policy, and specify the conditions
under which it is to be implemented. The standard is usually
embodied in the law itself.

• Among the accepted sufficient standards are: public

interest, promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in
government, public welfare, interest of law and order,
justice and equity, adequate and efficient instruction,
public safety, public policy, greater national interest,
protect the local consumer by stabilizing and subsidizing
domestic pump rates, fair and equitable employment
practices.
References: AGPALO. Administrative Law.
2005 ed.; CRUZ. Philippine Administrative
Law. 2007 ed. DE LEON. Administrative Law.
2016 ed.
 Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court
(March 20, 1987)
Facts: An EO was issued prohibiting the transportation of carabao and
carabeef from one province to another. A violation thereof shall be subject to
confiscation and forfeiture by the government to charitable institutions and
other similar institutions as the Chairman of the Meat Inspection Commission
may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through the
dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of
carabaos.

Held: The phrase “may see fit” is an extremely generous and dangerous
condition, if condition it is. It is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality
and abuse, and even corruption. One searches in vain for the usual standard
and reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said officers
must observe when they make their distribution. Definitely, there is here a
‘roving commission,’ a wide and sweeping authority that is not ‘canalized
within banks that keep it from overflowing,’ in short, a clearly profligate and
therefore invalid delegation of legislative power.

References: AGPALO. Administrative Law.

2005 ed.; CRUZ. Philippine Administrative
Law. 2007 ed. DE LEON. Administrative Law.
2016 ed.
 Limitations on the rule-making power
1. The administrative body may not make rules and
regulations which are inconsistent with the provisions of
the Constitution or a statute, particularly the statute it is
administering or which created it, or which are in
derogation of, or defeat, the purpose of a statute.

2. It may not, by its rules and regulations, amend, alter,

modify, extend, supplant, enlarge or expand, restrict or
limit the provisions or coverage of the statute as this
power belongs to the legislature. It cannot engraft
additional requirements or embrace matters not covered
or contemplated by the statute.
References: AGPALO. Administrative Law.
2005 ed.; CRUZ. Philippine Administrative
Law. 2007 ed. DE LEON. Administrative Law.
2016 ed.
Grego v. COMELEC (June 19, 1997)
Held: Since Section 6 of RA 6646, the law which Section 5 of Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules
of Procedure seeks to implement, employed the word “may,” it was improper and highly
irregular for the COMELEC to have used instead the word “shall” in its rules.

Bautista v. Juinio (Jan. 31, 1984)

Held: The Supreme Court sustained a letter of instruction prohibiting extra-heavy and heavy
vehicles from using public streets on weekends and holidays but annulled as ultra vires the
administrative regulation call for the impounding of the offending vehicles. As the penalty
imposed by the law was only a fine and suspension of registration, the Court declared that
the impounding of a vehicle finds no statutory justification.

Metropolitan Traffic Command v. Gonong (July 13, 1990)

Held: The Supreme Court declared as illegal the removal by traffic enforcers of the license
plates of illegally parked vehicles. PD 1605 authorized the Metro Manila Commission only
to suspend or revoke the license of the driver found to have violated traffic rules. Said law
did not include the removal of license plates, or even the confiscation of the license of the
offending driver as a penalty for illegal parking.

References: AGPALO. Administrative Law.

2005 ed.; CRUZ. Philippine Administrative
Law. 2007 ed. DE LEON. Administrative Law.
2016 ed.
3. The power of administrative officials to
promulgate rules in the implementation of the
statute is necessarily defined by and limited to what
is provided in the legislative enactment conferring
the power.
4. In case of discrepancy between the basic law and
a rule or regulation issued to implement said law,
the basic law prevails because said rule or
regulation cannot go beyond the terms and
provisions of the basic law.
References: AGPALO. Administrative Law.
2005 ed.; CRUZ. Philippine Administrative
Law. 2007 ed. DE LEON. Administrative Law.
2016 ed.
5. A rule or regulation should be uniform in operation,
reasonable, and not unfair or discriminatory.
Lupangco v. CA (April 29, 1988)
Held: Resolution No. 105 is declared unconstitutional for being unreasonable and violative of academic
freedom. The unreasonableness is more obvious in that one who is caught committing the prohibited
acts even without ill motives will be barred from taking future examinations conducted by the PRC.
Furthermore, it is inconceivable how the Commission can manage to have a watchful eye on each and
every examinee during the three days before examination period. The Resolution is not only
unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the examinees right to liberty guaranteed by the
Constitution. The PRC has no authority to dictate on the reviewees as to how they should prepare
themselves for the licensure exams.

Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila v. Board of Transportation (Sept. 30, 1982)

The petitioners assailed a regulation phasing out taxicabs more than six years old as an invalid exercise
of the police power. The Supreme Court declared the regulation reasonable, holding that its purpose
was to promote convenience and comfort and protect the safety of the passengers.

References: AGPALO. Administrative Law.

2005 ed.; CRUZ. Philippine Administrative
Law. 2007 ed. DE LEON. Administrative Law.
2016 ed.