SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 170180. November 23, 2007.]

ARSENIO VERGARA VALDEZ , petitioner, vs . PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES , respondent.

DECISION

TINGA , J : p

The sacred right against an arrest, search or seizure without valid warrant is not
only ancient. It is also zealously safeguarded. The Constitution guarantees the right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures. 1 Any evidence obtained in violation of said right
shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Indeed, while the power to
search and seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still it must be
exercised and the law implemented without contravening the constitutional rights of
the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of su cient importance to justify
indifference to the basic principles of government. 2
On appeal is the Decision 3 of the Court of Appeals dated 28 July 2005, a rming
the Judgment 4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 31, Agoo, La Union dated 31
March 2004 nding petitioner Arsenio Vergara Valdez guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of violating Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9165 (R.A. No. 9165) 5 and sentencing him
to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from eight (8) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor medium as minimum to fteen (15) years of reclusion temporal medium
as maximum and ordering him to pay a fine of P350,000.00. 6
I.
On 26 June 2003, petitioner was charged with violation of Section 11, par. 2 (2)
of R.A. No. 9165 in an Information 7 which reads:
That on or about the 17th day of March 2003, in the Municipality of
Aringay, Province of La Union, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, control and custody dried
marijuana leaves wrapped in a cellophane and newspaper page, weighing more
or less twenty- ve (25) grams, without rst securing the necessary permit, license
or prescription from the proper government agency.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 8

On arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits

ensued with the prosecution presenting the three (3) barangay tanods of San Benito
Norte, Aringay, La Union namely, Rogelio Bautista (Bautista), Nestor Aratas (Aratas) and
Eduardo Ordoño (Ordoño), who arrested petitioner. aEHIDT

Bautista testi ed that at around 8:00 to 8:30 p.m. of 17 March 2003, he was
conducting the routine patrol along the National Highway in Barangay San Benito Norte,
Aringay, La Union together with Aratas and Ordoño when they noticed petitioner,
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 lugging a bag, alight from a mini-bus. The tanods observed that petitioner, who
appeared suspicious to them, seemed to be looking for something. They thus
approached him but the latter purportedly attempted to run away. They chased him, put
him under arrest and thereafter brought him to the house of Barangay Captain Orencio
Mercado (Mercado) where he, as averred by Bautista, was ordered by Mercado to open
his bag. Petitioner's bag allegedly contained a pair of denim pants, eighteen pieces of
eggplant and dried marijuana leaves wrapped in newspaper and cellophane. It was then
that petitioner was taken to the police station for further investigation. 9
Aratas and Ordoño corroborated Bautista's testimony on most material points.
On cross-examination, however, Aratas admitted that he himself brought out the
contents of petitioner's bag before petitioner was taken to the house of Mercado. 1 0
Nonetheless, he claimed that at Mercado's house, it was petitioner himself who brought
out the contents of his bag upon orders from Mercado. For his part, Ordoño testi ed
that it was he who was ordered by Mercado to open petitioner's bag and that it was
then that they saw the purported contents thereof. 1 1
The prosecution likewise presented Police Inspector Valeriano Laya II (Laya), the
forensic chemist who conducted the examination of the marijuana allegedly
con scated from petitioner. Laya maintained that the specimen submitted to him for
analysis, a sachet of the substance weighing 23.10 grams and contained in a plastic
bag, tested positive of marijuana. He disclosed on cross-examination, however, that he
had knowledge neither of how the marijuana was taken from petitioner nor of how the
said substance reached the police o cers. Moreover, he could not identify whose
marking was on the inside of the cellophane wrapping the marijuana leaves. 1 2
The charges were denied by petitioner. As the defense's sole witness, he testified
that at around 8:30 p.m. on 17 March 2003, he arrived in Aringay from his place in
Curro-oy, Santol, La Union. After alighting from the bus, petitioner claimed that he went
to the house of a friend to drink water and then proceeded to walk to his brother's
house. As he was walking, prosecution witness Ordoño, a cousin of his brother's wife,
allegedly approached him and asked where he was going. Petitioner replied that he was
going to his brother's house. Ordoño then purportedly requested to see the contents of
his bag and appellant acceded. It was at this point that Bautista and Aratas joined
them. After inspecting all the contents of his bag, petitioner testi ed that he was
restrained by the tanod and taken to the house of Mercado. It was Aratas who carried
the bag until they reached their destination. 1 3
Petitioner maintained that at Mercado's house, his bag was opened by the tanod
and Mercado himself. They took out an item wrapped in newspaper, which later turned
out to be marijuana leaves. Petitioner denied ownership thereof. He claimed to have
been threatened with imprisonment by his arrestors if he did not give the prohibited
drugs to someone from the east in order for them to apprehend such person. As
petitioner declined, he was brought to the police station and charged with the instant
offense. Although petitioner divulged that it was he who opened and took out the
contents of his bag at his friend's house, he averred that it was one of the tanod who
did so at Mercado's house and that it was only there that they saw the marijuana for the
first time. 1 4
Finding that the prosecution had proven petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, the RTC rendered judgment against him and sentenced him to suffer
indeterminate imprisonment ranging from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor medium as minimum to fteen (15) years of reclusion temporal medium as
maximum and ordered him to pay a fine of P350,000.00. 1 5 HAaDcS

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 Aggrieved, petitioner appealed the decision of the RTC to the Court of Appeals.
On 28 July 2005, the appellate court a rmed the challenged decision. The Court of
Appeals, nding no cogent reason to overturn the presumption of regularity in favor of
the barangay tanod in the absence of evidence of ill-motive on their part, agreed with
the trial court that there was probable cause to arrest petitioner. It observed further:
That the prosecution failed to establish the chain of custody of the seized
marijuana is of no moment. Such circumstance nds prominence only when the
existence of the seized prohibited drugs is denied. In this case, accused-appellant
himself testi ed that the marijuana wrapped in a newspaper was taken from his
bag. The corpus delicti of the crime, i.e.[,] the existence of the marijuana and his
possession thereof, was amply proven by accused-appellant Valdez's own
testimony. 1 6

In this appeal, petitioner prays for his acquittal and asserts that his guilt of the
crime charged had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. He argues, albeit for the
rst time on appeal, that the warrantless arrest effected against him by the barangay
tanod was unlawful and that the warrantless search of his bag that followed was
likewise contrary to law. Consequently, he maintains, the marijuana leaves purportedly
seized from him are inadmissible in evidence for being the fruit of a poisonous tree.
Well-settled is the rule that the ndings of the trial court on the credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies are accorded great respect and weight, in the absence
of any clear showing that some facts and circumstances of weight or substance which
could have affected the result of the case have been overlooked, misunderstood or
misapplied. 1 7
After meticulous examination of the records and evidence on hand, however, the
Court finds and so holds that a reversal of the decision a quo under review is in order.
II.
At the outset, we observe that nowhere in the records can we nd any objection
by petitioner to the irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment. Considering this
and his active participation in the trial of the case, jurisprudence dictates that petitioner
is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing any
defect in his arrest. The legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court
over his person. 1 8 Petitioner's warrantless arrest therefore cannot, in itself, be the
basis of his acquittal.
However, to determine the admissibility of the seized drugs in evidence, it is
indispensable to ascertain whether or not the search which yielded the alleged
contraband was lawful. The search, conducted as it was without a warrant, is justi ed
only if it were incidental to a lawful arrest. 1 9 Evaluating the evidence on record in its
totality, as earlier intimated, the reasonable conclusion is that the arrest of petitioner
without a warrant is not lawful as well.
Petitioner maintains, in a nutshell, that after he was approached by the tanod and
asked to show the contents of his bag, he was simply herded without explanation and
taken to the house of the barangay captain. On their way there, it was Aratas who
carried his bag. He denies ownership over the contraband allegedly found in his bag
and asserts that he saw it for the first time at the barangay captain's house.

Even casting aside petitioner's version and basing the resolution of this case on
the general thrust of the prosecution evidence, the unlawfulness of petitioner's arrest
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 stands out just the same.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides the only
occasions on which a person may be arrested without a warrant, to wit:
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace o cer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from
a penal establishment or place where he is serving nal judgment or
temporarily con ned while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.

xxx xxx xxx

It is obvious that based on the testimonies of the arresting barangay tanod, not
one of these circumstances was obtaining at the time petitioner was arrested. By their
own admission, petitioner was not committing an offense at the time he alighted from
the bus, nor did he appear to be then committing an offense. 2 0 The tanod did not have
probable cause either to justify petitioner's warrantless arrest. cHaICD

For the exception in Section 5 (a), Rule 113 to operate, this Court has ruled that
two (2) elements must be present: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt
act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the
arresting o cer. 2 1 Here, petitioner's act of looking around after getting off the bus
was but natural as he was nding his way to his destination. That he purportedly
attempted to run away as the tanod approached him is irrelevant and cannot by itself
be construed as adequate to charge the tanod with personal knowledge that petitioner
had just engaged in, was actually engaging in or was attempting to engage in criminal
activity. More importantly, petitioner testi ed that he did not run away but in fact spoke
with the barangay tanod when they approached him.
Even taking the prosecution's version generally as the truth, in line with our
assumption from the start, the conclusion will not be any different. It is not
unreasonable to expect that petitioner, walking the street at night, after being closely
observed and then later tailed by three unknown persons, would attempt to ee at their
approach. Flight per se is not synonymous with guilt and must not always be attributed
to one's consciousness of guilt. 2 2 Of persuasion was the Michigan Supreme Court
when it ruled in People v. Shabaz 2 3 that "[f]light alone is not a reliable indicator of guilt
without other circumstances because ight alone is inherently ambiguous." Alone, and
under the circumstances of this case, petitioner's ight lends itself just as easily to an
innocent explanation as it does to a nefarious one.
Moreover, as we pointed out in People v. Tudtud, 2 4 "[t]he phrase 'in his presence'
therein, connot[es] penal knowledge on the part of the arresting o cer. The right of the
accused to be secure against any unreasonable searches on and seizure of his own
body and any deprivation of his liberty being a most basic and fundamental one, the
statute or rule that allows exception to the requirement of a warrant of arrest is strictly
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 construed. Its application cannot be extended beyond the cases speci cally provided
by law." 2 5
Indeed, the supposed acts of petitioner, even assuming that they appeared
dubious, cannot be viewed as su cient to incite suspicion of criminal activity enough
to validate his warrantless arrest. 2 6 If at all, the search most permissible for the tanod
to conduct under the prevailing backdrop of the case was a stop-and-frisk to allay any
suspicion they have been harboring based on petitioner's behavior. However, a stop-
and-frisk situation, following Terry v. Ohio , 2 7 must precede a warrantless arrest, be
limited to the person's outer clothing, and should be grounded upon a genuine reason,
in light of the police o cer's experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the
belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him. 2 8
Accordingly, petitioner's waiver of his right to question his arrest
notwithstanding, the marijuana leaves allegedly taken during the search cannot be
admitted in evidence against him as they were seized during a warrantless search
which was not lawful. 2 9 As we pronounced in People v. Bacla-an —
A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not also mean a
waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal
warrantless arrest . The following searches and seizures are deemed
permissible by jurisprudence: (1) search of moving vehicles (2) seizure in plain
view (3) customs searches (4) waiver or consent searches (5) stop and frisk
situations (Terry Search) and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last
includes a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid
warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if
effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court recognize permissible
warrantless arrests, to wit: (1) arrests in agrante delicto , (2) arrests effected in
hot pursuit, and, (3) arrests of escaped prisoners. 3 0
HTCIcE

When petitioner was arrested without a warrant, he was neither caught in

flagrante delicto committing a crime nor was the arrest effected in hot pursuit. Verily, it
cannot therefore be reasonably argued that the warrantless search conducted on
petitioner was incidental to a lawful arrest.
In its Comment, the O ce of the Solicitor General posits that apart from the
warrantless search being incidental to his lawful arrest, petitioner had consented to the
search. We are not convinced. As we explained in Caballes v. Court of Appeals 3 1 —
Doubtless, the constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and
seizures is a personal right which may be waived. The consent must be
voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal detention and search,
i.e. , the consent is unequivocal, speci c, and intelligently given,
uncontaminated by any duress or coercion . Hence, consent to a search is
not to be lightly inferred, but must be shown by clear and convincing evidence.
The question whether a consent to a search was in fact voluntary is a question of
fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances. Relevant to this
determination are the following characteristics of the person giving consent and
the environment in which consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2)
whether he was in a public or secluded location; (3) whether he objected to the
search or passively looked on; (4) the education and intelligence of the defendant;
(5) the presence of coercive police procedures; (6) the defendant's belief that no
incriminating evidence will be found; (7) the nature of the police questioning; (8)
the environment in which the questioning took place; and (9) the possibly
vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting. It is the State which has the
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 burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary consent
was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given. 3 2

In the case at bar, following the theory of the prosecution — albeit based on
con icting testimonies on when petitioner's bag was actually opened, it is apparent
that petitioner was already under the coercive control of the public o cials who had
custody of him when the search of his bag was demanded. Moreover, the prosecution
failed to prove any speci c statement as to how the consent was asked and how it was
given, nor the speci c words spoken by petitioner indicating his alleged "consent." Even
granting that petitioner admitted to opening his bag when Ordoño asked to see its
contents, his implied acquiescence, if at all, could not have been more than mere
passive conformity given under coercive or intimidating circumstances and hence, is
considered no consent at all within the contemplation of the constitutional guarantee.
3 3 As a result, petitioner's lack of objection to the search and seizure is not tantamount
to a waiver of his constitutional right or a voluntary submission to the warrantless
search and seizure. 3 4
III.
Notably, the inadmissibility in evidence of the seized marijuana leaves for being
the fruit of an unlawful search is not the lone cause that militates against the case of
the prosecution. We likewise nd that it has failed to convincingly establish the identity
of the marijuana leaves purportedly taken from petitioner's bag.
In all prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, the following
elements must concur: (1) proof that the transaction took place; and (2) presentation in
court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence. 3 5 The existence of dangerous
drugs is a condition sine qua non for conviction for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs,
it being the very corpus delicti of the crime. 3 6 EHaASD

In a line of cases, we have ruled as fatal to the prosecution's case its failure to
prove that the specimen submitted for laboratory examination was the same one
allegedly seized from the accused. 3 7 There can be no crime of illegal possession of a
prohibited drug when nagging doubts persist on whether the item con scated was the
same specimen examined and established to be the prohibited drug. 3 8 As we
discussed in People v. Orteza , 3 9 where we deemed the prosecution to have failed in
establishing all the elements necessary for conviction of appellant for illegal sale of
shabu —
First, there appears nothing in the record showing that police o cers
complied with the proper procedure in the custody of seized drugs as speci ed in
People v. Lim, i.e., any apprehending team having initial control of said drugs
and/or paraphernalia should, immediately after seizure or con scation, have the
same physically inventoried and photographed in the presence of the accused, if
there be any, and or his representative, who shall be required to sign the copies of
the inventory and be given a copy thereof. The failure of the agents to comply
with the requirement raises doubt whether what was submitted for laboratory
examination and presented in court was actually recovered from appellant. It
negates the presumption that o cial duties have been regularly performed by the
police officers.
In People v. Laxa, where the buy-bust team failed to mark the con scated
marijuana immediately after the apprehension of the accused, the Court held that
the deviation from the standard procedure in anti-narcotics operations produced
doubts as to the origins of the marijuana. Consequently, the Court concluded that
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 the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the corpus delicti.

The Court made a similar ruling in People v. Kimura, where the Narcom
operatives failed to place markings on the seized marijuana at the time the
accused was arrested and to observe the procedure and take custody of the drug.
More recently, in Zarraga v. People , the Court held that the material
inconsistencies with regard to when and where the markings on the shabu were
made and the lack of inventory on the seized drugs created reasonable doubt as
to the identity of the corpus delicti. The Court thus acquitted the accused due to
the prosecution's failure to indubitably show the identity of the shabu.

In the case at bar, after the arrest of petitioner by the barangay tanod, the
records only show that he was taken to the house of the barangay captain and
thereafter to the police station. The Joint A davit 4 0 executed by the tanod merely
states that they con scated the marijuana leaves which they brought to the police
station together with petitioner. Likewise, the Receipt 4 1 issued by the Aringay Police
Station merely acknowledged receipt of the suspected drugs supposedly con scated
from petitioner.
Not only did the three tanod contradict each other on the matter of when
petitioner's bag was opened, they also gave con icting testimony on who actually
opened the same. The prosecution, despite these material inconsistencies, neglected
to explain the discrepancies. Even more damning to its cause was the admission by
Laya, the forensic chemist, that he did not know how the specimen was taken from
petitioner, how it reached the police authorities or whose marking was on the
cellophane wrapping of the marijuana. The non-presentation, without justi able reason,
of the police o cers who conducted the inquest proceedings and marked the seized
drugs, if such was the case, is fatal to the case. Plainly, the prosecution neglected to
establish the crucial link in the chain of custody of the seized marijuana leaves from the
time they were rst allegedly discovered until they were brought for examination by
Laya. TcHCDI

The Court of Appeals found as irrelevant the failure of the prosecution to

establish the chain of custody over the seized marijuana as such "[f]inds prominence
only when the existence of the seized prohibited drug is denied." 4 2 We cannot agree.
To buttress its ratiocination, the appellate court narrowed on petitioner's
testimony that the marijuana was taken from his bag, without taking the statement in
full context. 4 3 Contrary to the Court of Appeals' ndings, although petitioner testi ed
that the marijuana was taken from his bag, he consistently denied ownership thereof. 4 4
Furthermore, it de es logic to require a denial of ownership of the seized drugs before
the principle of chain of custody comes into play.
The onus of proving culpability in criminal indictment falls upon the State. In
conjunction with this, law enforcers and public o cers alike have the corollary duty to
preserve the chain of custody over the seized drugs. The chain of evidence is
constructed by proper exhibit handling, storage, labeling and recording, and must exist
from the time the evidence is found until the time it is offered in evidence. Each person
who takes possession of the specimen is duty-bound to detail how it was cared for,
safeguarded and preserved while in his or her control to prevent alteration or
replacement while in custody. This guarantee of the integrity of the evidence to be used
against an accused goes to the very heart of his fundamental rights.
The presumption of regularity in the performance of o cial duty invoked by the
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 prosecution and relied upon by the courts a quo cannot by itself overcome the
presumption of innocence nor constitute proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 4 5
Among the constitutional rights enjoyed by an accused, the most primordial yet often
disregarded is the presumption of innocence. This elementary principle accords every
accused the right to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proven beyond
reasonable doubt. Thus, the burden of proving the guilt of the accused rests upon the
prosecution. STaAcC

Concededly, the evidence of the defense is weak and uncorroborated.

Nevertheless, this "[c]annot be used to advance the cause of the prosecution as its
evidence must stand or fall on its own weight and cannot be allowed to draw strength
from the weakness of the defense." 4 6 Moreover, where the circumstances are shown
to yield two or more inferences, one inconsistent with the presumption of innocence
and the other compatible with the nding of guilt, the court must acquit the accused for
the reason that the evidence does not satisfy the test of moral certainty and is
inadequate to support a judgment of conviction. 4 7
Drug addiction has been invariably denounced as "an especially vicious crime," 4 8
and "one of the most pernicious evils that has ever crept into our society," 4 9 for those
who become addicted to it "not only slide into the ranks of the living dead, what is
worse, they become a grave menace to the safety of law-abiding members of society,"
5 0 whereas "peddlers of drugs are actually agents of destruction." 5 1 Indeed, the havoc
created by the ruinous effects of prohibited drugs on the moral ber of society cannot
be underscored enough. However, in the rightfully vigorous campaign of the
government to eradicate the hazards of drug use and drug tra cking, it cannot be
permitted to run roughshod over an accused's right to be presumed innocent until
proven to the contrary and neither can it shirk from its corollary obligation to establish
such guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
In this case, the totality of the evidence presented utterly fails to overcome the
presumption of innocence which petitioner enjoys. The failure of the prosecution to
prove all the elements of the offense beyond reasonable doubt must perforce result in
petitioner's exoneration from criminal liability.
IV.
A nal word. We nd it tting to take this occasion to remind the courts to
exercise the highest degree of diligence and prudence in deliberating upon the guilt of
accused persons brought before them, especially in light of the fundamental rights at
stake. Here, we note that the courts a quo neglected to give more serious consideration
to certain material issues in the determination of the merits of the case. We are not
oblivious to the fact that in some instances, law enforcers resort to the practice of
planting evidence to extract information or even harass civilians. Accordingly, courts
are duty-bound to be "[e]xtra vigilant in trying drug cases lest an innocent person be
made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses." 5 2 In the same vein, let
this serve as an admonition to police o cers and public o cials alike to perform their
mandated duties with commitment to the highest degree of diligence, righteousness
and respect for the law.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner
Arsenio Vergara Valdez is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt. The Director of the Bureau
of Corrections is directed to cause the immediate release of petitioner, unless the latter
is being lawfully held for another cause; and to inform the Court of the date of his
release, or the reasons for his continued con nement, within ten (10) days from notice.
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 No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, Carpio, Carpio-Morales and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1. 1987 CONST., Art. III, Sec. 2.

2. People v. Aruta, 351 Phil. 868 (1998).

3. Rollo, pp. 76-89. Penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando, and
concurred in by Associate Justices Rosmari D. Carandang and Monina Arevalo-
Zenarosa.
4. Id. at pp. 28-45. Penned by Executive Judge Clifton U. Ganaya.
5. Entitled Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
6. Id. at 44-45.
7. Records, p. 1.
8. Id.
9. TSN, 24 February 2004, pp. 3-5, 7, 11-12. See also Records, p. 2.
10. TSN, 3 March 2004, p. 11.
11. Id. at 16.
12. TSN, 16 March 2004, pp. 4-7.
13. TSN, 17 March 2004, pp. 3-9.

14. Id. at 10-12, 16-17.

15. Rollo, pp. 44-45.
16. Id. at 87.
17. People v. Bacla-an, 445 Phil. 729, 746 (2003), citing People v. Mendoza, 327 SCRA 695
(2000). See also People v. Sevilla, 394 Phil. 125 (2000).
18. See People v. Bacla-an, 445 Phil. 445 Phil. 729, 748 (2003) citing People v. Lagarto, 326
SCRA 693 (2000) and People v. Nitcha, 240 SCRA 283 (1995). See also People v.
Kimura, G.R. No. 130805, 27 April 2004, 428 SCRA 51.
19. People v. Sarap, 447 Phil. 642 (2003).
20. TSN, 24 February 2004, p. 11; TSN, 3 March 2004, pp. 9, 19.
21. People v. Tudtud, 458 Phil. 752, 775 (2003), citing People v. Chua, G.R. Nos. 136066-67,
4 February 2003, 396 SCRA 657.
22. People v. Lopez, 371 Phil. 852, 862 (1999), citing People v. Bawar, 262 SCRA 325. ADSIaT

23. 424 Mich. 42, 378 N.W. 2d 451 (1985).

24. 458 Phil. 752 (2003).

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 25. Id. at 777.
26. See People v. Mengote, G.R. No. 87059, 22 June 1992, 210 SCRA 174.
27. 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2nd 889 [1968].
28. See People v. Chua, 444 Phil. 757 (2003).

29. See People v. Bacla-an, supra note 16, citing People v. Chua Ho San, 308 SCRA 42
(1999).

30. Id. at 748-749.

31. 424 Phil. 263 (2002).
32. Id. at 286.
33. People v. Tudtud, 458 Phil. 752, 788 (2003), citing People v. Compacion, 414 Phil. 68
(2001).
34. Id.
35. People v. Hajili, 447 Phil. 283, 295 (2003).
36. People v. Almeida, 463 Phil. 637, 648 (2003), citing People v. Mendiola, 235 SCRA 116
(1994). See also People v. Kimura, G.R. No. 130805, 27 April 2004, 428 SCRA 51, 61,
citing People v. Mendiola, supra, People v. Macuto, 176 SCRA 762 (1989), People v.
Vocente, 188 SCRA 100 (1990) and People v. Mariano, 191 SCRA 136 (1990).
37. See People v. Mapa, G.R. No. 91014, 31 March 1993, 220 SCRA 670 (1993), People v.
Dismuke, G.R. No. 108453, 11 July 1994, 234 SCRA 51, People v. Casimiro, 383 SCRA
400 (2002), People v. Pedronan, 452 Phil. 226 (2003), People v. Kimura, G.R. No. 130805,
27 April 2004, 428 SCRA 51, People v. Ong, G.R. No. 137348, 21 June 2004, 432 SCRA
470.
38. See People v. Ong, supra at 488.
39. G.R. No. 173051, 31 July 2007.
40. Records, p. 2.

41. Id. at 5.
42. Rollo, p. 87.
43. Id.
44. TSN, 17 March 2004, pp. 11-13.

45. People v. Sevilla, 394 Phil. 125, 158 (2000), citing People v. Pagaura, 267 SCRA 17
(1997), People v. De los Santos, 314 SCRA 303 (1999).
46. People v. Santos, G.R. No. 175593, 17 October 2007, citing People v. Samson, 421 Phil.
104 (2001).
47. People v. Sapal, 385 Phil. 109, 126 (2000), citing People v. Delos Santos, G.R. No.
126998, 14 September 1999 and People v. Fider, 223 SCRA 117 (1993).
48. Office of the Court Administrator v. Librado, 329 Phil. 432, 435 (1996), citing People v.
Nario, 224 SCRA 647 (1993).
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 49. Id. citing People v. Policarpio, 158 SCRA 85 (1988).
50. Id. at 436, citing People v. Bati, 189 SCRA 95 (1990), citing People v. Lamug, 172 SCRA
349 (1989).

51. Id. citing People v. Policarpio, supra.

52. People v. Sevilla, 394 Phil. 125, 159 (2000), citing People v. Pagaura supra. See also
People v. Sapal, supra.

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