Dela Torre v. COMELEC

Rolando P. Dela Torre vs.
Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 121592. July 5, 1996
FACTS:
Petitioner Rolando Dela Torre via the petition for certiorari seeks the nullification of two resolutions issued
by the COMELEC allegedly with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in a case for
disqualification filed against him before the COMELEC.
The first assailed resolution declared Dela Torre disqualified from running for the position of Mayor of
Cavinti, Laguna in the last May 8, 1995 elections, citing Sec. 40 (a) of the Local Government Code of 1991
as a ground:
“(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an
offense punishable by one year or more of imprisonment within two years after serving
sentence.”
In disqualifying Dela Torre, COMELEC held that:
“Documentary evidence established that Dela Torres was found guilty for violation of P.D.
1612 or Anti-Fencing Law and his conviction is final. There exists legal grounds to
disqualify him as candidate for Mayor of Cavinti, Laguna. Although there is dearth of
jurisprudence involving the violation of the Anti-Fencing Law, the nature of the offense
under the said law with which Dela Torre was convicted certainly involves moral
turpitude.”
Dela Torre claimed that Sec. 40 (a) of the Local Government Code does not apply to his case inasmuch as
the probation granted to him which suspended the execution of the judgment of conviction and all other
legal consequences, rendered Sec. 40 (a) inapplicable.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the crime of fencing involves moral turpitude.

2. Whether or not a grant of probation affects Sec. 40 (a)’s applicability.
HELD:
1. YES. Moral turpitude, as defined by Black’s Law Dictionary, is “an act of baseness, vileness, or
depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary
to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman or conduct
contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.”
In Zari v. FLores: It implies something immoral in itself, regardless of the fact that it is punishable
by law or not. It must not be merely mala prohibita, but the act itself must be inherently immoral.
The doing of the act itself, and not its prohibition by statute fixes the moral turpitude. Moral
turpitude, however, include such acts as are not of themselves immoral but whose illegality lies
in their being positively prohibited.
In International Rice Research Institute v. NLRC: There are crimes which are mala in se and yet
but rarely involve moral turpitude and there are crimes which involve moral turpitude and are
mala prohibita only. Whether or not a crime involves moral turpitude is ultimately a question of
fact and frequently depends on all the circumstances surrounding the violation of the statute.
Inasmuch as Dela Torre does not assail his conviction, he in effect admitted all the elements of
the crime of fencing.
Fencing is the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy,
receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any manner
deal in any article, item, object, or anything of value which he knows, or should be known to him,
to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. The elements are:
1. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed;
2. The accused who is not a principal or accomplice in the crime of robbery
or theft, buys, receives, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and
sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which
have been derived from the proceeds of the said crime;
3. The accused knows or should have known that the said article, item,
object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of
robbery or theft; and
4. There is, on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for
another.
Moral turpitude is deducible from the 3rd element. Actual knowledge by the “fence” of the fact
that property received is stolen displays the same degree of malicious deprivation of one’s
rightful property as that which animated the robbery or theft which, by their very nature, are
crimes of moral turpitude.
2. NO. The legal effect of probation is only to suspend the execution of the sentence. Dela Torre’s
conviction of fencing which is a crime of moral turpitude and falling under the disqualification
found in Sec. 40 (a), subsists and remains totally unaffected notwithstanding the grant of
probation. In fact, a judgment of conviction in a criminal case ipso facto attains finality when the
accused applies for probation, although it is not executory pending resolution of the application
for probation.
The instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED.

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Rolando P. Dela Torre vs.

G.R. No. 121592. July 5, 1996

In disqualifying Dela Torre, COMELEC held that:

1. Whether or not the crime of fencing involves moral turpitude.

The instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED.

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