Sec Reformer Dome Failure Refractory
Sec Reformer Dome Failure Refractory
Sec Reformer Dome Failure Refractory
Examination of the failed dome revealed that the bricks had primarily sheared at an angle close to 90
degrees to the major axis of the dome. It was concluded that the refractory dome failed as a result of
high thermal stresses introduced as a result of the different thermal expansion between the refractory
brick dome and the water cooled vessel shell. The design had no allowance for thermal expansion.
The dome was replaced with a novel design using readily available alumina blocks. The plant was
returned to service 30 days after the incident.
David Firth
Quest Integrity, Wellington, New Zealand
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Moranbah in Central Queensland is roughly reformer is a heat exchanger type system where
1000km (600 mile) from Brisbane in a remote the exhaust gas from the secondary reformer is
location. It is strategically located in the heart of used to heat the outside of the catalyst tubes in
one of the world's largest coal mining provinces the primary reformer. However, the secondary
to supply explosives. reformer operates in an identical manner to one
in a typical ammonia plant. The secondary
Secondary reformer design, history and reformer details are given in Figure 1 and Table
normal operational conditions 1. The refractory design details are shown in
Figure 2.
The plants reformer/secondary reformer system
differs from a standard design as the primary
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Table 1. Secondary reformer details (dimension for lower catalyst section)
The bottom of the row 0 bricks sit on the skew vessel design prior to recommissioning in
blocks (also called skew tiles) and are mounted August 2012.
at 35 degree to the horizontal. The skew blocks
are designed to fit against the inside of the After recommissioning in 2012, the Moranbah
vessel wall and sit on a steel support shelf. plant had numerous issues that resulted in the
plant having 42 restarts before the 10th May
The operational/history details available for the 2013 incident. These typically were unrelated to
secondary reformer prior to being installed at the reforming section of the plant and ranged
Moranbah were very limited. However, in 2002 from Electrical and Instrumentation faults to
at a turn around and catalyst change, the dome rotating equipment failure. Every stoppage of
was found to be damaged in some manner and the reformer area involves a rapid automated
was replaced. depressurization and 2 hour purge with nitrogen.
Typically this would reduce the dome
After the shipping to Moranbah, the second temperature to 650oC (1200oF)
dome was found to have collapsed. A new dome
was installed in accordance with the original
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The catalyst and alumina balls were removed
from the vessel. Examination from above
revealed that bricks had completely failed and
were missing in three locations. These were in
the West, East (see Figure 6) and South East
Locations. In total 14 bricks in row 0, 7 in row
1, 2 in row 2 and 2 in row 3 had fallen out of the
dome after failing. The bricks from the dome
were removed. Examination of the skew blocks
revealed that a large number had cracked and
section had fallen off. After the removal of the
skew blocks no damage was found to the inside
of the shell or the steel support row which was
present below the skew blocks. The shell
diameter was measured and found to be within
±5mm (0.2in). Examination of the broken pieces Figure 6. The refractory dome from above
of the dome showed that the failure of all the showing the East failure – cracked skew blocks
bricks was consistent with the dome trying to and missing bricks from row 0, 1, 2 and 3.
expand and being restrained from expanding;
see Figure 7, i.e. the resultant force was radial.
Figure 7. Typical cross section of the dome after the failure aligned in comparison with marker to show
the horizontal plane.
The damage in the rows 0, 1 and 2 bricks is all High alumina bricks are hard and not readily
consistent shear loading across the bricks with crushed. Whenever they are designed to be used
the failures running near to parallel with the in the high temperature condition the design
horizontal. The damage to the skew bricks is should suitably allow for thermal expansion. For
consistent with high point loading where contact the design of the arch no thermal expansion had
had occurred with top edge of the row 0 bricks, been accommodated for in the design. Typically
i.e. the loading was no longer evenly spread this could include a softer mortar that is
across the face of the skew bricks. The centre crushable, expansion gaps or a flexible outer
plug failed as a result of the compression point portion such as alumina balls.
loading at the contact points with the tops of the
row 4 bricks.
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Table 2. ATR
Age 4 years
Shell diameter 2.25m (7ft) at base of dome
Outlet temperature 950°C to1050°C
Shell temperature Water cooled at about 100°C (212°F)
Support dome Single layer of 300mm (12in) high alumina
Z bricks with dome radius of 1700mm (5ft
6in). The centre plug was made from 4
quadrant bricks
Load supported by dome Approximately 20 tonnes static load and 2
barg differential pressure dynamic load
Conclusions
The Moranbah catalyst support dome failed as a
result of high thermal stresses introduced as a
result of the different thermal expansion
between the refractory brick dome and the water
cooled vessel shell. The design had no
allowance for thermal expansion and high
number of thermal cycles.
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