G.R. No.

92403 April 22, 1992

VICTOR A. AQUINO, petitioner,

vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and LEONARDA D. DE LA PAZ, respondents.

MEDIALDEA, J.:

This petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a restraining order seeks to nullify the
resolutions issued by the respondent Civil Service Commission, namely: (1) Resolution No. 88-820
dated November 7, 1988 reversing the decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board dated
February 5, 1988 which sustained the decision of the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports
dated May 4, 1987 upholding the appointment of Mr. Victor A. Aquino as Supply Officer I in the
DECS, Division of San Pablo City; and (2) Resolution No. 90-224 dated February 27, 1990 denying
the motion for reconsideration with prayer for issuance of temporary restraining order for lack of
merit.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Petitioner Victor A. Aquino, then holding the position of Clerk II, Division of City Schools of San
Pablo City, was designated on July 20, 1984 as Officer-in-Charge of the Division Supply Office by
the DECS Regional Director Saturnino R. Magturo (Annex "H", petition, p. 55, Rollo) in view of the
retirement of the Supply Officer I, Mr. Jose I. Aviquivil.

Prior to such designation, or from the period February 16, 1984 to June 16, 1984, petitioner was
designated as Property Inspector and In-Charge of the Supply Office performing the duties and
responsibilities of the Supply Officer I (p. 55, Rollo).

Two (2) years thereafter, or on September 19, 1986, the Division Superintendent of City Schools of
San Pablo City, Milagros Tagle, issued a promotional appointment to private respondent Leonarda
D. de la Paz as Supply Officer I in the DECS Division of San Pablo City. She assumed and
performed the duties and functions of the position and received the compensation and benefits
therefor.

At the time of her appointment, private respondent was then holding the position of Clerk II, Division
of City Schools of San Pablo City. From August 25, 1976 to September 1983, she was designated
as Assistant to the Supply Officer (DECS decision, p. 31, Rollo). The Civil Service Regional Office IV
approved her appointment as permanent "provided that there is no pending administrative case
against the appointee, no pending protest against the appointment, nor any decision by competent
authority that will adversely affect the approval of (the) appointment" (Annex "A", Comment of CSC,
p 164, Rollo).

One (1) month after, or on October 20, 1986 petitioner filed a protest with the DECS Secretary
questioning the qualification and competence of private respondent for the position of Supply Officer
I.

In a decision dated May 4, 1987, DECS Secretary Lourdes R. Quisumbing sustained the protest of
petitioner and revoked the appointment of private respondent as Supply Officer I thus:
 From the foregoing comparative statement of the qualifications of Mr. Aquino and
Mrs. de la Paz, apparently the former has a decided advantage over the latter in
terms of education, experience and training. Further examination of the comparative
statement shows that Mrs. de la Paz has had no relevant in-service training course
attended and completed. Accordingly, therefore, Mr. Aquino is preferred to Mrs. de la
Paz for appointment as Supply Officer I.

xxx xxx xxx

Based on all the foregoing and as records further show that Mr. Aquino is competent
and qualified to hold the subject position and possesses the eligibility requirement,
this Office finds the instant protest meritorious and hereby rules and so rules that Mr.
Aquino be appointed Supply Officer I in place of Mrs. de la Paz, whose appointment
thereto is deemed revoked. (p. Annex "C", pp. 30-31, Rollo)

Private respondent then filed her petition for reconsideration of the aforequoted DECS decision but
the same was denied by Secretary Quisumbing in a Resolution dated August 11, 1967.

On the bases of the aforementioned rulings of the DECS Secretary, petitioner Aquino was issued a
permanent appointment dated August 11, 1987 as Supply Officer I by the DECS Regional Director
Pedro San Vicente effective October 26, 1987. On the date of effectivity of his appointment,
petitioner assumed the duties and functions of the position. The said appointment was approved by
the Civil Service Regional Office IV on October 27, 1987.

For her part, private respondent de la Paz filed on October 16, 1987 a notice of appeal with motion
to maintain status quo to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) which, on February 5, 1988,
rendered a decision upholding the appointment of Aquino as Supply Officer I (Annex "D", petition pp.
33-35, Rollo).

From the decision of the MSPB, private respondent appealed to public respondent Civil Service
Commission (CSC).

In Resolution No, 88-820 dated November 7, 1988, public respondent CSC found the appeal of
private respondent meritorious, thus revoking the appointment of petitioner Aquino and restoring
private respondent de la Paz to her position as Supply Officer I, DECS, Division of San Pablo City
under her previously approved appointment (Annex "B", petition, pp. 26-29, Rollo).

From said decision, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration with prayer for issuance of a
temporary restraining order. Finding no merit to the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner,
public respondent CSC issued Resolution No. 90-224 dated February 27, 1990 denying said motion
(Annex "A", petition, pp. 21- 24, Rollo).

Hence, this petition seeking the reversal of public respondent Commission's action on petitioner's
appointment.

Two (2) interrelated issues on the extent of authority of the Civil Service Commission to pass upon
the contested appointments were raised by petitioner which could be simplified into whether or not
public respondent Civil Service Commission committed grave abuse of discretion in revoking the
appointment of petitioner Victor A. Aquino as Supply Officer I in the DECS Division of San Pablo City
as it found private respondent Leonarda de la Paz better qualified.
In assailing the two (2) CSC Resolutions revoking his appointment, petitioner invokes the ruling of
this Court in the case of Santiago v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 81467, October 27, 1989,
178 SCRA 733 and Galura v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. 85812, June 1, 1989 (En
Banc resolution) that the Civil Service Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment on the
ground that another person is more qualified for a particular position for that would have constituted
an encroachment on the discretion vested solely in the appointing authority. The Civil Service
Commission cannot exceed its power by substituting its will for that of the appointing authority.

In support of petitioner's cause, the Solicitor General stresses the wide latitude of discretion given to
the appointing authority in the selection and appointment of qualified persons to vacant positions in
the civil service which was emphasized by the Court as rationale for the rule laid down in Luego
v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 69137, August 5, 1986, 143 SCRA 327, Central Bank v. CSC,
G.R. No. 80455-56, April 10, 1989, 171 SCRA 744, Patagoc v. CSC, G.R. No. 90229, May 14, 1990,
185 SCRA 411, that public respondent CSC, not being the "appointing power" in contemplation of
law, has no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that another person is more
qualified for a particular position and that the Commission has no authority to direct the appointment
of a substitute of its choice.

We have consistently applied the above doctrine in many cases with similar factual circumstances,
but we see no compelling reason to apply the same in the instant case. In the cases cited above, We
ruled that the Civil Service Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment simply because it
(CSC) believed that another person is better qualified than the appointee for it would constitute an
encroachment on the discretion solely vested on the appointing authority. The situation is different
as in the instant case, where the Civil Service Commission revoked the appointment of the
successful protestant, petitioner herein, principally because the right to security of tenure of the prior
appointee, private respondent herein, to the contested position had already attached (see CSC
decision, pp. 28-29, Rollo). It must be noted that public respondent CSC did not direct the
appointment of a substitute of its choice. It merely restored the appointment of private respondent
who was first appointed to the contested position.

The records show that private respondent was issued a permanent appointment on September 19,
1986 as Supply Officer I in the DECS Division of San Pablo City effective September 30, 1986. On
the basis of the of said appointment which was approved by the Civil Service Regional Office No. IV,
private respondent assumed and performed the duties and functions of the position as Supply
Officer I and received the compensation and benefits of the said position in accordance with the
mandate of Section 9 par.(h) of the Civil Service Law (P.D. 807, as amended). In consonance with
the doctrine laid down in Villanueva v. Balallo, G.R. No. L-17745, October 31, 1963, 9 SCRA 407,
that an appointment is complete when the last act required of the appointing power has been
performed, but later qualified in Favis v. Rupisan, G.R. No. L-22823, May 19, 1966, 17 SCRA 190,
that the acts of the head of a department or office making the appointment and the Commissioner of
Civil Service acting together, though not concurrently, but consecutively, are necessary to make an
appointment complete, the permanent appointment extended to private respondent, under the
circumstances of the case, is deemed complete. As such, she is entitled to the protection of the law
against unjust removal.

The conclusion of respondent Commission in the questioned decision that private respondent is
more qualified than petitioner merely supports the validity of the restoration of private respondent to
her previously approved appointment considering that she meets the prescribed qualification
standards required of the position of Supply Officer I and the appropriate civil service eligibility, to
wit:
 EDUCATION: Bachelor's degree with training in Supply Management
EXPERIENCE: None required
ELIGIBILITY: Supply Officer; Career Service (Professional)

It is well-settled that once an appointment is issued and the moment the appointee assumes a
position in the civil service under a completed appointment, he acquires a legal, not merely equitable
right (to the position), which is protected not only by statute, but also by the Constitution, and cannot
be taken away from him either by revocation of the appointment, or by removal, except for cause,
and with previous notice and hearing (Mitra v. Subido, G.R No. L-21691, September 15, 1967, 21
SCRA 127.

There is also authority for the rule that when the appointing power has once acted and the appointee
has accepted the office and done what is required of him upon its acceptance, his title to the office
becomes complete, and he can then be removed only in the regular way (Mechem, Law of Public
Offices and Officers, Sec. 461, p. 294, citing Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch (U.S.) 137). The
appointing power can not effect his removal indirectly by rescinding or revoking his appointment after
it is complete.

There is thus reasonable ground for the rule that the moment the discretionary power of appointment
has been exercised and the appointee assumed the duties and functions of the position, the said
appointment cannot be revoked by the appointing authority on the ground merely that the protestant
is more qualified than the first appointee, subject however to the condition that the first appointee
should possess the minimum qualifications required by law. Otherwise, the security of tenure
guaranteed by Article IX-B, Section 2 par. (3) of the 1987 Constitution would be rendered
meaningless if the appointing authority is allowed to flip-flop in exercising its discretionary power of
appointment.

While a protest is a made of action that may be availed of by the aggrieved party to contest the
appointment made, the protest must be "for cause" or predicated on those grounds provided for
under Section 19 par. (6) of the Civil Service Law (P.D. 807), namely: (1) that the appointee is not
qualified; (2) that the appointee is not the next-in-rank; and (3) in case of appointment by transfer,
reinstatement, or by original appointment, that the protestant is not satisfied with the written special
reason or reasons given by the appointing authority.

We have defined the concept of "for cause" in connection with removal of public officers in the case
of De los Santos v. Mallare, G.R. No. L-3881, August 31, 1950, 87 Phil. 289, as follows: "It means
for reasons which the law and sound public policy recognized as sufficient warrant for removal, that
is legal cause, and not merely causes which the appointing power in the exercise of discretion may
deem sufficient. It is implied that officers may not be removed at the mere will of those vested with
the power of removal, or without any cause. Moreover, the cause must relate to and affect the
administration of the office, and must be restricted to something of a substantial nature directly
affecting the rights and interests of the public."

The ground relied upon by petitioner in his protest that he is more qualified than private respondent
in terms of education, experience and training does not fall within the meaning of "for cause"
contemplated by Article IX-B, Section 2 par. (3) of the 1987 Constitution which would warrant the
revocation, if not removal, of the appointment of private respondent. Neither does it fall under the
grounds of appeal contemplated under Section 19 par. (6) of the Civil Service Law (P.D. 807).
Therefore, the protest of petitioner did not adversely affect the approval of the appointment of private
respondent.
Even on the assumption that the revocation of private respondent's appointment was validly
exercised by DECS Secretary Quisumbing, still the appointment extended to petitioner was tainted
with irregularity as it was issued before the finality of the decision on the protest in violation of CSC
Resolution No. 83-343 which prohibits the issuance of an appointment to protestant (petitioner) if the
protest case is not yet finally resolved, since there is no vacancy in the position pending resolution of
the protest case. There can be no appointment to a non-vacant position. The incumbent must first be
legally removed or his appointment validly terminated (Costin v. Quimbo, G.R. No. L-32271, January
27, 1983, 120 SCRA 159). An appointment to an office which is not vacant is null and void ab
initio (Morata v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-18975, May 25, 1964, 11 SCRA 42).

CSC Resolution No. 83-343 provides, thus:

An appointment though contested shall take effect immediately upon issuance if the
appointee assumes the duties of the position and (the) appointee is entitled to
receive the salary attached to the position. Likewise such appointment shall become
ineffective in case the protest is finally resolved in favor of the protestant, in which
case the protestee shall be reverted to his former position. (p. 223, Rollo)

Records reveal that the decision of the DECS Secretary revoking the appointment of private
respondent was rendered on May 4, 1987 and the motion for reconsideration filed by private
respondent was denied on August 11, 1987. The appointment issued to petitioner as Supply Officer I
was dated August 11, 1987 and he assumed the position on October 26, 1987 (date of effectivity of
his appointment) as reported by the Schools Division Superintendent of San Pablo City (pp. 77-
78, Rollo). From all indications, the appointment of petitioner dated August 11, 1987 was issued with
undue haste before the finality of the denial of the motion for reconsideration.

While it is true that the appointing authority has a wide latitude of discretion in making his choice in
the selection and appointment of qualified persons to vacant positions in the civil service, we cannot,
however, give a stamp of approval to such a procedural irregularity in extending appointments, as in
the instant case, to the prejudice of the right to security of tenure of the incumbent to the position.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED. The decision dated May 4, 1987 and the resolution dated
August 11, 1987 of the respondent Civil Service Commission are hereby AFFIRMED. The Secretary
of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports is hereby directed to restore private respondent
Leonarda de la Paz to her previously approved appointment as Supply Officer I, DECS, Division of
San Pablo City.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 94255 May 5, 1992

RICARDO L. MEDALLA, JR., petitioner,

vs.
HON. PATRICIA A. STO. TOMAS, in her capacity as Chairman of the Civil Service
Commission and HON. EDUARDO O. CARRASCOSO, in his capacity as General Manager of
the Manila International Airport Authority and ARMANDO F. SINGSON, respondents.

Roberto L. Madrid & Associates for petitioner.

Reynaldo F. Singson for private respondent.

PARAS, J.:

Petitioner, in this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, seeks to annul and set aside a)
the decision and order 1 of the Merit Systems Protection Board dated November 9, 1988 and
September 5, 1989 respectively, in MSPB Case No. 1650 entitled "Singson, Armando v. Medalla,
Ricardo" revoking petitioner's appointment and directing Singson's appointment in his stead, and b)
Resolution Nos. 90-155 and 90-373 2 of the Civil Service Commission dated February 9, 1990 and
April 16, 1990, the first resolution denying petitioner's request that he be given 15 days to file his
motion for reconsideration or appeal, upholding the decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board
dated November 9, 1988 and directing the Civil Service Commission — National Capital Region to
ensure its immediate implementation, and the second resolution denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration. Petitioner likewise prays for the nullification of an Office Order and a Memorandum
issued by the then Manila International Airport Authority relating to the abovecited decisions and
resolutions.

It appears on record that in 1982, Engr. Ricardo Medalla, petitioner herein, was appointed as a
Geodetic Engineer of the then Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA for brevity). In 1986, he
was promoted to Supervising Engineer A of its Buildings, Pavements and Grounds Division,
otherwise known as the B P and G Division. On February 16, 1987, Engr. Elpidio Mendoza, the said
Decision's Department Manager, was likewise promoted, thereby leaving his position vacant (Rollo,
pp. 7-8). In view thereof, Engr. Armando Singson was designated as the Acting Division Manager on
July 1, 1987 (Annex "K", Rollo, p. 48). The MIAA Selection/Promotion Board, however, in its meeting
on October 9, 1987, unanimously appointed Medalla as the new Division Manager B of the B P and
G Division (Annex "M", Ibid., p. 50). On the same date, Medalla was issued his formal appointment
by the then MIAA General Manager Aurelio German (Annex "N", Ibid., p. 52) after which he
immediately assumed his post. Apparently aggrieved over Medalla's appointment, Singson filed a
protest on October 19, 1987 to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) of the Civil Service
Commission (hereinafter referred to as the Commission) (Annex "0-1", Ibid., p. 54) which endorsed
the same on October 21, 1987 to the MIAA General Manager for appropriate action in accordance
with Section 14 of CSC Resolution No. 83-343 (Annex "O", Ibid., p. 53). In response thereto, Mr.
German affirmed Medalla's promotional appointment and in effect dismissed Singson's protest
(Annex "P", Ibid., p. 57). The latter appealed the decision once more to the MSPB (Annex "Q-
1", Ibid., p. 60) which again referred the same to the MIAA General Manager for comment (Annex
"Q", Ibid., p. 59). Acting thereon, Mr. Evergisto C. Macatulad as the Officer-in-Charge, reiterated
MIAA's position as contained in the letter of Mr. German, thus reaffirming Medalla's appointment.
Macatulad added that their office will no longer submit supplemental comments on the matter
(Annex "R", Ibid., p. 63). The MSPB then required the submission of the list of positions considered
next-in-rank, the approved organization chart and systems of ranking positions and the qualification
standards for the contested position (Annex "S", Ibid., p. 64) which was duly complied with by the
MIAA (Annex "T", Ibid., p. 65).

In the meantime, the MIAA underwent a reorganization pursuant to its Resolutions Nos. 87-55 and
87-68 dated as early as September 30 and October 22, 1987 respectively (Annexes "U" and "U-
1", Ibid., pp. 68-70). Its new staffing pattern was approved by the Department of Budget and
Management on February 25, 1988 (Rollo, p. 99) thus the MIAA Placement Committee deliberated
on personnel appointments prescinding from the said pattern (Annex "W", Rollo, p. 88). Medalla and
Singson were subsequently reappointed as Division Manager D and Principal Engineer C
respectively of the new Civil Works Division which replaced the former B P and G Division due to
added functions (Annexes "X" and "X-2", Ibid., pp. 96-97). Both ostensibly accepted their new
designations (Annex "X-3", Ibid., p. 98).

Notwithstanding the foregoing events, the MSPB still rendered its disputed ruling which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Board finds the appeal meritorious.

Accordingly, the appointment of appellee Mr. Medalla as Division Manager B is
hereby revoked. It is directed that Mr. Singson be appointed in his stead.

SO ORDERED. (Annex "A", Ibid., p. 32).

On December 20, 1988, the new MIAA General Manager Eduardo Carrascoso sought clarification
on the effectivity of this decision considering that both Singson and Medalla had already been given
their positions based on the new plantilla (Annex "Y", Ibid., p. 99). In a letter-reply dated April 17,
1988, MSPB Chairman Villones still declared the decision as final and executory and then directed
the MIAA General Manager to comply therewith (Annex "Z", Ibid., p. 100). The matter was referred to
the MIAA Legal Office which advised that the MIAA is not bound to follow the MSPB's directive as
the said MSPB decision has already been rendered moot and academic in view of MIAA's
reorganization and that protests should be addressed anew to the Task Force on Reorganization
Appeals, being the proper forum (Annex "AA", Ibid., pp. 102-103). The contested MSPB decision
therefore remained unacted upon.

On July 21, 1989, Singson's appeal to MIAA General Manager Carrascoso asking for the
implementation of the same decision (Annex "B", Ibid., pp. 104) turned to be in vain, so Singson filed
a motion to the MSPB which filed on September 5, 1989, as follows:

After a careful review of the records, the Board noted that the General Manager,
MIAA, received the decision dated November 9, 1988 of the Board on December 5,
1988. However, instead of filing a motion for reconsideration/appeal from the
decision, he requested for clarification as to whether said decision be (sic) executed.
He did not file a motion for reconsideration within the reglementary period of fifteen
(15) days from receipt of said decision. Hence, the decision of the Board became
final and executory. Consequently, the Board's decision dated November 9, 1988 be
(sic) implemented immediately. Accordingly, the appointment dated August 1, 1988
of Mr. Ricardo L. Medalla, Jr. as Division Manager D, in the Civil Works Division,
MIAA, is hereby revoked.

xxx xxx xxx

SO ORDERED. (Annex "B", Rollo, pp. 34-35).

On October 26, 1989, Medalla filed before the CSC a motion for reconsideration of the above order
(Annex "DD", Ibid., p. 113) but the motion was denied by the CSC in its Resolution No. 90-155 dated
February 9, 1990 stating thus:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Commission resolved to deny, as

it hereby denies the request of Ricardo Medalla that he be given fifteen (15) days to
file a motion for reconsideration or to appeal. Accordingly, the Order dated
September 5, 1989 of the Merit Systems Protection Board, directing the revocation of
the appointment of Medalla as Manager B, Civil Works Office, NAIA, and the
appointment of Armando F. Singson to said position in accordance with MSPB
Decision dated November 9, 1988, stands. . . . (Annex "C", Ibid., p. 38).

Medalla's second motion for reconsideration was also denied in Resolution No. 90-373 dated April
16, 1990 (Annex "D", Ibid., pp. 40-41). Undaunted, Medalla filed a third motion for reconsideration
which has as yet, remained pending (Annex "FF", Ibid., p. 121). Meanwhile, MIAA General Manager
Carrascoso, in conformance with the previous CSC resolutions issued Office Order No. 80 on May
18, 1990, which directed Singson and Medalla to assume their duties as Division Manager A and
Principal Engineer A, respectively, of the Civil Works Division (Annex "E", Ibid., p. 42). Medalla
promptly requested for the deferment of the said Office Order pending the resolution of his motion
for reconsideration before the CSC but he was informed that his request may not be given due
course as it is only a restraining order from the Supreme Court which can suspend the effectivity of
any CSC ruling (Annex "F", Ibid., p. 43).

Hence, the present petition.

Once again, the act of the Commission through the MSPB in replacing an appointee with an
employee of its choice is at issue in the case at bar.

The petition must be granted.

The Court has already repeatedly ruled that the Commission has no such authority to do so. Its only
function is limited to approving or reviewing appointments to determine their accordance with the
requirements of the Civil Service Law (Chang v. CSC, et al., G.R. No. 86791, November 26, 1990,
191 SCRA 663). Thus, when the Commission finds the appointee to be qualified and all the other
legal requirements have been satisfied, it has no choice but to attest to the appointment (Central
Bank of the Philippines, et al., v. CSC, G.R. Nos. 80455-56, April 10, 1989, 171 SCRA 774).
Thereafter, its participation in the appointment process ceases (Orbos v. CSC, G.R. No. 92561,
September 12, 1990, 189 SCRA 464). Indeed, the determination of who among several candidates
for a vacant position has the best qualifications is vested in the sound discretion of the Department
Head or appointing authority and not in the Commission (Gaspar v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No.
90799, October 18, 1990, 190 SCRA 777). This is because the appointing authority occupies the
ideal vantage point from which to identify and designate the individual who can best fill the post and
discharge its functions in the government agency he heads (Abila v. CSC, et al., G.R. No. 92573,
June 13, 1991, 198 SCRA 102). Consequently, when the appointing authority has already exercised
his power of appointment, the Commission cannot revoke the same on the ground that another
employee is better qualified for that would constitute an encroachment on the decision vested in the
appointing authority (Luego v. CSC, G.R. No. 69137, August 5, 1986; Pintor v. Tan, G.R. Nos.
84022 and 85804, March 9, 1989, En banc). The Commission may not and should not substitute its
judgment for that of the appointing authority (Patagoc v. CSC, et al., G.R. No. 90229, May 14, 1990,
189 SCRA 416).

In fine, the Court has categorically ruled:

 We declare once again, and let us hope for the last time, that the Civil Service
Commission has no power of appointment except over its own personnel. Neither
does it have the authority to review the appointments made by other offices except
only to ascertain if the appointee possesses the required qualifications. The
determination of who among aspirants with the minimum statutory qualifications
should be preferred belongs to the appointing authority and not the Civil Service
Commission. It cannot disallow an appointment because it believes another person is
better qualified and much less can it direct the appointment of its own choice.

Appointment is a highly discretionary act that even this Court cannot compel. While
the act of appointment may in proper cases be the subject of mandamus, the
selection itself of the appointee –– taking into account the totality of his qualifications,
including those abstract qualities that define his personality –– is the prerogative of
the appointing authority. This is a matter addressed only to the discretion of the
appointing authority. It is a political question that the Civil Service Commission has
no power to review under the Constitution and the applicable laws. (Lapinid v. CSC,
et al., G.R. No. 96298, May 14, 1991).

In the same case, the Court has even warned that from the date of its promulgation, departure from
the mandate of Luego by the Commission shall be considered contempt of this Court and shall be
dealt with severely, in view of the status of the contemnor.

In the light of the foregoing doctrines, the Commission appears to have overstepped its jurisdiction
when it revoked the appointment of petitioner Medalla who was shown to have satisfied the
requirements prescribed for the contested position, and instead directed the appointment of
protestant Singson. No sanction, however, may yet be imposed on the Commission as the act
complained of occurred before the promulgation of the aforestated Lapinid decision.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, a) the decision, order and resolutions appealed from are SET ASIDE
and b) Engr. Ricardo Medalla and Engr. Armando Singson are REINSTATED to the posts of Division
Manager D and Principal Engineer C respectively, of the Civil Works Division.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 135150 July 28, 1999

ROMEO LONZANIDA, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTION and EUFEMIO MULI, respondents.

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeks to set aside the resolutions
issued by the COMELEC First Division dated May 21, 1998 and by the COMELEC En Banc dated
August 11, 1998 in SPA 98-190 entitled, In the matter of the Petition to Disqualify Mayoralty
Candidate Romeo Lonzanida of San Antonio, Zambales, Eufemio Muli, petitioner, vs. Romeo
Lonzanida, respondent. The assailed resolutions declared herein petitioner Romeo Lonzanida
disqualified to run for Mayor in the municipality of San Antonio, Zambales in the May 1998 elections
and that all votes cast in his favor shall not be counted and if he has been proclaimed winner the
said proclamation is declared null and void.
1âwphi 1.nêt

Petitioner Romeo Lonzanida was duly elected and served two consecutive terms as municipal
mayor of San Antonio, Zambales prior to the May 8, 1995 elections. In the May 1995 elections
Lonzanida ran for mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and was again proclaimed winner. He assumed
office and discharged the duties thereof. His proclamation in 1995 was however contested by his
then opponent Juan Alvez who filed an election protest before the Regional Trial Court of Zambales,
which in a decision dated January 9, 1997 declared a failure of elections. The court ruled:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, this court hereby renders judgment declaring the results
of the election for the office of the mayor in San Antonio, Zambales last May 8, 1995
as null and void on the ground that there was a failure of election.

Accordingly, the office of the mayor of the Municipality of San Antonio, Zambales is
hereby declared vacant.

Both parties appealed to the COMELEC. On November 13, 1997 the COMELEC resolved the
election protest filed by Alvez and after a revision and re-appreciation of the contested ballots
declared Alvez the duly elected mayor of San Antonio, Zambales by plurality of votes cast in his
favor totaling P1,720 votes as against 1,488 votes for Lonzanida. On February 27, 1998 the
COMELEC issued a writ of execution ordering Lonzanida to vacate the post, which he obeyed, and
Alvez assumed office for the remainder of the term.

In the May 11, 1998 elections Lonzanida again filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor of San
Antonio. On April 21, 1998 his opponent Eufemio Muli timely filed a petition to disqualify Lonzanida
from running for mayor of San Antonio in the 1998 elections on the ground that he had served three
consecutive terms in the same post. On May 13, 1998, petitioner Lonzanida was proclaimed winner.
On May 21, 1998 the First Division of the COMELEC issued the questioned resolution granting the
petition for disqualification upon a finding that Lonzanida had served three consecutive terms as
mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and he is therefore disqualified to run for the same post for the
fourth time. The COMELEC found that Lonzanida's assumption of office by virtue of his proclamation
in May 1995, although he was later unseated before the expiration of the term, should be counted as
service for one full term in computing the three term limit under the Constitution and the Local
Government Code. The finding of the COMELEC First Division was affirmed by the COMELEC En
Banc in a resolution dated August 11, 1998.
Petitioner Lonzanida challenges the validity of the COMELEC resolutions finding him disqualified to
run for mayor of San Antonio Zambales in the 1998 elections. He maintains that he was duly elected
mayor for only two consecutive terms and that his assumption of office in 1995 cannot be counted as
service of a term for the purpose of applying the three term limit for local government officials,
because he was not the duly elected mayor of San Antonio in the May 1995 elections as evidenced
by the COMELEC decision dated November 13, 1997 in EAC No. 6-97 entitled Juan Alvez,
Protestant-Appellee vs. Romeo Lonzanida, Protestee-Appellant; wherein the COMELEC declared
Juan Alvez as the duly elected mayor of San Antonio, Zambales. Petitioner also argues that the
COMELEC ceased to have jurisdiction over the petition for disqualification after he was proclaimed
winner in the 1998 mayoral elections; as the proper remedy is a petition for quo warranto with the
appropriate regional trial court under Rule 36 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.

Private respondent Eufemio Muli filed comment to the petition asking this court to sustain the
questioned resolutions of the COMELEC and to uphold its jurisdiction over the petition for
disqualification. The private respondent states that the petition for disqualification was filed on April
21, 1998 or before the May 1998 mayoral elections. Under section 6, RA 6646 and Rule 25 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure petitions for disqualification filed with the COMELEC before the
elections and/or proclamation of the party sought to be disqualified may still be heard and decided
by the COMELEC after the election and proclamation of the said party without distinction as to the
alleged ground for disqualification, whether for acts constituting an election offense or for ineligibility.
Accordingly, it is argued that the resolutions of the COMELEC on the merits of the petition for
disqualification were issued within the commission's jurisdiction. As regards the merits of the case,
the private respondent maintains that the petitioner's assumption of office in 1995 should be
considered as service of one full term because he discharged the duties of mayor for almost three
years until March 1, 1998 or barely a few months before the next mayoral elections.

The Solicitor-General filed comment to the petition for the respondent COMELEC praying for the
dismissal of the petition. The Solicitor-General stressed that section 8, Art. X of the Constitution and
section 43 (b), Chapter 1 of the Local Government Code which bar a local government official from
serving more than three consecutive terms in the same position speaks of "service of a term" and so
the rule should be examined in this light. The public respondent contends that petitioner Lonzanida
discharged the rights and duties of mayor from 1995 to 1998 which should be counted as service of
one full term, albeit he was later unseated, because he served as mayor for the greater part of the
term. The issue of whether or not Lonzanida served as a de jure or de facto mayor for the 1995-
1998 term is inconsequential in the application of the three term limit because the prohibition speaks
or "service of a term" which was intended by the framers of the Constitution to foil any attempt to
monopolize political power. It is likewise argued by the respondent that a petition for quo
warranto with the regional trial court is proper when the petition for disqualification is filed after the
elections and so the instant petition for disqualification which was filed before the elections may be
resolved by the COMELEC thereafter regardless of the imputed basis of disqualification.

The petitioner filed Reply to the comment. It is maintained that the petitioner could not have served a
valid term from 1995 to 1998 although he assumed office as mayor for that period because he was
not lawfully elected to the said office. Moreover, the petitioner was unseated before the expiration of
the term and so his service for the period cannot be considered as one full term. As regards the
issue of jurisdiction, the petitioner reiterated in his Reply that the COMELEC ceased to have
jurisdiction to hear the election protest after the petitioner's proclamation.

The petition has merit.

Sec. 8, Art. X of the Constitution provides:

 Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which
shall be determined by law shall be three years and no such officials shall serve for
more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length
of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for
the full term for which he was elected.

Sec. 43 of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) restates the same rule:

Sec. 43. Term of Office.

(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms in the
same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the
elective official concerned was elected.

The issue before us is whether petitioner Lonzanida's assumption of office as mayor of San Antonio
Zambales from May 1995 to March 1998 may be considered as service of one full term for the
purpose of applying the three-term limit for elective local government officials.

The records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that the three-term limit which is now
embodied in section 8, Art. X of the Constitution was initially proposed to be an absolute bar to any
elective local government official from running for the same position after serving three consecutive
terms. The said disqualification was primarily intended to forestall the accumulation of massive
political power by an elective local government official in a given locality in order to perpetuate his
tenure in office. The delegates also considered the need to broaden the choices of the electorate of
the candidates who will run for office, and to infuse new blood in the political arena by disqualifying
officials from running for the same office after a term of nine years. The mayor was compared by
some delegates to the President of the Republic as he is a powerful chief executive of his political
territory and is most likely to form a political dynasty. 1 The drafters however, recognized and took
note of the fact that some local government officials run for office before they reach forty years of
age; thus to perpetually bar them from running for the same office after serving nine consecutive
years may deprive the people of qualified candidates to choose from. As finally voted upon, it was
agreed that an elective local government official should be barred from running for the same post
after three consecutive terms. After a hiatus of at least one term, he may again run for the same
office.2

The scope of the constitutional provision barring elective local officials with the exception of
barangay officials from serving more than three consecutive terms was discussed at length in the
case of Benjamin Borja, Jr.; vs. COMELEC and Jose Capco, Jr.3 where the issue raised was
whether a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of the mayor by operation of law upon the death of
the incumbent mayor and served the remainder of the term should be considered to have served a
term in that office for the purpose of computing the three term limit. This court pointed out that from
the discussions of the Constitutional Convention it is evident that the delegates proceeded from the
premise that the official's assumption of office is by reason of election. This Court stated:4

Two ideas emerge from a consideration of the proceedings of the Constitutional

Commission. The first is the notion of service of term, derived from the concern about
the accumulation of power as a result of a prolonged stay in office. The second is the
idea of election, derived from the concern that the right of the people to choose those
whom they wish to govern them be preserved.
 It is likewise noteworthy that, in discussing term limits, the drafters of the Constitution
did so on the assumption that the officials concerned were serving by reason of
election. This is clear from the following exchange in the Constitutional Commission
concerning term limits, now embodied in Art. VI sections 4 and 7 of the Constitution,
for members of Congress:

MR. GASCON. I would like to ask a question with regard to the issue
after the second term. We will allow the Senator to rest for a period of
time before he can run again?

MR. DAVIDE. That is correct.

MR. GASCON. And the question that we left behind before — if the
Gentlemen will remember-was: How long will that period of rest be?
Will it be one election which is three years or one term which is six
years?

MR. DAVIDE. If the Gentlemen will remember, Commissioner

Rodrigo expressed the view that during the election following the
expiration of the first 12 years, whether such election will be on the
third year or on the sixth year thereafter, this particular member of the
Senate can run. So it is not really a period of hibernation for six years.
That was the Committees' stand.

xxx xxx xxx

Second, not only historical examination but textual analysis as well supports the
ruling of the COMELEC that Art X, section 8 contemplates service by local officials
for three consecutive terms as a result of election. The first sentence speaks of "the-
term of office of elective local officials" and bars "such officials" from serving for more
than three consecutive terms. The second sentence, in explaining when an elective
official may be deemed to have served his full term of office, states that "voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected."
The term served must therefore be one "for which the official concerned was
elected." The purpose of the provision is to prevent a circumvention of the limitation
on the number of terms an elective official may serve."

This Court held that the two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: 1) that
the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government
post and 2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms. It stated:

To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the
right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position.
Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms
in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for
the same number of times before the disqualification can apply.

It is not disputed that the petitioner was previously elected and served two consecutive terms as
mayor of San Antonio Zambales prior to the May 1995 mayoral elections. In the May 1995 elections
he again ran for mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and was proclaimed winner. He assumed office
and discharged the rights and duties of mayor until March 1998 when he was ordered to vacate the
post by reason of the COMELEC decision dated November 13, 1997 on the election protest against
the petitioner which declared his opponent Juan Alvez, the duly elected mayor of San Antonio. Alvez
served the remaining portion of the 1995-1998 mayoral term.

The two requisites for the application of the three term rule are absent. First, the petitioner cannot be
considered as having been duly elected to the post in the May 1995 elections, and second, the
petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term by reason of involuntary relinquishment of
office. After a re-appreciation and revision of the contested ballots the COMELEC itself declared by
final judgment that petitioner Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections and his previous
proclamation as winner was declared null and void. His assumption of office as mayor cannot be
deemed to have been by reason of a valid election but by reason of a void proclamation. It has been
repeatedly held by this court that a proclamation subsequently declared void is no proclamation at
all 5 and while a proclaimed candidate may assume office on the strength of the proclamation of the
Board of Canvassers he is only a presumptive winner who assumes office subject to the final
outcome of the election protest.6 Petitioner Lonzanida did not serve a term as mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales from May 1995 to March 1998 because he was not duly elected to the post; he merely
assumed office as presumptive winner, which presumption was later overturned by the COMELEC
when it decided with finality that Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections.

Second, the petitioner cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to 1998 term because he
was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term. The respondents' contention that
the petitioner should be deemed to have served one full term from May 1995-1998 because he
served the greater portion of that term has no legal basis to support it; it disregards the second
requisite for the application of the disqualification, i.e., that he has fully served three consecutive
terms. The second sentence of the constitutional provision under scrutiny states, "Voluntary
renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of service for the full term for which he was elected. "The clear intent of the framers of the
constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office
and at the same time respect the people's choice and grant their elected official full service of a term
is evident in this provision. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in
the computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length
of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. The
petitioner vacated his post a few months before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary
renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to
that effect. Such involuntary severance from office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus,
the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.

In sum, the petitioner was not the duly elected mayor and that he did not hold office for the full term;
hence, his assumption of office from 1995 to March 1998 cannot be counted as a term for purposes
of computing the three term limit. The Resolution of the COMELEC finding him disqualified on this
ground to run in the May 1998 mayoral elections should therefore be set aside.

The respondents harp on the delay in resolving the election protest between petitioner and his then
opponent Alvez which took roughly about three years and resultantly extended the petitioners
incumbency in an office to which he was not lawfully elected. We note that such delay cannot be
imputed to the petitioner. There is no specific allegation nor proof that the delay was due to any
political maneuvering on his part to prolong his stay in office. Moreover, protestant Alvez, was not
without legal recourse to move for the early resolution of the election protest while it was pending
before the regional trial court or to file a motion for the execution of the regional trial court's decision
declaring the position of mayor vacant and ordering the vice-mayor to assume office while the
appeal was pending with the COMELEC. Such delay which is not here shown to have intentionally
sought by the petitioner to prolong his stay in office cannot serve as basis to bar his right to be
elected and to serve his chosen local government post in the succeeding mayoral election.
The petitioner's contention that the COMELEC ceased to have jurisdiction over the petition for
disqualification after he was proclaimed winner is without merit. The instant petition for
disqualification was filed on April 21, 1998 or before the May 1998 elections and was resolved on
May 21, 1998 or after the petitioner's proclamation. It was held in the case of Sunga
vs. COMELEC and Trinidad7 that the proclamation nor the assumption of office of a candidate
against whom a petition for disqualification is pending before the COMELEC does not divest the
COMELEC of jurisdiction to continue hearing the case and to resolve it on the merits.

Sec. 6 of RA 6646 specifically mandates that:

Sec. 6. Effects of disqualification Case. — any candidate who has been declared by
final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him
shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment
before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning
number of votes in such election, the court or commission shall continue with the trial
and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or
any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

This court held that the clear legislative intent is that the COMELEC should continue the trial and
hearing of the disqualification case to its conclusion i.e., until judgment is rendered. The outright
dismissal of the petition for disqualification filed before the election but which remained unresolved
after the proclamation of the candidate sought to be disqualified will unduly reward the said
candidate and may encourage him to employ delaying tactics to impede the resolution of the petition
until after he has been proclaimed.

The court stated:

Clearly, the legislative intent is that the COMELEC should continue the trial and
hearing of the disqualification case to its conclusion i.e., until judgment is rendered
thereon. The word "shall" signified that this requirement of the law is mandatory,
operating to impose a positive duty which must be enforced. The implication is that
the COMELEC is left with no discretion but to proceed with the disqualification case
even after the election. Thus, in providing for the outright dismissal of the
disqualification case which remains unresolved after the election, Silvestre
vs. Duavit in effect disallows what R.A. No. 6646 imperatively requires. This amounts
to a quasi-judicial legislation by the COMELEC which cannot be countenanced and is
invalid for having been issued beyond the scope of its authority. Interpretative rulings
of quasi-judicial bodies or administrative agencies must always be in perfect
harmony with statutes and should be for the sole purpose of carrying their general
provisions into effect. By such interpretative or administrative rulings, of course, the
scope of the law itself cannot be limited. Indeed, a quasi-judicial body or an
administrative agency for that matter cannot amend an act of Congress. Hence, in
case of a discrepancy between the basic law and an interpretative or administrative
ruling, the basic law prevails.

Besides, the deleterious effect of the Silvestre ruling is not difficult to foresee. A
candidate guilty of election offenses would be undeservedly rewarded, instead of
punished, by the dismissal of the disqualification case against him simply because
the investigating body was unable, for any reason caused upon it, to determine
before the election if the offenses were indeed committed by the candidate sought to
be disqualified. All that the erring aspirant would need to do is to employ delaying
 tactics so that the disqualification case based on the commission of election offenses
would not be decided before the election. This scenario is productive of more fraud
which certainly is not the main intent and purpose of the law.

The fact that Trinidad was already proclaimed and had assumed the position of
mayor did not divest the COMELEC of authority and jurisdiction to continue the
hearing and eventually decide the disqualification case. In Aguam v. COMELEC this
Court held —

Time and again this Court has given its imprimatur on the principle
that COMELEC is with authority to annul any canvass and
proclamation which was illegally made. The fact that a candidate
proclaimed has assumed office, we have said, is no bar to the
exercise of such power. It of course may not be availed of where
there has been a valid proclamation. Since private respondent's
petition before the COMELEC is precisely directed at the annulment
of the canvass and proclamation, we perceive that inquiry into this
issue is within the area allocated by the Constitution and law to
COMELEC . . . Really, were a victim of a proclamation to be
precluded from challenging the validity thereof after that proclamation
and the assumption of office thereunder, baneful effects may easily
supervene.

It must be emphasized that the purpose of a disqualification proceeding is to prevent

the candidate from running or, if elected. From serving, or to prosecute him for
violation of the election laws. Obviously, the fact that a candidate has been
proclaimed elected does not signify that his disqualification is deemed condoned and
may no longer be the subject of a separate investigation .

Accordingly, the petition is granted. The assailed resolutions of the COMELEC declaring petitioner
Lonzanida disqualified to run for mayor in the 1998 mayoral elections are hereby set aside.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-3913 August 7, 1952

EULOGIO RODRIGUEZ, SR., plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
CARLOS TAN, defendant-appellee.

Ramon Diokno and Jose W. Diokno for appellant.

Agustin Alvarez Salazar for appellee.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

Plaintiff seeks to collect from the defendant the aggregate sum of P18,400 as salaries and
allowances and the sum of P35,524.55 as damages, upon the plea that the latter usurped the office
of Senator of the Philippines which rightfully belongs to the former from December 30, 1947, to
December 27, 1949.

Plaintiff claims that on December 30, 1947, defendant usurped the office of Senator of the
Philippines, and from that date until December 1949, he continously collected the salaries,
emoluments and privileges attendant to that office amounting to P18,400; that protest having been
filed by plaintiff against defendant, the Senate Electoral Tribunal on December 16, 1949, rendered
judgment declaring plaintiff to have been duly elected to the office; and that by reason of such
usurpation, plaintiff suffered damages in the amount of P35,524.55 for expenses he incurred in
prosecuting the protest.

On February 2, 1950, defendant filed a motion to dismiss alleging, on one hand, that the judgment
rendered by the Senate Electoral Tribunal in the protest case is a bar to this action under the
principle of res judicata, and, on the other, that said Tribunal denied without any reservation the
claim of the plaintiff for expenses incurred in prosecuting the protest.

The issue having been thus joined upon the motion to dismiss, the Court entered on an order
dismissing the complaint with costs. From this order plaintiff has appealed.

The averment in the complaint that "defendant usurped the office of Senator of the Philippines" is a
conclusion of law, — not a statement of fact, — inasmuch as the particular facts on which the
alleged usurpation is predicated are not set forth therein. Hence such averment cannot be deemed
admitted by the motion to dismiss (Fressel vs. Mariano Uy Chanco & Sons & Co., 34 Phil., 122).
Moreover, such averment is negatived by the decision of the Senate Electoral Tribunal in the protest
case which says that defendant was one of those proclaimed elected as Senator in the general
elections held on November 11, 1947. Defendant, cannot, therefore, be considered a usurper as
claimed in the complaint.

With this preliminary statement, let us now proceed to determine the only issue involved in this
appeal, to wit, whether defendant, who has been proclaimed, took the oath of office, and discharged
the duties of Senator, can be ordered to reimburse the salaries and emoluments he has received
during his incumbency to the plaintiff who has been legally declared elected by the Senate Electoral
Tribunal. .

Plaintiff claims that, as defendant was found and by final judgment not to have been entitled to the
office of Senator, and, as such, he was during the time he discharged that office a mere de
facto officer, he should reimbursed to the plaintiff the salaries and emoluments he has received on
the following grounds; (1) because the salaries and emoluments follow and are inseparable from
legal title to the office and do not depend on whether the duties of the office are discharged or not;
and (2) because such a rule tends to curb election frauds and lessens the danger and frequency of
usurpation or instrusion into the office. Plaintiffs invites the attention of the Court to the annotation
appearing in 93 A.L.R. 258,273 et seq., supplemented in 151 A.L.R. 952, 960, et seq., wherein more
than 100 cases are cited in support of the rule.

Defendant, on the other hand, contends that the rule invoked by plaintiff, while sound and plausible
cannot be invoked in the present case, since it runs counter to the principle and rule long observed
in this jurisdiction to the effect that one who has been elected to an office, and has been proclaimed
by the corresponding authority, has a right to assume the office and discharge its functions
notwithstanding the protest filed against his election, and as a necessary consequence he has
likewise the right to collect and received the salaries and emoluments thereunto appertaining as a
compensation for the salaries he has rendered. Defendants avers that plaintiff already attempted to
seek the reimbursement of the salaries and emoluments he had received in the protest he has filed
against him Senate Electoral Tribunal constitutes a bar to his right to collect the same salaries and
emoluments in the present case.

After a careful consideration of the issue in the light of the law and precedents obtaining in this
jurisdiction, we are inclined to uphold the point of view of the defendant. There is no question that
the defendant acted as a de facto officer during the time he held the office of Senator. He was one of
the candidates of the Liberal Party in the elections of November 11, 1947, and was proclaimed as
one of those who had been elected by the Commission on Elections, and thereafter he took the oath
of office and immediately entered into the performance of the duties of the position. Having been
thus duly proclaimed as Senator and having assumed office as required by law, it cannot be
disputed that defendant is entitled to the compensation, emoluments and allowances which our
Constitution provides for the position (article VI, section 14). This is as it should be. This is in
keeping with the ordinary course of events. This is simple justice. The emolument must go to the
person who rendered service unless the contrary is provided. There is no averment in the complaint
that he is linked with any irregularity vitiating his election. This is the policy and the rule that has
been followed consistently in this jurisdiction in connection with the provisions held by persons who
had been elected thereto but were later ousted as a result of an election protest. The right of the
persons elected to compensation during their incumbency has always been recognized. We cannot
recall of any precedent wherein the contrary rule has been upheld.

A case which may be invoked in support of this point of view is Page vs. U.S. (127 U.S. 67; 32 Law
ed. 65), decided by the Supreme Court of the United States. In that case, one William A. Pirce was
declared elected, received a certificate of election, was sworn in and took his seat in the Congress of
the United States. His election was contested by Charles H. Page, and as a result the House of
Representatives found that Pirce was not duly elected his seat vacant. An election was thereafter
held to fill the vacancy and Page was duly elected. Thereupon Page was sworn in and took his seat.
Page later sued to recover the salary received by Price during his incumbency. The Supreme Court
ruled that he was not entitled to it holding that "one whose credentials showed that he was regularly
elected a member of Congress, and who was sworn in and took his seat, and served, and drew his
salary, was — although his seat was contested, and subsequently he was declared by Congress not
to have been elected, and this seat was declared vacant — the predecessor of the person elected to
fill the vacancy". This case, thought it arose under a special statute, is significant in that it regarded
Pirce as the lawful predecessor of Page in the office to which he was later legally elected. Pirce was
declared entitled to the salary and emoluments of the office.

We are sympathetic to the rule earnestly advocated by the plaintiff which holds that the salaries and
emoluments should follow the legal title to the office and should not depend and whether the duties
of the office are discharged or not, knowing that it is predicated on a policy designed to discourage
the Commission of frauds and to lessen the danger and frequency of usurpation or intrusion into the
office which defeat the will of the people. We are conscious that, if the rule is adopted, it would
indeed have a wholesome effect in future elections and would serve as a deterring factor in the
commission of frauds, violence and terrorism which at the times are committed in some sectors of
our country to the detriment of public interest. But an examination of the cases relied upon by him,
discloses that in some states, like Indiana, New York, Michigan, California, Lousiana, Idaho,
Missouri and Washington, the doctrine advocated is premised on express statutory by reason of
usurpation, (Mechem, A Treatise on the Law of Public Offices and Officers, pp. 223-224; 93 A.L.R.
pp. 284-287), whereas in the rest in the ruling is based on common law (Kreitz vs. Behrensmeyer,
24 A.L.R. 223-224). Under such predicament, it is indeed hard to see how we can extend here the
force and effect of such doctrine as we are urged, knowing well that, as a rule, "neither the English
nor the American common law as in force in these Islands upon our courts" (U.S. vs. Cuna, 12 Phil.,
241; Arnedo vs. Llorente and Liongson, 18 Phil., 257, 262) while, on the other hand, there is nothing
in our status which would authorize us to adopt the rule. For us to follow the suggestion of the
plaintiff would be legislate by judicial ruling which is beyond the province of the Court. Nor are we
justified to follow a common law principle which runs counter to a precedent long observed in this
jurisdiction.

Another reason that may be involved in opposition to the claim of the plaintiff is the principle of res
judicata. It appears that plaintiff had already set up this claim in the protest he filed against the
defendant before the Senate Electoral Tribunal, but when the case was decided on the merits the
Tribunal passed up this matter sub silentio. In our opinion, this silence may be interpreted as a
denial of the relief. This is a matter which can be considered as an incident to the power and
authority given to the Electoral Tribunal by our Constitution, whose jurisdiction over election cases is
ample and unlimited (Sanidad et al. vs. Vera et al., Case No. 1, Senate Electoral Tribunal), and
when the Tribunal chose to pass sub silentio, or ignore altogether, this important claim, the clear
implication is that it deemed it unjustified. This matter, therefore, cannot now be passed upon in line
with the doctrine laid down in the case of Kare vs. Locsin, (61 Phil., 541), wherein the Court, among
other things, said;

Locsin drew his pay by resolution and authority of the Legislature. The propriety of those
payments cannot be questioned on this complaint. We recognize Locsin's rigth to receive
and to retain the compensation because the Legislature voted it to him in spite of Mr. Kare's
pending contest and claim to that compensation. The legislature's carries the corollary of Mr.
Kare's lack of right to the same compensation. The Legislature might possibly have required
reimbursement by Locsin had it been its intention to recognize Mr. Kare's claim to the same
compensation; but not having done so, Locsin's superior right to this compensation is res
judicata for the courts. (Kare vs. Locsin, 61 Phil., pp. 541, 546.)

The same consideration may be made with regard to the claim for damages contained in the second
cause of action of the complaint.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellant.
G.R. No. 111471 September 26, 1994

CITY MAYOR ROGELIO R. DEBULGADO and VICTORIA T. DEBULGADO, petitioners,

vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.

Marlon P. Ontal for petitioners.

FELICIANO, J.:

Petitioner Rogelio R. Debulgado is the incumbent Mayor of the City of San Carlos, Negros
Occidental. On 1 October 1992, petitioner Mayor appointed his wife, petitioner Victoria T.
Debulgado, as General Services Officer, that is, as head of the Office of General Services 1 of the
City Government of San Carlos.

Petitioner Victoria was one of three (3) employees of the City Government who were considered for
the position of General Services Officer. Before her promotion in 1992, she had been in the service
of the City Government for about thirty-two (32) years. She joined the City Government on 3 January
1961 as Assistant License Clerk. Through the years, she rose from the ranks, successively
occupying the following positions:

(a) Assistant Chief of the License & Fees Division, from 1 July 1965 to 30 June 1973;

(b) Chief of the License and Fees Division, from 1 July 1973 to 1 January 1981;

(c) Cashier, from 2 January 1981 to 30 June 1989; and

(d) Cashier IV, from 1 July 1989 to 30 September 1992. 2

On 1 October 1992, petitioner Victoria assumed the new post, and commenced discharging
the functions, of General Services Officer of San Carlos City and receiving the regular salary
attached to that position.

On 16 December 1992, public respondent Civil Service Commission ("Commission") received a

letter 3 from Congressman Tranquilino B. Carmona of the First District of Negros Occidental, calling
attention to the promotional appointment issued by petitioner Mayor in favor of his wife.

The Commission directed its Regional Office No. 6-Iloilo City to submit a report on the appointment
of petitioner Victoria.

From the report submitted by Director Jesse J. Caberoy of the Iloilo City-CSRO No. 6, the
Commission found that petitioner Mayor was the lawful husband of the appointee, petitioner Victoria,
the two (2) having been married sometime in 1964. Director Caberoy also reported that the
appointment papers prepared by the Office of the City Mayor of San Carlos were submitted to the
Bacolod City CSC-Field Office on 28 October 1992, and that the appointment was thereafter
approved by Director Purita H. Escobia of that CSC-Field Office, on 18 November 1992.

Acting on the report of Director Caberoy, the Commission, in its Resolution No. 93-1427 dated 13
April 1993, recalled the approval issued by Director Escobia and disapproved the promotion of
petitioner Victoria to the position of General Services Officer of San Carlos City upon the ground that
that promotion violated the statutory prohibition against nepotic appointments.

On 14 June 1993, petitioner Mayor and petitioner Victoria received a copy of Resolution No. 93-1427
of the Commission. 4 Petitioners moved for reconsideration, contending that the statutory prohibition
against nepotism was not applicable to the appointment of Victoria as General Services Officer.
Petitioners also asserted that the Commission had deprived petitioner Victoria of her right to due
process by unilaterally revoking her appointment. The motion for reconsideration was denied by the
Commission on 21 July 1993.

In this Petition for Certiorari, petitioner Mayor and petitioner Victoria contend that the Commission
had gravely abused its discretion in withdrawing and disapproving petitioner Victoria's promotional
appointment. Petitioners assert that Victoria can no longer be removed from the position of General
Services Officer without giving her an opportunity to be heard and to answer the charged of
nepotism.

Petitioner Mayor denies that he had been motivated by personal reasons when he appointed his wife
to the new post. He states that his wife was the most qualified among the candidates for
appointment to that position, she having worked for the City Government for thirty-two (32) years
and being highly recommended by the OIC-Treasurer of San Carlos City. 5 It is also claimed by
petitioner Mayor that his choice of his wife for the position was concurred in by the Sangguniang
Panglungsod. 6 He further avers that he had consulted the Field and Regional Officers of the
Commission in Bacolod City, and raised the question of applicability of the prohibition against
nepotism to the then proposed promotion of his wife in one of the seminars conducted by the
Commission's Regional Office held in San Carlos City on 21 and 22 September 1992. According to
petitioner Mayor, one Gregorio C. Agdon, a supervising personnel specialist in the Commission's
Bacolod Office, informed him that the promotional appointment was not covered by the prohibition. 7

The basic contention of petitioners is that the prohibition against nepotic appointments is applicable
only to original appointments and not to promotional appointments. They believe that because
petitioner Victoria was already in the service of the City Government before she married petitioner
Mayor, the reason behind the prohibition no longer applied to her promotional appointment.
Petitioners also affirm that petitioner Victoria deserves to be promoted to General Services Officer,
considering her long and faithful service to the City Government. 8

The task before this Court is, accordingly, two-fold:

(1) to determine whether a promotional appointment is covered by the legal

prohibition against nepotism, or whether that prohibition applies only to original
appointments to the Civil Service; and

(2) to determine whether the Commission had gravely abused its discretion in
recalling and disapproving the promotional appointment given to petitioner Victoria
after the Commission, through Director Escobia, had earlier approved that same
appointment, without giving an opportunity to petitioner Victoria to explain her side on
the matter.

The prohibitory norm against nepotism in the public service is set out in Section 59, Book V of the
Revised Administrative Code of 1987 (also known as E.O. No. 292). Section 59 reads as follows:
 Sec. 59. Nepotism — (1) All appointments in the national, provincial, city and
municipal governments or in any branch or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, made in favor of a relative of the
appointing or recommending authority, or of the chief of the bureau or office, or of the
persons exercising immediate supervision over him, are hereby prohibited.

As used in this Section the word "relative" and members of the family referred to
are those related within the third degree either of consanguinity or of affinity.

(2) The following are exempted from the operation of the rules on nepotism: (a)
persons employed in a confidential capacity, (b) teachers, (c) physicians, and (d)
members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines: Provided, however, That in each
particular instance full report of such appointment shall be made to the Commission.

The restriction mentioned in subsection (1) shall not be applicable to the case of a
member of any family who, after his or her appointment to any position in an office or
bureau, contracts marriage with someone in the same office or bureau, in which
event the employment or retention therein of both husband and wife may be allowed.

(3) In order to give immediate effect to these provisions, cases of previous

appointment which are in contravention hereof shall be corrected by transfer and
pending such transfer, no promotion or salary increase shall be allowed in favor of
the relative or relatives who were appointed in violation of these provisions.
(Emphasis supplied).

Section 6 of Rule XVIII, of the "Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292
and other Pertinent Civil Service Laws," issued on 27 December 1991, implementing, among other
things, the abovequoted Section 59, provides as follows:

Sec. 6. No appointments in the national, provincial, city and municipal government or

in any branch or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters shall be made in favor of a relative of the
appointing or recommending authority, or of the chief of the bureau or office, or of the
persons exercising immediate supervision over the appointee.

Unless otherwise specifically provided by law, as used in this Section, the word
"relative" and the members of the family referred to are those related within the third
degree either of consanguinity or of affinity.

The following are exempted from the operation of the rules on nepotism: (a) persons
employed in a confidential capacity; (b) teachers; (c) physicians; (d) members of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines. Provided, however, That in each particular instance
full report of such appointment shall be made to the Commission.

The restriction mentioned in the first paragraph of this Section shall not be applicable
to the case of a member of any family who after his or her appointment to any
position in an office or bureau, contracts marriage with someone in the same office or
bureau, in which event the employment or retention therein of both husband and wife
may be allowed.

Cases of previous appointment which are in contravention hereof shall be corrected

by transfer, and pending such transfer no promotion or salary increase shall be
 allowed in favor of the relative or relatives who were appointed in violation of these
provisions. (Emphasis supplied)

It will be noted that the abovequoted Section 6 of Implementing Rule XVIII essentially tracks
the provisions of Section 59, Book V of E.O. No. 292. 9

We turn, therefore, to an analysis of Section 59, Book V of E.O. No. 292, quoted above. The
noteworthy fact may be pointed out, at the outset, that Section 59 as it exists today has been in our
statute books in substantially identical form and language for at least thirty (30) years. 10

A textual examination of Section 59 at once reveals that the prohibition was cast in comprehensive
and unqualified terms. Firstly, it explicitly covers "all appointments", without seeking to make any
distinction between differing kinds or types of appointments. Secondly, Section 59 covers all
appointments to the national, provincial, city and municipal government, as well as any branch or
instrumentality thereof and all government owned or controlled corporations. Thirdly, there is a list of
exceptions set out in Section 59 itself, but it is a short list:

(a) persons employed in a confidential capacity;

(b) teachers;
(c) physicians; and
(d) members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

The list has not been added to or subtracted from for the past thirty (30) years. The list
does not contain words like "and other similar positions." Thus, the list appears to us to be
a closed one, at least closed until lengthened or shortened by Congress.

Section 59 of Book V, E.O. No. 292 should, of course, be read in connection with the Omnibus
Implementing Rules. Additional light is shed on the issue we here address by some provisions of
these Rules. Section 1, Rule V of the Omnibus Implementing Rules reads as follows:

Sec. 1. All appointments in the career service shall be made only according to merit
and fitness to be determined as far as practicable by competitive examinations.

As used in these Rules, any action denoting movement or progress of personnel in

the civil service shall be known as personnel action. Such action shall include
promotion, transfer, reinstatement, reemployment, detail, secondment, reassignment,
demotion and separation. All original appointments and personnel actions shall be in
accordance with these Rules and with other regulations and standards that may be
promulgated by the Commission. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 1, Rule VII of the same Rules also bears upon our inquiry:

Sec. 1. The following constitute personnel actions: original appointment, appointment

through certification, promotion, transfer, reinstatement, reemployment, detail,
secondment, demotion and separation. (Emphasis supplied)

Under the abovequoted provisions of the Implementing Rules, both an original appointment and a
promotion are particular species of personnel action. The original appointment of a civil service
employee and all subsequent personnel actions undertaken by or in respect of that employee such
as promotion, transfer, reinstatement, reemployment, etc., must comply with the Implementing Rules
including, of course, the prohibition against nepotism in Rule XVIII. To the extent that all personnel
actions occurring after an original appointment, require the issuance of a new appointment to
another position (or to the original position in case of reinstatement), we believe that such
appointment must comply with all applicable rules and prohibitions, including the statutory and
regulatory prohibition against nepotism. To limit the thrust of the prohibition against nepotism to the
appointment issued at the time of initial entry into the government service, and to insulate from that
prohibition appointments subsequently issued when personnel actions are thereafter taken in
respect of the same employee, would be basically to render that prohibition, in the words of Laurel V,
etc. v. Civil Service Commission, 11 "meaningless and toothless."

Inquiry into the basic purpose or objective of the prohibition against nepotism also strongly indicates
that that prohibition was intended to be a comprehensive one. Section 1, Book V, E.O. No. 292 sets
out the basic policy which pervades all the provisions of our Civil Service law, including Section 59
thereof:

Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. — The State shall insure and promote

the Constitutional mandate that appointments in the Civil Service shall be made only
according to merit and fitness; . . . (Emphasis supplied)

Put succinctly, that purpose is to ensure that all appointments and other personnel actions in
the civil service should be based on merit and fitness and should never depend on how close
or intimate an appointee is to the appointing power. 12

Laurel V, etc. v. Civil Service Commission supra, is instructive in this connection. In that case,
petitioner Governor of Batangas Province appointed or designated his brother, Benjamin Laurel, who
had been holding a promotional appointment as Civil Security Officer, a position classified as
"primarily confidential" by the Civil Service, to the position of Provincial Administrator, a position in
the Career Civil Service. This Court held that the appointment or designation as Acting Provincial
Administrator was violative of the prohibition against nepotism, then embodied in Section 49, P.D.
No. 807. Moreover, the Court emphatically agreed with the Civil Service Commission that "although
what was extended to Benjamin was merely a designation and not an appointment, . . . the
prohibitive mantle on nepotism would include designation, because what cannot be done directly,
cannot be done indirectly:"

We cannot accept petitioner's view. His specious and tenuous distinction between
appointment and designation is nothing more than either a ploy ingeniously
conceived to circumvent the rigid rule on nepotism or a last-ditch maneuver to
cushion the impact of its violation. The rule admits of no distinction between
appointment and designation. Designation is also defined as "an appointment or
assignment to a particular office"; and "to designate" means "to indicate,
select, appoint or set apart for a purpose of duty." (Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth ed.,
402)

xxx xxx xxx

It seems clear to Us that Section 49 of P.D. No. 807 does not suggest that
designation should be differentiated from appointment. Reading this section with
Section 25 of said decree, career service positions may be filled up only by
appointment, either permanent or temporary; hence a designation of a person to fill it
up because it is vacant, is necessarily included in the term appointment, for it
precisely accomplishes the same purpose. Moreover, if a designation is not to be
deemed included in the term appointment under Section 49 of P.D. No. 807, then the
prohibition on nepotism would be meaningless and toothless. Any appointing
 authority may circumvent it by merely designating, and not appointing, a relative
within the prohibited degree to a vacant position in the career service. Indeed, as
correctly stated by public respondent, "what cannot be done directly cannot be done
indirectly." 13 (Emphasis partly in the original and partly supplied; citation omitted)

Thus, the Court was unwilling to restrict and limit the scope of the prohibition which is
textually very broad and comprehensive.

One of the contentions of petitioner in the case at bar is that the ratio of the prohibition against
nepotism is not applicable here because petitioner Victoria was already in the government service at
the time petitioners were married in 1964. It is not disputed that the original 1961 appointment of
petitioner Victoria as an Assistant License Clerk was not a nepotic appointment. Indeed, Section 59
itself states, in the 4th paragraph thereof, that the prohibition against nepotism is not

applicable to the case of a member of any family who, after his or her appointment to
any position in any office or bureau, contracts marriage with someone in the same
office or bureau, in which event the employment or retention therein of both husband
and wife may be allowed. (Emphasis supplied)

The subsequent marriage of one to the other of petitioners did not retroactively convert the
original appointment of petitioner Victoria into a prohibited nepotic one. It is the promotional
appointment issued by petitioner Mayor to petitioner Victoria in 1 October 1982 that is at
stake.

Here, the basic argument of petitioners is that to read the prohibition in Section 59, Book V of E.O.
No. 292 as applicable both to original and promotional or subsequent appointments, would be to
deprive the government of the services of loyal and faithful employees who would thereby be
penalized simply because the appointing or recommending official happens to be related to the
employees within the third degree of consanguinity or affinity.

A major difficulty with the petitioners' argument is that it tends to prove too much. For the appointee,
whether in an original or a promotion appointment, may in fact be quite loyal and efficient and hard-
working; yet that circumstance will not prevent the application of the prohibition certainly in respect of
the original appointment. The Court is not unaware of the difficulties that the comprehensive
prohibition against nepotism would impose upon petitioner Victoria and others who maybe in the
same position. It is essential to stress, however, that the prohibition applies quite without regard to
the actual merits of the proposed appointee and to the good intentions of the appointing or
recommending authority, and that the prohibition against nepotism in appointments whether original
or promotional, is not intended by the legislative authority to penalize faithful service.

The purpose of Section 59 which shines through the comprehensive and unqualified language in
which it was cast and has remained for decades, is precisely to take out of the discretion of the
appointing and recommending authority the matter of appointing or recommending for appointment a
relative. In other words, Section 59 insures the objectivity of the appointing or recommending official
by preventing that objectivity from being in fact tested. The importance of this statutory objective is
difficult to overstress in the culture in which we live and work in the Philippines, where family bonds
remain, in general, compelling and cohesive.

The conclusion we reach is that Section 59, Book V, E.O. No. 292 means exactly what it says in
plain and ordinary language: it refers to "all appointments" whether original or promotional in nature.
The public policy embodied in Section 59 is clearly fundamental in importance, and the Court has
neither authority nor inclination to dilute that important public policy by introducing a qualification
here or a distinction there.

It follows that the promotional appointment of petitioner Victoria by her husband, petitioner Mayor,
falls within the prohibited class of appointments: the prohibited relationship between the appointing
authority (petitioner Mayor) and the appointee (wife Victoria) existed at the time the promotional
appointment was issued. It is scarcely necessary to add that the reasons which may have moved
petitioner Mayor to issue the prohibited appointment are, as a matter of law, not relevant in this
connection. 14

II

We turn to the second issue where petitioners contend that when the promotional appointment of
petitioner Victoria was approved by Director Escobia, CSC Field Office, Bacolod City, that
appointment become complete. When petitioner Victoria took her oath of office and commenced the
discharge of the duties of a General Services Officer, she acquired a vested right to that position and
cannot, according to petitioners, be removed from that position without due process of law.

This argument misconceives the nature of the action taken by the respondent Commission. That
action was not the imposition of an administrative disciplinary measure upon petitioner Victoria, nor
upon petitioner Mayor. There were no administrative charges in respect of which petitioner Victoria
would have been entitled to notice and hearing. The Commission, in approving or disapproving an
appointment, only examines the conformity of the appointment with applicable provisions of law and
whether the appointee possesses all the minimum qualifications and none of the disqualifications. At
all events, as the Solicitor General has noted, petitioner Victoria was afforded an opportunity to be
heard when she filed a motion for reconsideration with the Commission and there challenged the
disapproval by the Commission.

The action of the Commission was, in other words, taken in implementation of Section 59, Book V,
E.O. No. 292 and the relevant Implementing Regulations. Because the promotional appointment in
favor of petitioner Victoria was a violation of Section 59, it was null and void as being contra legem.
Section 9 of Rule V of the Omnibus Implementing Regulations sets out the principal legal
consequence of an appointment issued in disregard of the statutory prohibition:

Sec. 9. An appointment accepted by the appointee cannot be withdrawn or revoked

by the appointing authority and shall remain in force and effect until disapproved by
the Commission. However, an appointment may be void from the beginning due to
fraud on the part of the appointee or because it was issued in violation of law.
(Emphasis supplied)

A void appointment cannot give rise to security of tenure on the part of the holder of such
appointment.

The Commission is empowered to take appropriate action on all appointments and other personnel
actions, e.g., promotions. 15 Such power includes the authority to recall an appointment initially
approved in disregard of applicable provisions of Civil Service law and regulations. Section 20 of
Rule VI of the Omnibus Implementing Rules makes this clear:

Sec. 20. Notwithstanding the initial approval of an appointment, the same may be
recalled on any of the following grounds:
 (a) Non-compliance with the procedures/criteria provided in the agency's Merit
Promotion Plan;

(b) Failure to pass through the agency's Selection/Promotion Board;

(c) Violation of the existing collective agreement between management and

employees relative to promotion; or

(d) Violation of other existing civil service law, rules and regulations. (Emphasis
supplied).

The recall or withdrawal by the Commission of the approval which had been issued by one of its
Field Officers, Director Escobia, was accordingly lawful and appropriate, the promotional
appointment of petitioner Victoria being void "from the beginning." The approval issued by Director
Escobia did not, as it could not, cure the intrinsic vice of that appointment.

We conclude, in respect of the second issue, that petitioners have not shown any grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack of excess of jurisdiction on the part of respondent Commission.

Petitioners have also complained that the letter of Congressman Carmona which had precipitated
action on the part of respondent Commission, was not a verified letter. They contend that the
Commission could not or should not have acted upon the charges raised in that letter.

We are not aware of any law or regulation requiring the letter written by the Congressman to be
subscribed under oath before the Commission could act thereon. Under its own rules and
regulations, the Commission may review motu proprio personnel actions involving the position of a
Division Chief or above, such as the position of General Services Officer. 16 We hold that the
respondent Commission had authority, indeed the duty, to recall on its own initiative the erroneous
initial approval of the promotional appointment extended to petitioner Victoria, and to review the
same de novo.

WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the Petition for Certiorari must be DISMISSED for lack of merit.
No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 181559 October 2, 2009

LEAH M. NAZARENO, CARLO M. CUAL, ROGELIO B. CLAMONTE, FLORECITA M. LLOSA,

ROGELIO S. VILLARUBIA, RICARDO M. GONZALES, JR., ROSSEL MARIE G. GUTIERREZ,
NICANOR F. VILLAROSA, JR., MARIE SUE F. CUAL, MIRAMICHI MAJELLA B. MARIOT, ALMA
F. RAMIREZ, ANTOLIN D. ZAMAR, JR., MARIO S. ALILING, TEODULO SALVORO, JR., PHILIP
JANSON ALTAMARINO, ANTONIETTA PADURA, ADOLFO R. CORNELIA, IAN RYAN PATULA,
WILLIAM TANOY, VICTOR ARBAS, JEANITH CUAL, BRAULIO SAYSON, DAWN M.
VILLAROSA, AGUSTIN A. RENDOQUE, ENRIQUETA TUMONGHA, LIONEL P. BANOGON,
ROSALITO VERGANTINOS, MARIO T. CUAL, JR., ELAINE MAY TUMONGHA, NORMAN F.
VILLAROSA, RICARDO C. PATULA, RACHEL BANAGUA, RODOLFO A. CALUGCUGAN,
PERGENTINO CUAL, BERNARD J. OZOA, ROGER JOHN AROMIN, CHERYL E. NOCETE,
MARIVIC SANCHEZ, CRISPIN DURAN, REBECO LINGCONG, ANNA LEE ESTRABELA,
MELCHOR B. MAQUILING, RAUL MOLAS, OSCAR KINIKITO, DARWIN B. CONEJOS, ROMEL
CUAL, ROQUETA AMOR, DISODADO LAJATO, PAUL PINO, LITO PINERO, RODULFO ZOSA,
JR. and JORGE ARBOLADO, Petitioners,
vs.
CITY OF DUMAGUETE, represented by CITY MAYOR AGUSTIN PERDICES, DOMINADOR
DUMALAG, JR., ERLINDA TUMONGHA, JOSEPHINE MAE FLORES AND ARACELI
CAMPOS, Respondents.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

The integrity and reliability of our civil service is, perhaps, never more sorely tested than in the
impassioned demagoguery of elections. Amidst the struggle of personalities, ideologies, and
platforms, the vigor and resilience of a professional civil service can only be preserved where our
laws ensure that partisanship plays no part in the appointing process. Consequently, we affirm the
validity of a regulation issued by the Civil Service Commission (CSC or the Commission) intended to
ensure that appointments and promotions in the civil service are made solely on the basis of
qualifications, instead of political loyalties or patronage.

This Petition for Review on Certiorari filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to reverse the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated August 28, 2007 and its Resolution2 dated January 11, 2008
in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 00665. The case stemmed from CSC Field Office’s invalidation of
petitioners’ appointments as employees of the City of Dumaguete, which was affirmed by the CSC
Regional Office, by the Commission en banc and by the Court of Appeals.

Legal and Factual Backgrounds

Accreditation of Dumaguete City by the Civil Service Commission

On October 25, 1999, pursuant to the Commission’s Accreditation Program, the CSC issued
Resolution No. 992411,3 which granted the City Government of Dumaguete the authority to take final
action on all its appointments, subject to, inter alia, the following conditions:

1. That the exercise of said authority shall be subject to Civil Service Law, rules and regulations and
within the limits and restrictions of the implementing guidelines of the CSC Accreditation Program as
amended (MC No. 27, s. 1994);

xxxx
5. That appointments issued under this authority shall be subject to monthly monitoring by the [Civil
Service Field Office] CSFO concerned;

xxxx

9. That appointments found in the course of monthly monitoring to have been issued and acted upon
in violation of pertinent rules, standards, and regulations shall immediately be invalidated by the Civil
Service Regional Office (CSRO), upon recommendation by the CSFO.

Appointments made by outgoing Mayor Remollo

Then Dumaguete City Mayor Felipe Antonio B. Remollo sought re-election in the May 14, 2001
elections, but lost to respondent Mayor Agustin R. Perdices. Thereafter, on June 5, 7, and 11, 2001,
outgoing Mayor Remollo promoted 15 city hall employees, and regularized another 74 city hall
employees, including the herein 52 petitioners.

On July 2, 2001, Mayor Perdices publicly announced at the flag raising ceremony at the Dumaguete
City Hall grounds that he would not honor the appointments made by former Mayor Remollo. On the
same day, he instructed the City Administrator, respondent Dominador Dumalag, Jr., to direct
respondent City Assistant Treasurer Erlinda C. Tumongha (now deceased), to refrain from making
any cash disbursements for payments of petitioners' salary differentials based on their new
positions.

The Petition for Mandamus before the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City

Thus, on August 1, 2001, petitioners filed a Petition for Mandamus with Injunction and Damages with
Prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order against the City of Dumaguete, represented by
respondent city mayor Perdices and city officers Dumalag, Tumongha, Josephine Mae Flores, and
Araceli Campos. The petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 13013, and raffled to Branch 41 of the
Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City. Petitioners sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction to enjoin respondents from taking any action or issuing any orders nullifying their
appointments.

In a Decision4 dated March 27, 2007, the Regional Trial Court dismissed the petition; petitioners’
Motion for Reconsideration was also denied in an Order5 dated April 26, 2007. The issues involved
in Civil Case No. 13013 have twice been elevated to and eventually resolved by the Court in G.R.
Nos. 1777956 and 168484.7

Revocation of Appointments by the Civil Service Commission Field Office

Relative to this main case, on August 1, 2001, the CSC Field Office in Dumaguete City, through
Director II Fabio R. Abucejo, revoked and invalidated the appointments of the petitioners (the August
1, 2001 Order) based of the following findings:

1. There were a total of 15 promotional appointments and 74 original appointments issued as

reflected in the submitted [Report of Personnel Actions] ROPA for the month of June 2001.

2. There was only one (1) en banc meeting of the City Personnel Selection Board (PSB) held
on 5 June 2001 to consider the number of appointments thus issued and there was no other
call for a PSB meeting certified to by the City [Human Resource Management Officer]
HRMO.
 3. There were no minutes available to show the deliberations of the PSB of the 89
appointments listed in the ROPA as certified by the City HRMO.

4. There were no PSB statements certifying that there was actual screening and evaluation
done on all candidates for each position.

5. The appointing officer of the 89 appointments was an outgoing local official who lost
during the 14 May 2001 elections for City Mayor of Dumaguete City.

6. The 89 appointments were all issued after the elections and when the new city mayor was
about to assume office.8

Director Abucejo invalidated the appointments as the same were done in violation of CSC
Resolution No. 010988 dated June 4, 2001, the pertinent portions of which provide:

WHEREAS, the May 14, 2001 national and local elections have just concluded and the Commission
anticipates controversies that would arise involving appointments issued by outgoing local chief
executives immediately before or after the elections;

WHEREAS, the Commission observed the tendency of some outgoing local chief executives to
issue appointments even after the elections, especially when their successors have already been
proclaimed.

WHEREAS, the practice of some outgoing local chief executives causes animosities between the
outgoing and incoming officials and the people who are immediately affected and are made to suffer
the consequences thereof are the ordinary civil servants, and eventually, to a large extent, their
constituents themselves;

WHEREAS, one of the reasons behind the prohibition in issuing appointments or hiring new
employees during the prohibited period as provided for in CSC Memorandum Circular No. 7, series
of 2001, is to prevent the occurrence of the foregoing, among others;9

WHEREAS, local elective officials whose terms of office are about to expire, are deemed as
"caretaker" administrators who are duty bound to prepare for the smooth and orderly transfer of
power and authority to the incoming local chief executives;

WHEREAS, under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution, the President or Acting President is
prohibited from making appointments two (2) months immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety;

WHEREAS, while there is no equivalent provision in the Local Government Code of 1991 (Republic
Act 7160) or in the Civil Service Law (Book V of Executive Order No. 292) of the abovestated
prohibition, the rationale against the prohibition on the issuance of "midnight appointments" by the
President is applicable to appointments extended by outgoing local chief executives immediately
before and/or after the elections;

xxxx

NOW THEREFORE, the Commission, pursuant to its constitutional mandate as the control
personnel agency of the government, hereby issues and adopts the following guidelines:
xxxx

3. All appointments, whether original, transfer, reemployment, reappointment, promotion or

demotion, except in cases of renewal and reinstatement, regardless of status, which are
issued AFTER the elections, regardless of their dates of effectivity and/or date of receipt by
the Commission, including its Regional or Field Offices, of said appointments or the Report
of Personnel Actions (ROPA) as the case may be, shall be disapproved unless the following
requisites concur relative to their issuance:

a) The appointment has gone through the regular screening by the Personnel
Selection Board (PSB) before the prohibited period on the issuance of appointments
as shown by the PSB report or minutes of its meeting;

b) That the appointee is qualified;

c) There is a need to fill up the vacancy immediately in order not to prejudice public
service and/or endanger public safety;

d) That the appointment is not one of those mass appointments issued after the
elections.

4. The term "mass appointments" refers to those issued in bulk or in large number after the
elections by an outgoing local chief executive and there is no apparent need for their
immediate issuance.

On September 4, 2001, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the August 1, 2001 Order
before the CSC Region VII Office in Cebu. The motion was, however, denied on the ground that it
should have been filed before the office of Director Abucejo in Dumaguete City. Thereafter, on
October 31, 2001, petitioners asked the CSC Region VII Office in Cebu to treat their previous Motion
for Reconsideration as their appeal.1avvphi1

On February 14, 2002, the CSC Region VII Office affirmed the August 1, 2001 Order. Subsequently,
an Appeal to the Commission en banc was filed through registered mail by 52 of the original 89
appointees, the petitioners herein, namely:

Ruling of the CSC en banc and the Court of Appeals

On August 23, 2004, the CSC en banc issued Resolution No. 040932 denying petitioners' appeal,
and affirming the invalidation of their appointments on the ground that these were mass
appointments made by an outgoing local chief executive.10 The Commission explained:

The rationale behind the prohibition in CSC Resolution No. 01-0988 is not hard to comprehend. The
prohibition is designed to discourage losing candidates from extending appointments to their
protégés or from giving their constituents "promised" positions (CSC Resolution No. 97-0317 dated
January 17, 1997, Re: Roldan B. Casinillo). Moreover, the same is intended to prevent the outgoing
local chief executive from hurriedly issuing appointments which would subvert the policies of the
incoming leadership. Thus, any means that would directly or indirectly circumvent the purposes for
which said Resolution was promulgated should not be allowed, particularly when the appointments
were issued by the appointing authority who lost in said election.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the Commission on April 11,
2005, through CSC Resolution No. 050473.

Petitioners then filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals, which was docketed as CA-
G.R. CEB-SP No. 00665. On August 28, 2007, the Court of Appeals denied the appeal and affirmed
CSC Resolution No. 040932 dated August 23, 2004 and CSC Resolution No. 050473 dated April 11,
2005, ratiocinating that:

The spirit behind CSC Resolution No. 010988 is evident from its preamble. It was issued to thwart
the nefarious practice by outgoing local chief executives in making appointments before, during,
and/or after the regular local elections for ulterior partisan motives. Said practice being analogous to
"midnight appointments" by the President or Acting President, the CSC then promulgated Resolution
No. 010988, to suppress the mischief and evils attributed to "mass appointments" made by local
chief executives.

Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated
January 11, 2008.

The Parties’ Arguments

Before us, petitioners maintain that CSC Resolution No. 010988 is invalid because the Commission
is without authority to issue regulations prohibiting mass appointments at the local government level.
Petitioners cite De Rama v. Court of Appeals11 which held that Section 15, Article VII of the
Constitution is only applicable to the President or Acting President. They claim that outgoing or
defeated local appointing authorities are authorized to make appointments of qualified individuals
until their last day in office, and that not all mass appointments are invalid. Finally, petitioners claim
that because Dumaguete City had been granted authority to take "final action" on all appointments,
the Commission did not have any authority to disapprove the appointments made by outgoing mayor
Remollo.

In their Comment dated May 15, 2008,12 respondents argue that petitioners’ appointments violated
civil service rules and regulations other than CSC Resolution No. 010988. Respondents also assert
that the Commission is authorized to invalidate the petitioners’ appointments, because the CSC
accreditation program carried with it the caveat that "said exercise of authority shall be subject to
Civil Service law, rules and regulations." Finally, respondents claim that petitioners were guilty of
forum shopping because the issues in this case and in G.R. No. 177795 are the same.

Our Ruling

We find that the Civil Service Commission has the authority to issue CSC Resolution No. 010988
and that the invalidation of petitioners’ appointments was warranted. Consequently, we affirm the
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 28, 2007 and its Resolution dated January 11, 2008
in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 00665.

The CSC has the authority to establish rules to promote efficiency in the civil service

The Commission, as the central personnel agency of the government,13 has statutory authority to
establish rules and regulations to promote efficiency and professionalism in the civil service.
Presidential Decree No. 807,14 or the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines, provides for the powers
of the Commission, including the power to issue rules and regulations and to review appointments:
Section 9: Powers and functions of the Commission – The Commission shall administer the Civil
Service and shall have the following powers and functions:

xxxx

(b) Prescribe, amend, and enforce suitable rules and regulations for carrying into effect the
provisions of this Decree x x x

(c) Promulgate policies, standards, and guidelines for the Civil Service and adopt plans and
programs to promote economical, efficient, and effective personnel administration in the
government;

xxxx

(h) Approve all appointments, whether original or promotional, to positions in the civil service, except
those of presidential appointees, members of the armed forces of the Philippines, police forces,
firemen, and jailguards, and disapprove those where the appointees do not possess the appropriate
eligibility or required qualifications; (Emphasis supplied)

Executive Order No. 292, or the Administrative Code of 1987, also provides:

Section 12: Powers and Functions – The Commission shall have the following powers and functions:

xxxx

(2) prescribe, amend, and enforce rules and regulations for carrying into effect the provisions
of the Civil Service Law and other pertinent laws;

(3) promulgate policies, standards, and guidelines for the Civil Service and adopt plans and
programs to promote economical, efficient, and effective personnel administration in the
government;

(4) take appropriate action on all appointments and other personnel matters in the Civil
Service including extension of Service beyond retirement age;

(5) inspect and audit the personnel actions and programs of the departments, agencies,
bureaus, offices, local government units, and other instrumentalities of the government,
including government owned and controlled corporations. (emphasis supplied)

Clearly, the above-cited statutory provisions authorize the Commission to "prescribe, amend, and
enforce" rules to cover the civil service. The legislative standards to be observed and respected in
the exercise of such delegated authority are set out in the statutes, to wit: to promote "economical,
efficient, and effective personnel administration."

The Reasons behind CSC Resolution No. 010988

We also find that there was substantial reason behind the issuance of CSC Resolution No. 010988.
It is true that there is no constitutional prohibition against the issuance of "mass appointments" by
defeated local government officials prior to the expiration of their terms. Clearly, this is not the same
as a "midnight appointment," proscribed by the Constitution, which refers to those appointments
made within two months immediately prior to the next presidential election.15 As we ruled in De
Rama v. Court of Appeals:16

The records reveal that when the petitioner brought the matter of recalling the appointments of the
fourteen (14) private respondents before the CSC, the only reason he cited to justify his action was
that these were midnight appointments that are forbidden under Article VII, Section 15 of the
Constitution. However, the CSC ruled, and correctly so, that the said prohibition applies only to
presidential appointments. In truth and in fact, there is no law that prohibits local elective officials
from making appointments during the last days of his or her tenure.

However, even while affirming De Rama, we explained in Quirog v. Aumentado,17 that:

We, however, hasten to add that the aforementioned ruling does not mean that the raison d' etre
behind the prohibition against midnight appointments may not be applied to those made by chief
executives of local government units, as here. Indeed, the prohibition is precisely designed to
discourage, nay, even preclude, losing candidates from issuing appointments merely for partisan
purposes thereby depriving the incoming administration of the opportunity to make the
corresponding appointments in line with its new policies. (Emphasis supplied)

Quirog also involved the disapproval of an appointment for non-compliance with CSC Resolution No.
010988. However, we found that Quirog’s appointment was made on June 1, 2001, or three days
prior to the issuance of CSC Resolution No. 010988. As such, we ruled that the retroactive
application of the law was not warranted.

In Sales v. Carreon, Jr.,18 we had occasion to discuss the reasons behind the prohibition by the
Commission of mass appointments after the elections. Sales involved the issuance of 83
appointments made by then Dapitan City Mayor Joseph Cedrick O. Ruiz in his last month of office
(on June 1, 18, and 27, 2001), which the newly elected Mayor, Rodolfo H. Carreon, subsequently
revoked, on the ground that these violated CSC Resolution No. 010988 in relation to CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 7, Series of 2001, imposing a ban on issuing appointments in the civil
service during the election period. In Sales, we declared:

This case is a typical example of the practice of outgoing local chief executives to issue "midnight"
appointments, especially after their successors have been proclaimed. It does not only cause
animosities between the outgoing and the incoming officials, but also affects efficiency in local
governance. Those appointed tend to devote their time and energy in defending their appointments
instead of attending to their functions.19

It is not difficult to see the reasons behind the prohibition on appointments before and after the
elections. Appointments are banned prior to the elections to ensure that partisan loyalties will not be
a factor in the appointment process, and to prevent incumbents from gaining any undue advantage
during the elections. To this end, appointments within a certain period of time are proscribed by the
Omnibus Election Code and related issuances.20 After the elections, appointments by defeated
candidates are prohibited, except under the circumstances mentioned in CSC Resolution No.
010988, to avoid animosities between outgoing and incoming officials, to allow the incoming
administration a free hand in implementing its policies, and to ensure that appointments and
promotions are not used as a tool for political patronage or as a reward for services rendered to the
outgoing local officials.

Not all Mass Appointments are Prohibited

Indeed, not all appointments issued after the elections by defeated officials are invalid. CSC
Resolution No. 010988 does not purport to nullify all "mass appointments." However, it must be
shown that the appointments have undergone the regular screening process, that the appointee is
qualified, that there is a need to fill up the vacancy immediately, and that the appointments are not in
bulk. In Nazareno v. Dumaguete,21 we explained:

CSC Resolution No. 010988 does not totally proscribe the local chief executive from making any
appointments immediately before and after elections. The same Resolution provides that the validity
of an appointment issued immediately before and after elections by an outgoing local chief executive
is to be determined on the basis of the nature, character, and merit of the individual appointment and
the particular circumstances surrounding the same.

Corollarily, we held in Sales,22 that:

x x x [e]ach appointment must be judged on the basis of the nature, character, and merits of the
individual appointment and the circumstances surrounding the same. It is only when the
appointments were made en masse by the outgoing administration and shown to have been made
through hurried maneuvers and under circumstances departing from good faith, morality, and
propriety that this Court has struck down "midnight" appointments.

In the instant case, Mayor Remollo issued the 89 original and promotional appointments on three
separate dates, but within a ten-day period, in the same month that he left office.23 Further, the
Commission’s audit found violations of CSC rules and regulations that justified the disapproval of the
appointments. In this regard, CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, otherwise known as the Revised
Rules on Appointments and Other Personnel Actions, provides:

Section 1 – Appointments submitted to the CSC office concerned should meet the requirements
listed hereunder. Non-compliance with such requirements shall be grounds for disapproval of said
appointments:

xxxx

(h) Personnel Selection Board (PSB) Evaluation/Screening. Appointees should be screened and
evaluated by the PSB, if applicable. As proof thereof, a certification signed by the Chairman of the
Board at the back of the appointment or alternatively, a copy of the proceedings/ minutes of the
Board’s deliberation shall be submitted together with the appointment. The issuance of the
appointment shall not be earlier than the date of the final screening/deliberation of the PSB.

Here, there was only one en banc meeting of the city PSB to consider the appointments, without any
evidence that there were any deliberations on the qualifications of the petitioners, or any indication
that there was an urgent need for the immediate issuance of such appointments. The absence of
evidence showing careful consideration of the merits of each appointment, and the timing and the
number of appointments, militate against petitioners’ cause. On the contrary, the prevailing
circumstances in this case indicate that the appointments were hurriedly issued by the outgoing
administration.

The Accreditation of Dumaguete City did not remove the CSC’s authority to review appointments

We find that the authority granted by CSC Resolution No. 992411 to the City Government of
Dumaguete to "take final action" on all its appointments did not deprive the Commission of its
authority and duty to review appointments. Indeed, Resolution No. 992411 states that such exercise
of authority shall be "subject to civil service law, rules and regulations" and that appointments in
violation of pertinent rules "shall immediately be invalidated."

Moreover, Section 20, Rule VI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No.
292 provides that notwithstanding the initial approval of an appointment, the same may be recalled
for "[v]iolation of other existing Civil Service laws, rules and regulations." The CSC is empowered to
take appropriate action on all appointments and other personnel actions and that such power
"includes the authority to recall an appointment initially approved in disregard of applicable
provisions of Civil Service law and regulations."24

Petitioners have not engaged in forum shopping

The essence of forum-shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same
cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable
judgment.25 Forum-shopping has been defined as the act of a party against whom an adverse
judgment has been rendered in one forum, seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in
another forum, other than by appeal or the special civil action of certiorari, or the institution of two or
more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other
court would make a favorable disposition.26

Although the factual antecedents of the cases brought before this Court are the same, they involve
different issues. The petition for Mandamus with Injunction and Damages, docketed as Civil Case
No. 13013, and raised before this Court as G.R. No. 177795, challenged respondents’ refusal to
recognize petitioners’ appointments and to pay petitioners’ salaries, salary adjustments, and other
emoluments. The petition only entailed the applications for the issuance of a writ of mandamus and
for the award of damages. The present case docketed as G.R. No. 181559, on the other hand,
involves the merits of petitioners’ appeal from the invalidation and revocation of their appointments
by the CSC-Field Office, which was affirmed by the CSC-Regional Office, CSC en banc, and the
Court of Appeals.

In any event, this issue had already been settled in our Decision of June 19, 2009 in G.R. No.
177795, which found petitioners not guilty of forum shopping, to wit:

True, that the [Petition in G.R. No. 177795] and the one in G.R. No. 181559 are interrelated, but they
are not necessarily the same for this Court to adjudge that the filing of both by petitioners constitutes
forum shopping. In G.R. No. 181559, the Court will resolve whether or not the petitioners’
appointments are valid. [In G.R. No. 177795], petitioners are claiming a right to the salaries, salary
adjustments and other emoluments during the pendency of the administrative cases, regardless of
how the CSC decided the validity of their appointments.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals’ Decision in CA-G.R.
CEB-SP No. 00665 dated August 28, 2007 affirming CSC Resolution No. 040932 dated August 23,
2004 and CSC Resolution No. 050473 dated April 11, 2005, and its Resolution dated January 11,
2008 denying the Motion for Reconsideration are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 213716, October 10, 2017

JOSE S. RAMISCAL, JR., Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Respondent.

DECISION

JARDELEZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Rules of Court,
assailing the Decision2 dated September 13, 2012 and Resolution3 dated May 6, 2014 of the
Commission on Audit (COA) in COA Decision No. 2012-139. The Decision denied petitioner Jose S.
Ramiscal's appeal for exclusion from liability in Notice of Disallowance (ND) No. 2010-07-084-(1996)
and Notice of Charge (NC) No. 2010-07-001-(1996), while the Resolution denied petitioner's motion
for reconsideration for lack of merit.

During the 11th Congress (1998 to 2001), the Senate's Committees on Accountability of Public Officers
and Investigations (Blue Ribbon) and National Defense and Security held hearings to investigate the
alleged anomalous acquisitions of land by the Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and
Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS) in Calamba, Laguna and Tanauan, Batangas. Prompted by a
series of resolutions by the Senate, the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military and other Law
Enforcement Offices sent to the COA a request dated April 29, 2004 for the conduct of audit on past
and present transactions of the AFP-RSBS. Thus, the COA constituted a special audit team (SAT)4 to
conduct the special audit/investigation.5

The SAT found, among others, that the AFP-RSBS, represented by petitioner, purchased from Concord
Resources, Inc.6 four parcels of land with a total area of 227,562 square meters in Calamba, Laguna
(collectively, the Calamba properties). These lands were intended to serve as right-of-way to the 600-
hectare property of the AFP-RSBS called the Calamba Land Banking project.7 The SAT discovered that
two deeds of sale containing different considerations were executed to cover the purchase. The deed
of sale recorded with the Registry of Deeds of Calamba, Laguna disclosed that the total purchase price
was P91,024,800. On the other hand, the records obtained by the audit team from the AFP-RSBS
management revealed that another deed of sale was executed by Concord Resources, Inc. alone and
has a purchase price of P341,343,000. The AFP-RSBS paid Concord Resources, Inc. this consideration
as was recorded in its books of account.8

The SAT concluded that the deed of sale filed before the Registry of Deeds was the true deed of sale,
considering that it was signed by both parties. It followed then that the true purchase price was
P91,024,800 and as such, the government lost P250,318,200 when it allegedly paid Concord
Resources, Inc. P341,343,000.9

The SAT also concluded that the execution of two deeds of sale covering the same parcels of land
resulted in the underpayment of capital gains and documentary stamp taxes in the amount of
P16,270,683. Based on the amount paid by the AFP-RSBS to Concord Resources, Inc., the total taxes
that should have been paid was P22,187,295 and not P5,916,612.10

On October 10, 2005, the SAT issued Audit Observation Memorandum No. 2005-01 (AOM) to then
AFP-RSBS President, Cesar Jaime for comment.11

On July 28, 2010, the SAT issued ND No. 2010-07-084-(1996)12 and NC No. 2010-07-001-
(1996).13 The ND directed petitioner, Elizabeth Liang, Jesus Garcia, and Rosemarie Ragasa14 to
immediately settle the amount of P250,318,200 representing excess payment for the Calamba
properties. The NC, on the other hand, directed petitioner, Oscar Martinez,15 and Alma Paraiso16 to
immediately settle the amount of P16,270,683 representing the deficiency for capital gains and
documentary stamp taxes.

Petitioner appealed the ND and the NC before the Commission Proper, but the same was denied for
lack of merit.
Hence, this petition which raises the following issues:

1. Whether the action of the COA in issuing the ND and NC had already prescribed;

2. Whether the COA had already lost its jurisdiction over the case and on the person of petitioner
when a criminal case, involving the same set of facts and circumstances, had already been filed with
the Sandiganbayan;

3. Whether the COA is authorized to issue an NC involving the payment of capital gains and
documentary stamp taxes which are national internal revenue taxes; and

4. Whether the COA has authority to institute an administrative complaint or proceedings against
petitioner who had already resigned.

On March 27, 2017, petitioner also filed an Urgent Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining
Order, praying that the COA be enjoined to suspend or recall its Order of Execution No. 2017-012 on
the NC.

We partially grant the petition.

The Constitution and the Rules of Court limit the permissible scope of inquiry in petitions under Rules
64 and 65 to errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion.17 There is grave abuse of discretion
when there is an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to
act in contemplation of law as when the judgment rendered is not based on law and evidence but on
caprice, whim and despotism.18 Hence, unless tainted with grave abuse of discretion, the COA's simple
errors of judgment cannot be reviewed even by this Court.19 Rather, the general policy has been to
accord weight and respect to the decisions of the COA. The limitation of the Court's power of review
over the COA's rulings merely complements its nature as an independent constitutional body that is
tasked to safeguard the proper use of government (and, ultimately, the people's) property by vesting
it with the power to: (1) determine whether government entities comply with the law and the rules in
disbursing public funds; and (2). disallow illegal disbursements of these funds.20 The deference is also
based on the doctrine of separation of powers and the COA's presumed expertise in the laws it is
entrusted to enforce.21

Bearing the foregoing principles in mind, we now proceed to determine whether the COA gravely
abused its discretion in affirming the ND and NC issued against petitioner.

Petitioner argues that the ND and NC have already prescribed pursuant to Articles 1149 and 1153 of
the Civil Code. Article 1149 provides that all other actions whose periods are not fixed in the Civil
Code or in other laws must be brought within five (5) years from the time the right of action accrues.
Article 1153, on the other hand, provides that the period for prescription of actions to demand
accounting runs from the day the persons who should render the same cease in their functions.
Petitioner explains that the transaction subject of the ND and NC occurred in 1997, a year before he
resigned in 1998. He concluded that in accordance with Articles 1149 and 1153, the COA has until
2003 within which to issue an ND or NC. As it happened, however, it was only in 2004 when the audit
investigation transpired. Consequently, the ND and NC issued against him in 2010 have already
prescribed.

Petitioner is mistaken. The right of the State, through the COA, to recover public funds that have been
established to be irregularly and illegally disbursed does not prescribe.

Article 1108 (4) of the Civil Code expressly provides that prescription does not run against the State
and its subdivisions. This rule has been consistently adhered to in a long line of cases involving
reversion of public lands, where it is often repeated that when the government is the real party in
interest, and it is proceeding mainly to assert its own right to recover its own property, thee can, as a
rule, be no defense grounded on laches or prescription.22 We find that this rule applies, regardless of
the nature of the government property. Article 1108 (4) does not distinguish between real or personal
properties of the State. There is also no reason why the logic behind the rule's application to reversion
cases should not equally apply to the recovery of any form of government property. In fact, in an
early case involving a collection suit for unpaid loans between the Republic and a private party, the
Court, citing Article 1108 (4) of the Civil Code, held that the case was brought by the Republic in the
exercise of its sovereign functions to protect the interests of the State over a public property. 23

Moreover, the SAT was created by authority of COA Legal and Adjudication Office Order No. 2004-125.
SATs may be created by the Legal and Adjudication Office of the COA based on complaints or audit
findings indicating existence of fraud as contained in audit reports or audit observation
memoranda.24 This flows from the investigative and inquisitorial powers of the COA under Section 40
of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1445, otherwise known as the General Auditing Code of the
Philippines.25 Thus, while ordinarily, under Section 52 of PD 1445, a settled account may only be
reopened or reviewed within three years after the original settlement on the grounds that it is tainted
with fraud, collusion, or error calculation, or when new and material evidence is discovered, a SAT is
not constrained by this time limit. It may still reopen and review accounts that have already been
post-audited and/or settled pursuant to Section 52. An Office Order directing the special audit is
deemed sufficient authority to reopen the accounts.26 As applied here, however, there is as yet no
settled account to speak of because it was only in 2003 when the nature of the AFP-RSBS as a
government or public entity was decided with finality in People v. Sandiganbayan, Jose S. Ramiscal,
Jr., et al..27

Even if we follow petitioner's argument that Articles 1149 and 1153 of the Civil Code apply here, the
action of the COA is still not barred by the statute of limitations. Indeed, petitioner's actions occurred
in 1997, after the consummated sale of the Calamba properties and its supposed inclusion in the
account of the AFP-RSBS. However, the COA's cause of action would accrue later, for it was only in
2004 when it was informed of a possible irregularity of the sale when the Ombudsman requested it to
conduct an audit of prior transactions of the AFP-RSBS.

A cause of action arises when that which should have been done is not done, or that which should not
have been done is done. A party's right of action accrues only when the confluence of the following
elements is established: (a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever
law it arises or is created; (b) an obligation on the part of defendant to respect such right; and (c) an
act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff. It is only when the
last element occurs or takes place can it be said in law that a cause of action has arisen. More, the
aggrieved party must have either actual or presumptive knowledge of the violation by the guilty party
of his rights either by an act or omission.28

To recall, the Ombudsman requested the COA to conduct an audit in view of People v. Sandiganbayan,
Jose Ramiscal, Jr., et al., where the Court ruled that the AFP is a government entity whose funds are
public in nature. Petitioner argued in that case that the AFP-RSBS is a private entity. He, in fact,
admitted in his Appeal Memorandum before the COA that prior to People v. Sandiganbayan, Jose
Ramiscal, Jr., et al., the AFP-RSBS has been operating as a private entity since its creation in
1973.29 Thus, the special audit in 2004 was the first audit ever conducted over its funds.

The COA immediately created the SAT in 2004 upon the request of Ombudsman. In 2005, the SAT had
issued its AOM against the AFP-RSBS. At this point, however, an AOM is merely an initial step in the
conduct of an investigative audit to determine the propriety of the disbursements made. 30

The AOM issued to the AFP-RSBS, in particular, merely requested it to explain: (1) why the AFP-RSBS
paid Concord Resources, Inc. P341,343,000 based on a unilateral deed of sale instead of P91,024,800
pursuant to a bilateral deed of sale executed by the parties; (2) why the AFP-RSBS acquiesced on the
execution of two (2) deeds of sale covering the same parcels of land that resulted in the
underpayment of taxes; (3) which of the two (2) deeds of sale is genuine; and (4) why the AFP-RSBS
paid a consideration which is 328% higher than the property's zonal valuation per Department of
Finance Order No. 16-97 dated December 16, 1996.31

After the issuance of an AOM, there are still several steps to be conducted before a final conclusion
can be made or before the proper action can be had against the auditee.32 As we have elaborated
in Corales v. Republic:
A perusal of COA Memorandum No. 2002-053, pru1icularly Roman Numeral III, Letter A, paragraphs 1
to 5 and 9, reveals that any finding or observation by the Auditor stated in the AOM is not yet
conclusive, as the comment/justification of the head of office or his duly authorized representative is
still necessary before the Auditor can make any conclusion. The Auditor may give due course or find
the comment/justification to be without merit but in either case, the Auditor shall clearly state the
reason for the conclusion reached and recommendation made. Subsequent thereto, the Auditor shall
transmit the AOM, together with the comment or justification of the Auditee and the former's
recommendation to the Director, Legal and Adjudication Office (DLAO), for the sector concerned in
Metro Manila and/or the Regional Legal and Adjudication Cluster Director (RLACD) in the case of
regions. The transmittal shall be coursed through the Cluster Director concerned and the Regional
Cluster Director, as the case may be, for their own comment and recommendation. The DLAO fer the
sector concerned in the Central Office and the RLACD shall make the necessary evaluation of the
records transmitted with the AOM. When, on the has is thereof: he finds that the transaction should
be suspended or disallowed, he will then issue the corresponding Notice of Suspension (NS), Notice of
Disallowance (ND) or Notice of Charge (NC), as the case may be, furnishing a copy thereof to the
Cluster Director. Otherwise, the Director may dispatch a team to conduct further investigation work to
justify the contemplated action. If after in-depth investigation, the DLAO for each sector in Metro
Manila and the RLACD for the regions find that the issuance of the NS, NO, and NC is warranted, he
shall issue the same and transmit such NS, NO or NC, as the case may be, to the agency head and
other persons found liable therefor.33

From the foregoing, it would be from the issuance of an AOM in 2005 that the COA's right of action
against petitioner, or its right to disallow or charge AFP-RSBS' accounts, would have only accrued. It
was only then that the COA would have had actual or presumptive knowledge of any illegal or
irregular disbursement of public funds. Hence, the COA would have had until 2010 within which to
issue a notice of disallowance or charge, which is considered as an audit decision, recommendation or
disposition.34

II

Petitioner argues that the audit proceedings may no longer proceed against him because of his prior
retirement and the pendency of a criminal case involving the same facts before the Sandiganbayan.
We disagree.

The "threefold liability rule" holds that the wrongful acts or omissions of a public officer may give rise
to civil, criminal and administrative liability.35 This simply means that a public officer may be held
civilly, criminally, and administratively liable for a wrongful doing. Thus, if such violation or wrongful
act results in damages to an individual, the public officer may be held civilly liable to reimburse the
injured pat1y. If the law violated attaches a penal sanction, the erring officer may also be punished
criminally. Finally, such violation may also lead to suspension, removal from office, or other
administrative sanctions.36

The action that may result for each liability under the "threefold liability rule" may proceed
independently of one another, as in fact, the quantum of evidence required in each case is
different.37 Thus, in Reyna v. Commission on Audit,38 we held that a criminal case tiled before the
Office of the Ombudsman is distinct and separate from the proceedings on the disallowance before the
COA.

Furthermore, the right of the government to exercise administrative supervision over erring public
ot1icials is lost when they cease their functions in office. Consequently, the government must
commence an administrative case while they are in office; otherwise, the disciplining body would no
longer have any jurisdiction over them. The same is not true with civil and criminal cases. We have
ruled in the past that even if an administrative case may no longer be filed against public officials who
have already resigned or retired, criminal and civil cases may still be filed against them.39 The
administrative case contemplated under the threefold liability rule is one that goes into the conduct of
the public official and is intended to be disciplinary.
This is not the nature of the present case against petitioner. The audit proceedings before the COA
may be characterized as administrative, but only in the sense that the COA is an administrative body.
Essentially, though, the conduct of the audit was not an exercise of the government's administrative
supervision over petitioner where he may be meted out with a penalty of suspension or dismissal from
office, with an order of restitution a mere accessory penalty. What was being determined through the
COA audit proceedings was his civil liability and accountability over the excess in the disbursement of
public funds and the underpaid taxes.40 The audit proceedings not being an administrative case against
him, petitioner's resignation in 1998 does not serve to bar the present case.

III

Petitioner maintains that the COA has no jurisdiction to issue the NC involving the payment of capital
gains and documentary stamp taxes because these are national revenue taxes, the assessment and
collection of which fall within the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR).

Petitioner's argument is partially correct.

The COA has authority to ascertain whether a government agency has paid the correct taxes. Section
2, Article IX-D of the Constitution gives the Commission the broad power, authority, and duty to
examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or
uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its
subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities. This constitutional mandate is echoed in various
provisions of PD No. 1445. Section 26, in part, specifically provides that the general jurisdiction of the
Commission includes the examination, audit, and settlement of all debts and claims of any sort due
from or owing to the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities.
Additionally, paragraph 2, Section 25 of PD No. 1445 provides that, as a primary objective, the
Commission shall develop and implement a comprehensive audit program that shall encompass an
examination of financial transactions, accounts, and reports, including evaluation of compliance with
applicable laws and regulations.

The authority of the Commission over national revenue taxes, however, appears to be limited. Section
28 of PD 1445 gives the Commission the authority to examine books, papers, and documents filed by
individuals and corporations with, and which are in the custody of government offices in connection
with government revenue collection operations, for the sole purpose of ascertaining that all funds
determined by the appropriate agencies as collectible and due the government have actually been
collected, except as otherwise provided in the Internal Revenue Code. This authority, in turn, is
consistent with the duty of the Commission to establish that all obligations of the agency have been
accurately recorded,41 and with its power, under such regulations as it may prescribe, to authorize and
enforce the settlement of accounts subsisting between agencies of the government.42 This limited duty
to ascertain under Section 28 expressly gives way to the Internal Revenue Code. It does not carry the
concomitant duty to collect taxes. As it is, the BIR is the government agency vested with the power
and duty to both assess and collect national internal revenue taxes.

We disagree with the argument of the COA that it was merely performing its duty to ensure that all
government revenues are collected when it issued the NC. Again, Section 28 of PD 1445 is clear that
the only purpose of the examination is to ascertain. Even under Section 35 of PD 1445, which COA
cited in its assailed Decision, its authority to assist in the collection and enforcement of all debts and
claims due the government shall be done through proper channels.43 The COA's duty to collect or
settle taxes, it appears, is done only in 8 facilitative manner.

It is a different matter, however, if the government agency or unit being examined and audited by the
COA is one that has the authority or function to collect taxes, such as the BIR itself or a local
government unit. In such cases, the audit would not only cover the disbursements made, but also the
revenues, receipts, and other incomes of the agency or unit. Should there be any deficiencies because
of under-appraisal, under-assessment or undercollection, the COA shall issue a notice of charge.44

This is not the case here. The underpaid capital gains and documentary stamp taxes did not come
from the account of the AFP-RSBS and did not form part of its revenues, receipts or other incomes.
The COA therefore erred in issuing the NC against petitioner for the collection of these taxes. It is, in a
sense, barking up the wrong tree. Quite tellingly, the SAT Report did not recommend that the AFP-
RSBS be held accountable for the deficient taxes. Instead, it merely recommended the enforcement by
the BIR for the collection of the deficiency on capital gains and documentary stamp taxes.45

Moreover, the deed of sale between the AFP-RSBS and Concord Resources, Inc. specifically provided
that all taxes such as withholding tax, documentary stamp tax and other costs and expenses covering
transfer tax, documentation and notarial and registration fees, shall be for the sole and exclusive
account of Concord Resources, Inc.46 In fact, both the SAT Report and the AOM noted that the
Certificate Authorizing Registration No. 615456 dated August 27, 1996 issued by the Revenue District
Officer of Calamba, Laguna disclo:5ed that it was Concord Resources, Inc. which paid the capital gains
and documentary stamp taxes.47

Finally, we find it incongruent to disallow the difference of P250,318,200 but, at the same time,
charge P16,270,683 against petitioner for the alleged underpaid taxes. Considering that the amount of
P91,024,800 is being held as the correct purchase price of the sale, the correct taxes in the amount of
P5,916,612 have already been settled. To demand more on the ground that all income from whatever
sources is taxable would unjustly enrich the government.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. COA Decision No. 2012-139
dated September 13, 2012 and Resolution dated May 6, 2014 are hereby AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that petitioner is NOT LIABLE under Notice of Charge No. 2010-07-001-(1996).

SO ORDERED.
FACTS:

From 1986 to 2006, Sereno served as a member of the faculty of the University of the
Philippines-College of Law. While being employed at the UP Law, or from October 2003 to
2006, Sereno was concurrently employed as legal counsel of the Republic in two
international arbitrations known as the PIATCO cases, and a Deputy Commissioner of the
Commissioner on Human Rights.

The Human Resources Development Office of UP (UP HRDO) certified that there was no
record on Sereno’s file of any permission to engage in limited practice of profession.
Moreover, out of her 20 years of employment, only nine (9) Statement of Assets, Liabilities,
and Net Worth (SALN) were on the records of UP HRDO. In a manifestation, she attached a
copy of a tenth SALN, which she supposedly sourced from the “filing cabinets” or “drawers
of UP”. The Ombudsman likewise had no record of any SALN filed by Sereno. The JBC has
certified to the existence of one SALN. In sum, for 20 years of service, 11 SALNs were
recovered.

On August 2010, Sereno was appointed as Associate Justice. On 2012, the position of Chief
Justice was declared vacant, and the JBC directed the applicants to submit documents,
among which are “all previous SALNs up to December 31, 2011” for those in the government
and “SALN as of December 31, 2011” for those from the private sector. The JBC
announcement further provided that “applicants with incomplete or out-of-date
documentary requirements will not be interviewed or considered for nomination.” Sereno
expressed in a letter to JBC that since she resigned from UP Law on 2006 and became a
private practitioner, she was treated as coming from the private sector and only submitted
three (3) SALNs or her SALNs from the time she became an Associate Justice. Sereno
likewise added that “considering that most of her government records in the academe are
more than 15 years old, it is reasonable to consider it infeasible to retrieve all of those files,”
and that the clearance issued by UP HRDO and CSC should be taken in her favor. There was
no record that the letter was deliberated upon. Despite this, on a report to the JBC, Sereno
was said to have “complete requirements.” On August 2012, Sereno was appointed Chief
Justice.

On August 2017, an impeachment complaint was filed by Atty. Larry Gadon against Sereno,
alleging that Sereno failed to make truthful declarations in her SALNs. The House of
Representatives proceeded to hear the case for determination of probable cause, and it was
said that Justice Peralta, the chairman of the JBC then, was not made aware of the
incomplete SALNs of Sereno. Other findings were made: such as pieces of jewelry
amounting to P15,000, that were not declared on her 1990 SALN, but was declared in prior
years’ and subsequent years’ SALNs, failure of her husband to sign one SALN, execution of
the 1998 SALN only in 2003

On February 2018, Atty. Eligio Mallari wrote to the OSG, requesting that the latter, in
representation of the Republic, initiate a quo warranto proceeding against Sereno. The
OSG, invoking the Court’s original jurisdiction under Section 5(1), Article VIII of the
Constitution in relation to the special civil action under Rule 66, the Republic, through the
OSG filed the petition for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of quo warranto to declare
as void Sereno’s appointment as CJ of the SC and to oust and altogether exclude Sereno
therefrom.

ISSUE: Whether Sereno, who is an impeachable officer, can be the respondent in a quo
warranto proceeding, i.e., whether the only way to remove an impeachable officer is
impeachment.

RULING: Anent the fifth issue: Impeachment is not an exclusive remedy by which an
invalidly appointed or invalidly elected impeachable official may be removed from office.

The language of Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution does not foreclose a quo
warranto action against impeachable officers: “Section 2. The President, the Vice-
President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office on impeachment for,
and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and
corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust.” The provision uses the permissive
term “may” which denote discretion and cannot be construed as having a mandatory effect,
indicative of a mere possibility, an opportunity, or an option. In American jurisprudence, it
has been held that “the express provision for removal by impeachment ought not to be taken
as a tacit prohibition of removal by other methods when there are other adequate reasons to
account for this express provision.”

The principle in case law is that during their incumbency, impeachable officers cannot be
criminally prosecuted for an offense that carries with it the penalty of removal, and if they
are required to be members of the Philippine Bar to qualify for their positions, they cannot
be charged with disbarment. The proscription does not extend to actions assailing the public
officer’s title or right to the office he or she occupies. Even the PET Rules expressly provide
for the remedy of either an election protest or a petition for quo warranto to question the
eligibility of the President and the Vice-President, both of whom are impeachable officers.

Further, that the enumeration of “impeachable offenses” is made absolute, that is, only
those enumerated offenses are treated as grounds for impeachment, is not equivalent to
saying that the enumeration likewise purport to be a complete statement of the causes of
removal from office. If other causes of removal are available, then other modes of ouster can
likewise be availed. To subscribe to the view that appointments or election of impeachable
officers are outside judicial review is to cleanse their appointments or election of any
possible defect pertaining to the Constitutionally-prescribed qualifications which cannot
otherwise be raised in an impeachment proceeding. To hold otherwise is to allow an absurd
situation where the appointment of an impeachable officer cannot be questioned even when,
for instance, he or she has been determined to be of foreign nationality or, in offices where
Bar membership is a qualification, when he or she fraudulently represented to be a member
of the Bar.
CASE DIGEST: FILIPINA SAMSON v. JULIA A. RESTRIVERA. (G.R. No. 178454;
March 28, 2011)

FACTS: Petitioner, a government officer from the Population Commission, agreed to

help her friend, respondent Julia A. Restrivera, to have the latter’s land located in
Carmona, Cavite, registered under the Torrens System. Petitioner said that the
expenses would reach P150,000 and accepted P50,000 from respondent to cover
the initial expenses for the titling of respondents land. However, petitioner failed to
accomplish her task because it was found out that the land is government property.
When petitioner failed to return the P50,000, respondent sued her for estafa.
Respondent also filed an administrative complaint for grave misconduct or conduct
unbecoming a public officer against petitioner before the Office of the Ombudsman.

The Ombudsman found petitioner guilty of violating Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 6713
and suspended her from office for six months without pay.It was reduced to three
months suspension without pay. According to the Ombudsman, petitioner’s
acceptance of respondents payment created a perception that petitioner is a fixer.
Her act fell short of the standard of personal conduct required by Section 4(b) of
R.A. No. 6713 that public officials shall endeavor to discourage wrong perceptions of
their roles as dispensers or peddlers of undue patronage. The CA affirmed, and
added that contrary to petitioner’s contentions, the Ombudsman has jurisdiction
even if the act complained of is a private matter.

HELD: Section 13(1), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution states that the
Ombudsman can investigate on its own or on complaint by any person any act or
omission of any public official. Under Section 16of R.A. No. 6770, otherwise known
as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman encompasses all
kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance committed by any public officer
or employee during his/her tenure.Section 19 of R.A. No. 6770 also states that the
Ombudsman shall act on all complaints relating, but not limited, to acts or omissions
which are unfair or irregular.Thus, even if the complaint concerns an act of the
public official or employee which is not service-connected, the case is within the
jurisdiction of the Ombudsman.The law does not qualify.

Both the Ombudsman and CA interpreted Section 4(A) of R.A. No. 6713 as broad
enough to apply even to private transactions that have no connection to the duties
of ones office. However, that petitioner may not be penalized for violation of Section
4 (A)(b) of R.A. No. 6713. In Domingo v. Office of the Ombudsman, this Court had
ruled that failure to abide by the norms of conduct under Section 4(A)(b) of R.A. No.
6713, in relation to its implementing rules, is not a ground for disciplinary action.
Nevertheless, for reneging on her promise to return aforesaid amount, petitioner is
guilty of conduct unbecoming a public officer. In Assistant Special Prosecutor
III Rohermia J. Jamsani-Rodriguez v. Justices Gregory S. Ong, et
al., unbecoming conduct means improper performance and applies to a broader
range of transgressions of rules not only of social behavior but of ethical practice or
logical procedure or prescribed method.