Presence - How Mindfulness and Meditation Shape Your Brain, Mind, and Life PDF

i
Presence
ii
iii
Presence
HOW MINDFULNESS AND MEDITATION SHAPE
YOUR BRAIN, MIND, AND LIFE
Paul Verhaeghen
1
iv
1
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers
the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education
by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University
Press in the UK and certain other countries.
Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press

198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America.
© Oxford University Press 2017
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in

a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the
prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted
by law, by license, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reproduction
rights organization. Inquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the
above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the
address above.
You must not circulate this work in any other form

and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer.
Library of Congress Cataloging-i n-P ublication Data

Names: Verhaeghen, Paul, author.
Title: Presence : how mindfulness and meditation shape your brain, mind, and life /
Paul Verhaeghen.
Description: 1 Edition. | New York : Oxford University Press, [2017] |
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2016042416 (print) | LCCN 2016055305 (ebook) |
ISBN 9780199395606 (hardcover : alk. paper) | ISBN 9780199395613 (UPDF) |
ISBN 9780199395620 (EPUB)
Subjects: LCSH: Mindfulness (Psychology) | Meditation. | Mind and body. | Brain.
Classification: LCC BF637.M4 V47 2017 (print) |
LCC BF637.M4 (ebook) | DDC 158/.9—dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2016042416
1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2
Printed by Sheridan Books, Inc., United States of America
v
This book is dedicated to you.

May you be happy.
May you be safe.
May you be free from harm.
May you be at ease.
vi
vii
{ CONTENTS }
Preface ix
1. What Is Mindfulness? 1
2. Your Body and Brain on Meditation 17
3. The Meditating Brain in Action: Attention, Body, and Self 39
4. Telltale Traces in the Brain 75
5. From Monkey Mind to Monk’s Mind: Mindfulness Practice

and Attention 95
6. Mindfulness Practice and Well-Being 117
7. Mindfulness as Medicine 145
8. Meditation and Mindfulness: Final Words 159
Notes 175
Bibliography 193
Index 219
viii
ix
{ PREFACE }
This book began with a bottle of orange juice. A big bottle. Half a gallon of
very nice orange juice. Organic, not from concentrate, no pulp.
The intended recipient of said juice was my son, but he no longer wanted
it, preferring, I believe, hot chocolate instead.
This was about the fifth time he had changed his mind in the space of a
minute or so.
So I did what every parent occasionally dreams of doing: I lifted the
bottle—still sealed—h igh above my head, with both hands, and I smashed it
into the kitchen floor with all my might.
The thing exploded.
My son was three years old at the time and so—by all signs and for all
intents and purposes—was I.
It took quite some time to clean up the mess—the oak floor, the walls, the
ceiling, the stove, the kitchen furniture were all soaked. From time to time we
still find two cookbooks joined together by the sticky force of my stupidity.
As one of my favorite writers would say: “So it goes.”
As soon as the bottle left my hands, in the suspended moment of my own
disbelief that I just did that, I of course grasped how very wrong this was, how
utterly senseless, how needless, how selfish, how heedless.
As episodes of domestic violence go, this one was pretty tame. But still.
Standing there in the aftermath, with my wife and son gaping at dumb-
founded me with his beard and glasses dripping with juice, something clicked.
I had just reacted to something that wasn’t true. I had had a flicker of a
thought in my head, and I had followed it through. I had given a mere flicker
of anger a set of black wings, as if I had no say in the matter, as if I had no
freedom.
And, of course, in such moments of frustration, you have no freedom.
I realized two things.
One: I did want freedom. I didn’t want this—I was better than that,
wasn’t I?
And two: I vaguely remembered actually being better that that.
So I promised myself to get back to that time. I promised myself to go back
to meditation.
x
xPreface
I have a checkered past.
I was a Catholic monk for a while, between the ages of 17 and 19—exactly
the age when a fruitless yet profound endeavor like that cuts the deepest.
The vow of poverty notwithstanding, we lived in a rather magnificent 19th-
century house (with a turret, no less) in one of the more quiet, woodsy, opu-
lent outskirts of Brussels.
Part of our training was a 30-day retreat. The retreat was silent, and it
involved all the usual accouterments of Catholic monastic life—morning
chant, Mass, evening chant—plus four to five hours of meditation. And
I loved every second of it. It felt like home. I loved the silence; I loved how it
turned time sticky and sweet; I loved my lonely afternoon walks in the nearby
forest that was just starting to awaken from its winter slumber. Most of all,
I loved what the silence did to my mind—I loved that expansive, lazy concen-
tration, that fluid, softly humming openness, that presence.
Then two things happened. One, I fell in love and, two, I started having
serious doubts about this whole idea of an interventionist god. Neither of
these two developments was very compatible with the monastic lifestyle, and
so off I went, on to a degree in psychology.
In the meantime, I somehow forgot to meditate—this whole love thing,
I suppose, and then a dissertation to work on, and in general a busy life, very
different from the helpful monotony of the cloister.
I have no precise memory of how I stumbled into the contemplative mood
again (a long trip to China was partially to blame); this time it took the form
of Zen, which I first glossed from books and then, a little later (we’re in the
mid-1990s now) practiced with a small group at the college where I landed my
first job, in Syracuse, New York. Take it from me: Knowing how to sit still for
long stretches of time is a great skill to possess in a city that is covered in snow
for about eight months of the year.
Zen fitted me well; it felt like home all over again. But then life collapsed
around me—my then-w ife couldn’t bear the snow and her new life in the
United States and went back to Belgium, and all other sorts of slow minor
social calamities conspired to drop me down into depression. Meditation
intensified my distress rather than still it. So I mostly quit the cushion and
returned to it only sporadically.
Life is different now.
Since the orange juice incident, I have been meditating every single day
(give or take a few). I took care to nurture my practice: I restarted slowly,
building up my meditation sessions from 6 minutes a day to my current
regimen of 30 to 40 minutes a day during the week and a 90-m inute sit on
Sundays. I have learned that it is helpful to have friends on this path.
Meditation has simply become a part of my life. It’s something I do, like
walking the dog, exercising, cooking dinner, or giving our son his evening
xi
Preface xi
bath—a habit that roots me, an organic and natural part of the day, nothing
special.
It also has, as I was hoping for, changed me for the better. Not spectacu-
larly so: I am far from perfect—never was, chances are I will never be. My
budding ability to be more present with whatever is presenting itself makes
me just a little more patient, I find, a little more willing to listen, a bit more
relaxed, and a little more prepared to insert that all-important half-second
pause between thought and action.
This, I find, is a very good recipe for peace and happiness in daily life.
These days, the fashionable term for the meditative experience and its after-
math is mindfulness—a sense of being present in the moment, of observing
whatever is happening rather than getting caught up in it, and doing so with
gentleness and a certain detachment; it is about approaching life with an
openness to whatever arises, dropping all preconceptions.
This is aspirational, of course—it is nearly impossible to actually live a
mindful life all of the time. It’s a near-unattainable ideal. As a consequence,
part of the practice of living mindfully is to learn how to fail with grace: Fail,
get yourself back to a state resembling mindfulness, fail again, get yourself on
track again, and so on. The hope is that ultimately something will come from
this perpetual gently guiding yourself back to where you need to be. (As we
shall see later in this book, it does—this practice of repeated stumbling does
lead to a more lasting habit of mindfulness.)
I discovered that, the more I meditated, the more I found the process itself
fascinating—what is it that is actually happening when you sit down on the
cushion and turn your attention to your breath entering and leaving your
nostrils? I found it equally fascinating to discover what this process gives
birth to: I observed an increasing mental clarity, a more positive outlook on
life, an increased kindness, and, generally, the gradual awakening of a desire
to awaken.
It is one thing to experience this from the inside or to see it happen in
friends; it is another to ask the question what good meditation does in a
more general sense. As an academic, I was naturally interested in what we
can know objectively about this endeavor—what the intrepid researchers
who have invited meditators into their psychological laboratories or inside
their brain scanners have found. As I learned very quickly when probing
PubMed, PsychInfo, and other search engines, there are an unwieldy num-
ber of papers on meditation and mindfulness, how they are implemented
and imprinted in the brain and/or how they impact your mind and your
psychological make-up. Some of that research—l ikely the studies that make
the boldest claims or those with the strongest results—even make it into the
popular press.
xii
xiiPreface
In my experience, this surfeit of findings leaves many practitioners of mind-

fulness a little perplexed. I vividly remember a discussion in one of the groups
I meditate with, in which someone brought up, with a tangible sense of awe,
that she had read that “meditation actually changes your brain!” (You could
hear both the quotation marks and the exclamation point in her voice.) This
didn’t exactly seem like news to me (where else would any repeated behavior
leave its imprints but in the brain?), but it made me realize that it might be
useful for people like her—meditators who are curious to find out what medi-
tation does and how it works but aren’t necessarily able or willing, even if
they had the requisite background, to devote a few hundred hours to finding
and reading the key papers in the field—to have someone (maybe someone
like me) plod through all that literature and make sense of it.
Part of the perplexity of some meditators who are confronted with the
scientific literature stems from the simple fact that scientific articles aren’t
aimed at providing the general public with the most transparent information.
Instead, they are small parts of a highly specialized ongoing exchange between
rarified experts, often couched in near-impenetrable language. Difficulty is
added because a large part of the conversation—the broader background, the
methodological minutiae, the foundational studies—is left unspoken because
it is part of the common history of those rarified experts. Often, the conver-
sation is also cast in adversarial tones—you are explaining to colleague Y
and Z why your work is so much better than that of colleague X—which can
be quite off-putting to outsiders. A number of excellent review papers and a
few excellent meta-analyses (i.e., analyses of analyses; see Chapter 1) can be
found, but those are still cast in specialist language, and they don’t command
the attention in the popular press that a single spectacular study often can.
In sum, it seemed to me that what would help my friend and others like
her would be a book aimed at a general audience that would translate all that
scientific geek language into an accurate, up-to-date but less overwhelming
overview. I should also confess that I very much wanted to read such a book
myself.
The age-old advice to writers, of course, is to “ ‘write what you know.” If

I had taken this advice seriously, I would never have written this book. This
isn’t my field. Most of my scientific work focuses on attention and memory
and how these are affected by the aging process; I have also done some work
on creativity and the positive aspects of stubbornly thinking in circles.
Fortunately, I have never taken the “write what you know” mantra as
an injunction against stepping outside your comfort zone. Rather, I see this
piece of advice as an encouragement to go out in the world, explore, and
actively figure out as much as you can about the thing you want or need to
know, and then report back. (Maybe that is because this is what you do as an
academic: You ask a question and then you set off and discover.)
xiii
Preface xiii
In some ways, I feel that my status as an outsider might even have some
advantages. First, I am not a part of the ongoing conversation, and that allows
me, I hope, to listen to all parties without prejudice. Second, in order to be
able to follow the conversation, I needed to figure out what the unspoken
background knowledge is, what the main threads of the discussion are, and
how these threads interconnect. I hope that this effort helped me in translat-
ing the work done in the psychologists’ and neuroscientists’ labs to the pages
of this book to, ultimately, your mind.
Of course, I do have my own biases and preconceptions, and I should
be clear about those. I am probably positively biased toward this body of
research, first because I am a meditator myself, and, second, because, as a
card-carrying Buddhist, I have been indoctrinated into the idea that medita-
tion and its consequences are an essential part of a fulfilled life. After writing
this book, I am convinced that it would be very hard to argue that meditation
is not a good thing for those who find it an enjoyable practice; it is, however,
clearly not a cure-all or a magic bullet.
I have another bias as well: Like many scientists, I am, philosophically
speaking, a materialist. That is, I see the mind, as most psychologists and neu-
roscientists do, not as an entity separate from the body but rather as an event,
a dynamic experience that springs from the brain. As we often say: The mind
is what the brain does. Many meditators, Buddhist meditators included,1 are,
or behave like, substance dualists: There is mind and there is body; they inter-
act, but they are fundamentally different things.
For me personally, scientific materialist explanations do not detract from
the mystery or the grandeur of things. For instance, noticing how the stories
that I weave about myself drop away as I sink into the relaxation of open
monitoring meditation isn’t any less wonderful now that I know that this is
my posterior cingulate cortex shutting down (we’ll get to that in Chapter 3),
just like witnessing a moon eclipse isn’t any less beautiful or awe-inspiring
knowing that it is just our planet’s satellite passing through our Earth’s
shadow. In many ways, I find the scientific worldview inspiring, even in a
spiritual context. There is great motivation in the realization that the full
extent of my experience originates in those 1,350 or so grams of brain tissue
that connect me to the rest of the world—that it is me and no one else who is
responsible for my actions and their consequences; that it is me and no one
else who will make or break my flourishing as a human being; that it is me
and no one else who is the father of my son, the spouse of my wife, the friend
of my friends; that it is me and only me that is my interface with the world.
For me, the dawning realization that, as a Zen invocation states it, all living
beings are one seamless body, moving swiftly from dark to dark, has given
some welcome urgency to how I lead my life.
That said, the objectivity of the type of studies that I describe in this book
has its drawbacks. The experience of meditating—first-hand—can never be
xiv
xivPreface
fully recovered in the research about meditating, which by necessity operates

from a third-p erson perspective. Reading about meditation is never going to
replace the actual practice.
It is customary to use a book’s preface to offer a few guidelines to potential

readers. Here are mine.
First, this book is not a book on how to meditate. Plenty of excellent books
on the subject exist. Check them out.
Second, this book is not a book on why to meditate. I review the kinds
of effects meditation leads to, but those aren’t the real reasons, I bet, people
meditate. Those reasons, as I have experienced and described already, can
change substantially over a meditator’s lifetime. And sometimes it turns out
that the real reason was something entirely different from what you thought
it was.
In his book Search Inside Yourself, Google’s mindfulness guru Chade-
Meng Tan (he goes by Meng) expresses the hope that one day meditation and
mindfulness might be as self-evident and nonremarkable as exercise is now.
I share Meng’s dream, and, as I mentioned, meditation certainly has that
place in my life. But it would also be silly to meditate just because research
shows that it might improve your well-being and mental health. That motiva-
tion seems hardly sustainable to me. (The exercise analogy works well here.
I like to run, and I notice an increase in the number of fellow joggers in the
streets over the first two weeks of January and then the inevitable decrease to
late December levels as motivation runs thin and the reality of muscle ache
sets in.) For meditation to really fit with your life, you have to find some plea-
sure, some fun (or joy, if you’re looking for a more spiritual term) in it. If you
have given it a fair chance and it doesn’t agree with you, maybe you shouldn’t
torture yourself but find another way to destress that fits you better. I do see
this book as a gentle encouragement, in case you need it. The literature is
there, showing modest effects from this practice on a wide variety of aspects
of the human experience that do matter. That is heartening.
Third, given that this book is on the scientific study of meditation, it isn’t
going to be an easy read. I will do my best to explain concepts in as plain an
English as I can muster, but it might demand a little effort—I will cover a
lot of terrain, and in quite some detail. Note that although I see a particular
order in the chapters, you should feel free to skip, or to skip around.
This book, in sum, is primarily aimed at the curious meditator, seasoned
or beginner. If you’ve ever wondered what actually happens in your brain as
you sit down and focus on the breath flowing in and out of your nostrils, this
is the book for you; if you’ve wondered what kind of psychological afteref-
fects you might expect from quieting down for half an hour a day, this is the
book for you; if you’ve ever wondered if your meditation experiences fit with
other people’s experiences, this is the book for you as well.
xv
Preface xv
Finally, prefaces often end with acknowledgments and thank-yous.

The first, largest, and biggest thank-you goes to all those researchers who
did the actual studies described here. There are hundreds of them, and many
of them toiled in very lonely circumstances way before the concept of mind-
fulness became fashionable. I am merely a translator of their work, and I bow
deeply to their ingenuity and tenacity. Four anonymous reviewers read early
drafts very carefully and made many useful suggestions. I bow in deep grati-
tude to their help, their dedication, and their thoroughness. All remaining
mistakes are entirely my own. Big thanks to my editor at Oxford University
Press, Joan Bossert, and her assistants, Louis Gulino and Lynnee Argabright,
for believing in this project and guiding me along so expertly and elegantly.
In Zen, it is customary to thank your “ancestors”—the countless women
and men, “centuries of enlightened women and men” who have spent their
time “in the still halls.” I would like to name a few of my own recent ances-
tors. Mark Rotsaert was my first meditation teacher; Terry Keenan my first
anchor in Zen; Andrew Quernmore introduced me to Vipassanā medita-
tion. I was lucky enough to receive the precepts from Thích Nhầt Hạnh in
Plum Village in January 2013; I feel very fortunate to have him as my root
teacher. I arrived at his monastery through some chance encounters, first
with Marilyn Hartman, who kindly showed me the way, and then with Pat
Tun, who sternly insisted I go find a community. This book wouldn’t have
existed without Thay Phap Luu’s encouragement to start teaching mindful-
ness. I thank Al Lingo and the Breathing Heart Sangha for deepening my
insights into the true nature of my aspirations. I thank the Insight Meditation
Group in Sandy Springs for being such a strong, solid haven, a true group of
seekers in the dhamma; in particular, I thank Joel Groover for being such
an honest, down-to-earth, and generous non-teacher in wisdom. Thanks go
to everyone at Red Clay Sangha for making Zen such a democratic, real,
and unrobed experience. A retreat with Stephen Batchelor taught me that the
dhamma can be lived in the fullness of the mind as well as the heart. Thanks
also to my amazing teachers at the master’s program in Buddhist Studies at
the University of South-Wales—Nick Swann, Warren Todd, and Sarah Shaw.
A vast amount of thanks go to Monica Halka, who somehow roped me
into teaching mindfulness classes to honors students at Georgia Tech—the
most fulfilling teaching experience I have ever had. Teaching mindfulness
is not sexy (unlike teaching general psychology, with all its flashy demos),
not cool (if anything, it seems to have a decidedly nerdy and/or New Age-ish
aroma to it), and not particularly fashionable either (to our engineering stu-
dents, it doesn’t quite have the cachet that, say, the concept of sustainability
has), but it is truly and utterly real. It is probably fair to state that colleges
tend to place little value on quietness and well-being, and they don’t see an
eye toward the collective good as an important value—instead, we typically
reward ego and brashness, put a macho spin on the stress of the rat race, and
xvi
xviPreface
push our students to combative competitiveness. It has been heart-warming

to observe the opposite in my classes: to see young minds (and often hearts
too) open up over the course of a semester, to feel a sense of community
emerge, and to watch a spirit of freedom develop. My first mindfulness semi-
nar in 2013, including my fruitless search for a good textbook, was exactly
the impetus I needed to start the actual work on this book. Many thanks
too to all my students, who have been incredibly supportive of each other’s
practice. Big thanks also to Holly Rogers and Libby Webb from the Center
for Koru Mindfulness for shaping my mindfulness teaching into something
much more competent.
Finally, great big thanks go to Shelley Aikman, my partner in life and
meditation, my ultimate sounding board and my ever-present life coach.
I bow deeply to her kindness and wisdom, which I can’t believe I am fortu-
nate enough to bask in on a daily basis.
Big thanks to you, reader, as well. Your purported existence was a driv-
ing force behind writing this book. I wish you all the best in your endeavors,
meditative and otherwise.
xvii
Presence
xviii
1
{ 1 }
What Is Mindfulness?
In the spring of 1979, on Day 10 of a two-week meditation retreat,1 the then-

34-year-old Jon Kabat-Zinn, a long-term practitioner of yoga and medita-
tion, had “a vision” (his own words), which lasted for about “10 seconds.”
In that vision, he saw what he later called his “karmic assignment”: a model
for how to share the essence of meditation and yoga practices (an essence he
labeled mindfulness) through hospitals and medical centers and clinics across
the world—”a practical path to liberation from suffering.”
Kabat-Zinn’s 10-second vision was the humble beginning of the mindfulness-
based stress reduction (MBSR) program, implemented first at the Pain Clinic
(now the Center for Mindfulness) at the University of Massachusetts Medical
School. Since 1979, more than 20,000 people have participated in MBSR
programs; the U-Mass database contains more than 480 mindfulness-based
health practitioners; a 2007 government survey found that more than 20 mil-
lion Americans used meditation (often considered to be the tool that leads to
mindfulness) for health reasons; and the mindfulness industry was estimated
to be worth $4.2 billion in 2009 in the United States alone.2 Some—notably
Time Magazine on its January 2014 cover—have called this “the Mindful
Revolution.”3
There are plenty of books on mindfulness too. A casual search on Amazon
brings up titles suitable for every area of life4: Mindful Work, The Mindful
Way through Depression, The Mindful Way through Stress, The Mindful Way
through Anxiety, Mindful Eating (there are at least eight different books with
that title), The Mindful Diet, The Mindful Athlete, The Mindful Therapist, The
Mindful Couple, which—we hope—experiences Mindful Loving (two titles)
and The Joy of Mindful Sex, which results in The Mindful Mom-to-Be, Mindful
Birthing, and Mindful Parenting (at least four titles), during which they can
read their offspring the book Mindful Monkey, Happy Panda. Perhaps my
favorite among those tomes is the Color Me Mindful series—a set of mind-
ful coloring books for adults. It’s not hard to find curious commercial aber-
rations either: One condiment producer sells MindfulMayo® (dairy-free;
2
2Presence
“Dollop, mix and smear your way to spread-happy euphoria”); the Budhagirl
[sic] jewelry line offers mindful glamour (“Turn the routine of getting dressed
in the morning into the ritual of presence”), complete with a scientific expla-
nation for why these bracelets work.
Since 2013, mindfulness aficionados even have their own popular
magazine—Mindful, which comes with a board of advisors that includes
academics from the University of Virginia, Duke University, Penn State, the
University of Wisconsin, and UCLA; the director of executive development
at Google is on this board as well. Since 2010, it even has its own high-i mpact5
scientific journal—Mindfulness—printed by the venerable Springer publish-
ing house. Typing in the keyword “mindfulness” in my university’s library’s
database of scientific articles produced no less than 50,330 hits. (In case you
were wondering—No, I did not read all those papers.)
Big business then, but also serious business.
And, judging from the titles of those books, a concept with wide applica-
bility and a lot of promises.
What is this mindfulness thing? Does it deliver?
What We Are Talking about When We Talk about Mindfulness
Let’s start with the first question: What is mindfulness? The definition of
mindfulness that seems to resonate most within the movement—just typing
in the whole definition into Google resulted in 15,400 hits—is one that Kabat-
Zinn coined, almost in passing, in the first pages of his 1994 book Wherever
You Go, There You Are: Mindfulness is “paying attention in a particular
way: on purpose, in the present moment, and non-judgmentally.”6
Maybe an example will help to show what is meant by this. The author of
that 2014 Time Magazine’s cover story, Kate Pickert, opens her article with a
description of a popular beginner’s mindfulness exercise—how to eat a rai-
sin7 mindfully:
The raisins sitting in my sweaty palm are getting stickier by the min-
ute. They don’t look particularly appealing, but when instructed by my
teacher, I take one in my fingers and examine it. I notice that the raisin’s
skin glistens. Looking closer, I see a small indentation where it once
hung from the vine. Eventually, I place the raisin in my mouth and roll
the wrinkly little shape over and over with my tongue, feeling its tex-
ture. After a while, I push it up against my teeth and slice it open. Then,
finally, I chew—very slowly. I’m eating a raisin. But for the first time in
my life, I’m doing it differently. I’m doing it mindfully.
Ms. Pickert is eating the raisin, and while she does so, she is paying attention
to its visual appearance, its texture, the sensations of its skin bursting open
3
What Is Mindfulness? 3
under the pressure of her teeth, the tiny explosion of taste enveloping her
mouth, the muscle contractions of swallowing, the aromatic lingerings. She
pays attention to this on purpose—unlike most of the time when we snack
and just pop the food into our mouths, she pays attention to every step of
the process, deliberately slowing everything down. She does this in the pres-
ent moment—this is all that fills her awareness—she is not doing anything
else, and she lets no memories of raisins past or hankerings for (or maybe
fears of) raisins future disrupt her communion with only and precisely this
raisin, right here, right now. Finally, she does this nonjudgmentally—she is
not comparing the raisin with any other raisin, or any other food, and she
is not letting herself be swayed by likes or dislikes for the raisin’s appear-
ance, texture, or taste; Ms. Pickert just is with the raisin. Put yourself in her
place. When you are eating a raisin mindfully, there are just two things in the
universe: you and the raisin. Maybe there is just one, actually: you—seeing,
touching, chewing, tasting, swallowing.
In a very simple way, we can define mindfulness as actually being present
in/for whatever it is you are doing, without letting your judging mind (Is this
good or bad? Do I like or dislike this?) interfere. If you are listening to Bach,
just listen to Bach; if you are dancing to Girl Talk, just dance to Girl Talk;
if you are cooking, just cook; if you are sweeping, sweep. To be fully present.
That is mindfulness.
This does not mean that every moment of your life should be lived non-
judgmentally in the present moment. Stuff needs to get done, so you need
to plan; you might want to revisit that fight with your spouse to see how
you can do better next time; and—on a grander scale—social or personal
change isn’t possible without a critical eye filled with wisdom. What mind-
fulness teachers are saying is that it is good to have mindfulness as a tool
in your toolbox, to be used when appropriate or opportune. Part of life’s
wisdom is figuring out—that is judgment, or discernment, right there—
what that appropriate or opportune moment is, and noticing when you
have missed it. And then, nonjudgmentally, remind yourself not to miss it
next time.
A Mindful Mind Is a Happy Mind
Why be mindful?
One simple and smartly selfish answer is that being present in the moment
is associated with happiness, and happiness is one of those things most living
beings are quite interested in. You can see this on a small scale: actually tast-
ing a good piece of chocolate or a nice mouthful of wine, actually getting an
earful of your favorite music, with full concentration, makes you enjoy it (or
maybe even life) even more.
4
4Presence
Let’s widen this up a bit. In a groundbreaking but very simple study, Matt
Killingsworth and Dan Gilbert8 had more than 2,000 people from 83 differ-
ent countries download an app on their iPhones. The app beeped people at
random times during the day, asking them three questions: “How are you
feeling right now?” (on a sliding scale from 0 [very bad] to 100[ very good]),
“What are you doing right now?” (pick one or more from a list of 22 activi-
ties), and “Are you thinking about something other than what you’re cur-
rently doing?” (no; yes, something pleasant; yes, something neutral; yes,
something unpleasant).
A first finding was that, generally speaking and as you would expect, some
activities made people quite happy (in descending order of happiness: mak-
ing love, exercising, talking, listening to music, and taking a walk), while
others not so much (in descending order of unhappiness: sleep or rest—
maybe because the beeps woke you up?—working, being at your home com-
puter, commuting, and grooming). Another finding was that people’s minds
wandered a lot: On average, people were not with the task 47% of the time.
Unexpectedly, the activity people were doing did not have much bearing on
whether their mind wandered or not (the one exception was making love—
people like to be present for that).
Perhaps unsurprisingly, when people were daydreaming, their mind most
often strayed to pleasant topics (42% of the time). You might be tempted to
think they were doing this to escape the unhappiness of their present circum-
stances, but the interesting finding was that people were no happier think-
ing about pleasant topics than they were when they were simply present with
their current activity. And, even more important, how people were feeling
was much more related to their level of mindfulness than to the actual activ-
ity they were supposed to be engaged in. As the authors state it: “People were
less happy when their minds were wandering than when they were not, and
this was true during all activities, including the least enjoyable.” It really feels
better to just be there.
In general, then, a mindful mind—or at least a mind that is present for
the experience it is having—is a happy mind. (Killingsworth and Gilbert—in
what may have been a moment of absent-m indedness—titled their paper with
the negative conclusion: A Wandering Mind Is an Unhappy Mind.)
This paper raises an important question: If a mindful mind is a happy
mind, why aren’t we simply mindful all the time?9 Why do we naturally stray
away from this most rudimentary, uncomplicated form of happiness?
The simple answer is that we don’t know why we do that. In the next chap-
ter, I discuss the finding that our mind, when asked to be at ease, does nothing
of the sort but instead becomes restless and flits from association to associa-
tion. Buddhist teachers call this “monkey mind”—just like a monkey swings
from one branch to the next, lets go, then grabs another branch, lets go again
and grasps for another branch, and so on,10 our minds tend to just go with
5
whatever mental flow is flowing. It’s human. It’s what we do. In fact, we have
a whole network of the brain—the default-mode network—dedicated to just
that: to daydream or mind wander (or, as neuroscientists like to call it, “to
engage in task-unrelated thought,” or—my favorite—“mental time travel”).
But why that is, what deeper evolutionary origins can explain our mental rest-
lessness, is an open question. I would assume—but I don’t know—that part
of our restlessness has helped us, as a species, with survival: We’re forever
pondering our mistakes so we don’t need to repeat them, and we’re forever
wondering what lies behind the next hill, so that we actually get going, out
into the world.
Training Mindfulness
A quick look around you will teach you that people differ greatly in their
ability to be in the moment. Psychologists have called this ability “trait mind-
fulness”11; in the past decade or so, quite a number of questionnaires have
been designed to tap this quality.12Typical questions to measure trait mind-
fulness are: “I watch my feelings without getting lost in them,” “When I take
a shower or bath, I stay alert to the sensations of water on my body,” “I pay
attention to how my emotions affect my thoughts and behavior,” “In difficult
situations, I can pause without immediately reacting,” “I am aware of what
thoughts are passing through my mind,” “When I do things, I get totally
wrapped up in them and don’t think about anything else,” or the opposite
of “I rush through activities without being really attentive to them,” and “I
break or spill things because of being careless, not paying attention, or think-
ing of something else.”13
Kabat-Zinn’s insight was that although mindfulness may be a trait—a
knack that certain people possess and others don’t—it is also very much a skill
that can be learned, and thus taught, and that acquiring it would be very use-
ful in people’s daily life. For Kabat-Zinn “useful” means what Killingsworth
and Gilbert showed—that being mindful can make us happier or, in Kabat-
Zinn’s more Buddhist terms, that mindfulness can relieve suffering; that is, it
can make you feel less stressed, less anxious, less depressed, more open, more
content, more joyful.
This is not a new or original idea. Kabat-Zinn’s work can be read—in
fact he does so himself14—as an adaptation of Buddhist principles and tech-
niques to modern Western concerns. Pickert sees this as a first example of
smart marketing on Kabat-Zinn’s part (we’ll get to the second one in the
next section): He avoids any talk of spirituality, which would be off-putting
to many, but emphasizes that mindful attention is like a muscle—it can be
trained. The goal is not to reach some nirvana but to become a little more
present, a little less stressed, a little happier—a small, modest, gradual form
6
6Presence
of awakening: awakening to what you have been missing, to who you are, and
to what life is all about.
How do you train your mind to do this?
Kabat-Zinn was not naïve; by the time he had his vision, he was exqui-
sitely proficient in quite a number of contemplative techniques. He had been
practicing Zen for 13 years; he was a yoga teacher; he had been director of
the Cambridge Zen Center; he was a teacher-in-training under the Korean
Zen Master Seung Sahn. He had also been extensively trained within the
Theravāda tradition15—he was in fact attending a Theravāda retreat at the
Insight Meditation Society in Barre, Massachusetts, when inspiration struck.
All these traditions rely extensively on meditation as a tool to gain mindful-
ness, and when Kabat-Zinn started to build his own program, he freely bor-
rowed techniques from each of those traditions.
Except for yoga, all of these traditions trace themselves back to the histori-
cal Buddha—teachings that are about 2,500 years old. One of the techniques
the Buddha taught extensively16 was to build a foundation of mindfulness by
becoming aware of, first, the body, in particular the breath and the posture;
second, of sensations and feelings; third, of the current state of awareness;
and, finally, of that what is held in awareness. In the Buddhist tradition, a
steady focus on the breath—merely observing, without intervening, while
suspending both your judgment and your potential urge to conceptualize,
and without reacting to whatever comes up in the mind in the process—has
remained one of the prime teaching tools for basic meditation. Meditation is
the laboratory, so to speak, in which you learn to develop mindfulness, first
by observing it as it occurs (or rather, in the early stages, by observing the
seething of its absence), then by deliberatively cultivating it.
Note that because MBSR and other such programs are derived from
Buddhism, they have also inherited some of the lingo. To meditate is often
called “to sit”; a meditation session itself can be called “a sit.” A meditator is
sometimes called “a yogi.” What you do to foster your mindfulness is often
called “the practice”; this term can also be applied more narrowly, so that
meditating is also called “practicing.” I personally like this concept, because
of its inherent double meaning in English—you practice mindfulness both
like a musician practices the piano (if you’ve been meditating for a while, you
know that there is definitely artistry involved, and no end in sight) and like a
doctor practices medicine (with diligence, aplomb, and selflessness).
Meditation Practices Inspired by Buddhism
Typically, meditation practices that are derived from Buddhist traditions,

at least as taught within the context of mindfulness training programs, fall
into three categories or styles: focused-attention practices, open-monitoring
7
(also called open- awareness, or choiceless- awareness) practices,17 and

the heart practices. All three of these train or incorporate elements of
mindfulness.
In focused-attention meditation, the meditator focuses (or tries to focus) his
mind on a single object, unwaveringly and clearly. Often, especially for begin-
ners, that object is the breath. You concentrate on a region of your body where
it is easy for you to pick up the breath (the nostrils, the chest, the abdomen)
and simply stay with it. This, it turns out, is hard: The mind starts to wander,
sudden itches and twitches and aches pop up and vie for attention, sleepiness
creeps in—all sorts of distraction or dullness appear. When that happens, you
simply notice them and go calmly back to the breath—over and over again,
without judging, without reacting. Sometimes, counting the breath helps—
count each outbreath, up to 10, and then back to 1. If you notice you are
getting distracted, start again at 1. See how far you get. (Not far. Not to 10.)
The goal here is to calm the mind, and to teach it to stay a particular course
for a period of time, thus practicing concentration and sustained attention.
By doing focused-attention meditation you also learn to observe and monitor
the mind, that is, to check for distractions and the absence of distractions. If
all goes well, you ultimately learn to be where you are.
Another popular form of focused-attention meditation is the body scan.18
You go on a mental walk through your body, either head to toe or toe to head,
and take a few seconds to stay with each body part and note the sensations
that are present there—pressure, temperature, vibrations, itches, whatever
the particular body part feels like at that moment.19 The body scan is often an
easier practice for beginners because it is a bit more concrete, and the shift-
ing of attention to different regions of the body gives you something more
concrete to do.
In all forms of focused- attention meditation, distractions, emotions,
memories, or projections will arise. The training consists in meeting those
with calm, patience, and kindness and then returning to the object of
concentration.
In open-monitoring meditation, you open up your awareness to whatever is
present in experience, moment to moment, inside the mind. (In Zen, this is
called “just sitting.”) An open-monitoring meditation typically starts with a
few minutes of focused-attention practice to build concentration and calm;
then you broaden your focus and wait for whatever arises to arise. The main
idea is to make attention become effortless, so that whatever arises—an emo-
tion, the hearing of a sound, a memory, a thought—is simply observed from
a distance, like you would observe a cloud in the sky or a leaf on a stream,
watching it float by without grasping. In some traditions, experiences are
“noted”; that is, a simple label is attached to the moment-to-moment con-
tents of awareness (“itch,” “memory,” “thinking,” “pleasant feeling,” “plan-
ning,” “thinking,” and so on). Along the way, you learn to cultivate “reflexive
8
8Presence
awareness,” that is, awareness that refers back on itself. Your mind bears
witness to your mind.
The heart practices distinguish themselves not by the type of attention that
is being cultivated but by the kind of attitude (toward oneself, toward others,
toward life) they try to foster—an attitude of positivity, of warm approach,
and of interpersonal wisdom. Two flavors have been popular.
The first, in essence a focused-attention practice, is loving-kindness medi-
tation, or metta meditation (metta is the Pali word—Pali is the language of
the earliest surviving Buddhist texts—that is translated as loving-k indness;
it could also be translated as goodwill, benevolence, or befriending). In this
type of meditation, you conjure up a visual image of a series of people, one at
a time, and you stay with each of them for a few minutes. The series typically
starts with yourself, then a friend, then a neutral person (someone you don’t
know very well and have no particular feelings toward, maybe the mailman
or your bus driver?), then a “difficult” person (someone you have a bit of a
hard time with), then an ever-w idening circle of people, ultimately encom-
passing the whole planet.20 As you stay with the mental image of those people,
you repeat phrases of goodwill, directing them toward these people—phrases
like “May you be happy; may you be safe; may you be free from harm; may
you be at ease.” The ultimate goal here is to allow yourself to experience an
open benevolence toward everyone you meet, including those people in your
life you find difficult to deal with.
A second heart practice, based on the Tibetan tradition of lojong21 (which
translates as “mind training”) is compassion training. This is a more ana-
lytical form of meditation—one in which you ponder rather than concen-
trate. Unlike loving-k indness practice, which is simply the same meditation
repeated over and over again until things seep into (and then from) the heart,
compassion training typically takes time, unfolding slowly, step by step. For
instance, one such program, Cognitively Based Compassion Training,22 con-
sists of six modules, each taking a week of guided meditations and reflections,
moving from focused-attention and open-monitoring basics to reflecting on
and cultivating impartiality, gaining appreciation of and affection for oth-
ers, and generating the skill of empathy, to finally start opening the heart for
engaged compassion.
Mindfulness Programs
Kabat-Zinn’s MBSR program 23 stretches over eight weeks, with about three
hours of class time once a week and a silent one-d ay retreat during the
sixth week. Participants learn four “formal” meditation methods: (a) body
scan meditation, (b) sitting meditation (with a mixture of focused-attention
9
and open-monitoring techniques: mindfulness of breath, body, feelings,

thoughts, and emotions, and choiceless awareness, as well as some loving-
kindness meditation), (c) walking meditation (mindful walking with a
focus on the breath, on the sensations in your body as your limbs move,
and/or on the outer world), and (d) gentle yoga exercises to be performed
mindfully. Informal techniques are added to this, including awareness of
pleasant or unpleasant events during the day, awareness of breathing, and
mindful awareness of daily activities (eating mindfully, drinking your cof-
fee mindfully, brushing your teeth mindfully, and so on). Homework is 45
minutes of formal and 15 minutes of informal practice per day, six days
a week. (As we will see later, the reality is slightly different; in practice,
there are fewer contact hours, and participants tend to practice less than
recommended.)
The success of the MBSR endeavor has inspired others to build simi-
lar programs with different emphases or with additions. A very successful
twist is the mindfulness-based cognitive therapy program (MBCT), designed
by Zindel Segal, Mark Williams, and John Teasdale.24 This program, which
fuses MBSR with cognitive therapy, is intended for the treatment of depres-
sion; its explicit goal is to reduce relapse rates. It includes the same formal
techniques as MBSR and adds an emphasis on acceptance, allowing, letting
be, with explicit classes focusing on how you can recognize and let go of the
downward spirals of thought (psychologist call these “rumination”) that
often start or keep depression alive.
Other therapy-oriented mindfulness programs include dialectical behavior
therapy (DBT),25 intended for people living with borderline personality disor-
ders, and acceptance and commitment therapy (ACT).26 These do not include
MBSR’s formal meditation exercises but work on mindfulness in daily life
through the skills of observing, describing, and accepting. ACT explicitly
encourages patients to develop an observing self that remains at a non-
judgmental distance from the thinking and feeling self—seeing your mere
thoughts as mere thoughts and not taking them so personally (i.e., observing
yourself thinking that you are a bad person as opposed to concluding that
you are a bad person).
Finally, note that there is a recent wave of programs (notably the ReSource
Project,27 Compassion Cultivation Training,28 and the aforementioned CBCT)
that have gone beyond traditional approaches to mindfulness to include an
explicit ethical component. These programs are still mostly grounded in a
basic training in mindfulness but have been designed to explicitly promote
the skills of empathy and compassion.
There are, of course, countless other classes, courses, workshops, and self-
help books that have introduced these or similar techniques to an ever widen-
ing audience.
10
10Presence
Does Mindfulness Deliver: How Would We Know?
This brings me to the second question I asked at the beginning of this chap-
ter: “Does mindfulness deliver?”
This is the core question that this book tries to answer, and I will need all
the remaining chapters in the book to do so.
Before I start this journey, I would like to briefly focus on a preparatory
question: How can we find out if mindfulness delivers?
In her Time Magazine article, Pickert mentions a second smart marketing
move on Kabat-Zinn’s part: He started explicitly studying the effects of mind-
fulness on people’s lives, more specifically on stress, psychological symptoms,
and different aspects of well-being. Pickert formulates this perhaps a bit too
much as a deliberate, shrewd move on Kabat-Zinn’s part; to me, the therapeu-
tic and research community that has developed around mindfulness really
seems to be driven by a sincerely felt, natural curiosity to find out what mind-
fulness does and does not do.
Since the time of MBSR’s inception, the scientific research endeavor has
really taken off. There are now literally thousands of papers on how mindful-
ness affects the brain and mind—in a recent review paper, Madhav Goyal
and colleagues29 retrieved an unbelievable 18,753 of those; an equally improb-
able 1,468 of those papers contained actual research (though only 47 of those
met the most rigorous criteria, as we shall see in Chapter 7). The number of
studies is also growing at an incredible clip—in 2006, 121 papers were pub-
lished on the topic of mindfulness; in 2010, that number was 381; in 2012,
there were 672; and in 2014, 1,004.30
This is a lot to read. It is certainly too much to comfortably keep up with.
This glut of studies has created its own problems; the biggest problem for
anyone new to this field—whether observer or participant—is what to read,
that is, where to begin and how to select.
One issue when trying to summarize a literature as vast as this is the pos-
sibility of bias. Researchers often come into this field with preconceived
notions. Maybe they like the idea of mindfulness; maybe they’ve been closet
meditators half their lives and now they finally see the day that meditation
is taken seriously enough for research papers to be published in the highest-
ranking journals. This bias may lead to some partiality, even if they’re not
always aware of it.
The following quote from an interview with Willoughy Britton—one of
the smartest and most successful researchers in this field—illustrates this
conundrum well:
My first ten years of practice, when I was also a researcher, I was in that
bright-faith phase of “Meditation can fix everything! Everybody should
do it!” I wrote a mega-article, the precursor to my dissertation, on all
11
of the neurological and biological concomitants to stress and depres-

sion. And then I cited all of the studies that suggested meditation could
reverse those processes. And I submitted that mega-article to three dif-
ferent journals and it got rejected three times. It finally dawned on me
that I was cherry-picking the data. I wasn’t actually being a scientist or
doing a scientific review; I was writing a persuasive essay.31
This cherry picking also happens in the media. I am keeping my eyes open for
this, and I often see mindfulness studies discussed on mainstream websites
and news aggregators, and the news is invariably positive: Your local news-
paper, the magazines you subscribe to, your news aggregator, the blogs you
read—they all are much more likely to push a study that shows that medita-
tion “works” than a study that shows it doesn’t. This may even just be for
the simple reason that a study that doesn’t pan out doesn’t seem to be so
newsworthy—positive results sell. When you read these sources, you will be
slowly accumulating the impression that mindfulness is a cure-all and the
ultimate route to happiness.32
There are two issues here. One is that these positive results are likely to
stack, or sum, in your head. Imagine two studies. Study A finds that medita-
tion helps you concentrate, but it doesn’t find any changes in stress. Study B
finds that meditation destresses you, but it doesn’t find any changes in your
ability to concentrate. Your favorite website will probably write up the first
study under the headline: “Meditation Helps You Focus” and the second
under the headline “Meditation Is a Mental Spa.” In your mind, meditation
becomes a mental spa that helps you focus—you are stacking or summing the
two findings. But the average of Study A and Study B on the ability to con-
centrate (one positive effect, one null effect) is not that meditation helps you
concentrate—it’s that it “might” help you concentrate, or that it helps “a bit”
with concentration, or, more precisely, that “one out of two studies shows that
it helps with concentration.” The same goes true for stress: One study finds an
effect, the other does not, and the one null finding should temper the enthusi-
asm generated by the one study that does find the effect. The issue is that the
media tend to report only the positive results, not the negative results or the
null result, and this risks creating a bias in the mind of the reader.
A second and related point is that reports in the media are more concerned
with the presence of an effect (“Study X finds that …”) than with the size of
the effect. But in research size does matter. For instance, imagine a study that
finds that meditation does have an effect on stress. (It does, by the way—see
Chapter 5.) But what does that mean? I would suspect that it almost never
means that if you meditate long and hard enough, you will never ever experi-
ence stress in your life. (Even the Dalai Lama, by his own admission,33 feels
anger from time to time.)
Let’s take a step back.
12
12Presence
There are essentially two ways in which the effectiveness of a treatment—

mindfulness training, for instance—can be evaluated: as progress (i.e., do
people feel less stressed out after having gone through MBSR?) and by com-
parison to other treatments or no treatment (e.g., do people who meditate reg-
ularly complain less about stress than people who do not meditate?). We can
quantify this effect in many ways; the statistic psychologists prefer is called
the mean standardized difference. It tells you how many standard deviations
(SDs) separate the two scores. For instance, an effect size of 1 SD for the first
type of comparison (progress) would mean that, after training, the average
participant has moved down one standard deviation on the stress distribu-
tion.34 An effect size of 1 SD for the second measure (comparison with non-
meditators) would mean that the average meditator is one standard deviation
less stressed than all nonmeditators.
If you’ve ever taken statistics, this should mean something to you. If you
have not, do not despair. There are other ways to gauge what a particular
effect size means.
One method is to give a general ballpark estimate of what a given effect
size means. In psychology, the convention is that an effect size of 0.2 SD is
small, 0.5 is medium, 0.8 is large, and 1.3 is very large.35
Another is to benchmark. The effect of aspirin on your risk for myocar-
dial infarction is about 0.0436 SD; the effect of bypass surgery on mortality is
0.15 SD; the effect of drug therapy for arthritis is 0.60 SD; the effect of psy-
chotherapy is 0.85 SD.37 We can compare the effects of mindfulness to these
benchmarks. One very large study of studies on all kinds of psychological,
educational, and behavioral treatments found an average effect size of 0.47
SD (compared to other treatment or no treatment). This latter number may
be a natural benchmark for mindfulness and meditation studies.
A third method, the measure I prefer, is statistical: If the effect size is X,
we know participants are now doing better than Y percent of people. (For
the statistics aficionados, you can read these out from a z score table; the
effect size is the z score, and you look up the area under the curve.) If the
progress effect size for MBSR is 1 SD, this would mean that, after MBSR, the
average participant would be less stressed than 84% of people who haven’t
yet gone through MBSR. In the meditator/nonmeditator comparison, this
would mean that the average meditator would be less stressed than 84% of
nonmeditators.
The reason to discuss effect size is that when researchers say they “find
an effect” or a media outlet mentions that a study found that something
“works”—or words to that effect—they do not mean to say that the effect size
is large. They mean that a result is “statistically significant.” Statistically sig-
nificant is a technical term; it implies that the researchers have followed the
rules of probability theory to make the bet that the results of a study, as they
are, are due to chance less than 5% of the time. Statisticians are more willing
13
to take that bet if the effect size is large (for obvious reasons) or when more
people are enrolled in the study. If you have, say, 20 people in your study, the
results are more likely to be odd than if you have 2,000 participants. (A good
analogy might be political polling. I wouldn’t trust a presidential poll that
used 20 people; 2,000 sounds a lot better.) These odds are calculated using
precise formulas. The upshot is that in very large studies, even small effects
can become significant; in small studies, the effect needs be whoppingly
large (that is not a technical term) to become significant. “Statistically sig-
nificant”—translated in the media as “mindfulness works”—is thus a term
that has a very specific, technical meaning and has little to do with what we
normally mean by the term “significant”—something that is meaningful, or
large, or useful. For meaningful, large, or useful, we need to look at the actual
effect size, which tells us the strength of the effect.
I am forcing all this technical baggage on you for a reason. Looking
at effect sizes is very helpful when it comes to combatting the type of bias
Britton was talking about. To see if mindfulness has an effect on X, Y, or Z,
you could carefully read all relevant papers (good luck with that!), keep track
of all the results, and distill those into a summary. That is what is called a
“subjective” or “narrative” review—basically, you present an overview of a
field in the form of a story. This story will be filtered, by necessity, through
your sensibilities.
The alternative is a “quantitative” or “objective” review, or (the term
I use in this book) a “meta-analysis”—an analysis of analyses. In this type
of review, you use statistics to pool the results from all studies on a particular
topic. Say you want to know what the effect of mindfulness on stress is: You
gather all relevant studies, you calculate the effect size for each of those stud-
ies, and you average across them all, giving larger weight to the larger stud-
ies. If all goes well, anyone who would do the analysis would come to the
exact same final number and thus the exact same final conclusion. (That is
what makes this type of review objective.) You can also pool brain activation
across studies, as we shall see in the next chapter; this allows us to see what
brain regions are activated during meditation across multiple studies.
Focusing on effect sizes, then, kills two birds with one stone.38 First, it
allows us to cut through the unconscious bias we might have when exploring
the vast amount of studies out there. Second, it gives us an indication of how
strong the effects actually are and how they compare to other interventions.
In other words, it tells us not just whether mindfulness delivers but also how
much it delivers.
In consequence, my own bias in this book will be to gravitate toward exist-
ing meta-analyses as objective overviews of specific questions in the field.
Here and there, when no meta-analysis yet exists, I conduct my own.39
The drawback of this method is that it paints effects with a broad
brush: Details of particular studies get lost. Especially in the chapters on the
14
14Presence
effects of meditation on the brain, I add some of the detail back in—there
are lots of studies that have yielded fascinating results using very innova-
tive methods that are simply too interesting to not discuss. In the chapters
on the effects of mindfulness on the mind—attention, well-being, stress, and
psychological problems—my instincts were to stay a little closer to the meta-
analyses and so to use that broader brush.
A final caveat: All the effects reported here (and, in fact, in all research
papers) are effects at the group level. They tell us what to expect for the aver-
age meditator or the average participant in this or that mindfulness curricu-
lum. Your own mileage may, and will, vary. Even if the effect size for stress
would be 1 SD (spoiler alert: it is much smaller than that), that doesn’t mean
that all participants experience the same effect. Some of them might become
much more relaxed than that, some of them only a little bit more, and some
of them might actually be more stressed out. Some of this is due to chance;
sometimes there’s a reason for this. Even a very large effect size cannot guar-
antee a positive outcome for any single participant.
This Book
Now that we know what mindfulness is and have some idea of how we can
glean its effectiveness from the literature, what can you expect from this book?
When I was an undergraduate, way back in the previous century, my pro-
fessors talked about meditation as “altered consciousness”—just like your
consciousness is altered when you are dreaming or after you’ve ingested cer-
tain drugs, meditation is an experience that is different from your usual walk-
ing around in the world. Depending on how you meditate, the outside world
may fade away, for instance; your attention may drift in and out of focus;
your body sense may change; you may even experience your self and your
awareness in a different light. Chapter 2 investigates how meditation, as it
happens in real time, impacts the body and brain. What changes occur in
your physiology as you sit? What goes on inside your brain as you meditate?
Chapter 3 looks more closely at individual studies that investigate how medi-
tation impacts attention, body awareness, and the sense of self as expressed
in the brain.
One very old adage in neuroscience is that what fires together wires
together. That is, if you activate particular brain regions and the connec-
tions between them a lot, chances are that you will craft some lasting changes
in these regions and their connections. Chapter 4 looks at the findings. Are
meditators’ brains wired differently? Do particular regions grow in size? How
long does it take for changes in brain structure to take hold? Do they last?
Chapters 5 through 7 examine how these changes play out in daily life, or
at least as close to daily life as psychological measures typically get. Chapter 5
15
focuses on changes in attention; Chapter 6 discusses changes in stress, sleep,

personality, and well-being; and Chapter 7 gives an overview of mindfulness
as medicine; that is, it examines the effects of mindfulness programs that are
used as therapeutic endeavors, mostly for anxiety, depression, and pain.
Chapter 8 is an attempt at bringing this all to a conclusion and to finally
answer the question: Does mindfulness deliver?
I hope to provide more than a mere catalog of effects. First, I think it is
truly essential to be on the lookout for convergence between different levels of
results—does activation in specific brain regions as it occurs during medita-
tion leave lasting changes in gray or white matter that in turn lead to trans-
formations in behavior and psychology? In my mind, the story that is so often
spun, namely that mindfulness is a valuable life tool, would be all the more
convincing if all of its parts were to fit nicely together. Do they?
Second, the question of how or why mindfulness works is just as vital as
the question of whether it works. (Of course, we need to first establish that
it works before we can bother with the why.) Within MBSR, Kabat-Zinn
talks about the “wise, discerning, embodied, and selfless aspects of aware-
ness itself.”40 This formulation may sound New Age-ish, but it points to two
crucial aspects of a developing meditation practice—the training of basic
awareness, coupled with the flourishing of trait mindfulness. This descrip-
tion also—implicitly but importantly—points away from another possible
explanation, popular in the 1970s, namely that all there is to meditation is a
calming, relaxed, parasympathetic antistress response. The question here—
to be tackled in Chapters 6 and 7—is to what extent we can explain changes
in well-being or psychological symptoms through changes in these two
aspects—increased trait mindfulness and more tightly focused and/or linger-
ing sustained and/or more open attention.
Third, I’d like to point to what is still missing in the story. What is it we do
not know but should? Where are the explanatory gaps? What are the ques-
tions that are open still?
This is quite an agenda. So let’s get started!
16
17
{ 2 }
Your Body and Brain on Meditation
We begin our tour of the effects of mindfulness and meditation with what
actually happens inside you when you sit down to meditate. What is going on,
in real time, inside your body (including, of course, the brain)?
To give the main point away at the beginning: Meditation, as seen through
this lens, is a story of quiet alertness, a state of calm yet watchful investiga-
tion (Jevning and colleagues1 call it somewhat more poshly “a wakeful hypo-
metabolic integrated response”). In this state, worries, plans, thoughts, time,
space, body awareness, and eventually the self—the very experience of who
you are—are allowed to slip away, ultimately revealing a frame of mind in
which the present can either be truly present or fully transcended.2
I examine first (and very briefly) how meditation impacts physiology and
turn to its effects on the brain next. To do so, I need to first briefly discuss
methods—how does one investigate brain function?—and then introduce you
to some brain facts, particularly how the attention networks of the brain are
organized. Next, I share results of a meta-analysis on brain and meditation,
and this leads me to an exploration of three themes: How meditation changes
attention, how it influences body awareness, and how it impacts your sense
of self.
Quieting the Body
Most people would agree that meditation is calming. How does that work?
The basic state of the body—whether you feel excited or calm—is regu-
lated by what is called the autonomic nervous system. This system controls
the visceral functions of the body—for instance, it regulates how fast your
heart beats, the depth and frequency of your breathing, how strongly your
pupils react to changes in lighting, how your sexual arousal fluctuates, the
progress of your digestion, when you blink your eyes, when you swallow the
food you are chewing, or how much to salivate or sweat.
18
18Presence
The system is called autonomic because it typically operates in an invol-

untary way, that is, outside your awareness or your conscious control. (This
is a good thing—imagine you’d have to actually remember to blink your
eyes, to swallow your saliva when you chew gum, or to consciously initiate
each breath.) That doesn’t mean that certain aspects of the system cannot be
hijacked by conscious control—you can certainly slow down your breath-
ing or hold your breath for a while, or you can take a swallow on command,
but most of the time your breathing just happens and you do just the right
amount of swallowing for what you’re chewing. Other parts of this system
are not under your control: Your stomach and guts just churn away, you can’t
directly control your heart rate, and you can’t stop yourself from sweating
when you’re hot or nervous.
The autonomic nervous system comes in two flavors—the sympathetic sys-
tem and the parasympathetic system.
The sympathetic system deals with emergencies. It preps you for fight or
flight by readying the bodily systems that might need to spring into action.
Thus, when something bad happens to you, the sympathetic system increases
your heart rate and your breathing rate and it opens up the bronchioles in
the lungs so that your muscles and brain can receive more oxygen; it will
also release glucose—extra fuel—into the blood stream. At the same time,
it shuts down the bodily systems that aren’t necessary for the fight-or-fl ight
response—they would just sap much-needed energy away from the action.
For instance, in times of excitement, blood flow to the stomach and gut is
largely cut off, so digestion stops. You’ll also try to dump all the extra weight
you can—you might need to make a run for the bathroom.
The parasympathetic system, in contrast, maintains our natural state of
relaxation. It calms the body down and keeps its basic functions going. The
parasympathetic response has been labeled as “rest and digest” or “feed and
breed”: Heart rate and breathing rate slow down, digestion proceeds apace,
and, if you feel amorous, go for it.
These two systems work in opposition: When one is active, the other is
suppressed. You cannot be angry and cool and collected at the same time; it’s
hard to be at peace with yourself while you’re at war with the world.
It will come as no surprise that meditation is primarily an exercise in para-
sympathetic activation. The first thing you do when you meditate is settle
down, often literally in a space of calm—low light, shielded from noise, pleas-
ant smells. You shut out most of the external world and turn to a calming
stimulus, often the breath. This settling down can be nicely seen in a set of
parasympathetic effects.
First, heart and breathing rate slow down. In the four studies I was able to
find that provide actual numbers, heart rate went down from, on average,
70.5 beats per minute before meditation—when the meditators were simply
sitting relaxed and quietly on the cushion—to, on average, 64.7 beats per
19
Your Body and Brain on Meditation 19
minute during actual meditation. Likewise, breathing frequency decreased

from 14.3 breath cycles (one in-breath, one out-breath) per minute to 10.7
cycles per minute. Put differently, during quiet rest, one breath cycle takes
you, on average, 4.2 seconds; during meditation, one breath takes about 5.6
seconds. There is also a tendency to shift from chest breathing to more dia-
phragmic breathing (i.e., belly breathing, or deep breathing).3 The combined
effect of these changes is a decrease in oxygen uptake, as well as a decrease
in carbon dioxide elimination. This is not a reason to worry—this effect is
really small, comparable to what happens during sleep or simple rest.4 In the
one study that reported this, there was a strong negative correlation (r = –.57)
between the number of years of meditation practice and how much breathing
rate slowed down—p eople who have been meditating longer settle more eas-
ily into this state of meditative calm.5
Second, heart rate and breathing rate are synchronized. For instance, Cysarz
and Büssing6 asked five inexperienced meditators to simply rest, perform
mental calculations, or do sitting or walking meditation. There was little
coordination between heart rhythm and breathing frequency during rest or
math but almost perfect synchronization during either form of meditation
(not one on one, of course: There are typically multiple heartbeats per breath).
This is likely a natural byproduct of low breathing frequency—slow breath-
ing makes it easier for the heart to get in synch with the breathing pattern.
Interestingly, one study found that the heart–breath coupling is strongest at a
breathing rate of 10 breaths per minute,7 which, as we just saw, is the average
breathing frequency in meditation. This synchronization is stronger in more
experienced meditators8 and also more regular: For experienced meditators,
a ratio of four or five heartbeats per breath was most common (incidentally,
this is also the synchronization pattern that occurs during deep sleep); inex-
perienced meditators do not show a preference for any specific ratio.9 The end
result of heart–breath synchronization is a pervading sense of calm.
There are other parasympathetic effects as well, such as an increase in gal-
vanic skin resistance, which is a technical term indicating that during medi-
tation you produce less sweat. There is also an increase in slow brain waves
(i.e., alpha waves), also typical of your brain going into relaxation mode.10
When this state of calm and relaxation endures for a while—during a
retreat, for instance—there can be a decreased need for sleep and food. One
study noted a 25% average decrease in sleep duration in participants in a three-
month retreat; the kitchen reported a decrease of one-third in food consump-
tion.11 These changes were particularly conspicuous in those retreatants who
reported periods of very strong concentration and mindfulness. One reason
may be that long-term meditation, as a relaxed, parasympathetic state, takes
over some of the role of non-REM sleep—I’ll say a little more about that in
Chapter 6. Another reason is that long-term, frequent meditation is likely to
lower your metabolic rate, thus reducing your body’s nutritional needs.
20
20Presence
A side note: These results are clear. At the same time, they also create
somewhat of an interpretation problem. Meditation, considered from this
angle, looks a lot like any other form of relaxation. In fact, physiologically,
meditation can look a lot like sleep. Especially in the mid-1970s, this led to
some heated debate, particularly surrounding Transcendental Meditation®.
This debate culminated in a few papers that claim that a considerable por-
tion of time spent on the cushion is simply time spent napping.12 As we shall
see, this claim is quite overblown—there is plenty of evidence that attention
is actively engaged during meditation.
Breath Suspension
Sometimes meditation can lead to physical experiences that are a bit more
unusual. One of these is that during meditation breathing can sometimes sim-
ply stop for a few seconds—called breath suspension. Estimates of the dura-
tion of these episodes of breath suspension vary: The longest period recorded
is 51 seconds13; the average over all eight studies I was able to find was 12
seconds. The remarkable thing about these episodes is that after the period of
suspension breathing simply resumes as if nothing has happened. Typically
when you hold your breath and then allow yourself to breathe again, you
will experience postapneic hyperventilation (better known as gasping for air).
This does not appear to happen during meditation. During breath suspen-
sion, the heart rate slows down further and skin resistance increases. Both of
these are signs of high parasympathetic activity, that is, a strong relaxation
response during the period when the breath halts.14
The estimates regarding how many meditators experience occasional
breath suspensions differ widely, from 1 out of 815 to 9 out of 10.16 Breath sus-
pension might also occur more often during Transcendental Meditation® than
during any other type of meditation.17 Research within the Transcendental
Meditation® tradition shows that suspensions often coincide with what this
tradition calls the experience of “pure consciousness”— “consciousness
awake to itself, without thoughts, without sensory input.”18 We do not know
what the link between breath suspension and these experiences is, but it is
not simply a matter of oxygen deprivation: In one study, control participants
(who were also regular practitioners of Transcendental Meditation®) were
asked to hold their breath, and they did not report such experiences.19
Changes in Body Temperature
Another, much rarer finding20 is of spontaneous changes in body temperature—

feelings of increasing warmth—during meditation. These feelings of warmth
21
(which sadly have so far not been verified by thermometer) are accompanied
by a very slow heart rate (on average, 43 beats/m inute), as well as a very slow
breathing rate (25 seconds or longer per breath). Such very low breathing fre-
quencies in and of themselves are related to the regulation of body tempera-
ture,21 and so the feeling of warmth that sometimes accompanies meditation
might be a purely physiological side effect of very slow breathing.
We are entering the realm of the exotic here, but it bears mention that
there is one Tibetan meditation practice—g-tummo—that is designed to con-
trol “inner energy” and has “psychic heat” as its byproduct. This meditation
technique has captured the imagination of Westerners for quite a while. In
1929, the Franco-Belgian Tibet explorer Alexandra David-Néel22 described
g-tummo practitioners wrapping their naked bodies in wet sheets and gener-
ating steam while meditating. Herbert Benson and colleagues studied Indo-
Tibetan yogis and reported changes in peripheral body temperature (fingers
and toes) of 8.3oC (14oF). They did, however, find no changes in core body
temperature.23
In a more recent attempt to find out what g-tummo is and does, Maria
Kozhevnikov and colleagues24 went directly to the source, a monastery in
eastern Tibet. Conducting his study was no mean feat: The monastery where
they did the testing was located 4,200 meters (14,000 feet) above sea level, and
the room where the monks and nuns were tested was literally freezing.
The monks and nuns explained to the researchers that the g-tummo tech-
nique has two components. The first is a breathing technique, called “the
vase”: The meditator holds her breath and contracts her abdominal and pel-
vic muscles so that the lower belly sticks out like a vase or pot. This can be
done fast and furiously, to generate heat—called “forceful breath”—or it can
be done gently and without strain, to maintain heat—“gentle breath.” The
second component is an accompanying visualization. During forceful breath,
the meditator visualizes a rising flame that starts below her navel and rises up
with each breath to the crown of her head; during gentle breath, she imagines
her whole body being filled with a surging sensation of bliss and heat.
Kozhevnikov asked her monks and nuns to perform both breathing
techniques with or without visualization. It turned out that the only type
of meditation that changed core body temperature was forceful breath with
visualization—a rise from 36.49o C (97.68o F) to 37.60o C (99.68o F). It also
turned out that the nuns and monks who held their breath longer while tens-
ing their muscles had a larger increase in body temperature. Concentration
was important too—meditators who were able to generate stronger beta
brainwaves (a hallmark of concentration) were faster in reaching their maxi-
mum body temperature.
In a second study—and here is the interesting twist—the researchers asked
a group of Westerners to try out these techniques. Eleven participants, well-
versed in either yoga or martial arts, performed the forceful breath technique
22
22Presence
but without the visualization. Their core body temperature increased from
36.38o C (97.48o F) to 37.02 o C (98.64o F). As in the Tibetan monastics, the key
was how long the Western yogis could hold their breath. Unlike the Tibetans,
and perhaps due to the lack of visualization, the Western yogis were not able
to sustain the increase in body temperature for very long.
The conclusion here is that the rise in body temperature generated is
modest and caused by how the yogis controlled their bodies—holding their
breath, tensing their muscles, or both. The more meditative aspect—the
visualization—seems necessary to sustain the concentration needed to keep
the body temperature up.
Although this example is exotic and, after we deconstructed it a bit, far
removed from what is typically considered to be mindfulness, it is also
instructive. A first take-away is that there is nothing mysterious about the
mind–body connection in this example—although we don’t fully understand
the mechanism that regulates body temperature from either muscle tension
or holding the breath, all we need to gain this knowledge is a few carefully
conducted studies. Likewise, there is nothing strange about visualization
or how it works; visualization is simply a very good aid to keep focus and
concentration going, which in turn helps to ensure that the breath-holding/
muscle-tension technique continues to be applied successfully and with the
necessary vigor (or gentleness, depending on the meditation). Again, it would
be easy to run a study to find out.
A second take-away from this, it seems to me, is that there might be good
reasons behind meditation techniques that have survived the centuries. In
the case of g-tummo, the two components—the muscle–breath component
and the imagination—work together for the dual purpose of heating up the
body and sustaining the heat generated. I am not implying here that every
traditional meditation technique should be followed to the letter. What I am
saying is that finding out what these techniques actually consist of, and study-
ing how and why they work, and perhaps then translating or fine-tuning them
for Western audiences, might be a worthwhile enterprise.
How We Look In On the Living Brain in Action
In the first half of the 19th century, a pseudoscience called phrenology was
quite popular. Literally, phrenology means “science of the mind”; in reality it
was the science (to use that word loosely) of bumps on the skull. Phrenologists
considered the mind as a collection of different abilities and faculties, each
located in a particular part of the brain’s outer layer (the cortex). Better-
developed faculties, so it was thought, would take up more brain space; the
cranium would helpfully drape itself around this spot and thus create a bump.
(In case you were wondering: This is simply not true.) A skilled phrenologist
23
would flutter his hands around your skull and give you an instant read-
out of your strengths and weaknesses in departments such as Firmness,
Destructiveness, Combativeness, Amativeness, or Philoprogenitiveness
(i.e., how much you love your children, or, if you don’t have any children,
how much you would love them if you had them). Ambrose Bierce, in his
The Devil’s Dictionary, famously called phrenology “the science of picking the
pocket through the scalp.”
It is only recently that we started being able to peek in on what the liv-
ing brain is doing. This endeavor is called “functional brain imaging”—we
take images (pictures or movies) of the brain as it is functioning (i.e., doing
whatever it is that brains do). There are essentially two ways in which we can
capture such images: By listening in on the electrical activity of neurons or
by following the rush of blood to particular areas of the brain. The two most
common ways of doing so are scalp electroencephalography (EEG; that is,
measuring brainwaves; the first study dates from 1929) and functional mag-
netic resonance imaging (fMRI), or “scanning”, developed in the 1990s.
In EEG studies, participants’ scalps are outfitted with a set of electrodes
(16, 32, 64, or even more), typically set in a sort of swimming cap with wires
coming out of it. The electrodes pick up electrical activity in the brain as it
happens, and researchers look at where these signals are located, what the
frequency of these signals is, and how they change over time. Note that the
brain’s electrical activity measured on the outside of the skull is very weak (on
the order of millivolts) and that whatever signal we are able to pick up origi-
nates from large groups of neurons (thousands of them—all the neurons in
the area below the electrode that have approximately a vertical orientation to
the scalp). One consequence is that we cannot pinpoint the source of the elec-
trical activity exactly. Another consequence is that it typically requires many
repetitions—many research participants repeating the task often—before a
coherent picture emerges. There is simply a lot of noise and not a very strong
signal.
In fMRI studies, participants are slid into the cylindrical tube of an mag-
netic resonance imaging (MRI) scanner. Here is how his works: When neu-
rons have recently fired,25 they need to replete their energy source, and so
blood rushes in to deliver oxygen; this rush of fresh, oxygen-r ich blood is
what the scanner picks up. It does so by using a combination of a powerful
magnetic field (about 50,000 times stronger than the earth’s magnetic field)
and radio waves; the resulting measure is called the blood-oxygenation-level
dependent (BOLD) response. With the fMRI method, we can pinpoint pretty
accurately what brain regions were recently active—the precision is about
1 mm for most research MRI scanners. However, because blood flow is rela-
tively sluggish (the BOLD response peaks about five to six seconds after the
event that provoked it), we cannot measure the timing of that activation as
accurately as we can with EEG.
24
24Presence
Looking In On the Meditating Brain
How can we use these methods to find out how the brain does meditation?
EEG research on meditation has focused mainly on the frequency of
the brainwaves that can be detected (five frequency bands can be distin-
guished: delta, theta, alpha, beta, and gamma, from slowest to fastest) and
the general location of each type of wave. To grossly oversimplify, the main
result from this work is that meditation tends to increase the amplitude26 of
slow waves—theta and alpha mostly—but not much is clear beyond that.27
Such slow waves are often seen when people get drowsy, and so—as I men-
tioned earlier—some scholars have used these reports to claim that meditat-
ing brains simply go into idling mode. Some, especially in the 1970s, have
even gone so far as to state that this work shows that meditators are simply
asleep. Currently, the same neuroscientists, or at least their successors, have
realized that they are not so sure. The reason for this is that we are becoming
increasingly aware that brainwave frequencies are still poorly understood.
Only recently, for instance, have we become aware that alpha activity—often
a sign of drowsiness—can also mean that the brain is actively clamping down
activation in particular brain regions, quieting them down. This makes for a
very different interpretation of the meditative state—instead of dozing off,
meditators might be actively engaged in curbing the many meanderings of the
wandering mind. There is, however, little in the brainwaves themselves that
can help us to tell these two possibilities—drowsy or alert—apart. With the
advent of fMRI research in the 1990s, this particular ambiguity got resolved,
as we will see later. (Spoiler alert: The latter of the two hypotheses is correct.
Meditators are very much awake and active participators in the process.)
In fMRI research, the standard method to find out what brain regions are
responsible for a particular task is called the subtraction method. The brain
is continuously on the go (so much that it hogs about 25% of the body’s energy
supply, even though it accounts for only about 2% of the body’s weight), and
so simply noting what parts are active during a particular task will tell us
little of use—there is always something going on somewhere in the brain. The
subtraction method serves to isolate brain regions that are actually doing the
task we are interested in.
Here is a simple example to illustrate this. Assume that I am interested in
how good you are at controlling your attention, that is, to direct it to where
you want it to go and exclude everything else. A standard test for this is the
so-called Stroop task, named after the person who invented it. In this test,
you are presented with a set of color words (like the word “green”) printed
in a color that is different from what the word says (like the word “green”
printed in red ink). Your task is to say out loud what the ink color is, ignoring
the meaning of the word. If we would be simply looking at what parts of your
25
brain are activated as you do this task, we would learn very little. That is,
attention would be part of the mix, but we would also see activation in brain
regions that have nothing to do with how well you are able to control your
attention—regions that deal with vision, for instance, or with understanding
and naming colors, or with remembering what it is again you were supposed
to be doing. What we need to do in order to see what attention does to your
brain is to get rid of all these other processes. The easiest way to do this is
to build a task that does everything the Stroop task does, minus the atten-
tion part—a control or baseline condition. For instance, I could have you tell
me the color of colored words that do not denote a color (words like “chair”
or “bed”). We take the activation patterns in the Stroop test and subtract
brain activation patterns in the control condition from it, and—voila!—we
now know what brain regions are activated in the attention-control part of
the Stroop.
You can see the problem for meditation research here: What would be a
good baseline or control condition? What do we compare meditation to?
Researchers in the field typically use one of two methods to compare medi-
tation to a meaningful baseline. One method is to compare brain activation
in seasoned meditators during meditation with activation in these same medi-
tators during a so-called resting or at-rest condition in which they simply lie
in the scanner and do nothing. A second method is to compare what happens
to seasoned meditators during meditation with what happens to novice medi-
tators or nonmeditators during meditation.
These methods come with their own issues. We don’t know very well what
people are actually doing when they are asked to lie in the scanner and rest
and do nothing (as we will see later, for seasoned meditators the answer
may very well be that they start meditating anyway). We also have no good
grasp on what the minds of newly instructed novices are doing when they are
attempting to meditate.
More recent studies try to circumvent these problems by using an approach
called neurophenomenology.28 In this approach, participants tell the research-
ers about their experiences in the scanner (that is the phenomenology part),
and researchers then relate these reports to brain activation (that is the neuro
part). For instance, in one study we will look at in more detail in Chapter 3,
meditators were asked to meditate from a selfless vantage point—to experi-
ence what was happening but without placing themselves at the center. After
they came out of the scanner, the meditators described their experiences to
the researchers; these reports were sorted into different categories or levels
of selflessness. Finally, the researchers looked for different brain patterns
depending on these categories to find out what parts of the brain were asso-
ciated with these experiences. This approach gives validation and weight to
people’s first-hand experiences and also allows the neuroscientists to check
26
26Presence
on their conclusions concerning what it is the brain does when its owner sits
down to meditate.
One drawback of the neurophenomenological method is that it requires
trust in the participants’ reports. The problem isn’t so much that participants
might be lying but that they might not be very precise in their descriptions
or—p erhaps more likely—that what they experience might be hard to put
into words.
The era of neurophenomenology has also led to an interest in manipulating
meditative states—for instance, by asking participants to meditate a certain
way (as in the selfless meditation example) or (in another study we will look at
in more depth in Chapter 3) by giving them feedback about what is happening
on the neural front and asking them to tune in to that feedback. The changes
in experience can then be related to changes in brain activation.
There is one other practical issue worth mentioning here. Most medita-
tion techniques require the meditator to sit upright on a cushion, a kneeling
bench, or a chair. One of the reasons for this is to promote alertness and focus.
To further help with concentration, the meditation environment is typically
set up so that nothing much disturbs the senses—you typically sit in a quiet,
comfortable, low-lit space, with perhaps some incense, a candle, or particular
images, all of which become cues that over time become associated with the
meditative state. Some ritual may be involved as well—you might light the
incense using a particular set of gestures, or you might bow, or sound a bell,
or start your sit with a particular phrase or chant. Sometimes the time and
space and ritual are shared with friends.
The brain scanner environment is almost the exact opposite of that
quiet, comfortable space: After emptying your pockets of anything mag-
netic, you enter a clean, sanitized hospital-style room with harsh lighting.
In the center of that room you find a medium-sized spaceship. You are
invited to lie down on a stretcher that slides down a narrow tube into the
innards of said spaceship. You are given foam earplugs and headphones to
wear. The reason for the earplugs becomes evident as soon as the machine
starts scanning. Paul Broks calls an MRI scan “the magnetic gaze.”29 That
is a bit of a misnomer: A gaze is not just scrutinizing and concentrated; it
is also steadfast and silent. An MRI scanner is anything but—w ith some
of the procedures, you have the distinct feeling that your whole body is
being rattled—a nd a scan is loud (about 120 decibels for a current state-
of-the-a rt system). The noise level is equivalent to a live rock concert, a
jack hammer three feet away, or a jet engine 300 feet away30—not an envi-
ronment conducive to relaxation or concentration. One side effect of this
is that researchers in this field, as we shall see shortly, prefer to use very
experienced meditators as their research participants—t hey are less easily
shaken by their external environment.
27
From Glob to Grid: Weaving the Networks of the Mind
Earlier in this chapter, I mentioned phrenology—the pseudoscience of exam-

ining bumps on the head. Current-day fMRI research leads to pretty pic-
tures, and with it, some researchers note, the danger of a new “technicolor
phrenology,” sometimes dubbed “blobology.”31 That is, we might be able to
pinpoint different areas of the brain that are active while you meditate, but,
even if this is true, does this tell us anything interesting?
Let me backtrack a little here and illustrate what I mean by “the dan-
gers of blobology” by borrowing an example from a very different field in
neuroscience—face recognition. There is a specific area in the brain, in a
structure called the fusiform gyrus, that is particularly active when faces
are shown but that does not react to objects, places, or scrambled faces; this
region is hence known as the fusiform face area (FFA).32 (An analogy in medi-
tation would be to find “the meditation area” or maybe “the open-monitoring
area,” the “focused-attention area,” or “the loving-k indness area,” which, of
course, do not exist.) In the past decade or so, it has become clear that there
are some problems with this interpretation of the FFA. One is that the simple
equation FFA = recognizing faces doesn’t work. The FFA turned out to not
only be interested in faces; it also lights up for any complex visual thing you
have a particular expertise in. If you are a connoisseur of vintage cars, your
FFA acts as your fusiform vintage car area; if you read Chinese, the FFA
is your fusiform Chinese-character area. One lesson here is that even if we
would find “the” meditation area, it would likely be doing other things as
well, and what those other things are would be informative. (In case of the
FFA, subsequent studies have taught that there is nothing special or innate
about processing human faces—it’s just something we have all acquired
exquisite expertise in.)
There has been an even more important course correction to blobology,
and that is the growing understanding that brain regions do not operate in
isolation. The brain is a tightly connected web, and the resulting teamwork of
regions is crucial to understanding what is really happening. To return to the
FFA example: There is a rare disorder called Capgras syndrome, or imposter
syndrome, where the patient (typically after a stroke or accident) can still
recognize faces but now has the bewildering feeling that all the people around
him have been replaced with perfect replicas—i mposters. (“This person looks
like my mom, but she isn’t my mom—there’s something off about her.”) The
cause of this curious syndrome is that the connection between the FFA and
the foremost emotional part of the brain (the amygdala) has been cut. The
consequence is that Capgras patients can still recognize people, and also still
experience emotions, but the connection between faces and emotions is gone.
This leads to the eerie feeling that Mom is no longer Mom—you no longer
28
28Presence
feel the emotional oomph you should get when you see your mom, and so you
sense that something is not quite right.
What this example shows is that the brain is not a connection of loose
parts. Rather, the brain works like a team where each member plays its
role—or actually more like a set of teams, akin to a construction crew or
a kitchen line. We can find out what brain regions belong on the same team
(the term typically used in neuroscience for team is “network”) by looking at
anatomical connections (white matter fibers between regions; this is called
“anatomical connectivity”) and also by examining what brain areas tend to
be activated or deactivated together (called “functional connectivity”).
The brain has many different networks—more than 20 major ones have
been identified.33 These networks do such diverse things as identifying shapes,
understanding speech, holding on to fleeting information, creating lasting
memories, preparing the body for action, or experiencing emotions.
Three of these 20-odd networks seem particularly relevant for medita-
tion: The so-called default-mode network and the two attention networks—
the “salience network” and the “executive-control network.” Figure 1 shows
you the anatomy of the core hubs of these networks.
What are these networks and what do they do?
The default-mode network was discovered and named by Marcus Raichle.34
It was a chance discovery.
Earlier I mentioned that brain scan studies use a control or baseline condi-
tion; often this baseline condition is just a resting condition—you are asked
to lie still and simply relax. Raichle’s discovery was that during this period
of rest the brains’ activity levels didn’t go down to zero: The brains of his
research participants were no less active during this resting period than
when they were asked to pay attention and engage in a particular task. Even
more interesting, during this resting period, the patterns of activation and
Default-Mode Network Salience Network Executive Control Network

Posterior Anterior Posterior Dorsolateral
cingulate cingulate parietal prefrontal cortex
cortex cortex cortex
Anterior
Medial prefrontal cortex insula
Monitoring and
dynamic switching
Unfocused attention; Focused, directed
mind-wandering attention; being on
task
FIGURE 1 The core hubs of the default-mode network and the two attention networks
(adapted from Uddin, 2015).
29
deactivation in specific areas of the brain (the medial prefrontal cortex, the
posterior cingulate cortex, the precuneus or lateral parietal cortex, and a
few others) fluctuated together—when one went up, the others did too; when
one went down, so did the others. In other words, these areas formed a net-
work. Intriguingly, activation in this network quieted down when the partici-
pants started doing the actual study they came in for. In other words, this is
a network that is active when you’re not doing anything in particular, but it
switches off when you need to focus on doing something in the outside world.
Raichle’s original idea was that this network captures the brain’s default
mode—its idling mode, so to speak. For a while, he tried to label this the
brain’s “dark energy,” but it was the more boring term “default-mode net-
work” that stuck.
Later work has shown that the default mode isn’t really a default; the brain
isn’t really idling. (It never is.) This is something that in retrospect seems
blatantly obvious: When you are resting in the scanner, your body may be
immobile, but your mind is hardly languishing. It is much more likely that
your mind will be superbly active—meandering and freewheeling, jumping
from fleeting thought to fleeting thought, watching memories surface and
making plans for the glorious moment when you will get out of the scanner
tube. We know this because the default-mode network also clicks on when
people are asked to produce associations (e.g., “Find a verb that goes with the
word ‘hammer’ ”),35 or to retrieve memories, or to imagine themselves in some
future scenario, or to take someone else’s perspective in a dialogue.36 Randy
Buckner called these mental musings “self-relevant mental simulations,” but
they are probably better known to all of us as daydreaming, mind-wandering
or—in the context of meditation—monkey mind.
Recent work has further subdivided the default-mode network into three
parts: A core hub (consisting of the posterior cingulate cortex and the ante-
rior medial prefrontal cortex) and two subsystems that interact with that
hub.37 The first subsystem (consisting of the dorsal medial prefrontal cor-
tex, lateral temporal cortex, temporal parietal junction, and temporal pole)
serves to represent your current situation or mental state; the second subsys-
tem (consisting of the hippocampal formation, parahippocampal complex,
retrosplenial cortex, parietal lobe, and ventromedial prefrontal cortex) is
active when imagining the future and reliving the past—mental time travel.
(If all these anatomical terms make you a bit dizzy—don’t worry. If and when
these—and other—brain regions return later in this book, I will remind you
of their function.)
The attention networks typically seesaw with the default- mode net-
work: When the default network is engaged, one or the other attention net-
works usually are not and vice versa.
Neuroscientists have uncovered a number of attention networks; two that
are often emphasized are the salience network and the executive network.38
30
30Presence
The salience network, sometimes also called the dorsal attention network,
has the anterior cingulate cortex and the anterior insula as its main regions.
“Salience” is psychology-speak for something that stands out—something
that is (to get a little circular in the reasoning here) attention grabbing. The
salience network is involved in detecting changes and events that are relevant
for what you are doing or want to do, so that you can reorient your atten-
tion and act accordingly.39 In the context of meditation, the salience network
would be detecting whether you have started daydreaming or whether you
have strayed from the breath.40 The salience network has direct connections
with brain regions that are part of the emotion and motivation system—the
amygdala (a structure specializing in gut-reaction emotions), the substantia
nigra, and the thalamus.
A second important attention network is the executive network, sometimes
also called the frontoparietal network. It consists of the dorsolateral prefron-
tal cortex and the posterior parietal cortex. The executive network directs
where your attention is going and also helps with setting the right amount of
effort for a particular task. In the context of meditation, the executive net-
work could be involved in fine-tuning of effort, in directing or redirecting the
wandering mind (detected by the salience network) to the breath, or in letting
go of an emotion that arises.
Meta-Analzying the Meditating Brain: Tomasino’s Map
Where to start our investigation into the meditating brain?

The first thing to note is that there are quite a number of studies out there
and a growing number of review articles as well.41 These give very detailed
overviews of the neuroimaging work in this field. Most of those reviews are
written for specialists, that is, neuroscientists working on this topic—they
might need some translation in plainer English before they are digestible by
most of us.
A second thing to note is that most of these reviews are of the so-called
narrative variety. As I mentioned in Chapter 1, such reviews tell a story—the
story that emerges in the reviewer’s mind after she reads the literature. That
story is subjective: Someone else reading the same articles might come away
with a different conclusion. There is no escaping this: Not all studies point
to the same conclusions, and that makes it necessary for reviewers to make
choices. In much of this book, I will be guilty of this too: I will guide you
through a large number of studies, and I will draw some conclusions, but
those do not emerge automatically—I will arrange the studies in a certain
way and emphasize certain outcomes more than others. There is simply no
other way to bring together a very varied, mixed set of studies that are all,
in their own way, trying to answer a large number of quite subtle questions.
31
As I also mentioned in Chapter 1, meta-analysis is a more objective way

to answer the single, more simple question we are interested in here: What
brain regions are active when people meditate? A meta-analysis on brain
activations simply pools the results from all relevant studies. It looks at
convergence between studies, and not all studies activate the same brain
regions. If, say, you analyze three meditation studies and Study 1 finds acti-
vation in brain region A, B, and C; Study 2 finds them in region B, D, and
E; and Study 3 finds them in A, B, and D, the conclusion will be that medi-
tation activates region B a lot, A and D a little less, and C and E to an even
smaller extent. (The actual statistics are more complicated, but this is the
gist.) The end product is a map of regions and how much each of these is
activated on average. Thus only outcomes that appear in multiple studies
are likely to be represented; it also implies that regions that have only been
found in a few studies are not likely to show up as significant. Additionally,
studies with a larger number of participants are given greater weight in the
analysis.
Again, this way of looking at the evidence stands somewhat in contrast to
how most of us (I think) read the scientific literature, especially as it comes
through to us in blogs and newspapers or magazines or other media: Study 1
finds activation in Region A, Study 2 in Region B, and Study 3 in Region C,
and a natural inclination might then be to conclude that meditation activates
all three of these regions. In a meta-analysis, none of those regions might
turn up significant because, for each region, the single positive effect that was
found is being diluted by the two zero effects (the lack of effect in Region A in
Studies 2 and 3, Region B in Studies 1 and 3, and Region C in Studies A and
B). Another way of stating the same point is that meta-analysis rewards one of
the most hallowed principles of science: If a result does not replicate, it should
not count for much.
There are to date two meta-analyses of brain activations during medita-
tion; the later one, by Antonietta Tomasino and colleagues42 contains all the
data from the earlier one,43 so I will focus here on Tomasino et al.’s.44 Their
map is reproduced in Figure 2: This, then, is your brain on meditation!
If at first glance Tomasino’s map leaves you a tad underwhelmed—what
is going on with all these little pinpricks; where is the big pattern?—you can
be forgiven. Meta-analysis works very well when the brain’s response to a
particular task is consistent—when a single region or a few regions shows or
show strong activation or strong deactivation. Such precision is likely when
all studies reflect the exact same process. A good example is the Stroop effect
I mentioned earlier—p eople are slow in naming the color of color words that
are printed in a different color than the color they refer to, like the word “red”
printed in green. In a meta-analysis of this task, there is very precise localiza-
tion of the effect.45 It makes sense that meditation is not like this at all—there
are likely lots of different processes going on. To complicate matters, these
32
32Presence
Your brain on meditation: activations

Supramarginal gyrus Superior parietal lobe
Insula
Inferior parietal lobe
Superior medial gyrus Supplementary
motor area
Your brain on meditation: Deactivations
Angular gyrus Superior medial gyrus Superior medial gyrus
Fusiform
Middle gyrus
temporal gyrus Precuneus Superior frontal gyrus
FIGURE 2 Tomasino et al.’s map: Areas of the brain that are activated (top) and
deactivated (bottom) during meditation (adapted from Tomasino et al., 2013).
may be different in different types of meditation, they may vary by the level
of experience of the meditators, and so on.
Another thing to keep in mind is that meditation studies likely also capture
brain activation in regions that have little to do with our idealized picture of
what meditation is. Meditation is, in practice, a deeply flawed endeavor. We
all know that the ideal of focused-attention meditation is to keep the mind
focused, but many of us (if not most of us, or virtually all of us) can tes-
tify that that is not what is actually happening—the mind very easily goes
off-leash.46 What the fMRI analysis picks up is both the intended process of
meditation and its failure, and there is little we can do to distinguish one from
the other. (In Chapter 3 I discuss studies from two research teams—Brewer’s
and Hasenkamp’s—that have cleverly managed to do so.)
Note that my emphasis on Tomasino’s map does not mean that this is the
final arbiter of brain activations during meditation. Derived from a meta-
analysis, this map is only a rough approximation of the actual terrain. I use
it here as a guide, setting us up for the journey of the next chapter, where we
33
will explore some of that actual terrain, that is, the details of some of the
actual studies.
Studies that Comprise Tomasino’s Map
Before I take you on a tour of Tomasino’s map, I should guide you through
some of the characteristics of the studies that went into it.
Tomasino’s map collects the results from 26 studies, reporting on a total
of 313 participants. Because some participants were tested in more than one
study or condition, the number of actual people tested is smaller still, namely
219—about the size of a typical freshman Psych 101 class at a large state col-
lege or the number of people that fit into an average movie theater. This is also
a group with a tremendous amount of meditation experience (11,552 lifetime
hours on average, to be precise 47). A full 21% of them are Buddhist monastics
(all male, and most of them Asian, that is, Tibetan or Japanese). It also seems
that most if not all of these individuals practice meditation in a religious
context, mostly Buddhist, but some hail from the Vedic/Hindu tradition. To
put the average amount of expertise in perspective: If you would meditate
an hour each day (which for most of us is already quite a lot), you would hit
11,552 hours after 31 years and 8 months of practice; if you would sneak in
an intensive seven-week retreat or two each year, you would get there after
23 and a half years. Some of the individuals in this group probably arrived
there much faster: Tibetan monks often meditate multiple hours per day, and
their lifetime practice would also include multiple, long retreats, each lasting
months or years. What is clear, then, is that Tomasino’s map is drawn on the
basis of a small and highly exceptional group, hardly representative of your
typical Western meditator or mindfulness practitioner. These people can per-
haps best be described as meditation professionals—they are meditators in
the same way that I am a college professor (except that they get paid a lot less,
I fear, and they don’t get summers off). Actually, my guess is that there are far
fewer of them than there are college professors, so maybe they are described
even more aptly as the professional athletes of meditation (even more under-
paid but still always practicing).
At first blush, this is a bit odd. If you wanted to know what exercise can
do for you and you keep yourself at, say, the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention–recommended 20 minutes per day of moderate exercise, it
wouldn’t be particularly helpful to study the physiology of Michael Phelps,
Usain Bolt, or Serena Williams (or whoever your favorite athlete is). If you
wanted to know what your own brain on meditation looked like, and maybe
get some practical pointers from what other people’s brain on meditation
looks like, you might not immediately want to turn to the brain of a Tibetan
monk who has spent the last 10 years of his life doing little else than meditate.
34
34Presence
Yet this bias is also understandable from the researcher’s point of view. It is,
in fact, probably the only practical way to get at a brain-on-meditation map.
First, as I described earlier, meditation circumstances in the fMRI
lab are less than ideal. If we want to know what meditation looks like
in the scanner, we need to do this research with people who are actually
able to meditate on command lying flat on their back inside a very noisy,
claustrophobic tube.
Second, we need to make sure not only that the meditators we study are
doing what we ask them to do (e.g., keep mind wandering to a minimum)
but also that they can follow the instructions and directions necessary for
the study. Often the designs used in the scanner require that meditators turn
the meditation state on and off within seconds or that they switch between
different types of meditations rather swiftly. That’s a job for true meditation
experts.
There is a further, more hidden advantage of using experts for these stud-
ies: Such studies can offer mere mortals like us, who are advancing somewhere
along the mountain but are nowhere near its peak, a tantalizing glimpse of
what the view from the top might look like. As just one example, our teach-
ers often tell us that it is possible to experience your sense of self dropping
away—that is, there is still something to experience, but the “you” who expe-
riences it is no longer there, separate from the experience. Work with very
advanced practitioners, discussed later, shows that this is indeed the case.
I find such findings inspiring. (Although I admit they also make the climb—
see how far I still am from the top?—look a bit daunting.)
Your Brain on Meditation: A Tour of Tomasino’s Map
What can we then learn from the modest field of fireflies in Figure 2?
I would argue that the map shows that four networks are implicated in
meditation, namely the two networks that deal with attention, the network
that creates the sense of self, and brain regions that are concerned with per-
ceptions of the body.48 Let’s look at each of those in turn.
First, meditating implies controlling attention, or at least a valiant attempt
to do so. On Tomasino’s brain map, we can see this in activation of the supe-
rior and inferior parietal lobe, both part of the executive control network. The
inferior parietal lobe is directly connected to the default network.49 Activation
in these brain regions might then mean that meditators are—as expected—
focusing their attention on the object of their meditation. Activation in the
inferior parietal lobe may additionally indicate that they are at the same time
suppressing the activation of the default-mode network, actively guarding the
mind against mind-wandering or daydreaming. This attempt appears to meet
with some success: The map of deactivations shows a quieting of some parts
35
of the default-mode network, notably the angular gyrus, the middle temporal
gyrus, and the precuneus.
Second, meditating implies a particular experience of the self. In Tomasino’s
map, we see stronger activation of the medial prefrontal cortex (more specifi-
cally, the superior medial gyrus) and deactivation of the precuneus. Both of
these regions are involved in the so-called self-referential processing but at
different levels. (I return to these levels in a bit more detail in the next chap-
ter when I discuss self-experiences and meditation more explicitly.) “Self-
referential processing” is psychology-speak to indicate that these areas perk
up when there is a question that involves the “I.” For instance, both areas
(along with a bunch of others) become active when people are asked to reflect
on questions such as “Am I a good friend?” but not when they are asked to
reflect on general questions such as “Do you need water to live?”50
The precuneus—deactivated on the Tomasino map—is part of the default-
mode network. It is involved in the so-called narrative self, that is, the part
of you that spins stories about yourself, the part, if you wish, that constructs
your persona. This region typically lights up when you retrieve personal
memories, when you make judgments about your personality (e.g., “Does the
word ‘talented’ describe how I typically feel and think about myself?”), or
when you compare yourself to others (“Am I more honest than the president
of the United States?”).51
The ventral medial prefrontal cortex, in contrast, becomes activated rather
than deactivated during meditation. This region is also part of the default-
mode and self-referential networks, but it is not as reflective as the precuneus.
The self that the ventral medial prefrontal cortex builds is more the observing
“I” that is experiencing the world and recognizes these experiences as belong-
ing to itself.52 For instance, the ventral medial prefrontal cortex can tell the
difference between an object that is yours (“my pen”) and one that belongs
to somebody else (“a pen”).53 More important perhaps, the ventral medial
prefrontal cortex specializes in self-relevant emotion: It turns on when you
are asked to check whether emotional words apply to yourself54 or when you
are asked to judge whether you can personally relate to a set of emotional
pictures.55
The brief conclusion here is that meditating appears to suspend some of
the involved storytelling you weave about yourself in daily life. Instead, as
many meditation teachers tell us,56 you become more of an observer, turn
inward, get in tune with and take possession of your emotions.
A third aspect of meditation gleaned from Tomasino’s map is a change in
body awareness. This is a two-fold story, with seemingly contradictory con-
clusions: One is a story of increased awareness and sensitivity and the other
of decreased awareness and sensitivity. You may have had this experience
in meditation yourself: When you pay attention to the breath, you naturally
become very keenly aware of the breath, to the point where you can feel
36
36Presence
yourself almost becoming the breath. When this happens, the rest of “you,”
and maybe particularly your sense of where you are and where your body
starts and ends, quietly slips outside awareness. So, in the meditation experi-
ence, a strong, explicit focus on one aspect of the body can be accompanied by
a an increasing sense of disembodiment.
This split is reflected beautifully in Tomasino’s map.
At the level of detailed and explicit focus, the map shows activation in
regions that are associated with direct body awareness, namely the superior
parietal lobe, the postcentral gyrus, and the right insula. One meditation
study has shown that these areas are activated when experienced meditators
meditate on bodily sensations, more specifically on the weight of different
body parts.57 This corner of Tomasino’s map may thus represent the effects
of concentration techniques that specifically involve the body—paying atten-
tion to the varied sensations of the breath or investigating minute shifts in
tension, temperature, and vibrations in the skin and muscle during a body
scan meditation. All of this makes these sensations more palpable, and you
can see this in activation in these particular brain areas.
On the more global level of body awareness, Tomasino’s map shows
decreased activity in the right angular gyrus and increased activity in the
supramarginal gyrus. The right angular gyrus is responsible for integrating
information from the different senses to create a consistent image of where you
are situated in space. Creating this image is a fine balancing act. Disturbing
that balance by providing this region either with too much stimulation (i.e.,
by sending electrical current into the angular gyrus through implanted elec-
trodes) or too little stimulation (e.g., after tissue damage following a stroke)
can lead to distortions in your sense of embodiment. These include out-of-
body experiences, the feeling that your body has been duplicated, or the
feeling that another body is lurking behind your own.58 Likewise, stimulat-
ing the supramarginal gyrus by electrical current leads to a vague feeling of
disembodiment—one such patient, G.A., reported that the brain stimulation
made her feel as if she was floating away or as if her arm was moving; she also
asked “Am I here?”59
Similar experiences of disembodiment can be found in meditative states.
Jack Kornfield interviewed about 160 yogis who were participating in a long
(two-week or three-month) meditation retreat.60 Some of the meditators61
reported shifts in body image. Examples included feeling the body dividing
in half, a sensation of floating, feeling the body disappear, losing the sense
of touch, experiencing the limbs as huge and bulbous, observing the head
becoming detached from the torso, or sensing the self leaving the body. It
is possible that some of these changes in the sense of embodiment originate
in activation or deactivation of the angular gyrus and/or activation of the
supramarginal gyrus.
37
More than half of Kornfield’s retreatants also reported spontaneous move-

ments (arms rising involuntarily or flapping, the whole body pulling to one
side, spontaneous hand movements, and the like). This can potentially be
linked to changes in the Tomasino map as well: Meditation activates the sup-
plementary motor area. The supplementary motor area coordinates move-
ment; meditators may engage it to control their posture. If this activation
misfires, an involuntary movement may occur.62
This activation of the supplementary motor areas may explain other
side effects: This area also routinely provides sensory suppression during
motion—that is, while you move a limb, sensations in that limb are disre-
garded.63 The reason for this sensory suppression is that otherwise you would
be overwhelmed with sensations every time you move a limb—as I type this
sentence, for instance, my arms and fingers and shoulders are fiercely and
rapidly moving, and if I were acutely aware of all those sensations, I might
be very much distracted from my task of molding thoughts into words and
sentences. It is possible, then, that the numbness you can experience during
meditation—like not being aware of sensations in your hands or no longer
realizing where your bottom ends and your cushion starts—have their origin
in this activation.
Taking all of Tomasino’s map together, three themes emerge—attention,
body, and self. These themes also suggest four flavors of experience. That is,
meditation is an ongoing pursuit of control over attention, with an increased
focus on body sensations, accompanied by an increased feeling of disembodi-
ment and a quieting down of the storytelling mind.
I note again that my interpretation of Tomasino’s map is a story. Many
brain regions do many things, and while this story makes sense (at least to
me), it is certainly not the only story one could spin about these results. Also,
as we accumulate more and more studies, it is likely that we will need to
redraw the contours of this map.
38
39
{ 3 }
The Meditating Brain in Action

ATTENTION, BODY, AND SELF
In Chapter 2, I gave an overview of what happens in the body and the brain
as you meditate. With regard to the brain, three themes emerged: Changes
in attention, changes in body awareness and the sense of embodiment, and
changes in the sense of self. In this chapter, I offer a more detailed look at
studies that flesh out these three themes in a more dynamic context, that is, as
they unfold over the course of a meditation and over the course of a lifetime
of meditating.
Theme 1: Paying Attention
Tomasino et al.’s map is static; that is, it provides an insight as to what areas of
the brain and what brain networks are active during meditation. Meditation,
however, is a dynamic process, where periods of great clarity trade off with
episodes of great dryness, and moments of sharp focus are interwoven with
interludes of mind-wandering.
ATTENTION AS THE NEURAL SWITCH INTO MEDITATION
What happens when you sit down, close or half-close your eyes, and start
meditating? Is there a neural switch, a brain circuit that turns on to propel
you into a meditative state?
Klaus Bærentsen and colleagues1 used a simple but effective procedure to
examine this switching process: They asked a group of 31 experienced medita-
tors to do a form of on/off meditation inside the scanner—short alternations
of 45 seconds of meditation and 45 seconds of rest. Such short bursts would
tell us what happens as meditators sink into the early stages of meditation.
40
40Presence
They found three types of effects within those 45-second episodes. (Note that
because this is just one study, the regions activated or deactivated do not
always correspond to Tomasino et al.’s map.)
First, meditators activated the inferior parietal lobe, which, as we have seen,
is a part of the executive control network that has a direct link to the default-
mode network. Second, likely as a consequence of this activation, parts of the
default-mode network (notably the precuneus and the posterior cingulate) were
deactivated. As you may recall, both the precuneus and the posterior cingulate
are also part of the narrative self. This suggests that, at the onset of meditation,
the chattering narrative self gets actively shushed. A third effect concerned
body awareness, in both guises. That is, Bærentsen et al. observed activation in
the supplementary motor areas familiar from Tomasino et al.’s map, as well as
activation of the primary somato-sensory cortex; both activations likely indi-
cate a sharpening of specific bodily sensations. They also noted the equally
familiar deactivation of the angular gyrus (more specifically the temporal pari-
etal junction), indicating an increasing sense of disembodiment.
The nice surprise is that there are no surprises: By and large, these
bursts of mini-meditations show the same pattern of results that appear on
Tomasino et al.’s map. Attention switches on, the narrative self dims, sensa-
tions are played up, and whole-body awareness is turned down. This result
suggests that meditation (or, more precisely, focused-attention meditation)
really is a state of consciousness, just like sleep or wakefulness is a state of
consciousness. By this I mean that meditation, like any other state of con-
sciousness, presents a consistent pattern of coordinated interaction between
specific brain systems—it forms what Tomasino et al. call a “meditation net-
work.” Another way of saying this is that meditation is a whole package that
by its nature implies the four flavors of experience I mentioned at the end of
Chapter 2—increased control over attention, increased focus on body sensa-
tions, increased global disembodiment, and a quieting down of the storytell-
ing mind. The finding that expert meditators can bring this entire package
online within 45 seconds or so, that is, in about 10 or so breaths, suggests that
the whole process unfolds rather quickly.
ETERNAL RETURN TO THE BREATH
If you have ever tried to meditate, you know very well that even if you manage
to get into the right state of mind within those 10 breaths, it still is far from
guaranteed that the rest of the sit is going to be a blissful coasting on an ever-
cresting wave of unbroken attention. On the contrary: For most (if not all) of
us, attention needs to be reset or sharpened repeatedly over the course of a
meditation session.
A study by Wendy Hasenkamp and colleagues2 illustrates very nicely how
attention wavers throughout a session and how the meditating brain copes
41
The Meditating Brain in Action: Attention, Body, and Self 41
with those distractions. They put 14 meditators (with, on average, about 1,400
hours of lifetime practice) inside the scanner for 20 minutes and asked them
to focus on their breath. Participants were given a button to press as soon as
they realized that their mind had wandered.
The researchers took a slice of time of three seconds around the button press
as an indicator of the brain state of becoming aware that the mind had drifted
off. (The three-second time frame has to do with the way the brain was scanned
in this study, that is, in time slices of 1.5 seconds.) They took the three-second
slice of time right before the “becoming aware” slice as an indicator of the brain
state of mind wandering. The three-second time slice right after the “becom-
ing aware” slice was used as an indicator of the process of shifting back into
the meditative state. Finally, they considered the three seconds after that as an
indicator of the brain state of sustained attention. Thus the assumption is that
there is a cycle: After a period of time of sustained attention, the mind wanders,
gets caught in the act, and then attention shifts and you get back on track.
Hasenkamp et al. found that when the meditators’ minds wandered, many
regions of the default-mode network were activated (the posterior cingulate
cortex among them)—as you would expect. The phase of becoming aware
mainly showed activation in the anterior insula and the anterior cingulate cor-
tex, regions associated with the salience network. The state of shifting was
associated with the executive attention network, here the lateral prefrontal
cortex, and with the inferior parietal lobe. The researchers also found acti-
vation in the ventromedial cortex. This part of the brain specializes in self-
related processing, particularly in emotion regulation (i.e., bringing down the
level of emotion after a negative experience). Maybe this activation is related
to the experience of letting go of the potentially emotionally grating experi-
ence of once again noticing that the mind has run off and then gently, with no
hard feelings, bringing it back to where it needs to be. During the sustained
attention phase, a part of the prefrontal executive network remained active,
but activation in the parietal part of the network activation went back to base-
line, maybe because activity in the default-mode network was now sufficiently
dampened, and so the parietal meditation switch was no longer needed.
One intriguing finding was how often this cycle repeated, even within this
well-trained group of yogis. On average, meditators pressed the button 15.5
times over the course of 20 minutes, that is, once every 80 seconds, or once
every 15 breaths or so. (It remains to be seen if this estimate of what happens
in the scanner is a reasonable estimate of what happens on the cushion. It is
possible that sitting upright on your own well-worn meditation cushion in
your usual meditation spot helps with concentration. On the other hand, it is
also possible that being watched inside the scanner—brain and all—brings
out the best in these veterans.) Equally intriguing is the finding that how
often people pressed the button was not significantly related to meditation
expertise.
42
42Presence
It is clear, then, that during actual meditation there is some cycling back
and forth between the attention systems and the default-mode network. I was
able to find three other studies that looked at couplings between the default-
mode networks and the attention networks during meditation, compared to
the couplings when participants are waiting in the scanner, asked to just rest.3
Each of these studies found a tighter coupling between at least some regions
of the default-mode network and at least one of the attention networks dur-
ing meditation. That suggests that meditators stay on task while meditat-
ing: When the default-mode network is active—when the mind strays from
the object of its focus—the attention system notices, clamps down, and cor-
rects.4 As we’ve seen, while people wait and rest in the scanner, the mind
likely goes off as well, but the relative uncoupling during rest suggests that
distraction just happens and that people let it be. The tighter coupling during
meditation reinforces the main point of Hasenkamp et al.’s study, namely that
focused-attention meditation really is a dynamic process, a series of predict-
able cycles that occurs in a predictable manner.
The main conclusion here is that meditation is a very dynamic process—a
cycle of setting a goal, drifting away from that goal, noticing the drift, and
then returning to the goal, over and over again. Over the course of their 1,400
hours of lifetime experience, Hasenkamp et al.’s meditators must have gone
through about 63,000 of such cycles: 63,000 times of noticing they were off the
breath, 63,000 times of returning to the breath, and 63,000 times of getting
lost again. That is a lot of drifting off focus and a lot of gentle correction.
I must admit that, as I write this, after my own accumulated 1,700 (and a
few) hours, I still find this simple fact astounding: You set yourself an exceed-
ingly simple goal (“focus,” “be quiet,” “be here and now”), and yet, almost
immediately, the mind veers away. Hasenkamp et al.’s data suggest that the
essential goal of this simple form of meditation is an unrealistic one: Every
time you sit, you set yourself up for failure, in a sense—it’s highly unlikely that
you will be focused, on task, here-and-now for very long. Yet this “failure”
might actually be helpful. That is, perhaps it is exactly the repeated fumbles
and their consequences, the gently tugging the mind by its sleeves and setting
it back on its course, from which it will then invariably wander, and doing this
over and over again that is one of the crucial aspects of this practice—it may
be this cycling that builds up trait mindfulness.
QUIETING THE MIND
All of this could lead us to conclude that quieting the mind is hard work. But
that would be wrong, as very nice recent work by Kathleen Garrison and
colleagues5 shows.
All of the studies we have looked at so far are still probing meditation from
the outside—we are inferring what the mind is doing from what the brain is
43
telling us, and this is risky business. Garrison and colleagues wanted to know
how brain activation relates to life as seen from the inside. What does it actu-
ally feel like to sit down (or lay down, in the case of an fMRI study), focus
your attention, and quiet down, and exactly how is brain activation related
to that experience?
Garrison asked 10 seasoned meditators (with, on average, 10,000 hours of
practice, collected over about 18 years) to meditate in the scanner for short
bouts of a minute each.6 After each bout, they were asked to describe their
meditation experience.
Here’s the crux: While the volunteers were meditating, the researchers
monitored activation in the meditators’ posterior cingulate cortex (PCC). As
we have seen, the PCC is a central part of the default-mode network, which is
activated during self-related thinking—it is part of the circuitry of the narra-
tive self, the self-as-story. This makes it a good indicator of whether the mind
is drifting away from the actual focus of meditation.7 The researchers were
able to capture activation in the PCC as it unfolded; they turned this activa-
tion into a real-time graph—showing activation up, in red, and deactivation
down, in blue, with a new bar popping up every two seconds. Given that the
BOLD response (the rushing of blood to the place where it is needed) is slug-
gish, this isn’t really real time: The graph lags behind by a few seconds, but
it is close.
Then they had some fun with this.
In the first bout of meditation, participants were simply asked to concen-
trate on their breath. In the second bout, they were shown an example of a
real-time PCC graph (not their own). They were asked to use this graph as the
object of their meditation, paying attention to it as they would to any other
object of concentration. In the third bout, they were shown the real-time feed-
back graph of their own PCC activation and deactivation and asked to use
this graph as the object of meditation. They were also told that this graph
reflected activation in “a particular region of their brain” and that there was
a two-to four-second delay involved. Next, they were given three more bouts
with the feedback graph and asked to “use their mind to make the graph go
blue.” To conclude, they were given three final bouts with the feedback graph
and asked to “use their mind to make the graph go red.”
The researchers wrote down the participants’ experiences. There were
a total of 404 reported experiences. These were sorted into eight broader
categories, forming four pairs of opposites: (a) concentration (experiences
of focus, focus on the breath, and clarity) versus (b) distraction (muddled
experiences); (c) observing sensory experiences (experiences of physical
sensations, engagement with what they saw, heard or mentally experi-
enced) versus (d) interpreting (self-related thinking, deliberating, engag-
ing with memories); (e) not “efforting” (not trying: experiences of open
awareness, calm, and acceptance) versus “efforting” (trying to change the
44
44Presence
experience); and (g) contentment (experiences of pleasure and equanim-

ity) versus (h) discontentment (displeasure, restlessness, discomfort, nega-
tive emotions, and the like). These eight categories were then reduced to
four: undistracted awareness (concentration and observing sensory experi-
ence) versus distracted awareness (distraction and interpreting) and effort-
less doing (not “efforting” and contentment) versus controlling (“efforting”
and discontentment).
These opposites in experience also played out as opposites at the level of
the brain. The first element of each pair of opposites (tending toward con-
centration and letting go) was associated with the graph turning blue—PCC
deactivation. The second element of each pair of opposites (tending toward
distraction and controlling) was associated with the graph turning red—PCC
activation. Experiences that made the graph turn red include8: “I worried that
I wasn’t using the graph as an object of meditation, so I tried, like, to look at
it harder or somehow pay attention more to it’ (this is “efforting”), or “I began
by thinking about a variety of things that need to be done, emails that need
to be sent, things that I have not done in a timely fashion, that type of thing”
(interpreting). Experiences that turned the graph blue include “Very smooth.
It was very easy to concentrate” and “a concentrated meditation this time”
(concentration) or “I maintained primary awareness on the full range of expe-
rience, including, just, awareness of the body and various touch points, the
breath moving throughout the body, the sound being integrated into that sort
of, sort of fuller awareness while watching the colors with relative ease … body
awareness” (observing) and “The red bars correspond to times when I was try-
ing to either force the experience or trying to think about, thinking about stuff
in general, thinking about making [the graph] blue. And then when I could let
it go, [the graph] turned blue” (effortless doing).
In many ways, these results confirm what we already know: Activation of
the default-mode network is related to activating the narrative self and to
spinning stories—to interpreting the experience, to deliberating, and to being
distracted—and deactivation results in the opposite—a sense of concentra-
tion and a tendency to simply (and calmly) observe.
What is new here is that this deactivation of the PCC is not an effortful
process. Although we know from Tomasino et al.’s map that meditation acti-
vates both the salience and the executive network, Garrison et al.’s results
show that “efforting”—trying your best, working hard—isn’t what quiets the
mind. On the contrary, trying hard really gets the PCC going, whereas the
stripping away of effort, the effortless doing, the relaxing, the letting go is
what settles the mind into the meditative groove. The act of mere observing
might be especially important here—what Garrison et al. call the mindset “of
not being pushed, pulled, or lost in mental content, feelings, or thoughts as
they arise.” Meditators in that study described this as “letting things flow by”
or “observing thinking.”
45
This is an interesting paradox: Trying too hard to meditate will likely

lead to PCC activation and hence distraction and unease, whereas not try-
ing and relaxing into the experience is likely to lead to PCC deactivation
and hence contentment and concentration. One of Garrison et al.’s graphs
that went quickest and most deeply in the blue deactivation territory was the
graph of a meditator who described the episode as: “I noticed that the more
I relaxed and stopped trying to do anything, the bluer it went.” This seems
valuable advice for any meditator: The quality of attention in meditation
should be gentle, not forceful. This is, in fact, advice that meditation teach-
ers often give.
One aspect of the results that is particularly encouraging for meditators is
that PCC deactivation is associated with feelings of contentment, equanim-
ity, and pleasure. PCC activation, on the contrary, seems to be associated
with displeasure. This is encouraging because it suggests that meditation has
a direct emotional feedback mechanism built right in: If it brings you calm
and peace, you’re doing it right; if it feels effortful and ill-fitting, you are prob-
ably doing it wrong. Thus one further piece of advice for the new meditator
is to lean in the direction of delight in the experience. Again, this advice isn’t
particularly new. (The caveat is that the meditators in this study were highly
practiced—the mileage of novices might vary.)
Finally, I should note that the meditators in this study succeeded very
well in the final two tasks, namely to meditate themselves into the red or
the blue zone of PCC activation and deactivation. Thus meditators can use
biofeedback to guide their experiences. Of course, few of us have an MRI
scanner in our basement, so this knowledge is of little practical use. What
is useful, though, is that the meditators learned to couple the biofeedback
to their states of mind; after you’ve done that, it might suffice to be guided
by your inner experiences. Specifically, some noted the relationship between
turning the graph blue and the direct feeling of relaxation, as the quotes in the
previous paragraphs show. Another technique was to connect directly to the
sensory experience from an observer point of view: “I maintained primary
awareness on the full range of experience, including, just, awareness of the
body and various touch points, the breath moving throughout the body, the
sound being integrated into that sort of, sort of fuller awareness while watch-
ing the colors with relative ease … body awareness.”
DEPTH OF MEDITATION
Although many meditation teachers sternly warn us against doing this, many
of us do evaluate our meditation experiences: This was a good sit; this was a
not-so-good-sit (and maybe once in a while we have an excellent sit). Is there
anything to this feeling? Can the brain show us what is better and deeper
about better and deeper sits?
46
46Presence
Danny Wang and colleagues9 asked 10 long-term meditators (with, on

average, about 20,000 hours of Kundalini yoga experience) to meditate for
24 minutes inside the scanner. The meditations were of the focused-attention
type. In one practice, called Kirtan Kriya, they repeated a short four-syllable
mantra while counting the syllables on their fingers; in the other, Shabad
Kriya, they focused on the breath while repeating the mantra with each
exhale. The researchers found that meditations that were rated as deeper and
more intense were associated with lower activation in the medial prefron-
tal cortex and in the anterior cingulate cortex—areas that, as we have seen,
deal with self-reference and the salience network. Thus stronger meditations
tended to be associated with less self-c enteredness and with a less active inner
monitor. The study cannot tell us, however, what the direction of influence is.
It might be the case that we consider meditations to be deep when we manage
to set our selves and our fault-finding ways aside. Or it might be the case that
our self and the little check-marker in our head is less active in deep medita-
tion because everything runs along smoothly and there is less fault to find.
An additional finding in this study was that deeper meditations tended to
be associated with activations in the left forebrain, in areas that are known
to be associated with positive mood.10 Again, it isn’t clear from these results
whether deeper sits make us happier or whether feeling happier during a sit
makes us think the meditation is deeper. Kornfield11 also noted in his survey
of retreatants that bliss is almost always associated with deep concentration
of the mind.
ATTENTION IN OPEN-M ONITORING MEDITATION
The type of meditation that has been studied most in the scanner is focused-
attention meditation; all of the studies I mentioned in this chapter so far
are of that variety. We saw that this type of meditation involves an intricate
dance between, on the one hand, the salience system and the executive sys-
tem, which pull you toward the object of the focus of attention, and, on the
other hand, the default-mode network, which seduces you into zoning out.
In an overview paper on how attention is regulated and monitored in the
two main types of meditation—focused attention and open monitoring—
Antoine Lutz and colleagues12 argue that open monitoring might be different
on three counts. First, because open-monitoring meditation is, by definition,
not focused on one particular object, there might be reason to assume that
the executive system would be less involved. Instead, you might expect more
activation in the salience system, which would be probing what is, right here,
right now, relevant for your sit. Second, open-monitoring meditation involves
the cultivation of awareness of the internal body states, and so you might
expect more activation in regions that are concerned with the body, such as
47
the somatosensory cortex. Finally, for some, and in some traditions, open
monitoring might involve an attempt at emotion regulation, for instance, by
labeling of feelings and emotions when they come up during a sit. This might
be reflected in brain activation as well.
All three of these assumptions seem more than reasonable. Unfortunately,
there are not yet enough studies that have probed open monitoring to warrant
a meta-analysis. We can, however, look at the few existing studies and try to
draw some tentative conclusions.
The most interesting studies would be those that directly contrast the
focus-attention and the open-monitoring approach to meditation. I could find
only two such studies. Sadly, they do not converge on the same conclusion.
The earliest of those two studies, by Antonietta Manna and colleagues,13
studied eight Buddhist monks from the Theravāda tradition, with 15,750 hours
of accumulated meditation experience on average. During open monitoring,
the left hemisphere, especially the left anterior insula and the left precuneus,
was more active than during focused attention. Activation was also higher
in midline structures and superior temporal areas—brain regions typically
associated with self-awareness. The results suggest that, as Lutz et al. pre-
dicted, the salience network (here: the insula) might be more active, and
awareness of internal states (here: precuneus, midline, and superior temporal
areas) might be turned up as well.
One interesting result not predicted by Lutz et al. is that, unlike what
Tomasino et al.’s map shows, the precuneus, typically related to the narrative
self, was activated rather than deactivated in the open-monitoring portion of
the meditation. Interestingly, activation in the language-related areas of the
brain was not higher during open monitoring, suggesting that this height-
ened awareness of one’s internal state is not associated with the creation of
an actual story involving words (or at least not more so than simply resting or
focusing on the breath do).
The second study, by Judson Brewer and colleagues,14 contrasted focused-
attention meditation, open- monitoring meditation, and loving- k indness
meditation inside the scanner in a group of 12 practitioners with, on average,
about 10,000 hours of practice. They found few differences between open-
monitoring and focused-attention practices, but the one difference they did
find—lower activation in the superior and medial temporal gyrus—stands in
contradiction to the results from Manna and colleagues, who found higher
activation in the superior temporal areas.
What to make of these results? The predictions made by Lutz et al. sound
reasonable, but it seems that there is little support for them, at least in direct
comparisons between focus-attention and open-monitoring meditation. One
study provides support for two of the hypotheses; the other does not support
any of them and contradicts one earlier finding. The sad conclusion, for now,
48
48Presence
is that we know all too little about the specifics of the differences between
focused attention and open monitoring.
A NOTE ON JOY AND JHANA
Two sections ago, I mentioned bliss.

People who don’t meditate sometimes think that meditators simply
close their eyes and off they go into the sunset, riding magnificent waves of
radiant bliss.
People who meditate know otherwise.
In some ways, of course, an absence of strong positive emotions is to be
expected in attention- type meditations. In focused- attention meditation,
there is a singular focus—typically on the breath—and when thoughts or
emotions pop up, the meditator simply returns to the breath, without judg-
ment and with acceptance. In open- monitoring meditation, you simply
observe, without attachment, what comes up. Over time, this leads to equa-
nimity vis-à-v is the original event that provoked the emotion.
There is one Buddhist practice, however, that has the effect of generating
joy or bliss from within, without any external cues, at least during some of its
stages—jhana meditation.15 Jhana meditation is a progression through eight
sequential practices or stages, each further deepening the meditator’s con-
centration to the point of losing contact with the senses and hence the outside
world. Stages 1 to 3 are associated with extreme bliss and the later stages
more with a less ecstatic sense of deep peace and equanimity.
There is alas only a single brain-imaging study on jhana meditation, and
it includes only a single meditator.16 This meditator, Leigh Brasington, is,
however, a well-k nown teacher in this field, with 17 years of experience; the
authors of the study claim he might be the one and only person in the United
States with the requisite proficiency in jhana who was willing to participate
in the study.
To test the joy hypothesis, the researchers probed the dopamine system.
Dopamine is a neurotransmitter (i.e., a chemical messenger in the brain)
that is released during pleasant events—your favorite food, sex, good music,
money, and drugs are some things that get the dopamine response going. The
researchers tapped into two crucial brain regions within the dopamine sys-
tem, the nucleus accumbens and the medial orbitofrontal cortex. The nucleus
accumbens is the basic brain structure from where the dopamine rush origi-
nates; the medial orbitofrontal cortex is activated a little later—it is where
pleasure registers in awareness.
The results showed that both the nucleus accumbens and the medial orbi-
tofrontal cortex were activated during Stage 2 jhana (Stage 1 was not recorded
due to a technical difficulty). Interestingly, activation in the nucleus accum-
bens declined after Stage 2, but the orbitofrontal cortex stayed active until
49
Stage 4. Thus, even as the dopamine reserves dwindled (as they are wont to
do—no high lasts forever), the subjective experience of joy still lingered.
Brasington described his experience quite dramatically—Stage 2 was com-
pared to “opening a birthday gift and getting exactly what you most wished
for” and Stage 3 to postcoital bliss. As the researchers point out, however,
the activation in the dopamine network wasn’t actually all that spectacular.
What is most probably happening is that due to the intense concentration
during jhana meditation, most cortical activity quiets down. In that quiet
environment, even a modest reward signal from the nucleus accumbens will
be detectable, and it will be felt as much more intense than it really is. Thus
training the mind to be quiet might help to inflate simple feelings of content-
ment into something approaching rapture.
Finally, the astute reader has noticed that neither the nucleus accum-
bens nor the medial orbitofrontal cortex are part of Tomasino et al.’s map.
This underscores again what I mentioned at the beginning of this sec-
tion: Meditation in its most typical forms is not likely to catapult the medita-
tor into euphoria on a day-by-day basis.
Theme 2: Awareness of the Body and Its Sensations
The focus of meditation manuals and teachers is almost exclusively on how to

deploy attention and how to work with emotions. The day-to-day practice of
meditation, however, comes with a wide variety of experiences, which often
receive a lot less mention in meditation manuals. In this section, I focus on
what we know about bodily and sensory experiences during meditation.
I start by mentioning that although most people assume humans have five
senses (sight, sound, smell, taste, and touch), in reality we have quite a few
more. The list also includes (but is not limited to) proprioception (knowing
where your body parts are relative to other body parts), interoception (the
sense of the physical condition of your body), thermoception (sense of tem-
perature), equilibrioception (the sense of balance and acceleration), and noci-
ception (awareness of pain), and even, some claim, a sense of time. Not all of
these, obviously, have been investigated during meditation.
Earlier I mentioned Kornfield’s survey of about 160 meditators who had
just finished either a two-week or three-month insight meditation retreat.
Kornfield examined the data for “unusual” experiences, and found that most
fell into three broad categories: somatic experiences (e.g., changes in proprio-
ception and nociception), visual experiences, and mental experiences (in which
Kornfield included experiences such as mood swings, rapture and bliss,
changes in the perception of time, and out-of-body experiences). If you’re
experiencing any of these in your sits and you would like to know whether
what you’re experiencing is “normal,” that is, something many meditators
50
50Presence
experience, or just a few, you’re out of luck: Kornfield refused to provide

exact frequency data for most of the experiences. What we do know: 55% of
the questionnaires mentioned the somatic experience of “spontaneous move-
ment”; spontaneous alterations of body perception (like a feeling of being
switched to slow-motion, a feeling of floating, or a loss of body awareness)
were reported “frequently” and so were visual hallucinations, either with the
eyes open (this involves seeing color changes in the visual field, perceiving
still objects as moving, having your perceptions sharpened or intensified,
seeing vibrations in the air, or having LSD-like melting visions) or with the
eyes closed (seeing flashes of light, or colors, or more full-flung visions, like
beholding the Buddha). Mental experiences were also common: 47% of the
reports mention dramatic mood swings (sudden heavy sadness or flatness,
fear, anger, sexual fantasies, rapid switching between doubts, bliss, boredom,
serenity, joy, etc.), perhaps offset by the rapture and bliss reported by 40% of
the two-week and 95% of the three-month meditators.
In the remainder of this section, I concentrate on three items on Kornfield’s
list that we do know a little about: body awareness experiences, visual hal-
lucinations, and perceptual awareness during meditation (i.e., how much of
the world gets through to you); I add what we know about how meditation
alters pain perception.
AWARENESS OF THE BODY IN SPACE AND TIME
Changes in body awareness during meditation are not unusual. I assume any-
one who has ever sat recognizes that after a few minutes of concentration the
body fades somewhat into the background: It becomes a little harder to tell
where the bottom ends and the cushion begins; if your hands touch or hold
each other, it might become less clear which hand is which, and so on. More
extreme examples of changes in body awareness can easily be found—see
Kornfield’s previously mentioned list.
It is, of course, impossible to link such experiences to whatever is happen-
ing inside the brain unless one has a precise account of what the meditator
experiences. That is exactly what Aviva Berkovich-Ohana and colleagues17
set out to examine in a group of 16 Vipassanā meditators with, on average,
11,225 hours of meditation practice.18
The original intent of the researchers was to examine the perception of
time and space during meditation (i.e., where you are in time and where you
are in space). Their hypothesis was that this sense of where you are might be
intimately linked to your body awareness—a sharper body image would lead
to a sharper sense of time and space or vice versa.
The design of the study was quite complicated, but understanding it is
worth the trouble, so bear with me. First, instead of waiting until medita-
tors reported time and/or space experiences, the researchers provided the
51
meditators with instructions. A first set of instructions was to “Try to be in

the present moment” (let’s call this the “now” instruction) and “Try to be
here” (“here” instruction)—routine meditation instructions. A second set
of instructions was to “Try to be in the near past (in the same place—the
lab)” (“then” instruction) or “Try to be elsewhere (at the moment, with the
experimenters outside the shielded magnetoencephalography [MEG] room)”
(“there” instruction). Finally, the meditators were instructed to “Try to be
outside time” (“timelessness” instruction) or “Try not to be in the center
of space” (“spacelessness” instruction). Participants cycled through these
instructions, taking 90 seconds for each of the six meditations.
This design allowed the researchers to look at a few things these conditions
have in common in terms of activation and what sets them apart. First, look-
ing at what the pairs within each instruction have in common gives us an idea
of what is overlapping in the brain’s representation of space and time. Second,
looking at the contrast between the second and the first set of instructions
(comparing “then” with “now” and “there” with “here”) gives us some idea of
what brain regions are involved in memory, imagination, and the like. Third,
the contrast between “timelessness” and “now” and between “spacelessness”
and “here” tells us something about how the brain perceives timelessness and
spacelessness. Here is where the second contrast comes in handy: We want
to make sure that the third contrast isn’t simply the meditators’ imagination
going wild, so it would be good to find that the third contrast involves differ-
ent brain regions than the second contrast.
After the meditation session was over, meditators were interviewed about
their experiences. Eight participants reported alterations in the sense of body
boundaries. Four of those involved a more diffuse sense of self, that is, the
feeling that the self spilled out of the body or that the body itself faded (e.g.,
“The experience of the body faded. There was a sense of body in the back-
ground, not in front of consciousness” and “a pleasant dissolution, some-
thing liquid-like”). For three participants, the body disappeared altogether
(e.g., “The body as physical image was absent. There was a sense of open
space without the bodily dimension” and “There was no awareness to bodily
and self boundaries”). One participant reported an out-of-body experience
(“I kept entering and leaving my body. Outside the body I felt short and small,
like a little child, I shrank.”). Thus, even though the instructions did not
emphasize the body or its boundaries in any way, the meditators’ attempts at
meditating outside time or space had the effect of loosening the sense of body
boundaries in half of them.
The contrast between “then” versus “now” and “there” versus “here”
showed overlap in activation in the part of the default-mode network typi-
cally associated with mental time travel (i.e., reminiscing about the past
or planning the future), as it should. Interestingly, these regions were not
the ones that were activated when participants were meditating timelessly
52
52Presence
or spacelessly. Meditating timelessly involved activation not only in brain

regions typically associated with time (right posterior parietal cortex) but
also in regions typically associated with body awareness (right insula,
right somatosensory, and medial posterior cingulate cortex). Likewise,
spaceless meditation did not only involve regions associated with spa-
tial processing (bilateral temporal gyrus, left thalamus, right postcentral
gyrus, medial frontal gyrus, bilateral frontal cortices, and right parietal
lobule) but also regions typically involved with interoception (bilateral
posterior cingulated cortex and right insula). Thus meditators who try
to meditate spacelessly and timelessly also deactivate some of the brain
areas associated with situating the body in space and time, which might
result in a feeling of disembodiment, as the reports noted in the previous
paragraph suggest.
This result was confirmed in another analysis. Here, the researchers split
up the participants in two groups: One group, about half of the participants,
consisted of those meditators who reported a change in the sense of both
space and time (e.g., “The center of space became endless, without a refer-
ence point. … Time was less relevant”); the other group consisted of the rest
of the participants, that is, meditators who either reported a regular experi-
ence of both space and time (e.g., “The mind was in the present moment”) or
a change in either the sense of time or space, but not both (e.g., “A sense of
expansion, something open and wide”). The first group showed lower activa-
tion in the temporal parietal junction and the insula and increased activity
in the cerebellum. As we discussed in the previous chapter, these regions are
associated with embodiment.19 So what distinguishes people who report more
timeless and spaceless awareness in meditation from those who do not is not
any brain region that has to do with time perception or spatial awareness per
se. Instead, the two groups differ in activation in brain areas that are associ-
ated with a sense of the body.
Taken together, the results from Berkovich-Ohana et al.’s study sug-
gest that in meditation the senses of time, space, and body are intricately
interwoven—when the experience of one of those changes, experience of
one if not both of the other ones will change as well, for the simple reason
that all three share activation in common brain regions. The final set of
results cited here suggests that changes in the sense of embodiment might
be the driving force. That is, changes in time and space are associated with
changes in regions that situate the body in space and time, but when there
are no changes in these body awareness regions, there are no changes in the
perception of space and time. Thus meditators who are trying to achieve a
timeless and/or spaceless state do so (knowingly or unknowingly) by alter-
ing the perception of the body—a more diffuse sense of body boundaries
may well allow the meditator to feel free from the confines of time and space
as well.
53
VISUAL EXPERIENCES
Another interesting side effect of meditation is the potential presence (in

some people and some of the time) of visual experiences of the kind psychol-
ogists routinely call “hallucinations.” How common or uncommon these are
is unknown—Kornfield simply mentions they happen “frequently.” My own
anecdotal polling of fellow meditators suggests individual differences—
some people encounter visual experiences while meditating and other peo-
ple don’t, and both categories of people are surprised to hear of the other’s
existence.20
I hasten to state that “hallucination” is a very strong word, often associ-
ated in people’s minds with mental illness. Here I simply intend the word’s
neutral, descriptive meaning in psychologists’ lingo: Seeing something that
isn’t physically there. The examples in Kornfield’s study include color changes
in the visual field, light flashes, colored lights, fields of great brightness, “a
luminous mind,” feeling as if someone is shining a spotlight on you or—for
those who meditate with eyes open—increased clarity of vision, melting-like
visions, or seeing air energies or vibrations. Kornfield also mentions more
complex experiences, such as visions of the Buddha, a radiating cross, or—
scarier—a hand-sized spider emerging out of the floor. Hallucinations can
also occur during walking meditation—seeing sparkles of light while walk-
ing at night, for instance.
A more systematic study of these phenomena was undertaken by Jared
Lindahl and colleagues.21 They looked in detail at the experiences of 28 peo-
ple recruited from Buddhist meditation groups. This was not a random sam-
ple: The researchers included only yogis who had ever encountered—to quote
their ad—“a meditation-related experience that was significant, unexpected,
challenging, or was associated with physiological or psychological changes.”
Out of these 28, nine participants, roughly one out of three, reported seeing
lights or other forms of luminous experiences; these started occurring, on
average, five years into their meditation practice.
The experiences fell into two types. The first type concerned distinct light
forms. A typical example is “Sometimes there were, oftentimes just a white
spot, sometimes multiple white spots. Sometimes the spots, or ‘little stars’ as
I called them, would float together in a wave, like a group of birds migrating.”
The second type of experience concerned patterns and fuzzy visual experi-
ences, commonly described by the practitioners in this study as shimmer-
ing light, a pixilation of space, or a brightening of the visual field. A typical
account is “Even with my eyes closed, there would be a lot of light in the
visual field. Diffuse, but bright. … When I let go, I was totally enveloped
inside this light. … I was seeing colors and lights and all kinds of things going
on … Blue, purple, red” and “There was often a curtain, this internal curtain
of light.”
54
54Presence
Before I turn to Lindahl’s take on these phenomena, it might be good to

note how meditation teachers react to such experiences. Lindahl gives a long
overview of these reactions. In some traditions, visual experiences are viewed
as positive, that is, as signals of progress on the meditative path. In some
forms of Theravāda Buddhism,22 the first type of visual experience—spots of
light—is often called a nimitta, or “sign.” Experiencing a nimitta is seen as
an indication that your practice is progressing to a stage where deep concen-
tration becomes possible. In the Tibetan tradition, both types of luminous
experience—spots and fuzzy lights—are likewise sometimes interpreted as
signs of progress—indications that the practitioner is making contact with
her own clear and luminous mind.23 Other traditions, however, consider
these experiences as side effects that can lead the meditator astray, making
her believe she is further along on the path than she actually is. This idea is
expressed clearest in contemporary forms of Theravāda Buddhism in Burma24
or in the Zen tradition.25 Still other traditions, like some Western forms of
Theravāda26 or the Tibetan Dzogchen tradition,27 encourage the meditator to
read and sometimes even manipulate these experiences in particular ways to
advance her practice. For instance, Ajahn Brahm suggests that meditators
first learn to recognize the nimitta and then try to “shine it up” or make it
more radiant by focusing on its center, to finally stabilize it. If the meditator
is able to stay with the nimitta with a one-pointed mind, she will eventually
enter the jhana state.
What can science tell us about those light experiences?
To answer this question, we must take two characteristics of these visions
into account. The first is that these hallucinations don’t occur early on in
practice—they only appear after some expertise in meditation has been devel-
oped. Half of the visions reported in the Lindahl et al. study also debuted
during retreats, that is, during periods of extensive, concentrated practice.
Second, the visions described by the meditators in the Lindahl et al. study
are all what psychologists call “simple” hallucinations. This is important
because both characteristics rule out one trivial explanation, namely that the
meditators are having hypnagogic hallucinations—that is, the kind of visions
you have when you are falling asleep. If the yogis were falling asleep, the
visions would to be more akin to dreams—multisensory (typically, hearing
things as well as seeing things), widescreen, without insight in their nature,
and uncontrollable.
Lindahl et al. note that in nonmeditators such simple hallucinations occur
after sensory loss, for instance when people are submitted to extended peri-
ods of isolation, silence, darkness, and immobility, or when they are liv-
ing in a very monotonous environment—like an isolation cell in a prison.
Visual impairment can be a cause as well (e.g., older adults with very poor
vision can develop hallucinations; the so-called Charles Bonnet Syndrome).
In fact, it doesn’t take long for sensory loss– driven hallucinations to
55
occur—15 minutes in a fully darkened room that completely dampens sound

typically does the trick.28 You likely don’t have access to an anechoic chamber
(aka, “dead room”), but you can mimic the effect easily by blindfolding your-
self and blasting a white noise app through your headphones loud enough
to drown out external sounds; half an hour of this often leads to (sometimes
remarkably detailed) visual hallucinations. The bonus is that you are likely to
also experience auditory hallucinations.29
Sensory-loss-driven hallucinations are associated with activation in the
occipital cortex, the seat of the early visual system located in the back of
the brain.30 It is this activity that appears to cause the hallucinations, rather
than the other way around: In an fMRI study with Charles-Bonnet patients,
activation started ramping up in the visual system before the patient reported
the hallucination.31 In the same study, the researchers also found a logical
connection between the content of the hallucination and the brain region that
was activated: A participant who reported seeing faces showed activation
in the left middle fusiform gyrus, an area associated with face perception;
patients seeing featureless colors showed activation in V4, a region crucially
involved in processing color, and so on.
What is then likely happening is that lack of input into the sensory regions
of the brain leads to spontaneous firing of neurons within those regions
through a mechanism called homeostatic plasticity—adjustments to keep the
activity levels within neuronal circuits stable. This can lead to two things.
One is lowering of the firing threshold of the particular brain region, which is
a fancy way of saying that the region will be easier to stimulate (even a little
light that falls on your closed eyelids might look very bright and colorful);
the other is that the neuronal circuit starts firing above threshold even in the
absence of an external stimulus (i.e., you hallucinate).
Meditation is a close cousin to sensory deprivation. You sit as immobile
as you can in a quiet room, alone or with no social interaction, often with the
lights dimmed, and you either fix your gaze on a point on the wall or floor or
close your eyes altogether. Although this isn’t an actual situation of sensory
deprivation (sounds and smells gets through, and, for those who do not close
their eyes, vision remains engaged), it is clearly one of diminished input.
Lindahl et al. speculate that a keen attentional focus, engaged with some-
thing very monotonous and undifferentiated like the breath at the exclusion of
everything else, might be the additional crucial element to bring the meditator
into a zone of deprivation. This might explain why meditation-based hallucina-
tions typically appear after only a few years of practice and why they are more
likely to surface during retreats—the attentional focus, with its active clamping
down of all that is not the immediate object of attention, needs to be strong
enough to create the effect. In line with this conjecture, seven out of nine prac-
titioners in the Lindahl et al. study who mentioned light experiences connected
the arising of these experiences with a period of enhanced concentration.
56
56Presence
All of this, for now, remains largely speculative. There are no fMRI stud-
ies of hallucinations during meditation. There is, however, one EEG study,32
which found that EEG for two meditators who reported light experiences dur-
ing a testing session showed strong alpha blocking, likely a sign of the brain
clamping down on external and internal input—as Lindahl et al. speculated.
So which of the three Buddhist explanations for these phenomena is cor-
rect? Intriguingly, Lindahl et al.’s study suggests that all three have their merit.
First, the finding that enhanced attention might be necessary for the hal-
lucinations to occur fits well with traditions that claim that such hallucina-
tions are a sign of progress: Nimitta or the luminous mind appear after a long
build-up of attentional muscle; they can thus herald an advance in singularity
of focus. Note here that although the results suggest that these visions are
signposts for progress in attention, the inverse is not necessarily true. That is,
individuals who never experience such visions are not necessarily not making
progress—there is no reason why attentional focus should always and auto-
matically lead to visual experiences.
Second, the traditions that claim that the nimitta are nothing more than
side effects are correct too: The hallucinations don’t seem to play any direct
crucial role in progress in any other aspect of meditation.
Third, the traditions that suggest that the nimitta can be used as guidance
for increasing concentration may also be correct. The EEG study suggests
that the presence of nimitta may be indicative of the strength of attention in
the moment. Developing the ability to maintain or stabilize the nimitta may
then be a very good feedback mechanism for further concentration train-
ing. One study on sensory deprivation33 found that participants often tried
to play with their hallucinations and that those research subjects who were
able to shift their attention to different aspects of the experience (e.g., fluctu-
ate between what they thought they were hearing in a sea of white noise and
their internal body states) or who were able to zoom in on the hallucinations
were also the ones who reported such perceptions more frequently. Thus the
ability to shift attention or zoom in on the visions might be a hallmark of
increased concentration and may be exactly what is needed to bring you to
the threshold of absorption, and maybe beyond, as advocates of the third
position claim.
NOISE AND SOUNDS: NOW YOU HEAR IT, NOW YOU DON’T
Meditation is often done with the eyes closed or half-closed. It is, of course,
impossible to close your ears, and sounds will, almost by definition, intrude.
(A possible exception concerns the deeper stages of meditative absorption,
where the claim is that all senses, except the sense of mind, fall away.)34
From what we have seen so far, we might formulate two expectations for
focused-attention meditation. One is the general expectation that focusing
57
attention simply works, and so sounds and noise might become less notice-
able. The other expectation is that the occasional paradoxical episode will
occur as well, where deep concentration leads to hypersensitivity to sounds,
just like visual isolation leads to lower visual thresholds. Fainter noises will
then be perceived more clearly, and ordinary noises may sound louder. When
my wife and I sit at home, sometimes one or the other of our cats likes to sit
with us. Being a cat, her initial curling-up session might abruptly erupt into
a fur-licking fest. When this happens, I often misjudge the cat as being much
closer by than she actually is. In meditation halls, it can sometimes seem as if
your neighbor is breathing right into your ear. And I once witnessed an other-
wise unflappable long-term practitioner of Vipassanā meditation get up quite
resolutely 10 minutes into a sitting, tear our newly acquired clock off the wall,
and throw it into the hallway, after which he returned, serenity re-embodied,
back to his cushion.
During open- monitoring meditation, in contrast, the practitioner is
expected to observe his internal and external environment, and so we might
expect that sounds do get through and may even be noticed more quickly or
hit with higher intensity.
The literature on auditory perception and meditation is large; much of that
literature investigates the effects of Transcendental Meditation®. Most stud-
ies ask the participants to meditate and then present them with sounds during
or right after the meditation period—clicks at regular or irregular intervals,
most often—and measure how the brain processes these sounds. Most of the
work has been done using EEG.
When we look at the literature, however, the picture isn’t clear at all.35 For
the six studies that examined open-monitoring meditation, the evidence is
mixed: Three studies find enhancement (i.e., stimuli are processed better or
faster), one finds no difference, and two find suppression (i.e., stimuli are pro-
cessed less well or slower). For the nine studies that examined focused-attention
meditation, the results suggest maybe a suppression effect: One study finds
enhancement, three find no difference, and five find evidence for suppression.
It is precarious to draw general conclusions from such diverse findings.
Here I highlight two results from this group of studies that might give
you a sense of the complexity of the literature. One comes from the McEvoy
et al. paper. In this study, the researchers tested five expert practitioners of
Transcendental Meditation®. They examined how the brain reacted to very
short clicks (lasting 1 millisecond, that is, 1/1000th of a second), presented at
20 clicks/second immediately before and after meditation. The researchers
recorded EEG in the brainstem; this EEG measured very early processing
(i.e., the brainwaves started between 5.5 and 9 milliseconds after the stimu-
lus occurred, depending on how loud the click was)—way before the sound
signal reached the cortex and stood even a chance of being represented in
awareness.
58
58Presence
It turned out that the brainstem reacted differently based on the inten-
sity of the clicks. When clicks were presented quietly (at 5 to 40 decibels, the
sound level of, at most, a whisper), there were no differences in processing
before and after meditation. Between 40 and 50 decibels (about the level of
ambient urban noise or a very quiet conversation), the brainstem response
was slightly delayed after meditation, suggesting that sounds at these levels
are processed less well during meditation. At 60 to 70 decibels, however (the
sound level of a normal conversation or of background music), there was a
speed-up after meditation, suggesting that meditators are more sensitive to
these sound levels during meditation than before meditation.
So, in this study, meditators were able to shut out (at least to some extent)
sounds that occurred at the levels typical for a quiet meditation hall (from a
whisper to birdsong and ambient traffic noise), but they became hypersensi-
tive to sound levels just a little louder than that—the level of casual conversa-
tion. (Maybe this explains why nothing grates meditators more than someone
having a conversation right outside the meditation room.)
In the second study, Cahn and colleagues tested 16 expert Vipassanā
meditators (with, on average, 20 years of experience). They compared EEG
recorded during a meditation period with EEG recorded during a period of
mind-wandering. During the last four minutes of either meditation or mind-
wandering, the researchers played a series of 250 sound stimuli to their vol-
unteers, one per second; the subjects were asked simply to continue what
they were doing and ignore the sounds. There were three types of sounds: a
low sound, a high sound, and a burst of white noise; the high sound was
played 80% of the time and the high sound and the white noise each 10% of
the time.
Why the 80% versus 10%? When you repeat the same stimulus over and
over, the brain tends to tune it out—a process called habituation. A good
example is the ticking of a clock: After a while, the sound of the ticking fades
away in your mind, and finally it just slips out of awareness altogether. (This
example also shows that habituation is fragile. When attention turns to the
clock again, the opposite occurs—the clock now seems louder and more
obnoxious than ever before: sensitization.) In the Cahn et al. study, the high
tones should have led to habituation, because they were presented very fre-
quently. That did indeed happen for the mind-wandering condition, but it did
not for the meditation condition. (This is likely what happened to my clock-
throwing friend: The ticking unfortunately failed to habituate.) In the mind-
wandering condition, the brain reacted differently to the infrequent sounds
(the low tones and the white noise) than to the frequent sound (the high tone),
as it should. In the meditation condition, however, the brain did not react dif-
ferently to the two types of sound.
All of this suggests that, while you meditate, you take in every sound as
it presents itself, every moment anew, as if the moments that came before
59
never were—truly engaging with each moment and each event as it arises and
passes.
Finally, I would be amiss not to mention one rather spectacular study that
demonstrates quite dramatically how far a truly exceptional meditator can
go in locking out distractions. In this study, by Bob Levenson, Paul Ekman,
and Matthieu Ricard,36 the two first authors tested the third author, a French
monk who, at the time of the study, had been practicing in the Tibetan tradi-
tion for more than 30 years. They subjected him to what the paper describes
as “a 115 decibels, 100 milliseconds acoustic stimulus.” This short burst of
noise was meant to sound like a gunshot; 115 decibels is about the noise level
of a rock concert, of a bass drum being hit, or of sandblasting (it falls short
of the sound level of a real gunshot, which is around 150 to 165 decibels). The
idea was to provoke what is called, unsurprisingly, the startle reflex: You jump
up, and your parasympathetic nervous system goes wild—your heart rate and
blood pressure go up, you breathe more rapidly, and you start to sweat.
There were four conditions in this experiment. The first was an open-
presence meditation, in which Ricard went into a state of open monitoring
that the paper describes as “very vast, clear, vivid, lucid and fully resting in
the moment.” After Ricard indicated that he had reached this state, there was
a 60-second waiting period, and then a 20-second countdown, at the end of
which the fake gunshot sound was blasted from loudspeakers located right
behind the monk’s head. In the second condition, Ricard first went into a state
of focused attention, with his “mind gathered into a point.” After he indicated
that he had reached this state, the same waiting period-then-countdown-
then-blast scenario followed. In the third condition, the same scenario was
followed after Ricard entered a state of distraction—thinking about a par-
ticular incident from the past. Finally, there was an “unanticipated” startle
condition: Ricard was simply blasted with the noise, unannounced.
The researchers measured the strength of Ricard’s startle reflex by poly-
graph (which records automatic physiological responses such as heart rate
and skin conductance) and by examining his facial expression. During the
study, Ricard was seated on a chair on casters, which had a motion detector
attached—yet another way of measuring startle.
Before anything else, the researchers compared Ricard’s unanticipated
startle response to that of other people of his age and found that Ricard had
a perfectly normal startle response.
The meditation results showed that both meditation techniques generally
led to much less of a startle response than distraction did, with open moni-
toring generally yielding less of a response than focused attention. This is
remarkable because typically when research volunteers are asked to suppress
their startle reflex, this actually leads to a larger response—bracing yourself
is counterproductive. Meditation works differently: It is neither a pushing
away, as when you are asked to suppress, nor a looking (or hearing) away,
60
60Presence
as in the distraction condition. Rather, it is a way of being with what hap-

pens when it happens. Ricard’s own description of his experience during open
monitoring was that he was fully in the present moment and the fake gunshot
was just one more of those present moments—in a way, there was nothing to
be startled about. In the focused-attention condition, Ricard reported being
fixed on the incoming event and thus a little more outside the present moment,
not resting in a state of no expectation but more in a state in between open
acceptance and distraction. This might explain why the startle response was
a little more outspoken in focused attention than in open monitoring.
PAIN IN MEDITATION
Pain is one of the certainties in life. It is also one of the certainties in medita-
tion: Almost every meditator who goes through longer retreats will have to
deal with a significant amount of pain in her joints or back sooner or later.
Interestingly, meditation itself provides some remedy for the pain it provokes.
I was able to find seven relevant papers.37 In all of these studies, medita-
tors were presented with painful stimuli that were carefully controlled by the
researchers. This involved things like hot patches applied to the skin (a typi-
cal value is 48˚C, or 118˚F, for a few seconds), low-level electric shocks (below
400 mA, typically lasting for a few seconds), or laser stimulation (supposed
to imitate a needle prick). In most of the studies, the painful stimulus was
presented during meditation; in a few, the stimulus occurred right after a
meditation session. Some studies compared meditators with nonmeditators;
some compared meditation states with various nonmeditative conditions.
The main conclusion is that meditation makes painful experiences
less unpleasant—this was found in all five studies that included this mea-
sure. Interestingly, that does not mean that the pain is necessarily felt less
sharply: In three of the seven studies, meditators rated the pain just as intense
during meditation as outside of meditation; the other four found a decrease
in intensity ratings. This suggests that the main effect of the meditative expe-
rience on pain is not that it removes or dulls the ache. Rather, meditation
makes the experience a tad more bearable.
Why is that?
One reason meditation could make pain more tolerable is the parasympa-
thetic response associated with meditation—the calming of the body.38 The
evidence here is mixed: One study39 found that all of the changes in the medi-
tators’ reports of pain intensity and unpleasantness could be explained by the
slowing down of breathing rate; another40 found that meditation decreased
pain intensity ratings but simple relaxation did not.
A second potential mechanism is distraction. You are now focusing your
attention elsewhere—like on the breath. One finding that suggests that this
61
might be the case is a study by Fadel Zeidan and colleagues—they found that
occupying participants’ minds by having them work on a simple math prob-
lem (counting backward by sevens, starting from 1,000) lowered pain ratings
as well, although not as much as meditation does.
Another possible piece of evidence for the meditation-as-distraction view
comes from a study on a yoga master who claims he is unable to feel pain dur-
ing meditation by “concentrating on not feeling pain.”41 The man is clearly
not all talk—he likes to demonstrate his insensitivity to pain by sticking
needles into his tongue and cheek. The researchers applied laser stimulation
to one of the yogi’s hands or feet at unpredictable points in time. The yogi
reported no pain during meditation but did indicate pain while not meditat-
ing. Brain imaging confirmed this report: During meditation, there was little
or no increase in activation in regions of the brain that are typically associ-
ated with the intensity of pain perception (the thalamus, the somatosensory
cortex).
A third potential mechanism is the nonjudgmental, accepting nature of
meditation—remember Kabat-Zinn’s definition of mindfulness?—especially
in its open-monitoring form. This mindful attention can come in a number
of flavors.
One is to direct your attention carefully to the actual sensations involved in
the experience. In support of this hypothesis, Tim Gard and colleagues found
that painful stimulation during meditation activated the posterior insula and
the secondary somatosensory cortex. These are brain regions typically asso-
ciated with pain intensity—the higher the activation, the sharper the pain.
But Gard et al. found the actual opposite: Meditators with higher activation
in these pain regions rated their pain as less intense. The best explanation is
that pain feels less painful when you carefully zoom in on the exact nature of
the experience—what it actually feels like moment to moment—rather than
labeling it as “pain” and sticking it into the “unpleasant” category.
A second form of nonjudgmental attention is to let go, that is, to disengage
the thinking mind and to give up control—to just be with the pain rather
than try to influence it. In support of this hypothesis, Gard et al. found that
meditators deactivated part of the prefrontal control system of the brain dur-
ing painful stimulation.
A third way to be mindful with pain is to dampen (or maybe even com-
pletely abandon) your usual emotional response to pain. You could reassess
the situation and realize “that all components of the experience of pain are
merely mental events, and thus do not necessarily need to be acted upon,”42
This type of reexamination is typically the task of part of the salience net-
work, notably the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex and the anterior insula.
Indeed, two studies43 reported an increase of activation in these brain regions
during painful stimulation.
62
62Presence
These three mechanisms, of course, aren’t incompatible with each other—

some may be more at play in some studies, some may be more active in some
people than in others, and you can even apply more than one of them at the
same time.
On a practical note, this leaves meditators with a nice bag of relatively
simple tricks to deal with unavoidable pain: You can focus your attention
elsewhere, for instance on the breath; you can get attuned to and relish in the
relaxing effects of meditation; or you can take an attitude of openness and
acceptance toward the true reality of the experience of the pain as it unfolds,
moment by moment.
Theme 3: The Self
THE SELF-A S-S TORY AND
THE SELF-O F-M OMENTARY-AWARENESS
Earlier I discussed changes in attention and in bodily awareness. This section

deals with the third aspect of Tomasino et al.’s map, namely the self. Before
I review the studies on how meditation changes the experience of self, I briefly
discuss how psychologists see the self (or, rather, the sense or experience of
self) and how the brain implements it.
What constitutes the self is still a matter of great psychological and philo-
sophical debate.44 As I briefly discussed in Chapter 2, most psychologists and
neuroscientists make a distinction between, on the one hand, the narrative
self, that is, the self-as-story, and, on the other, the core self or minimal self,
that is, the self-of-momentary-awareness. One difference is that the narrative
self extends over time—it has a past, it lives a present, and it projects itself
into a future. The core self does not—it just is, right here, right now.
The narrative self is the aspect of the self that is being interrogated at par-
ties (“So, tell me about yourself,” and we know what is expected: You talk
about your job, your kids, your spouse, your hobbies, and your recent vaca-
tion); it is also the self you consult when you make life decisions (“Should
I take that job offer?”—and off you go, dreaming up scenarios, referring to
your past experiences, and imagining yourself in new surroundings). The
narrative self is crucial in your sense of who you are: It anchors you in your
relationships with the world and the people around you, and it connects you
with your past and future selves. We can see this, for instance, in people
where this sense of self starts to dissolve, as in Alzheimer’s disease: From the
inside, there can be a real sense of being lost; from the outside, you likewise
can get the sense that you are losing a loved one who no longer understands
her connection to you.
The narrative self is also a story in another sense: It is a fiction—clearly, a
useful one—that is no more than a bundle of momentary impressions that are
63
strung together by memory and the imagination (to paraphrase Hume) but
that gives us a helpful sense of continuity. The classical example to illustrate
this is to look back at a picture of yourself as a child. Are you the same person
as that seven-year-old in that little turquoise jumpsuit? The only reason you
can affirm that that child is you is by pointing at the continuity that links you
to him, but if you were to meet that child, here and now, he would likely not
feel like he was “you” at all.
The minimal, living-in-the-moment, core self is more basic. After all else
is stripped away, after all my memories have faded and all my plans are for-
saken, I likely would still have the sense that there is an “I” here that “I” expe-
rience, an entity that is distinct from the rest of the world, that has a vantage
point anchored in this particular body that “I” recognize as “my” own and is
capable of doing things of its own accord—“I” am typing these words with
“my” hands, because “I” think them, and these words are “mine.” This self
is short-lived; it’s a series of transient selves, a process, born as each of its
experiences arises and thus born again with each new experience or, rather,
with each shift of attention. The narrative self is likely uniquely human, if
only because it seems very much tied to language,45 but the minimal self most
probably is not—our dog,46 who is right now nuzzling my hand, likely has as
much a sense of ownership of his body and of agency as I have and of me-not-
being-h im and him-not-being-me as I do, but it’s unlikely he has a compli-
cated story to tell about himself to his dog park buddies.
These two selves are represented in different parts of the brain, as we have
seen. The self-of-momentary experience is often seen as located in the thala-
mus and the brainstem, the somatosensory cortices, and the insula—those
parts of the brain that are sensitive to the current state of the body and its
interplay with the environment. The self-as-story is associated mostly with
activation in the precuneus and the posterior cingulate, regions that are
part of the default-mode network. And, as explained already, at a less self-
absorbed, maybe more emotional level, this self is associated with activa-
tion in the medial prefrontal cortex as well—also part of the default-mode
network.
SWITCHING OFF THE NARRATIVE SELF
In a very elegant fMRI study, Norman Farb and colleagues47 demonstrated

that even beginning meditators are capable of turning off the narrative self.
They showed participants (half of whom were trained in mindfulness through
an eight-week MBSR program; the other half were complete novices) lists of
personality traits, one word every second. Half of the words were positive
(like “confident”) and the other half negative (like “melancholy”).
There were two conditions. One was a narrative- focus condition,
designed (as the name suggests) to tap the narrative self. In this condition
64
64Presence
the participants were asked to judge what was occurring in their minds as
they were trying to figure out what the words meant to them; they were also
explicitly allowed to get caught up in their train of thought. The other con-
dition was an experience-focus condition, designed to tap into the self-of-
momentary-awareness. For that condition participants were asked to just
sense, without judging, what was occurring in their mind, bodies, and feel-
ings as they read the words, without purpose or goal. If they got distracted
by a particular thought or memory, they were asked to gently return to their
current experiences.
The narrative-focus condition did indeed yield, as you would expect, acti-
vation in the posterior cingulate and the medial prefrontal cortex, as well
as in language areas and the hippocampus (a memory structure). In the
experience- focus condition, the mindfulness- trained participants showed
suppression of the medial prefrontal cortex—in other words, they were deac-
tivating part of the narrative-self network—and an increase in activation in
the insula and the secondary somatosensory cortex—areas associated with
the self-as-momentary experience. These results confirm that meditators
(even with relatively little prior practice) can tune down the narrative self and
tune up the experiencing self simply when you ask them to do so.
One very interesting additional and unexpected result was that, in nov-
ice meditators, the two selves were correlated—when the self-as-momentary
experience was activated, so was the narrative self, and vice versa. This was
not the case in the mindfulness-trained meditators: For them, the two sys-
tems were decoupled. So, in people who are new to meditating, engaging the
narrative self may be an automatic response, a habit. Even a little meditation
experience, however, allows people to step out of this habit and free them-
selves from getting caught up in stories about I-me-m ine, at least for the dura-
tion of a sit.48
One mechanism that makes the decoupling of the narrative and the core
self possible could be the time difference in activation of the two types of
self. Two studies49 have shown that when people judge whether a word applies
to themselves or someone else, the brain structures that build the self-of-
momentary- awareness come online very quickly— after about 150 milli-
seconds; the narrative self takes about 500 to 800 milliseconds to become
operational. Meditators apparently can learn to exploit this gap and stop
the activation emanating from the immediate self before it spreads to the
narrative self.
This dampening of the narrative self seems to lead to greater happiness
in the moment. One study that looked at shifting from a focus on the narra-
tive self to a focus on the self-of-momentary-awareness during meditation
showed that this shift was accompanied by a marked decrease of negative and
mixed negative/positive emotions.50 This may be directly related to the deac-
tivation of the medial prefrontal cortex and the posterior cingulate.51 Thus
65
narrative-self-less meditating may be one way to (at least momentarily) lift

the dark clouds of the mind.
FORGETTING THE SELF ALTOGETHER
Astonishingly, it is possible to go further still in meditation and silence even

the self-of-momentary-awareness, as demonstrated by a clever study by Yair
Dor-Ziderman and colleagues.52 They tested 12 long-term practitioners of
Vipassanā in an MEG machine.53 (This study is part of a larger study, of which
the Berkovich-Ohana and colleagues study mentioned earlier—on timeless-
ness and spacelessness—was another subset.)
As in the Berkovich-Ohana et al. study, participants were asked to cycle
through different meditation conditions. The first condition was designed
to activate the narrative self (“Try to think what characterizes you”). The
second was a minimal- self condition, designed to tap into the self- of-
momentary-awareness (“Try to experience what is happening to you at the
present moment”). Finally, the third condition was a selfless condition (“Try
to experience what is happening at the present moment, when you are not in
the center”). The hope here was that this last instruction would deactivate
both the narrative self and the self-of-momentary-awareness. Immediately
after each bout of meditation, the meditators also told the researchers about
their experiences and rated the quality and stability of their meditation.
The contrast between the narrative-self and the minimal-self condition
showed a reduction in activation in the medial prefrontal cortex, as well as a
more global left frontal deactivation. The contrast between the minimal-self
and the selfless condition showed an even further decrease in medial prefron-
tal activation, as well as a reduction in activation in the precuneus and the
inferior parietal lobe. We have met both of these regions before—the precu-
neus as part of the self-referential network and the inferior parietal lobe as
a switch to the default-mode network. Additionally, both regions are known
to be involved in the feeling of agency (i.e., the feeling that “I” am the one
doing this), in discriminating between self and others, and in differentia-
tion between a third-p erson and a first-p erson perspective—all functions of
the minimal self. The results here then strongly suggest that meditators can
indeed dim down the activation in the core self.
When the core self is turned all the way down, what remains should by
definition be selfless. What does this feel like?
Three meditators described their experiences as a general relaxation or
quieting of body, thought, or experience (examples include: “less judgmental
element; less naming of the experience, less verbally” and “very pleasant and
relaxed and quiet. … devoid of effort”). These were also the meditators with
the least amount of meditation experience (note that the smallest number of
accumulated hours was 1,290, which is still quite respectable).
66
66Presence
Three participants with more accumulated practice described altered

experiences of their body, their senses, or a disorientation in space (“Like in
a dream. Sensations of all kinds of things flickering” and “as if I took a step
back and am looking at myself from the back. I see myself but I am also aware
of what is happening around”).
Finally, the four most seasoned meditators described experiences without
any sense of ownership or agency (“I understood that it was just a sensation,
it was not the hand itself, and the sensation was liberated, and so on in other
areas. There were jumps of liberation; there was a deep thought that all this
was not mine” and “It was emptiness, as if the self fell out of the picture.
There was an experience but it had no address, it was not attached to a center
or subject. … There was no sense of an object there running the show”). This
lack-of-ownership experience seems to be closest to what you would assume
selflessness would feel like, and it was the only type of experience associated
with a decrease in activation in the inferior parietal lobe, as well as in the
thalamus. The thalamus is an ancient brain structure that acts as a hub—it
receives input from the eyes, ears, and spinal cord and relays that information
to the cerebral cortex; it is also implicated in regulating alertness and sleep.
Thus, for this very accomplished group of meditators, this specific experience
of selflessness was indeed associated with the dimming of brain regions that
are associated with a core, minimal self—as self-less as it could possibly get.
In some forms of Buddhism, notably Zen, the self-less experience, labeled
kenshō or satori, is considered the peak experience of the meditative mind,
where “the sense of selfhood is dissolved and an ‘unattached, self-less, imper-
sonal’ awareness remains.”54 The Dor-Ziderman et al. study suggests that the
self-less meditators (or should we say meditations?) might have been self-less
in almost a literal sense. That is, this meditative state was associated with
a stripping away of activation in regions associated with the self, not with
increased activation in some other area of the brain. I point this out because
previous research on spiritual experiences has suggested that there is an on
switch for mystical experiences, sometimes nicknamed the “God spot” or the
“God module.”55 Here we find the opposite: There is no selflessness, empti-
ness, or kenshō module—the self-less experience is exactly what it claims to
be: the peeling or falling away of the self, the loss first of your own iden-
tity, then of identity altogether. It is not the attainment of something new
but rather the letting go, the unplugging of your habitual way of viewing the
world from the lens of an “I.”
On an interesting side note, all participants in the study felt very successful
in their endeavor to meditate selflessly, probably because all of them experi-
enced reduced activation in the precuneus and the inferior parietal lobe, both
of which may be associated with some change in inner experience. Clearly,
however, only the meditators with a tremendous amount of meditation expe-
rience succeeded in actually meditating with only minimal stirrings of a sense
67
of self, although the less accomplished meditators were clearly convinced that
they succeeded in doing this as well.
What about the Heart Practices?
All of the studies described here pertain to the attention-based practices—

focused attention (including jhana) and open monitoring.
What about the third type of Buddhist practice—heart practices such as
metta practice or compassion meditation?
The sad answer is that we don’t know much about brain activation during
the heart practices. I could only find six papers; between them, they reported
results from four different studies. Only one of those studies—the study by
Brewer and colleagues we have already encountered—provided an explicit
comparison with other types of meditation.
In the first fMRI study on heart practices, Antoine Lutz and colleagues56
compared novices and expert meditators. The experts (16 in the 2008 study;
data from 10 of them were reanalyzed in the 2009 study) had accumulated
between 10,000 and 50,000 hours of meditation experience. All had extensive
experience with compassion meditation. They meditated inside the scanner,
cycling a total of eight times between 3 minutes of compassion meditation57
and 1.6 minutes of rest. Every 6 to 10 seconds, a sound was played over ear-
phones. The sound could either be neutral (e.g., background noise at a restau-
rant), positive (e.g., a baby laughing), or negative (e.g., a woman screaming).
Participants were simply asked to continue meditating or resting and to
ignore the sounds. The researchers, of course, were interested in how the
brain reacted to these sounds.
In general, they found that expert meditators activated parts of the default-
mode network more than novices did. More specifically, they activated parts
of the network that are associated with present-state awareness (temporal
parietal junction) as well as the core of the network (precuneus and posterior
cingulate cortex). The default-mode network is also often active when people
are trying to figure out other people’s intentions and feeling, and Lutz et al.
speculate that this is what might be going on here: mentalizing, putting one-
self in the place of all the beings one feels compassion toward.
The anterior insula and the anterior cingulate cortex—that is, the salience
network—were also more active during compassion meditation than during
rest, as was the amygdala—the emotion center of the brain. Interestingly,
when emotional sounds were played, the right insular cortex was the only
brain area that reacted differently in novices and experts: Only in experts
did it react more strongly to negative sounds. This activity was also related
with the degree to which meditators indicated they had successfully entered
the meditative state: The deeper the meditation, the stronger the activation
68
68Presence
in the insula. These results suggest that the meditation set up the partici-
pants to check out emotional stimuli—p erhaps a readiness to empathize with
others—and experts in compassion meditation perceived negative stimuli—
the sound of a suffering fellow human being appealing to their compassion—
as acutely pertinent.
Compassion meditation also led to an increase in heart rate but not breath-
ing frequency. The change in heart rate correlated with the activation in the
insula, and especially so in experts. This suggests that compassion practice
effectively counteracts some of the usual parasympathetic, calming effect of
meditation. Teachers often prescribe heart practices when meditators feel
drowsy or sleepy,58 and this may be the reason: It is, indeed, regardless of its
emotional impact, an invigorating exercise.
In the second study on heart practices, Maria Engström and Birgitta
Söderfeldt59 tested a single highly experienced meditator (who, besides
her daily practice, had also participated in two three-year-long traditional
Tibetan Buddhist retreats). In the scanner, she cycled three times through
30 seconds of compassion meditation, accompanied by a mantra, and two
periods of repeating sentences. Like Lutz and colleagues, the researchers
found activation in the anterior cingulate and the right insula, as well as in
the right caudate. The caudate is implicated in, among other things, process-
ing of emotions.
In the third study, Tatia Lee and colleagues60 examined 12 meditators
with, on average, about 7,500 hours of compassion-meditation practice.
During meditation, the participants viewed a set of 20 neutral, 20 happy,
and 20 sad pictures. They rated how emotional they thought each picture
was. The main finding was that experts who were viewing sad pictures acti-
vated the left medial frontal gyrus and the left caudate more strongly than
novices did; while they were viewing happy pictures, experts showed higher
activation in the left anterior cingulate, the right medial frontal gyrus, and
the right precuneus. This suggests that compassion meditation experts react
more strongly to a display of sad emotions (anterior cingulate) and identify
more quickly with happy sentiments (left caudate). In both cases, they were
also more efficient in regulating these emotions (the middle or inferior fron-
tal gyrus).
A different picture, however, emerges from the fourth study, by Judson
Brewer and colleagues61 (12 meditators with about 10,000 hours of practice).
In this study, loving-k indness meditation specifically deactivated the amyg-
dala and the hippocampus. The hippocampus tends to be associated with,
among other things, the retrieval of memories and planning for the future.
Its deactivation suggests that meditators were on focus, that is, not mind-
wandering, and likely less self-c entered. The amygdala is intimately linked
with the processing of emotions. Its deactivation might mean that emotional
stimuli in general are temporarily shut out of awareness— a conclusion
69
opposite to that of Lutz and colleagues. It could, however, also mean that the
brain’s alarm system calms down as the meditator infuses himself with the
emotions and sensations of loving-k indness (the amygdalae are notable for
reacting very quickly to fearsome stimuli62).
Finally, Kathleen Garrison and colleagues63 replicated and extended the
results from the Brewer et al. study in a group of 20 expert meditators (with
about 10,000 hours of accumulated practice, on average). Specifically, they
found that experts showed lower connectivity between the inferior frontal
gyrus and the posterior insula and the rest of the brain. The inferior fron-
tal gyrus is often implicated in emotional processing and empathy,64 and so
Garrison et al.’s result suggests that experts engage in less emotional process-
ing during loving-k indness meditation than novices do.
How to summarize these diverse results?
For one, it is clear that, unlike the two attention-based practices, loving-
kindness and compassion meditation have a clear impact on emotion-related
structures in the brain. There is an interesting discrepancy here, how-
ever: Three studies show a heightened sensitivity or receptivity to emotions;
two show a decrease in emotional processing. I think the key difference is that
the second set of studies looked at loving-k indness/compassion meditation
as it occurred, undisturbed. The first set of studies, in contrast, interrupted
the meditation with emotional stimuli—sounds of distress or joy, or pictures
of happy or sad events. The differences in emotional processes between the
two sets of studies might be telling here: In the first set of studies, the salience
system was engaged, as was the system related to processing of the self, but
this was not the case in the second set of studies.
What might be happening, then, perhaps, is that during uninterrupted
loving-k indness meditation the self-related network and the salience system
are allowed to go silent because the object of meditation is clear and predict-
able; that is, there is little room for mind-wandering. When emotional sounds
or pictures puncture your loving-k indness meditation, however, the salience
system reacts swiftly, and the connection between the perceived suffering and
yourself is quickly established. Thus loving-k indness meditation appears to
be both a practice that is cool and composed and a practice that primes you
for compassion and loving-k indness, if the need to exercise those would arise.
Long-Term Meditation Expertise
No one is born a meditator—it takes time, effort, and dedication to develop

the skill. Most (but not all) of the studies I describe in this chapter were done
on highly accomplished meditators, with often tens of thousands of hours of
practice under their belts (or robes, in many cases). Given that there are few
studies of less accomplished meditators (people like me, and maybe you), it
70
70Presence
is hard to trace the development of meditation expertise from monkey mind

to monk’s mind.
Here is what we do know.
First, we know that, over time, meditators develop the skills associated with
the type of meditation they engage in.
In her meta-analysis on attention practices, Tomasino et al. also looked at
differences between long-term and shorter term meditators (the dividing line
was at 5,000 hours of total accumulated practice—quite a lot). They found
that long-term meditators activated the attention brain circuits to a lesser
extent than shorter term practitioners did, suggesting that as the meditation
practice matures, less effort is needed to sustain a sitting.
Tomasino et al.’s contrast was between studies; that is, they contrasted
studies in which the average level of expertise was high with those where it
was lower. A potential problem here is that studies differ in many aspects—
maybe the studies with long-term practitioners used simpler meditations and
thus placed lower demands on the yogi’s attentional systems.
When we look at studies that include individuals of different levels of
expertise, we find a more mixed pattern. Antonietta Manna and colleagues65
found the same result as Tomasino et al. when comparing monks with about
16,000 hours of practice with novices—monks showed decreased activation
in attention structures. Baron Short and colleagues66 found the opposite
result when looking at lay meditators (splitting the sample in meditators who
had an accumulated record of less than or more than about 2,000 hours)—
increased expertise leads to increased activation in attention structures. Julie
Brefczynski-Lewis and colleagues67 found the solution to the riddle: They
obtained both results when they split their group of meditators into three—
experts (19,000 hours of accumulated practice) showed stronger activation
than novices, but experts with 44,000 hours of accumulated practice showed
less activation than novices. What seems to be happening, then, is that medi-
tators initially learn to build up attentional effort (and this takes many years);
when they have done so, they slowly become more efficient. Part of the grow-
ing efficiency is that expertise builds stronger connections within the atten-
tion network, as we will see in a bit more detail in the next chapter. Likewise,
experts show stronger couplings between the attention network and the
default-mode network, which makes it easier to suppress mind-wandering, as
Hasenkamp and Barsalou found.68
Part of this fine-tuning of attention might be developing a better sense of
the sometimes subtle signals that tell you that the meditation is going where
it is supposed to go. Earlier I discussed the findings from Kathleen Garrison
et al.’s study where research participants were shown a real-time graph of
their PCC activity and were asked to meditate themselves into either the
red or the blue zone of PCC activation or deactivation. An important addi-
tional finding from this study was that only long-term meditators were able
71
to do this; novices were not. Expert meditators may thus be more sensitive
to nuances in their inner states, connect those with the graphs, and use this
knowledge to guide them toward deeper or shallower states of concentra-
tion, as the task required. This result also casts doubt on some of the claims
made by commercial enterprises (I won’t name any here) that meditation can
be taught through biofeedback. The reason for the doubt is twofold: One is
that collecting reliable default-mode network signals is hard to do outside the
scanner69; the other is that you might need a lot of experience with meditation
before you can use such signals to your advantage. We do know that biofeed-
back can teach you to relax,70 but meditation is much more than chilling out.
A second finding is that, over time, there seems to be a trend toward dis-
embodiment and selflessness. Tomasino et al.’s meta-analysis found that long-
term meditators show more activation in the supplemental motor areas and
in the superior medial gyrus than less experienced meditators—evidence for
a growing disembodiment with longer practice. Previously I cited the results
from the study on selflessness by Dor-Ziderman and colleagues, which sug-
gests that true selflessness, as characterized by a lack of ownership over expe-
riences, can be reached only after an extremely large amount of practice. Both
of these outcomes of meditation are side effects—they are not the actual goal
of practice (at least not in these traditions). This perhaps implies that they
are a natural outflow of the amount of time spent in meditation. Tomasino
et al. describe this as a strategy shift: Seasoned meditators might focus less on
controlling their attention and instead concentrate more on disembodiment.
This might fit with the (non-)strategy of “no-efforting” that Garrison et al.
found in their expert meditators.
Third, there is also some evidence that more experienced meditators take
less of a judgmental, evaluative, or emotional stance in meditation. Two stud-
ies support this idea. First, Manna et al. found that novices simultaneously
activate the anterior cingulate (part of the salience network) and the lateral
orbitofrontal cortex during open monitoring. The lateral orbitofrontal cortex
is involved in affective and cognitive evaluations, and so it appears that either
whatever you are monitoring is being evaluated, or you check in on your eval-
uations, or both. This coupling was absent in expert meditators, suggesting
that experts let go of their evaluative mindset. Second, Brefczynski-Lewis
et al. presented emotional sounds toward the end of short meditation peri-
ods. They found a strong negative relation between accumulated number of
hours of practice and activation in the amygdala (a region associated with
gut emotionality) and the posterior cingulate cortex (part of the default-mode
network), suggesting less emotional reactivity and less distraction in highly
accomplished meditators.
Fourth, over time, meditators become more meditative in daily life—or at
least they might use idle moments as meditative opportunities. This isn’t
really something researchers were looking for, so it’s a bonus finding. They
72
72Presence
happened to stumble across this result when comparing the brains of medita-
tors with those of nonmeditators when both were lying idle inside the scanner
or the testing room and asked to do nothing in particular. This is illustrated
in three examples.
First, in an EEG study, Rael Cahn et al.71 found that long-term Vipassanā
meditators (with, on average, 19 years of practice) showed just as much alpha
power in their brainwaves during rest as during meditation, and this level
was higher than that of meditators with fewer years of practice (2.5 years, on
average). As we have seen, meditators likely generate these alpha waves dur-
ing meditation as they turn off distracting thoughts. The new finding is that
experts also generate those waves when they are just sitting around, not doing
anything in particular. Cahn et al. interpret this as a trait difference: The
meditative habit starts seeping into every aspect of daily life; it becomes part
of your personality. Another interpretation is that meditators simply slip into
meditative states whenever there isn’t anything in particular that needs their
attention—like when they are waiting for the researchers to start up their
experiment.
Second, in their fMRI study, Judson Brewer and colleagues found a strong
coupling between the default-mode network and the salience network in long-
term meditators, regardless of what type of meditation they were engaged in.
But this didn’t happen only during meditation: The same coupling was found
during a rest period. As I mentioned, Hasenkamp and Barsalou obtained
a similar result: Longer meditation practice was associated with a stronger
coupling between the default-mode network and the attentional network at
rest. These two studies suggest that the meditative state carries over, with
meditators bringing more attention to their inner states, at least when resting
inside the scanner.
Third, Antonietta Manna and colleagues found that the brain patterns of
Buddhist monks during rest resembled those of open-monitoring meditation
but not focused-attention meditation; novices’ brains did not look meditative
at all. The conclusion here would be that monks practice open monitoring
also in nonmeditative conditions or, again, at least when waiting inside the
scanner.
The three key findings concerning the long- t erm development of
meditation—meditation becomes less effortful over time, during medita-
tion meditators become more self-less as well as less judgmental, and the
meditative state increasingly spills over into nonmeditative moments—
suggest that long-term meditation (or maybe even short-term meditation)
might leave lasting imprints on the brain and likely leaves traces on behav-
ior off the cushion as well. We explore those possibilities in the remainder
of this book.
A final note on this: None of the studies cited here suggest that there are cut-
offs or stages in meditation practice. Rather, when researchers plot activation
73
(or some other measure of how meditation is implemented in the brain) as a

function of accumulated practice, the plots all look wonderfully continuous
even if—in the attention case—curved. There are, as far as we know, no steps,
no plateaus, no sudden jumps. Thus meditation expertise (like just about any
other form of expertise) is built gradually, and also—another fascinating
point to consider—it never ends. The Buddha himself, after his peak experi-
ence at age 35, kept practicing for another 45 years—tradition has it that he
died while meditating, at age 80.
There is one exception to this pattern, as we have seen, and that is the expe-
rience of selflessness,72 which, in its form of loss of ownership, is something
that does look like a qualitative jump and one that can only be made after a
tremendous amount of practice. This may be one reason why this experience,
in some Buddhist traditions, is considered the hallmark of awakening.
74
75
{ 4 }
Telltale Traces in the Brain
One of the brain’s more incredible properties is its plasticity: The brain con-
stantly rewires itself in an endless run of updates. In a very real sense, you can
never use the same brain twice.
Some of these changes are self-evident. For instance, many experiences,
especially rare or emotional or highly important ones, leave more or less per-
manent imprints on the brain—that’s what memories are.
Some types of plasticity may be less obvious. For instance, repeatedly
performing a particular action leaves its mark on the brain structure that is
needed to perform this action: It starts to grow.
One of the first studies to show this type of plasticity in humans, by
Eleanor Maguire and colleagues, was done on London taxicab drivers.1
London is a very complicated city to navigate (not like most North American
cities, which are built on a rectangular grid, often with streets that have num-
bers for names). In order to be licensed, cab drivers have to prove they know
the shortest route between any two points in the city—they have to pass a
mysterious-sounding test called The Knowledge. Both the intense study of
maps necessary to pass The Knowledge as well as the actual driving around
in the city would build navigation skills. Maguire et al. found that the part
of the brain that is associated with spatial navigation, the back part of the
hippocampus, was larger in cab drivers than in other Londoners. They also
found that this growth came at a price—cab drivers had a smaller front part
of the hippocampus (the part that handles memory).
Sometimes such changes occur very rapidly. In one famous study,2 12
undergraduate students learned to juggle; they were compared with other
students who did not practice this skill. After only three months, two parts of
the jugglers’ brains had grown larger, namely V5, which specializes in motion
perception, and the left posterior intraparietal sulcus, which plans and exe-
cutes movements that involve objects. After another three months in which
the jugglers were asked to not practice their newly acquired skill, these two
areas shrunk about halfway back to their original volume. Thus plasticity
76
76Presence
can (at least under some circumstances, maybe with a relatively simple, well-
defined skill) turn on and off quite rapidly.
In this chapter, I look at differences in the structure (or “morphology”)
of the brains of meditators compared with the brains of nonmeditators and
at changes in structure within meditators over the course of their practice.
Chapters 2 and 3 were all about the brain activity associated with meditation;
this chapter investigates what lasting changes are wrought by this activity.
What Brain Changes Should We Look For?
Note that it is unlikely that we will find any qualitative differences between
the brains of meditators and nonmeditators. That is, there is no reason to
suspect that the brains of meditators would have different parts, or would
be wired differently, or would be arranged in different ways. More likely, we
will find quantitative differences, that is, differences between meditators and
nonmeditators in shape, mass, or volume of particular brain regions, as we
can see them on MRI scans.
In practice, three types of measures have been used to examine such dif-
ferences. The first is simply volume: how large a particular brain region or
structure is. The second is called gray matter density or gray matter concen-
tration, and it is a bit less intuitive. Scanners do not take a 3D picture of the
whole brain. Rather, they build a 3D representation of the brain by taking
multiple 2D pictures of a slice of brain tissue (rather like making a cut and
examining both sides of the cut); then they stack these images. These slices
have a thickness to them (often a millimeter or so). Within each slice, the
picture actually consists of a set of small blocks, called voxels. You can
think of voxels like pixels on a computer screen, only in 3D, hence the name,
short for “volume pixel.” Voxel size differs with the strength of the scanner
and the way scanning is done but is typically around 2 mm3—enough to
contain over a million neurons. Density is defined as the amount of gray
matter inside a voxel; the gray matter density of a particular brain structure
is the amount of gray matter combined over all voxels that fall within that
structure.
For both of these measures, volume and density, the actual reason behind
any changes we might find is ambiguous: Gray matter is made up of the cell
bodies of neurons, the end nodes of neurons, glial cells (cells that provide sup-
port and protection for neurons), and capillaries (small blood vessels). Thus
if we find that meditation increases gray matter volume or density, this could
mean a number of things: New neurons have formed, existing neurons have
built more connections, new glial cells have popped up, or new capillaries
have appeared (the technical term for the latter is angiogenesis), or any com-
bination of these four.
77
Telltale Traces in the Brain 77
Note that although volume and density are different measures, at least
two studies3 have found that they tend to go hand in hand; that is, if you find
a difference in one, you are also likely to find a difference in the other, so we
could combine studies that looked at only one of the two in the same meta-
analysis—exactly what was done in the one meta-analysis on brain structure
and meditation.4
The third measure, tractography, is quite different from the other two.
Tractography is a technique for mapping the white matter fibers that inter-
connect different parts of the brain; it also allows for an estimate of how
strong or efficient those connections are. White matter is the stuff that con-
nects neurons; white matter fibers, often called white matter tracts, thus send
information from one part of the brain to another.
How to Study the Influence of Meditation on Brain Structure
If we find differences between meditators and nonmeditators for one or more

of these measures in one or more brain regions, the hope, of course, is that
these differences are telltale traces left by meditation practice. This is not
a given, however. The issue is that most (but not all) of the relevant studies
are cross-sectional studies, that is, studies in which the two different groups—
meditators and nonmeditators—are scanned exactly once. This offers only
weak evidence for the hypothesis that meditation is the cause of the differ-
ence. It could also be the case that people with a particular brain structure
are attracted to meditation, or more successful at it, or find it more enjoyable
and are thus more likely to stick with it.
Consider, for instance, the finding that meditators have larger attention
centers in the brain (an outcome that has actually been observed, as we will
see). I hope I have convinced you by now that meditation is a form of atten-
tion training, and so it is tempting to conclude that this training translates
into an increase in relevant brain tissue. But it might also be possible that it is
the other way around: People who are better at paying attention (and so might
have larger attention centers in their brain to begin with) might take to medi-
tation more organically than people who are naturally more scatter-brained.
So how can we establish that differences between meditators and non-
meditators are due to the meditation history of the meditators and not to
preexisting differences between meditators and nonmeditators or to chance?
The previous argument, namely that what we see makes logical sense—
meditation trains attention, and so if we see differences in attention skills
between those who meditate and those who do not, this must be due to
attention—is a weak argument. The convergence argument sometimes used in
research papers—that is, that some regions found to show structural changes
in the brain are also found to be activated during meditation—is not much
78
78Presence
stronger: The causal link could still be reversed: Brain regions might acti-
vate more strongly because they contain more neurons, more connections, or
more capillaries, and so these preexisting differences between meditators and
nonmeditators might show up in brain activation as well.
The only type of study that can unambiguously establish the direction
of the effect (i.e., brain → meditation, or meditation → brain) is a longitudi-
nal study. In longitudinal research, two groups—nonmeditators (the “con-
trol” group) and beginning meditators (the “treatment” or “intervention”
group)—are followed over a period of time so that we can actually look at
change. Crucially, in these studies, everyone’s brain is scanned at at least two
time points, once before the treatment group starts meditating and once after
this group acquires some skill in meditation. Two types of comparisons can
be made. First, we can compare “after” with “before” in both groups and
see if meditators make more progress than nonmeditators. Second, we can
compare meditators with nonmeditators after the intervention to see if dif-
ferences between meditators and nonmeditators emerge after treatment. (At
first blush, it may seem strange to have the second comparison when we have
the first. One reason to look at differences after treatment is that this is the
statistic that matters to policymakers: How well are people who went through
a particular treatment doing compared to their peers who did not undergo
treatment? A second reason to look at differences after treatment is that
cross-sectional studies by definition only provide this second comparison,
and so by using this “after” contrast, we can directly link longitudinal and
cross-sectional studies.) In an ideal study, we would also scan at multiple time
points along the way, and have a follow-up test as well, so that we can have a
good look at the development of expertise and check if expertise is sustained.
Longitudinal studies into true meditation expertise are not very feasible,
alas—as we have seen, the people whom researchers in this field consider to
be meditation experts have spent many thousands of hours of practice on the
cushion. There are, however, a few intrepid researchers that have been brave
enough to investigate the effects of short-term interventions, notably eight-
week MBSR programs, on brain structure with a longitudinal design.
To some extent, the longitudinal design can be simulated by having dif-
ferences stand in for change. You can do this by comparing meditators of
varying degrees of expertise and relating the level of expertise to one or more
measures of brain morphology. Suppose we find, for instance, that in medita-
tors with one year of expertise, brain region X has a volume of 10 mm3 and
that this structure has a volume of 12 mm3 in meditators with three years of
expertise and 14 mm3 in those with five years of expertise. In this example,
each year of expertise translates into a 1 mm3 increase in brain volume in
region X. Researchers in pharmacology call this a dose–response relationship.
The dose is the amount of meditation expertise; the response is brain volume
in region X. It is still technically possible that a dose–response relationship is
79
due to chance or to preexisting differences between these three groups, but it

is also quite unlikely.
I should note here that dose–response relationships have been found in
plasticity studies outside the field of meditation research. In the London cab
driver study, for instance, the increase in volume in the back of the hippo-
campus was directly related to the number of years on the job; in the jug-
gling study, the students who were better at juggling (presumably because
they practiced more) also had larger increases in volume in the two critical
regions.
How Meditation Changes the Brain: What the Sample

of Participants Looks Like
As in my review of the literature on brain activation, I take a recent meta-

analysis of the literature as my starting point. There is only one at the time of
writing, by Kieran Fox and colleagues.5
As with the Tomasino et al. meta-analysis on brain activation, it may be
a good idea to first have a good look at what type of meditators we are talk-
ing about here. Fox et al. collected the results from 21 studies. The total tally
across all studies is 503 meditators and 472 nonmeditators. Because some
participants were tested in more than one study, the number of actual people
tested is smaller still, namely about 3706 meditators. All but one of the 21
studies looked at cross-sectional differences between meditators and non-
meditators; five also included a longitudinal component. The longitudinal
sample is extremely small, however: Only 114 people were tested before and
after participating in a meditation program; they were compared to 90 con-
trol participants.
There are four noticeable differences between this set of studies and those
on brain activation during meditation. One is that the amount of meditation
expertise is lower here (4,664 lifetime hours of lifetime expertise, on average,
versus 11,552 lifetime hours for the Tomasino et al. analysis; that is still a lot
of experience). A second difference is that the morphology studies, as far as
I can tell, all use laypeople—no monastics have been tested. The third is that
fewer studies (12 out of 21) focused on participants who practiced meditation
within an explicit Buddhist tradition. The fourth is that five of these stud-
ies (i.e., about one-quarter) recruited their participants from an MBSR or
MBSR-like program,7 that is, a relatively short and decidedly nonreligious
training program.
Again, this is a sample that is, on average, highly proficient and well trained
in meditation, and likely not very representative of the average Western medi-
tator. That said, the sample is also less extreme in their accomplishments
than the sample in the activation studies I discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. This
80
80Presence
is probably because it is easier to recruit participants at your nearest Zen or

Vipassanā center than to find a Buddhist monastery, and it is less critical for
these kind of studies to have truly unflappable meditators. In morphology
studies, what your mind actually does inside the scanner is unimportant as
long as you keep your head still, so you could simply rest, or daydream, or
make your shopping list.
Before We Start: Publication Bias
There is one important caveat with this set of studies, and that is the possibil-
ity of publication bias. What is publication bias?
Here is the scientific publication process in a nutshell: You conduct your
study, you analyze your results, you write them up, and you send it off to a
journal. The editor of the journal (a fellow scientist) will send your manuscript
to two or three other scientists to check on its merits and demerits. These
two or three colleagues write a detailed, anonymous review. These reviews
almost always contain suggestions for changes—new citations to be added,
new analyses to be performed, questions for clarification, errors in reasoning
or in the design of the study, and so on. On the basis of those reviews, the edi-
tor makes a decision about whether to publish it. When the paper looks good,
the decision usually takes the form of a “revise and resubmit”; that is, you are
invited to rewrite your manuscript to incorporate some or all of the changes
suggested by the reviewers or to counter the reviewer’s points of criticism.
The publication process has many rejection moments built in, starting with
the researcher: When you analyze your results, do you like them? Assume, for
instance, that you conduct a study on brain morphology and meditation and
you do not find any differences, or you find something unexpected that runs
counter your ideas (e.g., you find that the attention centers of meditators’
brains are actually smaller). In that case, you might be tempted to shelve the
results right away, because you think they do not make sense, or because
you think they will never make it past the reviewers.8 If you do write up the
results, the reviewers might lambast you for trying to publish “null results”
(another technical term—results that say there is nothing there) or for show-
ing results that you, or they, cannot explain, and so the editor rejects the
paper and it never sees the light of day.9 This creates a publication bias in that
studies reporting a positive result are more likely to be published and studies
that found a null or negative result are less likely to be published.
How can we know that publication bias exists in a particular set of stud-
ies? The best way is to ask around and see if there’s anyone who has unpub-
lished studies lying around—but who do you ask, and will they be truthful in
their answer? One slightly sneakier way to get at publication bias is to probe
for indirect evidence that a specific type of result is missing. This involves
81
capitalizing on the law of large numbers: If you have a study with many par-
ticipants, it is more likely to reveal the truth than a study with only a small
group of participants. I gave the example of political polling earlier—asking
a few thousand folks whom they will vote for is a better way to predict the
outcome of an election than asking just 20 people.
So one way to look for publication bias is to see what the effect size is in
the largest studies, and then see if smaller studies show effect sizes that are
symmetrical around this large-sample effect. That is, we would expect that
smaller scale studies show more randomness, but if random is really random,
this should work in both directions: Half of the studies should show a larger
effect and half a smaller effect. Also, the studies with the smallest number of
people should be off by a larger amount. That is not what Fox et al. found
in the brain morphology studies: In effect, all smaller scale studies showed
effects that were larger than the effect in the large-scale studies, and all stud-
ies showed a positive effect. This is highly suspicious, and it makes it very
likely that publication bias is operating—studies with null effects simply
don’t make it into print.
This doesn’t mean that the results cannot be trusted. First, publication
bias in and of itself is unlikely to lead to convergent results between studies,
which is what the Fox et al. meta-analysis ultimately set out to determine. If
the effects that have been published were all random, there should be very
little consistency in the actual brain regions that are being found to differenti-
ate between meditators and nonmeditators. If we find that there is consistency,
the result of publication bias is that we will overestimate the size of the effect,
but its location should still most likely be correct. Second, the effects in large-
scale studies are not zero—the large-sample effect size is still about 0.5 SD.
In sum, what the presence of publication bias does mean is that the “true”
size of the effect (i.e., its size if we were able to get those unpublished studies
out of the file drawer) is likely much smaller than what Fox et al. reported in
their meta-analysis.
Excitement Versus Replication: Averaging across Studies
As I mentioned in Chapter 1, and again when discussing the Tomasino et al.

map, the aim of meta-analysis is to find convergence among studies. It does so
by averaging results across studies. Recall that one consequence of this is that
differences in brain structure between meditators and nonmeditators that are
only found in a few studies are not likely to figure heavily in the final verdict.
One example of this is an excellent study10 that looked at brainstem volume
and found that areas in the brainstem that regulate breathing are enlarged
in meditators. This result is exciting because it makes sense—after all, medi-
tators are keenly attuned to their breathing—and it also has important
82
82Presence
implications—for instance, it might explain the effects of long-term medita-

tion on stress reactivity. (And you might read such claims in the media reports
on this study.) Much as I like this result, it has not been replicated—no other
study has found it—and so it remains a lonely data point that did not become
significant in the Fox et al. meta-analysis. This is the way it should be—after
all, one of science’s mottos is (or should be) “replication or it didn’t happen.”
Given the modest number of studies, the meta-analysis also by necessity
averages across aspects that we probably shouldn’t average across, such as
the particular tradition the meditators practice in, different levels of exper-
tise, the ultimate goal of the training (stress reduction vs. enlightenment), and
the like. How much this truly matters is unknown. For instance, we might
expect that traditions that emphasize focused attention might lead to dif-
ferent brain changes (maybe more thickening in executive control regions)
than traditions that put open monitoring to the fore (which might yield larger
modifications in the salience network). An early review found exactly these
differences between Vipassanā and Zen,11 but—p erhaps unsurprisingly, given
the mixed results in activation studies, as shown in Chapter 3—later studies
have not borne this out.
The Fox et al. Meta-Analysis: Changes in Gray Matter
Looking at changes in gray matter first, Fox et al. found eight brain regions
with more or less consistent increases in volume and/or density: (a) the ante-
rior and mid insula, (b) the sensory and motor cortex (including the supra-
marginal gyrus), (c) the anterior precuneus, (d) the rostrolateral prefrontal
cortex, (e) the anterior cingulate cortex and the medial cingulate cortex, (f)
the orbitofrontal cortex, (g) the inferior temporal gyrus and the fusiform
gyrus, and (h) the hippocampus. They also found two regions that show more
or less consistent decreases in volume and/or density: (a) the posterior cingu-
late cortex and (b) the precuneus.
One way of looking at these findings is to check for convergence with the
Tomasino et al. map. The assumption would be that brain areas that are
activated during meditation would also show structural changes. Under this
view, meditation is a skill that is continuously being honed, and this hon-
ing leaves its marks on the brain.12 You may have noticed that a few of Fox
et al.’s regions sound familiar from Tomasino et al.’s map or from the discus-
sion in Chapter 3 (anterior insula, anterior cingulate cortex, supramarginal
gyrus, posterior cingulate cortex, and precuneus). You may also have noticed
absences—regions that are on Tomasino et al.’s map but not on Fox et al.’s
(e.g., superior parietal lobe, medial prefrontal cortex)—and regions that are
on Fox et al.’s map but not Tomasino et al.’s (e.g., the sensory and motor cor-
tices and the hippocampus).
83
It seems to me that what is important here is not the region-to-region cor-

respondence between the two maps but the parts of the wider story that over-
lap. Recall that we viewed Tomasino et al.’s map as a map of four fields of
activity: (a) control over attention, which results in a silencing of the default-
mode network; (b) an increased focus on body sensations; (c) a decreased
sense of global body awareness; and (d) a quieting down of the storytelling
mind. Some of these themes are also present in Fox et al.’s map, suggesting,
indeed, that repeated activation of these brain regions in meditation might
result in structural changes. (Although, as noted earlier, it might also be
the other way around—structural differences leading to different levels of
activation.)
With regard to attention, Fox et al. find morphological changes in the
salience network—most notably an increase in the anterior cingulate cortex
and the anterior insula. We’ve encountered plenty of studies in the previous
chapter that show that meditation tends to activate these structures.
The evidence for changes in executive control is maybe harder to detect—
the major players in the frontoparietal control network do not figure in Fox
et al.’s map. Fox et al. did, however, find increased volume and/or density in
the rostrolateral prefrontal cortex (sometimes labeled the anterior prefron-
tal cortex). This area is not on Tomasino et al.’s map, but it is an area that
was activated in Hasenkamp et al.’s study on mind-wandering during med-
itation, notably during the phase of becoming aware of being distracted
and during the phase of shifting attention. One influential theory13 about
this region is that it selects the set of tasks that the mind needs to per-
form. More specifically, the rostrolateral prefrontal cortex acts as a kind
of gateway that enables switching between attending to environmental
stimuli (in meditation: the breath, sensations in the body, or sounds) and
internal stimuli (in meditation: thoughts, mind-wanderings, memories,
and the like). This, then, would be considered flexible executive control.
You could even argue that this is the type of control that the meditating
mind is practicing all the time. (Or at least the part of the time when it isn’t
dreaming away.)
From Fox et al.’s map, it seems like these types of control might be suc-
cessful, that is, major parts of the default-mode network (the posterior parietal
cortex and the precuneus) are lower in volume and/or density in meditators
than nonmeditators. Tomasino et al.’s map showed that both of these areas
deactivate during meditation.
Quite a number of the increases in volume and/or density on Fox et al.’s
map point at more efficient direct awareness of specific body sensations: the
insula (also part of the salience network), the anterior precuneus, and the sen-
sory and motor cortex. The increase in volume and/or density in the supra-
marginal gyrus (parallel to activation in this structure on Tomasino et al.’s
map) points to changes in global body awareness.
84
84Presence
Finally, some of Fox et al.’s results are in line with Tomasino et al.’s find-
ings concerning the quieting down of the narrative self. Notable here is the
decrease in volume and/or density in the precuneus—echoing its deactivation
on Tomasino et al.’s map. The precuneus is an area within the default-mode
network structure that is keenly associated with the self-as-story.
Thus the tale I spun from Tomasino et al.’s map is largely repeated here,
suggesting that changes in brain functioning during meditation (as measured
by activations and deactivations) go hand in hand with changes in gray mat-
ter structure. Again, this is a suggestion, a story, not a hard fact.
Interestingly, the Fox et al. map also has three regions that do not show
up in the Tomasino et al. analysis. The first of these is the right orbitofron-
tal cortex.14 This region is associated with a number of functions, including
decision-making; that is, it quickly assesses and integrates information to
predict what a specific situation could mean to you and what the outcome
of a specific decision might be.15 Others have pointed out that the orbito-
frontal cortex (like the anterior insula, also on Fox et al.’s map) is also richly
connected to the limbic system, that is, the emotional part of the brain, and
serves to down-regulate emotion and reappraise negative situations in a more
positive light.16
Both of these functions might fit with results of meditation practice as
meditators often experience them. Meditation might help, for instance, with
shifting the off-the-cushion meditator away from more reflexive, customary
reactions to the world around them toward the more dynamic, predictive—
shall we say mindful?—k ind of decisions that the orbitofrontal cortex per-
forms.17 And it may be the case that the repeated practice of letting go,
practiced over and over through the orbitofrontal cortex, may in turn lead to
positive effects on negative emotional states, such as depression and anxiety,
as we shall see in Chapter 6.
The second result that is unique to Fox et al.’s map is the increase in
volume and/or density of the fusiform gyrus and inferior temporal gyrus. It
should be noted that some fMRI studies have found activations in this
region as well, so this may be a case of convergence between activation
and morphology after all.18 Fox et al. point out that these findings “appear
puzzling and have been little discussed.” The reason is that these areas are
usually associated with visual processing, and given that meditation is typi-
cally done with the eyes either closed or half-open, this makes little sense.
Fox et al. suggest, with James Austin,19 that this area may be associated
with the visual hallucinations or imagery that sometimes pop up, especially
during long sitting periods or during retreats. (For more on these hallucina-
tions, see Chapter 3.)
Finally, Fox et al. finds consistent evidence for an enlarged hippocampus
in meditators. He offers three explanations.20 First, the hippocampus is part
of the default-mode network, and so this difference might signal the higher
85
levels of attention that meditators (especially of the open-monitoring vari-

ety) offer to spontaneous thoughts as they arise during meditation. (This,
of course, stands in contrast to the shrinkage in the precuneus.) Second,
the hippocampus is also a memory structure, specializing in the transfer
of short-term memories into more permanent storage. Fox et al. speculate
that it is possible that meditators spend a lot of time—not necessarily on the
cushion—reviewing, reexamining, and reintegrating memories, placing past
experiences in a new light, all in the interest of finding new freedom in their
actions and reactions. Third, the hippocampus, with its many connections to
the limbic system, also plays a role in emotion regulation and stress resilience.
For instance, it is smaller in people with posttraumatic stress disorder. In
rats, growing up in an exciting environment (by which we mean not in a bare
cage) increases the size of the hippocampus, and this in turn works to buffer
against stress.21
One possible solution to the puzzle comes from a study by Eileen Luders
and colleagues,22 which looked in more detail at exactly which part or parts of
the hippocampus were enlarged in meditators. They found significant effects
only for the subiculum, the lower part of the hippocampus. The role of the
subiculum is still not completely mapped out, but we do know that one of its
functions is to regulate stress via what is called the hypothalamic–pituitary–
adrenal axis, or HPA axis.23 Remember the discussion earlier about the para-
sympathetic and sympathetic nervous system? The HPA axis is what sets the
parasympathetic system in motion. Basically, when something stresses you
out, the following sequence of events unfolds: The hypothalamus (part of
the limbic system in the brain) starts releasing corticotropin-releasing hor-
mone, which causes the pituitary gland to release adrenocorticotropic hor-
mone (also known as corticotropin), which then signals the adrenal cortex to
start producing glucocorticoid hormones (mainly cortisol), epinephrine (also
known as adrenaline) and norepinephrine, and off you go on your fight-or-
flight response. The subiculum is intricately connected to this system, acting
as a brake—it stops or limits the response of the HPA system, more spe-
cifically the release of cortisol that sets the actual stress response in motion.
Thus, even when a stressor comes along, the subiculum can still intervene
and prevent your heart rate from going up, your lungs from gasping for air,
your blood pressure from skyrocketing, your sweat glands from pumping,
and your digestion from coming to a grinding halt. (Ever known a meditator
who is preternaturally calm, even when poked? That’s possibly a more than
fully grown subiculum in action.)
Interestingly, this may be a circular process. Stress hormones (particularly
cortisol) slowly destroy hippocampal tissue.24 If meditation, or the habit of
meditating, brings about a reduction of the stress response (through repeated
return to the breath, an increased parasympathetic response, or the increas-
ing habit of being able to let go of the small stuff), then this might have the
86
86Presence
added effect of preserving the hippocampus from the normal wear and tear
of daily life.
The average effect size over all these structures in all these studies is quite
large—about .75 of a standard deviation (0.77 SD, to be precise). As I men-
tioned, this is likely an overestimation. Fox et al. applied some fancy statistics
to obtain a better estimate and concluded that the true effect is more likely
about 0.44 SD. This means that 67% of people in the control group have lower
volume/density in these structures than the average meditator (or larger, for
the precuneus and the posterior cingulate cortex).
Another (maybe more surprising) way to look at these brain changes is to
consider that meditation might counteract aging. In many of the studies that
are represented in the Fox et al. map, there is a wide age range in the medita-
tors and controls. Two studies25 have calculated correlations between volume
of particular regions and age. One found a correlation between total gray
matter and age of r = –.54 for controls but a zero correlation in meditators
(r = .01); one looked at the right frontal region and found a negative correla-
tion in controls (r = –.76) and an essentially zero correlation in meditators
(r = –.05). These are only two studies, but the suggestion is that meditators’
brains (or parts thereof) show less age-related decline (i.e., in these two cases,
no aging at all) compared to the brains of those who do not meditate (which
show quite a bit of shrinkage with age).
The Fox et al. Meta-Analysis: Changes in White Matter
What happens in white matter, the bundles of nerve fibers that connect dif-
ferent parts of the brain?
Fox et al. found two pathways that show higher efficiency in meditators.
The first is the corpus callosum. You may know that the brain comes in two
halves (“hemispheres”). The corpus callosum connects those two halves.
Meditators have an enlarged corpus callosum, especially in the front of the
brain (the genu and the forceps minor), suggesting that information trans-
fer between the two brain halves proceeds more efficiently. This may be a
byproduct of all the activation going on in different areas of the front of the
brain during meditation (such as the insula, the anterior cingulate cortex, the
rostrolateral prefrontal cortex, and the orbitofrontal cortex).
The second is the superior longitudinal fasciculus. This is one of the brain’s
main front-to-back-to-front pathways; it connects parietal regions (like those
associated with body awareness) with frontal regions (like those involved in
attention). The different subcomponents of this tract are responsible for things
like the sense of your body in space, the moment-to-moment understand-
ing of the state of your body, spatial attention, and control over your focus
of attention.26 The most likely story here is that this enhanced connection
87
represents the fruit of repeatedly and persistently paying close attention to

fleeting sensations in the body (i.e., the breath and/or bodily sensations).
Eileen Luders and colleagues27 have looked at how well these white matter
tracts28 still work with advancing age. Over 20 different tracts, the correla-
tion with age was r = –.69 for nonmeditators, compared with –.25 for medi-
tators. This is only a single study, but the message is again that meditators’
brains may be less susceptible to the negative effects of aging than those of
nonmeditators.
Dose–Response Relationships
All the previous findings fall within the “weak” category of evidence for the
existence of a causal connection—the results could also be due to preexisting
differences between meditators and nonmeditators rather than to the prac-
tice itself.
Fortunately, a number of studies have recruited meditators that differ
widely in meditation experience. This allows the researchers to correlate
experience (typically the number of years the meditators have been medi-
tating) with volume and/or density of particular brain regions.29 As already
explained, the existence of a dose–response relationship (more meditation
experience is associated with an increase or decrease in volume and/or den-
sity) would be stronger evidence for the position that meditation practice
changes the brain.30
With regard to the salience network, two studies Grant et al. (2010) and
Ho ̈l zel et al. (2008) report a correlation between meditation experience and
volume/density in the anterior cingulate cortex; the average correlation is .21.
The average correlation between experience and volume/density in the insula
(if we consider the insula as part of the salience network) is .38,34 Hölzel et al.
(2008), Luders et al. (2009), and Luders et al. (2012b).
With regard to executive control and the default network, the single study34
that analyzed the correlation with the rostrolateral prefrontal cortex failed
to find one; one study Grant et al. (2013) found a high positive correlation
between experience and volume in the precuneus (.50); nothing is known
about the posterior cingulate cortex.
With regard to direct awareness of bodily sensations, the correlation between
meditation experience and volume/density in the insula (if we consider the
insula as part of the body-sensation regions) is about .38; the average correla-
tion between meditation experience and volume/density in the somatosen-
sory cortices (one study)34 is .71; the two studies Grant et al. (2013) and Kang
et al. (2013) that looked at the supramarginal gyrus found no effects. Nothing
is known about the anterior precuneus.
No data are available about global body awareness and the narrative self.
88
88Presence
With regard to regions unique to the Fox et al. map, dose–response cor-
relations involving the orbitofrontal cortex average to .04,34 Kang et al.
(2013), inferior temporal lobe correlations to .41 Hölzel et al. (2008), Luders
et al. (2009) and Luders et al. (2012b), and hippocampus correlations to .14,34
Leung et al. (2013), Luders et al. (2009) and Luders et al. (2013).
Summarized, it seems that there are some positive correlations between
experience and volume/density in gray matter, suggesting that meditation
practice indeed drives the changes in brain morphology. This link is found
for the salience attention network, for direct awareness of bodily sensations,
for the inferior temporal lobe and for the hippocampus, but not for the orbi-
tofrontal cortex. The verdict is still out for the executive control attention net-
work, global body awareness, and the narrative self, simply because there are
no or very few data. (It is often a cliché to state that more data are needed—
here we really need them.)
Overall, these results are grounds for cautious optimism. Note, on the one
hand, that the correlations are modest: Meditation experience is clearly not
the only factor at play in shaping the brain. On the other hand, experience
tends to correlate with age (as you gain experience, you also get older), and—
as we have seen—g ray matter volume and density decline with age, so finding
even modest positive correlations in the face of brain aging is a wonderful
result.
Brain Changes after Mindfulness Interventions
The strongest evidence for the point of view that meditation causes brain
changes would come from longitudinal studies, in which a group of nonmedi-
tators (the “treatment group or “intervention group”) receive meditation
instruction and another group of nonmeditators (the “control group”) does
not, and both groups are followed over time.
To date, four such longitudinal studies have been conducted. Two of
these31 have looked at MBSR programs, which involve on average around
30 hours of meditation; all measures were related to gray matter. The other
two32 have used an even shorter program, devised by their author, called
“integrative body-m ind training” (IBMT), with a total of 11 hours of medi-
tation. IBMT involves body relaxation, mental imagery, and mindfulness
training with musical background as help. Thus the level of expertise devel-
oped through these interventions is only a fraction of the level reached by
the meditators in the Fox et al. meta-analysis (which was more than 4,500
hours on average). The total number of participants involved is small—98
meditators and 90 nonmeditators, or on average less than 25 per group in
each study.
89
The picture emerging from these studies is mixed.

With regard to gray matter, one study finds no effects; one finds effects in
the dorsal anterior insula and the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex; the other
finds effects in the left hippocampus, the posterior cingulate cortex (with an
increase in density, contrary to the results of the Fox et al. meta-analysis,
which found lower density in experienced meditators), the left temporopa-
rietal junction, and two structures in the cerebellum. Thus there is no con-
vergence among these studies, but most of the structures that show growth
over the course of the intervention also showed up in the Fox et al. meta-
analysis, suggesting that, under certain circumstances, even very short-term
meditation experience might lead to growth in brain regions exercised by
meditation. This also adds modest (maybe very modest) confidence to the
assumption that it is meditation experience that leads to brain changes. But,
clearly, the main message is that we need a lot more studies on this topic, and
we would probably need to follow meditators over a longer period of time.
With regard to white matter, there is more convergence (but then both stud-
ies were conducted in the same lab, using the same meditation program)—
both studies observed an increase in white matter in the corpus callosum
and the superior longitudinal fasciculus, as Fox et al. also found in their
meta-analysis. The two studies also found consistent changes in the corona
radiata, a white matter tract associated with attention and control over atten-
tion.33 One of these studies also tested for gray matter changes and found
none. What intrigues me in this finding—if we combine it with gray matter
changes in programs that are a little longer—is the possibility that the change
in white matter precedes the change in gray matter. This would also suggest
that the changes in white matter might be more crucial than those in gray
matter—maybe the impact of meditation on the brain lies more in the hon-
ing of pathways, that is, in increasingly efficient information transfer, than in
changes in local processing of information. Given what pathways are being
honed, it seems that this effect might be primarily about transferring infor-
mation into the field of attention. Again, two studies is a very small number,
and we need more research.
The finding of almost immediate growth in some of these studies under-
scores how quickly the brain is able to reorganize itself. There is another
implication here—a flipside—that may be more unwelcome to you, and
that is that this opens up the possibility that unlearning is equally possible.
The brain changes in response to meditation experiences are just that—a
response, a reaction, a way to help out with the task. If the task is no longer
being performed, there is no reason to maintain the brain change. (Brain
tissue is expensive; it hogs a lot of resources. Recall the juggling study: The
brain regions that grew with training tended to shrink back again [at least
halfway] once the skill was no longer used.) In other words: Meditate for a
few months and the brain starts to rewire itself; quit meditation for a few
90
90Presence
months and the brain might well fall back to its baseline premeditation state.
This assumption is easy to test; all we need is a scanner, a good amount of
money, and two groups of people: Folks who persisted with MBSR (or a simi-
lar course) after the program is over and folks who are willing to confess that
they did not. Right now, we don’t know.
The Positive Side Effects of Meditation
Most—although possibly not all—of the differences in brain morphology

that I have described so far make sense: We can understand them as the brain
responding to the demands of meditation. Pay close attention to the sensa-
tions in your body and your brain will sharpen the pathway from the repre-
sentations of the bodily sensations to the attention centers. Let go of the story
you build around yourself and your precuneus will shrink a little. And so on.
In other words, the changes may correspond to your increasing experience
with meditation.
There are also, however, a few studies that show intriguing side effects of
the brain changes that come with meditation—positive changes in aspects of
behavior that have little to do with the stated goals or demands of meditation,
at least as it is typically practiced in a Buddhist context. Here I concentrate
on four examples.
The first example, also mentioned in the previous chapter, concerns
the brain’s response to pain. As all of us who have ever meditated know,
pain is part of the reality of sitting still on a cushion for a long time. But
we don’t meditate, of course, to get rid of the pain that meditation causes
(that would be a bit, well, circular and unproductive). Still, this seems to
be what happens: In the previous chapter, I mentioned that meditation
makes (literally) painful experiences less unpleasant. I discussed a num-
ber of mechanisms that could explain this effect. One of these is reexami-
nation, which helps dampen the emotional response. We saw that there is
some evidence that the salience network is involved in this endeavor. And,
of course, the salience network changes with meditation experience, as we
saw earlier—t he anterior cingulate cortex and the insula grow in volume
and/or density.
In one study, Joshua Grant and colleagues34 looked at this meditation–
salience network–pain connection directly, in 19 Zen practitioners and 10
nonmeditators. They put a thermode—a device that generates heat—on the
left calf of each participant, heated it up, and asked how painful the sensa-
tion was, on a scale from zero to 11. They wanted to measure the experience
of moderate pain, which they defined as 6 to 7 on that scale. They found that
meditators were less sensitive to pain—their threshold for moderate pain was
at 50.1oC (122.2oF), that of nonmeditators at 48.1oC (118.6oF).
91
Looking at brain morphology, they found that the size of the dorsal ante-
rior cingulate showed a correlation with meditation experience— p eople
who practiced meditation longer had a thicker anterior cingulate cortex.
Interestingly, they found that pain sensitivity was also related to volume in
this brain region, as well as a few others—the dorsal anterior cingulate cor-
tex, the hippocampus, the secondary sensory cortex, and the insula35: thicker
cortex, lower sensitivity to pain. What is happening here, it seems, is that
the experience of repeatedly checking in on your sensations, thoughts, and
emotions during meditation builds a brain that is also well equipped to deal
with pain.
The second example concerns personal well-being. You would imagine that
quite a number of people meditate to feel better about themselves and their
world, but it isn’t something that is typically deliberately practiced during
meditation. Omar Singleton and colleagues36 found a direct meditation–
brain–behavior relationship, much like the relationship Grant et al. found for
pain. In this case, meditation led to higher gray matter density in a few partic-
ular regions of the brainstem,37 which in turn correlated with meditators’ self-
reports of well-being.38 What is particularly important and exciting is that
this study was an intervention study—an eight-week MBSR program—and
that the key finding was that brain changes over this relatively brief period
correlated with changes in well-being, just about as strong an indicator of
causality as you can get with this sort of design.
The third example concerns self-perceived stress. Note that self-p erceived
stress is not about the daily hassles or important life events that actually hap-
pen to you (psychologists call these “stressors” rather than “stress”) but about
how you handle these—your feelings, thoughts, and behaviors in relation to
those experiences. It is possible to quibble about whether changes in self-
perceived stress are a side effect or a direct effect of meditation. One could
argue that the effect is direct, that is, intended, because meditation instruc-
tions often do emphasize the calming nature of meditation. On the other
hand, rarely do they involve asking meditators to handle stressful situations
then and there, on the cushion; in fact, most meditation traditions I know of
would explicitly discourage analytical thinking about your life issues during
meditation time. Either way, in one intervention study39 with a standard eight-
week MBSR program, changes in gray matter density in the amygdala were
associated with changes in self-p erceived stress—larger decreases in volume
in the amygdala were associated with larger decreases in perceived stress.
Finally, one study40 found meditation–brain–behavior effects on mood.
Like personal well-being, an improvement in mood is something people
might expect as a result of their practice, but mood enhancement isn’t explic-
itly part of the meditation training. After a four-week training in an MBSR-
like program, changes in the left sagittal stratum and corona radiata (both
are white matter tracts) correlated with changes in mood—p eople with newly
92
92Presence
strengthened neuronal connections described themselves as feeling less

angry, less confused, less dejected or depressed, and less tired or lethargic.
Both pathways have been implicated in depression,41 so it makes sense to
expect that changes in their efficiency would lighten mood.
In sum, there are some indications that practicing meditation has an impact
on specific brain structures, which in turn leads to positive side effects. In two
cases, the side effect aspect seems clear: The practice of one skill (vigilant
monitoring) likely leads to brain changes (growth in the anterior cingulate
cortex and changes in the corona radiata), which then in turn lead to side
effects (lowered sensitivity to pain, improved mood). In the two other cases
(stress and well-being), the reason for the brain changes is less obvious, and
the observed changes weren’t on Fox et al.’s map.
Again, I end with the cliché that we need more studies. One reason is
that none of the studies cited here have been replicated. It would be good if
they were, so we can be certain that the results are not some odd, one-time
occurrence. (Randomness happens.) Another reason is that what are truly
side effects from a strict point of view are often effects that for at least some
meditators are the real deal. That is, people who start meditating often do so
because they have heard it might help them with stress or might help improve
their mood. If these side effects are a natural consequence of the way medita-
tion is practiced, we don’t necessarily need to change anything in our cur-
ricula to accommodate meditators with such goals and desires. If, however,
stress reduction or mood improvement are not a direct consequence of the
type of attention training that is the focus of most meditation programs, it
might make some sense to see if we can find a more direct route for those
seeking this kind of relief.
Meditation Shaping the Brain: A Few Conclusions
The main conclusion from the studies I have reviewed here is that meditation
indeed seems to shape the brain. Specifically, meditators show measurable
differences in gray matter in areas associated with attention, global and spe-
cific body awareness, the quieting of the self, emotion regulation, and a better
regulated stress response. They also show stronger interconnections within
the brain, back to front and side to side. Meditation even seems to have some
anti-aging effects. There are dose–response relationships, suggesting that at
least some of these brain changes are due to meditation per se, and there is
some preliminary evidence that some of these changes may become visible
after only eight weeks of mindfulness training. These changes lead to some
desirable side effects—lowered pain sensitivity, heightened well-being, lower
stress, better mood.
93
Throughout this chapter I have indicated further avenues for research.

There is a lot we do not know: There is the puzzling finding that differences
between meditation orientations do not seem to matter much; we still have a
limited grasp on changes in white matter tracts; we know nothing about the
sequencing of effects (Do white matter changes precede gray matter changes?
Do changes in attention networks precede other changes?); we know nothing
about dose–response relationships in the executive control attention network,
in the areas associated with global body awareness, and in those associated
with the narrative self; and we have little direct and hard evidence that the
desirable side effects are indeed direct and inevitable consequences of the
attention-related aspects of meditation practice. The presence of publication
bias in morphology studies remains troubling, especially given that there is
no exact correspondence between the results from cross-sectional, longitudi-
nal, and dose–response relationships. Finally, we know a lot less about how
these brain changes inscribe themselves into behavior than we should.
In the next few chapters, I investigate the behavioral changes that come
with mindfulness and meditation in more depth. Chapter 5 looks at the
intended effect of most types of meditation, namely a sharpening of atten-
tion. Chapter 6 takes on the changes in stress, sleep, and well-being, and
Chapter 7 investigates the usefulness of mindfulness as therapy or medicine.
94
95
{ 5 }
From Monkey Mind to Monk’s Mind

MINDFULNESS PRACTICE AND ATTENTION
In the previous chapter, we saw that more permanent changes in the meditat-
ing brain include gray matter changes in regions associated with the salience
network and the executive control network, general body awareness, emotion
regulation, the stress response, and the linkages between them. From this,
we might expect changes in corresponding properties of heart and mind—
sharpened attention perhaps, improved vigilance, changes in body aware-
ness, maybe changes in personality and how you experience your self, maybe
an enhanced capability to deal with negative emotions and life’s small (or
even larger) frustrations.
As we saw in Chapter 1, modern Western definitions of mindfulness high-
light the concept of attention: Mindfulness is “paying attention in a particular
way: on purpose, in the present moment, and non-judgmentally”1—from the
point of view of mindfulness, everything follows from following the breath.2
It makes sense, then, to first look at how mindfulness training impacts atten-
tion before we look at changes in other aspects of a person’s psychological
make-up.
Note that we are switching methodological gears again. Studies probing
the meditating brain in action (Chapters 2 and 3), as we saw, mostly test very
long-term Buddhist meditators (many of them nuns or monks). Studies on
structural changes in the brains of meditators (Chapter 4) all used laypeople,
but still about half of them practiced within a religious, Buddhist context. On
average, these people had less than half the lifetime experience of the volun-
teers in the brain activation studies; these studies also included participants
from “secular” (or, if you prefer, “clinical”) meditation programs—MBSR or
MBSR-like.
The set of studies in this chapter lower the meditative achievement of the
average research participant a little more and have a much higher propor-
tion of participants from these secular programs. Part of the reason for this
96
96Presence
shift is pragmatism on the part of researchers: Such volunteers are generally

easier to find, and it is now perfectly feasible to include them in these studies.
That is, testing people on attention or other psychological measurements in a
psychology lab doesn’t require people with the amazing feats of unshakeable
meditation required for the studies in the previous chapters.
This shift, of course, makes it hard to directly link the studies on attention
to studies on the meditating brain—this is a different group of people, with
a very different level of experience. We simply don’t know if the changes in
attention we observe in these less experienced meditators bear any relation-
ship to the changes we’ve noted in the brains of the very advanced practi-
tioners. On the other hand, the research volunteers here look a lot more like
me and (perhaps) you, and so the results from the studies in this chapter are
more likely to be applicable to the average practitioner of mindfulness. Our
brains might not necessarily look like nuns’ or monks’ brains (frankly, we
don’t know), but our feats of attention likely look like the ones covered in this
chapter.
As in previous chapters, my emphasis here—all in the service of avoid-
ing bias—is on looking at results of batches of studies on a particular topic,
preferably relying on results from meta-analyses, rather than zooming in on
one particular study.
Meditation and Three Aspects of Attention
The largest meta-analysis on the psychological effects of meditation is by

Peter Sedlmeier and colleagues.3 This analysis gathered a total of 163 studies
that examined the effects of meditation on all kinds of psychological vari-
ables. All of these studies compared performance of a group of meditators
(who could be either seasoned or beginning, or anything in between, but most
of them were fresh out of an MBSR-type program) with that of a group of
control subjects, that is, people who do not meditate. They found 22 studies
that focused on attention. The average effect in these studies was 0.58 SD,
which is quite respectable. It implies that the average meditator is more atten-
tive than 72% of nonmeditators. In a follow-up study, Ebert and Sedlmeier4
refined the Sedlmeier et al. analysis to include only studies on mindfulness
meditation (in practice, that meant removing all studies on Transcendental
Meditation® from the larger meta-analysis); the remaining eight studies had
a very similar effect size—0.63 SD. The average mindfulness meditator has
stronger attention skills than 73% of nonmeditators.
Attention, of course, is not a single skill. It’s quite different to focus your
attention on just one thing and exclude all distractors than to remain sharp
and concentrated for a long time, and it is different still to divide your atten-
tion between two or more tasks at the same time. In Chapter 3, I introduced
97
From Monkey Mind to Monk’s Mind 97
a model devised by Wendy Hasenkamp and colleagues5 that captures the dif-
ferent types of attention engaged in meditation well: It starts with the inev-
itable cycle of mind-wandering (a lack of control over attention), which is
punctured by the awareness that you are mind-wandering, followed by bring-
ing your attention back, and finally sustaining it for a while—until your mind
wanders off again. Attention here, then, serves three functions.
The first is noticing and alerting, that is, detecting when the mind wanders;
this function is associated with the salience network. Note that Kabat-Zinn’s
definition highlights a particular quality of this noticing and alerting atten-
tion, namely a sense of openness and lightness (the “nonjudgmentally” in
his definition). This is an aspect of attention that is not typically studied by
psychologists.
The second is controlling attention, that is, returning your focus to where
it should be; this function is associated with the executive attention network.6
This aspect of attention is also often called “concentration.”
The third function is sustaining and stabilizing attention, that is, keeping
awareness focused on what it needs to be focused on; this is done by a subset
of the executive attention network.
It makes sense to group studies according to these three categories. I exam-
ine the evidence for changes in attentional control first, because most studies
on the effects of mindfulness and meditation on attention have focused on
this particular aspect.
The Effects of Meditation on Controlling Attention
Psychologists use many tasks to measure attentional control, but the one that
is perhaps most popular is a simple, yet devilish little test I introduced you to
in Chapter 2—the Stroop task. Recall that in the Stroop task you are shown a
series of color words (words like “red,” “green,” etc.). Each word is printed in
a different color than the word it refers to (e.g., the word “red” can be printed
in green, the word “green” may be in blue, and so on). Your task is to name
the color of the ink, not the color the word refers to (so, in the previous exam-
ple, you would say: “green,” “blue,” and not “red,” “green”). This is hard—it
slows you down, and you might make a few errors, maybe even producing
blended words like “bleen” or “grue.” The reason this task is difficult is that
reading is an automatic and “obligatory” process; that is, once you see a word
or a sentence, you can’t help but read it. (Try it: Next time you see a billboard,
try not to read what it says. Can you do it?) This automatic process of reading
the word interferes with you naming the ink color. To do well on the Stroop
task, you clearly need to pay attention and stay focused on the task and go
against your natural tendency to prioritize reading. The Stroop task is used
so often because it works and because is very easy to administer—all you
98
98Presence
need is paper and a stopwatch (although it is now often done on computers),

and it takes less than a minute.
I was able to locate nine studies on the effects of meditation and mindful-
ness practice on the Stroop test7; the total number of meditators involved was
small—221. The average effect size for these eight studies was 0.45 SD. The
average meditator does better on the Stroop task than 67% of the general
public.
In three of the nine studies, participants were new meditators who learned
to meditate over the course of the study (accumulating between 18 and 40
hours of experience); the effect size for these three studies was 0.42 SD. The
other studies compared seasoned meditators (with typically a few years of
experience) with nonmeditators; this resulted in a very similar effect size,
namely 0.48 SD.
The similarity in effects suggests two things. One conclusion— very
encouraging indeed— is that not much meditation practice is needed to
increase concentration. Even 20 to 40 hours or so of practice results in mea-
surable changes in control over attention.
The second conclusion is that you don’t need to have many years of medi-
tation practice to generate the kind of concentration needed for the Stroop.
What matters more is the amount of daily practice. One study did find that
the number of years of meditation correlated (rather modestly) with the
Stroop effect (a correlation of –.27; people who had been meditating longer
were less bothered by the color–word conflict), but the same study also found
that how often you meditate had about the same effect (the correlation was
–.23). (The first correlation can be explained by the fact that more seasoned
meditators also tend to spend more time on the cushion.) Another study only
found a dose–response relationship with the number of minutes practiced per
day (correlation of –.17, again quite modest), not with total hours of lifetime
meditation experience.8
Control can be measured with other tasks besides the Stroop task. I do
not go into detail for all of these tasks here; I’ll just mention one: the go/no-go
task. In this task, you see numbers flash by on a screen, one at a time, at a fast
clip. Your job is to press the button as quickly as you can whenever you see a
number appear (that’s the “go” part), except when you see a particular num-
ber, say, the number 2 (that is the “no-go” part). Being able to keep yourself
from pressing the button when you are not supposed to is a powerful measure
of how well you are able to control attention.
I found five studies on attentional control measures other than Stroop9;
these yielded an average effect size of 0.23 SD. One study10 found a strong cor-
relation (r = .52) between the number of minutes practiced over the past eight
weeks and how good people were at not making errors on a go/no-go task.
Combining the effect of all studies that included measures of attentional
control (there were 10 of those), I obtained an average effect size of meditation
99
on concentration of 0.39 SD, a lower number than reported in the two meta-
analyses I cited earlier but still sizeable. The average meditator has better
control over her attention than 65% of the general public.
The Effects of Meditation on Nonjudgmental Alerting
Kabat-Zinn’s concept on nonjudgmental attention can be applied to more

standard tasks of attention as well. Often, we look with an agenda, or we close
off our minds prematurely. I would venture that paying attention in an open,
nonreactive way would be an excellent example of this nonjudgmental stance.
One task that has been used to test the hypothesis that meditation experi-
ence might lead to a more objective, open-m inded, nonjudgmental type of
attention is the attentional blink task. In this task, you see a stream of about
20 or so letters, spit out one right after another on a computer screen at an
impossible pace—typically 1/10 of a second for each of them. One or two dig-
its are intermingled with the letters, and you simply press a button whenever
you spot a digit. It turns out that when the stream contains two digits, people
often miss the second digit when it is shown less than half a second after the
first one. It is as if seeing the first digit causes you to mentally blink—hence
the name of the task.
The standard explanation for the attentional blink effect is that you need
to focus really hard to detect any digit to begin with. If you devote a lot of
attention to detecting the first digit, you have no resources left for the second.
To put this in terms of mindfulness: What makes you miss the second digit is
that you are “stuck” on the first digit—too much investment, too much eager-
ness, too much “attachment” to doing it right (that is the judgmental mind,
right there) and not missing that first digit. Unexpected confirmation for this
account comes from studies where people are asked to do the task while they
are being distracted by listening to music or viewing pictures—they do bet-
ter when distracted than when they apply their full attention to finding the
digits.11
Three studies have looked at attentional blink and meditation.12 Two
compared long-term practitioners with novices. They indeed found smaller
attentional blink effects in meditators; the average effect size was 0.65 SD;
the average meditator was less susceptible to attentional blink than 74% of
nonmeditators. One of these two studies also compared attentional blink
before and after a three-month retreat; the effect size, comparing attentional
blink before the retreat with attentional blink after the retreat, was 0.38 SD in
beginning meditators and 1.17 SD in advanced meditators.
If it is true that this decrease in attentional blink has to do with open-
ness and nonreactivity, then you might expect that open-monitoring medi-
tation, with its wider horizons, would lead to less attentional blink than
100
100Presence
focused-attention meditation, with its more narrow focus. Marieke van Vugt
and Heleen Slagter13 tested this with a group of 30 long-term practitioners of
Zen, Tibetan Buddhism, or Vipassanā. They asked these participants to do the
attention blink task while they were meditating in either a focused-attention
or open-monitoring style (all participants were intimately familiar with both
styles). They found that in the group of participants with the largest amount
of experience (more than 2,600 hours), the attentional blink effect was indeed
smaller during open-monitoring meditation, suggesting a less sticky quality
to their attention. In the group with less experience (still on average 1,377
hours), however, there was no difference. This suggests that meditators can
fine-tune the amount of nonreactive attention they bring to a task, but it also
suggests that this ability takes some time to develop.
Other studies and tasks further show that meditators may have learned
to pay attention in a more open, nonreactive way. For instance, one study14
showed people the infamous gorilla video (if you have ever taken a Psychology
101 class, you’ve seen it—two group of students are playing basketball, you
are asked to count the number of passes in one of the two groups, ignoring the
other, and in the middle of the game, a man in a gorilla suit walks through the
group of players; about two-thirds of people typically fail to see the gorilla).
They found that meditators were 50% more likely to spot the gorilla than
nonmeditators. They were also about twice as accurate in keeping count of
the passes, suggesting that they were able to be focused and open-m inded at
the same time.
Another study15 used a startle-type task (you may remember we saw one
particularly compelling study of startle in one Tibetan monk in Chapter 3).
You stand in front of a screen. At one point, a light turns on either to the
left or the right; your task is to turn your head toward the light as fast as
you can. Intriguingly, you will be faster at doing this when a blast of sound
(coming from the center) is delivered at the same time as the light—one of
the few examples where a distracting event can actually make you faster. The
likely explanation is that the loud noise—if you let it get to you—g ives you
some extra boost of mental oomph. It turns out that meditators are less likely
to speed up than nonmeditators. This suggests that meditators are able to
just process the sound, without attaching a startling quality to it—it is just a
loud noise.
A third study that demonstrates that meditators may have lower reactivity
is one study on the Stroop effect we’ve already encountered in the previous
section.16 In this study, the researchers also recorded brainwaves. They were
particularly interested in two types of waveforms. The first is the so-called
error-related negativity (ERN; “negativity” here has nothing to do with any-
thing bad—it’s just that the electrical polarity of the brain signal is negative).
The ERN typically happens right after you make an incorrect response (to
be precise, about 1/10 of a second after). The signal likely comes from the
101
anterior cingulate cortex, a part of the salience attention system, as we have

seen. The ERN signifies that your brain has spotted that you have made a
mistake—it is the brain going “oops.” However, the presence of an ERN wave
doesn’t always mean that “you” will spot the mistake—even if you produce
an ERN, you are not always aware that you just made an error. The awareness
of making an error (your “Oh no!” response) is related to a second type of
wave, the error-related positivity effect (confusingly abbreviated as Pe; again,
positive here simply refers to the polarity of the brain signal). The Pe occurs
a little later than the ERN, about 2/10 of a second after making an error,
and it is thought to originate in the posterior cingulate, which is, as we have
seen, part of the core of the default-mode network (the part that seems to get
turned down during meditation). The researchers found that the ERN effect
is larger in meditators than in nonmeditators and that years and frequency
of meditation correlated with ERN as well (the correlation was .37 and .35,
respectively), showing that meditators’ brains are more alert to the mistakes
they make. Interestingly, meditators did not show larger Pe values—thus
their increased sensitivity to errors does not lead to stronger awareness of
errors. That is, even though a meditator’s brain quickly realizes and reacts to
its mistakes, it is also very quick to let go of that reaction.
In a fourth study, Sara van Leeuwen and colleagues17 showed people local-
global stimuli, one at a time. A local-g lobal stimulus is a large digit formed
out of multiple identical small digits (e.g., a large 3 made up of tiny 8s). They
asked their participants to press a button when they saw the digit 1 or 2,
regardless of whether it was the global (large) or local (small) digit in the
figure. Typically, people process the big, glaring global digit first, and so they
are typically faster to report the 1 or 2 if it is a global digit than a local digit—
in this study the difference was 56 milliseconds.18 The study also included
eight Buddhist monks and nuns; they showed less of a bias toward the global
digit—for them the difference was only 21 milliseconds. This suggests that
the monastics had more openness to what is really there, namely two differ-
ent digits. Brainwaves were also examined, and it turned out that the medita-
tors’ brains showed stronger responses in the very early stages of processing,
within the first 150 milliseconds or so,19 suggesting a quicker uptake of infor-
mation; they also showed larger engagement in the attention networks that
are typically implicated in this task.20
We end this section with a small anecdotal finding from one study, done by
Elizabeth Valentine and Philip Sweet.21 They had people listen to 60 series of 2
to 11 bleeps; all they had to do was count the number of bleeps. The research-
ers note that many participants in the control group—the nonmeditators—
commented on how boring this task was; none of the meditators did. This
may, of course, simply mean that meditators are more polite or shyer to speak
up than nonmeditators, but it may also mean that meditators meet their expe-
riences with a different attitude, maybe with added openness. This, I find, is
102
102Presence
an interesting potential side effect of meditation worthy of further explora-

tion: less boredom in daily life!
Let me note that another way of examining changes in this nonjudgmen-
tal attitude would be to give meditators and nonmeditators surveys that
measure trait mindfulness. This has been done, and I report those findings
in the next chapter, because they fit better in an overview of the subjective
well-b eing side of things than in the objective tests of attention discussed in
this chapter.
The Effects of Meditation on the Limits of Perception
Meditation manuals often imply that meditation will give you a more objec-
tive, accurate, and efficient way of looking at the world, maybe as a conse-
quence of cultivating a nonreactive, nonjudgmental alerting mode of dealing
with distractions in meditation. There are some reports that suggest that this
may be the case.
One is the van Leeuwen local-g lobal study I mentioned in the previous
section. Another example is a study by Christian Jensen and colleagues.22
They had people perform attention tasks before and after a standard eight-
week MBSR training. In one of those tasks people read out letters that were
flashed very briefly on a computer screen. By varying the duration each let-
ter was flashed, the researchers were able to calculate how much time each
participant needed to identify a single letter. Before training, it took partici-
pants 15 milliseconds to identify a letter; after MBSR, this was reduced to 9
milliseconds. Different control groups were included as well; neither of these
improved in the speed of letter reading.
Likewise, Katherine MacLean and colleagues23 tested seasoned medi-
tators before, during, and after a three-month retreat and compared their
performance with that of a no-retreat control group of equally seasoned
meditators. The participants were shown two lines of different length, one
after the other, and were asked to say which line was longest. The difference
in length between the lines was varied so that the researchers could deter-
mine the minimum difference in line length that people are able to detect.
Retreatants and nonretreatants did not differ in this minimum difference
before the retreat, but retreatants were able to detect smaller differences
between the lines both at the halfway point of the retreat and at the end of the
retreat, as well at a follow-up session five months after the end of the retreat.
There was a dose–response relationship: Those who spent more time in daily
meditation during the after-retreat period could detect smaller differences
between the two lines (r = .36).
These three studies, then, suggest that meditators have a faster and more
precise uptake of what is out there in the world.
103
The Effects of Meditation on Sustained Attention and

Attentional Stability
The third aspect of attention that is likely trained in meditation is the abil-
ity to sustain and stabilize your awareness on what it should be focused on.
Psychologists typically gauge sustained attention by giving their participants
very simple tasks. We could ask you, for instance, to look at letters passing
by and press a button whenever the letter “k” appears. This is an easy task.
The twist is that we make you do this for a very long time—typically 10 to
30 minutes in one go. This makes your time in the lab mind-numbingly bor-
ing. What is measured is how well you do at the end of the task, when you
are terminally bored, tired, or both, compared to the beginning, when your
mind was bright and fresh. Another way of measuring stability of attention is
to stop you from time to time during these boring tasks and simply ask you if
you were on task or not.
Maybe surprisingly, there is not a lot of research on meditation and sus-
tained attention. I was able to locate seven studies.24 Those yielded an aver-
age effect of 0.39 SD, on par with that for attention control and less than that
for nonjudgmental alerting. Five of these studies used novices going through
MBSR or an MBSR-like program; the average effect size was 0.33 SD. Two
studies compared seasoned meditators before and after a three-month retreat
(where the participants meditated for about 500 hours). They showed an aver-
age effect size of 0.60 SD, suggesting that an intense period of practice leads
to a better ability to sustain attention. As far as I can tell, only one of the
studies looked for a dose–response relationship; it did not find one.
Here I single out one additional study, done by Olivia Carter and col-
leagues, that used two rather exceptional tasks to measure stability of atten-
tion.25 This study was exceptional for another reason as well: The research
team traveled all the way to the Himalayan mountains in Ladakh, a region in
northern India, to test Tibetan Buddhist monks living in exile there.
The first task they used was a binocular rivalry task. Binocular rivalry
refers to a very curious sensation that happens when each of your eyes sees a
different picture (e.g., your right eye sees a house, your left eye sees a face; to
do this you can either use virtual reality goggles or, cheaper, red/g reen 3-D
glasses26). You might expect that you would see a composite image—the face
overlaid on the house, or vice versa—but that is not the case. Instead, what
happens is that your awareness keeps switching between the two—now you
see the face, then the house, then the face again, and so on. The two images
tend to alternate every few seconds, with a brief period in between where you
can feel the two images wrestle for dominance.
Why travel all the way to a remote region in India to show these images
to monks? Well, attention appears to have an influence on the frequency of
alterations: If you focus really hard on one image, you can keep it active in
104
104Presence
awareness a little longer. Carter et al. showed 23 monks binocular stimuli
while they were meditating in one of two modes: focused-attention medita-
tion or compassion meditation. Compassion meditation did not lead to any
changes, as you might expect (the primary focus in this type of meditation is
not on an outside object). Focused-attention meditation, however, did lead to
slower alterations (i.e., more stability) in over half of the monks, both during
and after the meditation.27
The second task Carter et al. included in this study was a motion-induced
blindness task.28 Motion-induced blindness is a visual illusion. You stare at a
blinking green dot at the center of a computer screen that also has three yel-
low dots arranged in a triangle closer to the edge of the screen and a lattice
of crosses that rotates. If you look intently enough, the yellow dots disappear
after about 10 seconds (sometimes all three of them at the same time, some-
times just one or two). As soon as you relax your attention or move your eyes,
the three dots reappear. The average student volunteer is able to keep the three
dots from reappearing for 2.6 seconds. The average monk was able to do this
for 4.1 seconds, or about 50% longer. More important, the duration record in
the group of students was 6 seconds; 10 of 76 monks tested equaled or beat that
record—one monk was able to stabilize the image for 128 seconds, and one
even for 723 seconds. (This study also illustrates that the sustained attention
effects that we have looked at so far, even in advanced meditators, are peanuts
compared to the feats that true meditation experts are able to deliver.)29
Is It Attention or Is It Effort?
Attention—as you know—fluctuates. A slight cold or a bad night’s sleep and

it becomes hard to focus; nothing like a cup of coffee to perk you up. One
psychological variable that influences attention is effort. (Psychologists call
this “motivation to perform.”) When you apply more effort to a task, you
typically do better; when you make only a half-hearted effort, you’ll likely not
to do as well as you possibly could.
Some have criticized the studies on meditation/m indfulness and attention
on this ground: It is possible that what changes is not attention per se but
the amount of effort that people are willing to put into the task. Remember
the Valentine and Sweet study, with the boring bleep counting task? In that
study, nonmeditators remarked on how tedious the task was; meditators did
not complain. It is then possible that meditators did better on the task not
because their core capacity for attention increased but simply because their
attitude changed. Maybe they were more motivated and thus more willing to
invest effort.
One study, by Christian Jensen and colleagues,30 tried to tease those two
explanations apart. They compared participants in an MBSR program with
105
a group of people who underwent a non-m indfulness–based stress reduction

program and also with two groups of people who did not go through a stress
reduction program at all. One of the latter groups was simply tested twice;
the second group was offered $50 if they did better on the second test than
the first test. For our purposes, it is the comparison with the latter group that
is interesting—they had a clear incentive to apply more effort. (I can’t speak
for you, but I’d happily take $50 to do my very best on an hour’s worth of
attention tests!)
The researchers found that the MBSR group did better on tests of focused
attention and on a visual threshold task than any other group. In contrast,
they did as well as or worse than the $50 group on tasks that measured how
well they could switch attention, return to the present moment, or be ready to
react. This suggests that meditation may have an effect on focused attention
and on visual perception that is not due to just effort. Effects on attention
switching and on alertness are, however, suspect. Maybe MBSR-trained par-
ticipants are more willing to invest the effort, perhaps because they want to
prove the value of the treatment to themselves and/or the researchers.
One conclusion is that some of the effects of mindfulness and meditation
on attention may be due to changes in effort, or the willingness to invest
effort, rather than to changes in attention per se. You could also, of course,
wonder if this distinction is truly important in day-to-day life: A change in
your underlying attitude to life, especially an increased willingness to meet
challenges with a bit more energy, seems like a vital part of healthy daily func-
tioning to me. This, of course, would assume that meditators approach life
in general with rejuvenated vim, and not just life inside the researchers’ lab.
The Effects of Meditation on Paying Attention to the

Body: Proprioception and Interoception
In many mindfulness traditions, paying attention to certain aspects of the

body—the breath, the fleeting sensations that arise during a body scan, the
sensations of how emotions actually inscribe themselves in the body—is a
central aspect of the training. Given this central place of body awareness
in mindfulness training, you would expect quite a number of studies on this
topic. This is not the case, however. There aren’t enough studies (for most of
the topics falling under this heading) to warrant a meta-analysis, so I just
briefly describe each of the studies and see if I can draw any meaningful
conclusions.
First, the breath.
The one study that I was able to find31 used two metrics. Participants were
hooked up to a machine that registered their breathing—their nose was clipped
shut, and they breathed into a mouthpiece that measured airflow. In a first task,
106
106Presence
the researchers added resistance to the air flow by placing little discs in the tube;
they checked whether participants could tell whether or not the airflow was
restricted. The answer is that people are quite accurate in this task, and medita-
tors not more so than nonmeditators. In a second task, participants used a slider
to indicate the frequency and depth of their breathing as they were hooked up to
this machine. Meditators turned out to be a bit more accurate in matching the
slider to their actual breathing. This, however, turned out not to be a meaningful
difference. That is, meditators are also (as we have seen in Chapter 2) typically
slower in their breathing, and this was true in this study as well. It is easier to
detect and match slow breathing than fast breathing. When the researchers took
this effect into account, meditators were no better at following their breath than
nonmeditators. Note, of course, that the breath is typically easy to detect—this is
actually one of the reasons it is so often used as the point of focus for beginners—
so there isn’t necessarily a lot of room for improvement after meditation.
The same cannot be said about heart rate: Those of you who wear fitness
bands or smart watches with heart rate monitors know that heart rate is quite
a bit harder to predict than breathing. Two studies32 failed to show that medi-
tators were better at heart rate detection than nonmeditators.
Two studies have looked at sensitivity to touch.33 Kieran Fox and colleagues
asked meditators and nonmeditators to indicate how sensitive each of 20
body regions (each of the fingers, the palm of the hand, the lips, the cheek,
the nose, etc.) were; they correlated those ratings with what previous research
has told us about these regions’ sensitivity.34 Nonmeditators showed correla-
tions that were zero or negative, indicating that they cannot identify the rela-
tive sensitivity of parts of the human body. In contrast, meditators produced
correlations between .31 and .46 (depending on the index of true sensibility),
showing that they do know what areas of the human body are more or less
sensitive. Accuracy (as measured by these correlations) also went up with the
total number of hours spent in meditation (the correlation between accuracy
and the logarithm of total number of hours of practice varied between .37 and
.48, depending on the index of true sensibility); this increases the possibility
that the increased sensitivity is due to meditation itself. Moreover, people
who practiced body scan meditation did better (correlations between .41 and
.64) than people who were novices in this particular technique (correlations
between .06 and .18), suggesting that it is indeed paying attention to the body
that drives this form of body awareness.
Laura Mirams looked more objectively at touch detection. A little vibrator
was strapped to the participant’s index finger; his job was to indicate when
the vibrator vibrated. The vibrations were set such that they were barely
detectable; on some trials, a light was also flashed near the finger, with or
without vibration. In that case, people often mistakenly reported vibration
when the only thing happening was that the light flashed. Students who had
gone through a short (two-hour) body scan meditation program made fewer
107
mistakes than before they were meditating and made fewer mistakes than
nonmeditators. They also detected the real vibrations more easily. Thus even
a very short meditation program can have some effect on touch sensitivity.
Meditation may also lead to better coordination between seeing and acting.
José Raúl Naranjo and Stefan Schmidt35 asked their participants to trace a line
between two dots on a tablet. Participants couldn’t see the actual tablet but
were given visual feedback on a projection screen. Unbeknownst to them, the
visual feedback was not completely correct, and so the angle of the line they
were seeing was off. Three groups were included: long-term meditators (with,
on average, 22 years of practice); a group of short-term meditators, tested
before and after an MBSR program; and a control group of nonmeditators.
The researchers found that long-term meditators were more accurate in line
tracing, mostly because they slowed down, which made them able to be more
deliberate in their movements. The MBSR participants were fast before the
program and slowed down afterwards, resulting in higher tracing accuracy. The
control group showed no changes. Thus mindfulness training seems to help
people to control their actions better, and maybe even to select the best way
of doing so, but doesn’t necessarily really have an effect on the coordination
between seeing and doing.
One study examined self-reported body awareness in daily life. In this
study,36 152 participants in a three-month mindfulness program reported on
eight different aspects of their so-called interoceptive awareness—the aware-
ness of what is happening inside the body, often—in this case—w ith an emo-
tional tinge. The researchers found that the answers of mindfulness-trained
participants changed more than those of control participants for five of the
eight aspects: Self-regulation (e.g., “When I feel overwhelmed I can find a
calm place inside”); attention regulation (e.g., “I can refocus my attention
from thinking to sensing my body”); body listening (e.g., “I listen for informa-
tion from my body about my emotional state”); body trusting (e.g., “I feel my
body is a safe place”); and emotional awareness (e.g., “I notice how my body
changes when I am angry”). Aspects that didn’t change were not-distracting
(i.e., saying no to “I distract myself from sensations of discomfort”); not-
worrying (i.e., saying no to “I start to worry that something is wrong if I feel
any discomfort”); and noticing (“I notice changes in my breathing, such as
whether it slows down or speeds up”). The average effect size, across the
eight aspects, was 0.31 SD. Attention-regulation and self-regulation showed a
dose–response relationship (the correlations between these aspects and total
number of hours practiced were .18 and .22). Interestingly, the researchers
found correlations between scores on the five aspects of body awareness that
changed over practice and responses to questions that probed for how much
the participants enjoyed the practice and looked forward to it—the more peo-
ple enjoyed mindfulness exercises, the better they became attuned to their
bodies, or vice versa (the correlations ranged from .30 to .43).
108
108Presence
One reason this study shows a connection between body awareness and
awareness of emotion might be an increased integration between body aware-
ness and emotional awareness. Jocelyn Sze and her colleagues37 monitored the
heart rate of three groups of participants (meditators, dancers, and nonmedi-
tators who also didn’t dance) while they were watching a series of short emo-
tional clips (depicting such things as a woman reacting to the news that her
family members have died, a man chewing cow intestines, or a funny improv).
The participants turned a dial to indicate their level of emotion (between neg-
ative and positive). The meditators showed the largest correlation between
their heart-rate data (a good measure of physiological arousal) and their
emotion ratings, followed by the dancers, who in turn did better than the
nondancing nonmeditators. Thus meditators seem to be particularly good at
tapping into the physiological markers of their emotions.38
Finally, the most researched aspect of the effects of mindfulness on paying
attention to the body—this may surprise you—is increased sensitivity to signs
of sexual arousal. The context here is the treatment of a specific type of sexual
dysfunction in women, sometimes called “wanting to want”—having a lower
sex drive than desired. Sexual arousal is an interplay between physiology
and psychological factors—there is the bodily feeling of desire and the emo-
tional oomph that (hopefully) accompanies it. It turns out that some women
have difficulty connecting the two: While their bodies show signs of sexual
arousal, their minds do not register the changes, and they remain emotionally
unstirred.39 Some have proposed that mindfulness could be very useful here, as
it helps you to tune into your body. Additionally, mindfulness training stresses
the suspension of judgment, which can be helpful as well—many women with
sexual difficulties report that they associate sexual acts with concerns over
performance, body image concerns, and/or partner and relationship issues,
none of which are particularly helpful thoughts to have in that context.40
Most of the work in this area was done by Lori Brotto and colleagues.41
The participants were women who were seeking treatment for sexual dif-
ficulties. The interventions in these studies typically consist of a two-week
or four-week program combining mindfulness exercises (such as following
the breath and a body scan) with education about diverse aspects of female
sexuality (e.g., discussion of the female response cycle, discussion about the
importance of sexuality in the participants’ lives, and/or discussion of psy-
chological influences on sexual behavior). The researchers measured how
good participants were at judging their level of arousal, how much their rat-
ings of arousal corresponded to physiological measures, or how they rated
themselves on scales for sexual desire, sexual arousal, lubrication, sexual
satisfaction, and overall sexual functioning. Average effect size for the three
studies that included a control group was 0.63 SD.
All these interventions contain multiple components. How can we conclude
with certainty that the mindfulness component was the crucial part of the mix?
109
One study42 can help here. Brotto and colleagues compared a two-week
mindfulness-based intervention (with an education component) to a two-
week cognitive-based therapy intervention (with the same education compo-
nent). They measured vaginal pulse amplitude (an objective, physiological
measure of sexual arousal) while participants were watching an erotic movie;
participants also used a computer mouse to indicate, moment to moment,
their feelings of sexual arousal. The researchers found that mindfulness-
trained participants became better at tracking their physiological arousal
over time—m indfulness had helped them tune in to their body sensations.
This was not the case in the cognitive-based therapy group. Unfortunately,
this study included an extremely small sample—8 women in the mindfulness
group and 12 in the cognitive-based therapy group—so the results can only be
taken as suggestive, rather than definitive; they are nevertheless encouraging.
There are a few additional results that are noteworthy. First, at least two
studies43 found that mindfulness treatment in women (many of them suf-
fering from low sexual desire, from failure to become aroused or to reach
orgasm, or from pain during intercourse) led to higher levels of sexual and
emotional intimacy, better communication with their partner, and more sat-
isfaction with the relationship.
There is also some evidence that mindfulness treatment may be especially
beneficial for women who have survived sexual abuse, maybe because it turns
their attention inward, facing their own momentary sensations as they occur,
rather than asking them to engage with their past, traumatic experience.44
Finally, one study45 found a relationship between changes in trait mindful-
ness (as measured by the Five-Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire) from before
to after a meditation program and changes in how quickly participants were
able to judge their level of sexual arousal for erotic pictures (the correla-
tion was .44—p eople who were more mindful were faster judges). Likewise,
changes in self-reported anxiety correlated with changes in speed of judg-
ments (correlation of .59—more relaxed participants were faster judges). This
gives us a glimpse at the potential mechanism: Meditation makes you both
more relaxed and more mindful, and this allows for more openness to erotic
stimulation. It is quite possible then that this is simply another example of
mindfulness practice creating a more open, nonjudgmental mind.
The Effects of Meditation on Timekeeping
An interesting often-noted side effect of mindfulness practice is a change in

the practitioner’s relationship to time—the present moment expands, and
time seems to slow down. Why would that be?
One reason might be that your sense of time is related to how much atten-
tion you are paying to what is happening. This is true both for timekeeping
110
110Presence
(i.e., keeping track of time as it is unfolding now; e.g., I am brewing tea, and
I need to let it steep for three minutes) and for looking back in time (e.g., how
many hours did we spend on the beach yesterday?).
The best theory we have for how internal timekeeping works (at least for
short durations) is that we have an internal clock. This clock has two parts: a
pacemaker (the easiest metaphor is to image something that ticks, like, indeed,
a clock) and an accumulator (e.g., a counter that keep track of how many ticks
have been emitted)46. Two things influence this clock. The first is physiologi-
cal arousal: When you are in a more relaxed state, the ticking goes slower.
The second is attention: When your attention is focused on keeping time,
you are more likely to collect all the ticks in the accumulator; when you are
distracted or absorbed in something else, you might miss a few (or even a lot
of) ticks. So if you are distracted, your accumulator will fill up more slowly;
this means that the experience will be a little more timeless—time will run
more slowly, which will make it seem as if it passes by more quickly. (In my
own tea-making experience: If I pour the water and then lose myself in email,
I will end up with a bitter brew.)47 To quote Herbert Woodrow48: “Situations
especially favorable to an experience that is subjectively timeless are those
characterized by intensely absorbing occupations, such as reading an inter-
esting novel, contemplating the beautiful hallucinations produced by some
drugs, or battling for one’s life.”
Does meditation fit Woodrow’s list? Two studies to date have compared
timekeeping between meditators and nonmeditators49; one of those50 found
that meditators indeed underestimated time durations (i.e., meditators asked
to press a button when they thought that, say, 8 seconds had passed were more
likely to press the button after 10 seconds or so, indicating that the perception
of time had slowed down); the other study,51 however, did not. Two other stud-
ies looked at timekeeping right after a guided meditation of a few minutes;
one52 found that this slowed down time perception and the other53 that it only
did so in experienced meditators. The conclusion is that the evidence for a
slowing down of time perception due to mindfulness practice leans ever so
slightly in the direction that it might.
What about estimating time duration in the past?
The best theory we have for how we look back at time is based on mem-
ory: When you look back on an event or a time period (yesterday or last
week), you retrieve memories from the event or the time period. If a lot
of things happened to you during the event or time period, you are more
likely to come up with more memories. If you come up with more memo-
ries, you will perceive the event as having lasted longer—fi lled to the brim.
(For instance, if you spent yesterday afternoon at the beach soaking up the
sun, you will estimate the duration as shorter than if you spent it playing
beach volleyball, swimming, and running back and forth to the ice cream
truck.)
111
There are (as far as I can tell) only two studies that have investigated how
meditators look back at experiences. One study54 had nonmeditators and
participants in a mindfulness program watch a five-m inute nature video clip
while they were waiting for the experiment to begin; the experiment itself
consisted of asking them how long they thought the video clip was. If they
were more engaged with the video, or with their inner experience, they would
experience more “events,” and time would seem longer in retrospect. The
meditators indeed thought the video clip was longer (4.14 minutes) than the
nonmeditators (3.29 minutes). Essentially the same result was found (4.26
minutes vs. 3.73 minutes) when people were just left in the waiting room
with no distractions and asked how long they thought they had been wait-
ing, probably because meditators create more “events” by paying attention
to their inner state and/or the outer world. Another study55 used simple ques-
tionnaires to look at judgments of time. The researchers found that medita-
tors felt less time pressure than nonmeditators (measured through answers
on questions such as “I often think that time is running out”) and had a more
spacious sense of time (measured by questions such as “My time is filled”).
The past week and the past month also went by more slowly for meditators
than for nonmeditators. (There were no differences in the experience of the
past year.)
These two studies, then, suggest that time gets filled more for meditators
than for nonmeditators, regardless of what kind of external events fill the
time. Another way of putting this is saying that, again, one of the side effects
of a meditation practice may be less boredom.
The Effects of Meditation on Other Aspects of Cognition
It appears, then, that meditation sharpens and tunes attention across a wide
variety of tasks and situations. Does it have an effect on other aspects of cog-
nitive functioning as well? The short answer is that we still know very little
about this.
Five studies56 have looked at what psychologists call working memory.
Working memory is the kind of back-of-the-m ind memory that operates for
a brief period of time—a few seconds. An example is you are having a con-
versation with a friend and something she says reminds you of something you
want to say. While you wait your turn and focus on what you are supposed
to be doing (listening to your friend), you stash away what you want to say in
the back of your mind: That is working memory. Four out of the five medi-
tation studies on working memory used beginners; all used relatively short
interventions (on average 18 hours of meditation). The average effect over the
five studies was 0.32 SD; the average meditator has a better working memory
than 62% of nonmeditators.
112
112Presence
The only other cognitive task that has more than a single study dedicated
to it is verbal fluency. In a verbal fluency task, you are asked to come up with
as many, say, animals or words starting with the letter S you can think of
in the span of a few minutes. This may look like a straight-up test for your
vocabulary, but it really is also a test of how smartly you can apply your atten-
tion. Take the “name as many animals as you can” example. Most people
start off strong, rattling off all animals they can think of within a category
(maybe pets); when they feel that category is exhausted, they typically move
over to another category (maybe farm animals), and when that category is
exhausted, they move to another one (maybe zoo animals), and so on. One
trick to do well on this test is to jump to the next category as soon as the one
you are working on runs dry; another trick is to figure out when that happens.
Sometimes people get stuck trying to squeeze as many animals as they can
out of a particular category and start repeating themselves, going over the
same names again and again. The two studies57 that have looked at the effect
of mindfulness training on verbal fluency have found positive effect sizes—
1.43 SD and 0.28 SD, respectively.
Finally, one study58 found an effect size of 0.32 SD on the verbal GRE.
Meditation and ADHD
Given that meditation and mindfulness have what appear to be moder-

ate effects on attention, it makes sense to ask if mindfulness interventions
could be of use for people who show specific impairments in this domain.
Mindfulness has indeed recently (the earliest published study dates from
2008) been used as a therapy for individuals with attention deficit hyperactiv-
ity disorder (ADHD). ADHD is a developmental condition, often continuing
into adulthood, that affects about 3% to 5% of people in the United States
and is characterized by frequent bouts of inattention (e.g., difficulty concen-
trating, difficulty sustaining attention, difficulty listening, being easily dis-
tracted), impulsivity (e.g., butting into conversations, difficulty awaiting one’s
turn, emotional outbursts), and hyperactivity (e.g., fidgeting, feelings of rest-
lessness, running about, excessive talking).
There are no meta-analyses on the effects of mindfulness on ADHD,59 but
there is one overview article by John Mitchell and colleagues.60 They were
able to locate three studies on ADHD and mindfulness training in children
and adolescents, five more in which children and adolescents participated
with their parents, and nine studies on adults with ADHD—a modest har-
vest.61 In total (and only counting people who went through treatment, not
the control subjects), 294 individuals with ADHD were trained and tested, or
an average of 17 per study (varying from 1 to 72). Eight of the studies included
a control group; seven did not.
113
Most studies in this field are then what are considered to be “pilot studies,”
that is, studies that are done to quickly check if it makes sense to conduct a
full-scale clinical study. (They are pilots in the old sense of the word: guides.)
The goal of a pilot study is to see if the intervention is indeed successful (e.g.,
does it show an effect?) and also—equally important in early stages of clinical
research—if the study can actually be done (do people like the intervention,
or do they drop out? do people follow the instructions well? can the trainers
handle what is thrown at them?).
The typical intervention in mindfulness-for-ADHD studies is about 8 to
10 weeks long. Many of these involve adaptations of existing curricula, like
MBCT or DBT, but there are also programs specifically designed for treating
ADHD with mindfulness principles: MYmind, aimed at children and adoles-
cents and their parents,62 and Mindfulness Awareness Practices for adults.63
These programs combine education about ADHD with mindfulness exercises
and practices. This, of course, makes it hard to gauge what the ingredients for
success (if any) actually are.
A first conclusion from these studies is that mindfulness is a feasible inter-
vention for ADHD—it can be done. Studies that note the participants’ reac-
tions mention that they find the intervention enjoyable, and the number of
participants who follow the program all the way through is high—around 80%
in the studies that report the numbers. This is encouraging indeed, because it
is far from self-evident that people who generally have a short attention span
and are quite distractible would enjoy the stillness of mindfulness activities
enough to continue a demanding program for two or three months.
A second conclusion is that the studies show moderate support for the
position that mindfulness is helpful to individuals with ADHD.
Let’s first look at changes in self-report, that is, how individuals with
ADHD describe their symptoms and experiences. In four out of five relevant
studies, participants indicated lower levels of inattention after the interven-
tion compared to before; in three out of three, they indicated lower levels of
hyperactivity; in three out of four, the total number of ADHD symptoms
declined; in three out of five, they indicated lower levels of depression; in one
out of two, lower levels of anxiety were noted; in one out of two, the partici-
pants reported a lower incidence of “externalizing behavior” (i.e., acting out);
and in three out of five, they noted an increase in quality of life. The score
sheet is far from perfect, but these are, indeed, nice results.
Some studies also looked at other-reports, that is, assessment by par-
ents, teachers, clinicians, or peers. The evidence is a bit more mixed in this
case: One out of two studies noticed less inattention; two out of three lower
levels of hyperactivity; and one out of two lower levels of depression.
Finally, scores on actual attention tests show an equally mixed picture.
Studies including multiple types of measures often only obtained changes in
a few (or none) of these (in two cases four out of 12, in another case one out
114
114Presence
of three, in yet another case one out of two; and there are three studies with
null results: zero out of four, zero out of three, and zero out of one). Taken
together, that means that across studies, we find six significant results out of
25 possible—a 24% hit rate. Clearly, this is not a slam-dunk.
One study64 examined brainwaves. After the intervention, the researchers
found an increase in error-related positivity in a go/no-go task, suggesting
heightened awareness of errors. Changes in error-related positivity correlated
with a decrease in hyperactivity/impulsivity symptoms and increased trait
mindfulness. There was also an increase in a specific brainwave component
(the P3) that is related to how strongly you engage attention; changes in P3
correlated with a decrease in inattention symptoms. Thus the intervention
was associated with brain markers of attention during an attention task, and
these changes also translated into an improvement of symptoms.
A final question concerns the duration of these effects. The results for
adolescents and children are mixed—three studies65 conducted follow-up
at eight weeks; five out of eight measures that were found significant right
after the intervention were also significant at follow-up. Encouragingly, what
seemed preserved was mostly the gain on ADHD core symptoms. For adults,
in all three studies66 that included follow-up (at three months or six months),
the gains that were found at the end of the intervention were still there at
follow-up.
Taken together, these results seem promising. They suggest that mindful-
ness training can help ease the burden of the core symptoms of ADHD in a
number of people. The results on objective tests are less clear-cut. All this
work is still in the pilot stage. We need larger scale clinical studies with con-
trol groups to reach firmer conclusions; these would also help us get a good
idea of the size of the effect.
Meditation and Attention: Conclusions
Meditation has an effect on all three forms of attention I have reviewed

here: Its effect on focused attention is around 0.4 SD; a similar effect is noted
on sustained attention; and there are also consistent effects on nonjudg-
mental alerting, with an effect size of 0.65 SD for attentional blink studies.67
Meditators, especially those who practice body scan meditation, seem to have
a keener sense of the body in terms of touch, better coordination between see-
ing and acting, and heightened body awareness in daily life; they are not bet-
ter at detecting the breath or the heartbeat. Also, their sense of time expands.
I was particularly intrigued by the many studies that found evidence for
nonjudgmental alerting, arguably the core aspect of Kabat-Zinn’s defini-
tion of mindfulness—we see it in the attentional blink task, the gorilla video
task, the (non) startle effect, the local-g lobal effect, and in brain parameters
115
like error-related negativity and positivity. Having so much converging evi-

dence from so many different types of tasks is heartening. It is also interest-
ing because this is an aspect of attention that is somewhat undervalued in
standard cognitive psychology, where we are more interested in the amount
or acuity of attention (how much can we take in, and how sharp do we see
it?), rather than its quality. We often think of open-m indedness as something
complex, an ability that operates at a high level of the mind (here I am, all
open-m inded!) and not as something that operates in a process as basic as
paying attention and as a skill that can be trained. Two studies even suggest
that meditation practice can help lower the threshold of perception, literally
letting more of the outside world enter the realm of awareness. An interesting
side note in this respect is the finding—in two different contexts—that medi-
tation experience seems to make life a little less boring.
Attention is often considered the gateway to other aspects of cognition.
Particularly, attention is important for working memory, helps with knowl-
edge retrieval, and is important for real-life aspects of cognition (for which we
saw only one example—GRE scores). All of these aspects of cognition indeed
seem to benefit from meditation and mindfulness training, although the num-
ber of studies and the number of participants involved in each of these studies
is still too small to allow for definitive conclusions.
Many studies underscore the importance of frequency or amount of medi-
tation, rather than accumulated hours of practice. Frequent practice appears
to sharpen the focus of attention, to alert you to mistakes, to broaden the
limits of perception, and to help sustain attention. And, of course, the finding
that eight-week MBSR programs can have a meaningful impact on attention,
often on par with the effects seen in very seasoned meditators, underscores
this point.
Finally, the attention- enhancing properties of meditation have led to
promising clinical applications. There is early, encouraging but far from
definitive evidence that mindfulness training might be helpful in easing the
symptom burden of ADHD and quite good evidence that it may be benefi-
cial for sexual dysfunctions that have their root in a lack of awareness of the
physiological signs of arousal.
There are many open questions still.
First, one study investigated the role of attentional effort, arguing that
what we are seeing in mindfulness-trained people is not the effect of the train-
ing per se but a newfound willingness to go the extra mile. That is a very good
point, and it deserves further scrutiny.
Second, it would be great to know if there is an order to these effects—does
one type of attention develop earlier than the other? Some68 have claimed that
changes in focused attention would come first and changes in sustained atten-
tion later, but I did not see much evidence for this position in the literature.
The simple answer is that we don’t know. We need an intervention study that
116
116Presence
looks at all three aspects of attention (and probably a few more cognitive and
well-being type measures as well) and measures the effects repeatedly over
the course of the training program.
A third open question is how these changes relate to changes in brain acti-
vation, and especially to changes in brain morphology—the link, so to speak,
with the two previous chapters.
117
{ 6 }
Mindfulness Practice and Well-Being
I must admit that my own bias, as a cognitive psychologist, lies with the pre-
vious chapter—to what extent do meditation and mindfulness sharpen the
mind; how far do they stretch attention? As we have seen, this question has
attracted a good deal of consideration from the research community.
I would very much doubt, however—although I have nothing but anec-
dotal data to support this—that most people (me included) take up medita-
tion because they hope it will help them focus. I also doubt they would stay
with it if that was all it did (assuming it results in measurable daily-life benefits
in that department—my graduate students, who bump into my forgetfulness
on at least a weekly basis, like to believe otherwise). In the latest National
Health Statistics report from the National Center for Complementary and
Alternative Medicine (NCCAM), meditation is described as a “complemen-
tary health approach,” and the authors say that “(t)his practice is believed
to result in a state of greater physical relaxation, mental calmness, and psy-
chological balance. Practicing meditation can change how a person relates
to the flow of emotions and thoughts in the mind.”1 My guess is that most
people practice meditation for these reasons—to get a deeper sense of calm
and relaxation (in other words, to feel less stressed) and to upgrade their per-
sonal well-being.
One of the things that struck me in the NCCAM report is the turn of
phrase: “This practice is believed to result … ” 2 There is quite an enormous
literature on meditation and mindfulness—surely we know by now?
The answer, as we shall see by the end of this chapter, is that we do know,
in gross terms, but we still know less about the particulars of the workings
of meditation than certainly I would like to know. Note that, in this chapter,
I restrict myself to the effects of meditation and mindfulness on well-being
in so-called nonclinical populations, that is, in people who aren’t looking
for relief from specific symptoms (e.g. anxiety) or specific syndromes (e.g.,
depression). I take up the question of the clinical effectiveness of mindful-
ness and meditation in Chapter 7—how mindfulness works as medicine for
118
118Presence
specific psychological problems rather than—as in this chapter—an enhance-

ment of daily life.
Effects of Meditation, in Meditators’ Own Words
Before I go into detail on the research on meditation and well-being (includ-
ing its effects on stress), it might be good to hear from meditators themselves.
What do they see as the primary benefits of the practice?
There is only one study I am aware of in which participants simply describe
perceived benefits and drawbacks in their own words.3 This study looked at
65 college students who took a semester-long meditation class. A large major-
ity of the participants—85%—listed at least one benefit. About half of the
participants (47%) noted increased attention or awareness, which was defined
a bit more broadly than what we saw in the last chapter (e.g., “Better general
sense of awareness,” “Becoming aware of my breath again,” “Staying in the
moment with others,” “To notice when I’m not being mindful’). Altogether,
there were 31 reports of such benefits. But the large majority of benefits (112
instances) had more to do with a sense of ease and well-being: increased calm
and relaxation (52% of the participants: “Being and becoming more calm,”
“More relaxed,” “At peace with myself”), increases in positive thoughts and
positive personality traits (26%: “Increased compassion for self and oth-
ers,” “Inserting love, kindness into thoughts,” “Acceptance,” “Letting go
of unhealthy expectations”), less anxiety and lower stress levels (24%: “Less
stress,” “Get over stress easier,” “Anxiety control”), clear-headedness (20% of
participants: “If I distance myself from the details, things become clearer,”
“Able to organize my thoughts,” “It helped me clear my head after a fight”),
and/or increased energy (15%: “A new-found energy,” “I felt refreshed and
more ready to face the day,” “A feeling of renewal”).
This is a very encouraging list—it suggests that these participants may
indeed truly be happier and more at peace after taking this class.
How to Study the Effects of Mindfulness on Well-Being
Sears et al.’s study nicely sets the stage for the type of effects we might expect
from meditation and mindfulness4: positive impact on (a) stress and health;
(b) sleep, fatigue, and relaxation; and (c) more emotional, personal, and inter-
personal aspects of well-being (studies of this type have looked at negative
and positive personality traits, affect, emotion regulation, self-compassion
and self-acceptance, and compassion for others and empathy).
Note that we make yet another methodology shift in this chapter. The pre-
vious chapters used (mostly) “objective” or “third-p erson” measures, that is,
119
Mindfulness Practice and Well-Being 119
effects that can be observed from the outside: changes in blood flow to partic-
ular areas of the brain, changes in the volume of specific brain regions, scores
on a particular test for attention. Because those measures are objective, we
mostly trust the measures themselves—disputes (if any) about these kinds of
studies are usually about the number of people in each study (too small, as
we have seen), whether the right kind of comparison group was used, or other
issues of that nature. With the exception of some of the studies on health and
stress (and a few choice others), we are now moving to “subjective” or “first-
person” measures—measures where you indicate, by telling us or by taking a
survey, how you feel, what you experience, or what you think.
One issue is that such subjective measures are more vulnerable to all
kinds of biases, be they conscious or—as is probably more often the case—
unconscious. For instance, if you spend a large amount of time meditating,
you might want to convince yourself that you see benefits from your efforts,
even if they aren’t really there.5 This is called effort justification (a process
meant to reduce cognitive dissonance): If you invest a lot of time/energy/
money in something, you assume it must be worth it.
Another possible issue is what psychologists call “demand characteris-
tics.” That is, when you know that you are a research subject in a study on the
effects of meditation on well-being, and you really take to meditation and you
really like the nice researchers who do all this stuff for you and for the greater
good of humanity, you might give in to the subtle pressure (the “demand”)
and report that, indeed, you are now doing so much better.
A third possible issue is expectancy: If you believe that meditation works,
this in and of itself can make you feel better.
Finally, subjective measures tend to be vulnerable to whatever is happen-
ing to you in the moment. If you woke up on the wrong side of the bed and
I ask you how you feel about the past eight weeks of meditation, you will
likely give a less favorable review of your experiences than if you are in an
excellent mood.
The fourth of these problems will just make the data noisier; that is, it will
introduce errors in both directions, positive and negative, and the first three
might seriously skew the conclusions from a study. The only way to effectively
deal with them is by using an active control condition, also known as a placebo
condition or placebo treatment. What do we mean by that?
As I mentioned in Chapter 1, there are two ways in which the effectiveness
of a treatment can be evaluated: as progress (e.g., do people feel less stressed
out after having completed a mindfulness program compared to before?) and
by comparison to other treatments or no treatment (e.g., is training in mind-
fulness a more effective way of letting go of stress than relaxation training?).
In clinical-psychology parlance, the second type of comparison is called a
“controlled comparison” or “controlled trial”—the word “control” refers to
the comparison group, which in scientific lingo is called the “control” group.
120
120Presence
Controlled comparison is the gold standard in any research designed to find

out the effectiveness of a particular treatment—it is the only way to demon-
strate that it is actually the treatment that causes the progress and not some-
thing else. Depression, for instance, often lifts by itself—if we simply note
that the symptoms of depression get less severe over the course of an eight-
week mindfulness program, it might be that all we are seeing is this natural
progression (in at least some of the people) instead of a real benefit of the
program.
There are two types of control groups: passive and active. Participants in a
passive control group receive no treatment; they are simply tested twice—once
before the mindfulness participants start their treatment and once after the
mindfulness participants conclude their treatment. (Often these individu-
als are given the option to participate in the mindfulness training after they
have done their job as control participants—this is called a wait-list control
group.) Participants in an active control group receive some form of interven-
tion that might be plausibly helpful. This treatment can be specific, that is,
it is a known therapy—relaxation therapy6 is popular—or it can be nonspe-
cific, that is, it is not a known therapy but it matches the duration and level
of attention people in the mindfulness program are getting—think health
education or a support group. In the first case—comparison with specific
treatment—we are interested in how well mindfulness works compared to
something that we know works. The second case—m indfulness versus non-
specific active control—tells us something about the effects of mindfulness
as a placebo. Placebo effects are effects that occur not because the treatment
works but because participants trust that the treatment will work, be it due
to expectancy, demand characteristics, or effort justification.7 Placebo effects
are often found in therapies for psychological difficulties. For instance, meta-
analyses suggest that about 70% to 80% of the beneficial effect of antidepres-
sants is due to the placebo effect.8
The gold standard in clinical research also involves randomization (“ran-
domized clinical trials” or “random assignment” are key words to look out
for). This means that when participants volunteer for the study, it is up to
chance whether they receive the control treatment or the mindfulness inter-
vention. The main reason for randomizing is to eliminate any possible bias
in assigning people to interventions—otherwise researchers might stack the
deck, consciously or not, and enroll people who they feel might benefit most
from meditation into the mindfulness program.
Note that ideally all of these studies explicitly recruit participants inter-
ested in meditation and/or mindfulness, so that the participants are at least
motivated to go through eight weeks of training. This is not always the case,
however—I found at least one study that recruited participants for “a life style
intervention program.”9 Vague recruitment could lead to smaller effects—
as someone who participates in group meditation sessions and occasionally
121
offers meditation instruction, I find that not everyone enjoys this activity in
the long run.
With these short-term intervention studies, we are now moving even fur-
ther away from looking at the effects of the kind of meditation practice for
which we have brain data. This may be to our advantage, because it allows us
a firmer grip on whether meditation and mindfulness are truly the forerun-
ners of well-being. If we were to compare long-time meditators with nonmedi-
tators and find that they are less stressed, some skeptic could always argue
that maybe chiller people are attracted to meditation, or maybe only people
who lead stress-free lives are able to stick with it. Do note, however, that not
all studies included in this chapter used an intervention approach. Some did
compare long-time meditators with nonmeditators; I will indicate when that
is the case.
Effects of Meditation and Mindfulness on Stress and Health
Let’s start our tour of studies on the effects of meditation and mindfulness on
well-being with the aspect of well-being that is perhaps most clearly anchored
in the body: resistance to stress.
When I typed “mindfulness and stress” into the PubMed online search
engine, I was greeted by no less than 1,016 papers. (I admit I started hyper-
ventilating a bit.) Then I remembered that the most popular mindfulness
program—MBSR—has “stress” right in its name, and so not all of these
papers were on the effects of meditation or mindfulness on stress. On the
other hand, the name also reinforces the idea that the main goal of medi-
tation for many is to live a less stressful life. More traditionally Buddhist
approaches to meditation emphasize the place where it all starts—w ith the
training of attention—while mindfulness training programs emphasize what
it sees as the goal—stress reduction.
There are at least two review papers on the effects of mindfulness on self-
perceived stress—one 2009 meta-analysis by Alberto Chiesa and Alessandro
Serretti10 (on 10 studies) and one follow-up paper by Manoj Sharma and Sarah
Rush11 that covers the findings since the Chiesa and Serretti paper (17 more
studies), for a total of 1,555 mindfulness-training participants. All of these
studies used some form of intervention, and all measured progress; some also
compared changes in stress within trained participants with those in one or
more control groups.
The groups of people investigated in these 27 papers aren’t very random—
13 of the studies had health-care professionals or health-care professionals
in training as participants (a high-stress group if ever there was one), 4 used
teachers, and 4 used undergraduate students; the rest were “community
samples,” that is, the general public. Most of the measures are self-report
122
122Presence
measures, that is, responses on a survey or questionnaire (the most popular

is the Perceived Stress Scale, which asks questions such as “In the last month,
how often have you been upset because of something that happened unex-
pectedly?” or “In the last month, how often have you found that you could
not cope with all the things that you had to do?”); only three studies used a
physiological measure. This isn’t necessarily bad—what we call “stress” in
common parlance is, after all, almost purely a subjective assessment. That is,
stress isn’t so much about what I have on my plate (technically, that is called a
“stressor”) as it is about how I deal with what’s on that plate. For most people,
public speaking is a major stressor, but those of us who teach regularly, for
instance, have learned how to cope with that stressor and might even have
figured out how to make it an enjoyable experience for all involved, including
ourselves.
What are the findings?
Both review papers focus on changes from before the program to after
completion. This is a fine way of looking at the findings—after all, when I go
meditate, I am less worried about whether I will now be less stressed than,
say, my colleague next door (a contest I could never win, because he is an
extremely laid-back fellow), but more about how it tweaks my own personal
stress levels. Chiesa and Serretti find that after mindfulness training, stress
levels go down by 0.74 SD; in control groups (all but one of those were pas-
sive control groups), stress levels, in contrast, go up, by 0.21 SD—the net shift
from before to after mindfulness training is thus close to one standard devia-
tion. Sharma and Rush did not crunch the numbers, but they found positive
change in 15 out of their 17 studies. So, yes: Mindfulness training clearly leads
to stress reduction.
This is, however, not the way other researchers have meta-analyzed the
findings I summarized in the previous chapters (i.e., those on brain function,
brain structure, and attention), nor is it, as we have seen, the way clinicians
typically look at the effects of therapy: There, the question is how meditators
compare to nonmeditators—in this case, does having a mindfulness practice
make you less stressed out than not having one? In the current group of stud-
ies, this amounts to a comparison between mindfulness-trained participants
and the control group at the end of training. Keeping only the studies that
contained a control group, and adding 12 further papers,12 I arrived at a total
of 27 studies, which yielded an average effect size of 0.36 SD; this implies that
the average mindfulness-trained participant is less stressed than 64% of his
nontrained counterparts. The seven studies that had college students as sub-
jects resulted in an effect size of 0.31 SD (the mindfulness-trained student is
thus less stressed than 62% of nontrained students at the same college); the 13
studies with health-care professionals or health-care professionals in training
showed a very similar effect of 0.34 SD (the mindfulness-trained health-care
professional is thus less stressed than 63% of her colleagues). Here too, then,
123
the conclusion is that mindfulness training makes you less stressed, com-
pared to living your life as usual.
Interestingly, three studies13 included follow-ups after either six months
or one year. Immediately after training, these three studies yielded an aver-
age effect size of 0.64 SD, which declined to 0.47 SD at follow-up. This sug-
gests that the benefits wane a bit over time, but they are still significant and
of medium size a few months after the training has ended. It would be nice
to know if the participants kept up with their practice in between the end of
training and the follow-up tests—if they did not, we have an easy culprit for
the decline—but, alas, we do not.
Only one study, by Thaddeus Pace and colleagues,14 examined the dose–
response relationship, maybe more out of desperation than out of principle
(they did not find a reliable effect of training), but what emerged was fascinat-
ing. This study is a bit atypical, in two respects. First, it is the one study in
this group that used a heart practice—compassion training—rather than a
strict mindfulness approach. Second, it included physiological measures of
reactivity to a stressor. That is, the researchers measured how blood plasma
levels of a stress hormone (cortisol) and a marker of immune functioning
(interleukin-6 [IL-6]) changed as the participants (trained in compassion
meditation, or not) went through what is one of the strongest stressors known
to humankind: giving an oral presentation in front of a group of strangers.
In this case, these strangers were all wearing lab coats and deadly serious
facial expressions. As I just mentioned, and unfortunately for the research-
ers, there was no significant difference between trained and untrained par-
ticipants on the stress measures. The meditating participants, however, also
kept a diary record of their daily practice, and the researchers quickly noted
that there was wide variability in the amount of practice: Some participants
did only one or two meditation sessions per week on their own; others did
seven or even eight. When the researchers looked at the relationship between
the amount of practice and stress reactivity, they found that changes in IL-6
scores were tied to the number of times the meditators actually hit the cush-
ion; the correlation was –.46, a good-sized effect. This suggests that there
might be a direct effect: Meditate more and you will be less stressed.
Can we trace these effects back to changes in underlying physiology?
Interestingly, the usual suspect—cortisol, the key stress hormone—does
not figure in this story, at least not as measured at rest. I am aware of three
studies on cortisol and mindfulness training.15 The average effect size across
the three is –0.07 SD, which is not significantly different from zero. We did see
in the previous paragraph, however, that one study suggests that the amount
of recent practice influences how much IL-6 the body secretes as a response
to a stressor. It may be the case, then, that under normal circumstances—at
rest—meditators have similar levels of baseline calm or unrest as nonmedi-
tators (as tapped by cortisol) but that they are less easily tipped off balance
124
124Presence
when a stressor does appear (as measured by IL-6). This is pure conjecture on
my part; we definitely need more studies here.
Other studies do show effects of mindfulness training on physiological
indicators of stress and health, notably on indicators of immune functioning.
The most famous of these is by Richie Davidson and colleagues.16 In this
study, participants in an MBSR program and wait-list control participants
were given a flu shot right after the conclusion of the mindfulness program.
Four months later, they came back to the lab to be tested. The researchers
found that the meditators had produced more antibodies against the flu than
the nonmeditators, indicating a more efficiently working immune system
(the effect size was 0.67 SD). The researchers also measured asymmetry in
frontal brain activation using EEG. The reason for this is that some stud-
ies seem to suggest that people who activate the left part of the brain more
than the right tend to have more “positive affect,” that is, a sunnier out-
look on life. Davidson found two remarkable things: After the training, the
mindfulness-trained participants showed more left-frontal activation than
before and more than the control participants, and there was a very nice
correlation (r = .53) between the change in left-frontal activation and the
amount of antibodies these participants produced. The natural interpreta-
tion here is that meditation makes people happier, which in turn might boost
their immune system.17
Four more studies provide some confirmation that mindfulness has an
effect on immune functioning, but three of those include individuals with a
medical diagnosis that explicitly compromises their immunity. This is excel-
lent for therapeutic purposes, of course, but less than ideal if we want to gen-
eralize the findings to nonclinical groups. Two of those studies18 looked at
HIV-positive men. Both found changes in immune functioning after an eight-
week MBSR program compared to a control group. More specifically, they
observed either an increase in NK cells (so-called killer cells; effect size = 0.86
SD) or stability (rather than the decline noted in the comparison group) in
CD4+ lymphocytes (effect size = 0.16 SD). A third study looked at different
aspects of immunity in survivors of breast cancer after surgery19 (targeting
killer cell activity, cytokines, and leukocytes); survivors who went through
an MBSR program post-surgery did better on all of these aspects one month
after completion of the program (effect size = 0.59 SD). Finally, one study20
found greater telomerase activity (a predictor of long-term cell survival) in
long-term meditators who had just finished a three-month retreat compared
to long-term meditators who had not (effect size = 0.22 SD).
The average effect size over these five studies is 0.46 SD. Note that all
of these studies, again, used small samples (25 people in the mindfulness
group in Davidson et al.; 24 in Robinson et al.; 33 in Creswell et al.; 44 in
Witek-Janusek et al.; 30 in Jacobs et al.), that the number of studies itself is
small, and that—as stated previously—three out of five studies chose their
125
participants explicitly because of a weakened immune system. For all these

reasons, we should be very, very cautious before attaching grand conclusions
to these findings.
Sleep Quality
Sleep can be considered an aspect of well-being—we all appreciative a good

night’s sleep. Does meditation and/or mindfulness help with that?
We could make two opposite predictions here. First, as we have seen in
Chapter 2, meditation is sometimes considered to be a form of relaxation
that—in some instances—looks like sleep. Second, as we saw in the previous
chapter, meditation also clearly involves alertness, and it is, in effect, quite
a powerful tool to improve attention, including vigilance and wakefulness.
From the first observation, we would expect that meditation might help
with sleep problems, perhaps by making it easier to fall asleep, by increasing
sleep duration, or by increasing sleep quality. This has led some research-
ers to use mindfulness and meditation as an intervention for insomnia
(i.e., sleeplessness), whether caused by medical issues (e.g., pain associated
with fibromyalgia), psychological problems (e.g., stress), or as a problem on
its own. There are now two review papers on this topic,21 covering a total of
14 studies, and the conclusions are not encouraging. Uncontrolled studies do
show positive effects, but the data are all self-reported (using diaries or sur-
veys), and controlled studies show largely no effects; that is, both the trained
participants and the untrained participants show the same self- reported
effects—usually beneficial. (Suggesting, perhaps, that simply participating in
sleep research makes you a better, sounder, happier sleeper, at least in your
own mind.)
When we look at objective measures—either studies where people are
brought into a sleep lab or where they are given sleep monitors to wear at
home—the second viewpoint appears to win. I was able to find four such
studies.22 On average, the meditators in these studies (three groups of long-
term meditators and one group of MBSR-trained folks) slept half an hour less
than the nonmeditators (6 hours and 7 minutes vs. 6 hours and 37 minutes; or
8% less); meditators were also awake for longer periods during the night (46
minutes vs. 38 minutes; or 22% longer), and they took just a little more time
between hitting the pillow and falling asleep (8.6 minutes vs. 8.0 minutes).
Sleep quality changed too, in the sense that meditators used sleep more effi-
ciently: They spent less time in Stage 1 sleep—the shallow sleep that starts
and ends a sleep cycle (43 minutes vs. 51 minutes, or 16% less), and more time
in Stage 3 and 4, or slow-wave sleep—the deep sleep that is generally seen
as the restful phase, where you recover from your daily activities and build
memories (42 minutes vs. 31 minutes, or 36% longer).23
126
126Presence
There may be a hidden dose–response relationship here: In Britton et al.,

the only study that included beginning meditators fresh out of an MBCT
class, participants spent more time in Stage 1 and less time in deep sleep;
moreover, within that group, people who did more home practice spent
more time in Stage 1 (a correlation of r = .80), spent less time in deep sleep
(r = –.61), and woke up more often during the night (r = .57). This possi-
bly suggests that the effects vary with levels of meditation experience: Early
in practice, your need for sleep decreases, and your levels of alertness and
physiological arousal run high, causing you to wake up more often and sleep
less deeply; later in practice, the body adapts to the wakefulness and makes
the most out of the shorter sleep period. (I should note here too that Britton
et al.’s participants were all depressed patients in remission, that is, people
who were formerly depressed but now considered symptom-free who went
through the MBCT program in the hope to prevent relapse. The changes in
sleep pattern correlated with decreases in depression scores, and so it is pos-
sible that what we see in this study is actually a further improvement of the
remaining depressive symptoms, rather than a direct effect of practice.)
Fabio Ferrarelli et al. report another type of dose–repose relationship. In
that study, meditators showed stronger gamma oscillations in their brain-
waves during non-REM sleep. What is really interesting is that these gamma
oscillations occurred in the same brain regions where meditators often show
gamma oscillations during the resting state and during meditation. The
strength of these gamma oscillations correlated with the total lifetime num-
ber of hours of meditation practice (r = .48). Gamma oscillations are typically
associated with executive attention. Ferrarelli et al. speculate that what might
be happening is that over time (these participants had on average about 4,000
hours of accumulated practice) meditation becomes a habit (or, as psycholo-
gists say, a trait). Just like the resting state becomes more meditation-like with
advancing practice (as we saw in Chapter 3), so too might sleep become more
meditationesque—the meditation pattern simply seeps through all aspects
of daily (and nightly) life. Or, as Britton et al. put it beautifully in the title of
their review paper24: “Awakening is not a metaphor.”
Emotional, Personal, and Interpersonal Aspects

of Well-Being
Several studies consider the effects of meditation and mindfulness on emo-

tional, personal, and interpersonal aspects of well-being—emotions and emo-
tion regulation, personality traits, self-concept (I fit self-compassion under
this umbrella), as well as empathy and compassion for others. Unfortunately,
the number of studies that meet customary methodological expectations is
much smaller than the actual number of studies that have been published.
For instance, in the largest meta-analysis on the effects of meditation on
127
psychology, by Peter Sedlmeier and colleagues,25 the authors initially col-

lected 595 studies. This number was eventually whittled down to 163, due—
mostly—to methodological concerns about the remaining 432 studies. Most
of these boiled down to the absence of a control group. This is bothersome, of
course: Three-quarters of the published studies in the field simply don’t meet
the basic standard that would allow for scientifically valid conclusions.
In my overview here, I reanalyze part of the pool of studies collected by
Sedlmeier et al.26 The original pool included studies of types of meditation
other than mindfulness meditation, such as Transcendental Meditation® or
other forms of mantra meditation; I deleted those.27 This leaves a total of 57
studies.28 These cover a wide range of psychological variables, including some
we have visited before, like stress (covered earlier in this chapter) or attention
(covered in the previous chapter). Of the 57, 46 are intervention studies where
absolute beginners were trained for, on average, 51 days (or about seven
weeks; the shortest training took 10 days, the longest 154 days). The remain-
ing 11 are studies looking at differences between nonmeditators and medita-
tors; the latter boasted, on average, nine years of prior meditation experience.
Average sample size was 55 people per study (3,154 participants total).
As you can imagine, there are many conceptualizations of well-being,29
but often psychologists look at life satisfaction either in general or within dif-
ferent domains of life (well-being at work, in relationships, and so on) or in
different aspects of life (emotional well-being, social well-being, and so on).
In the next few subsections, I give an overview of work on those aspects of
well-being that have been included in meditation/m indfulness studies: gen-
eral quality of life, emotional well-being, and interpersonal well-being.
MEDITATION AND GENERAL QUALITY OF LIFE
There are a few questionnaires that try to capture well-being and quality of
life as a general concept, using items such as “If I could live my life over, I
would change almost nothing,” “My daily life is filled with interesting things,”
or “Most of the things I do in the future will probably be …” (here the par-
ticipants can choose between seven gradations, from completely fascinating
to deadly boring). Sedlmeier et al. were able to locate five studies30 that used
such scales to gauge outcomes of meditation programs. The average effect
size was a respectable 0.55 SD, indicating that the average meditator enjoys a
higher perceived quality of life than 70% of nonmeditators.
MEDITATION AND EMOTIONAL WELL-B EING
Six studies31 have looked at state anxiety. State anxiety is the type of anxiety
that is temporary (psychologists call that a “state”). Such anxiety is often
due to circumstances and how you react to them—feelings of nervousness,
discomfort, or fear. For instance, when your airplane hits turbulence, you
128
128Presence
might feel nervous—that is state anxiety. Typical items used on surveys to

measure state anxiety are “I am tense” or “I am worried.” The effect size for
state anxiety is quite large at 0.69 SD. After taking a mindfulness or med-
itation class, the average course participant is less state-anxious than 75%
of nonmindfulness-trained people. My guess is that, like for pain, the skills
of relaxation, refocusing, and acceptance come in handy when dealing with
anxiety-provoking situations. (Next time you’re caught in turbulence, just
breathe.)
Eleven studies32 have looked at trait anxiety—the kind of worry or fear
or discomfort or being on edge that is part of your personality or that you
experience on a day-to-day basis. Typical items to measure trait anxiety are
“I worry too much over something that really doesn’t matter” or the oppo-
site of “I am a steady person.” The effect size here is again quite large—0.62
SD—i mplying that the average mindfulness-trained participant is less trait-
anxious than 73% of the general public.
I single out one particular study here, done by Peter Lin and colleagues.33
Lin et al. studied a group of conservatory students (most of them were piano
or violin students); they were interested in how meditation impacts perfor-
mance anxiety during an actual recital. Performance anxiety isn’t always
bad—typically, there is a curved relationship, where either an absence or an
overabundance of anxiety lead to flagging performance. If you don’t care at
all, you won’t do well; if you care too much, you might literally get shaky—not
a good thing for a precision sport like playing the violin. You need a medium,
just-r ight level of anxiety. What this just-r ight level is isn’t precisely defin-
able: It is different from person to person, and it also differs by skill level. In
the beginning stages of learning to play your instrument, a little anxiety can
wreck you; when you get more adept, you will need higher and higher levels
of anxiety to perform well.
In Lin et al.’s study, higher levels of anxiety were crippling on the recital
performance of musicians in the control group, as you might expect. The
newly minted meditators, however, played better and better as their levels
of anxiety went up. The actual levels of anxiety and of performance did not
differ between the two groups, so this finding is really about how the two
groups deal with anxiety—how they transform it, so to speak, into musical
energy. Meditators seemingly interpret the physiological signals of anxiety
differently than nonmeditators. When nonmeditators spy the signs of anxiety
in their body, they typically add psychological baggage to this—”Oh no, I am
nervous. I will mess up!” Meditators may have learned to take a little more
distance and to notice the changes in their body without getting caught up in
them—”Oh, my heart is beating faster, I better concentrate on playing.” This
may allow them to channel their physiological arousal to focus on the task
at hand: playing their instrument. Lin et al. cite one of the meditators, a jazz
pianist, who mentioned that this was “the most relaxed I had been during a
129
solo performance in a long time, despite the fact that I was still incredibly
nervous (my hands were cold).” This student was clearly able to just observe
and label what was going on, without letting the natural emotions associated
with the physiological changes run their course.
Six studies34 have looked at the effects of meditation on depressed mood,
measured by items such as “I think my life has been a failure,” “I have crying
spells,” “I do not expect things to work out for me,” or “I am sad all the time.”
The average effect size is 0.32 SD, indicating that the average meditator feels
less depressed than 63% of the general public.
There are six studies35 that examined positive and negative emotions, typi-
cally with a particular scale called the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule
(PANAS). This scale asks people either how they are feeling right now or
how they have felt over the past week. As the name implies, it traces a set of
positive emotions (i.e., do you feel interested, excited, strong, enthusiastic,
proud, …?) and negative emotions (i.e., do you feel distressed, upset, guilty,
scared, hostile, …?). Effect size for negative emotions was 0.41 SD; effect size
for positive emotions was 0.54 SD—after mindfulness training, the average
participant felt less negative than 66% of nonparticipants and more positive
than 70% of nonparticipants.
Nine studies36 have looked at emotion regulation. Emotion regulation refers
to the ability to keep emotions in check as required by either the situation
or your own personal goals. For instance, your boss might say something
negative about your work performance; it is then probably a good idea to
hold back a little and not to tell your boss exactly how you feel about that.
Emotion regulation typically also includes being able to label your emotions
and understand where they are coming from (just like the jazz pianist in Lin
et al.’s study did). Items that measure emotion regulation are “When I’m
upset, I feel like I can remain in control of my behaviors,” “I am rarely con-
fused about how I feel,” or the opposite of “Whenever I am in a bad mood,
I’m pessimistic about the future.” Emotion regulation can also be measured
in the psychology lab, as we have seen in the previous chapter, for instance by
trying to interrupt someone’s concentration by showing them emotional pic-
tures or playing emotional sounds. The average effect size for emotion regula-
tion is 0.34 SD, implying that the average mindfulness-trained participant is
better at emotion regulation than 63% of nontrained individuals.
Rumination is a concept that is related to emotion regulation. Rumination
means the rehashing of the same thoughts over and over again (usually these
are negative thoughts), often with the sense that you are powerless to stop
yourself from thinking them. Sample items are “When I feel depressed,
I think about my shortcomings, failings, faults, mistakes,” “Sometimes it
is hard for me to shut off thoughts about myself,” or “I find myself replay-
ing events over and over in my mind.” Rumination tends to get a foul mood
going—as you can imagine, revisiting your shortcomings and failures over
130
130Presence
and over again is not exactly conducive to happiness. In a meta-analysis,37 the

correlation between rumination measures and negative affect was found to
be 0.48. Depressed patients who ruminate more stay depressed longer,38 and
in random undergraduates, ruminators are more likely to get depressed over
the course of their college career.39 All of this suggests that it would be bet-
ter for your well-being not to ruminate too much. There are four studies on
meditation and its effects on rumination in the Sedlmeier et al. data set; the
average effect size is 0.39 SD,40 indicating that the average meditator rumi-
nates less often and/or less vigorously than 65% of nonmeditators.
MEDITATION AND PERSONALITY
Second, there is some but not a lot of research on personality changes after
training in mindfulness meditation.
There are only three studies41that look at what Sedlmeier et al. call negative
personality traits (viz., egoism, dominance, psychoticism, rigidity, and capac-
ity for status42). They show large effects: 0.89 SD. This is a nice outcome—
a little more kindness, a little rounding off of rough edges, and a little less
alpha-male behavior can make the world a better place for the people around
you. The effect size implies that the average meditator scores lower on these
negative traits than 81% of the general public.
One personality trait that has been examined a few times43 (four studies in
Sedlmeier et al.44) is emotional stability—that is, how good you are at main-
taining your emotional balance, how even-keeled you are, how unlikely you
are to be rattled or shaken by events. In classical personality theory, this is
considered the opposite of neuroticism. Good examples of items probing for
emotional stability are “I am relaxed most of the time,” “I am not easily frus-
trated,” or the opposite of “I have frequent mood swings” or “Sometimes
I feel just miserable for no reason.” The average effect size is a modest 0.26
SD, and this was not significantly different from zero; meditators are less eas-
ily ruffled than 60% of the general public.
Practicing mindfulness also appears to have effects—as you would hope it
would—on trait mindfulness.45 Trait mindfulness (as discussed in Chapter 1) is
measured with questions such as “I watch my feelings without getting lost in
them,” “When I take a shower or bath, I stay alert to the sensations of water
on my body,” or the opposite of “I rush through activities without being really
attentive to them.” This is a popular outcome variable, for obvious reasons;
Sedlmeier et al. found 16 studies46 that measured it. As expected, trait mind-
fulness is higher in meditators than in nonmeditators; the effect size is 0.72
SD. Thus the average meditator is more mindful than 76% of nonmeditators.
One particularly interesting study on trait mindfulness was done by Laura
Kiken and colleagues.47 In this study, participants in an MBSR-like program
131
received weekly emails; the email provided a link to a questionnaire on state

mindfulness,48 which the participants were asked to fill out right after com-
pleting a 10-m inute version of the mindfulness practice of the week (e.g., body
scan, mindful breathing, mindful movement, and so on). The answers on this
survey thus indicate how good the participants indicated they were at being
mindful during a mindfulness practice. The researchers then charted how
each of the participants progressed in state mindfulness over the course of the
eight weeks. They found that some people indeed made better progress than
others. The interesting part was that the rate of progress in state mindfulness
over the eight weeks of the program predicted the change in trait mindfulness
from before to after the training. It also predicted the change in psychologi-
cal distress. This suggests some form of translation process: When you prac-
tice your mindfulness practice more mindfully, this eventually translates into
changes in trait mindfulness as experienced in life off the cushion. (Again,
this is what one would expect and hope for—it is nice to see this expectation
confirmed in research.)
Finally, seven studies49 have looked at different aspects of the self-concept:
self-acceptance, self-compassion, and “internal locus of control,” that is, the
feeling that the events in your life are mostly due to your own actions. All
of these traits indicate a more positive and/or empowered view of your self.
To give a few examples of items: People who score high on self-acceptance
are “confident” and “present themselves with conviction”; self-compassion
would be measured by “I try to be loving toward myself when I’m feeling
emotional pain,” or the opposite of “When times are really difficult, I tend
to be tough on myself”; and people high on internal locus of control would
endorse statements such as “When I make plans, I am almost certain that
I can make them work” or “In my case, getting what I want has little or noth-
ing to do with luck.” Taken together, the seven studies have an average effect
size of 0.66 SD, indicating that the average meditator has a more positive,
stronger self-concept than 75% of nonmeditators.
MEDITATION AND INTERPERSONAL WELL-B EING
There is almost no research on the role of meditation practice in interper-

sonal attitudes and skills. Sedlmeier et al. found one study50 that measured
self-described social skills; the effect size was a whopping 1.58 SD.
One other study, by James Carson and colleagues,51 looked at couples
going through mindfulness training together and how that impacted their
functioning as a unit. The participants filled out a number of questionnaires
and also kept daily track of, among other things, their relationship happi-
ness, their relationship stress, and how they dealt with the latter. Mindfulness
had a positive impact on relationship satisfaction (items like “We have a
132
132Presence
good relationship” or “My relationship with my partner makes me happy”),

autonomy (e.g., “My partner encourages me to follow my own interests” or
“My partner thinks it’s okay if I disagree with him/her”), and closeness (e.g.,
“My partner talks over his/her problems with me” or “My partner asks me
to share things he/she enjoys”) and made the couples more accepting of their
partner (e.g., the rather complexly worded item “Considering characteristics
of your partner, or your relationship, which you find difficult to deal with,
over the last 2 months how easy has it been for you to stop struggling and
just allow such things to be?”) and decreased relationship distress (e.g., “I
am pretty discouraged about our relationship sometimes,” or the opposite
of “My partner and I seldom have major disagreements”). The average effect
size across these measures was 0.50 SD, suggesting that mindfulness-trained
couples have a stronger relationship than 69% of nonmeditating couples. The
benefits remained three months after completion of the program.
What I found intriguing in this study was that mindfulness practice had
its effects on an almost day-to-day basis: On days when the participants prac-
ticed more, as well as on the next few days, their levels of relationship happi-
ness went up and their levels of relationship stress (and stress in general) went
down. This is good evidence for the direction of the relationship between
mindfulness and relationship stress: It’s the practice that drives the reduction
in stress and increase in happiness, not the other way around.
Another interesting additional point was that, in the nonmeditating cou-
ples, confidence that they were able to deal well with stress (“Please indi-
cate how successful you were in coping with all types of stresses today”) was
tightly in line with their relationship stress and overall stress: When there
was more stress, confidence in being able to deal with it plummeted. In other
words, the nonmeditators only felt confident in their relationship as long as
it was going well. This association was gone in the meditating couples—they
were less reactive to the daily hassles in their world, likely because growing
mindfulness allows for just that little bit of emotional distance.
Two studies52 investigated empathy. Empathy is the ability to understand
someone else’s emotional experiences (e.g., “As a rule I have little difficulty in
putting myself into other people’s shoes,” “I feel other people’s pain,” or “If
someone gets upset, I get upset too.”). The average effect size over these two
studies is 0.82 SD, implying that the average meditator is more empathetic
than 79% of nonmeditators.
Empathy isn’t always a good thing. It can lead to what psychologist call
“empathic distress”—sometimes you can so strongly resonate with someone
else’s pain and suffering that you actually feel that pain and suffering your-
self. Studies53 suggest that this empathic distress actually leads to less helping
behavior: It paralyzes you.
Here is where compassion can be useful. Compassion is more than
a feeling54— it is accompanied by the motivation to help.55 Surveys for
133
compassion contain items such as “If I see someone going through a difficult
time, I try to be caring toward that person” or “I spend a lot of time con-
cerned about the well-being of those people close to me.”
Psychologists have also devised sneaky ways to measure compassion in
action in the lab. One way is having individuals play an online game56—called
the dictator game—w ith a few strangers who are, unbeknownst to the par-
ticipants, both computer-generated. There are many versions of the game, but
the basic idea is that there are three players and a small stack of real money.
In the first round, Player A plays the role of the dictator and is given $10 to
distribute between herself and Player B. She gives Player B $1, keeping $9 for
herself. In the second round, Player C becomes the dictator, endowed with
$10. In one variation, Player C is asked to share with Player B (i.e., Player C
can now ease Player B’s financial suffering). In another variation, Player C
is asked to share with both Player A and Player B. In this case, Player C has
a chance to both ease Player B’s suffering and punish Player A, if he is so
inclined. What would you do?
Especially within the Tibetan Buddhist tradition, there is the conviction
that compassion needs to be explicitly trained; it isn’t something that auto-
matically follows out of the mindfulness practices of focused attention or
open monitoring. It seems that, maybe for that reason, compassion has not
been much on the radar of researchers looking into the effects of mindful-
ness meditation. Sedlmeier et al. does not include it in his analysis; leafing
through the stack of original articles that he collected, I found no study that
measured it.
I did discover four studies57 that explicitly trained people in compassion
meditation and measured the effects of this training on some measure of
compassion58 and one59 that compared practitioners well versed in compas-
sion practices with novices in this practice. Compassion meditation programs
typically start by building focus. In the next step, they introduce different
concepts from the Tibetan compassion tradition known as lojong and ask
participants to reflect on those in a meditative state. The training follows
a progression. The idea is that you should first develop self-compassion—
notice how you yearn for happiness and well-being and observe the mental
states that hold you back from achieving that happiness. Next, you should
cultivate equanimity and impartiality (i.e., see all humans as yearning for and
deserving that same happiness) through an appreciation and gratitude for the
kindnesses of others. The next step is to foster affection and empathy, which
might then give rise to compassion—the wish to see others free from suffer-
ing. The average effect of compassion training on measures of compassion is
0.38 SD, indicating that the average compassion-trained meditator is more
compassionate than 65% of nonmeditators.
Note that the effect sizes for the two studies that used the dictator game
(in its first variation, the one where Player C could redistribute some—or
134
134Presence
all—of the money to the dictator’s victim) are quite a bit higher than those
for the studies using questionnaires (0.68 SD vs. 0.31 SD). The reason for this
might be that compassion is easier to fake on paper than in real life. That
is, for folks not trained in compassion, talk is cheap (and so they can afford
to do well on a survey), but when actual money is involved (as in the game),
they may back out a little. This has brought researchers like Tania Singer,
who leads the ReSource Project,60 to adopt measures that have even more at
stake, such as actual donations to charity, to gauge the effects of empathy
and compassion training. This project is still ongoing, and the first results are
only now starting to come out. Here I highlight one thought-provoking find-
ing from this project.61 This study used the redistribute-and-punish variant of
the dictator game, including a condition in which the participants themselves
were shorted by the dictator. In that case, nonmeditators were more likely to
retaliate than meditators, perhaps suggesting that nonmeditators took the
slight a little more personally. This was confirmed by the finding that non-
meditators became angrier when they were victimized than the meditators
did. But meditators were more likely to put their money where their heart
was: When Player B was the victim, both groups were equally likely to punish
the dictator (remember that doing so does not cost players any money; it’s just
not handed to the dictator), but meditators were more likely to recompense
the victim than nonmeditators (this behavior, of course, costs participants
money, because they give “theirs” away).
Effects of Mindfulness on Well-Being: A Summary
Taken together, the findings on meditation and well-b eing make an impres-
sive list. Figure 3 provides a summary. In the graph, the length of the bars
indicates the size of the effect. For each type of effect there are two bars:
one (light gray) shows the effect averaged over all studies, and the other
(darker gray) shows the effect only for those studies that were interventions
(as opposed to studies that looked at differences between long-term medita-
tors and novices). The error bars (the whiskers) indicate the 95% confidence
interval. This interval tells us where the “true” effect lies with 95% certainty,
given the mean effect, the variability in that effect (note, e.g., that the effect
sizes for depression were more alike than those for state anxiety, and state
anxiety thus has wider whiskers), and the number of studies involved (e.g.,
empathy was measured in only two studies, and so it has much wider whis-
kers than self-p erceived stress, which was assessed in a large number of stud-
ies). The dashed line in the graph is the benchmark I described in Chapter 1:
It represents the average effect of all educational, psychological, and behav-
ioral interventions as calculated in a meta-meta-analysis of no less than 156
meta-analyses.62
135
Effect size (MSD)

–0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Self-perceived stress (27 studies)

All studies
Cortisol (3 studies) Intervention studies only
Immune functioning (5 studies)
General well-being (5 studies)
State anxiety (6, resp. 4 studies)
Trait anxiety (11, resp. 8 studies)
Depressed mood (6, resp. 5 studies)
Negative emotions (6, resp. 5 studies)
Positive emotions (6, resp. 5 studies)
Emotion regulation (9, resp. 8 studies)
Rumination (4 studies)
Negative personality traits (3 studies)
Emotional stability (4, resp. 2 studies)
Trait mindfulness (16, resp. 11 studies)
Self-concept (7, resp. 4 studies)
Empathy (2 studies)
Compassion (5, resp. 4 studies)
FIGURE 3 The effects of mindfulness meditation on psychological well-being. The whiskers

embrace the 95% confidence interval. The dashed line is the average effect size for 156
different types of psychological, educational, and behavioral interventions (Lipsey &
Wilson, 1993).
Looking at this summary graph, one fair conclusion is that a lot of good
things seem to be happening to those who meditate (actually, these happen
to the average meditator, and that is important to note too—there’s no guar-
antee that every meditator will experience each [or even any] of those effects).
Most of the whiskers in the graph straddle the dashed line, indicating that the
size of the effects of mindfulness meditation are on par with what we would
expect from a typical educational, psychological, or behavioral intervention.
The effects on cortisol and self-p erceived stress are smaller than expected;
136
136Presence
those on trait mindfulness are larger. If the whiskers cross the zero line, the
effect is not significantly different from zero; that is, we cannot say with cer-
tainty that mindfulness works in this case—this is only true for the effects on
cortisol and emotional stability.
One conclusion is that mindfulness meditation is clearly not something
that lifts you out of the realm of the ordinary to the summum of well-being,
but it does help you along in life, just like any other good behavioral interven-
tion worth its salt.
What strikes me most is that the palette of effects is so broad: Mindfulness
seems to have a positive impact on just about any psychological variable we
(as a field) have looked at—it makes you less stressful, boosts your immune
function, makes you less anxious and less depressed, dampens your negative
emotions, amplifies your positive emotions, helps regulate your emotions,
makes you less ruminative, takes the edges off negative personality traits,
makes you more mindful, strengthens your self-concept, and makes you more
empathic and compassionate. (Plus it helps with attention too.) Mindfulness
meditation is thus a broad-spectrum corrective to the psychological ailments
of daily life.
The list is all the more impressive given that most of the studies included
in these analyses are intervention studies that are relatively short—recall that
the average duration was just over seven weeks. That is also the reason I high-
lighted just the intervention studies in the graph (in the dark gray bars). For
most aspects of well-being, there isn’t much difference between the effects from
all available studies and those from only the intervention studies, suggesting
that meditation’s beneficial effects are already in full swing after a mere two
months or so. Do note that there are precious few nonintervention studies in
this batch, so I feel squeamish drawing firm conclusions about what happens
in long-term meditators. Some of the effects we have seen—for instance that
meditation helps with relationship stress but that the effect of a single medi-
tation session lasts only for a few days—suggests that the effects of medita-
tion may develop rather quickly but are relatively short-lived in the sense that
they need a continuous boost from continued meditation. This reminds me of
the effects of exercise on physical fitness: You can build up fitness relatively
quickly, but you need to keep going at it or you risk losing the benefits.
One important limitation of these findings is that most of the studies (48
out of 57) used a passive rather than an active control group. This is a fair
comparison if we want to see how the mindful meditating life compares to
life as usual. (This is, I suspect, what most of us who meditate or are thinking
of taking up meditation are interested in: What will this add to my life?) It
isn’t such a fair comparison if we want to see what mindfulness can do over
and beyond another similar program, say, relaxation training. (This is the
question the critical consumer should be concerned with: Should I take up
meditation or yoga? Or go for a weekly massage?63)
137
When we look at the effects compared to active groups study by study, the
picture becomes less rosy. A good example is the study by Shamini Jain and
colleagues.64 Jain et al. found that both meditation training and relaxation
training did better than passive treatment in decreasing stress and increasing
positive mood. Meditation and relaxation had similar effects on distress, but
meditation had a bigger impact on positive mood states. This study, then,
teaches us that some of the effects of mindfulness (viz., on stress) might be
due to the relaxation component inherent in meditation, and others (viz., on
mood) are not. This is not an indictment of mindfulness meditation; I am
only saying here that its effects aren’t necessarily all due to meditation and/
or mindfulness per se.
Likewise, Irving Kirsch and David Henry65 found that meditation, relax-
ation, and a specific behavioral therapy technique (systematic desensitization)
all reduced public-speaking anxiety in students to the same degree compared
to a passive control group. They also found that the effects were larger for
those students who believed that the treatment (whatever it was) would work.
This then suggests that part of the effects of mindfulness on anxiety might
be a placebo response—believing that mindfulness will work becomes a self-
fulfilling prophecy.
In sum, we need more studies that include active control groups to help us
figure out what the active ingredients of mindfulness meditation are. Given
that these ingredients might differ by the type of effect we are looking at,
studies of this kind would be especially helpful for people who want to take
up meditation for a particular reason. If you want to reduce stress, relaxation
therapy works just as well; if you want to improve mood, mindfulness gener-
ally does better. It would at least give beginning mindfulness practitioners a
possible alternative if they find that meditation, or a particular type of medi-
tation, is not something they easily relate to.
Another limitation of these findings is that most of these studies—and
I apologize for singing the same refrain yet one more time—use very small
numbers of participants, ranging from 8 to 140 in the meditator groups, with
a mean of only 27 people per study. That makes it very risky to attach any
form of firm conclusion to any given study. Meta-analysis helps, because the
aggregation of the data should smooth out some sources of error, but a few
large clinical trials (preferably organized across different research centers)
would be extremely valuable here.
Do Your Homework: Adherence Matters
In previous chapters, I have looked at dose–response relationships. Most of the

interventions I review here were relatively short, and so there is little to inves-
tigate in terms of dose–response relationships. Endre Visted and colleagues66
138
138Presence
found in a meta-analysis that programs that included a half-day retreat—

which we can assume makes the program just a little more intensive—have
larger effects on trait mindfulness than programs that do not.
Within programs, the variation in treatment dose is most likely to be found
in actual time spent practicing rather than in-class time, which is presumably
the same for all participants. I was able to collect five studies67 that reported
correlations between some form of adherence (either whether or not partici-
pants practiced on a given day or how many minutes they practiced) and trait
mindfulness; the average correlation68 was .18. I found seven studies69 that
reported correlations between adherence and stress; the average correlation70
was .17. These are not very strong relationships, but they are positive: The
more or longer you practice, the more benefits you are likely to reap. Two
studies explicitly mentioned that the amount of informal, not formal, practice
was important; the other five did not make the distinction. (My advice would
be to neglect neither.)
One interesting finding in one of the studies71 was that practicing at home
was effective but trait mindfulness was a more powerful predictor of well-
being (in this case, stress levels and rumination) than practice per se.
Why and How Does Meditation work? The Role

of Trait Mindfulness
There are, of course, many reasons why meditation could have the effects
that it has on all these aspects of well-being. The discussion here suggests
that relatively pedestrian mechanisms, such as the relaxation component of
meditation and/or meditators’ expectations, do play a role.
Most psychologists in the field take a loftier view. Many mechanisms have
been proposed, and there are even some (what psychologists call) “mod-
els”—connections between different mechanisms, as in “this leads to that.”
Basically, all of the models I have seen make intuitive sense.72 They all have
different emphases, but the list of proposed reasons why mindfulness medita-
tion works generally contains three categories, as Vago and Silbersweig point
out. One proposed mechanism is a change in self-awareness. This involves rec-
ognizing your automatic habits and your automatic patterns of reactivity, an
increased awareness of momentary states of body and mind—what is typi-
cally meant by trait mindfulness. Another proposed mechanism is a change
in self-regulation. This includes better regulation of emotions, heightened
self-compassion, increased emotional and cognitive flexibility, and increased
nonattachment and acceptance. A final proposed mechanism is increased
self-transcendence. This implies increased decentering, a stronger awareness
of interdependence between self and others, heightened compassion, and an
emphasis on ethical practices.
139
Enthusiasm for model building has exceeded enthusiasm for model testing,
alas. The only links that have been extensively researched are the ones involv-
ing trait mindfulness, starting from the assumption that it is the develop-
ment of purposeful, nonjudging awareness that opens you up, destresses you,
makes you less anxious, and so on. This makes sense: If you can approach
the events that life throws at you—especially the ones you would typically
classify as “bad”—w ith more acceptance and less judgment, they will have
less of a negative impact. This will also allow you to go out into the world and
explore with a bit more fearlessness. Ultimately, this might lead to letting go
of the idea that you, the people around you, and your world in general need
to be a certain way and stay that way forever.
How can we find out if that is really the case?
First, it makes sense that mindfulness might be the key mechanism, given
what we know about trait mindfulness—it correlates with many aspects of
well-being, as reviewed here. That is, people who are more naturally mindful
tend to also enjoy higher levels of well-being. The idea, then, is that if trait
mindfulness is associated with higher well-being, changing trait mindful-
ness for the better by taking up meditation would organically lead to higher
well-being.
Let’s review the correlations. I was able to find 20 studies73 that provide
correlations between trait mindfulness and at least one aspect of well-being
in groups of nonmeditators. Trait mindfulness correlates74 quite nicely with
self-p erceived stress (five studies, r = 0.48), general well-being (eight studies,
r = .44), anxiety (two studies, r = .34), depressed mood (two studies, r = .33),
negative emotions (four studies, r = 0.43), emotion regulation (three studies,
r = .22), rumination (four studies, r = .22), and self-concept (four studies, all
on self-compassion, r = .46). Correlations were small for positive emotions
(four studies, r = .13) and empathy (three studies, r = .10). All of this sug-
gests that people who are naturally more mindful are less stressed, feel better,
are less anxious or depressed, regulate their emotions better, ruminate less,
and have higher levels of self-compassion. A study by Jennifer Daubenmier
and colleagues75— their participants were obese women— illustrates this
nicely: They found that trait mindfulness worked as a buffer between perceived
stress and the actual cortisol response. Women with low levels of mindfulness
simply expressed their stress into the cortisol response—h igh stress, lots of
cortisol. This was not the case for women with high levels of mindfulness,
where perceived stress was decoupled from the cortisol response: Perhaps
mindfulness—that tad of distance—kept them from being overwhelmed.
What about differences within a person? If your mindfulness fluctuates,
what happens to your well-being? Wai Kai Hou and colleagues76 tested 105
college students in Hong Kong before and after an intensive examination
period. They found that changes in mindfulness from before to during to
after the exam period were mirrored in changes in affect, anxiety symptoms,
140
140Presence
and the cortisol stress response—students who were more mindful suffered
less. This finding suggests that natural fluctuations in mindfulness (if we con-
sider exams a natural occurrence) are mirrored in stress and mood.
If mindfulness and well-being fluctuate together in the real world, we might
expect to see the same in mindfulness training. If it is true that trait mindful-
ness is the driving factor in changes in well-being after a mindfulness pro-
gram, then we would expect that, over the course of the program, changes in
trait mindfulness would give rise to changes in well-being. In a research study,
this would show up as a positive correlation between changes in mindfulness
and changes in well-being: People whose trait mindfulness increases more
should show higher levels of well-being. This appears to be the case. I found
13 studies77 that reported correlations between changes in mindfulness over
the course of a mindfulness intervention and changes in one or more aspects
of well-being over the same time period.78 The results are quite supportive of
the idea of a coupling between mindfulness and well-being: Changes in mind-
fulness correlate79 with changes in self-p erceived stress (six studies; r = .5480),
anxiety (two studies, r = .51), depressed mood (two studies; r = .62), positive
affect (three studies; r = .26), negative affect (two studies; r = .14), rumination
(one study; r = .36), and general well-being (two studies; r = .35).
These results are compatible with the view that changes in trait mindful-
ness are the basis for further changes in well-being. If we hadn’t found these
correlations, that hypothesis would be in trouble. But this finding doesn’t
mean that the hypothesis is necessarily correct: The relationship could be the
other way around (maybe higher well-being leads to sharpened mindfulness),
or the relationship could be mutually reinforcing, or something else could
cause both changes in well-being and changes in mindfulness.
To check whether mindfulness really is the forerunner of changes in well-
being, we need a more fine-g rained analysis. Recall that these effects largely
develop within two months or sooner, and so the usual two-shot approach—
testing once before an MBSR-type program and once after—cannot tell us
much in terms of what is the driving force. We need studies with more data
points.
I was able to find three such studies. The first of these, by Jon Vøllestad
and colleagues81 doesn’t teach us much. By the end of training, changes in
mindfulness indeed explained most of the changes occurring in anxiety and
rumination. However, the researchers didn’t find any evidence for a change
in mindfulness by the midpoint of training. Of course, it is still possible that
mindfulness could be the forerunner but it just takes more than four weeks
for mindfulness changes to become visible, after which changes in well-being
follow rapidly.
The second study, by Ruth Baer and colleagues,82 with eight measure-
ment points, once for every week of an MBSR program, did find signifi-
cant changes in trait mindfulness by the end of the second week; changes in
141
perceived stress appeared a little later, by week 4. In this study, mindfulness
continued to increase over the whole course of the program, so one possible
explanation for the delay could be that mindfulness needs to reach a certain
level before it spills over into other aspects of daily life. Comparing change
scores (survey results after training minus survey results before) showed that
changes in mindfulness and changes in perceived stress were correlated, as
they should be. Also of note here is that the appearance of changes in mind-
fulness was related to whether or not participants practiced according to the
instructions: Those who did practice by the book achieved larger changes in
mindfulness over the course of the first three weeks. All of this suggests a
simple cascade: Practicing diligently (or at least correctly) leads to an increase
in trait mindfulness that becomes statistically visible after a few weeks, fol-
lowed a few weeks later by a decrease in perceived stress.
Finally, Evelien Snippe and colleagues83 assessed mindfulness and positive
and negative mood on a daily basis during an MBSR program. They found
that day-to-day fluctuations in mindfulness predicted day-to-day fluctuations
in mood (more specifically: Higher levels of mindfulness on a given day were
followed by a happier mood on the next day) but not the other way around. This
is very strong evidence for the role of mindfulness as the forerunner of well-
being (or at least of mood), and it is a faster-churning cascade than the one Baer
et al. found. Snippe et al.’s result also implies that there isn’t much of a feedback
loop—while it is the case that mindfulness puts you in a better mood, better
mood does not lead to further increases in mindfulness. As in the Baer et al.
study, home practice was important: Doing at least one mindfulness exercise
during the day was followed by higher levels of trait mindfulness in the evening.
One additional interesting finding in this study was that people differed in
the strength of the coupling; some people had stronger mindfulness–mood
relationships than others. The cause of these differences is not clear. The
researchers looked, and it wasn’t gender, age, level of education, the amount
of practice at home, or levels of mindfulness or mood at the beginning of the
program.
Taken together, the results strongly speak for a model in which mindful-
ness practice leads to an increase in trait mindfulness, which then in turn
leads to changes in well-being. We don’t know much about the details of this
cascade yet. Vøllestad et al. looked at anxiety and rumination, Baer et al.
at stress, and Snippe et al. at mood. It is possible that the differences in the
results of these studies are due to the outcome measure. It might be harder
to change anxiety than to change stress levels, for instance, and harder to
change stress levels than to improve mood. This would suggest a cascade
within the cascade, where mindfulness first has an effect on mood, which
in turn affects stress, which then might help with anxiety—we simply don’t
know. If we would want to know, we need a study using daily measurements
with a wide battery of well-being measures.
142
142Presence
I should add two caveats to this model.

First, it is possible that the cascade starts even earlier. That is certainly
what the Buddhist tradition states: It considers changes in attention as the
first and necessary forerunner to any kind of other psychological change.
This model would then predict that the changes in self-awareness and self-
regulation would themselves be consequences of attention training. I dis-
cussed a few of those connections in Chapter 3, where we saw that increases
in well-being and mood might be side effects of the attention-related aspects
of meditation on brain structure. Earlier in this chapter we saw that changes
in attention and changes in mindfulness are at least connected (four studies,
r = .47). These are correlations that we would need to see in order for the
model to work, but they do not confirm that the model is true—for that, we
would need to see the kind of cascade data I discussed in this section.
The second caveat is that there may be more than one route to boosting
trait mindfulness. A recent meta-analysis by Endre Visted and colleagues84
has shown that active control groups (including progressive muscle relax-
ation, antidepressant treatment, and psychotherapy) can produce changes
in mindfulness that are just as large as those in mindfulness-trained groups
(mindfulness training had an additional effect of a meager and nonsignifi-
cant 0.10 SD). So meditation or mindfulness training per se is not necessary
to produce changes in trait mindfulness. It does remain to be seen whether
these active control groups produce changes in well-being and whether those
changes are correlated with changes in mindfulness.
Mindfulness in Special Populations: Schools,

Prisons, and at Work
The studies I review in this chapter are (almost) all done on nonclinical sam-
ples of (typically younger) adults. Mindfulness programs have, of course,
branched out considerably in the past few years.
One such branching out has been to school settings. A meta-analysis by
Charlotte Zenner and colleagues85 on 24 mindfulness interventions in schools
looked for (and found) effects on cognition (attention, creativity, mind-
wandering, and school grades; 0.80 SD), emotional problems (maladaptive
emotion, cognition and behavior, anxiety, depression, test anxiety, rumina-
tion, emotion regulation difficulties, and somatic reactions; 0.19 SD), stress
(stress and coping; 0.39 SD), and resilience (well-being, positive emotions,
resiliency, social skills, self-concept, and self-esteem; 0.36 SD). One big prob-
lem with this data set is that, as the researchers note, there is rather strong evi-
dence for a rather significant publication bias—there are a lot fewer low and
negative-effect studies than you would expect, given the data.86 Overall, there
is some evidence that mindfulness works in schools and that it has its largest
143
effect on cognition (mostly measures of attention) in these studies. Zenner

et al. also found evidence for a dose–response relationship: The number of
minutes of formal training within each program correlated very strongly with
the size of the effect87 (r = .72 for controlled studies).
Mindfulness has also been applied to work setting. For instance, Koichiro
Shiba and colleagues88 found, in a large sample of 1,470 individuals in Japan,
including 418 meditators, that meditation was associated with higher levels
of work engagement, better self-rated job performance, and higher levels of
job satisfaction.89
Finally, there has been some work using mindfulness in correctional set-
tings.90 In a review of the available eight studies, Edo Shonin and colleagues91
conclude that there are significant improvements on negative affect, sub-
stance use, anger and hostility, stress, self-esteem, and optimism.92
Mindfulness and Well-Being: A Few Conclusions
The quick summary of the findings from this chapter is that the practice of
mindful meditation seems to be associated with a number of positive effects,
with no negative effects noted. Mindful practice cascades into changes in
trait mindfulness, which in turn lead to changes in other aspects of well-
being. One of the more interesting conclusions is that the beneficial effects of
meditation and mindfulness are not acquired rights—something you didn’t
possess before the training and afterward are yours to keep. Quite a few
studies—for instance, Carson et al.’s work on couples, and Baer and Snippe’s
study using frequent measurements—show that some of the psychological
effects of mindfulness practice are restricted in time, lasting a few days or so
at most. The advice here would simply be to practice often.
One common thread through many of the studies I discuss within this
chapter is the theme of a more open-m inded, nonjudgmental stance to what
is happening inside the body and in the outside world—a lowering of reactiv-
ity. We saw this in Lin et al.’s musicians, Carson et al.’s couples, and McCall
et al.’s compassion-trained benevolent dictators. We also saw in the previous
chapter that attention takes on this more open character.
There are still many open questions. One concerns the actual active ingre-
dients of mindfulness training. We need more studies that contrast the effects
of mindfulness programs with specific active control groups to find out what
those are. Right now, it appears that relaxation and placebo effects are at
least part of the response to meditation training.
Another open question is whether everyone benefits equally from mind-
fulness training, or even whether everybody benefits. There are a few studies
that tackle this question, but more would be welcome. In a sample of college
students, Michael de Vibe and colleagues93 found larger benefits on stress
144
144Presence
reduction and general well-being in individuals who were more neurotic (i.e.,
less emotionally stable); participants who scored higher on conscientious-
ness experienced less study stress after the training. This suggests that differ-
ent types of people might score different effects from mindfulness training.
Jennifer Mascaro and colleagues94 tested people’s brains before they started
compassion training. They found that people who activated the empathy
regions of the brain95 more strongly when they saw someone else experience
pain were more engaged with the training. This then suggests that prior sen-
sibilities might play a role in how well you connect with a particular prac-
tice. Clearly, we are only just starting to explore what effects or what type of
engagement we could expect from what type of person.
Likewise, it would be good to know for whom mindfulness training may
be most effective. Snippe et al. found that people differ in the extent to which
changes in mindfulness are coupled with changes in well-being; some people
get more traction than others. Ideally, we would like to see strong coupling
(when mindfulness goes up, so does well-being), but we don’t know yet why
certain people have a stronger mindfulness–well-being coupling than others,
nor do we know what can be done about this.
145
{ 7 }
Mindfulness as Medicine
As I mentioned in Chapter 1, MBSR and its many offspring (with MBCT

being perhaps the most successful) were originally started as clinical pro-
grams. MBSR was designed at what was then called the Stress Reduction
Clinic at the University of Massachusetts Medical Center; MBCT was
explicitly developed as a program to prevent relapse in previously depressed
individuals—m indfulness and meditation as a form of therapy. The clinical
work in this area has focused mostly on people suffering from depression (or
the recently depressed who might be likely to relapse into depression) or vari-
ous forms of anxiety disorders, as well as people suffering from chronic pain
(as a primary ailment or as a secondary aspect of a medical condition, e.g.,
during cancer treatment) or chronic stress.
In the previous chapter, I discussed the primary methodology of clinical
research: Randomized controlled clinical trials are the gold standard. How
do studies on the therapeutic effects of mindfulness measure up against that
standard?
Not so well, it turns out. Many of the published meta-analyses—and
there are a few1—document the process by which studies were selected. This
includes detailing the reason why particular studies, once retrieved from the
library, were ultimately excluded from the analysis. The arguably most strin-
gent meta-analysis in the field is the one by Madhav Goyal and colleagues2: It
focuses only on randomized controlled trials with active controls. (Goyal
et al.’s focus was on meditation in general, and so the paper did include
not only mindfulness trainings; mantra practice was included as well.) The
researchers initially retrieved an incredible 18,753 papers; they ended up with
no more than 47 in the final analysis—discarding about 99.75% of the original
set. There were a number of reasons for rejection. Some were trivial: Studies
that simply did not fit, like work focusing on children or adolescents, or
research done on healthy volunteers, or studies that did not contain the kind
of clinical measures Goyal et al. were interested in. Noteworthy was the large
number of papers that did not contain original data, that is, review papers or
146
146Presence
position papers—a full 45%.3 Of the papers that contained original research,
20% did not include a control group and 26% did not randomize participants.
Thus about half of the empirical research falls well short of the accepted stan-
dard in the field of clinical research.
Meta-Analyses of the Effects of Mindfulness

in Clinical Populations
Let’s delve into a few of those meta-analyses, starting with the most com-
prehensive analysis, the one by Goyal and colleagues. Goyal et al. examined
changes in mental health in clinical populations (specifically, changes in depres-
sion, anxiety, stress and distress, mood and affect, substance use, eating and
sleeping patterns, pain, and body weight). “Clinical population” was defined
broadly here: About a third of the studies targeted individuals suffering from
psychological distress (viz., depression, anxiety, stress, or substance abuse),
while the rest suffered from medical problems that often lead to psychologi-
cal distress (viz., asthma, breast cancer, cardiovascular disease, chronic pain,
diabetes, organ transplant, or tinnitus; typically each study tackled only one
problem). As mentioned, Goyal et al. looked at interventions using either or
both mindfulness and mantra meditation—my interest here, given the topic
of this book, is in mindfulness interventions, so I report results on this type of
meditation only.4 Only randomized controlled trials with active controls were
included, yielding a small set of studies: 38 articles that focused on mindful-
ness interventions. The average sample size was 74 people per study for a total
of 2,895 participants. Goyal et al. analyzed the data separately for nonspecific
active control and specific active control. Recall from the previous chapter
that “nonspecific active control” refers to a control condition that is not a
known form of therapy (an example would be an educational intervention);
“specific active control” is a known form of therapy (e.g., relaxation therapy
or psychotherapy). Comparing the effects of mindfulness to the effects of
nonspecific control conditions tells us whether mindfulness has an effect over
and beyond placebo. Comparing the effects of mindfulness to the effects of
specific control conditions tells us whether mindfulness has an effect that is
larger (or smaller) than the effect of treatment-as-usual.
The first set of results concerns the comparison of mindfulness programs
with nonspecific controls. In general (but not always), the effects of mindful-
ness training exceed those of placebo treatment: For anxiety, the effect size
was 0.38 SD (7 studies); for depression, 0.30 SD (8 studies); for stress, 0.04 SD
(7 studies, this effect was not significantly different from zero); for negative emo-
tions, 0.33 SD (11 studies); for measures of positive emotions (e.g., well-being,
positive mood), 0.28 SD (4 studies, not significant); for measures of quality of
life as it related to health, 0.28 SD (3 studies, the effect was not significant);
147
Mindfulness as Medicine 147
for measures of sleep quantity or quality, 0.14 SD (4 studies, not significant);

and for pain, 0.33 SD (4 studies). Thus mindfulness clearly has a real effect in
clinical populations, over and beyond its possible effect as a placebo, on quite
a few outcomes that do matter—depression, anxiety, negative emotions, and
pain. There are also several important outcomes that do not show significant
effects: sleep, stress, mood, and quality of life. The effect sizes are generally
a little smaller than the effect sizes we observed in nonclinical studies in the
previous chapter (around 0.30 SD, implying that mindfulness-trained people
do better than 62% of nontreated individuals). Particularly nice to note is that
the effect size of mindfulness on depression (0.30 SD) is larger than the typical
effect of drug treatment: The effect of antidepressants for depressed patients
with mild to moderate symptoms compared to nonspecific treatment is 0.11
SD; for those with severe depression, it is 0.17 SD.5 For anxiety, however, both
drug treatment (placebo-controlled effect size of 0.80 SD for panic disorder
and 0.90 SD for generalized anxiety disorder) and standard psychological
treatment (placebo-controlled effect size of 0.73 SD after cognitive behavioral
therapy) seriously outperform mindfulness treatments (0.38 SD).
How does mindfulness compare to specific active control treatments? For
anxiety, the effect size was –0.07 SD (10 studies; a negative effect size means
that the control group performed better, but do remember that the effect is
not significant, meaning that it is for statistical purposes equal to zero); for
depression, 0.11 SD (11 studies); for measures of stress, 0.03 SD (6 studies); for
positive affect, –0.04 SD (4 studies); for measures of quality of life, 0.05 SD (5
studies); for sleep, –0.14 SD (2 studies); and for pain, –0.06 SD (4 studies). The
only significant effect (and it was a small effect) was for depression.
This result means that, for almost all mental health outcomes (depression
is the sole exception), mindfulness does not work any better (or any worse)
than treatment as usual. This is bad news for those who were hoping that
mindfulness would be a therapeutic magic bullet, curing a wide variety of
psychological ailments with much more ease than standard treatments do. It
does not.
The result does mean that mindfulness training is a viable alternative to
traditional therapies—it is just as effective as treatment-as-usual. This is an
important finding because some of the treatments-as-usual can have unpleas-
ant side effects. For instance, the most commonly prescribed class of anti-
depressants (selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors such as Zoloft, Praxil,
or Prozac, sometimes also prescribed for anxiety disorders) can lead to nau-
sea, restlessness, dizziness, reduced sexual desire, difficulty reaching orgasm,
insomnia, and/or weight gain or weight loss. Xanax, commonly prescribed
for anxiety disorder, has side effects such as drowsiness, dizziness, insom-
nia, memory problems, poor balance or coordination, slurred speech, and/
or loss of concentration.6 Goyal et al. are keen to point out (and other meta-
analyses of clinical trials confirm this) that not a single instance of negative
148
148Presence
side effects has been noted in any of these mindfulness studies.7 So mindful-
ness is a more than acceptable alternative for those who do not tolerate these
drugs very well and/or for those who prefer a more contemplative approach
over more traditional therapeutic tactics. This observation works both ways,
of course: There is no reason whatsoever to prefer mindfulness programs
over other forms of treatment. Thus people who find themselves unhappy in a
mindfulness program should also feel free to step out and try something else.
(Meditating just because you’ve heard it is good for you, without enjoying it,
does not seem like a very sustainable practice anyway.)
Mindfulness can also be used as a complementary intervention, that is, as
an intervention that is added to treatment-as-usual. In a review paper on
this topic, Chiesa and Serretti8 note that the evidence is scarce but somewhat
encouraging. In the four studies that compared the combination of MBCT
and treatment-as-usual with treatment-as-usual on its own, relapse rates
for depression were half as large for the combined treatment compared to
treatment-as-usual on its own. In the two studies that looked at the severity
of depressive symptoms, however, combined treatment was not superior to
treatment-as-usual.
Finally, a few meta-analyses (each looking at a small number of studies)
have focused more specifically on mindfulness as a treatment for the negative
psychological effects of medical problems. One of these9 looked at the effects
of MBSR in cancer patients (most of these concerned women with Stage II
breast cancer). Over three randomized controlled trials studies, the mean
effect on mental health (anxiety, depression, and stress) was 0.35 SD; for
physical health (immunity levels, dietary fat, hormonal indices, as well as
self-reported health), it was 0.17 SD, which was not statistically significant.
Another meta-analysis10 focused on chronic pain patients (including fibro-
myalgia and rheumatoid arthritis) and included both MBSR and ACT inter-
ventions (with MBSR comprising about 80% of all studies). Averaging across
all controlled studies included in the analysis, the interventions had statisti-
cally significant effects on pain (0.37 SD; 10 studies), depression (0.32 SD; 9
studies), anxiety (0.40 SD; 5 studies), physical well-being (0.35 SD; 6 studies),
and quality of life (0.41 SD; 6 studies).
A third analysis11 examined the effects of mindfulness interventions on
psychosis. Psychosis is a mental condition in which a person loses touch with
reality. Symptoms include delusions (false beliefs that are held with strong
conviction, even in the face of evidence to the contrary) and hallucinations
(sensations that seem very real but have no basis in reality; typically hearing
voices or seeing things that aren’t there); often the symptoms also include
disorganized speech and disorganized behavior or a state of immobility. The
meta-analysis found evidence for effects on the so-called negative symptoms
of psychosis (i.e., the disruptions to normal emotions and behaviors, things
like flat affect, lack of pleasure, difficulty interacting with other people; 0.56
149
SD; three studies). Mindfulness-trained participants were also less likely to

be rehospitalized (0.60 SD; two studies). There were, however, no effects on
so-called positive symptoms (i.e., hallucinations, delusions, or thought disor-
ders; 0.19 SD, not significant; four studies).
All of these meta-analyses show promising effects, but it bears repeating
that they are based on a very small number of studies.
The Effects of Mindfulness on Targeted Symptoms
The Goyal et al. meta-analysis examined mental health outcomes regardless

of the underlying mental or physical health issue. What is affected in such
cases is not necessarily the target of the intervention. For instance, MBCT
is a treatment that was explicitly designed to keep formerly depressed indi-
viduals from relapsing. Its target is thus relapse prevention; the most honest
way to see if MBCT works would then be to look at relapse rates. It would
be nice if other effects were present as well—say, a reduction in anxiety or an
increase in well-being—but this would not be critical in assessing its success.
Goyal et al.’s meta-analysis does not make that distinction; the risk is that the
(hopefully large) effect on target measures is confounded with the (possibly
smaller) effect on nontarget measures and thus potentially diluted.
Piet and Hougaard12 found that the relapse rate after MBCT training in
six randomized active controlled trials was 38% in MBCT participants ver-
sus 58% for control participants—a reduction in the risk of relapse by 34%.
Importantly, MBCT was even a little more effective for participants who
were at a higher risk for relapse: For participants with three or more prior
episodes of depression, risk of relapse was reduced by 43% (36% for MBCT
participants vs. 63% for controls). Moreover, MBCT was at least as effective
as a maintenance dose of antidepressant medication in the two studies that
examined this question. Clearly, MBCT does not reduce the relapse rate to
zero—that would be a bit much to ask for anyway—but it performs better
than standard treatment.
Khoury and colleagues13 provide additional meta-analytic data that show
that effects are larger on target measures. They did not restrict the analysis
to controlled studies but focused on progress from before to after a mindful-
ness intervention. They found an effect size of 0.57 SD across all measures (72
studies) but somewhat larger gains for more targeted interventions: 0.66 SD
for depression in studies targeting depression (6 studies) and 0.72 SD for anxi-
ety in studies targeting anxiety (10 studies). For studies with passive control,
the average after versus before effect was 0.53 SD (67 studies). Effects were
identical for depression in studies targeting depression (eight studies; effect
size = 0.53 SD), but were 1.00 SD for anxiety in studies targeting anxiety
(four studies). The evidence is not spectacular, but there is at least a hint that
150
150Presence
people make the most progress on the type of outcome that is the explicit aim
of the specific intervention.
Finally, Hofmann and colleagues14 gathered studies on mental health;
like Khoury et al., they focused on before to after progress. They found that
mindfulness interventions were best at reducing anxiety in individuals with
anxiety disorders (effect size = 0.97 SD; seven studies) and less effective in
reducing anxiety in cancer patients (0.64 SD; eight studies) or people suffer-
ing from pain (0.44 SD; five studies); there was only a small, statistically not
significant reduction in anxiety in depressed individuals (0.12 SD; one study).
Mindfulness interventions worked well at reducing depression in depressed
individuals (effect size = 0.95 SD; four studies) and did less well at reduc-
ing depression in anxious individuals (0.75 SD; six studies), individuals suf-
fering from chronic pain (0.51 SD; six studies), or cancer patients (0.45 SD;
seven studies). Thus progress is largest in the area of life where people are
suffering most.
In sum, there is reason to be cautiously optimistic: Mindfulness-based
therapy seems to have targeted effects. That is, mindfulness therapy aimed
at reducing relapse reduces relapse (and more so than treatment-as-usual),
people generally make the most progress on the type of mental health out-
come that is the explicit target of the specific intervention, and mindfulness
training is most effective at lightening the burden where it is felt the most.
Dose–Response Relationships
How long does a person need to be in mindfulness training for it to be

effective?
In their meta-analysis, Khoury and colleagues found a small but significant
effect of the duration of treatment (i.e., the number of contact hours between
therapist and clients) on measures of psychological distress. For every hour
increase in duration, the effect size went up by 0.01 SD. The MBSR standard
of practice15 is 34 contact hours; increasing that number to 44 would then
increase the effect size by 0.10 SD. This suggests that, at least for MBSR and
MBCT-style programs, some of the effective work is done in class. We don’t
know why—there is no research on this—but part of the effect may be due to
“modeling,” that is, teaching by example (from the point of view of the thera-
pist) and learning by imitation (from the point of view of the participant). An
indication that this may be the case comes from studies where the therapist
herself had received mindfulness training—these studies had, on average, an
effect that was 0.13 SD larger than studies where the therapist wasn’t trained
in mindfulness.16
One other meta-analysis17 looked at the effect of the number of in-class
contact hours within MBSR (30 studies); no effect was found. (The authors
151
also, incidentally, found that the number of contact hours in these studies was
much lower than the standard of 34: It varied between 6 and 28, with a mean
of 19.) One possible explanation for the discrepancy is that the Khoury et al.
meta-analysis may have had a wider range of durations (the paper doesn’t tell
us), implying that durations longer than 28 hours are critical and/or that short
programs are particularly ineffective. Another possibility is that some types
of treatments may take longer to kick in than others, and if the longer treat-
ment is more effective simply because it is a better treatment, this will show
up in the Khoury et al. results as an effect of duration. I hate to use the cliché
yet again, but—yes—more research is necessary.
Interestingly, in the Khoury et al. meta-analysis, the number of hours prac-
ticed at home did not predict treatment success. This study, however, used the
number of hours prescribed by the program for the analysis—no doubt due to
the absence of actual data on the amount of homework practice. People being
people, it is unlikely that any participant followed his mindfulness coaches’
prescription to the letter.
There is one review paper, by Lisa Christine Vettese and colleagues,18 that
directly addresses this question. They examined the effect of dosage by look-
ing at the effect of home practice as reported by the participants themselves.
Another difference is that they looked at this within individual studies. The
Khoury et al. and Carmody and Baer studies looked at practice across stud-
ies—does Study A, with a shorter duration, yield a smaller effect than Study
B, with a longer duration? That is a different question than the question of
whether people who are enrolled in Study A (or Study B) and practice dili-
gently do better than the slackers in Study A (or Study B). I would argue that
the latter analysis makes more sense from a scientific standpoint because it
keeps all other aspects constant. (It is likely that there are other differences
between Study A and Study B than just duration.)
One interesting conclusion from Vettese et al.’s review was that very few
studies have examined this question: Vettese et al. collected 98 applicable
studies, but only 24 of those looked at the relationship between how well
participants practiced at home and how that helped alleviate their psycho-
logical distress. Of those 24, 15 allowed for the calculation of amount of prac-
tice in the form of minutes per day—on average, participants practiced 28
minutes per day during the program, ranging from 5 minutes per day in one
study to 58 minutes per day in another. (These numbers are testimony to the
determination of the participants: half an hour of meditation and/or other
mindfulness practices per day seems very respectable to me.) Five studies
also reported practice at follow-up (with follow-up times ranging from two
months to four years), which varied from 5 minutes per day less than once
per week to 18.7 minutes per day every day. Of the initial 24 studies, 13 (just
over half) showed at least moderate support for a relationship between the
amount of home practice and psychological outcome. Vettese et al. did not
152
152Presence
crunch the numbers, but I calculated an average correlation over all 24 stud-
ies of r = .15.19 This correlation is very close to the corresponding correlation
in nonclinical samples we saw in the previous chapter (r = .18 for trait mind-
fulness and .17 for stress)—a small but positive association suggesting that
how much you practice has a modest influence on the effect you can expect
to score.
Why and How Does Meditation Work? The Role of Trait

Mindfulness and Rumination
Mindfulness training thus appears to be an effective form of therapy for men-

tal health issues—it works better than placebo, its effectiveness is on par with
that of standard treatment, and it works better for preventing relapse after
depression than treatment-as-usual does. It also has positive effects on men-
tal health for people afflicted with a diverse array of medical conditions.
In the previous chapter, we saw that many mechanisms have been pro-
posed for effects on well-being but only trait mindfulness has gained some
empirical traction in nonclinical samples. It is probably fair to say that
there has been more attention to the “why” question in clinical research. In
their review paper, Jenny Gu and colleagues identified 20 studies on mecha-
nisms; Anne Maj van der Velden and colleagues collected 23.20 These studies
also (and for the present purposes also, alas) cover a wide variety of these
mechanisms: Only two mechanisms have been investigated in more than
three studies (if we take three studies as the absolute minimum to conduct a
meta-analysis).
The first of these oft- researched mechanisms is our old friend trait
mindfulness—the self-reported ability to be present in and open to the pres-
ent experience. Gu et al. collected 12 studies that looked at mindfulness and
allowed for the computation of correlations. Seven of these examined levels
of depression as the main psychological outcome; two focused on stress, two
more on anxiety, and one on negative affect. In these studies, the effect of
the mindfulness intervention on trait mindfulness was, on average, 0.72 SD;
changes in mindfulness were correlated with changes in psychological out-
come (r = .36). On average, changes in mindfulness after the intervention
explained 61% of the changes in the mental health outcome. Another meta-
analysis21 found this effect also between studies; that is, studies that resulted
in stronger effects on trait mindfulness also showed more positive effects on
mental health. Technically, we cannot claim that changes in mindfulness lead
to changes in psychological outcomes—these are correlations, not a cascade
of changes over time. I cannot think of a good reason, however, to assume
that the cascade we saw in nonclinical studies (mindfulness practice leads
153
to higher levels of trait mindfulness, which leads to heightened well-being)

wouldn’t also be present in these clinical groups.
The second mechanism is what Gu et al. labels “repetitive negative think-
ing”—this includes both rumination and worry, which fall under the self-regu-
lation category in Vago and Silbersweig’s categorization of effects (as we saw
in the previous chapter). Recall from the previous chapter that rumination
and worry tend to be particularly active in people who struggle with depres-
sion. Gu et al. found that the stilling of repetitive negative thinking explains
a good amount of the changes in psychological outcome after a mindfulness
intervention. They compiled six studies: three on depression and one each
on stress, anxiety, and global symptoms of psychopathology. The effect of
the mindfulness intervention on negative repetitive thinking in these studies
was 0.65 SD; decreases in negative repetitive thinking were correlated with
positive psychological outcomes (r = .33). On average, changes in repetitive
negative thinking after the intervention explained 44% of the changes in the
psychological outcome. If we assume a cascade (mindfulness practice causes
you to ruminate less, which eases your symptoms), this means that a good por-
tion of the effectiveness of mindfulness interventions is due to lowered levels
of worry or rumination. Note that the positive changes in negative thinking
after mindfulness interventions are important in their own right: For many
people who have them, such persistent worries and seemingly unstoppable
negative thought spirals are in themselves rather distressing. Finding some
relief from their relentless onslaught is a welcome change.
How Long Do Intervention Effects Last?
Trait mindfulness and the ability to regulate thought and emotion (or at
least not to lose oneself in rumination and worry) are useful skills to have,
techniques that you can apply throughout life. Skill learning is wonderful,
because you might hope that once the tool is in the toolbox, it is always at
hand, helping you fight off further mental onslaughts. From this point of
view, mindfulness training should be expected to have long-term effects.
There are two meta-analyses on long-term(ish) effects of mindfulness
training on mental health. The first, by Stefan Hofmann and colleagues,22
gathered 19 studies and looked at outcomes at the final follow-up compared
to before the intervention. The mean follow-up length was 27 weeks after the
end of training. The effect for anxiety (17 studies) was 0.60 SD (compared to
0.83 SD right after training); for depression (18 studies), the effect size was
also 0.60 SD (compared to 0.50 SD right after training), suggesting, first,
that effects are still measurable half a year after the training program and,
second, that the effects do not differ much from those right at the end of
154
154Presence
training—they go down for anxiety (by 0.20 SD) and up a bit for depression
(by 0.10 SD).
The second meta-analysis, by Bassam Khoury and colleagues23 (the group
of studies partially overlaps with Hofmann et al.’s) had an average follow-up
length of 29 weeks. The effect size for the difference between the last follow-
up and pretest (24 studies) was 0.57 SD (compared to 0.55 SD right after train-
ing). Mindfulness programs were very effective for the treatment of anxiety
(0.91 SD, six studies, compared to 0.89 SD right after the intervention) and
depression (0.75 SD, two studies, compared to 0.69 SD right after treatment).
The conclusion is that, as with the Hofmann et al. analysis, mindfulness
training leads to long-term effects that do not differ (in this case, at all) from
the effects scored right after the training.
Khoury et al. also looked at comparisons between control treatment and
mindfulness interventions at follow-up. This answers the question of whether
or not mindfulness programs are more (or less) effective than standard forms
of treatment: At follow-up, mindfulness treatment (17 studies) showed an
effect size of 0.43 SD compared with passive control (effect size = 0.44 SD
right after the training); the effect size was 0.24 SD compared with active
control (30 studies; effect size = 0.34 SD right after the training). Seventeen
studies compared mindfulness training with other psychological treatments.
Mindfulness did better than supportive therapy24 (effect size = 0.34 SD, three
studies), but its effects were not different from those of relaxation (five stud-
ies), psycho-education (three studies), and traditional cognitive or behavioral
therapy (six studies). The conclusion here is that, as was the case with effects
measured right after the treatment, the effects of mindfulness practice are
similar to the effects of other kinds of therapy; the exception is that mindful-
ness does better than supportive therapy.
Bottom line: The effects of mindfulness training in clinical populations
are quite stable over time, at least for half a year or so.
Is Meditation Safe? Side Effects and Adverse Effects
You might wonder if meditation and mindfulness interventions are safe.

The website of the National Center for Complementary and Integrative
Health (NCCIH, a subdivision of the National Institutes of Health)25 states,
perhaps a bit mysteriously: “Meditation is considered to be safe for healthy
people. There have been rare reports that meditation could cause or worsen
symptoms in people who have certain psychiatric problems, but this question
has not been fully researched.”
While the last part of the final sentence is undeniably true—the question of
negative side effects hasn’t been fully researched—the former part may be a
bit puzzling. As we saw earlier in this chapter, the large-scale meta-analysis by
155
Goyal and colleagues—which concentrated on clinical samples—uncovered

not a single case of harm.26 Their database included 41 clinical trials; nine of
these explicitly reported on the question of harm. One of these nine looked
specifically for toxicities to hematologic, renal, and liver markers and found
none; seven others explicitly reported that they found no harmful events; one
did not comment on harm. Thus the NCCIH statement of caution may be a
bit overcautious—so far, no clinical trial has reported that new symptoms
were caused by, or existing symptoms worsened as a consequence of, mind-
fulness training. Your local MBSR or MBCT program is likely beneficial and
unlikely to cause you harm. (Nothing can ever be fully guaranteed, of course.)
The NCCIH statement, however, covers more than mindfulness training—
it is a statement about meditation in general. There are indeed a few papers
that suggest that meditation can lead to negative side effects.27 These include
case studies of increased negativity (increased anxiety, unnecessary critical
judgment), disorientation (being confused about who you are, “loss of self,”
spacing out), addiction to meditation (yes, it can happen), and interpersonal
problems (such as unwarranted feelings of superiority, increased discomfort
with friends), mania (an unexplained period of great excitement and eupho-
ria), or psychotic episodes (losing touch with reality). This has brought some
psychiatrists28 to advocate for careful screening, without, alas, giving clear
criteria as to what to screen for and how.
The most comprehensive study on this topic is an ongoing project by
Willougby Britton and colleagues. They conducted interviews with nearly 40
people who were expressly recruited because they had experienced adverse
effects of meditation (mostly done in a religious [Buddhist] context rather
than as part of a therapeutic endeavor); many of them experienced impair-
ments in daily functioning lasting between six months and more than 20 years.
The results from this study haven’t been published yet, but an article in The
Atlantic,29 a fascinating read, previews some of the findings, many center-
ing around disorientation, often occurring during periods of intense practice
such as retreats.
It isn’t clear what proportion of meditators are at risk or what the risk
factors are. Many of the former, it seems, are younger adults, in an age range
where psychotic breakdowns occur more frequently than in any other age
group, so the question is whether meditation is actually responsible for the
episodes. The lack of strong data makes it hard to predict who is vulnerable
or if there is a specific moment in meditation training when a person is most
vulnerable. If you teach meditation or mindfulness, it would certainly be a
good idea to keep an eye out for possible struggles your participants might be
having; if you meditate and find yourself losing touch with yourself or with
reality, you might want to discuss this with your teacher or your family doctor.
A complicating factor is that some Buddhist traditions consider some of these
adverse effects—especially disorientation—signs of progress. Thus there is
156
156Presence
some discussion about whether these adverse effects are really adverse and
whether or not they should be treated.30 Another complicating factor is that,
according to one diary study31 of a small group of MBSR participants, every-
one is likely to struggle with distress related to the practice at some point or
other during training. These temporary setbacks seem to resolve themselves
as participants acquire a more observing, less reactive self.
Again, the results from clinical trials strongly suggest that these problems
are unlikely to be widespread; so far, they are absent from the clinical appli-
cations of mindfulness.
Mindfulness as Medicine: Conclusions
The main conclusion from the research on clinical applications of mind-

fulness is that meditation can indeed be used as a form of medication—it
has measurable effects on depression (both symptom severity and the risk
of relapse), anxiety, mood, pain, and psychological problems that occur as
reactions to medical issues, and it is generally safe. It is, however, clearly not
a magic bullet or a “Buddha pill,” as one recent book calls it.32 A fair conclu-
sion would be to say that it works, but not spectacularly so.
First, the effects of mindfulness programs aren’t of very large magni-
tude: around 0.30 SD in comparisons with nonspecific controls, that is, after
taking out the placebo effect. These effects are largely on par with the effects
found on well-being in nonclinical groups. Note that the effects tend to be
a bit larger for targeted interventions and that mindfulness has its largest
effect on the aspect of life that the particular patient is struggling with most.
For depression, mindfulness appears to work better than drug treatment; for
anxiety, it does not.
Second, the effect decreases to zero when compared with specific active
controls, implying that mindfulness programs do just as well as other known
and respected treatments for depression, anxiety, and the like. On the plus
side, this makes meditation a viable alternative to other therapies. Its use-
fulness is increased by the finding that—in clinical contexts—there seem to
be no known adverse effects. Mindfulness can also be helpful for medical
conditions—the psychological side effects of cancer, chronic pain, and some
aspects of psychosis.
As far as we know now, the effects are due to two factors: an increase in
trait mindfulness and a decrease in rumination and worry. There is some
evidence for a dose–response relationship (more practice, better results), and
the gains scored right after training are largely maintained over a period of
half a year after training.
Many questions remain. First, we still know very little about the possible
cascade of effects. Studies that look at multiple outcomes on a day-by-day
157
basis and keep track of actual time practiced and its relationship to specific
outcomes would be very helpful here.
Second, the stability of training effects over a half-year period is some-
thing that deserves more scrutiny. In the previous chapter, we found that at
least some effects of mindfulness practice were limited in time—practicing
leads to greater mindfulness, which leads to greater well-being over the
course of, at most, a few days. Vetesse et al.’s meta-analysis suggests that once
the actual training program is over, time spent in practice sloughs off, and
so there must be something else at play to explain maintenance of practice
effects. The likely ingredient is trait mindfulness—m indfulness as a skill that
can and will be deployed whenever a threat arises, kicking in, for instance,
when you find yourself ruminating or thinking anxious thoughts and thus
stopping problems close to the root. It would be worthwhile to investigate this
claim, maybe using a time-sampling approach (e.g., ping former participants
on their phones a few times a day and record their experiences and their reac-
tions to those experiences).
Third, we know very little about individual differences in effectiveness in
these clinical programs. Is mindfulness training a good idea for everyone suf-
fering from depression, anxiety, psychosis, or medical problems? If it is not,
is there a way to find out before the patient begins an eight-week program or
at least early in the program?
158
159
{ 8 }
Meditation and Mindfulness

FINAL WORDS
This has been a long book. It has certainly grown bigger than I originally
envisioned it to be, and is probably longer than you wanted it to be (I hope
you felt free to skip sections). At the same time, it is also still too short: I am
sure that you—like me—have lots of questions that haven’t been answered.
It seems appropriate to end this book by, first, giving a summary of the
findings. The main question of course is whether mindfulness delivers. I’ll
answer that one first—the answer is “yes”—and then move on to the three
questions from the end of Chapter 1. First, in this book, we looked at three
levels of results: data from brain activation, data from brain morphology, and
data from mind and behavior. Do these three levels show converging results?
Second, do we have any idea why mindfulness works, and can we derive scien-
tifically sound meditation practices from that knowledge? And finally, what is
it that we do not know but probably should?
Mindfulness Delivers
Figure 4 puts together all the results of all the meta-analyses in this book
that compared people trained in mindfulness and/or mindful meditation to
control participants. The graph combines effects on attention and different
aspects of stress and well-b eing as seen in healthy adults (from Chapters 5
and 6), as well as effects on different symptoms and aspects of well-b eing
in clinical groups, compared both to placebo effects (i.e., comparison to
nonspecific controls) and to treatment-as-u sual (i.e., comparison to specific
controls) (from Chapter 7). The whiskers embrace the 95% confidence inter-
val for each effect; the bold line again represents the average effect of all
educational, psychological, and behavioral interventions, as calculated in
a meta-analysis of no less than 156 meta-analyses. We can benchmark the
160
160Presence
Effect size (MSD)

–0.1 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Control over attention (10 studies)
Attentional blink (3 studies)
Sustained attention (7 studies)
Propriocention for sexual arousal (3 studies)
Working memory (5 studies)
Self-perceived stress (27 studies)
HEALTHY ADULTS
Cortisol (3 studies)
Immune functioning (5 studies)
General well-being (5 studies)
State anxiety (6 studies)
Trait anxiety (11 studies)
Depressed mood (6 studies)
Negative emotions (6 studies)
Positive emotions (6 studies)
Emotion regulation (9 studies)
Rumination (4 studies)
Negative personality traits (3 studies)
Emotional stability (4 studies)
Trait mindfulness (16 studies)
Self-concept (7 studies)
Empathy (2 studies)
Compassion (5 studies)
Anxiety (7 studies)
Depression (8 studies)
COMPARED TO
Stress (7 studies) PLACEBO
CLINICAL POPULATIONS
Negative affect (11 studies)
Positive affect (4 studies)
Quality of life (3 studies)
Sleep (4 studies)
Pain (4 studies)
Psychosis (neg. symptoms, 3 studies)
Psychosis (pos. symptoms, 4 studies)
Anxiety (10 studies)

COMPARED TO
TREATMENTS
Depression (11 studies)

KNOWN
Stress (6 studies)
Positive affect (4 studies)
Quality of life (5 studies)
Sleep (2 studies)
Pain (4 studies)
FIGURE 4. Summary of the effects of mindfulness meditation in healthy and clinical

populations. The whiskers embrace the 95% confidence interval. The bold line is the
average effect size for 156 different types of psychological, educational, and behavioral
interventions (Lipsey & Wilson, 1993).
effects of mindfulness and/or mindful meditation against two standards.

One is the zero line; this comparison answers the question whether meditat-
ing is better than just going on with your life. The other is the bold line, which
answers the question how mindfulness and/or mindful meditation compare
161
Meditation and Mindfulness: Final Words 161
to what we can typically expect from interventions aimed at bettering our

psychology.1
In the Preface, I mentioned Meng’s dream—the hope that one day medita-
tion and mindfulness would be as self-evident and nonremarkable as exercise
is now. This dream can only come true if and when we—as a species—realize
that mindfulness and meditation are good for us. I am very glad to report
here that they are.
I summarize, first, the core findings concerning mindfulness and mindful
meditation in healthy adults—m indfulness as a mental gym. Then I discuss
mindfulness in a therapeutic context, or mindfulness as medicine.
MEDITATION AS A MENTAL GYM
To me, three discoveries stand out when looking at the effects of mindfulness
training in healthy adults.
The first is statistical significance. In healthy adults, we have data on 22
different aspects of attention, stress, and well-being; 20 of those effects are
larger than zero. The ones that are problematic are resting cortisol and emo-
tional stability, but mindfulness/meditation has significant and beneficial
effects on control over attention, attentional blink, sustained attention, pro-
prioception for sexual arousal, working memory, perceived stress, immune
functioning, general well-being, state anxiety, trait anxiety, depressed mood,
negative emotions, positive emotions, emotion regulation, rumination, nega-
tive personality traits, trait mindfulness, self-concept, empathy, and com-
passion. (Yes, I realize you can read this from the graph, but isn’t it very
satisfying to just go through this list?) In sum, the effects of meditation are
almost uniformly positive.
Second, mindfulness/meditation works just as well as standard psycho-
logical, educational, and behavioral interventions do, with a few exceptions.
On the one hand, the beneficial effects on cortisol and self-p erceived stress
fall a bit short; on the other hand, the beneficial effects on negative personal-
ity traits and trait mindfulness are significantly larger than those of standard
interventions. The average effect size over all 22 aspects is 0.49 SD, indicating
that the average meditator is psychologically speaking better off than 68%
of nonmeditators. This is a pretty strong result. No, meditation doesn’t turn
you into an off-the-charts super-being, but it does turn you into a more alert,
smarter, happier, less anxious, more balanced, better feeling, more mind-
ful, more emphatic, and more compassionate version of yourself—not a bad
result at all.2
Third, the effects are amazingly broad. If you were disappointed to find
that meditation works “only” as well as standard psychological interventions,
consider that such interventions are usually targeted to a specific problem
within a specific group. That is, marital counseling tries to make marriages
162
162Presence
work; Head Start hopes to improve toddlers’ school readiness; relaxation

therapy aims at making people feel less stressed; and so on. Essentially, typi-
cal psychological, behavioral, and educational interventions are one-trick
ponies, as they should be: It’s hard enough to change one thing in your life,
let alone your whole life. Meditation, in contrast, has many effects in quite a
number of domains in life—cognitive, emotional, and interpersonal.
This result offers an interesting parallel with physical exercise. Physical
exercise also works on multiple aspects of physical well-being—it reduces
your risk of cardiovascular disease, it strengthens your bones and muscles,
it improves your mood, it might help you live longer, and it even makes you a
tad smarter.3 If your reason to start or continue a regimen of physical exercise
would be that it has broad effects on a number of aspects of fitness that do mat-
ter, then you would have equal reason to take up or continue meditation—it
positively affects many aspects of mind and heart that do matter. Meditation
truly is a gym for your spirit. One exciting difference between physical exer-
cise and meditation is that while exercise is good for you, meditation may
also be good for those around you—you dull the edges of your negative traits,
your positive mood might be contagious, and there is even some evidence that
meditation makes you a better romantic partner.
In sum, meditation is a wonderful wellness tool, but it isn’t necessarily bet-
ter than anything else, if you are interested in just one outcome. (For instance,
relaxation therapy is just as good at preventing or lessening the harms of
stress as mindfulness is.) What sets mindfulness apart is its broad-spectrum
efficacy—I can’t think of any other intervention that has quite such a wide
range of positive outcomes.
MINDFULNESS AS MEDICINE
In clinical samples, where mindfulness is applied as a form of therapy, we find

a similar picture: Mindfulness/meditation has broad effects, comparable to
those of standard practice. The effects tend to be somewhat smaller, though,
and not always significant.
Compared to placebo treatment, meditation has a statistical significant
effect on anxiety, depression, negative affect, pain, and the negative symp-
toms of psychosis but not on stress, positive affect, quality of life, sleep, or
the positive symptoms of psychosis. We also find that meditation/m indful-
ness works just as well as standard treatment (the bold line in Figure 4)
for all aspects, with the exception of sleep, where it is less effective. Note
that the 95% confidence intervals for most outcomes are so wide that they
embrace both the zero line and the bold line simply because there are few
studies, and so the uncertainty (expressed in the width of the whiskers) is
large. On average, the effect size is 0.28 SD, smaller than for healthy adults.
The effect size indicates that the average mindfulness-trained patient is
163
better off than 61% of nonmeditating, untreated patients. An important

reminder is that, as we have seen, targeted interventions (e.g., MBCT, which
targets depression relapse rates) have larger effects on the target measure
than on nontarget measures. Likewise, effect sizes tend to be larger for the
problem areas that participants are struggling with (e.g., depressed patients
gain more on depression than on any other measure). We could thus rightly
consider the effect sizes in the graph to be underestimates of the true target
effect sizes.
In the comparison with treatment-as-usual, all confidence intervals con-
tain zero. This indicates that mindfulness interventions have the same effect
size as known treatments.
The conclusion here is that mindfulness/meditation does not propel you
into the stratosphere of mental health, but it does have larger effects than
placebo treatment and the same effects as treatment-as-usual, leaving people
who are struggling with mental health issues with one more viable option.
Mindfulness has the added advantages that it has broad effects that last for
at least six months and that it is has no known negative side effects, at least in
a clinical context (see Chapter 7).
The Time Course of Effects
One particularly thought-provoking set of findings concerns the unfolding of

practice over time. In the previous section, I basically looked at the effects of
meditating versus not meditating. But we can also make a more fine-g rained
distinction, namely between local effects—does the frequency or the number
of minutes that you meditate per day matter?—and cumulative effects—does
the total number of hours meditated over a lifetime make a difference? Note
that these two types of effects aren’t the same, but they are related: People
who have meditated more over the course of a lifetime also tend to meditate
more frequently and/or for longer periods than people who have accumulated
fewer hours. (This is in part a simple math issue: The only way to accumulate
more hours quickly is by sitting more and/or longer. In part, it is also the case
that people often start sitting more frequently and/or for longer sessions as
their practice progresses.)
One first finding (surprising to me) was that many of the effects of medita-
tion are not the result of accumulated practice. Figure 3 (in Chapter 6) illus-
trates this nicely: The effects of meditation on many aspects of well-being
are about the same whether we include all studies or only look at interven-
tion studies (which contain, by definition, no long-term meditators). If the
number of cumulative hours mattered, effect sizes would go down drastically
when only intervention studies are considered; this is the case for exactly zero
of the 16 aspects studied.4 Thus the effects of meditation on self-p erceived
164
164Presence
stress, immune functioning, general well-being, state anxiety, trait anxiety,

depressed mood, negative emotions, positive emotions, emotion regulation,
rumination, negative personality traits, emotional stability, trait mindful-
ness, self-concept, empathy, and compassion are already in full swing after
about two months of training.5
Or maybe I shouldn’t be surprised. The analogy with exercise might
work here too: Your level of fitness isn’t so much due to how much you’ve
exercised over a lifetime but rather whether you are currently exercising.
(Example: Retired professional athletes can go pudgy really fast.)
This finding can be interpreted in two ways: Either what matters is that
you meditate and not how much you meditate or it is a local effect; that is,
what matters is how much you’ve meditated in the past few days. One way to
find out which interpretation is true is to look for short-term dose–response
relationships. I found such dose–response relationships for control over atten-
tion (correlation of ~0.20 with frequency or number of minutes practiced
per day), speed of perception (correlation of ~0.40 with minutes practiced
per day), perceived stress (correlation of ~0.20 with mindfulness program
adherence), error monitoring (correlation of ~0.35 with frequency of medita-
tion), stress reactivity (correlation of ~0.50 with meditation frequency), trait
mindfulness (correlation of ~0.20 for adherence to the mindfulness training),
relationship happiness6 and—in clinical studies—psychological distress (cor-
relation of ~0.15).
The simple message is that it pays to practice more or more often. The
effect on trait mindfulness is especially important, given that it is the motor
for many other well-being–related effects, as is the effect on stress, given that
this might be, for many people, the motivator to start meditating in the first
place. The flipside of this finding is that you cannot rest on your meditation
laurels, at least for these aspects—it is about how much you practice right
now, not how much you have practiced in the past.
There are also effects that do seem to evolve over a lifetime of practice.
One notable long-term outcome is sustained attention (remember the Ladakh
monks and motion-induced blindness?), which also benefits from shorter
periods of intense practice, like a retreat, but does not appear to show a short-
term dose–response relationship.
There may also be long-term effects for sleep. Early in practice, you have
higher levels of alertness and your need for sleep decreases. Over time, your
body adapts to this wakefulness and you sleep more efficiently, with shorter
periods of shallow sleep and longer periods of deep sleep.
Effects on brain functioning and brain structure fall, almost by neces-
sity, into this category as well. (It is hard to measure day-to-day fluctua-
tions in brain functioning or structure and relate those to the amount of
daily practice—it would be prohibitively expensive to do, and the day-to-day
changes in the brain are likely too small to be noticeable.)
165
One very interesting brain change concerns attention. At first, the brain
activates its attention centers more and more strongly with advancing prac-
tice, and then, after tens of thousands of hours of practice, activation levels
drop again. This suggests, as we discussed, an initial slow build-up of atten-
tional effort and then an increasing efficiency in that effort, requiring less
activation for the same amount of attention. Higher efficiency can also be
seen in a quicker return to focused attention after mind-wandering. Other
changes in brain activation concern a growing trend toward disembodi-
ment and selflessness (seen in the supplemental motor areas and the superior
medial gyrus) and a less judgmental, evaluative, and emotional stance (less
coupling between the anterior cingulate cortex and the lateral orbitofrontal
cortex). Finally, meditators’ brains become more meditative in daily life—or,
at least, they become more meditative when asked to just rest inside the scan-
ner or the lab.
In terms of changes in brain structure, we find increases in volume and/or
density in regions of the salience attention network (anterior cingulate cortex,
insula; there is also a dose–response relationship here: the total number of
accumulated hours correlates with volume/density), in regions that are asso-
ciated with direct awareness of body sensations (insula, anterior precuneus,
sensory and motor cortex; a dose–response relationship with accumulated
hours has been found here as well), with global body awareness (supramar-
ginal gyrus), and with emotion regulation (right orbitofrontal cortex, also
showing a dose–response relationship with total number of hours accumu-
lated). There are also decreases in volume/density in regions associated with
stress reactivity (the subiculum of the hippocampus, showing a dose–response
relationship with accumulated hours) and with the narrative self (precuneus).
We also saw that true selflessness (i.e., when not just the narrative self but also
the self-of-momentary-awareness disappears) is something that takes tens of
thousands of hours to cultivate.
One way to summarize these many findings would be to say that the four
themes—changes in attention, direct body awareness, global body aware-
ness, and the sense of self—develop slowly over a lifetime of practice, but
changes in well-being (such as self-p erceived stress, mood, anxiety, emotion
regulation, self-concept, trait mindfulness, relationship quality, empathy,
and compassion) are mostly linked to local effects of meditation. Perhaps
another way of stating this would be to say that the effects that most medi-
tators would be interested in—stress reduction and how meditation affects
daily life—are easily acquired and maintained: Just sit! The effects that lead
to what Buddhists call awakening or enlightenment (especially a honing and
sharpening of sustained attention and increasing levels of selflessness) do
take decades to mature.
This, I believe, is a very crucial result. It suggests that we can quite nat-
urally dissociate these two strains of mindfulness—the one geared toward
166
166Presence
increased personal (and therefore also interpersonal) well-being and the one
emphasizing “awakening,” “liberation,” or “enlightenment”—the gym for the
heart and mind can be decoupled from the spiritual exercise. (But note that
the spiritual exercise seems to organically incorporate the heart/m ind gym.)
The exercise metaphor breaks down here, but yoga could be a good anal-
ogy. In the West, yoga has successfully decoupled the physical and well-being
aspects of the practice from the spiritual path. (Whether or not that is a good
idea depends on who you ask.) In the same vein, mindfulness, as I described
at the very beginning of the book, has gradually been turned into a wellness
industry. In the process, it has divorced itself from its Buddhist roots, all the
while claiming that the benefits remain intact. The available evidence sug-
gests that this may very well be true, as long as we are talking about the local
effects of meditation practice.
Whether this is a desirable evolution again depends on who you ask—quite
a few Buddhist scholars and teachers7 rail against what they see as a com-
modification and appropriation of a venerable tradition. I am less certain
that the baby is being thrown out with the bathwater: It seems to me that the
effects that can be had from short-term meditation training focused on stress
release or other forms of well-being aren’t negligible at all and that they might
make a real difference in real people’s lives. I frankly don’t see what is wrong
with this, especially when you consider that this sort of practice (unlike many
other therapeutic journeys) does not seem to yield as many adverse effects, at
least as far as current evidence shows. I, as a card-carrying Buddhist, am very
happy that the techniques that I happen to use on my spiritual path have also
proven to be helpful to countless others, even if what they are looking for isn’t
the same as what I am looking for.
This dissociation might also address the fear held by some that medita-
tion is a Buddhist Trojan horse—a way to introduce Buddhist concepts to
unsuspecting and potentially unwilling individuals. One thing to immedi-
ately point out is that meditation isn’t an exclusively Buddhist technique
(there are Christian, Hindu, Jain, Jewish, Muslim, and Sikh meditation tradi-
tions, among others), although mindfulness meditation is more closely asso-
ciated with Buddhism than with any other faith tradition. The techniques
of mindfulness meditation oriented toward well-being, however, are just as
little related to Buddhist concepts and principles as well-being-oriented yoga
practices are related to Vedic ideas.
That said, it may be hard to find meditation groups that are non-Buddhist
in orientation. I live in Atlanta, and we have two Vipassanā groups that I know
of, a Tibetan, a Chinese and a Vietnamese monastery, a Shambala center, a
Transcendental Meditation® center, at least three Zen groups, and a Plum
Village group, all of which offer free meditation instructions and sessions,
but I am not aware of any secular group that teaches meditation for free, with
the exception of one tea house.
167
I do feel—and, the more I think about this, the more I realize I feel about
this rather strongly—that there could be better efforts at stripping classes
in meditation and mindfulness from that religious background; the same is
true for meditation peer groups. I have been told that in order to do yoga in
the 1960s, you had to find an ashram; now, every strip mall seems to have its
yoga studio. Although you need less gear and less instruction to meditate
than to do yoga, anyone who meditates could benefit from the support of a
good teacher or a group of caring peers. The mindfulness community seems
to have fallen a bit short on this account.
Mindfulness from Brain to Mind
One of the questions I asked at the end of Chapter 1 was whether we can trace
the effects of meditation all the way from brain activation over structural
changes to changes in behavior and psychological make-up. The answer is
both “yes” and “no.”
One of the vagaries of neuroscience and psychology research is that we
live by the grace (or curse) of feasibility. This creates trade-offs. In order to
examine the meditating brain in action, we need to look at the professional
athletes of mindfulness; in order to be sure that effects are due to the prac-
tice per se, we need to look at how practice develops over time. It is impos-
sible to combine both: We simply cannot start a study now and reap the final
results in 20 years’ time. Thus studies looking at brain activation have been
done with very-long-term practitioners, like Buddhists monks, while studies
on structural changes in the brain use slightly less accomplished meditators;
studies on well-being have often followed newbies over the course of a two-
month training program.
On the one hand, we do find good convergence between the two first types
of studies: Brain areas that are activated during meditation also tend to show
structural changes. This concerns areas associated with the two attention
networks (the salience network and the executive network), the sharpening
of specific body awareness (related to focus on the breath or on body sensa-
tions), the dropping away of a general sense of body awareness, the shushing
of the self-as-story, and emotion regulation. Of these, attention and emotion
regulation also appear on the list of changes in well-being in both healthy
adults and clinical populations.
On the other hand, healthy adults also show effects on personality and
immune functioning that are harder to link directly to the brain changes as
found in monks and other long-term practitioners. And although it is likely
that changes in attention and emotion regulation have effects on stress, rumi-
nation, anxiety, depression, and mood, the ties of these psychological changes
to brain changes haven’t been researched very deeply.
168
168Presence
Conversely, one theme that emerged in the brain studies has garnered lit-
tle interest in the psychological community—the dissolution of the narrative
self and of the self-of-momentary-awareness. This may be partially because
changes in these aspects of the self are harder to study than, say, changes
in well-being or anxiety/depression; we don’t have ready-made scales and
surveys for these. It may also be because this aspect of meditation is more
exclusively Buddhist. As I mentioned in the previous chapter when discuss-
ing negative effects of meditation, it may be desirable for a Zen Buddhist to
“lose” her self; most people would probably very much like to keep their sense
of who and what they are (let alone the sense that they are someone) very
much intact.
Scientifically Sound Meditation
One conclusion from all this research is that mindfulness makes a person a
little bit of a better human being, a little happier, a tad less rough around the
edges, and just a bit more pleasant to be around. We also know—at least to
some extent—why: The application of mindfulness during meditation gives
birth to mindfulness in daily life, which becomes an ingrained habit, and
this, in turn, lowers levels of stress, anxiety, or depression; lifts your affect;
stops the downward spirals in your mind a bit more easily; and makes you
happier. (That is the big picture. We still need to know more about the time
course of this cascade, how this works exactly, and if other aspects of your
psychological makeup—for instance changes in sustained attention—also
play a role in triggering these effects.)
Knowing that meditation and mindfulness are optimizers, can we opti-
mize how we go about optimizing ourselves? That is, can science show us a
better way to meditate?
After reading all I could read for this book, and rereading what I wrote, it
seems to me that we are a long way off from being able to offer a simple recipe
for meditation: Do this, do that, don’t do this, and sweetness follows.
Let me try, however, to reiterate some of the findings that might be help-
ful here. These aren’t particularly earth shattering in their newness or bril-
liance, but it’s good to collect them and to note that there are studies to back
them up.
A first piece of advice is obvious: Do meditate! (Allow me to refrain from
enumerating the benefits yet one more time.)
Second, meditate often and/or make your sits a little longer. There are short-
term dose–response effects for outcomes such as attention, perceived stress
and stress reactivity, trait mindfulness, relationship happiness, and psycho-
logical distress. That is, for these outcomes, we know that it matters how
much you have been meditating in the past few days, as opposed to how much
169
you have meditated over your lifetime. That suggests you have to keep up
your practice to reap those rewards.
How often or how long should you meditate? We don’t really know. The
finding that at least some of the effects on well-being are no longer trace-
able after a few days suggests that meditation should be a daily or near-daily
habit, rather than a weekly occurrence. Note that standard MBSR programs,
with, on average, 28 minutes of actual meditation per day over an eight-week
period, result in nice-sized effects, so this seems like a good dose. The find-
ing that there is a modest positive correlation between practice at home and
effect size simply suggests that more is always better.
Should you concentrate your practice and go on meditation retreats?
Retreats appear to have their benefits, especially in the area of attention—a
more open-m inded approach to the world, sharpened visual perception, and
a longer attention span. We also know that MBSR programs that include
a half-day retreat lead to larger effects on trait mindfulness. Finally, one
study found a positive effect of retreats on immune functioning. There are
other effects that aren’t necessarily benefits and could even be perceived as
drawbacks: Retreats increase your chances for unusual body experiences and
visual hallucinations, and they may lead to changes in mood (positive, nega-
tive, or swinging) or perception of time, and even out-of-body experiences.
Britton et al.’s project on unusual experiences (discussed in Chapter 7) also
suggests that periods of disorientation or other types of losing touch with
reality can have their origins in retreats. The bottom line is that retreats can
be times for growth in the practice, but it would be a good idea to monitor
yourself for any signs of distress and discuss those with the retreat leaders.
A third piece of advice is to aim for the parasympathetic response, that
is: Relax! Shoot for a breathing rate of about six seconds per breath: This
particular cadence helps synchronize the breath and the heartbeat, which
feels particularly relaxing. Because the body settles into such rhythms easily,
it might make sense to spend some time at the beginning of each sit to con-
sciously slow down your breath; once that is set in motion, you should be able
to coast without thinking about it.8
Fourth, there are some feedback mechanisms that might help guide your
meditation. In Chapter 3, I described a study by Garrison et al. that used
brain activation (or, rather, deactivation) in the posterior cingulate cortex
(PCC) to guide meditation. Of course, most of us don’t have an MRI scan-
ner at hand, but one of the hallmarks of PCC deactivation is “not efforting,”
and “observing”—not getting lost in feelings, thoughts, or ideas as they arise
and simply letting those be. Effortless doing, relaxing, and letting go is thus
what settles the mind into the meditative groove: The quality of attention in
meditation should be gentle, not forceful. This advice is maybe more useful
for already seasoned meditators, however: Garrison et al.’s less experienced
participants had trouble deactivating the PCC, even with real-time direct
170
170Presence
feedback. Another interesting finding from this study was that PCC deactiva-
tion feels good: It leaves you more content and more serene, and it gives you
more pleasure. So, leaning in the direction of peace or delight might be more
practical alternative advice. Another feedback mechanism is the presence of
nimittas, that is, spots of light. (But note that their absence doesn’t mean any-
thing: Some people never develop nimittas.) You can use the nimittas to your
advantage: Trying to stabilize or maintain these visual hallucinations and
even play with them will likely increase your concentration.
Fifth, one particularly exciting finding is that there is some evidence for
a direct transformation from moment-to-moment mindfulness on the cush-
ion to more enduring mindfulness in the actual world outside the meditation
room. Given that many of the effects of meditation on well-being are due
to increases in trait mindfulness, I would suggest that anything that fosters
mindfulness off the cushion would be a good idea. This advice is not tradi-
tionally a part of Buddhist meditation instructions, but clinical programs do
spend a lot of time on exercises that infuse daily life with an open-m inded and
open-hearted awareness—r ightfully so, then, it seems. Such exercises9 include
picking a daily activity that is usually performed mindlessly—something like
showering, brushing your teeth, walking the dog, or cooking—and giving
it all your attention, or shaking up small parts of your daily routine—take
another route to work, don’t always order the same thing at your favorite
lunch spot, strike up a conversation with a stranger. Take a mindful walk,
paying careful attention to everything you see or hear or feel. Perform a ran-
dom act of kindness and observe what happens. Use your time in the check-
out lane or at a red light to reconnect to what is happening inside your body.
Some meditation studies also suggest more specialized pieces of advice.
For example, for those who want to achieve “timeless” or “spaceless” types
of meditation, working through the sense of body might be a good route—
that is, trying to dissolve the body boundaries might be a good strategy here.
As another example, for those who tend to get sleepy, or need re-energizing,
loving-kindness meditation may be a good remedy. Finally, in Chapter 3, we
gathered a nice little bag of tricks to deal with pain, either during or outside
of meditation: You can focus your attention elsewhere, for instance on the
breath; get attuned to and relish in the relaxing effects of meditation; or take
an attitude of openness and acceptance toward the true reality of the experi-
ence of the pain as it unfolds, moment by moment.
A final word of advice is that although meditation works, and works
quickly, it would be wrong to expect it to work wonders. It is still work—nothing
can replace time earnestly spent on the cushion. It is also still not something
that will lift you to soaring heights of human flourishing. Although the effect
sizes for the typical eight-week interventions are nice, they are in line with
what you can expect from other psychological interventions—nothing more,
nothing less.
171
What We Don’t Know But Should
The number of studies on mindfulness and/or meditation and how they

impact brain, body, and mind is simply staggering. There are still a lot of
unknowns, however, and I pointed out a lot of them along the way, at the end
of each chapter. I assume most people—including you—have their own wish
list of things they would like to know more about than we do now. Here is
mine, in no particular order.
First, we still know relatively little about what effects to expect from what
types of meditation. Some of the known effects seem self-evident. We saw,
for instance, that repeated use of the body scan makes you more sensitive
to touch. Experience in the heart practices has an impact on how the brain
processes emotion. Over and beyond that, we know little. For instance, com-
passion training fosters compassion—as expected—but we do not know yet
to what extent the more attention-based practices foster compassion too. As
another example, open monitoring and focused attention do not seem to lead
to different long-term signatures in the brain. This could mean that differ-
ences between the attention-based meditation traditions are smaller than we
typically think—in other words, meditation is meditation. Maybe it’s the case
that there is a small set of crucial ingredients that all mindfulness traditions
share and these inscribe themselves into the brain with greater force than the
more tradition-specific ingredients, making the latter hard to detect.
Second, although we know that there is a cascade where meditation pro-
motes mindfulness, which in turn promotes well-being, we do not know if
the cascade is really an automatic, mechanistic process. That is, it is unclear
whether meditation by necessity (and in all people) leads to lower levels of
stress, a better emotional life, and greater interpersonal happiness. We saw
that some of these effects do appear to have brain correlates (in Chapter 4,
I called them side effects of meditation), but at least some of these effects may
be part of a self-fulfilling prophecy: If you sign up for a stress reduction pro-
gram, wouldn’t you expect your stress levels to go down? This question seems
more pressing with regard to outcomes that seem further removed from the
attention-training aspect of meditation, such as stronger romantic relation-
ships or a growing sense of selflessness. Do those, indeed, come about as a
direct effect of meditation experience?
Third, although it seems indeed as if attention training brings about
changes in mindfulness, we still know very little about how that actually
works. At some point, there seems to be a jump from learning how to focus
on your breath to no longer being bothered when someone cuts you off in
traffic. How exactly are those two connected?
Fourth, we know a lot about very long-term meditators, and we likewise
know a lot about short-term interventions, but we have almost no data on
what happens in between these two extremes—a meditator’s development
172
172Presence
between 50 hours and a few thousand hours of practice. It seems to me that

this is a crucial period, where you hone your attention skills, figure out what
works for you and what doesn’t, learn to act (or not act) accordingly, and—if
you are working within a particular system, tradition, or lineage—where you
go through the different exercises prescribed by your system, tradition, or
teacher. It would be interesting to find out if this is a gradual process or a
process that goes through different stages. As I mentioned in the conclusion
to Chapter 3, we currently have little evidence for steps, plateaus, or sud-
den jumps in practice, but maybe that is because we haven’t been looking
where we should: in these intermediate stages of practice. (One exception is
the one study on selfless meditation, where qualitative changes were found
in the way the more or less experienced brain deals with the instruction to
meditate selflessly.)
Fifth, I mentioned earlier that we have no recipe for meditation. Maybe it
would be good to see if we can concoct one. Is more always better, or is there
an optimal duration? Are there diminishing returns for longer sits? I also note
that MBSR—the program that inspired most current meditation programs—
is a hybrid of different meditation techniques, some yoga, and a few addi-
tional exercises. We do not know what happens when the balance of these
ingredients is changed, when certain parts are omitted, or when we present
the program in abbreviated form.
Sixth, even if we could find a recipe, it is unlikely that it would suit or sat-
isfy everyone. There are no doubt individual differences in likes and dislikes
for particular practices; it seems very plausible that some people might benefit
more from one approach than from another. We also know that some people
“get it” faster than other people, and we have no idea why that is. To some,
this might suggest that we need a cookbook—a collection of recipes that you
can try out at your leisure. I personally think that what we ultimately need is
a flowchart, where you start from a common stem (probably attention-based
practices) and then branch out, given your own goals and inclinations, life’s
circumstances, and how you react to them.
Seventh, the idea of neural feedback is appealing. Even though it isn’t fea-
sible to tap into PCC activation, there might be ways to use, say, EEG signals
or other physiological measures to help guide beginners toward the relaxed
yet alert stance that is conducive to meditation. There are commercial appli-
cations that claim to do this but without research to back up this claim.
Finally, given that the road to enhanced well-being travels through trait
mindfulness, and given that not everyone likes to meditate, it would be help-
ful to discover if there are alternative ways to boost mindfulness—such as
the exercises described in the previous section—and if they result in the same
effects as meditation.
173
Final Words
You made it to the final few paragraphs of this book—congratulations!

I don’t know why you picked up this book or why you kept reading (or at
least skipped ahead to here), but I thank you for taking this journey with me.
If you are a beginning meditator looking for encouragement or a reason to
keep meditating, I hope you found it here. If you have never meditated but are
looking for a reason to start, I hope you found it here as well. Mindfulness is
an amazing, transformative journey—welcome! If you never meditated and
were looking for a reason not to, I hope this book informed whatever decision
you made. And if you have already been meditating for a while (maybe even a
lifetime), I hope you learned something new about how and why the practice
is so transformative—I know I learned a lot in the process of writing this
book. Of course, much more work remains to be done, and that is fitting: The
study of meditation is like meditation itself—a never-ending journey, and
who knows where you will end up.
Now, if you’ll excuse me: After writing all this, I feel a bit exhausted.
A sit would be nice.
174
175
{ NOTES }
Preface
1. The most famous example is the Dalai Lama, for instance in his book The Universe
in a Single Atom.
Chapter 1
1. This story is described in more detail in Kabat-Zinn (2011). Words in quotes are
citations from this paper.
2. The numbers come from Wilson (2014), an excellent source for the history of the
concept of mindfulness and the mindfulness movement within the United States, and
Pickert (2014).
3. In his study of mindfulness in the United States, Wilson (2014) sees Kabat-Zinn’s
work (e.g., 1990, 1994, 1998, 2005) as one of three sources of the mindfulness movement as
it began to take shape in the 1970s. The two others explicitly self-identified and advertised
themselves as Buddhist—one is the Asian-trained pioneers of the American Vipassanā
or Insight Meditation movement (notably Sharon Salzberg Jacqueline Schwartz, Jack
Kornfield, and Joseph Goldstein); the other is the modernist Vietnamese-Zen monk Thích
Nhầt Hạnh, with the publication of his 1975 book The Miracle of Mindfulness.
4. You might think the exception would be mindful sleeping, but Amazon does sell an
mp3 with that title.
5. Its impact factor in 2014 was 3.69.
6. Kabat-Zinn (1994, p. 4). A group of psychologists have come up with a slightly
wordier consensus definition: “nonelaborative, non-judgmental, present-centered aware-
ness in which each thought, feeling, or sensation that arises in the attentional field is
acknowledged.”
7. Other teachers—for instance Thích Nhầt Hạnh (http://w ww.lionsroar.com/the-
moment-is-perfect/) —prefer oranges or tangerines. When I teach mindfulness classes,
I use chocolate; it’s my Belgian roots. I also like what chocolate does that a raisin
doesn’t: melting on your tongue and slowly releasing a wide, long-lasting palette of tastes
and aromas. If you know what I am talking about—congratulations, you know what it is
to mindfully eat chocolate. If you don’t, get yourself to the store now and treat yourself to
a nice bar of Godiva or Lindt, and try it.
8. Killingsworth and Gilbert (2010).
9. Do note that this study shows that a wandering mind is an unhappy mind, but the
direction of the causality—that is, does the wandering mind make you unhappy, or does
unhappiness make your mind wander?—hasn’t been established yet, so maybe I am a bit
forceful with my interpretation here.
10. A Buddhist source for this comparison is the Assutavā Sutta.
176
176Notes
11. A trait is a more or less lasting quality in a person that can help distinguish that
person from another, because people differ in the amount of it. For instance, intelligence is
a trait—some of us have more of it than others. So is introversion—some people are more
introverted than others. Vision, on the other hand, is not a trait—barring physiological
damage, we can all see.
12. For instance, the Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (Brown & Ryan, 2003), the
Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness skills (Baer et al., 2004), the Freiburg Mindfulness
Inventory (Walach et al., 2006), and the Five-Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire (Baer
et al., 2006)—the five facets in the latter survey are observing, describing, acting with
awareness, nonjudging of inner experience, and nonreactivity to inner experience.
13. There is quite some controversy around this conceptualization. One criticism is
that it is quite narrowly focused on attention (leaving out, e.g., the social, affective, and
ethical aspects of the Buddha’s original conceptualization). Another is that it relies too
much on subjective self-report and not on objective, outside measures. There is also a criti-
cism that mindfulness scales might be approached differently by those who are trained
in mindfulness (and thus know the lingo) than by those who are not. That would make
direct comparisons between these two groups problematic. For a good review of these and
other criticisms, see Grossman and Van Dam (2011). There have been some attempts to use
more objective measures, such as the accuracy of breath counting (Levinson et al., 2014),
but these methods have not been widely adopted. The traditional mindfulness scales,
flaws and all, are for now the standard tool used in research (e.g., Grossman & Van Dam
counted no less than 350 papers looking into the three most-often used scales published
between 2004 and 2009).
14. Kabat-Zinn (2011).
15. Zen is a form of Buddhism practiced in Japan, Korea, China, and Vietnam;
Theravāda is a form of Buddhism practiced in Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Myanmar, and
Sri Lanka.
16. See the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta and Ānāpānasati Sutta. I grossly oversimplify these
instructions here, of course.
17. A good quick overview can be found in Lutz et al. (2008). Guided audio medita-
tions can be useful if you are new to this. Many links for different styles of meditation can
be found at https://contemplativemind.wordpress.com/how-to-meditate-links-for-g uided-
meditation-practice/.
18. Some would argue that the body scan also has an open monitoring quality to it.
19. A nice, 10-m inute guided body scan meditation can be found at https://w ww.you-
tube.com/watch?v=zsCVqFr6j1g.
20. Buddhists will often include all “sentient beings” in that circle. It is not a bad idea
to include your pets in this type of meditation.
21. A good introduction can be found in Fischer (2013) or Trungpa (2010).
22. Ozawa-de Silva and Dodson-Lavelle (2011).
23. As described in his books; see also Santorelli (2014).
24. Segal et al. (2002). Williams also co-wrote a self-g uided mindfulness-training book
(Williams & Penman, 2011) that uses many of the same ideas.
25. Linehan (1993).
26. Hayes et al. (1999). Note that although ACT is often included in lists of mindfulness-
based interventions (e.g., Chiesa & Malinowski, 2011), Hayes himself does not acknowl-
edge the similarity.
177
Notes 177
27. https://w ww.resource-project.org/en/home.html.

28. http://ccare.stanford.edu/education/about-compassion-cultivation-training-cct/.
29. Goyal et al. (2014).
30. Web of Science search on the topic of “mindfulness” (August 2015).
31. http://w ww.tricycle.com/blog/meditation-nation.
32. Inevitably, the pendulum has started to swing, and The New York Times (http://op-
talk.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/06/30/the-m indfulness-backlash/) and The Huffington Post
(http://w ww.huffingtonpost.com/2015/03/16/m indfulness-backlash_n_6800924.html) have
now discovered a mindfulness backlash—doubts about the strength of the evidence and
the discovery of a possible dark side—see the end of Chapter 6—as well as criticism from
a small host of Buddhist scholars and teachers.
33. http://w ww.dalailama.com/messages/transcripts/10-questions-time-magazine.
34. In this book, I use positive effect sizes to indicate that things are looking up for
meditators. So an effect of 1 SD on stress would mean that meditating makes you less
stressed; an effect size of –1 SD would mean it stresses you out more.
35. Cohen (1988).
36. Sanmuganathan et al. (2001).
37. Lipsey and Wilson (1993).
38. Although I would assume that few meditators are likely to be in the bird-killing
business.
39. In all meta-analyses, studies were weighted for sample size.
40. Kabat-Zinn (2011, p. 288).
Chapter 2
1. Jevning et al. (1992).
2. This book isn’t meant as a manual on mediation and the different traditions. A good
overview can be found, for instance, in Goleman (1996).
3. Beary et al. (1974), Tang et al. (2009). Note that different practices have different
emphases, so this does not happen in all mediation systems (e.g., nonreferential compas-
sion mediation, as we will see in Chapter 3, is invigorating rather than relaxing), nor does
it necessarily happen to all meditators, even in traditions that emphasize this type of quiet-
ing of body and mind.
4. Fenwick et al. (1977).
5. Lazar et al. (2005).
6. Cysarz and Büssing (2005).
7. Berntson et al. (1993)
8. Chang and Lo (2013).
9. Wu and Lo (2008).
10. Jevning et al. (1992).
11. Kornfield (1979).
12. Pagano et al. (1976), Younger et al. (1975).
13. Gallois (1984).
14. Travis and Wallace (1997).
15. Wolkove et al. (1984).
16. Gallois (1984).
17. Gallois (1984).
178
178Notes
18. www.tm.org/inner-peace; Badawi et al. (1984), Farrow and Hebert (1982), Travis
and Wallace (1997).
19. Badawi et al. (1984).
20. As far as I know, there are two studies on this: Lehrer et al. (1999) and Phongsuphap
et al. (2008).
21. Jovanov (2005), Kitney and Rompelman (1980).
22. David-Néel (1929).
23. Benson et al. (1982, 1990).
24. Kozhevnikov et al. (2013).
25. “Fired” is neuro-speak for transmitted a signal, that is, “worked.”
26. Higher amplitude means that brainwaves get more prominent.
27. For an excellent overview on this work, see Cahn and Polich (2006).
28. The term and method (at least in its current usage) was pioneered by Varela (1996).
29. Broks (2003).
30. It is not quite, then, like getting your head checked by a jumbo jet, but it is close.
31. Uttal (2001).
32. Kanwisher et al. (1997), Sergent et al. (1992).
33. Laird et al. (2011), Smith et al. (2009).
34. Raichle et al. (2001).
35. Bar et al. (2007).
36. Buckner et al. (2008).
37. Andrews-Hanna et al. (2010).
38. Originally discovered by Seeley et al. (2007); see Bressler and Menon (2010) for an
overview.
39. Corbetta et al. (2008).
40. Hasenkamp et al. (2012).
41. For instance, Braboszcz et al. (2010), Cahn and Polich (2006), Chiesa and Serretti
(2010), Deshmukh (2006), Fox et al. (2014), Jerath et al. (2012), Newberg (2014), Ott et al.
(2011), Sperduti et al. (2012), Tang et al. (2012), Tomasino et al. (2012), Vago and Silbersweig
(2012).
42. Tomasino et al. (2013).
43. Sperduti et al. (2012).
44. As this book is going to press, a third meta-analysis, by Fox and colleagues (2016)
has been published, covering mostly the same territory as the Tomasino analyses but add-
ing new studies, primarily in open monitoring and loving-kindness. Tomasino’s map pri-
marily highlights focus-attention and mantra-recitation studies.
45. Laird et al. (2005).
46. This is, I would argue, one of the deeper mysteries of the psyche: Why, when we
instruct our mind so politely to stay focused, does it simply refuse to comply? It isn’t as if
it goes on to dwell on matters of great concern—in my morning meditation, I often catch
myself wondering about what to wear to work, and I wear a black blazer, a black t-shirt,
and black jeans just about 98% of the time.
47. This number of hours is self-reported by the participants and is thus an estimate,
of course.
48. Note that Tomasino does not explicitly categorize her results in this way. Her inter-
est lies in identifying a meditation network (actually, one for meditation in general, one for
179
Notes 179
focus-attention meditation, and one for mantra meditation). At this point in this book, it
makes sense to me to relate the regions she identified in those networks to broader known
brain networks, such as the networks I described earlier—just to see what is there. Hölzel
et al. (2012) offer the same categorization as I use here, with the addition of emotion regu-
lation; another overview paper on the neuroscience of meditation (Tang et al., 2015) sees
an impact of meditation on attention control, self-awareness, and emotion regulation.
I see little evidence for emotion regulation in Tomasino’s map. Note that this is to be
expected: This map deals with activations during mediation in very experienced medita-
tors (who might have very little negative emotion to regulate during their session in the
scanner). There is, however, evidence for emotion regulation in studies that have looked at
structural changes in the brain, as we shall see.
49. Spreng et al. (2013).
50. Esslen et al. (2008).
51. Kircher et al. (2002), Kjaer et al. (2002).
52. Esslen et al. (2008), Northoff et al. (2006), van der Meer et al. (2010).
53. Kim and Johnson (2014).
54. Fossati et al. (2003).
55. Phan et al. (2003).
56. For example, Alidina and Marshall (2013), Salzberg (2010).
57. Lou et al. (1999).
58. Blanke et al. (2005).
59. Penfield and Erickson (1941).
61. Kornfield doesn’t mention how many.
62. Salardini et al. (2012).
63. Haggard and Whitford (2004).
Chapter 3
1. Bærentsen et al. (2010).
2. Hasenkamp et al. (2012).
3. Brewer et al. (2011), Froeliger et al. (2012), Josipovic et al. (2012).
4. This may be taking us too far, but in case you were wondering why the coupling is
positive: If you look at this at short time scales, the coupling is negative (default-attention-
default-attention). Over the long run, however, the coupling is positive: Each time you get
distracted, attention kicks in.
5. Garrison et al. (2013).
6. Note that Garrison did not use the resting state as the baseline task. Rather, in her
baseline task, participants were shown a list of adjectives and were asked to think about
and decide whether the words described them. This task is known to activate the crucial
brain region of interest in this study, the posterior cingulate cortex; this was done to pro-
vide a more comparable baseline between meditators and nonmeditators—as we will see,
meditators often show more meditation-like activation during resting states.
7. The PCC isn’t on Tomasino’s map, but it is intimately linked to the precuneus,
which is.
8. All these examples are direct quotations from Garrison (2013) et al.
180
180Notes
9. Wang et al. (2011).

10. Craig (2005).
12. Lutz et al. (2008).
13. Manna et al. (2010).
14. Brewer et al. (2011).
15. For contemporary accounts, see Brahm (2006), Brasington (2015), Catherine (2008),
or Shankman (2008, 2015).
16. Hagerty et al. (2013).
17. Berkovich-Ohana et al. (2013).
18. Note that this study was not done inside an MRI scanner but a MEG scanner,
which measures the magnetic fields produced by the electrical activity of the brain. The
researchers found that all interesting effects occurred in brainwaves of very low frequen-
cies, 4 to 7 Hz, so-called theta waves. Theta waves are often found in sleepy, drowsy, or
meditative states but not during deep sleep. It isn’t clear what causes these theta waves or
what their significance is. Some have argued that theta indicates relaxed attention turned
inward.
19. An alternative story, suggested by one of the reviewers, is that the temporal parietal
junction is associated with agency, empathy, perspective-taking in social situations, as
well as reorienting attention (Decety & Lamm, 2007). This would then mean that time-
lessness and spacelesness can also be described as a relinquishing of agency, increasing
distance from the social world, and a tendency for attention to stay where it is.
20. Note that, in Buddhist circles, it is somewhat taboo to discuss your meditation
experiences outside the teacher–student relationship, so meditators rarely hear about oth-
ers’ intimate experiences during meditation.
21. Lindahl et al. (2014).
22. For instance in the 5th-century meditation manual The Path of Purification by
Buddhaghosa.
23. Gyatso (2004).
24. For instance, Sayadaw (1994).
25. Austin (1999).
26. Brahm (2006), Catherine (2008).
27. Namdak (2006).
28. Mason and Brady (2009). One popular-science account of this study in the mag-
azine Wired was titled: “Out of LSD? Just 15 Minutes of Sensory Deprivation Triggers
Hallucinations.” Note that, in this study, a few of the participants did experience quite
a bit of paranoia, like sensing an evil presence in the room—bad trips are apparently
another possibility that LSD and perceptual isolation have in common.
29. Lloyd et al. (2012).
30. Boroojerdi et al. (2001).
31. ffythe et al. (1998).
32. Lo et al. (2003).
33. Lloyd et al. (2012).
34. For example, Brahm (2006).
35. Anand et al. (1961), Banquet and Sailhan (1974), Barwood et al. (1978), Becker and
Shapiro (1980), Cahn et al. (2013), Fenwick et al. (1977), Hiray (1974), Kasamatsu and Hirai
181
Notes 181
(1966), Kumar et al. (2010), McEvoy et al. (1980), Orme-Johnson (1973), Telles and Naveen
(2004), Telles et al. (1994), Younger et al. (1975).
36. Levenson et al. (2012).
37. Gard et al. (2012), Grant and Rainville (2009), Kakigi et al. (2005), Lutz et al. (2013),
Perlman et al. (2010), Zeidan et al. (2010), Zeidan et al. (2011). A detailed overview can be
found in Grant (2014).
38. Other studies, outside the meditation sphere, have shown that slow breathing can
decrease both feelings of pain intensity and pain unpleasantness (e.g., Zautra et al., 2010).
39. Grant and Rainville (2009).
40. Zeidan et al. (2010).
41. Kakigi et al. (2005).
42. Lutz et al. (2012, p. 539).
43. Lutz et al. (2012), Zeidan et al. (2011).
44. A great introduction can be found in Gallagher (2000); more extensive accounts are
given in Damasio (2010), Dennett (1991), and Metzinger (2004).
45. For instance, Gazzaniga (1998).
46. Appropriately (or inappropriately) named Dogen, by the way.
47. Farb et al. (2007).
48. For a similar result with an eight-week MBSR program, see Kerr et al. (2011).
49. Esslen et al. (2008), Walla et al. (2007).
50. Dor-Ziderman et al. (2013).
51. Wiebking et al. (2011).
53. MEG measures the magnetic fields inside the brain. These magnetic fields originate
from the electrical currents in the brain.
54. Lutz et al. (2007, p. 539).
55. Persinger (1983). His “God spot” is located in the temporal lobes.
56. Lutz et al. (2008, 2009).
57. In this meditation, they were trying to attain a state of ‘pure compassion’ or ‘non-
referential compassion’—a feeling of altruistic love and compassion towards all beings.
58. For instance, Goldstein (2013).
59. Engström and Söderfeldt (2010).
60. Lee et al. (2012).
61. Brewer et al. (2011).
62. Liddell et al. (2005).
63. Garrison et al. (2014).
64. Fan et al. (2011).
65. Manna et al. (2010).
66. Baron Short et al. (2010).
67. Brefczynski-Lewis et al. (2007).
68. Hasenkamp and Barsalou (2012).
69. For instance, Omata et al. (2013).
70. For instance, Nakao et al. (2003), Nestoriuc and Martin (2007), Nestoriuc et al.
(2008).
71. Cahn et al. (2010).
182
182Notes
Chapter 4
1. Maguire et al. (2000).
2. Draganski et al. (2004).
3. Hutton et al. (2009), Testa et al. (2004).
4. Fox et al. (2014).
5. Fox et al. (2014).
6. There are a few studies that simply mention that “some” of the participants have
been included elsewhere, so the exact number is unknown.
7. This is the group of longitudinal studies.
8. This is officially called the “file drawer” problem—many researchers have unpub-
lished data sets, simply because they don’t think there’s anything interesting there.
9. There can be a host of other reasons why reviewers reject a paper—the methodology
may be unsound, they might not think you answered your research question well, or—as
authors like to think—the reviewer woke up in a particularly evil mood that day.
10. Vestergaard-Poulsen et al. (2009).
11. Leung et al. (2013).
12. In neuroscience circles, this effect is often called “what fires together, wires
together.”
13. Burgess et al. (2007), Koechlin (2011).
14. One reason why it might not show up on Tomasino’s map is that activation in this
region is harder to measure with fMRI, due to signal dropout in this area.
15. Schoenbaum and Esber (2010).
16. Goldin et al. (2008), Ochsner et al. (2004).
17. Fox et al. (2014), Luders et al. (2009).
18. Brefczynski-Lewis et al. (2007), Goldin and Gross (2010), Lou et al. (1999), Pagnoni
et al. (2008).
19. Austin (2009).
20. Hölzel et al. (2011b) make largely the same points.
21. For an overview on this topic, see Davidson et al. (2002).
22. Luders et al. (2013).
23. Herman and Mueller (2006), McNaughton (2006), O’Mara (2005).
24. Conrad (2008).
25. Lazar et al. (2005), Pagnoni and Cekic (2007). A nice review can be found in Luders
(2014).
26. Makris et al. (2005).
27. Luders et al. (2011).
28. Their measure was fractional anisotropy.
29. Note that not all studies that could report a correlation do so. This could mean
anything—researchers didn’t do the analysis, or they did but did not find a relationship
and didn’t find this noteworthy enough to report, or they did find a relationship but for
some reason left this out of their paper.
30. Fox et al. (2014) summarize these results in their Table 6. Unfortunately, they only
tabulate significant results and do not mention studies that report that a particular region
is not associated with morphology. I added those studies back into the mix.
31. Farb et al. (2013), Hölzel et al. (2010), Hölzel et al. (2011a)—the latter two report data
from the same study.
183
Notes 183
32. Tang et al. (2010), Tang et al. (2012). The latter reports results halfway through train-
ing, that is, after a mere five hours of meditation experience.
33. For instance, Chaddock-Heyman et al. (2013), Olesen et al. (2003).
34. Grant et al. (2010).
35. The investigators looked at these brain regions specifically, because these are gener-
ally associated with pain perception and pain sensitivity.
36. Singleton et al. (2014).
37. The pontine tegmentum, locus coeruleus, nucleus raphe pontis, and the sensory tri-
geminal nucleus. Note that Hölzel et al. (2011a) found changes in some of the same regions.
38. More specifically, on scales that measured self-acceptance, environmental mastery,
autonomy, a sense of purpose in life, and personal growth.
39. Hölzel et al. (2010).
40. Tang et al. (2012).
41. Cole et al. (2012), Kieseppä et al. (2010).
Chapter 5
1. Kabat-Zinn (1994, p. 4).
2. Or whatever the basic attention practice in your given mindfulness tradition is.
3. Sedlmeier et al. (2012).
4. Ebert and Sedlmeier (2012).
5. Hasenkamp et al. (2012); for a similar model, see Malinowksi (2013).
6. This is often also called “selective” attention—focusing on a single thing at a time.
7. Allen et al. (2012), Anderson et al. (2007), Chan and Woollacott (2007), Jensen
et al. (2012), Kozasa et al. (2012), Lykins and Baer (2009), Moore et al. (2012), Moore and
Malinowksi (2012), and Teper and Inzlicht (2013). I excluded one study (Wenk-Sormaz,
2005), because it used a short-lived intervention: Nonmeditators were meditating on the
breath for 20 minutes right before doing the Stroop task.
8. Teper and Inzlicht (2013) and Chan and Woollacott (2010), respectively.
9. Allen et al. (2012), Heeren et al. (2009), Jensen et al (2011), Jha et al. (2007; this study
compares two types of meditation interventions with a control group), Sahdra et al. (2011).
10. Allen et al. (2012).
11. Olivers and Nieuwenhuis (2005, 2006).
12. Slagter et al. (2007), van Leeuwen et al. (2009), van Vugt and Slagter (2014).
13. Van Vugt and Slagter (2014).
14. Hodgins and Adair (2010).
15. Van den Hurk et al. (2010).
16. Teper and Inzlicht (2013).
17. van Leeuwen et al. (2012).
18. A millisecond is 1/1000 of a second.
19. P1 and N1, for the ERP aficionados among you.
20. The same researchers also looked at six focused-attention meditators (with, on
average, three years of meditation experience) before and after an intensive four-day open-
monitoring retreat. They found that the meditators were faster for the smaller digits before
the retreat (the researchers ascribed this to their focused-attention habits, which favor a
narrow “aperture”); after the retreat, they were balanced in their response times. This
184
184Notes
suggests that the open-m inded outlook on life (at least life as it plays on the computer
screen) can be trained relatively quickly and that the type of meditation one engages in
might matter—open-monitoring experience leads to more open awareness. This is a very
small-scale study, however, and I therefore hesitate to include this in the main text (which
is why you are reading about this in this endnote).
21. Valentine and Sweet (1999).
22. Jensen et al. (2011).
23. MacLean et al. (2010).
24. Anderson et al. (2007), Banks et al. (2015), Jha et al. (2015), MacLean et al. (2010),
Morrison et al. (2014), Mrazek et al. (2013), Sahdra et al. (2011).
25. Carter et al. (2005). I did not include this study in the previous group of seven stud-
ies because its methods and subject sample are atypical.
26. I suggest you get out your own pair of red/green 3D glasses. Then Google this phe-
nomenon for a few examples. Be prepared to be amazed.
27. Alterations were self-reported. We’ll assume here that monks don’t lie.
28. Again, please Google for examples.
29. Again, assuming that monks do not lie in their self-reports.
30. Jensen et al. (2011).
31. Daubenmier et al. (2013).
32. Khalsa et al. (2008), Melloni et al. (2013).
33. Fox et al. (2012), Mirams et al. (2013).
34. The authors used discrimination thresholds, areas devoted to the body region in the
primary sensorimotor cortex, and a combination of these two as their objective measures
of sensitivity.
35. Naranjo and Schmidt (2012).
36. Bornemann et al. (2014).
37. Sze et al. (2010).
38. Given that two studies suggest that meditators aren’t better at detecting heart rate,
it may be possible that they picked up on their embodied emotions through some other
route. As we have seen in Chapter 2, the arousal system has a broad range of symptoms,
including—besides a heart beating faster—shallower breathing, excessive sweating, and
the like.
39. This work focuses on women, because this particular issue is a more common prob-
lem for women than for men, possibly because the physiological signals for sexual arousal
in males—particularly, erections—are less ambiguous.
40. Dove and Wiederman (2000).
41. Brotto and Basson (2014), Brotto and Heiman (2007), Brotto et al. (2008, 2012a,
2012b, 2013, 2014, 2015); one additional study is Silverstein et al. (2011).
42. Brotto et al. (2012b).
43. Both reported in Hucker and McCabe (2014).
44. Brotto et al. (2008).
45. Silverstein et al. (2011).
46. For instance, Glicksohn (2001).
47. My new trick is to set an actual timer. Even though I have done this now dozens of
times, I am often still surprised when it rings—showing that time passes by more quickly
than I was anticipating.
185
Notes 185
48. Woodrow (1951, p. 1231).

49. Either by having people compare the length of two time durations or by having
them recreate the time duration of a beep. This is all on relatively short time scales—from
half a second to half a minute.
50. Berkovich-Ohana et al. (2011).
51. Wittmann et al. (2015).
52. Kramer et al. (2013).
53. Droit-Volet et al. (2015).
54. Sucala and David (2013).
55. Wittman et al. (2015).
56. Banks et al. (2015), Chambers et al. (2008), Jha et al. (2010), Morrison et al. (2013),
Mrazek et al. (2013).
57. Heeren et al. (2009), Zeidan et al. (2010).
58. Mrazek et al. (2013).
59. I suspect this is for two reasons: (a) There aren’t a lot of studies out there yet, and
(b) the few studies on the topic all use different measures.
60. Mitchell et al. (2015).
61. The studies were Bögels et al. (2008), Carboni et al. (2013), Fleming et al. (2015),
Haydicky et al. (2012), Haydicky et al. (2015), Hepark et al. (2014), Hirvikoski et al. (2011),
Mitchell et al. (2008), Mitchell et al. (2013), Pettersson et al. (2014), Philipsen et al. (2007),
Schoenberg et al. (2014), Singh et al. (2010), van de Weijer-Bergsma et al. (2012), van der
Oord et al. (2012), and Zylowska et al. (2008).
62. Bögels and Restifo (2014).
63. Mitchell et al. (2015).
64. Schoenberg et al. (2014).
65. Bögels et al. (2008), van de Weijer-Bergsma et al. (2012), van der Oord et al. (2012).
66. Fleming et al. (2015), Petterson et al. (2014), Zylowska et al. (2008).
67. Because the studies on nonjudgmental alerting used such diverse methods and mea-
sures, I did not dare throw them all in a single meta-analysis.
68. For instance, Chiesa et al. (2011).
Chapter 6
1. Clarke et al. (2015, p. 14).
2. Emphasis added.
3. Sears et al. (2011).
4. Effects on attention were, of course, covered in the previous chapter.
5. That’s why I ask our seven-year old to deliver me my dad report card from time to
time—he has a direct and much more objective outlook on my socioemotional failings as
a parent than I do. He also has a keen interest in seeing them remedied.
6. There are many types of relaxation therapy. The two most popular ones are auto-
genic relaxation (where you learn to couple restful visual imagery with an awareness of
its calming effects on the body; e.g., you could imagine a peaceful setting, like a beach,
and focus on deliberate, slow, relaxed breathing, or on relaxing your limbs one by one) or
progressive muscle relaxation (where you learn to slowly tense and then relax particular
muscle groups one by one).
186
186Notes
7. A key element here is that the participants shouldn’t suspect that they are part of a
placebo intervention, which isn’t always easy to pull off.
8. Kirsch et al. (2008), Rief et al. (2009).
9. Malarkey et al. (2013); this was, however, a clinical study so is not covered in this
chapter but in the next.
10. Chiesa and Serretti (2009).
11. Sharma and Rush (2014).
12. Aikens et al. (2014), Amutio et al. (2015), Banks et al. (2015), Gallego et al. (2014),
Kemper et al. (2015), O’Leary and Dockray (2015), Pace et al. (2009), Phang et al. (2015),
Song and Lindquist (2015), Sood et al. (2014), Taylor et al. (2014), Van Gordon et al. (2014).
13. Geary and Rosenthal (2011), Phang et al. (2015), Shapiro et al. (2011).
14. Pace et al. (2009)
15. Flook et al. (2013), Nyklíček et al. (2013), Pace et al. (2009). There are also a few stud-
ies looking at clinical groups; the one review on this topic (O’Leary et al., 2015) finds the
evidence inconclusive and notes that controlled studies show no effect.
16. Davidson et al. (2003).
17. Alternatively, an immune-system boost might lead to increased happiness.
18. Creswell et al. (2009), Robinson et al. (2003).
19. Witek-Janusek et al. (2008).
20. Jacobs et al. (2011).
21. Goyal et al. (2014), Winbush et al. (2007).
22. Britton et al. (2010), Ferrarelli et al. (2013), Kaul et al. (2010), Pattanashetty et al.
(2010). As usual, I did not include studies on meditation or meditation-related practices
that do not focus on mindfulness, such as Transcendental Meditation®, which is based on
the internal repetition of a mantra, or forms of yoga.
23. All these numbers are averaged over the three studies that provided them (the four
listed in the previous note minus Kaul et al., 2010). Note that the findings aren’t necessarily
consistent between studies. For instance, Britton et al. (2010) find less slow-wave sleep in
their meditators.
24. Britton et al. (2014).
25. Sedlmeier et al. (2012).
26. I also relied on Sedlmeier et al.’s (2012) calculations for the effect sizes of individual
studies. They use the correlation coefficient as their metric of effect size; I transformed
these to the metric I have been using throughout this book, the mean standardized dif-
ference, so that the numbers I report here are directly comparable to the other effect sizes
reported in this book.
27. To make matters even more complicated, Eberth and Sedlmeier (2012) also pub-
lished a separate meta-analysis on mindfulness meditation alone, that is, almost the same
subset of the Sedlmeier et al. (2012) studies as the one I used here. Their analysis, however,
also excludes active control groups, which I felt should be part of the picture.
28. Thirty-nine studies in Eberth and Sedlmeier (2012).
29. For example, Ryff (1989).
30. MacKenzie et al. (2006), Morone et al. (2008), Nyklíček and Kuipers (2008), Ortner
et al. (2007), Sauer et al. (2011b).
31. Chang et al. (2004), Kirsch and Henry (1979), Lin et al. (2008), Shapiro et al. (1998,
2007), Tacon et al. (2003).
187
Notes 187
32. Anderson et al. (2007), Astin (1997), Chambers et al. (2005), Chang et al. (2003),
Greene and Hiebert (1988), Lynch et al. (2011), Sauer et al. (2011), Sears and Kraus (2009),
Shapiro et al. (1998, 2007).
33. Lin et al. (2008).
34. Anderson et al. (2007), Chambers et al. (2008), Lynch et al. (2011), Oken et al. (2010),
Sauer et al. (2011b), Shapiro et al. (1998).
35. Anderson et al. (2007), Nyklíček and Kuipers (2008), Ortner et al. (2007), Sears and
Kraus (2009), Shapiro et al. (2007), Sze et al. (2010).
36. Carson et al. (2004), Chu (2010), MacKenzie et al. (2006), Oken et al. (2010), Oman
et al. (2007), Ortner et al. (2007), Sauer et al. (2011a), Sears and Kraus (2009), Walach et al.
(2007).
37. Mor and Winquist (2002).
38. Kuehner and Weber (1999), Nolen-Hoeksema. (2000).
39. Spasojeviç and Alloy (2001).
40. Remember that I use positive effect sizes to show “positive” effects, in the sense of
effects that would be good to experience, so a positive effect on rumination means that
people ruminate less.
41. Astin (1997), de Grâce (1976), Jain et al. (2007).
42. Capacity for status is a combination of ambition and self-assurance—the kind of
cockiness that is rewarded with status in our society. Maybe Sedlmeier is showing his
ideological cards a bit by calling this a negative trait.
43. There is only a single study that I am aware of (van den Hurk et al., 2011) that com-
pares a more complete personality profile of meditators and nonmeditators; this study
uses the NEO inventory. Within the group of meditators, those who had been practicing
longer were more open to experience, more extraverted, less neurotic, and less conscien-
tious (no difference in agreeableness). The sample size is small here (35 in each group), and
because it is the only study of its kind, I found it more prudent to mention it in this footnote
rather than in the main text.
44. Ortner et al. (2007), Sze et al. (2010), Tacon et al. (2003), van den Hurk (2011).
45. I treat trait mindfulness here as a one-dimensional concept. Some scales attempt
to measure more than one facet of mindfulness, particularly the Five Facet Mindfulness
Questionnaire, which has the five facets of observing, describing, acting with awareness,
nonjudgment, and nonreactivity. In the case of multi-facet scales, I used the total score
on those different subscales. I do this partially to make a complicated story somewhat
more digestible, partially because some researchers (e.g., Aguado et al. 2005; Tran et al.,
2013) have found that one or two dimensions do suffice to explain mindfulness, at least in
meditators.
46. Carson et al. (2004), Chambers et al. (2008), Grant and Rainville (2009), Hölzel et al.
(2011a), Jensen et al. (2011), Klatt et al. (2009), Lynch et al. (2011), Moore and Malinowski
(2013), Nyklíček and Kuipers (2008), Oken et al. (2010), Ortner et al. (2007), Sauer et al.
(2011a), Sauer et al. (2011b), Shapiro et al. (2007), Shapiro et al. (2008), Sze et al. (2010).
47. Kiken et al. (2015).
48. Measured with the Toronto Mindfulness Scale. Sample questions: “I noticed subtle
changes in my mood,” “I was open to taking notice of anything that might come up.”
49. Alexander et al. (1989), Astin (1997), de Grâce (1976), Kirsch and Henry (1979),
Oken et al. (2010), Ortner et al. (2007), Shapiro et al. (2007).
188
188Notes
50. Chu (2010).

51. Carson et al. (2004). Note that, in the spirit of this research, the two main authors of
this study appear to be married to each other.
52. Lesh (1970), Shapiro et al. (1998).
53. Batson et al. (1987), Eisenberg et al. (1989). One meditation study (Klimecki et al.,
2013a) found that empathy training increased negative affect when participants were
shown videos of human suffering.
54. I apologize to fellow baby-boomers for the bad late 1970s hair-rock flashback.
55. Keltner and Goetz (2007).
56. Used in McCall et al. (2014) and Weng et al. (2013).
57. Fredrickson et al. (2008), Jazaieri et al. (2013), Neff and Germer (2013), Weng et al.
(2013).
58. There are also studies that have concluded that compassion training has positive
aspects on other aspects of well-being such as responses to emotional stimuli (Desbordes
et al., 2012), affect (Klimecki et al., 2013a, 2013b), prosocial behavior (i.e., behavior explic-
itly meant to benefit another; Leiberg et al., 2011), and empathy (Mascaro et al., 2013a).
Compassion training also reverses the empathic distress that can result from empathy
training (Klimecki et al., 2013b).
59. McCall et al. (2014).
60. https://w ww.resource-project.org.
61. McCall et al. (2014).
62. Lipsey and Wilson (1993). The effects here are all comparisons between interven-
tions and their control groups. Listing all 156 would take this too far, but it includes mul-
tiple forms of psychotherapy, behavioral therapy, counseling, biofeedback, organizational
interventions, interventions to improve education and instruction, remedial language pro-
grams, and so on.
63. It is also the question for policymakers to ask: What is the most time-or cost-
efficient way to achieve a given desired result?
64. Jain et al. (2007).
65. Kirsch and Henry (1979).
66. Visted et al. (2015).
67. Phang et al. (2015), Shapiro et al. (2008), Snippe et al. (2015), Vieten and Astin (2008),
Wallmark et al. (2013).
68. Weighted for sample size.
69. de Vibe et al. (2013), Krusche et al. (2013), Phang et al. (2015), Shapiro et al. (2007),
Shapiro et al. (2008), Vieten and Astin (2008), Wallmark et al. (2012).
70. Weighted for sample size.
71. Shapiro et al. (2008).
72. A few can be found in Baer (2003), Brown et al. (2007), Chiesa et al. (2013), Creswell
and Lindsay (2014), Grabovac et al. (2011), Hölzel et al. (2011b), Segal et al. (2013), Shapiro
et al. (2006), and Vago and Silbersweig (2012).
73. Bao et al. (2015), Birnie et al. (2010), Black et al. (2011), Coffey et al. (2010), de Vibe
et al. (2015), Evans and Segerstrom (2011), Garland et al. (2015), Gauthier et al. (2015),
Gregorio and Pinto-Gouveia (2013), Haver et al. (2015), Moore and Malinowksi (2009),
Ortner et al. (2007), Prakash et al. (2015), Robinson et al. (2012), Ruocco and Direkoglu
(2013), Sauer et al. (2011a), Tipsord (2009); some papers contained more than one study.
189
Notes 189
74. Correlations averaged across studies, weighted for sample size. To make it easier to
interpret these correlations, I use positive correlations for an effect in the expected direc-
tion. So a positive correlation between mindfulness and depressed mood means that more
mindful people feel less depressed (i.e., better); a positive correlation with negative affect
means that mindful people are in a better mood than less mindful people.
75. Daubenmier et al. (2014).
76. Hou et al. (2015).
77. Amutio et al. (2015), Anderson et al. (2007), Bao et al. (2015), Birnie et al. (2010),
Chambers et al. (2005), Flook et al. (2013), Jain et al. (2007), Jensen et al. (2011), Lynch
et al. (2011), Nyklíček and Kuipers (2008), Ortner et al. (2007), Teper and Inzlicht (2013),
Wallmark et al. (2012).
78. Caveat: This is a very small number of studies, and for my conclusions to be valid,
I need to make the assumption that researchers who didn’t report these change correla-
tions did so because they simply weren’t thinking of doing this analysis, rather than not
reporting the results because they found no effect.
79. To make it easier to interpret correlations, I use positive correlations for an effect
in the expected direction. So a positive correlation between change in mindfulness and
change in depressed mood means that people feel less depressed (i.e., better) with increases
in mindfulness; a positive correlation with negative affect means that negative affect goes
down (i.e., people are now in a better mood).
80. Average correlation, weighted for sample size.
81. Vøllestad et al. (2011). Note that this was a clinical sample of patients with anxiety
disorder.
82. Baer et al. (2012).
83. Snippe et al. (2015).
84. Visted et al. (2014).
85. Zenner et al. (2014).
86. See Chapter 4 for an explanation on publication bias.
87. Effect included all outcome measures.
88. Shiba et al. (2015).
89. Shiba et al. (2015) do not provide any detail on the types of jobs these individuals
held. All were employed, most had a college degree, and median household income was
around $50,000 to $70,000.
90. I can recommend the movie documentary Dhamma Brothers to those interested in
this aspect of mindfulness training.
91. Shonin et al. (2013).
92. The number of studies per outcome is too small to make a meta-analysis feasible.
93. de Vibe et al. (2015).
94. Mascaro et al. (2013b).
95. In this case, the anterior insula.
Chapter 7
1. For instance, Chiesa and Serretti (2010, 2011), Fjorback et al. (2011), Goyal et al.
(2014), Grossman et al. (2004), Khoury et al. (2013a, 2013b), Klainin-Yobas et al. (2012),
Piet and Hougaard (2011), Vøllestad et al. (2012).
190
190Notes
2. Goyal et al. (2014).

3. In another meta-analysis, by Khoury and colleagues (2013a), which focused on
mindfulness and did not exclude studies without a control group, 2,876 papers were
retrieved; 31% of these were conceptual papers or reviews of other studies. It seems, then,
that writers on mindfulness almost like to discuss meditation more than they are willing
to actually study it. (And here I am, doing the same.)
4. To summarize the mantra meditation results (this included Transcendental
Meditation® studies): Mantra meditation did not lead to significant effects on any of the
mental health outcomes for either nonspecific or specific active control trials.
5. Meta-analysis by Fournier et al. (2010).
6. List of side effects of selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors and Xanax retrieved
from webmd.com.
7. We will, however, consider some evidence for adverse effects of meditation later in
this chapter.
8. Chiesa and Serretti (2011).
9. Ledesma and Kumano (2009).
10. Veehof et al. (2011).
11. Khoury et al. (2013b).
12. Piet and Hougaard (2011).
13. Khoury et al. (2013a).
14. Hofmann et al. (2010).
15. Santorelli (2014).
17. Carmody and Baer (2009).
18. Vettese et al. (2009).
19. I assumed that the correlation in studies not showing a dose–response relationship
was zero.
20. Gu et al. (2015), van der Velden et al. (2015).
22. Hofmann et al. (2010).
24. Supportive therapy is therapy in which the therapist acts as an emotional outlet,
giving the patient the chance to express herself; it involves comforting, advising, encourag-
ing, and active, empathic listening.
25. https://nccih.nih.gov/health/providers/digest/meditation-science.
26. This is not in the published paper—perhaps it was not deemed newsworthy—but it
was reported in their long-form (439 pages!) report to the National Institute of Health; see
http://w ww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK180102/pdf/Bookshelf_NBK180102.pdf.
27. Kuijpers et al. (2007), Shapiro (1992), Yorston (2001).
28. Manocha (2000), Perez-de-Albeniz and Holmes (2000).
29. http://w ww.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2014/06/the-d ark-k night-of-the-soul/
372766/.
30. During her talk on this topic at the 2014 International Symposium for Contemplative
Studies in Boston, Britton described these symptoms and asked the audience (by hand-
raising) whether they thought this was part of the normal progress of meditation or
something problematic. The large majority of the audience went for the first option. (Full
191
Notes 191
disclosure: I went for the second option, because anything that impairs you for months on
end doesn’t seem particularly liberating to me.)
31. Kerr et al. (2011).
32. Farias and Wikholm (2015).
Chapter 8
1. The dotted line covers only studies with healthy adults and placebo-controlled clini-
cal samples, because it makes no sense to extend it to studies that directly compare mind-
fulness effects to those of standard treatment—the dotted line is the standard treatment.
2. With this caveat that there is variability in the results: some people become much
better versions of themselves, others maybe less so, some do not change, and some might
even become less happy.
3. For physiological effects of exercise, see http://w ww.cdc.gov/physicalactivity/basics/
pa-health/; for effects on cognition, see Chang et al. (2012), Colcombe and Kramer (2003),
Sibley and Etnier (2003).
4. Sixteen, not 17, because cortisol showed no effect.
5. There is one notable possible exception, and that is the effect on emotional stabil-
ity, which goes in the opposite direction: Intervention studies show larger (and significant)
effects compared to all studies. This suggests either that long-term meditators always were
more neurotic than nonmeditators or that long-term meditation turned them more neu-
rotic. The number of studies here is, however, small (two for interventions, two for existing
differences), so we should be cautious about either conclusion.
6. The study used regression analysis, and so no correlations were reported.
7. For instance, Purser (2014) or Purser and Loy (2013).
8. Note that this is not a standard instruction for mindfulness meditation. It’s also not
necessarily the case that relaxation would be desirable at all times. Just try it out and see
if it works for you.
9. All of these examples are from Williams and Penman (2011).
192
193
{ BIBLIOGRAPHY }
Aikens, K. A., Astin, J., Pelletier, K. R., Levanovich, K., Baase, C. M., Park, Y. Y., &
Bodnar, C. M. (2014). Mindfulness goes to work: Impact of an online workplace
intervention. Journal of Occupational and Environmental Medicine, 56(7), 721–731.
Alexander, C. N., Langer, E. J., Newman, R. I., Chandler, H. M., & Davies, J. L. (1989).
Transcendental meditation, mindfulness, and longevity: An experimental study with
the elderly. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57, 950–964.
Alidina, S., & Marshall, J. J. (2013). Mindfulness workbook for dummies. Chichester,
UK: Wiley.
Allen, M., Dietz, M., Blair, K. S., van Beek, M., Rees, G., Vestergaard-Poulsen, P., …
Roepstorff, A. (2012). Cognitive- affective neural plasticity following active-
controlled mindfulness intervention. The Journal of Neuroscience, 32, 15601–15610.
Amutio, A., Martínez-Taboada, C., Hermosilla, D., & Delgado, L. C. (2015). Enhancing
relaxation states and positive emotions in physicians through a mindfulness training
program: A one-year study. Psychology, Health & Medicine, 20, 720–731.
Anderson, N. D., Lau, M. A., Segal, Z. V., & Bishop, S. R. (2007). Mindfulness-based
stress reduction and attentional control. Clinical Psychology & Psychotherapy, 14,
449–463.
Anand, B., Chhina, G. S., & Singh, B. (1961). Some aspects of electroencephalographic
studies in yogis. Electroencephalography and Clinical Neurophysiology, 13, 452–456.
Andrews-Hanna, J. R., Reidler, J. S., Sepulcre, J., Poulin, R., & Buckner, R. L. (2010).
Functional- anatomic fractionation of the brain’s default network. Neuron, 65,
550–562.
Astin, J. A. (1997). Stress reduction through mindfulness meditation: Effects on psycho-
logical symptomatology, sense of control, and spiritual experiences. Psychotherapy
and Psychosomatics, 66, 97–106.
Austin, J. H. (1999). Zen and the brain: Towards an understanding of meditation and con-
sciousness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Austin, J. H. (2009). Selfless insight. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Badawi, K., Wallace, R. K., Orme- Johnson, D., & Rouzere, A. M. (1984).
Electrophysiologic characteristics of respiratory suspension periods occurring dur-
ing the practice of the Transcendental Meditation Program. Psychosomatic Medicine,
46, 267–276.
Baer, R. A. (2003). Mindfulness training as a clinical intervention: A conceptual and
empirical review. Clinical Psychology: Science and Practice, 10, 125–143.
Baer, R. A., Lykins, E. L., & Peters, J. R. (2012). Mindfulness and self-compassion as
predictors of psychological wellbeing in long-term meditators and matched nonmed-
itators. The Journal of Positive Psychology, 7, 230–238.
Baer, R. A., Smith, G. T., & Allen, K. B. (2004). Assessment of mindfulness by self-
report: The Kentucky inventory of mindfulness skills. Assessment, 11, 191–206.
194
194Bibliography
Baer, R. A., Smith, G. T., Hopkins, J., Krietemeyer, J., & Toney, L. (2006). Using self-
report assessment methods to explore facets of mindfulness. Assessment, 13, 27–45.
Bærentsen, K. B., Stødkilde-Jørgensen, H., Sommerlund, B., Hartmann, T., Damsgaard-
Madsen, J., Fosnæs, M., & Green, A. C. (2010). An investigation of brain processes
supporting meditation. Cognitive Processing, 11, 57–84.
Banks, J. B., Welhaf, M. S., & Srour, A. (2015). The protective effects of brief mindful-
ness meditation training. Consciousness and Cognition, 33, 277–285.
Banquet, J. P., & Sailhan, M. (1974). EEG analysis of spontaneous and induced states
of consciousness. Revue d’Electroencephalographie et de Neurophysiologie Clinique, 4,
445–453.
Bao, X., Xue, S., & Kong, F. (2015). Dispositional mindfulness and perceived stress: The
role of emotional intelligence. Personality and Individual Differences, 78, 48–52.
Bar, M., Aminoff, E., Mason, M., & Fenske, M. (2007). The units of thought.
Hippocampus, 17, 420–428.
Baron Short, E., Kose, S., Mu, Q., Borckardt, J., Newberg, A., George, M. S., & Kozel,
F. A. (2010). Regional brain activation during meditation shows time and practice
effects: An exploratory fMRI study. Evidence-Based Complementary and Alternative
Medicine, 7, 121–127.
Barwood, T. J., Empson, J. A., Lister, S. G., & Tilley, A. J. (1978). Auditory evoked
potentials and transcendental meditation. Electroencephalography and Clinical
Neurophysiology, 45, 671–673.
Batson, C. D., Fultz, J., & Schoenrade, P. A. (1987). Distress and empathy: Two qualita-
tively distinct vicarious emotions with different motivational consequences. Journal
of Personality, 55, 19–39.
Beary, J. F., Benson, H., & Klemchuk, H. P. (1974). A simple psychophysiologic technique
which elicits the hypometabolic changes of the relaxation response. Psychosomatic
Medicine, 36, 115–120.
Becker, D. E., & Shapiro, D. (1980). Directing attention toward stimuli affects the P300
but not the orienting response. Psychophysiology, 17, 385–389.
Benson, H., Lehmann, J. W., Malhotra, M. S., Goldman, R. F., Hopkins, J., & Epstein,
M. D. (1982). Body temperature changes during the practice of g Tum-mo yoga.
Nature, 295, 234.
Benson, H., Malhotra, M. S., Goldman, R. F., Jacobs, G. D., & Hopkins, P. J. (1990).
Three case reports of the metabolic and electroencephalographic changes during
advanced Buddhist meditation techniques. Behavioral Medicine, 16, 90–95.
Berkovich- Ohana, A., Dor- Ziderman, Y., Glicksohn, J., & Goldstein, A. (2013).
Alterations in the sense of time, space, and body in the mindfulness- trained
brain: A neurophenomenologically guided MEG study. Frontiers in Psychology, 4.
Berkovich-Ohana, A., Glicksohn, J., & Goldstein, A. (2011). Temporal cognition changes
following mindfulness, but not transcendental meditation practice. Proceedings of
Fechner Day, 27(1), 245–250.
Berntson, G. G., Cacioppo, J. T., & Quigley, K. S. (1993). Respiratory sinus arrhyth-
mia: Autonomic origins, physiological mechanisms, and psychophysiological impli-
cations. Psychophysiology, 30, 183–196.
Birnie, K., Speca, M., & Carlson, L. E. (2010). Exploring self-compassion and empathy
in the context of mindfulness-based stress reduction (MBSR). Stress and Health, 26,
359–371.
195
Bibliography 195
Black, D. S., Semple, R. J., Pokhrel, P., & Grenard, J. L. (2011). Component processes
of executive function—Mindfulness, self-control, and working memory—and their
relationships with mental and behavioral health. Mindfulness, 2, 179–185.
Blanke, O., Mohr, C., Michel, C. M., Pascual-L eone, A., Brugger, P., Seeck, M., … Thut,
G. (2005). Linking out-of-body experience and self processing to mental own-body
imagery at the temporoparietal junction. The Journal of Neuroscience, 25, 550–557.
Bögels, S., Hoogstad, B., van Dun, L., de Schutter, S., & Restifo, K. (2008). Mindfulness
training for adolescents with externalizing disorders and their parents. Behavioural
and Cognitive Psychotherapy, 36, 193–209.
Bornemann, B., Herbert, B. M., Mehling, W. E., & Singer, T. (2014). Differential changes
in self-reported aspects of interoceptive awareness through 3 months of contempla-
tive training. Frontiers in Psychology, 5.
Boroojerdi, B., Battaglia, F., Muellbacher, W., & Cohen, L. G. (2001). Mechanisms under-
lying rapid experience-dependent plasticity in the human visual cortex. Proceedings
of the National Academy of Sciences, 98, 14698–14701.
Braboszcz, C., Habnusseau, S., & Delorme, A. (2010). Meditation and neurosci-
ence: From basic research to clinical practice. In R. Carlstedt (Ed.), Integrating psy-
chology, psychiatry, and behavioral medicine. Perspectives, practices, and research (pp.
1910–1929). New York: Springer.
Brahm, A. (2006). Happiness through meditation. Boston: Wisdom.
Brasington, L. (2015). Right concentration: A practical guide to the jhānas. Boston:
Shambhala.
Brefczynski-L ewis, J. A., Lutz, A., Schaefer, H. S., Levinson, D. B., & Davidson, R. J.
(2007). Neural correlates of attentional expertise in long-term meditation practitio-
ners. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 104, 11483–11488.
Bressler, S. L., & Menon, V. (2010). Large-scale brain networks in cognition: Emerging
methods and principles. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 14, 277–290.
Brewer, J. A., Worhunsky, P. D., Gray, J. R., Tang, Y. Y., Weber, J., & Kober, H. (2011).
Meditation experience is associated with differences in default mode network activity
and connectivity. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 108, 20254–20259.
Britton, W. B., Haynes, P. L., Fridel, K. W., & Bootzin, R. R. (2010). Polysomnographic
and subjective profiles of sleep continuity before and after mindfulness-based cogni-
tive therapy in partially remitted depression. Psychosomatic Medicine, 72, 539–548.
Britton, W. B., Lindahl, J. R., Cahn, B. R., Davis, J. H., & Goldman, R. E. (2014).
Awakening is not a metaphor: The effects of Buddhist meditation practices on basic
wakefulness. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1307, 64–81.
Broks, P. (2003). Into the silent land: Travels in neuropsychology. London: Atlantic.
Brotto, L. A., & Basson, R. (2014). Group mindfulness-based therapy significantly
improves sexual desire in women. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 57, 43–54.
Brotto, L. A., Basson, R., Carlson, M., & Zhu, C. (2013). Impact of an integrated
mindfulness and cognitive behavioural treatment for provoked vestibulodynia
(IMPROVED): A qualitative study. Sexual and Relationship Therapy, 28, 3–19.
Brotto, L. A., Basson, R., Smith, K. B., Driscoll, M., & Sadownik, L. (2014). Mindfulness-
based group therapy for women with provoked vestibulodynia. Mindfulness, 6,
417–432.
Brotto, L. A., Erskine, Y., Carey, M., Ehlen, T., Finlayson, S., Heywood, M., … Miller,
D. (2012a). A brief mindfulness-based cognitive behavioral intervention improves
196
196Bibliography
sexual functioning versus wait-list control in women treated for gynecologic cancer.
Gynecologic Oncology, 125, 320–325.
Brotto, L. A., & Heiman, J. R. (2007). Mindfulness in sex therapy: Applications for
women with sexual difficulties following gynecologic cancer. Sexual and Relationship
Therapy, 22, 3–11.
Brotto, L. A., Heiman, J. R., Goff, B., Greer, B., Lentz, G. M., Swisher, E., … Van
Blaricom, A. (2008). A psychoeducational intervention for sexual dysfunction in
women with gynecologic cancer. Archives of Sexual Behavior, 37, 317–329.
Brotto, L. A., Seal, B. N., & Rellini, A. (2012b). Pilot study of a brief cognitive behavioral
versus mindfulness-based intervention for women with sexual distress and a history
of childhood sexual abuse. Journal of Sex & Marital Therapy, 38, 1–27.
Brown, K. W., & Ryan, R. M. (2003). The benefits of being present: Mindfulness and
its role in psychological well-b eing. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 84,
822–848.
Brown, K. W., Ryan, R. M., & Creswell, J. D. (2007). Mindfulness: Theoretical founda-
tions and evidence for its salutary effects. Psychological Inquiry, 18, 211–237.
Buckner, R. L., Andrews-Hanna, J. R., & Schacter, D. L. (2008). The brain’s default
network. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1124, 1–38.
Burgess, P. W., Dumontheil, I., & Gilbert, S. J. (2007). The gateway hypothesis of rostral
prefrontal cortex (area 10) function. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 11, 290–298.
Cahn, B. R., Delorme, A., & Polich, J. (2010). Occipital gamma activation during
Vipassana meditation. Cognitive Processing, 11, 39–56.
Cahn, B. R., Delorme, A., & Polich, J. (2013). Event-related delta, theta, alpha and
gamma correlates to auditory oddball processing during Vipassana meditation.
Social Cognitive & Affective Neuroscience, 8, 100–111.
Cahn, B. R., & Polich, J. (2006). Meditation states and traits: EEG, ERP, and neuroim-
aging studies. Psychological Bulletin, 132, 180–211.
Carboni, J. A., Roach, A. T., & Fredrick, L. D. (2013). Impact of mindfulness training
on the behavior of elementary students with attention-deficit/hyperactive disorder.
Research in Human Development, 10, 234–251.
Carmody, J., & Baer, R. A. (2009). How long does a mindfulness-based stress reduction
program need to be? A review of class contact hours and effect sizes for psychological
distress. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 65, 627–638.
Carson, J. W., Carson, K. M., Gil, K. M., & Baucom, D. H. (2004). Mindfulness-based
relationship enhancement. Behavior Therapy, 35, 471–494.
Carter, O. L., Presti, D. E., Callistemon, C., Ungerer, Y., Liu, G. B., & Pettigrew, J.
D. (2005). Meditation alters perceptual rivalry in Tibetan Buddhist monks. Current
Biology, 15, R412–R413.
Catherine, S. (2008). Focused and fearless: A meditator’s guide to states of deep joy, calm
and clarity. Boston: Wisdom.
Chaddock-Heyman, L., Erickson, K. I., Voss, M. W., Powers, J. P., Knecht, A. M.,
Pontifex, M. B., … Hillman, C. H. (2013). White matter microstructure is associated
with cognitive control in children. Biological Psychology, 94, 109–115.
Chambers, R., Lo, B. C. Y., & Allen, N. B. (2008). The impact of intensive mindful-
ness training on attentional control, cognitive style, and affect. Cognitive Therapy and
Research, 32, 303–322.
197
Bibliography 197
Chan, D., & Woollacott, M. (2007). Effects of level of meditation experience on atten-
tional focus: Is the efficiency of executive or orientation networks improved? The
Journal of Alternative and Complementary Medicine, 13, 651–658.
Chang, C. H., & Lo, P. C. (2013). Effects of long-term dharma-chan meditation on car-
diorespiratory synchronization and heart rate variability behavior. Rejuvenation
Research, 16, 115–123.
Chang, V. Y., Palesh, O., Caldwell, R., Glasgow, N., Abramson, M., Luskin, F., Koopman,
C. (2004). The effects of a mindfulness-based stress reduction program on stress,
mindfulness self-efficacy, and positive states of mind. Stress and Health: Journal of
the International Society for the Investigation of Stress, 20, 141–147.
Chang, Y. K., Labban, J. D., Gapin, J. I., & Etnier, J. L. (2012). The effects of acute exer-
cise on cognitive performance: A meta-analysis. Brain Research, 1453, 87–101.
Chiesa, A., Calati, R., & Serretti, A. (2011). Does mindfulness training improve cogni-
tive abilities? A systematic review of neuropsychological findings. Clinical Psychology
Review, 31(3), 449–464.
Chiesa, A., & Malinowski, P. (2011). Mindfulness-based approaches: Are they all the
same? Journal of Clinical Psychology, 67, 404–424.
Chiesa, A., & Serretti, A. (2009). Mindfulness-based stress reduction for stress manage-
ment in healthy people: A review and meta-analysis. The Journal of Alternative and
Complementary Medicine, 15, 593–600.
Chiesa, A., & Serretti, A. (2010). A systematic review of neurobiological and clinical
features of mindfulness meditations. Psychological Medicine, 40, 1239–1252.
Chiesa, A., & Serretti, A. (2011). Mindfulness based cognitive therapy for psychiatric
disorders: a systematic review and meta-analysis. Psychiatry Research, 187, 441–453.
Chiesa, A., Serretti, A., & Jakobsen, J. C. (2013). Mindfulness: Top-down or bottom-up
emotion regulation strategy? Clinical Psychology Review, 33, 82–96.
Chu, L. (2010). The benefits of meditation vis-à-v is emotional intelligence, perceived
stress and negative mental health. Stress and Health: Journal of the International
Society for the Investigation of Stress, 26, 169–180.
Clarke, T. C., Black, L. I., Stussman, B. J., Barnes, P. M., & Nahin, R. L. (2015). Trends
in the use of complementary health approaches among adults: United States, 2002–
2012. National Health Statistics Reports, 79, 1–16.
Coffey, K. A., Hartman, M., & Fredrickson, B. L. (2010). Deconstructing mindfulness
and constructing mental health: Understanding mindfulness and its mechanisms of
action. Mindfulness, 1, 235–253.
Cohen, J. (1988). Statistical power analysis for the behavioral sciences (2nd ed.). Hillsdale,
NJ: Erlbaum.
Colcombe, S., & Kramer, A. F. (2003). Fitness effects on the cognitive function of older
adults: A meta-analytic study. Psychological Science, 14, 125–130.
Cole, J., Chaddock, C. A., Farmer, A. E., Aitchison, K. J., Simmons, A., McGuffin, P., &
Fu, C. H. (2012). White matter abnormalities and illness severity in major depressive
disorder. The British Journal of Psychiatry, 201, 33–39.
Conrad, C. D. (2008). Chronic stress-i nduced hippocampal vulnerability: The glucocor-
ticoid vulnerability hypothesis. Reviews in the Neurosciences, 19, 395–412.
Corbetta, M., Patel, G., & Shulman, G. L. (2008). The reorienting system of the human
brain: From environment to theory of mind. Neuron, 58, 306–324.
198
198Bibliography
Craig, A. D. (2005). Forebrain emotional asymmetry: A neuroanatomical basis? Trends

in Cognitive Sciences, 9, 566–571.
Creswell, J. D., & Lindsay, E. K. (2014). How does mindfulness training affect health?
A mindfulness stress buffering account. Current Directions in Psychological Science,
23, 401– 407.
Creswell, J. D., Myers, H. F., Cole, S. W., & Irwin, M. R. (2009). Mindfulness meditation
training effects on CD4+ T lymphocytes in HIV-1 infected adults: A small random-
ized controlled trial. Brain, Behavior, and Immunity, 23, 184–188.
Cysarz, D., & Büssing, A. (2005). Cardiorespiratory synchronization during Zen medi-
tation. European Journal of Applied Physiology, 95, 88–95.
Dalai Lama (2005). The universe in a single atom: The convergence of science and spiritual-
ity. New York: Morgan Road.
Damasio, A. (2010). Self comes to mind. New York: Pantheon.
Daubenmier, J., Hayden, D., Chang, V., & Epel, E. (2014). It’s not what you think, it’s how
you relate to it: Dispositional mindfulness moderates the relationship between psy-
chological distress and the cortisol awakening response. Psychoneuroendocrinology,
48, 11–18.
Daubenmier, J., Sze, J., Kerr, C. E., Kemeny, M. E., & Mehling, W. (2013). Follow
your breath: Respiratory interoceptive accuracy in experienced meditators.
Psychophysiology, 50, 777–789.
David-Néel, A. (1929). Mystiques et magiciens du Tibet. Paris: Plon.
Davidson, R. J., Kabat-Zinn, J., Schumacher, J., Rosenkranz, M., Muller, D., Santorelli,
S. F., … Sheridan, J. F. (2003). Alterations in brain and immune function produced
by mindfulness meditation. Psychosomatic Medicine, 65, 564–570.
Davidson, R. J., Pizzagalli, D., Nitschke, J. B., & Putnam, K. (2002). Depression:
Perspectives from affective neuroscience. Annual Review of Psychology, 53, 545–574.
Decety, J., & Lamm, C. (2007). The role of the right temporoparietal junction in social
interaction: How low-level computational processes contribute to meta-cognition.
The Neuroscientist, 13, 580–593.
de Grâce, G. (1976). Effects of meditation on personality and values. Journal of Clinical
Psychology, 32(4), 809–813.
Dennett. D. C. (1991). Consciousness explained. London: Penguin.
Desbordes, G., Negi, L. T., Pace, T. W., Wallace, B. A., Raison, C. L., & Schwartz, E. L.
(2012). Effects of mindful-attention and compassion meditation training on amyg-
dala response to emotional stimuli in an ordinary, non-meditative state. Frontiers in
Human Neuroscience, 6.
Deshmukh, V. D. (2006). Neuroscience of meditation. The Scientific World Journal, 6,
2239–2253.
de Vibe, M., Solhaug, I., Tyssen, R., Friborg, O., Rosenvinge, J. H., Sørlie, T., & Bjørndal,
A. (2013). Mindfulness training for stress management: A randomised controlled
study of medical and psychology students. BMC Medical Education, 13, 107.
de Vibe, M., Solhaug, I., Tyssen, R., Friborg, O., Rosenvinge, J. H., Sørlie, T., …
Bjørndal, A. (2015). Does personality moderate the effects of mindfulness training
for medical and psychology students? Mindfulness, 6, 281–289.
Dor-Ziderman, Y., Berkovich- Ohana, A., Glicksohn, J., & Goldstein, A. (2013).
Mindfulness-induced selflessness: A MEG neurophenomenological study. Frontiers
in Human Neuroscience, 7.
199
Bibliography 199
Dove, N. L., & Wiederman, M. W. (2000). Cognitive distraction and women’s sexual
functioning. Journal of Sex & Marital Therapy, 26, 67–78.
Draganski, B., Gaser, C., Busch, V., Schuierer, G., Bogdahn, U., & May, A. (2004).
Neuroplasticity: Changes in grey matter induced by training. Nature, 427, 311–312.
Droit-Volet, S., Fanget, M., & Dambrun, M. (2015). Mindfulness meditation and relax-
ation training increases time sensitivity. Consciousness and Cognition, 31, 86–97.
Eberth, J., & Sedlmeier, P. (2012). The effects of mindfulness meditation: A meta-
analysis. Mindfulness, 3, 174–189.
Eisenberg, N., Fabes, R. A., Miller, P. A., Fultz, J., Shell, R., Mathy, R. M., & Reno, R.
R. (1989). Relation of sympathy and personal distress to prosocial behavior: A multi-
method study. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57, 55–66.
Engström, M., & Söderfeldt, B. (2010). Brain activation during compassion medita-
tion: A case study. The Journal of Alternative and Complementary Medicine, 16, 597–599.
Esslen, M., Metzler, S., Pascual-Marqui, R., & Jancke, L. (2008). Pre-reflective and
reflective self-reference: A spatiotemporal EEG analysis. NeuroImage, 42, 437–449.
Evans, D. R., & Segerstrom, S. C. (2011). Why do mindful people worry less? Cognitive
Therapy and Research, 35, 505–510.
Fan, Y., Duncan, N. W., de Greck, M., & Northoff, G. 2011. Is there a core neural
network in empathy? An fMRI based quantitative meta-analysis. Neuroscience &
Biobehavioral Reviews, 35, 903–911.
Farb, N. A., Segal, Z. V., & Anderson, A. K. (2013). Mindfulness meditation training
alters cortical representations of interoceptive attention. Social Cognitive & Affective
Neuroscience, 8, 15–26.
Farb, N. A., Segal, Z. V., Mayberg, H., Bean, J., McKeon, D., Fatima, Z., & Anderson,
A. K. (2007). Attending to the present: Mindfulness meditation reveals distinct neu-
ral modes of self-reference. Social Cognitive & Affective Neuroscience, 2, 313–322.
Farias, M., & Wikholm, C. (2015). The Buddha pill: Can meditation change you?
London: Watkins.
Fenwick, P. B. C., Donaldson, S., Gillis, L., Bushman, J., Fenton, G. W., Perry, I., …
Serafinowicz, H. (1977). Metabolic and EEG changes during transcendental medita-
tion: An explanation. Biological Psychology, 5, 101–118.
Ferrarelli, F., Smith, R., Dentico, D., Riedner, B. A., Zennig, C., Benca, R. M., …
Tononi, G. (2013). Experienced mindfulness meditators exhibit higher parietal-
occipital EEG gamma activity during NREM sleep. PloS One, 8, e73417.
ffytche, D. H., Howard, R. J., Brammer, M. J., David, A., Woodruff, P., & Williams, S.
(1998). The anatomy of conscious vision: An fMRI study of visual hallucinations.
Nature Neuroscience, 1, 738–742.
Fischer, N. (2013). Training in compassion: Zen teachings on the practice of lojong.
Boston: Shambhala.
Fjorback, L. O., Arendt, M., Ørnbøl, E., Fink, P., & Walach, H. (2011). Mindfulness-
based stress reduction and mindfulness-based cognitive therapy: A systematic review
of randomized controlled trials. Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 124, 102–119.
Fleming, A. P., McMahon, R. J., Moran, L. R., Peterson, A. P., & Dreessen, A. (2015).
Pilot randomized controlled trial of dialectical behavior therapy group skills train-
ing for ADHD among college students. Journal of Attention Disorders, 19, 260–271.
Flook, L., Goldberg, S. B., Pinger, L., Bonus, K., & Davidson, R. J. (2013). Mindfulness
for teachers: A pilot study to assess effects on stress, burnout, and teaching efficacy.
Mind, Brain, and Education, 7, 182–195.
200
200Bibliography
Fossati, P., Hevenor, S. J., Graham, S. J., Grady, C., Keightley, M. L., Craik, F., &
Mayberg, H. (2003). In search of the emotional self: An fMRI study using positive
and negative emotional words. The American Journal of Psychiatry, 160, 1938–1945.
Fournier, J. C., DeRubeis, R. J., Hollon, S. D., Dimidjian, S., Amsterdam, J. D.,
Shelton, R. C., & Fawcett, J. (2010). Antidepressant drug effects and depression
severity: A patient-level meta-analysis. JAMA: The Journal of the American Medical
Association, 303, 47–53.
Fox, K. C., Dixon, M. L., Nijeboer, S., Girn, M., Floman, J. L., Lifshitz, M., … Christoff,
K. (2016). Functional neuroanatomy of meditation: A review and meta-analysis of
78 functional neuroimaging investigations. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, 65,
208–228.
Fox, K. C., Nijeboer, S., Dixon, M. L., Floman, J. L., Ellamil, M., Rumak, S. P., …
Christoff, K. (2014). Is meditation associated with altered brain structure? A system-
atic review and meta-analysis of morphometric neuroimaging in meditation practi-
tioners. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, 43, 48–73.
Fox, K. C., Zakarauskas, P., Dixon, M., Ellamil, M., Thompson, E., & Christoff,
K. (2012). Meditation experience predicts introspective accuracy. PLoS One, 7,
e45370.
Fredrickson, B. L., Cohn, M. A., Coffey, K. A., Pek, J., & Finkel, S. M. (2008). Open
hearts build lives: Positive emotions, induced through loving-k indness meditation,
build consequential personal resources. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
95, 1045–1065.
Froeliger, B., Garland, E. L., & McClernon, F. J. (2012). Yoga meditation practitioners
exhibit greater gray matter volume and fewer reported cognitive failures: Results of a
preliminary voxel-based morphometric analysis. Evidence-Based Complementary and
Alternative Medicine, 2012.
Gallagher, S. (2000). Philosophical conceptions of the self. Trends in Cognitive Sciences
4, 14–21.
Gallego, J., Aguilar-Parra, J. M., Cangas, A. J., Langer, Á. I., & Mañas, I. (2014). Effect
of a mindfulness program on stress, anxiety and depression in university students.
The Spanish Journal of Psychology, 17, 1–6.
Gallois, P. (1984). Modifications neurophysiologiques et respiratoires Iors de la pratique
des techniques de relaxation. L’Encephale, 10, 139–144.
Gard, T., Hölzel, B. K., Sack, A. T., Hempel, H., Lazar, S. W., Vaitl, D., & Ott, U. (2012).
Pain attenuation through mindfulness is associated with decreased cognitive control
and increased sensory processing in the brain. Cerebral Cortex, 22, 2692–2702.
Garland, E. L., Beck, A. C., Lipschitz, D. L., & Nakamura, Y. (2015). Dispositional
mindfulness predicts attenuated waking salivary cortisol levels in cancer survi-
vors: A latent growth curve analysis. Journal of Cancer Survivorship, 9, 1–8.
Garrison, K. A., Santoyo, J. F., Davis, J. H., Thornhill IV, T. A., Kerr, C. E., & Brewer,
J. A. (2013). Effortless awareness: Using real time neurofeedback to investigate cor-
relates of posterior cingulate cortex activity in meditators’ self-report. Frontiers in
Garrison, K. A., Scheinost, D., Constable, R. T., & Brewer, J. A. (2014). BOLD signal
and functional connectivity associated with loving kindness meditation. Brain and
Behavior, 4, 337–347.
201
Bibliography 201
Gauthier, T., Meyer, R. M., Grefe, D., & Gold, J. I. (2015). An on-the-job mindfulness-
based intervention for pediatric ICU nurses: A pilot. Journal of Pediatric Nursing, 30,
402– 409.
Gazzaniga, M. S. (1998). The split brain revisited. Scientific American, 279, 50–55.
Geary, C., & Rosenthal, S. L. (2011). Sustained impact of MBSR on stress, well-b eing,
and daily spiritual experiences for 1 year in academic health care employees. The
Journal of Alternative and Complementary Medicine, 17, 939–944.
Glicksohn, J. (2001). Temporal cognition and the phenomenology of time: A multiplica-
tive function for apparent duration. Consciousness and Cognition, 10, 1–25.
Goldin, P. R., & Gross, J. J. (2010). Effects of mindfulness-based stress reduction (MBSR)
on emotion regulation in social anxiety disorder. Emotion, 10, 83–91.
Goldin, P. R., McRae, K., Ramel, W., & Gross, J. J. (2008). The neural bases of emotion
regulation: Reappraisal and suppression of negative emotion. Biological Psychiatry,
63, 577–586.
Goldstein, J. (2013). Mindfulness: A practical guide to awakening. Boulder, CO: Sounds True.
Goleman, D. (1996). The meditative mind: The varieties of meditative experience. Los
Angelos: Tarcher Perigree.
Goyal, M., Singh, S., Sibinga, E. M., Gould, N. F., Rowland-Seymour, A., Sharma, R.,
… Haythornthwaite, J. A. (2014). Meditation programs for psychological stress and
well-b eing: A systematic review and meta-analysis. JAMA Internal Medicine, 174,
357–368.
Grabovac, A. D., Lau, M. A., & Willett, B. R. (2011). Mechanisms of mindful-
ness: A Buddhist psychological model. Mindfulness, 2, 154–166.
Grant, J. A. (2014). Meditative analgesia: The current state of the field. Annals of the
New York Academy of Sciences, 1307, 55–63.
Grant, J., Courtemanche, J., Duerden, E. G., Duncan, G. H., & Rainville, P. (2010).
Cortical thickness and pain sensitivity in Zen meditators. Emotion, 10, 43–53.
Grant, J. A., & Rainville, P. (2009). Pain sensitivity and analgesic effects of mindful states
in Zen meditators: A cross-sectional study. Psychosomatic Medicine, 71, 106–114.
Greene, Y. N., & Hiebert, B. (1988). A comparison of mindfulness meditation and cogni-
tive self-observation. Canadian Journal of Counselling, 22, 25–34.
Gregório, S., & Pinto-Gouveia, J. (2013). Mindful attention and awareness: Relationships
with psychopathology and emotion regulation. The Spanish Journal of Psychology,
16, 1–10.
Grossman, P., Niemann, L., Schmidt, S., & Walach, H. (2004). Mindfulness-based stress
reduction and health benefits: A meta-analysis. Journal of Psychosomatic Research,
57, 35–43.
Grossman, P., & Van Dam, N. T. (2011). Mindfulness, by any other name …: Trials and
tribulations of sati in Western psychology and science. Contemporary Buddhism, 12,
219–239.
Gu, J., Strauss, C., Bond, R., & Cavanagh, K. (2015). How do mindfulness-based cog-
nitive therapy and mindfulness-based stress reduction improve mental health and
wellbeing? A systematic review and meta-analysis of mediation studies. Clinical
Psychology Review, 37, 1–12.
Gyatso, K. N. (2004). Ornament of stainless light: An exposition of the kā lacakra tantra.
Edited and translated by G. Kilty. Boston: Wisdom.
202
202Bibliography
Hagerty, M. R., Isaacs, J., Brasington, L., Shupe, L., Fetz, E. E., & Cramer, S. C. (2013).
Case study of ecstatic meditation: fMRI and EEG evidence of self-stimulating a
reward system. Neural Plasticity, 2013, 653572.
Haggard, P., & Whitford, B. (2004). Supplementary motor area provides an efferent sig-
nal for sensory suppression. Cognitive Brain Research, 19, 52–58.
Hasenkamp, W., & Barsalou, L. W. (2012). Effects of meditation experience on
functional connectivity of distributed brain networks. Frontiers in Human
Neuroscience, 6.
Hasenkamp, W., Wilson-Mendenhall, C. D., Duncan, E., & Barsalou, L. W. (2012).
Mind wandering and attention during focused meditation: A fine-g rained temporal
analysis of fluctuating cognitive states. NeuroImage, 59, 750–760.
Haver, A., Akerjordet, K., Caputi, P., Furunes, T., & Magee, C. (2015). Measuring men-
tal well-b eing: A validation of the Short Warwick–Edinburgh Mental Well-Being
Scale in Norwegian and Swedish. Scandinavian Journal of Public Health, 43, 721–727.
Haydicky, J., Shecter, C., Wiener, J., & Ducharme, J. M. (2015). Evaluation of MBCT for
adolescents with ADHD and their parents: Impact on individual and family func-
tioning. Journal of Child and Family Studies, 24, 76–94.
Hayes, S. C., Strosahl, K. D., & Wilson, K. G. (1999). Acceptance and commitment ther-
apy: An experiential approach to behavior change. New York: Guilford.
Heeren, A., Van Broeck, N., & Philippot, P. (2009). The effects of mindfulness on execu-
tive processes and autobiographical memory specificity. Behaviour Research and
Therapy, 47, 403– 409.
Hepark, S., Kan, C. C., & Speckens, A. (2014). [Feasibility and effectiveness of mindful-
ness training in adults with ADHD: A pilot study]. Tijdschrift voor Psychiatrie, 56,
471–476.
Herman, J. P., & Mueller, N. K. (2006). Role of the ventral subiculum in stress integra-
tion. Behavioural Brain Research, 174, 215–224.
Hirvikoski, T., Waaler, E., Alfredsson, J., Pihlgren, C., Holmström, A., Johnson, A.,
… Nordström, A. L. (2011). Reduced ADHD symptoms in adults with ADHD
after structured skills training group: Results from a randomized controlled trial.
Behaviour Research and Therapy, 49, 175–185.
Hodgins, H. S., & Adair, K. C. (2010). Attentional processes and meditation.
Consciousness and Cognition, 19, 872–878.
Hofmann, S. G., Sawyer, A. T., Witt, A. A., & Oh, D. (2010). The effect of mindfulness-
based therapy on anxiety and depression: A meta- analytic review. Journal of
Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 78, 169–183.
Hölzel, B. K., Carmody, J., Evans, K. C., Hoge, E. A., Dusek, J. A., Morgan, L., …
Lazar, S. W. (2010). Stress reduction correlates with structural changes in the amyg-
dala. Social Cognitive & Affective Neuroscience, 5, 11–17.
Hölzel, B. K., Carmody, J., Vangel, M., Congleton, C., Yerramsetti, S. M., Gard, T., &
Lazar, S. W. (2011a). Mindfulness practice leads to increases in regional brain gray
matter density. Psychiatry Research: Neuroimaging, 191(1), 36–43.
Hölzel, B. K., Lazar, S. W., Gard, T., Schuman-Olivier, Z., Vago, D. R., & Ott, U. (2011b).
How does mindfulness meditation work? Proposing mechanisms of action from a
conceptual and neural perspective. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 6, 537–559.
203
Bibliography 203
Hou, W. K., Ng, S. M., & Wan, J. H. Y. (2015). Changes in positive affect and mindful-
ness predict changes in cortisol response and psychiatric symptoms: A latent change
score modelling approach. Psychology & Health, 30, 551–567.
Hucker, A., & McCabe, M. P. (2014). A qualitative evaluation of online chat groups
for women completing a psychological intervention for female sexual dysfunction.
Journal of Sex & Marital Therapy, 40, 58–68.
Hutton, C., Draganski, B., Ashburner, J., Weiskopf, N., 2009. A comparison between
voxel-based cortical thickness and voxel- based morphometry in normal aging.
NeuroImage, 48, 371–380.
Jacobs, T. L., Epel, E. S., Lin, J., Blackburn, E. H., Wolkowitz, O. M., Bridwell, D. A.,
… King, B. G. (2011). Intensive meditation training, immune cell telomerase activity,
and psychological mediators. Psychoneuroendocrinology, 36, 664–681.
Jain, S., Shapiro, S. L., Swanick, S., Roesch, S. C., Mills, P. J., Bell, I., & Schwartz, G.
E. (2007). A randomized controlled trial of mindfulness meditation versus relaxation
training: Effects on distress, positive states of mind, rumination, and distraction.
Annals of Behavioral Medicine, 33, 11–21.
Jazaieri, H., Jinpa, G. T., McGonigal, K., Rosenberg, E. L., Finkelstein, J., Simon-
Thomas, E., … Goldin, P. R. (2013). Enhancing compassion: A randomized con-
trolled trial of a compassion cultivation training program. Journal of Happiness
Studies, 14, 1113–1126.
Jensen, C., Vangkilde, S., Frokjaer, V., & Hasselbalch, S. G. (2011). Mindfulness
training affects attention— or is it attentional effort? Journal of Experimental
Psychology: General, 141, 106–123.
Jerath, R., Barnes, V. A., Dillard-Wright, D., Jerath, S., & Hamilton, B. (2012). Dynamic
change of awareness during meditation techniques: Neural and physiological cor-
relates. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 6.
Jovanov, E. (2005). On spectral analysis of heart rate variability during very slow yogic
breathing. Conference Proceedings: Annual International Conference of the IEEE
Engineering in Medicine and Biology Society, 3, 2467–2470.
Jevning, R., Wallace, R. K., & Beidebach, M. (1992). The physiology of medita-
tion: A review. A wakeful hypometabolic integrated response. Neuroscience &
Biobehavioral Reviews, 16, 415–424.
Jha, A. P., Krompinger, J., & Baime, M. J. (2007). Mindfulness training modifies subsys-
tems of attention. Cognitive, Affective & Behavioral Neuroscience, 7, 109–119.
Jha, A. P., Morrison, A. B., Dainer-Best, J., Parker, S., Rostrup, N., & Stanley, E. A.
(2015). Minds “at attention”: Mindfulness training curbs attentional lapses in mili-
tary cohorts. PloS One, 10, e0116889.
Jha, A. P., Stanley, E. A., Kiyonaga, A., Wong, L., & Gelfand, L. (2010). Examining the
protective effects of mindfulness training on working memory capacity and affective
experience. Emotion, 10, 54–64.
Josipovic, Z., Dinstein, I., Weber, J., & Heeger, D. J. (2012). Influence of meditation on
anti-correlated networks in the brain. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 5.
Kabat-Zinn, J. (1990). Full catastrophe living: The program of the stress reduction clinic at
the University of Massachusetts Medical Center. New York: Delta.
Kabat-Zinn, J. (1994). Wherever you go, there you are: Mindfulness meditation in everyday
life. New York: Hyperion.
204
204Bibliography
Kabat-Zinn, J. (1998). Toward the mainstreaming of American Dharma practice. In A.

Rapaport & B. D. Hotchkiss (Eds.), Buddhism in America: The official record of the
landmark conference on the future of Buddhist meditative practices in the West, Boston,
January 17–19, 1997 (pp. 478–528). Rutland, VT: Tuttle.
Kabat-Zinn, J. (2005). Coming to our senses: Healing ourselves and the world through mind-
fulness. London: Hachette.
Kabat-Zinn, J. (2011). Some reflections on the origins of MBSR, skillful means, and the
trouble with maps. Contemporary Buddhism, 12, 281–306.
Kakigi, R., Nakata, H., Inui, K., Hiroe, N., Nagata, O., Honda, M., … Kawakami, M.
(2005). Intracerebral pain processing in a yoga master who claims not to feel pain
during meditation. European Journal of Pain, 9, 581–581.
Kanwisher, N., McDermott, J., & Chun, M. M. (1997). The fusiform face area: a mod-
ule in human extrastriate cortex specialized for face perception. The Journal of
Kasamatsu, A., & Hirai, T. (1966). An electroencephalographic study on the Zen medi-
tation (Zazen). Folia Psychiatrica et Neurologica Japonica, 20, 315–336.
Kaul, P., Passafiume, J., Sargent, C. R., & O’Hara, B. F. (2010). Meditation acutely
improves psychomotor vigilance, and may decrease sleep need. Behavioral and Brain
Functions, 6, 47–47.
Keltner, D., & Goetz, J. L. (2007). Compassion. In R. F. Baumeister & K. D. Vohs (Eds.),
Encyclopedia of social psychology (pp. 159–161). Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE.
Kemper, K. J., Lynn, J., & Mahan, J. D. (2015). What is the impact of online training in
mind-body skills? Journal of Evidence-Based Complementary & Alternative Medicine,
20, 275–282.
Kerr, C. E., Jones, S. R., Wan, Q., Pritchett, D. L., Wasserman, R. H., Wexler, A.,
… Moore, C. I. (2011). Effects of mindfulness meditation training on anticipatory
alpha modulation in primary somatosensory cortex. Brain Research Bulletin, 85,
96–103.
Khalsa, S. S., Rudrauf, D., Damasio, A. R., Davidson, R. J., Lutz, A., & Tranel, D.
(2008). Interoceptive awareness in experienced meditators. Psychophysiology, 45,
671–677.
Khoury, B., Lecomte, T., Fortin, G., Masse, M., Therien, P., Bouchard, V., … Hofmann,
S. G. (2013a). Mindfulness-based therapy: A comprehensive meta-analysis. Clinical
Khoury, B., Lecomte, T., Gaudiano, B. A., & Paquin, K. (2013b). Mindfulness interven-
tions for psychosis: A meta-analysis. Schizophrenia Research, 150, 176–184.
Kieseppä, T., Eerola, M., Mäntylä, R., Neuvonen, T., Poutanen, V. P., Luoma, K., …
Rytsälä, H. (2010). Major depressive disorder and white matter abnormalities: A dif-
fusion tensor imaging study with tract-based spatial statistics. Journal of Affective
Disorders, 120, 240–244.
Kiken, L. G., Garland, E. L., Bluth, K., Palsson, O. S., & Gaylord, S. A. (2015). From
a state to a trait: Trajectories of state mindfulness in meditation during interven-
tion predict changes in trait mindfulness. Personality and Individual Differences,
81, 41– 46.
Killingsworth, M. A., & Gilbert, D. T. (2010). A wandering mind is an unhappy mind.
Science, 330, 932–932.
205
Bibliography 205
Kim, K., & Johnson, M. K. (2014). Extended self: spontaneous activation of medial pre-
frontal cortex by objects that are “mine.” Social Cognitive & Affective Neuroscience,
9, 1006–1012.
Kircher, T. T., Brammer, M., Bullmore, E., Simmons, A., Bartels, M., & David, A.
S. (2002). The neural correlates of intentional and incidental self processing.
Neuropsychologia, 40, 683–692.
Kirsch, I., Deacon, B. J., Huedo-Medina, T. B., Scoboria, A., Moore, T. J., & Johnson, B.
T. (2008). Initial severity and antidepressant benefits: A meta-analysis of data submit-
ted to the Food and Drug Administration. PLoS Medicine, 5.
Kirsch, I., & Henry, D. (1979). Self-desensitization and meditation in the reduction of
public speaking anxiety. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 47, 536–541.
Kitney, R. I., & Rompelman, O. (1980). The study of heart-rate variability. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Kjaer, T. W., Nowak, M., & Lou, H. C. (2002). Reflective self-awareness and conscious
states: PET evidence for a common midline parietofrontal core. NeuroImage, 17,
1080–1086.
Klainin-Yobas, P., Cho, M. A. A., & Creedy, D. (2012). Efficacy of mindfulness-based
interventions on depressive symptoms among people with mental disorders: A meta-
analysis. International Journal of Nursing Studies, 49, 109–121.
Klatt, M. D., Buckworth, J., & Malarkey, W. B. (2009). Effects of low-dose mindfulness-
based stress reduction (MBSR-ld) on working adults. Health Education & Behavior,
36, 601–614.
Klimecki, O. M., Leiberg, S., Lamm, C., & Singer, T. (2013a). Functional neural plas-
ticity and associated changes in positive affect after compassion training. Cerebral
Cortex, 23, 1552–1561.
Klimecki, O. M., Leiberg, S., Ricard, M., & Singer, T. (2013b). Differential pattern of
functional brain plasticity after compassion and empathy training. Social Cognitive
& Affective Neuroscience, 9(6), 873–879.
Koechlin, E. (2011). Frontal pole function: What is specifically human? Trends in
Cognitive Sciences, 15, 241.
Kornfield, J. (1979). Intensive insight meditation: A phenomenological study. Journal of
Transpersonal Psychology, 11, 41–58.
Kozasa, E. H., Sato, J. R., Lacerda, S. S., Barreiros, M. A., Radvany, J., Russell, T. A.,
… Amaro, E. (2012). Meditation training increases brain efficiency in an attention
task. NeuroImage, 59, 745–749.
Kozhevnikov, M., Elliott, J., Shephard, J., & Gramann, K. (2013). Neurocognitive and
somatic components of temperature increases during g-tummo meditation: Legend
and reality. PLoS One, 8, e58244.
Kramer, R. S., Weger, U. W., & Sharma, D. (2013). The effect of mindfulness meditation
on time perception. Consciousness and Cognition, 22, 846–852.
Krusche, A., Cyhlarova, E., & Williams, J. M. G. (2013). Mindfulness online: An evalu-
ation of the feasibility of a web-based mindfulness course for stress, anxiety and
depression. British Medical Journal Open, 3.
Kuehner, C., & Weber, I. (1999). Responses to depression in unipolar depressed
patients: An investigation of Nolen-Hoeksema’s response styles theory. Psychological
Medicine, 29, 1323–1333.
206
206Bibliography
Kuijpers, H. J., van der Heijden, F. M., Tuinier, S., & Verhoeven, W. M. (2007).
Meditation-i nduced psychosis. Psychopathology, 40, 461– 464.
Kumar, S., Nagendra, H. R., Naveen, K. V., Manjunath, N. K., & Telles, S. (2010).
Brainstem auditory-evoked potentials in two meditative mental states. International
Journal of Yoga, 3, 37–41.
Laird, A. R., Fox, P. M., Eickhoff, S. B., Turner, J. A., Ray, K. L., McKay, D. R., … Fox,
P. T. (2011). Behavioral interpretations of intrinsic connectivity networks. Journal of
Cognitive Neuroscience, 23, 4022–4037.
Laird, A. R., McMillan, K. M., Lancaster, J. L., Kochunov, P., Turkeltaub, P. E., Pardo,
J. V., & Fox, P. T. (2005). A comparison of label-based review and ALE meta-analysis
in the Stroop task. Human Brain Mapping, 25, 6–21.
Lazar, S. W., Kerr, C. E., Wasserman, R. H., Gray, J. R., Greve, D. N., Treadway, M.
T., … Fischl, B. (2005). Meditation experience is associated with increased cortical
thickness. Neuroreport, 16, 1893–1897.
Ledesma, D., & Kumano, H. (2009). Mindfulness- based stress reduction and can-
cer: A meta-analysis. Psycho-Oncology, 18, 571–579.
Lee, T., Leung, M. K., Hou, W. K., Tang, J. C., Yin, J., So, K. F., … Chan, C. C. (2012).
Distinct neural activity associated with focused-attention meditation and loving-
kindness meditation. PLoS ONE, 7, e40045.
Lehrer, P., Sasaki, Y., & Saito, Y. (1999). Zazen and cardiac variability. Psychosomatic
Medicine, 61, 812–821.
Leiberg, S., Klimecki, O., & Singer, T. (2011). Short-term compassion training increases
prosocial behavior in a newly developed prosocial game. PloS One, 6, e17798.
Lesh, T. V. (1970). Zen meditation and the development of empathy in counselors. Journal
of Humanistic Psychology, 10, 39–74.
Leung, M. K., Chan, C. C., Yin, J., Lee, C. F., So, K. F., & Lee, T. M. (2013). Increased
gray matter volume in the right angular and posterior parahippocampal gyri in
loving-k indness meditators. Social Cognitive & Affective Neuroscience, 8, 34–39.
Levenson, R. W., Ekman, P., & Ricard, M. (2012). Meditation and the startle
response: A case study. Emotion, 12, 650–658.
Levinson, D. B., Stoll, E. L., Kindy, S. D., Merry, H. L., & Davidson, R. J. (2014). A mind
you can count on: Validating breath counting as a behavioral measure of mindful-
ness. Frontiers in Psychology, 5.
Liddell, B. J., Brown, K. J., Kemp, A. H., Barton, M. J., Das, P., Peduto, A., … Williams,
L. M. (2005). A direct brainstem-amygdala-cortical “alarm” system for subliminal
signals of fear. NeuroImage, 24, 235–243.
Lin, P., Chang, J., Zemon, V., & Midlarsky, E. (2008). Silent illumination: A study on
Chan (Zen) meditation, anxiety, and musical performance quality. Psychology of
Music, 36, 139–155.
Lindahl, J. R., Kaplan, C. T., Winget, E. M., & Britton, W. B. (2014). A phenomenology
of meditation-induced light experiences: Traditional buddhist and neurobiological
perspectives. Frontiers in Psychology, 4.
Linehan, M. (1993). Cognitive- behavioral treatment of borderline personality disorder.
New York: Guilford.
Lipsey, M. W., & Wilson, D. B. (1993). The efficacy of psychological, educational, and
behavioral treatment. Confirmation from meta-analysis. The American Psychologist,
48, 1181–1209.
207
Bibliography 207
Lloyd, D. M., Lewis, E., Payne, J., & Wilson, L. (2012). A qualitative analysis of sen-
sory phenomena induced by perceptual deprivation. Phenomenology and the Cognitive
Sciences, 11, 95–112.
Lo, P. C., Huang, M. L., & Chang, K. M. (2003). EEG alpha blocking correlated with
perception of inner light during Zen meditation. The American Journal of Chinese
Medicine, 31, 629–642.
Lou, H. C., Kjaer, T. W., Friberg, L., Wildschiodtz, G., Holm, S., & Nowak, M. (1999).
A 15O-H2O PET study of meditation and the resting state of normal consciousness.
Human Brain Mapping, 7, 98–105.
Luders, E. (2014). Exploring age-related brain degeneration in meditation practitioners.
Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1307, 82–88.
Luders, E., Clark, K., Narr, K. L., & Toga, A. W. (2011). Enhanced brain connectivity in
long-term meditation practitioners. NeuroImage, 57, 1308–1316.
Luders, E., Thompson, P. M., Kurth, F., Hong, J. Y., Phillips, O. R., Wang, Y., … Toga,
A. W. (2013). Global and regional alterations of hippocampal anatomy in long-term
meditation practitioners. Human Brain Mapping, 34, 3369–3375.
Luders, E., Toga, A. W., Lepore, N., & Gaser, C. (2009). The underlying anatomical
correlates of long-term meditation: Larger hippocampal and frontal volumes of gray
matter. NeuroImage, 45, 672–678.
Lutz, A., Dunne, J. D., & Davidson, R. J. (2007). Meditation and the neuroscience of
consciousness: An introduction. In P. D. Zelazo, M. Moscovtich, & E. Thompson
(Eds.), The Cambridge handbook of consciousness (pp. 499–551). New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Lutz, A., Greischar, L. L., Perlman, D. M., & Davidson, R. J. (2009). BOLD signal in
insula is differentially related to cardiac function during compassion meditation in
experts vs. novices. NeuroImage, 47, 1038–1046.
Lutz, A., McFarlin, D. R., Perlman, D. M., Salomons, T. V., & Davidson, R. J. (2013).
Altered anterior insula activation during anticipation and experience of painful stim-
uli in expert meditators. NeuroImage, 64, 538–546.
Lutz, A., Slagter, H. A., Dunne, J. D., & Davidson, R. J. (2008). Attention regulation and
monitoring in meditation. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 12, 163–169.
Lykins, E. L. B., & Baer, R. A. (2009). Psychological functioning in a sample of long-
term practitioners of mindfulness meditation. Journal of Cognitive Psychotherapy, 23,
226–241.
Lynch, S., Gander, M. L., Kohls, N., Kudielka, B., & Walach, H. (2011). Mindfulness-
based coping with university life: A non-randomized wait-l ist-controlled pilot evalu-
ation. Stress and Health, 27, 365–375.
MacKenzie C. S., Poulin, P. A., & Seidman-Carlson, R. (2006). A brief mindfulness-
based stress reduction intervention for nurses and nurse aides. Applied Nursing
Research, 19, 105–109.
MacLean, K. A., Ferrer, E., Aichele, S. R., Bridwell, D. A., Zanesco, A. P., Jacobs, T.
L., … Wallace, B. A. (2010). Intensive meditation training improves perceptual dis-
crimination and sustained attention. Psychological Science, 21, 829–839.
Maguire, E. A., Gadian, D. G., Johnsrude, I. S., Good, C. D., Ashburner, J.,
Frackowiak, R. S., & Frith, C. D. (2000). Navigation-related structural change in
the hippocampi of taxi drivers. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 97,
4398–4 403.
208
208Bibliography
Makris, N., Kennedy, D. N., McInerney, S., Sorensen, A. G., Wang, R., Caviness, V. S.,
& Pandya, D. N. (2005). Segmentation of subcomponents within the superior longi-
tudinal fascicle in humans: A quantitative, in vivo, DT-MRI study. Cerebral Cortex,
15, 854–869.
Malarkey, W. B., Jarjoura, D., & Klatt, M. (2013). Workplace based mindfulness practice
and inflammation: A randomized trial. Brain, Behavior, and Immunity, 27, 145–154.
Malinowski, P. (2013). Neural mechanisms of attentional control in mindfulness medita-
tion. Frontiers in Neuroscience, 7, 8.
Manna, A., Raffone, A., Perrucci, M. G., Nardo, D., Ferretti, A., Tartaro, A., …
Romani, G. L. (2010). Neural correlates of focused attention and cognitive monitor-
ing in meditation. Brain Research Bulletin, 82, 46–56.
Manocha, R. (2000). Why meditation? Australian Family Physician, 29, 1135–1138.
Mascaro, J. S., Rilling, J. K., Negi, L. T., & Raison, C. L. (2013a). Compassion medi-
tation enhances empathic accuracy and related neural activity. Social Cognitive &
Affective Neuroscience, 8, 48–55.
Mascaro, J. S., Rilling, J. K., Negi, L. T., & Raison, C. L. (2013b). Pre-existing brain
function predicts subsequent practice of mindfulness and compassion meditation.
NeuroImage, 69, 35–42.
Mason, O. J., & Brady, F. (2009). The psychotomimetic effects of short-term sensory
deprivation. The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 197, 783–785.
McCall, C., Steinbeis, N., Ricard, M., & Singer, T. (2014). Compassion meditators show
less anger, less punishment, and more compensation of victims in response to fair-
ness violations. Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience, 8.
McEvoy, T. M., Frumkin, L. R., & Harkins, S. W. (1980). Effects of meditation on brain-
stem auditory evoked potentials. International Journal of Neuroscience, 10, 165–170.
McNaughton, N. (2006). The role of the subiculum within the behavioural inhibition
system. Behavioural Brain Research, 174, 232–250.
Melloni, M., Sedeño, L., Couto, B., Reynoso, M., Gelormini, C., Favaloro, R., …
Ibanez, A. (2013). Preliminary evidence about the effects of meditation on interocep-
tive sensitivity and social cognition. Behavioral and Brain Functions, 9.
Metzinger, T. (2004). Being no one: The self-model theory of subjectivity. Boston: MIT
Press.
Mirams, L., Poliakoff, E., Brown, R. J., & Lloyd, D. M. (2013). Brief body-scan medita-
tion practice improves somatosensory perceptual decision making. Consciousness and
Cognition, 22, 348–359.
Mitchell, J. T., McIntyre, E. M., English, J. S., Dennis, M. F., Beckham, J. C., & Kollins,
S. H. (2013). A pilot trial of mindfulness meditation training for ADHD in adult-
hood: Impact on core symptoms, executive functioning, and emotion dysregulation.
Journal of Atention Disorders. Online advance publication.
Mitchell, J. T., Nelson-Gray, R. O., & Anastopoulos, A. D. (2008). Adapting an emerg-
ing empirically supported cognitive-b ehavioral therapy for adults with ADHD and
comorbid complications: An example of two case studies. Clinical Case Studies, 7(5),
423–448.
Mitchell, J. T., Zylowska, L., & Kollins, S. H. (2015). Mindfulness meditation train-
ing for attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder in adulthood: Current empirical sup-
port, treatment overview, and future directions. Cognitive and Behavioral Practice, 22,
172–191.
209
Bibliography 209
Moore, A., Gruber, T., Derose, J., & Malinowski, P. (2012). Regular, brief mindfulness
meditation practice improves electrophysiological markers of attentional control.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 6.
Moore, A., & Malinowski, P. (2009). Meditation, mindfulness and cognitive flexibility.
Consciousness and Cognition, 18, 176–186.
Mor, N., and Winquist, J. (2002). Self-focused attention and negative affect: A meta-
analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 128, 638–662.
Morone, N. E., Greco, C. M., & Weiner, D. K. (2008). Mindfulness meditation for the
treatment of chronic low back pain in older adults: A randomized controlled pilot
study. PAIN, 134, 310–319.
Morrison, A. B., Goolsarran, M., Rogers, S. L., & Jha, A. P. (2013). Taming a wandering
attention: Short-form mindfulness training in student cohorts. Frontiers in Human
Neuroscience, 7.
Mrazek, M. D., Franklin, M. S., Phillips, D. T., Baird, B., & Schooler, J. W. (2013).
Mindfulness training improves working memory capacity and GRE performance
while reducing mind wandering. Psychological Science, 24 776–781.
Nakao, M., Yano, E., Nomura, S., & Kuboki, T. (2003). Blood pressure-lowering effects
of biofeedback treatment in hypertension: A meta-analysis of randomized controlled
trials. Hypertension Research, 26, 37–46.
Namdak, L. T. (2006). Bonpo dzogchen teachings. Edited and translated by J. M. Reynolds.
Kathmandu, Nepal: Vajra.
Naranjo, J. R., & Schmidt, S. (2012). Is it me or not me? Modulation of perceptual-
motor awareness and visuomotor performance by mindfulness meditation. BMC
Neuroscience, 13.
Neff, K. D., & Germer, C. K. (2013). A pilot study and randomized controlled trial of the
mindful self-compassion program. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 69, 28–44.
Nestoriuc, Y., & Martin, A. (2007). Efficacy of biofeedback for migraine: A meta-
analysis. PAIN, 128, 111–127.
Nestoriuc, Y., Rief, W., & Martin, A. (2008). Meta-analysis of biofeedback for tension-
type headache: Efficacy, specificity, and treatment moderators. Journal of Consulting
and Clinical Psychology, 76, 379–396.
Newberg, A. B. (2014). The neuroscientific study of spiritual practices. Frontiers in
Psychology, 5.
Nolen-Hoeksema, S. (2000). The role of rumination in depressive disorders and mixed
anxiety/depressive symptoms. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 109, 504–511.
Northoff, G., Heinzel, A., de Greck, M., Bermpohl, F., Dobrowolny, H., & Panksepp, J.
(2006). Self-referential processing in our brain—A meta-analysis of imaging studies
on the self. NeuroImage, 31, 440–457.
Nyklíček, I., & Kuipers, E. (2008). Effects of mindfulness-based stress reduction inter-
vention on psychological well-b eing and quality of life: Is increased mindfulness
indeed the mechanism? Annals of Behavioral Medicine, 35, 331–340
Nyklíček, I., Mommersteeg, P., Van Beugen, S., Ramakers, C., & Van Boxtel, G. J.
(2013). Mindfulness-based stress reduction and physiological activity during acute
stress: A randomized controlled trial. Health Psychology, 32(10), 1110.
Ochsner, K. N., Ray, R. D., Cooper, J. C., Robertson, E. R., Chopra, S., Gabrieli, J. D., &
Gross, J. J. (2004). For better or for worse: Neural systems supporting the cognitive
down-and up-regulation of negative emotion. NeuroImage, 23(2), 483–499.
210
210Bibliography
Oken, B. S., Fonareva, I., Haas, M., Wahbeh, H., Lane, J. B., Zajdel, D., & Amen, A.
(2010). Pilot controlled trial of mindfulness meditation and education for dementia
caregivers. The Journal of Alternative and Complementary Medicine, 16, 1031–1038.
O’Leary, K., & Dockray, S. (2015). The effects of two novel gratitude and mindfulness
interventions on well-b eing. The Journal of Alternative and Complementary Medicine,
21, 243–245.
Olesen, P. J., Nagy, Z., Westerberg, H., & Klingberg, T. (2003). Combined analysis of
DTI and fMRI data reveals a joint maturation of white and grey matter in a fronto-
parietal network. Cognitive Brain Research, 18, 48–57.
Olivers, C. N., & Nieuwenhuis, S. (2005). The beneficial effect of concurrent task-
irrelevant mental activity on temporal attention. Psychological Science, 16, 265–269.
Olivers, C. N., & Nieuwenhuis, S. (2006). The beneficial effects of additional task load,
positive affect, and instruction on the attentional blink. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 32, 364–379.
Oman, D., Shapiro, S. L., Thoresen, C. E., Flinders, T., Driskill, J. D., & Plante, T. G.
(2007). Learning from spiritual models and meditation: A randomized evaluation of
a college course. Pastoral Psychology, 55, 473–493.
O’Mara, S. (2005). The subiculum: What it does, what it might do, and what neuro-
anatomy has yet to tell us. Journal of Anatomy, 207, 271–282.
Omata, K., Hanakawa, T., Morimoto, M., & Honda, M. (2013). Spontaneous slow fluc-
tuation of EEG alpha rhythm reflects activity in deep-brain structures: A simultane-
ous EEG-f MRI study. PLoS ONE, 8, e66869.
Orme- Johnson, D. W. (1973). Autonomic stability and transcendental meditation.
Psychosomatic Medicine, 35, 341–349.
Ortner, C. N. M., Kilner, S. J., & Zelazo, P. D. (2007). Mindfulness meditation and
reduced emotional interference on a cognitive task. Motivation and Emotion, 31,
271–283.
Ott, U., Hölzel, B.K., & Vaitl, D. (2011). Brain structure and meditation. How spiri-
tual practice shapes the brain. In H. Walach, S. Schmidt, & W. B.Jonas (Eds.),
Neuroscience, consciousness and spirituality. Proceedings of the expert meeting in
Freiburg/Breisgau 2008. Berlin: Springer.
Ozawa- de Silva, B., & Dodson- Lavelle, B. (2011). An education of heart and
mind: Practical and theoretical issues in teaching cognitive-based compassion train-
ing to children. Practical Matters, 1, 1–28.
Pace, T. W., Negi, L. T., Adame, D. D., Cole, S. P., Sivilli, T. I., Brown, T. D., … Raison,
C. L. (2009). Effect of compassion meditation on neuroendocrine, innate immune
and behavioral responses to psychosocial stress. Psychoneuroendocrinology, 34, 87–98.
Pagano, R. R., Rose, R. M., Stivers, R. M., & Warrenburg, S. (1976). Sleep during
Transcendental Meditation. Science, 191, 308–310.
Pagnoni, G., & Cekic, M. (2007). Age effects on gray matter volume and attentional
performance in Zen meditation. Neurobiology of Aging, 28, 1623–1627.
Pagnoni, G., Cekic, M., & Guo, Y. (2008). “Thinking about not-thinking”: Neural cor-
relates of conceptual processing during Zen meditation. PLoS One, 3, e3083.
Pattanashetty, R., Sathiamma, S., Talakkad, S., Nityananda, P., Trichur, R., & Kutty,
B. M. (2010). Practitioners of vipassana meditation exhibit enhanced slow wave sleep
and REM sleep states across different age groups. Sleep and Biological Rhythms,
8, 34–41.
211
Bibliography 211
Penfield, W., & Erickson, T. C. (1941). Epilepsy and cerebral localization: A study of the
mechanism, treatment and prevention of epileptic seizures. Springfield, IL: Thomas.
Perez-De-A lbeniz, A., & Holmes, J. (2000). Meditation: Concepts, effects and uses in
therapy. International Journal of Psychotherapy, 5, 49–58.
Perlman, D. M., Salomons, T. V., Davidson, R. J., & Lutz, A. (2010). Differential effects
on pain intensity and unpleasantness of two meditation practices. Emotion, 10, 65–71.
Persinger, M. A. (1983). Religious and mystical experiences as artifacts of temporal lobe
function: A general hypothesis. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 57, 1255–1262.
Pettersson, R., Söderström, S., Edlund-Söderström, K., & Nilsson, K. W. (2014). Internet-
based cognitive behavioral therapy for adults with ADHD in outpatient psychiatric
care: A randomized trial. Journal of Attention Disorders. Online advance publication.
Phan, K. L., Taylor, S. F., Welsh, R. C., Decker, L. R., Noll, D. C., Nichols, T. E., …
Liberzon, I. (2003). Activation of the medial prefrontal cortex and extended amyg-
dala by individual ratings of emotional arousal: A fMRI study. Biological Psychiatry,
53, 211–215.
Phang, C. K., Mukhtar, F., Ibrahim, N., Keng, S. L., & Mohd, S. S. (2015). Effects of a
brief mindfulness-based intervention program for stress management among medi-
cal students: The Mindful-Gym randomized controlled study. Advances in Health
Sciences Education: Theory and Practice, 20, 1115–1134.
Philipsen, A., Richter, H., Peters, J., Alm, B., Sobanski, E., Colla, M., … van Elst, L. T.
(2007). Structured group psychotherapy in adults with attention deficit hyperactivity
disorder: Results of an open multicentre study. The Journal of Nervous and Mental
Disease, 195, 1013–1019.
Phongsuphap, S., Pongsupap, Y., Chandanamattha, P., & Lursinsap, C. (2008). Changes
in heart rate variability during concentration meditation. International Journal of
Cardiology, 130, 481– 484.
Pickert, K. (2014). The mindful revolution. Time, 23, 40–49.
Piet, J., & Hougaard, E. (2011). The effect of mindfulness-based cognitive therapy for
prevention of relapse in recurrent major depressive disorder: A systematic review and
meta-analysis. Clinical Psychology Review, 31, 1032–1040.
Prakash, R. S., Hussain, M. A., & Schirda, B. (2015). The role of emotion regulation
and cognitive control in the association between mindfulness disposition and stress.
Psychology and Aging, 30, 160–171.
Purser, R. E. (2014). Clearing the muddled path of traditional and contemporary mind-
fulness: A response to Monteiro, Musten, and Compson. Mindfulness, 6, 1–23.
Purser, R., & Loy, D. (2013). Beyond McMindfulness. Huffington Post. Retrieved from
http://w ww.huffingtonpost.com/ron-p urser/ b eyond-m cmindfulness_ b _ 3519289.
html.
Raichle, M. E., MacLeod, A. M., Snyder, A. Z., Powers, W. J., Gusnard, D. A., &
Shulman, G. L. (2001). A default mode of brain function. Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences, 98, 676–682.
Rief, W., Nestoriuc, Y., Weiss, S., Welzel, E., Barsky, A. J., & Hofmann, S. G. (2009).
Meta-analysis of the placebo response in antidepressant trials. Journal of Affective
Disorders, 118, 1–8.
Robinson, F. P., Mathews, H. L., & Witek- Janusek, L. (2003). Psycho- endocrine-
immune response to mindfulness- based stress reduction in individuals infected
212
212Bibliography
with the human immunodeficiency virus: A quasiexperimental study. The Journal of

Alternative & Complementary Medicine, 9, 683–694.
Ruocco, A. C., & Direkoglu, E. (2013). Delineating the contributions of sustained atten-
tion and working memory to individual differences in mindfulness. Personality and
Individual Differences, 54, 226–230.
Ryff, C. D. (1989). Happiness is everything, or is it? Explorations on the meaning
of psychological well- b eing. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57,
1069–1081.
Sahdra, B. K., MacLean, K. A., Ferrer, E., Shaver, P. R., Rosenberg, E. L., Jacobs, T. L.,
… Mangun, G. R. (2011). Enhanced response inhibition during intensive meditation
training predicts improvements in self-reported adaptive socioemotional function-
ing. Emotion, 11, 299–312.
Salardini, A., Narayanan, N. S., Arora, J., Constable, T., & Jabbari, B. (2012). Ipsilateral
synkinesia involves the supplementary motor area. Neuroscience Letters, 523, 135–138.
Salzberg, S. (2010). Real happiness: The power of meditation: A 28-day program. New York:
Workman.
Sanmuganathan, P. S., Ghahramani, P., Jackson, P. R., Wallis, E. J., & Ramsay, L. E.
(2001). Aspirin for primary prevention of coronary heart disease: Safety and abso-
lute benefit related to coronary risk derived from meta-analysis of randomised trials.
Heart, 85, 265–271.
Santorelli, S. (2014). Mindfulness-based stress reduction (MBSR): Standards of practice.
Amherst, MA: Center for Mindfulness in Medicine, Health Care & Society.
Sauer, S., Walach, H., & Kohls, N. (2011a). Gray’s behavioural inhibition system as a
mediator of mindfulness towards well-b eing. Personality and Individual Differences,
50, 506–511.
Sauer, S., Walach, H., Schmidt, S., Hinterberger, T., Horan, M., & Kohls, N. (2011b).
Implicit and explicit emotional behavior and mindfulness. Consciousness and
Cognition, 20(4), 1558–1569.
Sayadaw, M. (1994). The progress of insight: A treatise on Buddhist satipatthana meditation.
Edited and translated by N. Thera. Kandy, Sri Lanka: Buddhist Publication Society.
Schoenbaum, G., & Esber, G. R. (2010). How do you (estimate you will) like them
apples? Integration as a defining trait of orbitofrontal function. Current Opinion in
Neurobiology, 20, 205–211.
Schoenberg, P. L., Hepark, S., Kan, C. C., Barendregt, H. P., Buitelaar, J. K., & Speckens,
A. E. (2014). Effects of mindfulness-based cognitive therapy on neurophysiological
correlates of performance monitoring in adult attention-deficit/hyperactivity disor-
der. Clinical Neurophysiology, 125, 1407–1416.
Sears, S., & Kraus, S. (2009). I think therefore I om: Cognitive distortions and coping
style as mediators for the effects of mindfulness meditation on anxiety, positive and
negative affect, and hope. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 65, 561–573.
Sears, S. R., Kraus, S., Carlough, K., & Treat, E. (2011). Perceived benefits and doubts of
participants in a weekly meditation study. Mindfulness, 2, 167–174.
Sedlmeier, P., Eberth, J., Schwarz, M., Zimmermann, D., Haarig, F., Jaeger, S., & Kunze,
S. (2012). The psychological effects of meditation: A meta-analysis. Psychological
Bulletin, 138, 1139–1171.
213
Bibliography 213
Seeley, W. W., Menon, V., Schatzberg, A. F., Keller, J., Glover, G. H., Kenna, H., …
Greicius, M. D. (2007). Dissociable intrinsic connectivity networks for salience pro-
cessing and executive control. The Journal of Neuroscience, 27, 2349–2356.
Segal, Z. V., Williams, J. M. G., & Teasdale, J. D. (2002). Mindfulness-based cognitive
therapy for depression: A new approach to relapse prevention. New York: Guilford.
Segal, Z. V., Williams, J. M. G., & Teasdale, J. D. (2013). Mindfulness-based cognitive
therapy for depression (2nd ed.). New York: Guilford.
Sergent, J., Ohta, S., & MacDonald, B. (1992). Functional neuroanatomy of face and
object processing. A positron emission tomography study. Brain, 115, 15–36.
Shankman, R. (2008). The experience of Samadhi: An in-depth exploration of Buddhist
meditation. Boston: Shambhala.
Shankman, R. (2015). The art and skill of Buddhist meditation: Mindfulness, concentration,
and insight. Oakland, CA: New Harbinger.
Shapiro, D. H. Jr. (1992). Adverse effects of meditation: A preliminary investigation of
long-term meditators. International Journal of Psychosomatics, 39, 62–67.
Shapiro, S. L., Brown, K. W., & Biegel, G. M. (2007). Teaching self-care to caregiv-
ers: Effects of mindfulness-based stress reduction on the mental health of therapists
in training. Training and Education in Professional Psychology, 1, 105–111.
Shapiro, S. L., Brown, K. W., Thoresen, C., & Plante, T. G. (2011). The moderation of
mindfulness-based stress reduction effects by trait mindfulness: Results from a ran-
domized controlled trial. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 67, 267–277.
Shapiro, S. L., Carlson, L. E., Astin, J. A., & Freedman, B. (2006). Mechanisms of mind-
fulness. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 62, 373–386.
Shapiro, S. L., Oman, D., Thoresen, C. E., Plante, T. G., & Flinders, T. (2008). Cultivating
mindfulness: Effects on well-b eing. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 64, 840–862.
Shapiro, S. L., Schwartz, G. E., & Bonner, G. (1998). Effects of mindfulness-based stress
reduction on medical and premedical students. Journal of Behavioral Medicine, 21,
581–599.
Sharma, M., & Rush, S. E. (2014). Mindfulness- based stress reduction as a stress
management intervention for healthy individuals: A systematic review. Journal of
Evidence-Based Complementary & Alternative Medicine, 19, 271–286.
Shiba, K., Nishimoto, M., Sugimoto, M., & Ishikawa, Y. (2015). The association between
meditation practice and job performance: A cross-sectional study. PloS One, 10,
e0128287.
Shonin, E., Van Gordon, W., Slade, K., & Griffiths, M. D. (2013). Mindfulness and
other Buddhist-derived interventions in correctional settings: A systematic review.
Aggression and Violent Behavior, 18, 365–372.
Sibley, B. A., & Etnier, J. L. (2003). The relationship between physical activity and cogni-
tion in children: A meta-analysis. Pediatric Exercise Science, 15, 243–256.
Silverstein, R. G., Brown, A. C., Roth, H. D., & Britton, W. B. (2011). Effects of mind-
fulness training on body awareness to sexual stimuli: Implications for female sexual
dysfunction. Psychosomatic Medicine, 73, 817–825.
Singh, N. N., Singh, A. N., Lancioni, G. E., Singh, J., Winton, A. S., & Adkins, A. D.
(2010). Mindfulness training for parents and their children with ADHD increases the
children’s compliance. Journal of Child and Family Studies, 19, 157–166.
214
214Bibliography
Singleton, O., Hölzel, B. K., Vangel, M., Brach, N., Carmody, J., & Lazar, S. W. (2014).
Change in brainstem gray matter concentration following a mindfulness- based
intervention is correlated with improvement in psychological well-b eing. Frontiers in
Slagter, H. A., Lutz, A., Greischar, L. L., Francis, A. D., Nieuwenhuis, S., Davis, J. M.,
… Richard, J. (2007). Mental training affects distribution of limited brain resources.
PLoS Biology, 5, e138.
Smith, S. M., Fox, P. T., Miller, K. L., Glahn, D. C., Fox, P. M., Mackay, C. E., …
Beckmann, C. F. (2009). Correspondence of the brain’s functional architecture
during activation and rest. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 106,
13040–13045.
Snippe, E., Nyklíček, I., Schroevers, M. J., & Bos, E. H. (2015). The temporal order of
change in daily mindfulness and affect during mindfulness-based stress reduction.
Journal of Counseling Psychology, 62, 106–114.
Song, Y., & Lindquist, R. (2015). Effects of mindfulness-based stress reduction on
depression, anxiety, stress and mindfulness in Korean nursing students. Nurse
Education Today, 35, 86–90.
Sood, A., Sharma, V., Schroeder, D. R., & Gorman, B. (2014). Stress management
and resiliency training (SMART) program among department of radiology fac-
ulty: A pilot randomized clinical trial. Explore: The Journal of Science and Healing,
10, 358–363.
Spasojeviç, J., & Alloy, L. B. (2001). Rumination as a common mechanism relating
depressive risk factors to depression. Emotion, 1, 25–37.
Sperduti, M., Martinelli, P., & Piolino, P. (2012). A neurocognitive model of meditation
based on activation likelihood estimation (ALE) meta-analysis. Consciousness and
Cognition, 21, 269–276.
Spreng, R. N., Sepulcre, J., Turner, G. R., Stevens, W. D., & Schacter, D. L. (2013).
Intrinsic architecture underlying the relations among the default, dorsal atten-
tion, and frontoparietal control networks of the human brain. Journal of Cognitive
Sucala, M., & David, D. (2013). Mindful about time in a fast forward world. The effects
of mindfulness exercise on time perception. Transylvanian Journal of Psychology, 14,
243–253.
Sze, J. A., Gyurak, A., Yuan, J. W., & Levenson, R. W. (2010). Coherence between emo-
tional experience and physiology: Does body awareness training have an impact?
Emotion, 10, 803–814.
Tacon, A. M., McComb, J., Caldera, Y., & Randolph, P. (2003). Mindfulness medita-
tion, anxiety reduction, and heart disease: A pilot study. Family & Community
Health: Journal of Health Promotion & Maintenance, 26, 25–33.
Tang, Y. Y., Hölzel, B. K., & Posner, M. I. (2015). The neuroscience of mindfulness medi-
tation. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 16, 213–225.
Tang, Y. Y., Lu, Q., Geng, X., Stein, E. A., Yang, Y., & Posner, M. I. (2010). Short-term
meditation induces white matter changes in the anterior cingulate. Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences, 107, 15649–15652.
Tang, Y. Y., Ma, Y., Fan, Y., Feng, H., Wang, J., Feng, S., … Fan, M. (2009). Central
and autonomic nervous system interaction is altered by short- term meditation.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 106, 8865– 8870.
215
Bibliography 215
Tang, Y. Y., Rothbart, M. K., & Posner, M. I. (2012). Neural correlates of establishing,
maintaining, and switching brain states. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 16, 330–337.
Taylor, B. L., Strauss, C., Cavanagh, K., & Jones, F. (2014). The effectiveness of self-help
mindfulness-based cognitive therapy in a student sample: A randomised controlled
trial. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 63, 63–69.
Telles, S., & Naveen, K. V. (2004). Changes in middle latency auditory evoked potentials
during meditation. Psychological Reports, 94, 398–400.
Teper, R., & Inzlicht, M. (2013). Meditation, mindfulness and executive control: The
importance of emotional acceptance and brain- based performance monitoring.
Social Cognitive & Affective Neuroscience, 8, 85–92.
Testa, C., Laakso, M.P., Sabattoli, F., Rossi, R., Beltramello, A., Soininen, H., Frisoni,
G.B., 2004. A comparison between the accuracy of voxel-based morphometry and
hippocampal volumetry in Alzheimer’s disease. Journal of Magnetic Resonance
Imaging 19, 274–282.
Tipsord, J. M. (2009). The effects of mindfulness training and individual differences in mind-
fulness on social perception and empathy (Doctoral dissertation). University of Oregon.
Tomasino, B., Fregona, S., Skrap, M., & Fabbro, F. (2012). Meditation-related activa-
tions are modulated by the practices needed to obtain it and by the expertise: An
ALE meta-analysis study. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 6.
Travis, F., & Wallace, R. K. (1997). Autonomic patterns during respiratory suspen-
sions: Possible markers of transcendental consciousness. Psychophysiology, 34, 39–46.
Trungpa, C. (2010). Meditation in action. Boston: Shambhala.
Uttal, W. R. (2001). The new phrenology: The limits of localizing cognitive processes in the
brain. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Vago, D. R., & Silbersweig, D. A. (2012). Self- awareness, self- regulation, and self-
transcendence (S-ART): A framework for understanding the neurobiological mecha-
nisms of mindfulness. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 6.
Valentine, E. R., & Sweet, P. L. (1999). Meditation and attention: A comparison of the
effects of concentrative and mindfulness meditation on sustained attention. Mental
Health, Religion & Culture, 2(1), 59–70.
Van den Hurk, P. A. M., Giommi, F., Gielen, S. C., Speckens, A. E. M., & Barendregt, H.
P. (2010). Greater efficiency in attentional processing related to mindfulness medita-
tion. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 63, 1168–1180.
Van den Hurk, P. A., Wingens, T., Giommi, F., Barendregt, H. P., Speckens, A. E., & van
Schie, H. T. (2011). On the relationship between the practice of mindfulness medita-
tion and personality—A n exploratory analysis of the mediating role of mindfulness
skills. Mindfulness, 2, 194–200.
van der Meer, L., Costafreda, S., Aleman, A., & David, A. S. (2010). Self-reflection
and the brain: A theoretical review and meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies with
implications for schizophrenia. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, 34, 935–946.
Van der Oord, S., Bögels, S. M., & Peijnenburg, D. (2012). The effectiveness of mind-
fulness training for children with ADHD and mindful parenting for their parents.
Journal of Child and Family Studies, 21, 139–147.
Van der Velden, A. M., Kuyken, W., Wattar, U., Crane, C., Pallesen, K. J., Dahlgaard, J.,
… Piet, J. (2015). A systematic review of mechanisms of change in mindfulness-based
cognitive therapy in the treatment of recurrent major depressive disorder. Clinical
216
216Bibliography
Van de Weijer-Bergsma, E., Formsma, A. R., de Bruin, E. I., & Bögels, S. M. (2012). The
effectiveness of mindfulness training on behavioral problems and attentional func-
tioning in adolescents with ADHD. Journal of Child and Family Studies, 21, 775–787.
Van Gordon, W., Shonin, E., Sumich, A., Sundin, E. C., & Griffiths, M. D. (2014).
Meditation awareness training (MAT) for psychological well-b eing in a sub-clinical
sample of university students: A controlled pilot study. Mindfulness, 5, 381–391.
van Leeuwen, S., Muller, N. G., & Melloni, L. (2009). Age effects on attentional blink
performance in meditation. Consciousness and Cognition, 18, 593–599.
van Leeuwen, S., Singer, W., & Melloni, L. (2012). Meditation increases the depth of
information processing and improves the allocation of attention in space. Frontiers in
Van Vugt, M. K., & Slagter, H. A. (2014). Control over experience? Magnitude of the
attentional blink depends on meditative state. Consciousness and Cognition, 23, 32–39.
Varela, F. J. (1996). Neurophenomenology: A methodological remedy for the hard prob-
lem. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 3, 330–349.
Veehof, M. M., Oskam, M. J., Schreurs, K. M., & Bohlmeijer, E. T. (2011). Acceptance-
based interventions for the treatment of chronic pain: A systematic review and meta-
analysis. PAIN, 152, 533–542.
Vestergaard-Poulsen, P., van Beek, M., Skewes, J., Bjarkam, C. R., Stubberup, M.,
Bertelsen, J., & Roepstorff, A. (2009). Long-term meditation is associated with
increased gray matter density in the brain stem. Neuroreport, 20, 170–174.
Vettese, L. C., Toneatto, T., Stea, J. N., Nguyen, L., & Wang, J. J. (2009). Do mindful-
ness meditation participants do their homework? And does it make a difference?
A review of the empirical evidence. Journal of Cognitive Psychotherapy, 23, 198–225.
Vieten, C., & Astin, J. (2008). Effects of a mindfulness-based intervention during preg-
nancy on prenatal stress and mood: Results of a pilot study. Archives of Women’s
Mental Health, 11, 67–74.
Visted, E., Vøllestad, J., Nielsen, M. B., & Nielsen, G. H. (2014). The impact of group-
based mindfulness training on self-reported mindfulness: A systematic review and
meta-analysis. Mindfulness, 6, 501–522.
Vøllestad, J., Nielsen, M. B., & Nielsen, G. H. (2012). Mindfulness-and acceptance-
based interventions for anxiety disorders: A systematic review and meta-analysis.
British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 51, 239–260.
Vøllestad, J., Sivertsen, B., & Nielsen, G. H. (2011). Mindfulness-based stress reduc-
tion for patients with anxiety disorders: Evaluation in a randomized controlled trial.
Behaviour Research and Therapy, 49, 281–288.
Walach, H., Buchheld, N., Buttenmüller, V., Kleinknecht, N., & Schmidt, S. (2006).
Measuring mindfulness—T he Freiburg Mindfulness Inventory (FMI). Personality
and Individual Differences, 40, 1543–1555.
Walach, H., Nord, E., Zier, C., Dietz-Waschkowski, B., Kersig, S., & Schüpbach, H.
(2007). Mindfulness- based stress reduction as a method for personnel develop-
ment: A pilot evaluation. International Journal of Stress Management, 14, 188–198
Wallmark, E., Safarzadeh, K., Daukantaitė, D., & Maddux, R. E. (2013). Promoting
altruism through meditation: An 8- week randomized controlled pilot study.
Mindfulness, 4, 223–234.
217
Bibliography 217
Wang, D. J., Rao, H., Korczykowski, M., Wintering, N., Pluta, J., Khalsa, D. S., &
Newberg, A. B. (2011). Cerebral blood flow changes associated with different medita-
tion practices and perceived depth of meditation. Psychiatry Research: Neuroimaging,
191, 60–67.
Wenk- Sormaz, H. (2005). Meditation can reduce habitual responding. Alternative
Therapies in Health and Medicine, 11, 42–58.
Weng, H. Y., Fox, A. S., Shackman, A. J., Stodola, D. E., Caldwell, J. Z., Olson, M. C.,
… Davidson, R. J. (2013). Compassion training alters altruism and neural responses
to suffering. Psychological Science, 24(7), 1171–1180.
Wiebking, C., de Greck, M., Duncan, N. W., Heinzel, A., Tempelmann, C., & Northoff,
G. (2011). Are emotions associated with activity during rest or interoception? An
exploratory fMRI study in healthy subjects. Neuroscience Letters, 491, 87–92.
Williams, M., & Penman, D. (2011). Mindfulness: An eight-week plan for finding peace in a
frantic world. New York: Rodale.
Wilson, J. (2014). Mindful America: Meditation and the mutual transformation of Buddhism
and American culture. New York: Oxford University Press.
Wilson, T. D., Reinhard, D. A., Westgate, E. C., Gilbert, D. T., Ellerbeck, N., Hahn, C.,
… Shaked, A. (2014). Just think: The challenges of the disengaged mind. Science,
345, 75–77.
Winbush, N. Y., Gross, C. R., & Kreitzer, M. J. (2007). The effects of mindfulness-based
stress reduction on sleep disturbance: A systematic review. Explore: The Journal of
Science and Healing, 3, 585–591.
Witek-Janusek, L., Albuquerque, K., Chroniak, K. R., Chroniak, C., Durazo-A rvizu,
R., & Mathews, H. L. (2008). Effect of mindfulness based stress reduction on immune
function, quality of life and coping in women newly diagnosed with early stage breast
cancer. Brain, Behavior, and Immunity, 22, 969–981.
Wittmann, M., Otten, S., Schötz, E., Sarikaya, A., Lehnen, H., Jo, H. G., … Meissner,
K. (2015). Subjective expansion of extended time-spans in experienced meditators.
Frontiers in Psychology, 5.
Wolkove, N., Kreisman, H., Darragh, D., Cohen, C., & Frank, H. (1984). Effect of
Transcendental Meditation on breathing and respiratory control. Journal of Applied
Physiology: Respiratory, Environmental and Exercise Physiology, 56, 607–612.
Woodrow, H. (1951). Time perception. In S. S. Stevens (Ed.), Handbook of experimental
psychology (pp. 1224–1236). New York: Wiley.
Wu, S. D., & Lo, P. C. (2008). Inward-attention meditation increases parasympathetic
activity: A study based on heart rate variability. Biomedical Research, 29, 245–250.
Yorston, G. A. (2001). Mania precipitated by meditation: A case report and literature
review. Mental Health, Religion and Culture, 4, 209–213.
Younger, J., Adriance, W., & Berger, R. J. (1975). Sleep during transcendental medita-
tion. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 40, 953–954.
Zautra, A. J., Fasman, R., Davis, M. C., & Arthur, D. (2010). The effects of slow breath-
ing on affective responses to pain stimuli: An experimental study. PAIN, 149, 12–18.
Zeidan, F., Gordon, N. S., Merchant, J., & Goolkasian, P. (2010). The effects of brief
mindfulness meditation training on experimentally induced pain. The Journal of
Pain, 11, 199–209.
218
218Bibliography
Zeidan, F., Martucci, K. T., Kraft, R. A., Gordon, N. S., McHaffie, J. G., & Coghill, R. C.
(2011). Brain mechanisms supporting the modulation of pain by mindfulness medita-
tion. The Journal of Neuroscience, 31, 5540–5548.
Zenner, C., Herrnleben-Kurz, S., & Walach, H. (2014). Mindfulness-based interventions
in schools: A systematic review and meta-analysis. Frontiers in Psychology, 5.
Zylowska, L., Ackerman, D. L., Yang, M. H., Futrell, J. L., Horton, N. L., Hale, T. S., …
Smalley, S. L. (2008). Mindfulness meditation training in adults and adolescents with
ADHD: A feasibility study. Journal of Attention Disorders, 11, 737–746.
219
{ INDEX }
Note: Italicized page numbers indicate a figure on the designated page. Page numbers followed by
“n” and another number indicate a numbered endnote on the designated page.
acceptance and commitment therapy (ACT), 9, as neural switch into meditation, 39–40

148, 176n26 in nimitta, 56
active control condition, 119 nonjudgmental, effects of meditation
active control group, 120, 136–137, on, 99–102
142–143, 186n27 nonjudgmental attention, 99
adherence to practice, impact on trait noticing and alerting function of, 97
mindfulness, 137–138 in open-monitoring meditation, 46–48
adverse effects, of mindfulness, 154–156 stability of, meditation’s effects on, 103–104
agency, 63, 65, 66, 180n19 Stroop task measure, 24–25
alpha waves, 19, 24, 56, 72, 130 sustained, meditation’s effects
amygdala, 27, 30, 67–68, 71, 91 on, 103–104
angular gyrus, 32, 35, 36, 40 sustaining and stabilizing function of, 97
anterior cingulate cortex, 28, 30, 41, 46, 61, 67, Tomasino’s map and, 37, 83
82–83, 86–87, 90–92, 101, 165 white matter and, 89
anterior insula, 28, 30, 41, 47, 61, 67, 82–84, 89 attention deficit hyperactivity disorder
antidepressants, 120, 147, 149 (ADHD), 112–114
anxiety attention networks, 17. See also executive
mindfulness’s effects on, 15, 142, 146, control network; salience network
149–150, 153–154 core hubs, 28
state anxiety, 127–128, 134, 135, 160, 161, 164 cycling between, in meditation, 42
trait anxiety, 128, 135, 160, 161, 164 default-mode network coupling with,
attention. See also attention networks; paying 29, 42, 70
attention meditation expertise and, 70
brain changes related to, 77, 82 attentional blink task, 99–100, 114, 160, 161
to the breath, 35–36, 40–42 audio meditations, guided, 176n17
Cahn’s study of, 58 auditory perception research, 57–58
controlling, in meditation, 34 Austin, James, 84
controlling function of, 97 autonomic nervous system, 17–18. See
core self and, 63 also parasympathetic nervous system;
effects of meditation on controlling, 97–99 sympathetic nervous system
effort vs., 104–105 awareness of the body, in space and
in focused-attention practices, 7, 8, 27, time, 49–52
47–48, 56–57, 59–60
functions of, 96–97 Baer, Ruth, 140–141, 143
Garrison’s findings on, 43–45 Bærentsen, Klaus, 39–40
Hasenkamp’s findings on, 40–42, 97 behavioral therapy techniques, 137
Lindahl’s speculations on, 55 Benson, Herbert, 21
in longer-t erm vs. shorter-t erm Berkovich-Ohana, Aviva, 50–52, 65
meditators, 70 beta waves, 21, 24
MBSR program studies involving, 102–104 Bierce, Ambrose, 23
meditator’s statements on, 118 biofeedback, 45, 71, 188n62
mindfulness practice and, 95–116 blood-oxygenation-level dependent (BOLD)
mind-wandering and, 41, 58 response, 23, 43
220
220 Index
body brain activation

changes in awareness of, 35–36, 49–52 challenges in studying, 32
global body awareness, 83, 87, 88, 93, 165 Davidson’s study findings, 124
heart rate reduction in meditation, 20–21 Fox’s meta-analysis, 79–80, 176n44
meditation’s effects on paying attention to, Garrison’s study findings, 43
105–109 heart practices and, 67
mindfulness of, 5, 6, 9 long-t erm meditator studies, 167
perception of, 50 measurement strategies, 25
quieting during meditation, 17–20 meditators vs. nonmeditators, 78
self-reported body awareness, 107 open-monitoring meditation and, 47
sense of disembodiment, 36–37, 40, 52, publication bias in studies of, 80–81
71, 165 results from changes in, 165
spontaneous movements, 37, 50 Stroop test and, 25
warmth during meditation, 20–22 Tomasino’s meta-analysis, 31–37, 32, 79
body movements, 37 brain plasticity, 55, 75–76, 79
body scan meditation, 7, 8, 36, 105, 176n19 brain waves
body sensations, 49–50 alpha, 19, 24, 56, 72, 130
benefits of paying attention to, 90, 109 beta, 21, 24
body scan meditation and, 7, 36, 105 gamma, 24, 126
brain activation and, 36, 40, 86–87 brainstem, 57–58, 63, 81, 91
disembodiment and, 37 Brasington, Leigh, 48–49. See also joy
Grant’s study findings, 87 hypothesis
Kang’s study findings, 87 breath (breathing; breath rate)
long-t erm meditators and, 66 attention networks and, 167
mindfulness exercise example, 2–3 autonomic nervous system and, 17–18
mind-meditations and, 40 becoming the breath, 35–36
Tomasino’s map and, 36, 40, 83 body awareness study and, 105–106
trait mindfulness and, 5, 130 body temperature and, 21
borderline personality disorder, 9 brainstem and, 81
Brahm, Ajahn, 54 decreasing frequency, 19, 20–21
brain. See also brain activation; brain plasticity; executive network and, 30
Tomasino’s map; specific brain structures in focused-attention meditation, 7, 8–9, 48
attention networks, 29–30 focusing on, in mindfulness, xi, xiv, 6, 9, 18,
changes after mindfulness 35–36, 43, 47, 95, 105
interventions, 88–90 forceful breath technique, 21–22
changes in grey matter, 82–86 heart rate synchrony with, 19
changes in white matter, 86–87 MBSR-l ike program study, 130–131
cross-s ectional studies of, 77–79, 93 in open-monitoring techniques, 8–9
default mode network, 28, 28–29 pain sensitivity and, 60–62, 181n38
EEG studies, 23, 24, 56–58, 72, 124, 172 parasympathetic nervous system and, 169
executive network, 30 relaxation therapy and, 120, 185n6
fMRI studies, 23–24 returning to, 40–42
fusiform face area, 27 rostrolateral prefrontal cortex and, 83
gray matter, 82–86, 89 salience network and, 30
longitudinal studies of, 78–79, 86, 88–89, 93 Shabad Kriya and, 46
phrenology and, 22–23 study of frequency, depth, 105
plasticity, 55, 75–76, 79 suspension, in Transcendental
quantitative differences in meditators, 76–77 Meditation®, 20
reorganization capacity of, 89–90 breath-holding/muscle-t ension techniques, 22
response to pain, 60–62, 90–92 Brefczynski-Lewis, Julie, 70, 71
salience network, 30 Brewer, Judson, 47, 68–69, 72
studying the influence of meditation Britton, Willoughby, 10–11, 126, 155,
on, 77–79 190–191n30
two selves representation in, 63 Broks, Paul, 26
white matter, 15, 28, 77, 86–87, 89, 91–93 Brotto, Lori, 108–109
221
Index 221
Buckner, Randy, 34 somatosensory, 47, 61, 64

Buddhism (Buddhist tradition), xiii, 6–8. See ventromedial, 29, 35, 41
also Zen Buddhism cortisol, 85, 123, 135–136, 139–140, 160, 161, 191
Büssing, Cysarz, 19 couples going through mindfulness training,
study of, 131–132
Cahn, Rael, 58, 72 cross-s ectional studies, 77–79, 93
cancer patients, MBSR program for, 148
Capgras syndrome, 27–28 David-Néel, Alexandra, 21
Carson, James, 131–132, 143 Davidson, Richie, 124
Carter, Olivia, 103 daydreaming, 4, 29, 30, 34
Chade-Meng Tan (Meng), xiv de Vibe, Michael, 143–144
Charles Bonnet Syndrome, 54 default-mode network. See also medial
Chiesa, Alberto, 121–122, 148 prefrontal cortex; posterior cingulate
choiceless awareness, 7, 9 cortex; precuneus
clinical populations, mindfulness’s effects in, attention network coupling with, 29, 42, 70
146–149 core hub of, 28
cognition, meditation’s effects on, 111–112 meditation findings, 34–35, 40–4 4, 46, 51–52,
cognitive-based therapy, 109 67, 71, 85
Cognitively Based Compassion Training, 8 mind-wandering and, 5, 28, 34–35, 70
compassion minimal-s elf and, 65
measurement of, 133–134 narrative self and, 44, 65
self-c ompassion, 118, 126, 131, 138–139 open-monitoring meditation and, 46
studies of, 135 Raichle’s discovery of, 28–29
usefulness of, 132–133 salience network coupling with, 72
Compassion Cultivation Training, 9 self-as-story and, 63, 84
compassion meditation, 8, 67–69, 68, 104, subdivisions of, 29
123, 133 depression
compassion training, 8, 123, 133–134, 144, 171, books related to, 1
188n58. See also lojong tradition Britton’s writings on, 10–11
complementary intervention, mindfulness MBCT program for, 126, 145, 148, 149, 163
as, 148 mindfulness books related to, 1
control groups, active and passive, 120 mindfulness’s effects on, 15, 113, 117, 120,
controlled comparison, 119–120 134, 142, 146–147, 150, 152–154, 156, 168
convergence argument, in research orbitofrontal cortex, letting go, and, 84
papers, 77–78 placebo treatment comparison, 162
core (minimal) self. See also narrative self; self rumination and, 9, 130
Berkovich-Ohana study findings, 65 studies, 160
description, 63 white matter pathways and, 91–92
meditation and, 65 destressing, xiv, 11, 139
narrative self vs., 62, 64, 65 The Devil’s Dictionary (Bierce), 23
corpus callosum, 86, 89 dialectical behavior therapy (DBT), 9
correctional settings, mindfulness in, 143 dictator game, 133–134
cortex disembodiment, 36–37, 40, 52, 71, 165
anterior cingulate, 28, 30, 41, 46, 61, 67, dopamine system, 48–49
82–83, 86–87, 90–92, 101, 165 dorsal attention network. See salience network
dorsal medial prefrontal, 29 dorsal medial prefrontal cortex, 29
dorsolateral prefrontal, 28, 30 dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, 28, 30
lateral parietal, 28–29 Dor-Ziderman, Yair, 65, 66, 71
lateral temporal, 29 dose-response relationship
medial prefrontal, 28, 28–29, 35, 64 in attention-regulation, self-regulation, 107
orbitofrontal, 84, 165 Britton’s sleep quality study, 126
posterior cingulate, xiii, 28–29, 41–45, 67, 71, in long-t erm meditators, 78–79, 87–88, 98,
82, 86, 87, 89 102, 107, 156
posterior parietal, 28, 30, 52, 83 mindfulness as medicine and, 150–152
rostrolateral prefrontal cortex, 83 Pace’s study findings, 123
222
222 Index
dose-response relationship (Cont.) Ferrarelli, Fabio, 126

role in changes in brain structure, 165 Five-Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire, 109,
short dose-response relationships, 164 176n12, 187n45
Zenner’s study findings, 143 fMRI. See functional magnetic resonance
imaging
Ekman, Paul, 59–60 focused-attention meditation, 7
electroencephalography (EEG) studies Brewer’s study findings, 47
asymmetry in frontal brain activation, 124 open-monitoring comparison, 47–48
brainwave detection, 24, 56–57 reaction to sounds, noise in, 56–57
Cahn/Vipassanā meditators, 72 forceful breath technique, 21–22
description, 23 Fox, Kieran
findings on nimitta, 56 study of gray matter changes, 82–86
meditation period vs. mind-wandering, 58 study of white matter changes, 86–87
meditation research, 24 touch sensitivity study, 106–107
emotion regulation Freiberg Mindfulness Inventory, 176n12
attention networks and, 167 frontal gyrus. See also gyrus
dose-response relationship and, 165 inferior, 68, 69
gray matter and, 92 medial, 52, 68
hippocampal role in, 85 superior, 32
interventions for, 142 frontoparietal network. See executive control
mindfulness’s effects on, 142, 163–164 network
open-monitoring meditation and, 47 functional magnetic resonance imaging
rumination and, 129–130 (fMRI), 23–24
studies related to, 129, 135, 139 brain research findings, 24–25
Tomasino’s map and, 178–179n48 Brewer’s long-t erm meditator findings, 72
ventromedial cortex role in, 41 of Charles-Bonnet Syndrome patients, 55
emotional stability, 191n5 current research limitations, 27
cortisol and, 135–136, 161 description, 23
meditation’s effect on, 164 Farb’s narrative self study findings, 63–65
studies of, 130, 135, 160 Fox’s gray matter studies, 84
empathic distress, 132 Garrison’s quieting the mind study, 43
empathy heart practices findings, 67, 181n57
compassion training and, 8, 9, 68, 133, 134 Lutz’s loving-k indness study findings, 66–67
frontal gyrus and, 69 meditation findings, 32, 34, 43, 63, 72, 84
meditation/m indfulness’s effects on, 136, sensory deprivation findings, 54–55
163–163 fusiform face area (FFA), in the brain, 27
studies of, 132, 135, 139, 144, 160 fusiform gyrus, 84
temporal parietal junction and, 180n19
well-b eing and, 118, 126 gamma waves, 24, 126
Engström, Maria, 68 Gard, Tim, 61
error-related negativity (ERN), 100–101, Garrison, Kathleen, 42–45, 69, 70–71,
114–115 169, 179n6
error-related positivity, 101, 114 Gilbert, Dan, 4
executive control network global body awareness, 83, 87, 88, 93, 165
breath and, 30 glucocorticoid hormones, 85
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, 28, 30 God module, 66
Grant’s study findings, 87 God spot, 66
inferior parietal lobe, 32, 34, 40, 41, 65, 66 Goldstein, Joseph, 175n3
mind-wandering and, 30, 41 go/no-go task, 98, 114
as part of attention network, 28 gorilla video, 100, 114
posterior parietal cortex, 28, 30, 52, 83 Goyal, Madhav, 10, 145–149, 154–155
superior parietal lobe, 32, 34, 36, 82 Grant, Joshua
bodily sensations study, 87
Farb, Norman, 63–65 dose-response correlation study, 88
feelings, mindfulness of, 9 executive control/default network study, 87
223
Index 223
salience network study, 87 enlargement in meditators, 84–85

salience network-pain connection Fox map and, 88
study, 90, 91 gray matter and, 82, 88–89
gray matter link with memory, 64, 75
Fox’s study of changes in, 82–86 link with spatial navigation, 75, 79
IBMT and, 89 pain sensitivity and, 91
Tomasino’s map and, 82–84 stress response and, 86, 165
gray matter density (gray matter Hoffman, Stefan, 150, 153–154
concentration), 76 Hölzel, B. K., 87, 88, 178–179n48
g–tummo (Tibetan meditation practice), 21–22 Hou, Wai Kai, 139–140
gyrus Hougaard, E., 149
fusiform, 84 HPA (hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal) axis, 85
inferior frontal gyrus, 68, 69 hypnagogic hallucinations, 54
inferior temporal, 84
medial frontal gyrus, 52, 68 IBMT. See integrative body-m ind training
superior frontal gyrus, 32, 52, 68 IL-6, 123–124
immune functioning study, 124
hallucinations (visual) inferior temporal gyrus, 84
in drug experiences, 110 Insight Meditation, 175n3
hypnagogic, 54 Insight Meditation Society (MA), 6
Kornfield’s study findings, 50, 53 insomnia, 125, 147
Lindahl’s study findings, 53–56 insula
in nonmeditators, 54 anterior, 28, 30, 41, 47, 61, 67, 82–84, 89
in psychosis, 148–149 and direct awareness of body sensations, 83,
on retreats, in long sitting periods, 84, 169 87, 165
sensory-loss driven, 54–55 meditation activation, 32, 36, 67–68, 86–87
as side effect of meditation, 53 mid insula, 82
simple, 54–55 narrative-focus condition and, 64
Wired article on, 180n28 pain response and, 90
Hasenkamp, Wendy, 40–42, 83, 97 posterior insula, 61, 69
health. See also mental health right insula, 36, 52
meditation/m indfulness’s effects on, 1, 117, self-of-momentary experience and, 63
121–125, 152, 154, 159 integrative body-m ind training (IBMT), 89
quality of life studies, 146 interoception, 49, 105–109
heart practices interpersonal well-b eing, 131–134
Brewer, study findings, 68–69 iPhone app study (Killingsworth and
compassion meditation, 67–69, 104, 123, 133 Gilbert), 4
compassion training, 8, 123, 133–134, 144,
171, 188n58 Jain, Shamini, 137
Engström/Söderfeldt, study findings, 68 Jensen, Christian, 102, 104–105
Lee, study findings, 68 jhana meditation, 48–49, 54, 67. See also joy
Lutz’s study findings, 67–68 hypothesis
heart rate joy hypothesis, 48–49
autonomic nervous system and, 18, 59
body awarenes, emotional awareness, Kabat-Zinn, Jon. See also mindfulness-based
and, 108 stress reduction (MBSR) program
compassion meditation and, 68 definition of mindfulness, 2, 61, 97, 114
reduction during meditation, 18–19, 20–21 insight on mindfulness, 5
stress response and, 85–86 “karmic assignment” vision of, 1, 6
study of meditator’s ability to detect, 106, 184n38 meditation-related background, 6
synchrony with breath rate, 19 nonjudgmental attention concept, 99
Henry, David, 137 smart marketing moves by, 5, 10
hippocampus Wilson on work of, 175n3
deactivation in loving-k indness Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness, 176n12
meditation, 68 Khoury, Bassam, 149–151, 154, 190n3
224
224 Index
Killingsworth, Matt, 4, 5 as complementary intervention, 148

Kirsch, Irving, 137 for depression, 9, 126, 145, 148, 149, 163
Kirtan Kriya, 46 NCCIH statement on, 155
Kornfield, Jack, 175n3 origin of, 145
findings in interviews with yogis, 36–37, 46, post-treatment relapse rate, in
49–50, 53 depression, 149
Kozhevnikov, Maria, 21 MBSR program. See mindfulness-based stress
Kriya. See Kirtan Kriya; Shabad Kriya reduction program
Kundalini yoga, 46 McCall, C., 143
medial prefrontal cortex
lateral parietal cortex, 28–29 activation/deactivation, 28–29
lateral temporal cortex, 29 as default-mode network component, 29
Lee, Tatia, 68 narrative self and, 64
Leung, M. K., 88 Tomasino’s map and, 35
Levenson, Bob, 59–60 unfocused attention, mind-wandering, 28
limbic system, 84–85 medical uses of mindfulness. See mindfulness
Lin, Peter, 128–129 as medicine
Lindahl, Jared, 53–56 meditation. See also meditation, effects
living-i n-the-moment self. See core of; meditation teachers; meditators,
(minimal) self experienced; meditators, inexperienced;
local-g lobal stimuli, 101 meditators vs. nonmeditators; mindfulness;
lojong tradition, 8, 133 specific types of meditation
longitudinal studies, 78–79, 86, 88–89, 93 attention as neural switch into, 39–40
long-t erm meditators. See meditators, attention systems, default-mode
experienced cycling in, 42
loving-k indness meditation body temperature changes in, 20–22
Brewer’s study findings, 47, 68–69 breath suspension in, 20
description, 8–9 consequences of straining in, 45
Fox’s meta-analysis of, 178n44 as controlling attention, 34
Garrison’s study findings, 69 depth of, 45–46
re-energizing property, 170 as dynamic process, 42
Luders, Eileen, 85, 87–88 EEG findings, 24
Lutz, Antoine, 46–47, 67–69, 176n17 fMRI findings, 32, 34, 43, 63, 72, 84
future research directions, 171–172
MacLean, Katherine, 102 hallucinations in, 55–56
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) helpful feedback mechanisms, 169–170
in fMRI studies, 23 interpersonal well-b eing
results produced by, 76 and, 131–134
scanner environment description, 26 as a mental gym, 161–162
switching process study, 39–40 mind-wandering in, 39
magnetoencephalography (MEG) mini-meditations, 40
description, 180n18, 181n53 narrative self and, 40, 63–65
use in Berkovich-Ohana’s study, 50–52 noise and sounds in, 56–60
use in Dor-Ziderman’s study, 65 parasympathetic effects in, 18–20
manipulation of meditative states, 26 as particular experience of the self, 35
Manna, Antoinette, 47, 70–72 personal well-b eing and, 91, 117, 127
mantra meditation,178–179n48. See also personality and, 130–131
Transcendental Meditation® placebo treatment comparison, 162–163
effects on mental health, 146, 190n4 positive side effects, 84, 90–92
mental health and, 190n4 practices inspired by Buddhism, 6–8
MBCT mindfulness-based cognitive therapy quieting the body in, 17–20
(MBCT) program quieting the mind in, 42–45
for ADHD, 113 reasons for practicing, xiv
antidepressant comparison, 149 reasons for success of, 168–170
Britton’s sleep study, 126 research challenges, 25
225
Index 225
Sedlmeier’s meta-analysis of psychological Cahn’s study findings, 72

effects, 96 Dor-Ziderman’s study findings, 65–66
sensory deprivation relation to, 55 dose-response relationship in, 78–79, 87–88,
sitting meditation, 8–9 98, 102, 107, 156
state manipulation in, 26 evolving positive effects for, 164–165
Stroop task test of, 98, 100, 183n7 forgetting the self by, 66
visual experiences in, 49, 53–56 Garrison’s study of, 70–71
meditation, effects of heart/breathing rate synchronization, 19
on ADHD, 112–114 hippocampal enlargement in, 84–85
on controlling attention, 97–99 Lutz’s study findings, 67–68
on coordination between seeing and Manna’s study findings, 70, 72
acting, 107 meditation carryover in daily life, 71–72
on depressed mood, 129–130 parasympathetic nervous system and, 19
on emotional stability, 164 reduced judgmental, evaluative, emotional
on emotional well-b eing, 127–130 stance in meditation, 71
on health, 1, 117, 121–125, 152, 154, 159 researchers preference for, 26
increased sensitivity to signs of sexual self-descriptions of effects of meditation, 118
arousal, 108 sensitivity to inner states by, 71
on integration between body awareness, Short’s study findings, 70
emotional awareness, 108 skills development by, 70
on interoception, 49, 105–109 study of coordination between seeing,
on interpersonal well-b eing, 131–134 acting, 107
on limits of perception, 102 switching process study, 39–40
on mood, 91–92 Tomasino’s study of, 70–71
on nonjudgmental alerting, 99–102 trend toward disembodiment, selflessness, 71
on pain, 60–62, 90–92 Wang’s study findings, 46
on paying attention to the body, 105–109 meditators, inexperienced
on proprioception, 49, 105–109 heart/breathing rate synchronization, 19
on rumination, 152–153, 163–164 Lutz’s fMRI study findings, 67–68
on sleep quality, 125–126 meditators vs. nonmeditators
on stress and health, 121–125 (comparisons)
on sustained attention, attentional stability, anger/retaliation, 134
103–104 anxiety, 128
time course of, 163–167 attention, 96, 99–100
on timekeeping, 109–111 body awareness-e motional awareness
on verbal fluency, 112 integration, 108
on well-b eing and general quality of life, 127 boringness of task, 101, 104
on working memory, 111 brain structure, 25, 72, 76, 77–79, 81, 83, 87,
meditation teachers 88, 179n6
criticism of mindfulness by, 177n32 breath/breathing, 105–106
on ease of attention in meditation, 45 compassion, 133
experience discussions with, 180n20 control of actions, 107
heart practices recommendations, 68 ERN effect, 101
on mindfulness as a tool, 3 immune functioning, 124
on “monkey mind,” 4 pain comparison, 60, 90
reactions to visual experiences, 54 ruminations, 130
risk factors discussions with, 135 self-c oncept, 131
on storytelling in meditation, 35 self-c onfidence, 132
usefulness of, 167, 172 sensitivity to touch, 105–107
warning against evaluating experiences, 45 sleep, 125
meditators, experienced, 69–73 stress, 12, 25, 121–123, 132
attention practices meta-analysis, 70 timekeeping, 110–111
brain activation studies, 167 trait mindfulness, 130, 139
Brefczynski-Lewis’s study findings, 70 well-b eing, 127, 139
Brewer’s study findings, 72 working memory, 111
226
226 Index
mental health mindfulness as medicine, 146–157, 160, 162–163

mantra meditation and, 146, 190n4 adverse effects, side effects, 154–156
mindfulness’s effects on, 146–150, for anxiety, 15, 142, 146, 149–150, 153–154
152–154, 163 for chronic pain patients, 148
metta meditation, 8 in clinical populations, 146–149
mind. See also mind-wandering for depression, 15, 113, 117, 120, 134, 142,
Buddhist concept of, xiii 146–147, 150, 152–154, 156, 168
in compassion training, 8 dose-response relationships, 150–152
connection to the body, 22 for health, 1, 117, 121–125, 152, 154, 159
in focused-attention meditation, 7, 32 lasting effects of interventions, 153–154
judging aspect of, 3 for mental health issues, 152–153
mindfulness’s impact on, 3–5, 10 for negative psychological effects of medical
networks, 27–30 problems, 148
in open-monitoring meditation, 8 for pain, 15, 145–148, 150, 156, 160, 162
phrenology and, 22 for psychosis, 148–149
quieting the mind, 42–45 for repetitive negative thinking, 153
storytelling mind, 37, 40 for rumination, 142, 152–153, 163–164
training of, 6 studies in clinical populations, 146–149
Mindful Attention Awareness Scale, 176n12 summary of effects, 160
mindfulness (mindfulness programs), 8–9. See for targeted symptoms, 149–150
also meditation; mindfulness as medicine; time course of effects, 163–167
paying attention; specific programs mindfulness scales, 176n13
attention and, 95–116 mindfulness-based stress reduction (MBSR)
awakening-l iberation-enlightenment strain program
of, 166 attention-based studies, 102–104, 103–104
backlash against, 177n32 Baer’s trait mindfulness study, 140–141
brain changes after interventions, 88–90 brain changes studies, 78, 88
comparison with nonspecific controls, for cancer patients, 148
146–147 for chronic pain patients, 148
comparison with specific active controls, 147 description, 8–9, 169
as complementary intervention, 148 Farb’s narrative self study and, 62–63
in correctional settings, 143 immune functioning study, 124
definitions, xi, 2–3, 61, 95, 97, 114, 175n6 marketing strategy for, 5, 10
effectiveness for depression, 120 NCCIH statement on, 154, 155
effects on mental health, 146–150, non-MBSR program comparison, 105
152–154, 163 origin of, 1, 6, 145
evaluation of results, 10–14 sleep quality study, 125–126
future research directions, 171–172 Snippe’s positive/negative mood study, 141
helpful feedback mechanisms, 169–170 study of coordination between seeing and
long-t erm effects on mental health, 153–154 acting, 107
as medicine, 146–157 mind-wandering, 29
meditator vs. nonmeditator comparison, 111 Buckner on, 34
personal/well-b eing strain of, 165–166 default-mode network and, 28, 34–35, 70
Pickert’s example of, 2–3 EEG recording during, 58
placebo treatment comparison, 162–163 executive network and, 41
reasons for success of, 138–142, 168–170 habituation and, 58
in school settings, 142–143 happiness and, 175n9
self-reported body awareness study, 107 Hasenkamp’s findings on, 41, 83, 97
shortage of findings on, xii loving-k indness meditation and, 69
side effects/adverse effects, 154–156 in meditation, 39
summary of studies on effects, 160 salience network and, 41, 97
supportive therapy comparison, 154 suppression of, 70
training, 5–6 mini-meditations, 40
well-b eing and, 117–144 The Miracle of Mindfulness (Thích Nhầt
in work settings, 143 Hạnh), 175n3
227
Index 227
Mirams, Laura, 106–107 as MBSR program component, 9

Mitchell, John, 112 pre-/post-retreat study, 183–184n20
monkey mind reaction to sounds, noise in, 57
description, 4–5, 29 orbitofrontal cortex, 84
transition to monk’s mind, 95–116 out-of-body experiences, 49
mood
meditation–brain–b ehavior effects on, 91–92 pain
mindfulness’s effects on, 146 acceptance and commitment therapy for, 148
motion-i nduced blindness task, 104 emotional, 131
empathy and, 132, 144
Naranjo, José Raúl, 107 fibromyalgia-related, 125
narrative self (self-as-story). See also core intercourse-related, 109
(minimal) self; self Kornfield’s research findings, 49
activation of, 44 MBCT and, 145
Berkovich-Ohana’s study findings, 51, 65 meditation and, 60–62, 90–92
core (minimal) self vs., 62, 64, 65 mindfulness interventions for, 15, 145–148,
default-mode network and, 44, 65 150, 156, 160, 162
description, 35, 40, 62–63 salience network connection with, 90–91
Dor-Ziderman study findings, 65 slow breathing and, 181n38
posterior cingulate and, 40, 43, 63 parahippocampal complex, 29
precuneus and, 35, 40, 47, 63 parasympathetic nervous system
shushing, at onset of meditation, 40 effects in meditation, 18–20
switching off (quieting down), 63–65, 84 non-REM sleep and, 19
National Center for Complementary and parietal lobe
Integrative Health (NCCIH), 117, 154–155 inferior, 32, 34, 40, 41, 65, 66
NCCIH. See National Center for superior, 32, 34, 36, 82
Complementary and Integrative Health passive control group, 120
networks. See default-mode network; executive paying attention, 5, 39–49
control network; salience network to the breath, 35–36, 40–42
neurophenomenology, 25–26 depth of meditation, 45–46
nimittas (spots of light), 54, 56, 170 example of, 2–3
nociception (awareness of pain). See pain as neural switch into meditation, 39–40
noise and sounds, 56–60 in open-monitoring meditation, 46–48
focused-attention meditation and, quieting the mind, 42–45
56–57, 59–60 Tomasino’s map and, 36
Levenson/Ekman/R icard study PCC. See posterior cingulate cortex
findings, 59–60 perception
open-monitoring meditation and, 57 auditory, 57
open-presence meditation and, 59 of the body, 50, 52
startle reflex, 59 meditation’s effects on limits of, 102
Transcendental Meditation® and, 57–58 of pain, 50
Vipassanā meditation and, 57 of spatial awareness, 52
nonjudgmental attention, effects of meditation of time and space, 49–50
on, 99–102 personal well-b eing, 91, 117, 127
nonmeditators. See meditators vs. personality
nonmeditators meditations effects on, 72, 118, 130–131
nucleus accumbens, 48–49 negative traits, 130
precuneus and, 35
open-monitoring meditation trait anxiety and, 128
attention in, 46–48 phrenology, 22–23, 27
awareness of internal body states in, 46–47 Pickert, Kate, 2–3, 5, 10
Brewer’s study findings, 47 Piet, J., 149
description, 7–8 posterior cingulate cortex (PCC)
focused-attention meditation activation during self-related thinking, 43
comparison, 47–48 activation/deactivation patterns, 28–29
228
228 Index
posterior cingulate cortex (Cont.) salience network. See also anterior cingulate
as default-mode network component, 28, cortex; anterior insula
28–29, 43 brain morphology changes, 88, 165, 167
expert meditators and, 67, 71 default-mode networks coupling with, 42, 70
Fox’s study findings, 82, 86 Grant’s studies of, 87, 90–91
Garrison’s study findings, 42–45, Hölzel’s study of, 87
169, 179n6 meditation expertise and, 70
Grant’s study findings, 87 mind-wandering and, 41, 97
gray matter and, 89 pain connection with, 90–91
mind-wandering and, 41 Theravāda meditation and, 47
storytelling mind and, xiii Salzberg, Sharon, 175n3
Tomasino’s map and, 82 Schmidt, Stefan, 107
posterior parietal cortex, 28, 30, 52, 83 school settings, mindfulness in, 142–143
Praxil, 147 Schwartz, Jacqueline, 175n3
precuneus scientific research, 10–14
activation/deactivation patterns, Benson/Tibetan yogis, 21
28–29, 32, 35 biases in, 10–11, 13
body sensation awareness and, 3165 cherrypicking results, 11
dose-response relationship and, 87 evaluating results, 12–14
Fox’s gray matter findings, 82–86 Search Inside Yourself (Meng), xiv
Grant’s study findings, 87 Sears, S., 118
long-t erm meditators and, 66–68 Sedlmeier, Peter, 96, 127, 131, 133
narrative self and, 35, 40, 47, 63, 65, 84, Segal, Zindel, 9
90, 165 selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs),
PCC linkage with, 179n7 147, 190n6
present moment, 2, 3, 51, 52, 60, 65, self, 62–67. See also core (minimal) self;
95, 105, 109 narrative self
proprioception, 49, 105–109 Berkovich-Ohana’s study findings, 51
Prozac, 147 completely forgetting, 17, 65–67
psychosis, mindfulness for, 148–149 defined, 62
pure consciousness, in Transcendental Kornfield’s interview findings, 36
Meditation®, 20 meditation as particular experience of, 35
Tomasino’s map and, 62
Raichle, Marcus, 28–29 self-as-story. See narrative self
randomization, 120 self-awareness, change in, 138
relaxation therapy, 120, 185n6 self-less experience (kenshō or satori), 66
ReSource Project, 9, 134 selflessness, 71
retrosplenial cortex, 29 self-of-momentary-awareness, 62, 63
Ricard, Matthieu, 59–60 self-p erceived stress, 91, 121, 134–136, 139–140,
right angular gyrus, 36 160, 161, 165
right orbitofrontal cortex, 84, 165, 182n14 self-referential networks, 35, 65
rostrolateral prefrontal cortex, 83 self-regulation, change in, 138
rumination self-transcendence, increase in, 138
defined, 9, 129 sensory deprivation, 55–56, 180n28
depression and, 130, 153 sensory-loss driven hallucinations, 54–55
emotion regulation and, 129–130 Serretti, Alessandro, 121–122, 148
interventions for, 142 Seung Sahn, 6
meditation’s effects on, 152–153, 163–164 sexual abuse, 109
mindfulness’s effects on, 142 sexual arousal, 108, 184n39
overcoming, 136, 139 Shabad Kriya, 46
positive effects on, 187n40 Sharma, Manoj, 121–122
studies on, 135, 139, 140, 141, 160 side effects, of mindfulness, 154–156
trait mindfulness and, 152–153, 156–157 Silbersweig, D. A., 138, 153
well-b eing and, 138 Singer, Tania, 134
Rush, Sarah, 121–122 Singleton, Omar, 91
229
Index 229
Slagter, Helen, 99–100 Tomasino, Antonietta, 31, 70–71, 79,

sleep quality, meditation’s effects on, 125–126 178–179n48
Snippe, Evelien, 143, 1141 Tomasino’s map, 30–37, 39–40, 44, 47, 49, 62,
Söderfeldt, Birgitta, 68 70–71, 79, 81–82
somatic experiences, 49–50 activated brain areas, 31–32, 32, 34–37, 44,
somatosensory cortex, 47, 61, 64 178–179n48
spacelessness, 51, 65 attention, body, self themes, 37
startle reflex, 59 changes in body awareness and, 35–36
startle-t ype task, 100 deactivated brain areas, 31, 32, 34–36, 40
state anxiety, 127–128, 134, 135, 160, 161, 164 gray matter and, 82–84
storytelling mind, 37, 40 meditating brain meta-analysis, 30–37
stress particular experience of the self and, 35
destressing, xiv, 11, 139 right angular gyrus, 36
meditation/m indfulness’s effects on, the self and, 62
121–125, 143–144, 146 self-referential networks, 35, 65
self-p erceived, 91, 121, 134–136, 139–140, 160, supplementary motor area, 32, 37, 40, 71, 165
161, 165 supramarginal gyrus, 32, 36, 82, 83, 87, 165
Stress Reduction Clinic, University of Toronto Mindfulness Scale, 187n48
Massachusetts Medical Center, 145 touch sensitivity study, 106–107
stress response, 85–86, 92, 95, 140 tractography, mapping of white matter, 77
Stroop task test training mindfulness, 5–6
attention measurement by, 24–25, 31, 97 trait anxiety, 128, 135, 160, 161, 164
description, 24–25, 97–98 trait mindfulness
meditation findings, 98, 100, 183n7 adherence to practice and, 138
reasons for use of, 97–98 body sensations and, 5, 130
studies/fi ndings involving use of, 98–99 defined, 5
substance abuse, mindfulness’s effects on, 146 error-related positivity and, 114
superior longitudinal fasciculus, 86, 89 impact of half-d ay retreat on, 137–138
supplementary motor area, 32, 37, 40, 71, 165 MBSR and, 15
supportive therapy, 154, 190n24 measuring, 102, 130
supramarginal gyrus, 32, 36, 82, mechanisms of, 42, 138–142
83, 87, 165 meditators vs. nonmeditators, 130
Sweet, Philip, 101, 104 mindful practice and, 143
switching process, 40–41 as a one-d imensional concept, 187n45
sympathetic nervous system, 18, 18.85 as predictor of well-b eing, 138
systematic desensitization, 137 pre-/post-meditation study, 109
Sze, Jocelyn, 108 psychologists definition, 5
role in depression, rumination, 152–153
teachers. See meditation teachers role in meditation, 138–142
Teasdale, John, 9 studies of, 130–131, 135, 139
temporal parietal junction, 29, 40, 52, trait, defined, 176n11
67, 180n19 well-b eing and, 140
temporal pole, 29 Transcendental Meditation®, 96, 127, 166
test anxiety, mindfulness’s effects on, 142 auditory perception research, 57–58
thalamus, 30, 52, 61, 63, 66 breath suspension during, 20
Theravāda tradition, 6, 47, 54, 176n15 mental health and, 190n4
Thích Nhầt Hạnh, 175n3
thoughts, mindfulness of, 9 Vago, D. R., 138, 153
Tibetan Buddhism, 68, 103, 132. Valentine, Elizabeth, 101, 104
See also g–tummo; Vipassanā meditation van Leeuwen, Sara, 101, 102
Tibetan Dzogchen tradition, 54 van Vugt, Marieke, 99–100
Tibetan meditation. See g–tummo ventral medial prefrontal cortex, 29, 35
timekeeping, meditation’s effects on, verbal fluency, meditation’s effects
109–111, 184n47 on, 112
timelessness, 51, 65, 180n19 verbal GRE score, meditation’s effects on, 112
230
230 Index
Vipassanā meditation, xv, 79–80, 166, 175n3 trait mindfulness as predictor of, 138

Berkovich-Ohana study findings, 50–52 Wherever You Go, There You Are
Cahn’s study findings, 58, 72 (Kabat-Zinn), 2
Dor-Ziderman’s findings, 65–67 white matter
reaction to sound, noise in, 57 brain activation and, 15
van Vugt/Slagter’s findings, 99–100 defined, 77
Zen comparison, 82 depression and, 91–92
Visted, Endre, 137–138, 142 Fox’s study of changes in, 86–87, 89
visual experiences, 49, 53–56. See also future research directions, 93
hallucinations (visual) MBSR-l ike programs and, 91–92
Lindahl’s study findings, 54–56 reasons for investigating, 28
in Theravāda tradition, 54 tractography mapping of, 77
types of, 54 Williams, Mark, 9
in walking meditation, 53 Wilson, J., 175n3
visualization, 21–22 Woodrow, Herbert, 110
Vøllestad, Jon, 140, 141 work settings, mindfulness in, 143
working memory, meditation’s effects on, 111
walking meditation, 9, 19, 53
Wang, Danny, 46 Zeidan, Fadel, 61
well-b eing Zen Buddhism
brain changes and, 92 attention study, 100
emotional aspects of, 127–130 invocation on living beings, xiii
interpersonal, 131–134 “just sitting” practice, 7
methods of studying mindfulness’s effects Kabat-Zinn’s background in, 6
on, 118–121 salience network-pain connection
mindfulness and, 117–144 study, 90
mindfulness-related studies on, 135 self-less experience in, 66
personal, 91, 117, 127 thanking of “ancestors” in, xv
resistance to stress and, 121–124 Vipassanā comparison, 82
rumination and, 130 Zen meditation, 6, 176n15
sleep quality and, 125 Zoloft, 147

Presence - How Mindfulness and Meditation Shape Your Brain, Mind, and Life PDF

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Presence - How Mindfulness and Meditation Shape Your Brain, Mind, and Life PDF

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Presence - How Mindfulness and Meditation Shape Your Brain, Mind, and Life PDF

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

What is the book about?

What is the book about?

What brain areas are activated during meditation?

What brain areas are activated during meditation?

i

Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press

© Oxford University Press 2017

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in

You must not circulate this work in any other form

Library of Congress Cataloging-​i n-​P ublication Data

This book is dedicated to you.

2. Your Body and Brain on Meditation 17

3. The Meditating Brain in Action: Attention, Body, and Self 39

4. Telltale Traces in the Brain 75

5. From Monkey Mind to Monk’s Mind: Mindfulness Practice

6. Mindfulness Practice and Well-​Being 117

7. Mindfulness as Medicine 145

8. Meditation and Mindfulness: Final Words 159

In my experience, this surfeit of findings leaves many practitioners of mind-

The age-​old advice to writers, of course, is to “ ‘write what you know.” If

fully recovered in the research about meditating, which by necessity operates

It is customary to use a book’s preface to offer a few guidelines to potential

Finally, prefaces often end with acknowledgments and thank-​yous.

push our students to combative competitiveness. It has been heart-​warming

In the spring of 1979, on Day 10 of a two-​week meditation retreat,1 the then-​

What We Are Talking about When We Talk about Mindfulness

A Mindful Mind Is a Happy Mind

Meditation Practices Inspired by Buddhism

Typically, meditation practices that are derived from Buddhist traditions,

(also called open-​ awareness, or choiceless-​ awareness) practices,17 and

and open-​monitoring techniques: mindfulness of breath, body, feelings,

Does Mindfulness Deliver: How Would We Know?

of the neurological and biological concomitants to stress and depres-

There are essentially two ways in which the effectiveness of a treatment—​

focuses on changes in attention; Chapter 6 discusses changes in stress, sleep,

Your Body and Brain on Meditation

The system is called autonomic because it typically operates in an invol-

Your Body and Brain on Meditation 19

minute during actual meditation. Likewise, breathing frequency decreased

Changes in Body Temperature

Another, much rarer finding20 is of spontaneous changes in body temperature—​

Your Body and Brain on Meditation 21

How We Look In On the Living Brain in Action

Your Body and Brain on Meditation 23

Your Body and Brain on Meditation 25

Your Body and Brain on Meditation 27

From Glob to Grid: Weaving the Networks of the Mind

Earlier in this chapter, I mentioned phrenology—​the pseudoscience of exam-

Default-Mode Network Salience Network Executive Control Network

Your Body and Brain on Meditation 29

Meta-​Analzying the Meditating Brain: Tomasino’s Map

Where to start our investigation into the meditating brain?

Your Body and Brain on Meditation 31

As I also mentioned in Chapter 1, meta-​analysis is a more objective way

Your brain on meditation: activations

Your Body and Brain on Meditation 33

Studies that Comprise Tomasino’s Map

Your Brain on Meditation: A Tour of Tomasino’s Map

Your Body and Brain on Meditation 35

Library of Congress Cataloging-i n-P ublication Data

6. Mindfulness Practice and Well-Being 117

The age-old advice to writers, of course, is to “ ‘write what you know.” If

Finally, prefaces often end with acknowledgments and thank-yous.

push our students to combative competitiveness. It has been heart-warming

In the spring of 1979, on Day 10 of a two-week meditation retreat,1 the then-

(also called open- awareness, or choiceless- awareness) practices,17 and

and open-monitoring techniques: mindfulness of breath, body, feelings,

There are essentially two ways in which the effectiveness of a treatment—

Your Body and Brain on Meditation 19

Another, much rarer finding20 is of spontaneous changes in body temperature—

Your Body and Brain on Meditation 21

Your Body and Brain on Meditation 23

Your Body and Brain on Meditation 25

Your Body and Brain on Meditation 27

Earlier in this chapter, I mentioned phrenology—the pseudoscience of exam-

Your Body and Brain on Meditation 29

Meta-Analzying the Meditating Brain: Tomasino’s Map

Your Body and Brain on Meditation 31

As I also mentioned in Chapter 1, meta-analysis is a more objective way

Your Body and Brain on Meditation 33

Your Body and Brain on Meditation 35

Your Body and Brain on Meditation 37

The Meditating Brain in Action: Attention, Body, and Self 41

The Meditating Brain in Action: Attention, Body, and Self 43

The Meditating Brain in Action: Attention, Body, and Self 45

Danny Wang and colleagues9 asked 10 long-term meditators (with, on

ATTENTION IN OPEN-M ONITORING MEDITATION

The Meditating Brain in Action: Attention, Body, and Self 47

The Meditating Brain in Action: Attention, Body, and Self 49

The Meditating Brain in Action: Attention, Body, and Self 51

The Meditating Brain in Action: Attention, Body, and Self 53

The Meditating Brain in Action: Attention, Body, and Self 55

occur—15 minutes in a fully darkened room that completely dampens sound

The Meditating Brain in Action: Attention, Body, and Self 57

The Meditating Brain in Action: Attention, Body, and Self 59

The Meditating Brain in Action: Attention, Body, and Self 61

These three mechanisms, of course, aren’t incompatible with each other—

The Meditating Brain in Action: Attention, Body, and Self 63

The Meditating Brain in Action: Attention, Body, and Self 65

narrative-self-less meditating may be one way to (at least momentarily) lift

The Meditating Brain in Action: Attention, Body, and Self 67

All of the studies described here pertain to the attention-based practices—

The Meditating Brain in Action: Attention, Body, and Self 69

Long-Term Meditation Expertise

No one is born a meditator—it takes time, effort, and dedication to develop

The Meditating Brain in Action: Attention, Body, and Self 71

The Meditating Brain in Action: Attention, Body, and Self 73

Telltale Traces in the Brain 77

Telltale Traces in the Brain 79

As in my review of the literature on brain activation, I take a recent meta-

Telltale Traces in the Brain 81

implications—for instance, it might explain the effects of long-term medita-

The Fox et al. Meta-Analysis: Changes in Gray Matter

Telltale Traces in the Brain 83