Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
July 30, 1979
PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME "SYCIP, SALAZAR, FELICIANO, HERNANDEZ & CASTILLO." LUCIANO E. SALAZAR ,
FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, BENILDO G. HERNANDEZ. GREGORIO R. CASTILLO. ALBERTO P. SAN JUAN, JUAN C. REYES. JR., ANDRES G. GATMA ITAN,
JUSTINO H. CACANINDIN, NOEL A. LAMAN, ETHELWOLDO E. FERNANDEZ, ANGELITO C. IMPERIO, EDUARDO R. CENIZA, TRISTAN A. CATINDIG,
ANCHETA K. TAN, and ALICE V. PESIGAN, petitioners.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME "OZAETA, ROMULO, DE LEON, MABANTA & REYES."
RICARDO J. ROMULO, BENJAMIN M. DE LEON, ROMAN MABANTA, JR., JOSE MA, REYES, JESUS S. J. SAYOC, EDUARDO DE LOS ANGELES, and JO SE F.
BUENAVENTURA, petitioners.

RE SO LU TI O N

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1

Two s eparate Petitions were filed before this Court 1) by the surviving partners of Atty. Al exander Syci p, who died on May 5, 1975, a nd 2) by the s urviving
pa rtners of Atty. Herminio Oza eta, who died on February 14, 1976, pra yi ng that they be a llowed to continue using, in the names of their firms, the names
of pa rtners who had passed away. In the Court's Resolution of September 2, 1976, both Petitions were ordered consolidated.

Peti ti oners base their petitions on the following arguments:

1. Under the l aw, a partnership is not prohibited from continuing its business under a firm name which includes the name of a deceased partner; i n fact,
Arti cl e 1840 of the Ci vil Code explicitly s anctions the practice when i t provides i n the last paragraph that: têñ.£îhqwâ£

The us e by the person or partnership continuing the business of the partnership name, or the name of a deceased partner as pa rt thereof, s hall not of
i ts elf make the i ndividual property of the deceased partner liable for any debts contracted by s uch person or partnership. 1

2. In regulating other professions, s uch as accountancy a nd engineering, the l egislature has authorized the adoption of fi rm names without a ny restriction
a s to the use, i n such firm name, of the name of a deceased p artner; 2 the legislative a uthorization given to those engaged in the practice of accountancy
— a profession requiring the s ame degree of trust and confidence i n respect of clients as that implicit in the relationship of attorney a nd client — to
a cquire a nd use a trade name, strongly indicates that there is no fundamental policy that i s offended by the continued use by a firm of professionals of a
fi rm na me which i ncludes the name of a deceased partner, at l east where such firm name has acquired the characteristics of a "tra de name." 3

3. The Ca nons of Professional Ethics are not tra nsgressed by the continued use of the name of a deceased partner in the firm name of a law partnership
beca use Ca non 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association declares that: têñ.£îhqwâ£

... The continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner when permissible by l ocal custom, is not unethical but ca re should be ta ken that no
i mposition or deception is practiced through this use. ... 4

4. There is no possibility of imposition or deception because the deaths of their respective deceased partners were well -publicized in all newspapers of
general circulation for s everal days; the s tationeries now being used by them ca rry new letterheads indicating the years when their respective deceased
pa rtners were connected with the firm; petitioners will notify a ll l eading national a nd i nternational law directories of the fact of their respective deceased
pa rtners' deaths. 5

5. No l ocal custom prohibits the continued use of a deceased partner's name i n a professional firm's name; 6 there is no custom or usage i n the
Phi l ippines, or a t least in the Greater Ma nila Area, which recognizes that the name of a l aw firm necessarily Identifies the indivi dual members of the firm.
7

6. The continued use of a deceased partner's name in the firm name of law partnerships has been consistently a llowed by U.S. Courts and is an a ccepted
pra cti ce i n the legal profession of most countries in the world.8

The question involved in these Petitions first came under consideration by this Court i n 1953 when a l aw firm i n Cebu (the Deen case) cont inued i ts
pra cti ce of including in its firm name that of a deceased partner, C.D. Johnston. The ma tter was resolved with this Court a dvising the firm to desist from
i ncl uding i n their firm designation the name of C. D. Johnston, who has long been dead."

The s ame issue was raised before this Court in 1958 a s an i ncident in G. R. No. L-11964, enti tled Register of Deeds of Manila vs . Ch ina Banking
Corpora tion. The law firm of Perkins & Ponce Enrile moved to intervene as amicus curiae. Before acting thereon, the Court, in a Resolution of April 15,
1957, s ta ted that it "would like to be informed why the name of Perkins is still being used a lthough Atty. E. A. Perki ns i s already dead." In a Manifestation
da ted Ma y 21, 1957, the l a w firm of Perkins a nd Ponce Enrile, ra ising s ubstantially the same a rguments a s those now being ra i sed by petitioners, prayed
tha t the continued use of the firm name "Perkins & Ponce Enrile" be held proper.

On June 16, 1958, thi s Court resolved: têñ.£îhqwâ£

After ca refully considering the reasons given by Attorneys Alfonso Ponce Enrile and Associates for their continued use of the name of the deceased E. G.
Perki ns, the Court found no reason to depart from the policy i t a dopted in June 1953 when it required Attorneys Alfred P. Deen a nd E ddy A. Deen of Cebu
Ci ty to des ist from i ncluding i n their firm designation, the name of C. D. Johnston, deceased. The Court believes that, in vi ew of the personal and
confi dential nature of the relations between a ttorney a nd client, and the high standards demanded in the ca nons of professional ethics, no practice
s hould be allowed which even in a remote degree could give rise to the possibility of deception. Said a ttorneys are a ccordingly a dvised to drop the name
"PERKINS" from their firm name.

Peti ti oners herein now s eek a re -examination of the policy thus far enunciated by the Court.

The Court fi nds no sufficient reason to depart from the rulings thus laid down.

A. Inasmuch as "Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez a nd Ca stillo" a nd "Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon, Ma banta a nd Reyes" a re partnerships, the use i n their
pa rtnership names of the names of deceased partners will run counter to Arti cle 1815 of the Ci vil Code which provides: têñ.£îhqwâ£

Art. 1815. Every pa rtnership s hall operate under a firm name, which may or ma y not i nclude the name of one or more of the par tners.
Thos e who, not being members of the partnership, i nclude their names in the fi rm name, shall be subject to the liability, of a partner.

It i s cl early ta cit i n the above provision that names i n a fi rm name of a partnership must either be those of l iving partners and. in the case of non-partners,
s hould be living persons who ca n be subjected to l iability. In fa ct, Article 1825 of the Ci vil Code prohibits a third person from including his name in the firm
na me under pain of assuming the l iability of a partner. The heirs of a deceased partner in a law firm cannot be held liable a s the old members to the
credi tors of a firm particularly where they a re non-lawyers. Thus, Ca non 34 of the Ca nons of Professional Ethics "prohibits an a greement for the payment
to the wi dow and heirs of a deceased l awyer of a percentage, either gross or net, of the fees received from the future business of the deceased lawyer's
cl i ents, both because the recipients of such division are not lawyers and because such payments will not represent servi ce or responsibility on the part of
the reci pient. " Accordingly, neither the widow nor the heirs ca n be held liable for tra nsactions entered i nto a fter the death of their lawyer-predecessor.
There being no benefits accruing, there ran be no corresponding liability.

Pres ci nding the law, there could be practical objections to a llowing the u se by l aw firms of the names of deceased partners. The public relations va lue of
the us e of an old firm name can tend to create undue adva ntages and disadvantages i n the practice of the profession. An able lawyer wi thout connections
wi l l have to make a name for himself starting from s cratch. Another able l awyer, who can join an old firm, ca n i nitially ri de on that old fi rm's rep utation
es tablished by deceased partners.

B. In rega rds to the last paragraph of Article 1840 of the Ci vil Code ci ted by petitioners, supra, the first factor to consider is that it i s within Chapter 3 of
Ti tl e IX of the Code entitled "Dissolution a nd Winding Up." The Arti cle primarily deals with the exemption from liability i n ca ses of a dissolved partnership,
of the i ndividual property of the deceased partner for debts contracted by the person or partnership which continues the business using the partners hip
na me or the name of the deceased partner as part thereof. What the law contemplates therein is a hold -over situation preparatory to formal
reorga nization.

Secondly, Arti cle 1840 trea ts more of a commercial partnership with a good will to protect ra ther than of a professional part nership, with no saleable
good will but whose reputation depends on the personal qualifications of i ts indivi dual members. Thus, it has been held that a saleable goodwill can exist
onl y i n a commercial partnership a nd ca nnot arise i n a professional partnership consisting of l awyers. 9têñ.£îhqwâ£

As a general rule, upon the dissolution of a commercial partnership the succeeding partners or parties have the right to ca rry on the business under the
ol d name, in the absence of a s tipulation forbidding it, (s)ince the name of a commercial partnership is a partnership asset inseparable from the good will
of the fi rm. ... (60 Am Jur 2d, s 204, p. 115) (Empha sis supplied)

On the other hand, têñ.£îhqwâ£

... a professional partnership the reputation of which depends or; the individual skill of the members, such as partnerships of attorneys or physicians, has
no good win to be distributed as a fi rm asset on i ts dissolution, however i ntrinsically va luable s uch s kill a nd reputation may be, especially where there i s
no provi sion i n the partnership agreement relating to good will as a n asset. ... (i bid, s 203, p. 115) (E mphasis s upplied)

C. A pa rtnership for the practice of law cannot be l ikened to partnerships formed by other professionals or for business. For one thing, the law on
a ccountancy s pecifically allows the use of a trade name in connection with the practice o f accountancy.10 têñ.£îhqwâ£

A pa rtnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity. It i s a mere relationship or a ssociation for a particular purpos e. ... It is not a partnership formed
for the purpose of carryi ng on tra de or business or of holding property." 11 Thus, it has been s tated that "the use of a nom de plume, assumed or tra de
na me in l aw practice is i mproper. 12

The us ual reason given for different standards of conduct being a pplicable to the practice of l aw from those pertaining to business is that the law i s a
profession.

Dea n Pound, in his recently published contribution to the Survey of the Legal Profession, (The Lawyer from Antiquity to Moder n Times, p. 5) defines a
profession as "a group of men pursuing a l earned a rt as a common ca lling i n the spirit of public s ervice, — no less a public s ervice because i t may
i nci dentally be a means of l ivelihood."

xxx xxx xxx

Pri ma ry cha racteristics which distinguish the l egal profession from business are:

1. A duty of public s ervice, of which the emolument is a byproduct, and in which one may a ttain the highest eminence without making much money.

2. A rel a tion as an "officer of court" to the administration of justice i nvolving thorough sincerity, i ntegrity, a nd reliability.

3. A rel a tion to clients in the highest degree fiduciary.

4. A rel a tion to colleagues at the bar characterized by ca ndor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to current business met hods of advertising and
encroa chment on their practice, or dealing directly wi th their clients. 13

"The ri ght to practice law is not a natural or constitutional ri ght but i s in the nature of a privilege or fra nchise. 14 It i s limited to persons of good moral
cha ra cter with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. 15 The ri ght does not only presuppose i n i ts possessor integrity, l egal s tanding and
a tta inment, but also the exercise of a special privilege, highly personal a nd partaking of the nature of a public trust." 16

D. Peti ti oners ci ted Ca non 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association" i n support of their petitions.

It i s true that Ca non 33 does not consider a s unethical the continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner in the firm name of a law
pa rtnership when such a practice is permissible by l ocal custom but the Ca non warns that care should be taken that no i mposition or deception is
pra cti ced through this use.

It mus t be conceded that i n the Philippines, no l ocal custom permits or allows the co ntinued use of a deceased or former partner's name i n the firm
na mes of law partnerships. Firm names, under our custom, Identify the more active and/or more senior members or partners of t he law firm. A glimpse at
the hi story of the fi rms of petitioners an d of other law firms in this country would s how how their firm names have evolved and changed from ti me to
ti me a s the composition of the partnership changed. têñ.£îhqwâ£
The continued use of a firm name a fter the death of one or more of the partners designated by i t is proper only where sustained by l ocal custom a nd not
where by custom this purports to Identify the a ctive members. ...

There would s eem to be a question, under the working of the Ca non, as to the propriety of adding the name of a new partn er and a t the same time
reta i ning that of a deceased partner who was never a partner with the new one. (H.S. Drinker, op. ci t., supra, at pp. 207208) (Emphasis supplied).

The possibility of deception upon the public, real or consequential, where the name of a deceased partner continues to be used ca nnot be ruled out. A
pers on in search of legal counsel might be guided by the familiar ri ng of a distinguished name appearing in a firm title.

E. Peti tioners argue that U.S. Courts have consistently allowed the continued use of a deceased partner's name i n the firm name of law partnerships. But
tha t i s s o because it is s anctioned by custom.

In the ca se of Mendelsohn v. Equitable Li fe Assurance Society (33 N.Y.S. 2d 733) whi ch petitioners Salazar, et al. quoted in their memorandum, the New
York Supreme Court s ustained the use of the firm name Alexander & Green even if none of the present ten partners of the firm bears either name
beca use the practice was sanctioned by custom a nd did not offend any s tatutory provision or l egislative policy a nd was adopted by agreement of the
pa rti es. The Court s tated therein: têñ.£îhqwâ£

The pra ctice sought to be proscribed has the s anction of custom and offends no statutory provision or l egislative policy. Ca non 33 of the Ca nons of
Profes sional Ethics of both the American Bar Association a nd the New York State Bar Association provides i n part as follows: "The continued use of the
na me of a deceased or former partner, when permissible by l ocal custom is not unethical, but care should be ta ken that no i mp osition or deception is
pra cti ced through this use." There is no question as to l ocal cu stom. Many firms in the city use the names of deceased members with the a pproval of
other a ttorneys, bar associations a nd the courts. The Appellate Division of the First Department has considered the matter a nd reached The conclusion
tha t s uch practice should not be prohibited. (Emphasis s upplied)

xxx xxx xxx

Nei ther the Pa rtnership La w nor the Penal Law prohibits the practice i n question. The use of the firm name herein is also s us tainable by reason of
a greement between the partners. 18

Not s o i n this jurisdiction where there is no local custom that sanctions the practice. Custom has been defined as a rule of conduct formed b y repetition of
a cts , uniformly observed (practiced) as a social rule, legally binding a nd obligatory. 19 Courts ta ke no judicial n otice of custom. A custom must be proved
a s a fact, a ccording to the rules of evi dence. 20 A l ocal custom as a source of right ca nnot be considered by a court of just ice unless s uch custom is
properly established by competent evidence like any other fa ct. 21 We find such proof of the existence of a local custom, and of the elements requisite to
cons titute the same, wanting herein. Merely because something is done as a ma tter of practice does not mean that Courts can rely on the same for
purposes of adjudication as a juridical custom. Juridical custom must be differentiated from social custom. The former ca n s upplement s tatutory l aw or be
a pplied i n the absence of s uch statute. Not so with the latter.

Moreover, judicial decisions applyi ng or interpreting the laws form part of the legal s ystem. 22 When the Supreme Court in the Deen and Perkins cases
i s sued its Resolutions directing lawyers to desist from including the names of deceased partners in their firm designation, i t laid down a l egal rule a gainst
whi ch no custom or practice to the contrary, even if proven, ca n prevail. This is not to speak of our civil l aw which clearly ordai ns that a partnership is
di ssolved by the death of any partner. 23 Cus tom which are contrary to l aw, public order or public policy s hall not be countenanced. 24

The pra ctice of law is intimately a nd peculiarly related to the administration of justice and should not be considered l ike a n ordinary "money-making
tra de." têñ.£îhqwâ£

... It i s of the essence of a profession that i t is p racticed in a s pirit of public s ervice. A tra de ... a ims primarily a t personal gain; a profession a t the exercise
of powers beneficial to mankind. If, as in the era of wide free opportunity, we think of free competitive self a ssertion as t he highest good, lawyer and
grocer a nd fa rmer ma y seem to be freely competing wi th their fellows i n their calling in order each to a cquire as much of the world's good as he ma y
wi thin the allowed him by l aw. But the member of a profession does not regard himself as i n competition with his professional brethren. He is not
ba rtering his services as is the a rtisan nor exchanging the products of his skill a nd l earning as the farmer sells wheat or c orn. There should be no s uch
thi ng as a lawyers' or physicians' s trike. The best s ervice of the professional ma n is often rendered for no equivalent or for a tri fling equivalent and it i s his
pri de to do what he does i n a way worthy of his profession even i f done with no expectation of reward, This spirit of public s ervice in which the profession
of l a w is and ought to be exercised is a prerequisite of sound a dministration of justice according to law. The other two elem ents of a profession, namely,
orga nization and pursuit of a l earned a rt have their justification i n that they s ecure a nd maintain that spirit. 25

In fi ne, petitioners' desire to preserve the Identity of their firms i n the eyes of the public must bow to l egal and ethical i mpediment.

ACCORDINGLY, the petitions filed herein a re denied a nd petitioners a dvised to drop the names "SYCIP" a nd "OZAETA" from their respective firm names.
Thos e names may, however, be i ncluded in the l isting of individuals who have been partners i n their firms indicating the year s during which they s erved
a s s uch.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, Concepcion, Jr., Sa ntos, Fernandez, Guerrero a nd De Castro, JJ., concur

Ferna ndo, C.J. a nd Abad Santos, J., took no part.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-12426 February 16, 1959
PHILIPPINE LAWYER'S ASSOCIATION, petitioner,
vs.
CELEDONIO AGRAVA, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office, respondent.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

Thi s is the petition filed by the Philippine Lawyer's Association for prohibition a nd i njunction against Celedonio Agra va, in his ca pacity as Director of the
Phi l ippines Pa tent Office.

On ma y 27, 1957, res pondent Director i ssued a ci rcular a nnouncing that he had scheduled for June 27, 1957 a n exa mination for the purpose of
determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the Philippines Pa tent Office, the said examination to c over patent law a nd
juri s prudence a nd the rules of practice before said office. According to the circular, members of the Philippine Bar, engineers and other persons wi th
s ufficient s cientific and technical training a re qualified to ta ke the said examination. It would appear th at heretofore, respondent Director has been
hol ding s imilar examinations.

It i s the contention of the petitioner Philippine Lawyer's Association that one who has passed the bar examinations a nd is l i censed by the Supreme Court
to pra cti ce law in the Philippines and who is in good standing, i s duly qualified to practice before the Philippines Pa tent Office, a nd that consequently, the
ca t of the respondent Director requiring members of the Philippine Bar i n good standing to ta ke a nd pass a n examination given by the Pa tent Office a s a
condi tion precedent to their being allowed to practice before said office, s uch as representing applicants i n the preparation and prosecution of
a pplications for patent, is in excess of his jurisdiction a nd i s in vi olation of the law.

In hi s answer, respondent Director, through the Solicitor General, maintains that the prosecution of patent cases "does not i nvolve entirely or purely the
pra cti ce of law but includes the application of s cientific a nd technical knowledge a nd tra ining, so much s o that, as a matter of actual practice, the
pros ecution of patent cases may be handled not only by l a wyers, but also engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific a nd technical training who
pa ss the prescribed examinations as given by the Patent Office; . . . tha t the Rules of Court do not prohibit the Patent Office, or a ny other quasi -judicial
body from requiring further condition or qualification from those who would wish to handle ca ses before the Patent Office whi ch, as s tated in the
preceding paragraph, requires more of a n application of s cientific a nd technical knowledge than the mere application of provi sions of l aw; . . . tha t the
a cti on ta ken by the respondent is i n accordance with Republic Act No. 165, otherwise known a s the Pa tent Law of the Philippines, which similar to the
Uni ted States Patent Law, in accordance with which the United States Patent Office has also prescribed a similar examination as that prescribed by
res pondent. . . .

Res pondent further contends that just as the Pa tent l aw of the United States of America a uthorizes the Commissioner of Pa tents to prescribe
exa minations to determine as to who practice before the United States Pa tent Office, the respondent, is similarly a uthorized to do s o by our Patent Law,
Republic Act No. 165.

Al though as already s tated, the Director of Pa tents, i n the past, would a ppear to have been holding tests or examinations the passing of which was
i mposed as a required qualification to practice before the Patent Office, to our knowledg e, this is the first time that the right of the Director of Pa tents to
do s o, s pecially a s regards members of the bar, has been questioned formally, or otherwise put in i ssue. And we have given i t careful thought a nd
cons ideration.

The Supreme Court has the exclusive and constitutional power with respect to admission to the practice of l aw i n the Philippines1 and to any member of
the Phi lippine Bar i n good standing may pra ctice law a nywhere and before any entity, whether judicial or quasi-judicial or administrative, in the
Phi l ippines. Naturally, the question arises as to whether or not appearance before the patent Office and the preparation and the prosecution of patent
a pplications, etc., constitutes or is included i n the practice of law.

The pra ctice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; i t embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers i ncident to
a cti ons and social proceedings, the management of such actions a nd proceedings on behalf of cl ients before judges a nd courts, and in addition,
conveyi ng. In general, all advi ce to clients, and all a ction taken for them in matters connected with the law corporation servi ces, assessment and
condemnation servi ces contemplating a n appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's cl aim in
ba nkruptcy a nd i nsolvency proceedings, a nd conducting proceedings in a ttachment, and in matters of estate a nd guardianship ha ve been held to
cons titute law practice as do the preparation a nd drafting of l egal i nstruments, where the work done i nvolves the determination by the tra ined legal mind
of the l egal effect of fa cts a nd conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied).

Pra cti ce of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of a ny court and having no i mmediate relation to
proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of l egal advice on a large variety of s ubjects, a nd the preparatio n and execution of legal
i ns truments covering a n extensive field of business a nd trust relations and other a ffairs. Although these transactions may ha ve no direct connection with
court proceedings, they a re always subject to become involved in litigation. They require i n many a spects a high degree of le gal s kill, a wide experience
wi th men a nd a ffairs, and great capacity for a daptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an a ttorney or counselor at law
bea r a n intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far a s concerns the question set forth i n the order, ca n be
dra wn between that part which involves advice and drafting of i nstruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare o f the public that these
ma nifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning a nd s kill, of s ound moral character, a nd a cting at all times under
the heavy trus t obligations to cl ients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 (1953 e d.), p. 665-666, ci ti ng In re
Opi nion of the Justices (Mass.), 194 N.E. 313, quoted i n Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. vs . Automobile Servi ce Assoc. (R. I. ) 179 A. 1 39, 144). (Emphasis ours).

In our opinion, the practice of law i ncludes such a ppearance before the Pa tent Office, the representation of a pplicants, oppositors, a nd other persons,
a nd the prosecution of their a pplications for patent, their oppositions thereto, or the enforcement of their ri ghts in patent cases. In the first place,
a l though the tra nsaction of business in the Pa tent Office i nvolves the use a nd a pplication of technical and scientific knowle dge a nd training, still, a ll s uch
bus iness has to be rendered i n accordance with the Pa tent Law, as well as other l aws, i ncluding the Rules a nd Regulations promulgated by the Pa tent
Offi ce i n accordance with law. Not only this, but practice before the Pa tent Office involves the i nterpretation and applicati on of other laws a nd legal
pri nciples, as well as the existence of facts to be established in accordance with the law of evidence and procedure. For instance: Section 8 of our Pa tent
La w provi des that an invention shall not be patentable if it i s contrary to public order or morals, or to public health or welfare. Section 9 s ays that a n
i nvention s hall not be considered new or patentable if it was known or used by others in the Philippines before the invention thereof by the inventor
na med in any pri nted publication in the Philippines or any foreign country more than one year before the a pplication for a patent therefor, or if it had
been in public use or on sale in the Philippines for more than one year before the application for the patent therefor. Secti on 10 provides that the right to
pa tent belongs to the true a nd a ctual inventor, his heirs, legal representatives or assigns. Section 25 a nd 26 refer to conne ction of a ny mistake i n a patent.
Secti on 28 enumerates the grounds for cancellation of a patent; that although any person may appl y for s uch ca ncellation, under Section 29, the Solicitor
General is authorized to petition for the ca ncellation of a patent. Section 30 mentions the requirements of a petition for ca ncellation. Section 31 a nd 32
provi de for a notice of hearing of the petition for ca ncellation of the patent by the Director of Pa tents in case the said ca ncellation is warranted. Under
Secti on 34, a t a ny ti me after the expiration of three years from the day the patent was gra nted, a ny person patent on several grounds, s uch as, i f the
pa tented invention is not being worked i n the Philippines on a commercial scale, or if the demand for the patented a rticle i n the Philippines on a
commercial scale, or i f the demand for the patented article in the Philippines is not being met to a n adequate extent a nd reasonable terms, or i f by reason
of the pa tentee's refusal to gra nt a license on reasonable terms or by reason of the condition a ttached by hi m to the license , purchase or use of the
pa tented article or working of the patented process or machine of production, the establishment of a new tra de or i ndustry i n the Philippines is
prevented; or i f the patent or i nvention relates to food or medicine or i s necessary to public health or public safety. Al l t hese things involve the
a pplications of laws, legal principles, practice a nd procedure. They call for legal knowledge, training a nd experience for which a member o f the bar has
been prepared.

In s upport of the proposition that much of the business and many of the act, orders and decisions of the Pa tent Director i nvolve questions of law or a
rea s onable and correct evaluation of fa cts, the very Pa tent La w, Republic Act No. 165, Secti on 61, provi des that:

. . . . The a pplicant for a patent or for the registration of a design, a ny party to a proceeding to ca ncel a patent or to obtain a compulsory l icense, and a ny
pa rty to a ny other proceeding i n the Office may a ppeal to the Supreme Court from any final order or decision of the director.

In other words, the appeal is ta ken to this Tri bunal. If the transaction of business in the Pa tent Office a nd the a cts, orders and decisions of the Pa tent
Di rector involved exclusively or mostly technical a nd scientific knowledge a nd tra ining, then l ogically, the a ppeal should be ta ken not to a court or judicial
body, but ra ther to a board of scientists, engineers or technical men, which is not the case.

Another aspect of the question involves the consideration of the nature of the functions and acts of the Head of the Patent O ffice.

. . . . The Commissioner, i n issuing or withholding patents, in reissues, interferences, a nd extensions, exercises quasi-judicial functions. Patents a re public
records , and it is the duty of the Commissioner to gi ve authenticated copies to a ny person, on payment of the legal fees. (40 Am. Jur. 537). (Emphasis
s upplied).

. . . . The Commissioner has the only original initiatory jurisdiction that exists up to the granting a nd delivering of a pat ent, and it is his duty to decide
whether the patent i s new a nd whether i t is the proper subject of a patent; a nd his a ction in awarding or refusing a patent is a judicial function. In passing
on a n a pplication the commissioner s hould decide not only questions of law, but also questions of fact, as whether there has been a prior public use or
s a le of the article i nvented. . . . (60 C.J.S. 460). (Emphasis s upplied).

The Di rector of Pa tents, exercising a s he does judicial or quasi-judicial functions, i t is reasonable to hold that a member of the bar, because of his legal
knowledge a nd tra ining, should be a llowed to practice before the Patent Office, without further examination or other qualification. Of course, the
Di rector of Patents, i f he deems it a dvisable or necessary, ma y require that members of the bar practising before him enlist the assistance of technical
men a nd scientist in the preparation of papers and documents, s uch as, the drawing or technical description of a n invention o r machine s ought to be
pa tented, in the s ame way that a lawyer filing an application for the registration of a parcel of l and on behalf of his cl ients, is required to s ubmit a plan
a nd technical description of said l and, prepared by a licensed s urveyor.

But res pondent Director cl aims that he is expressly a uthorized by the law to require persons desiring to practice or to do business before him to submit
a n exa mination, even if they a re already members of the bar. He contends that our Pa tent Law, Republic Act No. 165, i s patterned a fter the United States
Pa tent La w; a nd of the United States Pa tent Office in Pa tent Ca ses prescribes an examination similar to that which he (respondent) has prescribed and
s cheduled. He invites our a ttention to the following provisions of s aid Rules of Pra ctice:

Regi stration of attorneys a nd a gents. — A regi ster of a n a ttorneys and a register a gents a re kept in the Pa tent Office on which a re entered the names of
a l l persons recognized a s entitled to represent applicants before the Patent Office i n the preparation and prosecution of a pplicants for patent.
Regi stration in the Patent Office under the provisions of these rules shall only entitle the person registered to practice before the Pa tent Office.

(a ) Attorney at l aw. — Any a ttorney at l aw i n good s tanding admitted to practice before a ny United States Court or the highest court of a ny State or
Terri tory of the United States who fulfills the requirements a nd complied with the provisions of these rules may be a dmitted to practice before the Patent
Offi ce a nd have his name entered on the register of attorneys.

xxx xxx xxx

(c) Requirement for registration. — No person will be admitted to practice a nd register unless he shall apply to the Commissioner of Pa tents in writing on
a pres cribed form supplied by the Commissioner a nd furnish all requested i nformation and materi al; a nd shall establish to the satisfaction of the
Commi ssioner that he i s of good moral character and of good repute and possessed of the legal a nd s cientific a nd technical qualifications necessary to
ena ble him to render a pplicants for patent valuable s ervice, a nd is otherwise competent to a dvise and assist him in the presentation and prosecution of
thei r a pplication before the Pa tent Office. In order that the Commissioner may determine whether a person s eeking to have his name placed upon either
of the registers has the qualifications s pecified, satisfactory proof of good moral character a nd repute, a nd of sufficient basic tra ining in s cientific and
technical matters must be s ubmitted and a n examination which is held from time to time must be ta ken a nd pa ssed. The taking of a n examination may be
wa i ved in the case of any person who has served for three years in the examining corps of the Patent Office.

Res pondent states that the promulgation of the Rules of Pra ctice of the United States Patent Office in Pa tent Ca ses is authorized by the United States
Pa tent La w i tself, which reads as follows:

The Commissioner of Pa tents, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Commerce may prescribe rules and regulations governi ng the recognition of
a gents, a ttorneys, or other persons representing applicants or other parties before his office, a nd may require of such persons, a gents, or a ttorneys,
before being recognized as representatives of applicants or other persons, that they s hall show they a re of good moral char acter and in good repute, a re
pos sessed of the necessary qualifications to enable them to render to a pplicants or other persons valuable service, a nd a re l ikewise to competent to
a dvi se and assist a pplicants or other persons in the presentation or prosecution of their applications or other business before the Office. The
Commi ssioner of Pa tents may, a fter notice and opportunity for a hearing, s uspend or exclude, either generally or i n a ny parti cular ca se from further
pra cti ce before his office any person, agent or a ttorney shown to be i ncompetent or disreputable, or guilty of gross misconduct, or who refuses to comply
wi th the said rules and regulations, or who s hall, with intent to defraud in any matter, deceive, mislead, or threaten a ny a pplicant or prospective
a pplicant, or other person having i mmediate or prospective applicant, or other person havi ng immediate or prospective busines s before the office, by
word, ci rcular, l etter, or by a dvertising. The reasons for a ny s uch suspension or exclusion s hall be duly recorded. The action of the Commissioner may be
revi ewed upon the petition of the person so refused recognition or so suspended by the district court of the United States fo r the District of Columbia
under such conditions and upon such proceedings as the s aid court may by i ts rules determine. (Emphasis s upplied)
Res pondent Director concludes that Section 78 of Republic Act No. 165 being similar to the provisions of law just reproduced, then he is a uthorized to
pres cribe the rules a nd regulations requiring that persons desiring to practice before him should submit to a nd pass an examination. We reproduce s aid
Secti on 78, Republic Act No. 165, for purposes of comparison:

SEC. 78. Rul es and regulations. — The Director s ubject to the a pproval of the Secretary of Justice, shall promulgate the necessary rul es and regula tions,
not i nconsistent with law, for the conduct of all business in the Patent Office.

The a bove provisions of Section 78 certainly a nd by fa r, a re different from the provisions of the United States Patent Law as regards a uthority to hold
exa minations to determine the qualifications of those allowed to practice before the Pa tent Office. While the U.S. Pa tent La w a uthorizes the
Commi ssioner of Pa tents to require a ttorneys to show that they possess the necessary qualifications and competence to render va luable service to a nd
a dvi se and assist their cl ients in patent ca ses, which s howing may ta ke the form of a test or examination to be held by the Commissioner, our Patent Law,
Secti on 78, i s silent on this i mportant point. Our attention has not been called to a ny express provision of our Pa tent La w, giving such authority to
determine the qualifications of persons allowed to practice before the Pa tent Office.

Secti on 551 of the Revised Administrative Code authorizes every chief of bureau to prescribe forms and make regulations or general orders not
i nconsistent with law, to s ecure the harmonious and efficient administration of his branch of the service a nd to ca rry i nto f ull effect the laws relating to
ma tters within the jurisdiction of his bureau. Section 608 of Republic Act 1937, known as the Ta riff and Customs Code of the Philippines, provides that the
Commi ssioner of Customs shall, subject to the a pproval of the Department Head, makes all rules and regulations necessary to e nforce the provisions of
s a id code. Section 338 of the Na tional Internal Revenue Code, Commonwealth Act No. 466 a s amended, states that the Secretary of Financ e, upon
recommendation of the Collector of Internal Revenue, shall promulgate a ll needful rules and regulations for the effective e nforcement of the provisions
of the code. We understand that rules a nd regulations have been promulgated not only for the Bureau of Customs a nd Internal R evenue, but a lso for
other bureaus of the Government, to govern the tra nsaction of business in and to enforce the law for said bureaus.

Were we to allow the Pa tent Office, in the absence of a n express and clear provision of law giving the necessary s anction, to require lawyers to submit to
a nd pass on examination prescribed by i t before they a re allowed to practice before said Pa tent Office, then there would be no reason why other bureaus
s pecially the Bureau of Internal Revenue a nd Customs, where the business i n the same area a re more or less complicated, s uch a s the presentation of
books of accounts, balance sheets, etc., assessments exemptions, depreciation, these as regards the Bureau of Internal Revenue, a nd the classification of
goods, i mposition of customs duties, seizures, confiscation, etc., a s regards the Bureau of Customs, may not also require th at any l awyer practising before
them or otherwise transacting business with them on behalf of clients, s hall first pass a n examination to qualify.

In concl usion, we hold that under the present l aw, members of the Philippine Bar a uthorized by this Tribunal to practice law, a nd i n good standing, may
pra cti ce their profession before the Pa tent Office, for the reason that much of the business in said office i nvolves the i nte rpretation a nd determination of
the s cope a nd a pplication of the Pa tent La w a nd other laws a pplicable, as well as the presentation of evidence to establish fa cts i nvolved; that part of the
functi ons of the Pa tent director are judicial or quasi-judicial, so much s o that appeals from his orders and decisions a re, under the law, taken to the
Supreme Court.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for prohibition i s granted and the respondent Director i s hereby prohibited from requiring members of the
Phi l ippine Bar to s ubmit to a n examination or tests and pass the same before being permitted to a ppear a nd practice before the Patent Office. No costs.

Pa ra s , C.J., Bengzon, Pa dilla, Reyes, A., Ba utista Angelo, La brador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L. and Endencia, JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 165922 : February 26, 2010]
BAGUIO MARKET VENDORS MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE (BAMARVEMPCO), REPRESENTED BY RECTO INSO, OPERATIONS MANAGER, PETITIONER,
VS. HON. ILUMINADA CABATO-CORTES, EXECUTIVE JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BAGUIO CITY, RESPONDENT.

DE CI SI ON

CARPIO, J.:

The Ca s e

For revi ew[1] a re the Orders[2] of the Executive Judge of the Regional Tri al Court of Baguio Ci ty fi nding petitioner Baguio Ma rket Vendors Multi-Purpose
Cooperative l iable for payment of foreclosure fees.

The Fa cts

Peti ti oner Ba guio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative (petitioner) is a credit cooperative organized under Republic Act No. 6938 (RA 6938), or the
Cooperative Code of the Philippines.[3] Arti cle 62(6) of RA 6938 exempts cooperatives:

from the pa yment of all court a nd s heriff's fees paya ble to the Philippine Government for a nd i n connection with all actions brought under this Code, or
where such a ction is brought by the Cooperative Development Authority before the court, to enforce the payment of obligations contracted i n favor of
the cooperative.[4]

In 2004, peti tioner, as mortgagee, filed with the Cl erk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio Ci ty (trial court ) a petition to extra judicially foreclose a
mortga ge under Act 3135, a s amended.[5] Under Section 7(c) of Rule 141, a s a mended,[6] petitions for extrajudicial foreclosure a re subject to legal fees
ba s ed on the va lue of the mortgagee's cl aim. Invoking Arti cle 62 (6) of RA 6938, peti tioner s ought exemption from payment of the fees.

The Ruling of the Trial Court

In a n Order dated 30 August 2004, Judge Iluminada Ca bato-Cortes (respondent), Executive Judge of the trial court, denied the request for exemption,
ci ti ng Section 22 of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, a s amended, exempting from the Rule's coverage only the "Republic of the Philippines, its agencies and
i ns trumentalities" and certain suits of l ocal government units.[7]

Peti ti oner s ought reconsideration but respondent denied i ts motion i n the Order dated 6 October 2004. This ti me, respondent reasoned that petitioner's
rel iance on Arti cle 62(6) of RA 6938 i s misplaced because the fees collected under Rule 141 a re not "fees payable to the Philippine Government" as they
do not a ccrue to the National Treasury but to a s pecial fund[8] under the Court's control.[9]

Hence, this petition.

Peti ti oner maintains that the case ca lls for nothing more than a simple a pplication of Arti cle 62(6) of RA 6938.

The Offi ce of the Solicitor General (OSG), i n i ts Ma nifestation (in lieu of Comment), joins causes with petitioner. The OSG s ubmits that as the substantive
rul e, Arti cle 62(6) of RA 6938 prevails over Section 22 of Rule 141, a judicial rule of procedure. The OSG also ta kes issue with respondent's finding that the
l egal fees collected under Rule 141 a re not "fees payable to the Philippine Government" as the judiciary forms part of the Ph ilippine government, as
defi ned under the Revised Administrative Code.[10]

Al though not a party to this s uit, we required the Court's Office of the Chief Attorney (OCAT) to comment on the petition, in volving as i t does, issues
rel a ting to the Court's power to promulgate judicial rules. In its compliance, the OCAT recommends the denial of the petition, opining that Section 22,
Rul e 141, a s amended, prevails over Article 62(6) of RA 6938 because (1) the power to i mpose judicial fees is eminently judic ial a nd (2) the 1987
Cons ti tution i nsulated the Court's rule-making powers from Congress' i nterference by omitting in the 1987 Constitution the provision in the 1973
Cons ti tution allowing Congress to alter judicial rules. The OCAT ca lled a ttention to the Court's previous denial of a request by a cooperative group for the
i s suance of "guidelines" to i mplement cooperatives' fees exemption under Arti cle 62(6) of RA 6938.[11] La stly, the OCAT recom mends the amendment of
Secti on 22, Rule 141 to ma ke explicit the non-exemption of cooperatives from the payment of legal fees.

The Issue

The question is whether petitioner's a pplication for extrajudicial foreclosure is exempt from l egal fees under Arti cle 62(6) of RA 6938.

The Ruling of the Court

We hol d that Arti cle 62(6) of RA 6938 does not apply to petitioner's foreclosure proceeding.

Peti ti ons for Extra judicial Foreclosure

Outs i de of the Ambit of Article 62(6) of RA 6938

The s cope of the legal fees exemption Article 62(6) of RA 6938 gra nts to cooperatives is l imited to two types of actions, nam ely: (1) a ctions brought under
RA 6938; a nd (2) a ctions brought by the Cooperative Development Authority to enforce the payment of obligations contracted i n favor of cooperatives.
By s i mple deduction, it i s immediately a pparent that Arti cle 62(6) of RA 6938 i s no a uthority for petitioner to cl aim exemption from the payment of l egal
fees i n this proceeding because first, the fees i mposable on petitioner do not pertain to an action brought under RA 6938 but to a petition for extrajudicial
forecl osure of mortgage under Act 3135. Second, petitioner is not the Cooperative Development Authority which can cl aim exemption only i n a ctions to
enforce payments of obligations on behalf of cooperatives.

The Power of the Legislature

vi s a vi s the Power of the Supreme Court
to Ena ct Judicial Rules

Our hol ding above suffices to dispose of this petition. However, the Court En Banc has recently rul ed in Re: Petition for Rec ognition of the Exemption of
the Government Service Insurance System from Pa yment of Legal Fees[12] on the i ssue of l egislative exemptions from court fees. We take the
opportunity to reiterate our En Banc ruling i n GSIS.
Unti l the 1987 Constitution took effect, our two previous constitutions textualized a power sharing s cheme between the l egisl ature and this Court i n the
ena ctment of judicial rules. Thus, both the 1935[13] a nd the 1973[14] Constitutions vested on the Supreme Court the "power to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice, a nd procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law." However, these constit utions also granted to the
l egislature the concurrent power to "repeal, alter or s upplement" s uch rules.[15]

The 1987 Cons titution textually altered the power-sharing s cheme under the previous charters by deleting in Section 5(5) of Arti cle VIII Congress'
s ubsidiary a nd corrective power.[16] This glaring and fundamental omission l ed the Court to observe in Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice[17] that this
Court's power to promulgate judicial rules "is no longer s hared by this Court with Congress":

The 1987 Cons titution molded a n even s tronger a nd more i ndependent judiciary. Among others, i t enhanced the rule making power of this Court [under]
Secti on 5(5), Arti cle VIII[18] x x x .

The rul e making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the fi rst ti me was given the power to promulgate rules conce rning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional ri ghts. The Court was also gra nted for the first ti me the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special court s and quasi-
judi cial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, a lter, or suppl ement rules concerning pleading,
pra cti ce a nd procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer s hared by thi s Court with Congress, more
s o wi th the Executive. x x x x (Ita licization in the original; boldfacing supplied)

Any l i ngering doubt on the i mport of the textual evolution of Section 5(5) should be put to rest with our recent En Banc ruli ng denying a request by the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) for exemption from payment of legal fees based on Section 39 of i ts Charter, Republic Act No. 8291,
exempting GSIS from "all ta xes, assessments, fees, charges or dues of all kinds."[19] Reaffirming Echegaray's construction of Section 5(5), the Court
des cribed its exclusive power to promulgate rules o n pleading, practice and procedure as "one of the safeguards of this Court's i nstitutional
i ndependence":

[T]he payment of l egal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated by this Court concerning pleading, practice a nd pro cedure, it ca nnot be va lidly
a nnulled, changed or modified by Congress. As one of the safeguards of this Court's i nstitutional independence, the power to promulgate rules of
pl eading, practice and procedure is now the Court's exclusive domain.[20] x x x (Emphasis supplied)

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Orders dated 30 August 2004 a nd 6 October 2004 of the Executive Judge of the Regional Tri al Court
of Ba guio Ci ty.

Let a copy of thi s Decision be furnished the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to a ll courts.

SO ORDERED.

Bri on, Del Castillo, Abad, a nd Perez, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. NO. 05-10-20-SC March 10, 2010
IN RE: EXEMPTION OF THE NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION FROM PAYMENT OF FILING/ DOCKET FEES

RE SO LU TI O N

MENDOZA, J.:

The Na tional Power Corporation (NPC) s eeks clarification from the Cou rt on whether or not i t is exempt from the payment of filing fees, appeal bonds and
s upersedeas bonds.

On December 6, 2005, the Court i ssued A.M. No. 05-10-20-SC, In re: Exemption of the National Power Corporation from the Pa yment of Filing/Docket
Fees, on the basis of Section 13, Republic Act No. 6395 (An Act Revi sing the Charter of the National Power Corporation). It reads:

The Court Resolved, upon the recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator, to DECLARE that the Na tional Power Corp oration (NPC) is s till
exempt from the payment of filing fees, appeals bond, a nd s upersedeas bonds.

On October 27, 2009, however, the Court issued A.M. No. 05-10-20-SC s tating that:

The Court Resolved, upon recommendation of the Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court, to DENY the request of the Na tional Power
Corpora tion (NPC) for exemption from the payment of filing fees pursuant to Section 10 of Republic Act No. 6395, a s am ended by Section 13 of
Pres i dential Decree No. 938. The request appears to run counter to Section 5(5), Arti cle VIII of the Constitution, in the rul e-making power of the Supreme
Court over the rul es on pleading, practice a nd procedure in a ll courts, which includes the s ole power to fix the filing fees of cases in courts.

Hence, the subject letter of NPC for cl arification as to i ts exemption from the payment of filing fees and court fees.

Secti on 22 of Rule 141 reads:

Sec. 22. Government exempt. – The Republic of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities a re exempt from paying the l egal fees provided in this
rul e. Local government units a nd government-owned or controlled corporations with or wi thout independent charters are not exempt from payi ng such
fees. (emphasis supplied)

Secti on 70 of Republic Act No. 9136 (El ectric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001), on priva tization of NPC a ssets, expressly s tates that the NPC "s hall
rema in as a national government-owned and controlled corporation."

Thus , NPC i s not exempt from payment of filing fees.

The non-exemption of NPC i s further fortified by the promulgation on ---February 11, 2010 of A.M. No. 08-2-01-0, In re: Peti tion for Recognition of the
Exempti on of the Government Service Insurance Sys tem (GSIS) from Payment of Legal Fees. In said ca se, the Court, ci ting Echegaray v. Secretary of
Jus ti ce,1 stressed that the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, a lter or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice, a nd
procedure; and that the power to promulgate these rules is no l onger s hared by the Court wi th Congress and the Executive, thus:

Si nce the payment of l egal fees is a vi tal component of the rules promulgated by this Court concerning pleading, practice a nd procedure, it cannot be
va l i dly a nnulled, changed or modified by Congress. As one of the safeguards of this Court’s i nstitutional independence, the p ower to promulgate rules of
pl eading, practice and procedure is now the Court’s exclusive domain. That power is no longer shared by this Court wi th Congress, much less the
Executi ve.

Spea king for the Court, then Associate Justice (now Chief Justice) Reynato S. Puno tra ced the history of the rule -making power of this Court a nd
hi ghlighted its evolution and development in Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice:

Under the 1935 Cons titution, the power of this Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice a nd procedure was gra nted but it a ppeared to be
co-exi stent with l egislative power for i t was subject to the power of Congress to repeal, a lter or supplement. Thus, its Section 13, Arti cle VIII provides:

Sec.13. The Supreme Court s hall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure i n all courts, a nd the a dmission to the
pra cti ce of law. Said rules s hall be uniform for all courts of the same grade a nd shall not diminish, i ncrease, or modify s ubstantive ri ghts. The e xisting l aws
on pl eading, practice, and procedure a re hereby repealed as statutes, a nd a re declared Rules of Court, s ubject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter
a nd modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter or s upplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, a nd the
a dmission to the practice of law in the Philippines.

xxx xxx xxx

[T]he 1973 Cons titution reiterated the power of this Court "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure i n all courts, x x x whi ch,
however, may be repealed, altered or s upplemented by the Batasang Pa mbansa x x x." More compl etely, Section 5(2) [sic] 5 of its Arti cle X provided:

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers.

xxx xxx xxx

(5) Promul gate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the a dmission to the practice of law, a nd th e integration of the Bar, which,
however, may be repealed, altered, or s upplemented by the Batasang Pa mbansa. Such rules shall provide a simplified a nd i nexpensive procedure for the
s peedy disposition of ca se, shall be uniform for a ll courts of the s ame grade, and shall not diminish, i ncrease, or modify s ubstantive rights.

xxx xxx xxx

The 1987 Cons titution molded a n even s tronger a nd more i ndependent judiciary. Among others, i t enhanced the rule making power of this Court. Its
Secti on 5(5), Arti cle VIII provides:
xxx xxx xxx

Secti on 5. The Supreme Court s hall have the following powers.

xxx xxx xxx

(5) Promul gate rules concerning the protection a nd enforcement of constitutional ri ghts, pleading, practice, and procedure i n all courts, the admission to
the pra ctice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal a ssistance to the underprivileged. Such rules s hall provide a simplified a nd i nexpensive procedure for the
s peedy disposition of ca ses, s hall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, a nd s hall not diminish, increase, or modify s ubstantive ri ghts. Rules of
procedure of s pecial courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.

The rul e making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the fi rst ti me was given the power to promulgate rules conce rning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional ri ghts. The Court was also gra nted for the first ti me the power to disapprove rules of procedur e of special courts and quasi-
judi cial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congres s to repeal, a lter, or supplement rules concerning pleading,
pra cti ce a nd procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer s hared by thi s Court with Congress, more
s o wi th the Executive.

The s eparation of powers a mong the three co-equal branches of our government has erected an i mpregnable wall that keeps the power to promulgate
rul es of pleading, practice and procedure wi thin the sole province of this Court. The other branches trespass upon this prero gative i f they enact laws or
i s sue orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify a ny of the procedural rules promulgated by this Court. Vi ewed from this perspective, the claim of a
l egislative grant of exemption from the payment of l egal fees under Section 39 of RA 8291 necessarily fails.1avvphi1

Wi th the foregoing ca tegorical pronouncement of the Court, it is cl ear that NPC ca n no longer invoke Republic Act No. 6395 (N PC Cha rter), as amended by
Pres i dential Decree No. 938, a s its basis for exemption from the payment of l egal fees.

WHEREFORE, i t is hereby CLARIFIED that the National Power Corporation is not exempt from the payment of l egal fees.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

As s ociate Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
Ja nuary 9, 1973
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.

RE SO LU TI O N
PER CURIAM:

On December 1, 1972, the Commission on Bar Integration1 s ubmitted its Report dated November 30, 1972, wi th the "earnest recommendation" — on the
ba s is of the said Report a nd the proceedings had in Administrative Case No. 5262 of the Court, and "consistently wi th the vi e ws a nd counsel received
from i ts [the Commission's] Board of Consultants, as well as the overwhelming nationwide s entiment of the Philippine Bench a nd Bar" — that "this
Honorable Court ordain the integration of the Philippine Bar a s soon as possible through the adoption a nd promulgation of a n a ppropriate Court Rule."

The petition i n Adm. Case No. 526 formally prays the Court to order the i ntegration of the Philippine Bar, after due hearing, giving recognition a s far as
pos sible and practicable to existing provincial a nd other local Bar associations. On August 16, 1962, a rguments in favor of a s well a s in opposition to the
peti tion were orally expounded before the Court. Wri tten oppositions were a dmitted,3 and all parties were thereafter gra nted l eave to file written
memoranda.4

Si nce then, the Court has cl osely observed a nd followed significant developments relative to the matter of the integration of the Bar i n this jurisdiction.

In 1970, convi nced from preliminary s urveys that there had grown a strong nationwide s entiment in fa vor of Bar i ntegration, t he Court created the
Commi ssion on Bar Integration for the purpose of a scertaining the a dvisability of unifyi ng the Philippine Bar.

In September, 1971, Congress passed House Bill No. 3277 entitled "An Act Provi ding for the Integration of the Philippine Bar, a nd Appropriating Funds
Therefor." The measure was signed by President Ferdinand E. Ma rcos on September 17, 1971 a nd took effect on the same day as R ep. Act 6397. Thi s law
provi des as follows:

SECTION 1. Wi thin two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Co urt ma y a dopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar
under such conditions as it s hall s ee fit in order to ra ise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, a nd enable the Bar to
di s charge its public responsibility more effectively.

SEC. 2. The s um of five hundred thousand pesos is hereby appropriated, out of any funds i n the National Treasury not otherwis e a ppropriated, to carry
out the purposes of this Act. Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for the same purpose shall be incl uded i n the a nnual appropriations for the
Supreme Court.

SEC. 3. Thi s Act s hall take effect upon its approval.

The Report of the Commission a bounds with a rgument on the constitutionality of Bar i ntegration a nd contains all necessary fa c tual data bearing on the
a dvi sability (practicability and necessity) of Bar i ntegration. Also embodied therein are the vi ews, opinions, s entiments, co mments and observations of
the ra nk and file of the Philippine lawyer population relative to Bar i ntegration, a s well as a p roposed i ntegration Court Rule drafted by the Commission
a nd presented to them by that body i n a national Bar plebiscite. There i s thus sufficient basis a s well a s ample material upo n which the Court ma y decide
whether or not to integrate the Philippine Bar at this time.

The following are the pertinent issues:

(1) Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine Bar?

(2) Woul d the i ntegration of the Bar be constitutional?

(3) Should the Court ordain the integration of the Bar a t this time?

A res olution of these issues requires, at the outset, a statement of the meaning of Bar i ntegration. It will suffice, for this p urpose, to adopt the concept
gi ven by the Commission on Bar Integration on pages 3 to 5 of i ts Report, thus:

Integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire l awyer population of the Philippines. This requires membership and financial
s upport (in reasonable a mount) of every a ttorney as conditions sine qua non to the practice of law and the retention of h is name in the Roll of Attorneys
of the Supreme Court.

The term "Bar" refers to the collectivi ty of all persons whose names appear i n the Roll of Attorneys. An Integrated Bar (or U nified Bar) perforce must
i ncl ude a ll l awyers.

Compl ete unification is not possible unless it is decreed by a n entity with power to do s o: the State. Bar i ntegration, therefore, s ignifies the setting up by
Government authority of a national organization of the legal profession based on the recognition of the lawyer as a n officer of the court.

Des igned to i mprove the position of the Bar a s an i nstrumentality of justice a nd the Rule of La w, i ntegration fosters cohesio n among lawyers, and
ens ures, through their own organized action and participation, the promotion of the objectives of the l egal profession, pursuant to the principle of
ma xi mum Bar autonomy wi th minimum supervision a nd regulation by the Supreme Court.

The purposes of a n i ntegrated Bar, in general, a re:

(1) As s ist in the administration of justice;

(2) Fos ter and maintain on the part of its members high ideals of integrity, l earning, professional competence, public servi c e and conduct;

(3) Sa feguard the professional interests of its members;

(4) Cul ti vate a mong its members a spirit of cordiality a n d brotherhood;

(5) Provi de a forum for the discussion of law, jurisprudence, law reform, pleading, practice a nd procedure, and the relations of the Bar to the Bench and
to the public, and publish information relating thereto;

(6) Encoura ge and foster l egal education;

(7) Promote a continuing program of l egal research in s ubstantive a nd a djective l aw, a nd make reports a nd recommendations the reon; a nd

(8) Ena ble the Bar to discharge its public responsibility effectively.

Integration of the Bar will, among other things, make it possible for the legal profession to:

(1) Render more effective a ssistance in maintaining the Rule of La w;

(2) Protect l a wyers and litigants a gainst the a buse of tyra nnical judges a nd prosecuting officers;

(3) Di s charge, fully a nd properly, i ts responsibility i n the disciplining and/or removal of incompetent and unworthy judges and prosecuting officers ;

(4) Shi eld the judiciary, which traditionally ca nnot defend i tself except within its own forum, from the assaults that politi cs and self-interest may l evel at it,
a nd a ssist it to maintain i ts i ntegrity, i mpartiality and i ndependence;

(5) Ha ve a n effective voice in the selection of judges and prosecuting officers;

(6) Prevent the unauthorized practice of law, and break up a ny mon opoly of l ocal practice maintained through influence or position;

(7) Es ta blish welfare funds for families of disabled and deceased lawyers;

(8) Provi de placement services, a nd establish l egal aid offices a nd s et up lawyer reference services throughout the country s o that the poor may not lack
competent legal s ervice;

(9) Di s tribute educational and informational materials that are difficult to obtain in many of our provinces;

(10) Devi se a nd maintain a program of continuing legal education for practising a ttorneys in order to eleva te the standards o f the profession throughout
the country;

(11) Enforce ri gid ethical s tandards, and promulgate minimum fees s chedules;

(12) Crea te l aw centers a nd establish l aw libraries for l egal research;

(13) Conduct ca mpaigns to educate the people on their l egal ri ghts a nd obligations, on the i mportance of preventive legal advice, and on the functions
a nd duties of the Filipino lawyer; a nd

(14) Generate and maintain pervasive a nd meaningful country-wide involvement of the lawyer population i n the solution of the multifarious problems
tha t a fflict the nation.

Anent the first issue, the Court is of the view that it may i ntegrate the Philippine Bar i n the exercise of its power, under Arti cle VIII, Sec. 13 of the
Cons ti tution, "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, a nd procedure in all courts, and the a dmission to the pract ice of law." Indeed, the power
to i ntegrate is an inherent part of the Court's constitutional a uthority over the Bar. In providing that "the Supreme Court m ay a dopt rules of court to
effect the i ntegration of the Philippine Bar," Republic Act 6397 neither confers a new power nor restricts the Court's i nherent power, but is a mere
l egislative declaration that the i ntegration of the Bar will promote public i nterest or, more specifically, will "raise the s tandards of the legal profession,
i mprove the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively."

Res olution of the second issue — whether the unification of the Bar would be constitutional — hinges on the effects of Bar integration on the lawyer's
cons titutional ri ghts of freedom of association a nd freedom of speech, and on the nature of the dues exacted from him.

The Court a pprovingly quotes the following pertinent discussion ma de by the Commission on Bar Integration pages 44 to 49 of i ts Report:

Cons ti tutionality of Bar Integration

Judi cial Pronouncements.

In a ll ca ses where the va lidity of Ba r integration measures has been put in issue, the Courts have upheld their constitutiona lity.

The judicial pronouncements support this reasoning:

— Courts have inherent power to s upervise a nd regulate the practice of l aw.

— The pra ctice of l aw is not a vested ri ght but a privilege; a privilege, moreover, cl othed with public i nterest, because a law yer owes duties not only to his
cl i ent, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, a nd to the nation; and takes part i n one of the most important functions of th e State, the
a dministration of justice, as an officer of the court.

— Beca use the practice of l aw is privilege clothed with public i nterest, it is far a nd just that the exercise of that privilege be regulated to a ssure
compl iance with the l awyer's public responsibilities.

— These public responsibilities can best be discharged through collective action; but there ca n be no collective a ction without a n organized body; no
orga nized body ca n operate effectively wi thout incurring expenses; therefore, i t is fair and just that all attorneys be requi red to contribute to the s upport
of s uch organized body; a nd, given existing Bar conditions, the most efficient means of doing so is by i ntegrating the Bar through a rule of court that
requi res a ll l awyers to pay a nnual dues to the Integrated Bar.

1. Freedom of Association.

To compel a l awyer to be a member of a n i ntegrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate (or the corollary ri ght not to a ssociate).
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not a lready a member. He became a member of the Bar w hen he passed the
Ba r exa minations. All that integration a ctually does is to provide a n official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized a nd i ncohesive
group of which every l awyer i s already a member.

Ba r i ntegration does not compel the l awyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not a ttend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote
or refus e to vote in i ts elections as he chooses. The body compulsion to which he i s subjected is the payment of annual dues.

Otherwise s tated, membership i n the Unified Bar i mposes only the duty to pa y dues i n reasonable amount. The issue therefore, is a question of
compelled financial support of group activities, not i nvoluntary membership in any other a spect.

The greater part of Unified Bar a ctivities serves the function of elevating the educational and ethical s tandards of the Bar to the end of improving the
qua lity of the l egal service a vailable to the people. The Supreme Court, i n order to further the State's legitimate i nterest i n elevating the quality of
professional servi ces, may require that the cost of improvi ng the profession in this fashion be s hared by the subjects a nd beneficiaries of the regulatory
progra m — the lawyers.

As s uming that Bar integration does compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar, such co mpulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power
of the Sta te. The legal profession has long been regarded as a proper s ubject of l egislative regulation a nd control. Moreover , the inherent power of the
Supreme Court to regulate the Bar i ncludes the a uthority to i ntegrate the Bar.

2. Regulatory Fee.

For the Court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean that the Court l evies a tax.

A membership fee in the Integrated Bar i s an exaction for regulation, while the purpose of a ta x is revenue. If the Court has inherent power to regulate
the Ba r, i t follows that as an incident to regulation, it may i mpose a membership fee for that purpose. It would not be possible to push through a n
Integrated Bar program without means to defray the concomitant expenses. The doctrine of implied powers necessarily includes the power to impose
s uch a n exaction.

The only l imitation upon the State's power to regulate the Bar i s that the regulation does not impose an unconstitutional bur den. The public interest
promoted by the integration of the Bar far outweighs the inconsequential i nconvenience to a member that might result from his required payment of
a nnual dues.

3. Freedom of Speech.

A l a wyer i s free, as he has always been, to voice his vi ews on any s ubject i n any manner he wishes, even though such vi ews be opposed to positions ta ken
by the Uni fied Bar.

For the Integrated Bar to use a member's due to promote measures to which said mem ber is opposed, would not nullify or a dversely a ffect his freedom
of s peech.

Si nce a State may constitutionally condition the ri ght to pra ctice l aw upon membership in the Integrated Bar, i t is difficult to understand why it s hould
become unconstitutional for the Bar to use the member's dues to fulfill the very purposes for which it was established.

The objection would make every Governmental exaction the material of a "free speech" issue. Even the i ncome ta x would be susp ect. The objection
woul d ca rry us to l engths that have never been dreamed of. The conscientious objector, i f his liberties were to be thus extended, might refuse to
contri bute ta xes in furtherance of war or of any other end condemned by his conscience as i rreligious or i mmoral. The ri ght o f private judgment has never
yet been exalted a bove the powers and the compulsion of the agencies of Government.

4. Fa i r to All La wyers.

Ba r i ntegration is not unfair to l awyers already practising because although the requirement to pay a nnual dues is a new regulation, i t will give the
members of the Bar a new s ystem which they hitherto have not had and through which, by proper work, they will receive benefit s they have not
heretofore enjoyed, and discharge their public responsibilities in a more effective manner than they have been able to do in the past. Because the
requi rement to pay dues is a va lid exercise of regulatory power by the Court, because i t will a pply equally to a ll l awyers, young a nd old, a t the time Bar
i ntegration ta kes effect, and because it is a new regulation i n exchange for new benefits, it is not retroactive, i t is not unequal, it is not unfair.

To res olve the third and final issue — whether the Court s hould ordain the i ntegration of the Bar at this time — requires a ca reful overview of the
pra cti cability a nd necessity a s well as the advantages a nd disadvantages of Bar i ntegration.

In ma ny other jurisdictions, notably i n England, Ca nada a nd the United States, Bar i ntegration has yi elded the following bene fits: (1) i mproved discipline
a mong the members of the Bar; (2) greater i nfluence a nd ascendancy of the Bar; (3) better a nd more meaningful participation o f the i ndividual lawyer i n
the a cti vities of the Integrated Bar; (4) greater Bar facilities and servi ces; (5) elimination of unauthorized practice; (6) a voidance of costly membership
ca mpaigns; (7) establishment of an official status for the Bar; (8) more cohesive profession; and (9) better a nd more effecti ve discharge by the Bar of its
obl igations and responsibilities to its members, to the courts, a nd to the public. No less than these salutary consequences are envisioned and in fact
expected from the unification of the Philippine Bar.

Upon the other hand, it has been va riously a rgued that in the event of integration, Government authority wi ll dominate the Bar; l ocal Bar associations will
be weakened; cl iquism will be the i nevitable result; effective lobbyi ng will not be possible; the Bar will become an impersonal Bar; a nd politics will i ntrude
i nto i ts affairs.

It i s noteworthy, however, that these a nd other evils prophesied by opponents of Bar integration have failed to materialize in over fifty years o f Bar
i ntegration experience in England, Ca nada and the United States. In all the jurisdictions where the Integrated Bar has been t ri ed, none of the abuses or
evi l s feared has arisen; on the other hand, it has restored public confidence in the Bar, enlarged professional consciousness , energized the Bar's
res ponsibilities to the public, and vastly i mproved the a dministration of justice.

How do the Filipino lawyers themselves regard Bar i ntegration? The official statistics compiled by the Commission on Bar inte gration show that in the
na ti onal poll recently conducted by the Commission i n the matter of the i ntegration of the Philippine B ar, of a total of 15,090 l a wyers from all over the
a rchi pelago who have turned in their i ndivi dual responses, 14,555 (or 96.45 per cent) voted i n favor of Bar i ntegration, whil e only 378 (or 2.51 per cent)
voted a gainst it, a nd 157 (or 1.04 per cent) are n on-commital. In addition, a total of eighty (80) l ocal Bar a ssociation and lawyers' groups all over the
Phi l ippines have s ubmitted resolutions a nd other expressions of unqualified endorsement a nd/or support for Ba r integration, w hile not a s ingle local Bar
a s sociation or l awyers' group has expressed opposed position thereto. Finally, of the 13,802 i ndividual lawyers who cast thei r plebiscite ballots on the
proposed i ntegration Court Rule drafted by the Commission, 12,855 (or 93.14 per cent) voted in favor thereof, 662 (or 4.80 per cent) vote against i t, and
285 (or 2.06 per cent) a re non-committal.5 All these clearly i ndicate a n overwhelming nationwide demand for Bar i ntegration a t this ti me.

The Court i s fully convinced, a fter a thoroughgoing conscientious s tudy of a ll the a rguments adduced i n Adm. Case No. 526 a nd the a uthoritative
ma terials a nd the mass of factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar Integration, that the i nte gration of the Philippine Bar
i s "perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable," within the context of contemporary conditions in the Philippines, has become an imperati ve
mea ns to ra ise the s tandards of the legal profession, i mprove the administration of justice, a nd enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility fully
a nd effectively.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court, by vi rtue of the power vested in i t by Section 13 of Arti cle VIII of the Constitution, hereby ordains the i ntegration of the Bar of
the Phi lippines i n accordance wi th the attached COURT RULE, effective on Ja nuary 16, 1973.

Concepcion, C.J., Ma kalintal, Zaldivar, Ca stillo, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Ma kasiar, Antonio a nd Es guerra, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

Res olution Ma rch 18, 1954

In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to 1953;
ALBINO CUNANAN, ET AL., petitioners.

DIOKNO, J.:

In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public interest and concern as Republic Act No. 972, popularly known as the "Bar Fl unkers'
Act of 1953." Under the Rules of Court governing admission to the bar, "in order that a ca ndidate (for admission to the Bar) may be deemed t o have
pa ssed his examinations s uccessfully, he must have obtained a general a verage of 75 per cent in a ll s ubjects, without fallin g below 50 per cent in any
s ubject." (Rule 127, s ec. 14, Rul es of Court). Nevertheless, considering the va rying difficulties of the different bar examinations held since 1946 a nd the
va ryi ng degree of strictness with which the examination papers were graded, this court passed and admitted to the bar those ca ndidates who had
obta ined an average of only 72 per cent i n 1946, 69 per cent i n 1947, 70 per cent i n 1948, a nd 74 per cent i n 1949. In 1950 to 1953, the 74 per cent was
ra i sed to 75 per cent.

Bel ieving themselves as fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered a nd passed by this court, a nd feeling conscious of having been discriminated
a ga inst (See Explanatory Note to R.A. No. 972), unsuccessful ca ndidates who obtained averages of a few percentage lower than those a dmitted to the Bar
a gi tated i n Congress for, and secured i n 1951 the passage of Senate Bill No. 12 which, a mong others, reduced the passing gene ral a verage in bar
exa minations to 70 per cent effective since 1946. The President requested the vi ews of this court on the bill. Complying with that request, seven
members of the court s ubscribed to a nd s ubmitted written comments adverse thereto, a nd s hortly thereafter the President vetoe d i t. Congress did not
overri de the veto. Instead, i t approved Senate Bill No. 371, embodying s ubstantially the provisions of the vetoed bill. Although the members of this court
rei terated their unfavorable views on the matter, the President a llowed the bill to become a l aw on June 21, 1953 wi thout his signature. The law, which
i nci dentally was enacted i n an election year, reads i n full as follows:

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FORTY -SIX UP TO AND INCLUDING NINETEEN HUNDRED
AND FIFTY-FIVE.

Be i t enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

SECTION 1. Notwi thstanding the provisions of section fourteen, Rule numbered one hundred twenty-seven of the Rules of Court, a ny bar ca ndidate who
obta ined a general average of seventy per cent i n a ny bar examinations after July fourth, nineteen hundred a nd forty-six up to the August nineteen
hundred and fifty-one bar examinations; s eventy-one per cent in the nineteen hundred a nd fi fty-two bar examinations; s eventy-two per cent in the i n the
ni neteen hundred and fifty-three bar examinations; seventy-three per cent in the nineteen hundred a nd fi fty-four bar examinations; s eventy-four per
cent i n the nineteen hundred and fifty-five bar examinations without a ca ndidate obtaining a grade below fifty per cent i n a ny s ubject, s hall be allowed to
ta ke a nd s ubscribe the corresponding oath of office a s member of the Philippine Bar: Provi ded, however, That for the purpose of this Act, a ny exact one-
ha l f or more of a fraction, s hall be considered as one and included as part of the next whole number.

SEC. 2. Any ba r ca ndidate who obtained a grade of s eventy-five per cent i n a ny s ubject i n a ny bar examination after July fourth, nineteen hundred a nd
forty-s i x shall be deemed to have passed i n s uch s ubject or s ubjects a nd s uch gra de or gra des s hall be i ncluded in computing the passing general averag e
tha t s aid ca ndidate may obtain in any subsequent examinations that he may ta ke.

SEC. 3. Thi s Act s hall take effect upon its approval.

Ena cted on June 21, 1953, wi thout the Executive a pproval.

After i ts approval, ma ny of the unsuccessful postwar ca ndidates filed petitions for admission to the bar invoking i ts provisi ons, while others whose
moti ons for the revision of their examination papers were still pending also invoked the a foresaid law as a n additional ground for a dmission. There a re
a l so others who have sought simply the reconsideration of their gra des without, however, i nvoking the law in question. To avoid i njustice to individual
peti tioners, the court first reviewed the motions for reconsideration, i rrespective of whether or not they had i nvoked Republ ic Act No. 972.
Unfortunately, the court has found no reason to revise their gra des. If they a re to be a dmitted to the bar, it must be pursuant to Republic Act No. 972
whi ch, if declared va lid, should be a pplied equally to all concerned whether they have filed petitions or not. A complete lis t of the petitioners, properly
cl a ssified, a ffected by this decision, a s well a s a more detailed a ccount of the history of Republic Act No. 972, a re a ppended to thi s decision as Annexes I
a nd II. And to realize more readily the effects of the law, the following s tatistical data are s et forth:

(1) The unsuccessful bar candidates who a re to be benefited by s ection 1 of Republic Act No. 972 tota l 1,168, cl assified as f ollows:

1946 (August) 206 121 18

1946 (November) 477 228 43

1947 749 340 0

1948 899 409 11

1949 1,218 532 164

1950 1,316 893 26

1951 2,068 879 196

1952 2,738 1,033 426

1953 2,555 968 284

 TOTAL 12,230 5,421 1,168

Of the tota l 1,168 ca ndidates, 92 ha ve passed i n s ubsequent examination, a nd only 586 ha ve filed either motions for admission to the bar pursuant to
s a id Republic Act, or mere motions for reconsideration.

(2) In a ddition, some other 10 unsuccessful ca ndidates are to be benefited by s ection 2 of said Republic Act. These ca ndidates had each taken from two to
fi ve di fferent examinations, but failed to obtain a passing a verage in any of them. Consolidating, however, their highest gra des i n different subjects i n
previ ous examinations, with their l atest marks, they would be s ufficient to reach the passing a verage as provided for by Republic Act No. 972.

(3) The tota l number of candidates to be benefited by this Republic Acts is therefore 1,094, of which only 604 ha ve filed petitions. Of these 604
peti tioners, 33 who failed i n 1946 to 1951 ha d i ndividually presented motions for reconsideration which were denied, while 12 5 unsuccessful ca ndidates
of 1952, a nd 56 of 1953, ha d presented similar motions, which are still pending because they could be fa vorably a ffected by Republic Act No. 972, —
a l though a s has been a lready s tated, this tri bunal finds no s ufficient reasons to reconsider their gra des

UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

Ha vi ng been called upon to enforce a law of far-reaching effects on the practice of the legal profession and the administration of justice, and because
s ome doubts have been expressed as to its va lidity, the court set the hearing of the afore-mentioned petitions for a dmission on the s ole question of
whether or not Republic Act No. 972 i s constitutional.

We ha ve been enlightened i n the study of this question by the brilliant assistance of the members of the bar who have amply a rgued, orally an in wri ting,
on the va rious aspects i n which the question may be gl eaned. The valuable studies of Messrs. E. Voltaire Garcia, Vicente J. Fra ncisco, Vi cente Pelaez a nd
Buenaventura Eva ngelista, i n favor of the va lidity of the law, and of the U.P. Women's Lawyers' Ci rcle, the Solicitor General , Messrs. Arturo A. Al afriz,
Enri que M. Fernando, Vicente Abad Santos, Ca rlos A. Ba rrios, Vicente del Rosario, Juan de Blancaflor, Ma merto V. Gonzales, a nd Roman Ozaeta a gainst it,
a s ide from the memoranda of counsel for petitioners, Messrs. Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Mi guel R. Cornejo and Antonio Enrile Inton, and of
peti tioners Ca brera, Macasaet and Galema themselves, has greatly helped us in this task. The legal researchers of the court h ave exhausted almost a ll
Phi l ippine a nd American jurisprudence on the matter. The question has been the object of i ntense deliberation for a long ti me by the Tri bunal, and finally,
a fter the voting, the preparation of the majority opinion was a ssigned to a new member i n order to place it as humanly a s pos sible a bove all suspicion of
prejudice or partiality.

Republic Act No. 972 ha s for its object, a ccording to its author, to a dmit to the Bar, those candidates who suffered from ins ufficiency of reading materials
a nd i nadequate preparation. Quoting a portion of the Explanatory Note of the proposed bill, i ts a uthor Honorable Senator Pablo Angeles David stated:

The reason for relaxing the s tandard 75 per cent passing gra de is the tremendous handicap which students during the years immediately a fter the
Ja pa nese occupation has to overcome such as the insufficiency of reading materials and the i nadequacy of the preparation of students who took up law
s oon after the liberation.

Of the 9,675 ca ndi dates who took the examinations from 1946 to 1952, 5,236 pa ssed. And now it is cl aim ed that i n addition 604 ca ndidates be a dmitted
(whi ch in reality total 1,094), because they s uffered from "insufficiency of reading materials" a nd of "inadequacy of prepara tion."

By i ts declared objective, the law i s contrary to public interest because i t qualifies 1,094 l aw gra duates who confessedly had inadequate preparation for
the pra ctice of the profession, as was exactly found by this Tri bunal i n the aforesaid examinations. The public i nterest dema nds of l egal profession
a dequate preparation and efficiency, precisely more s o as legal problem evolved by the ti mes become more difficult. An adequate legal preparation is
one of the vi tal requisites for the practice of law that s hould be developed constantly a nd maintained fi rmly. To the legal p rofession is entrusted the
protecti on of property, l ife, honor a nd civil liberties. To a pprove officially of those inadequately prepared indivi duals to dedicate themselves to s uch a
del icate mission i s to create a serious social danger. Moreover, the statement that there was an i nsufficiency of l egal reading materials is grossly
exa ggerated. There were abundant materials. Decisions of this court a lone i n mimeographed copies were made a vailable to the p ublic during those years
a nd priva te enterprises had a lso published them in monthly ma gazines and annual digests. The Official Gazette had been published continuously. Books
a nd magazines published abroad have entered without restriction since 1945. Ma ny l aw books, s ome even with revised and enlarg ed editions have been
pri nted locally during those periods. A new s et of Philippine Reports began to be published s ince 1946, which continued to be s upplemented by the
a ddition of new volumes. Those are facts of public knowledge.

Notwi thstanding all these, i f the l aw i n question i s valid, i t has to be enforced.

The question is not new in i ts fundamental aspect or from the point of view of applicable principles, but the resolution of t he question would have been
ea sier had a n i dentical case of similar background been picked out from the jurisprudence we daily consult. Is there any precedent in the long Anglo -
Sa xon l egal history, from which has been directly derived the judicial s ystem established here with i ts l ofty i deals by the Congress of the United States,
a nd which we have preserved a nd a ttempted to i mprove, or i n our contemporaneous judicial history of more than half a century? From the citations of
thos e defending the l aw, we ca n not find a case in which the validity of a similar law had been sustained, while those agains t i ts validity ci te, among
others , the cases of Day (In re Day, 54 NE 646), of Ca nnon (State vs. Ca nnon, 240 NW, 441), the opinion of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in 1932
(81 ALR 1061), of Gua ri ña (24 Phil., 37), a side from the opinion of the President which is expressed in his vote of the original bill and which the
pos tponement of the contested l aw respects.

Thi s law has no precedent i n its favor. When similar l aws in other countries had been promulgated, the judiciary i mmediately declared them without force
or effect. It i s not within our power to offer a precedent to uphold the disputed l aw.

To be exa ct, we ought to s tate here that we have examined carefully the ca se that has been ci ted to us as a fa vorable precede nt of the law — that of
Cooper (22 NY, 81), where the Court of Appeals of New York revoked the decision of the Supreme court of that State, denying the petition of Cooper to
be a dmitted to the practice of l aw under the provisions of a statute concerning the school of law of Col umbia College promulgated on April 7, 1860, which
wa s declared by the Court of Appeals to be consistent with the Constitution of the state of New York.

It a ppears that the Constitution of New York at that ti me provided:

They (i .e., the judges) shall not hold any other office of public trust. Al l votes for either of them for any elective office except that of the Court of Appeals,
gi ven by the Legislature or the people, shall be void. They s hall not exercise any power of a ppointment to public office. Any male citizen of the age of
twenty-one years, of good moral character, and who possesses the requisite qualifications of learning a nd a bility, s hall be entitled to admission to
pra cti ce i n all the courts of this State. (p. 93).

Accordi ng to the Court of Appeals, the object of the constitutional precept is as follows:
Attorneys , solicitors, etc., were public officers; the power of appointing them had previously rested with the judges, a nd th is was the principal a ppointing
power which they possessed. The convention was evidently dissatisfied with the manner i n which this power had been exercised, a nd with the
res tri ctions which the judges had i mposed upon admission to practice before them. The prohibitory clause i n the s ection quoted was aimed directly a t
thi s power, and the insertion of the provision" expecting the a dmission of attorneys, i n this particular s ection of the Constitution, evidently a rose from its
connection wi th the object of this prohibitory cl ause. There i s nothing indicative of confidence in the courts or of a disposition to preserve any portion of
thei r power over this s ubject, unless the Supreme Court i s right i n the inference it draws from the use of the word `admissio n' in the action referred to. It
i s urged that the a dmission s poken of must be by the court; that to a dmit means to grant l eave, and that the power of granting neces sarily i mplies the
power of refusing, a nd of course the ri ght of determining whether the a pplicant possesses the requisite qualifications to entitle him to admission.

Thes e positions may all be conceded, without a ffecting the va lidity of the act. (p. 93.)

Now, wi th respect to the law of April 7, 1860, the decision seems to indicate that i t provided that the possession of a diplo ma of the school of l aw of
Col umbia College conferring the degree of Bachelor of Laws was evidence of the legal qualifications that the constitution req uired of applicants for
a dmission to the Bar. The decision does not however quote the text of the l aw, which we ca nnot find in a ny public or accessible private library i n the
country.

In the ca se of Cooper, s upra, to ma ke the law consistent with the Constitution of New York, the Court of Appeals said of the object of the l aw:

The moti ve for passing the act i n question i s apparent. Columbia College being a n institution of established reputation, and havi ng a law department
under the charge of a ble professors, the students in which department were not only s ubjected to a formal examination by the law committee of the
i ns titution, but to a certain definite period of study before being entitled to a diploma of being gra duates, the Legislature evidently, a nd no doubt justly,
cons idered this examination, together with the preliminary s tudy required by the act, a s full y equivalent a s a test of l egal requirements, to the ordinary
exa mination by the court; a nd as rendering the latter examination, to which no definite period of preliminary s tudy was essen tial, unnecessary a nd
burdensome.

The a ct was obviously passed with reference to the l earning and ability of the a pplicant, and for the mere purpose of substituting the examination by the
l a w committee of the college for that of the court. It could have had no other object, and hence no greater s cope s hould be g iven to i ts provisions. We
ca nnot suppose that the Legislature designed entirely to dispense with the plain a nd explicit requirements of the Constitution; and the act contains
nothi ng whatever to i ndicate a n i ntention that the a uthorities of the college s hould inquire as to the a ge, ci tizenship, etc., of the s tudents before granting
a di ploma. The only ra tional i nterpretation of which the a ct admits is, that it was intended to make the college diploma competent evidence as to the
l egal attainments of the applicant, a nd nothing else. To this extent a lone i t operates as a modification of pre -existing statutes, and it i s to be read i n
connection wi th these statutes and with the Constitution i tself in order to determine the present condition of the law on the s ubject. (p.89)

xxx xxx xxx

The Legislature has not taken from the court i ts jurisdiction over the question of a dmission, that has s imply prescribed what s hall be competent evidence
i n certa in cases upon that question. (p.93)

From the foregoing, the complete inapplicability of the case of Cooper with that at bar may be cl early s een. Please note only the following distinctions:

(1) The l aw of New York does not require that any ca ndidate of Columbia College who failed i n the bar examinations be admitted to the practice of law.

(2) The l aw of New York a ccording to the very decision of Cooper, has not taken from the court i ts jurisdiction over the question of a dmission of attorney
a t l a w; in effect, it does not decree the admission of a ny l awye r.

(3) The Cons titution of New York a t that time and that of the Philippines a re entirely different on the matter of admission o f the practice of law.

In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment a nd reinstatement of attorneys at l aw i n the practice of
the profession a nd their s upervision have been disputably a judicial function and responsibility. Becaus e of this a ttribute, i ts continuous and zealous
pos session and exercise by the judicial power have been demonstrated during more than six centuries, which certainly "constit utes the most solid of
ti tl es." Even considering the power gra nted to Congress by o ur Constitution to repeal, alter s upplement the rules promulgated by this Court regarding the
a dmission to the practice of law, to our judgment and proposition that the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of the attorneys at law
i s a legislative function, properly belonging to Congress, is unacceptable. The function requires (1) previously established rules a nd p rinciples, (2) concrete
fa cts , whether past or present, a ffecting determinate i ndividuals. a nd (3) decision as to whether these facts a re governed by the rules and principles; i n
effect, a judicial function of the highest degree. And it becomes more undisputably judicial, a nd not legislative, if previous judicial resolutions on the
peti tions of these same i ndividuals a re attempted to be revoked or modified.

We ha ve said that in the judicial system from which ours has been derived, the act of a dmitting, suspending, disbarring and r einstating attorneys at l aw i n
the pra ctice of the profession is concededly judicial. A comprehensive and conscientious s tudy of this matter had been undertaken in the case of State vs .
Ca nnon (1932) 240 NW 441, i n which the va lidity of a l egislative enactment providing that Ca nnon be permitted to practice bef ore the courts was
di s cussed. From the text of this decision we quote the following paragraphs:

Thi s statute presents an assertion of legislative power without parallel i n the history of the English s peaking people s o far as we have been a ble to
a s certain. There has been much uncertainty as to the extent of the power of the Legislature to prescribe the ultimate qualifications of attorney a t law has
been expressly committed to the courts, a nd the a ct of admission has always been regarded as a judicial function. This act pu rports to constitute Mr.
Ca nnon a n a ttorney a t l aw, a nd i n this respect i t stands a lone as a n assertion of l egislative power. (p. 444)

Under the Constitution a ll l egislative power is vested i n a Senate and Assembly. (Section 1, a rt. 4.) In s o far as the prescribing of qualifications for
a dmission to the bar a re legislative i n character, the Legislature is acting within its constitutional authority when it s ets u p and prescribes such
qua lifications. (p. 444)

But when the Legislature has prescribed those qualifications which i n i ts judgment will serve the purpose of l egitimate legislative s olicitude, is the power
of the court to i mpose other a nd further exactions and qualifications foreclosed or exhausted? (p. 444)

Under our Constitution the judicial a nd l egislative departments a re distinct, independent, and coordinate branches of the government. Neither branch
enjoys all the powers of s overeignty which properly belongs to i ts department. Neither department should so act as to embarra ss the other in the
di s charge of i ts respective functions. That was the s cheme and thought of the people s etting upon the form of government under which we exist. State
vs . Ha s tings, 10 Wi s., 525; Attorney General ex rel. Bashford vs . Barstow, 4 Wi s., 567. (p. 445)

The judicial department of government is responsible for the plane upon which the a dministration of justice is maintained. Its responsibility i n this respect
i s exclusive. By committing a portion of the powers of s overeignty to the judicial department of our state government, under 42a scheme which it was
s upposed rendered it i mmune from embarrassment or i nterference by a ny other department of government, the courts ca nnot escape responsibility fi r
the ma nner i n which the powers of s overeignty thus committed to the judicial department are exercised. (p. 445)

The rel ation at the bar to the courts is a peculiar a nd i ntimate relationship. The bar is a n attache of the courts. The quali ty of justice dispense by the
courts depends i n no s mall degree upon the i ntegrity of its bar. An unfaithful bar ma y easily b ring scandal a nd reproach to the a dministration of justice
a nd bring the courts themselves into disrepute. (p.445)

Through all time courts have exercised a direct and severe supervision over their bars, at least in the English speaking countries. (p. 445)

After explaining the history of the ca se, the Court ends thus:

Our concl usion may be epitomized as follows: For more than six centuries prior to the adoption of our Constitution, the court s of England, concededly
s ubordinate to Pa rliament since the Revolution of 1688, ha d exercise the ri ght of determining who s hould be admitted to the practice of law, which, as
wa s said i n Ma tter of the Sergeant's a t Law, 6 Bi ngham's New Ca ses 235, "constitutes the most solid of all ti tles." If the co urts and judicial power be
rega rded as a n entity, the power to determine who s hould be admitted to practice law is a constituent element of that entity. It may be difficult to isolate
tha t el ement a nd s ay with a ssurance that it is either a part of the inherent power of the co urt, or a n essential element of the judicial power exercised by
the court, but that i t is a power belonging to the judicial entity a nd made of not only a s overeign i nstitution, but made of it a separate independent, and
coordi nate branch of the government. They took this institution along with the power tra ditionally exercise to determine who should constitute i ts
a ttorney at l aw. There i s no express provision i n the Constitution which indicates a n i ntent that this tra ditional power of t he judicial department should i n
a ny ma nner be s ubject to l egislative control. Perhaps the dominant thought of the framers of our constitution was to make the three great departments
of government s eparate and independent of one a nother. The idea that the Legislature might embarrass the judicial department by prescribing
i na dequate qualifications for a ttorneys at law is i nconsistent with the dominant purpose of making the judicial independent o f the legislative department,
a nd s uch a purpose should not be inferred in the a bsence of express constitutional provisions. While the legislature may l egislate with respect to the
qua lifications of attorneys, but is incidental merely to i ts general and unquestioned power to protect the public i nterest. W hen it does l egislate a fixing a
s ta ndard of qualifications required of a ttorneys at l aw i n order that public interests may be protected, s uch qualifications d o not constitute only a
mi nimum standard and limit the class from which the court must make its s election. Such legislative qualifi cations do not constitute the ultimate
qua lifications beyond which the court ca nnot go i n fixing a dditional qualifications deemed necessary by the course of the proper administration of judicial
functi ons. There is no legislative power to compel courts to a dmit to their bars persons deemed by them unfit to exercise the prerogatives of a n attorney
a t l a w. (p. 450)

Furthermore, it is a n unlawful a ttempt to exercise the power of appointment. It is quite l ikely true that the l egislature may exercise the power of
a ppointment when it is i n pursuance of a legislative functions. However, the authorities are well -nigh unanimous that the power to admit a ttorneys to the
pra cti ce of law is a judicial function. In all of the states, except New Jersey (In re Reisch, 83 N .J. Eq. 82, 90 A. 12), s o fa r a s our i nvestigation reveals,
a ttorneys receive their formal license to practice law by their a dmission as members of the bar of the court s o admitting. Co r. Jur. 572; Ex pa rte
Secombre, 19 How. 9,15 L. Ed. 565; Ex pa rte Ga rland, 4 Wa ll. 333, 18 L. Ed. 366; Ra ndall vs . Brigham, 7 Wa ll. 53, 19 L. Ed. 285; Ha nson vs . Grattan, 48 Ka n,
843, 115 P. 646, 34 L.R.A. 519; Da nforth vs . Egan, 23 S. D. 43, 119 N.W. 1021, 130 Am. St. Rep. 1030, 20 Ann. Ca s . 413.

The power of admitting an attorney to practice having been perpetually exercised by the courts, it having been s o generally held that the a ct of the cou rt
i n a dmitting an attorney to practice i s the judgment of the court, a nd an attempt as this on the part of the Legislature to c onfer such ri ght upon a ny one
bei ng most exceedingly uncommon, it s eems cl ear that the l icensing of a n attorney i s and always has been a purely judicial function, no matter where the
power to determine the qualifications may reside. (p. 451)

In tha t same year of 1932, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in answering a consultation of the Senate of that State, 180 NE 725, s a id:

It i s i ndispensible to the administration of justice a nd to i nterpretation of the laws that there be members of the bar of sufficient ability, a dequate
l earning and sound moral character. This a rises from the need of enlightened a ssistance to the honest, a nd restraining authority over the knavish, litigant.
It i s highly i mportant, also that the public be protected from incompetent a nd vi cious practitioners, whose opportunity for d oing mischief is wide. It was
s a id by Ca rdoz, C.L., i n People ex rel. Ka rlin vs . Culkin, 242 N.Y. 456, 470, 471, 162 N.E. 487, 489, 60 A.L.R. 851: "Membership i n the bar is a privilege
burden with conditions." One is a dmitted to the bar "for s omething more than private gain." He becomes an "officer of the cou rt", and ,like the court
i ts elf, an instrument or a gency to a dva nce the end of justice. His cooperation with the court is due "whenever justice would be i mperiled if cooperation
wa s withheld." Without such attorneys a t law the judicial department of government would be hampered i n the performance of its duties. That has been
the hi story of a ttorneys under the common law, both i n this country a nd England. Admission to practice as an attorney a t law is almost without exception
conceded to be a judicial function. Petition to that end is filed i n courts, a s are other proceedings invoking judicial action. Admission to the bar is
a ccomplish and made open and notorious by a decision of the court entered upon i ts records. The establishment by the Constitu tion of the judicial
department conferred a uthority necessary to the exercise of i ts powers as a coordinate department of government. It is an inherent power of such a
department of government ultimately to determine the qualifications of those to be a dmitted to practice in its courts, for assisting in its work, and to
protect i tself i n this respect from the unfit, those lacking i n s ufficient l earning, and those not possessing good moral character. Chi ef Justice Taney s tated
s ucci nctly a nd with finality i n Ex parte Secombe, 19 How. 9, 13, 15 L. Ed. 565, "It ha s been well s ettled, by the rules and practice of common -law courts,
tha t i t rests exclusively with the court to determine who is qualified to become one of i ts officers, as an a ttorney a nd counselor, and for what ca use he
ought to be re moved." (p.727)

In the ca se of Day a nd others who collectively fi led a petition to secure license to practice the legal profession by vi rtue of a l aw of state (In re Day, 54 NE
646), the court s aid in part:

In the ca se of Ex pa rte Garland, 4 Wa ll, 333, 18 L. Ed. 366, the court, holding the test oath for a ttorneys to be unconstitutional, explained the nature of the
a ttorney's office as follows: "They a re officers of the court, admitted as s uch by i ts order, upon evidence of their possessi ng sufficient legal l earning a nd
fa i r private character. It has always been the general practice in this country to obtain this evidence by a n examination of the parties. In this court the fact
of the a dmission of such officers in the highest court of the s tates to which th ey, respectively, belong for, three years preceding their application, i s
rega rded as s ufficient evidence of the possession of the requisite legal l earning, and the statement of counsel moving their a dmission s ufficient evidence
tha t their private a nd professional character is fair. The order of a dmission is the judgment of the court that the parties possess the requisite
qua lifications as a ttorneys and counselors, a nd a re entitled to appear as such a nd conduct ca uses therein. From i ts entry the parties become officers of
the court, a nd are responsible to it for professional misconduct. They hold their office during good behavior, and ca n only b e deprived of i t for misconduct
a s certained and declared by the judgment of the court a fter opportunity to be heard has been afforded. Ex parte Hoyfron, admission or their exclusion is
not the exercise of a mere ministerial power. It is the exercise of judicial power, and has been so held i n numerous cases. I t was so held by the court of
a ppeals of New York in the matter of the application of Cooper for a dmission. Re Cooper 22 N. Y. 81. "Attorneys and Counselors", said that court, "are not
onl y officers of the court, but officers whose duties relate a lmost exclusively to proceedings of a judicial nature; a nd henc e their appointment may, wi th
propri ety, be entrusted to the court, and the latter, i n performing his duty, ma y very jus tly considered as engaged i n the exercise of their a ppropriate
judi cial functions." (pp. 650-651).

We quote from other ca ses, the following pertinent portions:

Admi ssion to practice of law is almost without exception conceded everywhere to be the exercise of a judicial function, and t his opinion need not be
burdened with ci tations i n this point. Admission to practice have a lso been held to be the exercise of one of the i nherent powers of the court. — Re
Bruen, 102 Wa sh. 472, 172 Pa c. 906.

Admi ssion to the practice of law is the exercise of a judicial function, and is an inherent power of the court. — A.C. Brydonja ck, vs . State Bar of California,
281 Pa c. 1018; See Annotation on Power of Legislature respecting admission to bar, 65, A.L. R. 1512.

On thi s matter there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial a nd l egislative departments of th e government.

The di stinction between the functions of the legislative a nd the judicial departments i s that i t is the province of the legislature to es tablish rules that shall
regul ate and govern i n matters of transactions occurring subsequent to the legislative action, while the j udiciary determines rights and obligations with
reference to tra nsactions that are past or conditions that exist at the ti me of the exercise of judicial power, and the disti nction is a vi tal one a nd not
s ubject to a lteration or change either by l egislative action or by judicial decree.

The judiciary ca nnot consent that i ts province s hall be i nvaded by either of the other departments of the government. — 16 C.J.S., Cons titutional Law, p.
229.

If the l egislature ca nnot thus indirectly control the action of the courts by requiring of them construction of the law a ccording to its own vi ews, it is very
pl a in it ca nnot do s o directly, by s ettling aside their judgments, compelling them to grant new tri als, ordering the discharg e of offenders, or directing what
pa rti cular s teps shall be ta ken in the progress of a judicial inquiry. — Cool ey's Constitutional Limitations, 192.

In decreeing the bar ca ndidates who obtained i n the bar examinations of 1946 to 1952, a general average of 70 per cent without falling below 50 per cent
i n a ny s ubject, be a dmitted in mass to the practice of law, the disputed law is not a legislation; i t is a judgment — a judgment revoking those promulgated
by thi s Court during the a forecited year a ffecting the bar candidates concerned; and alth ough this Court certainly ca n revoke these judgments even now,
for jus ti fiable reasons, i t is no l ess certain that only this Court, and not the l egislative nor executive department, that m a y be so. Any a ttempt on the part
of a ny of these departments would be a clear usurpation of its functions, as is the ca se with the law in question.

Tha t the Constitution has conferred on Congress the power to repeal, alter or s upplement the rule promulgated by this Tribuna l, concerning the
a dmission to the practice of law, is no va lid argument. Section 13, a rticle VIII of the Constitution provides:

Secti on 13. The Supreme Court s hall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure i n all co urts, a nd the admission to
the pra ctice of law. Said rules s hall be uniform for all courts of the same grade a nd shall not diminish, i ncrease or modify s ubstantive rights. The existing
l a ws on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby repealed a s statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, s ubject to the power of the Supreme Court to
a l ter and modify the same. The Congress s hall have the power to repeal, alter, or s upplement the rules concerning pleading, p ractice, a nd procedure, and
the a dmission to the practice of law in the Philippines. — Constitution of the Philippines, Art. VIII, sec. 13.

It wi l l be noted that the Constitution has not conferred on Congress and this Tribunal equal responsibilities concerning the admission to the practice of
l a w. the primary power a nd responsibility which the Constitution recognizes continue to reside in this Court. Had Congress found that this Court has not
promulgated a ny rule on the matter, it would have nothing over which to exercise the power granted to i t. Congress may repeal , alter a nd s upplement
the rul es promulgated by this Court, but the a uthority a nd responsibility over the admission, suspension, disbarment a nd reinstatement of att orneys a t
l a w a nd their s upervision remain vested in the Supreme Court. The power to repeal, alter a nd s upplement the rules does not s ignify nor permit that
Congress s ubstitute or ta ke the place of this Tri bunal in the exercise of its primary power on the matter. The Constitution d oes not say nor mean that
Congress may a dmit, suspend, disbar or reinstate directly a ttorneys a t law, or a determinate group of individuals to the practice of l aw. Its power i s
l i mited to repeal, modify or s upplement the existing rules on the matter, i f a ccording to its judgment the need for a better s ervice of the legal profession
requi res i t. But this power does not relieve this Court of i ts responsibility to a dmit, suspend, disbar and reinstate a ttorneys at law and supervise the
pra cti ce of the legal profession.

Bei ng coordinate and i ndependent branches, the power to promulgate a nd enforce rules for the a dmission to the practice of law and the concurrent
power to repeal, alter a nd supplement them may a nd should be exercised with the respect that each owes to the o ther, giving ca reful consideration to
the res ponsibility which the nature of each department requires. These powers have existed together for centuries without dim inution on each part; the
ha rmonious delimitation being found in that the legislature may a nd should examine i f the existing rules on the admission to the Bar respond to the
dema nds which public interest requires of a Bar endowed with high vi rtues, culture, training a nd responsibility. The l egislat ure may, by means of a ppeal,
a mendment or supplemental rules, fill up a ny deficiency that i t may find, and the judicial power, which has the inherent responsibility for a good and
effi cient a dministration of justice and the supervision of the practice of the l egal profession, should consider these reform s as the minimum standards for
the el evation of the profession, and see to i t that with these reforms the l ofty objective that i s desired i n the exercise of its traditional duty of admitting,
s us pending, disbarring and reinstating a ttorneys at law is realized. They a re powers which, exercise within their proper constitutional limits, are not
repugnant, but ra ther complementary to each other in attaining the establishment of a Bar that would respond to the increasing and exacting necessities
of the a dministration of justice.

The ca se of Guariña (1913) 24 Phi l., 37, i llustrates our cri terion. Guariña took examination a nd failed by a few points to ob tain the general average. A
recently enacted law provided that one who had been a ppointed to the position of Fiscal ma y be admitted to the practice of law without a previous
exa mination. The Government appointed Guariña a nd he discharged the duties of Fiscal in a remote province. This tri bunal refused to give his license
wi thout previous examinations. The court s aid:

Rel ying upon the provisions of section 2 of Act No. 1597, the a pplicant i n this case seeks a dmission to the bar, without ta ki ng the prescribed examination,
on the ground that he holds the office of provincial fiscal for the Provi nce of Batanes.

Secti on 2 of Act No. 1597, ena cted February 28, 1907, i s a s follows:

Sec. 2. Pa ra gra ph one of s ection thirteen of Act Numbered One Hundred and ninety, entitled "An Act providing a Code of Procedure i n Ci vil Actions a nd
Special Proceedings i n the Philippine Islands," is hereby a mended to read as follows:

1. Thos e who have been duly l icensed under the laws and orders of the Islands under the sovereignty of Spain or of the United States and a re i n good a nd
regul ar standing as members of the bar of the Philippine Islands a t the time of the adoption of this code; Provi ded, That a ny person who, prior to the
pa ssage of this act, or a t a ny ti me thereafter, s hall have held, under the a uthority of the United States, the position of ju stice of the Supreme Court, judge
of the Court of Fi rst Instance, or judge or a ssociate judge of the Court of Land Registration, of the Philippine Islands, or the pos ition of Attorney General,
Sol icitor General, Assistant Attorney General, assistant a ttorney i n the office of the Attorney General , prosecuting a ttorney for the Ci ty of Manila, city
a ttorney of Manila, assistant ci ty a ttorney of Ma nila, provincial fiscal, attorney for the Moro Provi nce, or a ssistant a ttorney for the Moro Province, may be
l i censed to practice law in the courts of the Philippine Islands without an examination, upon motion before the Supreme Court and establishing s uch fact
to the s a tisfaction of said court.
The records of this court disclose that on a former occasion this appellant took, a nd failed to pass the prescribed examination. The report of the
exa mining board, dated Ma rch 23, 1907, s hows that he received an a verage of only 71 per cent i n the va rious branches of l egal learning upon which he
wa s examined, thus falling four points s hort of the required percentage o f 75. We would be delinquent in the performance of our duty to the public a nd
to the ba r, i f, i n the face of this affirmative indication of the deficiency of the a pplicant i n the required qualifications of l earning in the law a t the time
when he presented his former application for a dmission to the bar, we should grant him license to practice l aw i n the courts of these Islands, without first
s a tisfying ourselves that despite his failure to pass the examination on that occasion, he now "possesses the necessa ry qualifications of learning and
a bi lity."

But i t i s contented that under the provisions of the a bove-cited statute the a pplicant is entitled as of ri ght to be admitted to the bar without taking the
pres cribed examination "upon motion before the Supreme Court" accompanied by satisfactory proof that he has held and now holds the office of
provi ncial fiscal of the Province of Batanes. It is urged that having i n mind the object which the legislator a pparently s ought to attain i n enacting the
a bove-cited amendment to the earlier s tatute, and i n vi ew of the context generally a nd especially of the fact that the a mendment was inserted as a
provi s o in that section of the original Act whi ch specifically provides for the a dmission of certain candidates without exami nation. It is contented that this
ma ndatory construction is imperatively required i n order to give effect to the apparent intention of the l egislator, and to t he candidate's claim de jure to
ha ve the power exercised.

And a fter copying a rticle 9 of Act of July 1, 1902 of the Congress of the United States, a rticles 2, 16 a nd 17 of Act No. 136, a nd a rticles 13 to 16 of Act 190,
the Court continued:

Ma ni festly, the jurisdiction thus conferred upon this court by the commission and confirmed to it by the Act of Congress would be l imited a nd restricted,
a nd i n a case such as that under consideration wholly destroyed, by gi ving the word "may," as used i n the above ci tation from Act of Congress of July 1,
1902, or of a ny Act of Congress prescribing, defining or l imiting the power conferred upon the commission i s to that extent invalid a nd void, as
tra ns cending i ts rightful limits a nd a uthority.

Spea king on the a pplication of the law to those who were appointed to the positions enumerated, and with particular emphasis in the case of Guariña,
the Court held:

In the va rious cases wherein a pplications for the admission to the bar under the provisions of this s tatute have been conside red heretofore, we have
a ccepted the fact that such appointments had been made a s satisfactory evi dence of the qualifications of the applicant. But in all of those cases we had
rea s on to believe that the applicants had been practicing a ttorneys prior to the date of their appointment.

In the ca se under consideration, however, i t affirmatively a ppears that the applicant was not and never had been practicing a ttorney in this or a ny other
juri s diction prior to the date of his appointment as provincial fiscal, a nd i t further a ffirmatively a ppears that he was defi cient i n the required qualifications
a t the ti me when he last applied for a dmission to the bar.

In the l ight of this affirmative proof of his defieciency on that occasion, we do not think that his appointment to the offic e of provincial fiscal is in itself
s a tisfactory proof if his possession of the necessary qualifications of l earning and ability. We conclude therefore that this a pplication for license to
pra cti ce i n the courts of the Philippines, should be denied.

In vi ew, however, of the fact that when he took the examination he fell o nly four points short of the necessary gra de to entitle him to a license to
pra cti ce; a nd i n vi ew also of the fact that since that ti me he has held the responsible office of the governor of the Provi nce of Sorsogon a nd presumably
ga ve evi dence of such marked a bility i n the performance of the duties of that office that the Chi ef Executive, with the consent a nd approval of the
Phi l ippine Commission, sought to retain him in the Government servi ce by a ppointing him to the office of provincial fiscal, w e think we would be justified
under the a bove -cited provisions of Act No. 1597 i n waiving in his case the ordinary examination prescribed by general rule, provided he offe rs
s a tisfactory evidence of his proficiency i n a special examination which will be given him b y a committee of the court upon his application therefor,
wi thout prejudice to his ri ght, if he desires s o to do, to present himself a t any of the ordinary examinations prescribed by general rule. — (In re Guariña,
pp. 48-49.)

It i s obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to gra nt license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress
on the ma tter is of permissive character, or as other authorities say, merely to fi x the minimum co nditions for the l icense.

The l aw in question, like those in the case of Day a nd Ca nnon, has been found a lso to suffer from the fa tal defect of being a class l egislation, and that i f it
ha s intended to ma ke a cl assification, it is a rbitrary a nd unreasonable.

In the ca se of Day, a law enacted on February 21, 1899 requi red of the Supreme Court, until December 31 of tha t year, to gran t license for the practice of
l a w to those s tudents who began studying before November 4, 1897, a nd had s tudied for two years and presented a diploma i ssued by a school of l aw, or
to thos e who had s tudied i n a law office and would pass an examination, or to those who had studied for three years i f they c ommenced their s tudies
a fter the aforementioned date. The Supreme Court declared that this l aw was unconstitutional being, a mong others, a cl ass l egislation. The Court said:

Thi s is an application to this court for a dmission to the bar of this state by vi rtue of diplomas from law schools issued to the a pplicants. The act of the
general assembly passed in 1899, under which the a pplication is made, is entitled "An a ct to a mend section 1 of a n act entitled "An a ct to revise the law in
rel a tion to a ttorneys and counselors," approved Ma rch 28, 1884, i n force July 1, 1874." The a mendment, s o far as i t appears in the enacting clause,
cons ists in the a ddition to the section of the following: "And every a pplication for a l icense who shall comply wi th the rule s of the s upreme court i n regard
to a dmission to the bar i n force at the time such applicant commend the s tudy of l aw, either i n a law or office or a l aw s chool or college, shall be granted
a l i cense under this a ct notwithstanding any s ubsequent changes in said rules". — In re Day et al, 54 N.Y., p. 646.

. . . After s a id provision there is a double proviso, one branch of which is that up to December 31, 1899, thi s court s hall gra nt a l icense of a dmittance to
the ba r to the holder of every diploma regularly i ssued by a ny l aw s chool regularly organized under the laws of this state, w hose regular course of law
s tudies is two years, a nd requiring an a ttendance by the student of a t least 36 weeks in each of such years, and showing that the s tudent began the study
of l a w prior to November 4, 1897, a nd a ccompanied wi th the usual proofs of good moral character. The other branch of the proviso is that any s tudent
who ha s studied law for two years in a law office, or part of such ti me i n a l aw office, "a nd part i n the a foresaid law school," and whose course of s tudy
bega n prior to November 4, 1897, s hall be admitted upon a s atisfactory examination by the examining board i n the branches now required by the rules of
thi s court. If the ri ght to a dmission exists at all, it i s by vi rtue of the proviso, which, it is cl aimed, confers s ubstantia l ri ghts and privileges upon the persons
na med therein, a nd establishes rules of l egislative creation for their a dmission to the bar. (p. 647.)

Cons idering the proviso, however, as a n enactment, it is cl early a s pecial l egislation, prohibited by the constitution, and i nvalid as such. If the l egislature
ha d a ny ri ght to a dmit a ttorneys to practice in the courts and take part in the administration of justice, a nd could prescribe the character of evidence
whi ch should be received by the court as conclusive of the requisite learning a nd a bility of persons to practice law, it could only be done by a general law,
pers ons or cl asses of persons. Const. a rt 4, s ection 2. The right to practice law is a privilege, a nd a license for that purpose makes the holder an officer of
the court, a nd confers upon him the ri ght to appear for litigants, to a rgue ca uses, a nd to collect fees therefor, a nd creates certa in exemptions, s uch as
from jury s ervi ces and arrest on civil process while a ttending court. The law conferri ng such privileges mus t be general i n i ts operation. No doubt the
l egislature, in framing a n enactment for that purpose, may cl assify persons so l ong as the law establishing classes i n genera l, a nd has some reasonable
rel a tion to the end s ought. There must be some difference which furnishes a reasonable basis for different one, having no just relation to the s ubject of
the l egislation. Braceville Coal Co. vs . People, 147 Ill. 66, 35 N.E. 62; Ri tchi e vs . People, 155 Ill. 98, 40 N.E. 454; Ra i lroad Co. vs . Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 17 Sup.
Ct. 255.

The l ength of time a physician has practiced, and the skill a cquired by experience, may furnish a basis for classification (W illiams vs . People 121 Ill. 48, II
N.E. 881); but the place where s uch physician has resided and practiced his profession ca nnot furnish such basis, and is a n arbitrary discrimination,
ma ki ng an enactment based upon it void (State vs . Pennyeor, 65 N.E. 113, 18 Atl . 878). Here the l egislature undertakes to say what shall serve as a test of
fi tness for the profession of the law, and plainly, a ny cl assification must have s ome reference to learning, character, or a bility to engage in such practice .
The provi so is limited, first, to a cl ass of persons who began the study of law prior to November 4, 1897. Thi s class i s subdivided i nto two cl asses — Fi rst,
thos e presenting diplomas i ssued by a ny l aw s chool of this state before December 31, 1899; a nd, s econd, those who studied law for the period of two
yea rs i n a l aw office, or part of the ti me i n a l aw s chool and part i n a law office, who are to be a dmitted upon examination i n the subjects specified in the
pres ent rules of this court, and as to this latter s ubdivision there seems to be no limit of ti me for making a pplication for admission. As to both classes, the
condi tions of the rules a re dispensed with, a nd a s between the two different conditions a nd l imits of ti me a re fixed. No course of s tudy i s pre scribed for
the l a w s chool, but a diploma granted upon the completion of a ny s ort of course its managers may prescribe is made all -sufficient. Ca n there be a nything
wi th relation to the qualifications or fi tness of persons to pra ctice l aw resting upon the mere date of November 4, 1897, whi ch will furnish a basis of
cl a ssification. Pl ainly not. Those who began the study of law November 4th could qualify themselves to practice in two years as well as those who began
on the 3rd. The classes named in the proviso need spend only two years in study, while those who commenced the next day must spend three years,
a l though they would complete two years before the ti me limit. The one who commenced on the 3rd. If possessed of a diploma, is to be a dmitted without
exa mination before December 31, 1899, a nd without a ny prescribed course of study, while a s to the other the prescribed course must be pursued, and
the di ploma is utterly useless. Such classification ca nnot rest upon a ny natural reason, or bear a ny just relation to the s ubject s ought, a nd none is
s uggested. The proviso is for the sole purpose of bestowing privileges upon certain defined persons. (pp. 647-648.)

In the ca se of Ca nnon a bove cited, State vs . Cannon, 240 N.W. 441, where the legislature a ttempted by l aw to reinstate Cannon to the practice of law, the
court a l so held with regards to i ts aspect of being a class l egislation:

But the s tatute i s invalid for a nother reason. If i t be granted that the l egislature has power to prescribe ultimately a nd definite ly the qualifications upon
whi ch courts must admit and license those a pplying as a ttorneys at law, that power ca n not be exercised i n the manner here attempted. That power must
be exercised through general laws which will a pply to a ll a like and accord equal opportunity to all. Speaking of the ri ght of the Legislature to exact
qua lifications of those desiring to pursue chosen ca llings, Mr. Justice Field i n the case of Dent. vs . West Vi rginia, 129 U.S. 114, 121, 9 S. Ct. 232, 233, 32 L.
Ed. 626, s a id: "It is undoubtedly the ri ght of every ci tizen of the United States to follow a ny l awful calling, business or p rofession he may choose, subject
onl y to s uch restrictions as are imposed upon all persons of like age, sex, a nd condition." This right may i n many respects b e considered a s a distinguishing
fea ture of our republican institutions. Here all vocations are all open to every one on like conditions. All may be pursued a s sources of l ivelihood, s ome
requi ring years of study a nd great learning for their successful prosecution. The interest, or, a s it i s sometimes termed, th e "estate" a cquired i n them —
tha t i s, the ri ght to continue their prosecution — is often of great va lue to the possessors and cannot be a rbitrarily ta ken from them, any more than their
rea l or personal property ca n be thus ta ken. It is fundamental under our s ystem of government that a ll s imilarly s ituated a nd possessing equal
qua lifications s hall enjoy equal opportunities. Even statutes regulating the practice of medicine, requiring medications to e stablish the possession on the
pa rt of the application of his proper qualifications before he may be licensed to practice, have been challenged, a nd courts have seriously considered
whether the exemption from such examinations of those practicing in the s tate at the ti me of the enactment of the l aw rendere d s uch law
unconstitutional because of infringement upon this general principle. State vs . Thomas Call, 121 N.C. 643, 28 S.E. 517; s ee, also, The State ex rel. Winkler
vs . Ros enberg, 101 Wi s. 172, 76 N.W. 345; Sta te vs . Whitcom, 122 Wi s. 110, 99 N.W. 468.

Thi s law s ingles out Mr. Ca nnon and assumes to confer upon him the right to practice l aw a nd to constitute him an officer of this Court as a mere matter
of l egislative gra ce or favor. It is not material that he had once established his right to practice l aw a nd that one ti me he possessed the requisite l earning
a nd other qualifications to entitle him to that right. That fact i n no matter a ffect the power of the Legislature to s elect from the great body of the public
a n i ndividual upon whom it would confer i ts favors.

A s ta tute of the s tate of Mi nnesota (Laws 1929, c. 424) comma nded the Supreme Court to a dmit to the practice of l aw without examination, a ll who had
s erved in the military or naval forces of the United States during the World War a nd received a honorable discharge therefrom and who (were disabled
therein or thereby wi thin the purvi ew of the Act of Congress approved June 7th, 1924, known as "World War Veteran's Act, 1924 a nd whose disability i s
ra ted a t least ten per cent thereunder a t the time of the passage of this Act." This Act wa s held |unconstitutional on the ground that it cl early vi olated the
qua lity cl auses of the constitution of that s tate. In re Application of George W. Humphrey, 178 Mi nn. 331, 227 N.W. 179.

A good s ummary of a classification constitutionally a cceptable is explained i n 12 Am. Jur. 151-153 a s follows:

The general rule i s well s ettled by unanimity of the authorities that a classification to be va lid must rest upon material di fferences between the person
i ncl uded in it a nd those excluded and, furthermore, must be based upon s ubstantial distinctions. As the rule has sometimes a voided the constitutional
prohi bition, must be founded upon pertinent a nd real differences, as distinguished from i rrelevant a nd a rtificial ones. There fore, any l aw that is made
a pplicable to one class of citizens only must b e based on some substantial difference between the s ituation of that class a nd other individuals to which i t
does not apply and must rest on s ome reason on which it ca n be defended. In other words, there must be s uch a difference between the s ituation and
ci rcums tances of all the members of the class and the situation a nd circumstances of a ll other members of the state in relati on to the subjects of the
di s criminatory l egislation as presents a just and natural cause for the difference made in their liabilities and burdens and in their ri ghts and privileges. A
l a w is not general because it operates on all within a cl ause unless there is a substantial reason why i t is made to operate on that class only, a nd not
generally on all. (12 Am. Jur. pp. 151-153.)

Purs uant to the law in question, those who, without a gra de below 50 per cent in any s ubject, have obtained a general a verage of 69.5 per cent i n the bar
exa minations i n 1946 to 1951, 70.5 per cent i n 1952, 71.5 per cent i n 1953, a nd those will obtain 72.5 pe r cent in 1954, a nd 73.5 per cent in 1955, will be
permi tted to ta ke a nd s ubscribe the corresponding oath of office a s members of the Bar, notwithstanding that the rules require a minimum general
a vera ge of 75 per cent, which has been i nvariably followed since 1950. Is there any motive of the nature indicated by the a bovementioned authorities, for
thi s classification ? If there is none, and none has been given, then the classification is fa tally defective.

It wa s indicated that those who failed i n 1944, 1941 or the yea rs before, with the general a verage indicated, were not i nclud ed because the Tribunal has
no record of the unsuccessful candidates of those years. This fact does not justify the unexplained cla ssification of unsuccessful ca ndidates by years, from
1946-1951, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955. Nei ther is the exclusion of those who failed before said years under the same conditions justified. The fact that this
Court ha s no record of examinations prior to 1946 does not signify that no one concerned may prove by s ome other means his right to a n equal
cons ideration.

To defend the disputed law from being declared unconstitutional on account of i ts retroactivity, i t is argued that i t is cura tive, a nd that i n such form i t is
cons titutional. What does Rep. Act 972 i ntend to cure ? Only from 1946 to 1949 were there cases in which the Tri bunal permitt ed admission to the bar of
ca ndidates who did not obtain the general average of 75 per cent: i n 1946 those who obtained only 72 per cent; i n the 1947 a nd those who had 69 per
cent or more; i n 1948, 70 per cent a nd in 1949, 74 per cent; a nd in 1950 to 1953, thos e who obtained 74 per cent, which was considered by the Court as
equivalent to 75 per cent as prescribed by the Rules, by reason of ci rcumstances deemed to be s ufficiently justifiable. These changes in the passing
a vera ges during those years were all that could be objected to or cri ticized. Now, it is desired to undo what had been done — ca ncel the license that was
i s sued to those who did not obtain the prescribed 75 per cent ? Certainly not. The disputed l aw cl early does not propose to do s o. Concededly, i t approves
wha t has been done by this Tribunal. What Congress l amented is that the Court did not consider 69.5 per cent obtained by those candidates who failed in
1946 to 1952 a s s ufficient to qualify them to practice law. Hence, i t is the lack of will or defect of judgment of the Court that is being cured, and to
compl ete the cure of this infirmity, the effectivity o f the disputed l aw is being extended up to the years 1953, 1954 a nd 1955, i ncreasing each year the
general average by one per cent, with the order that said ca ndidates be admitted to the Bar. This purpose, manifest i n the sa id law, is the best proof that
wha t the law a ttempts to amend a nd correct are not the rules promulgated, but the will or judgment of the Court, by means of s imply ta king its place.
Thi s is doing directly what the Tri bunal s hould have done during those years according to the judgment of Congress. In other words, the power exercised
wa s not to repeal, alter or s upplement the rules, which continue in force. What was done was to s top or s uspend them. And thi s power i s not included i n
wha t the Constitution has granted to Congress, because it falls within the power to a pply the rules. This power corresponds to the judiciary, to which such
duty been confided.

Arti cl e 2 of the law i n question permits partial passing of examinations, a t indefinite i ntervals. The grave defect of this s ystem is that it does not ta ke i nto
a ccount that the laws a nd jurisprudence a re not s tationary, a nd when a candidate finally receives his certificate, it ma y happen that the existing laws and
juri s prudence a re already di fferent, s eriously a ffecting in this manner his u sefulness. The s ystem that the said l aw prescribes was used in the first bar
exa minations of this country, but was a bandoned for this and other disadvantages. In this case, however, the fatal defect is that the article is not
expressed i n the ti tle will have temporary effect only from 1946 to 1955, the text of a rticle 2 establishes a permanent system for an indefinite time. This is
contra ry to Section 21 (1), a rticle VI of the Constitution, which vi tiates a nd a nnuls a rticle 2 completely; a nd because i t is inseparable from article 1, i t is
obvi ous that its nullity a ffect the entire law.

La ws a re unconstitutional on the following grounds: fi rst, because they a re not within the l egislative powers of Congress to enact, or Congress has
exceeded its powers; second, because they create or establish arbitrary methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles; a nd third, because th eir
purposes or effects vi olate the Constitution or its basic principles. As has already been seen, the contested law suffers fro m these fatal defects.

Summa rizing, we a re of the opinion and hereby declare that Republic Act No. 972 i s unconstitutional a nd therefore, void, a nd without a ny force nor effect
for the following reasons, to wit:

1. Beca use i ts declared purpose is to a dmit 810 ca ndidates who failed i n the bar examinations of 1946-1952, a nd who, it a dmits, a re certainly
i na dequately prepared to practice l aw, as was exactly found by this Court i n the a foresaid years. It decrees the admission to the Bar of these ca ndidates,
depri ving this Tri bunal of the opportunity to determine if they a re at present already prepared to become members of the Bar. It obliges the Tribunal to
perform s omething contrary to reason and in a n a rbitrary ma nner. This is a manifest encroachment on the co nstitutional responsibility of the Supreme
Court.

2. Beca use i t is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of this Court on the petitions of these 810 ca ndidates, without having examined their
res pective examination papers, and although it i s admitted that this Tri bunal may reconsider s aid resolution at a ny ti me for justifiable reasons, only this
Court a nd no other may revise a nd alter them. In attempting to do i t directly Republic Act No. 972 vi ol ated the Constitution.

3. By the disputed law, Congress has exceeded its l egislative power to repeal, alter a nd supplement the rules on admission to the Bar. Such additional or
a mendatory rul es a re, as they ought to be, intended to regulate acts s ubsequent to its promulgation a nd s hould tend to improve a nd elevate the practice
of l a w, and this Tri bunal s hall consider these rules as minimum norms towards that end i n the a dmission, suspension, disbarme nt and reinstatement of
l a wyers to the Bar, i nasmuch as a good bar assists i mmensely i n the daily performance of judicial functions and is essential to a worthy a dministration of
jus ti ce. It i s therefore the primary a nd inherent prerogative of the Supreme Court to render the ultimate decision on who may be a dmitted and may
conti nue i n the practice of l aw a ccording to existing rules.

4. The reason advanced for the pretended classification of ca ndidates, which the law makes, is contrary to fa cts which are of general knowledge and does
not jus tify the a dmission to the Bar of law students inadequately prepared. The p retended classification is a rbitrary. It is undoubtedly a class l egislation.

5. Arti cl e 2 of Republic Act No. 972 i s not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the Constitution enjoins, and being i nseparable from the
provi sions of a rticle 1, the entire l aw is voi d.

6. La cki ng in eight votes to declare the nullity of that part of a rticle 1 referring to the examinations of 1953 to 1955, s a i d part of article 1, i nsofar as i t
concerns the examinations i n those years, shall continue i n force.

RE SO LU TI O N

Upon ma ture deliberation by this Court, a fter hearing a nd a vailing of the magnificent a nd impassioned discussion of the conte sted l aw by our Chief
Jus ti ce at the opening and close of the debate among the members of the Court, and a fter hearing the judicious observa tions of two of our beloved
col l eagues who since the beginning have announced their decision not to ta ke part i n voting, we, the eight members of the Court who subscribed to this
deci sion have voted a nd resolved, and have decided for the Court, a nd under the authority of the same:

1. Tha t (a ) the portion of a rticle 1 of Republic Act No. 972 referring to the examinations of 1946 to 1952, a nd (b) a ll of article 2 of s aid law are
unconstitutional a nd, therefore, voi d and without force a nd effect.

2. Tha t, for l ack of unanimity i n the eight Justices, that part of article 1 which refers to the examinations s ubsequent to t he approval of the law, that i s
from 1953 to 1955 i ncl usive, is va lid and shall continue to be i n force, i n conformity with section 10, a rticle VII of the Constitution.

Cons equently, (1) a ll the above-mentioned petitions of the ca ndidates who failed in the examinations of 1946 to 1952 i ncl usive a re denied, and (2) all
ca ndidates who in the examinations of 1953 obtained a general average of 71.5 per cent or more, without having a grade below 50 per cent in any
s ubject, a re considered as havi ng passed, whether they have filed petitions for a dmission or not. After this decision has bec ome final, they shall be
permi tted to ta ke a nd s ubscribe the corresponding oath of office a s members of the Bar on the date or dates that the chief Justice may s et. So ordered.

Bengzon, Montemayor, Jugo, Labrador, Pa blo, Pa dilla, a nd Reyes, JJ., concur.

ANNEX I

PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

A res ume‚ of pertinent facts concerning the bar examinations of 1946 to 1953 i ncl usive follows:
Augus t, 19461

Boa rd of Examiners: Hon. Pedro Tuason, Chairman, Prof. Gerardo Florendo, Atty. Bernardino Guerrero, Atty. Joa quin Ramirez, At ty. Cri spin Oben, Hon.
Jos e Teodoro, Atty. Federico Agrava, Atty. Jos e Perez Ca rdenas, and Hon. Bienvenido A. Ta n, members.

Number of candidates 206

Number of candidates whose grades were raised 12
73'S 6
72'S 6
Number of candidates who passed 85
Number of candidates who failed 121
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 18
Percentage of success(per cent) 41.62
Percentage of failure(per cent) 58.74
Pa s sing grade(per cent) 72

November, 1946

Boa rd of Examiners: The same as that of August, 1946, except Hon. Jose Teodoro who was s ubstituted by Atty. Honesto K. Ba usan.

Number of candidates 481

Number of candidates whose grades were raised 19
(72 per cent a nd a bove 73 per cent ---
Mi nutes of Ma rch 31, 1947)
Number of candidates who passed 249
Number of candidates who failed 228
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 43
Percentage of success(per cent) 52.20
Percentage of failure(per cent) 47.80
Pa s sing grade (By resolution of the Court).(per cent) 72

October, 1947

Boa rd of Examiners: Hon. Cesar Bengzon, Chairman, Hon. Guillermo B. Guevara, Atty. Antonio Araneta, Atty. Si mon Cruz, Hon. Sixto de l a Costa, Atty.
Cel s o B. Ja mora, Hon. Emilio Peña, Atty. Federico Agrava , Atty. Ca rl os B. Hilado, Members.

Number of candidates 749

Number of candidates whose grades were raised 43
70.55 per cent wi th 2 s ubject below 50 per cent 1
69 per cent 40
68 per cent 2
Number of candidates who passed 409
Number of candidates who failed 340
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 972
Percentage of success(per cent) 54.59
Percentage of failure(per cent) 45.41
Pa s sing grade(per cent) 69
(by res olution of the Court).

Note.--In passing the 2 whose grades were 68.95 per cent a nd 68.1 per cent respectively, the Court found out that they were not bene fited at all by the
bonus of 12 points given by the Exa miner i n Ci vil Law.

Augus t, 1948

Boa rd of Examiners: Hon. Ma rceliano R. Montemayor, Chairman Hon. Luis P. Torres, Hon. Felipe Natividad, Hon. Jose Teodoro, Sr., Atty. Federico Agrava,
Atty. Ma ca ri o Peralta, Sr., Hon. Jesus G. Barrera, Hon. Rafael Amparo, Atty. Al fonso Ponce Enrile, Members.

Number of candidates 899

Number of candidates whose grades were raised 64
71's 29
70's 35
Number of candidates who passed 490
Number of candidates who failed 409
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 11
Percentage of success(per cent) 62.40
Percentage of failure(per cent) 37.60
Pa s sing grade(per cent) 70
(by res olution of the Court).

Augus t, 1949

Boa rd of Examiners: Hon. Sabino Padilla, Chairman, Hon. Fernando Jugo, Hon. Enrique Filamor, Atty. Sa lvador Ara neta, Hon. Pas tor M. Endencia, Atty.
Federico Agrava , Hon. Ma riano H. de Joya, Hon. Felipe Natividad, Atty. Emeterio Barcelon, Members.

Number of candidates 1,218

Number of candidates whose grades were raised (74's) 55
Number of candidates who passed 686
Number of candidates who failed 532
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 164
Percentage of success(per cent) 56.28
Percentage of failure(per cent) 43.72
Pa s sing grade(per cent) 74
(by res olution of the Court).

Augus t, 1950

Boa rd of Examiners: Hon. Fernando Jugo,2 Chairman, Hon. Guillermo B. Guevara, Atty. Enri que Al tavas, Atty. Ma rci al P. Li chauc o, Atty. Ca rl os B. Hilado,
Atty. J. Antonio Araneta, Hon. Enrique V. Filamor, Hon. Francisco A. Delgado, Hon. Antonio Horrilleno, Members.

Number of candidates 1,316

Number of candidates whose grades were raised 38
(The gra de of 74 wa s raised to 75 per cent by recommendation and a uthority
of the exa miner i n Remedial Law, Atty. Fra ncisco Delgado).
Number of candidates who passed 432
Number of candidates who failed 894
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 26
Percentage of success(per cent) 32.14
Percentage of failure(per cent) 67.86
Pa s sing grade(per cent) 75

Augus t, 1951

Boa rd of Examiners: Hon. Guillermo F. Pa blo, Chairman, Hon. Pastor M. Endencia, Atty. Enri que Al tavas, Hon. Ma nuel Li m, Hon. Felipe Na tividad, Hon.
Vi cente Albert, Atty. Arturo Al afriz, Hon. Enrique V. Fi lamor, Hon. Al fonso Felix, Members.

Number of candidates 2,068

Number of candidates whose grades were raised (74's) 112
Number of candidates who passed 1,189
Number of candidates who failed 879
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 196
Percentage of success(per cent) 57.49
Percentage of failure(per cent) 42.51
Pa s sing grade(per cent) 75

Augus t, 1952

Boa rd of Examiners: Hon. Sabino Padilla, Chairman, Hon. Pa stor M. Endencia, Hon. Enrique V. Fi lamor, Atty. Fra ncisco Orti gas, Hon. Emilio Peña, Atty.
Emi l io P. Vi rata, Hon. Alfonso Felix, Hon. Felipe Na tivi dad, Atty. Ma ca rio Peralta, Sr., Members.

Number of candidates 2,738

Number of candidates whose grades were raised (74's) 163
Number of candidates who passed 1,705
Number of candidates who failed 1,033
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 426
Percentage of success(per cent) 62.27
Percentage of failure(per cent) 37.73
Pa s sing grade(per cent) 75

Augus t, 1953

Boa rd of Examiners: Hon. Fernando Jugo, Chairman, Hon. Pastor M. Endencia, Atty. Enri que Al tavas, Atty. Fra ncisco Orti gas, Jr ., Hon. Emilio Peña, Atty.
Jos e S. de la Cruz, Hon. Al fonso Felix, Hon. Felipe Natividad, Hon. Ma riano L. de la Rosa, Members.

Number of candidates 2,555

Number of candidates whose grades were raised (74's) 100
Number of candidates who passed 1,570
Number of candidates who failed 986
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 284
Percentage of success(per cent) 61.04
Percentage of failure(per cent) 38.96
Pa s sing grade(per cent) 75

A l i st of petitioners for a dmission to the Bar under Republic Act No. 972, grouped by the years in which they took the bar examinations, with annotations
a s to who had presented motions for reconsideration which were denied (MRD), and who filed mere motions for reconsideration w ithout invoking said
l a w, which are s till pending, follows:

There a re the unsuccessful candidates totaling 604 di rectly a ffected by this resolution. Adding 490 ca ndidates who have not p resented any petition, they
rea ch a total of 1,094.

The Ena ctment of Republic Act No. 972

As wi ll be observed from Annex I, this Court reduced to 72 per cent the passing general average in the bar examination of august a nd November of 1946;
69 per cent i n 1947; 70 per cent i n 1948; 74 per cent i n 1949; ma intaining the prescribed 75 per cent since 1950, but ra ising to 75 per cent those who
obta ined 74 per cent since 1950. Thi s caused the introduction i n 1951, i n the Senate of the Philippines of Bill No. 12 which was intended to amend
Secti ons 5, 9, 12, 14 a nd 16 of Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, concerning the admission of attorneys -at-law to the practice of the profession. The
a mendments embrace many i nteresting matters, but those referring to s ections 14 a nd 16 i mmediately concern us. The proposed a mendment is a s
fol l ows:

SEC. 14. Pa s s ing a verage. — In order that a candidate may be deemed to have passed the examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general
a vera ge of 70 per cent without falling below 50 per cent in any s ubject. In determining the a verage, the foregoing s ubjects s hall be given the following
rel a tive weights: Ci vil Law, 20 per cent; La nd Registration and Mortgages, 5 per cent; Mercantile La w, 15 per cent; Cri minal Law, 10 per cent; Political Law,
10 per cent; International Law, 5 per cent; Remedial Law, 20 per cent; Legal Ethics a nd Pra ctical Exercises, 5 per cent; Social Legislation, 5 per cent;
Ta xa tion, 5 per cent. Unsuccessful ca ndidates shall not be required to take another examination in any s ubject in which they ha ve obtained a ra ting of 70
per cent or hi gher and such ra ting s hall be ta ken i nto account i n determining their general average i n any s ubsequent examinations: Provi ded, however,
Tha t i f the ca ndidate fails to get a general average of 70 per cent in his third examination, he shall lose the benefit of ha ving already passed some subjects
a nd s hall be required to the examination in a ll the s ubjects.

SEC. 16. Admi ssion and oath of successful applicants. — Any a pplicant who has obtained a general average of 70 per cent in all subjects without falling
bel ow 50 per cent i n any examination held after the 4th day of July, 1946, or who has been otherwise found to be entitled to a dmission to the bar, shall
be a llowed to ta ke a nd subscribe before the Supreme Court the corresponding oath of office. (Arts . 4 a nd 5, 8, No. 12).

Wi th the bill was an Explanatory Note, the portion pertinent to the matter before us being:

It s eems to be unfair that unsuccessful candidates a t bar examinations s hould be compelled to repeat even those subjects whic h they have previously
pa ssed. This is not the case in any other government examination. The Rules of Court have therefore been amended in this measure to give a ca ndidate
due credit for a ny s ubject which he has previously passed with a ra ting of 75 per cent or higher."

Sena te Bill No. 12 ha ving been approved by Congress on Ma y 3, 1951, the Pres ident requested the comments of this Tri bunal before a cting on the same .
The comment was s igned by s even Justices while three chose to refrain from making a ny a nd one took no part. With regards to t he matter that interests
us , the Court said:

The next a mendment is of section 14 of Rule 127. One part of this amendment provides that if a bar ca ndidate obtains 70 per c ent or higher i n any
s ubject, although failing to pass the examination, he need not be examined in s aid subject in his next examination. This is a sort of passing the Bar
Exa mi nation on the installment plan, one or two or three s ubjects at a time. The trouble with this proposed s ystem i s that a l though it makes it easier a nd
more convenient for the ca ndidate because he may i n a n examination prepare himself on only one or two s ubjects so as to i nsure passing them, by t he
ti me that he has passed the last required subjects, which may be several years away from the time that he reviewed a nd passed the firs subjects, he s hall
ha ve forgotten the principles and theories contained i n those subjects and remembers only those of the one or two s ubjects th at he had last revi ewed
a nd passed. This is highly possible because there is nothing i n the law which re quires a ca ndidate to continue ta king the Bar examinations every year i n
s uccession. The only condition i mposed is that a ca ndidate, on this plan, must pass the examination in no more that three ins tallments; but there is no
l i mitation as to the ti me or number of years i ntervening between each examination taken. This would defeat the object a nd the requirements of the law
a nd the Court i n a dmitting persons to the practice of law. When a person is so admitted, it i s to be presumed and presupposed that he possesses the
knowledge a nd proficiency i n the law and the knowledge of a ll l aw s ubjects required in bar examinations, so as presently to b e able to practice the legal
profession a nd a dequately render the l egal servi ce required by prospective clients. But thi s would not hold true of the candidates who may have obtained
a pa ssing grade on any fi ve s ubjects eight years a go, another three s ubjects one year l ater, and the last two s ubjects the present year. We believe that the
pres ent s ystem of requiring a candidate to obtain a passing general average with no grade in a ny s ubject below 50 per cent is more desirable a nd
s a tisfactory. It requires one to be all around, and prepared i n all required legal s ubjects a t the time of a dmission to the p ractice of law.

xxx xxx xxx

We now come to the l ast a mendment, that of s ection 16 of Rule 127. This a mendment provi des that a ny a pplication who has obtai ned a general average
of 70 per cent i n all subjects without failing below 50 per cent in any s ubject in any examination held a fter the 4th day of July, 1946, s hall be allowed to
ta ke a nd s ubscribe the corresponding oath of office. In other words, Bar ca ndidates who obtained not l ess than 70 per cent in a ny examination since the
yea r 1946 wi thout failing below 50 per cent in a ny s ubject, despite their non-admission to the Bar by the Supreme Court because they failed to obtain a
pa ssing general a verage in any of those years, will be admitted to the Bar. This provision is not only prospective but retroa ctive i n i ts effects.

We ha ve already s tated i n our comment on the next preceding amendment that we are not exactly i n favor of reducing the passin g general average from
75 per cent to 70 per cent to govern even in the future. As to the va lidity of making s uch reduction retroactive, we have serious legal doubts. We should
not l ose sight of the fact that a fter every ba r examinations, the Supreme Court passes the corresponding resolution not only admitting to the Bar those
who ha ve obtained a passing general average grade, but also rejecting and denying the petitions for reconsideration of those who have failed. The
pres ent a mendment would have the effect of repudiating, reversing and revoking the Supreme Court's resolution denyi ng a nd rej ecting the petitions of
thos e who may ha ve obtained a n a verage of 70 per cent or more but less than the general passing average fi xed for that year. It is clear that this question
i nvol ves legal i mplications, a nd this phase of the a mendment if finally enacted i nto law might have to go thru a legal test. As one member of the Court
rema rked during the discussion, when a court renders a decision or promulgate a resolution or order on the basis of and in a c cordance with a certain l aw
or rul e then in force, the subsequent a mendment o r even repeal of said law or rule may not affect the final decision, order, or resolution already
promulgated, i n the sense of revoking or rendering i t void a nd of no effect.

Another aspect of this question to be considered is the fact that members of the bar are officers of the courts, including the Supreme Court. When a Bar
ca ndidate is a dmitted to the Bar, the Supreme Court i mpliedly regards him as a person fit, competent a nd qualified to be its officer. Conversely, when i t
refus ed a nd denied admission to the Bar to a ca ndidate who i n any year since 1946 ma y have obtained a general average of 70 per cent but less than that
requi red for that year in order to pass, the Supreme Court equally and i mpliedly considered a nd declared that he was not prepared, ready, competent
a nd qualified to be its officer. The present a mendment giving retroactivity to the reduction of the passing general average runs counter to all these acts
a nd resolutions of the Supreme Court a nd practically a nd i n effect says that a candida te not a ccepted, a nd even rejected by the Court to be i ts officer
beca use he was unprepared, undeservi ng and unqualified, nevertheless and in spite of all, must be a dmitted and allowed by thi s Court to s erve a s its
offi cer. We repeat, that this is a nother i mportant aspect of the question to be carefully a nd s eriously considered.

The Pres ident vetoed the bill on June 16, 1951, s ta ting the following:

I a m fully i n a ccord with the a vowed objection of the bill, namely, to elevate the s tandard of the l egal profession and maintain it on a high level. This is not
a chi eved, however, by a dmitting to practice precisely a special class who have failed i n the bar examination, Moreover, the b ill contains provisions to
whi ch I find serious fundamental objections.

Secti on 5 provides that a ny a pplicant who has obtained a general average of 70 per cent i n all subjects without failing below 50 p er cent in any s ubject i n
a ny exa mination held after the 4th day of July, 1946, s hall be a llowed to take and subscribed the corresponding oath of office. This provision constitutes
cl a ss legislation, benefiting as it does specifically one group of persons, namely, the unsuccessful ca ndidates in the 1946, 1947, 1948, 1949 a nd 1950 ba r
exa minations.

The s ame provision undertakes to revoke or s et aside final resolutions of the Supreme Court ma de in accordance with the law then in force. It should be
noted that after every ba r examination the Supreme Court passes the corresponding resolution not only admitting to the Bar th ose who have obtained a
pa ssing general a verage but also rejecting and denyi ng the petitions for reconsideration of those who have failed. The provis ion under consideration
woul d have the effect of revoking the Supreme Court's resolution denying and rejecting the petitions of those who may have failed to obtain the passing
a vera ge fixed for that year. Said provision also s ets a bad precedent in that the Government would be morally obliged to gran t a similar privilege to those
who ha ve failed i n the examinations for a dmission to other professions s uch a s medicine, engineering, architecture and certified public accountancy.
Cons equently, the bill was returned to the Congress of the Philippines, but it was not repassed by 2/3 vote of each House a s prescribed by s ection 20,
a rti cl e VI of the Constitution. Instead Bill No. 371 wa s presented i n the Senate. It reads as follows:

AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM 1946 UP TO AND INCLUDING 1953

Be i t enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

SECTION 1. Notwi thstanding the provisions of section 14, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, a ny bar ca ndidate who obtained a gen eral a verage of 70 per cent
i n a ny bar examinations a fter July 4, 1946 up to the August 1951 Ba r examinations; 71 per cent i n the 1952 ba r examinations; 72 per cent in the 1953 ba r
exa minations; 73 per cent in the 1954 bar examinations; 74 per cent i n 1955 ba r examinations without a candidate obtaining a grade below 50 per cent in
a ny s ubject, s hall be a llowed to take and subscribe th e corresponding oath of office as member of the Philippine Bar; Provi ded, however, That 75 per cent
pa ssing general a verage shall be restored i n all succeeding examinations; a nd Provi ded, fi nally, That for the purpose of this Act, a ny exact one-half or
more of a fra ction, shall be considered as one a nd i ncluded as part of the next whole number.

SEC. 2. Any ba r ca ndidate who obtained a grade of 75 per cent i n a ny s ubject i n any bar examination after July 4, 1945 s hall be deemed to have passed in
s uch s ubject or s ubjects a nd s uch gra de or gra des shall be included in computing the passing general a verage that said candidate ma y obt ain in any
s ubsequent examinations that he may ta ke.

SEC. 3. Thi s bill s hall ta ke effect upon i ts a pproval.

Wi th the following explanatory note:

Thi s is a revised Bar bill to meet the objections of the President a nd to a fford a nother opportunity to those who feel themse lves discriminated by the
Supreme Court from 1946 to 1951 when those who would otherwise have passed the bar exami nation but were arbitrarily not so considered by a ltering
i ts previous decisions of the passing mark. The Supreme Court has been altering the passing mark from 69 i n 1947 to 74 i n 195 1. In order to cure the
a pparent arbitrary fi xing of passing grades and to give s atisfaction to all parties concerned, it is proposed in this bill a gradual increase i n the general
a vera ges for passing the bar examinations as follows; For 1946 to 1951 ba r exa minations, 70 per cent; for 1952 ba r examination, 71 per cent; for 1953 bar
exa mination, 72 per cent; for 1954 ba r examination, 73 percent; a nd for 1955 ba r examination, 74 per cent. Thus in 1956 the p assing mark will be
res tored with the condition that the candidate shall not obtain i n a ny s ubject a grade of below 50 per ce nt. The reason for relaxing the standard 75 per
cent pa ssing gra de, is the tremendous handicap which s tudents during the years i mmediately a fter the Ja panese occupation has to overcome such as the
i ns ufficiency of reading materials a nd the i nadequacy of th e preparation of s tudents who took up l aw s oon a fter the liberation. It i s believed that by 1956
the preparation of our s tudents as well as the a vailable reading materials will be under normal conditions, if not i mproved f rom those years preceding the
l a st world war.

In thi s will we eliminated altogether the i dea of having our Supreme Court a ssumed the supervision as well as the a dministrat ion of the study of law
whi ch was objected to by the President in the Bar Bill of 1951.

The Pres ident i n vetoing the Bar Bill last year stated a mong his objections that the bill would admit to the practice of law "a special class who failed i n the
ba r exa mination". He considered the bill a class legislation. This contention, however, is not, in good conscience, correct b ecause Congress is merely
s upplementing what the Supreme Court have already established as precedent by ma king as low a s 69 per cent the passing mark o f those who took the
Ba r exa mination in 1947. These bar ca ndidates for who this bill should be enacted, considered themselves as having passed the bar examination on the
s trength of the established precedent of our Supreme Court and were fully a ware of the insurmountable difficulties a nd handicaps which they were
una voidably placed. We believe that s uch precedent ca nnot or could not have been a ltered, constitutionally, by the Supreme Court, without giving due
cons ideration to the ri ghts already a ccrued or ves ted in the bar ca ndidates who took the examination when the precedent was n ot yet a ltered, or i n
effect, was s till enforced a nd without being i nconsistent with the principles of their previous resolutions.

If thi s bill would be enacted, it shall be considered as a simple curative a ct or corrective statute which Congress has the p ower to enact. The requirement
of a "va l id classification" as a gainst class l egislation, is very expressed in the following American Jurisprudence:

A va l id classification must i nclude a ll who naturally belong to the cl ass, all who possess a common disability, a ttribute, or classification, a nd there must be
a "na tural" a nd s ubstantial differentiation between those included i n the class and those it l eaves untouched. When a class i s accepted by the Court as
"na tural" it ca nnot be again split and then have the dissevered fa ctions of th e original unit designated with different rules established for each. (Fountain
Pa rk Co. vs . Rensier, 199 Ind. 95, N. E. 465 (1926).

Another case penned by Justice Ca rdozo: "Time with i ts ti des brings new conditions which must be cared for by new laws. So metimes the new conditions
a ffect the members of a cl ass. If s o, the correcting statute must a pply to a ll alike. Sometimes the condition a ffect only a f ew. If s o, the correcting s tatute
ma y be a s narrow as the mischief. The constitution does not prohibit s pecial l aws inflexibly a nd always. It permits them when there are special evils with
whi ch the general l aws are i ncompetent to cope. The s pecial public purpose will sustain the s pecial form. . . . The problem i n the last analysis is one of
l egislative policy, wi th a wide margin of discretion conceded to the lawmakers. Only i n the ca se of plain abuse will there be revision by the court. (In
Wi l liams vs . Mayor a nd Ci ty Council of Baltimore, 286 U. S. 36, 77 L. Ed. 1015, 53 Sup. Ct. 431). (1932)

Thi s bill has a ll the earmarks of a corrective statute which always retroacts to the extent of the ca re of correction only a s in this case from 1946 when the
Supreme Court first deviated from the rule of 75 per cent i n the Rules of Court.

For the foregoing purposes the a pproval of this bill is earnestly recommended.

(Sgd.) PABLO ANGELES DAVID

Sena tor

Wi thout much debate, the revised bill was passed by Congress a s above tra nscribed. The President a gain asked the comments of this Court, which
endorsed the following:

Res pectfully returned to the Honorable, the Acting Executive Secretary, Ma nila, with the information that, with respect to Se nate Bill No. 371, the
members of the Court are taking the same vi ews they expressed on Senate Bill No. 12 passed by Congress i n Ma y, 1951, contained in the first
i ndorsement of the undersigned dated June 5, 1951, to the As sistant Executive Secretary.

(Sgd.) RICARDO PARAS

The Pres ident allowed the period within which the bill should be signed to pass without vetoing it, by vi rtue of which it became a law on June 21, 1953
(Sec. 20, Art. VI, Cons titution) numbered 972 (ma ny ti mes erroneously ci ted as No. 974).
It ma y be mentioned in passing that 1953 wa s a n election year, and that both the President and the author of the Bill were ca ndidates for re-election,
together, however, they l ost in the polls.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 1162 August 29, 1975
IN RE: VICTORIO D. LANUEVO, former Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk of Court, respondent.
MAKASIAR, J.:

Admi nistrative proceedings against Vi ctorio D. La nuevo — for disbarment; Ra mon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang — for disbarment; Hon. Bernardo
Pa rdo, Hon. Ramon Pa matian, Atty. Ma nuel C. Tomacruz; Atty. Ma nuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fi del Ma nalo and Atty. Guillermo Pa blo, Jr. — for disciplinary
a cti on — for their a cts and omissions during the 1971 Ba r Exa minations.

In hi s request dated Ma rch 29, 1972 conta ined in a confidential letter to the Court for re -correction a nd re-evaluation of his a nswer to the 1971 Bar
Exa mi nations question, Oscar La ndicho — who flunked in the 1971, 1968 a nd 1967 Ba r Examinations with a grade of 70.5%, 65.35% a nd 67.55%,
res pectively — i nvited the a ttention of the Court to "The starling fact that the grade in one examination (Ci vil Law) of at l east one bar ca ndidate was
ra i sed for one reason or a nother, before the bar results were released this year" (Confidential Letter, p. 2. Vol. I, rec.). This was confirmed, according to
hi m, by the Ci vil Law Exa miner himself (Hon. Ramon C. Pa matian) as well as by Ba r Confidant Vi ctorio D. La nuevo. He further therein s tated "that there
a re s trong reasons to believe that the gra des in other examination notebooks in other subjects also underwent alternat ions — to ra ise the grades — prior
to the rel ease of the results. Note that this was without a ny formal motion or request from the proper parties, i.e., the bar ca ndidates concerned. If the
exa miners concerned reconsidered their gra des without formal motion, there is no reason why they may not do s o now when proper request answer
moti on therefor is made. It would be contrary to due process postulates. Mi ght not one s ay that some ca ndidates got unfair a nd unjust treatment, for
thei r gra des were not asked to be reconsidered 'unofficially'? Why the discrimination? Does this not a fford sufficient reason for the Court en banc to go
i nto these matters by i ts conceded power to ultimately decide the matter of a dmission to the bar?" (p. 2, Confidential Letter, Vol. I, rec.).

Acti ng on the a foresaid confidential letter, the Court checked the records of the 1971 Ba r Examinations and found that the grades in five s ubjects —
Pol i tical La w a nd Public International Law, Ci vil Law, Mercantile Law, Cri minal Law a nd Remedial La w — of a s uccessful bar ca ndidate with office code No.
954 underwent some changes which, however, were duly i nitialed and a uthenticated by the respective examiner concerned. Furthe r check of the records
revea led that the bar ca ndidate with office code No . 954 i s one Ramon E. Galang, a perennial bar ca ndidate, who flunked in the 1969, 1966, 1964, 1963,
a nd 1962 ba r examinations with a gra de of 67.55%, 68.65%, 72.75%, 68.2%, 56.45% a nd 57.3%, respectively. He passed i n the 1971 ba r examinations with
a gra de of 74.15%, which was considered as 75% by vi rtue of a Court of 74.15%, which was considered as 75% a s the passing mark for th e 1971 ba r
exa minations.

Upon the direction of the Court, the 1971 Ba r Exa mination Chairman requested Bar Confidant Vi ctorio D. La nuevo a nd the fi ve (5) bar examiners
concerned to submit their sworn statements on the matter, with which request they complied.

In hi s sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, s a id Bar Confidant a dmitted having brought the five examination notebooks of Ramon E. Galang, alias
Ra mon E. Ga lang, back to the respective examiners for re -evaluation a nd/or re -checking, s tating the ci rcumstances under which the same was done and
hi s reasons for doing the s ame.

Ea ch of the five (5) examiners i n his individual sworn statement admitted having re -evaluated and/or re -checked the notebook involved pertaining to his
s ubject upon the representation to him by Ba r Confidant La nuevo that he has the authority to do the same and that the examine e concerned failed only
i n hi s particular s ubject a nd/or was on the borderline of passing.

Fi nding a prima facie ca se against the respondents warranting a formal investigation, the Court required, in a resolution dat ed March 5, 1973, Ba r
Confi dant Victorio Lanuevo "to show ca use within te n (10) days from notice why his name should not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys" (Adm. Ca se
No. 1162, p. 34, rec.). Cons idering that the re -evaluation of the examination papers of Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, was unauthorized, a nd
therefore he did not obtain a passing average in the 1971 ba r examinations, the Court likewise resolved on Ma rch 5, 1971 to requires him "to show ca use
wi thin ten (10) days from notice why his name s hould not be s tricken from the Roll of Attorneys" (Adm. Ca se No. 1163, p. 99, rec.). The five examiners
concerned were also required by the Court "to s how cause within ten (10) days from notice why no disciplinary a ction should b e ta ken a gainst them"
(Adm. Ca s e No. 1164, p. 31, rec.).

Res pondent Tomacruz filed his answer on March 12, 1973 (Adm. Ca s e No. 1164, p. 70, rec.). whi le respondents Pa rdo, Pa matian, Montecillo, Ma nalo and
La nuevo filed theirs on Ma rch 19, 1973 (Adm. Ca se No. 1162, pp. 60-63, 32-35, 40-41, 36-39 a nd 35-38, rec.). At the hearing on August 27, 1973,
res pondent La nuevo filed a nother sworn statement in addition to, and i n amplication of, his a nswer filed on Ma rch 19, 1973 (A dm. Ca s e No. 1162, pp. 45-
47, rec.). Res pondent Galang filed his unverified answer on Ma rch 16, 1973 (Adm. Ca se No. 1163, pp. 100-104, rec.). He was required by the Court to
veri fy the s ame a nd complaince came on Ma y 18, 1973 (Adm. Ca s e No. 1163, pp. 106-110,) rec.).

In the course of the i nvestigation, it was found that i t was not respondent Bernardo Pardo who re -evaluated and/or re-checked examination booklet with
Offi ce Code No. 954 i n Political Law and Public International La w of examinee Ramon Galang, alias Roman E. Ga lang, but Guille rmo Pablo, Jr., examiner in
Lega l Ethics and Pra ctical Exercise, who was asked to help i n the correction of a number of examination notebooks i n Political Law a nd Public
International La w to meet the deadline for submission (pp. 17-24, Vol. V, rec.). Because of this development, Atty. Gui llermo Pa blo, Jr. wa s likewise
i ncl uded as respondent i n Administrative Ca se No. 1164. Hon. Bernardo Pardo remainded as a respondent for i t was also discovered that another paper in
Pol i tical La w a nd Public International Law also underwent re -evaluation and/or re -checking. This notebook with Office Code No. 1662 turn ed out to be
owned by another s uccessful candidate by the name of Ernesto Quitaleg. Further i nvestigation resulted in the discovery of a nother re-evaluation a nd/or
re-checking of a notebook i n the s ubject of Mercantile Law resulting i n the change of the gra de from 4% to 50% Thi s notebook bearing Office Code No.
110 i s owned by a nother successful candidate by the name of Al fredo Ty dela Cruz. Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz a nd the latter's father were summoned to
tes tify i n the i nvestigation.

An i nvestigation conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation upon request of the Chairman of the 1971 Ba r Exa mination Committee as
Investigation Officer, showed that one Romy Galang y Es guerra , alias Ramon E. Ga lang, a student i n the School of Law of Manuel L. Quezon University,
wa s , on September 8, 1959, cha rged with the cri me of slight physical injuries i n the Municipal Court of Ma nila committed on E ufrosino F. de Vera, a nother
s tudent of the s ame university. Confronted with this i nformation at the hearing of August 13, 1973 (Vol . V, pp. 20-21, 32, rec.), res pondent Galang
decl ared that he does not remember having been charged with the crime of slight physical i njuries in that ca se. (Vol. VI, pp. 45-60, rec.).

Res pondent Galang, i n all his a pplication to ta ke the bar examinations, did not make mention of this fact which he is required under the rules to do.

The joi nt i nvestigation of a ll the ca ses commenced on July 17, 1973 a nd was terminated on October 2, 1973. Thereafter, partie s-respondents were
requi red to submit their memoranda. Respondents La nuevo, Galang a nd Pardo submitted their respective memorandum on November 1 4, 1973.

Before the joint hearing commenced, Os car La ndicho took up permanent residence in Australia, where he is believed to be g ainfully employed. Hence, he
wa s not s ummoned to testify.
At the joi nt investigation, a ll respondents, except respondent Pablo, who offered a s evidence only his oral testimony, s ubmit ted a s their direct evidence
onl y his oral testimony, s ubmitted as their direct evi dence the a ffidavits and answers earlier submitted by them to the Court. The same became the basis
for thei r cross-examination.

In their i ndividual s worn s tatements and a nswer, which they offered as their direct testimony i n the i nvestigation conducted by the Court, the
res pondent-examiners recounted the circumstances under which they re -evaluated and/or re -checked the examination notebooks in question.

In Hi s affidavit dated April 11, 1972, res pondent Judge (later Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals) Ramon C. Pa ma tian, examiner in Ci vil La w,
a ffi rmed:

2. Tha t one evening s ometime in December last year, while I was correcting the examination notebooks, Atty. La nuevo, Bar Confidant, explained to me
tha t i t i s the practice and the policy i n bar examinations that he (Atty. La nuevo) make a review of the gra des obtained i n all subjects and if he fi nds that
ca ndidate obtained an extraordinary high gra de in one subject and a rather l ow one i n a nother, he will bring back the latter to the examiner concerned
for re-eva luation a nd change of grade;

3. Tha t s ometime i n the latter part of Ja nuary of this year, he brought back to me a n examination booklet i n Ci vil La w for re -evaluation, because a ccording
to hi m the owner of the paper is on the borderline a nd i f I could reconsider his grade to 75% the candidate concerned will get passing mark;

4. Tha t ta king his word for it a nd under the belief that i t was really the practice and policy of the Supreme Court to do so in the further belief that I was
jus t ma nifesting cooperation i n doing so, I re -evaluated the paper a nd reconsidered the gra de to 75%;

5. Tha t only one notebook i n Ci vil La w was brought back to me for s uch re -evaluation a nd upon verifying my fi les I found that the notebook is numbered
'95;

6. Tha t the original grade was 64% a nd my re -evaluation of the a nswers were based on the same s tandard used i n the correction a nd evaluation of all
others ; thus, Nos. 3 a nd 4 wi th original grades of 7% each was reconsidered to 10%; No. 5 wi th 4% to 5%; No. 7 wi th 3% to 5%; a nd No. 8 wi th 8% to 10%
(emphasis supplied).

Hi s answer dated Ma rch 19, 1973 s ubstantially reiterated his allegations in his April 11, 1972 a ffi davit with following a ddit ional s tatements:

xxx xxx xxx

3. ... However the grades in Nos. 1, 2, 6, 9 a nd 10, were not reconsidered as i t is no l onger to make the reconsideration of these answers because of the
s a me evaluation a nd s tandard; hence, Nos. 1, 2 a nd 10 remainded at 5% a nd Nos. 6 a nd 9 a t 10%;

4. Tha t a t the ti me I made the reconsideration of examination booklet No. 951 I did not know the identity of i ts owner until I received this resolution of
the Honorable Supreme Court nor the identities of the examiners in other subjects;

5. Tha t the above re-evaluation was made i n good faith and under the belief that I a m a uthorized to do so in view of the misrepresentation of said Atty.
La nuevo, based on the following ci rcumstances:

a ) Si nce I s tarted correcting the papers on or about October 16, 1971, rel ationship between Atty. La nuevo and myself had developed to the point that
wi th respect to the correction of the examination booklets of bar ca ndidates I have always followed him a nd considered his i nstructions a s reflecting the
rul es and policy of the Honorable Supreme Court with respect to the same; that I have no alternative but to ta ke his words;

b) Tha t considering this relationship and considering his misrepresentation to me as reflecting the real a nd policy of the Ho norable Supreme Court, I did
not bother a ny more to get the consent a nd permission of the Chairman of the Bar Committee. Besides, a t that ti me, I was isolat ing myself from all
members of the Supreme Court a nd specially the chairman of the Bar Committee for fear that I might be i dentifie d as a bar examiner;

xxx xxx xxx

e) Tha t no consideration whatsoever has been received by me in return for s uch recorrection, and as proof of it, I declined t o consider and evaluate one
booklet i n Remedial La w a foresaid because I was not the one who ma de the original correction of the same (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 32-35, rec.;
emphasis supplied).

Then Assistant Solicitor General, now CFI Judge, Bernardo Pa rdo, examiner i n Political La w a nd Public International Law, conf irmed in his affidavit of April
8, 1972 tha t:

On a da y or two a fter the Bar Confidant went to my res idence to obtain from me the l ast bag of two hundred notebooks (bearing examiner's code
numbers 1200 to 1400) whi ch according to my record was on February 5, 1972, he ca me to my residence at a bout 7:30 p.m. ri ding i n a Vokswagen panel
of the Supreme Court, wi th at l east two companions. The bar confidant had with him a n examinee's notebook bearing code number 661, a nd, a fter the
us ual amenties, he requested me i f i t was possible for me to revi ew a nd re-examine the said notebook because i t appears that the examinee obtained a
gra de of 57, whereas, according to the Bar Confidant, the said examinee had obtained higher gra des in other s ubjects, the highest of which was 84, i f I
reca ll correctly, i n remedial law.

I a s ked the Bar Confidant if I was a llowed to receive or re -examinee the notebook as I had submitted the s ame beforehand, and he told me that I was
a uthorized to do s o because the same was s till within my control and authority a s long as th e particular examinee's name had not been i dentified or that
the code number decode and the examinee's name was revealed. The Bar Confidant told me that the name of the examinee in the c ase present bearing
code number 661 ha d not been identified or revealed; and that it might have been possible that I had given a particularly l ow grade to said examinee.

Accepti ng a t face value the truth of the Bar Confidant's representations to me, and as it was humanly possible that I might h ave erred in the grading of
the s aid notebook, I re -examined the s ame, ca refully read the answer, and graded it i n a ccordance with the same standards I had used throughout the
gra di ng of the entire notebooks, with the result that the examinee deserved a n i ncreased grade of 66. After a g ain clearing with the Bar Confidant my
a uthority to correct the grades, a nd as he had a ssured me that the code number of the examinee in question had not been decoded and his name known,
... I therefore corrected the total grade i n the notebook and the grade ca rd a ttached thereto, and properly i nitia(l)ed the same. I also corrected the
i temized grades (from item No. 1 to i tem No. 10) on the two sets of grading sheets, my personal copy thereof, and the Bar Con fidant brought with him
the other copy thereof, and the Bar Confidant brought with him the other copy the grading sheet" (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 58-59; rec.; emphasis
s upplied)
In hi s answer dated Ma rch 17, 1973 whi ch he denominated a s "Explanation", respondent Bernardo P. Pa rdo a dopted and replaced t herein by reference
the fa cts s tated in his earlier s worn statement a nd i n additional alleged that:

xxx xxx xxx

3. At the ti me I revi ewed the examinee's notebook in political and international law, code numbered 661, I did know the name of the examinee. In fact, I
ca me to know his name only upon receipt of the resolution of Ma rch 5, 1973; now knowing his name, I wish to state that I do n ot know him personally,
a nd that I have never met him even up to the present;

4. At tha t ti me, I a cted under the i mpression that I was authorized to make such review, a nd had repeatedly a sked the Bar Confidant whether I was
a uthorized to make s uch revision a nd was s o assured of my a uthority a s the name of the examinee had not yet been decoded or h is identity revealed. The
Ba r Confi dant's a ssurance was apparently regular a nd so a ppeared to be in the regular course of express prohibition in the rul es a nd guidelines given to
me a s an examiner, and the Bar Confidant was my official liaison with the Chairman, as, unless called, I refrained a s much as possible from frequent
pers onal contact with the Chairman lest I be identified as a n examiner. ...;

5. At the ti me the Bar Confidant came to see me a t about 7:30 o'cl ock in the evening at my residence, I felt it i nappropriate to verify his authority with the
Cha i rman. It did not a ppear to me that his representations were unauthorized or suspicious. Indeed, the Bar Confidant was riding i n the official vehicle of
the Supreme Court, a Volkswagen panel, a ccompanied by two companions, which was usual, a nd thus l ooked l ike a regular vi sit t o me of the Bar
Confi dant, as it was a bout the same hour that he used to s ee me:

xxx xxx xxx

7. Indeed, the notebook code numbered 661 was s till in the same condition a s when I s ubmitted the same. In agreeing to review the s aid notebook code
numbered 661, my a i m was to s ee if I committed an error i n the correction, not to make the examinee pass the s ubject. I considered it entirely humanly
pos sible to have erred, because I corrected that particular notebook on December 31, 1971, cons idering especially the represe ntation of the Bar
Confi dant that the said examinee had obtained higher gra des in other s ubjects, the highest of which was 84% i n remedial law, if I recall correctly. Of
cours e, it did not s trike me as unusual that the Bar Confidant knew the grades of the examinee in the position to know a nd th at there was nothing
i rregular in that:

8. In political a nd i nternational l aw, the original gra de obtained by the examinee with notebook code numbered 661 wa s 57%. A fter review, it was
i ncreased by 9 points, resulting in a final grade of 66%. Sti ll, the examinee did not pass the s ubject, a nd, as heretofore stated, my aim was not to make the
exa minee pass, notwithstanding the representation that he had passed the other subjects. ...

9. I qui te recall that during the first meeting of the Bar Exa miners' Committee consensus was that where an examinee failed in only one s ubject and
pa ssed the rest, the examiner in said subject would review the notebook. Nobody objected to it a s irregular. At the time of t he Committee's first meeting,
we s till did not know the names of the candidates.

10. In fi ne, I was a victim of deception, not a party to i t. It had a bsolutely no knowledge of the motives of the Bar Confida nt or his malfeasance in office,
a nd did not know the examinee concerned nor had I a ny kind of contract with him before or ra ther the review and even up to the present (Adm. Case No.
1164, pp. 60-63; rec.; emphasis supplied).

Atty. Ma nuel Tomacruz, examiner i n Cri minal Law, affirmed i n his a ffidavit dated April 12, 1972:

1. xxx xxx xxx

2. Tha t a bout weekly, the Bar Confidant would deliver and collect examination books to my residence at 951 Luna Mencias, Ma ndaluyong, Rizal.

3. Tha t towards the end when I had a lready completed correction of the books in Cri minal Law and was helping in the correction of some of the papers in
a nother subject, the Bar Confidant brought back to me one (1) paper in Cri minal Law saying that that particular examinee had missed t he passing grade
by onl y a fra ction of a percent a nd that i f his paper i n Cri minal La w would be ra ised a few points to 75% then he would make the general passing a verage.

4. Tha t s eeing the jurisdiction, I raised the grade to 75%, that is, giving a raise of, if I remember correctly, 2 or 3 poi nt s, initialled the revised mark and
revi s ed a lso the mark a nd revised a lso the mark i n the general l ist.

5. Tha t I do not recall the number of the book of the examinee concerned" (Adm. Ca se No. 1164, p. 69, rec.; emphasis s upplied).

In hi s answer dated Ma rch 12, 1973, res pondent Tomacruz stated that "I accepted the word of the Bar Confidant in good faith and without the slightest
i nkling as to the i dentity of the examinee i n question who up to now remains a total stranger a nd without expectation of nor did I derive a ny personal
benefit" (Adm. Ca se No. 1164, p. 70, rec.; emphasis s upplied).

Atty. Fi del Ma nalo, examiner in Remedial Law, stated i n his affidavi t dated April 14, 1972, tha t:

xxx xxx xxx

2. Sometime about the late part of January or early part of February 1972, Attorney La nuevo, Bar Confidant of the Supreme Cou rt, saw me i n my house at
No. 1854 As uncion Street, Ma kati, Rizal. He produced to me an examinee's notebook i n Remedial La w which I had previously gra ded and submitted to
hi m. He informed me that he and others (he used the words "we") had reviewed the said notebook. He requested me to review the said notebook a nd
pos sibly reconsider the grade that I had previously gi ven. He explained that the examine concerned had done well in other s ubjects, but that because of
the comparatively l ow grade that I had given him i n Remedial La w his general a verage was s hort of passing. Mr. La nuevo remark ed that he thought that i f
the pa per were reviewed I might find the examinee deservi ng of being a dmitted to the Bar. As far a s I ca n recall, Mr. La nuevo particularly called my
a ttention to the fact in his a nswers the examinee expressed himself clearly a nd i n good enough English. Mr. La nuevo however i nformed me that whether
I woul d reconsider the grades I had previously gi ven a nd s ubmitted was entirely within my di scretion.

3. Bel ieving fully that i t was within Mr. La nuevo's a uthority as Bar Confidant to a ddress such a request to me and that the s aid request was i n order, I, in
the presence of Mr. La nuevo, proceeded tore -read and re-evaluate each and every i tem of the paper in question. I recall that in my re -evaluation of the
a ns wers, I increased the grades in some i tems, made deductions in other i tems, and maintained the same grades i n other i tems. However, I recall that
a fter Mr. La nuevo and I had totalled the new grades that I had given after re -evaluation, the total gra de increased by a few points, but still short of the
pa ssing mark of 75% i n my s ubject.

xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Ca s e No. 1164, pp. 74-75, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In hi s answer (response) dated March 18, 1973, res pondent Ma nalo reiterated the contents of his s worn s tatement, a dding the f ollowing:

xxx xxx xxx

5. In a greeing to re -evaluate the notebook, wi th resulted in increasing the total gra de of the examinee-concerned i n Remedial La w from 63.75% to 74.5%,
herein respondent acted i n good faith. It may well be that he could be faulted for not having verified from the Chairman of t he Committee of Bar
Exa mi ners the l egitimacy of the request made by Mr. La nuevo. Herein respondent, however, pleads i n attenuation of such omission, that —

a ) Ha vi ng been appointed an Exa miner for the first time, he was not aware, not having been a pprised otherwise, that it was not within the authority of
the Ba r Confidant of the Supreme Court to request or suggest that the gra de of a particular examination notebook be revised o r reconsidered. He had
every ri ght to presume, owing to the highly fi duciary na ture of the position of the Bar Confidant, that the request was l egitimate.

xxx xxx xxx

c) In revi sing the gra de of the particular examinee concerned, herein respondent ca refully evaluated each and every a nswer wri tten i n the notebook.
Tes ting the a nswers by the criteria laid down by the Court, and giving the s aid examinee the benefit of doubt i n vi ew of Mr. La nuevo's representation that
i t wa s only i n that particular s ubject that the said examine failed, herein respondent became convinced that the said examine e deserved a higher gra de
tha n that previ ously given to him, but that he did not deserve, i n herein respondent's honest appraisal, to be given the pass ing grade of 75%. It should
a l so be mentioned that, in reappraising the answers, herein respondent downgraded a previous rating of an a nswer wri tten by the examinee, from 9.25%
to 9% (Adm. Ca s e No. 1164, pp. 36-39, rec.; emphasis s upplied).

Atty. Ma nuel Montecillo, examiner i n Mercantile Law, affirmed in his affidavi t dated April 17, 1972:

xxx xxx xxx

Tha t during one of the deliberations of the Bar Examiners' Committee after the Bar Exa minations were held, I was informed that one Bar examinee
pa ssed all other s ubjects except Mercantile Law;

Tha t I i nformed the Bar Examiners' Committee that I would be willing to re-evaluate the paper of this particular Bar ca ndidate;.

Tha t the next day, the Bar Confidant handed to me a Bar candidate's notebook (No. 1613) s howing a grade of 61%;

Tha t I revi ewed the whole paper a nd after re -evaluating the a nswers of this particular Bar ca ndidate I decided to i ncrease his final gra de to 71%;

Tha t consequently, I amended my report a nd duly i nitialed the changes i n the gra de sheet (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 72, rec.; emphasis supplied).

In hi s answer dated Ma rch 19, 1973, res pondent Montecillo restated the contents of his sworn statement of April 17, 1972, a nd

xxx xxx xxx

2. Supplementary to the foregoing sworn statement, I hereby s tate that I re -evaluated the examination notebook of Bar Ca ndidate No. 1613 i n Mercantile
La w i n a bsolute good faith and in direct compliance with the a greement made during one of the deliberations of the Bar Exa miners Committee that
where a ca ndidate fails in only one s ubject, the Exa miner concerned should make a re -evaluation of the a nswers of the candidate concerned, which I did.

3. Fi nally, I hereby s tate that I did not know a t the time I made the aforementioned re -evaluation that notebook No. 1613 i n Mercantile La w pertained to
ba r exa mine Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Ga lang, and that I have never met up to this ti me this particular bar examinee (A dm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-
41, rec.; emphasis s upplied).

In hi s sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, Ba r Confi dant La nuevo stated:

xxx xxx xxx

As I wa s going over those notebooks, checking the entries in the gra ding sheets a nd the posting on the record of ra tings, I w as i mpressed of the writing
a nd the a nswers on the first notebook. This led me to scrutinize a ll the s et of notebooks. Believing that those five merited re -evalation on the basis of the
memorandum circularized to the examiners shortly earlier to the effect that

... i n the correction of the papers, substantial weight should then be given to cl arify of language a nd s oundness of reasoning' (par. 4),

I took i t upon mys elf to bring them back to the respective examiners for re -evaluation a nd/or re -checking.

It i s our experience i n the Bar Division that i mmediately a fter the release of the results of the examinations, we a re usually s warmed with requests of the
exa minees that they be s hown their notebooks. Ma ny of them would copy their a nswers a nd have them checked by their professors . Eventually s ome of
them would file motions or requests for re -correction a nd/or re -evaluation. Right now, we have some 19 of s uch motions or requests which we a re
rea ding for submission to the Honorable Court.

Often we feel that a few of them are meritorious, but just the same they have to be denied because the result of the examinat ions when released is fi nal
a nd i rrevocable.

It wa s to at l east minimize the occurrence of s uch i nstances that motivated me to bring those notebooks back to the respective examiners for re-
eva l uation" (Adm. Ca se No. 1162, p. 24, rec.; emphasis supplied).

In hi s answer dated Ma rch 19, 1973, res pondent La nuevo a vers:

Tha t he submitted the notebooks i n question to the examiners concerned in his hotest belief that the same merited re -evaluation; that i n so doing, it was
not hi s i ntention to forsake or betray the trust reposed in him as bar confidant but on the contrary to do justice to the examinee concerned; that neither
di d he a ct in a presumptuous manner, because the matter of whether or not re -evaluation was inorder was l eft a lone to the examiners' decision; and
tha t, to hi s knowledge, he does not remember havi ng ma de the alleged misrepresentation but that he remembers havi ng brought to the a ttention of the
Commi ttee during the meeting a matter concerning a nother examinee who obtained a passing general a verage but with a grade bel ow 50% i n Mercantile
La w. As the Committee a greed to remove the disqualification by wa y of raising the gra de i n said subject, respondent brought the notebook in que stion to
the Exa miner concerned who thereby ra ised the grade thus enabling the said examinee to pass. If he remembers right, the examinee concerned i s one
s urnamed "de la Cruz" or "Ty-de l a Cruz".
Your Honors, respondent never entertained a notion that his a ct would stir s uch s erious charges as would tend to undermine hi s integrity because he did
i t i n a ll good faith.

xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Ca s e No. 1162, p. 35, rec.; emphasis supplied).

On Augus t 27, 1973, duri ng the course of the i nvestigation, respondent Lanuevo filed another s worn s tatement i n addition to, a nd i n a mplification of, his
a ns wer, s tating:

xxx xxx xxx

1. Tha t I vehemently deny havi ng deceived the examiners concerned into believing that the examinee i nvolved failed only i n their respective s ubjects, the
fa ct of the matter being that the notebooks in question were s ubmitted to the respective examiners for re -evaluation believi ng in a ll good faith that they
s o merited on the basis of the Confidential Memorandum (identified a nd marked as Exh. 1-La nuevo, particularly that portion marked as Exh. 1-a-
La nuevo)which was circulated to a ll the examiners earlier, leaving to them entirely the matter of whether or not re -evaluation was i n order,

2. Tha t the following coincidence prompted me to pry i nto the notebooks in question:

Sometime during the latter part of January a nd the early part of February, 1972, on my wa y ba ck to the offi ce (Bar Division) a fter l unch, I though of buying
a s weepstake ticket. I have always made it a point that the moment I think of so buying, I pick a number from a ny object and the first number that comes
i nto my s ight becomes the basis of the ticket that I buy. At that moment, the first number that I saw was "954" boldly pri nted on an electrical contribance
(evi dently belonging to the MERALCO) a ttached to a post s tanding along the ri ght sidewalk of P. Fa ura street towards the Supreme Court building from
Sa n Ma rcelino street a nd a lmost a djacent to the south-eastern corner of the fence of the Ara ullo High School(photograph of the number '954', the
contri va nce on which i t is printed and a portion of the post to which it is a ttached is i dentified and marked as Exhibit 4-Lanuevo and the number "954" a s
Exh. 4-a -La nuevo).

Wi th this number (954) i n mind, I proceeded to Pl aza Sta. Cruz to l ook for a ticket that would contain such number. Eventuall y, I found a ti cket, which I
then bought, whose last three digits corresponded to "954". This number became doubly i mpressive to me because the sum of all the six digits of the
ti cket number was "27", a number that is so significant to me that everything I do I try s omewhat i nstinctively to link or co nnect i t with said number
whenever possible. Thus even in assigning code numbers on the Ma ster List of examinees from 1968 when I first took charge of the examinations as Bar
Confi dant up to 1971, I either started with the number "27" (or "227") or end with said number. (1968 Ma s ter List is i dentified and marked as Exh. 5-
La nuevo a nd the figure "27" a t the beginning of the list, as Exh. 5-a La nuevo; 1969 Ma s ter List a s Exh. 6-Lanuevo a nd the figure "227" a t the beginning of
the l ist, as Exh. 6-a -Lanuevo; 1970 Ma ster Li st as Exh. 7-Lanuevo and the figure "227" a t the beginning of the l ist a s Exh. 7-a-Lanuevo; and the 1971
Ma s ter List as Exh. 8-La nuevo and the figure "227" a t the end of the l ist a s Exh. 8-a-Lanuevo).

The s ignificance to me of this number (27) was born out of these i ncidents in my l ife, to wit: (a ) On November 27, 1941 whi le with the Philippine Army
s ta tioned a t Ca mp Ma nacnac, Ca banatuan, Nueva Ecija, I was s tricken with pneumonia a nd was hospitalized a t the Nueva Ecija Provincial Hospital as a
res ult. As will be recalled, the l ast Pa cific War broke out on December 8, 1941. Whi l e I was still confined a t the hospital, our camp was bombed a nd
s tra fed by Japanese planes on December 13, 1941 res ulting in ma ny ca sualties. From then on, I regarded November 27, 1941 a s t he beginning of a new
l i fe for me having been saved from the possibility of being among the casualties;(b) On February 27, 1946, I wa s a ble to get out of the a rmy byway of
honorable discharge; and (c) on February 27, 1947, I got ma rri ed and since then we begot children the youngest of whom was born on February 27, 1957.

Returning to the office that same afternoon a fter buying the ti cket, I resumed my work which a t the time was on the checking of the notebooks. While
thus checking, I ca me upon the notebooks bearing the office code number "954". As the number was still fresh in my mi nd, i t aroused my curiosity
prompting me to pry i nto the contents of the notebooks. Impressed by the cl arity of the writing and language and the apparent soundness of the answers
a nd, thereby, believing in all good faith on the basis of the a forementioned Confidential Memorandum (Exh. 1-La nuevo a nd Exh. 1-a -Lanuevo) that they
meri ted re-evaluation, I s et them a side and later on took them back to the respective examiners for possible revi ew recalling to them the said
Confi dential Memorandum but leaving a bsolutely the matter to their discretion and judgment.

3. Tha t the alleged misrepresentation or deception could have reference to either of the two ca ses which I brought to the att ention of the committee
duri ng the meeting and which the Committee agreed to refer back to the respective examines, namely:

(a ) Tha t of a n examinee who obtained a passing general a verage but with a grade below 50% (47%) i n Mercantile La w(the notebooks of this examinee
bea r the Office Code No. 110, i dentified a nd marked as Exh. 9-La nuevo a nd the notebook in Mercantile La w bearing the Exa miner's Code No. 951 wi th the
ori gi nal gra de of 4% i ncreased to 50% a fter re -evaluation as Exh. 9-a-Lanuevo); and

(b) Tha t of an examinee who obtained a borderline general average of 73.15% wi th a grade below 60% (57%) i n one s ubject which, at the ti me, I could not
pi npoint having inadvertently left i n the office the data thereon. It turned out that the s ubject was Political a nd Int ernational La w under Asst. Solicitor
General Bernardo Pardo (The notebooks of this examinee bear the Office Code No. 1622 i dentified and marked as Exh. 10 -Lanuevo and the notebook i n
Pol i tical a nd International Law bearing the Exa miner's Code No. 661 wi th the original gra de of 57% increased to 66% a fter re -evaluation, as Exh. 10-a -
La nuevo). This notebook in Political and International La w is precisely the same notebook mentioned in the sworn statement of Asst. Solicitor General
Berna rdo Pardo(Exh. ------- Pardo).

4. Tha t i n each of the two cases mentioned in the next preceding paragraph, only one (1) subject or notebook was reviewed or re-evaluated, that is, only
Merca ntile La w i n the former; a nd only Political and International Law in the latter, under the facts a nd ci rcumstances I made known to the Committee
a nd pursuant to which the Committee a uthorized the referral of the notebooks i nvolved to the examiners concerned;

5. Tha t a t that juncture, the examiner i n Taxation even volunteered to revi ew or re -check some 19, or s o, notebooks i n his subject but that I told the
Commi ttee that there was very l ittle ti me l eft a nd that the i ncrease in gra de after re -evaluation, unless very highly s ubstantial, may not a lter the outcome
s i nce the subject carries the weight of only 10% (Adm. Ca se No. 1162, pp. 45-47, rec.).

The foregoing last-minute embellishment only s erves to a ccentuate the fact that La nuevo's s tory i s devoid of truth. In his sworn s tatement of Ap ril 12,
1972, he wa s "led to scrutinize all the s et of notebooks" of respondent Galang, because he "was i mpressed of the writing a nd the a nswers on the first
notebook "as he "was going over those notebooks, checking the entries i n the grading s heets and the posting on the record of ra tings." In his a ffidavit of
Augus t 27, 1973, he s tated that the number 954 on a Meralco post provoked him "to pry i nto the contents of the notebooks" of responde nt Galang
"bea ring office code number '954."

Res pondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, asserted, a mong others;

1. Tha t herein respondent is not acquainted with former BarConfidant Victorio Lanuevo and never met him before except once when, as re quired by the
l a tter respondent submitted certain papers necessary for ta king the bar examinations.
xxx xxx xxx

4. Tha t i t has been the consistent policy of the Supreme Court not to reconsider "failure" cases; a fter the official release thereof; why s hould it now
reconsider a "passing" case, especially i n a s ituation where the respondent and the bar confidant do not know each other and, indeed, met only once in
the ordi nary course of official business?

It i s not inevi table, then, to conclude that the entire situation cl early ma nifests a reasonable doubt to which respondent is ri chly entitled?

5. Tha t respondent, before reading a copy of this Honorable Court's resolution dated Ma rch 5, 1973, ha d no knowledge whatsoever of former Bar
Confi dant Victorio Lanuevo's actuations which are s tated in particular i n the resolution. In fa ct, the respondent never knew this man i ntimately nor, had
the herein respondent utilized anyone to contact the Bar Confidant Lanuevo in his behalf.

But, a s suming as true, the said actuations of Bar Confidant La nuevo as s tated in the Resolution, which are evidently purporte d to show a s having
redounded to the benefit of herein respondent, these questions arise: First, was the re-evaluation of Respondent's examination papers by the Bar
Exa mi nation Committee done only or especially for him and not done generally a s regards the paper of the other bar ca ndidates who a re supposed to
ha ve failed? If the re -evaluation of Respondent's grades was done a mong those of others, then i t must have been done as a matter of policy of the
Commi ttee to increase the percentage of passing in that year's examination a nd, therefore, the insinuation that only respondent's papers were re -
eva l uated upon the i nfluence of Bar Confidant Lanuevo would be unjustifiable, if not far fetched. Secondly, i s the fact that BarConfidant La nuevo's
a ctua tions resulted in herein Respondent's benefit a n evidence per se of Respondent's having caused actuations of Bar confidant La nuevo to be done in
former's behalf? To assume this could be disastrous i n effect because that would be presuming a ll the members of the Bar Exa mination Committee as
devoi d of integrity, unfit for the bar themselves a nd the result of their work that year, as also unworthy of a nything. All of these i nference s are deductible
from the na rration of facts in the resolution, and which only goes to show said narration of facts a n unworthy of credence, or consideration.

xxx xxx xxx

7. Thi s Honorable Tribunal's Resolution of Ma rch 5, 1973 would make this Respondent Account or answer for the actuations of B ar Confidant Lanuevo as
wel l as for the a ctuations of the Bar Examiners implying the existence of some conspiracy between them and the Respondent. The evident imputation is
denied and it is contended that the Bar Examiners were i n the performance of their duties a nd that they s hould be regarded as s uch in the consideration
of thi s ca se.

xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Ca s e No. 1163, pp. 100-104, rec.).

The evi dence thus disclosed cl early demonstrates how respondent Lanuevo s ystematically a nd cleverly i nitiated and prepared th e s tage l eading to the re -
eva l ation a nd/or recorrection of the a nswers of respondent Galang by deceiving separately a nd i ndividually the respondents-examiners to make the
des ired revision without prior authority from the Supreme Court after the corrected notebooks had been submitted to the Court through the respondent
Ba r Confi dant, who is simply the custodian thereof for and in behalf of the Court.

It a ppears that one evening, sometime around the middle part of December, 1971, just before Christmas day, respondent La nuevo approached Civil La w
exa miner Pamatian while the latter was in the process of correcting examination booklets, and then a nd there made the representations that a s
Ba rConfidant, he makes a review of the gra des obtained i n all subjects of the examinees a nd i f he finds that a ca ndidate obta ins an extra ordinarily high
gra de in one subject and a ra ther l ow one on another, he will bring back to the examiner concerned the notebook for re -evaluation a nd change of
gra de(Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm. Ca se No. 1164, pp. 55-56; Vol . V, pp. 3-4, rec.).

Sometime in the latter part of January, 1972, res pondent La nuevo brought back to respondent-examiner Pamatian an examination booklet in Ci vil Law for
re-eva luation, representing that the examinee who owned the particular notebook is on the borderline of passing and i f his grade i n said s ubject could be
reconsidered to 75%, the said examine will get a passin g a verage. Respondent-examiner Pamatian took respondent Lanuevo's word and under the belief
tha t wa s really the practice a nd policy of the Supreme Court and i n his further belief that he was just manifesting cooperati on i n doing s o, he re-evaluated
the pa per a nd reconsidered the examinee's grade in s aid subject to 75% from 64%. The particular notebook belonged to an examinee wit h Examiner's
Code Number 95 a nd with Office Code Number 954. Thi s examinee is Ramon E. Ga lang, alias Roman E. Ga lang. Respondent Pa matian did not know the
i dentity of the examinee at the ti me he re -evaluated the said booklet (Exhs. 1-Pa matian, 2-Pa matian, and 3-Pamatian, Adm. Ca se No. 1164, pp. 32-33, 55-
56, 57; Vol . V, pp. 3-4, rec.).

Before Justice Pa matian made the revision, Exa minee Galang failed in seven subjects i ncluding Ci vil La w. After such revision, examinee Galang s till failed in
s i x s ubjects a nd could not obtain the passing a verage of 75% for a dmission to the Bar.

Thereafter, about the l atter part of Ja nuary, 1972 or ea rly pa rt of February, 1972, res pondent La nuevo went to the residence of respondent-examiner
Fi del Ma nalo a t 1854 As uncion Street, Makati, Rizal, with an examinee's notebook in Remedial La w, which respondent Ma nalo and previously corrected
a nd gra ded. Respondent Lanuevo then requested respondent Ma nalo to review the said notebook a nd possibly to reconsider the grade given, explaini ng
a nd representing that "they" has reviewed the said notebook and that the examinee concerned had done well in other subjects, but that because of the
compa ratively l ow grade given said examinee by respondent Ma nalo i n Remedial La w, the general average of said examinee was sh ort of passing.
Res pondent Lanuevo likewise made the remark a nd observation that he thought that if the notebo ok were reviewed, respondent Ma nalo might yet find
the exa minee deservi ng of being admitted to the Bar. Respondent La nuevo also particularly ca lled the attention of respondent Manalo to the fact that i n
hi s answers, the examinee expressed himself cl early a nd i n good English. Furthermore, respondent Lanuevo called the attention of respondent Manalo to
Pa ra graph 4 of the Confidential Memorandum that read as follows:

4. Exa mi nation questions should be more a test of l ogic, knowledge of l egal fundamentals, a nd a bility to a nalyze a nd s olve l egal problems rather than a
tes t of memory; i n the correction of papers, substantial weight should be given to cl arify of l anguage a nd s oundness of reasoning.

Res pondent Manalo was, however, informed by respondent La nuevo th at the matter of reconsideration was entirely wi thin his (Ma nalo's) discretion.
Res pondent Manalo, believing that respondent La nuevo, as Bar Confidant, had the authority to ma ke s uch request and further be lieving that s uch request
wa s in order, proceeded to re-evaluate the examinee's answers in the presence of La nuevo, resulting in a n i ncrease of the examinee's grade in that
pa rti cular s ubject, Remedial La w, from 63.25% to 74.5%. Respondent Ma nalo authenticated with his signature the changes made b y him in the notebook
a nd i n the grading s heet. The said notebook examiner's code number i s 136, i nstead of 310 a s earlier mentioned by him in his affidavi t, and belonged to
Ra mon E. Ga lang, alias Roman E. Ga lang (Exhs. 1 & 2- Ma na lo, Adm. Ca se No. 1164, pp. 36-39, 74-75; Vol . V, pp. 50-53, rec.).

But even a fter the re-evaluation by Atty. Ma nalo, Exa minee Galang could not ma ke the passing grade due to his failing marks i n five s ubjects.
Li kewise, i n the latter part of January, 1972, on one occasion when respondent La nuevo went to deliver to respondent Guillermo Pa blo, Jr. i n the latter's
hous e a new batch of examination papers in Political Law and Public International La w to be corrected, respondent La nuevo bro ught out a notebook i n
Pol i tical La w bearing Exa miner's Code Number 1752 (Exh. 5-Pa rdo, Adm. Ca se No. 1164, p. 66, rec.), i nforming respondent Pa blo that particular examinee
who owns the said notebook seems to have passed i n all other s ubjects except i n Political La w a nd Public International Law; a nd that if the said notebook
woul d be re-evaluated a nd the mark be increased to at l east 75%, s aid examinee will pass the bar examinations. After s atisfying himself f rom respondent
tha t thi s is possible — the respondent Bar Confidant informing him that this is the practice of the Court to help out examinees who are failing i n just one
s ubject — respondent Pa blo acceded to the request a nd thereby told the Bar Confidant to just leave the said notebook. Respondent Pa blo thereafter re-
eva l uated the a nswers, this time with l eniency. After the re -evaluation, the grade was i ncreased to 78% from 68%, or a n i ncrease of 10%. Respondent
Pa bl o then made the corresponding corrections in the grading sheet and accordingly i nitialed the charges made. This notebook with Office Code Number
954 a l so belonged to Ramon E. Ga lang, alias Roman E. Galang (Vol. V, pp. 43-46, rec.).

After the re-evaluation by Atty. Pa blo, Jr., exa minee Galang's general average was still below the passing grade, because of his failing m arks in four
s ubjects.

Towa rds the end of the correction of examination notebooks, respondent La nuevo brought back to respondent Tomacruz one examinati on booklet in
Cri mi nal Law, with the former i nforming the latter, who was then helping i n the correction of papers in Political La w a nd Public International Law, as he
ha d a lready finished correcting the examination notebooks in his assigned subject — Cri minal Law — that the examinee who owns that particular
notebook had missed the passing grade by only a fraction of a percent a nd that i f his grade i n Cri minal La w would be raised a few points to 75%, then the
exa minee would make the passing grade. Accepting the words of respondent La nuevo, and seeing the justification a nd because he did not want to be the
one ca using the failure of the examinee, respondent Tomacruz raised the grade from 64% to 75% a nd thereafter, he initialed the revised mark a nd also
revi s ed the mark in the general list a nd likewise initialed the same. The examinee's Exa miner Code Number is 746 while his Of fice Code Number is 954.
Thi s examinee is Ramon E. Ga lang, a lias Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1, 2 & 3-Toma cruz, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 65, 66 a nd 71; Vol . V, pp. 24-25, 60-61, rec.).

Res pondent Tomacruz does not recall having been s hown any memo by respondent La nuevo when the latter a pproached him for this particular re -
eva l uation; but he remembers La nuevo declaring to him that where a candidate had almost made the passing a verage but had fail ed in one subject, a s a
ma tter of policy of the Court, l eniency i s applied in re viewing the examinee's notebook i n the failing s ubject. He recalls, however, that he was provided a
copy of the Confidential Memorandum but this was long before the re -evaluation requested by respondent Lanuevo as the same was received by him
before the examination period (Vol. V, p. 61, rec.).

However, such revision by Atty. Toma cruz could not ra ise Galang's general a verage to a passing gra de because of his failing m ark in three more s ubjects,
i ncl uding Mercantile La w. For the revision of examinee Galang's notebook in Mercantile La w, respondent La nuevo neatly s et the last phase of his quite
i ngenious scheme — by s ecuring a uthorization from the Bar Exa mination Committee for the examiner i n Mercantile Law tore-evaluate said notebook.

At the fi rst meeting of the Bar Examination Committee on February 8, 1972, res pondent La nuevo s uggested that where an examinee failed in only one
s ubject a nd passed the rest, the examiner concerned would review the notebook. Nobody objected to i t as irregular a nd the Com mittee adopted the
s uggestion (Exhs. A & B-Montecillo, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 41, 72, 63; Vol . Vi , p. 16, rec.).

At a s ubsequent meeting of the Bar Examination Committee, respondent Montecillo was informed by respondent La nuevo that a ca ndidate passed a ll
other s ubjects except Mercantile Law. This information was made during the meeting within hearing of the order members, who w ere all closely s eated
together. Respondent Montecillo made known his willingness tore-evaluate the particular paper. The next day, respondent La nuevo handed to
res pondent Montecillo a bar ca ndidate's notebook with Examiner's Code Number 1613 wi th a grade of 61%. Respondent Montecillo then reviewed the
whol e paper a nd a fter re -evaluating the answers, decided to i ncrease the final grade to 71%. The matter was not however thereafter officially brought to
the Commi ttee for consideration or decision (Exhs. A& B-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, 70-71; Vol . V, pp. 33-34, rec.).

Res pondent Montecillo declared that without being given the i nformation that the particular examinee failed only i n his subje ct and passed all the others,
he would not have consented to make the re -evaluation of the said paper (Vol. V, p. 33, rec.).Respondent Montecillo likewise a dded that there was only
one i nstance he remembers, which is s ubstantiated by his personal records, that he had to change the grade of a n examinee a ft er he had submitted his
report, referring to the notebook of examinee Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Ga lang, wi th Examiner's Code Number 1613 a nd with Office Code Number
954 (Vol . V, pp. 34-35, rec.).

A da y or two a fter February 5, 1972, when respondent Lanuevo went to the residence of respondent-examiner Pa rdo to obtain the last bag of 200
notebooks, respondent Lanuevo returned to the residence of respondent Pardo ri ding in a Volkswagen panel of the Supreme Court of the Philippines with
two compa nions. According to respondent Lanuevo, this was around the second week of February, 1972, a fter the first meeting of the Bar Examination
Commi ttee. respondent Lanuevo had with him on that occasion an examinee's notebook bearing Exa miner's Code No. 661. Respondent La nuevo, after
the us ual amenities, requested respondent Pa rdo to revi ew a nd re -examine, i f possible, the said notebook because, according to respondent Lanuevo, the
exa mine who owns that particular notebook obtained higher grades i n other s ubjects, the highest of which is 84% i n Remedial L aw. After cl earing with
res pondent La nuevo his authority to reconsider the grades, respondent Pardo re -evaluated the answers of the examine concerned, resulting i n an
i ncrease of gra de from 57% of 66%. Sa id notebook has number 1622 a s office code number. It belonged to examinee Ernesto Quita leg (Exhs. 1 & 2-Pa rdo,
Adm. Ca s e No. 1164, pp. 58-63; Vol . V, pp. 12-24, 29-30, rec.).

II

Re: Admi nistrative Case No. 1162, Vi ctorio D. La nuevo, respondent.

UNAUTHORIZED RE-EVALUATION OF THE ANSWERS OF EXAMINE RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E. GALANG, IN ALL F IVE (5) MAJOR SUBJECTS.

Res pondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having requested on his own i nitiative the five examiners concerned to re -evaluate the five notebooks of
Ra mon E. Ga lang, alias Roman E. Ga lang, that eventually resulted in the i ncrease of Galang's a verage from 66.25% to the passing grade 74.15%, or a total
i ncrease of eight (8) weighted points, more or l ess, that enabled Galang to hurdle the 1971 Ba r examinations via a resolution of the Court making 74% the
pa ssing a verage for that year's examination without a ny gra de below fifty percent (50%) i n any s ubject. Galang thereafter took his lawyer's oath. It is
l i kewise beyond dispute that he had no authority from the Court or the Committee to initiate such steps towards the said re -evaluation of the a nswers of
Ga l ang or of other examinees.

Denyi ng that he made representations to the examiners concerned that respondent Galang failed only i n their respective s ubjec ts a nd/or was on the
borderline of passing, Respondent La nuevo sought to justify his actuations on the a uthority of the aforequoted paragraph 4 of the Confidential
Memora ndum(Exhs. 1 a nd 1-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Ca ses Nos. 1162 & 1164, p. 51, Adm. Ca s e No. 1162; Vol . VII, p. 4, rec.) distributed to the members of the
Ba r Exa mination Committee. He maintains that he acted in good faith and "in his honest belief that the s ame merited re -evaluation; that in doing s o, it
wa s not his intention to forsake or betray the trust reposed i n him a s BarConfidant but on the contrary to do justice to the examinee concerned; a nd that
nei ther did he act i n a presumptuous manner because the matter of whether or not re -evaluation was i n order was l eft a lone to the examiners' decision
..." (Exh. 2-La nuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 35-37, rec.).

But a s openly a dmitted by hi m i n the course of the investigation, the s aid confidential memorandum was intended s olely for the examiners to guide them
i n the i nitial correction of the examination papers and never a s a basis for him to even suggest to the examiners the re -evaluation of the examination
pa pers of the examinees (Vol. VII, p. 23, rec.). Any s uch suggestion or request i s not only presumptuous but also offensive t o the norms of delicacy.

We believe the Examiners — Pa blo, Ma nalo, Montecillo, Tomacruz, Pa rdo a nd Pa matian — whose declarations on the matter of the misrepresentations
a nd deceptions committed by respondent Lanuevo, are cl ear and consistent as well as corroborate each other.

For i ndeed the fa cts unfolded by the declarations of the respondents-examiners (Adm. Ca se No. 1164) a nd clarified by extensive cross-examination
conducted during the investigation a nd hearing of the cases show how respondent La nuevo a droitly ma neuvered the passing of ex aminee Ramon E.
Ga l ang, alias Roman E. Ga lang in the 1971 Ba r Exa minations. It i s patent likewise from the records that respondent La nuevo too undue a dvantage of the
trus t a nd confidence reposed i n him by the Court and the Examiners implicit in his position as BarConfidant a s well as the trust a nd confidence that
preva iled i n a nd characterized his relationship with the five members of the 1971 Ba r Exa mination Committee, who were thus deceived and induced i nto
re-eva luating the answers of only respondent Galang i n five subjects that resulted i n the increase of his gra des therein, ultimately enabling him to be
a dmitted a member of the Philippine Bar.

It wa s plain, s imple a nd unmitigated deception that characterized respondent Lanuevo's well -studied and well-calculated moves in successively
representing s eparately to each of the five examiners concerned to the effect that the examinee failed only i n his particular s ubject a nd/or was on the
borderline of passing. To repeat, the before the unauthorized re -evaluations were made, Galang failed in the five (5) major s ubjects a nd i n two ( 2) minor
s ubjects while his general average was only 66.25% — whi ch under no circumstances or s tandard could it be honestly cl aimed that the examinee failed
onl y i n one, or he was on the borderline of passing. In fact, before the first notebook of Galang w as referred back to the examiner concerned for re -
eva l uation, Galang had only one passing mark a nd this was in Legal Ethics and Pra ctical Exercises, a minor s ubject, with grad e of 81%. The averages a nd
i ndividual gra des of Galang before a nd a fter the unauthorized re-evaluation a re as follows:

BAI

1. Pol i tical La w Public

International La w 68% 78% = 10 pts .
or 30 wei ghted points
BAI

La bor La ws a nd Social
Legi slations 67% 67% = no re -
eva l uation made.

2. Ci vi l Law 64% 75% = 1 poi nts

or 33 wei ghted points.

Ta xa tion 74% 74% = no re -

eva l uation made.

3. Merca ntile Law 61% 71% = 10 pts .

or 30 wei ghted points.

4. Cri mi nal La w 64% 75% = 11 pts . or

22 wei ghted points.

5. Remedial La w 63.75% (64) 75.5% (75%) =

11 pts . or 44 wei ghted points.

Lega l Ethics and Pra ctical

Exerci s es 81% 81% = no re -
eva l uation made.
————————————

General Weighted Averages 66.25% 74.15%

Hence, by the simple expedient of i nitiating the re -evaluation of the answers of Galang in the five (5) s ubjects under the circumstances already narrated,
Ga l ang's original a verage of 66.25% wa s increased to 74.15% or a n i ncrease of 7.9 weighted points, to the great damage and prejudice of the integrity of
the Ba r examinations and to the disadva ntage of the other examinees. He did this i n favor only of examinee Galang, with the possible addition of
exa minees Ernesto Quitaleg a nd Al fredo Ty dela Cruz. But only one notebook was re -evaluated for each of the l atter who — Political La w and Public
International La w for Quitaleg a nd Mercantile La w for Ty dela Cruz.

The Offi ce of the Bar Confidant, i t must be s tressed, has absolutely nothing to do in the re-evaluation or reconsideration of the grades of examinees who
fa i l to make the passing mark before or a fter their notebooks a re submitted to it by the Examiners. Af ter the corrected notebooks a re submitted to him
by the Exa mi ners, his only function is to ta lly the individual grades of every examinee i n all subjects ta ken and thereafter compute the general average.
Tha t done, he will then prepare a comparative data showing the percentage of passing and failing i n relation to a certain average to be s ubmitted to the
Commi ttee and to the Court and on the basis of which the Court will determine the passing average, whether 75 or 74 or 73, et c. The Ba r Confidant has
no business evaluating the answers of the examinees a nd ca nnot assume the functions of passing upon the a ppraisal made by the Exami ners concerned.
He i s not the over-all Examiner. He ca nnot presume to know better than the examiner. Any request for re -evaluation should be done by the examinee and
the s ame should be a ddressed to the Court, which alone ca n validly a ct thereon. A Ba r Confidant who ta kes such i nitiative, exposes himself to s uspicion
a nd thereby compromises his position as well as the i mage of the Court.

Res pondent Lanuevo's claim that he was merely doing justice to Galang without any i ntention of betraying the trust a nd confid ence reposed i n him by the
Court a s Bar Confidant, ca n hardly i nvite belief in the fact of the i ncontrovertible fact that he si ngled out Galang's papers for re -evaluation, leaving out the
pa pers of more than ninety (90) examinees with far better a verages ra nging from 70% to 73.9% of which he was fully a ware (Vol . VI, pp. 46-47, 101, rec.),
whi ch could be more properly cl aimed a s borderline ca ses. This fact further betrays respondent La nuevo's claim of absolute good faith i n referring back
the pa pers of Galang to the Examiners for re -evaluation. For certainly, as a gainst the original weighted a verage of 66.25% of Galang, there can h ardly be
a ny di spute that the ca ses of the a foresaid more than ninety (90) examinees were more deserving of reconsideration. Hence, in tryi ng to do justice to
Ga l ang, as claimed by respondent La nuevo, gra ve injustice was i nflicted on the other examinees of the 1971 Ba r examinations, especially the s aid more
tha n ninety ca ndidates. And the unexplained failure of respondent La nuevo to a pprise the Court or the Committee or even the B ar Chairman of the fact of
re-eva luation before or a fter the said re -evaluation a nd i ncrease of gra des, precludes, as the same is inconsistent with, a ny pretension of good faith.

Hi s request for the re -evaluation of the notebook i n Political La w a nd International Law of Ernesto Quitaleg and the notebook in Mercantile Law of
Al fredo Ty dela Cruz to give his a ctuations in the case of Galang a s emblance of i mpartiality, hoping that the over ninety examinees who were fa r better
s i tuated than Galang would not give him away. Even the re -evaluation of one notebook of Quitaleg and one noteb ook of Ty dela Cruz vi olated the
a greement of the members of the 1971 Ba r Exa mination Committee to re -evaluate when the examinee concerned fails only i n one subject. Quitaleg a nd
Ty del a Cruz failed i n four (4) a nd three (3) s ubjects respectively — a s hereinafter shown.

The s trange s tory concerning the figures 954, the office code number gi ven to Galang's notebook, unveiled for the first ti me by respondent Lanuevo in his
s uplemental s worn s tatement(Exh. 3- La nuevo, Adm. Ca se No. 1162, pp. 45-47. rec.) filed during the investigation with this Court as to why he pried i nto
the pa pers of Galang deserves s cant consideration. It only s erves to picture a man desperately cl utching at s traws in the wind for s upport. Furthermore, i t
wa s revealed by respondent Lanuevo for the fi rst ti me only on August 27, 1973 or a peri od of more than five 95) months after he filed his answer on
Ma rch 19, 1973(Exh. 2-La nuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 35-36, rec.), s howing that i t was just an after-thought.

REFERRAL OF EXAMINEE ALFREDO TY DELA CRUZ NOTEBOOK IN MERCHANTILE LAW TO RAISE HIS GRADE OF 47% TO 50% TO EXAMINER MANUEL
MONTECILLO AND OF EXAMINEE ERNESTO QUITALEG'S NOTEBOOK IN POLITICAL LAW TO EXAMINER BERNARDO PARDO FOR RE -EVALUATION,
RESULTING IN THE INCREASE OF HIS GRADE IN THAT SUBJECT FROM 57% TO 66%.

Li kewise, respondent Vi ctorio D. La nuevo a dmitted having referred back the a foresaid notebooks on Mercantile Law and Politica l La w respectively of
Al fredo Ty dela Cruz and Ernesto Quitaleg to the Exa miners concerned.

The records are not clear, however, under what circumstances the notebooks of Ty dela Cruz and Quitaleg were referred back to the E xa miners
concerned. Respondent La nuevo claimed that these two cases were officially brought to the Bar Exa mination Committee during its first meeting (Vol. VI,
pp. 50-51, rec.) a nd the latter decided to refer them back to the Examiners concerned for re -evaluation with respect to the case of Quitaleg and to
remove the disqualification in the ca se of Ty dela Cruz(Vol. VI, pp. 33-39, 84-86, rec.). Respondent La nuevo further cl aimed that the date of these two
ca s es were contained i n a s heet of paper which was presented at the s aid first meeting of the Committee (Vol. VI, pp. 39 -43, 49-51, rec.). Li kewise a
record of the dates of every meeting of the Committee was ma de by respondent La nuevo (Vol. VI, p. 28, rec.). The alleged s heet containing the date of
the two exa minees and record of the dates of the meeting of the Committee were not presented by respondent Lanuevo a s, according to him, he left
them i nadvertently i n his desk i n the Confidential Room when he went on l eave after the release of the Bar results (Vol. VI, pp. 28, 41-45, rec.). It a ppears,
however, that the inventory conducted by officials of the Court in the Confidential Room of respondent Lanuevo did not yi eld a ny s uch sheet of record
(Exh. X, Adm. Ca s e No. 1162, p. 74, rec.; Vol . VIII, pp. 11-13, 20-22, 29-31, rec.).

Res pondent Examiner Montecillo, Mercantile La w, maintained that there was only one notebook in Mercantile La w w hich was officially brought to him
a nd this is substantiated by his personal file a nd record (Vol. VI, pp. 34-35, rec.). According to him, this notebook's examiner code number i s 1613 (Vol. V,
p.35, rec.) a nd is owned by Ramon E. Ga lang, a lias Roman E. Galang. It appears, however, that the original grade of 47% i n Mercantile La w of Ty dela Cruz
wa s changed to 50% a s appearing in the cover of the notebook of said examinee and the change is authenticated with the i nitial of Examiner Montecillo.
He wa s present when respondent La nuevo presented in evidence the notebook of Ty dela Cruz bearing Exa miner code number 951 a nd Office Code
Number 110 a s Exhibit 9-Lanuevo in Administrative Case No. 1162, a nd the figures 47 cros sed out, replaced by the figures 50 bearing the i nitial of
Exa mi ner Montecillo as Exhibit 9-a-Lanuevo (Adm. Ca se No. 1162, p. 48, rec.; Vol . VI, pp. 23-24, Vol . VIII, p. 4, rec.); but Atty. Montecillo did not interpose
a ny objection to their a dmission i n evidence.

In thi s connection, respondent Exa miner Pa rdo testified that he remembers a ca se of a n examinee presented to the Committee, who obtained passing
ma rks in a ll s ubjects except i n one a nd the Committee agreed to refer back to the Examiner concerned the notebook i n the subj ect in which the examinee
fa i led (Vol. V, pp. 15-16, rec.). He cannot recall the subject, but he is certain that it was not Political La w (Vol. V, p. 16, rec.).Further, Pa rdo declared that
he i s not aware of a ny ca se of an examinee who was on the borderline of passing but wh o got a grade below 50% i n one s ubject that was taken up by the
Commi ttee (Vol. V, pp. 16-17, rec.).

Exa mi ner Montecillo testified that it was the notebook with Exa miner Code Number 1613 (belonging to Galang) which was referre d to the Committee and
the Commi ttee agreed to return it to the Examiner concerned. The day following the meeting i n which the case of an examinee with Co de Number 1613
wa s ta ken up, respondent Lanuevo handed him said notebook and he accordingly re -evaluated it. This particular notebook with Office Code Number 954
bel ongs to Galang.

Exa mi ner Tomacruz recalled a case of a n examinee whose problem was Mercantile La w that was taken up by the Committee. He is n ot certain of a ny
other ca se brought to the Committee (Vol. V, pp. 59-61, rec.). Pa rdo declared that there was no ca se of a n examinee that was referred to the Committee
tha t i nvolved Political La w. He re-evaluated the a nswers of Ernesto Quitaleg i n Political Law upon the representation made by respondent La nuevo to
hi m.

As heretofore s tated, it was this consensus at the meeting on February 8, 1972 of the members of the Committee that where a n examinee faile d in only
one s ubject a nd passed all the others, the Exa miner i n whose subject the examinee failed s hould re -evaluate or recheck the notebook (Vol. V, p. 16, rec.:
Exh. 2-Pa rdo, a llegation No. 9, Adm. Ca se No. 1164, pp. 60-63, Exh. A-Montecillo, Allegation No. 2, Adm. Ca se No. 1164, pp. 40-41, a nd Exh. B-Montecillo,
Adm. Ca s e No. 1164, p. 72, rec.).

At the ti me the notebook of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political Law with a gra de of 57% was referred back to Exa miner Pa rdo, s aid examinee had other failing
gra des in three (3) subjects, as follows:

La bor La ws 3%

Ta xa tion 69%

Merca ntile La w 68%

Ernes to Quitaleg's grades and a verages before a nd a fter the re -evaluation of his grade i n Political La w a re as follows:

BA

Pol i tical La w 57% 66% = 9 pts . or 27

wei ghted points
La bor La ws 73% 73% = No reeva luation
Ci vi l La w 75% 75% = "
Ta xa tion 69% 69% = "
Merca ntile La w 68% 68% = "
Cri mi nal Law 78% 78% = "
Remedial Law 85% 85% = "
Lega l Ethics 83% 83% = "
————————————————

Avera ge (weighted) 73.15% 74.5%

(Vol . VI, pp. 26-27; Exhs . 10 a nd 10-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Ca se No. 1162, rec.)

Al fredo Ty dela Cruz, at the time his notebook in Mercantile La w was referred to Exa miner Montecillo to remove the disqualification gra de of 47% i n sa id
s ubject, had two (2) other failing grades. These are:

Pol i tical La w 70%

Ta xa tion 72%

Hi s grades a nd a verages before and after the disqualifying grade was removed are as follows:

BA

Pol i tical La w 70% 70% = No reeva luation

La bor La ws 75% 75% = "
Ci vi l La w 89% 89% = "
Ta xa tion 72% 72% = "
Merca ntile La w 47% 50% = 3 pts . or 9
wei ghted points
Cri mi nal Law 78% 78% = no reevaluation
Remedial Law 88% 88% = "
Lega l Ethics 79% 79% = "
—————————————————

Wei ghted Averages 74.95% 75.4%

(Vol . VI, pp. 26-27, rec.).

The re-evaluation of the answers of Quitaleg i n Political La w a nd the a nswers of Ty d ela Cruz in Mercantile Law, vi olated the consensus of the Bar
Exa mi nation Committee in February, 1971, whi ch vi olation was due to the misrepresentation of respondent Lanuevo.

It mus t be s tated that the referral of the notebook of Galang in Mercantile La w to Exa miner Montecillo ca n hardly be s aid to be covered by the consensus
of the Ba r Exa mination Committee because even a t the time of s aid referral, which was a fter the unauthorized re -evaluation of his answers of four (4)
s ubjects, Galang had still failing grades in Taxation a nd La bor Laws. His re -evaluated grade of 74.5% i n Remedial La w was considered 75% under the
Confi dential Memorandum and was s o entered in the record. His grade in Mercantile La w as s ubsequently re -evaluated by Exa miner Montecillo was 71%.

Res pondent Lanuevo is therefore guilty of s erious misconduct — of havi ng betrayed the trust a nd confidence reposed i n him as Bar Confidant, thereby
i mpairing the i ntegrity of the Bar examinations and undermining public faith in the Supreme Court. He s hould be disbarred.

As to whether Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz s hould be disbarred or their names stricken from the Roll of Attorneys , it is believed that they
s hould be required to s how ca use and the corresponding investigation conducted.

III

Re: Admi nistrative Case No. 1163, Ra mon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Ga lang, respondent.

The na me of respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Ga lang, s hould likewise be s tricken off the Roll of Attorneys. This is a necessary consequence of
the un-authorized re-evaluation of his a nswers in five(5) major s ubjects — Ci vil La w, Political a nd International Law, Cri minal Law, Remedial La w, a nd
Merca ntile La w.

The judicial function of the Supreme Court i n admitting candidates to the legal profession, which necessarily i nvolves the ex ercise of discretion, requires:
(1) previ ous established rules and principles; (2) concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate individuals; and (3) a decision as to
whether these facts are governed by the rules and principles (In re: Cunanan — Fl unkers' Petition for Admission to the Bar -- 94 Phi l. 534, 544-545). The
determination of whether a bar ca ndidate has obtained the required passing grade certainly i nvolves discretion (Legal and Judicial Ethics, Justice Ma rtin,
1969 ed., p. 13).

In the exercise of this function, the Court a cts through a Bar Exa mination Committee, composed of a member of the Court who a cts as Chairman a nd
ei ght (8) members of the Bar who act as examiners in the eight (8) bar subjects wi th one s ubject assigned to each. Acting a s a sort of liaison officer
between the Court a nd the Bar Chairman, on one hand, a nd the i ndividual members of the Committee, on the other, i s the Bar Confidant who is a t the
s a me ti me a deputy cl erk of the Court. Necessarily, every a ct of the Committee in connection with the exercise of discretion i n the a dmission of
exa minees to membership of the Bar must be in accordance with the established rules of the Court a nd must always be s ubject t o the fi nal approval of
the Court. Wi th respect to the Bar Confidant, whose position i s primarily confidential as the des ignation i ndicates, his functions i n connection with the
conduct of the Bar examinations a re defined a nd ci rcumscribed by the Court a nd must be strictly a dhered to.

The re-evaluation by the Examiners concerned of the examination answers of respondent Galang i n five (5) subjects, as a lready cl early established, was
i ni tiated by Respondent Lanuevo without a ny a uthority from the Court, a s erious breach of the trust a nd confidence reposed by the Court i n him a s Bar
Confi dant. Consequently, the re -evaluation that enabled respondent Galang to pass the 1971 Ba r examinations and to be admitted to the Bar is a
compl ete nullity. The Bar Confidant does not possess a ny discretion with respect to the matter of admission of examinees to t he Bar. He is not cl othed
wi th a uthority to determine whether or not a n examinee's a nswers merit re-evaluation or re-evaluation or whether the Examiner's appraisal of such
a ns wers is correct. And whether or not the examinee benefited was in connivance or a privy thereto is immaterial. Wha t is decisive is whether the
proceedings or incidents that led to the ca ndidate's admission to the Bar were i n a ccordance with the rules.

Secti on 2 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964, i n connection, a mong others, with the character requi rement of ca ndidates for admission to
the Ba r, provides that "every a pplicant for a dmission as a member of the Bar must be ... of good moral
cha ra cter ... a nd must produce before the Supreme Court s atisfactory evidence of good moral character, a nd that no charges a gainst him i nvolving moral
turpi tude, have been filed or are pending in any court i n the Philippines." Pri or to 1964, or under the old Rules of Court, a bar applicant was required to
produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory testimonials of go od moral character (Sec. 2, Rule 127). Under both rules, every a pplicant is duty bound to
l a y before the Court all his involvement i n any cri minal case, pending or otherwise terminated, to enable the Court to fully a scertain or determine
a pplicant's moral character. Furthermore, as to what crime involves moral turpitude, is for the supreme Court to determine. Hence, the necessit y of
l a yi ng before or i nforming the Court of one's personal record — whether he was cri minally i ndicted, a cquitted, convicted or th e case dismissed or is s till
pending — becomes more compelling. The forms for application to take the Bar examinations provided by the Supreme Court beginning the year 1965
requi re the disclosure not only of cri minal cases involving moral turpitude filed o r pending a gainst the applicant but also of all other cri minal cases of
whi ch he has been accused. It i s of course true that the application form used by respondent Galang when he took the Bar for the first time in 1962 di d
not expressly require the disclosure of the applicant's criminal records, if a ny. But as already intimated, i mplicit in his task to show s atisfactory evidenc e
or proof of good moral character i s his obligation to reveal to the Court a ll his i nvolvement in a ny cri minal case so that th e Court ca n consider them in the
a s certainment a nd determination of his moral character. And undeniably, with the applicant's criminal records before i t, the Court will be i n a better
pos ition to consider the applicant's moral character; for i t could not be gainsaid that a n a pplicant's i nvolvement in any cri minal case, whether pending or
termi nated by i ts dismissal or a pplicant's acquittal or conviction, has a bearing upon his character or fi tness for a dmission to the Bar. In 1963 a nd 1964,
when respondent Galang took the Bar for the second a nd third time, respectively, the application form provided by the Court for use of a pplicants a lready
requi red the applicant to declare under oath that "he has not been a ccused of, indicted for or convicted by a ny court or t ri bunal of any offense involving
mora l turpitude; and that there is no pending case of that nature against him." By 1966, when Galang took the Bar examinations for the fourth time, the
a pplication form prepared by the Court for use of a pplicants required the a pplicant to reveal all his cri minal cases whether i nvolvi ng moral turpitude or
not. In pa ragraph 4 of that form, the a pplicant is required under oath to declare that "he has not been charged with any offe nse before a Fiscal, Municipal
Judge, or other officer; or a ccused of, i ndicted for or convicted by any court or tri bunal of any cri me i nvolving moral turpitude; nor is there a pending case
a ga inst him" (Adm. Ca se No. 1163, p. 56, rec.). Yet, respondent Galang continued to intentionally wi thhold or conceal from the Court his cri minal case of
s l ight physical injuries which was then a nd until now is pending in the City Court of Ma nila; a nd thereafter repeatedly omitt ed to make mention of the
s a me in his a pplications to take the Bar examinations i n 1967, 1969 a nd 1971.

Al l told, respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, is guilty of fra udulently concealing a nd withholding from the Co urt his pending cri minal case
for phys ical injuries in 1962, 1963, 1964, 1966, 1967, 1969 a nd 1971; a nd i n 1966, 1967,1969 a nd 1971, he committed perjury when he declared under
oa th that he had no pending cri minal case i n court. By fa lsely representing to the Court that he had no cri minal case pending in court, respondent Galang
wa s allowed unconditionally to ta ke the Bar examinations seven (7) times and in 1972 was a llowed to take his oath.

Tha t the concealment of an a ttorney i n his a pplication to ta ke the Bar examinations of the fact that he had been charged with, or i ndicted for, an alleged
cri me, i s a ground for revocation of his license to practice law is well — s ettled (see 165 ALR 1151, 7 CJS 741). Thus :

[1] It requires no argument to reach the conclusion that the respondent, in withholding from the board of law examiners a nd f rom the justice of this
court, to whom he applied for a dmission, i nformation respecting so s erious a matter a s an indictment for a felony, was guilty of fraud upo n the court
(ca s es cited).

[2] It i s equally cl ear that, had the board of law examiners, or the judge to whom he applied for a dmission, been apprised of the true situation, neither the
certi ficate of the board nor of the judge would have been forthcoming (State ex rel. Board of Law Examiners v. Podell, 207 N — W — 709 — 710).

The l icense of respondent Podell was revoke a nd a nnulled, a nd he was required to surrender to the clerk of court the l icense issued to him, a nd his name
wa s stricken from the roll of a ttorneys (p. 710).

Li kewise i n Re Ca rpel, i t was declared that:

[1] The power to a dmit to the bar on motion is conferred in the discretion of the Appellate Division.' In the exercise of the discretion, the court s hould be
i nformed truthfully a nd frankly of matters tending to show the character of the a pplicant and his s tanding at the bar of the s tate from which he comes.
The fi nding of i ndictments against him, one of which was s till outstanding a t the time of his motion, were fa cts which s hould have been submitted to the
court, wi th s uch explanations as were available. Silence respecting them was reprehensible, as tending to deceive the court (165 NYS, 102, 104; emphasis
s upplied).

Ca rpel's admission to the bar was revoked (p. 105).

Furthermore, respondent's persistent denial of his i nvolvement in any cri minal case des pite his having been apprised by the Investigation of s ome of the
ci rcums tances of the cri minal case i ncluding the very na me of the vi ctim i n that case(he finally a dmitted it when he was conf ronted by the victim himself,
who wa s called to testify thereon), a nd his continued failure for about thirteen years to cl ear his name in that cri minal case up to the present ti me,
i ndicate his l ack of the requisite attributes of honesty, probity a nd good demeanor. He is therefore unworthy of becoming a m ember of the noble
profession of law.

Whi le this aspect of the i nvestigation was not part of the formal resolution of the Court requiring him to explain why his na me should not be s tricken
from the Roll of Attorneys, respondent Galang was, as early a s August, 1973, a pprised of his omission to reveal to the Court his pending cri minal case. Yet
he di d not offer a ny explanation for s uch omission.

Under the ci rcumstances in which respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Ga lang, was allowed to ta ke the Bar examinations and the highly i rregular
ma nner i n which he passed the Bar, WE have no other a lternative but to order the s urrender of his a ttorney's certificate a nd the striking out of his name
from the Roll of Attorneys. For as WE s aid in Re Felipe del Rosario:

The pra ctice of the law is not a n absolute right to be gra nted every one who demands it, but is a privilege to be extended or withheld in the exercise of
s ound discretion. The standards of the l egal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of the criminal law.
It woul d be a disgrace to the Judiciary to receive one whose integrity i s questionable as a n officer of the court, to clothe him with all the prestige of i ts
confi dence, and then to permit him to hold himself as a duly a uthorized member of the bar (ci ting American cases) [52 Phi l. 399-401].

Wha t WE now do with respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, in this present ca se is not without a ny precedent i n t his jurisdiction. WE had
on s everal occasions in the past nullified the a dmission of successful bar ca ndidates to the membership of the Bar on the grounds, among others, of
(a )misrepresentations of, or false pretenses relative to, the requirement on a pplicant's educational a ttainment [Tapel vs. Pu blico, resolution of the
Supreme Court striking off the name of Juan T. Publico from the Roll of Attorneys on the basis of the findings of the Court I nvestigators contained i n their
report a nd recommendation, Feb. 23, 1962; In re: Telesforo A. Diao, 7 SCRA 475-478; (b) l a ck of good moral character [In re: Peralta, 101 Phil. 313-314];
a nd (c) fra udulent passing of the Bar examinations [People vs. Romualdez -- re: Luis Ma bunay, 57 Phi l. 151; In re: Del Rosario, 52 Phi l. 399 a nd People vs.
Ca s tro a nd Doe, 54 Phil. 42]. In the cases of Romualdez (Mabunay) and Ca stro, the Court found that the grades of Mabunay a nd Ca stro were falsified and
they were convicted of the cri me of falsification of public documents.

IV

RE: Admi nistrative Case No. 1164, As sistant Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo (now CFI Judge), Judge Ramon Pa matian(Later Associate Justice of the Court
of Appeals, now deceased)Atty. Ma nuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fi del Ma nalo, Atty. Ma nuel Tomacruz and Atty. Guillermo Pa blo, Jr. , respondents.

Al l respondents Bar e xaminers candidly admitted having made the re -evaluation and/or re -correction of the papers i n question upon the
mi s representation of respondent BarConfidant Lanuevo. All, however, professed good faith; and that they re -evaluated or i ncreased the grades of the
notebooks without knowing the identity of the examinee who owned the s aid notebooks; a nd that they did the same without a ny c onsideration or
expectation of a ny. These the records clearly demonstrate a nd WE a re of the opinion and WE so declare that i ndeed the respondents-examiners made
the re-evaluation or re-correcion i n good faith and without any consideration whatsoever.

Cons idering however the vi tal public interest i nvolved i n the matter of a dmission of members to the Bar, the respondents bar examiners, under the
ci rcums tances, should have exercised greater ca re a nd ca ution a nd should have been more i nquisitive before a cceding to the re quest of respondent Bar
Confi dant Lanuevo. They could have asked the Chairman of the Bar Exa mination Committee, who would have referred the matter to the Supreme Court.
At l east the respondents-examiners should have required respondent La nuevo to produce or s how them the complete grades and/or the a verage of the
exa minee represented by respondent Lanuevo to have failed only i n their respective a nd particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing to
ful ly s atisfy themselves that the examinee concerned was really s o ci rcumstances. This they could have easily done and the st ain on the Bar examinations
coul d have been a voided.

Res pondent Bar examiners Montecillo, Pa matian, a nd Ma nalo claimed a nd s o declared under oath that the answers of respondent G alang really deserved
or meri ted the i ncreased grades; a nd s o with respondent Pardo i n connection with the re -evaluation of Ernesto Quitaleg's answers i n Political La w. With
res pect to respondents Tomacruz and Pablo, it would a ppear that they i ncreased the gra des of Galang in their respective subje ct solely because of the
mi s representations of Respondent Lanuevo. Hence, i n the words of respondent Tomacruz: "You brought to me one paper a nd you said that this particular
exa minee had almost passed, however, i n my s ubject he received 60 s omething, I ca nnot remember the exact average a nd i f he would get a few points
hi gher, he would get a passing average. I a greed to do that because I did not wish to be the one ca using his failure. ..." (Vol. V, pp . 60-61, rec.; s ee also
a l legations 3 a nd 4, Exh. 1-Tomacruz, Adm. Ca se No. 1164, p. 69, rec.; emphasis ours). And respondent Pa blo: "... he told me that this particular examinee
s eems to have passed in a llot her subject except this subject and that i f I ca n re -evaluate this examination notebook a nd increase the mark to a t least 75,
thi s particular examinee will pass the bar examinations so I believe I asked him 'Is this being done?' a nd he said 'Yes, that is the practice used to be done
before to help out examinees who are failing in just one subject' s o I readily a cceded to his request a nd s aid 'Just leave i t with me and I will try to re-
eva l uate' and he left it with me and what i did was to go over the book a nd tri ed to be a s lenient as I could. While I did not mark correct the a nswers
whi ch were wrong, what I did was to be more lenient and if the a nswers was correct a lthough i t was not complete I raise the grade s o I had a total of 78
i ns tead of 68 a nd what I did was to correct the grading s heet a ccordingly a nd initial the changes" (Vol. V, pp. 44-45, rec.; emphasis supplied).

It coul d not be seriously denied, however, that the fa vorable re-evaluations made by respondents Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo and Pardo
notwi thstanding their declarations that the increases in gra des they gave were deserved by the examinee concerned, were to a certain extent i nfluenced
by the mi s representation a nd deception committed by respondent La nuevo. Thus in their own words:

Montecillo —

Q And by rea son of that i nformation you made the re -evaluation of the paper?

A Yea s, your Honor.

Q Woul d you have re -evaluated the paper of your own accord i n the a bsence of such information?

A No, your Honor, because I have submitted my report at that ti me" (Vol. V, p. 33, rec.; s ee a lso allegations i n paragraphs 2 , 3, 4 & 5, Affi davit of April 17,
1972, Exh. B-Montecillo; allegation No. 2, Answer dated march 19, 1973, Exh. A-Montecillo, Adm. Ca se No. 1164, pp. 40-41, a nd 72, rec.).

Pa ma tian —

3. Tha t s ometime i n the later part of Ja nuary of this year, he brought back to me a n examination booklet i n Ci vil La w for re-evaluation because a ccording
to hi m the owner of the paper is on the borderline a nd i f I could reconsider his grade to 75% the candidate concerned will ge t passing mark;

4. Tha t ta king his word for it a nd under the belief that i t was re ally the practice and policy of the Supreme Court to do so and in the further belief that I
wa s just manifesting cooperation in doing so, I re -evaluated the paper a nd reconsidered the grade to 75%; ..." (Exh. 2-Pa matian, Adm. Ca se No. 1164, p.
55, rec.); a nd

5. Tha t the above re -evaluation was made i n good faith and under the belief that I a m a uthorized to do so in view of them i s representation of s aid Atty.
Vi ctori o La nuevo, ..." (Exh. 1-Pa matian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 33-34, rec.).

Ma na lo —

(c) In revi sing the grade of the particular examinee concerned, herein respondent carefully evaluated each a nd every a nswer written i n the notebook.
Tes ting the a nswer by the cri teria l aid down by the Court, a nd gi ving the said examinee the benefit of the doubt in vi ew of Mr. La nuevo's representation
tha t i t was only i n that particular s ubject that said examinee failed, herein respondent became convinced that the said exami nee deserved a higher gra de
tha n that previ ously given him, but he did not deserve, i n herein respondent's honest a ppraisal, to be given the passing grade of
75%. ..."(a l legation 5-c, p. 38, Exh. 1-Ma nalo, rec.; emphasis s upplied).

Pa rdo —

... I cons idered i t entirely humanly possible to have erred, because I corrected that particular notebook o n December 31,1971, cons idering especially the
representation of the Bar Confidant that the said examinee had obtained higher grades i n other s ubjects, the highest of which was 84% i n Remedial La w,
i f I reca ll
correctl y. ... (a llegation 7, Exh. 2-Pa rdo, Adm. Ca se No. 1164, p. 62, rec.; emphasis s upplied).
Wi th the misrepresentations and the ci rcumstances utilized by respondent La nuevo to i nduce the herein examiners to make the re-evaluation a dverted
to, no one among them ca n truly cl aim that the re -evaluation effected by them was impartial or free from any i mproper i nfluence, their conceded
i ntegrity, honesty a nd competence notwithstanding.

Cons equently, Ga lang ca nnot justifiably cl aim that he deserved the increased grades given after the said re -evaluations(Galang's memo attached to the
records , Adm. Ca se No. 1163).

At a ny ra te, WE a re convinced, in the light of the explanations of the respondents-examiners, which were earlier quoted in full, that their a ctuations in
connection wi th the re -evaluation of the answers of Galang in fi ve (5) subjects do not warra nt or deserve the i mposition of any disciplinary a ction. WE
fi nd their explanations satisfactory. Nevertheless, WE a re constrained to remind herein respondents -examiners that their participation in the admission of
members to the Bar i s one i mpressed with the highest consideration of public i nterest — a bsolute purity of the proceedings — a nd so are required to
exerci se the greatest or utmost case and vi gilance i n the performance of their duties relative thereto.

Res pondent Atty. Vi ctorio D. La nuevo, in his memorandum filed on November 14, 1973, cl a i med that respondent-examiner Pamatian "in bringing up this
unfounded cause, or l ending undue assistance or support thereto ... wa s motivated with vi ndictiveness due to respondent's ref usal to be pressured i nto
hel ping his (examiner's) alleged fri end — a participant i n the 1971 Ba r Exa minations whom said examiner named as Os car Landicho a nd who, the records
wi l l show, did not pass said examinations (p. 9, La nuevo's memo, Adm. Ca se No. 1162).

It mus t be s tated that this is a very s erious charge against the honor and integrity of the l ate Justice Ramon Pa matian, who passed a way on October 18,
1973 a nd therefore cannot refute La nuevo's i nsinuations. Respondent Vi ctorio D. La nuevo did not bring this out during the investigation which in his
words is "essential to his defense. "His pretension that he did not make this charge during the i nvestigation when Justice Pa matian was s till alive, a nd
deferred the filing of such charge against Justice Pamatian and possibly a lso against Os car Landicho before the latter departed for Australia "until this case
s ha ll have been terminated l est i t be misread or misinterpreted as being intended a s a l everage for a favorable outcome of th is ca se on the part of
res pondent or a n a ct of reprisal", does not i nvite belief; because he does not impugn the motives of the five other members of the 1971 Ba r Exa mination
Commi ttee, who also affirmed that he deceived them i nto re -evaluating or revising the gra des of respondent Galang i n their respective subjects.

It a ppears, however, that after the release of the results of the 1971 Ba r examinations, Oscar Landicho, who failed i n that e xaminations, went to s ee and
di d s ee Ci vil Law examiner Pa matian for the purpose of s eeking his help i n connection with the 1971 Ba r Exa minations. Exa miner Pa matian advised
La ndicho to see the Chairman of the 1971 Ba r Exa mination Committee. Examiner Pa matian mentioned i n passing to La ndicho that a n examination booklet
wa s re-evaluated by him (Pamatian) before the release of the said bar results (Vol. V, pp. 6-7, rec). Even though such information was divulged by
res pondent Pa matian a fter the official release of the bar results, i t remains an i ndecorous a ct, hardly expected of a member of the Judiciary who should
exhi bit restraint in his a ctuations demanded by resolute adherence to the rules of delicacy. His unseemly a ct tended to undermine the integrity of the bar
exa minations a nd to impair public faith i n the Supreme Court.

VI

The i nvestigation failed to unearth direct evidence that the illegal machination of respondent La nuevo to enable Galang to pass the 1971 Ba r
exa minations was committed for va luable consideration.

There a re, however, a cquisitions made by Respondent La nuevo immediately a fter the official release of the 1971 Ba r examinations in February, 1972,
whi ch may be out of proportion to his salary as Bar Confidant a nd Deputy Cl erk of Court of the Supreme Court.

1. On Apri l 5, 1972, res pondent Lanuevo and his wife acquired from the BF Homes, Inc. a house a nd l ot with a n a rea of 374 s quare meters, more or l ess,
for the a mount of P84,114.00. The deed of sale was dated Ma rch 5, 1972 but wa s notarized only on April 5, 1972. On the s ame date, however,
res pondent La nuevo a nd his wife executed two (2)mortgages covering the said house and lot in favor of BF Homes, Inc. in the total a mount of P67,291.20
(Fi rs t mortgage — P58,879.80, Entry No. 90913: da te of instrument — April 5, 1972, da te of i nscription — April 20, 1972: Second mortgage — P8,411.40,
Entry No. 90914: da te of i nstrument — Apri l 5, 1972, da te of inscription — April 20, 1972). [D-2 to D-4, Vol . III, rec.]. Respondent La nuevo paid a s down
pa yment the a mount of only P17,000.00, whi ch according to him is equivalent to 20%, more or l ess, of the purchase price of P8 4,114.00. Respondent
La nuevo claimed that P5,000.00 of the P17,000.00 wa s his savings while the remaining the P12,000.00 ca me from his sister i n O kinawa in the form of a
l oa n a nd received by him through a niece before Christmas of 1971 i n dollars ($2000) [Vol. VII, pp. 41-48; Vol . VIII, pp. 2-3, rec.]

It a ppears, however, that his alleged P5,000.00 s a vings and P12,000.00 l oan from his sister; a re not fully reflected and acco unted for i n respondent's 1971
Sta tement of Assets and Liabilities which he filed on Ja nuary 17, 1972.

In s aid 1971 s tatement, respondent Lanuevo listed under As sets a bank deposit in the a mount of only P2,000.00. In hi s 1972 s t atement, his bank deposit
l i sted under Assets was in the amount of P1,011.00, whi ch shows therefore that of the P2,000.00 ba nk deposit listed i n his 1971 s ta tement under Assets,
onl y the amount of P989.00 wa s used or withdrawn. The a mount of P18,000.00 receivable l isted under As sets i n his 1971 s ta teme nt was not realized
beca use the tra nsaction therein i nvolved did not push through (Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent La nuevo from 1965 to 1972; Vol . VIII,
pp. 47-48, rec.).

Li kewise, the alleged December, 1971 $2000 l oa n of respondent from his married sister i n Okinawa is extremely doubtful. In th e first place, said amount
of $2000 (P12,000.00) i s not reflected i n his 1971 Sta tement of Assets and Liabilities filed on January 17, 1972. Secondly, t he a lleged note which he
a l legedly received from his sister at the ti me he received the $200 was not even presented by respondent during the investigation. And a ccording to
Res pondent Lanuevo himself, while he considered this a loan, his sister did not seriously consider it as one. In fact, no mode or ti me of payment was
a greed upon by them. And furthermore, during the investigation, respondent La nuevo promised to furnish the Investigator the a ddress of his sister i n
Oki nawa. Said promise was not fulfilled as borne out by the records. Considering that there is no s howing that his sister, who has a family of her own, is
a mong the top earners in Okinawa or has saved a lot of money to gi ve to him, the conclusion, therefore, that the P17,000.00 o f respondent Lanuevo was
ei ther a n ill-gotten or undeclared income is inevitable under the foregoing circumstances.

On Augus t 14, 1972, res pondent Lanuevo and his wife mortgaged their BF Homes house a nd l ot to the GSIS for the a mount of P65,000.00 (Ent ry No. 4992:
Augus t 14, 1972 — da te of instrument; August 23, 1972 — da te of inscription). On February 28, 1973, the s econd mortgage i n favor of BF Homes, Entry
No. 90914, wa s redeemed by respondent and was s ubsequently ca ncelled on Ma rch 20,1973, Entry No. 30143. Subs equently, or on Ma rch 2, 1973 the
fi rs t mortgage i n favor of BF Homes, Entry No. 90913 wa s also redeemed by respondent La nuevo a nd thereafter ca ncelled on Ma rch 20, 1973, (See D-2 to
D-4, Vol . III, rec.). Hence, only the mortgage i n favor of GSIS remains as the encumbrance of respondent's house a nd l ot. According to respondent
La nuevo, the monthly a mortization of the GSIS mortgage is P778.00 a month, but that since Ma y of 1973, he was unable to pay the same. In his 1972
Sta tement of Assets and Liabilities, which he filed in connection with his resignation a nd retirement (filed October 13, 1972 ), the house a nd lot declared
a s part of his assets, were valued at P75,756.90. Li s ted, however, as an item in his liabilities i n the same statement was th e GSIS real estate l oan in the
a mount of P64,200.00 (1972 Sta tement of Assets and Liabilities).

2. Li s ted as an asset i n his 1972 Sta tement of Assets a nd Liabilities i s a 1956 VW ca r va l ued a t P5,200.00. Tha t he acquired this car s ometime between
Ja nuary, 1972 a nd November, 1972 could be i nferred from the fact that no s uch car or a ny ca r was listed i n his statement of a ssets and liabilities of 1971
or i n the years previous to 1965. It a ppears, however, that his listed total assets, excluding receivables i n his 1971 Sta tem ent was P19,000.00, while i n his
1972 (a s of November, 1972) Sta tement, his listed total assets, excluding the house and lot was P18,211.00, i ncluding the said 1956 VW ca r worth
P5,200.00.

The proxi mity i n point of ti me between the official release of the 1971 Ba r examinations and the acquisition of the a bove -mentioned properties, tends to
l i nk or ti e up the said acquisitions with the i llegal machination committed by respondent La nuevo with respect to respondent Galang's examination
pa pers or to s how that the money used by respondent Lanuevo in the acquisition of the a bove properties ca me from respondent Galang i n consideration
of hi s passing the Bar.

Duri ng the early s tage of this i nvestigation but a fter the Court had informed respondent Lanuevo of the s erious irregularitie s i n the 1971 Ba r examinations
a l leged i n Oscar La ndicho's Confidential Letter a nd i n fact, a fter Respondent La nuevo had filed on April 12, 1972 hi s sworn s tatement on the matter, as
ordered by the Court, respondent Lanuevo surprisingly filed his l etter or resignation on October 13, 1972 wi th the end in vi e w of retiring from the Court.
Hi s resignation before he was required to show cause on March 5, 1973 but a fter he was i nformed of the said irregularities, i s indicative of a
cons ciousness of guilt.

It mus t be noted that immediately a fter the official release of the results of the 1971 Ba r examinations, respondent Lanuevo went on va cation a nd sick
l eave from Ma rch 16, 1972 to Ja nuary 15, 1973, obta ining the case va lue thereof i n lump sum in the amount of P11,000.00. He i nitially claimed at the
i nvestigation that h e used a part thereof as a down payment for his BF Homes house a nd l ot (Vol. VII, pp. 40-48, rec.), which he bought on April 5, 1972.

Cri mi nal proceedings may be i nstituted a gainst respondent Lanuevo under Section 3 (a & e) i n relation to Section 9 of Republ ic Act No. 1379 (Anti -Graft
La w) for:

(a ) Pers uading inducing or i nfluencing another public officer to perform a n act constituting a vi olation of rules a nd regulat ions duly promulgated by
competent authority or a n offense in connection with the official d uties of the latter, or a llowing himself to be presented, i nduced, or i nfluenced to
commi t s uch vi olation or offense.

xxx xxx xxx

(e) Ca using any undue injury to a ny pa rty, i ncluding the Government, or giving a ny private party a ny unwarranted benefits, a dvantage or preference in
the di scharge of his official a dministrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evi dence bad faith or gross i nexcusable negligence. This
provi sion s hall a pply to officers a nd employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of l icenses or permits or other concessions.

Secti on 8 of s aid Republic Act No. 3019 a uthorizes the dismissal or removal of a public officer once it is determined that hi s property or money "is
ma nifestly out of proportion to his s alary a s such public officer or employee and to his other lawful i ncome a nd the i ncome from legitimately a cquired
property ... " (Sec. 2, Rep. Act 1379; Sec. 8, Rep. Act 3019).

It s hould be s tressed, however, that respondent La nuevo's a forementioned Statements of Assets and Liabilities were not presented or ta ken up during
the i nvestigation; but they were examined as they a re part of the records of this Court.

There a re likewise circumstances indicating possible contacts between respondent Ramo n E. Galang a nd/or his father a nd respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo
before the l atter become the bar Confidant.

1. Res pondent Ramon E. Galang was a beneficiary of the G.I Bill of Rights educational program of the Philippine Veterans Boar d from his high s chool days
— 1951 to 1955 — up to hi s pre-law s tudies at the MLQ Educa tional Institution (now MLQ Uni versity) — 1955 to 1958. From 1948 to 1958, res pondent
Vi ctori o D. La nuevo was connected with the Philippine Veterans Board which is the governmental agency en trusted with the affairs of our veterans
i ncl uding the i mplementation of the Veterans Bill of Rights. From 1955 to 1958, Res pondent La nuevo s uccessively held the posi tion of Junior Investigator,
Vetera ns Claims Investigator, Supervising Veterans Investigator a nd Veterans Claims Investigator (Service Record, p. 9, Adm. Ca se No. 1162). During that
peri od of time, therefore, respondent La nuevo had direct contacts with a pplicants and beneficiaries of the Veterans Bill of R ights. Galang's educational
benefits was a pproved on Ma rch 16, 1954, retroa ctive as of the date of waiver — Jul y 31, 1951, whi ch is also the date of filing (A, Vol. IV, rec.).

It i s alleged by respondent Ramon E. Galang that it was his father who all the ti me a ttended to the availment of the s aid educational benefits and even
when he was already i n Manila taking up his pre -law a t MLQ Educational Institution from 1955 to 1958. In 1955, res pondent Galang was already 19 yea rs
ol d, a nd from 1957 to 1958, he wa s employed as a technical assistant in the office of Senator Roy (Vol. V, pp. 79-80, 86-87, rec.).[Subsequently, during the
i nvestigation, he claimed that he was the private s ecretary of Senator Puyat i n 1957 (Vol. VI, pp. 12-13, rec.)]. It a ppears, however, that a copy of the
noti ce-letter dated June 28, 1955 of the Phi lippine Veterans Board to the MLQ Educa tional Institution on the a pproval of the tra nsfer of respondent
Ga l ang from Sta. Rita Institute to the MLQ Educational Institution effective the first semester of the s chool year 1955-56 wa s directly a ddressed and
furni shed to respondent Ramon E. Galang at 2292 Int. 8 Ba nal St., Tondo, Ma nila (A-12, Vol. IV, rec.).

Res pondent Ramon E. Galang further declared that he never went to the Office of the Philippine Veterans to follow up his educ ational benefits and
cl a imed that he does not even know the l ocation of the said office. He does not also know whether beneficiaries of the G.I. B ill of Rights educational
benefits are required to go to the Philippine Veterans Board every s emester to submit their ra tings (Vol. V, p. 86, rec.). But respondent Galang admits that
he ha d gone to the GSIS and Ci ty Court of Ma nila, although he i nsists that he never bothered to ta ke a look a t the neighborin g buildings (Vol. V, pp. 93-94,
rec.). The huge and imposing Philippine Veterans Building is beside the GSIS building and is obliquely a cross the Ci ty Court building.

2. Res pondent Lanuevo s tated that as an investigator i n the Philippine Veterans Board, he i nvestigated claims for the several benefits given to veterans
l i ke educational benefits a nd disability benefits; that he does not remember, however, whether i n the course of his duties as veterans investigator, he
ca me a cross the application of Ramon E. Galang for educational benefits; a nd that he does not know the father of Mr. Ra mon E. Galang and has never
met hi m (Vol. VII, pp. 28, 49, rec.).

3. Res pondent Lanuevo, a s a member of the USAFEE, belonged to the 91st Infantry operating at Zambales a nd then Ca banatuan, Nueva Ecija, shortly
before the wa r (Vol. VII, pp. 48-49, rec.). La ter he joined the guerrilla movement i n Samar.

He us ed to be a member of the Philippine Veterans Legion especially while working with the Philippine Veterans Board(Vol. VII, p. 49, rec.).
He does not know the Banal Regiment of the guerrillas, to which Galang's father belonged. During the Japanese occupation, his guerrilla outfit was
opera ting i n Samar only a nd he had no communications with other guerrilla organization in other parts of the country.

He a ttended meetings of the Philippine Veterans Legion in his chapter i n Samar only and does not remember having attended i ts meeting here i n Ma nila,
even while he was employed with the Philippine Veterans Board. He is not a member of the Defenders of Bataan and Corregidor ( Vol. VII, p.51, rec.).

On November 27, 1941, whi l e respondent Lanuevo was with the Philippine Army s tationed at Ca mp Ma nacnac, Ca banatuan, Nueva Ecija, he was s tricken
wi th pneumonia and was hospitalized a t the Nueva Ecija Provincial Hospital as a result a nd was still confined there when thei r ca mp was bombed a nd
s tra fed by Japanese planes on December 13, 1941 (Sworn s tatement of respondent La nuevo dated August 27, 1973, Adm. Ca s e No. 1162, p. 46, rec.).

Germa n Galang, father of respondent Galang, was a member of the Banal Guerilla Forces, otherwise known a s the Banal Regiment. He was commissioned
a nd i nducted as a member thereof on January 16, 1942 a nd was given the rank of first lieutenant. His unit "was attached and served i nto the XI -Corps, US
Army; XIII-C US Army, 43rd Di v., US Army, s ta tioned headquarters a t Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija and with the 38th Division, US a rmy stati oned at Corregidor i n
the mopping-up operations against the enemies, from 9 Ma y 1945 da te of recognition to 31 December 1945, da te of demobilization"(Affidavit of Jose
Ba nal dated December 22, 1947, Vol . IV, A-3, rec.).

It s hould be s tressed that once the bar examiner has submitted the corrected notebooks to the Bar Confidant, the same ca nnot be withdrawn for any
purpose whatsoever without prior a uthority from the Court. Consequently, this Court expresses herein its strong disapproval o f the actuations of the bar
exa miners i n Administrative Ca se No. 1164 a s above delineated.

WHEREFORE, IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1162, RESPONDENT VICTORIO D. LANUEVO IS HEREBY DISBARRED AND HIS NAME ORDERED STRICKEN FROM
THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS; AND IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1163, RESPONDENT RAMON E. GALANG, a lias Roman E. GALANG, IS HEREBY LIKEWISE
DISBARRED AND HIS NAME ALSO ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS.

Ma ka lintal, C.J., Ca stro, Fernando, Barredo, Esguerra, Muñoz Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur.

Teehankee, J., concurs in the result.

Antoni o, J., i s on official leave.

Concepcion and Ma rtin, JJ., took no part.

EN BANC
[B.M. NO. 1222 : February 4, 2004]
Re: 2003 BAR EXAMINATIONS

RE SO LU TI O N

PER CURIAM:

On 22 September 2003, the day following the bar examination i n Mercantile Law, Justice Jose C. Vi tug, Chairman of the 2003 Ba r Examinations
Commi ttee, was a pprised of a rumored l eakage i n the examination on the subject. After making his own inquiries, Just ice Vitug reported the matter to
Chi ef Justice Hilario G. Davi de, Jr., a nd to the other members of the Court, recommending that the bar examination on the s ubject be nullified a nd that an
i nvestigation be conducted forthwith. On 23 September 2003, the Court a dopted the recommendation of Justice Vitug, and resolved to nullify the
exa mination in Mercantile La w a nd to hold another examination on 04 October 2003 a t eight oclock in the evening (being the ea rliest available ti me a nd
da te) at the De La Salle University, Ta ft Avenue, Ma nila. The resolution was issued without prejudice to a ny a ction that the Court would further ta ke on
the ma tter.

Fol lowing the issuance of the resolution, the Court received numerous petitions a nd motions from the Philippine Associat ion of Law Schools a nd va rious
other groups and persons, expressing agreement to the nullification of the bar examinations i n Mercantile Law but voicing s trong reservations against the
hol ding of a nother examination on the subject. Several reasons were advanced by petitioners or movants, a mong these reasons being the physical,
emoti onal and financial difficulties that would be encountered by the examinees, if another examination on the s ubject were t o be held anew. Alternative
proposals s ubmitted to the Court i ncluded the spreading out of the weight of Mercantile Law among the remaining s even bar s ubjects, i.e., to determine
a nd gauge the results of the examinations on the basis only of the performance of the examinees in the seven bar subjects. In a resolution, dated 29
September 2003, the Court, finding merit in the s ubmissions, resolved to cancel the s cheduled examination i n Mercantile Law o n 04 October 2003 a nd to
a l locate the fi fteen percentage points among the seven bar examination s ubjects. In the same resolution, the Court further resolved to create a
Commi ttee composed of three retired members of the Court that would conduct a thorough i nvestigation of the i ncident subject of the 23 September
2003 res olution.

In a resolution, dated 07 October 2003, the Court adopted the computation in the allocation of the fifteen percentage points for Mercantile Law among
the remaining s even bar examination subjects, to wi t:

Subject
Ori gi na Percentage Weight
Adjus ted Percentage Weight
Rel ative Weight
Adjus ted Relative Weight
Pol i tical a nd International Law
15%
17.647%
3
3.53%
La bor a nd Social Legislation
10%
11.765%
2
2.35%
Ci vi l law
15%
17.647%
3
3.53%
Ta xa tion
10%
11.765%
2
2.35%
Cri mi nal law
10%
11.765%
2
2.35%
Remedial Law
20%
23.529%
4
4.71%
Lega l Ethics and Pra ctical Exercises
5%
5.882%
1
1.18%
100%
20%
In a nother resolution, dated 14 October 2003, the Court designated the following retired Associate Justices of the Supreme Co urt to compose the
Investigating Committee:

Cha i rman: Jus ti ce Ca rolina C. Gri ño-Aquino

Members: Jus ti ce Jose A.R. Melo
Jus ti ce Vicente V. Mendoza
The Investigating Committee was tasked to determine a nd i dentify the s ource of l eakage, the parties responsible therefor or w ho might have benefited
therefrom, recommend sanctions against all those found to have been responsible for, or who would have benefited from, the i ncident in question and to
recommend measures to the Court to safeguard the i ntegrity of the bar examinations.

On 15 Ja nuary 2004, the Investigating Committee submitted its report a nd recommendation to the Court, herein reproduced in full; thus -crvll

In the morning of September 21, 2003, the thi rd Sunday of the 2003 ba r examinations, the examination i n commercial law was he ld in De l a Salle
Uni versity on Taft Avenue, Ma nila, the venue of the bar examinations since 1995. The next day, the newspapers ca rried news of a n alleged leakage in the
s a id examination.1 ςrνll

Upon hearing the news and making preliminary i nquiries of his own, Justice Jose C. Vi tug, chairman of the 2003 Ba r Exa minations Committee, reported
the ma tter to the Chief Justice and recommended that the examination in mercantile l aw be ca ncelled and that a formal i nvesti gation of the l eakage be
undertaken.

Acti ng on the report and recommendation of Justice Vi tug, the Court, i n a resolution dated September 23, 2003, nullified the examination i n mercantile
l a w a nd resolved to hold another examination i n that subject on Saturday, October 4, 2003 a t ei ght oclock in the evening (being the earliest available time
a nd date) at the same venue. However, because numerous petitions, protests, a nd motions for reconsideration were filed a gains t the retaking of the
exa mination in mercantile law, the Court ca ncelled the holding of such examination. On the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Court
i ns tead decided to a llocate the fi fteen (15) percentage points for mercantile law among the seven (7) other bar examination s ubjects (Resolution dated
October 7, 2003).

In a Resolution dated September 29, 2003, the Supreme Court created an Investigating Committee composed of three (3) retired Members of the Court
to conduct a n i nvestigation of the l eakage a nd to submit its findings a nd recommendations on or before December 15, 2003.

The Court designated the following retired Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to compose the Committee:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl l αω
l ιbrαrÿ

Cha i rman: JusticeCAROLINA GRIO-AQUINO

Members: Justice JOSE A. R. MELO

Jus ti ce VICENTE V. MENDOZA

The Investigating Committee was directed to determine a nd identify the source of the leakage, the parties responsible therefor a nd those who benefited
therefrom, a nd to recommend measures to s afeguard the i ntegrity of the bar examinations.

The i nvestigation commenced on October 21, 2003 a nd continued up to November 7, 2003. The following witnesses a ppeared a nd testifie d a t the
i nvestigation:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω l ιbrαrÿ

1.As s ociate Justice Jose C. Vi tug, chairman of the 2003 Ba r Exa minations Committee;chanroblesvi rtuallawlibrary

2.Atty. Ma rl o Ma gdoza-Malagar, law clerk in the office of Justice Vitug

3.Atty. Ma rci a l O. T. Ba lgos, examiner in mercantile law;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

4.Cheryl Pa l ma, private secretary of Atty. Ba l gos;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

5.Atty. Da nilo De Guzman, assistant lawyer i n the firm of Balgos & Perez;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

6.Atty. Enri co G. Velasco, managing partner of Balgos & Perez;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

7.Edua rdo J. F. Abella, reviewer in commercial law a t the Lex Review Center;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

8.Si l vestre T. Ati enza, office manager of Balgos & Perez;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

9.Reyni ta Villasis, private secretary of Atty. De Guzman;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

10.Rona n Garvi da, fraternity brother of Atty. De Guzman;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

11.Rona ld F. Collado, most illustrious brother of the Beta Sigma La mbda Fraternity;chanroblesvi rtuallawlibrary

12.Jovi to M. Sa l onga, Asst. Division Chief of Sys tems Development for Judicial Application, Ml SO;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The Commi ttee held nine (9) meetings - s ix ti mes to conduct the i nvestigation and three times to deliberate on its report.

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE JOSE C. VI TUG, chairman of the Bar Examinations Committee, testified that on Monday morning, September 22, 2003, the day a fter
the Ba r examination in mercantile or commercial law, upon arriving i n his office in the Supreme Court, his secretary,2 Rose Ka wada, informed him that
one of the l aw cl erks, Atty. Ma rl o Ma gdoza-Malagar, told her that a friend of hers named Ma . Cecilia Delgado-Carbajosa, a bar examinee from Xavier
Uni versity i n Ca gayan de Oro Ci ty, who was staying a t the Garden Plaza Hotel in Paco, confided to her that s omething was wrong with the examination in
merca ntile l aw, because previous to the examination, i .e., on Saturday a fternoon, the eve of the examination, she received a copy of the test questions i n
tha t s ubject. She did not pay a ttention to the test questions because no a nswers were provided, and she was hard -pressed to fi nish her review of that
s ubject, using other a vailable bar review materials, of which there were plenty coming from va rious bar revi ew centers.cr11

However, upon perusing the questions after the examinations, Cecilia noticed that many of them were the s ame questions that were asked i n the just-
concl uded-examination.

Jus ti ce Vitug requested Ma rlo to i nvite her fri end to his office i n the Supreme Court, but Ca rbajosa declined the invitation. So, Justice Vitug suggested that
Ma rl o a nd Rose invi te Carbajosa to meet them a t Robinsons Place, Ermita. She agreed to do that.
Ceci l ia Ca rbajosa a rrived at Robinsons Place a t the appointed time and showed the test questions to Rose and Marlo. Rose obta ined a xerox copy of the
l eaked questions a nd compared them with the bar questions in mercantile law. On the back of the pages, she wrote, i n her own hand, the differences s he
noted between the leaked questions and the bar examination questions.

Ros e and Marlo delivered the copy of the leaked questions to Justice Vitug who compared them with the bar examination questions i n mercantile law. He
found the leaked questions to be the exact same questions which the examiner in mercantile law, Attorney Ma rcial O. T. Ba lgos , had prepared and
s ubmitted to him a s chairman of the Bar Examinations Committee. However, not a ll of those questions we re asked in the bar examination. According to
Jus ti ce Vitug, only 75% of the final bar questions were questions prepared by Atty. Ba lgos; 25% prepared by Justice Vitug him self, were i ncluded i n the
fi nal bar examination. The questions prepared by Justice Vitug were not a mong the leaked test questions.

Apa rt from the published news s tories about the l eakage, Chief Justice Hilario G. Davi de, Jr. a nd Justice Vitug received, by telephone and mail, reports of
the l eakage from Dean Ma riano F. Ma gsalin, Jr. of th e Arellano La w Foundation (Exh. H) a nd a certain Dale Philip R. De los Reyes (Exh. B -B-3), a ttaching
copi es of the leaked questions and the fax tra nsmittal sheet showing that the source of the questions was Danny De Guzman who faxed them to Ronan
Ga rvi da on September 17, 2003, four da ys before the examination i n mercantile law on September 21, 2003 (Exh. B -1).

ATTORNEY MARLO MAGDOZA-MALAGAR was subpoenaed by the Committee. She i dentified the copy of the leaked questions that ca me from Cecilia
Ca rba josa (Exh. A). She testified that, a ccording to Ca rbajosa, the l atter received the test questions from one of her co -bar reviewees staying, like her, a t
the Ga rden Pl aza Hotel i n Pa co, a nd also enrolled in the revi ew classes at the Lex Review Center a t the corner of P. Fa ura Street a nd Roxas Boulevard,
Ermi ta . She did not pay for the hand-out because the Lex Review Center gives them a way for free to its bar reviewees.

ATTORNEY MARCIAL O. T. BALGOS, 71 yea rs of a ge, s enior partner in the law fi rm of BALGOS AND PER EZ with offices i n Rm. 1009 West Tektite Tower,
Excha nge Road, Ortigas Center, Pasig Ci ty, testified that in November 2002, Justice Jose C. Vi tug, as chair of the Committee on the 2003 Ba r Examinations,
i nvi ted him to be the examiner i n commercial law. He accepted the assignment and almost immediately began the preparation of test questions on the
s ubject. Using his personal computer i n the law office, he prepared for three consecutive days, three (3) s ets of test questi ons which covered the entire
s ubject of Mercantile Law (pp. 3-5, ts n, Oct. 24, 2003). As he di d not know how to prepare the questionnaire in final form, he asked his private secretary,
Cheryl Pa lma, to format the questions (p. 13, ts n, Oct. 24, 2003) .And, a s he did not know how to print the questionnaire, he likewise asked Cheryl Palma
to ma ke a print-out (Id., pp. 14-15). Al l of this was done i nside his office with only him and his s ecretary there. His secretary pri nted only one copy (Id., p.
15). He then placed the printed copy of the test questions, consisting of three s ets, i n an envelope which he s ealed, a nd called up Justice Vitug to i nform
hi m that he was bringing the questions to the latters office that a fternoon. However, a s Justice Vitug was leaving his office shortly, he a dvised Atty. Balgos
to gi ve the sealed envelope to his confidential assistant who had been instructed to keep it. When Atty. Ba lgos arrived i n th e office of Justice Vitug, he
wa s met by Justice Vitugs confidential assistant to whom he entrusted the s ealed envelope containing the test questions (pp. 19-26, ts n, Oct. 24, 2003).

Atty. Ba l gos admitted that he does not know how to operate a computer except to type on i t. He does not know how to open a nd close his own computer
whi ch has a password for that purpose. In fact, he did not know, as he s till does, the password. It i s his secretary, Cheryl Palma, who opened a nd cl osed
hi s computer for him (p. 45, ts n, Oct. 24, 2003).

Atty. Ba l gos testified that he did not devise the password himself. It was Cheryl Pa lma who devi sed i t (Id., p. 71).

Hi s computer i s exclusively for his own use. It i s located inside his room which i s locked when he is not in the office. He c omes to the office every other
da y onl y.

He thought that his computer was safely i nsulated from third parties, a nd that he a lone had a ccess to i t. He was surprised to discover, when reports of
the ba r l eakage broke out, that his computer was i n fact i nterconnected with the computers of his nine (9) a ssistant attorneys (tsn, pp. 30,45). As a matter
of fa ct, the employees - Jovito M. Sa longa and Benjamin R. Ka tly - of the Courts Ma nagement Information Systems Office (MISO) who, upon the request
of Atty. Ba l gos, were directed by the Investigating Committee to i nspect the computer s ystem in his office, reported that there were 16, not 9, computers
connected to each other via Local Area Network (LAN) a nd one (1) stand -alone computer connected to the i nternet (Exh. M). Atty. Ba l gos l aw partner,
former Justice Secretary Hernando Perez, a lso had a computer, but Perez took it a way when he became the Secretary of Justice.

The ni ne (9) assistant attorneys with computers, connected to Attorney Ba lgos computer, are:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl l αω l ιbrαrÿ

1. Zora yda Zosobrado (she resigned in July 2003)

2.Cl a ra vel Javi er

3. Rol ynne Torio

4. Ma rk Wa rner Rosal

5. Cha rl ynne Subia

6. Da nilo De Guzman (resigned on October 22, 2003 [Exh. D])

7. Enri co G. Velasco, managing partner

8. Concepcion De los Santos

9. Pa mela June Jalandoni

Upon l earning from Justice Vitug of the leakage of the bar questions prepared by hi m i n mercantile law, Atty. Ba lgos immediat ely called together a nd
questioned his office staff. He i nterrogated all of them except Atty. Da nilo De Guzman who was absent then. All of them professed to know nothing about
the ba r l eakage.

He questioned Silvestre Ati enza, the office manager, Ati enza is only a second year l aw s tudent a t MLQU. But he i s an expert i n i nstalling and operating
computers. It was he and/or his brother Gregorio who i nterconnected the computers in the law office, including Attorney Balgos computer, without the
l a tters knowledge a nd permission.

Ati enza a dmitted to Attorney Balgos that he participated i n the bar operations or bar ops of the Beta Sigma La mbda law fra ternity of which he is a
member, but he clarified that his participation consisted only of bringing food to the MLQU ba r examinees (Tsn, pp. 46 -47, Oct. 24, 2003).
The next day, Attorney Balgos questioned Attorney Danilo De Guzman, also a member of the Beta Sigma La mbda fraternity, FEU chapter. De Guzman
a dmitted to him that he downloaded the test questions from Attorney Balgos computer a nd faxed a copy to a fraternity brother. Attorney Balgos was
convi nced that De Guzman was the s ource of the l eakage of his test questions in mercantile law (Tsn, p. 52, Oct. 24, 2003).

Attorney Ba lgos prepared a COMPARISON (Exh. E) of the juxtaposed final bar questions a nd his proposed test questions, wi th ma rginal markings made by
Jus ti ce Vicente V. Mendoza (Ret.), indicating whether the questions a re similar: (S); or different: (D), together with the percentage points corresponding
to ea ch question. On the basis of this comparative table a nd Atty. Ba lgos indications as to which questions were the same or different from those given in
the fi nal questionnaire, Justice Mendoza computed the credit points contained in the proposed leaked questions. The proposed questions constituted
82% of the fi nal bar questions. Atta ched to this Report as Annex A i s the comparative table a nd the computation of credit points marked as Exh. E-1.

CHERYL PALMA, 34 yea rs old, private s ecretary of Attorney Ba lgos for the past six years, testified that s he did not type the test questions. She admitted,
however, that it was she who formatted the questions a nd printed one copy as directed by her employer. She confirmed Atty. Ba lgos testimony regarding
her pa rticipation in the operation of his personal computer. She disclosed that what a ppears in Atty. Balgos computer ca n be s een i n the neighborhood
network if the other computers are open and not i n use; that Silvestre Atienza of the accounting s ection, ca n access Atty. Ba lgos computer when the
l a tter is open and not in use.

ATTORNEY ENRICO VELASCO, ma naging partner of the firm, testified that on October 16, 2003, he s ent De Guzman a memo (Exh. C) gi ving him 72 hours
to expl ain i n writing why you s hould not be terminated for ca using the Firm an undeserved condemnation and dishonor because o f the l eakage aforesaid.

On October 22, 2003, De Guzma n handed i n his resignation effective i mmediately. He explained that:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl l αω l ιbrαrÿ

Ca us ing the firm, its partners a nd members to s uffer from undeserved condemnation and humiliation i s not only fa rthest from, but totally out of, my
mi nd. It is just unfortunate that the i ncident s ubject ma tter of your memorandum occurred. Rest assured, though, that I have never been part of a ny
del iberate scheme to malign the good reputation and i ntegrity of the firm, i ts partners and members. (Exh. D)

DANILO DE GUZMAN testified that he joined Balgos & Perez in April 2000. He obtained his LLB degree from FEU in 1998. As a s tudent, he was a n awardee
for a ca demic excellence. He passed the 1998 bar examinations with a grade of 86.4%. In FEU, he joined the B eta Sigma Lambda law fraternity which has
cha pters i n MLQU, UE a nd MSU (Mi ndanao State University). As a member of the fraternity, he was active during bar examinations and participated in the
fra ternitys bar ops.

He tes tified that s ometime in May 2003, when he was exploring Atty. Ba lgos computer, (which he often did without the owners knowledge or
permi ssion), to download materials which he thought might be useful to save for future use, he found and downloaded the test questions in mercantile
l a w consisting of 12 pa ges. He a llegedly thought they were quizzers for a book that Atty. Ba lgos might be preparing. He saved them i n hi s hard disk.

He thought of faxing the test questions to one of his fraternity brods, a certain Ronan Garvida who, De Guzman thought, was taking the 2003 ba r
exa minations. Ga rvida is also a law graduate from FEU. He had taken the 2002 ba r examinations, but did not pass.

On September 17, 2003, four da ys before the mercantile law bar examination, DeGuzman faxed a copy of the 12-page-test questions (Exhs. I, I-1, I-2, I-3)
to Ga rvi da because earlier he was informed by Ga rvida that he was retaking the bar examinations. He a dvised Garvida to s hare the questions with other
Beta n examinees. He allegedly di d not charge anything for the test q uestions. Later, a fter the examination was over, Ga rvida texted (sent a text message
on hi s cell phone) him (De Guzman), that he did not take the bar examination.

Bes ides Garvida, De Guzman fa xed the mercantile law bar questions to a nother fraternity brother named Arl an (surname unknown), through Reynita
(Na nette) Villasis, his s ecretary (Tsn, pp. 20-28, Oct. 29, 2003). But he himself faxed the questions to still a nother brod named Erwin Tan who had helped
hi m during the bar ops in 1998 when he (De Guzman) took the bar examinations (Id., p. 28). He obtained the cell phone numbers of Arlan and Erwin Tan
from Ga bby Ta npiengco whom he i nformed by text message, that they were guide questions, not tips, i n the mercantile law exami nation.

When he was confronted by Attorney Velasco on Wednesday a fter the examination, (news of the leakage was a lready i n all the newspapers), De Guzman
a dmitted to Attorney Velasco that he faxed the questions to his fraternity brothers, but he did not reveal where he got the t est questions.

De Guzman received a text message from Erwin Tan acknowledging that he received the test questions. However, Erwin i nformed h im that the questions
were kalat na kalat (all over the place) even i f he did not share them with others (Tsn, pp. 54-55, Oct. 29, 2003).

De Guzman a lso contacted Garvi da who informed him that he gave copies of the test questions to Betans Randy Iigo and James Bu gain.

Arl a n also texted De Guzman that a lmost all the questions were asked in the examination. Erwin Ta n commented that many of the l eaked questions were
a s ked i n the examination, pero hindi exacto; mi binago (they were not exactly the same; there were some changes).

De Guzman tri ed to text Garvi da, but he received no response.

De Guzman disclosed that he learned how to operate a computer from Silvestre Ati enza, the office manager, and through self-study, by a sking those who
a re knowledgeable on computers. He has been using computers since 1997, a nd he bought his own computer i n 2001, a Pentium 3, which he uses at
home.

REYNITA VILLASIS, the 36-year-old l egal secretary of Attorney De Guzman, submitted her a ffidavit (Exh. F) a nd orally a ffirmed her participation in the
reproduction a nd tra nsmittal by fax of the l eaked test questions in mercantile law to Ronan Garvi da and Arlan, as testified by De Guzman.

RONAN GARVIDA, appeared before the Investigating Committee in compliance with the subpoena that was issued to him. Garvida gr aduated from FEU
Col l ege of Law in 2000. He i s about 32 yea rs of age. While still a s tudent i n 1998, he was afflicted with multiple s clerosis or MS, a disease of the nervous
s ys tem that a ttacks the nerve s heaths of the brain and spinal cord. It is a chronic disabling disease although it may have pe riods of remission. It ca uses i ts
vi cti m to walk with erratic, stiff and staggering gait; the hands a nd fingers may tremble i n performing simple a ctions; the eyesight can be impaired, and
s peech may be slow and slurred (p. 737, Vol. 2, Readers Digest Medical Encyclopedia, 1971 Ed., compiled by Benjamin F . Mi ller, M.D.). Al l these symptoms
were present when Garvida testified before the Committee on November 6, 2003 to a ns wer i ts questions regarding his involvement i n the leakage of the
exa miners test questions in mercantile law.

Ga rvi da testified that when he was a freshman at FEU, he became a member of the Beta Sigma Lambda fra ternity where he met a nd was befriended by
Attorney De Guzman who was his s enior by one a nd a half years. Although they had been out of touch since he went home to the provi nce on account of
the recurrence of his i llness, De Guzman was able [to] get this cell phone number from his compadre, Atty. Jos eph Pajara. De Guzman told Garvida that he
wa s faxing him possible questions i n the bar examination i n mercantile law. Because the test questions had no answers, De Guzman stressed that they
were not ti ps but only possible test questions.
Ga rvi da had intended to ta ke the 2003 ba r examinations. He enrolled i n the Consortium Review Center i n FEU, payi ng P10,000.00 a s enrollment fee.
However, on his way to the Supreme Court to file his a pplication to ta ke the bar examination, he suffered pains in his wrist - s ymptoms that his MS ha d
recurred. His physician advised him to go to the National Orthopedic Hospital in Quezon Ci ty for treatment. Thi s he did.

He ga ve up his plan to take the 2003 bar examinations. Nevertheless, he continued to a ttend the revi ew classes a t the Consort ium Review Center because
he di d not want to waste completely the P10,000-enrollment fee that he paid for the review course (Nahihinayang a ko). That was presumably why De
Guzma n thought that Garvida was taking the bar exams and sent him a copy of the test questions i n mercantile law.

Upon receipt of the test questions, Garvida fa xed a copy to his brod Randy Iigo who was reviewing a t the Consortium Review Center. Randy photocopied
them for distribution to other fraternity brods. Some of the brods doubted the usefulness of the test questions, but Randy wh o has a high regard for De
Guzma n, believed that the questions were tips. Garvi da d id not fax the questions to any other person than Randy Iigo. He allegedly did not sell the
questions to Randy. I could not do that to a brod, he explained.

In vi ew of the fact that one of the copies of the l eaked test questions (Exh. H) bore on the l eft margin a rubber s tamp composed of the Greek i nitials BEA-
MLQU, i ndicating that the s ource of that copy was the Beta Sigma Lambda chapter a t MLQU, the Committee s ubpoenaed Ronald Coll ado, the Most
Il l ustrious Brother of the Beta Sigma Lambda fra ternity of MLQU.

RONALD COLLADO i s a senior l aw s tudent at the MLQU. He a dmitted that his fraternity conducted Bar Ops for the 2003 ba r exams. Bar Ops are the
bi ggest a ctivi ty of the fraternity every year. They s tart as s oon as new officers of the fra ternity a re elected in June, and they continue until the bar
exa minations a re over. The bar operations consist of s oliciting funds from alumni brods a nd fri ends to be spent in reproducing bar review materials for
the us e of their barristers (bar candidates) i n the va rious review centers, providing meals for their brod-barristers on examination days ; and to rent a bar
s i te or place near De la Salle University where the examinees and the frat members ca n convene and ta ke their meals during th e break ti me. The Betans
ba r s ite for the 2003 ba r examinations was l ocated on Leon Guinto Street, Ma late. On September 19 a nd 21, before [the] s tart of the examination,
Col l ados fra ternity distributed bar revi ew materials for the mercantile l aw examination to the examinees who came to th e bar site. The test questions
(Exh. H) were received by Collado from a brod, Alan Guiapal, who had received them from Randy Iigo.

Col l ado caused 30 copi es of the test questions to be printed with the l ogo a nd i nitials of the fraternity (BEA -MLQU) for distribution to the 30 MLQU
exa minees ta king the bar exams. Because of time constraints, fra t members were unable to a nswer the test questions despite th e clamor for answers, so,
they were given out a s is - without a nswers.

DEAN EDUARDO J. F. ABELLA of theJoseRizalUniversity l aw s chool in Ma ndaluyong Ci ty, was the reviewer i n Mercantile Law and Pra ctical Exercises at the
Lex Revi ew Center which i s operated by the Lex Review & Seminars Inc., of which Dean Abella is one of the i ncorporators. He l earned a bout the leakage of
tes t questions in mercantile law when he was delivering the pre-week lecture on Legal Forms a t the Arellano University. The l eaked questions were
s hown to him by his secretary, Jenyl yn Domingo, a fter the mercantile law exam. He missed the Saturday l ecture in mercantile law because he was
s uffering from a touch of flu. He gave his last l ecture on the subject on Wednesday or Thursday before the exam. He denied ha ving bought or obtained
a nd distributed the leaked test questions i n Mercantile Law to the bar reviewees i n the Lex Review Center.

FI ND I NGS

The Commi ttee finds that the leaked test questions i n Mercantile Law were the questions which the examiner, Attorney Ma rcial O. T. Ba lgos, had
prepa red and submitted to Justice Jose C. Vi tug, as chairman of the 2003 Ba r Exa minations Committee. The questions constituted 82% of the questions
a s ked i n the examination i n Mercantile La w i n the morning of September 21, 2003, Sunday, i n some ca ses with slight changes which were not s ubstantial
a nd i n other ca ses exactly a s proposed by Atty. Ba lgos. Hence, a ny bar examinee who was able to get hold of the leaked questions before the mercantile
l a w examination and answered them correctly, would have been assured of passing the examination with at l east a grade of 82%!

The ci rcumstance that the l eaked test questions consisted entirely of test questions prepared by Atty. Ba lgos, proves conclus ively that the leakage
ori gi nated from his office, not from the Office of Justice Vitug, the Bar Exa minations Chairm an.

Atty. Ba l gos claimed that the leaked test questions were prepared by him on his computer. Wi thout any doubt,the source of the l eaked test questions
wa s Atty. Ba lgos computer. The culprit who stole or downloaded them from Atty. Balgos computer wi thout the latters knowledge and consent, a nd who
fa xed them to other persons, was Atty. Ba lgos legal assistant, Attorney Danilo De Guzman, who voluntarily confessed the deed to the Investigating
Commi ttee. De Guzman revealed that he faxed the test questions, with the help of his s ecretary Reynita Villasis, to his fraternity brods, namely, Ronan
Ga rvi da, Arlan (whose surname he could not recall), and Erwin Ta n.

In turn, Ronan Garvida faxed the test questions to Betans Randy Iigo and James Bugain.

Ra ndy Iigo passed a copy or copies of the s ame questions to a nother Betan, Alan Guiapal, who ga ve a copy to the MLQU -Beta Sigma [Lambdas] Most
Il l ustrious Brother, Ronald F. Collado, who ordered the printing a nd distribution of 30 copies to the MLQUs 30 ba r candidates.

Attorney Da nilo De Guzmans act of downloading Attorney Balgos test questions i n mercantile law from the l atters computer, wit hout his knowledge a nd
permi ssion, was a cri minal act of larceny. It was theft of i ntellectual property; the test questions were in tellectual property of Attorney Balgos, being the
product of his intellect a nd l egal knowledge.

Bes ides theft, De Guzman also committed a n unlawful i nfraction of Attorney Ba lgos ri ght to privacy of communication, a nd to s ecurity of his papers a nd
effects a gainst unauthorized search a nd seizure - ri ghts zealously protected by the Bill of Rights of our Constitution (Sections 2 a nd 3, Arti cl e III, 1987
Cons ti tution).

He tra nsgressed the very first ca non of the lawyers Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that [a] lawyer s hall uphold the Constitution, obey
the l a ws of the land, a nd promote respect for law and legal processes.

By tra ns mitting and distributing the stolen test questions to some members of the Beta Sigma La mbda Fraternity, possibly for pecuniary profit and to
gi ven them undue adva ntage over the other examiners in the mercantile law examination, De Guzman abetted cheating or dishones ty by his fraternity
brothers in the examination, which is vi olative of Rule 1.01 of Ca non 1, a s well as Ca non 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for members of the
Ba r, whi ch provide:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl l αω l ιbrαrÿ

Rul e 1.01 - A l a wyer shall not engage i n unlawful, dishonest, i mmoral or deceitful conduct

Ca non 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR.
De Guzman was guilty of gra ve misconduct unbecoming a member of the Bar. He violated the law i nstead of promoting respect for i t a nd degraded the
nobl e profession of l aw i nstead of upholding i ts dignity a nd i ntegrity. His actuations impaired public respect for the Court, and damaged the integrity of
the ba r examinations a s the final measure of a law graduates a cademic preparedness to embark upon the practice of law.

However, the Investigating Committee does not believe that De Guzman was s olely responsible for the leakage of Atty. Ba lgos p roposed test questions in
the merca ntile l aw examination. The Committee does not believe that he acted alone, or did not have the assistance and cooper ation of other persons,
s uch a s:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω l ιbrαrÿ

Cheryl Pa lma, Atty. Ba lgos priva te secretary, who, a ccording to Atty. Ba lgos himself, was the only person who knew the password, who could open and
cl os e his computer; and who had the key to his office where his computer was kept. Since a computer may not be accessed or downloaded unless it i s
opened, s omeone must have opened Atty. Balgos computer i n order for De Guzman to retrieve the test questions stored therein.

Si l vestre Ati enza, also a fra ternity brod of De Guzman, who was responsible for i nterconnecting Atty. Ba lgos computer wit h the other computers outside
Atty. Ba l gos room or office, a nd who was the only other person, besides Cheryl Palma, who knew the password of Atty. Ba lgos c omputer.

The following persons who received from De Guzman, a nd distributed copies of the l eaked tes t questions, appear to have conspired with him to steal and
profi t from the sale of the test questions. They could not have been motivated s olely by a desire to help the fraternity, for the leakage was widespread
(ka lat na kalat) a ccording to Erwi n Tan. Th e possible co-conspirators were:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω l ιbrαrÿ

Rona n Garvi da,

Arl a n,

Erwi n Ta n,

Ra ndy Iigo,

Rona ld Collado, a nd

Al l an Guiapal

The Commi ttee does not believe that De Guzman recklessly broke the l aw a nd ri sked his job and future as a lawyer, out of l ove for the Beta Sigma Lambda
fra ternity. There must have been a n ulterior material consideration for his breaking the law a nd tearing the shroud of s ecrecy that, he very well knows,
covers the bar examinations.

On the other hand, the Committee finds that the theft of the test questions from Atty. Ba lgos computer could have been a voide d if Atty. Ba lgos had
exerci sed due diligence in s afeguarding the s ecrecy of the test questions which he prepared. As the computer is a powerful modern machine which he
a dmittedly i s not fairly fa miliar wi th, he should not have trusted i t to deep secret the test questions that he stored i n i ts hard disk. He admittedly di d not
know the password of his computer. He relied on his secretary to use the password to open and close his computer. He kept his computer in a room to
whi ch other persons had access. Unfamiliar with the use of the machine whose potential f or mischief he could not have been totally unaware of, he
s hould have avoided i ts use for s o sensitive a n undertaking as typing the questions i n the bar examination. After all he knew how to use the typewriter i n
the us e of which he i s quite proficient. Atty. Ba lgos s hould therefore have prepared the test questions in his trusty typewriter, i n the privacy of his home,
(i nstead of his law office), where they would have been safe from the pryi ng eyes of secretaries a nd assistant attorneys. Att y. Ba lgos negligence i n the
prepa ration and safekeeping of his proposed test questions for the bar examination i n mercantile law, was not the proximate c a use of the bar leakage; i t
wa s , in fact, the root cause. For, if he had ta ken those s imple precautions to protect the s ecrecy of his papers, nobody could have stolen them a nd copied
a nd ci rculated them. The integrity of the bar examinations would not have been s ullied by the scandal. He admitted that Mali siguro ako, but that was
wha t happened (43 ts n, Oct. 24, 2003).

RE CO M M EN DAT I ON

Thi s Honorable court i n the case of Burbe v. Ma gulta, A.C. No. 5713, June 10, 2002, 383 SCRA 276, pronounced the following re minder for l awyers:
Members of the bar must do nothing that may tend to l essen in a ny degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, the honesty a nd integrity of the
profession. In a nother case, i t likewise i ntoned: We cannot overstress the duty of a lawyer to a t all times uphold the integrity a nd dignity of the legal
profession. He ca n do this by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts, a nd to his clients. (Reyes v. Ja vi er, A.C. No. 5574,
February 2, 2002, 375 SCRA 538). It goes without s aying that a lawyer who vi olates this precept of the profession by committi ng a gross misconduct which
di s honors and diminishes the publics respect for the legal profession, s hould be disciplined.

After ca reful deliberation, the Investigating Committee recommends that:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl l αω l ιbrαrÿ

1.Attorney Da nilo De Guzman be DISBARRED for he had shown that he is morally unfit to continue as a member of the legal profession, for grave
di s honesty, l ack of i ntegrity, a nd cri minal behavior. In addition, he s hould make a written PUBLIC APOLOGY a nd pay DAMAGES to the Supreme Court for
i nvol ving it i n another bar s candal, causing the ca ncellation of the mercantile law examination, and wreaking havoc upon the image of this institution.

2.Attorney Ma rci al O. T. Ba lgos s hould be REPRIMANDED by the Court a nd likewise be required to make a written APOLOGY to the Court for the public
s ca ndal he brought upon i t as a result of his negligence and lack of due ca re i n preparing and safeguarding his proposed test questions in mercantile l aw.
As the Court had to cancel the Mercantile La w examination on a ccount of the l eakage ofAttorney Balgos test questions, which comprised 82% of the bar
questions i n that examination, Atty. Ba lgos is not entitled to receive any honorarium as examiner for that subject.

3.FURTHER INVESTIGATION of Danilo De Guzman, Cheryl Palma, Silvestre Atienza, Ronan Garvida, Arlan, Erwin Ta n, Randy Iigo, Ja mes Bugain, Ronald
Col l ado and Allan Guiapal by the Na tional Bureau of Investigation and the Philippine National Police, with a vi ew to their cri minal prosecution as probable
co-conspirators in the theft a nd l eakage of the test questions in mercantile l aw.

Wi th regard to recommending measures to safeguard the i ntegrity of the bar examinations and prevent a repetition of future le akage in the said
exa minations, i nasmuch as this matter is at present under s tudy by the Courts Committee on Legal Education a nd Bar Ma tters, as a n aspect of propos als
for ba r reforms, the Investigating Committee believes i t would be well-advised to refrain from including in this report what may turn out to be duplicative,
i f not contrary, recommendations on the matter.3 ςrνll

The Court a dopts the report, including with s ome modifications the recommendation, of the Investigating Committee. The Court, certainly will not
countenance a ny a ct or conduct that ca n i mpair not only the i ntegrity of the Bar Examinations but the trust reposed on the Court.
The Court a lso ta kes note that Mr. Jovi to M. Salonga and Mr. Benjamin R. Ka tly, two of i ts employees assigned to the Ma nageme nt Information Systems
Offi ce (MISO), who were tasked by the Investigating Committee to i nspect the computer s ystem in the office of Atty. Ba lgos, f ound that the Courts
Computer-Assisted Legal Research (CALR) database4 was installed in the computer used by Atty. Ba l gos. Mr. Sa lo nga a nd Mr. Ka tl y reported that the
s ys tem, which was developed by the MISO, was intended for the exclusive use of the Court. The i nstallation thereof to a ny ext ernal computer would be
una uthorized without the permission of the Court. Atty. Vel asco informed the two Court employees that the CALR database was i nstalled by Atty. De
Guzma n on the computer being used by Atty. Ba lgos. The matter would also need further investigation to determine how Atty. De Guzman was able to
obta in a copy of the Courts CALR da tabase.

WHEREFORE, the Court, a cting on the recommendations of the Investigating Committee, hereby resolves to -

(1) DISBAR Atty. DANILO DE GUZMAN from the practice of law effective upon his receipt of this RESOLUTION;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(2) REPRIMAND Atty. MARCIAL O.T. BALGOS a nd DISENTITLE him from receiving a ny honorarium as a n Exa miner i n Mercantile
La w;cha nroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(3) Di rect the Na tional Bureau of Investigation (a) to undertake further investigation of Danilo De Guzman, Cheryl Palma, Sil vestre Atienza, Ronan Garvida,
Erwi n Ta n, Randy Iigo, James Bugain, Ronald Collado a nd Al lan Guiapal with a vi ew to determining the ir participation and respective accountabilities in
the ba r examination leakage and to conduct a n investigation on how Danilo De Guzman was a ble to secure a copy of the Supreme Courts CALR database.

Let a copy of thi s Resolution be made part of the records of Danilo De Guzman in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines, a nd
copi es to be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines a nd ci rculated by the Office of the Court Administrator to a ll c ourts.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 7136 August 1, 2007
JOSELANO GUEVARRA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JOSE EMMANUEL EALA, respondent.

DE CI SI ON

PER CURIAM:

Jos elano Guevarra (complainant) filed on Ma rch 4, 2002 a Complaint for Disbarment1 before the Integrated Bar of the Philippin es (IBP) Committee on Bar
Di s cipline (CBD) a gainst Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Ea la a .k.a. Noli Eala (respondent) for "grossly i mmoral conduct a nd unmitigat ed vi olation of the lawyer's
oa th."

In hi s complaint, Guevarra gave the following account:

He fi rst met respondent in January 2000 when his (complainant's) then-fiancee Irene Moje (Irene) introduced respondent to him as her friend who was
ma rri ed to Ma rianne (sometimes spelled "Ma ry Ann") Ta ntoco with whom he had three children.

After hi s marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000, complainant noticed that from Ja nuary to Ma rch 2001, Irene had been receiving from respondent
cel l phone calls, as well a s messages s ome of which read "I love you," "I miss you," or "Meet you at Megamall."

Compl ainant a lso noticed that Irene habitually went home very l ate a t night or early i n the morning of the following day, a nd s ometimes did not go home
from work. When he asked about her whereabouts, she replied that s he slept a t her parents' house in Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy wi th her work.

In February or Ma rch 2001, complainant saw Irene and respondent together on two occasions. On the second occasion, he confronted them following
whi ch Irene a bandoned the conjugal house.

On Apri l 22, 2001, complainant went uninvited to Irene's birthday celebration at which he saw her a nd respondent celebrating with her family a nd
fri ends. Out of embarrassment, a nger and humiliation, he l eft the venue i mmediately. Following that i ncident, Irene went to t he conjugal house a nd
ha uled off all her personal belongings, pieces of furniture, and her s hare of the household appliances.

Compl ainant l ater found, i n the master's bedroom, a folded social card bearing the words "I Love You" on its face, which card when unfolded contained a
ha ndwritten letter dated October 7, 2000, the day of his wedding to Irene, reading:

My everdearest Irene,

By the ti me you open this, you'll be moments a way from walking down the aisle. I will say a prayer for you that you may fi nd meaning i n what you're
a bout to do.

Sometimes I wonder why we ever met. Is it only for me to find fleeting happiness but experience eternal pain? Is it only for us to find a true love but then
l os e it a gain? Or i s it because there's a bigger plan for the two of us?

I hope that you have experienced true happiness with me. I have done everything humanly possible to love you. And today, a s you make your vows . . . I
ma ke my own vow to YOU!

I wi l l love you for the rest of my l ife. I l oved you from the first time I laid eyes on you, to the ti me we s pent together, up to the final moments of your
s i ngle life. But more i mportantly, I will love you until the life in me is gone and until we are together again.

Do not worry a bout me! I will be happy for you. I have enough memories of us to last me a l ifetime. Always remember though that in my heart, i n my
mi nd and i n my s oul, YOU WILL ALWAYS

. . . AND THE WONDERFUL THINGS YOU DO!

BE MINE . . . . AND MINE ALONE, a nd I WILL ALWAYS BE YOURS AND YOURS ALONE!

I LOVE YOU FOREVER, I LOVE YOU FOR ALWAYS. AS LONG AS I'M LIVING MY TWEETIE YOU'LL BE!"2

Eterna lly yours,

NOLI

Compl ainant s oon saw respondent's car a nd that of Irene constantly pa rked at No. 71-B 11th Street, New Manila where, as he was to l ater learn
s ometime in April 2001, Irene was a lready residing. He also learned still later that when his fri ends saw Irene on or a bout January 18, 2002 together with
res pondent during a concert, she was pregnant.

In hi s ANSWER,3 respondent admitted having s ent the I LOVE YOU ca rd on which the above-quoted letter was handwritten.

On pa ra graph 14 of the COMPLAINT reading:

14. Res pondent and Irene were even FLAUNTING THEIR ADULTEROUS RELATIONSHIP as they a ttended s ocial functions together. For i nstance, in or a bout
the thi rd week of September 2001, the couple a ttended the l aunch of the "Wine All You Ca n" promotion of French wines, held at the Mega Strip of SM
Mega mall B a t Ma ndaluyong Ci ty. Their a ttendance was reported i n Section B of the Manila Standard issue of 24 September 2001, on page 21.
Res pondent and Irene were photographed together; their picture was ca ptioned: "Irene with Sportscaster Noli Eala." A photocopy of the report is
a tta ched as Annex C.4 (Italics a nd emphasis i n the original; CAPITALIZATION of the phrase "flaunting their a dulterous relationship" supplied),

res pondent, i n his ANSWER, stated:

4. Res pondent specifically denies having ever flaunted an adulterous relationship with Irene as alleged in paragraph 14 of th e Complaint, the truth of the
ma tter being that their relationship was low profile and known only to the i mmediate members of their respective families, and that Respondent, as far
a s the general public was concerned, was still known to be l egally married to Ma ry Anne Tantoco.5 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

On pa ra graph 15 of the COMPLAINT reading:

15. Res pondent's adulterous conduct wi th the complainant's wife and his a pparent a bandoning or neglecting of his own family, demonstrate his gross
mora l depravity, ma king him morally unfit to keep his membership in the bar. He flaunted his aversion to the i nstitution of m arriage, ca lling it a "piece of
pa per." Morally reprehensible was his writing the l ove l etter to complainant's bride on the very day of her wedding, vowing t o continue his l ove for her
"unti l we a re together a gain," as now they a re.6 (Underscoring supplied),

res pondent s tated in his ANSWER as follows:

5. Res pondent specifically denies the allegations i n paragraph 15 of the Complaint regarding his adulterous relationship and that his a cts demonstrate
gros s moral depravity thereby ma king him unfit to keep his membership i n the bar, the reason being that Respondent's relationship with Irene was not
under scandalous circumstances and that as far a s his relationship with his own family:

5.1 Res pondent has maintained a civil, cordial a nd peaceful relationship with [his wife] Mary Anne as i n fact they s till occasionally meet i n public, even if
Ma ry Anne i s a ware of Respondent's special friendship with Irene.

xxxx

5.5 Res pondent also denies that he has flaunted his a version to the i nstitution of marriage by calling the institution of marriage a mere piece of paper
beca use his reference [in his above-quoted handwritten l etter to Irene] to the marriage between Complainant a nd Irene as a piece of paper was merely
wi th respect to the formality of the marriage contract.7 (Emphasis a nd underscoring supplied)

Res pondent admitted8 paragraph 18 of the COMPLAINT reading:

18. The Rules of Court requires lawyers to support the Constitution and obey the laws. The Constitution regards ma rriage as a n inviolable social institution
a nd i s the foundation of the family (Arti cle XV, Sec. 2).9

And on pa ragraph 19 of the COMPLAINT reading:

19. Res pondent's grossly i mmoral conduct runs a foul of the Constitution and the laws he, as a lawyer, has been sworn to uphol d. In pursuing obsessively
hi s illicit l ove for the complainant's wi fe, he mocked the institution of marriage, betrayed his own family, broke up the complainant's marriage, commits
a dultery wi th his wife, a nd degrades the legal profession.10 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),

res pondent, i n his ANSWER, stated:

7. Res pondent specifically denies the allegations i n paragraph 19 of the Complaint, the reason being that under the ci rcumsta nces the a cts of Respondent
wi th respect to his purely personal and low profile special relationship with Irene i s neither under s candalous ci rcumstances nor ta ntamount to grossly
i mmoral conduct as would be a ground for disbarment pursuant to Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.11 (Emphasis a nd u nderscoring supplied)

To res pondent's ANSWER, complainant filed a REPLY,12 a lleging that Irene gave birth to a girl and Irene named respondent i n t he Certificate of Live Birth
a s the gi rl's father. Complainant a ttached to the Reply, as Annex "A," a copy of a Certificate of Live Birth13 bearing Irene's s ignature and naming
res pondent a s the father of her daughter Samantha Irene Louise Moje who was born on February 14, 2002 a t St. Luke's Hospital.

Compl ainant's REPLY merited a REJOINDER WITH MOTION TO DISMISS14 dated January 10, 2003 from res pondent in which he denied having "personal
knowledge of the Certificate of Li ve Birth a ttached to the complainant's Reply."15 Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint due to the pendency of a
ci vi l case filed by complainant for the a nnulment of his marriage to Irene, a nd a criminal complaint for a dultery a gainst respondent a nd Irene which was
pending before the Quezon Ci ty Pros ecutor's Office.

Duri ng the investigation before the IBP-CBD, complainant's Complaint-Affidavi t and Reply to Answer were a dopted as his testimony on direct
exa mination.16 Respondent's counsel did not cross-examine complainant.17

After i nvestigation, IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner Mi lagros V. Sa n Juan, in a 12-page REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION18 dated October 26, 2004,
found the charge against respondent s ufficiently proven.

The Commissioner thus recommended19 that respondent be disbarred for vi olating Rule 1.01 of Ca non 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
rea ding:

Rul e 1.01: A l a wyer shall not engage i n unlawful, dishonest, i mmoral or deceitful conduct (Underscoring supplied),

a nd Rule 7.03 of Ca non 7 of the same Code reading:

Rul e 7.03: A l a wyer shall not engage i n conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor s hall he, whether i n public or priva te life, behave
i n a s candalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. (Underscoring supplied)

The IBP Board of Governors, however, a nnulled and set aside the Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and accordingly dismissed the ca se
for l a ck of merit, by Resolution dated January 28, 2006 bri efly reading:

RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2006-06

CBD Ca s e No. 02-936

Jos elano C. Guevarra vs .
Atty. Jos e Emmanuel M. Ea la
a .k.a . Noli Eala

RESOLVED to ANNUL a nd SET ASIDE, a s it is hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE, the Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, a nd to APPROVE
the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled ca se for l ack of merit.20 (Italics and emphasis in the original)
Hence, the present petition21 of complainant before this Court, filed pursuant to Section 12 (c), Rule 13922 of the Rules of Court.

The petition is i mpressed with merit.

Oddl y enough, the IBP Board of Governors, i n setting aside the Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and dismissing the case for l ack of
meri t, ga ve no reason therefor as its a bove -quoted 33-word Resolution s hows.

Res pondent contends, i n his Comment23 on the present petition of complainant, that there is no evidence against him.24 The contention fails. As the IBP-
CBD Investigating Commissioner observed:

Whi le i t may be true that the l ove letter dated October 7, 2000 (Exh. "C") a nd the news i tem published in the Manila Standard (Exh. "D"), even taken
together do not s ufficiently prove that respondent is ca rrying on an adulterous relationship with complainant's wife, there a re other pieces of evidence
on record which s upport the a ccusation of complainant a gainst respondent.

It s hould be noted that in his Answer dated 17 October 2002, res pondent through counsel made the following s tatements to wit: "Respondent specifically
denies having [ever] flaunted a n a dulterous relationship with Irene as alleg ed in paragraph [14] of the Complaint, the truth of the matter being [that] their
rel a tionship was low profile and known only to i mmediate members of their respective families . . . , a nd Respondent specifically denies the allegations i n
pa ra graph 19 of the complaint, the reason being that under the circumstances the acts of the respondents with respect to his purely personal an d l ow
profi le relationship with Irene i s neither under s candalous ci rcumstances nor ta ntamount to grossly i mmoral conduct . . ."

Thes e statements of respondent i n his Answer a re an a dmission that there i s indeed a "s pecial" relationship between him a nd co mplainant's wife, Irene,
[whi ch] ta ken together with the Certificate of Li ve Birth of Samantha Louise Irene Moje (Annex "H -1") sufficiently prove that there was i ndeed a n illicit
rel a tionship between respondent a nd Irene which resulted i n the birth of the child "Samantha". In the Certificate of Li ve Birth of Samantha i t s hould be
noted that complainant's wife Irene supplied the information that respondent was the father of the child. Gi ven the fact that the respondent a dmitted his
s pecial relationship with Irene there is no reason to believe that Irene would l ie or make a ny misrepresentation regarding th e paternity of the child. It
s hould be underscored that respondent has not categorically denied that he is the fa ther of Samantha Louise Irene Moje.25 (Empha sis a nd underscoring
s upplied)

Indeed, from respondent's Answer, he does not deny ca rrying on an adulterous relationship with Irene, "a dultery" being defined under Art. 333 of the
Revi sed Penal Code as that "committed by a ny ma rried woman who shall have sexual i ntercourse with a man not her husband a nd b y the man who has
ca rna l knowledge of her, knowing her to be married, even if the marriage be subsequently declared void."26 (Italics supplied) What respondent denies is
ha vi ng flaunted such relationship, he maintaining that i t was "low profile and known only to the immediate members of their r espective families."

In other words, respondent's denial is a negative pregnant,

a denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are not squarely denied. It was in effect an a dmission of
the a verments it was directed a t. Stated otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form of negative expression which ca rries with i t in a ffirmation or at l east a n
i mplication of s ome kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an admission of the s ubstantial fa cts a lleged i n the pleading. Where a
fa ct i s alleged with qualifying or modifying language and the words of the allegation a s so qualified or modified a re literally denied, i t has been held that
the qualifying circumstances alone are denied while the fact i tself is admitted.27 (Ci tations omitted; emphasis and underscoring s upplied)

A negative pregnant too is respondent's denial of having "personal knowledge" of Irene's daughter Samantha Louise Irene Moje's Certificate of Li ve Birth.
In s aid certificate, Irene named respondent – a "l awyer," 38 years old – a s the child's father. And the phrase "NOT MARRIED" is entered on the desired
i nformation on "DATE AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE." A comparison of the signature a ttributed to Irene in the certificate28 wi th her signature on the
Ma rri a ge Certificate29 shows that they were affixed by one and the same person. Notatu dignum is that, as the Investigating Commissioner noted,
res pondent never denied being the father of the child.

Fra nklin A. Ri cafort, the records custodian of St. Luke's Medical Center, i n his January 29, 2003 Affi davit30 which he identified a t the witness stand,
decl ared that Irene gave the information in the Certificate of Li ve Birth that the child's father i s "Jose Emmanuel Masacaet Eala," who was 38 yea rs old
a nd a lawyer.31

Wi thout doubt, the a dulterous relationship between respondent and Irene has been sufficiently proven by more than cl early preponderant evide nce –
tha t evi dence adduced by one party which is more conclusive and credible than that of the other party a nd, therefore, has gre ater weight than the
other32 – whi ch i s the quantum of evidence needed in a n a dministrative case a gainst a lawyer.

Admi nistrative ca ses a gainst lawyers belong to a class of their own. They a re distinct from a nd they ma y proceed independentl y of ci vil and criminal cases.

. . . of proof for these types of cases differ. In a cri minal case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary; i n an a dministrative ca se for disbarment or
s us pension, "cl early preponderant evidence" is all that is required.33 (Emphasis s upplied)

Res pondent insists, however, that disbarment does not lie because his relationship with Irene was not, under Section 27 of Ru le 138 of the Revised Rules
of Court, rea ding:

SEC. 27. Di s barment or s uspension of a ttorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. ─ A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his
offi ce a s attorney by the Supreme Court for a ny deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct i n s uch office, g rossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
convi cti on of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for a ny vi olation of the oath which he is required to ta ke before admissi on to pra ctice, or for a willful
di s obedience appearing a s an a ttorney for a party to a ca se without authority s o to do. The practice of s oliciting cases at l aw for the purpose of gain,
ei ther personally or through paid a gents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

The di sbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or other disciplinatory a gency i n a foreign jurisdiction where he
ha s also been a dmitted as an attorney i s a ground for his disbarment or suspension i f the basis of such action includes any o f the acts hereinabove
enumerated.

The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary a gency shall be prima facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspensi on
(Emphasis and underscoring s upplied),

under scandalous circumstances.34

The i mmediately-quoted Rule which provides the grounds for disbarment or s uspension uses the phrase "grossly i mmoral conduct," not "under
s ca ndalous ci rcumstances." Sexual i ntercourse under s candalous ci rcumstances is, following Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code reading:
ART. 334. Concubi nage. - Any husband who shall keep a mistress in the conjugal dwelling, or, s hall have sexual intercourse, under s candalous
ci rcums tances, with a woman who is not his wife, or s hall cohabit with her i n a ny other place, s hall be punished by prision c orreccional i n its minimum
a nd medium periods.

x x x x,

a n element of the cri me of concubinage when a married ma n has s exual intercourse with a woman elsewhere.

"Whether a lawyer's s exual congress wi th a woman not his wi fe or without the benefit of marriage s hould be characte rized as 'grossly immoral conduct'
depends on the s urrounding ci rcumstances."35 The ca se at bar i nvolves a relationship between a married lawyer and a ma rried w oman who is not his
wi fe. It is immaterial whether the affair was ca rried out discreetly. Apropos is the following pronouncement of this Court i n Vitug v. Rongcal:36

On the cha rge of immorality, respondent does not deny tha t he had an extra-marital affair with complainant, a lbeit brief a nd discreet, and which a ct is
not "s o corrupt a nd false as to constitute a cri minal act or s o unprincipled a s to be reprehensible to a high degree" in order to merit disciplinary sanction.
We di sagree.

xxxx

Whi le i t has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of s exual relations between two unmarried adults is not sufficient to warrant administrative
s a nction for s uch illicit behavior, i t is not so with respect to betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity. Even i f not all forms of extra-marital relations are
punishable under penal law, sexual relations outside marriage i s considered disgraceful a nd i mmoral as it ma nifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of
ma rri age and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws.37 (Emphasis a nd underscoring s upplied)

And s o is the pronouncement i n Tucay v. Atty. Tuca y:38

The Court need not delve into the question of whether or not the respondent did contract a bigamous marriage . . . It i s enough that the records of this
a dministrative ca se substantiate the findings of the Investigating Co mmissioner, as well as the IBP Board of Governors, i.e., that i ndeed respondent has
been carryi ng on an illicit a ffair with a married woman, a grossly i mmoral conduct a nd i ndicative of an extremely l ow regard for the fundamental ethics of
hi s profession. This detestable behavior renders him regrettably unfit and undeservi ng of the treasured honor a nd privileges which his license confers
upon him.39 (Underscoring supplied)

Res pondent in fact also vi olated the lawyer's oath he took before admission to practice law which goes:

I _________, ha vi ng been permitted to continue i n the practice of law in the Philippines, do solemnly s wear that I recognize the s upreme a uthority of the
Republic of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution a nd obey the laws a s well a s the legal orders of the duly consti tuted a uthorities therein; I will do
no fa lsehood, nor consent to the doing of a ny i n court; I will not wittingly or wi llingly p romote or s ue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor gi ve aid
nor cons ent to the same; I will delay no man for money or ma lice, a nd will conduct mys elf as a lawyer according to the best o f my knowledge a nd
di s cretion with all good fidelity a s well a s to the courts as to my cl ients; a nd I i mpose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any mental
res ervation or purpose of evasion. So help me God. (Underscoring supplied)

Res pondent admittedly i s aware of Section 2 of Arti cle XV (The Family) of the Constitution reading:

Secti on 2. Ma rriage, as a n inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family a nd s hall be protected by the State .

In thi s connection, the Family Code (Executive Order No. 209), which echoes this constitutional provision, obligates the husband and the wife "to live
together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, a nd render mutual help a nd s upport."40

Furthermore, respondent vi olated Rule 1.01 of Ca non 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which proscribes a l awyer from engaging i n "unlawful,
di s honest, i mmoral or deceitful conduct," and Rule 7.03 of Ca non 7 of the same Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging i n any "conduct that
a dversely reflects on his fi tness to practice law."

Cl utchi ng at straws, respondent, during the pendency of the i nvestigation of the ca se before the IBP Commissioner, filed a Ma nifestation41 on March 2 2,
2005 i nforming the IBP-CBD that complainant's petition for nullity of his (complainant's) marriage to Irene had been granted by Branch 106 of the Quezon
Ci ty Regi onal Tri al Court, a nd that the cri minal complaint for a dultery complainant filed against respondent and Irene "based on the same set of fa cts
a l leged i n the instant case," which was pending review before the Department of Justice (DOJ), on petition of complainant, had been, on motion of
compl ainant, withdrawn.

The Secretary of Justice's Resolution of January 16, 2004 gra nting complainant's Motion to Withdraw Petition for Review reads :

Cons idering that the instant motion was filed before the final resolution of the petition for review, we a re inclined to grant the same pursuant to Section
10 of Department Ci rcular No. 70 da ted July 3, 2000, whi ch provides that "notwithstanding the perfection of the appeal, the p etitioner may withdraw the
s a me at a ny ti me before it i s finally resolved, i n which case the appealed resolution shall stand as though no appeal has bee n ta ken."42 (Emphasis
s upplied by complainant)

Tha t the marriage between complainant and Irene was subsequently declared void a b i nitio is immaterial. The acts complained of took place before the
ma rri age was declared null a nd void.43 As a lawyer, respondent should be a ware that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife a re
pres umed, unless proven otherwise, to have entered i nto a lawful contract of marriage.44 In ca rrying on an extra-marital affair with Irene prior to the
judi cial declaration that her ma rriage with complainant was null and void, a nd despite respondent himself being marri ed, he s howed disrespect for a n
i ns titution held sacred by the law. And he betrayed his unfitness to be a lawyer.

As for complainant's withdrawal of his petition for revi ew before the DOJ, respondent glaringly omitted to state that before complainant filed his
December 23, 2003 Moti on to Withdraw his Petition for Review, the DOJ had already promulgated a Resolution on September 22, 2003 reversing the
di s missal by the Quezon Ci ty Prosecutor's Office of complainant's complaint for a dultery. In reversing the Ci ty Prosecutor's Resolution, DOJ Secretary
Si meon Datumanong held:

Pa renthetically the totality of evi dence a dduced by complainant would, i n the fair estimation of the Department, sufficiently establish all the elements of
the offense of a dultery on the part of both respondents. Indeed, early on, respondent Moje conceded to complainant that she was going out on dates
wi th respondent Eala, and this s he did when complainant confronted her about Eala's frequent phone calls and text messages to her. Complainant a lso
pers onally wi tnessed Moje and Eala havi ng a rendezvous on two occasions. Respondent Eala never denied the fact that he knew Moje to be married to
compl ainant[.] In fa ct, he (Eala) himself was married to a nother woman. Moreover, Moje's eventual a bandonment of thei r conjugal home, a fter
compl ainant had once more confronted her a bout Eala, only s erved to confirm the i llicit relationship involving both respondents. This becomes a ll the
more a pparent by Moje's s ubsequent relocation i n No. 71-B, 11th Street, New Manila, Quezon Ci ty, which was a few blocks away from the church where
s he had exchange marital vows with complainant.

It wa s in this place that the two l overs a pparently cohabited. Es pecially s ince Eala's vehicle a nd that of Moje's were always s een there. Moje herself
a dmits that she came to live i n the said a ddress whereas Eala asserts that that was where he held office. The happenstance that i t was in that said address
tha t Ea la and Moje had decided to hold office for the firm that both had formed s macks too m uch of a coincidence. For one, the said a ddress a ppears to
be a residential house, for that was where Moje stayed all throughout after her s eparation from complainant. It was both resp ondent's l ove nest, to put
s hort; their illicit a ffair that was ca rried out there bore fruit a few months l ater when Moje gave birth to a girl a t the nearby hospital of St. Luke's Medical
Center. What fi nally militates against the respondents is the i ndubitable fa ct that i n the certificate of birth of the girl, Moje furnished the i nformation that
Ea l a was the father. This speaks a ll too eloquently of the unlawful and damning nature of the adulterous a cts of the responde nts. Complainant's supposed
i l legal procurement of the birth certificate i s most certainly beside the point fo r both respondents Ea la a nd Moje have not denied, i n a ny ca tegorical
ma nner, that Eala is the father of the child Samantha Irene Louise Moje.45 (Emphasis and underscoring s upplied)

It bea rs emphasis that a dultery i s a private offense which cannot be prosecuted de oficio and thus leaves the DOJ no choice but to grant complainant's
moti on to withdraw his petition for review. But even if respondent and Irene were to be acquitted of adultery a fter tri al, if the Information for a dultery
were fi led in court, the same would not have been a bar to the present administrative complaint.

Ci ti ng the ruling in Pa ngan v. Ra mos,46 vi z:

x x x The a cquittal of respondent Ramos [of] the cri minal charge i s not a bar to these [administrative] proceedings. The standards of l egal profession a re
not s a tisfied by conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of x x x cri mi nal law. Moreover, this Court, i n disbarment proceedings is a cting
i n a n entirely different capacity from that which courts assume in tryi ng cri minal case47 (Italics i n the original),

thi s Court in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pools, Inc. v. Atty. Na l doza,48 held:

Admi nistrative ca ses a gainst lawyers belong to a class of their own. They a re distinct from a nd they ma y proceed independently of ci vil and criminal cases.

WHEREFORE, the petition i s GRANTED. Resolution No. XVII-2006-06 passed on Ja nuary 28, 2006 by the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Phi l ippines is ANNULLED a nd SET ASIDE.

Res pondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Ea la, is DISBARRED for grossly i mmoral conduct, vi olation of his oath of office, a nd vi ola tion of Ca non 1, Rule 1.01
a nd Ca non 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Let a copy of thi s Decision, which is i mmediately executory, be made part of the records of respondent in the Office of the B ar Confidant, Supreme Court
of the Phi lippines. And l et copies of the Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines a nd ci rculated to all courts.

Thi s Decision takes effect i mmediately.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, Chi ef Justice, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Ca rpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Ca rpio-Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario,
Ga rci a, Velasco, Jr., Na chura, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
A.C. No. 5816, March 10, 2015
DR. ELMAR O. PEREZ, Complainant, v. ATTY. TRISTAN A. CATINDIG AND ATTY. KAREN E. BAYDO, Respondents.

DE CI SI ON

PER CURIAM:

Before the Court i s an administrative complaint1 for disbarment filed by Dr. El mar O. Perez (Dr. Perez) wi th the Office of th e Bar Confidant on August 27,
2002 a ga inst Atty. Tri stan A. Ca ti ndig (Atty. Ca tindig) and Atty. Ka ren E. Ba ydo (Atty. Ba ydo) (respondents) for gross immora lity a nd vi olation of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.

The Fa cts

In her complaint, Dr. Perez alleged that she and Atty. Ca ti ndig had been friends s ince the mid-1960’s when they were both students at the University of
the Phi lippines, but they lost touch a fter their gra duation. Sometime i n 1983, the paths of Atty. Ca ti ndig a nd Dr. Perez a gai n crossed. It was at that time
tha t Atty. Ca ti ndig started to court Dr. Perez.2chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Atty. Ca ti ndig a dmitted to Dr. Perez that he was a lready wed to Lily Cora zon Gomez (Gomez), having married the latter on May 18, 1968 a t the Central
Methodist Church in Ermita, Manila, which was followed by a Ca tholic wedding a t the Shrine of Our La dy of Lourdes i n Quezon Ci ty.3 Atty. Ca ti ndig
however claimed that he only married Gomez because he got her pregnant; that he was a fraid that Gomez would make a scandal ou t of her pregnancy
s hould he refuse to marry her, which could have jeopardized his s cholarship i n the Harvard Law School.4chanroblesvirtuallawli brary
Atty. Ca ti ndig told Dr. Perez that he was in the process of obtaining a divorce in a foreign country to dissolve his marriage to Gomez, a nd that he would
eventually ma rry her once the divorce had been decreed. Consequently, s ometime in 1984, Atty. Ca ti ndig and Gomez obtained a divorce decree from the
Domi nican Republic. Dr. Perez claimed that Atty. Ca ti ndig assured her that the said divorce decree was lawful and va lid and that there was no l onger a ny
i mpediment to their ma rriage.5chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Thus , on July 14, 1984, Atty. Ca ti ndig married Dr. Perez in the State of Vi rginia i n the United States of America (USA). Thei r union was blessed with a child
whom they named Tristan Jegar Josef Frederic.6chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Yea rs l ater, Dr. Perez ca me to know that her ma rriage to Atty. Ca ti ndig is a nullity s ince the divorce decree that was obtained from the Dominican
Republic by the l atter and Gomez is not recognized by Phi lippine laws. When she confronted Atty. Ca ti ndig a bout it, the latter a llegedly a ssured Dr. Perez
tha t he would l egalize their union once he obtains a declaration of nullity of his ma rriage to Gomez under the laws of the Philippines. He also promised to
l egally a dopt their s on.7chanroblesvi rtuallawlibrary
Sometime in 1997, Dr. Perez reminded Atty. Ca ti ndig of his promise to l egalize their union by fi ling a petition to nullify hi s marriage to Gomez. Atty.
Ca ti ndig told her that he would still have to get the consent of Gomez to the said petition.8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Sometime in 2001, Dr. Perez alleged that s he received a n a nonymous letter9 i n the mail i nforming her of Atty. Ca ti ndig’s scandalous a ffair with Atty.
Ba ydo, a nd that s ometime later, s he ca me upon a love letter10 wri tten a nd signed by Atty. Ca ti ndig for Atty. Ba ydo dated April 25, 2001. In the s aid letter,
Atty. Ca ti ndig professed his l ove to Atty. Ba ydo, promising to marry her once his “i mpediment is removed.” Apparently, five m onths i nto their
rel a tionship, Atty. Ba ydo requested Atty. Ca ti ndig to put a halt to their a ffair until s uch time that he i s able to obtain the a nnulment of his marriage. On
Augus t 13, 2001, Atty. Ca ti ndig filed a petition to declare the nullity of his marriage to Gomez.11chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On October 31, 2001, Atty. Ca ti ndig abandoned Dr. Perez and their son; he moved to a n upscale condominium i n Salcedo Village, Makati Ci ty where Atty.
Ba ydo was frequently s een.12chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In a Resolution13 dated October 9, 2002, the Court di rected the respondents to file their respective comments, which they s eparately did on November
25, 2002.14cha nroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Atty. Ca ti ndig, i n his Comment,15 a dmitted that he married Gomez on Ma y 18, 1968. He cl a imed, however, that immediately a fter the wedding, Gomez
s howed signs that she was i ncapable of complyi ng with her marital obligations, as s he had serious intimacy problems; a nd that while their union was
bl essed with four children, their relationship s imply deteriorated.

Eventually, their i rreconcilable differences led to their de facto separation in 1984. They then consulted Atty. Wi lhelmina Joven (Atty. Joven), a mutual
fri end, on how the a greement to separate a nd live apart could be implemented. Atty. Joven suggested that the couple a dopt a p roperty regime of
compl ete separation of property. She likewise a dvised the couple to obtain a divorce decree from the Dominican Republic for whatever va lue it may ha ve
a nd comfort i t may provide them.16chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Thus , on April 27, 1984, Atty. Ca ti ndig and Gomez each executed a Special Power of Attorney a ddressed to a Judge of the First Ci vil Court of San Cristobal,
Domi nican Republic, appointing a n attorney-in-fact to institute a divorce a ction under i ts l aws. Atty. Ca ti ndig likewise a dmitted that a divorce by mutual
cons ent was ra tified by the Dominican Republic court on June 12, 1984. Further, Atty. Ca ti ndig and Gomez filed a Joint Petiti on for Dissolution of Conjugal
Pa rtnership before the Regional Trial Court of Ma kati Ci ty, Bra nch 133, whi ch was granted on June 23, 1984.17cha nroblesvirtuallawl ibrary

Atty. Ca ti ndig claimed that Dr. Perez knew of the foregoing, i ncluding the fact that the divorce decreed by the Dominican R epublic court does not have
a ny effect i n the Philippines. Notwithstanding that s he knew that the marriage of Atty. Ca ti ndig and Gomez still subsisted, D r. Perez demanded that Atty.
Ca ti ndig marry her. Thus, Atty. Ca ti ndig married Dr. Perez i n July 1984 i n the USA.18chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Atty. Ca ti ndig claimed that Dr. Perez knew that their marriage was not va lid since his previ ous marriage to Gomez was s till s ubsisting, and that he only
ma rri ed Dr. Perez because he loved her a nd that he was afraid o f losing her i f he did not. He merely desired to lend a modicum of legitimacy to their
rel a tionship.19chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Atty. Ca ti ndig claimed that his relationship with Dr. Perez turned sour. Eventually, he l eft their home i n October 2001 to prevent a ny a crimony from
developing.20chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

He denied that Atty. Ba ydo was the reason that he l eft Dr. Perez, claiming that his relationship with Dr. Perez started to fall apart as early a s 1997. He
a s serted that Atty. Ba ydo joined his l aw firm only i n September 1999; a nd that while he was attracted to her, Atty. Ba ydo did not reciprocate and in fact
rejected him. He likewise pointed out that Atty. Ba ydo resigned from his firm i n January 2001.21cha nroblesvirtuallawlibrary

For her pa rt, Atty. Ba ydo denied that she had a n a ffair wi th Atty. Ca ti ndig. She cl aimed that Atty. Ca ti ndig began courting h er while s he was employed in
hi s firm. She however rejected Atty. Ca ti ndig’s romantic overtures; she told him that she could not reciprocate his feelings since he was married a nd that
he wa s too old for her. She said that despite being turned down, Atty. Ca ti ndig still p ursued her, which was the reason why s he resigned from his law
fi rm.22cha nroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On Ja nuary 29, 2003, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for i nvestigation, report a nd recommendation within 90
da ys from notice.23chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On June 2, 2003, the IBP’s Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) issued a n Order24 s etting the mandatory conference of the a dministrative case on July 4,
2003, whi ch was later reset to August 29, 2003. Duri ng the conference, the parties manifested that they were already s ubmitting the case for resolution
ba s ed on the pleadings already s ubmitted. Thereupon, the IBP-CBD directed the parties to submit their respective position papers within 10 days from
noti ce. Respondents Atty. Ca tindig a nd Atty. Ba ydo filed their position papers on October 17, 200325 a nd October 20, 2003,26 res pectively. Dr. Perez filed
her position paper27 on October 24, 2003.

Fi ndings of the IBP Investigating Commissioner

On Ma y 6, 2011, a fter due proceedings, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP-CBD issued a Report and Recommendation,28 which recommended
the di sbarment of Atty. Ca tindig for gross immorality, vi olation of Rule 1.01, Ca non 7 a nd Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The
Investigating Commissioner pointed out that Atty. Ca tindig’s a ct of marryi ng Dr. Perez despite knowing fully well that his pr evious marriage to Gomez still
s ubsisted was a grossly i mmoral a nd illegal conduct, which warrants the ultimate penalty of di sbarment. The Investigating Commissioner further opined
tha t:chanRoblesvi rtualLawlibrary
In thi s case, the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the admissions of Atty. Ca ti ndig established a pattern of g rossly i mmoral conduct that
wa rra nts fustigation a nd his disbarment. His conduct was not only corrupt or unprincipled; it was reprehensible to the highest degree.

There is no dichotomy of morality. A l a wyer and a professor of l aw, both in his official and personal conduct, must display e xemplary behavior.
Res pondent’s bigamous marriage a nd his proclivity for extramarital adventurism have definitely ca used damage to the l egal a nd teaching professions.
How ca n he hold his head up high a nd expect his students, his peers a nd the community to l ook up to him as a model worthy of emulation when he failed
to fol l ow the tenets of morality? In contracting a second marriage notwithstanding knowing fully well that he has a prior va l id subsisting marriage, Atty.
Ca ti ndig has made a mockery of a n otherwise inviolable institution, a s erious outrage to the generally a ccepted moral standards of the community.29
On the other hand, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that the charge a gainst Atty. Ba ydo be dismissed for dearth of evi dence; Dr. Perez
fa i led to present cl ear and preponderant evi dence i n support of the alleged a ffair between the respondents.

Fi ndings of the IBP Board of Governors

On December 10, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution,30 which adopted a nd a pproved the recommendation o f the Investigating
Commi ssioner.

Atty. Ca ti ndig s ought a reconsideration31 of the December 10, 2011 Res olution of the IBP Board of Governors, cl aiming that th e Investigating
Commi ssioner erred in relyi ng solely on Dr. Perez’s uncorroborated allegations. He pointed out that, under Section 1 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, a
compl aint for disbarment must be supported by a ffidavits of persons having knowledge of the fa cts therein alleged a nd/or by s uch documents as may
s ubstantiate said facts. He said that despite the absence of a ny corroborating testimony, the Investigating Commissioner gave credence to Dr. Perez’
tes timony.
He a lso claimed that he had absolutely no intention of committing any felony; that he never concealed the s tatus of his marri age from anyone. In fact,
Atty. Ca ti ndig asserted that he had a lways been tra nsparent wi th both Gomez and Dr. Perez.

The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution32 dated December 29, 2012, denied Atty. Ca ti ndig’s motion for reconsideration.

The Issue

The i ssue i n this case is whether the respondents committed gross i mmorality, which would warrant their disbarment.

Rul ing of the Court

After a thorough perusal of the respective allegations of the parties and the circumstances of this case, the Court a grees wi th the findings and
recommendations of the Investigating Commissioner a nd the IBP Board of Governors.

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Rul e 1.01 – A l a wyer s hall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Ca non 7 – A l a wyer s hall at all ti mes uphold the integrity a nd dignity of the l egal profession and s upport the activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rul e 7.03 – A l a wyer s hall not engage in conduct that a dversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor s hould he, whether i n public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the l egal profession.cralawred
In Arnobit v. Atty. Arnobi t,33 the Court held:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[T]he requirement of good moral character is of much greater i mport, a s far as the general public is concerned, than the possession of l egal learning.
Good moral character is not only a condition precedent for a dmission to the l egal profession, but it must also remain i ntact in order to maintain one’s
good s tanding i n that exclusive and honored fraternity. Good moral character is more than just the absence of bad character. Such character expresses
i ts elf in the will to do the unpleasant thing i f i t is ri ght and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it i s wrong. Thi s must be so because “vast interests
a re committed to his care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust and confidence; he deals with his client’s property, reputa tion, his life, his all.”34
(Ci ta tion omitted)
In thi s regard, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Co urt provides that a lawyer may be removed or s uspended from the practice of law, inter a lia, for
gros sly i mmoral conduct. Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. — A member of the bar may be removed or s uspended from his office as
a ttorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct i n such office, grossly i mmoral conduct, or by reason of his
convi cti on of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for a ny vi olatio n of the oath which he is required to ta ke before the admission to practice, or for a
wi l full disobedience of any lawful order of a s uperior court, or for corruptly or wi llful a ppearing as a n a ttorney for a part y to a case without authority so to
do. The practice of soliciting cases at l aw for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis
ours )
“A l a wyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct s howing a ny fa ult or deficiency i n his mora l character, honesty, probity or good
demeanor.”35 Immoral conduct involves a cts that a re willful, flagrant, or s hameless, a nd that s how a moral indifference to th e opinion of the upright and
res pectable members of the community. Immoral conduct is gross when i t is so corrupt as to constitute a cri minal act, or s o unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such s candalous or revolting ci rcumstances a s to shock the community’ s sense of decency. The
Court ma kes these distinctions, as the supreme penalty of disbarment a rising from conduct requires grossly i mmoral, not s imply i mmoral,
conduct.36chanroblesvi rtuallawlibrary

Contra cti ng a marriage during the subsistence of a previous one amounts to a grossly i mmoral conduct.
The fa cts gathered from the evidence adduced by the parties and, ironically, from Atty. Ca ti ndig’s own a dmission, i ndeed establish a pattern of conduct
tha t i s grossly i mmoral; i t is not only corrupt a nd unprincipled, but reprehensible to a high degree.

Atty. Ca ti ndig was va lidly ma rried to Gomez twice – a wedding i n the Central Methodist Church in 1968, whi ch was then followed by a Ca tholic wedding.
In 1983, Atty. Ca ti ndig s tarted pursuing Dr. Perez when their paths crossed again. Curiously, 15 yea rs i nto his first marriage and four children after, Atty.
Ca ti ndig claimed that his first marriage was then already fa lling a part due to Gomez’ serious intimacy problems.

A yea r a fter pursuing Dr. Perez, Atty. Ca tindig had a de facto separation from Gomez, dissolved their conjugal partnership of gains, obtained a divorce
decree from a court i n the Dominican Republic, a nd married Dr. Perez i n the USA all in the same year. Atty. Ca ti ndig was so enchanted with Dr. Perez at
tha t ti me that he moved heaven and earth just s o he could marry her ri ght a way – a ma rriage that has at least a s emblance of l egality.

From hi s own admission, Atty. Ca ti ndig knew that the divorce decree he o btained from the court i n the Dominican Republic was not recognized i n our
juri s diction a s he and Gomez were both Filipino citizens at that ti me. He knew that he was still validly ma rried to Gomez; th at he ca nnot marry a new
unl ess his previ ous marriage be properly declared a nullity. Otherwise, his subsequent ma rriage would be void. This notwithstanding, he still married Dr.
Perez. The foregoing circumstances seriously ta int Atty. Ca ti ndig’s sense of social propriety a nd moral va lues. It is a blata nt a nd purposeful disregard of
our l a ws on marriage.

It ha s also not escaped the attention of the Court that Atty. Ca tindig ma rried Dr. Perez i n the USA. Considering that Atty. Ca ti ndig knew that his previous
ma rri age remained va lid, the l ogical conclusion is that he wanted to marry Dr. Perez i n the USA for the added s ecurity of a voiding a ny charge of bigamy by
entering i nto the s ubsequent marriage outside Philippine jurisdiction.

Moreover, a ssuming a rguendo that Atty. Ca ti ndig’s claim is true, it ma tters not that Dr. Perez knew that their ma rriage is a nullity. The fact still remains
tha t he resorted to va rious legal s trategies in order to render a fa çade of va lidity to his otherwise i nvalid marriage to Dr. Perez. Such act i s, at the very
l east, s o unprincipled that it is reprehensible to the highest degree.

Further, a fter 17 yea rs of cohabiting with Dr. Perez, and despite the va rious legal a ctions he resorted to i n order to give t heir union a semblance of
va l i dity, Atty. Ca ti ndig left her a nd their s on. It was only a t that time that he finally decided to properly s eek the nullity of his first marriage to Gomez.
Appa rently, he was then already entranced with the much younger Atty. Ba ydo, a n associate lawyer employed by his firm.

Whi le the fa ct that Atty. Ca tindig decided to separate from Dr. Perez to pursue Atty. Ba ydo, in i tself, ca nnot be considered a grossly immoral conduct,
s uch fa ct forms part of the pattern showing his propensity towards i mmoral conduct. Lest it be misunderstood, the Court’s fin ding of gross immoral
conduct i s hinged not on Atty. Ca ti ndig’s desertion of Dr. Perez, but on his contracting of a s ubsequent marriage during the subsistence of his previ ous
ma rri age to Gomez.

“The moral delinquency that a ffects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as s uch i ncludes conduct that outrages the generally a ccepted moral
s ta ndards of the community, conduct for instance, which makes ‘a mockery of the i nviolable s ocial i nstitution of marriage.’”3 7 In va rious cases, the Court
ha s held that disbarment is warra nted when a lawyer abandons his lawful wife a nd maintains an illicit relationship with a nother woman who has borne
hi m a child.38chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Atty. Ca ti ndig’s subsequent marriage during the s ubsistence of his previous one definitely ma nifests a deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and
the ma rital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our l aws. By his own a dmission, Atty. Ca ti ndig made a mockery out of the institution of
ma rri age, taking a dvantage of his l egal skills in the process. He exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the
ba r, whi ch thus warrant the penalty of disbarment.

The Court i s not unmindful of the rule that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, a nd only i n a cl ear ca se of misconduct that seriously
a ffects the standing a nd character of the lawyer a s an officer of the Court a nd as a member of the bar. Where a lesser penalt y, s uch as temporary
s us pension, could accomplish the end desired, disbarment should never be decreed. Nevertheless, i n this ca se, the seriousness of the offense compels
the Court to wi eld i ts power to disbar, a s it a ppears to be the most a ppropriate penalty.

Atty. Ca ti ndig’s claim that Dr. Perez’s allegations against him are not credible since they a re uncorroborated and not supported by a ffidavits contrary to
Secti on 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, deserves scant consideration. Verily, Atty. Ca ti ndig himself admitted in his pleadings that he i ndee d married
Dr. Perez i n 1984 while his previous ma rriage with Gomez s till subsisted. Indubitably, s uch admission provides a mple basis for th e Court to render
di s ciplinary s anction a gainst him.

There is i nsufficient evidence to prove the affair between the respondents.

The Court l ikewise agrees with the Investigating Commissioner that there i s a dearth of evidence to prove the claimed amorous relationship between the
res pondents. As i t is, the evidence that was presented by Dr. Perez to prove her cl aim was mere allegati on, an anonymous letter i nforming her that the
res pondents were indeed having an affair a nd the purported love letter to Atty. Ba ydo that was s igned by Atty. Ca ti ndig.

The Court ha s consistently held that in s uspension or disbarment proceedings against la wyers, the lawyer enjoys the presumption of i nnocence, and the
burden of proof rests upon the complainant to prove the allegations i n his complaint. The evi dence required in suspension or disbarment proceedings is
preponderance of evi dence.39chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The presentation of the a nonymous letter that was received by Dr. Perez only proves that the latter i ndeed received a letter i nforming her of the alleged
rel a tions between the respondents; i t does not prove the veracity of the allegations th erein. Similarly, the supposed l ove l etter, if a t all, only proves that
Atty. Ca ti ndig wrote Atty. Ba ydo a letter professing his l ove for her. It does not prove that Atty. Ba ydo i s indeed in a rela tionship with Atty. Ca ti ndig.

WHEREFORE, i n consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the Court resolves to ADOPT the recommendations of the Commission on Bar Discipline of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Atty. Tri stan A. Ca ti ndig is found GUILTY of gross i mmorality a nd of vi olating the Law yer’s Oath and Rule 1.01, Ca non
7 a nd Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility a nd i s hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law.

Let a copy of thi s Decision be entered into the records of Atty. Tri s tan A. Ca tindig i n the Office of the Bar Confidant a nd h is name is ORDERED STRICKEN
from the Roll of Attorneys. Li kewise, copies of this Decision s hall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines a nd ci rculated by the Court
Admi nistrator to all appellate a nd tri al courts.

The cha rge of gross immorality a gainst Atty. Ka ren E. Baydo is hereby DISMISSED for l ack of evidence.

Thi s Decision takes effect i mmediately.

SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C. J., Ca rpi o, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Ca stro, Bri on, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe, and
Leonen, JJ., concur.
Ja rdeleza, J., no part respondent ca finding was collegue in faculty.
THIRD DIVISION
[A.C. No. 4369. November 28, 1997]
PIKE P. ARRIETA, Complainant, v. ATTY. JOEL A. LLOSA, Respondent.

RE SO LU TI O N

ROMERO, J.:

Compl ainant Pi ke P. Arri eta prays for the disbarment of Atty. Joel A. Ll osa for certifying under oath a Deed of Abs olute Sale.

Pa rti cularly, complainant avers that respondent notarized a Deed of Absolute Sale dated Ma rch 24, 19931 ma ki ng it appear that some of the vendors i n
s a id Deed namely, Edelina T. Bonilla, Jesus T. Bonilla and Leonardo P. Tol edano were parties a nd signatories thereto when i n truth and in fact, all three
were a lready dead prior to the execution of the said Deed of Absolute Sale. Jesus T. Bonilla died on August 22, 19922 whi l e L eonardo P. Toledano died on
November 1, 1992.3 Edel ina T. Bonilla a llegedly died on or a bout June 11, 1992.

In a nswer, respondent admitted having notarized the Deed of Absolute Sale. But before affixing his notarial s eal, he first as certained the authenticity of
the s ignatures, verified the i dentities of the signatories, and determined the voluntariness of i ts execution. Satisfied with all of the a bove, it was only then
tha t he certified the document.

Curi ously, on September 9, 1996, complainant had a complete turn-around a nd moved for the dismissal of his complaint. He a lleged that the instant ca se
i s only a product of misunderstanding a nd misinterpretation of some facts and is now convi nced that everything is in order.

The designated Investigating Commissioner of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines recommended the dismissal of the i nstant case. The Board of
Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines a dopted the a bove recommendation and resolved to dismiss the instant case a fter finding no
compelling reason to continue with the disbarment proceedings.

Thi s Court ca nnot a gree.

Sec. 1 of Publ ic Act No. 2103 provi des:

(a ) The acknowledgment shall be made before a notary public or an officer duly a uthorized by l aw of the country to ta ke a cknowledgment of i nstruments
or documents in the place where the act i s done. The notary public or the officer taking the a cknowledgment s hall certify that the person a cknowledging
the i nstrument or document is known to him a nd that he is the s ame person who executed i t, and acknowledged that the same i s his free act and deed.
The certi ficate s hall be made under his official s eal, i f he is by l aw required to keep a s eal, a nd i f not, his certificate s hall s o state.

It i s thus cl ear from the foregoing that the party a cknowledging must appear before the notary public or a ny p erson a uthorized to ta ke a cknowledgment
of i nstruments or documents.4 Aside from being required to appear before the Notary Public, i t is similarly i ncumbent upon th e person acknowledging
the i nstrument to declare before the same Notary Public that the execution of the i nstrument was done by him of his own free will.

In the Acknowledgment of the Deed of Sale, respondent certified: BEFORE ME, this 24th day of Ma rch, 1993 a t Dumaguete City, Phi lippines, personally
a ppeared x x x Jes us Bonilla; x x x Leonardo Toledano; x x x.5 Res pondent claims that as a Notary Public, he asked the signatories whether the signatures
a ppearing above their respective names were theirs, and whether they voluntarily executed the Deed of Absolute Sale. In order to ascertain their
i dentities, respondent asked for their respective residence certificates.

Except for Edelina T. Bonilla whose alleged death was not evidenced by a death certificate, respondent certified i n the a ckno wledgment that Jesus T.
Boni lla a nd Leonardo P. Tol edano personally a ppeared before him. Respondents acts require the presence of the vendors to be a ble to verify the
a uthenticity of their s ignatures, the i dentities of the s ignatories a nd the vol untariness of the execution of the Deed. It de fies imagination and belief how
thes e could have happened. It would have been impossible, both physically a nd l egally, for Jesus T. Bonilla and Leonardo P. T oledano to have personally
s ubscribed and sworn before respondent as to the authenticity a nd validity of the Deed of Sal e as they had already passed on to the Great Beyond prior
to the execution of the said documents.

Yet, res pondent certified to this effect. By a ffixing his notarial s eal on the instrument, he converted the Deed of Absolute Sale, from being a private
document into a public document. By certi fyi ng the Deed, respondent, i n effect, proclaimed to the world (1) that all the parties t herein personally
a ppeared before him; (2) that they a re all personally known to him; (3) that they were the same persons who execu ted the instruments; (4) that he
i nquired into the voluntariness of execution of the i nstrument; a nd (5) they a cknowledged personally before him that they vol untarily and freely executed
the s ame.

Nota ri zation is not a n empty, meaningless, routinary a ct. On the contrary, i t is i nvested with substantial public i nterest, such that only those who a re
qua lified or authorized may a ct as notaries public. Notarization of a private document converts the document i nto a public one making it admissible in
court wi thout further proof of its authenticity.6 A notarial document is by l aw entitled to full faith and credit upon its face a nd, fo r this reason, notaries
public must observe with the utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties. Otherwi se, the confidence of the public i n the
i ntegrity of this form of conveya nce would be undermined.7chanroblesvi rtuallawlibrary

As a l awyer commissioned to be a notary public, respondent is mandated to discharge his sacred duties which a re dictated by p ublic policy a nd, as such,
i mpressed wi th public i nterest. Faithful observance a nd utmost respect of the legal s olemnity of a n oath in a n a cknowledgment or jurat is sacrosanct.
8crä l ä wvirtualibräry

It i s for the a bove reason that this Court is most concerned about the explanation given by complainant for withdrawing his complaint a gainst
res pondent. In his Motion to Dismiss dated September 9, 1996, compl ainant declares:

xxx xxx xxx

Tha t he is now fully convinced that everything was i n order, and that nobody was ever prejudiced by the acts of the respondent. Herein complainant has
rea lized that he himself, or any other l egal practitioner, would have done s imilarly a s the respondent, i f confronted with su ch an urgent voluntary
tra ns action i n an emergency s ituation; x x x.

Tha t respondent a cted the way he did because he was confronted with an a lleged urgent s ituation is no excuse at all. As a n i ndividual, a nd even more s o
a s a member of the legal profession, he is required to obey the laws of the l and AT ALL TIMES, to refrain from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, i mmoral or
deceitful conduct AT ALL TIMES, to uphold the integrity of his profession AT ALL TIMES, to promote respect to his profession AT ALL TIMES, a nd to a ct
wi th justice AT ALL TIMES.
It i s dismaying to note how respondent so ca valierly disregarded the requirements and solemnities of the Notarial La w simply to a ccomodate his clients.
Not onl y did he commit an illegal act but also did so without thinking of the possible damage or prejudice that mi ght result from non-observance of the
s a me.

As a l awyer, respondent breached his professional responsibility by certifying under oath a n instrument fully knowing that s ome of the signatories thereto
were l ong dead. This Court cannot countenance this practice, especially coming, a s it does, from resp ondent who formerly s erved as president of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Negros Ori ental Chapter, President of the Dumaguete Lions Cl ub a nd Ci ty Councilor of Dumaguete. If indeed respondent
ha d ta ken steps to verify the i dentities of the signatories, he would have easily known that the signatures were fake as they purported to be those of his
former cl ients.

It i s worth s tressing that the practice of l aw is not a ri ght but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that th ey possess, and continue to
pos sess, the qualifications required by l aw for the conferment of s uch privilege.9 [M]embership i n the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. There
bei ng no l ifetime guaranty, a lawyer has the privilege and right to practice law only during good behavior and can be deprived of i t for misconduct
a s certained and declared by judgment of the court a fter opportunity to be heard has been afforded him.10chanroblesvirtuallawl ibrary

Purs uant to the foregoing, i t is primarily required of lawyers to obey the Constitution and laws of the land.11 They must refrain from engaging i n
unl awful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.12chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

An a ttorney may be disbarred or suspended for a ny vi olation of his oath or of his duties as a n a ttorney a nd counsellor, which i nclude s tatutory grounds
enumerated i n Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a ll of these being broad enough to cover practically any misconduct of a lawyer in his
professional or private ca pacity.13cräläwvirtualibräry

Res pondents a ct of certifying under oath a Deed of Absolute Sale knowing that s ome of the vendors were already dead, they bei ng his former cl ients,
cons titutes misconduct. But this being his first administrative offense, such s hould not warrant the s upreme penalty of disbarment.

ACCORDINGLY, this Court finds respondent Atty. Joel A. Ll osa guilty of misconduct. Consequently, he is ordered SUSPENDED from the practice of l aw for
s i x (6) months effective immediately, wi th a warning that a nother i nfraction w ould be dealt wi th more severely.

Let copi es of this Resolution be furnished all the courts of the land as well as the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the O ffice of the Bar Confidant and
recorded i n the personal files of respondent himself.

SO ORDERED.

Na rva sa, C.J., (Cha irman), Melo, Fra ncisco, and Pa nganiban, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
A.C. No. 8560, September 06, 2016
CARRIE-ANNE SHALEEN CARLYLE S. REYES, Complainant, v. ATTY. RAMON F. NIEVA, Respondent.

DE CI SI ON

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

For the Court's resolution is the Complaint1 dated Ma rch 3, 2010 fi l ed by co mplainant Ca rrie-Anne Shaleen Ca rlyle S. Reyes (complainant) a gainst
res pondent Atty. Ra mon F. Nieva (respondent), praying that the latter be disbarred for s exually ha rassing her.

The Fa cts

Compl ainant a lleged that she has been working a t the Ci vil Aviation Authority of the Philippines (CAAP) a s an Administrative Aide on a Job Order basis
s i nce October 2004. Sometime in January 2009, s he was re-assigned a t the CAAP Offi ce of the Board Secretary under the supervi sion of respondent, who
wa s then a cting as CAAP Acti ng Board Secretary. During complainant's s tint under respondent, she would notice that during office hours, responde nt
woul d often watch "pampagana" vi deos s aved i n his office laptop, all of which turned out to be pornographic films. Complainant also a verred that
whenever respondent got close to her, he would hold her hand a nd would s ometimes give i t a kiss. During these instances, complainant would remove
her ha nds and tell him to desist. According to complainant, respondent even offered her a cellular phone together with the necessary l oad to serve as
mea ns for their private communication, but she refused the said offer, insisting that s he already has her own cellular phone and does not need a nother
one.2

Compl ainant a lso narrated that at about 5 o'cl ock in the a fternoon of April 1, 2009, res pondent texted her to wait for him at the office. Fearing that
res pondent might ta ke a dvantage of her, complainant convinced two (2) of her officemates to accompany her until respondent a r rived. Upon
res pondent's arrival a nd s eeing that complainant had companions, he just told complainant and the other two (2) office s taff to lock the door when
they l eave.3

Compl ainant further recounted that on the following day, April 2, 2009, res pondent called her on her cellular phone, asked if she received his text
mes sage, a nd told her he would tell her s omething upon his arrival a t the office. At a bout 9:30 i n the morni ng of even date, respondent asked
compl ainant to encode a memorandum he was about to dictate. Suddenly, respondent placed his hand on complainant's waist a rea near her breast and
s ta rted caressing the latter's torso. Complainant immediately moved away from respondent and told him "sumosobra na ho kayo sir." Instead of asking
for a n a pology, respondent told complainant he was willing to give her P2,000.00 a month from his own pocket and even gave he r a note stating "just bet
(between) you a nd me, x x x ka hit na si mommy," referring to complainant's mother who was also working at CAAP. At a round past 11 o'clock in the
morni ng of the same day, while complainant and respondent were l eft a lone i n the office, respondent s uddenly cl osed the door, grabbed complainant's
a rm, a nd uttered "let's seal it with a kiss," then a ttempted to kiss complainant. This prompted complainant to thwart respondent's a dvances with her l eft
a rm, ra i sed her voice i n order to invite help, and exclaimed "wag naman kayo ganyan sir, yung a saw a nyo magagalit, sir may a sawa ako." After respondent
l et her go, complainant i mmediately l eft the office to ask assistance from her former s upervisor who a dvised her to file a n a dministrative case4 against
res pondent before the CAAP Committee on Decorum a nd Investigation (CODI).5

Fi nally, complainant alleged that after her ordeal with respondent, she was tra umatized a nd was even diagnosed by a psychiatrist to be suffering from
pos t-traumatic s tress disorder with recurrent major depression.6 Eventually, co mplainant filed the i nstant complaint.
In hi s defense,7 respondent denied all of complainant's allegations. He maintained that a s a 79-year old retiree who only took a position at the CAAP on a
cons ultancy basis, it was very unlikely for him to do the a cts i mputed a gainst him, especially i n a very s mall office space a llotted for him a nd his staff. In
thi s regard, he referred to his Counter-Affidavit8 s ubmitted before the CODI, wherein he explained, inter a lia, that: (a ) while he i ndeed watches
"i nteresting s hows" in his office laptop, he never invited a nyone, including complainant, to wa tch with him and that he would even cl ose his laptop
whenever someone comes near him;9 (b) he never held and kissed complainant's hand because i f he had done s o, he would have been easily noticed by
compl ainant's co-staffers;10 (c) he did offer her a cellular phone, but this was s upposed to be an office phone which should not be used for p ersonal
purposes, and thus, could not be given any s exual meaning;11 (d) h e did tell complainant to wait for him i n the afternoon of April 1, 2009, but only for the
purpose of having an available encoder s hould he need one for a ny urgent matter that would arise;12 a nd (e) he would not do t he acts he allegedly
commi tted on April 2, 2009 a s there were other people i n the office a nd that those people ca n a ttest in his favor.13 Respondent then pointed out that the
a dministrative ca se filed against him before the CODI was already dismissed for l ack of basis and that complainant was only being used by other CAAP
empl oyees who were a gitated by the reforms he helped i mplement upon his assumption a s CAAP consultant a nd eventually a s Actin g Corporate Board
Secretary.14

The IBP's Report and Recommendation

In a Report and Recommendation15 dated August 14, 2012, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Investigating Commissioner recommended the
di s missal of the instant a dministrative complaint against respondent.16 He found that complainant failed to s ubstantiate her a llegations a gainst
res pondent, a s opposed to respondent's defenses which a re ably s upported by evidence. Ci ting respondent's evidence, the Investi gating Commissioner
opi ned that since the CAAP Offi ce of the Board Secretary was very s mall, i t is i mplausible that a startling occurrence s uch as a n a ttempted sexual
mol estation would not be noticed by not only the other occupants of said office area, but also by those occupying the office adjacent to i t, i.e., the CAAP
Opera tions Center, which is separated only by glass panels. Further, the Investigating Commissioner drew attention to the investigation conducted by the
CODI s howing that the collective sworn statements of the witnesses point to the eventual conclusion that none of the alleged acts of misconduct
a ttri buted to respondent really occurred.17

In a Resolution18 dated May 10, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors (IBP Board) unanimously reversed the aforesaid Report a nd Re commendation. As such,
res pondent was found guilty of committing sexual a dvances, a nd a ccordingly, recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for three (3)
months.
In vi ew of respondent's Motion for Reconsideration,19 the IBP Board referred the case to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) for study,
eva l uation, a nd s ubmission of a n Executive Summary to the IBP Board.20

In the Director's Report21 dated July 8, 2014, the IBP-CBD National Director recommended that the current IBP Board adhere to the report and
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner a s it is s upported by the evidence on record; on the other hand, the reversal made by the previous
IBP Boa rd is bereft of a ny fa ctual and legal bases, a nd s hould therefore, be s et aside. In this l ight, the current IBP Board issued a Resolution22 dated
Augus t 10, 2014 s etting aside the previ ous IBP Board's Resolution, a nd a ccordingly, dismissed the a dministrative complaint against respondent.

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue in this case i s whether or not respondent s hould be held administratively liable for vi olating the Cod e of Professional Responsibility
(CPR).
The Court's Ruling

Rul e 1.01, Ca non 1 of the CPR provides:

CANON 1 - A l a wyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the l aws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes.

Rul e 1.01 - A l a wyer shall not engage i n unlawful, dishonest, i mmoral or deceitful conduct.
The provi sion instructs that "[a]s officers of the court, l awyers a re bound to maintain not only a high s tandard of l egal proficiency, but also of morality,
honesty, i ntegrity, a nd fair dealing."23

In s imilar l ight, Rule 7.03, Ca non 7 of the CPR s tates:

CANON 7 - A l a wyer shall at a ll ti mes uphold the i ntegrity a nd dignity of the legal profession a nd support the a ctivities of the Integrated Bar.

xxxx

Rul e 7.03 - A l a wyer shall not engage i n conduct that a dversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor s hall he, whether i n public or pri vate l ife, behave
i n a s candalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Good moral character is a trait that eve ry practicing lawyer i s required to possess. It may be defined as "what a person really i s, as distinguished from
good reputation, or from the opinion generally entertained of him, or the estimate i n which he is held by the public in the place where he is known. Moral
cha ra cter is not a s ubjective term but one which corresponds to objective reality."24 Such requirement has four (4) ostensibl e purposes, namely: (a ) to
protect the public; (b) to protect the public image of lawyers; (c) to protect prospective clients; a nd (d) to protect errant l awyers from themselves.25

In Va ldez v. Da bon,26 the Court emphasized that a lawyer's continued possession of good moral character i s a requisite condit ion to remain a member of
the Ba r, vi z.:
La wyers have been repeatedly reminded by the Court that possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a continuing
requi rement to warrant a dmission to the Bar a nd to retain membership in the l egal profession. This proceeds from the l awyer's bounden duty to observe
the hi ghest degree of morality i n order to safeguard the Bar's integrity, a nd the legal profession exacts from i ts members no thing less. Lawyers are ca lled
upon to safeguard the i ntegrity of the Bar, free from misdeeds a nd a cts constitutive of malpractice. Their exalted positions as officers of the court
dema nd no less than the highest degree of morality.

The Court explained i n Arnobit v. Atty. Arnobit that "as officers of the court, l awyers must not only in fact be of good mora l character but must also be
s een to be of good moral character a nd leading lives i n accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. A membe r of the bar a nd an
offi cer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or keeping a mistress but must also behave himself so as to avoid
s ca ndalizing the public by creating the impression that he is flouting those moral s tandards." Consequently, a ny errant behavior of the lawyer, be i t in his
public or pri vate activities, which tends to show deficiency i n moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor, is s ufficient to warrant suspension or
di s barment.27 (Emphasis a nd underscoring s upplied)
Veri ly, l awyers are expected to a bide by the tenets of morality, not only upon a dmission to the Bar but a lso throughout their l egal ca reer, i n order to
ma i ntain their good standing i n this exclusive a nd honored fraternity. They may be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred for a ny misconduct,
even i f it pertains to his private activities, as long as it s hows him to be wanting i n moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.28

After due consideration, the Court reverses the fi ndings and recommendations of the IBP, and finds respondent a dministrativel y l iable for vi olations of
the CPR, a s will be explained hereunder.
To reca pitulate, the IBP found that as compared to complainant's purposedly bare a nd uncorroborated allegations, respondent's evi dence point to the
concl usion that none of the alleged sexual a dvances made by respondent a gainst complainant actually occurred. As such, it a bs olved respondent from
a ny a dministrative liability. In support of s uch finding, the IBP largely relied on the following: (a ) the five (5) photographs29 respondent s ubmitted to the
CODI to s how that respondent's office space was s o small that any commotion ca used by a sexual harassment a ttempt would have been easily noticed by
the other occupants thereof;30 and (b) the i nvestigation conducted by the CODI per the Tra nscript31 s ubmitted by respondent w here the witnesses said
tha t they did not notice a nything out of the ordinary on April 2, 2009, the date when respondent's alleged s exual advances against complainant were
commi tted.32 However, the foregoing evidence, taken as a whole, did not actually refute complainant's allegation that at a round past 11 o'cl ock i n the
morni ng of April 2, 2009, res pondent cl osed the door, gra bbed complainant's ri ght a rm, uttered the words "let's s eal i t with a kiss" and attempte d to kiss
compl ainant despite the latter's resistance.

A ca reful perusal of the aforesaid Transcript shows that at a round past 11 o'clock i n the morning of April 2, 2009, there was a ti me that complainant a nd
res pondent were indeed l eft a lone i n the office:
Mr. Mendoza: Ngayon, puwede mo bang idescribe sa a min nung 9:30 to 11:00 s i nu-sino kayo doon?

Wi tness 1: Ta tlo (3) lang kami sir po dun. Si Ma 'am Ca rrie Anne [complainant], s i sir Nieva [respondent] tsaka a ka po.

Mr. Mendoza: So ikaw lang a ng witness, a ng taong naroon 9:30 to 11?

Wi tness 1: Yes s ir.

xxxx

Mr. Mendoza: Saan kayo kumakain ng lunch?

Wi tness 1: Sa l oob po kami naglulunch.

Mr. Mendoza: Pa g nag-order ng pagkain minsan may natitira pa bang i ba?

Wi tness 1: Itong po yung dalawa yung natira nung umalis po aka. Um... pagbalik ko po wala na po s i Ma'am Ca an [complainant] s i Ma 'am Amy nalang po
a ng nandoon.

Mr. Mendoza: So siya [complainant] nalang a t tsaka si Atty. Ni eva [respondent] a ng naiwan doon sa room? Eh nasaan na yung i bang OJT pa?

Wi tness 1: Ta tlo lang po kasi kami nun s ir, nasa Land Bank po yung dalawa.

Mr. Mendoza: So nasa Land Bank sila. So totoong may n angyari na naiwan silang dalawa [complainant and respondent] na ti me na silang dalawa lang a ng
na i wan s a kuwarto?

Wi tness 1: Opo nung mga quarter to 12 s iguro po nun.

Mr. Mendoza: Ilang beses na may na ngyayaring ganun na silang naiiwan doon sa kuwarto?

Wi tness 1: Yun l ang po kasi yung natatandaan ko po sir na ti me na naiwan s ila eh.

xxxx

Mr. Abes amis: Umalis ka sa room para bumili ng pagkain nandoon si Atty. Ni eva [respondent]?

Wi tness 1: Andoon pa po silang dalawa [complainant a nd respondent]. Pero ta pos na po s ilang magtype nun tas nag decide na maglunch na eh.

Mr. Abes amis: Saan? Sino a ng naiwan?

Wi tness 1: Da lawa pa lang sila s ir pagbalik ko tatlo na sila pero wala naman po si Ma 'am Caan [complainant]. Nung umalis po a ko s i sir Nieva [respondent]
ts a ka si Ma 'am Caan yung nandoon then pagbalik ko po wala na si Ma 'am Ca an, si sir Ni eva tsaka silang dalawa na po yung nando on.

Mr. Abes amis: Ok. So wala na silang kasamang i ba?

Wi tness 1: Opo.33
The s ame Transcript also reveals that the CODI interviewed the occupants of the a djacent office, i.e., the CAAP Operations Center, which, according to the
IBP Investigating Commissioner, was only s eparated from complainant a nd respondent's office, i.e. the CAAP Office of the Boar d Secretary, by gl ass
pa nels. Pertinent parts of the intervi ew read:
Mr. Borja : Nung oras ng mga alas onse (11) pagitan ng alas onse (11) hanggang alas dose (12), nasaan ka joy [Witness 4]?

Wi tness 4: Andun po s a ORCC [CAAP Operations Center].

Mr. Borja : Si a no naman Donna [Witness 5] ga nun din? Kasi sinasabi dito noong bandang ganung oras past eleven (11) parang nag -advance ya ta si Atty.
Ni eva [respondent] kay Ms . Reyes (Caan) [complainant] ngayon nung chinachansingan s iya parang ganun a ng dating eh "Iraised up my voi ce also, so that
the OPCEN pers onnel will hear of the alarm" may narinig ba kayo na sumigaw siya?

Wi tness 4: Eh ka si s ir wala pong braket yun yung ti me na a no yung RPCC 764 s o nag -cocoordinate kami...

Mr. Borja : Ano yung 764?

Wi tness 4: Yung sa Tuguegarao yung nawawala siya s o may a lerfa ta pos ditressfa so intransi po kami... opo...

Mr. Borja : So busing-busy ka sa telepono?

Wi tness 4: Opo l ahat kami.

Mr. Borja : Pa ti ikaw?

Wi tness 5: Opo.

Mr. Borja : Si nong walang ginagawa nun?

Wi tness 4: Wa la kasi kanya -kanya kami ng coordination lahat kami nasa telepono.

Mr. Borja : Ka ya kapag kumakalampag yung pader [sa] kabila hindi niyo maririnig?

Wi tness 4: Hi ndi s iguro sir kasi kung nakasara din sila ng pinto ta pos kanya-kanya kaming may ka usap sa telepono eh.

Mr. Borja : Kung hindi kayo nakikipag-usap ngayon wala kayong gi nagawa, narinig niyo a ng usapan doon sa kabila.

Wi tness 5: Yes s ir.

Atty. Gl ori a: Lalo na pag malakas.

Mr. Borja : Pa g malakas pero therein normal voice lang level.

Wi tness 4: Ka si minsan malakas din yung ra dio nila eh. Kung minsan kasi s ir may mga music sila. Eto sir yung time na kinuha.. . Dami nila eh... Lumabas
na kita naming mga ano mga 10:45 na ya n nabasa sir.

Mr. Borja : Pero a ng pinag-uusapan natin l agpas ng alas onse (11) ha bago mag-alas dose (12) a ng pinaka latest message mo dito 02/03/06 11:06. So
between 11:06 to 12 wa l a kayong...

Wi tness 4: Ka si nakikipag-coordination ta laga kami kahit... kami l ang nandoon sa telepono.

Mr. Borja : Wri tten pero voice coordination niyo sa telepono kayo?

Wi tness 4: Ts aka naka l og-in sa log book.

xxxx

Mr. Abes amis: Ma 'am Joy [Witness 4] sabi niyo kanina naririnig niyo si sir [respondent] sa kabila kung wala kayong kausap lal ong-lalo na kapag malakas
yung s a lita?

Wi tness 4: Opo.

Mr. Abes amis: So ibig sabihin kahit hindi malakas may possibility na maririnig niyo yung usapan kung walang ra dio? Siguro i f i ntelligible or knowledgeable
pero ma ririnig mo sa kabila?
Wi tness 4: Kung mahina o normal yung usapan?

Mr. Abes arnis: Normal na usapan, conversation.

Wi tness 4: Hi ndi s iguro pag sarado sila.

Mr. Abes amis: Pero kung halimbawa sisigaw?

Wi tness 4: Ma ri rinig s iguro kasi kapag nagdidictate si Attorney [respondent] minsan naririnig namin.

Mr. Mendoza: Ma ski sarado yung pinto?

Wi tness 4: Ah opo.

Mr. Mendoza: Naririnig?

Wi tness 4: Kung malakas.

Mr. Mendoza: Ah kung malakas?

Wi tness 4: Opo.

Mr. Abes amis: So wala kayong naririnig man lang kahit isang word na malakas doon sa kanila during the time na nangya ri ito?

Wi tness 4: Nung time na iyan wala kasi kaming maalala...

Mr. Abes amis: Walang possibility na narinig niyo pero mas busy ka yo s a telephone operation.

Wi tness 4: Busy ka mi.

Mr. Abes amis: Hindi ma kikilatis yung a no...

Wi tness 4: Ka si may ti me na sumigaw na babae nga pero kala lang namin a h...

Mr. Abes amis: Nung date na i yon o hindi?

Wi tness 4: Hi ndi, hindi pa s igurado eh kasi...

Mr. Abes arnis: Hindi yung date bang i yon ang sinasabi mo?

Wi tness 4: Hi ndi kasi busy ta laga kami sa coordination nung ano eh nung time na iyon. Nasabay kasi eh nung ti me na iyon hinahanap pa namin yung
requi rement.

Mr. Mendoza: Pero bago yung bago mag April 2, meron ba kayo na tuligan na nag-aanuhan ng ganun, nagrereklamo tungkol kay Atty. Ni eva [respondent],
wa l a? Ma y narinig kayong movie na parang sounding na porno ganun?

Wi tness 4: Wa la music lang talaga sir.

Mr. Mendoza: So music.

Wi tness 4: Kung minsan kasi binubuksan nila yung door pag mainit yung kuwarto nila.

Mr. Borja : At tha t ti me hindi bukas iyon?

Wi tness 4: Ka mi a no eh may cover ng a no ca rtolina na white.

Mr. Borja : Ma kakatestify l ang kayo sa audio eh, kasi wala kayong nakikita.34
The a bove-cited excerpts of the Tra nscript s how that at a round past 11 o'cl ock in the morning of April 2, 2009, complainant a nd respondent were left
a l one i n the CAAP Offi ce of the Board Secretary as complainant's officemates were all out on erra nds. In this regard, i t was error on the part of the IBP to
ha s tily conclude from the testimonies of complainant's officemates who were i nterviewed by the CODI that nothing out of the o rdinary happened. Surely,
they were not in a position to confirm or refute complainant's allegations as they were not physically i n the office so a s to make a credible testimony as to
the events that tra nspired therein during that time.

Nei ther ca n the testimonies of those i n the CAAP Operations Center be used to conclude th at respondent did not do anything to complainant, considering
tha t they themselves admitted that they were all on the telephone, busy with their coordinating duties. They likewise clarifi ed that while their office i s
i ndeed separated from the CAAP Offi ce of the Board Secretary only by gl ass panels, they could not s ee what was happening there as they covered the
gl a ss panels with white cartolina. In light of their preoccupation from their official duties as well a s the fact that the gl ass panels were covered, it is very
unl ikely for them to have noticed any commotion happening in the a djacent CAAP Offi ce of the Board Secretary.
Furthermore, the IBP should have taken the testimonies of the wi tnesses in the CODI proceedings with a grain of s alt. It bears noting that all those
i nterviewed i n the CODI proceedings were job order a nd regular employees of the CAAP. Na turally, they would be ca utious i n gi ving a ny unfavorable
s ta tements a gainst a high-ranking official of the CAAP s uch a s respondent who was the Acti ng Board Secretary a t that time - l est they earn the ire of such
offi cial and put their ca reer in jeopardy.

Thus , the IBP erred in concluding that s uch Tra nscript s hows that respondent did not perform the acts complained of. On the c ontrary, s aid Transcript
proves that there was indeed a period of time where complainant a nd respondent were left alone in the CAAP Offi ce of the Board Secretary which gave
res pondent a window of opportunity to ca rry out his a cts constituting sexual harassment a gainst complainant.

More i mportantly, records reveal that complainant's allegations a re a dequately s upported by a Certi ficate of Ps ychiatric Eva l uation35 dated April 13,
2009 s ta ting that the onset of her psychiatric problems - diagnosed as post-traumatic s tress disorder with recurrent major depression started a fter
s uffering the alleged sexual molestation at the hands of respondent. Moreover, complainant's plight was ably s upported by oth er CAAP employees36 as
wel l as a retired Brigadier General of the Armed Forces of the Philippines37 through va rious letters to authorities seeking justice for complainant.
Perceptibly, complainant would not seek help from s uch s upporters, a nd ri sk their i ntegrity i n the process, if none of her a l legations were true. Besides,
there i s no evidence to establish that complainant was impelled by a ny i mproper motive against respondent or tha t she had reasons to fabricate her
a l legations against him. Therefore, absent any competent proof to the contrary, the Court finds that complainant's s tory of t he April 2, 2009 i ncident was
not moved by a ny i ll-will a nd was untainted by bias; a nd hence, worthy of belief a nd credence.38 In this regard, i t should be mentioned that respondent's
a verment that complainant was only being used by other CAAP employees to g et back a t him for i mplementing reforms within the CAAP was plainly
uns ubstantiated, and thus, a mere self-serving assertion that deserves no weight in l aw.39
In a ddition, the Court notes that respondent never refuted complainant's a llegation that he would regularly wa tch "pampagana" movies in his office-
i s sued laptop. In fact, respondent readily a dmitted that he i ndeed watches "interesting s hows" while i n the office, a lbeit insisting that he only does s o by
hi mself, and that he would immediately dose his laptop whenever a nyone would pass by or go near his ta ble. As confirmed in the Transcript40 of the
i nvestigation conducted by the CODI, these "pampagana" movies and "interesting shows" turned out to be pornographic materials , which respondent
even a sks his male s taff to regularly play for him as he is not well-versed i n using computers.41

Wi thout a doubt, it has been established that respondent habitually watches pornographic ma terials in his office -issued laptop while inside the office
premi ses, during office hours, a nd with the knowledge and full vi ew of his staff. Obviously, the Court cannot countenance s uch audacious display o f
depra vity on respondent's part not only because his obscene habit ta rnishes the reputation of the government agency he works for - the CAAP where he
wa s engaged a t that time as Acting Corporate Secretary - but also because i t shrouds the l egal profession in a negative light. As a lawyer i n the
government servi ce, respondent is expected to perform a nd discharge his duties with the hi ghest degree of excellence, professionalism, intelligence, a nd
s ki ll, a nd wi th utmost devotion and dedication to duty.42 However, his a foresaid habit miserably fails to showcase these standards, a nd i nstead, displays
s heer unprofessionalism a nd utter l ack of respect to the government position he was entrusted to hold. His flimsy excuse that he only does so by himself
a nd that he would i mmediately cl ose his laptop whenever a nyone would pass by or come near his ta ble is of no moment, because the l ewdness of his
a cti ons, within the s etting of this case, remains. The legal profession - much more an engagement i n the public s ervice should a lways be held in high
es teem, a nd those who belong within its ra nks should be unwavering exemplars of i ntegrity a nd professionalism. As keepers of the public faith, lawyers,
s uch a s respondent, are burdened with a high degree of social responsibility a nd, hence, must handle their personal affairs w ith greater caution. Indeed,
thos e who have ta ken the oath to assist i n the dispensation of justice should be more possessed of the consciousness a nd the will to overcome the
wea kness of the flesh, as respondent in this case.43

In the Investigating Commissioner's Report a nd Recommendation adopted by the IBP Board of Governors, the quantum of proof by which the charges
a ga inst respondent were a ssessed was preponderance of evidence. Preponderance of evidence "means evidence which is of greater weight, or more
convi ncing than that which is offered in opposition to i t."44 Generally, under R ule 133 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, this evidentiary threshold applies
to ci vi l cases:
SECTION 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. - In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his ca se by a preponderance
of evi dence. In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may consider a ll the facts and
ci rcums tances of the case, the wi tnesses' manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they a re
tes tifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or i mprobability of their testimony, their i nteres t or want of interest, and a lso their
pers onal credibility s o far a s the same may l egitimately appear upon the trial. The court ma y also consider the number of witnesses, though the
preponderance is not necessarily wi th the greater number. (Emphasis s upplied)
Nonetheless, in non-civil cases such as De Zuzuarregui, Jr. v. Soguilon45 ci ted by the IBP Investigating Commissioner, the Court had pronounced that the
burden of proof by preponderance of evidence in disbarment proceedings is upon the complainant.46 These rulings appear to con flict with other
juri s prudence on the matter which contrarily hold that s ubstantial evidence is the quantum of proof to be applied in a dministrative ca ses a gainst
l a wyers.47 The l atter standard was applied in a dministrative ca ses s uch as Foster v. Agta ng,48 wherein the Court had, i n fact , illumined that:
[T]he quantum of evidence required in civil cases is different from the quantum of evidence required i n a dministrative cases. In ci vil cases, p reponderance
of evi dence is required. Preponderance of evi dence is "a phrase which, i n the last a nalysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more
convi ncing to the court as worthier of belief than that which i s offered i n opposition thereto." In a dministrative ca ses, onl y s ubstantial evidence is
needed. Substantial evi dence, which is more than a mere scintilla but is s uch relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a concl usion, would s uffice to hold one a dministratively liable.49 (Emphasis supplied; ci tations omitted)
Si milarly, i n Peña v. Pa terno,50 i t was held:
Secti on 5, i n [comparison with] Sections 1 [(Preponderance of evidence, how proved)] a nd 2 [(Proofbeyond reasonable doubt)], Rule 133, Rules of Court
s ta tes that in administrative cases, only s ubstantial evidence is required, not proof beyond reasonable doubt as in criminal cases, or preponderance of
evi dence as in civil cases. Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept a s adequate to justify a
concl usion.51 (Emphasis s upplied; citations omitted)
Ba s ed on a survey of ca ses, the recent ruling on the matter is Ca bas v. Sususco,52 which was promulgated just this June 15, 2016. In the s aid ca se, i t was
pronounced that:
In a dministrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt is substantial evidence, i .e., that amount of relevant evidence that a
rea s onable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Further, the complainant has the b urden of proving by s ubstantial evidence the
a l legations in his complaint. The basic rule is that mere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof. Cha rges based on mere suspicion a nd
s peculation l ikewise cannot be gi ven credence.53 (Emphasis s upplied)
Accordi ngly, this more recent pronouncement ought to control a nd therefore, quell a ny further confusion on the proper evident iary threshold to be
a pplied i n administrative cases against l awyers.

Bes ides, the evidentiary threshold of substantial evidence - a s opposed to preponderance of evidence - i s more i n keeping with the primordial purpose of
a nd essential considerations a ttending this type of cases. As case law elucidates, "[d]isciplinary proceedings against lawyer s a re sui generis. Neither purely
ci vi l nor purely cri minal, they do not i nvolve a tri al of a n action or a suit, but i s rather a n i nvestigation by the Court i nto the conduct of one of i ts officers.
Not bei ng intended to i nflict punishment, it i s in no sense a cri minal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may
be i nitiated by the Court motu proprio. Public i nterest is i ts primary objective, and the real question for determination i s whether or not the attorney i s
s ti ll a fi t person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, i n the exercise of i ts disciplinary powers, the Court merely ca lls upon a member of the Bar to
a ccount for his a ctuations as a n officer of the Court with the end in vi ew of preservi ng the purity of the l egal profession and the proper and honest
a dministration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no l onger worthy to be entrusted with
the duties a nd responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In s uch posture, there ca n thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a
pros ecutor."54
Wi th the proper application of the s ubstantial evidence threshold having been clarified, the Court fi nds that the present cha rges a gainst respondent have
been adequately proven by this standard. Complainant has established her claims through relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept a s
a dequate to s upport a conclusion - tha t is, that respondent had harassed her a nd committed despicable a cts which a re cl ear ethical vi olations of the CPR.
In fi ne, respondent should be held a dministratively l iable and therefore, penalized.

Juri s prudence provides that in s imilar administrative cases where the l awyer exhibited i mmoral conduct, the Court meted penalties ranging from
repri mand to disbarment. In Advincula v. Ma ca bata,55 the lawyer was reprimanded for his distasteful act of suddenly turning the h ead of his female
cl i ent towards him and kissing her on the lips. In De Leon v. Pedreña,56 the lawyer was s uspended from the practi ce of law for a period of two (2) years
for rubbi ng the female complainant's ri ght leg with his hand, tryi ng to i nsert his fi nger i nto her firmly cl osed hand, gra bbi ng her hand and forcibly placed it
on hi s crotch area, a nd pressing his finger a gainst her private part. While i n Guevarra v. Ea la57 a nd Valdez v. Da bon,58 the Court meted the extreme
penalty of disbarment on the erring lawyers who engaged i n extramarital affairs. Here, respondent exhibited his i mmoral behavior through his habitual
wa tching of pornographic materials while in the office and his a cts of s exual harassment against complainant. Considering the ci rcumstance s of this ca se,
the Court deems it proper to i mpose upon respondent the penalty of s uspension from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Ra mon F. Nieva i s found GUILTY of vi olating Rule 1.01, Ca non 1, a nd Rule 7.03, Ca non 7 of the Code of Professional
Res ponsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, effective upon the fi nality of this Decision, with
a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar a cts will be dealt with more severely.

Let copi es of this Decision be served on the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts i n the country for their
i nformation and guidance and be attached to respondent's personal record as a ttorney.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J., Ca rpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Del Castillo, Perez, Mendoza, Le onen, Jardeleza, and Ca guioa, JJ., concur.
Bri on, J., on leave.
Bers amin, J., on official l eave.
Reyes , J., on official leave.
THIRD DIVISION
AC No. 99-634 - June 10, 2002
DOMINADOR P. BURBE, Complainant, vs. ATTY. ALBERTO C. MAGULTA, Respondent.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

After a greeing to take up the ca use of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity to both cause a nd cl ient, even i f the cl ient never pa id a ny fee for the attorney-client
rel a tionship. La wyering is not a business; i t is a profession i n which duty to public servi ce, not money, i s the primary cons ideration.

The Ca s e

Before us i s a Complaint for the disbarment or s uspension or any other disciplinary a ction against Atty. Al berto C. Ma gulta. Filed by Dominador P. Burbe
wi th the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on June 14, 1999, the Complaint i s accompanied by a Sworn
Sta tement alleging the following:

"x x x - x x x - x x x

"Tha t i n connection with my business, I was introduced to Atty. Al berto C. Ma gulta, sometime in September, 1998, i n his office a t t he Respicio, Magulta
a nd Adan La w Offices at 21-B Otero Building, Juan de la Cruz St., Dava o Ci ty, who a greed to legally represent me i n a money cl aim a nd possible civil case
a ga inst certain parties for breach of contract;

"Tha t consequent to such agreement, Atty. Al berto C. Ma gulta prepared for me the demand letter a nd s ome other l egal papers, f or which servi ces I have
a ccordingly paid; i nasmuch, however, that I failed to s ecure a settlement of the dispute, Atty. Ma gulta suggested that I file the necessary complaint,
whi ch he subsequently dra fted, copy of which is a ttached as Annex A, the filing fee whereof will require the a mount o f Twenty Fi ve Thousand Pesos
(P25,000.00);

"Tha t ha ving the need to legally recover from the parties to be sued I, on January 4, 1999, deposited the a mount of P25,000.00 to Atty. Al berto C.
Ma gul ta, copy of the Receipt a ttached a s Annex B, upon the i nstruction that I needed the case filed i mmediately;

"Tha t a week later, I was informed by Atty. Al berto C. Ma gulta that the complaint had a lready been filed in court, a nd that I should receive notice of its
progress;

"Tha t i n the months that followed, I waited for s uch notice from the court or from Atty. Ma gulta but there seemed to be no progress in my case, s uch that
I frequented his office to i nquire, and he would repeatedly tell me just to wait;

"Tha t I had grown i mpatient on the case, considering that I am told to wait [every ti me] I asked; and in my l ast vi sit to Atty. Ma gulta last Ma y 25, 1999, he
s a id that the court personnel had not yet a cted on my ca se a nd, for my s atisfaction, he even brought me to the Hall o f Justice Building at Ecoland, Davao
Ci ty, a t a bout 4:00 p.m., where he l eft me at the Office of the City Pros ecutor at the ground floor of the building and told to wait while he personally
fol l ows up the processes with the Clerk of Court; whereupon, within the hour, he ca me back and told me that the Cl erk of Court was absent on that day;

"Tha t s ensing I was being given the run-around by Atty. Ma gulta, I decided to go to the Office of the Clerk of Court with my dra ft of Atty. Ma gulta's
compl aint to personally verify the progress of my ca se, and there told that there was no record at a ll of a case filed by Atty. Al berto C. Ma gult a on my
behalf, copy of the Certification dated Ma y 27, 1999, a tta ched as Annex C;

"Tha t feeling disgusted by the way I was l ied to and treated, I confronted Atty. Al berto C. Ma gulta at his office the following day, Ma y 28, 1999, where he
conti nued to l ie to with the excuse that the delay wa s being ca used by the court personnel, and only when s hown the certifica tion did he admit that he
ha s not a t all filed the complaint because he had s pent the money for the filing fee for his own purpose; and to appease my f eelings, he offered to
rei mburse me by i ssuing two (2) checks, postdated June 1 a nd June 5, 1999, i n the amounts of P12,000.00 a nd P8,000.00, res pectively, copies of which
a re a ttached as Annexes D a nd E;

"Tha t for the inconvenience, treatment a nd deception I was made to s uffer, I wish to complain Atty. Al berto C. Ma gulta for mi srepresentation, dishonesty
a nd oppressive conduct;"

x x x - x x x - x x x.1

On Augus t 6, 1999, purs uant to the July 22, 1999 Order of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline,2 respondent filed his Answer3 vehemently denying the
a l legations of complainant "for being totally outrageous and baseless." The latter had a llegedly been introduced as a kumpadre of one of the former's law
pa rtners. After their meeting, complainant requested him to draft a demand letter a gainst Regwill Industries, Inc. -- a s ervice for which the former never
pa i d. After Mr. Sa i d Sayre, one of the business partners of complainant, replied to this letter, the latter requested that a nother demand letter -- this time
a ddressed to the former -- be drafted by respondent, who reluctantly a greed to do so. Wi thout informing the lawyer, complaina nt asked the process
s erver of the former's law office to deliver the l etter to the a ddressee.

As i de from a ttending to the Regwill case which had required a three-hour meeting, respondent drafted a complaint (which was only for the purpose of
compelling the owner to s ettle the case) and prepared a compromise agreement. He was also requested by complainant to do the following:

1. Wri te a demand letter a ddressed to Mr. Nel son Ta n

2. Wri te a demand letter a ddressed to ALC Corpora tion

3. Dra ft a complaint against ALC Corporation

4. Res earch on the Mandaue Ci ty property cl aimed by complainant's wife

Al l of these respondent did, but he was never paid for his servi ces by complainant.

Res pondent likewise s aid that without telling him why, complainant l ater on withdrew all the files pertinent to the Regwill c ase. However, when no
s ettlement was reached, the l atter instructed him to draft a complaint for breach of contract. Respondent, wh ose servi ces had never been paid by
compl ainant until this ti me, told the latter about his acceptance and legal fees. When told that these fees a mounted to P187, 742 because the Regwill
cl a im was almost P4 million, complainant promised to pay on installment basis.
On Ja nuary 4, 1999, compl ainant gave the amount of P25,000 to res pondent's s ecretary a nd told her that i t was for the filing fee of the Regwill case.
When i nformed of the payment, the lawyer i mmediately called the a ttention of complainant, informi ng the latter of the need to pay the acceptance and
fi l ing fees before the complaint could be filed. Complainant was told that the a mount he had paid was a deposit for the a cceptance fee, and that he
s hould give the filing fee later.

Sometime in February 1999, complainant told respondent to suspend for the meantime the filing of the complaint because the former might be paid by
a nother company, the First Ori ental Property Ventures, Inc., which had offered to buy a parcel of land owned by Regwill Indus tries. The negotiations went
on for two months, but the parties never a rrived at a ny a greement.

Sometime in May 1999, complainant a gain relayed to respondent his i nterest in filing the complaint. Respondent reminded him o nce more of the
a cceptance fee. In response, complainant proposed that the complaint be filed first before payment of respondent's acceptance and legal fees. When
res pondent refused, complainant demanded the return of the P25,000. The lawyer returned the a mount using his own personal che cks because their law
offi ce was undergoing extensive renovation at the ti me, a nd their office personnel were not reporting regularly. Respondent's checks were accepted and
enca shed by complainant.

Res pondent averred that he never i nconvenienced, mistreated or d eceived complainant, and if anyone had been shortchanged by the undesirable events,
i t wa s he.

The IBP's Recommendation

In i ts Report a nd Recommendation dated Ma rch 8, 2000, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) opined as follows:

"x x x [I]t i s evident that the P25,000 deposited by complainant with the Respicio Law Office was for the filing fees of the Regwill complaint. With
compl ainant's deposit of the filing fees for the Regwill complaint, a corresponding obl igation on the part of respondent was created a nd that was to file
the Regwill complaint within the ti me frame contemplated by his client, the complainant. The failure of respondent to fulfill this obligation due to his
mi s use of the filing fees deposited by complainant, and his a ttempts to cover up this misuse of funds of the cl ient, which caused complainant additional
da mage and prejudice, constitutes highly dishonest conduct on his part, unbecoming a member of the l aw profession. The subsequent reimbursement by
the res pondent of part of the money deposited by complainant for filing fees, does not exculpate the respondent for his misappropriation of said funds.
Thus , to i mpress upon the respondent the gra vity of his offense, it is recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of l aw for a period of
one (1) yea r."4

The Court's Ruling

We a gree with the Commission's recommendation.

Ma i n Issue:
Mi s appropriation of Client's Funds

Centra l to this case a re the following alleged acts of respondent lawyer: (a) his non-filing of the Complaint on behalf of his cl ient and (b) his appropriation
for hi mself of the money gi ven for the filing fee.

Res pondent claims that complainant did not give him the filing fee for the Regwill complaint; hence, the forme r's failure to file the complaint in court.
Al s o, respondent alleges that the amount delivered by complainant to his office on January 4, 1999 wa s for a ttorney's fees a nd not for the filing fee.

We a re not persuaded. La wyers must exert their best efforts and ability i n the prosecution or the defense of the client's cause. They who perform that
duty wi th diligence and candor not only protect the i nterests of the client, but also s erve the ends of justice. They do honor to the bar a nd help maintain
the res pect of the community for the legal profession.5 Members of the bar must do nothing that may tend to lessen in any degree the c onfidence of the
public i n the fidelity, the honesty, a nd integrity of the profession.6

Res pondent wants this Court to believe that no l awyer-client relationship existed between him a nd complainant, because the latter never paid him for
s ervi ces rendered. The former a dds that he only drafted the said documents as a personal favor for the kumpadre of one of his partners.

We di sagree. A l awyer-client relationship was established from the very fi rst moment complainant asked respondent for l egal a dvice regarding the
former's business. To constitute professional employment, i t is not essential tha t the client employed the attorney professionally on any previous
occa s ion. It is not necessary that a ny retainer be paid, promised, or charged; neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not a fterward handle
the ca s e for which his service had been sought.

If a person, in respect to business affairs or troubles of a ny kind, consults a l awyer with a vi ew to obtaining professional advi ce or assistance, and the
a ttorney voluntarily permits or a cquiesces with the consultation, then the professional employment is established.7

Li kewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists notwithstanding the cl ose personal relationship between the lawyer a nd the complainant or the nonp ayment
of the former's fees.8 Hence, despite the fa ct that complainant was kumpadre of a law partner of respondent, and that respondent dispensed l egal a dvice
to compl ainant as a personal favor to the kumpadre, the l awyer was duty-bound to file the complaint he had a greed to prepare -- a nd had a ctually
prepa red -- a t the soonest possible ti me, i n order to protect the cl ient's i nterest. Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that
l a wyers s hould not neglect legal matters entrusted to them.

Thi s Court has likewise constantly held that once l awyers a gree to take up the ca use of a client, they owe fi delity to s uch ca use a nd must always be
mi ndful of the trust a nd confidence reposed i n them.9 They owe entire devotion to the interest of the cl ient, warm zeal in th e maintenance and the
defense of the client's rights, and the exertion of their utmost learning a nd a bilities to the end that nothing be ta ken or withheld from the client, save by
the rul es of law l egally a pplied.10

Si milarly unconvincing is the explanation of respondent that the receipt issued by his office to complainant on January 4, 1999 wa s erroneous. The IBP
Report correctly noted that it was quite incredible for the office personnel of a law firm to be prevailed upon by a client t o issue a receipt erroneously
i ndicating payment for s omething else. Moreover, upon discovering the "mistake" -- i f indeed it was one -- respondent should have i mmediately ta ken
s teps to correct the error. He s hould have lost no time in ca lling complainant's a ttention to the ma tter and should have i ssu ed another receipt i ndicating
the correct purpose of the payment.

The Pra cti ce of Law -- a

Profes sion, Not a Business
In thi s day and a ge, members of the bar often forget that the practice of law is a profession a nd not a business.11 Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a
money-making venture, and law advocacy i s not a ca pital that necessarily yi elds profits.12 The gaining of a livelihood is not a professional but a secondary
cons ideration.13 Duty to public s ervice and to the a dministration of justice s hould be the primary considera tion of lawyers, who must s ubordinate their
pers onal i nterests or what they owe to themselves. The practice of law is a noble calling in which emolument is a byproduct, a nd the highest eminence
ma y be a ttained without making much money.14

In fa iling to apply to the filing fee the a mount given by complainant -- as evidenced by the receipt issued by the l aw office of respondent -- the latter a lso
vi ol ated the rule that lawyers must be scrupulously ca reful in handling money entrusted to them in their professi onal ca pacity.15 Rule 16.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility s tates that l awyers s hall hold in trust all moneys of their cl ients and properties that may co me i nto their possession.

La wyers who convert the funds entrusted to them are i n gross violation of professional ethics a nd a re guilty of betrayal of public confidence in the l egal
profession.16 It may be true that they have a lien upon the cl ient's funds, documents and other papers that have lawfully com e into their possession; that
they ma y reta in them until their l awful fees and disbursements have been paid; and that they may a pply s uch funds to the satisfaction o f such fees a nd
di s bursements. However, these considerations do not relieve them of their duty to promptly a ccount for the moneys t hey received. Their failure to do so
cons titutes professional misconduct.17 In a ny event, they must s till exert all effort to protect their cl ient's i nterest within the bounds of law.

If much i s demanded from an a ttorney, i t is because the entrusted privilege to practice l aw ca rries with it correlative duties not only to the client but also
to the court, to the bar, a nd to the public.18 Respondent fell short of this s tandard when he converted into his l egal fees t he filing fee entrusted to him by
hi s client a nd thus failed to file the complaint promptly. The fa ct that the former returned the a mount does not exculpate him from hi s breach of duty.

On the other hand, we do not a gree with complainant's plea to disbar respondent from the practice of l aw. The power to disbar must be exercised with
grea t ca ution. Only i n a cl ear case of misconduct that seriously a ffects the standing and the character of the bar will disba rment be imposed as a
penalty.19

WHEREFORE, Atty. Al berto C. Ma gulta is found guilty of vi olating Rules 16.01 a nd 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility a nd is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, effective upon his receipt of this Decision. Let copies be f urnished all courts as well as
the Offi ce of the Bar Confidant, which is i nstructed to include a copy i n respondent's file.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, J.*, Sa ndoval-Gutierrez, and Ca rpio, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
B.M. No. 2540, September 24, 2013
IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS MICHAEL A. MEDADO, Petitioner.

RE SO LU TI O N

SERENO, C.J.:

We res olve the instant Petition to Sign i n the Roll of Attorneys filed by petitioner Mi chael A. Medado (Medado).

Meda do graduated from the University of the Philippines with the degree of Bachelor of La ws in 19791 a nd passed the s ame year’s bar examinations with
a general weighted a verage of 82.7.2cra law vi rtualaw library
On 7 Ma y 1980, he took the Attorney’s Oath at the Philippine Internatio nal Convention Center (PICC) together with the s uccessful bar examinees.3 He
wa s scheduled to s ign in the Roll of Attorneys on 13 Ma y 1980,4 but he fa iled to do so on his scheduled date, allegedly because he had misplaced the
Noti ce to Sign the Roll of Attorneys5 gi ven by the Bar Office when he went home to his province for a va cation.6cralaw vi rtualaw library

Severa l years l ater, while rummaging through his old college files, Medado found the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys. It was then that he realized that
he ha d not signed i n the roll, and that what he had signed a t the entrance of the PICC was probably just a n attendance record .7cralaw vi rtualaw library

By the ti me Medado found the notice, he was already working. He s tated that he was mainly doing corporate and taxation work, and that he was not
a cti vely i nvolved i n litigation practice. Thus, he operated “under the mistaken belief *that+ since he ha*d+ a lready ta ken th e oath, the signing of the Roll of
Attorneys was not as urgent, nor as crucial to his s tatus a s a lawyer”;8 a nd “the matter of signing in the Roll of Attorneys lost i ts urgency a nd compulsion,
a nd was s ubsequently forgotten.”9cralaw vi rtualaw library

In 2005, when Medado attended Ma ndatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) s eminars, he was required to provide his roll number in order for his
MCLE compl iances to be credited.10 Not having signed in the Roll of Attorneys, he was unable to provide his roll number.

About s even years later, or on 6 February 2012, Meda do filed the instant Petition, prayi ng that he be a llowed to sign in the Roll of Attorneys.11cralaw
vi rtua law library

The Offi ce of the Bar Confidant (OBC) conducted a clarificatory conference on the matter on 21 September 201212 a nd submitted a Report and
Recommendation to this Court on 4 February 2013.13 The OBC recommended that the instant petition be denied for petitioner’s gross neglige nce, gross
mi s conduct a nd utter lack of merit.14 It explained that, based on his answers during the clarificatory conference, petit ioner could offer no valid
jus ti fication for his negligence in signing i n the Roll of Attorneys.15cralaw vi rtualaw library

After a judicious review of the records, we gra nt Medado’s prayer in the instant petition, subject to the payment of a fine a nd the i mposition of a penalty
equivalent to suspension from the practice of law.

At the outset, we note that not allowing Medado to sign i n the Roll of Attorneys would be akin to i mposing upon him the ultimate penalty of disbarment,
a penalty that we have reserved for the most serious ethical tra nsgressions of members of the Bar.

In thi s case, the records do not s how that this a ction is warranted.
For one, petitioner demonstrated good faith a nd good moral character when he finally filed the i nstant Petition to Sign i n th e Roll of Attorneys. We note
tha t i t was not a third party who called this Court’s a ttention to petitioner’s omission; ra ther, i t was Medado himself who a cknowledged his own lapse,
a l beit after the passage of more than 30 yea rs. When asked by the Bar Confidant why i t took him this l ong to file the instant petition, Medado very
ca ndidly replied:chanrobles virtua1aw 1i brary
Ma hi rap hong i-explain ya n pero, yun bang a t the time, what ca n you say? Takot ka kung a nong mangya yari sa ‘yo, you don’t know what’s gonna happen.
At the s ame time, it’s a combination of a pprehension a nd a nxiety of what’s gonna happen. And, finally i t’s the right thing to do. I have to come here …
s i gn the roll a nd ta ke the oath as necessary.16
For a nother, petitioner has not been subject to a ny a ction for disqualification from the practice of law,17 which is more tha n what we can say of other
i ndividuals who were s uccessfully a dmitted as members of the Philippine Bar. For this Court, this fact demonstrates that petitioner s trove to a dhere to
the s tri ct requirements of the ethics of the profession, and that he has prima fa cie s hown that he possesses the character required to be a member of the
Phi l ippine Bar.

Fi nally, Medado appears to have been a competent and able l egal practitioner, having held va rious positions at the La urel Law Office,18 Petron, Petrophil
Corpora tion, the Philippine National Oil Company, a nd the Energy Development Corporation.19cralaw vi rtualaw l ibrary

Al l these demonstrate Medado’s worth to become a full-fledged member of the Philippine Bar. While the practice of law is not a right but a privilege,20
thi s Court will not unwarrantedly withhold this privilege from individuals who have shown mental fitness and moral fiber to wi thstand the ri gors of the
profession.

Tha t s aid, however, we cannot fully exculpate petitioner Medado from all liability for his years of i naction.

Peti ti oner has been engaged in the practice of law since 1980, a period s panning more than 30 yea rs, without having signed i n the R oll of Attorneys.21 He
jus ti fies this behavior by characterizing his a cts a s “neither willful nor i ntentional but based on a mistak en belief and a n honest error of
judgment.”22cralaw vi rtualaw library

We di sagree.

Whi le a n honest mistake of fact could be used to excuse a person from the l egal consequences of his acts23 a s it negates mali ce or evil motive,24 a
mi s take of law cannot be utilized as a lawful justification, because everyone is presumed to know the law a nd i ts consequences.25 Ignorantia facti
excus at; i gnorantia legis neminem excusat.

Appl yi ng these principles to the case a t bar, Medado may ha ve at fi rst operated under an honest mistake of fact when he thought that what he had
s i gned at the PICC entrance before the oath-taking was already the Roll of Attorneys. However, the moment he realized that what he had signed was
merely a n attendance record, he could no longer cl aim a n honest mistake of fact as a valid justification. At tha t point, Medado should have known that he
wa s not a full-fledged member of the Philippine Bar because of his failure to sign i n the Roll of Attorneys, as i t was the act of signing th erein that would
ha ve ma de him s o.26 When, i n spite of this knowledge, he chose to continue practicing law without taking the necessary s teps to complete all the
requi rements for a dmission to the Bar, he willfully engaged i n the unauthorized practice of law.
Under the Rules of Court, the unauthorized practice of law by one’s assuming to be an a ttorney or officer of the court, and a cting a s such without
a uthority, may constitute indirect contempt of court,27 which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both.28 Such a fi nding, however, is i n the nature
of cri mi nal contempt29 a nd must be reached a fter the filing of charges a nd the conduct of hearings.30 In this case, while i t appears quite clearly that
peti tioner committed indirect contempt of court by knowingly engaging i n unauthorized practice of law, we refrain from making any finding of liability for
i ndirect contempt, as no formal charge pertaining thereto has been filed a gainst him.

Knowi ngly engaging i n unauthorized practice of l aw l ikewise tra nsgresses Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:chanrobles
vi rtua 1aw 1ibrary
CANON 9 – A l a wyer s hall not, directly or i ndirectly, a ssist in the unauthorized practice of law.
Whi le a reading of Ca non 9 a ppears to merely prohibit lawyers from assisting in the unauthorized practice of law, the unauthorized practice of law by the
l a wyer himself is s ubsumed under this provision, because a t the heart of Ca non 9 i s the law yer’s duty to prevent the unauthorized practice of
l a w. This duty likewise applies to law students a nd Bar ca ndidates. As a spiring members of the Bar, they a re bound to comport themselves in accordance
wi th the ethical standards of the legal profession.

Turni ng now to the a pplicable penalty, previous vi olations of Ca non 9 ha ve warranted the penalty of suspension from the practi ce of law.31 As Medado is
not yet a full-fledged lawyer, we ca nnot suspend him from the practice of law. However, we s ee it fit to i mpose upon him a penalty akin to suspension by
a l lowing him to sign i n the Roll of Attorneys one (1) year a fter receipt of this Resolution. For his transgression of the prohibition against the unauthorized
pra cti ce of law, we likewise see it fi t to fine h im i n the a mount of P32,000. Duri ng the one year period, petitioner is warned that he is not a llowed to
enga ge i n the practice of law, a nd is sternly wa rned that doing any a ct that constitutes practice of law before he has signed i n the Roll of Attorneys will be
dea lt with s everely by this Court.

WHEREFORE, the i nstant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys is hereby GRANTED. Petitioner Mi chael A. Medado is ALLOWED t o sign in the Roll of
Attorneys ONE (1) YEAR a fter receipt of this Resolution. Petitioner i s likewise ORDERED to pay a FINE of P32,000 for hi s unauthorized practice of law.
Duri ng the one year period, petitioner is NOT ALLOWED to practice law, and is STERNLY WARNED that doing any act that constitu tes practice of law
before he has signed i n the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt with severely by this Court.
Let a copy of thi s Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, a nd the Of fice of the Court Administrator
for ci rcul ation to a ll courts in the country.chanroblesvi rtualawlibrary

SO ORDERED.

Ca rpi o, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Del Ca stillo, Abad, Perez, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe, and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Bri on, a nd Villarama, Jr., JJ., On l eave.
Pera l ta, Bersamin, a nd Mendoza, JJ., On official l eave.
SECOND DIVISION
[ A.C. No. 9834, August 26, 2015 ]
SAMUEL B. ARNADO, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. HOMOBONO A. ADAZA, RESPONDENT.

DE CI SI ON
CARPIO, J.:

The Ca s e

Thi s is an administrative case against Atty. Homobono A. Ada za (respondent) for his failure to comply with the requirements o f the Ma ndatory Continuing
Lega l Education (MCLE) under Bar Ma tter No. 850.

The Antecedent Facts

In a l etter, dated 15 Ma rch 2013, Atty. Sa muel B. Arnado (complainant) ca lled the attention of this Court to the practice of respondent of indicating
"MCLE a pplication for exemption under process" in his pleadings filed in 2009, 2010, 2011, a nd 2012, a nd "MCLE Application fo r Exemption for
Reconsideration" i n a pleading filed i n 2012. Complainant informed the Court that he inquired from the MCLE Offi ce about the s tatus of respondent's
compl iance and received the following Certification, dated 2 Ja nuary 2013, from Prof. Myrna S. Feliciano (Prof. Feliciano), MCLE's Executive Director:

Thi s is to certify that per our records, ATTY. HOMOBONO A. ADAZA wi th Roll Number 14118 of IBP MIS AMIS ORIENTAL Chapter did not comply with the
requi rements of Bar Ma tter [No.] 850 for the following compliance periods:
Fi rs t Compliance Period (April 15, 2001 -Apri l 14, 2004)
Second Compliance Period (April 15, 2004 -Apri l 14, 2007)
Thi rd Compliance Period (April 15, 2007 -Apri l 14, 2010)
Thi s is to further certify that Arty. Ada za filed an Application for Exem ption from the MCLE requirement on (sic) Ja nuary 2009 but wa s DENIED by the
MCLE Governi ng Board on (sic) i ts January 14, 2009 meeting.[1]

In i ts Resolution dated 17 June 2013, the Court referred this case to he MCLE Commi ttee for evaluation, report a nd recommendation.

In a l etter, dated 5 August 2013, Atty. Jes usa Jean D. Reyes (Atty. Reyes), Assistant Executive Officer of the MCLE Offi ce, f orwarded to the Court the rollo
of the ca se together with the MCLE Governing Board's Eva luation, Report a nd Recommendation.[2] In its Evaluation, Report and Recommendation[3]
da ted 14 August 2013,[4] the MCLE Governing Board, through retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Bernardo P. Pa rdo (Justice Pa rdo), MCLE Cha irman,
i nformed the Court that respondent a pplied for exemption for the First and Second Compliance Periods covering 15 April 2001 to 14 Apri l 2004 a nd 15
Apri l 2004 to 14 Apri l 2007, respectively, on the ground of "expertise i n law" under Section 3, Rule 7 of Ba r Ma tter No. 850. The MCLE Governing Board
denied the request on 14 Ja nuary 2009. In the s ame l etter, the MCLE Governing Board noted that respondent neither a pplied for exe mption nor complied
wi th the Third Compliance period from 15 April 2007 to 14 Apri l 2010.

In i ts 9 December 2013 Resolution, the Court directed the Second Division Cl erk of Court to furnish respondent with complainant's l etter of 15 Ma rch
2013. The Court l ikewise required respondent to file his comment within ten days from notice.

In hi s Compliance and Comment[5] dated 3 February 2014, res pondent alleged that he did not receive a copy of the 5 August 2013 l etter of Atty. Reyes.
He s ta ted that he was wondering why his a pplication for exemption could not be granted. He further a lleged that he did not re ceive a formal denial of his
a pplication for exemption by the MCLE Governing Board, and that the notice sent by Prof. Feliciano was based on the l etter of co mplainant who belonged
to Romualdo and Arnado Law Office, the l aw office of his political opponents, the Romualdo family. Respondent alleged that the Romualdo family
control led Ca miguin a nd had total control of the judges and prosecutors in the province. He further a lleged that the law firm had control of the lawyers i n
Ca mi guin except for himself.

Res pondent enumerated his a chievements as a lawyer and claimed that he had been practicing law for a bout 50 yea rs. He stated:

xxxx

Fi fth, with a great degree of immodesty, I was the first outsider of the Supreme Court WHOM PRESIDENT CORAZON C. AQUINO, offe red, i mmediately
a fter s he took over government i n February 1986, a s eat as Justice of the Supreme Court but I refused the intended a ppointment because I did not l ike
s ome members of the Cory crowd to get me to the SC i n an effort to buy my s ilence;

Si xth, I a lmost s ingle-handedly handled the case of CORAZON C. AQUINO i n the ca nvassing of the results of the 1986 s nap elections, DISCU SSING
CONSTITUTIONAL and legal issues which finally resulted to the EDSAI revolution;

xxxx

Ei ghth; I was one of the two l ead counsels of now SENATOR MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO in the national ca nvassing before the Na ti onal Ca nvassing
Boa rd when she ran for President against then GENERAL FIDEL RAMOS. The other counsel was former Justice of the Supreme Court SERAFIN CUEVAS;

Ni nth, I handled the 1987 a nd 1989 a s well a s the 2003 COUP CASES for l eading generals like ABENINA and COMMENDAOR and COLONE LS l ike GREGORIO
HONASAN a s well as the SIX OAKWOOD CAPTAINS, i ncluding now SENATOR ANTONIO TRILL ANES;

Tenth, I filed a case with the Supreme Court contesting the constitutionality a nd va lidity of the 2010 na tional elections, s till undecided up to this day;

El eventh, I filed together with a nother l awyer, a case in the Supreme Court on the constitutionality a nd legality of the Corona i mpeachment which the SC
onl y decided a fter the Senate decided his case and former SC Chi ef Justice Corona conceding to the decision, thus the SC declaring the case moot a nd
a ca demic;

Twel fth, I have been i mplementing a nd i nterpreting the Constitution a nd other laws a s GOVERNOR OF MISAMIS ORIENTAL, COMMISSIO N OF
IMMIGRATION a nd the s enior member of the Opposition in the regular Pa rliament i n the Committee on Revision of Laws and Constitutional
Amendments;

Thi rteenth, I was the l eading Opposition member of Pa rliament that drafted the Omnibus El ection La w;

Fourteenth, I was the l eading member of the Opposition i n Pa rliament that prepared and orchestrated the debate i n the complaint for i mpeachment
a ga inst PRESIDENT FERDINAND MARCOS;
Fi fteenth, I have been practicing l aw for about fi fty yea rs now with appearances before the Supreme Court when Justices were like Concepcion, Barrera
a nd JBL REYES; in the Court of Appeals; a nd numerous courts all over the country;

Si xteenth, I have been engaged as lawyer for a number of lawyers who have exemptions from the MCLE;

x x x x[6]

Res pondent further claimed that he had written fi ve books: (1) Leaders From Ma rcos to Arroyo; (2) Presidentiables and Emerging Upheavals; (3)
Begi nning, Hope a nd Change; (4) Ideas, Pri nciples and Lost Opportunities; a nd (5) Corona Impeachment. Thus, he asked for a re consideration of the notice
for hi m to undergo MCLE. He a sked for a n exemption from MCLE compliance, or i n the alternative, for him to be allowed to practice law while complyi ng
wi th the MCLE requirements.

In i ts 2 June 2014 Resolution, the Court referred respondent's Compliance and Comment to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report
a nd recommendation.

The Report a nd Recommendation of the OBC

In i ts Report a nd Recommendation dated 25 November 2014, the OBC reported that respondent applied for exemption for the First and Second
Compl iance Periods on the ground of expertise i n law. The MCLE Governing Board denied the request on 14 Ja nuary 2009. Prof. F el iciano i nformed
res pondent of the denial of his application in a letter dated 1 October 2012. The OBC reported that a ccording to the MCLE Governing Board, "in o rder to
be exempted (from compliance) pursuant to expertise i n lp.w under Section 3, Rule 7 of Bar Ma tter No. 850, the a pplicant must s ubmit sufficient,
s a tisfactory a nd convincing proof to establish his expertise in a certain a rea of law." The OBC reported that respondent fail ed to meet the requirements
necessary for the exemption.

The OBC reported that this Court requires practicing members of the Bar to i ndicate i n all their pleadings filed wi th the courts the counsel's MCLE
Certi fi cate of Compliance or Certi ficate of Exemption pursuant to 6a r Ma tter No. 1922. The OBC further reported that the MCLE Offi ce has no record that
res pondent filed a motion for reconsideration; and thus, his representation in a pleading that his "MCLE Application for Exemption [ is] for
Reconsideration" i n 2012 i s baseless.

The OBC further reported that under Rule 12 of Ba r Matter No. 850 a nd Section 12 of the MCLE Implementing Regulations, non-compliance with the
MCLE requi rements shall result to the dismissal of the case and the striking out of the pleadings from the records.[7] The OB C a lso reported that under
Secti on 12(d) of the MCLE Implementing Regulations, a member of the Bar who failed to comply with the MCLE requirements is given 60 days from
recei pt of notification to explain his deficiency or to s how his compliance with the requirements. Section 12(e) a lso provide s that a member who fails to
compl y wi thin the given period s hall pay a non-compliance fee of PI,000 a nd shall be listed as a delinquent member of the Integrated Bar of the
Phi l ippines (IBP) upon the recommendation of the MCLE Governing Board. The OBC reported that the Notice of Non-Compliance was sent to respondent
on 13 Augus t 2013. The OBC a lso reported that on 14 August 2013, the MCLE Governing Board recommended that cases be filed a ga inst respondent in
connection wi th the pleadings he filed without the MCLE compliance/exemption number for the immediately preceding compliance period and that the
pl eadings he filed be expunged from the records.

The OBC found that respondent had been remiss i n his responsibilities as a lawyer. The OBC s tated that respondent's failure t o comply with the MCLE
requi rements jeopardized the causes of his clients because the pleadings he filed could be stricken off from the records a nd considered i nvalid.

The OBC recommended that respondent be declared a delinquent member of the Bar a nd guilty of non -compliance with the MCLE requirements. The
OBC further recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of law for six months with a s tern warning that a repetitio n of the same or similar
a ct i n the future will be dealt with more severely. The OBC a lso recommen ded that respondent be directed to comply wi th the requirements set forth by
the MCLE Governi ng Board.

The Issue

The only i ssue here is whether respondent is a dministratively l iable for his failure to comply wi th the MCLE requirements.

The Ruling of this Court

Ba r Ma tter No. 850 requires members of the IBP to undergo continuing legal education "to ensure that throughout their ca reer, they keep a breast with
l a w a nd jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of the profession a nd enhance the standards of the practice of law."[8] The First Compliance Period was from
15 Apri l 2001 to 14 Apri l 2004; the Second Compliance Period was from 15 April 2004 to 14 Apri l 2007; a nd the Third Complianc e Period was from 15 April
2007 to 14 Apri l 2010. Complainant's l etter covered respondent's pleadings filed in 2009, 2010, 2011, a nd 2012 which means respondent also failed to
compl y wi th the MCLE requirements for the Fourth Compliance Period from 15 Apri l 2010 to 14 Apri l 2013.

The records of the MCLE Offi ce s howed that respondent failed to comply wi th the four compliance periods. The records a lso showed that respondent
fi l ed a n a pplication for exemption only on 5 Ja nuary 2009. Accordi ng to the MCLE Governing Board, respondent's a pplication fo r exemption covered the
Fi rs t a nd Second Compliance Periods. Respondent did not apply for exemption for the Third Compliance Period. The MCLE Governing Board denie d
res pondent's application for exemption on 14 Ja nuary 2009 on the ground that the a pplication did not meet the requirements of expertise i n law under
Secti on 3, Rule 7 of Ba r Matter No. 850. However, the MCLE Offi ce failed to convey the denial of the application for exemption to respondent. The MCLE
Offi ce only i nformed respondent, through i ts letter dated 1 October 2012 s i gned by Prof. Feliciano, when it received i nquiries from complainant, Judge
Si nfroso Tabamo, a nd Ca miguin Deputy Provi ncial Prosecutor Renato A. Abbu on the status of respondent's MCLE compliance. Resp ondent filed a motion
for reconsideration after one year, or on 23 October 2013, whi ch the MCLE Governing Board denied with fi nality on 28 November 2013. The denial of the
moti on for reconsideration was sent to respondent in a letter[9] dated 29 November 2013, s igned by Justice Pa rdo.

Cl ea rly, respondent had been remiss i n his responsibilities by failing to comply wi th Bar Ma tter No. 850. Hi s application for exemption for the First and
Second Compliance Periods was filed after the compliance periods had ended. He did not follow-up the status of his application for exemption. He
furni shed the Court wi th his l etter dated 7 February 2012[10] to the MCLE Offi ce asking the office to act on his application for exemption but alleged that
hi s secretary fa iled to send it to the MCLE Offi ce.[11] He did not comply wi th the Fourth Compliance Period.

In i ts 1 October 2012 l etter to respondent, the MCLE Offi ce enjoined him to comply with the requirements for the First to Thi rd Compliance periods. It
wa s reiterated in the 29 November 2013 l etter denying respondent's motion for reconsid eration of his a pplication for exemption. The OBC a lso reported
tha t a Notice of Non-Compliance was sent to respondent on 13 August 2013. Under Section 12(5) of the MCLE Implementing Regulations, respondent has
60 da ys from receipt of the notification to comply. However, i n his Compliance a nd Comment before this Court, respondent stated that because of his
i nvol vement in public interest i ssues i n the country, the earliest that he could comply wi th Bar Ma tter No. 850 would be on 1 0-14 February 2014 a nd that
he a l ready registered with the MCLE Progra m of the University of the Philippines (UP) Diliman on those dates.
Secti on 12(5) of the MCLE Implementing Regulations provides:

Secti on 12. Compliance Procedures

xxxx

(5) Any other a ct or omission a nalogous to any of the foregoing or i ntended to ci rcumvent or evade compliance with the MCLE requirements.

A member failing to comply wi th the continuing legal education requirement will receive a Non-Compliance Notice stating his s pecific deficiency a nd will
be gi ven sixty (60) da ys from the receipt of the notification to explain the deficiency or otherwise show compliance with the requirements. Such notice
s ha ll be written in capital letters as follows:

YOUR FAILURE TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE JUSTIFICATION FOR NON-COMPLIANCE OR PROOF OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE MCLE REQUIREMENT WITHIN 60
DAYS FROM RECEIPT OF THIS NOTICE SHALL BE A CAUSE FOR LISTING YOU AS A DELINQUENT MEMBER AND SHALL NOT BE PERMITTED TO PRACTI CE LAW
UNTIL SUCH TIME AS ADEQUATE PROOF OF COMPLIANCE IS RECEIVED BY THE MCLE COMMITTEE.

The Member may use the 60-day period to complete his compliance with the MCLE requirement. Credit units earned during this period may only be
counted toward compliance with the prior period requirement unless units in excess of the requirement are earned in which ca se the excess may be
counted toward meeting the current compliance period requirement.

A member who is i n non-compliance a t the end of the compliance period s hall pay a non-compliance fee of PI,000.00 a nd shall be listed as a delinquent
member of the IBP by the IBP Board of Governors upon the recommendation of the MCLE Commi ttee, in which case Rule 13 9 -A of the Rules of Court
s ha ll a pply.

Even i f respondent attended the 10-14 February 2014 MCLE Progra m of UP Di liman, it would only cover his deficiencies for the First Compliance Period.
He i s still delinquent for the Second, Third, a nd Fourth Compliance Periods. The Court has not been furnished proof of compli ance for the First
Compl iance Period.

The Court notes the lackadaisical attitude of respondent towards Complying with the requirements of Bar Ma tter No. 850. He as sumed that his
a pplication for exemption, filed a fter the compliance periods, would be granted. He purportedly wro te the MCLE Offi ce to follow-up the status of his
a pplication but cl aimed that his secretary forgot to send the letter. He now wa nts the Court to a gain reconsider the MCLE Off i ce's denial of his application
for exemption when his motion for reconsideration was already denied with finality by the MCLE Governing Board on 28 November 2013. He had the
temeri ty to inform the Court that the earliest that he could comply was on 10-14 February 2014, whi ch was beyond the 60-day period required under
Secti on 12(5) of the MCLE Implementing Regulations, and without even indicating when he intended to comply wi th his deficiencies br the Second , Third,
a nd Fourth Compliance Periods. Instead, he asked the Court to a llow him to continue practicing l aw while complying with t he MCLE requirements.

The MCLE Offi ce is not without fault in this ca se. While it a cted on respondent's application for exemption on 14 Ja nuary 200 9, i t took the office three
yea rs to i nform respondent of the denial of his a pplication. The MCLE Offi ce only i nformed respondent on 1 October 2012 a nd a fter it received i nquiries
rega rding the status of respondent's compliance. Hence, during the period when respondent i ndicated "MCLE a pplication for exe mption under process"
i n hi s pleadings, he was not aware of the action of the MCLE Governing Board on his a pplication for exemption. However, after he had been informed of
the denial of his a pplication for exemption, it s till took respondent one year to file a motion for reconsideration. After th e denial of his motion for
reconsideration, respondent still took, and is still aking, his time to satisfy the requirements of the MCLE. In a ddition, when respondent indicated "MCLE
Appl ication for Exemption for Reconsideration" in a pleading, he had not filed a ny motion for reconsideration before the MCLE Offi ce.

Res pondent's failure to comply wi th the MCLE requirements a nd disregard of the directives of the MCLE Offi ce warrant his decl aration as a delinquent
member of the IBP. While the MCLE Implementing Regulations s tate that the MCLE Commi ttee should recommend to the IBP Board of Governors the
l i sting of a lawyer a s a delinquent member, there i s nothing that prevents the Court from using i ts a dministrative power a nd supervision to discipline
erri ng lawyers a nd from directing the IBP Board of Governors o declare such lawyers as delinquent members of the IBP.

The OBC recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of aw for s ix months. We a gree. In addition, his l isting as a d elinquent member pf the
IBP i s also a kin to s uspension because he s hall not be permitted to practice law until such time as he s ubmits proof of full compliance to the IBP Board of
Governors, and the IBP Board of Governors has notified the MCLE Commi ttee of his reinstatement, under Section 14 of t he MCLE Implementing
Regulations. Hence, we deem i t proper to declare respondent as a delinquent member of the IBP and to suspend him from the pra ctice of law for six
months or until he has fully complied with the requirements of the MCLE for the Fi rst, Se cond, Third, and Fourth Compliance Periods, whichever i s later,
a nd he has fully paid the required non-compliance a nd reinstatement fees.

WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to:

(1) REMIND the Ma ndatory Conti nuing Legal Education Office to promptly a ct on matters that require its immediate a ttention, such as but not limited to
a pplications for exemptions, and to communicate i ts a ction to the i nterested parties within a reasonable period;

(2) DENY the pra yer of Atty. Homobono A. Ada za to be exempted from MCLE compliance as the matter had already been denied with finality by the MCLE
Governi ng Board on 28 November 2013;

(3) DECLARE Atty. Homobono A. Adaza as a delinquent member of the Integ rated Bar of the Philippines and SUSPEND him from the practice of law for SIX
MONTHS, or unti l he has fully complied with the MCLE requirements for the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Compliance Periods , whichever is l ater, and
he ha s fully paid the required non-compliance a nd reinstatement fees.

Let a copy of thi s Decision be attached to Atty. Homobono A. Ada za's personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and c opies be furnished to a ll
cha pters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts i n the land. Let copies be a lso furnished the MCLE Offi ce and the IBP Governing Board
for thei r a ppropriate actions.

SO ORDERED.

Del Ca stillo, Mendoza, Leonen, a nd Ja rdeleza,* JJ., concur.