Motion To Set Aside (Vacate) Trial Orders As Void (2 of 4)

FL-300
ATTORNEY OR PARTY
ATTORNEY OR WTTHOUT ATTORNEY
PARTY WlTHOUT ATTORNEY (Name,
(AtarrE, State
Stde Bar
Bar number,
nunber, and
and address):
€ddrcss): FOR COURT USE
FOR COURT USE ONLY
ONLY
__ Jeffery
Jeffery Fraz1er
Frazer 157792
157792
239 Sequo1a Avenue
239 SequoiaAvenue
Redwood City
Redwood City CA 94061
94061cA
TELEeHoNE NO:
TELEPHONE t{o.: (650) 275-2112 FAX
(650) 275-2112 No (Optional):
FAx NO. (opti,rrr: (650)
(6s0) 332-0180
332-0180
EJrrArL ADDRESS
E-MAIL ADoREss (Optional):
(qpr,orE,, [email protected]
[email protected]
moanev roe (Name): Self
ArroRNEyFoR(,v8,rer, (ReSpOndent in
Self (Respondent in Pro
PrO Per)
Per)
SUPERIOR COURT
SUPERIOR COURT OFOF CAUFORNI COUNTY OF
CAUFORNIA, couurv Santa Clara
OF Santa Clara
smear menses: 605
STREETADORESS. 605 West
WCSt EIlCammo Real, Sunnyvale,
CAMiNO Real, CA 94087
Sunnyvale, CA 94087
MAILINGADDRESS:
MAILINGADORESS. 191
19I N.
N. First
FiTSt St.
St.
CITY AND ZIP
CTTYAND ZP CODE:
CODE, San
SAN Jose
JOSE cA
CA 951 13
95113
semen NAME: Sunnyvale Courthouse
Courthouse
pETrTroN ERvPLAINTI FF : Kathleen
PETITIONERIPLAINTIFF: (Ko stas ) Frazier
Kathleen (Kostas) F razier
RESPONDENT/DEFENDANT: Jeffery
RESPoNDENT/DEFENoANT: Jeffery Frazier
Frazier
OTHER PARENT/PARTY:
OTHER PARENTFARTY:
CASE NUMBER:
CASE
REQUEST FOR
REQUEST FOR ORDER
ORDER [:|
[--l MODIFICATION
uoorrrcATrou E
[:1 Temporary
Tenrporary Emergency
Court Order
Court
EmergencY
NUMBER:
ctrilo Custody
[-l Child
1:] custody l--_l Visitation
[:1 virit"tion Order
6'11‘FL'005500
6-11-FL005500
[_-l Chi”
[:1 ctriu Support
support
and Costs
Fee and
sporsal Support
[---l Spousal
1: Support tn Other (specify):
1X:
Other (apecttY):
[__l Attorney Fees
[:1 Attorney
Gosts Set 08-16-13; subsequent
aside the Court's orders of 08—16-13;
SdasidetheCourtsordersof orders based thereon
subsequantordasbasodthermn
To (name): Kathleen Kostas (Frazier) and

1. @(Frazier) and her attorneys of
her attorneys of record
record
for Order will be
be held as follows: If child custody or visitation is issue in
an issue
is an in this proceeding, Family
thie proceeding, Family
2. A hearing
2. A on this
hearing on Request for
this Request oderwill held as follows: lf child custody orvisitation
3i70 requires
secti5n 3170
Code section
Code before or
mediation before
reqirires mediation or at
at the as the
time as
same time
the same hearing (see
the hearing item 7.)
(see item 7.)
a. Date: Time: 1:] Dept: 82 [:1 Room:
same as
l-.l same
court [:1 noted above
as noted otler (specify):
above [X] other S unnyvale Courthouse
( specify): Sunnyvale
nJaro. of
o. Address
b. of court Courthouse
West El
605 West
605 El Camino Sunnyvale, CA
Real, Sunnyvale,
Camino Real, 94087
CA 94087
Aftachments to
3. Attachments
3. be served
to be with this
served with this Request for Order:
Request for Order:
bhnk Resoonsive
A blank (form FL-320)
Dedaration (form
Reryonslre Declaration Completed Financial
[--l Completed
c.c. [:1 (Simplified) (form
Statement (Simplified)
Financiat Statement (tqm
a.
a. A FL320)
.
Declaration (form FL-155) and aa blank
FL-155) and Statement (Simplified)
Financial Statement
blank Financial
b. 1:1 Completed Income and Expense (Simplified)
FL-150) and a and Expense
blank Income
a blank lname aN Exqene dDn
d. Points and
Points authorities
and authorities
EL-1150)fiand
90 are on
Declaration e. olfrrer (specify):
[.!fl Other
e. 1X] (specify); Notice of motion
Notice of and motion
motion and to
motion to
set aside
set the court's
aside the orders
cqurt's orders of August
ofAugust 16, 2013
16,2013
Date: - -' J 21,
---- July
Julv 2015
21.2015 .
Date:
Jeffery D. Framer
Jefferv D. Frazier ’
)
IGNATURE)
(TYPE OR PRINT NAME)
'
E] counr ORDER
f--l COURT oRDER
couRT AT
tN COURT AT THE AND TIME
DATE AND
THE DATE LISTED IN
TIME LISTED lrEM 22 TO
lN ITEM ANY LEGAL
GlvE ANY
To GIVE LEGAL
T--lyou ARE
4. [:1 YOU
4. oRDERED TO
ARE ORDERED AppEAR IN
To APPEAR
REASON WHY THE ORDERS REQUESTED SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED.
REASoNwHYTHEoRDERSREQUESTEDSHoULDNoTBEGRANTED.
l--l must be
Service must
shortened. Service on or
be on before (date):
or before (datil:
n Time
S.. [:1 Time for l--l hearing isis shortened.
service 1:] hearing
for [:1 service
Any responsive
6.. Any must be
dedaration must
responsive declaration on or
seryed on
be served before (date):
or before (date):
parties are
Th; parties attend mandatory
to attend
ordered to
are ordered custody services as follows:
as follows:
7.. The
N001 mandatory custody servic-es
T-l comply with

to comply the Temporary
with the Court Orders
Emergency Court
Temponry Emergency FL-305) attached.
(form FL-305)
orders (form attached'
you are
g. 1:] You
8. ordered to
are ordered
9.
9. 1:
n other (specify):
Other (specifY):
Date:
Date: JUOICIAL OFFlCER
JUDICIAL OFFICER
Order: If you wish

lf you respond to
to respond to this Otder, you
for Order,
Request for file aa
muet file
you must
To the person who received this Raruest for Order: wish-to this.Reguest
ih4iiitiiio,u"'lffiit'J{or *o *I:
oectantioi to Request for Order (form FL-320) and serve a copy
Ruponsive Declaration
Responsive
of time.
on
You
the
L"-'9';11r::t5;fgle,;::5:1':}l"r:'l;#:l;do
other
not
parties
have to
at
pay
least
a
nine
filing
court
fee to
firins{ee to
days
file
f*e the
the
r.ff.i,:ffitrfiT:r.fr4?ffiffifi;Jil;i;E!*'
before the hearing date unless the court has ordered
D*tantion toio Request
a shorter period
e.'dg;r,.,ry _r-11?:*-h*.
for Order (form FL-320) or any other declaration
Ord"ri";f:jrXfytger
iquestfor including
declaration including
to
an
an
pav
Income
a
lncome and
and Expense
Expense
Reqponsrve Declaration
Responsive
'tr;;6;; 6; i'lq
Declaration (form FL-150) or rinanciat Statement
or Financial (form FL-155).
(simptifted) (form
Stabntent (Simplified) FL-155)'
Page 1 M4
REQUEST FOR ORDER

REQUEST FOR CEB
CfB 6226,
Family
53204326. 63mm
Cod€, §§
Farily Code, SS 2045, 2107. 8224,
2015,2107,424,
Judas. CdrEil «came

some.
Form Adopted for
Ftrm Adopted for MandatoryU*
Mandatory Use ORDER 6226,63ffi326, 63ffi383
PMs: g
F 02“?“
,Al?6
ofCalibmia CnuAmmMO
a^r,6dmAnr aJ-
Judicial
CI _W (Dav
Ft-SlPaw lulu 1
hnvl 70171
2n121
FL-300
PETITIONERIPLAINTIFF:
pErloNERypLArNTrFF: Kathleen
Kathleen (Kostas)
(Kostas) Frazier CASE
C]TSE NUMBER:
NUMBER:
_ Frazier
RESPONDENT/DEFENDANT:
RESPoNDENT/DEFENDANT: Jeffery
Jeffery Frazier
Frazier 6-11- FL” 005500
6-11-FL005500
OTHER
OTHER PARENT/PARTY:
PARENT/PARTYJ
REQUEST ORDER AND

FOR ORDER
REQUEST FOR SUPPORTING DECLARATION
AND SUPPORTING DECLARATION
f]
:1 Petitioner fI
P.tition"r [:3 Respondent
Respondent E[:| Other requests the
ParenuParty requests
Other ParentIParty follor,ing orders:
the following orders:
1.1. [:1 CHILD
f-_l cxrLo CUSTODY
cusroov E To be ordered
1:! To be
b.
pending the hearing
order€d pending
dy to
Legal custody
the hearing
(name of
to (name person who
of person c. qJstody to
Physical custody
c. Physical (name of
to (name of
a.
a. Child's and age
name and
child's name aoe b. Legal
cust who
makes decisions about
makes decisions education. etc.)
health. education,
about health, etc.) arson \ /ith whom
oarson with will live)
child will
whom child live)
d. E As
d. [:1 requested in
As requested form [:1
in form cnita Custody
f-l Child and Visitation
cu*ay and ApPlication Attachment
Visrtation Application (lom FL-311)
Aftachment (form FL-311]
f--f for Child
Request for
|:I Request Prevention Orders
Afluction Prevention
child Abduction (!om' FL-312)
orders (form FL-312\
[:1 Children
f1 '3 Holiday
children's Holiday Schedule
Schedule Attachment
Attachment (form
(lom FL-341(C))
FL-341(C)
i aAanonat Provisions—Physical
|:] Additional Cusbq Attachment
proisims-Physical Custody (tqm FL-341(D))
Ntachment (form FL-341(D))
|:] Joint
i Legal Custody
,toint Legal Custody Attachment
Afrachment (form
(form FL-341(E))
FL-341(E))
l:i Other
D (Attrachment 1d)
Other (Attachment 1d)
f--] .risting order

irbd,fy existing
e. i: Modify order
". (1) filed on
(1) filed on (date):
(daf4:
(2) ordering (specify):
(2ro,denr€Gc€firy):
(PARENTTA/G TIME)
vlslrATloN (PARENTING
cHtLD VISITATION fl To
1:] To be pending the
ordered pending
be ordered the hearing
2. T--l CHILD
2. 1:] rrME) hearing
Child Custody
f---"-l Child and Visitation
Custody and Applicaton Attachment
visitatc,l Application (lotm FL—311)
Attachmont (form
As requested in:
a. Asrequested
a. in: (1) Anachment 2a
T--l Attachment
(1) [:1 e\ 1:
2a (2)
FL-311)
(3) [3
(3) othsr (specify):
T--l Other (spectly):
b.
o. 1:]
l-_..| Modify existing order
uooiry existing order
filed on
(1) filed
(1) on (date):
(dafa):
(2) o,de'ing (specify):
(2) ordering (sPeciv:
now in
are now
ordeG are efied. (Attach
in effect. coPy of
(Afrach aa copy of the if you
orders if
the orders you
c. [:1 One
f] o, more
on. or domestic violence
.ore domestic restraining/proteclive orders
violence restraining/protective
". ordeG are
"fhe orders
one.) The from the
are from coud or
following court
the following courts (specify
or courts and state):
@unty and
(specify county state):
have one.)
have
crimind: County/state:
('l ) |:l Criminal:
(1) n county/state: T--l Juvenile:
(3) [:1 Juvenile:
(3) County/state:
County/state:
Case
caseNo. (if known):
No. fif Rnown): No. (if
Case No.
Case (il known):
laown):
Family: County/slam:
T_-l Family:
(2) [:1 (4) Other: County/state:
r-l Other:
(4) [:1
(2) County/state: County/state:
c-asr- No.
Case (if known):
No. (if known): No. (if
Case No.
Case (if known):
knd n):
T-
3. [:1 CHILD
3. SUPPoRT (An
cHlLo SUPPORT assignment order
aam,ngs assignment
(An earnings be issued.)
may be
oder may issued )
c. Monm
c. reouested (if
amount rguested
i/bnthlv amount (if not by guideline)
not by guideline)
a. Child's
a. and age
name and
child's name aoe request support
b. [:1 II request
b. T- based on
suPPort based on the
the
suPPort guidelines
cfi ild support
child guidelines 5$
d.
d. [:3 ensting order
Modify existing
T---l Modify order
filed on
(1) filed
(1) on (date):
(dare):
(2) ordeing (specify):
(2) ordering (sPxifY):
income of both parents. It normally until the

continues until the
Notice: The court is required to order child support based on the
onnalv-continues
y_our finances by filing an Income and
and Expense
Ex,ense Declaration
Declantion
child b 18.
chi6 is suppty the
must supply
you must
i8. You ;;;;iit i"]['r-.ti-
ihe court with information about your finances by filing an tncnm-e
eupPorl order
chitd support
the child rYill be
order will ba3ed on
be based
or aa Financial
FL-.tso) or
(form FL-150) ttor-"f"ut
satennmt (Simplified) (form
s",o,j,itij,ii;A orterwlee, the
fr--r6st. Otherwise,
FL-155). on
Frn
parent
iiii,#ii". lo"ri your
information about your income t''i itr'';;;e;i-J"" r"t ttt';'
incom" that the court receives from other sources, including
"".at the other
FL-300
CASE NUMBER:
cAss
_ PETITIONER/PLAINTIFF: (Kostas) Frazier
Kathleen (Kostas)
PETtTtoNERyPLAINTIFF: Kathleen F raner
NUIt'EER:
RESPONDENT/DEFENDANT: Jeffery Frazier

RESPoNDENT/DEFENDANT: Jeffery Frazier
6'11“ FL” 005 500
6-11-FL005s00
OTHER PARENT/PARTY:
4. n SPOUSAL
4. CZ! SpOUSAL OR SUPPORT (An
PARTNER SUPPORT
OR PARTNER assignment order
eamings assignment
(An earnings may be
order may be issued.)
issued.)
a. I: Amount requested (monthly): s C. [--l
c. l:l Modify existing order
Modfy existing order
n Terminate
b. l:l
b. existing order
Terminate existing order (1)
(1) filed on (date):
filed on (date):
(1) filed on
(1) filed (date):
on (date): (2) ordering (specify):
(2) ordering (sPec$:
(2) ordering
(specifY):
d. l: The Spousal or Partner Support Declaration Attachment (form FL-157) is attached (for modification of spousal or
paftner support
partner after iudgment only)
suppoft afterjudgment oilY)
e.
e. An
An lncome aN Expense
Income and (form FL-150)
Declaration (form
Expen* Declaration be attached
must be
FL-150) must attached
(form FL-319) or a
5. l:l ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS are requested on Request for Attorney Fees and Costs Order Attachment
addresses the covered in
factors covered form. An
that form. Aa Income aN Expense
lncom6 and Declaration
Expen* Declaration (form
(form FL-150) must be
50) must be
declaration that
declaration the factors in that FL-1
that addresses
for Attomey Fees and Costs Order Attachment (form FL-158) or a declaration that
that
attached. Supporting Declaration
attached. Aesupiing Dedaration for Attomey Fees and Cosfs Order Attachmenf (form FL-158) or a declaration
addresss the
addresses the factors
iactors covered that form
in that
covered in form must also be
must also attached.
be attached'
6,
6. C] PRoPERT RESTRAINT
T--l PROPERTY RESTRAINT [--l To
[:1 be ordered
fo be the hearing
pending the
ordered pending hearing
a. The
a. [-l petitioner
The [:l 1--l
petition", [:3 respondent l--l
respondent [:1 claimant
claimant is
is restrained
restained fiom transferring,
from encumbering, hypothecating,
tansfening, enolmbering, hypothecating,
disposing of
way disposing property, real
any property, or personal,
real or whether community, quasi-community, or
community, quasi-community, or
concealing, or
concealing, in any
or in any way of any personal, whether
separate, except
separate, except in the usual
in the usual course of business
course of business or
or for
for the
the necessities
necessities of
of life.
life.
be
will be notified at least
at business days
five business any proposed
before any
days before proposed extraordinary expenditures,
extraordinary expenditures,
The applicant
[---l The
[:1 applicant will notified least five
and an
and accounting of
an accounting such will
of suctr will be made to
be made the court.
to the court'
-n and enjoined from cashing, bonowing against,
cashing, borrowing of' or
disposing of,
Uansfern‘ng, disposing
canceling, tansferring, or
b. Cl Both
b. parties are
Both parties restrained and
are restrained enjoined fiom agains( canceling,
other
or other coverage, including life, health, automobile, and
and disability,
disabili$'
cfranging the
changing beneficiaries of
the beneficiaries any insurance
of any insurance or coverage, including life, health, automobile,
held
held for benefit of
the benefit
for the of the parties or
the parties or their minor children.
their minor children'
or liabilities for which olher may
the other resporsible, other
held responsible,
be held than in
other than the
in the
l-l
c. C] Neither
Neither party
parly may
may incur
incur any
any debts
debts or liabilities for wtricfr the may be
". ordinary murse of
ordinary odlrse of business
business or for the
or for necessities of
the necessities of life.
life'
f*1 PROPERTY CONTROL ro be

[--l To
[:3 ordercd Pending
be ordered the hearing
pending the
7.
T. [:1 -E
PRoPERW coNTRoL hearing
following
l---l the exclusive
given the
is given and control
possession, and
use, possession,
temporary use, ontrdof of the
the following
tne petitioner
a. [:l The respondent is
pemioner l:l respondent exdusive ternporary
". that we
property that
property own or
we own or are buying (specify):
are buying (specify):
to make following payments

the following on liens
payments on and encumbrances coming
encumbranccs coming
I---l The
b. l:
b. petitioner [:l
The petitioner respondent
I-_-l respondent is
is ordered
ordered to make the liens and
due
due while the order
while the order is in effect:
is in effect:
Amountofoavment
Amount of payment Pay to
Pavto
Debt
Debt
D
8' [XI OTHER RELIEF (specify):
8- 5
Re: Respondents
Order Re:
Court's orders of August 16,
ii:axi'ilTf#'yl"usust
The t6,20t3are vacated and
2013 are vacated set aside,
and set namely, (1)
aside, namely, 9-gq*', Order
Thg Court’s
(1) The Respondertl
Findings
of Child and Temporary
Support 9"a 1..-n9.*l Spousal Support; and (2)
(2) The
The Court’s
Court's Findings
ro, Modification
Request for
Request ruro[irr*tiortf chiia-S_;ifi Spousal Support; and
set a51de.
and set
vacated and
Fg€s and
Attorney’s Fees c;"4 Also,
,re Costs. rirur-".io"it orders
all subsequent
Alio, all thereon are
based thereon
orders based are vacated aside'
and order Re
and Order ReAttorney,s
use the forms Request for Order

NOTE: To obtain domestic violence restraining orders, you must
ffie$icviolencerestrainingorders'youmustusetheformsReguestfororder
(form DV-100), Temporary Restrainingorder (Domestic
Restraining Order Violence) (form
(Domesticviolence) (torm
(Domestic Violence Prevention)
(Dont(xiticwotence prcvention)(form DV-10OI,remponry
Court Hearing (Domestic violence) (form
Violence) DV-109).
(form DV'109)'
DV-1 10), and Notice
iiv,r-rq, xitice of court Hearing (Domestk
""J
mm [RN-“Y 1. 2°12] FOR ORDER CFB
PageaoN
FL-3OO [Rev. JulY 1, 20121 REOUEST FOR
REQUEST ORDER CfR
FL-300
pErTroNER/PLA|NT|rr: Kathleen (Kostas)
(Kostas) Frazier C SE NUMBER:
case
_ PETITIONERIPLAINTIFF: Kathleen
NUIBER:
Frazier
RESPONDENT/DEFENDANT: Jeffery Frazier
nEspoNoel\ltnepeNDANT: Jeffery Frazier
6-11-F1r 005500
6-11-FL005500
OTHER PARENT/PARTY:
OTHER PARENT/PARTY:
9. [:1 I request that time for service of the Request for Order and accompanying papers be shortened so that these documents may
be served no
be served less than
no less (srycify number):
than (specify number): days before
days the time
before the set for
time set for the need to
hearing. II need
the hearing. have this
to have this
order shortening time because of
order shortening time because ofthe the facts
facts specified
sPecified in
in item
itern 10
10 or
or the
the attached
attached declaration.
declaration.
10. FAcTs IN
TJC FACTS
10 [Z] SUppoRT of
tN SUPPORT requesled and
o(ders requested
of orders change of
and change circumstanc€s for
d circumstances for any
any modification arc (specify):
rnodification are (sryify):
IX] Contained
l- l in the attached
ContaineO in the attached declaration.
ded aalion. (You
(You may
may use
use Attached
Afracfied Declaration
Dedaration (form
(form MC-031)
MC-031) for
for this purpose.
this purposa.
The attached
The must not
dedaratbn must
afladBd declaration ex@od 10
not exceed pages in
10 pages in length permission to
unless permission
length unless fi16 a
to file longer declaration
a longer has been
dedaration has beon
from the
obtained from
obtained tlE court.)
@urt.)
penalty of under the

prjury under
of perjury laws of
the laws stale of
the State
of the califomia that
of California foregoing is
the foregoing
that the is true and correct.
true and conect'
under penalty
declare under
II declare
July 21,
Dae: July
Date: 2015
21,2015
Jeffery D. Frazier ’ W
' ATURE or APPLiQuT)
fiYPE 0R
(TYPE PRINT NAME)
OR PRINT MME)
Reque3ta for
Requests for Accommodations
Accornmodations available ifif
or sign language
captioning, or
real-time captioning, are available
interpreter services are
Assistive listening
Assistive comPuter-assisted real-time
systems, computer-assisted
lislening systems, :ign languag"www.courts.ca.gov/fonns
lgTj-"i"i-T1l=i
the proceeding. Contact the clerk’s office
ffi& or go to for
ca.gov/foms-fot
you f"r.t five
vo,J ask at least days before
n""" days before the proceeding. Contad the derk s or go to www. cnufts
"if "t
';s;;;;;;;";;;;br; iv-eiins
by Persons Mth and Response
Disabilities and
wioisbitities (rorm M0410).
Raspnsa (form code' §S 54.8.)
(civil Code,
Mc410) (Civil s4 8 )
Request for Accommodations
"'°“°"
”'3“ Jury " ”‘2‘
[Rov. “V
FL-3O0 ““- 1 2l
, 2O1 FOR ORDER
REQUEST FOR
REQUEST ORDER OFP,
CfR
1 ATTACHMENT TO
ATTACHMENT TO REQUEST
REQUEST FOR FOR ORDER
ORDER
MARRIAGE OF FRAZIER,
MARRIAGE OF FRAZIER, Case
Case No. 6—11-FL-005500
No. 6-11-FL-005500
2
I, Jeffery
I, Jeffery Frazier,
Frazier, declare
declare as
as follows:
follows:
3
1. NB.,
1. the term
N.B., the term “Briefing”
“Briefing” is
is used
used herein as defined
herein as defined in
in my
my NOTICE
NOTICE OF
OF MOTION
MOTION AND
AND
4
MOTION TO
MOTION TO SET
SET ASIDE THE ORDERS
ASIDE THE ORDERS OF
OF AUGUST 16, 2013
AUGUST 16, 2013 BY THE HON.
BY THE HON.
5
THEODORE C.
THEODORE C. ZAYNER UNDER CCP
ZAYNER UNDER CCP §
§ 473(d)
473(d) FOR
FOR DEPRIVATION
DEPRIVATION OF
OF DUE
DUE
6
PROCESS AND
PROCESS AND UNDER
UNDER THE
THE COURT’S
COURT’S INHERENT
INHERENT POWERS FOR EXTRINSIC
POWERS FOR EXTRINSIC
7
8
FRAUD OR
FRAUD OR MISTAKE
MISTAKE,, at
at p.l, filed on
p.1, filed on July
July 21,
21, 2015.
2015.
9
2. II am
am the
the Respondent
Respondent in
in the above—referenced case.
the above-referenced case. II have
have personal
personal knowledge of the
knowledge of facts
the facts
10
10
contained herein.
contained herein. If
If called
called to
to testify,
testify, II could
could and
and would
would testify competently to
testify competently to these facts.
these facts.
11
11
3. II am
am aa California
California Attorney (Bar Number
Attorney (Bar 157,792). II am
Number 157,792). am aa registered
registered patent
patent prosecution
prosecution
12
12
attorney (Reg.
attorney (Reg. No. 34,601). II am
No. 34,601). am not
not aa litigator.
litigator. II have
have never litigated aa case
never litigated case before
before this one.
this one.
13
13
14
14 Exhibits A,
4. Exhibits A, C,
C, D,
D, H, J, M,
H, J, M, O,
O, P, Q, R,
P, Q, S, and
R, S, and W are true
W are and correct
true and correct copies
copies of
of documents
documents that
that
15
15 II have
have filed
filed or
or had
had filed
filed in
in this litigation and
this litigation and are
are included
included in
in the Court’s file
the Court’s file for
for this case.
this case.
16
16
Exhibits B,
5. Exhibits B, E,
E, F,
F, G,
G, and
and II are
are true and correct
true and correct copies
copies of
of documents
documents that
that II have
have received from
received from
17
17
Petitioner or
Petitioner or her attorneys in
her attorneys in the course of
the course of this
this litigation
litigation and
and are
are included
included in
in the Court’s file.
the Court’s file.
18
18
Exhibits K,
6. Exhibits K, L,
L, N, T, U,
N, T, V, and
U, V, and X are unaltered
X are copies of
unaltered copies of documents
documents gotten
gotten from
from the Court.
the Court.
19
19
20
20 Exhibit V
Exhibit V was gotten from
was gotten from the
the Riverside Superior Court
Riverside Superior Court website.
website. All other Court
All other Court exhibits
exhibits
21
21 were gotten
were gotten from
from the Santa Clara
the Santa Clara Superior
Superior Court.
Court.
22
22
Judge Zayner
7. Judge Zayner made
made aa “constructive”
“constructive” amendment
amendment to
to Petitioner’s
Petitioner’s Briefing submission. II
after submission.
Briefing after
23
23
was not
was not given
given notice
notice or
or served
served regarding
regarding the constructive amendment,
the constructive amendment, nor
nor was
was II given
given an
an
24
24
opportunity to
opportunity to respond. The lack
respond. The lack of
of actual
actual notice
notice was
was not caused by
not caused any avoidance
by any avoidance of
of service
service
25
25
26
26 of process
of or inexcusable
process or inexcusable neglect on my
neglect on my part. In this
part. In this regard,
regard, II am
am not aware that
not aware any notice
that any notice
27
27 was attempted.
was attempted.
28
28
MARRIAGE OF FRAZIER, Case No. 6-11-FL-005500
6-11—FL—005500
DECLARATION OF JEFFERY FRAZIER IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE ORDERS OF AUGUST 16, 2013
1
1 8. II voiced
8. voiced my
my intention
intention that
that II would not pursue
would not my Motion
pursue my Motion for
for aa reduction in support
reduction in support filed
filed 11-
11-
2 13-12 in
13-12 in open
open court
court on
on 05-20-13
05-20-13 (See,
(See, Tr.
Tr. 05-20-13,
05-20-13, p.9, 11.18-23 (Exh.
p.9, ll.18-23 (E_Xh. M),
M), Respondent: “I’m
Respondent: “I'm
3
not pursuing
not that motion
pursuing that motion at
at this
this time.”).
time.”). As of that
As of that date,
date, no support had
no support had been
been paid in either
paid in either
4
direction since the stipulated order of 01-03-13 and, not
not having sufficient financial
having sufficient financial resources,
resources,
5
II did
did not have aa desire
not have desire to start paying
to start support. There
paying support. There had
had been no material
been no change in
material change in
6
7 circumstances since
circumstances since the
the most
most recent order of
recent order of 01-03-13.
01-03-13. Judge
Judge Zayner, in his
Zayner, in orders of
his orders of 08-16-13,
08-16—13,
8 picked
picked aa circumstance
circumstance before
before that date to
that date to justify
justify modification.
modification. Finally, nothing had
Finally, nothing had been done
been done
9 with my
with my Motion
Motion in
in nearly five months
nearly five as of
months as of that
that time, i.e., since
time, i.e., since the orders of
the orders of 01-03-13.
01-03—13. II had
had no
no
10
10
intention, ever,
intention, ever, to
to pursue
pursue that
that particular Motion to
particular Motion downwardly modify
to downwardly support again.
modify support again.
11
11
Petitioner’s initial
9. Petitioner’s initial request
request to impute income
to impute income to me, i.e.,
to me, i.e., her SUPPLEMENTAL
her SUPPLEMENTAL
12
12
DECLARATION and
DECLARATION and POINTS
POINTS AND
AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
OF IMPUTATION
IMPUTATION OF
OF
13
13
14
14 INCOME TO
INCOME TO RESPONDENT
RESPONDENT of
of 02-04-13,
02-04-13, did
did not include aa single
not include single request, or hint
request, or of aa
hint of
15
15 request, for
request, for aa modification
modification to child support
to child support or
or spousal
spousal support.
support.
16
16
10. The
10. only thing
The only thing Petitioner’s
Petitioner’s SUPPLEMENTAL
SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION IN SUPPORT
DECLARATION IN SUPPORT OF
OF
17
17
IMPUTATION OF
IMPUTATION OF INCOME
INCOME TO
TO RESPONDENT
RESPONDENT of
of 06-13-13
06-13—13 includes
includes about
about support
support is
is this
this
18
18
sentence: “I
sentence: “I also
also request
request the Court modify
the Court modify child
child support
support and
and spousal
spousal support
support to include this
to include this
19
19
20
20 imputation.” (p. 1, ll.20-21.)
imputation.” (p.1, 1120-21.)
21
21 ll. While
11. While the
the support
support orders
orders of
of 08-16-13
08-16-13 are
are captioned
captioned as
as if
if the
the request for modification
request for modification was
was
22
22
mine, II did
mine, did not have any
not have any such
such request
request before
before the Court. II had
the Court. had no intention to
no intention to pursue
pursue my
my
23
23
motion filed
motion filed 11-13-12
11—13-12 any
any further
further than
than with the 01-03-12
with the 01-03-12 stipulation
stipulation and
and order
order setting
setting support
support
24
24
at zero
at zero both
both ways, and II was
ways, and was content
content with
with zero as the
zero as the status
status quo.
quo.
25
25
26
26 12. At
12. At no
no time
time following
following the stipulation and
the stipulation and order
order of
of 01-03-13,
01-03-13, through
through to
to the
the hearing of 06-17-
hearing of 06-17-
27
27 13, did
13, did Petitioner file and
Petitioner file and serve
serve aa notice of motion
notice of and motion
motion and (or OSC)
motion (or OSC) putting an upward
putting an upward
28
28
modification to
modification to support
support before
before the Court for
the Court for aa decision
decision in
in connection
connection with
with the orders of
the orders of 08-16-
08-16-
6-11—FL—005500
2
1 13. The
13. The only
only thing
thing II ever
ever saw
saw in
in this
this regard
regard was
was the single sentence
the single sentence mentioned above, in
mentioned above, in
2 Petitioner’s declaration
Petitioner’s declaration of
of 06-13-13;
06-13-13; only
only four
four days
days before
before the
the hearing of 06-17-13.
hearing of 06-17-13. II did
did not
not
3
have sufficient
have sufficient time for preparation
time for of an
preparation of an adequate
adequate response, and II was
response, and was not given sufficient
not given sufficient
4
information content
information content to
to understand
understand how
how best
best to respond.
to respond.
5
l3. So,
13. So, neither
neither party
party put
put aa motion
motion or
or OSC
OSC properly
properly before
before the Court for
the Court for aa modification
modification to support
to support
6
7 in connection
in connection with
with the orders of
08-16-13. But
But the Court decided
the Court decided my old motion
my old motion anyway.
anyway.
8 14. Petitioner
14. Petitioner was seeking to
was seeking to impute
impute income
income and
and wanting an upward
wanting an upward modification in support,
modification in support, thus
thus
quo —
9
being the
being the party seeking aa change
party seeking change to
to the status quo
the status –Mnot me.
me.
10
10
15. As
15. As the
the unsuccessful
unsuccessful party,
party, II was
was kept in ignorance
kept in ignorance of
of Judge
Judge Zayner’s additions to
Zayner’s additions to the issues
the issues
11
11
until after
until after the submissions had
the submissions had been
been made. The same
made. The same is
is true
true for
for the
the new allegations and
new allegations and
12
12
13
13 attachments of
attachments of Petitioner’s
Petitioner’s opening
opening trial
trial submission.
submission. As
As aa consequence,
consequence, my
my participation in
participation in
14
14 the proceedings
the was unfairly
proceedings was limited.
unfairly limited.
15
15
l6. II agreed
16. agreed to
to waive an oral
waive an oral hearing for the
hearing for the trial,
trial, but
but II did
did not
not waive all usual
waive all usual modes of
modes of
16
16
responding to
responding to new arguments, e.g.,
new arguments, e.g., submission
submission of
of aa written
written response and evidence
response and evidence in
in rebuttal.
rebuttal.
17
17
II did
did not
not waive
waive my Constitutional rights,
my Constitutional including my
rights, including my due-process
due-process rights.
rights.
18
18
19
19 l7. Two
17. Two sets
sets of
of default
default orders
orders issued
issued against
against me
me on
on 08-16-13.
08-16-13. In
In the orders, Judge
the orders, Judge Zayner
Zayner ruled in
ruled in
20
20 Petitioner’s favor
Petitioner’s favor and
and against
against me
me on
on each
each and
and every
every issue;
issue; aa trend
trend that had begun
that had begun with
with the
the
21
21 forced sale
forced sale of
of the
the family
family home
home to
to aa third
third party, on 06-19-13,
party, on 06-19-13, and
and would continue at
would continue at least
least
22
22
through the
through the hearing
hearing of
of 04-21-14,
04-21-14, on
on my second set-aside
my second set-aside motion.
motion.
23
23
l8. Judge
18. Judge Zayner’s
Zayner’s financial
financial analysis
analysis in
in the order entitled
the order ORDER RE:
entitled ORDER RESPONDENT’S
RE: RESPONDENT’S
24
24
REQUEST FOR
REQUEST FOR MODIFICATION
MODIFICATION OF
OF CHILD
CHILD SUPPORT
SUPPORT AND TEMPORARY SPOUSAL
AND TEMPORARY SPOUSAL
25
25
26
26 SUPPORT did
SUPPORT did not account for
not account for shelter
shelter for
for myself
myself and
and the children. He
the children. He allocated
allocated nothing for it.
nothing for it.
27
27 II do
do not
not know
know what he expected
what he expected us
us to do for
to do for shelter
shelter because
because he
he never said anything
never said anything about
about it.
it.
28
28
6-11—FL—005500
3
1 19. Before
19. Before the
the orders
orders of
of 08-16-13
08-16-13 issued,
issued, I,
I, along
along with my parents,
with my parents, aa retired school teacher
retired school and aa
teacher and
2 retired church
retired church minister,
minister, bought
bought aa modest home in
modest home in Redwood
Redwood City,
City, CA,
CA, as
as Judge
Judge Zayner
Zayner had
had
3
forced me,
forced me, my
my two
two young daughters, and
young daughters, and my
my terminally
terminally disabled
disabled friend
friend that
that II was
was hosting as
hosting as
4
she received
she treatment at
received treatment at Stanford
Stanford Hospital (since passed
Hospital (since away) —
passed away) – whom Judge Zayner
whom Judge Zayner knew
knew
5
about -- out
about -- out of
of the
the family
family home
home with his order
with his order of
of 06-17-13
06-17-13 that it be
that it sold to
be sold to aa third
third party.
party.
6
7 20. Petitioner’s
20. Petitioner’s opening
opening trial
trial brief contained new
brief contained new allegations
allegations and
and included
included new attachments that
new attachments that
8 she had
she never surfaced
had never surfaced or
or raised
raised before in the
before in litigation. For
the litigation. For example,
example, the subject matter
the subject she
matter she
9
set forth
set forth at
at trial
trial seeking
seeking to
to have
have the Court sanction
the Court sanction me
me under Family Code
under Family Code (FC)
(FC) sec.
sec. 271
271
10
10
existed nowhere
existed in the
nowhere in record until
the record it showed
until it showed up,
up, unexpectedly
unexpectedly to
to me, in her
me, in opening trial
her opening trial
11
11
brief, given
brief, given to
to me
me for
for the first time
the first and filed
time and filed with the Court
with the Court on
on the same day,
the same day, 05-20-13.
05-20-13. Of
Of
12
12
13
13 that subject
that subject matter,
matter, included
included are
are false statements of
false statements of fact
fact and
and documents
documents containing
containing false
false
14
14 information created
information created by
by Attorney Ledgerwood that
Attorney Ledgerwood that Petitioner
Petitioner used in successfully
used in successfully seeking
seeking to
to
15
15
have me
have me sanctioned
sanctioned by
by the Court at
the Court at trial. (See, PC
trial. (See, PC §§ 134
134 [preparing
[preparing false
false evidence
evidence [felony]].)
[felony]].)
16
16
A number
A of Attorney
number of Ledgerwood’s false
Attorney Ledgerwood’s false emails
emails are
are needlessly, gratuitously, and
needlessly, gratuitously, and unfairly
unfairly
17
17
derogatory towards
derogatory towards me
me in
in front
front of
of third
third parties.
parties.
18
18
19
19 21. The
21. The false
false statements
statements and
and false
false documents
documents by
by Attorney Ledgerwood were
Attorney Ledgerwood were not
not hyperbole. They
hyperbole. They
20
20 were purefiction,
were made up
pure fiction, made up by her from
by her from thin air.
thin air.
21
21 22. The
22. The two
two people most central
people most central to
to Attorney Ledgerwood’s lies
Attorney Ledgerwood’s lies in
in Petitioner’s trial brief,
opening trial
Petitioner’s opening brief,
22
22
myself and
myself and Ms.
Ms. Ginny
Ginny Kavanaugh, each told
Kavanaugh, each told Attorney
Attorney Ledgerwood
Ledgerwood that
that what she was
what she saying
was saying
23
23
to third
to third parties
parties before trial about
before trial about me
me was
was not true. Namely,
not true. Namely, II did
did not
not tell
tell Ms.
Ms. Kavanaugh
Kavanaugh to
to
24
24
25
25
add the
add the so-called
so-called ‘$1.00
‘$1.00 term’
term’ to
to the listing agreement
the listing agreement for
for the sale of
the sale of the family home.
the family home.
26
26 23. II heard
23. the person
heard the that did
person that did tell
tell her
her to do so,
to do so, her manager, while
her manager, in a
while in a conference
conference room at Ms.
room at Ms.
27
27 Kavanaugh’s offices.
Kavanaugh’s offices. Another gentlemen was
Another gentlemen in the
was in the conference
conference room at the
room at the time, as well.
time, as well.
28
28
6-11—FL—005500
4
1 24. Petitioner’s
24. Petitioner’s opening
opening trial
trial brief submission was
brief submission unsworn and
was unsworn and unverified.
unverified. Judge
Judge Zayner
Zayner
2 accepted it
accepted it and
and relied
relied upon it. My
upon it. My opening
opening trial
trial brief submission was
brief submission sworn and
was sworn and verified.
verified.
3
25. My
25. My opening
opening trial
trial brief
brief was supported by
was supported evidence. Petitioner’s
by evidence. Petitioner’s opening
opening trial
trial brief submission
brief submission
4
included no
included no evidentiary
evidentiary support.
support.
5
26. The
26. The orders
orders caused
caused aa harsh,
harsh, undue financial burden
undue financial for me
burden for me and
and the children. II was
the children. forced to
was forced to
6
7 borrow to
borrow cover living
to cover living expenses
expenses for
for myself and my
myself and children (See
my children (See In re Marriage
In re ofMosley
Marriage of Mosley
8 (2008) 165
(2008) 165 Cal.App.4th
Cal.App.4th 1375
1375 [“[The
[“[The order]
order] placed [husband] in
placed [husband] in aa position of having
position of having to
to
9
borrow for
borrow for his
his living
living expenses,
expenses, and
and thus
thus resulted in aa miscarriage
resulted in ofjustice.”
miscarriage of (Id. at
justice.” (Id. at pp. 1386—
pp. 1386–
10
10
flh Moreover,
1387].) Moreover, II had
had to
to repay
repay the loans from
the loans fiom retirement
retirement since
since that
that was
was the only money
the only money II
11
11
had, once
had, once Petitioner
Petitioner finally
finally released
released that money to
that money to me. Judge Zayner
me. Judge Zayner had delegated to
had delegated to her
her
12
12
13
13 sole judicial
sole judicial power
power to lift the
to lift injunction he
the injunction he issued
issued that
that had frozen all
had frozen all of
of my
my non-liquid assets.
non-liquid assets.
14
14 Between paying
Between my retirement
paying my retirement to Petitioner, as
to Petitioner, as ordered
ordered by
by Judge Zayner, and
Judge Zayner, and using
using itit for
for the
the
15
15
essentials of
essentials of life,
life, my
my retirement is now
retirement is now fully
fillly depleted.
depleted.
16
16
27. It
27. It was
was my
my expectation
expectation that the trial
that the trial would
would proceed in accordance
proceed in accordance with
with my fundamental right
my fundamental right to
to
17
17
aa procedurally regular trial.
procedurally regular trial. II expected
expected the
the trial
trial would
would be according to
be according law, and
to law, and that it would
that it would
18
18
19
19 be the
be the same
same character
character of
of trial, governed by
trial, governed the same
by the same established
established rules of evidence
rules of evidence and
and
20
20 procedure as are
procedure as are applied
applied in
in other
other cases
cases under similar conditions.
under similar conditions. After briefs were
opening briefs
After opening were
21
21 submitted on
submitted on 05-20-13,
05-20-13, II expected
expected that reply briefs
that reply briefs would
would be solicited by
be solicited Judge Zayner
by Judge so that
Zayner so that
22
22
II could
could address
address the new subject
the new subject matter
matter in
in Petitioner’s
Petitioner’s opening
opening trial
trial brief,
brief, per due process.
per due process.
23
23
28. Instead,
28. Instead, the
the trial
trial procedures
procedures used
used by Judge Zayner
by Judge Zayner were
were non-standard,
non-standard, unpredictable, and
unpredictable, and
24
24
25
25
confusing. He
confusing. He provided
provided very little explanation
very little explanation as
as to
to his
his process. The procedures
process. The procedures he actually
he actually
26
26 used conflicted
used conflicted with
with his own written
his own written trial
trial policies
policies that
that he gave the
he gave the parties
parties to follow prior
to follow prior to
to
27 trial, DEPARTMENT
DEPARTMENT 82
82 LONG
LONG CAUSE
CAUSE AND TRIAL POLICIES
27 trial, AND TRIAL (E_Xh. X).
POLICIES (Exh. X).
28
28
6-11—FL—005500
5
1 29. Judge
29. Judge Zayner did not
Zayner did not call
call for
for reply
reply briefs, notwithstanding the
briefs, notwithstanding the new
new material submitted by
material submitted by
2 Petitioner in
Petitioner in and
and attached
attached to
to her opening trial
her opening trial brief.
brief. As
As aa result,
result, there
there was
was no
no way for me
way for me to
to
3
address the
address the new material.
new material.
4
30. Judge
30. Judge Zayner makes aa number
Zayner makes of misstatements
number of misstatements in
in the orders of
08-16-13. For example, in
For example, in
5
the Findings
the Findings and
and Order
Order re
re Fees
Fees and
and Costs,
Costs, at
at p. 3, Judge
p. 3, Judge Zayner says, “Respondent
Zayner says, “Respondent has
has
6
7 received adequate
received adequate notice of Petitioner’s
notice of [sanctions] request
Petitioner’s [sanctions] and has
request and has had
had the opportunity to
the opportunity to be
be
8 heard, both
heard, both parties having presented
parties having extensive briefs
presented extensive on these
briefs on these issues…”
issues...” There
There is
is nothing
nothing true
true
9
in that
in that statement.
statement. Petitioner’s
Petitioner’s sanctions
sanctions requests showed up
requests showed for the
up for the very first time
very first in her
time in her
10
10
opening trial
opening brief, which
trial brief, which was served on
was served on me and filed
me and filed on
on the
the very same day.
very same day. That
That was
was the first
the first
11
11
time she
time she had
had put
put aa dollar
dollar figure
figure with
with her sanctions request.
her sanctions request. Even
Even at
at that,
that, her submission itself
her submission itself
12
12
13
13 was insufficient
was insufficient notice
notice because her allegations
because her allegations included
included vague language to
vague language to which
which aa response
response
14
14 was not
was not possible. It was
possible. It was not
not possible for me
possible for me to
to write an extensive
write an extensive brief after II had
brief after submitted
had submitted
15
15
my opening
my opening trial
trial brief and then
brief and then saw
saw for
for the first time
the first Petitioner’s sanctions
time Petitioner’s sanctions allegations.
allegations.
16
16
31. Judge Zayner
31. Judge says in
Zayner says in the Order re:
the Order re: Respondent’s
Respondent’s Request for Modification
Request for of Child
Modification of Child
17
17
Support and
Support and Temporary
Temporary Spousal
Spousal Support,
Support, e.g.,
e. g., on
on p. 1, “Jeffery
p. 1, “Jeffery Frazier’s
Frazier’s request for order
request for order
18
18
19
19 for modification
for modification of
of child
child support
support came
came on
on for
for hearing…”
hearing...” II did
did not
not have
have aa request
request before
before the
the
20
20 Court for
Court for modification
modification of
of support.
support. My
My request of 11-13-12
request of 11-13-12 resulted in the
resulted in stipulation and
the stipulation and
21
21 order of
order of 01-03-13,
01-03-13, and
and after
after that
that II had
had no intention of
no intention of further
further pursuing it, as
pursuing it, as II told
told Judge
Judge
22
22
Zayner at
Zayner at the
the hearing of 05-20-13.
hearing of 05-20-13. II also
also indicated
indicated this
this in
in my
my MSC Statement (Exh.
MSC Statement (1%. A).
A).
23
23
Judge Zayner
Judge Zayner forced
forced that motion, which
that motion, which II did
did not support, into
not support, into trial and to
trial and to aa decision.
decision. II was
was
24
24
25
25
forced into
forced into litigation
litigation against
against my
my will, and the
will, and results could
the results could only
only go
go against
against my interests (there
my interests (there
26
26 was only
was only one
one direction
direction for
for support
support to go... up.
to go… up. And,
And, necessarily,
necessarily, the
the burden of proof
burden of proof would
would
27
27 shift to
shift to onto
onto me.)
me.) Moreover,
Moreover, II did
did not
not know
know Judge
Judge Zayner
Zayner was going to
was going do decide
to do decide that
that motion.
motion.
28
28
6-11—FL—005500
6
1 II did
did not
not have
have prior
prior notice of it.
notice of it. The
The dialog
dialog between Judge Zayner
between Judge and Attorney
Zayner and Ledgerwood
Attorney Ledgerwood
2 about her
about not filing
her not filing her
her own
own motion
motion but
but just “using what’s
just “using what’s there,”
there,” was confiising and
was confusing and
3
nonsensical. II have
nonsensical. have not seen it
not seen it in
in any
any US.
U.S. rules or law.
rules or law.
4
32. Prior
32. Prior to trial, Judge
to trial, Judge Zayner instructed the
Zayner instructed the parties
parties that certain information
that certain information did
did not
not need
need to
to be
be
5
submitted for
submitted for trial,
trial, such
such as
as current
current income
income and
and expense
expense declarations
declarations (note,
(note, the income and
the income and
6
7 expense declarations
expense declarations of
of both
both parties on file
parties on file at
at that
that time
time were outdated) and
were outdated) and Judicial
Judicial Council
Council
8 forms pertinent
forms to the
pertinent to the parties’
parties’ requests.
requests. He did not
He did give an
not give an explanation.
explanation. He
He rendered
rendered his
his
9
orders without
orders without the evidence they
the evidence they provide. Such instructions
provide. Such instructions were in conflict
were in conflict with
with Judge
Judge
10
10
Zayner’s written
Zayner’s written trial
trial policies given to
policies given to the
the parties
parties prior
prior to
to trial (E_xh. )_().
trial (Exh. X).
11
11
33. It
33. It turned out, Judge
turned out, Judge Zayner did need
Zayner did an updated
need an income and
updated income and expense
expense declaration
declaration from
from me.
me. He
He
12
12
13
13 points out aa few
points out few times
times in
in his orders of
his orders of 08-16-13,
08-16-13, my
my failure
failure to
to provide evidence to
provide evidence carry my
to carry my
14
14 burden in
burden in light
light of
of the
the new
new post-submission argument he
post-submission argument substituted for
he substituted for Petitioner’s
Petitioner’s position;
position;
15
15
and, in
and, in particular, that II did
particular, that did not
not provide important financial
provide important financial evidence,
evidence, that
that II would
would have
have
16
16
provided had he
provided had he not
not told
told the
the parties
parties that it did
that it did not
not need
need to
to be submitted.
be submitted.
17
17
34. II did
34. did not
not receive
receive prior
prior notice of Petitioner’s
notice of Petitioner’s new arguments and
new arguments and new
new allegations
allegations comprising
comprising
18
18
19
19 her false
her false statements
statements in,
in, and
and false
false documents
documents attached
attached to,
to, her opening trial
her opening trial brief submission
brief submission
20
20 relating to
relating to the $1.00 term
the $1.00 in the
term in listing agreement.
the listing agreement. (These
(These arguments/allegations
arguments/allegations are
are in
in sec.
sec. 5,
5,
21
21 which starts
which starts on
on p. 12, l.20
p.12, 1.20 of
of Petitioners’
Petitioners’ opening
opening trial
trial brief (E_xh. E).)
brief (Exh. E).) My lack of
My lack of actual
actual notice
notice
22
22
was not
was not caused
caused by any avoidance
by any avoidance of
of service
service of
of process or inexcusable
process or inexcusable neglect on my
neglect on my part. To
part. To
23
23
my knowledge,
my knowledge, notice and service
notice and service were
were not attempted.
not attempted.
24
24
25
25
35. II did
35. did not
not receive
receive service
service of
of Petitioner’s
Petitioner’s new arguments and
new arguments and new comprising her
allegations comprising
new allegations her
26
26 false statements
false statements in,
in, and
and false
false documents
documents attached
attached to,
her opening trial brief submission
brief submission
27
27 relating to
relating to the
the $1.00
$1.00 term in the
the listing agreement.
28
28
6-11—FL—005500
7
1 36. Judge
36. Judge Zayner
Zayner did
did not
not provide
provide me an opportunity
me an opportunity to
to respond
respond to
to Petitioner’s
Petitioner’s new arguments and
new arguments and
2 new allegations
new allegations comprising
comprising her
her false
false statements
statements in,
in, and
and false
false documents
documents attached
attached to,
to, her
her
3
opening trial
opening trial brief submission relating
brief submission to the
relating to the $1.00
$1.00 term in the
the listing agreement. He did not
He did not
4
call for
call for replies,
replies, nor
nor any
any other
other type of follow-up
type of follow-up filings.
filings.
5
37. Post-judgment,
37. Post—judgment, on
on multiple occasions, II communicated
multiple occasions, communicated with each of
with each of Petitioner
Petitioner and
and Attorney
Attorney
6
7 Ledgerwood about
Ledgerwood about the fact of
the fact of the false material
the false material in,
in, and
and attached
attached to,
to, Petitioner’s opening trial
Petitioner’s opening trial
8 brief, and
brief, and about
about Ms.
Ms. Ledgerwood’s
Ledgerwood’s duty
duty under
under the law to
the law inform the
to inform Court about
the Court about it,
it, and
and to ask
to ask
9
the Court,
the Court, or
or stipulate,
stipulate, that the orders
that the orders of
of 08-16-13
08-16-13 be set aside
be set aside because
because they
they relied
relied upon
upon her
her
10
10
misrepresentations. Ms.
misrepresentations. Ms. Ledgerwood
Ledgerwood steadfast
steadfast refilsed to comply
refused to comply with
with her duty under
her duty under the
the
11
11
law. (Datig
law. (Datig v.
v. Dove
Dove Books,
Books, Inc. (1999) 73
Inc. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th
Cal.App.4th 964,
964, 980-982
980-982 [counsel
[counsel had duty to
had duty to
12
12
13
13 disclose misrepresentation
disclose misrepresentation made
made to court and
to court and to stipulate to
to stipulate to vacate default judgment
vacate default judgment resulting
resulting
14
14 from misrepresentation].)
from misrepresentation].) Petitioner
Petitioner refused to respond.
refused to respond.
15
15
38. Since
38. Since II did
did not learn about,
not learn about, and
and had
had no
no way
way to learn about,
to learn about, Petitioner’s
Petitioner’s new argument and
new argument and
16
16
attachments until
attachments after II had
until after submitted my
had submitted my opening
opening trial
trial brief,
brief, II was not provided
was not an
provided an
17
17
opportunity to
opportunity to present the defense
present the defense of
of my
my case
case and
and to
to protect
protect myself from the
myself from fraud of
the fraud of
18
18
19
19 Petitioner, e.g.,
Petitioner, e.g., Petitioner’s
Petitioner’s lies
lies in,
in, and
and false
false documents
documents attached
attached to,
her opening trial brief.
brief.
20
20 39. From
39. From the
the time
time Judge
Judge Zayner
Zayner came
came onto
onto this case, as
this case, as with any judge,
with any judge, II considered
considered him
him aa
21
21 fiduciary and
fiduciary and had
had the
the utmost
utmost trust and confidence
trust and confidence in
in his integrity and
his integrity and fidelity.
fidelity. My
My trust and
trust and
22
22
confidence in
confidence in him,
him, however, steadily eroded
however, steadily eroded subsequent
subsequent to
to the
the hearing of 06-17-13,
hearing of 06-17-13, and
and
23
23
particularly
particularly beginning
beginning with
with his order of
his order of 06-19-13
06-19-13 that
that the family home
the family home be sold to
be sold to aa third
third party,
party,
24
24
25
25
whereby he
whereby he ignored
ignored the order of
the order of Judge Mills of
Judge Mills of 05-09-13
05-09-13 (Exh.
(E_Xh. T),
1), giving
giving me
me the
the right
right to
to buy
buy
26
26 the property
the at $1.00
property at $1.00 over the highest
over the open market
highest open market bid.
bid. Ultimately, the hearing
after the
Ultimately, after of 04-21-
hearing of 04-21-
27
27 14, where
14, where my second set-aside
my second set-aside motion
motion was denied and
was denied and II was
was rendered completely indigent,
rendered completely indigent,
28
28
6-11—FL—005500
8
1 among other
among other things,
things, II lost
lost faith
faith and
and became frightened of
became frightened of him. The psychological
him. The injury he
psychological injury he
2 caused me
caused me particularly caused me
particularly caused me to
to become of him.
frightened of
become frightened him.
3
40. As
40. As aa result
result of
of Judge
Judge Zayner’s
Zayner’s constructive
constructive amendment,
amendment, II suffered
suffered injury,
injury, e.g.,
e.g., including
including being
being
4
thrust into
thrust into an
an untenable legal position,
untenable legal e.g., by
position, e.g., by way of the
way of shift in
the shift in burden of proof,
burden of proof, putting
putting me
me
5
into aa position
into of unpreparedness
position of and suddenly
unpreparedness and suddenly facing
facing steep
steep financial
financial liability.
liability. II also
also suffered
suffered
6
7 the injury
the injury of
of aa breach of aa legal
breach of legal duty,
duty, e.g.,
e.g., the
the denial
denial of
of procedural due process,
procedural due in and
process, in and of
of
8 itself, because
itself, because II was not given
was not given notice, service, or
notice, service, or an
an opportunity
opportunity to
to respond.
respond.
9
41. II demonstrated
41. demonstrated that
that II had/have
had/have aa meritorious case/defense by
meritorious case/defense by way of my
way of my proposed
proposed reply
reply brief
brief.
10
10
“B” to
See, Exhibit “B” to my SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION
my SUPPLEMENTAL OF JEFFERY
DECLARATION OF JEFFERY FRAZIER and
FRAZIER and
11
11
MEMORANDUM OF
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS
POINTS AND
AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION TO SET
MOTION TO SET
12
12
13
13 ASIDE THE
ASIDE THE ORDERS
ORDERS OF
OF AUGUST 16, 2013
AUGUST 16, filed 04-14-14
2013 filed 04—14-14 (Exh.
(Q. O).
Q).
14
14 42. The
42. The constructive
constructive amendment
amendment to Petitioner’s opening
to Petitioner’s opening trial
trial brief
brief was
was not discovered, or
not discovered, or even
even
15
15
discoverable, by
discoverable, me until
by me until II received
received the orders of
the orders of 08-16-13
08-16-13 in
in the
the US.
U.S. Mail from the
Mail from Court.
the Court.
16
16
By then
By then it
it was too late
was too late to
to present
present aa defense
defense to
to the original action,
the original action, as
as II had already filed
had already filed my
my
17
17
opening trial
opening brief by
trial brief by then, and so
then, and so no
no longer
longer had control over
had control over it.
it.
18
18
19
19 43. II was
43. diligent in
was diligent in attacking
attacking the
the orders
orders once
once II discovered
discovered the default. For
the default. For example:
example:
20
20 ·0 II sought
sought reconsideration
reconsideration or
or in
in the alternative aa set-aside
the alternative set-aside of
of the orders of
the orders of 08-16-13
08-16—13 via
via my
my
21
21
MOTION FOR
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
RECONSIDERATION FOR TWO ORDERS
FOR TWO ORDERS ENTERED
ENTERED AUGUST 16,
AUGUST 16,
22
22
2003 AND
2003 AND ALTERNATIVELY
ALTERNATIVELY A SET ASIDE
A SET OF THE
ASIDE OF THE TWO
TWO ORDERS
ORDERS PURSUANT
PURSUANT
23
23
TO CAL
TO CAL CODE
CODE CIV
CIV PRO
PRO §473(b)
§473(b) filed
filed 08-29-13
08-29-13 (Exh.
(Eih. B)
P) (Denied);
24
24
25
25 ·o II filed
filed aa NOTICE OF APPEAL
NOTICE OF APPEAL re the orders
re the orders of
of 08-16-13
08-16-13 on
on 10-15-13
10-15-13 (Exh.
(Eih. Q)
Q) [[Appeal
Appeal
26
26 dismissed for
dismissed failure to
for failure file opening
to file opening brief, 07-23—14];
brief, 07-23-14];
27
27
28
28
6-11—FL—005500
9
1 ·o II sought
sought to
to have
have the
the orders
orders of
of 08-16-13
08-16-13 set-aside
set-aside by
by way of my
way of my NOTICE OF MOTION
NOTICE OF MOTION
2 AND MOTION
AND MOTION TO
TO SET
SET ASIDE
ASIDE UNDER CCP §
UNDER CCP § 473(b);
473(b); POINTS
POINTS AND
AND
3
AUTHORITIES; DECLARATION
AUTHORITIES; DECLARATION filed
filed 02-19-14
02-19-14 (Exh.
(Eih. R), and related
related
4
SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION
SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION OF
OF JEFFERY
JEFFERY FRAZIER and MEMORANDUM
FRAZIER and MEMORANDUM
5
POINTS AND
OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION
MOTION TO
TO SET
SET ASIDE THE
ASIDE THE
6
7 ORDERS OF
ORDERS OF AUGUST 16, 2013
AUGUST 16, 2013 filed
filed 04-14-14
04—14-14 (Exh.
(Bib. O)
Q) (Denied);
(Denied);
8 ·o In apparent
In apparent futility,
futility, as
as Judge
Judge Zayner never gave
Zayner never gave any
any indication
indication he
he was aware of
was aware of it,
it, II
9
sought to
sought to bring
bring problematic issues with
problematic issues the orders
with the orders of
of 08-16-13
08-16-13 to
to the Courts attention
the Courts attention with
with
10
10
my SUPPLEMENTAL
my SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION
DECLARATION OF
OF JEFFERY
JEFFERY FRAZIER and
FRAZIER and
11
11
MEMORANDUM OF
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS
POINTS AND
AND AUTHORITIES
AUTHORITIES AS TO WHY
AS TO WHY UNDER THE LAW
UNDER THE LAW
12
12
13
13 THE ORDERS
THE ORDERS OF
OF AUGUST 16, 2013
AUGUST 16, MUST BE
2013 MUST SET ASIDE
BE SET filed on
ASIDE filed on 09/27/2013
09/27/2013 (Exh.
(E_xh.
14
14 S), which
which included evidence; and,
15
15
·0 Again in
Again in apparent
apparent futility,
futility, as
as Judge
Judge Zayner
Zayner never gave any
never gave any indication
indication he
he was aware of
was aware it, II
of it,
16
16
sought to
sought to bring
bring problematic issues with
problematic issues the orders
with the orders of
of 08-16-13
08-16-13 to
to the Courts attention,
the Courts attention, and
and
17
17
submitted aa proposed
submitted proposed reply
reply to
to the orders of
the orders of 08-16-13,
08-16-13, via “B” to
Exhibit “B”
via Exhibit to my
my
18
18
19
19 SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION
SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION OF
OF JEFFERY
JEFFERY FRAZIER and MEMORANDUM
FRAZIER and MEMORANDUM
20
20 POINTS AND
OF POINTS
OF AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION
MOTION TO
TO SET
SET ASIDE THE
ASIDE THE
21
21
ORDERS OF
ORDERS OF AUGUST 16, 2013
AUGUST 16, 2013 filed
filed 04-14-2014
04-14-2014 (Exh.
(m. O),
O), which included evidence.
which included evidence.
22
22
44. Further,
44. Further, Judge
Judge Zayner
Zayner invariably
invariably ruled against me
ruled against me (except
(except for
for Petitioner’s
Petitioner’s request for random
request for random
23
23
drug testing
drug testing made
made in
in the BFA in
the BFA in 2014) since the
2014) since the hearing of 06-17-13.
hearing of 06-17-13. Judge
Judge Zayner
Zayner ruled
ruled
24
24
25
25 against me
against me on
on every
every submitted
submitted matter.
matter. II eventually
eventually succumbed
succumbed to
to the notion that
the notion success in
that success in
26
26 getting the
getting the orders
orders of
of 08-16-13
08-16-13 set
set aside
aside with Judge Zayner
with Judge as the
Zayner as decision maker
the decision maker was filtile.
was futile.
27
27
SIGNATURE ON
SIGNATURE ON JUDICIAL COUNCIL FORM
JUDICIAL COUNCIL FORM
28
28
6-11—FL—005500
10
Jeffery D. Frazier SBN 157792
239 Sequoia Avenue
Redwood City, California 94061
Telephone: (650) 275-2112
Ema11: [email protected]
Respondent in Pro Per
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA
In re the Marriage of: Case No.: 6-11-FL-005500

10
Petitioner: KATHLEEN KOSTAS (FRAZIER) §§§¥2§§§9;E¥1%1§3RN,ABnMOTIOI NI
11 HEODORE ZAYNER’S FACIALLY VOID
and RDERS OF AUGUST 16,2013 AND ALL
12 UBSEQUENT ORDERS BASED THEREOD 1;
Respondent: JEFFERY FRAZIER OINTS AND AUTHORITIES
13
Date: , 2015
14 Time: at
Dept: 82, Honorable Joshua Weinstein
15
TO PETITIONER KATHLEEN KOSTAS AND HER ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:
16
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT on , at , or as

17
18 soon afler that as the matter can be heard, in Dept. 82 of the above-entitled Court located at_605 West
19 El Camino Real, Sunnyvale, CA 94087, Respondent, Jeffery Frazier, will and does move the Court to
20
vacate and set aside the orders that were entered against him on August 16, 2013, as well as all
21
subsequent orders based thereon.
22
The Motion will be made under Code of Civil Procedure (CCP) §§473(d) and the Court’s
23
24 inherent powers in law and equity to set aside a judgment or order (i) that is void because it was
25 rendered in violation of Respondent’s due-process and fundamental-faimess rights under the US and
26
California Constitutions, and (ii) that was obtained through extrinsic fraud, mistake, accident, or duress on
27
the ground that there has been no fair adversary trial at law, and Respondent has a meritorious response.
28
FIRST NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO SET ASIDE AS VOID; POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
i
The Motion shall be based upon this notice; the attached Points and Authorities in support thereof;
the SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION OF JEFFERY FRAZIER and MEMORANDUM OF POINTS
AND AUTHORITIES AS TO WHY UNDER THE LAW THE ORDERS OF AUGUST 16. 2013 MUST
BE SET ASIDE filed 09—27—2013; the SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION OF JFFERY FRAZIER and
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SET ASIDE
THE ORDERS OF AUGUST 16, 2013 filed 04-14-2014 including specifically Exhibit B thereto, entitled
SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION OF JEFFERY FRAZIER and MEMORANDUM OF POINTS
AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO PETITIONER’S TRIAL BRIEF FILED MAY 20, 2013;
10 items byjudicial notice; the files and records ofthis case (including thejudgment roll [see CCP §
11
670(b)]), and the Exhibits attached thereto, attached hereto; and on such other and further oral and/or
12
documentary evidence as may be presented at the hearing on this Motion.
13
Respectfully submitted.
14
15
7A % Eé 2'4?
l6
Dated: July 20. 2015
17 Jeffery D. FrazieirRespondent in pro ber, SBN 157792
18
19
20
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
ii
CONTENTS
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Set Aside ............................... 1
Request .................................................................................................................................................. 1
Introduction and Factual Background .............................................................................................. 1
I. Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 1
II. Factual Background ................................................................................................................. 1
Points and Authorities ......................................................................................................................... 2
III. Due Process Concepts ........................................................................................................... 2
IV. Void Judgments and Orders ................................................................................................ 3
A. Statutory and Inherent Powers of Courts ............................................................................. 3
10 B. Test for Void ........................................................................................................................ 3
11
C. Legal Effect of Void Judgment or Order ............................................................................. 4
D. A judge may set aside a void order by anotherjudge .......................................................... 4
12
V. Although an oral hearing was waived, Respondent’s Constitutional right to respond
l3
and present evidence in rebuttal was not waived .......................................................................... 4
14
VI. The Orders of August 16, 2013 Are Void for Due Process Violations .............................. 5
15
A. The trial court failed to provide an opportunity to respond and thus violated Respondent’s
16 rights to due process....................................................................................................................... 5
17 B. The trial court’s admission of, and reliance upon Petitioner’s non-evidence, and its use of
18 odd, non-adversarial trial procedures violated Respondent’s rights to due process and
19 fundamental fairness. ..................................................................................................................... 7

VII. The Imputation of Income to Respondent was Improper ............................................ 12
20
A. The trial court made no findings that imputing income to Respondent would be in the
21
children's best interest so the imputation order and all orders based upon it are void. ................ 12
22
Conclusion........................................................................................................................................... 15
23
EXHIBIT LIST .................................................................................................................................. 16
24
25
26
27
28
i
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Set Aside
Request
Respondent asks that the Court set aside the orders of August I6, 2013, and permit him to answer
Petitioner’s submissions in connection with the orders.
Introduction and Factual Background
1. Introduction
This motion, presented by Respondent in Pro Per, Jeffery Frazier, brings grounds to the
attention of the trial court showing that the orders of 08-16-13 are void upon their face. It is
10
ll
requested that the Court act on this motion and set aside each of the void orders.
12 Petitioner, Kathleen Kostas (Frazier), is represented by attorneys Nedda Ledgerwood and
l3 Walter Hammon. The parties were married on April 8, 1995. Judgment/Dissolution was entered 04-
14
17-13. The parties have two daughters, Kalista (DOB 02-05-2002) and Lauren (DOB 02-29-2005).
15
I]. Factual Background
16 Petitioner commenced the action on January 26, 2011. Mandatory settlement conference
17
(MSC) statements were filed in early April 2013 by each party (Libits A [Respondent], 3
18
[Petitioner]), and opening trial briefs were filed and exchanged by the parties at the courthouse on
19
May 20, 2013 (Exh_ibits Q [Respondent], E [Petitioner]). Petitioner had sought to impute income to
20
21 Respondent with a declaration filed February 4, 2013 (E. 9), which was opposed by Respondent
22 on February 5, 2013 (E_xh. fl). Petitioner supplemented her request for imputation by a declaration
23
filed June 13, 2013 (E_xh. 1), which was opposed by Respondent on June 14, 2013 (m. 1). A hearing
24
on imputation was held June 17, 2013. Two sets of orders were issued on August 16, 2013 (m
25
K [Order Re: Respondent’s Request for Modification of Child Support and Temporary Spousal Support],
26
27
L [Findings and Order Re Attomey’s Fees and Costs]). The Court held in Petitioner’s favor and against
28 Respondent on each and every issue. One of the orders upwardly modified child support and
1
temporary spousal support in favor of Petitioner. That order also granted an imputation of income of
$225,000/yr. against Respondent. The other of the orders granted Petitioner attomey’s fees, costs,
and sanctions of $105,000. The orders are facially void.
Points and Authorities

111. Due Process Concepts
“Fairness of procedure is ‘due process in the primary sense.’ Brinkerhojf-Faris Co. v. Hill,
281 US. 673, 681 In a variety of situations the Court has enforced this requirement by checking
attempts of lower courts to disregard the deep-rooted demands of fair play enshrined in the
10 Constitution.” (Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath (1951) 341 US. 123, 161 [71 S.Ct.
11 624, 643, 95 L.Ed. 817, 848].) “‘The essentials of due process of law are a regular and orderly
12
procedure in a court of competent jurisdiction [citations] before an impartial judge [citations]; and
l3
the hearing must be fair [citation].’” (Redevelopment Agency v. Tobriner (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d
14
1087, 1095, quoting, State ofCal. ex rel. Dept. of Water Resources v. Natomas Co. (1966) 239
15
l6 Cal.App.2d 547, 558.) “"‘"[I]t is established that due process is absent if a party is denied the right to
17 have his cause tried and determined in accordance with the procedures that are applied in other cases
18
of like character. [Citations] [Due Process] implies the right not to be deprived of one's property or
19
liberty without evidence having been offered against him in accordance with the established rules
20
and the opportunity to present evidence in his own behalf. [Citations.]’" [Citation.]"” (Redevelopment
21
22 Agency v. Tobriner, supra, 215 Cal. App.3d at 1095, quoting In re Watson (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d
23 455, 461 .)
24
The US. Supreme Court case, ". .. Memphis Light demonstrates that notice of the procedures
25
for protecting one's property interests may be required when those procedures are arcane and not set
26
forth in documents accessible to the public..." (City of W. Covina v. Perkins (1999) 525 US. 234, 242
27
28
2
[119 S.Ct. 678, 682, 142 L.Ed.2d 636, 644], referencing Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division v.
Crafi‘ (1978) 436 US. 1, 98 S. Ct. 1554, 56 L. Ed. 2d 30.)
IV. Void Judgments and Orders

A. Statutory and Inherent Powers of Courts
Under Code Civ. Proc. (CCP) §473(d), a court may, on motion of either party, after notice to
the other party, set aside any void judgment or order. Apart from CCP § 473, courts historically have
inherent power at law to set aside a void judgment on the motion of a party, whether or not it is void
on its face (People v. One 1941 Chrysler Sedan, supra, 81 Cal. App.2d 18 at 21, 25.) “[A] trial court
generally retains the inherent power to vacate a default judgment or order on equitable grounds where
10
a party establishes that the judgment or order was void for lack of due process [citation] or resulted
11
12 from extrinsic fraud or mistake [citation].” (County ofSan Diego v. Gorham (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th
13 1215, 1228 [113 Cal.Rptr.3d 147].)

14
The court has equitable power to set aside a void judgment at any time. “‘It is well settled that
15
ajudgment or order which is void on its face, and which requires only an inspection of the judgment-
16
roll or record to show its invalidity, may be set aside on motion, at any time after its entry, by the
17
18 court which rendered the judgment or made the order. [Citations.]’ [Citations.]” (Reid v. Balter
19 (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1186, 1194 [18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 287].)

20
A motion for relief from a judgment or order void on its face may be sought at any time (see,
21
e.g., Nagel v. P & M Distributors, Inc. (1969) 273 Cal. App. 2d 176, 176, 179—180, 78 Cal. Rptr. 65.)
22
B. Test for Void
23 A judgment is void on its face when its invalidity appears from inspection of the record (Cruz
24
v. Fagor America, Inc. (2007) 146 CA4th 488, 496, 52 CR3d 862), otherwise known as the judgment
25
roll in the statute defining it [see CCP § 670(b)]. (County of Ventura v. Tillett (1982) 133 Cal. App.
26
3d 105, 112, 183 Cal. Rptr. 741, 745.) A judgment may also be void on its face when its invalidity
27
28 appears from the inspection of certain other papers on file in the case (See, e.g., Swain v. Swain
3
(1967) 250 CA2d 1, 10—1 1, 58 CR 83 [facts stated in domestic relations officer’s report that had been
filed in case].)
C. Ligal Effect of Void Judgment or Order

A “final" but void order can have no preclusive effect. "’A void judgment [or order] is, in
legal effect, no judgment. By it no rights are divested. From it no rights can be obtained. Being
worthless in itself, all proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars any
one.’ [Citation.]" (Bennett v. Wilson (1898) 122 Cal. 509, 513-514 [55 P. 390].)
D. A judge may set aside a void order by another judge

The law is hostile to "void orders" and such orders can be set aside at any time, by anyjudge. (See
10
People v. West Coast Shows, Inc. (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 462, 467 [explaining that a voidjudgment may
ll
be set aside "by ajudge other than the one who made it"]; Ross v. Murphy (I 952) l 13 Cal.App.2d 453,
l2
455 [holding that the court has statutory authority under Code Civ. Proc., § 473 as well as inherent
13
authority to set aside a void judgment or order of anotherjudge].)
14
15
V. Although an oral hearing was waived, Respondent’s Constitutional right
to respond and present evidence in rebuttal was not waived
16 The parties agreed to waive an oral hearing for the trial, but Respondent certainly did not
17 waive all usual modes of responding to new issues. In particular, Respondent did not waive his due
18
process rights to respond to new arguments and issues raised for the first time in Petitioner’s opening
19
brief at trial, and to present arguments and evidence in rebuttal.
20
"Waivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent
21
22 acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.
23 [citation]” (People v. D'Arcy (2010) 48 Cal.4th 257, 284 [106 Cal.Rptr.3d 459, 226 P.3d 949].)
24
"There is a presumption against the waiver of constitutional rights, see, e. g. Glasser v. United States,
25
314 US. 60, 70-71, and for a waiver to be effective it must be clearly established that there was an
26
'intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’ [citation] " (Brookhart v.
27
28
Janis (1966) 384 US. 1; 86 S.Ct. 1245; 16L.Ed.2d. 314.)
4
VI. The Orders of August 16, 2013 Are Void for Due Process Violations
“The constitutional right to due process, which includes the right to notice and an opportunity
to be heard... is a clearly established right, which any reasonable, competent public official
responsible for code enforcement would have known. [citation.]” (VIcek v. Chodkowski (Ct.App.)
2015-Ohio-l943, in 22.)
A. The trial court failed to provide an opportunity to respond and
thus violated Respondent’s rights to due process.
At trial in this case, presiding judge, Hon. Theodore C. Zayner, gave Respondent no
opportunity to respond to Petitioner’s opening trial brief with argument or to submit rebuttal
10 evidence. Judge Zayner did not call for reply briefs after receiving and reviewing the opening trial
11
briefs, which were exchanged and filed on the same day, 05-20-2013. The following transcript
12
excerpts show the manner in which the process for exchanging and submitting opening trial briefs
l3
and any follow-on submissions was determined/explained:
14
4-17-2013 Tr. p.11. II. 19-24. IExh. Ul

15
16 Re Trial Briefs - [briefs exchanged at 5/20 status conference]

MS. LEDGERWOOD: Or perhaps we just exchange at the status conference.
17 THE COURT: That would work as well.
MS. LEDGERWOOD: Okay. So, why don't we exchange at the status conference and file.
18
THE COURT: Okay. Okay. Thank you much.
19
5-20—2013 Tr. p. 12I II.25-28. |Exh. N|
20
Re Reply Briefs — [judge will accept reply briefs if he advises both sides]
21 THE COURT: I don't need, I don't think I need any replies. Let me put it this way, ifl feel in
reviewing them that there's, I would like some further filings, I will advise both sides.
22
However, notwithstanding the considerable amount of new allegations, argument, and attachments of
23
24 Petitioner’s opening trial brief, there was no word from the Court about fiirther filings from the date
25 of exchange/filing of the opening trial briefs, 05-20-13, to the date the orders issued, 08-16-13. In
26
between, the call Respondent expected from the Court to prepare and submit a reply, due to such new
27
material, never came. The trial was on the opening briefs, only.
28
5
After the orders issued on 08-16-13 (m E and L), and Respondent submitted his
AND AUTHORITIES AS TO WHY UNDER THE LAW THE ORDERS OF AUGUST 16, 2013
MUST BE SET ASIDE of 09/27/2013 (m. S), containing his objections and replies, nothing
occurred in the case to indicate that Judge Zayner ever considered it. The same can be said for
Respondent’s SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION OF JEFFERY FRAZIER and MEMORANDUM
OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE ORDERS OF
AUGUST 16, 2013 (m. Q), specifically exhibit B to that document, filed 04-14-2014 which
10
conveys much of the same subject matter as Respondent’s declaration of 09/27/2013 @. S). Judge
11
Zayner never gave any noticeable indication that he saw, heard, or acted on any of it. Respondent
12
13 was not heard in his attempts to bring issues with the orders of 08-16-13 before the Court, e.g., by
14 way of his declarations of 09-27-13 and 04-14-14.

15
“The opportunity to be heard necessarily includes the opportunity to respond, since one
16
cannot be heard unless one responds.” (Cumbre, Inc. v. State Comp. Ins. Fund (2010) 189
17
Cal.App.4th 1381, 1382 [117 Cal.Rptr.3d 582].) Further, “[t]he right to be heard must necessarily
18
19 embody a right to file motions and pleadings essential to present claims and raise relevant issues.
20 [citation.]” In re Buckley (1973) 10 Cal. 3d 237, 252, 514 P.2d 1201, 1211, 110 Cal. Rptr. 121, 131.
21
The Courts recognize a deprivation of due process where there is no opportunity to respond. (See,
22
e.g., Lesser v. Huntington Harbor Corp. (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 922 [219 Cal.Rptr. 562], and Annex
23
British Cars, Inc. v. Parker-Rhodes (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 788 [244 Cal.Rptr. 48].)
24
25
Respondent was denied an opportunity to respond to the new arguments, new issues, and new
26 attachments in Petitioner’s opening trial brief. For example, in her opening trial brief, at pp.11-14,
27 Petitioner sets out new allegations for which she sought the Court to sanction Respondent under
28
6
Family Code (FC) § 271. Following submission of his opening trial brief, Respondent was not given
an opportunity to file motions and pleadings, e.g., to submit rebuttal evidence, essential to presenting
his defenses, etc. This was directly contrary to Respondent’s reasonable expectations, as
exemplified, e.g., by a flowchart that the Riverside Superior Court distributes to the public describing
judicial civil trials as including an “answer” step following a “complaint” step (E_xh. 30. That is to
say, Respondent’s expectation was in line with the ubiquitous public perception that judicial civil
trials are adversarial, not one-sided as conducted here by Judge Zayner.
The denial of an opportunity to respond and to be heard violated the due-process rights of
10
Respondent. "A fundamental requirement of due process is "the opportunity to be heard." [citation]
ll
The trial court could have fully accorded this right to the petitioner only by granting his motion to
12
l3 set aside the decree and consider the case anew. Only that would have wiped the slate clean. Only
l4 that would have restored the petitioner to the position he would have occupied had due process of law
15
been accorded to him in the first place. His motion should have been granted." (Armstrong v. Manzo
16
(1965) 380 US. 545, 552 [85 S.Ct. 1187, 1191, 14 L.Ed.2d 62, 66-67].)
17
The orders of 08-16-13 are void and must be set aside.
18
B. The trial court’s admission of. and reliance upon Petitioner’s

19
non-evidence and its use of odd non-adversanal trial
20 procedures violated Respondent’s rights to due process and
fundamental fairness.
21 The material from sec. VI.A., supra, is pertinent here, as well.
22 “It is the right of every person, before he can be deprived of his property, to have a trial
23
according to law, to have the same character of trial, governed by the same established rules of
24
evidence and procedure as are applied in other cases under similar conditions.” (San Jose Ranch Co.
25
v. San Jose Land & Water C0. (1899) 126 Cal. 322, 326 [58 P. 824]; see, Ransome-Crummey Co. v.
26
27 Bennett (1918) 177 Cal. 560, 565, 171 P. 304, 306 [“[T]he law strongly favors the determination of
28 litigation upon the merits, and [] uniformity in the administration ofjustice is a fundamental right.”]
7
(emphasis added).) “California courts, too, retain flexibility to exercise historic inherent authority in
modern circumstances, fashioning procedures and remedies as necessary to protect litigants' rights.”
[citations.]” Stephen Slesinger, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co. (2007) 155 Cal. App. 4th 736, 762, 66 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 268, 288-289. (emphasis added.)
Respondent had a reasonable expectation that at trial in this case, after opening briefs were
submitted on 05-20-13, a reply brief would be solicited of him so that new subject matter in
Petitioner’s opening brief could be addressed. But Judge Zayner did not include an opportunity to
respond — among the most foundational aspects of due process — in his procedure. "Shortcuts around
10
constitutional and statutory requirements and other conditions of due process are unacceptable and
11
are not tolerated in any court by any judicial officer." (In re Michels (2003) 150 Wn.2d 159, 170 [75
12
13 P.3d 950, 955].)
14 In In re Marriage of Carlsson, as here, a truncated, non-standard trial procedure was devised
15
by the trial judge. The result was found to be unfair and not allowed to stand. (In re Marriage of
16
Carlsson (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 281 [77 Cal.Rptr.3d 305].) “The public has a right to expect that
17
trials will be conducted in an evenhanded and procedurally regular manner...’ [citation].)” Inquiry
18
19 Concerning McBrien, 49 Cal. 4th CJP Supp. 315, 326 (Cal. Comm. Jud. Perf. 2010).
20 With regards to the rules of evidence, the trial for this case was neither regular nor did it make
21
sense. Said the Supreme Court long ago, “[r]ules of evidence are adopted for practical purposes in
22
the administration ofj ustice; and must be so applied, as to promote the ends for which they are
23
designed.” (United States v. Reyburn (1832) 31 US. 352, 367 [8 L.Ed. 424, 430].)
24
25
Judge Zayner strayed far from the rules. Petitioner did not submit any admissible evidence
26 with her trial brief. Her trial brief was unswom and unverified. A verification is a declaration under
27 penalty of perjury that the complaint is true. Certain complaints must be verified, including all
28
8
pleadings filed under the Family Code (Fam. C. § 212.) The statute is imperative that the complaint
must be verified.
There was no declaration submitted with Petitioner’s opening trial submission. Petitioner’s
trial brief was entirely attorney argument. “The rule is established that unswom statements of
counsel not intended to be, and not amounting to, stipulations of fact do not constitute evidence
which may be considered by the trial court in making its findings of fact. [citation]” (Estate ofSilver
(1949) 92 Cal. App. 2d 173, 176, 206 P.2d 895, 897-898.) “[P]leadings are allegations, not evidence,
and do not suffice to satisfy a party's evidentiary burden. [citation] (Soderstedt v. CBIZ Southern
10
California, LLC (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 133, 154-155 [127 CaI.Rptr.3d 394].) The court carmot rely
11
on nonevidence, such as an attorney's unswom statements. (County ofAlameda v. Moore (1995) 33
12
13 Cal.App.4th 1422, 1427 [40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 18].)
14 As told by the results of the trial, Judge Zayner relied extensively upon Petitioner’s non-
15
evidence. For example, Judge Zayner relied upon Petitioner’s new, unverified, unproven allegations
16
for sanctions (Petr.Tr.Br. pp. 1 1-14; m. E), which consisted merely of attorney argument,
17
supplemented by several unswom attachments, many of which were counsel’s own self-serving,
18
19 unanswered email letters, that tended to prove nothing.
20 Respondent’s properly sworn declaration, on the other hand, was primafacie evidence of the
21
facts stated therein. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2009, 2011.) His declaration did not merely purport to
22
authenticate the attached exhibits, but also evidenced personal knowledge of the critical facts. The
23
facts stated in his declaration remain uncontroverted. Therefore, Respondent’s opening brief was
24
25
supported by competent, credible, and undisputed evidence. Yet, Judge Zayner gave Respondent’s
26 opening brief and evidence no credit whatsoever (See m. L, p.4.)
27
28
9
"The only evidence the trial court should have considered and which we may consider here is
that contained in the declarations filed in support of and in opposition to the motion. The matters set
forth in the unverified "Statement of Facts" and in memoranda of points and authorities are not
evidence and cannot provide the basis for the granting of the motion." (Smith, Smith & Kring v.
Superior Court (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 573, 578 [70 Cal.Rptr.2d 507].)
“[A] trial judge, when sitting as a trier of fact, routinely encounters inadmissible evidence.
He is expected and obliged to ignore that evidence and base his decision only on competent and
admissible evidence. [citations.]” (Gonzales v. Nork (1978) 20 Cal.3d 500, 510 [143 Cal.Rptr. 240,
10
573 P.2d 458].) “Stated another way, a trial court is presumed to ignore material it knows is
11
incompetent, irrelevant, or inadmissible. [citations.]” (In re Marriage ofDavenport (201 1) 194
12
13 Cal.App.4th 1507, 1526.) The orders of 08-16-13 are based upon inadmissible materials that should
14 have been ignored by the trial judge. When Petitioner’s nonevidence is ignored, there is no
15
substantial evidence upon which to base sufficient findings of fact to support the orders of 08-16-13.
l6
For example, Petitioner’s requests for fees and sanctions were not supported by evidence
17
sworn under penalty of perjury and should not have been granted. The absence of evidence
18
19 “disclosing the nature and extent of counsel's services” hampered the trial court's ability to make fact
20 findings. (In re Marriage ofCueva (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 290, 303 [149 Cal. Rptr. 918].) It could not
21
impose monetary liability based on speculation or on opposing counsel's unswom statements. (In re
22
Marriage ofReese & Guy (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 1214, 1222, fn. 5 [87 Cal.Rptr.2d 339].)
23
Petitioner provided only unverified, unswom attorney argument, submitted unswom invoices
24
25
from her attorney and accountant, and submitted an unswom spreadsheet in support of her request for
26 attorney’s fees and sanctions. Nothing that she provided in or with her opening trial brief was itself
27
28
10
properly verified or sworn under penalty of perjury. (See, e.g., Fam. C. § 212.) Yet, she was awarded
$75,000 in attorney’s fees and $30,000 in sanctions.
“Decision making is constrained by the evidence, by appropriate procedural rules, records and
legal principles.” (In re Hammermaster (1999) 139 Wn.2d 211, 234 [985 P.2d 924, 936], citing,
Deanell Reece Tacha, Independence ofthe Judiciaryfor the Third Century, 46 Mercer L. Rev. 645
(1995).) From the results, Judge Zayner admitted most, if not all, of Petitioner’s non—evidence and
relied upon it in his decisions according to his non-adversarial procedure.
“‘Where no evidence, or insufficient evidence, is introduced on an issue, the finding on that

10
issue should be against the party who has the burden of proof. A finding in his favor thereon cannot
ll
stand.’ (48 Cal.Jur.2d § 290, p. 292.)” (Calabrese v. Rexall Drug & Chemical Co. (1963) 218
12
13 Cal.App.2d 774, 785.) The improper admission or exclusion of evidence is an error in law. (See,
14 California Judges Benchbook: Civil Proceedings - After Trial, Second Edition (Cal CJER 2014),
15
p.126, § 2.66, citing, Richard v. Scott (1978) 79 Cal.App.3d 57 [144 Ca1.Rptr. 672].)
16
Had the proceedings been conducted with procedural regularity per Respondent’s right,
17
Petitioner could not have prevailed as she did as Respondent would have gotten the opportunity to
18
19 object to the admissions of Petitioner’s unswom attachments and attorney argument.
20 “Both the federal and the California Constitutions require certain procedure to ensure
21
reliability in the fact-finding process. [citations.]” (People v. Mincey, 2 Cal. 4th 408, 445, 827 P.2d
22
388, 410, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 822, 844 (Cal. 1992).) "The primary value promoted by due process in
23
factfinding procedures is "to minimize the risk of erroneous decisions." Greenholtz v. Inmates ofthe
24
25
Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 US. 1, 13, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 2107, 60 L. Ed. 2d 668
26 (1979). See also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 US. 319, 335, 96 S. Ct. 893, 903, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18
27 (1976)." "[I]n the context of a completely adversary proceeding, like a civil trial, due process
28
11
requires that 'the decisionmaker‘s conclusion . . . rest solely on the legal rules and evidence adduced
at the hearing.’ Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 US. 254, 271, 90 S. Ct. 1011, 1022, 25 L. Ed. 2d 287 (1970)."
1. The improper admission of Petitioner’s non-evidence

violated Res ondent’s due—process rights and rendered
the trial fund arnentallv unfair.
"This case presents one of those rare and unusual occasions where the admission of evidence
has violated federal due process and rendered the defendant's trial fundamentally unfair.” People v.
Albarran (2007) 149 Cal. App. 4th 214, 229, 57 Cal. Rptr. 3d 92, 104. Here, the admission of
Petitioner’s substantial amount of non-evidence and reliance upon it violated Respondent’s due-
process rights and rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. The orders of 08-16-13, therefore, are
10
11 void and must be set aside.
12 2. The lack of procedural regularity with the trial,

disallowing Respondent to enjoy his fundamental right
13 to uniforrnitv in the administration of iustice, denied him
due process.
14 With the “fundamental right” of “uniformity in the administration ofjustice” missing for
15
Respondent, the orders of 08-16-13 are void and must be set aside. (Ransome-Crummey Co. v.
16
Bennett, supra, 177 Cal. at 565.)
17
VII. The Imputation of Income to Respondgt was Improper
18
In the orders of August 16, 2013, the Court granted Petitioner child and spousal support based
19
on an imputed income to Respondent of $225,000 per year. The orders imputing income are void,
20
e.g., because the Court failed to make an express finding that imputing income to Respondent would
21
be in the best interests of the children.

22
23 A. The trial court made no findings that imputing income to

Respondent would be in the children's best interest so the
24 imputation order and all orders based upon it are void.
At the time of filing the opening trial briefs, on 05-20-13, Petitioner and Respondent shared
25
equal physical and legal custody of the children, Kalista (DOB 02-05-2002) and Lauren (DOB 07-29-
26
27 2005), as well as 50/50 equal timeshare. Respondent had been laid off from an executive-level
28 position as Vice President, Intellectual Property with Kateeva, Inc. on 10-08-12 (i.e., about six
12
months before trial) where he had been earning $225,000.00/year. The $225,000 per year income
imputation against Respondent was made retroactive to the day he was laid off, 10-08-12. From the
time of being laid off until the time of trial, Respondent was simultaneously working solo as a
registered patent attorney, while looking for full-time employment with a company. As Petitioner
pointed out in her initial SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION and POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN
SUPPORT OF IMPUTATION OF INCOME TO RESPONDENT of 02-04-1 3 (Exh. Q), "opportunity" is
not limited to working for someone else; the Court may also consider the parent's "opportunity" for self-
employment. (Marriage ofCohn (l 998) 65 CA 4th 923, 930.) The Court here did not do so.
10
In any event, the trial court made no explicit or implicit finding that imputing earning
11
capacity to Respondent would be in the children's best interest. Certainly, the use of outdated
12
financial information, as the Court used, since there were no current income and expense declarations
l3
14 on file and the Court said they were not needed, would have foiled the effort had the Court tried. No
15 authority permits a court to impute earning capacity to a parent unless doing so is in the best interest
16
of the children. By explicit statutory direction, the court's determination of earning capacity must be
17
"consistent with the best interest of the children." (Fam. Code § 4058, subd. (b); In re the Marriage of
18
David R. & Iris M. Fraser Cheriton, (2001) 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 755.)
19
20 In In re Marriage ofFicke, in the context of child support, the Court of Appeals held that the
21 trial court abused its discretion in imputing income to the mother without an express finding
22
supported by substantial evidence that the imputation of income would benefit the children. (In re
23
Marriage ofFicke (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 10, 13 [157 Cal.Rptr.3d 870].)
24
“'A judgment entered without findings where findings are required is a nullity . . .' [citation]”
25
26 (In re Marriage ofAbargil (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1294, 1301 [131 Cal.Rptr.2d 429]; see, Willis
27 Finance & Constr. Co. v. Porter (1928) 88 Cal.App. 523, 527 [A judgment absolutely void upon its
28
face is simply a nullity. . .].) A number of cases repeat the proposition that a judgment rendered
13
Jeffery D. Frazier SBN 157792 (ENDORSED)
14 Arastradero Road
Portola Valley, California 94028
Telephone: (650) 275-2112
Email: jeff@fi'azie1jd.com
/«'33 C 8 W3
S°1f'R°presented l'Jg~h',~; g;, :§, , ; i"}3§¥l§;,?é::}E“
EY S”°‘"’°'iiffifffT7.ii.ii":T3§FvW
“.7
Q.
summon counr or CALIFORNIA $0
COUNTY or SANTA CLARA '3»
In re the Maxfiage of; Case No.: 6-1 1-FL-005500
KATHLEEN FRAZER
10 Peguonerz Res ondent’s Mandato Settlement
an Eonference
11 Respondent: JEFFERY FRAZIER
Dept.: 82
12
13
14 Petitioner, Kathleen Frazier, is represented by attorney Nedda Ledgerwood (with

15 forensic accountant John Peth). Respondent, Jeffery Frazier, appearing in propria persona,
16
respectfully submits his Mandatory Settlement Conference Brief:
17
L STATISTICAL INFORMATION
18
Date of Marriage: April 8, 1995.
19
20 Date of Separation: September 20, 2009.

21 Length of Marriage: 14 years, 5 months.
22
Children: Kalista Frazier, born February 5, 2002, age 11; and,
23
Lauren Frazier, born July 29, 2005, age 7.
24
Petitioner's Information:
25
26 Age: 48
27 Occupation: Contracts Manager

28
Respondent’s Information:
PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT NO.
_ 1 _
RESPONDENT'S MSC BRIEF A-1
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
Age: 49
Occupation: Patent Attorney
II. SUMMARY OF CASE
Immediately prior to Petitioner’s initiating the current action, the parties had well over a half
million dollars in cash or cash equivalents in two brokerage accounts (Exhibits A and B). The parties
had an oral agreement that $200,000 of the Schwab family trust money would be reserved for the
children’s education. For reasons that will become apparent, due to choices by Petitioner, the parties
now have almost no cash / cash equivalents.

10
Petitioner hired an attorney who consistently used highly aggressive tactics with questionable
ll
foundations in an attempt to influence custody decisions, such as attempting to inflate a benign
12
13 domestic situation into a domestic violence case. Petitioner spent upwards of $20,000 on a
14 “professional, confidential consultant” whose purpose and expertise was never explained (Exh. C).
15
Petitioner, without Respondent’s knowledge or consent, transferred $200,000 from the Schwab
16
family trust account to a new bank account of which he also had no knowledge (Exh. D). Petitioner
17
then launched, with no advance discussion or notice of any kind, an ex parte restraining order request
18
19 with insufficient supporting facts (Exh. E); pursuit of a full CLETS restraining order lasting more
20 than 7 months, then dismissed with prejudice; unyielding vigorous contesting of custody lasting more
21
than 18 months; repeated exaggerations and mistruths used in a hurtful, taunting manner (e.g.,
22
Exhibits F and G); taking complete control over the children and withholding of visitation for greater
23
than 5 months. All the while, Petitioner refused to reasonably discuss any of the situation, including
24
25
settlement.
26 Petitioner tried to have Respondent jailed twice for domestic violence; however, the police
27 found no basis for the allegations and did not even make a report. In addition, the parties’ custody
28
_ 2 _
RESl?ONDENT’S MSC BRIEF
A-2
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
evaluator, Dr. Michael Kemer, “did not find domestic violence to have occurred in this family
system.” (Child Custody Evaluation Report RE FRAZIER, June 2, 2011, p. 6)
Facing potential loss of the children, and feeling the trauma the children were experiencing
while kept apart from their father, Respondent felt the stakes were too high not to spend money to
respond to Petitioner’s attacks. Adding further stress to the situation, Petitioner was on an unbridled
spending spree, topping $10,000 per month for many months (Exhibits C and H), and generating the
need for constant legal responses at crippling expense. Due to time constraints, Respondent
sometimes had to match her legal expenditures against claims he knew, and which have been shown
10
during the course of this litigation, to be meritless.
11
Respondent has paid $20,000 of Petitioner’s legal fees, with $10,000 being voluntarily paid
12
13 and $10,000 paid pursuant to an order of the Court, the latter ordered even though Respondent was at
14 the time unemployed and Petitioner was fully employed. Respondent was driven into self-
15
representation, while allowing Petitioner to make liberal use of her accountant and attorney, even
16
having her attorney generate plainly wasteful, frivolous work product. Respondent would certainly
17
prefer to have an attorney and accountant like Petitioner, but he carmot afford it as he has previously
18
19 shown. Petitioner’s attorney has already taken advantage of Respondent’s lack of knowledge in
20 family law and litigation, and Respondent is certain she will continue to do so.
21 On July 31, 2012, Respondent filed a motion against Petitioner where he seeks sanctions for
22
Petitioner’s uncooperative and unnecessary litigious conduct, and prevailing party attomey’s fees
23
related to the restraining order matter; and where he requests to modify downward any spousal
24
25
support as a sanction; requests reimbursement of the assets, including the aforementioned $200,000,
26 that Petitioner did not disclose and/or transferred in breach of her fiduciary duties; and requests that
27
28
_ 3 _
RESPONDENT'S MSC BRIEF
A-3
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
Petitioner’s papers relating to her restraining order request, and Respondent’s reply papers, be sealed.
This motion is set to be heard at trial.
At a hearing pertaining to choice of their youngest daughter’s school on August 22, 2012,
Petitioner finally stipulated to joint legal and joint physical custody of the minor children with a fifty-
fifty timeshare. Had she agreed to Respondent’s requests and done this from the beginning, the first
year and seven months of this case could have been greatly compressed and conducted for a tiny
fraction of the actual cost (Exh. I). With the most important issue, the children, settled, the parties
moved their focus to financial matters.

10
III. DISPUTES ABOUT STATISTICAL INFORMATION
ll
A. DATE OF SEPARATION
12
In 2009, the parties experienced marital problems. An agreement stipulating a date of
13
separation (namely, September 20, 2009) was reached and memorialized in an email exchange (Exh.
14
J).
15
16 California law recognizes email agreements as valid written contracts. Lamle v. Mattel, Inc.,
17 394 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir., 2005) [Applying CA law, appeals court held that oral discussions that were
18
summarized in an email could satisfy the statute of frauds requirement that key terms of an agreemenu
19
must be in writing to be enforceable. If plaintiff can show at trial that such was the case, then there
20
was an enforceable contract]. California law further provides for electronic signatures. California
21
22
adopted a version of the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UETA) (see CC §§l633.1-1633.17),
23 which provides for the enforceability of electronic contracts. CC § 1633.7 provides:
24 (a) A record or signature may not be denied legal effect or enforceability solely because it is
25
in electronic form.
26 (b) A contract may not be denied legal effect or enforceability solely because an electronic
record was used in its formation.
27
28
(c) If a law requires a record to be in writing, an electronic record satisfies the law.
_4_
RESPONDENT’S MSC BRIEF

A-4
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
(d) If a law requires a signature, an electronic signature satisfies the law. [Added by Stats.
1999, Ch. 428, Sec. 1. Effective January 1, 2000]
Here, Petitioner accepted the material term of the agreement (i.e., the date of separation being
September 20, 2009) by typing “OK” and further subscribed her note by pressing reply, which
process placed her name in the “FROM” line of her reply email. The comments to the UETA provide
that, “the mere inclusion of one's name as a part of an e-mail message” can qualify as an electronic
signature. (From Official Comment 7 to Section 2.)
The parties then went forward with marriage counseling, which they would not have but for
10 their agreement regarding the date of separation. This further evidences the acceptance by both
11 parties of September 20, 2009 as the stipulated date of separation. "A voluntary acceptance of the
12
benefit of a transaction is equivalent to a consent to all the obligations arising from it, so far as the
13
facts are known, or ought to be known, to the person accepting." See Melchior v New Line Prods.,
14
Inc. (2003) 106 CA4th 779, 131 CR2d 347; Norcal Mut. Ins. Co. v Newton (2000) 84 CA4th 64, 100
15
16 CR2d 683. It is clear under California law that an offer may be accepted by conduct on the part of an
17 offeree as well as by the offeree's words. See Windsor Mills, Inc. v Collins & Aikman Corp. (1972)
18
25 CA3d 987, 992, 101 CR 347; Russell v. Union Oil Co. (1970) 7 CA3d 110, 114, 86 CR 424.
19
Once the parties have agreed on the essential terms of an agreement in writing, there is a
20
contract even though they may still intend that a formal writing will be executed later. Harris v.
21
22
Rudin, Richman & Appel, 74 Cal.App.4th 299, 308, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 822 (1999); see also Smissaert v.
23 Chiodo, 163 Cal.App.2d 827, 831, 330 P.2d 98 (1958) (where writing shows “no more than an intent
24
to further reduce the informal writing to a more formal one,” failure to follow with more formal
25
writing does not negate existence of prior contract).
26
In general, whether a writing (or an oral agreement) constitutes a final agreement or merely an
27
28
agreement to make a further agreement depends on the parties’ intent. In the absence of ambiguity,
-5-

Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
the parties’ intent is determined by construction of the writing (or the parties‘ words) as a whole, and
the court's interpretation is governed by the parties’ objective intent as evidenced by their words, and
not their subjective intent. Elyaoudayan v Hoffman (2003) 104 CA4th 1421, 1430, 129 CR2d 41;
Beck v American Health Group Int'l, Inc. (1989) 211 CA3d 1555, 1562, 260 CR 237. Here,
Petitioner’s agreement to the stipulated date of separation is evidenced by her reply. That she also
agreed to obtain a more formal writing that would include that specific date does not negate her
agreement with the material tenn of September 20, 2009 as the date of separation.
In a further agreement prepared by Petitioner in September 2010 (Exh. K), she again set out
10
September 20, 2009 as a critical date. Particularly, Exh. K is a draft “Postnuptial Agreement” where,
11
in section III, Petitioner states that all earnings, salary, wages, bonuses or commissions received or
12
13 earned after September 20, 2009 shall be the separate property of each party. Once the parties agreed
14 on this essential term of the agreement in writing, there was a contract even though they may still
15
have intended that a more formal writing would be executed later. Harris v. Rudin, Richman &
16
Appel, 74 Cal.App.4th 299, 308, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 822 (1999); see also Smissaert v. Chiodo, 163
17
Cal.App.2d 827, 831, 330 P.2d 98 (1958).
18
19
Typically to make a contract valid, consideration is required. However, pursuant to California
20 Family Code §850, no consideration is required to make a valid transmutation agreement.

21
California courts have held that a contract may be "in writing" (and within the four-year
22
statute of limitations) even though it was accepted orally or by an act other than signing. Amen v.
23
Merced County Title Co., 58 Cal. 2d 528 (1962); E.O.C. Ord, Inc. v. Kovakovich (1988) 200 Cal.
24
25
App. 3d 1194 [246 Cal. Rptr. 456]. In Amen, acceptance was shown where defendant prepared the
26 written agreement and unequivocally expressed its consent. (Amen, supra, 58 Cal.2d at p. 532.) In
27 E. 0. C. Ord, acceptance was shown where the party to be charged received a copy of the written
28
_ 6 _
A-6
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
agreement and then orally accepted its terms. (E. 0. C. Ord, supra, 200 Cal.App.3d at p. 1202.)
Whatever the manner of acceptance, the conduct of the party must be sufficient to be deemed an
acceptance of the terms of the writing itself. Here, in addition to preparing the postnuptial agreement,
Petitioner clearly told Respondent that she accepted September 20, 2009 as the date of separation.
In view of either or both of the above agreements, Respondent requests that the Court find a
date of separation of September 20, 2009.
B. LENGTH OF MARRIAGE
As a result of disagreement over the date of separation, the parties’ calculation regarding the
10 length of their marriage differs. Respondent calculates the marriage at 14 years, 5 months. Unless she
ll has changed her mind again, Petitioner’s date of separation is October 1, 2010, which leads to a
12
calculated length of marriage of 15 years, 5 months.
13
IV. SETTLED ISSUES
14
A. CHILD CUSTODY:
15
16 At the hearing on August 22, 2012, both parties stipulated to joint legal andjoint physical
17 custody of the minor children and a fifty-fifty timeshare. A copy of the stipulation is attached as
18
Exhibit L.
19
Respondent agrees with the current custody and timeshare stipulation.
20
B. SUPPORT:
21
22
At the hearing of January 3, 2013, the parties agreed that neither would pay spousal or child
23 support to the other.
24 Respondent agrees with the current support stipulation.

25
V. DISPUTED ISSUES
26
A. DIVISION OF PROPERTY
27
1. PERSONAL PROPERTY
28
_ 7 _
A-7
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
a) The Approximately $300,000 Severance Disbursement
Section 852(a) of the Family Code provides:
A transmutation of real or personal property is not valid unless made in writing by an
express declaration that is made, joined in, consented to, or accepted by the spouse
whose interest in the property is adversely affected.
Here, the express declaration was made in the Postnuptial Agreement prepared by Petitioner,
wherein she listed and marked as “Separate” the following “Property Type”:
Any award or settlement received as a result of a lawsuit or other court proceeding

10
before the execution of the Agreement (i.e., The severance disbursement from LIFE
ll
Technologies — net approx $300K) (Exh. K; See section III.A.7).
12
13
There is no known requirement that the writing needs to be signed. Nevertheless, once the
14
parties reduced this essential term of the agreement to writing, there was a contract even though they
15
16 may still have intended that a more formal writing would be executed later. Harris v. Rudin, Richman
17 & Appel, 74 Cal.App.4th 299, 308, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 822 (1999); see also Smissaert v. Chiodo, 163
18
Cal.App.2d 827, 831, 330 P.2d 98 (195 8). The non-signing party's acceptance of the contract is
19
established by facts and circumstances other than that party's signature. California Law of Contracts,
20
4 Contract Formation: Offer and Acceptance, Formalities, Electronic Contracting, §4.40 B.
21
22
Signatures. California courts have held that a contract may be "in writing" (and within the four-year
23 statute of limitations) even though it was accepted orally or by an act other than signing. Amen v.
24 Merced County Title Co., 58 Cal. 2d 528; E.O.C. Ord, Inc. v. Kovakovich (1988) 200 Cal. App. 3d
25
1194 [246 Cal. Rptr. 456]. In Amen, acceptance was shown where defendant prepared the written
26
agreement and unequivocally expressed its consent. (Amen, supra, 58 Cal.2d at p. 532.) In E. 0. C.
27
0rd, acceptance was shown where the party to be charged received a copy of the written agreement
28
_ 8 _
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
and then orally accepted its terms. (E. 0. C. 0rd, supra, 200 Cal.App.3d at p. 1202.) Whatever the
manner of acceptance, the conduct of the party must be sufficient to be deemed an acceptance of the
terms of the writing itself. Here, in addition to preparing the postnuptial agreement, Petitioner
repeatedly told Respondent that she accepted the term providing Respondent with the severance
payment (Exh. M) as his separate property.
B. SPOUSAL SUPPORT
Petitioner claims that for the period from her last known claimed date of separation (10/ 1/10)
through the date on which she took the children into hiding (incorrectly, Petitioner states this date as
10
1/31/11, when it is actually about 1/27/11), Respondent should have been paying support. Petitioner
11
argues that Respondent should pay over $32,000 in Petitioner’s pre-filing expenses as “equitable”
12
13 support.
14 Respondent has not been able to find any authority for the concept of “equitable” support as
15
put forward by Petitioner. The Court has no jurisdiction to award support for any time prior to the
16
date on which Petitioner first formally requested it.
17
Moreover, Petitioner is requesting “equitable” support for months while Respondent was
18
19 unemployed, yet at an amount approximately equal to that paid when he was fully employed.
20 Respondent was not employed as of October 1, 2010 and did not collect a paycheck until about mid-
21
December 2010. Respondent owes nothing to Petitioner during his months of unemployment, and
22
certainly not an amount equal to the amount he paid while fully employed.
23
Further, Respondent was fully supporting Petitioner during the short period between when he
24
25
collected his first paycheck in mid-December 2010 and Respondent’s filing of this action on January
26 26, 2011. Petitioner remained in the family home, for which Respondent paid all living expenses.
27 How then can she possibly expect to collect, according to an equitable theory, an amount of money
28
_ 9 _
A-9
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
equal to the full amount she received as guideline support after filing? In fact, Petitioner is asking to
have “equitable” support benefit her in the full amount of guideline support ph1_s the amount of
money that Respondent spent supporting her after he was paid by his new job until the filing of this
action. In essence, she is asking for double support for that period. Out of fairness, Petitioner should
not be permitted to have such double support.
Still further, Petitioner is trying to collect double support for a portion of late January 2011.
She is claiming that “equitable” support is owed for dates after she filed for divorce. As a matter of
fairness, Petitioner should not be permitted to collect both guideline support and “equitable” support
10
for the same time period.
11
C. 2009-2010 REIMBURSEMENTS OWED RESPONDENT
12
13 Respondent requests reimbursement of his 2009 and 2010 expenses ($36,751 and $25,479,
14 respectively), attached as Exh. N. To date, Petitioner has refused to pay these reimbursements stating
15
that the parties were married. It is bizarre that Petitioner would seek to collect “equitable” support for
16
the portion of 2010 that she asserts the parties were separated, yet she refuses to recognize
17
Respondent’s reimbursement requests for that same time period stating the parties were married. In
18
19 any event, given the date of separation is September 20, 2009, and Respondent used his separate
20 property funds to pay community expenses from that date up until 2011 (for which year Petitioner
21
has agreed to pay reimbursements), reimbursements are owed for that period. In re Marriage of
22
Epstein (1979) 24 Cal.3d 76.
23
D. PERSONAL PROPERTY DIVISION
24
25
1. Bank Accounts
26 The bank accounts should be valued as of the date of separation, September 20, 2009.
27
28
_ 10 _
RESPONDENT'S MSC BRIEF
A-10
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
2. Sale of Cessna and division of accounts related to the airplane
Petitioner requests orders to sell the parties’ 2002 Cessna Skyhawk.
On average, the income of Looking Up LLC (the airplane rental business) has been enough to
cover the business’ expenses. Thus, any complaints by Petitioner that she carmot afford the airplane
and its maintenance are bogus. It is essentially costless to keep the airplane, but it is not costless to
sell it. The parties’ accountant has described how a sale of the airplane will result in a loss due to
taxes. The parties’ accountant states that it could cost $3 7,000 if the airplane were sold for $100,000
10
due to an accelerated depreciation recapture.
11
Additionally, the airplane has sentimental value for Respondent. It is the airplane in which he
12
13 earned both his private pilot's license and his instrument rating.
14 Respondent requests that Petitioner's request for orders to sell the airplane be denied. Should
15
Petitioner continue in her refusal to reasonably settle the issue, it is requested that the Court order her
16
to transfer her ownership interest to Respondent using a value equal to that which a private party
17
would obtain. Further, since a sale would involve a loss, it is requested that Petitioner be ordered to
18
19
reimburse Looking Up LLC for one-half of that loss (as Respondent will realize the full loss upon
20 disposition of the airplane).

21
3. Patent
22
The patent co—owned by Petitioner and Respondent should be governed by the patent laws of
23
the United States. The parties should be equally liable for post-grant expenses, including maintenance
24
25
fees. If a party fails to timely contribute to a maintenance fee due, then they should forfeit their
26 ownership in the patent.
27 E. REAL PROPERTY
28
_ 11 _
RESPONDENT’S MSC BRIEF A-11
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
1. Sale of the Family Residence
Petitioner has sought to have the family home sold.
Respondent wishes to remain in the family home for the benefit of the children. Kalista (11-
year-old) has said of her birth home on more than one occasion, “I love this place!” Respondent is
also deeply attached to the family residence —— his home of almost 11 ‘/2 years and the first home he
has owned.
VI. OTHER ISSUES
A. CUSTODY EVALUATION FEES AND COSTS [024]

10
Visitation could have been worked out early in this litigation. But Petitioner had other plans,
11
and took visitation into her own hands. With her newly minted restraining order, Petitioner suddenly
12
13 cut off all communication between the children and their father, yanking the children from their birth
14 home and taking them into hiding. When communication resumed some weeks later, Respondent
15
was put in the position of begging to see his small daughters as a favor to be granted or withheld at
16
the uncontrolled discretion of the Petitioner. In Petitioner’s hands, the restraining orders of the Court
17
became substantially equivalent to a complete termination of rights of visitation. Messer v. Messer
18
19 259 Cal. App. 2d 507 (1968).
20 Petitioner dragged this matter to a place where an evaluator was needed. But for Petitioner’s
21
defiant behavior, ignoring the order of the Court to settle the visitation issue, the cost of the
22
evaluation would have been dramatically less. In view of Petitioner’s misuse of the restraining orders
23
in using them to effectively terminate Respondent’s rights of visitation, and her refusal to negotiate in
24
25
good faith to resolve the visitation issue, Respondent request that the Court make Petitioner bear the
26 all costs of the custody evaluation.
27
28
_ 12 _
RESPONDENT’S MSC BRIEF A-12
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing
is true and correct.
Dated: /;A\‘Dr\\ 8,, 90\7>

\
( fix"?
Jeiffie/ry Fr§’zier, Petitioner, l’n Pro Per SBN 157792
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
- 13 _
A-13
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
Jeffery D. Frazier
Jeffery D. Frazier SBN
SBN 157792
157792
14 Arastradero
14 Road
Arastradero Road
Portola Valley,
Portola Valley, California
California 94028
94028
Telephone: (650)
Teleehone: (650) 275-2112
275-2112
Email: [email protected]
Self-Represented
Self-Represented
SUPERIOR COURT
SUPERIOR COURT OF
OF CALIFORNIA
CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF
COUNTY OF SANT
SANTA CLARA
A CLARA
In re
In re the
the Marriage
Marriage of:
of: Case No.:
Case No.: 6-l 1-FL-005500
6-1 l-FL-005500
Petitioner: KATHLEEN
Petitioner: KATHLEEN FRAZIER
FRAZIER Respondent's Mandatog Settlement
Resgondent’s Mandatory
SC Statement
Conference (MSC)
and
and
Dept.: 82
Dept.: 82
Respondent: JEFFERY
Respondent: JEFFERY FRAZIER
FRAZIER
Exhibit
Exhibit
A Schwab statement
Schwab statement
B Fidelity statement
Fidelity statement
c Declaration of
Declaration of Rebekah
Rebekah Frye
Frye
U0
D Schwab Statement
Schwab Statement
E Restraining order
Restraining order
F
'11 R. Frye
R. Frye communication
communication
G R. Frye
R. Frye communication
communication
H Declaration of
Declaration of Nedda
Nedda Ledgerwood
Ledgerwood
-21:53 Declaration of
Declaration of Natalie
Natalie Daprile
Daprile
J DOS Email
DOS Email
K Postnuptial agreement
Postnuptial agreement
L Stipulation and
Stipulation and Order
Order
M Severance pay
Severance pay stub
stub
N Respondent's reimbursement
Respondent's reimbursement requests
requests
A-14
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
Nedda A. Ledgerwood SBN 224886
LAW OFFICE OF NEDDA A. LEDGERWOOD
438 South Murphy Avenue
2 Sunnyvale, CA 94086
408.730.0333 (T)
3 408.732.0709 (F)
[email protected]
4
5 Attorney for KATHLEEN FRAZIER APR o 1l 20':3

6 D/WID H. YNN3AKI
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNlkhief Exod•:t.ivs OHioor/Clorl<
Superior Court of CA, County Df Santa Clara
7 D!SPUTY
COUNTY OF SANTA CLAifZk==·=~··=·"~"'"'~~,=···
8
9 Case No. 6-11-FL-005500

In re Marriage of:
10
KATHLEEN FRAZIER
11 PETITIONER'S MANDATORY
Petitioner, SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE STATEMENT
12 PURSUANT TO SANTA CLARA COUNTY
and FAMILY LAW LOCAL RULE 6(F)(3)
13
JEFFREY FRAZIER
14
Respondent HON. THEODORE ZA YNER
15 DEPT. 82
16
17
ISSUES
18
1. The identification, division, and allocation of the parties' community property assets and debts,
19
as well as other reimbursement claims and credits;
20
2. Date of separation;
21
3. Attorneys' fees and costs;
22
4. Family Code §271 sanctions.
23
PETITIONER'S POSITION
24
1. The Court shall grant Petitioner Kathleen Frazier's (hereinafter Wife) requests regarding
25
property division, reimbursements, and credits, as delineated in the attached spreadsheets and
26
below.
27
2. The Court shall grant Wife's request that the date of separation be deemed October 1, 2010.
28
Jn re Marriage of FRAZIER
Case #6-1 !-FL-005500
B-1 1
PETITIONER'S MANDA TORY SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE STATEMENT Case Number

6-11-FL-005500
3. The Court shall award attorney's fees and costs to Wife in the amount requested.
2 4. The Court shall deny Respondent Jeffrey Frazier's (hereinafter Husband) request for sanctions
3 against Wife, and shall grant Wife's request for sanctions against Husband.
4 STATEMENT OF FACTS
5 Kathleen Frazier m1d Jeffrey Frazier married on April 8, 1995 and separated on October 1, 2010.
6 They were married for 15 years and 6 months.
7 They have two children of the marriage: Kalista, age 10, and Lauren, age 7. The parties hav
s previously filed a Stipulation and Order on January 3, 2013, regarding child custody and visitation, chi!
9 support, and spousal support, and such issues are therefore not before the court for purposes of this trial.
10 The parties' community estate, including a family residence and retirement accounts, i
11 approximately $1.2 million dollars, inclusive of all outstanding debts or encumbrances.
12 ISSUES FOR TRIAL
13 I. PROPERTY DIVISION
14 Wife requests the Court order the community assets of the parties' be identified, characterized,
15 and divided in the manner outlined in the attached spreadsheets and as shown in the next paragraph
16 (*NOTE: Petitioner reserves the right to amend said spreadsheet upon receipt of further evidence). She
17 is asking the Court apply basic community property principles in dividing their assets, with an
18 equalizing payment incorporated to accomplish a fair and equal division of the parties' community
19 assets. Wife requests that the community assets be divided as follows:
20 a) Bank Accounts: Wife requests the divisions listed in Page 1 of the attached spreadsheet.
21 b) Stocks and Securities: Wife requests the divisions listed in Page 1 of the attached
22 spreadsheet.
23 c) Real Estate: With the exceptions noted below, Wife requests the divisions listed in Page 1 of
24 the attached spreadsheet.
25 d) Personal Property: With the exceptions noted below, Wife requests the divisions listed in
26 Page 2 of the attached spreadsheet.
27 e) Other Assets: Wife requests the divisions listed in Page 2 of the attached spreadsheet.
28 .
In re Marriage of FRAZIER B-2 2

Case #6-11-FL-005500
Case Number
PETITIONER'S MANDATORY SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE STATEMENT
6-11-FL-005500
f) Retirement Acconnts: Wife requests the divisions listed in Page 3 of the attached
2 spreadsheet.
3 Not included in the attached spreadsheets are appraisal documents for the following assets:
4 Real property located at 14 Arastradero Road, Portola Valley, CA: Wife requests the
5 Court order the property sold, and the net proceeds divided equally between the parties.
6 2002 Cessna 1725 Airplane: Wife requests the Court order the property sold and the net
7 proceeds divided equally between the parties. The bank account associated with the Cessna
s shall also be divided equally.
9 Wife requests her separate property claims be awarded to her, and that Husband's separate
10 property claims that she stipulates to be awarded to him. Wife also requests that her reimbursement
11 claims and credits, as outlined in Pages 2 and 3 of the attached spreadsheet, be ordered as well.
12 Spreadsheets evidencing her separate property and reimbursement claims and credits are attached.
13 Both parties have submitted their Final Declarations of Disclosure on or near October 1, 2012, to
14 which all current appraisals, with the exceptions noted above, and updated account statements were
15 attached. The statements attached to Wife's Final Declaration of Disclosure shall be incorporated herein
16 by reference.
17 IL DATE OF SEPARATION
18 Wife request the Court find the parties' date of separation as October 1, 2010 for the purpose of
19 dividing the parties' community property assets and debts, and reimbursement claims and credits. On
20 September 9, 2010, Wife told Husband during a counseling session that she wanted to separate from
21 him. However, the parties continued to live at the same residence, carried finances the same, and even
22 attended a holiday party hosted by Husband's employer in December 2010, where the parties arrived as
23 a family with their children with their wedding rings on.
24 Pursuant to Family Code §771, the parties must establish that they are living separate and apart.
25 Sleeping in separate bedrooms, no longer having sex, seeing an attorney, or working on a draft
26 separation agreement are not substantial enough to meet the legal requirement. Because the parties were
27 living in the same home, carried on the same financially, and attended Husband's work event in
28 December 2010 as a family with their wedding rings on, the parties had not yet met the legal standard of
In re Marriage of FRAZIER
Case #6-Jl-FL-005500
B-3 3
PETITIONER'S MANDATORY SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE STATEMENT Case Number

6-11-FL-005500
living separate and apart as of December 2010. That standard was met after the holiday party, and more
2 accurately, once Wife was granted leave from the family residence with the minor children.
3 However, Wife requests that the date of separation be deemed October 1, 2010, given the events
4 that occurred following her statement of intention to Husband that she wished to separate. As Wife
5 decided the marriage was over by the end of September, and clearly expressed her decision to Husband,
6 the effect date of separation was October 1, 2010.
7 III.ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS
8 Wife requests the Court order Husband to pay attorney's fees and costs in the amount of
9 $50,000. This amount has been incorporated into Wife's reimbursement claims and credits as listed in
1o Pages 2 and 3 of the attached spreadsheet.
11 IV. FAMILY CODE §271 SANCTIONS
12 Wife requests that Husband's request for Family Code §271 sanctions be denied in its entirety.
13 On July 31, 2012, Husband filed a motion requesting sanctions in the amount of $80,000 against Wife.
14 Husband claimed that Wife filed a baseless ex-parte request for a restraining order in 2011, and did not
15 act in good faith during negotiations between the parties regarding visitation of the parties' children,
16 thus resulting in Husband losing significant visitation time with his children during the year 2011.
17 However, Husband failed to acknowledge that Wife's request for a restraining order was due to her
18 substantial fear that Husband posed a significant threat to the entire family. Husband's behavior at the
19 time of Wife's filing was erratic, unpredictable, and dangerous, and reminiscent of behavior he
20 previously had exhibited while using drugs. As a result, Wife was afraid for both her life and the
21 wellbeing of her children, and did have reasonable grounds for filing her ex-parte request, despite
22 Husband's assertions that it was entirely baseless. In addition, Wife did not unilaterally bar Husband
23 from having regular visits with the children. Husband himself did not make any significant efforts to
24 work with Wife to establish a mutually agreeable visitation schedule - another fact that he wishes to
25 deny by now placing the entire blame on Wife.
26 Wife requests that the Court instead impose sanctions against Husband on the grounds that
27 Husband's request is in itself a clear attempt to frustrate settlement and amicable negotiation. Wife asks
28 the Court to note that Husband waited more than 1 and Yz years after Wife's ex-parte request was filed
Case #6-11-FL-005500
B-4 4
PETITIONER'S MANDATORY SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE STATEMENT Case Number

6-11-FL-005500
and granted before even bringing his request for sanctions, indicating Husband's intent to stall or delay
2 any attempts to settle more pressing issues by placing focus on events in the past. Husband has .also
3 repeatedly refused to negotiate or make any attempts to discuss settlement, but instead proceeded to file
4 ex-parte motions and requests of his own, thus forcing the parties to litigate every issue. It is Husband,
s not Wife, who has impeded the settlement process, and he therefore should be subject to Family Code
6 271 sanctions.
7 CONCLUSION
8 Wife respectfully asks the Court grant her requests above.
JO
DATED: 4/2/2013
11
NEDDA A. LEDGERWOOD
12 Attorney for Petitioner
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
B-5 5
Case Number
B-5
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
Case #6-11-FL-005500
PETITIONER'S MANDA TORY SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE STATEMENT 6-11-FL-005500
MARRIAGE OF FRAZIER
ASSET DIVISION WORKSHEET
LINE# DESCRIPTION DATE VALUE CPVALUE HUSBAND WIFE COMMENTS
l BANK ACCOUNTS
2 CHASE ACCT 4485 (HUSBAN-rl) 10/l/2010 $0 $0 $0 EXHIBIT l (OPENED AFTER DOS)
3 WELLS FARGO 6273 (HUSBAND BUS) 10/1/2010 $10,097 $10,097 $10,097 EXHIBIT2
4 WELLS FARGO 2095 (HUSBAND BUS) 10118/2010 $474 $474 $474 EXHIBIT 3
EXHffiIT4.l - CURRENTBANKSTATEMENT
5 WELLS FARGO 9840 (LOOKING UP LLC) 113 l/2013 $19,893 $19,893 $19,893 EXHIBIT 4.2 - BANK ACTIVITY HISTORY
EXHIBIT 4.3 - DIAMOND AVIATION ANALYSIS 6/12 ~ 1113
6 WELLS FARGO 7614 (BOTH) 10/1/2010 S4,264 $4,264 $2,132 $2, 132 EXHIBIT 5 (ALSO SEE EXHIBIT 24)
7 WELLS FARGO 7218 IBOTH) IO/l/2010 $3,637 53,637 $3,637 EXHIBIT 5
8 WELLS FARGO 7226 (BOTH) 1011/2010 $5,130 $5,130 $5,130 EXHIBIT 5
EXHIBITS - BAL@ IO/l/10WAS$70,015. AMOUNTWAS

9 WELLS FARGO 7152 (BOTH) 10/112010 $70,015 $0 50 TRANSFERRED TO JT CHECKING ACCT AND IS INCLUDED IN
ANALYSIS OF WELLS 7614 ACCT AT EXHIBIT 24)
10 CHASE HSA 9291 10/1/2012 $12,373 512,373 $12,373 EXHIBIT20

11 B OF A 5336 (WIFE) 10/112010 $0 $0 EXHIBIT 21 (OPENED AFTER DOS)
12 B OF A 1794 (WIFE) 10/112010 $0 $0 EXHIBIT 22 (OPENED AFTER DOS)
13 B OF A 4987 (WIFE) lOJl/2010 50 $0 EXHIBIT 23 (OPENED AFTER DOS)
14 STOCKS AND SECURITIES

15 ETRADE6194 (BOTH NAMES) 10/3/2012 $5 $5 $3 $3 EXHIBIT 6 (DIVIDED 50/50 BY THE PARTIES)
16 ETRADE 2935 (BOTH) (ET ABl) 10/3/2012 $96,066 $96,066 $48,033 $48,033 EXHIBIT6 (DIVIDED 50150 BY THE PARTIES)
17 ETRADE 1181 (WIFE) (ET ERTS) 10/3/2012 $5,244 $5,244 $2,622 $2,622 EXHIBIT 6 (DIVIDED 50/50 BY THE PARTIES)
18 ETRADE 1215 (BOTH) 10/3/2012 $4 $4 $2 $2 EXHIBIT 6 (DIVIDED 50/50 BY THE PARTIES)
19
20 FIDELITY 4222 (HUSBAND NAME) ! 6/30/2012 ! $19,353 $19,353 $9,677 I $9,677 EXHIBIT 8 (DIVDED 50/50 BETWEEN THE PARTIES) I
21
22 SCHWAB 9951 (BOTH NAMES) 8/31/2012 $0 $0 EXHIBIT 10.1
23 SSGA UPROMISE 529 - 380-02 (KALISTA) 6/30/2012 $15,472 $0 EXHIBIT 10.2
24 SSGA UPROMISE 529 - 733-0 l (LAUREN) 1213112011 $13,765 $0 WIFE SAD
25 KATEEV A STOCK OPTIONS OR RSU'S TBD TBD ALL GRANTED AFI'ER DOS AND ARE THEREFORE ALL HSP
26 REAL ESTATE
14 ARASTRADERO ROAD, PORTOLA VALLEY, CA - FAIR

27 MARKET VALUE BASED ON APPRAISAL DONE IN EARLY $1,700,000 $1,700,000 SELL HOUSE AND DIVIDE NET PROCEEDS EQUALLY
50%0FNET 50%0FNET
2012. PROCEEDS PROCEEDS
28 LESS: MORTGAGE 3/4/2013 ($967,769) ($967,769) EXHIBIT 11
Case Number
B-6
41lllGO 3'21 PM C:\V><nl.!o.~o\O<.:unt<:o<s\D"'l'W.\JWP Cl.JENT fiu:s2\FRAZU,;lt\MSCVJ'Rlt. 2 20!l_i\S..,, Divl>ton Worl:_<Oec<.xlix Page lof3
6-11-FL-005500
'
MARRIAGE OF FRAZIER
ASSET DfVISION WORKSHEET
.
LINE# DESCRIPTION DATE VALUE CPVALUE HUSBAND WIFE COMMENTS

29
30 LIFE INSURANCE AND ANNUITIES
31 NO WHOLE LIFE POLICIES
32
33 PERSONAL PROPERTY
34 2001 HONDA ODYSSEY - FMV (AWARDED TO HUSBAND) $6,148 $6,148 $6,148 PER SETTLEMENT OFFER LETTER DATED 9124112 FROM
35 2001 HONDA ODYSSEY - LOAN (A WARDED TO HUSBAND) $0 $0 $0 NATALIE DAPRILE - AMOUNTSWEREAGREEDTOAND
36 2009 HONDA ODYSSEY - FMV (AWARDED TO WIFE) $23,194 $23,194 $23,194 WIFE AGREED TO REMBURSE HUSBAND FOR $688 OF
37 2009 HONDA ODYSSEY - LOAN (A WARDED TO \VIFE) $0 $0 $0 REP AIR COSTS.
.
38
2002 CESSNA 1725 - FAIR MARKET VALUE BASED ON
39 $105,000 $105,000 50%0FNET 50%0FNET SELL AIRPLANE AND DIVIDE NET PROCEEDS
ESTJMATE DONE IN EARLY 2012.
PROCEEDS PROCEEDS
40 2002 CESSNA 1725 - LOAN 3/27/2013 ($82,623) ($82,623) EXHIBIT 11
41
42 OTHER ASSETS
43 OWNERSHIP INTEREST IN AN CAERUS TBD TBD TBD
44 US PATENT #7,798,542 B2 DOOR LOCK APPARATUS TBD TBD TBD
45 SUBTOTAL $116,583 $89,299
46 EQUALIZING PAYl'vIENT ($13,642) $13,642
47 TOTALS $102,941 $102,941

48
49
50 REIMBURSEMENT CLAIMS & OTHER ISSUES

51 WITHDRAWALS BY WIFE FROM SCHWAB 9951 $269,200 $269,200 $269,200 EXHIBIT 12
52 \VITHDRA WALS BY HUSBAND FROM SCHWAB 9951 $232,611 $232,611 $232,611 EXHIBIT 12
REIMBURSEMENT CLAIM OF \VIFE RELATED TO WELLS
53 $36,643 ($36,643) EXHIBIT 24
FARGO 7614 ACCOUN:T
54 SUPPORT ARREARAGES O\VED BY HUSBAND TO WIFE $42,740 $42,740 $42,740 ($42,740) EXHIBIT 13
55 2011 REIMBURSEMENTS OWED BY WIFE TO HUSBAND $35,439 $35,439 ($35,439) $35,439 EXHIBD'25
REQUEST FOR PAYMENT OF WIFE'S ATTORNEYS FEES &
56 $70,000 $70,000 $70,000 ($70,000)
COSTS BY HUSBAND
WIFE'S ATTORNEYS FEES & COSTS PAID BY HUSBAND TO
57 ($20,000) ($20,000) ($20,000) $20,000
DATE
Case Number
WITHDRAW AL BY HUSBAND FROM DEFERRED COMP PLAN
58 $43,365 $43,365 $43,365 EXHIBIT 18
1N Q3 2010
B-7
41112o!ll:ZZ!'M C:\U:e:ts\lolm\Do<un«<11;1Drort>O<\IWP 0.IENT fILES2lfl!AZ\ER\\lSC\Af'R!L l :COD_Au<< [>i•i,,on W"'~'h""r.<I" Page 2of3
6-11-FL-005500
.
MARRIAGE OF FRAZIER
ASSET DIVISION WORKSHEET
LINE# DESCRIPTION DATE VALUE CPVALUE HUSBA.i'lD WIFE COMMENTS

ISSUE WITH RESPECT TO QUESTION RAISED BY REAGAN
WADE RE: WHETHER $3 l ,333 OF DEFERRED COMP PAID TO
59 $31,333 TBD TBD TBD EXHIBIT 18
JEFF IN JUNE 2009 WAS DEPOSTED INTO A COMMUNITY
ACCOUNT
60 AUTO REPAIR COSTS AGREED TO BY WIFE $688 $688 ($688) $688 PER DAPRil...E 9/24/!2 SETTLEMENT OFFER LEITER
WITHDRAWAL BY HUSBAND FROM ETRADE ACCT 1215

61 $10,000 $10,000 $10,000 EXHIBIT7
AFfERDOS
WITHDRAWALS FROM FIDELITY 4222 BETWEEN DATE OF

62 SEPARATION AND JULY 31, 2012 (THE REMAINING $43,638 $43,638 $38,638 $5,000 EXHIBITS
BALANCE AT 7/31112 IS ALLOCATED IN LINE20 ABOVE
'
63 SUBTOTAL $417,870 $180,944
64 EQUALIZING PAYMENT ($118,463) $118,463
65 TOTALS $299,407 $299,407
66
67 TOTAL EQUALIZING PAYMENT· NON RET ACCTS + REIMB CLAIMS ($132,105) $132,105
68
69 RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS
70 LIFE TECHNOLOGIES 401(K) 3/26/2013 $402,088 $402,088 $402,088 EXHIBIT 14
71 DANISCO 401(K) (TRP) $0 so $0 TRANSFERRED TO MERRILL~ SEE LINE 75
72 ETRADE ROLLOVER IRA 7916 3/27/2013 $7,240 $7,240 $7,240 EXHIBIT6
73 THRlFf SAVlliGS PLAN 3126/2013 $22,829 $22,829 $22,829 EXHIBIT 16
74 LIFE TECHNOLOGIES DEFERRED COMP PLAN 3/26/2013 $16,904 $16,904 $16,904 EXHIBIT 17
75 MERRILL LYNCH - DUPONT RETIREMENT SAVINGS PLAN 3/26/2013 $21,396 $21,396 $21,396 EXHIBIT 15
76 SCHWAB IRA ROLLOVER 6269 (WIFE) 8/31/2012 $76,456 $76,456 $76,456 EXHIBIT 19
77 SUBTOTALS $546,913 $546,913 $463,217 $83,696

78 EQUALIZING PAYMENT ($189,761) $189,761
79 TOTALS $273,457 $273,457
Case Number
B-8
'1V10U3:22PM C.\Uwsl.1<.'fulll'.H.:um.A<>IOropl>o•\lWP CUE.NT Fll.ES:lll'RAZ!Ell.\Wi(\Af!U[.. 210H_Am:t Oivi:;ioo WO<~'"'""'';" Page 3of3
6-11-FL-005500
POS-040
ATTORNEY OR PARTY WITHOUT ATTORNEY (Name, State Bar number, and address): FOR COURT USE ONLY
EDDA A. LEDGERWOOD 224886

LAW OFFICES OF NEDDA A. LEDGERWOOD
438 SOUTH MURPHY AVENUE
SUNNYVALE, CA 94086
TELEPHONE NO.: ( 4 0 8) · 7 3 0-0 3 3 3 FAXNO.(OpU,,al) ( 4 0 8) 7 32-07 0 9
E-MAILAOOREss 1opuona1r [email protected]
ATTORNEYFOR(Nama/ Kathleen Kostas Frazier
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF Sant a c 1 a r a
srREETAoDREss: 605 W. El Camino Real APR 0 3 20·13
MA1uN0AooREss: 191 N. First Street DAVID H. YAM!\SAKI
c1TYANoz1ecooE: San Jose, CA 95113 Chief Exeicutiva Officer/Clerk
Superior Court of CA, County o'i Santa Clara
BRANCH NAME;
BY DEPUTY
PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER: Kathleen Kostas Frazier
DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT: Jeffery Frazier CASE NUMBER:
6-ll-FL-005500
f--~~~~~~~~P~R~O~O~F~o=F~s=E=R~v~1c=E~-c=1~v=1L~~~~~~--<
Check method of service (only one):

JUDGE: ZAYNER
D By Personal Service CiQ By Mail D By Overnight Delivery
D By Messenger Service D By Fax D By Electronic Service DEPL 82
(Do not use this proof of service to show service of a Summons and complaint.)
1. At the time of service I was over 18 years of age and not a party to this action.
2. My residence or business address is:

438 S. MURPHY AVENUE
SUNNYVALE, CA 94086
3. D The fax number or electronic service address from which I served the documents is (complete if service was by fax or
electronic service):
4. 4I2I2013
On (date): I served the following documents (specify):
PETITIONER'S MANDATORY SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE STATEMENT
D The documents are listed in the Attachment to Proof of Service-Civil (Documents Served) (form POS-040(0)).
5. I served the documents on the person or persons below, as follows:

a. Name of person served: Jeffery Frazier
b. CiQ (Complete if service was by personal service, mail, overnight delivery, or messenger service.)
Business or residential address where person was served:
14 Arastradero Drive
Portola Valley, CA 94028
c. D (Complete if service was by fax or electronic service.)
(1) Fax number or electronic service address where person was served:
(2) Time of service:

D The names, addresses, and other applicable information about persons served is on the Attachment to Proof of
Service-Civil (Persons Served) (form POS-040(P)).
6. The documents were served by the following means (specify):

a. D By personal service. I personally delivered the documents to the persons at the addresses listed in item 5. (1) For a
party represented by.an attorney, delivery was made to the attorney or at the attorney's office by leaving the documents,
in an envelope or package clearly labeled to identify the attorney being served, with a receptionist or an individual in
charge of the office, between t.he hours of nine in the morning and five in the evening. (2) For a party, delivery was made
to the party or by leaving the documents at the party's residence with some person not younger than 18 years of age
between the hours of eight in the morning and six in the evening.
PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT NO. Page 1 of 3
PROOF OF SERVICE - CIVIL
B-9
Form Approved for Optional Use Code of Civil Procedure,§§ 1010.6, 1011, 1013, 1013a,
Judicial Council of California Q M11rli11 D(.{m$ 2015.5: Cal, Rules of Court, rules 2.260, 2.306
PoS-o4o[Rev. July 1, 20111 ~ ESfNTiALlDRMS·,;; (Proof of Service) www.courts.ca.gov
Frazierr Kathleen Kostas
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
POS-040
CASE NAME CASE NUMBER:
Marria e of Frazier 6-ll-FL-005500
6. b. !XI By United States mail. I enclosed the documents in a sealed envelope or package addressed to the persons at the
addresses in item 5 and (specify one):
(1) D deposited the sealed envelope with the United States Postal Service, with the postage fully prepaid.
(2) !XI placed the envelope for collection and mailing, following our ordinary business practices. I am readily familiar
with this business's practice for collecting and processing correspondence for mailing. On the same day that
correspondence is placed for collection and mailing, it is deposited in the ordinary course of business with the
United States Postal Service, in a sealed envelope with postage fully prepaid.
I am a resident or employed in the county where the mailing occurred. The envelope or package was placed in the mail at
(city and state): Sunnyvale, CA
c. D By overnight delivery. I enclosed the documents in an envelope or package provided by an overnight delivery
carrier and addressed to the persons at the addresses in item 5 .. 1placed the envelope or package for collection
and overnight delivery at an office or a regularly utilized drop box of the overnight delivery carrier.
d. D By messenger service. I served the documents by placing them in an envelope or package addressed to the persons
at the addresses listed in item 5 and providing them to a professional messenger service for service. (A declaration by
the messenger must accompany this Proof of Service or be contained in the Declaration of Messenger below.)
e. D By fax transmission. Based on an agreement of the parties to accept service by fax transmission, I faxed the documents
to the persons at the fax numbers listed in item 5. No error was reported by the fax machine that I used. A copy of the
record of the fax transmission, which I printed out, is attached.
f. O By electronic service. Based on a court order or an agreement of the parties to accept electronic service, I caused the
documents to be sent to the persons at the electronic service addresses listed in item 5.
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.
Date: 4 I 2 I 2013
NF.DDA A J,f.DGF:RWOOD
(TYPE OR PRINT NAME OF DECLARANT) {SIGNATURE OF DECLARANT)
(If item 6d above is checked, the declaration below must be completed or a separate declaration from a messenger must be attached.)
DECLARATION OF MESSENGER
D By personal service. I personally delivered the envelope or package received from the declarant above to the persons at the
addresses listed in item 5. (1) For a party represented by an attorney, delivery was made to the attorney or at the attorney's
office by leaving the documents in an envelope or package, which was clearly labeled to identify the attorney being served,
with a receptionist or an individual in charge of the office, between the hours of nine in the morning and five in the evening. (2)
For a party, delivery was made to the party or by leaving the documents at the party's residence with some person not younger
than 18 years of age between the hours of eight in the morning and six in the evening.
At the time of service, I was over 18 years of age. I am not a party to the above-referenced legal proceeding.
I served the envelope or package, as stated above, on (date):
Date:
{NAME OF DECLARANT) (SIGNATURE OF DECLARANT)
Page 2 of 3
POS·040 {Rev. July 1, 2011) PROOF OF SERVICE - CIVIL PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT NO.
(Proof of Service)
~ r;rmi~l"iiiRMi'· B-10
Frazier, Kathleen Kostas
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
ENDORSED
1 Jeffery D. Frazier SBN 157792 F\LED
14 Arastradero Road
2 Portola Valley, California 94028 1013 APR I 2 P \2: 3'l
Teleehone: (650) 275-2112
3 Ematl: [email protected]
4 Self-Represented
7
8 COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA
9 In re the Marriage of: Case No.: 6-11-FL-005500

10 Respondent's Reply to Petitioner's
and Mandatory Settlement Conference <MSC)
11 Respondent: JEFFERY FRAZIER Statement
12 Dept.: 82
13
14 Respondent, Jeffery Frazier, appearing in propria persona, respectfully submits his

15 Reply to Petitioner's Mandatory Settlement Conference (MSC) Statement:
16
I. PROPERTY DIVISION
17
Respondent has annotated by hand Petitioner's spreadsheet for property division (Ex.h. 0).
18
19
a) Bank Accounts
20 Wells Fargo 9840 is the account that holds the operating cash for Looking Up LLC and
21 belongs to Looking Up LLC. The account should be valued as of the most recent statement date or
22
account balance to Petitioner's exit from Looking Up LLC, when the latter occurs. The most recent
23
account statement available is attached as Exh. P. When Petitioner exits Looking Up LLC, Wells
24
Fargo 9840 should be divided 50/50 between the parties.
25
26 b) Real Estate
27 The house should be valued at $1. 7M, per Petitioner's latest offer and agreement between the
28
parties, and Respondent permitted to buy out Petitioner's equity in the house on reasonable tenns.
- 1 - PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT NO.

RESPONDENT'S REPLY TO PETITIONER'S MSC STATEMENT
C-1
DY6-11-FL-005500
FAX
Case Number
1 If a sale is ordered, it should be deferred until the youngest child is out of high school.
2 It is both children's birth home, and would be another emotional loss in their lives if sold. The
3
net cost for Respondent to move to another residence most certainly exceeds what it would cost him
4
to remain in the home.
5
c) Sale of Cessna and division of accounts related to the airplane
6
7 The plane has more hours on the engine now than it did at the time of the previous estimate.
8 The value of an aircraft goes down as the time between major overhauls goes down, and this aircraft
9
is closer to its next overhaul than it was as of the previous estimate. So, the aircraft is worth less than
10
$105,000.
11
d) Support Arrearages
12
13 Respondent is in agreement that his arrears once totaled $42,470, however, he has already
14 paid and agreed to be charged with the $30,000 withdrawal from the Charles Schwab account. This
15
leaves a total balance owed by Respondent to Petitioner in the sum of $12,4 70.
16
e) Deferred Comp Plan
17
Regarding Respondent's deferred compensation in the amount of $43,365, that amount net of
18
19 taxes is $32,051.88. The check was for $32,051.88, not $43,365. The amount of $32,051.88 shall be
20 divided equally between the parties. (Exh. Q).
21 f) Retirement Accounts
22
Petitioner has repeatedly tried to assign Respondent's separate property, E-trade Rollover I
23
7916, to herself, and she continues to do so. As this asset was acquired prior to the marriage by
24
25
Respondent, this account is Respondent's separate property.
26
27 II. DATE OF SEPARATION

28
- 2 -
C-2
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
1 Petitioner argues a date of separation of October 1, 2010. Petitioner makes it especially
2 important for a date of separation here, that the parties attended a holiday party in December 2010
3
where, allegedly, they wore their wedding rings. To the contrary, Respondent removed his wedding
4
ring the day that Petitioner said she wanted to separate (namely, September 8, 2010), and he placed it
5
on a ring holder in a drawer, where it has stayed ever since. Exhibits R and S are views of a
6
7 photograph taken at the holiday party. There is no ring on Respondent's ring finger.
8 Petitioner indicates Respondent forbade her to leave the family residence, stating," ... once
9
Wife was granted leave from the family residence with the minor children." Quite the contrary,
10
Respondent never forbade Petitioner from leaving the family residence, and, in truth, joined her in
11
seeking a suitable residence. (Exh. T includes her communication with a realtor in which she
12
13 includes Husband with the decision-making.) There was absolutely no indication she would take the
14 children.
15
16
III. ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS
17
Petitioner requests $50,000 as fees. Respondent has previously paid $20,000 to Petitioner for
18
19 fees. Her ongoing liberal use of an attorney and forensic accountant while requesting Respondent to
20 foot the bills is baffling. Now, Respondent cannot afford his own attorney. He has not secured full
21 time employment since he was laid off in October 2012, while Petitioner enjoys the benefits of a full
22
time job, allowing her to pay for her team. To complicate matters, while Respondent is building his
23
own business, he has to spend substantial time with Petitioner's excessive litigation, resulting in lost
24
25
potential wages and time to build clientele.
26 Respondent requests the Court order Petitioner to pay attorney's fees and costs in the amount
27 of $20,000 to level the playing field.

28
- 3 -
C-3
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
1
2 IV. FAMILY CODE SEC. 271 SANCTIONS

3
Petitioner makes two arguments against being sanctioned in this matter. Petitioner states:
4
(1) Wife's request for a restraining order was due to her substantial fear that
5
Husband posed a significant threat to the entire family. Husband's behavior at
6
7 the time of Wife's filing was erratic, unpredictable, and dangerous, and
8 reminiscent of behavior he previously had exhibited while using drugs. As a

9
result, Wife was afraid for both her life and the wellbeing of the children.
10
This is the same vague, unsupported language that Petitioner rallied behind during the 7+
11
month restraining-order phase of this litigation, until she suddenly abandoned it when dismissing her
12
13 restraining-order request with prejudice at the last minute - making Respondent the prevailing party.
14 Adler v. Vaicius, 21 Cal. App. 4th 1770, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32 (1993); Krug v. Maschmeier, 172 Cal.
15
App. 4th 796 (2009). Petitioner has never described, much less supported, anything at all in the
16
course of this litigation that would lead a reasonable person to fear for their life. Certainly, the
17
following emails of Petitioner do not indicate a person fearing for their life: Exhibits U, V, and W.
18
19 In his Report (Child Custody Evaluation Report RE FRAZIER, June 2, 2011, p. 6), Dr.
20 Michael Kerner "did not find domestic violence" and "did not find issues related to child abuse."
21 The second of Petitioner's two arguments against being sanctioned in this matter:
22
(2) Husband did not make any significant efforts to work with Wife to establish a
23
mutually agreeable visitation schedule.
24
25
Respondent can provide numerous emails supporting his substantial efforts for visitation that
26 were met with what Petitioner termed, "non-negotiable" requirements. Examples include her offering
27 visitation in the middle of Respondent's workday in a new job; requiring the rare visits be supervised,
28
- 4 -
C-4
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
1 and fo rcing Respondent to pay the supervisor' s ex penses; requiring an exchange service and after
2 Respondent enrolled, Petiti oner never even applied; offering visitati on on Saturdays during
3
Respondent' s weekly group exercise time and refusing to change the open time to Sundays. These
4
are onl y examples of humili ati ng, vindi cti ve actions Petitioner did to keep the Father and children
5
from being together. All the while, the custody evaluator nor any Cou11 suggested such atrocities.
6
7 See, for example, Exhibits Y-EE, which evidence some of Respondent's efforts at visitation (more
8 can be provided).
9
10
I declare unde r penalty of pe1jury under the laws of the State of California that the forego ing
11
is true and correct.
12
13
14
15
Dated: A~r. \d.- 1 20 \ 3 SBN 157792
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
- 5 -
RESPONDENT ' S REPLY TO PET I TIONER ' S MSC STATEMENT
C-5
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
1
Jeffery D. Frazier SBN 157792 BHBBmM
14 Arastradero Road
2
Portola Valley, California 94028
Telephone: (650) 275-2112
3
4
Respondent in pro per
7

10 Respondent's Trial Brief
and
11 Respondent: JEFFERY FRAZIER Dept.: 82, Zayner
12
13
14 Petitioner, Kathleen Frazier, is represented by attorney Nedda Ledgerwood and forensic
15
accountant, John Peth. Respondent, Jeffery Frazier, appearing in propria persona, respectfully
submits his Trial Brief:
16
OnJuly 31,2012, Respondent filed a motion1 against Petitioner seeking (i) sanctions for
17
Petitioner's uncooperative and unnecessary litigious conduct, and (ii) prevailing party attorney's fees
18
related to the restraining order matter; and where he requests (iii) to modify downward spousal
19
support as a sanction; (iv) requests reimbursement of the assets (including $200,000 cash) that
20
Petitioner did not disclose and transferred in breach of her fiduciary duties; and (v) requests that
21 Petitioner's papers relating to her restraining order request, and Respondent's reply papers, be sealed.
22 The July 31 motion was continued. Here, except for item (iii) above, Respondent reiterates the
23 foregoing requests and incorporates the July 31 motion by reference.
24
25
26
27 1See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Respondent's Request for $80,000 in Sanctions, dated July
31,2012; Respondent Jeffery Frazier's Declaration in Supportof Request for Order Re: Modification of Child Support
28
and Spousal Support, and Sanctions in the Amount of $80,000, dated July 31, 2012; and, Declaration of Natalie T.
Daprile in Support of Respondent's Request for Sanctions in the Amount of $80,000, dated July 31,2012.
- 1 -
RESPONDENT'S TRIAL BRIEF
D-1
Case Number
1 In addition, Respondent requests (i) to recover custody evaluation fees/costs, previously
2
reserved, and (ii) sanctions under Family Code (FC) §3027.1(a) for false allegations of child abuse in
a custody proceeding.
3
STATISTICAL INFORMATION
4
Date of Marriage - Separation: April 8, 1995 - September 8, 2010 (15 years, 5 months)
5
Children: Kalista Frazier, born February 5, 2002, age 11; and,
6
Lauren Frazier, born July 29, 2005, age 7.
7
8 SUMMARY
9 This action was instigated with Petitioner pursuing her scheme to make false claims of
10 domestic violence against Respondent, utilize the restraining order process to have him kicked out of
11
the family residence, confiscate the majority of the parties' assets, and gain sole custody of the
parties' children. Successful in Court to varying degrees, Petitioner took matters into her own hands
12
to get her way when it was not given to her.

13
Just prior to initiating this action, without Respondent's knowledge, Petitioner transferred
14
$200,000 cash from the Schwab community trust account to her secret bank account (Exh. A) to
15
which Respondent had no access. At no time did she inform Respondent of the transaction. Once
16 Respondent learned by happenstance of the cash transferand told Petitionerto return the money and
17 provide information concerning its whereabouts (includingthe account number), Petitioner refused to
18 return the money orprovide any information other than an acknowledgement that she took it2.
19
On January 27, 2011, Respondent began this litigation "guns a blazin'" with an ex parte, no
notice, request for a full CLETS restraining order3. Although failing in most respects,
20
notwithstanding "insufficient facts" noted by the Court4, Petitioner and her aggressive attorney
21
managed to obtain a temporary non-harassment order and legal custody5. The Court did not order
22
physical custody or visitation because as it noted, the parties were still living in the same house.
23
Petitioner then moved out of the house, taking the two minor children with her into hiding. She used
24
the illegitimately obtained TRO to withhold visitation between Respondent and the children until
25
26
2See Respondent Jeffery Frazier's Declaration in Support of Request for Order Re: Modification of Child Supportand
27 Spousal Support, and Sanctions in the Amount of $80,000, dated July 31, 2012, p. 4, paragraph 9.
3See Respondent Jeffery Frazier's Declaration in Support of Trial Brief, dated May 20, 2013, page 2, paragraph 5.
28
4 See DV-109 Notice of Court Hearing, dated January 25,2011.
5See Temporary Restraining Order, dated January25,2011.
RESPONDENT'S
- 2 -
TRIAL BRIEF
D-2
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
1 June 30, 2011 (over 5 months!). She encumbered the few offers of short visits with onerous,
2
unreasonable, "non-negotiable" terms and conditions (Exh. B), which she changed at her whim
when Respondent complied6. She further used the TRO to deny Respondent of legal decision-making
3
until the long-cause hearing of September 6, 2011.7 Petitioner had maintained the TRO for so long
4
not because of any domestic violence, but because the temporary orders where so highly effective in
5
ousting Respondent from the lives of the children.
6
Petitioner made no effort to resolve the restraining order issue for over 7 months,
7
notwithstanding Respondent's repeated requests. Finally, at the very last minute, Petitioner became
8 willing to stipulate to benign terms that did not come close to a restraining order of any kind. At the
9 outset of the long-cause hearing on September 6, 2011, suddenly and without explanation, Petitioner
10 proceeded to dismiss her CLETS restraining-order request, with prejudice.8
11
Petitioner's strategy and tactics in this matter shock the conscious. For example, she
suggested 50/50joint custody just prior to initiating this action, then vigorously contested such
12
custody arrangement for more than 18 months in litigation.9 She spent upwards of $20,000 ona
13
"professional, confidential consultant" whose purpose and expertise was never explained10. While
14
Respondent suffered emotional and financial fallout from her bogus restraining-order request,
15
Petitioner repeatedly taunted him with gross exaggerations and outright mistruths1'. Her false
16 accusations included child abuse during the custody phase of this matter12. When challenged to
17 substantiate her false statements, Petitioner provided nothing. All the while, Petitioner refused to
18 reasonably discuss any of the situation, including settlement.
19
No protection was needed, as evidenced by the following: (i) Custodyevaluaton Dr. Michael
Kerner, commenced his study in February 2011 that resulted in a June 2, 2011, evaluation report
20
based on 37 hours of interviews (including both parties, the children and collateral contacts), home
21
visits, documentreviews, and psychological evaluations. He concluded that he "did not find domestic
22
23 6See Respondent Jeffery Frazier's Declaration in Support of Request for Order Re: Modification of Child Support and
Spousal Support, and Sanctions in the Amount of $80,000, datedJuly 31, 2012, p. 6, paragraphs 14-15.
24 7See Respondent Jeffery Frazier's Declaration in Support of Trial Brief, dated May 20, 2013, page 2, paragraph 6.
8See Respondent Jeffery Frazier's Declaration in Support of Request for Order Re: Modification of Child Support and
25
Spousal Support, and Sanctions in the Amount of $80,000, dated July 31, 2012, pp. 7-8, paragraphs 19-20.
9See Respondent Jeffery Frazier's Declaration in Support of Trial Brief, dated May 20, 2013, page 2, paragraph 7.
26
10 See Declaration of Rebekah A. Frye, CFLS in Support of Petitioner-Mother's Request for Attorney's Fees and Costs,
dated September 1, 2011.
27 11 SeeRespondent Jeffery Frazier's Declaration in Support of Request for OrderRe: Modification of Child Support and
Spousal Support, and Sanctions in the Amount of $80,000, dated July 31,2012, p. 10, paragraph 27.
28
12 See Declarationof Kathleen Frazier in Support of Request for Temporary Restraining Order, dated January 20, 2011;
and, Declaration of Petitioner-Mother, Kathleen Frazier, in Opposition to Ex Parte Motion, dated February 4, 2011.
- 3 -
D-3
Case Number
1 violence to have occurred in this family system"13; (ii) The police did not even generate a report
2
twice when Petitioner alleged domestic violence14; (iii) For many years preceding September 8,2010
(DOS), the parties attended couples counseling, and not once did Petitioner, nor the
3
therapists, mention anything akin to domestic violence15; (iv) No school counselor or teacher in either
4
school thechildren attended surfaced suspected domestic violence16; and, (v) nordid the children's
5
therapists during this litigation17. Even Petitioner raved to her friends howwonderful it was to have
6
Respondent at home (Exhibits C, D, and E).
7
Incredibly, nearly three months after obtaining the TRO, Petitioner continued refusing to
8 discuss settlement and insisted on having the resource-intensive, long-cause hearing (Exh. F).
9 Facing potential loss of the children, and knowing the trauma they were experiencing
10 (something they still speak of), Respondent felt the stakes were too high not to spend money to
11
respond to Petitioner's attacks. Adding further stress to the situation, Petitioner was on an unbridled
spending spree, topping $10,000 per month for many months18, and generating the need for constant
12
legal responses at crippling expense.

13
At a hearing on July 1, 2011, after over 5 months of fighting to prevent regular visitation,
14
Petitioner, for the first time, agreed to a minimal visitation schedule, but it was not until an August
15
22,2012 hearing, that Petitioner agreed to joint legal and joint physical custody of the children with a
16 50/50 timeshare. The first 19 months could have been greatly compressed and conducted for a few
17 tens of thousands of dollars19 in fees instead of the greater than $155,000 in fees20 (Exhibits G, H)
18 (greater than $195,500 total (Exh. I)) that it actually cost had she done this from the beginning as the
19
parties had agreed, or had she agreed to Respondent's requests and settled for this early on. More
importantly, the children would have been spared a tremendous amount of stress and change.
20
Petitioner could have left peacefully and not harassed Respondent with the full CLETS
21
restraining-order request, TRO, withholding of visitation, contested custody, etc. It was Petitioner's
22
23 13 See Child Custody Evaluation Report RE FRAZIER, June 2,2011, p. 6.

14 See Respondent Jeffery Frazier's Declaration in Support of Trial Brief, dated May 20,2013, page 2, paragraph 10.
24 15 Id. at paragraph 11.
16 Id. at paragraph 12.
25 17 Id. at paragraph 13.
18 See Declaration of Rebekah A. Frye, CFLS in Support of Petitioner-Mother's Request for Attorney's Fees and Costs,
26 dated September 1, 2011; and, Declaration of Nedda A. Ledgerwood in Support of Petitioner's Request for Pendente Lite
Attorney's Fees and Costs.
27 19 See Declaration of NatalieT. Daprile in Support of Respondent's Request for Sanctions in the Amountof $80,000
("Had Ms. Frazier been reasonable or not pursued her restraining order request, this case could have been resolved for
28 between $15,000 and $20,000 in fees.")
20 See Respondent Jeffery Frazier's Declaration in Support of Trial Brief, dated May 20, 2013, page 3, paragraph 14.
- 4 - PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT NO.

D-4
Case Number
1 choice to employ extreme aggression and "unnecessary roughness." Respondent could only cower
2
and plead, and he did, for Petitioner to be reasonable, amicable, and collaborative (e.g., Exhibits J, K
and L). Every request was ignored.
3
With the most important issue, the children, settled, the parties moved their focus to financial
4
matters, which were partially settled at the Mandatory Settlement Conference of April 17, 2013.
5
6
REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS UNDER FAMILY CODE S 271
7
Respondent requests sanctions in the amount of $80,000 pursuant to FC §271 against
8 Petitioner for frustrating the policy of the law to promote settlement and cost-savings, and to
9 encourage cooperation by, among other things, her misuse of the judicial process in order to gain a
10 legal advantage over custody and visitation of the parties' children.
11
Prior notice regarding Respondent's request for sanctions related to Petitioner's pursuit of a
CLETS restraining order was made in open court on August 22, 2011 in addition to written notice in
12
email and correspondence. Respondent's substantive and factual response to Petitioner's allegations
13
regarding the restraining order are set forth in Respondent's Answer to Temporary Restraining Order
14
filed with the Court on February 14, 2011 and Respondent's Supplemental Declaration which was
15
filed with the Court on March 4, 2011. Included in Respondent's Answer is an affirmative request
16 for attorney fees and costs, as well.
17 The cost of the litigation, especially related to the restraining order, escalated substantially.
18 Respondent has been forced to incur substantial and unnecessary attorneys' fees not only to prepare
19
for the long-cause hearing with evidence and witnesses on the restraining order itself (due to
Petitioner's last minute response to Respondent's request for a dismissal of the action) but also to
20
prepare multiple pleadings and declarations. Respondent also incurred substantial attorney fees
21
pursuing his custody and visitation rights at two contested hearings and expenses related to the
22
custody evaluation to prove that he is not a wrongdoer and does not pose any threat of harm.
23
24
I. Under Family Code 271. the Court can award attorney's fees as sanctions
25 A trial court may base an attorney fees and costs award "on the extent to which the conduct of
26 each party or attorney furthers or frustrates the policy of the law to promote settlement of litigation
27 and, where possible, to reduce the cost of litigation by encouraging cooperation between the parties
28
and attorneys." (§271, subd. (a).)
-
RESPONDENT'S
5 -
TRIAL BRIEF
D-5
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
1 FC §271 "explicitly makes parties liable for the obstreperous actions of their counsel..." [In
2 re Marriage of Daniels. 19 Cal. App. 4th 1102, 1110 (1993) [23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 869-870].
3
Section 271 sanctions have been upheld for, e.g., misuse of the family law process and
meritless motions (In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke. 164 Cal. App. 4th 814 (2008)), and litigating
4
the claim of spousal abuse in bad faith (In re Marriage of Battenburg. 28 Cal. App. 4th 1338 (1994)).
5
6
II. Respondent seeks sanctions be imposed against Petitioner for frustrating the policy of
7
the law to promote settlement and encourage cooperation
8 After receiving the findings of Dr. Kerner on June 2, 201121 and repeated requests that she
9 dismiss her restraining order request, Petitioner ignored such requests, and continued to engage in
10 behavior that only increased acrimony and expense. Petitioner's conduct is the exact type of conduct
11
that FC §271 is designed to sanction and deter.
Additionally, while it is not necessary for Respondent to show injury to obtain sanctions (In re
12
Marriage of Feldman. 153 Cal. App. 4th 1470, 1479-80 (2007)), Respondent was in fact injured. For
13
example, Respondent endured a long, drawn out battle to have a custody schedule in place in order
14
for him to spend quality, consistent time with his children. Before that, Respondent had to beg for
15
just a few hours every weekor two, at best, with his children, which was all that Petitioner was ever
16 willing to offer- always encumbered with unilateral demands such as supervision. Also,
17 Respondent's reputation in his small-knit community was tarnished by Petitioner's statements to
18 others about his being a perpetrator of domestic violence.
19
Based upon the finding of no domestic violence by Dr. Kerner, the lack of any evidence to
warrant the issuance of a restraining order, and Petitioner's last minute willingness to settle on terms
20
nowhere near being akin to a restraining order, Respondent requests that the Court issue sanctions
21
against Petitioner for exceptionally uncooperative behavior, pursuing a motion so as to frustrate the
22
litigation process (including settlement), and senselessly driving up the cost of these proceedings.
23
24
III. Petitioner is able to pay the requested amount which is reasonable
25 A court awarding attorney fees and costs as a sanction under FC §271 must consider "all
26 evidence concerning the parties' incomes, assets, and liabilities" and must not impose an
27
28
21 See Child Custody Evaluation Report RE FRAZIER, June 2,2011. PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT NO.
- 6 -
D-6
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
1 unreasonable financial burden on the sanctioned party. FC §271, subd. (a). In re Marriage of Fong,
2
193 Cal. App. 4th 278, 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 260 (2011).
Petitionerhas an ample asset base. Petitionerrecently sold nearly $50,000 in stock. The
3
family home is set to be listed for sale by June 1, 2013 for a listing price of $1,795,000, which would
4
provide $830,482 in equity for the parties to split (i.e., $415,241 for Petitioner). Additionally,
5
according to the Judgment of April 17,2013, Petitioner shall receive an equalizing payment of
6
$20,000 from the sale proceeds. What's more, Petitioner unjustly took exclusive use of $200,000 in
7
cash in January 2011. Petitioner's income is substantial. Petitioner works in a salaried position as a
8 Senior Paralegal at Rocket Fuel Inc. earning $103,000/year, plus stock options (Exh. M).
9 For the above reasons, sanctions under Family Code §271 against Petitioner in the form of
10
attorney's fees payable to Respondent in the total amount of $80,000 is not only warranted, but
11
neededto deter Petitioner's misuse of legal process, excessive litigation, and uncooperative conduct.
12
REQUEST FOR PREVAILING PARTY ATTORNEY FEES RELATED TO TRO
13
Family Code §6344(a) permits the courtto award attorney's fees and costs to the prevailing
14
party in a restraining order matter. Since a dismissal was entered in Respondent's favor, Respondent
15
is the prevailing party in this case. Similar facts are found in Adler v. Vaicius, 21 Cal. App. 4th
16 1770, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32 (1993) involving civil anti-harassment protection orders. (Despite claim by
17 Plaintiffwho had sought TRO that she was the "prevailing party" because she had obtained all the
18 reliefshe sought, a TRO against Defendant, Defendant was held to be the prevailing party dueto
19
dismissal with prejudice of restraining-order request entered in Defendant's favor) (See Krug v.
Maschmeier, 172Cal. App. 4th 796 (2009) ~ a winning defendant in a civil harassment proceeding
20
could be awarded attorney's fees in the discretion of the lower court.)
21
As the prevailing party in a restraining order matter, Respondent requests reimbursement of
22
his attorney's fees and costs in the amount of $80,000, pursuant to FC §6344.
23
24
REQUEST FOR REIMBURSEMENT OF 100% OF THE ASSETS THAT PETITIONER DID
25 NOT DISCLOSE AND/OR TRANSFERRED AS A BLATANT BREACH OF HER
26 FIDUCIARY DUTIES
27
28
I. California Law Requires A Spouse to Act With the ' 'Utmost Good Faith"
RESPONDENT'S
- 7 -
TRIAL BRIEF
D-7
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
1 The rules governing a breach of fiduciary duty are set out in FC §§721, 1100, 1101 and 2102
2
FC §721 sets forth in relevant part the fundamental fiduciary duty between spouses: "[I]n transactions
between themselves, a husband and wife are subject to the general rules governing fiduciary
3
relationships which control the actions of persons occupying confidential relations with each other.
4
This confidential relationship imposes a duty of the highest good faith and fair dealing on each
5
spouse, and neither shall take any unfair advantage of the other. This confidential relationship is a
6
fiduciary relationship subject to the same rights and duties of nonmarital business partners... "
7
No other fiduciary duty exceeds this level. It requires a spouse to act with the "utmost good
8 faith" fin re Marriage of Reuling, 23 Cal. App. 4th 1428,1437-38 (1994)].
9
10 II. An Actionable Claim Against One's Spouse Lies Where There Is A Breach Of
11
Fiduciary Duty Which Results In Impairment To The Claimant Spouses Present
Undivided One-Half Interest In The Community Estate
12
An analysis of what constitutes a breach of a fiduciary duty depends upon an analysis of the
13
spouse's conduct to determine whether the extraordinary high standards set forth in FC §721 have
14
been breached. Two key questions are: (1) Was a spouse's conduct consistent with the highest duty
15
of good faith and fair dealing? and (2) Was the claimant spouse's interest in the community estate
16 impaired, or would it be impaired, by the other spouse's conduct? The heart and soul of what
17 constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty is found in FC §1101(a). This section provides that a spouse has
18 a claim against the other spouse for any breach of fiduciary duty that results in impairment to the
19
claimant spouse's present undivided one-half interest in the community estate, whether it is a single
transaction or a pattern or series of transactions.
20
21
III. Remedies Can Include From 50 to 100 Percent of Any Assets Undisclosed or
22
Transferred In Breach of The Fiduciary Duty. Plus Attorney's Fees and Costs
23
24
50 Percent ofAny Assets Undisclosed or Transferred, and Mandatory Attorney's Fees
25 FC §1101(g) specifies that the remedies for breach of a fiduciary duty "shall include, but not
26 be limitedto" an award to the other spouse of 50 percent or an amount equal to the value of 50
27
percent of any asset "undisclosed or transferred in breach of the fiduciary duty plus attorney's fees
and court costs."
28
- 8
-
D-8
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
1 The Court of Appeals for the Second Appellate District held that, under FC §1101(g),
2
attorney fee awards are mandatory when a party breaches a fiduciary duty by failing to disclose the
transfer of a community asset into a separate account. In re Marriage of Fossum. 192 Cal. App. 4th
3
336,121 Cal. Rptr. 3d 195 (2011). The court held that under FC §1101(g), a spouse's statutory
4
fiduciary duty of care arises "without reference to any wrongdoing" (citing In re Marriage of
5
Brewer & Frederici. 93 Cal. App. 4th 1334, 1344 (2001)).
6
7
100 Percent ofAny Assets Undisclosed or Transferred, and Discretionary Attorney's Fees
8 If the breach of fiduciary duty is found to be intentional or committed with actual fraudulent
9 intent, the legal ramifications are quite serious. FC §1101(h) provides that when the pertinent breach
10 of fiduciary duty falls within the ambit of CC §3294, the '[r]emedies ... shall include, but not be
11
limited to, an award to the other spouse of 100 percent, or an amount equal to 100 percent, of any
asset undisclosed or transferred in breach of the fiduciary duty,' and the family court has the
12
discretion to order the breaching spouse to pay the other spouse's reasonable attorney's fees and
13
costs. FC §1101(h); In re Marriage of Rossi. 90 Cal. App. 4th 34 (2001).
14
15
IV. Petitioner Intentionally and Fraudulently Transferred $200.000 Cash from the Parties'
16 Community Trust Account to Her Secret Personal Account. Refusing To Return the
17 Money or Provide Any Information Regarding Its Whereabouts
18 Petitioner intentionally carried outthe $200,000 cash transfer in secrecy22. At notime did she
19
inform Respondent of the transaction. Petitioner continued to conceal the whereabouts of the
community assets23, exhibiting a willful and conscious disregard of the rights of Respondent and
20
impairing his interest in the assets. Petitioner enjoyed additional earnings, such as interest, on the
21
$200,000, while Respondent was deprived of any such earnings. Petitioner's conduct constituted
22
'fraud' due at least to her intentional concealment of the transfer and whereabouts of the $200,000
23
cash with the intention on her part of depriving Respondent of property or legal rights. Moreover,
24
Petitioner has exhibited malice by her despicable conduct carried on with a willful and conscious
25 disregard of the rights of Respondent to the $200,000 cash, which rights are not in dispute.
26
27
22 See RespondentJeffery Frazier's Declaration in Support of Request for Order Re: Modification of Child Support and
28
Spousal Support, and Sanctions in the Amount of $80,000, dated July 31, 2012, pp. 4-5, paragraphs 8-12.
23 Id. at p. 4, paragraph 9.
RESPONDENT'S
- 9 -
TRIAL BRIEF
D-9
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
1 Petitioner's conduct has been oppressive as it has subjected Respondent to cruel and unjust hardship
2
in conscious disregard of his rights in, and urgent need for his share of, the $200,000 cash24.
V. Petitioner Intentionally Transferred the Lion's Share of the Parties, Cash to Her
4
Personal Account. Knowing It Would Disadvantage Respondent in the Impending
5
Dissolution Action
6
Petitioner may argue that she merely took about one half of the assets in the trust account,
7
leaving half for Respondent. However, the portion left for Respondent was mostly stock and
8 Petitioner vehemently objected to any stock sales by Respondent (even seeking sanctions against
9 Respondent when he did sell stock to pay his living expenses and attorney's fees!25'26). Why didn't
10 she transfer half the cash and half the stock to her personal account, vs. cash only, as she did? Being
11
the only one knowing that a dissolution action was about to be filed, Petitioner transferred only cash
becausethe person left with primarily stock (Respondent) would be at a disadvantage compared to
12
the person having all cash (Petitioner).
13
14
VI. Respondent requests that Petitioner be ordered to reimburse him for 100% of the value
15
of these assets and sanctioned for her conduct.
16 As Petitioner's reprehensible conduct in this series of breaches constituted at least one of
17 fraud, oppression, and malice within the meaning of CC §3294, Respondent requests a remedy
18 including an awardof 100 percent(or its equivalent) of the undisclosed / transferred community
19
assets. FC §1101(h). Particularly, Respondent requests $200,000, plus interest, for Petitioner's
breach of fiduciary duty with regard to Petitioner's clandestine transfer of $200,000 from the parties'
20
community trust account to her secret personal account. Respondent further requests an award of
21
attorney's fees and costs related to her breach of fiduciary duty.
22
In the event the Court does not find Petitioner's breaches fall within CC §3294 and §1101,
23
subdivision (h), Respondent requests, pursuant to FC §1101, subdivision (g), reimbursement of
24
50 percent of the undisclosed assets plus interest, attorney's fees, and costs.
25
26 24 Id at pp. 4-5, paragraphs 9-10.

25 See Declaration of Kathleen Kostas Frazier in Support of Request for Attorney's Fees and Costs, dated April 10, 2012,
27
paragraph 22 (note, due to Petitioner takingthe $200,000 cash, for the vast majority of this case, to get money from the
Schwab account, stock in that account had to be sold).
28
26 See Respondent Jeffery Frazier's Declaration in Support of Request for Order Re: Modification of Child Supportand
Spousal Support, and Sanctions in the Amount of $80,000, dated July 31, 2012, p. 5, paragraph 10.
- 10 -
D-10
Case Number
1
2
REQUEST FOR ORDER - RECOVER CUSTODY EVALUATION FEES AND COSTS
Fees and costs for the custody evaluation were reserved.

3
In Petitioner's hands, the restraining orders of the Court were equivalent to a termination of
4
Respondent's rights of visitation. In re Marriage of Epstein, 24 Cal. 3d 76 (1979). But for Petitioner's
5
defiant behavior, the cost of the evaluation would have been dramatically less, if it were needed at all.
6
Petitioner has repeatedly, recklessly alleged drug abuse by Respondent27. In his report, Dr.
7
Kerner states that, "Mother's allegation and fears of Father abusing illicit drugs are unfounded." He
8 further comments that this"does not constitute a drug testing situation."28.
9 In view of Petitioner's reckless accusations, misuse of the restraining orders, and her refusal
10 to negotiate visitation in good faith, Respondent requests the Court have Petitioner bear all the costs
11
ofthe custody evaluation. Respondent paid $8,718 for the private custody evaluator.29 (Exhibit N)
12
REQUEST FOR ORDER - SANCTIONS BASED ON ACCUSATIONS OF CHILD ABUSE IN
13
A CUSTODY PROCEEDING
14
During the custody proceedingsof this matter, Petitioner accused Respondent of abusive
15
behaviors with regards to the children. For example, she stated:
16
• "... his unpredictable behavior has threatened our safety..."30
17 • "He has screamed at our children, unable to control his rage..."31
18 • "I am ... seeking protection for [the children] from Respondent's violent and unstable
19 behavior."32
20
Further, Petitioner alleged abusive behaviors towards the children in her interviews with
custody evaluator, Dr. Michael Kerner.33
21
Petitioner has provided no evidence to support such serious allegations. Respondent denies
22
ever abusing the children. Respondent has neverexhibited unpredictable behaviorthreatening the
23
24 27 Forexample, see Declaration of Petitioner-Mother, Kathleen Frazier, in Opposition to Ex Parte Motion, dated February
4, 2011, p. 4, paragraph 8; and, ChildCustody Evaluation ReportRE FRAZIER, June 2, 2011, e.g., at pp. 4-5.
25 28 See Child Custody Evaluation Report RE FRAZIER, June 2, 2011, p. 26.
29 See Respondent Jeffery Frazier's Declaration in Support of Trial Brief, dated May 20, 2013, page4, paragraph 17.
26
30 Declaration of Kathleen Frazier in Supportof Request for Temporary Restraining Order, dated January 20,2011, p. 6,
paragraph 15.
27 31 Declaration of Petitioner-Mother, Kathleen Frazier, in Opposition to Ex Parte Motion, dated February4, 2011, p. 5,
paragraph 11.
28 32 Id. at p. 8, paragraph 17.
33 See Child Custody Evaluation Report RE FRAZIER, June 2, 2011, e.g., at p. 6 under the heading,"CHILD ABUSE"
- 11 -
D-11
Case Number
1 children's safety, screamed at the children in an out-of-control rage, acted violently towards the
2
children, or committed any other abuse or neglect.
A court may order sanctions against a party, attorney, or witness, if the court determines,
3
based on the investigation of allegations of child abuse described in FC §3027 or on other evidence
4
presented to it, that an accusation of child abuse or neglect made during a child custody proceeding is
5
false and the person making the accusation knew it to be false when the accusation was made.
6
Potential sanctions include reasonable money sanctions, not to exceed all costs incurred by the party
7
accused as a direct result of defending the accusation, and reasonable attorney fees incurred in
8 recovering the sanctions, against the person making the accusation. See FC §3027.1(a).
9 Respondent requests sanctions under FC §3027.1(a) against Petitioner for having made false
10
allegations of child abuse in a custody proceeding. Respondent paid $8,718 for the private custody
11
evaluator34 (Exhibits N) which resulted inclearing him of such false allegations.35
12
REQUEST THAT PETITIONER'S PAPERS RELATING TO HER REQUEST FOR
13
RESTRAINING ORDERS, AND RESPONDENT'S REPLY PAPERS, BE SEALED
14
Respondent's rights and interests will be prejudiced if the documents relating to Petitioner's
15
restraining-order request are not sealed.
16 A. This Court Has the Authority to Seal Its Record.
17 California has a long-standing tradition of open civil proceedings. This applies with equal
18 force to family law cases, although trial courts may redact or seal particular documents to protect
19
private information concerning an overriding privacy interest. (NBC Subsidiary. Inc. v. Superior
Court. 20 Cal. 4th 1178 (1999) (NBC Subsidiary); In re Marriage of Burkle. 135 Cal. App. 4th 1045
20
(2006)).
21
California Rules of Court 2.550 and 2.551 concern sealed records. Rule 2.550(d) details the
22
express factual findings required before a court can seal or unseal court records: "(1) There exists an
23
overriding interest that overcomes the right of public access to the record; (2) The overriding interest
24
supports sealing the record; (3) A substantial probability exists that the overriding interest will be
25 prejudiced if the record is not sealed; (4) The proposed sealing is narrowly tailored; and (5) No less
26 restrictive means exist to achieve the overriding interest."
27
28 34 See Respondent Jeffery Frazier's Declaration in Support ofTrial Brief, dated May 20, 2013, page 4, paragraph 17.
35 Id
RESPONDENT'S
- 12 -
TRIAL BRIEF D-12
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
1 B. Respondent's Interests in Privacy and Reputation Override the Public Interest in
2
Disclosure
As discussed below, the interests served by sealing the court record override public access.
3
4
Invasion of Privacy
5
The overriding interests discussed below are largely privacy-based (See, Statev. Cottman
6
Transmission. 542 A.2d 859, 864 (1988) ("interests compelling enough to overcome the presumption
7
of openness usually take the form of a privacy right")).
8 It is noted that the statements at issue here involve private individuals and matters of private
9 concern. As one Californiaappellate court has acknowledged, M[s]ince the statements at issue here
10 involved a matter of purely private concern communicated between private individuals, we do not
11
regard them as raising a First Amendment issue. 'While such speech is not totally unprotected by the
First Amendment, its protections are less stringent' [than that applying to speech on matters of public
12
concern]." (Savage v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co.. 21 Cal. App. 4th 434, 445 (1993) (26 Cal.Rptr.2d 305),
13
quoting Dun & Bradstreet. Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders. Inc.. 472 U.S. 749, 760 (1985) (105 S.Ct.
14
2939, 86 L.Ed.2d 593), internal citation omitted.)
15
Medical Information
16 The California Constitution guarantees all people certain inalienable rights, among them the
17 right of "pursuing and obtaining ... privacy." (Cal. Const, art. I, § 1) The right of privacy extends to
18 information in an individual's medical records, information about his or her physical and mental
19
condition, and information in his or her medical history. (John B. v. Superior Court. 38 Cal. 4th 1177,
1198-99 (2006); Hill v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n. 7 Cal. 4th 1, 41 (1994); Bd. of Med. Quality
20
Assurance v. Gherardini. 93 Cal. App. 3d 669, 678-79 (1979).

21
Various statutory enactments demonstrate that "established social norms" protect the
22
privacy of confidential medical records. In 1981, the California Legislature enacted the
23
Confidentiality of Medical Information Act. [1981 Cal. Stat. 782, § 1 (codified as amended at Cal.
24
Civ. Code §§ 56-56.37)]. One of the more well-known federal privacy-related acts is the Health
25 Insurance Portability and Accountability Act ("HIPAA"). These are but a couple of the numerous
26 protections afforded individuals' private medical information.
27 Public Disclosure of Private Facts
28
-
RESPONDENT'S
13 -
TRIAL BRIEF
D-13
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
1 Another overriding interest is that against the public disclosure of private facts. "Private facts
2
thathave absolutely no impact on the public may be of devastating importance to the parties who
want to protect those facts from public knowledge." 17 J. Am. Acad. Matrimonial Law. 107 (2001).
3
Petitioner's invasion of Respondent's privacy interests was unexpected and contrary to

4
established social norms. Respondent's reasonable expectation of privacy vis-a-vis Petitioneris
5
noteworthy. Two people who are married to each otherare in a fiduciary relationship. As part of that
6
relationship, there is a legal obligation not to disclose confidential information to a third party and not
7
to use confidential information for personal advantage. Communications between spouses, privately
8 made, are generally assumed to have been intended to be confidential. See Wolfle v. United States.
9 291 U.S. 7, 54 S. Ct. 279, 78 L. Ed. 617 (1934) (internal citations omitted); Blau v. United States.
10 340 U.S. 332, 71 S. Ct. 301, 95 L. Ed. 306 (1951).
11
None of Petitioner's personal factual disclosures about Respondent have any social value;
they are not newsworthy; they extend deeply into Respondent's private life; and, Respondent has
12
never consented to publicity. The public has no legitimate interest in the objectionable statements.
13
This is particularly true since Petitioner never substantiated her request for restraining orders and
14
even dismissed her request with prejudice.
15
False Light / Defamation
16
As an invasion of privacy claim, a plaintiff must show that a defendant made statements
17 placing him in a false light that would be highly offensive to a reasonable person. (Fellows v. Nat'l
18 Enquirer. Inc.. 42 Cal. 3d 234,238-39 (1986)) "Defamation is an invasion of the interest in
19
reputation." Smith v. Maldonado. 72 Cal. App. 4th 637, 645 (1999). Not only are direct, false
20
accusations and charges of misconduct wrong, California courts have held that descriptive words or
opinions that carry with them the implication of acts of misconduct are actionable. See, e.g.,
21
Maidman v. Jellish Publ'ns. 54 Cal. 2d 643 (1960).
22
Respondent has been portrayed in a false light and endured damage to his reputation in the
23
parties' tight-knit community as a result of Petitioner's portrayal of him as a domestic violence
24
offender to friends and acquaintances. He has been shunned and avoided, as described in his
25 Declaration36.
26
27
28 36 Respondent Jeffery Frazier's Declaration in Support of Request for Order Re: Modification ofChild Support and
Spousal Support, and Sanctions in the Amount of $80,000, dated July 31, 2012, p. 16, paragraph 46.

- 14 -
D-14
Case Number
1 The Public Interest in Disclosure Must Be a Legitimate One
2
As the Supreme Court stated in Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001), privacy concerns
give way to First Amendment rights only when there is a legitimate public concern at stake.
3
It is simply not realistic that the public could have a legitimate interest in a private family
4
matter involving private individuals, where the matter involves false statements, private facts,
5
defamatory statements, and unproven accusations that have been dismissed with prejudice.
6
7
The Common Law Right of Access is not Absolute
8 In Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc.. 435 U.S. 589, 591 (1978) the Supreme Court declared
9 that the common-law right of access was "not absolute" and listed situations where access may be
10 denied. Nixon. 435 U.S. at 598. For example, use of court files for improper purposes such as: (1)
11
where there is "publication of'the painful and sometimes disgusting details of a divorce case1"
(emphasis added) (quoting In re Caswell. 29 A. 259 (R.I. 1893)); and, (2) where publications contain
12
libelous statements.
13
14
The Proposed Sealing Is Narrowly Tailored and No Less Restrictive Means Exist
15
Respondent's request to have Petitioner's Declaration and Opposition Declaration, and his
16 Responsive Declaration and Supplement Declaration placed under seal meets the factual findings
17 required before a court can seal or unseal court records. For example:
18 • (1) There existsan overriding interest in Respondent's constitutionally-mandated right to
19
privacy. Further, there exists an overriding personal interest in his reputation. The interest in
protecting one's reputation is particularly strong for private persons in private matters. These
20
interests overcome the right of public access.

21
• (2) The overriding interests support sealing the record. If the information sought to be
22
protected is not sealed, Respondent's constitutional right to privacy will be meaningless. Similarly, if
23
the defamatory statements are not sealed, it is probable that Respondent will be further defamed.
24
• (3) A substantial probability exists that these overriding interests will be prejudiced if the
25 record is not sealed, because Respondent will lose the constitutional right to privacy in the disclosed
26 information. If the records are not sealed, Respondent will have no way to protect his reputation
27 from on-going damage due to Petitioner's public disclosures.
28
RESPONDENT'S
- 15 -
TRIAL BRIEF
D-15
Case Number
II 6-11-FL-005500
1 • (4) and (5) The proposed sealing is narrowly tailored and no less restrictive means exist to
2
achieve the overriding interest of his right to privacy in the disclosed information. Due to the public
disclosure of confidential information and defamatory statements throughout these papers, there is no
3
other tailoring that would adequately protect Respondent's rights and interests.
4
5
FINAL REMARKS RE SEALING
6
Specific objectionable materials are identified in Respondent Jeffery Frazier's Declaration in
7
Support of Request for Order Re: Modification of Child Support and Spousal Support, and Sanctions
8 in the Amount of $80,000, dated July 31, 2012, incorporated herein by reference.
9 Respondent has been falsely accused of domestic violence. This court granted temporary
10 relief to the accuser. Going forward, persons accessing the court records will be left with, at a
11
minimum, a question in their minds as to whether or not Respondent is a perpetrator of domestic
violence. By this, at least, it is probable that Respondent's reputation will be tarnished and he will be
12
seen in a false light. Among others, potential employers, clients, and eventually the children may
13
access the materials. Without the relief requested herein, it is probable that Respondent's
14
constitutional privacy interests and his right to protect his reputation will be seriously prejudiced.
15
Respondent could not possibly find those persons that would access the court records and rehabilitate
16 his reputation. Respondent could not expel those that would intrude upon his privacy interests.
17
18 REQUESTED ORDERS
19
Respondent requests that the Court issue the following orders:
• Section 271 Sanctions
20
Petitioner shall immediatelypay to Respondent sanctions in the amount of $80,000.

21
• Prevailing Party Attorney's Fees and Costs

22
Petitioner shall immediately pay to Respondent prevailing party attorney's fees and costs in
23
the amount of $80,000.
24
• Breach of Fiduciary Duty
25
Intentional or Actual Fraudulent Intent Breach
26 Petitioner shall immediately pay to Respondent $200,000, plus interest.

27 Petitioner shall immediately pay to Respondent an award of attorney's fees and costs in the
28 amount of $5,000.
- 16 -
D-16
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
1 Qr,
2
Breach Other Than Intentional or With Actual Fraudulent Intent
Petitioner shall immediately reimburse Respondent in the amount of $100,000. plus interest.
3
Petitioner shall immediately pay to Respondent an award of attorney's fees and costs in the
4
amount of $5,000.
5
• Costs of Custody Evaluation
6
Petitioner shall immediately reimburse Respondent in the amount of $8,718.00.
7
• False Accusations of Child Abuse
8 Petitioner shall immediately pay to Respondent $8,718.00 as sanctions.
• Sealing
10 The following documents relating to Petitioner's request for restraining orders shall be sealed:
11
A. Request for Order - filed 1/26/11
B. Declaration of Kathleen Frazier in Support of TRO - filed 1/26/11
12
:3
C. Declaration of Kimberly K. Glass - filed 1/26/11
14
D. Declaration in Support of Ex Parte Application for Order - filed 1/26/11
15 E. CLETS - Temporary Restraining Order w/ Parenting Plan - filed 1/26/11
16 F. Responsive Declaration to OSC - filed 2/4/11
17 G. Order to Show Cause - filed 2/7/11
18 H. Declaration of Jeff Frazier in Support of Ex Parte Request - filed 2/7/11
19 I. Answer to Temporary Restraining Order - filed 2/14/11
20 J. Restraining Order After Hearing - filed 2/16/11
21 K. Supplemental Declaration of Respondent - filed 3/4/11

22 L. Restraining Order After Hearing - filed 4/13/11
23
Respectfully submitted.
24
25
26
Dated: May 20. 2013
r, Respondent. In Pro Per. SBN 157792
27
2£
RESPONDENT'S
- 17 -
TRIAL BRIEF
D-17
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
1 Jeffery D. Frazier SBN 157792
14 Arastradero Road
2 Portola Valley, California 94028
Telephone: (650) 275-2112
3 Email: [email protected]
4 Respondent in pro per
5
7
8
9
10
Case No.: 6-11-FL-005500
In re the Marriage of:
11
TRIAL BRIEF EXHIBITS
12
Dept: 82, Zayner
and
13
14
15
Exhibit Description Paeeft)
16
A Schwab statement for period 1/1/11 to 1/31/11 showing undisclosed $200K 1-4
17
cash transfer by Petitioner on 1/19/11.
18
B R. Frye 3/7/11 email re "non-negotiable" terms of visitation. 5-6
19
C Petitioner's 9/11/10 email: "Jeff is a really great person, and can be a great
20
co-parent."
21
D Petitioner's 8/6/10 email: "I am sooo, soooo, soooo glad that we are all going
22
to be together this year. <big sigh of relief>"
23
E Petitioner's 6/26/10 email: "It has been awesome having [Jeff] around."
24
F R. Frye 4/18/11 letter stating intent to move forward with Sept. hearing for
25
full CLETS orders.
26
G Respondent's invoices from Law Office ofJohn M. Ferrera for this
27
litigation.
28 PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT NO.
JefTcry D. Frazier
14 Arastradero Road
Marri age of Frazier
CaselMo:6-ll-FL-005500
D-18
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
D-18 Pag el of 2
Portola Valley. CA 94028 Case Number
(650)533-9138
Trial 1Brief Exhibit List
6-11-FL-005500
1 11 Respondent's invoices from Daprile-Bell Family Law Offices for this
2 litigation.
3 Respondent's Bill.com vendor expense report for this litigation

4 Respondent's 5/27/11 email to Petitionerseeking to reduce tensions, etc.
5 K Respondent's 2/12/11 text to Petitioner seeking to reduce tensions, etc.
6 1. Respondent's 4/20/11 email to Petitionerseeking to reduce tensions, etc.
7 M Offer-of-employment letter dated 9/26/12 to Petitioner from Rocket Fuel Inc.
8 N Respondent's invoices from custody evaiuator Michael J. Kerner, Ph.D. for
9 this litigation.
10
11
12
Respectfully submitted,
13
14
15 Dated: May 19.2013

16
Jeffery Frazier, Respondent, In Pro Per. SBN 157792
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
JelYery D Frazier
Marriage of Frazier D-19 Page 2 of 2
M Arastradero Road CaseNo:6-ll-FL-005500
Portola Valley. CA 94028
Case Number
Trial Brief Exhibit List
(650)533-9138
6-11-FL-005500
1 LAW OFFICES OF NEDDA A. LEDGERWOOD
408.730.0333 (T)
3 408.732.0709 (F)
[email protected]
4
5 Attorney for KATHLEEN KOSTAS

fka KATHLEEN FRAZIER
6
7 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
9
CaseNo.6-ll-FL-005500
10 In re Marriage of:
11 KATHLEEN KOSTAS
PETITIONER'S TRIAL BRIEF PURSUANT
12 Petitioner, TO 4/17/2013 COURT ORDER TO SUBMIT
POSITION RE: ATTORNEY'S FEES, COSTS,
13 and AND SANCTIONS, BY PLEADINGS
14 JEFFERY FRAZIER Hearing Date: 5/20/2013

Time: 9:00 AM
15 Respondent Hon. Theodore C. Zayner
Dept. 82
16
17
18 PETITIONER'S REQUEST
19
20 1. Attorney's Fees and Costs: Petitioner, Kathleen Kostas ("Kathy"), requests the Court order
21 Respondent, Jeffery Frazier ("Jeff"), pay 84% of her attorney's fees and costs, the sum of which
22 is $165,785.12 (Kathy's total fees and costs to date is $197,363.24). She also requests the Court
23 deny Jeffs request for Kathy to pay his attorney fees and costs.
24
25 2. Sanctions: Kathy requests the Court sanction Jeff $30,000. She also requests the Court deny
26 Jeffs request for sanctions against her.
27
28 Reasoning to support Kathy's requested orders above follow below.
Case #6-1 l-FL-005500
E-1
PETITIONER'S TRIAL BRIEF PURSUANT TO 4/17/2013 COURT ORDER Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
1 STATEMENT OF FACTS
2 Kathy and Jeff married on April 8, 1995 and stipulated to a separation date of October 1, 2010
3 They were married for 15 years and 6 months. They have two children of the marriage: Kalista, age 11
4 and Lauren, age 7.
5 Kathy filed for dissolution of marriage on January 26, 2011, as well as ex parte temporary
6 restraining orders, which was partially granted. Kathy attempted to attend mediation with Jeff, but soon
7 learned that mediation was not yet the appropriate forum for their divorce. Since then, the parties have
8 been heavily engaged in litigation. Kathy initially retained attorney Rebekah Frye, and was represented
9 by her into September 2011. In September, 2011, attorney Nedda Ledgerwood became Kathy's attorney
10 of record. Ms. Ledgerwood is still Kathy's attorney.
11 Jeff retained attorney John Ferrera, who was his attorney through May 2011. In May 2011,
12 attorney Natalie Daprile became Jeffs attorney of record. Ms. Daprile was substituted out in December
13 2012, at which timeJeff no longer maintained legal counsel for this matter.
14 Between Ms. Ledgerwood, Mr. Jack Peth (Kathy's forensic accountant), Kathy, Jeff, and the
15 Court's Pro Tern system, the parties were able to reach an agreement and submit for Judgment on
16 4/17/2013 the issue of property division. Procedurally, they are managing the issues of child
17 custody/visitation, child support, and spousal support separately.
18 However, in the 4/17/2013 Judgment, the parties agreed to submit by the pleadings the issue of
19 attorney's fees, costs and sanctions. At the 4/17/2013 MSC, the Court ordered the parties to submit said
20 pleadings by or before the hearing set for May 20, 2013 at 9:00 a.m. in Department 82 before the
21 Honorable Theodore Zayner. The Court did not require the parties to file current Income and Expense
22 Declarations, nor did the Court require the parties to file current judicial council forms and/or further
23 pleadings for the purpose ofthis request for attorney's fees, costs, and sanctions.
24 A. Income of the parties:
25 The below spreadsheet is an assessment ofthe respective incomes of each party, the information
26 from which was derived from many of the parties' filed Income and Expense Declarations withthe
27 Court. It shows that Jeff has earned significantly more than Kathy, and during periods in which she
28 earned no income, he paid nothing toward her attorney's fees and costs.
Case #6-1 l-FL-005500
E-2
6-11-FL-005500
Petitioner/Wife Respondent/Husband
2009
2 Income from regular salary $0 $395,006
Total Income 2009: so $395,006

3
4 2010
Income from regular salary $0 $395,006

5
Total Income 2010: $0 $395,006

6
DOS: 10/1/2010
7 (Kathy filed 1/2011) 2011
Income from regular salary $0 $225,000

8
Income from self-employment $0 $17,108
9
Income from rental of rooms
in house $0 $25,800
10
Income from airplane rental $0 $17,939
11
Income from spousal support $55,884 $0
Total Income 2011: $55,884 $285,847

12
13
2012
14 Income from regular salary $27,552 $225,000
Income from self-employment $0 $2,748

15
16 in house _$0 $25,800
Income from airplane rental $0 $41,220

17
Income from spousal support $48,728 $0
18
Note Jeff paid $20,000 toward
19 attorney's fees in 2012
Total Income 2012: $76,280 $294,768
20
21 Through March 2013

Income from regular salary $25,749 $0
22
Income from self-employment $0 $35,037.50 per Jeffs emails
23
in house $0 $6,450 + unstated cash?
24
Income from airplane rental $0 unknown

25
Income from spousal support $0 $0
26 Paymenttowards attorney's
fees $0 $0
27 Total Income through March
2013: 1,583 per month $13,829 per month (+ cash?)
28
Case #6-1 l-FL-005500
E-3
6-11-FL-005500
1 Simply stated, at all times Jeff has earned significantly more than Kathy.
2 Based on the calculations of Mr. Jack Peth in reviewing the parties' respective gross incomes,
3 Jeffshould pay at least 84% of Kathy's litigation expenses (Exhibit A). This is based on what the
4 parties have earned in income, paid and incurred in attorney's fees and coststhrough October 2012 (an
5 update was not possible). Throughout litigation, they have evidently notbeen onequal footing in ability
6 to pay their own litigation fees and costs. Please note that Mr. Petri's spreadsheet only includes fees
7 incurred after October 2012.
8 a. Kathy's Fees and Costs (Exhibit B):
9 Kathy has paid and owes the following fees and costs:
10 1. Rebekah Frye $88,065.45 2011 fees Kathy paid. In 2011 Jeffpaid $0 in fees toKathy, while she
11 earned $0 and Jeff earned $285,847. Funds to pay her attorney came
12 from the parties'joint Schwab account, and those funds were allocated
13 and charged to Kathy for non-attorney fee purposes and instead wentto
14 children expenses, their education, and basic living needs.
15 2. Nedda Ledgerwood $43,000 September 2011 through the current date fees paid. $20,000 ofthese fees
16 paid byJeff($10,000 in December 2011 by agreement and $10,000 by
17 Court order in November 2012).
18 3. Nedda Ledgerwood ($14,320.81) Kathy owes this amount toMs. Ledgerwood. She owes a further retainer
19 of $5,000.
20 4. Costs $42,976.98 Kathy paid Court runner fees, court filing fees, copy costs, subpoenas,
21 forensic accounting fees, custodyexpert fees, consulting attorney and
22 expert fees). Please note that additional funds should be included in
23 costs, but obtaining an accounting of those costswas not possible by the
24 May 20, 2013 deadline.
25 5. Jack Peth ($9,953.75) Kathy owes this amount to Mr. Peth.
26 TOTAL PAID: $173,088.68
27 AMOUNT OWED: +24,274.56 (to Nedda Ledgerwood and Jack Peth)
28 TOTAL INCURRED: $197,363.24
Case #6-1 l-FL-005500
E-4
6-11-FL-005500
Kathy anticipates additional fees and costs for the issues of child custody and visitation, aswell
2 as child and spousal support. If Jeffcooperates reasonably with Kathy, then additional fees should not
3 exceed $1,000.
4 However, If Jeff does not cooperate, then Kathy will spendat least an additional $10,000 in
5 order to litigate, prepare for hearing, appear at a hearing, communicate back and forth with opposing
6 party, and conduct any other action necessary to achieve orders for Kathy onopen issues inthis case,
7 one of which is imputation of income to Jefffor the purpose of child and spousal support.
8
9 b. Jeffs Fees and Costs:
10 In his Income and Expense Declaration filed on November 13, 2012, Jeff states he has paid
11 $127,909 in attorney's fees ($13,500 to his initial attorney and $114,409 to Natalie Daprile, Esq.). This
12 amount does not include what he has paid in costs (expert fees, court fees, appraisals, co-parent
13 counseling, etc.). In order to comport with the principles and policies of the Family Code, it is
14 appropriate for the Court to order that Jeff pay 84% ofKathy's fees based on the facts identified above.
15 Jeff has also paid, per verbal agreement, Kathy's expert, Mr. Peth, $442.40 on April 8,2013. Jefi
16 agreed to pay Mr. Peth for time Jeff used to further understand Mr. Peth's accounting. There were
17 multiple other meetings and hearings in which Mr. Peth prepared for and was present. Without the
18 assistance of Mr. Peth, the parties would nothave reached settlement on 4/17/2013.
19
20 c. Source of liquid funds from which attorney's fees, costs and sanctions are available:
21 The April 17, 2013 Judgment provides that the family residence located at 14 Arastradero Road
22 in Portola Valley shall be listed for sale by June 1, 2013. Thus, it is from the anticipated equity proceeds
23 from which the Court may grant fees, costs, and sanctions.
24 The parties agreed to list the property for $1,795,000, and with a mortgage ofroughly $892,000
25 against it, that leaves at least $815,000 in equity ($903,000 less estimated cost of sale of $88,000 =
26 $815,000). There is no question that the property will sell in the current real estate market. The
27 assumption is that the property will sell for above the asking price, but at the least, the parties stand to
28
Case #6-1 l-FL-005500
E-5
6-11-FL-005500
A"
each receive $407,500 (one-half of $815,000). This shows Jeff will have liquid fund available to pay
2 Kathy's reasonable attorney's fees and costs, as well as sanctions.
3 The Court may note that per their 4/17/2013 Judgment, the parties agreed to retain $150,000
4 from the sale proceeds in a trust account pending a later determination of attorney's fees, costs, and
5 sanctions. The purpose ofretaining these funds was to allow the Court to use at least these funds to pay
6 one side or the other reasonable attorney's fees and costs, as well as sanctions, based on the history of
7 this case. The Court is not limited to only the $150,000 in awarding attorney's fees, costs and sanctions.
8 It is merely another option for the Court to use inmaking its decision.
9
10 ARGUMENT
11
12 1. ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS
13 In applying the facts outlined above, Kathy requests the Court order Jeffto pay 84% of her
14 reasonable attorney's fees and costs pursuant to California Family Code §2030 et. seq. and applicable
15 case law.
16 A. Kathy is entitled to fees pursuant to Family Code §2030.

17
The purpose ofa §2030 fee award is to ensure "parity between spouses in their ability to obtain
18 legal representation." Hogoboom &King, Cal. Prac. Guide: Family Law (The Rutter Group 2008)
19 1(14:155. The Court's decision on arequest for §2030 fees must be based on (1) an assessment ofthe
20
parties' respective income and needs, (2) whether there is adisparity in their respective access to funds,
21
and (3) whether one party is able to pay for legal representation ofboth parties. Id Ultimately, afee
22 award must be "just and reasonable" under the "relative circumstances" (need and ability to pay) ofthe
23
respective parties. 14 (parenthetical added). Family Code §2032 makes clear that the parties' "relative
24 circumstances" must reflect consideration ofall available sources from which fees could be paid (i.e. the
25 parties' community property, separate property, principal or income). IcL at 1(14:165. Finally, inquiry
26 into the parties' relative circumstances must be made to the parties' present need and ability to pay. Id
27 at 1(14:161.
28 //
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^
1 a. Kathv's Income
2 During the three years of 2009 to 2011, Kathy did not earn any income. When Kathy first
3 filed for divorce in January 2011, she had absolutely no income, and received nothing towards her
4 attorney's fees. But in December 2011, Jeffagreed to pay $10,000 towards Kathy's attorney's fees and
5 costs. But this amount is negligible compared to what Kathy and Jeff have occurred, and with him
6 historically earning significantly more than Kathy, the Court may order him to pay 84% ofher
7 reasonable attorney's fees and costs.
8 Kathy only began working again in 2012 atvarious temporary positions, first as a Business
9 Development Manager for Pro Unlimited Inc., and later as a Contracts Manager for Barnes and Noble.
10 These positions were all part-time, and only on aconsulting basis. As a result, her income fluctuated
11 constantly depending on the number ofhours ofwork she was able to get, with her average gross salary
12 ranging anywhere from approximately $450 per month (see Petitioner's Income and Expense
13 Declaration filed 4/11/2012), to $2,296 per month (see Petitioner's Income and Expense Declaration
14 filed 10/3/12). It was not until October 2012 that she began working full-time atRocket Fuel, Inc.,
15 where she currently earns a gross monthly income ofapproximately $8,583 permonth (See Petitioner's
16 Income and Expense Declaration filed 12/19/2012).
17 With regard to spousal support payments, Kathy has not received regular, consistent payments
18 ofspousal support since the summer of2012. Pursuant to the Stipulation and Order filed July 1,2011,
19 Jeff was ordered to pay Kathy $4,657 permonth inspousal support, including arrears dating back to
20 January 26, 2011 when Kathy first initiated dissolution proceedings. Jeff was later ordered to pay Kathy
21 $2,868 per month pursuant to the parties' stipulation entered on the record on August 22, 2012.
22 However, Jeffs payments towards Kathy's spousal support were very irregular and varied greatly from
23 month to month (see Petitioner's Income and Expense Declaration filed 4/11/2012 atpage 2, line "e";
24 see also Petitioner's Income and Expense Declaration filed 10/13/12 at page 2, line "e"). Because Jeff
25 has chosen to work for himself, he has not beenworking to his potential, and his earnings havebeen
26 significantly less than how much he can make. By stipulation and pending further hearing, Jeff has not
27 paidany support to Kathy since December 2012.
28 Kathy has also not gained substantial liquid assets from the division ofthe parties' community
Case #6-1 l-FL-005500
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1 property to allow herto pay for herown fees. Funds from the joint Schwab account, in which they
2 had over $400,000, has been liquidated and charged to both parties for non-attorney fee purposes.
3 Numerous assets awarded to Kathy have no cash value, specifically the three Bank of America
4 accounts that all have a current balance of $0, or are not liquid assets that Kathy can easily sell to pay for
5 her attorney's fees. Further, her anticipated receipt of certain assets, such as the money inthe Wells
6 Fargo Looking Up LLC account, the proceeds from the house sale, and the proceeds from the sale ofthe
7 Cessna airplane, is contingent upon certain events occurring first, all of which require active steps on
8 Jeffs part. Thus, even with the division ofthe parties' assets, Kathy does not have sufficient liquid
9 assets to pay for her significant amount ofattorney's fees and costs, and there remains a significant
10 disparity between the parties' respective incomes and ability to pay for attorney's fees. Itis not
II justifiable that Jeff can afford legal representation during times when Kathy cannot. To order otherwise
12 shirks the principles set forth inthe California family code and applicable case law.
13
14 b. Jeffs Income
15 Jeffis anintellectual property attorney and until October 2012, was the Vice President of
16 Intellectual Property for Kateeva, Inc., where he earned an average gross salary of $225,000 per year.
17 He currently earns substantial additional income from self-employment as a legal consultant, rental of
18 various rooms inthe parties' Portola Valley residence, and renting his airplane. (See Respondent's
19 Income and Expense Declaration filed 11/13/12) Prior to his employment with Kateeva, Inc., Jeff was
20 working for Life Technologies and earned an average gross salary of$395,006 per year.
21
22 Acomparison ofJeffand Kathy's respective incomes from 2009 to present clearly reveals Kathy
23 has had no income both prior to the parties' separation and during the majority ofthis dissolution
24 proceeding. Only recently has Kathy began to earn income. This clearly demonstrates a "disparity in
25 access to funds," as defined under California Family Code §2030, and also signifies Jeffs ability to pay
26 Kathy's fees and her reasonable need for him to contribute to her fees. The Court may order Jeff pay
27 toward Kathy's attorney's fees and costs in order to allow for parity between the parties.
28
in re Marriage of FRAZIER
Case #6-1 l-FL-005500
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1 Jeffmay argue that he does not have an attorney at the moment because he cannot afford one.
2 However, Jeff is a licensed Californiaattorney and made the independent choice to represent himselfin
3 December 2012. His decision to representhimselfcannot be viewed as anything but an independent
4 choice, as opposed to any inability to afford an attorney.
5 In conclusion, the substantial disparity in eachparties' access to funds, Jeffs higher earnings
6 than Kathy, Jeffs ability to pay Kathy's attorney's fees, and Kathy's need for hishelp to pay toward her
7 fees, demonstrates that Kathy is clearly entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to the terms of California
8 Family Code §2030 and applicable case law.
9
10 2. FAMILY CODE S271 SANCTIONS
11 Jeff is subject to §271 sanctions because his conduct actively frustrated settlement and
12 hindered cooperation between the parties, resulting in substantial unnecessary fees and costs.
13 The Court may base an attorney fees and costs award "tothe extent to which the conduct ofeach
14 party orattorney furthers orfrustrates the policy ofthe law to promote settlement oflitigation and,
15 where possible, to reduce the cost oflitigation by encouraging cooperation between the parties and
16 attorneys." Family Code §271 (a). Family Code §271 imposes a minimum level ofprofessionalism and
17 cooperation to effect the policy favoring settlement offamily law litigation—and a reduction ofthe
18 attendant costs. In re Marriage of Davenport, (2011) 194 Cal. App. 4th 1507, 1524. Litigants who flout
19 that policy by engaging inconduct that increases litigation costs are subject to imposition ofattorney
20 fees and costs as a section 271 sanction. In re Marriage of Corona (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1205,1225.
21 Section 271 authorizes sanctions to advance the policy of promoting settlement of litigation and
22 encouraging cooperation of the litigants and does not require any actual injury. Davenport at 1524. The
23 fee award pursuant to this section is in the nature ofa sanction. Family Code §271(a).
24 In the instant matter, both Jeff and Kathy have requested Family Code §271 sanctions against
25 one another.
26 A. The Court may deny Jeffs request for sanctions against Kathy.
27 Kathy asks that Jeffs request for Family Code §271 sanctions be denied in its entirety as his
28 motion has no proper legal basis.
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1 As stated in Kathy's Mandatory Settlement Conference (MSC) statement, on July 31,2012, Jeff
2 filed a motion requesting sanctions in the amount of $80,000 against Kathy. Jeffclaimed that Kathy
3 filed a baseless ex-parte request for a restraining order onJanuary 26, 2011, which was granted inpart,
4 and claimed that Kathy did not act in goodfaith during negotiations regarding Jeff visiting the children,
5 thus resulting in Jefflosing significant visitation time with his children during the year 2011.
6 Kathy and Jeffexchanged 189 emails for the first part of 2011, with Kathy attempting to give
7 Jeff time withthe children, however, most oftenhe would not change his cycling schedule to
8 accommodate seeing his daughters. The worst was when he refused to pick up the girls atthe Stanford
9 Shopping Center McDonald's on Father's Day 2011 because itwas not convenient for him, and not
10 letting Kathy know after making the girls wait an hour. She had them driven to and from his house to
11 accommodate his needs. Email examples are attached to Jeffs April 8, 2013 MSC statement and Reply
12 Declaration filed on about April 12,2013, and are attached here as well as Exhibit C.
13 Jefffails to acknowledge thatKathy's request for a restraining order was due to her substantial
14 fear that Jeff posed a significant threat to the entire family. Jeffs behavior atthe time ofKathy's filing
15 was dangerous, demeaning, unpredictable, he even took pictures ofKathy naked without her knowledge
16 orconsent, and his behavior was reminiscent ofthe time she broke up with him in 1993 after finding out
17 he used crystal meth. As a result, Kathy was afraid for both her life and the wellbeing ofher children,
18 and definitely did have grounds for filing her ex-parte request, despite Jeffs assertions that itwas
19 entirely baseless (Exhibit D).
20 The court additionally granted Kathy's request for a restraining order in part, clearly
21 demonstrating that the court did not find her claim frivolous or without just cause. Kathy did not file her
22 request in an attempt to increase the costs oflitigation or flout settlement, but filed with a good faith
23 belief that she was in danger and needed the court's protection. This is not the type of conduct that the
24 court has expressly contemplated as sanctionable under Family Code §271.
25 B. The Court may grant Kathy's request for sanctions against Jeff.
26 In contrast, Jeffs conduct and actions throughout this case fall squarely within the scope of
27 sanctionable conduct pursuant to Family Code §271.
28
Case #6-1 l-FL-005500
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6-11-FL-005500
1 In addition to what has been identified above, other examples exist, as follows, noting that the
2 below list is not complete:
3 1. Timing of Jeffs sanction request against Kathy for $80,000:

4 a. Jeff submitted this filing on July 31, 2012, the day before a Court hearing for Kathy's request
5 for child-related reimbursements, attorney's fees, and other issues. This shows his attemptto
6 frustrate settlement or coerce Kathy into settlement on the eve of hearing. He chose the day
7 before a hearing, after having waited more than 1 and lA years after Kathy's ex-parte request
8 was filed before even bringing his request for sanctions, which is clearly a showing of bad
9 faith conduct.
10 2. Delay of Court ordered fee award:

11 a. The Court ordered Jeffto pay the $10,000 to Kathy per Order filed onNovember 9,2012. By
12 this order, Jeffwas to pay her this amount by December 1, 2012, but hedid not pay her those
13 funds until the end of December 2012, after the Court ordered due date. He also attempted to
14 negotiate out of having to paythe Court ordered fees.

15 b. Nonetheless, while the slight delay is tolerable, the delay should not exist. The further
16 negotiation even after a Court order was made and the delay in payment are just other
17 examples frustrating the case, needless communication between parties, and wasted effort
18 that pulls parties away from settlement. Itis just this type ofconduct Kathy asks the Court
19 sanction in hope to avoid the conduct reoccurring in the future.
20 3. Initial Meeting with a mediator in January 2011:
21 a. Immediately prior to Kathy's initial filing for divorce in January 2011, the parties attempted
22 a mediation session in January 2011. At that time, Jeffwas employed full time and through
23 his employer, whom provided health insurance for Kathy and their two daughters. Jeff told
24 Kathy hewas going to remove her from his health insurance because she had called the
25 police to protect her against Jeff during an event where she feared for her safety. After the
26 mediation session, Jeff ended up not removingKathy from his health insurance.
27 b. While this is a relatively small incident that occurred, this unbalanced and unreasonable form
28 of negotiation has been prevalent throughout this litigation process. It is this conduct that
Case #6-1 l-FL-005500
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6-11-FL-005500
1 Kathy requests theCourt to sanction Jeff, inhope that for the remainder oftheir children's
2 lives while under this Court's jurisdiction (Kali is 11 and Lauren in 7), Jeff will focus and act
3 on reasonable compromise.
4 4. Paying Court ordered child-related reimbursements:

5 a. Kathy filed a motion on April 11,2012 inorder to get Jeff to pay court ordered child-related
6 reimbursement claims, among other requests. The parties attempted to resolve this issue at an
7 SOC on June 12, 2012. Kathy offered to offset Jeffs overpayment of support against
8 reimbursements due to Kathy. Jeff said no.
9 b. However, in Jeff s Responsive Declaration filed on or about July 31,2012, page 13,
10 paragraph 36, itreads in the middle ofthe paragraph: "Likewise, given that the parties
11 already reached a settlement on this issue and agreed to offset these costs with my
12 overpayments ofsupport, Petitioner's request for $2,000 in sanctions should be denied."
13 c. This "agreement" was news to Kathy's attorney, who then contacted Jeffs attorney but his
14 attorney would not respond to her call. Kathy did not know why they would continue
15 litigating this issue ifhe was already in agreement, but still he forced the issue to hearing,
16 which was a complete waste ofthe Court's and the parties' respective time and resources.
17 Eitherthere was a miscommunication between Jeff and his attorney, or they used the hearing
18 date in bad faith for their own agenda. Either way, the conduct cannot becondoned by the
19 Court.
20 5. Sale of community residence:
21 a. Pursuant to paragraph 1ofthe parties' Stipulated Judgment entered on April 17, 2013, the
22 parties were to list the family residence at 14 Arastradero Road in Portola Valley for sale.
23 Paragraph 3 ofthe judgment additionally required that the parties choose a selling agent by
24 May 1, 2013, and ifthey were unable to agree on an agent, Ed Mills, who had been granted
25 judiciary authority to oversee the sale ofthe residence, was tochoose an agent.
26 b. The parties were unable to choose an agent by May 1st, as required. Therefore, on May 2n ,
27 Kathy's attorney, Ms. Ledgerwood requested Judge Mills choose an agent per the terms of
28 the judgment. However, Jeff proceeded to confuse Judge Mills as to the current status ofthe
Case #6-1 l-FL-005500
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6-11-FL-005500
sale, causing Judge Mills to believe thatthe parties had already selected a listing agent. Ms.
Ledgerwood was therefore required to send additional e-mails to Judge Mills in an effort to
rectify this problem, and Judge Mills ultimately selected Ginny and Joe Kavanaugh as the
4 listing agents, the names submitted by Ms. Ledgerwood.
5 c. Following Judge Mills' order, Jeff proceeded to make matters even worse bytelling the
6 Kavanaughs to include additional terms into the proposed listing agreement that were not
7 part ofany court orders and claiming that they were in accordance with Judge Mills'
8 previous e-mails to the parties. The Kavanaughs became very confused and contacted Ms.
9 Ledgerwood for further guidance.
io d. Between May 2nd and May 3rd alone, Ms. Ledgerwood had to send numerous separate e-
11 mails to Judge Mills, Jeff, and the Kavanaughs simply to clarify the explicit orders from the
12 court orders and to advise that no additional terms were to be added to the listing agreement.
13 It was only after Ms. Ledgerwood requested an additional Settlement Officer Conference
14 with Judge Mills that Jefffinally agreed to sign the listing agreement inthe judge's presence.
15 Over 16 emails, telephone calls to coordinate the SOC, telephone calls with the agent,
16 preparation for the SOC, and the SOC appearance all occurred because Jeff created an issue
n for his own benefit, one thatdid not exist, and resulted in wasting the Court's and Kathy's
18 respective time and resources (Exhibit E).
!9 e. This incident provides a typical example ofJeffs behavior throughout this case. He will
20 constantly claim that his improper conduct conforms to the court orders, which in turn causes
2i Kathy and her attorney to spend additional time and money simply to force Jeff to realize that
22 the court orders do not allow him to engage in such actions.
23 6. Inability to comply with January 3,2013 Court Order:
24 a. Pursuant to the January 3, 2013, stipulation and order, Jeffis subject to an Employment
25 Efforts Order and is required to submit his work efforts on a monthly basis. While his efforts
26 appeared reasonable inJanuary 2013, his efforts become very infrequent through April 2013,
27 thus showing he is not in compliance with the January 3, 2013 order
28
In reMarriage of FRAZIER
Case #6-1 l-FL-005500
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6-11-FL-005500
1 b. In addition, Ms. Ledgerwood must fish for this information rather than Jeffassuming his
2 affirmative duty to provide herwith that information. (Exhibit F). This effort onherpart
3 should not be made, but she is forced to because he does not provide her with the information
4 as ordered.
5 7. Arguing a writing is a contract when it is plainly obvious it is NOT a contract:

6 a. Alay person arguably understands basic contract law principles. But Jeff is a practicing
7 lawyer, and somehow he thought itappropriate that he spend the Court's and Kathy's
8 resources to review his position that an unsigned post-marital draft agreement with multiple
9 changes on it be treated as a valid contract (see Respondent's MSC statement filed on April
10 8,2013, Exhibit K). This argument from a person ofhis credentials is absurd and wasted
11 time inhaving to read it and discuss it at the MSC. The exhibit should not exist in the first
12 place and is just another example showing Jeffsdisregard to act in good faith settlement
13 negotiations.
14 8. Accessing Kathy's personal email unlawfully:

15 a. Kathy noticed in prior filings but again in JeffsReply MSC statement filed on or about April
16 12, 2013 that he attached exhibits T, U, V, and W. These are emails between Kathy
17 fkathvffikathvfrazier.com) and others (Jeff was NOT included). None ofthe emails were
18 provided to Jeff, and the only way he obtained these were by accessing her email without her
19 knowledge. Kathy later found out that Jeff accessed, without Kathy's agreement, her email
20 account, her phone, and tracked her whereabouts, all without her knowledge or consent.
21 b. Jeffstole these emails from Kathy. Not only did he illegally take her information, but then he
22 had the audacity to provide it to the Court. This type of conduct cannot beshown as
23 acceptable by the Court, and without a sanction, he will proceed to act in this manner. Kathy
24 needs the Court's assistance here in order to keep the parties focused on settlement.
25 //
26 //
27 //
28 //
In reMarriage of FRAZIER
Case #6-1 l-FL-005500
E-14 14
6-11-FL-005500
1 Other examples include Jeff filing ex parte applications (June 2011 andAugust 2012) in order to
2 get anupper hand on issues rather than litigate in fairness. For example, Jefffiled anex-parte
3 declaration and motion in June 2011 regarding child custody evaluation prior to filing objections and
4 during a known period unavailability of Kathy's counsel. The list goes on.
5 Kathy should nothave to provide the Court with multiple examples to geta sanction request. It is
6 evident that sanctions are necessary because Jeffs conduct has frustrated andtaken the focus away from
7 settlement. The hope is that with a sanction award, Jeffwill think twice before arguing a post-marital
8 draft agreement is a contract when it has changes on it with no signatures, for example. The focus should
9 be on reasonable settlement offers and negotiating in fairness, not submitting arguments that have no
10 valid basis, hoping that it can slip by the eyes of counsel and the Court.
11 There is no financial burden in ordering Jeff to pay such sanctions because as stated above, the
12 parties will receive liquid funds from the sale ofthe family residence. It is from these funds Kathy
13 requests the Court order Jeff pay sanctions to her, and from which the parties anticipate a fee award be
14 made. Therefore, any claims onJeffs part that it is too burdensome on him to pay such fees and
15 sanctions are clearly without merit.
16 Kathy has been displaced since January 2011 and has been struggling financially since then,
17 particularly with her taking on the burden ofthe children's upkeep. It is reasonable for her to desire for
18 Jeffs conduct to be more cooperative to avoid significant unnecessary emotional and financial drain on
19 the case. However, Jeffs conduct involves him repeatedly wasting time, disobeying explicit court
20 orders, and confusing simple tasks as described indetail above. Jeff needs to realize that his conduct is
21 absolutely unacceptable in a family law matter where the underlying goal is to promote settlement and
22 cooperation and not engage infrivolous litigation and arguments with additional costs. Therefore, Jeffs
23 conduct clearly falls within the scope of Family Code §271, and should accordingly be subject to
24 sanctions in the amount of $30,000.
25 //
26 //
27 //
28 //

Case #6-1 l-FL-005500 E-15 15
PETITIONER'S TRIAL BRIEF PURSUANT TO 4/17/2013 COURT ORDER

Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
CONCLUSION
1
2
Kathy requests the Court grant her request that Jeff pay 84% of her attorney's fees and costs in th
3
amount of $165,785.12 and sanctions of $30,000 based on the above, and as follows:
4
1. The Court grants Kathy's request for attorneys fees and costs for $165,785.12, payable from the
5 Arastradero equity proceeds as follows:
6
a. Of the $150,000 community funds to be held in trust from the Arastradero sale proceeds, the
7
entire amount shall be payable directly to Kathy Kostas ($75,000 of which is already hei
8 property)
9
b. From Jeffs anticipated sale proceeds, he shall pay her $90,785.15 ($165,785.12 fees incurred -
10
$75,000 paid from his portion ofthe $150,000 trust amount =$90,785.12).
II
2. The Court also grants Kathy's request for sanctions against Jeff in the amount of $30,000, also
12
payable from Jeffs portion of anticipated Arastradero sale proceeds
13
3. Attorney's fees, costs, and sanctions due to Kathy from Jeff shall be payable either out of escrow or
14
within 10 days of funds being released from escrow
15
4. Jeffs request for attorney's fees, costs, and sanctions is denied.
16
By the Court granting Kathy's requests above, she will be placed back into similar footing as Jeff
17
has been in since the inception of this litigation process and she will be able to catch up on her bills (for
18
example, the parties owe $23,781 to Charles Armstrong School, specialized to educate Kali, who has
19
dyslexia, and she has other bills to catch up on). She has managed her expenses best she could while
20
support payments significantly fluctuated downward from the summer 2012 through being paid $0 in
21
support since December 2012. While she is mindful and grateful for all that she does have, with hei
22
health, the children's health, and her work, she does need to appeal to the Court for the law provides she
23
ought to receive because Jeff has not been flexible in paying his reasonable share in attorney's fees and
24
costs. Thus, Kathy requests the Court grant her requests identified above
25
26
DATED: 5/2°/13 NEDDA
EDDA A.
A. LEDGERWOOD
LEDGERS
27
Attorney for Petitioner
28
E-16 16
Case #6-1 l-FL-005500 Case Number

PETITIONER'S TRIAL BRIEF PURSUANT TO 4/17/2013 COURT ORDER
6-11-FL-005500
2
E-17
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
Nedda Ledgerwood
From: Nedda Ledgerwood [[email protected]]
Sent: Tuesday, May 07, 2013 8:57 AM
To: [email protected]
Cc: 'Kathleen Kostas'
Subject: FW: 14 Arastradero Road
Attachments: SKMBT_C45213050615080.pdf
Jeff:
Please review the attached, sign and date, and immediately send back to me. Kathy: by copy ofthis email
ask that you do the same.
Thanks.
NEDDA A. LEDGERWOOD
Attorney at Law
Sunnyvale, CA 94086
Office: 408.730.0333
Fax: 408.732.0709
www.ledgerwoodlaw.com
NOTICE: This E-mail (including attachments) iscovered by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. 2510-
2521, is confidential, and may be legally privileged. Information contained in this e-mail message is intended only for the
individual to whom it is addressed and is private and confidential. If you are not the intended recipient, or the employee
oragent responsible for delivering this message to the intended recipient, any dissemination, distribution orcopying of
this communication is strictly prohibited. If you are notthe intended recipient of thise-mail, please kindly destroy it and
notify the sender immediately by reply e-mail. Please take standard precautions to mitigate virus issues. Thank you for
your cooperation.
From: Dolan, Dolores [mailto:DDolan(5k:bnorcal.com1

Sent: Monday, May 06, 2013 4:36 PM
Cc: Kavanaugh, Ginny; Kavanaugh, Joseph; Denmark, Cecilia
Subject: 14 Arastradero Road
HeUo Nedda,
Attached is the listing agreement for 14Arastradero Road.

Please let us know if you need anything else.
Dolores for Ginny & Joe

650 529-8571
E-18
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
'The information inthis electronicmail message is the sender's confidential business and may be legally privileged. Itis intendedsolelyforthe
addressee(s). Access to this internet electronic mail message by anyone else is unauthorized. If you are not the intended recipient, anydisclosure,
copying, distribution oranyaction taken oromitted to betaken in reliance on it is prohibited andmay be unlawful."
"The sender believes that this E-mail and any attachments were free of anyvirus, worm, Trojan horse, and/ormalicious code whensent. This message
and its attachments could have been infected during transmission. By reading the message and opening any attachments, the recipient accepts full
responsibility for taking protective and remedial action about viruses and other defects. The sender's company is not liable for any loss ordamage
arising in any wayfrom this message or its attachments."
"Nothing in this email shall bedeemed tocreate a binding contract topurchase/sell real estate. The sender ofthis email does not have the authority to
bind a buyer orseller to a contract via written orverbal communications including, but not limited to, email communications."
E-19
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
PRDS® EXCLUSIVE AUTHORIZATION AND | f^S m
RIGHT TO SELL , SSI LA
OPPORTUNITY realtors
www. ptdsfornt3.com Revision Date 8/07
1 EXCLUSIVE RIGHT TO SELL: Kathleen Kostas Jeffrey Frazier ("Seller") hereby employs
coidweii Banker ("Broker"), granting to Broker the exclusive and irrevocable right,
beginning on os/os/13 (Date), and expiring at 11:59 P.M. on ii/os/13 (Date), to sell or exchange
the real property located at 14 Arastradero Road
Cjty of Portola Valley ,Countyof Santa Clara ,CA ("Property").
This agreement ("Listing Agreement") establishes and adopts the price ("List Price"), setforth in Paragraph 2, below, at which
the Property shall be marketed by Broker and shall include such extensions or other modifications hereto as agreed to in writing.
(A real estate broker is the person qualified to advise on real estate. If you desire legal or tax advice, consult an appropnate
professional.)
2 LIST PRICE: One Million Seven Hundred Ninety-Five Thousand ($ 1,795,000.00 ).
3 AGENCY AUTHORIZATION: Sellerauthorizes Brokerto act through any of its agents asadual agent, to introduce aBuyerto the
Property and to represent both Buyer and Seller in the transaction. Seller also authorizes Brokerto cooperate with other brokers,
who will not be sub-agents of Seller. Seller acknowledges receipt of the "Disclosure Regarding Real Estate Agency Relationships."
4. MARKETING; DISSEMINATION OFSALE/LISTING INFORMATION:
a) Within 48 hours of execution of this Listing Agreement by all parties, the listing shall be entered into the Multiple Listing
Service ("MLS"). Listing agent shall provide to Seller acopy of the MLS Agent Full Printout ("Property Profile Page")
published and disseminated to the MLS participants/ subscribers and Seller shall promptly review said document
for accuracy and, unless corrections arerequired, approve by initialing a copy thereof.
EXCLUSION FROMTHE MLS: If initialed here ( )( ), however, Seller instructs that the Property be withheld
from theMLS until such time as indicated in the separately executed Sellers Instructions to Exclude Listing From Multiple
Listing Service ("REXMLS").
b) Broker agrees to act diligently to achieve the purposes of this Listing Agreement, and is authorized to advertise and market
the Property in any medium selected by Broker (e.g., Internet), unless otherwise instructed in writing by Seller.
c) Broker is authorized (in accordance with applicable MLS rules and regulations) to report the sale, all status changes (including,
but not limited to, cancellation, withdrawal and expiration) and, upon close of escrow, sale price, terms and financing for the
publication, dissemination and use by, and information of, MLS participants / subscribers.
5. AUTHORIZATION REGARDING SIGNAGE, LOCKBOX; ADVISORY REGARDING "SHOES OFF AT PREMISES"
REQUIREMENTS; ORDERING OF REPORTS:
a) SIGNAGE: Broker is authorized to place a"FOR SALP sign on the Property unless Seller initials the following "NO SIGNAGE
scaca, in which case signage will not be utilized. NO SIGNAGE ( )( )•
b) LOCKBOX: Alockbox is alockable container designed for on-site storage of akey to the premises so as to permit convenient
showings of the Property by other agents who are members of the MLS. If the Property is tenant-occupied, Seller must obtain
tenants* written permission for use of a lockbox. Broker is authorized to place a lockbox atthe Property unless Seller initials
the following "NO LOCKBOX" space, in which case a lockbox will npj be utilized. NO LOCKBOX: ( )( ).
c) ADVISORY REGARDING "SHOES OFF AT PREMISES" REQUIREMENT; AGREEMENT TO HOLD HARMLESS,
INDEMNIFY AND DEFEND: Forimportant risk management reasons, Broker strongly recommends thatSeller not require
business invitees and other visitors to the Property to enter the premises instocking feet only or to use disposable shoe
coverings. If Seller nevertheless insists on the imposition of such a requirement, Seller agrees tofirst read, execute and
deliver to Broker the form entitled"Premises Liability Advisory Regarding "Shoes Off Requirements;Agreement to Hold
Harmless, Indemnify and Defend."
Seller's Initials ( )( )
Copyright-- 2007 Advanced Real Estate Solutions. Inc. Page i of 4 PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT NO.Form REXA Revised 8/07
E-20
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
Pr»p0rty-14 Araatradero Road Portola Valley Date: 05/06/13
PRDS®EXCLUSIVE AUTHORIZATION AND RIGHT TO SELL (Page 2 of 4):
d) REPORTS AND DOCUMENTS: Seller agrees to payfor, and authorizes Broker to order, aNatural Hazard Disclosure Report
(including environmental risk report and tax data report) and the following, as checked:
MPreliminary [title] report D Roof inspection report DHomeowners' Association documents
§ Property inspection report CChimney inspection report DOther
^Structural pest inspection report ^Sewer/septic inspection report GOther: _
• Pool inspection report D Building permit search U Other: _.
6 SELLER DISCLOSURES; Seller shall promptly complete and provide all property-related disclosures required either by statute or
by way of purchase contract, such as the Transfer Disclosure Statement, PRDS® Supplemental Seller's Checklist, Lead-based
paint disclosure, Earthquake Hazards Report ("Questionnaire") and Natural Hazard Disclosure Statement. Seller agrees to save
and hold Broker harmless from ail claims, disputes, litigation and judgments arising from any incorrect information supplied by
Seller, and from any material fact known by Seller which Seller fails to disclose. As applicable, Seller shall provide to Buyer all
legally required Homeowners' Association and common interest development information.
7. TAX WITHHOLDING DECLARATIONS: Seller also agrees tocomplete and execute a currently valid form affidavit (commonly
referred to as "FIRPTA") setting forth Seller's citizenship status and exempt/non-exempt status for purposes of both federal and
California state tax withholding attributable to the subject transaction. Seller acknowledges that Broker claims no expertise
regarding taxes, tax exemption status or the completion of the FIRPTA form; Seller is advised to consult a CPA or attorney
regarding this and any other tax issues. Upon acceptance of an offer to purchase the Property, Seller also authorizes Broker to
provide to the buyer afully completed FIRPTA form (including Social Security Number(s)) in time to close the escrow.
8. SECURITY AND PREMISES LIABILITY; INSURANCE: Seller acknowledges thatbrokers, agents, prospective buyers, property
inspection professionals and other business invitees are likely to visit and enter the Property at various times, including broker
tours, open houses, agent showings, property inspections, and at other times and on other occasions during which neither Seller
nor Broker is able to monitor such visits. Accordingly, Seller isstrongly advised to secure and safeguard valuables from loss,
damage and theft. Seller is further advised to keep the premises free and clear of debris and such personal belongings and other
items that might pose a risk of injury (from, e.g., slip and fall), and to make certain that steps, walkways and other foot traffic
areas are reasonably safe. Seller acknowledges that Broker does not have expertise in the area of premises liability and casualty
and agrees to hold Broker harmless asto any loss or injury in regard thereto. Seller is expressly advised to consult insurance
professionals in regard to the foregoing.
9. HOME PROTECTION PLAN: Home protection plans provide relatively low-cost insurance coverage for specified home appliances
and systems (e.g., furnace, water heater, etc.) that fail during certain time periods surrounding the transaction. Coverage periods
that range from inception of the listing period to well after transfer of title are typically available, as is a variety of different
coverage features (e.g., roof, pool, etc.) and premium costs, depending on the individual plan. When put in place, home protections
plans often fund repair or replacement costs (subject to aservice charge) for items and issues that might otherwise have led to a
claim against Seller, or otherwise have resulted in an expensive loss. If checked. Seller agrees to pay for, and authorizes Broker
to order, a • Home Protection Plan (Buyer's Coverage) D Home Protection Plan (Seller's Coverage) ata cost not to exceed
$ -
10.COMPENSATION TO BROKER: NOTICE: The amountor rateof real estate brokeragefees Is notflxedby law. Theyareset
byeach Broker individually and may be negotiable between theSeller and Broker.
a) Seller shall pay to Broker percent ( s.oo %) ofthe sales price (or an amount of
* ^("Brokerage Fee") if Property issold by Broker, Seller, or any other person during the
term (orany extension thereof)of the Listing Agreement.
b) Broker shall offer, through theMLS, compensation tocooperating brokers in theamount of.
percent ( 2.50 %) of the sales price (or an amount of $ ), payable from said
Brokerage Fee.
c) In theevent Property iswithdrawn from sale,transferred, conveyed, leased, orrented without theconsent ofBroker, or
otherwisemade unmarketableby Seller's voluntary act, during the term (orany extension thereof)ofthe Listing Agreement,
the Brokerage Feeas calculated from the List Price (or thedollar amount entered in Paragraph 10(a)) shall immediately
become due and payable to Broker.
Seller's Initials ( )( )
Copyright* 2007 Advanced Real Estate Solutions, Inc. Page 2 of 4 PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT NO.
Form REXA Revised 8/07
lostan&t
E-21
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
Portola Vallay Date: 05/06/13
Property: 14 Arastradero Road
PRDS® EXCLUSIVE AUTHORIZATION AND RIGHT TO SELL (Page 3 of 4):
d) Sellershallpayto Broker the compensation provided inParagraph 10(a)if Property is sold,conveyed orotherwise transferred
within 90 or D calendar days ("Protection Period") afterthe termination ofthis Listing Agreement to anyonewith whom
Broker or a cooperating broker has, prior to termination, had contact relating to the Property,provided Sellerhas beengiven
written notice ofthenames ofsuch prospective purchasers no later than10orD calendar days after termination of this
Listing Agreement. Sellershall not, however, be obligated topaythecompensation provided for in Paragraph 10(a) in the
event a valid listing agreement is entered intoduring said Protection Period withany other licensed real estate salesperson.
e) Seller shall executeand deliver an escrow instruction irrevocably assigning to Broker, from Seller'sproceeds, the Brokerage
Fees as provided for herein.
11. MEDIATION OF DISPUTES: Seller and Broker(collectively "Parties") agree to mediate any dispute between them arising out of
this Listing Agreement prior to anycourt action or arbitration. Mediation is a non-binding process in which Parties to a dispute
meet with a neutralmediator(selected bythe Parties)who will trytowork out a mutually acceptable resolution. The mediator does
not impose a settlement onthe Parties. If the Parties cannot agree ona mediator, theSuperior Court shall appoint a mediator. The
mediator may conduct more than onesessionand mediation fees shall be paid equally byparticipating Parties. Matters excluded
fromarbitration (Para. 12(b)) are also excluded from mediation.
12. ARBITRATION OF DISPUTES:

a) Explanation: Arbitration is a private dispute resolution process in which Parties (by themselves orthrough their attorneys)
submit disputes to a neutralarbitratorwhois charged with rendering a fair and impartial decisionas to allissues presented.
When arbitrationis selected, the Parties give up their rightstotrialby judge or juryand to full and formal court process. Basic
discovery rights (e.g., depositions, document production) are provided for under California law. Rules ofevidence andprocedure
are less rigid than intrial court. Arbitration fees are typically on an hourly basis. The decision of the arbitrator is final and
binding on all Parties to the arbitration agreement (Paragraph 12(b)). The arbitrator can awardcompensatory damages,
punitive damages,and/ororderspecific performance, injunctive relief and declaratory relief. Notrial or other court process
is available to re-try the case or to appeal the merits of the arbitrator's ruling. This means that even when a partyclaims
the arbitrator made a clearly wrong decision, based on a misunderstanding of fact or of law or an unwillingness to follow the
law, that decision nevertheless remains final and unappealable. Only in cases of actual fraud in the arbitration process,
corruption, bias, lackofdue process or jurisdiction, orarbitrator's computation error, can an awardbe vacatedor modified.
The Parties are advised to confer with legal counsel for advice before committing to binding arbitration.
b) Arbitration Process, Election to Arbitrate: Any dispute arising outofthis Listing Agreement shall be decided by neutral
binding arbitration (in accordance with Chapter 3,Title 9of theCalifornia Code ofCivil Procedure (CCP §1283.05) including,
but not limited to, the rightof discovery), and not by courtaction, except as provided by California law for judicial review of
arbitration proceedings. The arbitratorshall be a retired Superior Courtjudge ora licensed California attorney with at least5
years real estate experience. If the Parties cannot agree onanarbitrator, theSuperior Court shall appoint thearbitrator. The
filing of an action in a court of competent jurisdiction to enable the recording of a notice of pending action, for order of
attachment, receivership, injunction, or other provisional remedies shall not constitute a waiverof the right to mediation or
arbitration under this Contract, regardless of whether the said complaint includes causes of action not necessary to the
recordationof the notice of pending action. The Parties agree that, in the event of such court filing, itwould be appropriatefor
the courtto issue an order staying proceedings therein, pending the completion ofmediation orarbitration underthisContract.
The filing of such judicial action shall notconstitute a waiver ofmediation or arbitration rights. Exclusions from arbitration:
unlawful detainer, foreclosure-related actions, matters within Small Claims Court jurisdiction.
"NOTICE: BY INITIALING IN THE SPACE BELOW, YOU ARE AGREEING TO HAVE ANY DISPUTE ARISING OUT OF THE
MATTERS INCLUDED IN THE 'ARBITRATION OF DISPUTES' PROVISION DECIDED BY NEUTRAL ARBITRATION AS
PROVIDED BY CALIFORNIA LAW AND YOU ARE GIVING UP ANY RIGHTS YOU MJGHT POSSESS TO HAVE THE DISPUTE
LITIGATED IN A COURT OR JURY TRIAL. BY INITIALING IN THE SPACE BELOW, YOU ARE GIVING UP YOUR JUDICIAL
RIGHTS TO DISCOVERY AND APPEAL, UNLESS SUCH RIGHTS ARE SPECIFICALLY INCLUDED INTHE 'ARBITRATION
OF DISPUTES' PROVISION. IF YOU REFUSE TO SUBMIT TO ARBITRATION AFTER AGREEING TO THIS PROVISION,
YOU MAY BE COMPELLED TO ARBITRATE UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THE CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
YOUR AGREEMENT TO THIS ARBITRATION PROVISION IS VOLUNTARY."
"WE HAVE READ AND UNDERSTAND THE FOREGOING AND AGREE TO SUBMIT DISPUTES ARISING OUT OF THE
MATTERS INCLUDED IN THIS 'ARBITRATION OF DISPUTES' PROVISION TO NEUTRAL ARBITRATION."
Seller's Initials:(_ /_ J Broker's/Agent's Initials: ( / )

Setter's Initials ( )( )
Copyright" 2007 Advanced Real Estate Solutions, Inc. Page 3 of 4 PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT NO.
Form REXA Revised 8/07
E-22
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
Property: 14 Arastradero Road Portola Valley Date: 05/06/13
13. EQUAL HOUSING OPPORTUNITY: Property is offered in compliance with state, local, and federal anti-discriminationlaws.
14. ATTORNEY'S FEES: In the event of any dispute between Brokerand Seller arising out of or relatingto this Listing Agreement,
including disputes overpaymentof Brokerage fees, each ofthe parties hereto shall be responsible for the payment ofits own
attorney's fees and other legal costs.
15. ADDITIONAL TERMS:
16. ENTIRE AGREEMENT: The undersigned warrants havingthe authority to execute this agreement on behalfof all owners. Seller
and Broker intend that this writing, including any attachments, constitute the entire agreement and that no extrinsicevidence
whatsoever maybe introduced inanyjudicial orarbitration proceeding to modify itsterms. Unless otherwise agreed, all documents
may besigned in counterparts, andthosetransmitted by facsimile shall beregarded as valid substitutes forthe originals thereof.
Selleracknowledges having read and understood, and havingreceived a copy of, this Listing Agreement.
Date:. Seller:. Kathleen Kostas .Signature:

(Print Name)
Date: .Seller: Jeffrey Frazier .Signature:

(Print Name)
Address:
TEL: FAX: E-mail:
Date: Listing Office:. Coldwoll Banker by:
DRE license number and name of Listing Agent: 70010886 Joe & Qinny Kavanaugh,
(DRE License No.) (Print Name)
Address: 116 Portola Rd, Portola Valley/ CA 94028
TEL:. (650)851-1961 FAX: (650)851-4231 E-mail: j oaeph.. kavanaughacamoves. con

Copyright0 2007 Advanced Real Eslate Solutions, Inc. Page 4 of 4 Form REXA Revised 8/07
E-23
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
Nedda Ledgerwood
Sent: Monday, May 06, 2013 2:04 PM
Subject: Judge Mills meeting
Jeff:
Judge Mills' clerk called me back and said we are to meet him tomorrow, May 7 at4:30pm. He will be in
Department 94, which is located at 99 Notre Dame Ave; San Jose, 95113 (same building asthe SOC office).
See you then.
NEDDA A. LEDGERWOOD
Attorney at Law
ûnnyvale, CA 94086
Office: 408.730.0333
Fax: 408.732.0709
NOTICE: This E-mail (including attachments) iscovered bythe Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18U.S.C. 2510-
individual to whom it is addressed and is private and confidential. Ifyou are not the intended recipient, or the employee
or agent responsible for delivering this message tothe intended recipient, any dissemination, distribution or copying of
this communication is strictly prohibited. If you are notthe intended recipient of this e-mail, please kindly destroy it and
your cooperation.
E-24
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
Nedda Ledgerwood

Sent:' Monday, May 06, 2013 10:05 AM
Subject: Sale of the house
Jeff:
Ihave called Judge Mills' clerk for the next available SOC date and/or meeting with Judge Mills. When Ihear when he
can meet with us I will take the date and immediately let you know.
You have made a simple process difficult. You did not inform Judge Mills that we did not have an agreement (one where
everyone actually signs it) to a listing agent. He gave his initial email response to you not knowing that key fact. Once I
let him know, he said you and Kathy haveto agree on the Kavanaughs.
At that point, you have to sign the agreement with the Kavanaughs without any additional terms (ie #15 of the contract
you sent the Kavanaughs and Isimply can't believe you would include those terms when there are no court orders that
allow for that). There is no outwith that. You are causing both parties to fail to adhere to the court order. This is a major
problem.
Ihave been nothing but honest with you, and after all the hassle you create, you end up realizing what Ihave said and
done was correct. This case is no different.
Your conduct shows a pattern of being difficult and that type of conduct is sanctionable. Iask that you notgive me
another item to add to my list and adhere to the process that was agreed to: agree to a listing agent, list the house for
sale, then move on. If you want to submit an offer after the house is listed, then be my guest. Until then, you need to
follow the court orders. At this point, it may be necessary to get you out ofthe house before it's listed for sale because I
cannot trust thatyou will be cooperative. Imay request too that Kathy have sole control over thesale ofthe house. I
have tofigure out how to best sell a community asset. That is next on my list to do based on how you are conducting
yourself.
NEDDA A. LEDGERWOOD
Attorney at Law
Sunnyvale, CA 94086
Office: 408.730.0333
Fax: 408.732.0709
NOTICE: This E-mail (including attachments) is covered by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. 2510-
individual to whom it isaddressed and is private and confidential. If you are not the intended recipient, or the employee
or agent responsible for delivering this message to the intended recipient, any dissemination, distribution or copying of
this communication is strictly prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient ofthis e-mail, please kindly destroy itand
your cooperation.
E-25
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
Nedda Ledgerwood
From- Kavanaugh, Ginny [[email protected]]
Sent:' Friday, May 03, 2013 6:03 PM
jo: Ledgerwood, Nedda
Cc- Kathleen Frazier; Jeffery Frazier
Subject: Re: 14 Arastradero and all the emails etc
Nothing was signed

We would be happy to represent Kathy and Jeff
And no we only got that email
Sent from my iPhone
On May 3, 2013, at 5:52 PM, "Ledgerwood, Nedda" <nedda(5)Jedgerwoodlaw.com> wrote:

Dear Ginny:
I know the email you are talking about.
Jeff neglected to send you the emails that followed clarifying what I've been telling you this
entire time. Jeff neglected to give you the full story. I'm abit shocked that he would do this, but
again, I will deal with it next week.
Generally, the Judge misunderstood, thinking that we already agreed to alisting agent (this is
when he sent the $1 email). Then I emailed the Judge clarifying that we did not have a listing
agent, asking you be the listing agent. The Judge then selected you as the agent. From there, they
are to signwith you and move forward.
I have gone through these types ofdeals before and never have they been this messy. This is no
fault of yours.
I hope nothing got signed today and I will deal with itnext week.
NEDDA A. LEDGERWOOD
Attorney at Law
Sunnyvale, CA 94086
Office: 408.730.0333
Fax: 408.732.0709
www, ledeerwoodlaw. com
NOTICE: This E-mail (including attachments) is covered bythe Electronic Communications

Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. 2510-2521, is confidential, and may be legally privileged. Information
contained in this e-mail message is intended only for the individual to whom it is addressed and
isprivate and confidential. If you are not the intended recipient, orthe employee oragent
responsible for delivering this message to the intended recipient, any dissemination, distribution
or copying ofthis communication is strictly prohibited. Ifyou are not the intended recipient of
this e-mail, please kindly destroy it and notify the sender immediately byPLAINTIFF’S
reply e-mail.
EXHIBITPlease
NO.
take standard precautions to mitigate virus issues. Thank you for your cooperation.
l
E-26
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
'The information inthiselectronic mail message is the sender'sconfidential business and may be legally privileged. It is intended solely for the
addressee(s). Access tothis internet electronic mail message by anyone else is unauthorized. If you are not the intended recipient, any disclosure,
copying, distribution or any action taken oromitted to betaken in reliance on it is prohibited and may be unlawful."
"The sender believes thatthis E-mail and any attachments were free ofany virus, worm. Trojan horse, and/or malicious code when sent. This message
responsibility for taking protective and remedial action about viruses and other defects. The sender's company is not liable for any loss or damage
arising inany wayfrom this message or its attachments."
"Nothing in this email shall be deemed to create a binding contract to purchase/sell real estate. The sender of this email does not have the authority to
bind a buyer orseller to a contract via written orverbal communications including, but not limited to, email communications."
E-27
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
Nedda Ledgerwood
From: Jeffery Frazier [[email protected]]

Sent: Monday. May 06, 2013 9:00 AM
To: emills
Cc- Nedda A; Kathy Frazier ([email protected])
Subject: Fwd: IRMO Frazier, Case #6-11-FL 0055500, 14 Arastradero Road, Portola Valley, CA 94028
Attachments: Patently Innovative Mail -14 Arastradero.pdf;
Please_DocuSign_these_documents_Agency14Aras-3.pdf
Dear Judge Mills,
I discussed the option you provided in your email ofMay 2,2013, below, with the listing agent per your
instructions, but not without a verbal thrashing for it from counsel for Ms. Kostas (Frazier). She has informed
all involved, including the listing agents, that the process set out inyour May 2 email isirrelevant in favor of
the process set out in her email ofMay 3, 2013 (attached). As you will see, she says that I cannot obtain the
property "for the equivalent of one half of the offered price plus one dollar." This is notwithstanding that I
executed the listing agreement (attached) prior to close-of-business Friday May 3, 2013, per your May 2 email.
My understanding, on the other hand, is that the process set out in your email ofMay 2is valid and available to
me. I cannot imagine you would have withdrawn it without telling me, and I never received any such word from
you.
Please confirm my understanding, or otherwise, at your earliest convenience. We are at a standstill until we hear
from you.
Thank you,
Jeffery Frazier
Forwarded message
From: <EMills(g>scscourt.org>
Date: Thu, May 2, 2013 at 1:42 PM
Subject: Re: IRMO Frazier, Case #6-11-FL 0055500,14 Arastradero Road, Portola Valley, CA 94028
To: iefftgtoatentlv-i.com
Cc: Nedda Ledgerwood <nedda(g>ledgerwoodlaw.com>
Iapologize for the delay in responding to you all. I have reviewed the various correspondence, and
believe I understand the various positions. I cannot order a sale between parties: such a transaction
must be done by agreement. Nothing indicates that there is such an agreement. Mr. Frazier, Iwill
authorize you to match any offer that is presented for the equivalent of one half of the offered price
plus one dollar to acquire the other party's interest so long as there are no financing contingencies.
Please discuss this option with the listing agents. In the event that the listing agreement is not
signed by close of business tomorrow, the option will be no longer available to you.
Edward F. Mills
Family Court Settlement Officer
Santa Clara County Superior Court
E-28
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
atently Innovative Mail - 14 Arastradero https://rnail.google.corn/rnail/u/0/?ui=2&ik=68f4dfb8d4&view=pt&q=ne.
•fltSntlV InnOV3UV6 li Jeffery Frazier <[email protected]>
14 Arastradero
Ledgerwood, Nedda <[email protected]> Fri, May 3, 2013 at 4:16 PM

To: [email protected], Kathleen Frazier <[email protected]>, Jeffery Frazier <jeff@patently-Lcom>
Cc: Nedda Ledgerwood <[email protected]>
Dear All:
Ginny, you and I spoke earlier and I believe Iclearly told you that there is nothing atypical about this sale. Itis a typical sale, and theONLY
possible atypical part ofit is in theevent Jeff's offer is accepted by both Jeff and Kathy after thehome is listed for sale.
No "$1 more than" termexists anywhere inany agreement, unless of course youare creating itfor some purpose. Jeffs offer, ifhe submits one,
will be reviewed just the same as other offers AFTER the home is listed publicly for sale onthe market. At that point, I mentioned to you to figure
out what your costs are plus your hours, estimate itthe bestyou can, and write that figure into theagreement as theamount you get paid if the
sale is between spouses.
No notehas to be made inthe public mislisting that Jeff will make an offer. His offer is no different than anyone else's offer. Recall there is nosuch
agreement as to "$1 more." I have no idea why that is being brought upbecause it's notreal.
Jeffhas complicated and confused sucha simple transaction that he is now hindering the sale ofthe property. He is a very smart man so I believe
he should know better.
Ginny: I hope you realize I know you are doing the bestyou can. But I also realize Jeff isfrustrating this simple transaction.
Ifyou are ableto help them today, great, but ifnot. Iwill get it ontrack next week.
Have a nice weekend.
NEDDA A. LEDGERWOOD
Attorney at Law
Sunnyvale, CA 94086
Office: 408.730.0333
Fax 408.732.0709
NOTICE: This E-mail (including attachments) is covered bythe Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. 2510-2521, is confidential, and
may belegally privileged. Information contained in this e-mail message is intended only for the individual to whom it is addressed and isprivate and
confidential. If you are not the intended recipient, or the employee or agent responsible for delivering this messageto the intended recipient, any
dissemination, distribution or copying ofthiscommunication is strictly prohibited. Ifyou are notthe intended recipient ofthise-mail, pleasekindly
destroy itand notify the senderimmediately byreply e-mail. Please take standard precautions to mitigate virus issues. Thank you for your
cooperation.
E-29
ofl Case Number 5/4/2013 7:32 AM
6-11-FL-005500
DocuSign Envelope ID: 4953AB6B-8B40-40F2-A76C-A002D87AE3FF
PRDS® DISCLOSURE REGARDING REAL ESTATE <^S TTi

AGENCY RELATIONSHIPS (Page 1of 2) LZJ |Q
EOUAlHOUSING „rA1TrtO®
(As required by the Civil Code) OPPORTUNITY REALTOR'"
Revision Date 9/04
www.prdsforms.com
When you enter into a discussion with a real estate agent regarding a real estate transaction, you should from the outset understand what type of agency
relationship or representation you wish to have with the agent(s) inthe transaction.
FORM NEEDS TO BE COMPLETED AND PROVIDED AS FOLLOWS:
a) Listing Agent to the Seller before entering into a listing agreement; b) Buyer's Agent to the Buyer as soon as practicable before signing an offer;
c) Buyer's Agent to the Seller before presenting an offer; d) Listing Agent, when acting as a dual agent, to the Buyer as soon as
practicable before the Buyer signs an offer.
SELLER'S AGENT
ASeller's agent under a listing agreement with the Seller acts asthe agent for the Seller only. ASeller's agent or a subagent of that agent has the following
affirmative obligations:
To the Seller:
Afiduciary duty of utmost care, integrity, honesty, and loyalty in dealings with theSeller.
To the Buyer and the Seller:
(a) Diligent exercise of reasonable skill andcare in performance of the agent's duties.
(b) Aduty of honest and fair dealing and good faith.
(c) Aduty to disclose all facts known to the agent materially affecting the value or desirability of the Property that are not known to, or
within the diligent attention and observation of, the parties.
An agent is not obligated to reveal to either party any confidential information obtained from the other party that does not involve the affirmative
duties set forth above.
BUYER'S AGENT
Aselling agent can, with a Buyer's consent, agree to act as agent for the Buyer only. In these situations, the agent is not the Seller's agent, even if
by agreement the agent may receive compensation for services rendered, either in full or in part from the Seller. An agent acting only for a Buyer
has the following affirmative obligations:
To the Buyer:
Afiduciary duty ofutmost care, integrity, honesty, and loyalty in dealings with the Buyer.
To the Buyer and the Seller:
(a) Diligent exercise ofreasonable skill and care in performance of the agent's duties.
(b) Aduty of honest and fair dealing and good faith.
(c) Aduty to disclose all facts known to the agent materially affecting the value or desirability of the property that are not known to, or
within the diligent attention and observation of, the parties.
An agent is not obligated to reveal to either party any confidential information obtained from the other party that does not involve the affirmative
duties set forth above.
AGENT REPRESENTING BOTH SELLER AND BUYER
Areal estate agent, either acting directly or through one or more associate licensees, can legally be the agent of both the Seller and the Buyer in a
transaction, but only with the knowledge and consentof both the Seller and the Buyer.
In a dual agency situation, the agent has the following affirmative obligations to both the Seller and the Buyer:
(a) Afiduciary duty of utmost care, integrity, honesty, and loyalty in the dealings with either the Seller or the Buyer.
(b) Other duties to theSeller and the Buyer as stated above in their respective sections.
In representing both Seller and Buyer, the agent may not, without the express permission of the respective party, disclose to the other party that the
Seller will accept a price less than the listing price orthat the Buyer will pay a price greater than the price offered.
The above duties of the agent in a real estate transaction do not relieve a Seller or Buyer from the responsibility to protect his or her own interests. You
should carefully read all agreements to assure that they adequately express your understanding of the transaction. Areal estate agent is a person qualified
to advise about real estate. If legal or tax advice is desired, consult a competent professional.
Throughout your real property transaction you may receive more than one disclosure form, depending upon the number of agents assisting in the transaction.
The law requires each agent with whom you have more than a casual relationship to present you with this disclosure form. You should read its contents each
time it is presented to you, considering the relationship between you and the real estate agent in your specific transaction.
This disclosure form includes the provisions of Section 2079.13 to 2079.24, inclusive, of the Civil Code setforth on the reverse side hereof. Read it carefully.
If the transaction involves one-to-four dwelling residential property(s), including a mobile home, this Disclosureform must be provided in a
listing, sale, exchange, installment land contract, or lease over one year.
I/WE ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF A COPY OF THIS DISCLOSURE.
• BUYER El SFII FR Kathy Kostas -DocuSignedby: Date Tjme fj AM D PM
D BUYER HSFU.ER Jeff Frazier
M frazil* na>fl 5/3/2013 lT16:43 PT Qam DpM
AGENT Coldwell Banker by ^—CEF2AB4C1195423.. Pate Time DAM DPM
(Associate Licensee or Broker-Signature)
BUYER'S AGENT by Date Time DAM D PM

(before presentingoffer) (AssociateLicenseeor Broker-Signature)
SELLER —— Date Time Dam Dpm
(before presentation of offer) PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT NO.
seller
(before presentation of offer)
Copyright® 2007 Advanced Real Estate Solutions, Inc. Page 1of 2
Date
E-30 Time Dam Dpm
instatW&t Form RAD Revised 9/04
Case Number forms^"
6-11-FL-005500
PRDS* DISCLOSURE REGARDING REAL ESTATE AGENCY RELATIONSHIPS (Page 2 of 2):

CHAPTER 2 OF TITLE 9 OF PART 4 OF DIVISION 3 OF THE CIVIL CODE
2079.13 As used in Sections 2079.14 to 2079.24, inclusive, the following terms have the following meanings:
(a) "Agent" means a person acting under provisions of Title 9 (commencing with Section 2295) in a real property transaction, and includes a person who islicensed
as a realestate brokerunder Chapter3 (commencing with Section 10130) of Part1 ofDivision 4 of the Businessand ProfessionsCode,and underwhoselicense
a listing is executed or an offer to purchase is obtained.
(b) "Associate licensee" means a person who islicensed as a real estate broker orsalesperson under Chapter 3 (commencing with Section 10130) ofPart 1of
Division 4 ofthe Business and ProfessionsCode and whois either licensed under a brokeror has entered intoa written contractwith a brokerto act as the
broker's agent in connection with acts requiring a real estate license and tofunction under thebroker's supervision in thecapacity ofanassociate licensee.
The agent in thereal property transaction bears responsibility for his orher associate licensees who perform as agents oftheagent. When anassociate licensee
owes a duty toanyprincipal, ortoanybuyer orseller who is nota principal, ina real property transaction, thatduty isequivalent totheduty owed tothat party by
the broker for whom the associate licensee functions.
(c) "Buyer" means a transferee in a real property transaction, andincludes a person who executes anoffer topurchase real property from a seller through anagent, or
who seeks theservices ofanagent in more than a casual, transitory, orpreliminary manner, with theobject ofentering into a real property transaction. "Buyer*
includes vendee or lessee.
(d) "Dual agent" means an acting agent, either directly or through an associate licensee, asagent for both the seller and the buyer in a real property transaction.
(e) "Listing agreement" means acontract between an owner of real property and an agent, by which the agent has been authorized to sell the real property or to find or
obtain a buyer.
(f) "Listing agent" means a person who hasobtained a listing of real property toact as anagent for compensation.
(g) "Listing price" isthe amount expressed in dollars specified in the listing for which the seller iswilling to sell the real property through the listing agent,
(h) "Offering price" isthe amount expressed in dollars specified in anoffer to purchase for which the buyer iswilling tobuy thereal property.
(i) "Offer to purchase," means a written contract executed by a buyer acting through aselling agent which becomes the contract for the sale of the real property upon
acceptance by the seller,
(j) "Real property" means any estate specified by subdivision (1) or (2) of Section 761 in property which constitutes or is improved with one to four dwelling units, any
leasehold in this type of property exceeding one year's duration, and mobile homes, when offered for sale orsold through anagent pursuant to the authority
contained in Section 10131.6 of the Business and Professions Code,
(k) "Real property transaction" means a transaction for the sale of real property in which an agent is employed by one or more of the principals to act in that
transaction, and includes a listing or an offer to purchase.
(I) "Sell", "sale", or "sold" refers to a transaction for the transfer of real property from the seller tothe buyer, and includes exchanges of real property between the seller
and the buyer, transactions for the creation of a real property sales contract within the meaning of Section 2985, and transactions for the creation of a leasehold
exceeding one year's duration,
(m) "Seller" means the transferor in a real property transaction, and includes an owner who lists real property with an agent, whether or not atransfer results, or who
receives anoffer topurchase real property of which heorsheisthe owner from anagent of behalf of another. "Seller includes both a vendor and a lessor,
(n) "Selling agent" means a listing agent who acts alone, or an agent who acts in cooperation with a listing agent, and who sells or finds and obtains a buyer for the real
property, or an agent who locates property for a buyer or who finds a buyer for a property for which no listing exists and presents an offer to purchase to the seller,
(o) "Subagent" means a person to whom an agent delegates agency powers asprovided in Article 5(commencing with Section 2349) of Chapter 1of Title 9. However,
"subagent" does not include anassociate licensee who isacting under the supervision of anagent in a real property transaction.
2079 14 Listing agents and selling agents shall provide the seller and buyer in a real property transaction with acopy of the disclosure form specified in Section 2079.16. and, except
asprovided in subdivision (c). shall obtain asigned acknowledgment of receipt from that seller or buyer, except asprovided in this section or Section 2079.15, asfollows:
(a) The listing agent, if any, shall provide the disclosure form tothe seller prior toentering into the listing agreement.
(b) The selling agent shall provide the disclosure form to the seller assoon as practicable prior to presenting the seller with an offer to purchase, unless the selling
agent previously provided the seller with a copy of the disclosure form pursuant tosubdivision (a).
(c) Where the selling agent does not deal on aface-to-face basis with the seller, the disclosure form prepared by the selling agent may be furnished to the seller (and
acknowledgment of receipt obtained for the selling agent from the seller) by the listing agent, or the selling agent may deliver the disclosure form by certified mail
addressed tothesellerat hisor herlastknown address,inwhich case nosigned acknowledgment ofreceipt is required.
(d) The selling agent shall provide the disclosure form to the buyer assoon aspracticable prior to execution of the buyer's offer to purchase, except that if the offer to
purchase is not prepared by the selling agent, the selling agent shall present the disclosure form to the buyer not later than the next business day after the selling
agent receives the offerto purchase fromthe buyer.
2079.15 In any circumstance in which the seller or buyer refuses to sign an acknowledgment of receipt pursuant to Section 2079.14, the agent, or an associate licensee acting for
anagent, shall setforth, sign.and datea written declaration ofthefacts ofthe refusal.
2079.17 (a) As soon aspracticable, the selling agent shall disclose to the buyer and seller whether the selling agent isacting in the real property transaction exclusively asthe
buyer's agent, exclusively as the seller's agent, orasa dual agent representing both the buyer and the seller. This relationship shall beconfirmed in the contract to
purchase and sell real property or in aseparate writing executed or acknowledged by the seller, the buyer, and the selling agent prior to or coincident withexecution of
that contract by the buyer and the seller, respectively.
(b) As soon as practicable, the listing agent shall disclose to the seller whether the listing agent isacting in the real property transaction exclusively asthe seller's agent,
oras a dual agent representing both thebuyer and theseller. This relationship shall beconfirmed in the contract topurchase and sell real property orina separate
writing executed oracknowledged by the seller and the listing agent prior toor coincident with the execution of that contract by the seller.
(c) The confirmation required bysubdivisions (a)and (b)shall be inthefollowing form:
Example Only is the agent of (check one): Example Only is the agent of (check one):
(Name of Listing Agent) (Name ofSelling Agent if not the same as the Listing Agent)
• the seller exclusively; or • both the buyer and the seller. • the buyer exclusively; or D the seller exclusively; or • both the buyer and the
seller.
(d) Thedisclosures andconfirmation required bythissection shall be inaddition tothedisclosure required bySection 2079.14.
2079.18 No selling agent in a real property transaction may actas an agent for the buyer only, when the selling agent is also acting as thelisting agent in thetransaction.
2079.19 The payment of compensation ortheobligation topaycompensation toanagent by the seller orbuyer isnot necessarily determinative ofa particular agency
relationship between an agentandtheseller orbuyer. Alisting agentanda selling agent may agree toshareanycompensation orcommission paid, orany right toany
compensation orcommission for which anobligation arises as theresult ofa real estate transaction, andtheterms ofany such agreement shall not necessarily be
determinative of a particular relationship.
207920 Nothing inthis article prevents an agentfrom selecting, as a condition oftheagent's employment, a specific form ofagency relationship not specifically prohibited by this
article ifthe requirements of Section 2079.14 and Section 2079.17 are compliedwith.
2079.21 Adual agent shall notdisclose to the buyer thatthe selleriswilling tosellthe property at a price less thanthelisting price, without theexpress written consent ofthe
seller. Adual agentshallnotdisclose to the sellerthat the buyer iswilling topaya price greaterthanthe offering price, without the expresswritten consent ofthe buyer.
Thissectiondoes not alter in any waythe dutyor responsibility ofa dual agentto any principal with respect to confidential information other than price.
2079.22 Nothing inthis article precludes a listing agentfrom alsobeing a selling agent, andthecombination ofthese functions inone agentdoesnot, ofitself, make thatagent a
dual agent.
2079.23 Acontractbetween the principal and agent may be modified or altered to change the agency relationship at any time before the performanceof the act which is the
object of the agency withthe writtenconsent of the parties to the agency relationship.
2079.24 Nothing inthisarticleshall be construed to either diminish the dutyofdisclosure owedbuyers and sellers by agents and theirassociates licenses, subagents,and
PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT
employees or to relieve agents and theirassociate licensees,subagents,and employees from liability fortheirconductinconnection with actsNO.
governed bythisarticle or
for any breach of a fiduciary duty or a duty of disclosure.
Page 2 of 2
E-31 Instant
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
ADVISORY AND CONSENT REGARDING
MULTIPLE AGENCY AND DUAL AGENCY
Revision Date 8/04
tUE REALTOR®
www.prdsforms.com
Real estate brokerage companies vary in terms of number of sales agents and branch offices. Larger brokerages may, at
any one time, service hundreds of listings and address the needs of thousands of individual clients. Client is advised that
such circumstance, coupled with limited housing inventories and expanding demand for homes, can engender vigorous
competition for the same property by numerous buyers and result in situations (referred to herein as "Multiple Agency")
wherein two or more sets of buyers are represented by agents from the same brokerage company. Related to Multiple
Agency (and included within the scope of that term for purposes of this document) are situations wherein a buyer client is
introduced to and shown properties that are listed with the same brokerage to which that buyer's agent belongs.
"Dual Agency" arises when (1) both the buyer and seller of a particular property are represented by the same, individual
agent or (2) the buyer and seller are separately represented by different agents of the same brokerage company. Dual
Agency is recognized and accepted under California law as a legally authorized agency relationship, and is addressed in
the "Disclosure Regarding Real Estate Agency Relationships" form required by Civil Code Section 2079.13, et seq. and
provided to Client. When consented to by the subject buyer and seller, a listing agent is thus permitted by law to represent
said listing agent's own buyer client (if any) in the showing and eventual sale of property listed by that agent, and may
present offers for that buyer on properties listed by other agents affiliated with the same brokerage. Client is nevertheless
advised and acknowledges and understands, that conflicts of interests can and do arise in Dual Agency situations due to
the inherently competing interests of buyers and sellers of a particular property and the fact that one single brokerage
company, and the agent(s) involved, owe a fiduciary duty to buyer and seller both.
As to any such conflict or dispute, Client understands and agrees that Agent may seek guidance and counsel from Agent's
managing broker or broker of record (as applicable) to assist in achieving a fair and impartial resolution. Client
acknowledges and accepts Agent's affirmation of brokerage fiduciary duties and responsibilities and Agent's commitment
to devote best efforts to fairly and ably resolve such conflicts and other disputes in a manner that favors the interests of
neither party over the other. Additionally, Client accepts that, although Agent commits to the full and faithful disclosure to
both Buyer and Seller of all material information (of which Agent is aware) reasonably bearing on value or desirability of
the subject property, Agent will not (without written consent):
(a) reveal to Buyer the fact or extent of any willingness by Seller to sell the property at a price, and/or upon terms,
less than those set forth in the subject listing;
(b) reveal to Seller the highest price and/or most Seller-favorable terms upon which Buyer is willing to buy the
property; or
(c) reveal to the other party to the transaction any information relating to any family, financial, health, occupational or
other circumstance, purpose or motivation (not relating to condition, value or desirability of the property) that might
influence or otherwise bear on Buyer's or Seller's decision to purchase or sell the property.
Client acknowledges and accepts the foregoing limitations and exceptions regarding disclosure by Agent, and
acknowledges Agent's advice and recommendation to confer with legal counsel regarding Multiple Agency and Dual
Agency and any decision to proceed on the basis thereof.
Client affirms that Client has read and considered the foregoing, and that Client expressly consents to, and hereby
agrees to allow Agent and Agent's Broker to proceed on the basis of, Multiple Agency and Dual Agency on Client's
behalf as explained herein.
Client (Buyer) Date Client (Seller) Kathy Kostas Date

— DocuSigncd by:
5/3/2013 | 16:43 F
jt/f £roj^vr
Client (Buyer) Date Client (Seller) *SfcWS^<?ite. Date
Agent for Client (Buyer) Date Agent for Client (Seller) Date
Joe & Ginny Kavanaugh
Coldwell Banker
Brokerage Company (please print) Brokerage Company (please print)
Copyright'0 2006 Advanced Real Estate Solutions, Inc. E-32 Form RCMDA Revised 8/04
Instan&t
Case Number forms ^
6-11-FL-005500
DocuSIon Envelope ID: 4953AB6B-8B40-40F2-A76C-A002D87AE3FF
COLDIUeiX
BANKER0
NORTHERN CALIFORNIA
MARKET CONDITIONS ADVISORY
Real estate markets are cyclical and what goes up may well come down. It is impossible to predict what the
market conditions will be at any given time. The ultimate decision of what amount to offer on any given property
rests with the buyer. Buyers need to decide what they are willing to pay for a property in light ofmarket
conditions and their own financial resources. Buyersalso needto decide what type of offer they are willingto
make in recognition of market conditions existing atthe time oftheir offer. The purpose ofthis Advisory is to
bring to the attention of buyers and sellers some ofthe risks attendant to changing market conditions.
Non-Contingent Offers
A non-contingent offer means that the buyer will proceed with the purchase ofthe property (or, ifthe buyer fails
to do so, possibly paying damages to the seller such as the deposit money) regardless ofwhat the buyer may learn
about the condition of the property prior to the close of escrow and regardless of whether the buyer's financing
is available or approved by the lender. Some sellers are insisting that the contract be non-contingent.
Property Condition
Real estate brokers traditionally recommend that buyers protect themselves by conditioning their purchase ofthe
property on an inspection ofthe property so that the buyers can be assured that the property meets their needs. In
some markets, many buyers are choosing to forego that sage advice sothat their offers are more attractive to the
seller.
If, after making an offer without a property condition contingency, a buyer becomes aware of an aspect of the
condition of the property that affects its value or desirability, the buyer may still be required to proceed to
purchase the property or possibly pay damages tothe seller, which may be the deposit in escrow. Ifthis is a
condition that must subsequently be repaired, the buyer may have no legal recourse against any ofthe parties in
the transaction afterescrow closes including the seller, the agents or the inspectors and then the buyer may have
to pay to correct those problems.
NOTE: Waiving the right to have a contingency regarding the property condition does not waive the buyer's right
to inspect the property, even if the property is being sold "AS IS". Regardless of whether there is a property
condition contingency. Broker recommends that prospective buyers have the property thoroughly inspected by
their own experts prior to the close of escrow.
Unless exempt, sellers of residential property of 1to 4 units must complete the Real Estate Transfer Disclosure
Statement (TDS), even if the property is being sold "AS IS". The California Legislature has given buyers the
right to rescind the transaction within three (3) days of personal delivery and five (5) days of mailing of theTDS
if the buyer is dissatisfied with the information supplied by the sellers. The parties cannot waive this statutory
right. If the seller becomes aware of new information that could affect the value or desirability of the property
that was not already disclosed in the TDS, California law provides that the seller "may" (not "must") amend the
TDS, however some contract forms require such an amendment under certain circumstances. Only if the TDS is
amended, in writing, by the seller or the Listing Agent (but not the Selling Agent) does the buyer have the right to
terminate the purchase contract within three (3) days of personal delivery and five (5) days of mailing of the
amended TDS.
Page
*&" 1 of 2

Instan&t
E-33 forms ^
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
MARKET CONDITIONS ADVISORY
Financing
The lender's approval of financing includes the lender's determination that(A) the buyer is creditworthy and can
afford to make the mortgage payments and (B) thatthe property appraises for at leastthe principal amount of the
loan. Even if a buyer has obtained a prequalification or preapproval letter from a lender, the lender may not
ultimately approve the loan if the lender's appraiser determines thatthe property's fair market value is less than
the amount ofthe purchase price or if the buyer's financial/employment situation has changed.
Ifthere is no financing contingency and the property does not "appraise", thebuyer may not beable to afford to
make up the difference between the loan amount applied for and the loan amount actually offered by the lender.
Under those circumstances, the buyer may not be able to perform on their contractual obligations. This could then
result in the buyer paying damages to the seller. It is thus a serious risk for a buyer to eliminate from the purchase
contract their right to have a financing contingency if they intend to secure a loan.
Broker Recommendations
• Buyers should, if possible, try to engage property inspection professionals before making an offer to
inspect the property as well as review any disclosures, records and reports supplied by the sellers or
other sources, such as the local planning entities.
• Buyers should carefully assess their financial situation with their own financial advisor prior to
determining whether to waive any rights to have a financing contingency.
• Even buyers who intend to pay all cash (e.g. from the sale of stock) would be wise to include a
financing contingency if there is any chance that the buyers' ability to pay might be jeopardized by
a loss in value of their source of funds during escrow.
Each buyer must, upon careful deliberation, decide how much risk he or she is willing to assume.
This is not a decision that can be made for a buyer by a Real Estate Agent.
THE UNDERSIGNED ACKNOWLEDGE AN UNDERSTANDING OF AND RECEIPT OF A

COPY OF THIS TWO PAGE ADVISORY.
Date:
Buyer
Date:
Buyer
Date:
Seller Kathy Kostas
-DoeuSigned by:
Date: 5/3/2013 I 16:43 PT .iff frosjur

Seller JMlcfi5ft5cfi£423...
Page 2 of2
Instan^t
E-34
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
DocuSiqn Envelope ID: 4953AB6B-8B40-40F2-A76C-A002D87AE3FF
jH|g PRDS® EXCLUSIVE AUTHORIZATION AND
r^ RIGHT TO SELL t£r[B REALTOR®
www.prdsforms.com
Revision Date 8/07
1 EXCLUSIVE RIGHT TO SELL: Kathy Kostas Jeff Frazier ("Seller") hereby employs
coidweii Banker ("Broker"), granting toBroker the exclusive and irrevocable right,
beginning on 05/03/13 (Date), and expiring at 11:59 P.M. on 11/03/13 (Date), to sell or exchange
the real property located at ^__ 14 Arastradero Road
City of portola valley County of H§a ,CA ("Property").
This agreement ("Listing Agreement") establishes and adopts the price ("List Price"), set forth in Paragraph 2, below, at which
the Property shall be marketed by Broker and shall include such extensions or other modifications hereto asagreed to in writing.
(A real estate broker is the person qualified to advise on real estate. If you desire legal or tax advice, consult an appropriate
professional.)
2 LIST PRICE: One Million Seven Hundred Ninety-Five Thousand ($ 1,795,000.00 ).
3. AGENCY AUTHORIZATION: Seller authorizes Broker to act through any of its agents as a dual agent, tointroduce a Buyer to the
Property, and to represent both Buyer and Seller in the transaction. Seller also authorizes Broker to cooperate with other brokers,
who will not be sub-agents of Seller. Seller acknowledges receipt of the "Disclosure Regarding Real Estate Agency Relationships."
4. MARKETING; DISSEMINATION OF SALE/LISTING INFORMATION:
a) Within 48 hours of execution of this Listing Agreement by all parties, the listing shall be entered into the Multiple Listing
Service ("MLS"). Listing agent shall provide to Seller a copy of the MLS Agent Full Printout ("Property Profile Page")
published and disseminated to the MLS participants / subscribers and Seller shall promptly review said document
for accuracy and, unless corrections are required, approve by initialing a copy thereof.
EXCLUSION FROM THE MLS: If initialed here ( )( ),however, Seller instructs thatthe Property bewithheld
from the MLS until such time as indicated inthe separatelyexecuted Sellers Instructions to Exclude Listing From Multiple
Listing Service ("REXMLS").
b) Broker agrees to act diligently to achieve the purposes of this Listing Agreement, and is authorized to advertise and market
the Property in any medium selected by Broker (e.g., Internet), unless otherwise instructed in writing by Seller.
c) Broker is authorized (in accordance with applicable MLS rules and regulations) to report the sale, all status changes (including,
but not limited to, cancellation, withdrawal and expiration) and, upon close of escrow, sale price, terms and financing for the
publication, dissemination and use by, and information of, MLS participants /subscribers.
5. AUTHORIZATION REGARDING SIGNAGE, LOCKBOX; ADVISORY REGARDING "SHOES OFF AT PREMISES"
REQUIREMENTS; ORDERING OF REPORTS:
a) SIGNAGE: Broker is authorized to place a"FOR SALE" sign on the Property unless Seller initials the following "NO SIGNAGE"
space, in which case signage will not be utilized. NO SIGNAGE ( )( ).
b) LOCKBOX: Alockbox is a lockable container designed for on-site storage of akey to the premises so asto permit convenient
showings of the Property by other agents who are members of the MLS. If the Property is tenant-occupied, Seller-mjiSt obtain
tenants' written permission for use of alockbox. Broker is authorized to place alockbox at the Property unless Sjjler initials
the following "NO LOCKBOX" space, in which case a lockbox will not beutilized. NO LOCKBOX: ( )(. -)•
c) ADVISORY REGARDING "SHOES OFF AT PREMISES" REQUIREMENT; AGREEMENT TO HOLD HARMLESS,

INDEMNIFY AND DEFEND: For important risk management reasons, Broker strongly recommends that Seller not require
business invitees and other visitors to the Property to enterthe premises in stocking feet only orto use disposable shoe
coverings. If Seller nevertheless insists on the imposition of such a requirement, Seller agrees to first read, execute and
deliver to Broker the form entitled "Premises Liability Advisory Regarding "Shoes Off' Requirements; Agreement toHold
Harmless, Indemnify and Defend."
, DS
Seller's NO. (
Initials ) l± )
Copyright® 2007 Advanced Real Estate Solutions, Inc. Page 1of 4 E-35 Form REXA Revised 8/07
Igstan&t
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
DocuSjgn Envelope ID: 4953AB6B-8B40-40F2-A76C-A002D87AE3FF Portola Valley Date: 04/30/13
d) REPORTS AND DOCUMENTS: Seller agrees to payfor, andauthorizes Broker toorder, a Natural Hazard Disclosure Report
(including environmental risk report and tax data report) andthe following, as checked:
H Preliminary [title] report D Roof inspection report • Homeowners' Association documents
IS Property inspection report • Chimney inspection report • Other:
§3 Structural pest inspection report §3 Sewer/septic inspection report • Other:
• Pool inspection report • Building permit search D Other:
6. SELLER DISCLOSURES; Seller shall promptly completeand provide all property-related disclosures required eitherbystatute or
by way of purchase contract, such as theTransfer Disclosure Statement, PRDS® Supplemental Seller's Checklist, Lead-based
paint disclosure, Earthquake Hazards Report ("Questionnaire") and Natural Hazard Disclosure Statement. Seller agrees to save
and hold Broker harmless from all claims, disputes, litigation and judgments arising from any incorrectinformation supplied by
Seller, andfrom anymaterial fact known by Seller which Seller fails to disclose. As applicable, Seller shall provide to Buyer all
legally required Homeowners' Association and common interest development information.
7. TAX WITHHOLDING DECLARATIONS: Seller also agrees to completeand execute a currently valid form affidavit (commonly
referred toas "FIRPTA") setting forth Seller's citizenship status and exempt/non-exempt statusfor purposes of both federal and
California state tax withholding attributable to the subject transaction. Seller acknowledges that Broker claims no expertise
regarding taxes, tax exemption status or the completion of the FIRPTA form; Seller is advised to consult a CPA or attorney
regarding this and any other tax issues. Upon acceptance of an offer to purchase the Property, Seller also authorizes Broker to
provide tothebuyer a fully completed FIRPTA form (including Social Security Number(s)) in time toclose the escrow.
8. SECURITY ANDPREMISES LIABILITY; INSURANCE: Selleracknowledges that brokers, agents, prospective buyers,property
inspection professionals and other business invitees are likely to visit and enter the Property atvarious times, including broker
tours, open houses, agent showings, property inspections, and atother times and on other occasions during which neither Seller
nor Broker is able to monitor such visits. Accordingly, Selleris strongly advised to secure and safeguard valuables from loss,
damage and theft. Seller isfurther advised tokeep the premises free and clear of debris and such personal belongings and other
items that might pose a risk of injury (from, e.g., slip and fall), and to make certain that steps, walkways and other foot traffic
areas are reasonably safe. Seller acknowledges that Broker does not have expertise in the areaof premises liability and casualty
and agrees to hold Broker harmless as to any loss or injury in regard thereto. Seller isexpressly advised to consult insurance
professionalsin regard to the foregoing.
9. HOME PROTECTION PLAN: Home protection plans provide relatively low-cost insurance coverage for specified home appliances
and systems (e.g., furnace, water heater, etc.) that fail during certain time periods surrounding the transaction. Coverage periods
that range from inception of the listing period to well after transfer of title are typically available, as is a variety of different
coverage features (e.g., roof, pool, etc.) and premium costs, depending on the individual plan. When put in place, home protections
plans often fund repair or replacement costs (subject to aservice charge) for items and issues that might otherwise have led to a
claim against Seller, or otherwise have resulted in an expensive loss. If checked. Seller agrees to pay for, and authorizes Broker
to order, a D Home Protection Plan (Buyer's Coverage) • Home Protection Plan (Seller's Coverage) at a cost not to exceed
10. COMPENSATION TO BROKER: NOTICE: The amount or rate of realestate brokerage fees is not fixed by law.They are set
by each Broker individually and may be negotiable between the Seller and Broker.
a) Seller shall pay to Broker percent ( 5-00 %) of the sales price (or an amount of
$ ^'Brokerage Fee") if Property issold by Broker, Seller, oranyother person during the
term (or any extension thereof) of the ListingAgreement.
b) Broker shall offer, through the MLS, compensation tocooperating brokers in theamount of.
percent f 2-50 %) of thesales price (or an amount of $ ),payable from said
Brokerage Fee.
c) In the eventProperty iswithdrawn from sale, transferred, conveyed, leased, or rented without the consent of Broker, or
otherwise made unmarketable by Seller's voluntaryact, duringthe term (or any extension thereof) ofthe Listing Agreement,
the Brokerage Fee as calculated from the List Price (orthe dollar amount entered in Paragraph 10(a)) shall immediately
become due and payable to Broker. /—DS
Seller's Initials
if
PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT NO.( ) )
Copyright® 2007 Advanced Real Estate Solutions, Inc. Page 2 of 4 E-36 Form REXA Instan&t
Revised 8/07
ostan
Case Number forms
TO
6-11-FL-005500
DocuSjan Envelope ID: 4953AB6B-8B40-40F2-A76C-A002D87AE3FF Portola Valley Date: 04/30/13
d) Seller shall pay to Broker the compensation provided in Paragraph 10(a) if Property is sold, conveyed or otherwise transferred
within 90or• calendar days ("Protection Period") afterthe termination ofthis Listing Agreement to anyonewith whom
Broker ora cooperating broker has, prior totermination, had contact relating tothe Property, provided Seller has been given
written notice of the names of such prospective purchasers no later than 10 orD calendar days after termination of this
Listing Agreement. Seller shall not, however, be obligated to pay the compensation provided for in Paragraph 10(a) in the
event a valid listing agreement is entered into during said Protection Period with anyotherlicensed real estatesalesperson.
e) Seller shall execute and deliver anescrow instruction irrevocably assigning toBroker, from Seller's proceeds, the Brokerage
Fees as provided for herein.
11. MEDIATION OF DISPUTES: Sellerand Broker (collectively "Parties") agree to mediate anydispute between them arising outof
this Listing Agreement prior to any court action or arbitration. Mediation is a non-binding process in which Parties to a dispute
meet with a neutral mediator (selected by the Parties) who will try towork out a mutually acceptable resolution. The mediator does
not impose asettlement on the Parties. If the Parties cannot agree on amediator, the Superior Court shall appoint a mediator. The
mediator may conduct more than one session and mediation fees shall be paid equally by participating Parties. Matters excluded
from arbitration (Para. 12(b)) are also excluded from mediation.
12. ARBITRATION OF DISPUTES:

a) Explanation: Arbitration is a private dispute resolution process in which Parties (by themselves or through their attorneys)
submit disputes to a neutral arbitrator who is charged with rendering a fair and impartial decision as to all issues presented.
When arbitration isselected, the Parties give up their rights totrial by judge orjury andtofull and formal court process. Basic
discovery rights (e.g., depositions, document production) are provided for under California law. Rules of evidence and procedure
are less rigid than in trial court. Arbitration fees are typically on an hourly basis. The decision ofthe arbitrator isfinal and
binding on all Parties tothearbitration agreement (Paragraph 12(b)). The arbitrator can award compensatory damages,
punitive damages, and/or order specific performance, injunctive relief and declaratory relief. No trial or other court process
isavailable to re-try the case orto appeal the merits ofthearbitrator's ruling. This means that even when a party claims
the arbitrator made a clearly wrong decision, based on a misunderstanding of fact orof law oranunwillingness to follow the
law, that decision nevertheless remains final and unappealable. Only in cases of actual fraud in the arbitration process,
corruption, bias, lack of due process or jurisdiction, or arbitrator's computation error, can an award be vacated or modified.
The Parties areadvised to confer with legal counsel for advice before committing to bindingarbitration.
b) Arbitration Process, Election to Arbitrate: Any dispute arising out of this Listing Agreement shall be decided by neutral
binding arbitration (in accordance with Chapter 3, Title 9of the California Code of Civil Procedure (CCP §1283.05) including,
but not limited to, the right of discovery), and not by court action, except as provided by California law for judicial review of
arbitration proceedings. The arbitrator shall be a retired Superior Court judge or a licensed California attorney with at least 5
years real estate experience. If the Parties cannot agree on an arbitrator, the Superior Court shall appoint the arbitrator. The
filing of an action in a court of competent jurisdiction to enable the recording of a notice of pending action, for order of
attachment, receivership, injunction, orother provisional remedies shall not constitute a waiver of the right to mediation or
arbitration under this Contract, regardless of whether the said complaint includes causes of action not necessary to the
recordation of the notice of pending action. The Parties agree that, in the event of such court filing, it would beappropriate for
the court toissue anorder staying proceedings therein, pending thecompletion of mediation orarbitration under this Contract.
The filing of such judicial action shall not constitute a waiver of mediation or arbitration rights. Exclusions from arbitration:
unlawful detainer, foreclosure-related actions, matters within Small Claims Court jurisdiction.
"NOTICE: BY INITIALING IN THE SPACE BELOW,YOU ARE AGREEING TO HAVE ANY DISPUTE ARISING OUT OF THE
MATTERS INCLUDED IN THE 'ARBITRATION OF DISPUTES' PROVISION DECIDED BY NEUTRAL ARBITRATION AS
PROVIDED BY CALIFORNIA LAW ANDYOU ARE GIVING UP ANY RIGHTS YOU MIGHT POSSESS TO HAVE THE DISPUTE
LITIGATED IN A COURT OR JURY TRIAL. BY INITIALING IN THE SPACE BELOW,YOU ARE GIVING UP YOURJUDICIAL
RIGHTS TO DISCOVERY AND APPEAL, UNLESS SUCH RIGHTS ARE SPECIFICALLY INCLUDED IN THE 'ARBITRATION
OF DISPUTES' PROVISION. IF YOU REFUSE TO SUBMITTO ARBITRATION AFTER AGREEING TO THIS PROVISION,
YOU MAY BE COMPELLED TO ARBITRATE UNDERTHE AUTHORITYOFTHE CALIFORNIA CODE OFCIVIL PROCEDURE.
YOUR AGREEMENT TO THIS ARBITRATION PROVISION IS VOLUNTARY."
"WE HAVE READ AND UNDERSTAND THE FOREGOING AND AGREE TO SUBMIT DISPUTES ARISING OUT OF THE
MATTERS INCLUDED INTHIS 'ARBITRATION OF DISPUTES' PROVISION TO NEUTRAL ARBITRATION."
Seller's Initials: ( / ) Broker's/Agent's Initials: (_
Seller's NO.(
Initials ) (_ )
Copyright® 2007 Advanced Real Estate Solutions, Inc. Page 3 of 4 E-37 Form REXA InstanQt
Revised 8/07
Case Number forms1^
6-11-FL-005500
DocuSjgn Envelope ID: 4953AB6B-8B40-40F2-A76C-A002D87AE3FF Portola Valley Date: 04/30/13
13. EQUAL HOUSING OPPORTUNITY: Property is offered in compliance with state, local, and federal anti-discrimination laws.
14. ATTORNEY'S FEES: In the event of any dispute between Broker and Seller arising out of or relating to this Listing Agreement,
including disputes over payment of Brokerage fees, each of the parties hereto shall be responsible for the payment of its own
attorney's fees and other legal costs.
15. ADDITIONAL TERMS:

1. Jeff Frazier is authorized to match any offer that is presented for the
equivalent of one half of the offered price plus $1 to acquire the other
parties interest so long as there are no financing contingencies.
2. If Mr. Frazier exercises the above option (#1), Ginny and Joe Kavanaugh
of Coldwell Banker will be due 2.5% of sale price as the listing commission.
3. Management for Coldwell Banker has advised that we disclose to real

estate agents in the Multiple Listing Service that one of the sellers has an
option to pay $1 more than any acceptable offer.
16. ENTIRE AGREEMENT: The undersignedwarrants having the authority to executethis agreement on behalf ofall owners. Seller
and Broker intend that this writing, including any attachments, constitute the entire agreement and that no extrinsic evidence
whatsoever may beintroduced in anyjudicial orarbitration proceeding tomodify its terms. Unless otherwise agreed, all documents
may be signed in counterparts, and those transmitted by facsimile shall beregarded as valid substitutes for the originals thereof.
Seller acknowledges having read and understood, and having received a copy of, this Listing Agreement.
Date: Seller: Kathy Kostas Signature:

(Print Name)
—OocuSigned by:
natB. 5/3/20X3 I ISi^Jk Jeff Frazier .Signature: jtff f rosfvr

(Print Name) -CEF2AB4C1195423.
Address:
TEL: FAX: E-mail:
Date: Listing Office:. Coldwell Banker by:
DRE license number and name of Listing Agent: Joe Kavanaugh

(DRE License No.) (Print Name)
Address: 116 Portola Rd, Portola Valley, CA 94028
TEL: (650)851-1961 FAX: (650)851-4231 E-mail: j oseph.kavanaughOcamoves.com

Copyright® 2007 Advanced Real Estate Solutions, Inc. Page 4 of 4

E-38 Form REXA Revised 8/07
Case Number TOi
6-11-FL-005500
Nedda Ledgerwood
From: Ledgerwood, Nedda [[email protected]]
Sent: Friday, May 03, 2013 11:29 AM
To: [email protected]; [email protected]
Cc: Kathleen Frazier; Jeffery Frazier
Subject: 14 Arastradero listing agreement terms
Dear Ginny and Joe Kavanaugh:
My name is Nedda and I am Kathy Kostas' attorney in her family law matter. She and JeffFrazier have a court
order filed 4/17/13 requiring them to list the above mentioned property for sale by June 1, 2013.
After the house is listed for sale, either Jeff or Kathy can put an offer in for the purchase of the house. These
offers, if submitted, would be weighed against other offers submitted. Of course the goal is to getthe best deal
possible for them.
However, if it happens that Jeffor Kathy's offer is the best, then that makes the sale extremely simple, as you
already know. There is no need for any ofthe contract forms, the financing part, etc. It's merely an interspousal
transfer, requiring the Interspousal Transfer Deed, the PRECOR form, and really itjustcomes back to me (and I
can take care of those forms as well).
Thus, I suppose inyour listing agreement, ifthe sentence isnot already there, you can write inand initial a one-
liner that states something to the effect of: "In the event Kathy and Jeffagree to an interspousal transfer, then
the fees payable to the listing agent is $ ." Nothing more, really.
With that said, though, the goal is to take the best offer available for the property. If you have any questions,
please do not hesitate to contact me. Good luck at your meeting this afternoon and with the house sale.
NEDDA A. LEDGERWOOD
Attorney at Law
Sunnyvale, CA 94086
Office: 408.730.0333
Fax: 408.732.0709
NOTICE: ThisE-mail (including attachments) is covered by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18
U.S.C. 2510-2521, is confidential, and may be legally privileged. Information contained in this e-mail message
is intended only for the individual to whom it is addressed and is private and confidential. If youare notthe
intended recipient, or the employee or agent responsible for delivering this message to the intended recipient,
any dissemination, distribution or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you are not the
intended recipient of this e-mail, please kindly destroy it and notify the sender immediately by reply e-mail.
Please take standard precautions to mitigate virus issues. Thank you for your cooperation.
E-39
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
Nedda Ledgerwood
Fronr Ledgerwood, Nedda [[email protected]]
Sent:' Thursday, May 02, 2013 4:37 PM
To: Jeffery Frazier
Cc: Kathleen Frazier
Subject: house sale
Jeff:
The Judge wrote the first email from today assuming we already agreed on the realtor. He was mistaken. After
an agent is selected, and once the house is listed, thereafter you have the opportunity to submit your offer. We
have the agent selected, but it's not acontract yet until you and Kathy sign alisting agreement with them. An
email is not enough to get a house listed and sold.
That is how the process works, not for you to submit your offer before hand.
You and Kathy first need to sign on with the Kavanaughs then get the house listed then sell your house (if you
and Kathy accept your offer then the real estate agent fees don't get paid, maybe alittle for their time, but the
agents should include that language in their agreement, ie, they should have language to cover this scenario).
NEDDA A. LEDGERWOOD
Attorney at Law
Sunnyvale, CA 94086
Office: 408.730.0333
Fax: 408.732.0709
www,ledgerwoodlaw.com
NOTICE: This E-mail (including attachments) is covered by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18
is intended only for the individual to whom it is addressed and is private and confidential. Ifyou are not the
intended recipient, or the employee or agent responsible for delivering this message to the intended recipient,
any dissemination, distribution or copying ofthis communication is strictly prohibited. Ifyou are not the
intended recipient of this e-mail, please kindly destroy it and notify the sender immediately by reply e-mail.
E-40
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
Nedda Ledgerwood
From: Kavanaugh, Ginny [[email protected]]

Sent: Friday, May 03, 2013 5:12 PM
To: Ledgerwood, Nedda
Cc: Kathleen Frazier; Jeffery Frazier; Nedda Ledgerwood; Joe Kavanaugh; Wendy McPherson
Subject: Re: 14 Arastradero
Nedda
We were sent an email by judge Mills

We used his language
Did you receive?
We did not "create" the 1.00 amount

It came from the Judge's email
Is this a bonafied email from him?
You say it is not an agreement
But it reads as a directive to me.
And it expires today
This did not come from Jeff

Though he did forward it to me
The advisory on the commission is from our manager Wendy McPherson
Our manager has advised that we could do this for 2%

Instead if 2.5
If Jeff buys it
But ourcommission as listing agents will have been earned by bringing in an acceptable offer
I will forward you the Judge's email
As an agent representing buyers inthis area I would want to know what the playing field was in order to best
advise any buyer
To not disclose that there is someone who could up the offer by any amount
Would not be something Joe and I would be comfortable with
We have great respect in thereal estate community which we pride ourselves on
Perhaps eachparty should have an appraisal done

Then determine value and come to an agreement
This would eliminate the frustration.
It seems as if listing the house and putting in multiple is anattempt to establish value
Happy to continue our discussion next week
We would like to list and sell the house

We did this years ago! PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT NO.
E-41
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
' It is a good property with great potential
Thank you for your time and suggestions
Ginny and Joe
Sent from my iPhone
On May 3, 2013, at 4:17 PM, "Ledgerwood, Nedda" <[email protected]> wrote:
Dear All:
Ginny, you and I spoke earlier and I believe I clearly told you that there is nothing atypical about
this sale. It is a typical sale, and the ONLY possible atypical part of it is in the event Jeffs offer
is accepted by both Jeff and Kathy after the home is listed for sale.
No "$1 more than" term exists anywhere in any agreement, unless of courseyou are creating it
for some purpose. Jeffs offer, if he submits one, will be reviewed just the same as other offers
AFTER the home is listed publicly for sale on the market. At that point, I mentioned to you to
figure out what your costs are plus your hours, estimate it the best you can, and write that figure
intothe agreement as the amount you get paid if the sale is between spouses.
No note has to be made in the public mis listing that Jeff will make an offer. His offeris no
different than anyone else's offer. Recall there is no such agreement as to "$1 more." I have no
idea why that is being brought up becauseit's not real.
Jeffhas complicated and confused such a simple transaction that he is now hindering the sale of
the property. He is a very smart man so I believe he should know better.
Ginny: I hope you realize I know you are doing the best you can. But I also realize Jeffis
frustrating this simple transaction.
If you are able to help them today, great, butif not, I will get it on track next week.
Have a nice weekend.
NEDDA A. LEDGERWOOD
Attorney at Law
Sunnyvale, CA 94086
Office: 408.730.0333
Fax: 408.732.0709
NOTICE: This E-mail (including attachments) is covered by the Electronic Communications

PLAINTIFF’S
Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. 2510-2521, is confidential, and may be legally privileged. EXHIBIT NO.
Information
E-42
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
contained in this e-mail message is intended only for the individual to whom it is addressed and
is private and confidential. If you are not the intended recipient, or the employee or agent
responsible for delivering this message to the intended recipient, any dissemination, distribution
or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient of
this e-mail, please kindly destroy it and notify the sender immediately by reply e-mail. Please
take standard precautions to mitigate virus issues. Thank you for your cooperation.
"The information in this electronic mail message is the sender's confidential business and may be legally privileged. It is intended solely for the
addressee(s). Access to this internet electronic mail message by anyone else is unauthorized. Ifyou are not the intended recipient, any disclosure,
copying, distribution or any actiontaken or omitted to be taken in relianceon it is prohibited and may be unlawful."
"The sender believes that this E-mail and any attachments were free of any virus,worm, Trojan horse, and/or malicious code when sent. This message
responsibility fortaking protective and remedial action about virusesand otherdefects. The sender's company is not liable forany loss or damage
arising in any way from this message or its attachments."
"Nothing inthisemail shallbe deemed to create a binding contract to purchase/sell realestate. The sender of this emaildoes not havethe authority to
binda buyeror seller to a contractvia written or verbal communications including, but not limited to, email communications."
E-43
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
From: EMillstascscourtorq [mailto:[email protected]
Sent: Thursday, May 02, 2013 1:43 PM
Cc: Nedda Ledgerwood
Subject: Re: IRMO Frazier, Case #6-11-FL 0055500, 14 Arastradero Road, Portola Valley, CA 94028
I apologize for the delay in responding to you all. I have reviewed the various correspondence, and believe I understand
the various positions. I cannot order a sale between parties: such a transaction must be done by agreement. Nothing
indicates that there is such an agreement. Mr. Frazier, I will authorize you to match any offer that is presented for the
equivalent of one half of the offered price plus one dollar to acquire the other party's interest so long as there are no
financing contingencies. Please discuss this option with the listing agents. In the event that the listing agreement is not
signed by close of business tomorrow, the option will be no longer available to you.
Edward F. Mills
E-44
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
Nedda Ledgerwood

Cc: [email protected]; 'Kathleen Kostas'
Subject: RE: IRMO Frazier, Case #6-11-FL 0055500, 14 Arastradero Road, Portola Valley, CA 94028
Dear Judge Mills:
I want to make sure we are clear as to what is going on and what the 4/17/2013 Judgmentterms (pertinent
portions to the current circumstances read as follows):
1. Theparties shall list for salethe family residence located at 14 Arastradero Road; Portola
Valley, CA 94028.
3. Ed Mills shall be granted judiciary authority to oversee the sale of said residence. In the
event the parties cannot agree on a real estate agent to act as the selling agent by May
1, 2013, Judge Mills shall decide who the selling agent is. The parties agree to allow the
agent to control the method in which the house is sold, although considering both parties
interests in the method of sale. The house must be listed for sale byJune 1,2013.
My understanding is that Mr. Frazier can make an offer, but he can only do so to the agents. The agents have
yet to be determined, and we need you to make that decision as to who the listing agents will be.
In my email to you yesterday, I requested Ginny and Joe Kavanaugh. Both parties have already met with
Ginny and I understand from Ginny that she had a pleasant experience meeting Mr. Frazier.
Thus, please select who the listing agent is and then Mr. Frazier is welcome to submit an offer after the
residence has been listed for sale.
I ask that you immediately select the listing agent and have the parties sign the listing agreement by Friday
May 3, 2013 so that the home is ready for sale by June 1, 2013. We have a very tight calendar to work with.
Thank you for your time.
NEDDA A. LEDGERWOOD
Attorney at Law
Sunnyvale, CA94086
Office: 408.730.0333
Fax: 408.732.0709
NOTICE: This E-mail (including attachments) is covered by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. 2510-
individual to whom it is addressed and is private and confidential. If you are notthe intended recipient, orthe employee
or agent responsible for delivering this message to the intended recipient, any dissemination, distribution orcopying of
this communication is strictly prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient ofthis e-mail, please kindly destroy itand
notify thesender immediately by reply e-mail. Please take standard precautions to mitigate virus issues. Thank you for
your cooperation.
E-45
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
Nedda Ledgerwood
£rom: Ledgerwood, Nedda [nedda@ledgerwoodlaw com]

Cc: Jeffery Frazier; Kathleen Kostas
S"bjeCt: Re: IRM0 Fr*z™> Ca*e #6-11-FL 0055500, 14 Arastradero Road, Portola Valley, CA 94028
Thank you Judge Mills.
Ihope it is not the case, but Iwill contact you by Monday iffor some reason the parties fail to sign the listing
agreement th.s week. To Jeffand Kathy: please set up an appt. asap in order to get the listing agreement signed.
Thank you.
NEDDA A. LEDGERWOOD
Attorney at Law
Sunnyvale, CA 94086
Office: 408.730.0333
Fax: 408.732.0709
www, ledgerwoodlaw. com
^™E,\^h!fi:mail (inîng attachments) is covered by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18

is intended only for the individual to whom it is addressed and is private and confidential. If you are not the
intended recipient, or the employee or agent responsible for delivering this message to the intended recipient
any dissemination, distribution or copying ofthis communication is strictly prohibited If you are not the '
intended recipient ofthis e-mail, please kindly destroy it and notify the sender immediately by reply e-mail
On Thu, May 2, 2013 at 2:51 PM, <[email protected]> wrote:

Iselect Ginny and Joe Kavanaugh.
Edward F. Mills
E-46
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
Jeffery D. Frazier
14 Arastradero Road
(650)275-2112
April 30,2013
Edward F Mills
Superior Court of California
County of Santa Clara
191 North First Street
San Jose CA 95113
FAX: 408 882-2990

E-mail: [email protected]
Subject: MARRIAGE OF FRAZIER

Case #6-ll-FL 0055500
Dear Judge Mills:
I, Jeffery Frazier, represent myself in theabove-entitled action and Ms. Frazier is represented by Nedda
Ledgerwood.
This is in reference to the accompanying Judgment ofApril 17,2013, related to selling ourhouse (see
Paragraphs 1and 3). Due to significant developments since thattime, Iam respectfully requesting that
we have a telephonic case management conference at your earliest convenience.
Ihave now acquired financing that will enable me to immediately buy out Petitioner's equity in the
house, exceeding by a couple thousand dollars the amount the realtor determined to be the net price.
Petitioner refusesthat offer with no substantive explanation.
While we have met with a realtor ofPetitioner's choosing, we have not formally engaged them. They
have emailed their proposal that includes:
$1,795,000 List price minus $96,714.50 Closing costs =$1,698,285.50 Net (Realtor verbally indicated
therewill be an additional $1,500-2,000 preliminary report fees, as well.)
My offer includes:
E-47
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
Edward Mills
Page Two
April 30,2013
$1,700,000 minus $0 expenses =$1,700,000 Net. Payment for herequity would be derived from
transferring my retirement assets to Petitionerand giving her the remainder in cash. Iwill cover
accountanfs fees for adjusting the settlement sheet, as well as fees related to the transfer. There would
be no other expenses for Petitioner.
My position:
• My offer is at least $1,700 over the net of selling through an agent

• This Portola Valley house isourchildren's birth home, rendering them emotional security and a
safe placein which to live. Selling would be a huge emotional loss for them so I have worked
hard to prevent this trauma.
• Selling would create a financial hardship on me while making no financial difference for
Petitioner. Idesire home ownership over renting and the costs for selling, buying and moving
would negatively affect my position.
• I am very attached to the house.
It has been only very recently that Iwas able to workout financing. In addition, I had to hearthe
realtor's list price and closing costs before Icould be confident Icould match them.
Thank you for your help In this matter. Iam available to do whatever Ican to expedite our conference.
Best regards,
fery D. Frazier
Enclosures: Judgment and Seller's Estimated Settlement Statement
Cc: Nedda Ledgerwood, Attorney for Petitioner (via email)
E-48
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
Neéda A. Ledgerwood SBN 224886
43 8 South Murphy Avenue
Sunnyvale, CA 94086
408.730.0333 (T)
408.732.0709 (F)
[email protected]
Attorney for KATHLEEN KOSTAS

fka KATHLEEN FRAZIER

_ Case No. 6—11—FL-005500

In re Marriage of:
KATHLEEN KOSTAS PETITIONER’S SUPPLEMENTAL TRIAL

, _ BRIEF PURSUANT TO 4/17/2013 COURT
.— E0 P6’€1t10f13f, ORDER TO SUBMIT POSITION RE:
ATTORNEYS FEES, COSTS, AND
. . « DJ and SANCTIONS, BY PLEADINGS
. . -> JEFFERY FRAZIER Hearing Date: 5/20/2013
Time: 9:00 AM
. . U1 ReSP0I1d3m Hon. Theodore C. Zayner
Dept. 82
._ O\
. . -1
._. 00 This suppleinental pleading is to reviewed contemporaneousiy with Petitioner 1? Trial Brief
». © Pursuant to 4/1 7/2013 Court Order to Submit Position re: Attorney ’s Fees, Costs, and Sanctions by
ix) O Pleadings filed on May 20, 2013, and is being submitted for the sole purpose of attaching the biliing
statements from Petitioner, Ms. Kathy Kostas’, initial lawyer in this matter, Ms. Rebekah Frye, for the
22 Court’s review. Piease see attached.
24
OwM9>nL
25
26
DATED: 5/21/13
NEDDA A. LEDGERWOOD
27 Attorney for Petitioner
In re Marriage of FRAZJER
Case #6-1 I-FL-005500
F-1 1
PETITIONEWS SUPPLEMENTAL TRIAL BRIEF PURSUANT TO 4/17/2013 COURT ORDER Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
408.730.0333 (T)
3 408.732.0709 (F)
[email protected]
4
5 Attorney for Petitioner:

KATHLEEN KOST AS FRAZIER
6
7
8
9
Case No. 6-l l-FL-005500
In re Matter of:
IO KATHLEEEN KOST AS FRAZIER SUPPLEMENT AL DECLARATION and
II
Petitioner, POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT
OF IMPUTATION OF INCOME TO
I2
and RESPONDENT
13
JEFFERY FRAZIER
Dept: 82
I4
Respondent APJ: ZAYNER
IS
I, Nedda Ledgerwood, declare:
16
I am the attorney for Petitioner/Mother in this matter. We have an Employment Efforts Order revieVI
hearing against Respondent/Father set for February 6, 2013 at 1:30 p.m.
I request the Court impute income to Respondent at $225,000 per year, or $18,750 per month. Thi~
was the income he was earning at his prior employment as VP at Kateeva. His job ended in Octobe1
2012.
I am making this request because multiple career opportunities are available to Respondent howeve1
he has chosen not to take them. He has the earning capacity of at least $225,000 per year, and in th<
past, he has earned up to $1 million in one year (base salary plus bonus plus stock sales, etc.).
attempted to personally help him find work, to which he was amenable. He kindly sent me his CV,
and that email and CV are attached. Respondent's impressive educational and employmen
background are attached (Exhibit A).

In re Matter of Frazier
Case #6-11-FL-005500 G-1 1
SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION OF ATTORNEY NEDDA LEDGERWOOD

Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
4. I researched positions available for someone of Respondent's caliber. There are multipl
2 opportunities available. I did an initial set of research in December 2012 (Exhibit B) and agai
3 recently (Exhibit C). I sent Respondent a courtesy email to notify him of the need to fin
4 employment (Exhibit D).
5 5. He insists on having his own business, but until then, he has two daughters to support. On top o
6 that, he desires to keep the family residence, but without higher income, I see of no fathomable wa
7 that he can keep the family residence. Right now I know he is borrowing money from his parents i
8 order to keep the mortgage afloat.
9 6. While he resides at the family residence, my client cannot afford rent (Exhibit E). The parties nee
IO to divide and sell their assets immediately. Until then, my client is taking the financial hit.
11 7. Please note that in addition to imputing income to him at a reasonable earning capacity of $225,000
12 per year, he also receives income for renting out rooms in the family residence and airplane income.
13 He would need to tell us the current values for those items.
14 8. I did research the law behind the request of imputing income to Respondent, proving that a
15 imputation is proper:
16
The Court may consider Father's earning capacity instead of actual income retroactive to January 3, 2013. In
17 determining child support, the Court has discretion to consider a parent's earning capacity instead of the
parent's actual income, consistent with the best interests of the supported children. Family Code §4058(b). The
18 strong public policy in favor of providing adequate child support has led to an expansive use of earning capacity
in setting the level of support when consistent with the needs of the child. Marriage of Destein (2001) 91 CA 4th
19 1385 at 1391. Courts have the discretion to impute income to both the payor and the payee parent based on
earning capacity. Marriage of Cheriton (2001) 92 CA 4th 269 at 301.
20
21 When the Court considers earning capacity instead of actual income, it is only the actual earned income that
is replaced by earning capacity. The Court may consider both earning capacity and actual unearned income and
22 add the two items together. Stewart v. Gomez (1996) 47 CA 4th 1748 at 1752 -1754.
23
A court is not limited to considering earning capacity only on a showing of bad faith or that the parent is
24 deliberately avoiding his or her financial responsibilities to the family by refusing to accept or seek gainful
employment. Marriage of Smith (2001) 90 CA 4th 74 at 81. Rather, as set out in Marriage of Regnery (1989) 214
25 CA 3'' 1367 at 1372-1373, the Court should consider the "earning capacity" of an unemployed or allegedly
underemployed parent when it is shown that the parent has:
26
27 The ability to work, considering factors such as the parent's age, occupation, skills, education, health,
background, work experience, and qualifications; and
28
Case #6-11-FL-005500 G-2 2
SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION OF ATTORNEY NEDDA LEDGERWOOD Case Number

6-11-FL-005500
An opportunity to work. Marriage of Regnery (1989) 214 CA 3'd 1367 at 1372 -1373. A parent has an
opportunity to work if there is a reasonable likelihood that the party could, with reasonable effort, apply
2 his or her education, skills and training to produce income. Marriage of Smith, Supra. "Opportunity" is
not limited to working for someone else; the Court may also consider the parent's "opportunity" for
3 self-employment. Marriage of Cohn (1998) 65 CA 4th 923 at 930.
4 If either the ability or opportunity to work is absent, a parent's earning capacity may not be considered. But
if a Parent is unwilling to work, despite having the ability and opportunity to do so, earning capacity may be
5
imputed. Marriage ofReqnerv, supra.
6
It is Mother's burden to prove Father's ability and opportunity to be employed. Once this burden is met, the
7 other party must prove that, despite reasonable efforts, he or she could not secure employment. Marriage of
LaBass and Munsee (1997) 56 CA 4th 1331at1338-1339 (help wanted ads from newspaper are admissible for
8
purpose of showing employment opportunities). Thus, it is on Father to prove that he has made reasonable
9 efforts to secure employment but has not been able to do so.
10
9. Because of the reasons above and on behalf of my client, I request the Court impute income t
11
Respondent at $18,750 gross per month retroactive to January 3, 2013. She has not been paid an
12
support by him since January 2013, and she is in desperate need of his help.
13
14
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in Sunnyvale,
15
California on February 4, 2013.
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Case #6-ll-FL-005500 G-3 3

Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
Jeffery D. Frazier
14 Arastradero Road c]\J[)Of=?sr-~o
.- I ,..._ '""
2 Portola Valley, California 94028 I - _I_...
Telephone: (650) 275-2112
201] FEO - 5 p I: oI
4 Self-Represented
. • :.:i:Ca.·1
5 . \, ". ··o'•l ~
------ ~
c·. '. :.~ ~
6
7 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA 11
9
11 Petitioner: KATHLEEN FRAZIER Respondent's Reply to Petitioner's

Supplemental Declaration
12 and
Dept.: 82
14
15 This paper is responsive to Petitioner's SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION and POINTS
16 AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF IMPUTATION OF INCOME TO RESPONDENT

17 ("Supplemental Declaration").
18 I, Jeffery Frazier, declare as follows:
19 l. I am the Respondent in the above-captioned matter. We have an Employment Efforts Order
20 review hearing against me set for February 6, 2013 at 1:30 p.m.
21 2. Yesterday, February 4, 2013, Petitioner blindsided me with her Supplemental Declaration
22 requesting that $225,000 income be imputed to me, which was my salary at my last job from which I
23 got laid off in October 2012. For the reasons below, I request that Petitioner's request be denied and
24 that she be sanctioned $2,500 for bringing it.
25 3. Two Days' Notice. Petitioner's request was sprung on me yesterday by email (TWO days
26 before the hearing on it), with no advance discussion about it and, to this moment, no meet and
27 confer request from Petitioner's attorney. It literally came out of nowhere and why it was done that
28
Marriage of Frazier Page I of 4
Case No: 6- l 1-FL-005500
Respondent's Reply to Petitioner's Supplemental Declaration
H-1
BVFAX
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
way remains a mystery to me. I request $2,500 in sanctions for Petitioner's unnecessary eleventh
2 hour approach to her request and her failure to comply with rules regarding meet and confer.
3 4. No Relevant Evidence. Petitioner's Supplemental Declaration does not include any relevant
4 evidence. Not a single attachment purporting to be job openings shows a generally current opening
5 for a person of my qualifications at a salary of $225,000 per year. Most do not show any salary
6 information at all, and the couple that do are significantly less than $225,000. The majority are for
7 far less qualified people. Many are for people with backgrounds different than mine, e.g., engineers,
8 which I am not. Others are so vague and fragmented they are useless. If the Court should entertain
9 Petitioner's request to impute income, then I request the opportunity to speak to each and every
10 position advertisement that Petitioner has attached to her Declaration. I simply don't have the time to
11 do it now, given the short notice. There being absolutely no relevant evidence to support her
12 position, Petitioner's request to impute income must fail. I request $2,500 in sanctions since
13 Petitioner's request is completely lacking in merit.
14 5. What's more, Petitioner observed my job-hunting efforts the last time I was laid off while
15 both consulting and looking for a job, about two years ago. She knows that it took me about ONE
16 YEAR to find a job in this area that was a match for me and that paid $225,000. How then can she
17 reasonably expect me to find a $225,000/year job in less than four months since I was laid off, and
18 only one month since the Employment Efforts Order issued? She cannot. Besides, she knows that I
19 have been focusing on my consulting business up until this point. I request $2,500 in sanctions
20 because Petitioner brought a request which she knows it is highly unlikely that I (or anyone in my
21 position) would have been able to have met the employment and income requirements she has put
22 forth. This alone makes her Supplement Declaration a waste of time and money.
23 6. Also, Petitioner knows that I found my last $225,000/year job because of the consulting work
24 I was doing. It's bizarre, then, that Petitioner's attorney is now trying to shut down my consulting
25 work, as my experience has shown it is one of the best ways to find a permanent job.
26 7. Guerilla Tactics. This is the exact same kind of guerilla tactic that Petitioner has employed
27 throughout this litigation. For example, she started this litigation with an ex part, no notice, TRO
28 request against me (note, she dismissed the resulting TRO with prejudice at the hearing after
Marriage of Frazier
Case No: 6-11-FL-005500
H-2 Page 2of4
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
1 maintaining it for over eight months!). From there tensions only steadily increased due to her
2 continuing heavy handed tactics. Now, she does the same thing again. No wonder the parties are
3 having difficulties with settlement - Petitioner keeps unnecessarily inflaming the situation with
4 papers such as her Supplemental Declaration. I request sanctions of $2,500 to deter Petitioner from
5 ever further continuing to employ these all too familiar tactics.
6 8. Wasted Resources. Petitioner recently requested the Court to grant her attorney's fees from
7 me which the Court did, in the amount of $10,000. Notwithstanding that I was nearly broke and
8 unemployed, and Petitioner was fully employed, I paid her the $10,000. So, what does she do with
9 it? She spends it on the meritless Supplement Declaration which she brings in the most
10 counterproductive way. As described herein, the Supplemental Declaration is so lacking, it must fail.
11 Yet, I am put to task spending my time to reply, instead of spending these hours working at $300 per
12 hour as I could be. Moreover, the Court's time and effort is wasted dealing with Petitioner's
13 meritless, eleventh hour request. I request sanctions of $2,500 as I would use the money in
14 productive ways. As long as Petitioner would refrain from making me respond to items such as her
15 Supplement Declaration and her attempt to reopen custody, I would focus on settlement. However,
16 Petitioner has a settlement team comprising a family law attorney and a forensic accountant, while I
17 have only me. I need at least the help of an accountant to understand the incredibly complex
18 spreadsheet that Petitioner has given me and is demanding that I edit. Particularly since giving
19 Petitioner the $10,000, I simply do not have the resources to afford it now.
20 9. No Diligence. The Employment Efforts Order in this litigation issued against me only a
21 month ago, on January 3, 2013. Petitioner's attorney has not even bothered to look at my summary
22 of efforts or to learn of my billings for January 2013. No, instead she just prepared and filed her
23 Supplemental Declaration without speaking to me even once about it. Had she bothered to learn
24 about these things, she would have found, for example, that I have an interview this Friday and
25 another on Monday at Intermolecular, Inc. Further, she would have learned, for example, that my
26 January 2013 billings were about three times greater than any of the three previous months since I
27 was laid off in October 2012. These things were readily available to Petitioner's attorney and should
28 have been gotten. I request $2,500 in sanctions for Petitioner's bringing of such an extreme request
Marriage of Frazier
Case No: 6-11-FL-005500
H-3 Page 3of4
Respondent's Reply to Petitioner's Supplemental Declaration Case Number

6-11-FL-005500
while she purposefu lly ignored relevant information she knew she should and could have (i.e., my
2 EEO tracker information and my billing information). In fact, Peti tioner's attorney speaks to the
3 substance of both of these things in her Declaration, so these things are relevant, yet she chose to
4 ignore them!
5 10. Because of the reasons above, I request that the Court deny Petiti oner's request to impute
6 income to me at $18,750 gross per month retroactive to January 3, 20 13. I fi.1rther request that the
7 Court sanction Petitioner in the amount of $2,500.
8
9 I declare under penalty of pe1jury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in Portola Valley,
H-4 Page 4 of 4
Case Number
Respondent's Reply to Petitioner's Supplementa l Declaration
6-11-FL-005500
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
State of California
County of .s::=-~ ,.,_ )/lv.-1e.u
On f(} hr?A~5-r- u, ; J before me, -+

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~ (insert name anhlitle of th:ei officer)
personally appeared .ft. r? , . !frA : _r ,

who proved to me on the basis of satis ctory evidence to be the person whose name( e
subscribed to the within instrumenty nd acknowle~ed to me that&/ ~y executed the same in
diist~~r authorized capacity.(.ies), and that b(5is'/l)er7thprrsignatur~on the instrument the
persr s), or the entity upon behalf of which the perso~ cted , executed the instrument.
I certify under PENAL TY OF PERJURY under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing
paragraph is true and correct.
~ 0 '4~
WITNESS my hand and official seal.

1£·J;.2\ ~B:~Rl~O.~NY~B~IE~Re...LY..,....,.=i....
~ ~,>'~:t}J!L\~;: Comm1ss'.o '. 1ll 1881759
:z: ·{~·~!,,. . Notary Puo11c - California :z:
--~·"· San Mateo County ~
My Comm E
. >:pires Mar 6, 201
~
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Signature ~
~\;Po t
(Seal)
H-5
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
Auomey or Parry witlto111 Auomey: For Court Use Only
Jeffrey 0. Frazier
14 Arastradero Road
Telephone No: 650-533-9138
IRef No. or File No.:
Auorney for: Respondent
Insert 11a111e of Court, and Judicial District a11d Bra11clt Court:
Santa Clara Coun ty Superior Court, North County Family Division
Petilio11er: Kathleen Frazier
Respo11de11t: Jeffery Frazier
PROOF OF SERVICE Ileari11g Date: Time: Dept/ Div: Case Number:
6 11 FL005500
I. At the time ofservice I was at least 18 years of age and not a party to this action.
2. I served copies of the Respondent's Reply to Petitioner's Supplemental Declaration
3. a. Party served: Nedda A. Ledgerwood

b. Person served: Nedda A. Ledgerwood
./. Address where the party was served: 438 South Murphy Avenue
Sunnyvale, CA 94086
5. I served the party:
a. by personal service. I personally de livered the documents listed in item 2 to the party or person authorized to receive
process for the party on: Tue., Feb. 05, 201 3 at: I :30PM, to the person(s) indicated below in the manner as provided in I011
CCP:
Starla Panzica, Authorized to Accept Service, Caucasian, Female, 50 Years Old,
Blond Hair, Blue Eyes
7. Person Who Served Papers: Recoverable Cost Per CCP 1033.S(a)(4)(B)

a. Jason R. Anderson d. The Fee for Se111ice was: $72.50
b. Bender's Legal Service, Inc. e. I am: (3) registered Cali fornia process server
1625 The Alameda (i) Independent Contractor
Suite 5 11 (ii) Registration No.: 1428
San Jose, CA 95 126 (iii) County: Santa Clara
c. 408 286-4 182, FAX 408 298-4484 (iv) Expiration Date: Sat, Jul. 19, 201 4
8. I declare under penalty ofp erjury under the laws of the State of Califomia that the foregoing is true and correct.
Date: Wed, Feb. 06, 2013
.Judicial Co.un cil Form

Ruic 2. 150.(a)&(b) Kev J a nuary I, 2007
PROOF OF SE RVI C~ason H-6ltncrsor J,OZ;erj.
213906
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
Sunnyvale, CA 94086
I .)") I'')
2
408.730.0333 (T) } 0!.1
3 408.732.0709 (F)
[email protected]
4
5 Attorney for Petitioner:

KATHLEEN KOST AS (FRAZIER)
6
7
8
Case No. 6-11-FL-005500
9 In re Matter of:
IO I
KATHLEEEN KOSTAS (FRAZIER) SUPPLEMENT AL DECLARATION IN
11 Petitioner, SUPPORT OF IMPUTATION OF INCOME T
SPONDENT
12
and
13 JEFFERY FRAZIER
14 Respondent
15
I, Nedda Ledgerwood, declare:
16 I. I am the attorney for Petitioner/Mother/Kathy Kostas in this matter. We have an Employment Effort
17
Order review hearing against Respondent/Father/Jeffery Frazier set for June 17, 2013 at 9:00 a.m.
18 Mr. Frazier has an Employment Efforts Order against him per Court order filed on January 3, 2013.
19
2. On Ms. Kostas' behalf, I request the Court impute income to Respondent at $225,000 per yea
20 minimum, which is $18,750 per month retroactive to January 3, 2013. I also request the Cour
21
modify child support and spousal support to include this imputation.
22 3. Please see Mr. Frazier's Curriculum Vitae attached as Exhibit 1. While working for LiD
23
Technologies, Mr. Frazier earned a base salary of approximately $395,006, plus bonus, stock, an
24 other incentives. While working as a VP of Intellectual Property at Kateeva, Mr. Frazier earne
25 $225,000 gross base income per year. His job with Kateeva ended in October 2012.
26 4. Since then, Mr. Frazier has decreasingly earned income through his consulting business. Attache
27 are the job efforts provided by him to me (Exhibit 2). I have not received employment efforts fro
28 Mr. Frazier since May 2013. I have had to solicit his efforts and earnings from him, rather than hi1

In re Matter of Frazier I
Case #6-l l-FL-005500
I-1
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
affirmatively providing me with the Court ordered information (Exhibit 2). His efforts show that h
2 has an unwillingness to give more effort for full time employment. It is because of this that the Cou
3 may impute income to Mr. Frazier.
4 5. Please review my brief Supplemental Declaration and Points and Authorities in Support o
s Imputation of Income to Respondent filed on February 4, 2013 for facts and legal argument i
6 support of my client's request.
7 6. On behalf of Ms. Kostas, we have recently retained Ms. Cheryl Foden of Cheryl Foden
8 Associates, a vocational evaluator, for the purpose of giving testimony as to Mr. Frazier's ability t
9 work, career opportunities available to him, his earning capacity, his work search efforts, and a basi
10 from which she is able to provide her opinions. Her CV is attached as Exhibit 3 and her report i
11 attached as Exhibit 4.
12 7. Ms. Foden's report shows that Ms. Kostas' request to impute income to Mr. Frazier at $225,000 i
13 actually low and should instead be in the range of $350,000 to $500,000 base income plus incentive
14 for a total of a one million in total compensation with variances based on the size of the company
1s industry sector, and his skills in negotiation in the interview. He is still under his earning capacit
16 even if we impute him with income at $225,000 annually.
11 8. Ms. Foden's report also shows that there are ample jobs readily available to Mr. Frazier at his skill
18 level, but he has not taken the action to truly obtain any of these positions. He has not mad
19 reasonable efforts to find employment but instead actually shows an unwillingness to work to his ful
20 potential. Because of this, the Court may impute income to him.
21 9. Both parents have a duty to their daughters, both elementary school aged, to work to the best ofthei
22 abilities to support them. Failure to do so must be considered by this Comi and orders ought to b
23 made to support the public policy of financially suppo1iing their minor children after a divorce.
24 10. Ms. Kostas was under an Employment Efforts Order at one time, during the midst of heavy divorc
2s litigation. Based on her vocational evaluation, she should have taken a year longer to fin
26 employment than she actually did. She has exceeded the expectations of her vocational evaluatio
21 and faced her duty to her children to earn to her best potential possible.
28

In re 1\.1atter of Frazier 2
Case #6-1 l-FL-005500
I-2
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
11. Lastly, pursuant to Family Code section 217, at the June 17, 2013 hearing, Ms. Kostas will need th
2 live testimony of Ms. Cheryl Foden to testify as to the earning capacity of Mr. Frazier. As
3 vocational expert, she will be able to educate the court as to Mr. Frazier's earning potential.
4 12. Ms. Kostas will also need the minimal live testimony of Mr. Frazier as to his employment efforts
s and issues related to his current business and gaining full time employment.
6
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing 1s true and correct. Executed m Sunnyvale,
7
California on June 13, 2013.
8
9
Nedda Ledgerwood
JO Attorney for Petitioner
JI
12
13
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28

In re Matter of Frazier 3
Case #6-11-FL-005500
I-3
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
14 Arastradero Road
2 Portola Valley, California 94028
Telephone: (650) 275-2112
4 Self-Represented
11 Petitioner: KATHLEEN KOSTAS (FRAZIER) Respondent's Reply to Petitioner's

Supplemental Declaration
12 and
Dept.: 82
14
15 This paper is responsive to Petitioner's Supplemental Declaration In Support of Imputation

16 of Income to Respondent ("Supplemental Declaration").
17 I, Jeffery Frazier, declare as follows:
18 1. I am the Respondent in the above-captioned matter. We have an Employment Efforts Order
19 review hearing against me set for June 17,2013 at 9:00 a.m.
20 2. Today, June 14, 2013, Petitioner served me with her Supplemental Declaration In Support of
21 Imputation of Income to Respondent requesting that $225,000 income be imputed to me, which was
22 my salary at my lastjob from which I got laid off in October2012. At least for the reasons below, I
23 request that Petitioner's request be denied.
24 3. The vocational report of Cheryl Foden, attached to Petitioner's Supplemental Declaration,
25 contains numerous errors and is not reliable. For example:
26 • I never earned a base salary of $395,006 (Petitioner's Supplemental Dec. at p. 2)
27 • I never held the position of General Counsel (p. 3)
28
Marriage of Frazier
CaseNo:6-ll-FL-005500
J-1 Page 1 of3
Case Number
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1 • I never reported to the General Counsel at Life Technologies (p. 3)
2 • The recitation of my compensation package at Kateeva is almost completely wrong (p. 3)

3 • The report fails to mention that the Dow-Corning opportunity was in Michigan, not the Bay
4 Area.
5 • The report states that I have been "continuously employed throughout the years." (p. 5) To
6 the contrary, e.g., I was laid off in January 2010 and unemployed until November 2010.
7 These examples show that the vocational "expert" did not use accurate information in conducting
8 or formulating her assessment. Whether the inaccurate information is in the report because of a lack
9 of due care, "puffery" to try and make a stronger case, or some other reason, the result is the same:
10 the conclusions in the report relying upon such inaccurate information cannot be trusted.
11 4. Petitioner's Supplemental Declaration lacks relevant evidence. Not one of the seven (7)
12 attachments purporting to be job openings shows a generally current opening for a person of my
13 qualifications at a salary of $225,000 per year or greater. Most all of the attachments are irrelevant.
14 For example, taking the attachments in order:
15 1) This is a high tech position (consumer electronics) - not my expertise.
16 2) This is for a transactional attorney.
17 3) This is for a licensing attorney.
18 4) This is for NetApp - I've already applied for this and reported it to Petitioner!
19 6) This is for a transactional attorney.
20 7) This is for a person knowledgeable in computer science, electrical engineering, or the like.
21 There being a lack of relevant evidence to support her position, Petitioner's request to impute
22 income must fail.
23 5. I am currently self-employed and working to build a clientele. Simultaneously, I am
24 exploring in-house positions for which I am qualified. It is critical to me, and my children, that I
25 work in this geographic area in that Ms. Kostas and I share 50/50 custody of the children.
26
27
28
Marriage of Frazier
J-2 Page 2 of3
Respondent's Reply to Petitioner's Supplemental Declaration Case Number

6-11-FL-005500
6. I declare under penalty ofperjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in Portola
Valley, California on June 14, 2013.
4
Dated: vlorxe, \^ ,PO\^
5 ondentSBN 157792
10
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Marriage of Frazier
J-3 Page 3 of3
Respondent's Reply to Petitioner's Supplemental DeclarationCase Number

6-11-FL-005500
FL-335
ATTORNEY OR PARTY WITHOUT ATTORNEY (Name. State Bar number, and address):
FOR COURT USE ONLY
_ Jeffery Frazier 157792

14 Arastradero Road
Portola Valley CA 94028

TELEPHONE NO.. (650) 275-2112 FAX NO. (Optional): (650) 618-9802
e-mail addressfoptona/;[email protected]
attorney for (Name): Jeffery Frazier
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF Santa Clara

street address: 605 West El Camino Real, Sunnyvale, CA 94087
mailing address: 191 N. First Street San Jose, CA95113
cityandzip code: Sunnyvale CA 94087
BRANCH NAME:
CASE NUMBER:
PETITIONER/PLAINTIFF: Kathleen Frazier
6-11-FL-005500
RESPONDENT/DEFENDANT: Jeffery Frazier (Ifapplicable, provide):
HEARING DATE:
OTHER PARENT/PARTY:
HEARING TIME:
PROOF OF SERVICE BY MAIL

DEPT.: 82
NOTICE: To serve temporary restraining orders you must use personal service (see form FL-330).
1. I am at least 18 years of age, not a party to this action, and I am a resident of or employed in the county where the mailing took
place.
2. My residence or business address is:

14 Arastradero Road
3. I served a copy of the following documents (specify):

by enclosing them in an envelope AND

a. I X I depositing the sealed envelope with the United States Postal Service with the postage fully prepaid.
b. I I placing the envelope for collection and mailing on the date and at the place shown in item 4 following our ordinary
business practices. I am readily familiar with this business's practice for collecting and processing correspondence for
mailing. On the same day that correspondence is placed for collection and mailing, it is deposited in the ordinary course of
business with the United States Postal Service in a sealed envelope with postage fully prepaid.
4. The envelope was addressed and mailed as follows:

a. Name of person served: Nedda Ledgerwood, Esq.
b. Address: 438 South Murphy Avenue
Sunnyvale, CA 94086
c. Date mailed: June 14, 2013
d. Place of mailing (cityand state): Portola Valley, CA
5. I I Iserved a request to modify a child custody, visitation, or child support judgment or permanent order which included an
address verification declaration. (Declaration Regarding Address Verification—Postjudgment Request to Modifya Child
Custody, Visitation, or ChildSupport Order(form FL-334) may be used for this purpose.)
6. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.
Date: June 14, 2013

Mara Cardoso PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT NO.
Form Approved for Optional Use

PROOF OF SERVICE BY MAIL
J-4 Page 1 of 1
Code of Civil Procedure. §§ 1013.1013a
Judicial Council of California www.courts.ca.gov
FL-335 [Rev. January 1.2012] Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
2 €NCDR-sSb
3 FI LED
4 1\UG 1 62013
5 DA\/10 H. AMASAKI
Chi.I o~~'lla Cl&i"ll
Superior Co\Jrt ct ll!1IY oEPUTY
6
7 SUPERIOR COURT, STATE OF CALIFORNIA
8 COUNTY OF SAN TA CLARA
9
)
IO In re the Maniage of: ) Case No .: 6- l l-FL-005500
11 KATHLEEN FRAZIER, j Decision on Submitted Matter

) ORDER RE: RESPOND ENT' S REQUEST
12 Petitioner, ) FOR MODIFICATION OF CHILD
) SUPPORT AND TEMPORARY SPOUSAL
13 v. ) SUPPORT
)
14 JEFFERY FRAZIER, ) Department 82
) APJ: Zayner
15 ______ R_e_sp_o_n_d_en_t_._ _ _ _ _ _)
16 Respondent Jeffery Frazier's request for order for modification of child support and
17 spousal support came on for hearing before the Honorable Theodore C. Zayner on June 17, 2013,
18 at 9:00 am in D epartment 82. An Employment Efforts Order review also came on for hearing.
19 Petitioner Kathleen Frazier aka Kathleen Kostas ("Kathleen") appeared with her attorney Nedda
20 A. Ledgerwood and Respondent Jeffery Frazier ("Jeffery") appeared as a self-represented
21 litigant. The matters having been submitted, the Court orders as fo llows:
22
23 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
24 The parties married on April 8, 1995. They have two daughters. Kalista was born on
25 February 5, 2002, and Lauren was born on July 29, 2005. Kathleen filed a Petition for
ORDER RE: RESPOND ENT'S REQUEST FOR MODIFICATION OF CHILD SUPPORT, et al.
K-1
-1- Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
Dissolution on January 26, 2011. Jeffery filed a Response and Request for Dissolution on March
2 4, 2011.
3 Pursuant to Stipulation and Order filed on July 1, 2011, Jeffery was required to pay
4 temporary spousal support to Kathleen in the amount of $4,657 per month, and child support in
5 the amount of $3,837 per month. These amounts were calculated based, in part, upon Jeffery
6 having a 17% timeshare and $ 18,750 in monthly wages and salary. The parties agreed to modify
7 support without the need to file a motion based upon changes to the custodial timeshare. Any
8 such modification was to be retroactive to the date of the change to the timeshare.
9 On July 31, 20 12, Jeffery filed a request for modification of child support and temporary
10 spousal support. Jeffery claimed that circumstances had changed in that his timeshare had
11 increased four times since the existing support order was issued, and Kathleen had obtained a
12 well paying job.
13 On August 22, 2012, the parties appeared for a hearing and entered a stipulation on the
14 record. The stipulation was entered as an order on April 11 , 2013 . The stipulation and order
15 states that, commencing September 1, 2012, Jeffery shall pay child support to Kathleen in the
16 amount of$1,664 per month, and temporary spousal support in the amount of $2,868 per month.
17 The parties agreed to meet and confer and modify support without the need to file a motion as a
18 result of any changes to either party's emp loyment. Any modification in support shall be
19 retroactive to the date of the change to the timeshare or income. The stipulation and order
20 incorporates a Dissomaster report showing that the support amounts are based upon Jeffery's
21 income being $18,750 per month and Kathleen's income being $5,958 per month.
22 On September 24, 2012, Kathleen filed a responsive declaration acknowledging that she
23 had just started a new contracting position on September 4, 20 12, earning $65 per hour for a
24 maximum of 25 hours per week. However, Kathleen claimed she was not currently working 25
25 hours per week.

ORDER RE: RESPONDENT'S REQUEST FOR MODIFICATION OF CHILD SUPPORT, et al.

K-2
-2- Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
On November 13, 2012, Jeffery filed another request for modification of the child
2· · support and spousal support. Jeffery claimed that circumstances had again changed in that he·
3 was laid off on October 8, 2012, and was now doing consulting work on a contract basis.
4 Additionally, Jeffery claimed that Kathleen had accepted a full time job with an annual salary of
5 $103,000. According to Kathleen's offer letter, she would start on October 8, 2013. Jeffery's
6 Income and Expense Declaration incorporated a copy of his final pay stubs from Kateeva. These
7 pay stubs confirm that his yearly salary was $225,000, and his employment ended on October 8,
8 2012. The check dated October 5, 2012 included payment of $17,163.82 for 158.67 hours of
9 unused vacation. The check dated November I, 2012 was for severance pay in the gross amount
10 of $17,307.69, which is the equivalent of 160 hours at his hourly rate. Jeffery's year-to-date
11 earnings for 2012 were $208,335.15.
12 On December 19, 2012, Kathleen filed a responsive declaration indicating that she would
13 consent to guideline child support. Kathleen requested income to be imputed to Jeffery at a
14 minimum of $10,000 per month as self employment income. Alternatively, Kathleen requested
15 an employment efforts order to be issued against Jeffery.
16 On January 3, 2013, the parties appeared for a hearing on Jeffery's request for
17 modification of support. Pursuant to stipulation and order, a Seek Work Order was issued
18 against Jeffery and jurisdiction was reserved over child support and spousal support from
19 January 1, 2013 forward. The Seek Work Order requires Jeffery to make at least 10 applications
20 for jobs every week and immediately register with at least five temporary employment agencies.
21 A review hearing was set for February 6, 2013.
22 On February 4, 2013, Kathleen filed a supplemental declaration and points and
23 authorities requesting the Court to impute income to Jeffery at $225,000 per year, or $18,750 per
24
25 ("CV") and a list of job advertisements for someone of Jeffery's caliber. Kathleen also presented
ORDER RE: RESPONDENT'S REQUEST FOR MODIFICATION OF CHILD SUPPORT, et al. K-3
-3- Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
evidence that Jeffery is renting out rooms in the family residence and earning income from the
2- ~ use of the airplane.
3 On February 5, 2013, Jeffery filed a reply claiming to be blindsided by Kathleen's
4 request to impute income at $225,000 per year. Jeffery argued that the majority of the job
5 advertisements attached to Kathleen's declaration are for "far less qualified people." Jeffery
6 claimed to be focusing on his consulting business because that is how he found his prior job.
7 The parties appeared for a status conference and employment efforts review on February
8 6, 2013. The employment efforts review was subsequently continued to March 13, 2013, then
9 April 17, 2013, then May 20, 2013, and then June 17, 2013.
10 On May 20, 2013, Jeffery filed a trial brief (concerning a separate matter) in which he
11 claimed that the family home is set to be listed for sale by June 1, 2013, for a listing price of
12 $1.795 million, which would provide $830,482 in equity for the parties to split (i.e., $415,241 for
13 Kathleen). (Page 7, lines 3-5.)
14 On June 13, 2013, Kathleen's attorney ("Ledgerwood") filed a supplemental declaration
15 in support of imputation of income to Jeffery. Ledgerwood indicated that Cheryl Foden had
16 been retained to give expert testimony concerning Jeffery's ability to work, career opportunities
17 available to him, his earning capacity, and his work efforts. Ledgerwood attached a copy of
18 Foden' s report concerning Jeffery.
19 On June 14, 2013, Jeffery filed a reply to Ledgerwood's supplemental declaration.
20 Jeffery argued that Foden's report is not reliable because it is based, in part, upon mistakes of
21 fact. Further, Jeffery argued that not one of the job openings attached to Foden's report shows a
22 current opening for a person of Jeffery's qualifications at a salary of $225,000 per year or
23 greater. Jeffery argued that "[t]here being a lack of relevant evidence to support her position,
24
25

K-4
-4- Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
working to build a clientele and exploring in-house positions for which he is qualified.
2- -However, Jeffery did not introduce any evidence as to his current self-employment income.
3 On June 17, 2013, Jeffery's request for modification of support and the employment
4 efforts review came on for hearing. Although Foden testified as an expert witness for Kathleen,
5 her report was not admitted into evidence.
6 Kathleen introduced four exhibits into evidence. Trial exhibit 1 consists of documents
7 reflecting the earnings of the parties in 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2011. Jeffery's 2007 W-2
8 shows that he earned $478,745.36 in gross pay from Applera. Jeffery's 2008 W-2 shows that he
9 earned $1,093,235.83 in gross pay from Applied Biosystems. Jeffery's 2009 W-2 shows that he
IO earned $462,284.88 in gross pay from Applied Biosystems. Jeffery's 2010 federal income tax
11 return (1040) shows that his gross wages in 2010 were $932,125. Jeffery's 2011 federal income
12 tax return (1040) shows that his gross wages in 2011 were $215,670. Trial exhibit 2 is a copy of
13 Jeffery's sworn responses to form interrogatories, dated May 26, 2011. Trial exhibit 3 is a copy
14 of a Wells Fargo bank statement for the period from May 1, 2013 through May 31, 2013. This
15 statement shows that Jeffery deposited $240,000 from a checking account x7226 to his Business
16 Market Rate Savings account x2095 on May 12, 2013. Trial exhibit 3 also shows an in-branch
17 deposit of $125,000 on June 12, 2013 in checking account x7226. Trial exhibit 4 is a copy of
18 Jeffery's EEO Update for May 2013 and part of June 2013.
19 Evidence was introduced that the parties had received a third-party offer to buy the
20 family home for $1.97 million. Jeffery had submitted a counteroffer at one dollar more, and
21 claimed the ability to buy out part of Kathleen's interest in cash, and the remainder out of his
22 share of 401 K retirement funds. The parties submitted the issue as to whether or not to accept
23 the third-party offer or Jeffery's request to buy out Kathleen's interest. On June 19, 2013, the
24 Court ordered the parties to accept the third-party offer.
25
ORDER RE: RESPONDENT'S REQUEST FOR MODIFICATION OF CHILD SUPPORT, et al. K-5
-5- Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
II. DISCUSSION
Jeffery is requesting modification of child support and temporary spousal support on the
3 grounds that his income has decreased as a result of being laid off and Kathleen's income has
4 increased as a result of her obtaining full time employment.
5 A party seeking a modification of child support must present evidence that establishes a
6 change of circumstances. (Marriage ofBrinkman (2003) 111Cal.App.4th1281, 1292.) Each
7 case stands or falls on its own facts, but the overriding issue is whether a change has affected
8 either party's.financial status. (Marriage ofLaudeman (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1009, 1015.)
9 In this case, there is no question that there has been at least one material change of
1o circumstances. The existing support order is based upon Kathleen having a gross income of
11 $5,958 per month. Her gross income has increased to $8,583 per month. As a result of this
12 change in circumstances, the Court will issue a modified support order.
13 However, the fact that Jeffery was recently laid off does not necessarily mean that
14 support should be calculated based upon his current actual income. It has long been the rule in
15 California that a parent's earning capacity may be considered in determining spousal and child
16 support. (Marriage of Cheriton (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 269, 301.) For purposes of determining
17 support, earning capacity represents the income the spouse is reasonably capable of earning
18 based upon the spouse's age, health, education, marketable skills, employment history, and the
19 availability of employment opportunities. (Id.)
20 A modification proceeding by definition presumes a change in an already established
21 status quo. (Marriage ofBardzik (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1291, 1303.) The burden of proof as
22 to ability and opportunity to earn imputed income (or lack thereof) plays out differently
23 depending on the status quo going into the modification proceeding. (Id. at 1304.) For example,
24 in the situation where the payor loses his or her job and seeks a reduction in court-ordered
---- - - - - - - - - -
25

K-6
-6- Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
support based on the changed circumstance of lack of income, it will be the payor, as moving
2 party, who bears the burden of showing a lack of ability and opportunity to earn income~ (Id.)
3 Imputation of income is never automatic. This is so even where employment is lost due
4 to misconduct. (Marriage ofEggers (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 695, 697.) Regardless of who has
5 the burden of proof, the court must reach the issues of ability to find employment and reasonable
6 opportunities to find employment. (Id. at 701.)
7 In this case, Jeffery has been proceeding as though it is Kathleen's burden to prove that
8 his earning capacity is $225,000 per year. This is incorrect. The status quo going into this
9 modification proceeding is that Jeffery earns a baseline income of $225,000 per year. Jeffery is
10 the moving party seeking a reduction in court-ordered support based on the changed
11 circumstance of lack of income. As the moving party, it is Jeffery's burden to show lack of
12 ability and opportunity to earn.
13 Notably, when Jeffery filed this motion, he presented no evidence that he lacks the ability
14 and opportunity to earn income. Instead, he simply stated that he got laid off and has "no idea"
15 how many hours and for how long his company will be able to give him consulting work.
16 In the supplemental declaration he filed on February 5, 2013, Jeffery failed to introduce any
17 evidence to show what he is currently earning and what he is capable of earning. In the reply
18 declaration he filed on June 14, 2013, Jeffery again failed to introduce any evidence to show
19 what he is currently earning and what he is capable of earning. During the seven month period
20 in which this motion has been pending, Jeffery did not file an updated Income and Expense
21 Declaration. Although Jeffery eventually stipulated to the issuance of a Seek Work Order, his
22 efforts thus far have fallen far short of the requirement of making at least I 0 applications for jobs
23 every week and registering with at least five temporary employment agencies.
24 Instead of introducing evidence to support his motion, Jeffe~-~~p~_y_o~!~ct_~d~? _____ _ ______ _
25 Kathleen's evidence. With regard to Foden's report concerning his earning capacity, Jeffery

K-7
-7- Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
1 claimed that the report contained mistakes concerning one of his prior base salaries, one of his
·2 prior job titles, who he previously reported to, his most recent compensation package, the
3 location of a job opportunity he turned down, and failed to mention his unemployment from
4 January 2010 until November 2010. However, these mistakes do not detract from the evidence
5 that Jeffery earned $478,745.36 in gross pay in 2007, $1,093,235.83 in gross pay in 2008,
6 $462,284.88 in gross pay in 2009, $932,125 in gross wages in 2010, and $215,670 in gross
7 wages in 2011. This evidence shows that, despite being previously unemployed for a 10 month
8 period, Jeffery's annual earnings from 2007 through 2011 never fell below $215,670. Other
9 evidence shows that, although Jeffery was laid off in October 2012, as of November 1, 2012, his
10 year-to-date earnings were $208,335.15.
11 In ruling on a request for reduction in court-ordered support, the Court may consider
12 whether the support obligor has other assets that will enable him to meet his current support
13 obligation, either in whole or in part. (Marriage ofEggers, supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at 701; State
14 of Oregon v. Vargas (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1123, 1128.) Notably, during the pendency of this
15 modification proceeding, Jeffery claimed to have sufficient financial resources (from savings and
16 his share of 401K retirement accounts) to buy out Kathleen's interest in the family home (which
17 he estimated to be over $415,000 based upon his assumption that the house would sell for $1.795
18 million). Ultimately, the Court ordered the parties to accept the third-party offer to buy the
19 family home for $1.97 million. As a result, Jeffery will not only retain the financial resources he
20 was willing to spend to buy out Kathleen's interest in the family home, he will also have his
21 share of the net equity (which should be one-half of approximately $1 million). Thus, Jeffery
22 clearly has more than sufficient financial resources to pay support at the status-quo $225,000 per
23 year baseline income during the time period he remains underemployed, if indeed he is and
24 continues to be so, which the court finds is of his own volition.
25

K-8
-8- Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
In conclusion, although Jeffery is seeking a reduction in court-ordered support based
2 upon the changed circumstance of lack of income, he completely failed to meet his burden of
3 showing a lack of ability and opportunity to earn income. In fact, Jeffery did not present any
4 evidence that his current income from all sources (including rental income and self-employment
5 income) is, in fact, less than the $225,000 per annum upon which the existing support order is
6 based. Further, other evidence presented at the hearing on this modification proceeding shows
7 that Jeffery has other assets that will enable him to meet his support obligation based upon an
8 earning capacity of $225,000 per annum.
9 As noted previously, Kathleen's gross income has increased from $5,958 per month to
IO $8,583 per month. The evidence also shows that Kathleen has a health insurance deduction of
11 $400 per month. In light of these changed circumstances, Jeffery shall pay guideline child
12 support to Kathleen in the amount of $1,455 per month, and temporary spousal support in the
13 amount of$2,371 per month, for a total support obligation of $3,826 per month. (See
14 Dissomaster report 1.) These amounts are retroactive October 8, 2012, which is the date on
15 which Kathleen began earning $8,583 per month.
16 Once escrow closes on the sale of the family home, Jeffery will lose his income tax
17 deductions for mortgage interest and property taxes. This will result in a change of
18 circumstances that will slightly decrease guideline support. At that time, Jeffery shall pay
19 guideline child support to Kathleen in the amount of $1,221 per month, and temporary spousal
20 support in the amount of $1,854 per month, for a total support obligation of $3,075 per month.
21 (See Dissomaster report 2.)
22
23 DATED: August fk, 2013

24
25

ORDER RE: RESPONDENT'S REQUEST FOR MODIFICATION OF CIDLD SUPPORT, et al.
K-9
-9- Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
ATTORNEY, AGENCY, OR PARTY Wlll-IOUT ATTORNEY (NAME AND ADDRESS): TELEPHONE NO:
Santa Clara County

Superior Court
- - --
ArroRNEYFoR: Father
DISSOMASTER REPORT CASE NUMBER:
2012, Monthly
Input Data Father Mother Guideline (2012) Cash Flow Analysis Father Mother
Number of children Nets (adjusted) Guideline
% time with NCP 49.99% 49.99% Father 14,557 Payment (cost)/benefit (2,835) 3,012
Filing status HH/MLA HH/MLA Mother 5,215 Net spendable income 10,732 9,041
# Federal exemptions 2* 2* Total 19,772 % combined spendable 54.3% 45.7%
Wages + salary 18,750 8,583 Support Total taxes 4,193 2,968
Self-employment income 0 0 Presumed 1,455 #withholding 22 0
Other taxable income 0 0 Basic CS 1,455 allowances
0 Net wage paycheck/mo 14,001 5,869
TANF plus CS received 0 0 Add-ons
Other nontaxable income 0 0 Per Kid Proposed
532 Payment (cost)/benefit (2,775) 2,884
New-spouse income 0 0 Child 1
Child2 923 Net spendable income 10,765 9,085
Wages + salary 0 0
0 Santa 2,371 NSI change from gdl 33 44
Self-employment income 0
Clara SS % combined spendable 54.2% 45.8%
SS paid other marriage 0 0
Total 3,826 % of saving over gdl 42.8% 57.2%
Retirement contrib if ATl 0 0
Proposed, tactic 9 Total taxes 4,233 2,851
Required union dues 0 0
Presumed 1,414 #withholding 22 0
Nee job-related exp. 0 0
Basic CS 1,414 allowances
Adj. to income (ATI) 0 0
14,001 5,869
SS paid other marriage 0 0 Add-ons 0 Net wage paycheck/mo
CS paid other relationship 0 0 Per Kid
0 400 Child 1 508

Health insurance
Itemized deductions 4,274 0 Child 2 906
Other medical expenses 0 0 Santa 2,339
Clara SS
Property tax expenses 1,386 0
Total 3,753
Ded. interest expense 2,888 0
Combined 77
Charitable contribution 0 0 Savings
Miscellaneous itemized 0 0 Total
Required union dues 0 0 releases to
Mandatory retirement 0 0 Mother
Hardship deduction O* O* Default Case Settings
Other gdl. deductions 0 0

AMT info (IRS Form 6251) 0 0
Child support add-ons 0 0
- - --~--- -- ·- ·- ---- ---------- -
cfii.. (. . . """""" 2009)

DissoMaster™ 2013-1
DissoMaster Report (Monthly)
Santa Clara County, Superior Court
Page I of I
PLAINTIFF’S
8/14/2013 5:16EXHIBIT
PM NO.
08.14.13 - Frazier JK.dm
K-10
t'.1\""-0-~~ ~o<"t- 6-11-FL-005500
Case \Number
0 r\/;?
ATTORNEY, AGENCY, OR PARTY WITHOUT ATTORNEY (NAME AND ADDRESS}: TELEPHONE NO:
Santa Clara County

Superior Court
--- .
ATTORNevFoR: Father
DISSOMASTER REPORT CASE NUMBER:
2013, Monthly
Input Data Father Mother Guideline (2013) Cash Flow Analysis Father Mother
Number of children 1 1 Nets (adjusted) Guideline
% time with NCP 49.99% 49.99% Father 12,890 Payment (cost)/benefit (2,257) 2,439
Filing status HH/MLA HH/MLA Mother 5,254 Net spendable income 9,815 8,329
# Federal exemptions 2* 2* Total 18,144 % combined spendable 54.1% 45.9%
Wages + salary 18,750 8,583 Support Total taxes 5,860 2,929
Self-employment income 0 0 Presumed 1,221 #withholding 9 0
Other taxable income 0 0 Basic CS 1,221 allowances
Net wage paycheck/mo 12,545 5,726
TANF plus CS received 0 0 Add-ons 0
0 0 Per Kid Proposed
Other nontaxable income
Payment (cost)/benefit (2, 196) 2,309
New-spouse income 0 0 Child 1 444
Net spendable income 9,849 8,374
Wages + salary 0 0 Child 2 777
NSI change from gdl 34 45
Self-employment income 0 0 Santa 1,854
% combined spendable 54% 46%
SS paid other marriage 0 0 Clara SS
Total 3,075 % of saving over gdl 43.3% 56.7%
Retirement contrib if ATI 0 0
Proposed, tactic 9 Total taxes 5,901 2,809
Required union dues 0 0
Presumed 1,178 #withholding 9 0
Nee job-related exp. 0 0
Basic CS 1,178 allowances
Adj. to income (ATI) 0 0
Net wage paycheck/mo 12,545 5,726
0 0 Add-ons 0
SS paid other marriage
0 0 Per Kid
CS paid other relationship
0 400 Child 1 419
Health insurance
0 0 Child 2 759
Itemized deductions
0 0 Santa 1,822
Other medical expenses
Clara SS
Property tax expenses 0 0
Total 3,000
Ded. interest expense 0 0
Combined 79
Charitable contribution 0 0 Savings
Miscellaneous itemized 0 0 Total
Required union dues 0 0 releases to
Mother
Mandatory retirement 0 0
O* O* Default Case Settings
Hardship deduction
Other gdl. deductions 0 0
AMT info (IRS Form 6251) 0 0
Child support add-ons 0 0
- ------ ~-~--- - . ·-· ---- --- - --- ---- --- -- ---- ~ -- - - -- --·-- - . -- -
cfii.. (Rov. ,,......, 1,2009)

OissoMaster™ 2013-1
DissoMaster Report (Monthly)
Santa Clara County, Superior Court 8/14/2013
Page I of I
PLAINTIFF’S
5:19EXHIBIT
PM
08.14.13 - Frazier2 JK.dm
NO.
K-11
0 ~?::? 0 ~-~+
c-- ~"\-ur' Case Number ;i_
6-11-FL-005500
FOR COURTUSE ONLY
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA,

r:-1:N-=-=r:-:-=HE-:MA-: --=-=rr=ER=--o:-:F:---------~
-:- F ILED
FRAZIER v. FRAZIER .. 1 ·G·1 9Z01J
'
~ •
\Q~
H.YAMASAK\
ott1oer/Clerl< cwa
Su
;11~.i;
Cw-•
ot c>. ccuntY ~ snma- o"'P\J'N
s;
[K) PROOF OF SERVICE BY MAIL OF: l!!'L VJ -

Order Re: respondents request for modification of child support and
temporary spousal support Cas ~ No: 6-1 1-FL-005500
D PROOF OF PERSONAL SERVICE OF:

FCS No:
I certify that I am not a party to this cause and that a copy of the foregoing was mailed first class, postage prepaid,
in a sealed envelope, and that the mailing of the foregoing and execution of this certificate occurred at San Jose,
California.
I certify (or declare) under penalty of perjury, that the foregoing is true and correct.
DAVID YAM/ S Kl , CHIEF_: _XECUTIVE OFFICER
Executed on 8-19-13- -- By M.Marin

____,u++-+--
J Jeffrey D. Frazier
14 Arastradero Rd
I
\
Nedda Ledgerwood
438 South Murphy Ave
Sunnyvale, CA 94086
l
K-12
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
F rDr$E
PLAINTIF_F/PETITIONER: AUG 2 1ZOD
Kathleen Celile Kostas
DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT:
Jeffre Frazier
ORDER FOR DISPOSITION OF EXHIBITS CASE NUMBER:
611F1005500
Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 1952, it is hereby ordered that any exhibit or deposition that has been
introduced in this action be destroyed or otherwise disposed of by the Clerk of the Court.
/2J CCP l952(c) Trial of Action. Operative date of disposition is 60 days following final determination of
action, including fmal determination on appeal.
D CCPl 952(d) Post-trial bearing. Operative date of disposition · days following conclusion of
· - nap ea! of hea ring.
Dated i.:zd ~ 1heodore C. Zayner
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE: I certi fy that I am not a

Order was served as follows:
0 By personal service on the parties and on the date shown below.
K By first class mail, postage prepaid, addressed as shown below and mailed on the date shown below.
Dated: _e / :21 / !3
..__ .
Neddll. L e,f1eRuJCo d
0 f'ff-Re!j -rra.zr e!G
lJ3B Sourh ('(\u'{(ph(J- f\v'-e_
l ~ A-p_ t:C~~c&mi 0r-
5-Jnn~vttLc Cir qLfOS6
~citilc\ V0- ll6J 611- q L/t>Zf)
Attorne for Pebh<~ae..n__
1
K-13
Case Number
ORDER FOR DISPOSITION OF EXHIBITS 6-11-FL-005500
2
1~UG 1 62013
3
7 SUPERIOR COURT, STATE OF CALIFORNIA
9
)
10 In re the Marriage of: ) Case No.: 6- l l -FL-005500
)
11 KATHLEEN FRAZIER, )
) Fll\TDINGS AND ORDER
12 Petitioner, ) RE ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS
)
13 and ) Decision on Submitted Maner
) Department 82
14 JEFFERY FRAZIER, ) APJ: Zayner
)
15 Respondent.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
)
16 The parties having reached agreement on entry of their Judgment regarding property
17 division at a Mandatory Settlement Conference on April 17, 2013, reserved for later briefing and
18 submission to the court were each party' s respective requests for attorney's fees, costs and
19 sanctions. The Judgment includes an agreement to retain in trust $ 150,000 from the sale proceeds
20 of the family residence, pending the court's determination on the requests for attorney's fees,
21 costs and sanctions. The parties agreed to submit briefs and attorney billing statements on these
22 issues, and did so on May 20 and 2 1, 20 l 3. The matter was deemed submitted to the court for
23 decision on May2 1, 2013.
24 The issues of Respondent's request for modification of support, an Employment Efforts
25 review, and Petitioner's request for an imputation of income to Respondent were later presented
FINDINGS Al"'ID ORDER RE ATTORNEY' S FEES AND COSTS - 6-l l -FL-005500

L-1
-1- Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
and submitted to the court on June 17, 2013. The Court issues this order contemporaneously with
2 its order on those issues.
3 The Court has carefully reviewed and considered all evidence and argument presented,
4 and now makes the following findings and order.
5 Petitioner requests both attorney's fees and costs based on need, pursuant to Family Code
6 §2030, and sanctions pursuant to Family Code §271. Respondent requests sanctions based on the
7 following: §271; breach of fiduciary duty pursuant to §§721, 1100, 1101 and 2102; §3027.l; and
8 prevailing party fees pursuant to §6344. Respondent also requests sealing of certain portions of
9 the court record, although no motion has been filed pursuant to California Rule of Court 2.551.
IO
11 Petitioner's Requests
12 California Family Code §2030 provides, in pertinent part: "If the findings (of the court)
13 demonstrate disparity in access and ability to pay (attorney's fees), the court shall make an order
14 awarding attorney's fees and costs." (Emphasis and parentheses added.)
15 Petitioner's showing of disparity in access between the parties, and Respondent's ability
16 to pay, is more than adequate. The disparity in income between the parties, with Respondent
17 earning substantially more than Petitioner, has been significant and profound throughout this
18 litigation. Although Petitioner is now gainfully employed with a job that does pay well, the
19 disparity between her income and Respondent's income and earning capacity remains
20 significant, though somewhat narrowed.
21 Petitioner's request for need-based fees and costs is GRANTED. The Court finds that an
22 award of attorney's fees and costs is appropriate, that there is and has been a disparity in access
23 to funds to retain counsel, and that Respondent is able to pay for the legal representation of both
24 part~~s~P~~:uanU<?_fa.IAUY Code §i03o, t~e courj order!)J~.e.sponc.lent to p~y to Petitioner __

25
FINDINGS AND ORDER RE ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS-6-11-FL-005500 L-2

-2- Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
$75,000 as and for attorney's fees and costs which the court finds have been reasonably
2 necessary to sustain or defend this action.
3 Regarding Petitioner' s request for sanctions, the court finds ample evidence has been
4 presented of Respondent's conduct which has frustrated the policy of the law to promote
5 settlement of litigation and reduce the cost of litigation by encouraging cooperation between the
6 parties and attorneys. Respondent has received adequate notice of Petitioner's request and has
7 had the opportunity to be heard, both parties having presented extensive briefs on these issues
8 and having agreed to submit these issues to the court for decision. Petitioner is not required to
9 demonstrate any financial need for requesting such sanctions, and the court finds that the
10 imposition of sanctions will not impose an unreasonable financial burden on Respondent.
11 Petitioner's request for sanctions is GRANTED, and Respondent is ordered to pay $30,000 to
12 Petitioner, as and for sanctions pursuant to Family Code §271.
13 The amounts awarded to Petitioner, which total $ 105,000, shall be paid by Respondent as
14 follows: either out of escrow from Respondent's proceeds of the sale of the family residence, or
15 within 10 days of the release of funds to the respective parties from escrow, whichever occurs
16 fust. If escrow has already closed by the time the parties and counsel receive this Order, and
17 funds have been disbursed from escrow to the parties and the trust account to which they have
18 stipulated, then the entire amount of $ 150,000 held in trust shall be disbursed forthwith to
19 Petitioner. The remainder of the amounts ordered herein shall be paid to Petitioner directly by
20 Respondent within 10 days of this order. If escrow has not yet closed, Petitioner shall be paid the
21 entirety of$105,000 out of escrow from Respondent' s share of the sale as set forth above.
22 With this Order, the amount of $ 150,000 which the parties had agreed to hold in trust
__,
?" pending the court's decision may be disbursed directly to the parties from escrow in accordance
24 with the terms of this Order, rather than to counsel's trust account.
25
FINDINGS AND ORDER RE ATTORNEY 'S FEES AND COSTS - 6-l l-FL-005500 L-3
..,
-.) - Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
Respondent's Requ ests
2 The Court does not find a sufficient factual or legal basis to support any of Respondent's
3 requests for sanctions. Respondent has not met his burden of proof on any of the issues
4 presented. This includes Respondent's request that Petitioner bear the entire cost of the child
s custod.y evaluation - Respondent does not clearly set forth on what legal basis he relies for this
6 request, which is sufficient to deny it. Assuming Respondent meant to include this request for
7 reimbursement as a sanction under §271, the court does not find a sufficient factual or legal basis
8 for imposing such a sanction, just as the cowt has found with respect to the requested sanctions
9 that are more clearly described by Respondent as based upon §27 1. The court finds insufficient
lo evidence has been presented to support a claim of breach of fiduciary duty and sanctions as a
11 result of such alleged breach. The court does not find a sufficient, adequate factual or legal basis
12 to award prevailing party fees under §6344, nor to award sanctions under §3027 .1. All of
13 Respondent's requests for sanctions or payments are DENIED.
14 Regarding Respondent's request that certain portions of the court file be sealed, this
15 request is DENIED. Respondent has not brought the motion required by California Rule of Court
16 2.551. Moreover, Respondent has not presented a sufficient factual basis for the court to make
17 the findings required by Rule of Court 2.550(d).
18
19 IT IS SO ORDERED.
20
21 DATED: August/,£, 2013
22
23
24
25
FINDINGS AND ORDER RE ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS - 6- l l -FL-005500

L-4
-4- Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
FOR COURT USE ONLY
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA,

IN THE MATTER OF:

FI LED
FRAZIER v. FRAZIER
(XJ PROOF OF SERVICE BY MAIL OF:

Findings and order re attorneys fees and costs
0 PROOF OF PERSONAL SERVICE OF:

FCS No:
I certify that I am not a party to this cause and that a copy of the foregoing was mailed first class, postage prepaid,
in a sealed envelope, and that the mailing of the foregoing and execution of this certificate occurred at San Jose,
California.
I certify (or declare) under penalty of perjury, that the foregoing is true and correct.
'Kl , CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
Executed on 8-19-13- - -
Jeffrey D. Frazier
14 Arastradero Rd I
I Nedda Ledgerwood
I
438 South Murphy Ave

Sunnyvale, CA 94086 •
L-5
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
FAMILY LAW OFFICES A11 Associatio11 of Attorneys
NATALIE T. DAPRILE .. NICOLE M. MYERS

[email protected] [email protected]
CHERI A. BELL YSELLE DOMINGUEZ

[email protected] [email protected]
November 21, 2012 CHRISTIE L. MAHON

[email protected]
Nedda Ledgerwood
438 S. Murphy Avenue
Sunnyvale, CA 94086
Re: Marriage of Frazier 6-11-FL 005500
Dear Nedda:
On behalf of my client, I have filed a motion to modify support that is set for hearing on
January 3, 2013. I have enclosed a copy of our motion along with a Notice of
Acknowledgment of Receipt. Would you kindly accept service on behalf of your client?
The documents enclosed are as follows:
• Application and Order for Reissuance of Request for Order, filed 11/15/ 12;
• Request for Order, filed 11 /13/12;
• Income & Expense Declaration, filed 11 /13/12; and
• (Blank) Responsive Declaration·to Request for Order.
I would appreciate it if you would sign and return the acknowledgment in the self-
addressed stan1ped envelope by no later than 11/30/12. If not received by that date, we
will take steps to have your client personally served.
As stated above
Client
1224 Lincoln Avenue, San Jose, California 95125

www.daprile-bell.com • Telephone (408) 918 -0920 • Facsimile (408) 918-0925
M-1
•certified as a Family Law Specialist by the State Bar of California Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
FL-117
ATTORNEY OR PARTY WITHOUT ATTORNEY (Name, State d ar nu1 nd address) : FOR COURT USE ONLY
- Na tal ie T . Da p r i le 161347
Da p r ile Bell Family La w Off ice
1224 Lincoln Avenue
San J os e , CA 951 25
TELEPHONE NO.: ( 4 08) 918-0920 FAX NO .(Optionol) : ( 4 08) 918-092 5
E-MAIL ADDRESS (Optional):
ATTORNEY FOR (Namef. Re sponde nt JEFFERY FRAZIER

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF Sa nta Clara
STREET ADDRESS: 6 Q 5 W.El Camino Real , Sunnyva le , CA
MAILING ADDRESS: 1 91 N. Fi r st Stre e t
CITY AND Z IP CODE: s an Jose , CA 951 13
BRANCH NAME: Fami 1 y Law
PETITIONER: KATHLE EN FRAZ IER
RESPONDENT:J E FFERY FRAZIER
OTHER:
CASE NUMBER:
NOTICE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF RECEIPT
6- 11-FL 00 5500
To (name of individual being served): KATHLEEN FRAZIER and her attorne y of r ecord NEDDA LED.GERWOOD
NOTICE
The documents identified below are being.served on you by mail with this acknowledgment form. You must personally sign, or a
person authorized. by you must sign, this form to acknowledge receipt of the documents.
If the documents described below include a summons and you fail to complete and return this acknowledgment form to the
sender within 20 days of the date of mailing , you will be liable for the reasonable expenses incurred after that date in serving you
or attempting to serve you with these documents by any other methods permitted by law. If you return this form to the sender,
service of a summons is deemed complete on the date you sign the acknowledgment of receipt below. This is not an answer to
the action. If you do not agree with what is being requested, you must submit a completed Response form to the court with in 30
calendar days.
J_.J__,/'-'2'-'-1_,_/_.l_..2_ __ __ _ _ _ __ __
Date of mailing: _._
T.a ll ra Atkin s o n
(TYPE OR PRINT NAME) 0 SENDER · MUST NOT BE A PARTY IN T HIS CASE
AND MUST BE 16 OR OLDER)
ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF RECEIPT
(To be completed by sender before mailing)
I agree I received the following:
a. D
Family Law: Petition (form FL-100), Summons (form FL-110) , and blank Response (form FL-120)
b. D
Family Law- Domestic Partnership : Petition-Domestic Partnership (form FL- 103), Summons (form FL-110), and
blank Response-Domestic Partnership (form FL-123)
c. D
Uniform Parentage: Petition to Establish Parental Relationship(form FL-200), Summons (form FL-210), and blank
Response to Petition to Establish Parental Relationship(form FL-220)
d. D
Custody and Support: Petition for Custody and Support of Minor Children (form FL-260), Summons (form FL-210),
and blank Response to Petition for Custody and Support of Minor Children (form FL-270)
e. IX) (1) D
Completed and blank Declaration Under (5) D
Completed and blank Financial Statement
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and (Simplified) (form FL-155)
Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) (form FL-105) (6) IX) Order to Show Cause (form FL-300), Application
(2) D
Completed and blank Declaration of for Order and Supporting Declaration (form
Disclosure (form FL-140) FL-310), and blank Responsive Declaration to
(3) D
Completed and blank Schedule of Assets Order to Show Cause or Notice of Motion (form
and Debts (form FL-142) FL-320)
(4) IX) Completed and blank Income and (7) D
Other (specify) :
Expense Declaration (form FL-150)
(To be completed by recipient) ·
Date this acknowledgment is signed:

~~~=======~===-==--~
,. (SIGNATURE OF PERSON ACKNOWLEDGING RECEI PT)
Page 1 of 1
Form Approved for Optional Use ~[.

"I Mnr<in Dean) NOTICE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF RECEIPT PLAINTIFF’S
Code or Civil Procedure, §§ EXHIBIT NO.
415.30, 417.10
Judicial Council of California ~ ts-·s·E-NT-,1-l FOR-M·s;~ www.courtlnfo.ca.gov
F L-117 IRev. January 1, 2005] ~· [ II (Family Law)
Frazier , Jeffery M-2
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
FL-306/JV-251
ATTORNEY OR PARTY WITHOUT ATIORNEY (Name, State Bar number, and address): FOR COURT USE ONLY
Natalie T . Daprile 161347
Daprile Be l l F ami ly L aw Off ice
1224 Lincol n Avenue
San Jose , CA 95125
TELEPHONE NO.: ( 4 0 8 ) 9 1 8 - 0 9 2 0
E-MAIL ADDRESS (Optional):
FAX NO. (Opticna/): ( 4 0 8 ) 918 - 0 9 2 5
F IL-FD
ATIORNEYFOR(NameJ:Re s o ndent J E F FERY F RA Z IER
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF Santa C la r a
srREETADDREss: 605 W. El Camino Real , Sunnyvale , CA
MAruNGADDREss: 191 N . Fi r s t Street
c1TYANoz1PcooE: San Jose , CA 951 1 3
BRANCHNAME: Famil La w
PETITIONER/PLAINTIFF: KATHL EEN FRAZI E R
RESPONDENT/DEFENDANT: JEFFERY FRAZI E R
OTHER PARENT/PARTY:
APPLICATION AND ORDER FOR REISSUANCE OF CASE NUMBER(S):
fXI REQUEST FOR ORDER 0 RESTRAINING ORDER (JUVENILE)
0 ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 6-11 - FL 005500
1. Name of Applicant: JE FFE FY FRAZIER
2. Applicant requests the court to reissue the:

a. [&] Request for Order and 0 Temporary Emergency Court Orders
b. D Restraining Order - Juvenile
c. 0 Order to Show Cause (specify):
. ''LY RIJ~ c:s REQUIRED
COMPLIANCE WIT~ r~~ R.-c:·l 'LTIN SANCTIONS
11
3. The orders were originally issued on (date) : 11Il3 I l 2 FAILURE TO CO'v\P\.:1 iv/ \ . r::
4. The last hearing date was (date): 12 I 2 0 I l 2
5. Number of times the orders have been reissued: 0
6. Applicant requests reissuance of the orders because:
a. 0 Respondent/Defendant 0 Petitioner/Plaintiff D Person to be restrained 0 Other party could not be
served as required before the hearing date.
b. D The hearing was continued because the parties were referred to a court mediator ~
or;f~am~il~~~-:;-:::::---:/
c. fXI Other (specify): Respondent's attorney had a sche::.!-~~n
7.
Dept.: f ~
8. D Other (sp ecify):
9. All orders will end on the date and time shown in the box above unless the cou
Date:
NO'I 1 5 Z01Z JUDICIAL OFFICER
Page 1 of 1
APPLICATION AND ORDER FOR REISSUANCE OF REQUEST FOR CodeofCivilProcedure, §527(d)

ORDER OR RESTRAINING ORDER (JUVENILE) OR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT NO.
WWW.Courts.ca.gov
(Family Law-Governmental-Uniform Parentage-

Custody and Support-Juvenile) Frazi er , Jeffery M-3
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
FL-300
, ATIORNf.Y OR PARTY WITHOUT ATIORNEY (Name. State Bar number, end address): FOR COURT USE ONL V
-Natalie T. Daprile 161347

· Dap"r i l e Bell Family Law Off ice
1224 Lincoln Avenue cf\,,-... , ..' ... .--.,....- !)
' ..... -.
l-' , \ ~:» . _. '_... ,~.;~ '......·
San Jose , CA 95125
TELEPHONE NO.: ( 4 08) 918-0920 FAX NO. (Optional): ( 4 0 8 ) 918-0925
:
-- ..
. -·.
I
-j
E-MAIL ADDRESS {Optional):
Respondent JEFFERY FRAZIER
ATIORNEYFOR(Name/:
--~ 1
. ·r·' '
.... '
I') :-J
I
-
]
.--. r
:..~ "
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF Santa Clara L .. :. I -
STREET ADDRESS: 6 0 5 W.El Camino Real, Sunnyvale, CA ..

MAILING ADDRESS: 191 N.
CITY ANO ZIP CODE: an s

First Street
Jose, CA 95 11 3
r
-·
l
.--·.··--- ~~
..
. c~
v
~~
eRANCHNAME: Fami l Law
PETITIONER/PLAINTIFF KATHLEEN FRAZIER
RESPONDENT/DEFENDANT: JEFFERY FRAZIER
OTHER PARENT/PARTY:
CASE NUMBER:
REQUEST FOR ORDER IX) MODIFICATION D Temporary Emergency
6 - 11 - FL 005500
D Child Custody VisitationD Court Order
W Child Support lX) Spousal Support D Other (specify):
D Attorney Fees and Costs
1. T00am~:Kathl een Frazier and her Attorney of Record
2. A hearing on this Request for Orderwill be held as follows : If child custody or visitation is an issue in this proceeding, Family
Code section 3170 requires mediation before or at the same time as the hearing (see item 7.)
I a. Date: I;< ..--::<_ O·" IQ. Time: q(}Arr) D Dept. : ?-oz D Room:
b. Address of court D same as noted above
3. Attachm~nts to be served with this Request for Order:

a. A blank Responsive Declaration (form FL-320)
b. W Completed Income and Expense Declaration (form
FL-1'50) and a blank Income and Expense
,. Deel ration
( 1 /:!; /z-
4. 0 YOU ARE ORDERED TO APPEAR IN COURT AT THE DATE AND TIME LISTED IN ITEM 2 TO GIVE ANY LEGAL
5. D Time for 0 service D hearing is shortened. Service must be on or before (date):

6. Any responsive declaration must be .served on or before (date):
7. The parties are ordered to attend mandatory custody services as follows:
8. D You are ordered to comply with the Temporary Emergency Court Orders (form FL-305) attached.
9. D Other (specify):
Date:
JUDICIAL OFFICER
To the person who received this Request for Order: If you wish to respond to this Request for Order, you must file a
Responsive Declaration to Request for Order (form FL-320) and serve a copy on the other parties at least nine court days
before the hearing date unless the court has ordered a shorter period of time. You do not have to pay a filing fee to file the
Responsive Declaration to Request for Order (form FL-320) or any other declaration including an Income and Expense
Declaration (form FL-150) or Financial Statement (Simplified) (form FL-155).
Page 1of4
REQUEST FOR ORDER
M-4
Family Code, §§ 2045, 2107, 6224,
6226, 6320-0326, 6360-0383
Government Code, § 26826
www.courls.ca.gov
Frazie r, Case Number
Jeffery
6-11-FL-005500
FL-300
. PETITIONER/PLAINTIFF: KATHLEEN FRAZIER CASE NUMBER:
- RESPONDENT/DEFENDANT: JEFFERY FRAZIER ',,6-.,-±-1~~@5500

OTHER PARENT/PARTY:
C: I' -, • I
\ \ •• :.. • • ~
;\
p
.
..... -
· ·-· · ·
.-~
REQUEST FOR ORDER AND SUPPORTING DECLARAllON

D Petitioner lXJ Respondent D Other Parent/Party requests the following orders.:. ,, '~
. ! l - r_; ·.: · --
1. D CHILD CUSTODY D To be ordered pending the hearin~·;;·_ , . • . · : ' -
a. Child's name and age b. Legal custody to (name of person who c. P.hysical custody to (name of
makes decisions about health. educa.~i.on. etc.) !?.~rson with whom child will live)
. ·--··---- _..... -··-
d. D As requested in form D Child Custody and Visitation Application Attachment (form FL-311)
D Request for Child Abduction Prevention Orders (form FL-312)
D Children's Holiday Schedule Attachment (form FL-341(C))
D Additional Provisions-Physical Custody Attachment (form FL-341 (D))
D Joint Legal Custody Attachment (form FL-341 (E))
D Other (Attachment 1d)
e. D Modify existing order
(1) filed on (date):
2. 0 CHILD VISITATION (PARENTING TIME) D To be ordered pending the hearing

a. As requested in: (1) DAttachment 2a (2) D Child Custody and Visitation Application Attachment (form FL-311)
(3) D Other (specify):
b. 0Modify existing order
c. D One or more domestic violence restraining/protective orders are. now in effect. (Attach a copy of the orders if you
have one.) The orders are from the following court or courts (specify county and state):
(1) O criminal: County/state: (3) QJuvenile: County/state:
Case No. (if known): Case No. (if known):
(2) 0Family: County/state: (4) 0 0ther: County/state:
3. W CHILD SUPPORT (An earnings assignment order may be issued.) .
a. Child's name and age b. D I request support based on the c. Monthly amount requested (if not by guideline)
child support guidelines $
d. IX) Modify existing order

(1) filed on (date): Order; entered on record at August 22, 2012 Hearing
(2) ord~ring (specify): Respondent shall pay Petitioner a total of $1, 664 ($599 for
Kalista and $1 , 066 for Lauren) per month as and for temporary
child support , payable in two monthly installments on the first
and fifteenth of the month.
Notice: The court is required to order child support based on the income of both parents. It normally continues until the
child is 18. You must supply the court with information about your finances by filing an Income and Expense Declaration
(form FL-150) or a Financial Statement (Simplified) (form FL-155). Otherwise, the child support order will be based on
information about your income that the court receives from other sources, including the other parent.
FL-300 (Rev. July 1, 2012) REQUEST FOR ORDER Page 2 or 4

Frazier , Jeffery M-5

Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
FL-300
• P.ETITIONER/PLAINTIFF: KATHLEEN FRAZIER CASE NUMBER:
..-RESPONDENT/DEFENDANT: JEFFERY FRAZ !ER 6-11 - FL 005500
OTHER PARENT/PARTY:
4. !X) SPOUSAL OR PARTNER SUPPORT (An earnings assignment order may be issued.}
a. 0 Amount requested (monthly): $ c. W Modify existing order
b. O Terminate existing order (1) filed on (datey.der entered on record 8/22/12
(1) tiled on (date): (2) ordering (specify): Respondent to pay
(2) ordering (specify): $2, a 68 to Petitioner
d. D The Spousal or Partner Support Declaration Attachment (form FL- 157) is attached (for modification of spousal or
partner support afterjudgment only}
e. An Income and Expense Declaration (form FL-150) must be attached
5. O ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS are requested on Request for Attorney Fees and Costs Order Attachment (form FL-319) or a
deciaration that addresses the factors covered in that form. An Income and Expense Declaration (form FL-150) must be
attached. A Supporting Declaration for Attorney Fees and Costs. Order Attachment (form FL-158) or a declaration that
addresses the factors covered in that form must also be attached.
6. D PROPERTY RESTRAINT 0 To be ordered pending the hearing

a. The 0
petitioner 0 respondent D claimant is restrained from transferring, encumbering, hypothecating,
concealing, or in any way disposing of any property, real or personal, whether community, quasi-community, or
separate, except in the usual course of business or for the necessities of life.
O The applicant will be notified at least five business days before any proposed extraordinary expenditures,
and an accounting of such will be made to the court.
b. D Both parties are restrained and enjoined from cashing , borrowing against, canceling, transferring, disposing of, or
changing the beneficiaries of any insurance or other coverage, including life , health, automobile, and disability,
held for the benefit of the parties or their minor children.
c. O Neither party may incur any debts or liabilities for which the other may be held responsible, other than in the
ordinary course of business or for the necessities of life.
7. O PROPERTY CONTROL 0
To be ordered pending the hearing
a. O The petitioner 0 respondent is given the exclusive temporary use, possession, a nd control of th~ following
property that we own or are buying (specify): ·
b. 0 The petitioner D respondent is ordered to make the following payments on liens and encumbrances coming
due while the order is in effect:
Debt Amount of payment
8. D OTHER RELIEF (specify):
NOTE: To obtain domestic violence restraining orders, you must use the forms Request for Order
(Domestic Violence Prevention) (form DV-100), Temporary Restraining Order (Domestic Violence) (form
DV-11 O), and Notice of Court Hearing (Domestic Violence) (form DV-109).
FL-300 jRev. July 1, 20121 REQUEST FOR ORDER Page 3 of 4
~ MmtinD<nn!s
~ EsSfHTIAl FORMS"" Frazier , Jeffery .
M-6
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
FL-300
PETITl'oNER/PLAINTIFF: KATHLEEN FRAZIER CASE NUMBER:
,__RESPONDENT/DEFENDANT: JEFFERY FRAZIER 6-11 -FL 005500
OTHER PARENT/PARTY:
9. DI request that time for service of the Request for Order and accompanying papers be shortened so that these documents may
be served no less than (specify number): days before the time set for the hearing. I need to have this
order shortening time because of the facts specified in item 10 or the attached declaration.
1o. [X) FACTS IN SUPPORT of orders requested and change of circumstances for any modification are (specify):
IX) Contained in the attached declaration . (You may use Attached Declaration (form MC-031) for this purpose.
The attached declaration must not exceed 10 pages in length unless permission to file a longer declaration has been
obtained from the court.)
Date:
,Jeffery Frazier
(TYPE OR PRIN.T NAME) (SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT)

Assistive listening systems, computer-assisted real-time captioning, or sign language interpreter services are available if
you ask at least five days before the proceeding . Contact the clerk's office or go to www.courts.ca.gov/forms for
Request for Accommodations by Persons With Disabilities and Response (form MC-410). (Civil Code, § 54.8.)
FL-300 (Rev. July 1, 2012] REQUEST FOR ORDER Page 4 of 4

~ f;5[~~Ai"roRMr· Frazier , Jeffery M-7

Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
FL-300
~__ .,. .. -PETiTiONER1PLAINTif:F-·~·. 1~F·.7i: ~n~·sr~:-~i~ . ~~/~-~-: ( i:: ·=~-- · · ·------- ~ - ·-·-·- -r~~;F. ~t::,,; ;~- . . -·-·-----
r·i~E:SPONDENT/DEFENDANT: J'EP::-'SRY F:rn:'.:1F:H I G-lJ-F'L 0 0 550 0
L·-·..£!17ER PARENT/PARTY: - -- - - - · -··... . _J______ . -·-- ------·- ----.--·
9. QI request lhCJt lime for service oi1he Request for 01de1 and accompanying papers be shortened so Iha! !hese documents may
be served no less than (spocify number): days before the lime set for the hearing. I need to have this
order shor1ening time b::-cause of the facts spc·cified ir. item 10 or the attached declaration.
IQ. lfl FACTS IN SUPPORT or orders requested and ctia.1ge of circumstances for any modification are (spocify):
IBJ Con!aineo in the attached declarat:on. (You may use /\t1ached Declaration (fo1m MC-031) for t/Jis purpose.
Tile a/Inched rlfJcloration must 110i excee(/ 1.0 p1.Jgc.:s in /engl/J unless ponnission to file a longer dee/oration has been
o/Jtained frum the COUil.)
1 declare under penally cf perjury under the laws of the Sl"te of California that the foregoing is true and correct.
Dale: \, \H "J l \ ?-
J.0ffe..r..y.'---F'-'-r~a~'l..._._·j~e~r'-------------~
(l'tl'f OP. f''<I~;; NAM[)

r\ssistive listening systems, computer-assisted real-lime captioning, or slgn language interpreter services are available if
you ask at least five days before the proc1::eding. C:ontact the clerk's ottice or go lo v1ww.courts.ca.gov/forms for
Request for Accommodations by Persons Wil/J D1sobili/ics and Respom;o (form MC-410). (Civil Code,§ 54.8.)
i'L 3COIHov. July 1·:-201-2; - - ·-· • ·- .. .. -----··--·--···-·REQUEST FOR 0-RDER -· ·---.. -·- -------
Pogo 4 or 4
Fra~ier, Jef~ery
M-8
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
NATALIE T. DAPRILE, SBN 161347
NICOLE M. MYERS, SBN 240878
DAPRILE c BELL
2 FAMILY LAW OFFICES
1224 Lincoln A venue
3 San Jose, California 95125
Telephone: (408) 9 18-0920
4
Attorneys for Respondent
5
6
10
Case No.: 6-11-FL-005500
11 In re the Marriage of:
RESPONDENT JEFFERY FRAZIER'S
12 Petitioner: KATHLEEN FRAZIER DECLARATION IN SUPPORT OF
REQUEST FOR ORDER RE:
13 and MODIFICATION OF CHILD SUPPORT
AND SPOUSAL SUPPORT
APJ: Zayner
15 Dept: 82
16
I, JEFFERY FRAZIER, declare as follows:
17
1. I am the Respondent in the above-entitled matter. If called upon to testify as to the contents
18
of this declaration I could do so competently.
19
2. Petitioner Kathleen Frazier (hereinafter "Kathy") and I were married on April 8, 1995 and
20
separated in September 2009. We have two minor children: Kalista Frazier, age 10 and
21
Lauren Frazier,.age 7. I make this declaration in support of my Request for Order for
22
modification of child support and spousal support to reflect both my change in income due to
23
being laid off, and Kathy's change in income due to obtaining full-time employment.
24 Ill
25 Ill
26 Ill
Ill
27
Ill
28
Marriage of Frazier PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT NO.
Daprile• Bell Page 1 of 3
Case No: 6-1 l-FL-005500
1224 Lincoln Ave.
San Jose. CA 95125
(408) 918-0920
Respondent's Declaration in Support of Request for Order M-9
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
1
3. The last child and spousal support order on file does not actually reflect the current support
2
amounts. Pursuant to the Stipulation and Order filed on July 1, 2011 , I owed Kathy
3
temporary spousal support of $4,657 per month and tempor~y child support of $3,837.
4
However, this Stipulation was based on Kathy having primary custody of our two daughters
5
(now we have 50/50) and was also based on Kathy having no income. This Stipulation
6
reserved the right to retroactively modify child and spousal support to account for periodic
7
increases in my custody timeshare of our daughters, and for any changes in Kathy's income.
8
From the date of the July 1, 2011 Stipulation and Order for child and spousal support, my
9
timeshare with our daughters increased four times, but support was never officially modified.
10
Additionally, Kathy obtained part-time employment and support was likewise not officially
11
modified to reflect this change.
12
4. At the hearing on August 22, 2012, Kathy and I agreed on the record to modify child and
13
spousal support according to guideline calculations. We agreed on the record that I would
14
pay Kathy guideline child and spousal support based on the fact that we now share 50/50
15
custody of our daughters, and Kathy was working part-time. We also stipulated on the
16
record to reserve the issue of my overpayments of support during the time that my custodial
17
time increased and Kathy obtained new employment. At the time of the August 22"d hearing,
18
Kathy was working part-time, but she had received an offer at a higher hourly rate with
19
Nook.
20
5. Subsequent to the August 22"d hearing, we have not finalized an Order After Hearing. My
21
attorney drafted a Stipulation and Order and provided it to Kathy and her attorney to review.
22
Due t o disagreement over its content, this Stipulation and Order has never been signed.
23
However, since the August 22, 2012 hearing, Kathy and I have adhered to the Orders made
24
that day regarding the modification of child and spousal support, and I have been paying
25
$1,664 per month in temporary child support, and $2,868 per month in spousal support. This
26
is the order I am seeking to modify.
27
28
Daprile• Bell Page 2of3
Case No: 6-11 -FL-005500
1224 Li ncoln Ave.
San Jose, CA 95 125
(408) 918·09 20
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
I REQUEST A MODIFICATION OF CHILD AND SPOUSAL SUPPORT BECAUSE
1 KATHY AND I BOTH EXPERIENCED A RECENT CHANGE IN OUR
RESPECTIVE INCOME.
2
6. On October 8, 2012, I was informed in a letter from my employer, Kateeva, Inc. that my
3
position was being eliminated and that I was being laid off from the company effective
4
immediately. A copy of the letter that I received from my employer will be made available at
5
the time of the hearing and is not attached hereto due to its confidentiality. Thus, I am no
6
longer earning $18,750 per month in gross salary. Fortunately, I have an opportunity to
7
perform consulting work for my company and I have been given some work to perform on a
8
contract basis since I was laid off. However, I have no idea how many hours and for how
9
long my company will be able to give me work. I have not yet been paid and my hours, work
10
load, and work-related expenses remain unknown at this time. I will bring all consulting
11
documents to the next court hearing or file an updated Income and Expense Declaration in
12
advance of the hearing.
13
7. At the August 22, 2012 hearing, Kathy's attorney informed the court that she was offered
14
part-time contract work with Nook, and was considering the offer. Kathy never informed me
15
directly or through our attorneys whether she ended up accepting the job with Nook.
16
However, on October 9, 2012, my attorney received an email from Kathy' s attorney stating
17
that she accepted full-time salaried employment with Rocket Fuel, and would earn $103,000
18
annually plus benefits. Attached hereto is a true and correct copy of Kathy's Offer
19
Letter as Exhibit "A."
20
8. Based on the changes to our respective incomes, I am requesting that the Court calculate
21
guideline support that accurately reflects our earnings. Since the last Stipulation and Order
22
was entered, Kathy has gone from zero income to an income of $103,000, and our custody
23
arrangement for our two daughters is now an equal timeshare. I respectfully request that
24
child and spousal support be modified to reflect the positive changes in my life and in
25
Kathy's life going forward.
26
SIGNATURE ON .nJDICIAL COUNCIL FORM
27
28
Dapril e • Bell Page 3 of3
Case No·: 6-l l-FL-005500
1224 Lincol n Ave.
San Jose, CA 95125
(408) 918-0920
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
EXHIBIT "A" .
M-12
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
September 26th, 2012
Kathy Kostas
1074 Connecticut Drive
Redwood City CA, 94061
Dear Kathy,
On behalf of Rocket Fuel, Inc. ("Rocket Fuel"), I am pleased to offer you full-time employment with
Rocket Fuel on the terms and conditions contained in this Jetter (the "Offer Letter"). Your title will be
Contracts Manager and you will report to JoAnn Covington, Vice President, General Counsel.
Your annual salary will be $103,000, and will be paid in accordance with Rocket Fuel's normal payroll
procedures. You will also be eligible to participate in Rocket Fuel's complete package of employee
benefits that are generally made available to all of Rocket Fuel's full-time employees. Details about these
benefit plans will be made available for your review. You should note that Rocket Fuel may modify or
terminate benefits from time to time as it deems necessary or appropriate.
Additionally, it will be recommended to the Board of Directors ("Board") that you be granted an option
to purchase 5,000 shares of Rocket Fuel's common stock at a price per share equal to the fair market
value per share of Rocket Fuel's common stock on the date of grant, as determined by the Board in its
sole discretion. This option will be subject to the terms and conditions of Rocket Fuel's 2008 Stock Plan
and stock option agreement.
As a Rocket Fuel employee, you will be expected to abide by Rocket Fuel rules and regulations and sign
and comply with Rocket Fuel's Proprietary Information and Inventions Agreement that, among other
things, prohibits the unauthorized use or disclosure of Rocket Fuel proprietary information.
We also ask that, if you have not already done so, you disclose to Rocket Fuel any and all agreements
relating to your prior employment that may affect your eligibility to be employed by Rocket Fuel or limit
the manner in which you may be employed. It is Rocket Fuel's understanding that any such agreements
will not prevent you from performing the duties of your position and you represent that such is the case.
In addition, you agree that, during the term of your employment with Rocket Fuel, you will not engage in
any other empioyment, occupation, consulting, or other business activity directly related tp the business
in which Rocket Fuel is now involved or becomes involved during the term of your employment, nor will
you engage in any other activities that conflict with your obligations to Rocket Fuel. Similarly, you agree
not to bring any third-party confidential information to Rocket Fuel, including that of your former
employer, and that you will not in any way utilize any such information in performing your duties for us.
By signing below, you agree that your employment with Rocket Fuel is an employment "at will."
Employment "at will" means either party may terminate the relationship at any time for any reason
whatsoever, with or without cause or advance noti~e. Rocket Fuel reserves the right to revoke this offer
should it not receive a satisfactory reference check and background screen for you.
M-13
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
oi~cu.si 9r~~~~~~~~~1.~~~~~,,_=:;·:;:zif.~~rn:kll~
. . ' .
~
This Offer Letter will be governed by the laws of the State of California, without reference to rules
relating to conflicts of law. In the event of any dispute or claim relating to or arising out of our
employment relationship, you and Rocket Fuel agree to an arbjtration in which (i) you are waiving
any and all rights to a jury trial but all court remedies will be available in arbitration, (ii) we agree
that all disputes between you and Rocket Fuel shall be fully and finally resolved by binding
arbitration, (iii) all disputes shall be resolved by a neutral arbitrator who shall issue a written
opinion, (iv) the arbitration shall provide for adequate discovery, and (v) Rocket Fuel shall pay those
arbitration fees required by law.
[
t"
This Offer Letter, together with the Proprietary Information and Inventions Agreement, is the entire
agreement between you and Rocket Fuel with respect to your employment and supersedes any other
agreem ents or promises made to you by anyone, whether oral or written. As required by law, this
offer is subject to satisfactory proof of your right to work in the United States.
Please sign and date this Offer Letter and return one copy to Rocket Fuel by September 28th, 2012 if
. you wish to accept employment under the terms described above. If you accept our offer, the first
day of your employment will begin on October 8th, 2012. This offer of employment will terminate if it
is not accepted, signed and returned to me by September 28th, 2012.
We welcome you to the Rocket Fuel team and look forward to your contribution to Rocket Fuel's
success. If you have any questions regarding this letter, feel free to contact me at any time.
Sincerely,
~DocuSlgned by.
L~o~6~77~~Jwi<k
J. Peter Hardwick
CFO
AGREED TO AND ACCEPTED:
Signature Date
Printed Name
r ,,H4 +-
M-14 PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT NO.
M-14
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
M-15
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
,'.j l i Y C'' . ..... : r. : . ("' .· .1 r. ....l.' I , ·:'lolr> • t ' • •. FCR COUP. I' USE ONLY
~ . .... ,_... ..:..... - : :;. :. :· i 1 \ . ·: I j . ;

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suPERioR couR'ToF cALif:oRNIP..~ couNrY oF ~;:.:-..:.:~ ::.! i:Ja___________ - l il l•J I 13
t!~[~~ :\\.f... ~- ~•5 t; ;)~ ..:. 21 C l.l:H.i.:1 ~J }{f-1 (.i.l. , ~t.lJ'1ny ·..'c.t l e, C't .( /
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PETiT.•0:,:fr~•F'L·'i!t~ r'1i:' : ~-),: ; !L:...L .. !<.:". /, _i: -:. ··· ·- -· ·· -- --------·- ·t
RESF'OtllDEKi 1DFENDAN"'.J ::'. : · '.: _: :i.\' '.· ; . .''; . :. f-: H
OTHER PAREN "/CLA. '. ~-". NT _ _ _ _ _____ J
i'V't'• 0 I
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""'('f'
INCOME AND EXPENSE DECLARATION
___ _l I~i(~_ 1 o_:i_:i_oo
_ _ _ _J
Employment jGi»'C mf..Jrmation rin your i:ur.ont job or. if you're: unomp/oyod, your mos/ ri:;cent job.)
--- ·--- a. Fn,:;':)yer: :<::· ,- : .,. . , l~ ·:: .
:>,!(a::ll copi.:s '
of yOi:r pay i.J. Ell1 f: 1 :>yer'saddre~~: ~ · :: '.) .~:..r: .·. ": 1. .. : ... : , 1
;.~~~it.! P., ~: .. i"'. !.~:. ::.~ _ r , ·- · ' 01~ 0 2~)
stubs '.or a~I t: Erni;·oyer's pl•onc nurnner: G(j '.) - .'.: · r, · ·: ·; (. :>
t\...'C n1onths U :J::c~.patlo~: ? ~: j . _ ""., :. .-~ ;.: =~· i! s ·,_; . : <• • • ••
(h l<ick out e . Date job started: \f · C• f- r C: s 1 c: .. ~';, , .:. n ;:c]. h;c !_ ~:;:, -
social f. :r unemployed, date> JDb ended: (}(:•.1i·::r' ~.. 8, ?.012
i security g : \'!Cfk about noltl s per w eek
, !1~Jlll~~~-·~; h. I u· t pa:d S gross (before taxes) D per rnon\h C. per week 0 per hour.
(tf you have more thon one job, attach an 8 1 /2-by -11 -i nch sheet of paper and list the same information as above for your other
jobs. Write "Question 1 - Other Jobs" at the top.)
2 Age and education

a My C1gc rs (spf:i:ify): t; ;:;
b . I h?.ve c01 .1µletcd hign school or l h0 equivalent: G.Jl Ye!\ en tfo If no, highest grnoe completed (spac1fy) :
r. Numbe'. ol yea~s oi c.Jllegz completed (specify): !, 0 Degree(s} obtained (spcciry):
d N~mJe r o' yc:;:,.;s 0 1 ;iraduale s-::hool ccn:pletec (sper:ify) : '· ·";:.; CD Degree(s) obiained (specify): ;; . A.,:·:. s. , .'. ~1-
e J have: 0
pruie:>s1orial/ocr,up<11:onJ I license(s1 (spocify): !·'. .....:~:: :.. c ;;;.. _ . r , :.- . :· ' t-: .t 01. ~ic· u<. r
0
vocat:onal traini:1g (.>1i1.df1') :
::! Tax information
a . CZ] I las! filed '.aXU\; fer tax yea r(spec:ify yemJ: :.:: (! J ~.
b. My t;ix filing s:atus is s•ngle D
(KU head of hou~chold married. filing s~pura!ely 0
C
murrted. fi:in] jcint'y with (Sf' C'Cify 11.:ime):
c. I '.i!e stale tax r!•' u~ ... ~ in [;:;] Ca~ifornia ot:lcr :.:.per.ify state): 0
li I i: a"11 the: •011m-.•1:1q !":,mber o;' uxt.:rn;' l. JllS (inch.. ding rnrc;tf) or. m:1 taxes(spec:ify): .-:
4 Other party's inconw. 1 estimaL tlii; grvss :nonlhly income (before t11xes) of the other party in this case at (specify): S
T:l:s estirriatc is :J<Jfed on 1explain): ~. ·· · .. ·,t; .. . ·:, ·· . 1 · .·: ·' " ; ! i •)t. _1 • r. ~ t ·• " . .. ~. .... : c ... ;.: Ni tu~l
(If you need more s p<1c:c to answer any qu estions on this form . attach an 8 1 /2-by-11-inch sheet of paper and write the
question number before your answer.) N1m1bt:r 0f p;1~., ~ ., :· .~ched : _ _ . _ - ·.
I ciecta;e under pen::lty of ;;er;rny uncer t::e I';\'/ ~ of [hf: St?.t!:! o'. C ;1::or.1i;; that t1e inform c;tron co:i: s ned on all p<iges of th is form and
any atfachrrt.. i:s is true an~! c:lr<ec• :· ·c. .'..;.. ~ - c ,. · .. ; •. -::.r .. : . • :: .. : .; ~. .. :.•i.·~ :;l.,l_ l>c t !."c-L.t.
.. l) J: i } i .. £.. _
Date: \\I l~I \ ~
.J·~t:··.~·~.H- ~;·l~'° . '? .~ =~ ·t

<• .. , l FR' "l-. • • i
F. r . t.:.: . :~· '

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• ~ •
ri.. ·. · ?... • -, ·~ • ~ ; •
M-15
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
FL-150
ATTORNEY OR PARTY WITHOUT ATTORNEY (Name, Sta. number, and address) : FOR COURT USE ONLY
- Natalie T. Daprile 16134 7

Daprile Bell Family Law Off ice
1224 Linco l n Avenue
San Jose , CA 95125
TELEPHONE NO.: ( 4 08) 918-0920 ( 4 08) 918-0925
E-MAIL ADDRESS (Optional) :
ATTORNEY FOR (Name); Respondent JEFFERY FRAZIER

STREET ADDRESS: 6 0 5 W.El Camino Real, Sunnyvale, CA
MAILING ADDRESS; 1 9 1 N. First Street
CITY AND ZIP CODE: s an Jose , CA 95113
BRANCH NAME: Family Law
PETITIONER/PLAINTIFF: KATHLEEN FRAZIER

RESPONDENT/DEFENDANT:JE F FERY FRAZIER
OTHER PARENT/CLAIMANT:
INCOME AND EXPENSE DECLARATION CASE NUMBER:
6-1 1- FL 005500
1. Employment (Give.information on your current job or, if you're unemployed, your most recent job.)
Attach copies a. Employer: Kateeva , Inc .

of your pay b. Employer'saddress: 1430 O'Brien Drive , Suite A , Menlo Park, CA 94025
stubs for last c. Employer's phone number: 8 0 0 - 3 8 5- 7 8 0 2
two months d. Occupation: Private Consu l tant
(black out e. Date job started: Vice President , I n tellectual Property
social f. If unemployed, date job ended: October 8 , 2012
security g. I work about hours per week.
numbers). h. I get paid $ gross (before taxes) per monthDper week D D per hour.
(If you have more than one job, attach an 8 1/2-by-11-inch sheet of paper and list the same information as above for your other
jobs. Write "Question 1 - Other Jobs" at the top.)
2. Age and education

a. My age is (specify): 48
b. I have completed high school or the equivalent: Yes IXJ D
No If no, highest grade completed (specify):
c. Number of years of college completed (specify): 4 D
Degree(s) obtained (specify):
d. Number of years of graduate school completed (specify) : 6 (est) IXJ
Degree(s) obtained (specify): B. A., M: s., J . D.
e. I have: IXJprofessional/occupational license(s)(specify): Member of CA Bar, Member of Patent Of fice Bar
D vocational training (specify):
3. Tax information
a. IXJ I last filed taxes for tax year (specify year): 2011
b. My tax filing status is D
single IXJ head of household D
married, filing separately
D married , filing jointly with (specify name):
c. I file state tax returns in IX) California D
other (specify state):
d. I claim the following number of exemptions (including myself) on my taxes(specify) : 2
4. Other party's income. I estimate the gross monthly income (before taxes) of the other party in this case at (specify):$ 8 , 583
This estimate is based on (explain): E- mail notification from Petitioner's attorney that she accepted full
time employment at $103,000 annually .
(If you need more space to answer any questions on this form , attach an 8 1/2-by-11 -inch sheet of paper and write the
question number before your answer.) Number of pages attached:
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the information contained on all pages of this form and
any attachments is true and correct. Facsimile or electronic signature shall be treated
as original
Date:
,JEFFERY FRAZIER ~~~~~~~~~~~~

(TYPE OR PRINT NAME) (SIGNATURE OF DECLARANT)
Page 1of4
Form Adopted for Mandatory Use INCOME AND EXPENSE DECLARATION Family Code, §§ 2030-2032,
Ll
Judicial Council of California
FL-1so1Rev. January 1. 20011 tJ E~s(~'{~AL,,fORMS'M 2100-2113, 3552, 3620-3634,
PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT NO.4300-4339
4050-4076,
www.courtinfo.ca .gov
Frazie r, M-16
Jeffery
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
FL-150
KATHLEE1. fRAZ IER
PETITIONER/PLAINTIFF: .• SE NUMBER
RESPONDENT/DEFENDANT:J E FFERY FRAZIER 6- 11 - FL 005500

Attach copies of your pay stubs for the last two months and proof of any other income. Take a copy of your latest federal
tax return to the court hearing. (Black out your social security number on the pay stub and tax return.)
5. Income (For average monthly, add up all the income you received in each category in the last 12 months Average
and divide the total by 12.) Last month monthly
a. Salary or wages (gross, before taxes) ................................................ .............................................................. ........................ $
b. Overtime (gross. before taxes) ............ .. . .. ..................... .. ...... ......................................................................... .. .......................$
0
0
••
c. Commissions or bonuses ................................................................... .... ............................................................ ............ ............. $
d. Public assistance (for example: TANF, SSI, GA/GR) D currently receiving ........................................... $
0
0
•
e. Spousal support D from this marriage D from a different marriage .......................................... ........ $
f. Partner support D from this domestic partnership D from a different domestic partnership $
0
a ''
g. Pension/retirement fund payments .................................................................................................................................................. $ 0
•'
•'
h. Social security retirement (not SSI) .............................................................................................................................. .............. $ 0
i. Disability: D Social security (not SSI) D State disability (SDI) D Private insurance. $ 0
'
j. Unemployment compensation ..................................................................... ................................................................. .... ................ $
k. Workers' . ~ompensation ................ .......... ...... .................:............ A'i':fj?Ta·h'e .....refitaT' ........................... $
0
'
*3435'
O
I. Other (military BAQ, royalty payments, etc.) (specify): .............................................................................................. $ !Jn k
6. Investment income (Attach a schedule showing gross receipts less cash expenses for each piece of property.)
a. Dividends/interest ............................................................................................................................................................. ..... ................. $ _ _ __ __._,_ minima l
b. Rental property income ....................................................................................................................................... ........................... $ 2 , 150 2. 1 50
'
c. Trust income ......... ................ .................. ..................................................................................................................................... $ 0
d. Other (specify) : $ _ _ _ _-'O..._

................................................................... .................................................................................................................
7. Income from self-employment, after business expenses for all businesses .....................................>!'-$_ _ _ __....01.... _____T_B~D-
1 am the IX) owner/sole proprietor D business partner D other (specify) :
Number of years in this business (specify) : 2 . 7 5
Nameofbusiness(specify): Jef fery D . Frazier, Esq.
Type of business (specify) : IP Consul tat ion and Services
Attach a profit and loss statement for the last two years or a Schedule C from your last federal tax return. Black out your
social security number. If you have more than one business, provide the information above for each of your businesses.
8. D Additional income. I received one-time money (lottery winnings, inheritance, etc.) in the last 12 months (specify source and
amount):
9. IX) Change in income. My financial situation has changed significantly over the last 12 months because (specify) :
5(1 ) : Respondent and I own an airplane wh ich we rent . All rental i n come (approx. $3400/month) is not
disbursed and remains i n the business. I lost m1 job in October a n d am now j u st consultiCg .
1 O. Deductions ast month
a. Required union dues ....................................................................................... ............................................................................................................................ $ 0
b. Required retirement payments (not social security, FICA, 401 (k), or IRA) ..........................................................................................$ 0
c. Medical, hospital, dental , and other health insurance premiums(total monthly amount) ...........................................................$·----~~
d. Child support that I pay for children from other relationships .................................................... ................................................................... $ _ _ _ ___...._
e. Spousal support that I pay by court order from a different marriage ....................................................................... ................................ $~---~~
f. Partner support that I pay by court order from a different domestic partnership ...........................................................................$~---~~
g. Necessary job-related expenses not reimbursed by my employer(attach explanation labeled "Question 10g'J .....$._ _ _ _~.,_
11 . Assets Total
a. Cash and checking accounts, savings, credit union, money market, and other deposit accounts ......................................$ 11, 000
b. Stocks, bonds, and other assets I could easily sell ............................................................................................................................................. $ 1 1 2, 4 2 6
c. All other property, l4J
real and IX) personal (estimate fair market value minus the debts you owe) $1 r 21 0, 5 9 8
Real property : $725 , 787; Airplane business
Personal property : includes retirement accounts exclusive of withdrawal penalties .
FL-150 (Rev. January 1, 20071 INCOME AND EXPENSE DECLARATION Page 2of4
8 [~liH~~A'L°'fORMS'" Fra z ier , J effery

M-17
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
FL-150
PETITIONERJPLAINTIFF: KATHLEE1 2RAZIER 'SE NUMBER:
RESPONDENT/DEFENDANT:JE F FERY FRAZIER 6 - 11-FL 005500

12. The following people live with me:

Name Age How the person is That person's gross Pays some of the
related to me? ex: son month! income household ex enses?
a. Ka ista Frazier Daug ter Yes No
b. Lauren Frazier 5 Daughter 0 D Yes IX) No
c. D Yes No D
d. D Yes No D
e. D Yes No D
13. Average monthly expenses IX) Estimated expenses D Actual expenses D Proposed needs
a. Home: h L d d I · $ 31 5
(1) D Rent or IX) mortgage .................$...__ _-=4+r-'"4i....:4~6..,_ . aun ry an c eaning .......................... ................. -----~~-~
i. Clothes ...........................................................................$_ _ _ __ _~._
If mortgage:
(a) average principal: $_ _ _ _1_,,_,.5~6~7~ j. Education ................... . .....................................$ 2_,.,~0~0~0
_____
(b) average interest: $ 2.878 I
$ _ _ _ __ =4_,,_0._.0.._
k. Entertainment, gifts, and vacation ..................
(2) Real property taxes ] +i-'-""-'6
.....................................$.. __ _ _..._ 3 8 '"'- I. Auto expenses and transportation
(3) Homeowner's or renter's insurance (insurance, gas, repairs, bus, etc.) ..............$
__ _ __ _~5~0~
0
(if not included above) .................................... 7~

$ _ _ ___J~ 1 - m. Insurance (life, accident, etc.; do not
include auto, home, or health insurance) $.,.__ _ _ _ _~4-6~2-

(4) Maintenance and repair $ _ ____3~0~0~
................................
n. Savings and investments ....................................$,..__ _ _ _ __ _.O.._
b. Health-care costs not pai d by insurance .... ,.._
$ _ _ _ ___ 00
5._._""'-"-
o. Charitable contributions . ..............................$.,.._ _ _ _ _ _~O.._
c. Child care ........................................................... ,....$_ _ _..._]_,.,_.c:;4.. .,0"-"0.. _ p. Monthly payments listed in item 14
(itemize below in 14 and insert total here) 5_3u.8,_
.,..$_ _ _ _]"-+-,.....
$ _ _ _ _ _9'--'0""'.....
d. Groceries and household supplies .................. 0 q. Other (specify) : $ _ _ _ _ _~8~7~3.._
......................................................
See Attachment
e. Eating out $ _ _ _ __,_2_.2_5...._ ..-----------------------~
......................................................................
r. TOTAL EXPENSES (a-q) (do not add in $ _ __ ~1h'+--i._.7._Q"-l
f. Utilities (gas, electric, water, trash) $ _ _ _ __.6,_,0.._6..._
.............. the amounts in a(1)(a) and (b))
g. Telephone, cell phone, and e-mail $ _ _ _ _ _2.. ._. . .8....2_ s. Amount of expenses paid by others$-------~OL..
.................
14. Installment payments and debts not listed above

Paid to Amount Balance
$ $
$ $
$ $
oan $ 1 ,3 $
$ $
$ $
15. Attorney fees (This is required if either party is requesting attorney fees.) :
a. To date, I have paid my attorney this amount for fees and costs(specify): $$13,SOO(former atty) + $114,409(Natalie Daprile)
b. The source of this money was (specify) : Wells Fargo account
c. I still owe the following fe~s and ~osts to my attorney (specify total owed): $ ...... ) --~-;::t?"-
d. My attorney's hourly rate 1s (specify) : $ 395 . · ""' .. ~
..··
I confirm this fee arrangement.
Date/ / / /?h-
(TYPE OR PRINT NAME OF ATTORNEY)
FL- 150 !Rev. January 1, 2007) Page 3 of 4
a [~si~~;~'L"r ORMI ... Frazier , Jeffe ry

M-18
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
FL-150
PETITIONER/PLAINTIFF: KATHLEE.L c~RA Z I ER ,se NUMBER:
RESPONDENT/DEFENDANT:JE FFERY FRA Z IER 6-11 - F L 00 55 00
CHILD SUPPORT INFORMATION

(NOTE: Fill out this page only if your case involves child support.)
16. Number of children

a. I have (specify number) : 2 children under the age of 18 with the other parent in this case.
b. The children spend 5 0 percent of their time with me and 5 0 percent of their time with the other parent.
(If you 're not sure about percentage or it has not been agreed on, please describe your parenting schedule here.)
17. Children's health-care expenses

a. O I do IX) I do not have health insurance available to me for the children through my job.
b. Name of insurance company:
c. Address of insurance company:
d. The monthly cost for the children's health insurance is or would be (specify) : $
(Do not include the amount your employer pays.)
18. Additional expenses for the children in this case Amount per month
a. Child care so I can work or get job training .............................................................................$....._ _ _ _ __ _ __.O..._
b. Children's health care not covered by insurance ················-·-·-··-···································-·········$-iz._ _ _ _ _ _J.._,_,uOCi.OL..10..._
c. Travel expenses for visitation ....................................................................................................... .........$
...._ _ _ _ _ _ _ __.O..._
d. Child ren's educational or other special needs (specify below) : .................................. >jl.$_ _ _ __ ~2'-'-,-'-OL..10.uO.,_
ADD/ Dy slexia relate d educati o n / trai n i ng .
Amount included in monthly expens es on page 3.
19. Special hardships. I ask the court to consider the following special financial circumstances
(attach documentation of any item listed here, including court orders) :
Amount per month For how many months?
a. Extraordinary health expenses not included in 18b .....................................................................__ _ _ _ _ __ __,..._
b. Major losses not covered by insurance (examples: fire, theft, other

insured loss) ................................................. ········································-·····-··················································-····" ' - - -- - - - - - - '..._ - - - - -- -- -
c. (1) Expenses for my minor children who are from other relationships and
are living with me ..................................................... ......................... .. ....................... ............... >jl$_ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___:0.,_ _____ _ __ _
(2) Names and ages of those children (specify) :
(3) Child support I receive for those children ............................................................................. ,.._$_ _ _ _ _ __ _ ~

0
The expenses listed in a, b and c create an extreme financial hardship because (explain) :
20. Other information I want the court to know concerning support in my case (specify) :
FL-150 (Rev January 1, 2007) INCOME AND EXPENSE DECLARATION Page 4 of 4
B [~5'[~i;ft:["fORMI'" Fraz ier , Jeffery

M-19
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
)l<!aSe olose window when done printing htlpi; ://www.hrpasspDrt.r 'Li nk2HR.cng?/EntltyiPerson/Pay/Trpayehk·d. ,.
TriN11t, 1100 8aH Leandro Qlvd., Sult11 SOU, 8Jn LHndro, CA Mti'FJ
For Pil.Yf9fl·lnquirlas oontect tr.e Trt~t Solution Center at (800) 638-0401
Ka:toova, Inc. PoyGroup: SM-Kateeva, Inc. SM Advice#: 9752075
1430 O'Brien Oriw !<ams Begin Data: 09/1612012
Suite A Earns End Oato: OQ/~Oi2012 Advice Oato: 09128/:!012
Menlo Park, CA 94025 Pay End Dote: 09/30/2012
6501327-2903
Jotfary Frazier Employee ID: 00001261523 TAX DATA Fodera! CAStato

1025 Alameda D LS Pulgas Department: 7013KTIP Marital Sll;ltu6: Single H-of.H
APT 206 Location: Kateeva, lno.·HO Al.lowance&: 15 46 +
Bellmont , CA 94002- Bus Title: VP or Intellectual Properties Addi.Pel:
Pay Rate: $226,000.00 Annual Addi.Amt 0.00
HOURS AND EARNINGS TAXES
Description Rate
Current----
Hol)(S Earnings
--YTD--- Oescriptlon
Hours Earnings
Currc111t
=l
I
Regular 9,375.00 1.416.00 163,173.11 Fed Wllhholdng 1,535.59 18,657.04
Fed MED/EE 129.36 2,328.63
Vacation 0,00 104.00 11 ,249.911
Fed OASDVEE 0.00 4,624.20
CA Wlthholdng 486.99 5,619.94
Holiday 0.00 40.00 4,326.90
CAOASDVEE 0.00 955.85
Total: 9,375.00 1,560.00 168,750.00 Total: 2,151.94 32,185.66

BEFORE TAX DEDUCTIONS AFTER-TAX DEDUCTIONS EMPLOYER PAID BENEFITS
Description Current YTD PLNTD Description Currant YTD Description Current YTD
Blue Shield 128.00 2,304.00 0.00 Supplemental NJ 5.00 90.00 Blue Shield 673.00 12,114.00
and D
Delta Dental 21 .76 391.68 0.00 Delta Dental 61.80 1,112.40
Short Term 45.69 820.62
VSP Vision 3.90 70.20 0.00 \ISP Vision 10.00 180.00
Disabmty
General Use 208.33 3,750.02 5,000.00 Ufe&AD/O 13.20 237.60
METLIFE HYATI 10.93 196.74
FSA without LEGAL PL multiple o
HSA
METLIFE J;XE ~.65 911,70
·ure & MJ/O 13.13 230.34
Dependent 104.16 1,874.08 2,500.00 multiple
SUPP DISAB
Care FSA -
Long-Tem1 2Q.86 376.48
Fiscal
Disability
Total: 466.15 8,390.88

-
7,500.00 Total: 112.17 2,019.06 (•TaXllblo)Total: 791.99 14,255.82
TOTAL GROSS FED TAXABLE GROSS TOTAL TAXES TOTAL DEDUCTIONS NET PAY
Current 9,375.00 8,921.98 2,151 .94 578.32 6,644.74
YTD 168,750.00 160,595.46 32,185.66 10,409.94 126,154.40
VAC/PTO HOURS YTD SICK HOURS YTD NET PAY DISTRIBUTION
Slart Balance: 129.33 Start Balance: 69.33 Advice # 9752075 6,644.74
+Earned: 120.00 +Earned: 48.00
-Taken 104.00 -Tak!!n o.oo
+Adjustments 0.00 +Adjustments 0.00 Total: 6,644.74
End Balance 145.33 End Balance 117.33

DIRECT DEPOSIT DISTRIBUTION
AQCount Type . Account# Deposit Amount
Cheoklng 6,844.74
I
Total: 8,644.'!4
of l
M-20
11/5/2012 1:24 PM
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
Jeffery D Frazier
1025 Alameda D LS Pulgas 7013KTIP
APT 206
N:i~1:;)~~i 1?.~ I~~~?.l1I1I1 I
TrINet HR Corp., 1100 San Leandro Blvd., Suite #300
San Leandro, CA 94577
For a roll in uiries contact TrlNet at BOO 638-0461
Kateeva, Inc. Pay Group: SM-Kateeva, Inc. SM Check #: 002366~01
1430 O'Brien Drive , Suite A Earns Begin date: 10/01/2012
Menlo Park CA 94025 Earns End date: 10108/2012 Check Date: 10/05/2012
650/327-2903 Pa End Date: 10/1512012
Jeffery 0 Frazier Employee ID: 00001251523 TAX DATA: Federal CA State

1025 Alameda D LS Pulgas Department: 7013KTIP·lntellectuat Properties Marital Status: Single H·of·H
APT206 Location: Kateeva, lnc.-HQ Allowances: 15 48
Bellmont CA 94002 Bus Tiile: VP of Intellectual Properties Addi. Pct.:
Pav Rate: $225,000.00 Annual Addi.Amt.:
' l:iOUfl.S. ANO;~°BN.ltl:G$ T:AAJ:s·

...........---······ Current -.- ........................ -····-····YTD ·-----···
Description Rate Hours Earnlnas Hours Eamlnas Description Current YTD
Regular 5, 113.64 1,464.00 158,286.75 Fed Withholdng 4,608.85 23,265.89
Vacation Supplement 108.173077 158.67 17, 163.82 156.67 17,163.82 Fed MEO/EE 312.65 2,641.28
Holiday 0.00 40.00 4,326.90 Fed OASDl/EE 0.00 4,624.20
Vacation 0.00 104.00 11,249.99 CA Withholdng 1,177.00 6,796.94
CAOASDUEE 0.00 955.85
Total:
.aEi:O.a'&l'-.AX'.DEniJ:C;m~NS . ~
158.67
.. , 22,277.46
. ' AET:Effil"A'*iOliD.OCllONS
1 766.67 191,027.46
'
.. Total:
~'
6 098.50
·. :r · EMR~l>'.¥.r.H.:1?1>;1DJ:aENEl1ll':$.
38,284.16
Descrlotion Current YTD PLNTD DescriPUon Current YTD Dascripllon Current YTO
Blue Shleld 271.66 2,575.66 Supplemental AD and D 10.00 100.00 Blue Shield 1,428.34 13,542.34
Della Denial 45.70 437.38 Short Term Dlsablllty 93.60 914.22 Delta Dental 129.78 1,242.18
VSP Vision 8.04 78.24 METLIFE HYATI LEC3AL PL 10.93 207.67 VSPVision 20.62 200.62
General Use FSA without HSA 208.33 3,958.35 208.33 METLIFE EXE SUPP DISAB 0.00 911 .70 Life & ADID mufUple of salary 26.40 264.00
Dependent Care FSA • Fiscal 208.33 2,083.31 208.33 Life & AD/D multiple of salary• 26.26 262.60
Long-Term Dlsabillty 42.02 418.30
...
Tola/:
'
742.06 9.132.94
'l'.OT:Al...$ROSS .
22,277.46
416.66 Total:
, 'F.ED:TAXPlBll'e',GlWSS.. >
114.53 2,133.59
'l'.OT:AL iliXES
•Taxable
tO::t1..Xl..D:ED:tl.C.TIO.N$. .. . ·( ')ilE1r.J1A:Y
Cwrenl: 21,561.66 6,098.50 856.59 15,322.37
YTO: 191 027.46 182,157.12 38,284.16 11,266.53 141,476.77
V/i'~MIONlJ>T:O'fEiALi..~O . ::SIC.IC~~eA'\!El~L) . Y:J'l:i lNEm.\P..AYD.lst:RtalU'lON
Siert Balance: 129.33 Start Balance: 69.33 Check #002356401 15,322.37
Total: 15,322.37
• Taken: 262.67 • Taken:
+ Adlustments: + Adluslments:
End Balance: 0.00 End Balance: 122.67
M-21
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
~l~ase ulose window when done prlnthlg httpa1//www .hrpasaport.
'frlNet, 1100 8an LeandFO Sivd., liUllo llOO, 61n 1.t andr~, (!A 949'
For p.yroll i nqulrl~ eentsct 1!1e TrlNet Solution Center at (800) 836·0461
Kateova, Inc. Pay Group: SM-Keteeva, Inc. SM Check#: 2373826
1430 O'Brien Prive Earns Begin Date: 11/1512012
Suite A Earns End Date: 11/151201 2 Chock Date: 11101/2012
lv\:lnlo Pafk. CA 94025 Pay End Dato: 11/iS/2012
6$0/327·2903
Jeffery Fr11itler Employee ID: 00001251523 TAX DATA Fodor•! CA State

14 ARASTRADERO RD Department 7013KTIP Marital Slat\1$: Singlu li-of-H
PORTOLA VALLEY. CA 94028 Location: Kateeva, lnc.-HQ Allowances: 16 48 +
Bus llUe: VP of Intellectual Properties Addi.Pct:
Pay Rate: $225,000.00 Annual Addi.Arnt: 0.00
HOURS AND EARNINGS TAXES

Current- -YTD- - - Des crlp~on Current YTD
Description Rate Hours Eamlngs Hours Earnings
Separation Pay One 11me 108.173 17,307.69 17,307.69 Fed Wlthholdng 4,326.92 27,5112.81
Fed t.'CDIEE 260.96 2,092.24
Holiday 0.00 40.00 4,326.90
Regl,Jlar 0.00 1.464.00

FadOASDVEE
168,286.75 CA Wltnholdnci 1,14U1

0.00 4,624.20
7,S30.21i II
CAOASDVEE 0.00 Q68.85 I
Vacation 0.00 104.00 11 ,249.99
vacation Supplement 0.00 168.67 17,163.62
Total: 17,307.69 1,766.67 208,335.15 Total: 5,720.19 44,004.35

BEFORE TAX DEDUCTIONS AFTER-TAX DEDUCTIONS EMPLOYER PAID BENEFITS
Description Current YTD PLNTD Description Current YTD Description Current YTD
Blue Shield 0.00 2,575.66 0.00 ro.ETLIFE EXE 0.00 911 .70 Blue Shield Q.00 13,542.34
SUPP DISAB
Detta Dental 0.00 437.38 0.00 Delta Dental 0,00 1,242.18
Supplemental AD 0.00 100.00
VSP Vision 0.00 78.24 0,00 end D VSP\llslon 0.00 200.62
General Use 0.00 3,956.35 208.33 Short Term 914.22 Life &/>UJ/O 0.00 264.00
0.00
FSA without Disability multiple o
HSA •Life& AO/D 0.00 262.60
WETLIFE HYATI 0.00 207.67
DependE111t 0.00 2,083.31 208.33 LEGAL PL multiple
Care FSA· Long-Term 0.00 418.30
Flsoal
Diaability
!
Total: 0.00 9, 132.94 416.66 Total: 0.00 2,133.59 (•Taxable )Total: 0.00 16,930.04
TOTAL.GROSS FED TAXABLE GROSS TOTAL TAXES TOTAL DEDUCTIONS NET PAY
Current 17,307.69 17,307.69 6,720.19 0.00 11,587.50
YTD 208,335.15 190,464.61 44,004.35 11 ,268.53 153,064.27
VAC/PTO HOURS YTD SICK HOURS YTD NET PAY DISTRIBUTION
Start Balance: 129.33 Start Balance: 69.33 Check # 2373826 11 ,587.50
-Taken 262.67 -Taken 0.00
+Adjustments 0.00 +Adjustments 0.00 Total: 11,687.50
End Balance 0.00 End Balance 122.67
oft M-22
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
DO NOT COPY GC 69954 (d) 1
1 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
2 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA
3 BEFORE THE HONORABLE THEODORE C. ZAYNER, JUDGE
4 SUNNYVALE FACILITY - DEPARTMENT NO. 82
5
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF: )
6 )
PETITIONER: KATHLEEN FRAZIER )
7 )
AND ) CASE NO. 6-11-FL-005500
8 )
RESPONDENT: JEFFERY FRAZIER )
9 ______________________________)
10
11
12 REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
13 MAY 20, 2013
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23 APPEARANCES:
24 FOR THE PETITIONER: NEDDA A. LEDGERWOOD

Attorney at Law
25
FOR THE RESPONDENT: SELF REPRESENTED
26
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER: SUSAN M. Y. PETSCHE
27 Certificate No. CSR 7849
28
SUSAN M.Y. PETSCHE, C.S.R. 7849 N-1

Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
1 Sunnyvale, California May 20, 2013
2 PROCEEDINGS
3 (Whereupon, Court convened and the following
4 proceedings were had:)
5 THE COURT: Line 5 is Kathleen Frazier and Jeffery
6 Frazier.
7 MS. LEDGERWOOD: Good morning. Nedda Ledgerwood
8 for the petitioner who is present.
9 MR. FRAZIER: Jeff Frazier. I'm representing
10 myself.
11 THE COURT: All right. I don't remember exactly
12 what we have left because you've actually gotten a few
13 things filed since the last time I saw you.
14 MS. LEDGERWOOD: Right, Your Honor. What I
15 understood based on my recollection as to what was supposed
16 to happen today is we agreed at the April 17th, 2013
17 Mandatory Settlement Conference that we would submit the
18 issue of attorneys fees, costs and sanctions by pleadings
19 today and exchange that today. So, that's one thing we were
20 supposed to do.
21 The other thing is to have an employment efforts review
22 of Mr. Frazier. And then I also wrote down that we're
23 supposed to have a support trial setting status conference.
24 So, for a time estimate, I would just spend 5 minutes
25 going through what I know of Mr. Frazier's employment effort
26 review and then we can set on the short cause calendar a
27 hearing for support.
28 THE COURT: Is --

Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
1 MS. LEDGERWOOD: And, excuse me. And for
2 imputation of income.
3 THE COURT: Okay. Have the parties filed papers
4 on the attorneys fees issues?
5 MS. LEDGERWOOD: I have not. And I have
6 Mr. Frazier's copy as well as the Court's copy. Did you
7 want me to submit that to you or file it at --
8 THE COURT: Well, you should file it first and
9 then submit it to me. But that was my recollection as well,
10 we had a pending attorneys fees matter that was supposed to
11 be submitted, that we had the --
12 MS. LEDGERWOOD: This is Mr. Frazier's.
13 THE COURT: -- employment efforts review and our
14 calendar does show that this was continued, it doesn't say
15 status conference, but it was continued, the trial was
16 continued, but, of course, this is not the trial calendar,
17 so it would have been for setting --
18 MS. LEDGERWOOD: Right.
19 THE COURT: -- of the issues on support and
20 imputation.
21 And how much time do you think you need on the
22 employment efforts?
23 MS. LEDGERWOOD: Review?
24 THE COURT: Yeah.
25 MS. LEDGERWOOD: Five minutes. I don't need to do
26 any examination. I really just want to give you what I know
27 about his employment efforts.
28 THE COURT: All right. And, Mr. Frazier, do you

Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
1 generally agree that's what we have left in front of us
2 right now?
3 MR. FRAZIER: That sounds right to me.
4 MS. LEDGERWOOD: All right. And, Your Honor --
5 Mr. Frazier, do you have your fees to be submitted today by
6 the pleadings?
7 MR. FRAZIER: I do.
8 MS. LEDGERWOOD: Okay. So, we can exchange that
9 right now and then you'll call our matter?
10 THE COURT: Yes.
11 MS. LEDGERWOOD: Thank you, Your Honor.
12 THE COURT: Thank you.
13 (Whereupon, the matter was passed.)
14 THE COURT: All right. We're back on the record.
15 If everybody could come forward now on the Frazier
16 matter, line 5.
18 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. And I
19 apologize for making you wait. In retrospect, your matter
20 would have been one of the briefer matters. And I apologize
21 it took us a while to get there.
22 MS. LEDGERWOOD: And, Your Honor, I have one quick
23 question with regard to the fee pleading that we submitted,
24 we exchanged. I did not include, and I can include it if
25 you want, the fee statements for the attorney that was on
26 the case before me. I didn't think you'd want that, but if
27 you want that, I can include it. I included all of mine. I
28 identified how much was spent on that attorney but if you

Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
1 want to see the actual statements, I can submit that to the
2 Court.
3 THE COURT: I think that would be appropriate.
4 MS. LEDGERWOOD: Okay.
5 How, how soon do you want it? Do you want it today
6 or --
7 THE COURT: Well, how soon can you get them?
8 MS. LEDGERWOOD: How soon can you get them?
9 MS. KOSTAS: I think, I think I can get them by
10 the end of the day tomorrow would be safe.
11 MS. LEDGERWOOD: Oh. You have to get it by the
12 morning tomorrow, because I'll be on a plane Wednesday.
13 MS. KOSTAS: Okay.
14 MS. LEDGERWOOD: Okay.
15 THE COURT: Okay.
16 MS. LEDGERWOOD: I'll submit it tomorrow and send
17 a copy to Mr. Frazier.
18 THE COURT: That's fine.
19 MS. LEDGERWOOD: Is email okay?
20 MR. FRAZIER: Uh-hum.
21 MS. LEDGERWOOD: Thank you. Sorry about that.
22 THE COURT: Okay. And, again, we're here, you
23 wanted to report on employment efforts and then we're to set
24 the matter for a further hearing on support.
25 MS. LEDGERWOOD: Right, Your Honor. I, I've been
26 receiving on somewhat of a monthly basis Mr. Frazier's
27 employment efforts. And I just would like you to review
28 them as well as one other document.

Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
1 And, basically, what I've seen is that Mr. Frazier's
2 efforts have significantly decreased since the order was
3 made on January 3rd, 2013. I will be requesting an
4 imputation of income. I do not think he is complying with
5 the current orders. I know what the rule is with regard to
6 imputing income. I see that he's been able to work and has
7 the opportunity to work, so an imputation will be
8 appropriate.
9 He was making $225,000 at the Cativa (phonetic) which
10 was his last job and that job ended October of 2012. I had
11 hoped and had been flexible with Mr. Frazier even though I
12 had not been getting reports on time, I had hoped that
13 something more permanent would have been secured or that his
14 consulting business would have improved and it has not and
15 you can see in the first two pages of the spread sheet that
16 the efforts have just dwindled.
17 And at the hearing that we will have on support, I plan
18 on asking an imputation retroactive to the date that his
19 motion was filed to modify support on November 13th, 2012 or
20 in the alternative perhaps the date that we enter into the
21 EEO which was January 3rd, 2013. And the second set of
22 documents that I've provided you is just a quick update that
23 I got yesterday for patent, patent attorney positions that
24 are available in Silicon Valley. And at this point, I
25 believe Mr. Frazier should have found permanent employment
26 or more income or contracting jobs for his consulting
27 company.
28 If you're to say that it's been tough lately, things

Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
1 have been hard, he's had personal issues, that's no
2 different than what my client has gone through. She was
3 displaced from the family residence back in January of 2011.
4 And by 2012, after having been out of the work force for
5 years, she found contract work and she's built up and now
6 she's got a permanent position, and it's going well.
7 So, I want to see someone, who is Mr. Frazier, who has
8 been recently employed and gainfully employed, making more
9 during the marriage to only be on the upward scale.
10 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Frazier, these
11 documents with the exception of the web print-out of
12 apparent, an apparent job opportunity or job opportunities,
13 the other ones are documents that you prepared; is that
14 right?
15 MR. FRAZIER: The spread sheet?
16 THE COURT: Yes.
17 MR. FRAZIER: Yes, sir.
18 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.
19 Do you wish to add anything at this point understanding
20 that we need to set a hearing on support and, of course,
21 I'll take evidence on the information that's relevant at
22 that time, your request to modify and counsel's request to
23 impute income?
24 MR. FRAZIER: I don't know how much there is to
25 really add at this point. It might wait best until we're
26 actually talking about imputing income.
27 I will mention that there are only so many jobs that
28 I've found that come open, you know, each week or each month

Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
1 that are $225,000 a year jobs for people that are Bio Tech
2 patent attorneys within commuting range from where my
3 daughters live. And so there were more jobs open early on
4 when I was first looking than there have been recently. So,
5 I, I'm just not seeing the jobs so many much anymore to
6 apply to.
7 So, the opportunities that Ms. Ledgerwood just
8 provided, if they're anything like the evidence she attached
9 to, to her request to have income imputed to me in her last
10 request she filed, they didn't show, they didn't show the
11 technical background of the person. I'm Bio Tech. A lot of
12 them that did state the technical background of computer
13 science or engineering. That's not me. A lot of them were
14 for very junior people that weren't for me, you know, when I
15 looked through them. Most of them don't state the salary
16 range. And a lot of them were just too terse to tell really
17 what they were about.
18 I see one here, one to three years of post law school
19 experience. They were just off point. So I didn't see them
20 really showing opportunity.
21 THE COURT: All right.
22 Ms. Ledgerwood, how much time do you think we need for
23 the hearing on support, on spousal support and on
24 imputation?
25 MS. LEDGERWOOD: Fifteen minutes on my side,
26 Your Honor.
27 THE COURT: Okay. And let me just try and
28 pinpoint what order we had calendared or what motion we had

Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
1 calendared, if you will.
2 This was Mr. Frazier's motion, wasn't it?
3 MS. LEDGERWOOD: Yes.
4 THE COURT: Okay. Do you remember the filing
5 date?
6 MS. LEDGERWOOD: I believe the filing date was
7 November 13th, 2012. Either the 13th or the 18th and
8 then --
9 THE COURT: No, I see -- well, I see an endorsed
10 file November 13th and here's the original which is the
11 request for order to modify child and spousal.
12 And is this, again, are we talking only about spousal
13 support or both?
14 MS. LEDGERWOOD: Child support, spousal support,
15 and thus, the imputation.
16 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Frazier, do you agree with
17 that time estimate?
18 MR. FRAZIER: So, this was my motion we're saying?
19 THE COURT: Right.
20 MR. FRAZIER: And my understanding was that from
21 my motion that we agreed that there wasn't going to, I'm,
22 I'm a little confused I'm not pursuing that motion at this
23 time.
24 THE COURT: That's why I was asking, because it's
25 not nominally on --
26 MS. LEDGERWOOD: Your Honor.
27 THE COURT: -- calendar or, yes, it is.
28 This is, this is respondent's spousal support,

Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
1 attorneys fees and costs, sanctions and that refers back to
2 the November 13th, 2012 request for order.
3 MS. LEDGERWOOD: Right. And when we filed a
4 stipulation and order including the employment efforts order
5 on January 3rd, 2013, the issue of child support and spousal
6 support was reserved pending Mr. Frazier's job status and
7 his income. So, support hasn't been exchanged since January
8 of 2013. I have a tally going. I had hoped that his
9 employment would have been improved by now or been on the
10 upward path. So, that's why the issue is reserved which is
11 why we need a hearing date, because the issues are open
12 right now.
13 THE COURT: Well, but the stipulation and order
14 set support for the time being, right?
15 MS. LEDGERWOOD: Right. But it's reserved and
16 subject to modification, because we knew things would be
17 changing going forward. He's contracting and has his own
18 business right now, so it fluctuates like mine and we don't
19 know what's going on with his income. That's why we needed
20 to come back and try to resolve it.
21 THE COURT: Okay. So, in a sense, with the
22 reservation, this is a request that you wish to proceed
23 with, because you don't want to, you don't think it's
24 appropriate to continue with the current support orders
25 because of the evidence you wish to present and the argument
26 for imputation of income.
27 MS. LEDGERWOOD: Correct. And it would be an
28 exercise I can do, but waste of time of the parties for me

Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
1 to file a separate motion just to keep it going. I'm just
2 utilizing what's already there.
3 THE COURT: Okay. I understand.
4 And I do think we can do this on a regular law and
5 motion calendar.
6 How much time out would you like to set this?
7 MS. LEDGERWOOD: 30 days.
8 THE COURT: Okay. All right. What I'm going to
9 do is see if we have time on one of our Monday morning
10 calendars, because sometimes our Monday calendars, which are
11 attorney only, tend to be a little lighter set just in case
12 we need a little more time.
14 THE CLERK: June 17th at 9 o'clock. There's
15 nothing set yet.
16 MS. LEDGERWOOD: June 17th is fine.
17 THE COURT: Does that work for you, Mr. Frazier?
18 MR. FRAZIER: Sure.
19 THE COURT: Okay.
20 So, what I'll do is this. I guess for our calendar
21 purposes, we're continuing the support matters for event 1
22 on our calendar, which was request for order, to have
23 further hearing on June 17 at 9 o'clock and that's also
24 consistent with the parties' reservation of those issues in
25 the prior stipulations and order.
26 As it is certainly relevant to the argument regarding
27 imputation of income, I'll continue the employment efforts
28 review to that date and time.

Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
1 With respect to the trial matter, which is event 2 on
2 our calendar, the matter of attorneys fees is being
3 submitted by the filing of the pleadings and the
4 supplemental statements from the prior attorneys today.
5 That will be submitted tomorrow, Ms. Ledgerwood?
6 MS. LEDGERWOOD: Yes, Your Honor, just need to
7 submit the initial attorneys fees statements and that's all
8 I will be submitting. Nothing more.
9 THE COURT: Okay. So, that's submitted on
10 attorneys fees only on the pleadings and attorney fee
11 statements.
12 And we'll see everybody June 17 at 9:00.
13 Rather than lodging these at this time, I'll hand these
14 back to you, Ms. Ledgerwood, so you can, both parties can
15 update me when we see you next month.
17 MR. FRAZIER: Your Honor?
18 THE COURT: Yes, sir.
19 MR. FRAZIER: Would there be any replies with
20 these papers that we just filed today or we're not doing
21 that?
22 THE COURT: I think they can be submitted just
23 based on your respective papers.
24 MS. LEDGERWOOD: Right.
25 THE COURT: I don't need, I don't think I need any
26 replies. Let me put it this way, if I feel in reviewing
27 them that there's, I would like some further filings, I will
28 advise --

Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
1 MR. FRAZIER: Okay.
2 THE COURT: -- both sides. Okay?
5 THE COURT: Oh, I'm sorry. Let me pause you just
6 for a moment. Sorry for this, Ms. Frazier.
7 MS. KOSTAS: That's all right.
8 MS. LEDGERWOOD: That's all right.
9 THE COURT: There's something that just jumped out
10 to me on this calendar, which is a bit of a mystery that I
11 haven't seen before and I don't know if this was just some
12 sort of inadvertent error on the clerk's office. I
13 understand your prior given name was Kostas.
14 MS. KOSTAS: Right.
15 THE COURT: And you've been referred throughout as
16 Kathleen Kostas Frazier and somehow there's an aka Cecile
17 Kostas in here which doesn't seem to make any sense.
18 MS. LEDGERWOOD: It doesn't, because Cecile is her
19 middle name.
20 THE COURT: Okay. Then I will ask the clerk to
21 take that off of the computer. And I don't know how it got
22 there, but I had not noted it before in all the hearings I
23 had before and I just saw it here.
24 MS. LEDGERWOOD: I just saw it.
25 THE COURT: Kostas made sense. Cecile Kostas as
26 an aka didn't make sense.
27 MS. LEDGERWOOD: So for accuracy, her name is
28 Kathleen Cecile Kostas.

Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
1 THE COURT: Okay. So, your full, current name is
2 Kathleen Cecile Kostas. We're not going to put you down as
3 an aka Cecile Kostas.
4 MS. KOSTAS: Okay. Good.
5 THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
7 (Whereupon, the proceedings adjourned.)
8 ---o0o---
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Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
1 STATE OF CALIFORNIA )
2 COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA )
6 I, Susan M.Y. Petsche, HEREBY CERTIFY: That the
7 foregoing is a full, true and correct transcript of the
8 testimony given and proceedings had in the above-mentioned
9 action taken on the 20th day of May 2013; that it is a full,
10 true and correct transcript of the evidence offered and
11 received, acts and statements of the Court, also all
12 objections of counsel and all matters to which the same
13 relate; that I reported the same in stenotype to the best of
14 my ability being the duly appointed, qualified and acting
15 official stenographic reporter of said court, and thereafter
16 had the same transcribed into typewriting as herein appears.
17
18 Dated this 6th day of September, 2013.
19
20
21
_______________________________________
22 SUSAN M.Y. PETSCHE
CERTIFICATE No. CSR 7849
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24
25
26
27
28

Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
1 Jeffery D. Frazier, SBN 157792
239 Sequo ia Avenue
2 Redwood City, California 94061
(ENDORSED)
3
Telephone: (650) 275-2112
Email: jeff@ frazierjd.com F ~ ~~ ~
APR 14 201 4
D
, "'
4 Respondent in Pro Per
l h·111f'1:- . 1 , 1 , .1~ .rlv/ d\f
. Chief Executiva Officer/Clerk
5 Suponor Cowt of CA County of Santa Claro
BY ---A.. 8angeL_ DEPUTY
6
7
SUPERJOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
8
9
10
In re the Marriage of: Case No.: 6-11-FL-005500
11
Petitioner: KATHLEEN FRAZIER UPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION OF
12 FFERY FRAZIER and l\1EMORANDUM OF
and OINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT
13 F MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE ORDERS
Respondent: JEFFERY FRAZIER F AUGUST 16, 2013
14
AP J: The Hon. Theodore Zayner
15 DEPT: 82
DATE: April 21 , 2014
16 TIME: 9:00 a.m.
17 Table of Contents
18 SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION OF JEFFERY FRAZIER and MEMORANDUM OF POINTS
19 AND AUTHORJTIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE ORDERS OF AUGUST
20 16, 2013 ························ ·· ······ ····· ··············· ····· ·································· ················· ································ i
21 I. INTilODUCTION AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND ......... .. .... ..................................... 1

22 II. SUl\1J\1ARY OF ARGU1\1ENT ........................................ .............. .......... .... ....................... 1
23 ID. THE TRIAL COURT HAS THE AUTHORITY TO CONSTRUE RESPONDENT'S

MOTION TO SET ASIDE AS A MOTION FOR A NEW mIAL ................ ....... ................... 2
24
IV. THE TRIAL COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO HEAR RESPONDENT'S MOTION
25
TO SET ASIDE BECAUSE THE STATUS OF THE APPEAL STANDS AS
26
"DISMISSED .. . " ....................................................... ..................... ..... ............. ................ ..... ..... 3
27 V. PETITIONER'S REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS SHOULD BE DENIED .. ....... ............. . 3
28
SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION OF JEFFERY FRAZIER and MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND

AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE ORDERS OF AUGUST 16, 2013 - i O-1
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
B'f FPJ<
1 VI. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS PROHIBIT ONE FROM OVEREXTENDING
2 ONESELF WHEN CAPACITY IS REDUCED ........................................................................ 4

VII. PETITIONER’S EGREGIOUS FRAUD UPON ME AND THE COURT SHOULD
3
NOT BE TOLERATED ............................................................................................................. 5
4
VIII. FINAL THOUGHTS AND CONCLUSION .............................................................. 6
5
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O-2
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE ORDERS OF AUGUST 16, 2013 - ii
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
1 My name is Jeffery Frazier and I am the Respondent in this matter. I have personal first-
2 hand knowledge of the facts set forth in this Declaration, and if called to testify to those facts, I
3 could and would testify competently thereto. I make this Supplemental Declaration in support of my
4 second Motion to Set Aside the orders of August 16, 2013, and I declare as follows:
5 I. INTRODUCTION AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Judgment of dissolution was entered April 17, 2013. There are two minor children, Kalista
6
Frazier, born Feb. 5, 2002, and Lauren Frazier, born July 29, 2005.
7
On May 20, 2013, I filed my Trial Brief, in which I requested section 271 sanctions,
8
prevailing party attorney’s fees, reimbursement due to breach of fiduciary duty, recovery of custody
9
evaluation fees and costs, sanctions for accusations of child abuse in a custody proceeding, and
10
sealing of portions of the record. On the same date, Petitioner filed her Trial Brief, requesting
11
imputation of income, attorney fees, and section 271 sanctions.
12
The Court entered two orders on August 16, 2013: (1) The order “FINDINGS AND ORDER
13
RE ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS” denied all of my requests for sanctions and payments, and
14
to seal the record, and granted Petitioner's requests for attorney fees and sanctions; and, (2) The
15
order “ORDER RE: RESPONDENT'S REQUEST FOR MODIFICATION OF CHILD SUPPORT
16
AND TEMPORARY SPOUSAL SUPPORT” provided for child and spousal support payments by
17
me, increased from a prior stipulation and order wherein no support was paid. It also imputed
18
income to me for purposes of support.
19
On October 15, 2013, I filed a Notice of Appeal from the same orders.
20
On February 19, 2014, I filed a (second) motion to set aside the August 16, 2013 orders
21
under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b). This submission is in support of such
22
motion, and responsive to Petitioner’s paper filed April 2, 2014 in opposition thereto.
23
II. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
24 The Court has the authority to rectify the miscarriage of justice that has occurred in this
25 matter by (1) treating my motion to set aside as a motion for a new trial, if there are any doubts as to
26 the Court’s jurisdiction; or, (2) acting on my motion to set aside as it is, because the Court does in
27 fact have jurisdiction as no briefs have been filed, and the status of my appeal stands as “Appeal
28 dismissed for failure to file opening brief.”


O-3
Case Number
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE ORDERS OF AUGUST 16, 2013 - 1
6-11-FL-005500
1 The August 16, 2013 orders should be set-aside, or there should be a new trial, so there can
2 be a fair trial, where I receive reasonable accommodations under the Americans with Disabilities Act
3 (ADA) and the Americans with Disabilities Amendments Act (ADAA) to make it so, and thus a fair
4 result.
5 III. THE TRIAL COURT HAS THE AUTHORITY TO CONSTRUE

RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE AS A MOTION FOR A
6 NEW TRIAL
If there is any doubt as to the trial court’s jurisdiction to hear my set-aside motion, it is noted
7
that the trial court has authority to treat my motion to set aside as a motion for a new trial for which
8
it certainly has jurisdiction.
9
“[W]hen a party brings a timely posttrial motion, the trial court has broad discretion to
10
determine the relief being requested.” “In Finnie v. District No. 1 — Pacific Coast Dist. etc. Assn.
11
(1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1311 [12 Cal.Rptr.2d 348] (Finnie), the plaintiff filed a motion under section
12
663 to vacate an order and judgment of dismissal, and the Court of Appeal held it was properly
13
treated as a motion for a new trial.” Shapiro v. Prudential Property & Casualty Co. (1997) 52
14
Cal.App.4th 722.
15
16 The superior court has jurisdiction to decide a motion for a new trial while an appeal is
17 pending, because the motion is considered to be "collateral to the judgment." Weisenburg v Molina
18 (1976) 58 CA3d 478, 485, 129 CR 813.
19 “The court's jurisdiction … does not depend on whether the remedies for the two motions
20 resemble each other, but whether the trial court had the authority to grant a new trial … based on the
21 error set forth in the filed motion. [T]he fact that such power exists, if properly called into play, is a
22 persuasive factor in justifying the granting of similar relief under the circumstances.... (Jacuzzi v.
23 Jacuzzi Bros., Inc. (1966) 243 Cal.App.2d 1, 23-24 [52 Cal.Rptr. 147] [upheld ruling on motion to
24 vacate when proper procedure would have been to grant motion for new trial].)” Shapiro v.
25 Prudential Property & Casualty Co. (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 722.
26 Code of Civil Procedure Section 657 specifies when the court may grant a motion for a new
27 trial. Section 657 states, in part:
28

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Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
1 "The verdict may be vacated and any other decision may be modified or vacated, in whole or
2 in part, and a new or further trial granted on all or part of the issues, on the application of the
3 party aggrieved, for any of the following causes, materially affecting the substantial rights of
4 such party: [¶] ... [¶] 3. Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have
5 guarded against.” (Emphasis added).
6 Here, my motion was filed as a motion to set-aside based upon mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
7 excusable neglect. As shown below, these two bases for relief substantially equate to one another.
8 o Synonyms for "accident": “… mistake…”
9 ("Synonyms for ‘accident’" Synonyms for Accident. Synonyms360.com, n.d. Web. 06
10 Apr. 2014. <http://www.synonyms360.com/accident>. (Emphasis added)).
11 o “When something happens by accident, it's inadvertent, or unintentional.”

12 ("Inadvertent." Vocabulary.com. Vocabulary.com, n.d. Web. 06 Apr. 2014.
13 <http://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/inadvertent>. (Emphasis added)).
14 o An accident can be caused by neglect.

15 Thus, in theses contexts, the phrase “accident or surprise…” substantially equates to the phrase
16 “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.”
17 Should the Court doubt its jurisdiction to hear my set-aside motion as such, it is respectfully
18 requested that the Court exercise its authority to treat my motion to set aside as a motion for a new
19 trial based upon “accident or surprise,” and grant such motion.
20 IV. THE TRIAL COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO HEAR
RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE BECAUSE THE STATUS
21 OF THE APPEAL STANDS AS “DISMISSED…”
My Appellant’s Opening Brief was not filed by the deadline of March 17, 2014. In fact, I
22
have not filed an opening brief at all. As of April 4, 2014, the status of my appeal stands as:
23
“Appeal dismissed for failure to file opening brief.”
24
(See Exh. A – “Case Information” from the California Court of Appeals, Sixth Appellate District
25
website). Therefore, the trial court does have jurisdiction to hear my motion to set aside.
26
V. PETITIONER’S REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS SHOULD BE DENIED
27 I am not able to cover my monthly expenses with my current income. I have paid at least
28 $260 in overdraft fees since the beginning of this year, of which $70 was paid within the past ten

O-5
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
1 days. The Court has ordered me to pay for half of a Brief Focused Review, with $2,500 being due. I
2 need to make an emergency withdrawal (with penalty) from a retirement account simply to survive
3 and to pay my several debts to third parties – something the Court’s order of April 7, 2014 now
4 prevents me from doing. While my overwhelming preference is to use those accounts for retirement,
5 per public policy (Marriage of Olsen (1993) 14 Cal. App. 4th 1, 11 [17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 480]), I am in
6 desperate need for at least a portion of them for this emergency caused by the orders at issue here.
7 Aside from the Court’s order of April 7, 2014, I cannot access money from equity in my home, as I
8 cannot get a loan. Also, I owe my parents over $200,000 on the house, which comes due and
9 payable in less than two years, so my “equity” is essentially meaningless. Obviously, this situation
10 thrust upon me is not in the best interest of the children.
11 When I was working productively, as I have most of my life, I earned more than enough to
12 take care of all of us for quite a while. We saved so none of us would ever find ourselves struggling
13 to survive. Now, because of the orders at issue here, Petitioner is set for life, and I can barely live –
14 and I am facing potential incarceration due to the disabilities that are impacting my ability to earn.
15 Moreover, Petitioner has not cited any authority in her request for sanctions. Further, it is
16 noted, “[t]here is no statutory provision for an award of attorney fees in family law proceedings,
17 from a needy spouse to a nonneedy spouse, as a sanction or damages for inconveniencing the
18 nonneedy party.” In re the Marriage of Kerry (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 456, 464-465.
19 Besides the fact that the $30,000 in sanctions already against me in this matter were based on
20 Petitioner’s lies to the Court, had I been capable of timely filing an Income and Expense Declaration
21 at the time of trial, it would have been clear that I was a needy spouse and Petitioner a nonneedy
22 spouse. All the more reason my motion to set aside should be granted.
23 Petitioner’s request for an additional $900 in sanctions should be denied.
24 VI. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS PROHIBIT ONE FROM

OVEREXTENDING ONESELF WHEN CAPACITY IS REDUCED
25 Not only has my mental condition, described in my set-aside motion, affected my ability to
26 procure and carry-out work, it would be ethically irresponsible for me to overextend myself during
27 the period of reduced capacity. Rule 3-110 (Failing to Act Competently), of the CA Rules of
28 Professional Conduct provides, in part:


O-6
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
1 (A) A member shall not intentionally, recklessly, or repeatedly fail to perform legal
2 services with competence.
3 (B) For purposes of this rule, "competence" in any legal service shall mean to apply
4 the 1) diligence, 2) learning and skill, and 3) mental, emotional, and physical ability
5 reasonably necessary for the performance of such service.
6 Acute depression or other psychological problems will not excuse violation of this rule. The State
7 Bar court will consider misconduct “willful” when the lawyer knew, or should have known, that a
8 mental, emotional or physical disability would affect his or her competent representation: Silva-
9 Vidor v. State Bar (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1071, 1074-1075, 264 Cal.Rptr. 439, 782 P.2d 680 (severe
10 psychological, physical and financial difficulties); Bradpiece v. State Bar (1974) 10 Cal.3d 742, 111
11 Cal.Rptr. 905, 518 P.2d 337 (financial and domestic difficulties).
12 Daily, I fear that I might slip up somehow in my work. Compounding my worries, I cannot
13 afford and, so, do not carry professional liability insurance. If the present imputation of income to
14 me should stand, that would be tantamount to punishing me for abiding by Rule 3-110.
15 VII. PETITIONER’S EGREGIOUS FRAUD UPON ME AND THE COURT

SHOULD NOT BE TOLERATED
16 Just some of Petitioner’s lies to the Court in her Trial Brief, which greatly prejudiced me, are
17 described in my SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION OF JEFFERY FRAZIER and

18 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO PETITIONER’S
19 TRIAL BRIEF FILED MAY 20, 2013 (aka, reply brief – Exh. B). Petitioner and her attorney do
20 not deny they lied to the Court; they merely assert their lies were intrinsic in nature. (See
21 PETITIONER’S SUR-REPLY IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO SET ASIDE OR
22 RECONSIDER AUGUST 16, 2013 ORDERS filed 10/01/2013, at p. 10).
23 “A trial court has inherent power to set aside a judgment obtained through fraud committed
24 upon the other party or the court, and its right to do so is not derived from section 473 of the Code of
25 Civil Procedure. (Aldrich v. Aldrich, 203 Cal. 433, 264 P. 754; Rhea v. Millsap, 68 Cal.App.2d 449,
26 156 P.2d 941.)” Necessary v. Necessary (1962) 207 Cal. App. 2d 780. Among the Court’s powers
27 are its “equitable power derived from the historic power of equity courts” and “supervisory or
28 administrative powers which all courts possess to enable them to carry out their duties.” Peat,

O-7
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
1 Marwick, Mitchell & Co. v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. App. 3d 272, 287 (1988) (internal quotations
2 omitted). The latter powers, in particular, enable a court to “control litigation before it, to prevent
3 abuse of its process, and to create a remedy for a wrong even in the absence of specific statutory
4 authority.” Western Steel & Ship Repair, Inc. v. RMI, Inc., 176 Cal. App. 3d 1108, 1116-17 (1986).
5 Further, I request that Petitioner’s attorney, Ms. Nedda Ledgerwood, be referred to the
6 California State Bar for disciplinary action (particularly, for her lie in her Trial Brief that I told the
7 listing agents (Kavanaughs) to add certain terms to the listing agreement for the Portola Valley
8 property that were not proper or authorized (See items III.C.3 and III.C.4 of my accompanying
9 SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION OF JEFFERY FRAZIER and MEMORANDUM OF

10 POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO PETITIONER’S TRIAL BRIEF FILED
11 MAY 20, 2013 (Exh. B)). Otherwise her lying will continue to my detriment (e.g., as it is now in the
12 Brief Focused Assessment, which will be detailed to the Court at a later date.) (See, Dr. Karin
13 Huffer. Unlocking Justice – The Americans With Disabilities Act And Its Amendments Act Protecting
14 Persons With Disabilities In Court: Domestic Violence, Post Traumatic Stress Disorders & Other
15 Functional Impairments. Las Vegas, NV: Fulkort Press, LLC, 2012. Print.)
16 VIII. FINAL THOUGHTS AND CONCLUSION
Petitioner is terrified of what might happen if there is a fair trial. She won a tremendous, but
17
unjustified, windfall from my inadvertence, as described in my set-aside motion, and my confusion
18
around the submission of a reply brief. Recall the Court’s statement that if it would like further
19
filings [to my Trial Brief], it would ask for them. [Hearing Tr., 12-13, May 20, 2013]. As the Court
20
did not ask for reply briefs, I did not file one as I did not want to upset the Court. Further, after the
21
hearing on June 17, 2013, I could barely think of this litigation without compounding my symptoms.
22
I forwent a hearing for the trial because I became very anxious and had a difficult time
23
thinking and concentrating in a hearing setting due to my conditions. I thought I would do better in
24
writing. However, the Court asked that I “summarize and condense” my arguments and positions
25
[Hearing Tr., 10-11, April 17, 2013], which I did and which caused me to lose much
26
substance/evidence compared to what I otherwise would have submitted. The Court then denied all
27
of my requests for insufficient evidence and factual/legal bases. It was a mistake not to ask for an
28

O-8
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
1 ADA/ADAA accommodation of leave to file a longer brief, especially since there would be no
2 burden of a hearing on the Court. At that time, I did not have the requisite knowledge or wherewithal
3 of my conditions to make such a request. While earning my certification in ADA advocacy in the
4 winter of 2013/2014 (Exh. C), for which I earned CLE credit, I was informed of my right to have
5 such barriers to access to justice removed. This motion soon followed.
6 I submit herewith my SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION OF JEFFERY FRAZIER

7 and MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO
8 PETITIONER’S TRIAL BRIEF FILED MAY 20, 2013 (Exh. B), as it was a mistake not to have
9 requested an accommodation of a continuance and filed such prior to issuance of the orders of
10 August 16, 2013. This pleading is timely since it is submitted before the hearing on the application.
11 (See County of Stanislaus v Johnson (1996) 43 CA4th 832, 51 CR2d 73, and Job v Farrington
12 (1989) 209 CA3d 338, 257 CR 210 (The requirement that the motion be accompanied by a proposed
13 pleading is satisfied by substantial compliance.).
14 “The existence of some degree of mental confusion or illness of the party moving to set
15 aside an order supports granting the motion… [W]hen setting aside a judgment will compel a
16 hearing on the merits, the trial court's determination of a motion to set aside a judgment under
17 section 473 will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion.” In re the
18 Marriage of Kerry (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 456, 466.
19 Fortunately, the Court is empowered to rectify the miscarriage of justice that has occurred in
20 this matter by (1) treating my motion to set aside as a motion for a new trial, if there are any doubts
21 as to the Court’s jurisdiction; or, (2) acting on my motion to set aside as it is, because the Court does
22 in fact have jurisdiction as no briefs have been filed, and the status of my appeal stands as “Appeal
23 dismissed for failure to file opening brief.”
24 The August 16, 2013 orders should be set-aside, or there should be a new trial, so there can
25 be a fair trial, where I receive reasonable accommodations under the ADA/ADAA to make it so, and
26 thus a fair result.
27
28

O-9
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing
2 is true and correct.
3 Respectfully submitted,
4
5 Dated: April 14, 2014
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O-10
SUPPLEMENT AL DECLARATION OF JEFFERY FRAZIER and MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
O-11
Case Number
1 Jeffery Frazier
239 Sequoia Ave.
2 Redwood City, CA 94061
Telephone: (650) 275-2112
3
4
11 Petitioner: KATHLEEN FRAZIER SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION OF

JEFFERY FRAZIER and MEMORANDUM OF
12 and POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN
OPPOSITION TO PETITIONER’S TRIAL
13 Respondent: JEFFERY FRAZIER BRIEF FILED MAY 20, 2013
14 APJ: The Hon. Theodore Zayner
DEPT: 82
15
16 TABLE OF CONTENTS
17 SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION OF JEFFERY FRAZIER and MEMORANDUM OF POINTS
18 AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO PETITIONER’S TRIAL BRIEF FILED MAY 20,
19 2013 ................................................................................................................................................. 1
I. INTRODUCTION AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND ................................................ 1
20
II. ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................. 1
21
A. This reply brief is appropriate since arguments and attachments were presented for the first
22
time in Petitioner’s trial brief. ................................................................................................... 1
23 B. Petitioner failed to provide a current income and expense declaration. .............................. 2
24 C. Petitioner failed to verify her trial brief; therefore, it should be stricken. ........................... 3
25 D. Petitioner’s requests for fees and sanctions are not supported by evidence sworn under
26 penalty of perjury...................................................................................................................... 3
E. Petitioner’s requests for fees, sanctions, and support lacks substantial evidence. ............... 4
27
F. Inadequate notice was provided regarding sanctions. ........................................................ 4
28
i
O-12
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
1 G. There was a complete lack of evidence that Petitioner was in need of an award of fees. .... 5
2 H. Petitioner failed to follow local and state rules on her request for fees. .............................. 5
I. Should the Court award Petitioner fees, it must consider my ability to pay in the manner
3
awarded. ................................................................................................................................... 6
4
J. The Court must base any spousal support decision on the standard of living that was
5
established during the marriage. ................................................................................................ 6
6 K. The DissoMaster program cannot be used in calculating long-term spousal support. ......... 6
7 L. An impermissible retroactive spousal support order must be avoided. ............................... 7
8 M. Any imputation of income to me would require findings that it is in the children's best
interest. ..................................................................................................................................... 7
9
N. The burden of proof regarding my opportunity to work is upon Petitioner ......................... 7
10
O. I submitted evidence relevant to my opportunity to work .................................................. 8
11
III. KATHLEEN FRAZIER AND MS. LEDGERWOOD LIED TO THE COURT AND
12 THERE IS EVIDENCE PROVING FALSENESS ................................................................... 9
13 A. Kathleen knowingly and purposefully understated her income .......................................... 9
14 B. Kathleen falsely inflated my use of her accounting expert ............................................... 10
15 C. Having no grounds, Kathleen invented reasons why the Court should sanction me .......... 10
D. Contrary to Kathleen’s false assertion, my past support payments have been a model of
16
timeliness and regularity ......................................................................................................... 12
17
IV. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 12
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ii
O-13
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
1 My name is Jeffery Frazier and I am the Respondent in this matter. I have personal first-
2 hand knowledge of the facts set forth in this Declaration, and if called to testify to those facts, I
3 could and would testify competently thereto. I make this Supplemental Declaration in opposition to
4 Petitioner’s Trial Brief filed May 20, 2013, and I declare as follows:
5 I. INTRODUCTION AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Judgment of dissolution was entered April 17, 2013. There are two minor children, Kalista
6
Frazier, born Feb. 5, 2002, and Lauren Frazier, born July 29, 2005.
7
On May 20, 2013, I filed my Trial Brief, in which I requested section 271 sanctions,
8
prevailing party attorney’s fees, reimbursement due to breach of fiduciary duty, recovery of custody
9
evaluation fees and costs, sanctions for accusations of child abuse in a custody proceeding, and
10
sealing of portions of the record. On the same date, Petitioner filed her Trial Brief, requesting
11
12
II. ARGUMENT
13 A. This reply brief is appropriate since arguments and attachments
were presented for the first time in Petitioner’s trial brief.
14 Numerous arguments and attachments were presented for the first time in Petitioner’s Trial
15 Brief. Albeit the parties waived a hearing, I did not waive my right to reply. Speaking about filings
16 beyond the Trial Briefs, Judge Zayner stated: “[I]f ... I would like some further filings, I will advise
17 both sides.” [Hearing Tr., 12-13, May 20, 2013] However, if I am given no forum to present
18 opposition argument and evidence, I may be substantially prejudiced.
19 “Denying a party the right to testify or to offer evidence is reversible per se.” In re Marriage
20 of Carlsson (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 281, 291. A trial judge should not determine any issue that is
21 presented for his consideration until he has heard all competent, material, and relevant evidence the
22 parties desire to introduce.'" (Elkins v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1337, 1357-1358,
23 quoting Shippey v. Shippey (1943) 58 Cal.App.2d 174, 177.) In Elkins v. Superior Court, the Court
24 emphasized, ‘“One of the elements of a fair trial is the right to offer relevant and competent evidence
25 on a material issue... denial of this fundamental right is almost always considered reversible error”’
26 Elkins v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1337, 163 P.3d 160.
27
28
1 O-14
Case Number
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1 1. Since all of Petitioner’s arguments for sanctions are
new, denial of the right to reply would constitute a
2 violation of due process
It would be error to prevent me from presenting evidence to challenge the basis for any
3
sanction award, the reasonableness of the fees and the hourly rates. (See, In re Marriage of Duris
4
and Urbany (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 510, 515.) “[S]ummary imposition of attorney fees as sanctions
5
is not consistent with due process procedural protections.” Id; see also, In re Marriage of Flaherty
6
(1982) 31 Cal.3d 637, 652, 183 Cal.Rptr. 508, 646 P.2d 179.
7
“[I]t is basic that counsel must have the opportunity to be heard on the issue before sanctions
8
can be imposed” Brekhus & Williams v. Rhodes (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 788, 793. “In a proceeding
9
to determine whether an attorney's conduct justifies sanctions, there must be a sufficient opportunity
10
to present opposing evidence.” In re Marriage of Duris and Urbany (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 510,
11
514; See, In re Marriage of Quinlan (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1417, 1422. “Summary proceedings are
12
common in family law cases. Nevertheless, however certain a court may be that a party or an
13
attorney in a family law proceeding deserves sanctions, it must keep in mind an immutable principle
14
that cuts across all areas of the law: sanctions may not be summarily imposed. Due process demands
15
more.” In re Marriage of Duris and Urbany (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 510, 511.
16
Moreover, quite apart from the issue of a separate hearing, notice that the court is considering
17
the imposition of sanctions must be given before findings on the sanctions issue are made and at a
18
time preceding the trial judge's decision whether to assess sanctions. [Bergman v. Rifkind & Sterling,
19
Inc. (1991) 227 CA3d 1380, 1387, 278 CR 583, 587). This has not been done.
20
B. Petitioner failed to provide a current income and expense
21 declaration.
Court rules require that current income and expense declarations be filed when the trial court
22
is awarding attorney fees. Cal. Rules of Ct, rule 5.128 (repealed effective January 1, 2013) requires
23
current income and expense declarations, including attorney fees information, when relevant to
24
issues. A party seeking attorneys’ fees, experts’ fees, or costs must comply with Cal. Rules of Ct,
25
rule 5.427 (renumbered from Rule 5.93 effective January 1, 2013) which identifies the process that a
26
party must complete to request or respond to a request for attorney fees and costs, and the court
27
28
2
O-15
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
1 process for making an order with respect to attorney fees and costs. Among the requirements are the
2 submission of current income and expense declarations.
3 C. Petitioner failed to verify her trial brief; therefore, it should be

stricken.
4 Family Code (FC) §212 expressly requires all pleadings filed under the Family Code to be
5 verified. "A petition, response, application, opposition, or other pleading filed with the court under
6 this code shall be verified." A verification is an affidavit of the truth of the matter stated. (CCP
7 §446(a).) A verification’s object is to assure good faith in the averments or statements of a party to
8 litigation. Star Motor Imports, Inc. v. Superior Court (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 201, 204 151 CR 721,
9 723. Petitioner’s Trial Brief was subscribed by her attorney, but not verified as required.
10 All Judicial Council Forms requiring verification contain a preprinted verification for
11 signature. Juridical Council Form FL-300 is adopted for mandatory use and as such contain the
12 preprinted required verification for signature. Contrary to these statutes, Petitioner failed to use a
13 Request for Order form. There was no verification. Lacking a properly verified pleading, the court is
14 without authority to consider it and assess fees and sanctions, nor can it award support.
15 D. Petitioner’s requests for fees and sanctions are not supported

by evidence sworn under penalty of perjury.
16 Petitioner provided attorney argument, submitted invoices from her attorney and accountant,
17 and submitted a spreadsheet in support of her request for attorney’s fees and sanctions. However,
18 nothing that she provided in or with her Trial Brief was itself sworn under penalty of perjury.
19 1. Fees – Monetary liability cannot be imposed based on
speculation or on opposing counsel's unsworn
20 statements.
The absence of sworn evidence “disclosing the nature and extent of counsel's services”
21
would hamper the trial court's ability to make fact findings. (In re Marriage of Cueva (1978) 86
22
Cal.App.3d 290, 303, 149 Cal. Rptr. 918.) It cannot impose monetary liability based on speculation
23
or on opposing counsel's unsworn statements. (In re Marriage of Reese & Guy (1999) 73 Cal. App.
24
4th 1214, 1222, fn. 5, 87 Cal. Rptr. 2d 339) “Without ascertaining whether or at what hourly rate the
25
work for which reimbursement was sought was actually done, much less that the work was
26
‘reasonably necessary’ ..., the trial court could not properly find that imposing” liability for the other
27
28
3
O-16
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
1 spouse's legal fees was appropriate. (In re Marriage of Keech (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 860, 869, 89
2 Cal.Rptr.2d 525.)
3 E. Petitioner’s requests for fees, sanctions, and support lacks

substantial evidence.
4 Petitioner’s Trial Brief is almost entirely attorney argument. No declarations under penalty of
5 perjury were submitted with it. Petitioner failed to provide substantial evidence for any of her
6 requests.
7 Pleadings are allegations, not evidence, and do not suffice to satisfy a party's evidentiary
8 burden. (San Diego Police Officers Assn. v. City of San Diego (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1736, 1744.)
9 The Court cannot rely on non-evidence, such as an attorney’s unsworn statements (County of
10 Alameda v. Moore (1995) 33 Cal. App. 4th 1422, 1427 [40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 18]).
11 “[S]ubstantial evidence is not just any evidence; it must be believable evidence. "’Substantial
12 evidence’ is evidence of ponderable legal significance, evidence that is reasonable, credible and of
13 solid value.” Roddenberry v. Roddenberry (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 634, 651. The substantial evidence
14 test requires "more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
15 accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59
16 S.Ct. 206, 217, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938).
17 F. Inadequate notice was provided regarding sanctions.

Petitioner did not provide sufficient notice of her claims for section 271 sanctions. While
18
general notice may have been provided that Petitioner would seek sanctions, the specific conduct or
19
amount for which she would seek sanctions was not provided until she actually served the Trial Brief
20
itself on May 20, 2013. No notice was provided to me prior to the request for the sanctions. Thus, as
21
a matter of law, it would be improper for the trial court to impose a sanction under Family Code
22
section 271 (In re Marriage of Davenport (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1507, 1529.)
23
Family Code section 271, subdivision (a), provides for the award of attorney's fees as a
24
sanction. "An award of attorney's fees and costs as a sanction pursuant to this section shall be
25
imposed only after notice to the party against whom the sanction is proposed to be imposed and
26
opportunity for that party to be heard." (Fam. Code, § 271, subd. (b).)
27
28
4
O-17
Case Number
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1 Further, Petitioner’s Trial Brief contains both specified and unspecified conduct, which
2 unspecified conduct includes: “... engage in frivolous litigation and arguments with additional costs.”
3 Notice "must also advise of the specific grounds and conduct for which the fees or sanctions
4 are sought, and must be directed to the specific person against whom they are sought. [Citation.]" (In
5 re Marriage of Davenport (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1507, 1529.)
6 G. There was a complete lack of evidence that Petitioner was in

need of an award of fees.
7 “There is no statutory provision for an award of attorney fees in family law proceedings,
8 from a needy spouse to a nonneedy spouse, as a sanction or damages for inconveniencing the
9 nonneedy party.” IRMO Kerry (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 456, 464-465, 204 Cal. Rptr. 660.
10 H. Petitioner failed to follow local and state rules on her request

for fees.
11 In applying for attorney fees and costs, counsel must follow Cal Rules of Ct 5.427 and 5.92,
12 as well as the directions of Form FL-300. To request fees and costs, Item 5 of Form FL-300 must be
13 checked. In addition, counsel should submit a Request for Attorney’s Fees and Costs Attachment
14 (Judicial Council Form FL-319) (or a declaration that addresses the factors in that form) and a
15 Supporting Declaration for Attorney’s Fees and Costs Attachment (Judicial Council Form FL-158)
16 (or a declaration that addresses the factors in that form), along with a current Income and Expense
17 Declaration (Judicial Council Form FL-150). These declarations must provide the court with
18 sufficient information about the nature and difficulty of the case, the skill and experience required
19 and possessed by counsel, the time required, why the requested fees and costs are just, necessary,
20 and reasonable, and any other pertinent factors. See Cal Rules of Ct 5.427(b); Marriage of Cueva
21 (1978) 86 CA3d 290, 296. The requesting party must include an Income and Expense Declaration
22 (Judicial Council Form FL-150) as part of an application for fees (Cal Rules of Ct 5.92, 5.427), and
23 ensure that it lists the information required in that form regarding attorney fees and costs. Cal Rules
24 of Ct 5.427(b).
25 Local Family Rule 4 (Attorney’s Fees and Costs), Part A (Fee Requests) provides, “When a
26 party has requested attorney’s fees (either pendente lite or after judgment), both parties shall file a
27 current Income and Expense Declaration with attached paystubs, which shall be served along with
28
5
O-18
Case Number
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1 the Application, Request for Order, or Responsive Declaration requesting fees.” Part B provides that
2 a written fee declaration shall be provided for requests over $1,000, and sets out the details thereof.
3 I. Should the Court award Petitioner fees, it must consider my

ability to pay in the manner awarded.
4 In the absence of current financial information, the Court would not be able to determine
5 whether I could actually pay any fee award in the manner awarded.
6 In Marriage of Schulze, a pendente lite fee award to wife was reversed as an abuse of
7 discretion because, among other things, the court failed to consider husband's ability to pay at the
8 rate ordered; Marriage of Schulze (1997) 60 Cal. App. 4th 519, 531-532, 70 CR2d 488, 496-497.
9 J. The Court must base any spousal support decision on the

standard of living that was established during the marriage.
10 The Court must make findings as to the standard of living that was established during the
11 marriage, as that is a critical component in a permanent spousal support order.
12 The Court must base any spousal support decision on the standard of living that was
13 established during the marriage. [FC §4330(a).] The Court must make specific factual findings about
14 the standard of living during the marriage. [FC §4332.] (See In re Marriage of Smith (1990) 225
15 Cal.App.3d 469, 491-493, 274 Cal. Rptr. 911; In re Marriage of Rosen (2002) 105 Cal.App.4th 808,
16 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 1). In ordering spousal support, the trial court must consider "[t]he needs of each
17 party based on the standard of living established during the marriage." (Fam. Code § 4320(d).)
18 K. The DissoMaster program cannot be used in calculating long-
term spousal support.
19 While the court may use a computer program or guideline to calculate a temporary spousal
20 support amount pending trial in the matter, the DissoMaster cannot be used in calculating permanent
21 support. (In re Marriage of Olson (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1, Permanent spousal support order based
22 on DissoMaster reversed for failure to consider all 4320 factors.) The spousal support component of
23 a permanent family support order must be based on the statutory factors enumerated in section 4320
24 of the Family Code, not pegged to a number generated by a computer program intended for use in
25 calculating temporary support. In re Marriage of Schulze (1997) 60 Cal. App. 4th 519, 70 Cal. Rptr.
26 2d 488.
27 In that this case is now post-judgment, it would not be proper to employ the DissoMaster
28 program in calculating long-term spousal support.

6
O-19
Case Number
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1 L. An impermissible retroactive spousal support order must be
avoided.
2 In modifying a spousal support order because either spouse is unemployed, the Court must
3 make the order retroactive to the later of (1) the date the moving papers were served or (2) the date
4 of unemployment, unless it finds and states on the record good cause for not making the order
5 retroactive. [FC §3653(b).]
6 Here, the date of unemployment is October 8, 2012. The moving papers were served
7 November 13, 2012.
8 M. Any imputation of income to me would require findings that it

is in the children's best interest.
9 Should the trial court impute income to me, it must find that imputing earning capacity to me
10 would be in the children's best interest. (In re Marriage of Ficke (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 10 [held it
11 was an abuse of discretion for the judge to impute income to a custodial parent without a finding, supported
12 by substantial evidence, that such an imputation was in the best interest of the children.]). Certainly, the use
13 of outdated financial information, would foil that effort.
14 No authority permits a court to impute earning capacity to a parent unless doing so is in the
15 best interest of the children. By explicit statutory direction, the court's determination of earning
16 capacity must be "consistent with the best interest of the children." Fam. Code § 4058, subd. (b); In
17 re the Marriage of David R. & Iris M. Fraser Cheriton, (2001) 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 755.
18 Moreover, “it is counterintuitive – often counterproductive – to impute income to a custodial parent,
19 because the objective effect of such an imputation will be to reduce the money otherwise available for the
20 support of any minor children.” In re Marriage of Ficke (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 10.
21 N. The burden of proof regarding my opportunity to work is upon

Petitioner
22 I explicitly stated on the record that I was not pursuing my motion for a modification of
23 support. Further, the Court and Petitioner acknowledged that Petitioner assumed my motion:
26 MR. FRAZIER: ... I'm a little confused I'm not pursuing that motion at this time.
27 ....
28
7
O-20
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
1 THE COURT: ... this is a request that [to Petitioner] you wish to proceed with,
2 because [to Respondent] you don’t want to, [to Petitioner] you don’t think it’s appropriate to
3 continue with the current support orders because of the evidence you wish to present and the
4 argument for imputation of income.
5 MS. LEDGERWOOD: Correct. And it would be an exercise I can do, but waste of
6 time of the parties for me to file a separate motion just to keep it going. I’m just utilizing
7 what’s already there.
9 Thus, Petitioner is the party seeking a change to the status quo. "If one parent seeks to
10 modify an existing order so as to have income imputed to the other parent, the parent seeking
11 imputation - that is, in that context, the parent seeking to overturn the status quo - bears the burden
12 of proof of showing that the other parent has the ability and opportunity to earn that imputed income.
13 [Citations.]" (In re Marriage of Bardzik (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1291, 1294.) As can be seen,
14 Petitioner is the moving party, not me. Accordingly, the burden should be on Petitioner to prove an
15 opportunity to work. Petitioner has failed to carry such burden, so there should be no imputation to
16 me. In re Marriage of Wittgrove (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1317, 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 489 [no imputation
17 at OSC where parent seeking order imputing income based on earning capacity failed to present any
18 competent evidence other parent had ability or opportunity to earn imputed income].)
19 O. I submitted evidence relevant to my opportunity to work
Regarding a lack opportunity to work, I testified under oath, in part:
20
MR. FRAZIER: ... there are only so many jobs that I've found that come open, you
21
know, each week or each month that are $225,000 a year jobs for people that are Bio Tech
22
patent attorneys within commuting range from where my daughters live. And so there were
23
more jobs open early on when I was first looking than there have been recently. So, I, I'm just
24
not seeing the jobs so [ ] much anymore to apply to.
25
So, the opportunities that Ms. Ledgerwood just provided, if they're anything like the
26
evidence she attached to, to her request to have income imputed to me in her last request she
27
filed, they didn't show, they didn't show the technical background of the person. I'm Bio
28
8 O-21
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
1 Tech. A lot of them that did state the technical background of computer science or
2 engineering. That's not me. A lot of them were for very junior people that weren't for me, you
3 know, when I looked through them. Most of them don't state the salary range. And a lot of
4 them were just too terse to tell really what they were about.
5 ... They were just off point. So I didn't see them really showing opportunity.
6 As well, further proving a lack of opportunity to work, Petitioner’s counsel and her
7 vocational expert were unable to provide relevant job advertisements despite their combined efforts.
8 III. KATHLEEN FRAZIER AND MS. LEDGERWOOD LIED TO THE

COURT AND THERE IS EVIDENCE PROVING FALSENESS
9 Included among Ms Ledgerwood’s lies1 are:
10 A. Kathleen knowingly and purposefully understated her income

1. Lie
11 Kathleen’s “Income from airplane rental” was “$0” for 2011-2013 (Pet’r Tr. Brief, p. 3). It is
12 noted, as well, that Kathleen’s income and expense declarations, albeit outdated, have not shown any
13 income from the airplane since she started this litigation.
14 2. The Truth
Kathleen consistently received one half of the income from the airplane rental. This is
15
evidenced by the operating agreement of Looking Up LLC (Kathleen being a 50% member),
16
Exhibit A, and Kathleen’s 2011 income tax return which shows her reporting 50% of the income
17
(Exhibit B). The income from the airplane rental was $17,939 in 2011, and $41,220 in 2012 (Pet’r
18
Tr. Brief, p. 3).
19
3. Lie
20 “When Kathy first filed for divorce in January 2011, she had absolutely no income...” (Pet’r
21 Tr. Brief, p. 7).
22 4. The Truth
Kathleen’s 2011 income tax return (Exhibit B) shows her reporting 50% of the income from
23
the airplane rental business, Looking Up LLC.
24
25
26
1
Penal Code 118 makes it a crime to commit perjury and Penal Code 127 makes it a crime to suborn perjury.
27
28
O-22
9
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
1 5. Lie
“A comparison of Jeff and Kathy's respective incomes from 2009 to present clearly reveals
2
Kathy has had no income both prior to the parties' separation and during the majority of this
3
dissolution proceeding.” (Pet’r Tr. Brief, p. 8).
4
6. The Truth
5 By agreement (Exhibit A), Kathy has shared equally, every year, in the income from
6 Looking Up LLC (airplane rental) since the business began in 2004.
7 7. Lie
“He [Jeff] currently earns substantial additional income from ... renting his airplane.” (Pet’r
8
Tr. Brief, p. 8) (emphasis added).
9
8. The Truth
10 It was not only Jeff’s airplane. The airplane was owned by Looking Up LLC. Kathleen was a
11 50% member of the LLC, along with Jeff. So, via the LLC, Kathleen owned 50% of the airplane.
12 B. Kathleen falsely inflated my use of her accounting expert
1. Lie
13 “Jeff agreed to pay Mr. Peth for time Jeff used to further understand Mr. Peth’s accounting”
14 (Pet’r Tr. Brief, p. 5).
15 2. The Truth
There was no such agreement. I was invoiced by Mr. Peth for an amount corresponding to
16
the agreed-upon time together, and I paid the amount of the invoice. If I had agreed to more, why
17
didn’t Mr. Peth invoice me for it?
18
C. Having no grounds, Kathleen invented reasons why the Court
19 should sanction me
1. Lie
20 “Kathy did not know why they would continue litigating [reimbursement claims] if he was
21 already in agreement, but still he forced the issue to hearing, which was a complete waste of the
22 Court's and the parties' respective time and resources.” (Pet’r Tr. Brief, p. 12)
23 2. The Truth
At least twice, I emailed Kathy (as Kathy said she wanted to work directly with me [Exhibit
24
C]) asking her to cancel or continue the August 1, 2012 hearing because the parties were in
25
agreement. See Exhibit D for my emails to Kathy, of July 16, 2012 and July 30, 2012. Kathy never
26
responded about the agreed-upon reimbursements.
27
3. Lie
28 From Petitioner’s Trial Brief, pp. 12-13:
10
O-23
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
1 “3b... Jeff proceeded to confuse Judge Mills as to the current status of the sale,
2 causing Judge Mills to believe that the parties had already selected a listing agent. Ms.
3 Ledgerwood was therefore required to send additional e-mails to Judge Mills in an effort to
4 rectify this problem...
5 c. Following Judge Mills' order, Jeff proceeded to make matters even worse by telling
6 the Kavanaughs to include additional terms into the proposed listing agreement that were not
7 part of any court orders and claiming that they were in accordance with Judge Mills' previous
8 e-mails to the parties. The Kavanaughs became very confused and contacted Ms.
10 d. Between May 2nd and May 3rd alone, Ms. Ledgerwood had to send numerous
11 separate e-mails to Judge Mills, Jeff, and the Kavanaughs simply to clarify the explicit orders
12 from the court orders and to advise that no additional terms were to be added to the listing
13 agreement. It was only after Ms. Ledgerwood requested an additional Settlement Officer
14 Conference with Judge Mills that Jeff finally agreed to sign the listing agreement in the
15 judge's presence. Over 16 emails, telephone calls to coordinate the SOC, telephone calls
16 with the agent, preparation for the SOC, and the SOC appearance all occurred because Jeff
17 created an issue for his own benefit, one that did not exist, and resulted in wasting the Court's
18 and Kathy's respective time and resources (Exhibit E).”
19 4. The Truth
I never told the Kavanaughs to put any additional language into any listing agreement.
20
See the attached email from Ginny Kavanaugh to Nedda Ledgerwood stating that the “+$1”
21
term did not come from me and that she, Ginny, would not be comfortable not disclosing such a
22
term. (Exhibit E). See also the attached email from Ginny Kavanaugh to me wherein Ms.
23
Kavanaugh states that I did not tell her to insert any terms into the listing agreement (Exhibit F). In
24
fact, before Petitioner filed her Trial Brief, I told Ms. Ledgerwood, directly and in person, that I did
25
not say these things she was attributing to me. Continuing with her lie, or at least exhibiting a
26
reckless disregard for the truth, she sought sanctions anyway.
27
28
11
O-24
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
1 5. Lie
“Jeff told Kathy he was going to remove her from his health insurance because she had called
2
the police to protect her against Jeff during an event where she feared for her safety.” (Pet’r Tr.
3
Brief, p. 11).
4
6. The Truth
5 I never told Kathy I was going to drop her from my insurance.
6 7. Lie
“Kathy later found out that Jeff accessed, without Kathy's agreement, her email account ...
7
without her knowledge or consent.” (Pet’r Tr. Brief, p. 14).
8
8. The Truth
9 As stated in my declaration in this matter dated February 11, 2011 (Exhibit G):
10 “17. ... In truth, she invited me to read her email at any time (after I happened upon a flirtatious
11 email with a male friend relating sexual information about me) as she claimed she had nothing to
12 hide. Further, we willingly provided access to one another's email and calendars this past spring and
13 summer, when Petitioner assisted me with consulting work.”
14 It is also true that Kathleen and her attorney accessed my iPad without my agreement, and
15 without my knowledge or consent.

16 D. Contrary to Kathleen’s false assertion, my past support
payments have been a model of timeliness and regularity
17 1. Lie
“Jeff’s payments towards Kathy's spousal support were very irregular and varied greatly
18
from month to month.” (Pet’r Tr. Brief, p. 7) (Emphasis added).
19
2. The Truth
20 The attached print-out shows support payments sent automatically from my Wells Fargo
21 checking account to Kathleen from 9/1/11 to 12/3/12 (Exhibit H). As can readily be seen, for the
22 amounts and the time period complained of by counsel for Petitioner, the payments are extremely
23 regular and change in dollar amount only once by stipulation.

24 IV. CONCLUSION
There are numerous substantive and procedural errors with Petitioner’s Trial Brief that are
25
fatal to her requests.
26
27
28
12
O-25
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
1 Further, Petitioner and her counsel committed fraud upon the Court by making numerous
2 false statements in their Trial Brief. A trial court has inherent power to set aside a judgment
3 obtained through fraud committed upon the other party or the court, and its right to do so is not
4 derived from section 473 of the Code of Civil Procedure. (Aldrich v. Aldrich, 203 Cal. 433, 264 P.
5 754; Rhea v. Millsap, 68 Cal.App.2d 449, 156 P.2d 941.) Further, the Court should strike
6 Petitioner's Trial Brief with prejudice as a sanction. (Per the courts' "equitable power derived from
7 the historic power of equity courts" and "supervisory or administrative powers which all courts
8 possess to enable them to carry out their duties." Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. v. Superior Court,
9 200 Cal. App. 3d 272, 287 (1988) (internal quotations omitted). The latter powers, in particular,
10 enable a court to "control litigation before it, to prevent abuse of its process, and to create a remedy
11 for a wrong even in the absence of specific statutory authority." Western Steel & Ship Repair, Inc. v.
12 RMI, Inc., 176 Cal. App. 3d 1108, 1116-17 (1986).

13
15
16 Dated: April 14, 2014

ef ery D. Frazier
17 Respondent in Pro Per
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
O-26
13 Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
FL-300
ATTORNEY OR PARTY WITHOUTATTORNEY (Name, State Bar number, and address): FOR COURT USE ONLY
Natalie T. Daprile 161347

Daprile Bell Family Law Off ice . ~~ ., -~~)
1224 Lincoln Avenue
. i . :- .
San Jose, CA 95125 --'-- l_)
TELEPHONE NO.: ( 4 0 8 ) 918 - 0 9 2 0 FAX NO. (Optional) · ( 4 0 8 ) 918 - 0 9 2 5
E-MAILAOORESS(Optional):
ATTORNEYFOR(Name): Res ondent JEFFERY FRAZIER
sTREET ADDREss: 605 W. El Camino Real, Sunnyvale , CA
MA1uNGADDREss: 191 N. First Street
c1TYANoz1PcooE:San Jose, CA 95113
BRANCHNAME: Famil Law
PETITIONER/PLAINTIFF:KATHLEEN FRAZIER
RESPONDENT/DEFENDANT: JEFFERY FRAZIER
OTHER PARENT/PARTY:
CASE NUMBER:
REQUEST FOR ORDER 0 MODIFICATION D Temporary Emergency
6-11 - FL 005500
D Child Custody D Visitation Court Order
D Child Support D Spousal Support W Other (specify):
of 8 / 16/13 court o rders per CC
D Attorney Fees and Costs Reconsideration
1. TO (name): KATHLEEN FRAZIER and her a ttorney o f rec o r d o f 8/16/ 1 3 p er c c P 4 7 3 (b).

2. A hearing on this Request for Order will be held as follows: If child custody or visitation is an issue in this proceeding, Family
Code section 3170 i;equires mediation before or at the same time as the hearing (see item 7.)
I a. Date: \0 ~ \3 Time: ui · Vl)t1rl) D Dept.: i {}_ D Room :

b. Address of ce>ur\ D same as noted above D other (specify):
3. Attachments to be served with this Request for Order:

a. A blank Responsive Declaration (form FL-320) c. D Completed Financial Statement (Simplified) (form
b. W Completed Income and Expense Declaration (form FL-155) and a blank Financial Statement (Simplified)
FL-150) and a blank Income and Expense d. W Points and authorities
12. D;glaratiOJ!J..... e. D Other (sper.i·~~:---:
Date: v · Z,7 · l /
NATALIE T DAPRILE
(TYPEOR PRINT NAME)
4. 0 YOU ARE ORDERED TO APPEAR IN COURT AT THE DATE AND TIME LISTED IN ITEM 2 TO GIVE ANY LEGAL
5. D Time for D service D hearing is shortened. Service must be on or before (date):
6. Any responsive declaration must be served on or before (date):
7. The parties are ordered to attend mandatory custody services as follows:
8. D You are ordered to comply with the Temporary Emergency Court Orders (form FL-305) attached.
9. D Other (specify):
Date:
JUDICIAL OFFICER
To the person who received this Request for Order: If you wish to respond to this Request for Order, you must file a
Responsive Declaration to Request for Order (form FL-320) and serve a copy on the other parties at least nine court days
before the hearing date unless the court has ordered a shorter period of time. You do not have to pay a filing fee to file the
Responsive Declaration to Request for Order (form FL-320) or any other declaration including an Income and Expense
Declaration (form FL-150) or Financial Statement (Simplified) (form FL-155).
Page 1 of 4
REQUEST FOR ORDER , . .,_;. / ~ "' ''' ., " .) /
.... ' ~ "---'P-1
: :- Family Code, §§ 2045, 2107, 6224,
6226, 632()..8326, 638()..8383
Government Code,§ 26826
www.courts.ca. gov
Case Number
F raz i er , J effery
J.. ,. --6-11-FL-005500
f
FL-300
PETITIONER/PLAINTIFF: KATHLEEN FRAZIER CASE NUMBER:
~RESPONDENT/DEFENDANT: JEFFERY FRAZIER 6-11 - FL 005500
OTHER PARENT/PARTY: -. r - •..
. '--·
... _,, I
REQUEST FOR ORDER AND SUPPORTING DECLARATION l

CJ Petitioner IX) Respondent CJ Other Parent/Party requests the following orders: - ·- - .~
1. D CHILD CUSTODY D To be ordered pending the hearing .. .,

a. Child's name and age b. Legal custody to (name of person who c. Physical custody to (name of
makes decisions about health. education , etc.) ·person with whom child will live)
d. D As requested in form D Child Custody and Visitation Application Attachment (form FL-311)
D Request for Child Abduction Prevention Orders (form FL-312)
D Children's Holiday Schedule Attachment (form FL-341(C))
D Additional Provisions- Physical Custody Attachment (form FL-341(D))
D Joint Legal Custody Attachment (form FL-341(E))
D Other (Attachment 1d)
e. D Modify existing order
2. CJ CHILD VISITATION (PARENTING TIME) D To be ordered pending the hearing

a. As requested in : (1) CJ Attachment 2a (2) D Child Custody and Visitation Application Attachment (form FL-311)
(3) D Other (specify):
b. D Modify existing order
c. D One or more domestic violence restraining/protective orders are now in effect. (Attach a copy of the orders if you
have one.) The orders are from the following court or courts (specify county and state):
(1) CJ Criminal: County/state: (3) CJJuvenile: County/state:
(2) 0Family: County/state: (4) CJOther: County/state:
3. D CHILD SUPPORT (An earnings assignment order may be issued.)
a. Child's name and age b. D I request support based on the c. Monthly amount requested (if not by guideline)
child support guidelines $
d. D Modify existing order

Notice : The court is required to order child support based on the income of both parents. It normally continues until the
child is 18. You must supply the court with information about your finances by filing an Income and Expense Declaration
(form FL-150) or a Financial Statement (Simplified) (form FL-155). Otherwise, the child support order will be based on
information about your income that the court receives from other sources, including the other parent.
FL-300 (Rev. July 1, 2012) REQUEST FOR ORDER Page 2 of 4
P-2
Frazier, Jeffery
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
FL-300
PETITIONER/PLAINTIFF: KATHLEEN FRAZIER CASE NUMBER:
- RESPONDENT/DEFENDANT: JEFFERY FRAZIER 6-11 - FL 005500
OTHER PARENT/PARTY:
4. 0 SPOUSAL OR PARTNER SUPPORT (An earnings assignment order may be issued.)

a. DAmount requested (monthly): $ c. D
Modify existing order
b. D Terminate existing order (1) filed on (date):
(1) filed on (date): (2) ordering (specify):
d. D The Spousal or Partner Support Declaration Attachment (form FL-157) is attached (for modification of spousal or
partner support after judgment only)
e. An Income and Expense Declaration (form FL-150) must be attached
5. DATIORNEY FEES AND COSTS are requested on Request for Attorney Fees and Costs Order Attachment (form FL-319) or a
declaration that addresses the factors covered in that form. An Income and Expense Declaration (form FL-150) must be
attached. A Supporting Declaration for Attorney Fees and Costs Order Attachment (form FL-158) or a declaration that
addresses the factors covered in that form must also be attached.
6. D PROPERTY RESTRAINT D To be ordered pending the hearing

a. The D petitioner D respondent D claimant is restrained from transferring, encumbering, hypothecating,
concealing, or in any way disposing of any property, real or personal, whether community, quasi-community, or
separate, except in the usual course of business or for the necessities of life.
D The applicant will be notified at least five business days before any proposed extraordinary expenditures,
and an accounting of such will be made to the court.
b. D Both parties are restrained and enjoined from cashing , borrowing against, canceling , transferring, disposing of, or
changing the beneficiaries of any insurance or other coverage, including life, health, automobile, and disability,
held for the benefit of the parties or their minor children.
c. D Neither party may incur any debts or liabilities for which the other may be held responsible , other than in the
ordinary course of business or for the necessities of life.
7. D PROPERTY CONTROL D To be ordered pending the hearing

a. D The petitioner D respondent is given the exclusive temporary use, possession, and control of the following
property that we own or are buying (specify):
b. D The petitioner D respondent is ordered to make the following payments on liens and encumbrances coming
due while the order is in effect:
Debt Amount of payment
8. IXI OTHER RELIEF (specify):

Please See Attachment 8 to Request for Order.
NOTE: To obtain domestic violence restraining orders, you must use the forms Request for Order
(Domestic Violence Prevention) (form DV-100), Temporary Restraining Order (Domestic Violence) (form
DV-110), and Notice of Court Hearing (Domestic Violence) (form DV-109).
FL-300 !Rev. July 1, 201 2) REQUEST FOR ORDER Page 3 of4
~ ~sENfiAffoRMs;;
P-3
Fra z ier, Jeffery
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
FL-300
PETITIONER/PLAINTIFF:
OTHER PARENT/PARTY:
KATHLEEN FRAZIER
JEFFERY FRAZIER I"" '"""'"'
6-11-FL 005500
-------- - -
9. O I request that time for service of the Request tor Order and accompanying papers be shortened so that these documents may
be served no less than (specify number): days before the time set for the hearing. I need to have this
order shortening time because of the facts specified in item 10 or the attached declaration.
10. IX) FACTS IN SUPPORT of orders requested and change of circumstances for any modification are (specify):
IX) Contained in the attached declaration. (You may use Attached Declaration (form MC-031) for this purpose.
The attached declaration must not exceed 10 pages in length unless permission to file a longer declaration has been
obtained from the court.)
I declare under penalty of perjury under the Jaws or the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.
Date:
,TEfFERY FRAZ TER

(TYPE OR PAINT NAME)
Request s for Accommodations

Assislive listening systems. computer-assisted real-time captioning, or sign language interpreter services are available if
you ask at least five days before the proceeding . Contact the clerk's office or go to www.courts.ca.gov/forms for
Request for Accommodations by Persons With Disabilities and Response (form MC-410). (Civil Code,§ 54 .8.)
Fl ·300 {Rev. July I , 2012) REQUEST FOR ORDER Pogo 4 of 4

P-4
Fra z ier, Jeffer y
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
ATTACHMENT TO REQUEST FOR ORDER
I, JEFFREY FRAZIER, declare as follows:

I am the Respondent in the above-referenced case. I have personal knowledge of the facts contained
herein. If called to testify, I could and would testify competently to these facts, and hereby submit this
Declaration in support of my Request for Order for Reconsideration or in the alternative set aside of the
(1) Findings and Order Re Attorneys Fees and Costs filed August 16, 2013; and (2) Order re:
Respondent's Request for Modification of Child Support and Temporary Spousal Support.
THERE ARE NEW FACTS AND EVIDENCE NOT CONSIDERED BY THE COURT
WHICH WOULD MAKE A MATERIAL DIFFERENCE AND LEAD TO DIFFERENT
ORDERS. FURTHER, I AM NOT A FAMILY LAW ATTORNEY AND I MADE MISTAKES
AND IF THE COURT DOESN'T RECONSIDER THE ORDERS THEN I REQUEST THEY
BE SET ASIDE BASED ON MY MISTAKES.
1. At the time of trial, the following facts and evidence now available were not considered, but will
make a material difference and result in different orders:
a) The court did not have my current income. I mistakenly did not file an updated Income and
Expense Declaration.
b) The court did not have any documents that accurately reflected my actual consulting income
earned. I now have my Profit and Loss Statements to show actual earnings.
c) My 2012 tax returns show the sharp decrease in income that I experienced when I lost my job and
began consulting full time, which was not available at the time .ofthe June 17, 2013 hearing.
d) At the end of the hearing the court ordered me to provide all documentation regarding my income
to opposing counsel and I did so, but it was not provided to the court and thus the court could not
make orders based on this new evidence.
e) I believe that the court based its order for Family Code 271 Sanctions largely on my alleged non-
compliance with the EEO even thought the Order did not state a reason, but I did not know at the
time that I had to include all of the efforts made to grow my consulting business. Moreover, the
1
Marriage of Frazier
Case No. 6- l l-FL-00550.0
Respondent' s Declaration in Support of Request for Order for Reconsideration of 08/16/2013 Court OrdersP-5
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
court did not have the proper evidence of the long-standing nature of Petitioner' s sanctionable
conduct.
f) The court stated the orders were in part based on the assumption I would get 50% of $1 ,000.000
from the sale of the family residence. I got $287,789.
g) The court indicated it relied on rental income I have from the family residence, but it has been
sold and I no longer have it.
h) The court indicated it relied on rental income I had for the use of my Cessna airplane, but it was
sold to pay my own living expenses due to the decline in my income.
RELEVANT FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
2. Petitioner and I married on April 8, 1995 and separated after more than 15 years of marriage. We
have two daughters together, Kalista (DOB 02/05/2002) and Lauren (DOB 7/29/2005). We had a
contentious custody case wherein I spent over $150,000 to prove myself a fit father and to disprove
the malicious lies and misrepresentations that Petitioner made against me through a series of
attorneys that she retained. I ultimately prevailed, but only after limited time with my daughters and
the excruciating and financially draining litigated custody processes which resulted in a 50/50
schedule, as I had proposed at the beginning of litigation.
3. On August 22, 2012, I filed a request to modify child and spousal support, since I discovered that
Petitioner had obtained a well paying job at 25 hours per week and because my timeshare with the
children had increased after the extended evaluation process finally concluded. We entered into a
Stipulation and Order that decreased the amount of support I paid to Petitioner.
4. I was laid off from my job at Kateeva in October 2012 and when I was unable to find other work I
began to work on a consulting basis making less money than my previous salary, and spent equal
efforts building the consulting practice but also looking for another W-2 job. I thereafter discovered
that Petitioner had obtained full time employment earning approximately $103,000 annually. I filed
another motion for modification of child and spousal support on November 13, 2012. This Motion
was eventually set for hearing along side the issue of attorney's fees and costs for June 17, 2013.
2
Case No. 6-l l -FL-005500
Respondent's Declaration in Support of Request for Order for Reconsideration of08/16/2013 Court OrdersP-6
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
5. On August 16, 2013, the court issued orders for support and attorney's fees that came as a shock to
me, because they are based on assumptions that do not account for new facts and evidence that
materially affect the financial orders issued. Orders for child and spousal support were based on an
imputation of income to me at my old salary of $225,000 as evidenced by the last Income and
Expense Declaration that was filed on November 13, 2012. I have profit and loss statements and
spreadsheets from my consulting income that show that I am earning far less than I was during the
last four years of our marriage. Moreover, the court relied on only the last four years of income to
determine whether I should be imputed at my former salary and never considered whether these years
were characteristic of my overall earnings. I was ordered on June 17, 2013 to provide these financial
documents to Petitioner's attorney, and I provided everything I had available at the time. The court,
however, never had the ability to consider these highly relevant documents before issuing orders.
These financial documents will reveal the many inaccuracies in the expert testimony provided by
Cheryl Faden. Last, the judge relied on the anticipated amount of profit that I was to receive from the
sale of the family residence, but this amount ended up being far less than expected; instead of
receiving 50% of $1 million, I only received $287,879, which I have used for the purchase of a new
home. It was assumed that I would have approximately half a million dollars available liquidity with
which to pay attorney's fees and costs, but this is not the case. Lastly, the court ordered imputation
of income and attorney's fees to be paid in part by relying on the assumption that I would continue to
have extra income from the rental unit attached to the family residence and from rents received for
use of my Cessna private airplane. Since the time of trial, both assets have been sold. Since the time
of the trial, facts have come to light that seriously call into question the accuracy of my financial
situation as presented by Petitioner and her counsel.
Ill

3
Marriage of Frazier
Case No. 6-l l -FL-005500 P-7
Respondent' s Declaration in Support of Request for Order for Reconsideration of 08/16/2013 Court Orders
P-7
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
ADDITIONAL FACTS AND EVIDENCE THAT WAS NOT CONSIDERED OR AVAILABLE AT
THE TIME OF TRIAL WILL DEMONSTRATE THAT I SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN IMPUTED
WITH $225,000 ANNUAL INCOME FOR SUPPORT PURPOSES AND THAT I CANNOT AFFORD
TO PAY $105,000 IN ATTORNEY'S FEES.
6. I am seeking reconsideration of the Court' s ruling that I be imputed with $225,000 annual income
and reconsideration of the $105,000 in fees that I have been ordered to pay to Petitioner. The
following new facts and evidence are directly relevant to the orders issued:
a) The Court relied on an Income and Expense Declaration filed on November 13, 2012, but I
now have my current Profit and Loss Statements and a new Income and Expense
Declaration: At the time of trial on June 17, 2013, the only Income and Expense Declaration
that was on file for me was from November 13, 2012, right after I was laid off from Kateeva.
Petitioner relied on my former salary to argue that I should be imputed with the same, but the
court never received evidence to the contrary because I mistakenly failed to file a current Income
and Expense Declaration. Thus, the court was never able to properly consider my actual earnings
from my consulting business. My current Income and Expense Declaration along with a current
Profit and Loss Statement, is filed herewith, and shows that my consulting income from
September 2012 through August 2013 is $31,954. Likewise, my 2012 draft tax return, which was
also unavailable at the time of trial, demonstrates the decrease in my actual earnings. In the three
months that worked as a consultant, I only made a profit of$10,239 in 2012. Attached hereto is a
copy of my 2012 draft tax return as Exhibit A. The court stated in its ruling that it relied only on
evidence presented by Petitioner, as no rebuttal evidence was presented, despite ordering that I
provide current income documentation to Petitioner's attorney, which I did. However, in order to
ensure a fair and just ruling under the law, the court needs to consider this new evidence and
weight it in light of all the facts and circumstances.
b) My Social Security Statement of Earnings demonstrates that my earnings for the last five
years of our marriage were uncharacteristically high: Petitioner presented evidence by and

4
Marriage of Frazier
Case No. 6-l l-FL-005500 P-8
Respondent's Declaration in Support of Request for Order for Reconsideration of 08/ 16/2013 Court Orders
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
through Cheryl Foden regarding my ability and opportunity to earn based on my employment
history, but the court did not have the opportunity to consider my actual historical earnings. First
of all, Ms. Foden's report was filled with inaccuracies, as I summarized in my Trial Brief. For
example, I never earned a base salary of $345,000, and I was not continuously employed
throughout our marriage. What's more, Petitioner's attorney failed to move Ms. Foden's report
into evidence, so it cannot be properly considered. At the time of trial, my actual historical
earnings were not presented as rebuttal evidence against Ms. Foden's testimony. However, I now
have a copy of my historical earnings, which show that over the course of 30 years, I never
earned over $200,000 for 20 of them. Attached hereto is a copy of my Social Security Earnings
Statement as Exhibit B. My actual historical earnings should have been considered, as the court
relies heavily on Ms. Foden's testimony regarding the last five years of my gross earnings.
c) The court did not have an opportunity to consider the efforts I made to expand my
consulting business when I was operating under the Employment Efforts Order: When I
submitted to the Employment Efforts Order, Petitioner's attorney told me that she "didn't care if I
searched for three jobs per week." Thus, while I was under the EEO and compiling my seek
work logs to comport with what Petitioner's attorney had told me to do, I did not know at the time
that I was supposed to report the efforts I was making to expand my consulting business. During
the time that I was subject to the EEO, I made the following efforts with respect to my consulting
business: I initiated a Yodel internet campaign and followed numerous leads, as shown by the
leads attached as Exhibit C; submitted several proposals for more consulting work, and example
of which is attached hereto as Exhibit D; I engaged in numerous networking events, telephone
conferences, client meetings, for which detailed EEO tracking spreadsheets are attached as
Exhibit E. These efforts were never presented to the court as evidence of my compliance with
the EEO, which directly impacted the court's decision to impute me with my former base salary
for support purposes. I mistakenly did not include this information at the time because I did not
know I was supposed to do so.
d) I am in the process of purchasing a house for which I may have to liquidate my retirement
5
Case No. 6-11-FL-005500
Respondent's Declaration in Support of Request for Order for Reconsideration of08/ 16/2013 Court OrdersP-9
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
account, and I used the $287,879 I received from the sale of our family residence, so I do not
have access to the liquidity the court assumed I would have when it ordered imputation of
income and attorney's fees paid: The court relied on the assumption that I was to receive 50%
of $1,000.000 from the sale of the family residence when the court ordered me imputed with
income and ordered that I pay attorney's fees out of the sale proceeds of the family residence. I
only received $287,879. Attached hereto are copies of the closing documents for the family
residence demonstrating the amount I received as Exhibit F. Additionally, I am in the process of
purchasing a home, and I have used $250,000 of the proceeds from the family residence as a
down payment on a modest home with a purchase price of $875,000. I am borrowing the
difference. Thus, I do not have access to nearly $1 million in liquidity as the court assumed when
it ordered me to pay fees out of the sale proceeds of the family residence when I was ordered to
be imputed with $225,000 annual income for support.
e) The court relied on evidence of my other assets in determining whether to impute me with
income and order fees that I no longer own: The court mentions other assets that were
considered when deciding to impute me with $225,000 in income for support and need based
fees; namely, the court referenced evidence of income I received in the past from the rental unit at
the family residence and the Cessna private plane. The home is sold and I will have no more
rental income. My new home is simple and does not have a rental unit. Furthermore, I had also
sold the aircraft as my income has been down for almost a year and I needed the sales proceeds,
as I went through almost all of my liquid money fighting for custody of my two children. The
court assumed that I would continue to have access to assets that have since been sold when
determining whether to impute me with income and when my need and ability to pay fees was
analyzed. This new evidence, however, demonstrates that the assumption I could rely on these
sources was incorrect.
7. Due to the new facts and evidence presented herein, I request that this court stay orders for child
and spousal support and attorney's fees pending reconsideration of the orders made on August 16,
2013, and issue new orders consistent with this new evidence.

6
Marriage of Frazier
Case No. 6-l l-FL-005500
P-10
Respondent' s Declaration in Support of Request for Order for Reconsideration of08/16/2013 Court Orders
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
8. I have timely filed this motion for the court to reconsider its orders and make appropriate orders
given my earnings are $31 ,954 and guideline child and spousal support should be $1 ,646 payable
to me! However, in the event the court declines my request for a reconsideration of the two
orders then I seek to have them set aside on the basis of my mistake, excusable neglect, surprise,
or inadvertence under Cal. Code Civ. Pro. §473(b).
SIGNATURE ON JUDICIAL COUNCIL FORM

7
Marriage of Frazier
Case No. 6-l l -FL-005500
P-11
Respondent's Declaration in Support of Request for Order for Reconsideration of08/16/2013 Court Orders
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
'
DAPRILE • BELL
2 FAMILY LAW OFFICES ,:: ;'
I -L--
r~-~ I)
3 San Jose, California 95125 '). I'. 0
Telephone: (408) 918-0920 c..· 4
4 Attorneys for Respondent - • ~ '.... .J .... ~
- ........ ..:
JEFFERY FRAZIER
5
9
Case No.: 6-l 1-FL-005500
In re the Marriage of:
10
Petitioner: KATHLEEN FRAZIER MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
11 AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION FOR TWO
12 ORDERS ENTERED AUGUST 16, 2003 AND
And ALTERNATIVELY A SET ASIDE OF THE
13 TWO ORDERS PURSUANT TO CAL CODE
CIV PRO §473(bl
14
15 APJ: Zayner
Dept: 82
16
17
18
I. RELEVANT FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
19
Petitioner and Respondent married on April 8, 1995 and separated after more than 15 years
20
of marriage. The parties have two daughters together, Kalista (DOB 02/05/2002) and Lauren (DOB
21
7/29/2005). On August 22, 2012, Respondent filed a request to modify child and spousal support,
22 since he discovered that Petitioner had obtained a well paying job at 25 hours per week and because
23 his timeshare with the children had increased. The parties entered into a Stipulation and Order that
24 decreased the amount of support paid to Petitioner.
25 Respondent was laid off from his job at Kateeva in October 2012 and he began to work on a
26 consulting basis making a fraction of his prior income. Around the same time, Petitioner had
Marriage of Frazier PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT NO. Page 1 of7
27
P-12 .
Daprile• Bell Case No: 6-11-FL-005500 L/J-
/''
I 3 0..;
I • '.-./I
J.>''~ /l((r,'!{ .·: ._)
.·:/·(.:. __ _
1224 Lincoln Ave.
San Jose, CA 95125 Points and Authorities in Support of Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration and Set ..a-i'#(/. c_f
(408) 91s.o920
Aside Case Number
. '
1
obtained full time employment earning approximately $103,000 annually. Respondent filed another
2 motion for modification of child and spousal support on November 13, 2012. This Motion was
3 eventually set for hearing along side the issue of attorney's fees and costs for June 17, 2013.
4 On August 16, 2013, the court issued orders for support and attorney's fees pursuant to
5 which Respondent was imputed with his former base salary of $225,000 annually for purposes of
6 support and was ordered to pay a total of $105,000 in attorney's fees to Petitioner. The orders were
7 served by mail on August 19, 2013 and received by Petitioner approximately August 23, 2013 and
8 despite not having the financial resources, he immediately borrowed the money to re-hire Ms.
Daprile, as the orders were based on misinformation, wrong information and Respondent willingly
9
admits to making many mistakes that led to the court not having the information necessary to make
10
accurate orders. There is new evidence, as set forth in the declaration filed herewith, and there are
11
also many mistakes. Either way, the orders must be stayed pending the court's determination of this
12
motion.
13
14
II. LEGAL ARGUMENT
15
16 A. Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration is Timely and Appropriate under Code of

Civil Procedure§ 1008(a)
17 Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration is timely pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure§
18 1008(a) as it has been filed within ten days of service of the written notice of entry of the court
19 order. The California Code of Civil Procedure § 1008(a) states:
20 (a) When an application for an order has been made to a judge, or to a court, and
refused in whole or in part, or granted, or granted conditionally, or on terms, any
21 party affected by the order may, within 10 days after service upon the party of
written notice of entry of the order and based upon new or different facts,
22 circumstances, or law, make application to the same judge or court that made the
order, to reconsider the matter and modify, amend, or revoke the prior order. The
23
party making the application shall state by affidavit what application was made
24 before, when and to what judge, what order or decisions were made, and what
new or different facts, circumstances, or law are claimed to be shown.
25
27
Marriage of Frazier
Case No: 6-l l-FL-005500
P-13 Page 2 of7
Daprile • Bell
1224 Lincoln Ave. Case Number
5411 Jose, CA 9S 125 Points and Authorities in Support of Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration and Set
(408) 918-0920
Aside
6-11-FL-005500
1 Here, the court order was filed and served on August 19, 2013 and the notice of entry of
2 order was also provided on August 19, 2013. Since Respondent is submitting his Motion for
3 Reconsideration prior to the August 29, 2013 deadline, his motion is timely.
4
5
B. The Court should Reconsider the Order for Modification of Child and Spousal
6 Support and Attorney Fees Pursuant to Family Code §§2030, 2032, and 271 Due
to New Facts that Have Come to Light.
7 As argued more fully in Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration, Orders for child and
8 spousal support were based on income to Respondent at his former salary of $225,000. This was
9 based on the Income and Expense Declaration that was filed on November 13, 2012. The court
10 never had the opportunity to consider Respondent's current profit and loss statements and
11 spreadsheets from his consulting income that show that he is earning far less than he was during the
12 last four years of the marriage. His 2012 draft tax return, unavailable at the time of trial,
demonstrates the decline in actual earnings. At the end of the hearing it was apparent this
13
information was needed and the court ordered him to provide it to Petitioner's counsel, but it was not
14
provided to the Court.
15
Moreover, the court relied in part on the last four years of income but never considered
16
whether these years were characteristic of Respondent's overall earnings. The facts are that
17
Respondent had one good job that provided stock due to the company buyout and three of those
18
years were reflective of the stock sales that did not occur prior and have not occurred since. These
19
amounts were anomalies The court was provided with only a skewed sense of his income and not a
20 true average. Since that time Respondent has gathered his Social Security summary information and
21 can now show the new evidence that his income history was not as Cheryl Foden and Petitioner's
22 counsel represented to the court.
23 Further, the Court relied on the anticipated amount of profit that the parties were to receive
24 from the sale of the family residence. The court indicated it was somewhere close to 50% of
25 $1,000,000 but instead Respondent only received $287,879, which Respondent has since used for
the purchase of a new home.

27
Daprile • Bell
Marriage of Frazier
Case No: 6-11-FL-005500
P-14 Page 3 of7

San Jose. CA 95125 Points and Authorities in Support of Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration and Set
(408) 918-0920
Aside 6-11-FL-005500
Lastly, the court ordered imputation of income and attorney's fees to be paid in part by
2
relying on the assumption that Respondent would continue to have extra income from the rental unit
3 attached to the family residence and from rents received for use of his Cessna private airplane. Since
4 the time of trial, both assets have been sold.
5 These new facts and evidence seriously call into question the accuracy of Respondent's
6 financial situation as presented by Petitioner and her counsel, on which the court relied almost
7 entirely in issuing its orders.
8
c. The Court's Order regarding Payment of Child and Spousal Support and
9 Attorney Fees under Family Code §§ 2030, 2032 and 271 Should be Stayed Until
There is a Final Determination of Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration.
10
Respondent should not be required to pay child and spousal support or attorney's fees
11
consistent with the August 16, 2013 court orders until his Motion for Reconsideration has been
12 decided and in the event it is not granted, then upon hearing for his motion to set aside the orders
13 based on mistake, as clearly mistakes were made. Respondent needs an opportunity to show the
14 court his profit and loss (which did not exist at the time of the hearing), his 2012 tax return (which
15 did not exist at the time of the hearing), and the social security summary of earnings that he has since
16 obtained to show the court was misrepresented as to his historical earnings.
17 The court considered Respondent's ability to pay attorney's fees to Petitioner and his alleged
failure. to comply with the EEO in issuing attorney's fees and costs and sanctions, and made several
18
assumptions about his earning capacity and his income from other assets. However, Respondent has
19
new evidence to demonstrate that he did not receive the amount anticipated from the sale of the
20
family residence, and that he does not have access to the level of liquidity that the court anticipated,
21
and that he does not have rental income from either the family residence or the plane. When the
22
court made determinations about need-based fees, it relied on circumstances that have since changed
23
and assumed income from assets that are no longer available.
24
Additionally, the court considered Respondent's alleged lack of compliance with the EEO
25 when determining Sanctions pursuant to Family Code Section 271, but Respondent can present new
26 evidence that he only tracked the efforts to look for outside positions and did not know that he was
Marriage of Frazier Page 4 of7
Daprile• Bell Case No: 6-11-FL-005500
1224 Lincoln Ave.
San Jose. CA 95125
(408) 918-0920
P-15
Points and Authorities in Support of Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration and Set
Aside Case Number
1
to have tracked the extensive efforts he made to build his consulting business. The court did not
2 have the evidence. It is possible Respondent erred in not knowing what to put down on his sheet -
3 but the bottom line is that the court made a finding based on incomplete and not factual evidence and
4 that the new evidence would lead to a different conclusion.
5 D. In the Alternative, The Orders Issued by the Court on August 16, 2013, should
6 be Set Aside due to Mistake, Inadvertence, Surprise, or Excusable Neglect under
7 Cal. Code Civ. Pro. §473(b).
8 The California Code of Civil Procedure §473(b) states "The court may, upon any terms as
may be just, relieve a party or his or her legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or
9
other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
10
excusable neglect.... " There is a strong public policy in favor of granting relief under CCP §473.
11
Marriage ofStevenot (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 1051 (emphasis added).
12
In the present case, Respondent failed to file a new Income and Expense Declaration causing
13
the court to inadvertently rely on outdated information supplied 7 months before the time of trial.
14
That Income and Expense Declaration did not present an accurate picture of Respondent's current
15 income, and should not have been relied upon. While Respondent did provide evidence of each
16 consulting check and expense to Petitioner, he mistakenly assumed that was sufficient. However, the
17 court did not have this information. He made a mistake in not presenting it.
18 Respondent made a mistake in not providing evidence to refute the inaccurate income history
19 presented by Petitioner. Respondent has been unemployed for almost one year and did not realize
20 the court would rely on limited period of years where he made stock in one company. He has never
had earning years like those in the past and they have not occurred since. Respondent can now show
21
his social security income summary and the court can see his true earning capacity. This is new
22
evidence or it was a mistake not to provide it, but either way the court must ~nsider the true
23
evidence.
24
Additionally, Respondent made a mistake in relying on Petitioner's attorneys' word that she
25
didn't care how many jobs he applied to each month; she stated that as long as he was making an
26
Marriage of Frazier Page 5 of7
Daprile• BcU
27
Case No: 6-l l-FL-005500 P-16
1224 Lincoln Ave.
San Jose. CA 95125 Case Number and Set
Points and Authorities in Support of Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration
(408) 91 B-0920
Aside 6-11-FL-005500
effort, it could be three per week. Respondent did not understand that he should have also kept
2 detailed logs of his efforts to build his consulting business and that these efforts would serve to
3 satisfy the EEO. Respondent is now going back in time and studying his email and calendar and will
4 be able to establish he was working very hard to build his consulting practice and increase his
5 income. His failure to do so prior to the hearing was a mistake (but one which happens to many
6 people at EEO hearings).
7 The Respondent received approximately 50% less than the court anticipated from the sale of
8 the house and a 100% less than the court anticipated from the rental income from the family
residence and the rents from the aircraft. Had Respondent known that the court would rely on
9
outdated income information and what he was expected to obtain from the sale of the family
10
residence and his assets that he had at the time, Respondent would have presented evidence to
11
demonstrate that the court was misguided in its assumptions. These facts clearly call for a motion
12
for reconsideration but in the alternative clearly a mistake was made that needs to be rectified.
13
The new facts and evidence presented in Respondent's Motion for reconsideration strikes at
14
the very heart of the considerations made by this court when determining to impute respondent with
15 his former salary and when assessing need and ability to pay and Sanctions for attorney's fees.
16 Since these matters are now directly back in controversy in front of this court, it is proper to stay the
17 August 16, 2013 court orders until a determination regarding Respondent's Motion for
18 Reconsideration is made. In the alternative, the Order Re Respondent's Request for Modification of
19 Child Support and Temporary Spousal Support filed August 16, 2013 and the Findings and Order Re
20 Attorney's Fees and Costs filed August 16, 2013 shall be set aside pursuant to Cal. Code Civ. Pro.
21 §473(b).
22
23
24
Ill
25
27 Marriage of Frazier P-17 Page 6 of7

Daprile • Bell Case No: 6-11-FL-005500
San Jose. CA 95125 Points and Authorities in Support of Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration and Set
(408) 918-0920
Aside
6-11-FL-005500
. .
Whether it is reconsidered or set aside, the two August 16, 2013 Orders should be stayed so
2 that the Court can hear the true facts and evidence. Staying the orders simply preserves the status
3 quo until the matter can be heard. There is no prejudice to Petitioner, as she is flush with the
4 substantial monies from the sale of the family residence and, unlike Respondent, is gainfully
5 employed full time. Respondent simply seeks justice under the law.
10
I1
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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Marriage of Frazier P-18 Page 7 of7
Daprile • Bell Case No: 6-11-FL-005500 Case Number
1224 Lincoln Ave.
Sa.n Jose, CA 95125 Points and Authorities in Support of Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration and Set
6-11-FL-005500
(408) 918-0920
Aside
Q-1
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
Q-2
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
239 Sequoia Avenue
2 Redwood City, California 94061
Tele_P,hone: (650) 275-2112 I: "".)
3 Email: [email protected] ~ ,)
4
7
9 In re the Marriage of: Case No.: 6-ll-FL-005500

10 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO
Petitioner: KATHLEEN KOSTAS FRAZIER SET ASIDE UNDER CCP § 473(b);
11 POINTS AND AUTHORITIES;
and DECLARATION
12
Respondent: JEFFERY FRAZIER Date: April 17. 2014
13 Dept. /Time: Dept. 82 at 9:00 a.m.
14
TO EACH PARTY AND TO THE COUNSEL OF RECORD FOR EACH PARTY:
15
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED THAT at the above-captioned date and time and
16
department in the courthouse located at 605 W El Camino Real, Sunnyvale, CA 94086, California,
17
that Respondent will move the court for an order requesting that the (1) Findings and Order Re
18 Attorney's Fees and Costs; and (2) Order re: Respondent's Request for Modification of Child
19 Support and Temporary Spousal Support, each filed on August 16, 2013 in this action, be set aside.
20 This motion is made on the grounds of inadvertence, surprise, mistake, and/or excusable neglect
21 (CCP §473(b)).
22 This motion will be based upon this notice, the attached points and authorities and declaration
23 of Jeffery Frazier, the records and files in this action, and on evidence that may be presented at the
24 hearing of the motion.
Dated: February 12, 2014
25
26
27 ~ Jeffery D. Frazier
Respondent, In Pro Per
28
NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO SET ASIDE UNDER CCP § 473{b); POINTS AND AUTHORITIES;
DECLARATION - 1 PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT NO.
R-1
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
1
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Set Aside
2 I. BACKGROUND
3 Petitioner and Respondent married on April 8, 1995 and separated after more than 15 years of
4 marriage. The parties have two daughters together, Kalista (age 12) and Lauren (age 8).
5 On August 22, 2012, Respondent filed a request to modify child and spousal support, since he
6 discovered that Petitioner had obtained a well-paying job at 25 hours per week and because his
7 timeshare with the children had increased. The parties entered into a Stipulation and Order that
8 decreased the amount of support paid to Petitioner.
9 On October 8, 2012, the day Respondent was laid off from his job at Kateeva, Inc., Petitioner
10 obtained full time employment earning well over $100,000 a year. While looking for a new full-time
11 job, Respondent attempted to do consulting work, but was only able to make a small fraction of his
12 prior income. In light of Petitioner's full-time job, Respondent filed another motion for modification
13 of child and spousal support on November 13, 2012. This motion was eventually set for hearing
14 alongside the issue of attorney's fees and costs for June 17, 2013.
15 On August 16, 2013, the court issued orders for support and attorney's fees. For purposes of
16 support, Respondent's former base salary of $225,000 annually was imputed to continue regardless o
17 the fact that he had been laid off. Respondent was ordered to pay $105,000 in attorney's fees to
18 Petitioner. The orders were served by mail on August 19, 2013.
19 On August 29, 2013, Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of and, in the alternative,
20 to set aside the August 16 orders. This motion was denied at the hearing on October 3, 2013.
21 Following the August 16 orders, on October 31, 2013, Petitioner filed a motion demanding
22 Respondent cash out a substantial portion of his retirement funds and, in addition, several weeks
23 later, on January 8, 2014, she filed a contempt motion against him in attempt to force payment and
24 have Respondent incarcerated. Respondent, however, is unable to pay, being nearly broke,
25
considering bankruptcy, and struggling to provide for himself and his two girls.
26
Exacerbating all of the above, is the fact that Respondent has been suffering from chronic and
acute effects of mental illnesses, detailed in Section II, below.
27
28
NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO SET ASIDE UNDER CCP § 473(b); POINTS AND AUTHORITIES;
DECLARATION - 2 R-2
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
1
Respondent reminds the Court, that it is in this context that he has acted as his own attorney
2
throughout the proceedings pertinent to this motion.
3 II. LEGAL ARGUMENT
4
The Court Should Set Aside These Adverse Orders Based on Mistake, Inadvertence,
Surprise, and/or Excusable Neglect under Code Civ. Proc.§ 473(b)
5
A. Respondent's Motion to Set Aside is Timely and Appropriate Under Code Civ. Proc.
§473(b).
6
Respondent's Motion to Set Aside is timely pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure§ 473(b) as it
7
has been filed within six months of service of the written notice of entry of the court orders.
8
California Code of Civil Procedure§ 473(b) states:
9
Application for this relief shall ... be made within a reasonable time, in no case exceeding six
10 months, after the judgment, dismissal, order, or proceeding was taken.
11 Here, the court orders were filed on August 16 and served on August 19, 2013 and the notice of
12 entry of order was also provided on August 19, 2013. Since Respondent is submitting his Motion to
13 Set Aside by the February 19, 2014 deadline, the motion is timely.
14 B. Grounds for Relief is Provided in Code Civ. Proc. § 473, Favoring a Hearing on the
15
Merits.
Code Civ. Proc. § 473, subdivision (b), provides that the trial court may relieve a party from a
16
judgment "taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
17
neglect." This provision "applies to any 'judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceedings."' (Zamora
18
v. Clayborn Contracting Group, Inc. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 249, 254.) This is a remedial measure to be
19
liberally construed, and any doubts existing as to the propriety of setting aside a default thereunder
20
will be resolved in favor of a hearing on the merits (Berman v. Klassman ( 1971) 17 Cal. App. 3d 900,
21
910, 95 Cal. Rptr. 417).
22
C. The Court Will Set Aside a Default upon a Very Slight Showing.
23
In Kesselman v. Kesselman (1963) 212 Cal.App.2d 196, the appellate court noted: "'The rules of
24
practice applicable to divorce actions differ in many respects from those which govern other actions.
25
In an action for divorce, upon very slight showing the court will set aside a default, if application for
26
relief be made in due time."' (Id at p. 207.)
27
28
DECLARATION - 3 R-3
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
1
D. "Excusable neglect" May Be the Result of a Disability.
2 "Excusable neglect" may be the result of a disability. The court may infer the existence of mental
3 confusion or illness from the whole record before it. (In re Marriage of Kerry (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d
4 456, 465-466; Kesselman v. Kesselman (1963) 212 Cal.App.2d 196, 207-208; see also, Judge L.
5 McMaster "Making and Opposing Motions to Set Aside a Default - Part 2 (Mistake, Surprise,
6 Inadvertence, and Excusable Neglect)." Sacramento Lawyer Nov./Dec. 2009: 8-9. Web. 17 Feb.
7 2014.)
8 E. Depression Meets the Definition of Disability under Antidiscrimination Laws.
9 "Numerous cases under state and federal law have held that depression and its related
10 manifestations can meet the definition of disability under antidiscrimination laws. (citations)" Auburn
11 Woods I Homeowners Association v. Fair Employment and Housing Commission (2004) 18
12 Cal.Rptr.3d 669, 679, 121 Cal. App. 4th 1578.
13 F. The Law Protects Manifestations of an Invisible Disability as Part and Parcel of the
Disability.
14
The law provides protection for those with invisible disabilities. In Gambini v. Total Renal Care
15
Inc., 486 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2007), for example, an employee with bi-polar disorder was discharged
16
after she cursed, shouted, and threw papers at her supervisors during a meeting about her
17
performance. Reversing a verdict in favor of the employer, the court held the jury should have been
18
instructed: "Conduct resulting from the disability.. .is part of the disability and not a separate basis for
19
termination." The Court wrote that it was "reasonable [to] infer that [Gambini's] 'violent
20
outburst' ... was a consequence of her bipolar disorder, which the law protects as part and parcel of
21
her disability ... if the law fails to protect the manifestations of her disability, there is no real
22
protection in the law because it would protect the disabled in name only."
23
G. Medical Testimony Is Not Required For Granting Relief Under Code Civ. Proc. § 473.
24
When defaults are caused by illness, the courts have not required medical testimony to establish
25
the nature or gravity of the illness before granting relief under§ 473. (See Contreras v. Blue Cross o
26
California (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 945, 951 [excusable neglect shown when counsel declared that a
27
fractured arm impaired "her mobility and writing ability"]; Robinson v. Varela (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d
28
611, 616 [excusable neglect in failing to file an answer shown by "the press of business at defense
NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO SET ASIDE UNDER CCP § 473(b); POINTS AND AUTHORITIES·
DECLARATION - 4 PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT NO. I
R-4
Case Number
1
counsel's office arising from the [unspecified] illness of the chief trial attorney, the limited office
2
hours during Christmas week, and defense counsel's preoccupation with other litigated matters"]; an
3 Arnke v. Lazzari Fuel Co. ( 1962) 202 Cal.App.2d 278, 279-282 [excusable neglect in failing to
4 answer a complaint when counsel declared that he "'has been ill and under the care of a
5 physician"'].)
6 H. The Current Orders Fail to Account for Respondent's Disabilities.
7 Respondent has suffered from chronic depression and attention deficit disorder from well before
8 this litigation to this day. Petitioner has been aware of Respondent's disabilities since early in their
9 relationship and, in fact, has earlier notified the Court that he does have conditions ("his social
10 anxiety" - Petitioner's Declaration of 2/4/11; "Respondent has his own Adderol prescription ... " -
11 Petitioner's Declaration of 1/20/2011). Petitioner's statements were again brought to the Court's
12 attention in Respondent's Motion to Seal of May 20, 2013.
13 Respondent was especially symptomatic during 2013, such that major life activities were
14 substantially limited (especially working). The orders, on the other hand, state that Respondent was
15 underemployed "of his own volition." To the contrary, disabilities were the reason for Respondent's
16 underemployment.
17 Work on the litigation suffered due to Respondent's disabilities. For example, the Court states in
18 its August 16 orders that Respondent failed to provide evidence of lack of opportunity to work. This
19 failure, as well, was caused by Respondent's disabilities, as a lack of sufficient time, coupled with
20 difficulty thinking and concentrating, hampered his ability to gain a correct understanding of where
21 the burden of proof properly lied with regard to opportunity to work. In other words, his disabilities
22 caused a mistake of law. Similarly, Respondent's disabilities caused his failure to submit an updated
23 Income and Expense Declaration.
24 Respondent is now in financial ruins and facing incarceration because his disabilities were not
25 considered by the Court. Disturbingly, and in other words, he is facing incarceration because his
26 disabilities severely impaired his ability to work productively. A cascade of failures followed from
27 his inability to work productively, including: (i) inability to secure a substantial amount of paying
28 work; (ii) inability to efficiently complete the small amount of paying work he actually acquired; (iii)
DECLARATION - 5
R-5
I
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
1
failure to obtain evidence he could have gotten to show he complied with the work efforts order to
2
the extent possible; (iv) the combination of (i), (ii), and (iii), above, leading the Court to the
3 conclusion that Respondent was purposefully underemployed; and, (v) work on the divorce-related
4 litigation itself, including: (a) failing to file an updated income and expense declaration; and, (b)
5 mistakenly believing the burden was on Petitioner to prove opportunity to work vs. on Respondent to
6 prove lack of opportunity.
7 It is against the interest of society that a person would certainly be financially ruined and perhaps
8 incarcerated due to their disabilities. The trial judge has a "duty to see that a miscarriage of justice
9 does not occur through inadvertence." Lombardi v. Citizens Nat. Trust & Sav. Bank ( 1951) 13 7 Cal
10 App.2d 206, 209, [289 P .2d 8231].
11 I. Upon Appreciating That Disabling Depression and ADD Caused His Failure to Act,
Respondent Diligently Undertook This Motion.
12
Depression and ADD can disable and, here, did so during a critical period relevant to the orders at
13
issue (during 2013, e.g., throughout the MSC activities and Trial Brief activities in the spring of
14
2013, on through the June 17, 2013 hearing, and on throughout the summer of2013). During these
15
times, Respondent's productivity was abnormally low due to exacerbated chronic depression and
16
ADD. Thus, despite realizing that he should update and file his income and expense declaration by
17
May 20, 2013, the date the Trial Briefs were due -he was not able to get it done. Despite believing
18
that he had gained an accurate understanding of the law regarding the burden of proof re imputation
19
of income, he was apparently mistaken. As described in section H above, a plethora of mistakes wer
20
made.
21
Respondent did not have the wherewithal during the relevant period to appreciate his subpar
22
performance. Despite working diligently, he crune up substantially short on time. In the fog of
23
depression, he just did not put two and two together that depression and ADD were causing him to
24
work so uncharacteristically slow. (See, e.g., "Half ofMDD Patients Are Unaware of Their Own
25
Depression." Kantar Health News. Kantar Health, 18 Oct. 2012. Web. 18 Feb. 2014.) Respondent's
26
awareness was raised much later, e.g., in the winter of2013/2014, once he learned of and becrune
27
affiliated with the organization Equal Access Advocates (EAA)
28
(http://www.equalaccessadvocates.com/). At that time, he earned a certification in ADA advocacy
DECLARATION - 6
R-6
Case Number
1
(for which he received CLE credit) from EAA. Upon appreciating the root cause of his mistakes, he
2
diligently began work on and filed the present motion.
3 J. By Setting Aside the Orders, the Severe Prejudice Suffered By Respondent Could Be
4
Rectified.
The orders at issue in this motion have been negatively influenced by Respondent's disabilities.
5
However, the orders fail to account for them. Accordingly, Respondent has been prejudiced. For
6
example, had Respondent's functional limitations in working been considered (2-4 hours/day), it is
7
probable that he would not have been imputed with his full former salary ($225,000/year) from the
8
day after he was laid off. That, in turn, would likely have had an impact on other aspects of the
9
orders (e.g., back support, on-going support, fees, and sanctions). Respondent seeks a fair
10
opportunity to have the full picture considered - something which has not happened to date due to
11
Respondent's mistake, inadvertence, surprise, and/or excusable neglect.
12
Accordingly, for the aforementioned reasons, Respondent requests set aside of the (1) Findings
13
and Order Re Attorney's Fees and Costs; and (2) Order re: Respondent's Request for Modification of
14
Child Support and Temporary Spousal Support, each filed on August 16, 2013 in this action.
15
An updated Income and Expense Declaration accompanies this motion. Additionally, a
16
Declaration (of Jeffery Frazier) providing evidence of lack of opportunity to work accompanies this
17
motion.
18
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is
19
true and correct.
20
21
22 Dated: February 19, 2014
23
24
25
Defendant, In Pro Per
26
27
28
DECLARATION - 7 . R-7 I
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
1 DECLARATION
2 I, Jeffery D. Frazier, declare:

3
1. I am the Respondent in this case. I have personal knowledge of the facts I state below, and if
4
I were to be called as a witness, I could competently testify about what I have written in this
5
declaration.
6
2. I hereby submit this declaration in support of my request that the (1) Findings and Order Re
7
Attorney's Fees and Costs (Exh. A); and (2) Order re: Respondent's Request for
8
Modification of Child Support and Temporary Spousal Support (Exh. B), each filed on
9
August 16, 2013 in this action, be set aside.
10
3. A recently updated Income and Expense Declaration accompanies this motion (Exh. C).
11
4. A Declaration (of Jeffery Frazier) providing evidence of lack of opportunity to work
12
accompanies this motion (Exh. D).
13
14
I Have Hidden Disabilities - Chronic Depression and Adult Attention Deficit Disorder
15
5. I have hidden disabilities, particularly mental disabilities which impair my ability to function
16
in the above-referenced litigation, in working, and in looking for work.
17
6. Since well before this litigation began in January 2011, I have been diagnosed by my regular
18
psychiatrist, David L. Smith, M.D., with chronic depression (dysthymic disorder) and
19 attention deficit disorder (ADD).
20
Dysthymia and ADD Interfere With Normal Functioning and Performance
21
22 7. Next, is a true and correct copy of the Mayo Clinic's description of dysthymia from their
23 website:
24 Dysthymia (dis-THIE-me-uh) is a mild but long-term (chronic) form of depression.
25 Symptoms usually last for at least two years, and often for much longer than that.
Dysthymia interferes with your ability to function and enjoy life.
26
With dysthymia, you may lose interest in normal daily activities, feel hopeless, lack
27
productivity, and have low self-esteem and an overall feeling of inadequacy. People
28
NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO SET ASIDE UNDER CCP § 473(b}; POINTS AND AUTHORITIES;
DECLARATION - 8 R-8
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
1 with dysthymia are often thought of as being overly critical, constantly complaining
2 and incapable of having fun. (Emphasis added)

Mayo Clinic. Mayo Foundation for Medical Education and Research, n.d. Web. 11Feb.2014.
3
4
8. Next, is a true and correct copy of the Mayo Clinic's description of Adult ADD from their
5 website:
6 Adult attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) is a mental health condition
7 exhibited by difficulty maintaining attention, as well as hyperactivity and impulsive
8 behavior. Adult ADHD symptoms can lead to a number of problems, including
9
unstable relationships, poor work or school performance, and low self-esteem.
(Emphasis added)
10
Mayo Clinic. Mayo Foundation for Medical Education and Research, n.d. Web. 11Feb.2014.
11
12 9. The research literature further demonstrates how these conditions interfere with one's ability
13 to function, thereby reducing their work productivity; e.g.
14 • British Medical Journal (2008, May 28). People With ADHD Do One Month's Less
15 Work Per Vear, Study Finds. ScienceDaily. Retrieved December 26, 2013, from
16 http://www.sciencedaily.com- /releases/2008/05/080527125324.htm (Exh. E)
17 • Adler DA, Mclaughlin TJ, Rogers WH, Chang H, Lapitsky L, and Lerner D. (2006). Job
18 performance deficits due to depression. Am J Psychiatry.
19 doi:l0.1176/appi.ajp.163.9.1569 (Exh. F)
20 10. Throughout 2013, and into 2014, dysthymia and ADD greatly interfered with my usual work
21 functioning, performance, and productivity.
22
My Hidden Disabilities Have Been Diagnosed and Treated By Specialists
23
24 11. I was first diagnosed by a psychiatrist at the University of Virginia with anxiety and panic
25 disorder in 1983. I have been in treatment most of my life since then, mostly for depression
26 and anxiety disorders.
27
28
DECLARATION - 9 R-9 I
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
1 12. More recently, in addition to regularly seeing Dr. Smith, my psychotherapy includes session
2 with Lisa Post, Ph.D., from Dec. 2011 until March 2012, and currently with Alice Locke
3 Chezar, M.A., MFT, ATR beginning February 28, 2012.
4 13. I have been taking, on a daily basis from well before this litigation, three prescription
5 medications for depression and two prescription medications for attention deficit disorder.
6 As well, every day, I have been taking two prescription medications to counter side effects of
7 one of the depression medications. I have been using various other prescription medications
8 as needed, including medications for anxiety with depression, panic disorder, major
9 depressive disorder, and sleep.

10 14. While I have long been, and continue to be, in treatment, it appears I will have to stop, as I
11 do not have the financial resources to continue.
12
Various Situations Have Worsened My Depression
13
14 15. The children's time with their father has been and is being seriously compromised due to thi
15
litigation. In October 2012, I was laid off from my job for the second time in less than three
years. In February 2013, my good friend and housemate was diagnosed with terminal brain
16
cancer, which has progressively worsened to this day. In May 2013, I was lied about in
17
Petitioner's Trial Brief, and in August 2013, I was sanctioned $30,000 based on those lies. In
18
June 2013, I was forced, against my wishes, to sell my home of almost 12 years, and then to
19
move. In August 2013, a plethora of adversities flowed from the Court's decision to impute
20
my full, previous salary ($225,000/yr.) to me from the day after I was laid off. More
21
recently, I learned that my ex-wife's longtime boyfriend is the very man with whom she was
22
intimate during our marriage, leading me to believe her relationship with him is the reason
23
she broke up our family and separated from me.
24
16. On top of that, I am suffering an extreme financial hardship. Nearly all of my non-liquid
25
savings have been depleted. I owe many people substantial money. For example, my former
26
attorneys, accountant, older daughter's private school (which is threatening to kick her if not
27
paid up soon), and younger daughter's former therapist, to name some. It is not fair that
28
PLAINTIFF’S
NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO SET ASIDE UNDER CCP § 473(b); POINTS EXHIBIT NO.
AND AUTHORITIES;
DECLARATION - 10
R-10
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
1
these entities should have to act as banks, when I would have paid each of them fully once I
2 received my $75,000 from escrow (from sale of the Portola Valley home)- something which
3 never happened since that money was ordered given to an already cash-rich Petitioner.
4 17. I do not have enough savings to pay my 2013 income taxes which I owe.
5
Warning Signs That Indicate Worsening Depression
6
7 18. During this litigation, among the signs indicative of worsening depression, my weight has
8 gone from the low 160's (Aug. 2010) to the upper l 90's (now) (Exh. G- Weight chart from
9 my primary care physician, Dr. John Madej (Portola Valley)). I rarely leave the house, except
10 when I must. I have essentially quit participating in activities I used to greatly enjoy, for
11 example:
12 I have gone from flying every 2 -4 weeks prior to separation, to barely once a year now.
13 I have gone from cycling every couple of days in the year prior to separation, to not even
14 once a month now. The following chart shows data from my cycling GPS:
15
Cycling Summary 2009 2013
16
Count: 165 Activities 10 Activities
17
18 Distance: 5,190.84 mi 159.23 mi
19
Time: 351 :36:02 h:m:s 12:20:41 h:m:s
20
21 Elevation Gain: 401,711 ft. 9,618 ft.

22
23 Functional Limitations Caused By My Hidden Disabilities

24
19. My depression, distraction, and anxiousness have worsened substantially and progressively
25
during this litigation. I told both my psychiatrist and psychotherapist numerous times during
26
2013 that I was feeling depressed, having trouble concentrating and thinking, and I was
27
having a difficult time working and looking for work. In 2013, due to my disabilities, my
28
DECLARATION -11 R-11 I
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
1
ability to do patent-attorney work fell within a range of from about two to about four hours
2 per day. I have had great difficulties getting out and soliciting business.
3 20. Exhibits H and I are true and correct copies of letters that were provided to me by my
4 psychiatrist, David L. Smith, M.D., on January 13 and 24, 2014, respectively. Among other
5 things, these letters set out my illnesses and functional limitations. Exh. J is a true and
6 correct copy of the "About Me" page of Dr. Smith's website I printed at 9:17 p.m. on
7 February 2, 2014.
8 21. Exh. K is a true and correct copy of a letter that was provided to me by my psychotherapist,
9 Alice Locke Chezar, M.A., MFT, ATR, on January IO, 2014. Among other things, this letter
10 sets out my conditions. Notably, she concurs with Dr. Smith.
11
The Current Orders Fail To Account For My Disabilities
12
13 22. I have suffered from chronic depression (dysthymia) and attention deficit disorder (ADD)
14 from well before this litigation to this day. Petitioner has been aware that I have disabilities
15 since early in our relationship and, in fact, has earlier notified the Court that I do have
16 conditions ("his social anxiety" - Petitioner's Declaration of 2/4/11; "Respondent has his
17 own Adderol prescription ... " - Petitioner's Declaration of 1/20/2011 ). Petitioner's
18 statements were again brought to the Court's attention in my Motion to Seal of May 20,
2013.
19
20
23. I was especially symptomatic during 2013, such that major life activities were substantially
21
limited (especially working). The orders, on the other hand, state that I was underemployed
22
of my own volition. To the contrary, disabilities were the reason for my underemployment.
23
24. Work on this litigation suffered due to my disabilities. For example, the Court states in its
24
August 16 orders that I failed to provide evidence of lack of opportunity to work. This
25
failure was caused by my disabilities, as a lack of sufficient time, coupled with difficulty
thinking and concentrating, hampered my ability to gain a correct understanding of where the
26
burden of proof properly lied with regard to opportunity to work. In other words, my
27
disabilities caused a mistake oflaw. Similarly, a lack of sufficient time, coupled with
28
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
1
difficulty thinking and concentrating, caused my failure to submit an updated Income and
2
Expense Declaration.
3 25. I am now in financial ruins and facing incarceration because my disabilities were not
4 considered by the Court. Disturbingly, and in other words, I am facing incarceration because
5 my disabilities severely impaired my ability to work productively. A cascade of failures
6 followed from my inability to work productively, including: (i) inability to secure a
7 substantial amount of paying work; (ii) inability to efficiently complete the small amount of
8 paying work I actually acquired; (iii) failure to obtain evidence I could have gotten to show I
9 complied with the work efforts order to the extent possible; (iv) the combination of (i), (ii),
10 and (iii), above, leading the Court to the conclusion that I was purposefully underemployed;
11 and, (v) work on the divorce-related litigation itself, including: (a) failing to file an updated
12 income and expense declaration; and, (b) mistakenly believing the burden was on Petitioner
13 to prove opportunity to work vs. on me to prove lack of opportunity.
14
Upon Appreciating That Disabling Depression and ADD Caused My Failure to Act, I
15 Diligently Undertook This Motion
16
26. Depression and ADD can disable and, here, did so during a critical period relevant to the
17
orders at issue (during 2013, e.g., throughout the MSC activities and Trial Brief activities in
18
the spring of 2013, on through the June 17, 2013 hearing, and on throughout the summer of
19
2013). During these times, my productivity was abnormally low due to exacerbated chronic
20
depression and ADD. Thus, despite realizing that I should update and file my income and
21
expense declaration by May 20, 2013, the date the Trial Briefs were due - I was not able to
22
get it done. Despite believing that I had gained an accurate understanding of the law
23
regarding the burden of proof re imputation of income, I was apparently mistaken.
24
27. I did not have the wherewithal during the relevant period to appreciate my subpar
25
performance. Despite working diligently, I came up substantially short on time. In the fog o
26
depression, I just did not put two and two together that depression and ADD were causing me
27
to work so uncharacteristically slow. (See, e.g., Exh. L: "Half of MDD Patients Are Unawar
28
of Their Own Depression." Kantar Health News. Kantar Health, 18 Oct. 2012. Web. 18 Feb.
DECLARATION - 13
R-13
Case Number
1
2014.) My awareness was raised much later, e.g., in the winter of 2013/2014, once I learned
2
of and became affiliated with the organization Equal Access Advocates (EAA)
3 (http://www.equalaccessadvocates.com/). At that time, I earned a certification in ADA
4 advocacy (for which I received CLE credit) from EAA. Upon appreciating the root cause of
5 my mistakes, I diligently began work on and filed the present motion.
6 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is
7 true and correct.
8
10 Dated: February 19, 2014

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Pro Per, SBN 157792
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Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
··c,t::··~
.,,,.

DAPRILE e BELL ·
2 FAMILYLAWOFFICES Ef\JOORSED
3
San Jose, California 95125
c11
I
co
l..-L
Telephone: (408) 918-0920

4 ZGl3 Sf P 21 P I: 55
Attorneys for Respondent
5

10

12 Petitioner: KATHLEEN FRAZIER UPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION OF
EFFERY FRAZIER and MEMORANDUM OF
13 and OINTS AND AUTHORITIES AS TO WHY
NDER THE LAW THE ORDERS OF
14 Respondent: JEFFERY FRAZIER UGUST 16, 2013 MUST BE SET ASIDE
15 APJ: The Hon. Theodore Zayner

DEPT: 82
16 DATE: October 3, 2013
·~: 9:00 a.m ..
17
18 ' .
19
TABLE OF CONTENTS
20
21 . .
AND AUTHORITIES AS TO WHY UNDER THE LAW THE ORDERS OF AUGUST 16, 2013
22
MUST BE SET ASIDE ...................................... :.................................................. :............................... i
23 I. INTRODUCTION AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND ...................................................... 1
24 Il. PROPER PROCEDURES WERE NOT FOLLOWED ...................................................... 1
25 · A. Petitioner failed to verify her trial brief; therefore, it should have been stricken................. 2
26 B. The Court erroneously employed the DissoMaster program in calculating long-tenn

spousal support.............................................................................................................................. 2
27
28
1
Daprile. BcD
1224 LincolD Ave. Marriage of Frazier
S-1
Saa Joie, CA 9S125
(40!) 918-0920 Case No. 6-ll-FL-005500 Case Number
Supplemental Declaration of Respondent 6-11-FL-005500
1 C. Petitioner's requests for fees and sanctions were not supported by evidence sworn under
2 penalty of perjury.......................................................................................................................... 3
3 D. The Court made an impermissible retroactive spousal support order.................................. 3

E. The Court erred in failing to base its spousal support decision on the standard of living that
4
was _established during the marriage ............................................................................................ ~ 3
5
F. The Court failed to enforce the Rules of Court requiring current income and expense
6
declarations from the parties .......·.................................................................................................. 4
7 G. The Court failed to consider my ability to pay the fee award as ordered ............................. 5
8 H. Arguments and attachments were presented for the first time in Petitioner's Trial Brief, to
9 which I was given no opportunity to reply................................................................................... 5

I. The Court failed to follow local and state rules on Petitioner's request for fees .................. 7
10
J. The Court erroneously awarded fees, sanctions, and support in the absence of substantial
11
evidence........................................................................................................................................ 7
12 K. Inadequate notice was provided regarding sanctions ........................................................... 8
13 L. The trial court made no findings that imputing income to me would be in the children's
14 best interest........................................................................................................ ~ .......................... 9
15 M. In the absence of evidence, the Court impliedly found I lost my job due to misconduct. 9
N. The Court incorrectly assigned the burden of proof regarding my opportunity to work ...... 9
16
0. The Court erroneously disregarded evidence relevant to my opportunity to work ............ 10
17
Ill. KATHLEEN FRAZIER AND MS. LEDGERWOOD LIED TO THE COURT AND
18 THERE IS EVIDENCE PROVING FALSENESS .................................................................... 11
19 A. Kathleen knowingly and purposefully understated her income .......................................... 11
20 B. Kathleen falsely inflated my use of her accounting expert ................................................. 12
21 C. Having no grounds, Kathleen invented reasons why the Court should sanction me .......... 13
D. Contrary to Kathleen's false assertion, my past support payments have been a model of
22
timeliness and regularity .................................................. :.......................................................... 15
23
IV. THE INFIRMITIES IN PETITIONER'S DECLARATION AND POINTS &
24
ATHORITIES SERVE TO HIGHLIGHT MY STRONG CASE IN FAVOR OF
25 GRANTING MY MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE,
26 MOTION TO SET ASIDE ........................................................................................................... 15
27 A. I have made the requisite showings providing the Court with jurisdiction to grant my
motion for reconsideration.......................................................................................................... 15
28
11
D&prilc • Bell
J224 Lincoln Ave.
San1osc,CA 9S12S
Marriage of Frazier S-2
(408) 918-0920 Case No. 6-11-FL-005500 Case Number
Supplemental Declaration of Respondent
6-11-FL-005500
1 B. Code of Civil Procedure Section 473(b) is a remedial measure to be liberally construed,
2 which favors a hearing on the merits .......................................................................................... 16

C. By way of simultaneous job hunting and consulting, my employment efforts have been
3
reasonable ................................................................................................................................... 17
4
D. I made good faith efforts in purchasing a home after being ordered to sell the family home
5
18
6 v. CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................... 18
7
IO
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iii
Daprile • BcD
1224 Linc:oln Ave. Marriage of Frazier
S-3
Su Jose, CA 9Sl2S
Case No. 6-11-FL-005500 Case Number
(408) 918-0920
1 My name is Jeffrey Frazier and I am the Respondent in this matter. I have personal
2 first hand knowledge of the facts set forth in this Declaration, and if called to testify to those
3
facts, I could and would testify competently thereto. I make this Supplemental Declaration in
4
support of my Motion for Reconsideration of the orders entered on August 17, 2013 and
5
alternative set-aside relief I declare as follows:
6
7
I. INTRODUCTION AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
8 Judgment of dissolution was entered April 17, 2013. There are two minor children, Kalista
9 Frazier, born Feb. 5, 2002, and Lauren Frazier, born July 29, 2005.
10 On May 20, 2013, I filed my Trial Brief, in which I requested section 271 sanctions,
11 prevailing party attorney's fees, reimbursement due to breach of fiduciary duty, recovery of custody
12 evaluation fees and costs, sanctions for accusations of child abuse in a custody proceeding, and
13 sealing of portions of the record. On the same date, Petitioner filed her Trial Brief, requesting
14
15
The Court entered two orders on August 16, 2013: (1) The order "FINDINGS AND ORDER
16 RE ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS" denied all of my requests for sanctions and payments, and
17 to seal the record, and granted Petitioner's requests for attorney fees and sanctions; and, (2) The
18 order "ORDER RE: RESPONDENT'S REQUEST FOR MODIFICATION OF CHILD SUPPORT
19 AND TEMPORARY SPOUSAL SUPPORT" provided for child and spousal support payments by
20 me, increased from a prior stipulation and order wherein no support was paid. It also imputed
21 income to me for purposes of support.
22 On September 6, 2013, I filed a motion to reconsider the August 16, 2013 orders under Code
23 of Civil Procedure section 1008, subdivision (a), or alternatively, to grant relief from the orders
24 under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b). This submission is in support of such
25 motion, and responsive to Petitioner's paper in opposition thereto.
26 PROPERPROCEDURESWERENOTFOLLOWED
II.
27
In its orders of August 16, 2013, the Court did not follow proper procedures.
28
Daprile• BcD
1224 Linc:oln Ave.
SanJosc:.CA 95125
Marriage of Frazier
Case No. 6-11-FL-005500
S-4
(408) 918-0920
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
1 A. Petitioner failed to verify her trial brief; therefore, it should
have been stricken.
2 Family Code (FC) §212 expressly requires all pleadings filed under the Family Code to be
3 verified. "A petition, response, application, opposition, or other pleading filed with the court under
4 this code shall be verified." A verification is an affidavit of the truth of the matter stated. (CCP
5 §446(a).) A verification's object is to assure good faith in the averments or statements of a party to
6 litigation. Star Motor Imports, Inc. v. Superior Court (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 201, 204 151 CR 721,
7 723. Petitioner's Trial Brief was subscribed by her attorney, but not verified as required.
8 All Judicial Council Forms requiring verification contain a preprinted verification for
9 signature. Juridical Council Form FL-300 is adopted for mandatory use and as such contain the
10 preprinted required verification for signature. Contrary to these statutes, Petitioner failed to use a
11 Request for Order form. There was no verification. Lacking a properly verified pleading, the court
12 was without authority to consider it and assess fees and sanctions, nor could it award support.
13 B. The Court erroneously employed the DissoMaster program

in calculating long-term spousal support.
14
15 In its ORDER RE: RESPONDENT'S REQUEST FOR MODIFICATION OF CHILD
16 SUPPORT AND TEMPORARY SPOUSAL SUPPORT, the Court erroneously employed the
17 DissoMaster program in calculating long-term spousal support, as a post-judgment support order by
18 definition cannot be temporary.
19 While ·the court may use a computer program or guideline to calculate a temporary spousal
20 support amount pending trial in the matter, the parties are not allowed to use the D~ssoMaster in
21 calculating permanent support post-judgment. (In re Marriage ofOlson (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1,
22 Permanent spousal support order based on DissoMaster reversed for failure to consider all 4320
23 factors.) The spousal support component of a permanent family support order must be based on the
24 statutory factors enumerated in section 4320 of the Family Code, not pegged to a number generated
25 by a computer program intended for use in calculating temporary support. In re Marriage of
26 Schulze (1997) 60 Cal. App. 4th 519, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 488.
27
. 28 ///
2
Daprile • Bdl
1224 I..hlcoln Ave. Marriage of Frazier
S-5
Sm Jose, CA 95125
1 c. Petitioner's reguests for fees and sanctions were not
supported by evidence sworn uilder penalty of perjury.
2
3 Petitioner provided attorney argument, submitted invoices from her attorney and accountant,
4 and submitted a spreadsheet in support of her request for attorney's fees and sanctions. However,
5 nothing that she provided in or with her Trial Brief was itself sworn under penalty of perjury.
6 1. Fees - The trial court could not impose monetary

liability based on speculation or on opposing counsel's
7 unswom statements.
The absence of sworn evidence "disclosing the nature and extent of counsel's services"
8
hampered the trial court's ability to make fact findings. (In re Marriage of Cueva (1978) 86
9
Cal.App.3d 290, 303, 149 Cal. Rptr. 918.) It could not impose monetary liability based on
lO
speculation or on opposing counsel's unsworn statements. (Jn re Marriage ofReese & Guy (1999) 73
11
Cal. App. 4th 1214, 1222, fn. 5, 87 Cal. Rptr. 2d 339) "Without ascertaining whether or at what
12
hourly rate the work for which reimbursement was sought was actually done, much less that the
13
work was 'reasonably necessary' ... , the trial court could not properly find that imposing" liability
14
for the other spouse's legal fees was appropriate. (In re Marriage ofKeech (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th
15
860, 869, 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 525.)
16
D. The Court made an impermissible retroactive spousal
17 support order.
18
The Court impennissibly made spousal support retroactive to the date of unemployment
19
(October 8, 2012), rather than to the date the moving papers were served (November 13, 2012).
20
In modifying a spousal support order because either spouse is unemployed, the Court must
21
make the order retroactive to the later of (1) the date the moving papers were served or (2) the date
22
of unemployment, unless it finds and states on the record good cause for not making the order
23
retroactive. [FC §3653(b). ] Here, the Court did not make any such finding or statement.
24
E. The Court erred in failing to base its spousal support
25 decision on the standard of living that was established
during the marriage.
26
27 The Court made no findings as to the standard of living that was established during the
28 marriage, and that is a critical component in a permanent spousal support order.

3
Daprile • Bell
1224 Lincoln Ave.
San Jose, CA 95125
Marriage o( Frazier S-6
(408)918-0920 Case No. 6- l l-FL-005500 Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
1 The Court must base its spousal support decision on the standard of living that was
2 . established during the marriage. [FC §4330(a).] The Court must make specific factu~I findings about
3 the standard of living during the marriage. [FC §4332.] (See In re Marriage ofSmith (1990) 225
4 Cal.App.3d 469, 491-493, 274 Cal. Rptr. 911; Jn re Marriage ofRosen (2002) 105 Cal.App.4th SOS,
5 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 1). In ordering spousal support, the trial court must consider "[t]he needs of each
6 party based on the standard of living established during the marriage." (Fam. Code§ 4320(d).) In
7 the present matter, the court did not make any such findings as they related to support whatsoever,
8 instead erroneously relying on a guideline calculation.
9 F. The Court failed to enforce the Rules of Court requiring

current income and expense declarations from the parties.
10
11 The Court did not require the parties to file current income and expense declarations. The
12 Court's failing in this regard prejudiced me. Lacking "complete, accurate and current financial
13 information," in imputing income to me, the Court instead applied largely stale and non-predictive
14 information, resulting in incorrect factual findings and the imposition of substantial fees, sanctions,
15 and support obligations upon me that I do not have the ability to pay and which place an
16 unreasonable financial burden upon me. Had up-to-date information been used, per proper
17 procedure, such hardship upon me would have been clear, and so the imposition of such substantial
18 fees, sanctions, and support obligations could have been avoided.
19 Court rules require that current income and expense declarations be filed when the trial court
20 is awarding ~ttorney fees. Cal. Rules of Ct, rule 5.128 (repealed effective January 1, 2013) requires
21 current income and expense declarations, including attorney fees information, when relevant to
22 issues. A party seeking attorneys' fees, experts' fees, or costs must cc;>mply with Cal. Rules of Ct,
23 rule 5.427 (renumbered from Rule 5.93 effective January 1, 2013) which identifies the process that a
24 party must complete to request or respond to a request for attorney fees and costs, and the court
25 process for making an order with respect to attorney fees and costs. Among the requirements are the
26 submission of current income and expense declarations.
27 Although the language of a Rule of Court phrased in mandatory language is generally
28 binding on the courts, departure from the rule is not reversible error unless prejudice is shown. In re
Daprile • Bc11
1224 Lincoln Ave.
Sm Jose, CA 95125
(408) 918-0920
Marriage of Frazier
Case No. 6-11-FL-005500
S-7
Supplemental Declaration of Respondent Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
1 Marriage ofBurkle (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 387; See, In re Marriage ofTydlaska (2003) 114
2 Cal.App.4th 572 - failure to produce current income and expense declaration meant that he "failed to
3 present an 'evidentiary yardstick' with which the court could determine the appropriateness of a
4 modification order.")
5 G. The Court failed to consider my ability to pay the fee

award as ordered.
6
7 In the absence of current financial information, the Court could not determine whether I
8 could actually pay the fee award in the fashion set out in the Orders.
9 In Marriage ofSchulze, a pendente lite fee award to wife was reversed as an abuse of
1O discretion because, among other things, the court failed to consider husband's ability to pay at the
11 rate ordered; Ma"iage ofSchulze (1997) 60 Cal. App. 4th 519, 531-532, 70 CR2d 488, 496-497.
12 H. Arguments and attachments were presented for the first

time in Petitioner's Trial Brief, to which I was given no
13 opportunity to reply.
14
Numerous arguments and attachments were presented for the first time in Petitioner's Trial
15
Brief. Albeit the parties waived a hearing, I did not waive my right to reply. Speaking about filings
16
beyond the Trial Briefs, Judge Zayner stated: "[I]f ... I would like some further filings, I will advise
17
both sides." [Hearing Tr., 12-13, May 20, 2013] No request for reply briefs came. Thus, I had no
18
forum to present opposition argument and evidence. I was substantially prejudiced. For example, ·the
19
Court adopted Petitioner's stated reasons in her request for sanctions (presented for the first time in
20
her Trial Brief) and sanctioned me ·$30,000, without ever giving me an opportunity to present
21
argument or evidence.
22
The Court's decision not to solicit reply briefs effectively tenninated the receipt of evidence
23
subsequent to the submission of the parties' Trial Briefs and Petitioner's Supplemental Trial Brief,
24
which she had received prior approval to file. So, no further proofs were offered. When the trial
25
court states or the court has clearly intimated that it will not receive evidence, a specific offer of
26
proof is not necessary and would be idle under the circumstances, and it therefore may be claimed
27
28
5
Daprile. Bell
1224 Lincoln Ave. Marriage of Frazier
S-8
San Jose. CA 95125
(408)918-0920 Case No. 6-l l-FL-005500 Case Number
1 that it was error to exclude such evidence. (Caminetti v. Pacific Mut. L. Ins. Co. (1943) 23 Cal.2d 94,
2. 100, 142 P.2d 741.)
3 "Denying a party the right to testify or to offer evidence is reversible per se." In re Marriage
4 of Carlsson (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 281, 291. A trial judge should not determine any issue that is
5 presented for his consideration until he has heard all competent, material, and relevant evidence the
6 parties desire to introduce."' (Elkins v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1337, 1357-1358,
7 quoting Shippey v. Shippey (1943) 58 Cal.App.2d 174, 177.) In Elkins v. Superior Court, the Court
8 emphasized, "'One of the elements of a fair trial is the right to offer relevant and competent evidence
9 on a material issue ... denial of this fundamental right is almost a~ways considered reversible error"'
10 Elkins v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1337, 163 P.3d 160.
11 1. The manner in which the court imposed the sanction

was a violation of due process
. 12
13 I was prevented from presenting evidence to challenge the basis for the sanction award, the
14 reasonableness of the fees and the hourly rates. (See, In re Marriage ofDuris and Urbany (2011)
15 193 Cal.App.4th 510, 515.) "This summary imposition of attorney fees as sanctions is not consistent
16 with due process procedural protections." Id; see also, In re Marriage ofFlaherty (1982) 31 Cal.3d
17 63 7, 652, 183 Cal.Rptr. 508, 646 P.2d 179.
18 "[I]t is basic that counsel must have the opportunity to be heard on the issue before sanctions
19 can be imposed" Brekhus & Williams v. Rhodes (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 788, 793. "In a proceeding
20 to determine whether an attorney's conduct justifies sanctions, there must be a sufficient opportunity
21 to present opposing evidence." In re Marriage ofDuris and Urbany (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 510,
22 514; See, In re Marriage of Quinlan (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1417, 1422. "Summary proceedings are
23 common in family law cases. Nevertheless, however certain a court may be that a party or an
24 attorney in a family law proceeding deserves sanctions, it must keep in mind an immutable principle
25 that cuts across all areas of the law: sanctions may not be summarily imposed. Due process demands
26 more." In re Marriage ofDuris and Urbany (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 510, 511.
27
28
·6
Daprile• Bell
1224 Liucolo Ave. Marriage of Frazier
S-9
San Jose, CA 95125
1 I. The Court failed to follow local and state rules on
Petitioner's reguest for fees.
2
3 The Court did not enforce Cal Rules of Ct 5.427 or 5.92, or Local Family Rule 4.
4 In applying for attorney fees and costs, counsel must follow Cal Rules of Ct 5.427 and 5.92,
5 as well as the directions of Form FL-300. To request fees and costs, Item 5 of Form FL-300 must be
6 checked. In addition, counsel should submit a Request for Attorney's Fees and Costs Attachment
7 (Judicial Council Form FL-319) (or a declaration that addresses the factors in that form) and a
8 Supporting Declaration for Attorney's Fees and Costs Attachment (Judicial Council Form FL-158)
9 (or a declaration that addresses the factors in that form), along with a current Income and Expense
10 Declaration (Judicial Council Form FL-150). These declarations must provide the court with
11 sufficient information about the nature and difficulty of the case, the skill and experience required
12 and possessed by counsel, the time required, why the requested fees and costs are just, necessary,
13 and reasonable, and any other pertinent factors. See Cal Rules of Ct 5.427(b); Marriage of Cueva
14 (1978) 86 CA3d 290, 296. The requesting party must include an Income and Expense Declaration
15 (Judicial Council Form FL-150) as part of an application for fees (Cal Rules of Ct 5.92, 5.427), and
16 ensure that it lists the information required in that form regarding attorney fees and costs. Cal Rules
17 of Ct 5.427(b).
18 Local Family Rule 4 (Attorney's Fees and Costs), Part A (Fee Requests) provides, "When a
19 party has requested attorney's fees (either pendente lite or after judgment), both parties shall file a
20 current Income and Expense Declaration with attached paystubs, which shall be served along with
21 the Application, Request for Order, or Responsive Declaration requesting fees." Part B provides that
22 a written fee declaration shall be provided for requests over $1,000, and sets out the details thereof.
23 J. The Court erroneously awarded fees, sanctions, and

support in the absence of substantial evidence.
24
25 Petitioner's Trial Brief is almost entirely attorney argument. No declarations under penalty of
26 perjury were submitted with it. Petitioner failed to provide substantial evidence for any of her
27 requests.
28
7
Daprile• BcD
S-10
Sm Jose. CA 95125 Case Number
(408) 918-0920 Case No. 6-11-FL-005500
1 Pleadings are allegations, not evidence, and do not suffice to satisfy a party's evidentiary
2 burden. (San Diego Police Officers Assn. v. City ofSan Diego (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1736, 1744.)
3 The Court cannot rely on non-evidence, such as an attorney's unsworn statements (County of
4 Alameda v. Moore (1995) 33 Cal. App. 4th 1422, 1427 [40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 18]).
5 "[S]ubstantial evidence is not just any evidence; it must be believable evidence. "'Substantial
6 evidence' is evidence of ponderable legal significance, evidence that is reasonable, credible and of
7 solid value." Roddenberry v. Roddenberry (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 634, 651. The substantial evidence
8 test requires "more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
9 accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59
10 S.Ct. 206, 217, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938).
11 K. Inadequate notice was provided regarding sanctions.

12
Petitioner did not provide sufficient notice of her claims for section 271 sanctions. While
13
general notice may have been provided that Petitioner would seek sanctions, the specific conduct or
14
amount for which she would seek sancticms was not provided until she actually served the Trial Bri·ef
15
itself. No notice was provided to me prior to the request for the sanctions. Thus, as a matter oflaw,
16
it was improper for the trial court to impose a sanction under Family Code section 271 (In re
17
Marriage ofDavenport (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1507, 1529.)
18
Family Code section 271, subdivision (a), provides for the award of attorney's fees as a
19
sanction. "An award of attorney's fees and costs as a sanction pursuant to this section shall be
20
imposed only after notice to the party against whom the sanction is proposed to be imposed and
21
opportunity for that party to be heard." (Fam. Code,§ 271, subd. (b).)
22
Further, Petitioner's Trial Brief contains both specified and unspecified conduct, which the
23
Court adopted as its reasons for granting sanctions, which unspecified conduct includes: " ... engage
24
in frivolous litigation and arguments with additional costs."
25
Notice "must also advise of the specific grounds and conduct for which the fees or sanctions
26
are sought, and must be directed to the specific person against whom they are sought. [Citation.]" (In
27
re Marriage ofDavenport (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1507, 1529.)
28
8
Daprile. Bell
1224 Lincoln Ave.
Sm Jose, CA 95125
Marriage of Frazier
S-11
1 L. The trial court made no findings that imputing income to
· me would be in the children's best interest.
2
3 The trial court made no express or implied finding that imputing earning capacity to me
4 would be in the children's best interest. Certainly, the use of outdated financial information, as the
5 Court used, would have foiled the effort had the Court tried.
6 No authority permits a court to impute earning capacity to a parent unless doing. so is in the
7 best interest of the children. By explicit statutory direction, the court's determination of earning
8 capacity must be "consistent with the best interest of the children." Fam. Code§ 4058, subd. (b); In
9 re the Marriage ofDavid R. & Iris M. Fraser Cheriton, (2001) 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 755.
10 M. In the absence of evidence, the Court impliedly found I lost

my job due to misconduct.
11
12 At p. 7 of its ORDER RE: RESPONDENT'S REQUEST FOR MODIFICATION OF CHILD
13 SUPPORT AND TEMPORARY SPOUSAL SUPPORT, the Court cites Marriage ofEggers for its
14 holding, "Imputation of income is not automatic upon loss of employment due to misconduct."
15 Marriage ofEggers (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 695, 697 [employment of father was terminated by his
16 employer for misconduct].
17 Here, there is not even a scintilla of evidence anywhere in the record to support a finding that
18 I lost my job due to misconduct. (It was a multi-person layoff.) It is well recognized that the
19 substantial evidence test requires "more than a mere scintilla." Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305
20 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 217, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938).
21 N. The Court incorrectly assigned the burden of proof

regarding my opportunity to work
22
23 The Cou~ states that I, as the party moving for a modification of support, bear the burden of
24 proving lack of opportunity to work. This ignores the record where I explicitly state I am not
25 pursuing such motion, and where the Court and Petitioner acknowledge that Petitioner asslimed my
26 motion:

9
Daprile • Bell
1224 Lincoln Ave.
San Jose, CA 95125
(4-08) 918-0920 Case No. 6-ll-FL-005500 Case Number
1 MR. FRAZIER: ... I'm a little confused I'm not pursuing that motion at this time.
2
3 THE COURT: ... this is a request that [to Petitioner] you wish to proceed with,
4 because [to Respondent] you don't want to, [to Petitioner] you don't think it's appropriate to
5 continue with the current support orders because of the evidence you wish to present and the
6 argument for imputation of income.
7 MS. LEDGERWOOD: Correct. And it would be an exercise I can do, but waste of
8 time of the parties for me to file a separate motion just to keep it going. I'm just utilizing
9 what's already there.
11 Thus, Petitioner was the party seeking a change to the status quo. "If one parent seeks to
12 modify an existing order so as to have income imputed to the other parent, the parent seeking
13 imputation - that is, in that context, the parent seeking to overturn the status quo - bears the burden
14 of proof of showing that the other parent has the ability and opportunity to earn that imputed income.
15 [Citations.]" (In re Marriage ofBardzik (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1291, 1294.) As can ~e seen,
16 Petitioner was the moving party, not me. Accordingly, the burden should have been on Petitioner to
17 prove an opportunity to work~ Petitioner failed to carry such burden, so there should be no
18 imputation to me. In re Marriage ofWittgrove (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1317, 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 489
19 [no imputation at OSC where parent seeking order imputing income based on earning capacity failed
20 to present any competent evidence other parent had ability or opportunity to earn imputed income].)
21 o. The Court erroneously disregarded evidence relevant to my

opportunity to work
22
23 The Court states that I provided no evidence regarding a lack opportunity to work. To the
24 contrary, I testified under oath, in part:
25 MR. FRAZIER: ... there are only so many jobs that I've found that come open, you
26 know, each week or each month that are $225,000 a year jobs for people that are Bio Tech
27 patent attorneys within commuting range from where my daughters live. And so there were
28
10
Daprile • BcJJ
1224 Lincoln Ave.
San Jose, CA 9Sl2S
(408)918-0920 Case No. 6-l l-FL-005500 Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
l more jobs open early on when I was first looking than there have been recently. So, I, I'm just
2 not seeing the jobs so [ ] much anymore to apply to.
3 So, the opportunities that Ms. Ledgerwood just provided, if they're anything like the
4 evidence she attached to, to her request to have income imputed to me in her last request she
5 filed, they didn't show, they didn't show the technical background of the person. I'm Bio
6 Tech. A lot of them that did state the technical background of computer science or
7 engineering. That's not me. A lot of them were for very junior people that weren't for me, you
8 know, when I looked through them. Most of them don't state the salary range. And a lot of
9 them were just too terse to tell really what they were about.
lO ... They were just off point. So I didn't see them really showing opportunity.
11 The Court ignores my testimony regarding lack of opportunity to work, as well as the
12 inability of Petitioner's counsel and her vocational expert to provide relevant job advertisements
13 despite their efforts. The Court does not just dismiss such evidence proving lack of opportunity to
14 work; it arbitrarily and completely ignores it (stating such evidence is non-existent!), severely
15 prejudicing me.
16 III. KATHLEEN FRAZIER AND MS. LEDGERWOOD LIED TO THE

COURT AND THERE IS EVIDENCE PROVING FALSENESS
17
18 Included among Ms Ledgerwood' s lies 1 are:
19 A. Kathleen knowingly and pumosefully understated her

income
20
21 1. Lie
Kathleen's "Income from airplane rental" was "$0" for 2011-2013 (Pet'r Tr. Brief, p. 3). It is
22
noted, as well, that Kathleen's income and expense declarations, albeit outdated, have not shown any
23
income from the airplane since she started this litigation.
24
25
26
1
Penal Code 118 makes it a crime to commit perjury and Penal Code 127 makes it a crime to suborn perjury.
27
28
11
Daprile • Bell
1224 Lincoln Ave.
SanJosc,CA 95125
6-11-FL-005500
1 2. The Truth
Kathleen consistently received one half of the income from the airplane rental. This is
2
evidenced by the operating agreement of Looking Up LLC (Kathleen being a 50% member),
3
Exhibit A, and Kathleen's 2011 income tax return which shows her reporting 50% of the income
4
(Exhibit B). The income from the airplane rental was $17,939 in 2011, and $41,220 in 2012 (Pet'r
5
Tr. Brief, p. 3).
6
3. Lie
7 "When Kathy first filed for divorce in January 2011, she had absolutely no income ..." (Pet'r
8 Tr. Brief, p. 7).
9 4. The Truth
Kathleen's 2011 income tax return (Exhibit B) shows her reporting 50% of the income from
10
the airplane rental business, Looking Up LLC.
11
5. Lie
12 "A comparison of Jeff and Kathy's respective incomes from 2009 to present clearly reveals
13 Kathy has had no income both prior to the parties' separation and during the majority of this
14 dissolution proceeding." (Pet'r Tr. Brief, p. 8).
15 6. The Truth
By agreement (Exhibit A), Kathy has shared equally, every year, in the income from
16
Looking Up LLC (airplane rental) since the business began in 2004.
17
7. Lie
18 "He [Jeff] currently earns substantial additional income from ... renting his airplane." (Pet'r
19 Tr. Brief, p. 8) (emphasis added).
20 8. The Truth
It was not only Jeffs airplane. The airplane was owned by Looking Up LLC. Kathleen was a
21
50% member of the LLC, along with Jeff. So, via the LLC, Kathleen owned 50% of the airplane.
22
B. Kathleen falsely inflated my use of her accounting expert
23
24 1. Lie
"Jeff agreed to pay Mr. Peth for time Jeff used to further understand Mr. Peth's accounting"
25
(Pet'r Tr. Brief, p. 5).
26
27
28
12
Daprile. Bell
1224 Lincoln Ave. Marriage of Frazier·
S-15
San Jose, CA 95125
1 2. The Truth
There was no such agreement. I was invoiced by Mr. Peth for an amount corresponding to
2
the agreed-upon time together, and I paid the amount of the invoice. If I had agreed to more, why
3
didn't Mr. Peth invoice me for it?
4
c. Having no grounds, .Kathleen invented reasons why the
5 Court should sanction me
6
1. Lie
7 "Kathy did not know why they would continue litigating [reimbursement claims] ifhe was
8 already in agreement, but still he forced the issue to hearing, which was a complete waste of the
9 Court's and the parties' respective time and resources." (Pet'r Tr. Brief, p. 12)
10 2. The Truth
At least twice, I emailed Kathy (as Kathy said she wanted to work directly with me) asking
11
her to cancel or continue the August 1, 2012 hearing because the parties were in agreement. See
12
Exhibit C for my emails to Kathy, of July 16, 2012 and July 30, 2012. Kathy never responded
13
about the agreed-upon reimbursements.
14
3. Lie
15 From Petitioner's Trial Brief, pp. 12-13:
16 "3b ... Jeff proceeded to confuse Judge Mills as to the current status of the sale,
17 causing Judge Mills to believe that the parties had already selected a listing agent. Ms.
18 Ledgerwood was therefore required to send additional e-mails to Judge Mills in an effort to
19 rectify this problem ...
20 c. Following Judge Mills' order, Jeff proceeded to make matters even worse by telling
21 the Kavanaughs to include additional terms into the.proposed listing agreement that were not
22 part of any court orders and claiming that they were in accordance with Judge Mills' previous
23 e-mails to the parties. The Kavanaughs became very confused and contacted Ms.
25 d. Between May 2nd and May 3rd alone, Ms. Ledgerwood had to send numerous
26 separate e-mails to Judge Mills, Jeff, and the Kavanaughs simply to clarify the explicit orders
27 from the court orders and to advise that no additional terms were to be added to the listing
28 agreement. It was only after Ms. Ledgerwood requested an additional S_ettlement Officer
Daprile • Bell
1224 Lincoln Ave.
San Jose, CA 95125
(408) 918-0920
Marriage of Frazier
Case No. 6-11-FL-005500
S-16
6-11-FL-005500
1 Conference with Judge Mills that Jeff finally agreed to sign the listing agreement in the
2 judge's presence. Over 16 emails, telephone calls to coordinate the SOC, telephone calls
3 with the agent, preparation for the SOC, and the SOC appearance all occurred because Jeff
4 created an issue for his own benefit, one that did not exist, and resulted in wasting the Court's
5 and Kathy's respective time and resources (Exhibit E)."
6 4. The Truth
I never told the Kavanaughs to put any additional language into any listing agreement.
7
See the attached email from Ginny Kavanaugh to Nedda Ledgerwood stating that the "+$1"
8
term did not come froni me and that she, Ginny, would not be comfortable not disclosing such a
9
tenn. (Exhibit D). See also the attached email from Ginny Kavanaugh to me wherein Ms.
10
Kavanaugh states that I did not tell her to insert any terms into the listing agreement (Exhibit E). In
11
fact, before Petitioner filed her Trial Brief, I told Ms. Ledgerwood, directly and in person, that I did
12
not say these things she was attributing to me. Continuing with her lie, or at least exhibiting a
13
reckless disregard for the truth, she sought sanctions anyway.
14
5. Lie
15 "Jeff told Kathy he was going to remove her from his health insurance beca"Qse she had called
16 the police to protect her against Jeff during an event where she feared for her safety." (Pet'r Tr.
17 Brief, p. 11).
18 6. The Truth
I never told Kathy I was going to drop her from my insurance.
19
7. Lie
20 "Kathy later found out that Jeff accessed, without Kathy's agreement, her email account ...
21 without her knowledge or consent." (Pet'r Tr. Brief, p. 14).
22 8. The Truth
As stated in my declaration in this matter dated February 11, 2011 (Exhibit F):
23
"17. ... In truth, she invited me to read her email at any time (after I happened upon a flirtatious
24
email with a male friend relating sexual information about me) as she claimed she had no~ng to
25
hide. Further, we willingly provided access to one another's email and calendars this past spring and
26
summer, when Petitioner assisted me with consulting work."
27
28
14
Dqirllc • Bd1
S-17
San Jose, CA 95125
l It is also true that Kathleen and her attorney accessed m.y !Pad without my agreement, and
2 without my knowledge or consent.
3 D. Contrary to Kathleen's false assertion, my past support

payments have been a model of timeliness and regularity
4
5 1. Lie
"Jeffs payments towards Kathy's spousal support were very irregular and varied greatly
6
from month to month." (Pet'r Tr. Brief, p. 7) (emphasis added).
7
2. The Truth
8 The attached print-out shows support payments sent automatically from my Wells Fargo
9 checking account to Kathleen from 9/1111 to 12/3/12 (Exhibit G). As can readily be seen, for the
10 amounts and the time period complained of by counsel for Petitioner, the payments are extremely
11 regular and change in dollar amount only once by stipulation.
12 IV. THE INFIRMITIES IN PETITIONER'S DECLARATION AND

POINTS & ATHORITIES SERVE TO HIGHLIGHT MY STRONG
13 CASE IN FAVOR OF GRANTING MY MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION TO
14 SET ASIDE
15
Petitioner filed a declaration and points & authorities on September 18, 2013_ opposing my
16
motion for reconsideration and, in the alternative, the motion to set aside. To the extent not
17
discussed above, this section addresses that declaration and points & authorities.
18
Petitioner continues to play up the fact that I am an attorney. I am, however, a patent
19
prosecution attorney. I have never been a litigator. Nor have I ever appeared in an inter partes matter
20
until these proceedings.
21
A. I have made the requisite showings providing the Court
22 with jurisdiction to grant my motion for reconsideration.
23
Petitioner asserts that I have admitted previously knowing of and possessing the evidence I
24
.now seek to present. Notably, Petitioner neither quotes me nor cites to any portion of my motion for
25
reconsideration and set aside. This is because no such admissions exist and Petitioner has simply
26
invented the alleged admissions.
27
28
15
Daprile• Bell
1224 Lillcoln Ave.
San.Jase.CA 9S12S
(401) 918-0920 Case No. 6- l l-FL-005500 Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
1 Petitioner asserts that my only explanation for failing to offer the evidence earlier is that I did
2 not understand that I needed to so. This is not true either. I have testified about the previous
3 unavailability of the new evidence, as well as about changed circumstances involving loss of the
4 rental apartment in the former family home, sale of the parties' airplane, and purchase of a new
5 home.
6 Petitioner maintains that the Court may not correct judicial error. To the contrary, it has been
7 shown herein that Petitioner and her attorney committed fraud by lying to the Court. "A trial court
8 has inherent power to set aside a judgment obtained through fraud committed upon the other party or
9 the court, and its right to do so is not derived from section 4 73 of the Code of Civil Procedure."
10 Necessary v. Necessary (1962) 207 Cal.App.2d 780, 24 Cal. Rptr. 713 (citing Aldrich v. Aldrich, 203
11 Cal. 433, 264 P. 754; Rhea v. Millsap, 68 Cal.App.2d 449, 156 P.2d 941.)
12 B. Code of Civil Procedure Section 473(b) is a remedial

measure to be liberally construed, which favors a hearing
13 on the merits.
14
Petitioner accuses me of choosing not to consult the rules that pertain to income and expense
15
declarations, and choosing not to find out what evidence was required to produce in support of my
16
motion. It was not a matter of choice. I provided evidence with my Trial Brief, but providing
17
further evidence subsequent to that with a reply brief was not possible, since the Court would receive
18
the latter only by invitation - and an invitation never came.
19
The fact that confusion surrounded the question of just who was the moving party (see sec.
20
11.N., above) with the motion to modify support, was driven home by Petitioner herself telling the
21
Court that "It is Mother's burden to prove Father's ability and opportunity to be employed."
22
(Petitioner's SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION and POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN
23
SUPPORT OF IMPUTATION OF INCOME TO RESPONDENT dated February4, 2013; p. 3, I. 7.)
24
I, as well, was confused and mistakes were made.
25
The irony is inescapable that Petitioner makes statements as she does at p. 7, 11. 20-24 of her
26
OPP. TO MOTION TO SET ASIDE OR RECONSIDER, ranting about California Rules of Court,
27
rule 5.620 [repealed] and what she describes as the inexcusability of not filing an income and
28
16
Daprile • Bell
1224 Lincoln Ave.
SanJosc, CA 95125
Marriage of Frazier
S-19
6-11-FL-005500
expense declaration, while knowing full well that she failed to comply with the rules of Court
2 pertaining to the filing of a current one [because, as she says at p. 2, II. 21-22 of her Trial Brief:
3 "The Court did not require the parties to file current Income and Expense Declarations, ... "].
4 Petitioner talks out of both sides of her mouth.
5 With regard to the set-aside motion, Petitioner characterizes my mistake as willful ignorance.
6 There was nothing willful about it. Mistakes were made, among other ways, in the course of
7 navigating the mixed signals I was receiving from the judiciary - on the one hand, the rules said I
8 must file an income and expense declaration, and on the other, I understood the Court to tell the
9 parties not to file an income and expense declaration in connection with the then-pending issues.
10 (See Pet'r Trial Br. at p. 2, 11. 21-22) I was planning to file an income and expense declaration; I told
11 pepple I wanted to, but did not because of the uncertainty. What behavior could ever be excusable,
12 if such a response due to getting polar opposite messages from the judiciary about what to do with a
13 particular [critically important] form is not?
l4 The outcome in this matter would have been different had I had a current income and
15 expense declaration on file. There can be no question that I was prejudiced by the mixed messages.
16 Would the Court tell me that an income and expense declaration is not required, and then hold out an
17 expectation that I must submit one, or otherwise be penalized with an overwhelming amount of
18 sanctions, fees, and support?
19 Code of Civil Procedure Section 473(b) is a remedial measure to be liberally construed, and
20 any doubt existing as to the propriety of setting aside a default thereunder will be resolved in favor
21 of a hearing on the merits (Berman v. Klassman (1971) 17 Cal. App. 3d 900, 910, 95 Cal. Rptr. 417).
22 See In re Marriage o/Stevenot (1984) 154 Cal. App. 3d 1051, 1070-1071, 202 Cal. Rptr. 116. ["The
23 Legislature has determined that during the time frame provided by Code of Civil Procedure section
24 4 73 there is a strong public policy in favor of allowing litigants their day in court."].
25 c. By way of simultaneous job hunting and consulting, my

employment efforts have been reasonable.
26
27 Petitioner makes the same error as the Court when she states that I made no effort to produce
28 evidence on [the] issue [of burden of proof as to my ability and opportunity to earn]. I have shown
D&prilc • Bell
1224 LiDcoln Ave.
San Jose, CA 9S 125
(408) 918-0920
Marriage of Frazier
Case No. 6-11-FL-005500
S-20
6-11-FL-005500
I above, in sec. 11.N ., that I did in fact provide sworn testimony on the issue. Here, Petitioner merely
2 highlights the fact that there were errors in providing evidence - such as errors relating to the
3 confusion surrounding whether or not to file an income and expense declaration. Similarly, if it
4 turns out the Court would have accepted a reply brief, then there was confusion and mistake around
5 that issue, as well, because that is not what I understood.
6 It is Petitioner's position that instead of seeking new employment, I elected to start my own
7 consulting business. The truth is, I chose to build a consulting business while looking for a job, and
8 that is what I have been doing. In any event, ''Opportunity" is not limited to working for someone
9 else; the Court may also consider the parent's "opportunity" for self-employment. Marriage of Cohn
10 (1998) 65 CA 4th 866 at 871 [" ... a licensed attorney with marketable skills who cannot find outside
11 employment may still 'hang up the shingle' and try to sustain a living ... "].
12 D. I made good faith efforts in purchasing a home after being

ordered to sell the family home
13
14 After the Court ordered me to sell the family residence to a third party, I had to find a home
15 for my daughters and myself. I quickly made good f~th efforts in finding and purchasing a home. I
16 bought a modest home in Redwood City for $875,000. I now live in that home with my daughters.
17 V. CONCLUSION
In its orders of August 16, 2013, the Court did not follow proper procedure and failed to
18
consider highly relevant evidence regarding my true income and employment efforts before it issued
19
a decision. In addition, the court erroneously assigned the burden of proof of ability and opportunity
20
to earn to me, when the trial took place regarding Petitioner's ·Motion. While the court issued orders
21
that have a significant financial impact on me, the court did not properly take the required evidence
22
to support its findings as is required by statutory and case law. Last, Petitioner and her attorney
23
misstated the facts in their Trial Brief to make it appear· as though Petitioner had access to far less
24
financial resources than she actually does and to make it appear as though I ran delinquent on my
25
support payments.
26
27
28
18
Daprile• Bell
1224 Lincoln Ave.
SID lose, CA 95125
6-11-FL-005500
1 The policy of the law is that controversies should be heard and disposed of on their merits
2 (Fasuyi v. Permatex, Inc. (2008) 167 Cal. App. 4th 681, 694-703, 84 Cal. Rptr. 3d 351 ; Berman v.
3 Klassman (1971) 17 Cal. App. 3d 900, 909, 95 Cal. Rptr. 417). I simply seek justice and a ruling
4 based on the facts.
9 Dated: q/JY~ 1-'S ~~

lNatafeT.DaJ)riie)ESq.
10 Attorney for Respondent
JEFFERY FRAZIER
11
12
c~ ;;2. ~, ~· r-n--
N~ T.D~
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Daprile. Bell
1224 Lincoln Ave.
SanJosc,CA 95125
6-11-FL-005500
05/2112013 11: 45 FAX 408 882 2990 !gJ 002
O!l/2i/2.0J3 11:25 FAX 408 4813581 DEPT 82 SUPERIOR COURT !gj001/004
.? I t..Vf L;.> l / VV.M'\ /) lS ~
"-"'

; I LAW OFFICES OFNEDDAA. LEDGERWOOD
'L-:"'
408.730.0333 (T)
3 408. 732.0709 (F)
[email protected]
4
'
I
' .......L .Attorney fol' KATHLEEN (KOSTAS) FRAZIER
!
6
9•.: Case No, 6-1 l-FL-005500

; !In re Marriage of:
1()
:. ?'·KATHLEEN (KOSTAS) FRAZIER
1 , .'....-. -~" r . ·
·~ 11: ll
'" ! s
''?
Petitioner, ORDER AFTER STATUS CONFERENCE
. .l:i ' ·'
'"'\'
and.
JEFFERY FRAZIER
F. MILLS
i!,,_/_ _ _ _ _R_es_.,p_o_n_de_n_t_ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___...HON.EDWARD
)4
5 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _-1
If -
-]6 :I
n ,• The ur\dersigned was appointed as temporary judge for real estate concerning the
I i
17
. ' sale of the real property commonly known as 14 Arastradero Road; Portola Valley, CA ~-.
94028 (hereinafter "14 Arastradero"). The matter came on for a regularly scheduled
r.
I\ ,l.4,
.'' : (\ Status Conference on May 7, 2013. Petitioner appeared through her attorney Nedda
20 . f i ·..
.... , ' Ledgerwood, and Respondent Jeffery Frazier representing himself.
21 ,,
ii \. . Findings: The terms of the Stipulated Judgment filed April 17, 2013 proviede
ii. f·. that 14 Arastadero shall be listed for sale by no later than June 1, 2013. I make the
221· ,;·· following orders:

( ~ '
:ts l. The parties shall list 14 Arastradero with Ginny and Joe Kavanaugh (650) 851-1961
'dg
(hereinafter "the listing agents"), Each party is directed to contact the listing agents
othe~se
::.~. .• i§ :...'· .·.:
within forty-eight hours of receipt of this order. Unless agreed in writing
~

:, 11:,.,·_· -:-:-:--:::=-:-=,.,..----------------------------+
.. · J; !In.re Marriage of
· ! . Case ~6•1 l•FL·OOSSOO
FRAZIER
T-1
' ORDER AFTER STATUS CONFERENCE Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
05/21/2013 11:45 FAX 408 882 2990 141003
05/if/2013 11:25 FAX 408 4813591 DEPT 02 SUPERIOR COURT 141002/004
; .~
,J
with the listing agents, the commission rate in the listing agreement shall be five·.
·.. l !.'
!' .
2;. percent.
', . .. ;
3 I' •.:;. 2. The listing agents shall contact both owners to discuss the listing, and shall discuss·
4 · .and disclose to each the positions and comments of the other. So long as the parties '
.....
5•f agree to a joint course of conduct, the listing agents shall comply with their joint ·
: f; '
decisions. lf a disagreement between the parties about the terms and conditions of :
the listing agreement, the course of conducting the sale, repairs and preparation of'
!.i
s '
" the prope1:ties for showing and sale, or the terms and conditions of the offer,
9
acc~ptance, counter offer, contract or escrow arises, recourse may be made to the
•. 10 .
lI . Temporary Judge for Real Estate in an informal manner, with notice, to make a de
nova determination of the issue. The parties shall cooperate with the listing agents.
..
'·. ~ ·.;
3. Both parties shall promptly complete all disclosure forms as requested by the
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!i listing agents.
4, Both parties shall provide copies of working keys and security codes for main
16' "
gates, front doots, and garage doors to the listing agent forthwith. The listing
i7
.~ agents may place a lockbox on the real property.
18
. 19
., 5. The parties shall cooperate with the listing agents by providing access to the agent
d~' and to tradespeople at reasonable times upon reasonable request. The parties shall
21 '' be advised not less than forty eight hours Jn advance of the scheduling of work and
'..
22 ..
inspections at 14 Arastradero.
23
6. Neither party shall be present at 14 Arastradero during times when workers are
,,. scheduled to be present to prepare 14 Arastradero for sale. Neither party shall
25 !i
t_\
1
i. interfere in any way with performance of the work. All wo.rk shall be scheduled to
26 ..
,,
27.
commence on weekdays or on Saturdays siter 8 a.m. and shall cease by no later
2~: than 5 p.m.
'
·· .. ·~fore Mar1l~ge of FRAZIER z
"
i Cilse #6-l l·FL.005500
ORDER AFT&R STATUS CONFERENCE
T-2
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
05/21/2013 11:45 FAX 408 882 2990 141004
05/:il/2013 11 :25 FAX 408 4813581 DEPT 82 SUPERIOR COURT 141 003/004
._/ ·~·
'•"
7. Once work necessary to show 14 Arastradero has been completed, both parties
2
shall be advised not less than twenty four hours in advance of scheduled showings
3 of.14 Arastradero, including open houses and the realtors' tours.
8. Until such time as 14 Arastadero Is sold, neither party shall let any other person
', ....
' ·,:r
' (other than the children of the parties or either of them) to occupy 14 Arastadero
. 6 '. '.
'·· without the prior express written consent of the other party or further court order.
7·
8 9. 14 Arastradero shall be kept in broom clean condition at all times.

9 10.ln the event that either party fails to execute the listing agreement or any other 1
!
document necessary to complete the sale In a timely fashion, the Clerk of the Court
is· hereby ordered to execute such documents in their place and stead, at the sole
expense of the non-signing party.

!.l
.,.. 11.R.espondent Jeffrey Frazier shall have the right to acquire Petitioner Kathleen
14
5
lS Frazer's interest in 14 Arastadero if he pays her the equivalent of one-half the
(~
)6 amount the parties would receive based on the best offer received by the parties, plus
..,
.i
!? one dollar. Any offer to purchase Petitioner's interest made by Respondent shall be
a l;·,'·
18 ;.:· without contingencies as to financing or condition of the premises.
~· ::;
19 ,.
12. The Court reserves jurisdiction over the allocation of any funds expended by either
Ji)
20
party to prepare 14 Arastradero for sale as well as over a11y funds expended to pey
L 1! mortgage payments, real property taxes, o:r insurance.

,
22... ''
21 H 13.Absent the written agreement ofthe parties, net proceeds of sale shall be placed in
24· sp.~i;:ial tn1st account with the parties' attorneys as signatoriee. No disbursement sh
.L~
25
·i· be .made from the account without the express written consent of both parties or orde
J..z.. l,;·
26· •; "
:.•
' of court.
i1 •.· ·' j'
r~i !. : 14.Nothing contained in this Order is intended to modify any existing order of this Court
28· i"
,~, H··
'1..---,;-:;-~-===:0::--------------------------------+''i:
i
ln re Morrl•ge of FRAZIER
::.1 : '.Caso ~6·11·FL·005500
,ORl>ER AFTER STATUS CONFERENCE
T-3
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
I
0.5/21/2013
-·'· .. "f·" ........ ,' '
11: 45 FAX 408 882 2990 141005
05/21;_2013 11:25 H.X 408 4813591 DEPT 82 SUPERIOR COURT 141004/004'
,._,
~··
except as is expressly set forth herein,

'I ..
.:·;.;·
: 3 .· Date:· May 8, 2013
..4 '
I
,!l? i
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2·~6
•'. i Edward F. Mills, Temporary Judge
Superior Court of the County of Santa Clai'a
:•.8
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:.9
.r., PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT NO.
In re Matrlo~e of FRAZIER
Caso #6·11-FL.{)05500 T-4 4
ORDER AFTER STATUS CONFERENCE Case Number

'·'·
6-11-FL-005500
1 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
2 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA
3 BEFORE THE HONORABLE THEODORE C. ZAYNER, JUDGE
4 SUNNYVALE FACILITY - DEPARTMENT NO. 82
5
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF: )
6 )
PETITIONER: KATHLEEN FRAZIER )
7 )
AND ) CASE NO. 6-11-FL-005500
8 )
RESPONDENT: JEFFERY FRAZIER )
9 ______________________________)
10
11
12 REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
13 APRIL 17, 2013
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22 APPEARANCES:
23 FOR THE PETITIONER: NEDDA A. LEDGERWOOD

Attorney at Law
24
FOR THE RESPONDENT: SELF REPRESENTED
25
JUDGE PRO-TEM: JACK STEINER
26 Attorney at Law
27 OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER: SUSAN M. Y. PETSCHE

Certificate No. CSR 7849
28
SUSAN M.Y. PETSCHE, C.S.R. 7849 U-1

Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
1 Sunnyvale, California April 17, 2013
2 PROCEEDINGS
3 (Whereupon, Court convened and the following
4 proceedings were had:)
5 THE COURT: So, okay. We have everyone here on
6 the Frazier matter?
8 THE COURT: Let's get everyone's appearances
9 because this is actually the first time we've been on the
10 record today on this case.
11 MS. LEDGERWOOD: Nedda Ledgerwood for the
12 petitioner who is personally present.
13 MR. FRAZIER: Jeff Frazier, respondent.
14 MR. STEINER: And I'm Jack Steiner who is
15 pro-teming today.
16 THE COURT: Okay. You've handed me a judgment and
17 the promised spread sheet including a, titled stipulated
18 judgment regarding some disbursements and divisions.
19 MR. STEINER: And, Your Honor, I did not sign
20 that, because I'm not sure if I should sign it or you should
21 sign it. I think I may not be, I think we talked about this
22 last time I was pro-teming, I think, I'm not officially on
23 the approved pro-tem list at the moment.
24 THE COURT: And that doesn't -- for the parties'
25 benefit, it doesn't mean that Mr. Steiner isn't an
26 experienced and approved settlement officer. It may mean
27 that, like many of the lawyers that assist us as settlement
28 officers, they just haven't done all the technical,


Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
1 procedural requirements which allow the Court to officially
2 appoint them as a judge pro-tem where they can sign orders
3 and take things on the record. So, that's one last
4 procedural step. It doesn't mean, hope you all appreciate,
5 it doesn't mean that he's not experienced and capable and
6 qualified enough to do what he's been doing to try to get
7 this case resolved.
8 That being the case, Ms. Ledgerwood, is there
9 anything -- first of all, does this address everything
10 pending?
11 MS. LEDGERWOOD: In my opinion, yes. And I think
12 Mr. Frazier agrees with me that it addresses all the
13 property division issues.
14 THE COURT: Yes.
15 MS. LEDGERWOOD: Date of separation, how we're
16 going to handle attorneys fees, costs and sanctions. And I
17 believe that's it. You also have on calendar an EEO review,
18 but we just assume continue that another month. And it does
19 take care of the trial for the 30th. I saw the Court's
20 calendar that the --
21 THE COURT: Okay.
22 MS. LEDGERWOOD: -- that father's motion for
23 modified child support and spousal support is on calendar
24 for the 30th, but we're fine to put that over until next
25 month.
26 THE COURT: All right. Is that agreeable with
27 you, Mr. Frazier?
28 MR. FRAZIER: Yes.

Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
1 THE COURT: Okay.
2 MS. LEDGERWOOD: And I put it in the form of a
3 stipulated judgment just for cleanness, hopefully for
4 cleanness.
5 THE COURT: Okay.
6 MR. STEINER: And you're going to divorce them
7 today or are there --
8 THE COURT: We're ready to do that?
10 THE COURT: There's nothing else out there that
11 would hold that up?
12 MS. LEDGERWOOD: No, meaning medical insurance or
13 health insurance or, no.
14 THE COURT: Yes.
15 MS. LEDGERWOOD: No.
16 THE COURT: All the usual things we need to think
17 about.
18 MS. LEDGERWOOD: No. No, I hope I thought of them
19 all, but, no, I don't think there's those issues.
20 THE COURT: All right. I'll ask our clerk to
21 swear both of you in and, Ms. Frazier, you're --
22 Ms. Ledgerwood will ask you a series of questions confirming
23 your understanding and agreement with the stipulated
24 judgment as well as the necessary jurisdictional facts to
25 accomplish your judgment of dissolution.
26 And, Mr. Frazier, I'll ask you similar questions about
27 your understanding and agreement with this stipulated
28 judgment, okay?

Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
2 THE CLERK: Please raise your right hands.
3 (Whereupon, petitioner and respondent were sworn
4 under penalty of perjury.)
5 MS. KOSTAS: Yes.
6 MR. FRAZIER: I do.
7 THE COURT: Okay. Ms. Ledgerwood.
8 MS. LEDGERWOOD: Ms. Kostas, did you read the
9 agreement that we signed today?
10 MS. KOSTAS: Yes.
11 MS. LEDGERWOOD: And do you understand it?
12 MS. KOSTAS: Yes.
13 MS. LEDGERWOOD: And did you voluntarily agree to
14 sign it?
15 MS. KOSTAS: Yes.
16 MS. LEDGERWOOD: Okay. And do you want me to ask
17 her the jurisdictional facts that I hope I remember, 1
18 through 6?
19 THE COURT: Yes. Please.
20 MS. LEDGERWOOD: Were you a resident at the time
21 you filed your petition?
22 MS. KOSTAS: Yes.
23 MS. LEDGERWOOD: And.
24 MR. STEINER: Six months, State of California.
25 MS. LEDGERWOOD: And you've been in the State of
26 California --
27 THE COURT: We can give Mr. Steiner more to do.
28 MR. STEINER: Yeah.

Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
1 Were you a resident of the State of California for more
2 than six months and the County of Santa Clara for more than
3 three months at the time of signing the petition?
4 MS. KOSTAS: Yes.
5 MR. STEINER: And all the facts stated therein are
6 true and correct?
7 MS. KOSTAS: Yes.
8 MR. STEINER: And have irreconcilable differences
9 arisen in your marriage such that you would like it to be
10 terminated?
11 MS. KOSTAS: Yes.
12 MR. STEINER: And is there anything that this
13 Court or anyone else could do to help save your marriage?
14 MS. KOSTAS: No.
15 MR. STEINER: Okay. I think that's it.
16 THE COURT: I think that covers those.
17 Thank you, Mr. Steiner.
18 MS. LEDGERWOOD: Thank you, Mr. Steiner.
19 THE COURT: Mr. Frazier, you're here
20 unrepresented, but you've been represented in the past,
21 although I know you are a lawyer. Do you understand and
22 agree to be bound by all of the terms of this stipulated --
23 excuse me, I'm stumbling over my own words now -- stipulated
24 judgment?
26 THE COURT: Do you have any questions about it?
27 MR. FRAZIER: No.
28 THE COURT: Do you feel comfortable that you've

Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
1 had sufficient time to read, understand, and digest with the
2 assistance of Mr. Steiner, Ms. Ledgerwood and Ms. Kostas and
3 in cooperation with them?
4 MR. FRAZIER: Yes.
5 THE COURT: Okay.
6 MR. STEINER: So, I think that's it.
7 Just so the Court knows --
8 THE COURT: I wanted to ask a few more questions.
9 MR. STEINER: I'm sorry. You turned to me like I
10 was -- so that's the only reason I responded like I did.
11 THE COURT: It's okay.
12 MR. STEINER: Go ahead.
13 THE COURT: And you've signed the stipulated
14 judgment on the third page, Mr. Frazier?
16 THE COURT: You're asking that I enter it as a
17 judgment here today?
18 MR. FRAZIER: Yes, I am.
19 THE COURT: And declare the two of you now as
20 single persons?
22 THE COURT: And, Ms. Kostas, I apologize. I
23 neglected to note that you wish to restore your name which
24 after the entry of this judgment will be Kathleen Celile
25 Kostas; is that correct?
26 MS. KOSTAS: Yes. Yes.
27 THE COURT: Did I pronounce everything correctly?
28 Well, more or less?

Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
1 MS. KOSTAS: Yes.
2 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.
3 Now, Mr. Steiner, was there something else?
4 MR. STEINER: Just so you know, the work that will
5 need to be done is they will be submitting declarations with
6 regard to fees. I don't think -- Nedda, did you set a time
7 frame?
8 MS. LEDGERWOOD: I did not.
9 MR. STEINER: So, they didn't set a time frame.
10 If you want to set a time frame, we can do that.
11 And, in addition, they've agreed to Ed Mills to be
12 appointed to oversee the sale of the home and airplane
13 should they run into any problems. I assume, presumably he
14 can do that, but if not I assume they can agree on someone
15 else or the Court can appoint someone.
16 THE COURT: Okay. Is that correct? Is everybody
17 agreeable to and do they wish me to appoint Mr. Mills as a
18 special master for those purposes?
19 MR. LEDGERWOOD: Yes.
20 THE COURT: The home and the airplane?
22 THE COURT: Okay. This resolved the issues
23 currently on calendar for trial on April 30th. So, let's do
24 a couple of things here. I'll set another date as requested
25 for the employment efforts review and then we'll talk a
26 little bit about briefing and submission of papers regarding
27 attorney fees.
28 Ms. Ledgerwood, how far out would you suggest for the

Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
1 employment efforts review?
2 MS. LEDGERWOOD: A month.
3 THE COURT: Okay.
4 MS. LEDGERWOOD: So, perhaps May 20th or the week
5 of May 20th?
6 THE COURT: Monday, May 20th looks okay if that
7 works for everybody.
8 MS. LEDGERWOOD: Let me see. At what time,
9 Your Honor?
10 THE COURT: 9 o'clock.
11 And, I'm sorry, let me just clarify this again. With
12 respect to the request for order to modify support, are we
13 going to continue that or that's addressed here?
14 MS. LEDGERWOOD: So, what happened is in January
15 we came up with a stipulation --
17 MS. LEDGERWOOD: -- to reserve the issue of
18 support.
19 THE COURT: Exactly.
20 MS. LEDGERWOOD: Because it's washed out on some
21 level. It's gone up and down and there's moneys owed by
22 each side, but, no, we have to have, what we believe is
23 respondent to come up to his level of earnings or have a
24 trial on his income. But right now no money is being
25 exchanged for support.
26 But we do need a hearing on modifying support at one
27 point. So what might end up happening is the EEO review
28 will be more into a hearing on modified support.


Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
1 THE COURT: Okay. Well, if we already have it
2 pending on calendar, we might be better served by just
3 continuing it to the date for the EEO review for, as a
4 status conference for setting.
5 MS. LEDGERWOOD: Fine.
6 THE COURT: Keep tracking it on the calendar that
7 way.
8 MS. LEDGERWOOD: I'll consider it an EEO and a
9 status conference.
10 THE COURT: Yeah.
11 MS. LEDGERWOOD: Okay? So, May 20th at 9:00 AM.
12 THE COURT: Yes.
13 Now, let's just talk about briefing for the submission
14 of request for attorneys fees.
15 How much time does everybody think they need to do
16 that?
17 MR. FRAZIER: I have most of what I, you know,
18 I've already turned it in. I'm not sure what briefing there
19 is to do really. I mean, there's your response to what, to
20 what I filed already and my reply to what you did.
21 MS. LEDGERWOOD: I would probably consolidate it
22 for him and put it in one, nice, little trial brief.
23 However you want to call it.
24 THE COURT: It doesn't need to be called a trial
25 brief.
26 MS. LEDGERWOOD: Just consolidate it.
27 THE COURT: You can call it whatever you want.
28 Submission on attorneys fees, but it would be helpful if it

Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
1 were, if the arguments and positions, helpful for my
2 purposes and for yours, if you summarized and condense them
3 at least so I can digest them in one place.
5 MS. LEDGERWOOD: Why don't we submit them by May
6 20th or do you want them the week before?
7 THE COURT: No, that's fine. If that's sufficient
8 time for you to do that.
9 MS. LEDGERWOOD: That's fine.
10 THE COURT: Okay.
11 MS. LEDGERWOOD: So, do you want it filed by,
12 served by, what would you like?
13 THE COURT: How about just filed by May 20th.
14 Filed and served by May 20th. And as part of the status
15 conference that day we can just confirm that everything is
16 there and I have everything I need --
17 MS. LEDGERWOOD: And perhaps we can --
18 THE COURT: -- or what you think I need.
19 MS. LEDGERWOOD: Or perhaps we just exchange at
20 the status conference.
21 THE COURT: That would work as well.
22 MS. LEDGERWOOD: Okay. So, why don't we exchange
23 at the status conference and file.
24 THE COURT: Okay. Okay. Thank you much.
25 And, Mr. Steiner, thank you for --
26 MR. STEINER: Okay. No problem.
27 THE COURT: -- going above and beyond and being
28 willing to come back this afternoon with everybody working

Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
1 through the lunch hour.
2 MR. STEINER: Well, I didn't have to work through
3 the lunch hour, they did. I just came back.
4 MS. LEDGERWOOD: And really --
5 MS. KOSTAS: Really.
6 MS. LEDGERWOOD: -- I typically don't do this, but
7 he did do an outstanding job. I almost walked out on him
8 this morning because of my own frustration, but he did keep
9 things together and it was really impressive how he helped
10 today. So, thanks, Jack.
11 MR. STEINER: Well, they wanted to settle and they
12 did so.
13 MS. LEDGERWOOD: Well, you did a good job, so
14 let's leave it at that.
15 MR. STEINER: All right.
16 THE COURT: And he has that effect on some people
17 too. Almost wanting to walk out.
18 MR. STEINER: Sometimes.
19 MS. LEDGERWOOD: So, thank you.
20 THE COURT: Thank you very much.
21 (Whereupon, the proceedings adjourned.)
22 ---o0o---
23
24
25
26
27
28

Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
1 STATE OF CALIFORNIA )
2 COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA )
6 I, Susan M.Y. Petsche, HEREBY CERTIFY: That the
7 foregoing is a full, true and correct transcript of the
8 testimony given and proceedings had in the above-mentioned
9 action taken on the 17th day of April 2013; that it is a
10 full, true and correct transcript of the evidence offered
11 and received, acts and statements of the Court, also all
12 objections of counsel and all matters to which the same
13 relate; that I reported the same in stenotype to the best of
14 my ability being the duly appointed, qualified and acting
15 official stenographic reporter of said court, and thereafter
16 had the same transcribed into typewriting as herein appears.
17
18 Dated this 6th day of September, 2013.
19
20
21
_______________________________________
22 SUSAN M.Y. PETSCHE
CERTIFICATE No. CSR 7849
23
24
25
26
27
28

Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
Basic Civil Case Flow Chart
Summons & Within 30 days of
Serve Defendant
Complaint filed being served
TIP: If the complaint is verified

(signed under penalty of perjury)
then the Answer must specifically
admit or deny each allegation in
No Answer filed Answer filed the complaint.
TIP: Responses to Discovery are

Request for Entry of
Case Number
Discovery due within 30 days if the request
Default/Default is received in person, or 35 days
Judgment
if received by mail.
V-1
(after 30 days)
6-11-FL-005500
Default Judgment Case Management TIP: Held 120 – 180 days after
TIP Conference
ADR - Parties may choose to the complaint filed. The parties,
resolve their dispute outside of lawyers, and judge meet and talk
Court through Alternative about how to handle the case.
Dispute Resolution (ADR), File Case Management
which can take less time and Statement (CM-110) 15 days
cost less than litigation. To before the CMC.
Trial
learn more, visit the Court’s
ADR webpage:
http://www.riverside.courts.ca.
gov/adr/adr.shtml
Judgment
This chart provides only a brief overview of the civil case process. It does not provide a comprehensive outline of all of the steps and procedures
that may be applicable in your specific case. For a detailed explanation about any of the topics listed you may talk to an attorney or visit the
Riverside County Law Library.
DAVID L. SMITH, M.D.
550 HAMILTON AVENUE, SUITE 208
PALO ALTO, CA 94301
TELEPHONE (650) 325-6240
FAX (650) 320-9814
1/24/14
To: Whom it May Concern
Re: Jeff D. Frazier

DOB: 3/24/64
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
Regarding specific restrictions and limitation in Mr. Frazier’s functioning as a result of his
psychiatric condition:
1. He has been limited to 2-4 hours per day of functioning in a work-related capacity for his
usual occupation (lawyer).
2. He has been limited in his ability to perform complex and cognitively demanding work and
either avoids these tasks or takes much longer than usual to accomplish them
3. He has been limited in his capacity to tolerate interpersonal stress and either avoids or
takes much longer than usual to properly interact with clients and solicit new contacts.
Sincerely,
David Smith, M.D.
W-1
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
DEPARTMENT 82 LONG CAUSE AND TRIAL POLICIES
JUDGE THEODORE C. ZAYNER
For all matters set for a long cause hearing or trial in Department 82, the parties are
required to comply with all applicable current California Rules of Court, and the
Santa Clara County Superior Court Local Rules of Court.
The Court expects the parties and counsel to continually meet and confer in advance
of and during the hearing, to attempt to resolve, narrow
' or limit the issues, and to
streamline the procedure.
The Court shall be promptly notified of any complete or partial settlement, revised
time estimates, scheduling issues, or any other matters which may affect the conduct
and timing of the hearing.
(1) PRE-TRIAL REQUIREMENTS

a. Meet and Confer Requirement: All parties and counsel are expected to make a
good faith effort to resolve all issues, as required by California Rule of Court 5.98. The
parties do not have to meet and confer if both parties are self-represented and there is a
restraining order preventing contact between them.
Prior to any mandatory settlement conference and scheduled trial or long cause
hearing, attorneys or self-represented parties shall meet and confer to discuss and
exchange trial exhibits and discuss the issues below:
i. The names of witnesses expected to be called at the hearing, (including

expert witnesses), with the exception of rebuttal witnesses, any scheduling problems
with any witness, and any witness testimony to be presented by offer of proof;
ii. Each party’s list of exhibits, except rebuttal exhibits. Exhibit lists and
copies of all exhibits to be used at trial shall be exchanged no later than the deadline
for serving the Trial Brief;
iii. Objections to witnesses and exhibits; including any objections to
proceeding by offer of proof; and
iv. Any proposed stipulations, including stipulating to the admission of
exhibits or reports.
b. Trial Brief: The parties shall file and serve a Trial Briefin full compliance with
California Rule of Court 5.394, which is set forth below:
Rule 5.394. Trial or hearing brief
(a) Contents of brief

For cases in which thejudge orders each party to complete a trial or hearing brief or other
pleading, the contents ofthe brief must include at least:
(1) The statistical facts and any disputes about the statistical facts. Statistical facts that may
apply to the case could include:
(A) Date of the marriage or domestic partnership; PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT NO.
(B) Date of separation;
2013
X-1 1
Department 82 Trial Policies
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
(C) Length of marriage or domestic partnership in years and months; and
(D) Names and ages of the parties’ minor children;
(2) A brief summary of the case;
(3) A statement of any issues that need to be resolved at trial;
(4) A brief statement summarizing the contents of any appraisal or expert report to be
offered at trial;
(5) A list of the witnesses to be called at trial and a brief description of the anticipated
testimony of each witness, as well as name, business address, and statement of
qualifications of any expert witness;
(6) Any legal arguments on which a party intends to rely; and
(7) Any other matters determined by the judge to be necessary and provided to the parties
in writing.
(b) Service of brief

The parties must serve the trial or hearing brief on all parties and file the brief with the
court a minimum of 5 court days before the trial or long-cause hearing.
Rule 5.394. adopted effective January 1, 2013.
The Trial Brief shall also include:

i. An updated time estimate for the hearing;
ii. Any stipulations that have been reached;
iii. A list of any pretrial motions or motions in limine.
Any pretrial motions or motions in limine shall be submitted with the Trial Brief.
(2) TRIAL PROCEDURE
a. Documents: Documentary evidence should be offered by stipulation, to avoid the

need for foundational witnesses. Parties shall provide to the clerk, on the day of trial
before the case is called, three copies of a list of exhibits and three copies of each
exhibit, with the exception of impeachment exhibits: one for the trial judge, one for the
other party, and one to be marked at the trial or hearing. (Please notefor Department
82: the use oftrial exhibit binders is strongly encouraged.)
b. Interpreters: The party calling any witness needing an interpreter shall arrange
in advance for the interpreter and shall pay his or her compensation.
c. Failure to Appear: If a party fails to appear at the trial or long cause hearing, the
Court may take the matter off calendar, proceed in the absence of the party, or impose
other sanctions.
d. Trial Time Estimates: The Family Law Division sets trials and long cause
hearings based on the parties’ reasonable time estimates. The time estimates will be
strictly enforced, and failure to complete in time may result in a mistrial whenever the
Court’s calendar will be adversely affected by allowing excess time.
2013 Department 82 Trial Policies

X-2 l\)
Case Number
6-11-FL-005500
ATTORNEY OR PARTY WTHOUT ATTORNEY (Name, State Bar number, aN address):
TELEPHONE NO,:
E-MAIL ADDRESS (Optrorat) j
ATTORNEY FOR ( /ame)l
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNry OF

STREET ADDRESS:
MAILINGADDRESS:
CITY AND ZIP CODE:
BRANCH NAME:
PETITIONER/PLAINTIFF:
RESPONSIVE DECLARATION TO REQUEST FOR ORDER

TIME: DEPARTMENTOR ROOM:
1. T--] CHILDCUSTODY
a. [-_l I consent to the order requested.
b. T_l I do not consent to the order requested, but I consent to the following order:
2. .l CHILD VISITATION (PARENTING TIME)

a. [-_l
I consent to the order requested.
b. l-_l
I do not @nsent to the order requested, but I consent to the following order:
3. N CHILD SUPPORT
a. [--l I consenttotheorderrequested.
b. T--l I consent to guideline suppo(.
c. l---l I do not consent to the order requested, but I consent to the following order:
(1) l-*-l Guideline
(2) T__l Other (specity):
4. f_-f SPoUSAL oR PARTNER SUPPORT

a. [--_l I consent to the order requested.
b. T-l I do notconsenttothe orderrequested.
c. [-l I consent to the following order:
P3S9l of3
Fom Adopted for Mandatory Use w.@[email protected]
Judicial Council of Califomia RESPONSIVE DECLARATION TO REQUEST FOR ORDER
FL-320 [Rev. July 1, 2012]
t
FL-3I2U
CASE NUMBER:
PETITIONER/PLAI NTIFF:
OTHER PARTY:
5T-l ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS

a. l---l I consent to the order requested.
b. T-l I do not consent to the order requested.
c. [-.-l I consent to the following order:
6 T--l PROPERTY RESTRAINT

a. l--l
I consent to the order requested.
b. [---l I do not consent to the order requested.
c. [--l I consent to the following order:
7.f 1 PROPERTY CONTROL

a. [-_-l I consent to the order requested.
b. T--lI do not consent to the order requested.
c. l-_-l I consent to the following order:
s. l---l OTHER RELIEF

u. [--l I consent to the order requested.
b. l---l I do not consent to the order requested.
c. [--l I consent to the following order:
e. l-_-l SUPPORTING I NFORMATION

[J Contained in the attached declaration. (You may use Attached Declaration (form MC-03'l) for this purpose)
NOTE: To respond to domestic violence restraining orders requested in the Request for Order (Domestic Violence Prevention)
(form DV-100), you must use the Ans'A,e-r to Temporary Restraining Order (Domestic Violence Prevention) (form DV-120).
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing and all attachments are true and correct.
Date:
)
CTYPE OR PRINT NAME) (SIGMTURE OF DECLARANT)
FL-320 [Rev. July 1, 2012j Page 2 ot 2

RESPONSIVE DECLARATION TO REQUEST FOR ORDER
a
239 Sequoia Avenue
Z Redwood City, Califo rnia 94061
Telephone: (650) 27 5-21 12
3
Email : jeff@frazieri d. com
4
7
ST]PERIOR COURT OF CALIF'ORNIA
I COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA
9 In re the Marriage of: Case No.: 6-1 t-FL-005500
10 EST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE IN

Petitioner: KATHLEEN KOSTAS (FRAZIER) RT OF RESPONDENT'S MOTION
11 SET ASIDE THE COURT'S ORI}ERS
and F AUGUST 16,2016 FILED JULY 21,2015
72
Date:
JEFFERY FRAZIER
13 Time:
Dept.: 82, Honorable Joshua Weinstein
1"4
15
16
TO: PETITIONER, KATHLEEN KOSTAS (FRAZIER), AND HER ATTORNEYS AND
L7 RECORD:
1B PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT RESPONDENT, JEFFERY FRAZIER, requests that the Court,
19
pursuant to California Evidence Code $$ 451 through 453, inclusive, take judicial notice of the
20
following matters, facts, and documents in connection with Respondent's Motion to Set Aside the
21
)) Court's Orders of August 16,2016 filed July 2I,2015.
a1 L The Court is requested to judicially notice the content of, but not the truth, if
24 any, of the following hearing transcripts from the proceedings in this case:
25
1. Hearing Transcript of 05-20-13; Exh. I to Respondent's Motion to Set Aside filed July 21,2015;
26
and
u1
2. Hearing Transcript of 04-17-13; Exh. U to Respondent's Motion to Set Aside filed July 21,2A15.
2B
RESPONDENTS REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SET ASIDE

1
+
1 II. The court is requested to judicially notice the content of:
2 1. Riverside Superior Court's "Basic Civil Case Flow Chart"; Exh. V to Respondent,s Motion to
3
Set Aside filed July 21,2}Ll;Available at:
4
http://www.riverside.courts.ca.gov/selftrelp/civ_basic_flowchart.pdf (last accessed July 21,2015);
5
and
6
z. Judge z.ayner's DEPARTMENT 82 LONG CAUSE AND TRIAL POLICIES; Exh. X to

1
8 Respondent's Motion to Set Aside filed July 21,2015.
9 ilI. The Court is requested to judicially notiee the content of, but not the truth, if
10
any, of the documents and records from the Court's file for this case, including
11
the following documents and records, and all exhibits and attachments thereto:
l2
1. Respondent's Mandatory Settlement Conference (MSC) Statement of 04-08-2013;
13
2. PETITIONER'S MANDATORY SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE STATEMENT PURSUANT
L4
15 TO SANTA CLARA COLiNTY FAMILY LAw LOCAL RULE 6GX3) of 04-03-13;
76 3. Respondent's Reply to Petitioner's Mandatory Settlement Conference (MSC) Statement of 04-12-
L1 13;
18
4. Respondent's Trial Brief of 05-20-13;
t9
5. PETITIONER'S TRIAL BRIEF PURSUANT TO 4/1 7I2OI3 COURT ORDER TO SUBMIT
20
POSITION RE: ATTORNEY'S FEES, COSTS, AND SANCTIONS, BY PLEADINGS of 05-20-
2L
2013, including Exhibit E thereto;
ZJ 6. PETITIONER'S SUPPLEMENTAL TRIAL BRIEF PURSUANT TO 4II7I2O13 COURT
24 ORDER TO SUBMTT POSITION RE: ATTORNEYS FEES, COSTS, AND SANCTIONS, BY
25 PLEADINGS of 05-21 -2013;

ZO
7. Petitioner's SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION and POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN
21
SUPPORT OF IMPUTATION OF INCOME TO RESPONDENT of 02-04-13;
2B
RESPONDENT'S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SET ASIDE

2
1 8. Respondent's Reply to Petitioner's Supplemental Declaration of 02-05-13;
2 9. Petitioner's SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION IN SUPPORT OF IMPUTATION OF
3
INCOME TO RESPONDENT of 06-13-13;
4
10. Respondent's Reply to Petitioner's Supplemental Declaration of 06-14-13;
5
I 1. The Court's Order Re: Respondent's Request for Modification of Child Support and Temporary
6
Spousal Support of 08-1 6-201 3;
'7
12. The Court's Findings and Order Re Attorney's Fees and Costs of 08-16-2013;
I
9 13. RESPONDENT JEFFERY FRAZIER'S DECLARATION IN SUPPORT OF REQUEST FOR
10 oRDER RE: MODIFICATION OF CHILD SUPPORT AND SPOUSAL SUPPORT Of 1 I -13-
11 2012;
12
14. Respondent's SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION OF JEFFERY FRAZIER and
13
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SET
l4
ASIDE THE ORDERS OF AUGUST 16,2013 filed04-14-2014, including Exhibit B thereto;
15
15. Respondent's MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION FOR TWO ORDERS ENTERED
t6
77 AUGUST 16,2003 AND ALTERNATIVE,LY A SET ASIDE OF THE TWO ORDERS
-LO PURSUANT TO CAL CODE CIV PRO $473(b) of 08-29-13;
L9 16. Respondent's NOTICE OF APPEAL re the orders of 08-16-13 filed on 10-15-13;

20 aT@);
17. Respondent,s NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO SET ASIDE UNDER CCP $
21-
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; DECLARATION of 02-19-14:'
22
18. Respondent's SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION OF JEFFERY FRAZIER
and
23
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORTTIES AS TO WHY UNDER TFIE LAW THE
24
25 ORDERS OF AUGUST 16,2013 MUST BE SET ASIDE Of 09/27/2013;
26 19. ORDERAFTER STATUS CONFERENCE (J. Mills) of 05-09-2013; and
2't
ZO
RESPONDENT'S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE IN SUPPORT OF MOTION

TO SET ASIDE
3
1 20. Respondent's Letter by Psychiatrist re Work Limitations of 0l-24-2014; Exh. W to Respondent's
2 Motion to Set Aside filed July 21,2015; Exh. ! to Respondent's Motion to Set Aside filed 02-19-
3
20t4.
4
CONCLUSION
5
Respondent respectfully requests that the Court take judicial notice for consideration in this
6
proceeding the items requested above.
8
10 Dated: luly 21,2015

per, SBN 157792
11
)_2
13
L4
15
76
l1
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19
20
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TO SET ASIDE
RESPONDENT,S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
4

Motion To Set Aside (Vacate) Trial Orders As Void (2 of 4)

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FL-300

To (name): Kathleen Kostas (Frazier) and

a. Date: Time: 1:] Dept: 82 [:1 Room:

T-l comply with

Order: If you wish

REQUEST FOR ORDER

Judas. CdrEil «came

REQUEST ORDER AND

f--] .risting order

income of both parents. It normally until the

RESPONDENT/DEFENDANT: Jeffery Frazier

f*1 PROPERTY CONTROL ro be

to make following payments

use the forms Request for Order

penalty of under the

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

In re the Marriage of: Case No.: 6-11-FL-005500

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT on , at , or as

the SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION OF JEFFERY FRAZIER and MEMORANDUM OF POINTS

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SET ASIDE

SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION OF JEFFERY FRAZIER and MEMORANDUM OF POINTS

19 fundamental fairness. ..................................................................................................................... 7

Petitioner’s submissions in connection with the orders.

Introduction and Factual Background

12 Petitioner, Kathleen Kostas (Frazier), is represented by attorneys Nedda Ledgerwood and

and sanctions of $105,000. The orders are facially void.

Points and Authorities

Craﬁ‘ (1978) 436 US. 1, 98 S. Ct. 1554, 56 L. Ed. 2d 30.)

IV. Void Judgments and Orders

13 1215, 1228 [113 Cal.Rptr.3d 147].)

19 (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1186, 1194 [18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 287].)

C. Ligal Effect of Void Judgment or Order

D. A judge may set aside a void order by another judge

4-17-2013 Tr. p.11. II. 19-24. IExh. Ul

16 Re Trial Briefs - [briefs exchanged at 5/20 status conference]

SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION OF JEFFERY FRAZIER and MEMORANDUM OF POINTS

Respondent’s SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION OF JEFFERY FRAZIER and MEMORANDUM

OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE ORDERS OF

14 way of his declarations of 09-27-13 and 04-14-14.

trials are adversarial, not one-sided as conducted here by Judge Zayner.

B. The trial court’s admission of. and reliance upon Petitioner’s

Rptr. 3d 268, 288-289. (emphasis added.)

13 P.3d 950, 955].)

14 In In re Marriage of Carlsson, as here, a truncated, non-standard trial procedure was devised

13 Cal.App.4th 1422, 1427 [40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 18].)

19 unanswered email letters, that tended to prove nothing.

26 opening brief and evidence no credit whatsoever (See m. L, p.4.)

Superior Court (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 573, 578 [70 Cal.Rptr.2d 507].)

$75,000 in attorney’s fees and $30,000 in sanctions.

relied upon it in his decisions according to his non-adversarial procedure.

“‘Where no evidence, or insufﬁcient evidence, is introduced on an issue, the ﬁnding on that

19 object to the admissions of Petitioner’s unswom attachments and attorney argument.

1. The improper admission of Petitioner’s non-evidence

11 void and must be set aside.

12 2. The lack of procedural regularity with the trial,

be in the best interests of the children.

23 A. The trial court made no ﬁndings that imputing income to

SUPPORT OF IMPUTATION OF INCOME TO RESPONDENT of 02-04-1 3 (Exh. Q), "opportunity" is

14 Petitioner, Kathleen Frazier, is represented by attorney Nedda Ledgerwood (with