CHAPTER TWO

A Practical Ethics Toolkit

Main Ideas in This Chapter:

• The first task of ethical analysis is to sort out the issues in a case into four categories:
factual issues, conceptual issues, application issues, and moral issues.
• The line-drawing method is a way of comparing a controversial situation with
uncontroversial (paradigm) ones in order to determine what should be said about the
controversial situation.
• The creative-middle-way approach is a way of resolving moral problems involving
competing moral demands by coming up with courses of action that satisfy as many
moral demands as possible.
• What are sometimes called moral theories or approaches to moral thinking are
attempts to identify the fundamental idea(s) in common morality. They are not always
necessary for resolving a moral problem, but, when they are, it is better to use more
than one approach.
• The utilitarian approach finds the fundamental idea of common morality to be the
imperative to maximize overall well-being. There are several ways of applying the
utilitarian approach.
• The respect for persons (RP) approach finds the basic idea of common morality to be
the imperative to act so as to respect humans as free and equal moral agents. There
are several ways of applying the RP approach.
• The virtue ethics approach finds the basic idea of common morality to be the
imperative to act in the way the virtuous person would act. It supplies concepts for
understanding moral motivation and development and gives guidance when moral and
professional rules provide insufficient direction.

IN 1993, IT WAS PUBLICLY REVEALED that Germany s Heidelberg University had in the
past used more than 200 cadavers, including those of 8 children, in automobile crash tests.
This revelation drew immediate protests in Germany. Rudolph Hammerschmidt, spokesperson
for the Roman Catholic Bishop’s Conference, objected. Even the dead possess human dignity.
This research should be done with mannequins, he said. ADAC, Germany s largest
automobile club, issued a statement saying, in an age when experiments on animals are being
put into question, such tests must be carried out on dummies and not on children s cadavers.
In reply, the university claimed that, in every case, relatives granted permission, as
required by German law. It added that although it had used children in the past, this practice
had been stopped in 1989. The rationale for using cadavers is that data from such crash tests
are vital for constructing more than 120 types of instrumented dummies, ranging in size from
infants to adults, that can simulate dozens of human reactions in a crash. The statement
claimed that such tests have been used to save many lives, including those of children.
Similar testing has also been conducted in the United States at Wayne State s Bio-
engineering Center. Robert Wartner, a Wayne State spokesperson, indicated that the testing
has been done as a part of a study by the federal government s Centers for Disease Control.
However, he added, Cadavers are used only when alternative could not produce useful safety
research.
Clarence Ditlow, head of the Center for Auto Safety, a Washington, DC, public advocacy
group, said that the center advocates three criteria for using cadavers in crash testing: (1)
assurance that the data sought by the tests cannot be gained from using dummies, (2) prior
consent by the deceased person, and (3) informed consent of the family.1

2.1 INTRODUCTION

This case illustrates how technology raises important moral and social issues. Here, we
can see a conflict between the safety and well-being of the public, which apparently can be
enhanced by the use of cadavers, and concerns about the dignity of the cadaver. As we shall
see later in this chapter, these moral considerations correspond to two different and
sometimes conflicting moral approaches. If we take the code of the National Society of
Professional Engineers (NSPE) as representative of other engineering codes, it is clear that
simply referring to a professional code is not sufficient to resolve some issues in engineering.
To be sure, the first Fundamental Canon of the NSPE code says that engineers must hold
paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public. But does this directive imply that
cadavers should be used for crash testing, or does the consideration of human dignity (rarely
mentioned in engineering codes) override considerations of health, welfare, and safety in this
case? In addressing many issues in engineering ethics, we need ethical resources or methods
to supplement the codes.
These methods should be thought of as analogous to tools in a toolbox. Carpenters have
many tools at their disposal: hammers, screwdrivers, saws, and so forth. For some tasks, a
hammer is appropriate, for others, a screwdriver, and for others, the saw. The carpenter must
learn which tools are appropriate for a given task, and this knowledge comes only with
experience.
We begin with tools for analyzing a moral problem into its components. Most moral
problems contain one or more of the following components.

2.2 DETERMINING THE FACTS: FACTUAL ISSUES

We cannot discuss a moral problem intelligently apart from a knowledge of the facts that
bear on the problem. We have designated questions about what the facts are as factual
issues. We might think that the facts of a situation are always beyond dispute, but this is often
not the case. To understand the status of facts in a moral controversy, consider the following
three claims about factual issues.
First, many apparent moral disagreements turn out to be disagreements over the relevant
facts. In looking at the case at the beginning of the chapter, you may be asking yourself:
Is it really the case that important factual information that will save lives can only be
gained from crash testing with cadavers? Many people (although certainly not all) would
agree that if vital information can be gained only by the use of cadavers, then cadavers should
be used, but people might legitimately disagree over whether cadavers are really necessary.
 Second, factual issues are sometimes very difficult to resolve. In this case, for example, it
may be difficult or even impossible to determine with certainty whether using information from
testing cadavers produces a significant decrease in accidents, as opposed to using
information from other sources, such as computer simulations or testing with dummies.
Third, sometimes we must make decisions about important moral issues, even though
some of the relevant factual issues cannot be resolved. Suppose there is sim- ply no way to
confirm or deny the claim that cadaver testing results in a higher level of safety. How shall we
decide what to do? Should we put greater emphasis on respecting the bodies of dead humans
or obtaining data that may save lives? In this case, the controversy shifts to a more direct
consideration of moral issues.

2.3 CLARIFYING CONCEPTS: CONCEPTUAL ISSUES

Responsible moral thinking requires not only attending carefully to facts but also having a
good grasp of the key concepts we are using. That is, we need to get as clear as we can about
the meanings of key terms. For example, public health, safety, and welfare, conflict of
interest, bribery, extortion, confidentiality, trade secret, and loyalty are key terms for
ethics in engineering, but their meanings are not always obvious. We call questions about the
meanings of terms conceptual issues. If people disagree about the meanings of such terms,
they may be unable to resolve arguments which make reference to them, even if they agree
about all of the facts and moral assumptions. For example, an engineer s action might be a
conflict of interest according to one definition of the term, but not a conflict of interest by
another definition of the same term.
It would be desirable to have precise definitions of disputed terms; but like most terms in
ethics, their meanings are somewhat open ended. In many cases, it is sufficient to clarify our
meaning by thinking of paradigms, or clear-cut examples, of what we have in mind. We might,
for example, think of an uncontroversial case of a conflict of interest, such as an engineer s
specifying bolts from a company he owns, even though the bolts are the most expensive and
lowest quality on the market. From this example, we can draw out a definition of a conflict of
interest: a situation involving a conflict between a professional obligation (e.g., specifying the
best product at the best price) and a private interest (e.g., promoting the interests of a firm one
owns).
In the case at the beginning of the chapter, the concept of human dignity is crucial.
Similarly, the concept of informed consent is important in determining whether the cadavers
were obtained with the proper kind of consent.

2.4 DETERMINING HOW CONCEPTS APPLY: APPLICATION ISSUES

When we say that the use of cadavers in crash testing violates human dignity, we are
saying that the concept of respecting human dignity cannot be correctly applied to the practice
of using cadavers for crash testing. This is a claim about an application issue, that is, a claim
about whether a given term or expression applies to an individual action, or a general practice.
Since application issues have to do with whether a concept applies to or fits a situation,
disagreements over application issues can occur when there is disagreement over (1) the
meaning of the concept to be applied (conceptual issue), (2) the facts to which the concept is
to be applied (factual issue), or (3) whether the concept applies in the situation (application
issue). In this case, one conceptual issue is how we should define human dignity. A factual
issue is whether cadavers are necessary to obtain some types of information relevant to auto
safety. An application issue is the question whether using cadavers for testing can be
considered an example of respecting human dignity.

2.5 LINE DRAWING

So far we have been looking at three analytical techniques for sorting out moral controversies
into categories. Now we are ready to look at a way of resolving moral issues. Keep in mind
that sometimes a moral judgment is justified as soon as an application issue has been
decided,
especially when the application issue involves a concept that we can call morally laden. When
we have established that an action is a lie, or is murder, or bribery, we have, under ordinary
circumstances, already decided that an action is wrong, because lying, committing murder, or
bribery are ordinarily wrong. In other words, to resolve the application issue is to justify a moral
judgment about the action. However, sometimes lying, murder (or at least killing), or bribery
might have to be balanced against other important moral considerations. Then, we have a true
moral issue in the sense defined in Box 2.1
Consider the following example. Victor is an
engineer in a large construction firm.
Although he will not make the final decision,
he has been assigned the task of
recommending which welded steel studs
should be used for the construction of a large
apartment building. After some research and
testing, he decides to recommend ACME
steel studs for the job. On the day after Victor
s recommendation was made, an ACME
representative visits him and gives him a
voucher for an all- expense paid trip to the
annual ACME Technical Forum, which meets
in Jamaica. The trip will have considerable
educational value, but will also include day trips to the beach and other points of interest
 If Victor accepts, has he been bribed? In answering this question an application issue it
is useful to begin by coming up with a clear-cut, unproblematic case of a bribe. We have
referred to such cases as paradigm cases. Here is a paradigm case of a bribe. Suppose a
vendor offers an engineer $10,000 to get the engineer to recommend the vendor s product to
the engineer s company. Since all of the facts we need are not supplied in the narrative, we
must make some assumptions. Filling in some facts not given in the narrative with reasonable
assumptions, we can say that several aspects of the situation we shall call them features are
relevant in making this situation a paradigmatic bribe. The gift is substantial; it is offered before
the engineer s decision on which product to recommend; the engineer accepts the offer for
reasons of personal gain; the engineer has sole responsibility for the decision as to which
studs to specify; the vendor s product is the most expensive on the market; and it is of
questionable quality. This is, without question, a bribe. Box 2.2 shows a useful graphic way of
representing a paradigm case of a bribe.
We can also construct a paradigm at the other extreme, one which depicts a situation
that is clearly not a bribe. In most cases, this can be done by simply negating the
characteristics of the paradigm bribe. Thus, a paradigmatic non-bribe would be a situation in
which the gift is very small (perhaps a pen worth two dollars); it is offered after the engineer s
decision on which product to recommend has been made; the engineer does not personally
gain from the decision; the engineer does not make the final decision on whether to buy the
steel studs; and the vendor s product is the highest quality and lowest price on the market.
Now we can return to Victor s situation. We can call his situation a test case, because it
is a case in which the question whether Victor s action is a bribe is controversial and must be
tested by comparing it with paradigm bribes and non- bribes. In the case of each feature, we
can place an X on the continuum between the two paradigms to indicate whether a given
feature of the test case is closer to the paradigm bribe or the paradigm non-bribe. It is also
useful to put circles around a few of the Xs to indicate features you think have special
importance in evaluating this test case. Box 2.3 provides a useful graphic representation of
these issues.
As Box 2.3 suggests, the test case is by no means a paradigm bribe and probably
should not be considered a bribe. Nevertheless, it comes close enough to a paradigm bribe
with regard to several features especially gift size to raise some concern.
 So far, line-drawing has been applied to an application issue, namely whether Vic- tor s
accepting the vendor s offer should be considered accepting a bribe. Since we have
concluded that Victor s action is not a bribe, the analysis so far does not give Victor a definitive
answer to the question whether he should accept the vendor s offer. This is because, even if
accepting the offer is not accepting a bribe, other rea- sons for not accepting the offer might be
relevant.
A second line-drawing exercise might help decide whether Victor should accept the
offer, all things considered. The opposing paradigms would be a situation in which accepting
the offer would not be morally justifiable and a situation in which accepting the offer would be
morally justifiable. The features might include whether accepting the offer confirms to industry-
wide practice, whether accepting the vendor s offer would conform to company policy, whether
really useful information will be offered at the Technical Forum, whether it will be generally
known that the offer of the trip was made after the decision to purchase the vendor s product,
and whether accepting the vendor s offer might influence Victor or others to make unethical
decisions in the future. Just as we had to make some assumptions in the first decision,
assumptions will have to be made here. Given the absence of sufficient facts, performing this
analysis will involve many assumptions. We leave it to the reader to perform this analysis and
come to a conclusion, based on the assumptions made.

2.6 CONFLICTING VALUES: CREATIVE- MIDDLE-WAY SOLUTIONS

Here is a case involving conflicting values, making it a moral issue as defined in Box 2.1.
Brad is in the second year of his first full-time job after graduating from Engineering Tech.2 He
enjoys design, but is becoming increasingly concerned that his work is not being adequately
checked by more experienced engineers. He has been assigned to assist in the design of a
number of projects that involve issues of public safety, such as schools and overhead
walkways between buildings. He has already spoken to his supervisor, whose engineering
competence he respects, and he has been told that more experienced engineers check his
work. Later, he discovers to his dismay that his work is often not adequately checked. Instead,
his drawings are stamped and passed on to the contractor. Sometimes the smaller projects he
designs are under construction within a few weeks after his designs are completed.
At this point, Brad calls one of his former professors at Engineering Tech for advice. I’m
really worried that I’m going to make a mistake that will kill someone, Brad says. I try to
overdesign, but the projects I’m being assigned to are becoming increasingly difficult. What
should I do? Brad s professor tells him that he cannot ethically continue on his present course
because he is engaging in engineering work that surpasses his qualifications and may
endanger the public. What should Brad do?
Brad s case illustrates one of the most common conflicts faced by engineers, one in
which his obligation to his employer seems to conflict with his obligation to the public. Both of
these obligations are clearly mandated by the codes. The NSPE code requires engineers to
hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public (Canon 1) and also to act in
professional matters for each employer or client as faithful agents or trustees (Canon 4).
Brad also has a legitimate interest in preserving and promoting his own career and protecting
the interests of his family, if he has one.
Because of the multiple conflicting values, Brad should attempt to find what we call a
creative middle way that would satisfy as many of these conflicting obligations as possible. In
carrying out the search for a creative-middle-way solution, it is helpful to arrange courses of
action in serial order, beginning with the one that would most satisfactorily honor all three of
the obligations, and continuing to options that would not honor all of the obligations. Here are
some possible courses of action:
1. Brad could go to his supervisor again and suggest in the most tactful way
possible that he is uncomfortable about the fact that his designs are not being
properly checked, pointing out that it is not in the firm s interests to produce
designs that may be flawed. If the supervisor agrees to provide more adequate
supervision, Brad could resolve the problem and keep on the best of terms with
his employer. Brad could thus honor his obligation to the safety of the public, to
his employer, and to himself and his career. This would be an ideal creative-
middle-way solution.
2. Brad might talk to others in the organization with whom he has a good working
relationship and ask them to help him persuade his supervisor that he (Brad)
should be given more supervision. This solution is almost as good, because it
would resolve the problem, but it might tarnish the supervisor s reputation with
his other employees and perhaps with the public. While satisfying Brad s
obligation to the public, it might not as satisfactorily honor the obligation to his
employer and himself.
3. Brad could find another job and then, after his own employment is secure, reveal
the information to the state registration board for engineers or to others who
could stop the practice. While protecting his own career and the public, this
option does not promote his employer s interests.
4. Brad might tell his supervisor that he does not believe he can continue to
engage in design work that is beyond his abilities and experience and that he
might have to consider changing jobs. This solution involves a confrontation with
his employer. This solution might not cause the employer to change his bad
practices and might harm Brad s career. It might also harm the reputation of the
supervisor with his other employees.
5. Brad could go to the press or his professional society and blow the whistle
immediately. This would protect the public, but possibly damage his career
prospects and certainly severely damage the supervisor’s business.
 You can think of other possibilities as well, such as continuing in his job without protest or
finding another job without protest. If the first obligation is to protect the public as the codes
enjoin these options would be unsatisfactory. Perhaps only the first two options could be
considered really satisfactory creative-middle-way solutions, because they satisfy the most
important demands, and the first option is the more desirable of the two.
As this example illustrates, finding a creative-middle-way solution is often the best way to
resolve a moral problem with important, but conflicting, moral considerations. It also illustrates
the need for creativity, because it may take some creative work to think of good solutions.

2.7 COMMON MORALITY

We have seen that the work of the practical ethicist is analogous to the work of a carpenter
who uses whatever tools are appropriate to the task at hand. A hammer is sometimes
appropriate, but at other times, the carpenter needs a saw or a screwdriver. Like a skilled
carpenter, the practical ethicist must have a command of all of the available tools and use
whatever is appropriate for the situation. The methods of line drawing or finding a creative
middle way may be sufficient, but sometimes something more is needed. In order to resolve
some moral issues especially those involving larger social policies we must look more deeply
into the moral ideas that lie at the basis of our moral judgments.
The most obvious place to look is the stock of common moral beliefs which most people in
our culture, and perhaps people generally, accept. We call this set of beliefs common morality.
Several summary accounts of the basic precepts of common morality exist; as you might
expect, they are similar.
The first account is by philosopher W. D. Ross, who constructed a list of basic duties or
obligations, which he called prima facie (at first sight, or before closer inspection) duties. In
using these terms, Ross intended to convey the idea that although any given duty is usually
obligatory, it can be overridden by another duty in special circumstances. He disclaimed
finality for his list, but he believed it was reasonably complete. His list of prima facie duties can
be summarized in Box 2.4.
 Engineers, like others, probably share
these moral beliefs, and many of them are
reflected in engineering codes of ethics. Most
codes enjoin engineers to be faithful agents
of their employees, and this injunction is
reflected in the duties of fidelity (R1) and
gratitude (R2). Most codes require engineers
to act in ways that protect the health, safety,
and welfare of the public, and this obligation
is reflected in the duties of justice (R3) and
beneficence (R4), and especially in the duty
not to injure others (R6). Finally, most codes
encourage engineers to improve their
professional skills, a duty reflected in R5
.

Another attempt to formulate many of the

basic elements of common moral- ity is the
list of 10 moral rules formulated by
philosopher Bernard Gert. His list is shown in
Box 2.5. Ross s prima facie duties and Gert s
moral rules overlap each other consider- ably.
Moral rules G1 G9, for example might be
seen as specifications of Ross s duty not to
injure others. The wrongness of lying and
promise breaking appear on both lists. R2 R5
seem to be of a more positive nature than
Gert s moral rules, which focus on not
causing harm. However, Gert also provides a
list of 10 moral ideals, which focus on
preventing harm. In fact, the moral ideals can
be formulated by introducing the word slightly
prevent and changing the wording of the rules slightly. Thus, the moral ideal corresponding to
Don t kill is Prevent killing. For Gert, the moral rules specify moral requirements, whereas the
moral ideals are aspirational. Nevertheless, there is a difference of emphasis. While Gert
believes that the primary requirements of common morality are negative and prohibitive, Ross
gives preeminence to positive duties.
Everyone recognizes that moral precepts and rules have exceptions. We have already
seen that Ross calls his duties prima facie, but he does not explain how we go about deciding
when an exception is justified. There are two ways.
First, when moral duties or rules conflict, we must decide which precept is more binding in a
given situation.5 Usually, it is wrong to lie, but if the only way to save an innocent person from
being murdered is to lie to the assailant about that person s whereabouts, then most would
agree that lying is justified. How is this exception jus- tified? According to Gert, if we are willing
for this exception to be widely practiced if we are willing for others also to lie in similar
circumstances then the exception is justified.
This exception is based on a widely held moral idea that we shall encounter later: we
must be willing for others to do what we do in similar situations. This principle, called the
Universalization Principle, while an idea of great importance in common morality, is not always
easy to apply. People can disagree as to when a situation is really similar and when one
should be willing to universalize. Nevertheless, the principle is an important one in ethics.
Second, exceptions can be made to moral duties or rules when our conscience
intervenes. Suppose a young man is called into military service, but sincerely believes that
killing others is wrong, even to defend one s country. He might understand the obligation not to
kill in war to follow from a duty not to injure others. In this situa- tion, many nations, including
the United States, allow an exception to the presumed duty to defend one s country, based
onconscientious objection.

The moral justification is that if this young man is forced to defend his country by killing,
he is being forced to do what he deeply and sincerely believes to be wrong; and, according to
common morality as ordinarily understood, one should never do what he or she deeply and
sincerely believes to be wrong.
Such exceptions must be handled carefully and sometimes cannot be allowed. We may
believe that the young man is mistaken, and that an implicit obligation as a citizen to defend
one’s country follows from the general duty to keep promises. And we certainly cannot allow a
person to follow up on a presumed obligation to kill those who disagree with him on political or
religious grounds, even if such a belief is deeply and sincerely held. Nevertheless, a certain
freedom to make exceptions to duties or moral rules on the basis of conscience is a part of
common morality.

2.8 ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS OF COMMON MORALITY

Several other elements are a part of common morality as generally understood and are
useful in practical moral analysis First, moral judgments can be of several types, which are
enumerated in Box 2.6. We can say that, from the standpoint of common morality, there are
four types of moral judgments. See Box 2.6. Second, moral statements can usefully be divided
into three levels of generality described in Box 2.7.
 Third, determining the intent behind an
action is of great importance in com- mon
morality. In the law, which follows common
morality here, whether you kill someone
deliberately, as in first-degree murder, or
accidently, as in an unavoidable traffic
accident, is crucial in deter- mining moral
blame. Similarly, whether engineers do
something intentionally (as was apparently
the case in the attempts of Volkswagen
officials to deceive governmental regulators)
or unintentionally (even if negligently) is of
central moral and legal importance.

2.9 IS THERE A PLACE FOR MORAL

THEORIES?

We have now reviewed several

methods in practical ethics: line-drawing,
creative middle ways, and an appeal to duties
or rules, along with the Universalization
Principle. Are there any other useful
methods? Philosopher Michael Davis
suggests eight questions or tests that rely on our commonsense morality, but also reflect some
of the concepts in moral theories or approaches that we discuss later. (See his tests in Box
2.8.) Thus, they offer an appropriate transition to the moral theories, or what we shall often call
approaches, to moral thinking, because the latter term emphasizes their partial and
incomplete nature.6
In some situations, these questions may be sufficient to guide us in resolving a moral
issue, and when they are, they should be used. But other questions can arise. How should I go
about deciding whether I would want my decision to be made public? On what grounds would I
defend my decision before a Congressional committee? Would my colleagues or ethics officer
be right in agreeing or disagreeing with my action?
Here are some further questions not related to Davis tests. Think of the case at the
beginning of this chapter. You notice that if you begin by thinking about respecting cadavers
you seem to come to one conclusion and that if you think about the lives that might be saved
by using the cadavers in crash tests, you come to another conclusion. Why are there such
different approaches to moral decision making? Is one superior to the other? Consider some
other questions, for example, why should we keep promises, or refrain from injuring others, or
refrain from deceiving others?

2.10 MORAL THEORIES: APPROACHES AS MODELS

In the remainder of this chapter, we look at three theories or approaches that shed light on
these and other questions. Before doing this, we shall make a case for what we believe are
useful analogies between ethical theories or approaches and models in engineering and
computer science. Let’s begin by considering the following two examples:

Example 1. A Materials Model. Modeling is a technique familiar to engineers. For example,

we often model the behavior of a material as linearly elastic, meaning the stress is linearly
proportional to the strain, E. Sometimes this theory about the behavior of a material is simply
not accurate, however. Sometimes we must model the material as nonlinear or perhaps with
time-, temperature-, or rate-dependent properties. That doesn’t mean that the linear elastic
material model is wrong, but only that it is not applicable or sufficiently accurate for the
particular material in the particular situation under consideration. As part of their professional
training and experience, engineers come to understand this kind of problem. They learn how
to recognize this deficiency and to understand that a different model might be more
appropriate.
Example 2. An Online Bookstore. Suppose computer experts are designing computer
programs to operate an online bookstore. They quickly discover that several programs are
needed: one to model the elements used and the relationships between them (books, authors,
invoices and payment options, etc.), one to model the sequence of steps in the ordering
process (designation of a book, placing an order, processing order, etc.), and one to model the
costs involved in operating the online bookstore (costs for each step, various options, etc.).
They also notice that the models can lead to incompatible conclusions. For example, one
sequence of steps in the ordering process may be the most user-friendly, but too expensive. In
the event of such conflicts, a process of reconciliation must be used to produce a final design.
Notice several analogies between these examples and the way moral theories are
employed in practical or applied ethics.
First, just as the equation for stress reveals a principle widely applicable in science and
engineering, so ethical theories reveal widespread patterns of moral thinking. Recalling the
cadaver example, both the value of promoting the public good (a utilitarian approach) and the
value of protecting the dignity of cadavers (an RP approach) are important and widely
accepted ways of moral thinking.
Second, just as the stress equation may not be adequate in some situations, some-
times a generally valid moral principle is simply not relevant in a particular moral analysis. We
shall see, for example, that sometimes the utilitarian approach may be more relevant to a
moral analysis, and sometimes virtue ethics or RP approaches may be more relevant. This is
not because the other approaches are wrong, but only that they are not as relevant to the
situation at hand as another approach. They do not capture moral considerations that are
helpful in a given analysis.
Third, just as several approaches are useful in the online bookstore example, sometimes
several ethical models are necessary to adequately analyze and resolve a moral dilemma. In
the cadaver example, both the utilitarian and RP approaches are necessary in order to
understand the moral considerations underlying the controversy.
Fourth, just as in the online bookstore example, the programs for the ordering process
and economic analysis may suggest different conclusions, so different ethical analyses may
suggest different conclusions. (Remember the cadaver example at the beginning of the
chapter.) More generally, well-being, respecting individual dignity, and the ethical ideas in
virtue ethics may not produce the same conclusions.

Fifth, just as the differing conclusions in the bookstore example require reconciliation, so
differing conclusions suggested by the different ethical approaches may require reconciliation.
As you might expect, sometimes the differing lines of reasoning from the various approaches
converge on the same conclusion, and then they reinforce each other. When the conclusions
diverge, a process of reconciliation must take place, where we determine which moral
considerations are more important. There is no set formula for reconciliation; instead, the
insight and judgment of the person facing the moral problem are crucially important.

With these considerations in mind, we turn to the three ethical approaches, which we
shall interpret as models of common morality. Each of the theories attempts to organize the
elements of common morality around an overriding theme or principle. As with most models,
each of the models will suffer from incompleteness, but each provides valuable insight into
fundamental moral ideas and into the basis of many moral controversies.

2.11 THE UTILITARIAN APPROACH

The fundamental principle of the utilitarian model of common morality is We should maximize
overall well-being. We refer to the population over which well-being is maximized as the
audience. In order to implement the utilitarian approach, we must determine the scope of this
audience. Ideally, perhaps the audience should include all humans, or at least all humans who
might be affected by the action to be evaluated. Some utilitarian think that even those animals
clearly able to experience pain or pleasure should be included in the audience, if they would
also be affected. But then it becomes enormously difficult to calculate which actions produce
the most goods for so large an audience. If we limit the audience so that it includes only our
country, company, or community, then we face the criticism that others have been arbitrarily
excluded. Therefore, in practice, those with utilitarian sympathies need to develop acceptable
ways of limiting the audience.
Once we determine the audience, we must know which course of action will produce the
most goods in both the short and the long term. Unfortunately, this knowledge is sometimes
not available at the time decisions must be made. We do not have enough factual knowledge,
for example, to know for sure whether permitting or prohibiting advertising and competitive
pricing for professional services in engineering will maximize the well-being of the public. The
well-being of the public in this con- text is interpreted broadly as having the best professional
services at the best price. Sometimes all we can do is try a certain course of action and see
what happens. Unfortunately, this may be risky in some situations.
Another issue is that the utilitarian approach sometimes favors the greater aggregate
good at the expense of a minority. From a utilitarian standpoint, it might be justifiable to allow
the emission of pollutants from a plant that will severely harm a few, if the benefits from the
plant (good jobs, etc.) outweigh the harms to the few. Thus, utilitarianism can lead to unjust
distributions, suggesting that it has not adequately captured all of the elements of common
morality. As in applying any model, one must be aware of the characteristic weaknesses of the
model. Despite this weakness, utilitarian thinking is often enormously useful. Now we can look
at three tests suggested by the utilitarian approach.

The Cost-Benefit Test

If a utilitarian approach requires that we maximize well-being, how should we go about

determining the criteria we should use in seeking this maximization? One approach that has
appeal from the engineering perspective is cost-benefit analysis (CBA), which holds that the
course of action that produces the greatest benefit or utility relative to cost should be chosen.
In using this method, one must convert negative and positive utilities into monetary terms. A
close relative of CBA is risk-benefit analysis (RBA), which attempts to balance the risk of
benefit against the risk of harm. Because it is often more difficult to determine risks than costs,
we shall consider only CBA, which involves three steps, detailed in Box 2.9.
As we should expect, there are serious problems with using CBA as a sole guide for
moral thinking. One problem is that the cost-benefit approach assumes that economic
measures of cost and benefit override all other considerations. Sup- pose a wilderness area is
damaged by a plant’s emissions. From the CBA standpoint, it might not be justifiable to
eliminate the pollutant, but economic considerations alone may not be an adequate measure
of the value of the wilderness.
 In fact, CBA might seem to justify
many practices in the past that we now
believe were morally wrong. In the
nineteenth century, many people opposed
child labor laws, arguing that they would
lead to economic inefficiencies. They
pointed out, for example, that tunnels and
shafts in coal mines were too small to
accommodate adults and that using
children was more economically efficient.
Again, many arguments in favor of slavery
were based on considerations of economic
efficiency. When our society finally
decided to eliminate child labor and
slavery, it was not simply because they
became economically inefficient, but
because they came to be considered
unjust, an objection that can be made
more straightforwardly from an RP
approach than from a utilitarian perspective.

Another problem with CBA is how to ascertain the cost of the loss of human life or even
serious injury. Estimates are often made on the basis of such factors as how much a person is
willing to pay for a safer vehicle or how much more a person would have made if they lived a
normal lifespan, but both of these measures are dependent on how wealthy a person is and
are considered unjust by many. Aside from the difficulty of determining the costs and benefits
of known factors (such as immediate death or injury), it is also difficult to predict what factors
will be relevant in the future. If the threat to human health posed by a substance is not known,
then it is impossible to execute a definitive CBA. This problem becomes especially acute if we
consider long-term costs and benefits, most of which are impossible to predict or measure.
In a slightly different way of stating the problem of injustice described earlier, we can say
that CBA fails to take into account the distribution of costs and benefits. Suppose a plant
dumps a pollutant into a river in which many poorer members of the community fish to
supplement their diets. Suppose also that after all of the
known costs and benefits are calculated, it is concluded that the costs of eliminating the
pollutant outweigh all of the health costs to the poor. Still, if the costs are paid by the poor and
the benefits are enjoyed by the rich, then the costs and benefits are not equally shared. Even if
the poor are compensated for the damage to their health, many would say that an injustice has
still been done. After all, the wealthy members of the community do not have to suffer the
same threats to their health.
After recognizing its limitations, we can still see that CBA can make an important
contribution to moral problem solving. We cannot imagine constructing a large engineering
project, such as a hydroelectric dam, without performing an elaborate CBA. Its ability to
evaluate many conflicting considerations in terms of a single mea- sure monetary value
 makes it enormously useful in certain circumstances. As with all other tools for moral
analysis, however, we must keep its limitations in mind.

The Test of Maximizing Good Consequences

Some utilitarian approaches do not require that values be measured in strictly
quantitative terms. However, they do require that we try to determine what will, in some sense,
maximize good consequences. Here, we can try to proceed on the assumption that an action
is right if it results in more utility than any alternative action that is available in this situation. In
other words, the question is, will this particular course of action result in more good than any
alternative course of action that is available in this situation? To answer this question, the
procedure in Box 2.10 is useful.
Although the Universalization Principle requires that if two situations are similar, we must
resolve them in a similar way, focusing on the consequences in particular situations is still
often appropriate. For example, assuming the costs are roughly equal, a utilitarian would make
the choice between two safety devices in an automotive design by determining which device is
more likely to reduce the most injuries and fatalities. To take another example, the choice
between two plans for road improvements would be decided on the basis of such
considerations as which plan would save the most lives and which plan is most economically
feasible. Or again, unless one believes that hydroelectric plants should not be built at all,
because of environmental or other considerations, an engineer would ordinarily focus on the
pros and cons of how and where a particular site should be built. In these cases, the focus is
on a single case, not all similar cases.
By contrast, in some situations, the
questions about the utilitarian pros and cons of a
general practice are more relevant, especially if
there already exists a general practice governing
the situation. Here, the utilitarian considerations
should focus on the general practice: whether it
should be followed, whether it should be
modified, whether it should be violated in this
particular situation, or whether the practice
should be abolished altogether. The
Universalization Principle, that is, comes into
much greater prominence. We now consider this
version of the utilitarian approach.

The Rules and Practices Test

Consider the following case. James works for Precision Parts, which supplies high- quality
components for large machines. Precision Parts has a substantial in-house manufacturing
operation, but also contracts with other manufacturers to make some of the components it
supplies to customers. James has called for bids from some of the firm s trusted
manufacturers for Part X. After the bids have been submitted, Wendell, head of the in-house
manufacturing operation, comes into James office and says, I know the bids are supposed to
be secret, but why don t you tell me what the lowest bid was and I will try to come in under that
bid. We are all in this together, and it would help Precision Parts to be able to make Part X in-
house.
Looking at Wendell s request, James decides that it makes a lot of sense. The out- side
manufacturer that made the lowest bid is large and will not be hurt by the loss of this contract.
Precision Parts is not able to keep its own employees busy because of decreased business,
and its profits are down. It seems like everyone will be better off if James honors Wendell s
request.

But then James broadens his perspective. He realizes that he is trying to justify helping
his company violate a rule (respecting confidentiality) that is understood to apply to all involved
in the bidding process, including his company. He realizes that the Universalization Principle
requires him to ask some more general questions. What if Precision Parts made the violation
of confidentiality their general practice? What would other companies do if they discovered
that this is how Precision Parts operates? What if other companies make themselves
exceptions to the practice in this way, too?
Now he may reflect, Precision Parts is just one player in the practice of bidding; and I
cannot convincingly argue that it is so special that it need not abide by the confidentiality rule
even though others should. So, James asks a different question:
Suppose Precision Parts and other firms supported the practice, whenever it is in a firm
s interest, it may break the confidentiality of bids. Would this practice, if generally adopted,
benefit Precision Parts, or other firms, or the public?
Now James is looking at things from a very different perspective. Instead of trying to
determine the consequences of one action his firm s secretly violating the confidentiality of bids
in this one case he is thinking about the consequences of the adoption of the practice of
violating confidentiality by other firms as well. If this happened, it would be common knowledge
that the confidentiality of bids would not be honored, and the integrity of the whole bidding
process might unravel. Firms might even be reluctant to submit bids to firms with in-house
manufacturing facilities, like Precision Parts, knowing that their bids probably would not be
successful.
This fictional case illustrates an important point. It is one thing to ask about the utility of
the consequences of a single action, and another thing entirely to ask about the utility of the
consequences of a general practice, as this practice is enshrined in a rule or set of rules.7 In
the case under discussion, while breaking the confidentiality of bids in this situation might
seem like a good idea, the general practice of doing so is a very bad idea indeed.
Determining the consequences of a general practice may be more difficult than
determining the consequences of a single act, because the number of people affected by a
general practice the audience is usually much larger. However, as the bidding case
illustrates, this is not always so. Sometimes the consequences of a general practice are so
obvious that little imagination is needed to know what the consequences of the
policy would be. Think of traffic rules designed to enhance cooperative, safe driving. It is
late at night and there seems to be no one around, and the light is red. You might think it is
obvious that no one would be harmed and it would be more convenient to you to violate the
law and go through the red light.
 Then you think of the general practice involved. Clearly, general disobedience of traffic
lights, stop signs, yield signs, and other conventions of the road would be disastrous for
everyone, including you. So it seems reasonable to conclude that, in general, it is better for all
of us that we guide our driving by conforming to these rules and conventions rather than trying
in each circumstance to determine whether, for example, it is safe to go through a red light.
That is, it is better to develop good driving habits that others can count on our having rather
than trying to decide what to do in a less predictable manner, instance by instance.
Of course, rules and practices can, and sometimes should, change. At one time, there
were no yield signs. Then some stop signs were replaced by yield signs, and yield signs were
sometimes introduced where no traffic signs were present at all. Now many stoplight
intersections are being replaced by roundabouts. Presumably, these changes were introduced
to improve traffic safety and efficiency, desirable goals from a utilitarian perspective. But, it
should be noted, these are examples of rule and practice replacements, not simply the
elimination of rules and practices.
From a utilitarian perspective, in situations covered by well-understood, generally
observed rules or practices that serve utilitarian ends, a case can be made for justify- ing your
actions by appealing directly to these rules and practices. These generally observed rules and
practices, in turn, are justified by their utility. In the vast majority of cases, you should probably
just abide by the general rules and not even consider whether their violation in a particular
case should be justified.
There are complications, however. If there are widespread departures from rules or
practices, then it is less clear whether overall utility is still being promoted by continuing to
conform to the rules or practices when others do not. To preserve the beauty of a grassy
campus quad, a Please Use Sidewalks sign might be posted. As long as most comply with this
request, the grassy area may retain its beauty. But if too many cut across the grass, a worn
path will begin to form. Eventually, the point of complying with the sign may seem lost from a
utilitarian standpoint the valued end has been lost.
Another problem is that determining the precise nature of the rule to be followed is
sometimes difficult and controversial. Suppose James, in considering whether to violate the
confidentiality of bids, considers this rule: An employee should always and without any
exceptions act so as to maximize the firm s profits. This rule is too broad and would lead to
disaster if implemented. Another rule might be, if your name is James and you work for
Precision Parts, you should violate the confidentiality of the bidding process in Situation X (the
situation James faces in the case described above). This rule is too specific and exhibits
arbitrary pleading. What, we may ask, is so special about having the name James and working
for Precision Parts? What about having the name Robert and working for Safety Parts? In
short, limiting a moral rule about confidentiality to just James and Precision Parts will not work.
Nevertheless, some exceptions to the rule do seem to be quite legitimate. If you are
approaching a stop sign in an otherwise remote area when a large, out- of-control truck is right
behind you, then you had better get out of the way.
Thinking about the utility of rules can be enormously useful in considering some
decisions, especially decisions about legal and social policy issues having broad social
consequences. Consider the question whether professions should be allowed to advertise. On
the one hand, some believe that advertising provides information to the public that it would not
otherwise have and promotes competition which keeps down prices for professional services.
On the other hand, some believe that professional advertising can mislead the public and give
an advantage to professionals and professional firms who are good at advertising, but not
necessarily the most professionally competent. All of these arguments are utilitarian because
they pose the question, which general practice followed by all professionals promotes the well-
being of the public, all things considered?
See Box 2.11 for useful steps to follow
when engaging in utilitarian thinking about
rules and practices.

Applying the utilitarian procedures

described in this section requires addressing
many questions, some of which may prove to
be quite complex and may not yield answers
about which we can be certain. Nevertheless,
following these procedures can often be very
useful in practical ethics, especially given the
ease with which someone like James can
otherwise overlook, or even deliberately
ignore, factors that should be taken into
account.

2.12 THE RESPECT FOR PERSONS APPROACH

The fundamental principle of the RP model of common morality is Act so that you
respect all humans as free and equal moral agents. This equal regard for moral agents can be
understood as a basic requirement of justice. A moral agent must be distinguished from knives
or airplanes, which can only fulfill goals or purposes that are imposed upon them from the
outside. Inanimate objects cannot evaluate actions from a moral standpoint. A paradigm
example of a moral agent is a normal adult human being who, in contrast to inanimate objects,
can formulate goals or purposes of his or her own. Such a being is said to have autonomy.
From the RP standpoint, maximizing the welfare of the majority, as utilitarianism
suggests, must take second place to the goal of respecting the moral agency of all individuals.
People may not be killed, deceived, denied their freedom, or otherwise violated simply to bring
about a greater total amount of utility. As with our treatment of utilitarian thinking, we consider
three approaches to RP thinking.

The Golden Rule Test

RP theory places great importance on the Universalization Principle, and it may offer
the most plausible explanation of why it is so important. Most of us would acknowledge that if
we think we are acting in a morally acceptable fashion. We should allow others to do similar
kinds of things in similar circumstances. This same insight can lead us to ask questions about
fairness and equal treatment, such as What if every- one did that? and Why should you make
an exception to yourself? The most obvious reason for this universalizability test is that we are
all equally moral agents.
Reversibility is a special application of the Universalization Principle, because the idea of
universalization implies that a judgment should not change simply because the roles are
reversed. In thinking about treating others as I would have them treat me, I need to ask what I
would think if I were in their position. If I am tempted to tell a lie in order to escape a particular
difficulty, then I need to ask what I would think if the lie were told to me. Universalizing our
thinking by applying the idea of reversibility can help us realize that we may be endorsing
treating others in ways that we would object to if done to us. This is the basic idea behind the
Golden Rule, variations of which appear in the religious and ethical writings of most cultures.
Its most familiar formulation in our culture is Do unto others as you would have them do unto
you.
Suppose a manager orders a young engineer to remain silent about the discovery of an
emission from the plant that might cause minor health problems for people who live near the
plant. For this order to satisfy the Golden Rule, the manager must be willing to have her
supervisor give a similar order to her if she were a young engineer. The manager must also be
willing to place herself in the position of the people who live near the plant and would
experience the health problems if the emission were not eliminated.
This example reveals a significant problem in using the Golden Rule to resolve a moral
problem. Suppose the manager attempts to imaginatively put herself in the position of the
young engineer. We can call the engineer the recipient of the action. Perhaps, the manager
believes that a person should obey her superiors without question, especially if the superior is
as she is a professional with many years of experience. Or she may believe that people are
overly sensitive to minor health threats, especially when protecting people from them is very
expensive, is detrimental to the economy, and may cost jobs. If she puts herself in the position
of the recipient with these values and beliefs, she may conclude that her order is completely
legitimate. On the other hand, the manager may think that people have a right to question their
superiors, that industries are too prone to impose health risks on others when it is to their
benefit, and that these risks are often imposed on the most economically vulnerable elements
of the population, because they tend to live nearer to industrial facilities. In this case, the
manager may conclude that her order is not justifiable by the Golden Rule. The results of
using the Golden Rule as a test of morally permissible action may vary, then, depending on
the values and beliefs of the actor.
One can try to avoid these problems by interpreting the Golden Rule as requiring not
only that the actor place herself in the position of the recipient of the action, but also that the
actor adopt the values of the recipient, and assume her particular circumstances. If the
recipient is, in fact, troubled by the order and has the second set of values discussed above,
the manager must not order the young engineer to remain silent.
Unfortunately, this tactic does not resolve all of the problems. Suppose I am an engineer
who supervises other engineers and I find that I must dismiss one of my supervisees because
he is lazy and unproductive. The engineer whom I want to dis- miss, however, believes that
the world owes me a living and does not want to be punished for his irresponsibility.
 Dismissing the supervisee fails this interpretation of the Golden Rule, even though most
of us would probably believe that irresponsible employees should be dismissed, even if we are
the irresponsible employee.

This is not the end of the problems in applying

the Golden Rule. So far we have assumed that
the class of recipients consists of only one
person, the young engineer or the employee who
does not want to be dismissed. But of course
others are affected by the action. The decision
whether to remain silent about a pollutant can
affect those near the plant, and the decision
whether to dis- miss the irresponsible employee
can affect many people, including other
employees. If we enlarge the class of recipients
to all those affected by the action, we have an
almost impossible task on our hands. The
recipients will almost certainly not all agree to the same decision, and then applying the
Golden Rule yields no answer
.
Although these problems need to be pointed out, they are often not as severe as we might
suppose. In many situations, the effects of our action fall primarily on one person.
Furthermore, when the effects fall on many people, we can often make reasonable
assumptions about what others would want, and, in many situations where the wants and
desires of people are probably similar everywhere (such as for health, safety, and equal
treatment), we can have a fairly high degree of certainty about these assumptions. If we have
reason to believe these assumptions cannot be made, we may have to use the insights of the
Golden Rule in a more general way. What it really requires is that we consider matters from a
more general perspective, one in which we strive to treat others in accordance with standards
that we can share.8 We must keep in mind that whatever standards are adopted, they must
respect all affected parties. Viewing oneself as, potentially, both agent and recipient is
required. This perspective mandates that we under- stand the perspectives of agents and
recipients, and the Golden Rule serves the useful function of reminding us of this. See Box
2.12 for an account of how to apply it.

The Self-Defeating Test

The Golden Rule does not by itself provide all the criteria that must be met to satisfy the RP
standard, but its requirements of universalizability and reversibility are vital steps in satisfying
that standard. Now, we consider additional features of the Universalization Principle as they
apply to the RP standard.
Still another way of applying the fundamental idea of the Universalization Principle is to
ask whether I would be able to perform the action in question if everyone else performed the
same action in the same or similar circumstances. If everyone else did what I am doing, would
this undermine my ability to do the same thing?9 If I must say yes to this question, then I
cannot approve others doing the same kind of thing that I have done, and thus universalizing
my action would be self-defeating. To proceed anyway, treating myself as an exception to the
rule is to pursue my own good at the expense of others. Thus, it fails to treat them with
appropriate respect. See Box 2.13.
A universalized action can be self-
defeating in either of two ways. First,
sometimes the action itself cannot be
performed if it is universalized. Suppose John
borrows money, promising to pay it back at a
certain time but having no intention of doing
so. For John’s lying promise to work,
the person to whom John makes the promise
must believe that he will make good on his
word. But if everyone borrowed money on the
promise to return it and had no intention of
keeping the promise, promises would not be
taken seriously. No one would loan money on
the basis of a promise. The very practice of promising would lose its point and cease to exist.
Promising, as we under- stand it, would be impossible.
Consider an engineering example. Suppose engineer John decides to substitute an
inferior and cheaper part in a product he is designing for one of his firm s large customers. He
assumes that the customer will not check the product closely enough to detect the inferior part
or will not have enough technical knowledge to know that the part is inferior. If everyone
practiced this sort of deception and expected others to practice it as well, then customers
would be far more inclined to have products carefully checked by experts before they were
purchased. This would make it much less likely that John’s deception would be successful.
It is important to realize that using the self-defeating test does not depend on whether
anyone actually makes promises without intending to keep them, cheats on exams, or
substitutes inferior and cheaper parts in a product. The question is, what if everyone did this?
This is a hypothetical question not a prediction that others actually will act this way as a
result of what someone else does.
As with other approaches, the self-defeating test has limitations. Some unethical actions
might avoid being self-defeating. Engineer Bill is by nature an aggressive per- son who
genuinely loves a highly competitive, even brutal, business climate where everyone attempts
to cheat and deceive as much as he can. He thinks of business as a game and values this
aspect of business even more than making the highest possible profits. If everyone follows his
example, then his ability to be ruthless in a ruthless business climate will not be undermined.
His action is not self-defeating, even though most of us would consider his practice immoral.
Here is another example. Engineer Alex, who has no interest in preserving the
environment, could design projects that are highly destructive to the environment without his
action’s being self-defeating. The fact that other engineers know what Alex is doing and even
designed environmentally destructive projects themselves would not keep him from doing so
or destroy the goal he had in designing such projects, namely to maximize his profit. However,
as with the Golden Rule, the self-defeating test is a useful test in many practical
circumstances. Now we can look at a third test for the RP approach.

The Rights Test

Some theorists in the RP tradition have concluded that one of the most useful ways of
formulating the requirement to respect the moral agency of others is to say that we should
honor the rights of people that are necessary for them to exercise their moral agency and to
pursue their well-being. A right may be understood as both an entitlement to act and an
entitlement to have another individual act in a certain way. Because of this dual aspect, rights
are often thought of as existing in a correlative relationship with duties. Thus, if Kelly has a
right to life, others have a duty not to kill Kelly. If Kelly has a right to bodily integrity, others
have a duty not to cause bodily harm to Kelly.
As we have described them, rights serve as a protective barrier, shielding individuals
from unjustified infringements of their moral agency by others. We can call these kinds of
rights negative rights. Beyond this, rights are sometimes asserted more positively as requiring
the provision of food, clothing, and education. Thus, if Kelly has a right to food, others have a
correlative duty to provide her with at least minimal food for survival. We can call these
positive rights. Because such positive rights are much more controversial in our culture and
generally somewhat more difficult to satisfy, we focus on negative rights, or those requiring
only noninterference with another person, not active support of that person s interests.
Even though determining just what negative rights people have and what they require
from others can be controversial, the general underlying principle is clear: an individual should
not be deprived of anything that seriously impedes his or her moral agency. If someone takes
your life, then you cannot exercise your moral agency at all, so this right is relatively
uncontroversial, but some of the other proposed rights do not negate your moral agency,
although they diminish your power to exercise it effectively. So their status as rights may be
more subject to dispute.

One problem any account of rights must face is

how to deal with conflicting rights. Suppose a
plant manager wants to save money by
eliminating a pollutant from his plant that is
carcinogenic. The manager, acting on behalf of
the firm, has a right not to be deprived of the
freedom to use his property for economic
benefit. But the pollutant threatens the right to
life of the surrounding inhabitants. Note that the
pollutant does not directly and in every case kill
surrounding inhabitants, but it does increase the
risk of the inhabitants getting cancer. So we can
say that the pollutant infringes on the right to life
of the inhabitants, but does not directly violate
that right. In a rights violation, one’s ability to
exercise that right in a certain situation is essentially wholly denied, whereas in a rights
infringement, one’s ability to exercise a right is only diminished. This diminishment can occur
in one of two ways. First, sometimes the infringement is a potential violation of that right, as in
the case of a pollutant that increases the chance of death. Second, sometimes the
infringement is a partial violation, as when some, but not all, of a person s property is taken.
The problem of conflicting rights requires that we prioritize rights, giving greater
importance to some than to others. A useful way of prioritizing is offered by philosopher Alan
Gewirth10 in Box 2.14.

Using this hierarchy, it would be wrong for a

plant manager to attempt to save money by
emitting a pollutant that is highly carcinogenic,
because the right to life is a first-tier right and the
right to acquire and use property and wealth for
one’s benefit is a third-tier right. Some- times,
however, the hierarchy is more difficult to apply.
How shall we balance a slight infringement of a
first-tier right against a much more serious
infringement or outright violation of a second- tier
or third-tier right?
The hierarchy of rights provides no
automatic answer to such questions.
Nevertheless, it provides a framework for
addressing them. We suggest a set of steps that could be taken, shown in Box 2.15.
Virtue ethics, perhaps the oldest tradition of ethical thought, has become increasingly
important among contemporary ethicists. The fundamental principle of virtue ethics is
Act in the way the good or virtuous person would act in the circumstances.

What Is a Virtue?
A virtue is usually described as a dispositional trait, that is, a character trait that disposes
or inclines a person to do the right thing. A virtue can be described as both deep and wide. It is
deep in the sense that a virtue is a firmly entrenched habit that leads a person to consistently
act in a certain way and to which he is strongly committed. It is wide in that it manifests itself in
a variety of ways. A virtuous person exhibits virtue not only in actions but also in emotional
reactions, in interests, and in general sensibilities. A truly honest person is not honest simply
because she thinks it is the best way to stay out of trouble, but because she genuinely
believes that being honest is the best way to live. She is disgusted by people who are
dishonest and does not enjoy being in their company. She does not have to make herself be
honest, because being honest has become a part of her character. Honesty is simply a part of
who she is. She would not be happy or think she was living a good life if she were dishonest.
In order to better understand what a virtue is, virtue ethicists such as Aristotle have
found it useful to think of virtues as occupying a middle position (or mean) between vices. We
can think of courage as a middle ground between the vice of cowardice on the one hand and
the vice of foolhardiness on the other. We can think of the virtue of generosity as a middle
ground between the vice of miserliness on the one hand and the vice of being a spendthrift on
the other. We can think of the virtue of loyalty to an employer as a middle ground between the
vice of complete disloyalty on the one hand and the vice of unquestioning obedience to the
employer on the other Just as Ross and Gert summarize common morality in terms of rules,
virtue ethicists summarize common morality by a list of virtues. Various lists of virtues have
been proposed, but there is a considerable overlap. The Greek philosopher Aristotle, the first
and probably most important virtue ethicist, provided a very short list that includes courage,
truthfulness, self-respect, wittiness, friendliness, modesty, and generosity or magnificence. 12
This list probably summarized the moral ideals of upper- class Athenians in the fifth-century
BC, but we need a more universal list. Contemporary psychologists Christopher Peterson

and Martin Seligman have surveyed cultures throughout the world and come up with what they
believe is a comprehensive list of core virtues and associated character strengths (listed in
parentheses in Box 2.16). You may find it more plausible to con- sider the character strengths
as simply additional virtues. Here is an account of the core virtues and a selection of the
character strengths identified by Peterson and Seligman. Even the list in Box 2.16 may not
enumerate all of the virtues (such as integrity and loyalty), but it is a good start.
In addition to these general virtues, some virtues that we can call professional virtues
can assist professionals in carrying out the special mission of their profession. The virtue of
compassion toward patients is an especially important professional virtue in medicine and
loyalty to clients is an especially important virtue in law. What about engineering? In Chapter
1, we saw that the primary function of engineering is to promote human welfare, well-being,
and quality of life. We suggest the following two virtues have a special relevance to the
mission of engineering to pro- mote well-being.

Professional Care
Engineers recognize the importance of this virtue, because they often refer to taking due
care as important for members of their profession. Care is a disposition to both protect and
promote the well-being of another in the case of engineering, the well- being of the public.
The paradigm of care is the relationship of parents to their children. The care relationship to
children has two dimensions: protecting children from harm, and promoting their well-being. In
manifesting the virtue of care for the public, these same dimensions are important. Engineers
must insure that they not only do not harm the health, safety, and welfare of the public
(prohibitive and preventive ethics), but also promote the well-being of the public through their
professional work (aspirational ethics). As an optional further extension of aspirational ethics,
engineer may devote themselves to improving the well-being of the poor and disadvantaged.

Respect for Nature

In recent years, engineers have come to recognize the relation of their work to the natural
world. Technology both draws from and affects the environment. It is not surprising, then, that
the virtue of respect for nature is becoming increasingly important for the engineering
profession. According to The American Heritage Dictionary, respecting something is to show
esteem for; to honor, to show consideration for; avoid violation of; treat with deference. This
attitude toward nature can motivate engineers to engage in environmentally friendly or green
engineering, not simply because it may be required by law, but because it is deeply rooted in
the engineer s character. Recalling that a virtue must be not only deep but also wide, we can
say that respecting nature means not only that one’s intellect is involved but also that one’s
emotions and sensibilities must come into play. An engineer is concerned about sustainability
and unnecessary exploitation of natural resources. She is offended by lack of respect for the
natural world and takes pride in creating environmentally friendly technology. She may even
be uncomfortable in associating with engineers who do not share this attitude.

Strengths of Virtue Ethics: The Rational and Intuitive

Elements in Morality
For utilitarian and RP theorists, moral thinking is primarily a rational task, involving the
application of moral concepts and rules to particular circumstances. Until recently, many
psychologists studying moral thinking took the same view. Rational, logical thought is the way
to arrive at correct moral judgments. Evidence exists for this view. Classroom work can
promote the rational side of moral development. Korean students who had moral education
classes during childhood and adolescence showed significantly more brain activity associated
with mental calculation. Presumably, this calculation involved moral reflection, including the
study of cases, and making appropriate moral judgments about them. Moral reflection on
issues involving care and respect for nature might include the meaning of care and how to
implement a caring attitude toward the public and the natural world.
More recently, psychologists have become aware of the dual nature of what we might broadly
call moral thinking. One aspect is indeed the rational system, which works relatively slowly and
involves voluntary effort and conscious moral reasoning. The other element is the intuitive or
automatic element in moral judgments and behavior. Located in a different part of the brain,
the intuitive system, is quick and automatic or involuntary. It is especially associated with
emotion, and it produces moral judgments that appear in consciousness with little apparent
effort. Most moral judgments and actions that we make in daily life come from this source.17
These two systems often work together to produce moral judgments, although one system
may be dominant in a given situation.18
This picture of the dual sources of moral judgment and behavior coincides with what
virtue ethicists have long held: being a morally good person requires cultivating not only one’s
reasoning skills but also an intuitive, automatic part, closely related to what we usually call a
habit. We have already seen how the rational part can be cultivated. What about the intuitive,
automatic part? We suggest two ways.

Moral Exemplars
One of the most effective ways to take advantage of the intuitive automatic element in
morality is by exposure to paradigms of virtue people who exhibit the virtues to an outstanding
degree. In studying these exemplars, we learn that virtue is not so much taught as caught. In
their classic study of moral exemplars, psychologists Anne Colby and William Damon set up
some criteria for identifying moral exemplars. They include a strong tendency to act on moral
ideals, a willingness to risk self-interest to follow one’s ideals, a tendency to inspire others to
moral action, humility about one’s own importance, and a consequent lack of concern about
one’s own ego.19 Summarizing their study of actual cases, Colby and Damon identified some
additional characteristics of exemplars: a high degree of moral certainty, close family ties in
their formative years, a strong sense of meaning and mission in their lives, a positive attitude
toward life and lifelong optimism, a sense of humor, an ability to forgive, and resilience that
allowed them to recover from setbacks. Most of us probably recognize these as admirable
traits which we all wish we had.
Empirical evidence supports the importance of moral exemplars in forming character.
College students showed significant signs of self-improvement when they watched exemplars
in their major field. Interestingly, such improvement was not evident when less relevant
exemplars were used. This suggests the importance of exposing young engineers to
outstanding members of their profession, engineers who are not only technically accomplished
and successful but also outstanding from the standpoint of professionalism and moral
commitment. This would include engineers who exhibit the two virtues of care for the health,
safety and welfare of the public, and respect for nature.

Moral Habituation
Following Aristotle, virtue theorists have also recognized that developing habits of
virtuous conduct is an important way to enhance moral virtue. Again, psychologists have
confirmed this insight. Participating in morally praiseworthy action (perhaps designing
technologies to assist the handicapped or engaging in some type of com- munity service) is an
effective and a meaningful type of moral education.22 Students who are members of
Engineers Without Borders have many opportunities for moral habituation.

Strengths of Virtue Ethics: Open-Ended Situations

Virtue ethics also has a special strength related to areas where a person has a
considerable degree of discretion as to how a moral imperative is to be implemented.
Engineering codes require engineers to hold paramount the safety of the public, but they
provide minimal specification as to how this obligation should be implemented. Of course, one
should not violate the prohibitions of such activities as having conflicts of interest or practicing
without proper qualifications, but what about the more positive aspects of this imperative?
Rules are inadequate here, and we must rely primarily on the character of the engineer,
especially on the two professional virtues of care and respect for nature.
This need to rely on character rather than rules is especially relevant in that part of aspirational
ethics that goes beyond what is morally required, such as attempts to improve the well-being
of the poor or marginalized members of society. How or even whether an engineer engages in
such projects depends on personal values and character, not on a set of rules.

Deficiencies of Virtue Ethics

Despite these advantages, virtue ethics has some deficiencies that render it inadequate
as a complete account of ethical thinking. We have already said that prohibitive rules are more
useful, where legal enforcement is appropriate. Also, appeal to virtues rather than rules, while
advantageous where a considerable degree of discretion is appropriate, may not yield
direction for action that is sufficiently precise. In general, appeal to virtues seems to yield less
precise direction for action than appeal to rules. The procedure shown in Box 2.17, however,
should give some direction for applying virtue ethics.
Virtue Ethics: An Application
Because applying virtue ethics may cause special difficulties, we supply an example of
how these guidelines apply to a moral issue.

After completing his degree in chemical

engineering in June, Gerald is scheduled to
return to the family farm to help with its
operation. In early May, his father became
seriously ill, and Gerald is convinced that the
only way to save the family farm is to take a
job in engineering. Most of his fellow seniors
have already taken jobs, and the interviewing
season is over. The only employment
opportunity Gerald finds is with Pro-Growth
Pesticides. The family farm is an organic
farm, however, and Gerald s father has
always strongly opposed the use of
pesticides. Gerald himself has become
convinced that pesticides harm the environment generally and farm products in particular. He
knows that he will be asked about his views on pesticides. What should he do? Let us look at
the issue from the standpoint of virtue ethics.
1. Gerald must first determine the alternative actions that are possible in the situation.
He thinks of three possibilities. He could (a) refuse to interview for the job, (b)
interview but answer questions about pesticides honestly, or (c) inter- view and
misrepresent his views on pesticides in order to get the job.

2. In determining the virtues and vices that correspond to these courses of action,
Gerald might come up with the following analysis. (a) If he refuses to interview for
the job, he will continue to be an honest person and also maintain his integrity. That
is, he will continue to be a person who acts consistently with his principles. He may,
however, not manifest proper loyalty to his family members, because he would fail
to help them keep the farm. He would show loyalty to the family ideals, however.
(b) If he interviews for the job but answers questions about his views on pesticides
honestly, he will preserve his honesty, but may compromise his integrity by
applying for (and possibly getting) a job that would be inconsistent with his
principles. He will preserve his loyalty to his family, however, at least in the sense
of helping to keep the farm. (c) If he interviews for the job and misrepresents his
views on pesticides, he will manifest loyalty to his family, but fail to be honest or a
person of integrity.

3. Now we must evaluate the alternatives open to Gerald in terms of whether they are
grounded, either directly or indirectly, in the virtues appropriate to a morally worthy
person. How should he evaluate these three options? He will fail to properly
manifest at least one of the virtues he prizes no matter what he does. Options (a)
 and (b) will violate only one of the virtues, while (c) will violate two. Option (c),
furthermore, seems to more directly manifest the vices of dishonesty and lack of
integrity. While (c) seems to be the least desirable choice, the choice between (a)
and (b) is more difficult. If he can find another job opportunity, clearly option (a) is
the most desirable. If this possibility is not open to him, it may depend upon what
kind of person Gerald most wants to be: a loyal person or a person with integrity.
Gerald may well decide that he wants to manifest integrity by being consistent with
his own values even more than he wants to be loyal to his family, so that he should
refuse the interview. Gerald may be able to find a creative middle way, so that such
a difficult choice will not have to be made.

2.14 USING MORAL THEORIES OR APPROACHES IN PRACTICAL ETHICS

These three approaches are to be used in the same way as line-drawing and creative-
middle-way techniques: as aids to resolving practical moral issues whenever they are found to
be relevant. Just as a carpenter chooses a saw or hammer when these tools are useful in
building a house, so a practical ethicist chooses techniques useful to the purposes at hand.
Knowledge of moral theories can make a contribution to moral analysis in several ways.
First, the theories can help us to understand the moral basis of alternative ways of thinking
about moral issues. When we think about the advisability of building a hydroelectric facility on
a river and consider such issues as the benefits of increased electrical power and also the
costs and possible environmental damage, it is useful to know that this way of thinking is
utilitarian and that is a widely used and morally legitimate method of moral analysis. When we
consider whether the rights of individuals are being violated, we are doing a very different kind
of moral analysis, but one that is equally legitimate. Furthermore, it is important to know ahead
of time that these two approaches can lead to different moral conclusions, and that a process
of reconciliation may be necessary. Finally, in some situations, an evaluation in terms of
character may be more important. What character traits prompted an engineer or a moral
exemplar to act as she did, and what can be done to encourage these traits in others? Why
did one engineer exhibit such high professionalism in a situation of great stress, while another
did not?
Second, these approaches can suggest more detailed and adequate ways of moral
analysis than might otherwise be available. Ethical theories reminded us of the importance of
considering all of the people affected by an action or a policy (the audience) and to consider
the difference between looking at the utility of a particular action and the utility of a general
practice. They bring up the relevance of asking whether rights are being violated and we would
be willing to universalize an action. They prompt us to ask what character traits are important
in prompting professionally responsible action and how those character traits might be
developed. It is unlikely that we would ask many of these questions apart from the prompting
of moral theory imitations of important ways of thinking about moral issues and to remind us
that we should examine a moral problem from more than one perspective. As we have seen, a
utilitarian analysis can neglect considerations of justice or respecting individuals. An RP
analysis can fail to give adequate weight to overwhelming public goods in the face of minor
infringements of individual rights. Both approaches neglect character traits that are important
in motivating many types of professional activity. Virtue theory often does not provide clear
answers to moral questions.

2.15 CHAPTER SUMMARY

Ethical methodologies and theories are a set of tools to be used in dealing with ethical
issues. It is always useful to divide a moral problem into factual, conceptual, application, and
moral components. Deciding whether and how line-drawing and creative-middle-way solutions,
and utilitarian, RP, and virtue ethics approaches should be used must be left to the judgment
of the person facing an ethical dilemma. Thinking of the three theory approaches as partial
and incomplete models of common morality can aid in understanding how the three moral
theories or approaches should be used in applied ethics.
Ross and Gert have attempted to summarize common morality in duties and rules, and
Davis has offered several tests for the moral acceptability of actions that reflect ideas in
common morality and the classic moral theories. It is also important to know that moral
judgments can evaluate actions or practices as permissible, impermissible, obligatory, or
supererogatory and that moral evaluations can be of particular actions, general practices, or
very general moral criteria. Finally, in moral evaluation in com- mon morality, the intention
behind an action can be critically important.