Public office is not property.

MIGUEL R. CORNEJO vs. ANDRES GABRIEL, provincial governor of Rizal, and the
PROVINCIAL BOARD OF RIZAL, composed of ANDRES GABRIEL, PEDRO
MAGSALIN and CATALINO S. CRUZ
G.R. No. 16887, November 17, 1920

Doctrine:
It is well settled in the United States, that a public office is not property within the
sense of the constitutional guaranties of due process of law but is a public trust or agency.

Facts:
The CFI of Rizal found Cornejo guilty of the criminal act of falsification of a private
document, Gabriel filed with the provincial board of that province an administrative
complaint against Cornejo for corruption and improper conduct unbecoming a public
officer, and thereafter was suspended as municipal president of Pasay. Cornejo seeks to
have Gabriel and the provincial board of the Province of Rizal temporarily restrained from
going ahead with investigation of the charges filed against him pending resolution his
case, and to have an order directing Gabriel to return the petitioner to his position as
municipal president of Pasay. Petitioner argues that he has been deprived of due process
by Gabriel.

Issue:
Whether petitioner is entitled to due process pending the administrative case filed
against him?

Held:
No, in administrative proceedings, it may be stated, without fear of contradictions
that the right to a notice and hearing are not essential to due process of law. Notice and
hearing are not prerequisites to suspension unless required by statute and therefore
suspension without such notice does not deprive the officer of property without due
process of law. For this petition to come under the due process of law prohibition, it would
be necessary to consider an office as "property." It is, however, well settled in the United
States, that a public office is not property within the sense of the constitutional guaranties
of due process of law, but is a public trust or agency.
Immovable property
MANUEL C. MANARANG and LUCIA D. MANARANG vs. MACARIO M. OFILADA,
Sheriff of the City of Manila and ERNESTO ESTEBAN
G.R. No. L-8133. May 18, 1956

Doctrine:
House is personal property for purposes of chattel mortgage only; remains real
property.

Facts:
Lucia obtained a loan of P200 from Ernesto Esteban, and to secure its payment
she executed a chattel mortgage of her house. Lucia failed to pay, thereafter, Esteban
brought an action for its recovery of the mortgaged property, MTC ruled in his favor.
Before the property could be sold Lucia offered to pay the sum of P277 but the sheriff
refused the tender unless the additional amount of P260 representing the publication of
the notice of sale in two newspapers be paid also.||| She contended in the court below
that the house in question should be considered as personal property and the publication
of the notice of its sale at public auction in execution considered unnecessary.

Issue:
Whether the house should be considered as personal property?

Held:
No, the house of mixed materials levied upon on execution, although subject of a
contract of chattel mortgage between the owner and a third person, is real property within
the purview of Rule 39, section 16, of the Rules of Court as it has become a permanent
fixture on the land, which is real property. the mere fact that a house was the subject of a
chattel mortgage and was considered as personal property by the parties does not make
said house personal property for purposes of the notice to be given for its sale at public
auction. This ruling is demanded by the need for a definite, orderly and well- defined
regulation for official and public guidance and which would prevent confusion and
misunderstanding.
Pipeline System Is Real Property
MERALCO SECURITIES INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION vs. CENTRAL BOARD OF
ASSESSMENT APPEALS, BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS OF LAGUNA and
PROVINCIAL ASSESSOR OF LAGUNA
G.R. No. L-46245, May 31, 1982

Doctrine:
Article 415(1) and (3) provides that real property may consist of constructions of
all kinds adhered to the soil and everything attached to an immovable in a fixed manner,
in such a way that it cannot be separated therefrom without breaking the material or
deterioration of the object.

Facts:
Meralco Securities installed from Batangas to Manila a pipeline system
consisting of cylindrical steel pipes joined together and buried not less than one meter
below the surface along the shoulder of the public highway. The pipes are embedded in
the soil and are firmly and solidly welded together so as to preclude breakage or damage
thereto and prevent leakage or seepage of the oil. The valves are welded to the pipes so
as to make the pipeline system one single piece of property from end to end. the
provincial assessor of Laguna treated the pipeline as real property and issued Tax
Declarations. However, Meralco Securities notes that segments of the pipeline can be
moved from one place to another as shown in the permit issued by the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications.

Issue:
Whether pipelines should be considered as real property?

Held:
Yes, Article 415(1) and (3) provides that real property may
consist of constructions of all kinds adhered to the soil and everything attached to an
immovable in a fixed manner, in such a way that it cannot be separated therefrom without
breaking the material or deterioration of the object. The pipeline in question is indubitably
a construction adhering to the soil. It is attached to the land in such a way that it cannot
be separated therefrom without dismantling the steel pipes which were welded to form
the pipeline. It should be borne in mind that what are being characterized as real property
are not the steel pipes but the pipeline system as a whole. Meralco Securities has
apparently two pipeline systems.
Classification of property
DAVAO SAW MILL CO., INC. vs. APRONIANO G. CASTILLO and DAVAO LIGHT &
POWER CO., INC.
G.R. No. L-40411, August 7, 1935

Doctrine:
Article 334, paragraphs 1 and 5, of the Civil Code, is in point. According to the
Code, real property consists of — 1. Land, buildings, roads and constructions of all kinds
adhering to the soil; x x x 5. Machinery, liquid containers, instruments or implements
intended by the owner of any building or land for use in connection with any industry or
trade being carried on therein and which are expressly adapted to meet the requirements
of such trade of industry.

Facts:
The Davao Saw Mill Co., Inc., is the holder of a lumber concession from the
Government of the Philippine Islands. However, the land upon which the business was
conducted belonged to respondent. On the land the sawmill company erected a building
which housed the machinery used by it. Some of the implements thus used were clearly
personal property, the conflict concerning machines which were placed and mounted on
foundations of cement. In the contract of lease between the sawmill company and the
owner of the land, it provided that all the improvements and buildings introduced and
erected by the former shall be owned by the latter. However, it was explicitly stated that
improvement do not include machineries and accessories.
Issue:
Whether the machines should be treated as personal property?
Held:
Yes, while not conclusive, the characterization of the property as chattels by the
appellant is indicative of intention and impresses upon the property the character
determined by the parties. The machinery not intended by the owner of any building or
land for use in connection therewith, but intended by a lessee for use in a building erected
on the land by the latter to be returned to the lessee on the expiration or abandonment of
the lease.
Immovables by destination
PASTOR D. AGO vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL P. BARCELONA,
BENITO MACROHON, VENANCIO CASTAÑEDA and NICETAS HENSON
G.R. No. L-19718, October 31, 1962
Doctrine:
By the installation of the sawmill machineries in the building of the sawmill
company, for use in the sawing of logs carried on in said building, the same became a
necessary and permanent part of the building or real estate on which the same was
constructed, converting the said machineries and equipment into real estate within the
meaning of Article 415 (5) of the Civil Code.

Facts:
Petitioner bought sawmill machineries and equipments from respondent Grace
Park Engineering, Inc., executing a chattel mortgage over said machineries and
equipments. Petitioner defaulted in his payments and so, in 1958, respondent Grace Park
Engineering, Inc. instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings of the mortgage.
Petitioner continued to default in his payments as provided in the judgment by
compromise, so Grace Park Engineering, Inc. filed with the lower court a motion for
execution, which was granted by the court. A writ of execution, later followed.|||Petitioner
alleges that the sawmill machineries and equipments which have become real
properties of the Golden Pacific Sawmill, Inc., and is about to proceed in selling the same
without prior publication of the notice of sale thereof in some newspaper of general
circulation as required by the Rules of Court.

Issue:
Whether the machineries and equipments became a real property?

Held:
Yes, the sawmill machineries and equipments were installed in a building
and permanently attached to the ground. By reason of such installment in a building,
the said sawmill machineries and equipments became real estate properties in
accordance with the provision of Art. 415(5) of the Civil Code, thus: Machinery
receptacles instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an
industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and
which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works.
Immovable Property, House On Land Belonging To Another; General Rule And
Exceptions
CONRADO P. NAVARRO vs. RUFINO G. PINEDA, RAMONA REYES, ET AL.,
G.R. No. L-18456, November 30, 1963

Doctrine:
Although in some instances, a house of mixed materials has been considered as
a chattel between the parties and that the validity of the contract between them, has been
recognized, it has been a constant criterion that, with respect to third persons, who are
not parties to the contract, and specially in executed proceedings, the house is considered
as an immovable property.|||

Facts:
Rufino Pineda and his mother, Juana Gonzales, borrowed from plaintiff Conrado
Navarro, the sum of P2550.00, and payable 6 months after date. Pineda executed “Deed
of Real Estate and Chattel Mortgages,” whereby his mother, by way of Real Estate
Mortgage hypothecated a parcel of land, belonging to her. Both mortgages were
contained in one instrument, which was registered in both the Office of the Register of
Deeds and the Motor Vehicles Office of Tarlac. The defendants failed to pay when the
mortgage became due and payable. The plaintiff gave two extensions. They still failed to
pay. When the plaintiff filed a complaint for foreclosure of the mortgage, defendant
questioned the validity of the chattel mortgage over his house on the ground that the
house, being an immovable property, could not be the subject of a chattel mortgage.
Defendant cited cases to prove their point.

Issue:
Whether the residential house can be considered a chattel and the propriety of the
attorney’s fees?

Held:
Yes, the house in question was treated as personal or movable property, by the parties
to the contract themselves. In the deed of chattel mortgage, appellant Rufino
G. Pineda conveyed by way of "Chattel Mortgage" "my personal properties", a residential
house and a truck. The mortgagor himself grouped the house with the truck, which is,
inherently a movable property. The house which was not even declared for taxation
purposes was small and made of light construction materials: G.I. sheets
roofing, sawali and wooden walls and wooden posts; built on land belonging to
another.||| (Navarro v. Pineda, G.R. No. L-18456, [November 30, 1963], 118 PHIL 1481-
1487)
Possessor In Good Faith Not Entitled To Fruits After Legal Interruption Of
Possession
MINDANAO ACADEMY V. ILDEFONSO D. YAP
G.R. Nos. L-17681 & L-17682, February 26, 1965

Doctrine:
A possessor in good faith cannot recover the value of a new building constructed
after the filing of an action for annulment of the sale of land on which it is
constructed, thus rendering him a builder in bad faith who is denied by law any
right of reimbursement.

Facts:
Rosenda A. de Nuqui, a co-owner of a portion of land sold three parcels of
residential land in favor of Yap. Included in the sale were buildings situated on said
lands as well as laboratory equipment, books, furniture and fixtures used by
petitioners. Yap, obtained possession of the properties by virtue of the sale, took
over the operation of the two schools and even changed their names to Harvardian
Colleges. Other co-owners filed an action for annulment of sale and recovery of
rent from petitioners, and rescission to which RTC rendered a favorable ruling. Yap
appealed the decision.

Issue:
Whether Yap is a builder in good faith?

Held:
No, A possessor in good faith is entitled to the fruits only so long as his possession
is not legally interrupted, and such interruption takes place upon service of judicial
summons. If the defendant constructed a new building, as he alleges, he cannot
recover its value because the construction was done after the filing of the action
for annulment, thus rendering him a builder in bad faith who is denied by law any
right of reimbursement.
Prescription
REYNALDO, TELESFORO, REMEDIOS, ALFREDO and BELEN, all surnamed
AGUIRRE, VICENTA, HORACIO and FLORENCIO, all surnamed MAGTIBAY
and LEONILA, CECILIA, ANTONIO, and VENANCIO, all surnamed MEDRANO,
and ZOSIMA QUIAMBAO vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ELIAS, JOSE,
ARSENIA and ROGELIO, all surnamed BALITAAN, and MARIA ROSALES
G.R. No. 122249, January 29, 2004

Doctrine:
Acquisitive prescription of real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary
acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good faith and with just
title for the time fixed by law; without good faith and just title, acquisitive
prescription can only be extraordinary in character.

Facts:
Leocadio Medrano and his first wife Emilia owned a piece of land. After the death
of Emilia, Leocadio married his second wife Miguela. When Leocadio died, all his
heirs agreed that Sixto Medrano, a child of the first marriage, should manage and
administer the said property. After Sixto died, his heirs learned that he had
executed an Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property in which he falsely stated that
he was the only heir of Leocadio. It turned out that while Sixto were still alive, he
sold a portion of the subject land tp Tiburcio Balitaan and another portion to Maria
Bacong, Maria Bacong later sold the said portion to Rosendo Bacong. Petitioners,
all heirs of Leocadio who were affected by the sale demanded reconveyance of
the portions sold by Sixto but the 3 vendees refused. Resultantly, petitioners filed
a suit against them seeking the nullity of the documents and partition thereof. The
vendees contended that they acquired the property under the valid deed of sale
and petitioners’ cause of action was barred by laches and prescription. Tiburcio
also contended that he is an innocent purchaser for value.

Issue:
Whether petitioners acquired ownership through prescription?

Held:
No,