13.

ANTONIO ABACAN v. NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY

GR NO. 140777, Apr 08, 2005

FACTS:

Two opposing factions within respondent Northwestern University, Inc. (NUI), the "Castro" and
the "Nicolas" factions, seek control as the legitimate board thereof. NUI, through Roy A. Nicolas
of the "Nicolas faction," filed a complaint before the RTC of Laoag, for damages with application
for attachment against petitioners together with the employees of NUI belonging to the "Castro
faction”. NUI claims that between defendants acting together, and helping one another, with herein
petitioners taking undue and unlawful advantage of their respective positions in Metrobank,
withdrew and released to themselves, for their own personal gain and benefit, corporate funds of
NUI in the sum of P1.4 M without the knowledge, consent or approval of NUI to the grave and
serious damage and prejudice of the latter. NUI also claims that defendants have not accounted for
the said amount despite several demands for them to do so. Petitioner Palanca filed a motion to
dismiss alleging that the complaint fails to state a cause of action against her since she is not a real
party in interest. RTC denied the motion and ordered them to file their answer. Instead of filing
their answers or a motion for reconsideration of the said Order, herein petitioners went to the CA
on a petition for certiorari and prohibition raising the same issues.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the complaint states a cause of action?

HELD:

YES.
It is settled that the existence of a cause of action is determined by the allegations in the
complaint. In resolving a motion to dismiss based on the failure to state a cause of action, only
the facts alleged in the complaint must be considered. The test is whether the court can render a
valid judgment on the complaint based on the facts alleged and the prayer asked for. Indeed, the
elementary test for failure to state a cause of action is whether the complaint alleges facts which
if true would justify the relief demanded. Only ultimate facts and not legal conclusions or
evidentiary facts, which should not be alleged in the complaint in the first place, are considered
for purposes of applying the test. It is clear that a cause of action is present in the complaint
filed a quo. NUI has specifically alleged an act, that is, the undue withdrawal of funds from its
account with Metrobank, which the petitioners and the other defendants committed, to the
prejudice of NUI's rights.

14.

G.R. No. 143088 January 24, 2006

PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., MANOLO AQUINO, JORGE MA. CUI, JR. and
PATRICIA CHIONG, Petitioners,
vs.
FLIGHT ATTENDANTS AND STEWARDS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES
(FASAP) and LEONARDO BHAGWANI

FACTS:

FASAP and Leonardo Bhagwani filed a complaint for unfair labor practice, illegal suspension
and illegal dismissal against petitioners before the Labor Arbiter of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC). The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision holding that PAL committed unfair
labor practice and illegal dismissal of Bhagwani and, consequently, ordered the payment of
damages. The NLRC later modified the decision by setting aside the finding that PAL was guilty
of unfair labor practice, but affirming the rest of the decision. When petitioners filed a petition
for certiorari against the decision with the Court of Appeals, it was accompanied by a
Certification of Non-Forum Shopping executed by Cesar R. Lamberte and Susan Del Carmen,
respectively, who are not parties to the case. The certification, however, was without proof that
the two affiants had authority to sign in behalf of petitioners. As a result, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the case for failure to show the authority of affiants to sign for PAL and for failure of
the other petitioners to join in the execution of the certification.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT THE CERTIFICATION OF NON FORUM SHOPPING IS VALID?

HELD:

NO.
The necessity for a certification of non-forum shopping in filing petitions for certiorari is found
in Rule 65, Section 1, in relation to Rule 46, Section 3 of the Rules of Court. These provisions
require it to be executed by the corresponding petitioner or petitioners. As no distinction is made
as to which party must execute the certificate, this requirement is made to apply to both natural
and juridical entities.1 When the petitioner is a corporation, the certification should be executed
by a natural person. Furthermore, not just any person can be called upon to execute the
certification, although such a person may have personal knowledge of the facts to be attested to.
Thus, only individuals vested with authority by a valid board resolution may sign the certificate
of non-forum shopping in behalf of a corporation. In addition, the Court has required that proof
of said authority must be attached. Failure to provide a certificate of non-forum shopping is
sufficient ground to dismiss the petition. Likewise, the petition is subject to dismissal if a
certification was submitted unaccompanied by proof of the signatory’s authority. The petition
filed with the Court of Appeals had a certification of non-forum shopping executed by Cesar R.
Lamberte and Susan Del Carmen. The certification, however, was without proof of authority to
sign. When a motion for reconsideration was filed, a Secretary’s Certificate was submitted as
proof that the board of directors of PAL had authorized the two to execute the certificate.
Nonetheless, the Court finds that this belated submission is an insufficient compliance with the
certification requirement.
15.

G.R. Nos. 142286-87. April 15, 2005

KOREA EXCHANGE BANK, Petitioners,

vs.
HON. ROGELIO C. GONZALES, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 50 of the
Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, PHI-HAN DEVELOPMENT, INC., LOURDES DE
MESA MENDOZA, MENELEO MENDOZA, ANTUSA DE MESA MAGNO,
FRANCISCO MAGNO, TEODORO DE MESA, FIRMO DE MESA and MERCEDES DE
MESA, Respondents.

FACTS:

The petitioner avers that the respondents are guilty of forum shopping because they sought to
recover US$160,000.00 by way of set-off in their counterclaims in Civil Case No. G-3119,
pending in Branch 50 of the RTC of Guagua, Pampanga, the same amount they sought to recover
in their complaint in Civil Case No. G-3012 pending in Branch 49 of the said court. The
petitioner asserts that the respondents also sought to recover ₱500,000.00 in moral damages, and
₱500,000.00 as exemplary damages in Civil Case No. G-3012, which are the same amounts the
respondents sought to collect from the petitioner in their counterclaims in Civil Case No. G-
3119. The petitioner notes that although the respondents alleged set-off of the US$160,000.00 in
their special and affirmative defenses, they, however, repleaded and incorporated, by way of
reference, the said allegations in their counterclaims for moral and exemplary damages and
attorney’s fees; hence, the claim of set-off or compensation of the respondents was a
counterclaim. The respondents were, thus, mandated to append a certificate of non-forum
shopping to their counterclaims as mandated by Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, but
failed to do so. The petitioner avers that there is identity of causes of action, issues and reliefs
prayed for in the complaint of the respondents in Civil Case No. G-3012, and their counterclaims
for set-off or compensation of the US$160,000.00, moral damages of ₱500,000.00 and
₱500,000.00 as exemplary damages in Civil Case No. G-3119. As such, the petitioner insists that
the respondents were guilty of forum shopping, for which reason their complaint in Civil Case
No. G-3012 should be dismissed.

The respondents, for their part, refute the contentions of the petitioner and maintain that their
claim for set-off or compensation33 in Civil Case No. G-3119 is a counterclaim but is compulsory
in nature; hence, there was no need for them to append a certificate of non-forum shopping. The
respondents also allege that the petitioner itself is guilty of forum shopping because instead of
filing counterclaims against them in Civil Case No. G-3012, it filed a complaint for reformation
of the real estate mortgage and for the collection of US$500,000.00 and, in case of refusal or
failure of the respondents to pay the said amount of US$500,000.00 for the judicial foreclosure
of the real estate mortgage, docketed as Civil Case No. G-3119. The respondents assert that, by
praying for the dismissal of their complaint in Civil Case No. G-3012 and their counterclaims in
Civil Case No. G-3119, the petitioner could win in both instances without due process of law.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the set off is a compulsory counterclaim?
2. Whther or not there is forum shopping?

HELD:
1.
A counterclaim, as now used and understood, includes both set-off and recoupment and is
broader than both; it includes equitable demands and secures to the defendant full relief which is
a separate action at law and would have secured him on the same state of facts being
substantially a cross-action by the defendant against the plaintiff. We do not agree with the
contention of the respondents that their counterclaims are compulsory in nature.As correctly held
by the CA, the counterclaim of the respondents for moral and exemplary damages against the
petitioner is permissive. So is the respondents’ claim of a set-off or compensation of the
US$160,000.00 which they sought in Civil Case No. G-3012 against the US$500,000.00 claimed
by the petitioner against the respondents in Civil Case No. G-3119

2.
There is forum shopping where a litigant sues the same party against whom another action or
actions for the alleged violation of the same right and the enforcement of the same relief is/are
still pending. The defense of litis pendentia in one case is a bar to the other/others; and, a final
judgment is one that would constitute res judicata and thus would cause the dismissal of the rest.
Absolute identity of parties is not required. It is enough that there is substantial identity of
parties.42 It is enough that the party against whom the estoppel is set up is actually a party to the
former case.43 There is identity of causes of action if the same evidence will sustain the second
action. The principle applies even if the relief sought in the two cases may be different.44 Forum
shopping consists of filing multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action,
either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. In this
case, in interposing their counterclaim for set-off of the US$160,000.00 against their loan of
US$500,000.00 in Civil Case No. G-3119, as well as the counterclaims for ₱500,000.00 as moral
damages, and ₱500,000.00 as exemplary damages, the respondents thereby engaged in forum
shopping

16.

G.R. No. 153171 May 4, 2006

SPOUSES RODOLFO CARPIO and REMEDIOS ORENDAIN, Petitioners,

vs.
RURAL BANK OF STO. TOMAS (BATANGAS), INC., Respondent

FACTS:
Spouses Carpio filed a complaint for annulment of foreclosure sale and damages before RTC
Against Respondent. Petitioners alleged that the sale was conducted without proper publication
as the sheriff’s notice of sale was published in a newspaper which is not of general circulation.
On the same day the property was sold, the sheriff issued a certificate of sale in favor of
respondent bank. Respondent bank filed its Answer with Counterclaim. petitioners filed a motion
to dismiss the counterclaim on the ground that respondent bank’s counterclaim was not
accompanied by a certification against forum shopping. Respondent bank filed an opposition to
the motion, contending that its counterclaim, which is compulsory in nature, is not a complaint or
initiatory pleading that requires a certification against forum shopping.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Certificate of non forum shopping is reuired to the case at bar?

HELD:

NO.

Petitioners contend that the trial court and the Court of Appeals gravely abused their discretion in
not dismissing respondent bank’s counterclaim for lack of a certification against forum shopping.

Petitioners’ contention is utterly baseless. It bears stressing that the Rule distinctly provides that
the required certification against forum shopping is intended to cover an "initiatory pleading,"
meaning an "incipient application of a party asserting a claim for relief."6 Certainly, respondent
bank’s Answer with Counterclaim is a responsive pleading, filed merely to counter petitioners’
complaint that initiates the civil action. In other words, the rule requiring such certification does
not contemplate a defendant’s/respondent’s claim for relief that is derived only from, or is
necessarily connected with, the main action or complaint. In fact, upon failure by the plaintiff to
comply with such requirement, Section 5, quoted above, directs the "dismissal of the case
without prejudice," not the dismissal of respondent’s counterclaim.

17. Remelita Robinson vs. Celita Miralles,

G.R. No. 163584, December 12, 2006

Facts:

Celita Miralles filed with RTC Paranaque City a complaint for sum of money against petitioner.
The sheriff went to effect the summons. However, the security guard, assigned at the gate of the
subdivision where Robinson lived, refuse to let the sheriff go inside the subdivision. The security
guard alleged that he was instructed by Robinson not to let anybody proceed to her house if she
is not around. Despite the sheriff's explanation, the guard still refused admittance. The sheriff
returned the second time to serve the summons. The same thing happened. So, the sheriff served
the summons by leaving a copy thereof together with the copy of the complaint to the security
guard by the name of A.H. Geroche, who refused to affix his signature on the original copy
thereof, so he will be the one to give the same to the defendant.

Eventually, Robinson was declared in default and judgment was rendered ordering her to pay
US$20,054.00. A copy of the decision was sent to her by registered mail. She filed a petition for
relief from the judgment by default. She claimed that summons was improperly served upon her,
thus, the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over her and that all its proceedings are void. She
contends that the service of summons upon the subdivision security guard is not in compliance
with Section 7, Rule 14 since he is not related to her or staying at her residence. Moreover, he is
not duly authorized to receive summons for the residents of the village. Hence, the substituted
service of summons is not valid and that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over her
person.

Issue:

Whether or not a substituted service of summons upon petitioner has been validly effected?

Held:

Yes. We have ruled that the statutory requirements of substituted service must be followed
strictly, faithfully, and fully and any substituted service other than that authorized by the Rules
is considered ineffective. However, we frown upon an overly strict application of the Rules. It is
the spirit, rather than the letter of the procedural rules, that governs.

In his Return, Sheriff Potente declared that he was refused entry by the security guard in Alabang
Hills twice. The latter informed him that petitioner prohibits him from allowing anybody to
proceed to her residence whenever she is out. Obviously, it was impossible for the sheriff to
effect personal or substituted service of summons upon petitioner. We note that she failed to
controvert the sheriff’s declaration. Nor did she deny having received the summons through the
security guard. Considering her strict instruction to the security guard, she must bear its
consequences. Thus, we agree with the trial court that summons has been properly served upon
petitioner and that it has acquired jurisdiction over her.

18.

G.R. No. 172242 August 14, 2007

PERKIN ELMER SINGAPORE PTE LTD., Petitioner,

vs.
DAKILA TRADING CORPORATION, Respondent.

FACTS:
Petitioner contends that Civil Case No. MC99-605 involves an action for collection of sum of
money and damages arising from the alleged breach of the Distribution Agreement. The action is
one in personam, or an action against a person based on his personal liability; and for the court a
quo to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner, personal service of summons, and
not extraterritorial service of summons, must be made within the state even if the petitioner is a
non-resident. Petitioner avers that extraterritorial service of summons stated under Section 15,
Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, is only proper in in rem and quasi in rem
cases; thus, resort to an extraterritorial service of summons in the case at bar was erroneous.
Petitioner asseverates that the allegations in the respondent’s Amended Complaint that the
petitioner has personal properties within the Philippines does not make the present case one that
relates to, or the subject of which is, property within the Philippines warranting the
extraterritorial service of summons under Section 15, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure. Petitioner states that for an action to be considered as one that relates to, or the
subject of which is, property within the Philippines, the main subject matter of the action must be
the property within the Philippines itself, and such was not the situation in this case.

ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT RTC ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF THE
PETITIONER?

HELD:
NO.
Respondent’s allegation in its Amended Complaint that petitioner had personal property within
the Philippines in the form of shares of stock in PEIP does not convert Civil Case No. MC99-605
from an action in personam to one quasi in rem, so as to qualify said case under the fourth
instance mentioned in Section 15, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure wherein
extraterritorial service of summons upon the petitioner would have been valid. It is worthy to
note that what is required under the aforesaid provision of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure
is not a mere allegation of the existence of personal property belonging to the non-resident
defendant within the Philippines but, more precisely, that the non-resident defendant’s personal
property located within the Philippines must have been actually attached. As a rule, even if the
service of summons upon the defendant or respondent in a civil case is defective, the court can
still acquire jurisdiction over his person when he voluntary appears in court or submits himself to
its authority. Nonetheless, voluntary appearance, as a mode of acquiring jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant, is likewise inapplicable in this case.

19.
CESAR VS RICAFORT-BAUTISTA
GR 136415 Oct 31, 2006

Facts:
Private respondent Specified Material Corp filed a complaint for collection of sum of money
against petitioner due to the latter’s failure to pay the construction materials it purportedly
purchased under a credit line from Specified. After Cezar failed to show up in meetings for
verification of documents, Specified sent a final demand letter and later on filed the complaint.
Sheriff Marquez served the summons to Robles, an alleged employee of Cezar. As Cezar failed
to answer the complaint, the respondent judge declared him in default. Specified filed an
amended complaint, raising the obligation to P2,005,000, a copy of the which was personally
received by Cezar. Cezar, by way of special appearance, filed a motion to set aside decision
arguing that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over his person. He claims that the person
who allegedly received the summons on his behalf, and who was identified in the sheriff's return
as Arsenio Robles, was not his employee. He adds that when he conducted an inquiry, he found
out that Robles was a native of Batangas and was merely peddling mango seedlings within the
vicinity of his office when the summons was served.
Issue:
W/N RTC acquired jurisdiction?

Held:
Yes. A court can acquire jurisdiction over the defendant or respondent either through service of
summons or voluntary appearance. The service of summons is intended to give official notice to
the defendant or respondent that an action had been commenced against it.
Whenever practicable, summons must be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in
person and he refuses to receive and sign it, by tendering the summons to him.
It is only when the defendant cannot be served personally within a reasonable time that a
substituted service may be made. Impossibility of prompt service should be shown by stating the
efforts made to find the defendant personally and the fact that such efforts failed in the proof
service. In the case, the sheriff’s return is patently defective for failure to state impossibility of
personal service. However, the defect in service was cured and the RTC acquired
jurisdiction by virtue of Cezar’s voluntary through his motion for re-setting the court’s
hearing on the motion for execution. An appearance in whatever form without expressly
objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person, is a submission to the jurisdiction of the
court over the person of the defendant or respondent. A voluntary appearance is a waiver of the
necessity of a formal notice. The defendant may appear by presenting a motion, for example, and
unless by such appearance he specifically objects to the jurisdiction of the court, he thereby gives
his assent to the jurisdiction of the court over his person
20.

G.R. No. 160895 October 30, 2006

JOSE R. MARTINEZ, petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS:
Petitioner Jose R. Martinez filed a petition for the registration in his name of three (3) parcels of
land. The lots collectively comprised around 3,700 square meters. It was claimed that Martinez
had remained in continuous possession of the lots; that the lots had remained unencumbered; and
that they became private property through prescription. The Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) was furnished a copy of the petition. The trial court set the case for hearing and directed
the publication of the corresponding Notice of Hearing in the Official Gazette. OSG, in behalf of
the Republic of the Philippines, opposed the petition on the grounds that appellee’s possession
was not in accordance with law. Despite the opposition filed by the OSG, the RTC issued an
order of general default, even against the Republic of the Philippines. This ensued when during
the hearing of even date, no party appeared before the Court to oppose Martinez’s petition. The
RTC thus decreed the registration of the three (3) lots in the name of Martinez. OSG appealed
the Decision. The CA granted the motion of the OSG nd reversed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the OSG could still have appealed the RTC decision after it had been declared
defult?

HELD:
YES.
The juridical utility of a declaration of default cannot be disputed. By forgoing the need for
adversarial proceedings, it affords the opportunity for the speedy resolution of cases even as it
penalizes parties who fail to give regard or obedience to the judicial processes.

We hold that a defendant party declared in default retains the right to appeal from the judgment
by default on the ground that the plaintiff failed to prove the material allegations of the
complaint, or that the decision is contrary to law, even without need of the prior filing of a
motion to set aside the order of default. We reaffirm that the Lim Toco doctrine, denying such
right to appeal unless the order of default has been set aside, was no longer controlling in this
jurisdiction upon the effectivity of the 1964 Rules of Court, and up to this day.

21.
PINGA vs SANTIAGO
G.R. No. 170354 June 30, 2006

FACTS:

Petitioner Eduardo Pinga was named as one of two defendants in a complaint for injunction filed
by respondent .The Complaint alleged that petitioner and co-defendant Vicente Saavedra had
been unlawfully entering the coco lands of the respondent, cutting wood and bamboos and
harvesting the fruits of the coconut trees.

Petitioner and his co-defendant disputed respondents' ownership of the properties in question,
asserting that petitioner's father, from whom defendants derived their interest in the properties,
had been in possession thereof since the 1930s. They alleged that as far back as 1968,
respondents had already been ordered ejected from the properties after a complaint for forcible
entry was filed by the heirs of Edmundo Pinga.

Respondents, as plaintiffs, had failed to present their evidence and failed to prosecute the case
for an unreasonable length of time. On that ground, the complaint was dismissed. At the same
time, the RTC allowed defendants "to present their evidence ex-parte."

Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration and prayed that the entire action be dismissed
and petitioner be disallowed from presenting evidence ex-parte. Respondents claimed that the
order of the RTC allowing petitioner to present evidence ex-parte was not in accord with
established jurisprudence. They cited cases, particularly City of Manila v. Ruymann and
Domingo v. Santos, which noted those instances in which a counterclaim could not remain
pending for independent adjudication.
ISSUE: Whether the dismissal of the complaint necessarily carries the dismissal of the
compulsory counterclaim.

HELD:

The constitutional faculty of the Court to promulgate rules of practice and procedure necessarily
carries the power to overturn judicial precedents on points of remedial law through the
amendment of the Rules of Court. One of the notable changes introduced in the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure is the explicit proviso that if a complaint is dismissed due to fault of the plaintiff,
such dismissal is "without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in
the same or in a separate action." The innovation was instituted in spite of previous jurisprudence
holding that the fact of the dismissal of the complaint was sufficient to justify the dismissal as
well of the compulsory counterclaim.

In granting this petition, the Court recognizes that the former jurisprudential rule can no longer
stand in light of Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

We hold that under Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the dismissal of the
complaint due to the fault of plaintiff does not necessarily carry with it the dismissal of the
counterclaim, compulsory or otherwise. In fact, the dismissal of the complaint is without
prejudice to the right of defendants to prosecute the counterclaim.

The doctrine that the complaint may not be dismissed if the counterclaim cannot be
independently adjudicated is not available to, and was not intended for the benefit of, a plaintiff
who prevents or delays the prosecution of his own complaint.

22.

G.R. No. 149908 May 27, 2004

UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK, petitioner,

vs.
MIGUEL "MIKE" MAGPAYO, respondent.

FACTS:
Respondent filed a complaint against petitioner with the RTC, Branch 257, for reimbursement of
a sum of money and consequent damages. After petitioner’s answer was filed, pre-trial was set
on. When the case was called, only the respondent’s counsel was present. Asked if he had a
special power of attorney, counsel replied that he had, but he left it in the office. Hence, the
petitioner moved to declare the respondent non-suited. Accordingly, the trial court issued an
Order of Dismissal for failure to prosecute. They appealed.and the order of dismissal by the trial
court was reversed.
Petitioner argues that it is mandatory for both the party and his counsel to be present at the pre-
trial. The severity of the consequence for its non-compliance is evident as the Rules of Court
states that it shall be a cause for dismissal of the action with prejudice unless otherwise ordered
by the court.13 Petitioner contends that the respondent failed to appear for no valid cause.

ISSUE:
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS’ REVERSAL OF THE TRIAL COURT’S
DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT FOR RESPONDENT’S FAILURE TO APPEAR
DURING PRE-TRIAL AND HIS COUNSEL’S FAILURE TO PRODUCE A SPECIAL
POWER [OF] ATTORNEY WAS IN ACCORD WITH THE RULES OF COURT AND
APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE?

HELD:

Prior to the 1997 Rules of Court, a representative was allowed to establish the authority needed
by showing either a written special power of attorney or by competent evidence other than the
self-serving assertions of the representative.23 Noteworthy is the fact that Section 4, Rule 18 of
the 1997 Rules of Court is a new provision; and requires nothing less than that the representative
should appear in a party’s behalf fully authorized in writing to enter into an amicable settlement,
to submit to alternative modes of dispute resolution, and to enter into stipulations of facts and of
documents.

To uphold respondent’s position would be a setback to the improvement of the old rules which
the new provision wishes to make. It defeats the purpose of the new provision, and is no better
than the situation where the counsel appeared at the pre-trial alone and assured the court that he
had authority verbally given by the party.24 The rules now require the special power of attorney
be in writing because the courts can neither second-guess the specific powers given to the
representative, nor can the courts assume that all the powers specified in Section 4 of Rule 18 are
granted by the party to his representative.

With this case, we reiterate the importance of the pre-trial. It cannot be taken for granted. It is not
a mere technicality in court proceedings. For it serves a vital objective: the simplification,
abbreviation and expedition of the trial, if not indeed its dispensation.

23. G.R. Nos. 169131-32 January 20, 2006

LULLETE S. KO and ARLETTE SIMPLICIANO BASILIO, Petitioners,

vs.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Laoag Branch, and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
ILOCOS NORTE, Respondents.

FACTS:

The case stemmed from an action filed by petitioners in the trial court for Annulment of
Mortgage, Extra-judicial Foreclosure Sale, Annulment of Transfer Certificate of Title and Deed
of Sale with a Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Restraining Order. The complaint alleged
that the assailed mortgage and the foreclosure proceedings were null and void since the written
consent of petitioners, as beneficiaries of the mortgaged property, were not secured. Respondent
bank denied the claim and alleged that in the execution of the mortgage, petitioners in fact gave
their consent.

During the course of the proceedings, petitioners and their counsel failed to attend a scheduled
trial. Upon motion of respondent bank, the complaint was dismissed. Petitioners filed a motion
for reconsideration claiming that they have been continuously pursuing negotiations with
respondent bank to purchase back the property and have gained positive results. Respondent
bank countered that from the time the complaint was filed, a period of three years had elapsed
but petitioners failed to prosecute their case, showing lack of interest in the early resolution
thereof. The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN LAW IN DISMISSING

PETITIONERS COMPLAINT ON THE GROUND OF THEIR FAILURE TO APPEAR AT
THE SCHEDULED HEARING ?

HELD:
We find that petitioners erred in filing a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court instead of filing an appeal with the Court of Appeals.

The rule is clear. In order to perfect an appeal all that is required is a pro forma notice of appeal.
Perhaps due to failure to file a notice of appeal within the remaining two days of the appeal
period, petitioners’ counsel instead filed the instant petition. The rules of procedure, however, do
not exist for the convenience of the litigants. These rules are established to provide order to and
enhance the efficiency of our judicial system. They are not to be trifled with lightly or
overlooked by mere expedience of invoking "substantial justice."

Even on the merits, petitioners’ cause must still fail. The trial court dismissed the complaint due
to petitioners and counsel’s apparent lack of interest to prosecute the case. Petitioners’ counsel
argued that their repeated failure to attend the hearing was caused by conflicts in his schedule
and by his lack of knowledge of the trial dates. He also contended that respondent bank and
counsel have been similarly guilty thereof, and that petitioners have informed the court of
ongoing negotiations for the re-purchase of the foreclosed property. Hence, petitioners invoke
liberality and the primordial interest of substantial justice over the strict enforcement of the rules
of technicality.

We are not persuaded. In every action, the plaintiff is duty-bound to prosecute the same with
utmost diligence and with reasonable dispatch to enable him to obtain the relief prayed for and,
at the same time, minimize the clogging of the court dockets. The expeditious disposition of
cases is as much the duty of the plaintiff as the court. It must be remembered that a defendant in
a case likewise has the right to the speedy disposition of the action filed against him7 considering
that any delay in the proceedings entail prolonged anxiety and valuable time wasted.