Rules of Special Proceedings (Rule 72, Rules of Court)

1. Vda. De Manalo vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129242 (2001)

FACTS:

Troadic Manalo who died on February 1992, was survived by his Pilar and his 11 children. The deceased left several real
properties in Manila and a business in Tarlac. In November 1992, herein respondents, 8 of the surviving children, filed a
petition with RTC Manila for the judicial settlement of the estate of their late father and for appointment of their
brother Romeo Manalo as administrator thereof. Hearing was set on February 11, 1993 and the herein petitioners were
granted 10 days within which to file their opposition to the petition.

ISSUE: WON the case at bar is covered under Article 151 where earnest efforts toward compromise should first be made
prior the filing of the petition.

HELD:

It is a fundamental rule that in the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the averments and the
character of the relief were sought in the complaint or petition, shall be controlling. The careful scrutiny of the petition
for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement and distribution of the estate belies herein petitioners’ claim
that the same is in the nature of an ordinary civil action. The provision of Article 151 is applicable only to ordinary civil
actions. It is clear from the term “suit” that it refers to an action by one person or persons against another or other in a
court of justice in which the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law affords him for the redress of an injury or
enforcement of a right. It is also the intention of the Code Commission as revealed in the Report of the Code
Commission to make the provision be applicable only to civil actions. The petition for issuance of letters of
administration, settlement, and distribution of estate is a special proceeding and as such a remedy whereby the
petitioners therein seek to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. Hence, it must be emphasized that herein
petitioners are not being sued in such case for any cause of action as in fact no defendant was pronounced therein.

2. Natcher vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 133000 (2001)

Doctrine:Matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the decedent fall within the exclusive
province of the probate court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction.

Facts:

Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were registered owners of a land in Manila. Upon the death of
Graciana in 1951, Graciano, together with his 6 children entered into an extrajudicial settlement of Graciana's
adjudicating and dividing among themselves the said land. Under the agreement, Graciano received 8/14 share while
each of the children received 1/14 share of the said property. Accordingly, TCT No. 11889 was cancelled, TCTs
were issued in the name of Graciano and the children.Further, said heirs executed and forged an "Agreement
of Consolidation-Subdivision of Real Property with Waiver of Rights" where they subdividedamong themselves
the land into several lots. Graciano then donated to his children, share and share alike, a portion of his interest
in the land leaving only 447.60 square meters registered under Graciano's name. Subsequently, the said land
was further subdivided into 2 lots where the 1stwith an area of 80.90 sqm. and the 2ndlot with an area of 396.70
sqm. Eventually, Graciano sold the 1stlot to a 3rdperson but retained ownership over the 2ndlot.On 1980, Graciano
married herein petitioner Patricia Natcher. During their marriage, Graciano sold the (2nd) land to his wife
Patricia to which a TCT was issued in her name. On 1985,Graciano died leaving his 2ndwife Patricia and his
children by his 1stmarriage, as heirs.In a complaint, private respondentsalleged that upon Graciano's death,
Natcher through fraud, misrepresentation and forgery acquired the TCT making it appear that Graciano executed
a Deed of Sale. And, that their legitimes have been impaired.Petitioner‘s Allegations: She was legally married to
Graciano in 1980. Thus, under the law, she was likewise considered a compulsory heir of the latter. That during
Graciano's lifetime, Graciano already distributed, in advance, properties to his children, hence, herein private
respondents may not anymore claim against Graciano's estate or against herein petitioner's property.RTC (Manila):
Deed of sale is void being contrary to law. No evidence of separation of property or a decree of judicial separation
of property between them, the spouses are prohibited from entering (into) a contract of sale; Prohibited
donation; Although the deed of sale cannot be regarded as such or as a donation, it may however be regarded as an
extension of advance inheritance of Patricia Natcher being a compulsory heir of the deceased.CA: Reversed and set
aside RTC‘s ruling. (It is the probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the
estate... Thus the court a quo erred in regarding the subject property as advance inheritance. What the court
should have done was merely to rule on the validity of the sale and leave the issue on advancement to be resolved in
a separate proceeding instituted for that purpose.)

Issue: Whether or not the RTC (in an action for reconveyance) may adjudicate matters relating to the settlement
of the estate of a deceased person particularly on questions as to advancement of property made by the decedent
to his heirs.

Held:

No, the RTC trying an ordinary action for reconveyance / annulment of title, went beyondits jurisdiction when it
performed the acts proper only in a special proceeding for the settlement of estate of a deceased person.
(Petition DISMISSED)A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a
right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are government
by the rules for ordinary civil actions, subject to specific rules prescribed for a special civil action. A special
proceeding is a remedy by which aparty seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact.There lies a
marked distinction between an action and a special proceeding. An action is a formal demand of one's right in
a court of justice in the manner prescribed by the court or by thelaw. It is the method of applying legal remedies
according to definite established rules. The term "special proceeding" may be defined as an application or
proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. Usually, in special proceedings, no formal
pleadings are required unless the statute expressly so provides. In special proceedings, the remedy is granted
generally upon an application or motion.

Applying these principles, an action for reconveyance and annulment of title withdamages is a civil action, whereas
matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property made by the
decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly requires the application of
specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution of the
estate of the decedent fall within the exclusive province of the probate court in the exercise of its limited
jurisdiction.Under Sec. 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, questions as to advancement made or alleged to have been
made by the deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate
proceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the person raising the questions and on the
heir.In resolving the case at bench, this Court is not unaware of our pronouncement in Coca vs. Borromeo and Mendoza
vs. Teh that whether a particular matter should be resolved by the RTC in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or
its limited probate jurisdiction is not a jurisdictional issue but a mere question of procedure. In essence, it is procedural
question involving a mode of practice "which may be waived".We do not see any waiver on the part of herein
private respondents inasmuch as the children of the decedent even assailed the authority of the RTC, acting in
its general jurisdiction, to rule on this specific issue of advancement made by the decedent.This Court has
consistently enunciated the long standing principle that although generally, a probate court may not decide a
question of title or ownership, yet if the interested parties are all heirs, or the question is one of
collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the
rights of third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to decide the question of ownership.

3. Reyes vs. Sotero, G.R. No. 167405 (2006)

Facts: Respondent Chichioco filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration and settlement of estate of the
late Elena Lising claiming that she was the niece and heir of Lising who died intestate. Respondent claims that real and
personal properties were allegedly in the possession of petitioner Ana Joyce S. Reyes, a grandniece of the deceased.

Petitioner Reyes filed an Opposition to the petition, claiming that she was an adopted child of Lising and the latter’s
husband and asserting that the petition be dismissed since she was the only heir of Lising who passed away without
leaving any debts.

Subsequently, petitioner filed a Supplement to the Opposition attaching thereto the certification of her adoption from
the local civil registrar’s office that the adoption decree was registered therein and also a copy of a Judicial Form and a
certification issued by the clerk of court that the decree was on file in the General Docket of the RTC-Tarlac.
Respondents filed a Comment to the opposition stating that reasonable doubts have been cast on Petitioner’s claim that
she was legally adopted due allegedly to certain “badges of fraud.”

The appellate court refused to dismiss the proceeding because it was incumbent upon the petitioner to prove before the
trial court that she was indeed adopted by the Delos Santos spouse since, “imputations of irregularities permeating the
adoption decree render its authenticity under a cloud of doubt.”

Issue: WON petitioner had to prove the validity of her adoption due to imputations of irregularities.

Held: No. Petitioner need not prove her legal adoption by any evidence other than those which she had already
presented before the trial court.

An adoption decree is a public document required by law to be entered into public records, the official repository of
which, as well as all other judicial pronouncements affecting the status of individuals, is the local civil registrar’s office as
well as the court which rendered the judgment.

Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie
evidence of the facts therein stated. As such, the certifications issued by the local civil registrar and the clerk of court
regarding details of petitioner’s adoption which are entered in the records kept under their official custody, are prima
facie evidence of the facts contained therein. These certifications suffice as proof of the fact of petitioner’s adoption by
the Delos Santos spouses until contradicted or overcome by sufficient evidence. Mere “imputations of irregularities” will
not cast a “cloud of doubt” on the adoption decree since the certifications and its contents are presumed valid until
proof to the contrary is offered.

4. Ancheta vs. Guersey-Dalaygon, G.R. No. 139868 (2006)

Facts: Spouses Audrey O’Neill (Audrey) and W. Richard Guersey (Richard) were American citizens who have resided in
the Philippines for 30 years. They have an adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill (Kyle). Audrey died in 1979. She left a will
wherein she bequeathed her entire estate to Richard consisting of Audrey’s conjugal share in real estate improvements
at Forbes Park, current account with cash balance and shares of stock in A/G Interiors. Two years after her death,
Richard married Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon. Four years thereafter, Richard died and left a will wherein he bequeathed
his entire estate to respondent, except for his shares in A/G, which he left to his adopted daughter.

Petitioner, as ancillary administrator in the court where Audrey’s will was admitted to probate, filed a motion to declare
Richard and Kyle as heirs of Audrey and a project of partition of Audrey’s estate. The motion and project of partition
were granted. Meanwhile, the ancillary administrator with regards to Richard’s will also filed a project of partition,
leaving 2/5 of Richard’s undivided interest in the Forbes property was allocated to respondent Candelaria, while 3/5
thereof was allocated to their three children. Respondent opposed on the ground that under the law of the State of
Maryland, where Richard was a native of, a legacy passes to the legatee the entire interest of the testator in the
property subject to the legacy.

Issue: Whether or not the decree of distribution may still be annulled under the circumstances.

Held: A decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land of the estate in the
distributees, which, if erroneous may be corrected by a timely appeal. Once it becomes final, its binding effect is like any
other judgment in rem.

However, in exceptional cases, a final decree of distribution of the estate may be set aside for lack of jurisdiction or
fraud. Further, in Ramon vs. Ortuzar, the Court ruled that a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final
liquidation set aside when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or
inadvertence not imputable to negligence.
Petitioner’s failure to proficiently manage the distribution of Audrey’s estate according to the terms of her will and as
dictated by the applicable law amounted to extrinsic fraud. Hence the CA Decision annulling the RTC Orders dated
February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, must be upheld.

5. Domingo vs. Landicho, G.R. No. 170015 (2007)

To prove that a land is alienable, an applicant must conclusively establish the existence of apositive act of the
government, such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, oradministrative action, investigation reports
of the Bureau of Lands investigator or alegislative act or statute.

FACTS: Crisologo Domingo filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tagaytay City, anapplication for
registration of certain parcels of land (the ―lots‖), which he supposedly purchasedfrom one Genoveva Manlapit in
1948, and has since been in continuous, open, public, adverse anduninterrupted possession thereof in the
concept of an owner. Severino and Raymundo Landicho, Julian Abello, Marta de Sagun and Editha G.
Sarmientosubsequently filed an Answer/Opposition to Domingo‘s application, claiming, among other things,that they
have been the ones in open, continuous, adverse and actual possession and cultivation ofthe lots in the concept of
owners and have even been paying real estate taxes thereon. The RTC approved Domingo‘s application for registration.
On appeal by Landicho, et al., the Courtof Appeals reversed and set aside the RTC Decision and dismissed
Domingo‘s application forregistration of land title. Petitioner Domingo filed a motion for reconsideration with
the Court ofAppeals which was subsequently denied by said court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Domingo is entitled to the registration of the lots in question pursuant toSection 14, sub pars. (1)
and (4) of P.D. 1529

HELD: Section 14 of P.D. No. 1529 provides that to be entitled of a land, the applicant must provethat: (a) the land
applied for forms part of the disposable and alienable agricultural lands of thepublic domain and (b) he has been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession andoccupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership
either since time immemorial or sinceJune 12, 1945. All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong tothe State, and unless it has been shown that they have been reclassified by the
State as alienable ordisposable to a private person, they remain part of the inalienable public domain. To prove that
aland is alienable, an applicant must conclusively establish the existence of a positive act ofgovernment,
such as presidential proclamation or an executive order, or administrative action,investigation reports of the
Bureau of Lands investigator or a legislative act or statute.

Settlement of Estates of Deceased Persons (Rules 73-90, Rules of Court

1. Maloles II vs. Phillips, G.R. No. 133359 (2000)

FACTS:

On July 20, 1995, Dr. Arturo de Santos, Filipino and a resident of Makati City, filed a petition for probate of his will 1 in
the Regional Trial Court. He alleged that he had no compulsory heirs; that he had named in his will as sole legatee and
devisee the Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc.; that he disposed by his will his properties with an approximate value of
not less than P2,000,000.00; and that copies of said will were in the custody of the named executrix, private respondent
Pacita de los Reyes Phillips.

Petitioner Octavio S. Maloles II filed a motion for intervention claiming that, as the only child of Alicia de Santos
(testator’s sister) and Octavio L. Maloles, Sr., he was the sole full-blooded nephew and nearest of kin of Dr. De Santos.
He likewise alleged that he was a creditor of the testator. Petitioner thus prayed for the reconsideration of the order
allowing the will and the issuance of letters of administration in his name.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner, being a creditor of the late Dr. Arturo de Santos, has a right to intervene and oppose the
petition for issuance of letters testamentary filed by the respondent

RULING:

No. The petitioner in this case avers that, as the nearest next of kin and creditor of the testator, his interest in the
matter is material and direct. Even if petitioner is the nearest next of kin of Dr. De Santos, he cannot be considered an
“heir” of the testator. It is a fundamental rule of testamentary succession that one who has no compulsory or forced
heirs may dispose of his entire estate by will. Thus, Article 842 of the Civil Code provides:

“One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all his estate or any part of it in favor of any person having
capacity to succeed.”

“One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he does not contravene the provisions of this Code
with regard to the legitimate of said heirs.”

Compulsory heirs are limited to the testator’s —

Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants;

In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children and
descendants;

The widow or widower;

Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;

Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of the Civil Code.

Petitioner, as nephew of the testator, is not a compulsory heir who may have been preterited in the testator’s will. Nor
does he have any right to intervene in the settlement proceedings based on his allegation that he is a creditor of the
deceased. Since the testator instituted or named an executor in his will, it is incumbent upon the Court to respect the
desires of the testator. Only if the appointed executor is incompetent, refuses the trust, or fails to give bond may the
court appoint other persons to administer the estate. None of these circumstances is present in this case.

2. Rodriguez, et. al. vs. Borja, et. al, G.R. No. 180906

FACTS:

In this case, there were 2 proceedings. First was an intestate proceeding instituted meaning, a proceeding to settle the
estate of a deceased person who died without a will. But subsequently, a will was found and again another proceeding
was instituted, this time, testate proceeding wherein the estate of the deceased person is settled if that person has left a
will. We are confronted here of 2 proceedings, one was instituted ahead of the other.

ISSUE:

Which proceeding should be preferred?

RULING:

As long as there is a will, even if that will is found later and even if the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a
person with a will is filed later, that should be preferred. The will should be probated. The will should be given effect as
much as possible in order to give effect to the wishes of the testator. The wishes of the testator must be given such
preference first. Probate of the will is needed in order to determine whether or not the will was indeed valid, whether
or not the will was executed in observance with the formalities required by law and whether or not the testator
executed it with a sound mind

3. Cortes vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117417 (2000)

Facts:

Petitioner Menandro A. Reselva, private respondent (petitioner in this petition) Milagros R.Cortes, and Florante Reselva
are brothers and sister and children - heirs of the late spousesTeodoro T. Reselva and Lucrecia Aguirre Reselva, who died
on April 11, 1989 and May 13,1987, respectively. During their lifetime, they acquired a property particularly a house and
lotconsisting of 100 square meters, more or less, with address at 173 Ilaw St., Balut, Tondo,Manila. Lucrecia Aguirre
Reselva died ahead of Teodoro T. Reselva. The latter executed aholographic will which was probated in this case on July
31, 1991, with Milagros R. Cortes, asthe appointed Executrix. After having been appointed and qualified as Executrix, she
filed amotion before respondent probate court praying that Menandro A. Reselva, the occupant of theproperty, be
ordered to vacate the property at No. 173 Ilaw St., Balut, Tondo, Manila and turnover to said Executrix the possession
thereof. This isthe motion which the respondent court granted in the assailed order of October 18, 1993.In the Appellate
Court, the Regional Trial Court's order was set aside for having been issuedbeyond the latter's limited jurisdiction as a
probate court.

Issue:Whether the property in issue belongs to the partnership or exclusively to the decedent is withinthe jurisdiction of
the probate court.

Held:Probate courts, or those in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate, cannotadjudicate or determine title
to properties claimed to be part of the estate and which are claimedto belong to outside parties.In the present case,
however, private respondent Menandro A. Reselva, who refused to vacatethe house and lot being eyed as part of the
estate of the late Teodoro T. Reselva, cannot beconsidered an "outside party" for he is one of the three compulsory
heirs of the former. As such,he is very much involved in the settlement of Teodoro's estate. By way of exception to the
rule,when the parties are all heirs of the decedent, it is optional upon them to submit to the probatecourt the question
of title to property. Here, the probate court is competent to decide thequestion of ownership. More so, when the
opposing parties belong to the poor stratum ofsociety and a separate action would be most expensive and
inexpedient.In addition, Menandro's claim is not at all adverse to, or in conflict with that of, the decedentsince the
former's theory merely advances co-ownership with the latter. In the same way, whenthe controversy is whether the
property in issue belongs to the conjugal partnership orexclusively to the decedent, the same is properly within the
jurisdiction of the probate court,which necessarily has to liquidate the conjugal partnership in order to determine the
estate ofthe decedent which is to be distributed among the heirs

4. G.R. No. 211153, February 28, 2018 Amparo S. Cruz; Ernesto Halili; Alicia H. Florencio; Donald Halili; Editha H.
Rivera; Ernesto Halili, Jr.; And Julito Halili, Petitioners, V. Angelito S. Cruz, Concepcion S. Cruz, Serafin S. Cruz, And
Vicente S. Cruz, Respondents.

Summary Settlement of Estates (Rule 74, Rules of Court)

1. Cua vs Vargas GR No. 156536 (2006)

SHort Summary: Cua bought property from some of the co-heirs who were also signatories to the 2 documents they
executed, excluding some of the other heirs who were not notified before the alleged partition, though there was a
publication ofthe partition after the partition was done.Mom/Decedent: Paulina
VargasHeirs:EsterVisitacionJuanZenaidaRosario<>AndresGloriaAntoninaFlorentinoThose who signed the notarized EJ
Settlement:EsterVisitacion

JuanZenaidaRosario-the said EJ Settlement was published in Catanduanes Tribune for 3 consecutive weeks-they were
also the ones who executed an EJ Settlement Among Heirs with Sale withCua*the latter 4 never signed any
document*all documents executed and published in 1994-one of the heirs (Gloria Vargas, widow of Santiago Vargas)
claimed that she only knew of the EJ Settlement + Sale when the original house was demolished sometime in 1995;
claimed she was unaware of said settlement-tried to redeem the property from Cua but Cua refused their offer-
amicable settlement not reached in barangay level-ACTION FOR ANNULMENT OF EJ SETTLEMENT AND LEGAL
REDEMPTION OF LOT, MTC: 30-d period ff a written notice by vendors to co-owners not sent to them so theEJ
Settlement and Sale were null and void and had no legal effect on themMTC: DISMISS-transaction occurred after
partition so the co-owners could validly dispose of their shares-written notice of sale under A1088, though not sent, was
cured by the ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF SALE (which was more than 30d before filing of complaint)-no bad faith on part of
CuaRTC, appeal: affirm MTCCA: Reversed RTC and MTC-pursuant to Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, the
extrajudicial settlement made by the other co-heirs is not binding upon respondents considering the latter never
participated in it nor did they ever signify their consent to the same.-MR DeniedWON PUBLICATION of the EJ Partition
was binding on the non-signatory heirs because it constitutes due notice and therefore, the non-signatory co-heirs were
already estopped from assailing the partition and saleNO. Publication was made AFTER THE PARTITION WAS MADE, NOT
BEFORE WHICH WAS REQUIRED IN R74.1-The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex parte proceeding. The
rule plainly states, however, that persons who do not participate or had no notice of an extrajudicial settlement will not
be bound thereby. It contemplates a notice that has been sent out or issued before any deed of settlement and/or
partition is agreed upon (i.e., a notice calling all interested parties to participate in the said deed of extrajudicial
settlement and partition), and not after such an agreement has alreadybeen executed as what happened in the instant
case with the publication of the firstdeed of extrajudicial settlement among heirs.-The publication of the settlement
does not constitute constructive notice to the

heirs who had no knowledge or did not take part in it because the same was notice after the fact of execution. The
requirement of publication is geared for the protection of creditors and was never intended to deprive heirs of their
lawful participation in the decedent's estate. In this connection, the records of the present case confirm that
respondents never signed either of the settlement documents, having discovered their existence only shortly before the
filing of the present complaint. Following Rule 74, these extrajudicial settlements do not bind respondents, and the
partition made without their knowledge and consent is invalid insofar as they are concerned.WON THE RESPONDENTS
NON-SIGNATORY CO-HEIRS HAD RIGHT TO REDEEM?YES.-sale of pro indiviso shares allowed, subject to right of
redemption of other co-heirs. This right was never lost because the non-signatory co-heirs were never notified in writing
of the actual sale. NOTIFICATION IN WRITING OF THE SALE BY THE VENDOR is required to start the period of redemption
(w/n 1 month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale); even if the co-heirs have actual knowledge of sale,
the notification in writing is still required. As there was no such notice here, the rightto redeem the shares is still with
the non-signatory co-heirs.-method of notification remains exclusive, no alternative provided by law-purpose of A1088:
keep strangers to the family out of a joint ownershipWON Cua was a builder in GF-not in GF because he was very much
aware that NOT ALL THE HEIRS PARTICIPATED IN THE EJ SETTLEMENT + SALE, as evident from the face of the document
itself-since no valid partition yet, no sale could occur. Despite this glaring fact, and over the protests of the respondents,
he still constructed improvements on the propertyWON MTC does not have jurisdiction, this being incapable of
pecuniary estimationCua estopped thru active participation in the MTCWON it should still be dismissed for non-joinder
of indispensable partiesNO.-indispensable party: party-in-interest, without whom there can be no final determination of
an action and who is required to be joined as either plaintiff or defendant.-here: prayer of complaint was that they be
allowed to redeem shares in property sold. The other co-heirs already relinquished their right over their shares to Cua
withthe alleged sale. As a result, the other co-heirs who sold him the property are not anymore needed.On improper
verification and CNFSRule may be relaxed. And since the respondent share a common interest with the other
respondent, her sole signature complies with the rules.

G.R. No. 156536 October 31, 2006JOSEPH CUA,petitioner,vs.GLORIA A. VARGAS, AURORA VARGAS, RAMON VARGAS,
MARITES VARGAS, EDELINA VARGAS AND GEMMA VARGAS,respondents.FACTS:A parcel of residential land with an area
of 99 square meters located in San Juan, Virac, Catanduanes was left behind by the late Paulina Vargas. On February 4,
1994, a notarized Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs was executed by and among Paulina Vargas' heirs, namely Ester
Vargas, Visitacion Vargas, Juan Vargas, Zenaida V. Matienzo, Rosario V. Forteza, Andres Vargas, Gloria Vargas, Antonina
Vargas and Florentino Vargas, partitioning and adjudicating unto themselves the lot in question, each one of them
getting a share of 11 square meters. Florentino, Andres, Antonina and Gloria, however, did not sign the document. Only
Ester, Visitacion, Juan, Zenaida and Rosario signed it. The Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs was published in the
Catanduanes Tribune for three consecutive weeks.3On November 15, 1994, an Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs
with Sale4was again executed by and among the same heirs over the same property and also with the same sharings.
Once more, only Ester, Visitacion, Juan, Zenaida and Rosario signed the document and their respective shares totaling 55
square meters were sold to Joseph Cua, petitioner herein.Respondents argue that said Extra Judicial Settlement cannot
bind them for it was executed without their consent and participation.ISSUE:WON said Settlement would bind the
respondents who did not give their consent?HELD:No. It would not bind them. The Supreme Court gave the following
reason.The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is anex parteproceeding. The rule plainly states, however, that
persons who do not participate or had no notice of an extrajudicial settlement will not be bound thereby.18It
contemplates a notice that has been sent out or issuedbeforeany deed of settlement and/or partition is agreedupon
(i.e., a notice calling all interested parties to participate in the said deed of extrajudicial settlement and partition), and
not after such an agreement has alreadybeen executed19as what happened in the instant case with the publication of
the first deed of extrajudicial settlement among heirs

2. Cruz vs. Cristobal, G.R. No. 140422 (2006)

FACTS:

Petitioners claim that they are the legitimate children of Buenaventura Cristobal during his first marriage to Ignacia
Cristobal. On the other hand, private respondents are also the children of Buenaventura Cristobal resulting from his
second marriage to Donata Enriquez. On 18 June 1926, Buenaventura Cristobal purchased a parcel of land with an area
of 535 square meters. Sometime in the year 1930, Buenaventura Cristobal died intestate. More than six decades later,
petitioners learned that private respondents had executed an extrajudicial partition of the subject property and
transferred its title to their names. A Complaint for Annulment of Title and Damages was filed before the RTC by
petitioners against private respondents to recover their alleged pro-indiviso shares in the subject property. To prove
their filiation with the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal, the baptismal certificates of Elisa, Anselmo, and the late
Socorro were presented. In the case of Mercedes who was born on 31 January 1909, she produced a certification issued
by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar attesting to the fact that records of birth for the years 1901, 1909, 1932 to 1939,
1940, 1943, and 1948 were all destroyed due to ordinary wear and tear. After trial on the merits, the trial court
rendered a judgment dismissing the case, ruling that petitioners failed to prove their filiation with the deceased
Buenaventura Cristobal as the baptismal and birth certificates presented have scant evidentiary value and that
petitioners’ inaction for a long period of time amounts to laches. On appeal, the CA ruled that they were able to prove
their filiation with the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal thru “other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws,” but affirmed the ruling of the trial court barring their right to recover their share of the subject property because
of laches.

ISSUES:

Whether or not petitioners were able to prove their filiation with the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal.

Whether or not the petitioners are bound by the Deed of Partition of the subject property executed by the private
respondents

RULING:

Yes. In relation to Article 172 of the Family code, “Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and Special Laws,”
may consist of the child’s baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family bible in which the child’s name has been
entered, common reputation respecting the child’s pedigree, admission by silence, the testimony of witnesses, and
other kinds of proof of admission under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. In the present case, the baptismal certificates of
Elisa, Anselmo, and the late Socorro were presented. Baptismal certificate is one of the acceptable documentary
evidence to prove filiation in accordance with the Rules of Court and jurisprudence. In the case of Mercedes, who was
born on 31 January 1909, she produced a certification issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro
Manila, attesting to the fact that records of birth for the years 1901, 1909, 1932 to 1939, 1940, 1943, and 1948 were all
destroyed due to ordinary wear and tear.Petitioners likewise presented Ester Santos as witness who testified that
petitioners enjoyed that common reputation in the community where they reside as being the children of Buevaventura
Cristobal with his first wife. Testimonies of witnesses were also presented to prove filiation by continuous possession of
the status as a legitimate child.

No. Section 1, Rule 74 of the ROC provides that the fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be
published in a newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided in the next succeeding section; but no
extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof. In
this case, since the estate of the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal is composed solely of the subject property, the
partition thereof by the private respondents already amounts to an extrajudicial settlement of Buenaventura Cristobal’s
estate. The partition of the subject property by the private respondents shall not bind the petitioners since petitioners
were excluded therefrom. Petitioners were not aware of the Deed of Partition executed by private respondents among
themselves in 1948. Petitioner Elisa became aware of the transfer and registration of the subject property in the names
of private respondents only in 1994 when she was offered by private respondent Eufrocina to choose between a portion
of the subject property or money, as one of the children of private respondent Jose wanted to construct an apartment
on the subject property. Considering that the Deed of Partition of the subject property does not affect the right of
petitioners to inherit from their deceased father, this Court shall then proceed to divide the subject property between
petitioners and private respondents, as the rule on succession prescribes. It appears that the 535 square meters subject
property was a conjugal property of Buenaventura Cristobal and Donata Enriquez, the second wife, as the property was
purchased in 1926, during the time of their marriage. Upon the deaths of Buenaventura in 1930 and Donata in 1936,
both deaths occurring before the enactment of the New Civil Code in 1950, all the four children of the first marriage and
the four children of the second marriage shall share equally in the subject property in accordance with the Old Civil
Code. Absent any allegation showing that Buenaventura Cristobal left any will and testament, the subject property shall
be divided into eight equal parts pursuant to Articles 921 and 931 of the Old Civil Code on intestate succession, each
receiving 66.875 square meters thereof. At the time of death of Buenaventura Cristobal in 1930, Donata was only
entitled to the usufruct of the land pursuant to Article 834 of the Old Civil Code, which provides that a widower or
widow who, on the death of his or her spouse, is not divorced, or should be so by the fault of the deceased, shall be
entitled to a portion in usufruct equal to that corresponding by way of legitime to each of the legitimate children or
descendants who has not received any betterment. If only one legitimate child or descendant survives, the widow or
widower shall have the usufruct of the third availment for betterment, such child or descendant to have the naked
ownership until, on the death of the surviving spouse, the whole title is merged in him. Donata’s right to usufruct of the
subject property terminated upon her death in 1936.

3. G.R. No. 187524 August 5, 2015 SPOUSES MARIA BUTIONG and VILLAFRlA, DR. RUEL B. SPOUSES MARIA FRANCISCO
substituted by VILLAFRIA, Petitioners,

vs.

MA. GRACIA RINOZA PLAZO and MA. FE RINOZA ALARAS, Respondents.

FACTS: On November 16, 1989, Pedro L. Rifioza died intestate, leaving several heirs, including his children with his first
wife the respondents leaving several properties to them. Thereafter, a complaint for judicial partition with Annulment of
Title and Recovery of Possession was filed by the respondents alleging that they discovered that their co-heirs sold the
properties to the petitioners, who were now deceased and duly represented by their son, without their consent.

The respondents also learned of a notice of an extra-judicial settlement of estate of their late father was published in a
tabloid called Balita. Because of this, they caused the annotation of their adverse claims over the subject properties
before the Register of Deeds and filed the said complaint.

The petitioners denied the allegations of the complaint on the ground of lack of personal knowledge and good faith in
acquiring the subject properties. Petitioner Francisco further contended that what they purchased was only the resort.
He also presented an Extra-Judicial Settlement with Renunciation, Repudiations and Waiver of Rights and Sale which
provides that respondents’ co-heirs sold the family home to the spouses Rolando and Ma. Cecilia Bondoc for Pl million
as well as a Deed of Sale whereby Benita sold the resort to petitioners.

The trial court nullified the transfer of the subject Properties to petitioners and spouses Bondoc due to irregularities in
the Documents of conveyance offered by petitioners as well as the circumstances Surrounding the execution of the
same. CA affirmed hence, the petition where they alleged that since the Respondents’ complaint alleged causes of
action for settlement of estate under Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, therefore it is actually one for settlement of estate
and not of judicial partition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition is for partition or for settlement of estate?

HELD: The court held that the complaint filed by the respondents was for judicial partition. It is true that some of
respondents’ causes of action pertaining to the properties left behind by the decedent Pedro, his known heirs, and the
nature and extent of their interests thereon may fall under an action for settlement of estate. However, a complete
reading of the complaint would readily show that, based on the nature of the suit, the allegations therein, and the
relief’s prayed for, the action, is clearly one for judicial partition with annulment of title and recovery of possession.

In this case, it was expressly alleged in the complaint, and was not disputed, that Pedro died without a will, leaving his
estate without any ending obligations. Thus, contrary to petitioner’s contention, respondents were under no legal
obligation to submit the subject properties of the estate of a special proceeding for settlement of intestate estate, and
are, in fact, encouraged to have the same partitioned, judicially or extrajudicially.

4. G.R. No. 199885 JESUSA DUJALI BUOT, Petitioner

vs.

ROQUE RASAY DUJALI, Respondent

FACTS:

Buot filed before the RTC a petition for letters of administration of the estate of deceased Gregorio Dujali (Gregorio).
Buot alleged that she was a surviving heir of Gregorio who died intestate. She also claimed that since Gregorio’s death,
there had been no effort to settle his estate. And that Dujali purportedly continued to manage and control the
properties to the exclusion of all the other heirs. Buot further alleged that Dujali for no justifiable reason denied her
request to settle the estate. Thus, Buot asked that: (1) an administrator be appointed to preserve Gregorio’s estate; (2) a
final inventory of the properties be made; (3) the heirs be established; and (4) the net estate be ordered distributed in
accordance with law among the legal heirs.
Dujali filed an opposition with motion to dismiss. According to Dujali, when an estate has no debts, recourse to
administration proceedings is allowed only when there are good and compelling reasons. Where an action for partition
(whether in or out of court) is possible, the estate should not be burdened with an administration proceeding.

Buot maintains that heirs are not precluded from instituting a petition for administration if they do not, for good reason,
wish to pursue an ordinary action for partition. In her case, she claims that there are good reasons justifying her
recourse to administration proceedings: (1) the Amended Extrajudicial Settlement did not cover the entire estate; (2)
there has been no effort to partition the property; (3) Dujali seeks to challenge Buot’ s status as an heir; (4) other heirs
have been deprived of the properties of the estate; and (5) other heirs, particularly Constancia Dujali and Marilou Dujali,
have already manifested that they are amenable to the appointment of an administrator.

ISSUE: Won Petition for letters of administration filed by Buot be granted

HELD:

No, The Supreme Court held that the reasons which Buot proffers to warrant the grant of her petition for letters of
administration do not suffice to warrant the submission of Gregorio’s estate to administration proceedings.

Buot’s allegation that the extrajudicial settlement in this case did not cover Gregorio’s entire estate is, by no means, a
sufficient reason to order the administration of the estate. Whether the extrajudicial settlement did in fact cover the
entire estate and whether an extrajudicial settlement that does not cover the entire estate may be considered valid do
not automatically create a compelling reason to order the administration of the estate

As to Buot’s other allegations that: (1) there has been no effort to partition the estate; (2) that Dujali challenges her
status as an heir; (3) that other heirs have been deprived of the estate; and (4) these heirs are amenable to the
appointment of an administrator, we find that none of these allegations actually prevent the filing of an ordinary action
for partition.

An action for partition is also the proper venue to ascertain Buot’s entitlement to participate in the proceedings as an
heir. Not only would it allow for the full ventilation of the issues as to the properties that ought to be included in the
partition and the true heirs entitled to receive their portions of the estate, it is also the appropriate forum to litigate
questions of fact that may be necessary to ascertain if partition is proper and who may participate in the proceedings.

When a person dies intestate, his or her estate may generally be subject to judicial administration proceedings.There
are, however, several exceptions.

If the deceased left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, the heirs may divide the estate among themselves
without judicial administration. The heirs may do so extrajudicially through a public instrument filed in the office of the
Register of Deeds. In case of disagreement, they also have the option to file an action for partition.

Section 1 of Rule 74, however, does not prevent the heirs from instituting administration proceedings if they have good
reasons for choosing not to file an action for partition.

In the case of Rodriguez, et al. v. Tan, etc. and Rodriguez,

Section 1 of Rule 74 does not preclude the heirs from instituting administration proceedings, even if the estate has no
debts or obligation, if they do not desire to resort for good reasons to an ordinary action of partition.

Said section is not mandatory or compulsory as may be gleaned from the use made therein of the word may.

In Pereira v. Court of Appeals we refused to allow administration proceedings where the only reason why the
appointment of an administrator was sought so that one heir can take possession of the estate from the other heir.

5. G.R. No. L-48840 December 29, 1943 ERNESTO M. GUEVARA, Petitioner-Appellant, vs. ROSARIO GUEVARA and her
husband PEDRO BUISON, respondent-appellees.

Facts:

"This case being the sequel to, and aftermath of, a previous litigation between the parties that reached the Supreme
Court through the former Court of Appeal's, it becomes necessary to restate the essential antecedent facts to view the
issues in... proper perspective. For this purpose, it is important to recall that on "August 26, 1931, Victorino L. Guevara,
a resident of Bayambang, Pangasinan, executed a will (Exhibit A), distributing assorted movables and a residential lot
among his... children, Rosario and Ernesto Guevara, and his stepchildren, Vivencio, Eduvigis, Dionista, Candida, and Pio
Guevara.

To his second wife Augustia Posadas, the testator bequeathed, in addition to various movables, a portion of 25 hectares
to lie .taken out of a 259 odd... hectare parcel outlined in Plan Psu-68618, plus another five (5) hectares in settlement,
of her widow's usufruct.

The balance of the 259 odd hectares ho distributed as follows:

100 hectares reserved for disposal during the testator's lifetime and for payment of his debts and family expenses;

108.0854 hectares to his legitimate son Ernesto Guevara, including therein 43.2342 hectares by way of mejora;

21.6171 hectares to 'mi hija natural reconocida Rosario Guavara.' Ernesto Guevara was appointed executor without
bond.

On July 12, 1933, the same testator executed a deed of sale in favor of Ernesto Guevara, conveying to the latter the
southern half of 'the 259-hectare lot heretofore mentioned, and expressly recognized Ernesto Guevara ... as owner of
the northern half.

Prior to this sale, oh November 1, 1932, Victorino and his son Ernesto had jointly applied for registration of the big
parcel (case No. 15174), but in view of the sale from the former to the latter, the decree was... issued in the name of
Ernesto Guevara exclusively and for the whole tract a certificate of title

Fifteen days previously, i.e., on September 27, 1933, Victorinc Guevara died, but his ¦will was not filed for probate.

About four years later, Rbsario Guevara, claiming; to be a recognized natural child of the deceased Victorino, and on...
the assumption that he had died intestate, brought' suit against' Ernesto Guevara to recover. 423,492 square meters

The case reached the former Court of Appeals in due course and was decided in Rosario Guevara's favor... but upon
certiorari, the Supreme Court rnodified the judgment

Judgment of said court insofar as it awarded any relief to the respondent Rosario Guevara, in this action is hereby
reversed and set aside, and the parties are hereby ordered to present the document Exhibit A to the proper) court for...
probate in accordance with law, without prejudice to such action as the provincial fiscal Pangasinan may take against
the responsible party or parties under section 4 of Rule 76. After the said document, is approve and allowed by the
court as the... last will and testament of the deceased Victorino L. Guevara, the heirs and legatees herein named may
take such action, judicial or extra judicial, as necessary to partition the estate of the testator, taking in consideration.
the pronouncements made in... part II of this opinion No -finding as to costs in any of the three instances.'

Claiming to act pursuant to the foregoing decision Rosario Guevara commenced on October 5, 1945, special
proceedings No. 2646 in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan for the probate of the will of Victorino Guevara.

Notice of the petition having been duly published pursuant to Rule of Court 77,. section 4, Ernesto Guevara appeared
and opposed the probate. Pedro L. Quinto, counsel for Rosarioin theformer litigation, was ... allowed to intervene in
view of his recorded attorney's lien.

Ernesto. Guevara, through counsel, filed a motion to dismiss the petition on' the grounds that (a petition itself alleged
that the will was revoked; (b) that 'whatever right to probate the parties may have has ... already prescribe (Record on
Appeal,, p. 14); and (c) that the purpose of th probate was, solely to have petitioner Rosario declared an
acknowledged natural child of the deceased.

Judge Sotero Rodas denied the motion, to dismiss; but upon motion of reconsideratio Judge Mainalac of the same
court, on June 23, 1937, reconsidaration set aside the previous resolution and ordered the... petition dismissed on the
ground that Rosario Guevara's petition did not for the probate in toto of the will, contrary to the order of Supreme
Court; that her right to petition for the probate o testament .

of Victorino L. Guevara had prescribed; and that her action for judicial declaration of acknowledgment had likewise
prescribed.

Issues:
(c) Is the petition for probate of the alleged will of the deceased Victorino L, Guevara barred by the statute of
limitations?

Ruling:

(3) The last question for determination in this case is whether or not the petition for probate of the will of Victorino
L. Guevara is barred by the statute of limitations, considering that the testator died on September 27, 19S3,... and that
the petition for probate of said will was filed twelve (12) years later, or, to be exact, on October 5, 1945. The Court of
Appeals resolved the question in the negative

"We are of the opinion that the Court below was in error when it declared that the petition for probate of the will of
Victorino Guevara was barred by prescription. The provision of Article 756 of the old

Civil Code (1042 of the New) and of Rule 76 of the Rules of Court, reiterating those of the old Code of Civil Procedure
(Act 190), point out that the presentation of a decedent's will to the competent court has always been deemed by our
law as more of a... duty than a right, and the neglect of such obligation carries with it the corresponding penalty; and
it is inconsistent with that policy that the court should refuse to admit wills to probate, without inquiry into their
validity.

The authority... given to testators to dispose freely of a portion of their estate would be imperfectly safeguarded,
unless adequate measures were provided by the state to assure that the wishes of the deceased would be... carried
out. Because the decedent may no longer act to have his testamentary dispositions duly executed, the state authority
must take over the opposite vigilance and supervision, so that free testamentary disposition does... not remain a
delusion and a dream.

we hold that under section 1 of Rule 74, in relation to Rule 76, if the decedent left a will and no debts 'and the heirs
and legatees desire to make an extra-judicial partition of the... estate, they must first present that will to the court for
probate and divide the estate in accordance with the will.

They may not disregard the provisions of the will unless those provisions are contrary to law.

Neither may they do away with the presentation of the will to the court for probate, because such suppression of the
will is contrary to law and public policy. The law enjoins the probate of the will... and public policy requires it,
because unless the will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of ¦a person to dispose of
his property by will may be rendered nugatory, as is attempted to be... done in the instant case. Absent legatees and
devisees, or such of them as may have no knowledge of the will, could be cheated of their inheritance thru the
collusion of some of the heirs who might agree to the partition of the estate... among themselves to the exclusion of
others.'

'This excludes the bar of the statute of limitation from consideration as one of the matters which may be shown in
opposition to the probate. This is further emphasized by section 1341 which, in substance, declares that, if upon the...
verdict of the jury facts mentioned in section 1317 as aforesaid appear to be established, the court 'must' admit the
will to probate. Section 1314 makes it imperative that the court shall admit the "will to probate if the... execution is
proven and the grounds of opposition authorized by section 1312 are not established. This clearly implies that no
grounds of opposition other than those enumerated in section 1312 may be set up, ... and it leaves no place for the
application of the statute of limitations.

'One of the most fundamental conceptions of probate law, is that it is the duty of the court to effectuate, in so far as
may be compatible with the public interest, the devolutionary wishes of a deceased person

'Even if the decedent left no debts and nobody raises any question as tot the authenticity and due execution of the will,
none of heirs may sue for the partition of the estate in accordance with that will without first securing its allowance
or... probate by the court: first, because the law expressly provides that 'no will shall pass either real or personal estate
unless it is proved and allowed in the proper court; and, second, because the probate of a will, which is a proceeding
in... rem, cannot be dispensed with and substituted by any other proceeding, judicial or extrajudicial, with offending
against public policy designed to effectuate the testator's right to dispose of his property by will in accordance with law
and to... protect the rights of the heirs and legatees under the will thru the means provided by law, among which are
the publication and the personal notices to each and all of said heirs and legatees. Nor may the court approve and
allow the will... presented in evidence in such an action for partition, which is one in personam, any more than it could
decree the registration under the Torrens system of the land involved in an ordinary action for revindicacion or
partition.'

"From whatever angle the case is viewed, a hearing on the allowance of the will is unavoidable. The persistent, albeit
obnoxious, attempts of Rosario Guevara to sidetrack the will are not remedied by dismissing the petition for probate of
will, and allowing

Ernesto to retain a greater interest than that intended by the testator.

Probate of Wills (Rules 75-77, Rules of Court)

1. Nittscher vs. Nittscher, G.R. No. 160530 (2007)

Letters Testamentary and of Administration (Rules 78-79, Rules of Court)

1. Maloles II vs. Phillips, G.R. No. 129505 (2000)

2. Edgar San Luis vs. San Luis, G.R. Nos. 133743 and 134029 (2007)

Facts:

The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former governor
of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. The first marriage was with Virginia
Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel.
On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo. The second was Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son,
Tobias; and Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, with whom he had no children with respondent but lived with
her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death.

Respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. On
December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 146.

Thereater, the heirs of Virginia Sulit filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a
cause of action. But the trial court issued an order denying the two motions to dismiss. On September 12, 1995, the trial
court dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly
elected governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz,
Laguna and not in Makati City. It also ruled that respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition for letters of
administration because her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. The Court of Appeals reversed
and set aside the orders of the trial court, and, hence, the case before the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration

Held:

Respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their
cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and
Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of
the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the
property relations between parties who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their
marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either or both of them through their work
or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co- ownership, it is not
necessary that the property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the
union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the
co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven.

Morover, the Supreme Court founnd that respondent’s legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of
administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co- owner under Article 144 of the
Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.
The order of the Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss and its October 24, 1994 Order which
dismissed petitioners’ motion for reconsideration is affirmed. It was also REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings.

3. Avelino vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115181 (2000)

4. G.R. No. 209651 November 26, 2014 MARCELO INVESTMENT AND MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, and THE
HEIRS OF EDWARD T. MARCELO, NAMELY, KATHERINE J. MARCELO, ANNA MELINDA J. MARCELO REVILLA, and JOHN
STEVEN J. MARCELO, Petitioners,

vs.

JOSE T. MARCELO, JR., Respondent.

Special Administrator (Rule 80, Rules of Court)

1. Heirs of Belinda Dahlia A. Castillo vs. Lacuata-Gabriel, G.R. No. 162934 (2005)

2. G.R. No. 187879 July 5, 2010 DALISAY E. OCAMPO, VINCE E. OCAMPO, MELINDA CARLA E. OCAMPO, and
LEONARDO E. OCAMPO, JR., Petitioners,

vs.

RENATO M. OCAMPO and ERLINDA M. OCAMPO, Respondents.

3. G.R. No. 140929 May 26, 2005 MARGARITO R. JAMERO, petitioner,

vs.

THE HONORABLE ACHILLES L. MELICOR, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City,
Branch 4, ATTY. ALBERTO BAUTISTA, in his capacity as the appointed SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR, and ERNESTO R.
JAMERO, respondent.

Executors and Administrators (Rules 81-85, Rules of Court)

1. G.R. No. L-6829 December 29, 1954 Intestate Estate of RUFINA MERCADO, deceased. CATALINA JAVIER,
petitioner-appellee,

vs.

EULOGIO MAGTIBAY and SOLEDAD MAGTIBAY DE HERNANDEZ, respondents-appellants.

2. Gr No. 167979 ,March 16, 2006 Wilson S. Uy, As Judicial Administrator Of The Intestate Estate Of The Deceased Jose
K. C. Uy, Petitioner, Vs. The Hon. Court Of Appeals, Hon. Anastacio C. Rufon, As Presiding Judge Of Branch 52, Of The
Regional Trial Court, Sixth Judicial Region, Sitting At Bacolod City, And Johnny K. H. Uy, Respondents.

3. [G.R. No. 183053 : June 15, 2010]

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF CRISTINA AGUINALDO-SUNTAY; EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III, PETITIONER, VS.
ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY, RESPONDENT.

Claims against the Estate (Rule 86, Rules of Court)

1. Sps. Suria vs. Heirs of Brigido Tomolin, G.R. No. 157483 (2007)

2. Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc. vs. Republic-Asahi Glass Corporation, G.R. No. 147561 (2006)

Payment of the Debts of the Estate Sales, Mortgages and other Encumbrances of the Property of Decedent Distribution
and Partition of the Estate (Rules 88-90 Rules of Court)

1. Vda. De Gurrea vs. Suplico, G.R. No. 144320 (2006)