Republic v. Gielczyk

Civil Law – Property
Case Digests
DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS

FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
LIST OF CASES
Property
Leung vs. Strong Machinery 37 Phil. 644

DBP vs. CA 253 SCRA 414
Republic vs. Guzman 326 SCRA 574
Heirs of Delfin v. NHA G.R. No. 193618 November 28, 2016
Malabanan v. Republic G.R. No. 179987 September 3, 2013.
Republic v. Gielczyk G.R. No. 179990 October 23, 2013
Leong vs. See G.R. No. 194077 (428) December 03, 2014
Tanyag v. Gabriel G.R. No. 175763 April 11, 2012
Mendoza vs. Salinas (433) February 6, 2007
Tanyag v. Gabriel G.R. No. 175763 April 11, 2012 (434)
Villasi v. Garcia G.R. No. 190106 January 15, 2014
Geminiano vs. CA 259 SCRA 344
Aquino vs. Aguilar G.R. No. 182754 (448) June 29, 2015
Tecnogas vs. CA February 10, 1997
Pleasantville vs. CA 253 SCRA 10
Delos Santos v. AbejonG.R. No. 215820 March 20, 2017
BPI v. Sanchez et.al G.R. No. 179518/179835 November 19, 2014
Ochoa v. Almazan(448) Sept. 13, 2007
Nazareno vs. CA (accr) 257 SCRA 589
Navarro vs. IAC (accr) February 12, 1997
Robles vs. CA 328 SCRA 97
De Aviles vs. CA (quieting) 264 SCRA 473
Caldito v. Obado G.R. No. 181596 January 30, 2017
Catedrilla v. Lauron G.R. NO. 179011 (487) April 15, 2013
Del Campo vs. CA 351 SCRA 1
Extraordinary Devt. V. Bico G.R. No. 191090, October 13, 2014 (493)
Torres v. Velez G.R. No. 187987 November 26, 2014(493)
Magsano et. Al. vs. PSLBI G.R. No. 215038 October 17, 2016 (493)
Quintos v. Nicolas G.R. 210252 (494) June 25, 2014
Seraspi vs. CA 331 SCRA 293
Catapusan vs. CA 264 SCRA 534
Verdad v. CA 256 SCRA 593
Tabuso vs. CA (G.R. No. 108558) June 21, 2001
Gabriel v. Crisologo G.R. No. 204626 June 9, 2014
Cequena vs. Bolante 330 SCRA 216
Subic Bay Resorts v. FernandezG.R. No. 193426 September 29, 2014 (559)
Leviste Management System, Inc.
Vs. Legaspi Towers 200, Inc., GR NOS. 199353 & 199389 04 APRIL 2018
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EASEMENTS
Pilar Devt. Corp. v. Dumadag G.R. No. 194336 March 11, 2013
Reyes v. Spouses Ramos G.R. No. 194488(448) February 11, 2015
De Guzman vs. Filinvest G.R. No. 191710 January 14, 2015
Williams vs. Zerda G.R. No. 207146 March 15, 2017
Villanueva vs. CA 330 SCRA 278
Quimen vs. CA 257 SCRA 163
Spouses Sta. Maria vs. CA 285 SCRA 351
Cristobal vs. CA 291 SCRA 122
Camarines Norte Elec. vs. CA 345 SCRA 85
Villanueva vs. Velasco 346 SCRA 99
Costabella vs. CA 193 SCRA 332
Encarnacion vs. CA 195 SCRA 74
Dionisio vs. Ortiz 204 SCRA 745
Calimoso v. RoulloG.R. No. 198594 January 25, 2016
Cruz v. Pandacan Hiker’s Club G.R. No. 188213 January 11, 2016(Nuisance)
Perez v. Madrona G.R. No. 184478 March 21, 2012
DONATIONS
Cabatingan vs. Cabatingan June 5, 2002

Gonzales vs. CA(donation) June 18, 2001
Republic vs. Silim (Acceptance) April 2, 2001
Republic v. Llamas G.R. No. 194190 January 25, 2017
Carinan v. Cueto G.R. No. 198636 08 October 2014 (748)
Roman Catholic vs. CA 198 SCRA 300
Prov. of Cam. Sur v. Bodega Glassware G.R. No. 194199 March 22, 2017
Gestopa vs. CA 342 SCRA 105
Noceda vs. CA 313 SCRA 504
Imperial vs. CA 316 SCRA 393
Eduarte v. CA 253 SCRA 391
City of Angeles vs. CA 261 SCRA 9
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LEUNG YEE, Plaintiff-appellant, -versus- FRANK L. STRONG MACHINERY COMPANY and J. G.

WILLIAMSON, Defendants-appellees.
G.R. No. L-11658, FIRST DIVISION, February 15, 1918, CARSON, J.
A factory building is real property, and the mere fact that it is mortgaged and sold, separate and apart
from the land on which it stands, in no wise changes its character as real property. Here, the building of
strong materials in which the rice-cleaning machinery was installed by the "Compañia Agricola
Filipina" was real property, and the mere fact that the parties seem to have dealt with it separate and
apart from the land on which it stood in no wise changed its character as real property.
FACTS:
Compañia Agricola Filipina bought rice-cleaning machinery from Frank L. Strong Machinery
Company and to secure the payment of such, it executed a chattel mortgage over such machineries
including the building to which they are installed. This mortgage was registered in the chattel
mortgage registry. Due to its failure to pay, the mortgaged property was sold and was bought by
Strong Machinery Company. Later, Strong Machinery Company took possession of the said building.
Unknown to Strong Machinery Company, the same buildings are likewise subject of another
mortgage executed by Compañia Agricola Filipina in favor of Leung Yee to secure its outstanding
obligation. Compañia Agricola Filipina also defaulted in his obligation which prompted Yee to levy
execution upon the building. Yee subsequently bought the property in an auction sale and was issued
a sheriff's certificate of the sale which he latter registered.
The defendant machinery company filed with the sheriff a sworn statement setting up its claim of
title and demanding the release of the property from the levy. Upon execution of the necessary bond,
the sheriff sold the property to Yee. Thereafter, Yee instituted an action to recover possession of the
building from the machinery company.The RTC relied on Article 1473 of the Civil Code and ruled in
favor in favor of the machinery company holding that the company had its title to the building
registered prior to the date of registry of the plaintiff's certificate.
ISSUE:
Whether the annotation of a deed of sale of real property in a chattel mortgage registry can be given
the legal effect of an annotation in the registry of real property. (NO)
RULING:
The registry referred to in Article 1473 is of course the registry of real property, and it must be
apparent that the annotation or inscription of a deed of sale of real property in a chattel mortgage
registry cannot be given the legal effect of an inscription in the registry of real property. By its express
terms, the Chattel Mortgage Law contemplates and makes provision for mortgages of personal
property; and the sole purpose and object of the chattel mortgage registry is to provide for the
registry of "chattel mortgages," that is to say, mortgages of personal property executed in the manner
and form prescribed in the statute. The building of strong materials in which the rice-cleaning
machinery was installed by the "Compañia Agricola Filipina" was real property, and the mere fact
that the parties seem to have dealt with it separate and apart from the land on which it stood in no
wise changed its character as real property. It follows that neither the original registry in the chattel
mortgage of the building and the machinery installed therein, nor the annotation in that registry of
the sale of the mortgaged property, had any effect whatever so far as the building was concerned.
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DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, -versus- COURT OF APPEALS, MYLO O.

QUINTO and JESUSA CHRISTINE S. CHUPUICO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 109946, FIRST DIVISION, February 9, 1996, BELOSILLO, J.
What divests the government of title to the land is the issuance of the sales patent and its subsequent
registration with the Register of Deeds. It is the registration and issuance of the certificate of title that
segregate public lands from the mass of public domain and convert it into private property. Since the
disputed lot was still the subject of a Free Patent Application when mortgaged to DBP and no patent
was granted to the Spouses Olidiana, the lot remained part of the public domain.
FACTS:
DBP granted a loan to Spouses Olidiana which was secured by a real estate mortgage on several
properties. At the time of the mortgage, the disputed lot was still the subject of a Free Patent
application filed by the Spouses Olidiana with the Bureau of Lands but registered under their name
for taxation purposes. Spouses Olidiana amended their Free Patent application over several parcels
of land, in which they waived all their rights and interests over the disputed lot in favor of Chupuico
and Quinto. Thereafter, each of them obtained original certificate of title over the subdivided lot. For
failure of Spouses Olidiana to comply with their mortgage contract, DBP extrajudicially foreclosed all
their mortgaged properties, and was awarded as the highest bidder. When DBP tried to register the
sale, it was discovered that the lot had already been divided into 2 parcels, belonging to Chupuico
and Quinto, respectively. DBP then filed an action for quieting of title. RTC ruled against DBP as the
Spouses Olidiana were not yet owners in fee simple when they mortgaged the property and that the
property was still a public land when mortgaged to DBP, thus it could not have been the subject of a
valid mortgage. The CA affirmed such decision.
ISSUE:
Whether the lot was still a public land which could not have been validly mortgaged. (YES)
RULING:
DBP did not acquire valid title over the land in dispute because it was public land when mortgaged
by the Spouses Olidiana. In Visayan Realty, Inc. v. Meer, the Court ruled that the approval of a sales
application merely authorized the applicant to take possession of the land so that he could comply
with the requirements prescribed by law before a final patent could be issued in his favor. Meanwhile,
the government still remained the owner thereof, as in fact the application could still be cancelled
and the land awarded to another applicant should it be shown that the legal requirements had not
been complied with. What divests the government of title to the land is the issuance of the sales
patent and its subsequent registration with the Register of Deeds. It is the registration and issuance
of the certificate of title that segregate public lands from the mass of public domain and convert it
into private property. Since the disputed was still the subject of a Free Patent Application when
mortgaged to DBP and no patent was granted to the Spouses Olidiana, the lot remained part of the
public domain.
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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, -versus- DAMIAN ERMITAÑO DE GUZMAN,

DEOGRACIAS ERMITAÑO DE GUZMAN, ZENAIDA ERMITAÑO DE GUZMAN, ALICIA
ERMITAÑO DE GUZMAN, SALVADOR ERMITAÑO DE GUZMAN, DOMINGA ERMITAÑO,
NATIVIDAD ENCARNACION, MELBA E. TORRES, FLORA MANALO, SOCORRO DELA ROSA, JOSE
ERMITAÑO, ESMERANDO ERMITAÑO, TRICOM DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and
FILOMENO ERMITAÑO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 137887, FIRST DIVISION, February 28, 2000, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Forest lands are not capable of private appropriation and possession thereof, however long, cannot
convert them into private property, unless and until such lands were reclassified and considered
disposable and alienable. Here, the property subject of De Guzmans’ application was only declared
alienable in 1965. Prior to such date, the same was forest land incapable of private appropriation.
FACTS:
Conflicting applications for confirmation of imperfect title were filed by Norma Almanzor and
Salvador De Guzman over parcels of land. The RTC ruled in favor of De Guzman. The CA affirmed the
RTC decision and the petition for registration of the De Guzmans. The Republic now contends that
the De Guzmans have not overthrown the presumption that the lands are portions of the public
domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines.
ISSUE:
Whether the subject parcels of land are part of the public domain. (YES)
RULING:
The property subject of De Guzmans’ application was only declared alienable in 1965. Prior to such
date, the same was forest land incapable of private appropriation. It was not registrable and
possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, could not convert it into private property, unless and until
such lands were reclassified and considered disposable and alienable. Therefore, prior to its
declaration as alienable land in 1965, any occupation or possession thereon cannot be considered in
the counting of the thirty-year possession requirement. This is in accord with the ruling in Almeda
vs. Court of Appeals, and because the rules on the confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply unless
and until the land classified as forest land is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that
it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain.
HEIRS OF LEOPOLDO DELFIN AND SOLEDAD DELFIN, NAMELY EMELITA D. FABRIGAR AND
LEONILO C. DELFIN, Petitioners, -versus- NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, Respondent.
G.R. No. 193618, SECOND DIVISION, November 28, 2016, LEONEN, J.
For land of the public domain to be converted into patrimonial property, there must be an express
declaration - "in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases
where the President is duly authorized by law" - that "the public dominion property is no longer
intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been
converted into patrimonial." However, a mere indorsement of the executive secretary is not the law or
presidential proclamation required for converting land of the public domain into patrimonial property
and rendering it susceptible to prescription. There then was no viable declaration rendering the Iligan
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property to have been patrimonial property at the onset. Accordingly, regardless of the length of
petitioners' possession, no title could vest on them by way of prescription.
FACTS
The Regional Trial Court's May 20, 2002 Decision awarded compensation to Leopoldo and Soledad
Delfin (Delfin Spouses) for an Iligan City property subsequently occupied by respondent National
Housing Authority. he assailed Court of Appeals Decision reversed the Regional Trial Court's May 20,
2002 Decision and dismissed the Delfin Spouses' complaint seeking compensation. The assailed
Court of Appeals Resolution denied their Motion for Reconsideration.
In a Complaint for "Payment of Parcel(s) of Land and Improvements and Damages"5 the Delfin
Spouses claimed that they were the owners of a 28,800 square meter parcel of land in Townsite,
Suarez, Iligan City (the "Iligan Property").6 They allegedly bought the property in 1951 from Felix
Natingo and Carlos Carbonay, who, allegedly, had been in actual possession of the property since time
immemorial.7 The Delfin Spouses had been declaring the Iligan Property in their names for tax
purposes since 1952,8 and had been planting it with mangoes, coconuts, corn, seasonal crops, and
vegetables. They farther alleged that, sometime in 1982, respondent National Housing Authority
forcibly took possession of a 10,798 square meter portion of the property.10 Despite their repeated
demands for compensation, the National Housing Authority failed to pay the value of the
property.11 The Delfin Spouses thus, filed their Complaint. On May 20, 2002, the Regional Trial Court
rendered a Decision in favor of the Delfin Spouses.
ISSUE
Whether petitioners are entitled to just compensation for the Iligan City property occupied by
respondent National Housing Authority (YES)
RULING
Petitioners are erroneously claiming title based on acquisitive prescription under Section 14(2) of
Presidential Decree No. 1529. For acquisitive prescription to set in pursuant to Section 14(2) of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, two (2) requirements must be satisifled: first, the property is
established to be private in character; and second the applicable prescriptive period under existing
laws had passed.
Contrary to petitioners' theory then, for prescription to be viable, the publicly-owned land must be
patrimonial or private in character at the onset. Possession for thirty (30) years does not convert it
into patrimonial property.
For land of the public domain to be converted into patrimonial property, there must be an express
declaration - "in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases
where the President is duly authorized by law"46 - that "the public dominion property is no longer
intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been
converted into patrimonial."47Attached to the present Petition was a copy of a May 18, 1988
supplemental letter to the Director of the Land Management Bureau.52 This referred to an executive
order, which stated that petitioners' property was no longer needed for any public or quasi-public
purposes:
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That it is very clear in the 4th Indorsement of the Executive Secretary dated April 24, 1954 the portion
thereof that will not be needed for any public or quasi-public purposes, be disposed in favor of the
actual occupants under the administration of the Bureau of Lands (copy of the Executive Order is
herewith attached for ready reference)
However, a mere indorsement of the executive secretary is not the law or presidential proclamation
required for converting land of the public domain into patrimonial property and rendering it
susceptible to prescription. There then was no viable declaration rendering the Iligan property to
have been patrimonial property at the onset. Accordingly, regardless of the length of petitioners'
possession, no title could vest on them by way of prescription.
While petitioners may not claim title by prescription, they may, nevertheless, claim title pursuant to
Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (the Public Land Act).
Section 48 enabled the confirmation of claims and issuance of titles in favor of citizens occupying or
claiming to own lands of the public domain or an interest therein. Section 48 (b) specifically pertained
to those who "have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and, occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since
June 12, 1945"Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act therefore requires that two (2) requisites be
satisfied before claims of title to public domain lands may be confirmed: first, that the land subject of
the claim is agricultural land; and second, open, continuous, notorious, and exclusive possession of
the land since June 12, 1945.
That the Iligan property was alienable and disposable, agricultural land, has been admitted. What is
claimed instead is that petitioners' possession is debunked by how the Iligan Property was
supposedly part of a military reservation area57 which was subsequently reserved for Iligan City's
slum improvement and resettlement program, and the relocation of families who were dislocated by
the National Steel Corporation's five-year expansion program.
Indeed, by virtue of Proclamation No. 2143 (erroneously referred to by respondent as Proclamation

No. 2151) certain parcels of land in Barrio Suarez, Iligan City were reserved for slum-improvement
and resettlement program purposes.59 The proclamation characterized the covered area as
"disposable parcel of public land"
Clearly then, petitioners acquired title over the Iligan Property pursuant to Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act.
First, there is no issue that the Iligan Property had already been declared to be alienable and
disposable land. Respondent has admitted this and Deputy Public Land Inspector Pio Lucero, Jr.'s
letters to the Director of Land attest to this.
Second, although the Delfin Spouses' testimonial evidence and tax declarations showed that their
possession went only as far back as 1952, Deputy Public Land Inspector Pio Lucero, Jr.'s letters to the
Director of Land nevertheless attest to a previous finding that the property had already been
occupied as early as June 1945.
Having shown that the requisites of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act have been satisfied and
having established their rights to the Iligan Property, it follows that petitioners must be compensated
for its taking.
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HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, (Represented by Sally A. Malabanan), Petitioners, -versus-

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 179987, EN BANC, September 3, 2013, BERSAMIN, J.
A positive act of the Government is necessary to enable such reclassification, and the exclusive
prerogative to classify public lands under existing laws is vested in the Executive Department, not in the
courts. If, however, public land will be classified as neither agricultural, forest or timber, mineral or
national park, or when public land is no longer intended for public service or for the development of the
national wealth, thereby effectively removing the land from the ambit of public dominion, a declaration
of such conversion must be made in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or by a Presidential
proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law to that effect.
Petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that they and their predecessors-in-interest
had been in possession of the land since June 12, 1945. Without satisfying the requisite character and
period of possession – possession and occupation that is open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious since
June 12, 1945, or earlier – the land cannot be considered ipso jure converted to private property even
upon the subsequent declaration of it as alienable and disposable.
FACTS
Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration covering the property he purchased from
Eduardo Velazco, claiming that the property formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the
public domain, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous,
uninterrupted, public and adverse possession and occupation of the land for more than 30 years,
thereby entitling him to the judicial confirmation of his title.
The application was granted by the RTC. However, the OSG for the Republic appealed the judgment
to the CA, which reversed the RTC Judgment.
Due to Malabanan’s intervening demise during the appeal in the CA, his heirs elevated the said
decision to this Court through a petition for review on certiorari.
The petition was denied.
Petitioners and the Republic filed Motions for Reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners were able to prove that the property was an alienable and disposable land
of the public domain. (NO)
RULING:
Land, which is an immovable property, may be classified as either of public dominion or of private
ownership. Land is considered of public dominion if it either:
(a) is intended for public use; or
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(b) belongs to the State, without being for public use, and is intended for some public service or for
the development of the national wealth.
Land belonging to the State that is not of such character, or although of such character but no longer
intended for public use or for public service forms part of the patrimonial property of the State. Land
that is other than part of the patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities and municipalities is
of private ownership if it belongs to a private individual.
Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a legal concept first introduced into the country
from the West by Spain through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, all lands of the public
domain belong to the State. This means that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership
of land, and is charged with the conservation of such patrimony.
All lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.
Also, public lands remain part of the inalienable land of the public domain unless the State is shown
to have reclassified or alienated them to private persons.
A positive act of the Government is necessary to enable such reclassification, and the exclusive
prerogative to classify public lands under existing laws is vested in the Executive Department, not in
the courts. If, however, public land will be classified as neither agricultural, forest or timber, mineral
or national park, or when public land is no longer intended for public service or for the development
of the national wealth, thereby effectively removing the land from the ambit of public dominion, a
declaration of such conversion must be made in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or by a
Presidential proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law to that effect. Thus,
until the Executive Department exercises its prerogative to classify or reclassify lands, or until
Congress or the President declares that the State no longer intends the land to be used for public
service or for the development of national wealth, the Regalian Doctrine is applicable.
However, in the case at bar, the petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that they
and their predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land since June 12, 1945. Without
satisfying the requisite character and period of possession – possession and occupation that is open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious since June 12, 1945, or earlier – the land cannot be considered
ipso jure converted to private property even upon the subsequent declaration of it as alienable and
disposable.
Prescription never began to run against the State, such that the land has remained ineligible for
registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Likewise, the land continues to
be ineligible for land registration under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree unless
Congress enacts a law or the President issues a proclamation declaring the land as no longer intended
for public service or for the development of the national wealth.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, -versus- DAVID REY GUZMAN, represented by his
Attorney-in-Fact, LOLITA G. ABELA, and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BULACAN, MEYCAUAYAN
BRANCH, Respondents.
G.R. No. 132964. SECOND DIVISION, February 18, 2000, BELLOSILLO, J.
There are three (3) essential elements of a donation: (a) the reduction of the patrimony of the donor;
(b) the increase in the patrimony of the donee; and, (c) the intent to do an act of liberality or animus
donandi. When applied to a donation of an immovable property, the law further requires that the
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donation be made in a public document and that there should be an acceptance thereof made in the
same deed of donation or in a separate public document.7 In cases where the acceptance is made in a
separate instrument, it is mandated that the donor should be notified thereof in an authentic form, to
be noted in both instruments. Not all the elements of a donation of an immovable property are present
in the instant case.
FACTS
David Rey Guzman, a natural-born American citizen, is the son of the spouses Simeon Guzman
(naturalized American) and Helen Meyers Guzman (American citizen). In 1968, Simeon died leaving
to his heirs, Helen and David, an estate consisting of several parcels of land in Bulacan.
In 1970, Helen and David executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate, dividing and
adjudicating to themselves all of the property, and registered it to the RD a year after.
In 1981, Helen executed a Deed of Quitclaim, assigning, transferring and conveying her ½ share of
the properties to David. But since it was not registered, she executed another Deed of Quitclaim to
confirm the first.
In 1994, Atty. Batongbacal wrote the OSG and furnished it with documents showing that David’s
ownership of ½ of the estate was defective. He argued that Art. XII of the Constitution only allows
Filipinos to acquire private lands in the country. The only instances when a foreigner may acquire
private property are by hereditary succession and if he was formerly a natural-born citizen who lost
his Filipino citizenship. Moreover, it contends that the Deeds of Quitclaim executed by Helen were
really donations inter vivos.
Republic filed with RTC a Petition for Escheat praying that ½ of David’s interest be forfeited in its
favor. RTC dismissed. CA affirmed.
ISSUE
Whether or not there was a donation inter vivos (NO)
HELD
same deed of donation or in a separate public document.7 In cases where the acceptance is made in a
separate instrument, it is mandated that the donor should be notified thereof in an authentic form,
to be noted in both instruments.
Not all the elements of a donation are present. The transfer of the properties by virtue of a Deed of
Quitclaim resulted in the (1) reduction of her patrimony as donor and the (2) consequent increase in
the patrimony of David as donee. However, Helen’s (3) intention to perform an act of liberality in
favor of David was not sufficiently established. The 2 Quitclaims reveal that Helen intended to convey
to her son certain parcels of land and to re-affirm it, she executed a waiver and renunciation of her
rights over these properties. It is clear that Helen merely contemplated a waiver of her rights, title,
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interest over the lands in favor of David, not a donation. She was also aware that donation was not
possible.
Moreover, the essential element of acceptance in the proper form and registration to make the
donation valid is lacking. The SPA executed by David in favor of Atty. Abela was not his acceptance,
but an acknowledgment that David owns the property referred to and that he authorizes Atty. Abela
to sell the same in his name. Further, there was nothing in the SPA to show that he indeed accept the
donation.
However, the inexistence of a donation does not make the repudiation of Helen in favor David valid.
There is NO valid repudiation of inheritance as Helen had already accepted her share of the
inheritance when she, together with David, executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate,
dividing and adjudicating between them all the properties. By virtue of that settlement, the
properties were registered in their names and for 11 years, they possessed the land in the concept of
owner. Thus, the 2 Quitclaims have no legal force and effect. Helen still owns ½ of the property.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, -versus- DIOSDADA I. GIELCZYK, Respondent.

G.R. No. 179990, FIRST DIVISION, October 23, 2013, REYES, J.
In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic, the Court further clarified the difference between Section
14(1) and Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529. The former refers to registration of title on the basis
of possession, while the latter entitles the applicant to the registration of his property on the basis
of prescription. Moreover, under Section 48(b) of the PLA, as amended by Republic Act No. 1472, the
30-year period is in relation to possession without regard to the Civil Code, while under Section 14(2) of
P.D. No. 1529, the 30-year period involves extraordinary prescription under the Civil Code, particularly
Article 1113 in relation to Article 1137.
In this case, the respondent failed to meet the required period of possession and occupation for purposes
of prescription. From the time of the declaration on September 1, 1965 that the properties in question
are purportedly alienable and disposable up to the filing of the application of the respondent on July 17,
1995, the respondent and her predecessors-in-interest had possessed and occupied the said properties
for only 29 years and 10 months, short of two months to complete the whole 30-year possession period.
Furthermore, the respondent failed to show that she or her predecessors-in-interest have exercised acts
of dominion over the said parcels of land. In fact, it was only the respondent who testified to substantiate
her allegations in the application. She did not present anyone else to support her claim of "open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation." Unfortunately, her testimony simply
made general declarations without further proof.
FACTS:
On July 17, 1995, the respondent sought the registration under her name of the lands denominated
as Lot No. 3135-A and Lot No. 3136-A of Plans Csd-072219-004552 and Csd-072219-004551. Both
lands were situated in Jugan, Consolacion, Cebu. In her verified application in LRC Case No. N-452,
the respondent claimed that she is the owner of the two parcels of land.
The respondent further alleged the following: (a) that the said parcels of land were last assessed for
taxation at P2,400.00; (b) that to the best of her knowledge and belief, there is no mortgage nor
encumbrance of any kind affecting said land, nor any person having interest therein, legal or
equitable; (c) that she had been in open, complete, continuous, and peaceful possession in the concept
11
of an owner over said parcels of land up to the present time for more than 30 years, including the
possession of her predecessors-in-interest; (d) that she acquired title to said land by virtue of the
deeds of absolute sale; and (e) that said land is not occupied.
The petitioner filed an opposition dated September 18, 1995 to the respondent's application for
registration of title, alleging among others: (1) That neither the respondent nor her predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the
land in question since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto; (2) That the muniments of title and/or the tax
declarations and tax payment receipts of the respondent attached to or alleged in the application do
not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the land applied for or
of their open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation thereof in the concept
of an owner since June 12, 1945, or prior thereto; and that said muniments of title do not appear to
be genuine and the tax declarations and/or tax payment receipts indicate the pretended possession
of the respondent to be of recent vintage; (3) That the respondent can no longer avail of the claim of
ownership in fee simple on the basis of Spanish title or grant since she has failed to file an appropriate
application for registration within the period of six months from February 16, 1976 as required by
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 892. From the records, the petitioner further alleged that the instant
application was filed on July 7, 1995; and, (4) That the parcel of land applied for is a portion of the
public domain belonging to the petitioner and that the said parcel is not subject to private
appropriation.
On November 3, 1999, the RTC rendered its Decision in favor of the respondent. On appeal, the CA
affirmed the decision of RTC. Thus, the petitioner filed the present Petition for Review under Rule 45
of the 1997 Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
Whether the respondent was able to prove that she and her predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, complete, continuous, notorious, exclusive and peaceful possession over the lands subject of
the application for original registration for a period of over 40 years through mere tax declarations
and in the absence of proof when the subject lots were declared alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain. (No)
RULING:
The respondent failed to completely prove that there was an expressed State declaration that
the properties in question are no longer intended for public use, public service, the development
of the national wealth and have been converted into patrimonial property, and to meet the
period of possession and occupation required by law.
In the assailed decision granting the respondent's application for registration of title, the CA
explained that the RTC's decision was based on Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 and not on Section
14(1) of the same decree.
The Court agrees with the CA's finding that the RTC's grant of the respondent's application for
registration of title was based on Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 and not on Section 14(1) of the same
decree. As the CA, citing Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals and Naguit, correctly explained,
an applicant may apply for registration of title through prescription under Section 14(2) of P.D. No.
1529, stating that patrimonial properties of the State are susceptible of prescription and that there
12
is a rich jurisprudential precedents which rule that properties classified as alienable public land may
be converted into private property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least
30 years.
In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic,[36] the Court further clarified the difference between Section
14(1) and Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529. The former refers to registration of title on the basis
of possession, while the latter entitles the applicant to the registration of his property on the basis
of prescription. Registration under the first mode is extended under the aegis of the P.D. No. 1529
and the Public Land Act (PLA) while under the second mode is made available both by P.D. No. 1529
and the Civil Code. Moreover, under Section 48(b) of the PLA, as amended by Republic Act No. 1472,
the 30-year period is in relation to possession without regard to the Civil Code, while under Section
14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, the 30-year period involves extraordinary prescription under the Civil Code,
particularly Article 1113 in relation to Article 1137.
Indeed, the foregoing jurisprudence clearly shows the basis of the respondent's application for
registration of title. However, the petitioner argued that the respondent failed to show proof of an
expressed State declaration that the properties in question are no longer intended for public use,
public service, the development of the national wealth or have been converted into patrimonial
property. It pointed out that the certification which the respondent submitted did not indicate when
the lands applied for were declared alienable and disposable.
On this point, the Court cannot completely agree with the petitioner. Indeed, the respondent
attempted to show proof as to when the subject lands were declared alienable and disposable. While
the RTC and the CA failed to cite the evidence which the respondent submitted, the Court cannot, in
the name of substantial justice and equity, close its eyes to the September 23,
2004 Certification issued and signed by Fedencio P. Carreon (Carreon), OIC, CENRO, which the
respondent attached in her Appellee's brief in the CA.
However, following our ruling in Republic of the Philippines v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,[41] this CENRO
Certification by itself is insufficient to establish that a public land is alienable and disposable. While
the certification refers to Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1063 dated September 1, 1965, the
respondent should have submitted a certified true copy thereof to substantiate the alienable
character of the land. In any case, the Court does not need to further discuss whether the respondent
was able to overcome the burden of proving that the land no longer forms part of the public domain
to support her application for original land registration because of other deficiencies in her
application.
Indeed, the respondent failed to meet the required period of possession and occupation for purposes
of prescription. From the time of the declaration on September 1, 1965 that the properties in question
are purportedly alienable and disposable up to the filing of the application of the respondent on July
17, 1995, the respondent and her predecessors-in-interest had possessed and occupied the said
properties for only 29 years and 10 months, short of two months to complete the whole 30-year
possession period.
The respondent failed to present specific acts of ownership to substantiate her claim of open,
continuous, exclusive, notorious and adverse possession in the concept of an owner.
13
The petitioner contends that the respondent failed to present specific acts of ownership to
substantiate the latter's claim of open, continuous, exclusive, notorious and adverse possession in
the concept of an owner. Here, the Court agrees with the petitioner's argument.
In Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo, Aklan v. Municipality of Buruanga, Aklan,[45]the Court ruled that
for an applicant to ipso jure or by operation of law acquire government grant or vested title to a lot,
he must be in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the lot.
A simple claim of "open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation" does not
suffice. An applicant for a grant or title over a lot must be able to show that he has exercised acts of
dominion over the property in question. The applicant's possession must not be simply a nominal
claim where he only plants a sign or symbol of possession. In other words, his possession of the
property must be patent, visible, apparent, notorious and not clandestine; it should be uninterrupted,
unbroken and not intermittent or occasional; it should demonstrate exclusive dominion over the land
and an appropriation of it to his own use and benefit; and it should be conspicuous, which means
generally known and talked of by the public or the people in the neighborhood.
In the instant case, the respondent failed to show that she or her predecessors-in-interest have
exercised acts of dominion over the said parcels of land. In fact, it was only the respondent who
testified to substantiate her allegations in the application. She did not present anyone else to support
her claim of "open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation." Unfortunately,
her testimony simply made general declarations without further proof. In the continuance of her
testimony, the respondent added no further information for this Court to conclude that she indeed
exercised specific acts of dominion aside from paying taxes. The respondent's cross-examination
further revealed that she and her predecessors-in-interest have not exercised specific acts of
dominion over the properties.
From the foregoing testimony of the lone witness (the applicant-respondent herself), the Court can
deduce that, besides intermittently paying the tax dues on Lot No. 3135-A, the respondent did not
exercise acts of dominion over it. Neither can the Court give credence to the respondent's claim that
her predecessors-in-interest had exercised dominion over the property since the respondent failed
to present any witness who would substantiate her allegation. The pieces of documentary evidence,
specifically the tax declarations and the deeds of absolute sale, can neither be relied upon because
the same revealed no indication of any improvement that would have the Court conclude that the
respondent exercised specific acts of dominion. For instance, the deed of absolute sale simply said
that the improvements on Lot No. 3135-A consisted of two (2) coconut trees, one (1) mango tree, one
(1) caimito tree and one (1) jackfruit tree.[56]The tax declarations have not shown any indication
supporting the respondent's claim that she exercised specific acts of dominion. [57]
As to Lot No. 3136-A, the deed of absolute sale showed that there were 14 coconut trees, eight (8)
jackfruit trees, and a residential building, which was actually possessed by the vendor Constancio
Ceniza. Moreover, it was only in Tax Declaration Nos. 29200, 04210 and 13275 where it was declared
that a residential building has been built in Lot No. 3136-A.[58] And based on the records, Tax
Declaration No. 29200, where the residential building was first indicated, is dated 1981. It may be
said then that it was only in 1981 when the respondent's predecessors-in-interest exercised specific
acts of dominion over Lot No. 3136-A, the period of which consists barely of 14 years. Thus, the
respondent has not completed the required 30 years of "open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation."
14
Clearly, from the pieces of documentary and testimonial evidence, and considering that the
respondent did not present any other witness to support her claim, the Court has no other recourse
but to declare that she has not presented the premium of evidence needed to award her title over the
two parcels of land.
FLORENTINO W. LEONG AND ELENA LEONG, ET AL., Petitioners, -versus- EDNA C.

SEE, Respondent.
G.R. No. 194077, SECOND DIVISION, December 03, 2014, Leonen, J.
Spouses owned the subject property wherein petitioner Elena was allowed to stay. Upon the spouses’
divorce, the property went to the wife. She sold it to the respondent See. The Court held that See was a
buyer in good faith. She went to the Register of Deeds to verify the title and relied on the marriage
settlement agreement. The Court found that she exerted due diligence. An innocent purchaser for value
refers to someone who buys the property of another without notice that some other person has a right
to or interest in it, and who pays a full and fair price at the time of the purchase or before receiving any
notice of another person’s claim.
FACTS:
The spouses Florentino Leong and Carmelita Leong used to own the property located at De Guzman
Street, Quiapo, Manila. Elena Leong is Florentino's sister-in-law. She had stayed with her in-laws on
the property rental-free for over two decades until the building they lived in was razed by fire. They
then constructed makeshift houses, and the rental-free arrangement continued.
Florentino and Carmelita immigrated to the United States and eventually had their marriage
dissolved in Illinois. A provision in their marital settlement agreement states that “Florentino shall
convey and quitclaim all of his right, title and interest in and to 540 De Guzman Street, Manila,
Philippines . . . to Carmelita.”
Intercalated in the lower margin of page 12 of the instrument was a long-hand scribbling of a proviso,
purporting to be a footnote remark: “Neither party shall evict or charge rent to relatives of the parties,
or convey title, until it has been established that Florentino has clear title to the Malabon property.
Clear title to be established by the attorneys for the parties or the ruling of a court of competent
jurisdiction. In the event Florentino does not obtain clear title, this court reserves jurisdiction to
reapportion the properties or their values to effect a 50-50 division of the value of the 2 remaining
Philippine properties.
Carmelita sold the land to Edna. In lieu of Florentino's signature of conformity in the deed of absolute
sale, Carmelita presented to Edna and her father a waiver of interest notarized in Illinois. In this
waiver, Florentino reiterated his quitclaim over his right, title, and interest to the land. Consequently,
the land’s title was transferred to Edna's name. Edna was aware of the Leong relatives staying in the
makeshift houses on the land. Carmelita assured her that her nieces and nephews would move out,
but demands to vacate were unheeded.
Edna filed a complaint for recovery of possession against Elena and the other relatives of the Leong
ex-spouses. Florentino filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of contract, title, and damages
against Carmelita, Edna, and the Manila Register of Deeds, alleging that the sale was without his
consent. The two cases were consolidated.
15
The trial court granted Edna possession and ownership over the subject property. The appellate
court affirmed the ruling.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Edna is a buyer in good faith and for value. (Yes)
RULING:
The Torrens system was adopted to obviate possible conflicts of title by giving the public the right to
rely upon the face of the Torrens certificate and to dispense, as a rule, with the necessity of inquiring
further. One need not inquire beyond the four corners of the certificate of title when dealing with
registered property.
An innocent purchaser for value refers to someone who buys the property of another without notice
that some other person has a right to or interest in it, and who pays a full and fair price at the time of
the purchase or before receiving any notice of another person’s claim. One claiming to be an innocent
purchaser for value has the burden of proving such status.
The Court cited the ruling of the trial court: “By her overt acts, Edna See with her father verified the
authenticity of Carmelita’s land title at the Registry of Deeds of Manila. There was no annotation on
the same, and thus, it is deemed a clean title. Also, she relied on the duly executed and notarized
Certificate of Authority issued by the State of Illinois and Certificate of Authentication issued by the
Consul of the Republic of the Philippines for Illinois in support to the Waiver of Interest incorporated
in the Deed of Absolute Sale presented to her by Carmelita.
Examination of the assailed Certificate of Authority shows that it is valid and regular on its face. The
assailed Certificate of Authority is a notarized document and therefore, presumed to be valid and
duly executed. Thus, Edna See’s reliance on the notarial acknowledgment found in the duly notarized
Certificate of Authority presented by Carmelita is sufficient evidence of good faith.”
The Court found that Edna exerted due diligence when she ascertained the authenticity of the
documents attached to the deed of sale. These further inquiries were considered by the lower courts
in finding See to be an innocent purchaser in good faith and for value.
Edna, an innocent purchaser in good faith and for value with title in her name, has a better right to
the property than Elena. Elena’s possession was neither adverse to nor in the concept of owner.
HEIRS OF BIENVENIDO AND ARACELI TANYAG, namely: ARTURO TANYAG, AIDA T. JOCSON
AND ZENAIDA T. VELOSO, Petitioners, -versus-
SALOME E. GABRIEL, NESTOR R. GABRIEL, LUZ GABRIEL-ARNEDO married to ARTURO
ARNEDO, NORA GABRIEL-CALINGO married to FELIX CALINGO, PILAR M. MENDIOLA,
MINERVA GABRIEL-NATIVIDAD married to EUSTAQUIO NATIVIDAD, and ERLINDA
VELASQUEZ married to HERMINIO VELASQUEZ, Respondents.
G.R. No. 175763, FIRST DIVISION, April 11, 2012, Corona, C.J.
Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse
possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith.
16
To successfully maintain an action to recover the ownership of a real property, the person who claims a
better right to it must prove two (2) things: first, the identity of the land claimed; and second, his title
thereto.
FACTS:
Subject of controversy are two adjacent parcels of land located at Ruhale, Barangay Calzada,
Municipality of Taguig. The first parcel (“Lot 1”) with an area of 686 square meters was originally
declared in the name of Jose Gabriel, while the second parcel (“Lot 2”) consisting of 147 square
meters was originally declared in the name of Agueda Dinguinbayan. For several years, these lands
lined with bamboo plants remained undeveloped and uninhabited.
Petitioners claimed that Lot 1 was owned by Benita Gabriel, sister of Jose Gabriel, as part of her
inheritance as declared by her in a 1944 notarized instrument (“Affidavit of Sale”) whereby she sold
the said property to spouses Gabriel Sulit and Cornelia Sanga.
Lot 1 allegedly came into the possession of Benita Gabriel’s own daughter, Florencia Gabriel Sulit,
when her father-in-law Gabriel Sulit gave it to her as part of inheritance of his son, Eliseo Sulit who
was Florencia’s husband. Florencia Sulit sold the same lot to Bienvenido S. Tanyag, father of
petitioners, as evidenced by a notarized deed of sale dated October 14, 1964. Petitioners then took
possession of the property, paid the real estate taxes due on the land and declared the same for tax
purposes issued in 1969 in the name of Bienvenido’s wife, Araceli C. Tanyag.
As to Lot 2, petitioners averred that it was sold by Agueda Dinguinbayan to Araceli Tanyag under
Deed of Sale executed on October 22, 1968. Thereupon, petitioners took possession of said property
and declared the same for tax purposes. Petitioners claimed to have continuously, publicly,
notoriously and adversely occupied both Lots 1 and 2 through their caretaker Juana Quinones; they
fenced the premises and introduced improvements on the land.
Sometime in 1979, Jose Gabriel, father of respondents, secured in his name Lot 1 indicating therein
an increased area of 1,763 square meters.
On March 20, 2000, petitioners instituted a civil case alleging that respondents never occupied the
whole 686 square meters of Lot 1 and fraudulently caused the inclusion of Lot 2 in such that Lot 1
consisting of 686 square meters originally declared in the name of Jose Gabriel was increased to
1,763 square meters. They contended that the issuance of OCT No. 1035 on October 28, 1998 over
the subject land in the name of respondent’s heirs of Jose Gabriel was null and void from the
beginning.
On the other hand, respondents asserted that petitioners have no cause of action against them for
they have not established their ownership over the subject property covered by a Torrens title in
respondents’ name. They further argued that OCT No. 1035 had become unassailable one year after
its issuance and petitioners failed to establish that it was irregularly or unlawfully procured.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioners acquired the property through acquisitive prescription. (Yes)
17
RULING:
Acquisitive prescription is a mode of acquiring ownership by a possessor through the requisite lapse
of time. In order to ripen into ownership, possession must be in the concept of an owner, public,
peaceful and uninterrupted. Possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent, notorious and not
clandestine. It is continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or occasional;
exclusive when the adverse possessor can show exclusive dominion over the land and an
appropriation of it to his own use and benefit; and notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is
generally known and talked of by the public or the people in the neighborhood. The party who asserts
ownership by adverse possession must prove the presence of the essential elements of acquisitive
prescription.
Article 1137 of the Civil Code provides that “ownership and other real rights over immovables also
prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or
of good faith. Here, petitioners have been in continuous, public and adverse possession of the subject
land for 31 years. Having possessed the property for such period and in the character required by
law as sufficient for extraordinary acquisitive prescription, petitioners have indeed acquired
ownership over the subject property. Such right cannot be defeated by respondents’ acts of declaring
again the property for tax purposes in 1979 and obtaining a Torrens certificate of title in their name
in 1998.
Petitioners were not able to interrupt respondents’ adverse possession since 1962. Civil interruption
takes place with the service of judicial summons to the possessor and not by filing of a mere Notice
of Adverse Claim. In this case, while there was a Notice of Adverse Claim, such cannot take the place
of the judicial summons required for under the law.
Petitioners’ right as owner, however, does not extend to Lot 2 because they failed to substantiate
their claim over the same by virtue of a deed of sale from the original declared owner, Dinguinbayan.
Under Article 434 of the Civil Code, to successfully maintain an action to recover the ownership of a
real property, the person who claims a better right to it must prove two (2) things: first, the identity
of the land claimed; and second, his title thereto. In regard to the first requisite, in an accion
reinvindicatoria, the person who claims that he has a better right to the property must first fix the
identity of the land he is claiming by describing the location, area and boundaries thereof. In this case,
petitioners failed to identify Lot 2 by providing evidence of the metes and bounds thereof, so that the
same may be compared with the technical description contained in OCT No. 1035. The testimony of
Dinguinbayan’s son would not suffice because said he merely stated the boundary owners as
indicated in the 1966 and 1967 tax declarations of his mother. Arturo Tayag claimed that he had the
lots surveyed in the 1970s in preparation for the consolidation of the two parcels. However, no such
plan was presented in court.
GERARDO MENDOZA, TRINIA AND IYLENE ALL SURNAMED MENDOZA v. SOLEDAD SALINAS
G.R. No. 152827, THIRD DIVISION, February 6, 2007, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
In Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, the term "judicial process" could mean no less than an
ejectment suit or reinvindicatory action, in which the ownership claims of the contending parties may
be properly heard and adjudicated. Thus, one who claims to be the owner of a property possessed by
another must bring the appropriate judicial action for its physical recovery, not summarily through a
motion for the issuance of a writ of possession.
18
It is noted that, in this case, there already exists a final and executory decision disregarding Salinas'
claim for possession over the property. An action for unlawful detainer was filed by Salinas against the
Mendozas but was dismissed by the MTCC. Salinas did not appeal the case but filed for a writ of
possession in the land registration case.
FACTS:
Assailed in the present Petition for Review on Certiorari is the Order dated April 2, 2002 issued by
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Olongapo City, Branch 72, acting as Land Registration Court, in LRC
Case No. N-04-0-97, granting respondent's prayer for the issuance of a writ of possession in her favor.
The assailed Order was issued by the RTC after it rendered a favorable judgment on respondent's
application for registration in its Decision dated November 3, 1998, and Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. P-10053 was issued in her name covering a parcel of land.
Petitioners opposed respondent's application for the issuance of a writ of possession claiming that
they were not oppositors/parties to the registration case and they have been in actual physical
possession of the property since 1964. The RTC, however, rejected their arguments and granted
respondent's application for the issuance of a writ of possession per herein assailed Order. Hence,
the present petition.
Petitioners set forth the lone assignment of error that the RTC erred in issuing the writ of possession
and acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack and excess of jurisdiction. Petitioners
reiterate their argument that they cannot be ousted of their possession of the property, having been
in actual possession of the property since 1964, as evidenced by petitioner Gerardo C. Mendoza's
Sales Application made in January 1986 over the following property:
A parcel of land situated at Burgos St., Bo. Barretto, O.C. Bounded on the North., by Benjamin
Salinas; South., by Gloria Montemayor; East., by Benjamin Salinas &ConradoPilapil and West.,
Burgos St. situated in Bo. Barretto, Olongapo City, Zambales, and containing an area of 932
square meters x xx.
and a Declaration of Real Property for the years 1976 and 1985, among others.
Respondent counters that the present petition should be dismissed, arguing that the petition should
have been initially with the Court of Appeals, based on the principle of hierarchy of courts, and that
the general order of default on October 8, 1998 issued by the RTC binds them. and personal notice
was not necessary.
ISSUE:
Whether or not writ of possession should be issued in favor of Salinas?
RULING:
No. The issuance of a writ of possession is a ministerial duty of the court in a decree of registration in an
original land registration proceeding. Such ministerial duty, however, ceases to be so with particular
regard to petitioners who are actual possessors of the property under a claim of ownership. This
conclusion is supported by Article 433 of the Civil Code, which provides:
19
Actual possession under claim of ownership raises a disputable presumption of ownership.

The true owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of the property.
In Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, the term "judicial process" could mean no less than
an ejectment suit or reinvindicatory action, in which the ownership claims of the contending parties
may be properly heard and adjudicated. Thus, one who claims to be the owner of a property
possessed by another must bring the appropriate judicial action for its physical recovery, not
summarily through a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession.
It is noted that, in this case, there already exists a final and executory decision disregarding Salinas'
claim for possession over the property. An action for unlawful detainer was filed by Salinas against
the Mendozas but was dismissed by the MTCC. Salinas did not appeal the case but filed for a writ of
possession in the land registration case. Moreover, the Mendozas opposed Salinas' application for the
issuance of a writ of possession and apprised their actual, peaceful, physical and uninterrupted
possession. The RTC, nevertheless, ruled that a writ of possession may be issued in a land registration
proceeding. Thus, it was erroneous for the RTC to have issued the writ of possession against the
Mendozas.
HEIRS OF BIENVENIDO and ARACELI TANYAG, namely ARTURO TANYAG, AIDA T. JOCSON and
ZENAID T. VELOSO vs. SALOME E. GABRIEL, ET AL.
G.R. No. 175763, FIRST DIVISION, April 11, 2012, VILLARAMA, JR., J.
Art. 1137of the Civil Code provides that “ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe
through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith.”
In the case of Heirs of MarcelinaAzardon-Crisologo v. Rañon, this Court citing Article 1123 of the Civil
Codeheld that civil interruption takes place with the service of judicial summons to the possessor and
not by filing of a mere Notice of Adverse Claim.
Here, petitioners have been in continuous, public and adverse possession of the subject land for 31 years.
Having possessed the property for such period and in the character required by law as sufficient for
extraordinary acquisitive prescription, petitioners have indeed acquired ownership over the subject
property. Also, Petitioners were not able to interrupt respondents’ adverse possession since 1962. Civil
interruption takes place with the service of judicial summons to the possessor and not by filing of a mere
Notice of Adverse Claim. In this case, while there was a Notice of Adverse Claim, such cannot take the
place of the judicial summons required for under the law.
FACTS:
Subject of controversy are two adjacent parcels of land located at Ruhale, Barangay Calzada,
Municipality of Taguig. The first parcel (“Lot 1”) with an area of 686 square meters was originally
declared in the name of Jose Gabriel, while the second parcel (“Lot 2”) consisting of 147 square
meters was originally declared in the name of AguedaDinguinbayan. For several years, these lands
lined with bamboo plants remained undeveloped and uninhabited.
Petitioners claimed that Lot 1 was owned by Benita Gabriel, sister of Jose Gabriel, as part of her
inheritance as declared by her in a 1944 notarized instrument (“Affidavit of Sale”) whereby she sold
the said property to spouses Gabriel Sulit and Cornelia Sanga.
20
Lot 1 allegedly came into the possession of Benita Gabriel’s own daughter, Florencia Gabriel Sulit,
when her father-in-law Gabriel Sulit gave it to her as part of inheritance of his son, Eliseo Sulit who
was Florencia’s husband. Florencia Sulit sold the same lot to Bienvenido S. Tanyag, father of
petitioners, as evidenced by a notarized deed of sale dated October 14, 1964. Petitioners then took
possession of the property, paid the real estate taxes due on the land and declared the same for tax
purposes issued in 1969 in the name of Bienvenido’s wife, Araceli C. Tanyag.
As to Lot 2, petitioners averred that it was sold by AguedaDinguinbayan to AraceliTanyag under Deed
of Sale executed on October 22, 1968. Thereupon, petitioners took possession of said property and
declared the same for tax purposes. Petitioners claimed to have continuously, publicly, notoriously
and adversely occupied both Lots 1 and 2 through their caretaker Juana Quinones; they fenced the
premises and introduced improvements on the land.
Sometime in 1979, Jose Gabriel, father of respondents, secured in his name Lot 1 indicating therein
an increased area of 1,763 square meters.
On March 20, 2000, petitioners instituted a civil case alleging that respondents never occupied the
whole 686 square meters of Lot 1 and fraudulently caused the inclusion of Lot 2 in such that Lot 1
consisting of 686 square meters originally declared in the name of Jose Gabriel was increased to
1,763 square meters. They contended that the issuance of OCT No. 1035 on October 28, 1998 over
the subject land in the name of respondent’s heirs of Jose Gabriel was null and void from the
beginning.
On the other hand, respondents asserted that petitioners have no cause of action against them for
they have not established their ownership over the subject property covered by a Torrens title in
respondents’ name. They further argued that OCT No. 1035 had become unassailable one year after
its issuance and petitioners failed to establish that it was irregularly or unlawfully procured.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioners acquired the property through acquisitive prescription?
RULING:
Yes. Petitioners acquired part of the property (Lot 1) through acquisitive prescription.
Acquisitive prescription is a mode of acquiring ownership by a possessor through the requisite lapse
of time. In order to ripen into ownership, possession must be in the concept of an owner, public,
peaceful and uninterrupted. Possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent, notorious and not
clandestine. It is continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or occasional;
exclusive when the adverse possessor can show exclusive dominion over the land and an
appropriation of it to his own use and benefit; and notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is
generally known and talked of by the public or the people in the neighborhood. The party who asserts
ownership by adverse possession must prove the presence of the essential elements of acquisitive
prescription.
Article 1137 of the Civil Code provides that “ownership and other real rights over immovables also
prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title
or of good faith”. Here, petitioners have been in continuous, public and adverse possession of the
21
subject land for 31 years. Having possessed the property for such period and in the character
required by law as sufficient for extraordinary acquisitive prescription, petitioners have indeed
acquired ownership over the subject property. Such right cannot be defeated by respondents’ acts of
declaring again the property for tax purposes in 1979 and obtaining a Torrens certificate of title in
their name in 1998.
Petitioners were not able to interrupt respondents’ adverse possession since 1962. Civil
interruption takes place with the service of judicial summons to the possessor and not by filing of a
mere Notice of Adverse Claim. In this case, while there was a Notice of Adverse Claim, such cannot
take the place of the judicial summons required for under the law.
Petitioners’ right as owner, however, does not extend to Lot 2 because they failed to substantiate
their claim over the same by virtue of a deed of sale from the original declared owner, Dinguinbayan.
Under Article 434 of the Civil Code, to successfully maintain an action to recover the ownership of a
real property, the person who claims a better right to it must prove two (2) things: first, the identity
of the land claimed; and second, his title thereto. In regard to the first requisite, in an
accionreinvindicatoria, the person who claims that he has a better right to the property must first fix
the identity of the land he is claiming by describing the location, area and boundaries thereof. In this
case, petitioners failed to identify Lot 2 by providing evidence of the metes and bounds thereof, so
that the same may be compared with the technical description contained in OCT No. 1035. The
testimony of Dinguinbayan’s son would not suffice because said he merely stated the boundary
owners as indicated in the 1966 and 1967 tax declarations of his mother. Arturo Tayag claimed that
he had the lots surveyed in the 1970s in preparation for the consolidation of the two parcels.
However, no such plan was presented in court.
MAGDALENA T. VILLASI vs. SPOUSES FILOMENO GARCIA AND ERMELINDA HALILI- GARCIA
G.R. No. 190106, SECOND DIVISION, January 15, 2014, Perez, J.
In Buduhan v. Pakurao,we underscored the significance of a tax declaration as proof that a holder has
claim of title, and, we gave weight to the demonstrable interest of the claimant holding a tax receipt:
Although tax declarations or realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of
ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner for no one
in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least
constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over
the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests
not only one's sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property and announces his
adverse claim against the State and all other interested parties, but also the intention to
contribute needed revenues to the Government. Such an act strengthens one's bona fide claim
of acquisition of ownership.
In this case, the Spouses Garcia failed to prove that they have a bona fide title to the building in
question. In contrast, Villasi was able to satisfactorily establish the ownership of FGCI thru the pieces of
evidence she appended to her opposition. Worthy to note is the fact that the building in litigation was
declared for taxation purposes in the name of FGCI and not in the Spouses Garcias'.
22
FACTS:
Petitioner Magdalena T. Villasi (Villasi) engaged the services of respondent Fil-Garcia Construction,
Inc. (FGCI) to construct a seven-storey condominium building. For failure of Villasi to fully pay the
contract price despite several demands, FGCI initiated a suit for collection of sum of money before
the RTC. The RTC ruled in favor of FGCI. The CA, however, reversed the decision. FGCI filed a petition
for review on certiorari, but the same was denied. To enforce her right as prevailing party, Villasi
filed a Motion for Execution. A Writ of Execution was issued commanding the Sheriff to execute and
make effective the Decision of the Court of Appeals.
To satisfy the judgment, the sheriff levied on a building. While the building was declared for taxation
purposes in the name of FGCI, the lots in which it was erected were registered in the names of the
Spouses Filomeno Garcia and ErmelindaHalili-Garcia (Spouses Garcia). After the mandatory posting
and publication of notice of sale on execution of real property were complied with, a public auction
was scheduled. To forestall the sale on execution, the Spouses Garcia filed an Affidavit of Third Party
Claim and a Motion to Set Aside Notice of Sale on Execution, claiming that they are the lawful owners
of the property which was erroneously levied upon by the sheriff. To persuade the court a quo to
grant their motion, the Spouses Garcia argued that the building covered by the levy was mistakenly
assessed by the City Assessor in the name of FGCI. The motion was opposed by Villasi who insisted
that its ownership belongs to FGCI and not to the Spouses Garcia as shown by the tax declaration.
The RTC issue an order directing the Sheriff to hold in abeyance the conduct of the sale on execution.
Villasi moved for reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the building and the lot in which it was erected should be treated separate properties?
RULING:
In Buduhan v. Pakurao, we underscored the significance of a tax declaration as proof that a holder
has claim of title, and, we gave weight to the demonstrable interest of the claimant holding a tax
receipt:
ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner for no
one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least
constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over
the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation
purposes manifests not only one's sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property
and announces his adverse claim against the State and all other interested parties, but also
the intention to contribute needed revenues to the Government. Such an act strengthens
one's bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.
Our perusal of the record shows that, as the party asserting their title, the Spouses Garcia failed to
prove that they have a bona fide title to the building in question. Aside from their postulation that as
title holders of the land, the law presumes them to be owners of the improvements built thereon, the
Spouses Garcia were unable to adduce credible evidence to prove their ownership of the property. In
contrast, Villasi was able to satisfactorily establish the ownership of FGCI thru the pieces of evidence
23
she appended to her opposition. Worthy to note is the fact that the building in litigation was declared
for taxation purposes in the name of FGCI and not in the Spouses Garcias'.
It likewise failed to escape our attention that FGCI is in actual possession of the building and as the
payment of taxes coupled with actual possession of the land covered by tax declaration strongly
supports a claim of ownership. Quite significantly, all the court processes in an earlier collection suit
between FGCI and Villasi were served, thru the former's representative Filomeno Garcia, at No. 140
Kalayaan Avenue, Quezon City, where the subject property is located. This circumstance is consistent
with the tax declaration in the name of FGCI.
While it is a hornbook doctrine that the accessory follows the principal, that is, the ownership of the
property gives the right by accession to everything which is produced thereby, or which is
incorporated or attached thereto, either naturally or artificially, such rule is not without exception.
In cases where there is a clear and convincing evidence to prove that the principal and the accessory
are not owned by one and the same person or entity, the presumption shall not be applied and the
actual ownership shall be upheld. In a number of cases, we recognized the separate ownership of the
land from the building and brushed aside the rule that accessory follows the principal.
In Carbonilla v. Abiera, the court denied the claim of petitioner that, as the owner of the land, he is
likewise the owner of the building erected thereon, for his failure to present evidence to buttress his
position:
To set the record straight, while petitioner may have proven his ownership of the land, as
there can be no other piece of evidence more worthy of credence than a Torrens certificate
of title, he failed to present any evidence to substantiate his claim of ownership or right to the
possession of the building. Like the CA, we cannot accept the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement
of Estate (Residential Building) with Waiver and Quitclaim of Ownership executed by the
Garcianos as proof that petitioner acquired ownership of the building. There is no showing
that the Garcianos were the owners of the building or that they had any proprietary right over
it. Ranged against respondents’ proof of possession of the building since 1977, petitioner’s
evidence pales in comparison and leaves us totally unconvinced.
In Caltex (Phil.) Inc. v. Felias, the court ruled that while the building is a conjugal property and
therefore liable for the debts of the conjugal partnership, the lot on which the building was
constructed is a paraphernal property and could not be the subject of levy and sale:
x xx. In other words, when the lot was donated to Felisa by her parents, as owners of the land
on which the building was constructed, the lot became her paraphernal property. The
donation transmitted to her the rights of a landowner over a building constructed on it.
Therefore, at the time of the levy and sale of the sheriff, Lot No. 107 did not belong to the
conjugal partnership, but it was paraphernal property of Felisa. As such, it was not
answerable for the obligations of her husband which resulted in the judgment against him in
favor of Caltex.
The rule on accession is not an iron-clad dictum. On instances where this Court was confronted with
cases requiring judicial determination of the ownership of the building separate from the lot, it never
hesitated to disregard such rule. The case at bar is of similar import. When there are factual and
evidentiary evidence to prove that the building and the lot on which it stands are owned by different
24
persons, they shall be treated separately. As such, the building or the lot, as the case may be, can be
made liable to answer for the obligation of its respective owner.
FEDERICO GEMINIANO, MARIA GEMINIANO, ERNESTO GEMINIANO, ASUNCION GEMINIANO,

LARRY GEMINIANO, AND MARLYN GEMINIANO, Petitioners, -versus- COURT OF APPEALS,
DOMINADOR NICOLAS, AND MARY A. NICOLAS, Respondents.
G.R. No. 120303, THIRD DIVISION, July 24, 1996, DAVIDE, JR, J.
It has been said that while the right to let property is an incident of title and possession, a person may
be a lessor and occupy the position of a landlord to the tenant although he is not the owner of the
premises let. After all, ownership of the property is not being transferred, only the temporary use and
enjoyment thereof.
It is undisputed that the private respondents came into possession of a 126 square-meter portion of the
said lot by virtue of a contract of lease executed by the petitioners' mother in their favor. The juridical
relation between the petitioners' mother as lessor, and the private respondents as lessees, is therefore
well-established, and carries with it a recognition of the lessor's title. The private respondents, as lessees
who had undisturbed possession for the entire term under the lease, are then estopped to deny their
landlord's title, or to assert a better title not only in themselves, but also in some third person while they
remain in possession of the leased premises and until they surrender possession to the landlord. This
estoppel applies even though the lessor had no title at the time the relation of lessor and lessee was
created, and may be asserted not only by the original lessor, but also by those who succeed to his title.
FACTS:
A 314 square meter lot was originally owned by the petitioners' mother, Paulina Geminiano. On a 12-
square-meter portion of that lot stood the petitioners' unfinished bungalow, which the petitioners
sold in 1978 to private respondents with an alleged promise to sell to the latter that portion of the
lot occupied by the house. Subsequently, the petitioners' mother executed a contract of lease over a
126 square-meter portion of the lot, including that portion on which the house stood, in favor of the
private respondents for P40 per month for a period of seven years. The private respondents then
introduced additional improvements and registered the house in their names. After the expiration of
the lease contract in 1985, however, the petitioners' mother refused to accept the monthly rentals.
Petitioners demanded private respondents to vacate the premises and pay the rentals in arrears.
Upon failure of the private respondents to heed the demand, the petitioners filed with the MTCC a
complaint for unlawful detainer and damages.
During the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed to confine the issues to: (1) whether there was an
implied renewal of the lease (2) whether the lessees were builders in good faith and entitled to
reimbursement of the value of the house and improvements; and (3) the value of the house.
The court resolved the second issue in the negative, holding that Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil
Code, which allow possessors in good faith to recover the value of improvements and retain the
premises until reimbursed, did not apply to lessees like the private respondents, because the latter
knew that their occupation of the premises would continue only during the life of the lease. Besides,
the rights of the private respondents were specifically governed by Article 1678, which allows
reimbursement of up to one-half of the value of the useful improvements, or removal of the
improvements should the lessor refuse to reimburse.
25
ISSUE:
Whether the private respondents are builders in good faith. (NO)
RULING:
It has been said that while the right to let property is an incident of title and possession, a person may
be a lessor and occupy the position of a landlord to the tenant although he is not the owner of the
premises let. After all, ownership of the property is not being transferred, only the temporary use
and enjoyment thereof.
It is undisputed that the private respondents came into possession of a 126 square-meter portion of
the said lot by virtue of a contract of lease executed by the petitioners' mother in their favor. The
juridical relation between the petitioners' mother as lessor, and the private respondents as lessees,
is therefore well-established, and carries with it a recognition of the lessor's title. The private
respondents, as lessees who had undisturbed possession for the entire term under the lease, are then
estopped to deny their landlord's title, or to assert a better title not only in themselves, but also in
some third person while they remain in possession of the leased premises and until they surrender
possession to the landlord. This estoppel applies even though the lessor had no title at the time the
relation of lessor and lessee was created, and may be asserted not only by the original lessor, but also
by those who succeed to his title.
Being mere lessees, the private respondents knew that their occupation of the premises would
continue only for the life of the lease. Plainly, they cannot be considered as possessors nor builders
in good faith.
SPOUSES CRISPIN AQUINO and TERESA V. AQUINO, HEREIN REPRESENTED BY THEIR

ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, AMADOR D. LEDESMA, Petitioners, -versus- SPOUSES EUSEBIO AGUILAR
and JOSEFINA V. AGUILAR, Respondents.
G.R. No. 182754, FIRST DIVISION, June 29, 2015, SERENO, C.J.
Based on the findings of fact of the MeTC and the RTC, petitioners had already warned respondents not
to build a structure on the property as early as 1983. This ruling was affirmed by the RTC. Thus, the SC
found no reason to depart from the conclusions of the trial courts. Respondents were evidently
prohibited by petitioners from building improvements on the land because the latter had every intention
of selling it.
Hence, petitioners, as the owners of the land, have the right to appropriate what has been built on the
property, without any obligation to pay indemnity therefor; and that respondents have no right to a
refund of any improvement built therein, pursuant to Articles 449 and 450 of the Civil Code.
XXX
Pursuant to Article 452 of the Civil Code, a builder in bad faith is entitled to recoup the necessary
expenses incurred for the preservation of the land. The CA correctly ruled that respondents in this case
are similarly entitled to this reimbursement. However, being builders in bad faith, they do not have the
right of retention over the premises.
26
FACTS:
Spouses Crispin and Teresa Aquino are the owners of a house and lot. Since 1981, this property has
been occupied by Teresa’s sister, Josefina Aguilar and her spouse Eusebio Aguilar. It appears from
the record that respondents stayed on the property with the consent and approval of petitioners,
who were then residing in the US.
While respondents were in possession of the property, the house previously constructed therein was
demolished, and a three-storey building built in its place. Respondents occupied half of the third floor
of this new building for the next 20 years without payment of rental.
In 2003, petitioners demanded the surrender of the property. Respondents failed to heed this
demand, prompting petitioners to file a Complaint for ejectment against them.
In their Answer with Counterclaim, respondents claimed that they had contributed to the
improvement of the property and the construction of the building, both in terms of money and
management/supervision services.
The MeTC ruled in favor of petitioners, stating that they had the right to enjoy possession of the
property as the registered owners thereof. The MeTC also declared that respondents were builders
in bad faith who were not entitled to recover their purported expenses for the construction of the
building. It emphasized that their occupation of the property was by mere tolerance of petitioners
and, as such, could be terminated at any time.
The RTC affirmed the MeTC’s Decision. The CA affirmed the conclusion of the lower courts that
respondents could not be considered co-owners of the property or builders in good faith.
Nevertheless, the CA declared that respondents should be reimbursed for the necessary and useful
expenses they had introduced on petitioners’ property, pursuant to Articles 1678 and 548 of the Civil
Code.
ISSUE:
Whether respondents should be reimbursed for the useful expenses they had introduced on
petitioners’ property. (NO) Whether respondents should be reimbursed for the necessary expenses
they had introduced on petitioners’ property. (YES)
RULING:
As builders in bad faith, respondents are not entitled to reimbursement of useful expenses.
Based on the findings of fact of the MeTC and the RTC, petitioners had already warned respondents
not to build a structure on the property as early as 1983. This ruling was affirmed by the RTC. Thus,
the SC found no reason to depart from the conclusions of the trial courts. Respondents were evidently
prohibited by petitioners from building improvements on the land because the latter had every
intention of selling it.
Hence, petitioners, as the owners of the land, have the right to appropriate what has been built on
the property, without any obligation to pay indemnity therefor; and that respondents have no right
to a refund of any improvement built therein, pursuant to Articles 449 and 450 of the Civil Code.
27
Art. 449. He who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what is built,
planted or sown without right of indemnity.
Art. 450. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, planted or sown in bad faith
may demand the demolition of the work, or that the planting or sowing be removed, in order
to replace things in their former condition at the expense of the person who built, planted or
sowed; or he may compel the builder or planter to pay the price of the land, and the sower
the proper rent.
Art. 451. In the cases of the two preceding articles, the landowner is entitled to damages from
the builder, planter or sower.
Respondents may recover the necessary expenses incurred for the preservation of the property
but without the right of retention.
Pursuant to Article 452 of the Civil Code, a builder in bad faith is entitled to recoup the necessary
expenses incurred for the preservation of the land. The CA correctly ruled that respondents in this
case are similarly entitled to this reimbursement. However, being builders in bad faith, they do not
have the right of retention over the premises.
While the evidence before this Court does not establish the amount of necessary expenses incurred
by respondents during their stay in the property, we note that even petitioners do not deny that such
expenses were incurred. In fact, in a letter dated 15 July 1983, petitioners acknowledged that
respondents had spent personal money for the maintenance of the property. Petitioners even
promised to reimburse them for those expenses. In this light, we find it proper to order the remand
of this case to the court a quo for the purpose of determining the amount of necessary expenses to be
reimbursed to respondents.
TECNOGAS PHILIPPINES MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, Petitioner, -versus- COURT OF

APPEALS (FORMER SPECIAL SEVENTEENTH DIVISION) AND EDUARDO UY, Respondents.
G.R. No. 108894, THIRD DIVISION, February 10, 1997, PANGANIBAN, J.
There is no question that when petitioner purchased the land from Pariz Industries, the buildings and
other structures were already in existence. The record is not clear as to who actually built those
structures, but it may well be assumed that petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest, Pariz Industries, did so.
Article 527 of the Civil Code presumes good faith, and since no proof exists to show that the
encroachment over a narrow, needle-shaped portion of private respondent’s land was done in bad faith
by the builder of the encroaching structures, the latter should be presumed to have built them in good
faith. It is presumed that possession continues to be enjoyed in the same character in which it was
acquired, until the contrary is proved. Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is
building on is his, and his ignorance of any defect or flaw in his title.
Hence, such good faith, by law, passed on to Pariz’s successor, petitioner in this case. Further, “(w)here
one derives title to property from another, the act, declaration, or omission of the latter, while holding
the title, in relation to the property, is evidence against the former.” And possession acquired in good
faith does not lose this character except in case and from the moment facts exist which show that the
possessor is not unaware that he possesses the thing improperly or wrongfully. The good faith ceases
28
from the moment defects in the title are made known to the possessor, by extraneous evidence or by suit
for recovery of the property by the true owner.
FACTS:
The parties in this case are owners of adjoining lots in Parañaque, Metro Manila. It was discovered in
a survey that a portion of a building of petitioner, which was presumably constructed by its
predecessor-in-interest, encroached on a portion of the lot owned by private respondent.
Tecnogas Philippines Manufacturing Corporation (petitioner) is the registered owner of a parcel of

land situated in Parañaque, Metro Manila. The said land was purchased by from Pariz Industries, Inc.
in 1970, together with all the buildings and improvements including the wall existing thereon.
Private respondent Eduardo Uy (defendant) on the other hand is the registered owner of a parcel of
land which adjoins plaintiff’s land. He purchased the same from a certain Enrile Antonio also in 1970.
In 1971, defendant purchased another lot also adjoining plaintiff’s land from a certain Miguel
Rodriguez and the same was registered in defendant’s name.
Portions of the buildings and wall bought by petitioner together with the land from Pariz Industries
are occupying a portion of defendant’s adjoining land. Upon learning of the encroachment or
occupation by its buildings and wall of a portion of defendant’s land, petitioner offered to buy from
defendant that particular portion of defendant’s land occupied by portions of its buildings and wall,
but defendant refused the offer.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner can be considered a builder in bad faith because it is 'presumed to know the
metes and bounds of his property.' (NO)
RULING:
There is no question that when petitioner purchased the land from Pariz Industries, the buildings
and other structures were already in existence. The record is not clear as to who actually built those
structures, but it may well be assumed that petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest, Pariz Industries, did
so.
Article 527 of the Civil Code presumes good faith, and since no proof exists to show that the
encroachment over a narrow, needle-shaped portion of private respondent’s land was done in bad
faith by the builder of the encroaching structures, the latter should be presumed to have built them
in good faith. It is presumed that possession continues to be enjoyed in the same character in which
it was acquired, until the contrary is proved. Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the
land he is building on is his, and his ignorance of any defect or flaw in his title.
Hence, such good faith, by law, passed on to Pariz’s successor, petitioner in this case. Further,
“(w)here one derives title to property from another, the act, declaration, or omission of the latter,
while holding the title, in relation to the property, is evidence against the former.” And possession
acquired in good faith does not lose this character except in case and from the moment facts exist
which show that the possessor is not unaware that he possesses the thing improperly or wrongfully.
29
The good faith ceases from the moment defects in the title are made known to the possessor, by
extraneous evidence or by suit for recovery of the property by the true owner.
Recall that the encroachment in the present case was caused by a very slight deviation of the erected
wall. It was an error which, in the context of the attendant facts, was consistent with good faith.
Consequently, the builder, if sued by the aggrieved landowner for recovery of possession, could have
invoked the provisions of Art. 448 of the Civil Code.
The obvious benefit to the builder under this article is that, instead of being outrightly ejected from
the land, he can compel the landowner to make a choice between the two options: (1) to appropriate
the building by paying the indemnity required by law, or (2) sell the land to the builder. The
landowner cannot refuse to exercise either option and compel instead the owner of the building to
remove it from the land.
The question, however, is whether the same benefit can be invoked by petitioner who, as earlier
stated, is not the builder of the offending structures but possesses them as buyer.
The SC answered such question in the affirmative. In the first place, there is no sufficient showing
that petitioner was aware of the encroachment at the time it acquired the property from Pariz
Industries. Various factors in evidence adequately show petitioner’s lack of awareness thereof. In any
case, contrary proof has not overthrown the presumption of good faith under Article 527 of the Civil
Code, as already stated, taken together with the disputable presumptions of the law on evidence.
These presumptions state, under Section 3 (a) of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, that the person is
innocent of a crime or wrong; and under Section 3 (ff) of Rule 131, that the law has been obeyed. In
fact, private respondent Eduardo Uy himself was unaware of such intrusion into his property until
after 1971 when he hired a surveyor, following his purchase of another adjoining lot, to survey all his
newly acquired lots. Upon being apprised of the encroachment, petitioner immediately offered to buy
the area occupied by its building -- a species of conduct consistent with good faith.
In the second place, upon delivery of the property by Pariz Industries, as seller, to the petitioner, as
buyer, the latter acquired ownership of the property. Consequently and as earlier discussed,
petitioner is deemed to have stepped into the shoes of the seller in regard to all rights of ownership
over the immovable sold, including the right to compel the private respondent to exercise either of
the two options provided under Article 448 of the Civil Code.
PLEASANTVILLE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner, -versus – COURT OF APPEALS,

WILSON KEE, C.T. TORRES ENTERPRISES, INC. and ELDRED JARDINICO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 79688, THIRD DIVISION, February 1, 1996, PANGANIBAN, J.:
Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is his and his ignorance of
any defect or flaw in his title. At the time he built improvements on Lot 8, Kee believed that said lot was
what he bought from petitioner. He was not aware that the lot delivered to him was not Lot 8. Thus, Kee
is a builder in good faith. Petitioner failed to prove otherwise.
FACTS:
Robillo purchased from petitioner a parcel of land designated as Lot 9, Phase II and located at
Taculing Road, Pleasantville Subdivision, Bacolod City. Respondent Jardinico bought the rights to the
lot from Robillo in 1975. At that time, Lot 9 was vacant.
30
Jardinico secured from the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City on December 19, 1978 Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 106367 in his name. It was then that he discovered that improvements had
been introduced on Lot 9 by respondent Wilson Kee, who had taken possession thereof.
It appears that on March 26, 1974, Kee bought on installment Lot 8 of the same subdivision from C.T.
Torres Enterprises, Inc. (CTTEI), the exclusive real estate agent of petitioner. Under the Contract to
Sell on Installment, Kee could possess the lot even before the completion of all installment payments.
After the preparation of the lot plan and a copy thereof given to Kee, CTTEI through its employee,
Zenaida Octaviano, accompanied Kees wife, Donabelle Kee, to inspect Lot 8. Unfortunately, the parcel
of land pointed by Octaviano was Lot 9. Thereafter, Kee proceeded to construct his residence, a store,
an auto repair shop and other improvements on the lot.
After discovering that Lot 9 was occupied by Kee, Jardinico confronted him. The parties tried to reach
an amicable settlement, but failed. Jardinicos lawyer wrote Kee, demanding that the latter remove all
improvements and vacate Lot 9. When Kee refused to vacate Lot 9, Jardinico filed with the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities, Branch 3, Bacolod City (MTCC), a complaint for ejectment with damages against
Kee. Kee, in turn, filed a third-party complaint against petitioner and CTTEI.
The MTCC held that the erroneous delivery of Lot 9 to Kee was attributable to CTTEI. However, the
MTCC found that petitioner had already rescinded its contract with Kee over Lot 8 for the latter’s
failure to pay the installments due, and that Kee had not contested the rescission. The MTCC
concluded that Kee no longer had any right over the lot subject of the contract between him and
petitioner. Consequently, Kee must pay reasonable rentals for the use of Lot 9, and, furthermore, he
cannot claim reimbursement for the improvements he introduced on said lot.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 48, Bacolod City (RTC) ruled that petitioner and CTTEI
were not at fault or were not negligent, there being no preponderant evidence to show that they
directly participated in the delivery of Lot 9 to Kee. The Court of Appeals ruled that Kee was a builder
in good faith, as he was unaware of the "mix-up" when he began construction of the improvements
on Lot 8.
ISSUES:
(I) Was Kee a builder in good faith? (YES)
(II) What is the liability, if any, of petitioner and its agent, C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc.?
RULING:
(I)
Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is his and his ignorance
of any defect or flaw in his title. At the time he built improvements on Lot 8, Kee believed that said
lot was what he bought from petitioner. He was not aware that the lot delivered to him was not Lot
8. Thus, Kee is a builder in good faith. Petitioner failed to prove otherwise.
To demonstrate Kees bad faith, petitioner points to Kees violation of paragraphs 22 and 26 of the
Contract of Sale on Installment.
31
We disagree. Such violations have no bearing whatsoever on whether Kee was a builder in good faith,
that is, on his state of mind at the time he built the improvements on Lot 9. These alleged violations
may give rise to petitioners cause of action against Kee under the said contract (contractual breach),
but may not be bases to negate the presumption that Kee was a builder in good faith.
(II)
Petitioner does not dispute the fact that CTTEI was its agent. But it contends that the erroneous
delivery of Lot 9 to Kee was an act which was clearly outside the scope of its authority, and
consequently, CTTEI alone should be liable.
Petitioners contention is without merit.
The rule is that the principal is responsible for the acts of the agent, done within the scope of his
authority, and should bear the damage caused to third persons. On the other hand, the agent who
exceeds his authority is personally liable for the damage. CTTEI was acting within its authority as the
sole real estate representative of petitioner when it made the delivery to Kee. In acting within its
scope of authority, it was, however, negligent.
Pending resolution of the case before the Court of Appeals, Jardinico and Kee on July 24, 1987 entered
into a deed of sale, wherein the former sold Lot 9 to Kee. Jardinico and Kee did not inform the Court
of Appeals of such deal. Obviously, the deed of sale can have no effect on the liability of petitioner. As
we have earlier stated, petitioners liability is grounded on the negligence of its agent.
The rights of Kee and Jardinico vis-a-vis each other, as builder in good faith and owner in good faith,
respectively, are regulated by law (i.e., Arts. 448, 546 and 548 of the Civil Code). It was error for the
Court of Appeals to make a "slight modification" in the application of such law, on the ground of
"equity". At any rate, as it stands now, Kee and Jardinico have amicably settled through their deed of
sale their rights and obligations with regards to Lot 9.
ERLINDA DINGLASAN DELOS SANTOS AND HER DAUGHTERS, NAMELY, VIRGINIA, AUREA,
AND BINGBING, ALL SURNAMED DELOS SANTOS, Petitioners, -versus – ALBERTO ABEJON AND
THE ESTATE OF TERESITA DINGLASAN ABEJON, Respondents.
G.R. No. 215820, FIRST DIVISION, March 20, 2017, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
The terms builder, planter, or sower in good faith as used in reference to Article 448 of the Civil Code,
refers to one who, not being the owner of the land, builds, plants, or sows on that land believing himself
to be its owner and unaware of the defect in his title or mode of acquisition. "The essence of good faith
lies in an honest belief in the validity of one's right, ignorance of a superior claim, and absence of
intention to overreach another."
On the other hand, bad faith may only be attributed to a landowner when the act of building, planting,
or sowing was done with his knowledge and without opposition on his part.
In this case, it bears stressing that the execution of the Deed of Sale involving the subject land was done
in 1992. However, and as keenly pointed out by Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa during the
deliberations of this case, Teresita was apprised of Pedro's death as early as 1990 when she went on a
vacation in the Philippines.
32
As such, she knew all along that the aforesaid Deed of Sale which contained a signature purportedly
belonging to Pedro, who died in 1989, or three (3) years prior to its execution - was void and would not
have operated to transfer any rights over the subject land to her name. Despite such awareness of the
defect in their title to the subject land, respondents still proceeded in constructing a three (3)-storey
building thereon. Indubitably, they should be deemed as builders in bad faith.
On the other hand, petitioners knew of the defect in the execution of the Deed of Sale from the start, but
nonetheless, still acquiesced to the construction of the three (3)-storey building thereon. Hence, they
should likewise be considered as landowners in bad faith.
FACTS:
Erlinda and her late husband Pedro Delos Santos (Pedro) borrowed the amount of P100,000.00 from
the former's sister, Teresita, as evidenced by a Promissory Note dated April 8, 1998. As security for
the loan, Erlinda and Pedro mortgaged their property situated at 2986 Gen. Del Pilar Street, Bangkal,
Makati City.
After Pedro died, Erlinda ended up being unable to pay the loan, and as such, agreed to sell the subject
land to Teresita for P150,000.00, or for the amount of the loan plus an additional P50,000.00. On July
8, 1992, they executed a Deed of Sale and a Release of Mortgage.
Thereafter, respondents constructed a three (3)-storey building worth P2,000,000.00 on the subject
land. Despite the foregoing, petitioners refused to acknowledge the sale, pointing out that since Pedro
died in 1989, his signature in the Deed of Sale executed in 1992 was definitely forged. As such,
respondents demanded from petitioners the amounts of P150,000.00 representing the consideration
for the sale of the subject land and P2,000,000.00 representing the construction cost of the three (3)-
storey building, but to no avail. Thus, respondents filed the instant case.
In defense, petitioners denied any participation relative to the spurious Deed of Sale, and instead,
maintained that it was Teresita who fabricated the same and caused its registration before the
Register of Deeds of Makati City. They likewise asserted that Erlinda and Pedro never sold the subject
land to Teresita.
The RTC: (a) declared the Deed of Sale null and void and ordered petitioners to pay respondents the
following amounts: (1) P100,000.00 plus twelve percent (12%) per annum computed from July 8,
1992 until fully paid representing the loan obligation plus legal interest; (2) P2,000,000.00
representing the construction cost of the three (3)-storey building; and (3) another P100,000.00 as
attorney's fees and litigation expenses. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling with modifications.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA correctly held that petitioners should be held liable to respondents in the
aggregate amount of P2,200,000.00, consisting of the loan obligation of P100,000.00, the
construction cost of the three (3)-storey building in the amount of P2,000,000.00, and attorney's fees
and costs of suit amounting to P100,000.00.
33
RULING:
As correctly argued by petitioners, it is more accurate to apply the rules on accession with respect to
immovable property, specifically with regard to builders, planters, and sowers, as this case involves
a situation where the landowner (petitioners) is different from the owner of the improvement built
therein, i.e., the three (3)-storey building (respondents). Thus, there is a need to determine whether
petitioners as landowners on the one hand, and respondents on the other, are in good faith or bad
faith.
The terms builder, planter, or sower in good faith as used in reference to Article 448 of the Civil Code,
refers to one who, not being the owner of the land, builds, plants, or sows on that land believing
himself to be its owner and unaware of the defect in his title or mode of acquisition. "The essence of
good faith lies in an honest belief in the validity of one's right, ignorance of a superior claim, and
absence of intention to overreach another."
On the other hand, bad faith may only be attributed to a landowner when the act of building, planting,
or sowing was done with his knowledge and without opposition on his part.
In this case, it bears stressing that the execution of the Deed of Sale involving the subject land was
done in 1992. However, and as keenly pointed out by Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa during the
deliberations of this case, Teresita was apprised of Pedro's death as early as 1990 when she went on
a vacation in the Philippines.
As such, she knew all along that the aforesaid Deed of Sale which contained a signature purportedly
belonging to Pedro, who died in 1989, or three (3) years prior to its execution - was void and would
not have operated to transfer any rights over the subject land to her name. Despite such awareness
of the defect in their title to the subject land, respondents still proceeded in constructing a three (3)-
storey building thereon. Indubitably, they should be deemed as builders in bad faith.
On the other hand, petitioners knew of the defect in the execution of the Deed of Sale from the start,
but nonetheless, still acquiesced to the construction of the three (3)-storey building thereon. Hence,
they should likewise be considered as landowners in bad faith.
In this relation, Article 453 of the Civil Code provides that where both the landowner and the builder,
planter, or sower acted in bad faith, they shall be treated as if both of them were in good faith, viz.:
“Article 453. If there was bad faith, not only on the part of the person who built, planted or
sowed on the land of another, but also on the part of the owner of such land, the rights of one
and the other shall be the same as though both had acted in good faith.
It is understood that there is bad faith on the part of the landowner whenever the act was
done with his knowledge and without opposition on his part.”
Whenever both the landowner and the builder/planter/sower are in good faith (or in bad faith,
pursuant to the afore-cited provision), the landowner is given two (2) options under Article 448 of
the Civil Code, namely: (a) he may appropriate the improvements for himself after reimbursing the
buyer (the builder in good faith) the necessary and useful expenses under Articles 546 and 548 of
the Civil Code; or (b) he may sell the land to the buyer, unless its value is considerably more than that
of the improvements, in which case, the buyer shall pay reasonable rent.
34
Applying the aforesaid rule in this case, under the first option, petitioner may appropriate for
themselves the three (3)-storey building on the subject land after payment of the indemnity provided
for in Articles 546 and 548 of the Civil Code, as applied in existing jurisprudence. Under this option,
respondents would have a right of retention over the three (3)-storey building as well as the subject
land until petitioners complete the reimbursement. Under the second option, petitioners may sell the
subject land to respondents at a price equivalent to the current market value thereof. However, if the
value of the subject land is considerably more than the value of the three (3)-storey building,
respondents cannot be compelled to purchase the subject land. Rather, they can only be obliged to
pay petitioners reasonable rent.
Thus, following prevailing jurisprudence, the instant case is remanded to the court a quo for the
purpose of determining matters necessary for the proper application of Articles 448 and 453, in
relation to Articles 546 and 548 of the Civil Code.
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Petitioner, -versus – VICENTE VICTOR C. SANCHEZ, HEIRS
OF KENNETH NEREO SANCHEZ, represented by FELISA GARCIA YAP, and HEIRS OF IMELDA C.
VDA. DE SANCHEZ, represented by VICENTE VICTOR C. SANCHEZ, Respondents.
G.R. No. 179518, THIRD DIVISION, November 19, 2014, VELASCO, J.:
Article 453 of the Civil Code relevantly states:
“Article 453. If there was bad faith, not only on the part of the person who built, planted or sowed
on the land of another, but also on the part of the owner of such land, the rights of one and the
other shall be the same as though both had acted in good faith.
It is understood that there is bad faith on the part of the landowner whenever the act was done
with his knowledge and without opposition on his part.”
The second paragraph of the provision clearly reads that a landowner is considered in bad faith if he
does not oppose the unauthorized construction thereon despite knowledge of the same. It does not,
however, state what form such opposition should take. The fact of the matter is that the Sanchezes did
take action to oppose the construction on their property by writing the HLURB and the City Building
Official of Quezon City. As a result, the HLURB issued two (2) Cease and Desist Orders and several
directives against Garcia/TSEI which, however, were left unheeded. In addition, the Sanchezes could not
be faulted for not having been able to enjoin the sale of the townhouses by Garcia and TSEI to the
intervenors Sps. Caminas, Maniwang, Tulagan, and Marquez who bought their townhouse units during
the same period that the Sanchezes were demanding the full payment of the subject lot and were
exercising their right of extrajudicial rescission of the Agreement. As the intervenors asserted having
bought the townhouse units in early 1989, it can be seen that the preselling was done almost
immediately after the Sanchezes and Garcia/TSEI agreed on the terms of the sale of the subject lot, or
shortly after Garcia and TSEI had taken over the property and demolished the old house built thereon.
The Court agrees with both the RTC and the CA that Garcia and/or TSEI are builders in bad faith. They
knew for a fact that the property still belonged to the Sanchezes and yet proceeded to build the
townhouses not just without the authority of the landowners, but also against their will.
FACTS:
Vicente Victor C. Sanchez (Vicente), Kenneth Nereo Sanchez and Imelda C. V da. De Sanchez owned a
parcel of land located at No. 10 Panay Avenue, Quezon City. On October 10, 1988, Jesus V. Garcia
35
(Garcia), doing business under the name TransAmerican Sales and Exposition, Inc. (TSEI), wrote a
letter to Vicente offering to buy the Subject Property for One Million Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos.
The offer was good for only seven (7) days. The period elapsed with the parties failing to come to an
agreement.
Sometime in the third week of October 1988, Felisa Yap (Yap), the widow of Kenneth Nereo Sanchez,
and Garcia had a meeting at the Quezon City Sports Club wherein the parties agreed to the sale of the
subject property. Yap turned over to Garcia the original owner’s copy of TCT 156254, the copy of the
filed Application for Restitution of Title to the property, and copies of all receipts for the payment of
real estate taxes on the property, while Garcia paid Yap 50,000 as earnest money.
Afterwards, Yap required the occupants of the subject property to vacate the same. Immediately after
it was vacated, Garcia, without Yap’s knowledge and consent, took possession of the lot and installed
his own caretaker thereon with strict instructions not to allow anyone to enter the property. Yap
later learned that Garcia had also demolished the house on the property and advertised the
construction and sale of "Trans American Townhouse V" thereon. The foregoing developments
notwithstanding and despite numerous demands, Garcia failed to pay the balance of the purchase
price as agreed upon.
Then, on December 5, 1988, Yap was informed that the checks representing the purchase price of the
subject property were ready but that Vicente must pick up his checks personally. On December 8,
1988, Vicente came to Manila from Laguna and proceeded to Garcia’s office to get the checks.
However, out of the six (6) checks that were presented to them, four (4) of them were post-dated,
further delaying their overdue payment.
Subsequently, the first four (4) checks were deposited with no issue. However, the last two (2)
checks, amounting to ₱400,000 each, were dishonored for the reason of "DAIF" or drawn against
insufficient funds. Thus, Yap wrote a letter dated December 26, 1988 to Garcia informing him that
the two (2) checks were dishonored and asking that the checks be replaced within five (5) days from
receipt of the letter. Such request was left unheeded.
On January 10, 1989, Yap informed Garcia in a letter that she and Vicente were rescinding the
Agreement while demanding the return of the original owner’s copy of TCT 156254. This prompted
Garcia to offer two (2) manager’s checks in the aggregate amount of ₱300,000 which Yap flatly
refused, reiterating the rescission of their Agreement and demanding for the return of all documents
entrusted to Garcia.
Yap and Vicente discovered that Garcia posted an advertisement in the classified ads of the Manila
Bulletin offering to sell units at the Trans American Townhouse V situated at the subject property.
Thus, on February 27, 1989, Atty. Yap wrote the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB)
informing the latter of the existing public advertisement of TSEI offering for sale townhouses illegally
constructed on the subject property and urging the HLURB to cancel any existing permit or license
to sell the said townhouse units or to deny any application therefor. The HLURB issued a Cease and
Desist Order enjoining TSEI and Garcia from further developing and selling the townhouses.
To further protect their interests, Yap and Vicente also inquired from the City Building Official of
Quezon City, whether a building permit had been issued for the construction on the Subject Property.
36
In a letter dated March 14, 1989, the office found that the construction on the subject property was
indeed illegal and at its 5% initial stage.
On August 21, 1989, Yap filed a formal complaint with the Office of the City Building Official of Quezon
City. Thereafter, on February 15, 1990, Yap and Vicente, in his own behalf and representing the heirs
of Imelda C.Vda. De Sanchez, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Quezon City, Branch 89 a
Complaint dated February 14, 1990 for the rescission of contract, restitution and damages with
prayer for TRO/preliminary injunction against TSEI and Garcia.
The records reveal that on January 31, 1989, TSEI sold to Tulagan a 52-square meter portion of TCT
156254 and the townhouse unit that was going to be built upon it for the amount of ₱800,000 as
evidenced by a Conditional Deed of Sale of even date. Then, Maniwang bought a unit from TSEI for
₱700,000 through an Absolute Deed of Sale dated February 22, 1989. Later, Marquez purchased a
townhouse unit from TSEI for ₱800,000 in a Contract to Sell dated March 13, 1989. Afterwards, TSEI
sold to Caminas a townhouse unit for ₱650,000 through an Absolute Deed of Sale dated March 21,
1989. Thereafter, VTCI bought three (3) townhouses from TSEI for ₱700,000 each.
Notably, except for the Absolute Deeds of Sale executed between TSEI and VTCI, all the other
intervenors’ contracts conveying townhouses in their favor identified their purchased lots as covered
by TCT 156254 (the title of the Sanchezes).
Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC) entered into a Loan Agreement dated May 22, 1989 with
TSEI secured by a Real Estate Mortgage over TCT 156254.FEBTC later merged with the Bank of the
Philippine Islands (BPI) with the latter as the surviving bank. Garcia purportedly explained to FEBTC
that the parties were still in the process of transferring the title. Afterwards, Garcia submitted a copy
of TCT 383697 in TSEI’s name. Upon default, FEBTC (now BPI) foreclosed the subject lot and had the
Foreclosure Certificate of Sale annotated on TCT 383697.
The RTC rendered a Decision in favor of the Sanchezes as plaintiffs. Upon appeal by the intervenors-
appellants, the CA rendered, on November 6, 2006, the assailed Decision affirming the RTC Decision
with modifications.
ISSUES:
(I) Whether the Sanchezes are guilty of negligence. (NO)
(II) Whether the Sanchezes acted in bad faith. (NO)
(III) Whether the intervenors (Sps. Caminas, Maniwang. Tulagan and Marquez) are
purchasers in good faith. (NO)
RULING:
(I)
Negligence is the omission of that diligence required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds
to the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. The Sanchezes could not be found
negligent as they relied upon the assurances of Garcia after their oral agreement to sell was
negotiated. The Sanchezes trusted Garcia and entrusted to him—per their oral agreement—the
owner’s original duplicate of TCT 156254 in order to facilitate the documentation required under the
terms of agreement for the sale of the subject lot. It must be pointed out that the parties in this case
were not dealing on equal terms. The Sanchezes had insufficient knowledge in the legalities of
37
transacting with real estate. This is evidenced by the fact that they already considered an oral
agreement for the sale of real property as sufficient. Had they been knowledgeable in such matters,
they would have known that such oral agreement is unenforceable and instead sought the production
of a written agreement. Moreover, the facts show that the Sanchezes did not simply surrender
possession of the property to TSEI and Garcia, but that such possession was taken from them without
their consent.
(II)
Article 453 of the Civil Code relevantly states:
“Article 453. If there was bad faith, not only on the part of the person who built, planted or
sowed on the land of another, but also on the part of the owner of such land, the rights of one
and the other shall be the same as though both had acted in good faith.
It is understood that there is bad faith on the part of the landowner whenever the act was
done with his knowledge and without opposition on his part.”
The second paragraph of the provision clearly reads that a landowner is considered in bad faith if he
does not oppose the unauthorized construction thereon despite knowledge of the same. It does not,
however, state what form such opposition should take. The fact of the matter is that the Sanchezes
did take action to oppose the construction on their property by writing the HLURB and the City
Building Official of Quezon City. As a result, the HLURB issued two (2) Cease and Desist Orders and
several directives against Garcia/TSEI which, however, were left unheeded. In addition, the
Sanchezes could not be faulted for not having been able to enjoin the sale of the townhouses by Garcia
and TSEI to the intervenors Sps. Caminas, Maniwang, Tulagan, and Marquez who bought their
townhouse units during the same period that the Sanchezes were demanding the full payment of the
subject lot and were exercising their right of extrajudicial rescission of the Agreement. As the
intervenors asserted having bought the townhouse units in early 1989, it can be seen that the
preselling was done almost immediately after the Sanchezes and Garcia/TSEI agreed on the terms of
the sale of the subject lot, or shortly after Garcia and TSEI had taken over the property and
demolished the old house built thereon.
The Court agrees with both the RTC and the CA that Garcia and/or TSEI are builders in bad faith. They
knew for a fact that the property still belonged to the Sanchezes and yet proceeded to build the
townhouses not just without the authority of the landowners, but also against their will.
(III)
Firstly, they admitted that they executed either contracts of sale or contracts to sell indicating that
the lot is covered by TCT No. 156254 registered under the name of the respondent Sanchezes. While
the established rule is that persons dealing with property covered by a Torrens certificate of title are
not required to go beyond what appears on the face of the title, intervenors cannot seek haven from
such doctrine as the title of the lot does not pertain to the vendor (Garcia or TSEI) they dealt with.
Secondly, the intervenors know, based on the contract of sale or contract to sell, that the property is
registered under TCT No. 156254 in the name of the Sanchezes. As such, they should have insisted
that they talk to the Sanchezes before executing said conveyances.
Thirdly, the intervenors should have been suspicious of the explanation of Garcia that TCT No.
383697, reflecting TSEI as the owner of the property, has been burned and that he is in the process
38
of reconstituting the title. Before signing the contract of sale or contract to sell, they should have
asked Garcia where the reconstitution case has been filed or is pending and proceeded to verify with
the said court the status of the reconstitution.
Fourthly, the intervenors knew that they were buying a townhouse over a subdivision lot from TSEI
and Garcia. Such being the case, they should have verified with the HLURB whether said project is
registered with said housing agency and if a license to sell has been issued to TSEI or Garcia. Had they
made such an inquiry, they would have known that instead of a permit for the project and a license
to sell the property, a cease and desist order was issued by the HLURB precisely to enjoin TSEI and
Garcia from selling said property to the public.
As compared to the other purchasers, the Deeds of Absolute Sale of intervenor VTCI cited TCT
383697 in the name of VTCI and not TCT 156254. Nevertheless, the Court finds that respondent VTCI
is a purchaser in bad faith for the following reasons:
Firstly, respondent VTCI has not shown that it verified with the RD if the alleged TCT 383697 of
respondent TSEI is valid and genuine. Secondly, Garcia and TSEI stopped the construction of the
townhouses on March 30, l989 pursuant to the CDO of the HLURB. Thus, the townhouses were not
fully finished and completed. Yet on December 27, l989 (date of notarization), VTCI entered into three
(3) Deeds of Absolute sale over three (3) townhouses on three (3) lots covered by TCT 383697 and
despite the non-completion of the townhouses, it still fully paid the uniform price of ₱700,000 for the
townhouse on each of the 3 lots. Thirdly, with the CDO and the warnings to the public and prospective
buyers published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on April 16, 1989 and in the Manila Bulletin on April
19, 2014, VTCI should have been aware of the irregularities in the proposed sale of townhouses.
Fourthly, VTCI should have inquired with the said HLURB if Garcia and TSEI have a permit to sell the
townhouses. Fifthly, a buyer of a townhouse will ordinarily visit the project site and look at and
investigate the lot, the title and the townhouses being sold. If it inspected the site of the construction
project, it would have known from the other purchasers that the project has no permit from the
HLURB and that construction has been stopped because of the CDO.
Even as the intervenors have been found to be in bad faith, BPI, the successor of FEBTC, cannot be
considered a mortgagee in good faith, considering the glaring anomalies in the loan transaction
between TSEI and FEBTC. when Garcia gave TCT 156254 to FEBTC for the processing of a loan
secured by a mortgage, it indubitably showed that Garcia/TSEI did not yet own the subject property
as said title was in the name of the Sanchezes. considering that Garcia/TSEI were already selling the
townhouse units to the public as early as January 1989, FEBTC was also remiss in not requiring
Garcia/TSEI to submit a written approval from the HLURB for the mortgage of the subject property
where the townhouse units were being constructed. FEBTC was again negligent in not scrutinizing
the TCT 383697 considering that the title has the purported issuance date of June 9, 1988 way before
the December Agreement was executed and when the loan was negotiated. FEBTC released portions
of the loan proceeds in April even before it approved the loan secured by a real estate mortgage on
May 22, 1989. And more anomalous is the fact that FEBTC had TCT 383697 verified for its veracity
and genuineness way after it approved the loan to Garcia/TSEI. The general rule that a mortgagee
need not look beyond the title does not apply to banks and other financial institutions as greater care
and due diligence are required of them.
39
FLORENTINO, TROADIO AND PEDRO, ALL SURNAMED OCHOA, PETITIONERS, VS. MAURO
APETA AND APOLONIA ALMAZAN, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 146259, FIRST DIVISION, September 13, 2007, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
Applied to possession, one is considered in good faith if he is not aware that there exists in his title
or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it. The landowner can make a choice - either by
appropriating the building by paying the proper indemnity or obliging the builder to pay the
price of the land. The choice belongs to the owner of the land, a rule that accords with the principle
of accession that the accessory follows the principal and not the other way around. He must choose only
one.
Respondents, as owners of Lot No. 1580, may choose between appropriating as their own the
houses and apartment building constructed thereon by petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest by
paying the proper indemnity or value; or obliging petitioners to pay the price of Lot No. 1580 which
is not more than that of the improvements.
FACTS:
Since 1910, petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest have been occupying Lot No. 1580 covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-40624. They built their houses and apartment building thereon.
Respondents found that they are the true owners of the lot.
Respondents filed a complaint for recovery of possession and damages against petitioners. They
alleged that they are the lawful owners of the lot. Petitioners denied the allegations contending that
they are the owners of the lot as shown by TCT.
The trial judge commissioned Engr. Romulo Unciano of the Bureau of Lands to conduct a resurvey of
the property. The result of the resurvey shows that the lot was registered in the name of Margarita
Almada, respondents’ predecessor-in-interest; and that the lot covered by TCT No. T-40624 is not
Lot No. 1580, but Lot No. 1581 registered in the name of Servillano Ochoa, petitioners’ predecessor-
in-interest. This lot has been occupied by Isidro Jasmin.
The trial court rendered a Decision in favor of respondents. CA affirmed the judgment of the RTC.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners are builders in good faith when they built their houses and apartment
building on Lot No. 1580. (YES)
RULING:
Good faith is an intangible and abstract quality with no technical meaning or statutory definition, and
it encompasses, among other things, an honest belief, the absence of malice and the absence of design
to defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage. It implies honesty of intention, and freedom from
knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry. The essence of good faith
lies in an honest belief in the validity of one’s right, ignorance of a superior claim and absence of
intention to overreach another.
40
Applied to possession, one is considered in good faith if he is not aware that there exists in his
title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it. The landowner can make a choice -
either by appropriating the building by paying the proper indemnity or obliging the builder
to pay the price of the land. The choice belongs to the owner of the land, a rule that accords with
the principle of accession that the accessory follows the principal and not the other way around. He
must choose only one.
Respondents, as owners of Lot No. 1580, may choose between appropriating as their own the
houses and apartment building constructed thereon by petitioners and their predecessors-in-
interest by paying the proper indemnity or value; or obliging petitioners to pay the price of Lot No.
1580 which is not more than that of the improvements.
DESAMPARADO VDA. DE NAZARENO AND LETICIA NAZARENO TAPIA, PETITIONERS, VS. THE
COURT OF APPEALS, MR. & MRS. JOSE SALASALAN, MR. & MRS. LEO RABAYA, AVELINO LABIS,
HON. ROBERTO G. HILARIO, ROLLEO I. IGNACIO, ALBERTO M. GILLERA AND HON. ABELARDO
G. PALAD, JR., IN THEIR OFFICIAL AND/OR PRIVATE CAPACITIES, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 98045, SECOND DIVISION, June 26, 1996, ROMERO, J.
In the case of Meneses v. CA, this Court held that accretion, as a mode of acquiring property under Art.
457 of the Civil Code, requires the concurrence of these requisites: (1) that the deposition of soil or
sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the
river (or sea); and (3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks or rivers (or
the sea coast). These are called the rules on alluvion which if present in a case, give to the owners of
lands adjoining the banks of rivers or streams any accretion gradually received from the effects of the
current of waters.
For petitioners to insist on the application of these rules on alluvion to their case, the above-mentioned
requisites must be present. However, they admit that the accretion was formed by the dumping of
boulders, soil and other filling materials on portions of the Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan River
bounding their land. It cannot be claimed, therefore, that the accumulation of such boulders, soil and
other filling materials was gradual and imperceptible, resulting from the action of the waters or the
current of the Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan River.
It is this Court's irresistible conclusion, therefore, that the accretion was man-made or artificial. In
Republic v. CA, this Court ruled that the requirement that the deposit should be due to the effect of the
current of the river is indispensable. This excludes from Art. 457 of the Civil Code all deposits caused by
human intervention. Putting it differently, alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature.
FACTS:
Sometime in 1979, private respondents Salasalan and Rabaya leased the subject lots on which their
houses stood from one Antonio Nazareno, petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest. In the latter part of
1982, private respondents allegedly stopped paying rentals. As a result, petitioners filed a case for
ejectment with the MTC of CDO.
A decision was rendered against private respondents, which decision was affirmed by the RTC of
Misamis Oriental. Before he died, Antonio Nazareno caused the approval by the Bureau of Lands of
the Survey plan with a view of perfecting his title over the accretion are being claimed by him. Before
41
the approved survey plan could be released to the applicant, however, it was protested by private
respondents before the Bureau of Land.
Upon investigating of the RD of Bureau of Land, it was recommended that Survey Plan in the name of
Antonio Nazareno who denied the motion, Respondent Director of Land then ordered him to vacate
the portion adjudicated to private respondent be placed in possession thereof.
Upon the denial of the late Antonio Nazareno's motion for reconsideration, petitioners Desamparado
Vda. de Nazareno and Leticia Tapia Nazareno, filed a case before the RTC for annulment of the
following: order of investigation by respondent Gillera, report and recommendation by respondent
Labis, decision by respondent Hilario, order by respondent Ignacio affirming the decision of
respondent Hilario and order of execution by respondent Palad.
The RTC dismissed the complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies which resulted in
the finality of the administrative decision of the Bureau of Lands, On Appeal, the CA affirmed the
decision of the RTC dismissing the complain.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was accretion. (NO)
RULING:
Petitioners claim that the subject land is private land being an accretion to his titled property,
applying Art. 457 of the Civil Code which provides:
To the owner of lands adjoining the banks of river belong the accretion which they gradually
receive from the effect of the current of the water.
In the case of Meneses v. CA, this Court held that accretion, as a mode of acquiring property under
Art. 457 of the Civil Code, requires the concurrence of these requisites: (1) that the deposition of
soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of the waters
of the river (or sea); and (3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks or
rivers (or the sea coast). These are called the rules on alluvion which if present in a case, give to the
owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers or streams any accretion gradually received from the
effects of the current of waters.
For petitioners to insist on the application of these rules on alluvion to their case, the above-
mentioned requisites must be present. However, they admit that the accretion was formed by the
dumping of boulders, soil and other filling materials on portions of the Balacanas Creek and the
Cagayan River bounding their land. It cannot be claimed, therefore, that the accumulation of such
boulders, soil and other filling materials was gradual and imperceptible, resulting from the action
of the waters or the current of the Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan River.
In Hilario v. City of Manila, this Court held that the word "current" indicates the participation of the
body of water in the ebb and flow of waters due to high and low tide. Petitioners' submission not
having met the first and second requirements of the rules on alluvion, they cannot claim the rights of
a riparian owner.
42
It is this Court's irresistible conclusion, therefore, that the accretion was man-made or artificial. In
Republic v. CA, this Court ruled that the requirement that the deposit should be due to the effect of
the current of the river is indispensable. This excludes from Art. 457 of the Civil Code all deposits
caused by human intervention. Putting it differently, alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature.
In the case at bar, the subject land was the direct result of the dumping of sawdust by the Sun Valley
Lumber Co. consequent to its sawmill operations. Even if this Court were to take into consideration
petitioners' submission that the accretion site was the result of the late Antonio Nazareno's labor
consisting in the dumping of boulders, soil and other filling materials into the Balacanas Creek and
Cagayan River bounding his land, the same would still be part of the public domain.
HEIRS OF EMILIANO NAVARRO, PETITIONER, VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND

HEIRS OF SINFOROSO PASCUAL, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 68166, FIRST DIVISION, February 12, 1997, HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.
Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under said Article 457, requires the concurrence of the
following requisites: (1) that the accumulation of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2)
that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river; and (3) that the land where the accretion
takes place is adjacent to the bank of the river.
Private respondents' claim of ownership over the disputed property under the principle of accretion, is
misplaced. First, the title of private respondents' own tract of land reveals its northeastern boundary
to be Manila Bay. Private respondents' land, therefore, used to adjoin, border or front the Manila
Bay and not any of the two rivers whose torrential action, private respondents insist, is to account
for the accretion on their land.
If the accretion were to be attributed to the action of either or both of the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers,
the alluvium should have been deposited on either or both of the eastern and western boundaries of
private respondents' own tract of land, not on the northern portion thereof which is adjacent to the
Manila Bay. Clearly lacking, thus, is the third requisite of accretion, which is, that the alluvium is
deposited on the portion of claimant's land which is adjacent to the river bank.
FACTS:
On October 3, 1946, Sinforoso Pascual, filed an application for foreshore lease covering a tract of
foreshore land in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan, having an area of approximately 17 hectares.
Subsequently, petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, Emiliano Navarro, filed a fishpond application
with the Bureau of Fisheries covering 25 hectares of foreshore land also in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan.
Initially, such application was denied by the Director of Fisheries on the ground that the property
formed part of the public domain.
Sometime in the early part of 1960, Sinforoso Pascual flied an application to register and confirm his
title to a parcel of land, situated in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan, described in Plan Psu-175181 and said
to have an area of 146,611 square meters. Pascual claimed that this land is an accretion to his
property, situated in Barrio Puerto Rivas, Balanga, Bataan, and covered by Original Certificate of Title
No. 6830. It is bounded on the eastern side by the Talisay River, on the western side by the Bulacan
River, and on the northern side by the Manila Bay. The Talisay River as well as the Bulacan River flow
downstream and meet at the Manila Bay thereby depositing sand and silt on Pascual's property
resulting in an accretion thereon. Sinforoso Pascual claimed the accretion as the riparian owner.
43
On March 25, 1960, the Director of Lands, represented by the Assistant Solicitor General, filed an
opposition thereto stating that neither Pascual nor his predecessors-in-interest possessed sufficient
title to the subject property, the same being a portion of the public domain and, therefore, it belongs
to the Republic of the Philippines.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the land sought to be registered is accretion formed by the action of the two rivers of
Talisay and Bulacan. (NO)
RULING:
Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under said Article 457, requires the concurrence of the
following requisites: (1) that the accumulation of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2)
that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river; and (3) that the land where the accretion
takes place is adjacent to the bank of the river.
Private respondents' claim of ownership over the disputed property under the principle of accretion,
is misplaced.
First, the title of private respondents' own tract of land reveals its northeastern boundary to be
Manila Bay. Private respondents' land, therefore, used to adjoin, border or front the Manila Bay
and not any of the two rivers whose torrential action, private respondents insist, is to account
for the accretion on their land.
Moreover, there is no dispute as to the location of: (a) the disputed land; (b) private respondents'
own tract of land; (c) the Manila Bay; and, (d) the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers. Private respondents'
own land lies between the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers; in front of their land on the northern side lies
now the disputed land where before 1948, there lay the Manila Bay.
If the accretion were to be attributed to the action of either or both of the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers,
the alluvium should have been deposited on either or both of the eastern and western boundaries of
private respondents' own tract of land, not on the northern portion thereof which is adjacent to the
Manila Bay. Clearly lacking, thus, is the third requisite of accretion, which is, that the alluvium is
deposited on the portion of claimant's land which is adjacent to the river bank.
Second, there is no dispute as to the fact that private respondents' own tract of land adjoins the
Manila Bay. Manila Bay is obviously not a river, and jurisprudence is already settled as to what kind
of body of water the Manila Bay is.
The disputed land, thus, is an accretion not on a river bank but on a sea bank, or on what used to be
the foreshore of Manila Bay which adjoined private respindents' own tract of land on the northern
side. As such, the applicable law is not Article 457 of the Civil Code but Article 4 of the Spanish Law
of Waters of 1866.
Applicant Pascual has not presented proofs to convince the Court that the land he has applied for
registration is the result of the settling down on his registered land of soil, earth or other deposits so
as to be rightfully be considered as an accretion [caused by the action of the two rivers]. Said Art. 457
finds no applicability where the accretion must have been caused by action of the bay."
44
LUCIO ROBLES, EMETERIA ROBLES, ALUDIA ROBLES and EMILIO ROBLES, petitioners, -
versus - COURT OF APPEALS, Spouses VIRGILIO SANTOS and BABY RUTH CRUZ, RURAL BANK
OF CARDONA, Inc., HILARIO ROBLES, ALBERTO PALAD JR. in his capacity as Director of
Lands, and JOSE MAULEON in his capacity as District Land Officer of the Bureau of
Lands, respondents.
G.R. No. 123509, THIRD DIVISION, March 14, 2000, PANGANIBAN, J.
An action to quiet title is a common-law remedy for the removal of any cloud or doubt or uncertainty
on the title to real property. It is essential for the plaintiff or complainant to have a legal or an equitable
title to or interest in the real property which is the subject matter of the action. Also, the deed, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding that is being alleged as a cloud on plaintiff's title must be shown to be in
fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.
The failure to show the indubitable title of Exequiel to the property in question is vital to the resolution
of the present Petition. It was from him that Hilario had allegedly derived his title thereto as owner, an
allegation which thereby enabled him to mortgage it to the Rural Bank of Cardona. The occupation and
the possession thereof by the petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest until 1962 was not disputed,
and Exequiel's acquisition of the said property by prescription was not alleged. Thus, the deed of
conveyance purportedly evidencing the transfer of ownership and possession from the heirs of
Silvino to Exequiel should have been presented as the best proof of that transfer. However, no
such document was presented.
Therefore, there is merit to the contention of the petitioners that Hilario mortgaged the disputed
property to the Rural Bank of Cardona in his capacity as a mere co-owner thereof. Clearly, the
said transaction did not divest them of title to the property at the time of the institution of the
Complaint for quieting of title.
FACTS:
Leon Robles owned and occupied the land situated in Kay Taga, Lagundi, Morong, Rizal openly and
adversely. He also declared the same in his name for taxation purposes and paid the corresponding
taxes thereon. When Leon died, his son Silvino Robles inherited the land, who took possession of the
land, declared it in his name for taxation purposes, and paid the taxes thereon.
Upon the death of Silvino, his widow Maria de la Cruz and his children inherited the property. They
took adverse possession of said property, and paid taxes thereon. The task of cultivating the land was
assigned to petitioner Lucio Robles, who planted trees and other crops. He also built a nipa hut on
the land. The petitioners entrusted the payment of the land taxes to their co-heir and half-brother,
Hilario Robles.
Thereafter, for unknown reasons, the tax declaration of the parcel of land in the name of Silvino
Robles was canceled and transferred to Exequiel Ballena, father of Andrea Robles, who is the wife of
Hilario Robles. Thereafter, Exequiel secured a loan from the Antipolo Rural Bank, using the tax
declaration as security. The tax declaration was transferred to the name of Antipolo Rural Bank and
later on, was transferred to the name of Hilario Robles and his wife.
Andrea Robles secured a loan from the Cadona Rural Bank, Inc., using the tax declaration as security.
Andrea Robles testified without contradiction that somebody else, not her husband Hilario Robles,
signed the loan papers because Hilario was working in Marinduque at that time.
45
For failure to pay the mortgage debt, foreclosure proceedings were had and Rural Bank emerged as
the highest bidder. The spouses Robles failed to redeem the property and so the tax declaration was
transferred in the name of Rural Bank. Rural Bank sold the same to the Spouses Vergel and Ruth
Santos.
Petitioner discovered the mortgage and attempted to redeem the property, but was unsuccessful.
Spouses Santos took possession of the property in question and was able to secure Free Patent No.
IV-1-010021 in their names.
The petitioners filed a complaint against Spouses Virgilio and Ruth Santos, as well as the Rural Bank
of Cardona, Inc. before the RTC. The petitioners contended that they had been in possession of the
land since 1942, and alleged, among other matters, that it was only in 1987 that they came to know
of the foreclosure of the real estate mortgage (REM) constituted thereon by their half-brother, Hilario
Robles, in favor of Rural Bank; and that they likewise learned upon further inquiry, that the latter had
already sold the same parcel of land in favor of the spouses Santos.
The RTC ruled that the REM allegedly executed by Hilario is not valid because his signature in the
mortgage deed was forged. The foreclosure proceedings therein were likewise not valid. Therefore,
the Bank did not acquire any right arising out of the foreclosure proceedings. The Bank could not
have transferred any right to the spouses Santos. Consequently, the issuance of a free patent title to
the Spouses Santos is not valid, because at that time, the property subject of this case was already
private land. Thus, the Bureau of Lands has no jurisdiction to dispose of the same.
The CA reversed the RTC, ruling that petitioners no longer had any title to the subject property at the
time they instituted the complaint for quieting of title.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the petitioners have the appropriate title that will entitle them to avail themselves
of the remedy of quieting of title. (YES)
2. Whether the Real Estate Mortgage is valid. (NO)
RULING:
Quieting of Title
An action to quiet title is a common-law remedy for the removal of any cloud or doubt or uncertainty
on the title to real property. It is essential for the plaintiff or complainant to have a legal or an
equitable title to or interest in the real property which is the subject matter of the action. Also, the
deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding that is being alleged as a cloud on plaintiff's title must be
shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal
efficacy.
The CA failed to consider irregularities in the transactions involving the disputed property. First,
while it was declared in the name of Exequiel, there was no instrument or deed of conveyance
evidencing its transfer from the heirs of Silvino to him. This fact is important, considering that the
petitioners are alleging continued possession of the property. Second, Exequiel was the father-in-law
of Hilario, to whom petitioners had entrusted the payment of the land taxes. Third, considering that
46
the subject property had been mortgaged by Exequiel to the Rural Bank of Antipolo, and that it was
foreclosed and in fact declared in the bank's name, why was he able to sell it to Spouses Robles?
Lastly, inasmuch as it was an unregistered parcel of land, the Rural Bank of Cardona, Inc., did not
observe due diligence in determining Hilario's title thereto.
The failure to show the indubitable title of Exequiel to the property in question is vital to the
resolution of the present Petition. It was from him that Hilario had allegedly derived his title thereto
as owner, an allegation which thereby enabled him to mortgage it to the Rural Bank of Cardona. The
occupation and the possession thereof by the petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest until
1962 was not disputed, and Exequiel's acquisition of the said property by prescription was not
alleged. Thus, the deed of conveyance purportedly evidencing the transfer of ownership and
possession from the heirs of Silvino to Exequiel should have been presented as the best proof
of that transfer. However, no such document was presented.
Therefore, there is merit to the contention of the petitioners that Hilario mortgaged the
disputed property to the Rural Bank of Cardona in his capacity as a mere co-owner thereof.
Clearly, the said transaction did not divest them of title to the property at the time of the
institution of the Complaint for quieting of title.
Contrary to the disquisition of the CA, Hilario effected no clear and evident repudiation of the co-
ownership. It is a fundamental principle that a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of
the other co-owners, absent any clear repudiation of the co-ownership. In order that the title may
prescribe in favor of a co-owner, the following requisites must concur: (1) the co-owner has
performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the other co-owners; (2) such
positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the other co-owner; and (3) the evidence
thereof is clear and convincing.
In the present case, Hilario did not have possession of the subject property; neither did he exclude
the petitioners from the use and the enjoyment thereof, as they had indisputably shared in its fruits.
Likewise, his act of entering into a mortgage contract with the bank cannot be construed to be a
repudiation of the co-ownership. As absolute owner of his undivided interest in the land, he had the
right to alienate his share, as he in fact did. Neither should his payment of land taxes in his name, as
agreed upon by the co-owners, be construed as a repudiation of the co-ownership. The assertion that
the declaration of ownership was tantamount to repudiation was belied by the continued occupation
and possession of the disputed property by the petitioners as owners.
Validity of the Real Estate Mortgage
In a real estate mortgage contract, it is essential that the mortgagor be the absolute owner of the
property to be mortgaged; otherwise, the mortgage is void. In the present case, it is apparent that
Hilario Robles was not the absolute owner of the entire subject property, and that the Rural
Bank of Cardona, Inc., in not fully ascertaining his title thereto, failed to observe due diligence
and, as such, was a mortgagee in bad faith.
Considering that Hilario can be deemed to have mortgaged the disputed property not as absolute
owner but only as a co-owner, he can be adjudged to have disposed to the Rural Bank of Cardona,
Inc., only his undivided share therein. The said bank, being the immediate predecessor of the
Santos spouses, was a mortgagee in bad faith. Thus, justice and equity mandate the
47
entitlement of the Santos spouses, who merely stepped into the shoes of the bank, only to what
legally pertains to the latter — Hilario's share in the disputed property.
ANASTACIA VDA. DE AVILES, ET AL., petitioners, - versus - COURT OF APPEALS and CAMILO
AVILES, respondents.
G.R. No. 95748, THIRD DIVISION, November 21, 1996, PANGANIBAN, J.
An action to quiet title or to remove cloud may not be brought for the purpose of settling a
boundary dispute. In this case, the facts presented unmistakably constitute a clear case of
boundary dispute, which is not cognizable in a special civil action to quiet title.
Thus, petitioners have wholly misapprehended the import of the foregoing rule by claiming that
respondent Court erred in holding that there was "no evidence of any muniment of title,
proceeding, written contract," and that there were, as a matter of fact, two such contracts: (i) the
Agreement of Partition; and (ii) the Deed of Sale. However, these documents in no way constitute
a cloud or cast a doubt upon the title of petitioners. Rather, the uncertainty arises from the
parties' failure to situate and fix the boundary between their respective properties.
FACTS:
The petitioners filed an action for quieting of title before the RTC, averring that they are the actual
possessors of a parcel of land situated in Malawa, Lingayen, Pangasinan. This property is the share of
their father, Eduardo Aviles (the brother of Camilo Aviles), in the estate of their [Eduardo and
Camilo’s] deceased parents, Ireneo Aviles and Anastacia Salazar.
Since 1957, Eduardo Aviles was in actual possession of the property. In fact, he mortgaged the same
with the Rural Bank and the PNB. When the property was inspected, Eduardo, in the presence of the
boundary owners, namely, Camilo Aviles, Anastacio Aviles, and Juana and Apolonio Joaquin, pointed
to the inspector the existing earthen dikes as the boundary limits of the property, and nobody
objected. When the real estate mortgage (REM) was foreclosed, the property was sold at public
auction, but the same was redeemed by petitioners’ mother, Anastacia Vda. de Aviles. The land was
subsequently transferred and declared in Anastacia’s name.
Camilo Aviles asserted a color of title over the northern portion of the property by constructing a
bamboo fence thereon and moving the earthen dikes, thereby disturbing the peaceful possession of
the petitioners over said portion. Camilo admitted the Agreement of Partition executed by him and
his brothers, Anastacio and Eduardo. In accordance therewith, the respective areas allotted to the
siblings was agreed and measured before the execution of the agreement, but Camilo was not present
when the measurement was made. Camilo agreed to have a smaller area when his brother Eduardo
asked him for a bigger share, because the latter has several children to support.
The RTC ordered the dismissal of the complaint for lack of basis and merits. The CA affirmed the RTC,
reasoning that a special civil action for quieting of title is not the proper remedy for settling a
boundary dispute, and that petitioners should have instituted an ejectment suit instead.
Petitioners assert that private respondent is occupying the disputed lot because he claimed it to be
part of his share in the partitioned property of his parents, whereas petitioners are claiming the said
lot as part and parcel of the land allotted to Eduardo Aviles, petitioners' predecessor-in-interest. They
contend that they have been occupying the aforesaid land as heirs of Eduardo Aviles in open, actual,
48
continuous, peaceful, public and adverse possession against the whole world. Further, they argue
that, if indeed the disputed lot belonged to private respondent, why then did it take him almost 26
long years to assert his ownership; why did he not assert his ownership over the property when
Eduardo Aviles was still alive; and why did he not take any action when the mortgage over the
disputed property was foreclosed?
ISSUE:
Whether the complaint for quieting of title instituted by the petitioners is the proper remedy. (NO)
RULING:
An action to quiet title or to remove cloud may not be brought for the purpose of settling a
boundary dispute. In this case, the facts presented unmistakably constitute a clear case of
boundary dispute, which is not cognizable in a special civil action to quiet title.
Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud upon or doubt or uncertainty
with respect to title to real property. In fine, to avail of the remedy of quieting of title, a plaintiff must
show that there is an instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which constitutes or
casts a cloud, doubt, question or shadow upon the owner's title to or interest in real property.
Thus, petitioners have wholly misapprehended the import of the foregoing rule by claiming that the
CA erred in holding that there was no evidence of any muniment of title, proceeding, written contract,
and that there were, as a matter of fact, two such contracts: (i) the Agreement of Partition executed
by private respondent and his brothers (including the petitioners' father and predecessor-in-
interest), in which their respective shares in the inherited property were agreed upon; and (ii) the
Deed of Sale evidencing the redemption by petitioner Anastacia Vda. de Aviles of the subject
property in a foreclosure sale. However, these documents in no way constitute a cloud or cast a
doubt upon the title of petitioners. Rather, the uncertainty arises from the parties' failure to
situate and fix the boundary between their respective properties.
Corollarily, and equally as clear, the construction of the bamboo fence enclosing the disputed
property and the moving of earthen dikes are not the "clouds" or "doubts" which can be removed in
an action for quieting of title.
JENESTOR B. CALDITO and MARIA FILOMENA T. CALDITO, Petitioners - versus - ISAGANI V.

OBANDO and GEREON V. OBANDO, Respondents
G.R. No. 181596, THIRD DIVISION, January 30, 2017, REYES, J.
Although tax declarations or realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership,
as in the instant case, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner, for no one in his right
mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or constructive possession. They
constitute evidence of great weight in support of the claim of title of ownership by prescription when
considered with the actual possession of the property by the applicant.
Indeed, the respondents' presentation of the tax declarations and tax receipts which all are of
ancient era indicates possession in the concept of an owner by the respondents and their
predecessors-in-interests.
49
Granting without admitting that Felipe's possession of Lot No. 1633 cannot be tacked with the
respondents' possession, the latter's possession can be tacked with that of Paterno. Thus, from 1961 to
the time of the filing of the quieting of title by the petitioners in 2003, the respondents have been
in possession of the entire Lot No. 1633 in the concept of an owner for almost 42 years. This
period of time is sufficient to vest extraordinary acquisitive prescription over the property on
the respondents. As such, it is immaterial now whether the respondents possessed the property in good
faith or not.
From the foregoing disquisitions, it is clear that the petitioners were not able to prove equitable
title or ownership over the subject parcel of land. Except for their claim that they merely purchased
the same from the Spouses Ballesteros, the petitioners presented no other justification to disprove the
ownership of the respondents. Since the Spouses Ballesteros had no right to sell the subject parcel of
land, the petitioners cannot be deemed to have been the lawful owners of the same.
FACTS:
As early as 1921, Lot No. 1633 (subject property) was declared for taxation purposes in the name of
Felipe Obado. After Felipe's death, Paterno Obado, whom Felipe treated like his own son,
subsequently occupied Lot No. 1633 and continued to pay the realty taxes of the same.
Sometime in 1995, Antonio Ballesteros executed an Affidavit of Ownership narrating his claim over
the subject parcel of land. In his Affidavit, Antonio claimed that Lot No. 1633 was co-owned by Felipe
with his five siblings, namely: Eladia, Estanislao, Maria, Severino, and Tomasa, all surnamed Obado.
Thereafter, Spouses Antonio and Elena Ballesteros sold the subject parcel of land to the petitioners
for the sum of P70,000.000 evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale. Thereafter, the petitioners declared
the subject lot for taxation purposes and paid the realty taxes thereon.
In 2002, the petitioners attempted to build a house on the subject parcel of land, but the respondents
prevented them from completing the same. The respondents then filed a complaint before the
barangay but no amicable settlement was reached between the parties. Hence, the petitioners
instituted a complaint for quieting of ownership against the respondents before the RTC, as well as
an injunctive writ to prevent the respondents from interfering with the construction of their house.
For their part, the respondents averred that the Spouses Ballesteros were not the owners and
possessors of the subject parcel of land. They maintained that Lot No. 1633 was inherited by their
father, Paterno, from its original owner Felipe, and they have been paying the real property taxes for
the entire property. They asserted that the petitioners are buyers in bad faith since their family had
been in possession of the entire Lot No. 1633 since 1969 and had been in open, peaceful and
uninterrupted possession of the whole property up to the present or for more than 30 years in the
concept of an owner.
The RTC upheld the validity of the sale between the petitioners and the Spouses Ballesteros and
dismissed the respondents' claim of ownership over Lot No. 1633.
The CA reversed the RTC decision ruling that for a party seeking to quiet their ownership of the
portion in litigation, the petitioners have miserably failed to prove the title of their immediate
predecessors-in-interest, the Spouses' Ballesteros. Except for the Affidavit of Ownership executed by
50
Antonio, there is, in fact, no evidence on record to support the claim that the subject parcel was,
indeed, co-owned by Felipe and his siblings.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioners were able to prove ownership over the subject parcel of land. (NO)
RULING:
In this case, the petitioners' cause of action relates to an action to quiet title which has two
indispensable requisites, namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to
or interest in the real property subject of the action; find (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative
despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.
From the foregoing provisions, it is clear that the petitioners' cause of action must necessarily
fail in view of the absence of the first requisite since the petitioners were not able to prove
equitable title or ownership over the subject parcel of land.
The petitioners' claim of legal title over the subject parcel of land by virtue of the Deed of Sale
and Affidavit of Ownership issued by Antonio cannot stand because they failed to prove the
title of their immediate predecessors-in-interest, the Spouses Ballesteros. The Court cannot
give full credence to Antonio's Affidavit of Ownership for he simply made general and self-serving
statements therein which were favorable to him, and which were not supported with documentary
evidence, with no specifics as to when their predecessors-in-interest acquired the subject parcel of
land. Moreover, Antonio was not even called to the witness stand to testify on the contents of his
Affidavit of Ownership, thus, making the affidavit hearsay evidence and its probative value
questionable.
The RTC’s reliance on the Affidavit of Ownership executed by Antonio that the entire Lot No. 1633
was co-owned by Felipe and his siblings is misplaced, considering that nothing on record shows
the relationship between Felipe and his supposed legal heirs. Moreover, no other piece of
evidence was ever presented to prove that Lot No. 1633 was ever subdivided. In fact, the petitioners
admitted that the subject lot has always been declared for taxation purposes in the name of Felipe,
and that the Spouses Ballesteros or the siblings of Felipe have never declared the same for taxation
purposes in their names.
While the petitioners submitted official receipts and tax declarations to prove payment of taxes,
nowhere in the evidence was it shown that Spouses Ballesteros declared the subject parcel of land in
their name for taxation purposes or paid taxes due thereon. True, a tax declaration by itself is not
sufficient to prove ownership. Nonetheless, it may serve as sufficient basis for inferring possession.
Be that as it may, the rights of the respondents as owners of Lot No. 1633 were never alienated from
them despite the sale of the subject parcel of land by the Spouses Ballesteros to the petitioners nor
does the fact that the petitioners succeeded in paying the real property taxes of the subject parcel of
land. Besides, it seems that the petitioners knew of the fact that they did not have a title to the subject
parcel of land and could not, therefore, have validly registered the same, because of the respondents'
possession of the entire property.
51
The respondents also presented the following pieces of evidence: (1) old certified photocopies of
declarations of real property and original copy of tax receipts x x x in the name of Felipe x x x; (2)
original copy of tax receipts x x x in the name of the respondents' father Paterno x x x; (3) original
copy of tax receipt x x x in the name of Isagani x x x; (4) original copy of the Certification issued by
the Municipal Treasurer of Sarrat, Ilocos Norte that Lot No. 1633 covered by Tax Declaration No. 03-
001-00271 declared in the name of Felipe is not delinquent in the payment of realty taxes.
ownership, as in the instant case, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner, for no
one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or constructive
possession. They constitute evidence of great weight in support of the claim of title of ownership by
prescription when considered with the actual possession of the property by the applicant.
Indeed, the respondents' presentation of the tax declarations and tax receipts which all are of
ancient era indicates possession in the concept of an owner by the respondents and their
predecessors-in-interests. The tax declarations in the name of Paterno take on great significance
because the respondents can tack their claim of ownership to that of their father. It is worthy to note
that the respondents' father Paterno to whom they inherited the entire Lot No. 1633 paid the taxes
due under his name; and subsequently, the respondents paid the taxes due after the death of
Paterno. Granting without admitting that Felipe's possession of Lot No. 1633 cannot be tacked with
the respondents' possession, the latter's possession can be tacked with that of Paterno. Thus, from
1961 to the time of the filing of the quieting of title by the petitioners in 2003, the respondents
have been in possession of the entire Lot No. 1633 in the concept of an owner for almost 42
years. This period of time is sufficient to vest extraordinary acquisitive prescription over the
property on the respondents. As such, it is immaterial now whether the respondents possessed the
property in good faith or not.
From the foregoing disquisitions, it is clear that the petitioners were not able to prove
equitable title or ownership over the subject parcel of land. Except for their claim that they
merely purchased the same from the Spouses Ballesteros, the petitioners presented no other
justification to disprove the ownership of the respondents. Since the Spouses Ballesteros had no right
to sell the subject parcel of land, the petitioners cannot be deemed to have been the lawful owners of
the same.
REY CASTIGADOR CATEDRILLA, PETITIONER, VS. MARIO AND MARGIE LAURON,

RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. No. 179011, THIRD DIVISION, APRIL 15, 2013, PERALTA, J.]
In suits to recover properties, all co-owners are real parties in interest. However, pursuant to Article 487
of the Civil Code and the relevant jurisprudence, any one of them may bring an action, any kind of action
for the recovery of co-owned properties. Therefore, only one of the co-owners, namely the co-owner who
filed the suit for the recovery of the co-owned property, is an indispensable party thereto. The other co-
owners are not indispensable parties. They are not even necessary parties, for a complete relief can be
afforded in the suit even without their participation, since the suit is presumed to have been filed for the
benefit of all co-owners.
52
FACTS:
Petitioner Rey Castigador Catedrilla filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Lambunao, Iloilo a
Complaint for ejectment against the spouses Mario and Margie Lauron. The case arose from a parcel
of land, alleging that Lorenza Lizada is the owner of a parcel of land known as Lot 183, located in
Mabini Street, Lambunao, Iloilo. Lilia was succeeded by her heirs, her husband Maximo and their
children, one of whom is herein petitioner; that petitioner filed the complaint as a co-owner of Lot
No. 5; that sometime in 1980, respondents Mario and Margie Lauron, through the tolerance of the
heirs of Lilia, constructed a residential building of strong materials on the northwest portion of Lot
No. 5 covering an area of one hundred square meters; that the heirs of Lilia made various demands
for respondents to vacate the premises and even exerted earnest efforts to compromise with them
but the same was unavailing; and that petitioner reiterated the demand on respondents to vacate the
subject lot but respondents continued to unlawfully withhold such possession.
Respondents claimed that petitioner had no cause of action against them, since they are not the
owners of the residential building standing on petitioner's lot, but Mildred Kascher (Mildred),
Mildred had already paid P10,000.00 as downpayment for the subject lot to Teresito Castigador; that
there were several instances that the heirs of Lilia offered the subject Lot 183 for sale to respondents
and Mildred and demanded payment, however, the latter was only interested in asking money
without any intention of delivering or registering the subject lot; that in 1998, Maximo, petitioner's
father, and respondent Margie entered into an amicable settlement before the Barangay Lupon of
Poblacion Ilawod, Lambunao, Iloilo wherein Maximo offered the subject lot to the spouses Alfons and
Mildred Kascher in the amount of P90,000.00 with the agreement that all documents related to the
transfer of the subject lot to Maximo and his children be prepared by Maximo, but the latter failed to
comply; and that the amicable settlement should have the force and effect of a final judgment of a
court, hence, the instant suit is barred by prior judgment. Respondents counterclaimed for damages.
The MTC rendered its Decision in favor of the plaintiff. RTC affirmed but deleted the attorney's fees,
since the MTC decision merely ordered the payment of attorney's fees without any basis. The RTC
found that petitioner, being one of the co-owners of the subject lot, is the proper party in interest to
prosecute against any intruder thereon. It found that the amicable settlement signed and executed
by the representatives of the registered owner of the premises before the Lupon is not binding and
unenforceable between the parties. It further ruled that even if Mildred has her name in the tax
declaration signifying that she is the owner of the house constructed on the subject lot, tax
declarations are not evidence of ownership but merely issued to the declarant for purposes of
payment of taxes; that she cannot be considered as an indispensable party in a suit for recovery of
possession against respondents; that Mildred should have intervened and proved that she is an
indispensable party because the records showed that she was not in actual possession of the subject
lot. CA reversed. The CA found that petitioner's co-heirs to the subject lot should have been
impleaded as co-plaintiffs in the ejectment case against respondents, since without their presence,
the trial court could not validly render judgment and grant relief in favor of petitioner.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner can file the action without impleading his co-owners.
53
RULING:
Yes. Petitioner can file the action for ejectment without impleading his co-owners.
In Wee v. De Castro,22 wherein petitioner therein argued that the respondent cannot maintain an
action for ejectment against him, without joining all his co-owners, we ruled in this wise:
Article 487 of the New Civil Code is explicit on this point:
“ART.487. Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment.
This article covers all kinds of action for the recovery of possession, i.e., forcible entry and unlawful
detainer (accion interdictal), recovery of possession (accion publiciana), and recovery of ownership
(accion de reivindicacion). As explained by the renowned civilest, Professor Arturo M. Tolentino: A
co-owner may bring such an action, without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-
plaintiffs, because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. If the action is for the
benefit of the plaintiff alone, such that he claims possession for himself and not for the co-ownership,
the action will not prosper.”
In sum, in suits to recover properties, all co-owners are real parties in interest. However, pursuant
to Article 487 of the Civil Code and the relevant jurisprudence, any one of them may bring an action,
any kind of action for the recovery of co-owned properties. Therefore, only one of the co- owners,
namely the co-owner who filed the suit for the recovery of the co-owned property, is an indispensable
party thereto. The other co-owners are not indispensable parties. They are not even necessary
parties, for a complete relief can be afforded in the suit even without their participation, since the
suit is presumed to have been filed for the benefit of all co-owners.
In this case, although petitioner alone filed the complaint for unlawful detainer, he stated in the
complaint that he is one of the heirs of the late Lilia Castigador, his mother, who inherited the subject
lot, from her parents. Petitioner did not claim exclusive ownership of the subject lot, but he filed the
complaint for the purpose of recovering its possession which would redound to the benefit of the co-
owners. Since petitioner recognized the existence of a co-ownership, he, as a co- owner, can bring the
action without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs.
SPOUSES MANUEL AND SALVACION DEL CAMPO, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
AND HEIRS OF JOSE REGALADO, SR., RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. No. 108228, SECOND DIVISION, FEBRUARY 01, 2001, QUISUMBING, J.]
We have ruled many times that even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect
only his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale. Since a co-owner
is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner will only transfer the
rights of said co-owner to the buyer, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property.
FACTS:
The Bornales were the original co-owners of Lot 162. The lot was divided in aliquot shares among
the 8 co-owners as follows:
1. Salome – 4/16
2. Consorcia – 4/16
54
3. Alfredo -2/16
4. Maria – 2/16
5. Jose – 1/16
6. Quirico – 1/16
7. Rosalia – 1/16
8. Julita – 1/16
Salome sold part of her 4/16 share in Lot 162 for P200.00 to Soledad Daynolo. Thereafter, Soledad
immediately took possession of the land and built a house thereon.
A few years later, Soledad and husband, Simplicio, mortgaged the subject portion of Lot 162 as
security for a P4000 debt to Jose Regalado Sr. This was evidenced by a Deed of Mortgage.
Three of the eight co-owners of Lot 162 (Salome, Consorcia, and Alfredo) sold portions of the said lot
to Jose Regalado, Sr.
Simplicio, heir of Soledad, paid the mortgage debt and redeemed the mortgaged portion of Lot 162
from Jose Regalado, Sr, who in turn executed a Deed of Discharge of Mortgage in favor of Soledad’s
heirs. On the same date, the said heirs sold the redeemed portion of Lot 162 for P1,500 to herein
petitioners (Spouses Del Campo).
Meanwhile, Jose Regalado caused the reconstitution of OCT No. 18047. The Reconstituted OCT
initially reflected the shares of the original co- owners in Lot 162. However, the title was transferred
later to Jose Regalado Sr. who subdivided the entire property into smaller lots, each covered by a
respective title in his name.
In 1987, petitioners Manuel and Salvacion del Campo brought this complaint for "repartition,
resurvey and reconveyance" against the heirs of the now deceased Jose Regalado, Sr. Petitioners
claimed that they owned an area of 1,544 square meters located within Lot 162-C-6 which was
erroneously included in TCT No. 14566 in the name of Regalado. Petitioners alleged that they
occupied the disputed area as residential dwelling ever since they purchased the property from the
Distajos way back in 1951. They also declared the land for taxation purposes and paid the
corresponding taxes.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale made by Salome in favor of Soledad be valid, notwithstanding that it is a
physical portion of the undivided co-owned property.
RULING:
Yes. The sale made by Salome in favor of Soledad be valid, notwithstanding that it is a physical portion
of the undivided co-owned property.
There can be no doubt that the transaction entered into by Salome and Soledad could be legally
recognized in its entirety since the object of the sale did not even exceed the ideal shares held by the
former in the co-ownership. As a matter of fact, the deed of sale executed between the parties
expressly stipulated that the portion of Lot 162 sold to Soledad would be taken from Salome’s 4/16
undivided interest in said lot, which the latter could validly transfer in whole or in part even without
55
the consent of the other co-owners. Salome’s right to sell part of her undivided interest in the co-
owned property is absolute in accordance with the well-settled doctrine that a co-owner has full
ownership of his pro- indiviso share and has the right to alienate, assign or mortgage it, and substitute
another person in its enjoyment. Since Salome’s clear intention was to sell merely part of her aliquot
share in Lot 162, in our view no valid objection can be made against it and the sale can be given effect
to the full extent.
We are not unaware of the principle that a co-owner cannot rightfully dispose of a particular portion
of a co-owned property prior to partition among all the co-owners. However, this should not signify
that the vendee does not acquire anything at all in case a physically segregated area of the co-owned
lot is in fact sold to him. Since the co-owner/vendor’s undivided interest could properly be the object
of the contract of sale between the parties, what the vendee obtains by virtue of such a sale are the
same rights as the vendor had as co-owner, in an ideal share equivalent to the consideration given
under their transaction. In other words, the vendee steps into the shoes of the vendor as co-owner
and acquires a proportionate abstract share in the property held in common.
Resultantly, Soledad became a co-owner of Lot 162 as of the year 1940 when the sale was made in
her favor. It follows that Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo could not have sold the entire Lot 162 to Jose
Regalado, Sr. on April 14, 1948 because at that time, the ideal shares held by the three co-
owners/vendors were equivalent to only 10/16 of the undivided property less the aliquot share
previously sold by Salome to Soledad. Based on the principle that "no one can give what he does not
have," Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo could not legally sell the shares pertaining to Soledad since a
co-owner cannot alienate more than his share in the co-ownership. We have ruled many times that
even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but not those
of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale. Since a co-owner is entitled to sell his
undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner will only transfer the rights of said co-
owner to the buyer, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property.
In this case, Regalado merely became a new co-owner of Lot 162 to the extent of the shares which
Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo could validly convey. Soledad retained her rights as co-owner and
could validly transfer her share to petitioners in 1951. The logical effect on the second disposition is
to substitute petitioners in the rights of Soledad as co-owner of the land. Needless to say, these rights
are preserved notwithstanding the issuance of TCT No. 14566 in Regalado’s name in 1977.
EXTRAORDINARY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. HERMINIA F. SAMSON-

BICO AND ELY B. FLESTADO, RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. No. 191091, FIRST DIVISION, OCTOBER 13, 2014, PEREZ, J.]
A co-owner cannot rightfully dispose of a particular portion of a co-owned property prior to partition
among all the co-owners. However, this should not signify that the vendee does not acquire anything at
all in case a physically segregated area of the co-owned lot is in fact sold to him. Since the co-
owner/vendor’s undivided interest could properly be the object of the contract of sale between the
parties, what the vendee obtains by virtue of such a sale are the same rights as the vendor had as co-
owner, in an ideal share equivalent to the consideration given under their transaction. In other words,
the vendee steps into the shoes of the vendor as co-owner and acquires a proportionate abstract share
in the property held in common.
56
FACTS:
Apolonio Ballesteros (Apolonio) and Maria Membrebe (Maria) were husband and wife. They begot
two (2) children, namely, Juan M. Ballesteros (Juan), who married Leonarda Tambongco (Leonarda)
and Irenea Ballesteros (Irenea), who married Santiago Samson (Santiago).
During his lifetime, Apolonio owned a parcel of land consisting of 29,748 square meters situated at
Barangay Pantok, Binangonan, Rizal. When Apolonio and Maria died, the property was inherited by
Juan and Irenea. When the latter died, the heirs of Juan and Irenea became co- owners of the property.
On 16 April 2002, the heirs of Juan, without the consent of respondents, the heirs of Irenea executed
in favor of petitioner EDC a Deed of Absolute Sale covering the subject property for P2,974,800.00.
Prior to the sale, respondents claimed that they learned that the property had been the subject of a
contract to sell between the heirs of Juan and EDC. On 7 March 2000, respondents wrote to EDC
informing it of the existence of coownership over the subject property. EDC wrote back that it will
look into the matter and asked respondents to further establish the basis of their claims.
EDC was able to cause the registration of the Deed of Absolute Sale with the Office of the Provincial
Assessor Rizal and transfer the tax declaration over the subject property in its name. This prompted
respondents to file the Complaint for Annulment of Contract and Reconveyance of Possession with
Damages.
In its Answer, EDC alleged that it is a buyer in good faith and for value of the subject property because
it was of the honest belief that the heirs of Juan are the only heirs of the late Apolonio. On the other
hand, the heirs of Juan asserted that respondents were aware of and were parties to the contract to
sell entered into by them and EDC. The heirs of Juan claimed that respondents received their share
in the downpayment made by EDC but they were both unpaid of the balance on the cost of the land.
The RTC ruled in favor of respondents. EDC appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
partially granted the appeal. The Court of Appeals ruled that respondents were able to establish their
co-ownership over one-half of the subject property. The appellate court pointed out that the heirs of
Juan categorically admitted in their Answer, as well as during the hearing the existence of co-
ownership. The appellate court agreed with the trial court’s finding that the heirs of Juan, as co-
owners, could only alienate or convey to EDC their one-half portion of the subject property which
may be allotted to them in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. Thus, the sale will
affect only their share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale. However,
the appellate court reversed the ruling of the trial court that the Deed of Absolute Sale is null and
void. According to the appellate court, the same is valid with respect to the transfer of the rights of
the co-owners sellers heirs of Juan over the one-half portion of the subject property, thereby making
EDC a co-owner thereof. Aggrieved, EDC filed this present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grave error in ruling that the respondents
are entitled to 1⁄2 of the Property.
RULING:
No. The Court of Appeals did not commit grave error in ruling that the respondents are entitled to
1⁄2 of the Property.
57
As borne by the records, respondents were able to convincingly establish their co- ownership over
one-half of the subject property. Herminia has successfully established her successional rights over
the subject property through her clear testimony and admitted by the opposing counsel.
In a contract of sale, it is essential that the seller is the owner of the property he is selling. Under
Article 1458 of the Civil Code, the principal obligation of a seller is to transfer the ownership of the
property sold. Also, Article 1459 of the Civil Code provides that the thing must be licit and the vendor
must have a right to transfer the ownership thereof at the time it is delivered. The execution by
appellants Ballesteros of the Deed of Absolute Sale over the subject property which they do not
exclusively own but is admittedly co-owned by them together with the respondents, was valid only
to the extent of the former’s undivided one-half share thereof, as they had no title or interest to
transfer the other one-half portion which pertains to the respondents without the latter’s consent. It
is an established principle that no one can give what one does not have – nemo dat quod non habet.
Accordingly, one can sell only what one owns or is authorized to sell, and the buyer can acquire no
more than what the seller can transfer legally. Thus, since appellant EDC’s rights over the subject
property originated from sellers-appellants Ballesteros, said corporation merely stepped into the
shoes of its sellers and cannot have a better right than what its sellers have. Indeed, a spring cannot
rise higher than its source. Moreover, EDC was given an ample opportunity to be heard through
counsel. The essence of due process is the right to be heard. Due process is satisfied when the parties
are afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the controversy.
Thus, when the party seeking due process was in fact given several opportunities to be heard and air
his side, but it is by his own fault or choice he squanders these chances, then his cry for due process
must fail.
Having established respondents’ co-ownership rights over the subject property, we find no error in
the appellate court’s ruling sustaining the validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale but only with respect
to the rights of the heirs of Juan over one-half of the property.
Article 493 of the Civil Code recognizes the absolute right of a co-owner to freely dispose of his pro
indiviso share as well as the fruits and other benefits arising from that share, independently of the
other coowners, thus:
“Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part of the fruits and benefits pertaining
thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in
its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the
mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him
in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.”
In Spouses Del Campo v. Court of Appeals, we had the occasion to expound the rights of a co-owner
vis-à -vis the vendee, thus:
“x x x Would the sale by a co-owner of a physical portion of an undivided property held in common
be valid? x x x
On the first issue, it seems plain to us that the trial court concluded that petitioners could not have
acquired ownership of the subject land which originally formed part of Lot 162, on the ground that
their alleged right springs from a void sale transaction between Salome and Soledad. The mere fact
that Salome purportedly transferred a definite portion of the co-owned lot by metes and bounds to
Soledad, however, does not per se render the sale a nullity. This much is evident under Article 493 of
58
the Civil Code and pertinent jurisprudence on the matter. More particularly in Lopez vs. Vda. De
Cuaycong, et. al. which we find relevant, the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Bocobo, held that:
...The fact that the agreement in question purported to sell a concrete portion of the hacienda does
not render the sale void, for it is a well-established principle that the binding force of a contract must
be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so. "Quando res non valet ut ago, valeat quantum
valere potest." (When a thing is of no force as I do it, it shall have as much force as it can have.)”
Applying this principle to the instant case, there can be no doubt that the transaction entered into by
Salome and Soledad could be legally recognized in its entirety since the object of the sale did not even
exceed the ideal shares held by the former in the co-ownership. As a matter of fact, the deed of sale
executed between the parties expressly stipulated that the portion of Lot 162 sold to Soledad would
be taken from Salome’s 4/16 undivided interest in said lot, which the latter could validly transfer in
whole or in part even without the consent of the other co-owners. Salome’s right to sell part of her
undivided interest in the co-owned property is absolute in accordance with the well-settled doctrine
that a co-owner has full ownership of his pro-indiviso share and has the right to alienate, assign or
mortgage it, and substitute another person in its enjoyment. Since Salome’s clear intention was to
sell merely part of her aliquot share in Lot 162, in our view no valid objection can be made against it
and the sale can be given effect to the full extent.
We are not unaware of the principle that a co-owner cannot rightfully dispose of a particular portion
of a co-owned property prior to partition among all the co-owners. However, this should not signify
that the vendee does not acquire anything at all in case a physically segregated area of the co-owned
lot is in fact sold to him. Since the co-owner/vendor’s undivided interest could properly be the object
of the contract of sale between the parties, what the vendee obtains by virtue of such a sale are the
same rights as the vendor had as co-owner, in an ideal share equivalent to the consideration given
under their transaction. In other words, the vendee steps into the shoes of the vendor as co-owner
and acquires a proportionate abstract share in the property held in common.
VICENTE TORRES, JR.,CARLOS VELEZ, AND THE HEIRS OF MARIANO VELEZ, NAMELY: ANITA
CHIONG VELEZ, ROBERT OSCAR CHIONG VELEZ, SARAH JEAN CHIONG VELEZ AND TED
CHIONG VELEZ, petitioners –versus- LORENZO LAPINID AND JESUS VELEZ, respondents.|||
G.R. No. 187987, FIRST DIVISION, November 26, 2014, PEREZ J.
Under Article 493 of the New Civil Code, a co-owner has an absolute ownership of his undivided and pro-
indiviso share in the co-owned property. He has the right to alienate, assign and mortgage it, even to the
extent of substituting a third person in its enjoyment provided that no personal rights will be affected.
In this case, Jesus can validly alienate his co-owned property in favor of Lapinid, free from any opposition
from the co-owners. Lapinid, as a transferee, validly obtained the same rights of Jesus from the date of
the execution of a valid sale. Absent any proof that the sale was not perfected, the validity of sale subsists.
In essence, Lapinid steps into the shoes of Jesus as co-owner of an ideal and proportionate share in the
property held in common. Thus, from the perfection of contract on 9 November 1997, Lapinid eventually
became a co-owner of the property. Even assuming that the petitioners are correct in their allegation
that the disposition in favor of Lapinid before partition was a concrete or definite portion, the validity
of sale still prevails.
59
FACTS:
Vicente Torres, Jr. (Vicente), Mariano Velez (Mariano) and Carlos Velez (Petitioners) filed a
Complaint before RTC Cebu City praying for the nullification of the sale of real property by
respondent Jesus Velez (Jesus) in favor of Lapinid; the recovery of possession and ownership of the
property; and the payment of damages.
Petitioners alleged in their complaint that they, including Jesus, are co-owners of several parcels of
land including the disputed Lot. No. 4389 located at Cogon, Carcar, Cebu. Sometime in 1993, Jesus
filed an action for partition of the parcels of land against the petitioners and other co-owners before
Branch 21 of RTC Cebu City.
On 13 August 2001, a judgment was rendered based on a compromise agreement signed by the
parties wherein they agreed that Jesus, Mariano and Vicente were jointly authorized to sell the said
properties and receive the proceeds thereof and distribute them to all the co-owners. However, the
agreement was later amended to exclude Jesus as an authorized seller. Petitioners inspected the
property and discovered that Lapinid was occupying a specific portion of the 3000 square meters of
Lot No. 4389 by virtue of a deed of sale executed by Jesus in favor of Lapinid. It was pointed out by
petitioners that as a consequence of what they discovered, a forcible entry case was filed against
Lapinid. The petitioners prayed that the deed of sale be declared null and void arguing that the sale
of a definite portion of a co-owned property without notice to the other co-owners is without force
and effect. Further, they prayed for payment of rental fees amounting to P1,000.00 per month from
January 2004 or from the time of deprivation of property in addition to attorney’s fees and litigation
expenses.
Jesus admitted that there was a partition case between him and the petitioners filed in 1993 involving
several parcels of land including the contested Lot No. 4389. However, he insisted that as early as 6
November 1997, a motion was signed by the co-owners (including the petitioners) wherein Lot No.
4389 was agreed to be adjudicated to the co-owners belonging to the group of Jesus and the other
lots be divided to the other co-owners belonging to the group of Torres. When the motion was filed
and signed by the parties on 6 November 1997, his rights as a majority co-owner (73%) of Lot No.
4389 became consolidated. Jesus averred that it was unnecessary to give notice of the sale as the lot
was already adjudicated in his favor.
On his part, Lapinid admitted that a deed of sale was entered into between him and Jesus pertaining
to a parcel of land with an area of 3000 square meters. However, he insisted on the validity of sale
since Jesus showed him several deeds of sale making him a majority owner of Lot No. 4389. He further
denied that he acquired a specific and definite portion of the questioned property, citing as evidence
the deed of sale which does not mention any boundaries or specific portion. He explained that Jesus
permitted him to occupy a portion not exceeding 3000 square meters conditioned on the result of
the partition of the co-owners.
Regarding the forcible entry case, Jesus and Lapinid admitted that such case was filed but the same
was already dismissed by the MTC of Carcar, Cebu. In that decision, it was ruled that the buyers,
including Lapinid, were buyers in good faith since a proof of ownership was shown to them by Jesus
before buying the property.
The trial court dismissed the complaint of petitioners and nullifies the site assignment made by Jesus
Velez in the Deed of Sale of Lorenzo Lapinid’s portion, the exact location of which still has to be
60
determined either by agreement of the co-owners or by the Court in proper proceedings. Aggrieved,
petitioners filed their partial motion for reconsideration which was denied. Thereafter, they filed a
notice of appeal
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. It validated the sale and ruled that the
compromise agreement did not affect the validity of the sale previously executed by Jesus and
Lapinid. It likewise dismissed the claim for rental payments, attorney’s fees and litigation expenses
of the petitioners.
Upon appeal before the Supreme Court, the petitioners echo the same arguments posited before the
lower courts.
ISSUE:
Whether Jesus, as a co-owner, can validly sell a portion of the property he co-owns in favor of another
person. (YES)
RULING:
The petition is denied.
Admittedly, Jesus sold an area of land to Lapinid on 9 November 1997. To simplify, the question now
is whether Jesus, as a co-owner, can validly sell a portion of the property he co-owns in favor of
another person. The Court answers in the affirmative.
A co-owner has an absolute ownership of his undivided and pro-indiviso share in the co-owned
property. He has the right to alienate, assign and mortgage it, even to the extent of substituting a third
person in its enjoyment provided that no personal rights will be affected. This is evident from the
provision of the Civil Code:
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits
pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another
person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or
the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to
him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
A co-owner is an owner of the whole and over the whole he exercises the right of dominion, but he is
at the same time the owner of a portion which is truly abstract. Hence, his co-owners have no right
to enjoin a co-owner who intends to alienate or substitute his abstract portion or substitute a third
person in its enjoyment.
In this case, Jesus can validly alienate his co-owned property in favor of Lapinid, free from any
opposition from the co-owners. Lapinid, as a transferee, validly obtained the same rights of Jesus
from the date of the execution of a valid sale. Absent any proof that the sale was not perfected, the
validity of sale subsists. In essence, Lapinid steps into the shoes of Jesus as co-owner of an ideal and
proportionate share in the property held in common. Thus, from the perfection of contract on 9
November 1997, Lapinid eventually became a co-owner of the property.
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Even assuming that the petitioners are correct in their allegation that the disposition in favor of
Lapinid before partition was a concrete or definite portion, the validity of sale still prevails.
In a catena of decisions, the Supreme Court had repeatedly held that no individual can claim title to
a definite or concrete portion before partition of co-owned property. Each co-owner only possesses
a right to sell or alienate his ideal share after partition. However, in case he disposes his share before
partition, such disposition does not make the sale or alienation null and void. What will be affected
on the sale is only his proportionate share, subject to the results of the partition. The co-owners who
did not give their consent to the sale stand to be unaffected by the alienation.
NORMA C. MAGSANO, ISIDRO C. MAGSANO, RICARDO C. MAGSANO, ROQUE C. MAGSANO, JR.,

NIDA M. CAGUIAT, PERLITA MAGSANO, and SALVADOR C. MAGSANO, petitioners, -versus-
PANGASINAN SAVINGS AND LOAN BANK, INC. and SPOUSES EDDIE V. MANUEL and MILAGROS
C. BALLESTEROS, substituted by her heirs: GEMMA C. MANUEL-PEREZ, ANGELO JOHNDREW
MANUEL, and RESSY C. MANUEL, respondents.
G.R. No. 215038, FIRST DIVISION, October 17, 2016, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
The effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the
portion, which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
Consequently, the validity of the subject REM and the subsequent foreclosure proceedings therefor
conducted in favor of respondent bank should be limited only to the portion which may be allotted to it,
as Susana's successor-in-interest, in the event of partition, thereby making it a co-owner with petitioners
pending partition.
FACTS:
The spouses Roque Magsano and Susana Capelo (collectively, mortgagors), the parents of petitioners,
purportedly executed in favor of respondent bank a Real Estate Mortgage (REM) over a parcel of land
in Dagupan City, as well as the improvements thereon. However, they defaulted in the payment of
their loan, causing respondent bank to extra-judicially foreclose the mortgaged property. The
mortgagors then failed to redeem the property within the redemption period, which led to the
issuance of a title in the name of respondent bank. The latter subsequently sold the same to Sps.
Manuel.
Despite repeated demands, the mortgagors refused to vacate the premises; hence, respondent bank
applied for and was granted a writ of possession over the subject property and, thereafter, a writ of
demolition. Consequently, petitioners filed a complaint for annulment of REM, Certificate of Sale,
Sheriff's Final Sale, Deed of Sale, and title against respondent bank, Sps. Manuel, and Sheriff Daroy.
They averred that Roque had already passed away prior to the execution of the REM; hence, the said
mortgage was null and void, and could not have conferred any right on the subject property in favor
of respondent bank which it could pass to Sps. Manuel.
The RTC dismissed the complaint. The CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling and held that while the Real
Estate Mortgage was void as to the share of Roque who was shown to be already deceased at the time
the same was executed, rendering respondent bank a mortgagee in bad faith, it declared Sps. Manuel
innocent purchasers for value whose rights may not be prejudiced.
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ISSUES:
1) Whether the REM was void. (YES)

2) Whether the Sps. Manuel were purchasers in good faith. (NO)
3) What rights were transmitted to the Sps. Manuel.
RULING:
1) The REM is void as to the share of Roque but valid with respect to the portion, which may be
allotted to respondent bank as Susan’s successor-in-interest in the event of partition.
At the time the REM was constituted, Roque was already deceased. Upon his death, the conjugal
partnership between him and Susana was dissolved pursuant to Article 126 (1) of the Family Code,
and an implied ordinary co-ownership arose among Susana and the other heirs of Roque with respect
to his share in the assets of the conjugal partnership pending liquidation. The ensuing implied
ordinary co-ownership is governed by Article 493 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits
pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another
person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation
or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be
allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, although Susana is a co-owner with her children with respect to Roque's share in the conjugal
partnership, she could not yet assert or claim title to any specific portion thereof without an actual
partition of the property being first done either by agreement or by judicial decree. While she herself
as co-owner had the right to mortgage or even sell her undivided interest in the subject property, she
could not mortgage or otherwise dispose of the same in its entirety without the consent of the other
co-owners. Consequently, the validity of the subject REM and the subsequent foreclosure
proceedings therefor conducted in favor of respondent bank should be limited only to the portion
which may be allotted to it, as Susana's successor-in-interest, in the event of partition, thereby
making it a co-owner with petitioners pending partition.
2) The Sps. Manuel were purchasers in bad faith.
While the rule is that every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of
the certificate of title issued therefor and the law will in no way oblige him to go beyond the certificate
to determine the condition of the property, where the land sold is in the possession of a person other
than the vendor, as in this case, the purchaser must go beyond the certificate of title and make
inquiries concerning the actual possessor. The failure of a prospective buyer to take such
precautionary steps would mean negligence on his part and would thereby preclude him from
claiming or invoking the rights of a "purchaser in good faith."
Here, petitioners were in possession of the subject property when Sps. Manuel bought the same on
(and even up to the filing of the amended complaint before the RTC). However, Sps. Manuel did not
inspect the property and inquire into the nature of petitioners' possession and/or the extent of their
possessory rights as a measure of precaution which may reasonably be required of a prudent man in
a similar situation, Sps. Manuel, therefore, failed to exercise the diligence required in protecting their
rights.
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Furthermore, the claim that one is an innocent purchaser for value is a matter of defense. Hence,
while petitioners alleged that Sps. Manuel were purchasers in bad faith, the rule is that he who asserts
the status of a purchaser in good faith and for value has the burden of proving the same, and this onus
probandi cannot be discharged by mere invocation of the legal presumption of good faith.
3) The fact that respondent bank succeeded in consolidating ownership over the subject property in
its name did not terminate the existing co-ownership between it and petitioners. In case of
foreclosure, a sale would result in the transmission of title to the buyer, which is feasible only if the
seller can be in a position to convey ownership of the things sold. Here, Sps. Manuel merely stepped
into the shoes of respondent bank and acquired only the rights and obligations appertaining thereto.
Thus, while they have been issued a certificate of title over the entire property, they shall: (a) only
acquire what validly pertains to respondent bank as successor-in-interest of Susana in the event of
partition; and (b) hold the shares therein pertaining to the co-owners who did not consent to the
mortgage, i.e., petitioners, in trust for the latter pending partition.
VILMA QUINTOS, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact FIDEL I. QUINTOS, JR.; FLORENCIA I.

DANCEL, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact FLOVY I. DANCEL; and CATALINO L. IBARRA,
petitioners, -versus- PELAGIA I. NICOLAS, NOLI L. IBARRA, SANTIAGO L. IBARRA, PEDRO L.
IBARRA, DAVID L. IBARRA, GILBERTO L. IBARRA, HEIRS OF AUGUSTO L. IBARRA, namely
CONCHITA R. IBARRA, APOLONIO IBARRA, and NARCISO IBARRA, and the spouses RECTO
CANDELARIO and ROSEMARIE CANDELARIO, respondents.
G.R. No. 210252, THIRD DIVISION, June 16, 2014, VELASCO, JR., J.
For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff
or complainant has a legal or equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and
(2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on the title must be shown
to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or efficacy.
The first requisite was not complied with. Petitioners’ alleged open, continuous, exclusive, and
uninterrupted possession of the subject property is belied by the fact that respondents, in 2005, entered
into a Contract of Lease with the Avico Lending Investor Co. over the subject lot without any objection
from the petitioners. Petitioners’ inability to offer evidence tending to prove that Bienvenido and
Escolastica Ibarra transferred the ownership over the property in favor of petitioners is likewise fatal
to the latter’s claim.
FACTS:
Petitioners and respondents are siblings. Their parents, Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra, were the
owners of the subject property. By 1999, both Bienvenido and Escolastica had already passed away,
leaving to their 10 children ownership over the subject property. Subsequently, sometime in 2002,
respondents brought an action for partition against petitioners. It was dismissed for the failure of the
parties to attend the scheduled hearings. It was not appealed and thus became final.
Thereafter, respondents instead resorted to executing a Deed of Adjudication to transfer the property
in favor of the 10 siblings. TCT No. 318717 was then canceled and TCT No. 390484 was issued in its
place by the Registry of Deeds of Tarlac in the names of the 10 heirs of the Ibarra spouses.
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Respondents sold their 7/10 undivided share over the property in favor of their co-respondents, the
spouses Recto and Rosemarie Candelario. A Deed of Absolute Sale was executed in favor of the
spouses and an Agreement of Subdivision was purportedly executed by them and petitioners. TCT
No. 434304 was issued in the name of the Candelarios, covering the 7/10 portion.
Petitioners filed a complaint for Quieting of Title and Damages against respondents wherein they
alleged that upon distribution of their parents’ properties, they received the subject property and the
house constructed thereon as their share. They averred that they have been in adverse, open,
continuous, and uninterrupted possession of the property for over four decades and are, thus,
entitled to equitable title thereto. They also denied any participation in the execution of the Deed of
Adjudication and the Agreement of Subdivision.
During pre-trial, the respondents admitted having filed an action for partition, and that petitioners
did not participate in the Deed of Adjudication that served as the basis for the issuance of TCT No.
390484, and that the Agreement of Subdivision that led to the issuance of TCT No. 434304 in favor
of spouses Candelario was falsified.
The trial court, however, dismissed the petition. The court did not find merit in the allegations that
the petitioners have acquired title over the property through acquisitive prescription and noted that
there was no document evidencing that their parents bequeathed to them the subject property.
On appeal, the petitioners added that the partition should no longer be allowed since it is already
barred by res judicata, respondents having already filed a case for partition that was dismissed with
finality. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s ruling. As to the partition, CA ruled that it shall
be in accordance to the subdivision plan as prepared.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the petitioners were able to prove ownership over the property. (NO)
2. Whether the respondents’ counterclaim for partition is already barred by res judicata. (NO)
3. Whether the CA was correct in approving the subdivision agreement as basis for the partition of
the property. (YES)
RULING:
1. No, the petitioners were not able to prove their ownership.
For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (1) the
plaintiff or complainant has a legal or equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the
action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on the title
must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or
efficacy.
The first requisite was not complied with. The Court stressed that this issue is substantially a factual
issue that improper to delve into in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
Petitioners’ alleged open, continuous, exclusive, and uninterrupted possession of the subject
property is belied by the fact that respondents, in 2005, entered into a Contract of Lease with the
Avico Lending Investor Co. over the subject lot without any objection from the petitioners.
65
Petitioners’ inability to offer evidence tending to prove that Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra
transferred the ownership over the property in favor of petitioners is likewise fatal to the latter’s
claim. On the contrary, Escolastica Ibarra executed a Deed of Sale covering half of the subject property
in favor of all her 10 children, not in favor of petitioners alone.
The Court ruled that all 10 siblings inherited the subject property and after the respondents sold
their aliquot share to the spouses Candelario, petitioners and the spouses became co-owners of the
same.
2. No, respondents’ counterclaim for partition is not barred by res judicata.
The doctrine of res judicata provides that the judgment in a first case is final as to the claim or demand
in controversy, between the parties and those privy with them, not only as to every matter which was
offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter
which must have been offered for that purpose and all matters that could have been adjudged in that
case.
There is res judicata when the following requisites are present: (1) the formal judgment or order
must be final; (2) it must be a judgment or order on the merits, that is, it was rendered after a
consideration of the evidence or stipulations submitted by the parties at the trial of the case; (3) it
must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and
(4) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and of
cause of action.
The respondents have admitted that their previous petition for partition has been dismissed and has
attained finality. The subject property of said case and in the present controversy are one and the
same, and that in both cases, respondents raise the same action for partition. And lastly, although
respondent spouses Candelario were not party-litigants in the earlier case for partition, there is
identity of parties not only when the parties in the case are the same, but also between those in privity
with them, such as between their successors-in-interest.
Under Section 3 of Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, the dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute has
the effect of adjudication on the merits, and is necessarily understood to be with prejudice to the
filing of another action, unless otherwise provided in the order of dismissal. Petitioners claim that
the order did not state it to be without prejudice and thus, must be treated as dismissal on the merits.
However, dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court cannot defeat the right
of a co-owner to ask for partition at any time, provided that there is no actual adjudication of
ownership of shares yet. Under Art. 494 of the Civil Code, no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in
the co-ownership. Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in
common, insofar as his share is concerned.
It can be gleaned that the law generally does not favor the retention of co-ownership as a property
relation, and is interested instead in ascertaining the co-owners’ specific shares so as to prevent the
allocation of portions to remain perpetually in limbo.
Between dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3 and the right granted to co-owners under Art.
494 of the Civil Code, the latter must prevail. To construe otherwise would diminish the substantive
right of a co-owner through the promulgation of procedural rules. Such a construction is not
sanctioned by the principle that a substantive law cannot be amended by a procedural rule.
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The Court held that that Art. 494 is an exception to Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court to the effect
that even if the order of dismissal for failure to prosecute is silent on whether or not it is with
prejudice, it shall be deemed to be without prejudice.
3. Yes, the Court of Appeals erred in approving the proposal partition submitted by spouses
Candelario.
Art. 496 provides that partition shall either be by agreement of the parties or in accordance with the
Rules of Court. In this case, the Agreement of Subdivision allegedly executed by spouses Candelario
and petitioners cannot serve as basis for partition, for, as stated in the pre-trial order, respondents
admitted that the agreement was a falsity and that petitioners never took part in preparing the same.
The "agreement" was crafted without any consultation whatsoever or any attempt to arrive at
mutually acceptable terms with petitioners. It, therefore, lacked the essential requisite of consent.
HEIRS OF QUIRICO SERASPI AND PURIFICACION R. SERASPI, Petitioners, -versus- COURT OF

APPEALS AND SIMEON RECASA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 135602, SECOND DIVISION, April 28, 2000, MENDOZA, J.
Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary, depending
on whether the property is possessed in good faith and with just title for the time fixed by law.
Neither can private respondent claim good faith in his favor. Good faith consists in the reasonable belief
that the person from whom the possessor received the thing was its owner but could not transmit the
ownership thereof. Private respondent entered the property without the consent of the previous owner.
For all intents and purposes, he is a mere usurper.
FACTS:
Marcelino Recasa was the owner of two parcels of land. During his lifetime, Marcelino contracted
three (3) marriages. At the time of his death in 1943, he had fifteen (15) children from his three
marriages. In 1948, his intestate estate was partitioned into three parts by his heirs, each part
corresponding to the share of the heirs in each marriage.
In the same year, Patronicio Recasa, representing the heirs of the first marriage, sold the share of the
heirs in the estate to Dominador Recasa, an heir of the second marriage. On June 15, 1950,
Dominador, representing the heirs of the second marriage, in turn sold the share of the heirs to
Quirico and Purificacion Seraspi whose heirs are the present petitioners. Included in this sale was
the property sold by Patronicio to Dominador.
In 1958, the Seraspis obtained a loan from the Kalibo Rural Bank, Inc. (KRBI) on the security of the
lands in question to finance improvements on the lands. However, they failed to pay the loan for
which reason the mortgage was foreclosed and the lands were sold to KRBI as the highest bidder.
Subsequently, the lands were sold by KRBI to Manuel Rata, brother-in-law of Quirico Seraspi. It
appears that Rara, as owner of the property, allowed Quirico Seraspi to administer the property.
In 1974, private respondent Simeon Recasa, Marcelino's child by his third wife, taking advantage of
the illness of Quirico Seraspi, who had been paralyzed due to a stroke, forcibly entered the lands in
question and took possession thereof.
67
In 1983, the Seraspis purchased the lands from Manuel Rata and afterwards filed a complaint against
Simeon Recasa for recovery of possession of the lands.
The trial court ruled in favor of the Seraspis, stating that they had acquired the property through a
sale and acquisitive prescription. However, on appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed on the ground
that the action of the Seraspis was barred by the statute of limitations. Hence, this petition filed by
Quirico Seraspi who, in the meantime, had passed away and was thus substituted by his heirs.
ISSUE:
Whether Simeon Recasa acquired ownership of the properties in question through acquisitive
prescription. (NO)
RULING:
Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary,
depending on whether the property is possessed in good faith and with just title for the time fixed by
law.
In the case at bar, private respondent did not acquire possession of the property through any of the
modes recognized by the Civil Code, to wit: (1) occupation, (2) intellectual creation, (3) law, (4)
donation, (5) succession, (6) tradition in consequence of certain contracts, and (7) prescription.
Private respondent could not have acquired ownership over the property through occupation since,
under Art. 714 of the Civil Code, the ownership of a piece of land cannot be acquired by occupation.
Nor can he base his ownership on succession for the property was not part of those distributed to
the heirs of the third marriage, to which private respondent belongs. It must be remembered that in
the partition of the intestate estate of Marcelino Recasa, the properties were divided into three parts,
each part being reserved for each group of heirs belonging to one of the three marriages Marcelino
entered into. Since the contested parcels of land were adjudicated to the heirs of the first and second
marriages, it follows that private respondent, as heir of the third marriage, has no right over the
parcels of land. While, as heir to the intestate estate of his father, private respondent was co-owner
of all of his father's properties, such co-ownership rights were effectively dissolved by the partition
agreed upon by the heirs of Marcelino Recasa.
Neither can private respondent claim good faith in his favor. Good faith consists in the reasonable
belief that the person from whom the possessor received the thing was its owner but could not
transmit the ownership thereof. Private respondent entered the property without the consent of the
previous owner. For all intents and purposes, he is a mere usurper.
DOMINGO R. CATAPUSAN, MINELIO R. CATAPUSAN, and FILOMENO R. CATAPUSAN,

Petitioners, -versus- THE COURT OF APPEALS, VICENTE CATAPUSAN, JR., CIPRIANO
CATAPUSAN, GREGORIA CATAPUSAN, SEGUNDA BAUTISTA, CATAPUSAN, NICANOR T.
CATAPUSAN, NARCISA T. CATAPUSAN, GREGORIO T. CATAPUSAN, BENIGNO T. CATAPUSAN,
REYNALDO T. CATAPUSAN, CATALINA T. CATAPUSAN, GERTRUDES, CATAPUSAN and FLORA
DIAZ CATAPUSAN, Respondents.
G.R. No. 109262, THIRD DIVISION, November 21, 1996, FRANCISCO, J.
68
Although tax declarations and receipts are not direct proofs of ownership, yet when accompanied by
proof of actual possession for the required period, they become strong evidence to support the claim of
ownership thru acquisitive prescription. The possession contemplated as foundation for prescriptive
right must be one under claim of title or adverse to or in concept of owner.
Possession by tolerance, as in the case of petitioners, is not the kind of possession that may lead to title
by prescription. It is the respondents' open, continuous, adverse and uninterrupted possession far
beyond the year extraordinary period for acquisitive prescription, coupled with the tax declarations of
their predecessors-in-interest, that constitutes a superior weight of evidence that clinched their claim.
FACTS:
Bonifacio Catapusan was first married to Narcissa Tanjuatco, the only surviving heir of Dominga
Piguing. 2 They had four (4) children namely, Felix, Vicente, Benicio and Loreto. Narcissa died in
1910. In 1927, Bonifacio married Paula Reyes and out of their wedlock petitioners Domingo, Minelio
and Filomeno Catapusan were born. Bonifacio died in 1940. Felix, Vicente and Benicio, Bonifacio's
sons from the first marriage, died before the institution of this case, survived by their respective
widows and children, respondents herein.
The petitioners filed on June 11, 1974, an action for partition of the Wawa lot, which they allegedly
co-own with their half-brothers and half-sisters. Petitioners contend that the said lot belongs to their
father Bonifacio and should therefore be partitioned among the heirs of the first and second
marriages. In support thereof, they presented the tax declarations of the Wawa lot's four (4) adjacent
lot owners. These four tax declarations state that each of them bounds on one side the Wawa lot
declared in the name of Bonifacio. Stated differently, the petitioner's proof of Bonifacio's ownership
of the Wawa lot are the tax declarations of the adjoining lot owners which noted that they each border
on one side the Wawa lot declared in the name of Bonifacio.
After trial, the lower court dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed
the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether Bonifacio had title to the Wawa lot. (NO)
RULING:
In this case, petitioners' evidence of their father's (Bonifacio) ownership of the Wawa lot are the tax
declarations of the adjacent lot owners and the testimonies of some witnesses who merely saw
Bonifacio working on the lot. On the other hand, respondents presented tax declarations which
indicated that the same lot is owned by their predecessors-in-interest, the children of the first
marriage, evidence which carry more weight as they constitute proof of respondents' ownership of
the land in their possession. The statement in the neighboring lot owners' tax declarations is not a
conclusive proof that Bonifacio owned the surrounded lot.
In fact, petitioners cannot show any tax receipts or declarations of their ownership over the same lot.
Although tax declarations and receipts are not direct proofs of ownership, yet when accompanied by
proof of actual possession for the required period, they become strong evidence to support the claim
69
of ownership thru acquisitive prescription. The possession contemplated as foundation for

prescriptive right must be one under claim of title or adverse to or in concept of owner.
Possession by tolerance, as in the case of petitioners, is not the kind of possession that may lead to
title by prescription. It is the respondents' open, continuous, adverse and uninterrupted possession
far beyond the year extraordinary period for acquisitive prescription, coupled with the tax
declarations of their predecessors-in-interest, that constitutes a superior weight of evidence that
clinched their claim. Moreover, petitioners bare and unsubstantiated allegation that respondents' tax
declarations were fraudulently issued is insufficient to sustain the imputation of fraud considering
that good faith is always presumed. Besides, respondents' tax declarations are deemed regularly
issued. Being an action involving property, the petitioners must rely on the strength of their own title
and not on the weakness of the respondents' claim.
ZOSIMA VERDAD, Petitioner, -versus- THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SOCORRO C. ROSALES,
AURORA ROSALES, NAPOLEON ROSALES, ANTONIO ROSALES, FLORENDA ROSALES, ELENA
ROSALES AND VIRGINIA ROSALES, Respondents.
G.R. No. 109972, FIRST DIVISION, April 29, 1996, VITUG, J.
It is true that Socorro, a daughter-in-law (or, for that matter, a mere relative by affinity), is not an
intestate heir of her parents-in-law; however, Socorro's right to the property is not because she rightfully
can claim heirship in Macaria's estate but that she is a legal heir of her husband, David Rosales, part of
whose estate is a share in his mother's inheritance.
David Rosales, incontrovertibly, survived his mother's death. When Macaria died on 08 March 1956 her
estate passed on to her surviving children, among them David Rosales, who thereupon became co-
owners of the property. When David Rosales himself later died, his own estate, which included his
undivided interest over the property inherited from Macaria, passed on to his widow Socorro and her
co-heirs pursuant to the law on succession.
FACTS:
During her lifetime, Macaria contracted two marriages: the first with Angel Burdeos and the second,
following the latter's death, with Canuto Rosales. At the time of her own death, Macaria was survived
by her son Ramon A. Burdeos and her grandchild (by her daughter Felicidad A. Burdeos) Estela
Lozada of the first marriage and her children of the second marriage, namely, David Rosales, Justo
Rosales, Romulo Rosales, and Aurora Rosales.
Socorro Rosales is the widow of David Rosales who himself, some time after Macaria's death, died
intestate without an issue.
In an instrument, dated 14 June 1982, the heirs of Ramon Burdeos, namely, his widow Manuela
Legaspi Burdeos and children Felicidad and Ramon, Jr., sold to petitioner Zosima Verdad (their
interest on) the disputed lot supposedly for the price of P55,460.00. In a duly notarized deed of sale,
dated 14 November 1982, it would appear, however, that the lot was sold for only P23,000.00.
Petitioner explained that the second deed was intended merely to save on the tax on capital gains.
Socorro discovered the sale on 30 March 1987 while she was at the City Treasurer's Office. On 31
March 1987, she sought the intervention of the Lupong Tagapayapa of Barangay 9, Princess Urduja,
for the redemption of the property. She tendered the sum of P23,000.00 to Zosima. The latter refused
70
to accept the amount for being much less than the lot's current value of P80,000.00. No settlement
having been reached before the Lupong Tagapayapa, private respondents, on 16 October 1987,
initiated against petitioner an action for "Legal Redemption with Preliminary Injunction" before the
Regional Trial Court of Butuan City.
The trial court ruled that private respondents' right to redeem the property had already lapsed. The
CA, however, reversed the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether Socorro can redeem the property. (YES)
RULING:
It is true that Socorro, a daughter-in-law (or, for that matter, a mere relative by affinity), is not an
intestate heir of her parents-in-law; however, Socorro's right to the property is not because she
rightfully can claim heirship in Macaria's estate but that she is a legal heir of her husband, David
Rosales, part of whose estate is a share in his mother's inheritance.
David Rosales, incontrovertibly, survived his mother's death. When Macaria died on 08 March 1956
her estate passed on to her surviving children, among them David Rosales, who thereupon became
co-owners of the property. When David Rosales himself later died, his own estate, which included his
undivided interest over the property inherited from Macaria, passed on to his widow Socorro and
her co-heirs pursuant to the law on succession.
When their interest in the property was sold by the Burdeos heirs to petitioner, a right of redemption
arose in favor of private respondents. We hold that the right of redemption was timely exercised by
private respondents.
ANDREA TABUSO AND RENATO BISMORTE, Petitioners, -versus- COURT OF APPEALS AND
THE HEIRS OF ESTEBAN ABAD REPRESENTED BY NEMESIO ABAD AND ANA ABAD
PAGHUBASAN, Respondents.
G.R. No. 108558, THIRD DIVISION, June 21, 2001, PANGANIBAN, J.
It must be stressed "that possession and ownership are distinct legal concepts. Ownership exists when
a thing pertaining to one person is completely subjected to his will in a manner not prohibited by law
and consistent with the rights of others. Ownership confers certain rights to the owner, one of which is
the right to dispose of the thing by way of sale. xxx. On the other hand, possession is defined as the
holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right. Literally, to possess means to actually and physically
occupy a thing with or without right. Possession may be had in one of two ways: possession in the
concept of an owner and possession of a holder. Possessors in the concept of owners may be the owners
themselves or those who claim to be so. On the other hand, those who possess as mere holders
acknowledge in another a superior right which he believes to be ownership, whether his belief be right
or wrong."
In this case, the evidence shows that the occupation of the property by petitioners is not in the concept
of owners, because their stay is merely tolerated. This finding is bolstered by the fact that Petitioner
Andrea Tabuso is the daughter of Marcelo Tabuso, who was merely allowed by the previous owner,
Esteban Abad, to construct a small house on the lot. As held in Caniza v. Court of Appeals, "an owner's
71
act of allowing another to occupy his house, rent-free, does not create a permanent and indefeasible
right of possession in the latter's favor."
FACTS:
"This case involves declaration of ownership filed before the Regional Trial Court of Naval, Leyte, in
Biliran, Leyte, of an unregistered parcel of land at Antipolo, Naval, Leyte with an area of 3,267 square
meters.
"The plaintiffs' evidence consists of the following:
"a) A tax declaration No. 3705 in the name of Ignacio Montes for the year 1912. However, the land
taxes thereon for the years 1944 to 1947 were paid only in 1981.
"b) Plaintiff Andrea Tabuso claims to be the owner as successor in interest (granddaughter) of one
Andrea Elaba, daughter of Maria Montes and Borja Elaba, Maria Montes appears to be a sister of
Ignacio Montes, in whose name the tax declaration for the property in question was issued for the
year 1912.
"c) The property in question has been in the possession of the defendants (heirs of Esteban Abad),
although the house standing thereon appears to have been constructed by Marcelo Tabuso, father of
plaintiff Andrea Tabuso.
"On the other hand, evidence for the defendants tends to establish the following:
"a) The land in question originally owned by Maria Montes was donated to Isabel Elaba through an
ancient document executed on September 24, 1923. Isabel in turn sold the land to Esteban Abad on
May 5, 1948.
"b) The original tax declaration in the name of Ignacio Montes was superseded by Tax Declaration
Nos. 6422 and 1450 both in the name of Isabel Elaba; Declaration No. 1450 for the year 1948 was
superseded by Tax Declaration No. 6959 for 1960 in the name of Esteban Abad; and the latter was
superseded in 1969 by Tax Declaration No. 1661 in the name of Esteban Abad. In 1974 a new tax
declaration No. 19 was issued in the name of Esteban Abad with Nemesio Abad and his co-heirs as
administrators. The last tax declaration No. 22 for 1982 was in the name of Esteban Abad.
"c) The land in question is tenanted by one Valentin Poblete in accordance with a lease contract
executed by defendant Nemesio Abad, one of the heirs and co-owners of the land.
The trial court concluded that there was abundant proof of private respondents' ownership of the lot
in question as against the scanty evidence offered by petitioners. The trial court likewise gave credit
to the testimony of Atty. Jose Gonzales, private respondents' counsel who had been presented by
petitioners as their own witness. He testified that the land in question, which was adjacent to the
land he himself possessed, had been in the possession of Esteban Abad's heirs, herein private
respondents. The trial court also took note of the various tax declarations covering the property,
indicating that it was owned by private respondents.
The Court of Appeals upheld the findings of the trial court.
72
ISSUE:
Whether private respondents are the owners of the land. (YES)
RULING:
We agree with the findings of the Court of Appeals that for a period of more than 60 years, private
respondents have been able to establish that they are the owners of the lot; and that for said period,
they have been in open, continuous and uninterrupted possession of the same.
While Atty. Gonzales was private respondents' counsel, he was presented by petitioners themselves.
Having done so, they are bound by his testimony, even if it is hostile.
The only substantial argument of petitioners supporting their claim of ownership is their
construction of a small house (barong-barong) on the property, as acknowledged in private
respondents' Notice to Vacate.
Obviously, the claim of private respondents that they are the owners of the land is supported by the
above letter, in which they were asking petitioners to vacate the property. Moreover, considering its
size, which is 11,927 square meters as found by the court-appointed commissioner, the fact that
petitioners' house is only a barong-barong or make-shift shanty lends support to private
respondents' claim that the former's presence on the property was merely tolerated.
It must be stressed "that possession and ownership are distinct legal concepts. Ownership exists
when a thing pertaining to one person is completely subjected to his will in a manner not prohibited
by law and consistent with the rights of others. Ownership confers certain rights to the owner, one
of which is the right to dispose of the thing by way of sale. xxx. On the other hand, possession is
defined as the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right. Literally, to possess means to actually
and physically occupy a thing with or without right. Possession may be had in one of two
ways: possession in the concept of an owner and possession of a holder. Possessors in the concept
of owners may be the owners themselves or those who claim to be so. On the other hand, those who
possess as mere holders acknowledge in another a superior right which he believes to be ownership,
whether his belief be right or wrong."
In this case, the evidence shows that the occupation of the property by petitioners is not in the
concept of owners, because their stay is merely tolerated. This finding is bolstered by the fact that
Petitioner Andrea Tabuso is the daughter of Marcelo Tabuso, who was merely allowed by the
previous owner, Esteban Abad, to construct a small house on the lot. As held in Caniza v. Court of
Appeals, "an owner's act of allowing another to occupy his house, rent-free, does not create a
permanent and indefeasible right of possession in the latter's favor."
Lastly, the claim of petitioners that private respondents are not in actual possession of the land is
unsubstantiated. Besides, it is not necessary that the latter actually stay on the property in order to
prove ownership of the same. As found by both the trial and the appellate courts, since the
acquisition of the subject property by private respondents, they had religiously paid the taxes due
thereon. Further, one of the co-owners executed a lease contract over it in favor of a tenant. These
acts are clearly consistent with ownership.
73
PAUL P. GABRIEL, JR., IRENEO C. CALWAG, THOMAS L. TINGGA-AN, AND THE HEIRS OF JULIET
B. PULKERA, Petitioners, -versus- CARMELING CRISOLOGO, Respondent.
GR No. 204626, THIRD DIVISION, Jun 09, 2014, MENDOZA, J.
Also known as accion plenaria de posesion, accion publiciana is an ordinary civil proceeding to
determine the better right of possession of realty independently of title. It refers to an ejectment suit
filed after the expiration of one year from the accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful
withholding of possession of the realty.
The objective of the plaintiffs in accion publiciana is to recover possession only, not ownership. When
parties, however, raise the issue of ownership, the court may pass upon the issue to determine who
between the parties has the right to possess the property. This adjudication, nonetheless, is not a final
and binding determination of the issue of ownership; it is only for the purpose of resolving the issue of
possession, where the issue of ownership is inseparably linked to the issue of possession. The adjudication
of the issue of ownership, being provisional, is not a bar to an action between the same parties involving
title to the property. The adjudication, in short, is not conclusive on the issue of ownership.
In her complaint, Crisologo prayed that she be declared in prior actual possession of the properties in
dispute and that petitioners vacate the same and demolish their houses therein. She alleged, among
others, that she was the registered owner of the subject parcels of land and that petitioners unlawfully
entered her properties by stealth, force and without her prior consent and knowledge. Clearly, she
primarily wanted to recover possession of the subject parcels of land from petitioners. Hence, the case is
an accion publiciana.
FACTS:
Records show that Carmeling Crisologo (Crisologo), represented by her attorney-in-fact, Pedro
Isican (Isican), filed her complaint for Recovery of Possession and/or Ownership with Damages
against Juliet B. Pulkera, Paul P. Gabriel, Ireneo C. Calwag, and Thomas L. Tingga-an (petitioners)
before the MTCC.
Crisologo alleged, among others, that she was the registered owner of two parcels of land with a total
area of approximately 2,000 square meters, described in, and covered by, two (2) certificates of title
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-13935 and T-13936; that the properties were covered by
an Assessment of Real Property; that the payments of realty taxes on the said properties were
updated; that sometime in 2006, she discovered that petitioners unlawfully entered, occupied her
properties by stealth, by force and without her prior consent and knowledge, and constructed their
houses thereon; that upon discovery of their illegal occupation, her daughter, Atty. Carmelita
Crisologo, and Isican personally went to the properties and verbally demanded that petitioners
vacate the premises and remove their structures thereon; that the petitioners begged and promised
to buy the said properties for ?3,500.00 per square meter; that she gave petitioners time to produce
the said amount, but they reneged on their promise to buy them; that petitioners refused to vacate
the subject properties despite several demands; that the petitioners knew full well that the subject
premises they were occupying were titled properties but they insisted on unlawfully holding the
same; and that she was unlawfully dispossessed and displaced from the subject properties due to
petitioners' illegal occupation.
74
On the other hand, petitioners countered that the titles of Crisologo were products of Civil
Registration Case No. 1, Record 211, which were declared void by the Supreme Court in Republic v.
Marcos, and reiterated in Republic v. Marcos; that the said case was later enacted into law,
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1271, entitled "An Act Nullifying Decrees of Registration and Certificates
of Title within the Baguio Townsite Reservation Case No.1, GLRO Record No. 211, pursuant to Act No.
931, as amended, but Considering as Valid Certain Titles of Lands that are Alienable and Disposable
Under Certain Conditions and For Other Purposes" which took effect on December 22, 1977; that
Crisologo failed to comply with the conditions provided in Section 1 of P.D. No. 1271 for the validation
of said titles, hence, the titles were void; that petitioners had been in open, actual, exclusive,
notorious, uninterrupted, and continuous possession of the subject land, in good faith; and that
Crisologo was never in prior possession and had no valid title over the subject land.
The MTCC ruled that Crisologo was the registered owner of the subject parcels of land, who, as such,
had declared these properties for taxation purposes since 1969 and regularly paid the realty taxes
thereon. It stated that with Crisologo being the owner, petitioners were illegally occupying the land.
The RTC reversed and set aside the decision of the MTCC. It was of the view that petitioners' assertion
of the TCTs' invalidity was not a collateral attack. It cited the rulings in Republic v.
Marcos, and Republic v. Marcos, which perpetually prohibited the reopening of Civil Reservation Case
No. 1, LRC Rec. No. 211, and, therefore, the registration of parcels of lands. For said reason, the titles
of Crisologo were products of illegal proceedings nullified by this Court. She also failed to comply
with the conditions set forth in P.D. No. 1271.
CA rendered the assailed decision, setting aside the RTC decision and reinstating that of the MTCC.
ISSUE:
Whether respondent Crisologo has a better right of possession over the subject parcels of land. (YES)
RULING:
Also known as accion plenaria de posesion, accion publiciana is an ordinary civil proceeding to
determine the better right of possession of realty independently of title. It refers to an ejectment suit
filed after the expiration of one year from the accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful
withholding of possession of the realty.
The objective of the plaintiffs in accion publiciana is to recover possession only, not ownership.
When parties, however, raise the issue of ownership, the court may pass upon the issue to determine
who between the parties has the right to possess the property. This adjudication, nonetheless, is not
a final and binding determination of the issue of ownership; it is only for the purpose of resolving the
issue of possession, where the issue of ownership is inseparably linked to the issue of possession.
The adjudication of the issue of ownership, being provisional, is not a bar to an action between the
same parties involving title to the property. The adjudication, in short, is not conclusive on the issue
of ownership.
In her complaint, Crisologo prayed that she be declared in prior actual possession of the properties
in dispute and that petitioners vacate the same and demolish their houses therein. She alleged, among
others, that she was the registered owner of the subject parcels of land and that petitioners
unlawfully entered her properties by stealth, force and without her prior consent and knowledge.
75
Clearly, she primarily wanted to recover possession of the subject parcels of land from petitioners.
Hence, the case is an accion publiciana.
Although Section 1 of P.D. No. 1271 invalidated decrees of registration and certificates of title within
the Baguio Townsite Reservation Case No. 1, GLRO Record No. 211, the nullity, however, is not that
sweeping. The said provision expressly states that "all certificates of titles issued on or before July 31,
1973 shall be considered valid and the lands covered by them shall be deemed to have been conveyed in
fee simple to the registered owners" upon 1) showing proof that the land covered by the subject title
is not within any government, public or quasi-public reservation, forest, military or otherwise, as
certified by appropriating government agencies; and 2) compliance by the title holder with the
payment to the Republic of the Philippines of the correct assessed value of the land within the
required period.
In the case at bench, the records show that the subject parcels of land were registered on August 24,
1967.
The respondent's certificates of title give her the better right to possess the subject parcels of land.
It is settled that a Torrens title is evidence of indefeasible title to property in favor of the person in
whose name the title appears. It is conclusive evidence with respect to the ownership of the land
described therein. It is also settled that the titleholder is entitled to all the attributes of ownership of
the property, including possession. Thus, in Arambulo v. Gungab, this Court declared that the "age-old
rule is that the person who has a Torrens title over a land is entitled to possession thereof."
The records show that TCT No. T-13935 and TCT No. T-13936 bear the name of Carmeling P.
Crisologo, as the registered owner. Petitioners do not dispute the fact that she has a Torrens title over
the subject parcels of land.
The respondent's Torrens certificates of title are immune from a collateral attack. The petitioners-
defendants' attack on the validity of respondents-plaintiffs' title, by claiming that fraud attended its
acquisition, is a collateral attack on the title. It is an attack incidental to their quest to defend their
possession of the properties in an "accion publiciana," not in a direct action whose main
objective is to impugn the validity of the judgment granting the title. As the lawful possessor,
the respondent has the right to eject the petitioners.
FERNANDA MENDOZA CEQUENA AND RUPERTA MENDOZA LIRIO, Petitioners, -versus-

HONORATA MENDOZA BOLANTE, Respondent.
G.R. No. 137944, THIRD DIVISION ,April 06, 2000, PANGANIBAN, J.
The presumption in Article 541 of the Civil Code is merely disputable; it prevails until the contrary is
proven. That is, one who is disturbed in one's possession shall, under this provision, be restored thereto
by the means established by law. Article 538 settles only the question of possession, and possession is
different from ownership. Ownership in this case should be established in one of the ways provided by
law.
To settle the issue of ownership, we need to determine who between the claimants has proven acquisitive
prescription.
Ownership of immovable property is acquired by ordinary prescription through possession for ten years.
76
In this case, being the sole heir of her father, respondent showed through his tax receipt that she had
been in possession of the land for more than ten years since 1932. When her father died in 1930, she
continued to reside there with her mother. When she got married, she and her husband engaged in
kaingin inside the disputed lot for their livelihood.
Respondent's possession was not disturbed until 1953 when the petitioners' father claimed the land. But
by then, her possession, which was in the concept of owner -- public, peaceful, and uninterrupted -- had
already ripened into ownership. Furthermore she herself, after her father's demise, declared and paid
realty taxes for the disputed land. Tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation, when coupled
with proof of actual possession of the property, can be the basis of a claim for ownership through
prescription.
FACTS:
The Petition herein refers to a parcel of land situated in Barangay Bangad, Binangonan, Province of
Rizal, having an area of 1,728 square meters and covered by Tax Declaration No. 26-0027.
Prior to 1954, the land was originally declared for taxation purposes in the name of Sinforoso
Mendoza, father of [respondent] and married to Eduarda Apiado. Sinforoso died in 1930.
[Petitioners] were the daughters of Margarito Mendoza. On the basis of an affidavit, the tax
declaration in the name of Sinforoso Mendoza of the contested lot was cancelled and subsequently
declared in the name of Margarito Mendoza. Margarito and Sinforoso are brothers. [Respondent] is
the present occupant of the land. Earlier, on October 15, 1975, [respondent] and Miguel Mendoza,
another brother of [petitioners], during the cadastral survey had a dispute on [the] ownership of the
land.
the court a quo rendered its judgment in favor of [petitioners.
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court because the genuineness and the due execution of the
affidavit allegedly signed by the respondent and her mother had not been sufficiently established.
The notary public or anyone else who had witnessed the execution of the affidavit was not presented.
No expert testimony or competent witness ever attested to the genuineness of the questioned
signatures.
Moreover, the appellate court held that the probative value of petitioners’ tax receipts and
declarations paled in comparison with respondent’s proof of ownership of the disputed parcel.
Actual, physical, exclusive and continuous possession by respondent since 1985 indeed gave her a
better title under Article 538 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE:
Whether CA erred in holding that respondent has been in actual and physical possession, coupled
with xxx exclusive and continuous possession of the land since 1985, which are evidence of the best
kind of circumstance proving the claim of the title of ownership and enjoys the presumption of
preferred possessor. (NO)
77
RULING:
The presumption in Article 541 of the Civil Code is merely disputable; it prevails until the contrary is
proven. That is, one who is disturbed in one's possession shall, under this provision, be restored
thereto by the means established by law. Article 538 settles only the question of possession, and
possession is different from ownership. Ownership in this case should be established in one of the
ways provided by law.
To settle the issue of ownership, we need to determine who between the claimants has proven
acquisitive prescription.
Ownership of immovable property is acquired by ordinary prescription through possession for ten
years. Being the sole heir of her father, respondent showed through his tax receipt that she had been
in possession of the land for more than ten years since 1932. When her father died in 1930, she
continued to reside there with her mother. When she got married, she and her husband engaged in
kaingin inside the disputed lot for their livelihood.
Respondent's possession was not disturbed until 1953 when the petitioners' father claimed the land.
But by then, her possession, which was in the concept of owner -- public, peaceful, and
uninterrupted -- had already ripened into ownership. Furthermore she herself, after her father's
demise, declared and paid realty taxes for the disputed land. Tax receipts and declarations of
ownership for taxation, when coupled with proof of actual possession of the property, can be the
basis of a claim for ownership through prescription.
In contrast, the petitioners, despite thirty-two years of farming the subject land, did not acquire
ownership. It is settled that ownership cannot be acquired by mere occupation. Unless coupled with
the element of hostility toward the true owner, occupation and use, however long, will not confer
title by prescription or adverse possession. Moreover, the petitioners cannot claim that their
possession was public, peaceful and uninterrupted. Although their father and brother arguably
acquired ownership through extraordinary prescription because of their adverse possession for
thirty-two years (1953-1985), this supposed ownership cannot extend to the entire disputed lot, but
must be limited to the portion that they actually farmed.
We cannot sustain the petitioners' contention that their ownership of the disputed land was
established before the trial court through the series of tax declarations and receipts issued in the
name of Margarito Mendoza. Such documents prove that the holder has a claim of title over the
property. Aside from manifesting a sincere desire to obtain title thereto, they announce the holder's
adverse claim against the state and other interested parties.
However, tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership. At most, they
constitute mere prima facie proof of ownership or possession of the property for which taxes have
been paid.
78
SUBIC BAY LEGEND RESORTS AND CASINOS, INC., Petitioner, vs.

BERNARD C. FERNANDEZ, Respondent.
(G.R. No. 193426, SECOND DIVISION, September 29, 2014, DEL CASTILLO, J.)
Given this premise that casino chips are considered to have been exchanged with their corresponding
representative value, it is with more reason that this Court should require petitioner to prove
convincingly and persuasively that the chips it confiscated from Ludwin and Deoven were indeed stolen
from it; if so, any Tom, Dick or Harry in possession of genuine casino chips is presumed to have paid for
their representative value in exchange therefor. If petitioner cannot prove its loss, then Article 559
cannot apply; the presumption that the chips were exchanged for value remains.
FACTS:
An operation was launched by Legenda Hotel and Casino (owned and operated by Subic Bay Legend
Resorts and Casino, Inc.) to zero-in on Ludwin. Legenda admitted in its brief that its surveillance staff
paid close attention to Ludwin simply because it was "unusual" for a Filipino to play using dollar-
denominated chips.
After Ludwin and his brother Deoven were accosted by the Legenda’s internal security, they were
separately interrogated about the source of the chips they brought. The ultimatum was to confess
that the chips were given by a certain employee, Michael Cabrera, or they would not be released from
questioning. Finally, the brothers succumbed to Legenda's instruction to execute a joint statement
implicating Cabrera.
However, the brothers recanted their statement and another brother, Bernard, filed an action for
recovery of sum of money with damages against petitioner. Bernard alleged that the Legenda casino
chips worth US$6,000.00, belonged to him; that petitioner illegally confiscated his casino chips
equivalent to US$5,900.00; and that petitioner refused and continues to refuse to return the same to
him despite demand.
Petitioner's Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim essentially alleged that respondent had no cause
of action since the confiscated casino chips were stolen from it, and thus it has the right to retain
them.
The trial court rendered its Decision, ordering the defendant to return to plaintiff the casino chips.
According to the trial court, the onus fell on defendant to prove that the casino chips were stolen. The
proof adduced however, is wanting.
On appeal, CA affirmed the trial court’s Decision. CA held that, applying Article 559 of the Civil Code,
respondent had the legal presumption of title to or ownership of the casino chips. This conclusion
springs from Bernard's admission that the chips represented payment by a Chinese customer for
services he rendered to the latter in his car shop. The CA added that since respondent became the
owner of the chips, he could very well have given them to Ludwin and Deoven, who likewise held
them as "possessors in good faith and for value" and with "presumptive title" derived from the
respondent.
79
ISSUES
Whether or not CA erred in ruling that the evidence is not sufficient to rebut the legal presumption
that a person in possession of personal property is the lawful owner of the same? (NO)
RULING
Indeed, for purposes of this proceeding, there appears to be no evidence on record - other than mere
allegations and suppositions - that Cabrera stole the casino chips in question; such conclusion came
unilaterally from petitioner. Thus, there should be no basis to suppose that the casino chips found in
Ludwin's and Deoven's possession were stolen; petitioner acted arbitrarily in confiscating the same
without basis.
Though casino chips do not constitute legal tender, there is no law which prohibits their use or trade
outside of the casino which issues them. In any case, it is not unusual – nor is it unlikely – that
respondent could be paid by his Chinese client at the former's car shop with the casino chips in
question; said transaction, if not common, is nonetheless not unlawful. These chips are paid for
anyway; petitioner would not have parted with the same if their corresponding representative
equivalent - in legal tender, goodwill, or otherwise – was not received by it in return or exchange.
Given this premise, it is with more reason that this Court should require petitioner to prove
convincingly and persuasively that the chips it confiscated from Ludwin and Deoven were indeed
stolen from it; if so, any Tom, Dick or Harry in possession of genuine casino chips is presumed to have
paid for their representative value in exchange therefor. If petitioner cannot prove its loss, then
Article 559 cannot apply; the presumption that the chips were exchanged for value remains.
LEVISTAE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, INC., Petitioner vs.

LEGASPI TOWERS 200, INC., and VIVAN Y. LOCSIN and PITONG MARCORDE, Respondents
x-----------------------x
ENGR. NELSON Q. IRASGA, in his capacity as Municipal Building Official of Makati, Metro
Manila and HON. JOSE P. DE JESUS, in his capacity as Secretary of the Dept.
(G.R. No. 199353, FIRST DIVISION, APRIL 4, 2018, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.)
In the case at bar, however, the land belongs to a condominium corporation, wherein the builder, as a
unit owner, is already in a co-ownership with other unit owners as members or stockholders of the
condominium corporation, whose legal relationship is governed by a special law, the Condominium Act.
Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code on builders in good faith are therefore inapplicable in cases
covered by the Condominium Act where the owner of the land and the builder are already bound by
specific legislation on the subject property (the Condominium Act), and by contract (the Master Deed
and the By-Laws of the condominium corporation).
FACTS:
Legaspi Towers is a condominium building located at Paseo de Roxas, Makati City. Lemans bought
Concession 3 and decided to build another unit ("Concession 4") on the roof deck of Concession 3.
Despite Legaspi Corporation's notice that the construction of Concession 4 was illegal, Lemans
refused to stop its construction.
80
When Legaspi Corporation forbade the entry of Lemans' construction materials to be used in
Concession 4 in the condominium, Lemans filed a Complaint with the RTC, praying that a writ of
mandatory injunction be issued to allow the completion of the construction of Concession 4. RTC
issued the writ prayed for by Lemans.
RTC, in its Order, then found the application of Article 448 of the Civil Code and the ruling in the Depra
vs. Dumlao to be proper. Afterwards, RTC rendered the Assailed Decision, ordering Legaspi Towers
to exercise its option to appropriate the additional structure constructed on top of the penthouse
within sixty [60] days from the time the Decision becomes final and executory. Should defendant
Legaspi Towers 200, Inc. choose not to appropriate after proper indemnity, the parties shall agree
upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the Court shall fix the terms thereof.
When the case was elevated, CA affirmed the decision of the RTC of Makati City. CA held that while
Concession 4 is indeed a nuisance, Lemans has been declared a builder in good faith, and noted that
Legaspi Towers failed to contest this declaration. Since Concession 4 was built in good faith, it cannot
be demolished. Hence, LEMANS and Legaspi Towers filed separate Petitions for Review
on Certiorari with the Court.
ISSUE:
Whether Article 448 of the Civil Code and the Court’s ruling in Depra v. Dumlao are applicable to the
parties' situation? (NO)
RULING:
Significantly, the parties are no longer questioning the past rulings regarding Legaspi Towers'
ownership of the air space above Concession 3 which is the air space above the condominium
building itself.
The ruling of this Court in Depra v. Dumlao extensively cited by both parties pertains to the
application of Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code.
Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good
faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after
payment of the indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built
or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the
builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that
of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land
does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall
agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms
thereof.
Art. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the possessor in
good faith may retain the thing until he has been reimbursed therefor.
Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith with the same right of
retention, the person who has defeated him in the possession having the option of refunding
the amount of the expenses or of paying the increase in value which the thing may have
acquired by reason thereof.
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Firstly, it is recognized in jurisprudence that, as a general rule, Article 448 on builders in good faith
does not apply where there is a contractual relation between the parties. Morever, in several cases,
the Court has explained that the raison d'etre for Article 448 of the Civil Code is to prevent the
impracticability of creating a state of forced co-ownership. In accord with the principle of accession,
the landowner cannot refuse to exercise either option and compel instead the owner of the building
to remove it from the land.
In the case at bar, however, the land belongs to a condominium corporation, wherein the builder, as
a unit owner, is already in a co-ownership with other unit owners as members or stockholders of the
condominium corporation, whose legal relationship is governed by a special law, the Condominium
Act.
Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code on builders in good faith are therefore inapplicable in cases
covered by the Condominium Act where the owner of the land and the builder are already bound
by specific legislation on the subject property (the Condominium Act), and by contract (the Master
Deed and the By-Laws of the condominium corporation).
In accordance therefore with the Master Deed, the By-Laws of Legaspi Towers, and the Condominium
Act, Legaspi Towers is correct that it has the right to demolish Concession 4 at the expense of Lemans.
Indeed, the application of Article 448 to the present situation is highly iniquitous, in that an owner,
also found to be in good faith, will be forced to either appropriate the illegal structure and impliedly
be burdened with the cost of its demolition) or to allow the continuance of such an illegal structure
that violates the law and the Master Deed, and threatens the structural integrity of the condominium
building upon the payment of rent. The Court cannot countenance such an unjust result from an
erroneous application of the law and jurisprudence.
EASEMENT
PILAR DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs.
RAMON DUMADAG, EMMA BACABAC, RONALDO NAVARRO, JIMMY PAGDALIAN, PAY DELOS
SANTOS, ARMANDO TRILLOS, FELICISIMO TRILLOS, ARCANGEL FLORES, EDDIE MARTIN,
PRESILLA LAYOG, CONRADO CAGUYONG, GINA GONZALES, ARLENE PEDROSA, JOCELYN
ABELINO, ROQUE VILLARAZA, ROLANDO VILLARAZA, CAMILO GENOVE, NILDA ROAYANA,
SUSAN ROAYANA, JUANCHO PANGANIBAN, BONG DE GUZMAN, ARNOLD ENVERSO, DONNA
DELA RAZA, EMELYN HAGNAYA, FREDDIE DE LEON, RONILLO DE LEON, MARIO MARTINEZ,
and PRECY LOPEZ, Respondents.
(G.R. No. 194336, THIRD DIVISION, March 11, 2013, PERALTA, J.)
Thus, the above prove that petitioner’s right of ownership and possession has been limited by law with
respect to the 3-meter strip/zone along the banks of Mahabang Ilog Creek. Despite this, the Court cannot
agree with the trial court’s opinion, that respondents have a better right to possess the subject portion
of the land because they are occupying an area reserved for public easement purposes. Similar to
petitioner, respondents have no right or title over it precisely because it is public land. Likewise, the
Court has repeatedly held that squatters have no possessory rights over the land intruded upon. The
length of time that they may have physically occupied the land is immaterial; they are deemed to have
entered the same in bad faith, such that the nature of their possession is presumed to have retained the
same character throughout their occupancy.
As to the issue of who is the proper party entitled to institute a case with respect to the 3-meter
strip/zone, the Court holds that both the Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG and the local
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government of Las Piñas City, may file an action depending on the purpose sought to be achieved. The
former shall be responsible in case of action for reversion under C.A. 141, while the latter may also bring
an action to enforce the relevant provisions of Republic Act No. 7279 (otherwise known as the Urban
Development and Housing Act of 1992).
FACTS:
Pilar Development Corporation filed a Complaint for accion publiciana with damages against
Dumadag, et al. for allegedly building their shanties, without its knowledge and consent, in its 5,613-
square-meter property in Las Piñas City. It claims that said parcel of land was designated as an open
space of Pilar Village Subdivision intended for village recreational facilities and amenities for
subdivision residents. In their Answer with Counterclaim, respondents denied the material
allegations of the Complaint and briefly asserted that it is the local government, not petitioner, which
has jurisdiction and authority over them.
Trial court dismissed petitioner’s complaint, opining that respondents have a better right to possess
the occupied lot, since they are in an area reserved for public easement purposes and that only the
local government of Las Piñas City could institute an action for recovery of possession or ownership.
On appeal, CA sustained the dismissal of the case. Referring to Section 2 of A.O. No. 99-21 of the DENR,
the appellate court ruled that the 3-meter area being disputed is located along the creek which, in
turn, is a form of a stream; therefore, belonging to the public dominion. Unlike the trial court,
however, the CA noted that the proper party entitled to seek recovery of possession of the contested
portion is not the City of Las Piñas, but the Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, pursuant to
Section 101 of C.A. No. 141 (otherwise known as The Public Land Act). Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the respondents have a better right to possess the subject portion of the land
because they are occupying an area reserved for public easement purposes? (NO)
(2) Who is the proper party entitled to institute the case?
RULING:
(1) While Article 630 of the Code provides for the general rule that "the owner of the servient estate
retains the ownership of the portion on which the easement is established, and may use the same in
such a manner as not to affect the exercise of the easement," Article 635 thereof is specific in saying
that "all matters concerning easements established for public or communal use shall be governed by
the special laws and regulations relating thereto, and, in the absence thereof, by the provisions of this
Title VII on Easements or Servitudes."
Certainly, in the case of residential subdivisions, the allocation of the 3-meter strip along the banks
of a stream, like the Mahabang Ilog Creek in this case, is required and shall be considered as forming
part of the open space requirement pursuant to P.D. 1216. Said law is explicit: open spaces are "for
public use and are, therefore, beyond the commerce of men" and that "[the] areas reserved for parks,
playgrounds and recreational use shall be non-alienable public lands, and non-buildable."
Running in same vein is P.D. 1067 or The Water Code of the Philippines which provides:
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Art. 51. The banks of rivers and streams and the shores of the seas and lakes throughout their
entire length and within a zone of three (3) meters in urban areas, twenty (20) meters in
agricultural areas and forty (40) meters in forest areas, along their margins, are subject to the
easement of public use in the interest of recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing and salvage.
No person shall be allowed to stay in this zone longer than what is necessary for recreation,
navigation, floatage, fishing or salvage or to build structures of any kind.
Thus, the above prove that petitioner’s right of ownership and possession has been limited by law
with respect to the 3-meter strip/zone along the banks of Mahabang Ilog Creek. Despite this, the
Court cannot agree with the trial court’s opinion, that respondents have a better right to possess the
subject portion of the land because they are occupying an area reserved for public easement
purposes. Similar to petitioner, respondents have no right or title over it precisely because it is public
land. Likewise, the Court has repeatedly held that squatters have no possessory rights over the land
intruded upon. The length of time that they may have physically occupied the land is immaterial; they
are deemed to have entered the same in bad faith, such that the nature of their possession is
presumed to have retained the same character throughout their occupancy.
(2) As to the issue of who is the proper party entitled to institute a case with respect to the 3-meter
strip/zone, the Court holds that both the Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG and the local
government of Las Piñas City, may file an action depending on the purpose sought to be achieved.
The former shall be responsible in case of action for reversion under C.A. 141, while the latter may
also bring an action to enforce the relevant provisions of Republic Act No. 7279 (otherwise known as
the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992). Under R.A. 7279, all LGUs are mandated to evict
and demolish persons or entities occupying danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage
dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public places such as sidewalks, roads, parks,
and playgrounds.
ALICIA B. REYES, Petitioner, - versus -. SPOUSES VALENTIN RAMOS, FRANCISCO S. AND

ANATALIA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 194488, SECOND DIVISION, February 11, 2015, LEONEN, J.
This court explained in Dichoso, Jr. v. Marcos that the convenience of the dominant estate's owner is not
the basis for granting an easement of right of way, especially if the owner's needs may be satisfied
without imposing the easement.
The outlet referred to in the Ocular Inspection Report may be longer and more inconvenient to petitioner
because she will have to traverse other properties and construct a bridge over the irrigation canal
before she can reach the road. However, these reasons will not justify the imposition of an easement on
respondents' property because her convenience is not the gauge in determining whether to impose an
easement of right of way over another's property.
FACTS:
Petitioner Alicia B. Reyes, through Dolores B. Cinco, filed a Complaint for easement of right of way
against respondents, Spouses Francisco S. Valentin and Anatalia Ramos. Alicia alleged that she was
the owner of a parcel of land which used to be a portion of Lot No. 3-B and was surrounded by estates
belonging to other persons. Petitioner further alleged that respondent’s property was the only
adequate outlet from her property to the highway.
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In their Answer, respondents contended that the isolation of petitioner's property was due to her
mother's own act of subdividing the property among her children without regard to the pendency of
an agrarian case between her and her tenants. The property chosen by petitioner as easement was
also the most burdensome for respondents.
The Branch Clerk of Court conducted an ocular inspection. The trial court dismissed the complaint.
The trial court found that petitioner's proposed right of way was not the least onerous to the servient
estate of respondents. The trial court noted the existence of an irrigation canal that limited access to
the public road. However, the trial court pointed out that "[o]ther than the existing irrigation canal,
no permanent improvements/structures can be seen standing on the subject rice land." Moreover,
the nearby landowner was able to construct a bridge to connect a property to the public road. Hence,
"[t]he way through the irrigation canal would . . . appear to be the shortest and easiest way to reach
the barangay road."
ISSUE:
Whether Alicia Reyes is entitled to the easement of right of way. (NO)
RULING:
Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code provide the requisites of an easement of right of way. Based on
these provisions, the following requisites need to be established before a person becomes entitled to
demand the compulsory easement of right of way:
1. An immovable is surrounded by other immovables belonging to other persons, and is without

adequate outlet to a public highway;
2. Payment of proper indemnity by the owner of the surrounded immovable;
3. The isolation of the immovable is not due to its owner's acts; and
4. The proposed easement of right of way is established at the point least prejudicial to the
servient estate, and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance of the dominant
estate to a public highway may be the shortest.
There is an adequate exit to a public highway. This court explained in Dichoso, Jr. v. Marcos that the
convenience of the dominant estate's owner is not the basis for granting an easement of right of way,
especially if the owner's needs may be satisfied without imposing the easement.
Based on the Ocular Inspection Report, petitioner's property had another outlet to the highway. In
between her property and the highway or road, however, is an irrigation canal, which can be
traversed by constructing a bridge, similar to what was done by the owners of the nearby properties.
There is, therefore, no need to utilize respondents' property to serve petitioner's needs. Another
adequate exit exists. Petitioner can use this outlet to access the public roads.
The outlet referred to in the Ocular Inspection Report may be longer and more inconvenient to
petitioner because she will have to traverse other properties and construct a bridge over the
irrigation canal before she can reach the road. However, these reasons will not justify the imposition
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of an easement on respondents' property because her convenience is not the gauge in determining
whether to impose an easement of right of way over another's property.
Petitioner also failed to satisfy the requirement of "least prejudicial to the servient estate. Article 650
of the Civil Code provides that in determining the existence of an easement of right of way, the
requirement of "least prejudice] to the servient estate" trumps "distance [between] the dominant
estate [and the] public highway." "Distance" is considered only insofar as it is consistent to the
requirement of "least prejudice."
This court had already affirmed the preferred status of the requirement of "least prejudice" over
distance of the dominant estate to the public highway. Petitioner would have permanent structures
— such as the garage, garden, and grotto already installed on respondent's property — destroyed to
accommodate her preferred location for the right of way. The cost of having to destroy these
structures, coupled with the fact that there is an available outlet that can be utilized for the right of
way, negates a claim that respondents' property is the point least prejudicial to the servient estate.
The trial court found that there is still no necessity for an easement of right of way because
petitioner's property is among the lots that are presently being tenanted by Dominador and Filomena
Ramos' children. Petitioner is yet to use her property. The Complaint for easement was found to have
been filed merely "for future purposes." The aspect of necessity may not be specifically included in
the requisites for the grant of compulsory easement under the Civil Code. However, this goes into the
question of "least prejudice." An easement of right of way imposes a burden on a property and limits
the property owner's use of that property. The limitation imposed on a property owner's rights is
aggravated by an apparent lack of necessity for which his or her property will be burdened.
DEMETRIA DE GUZMAN, AS SUBSTITUTED BY HER HEIRS OLGA C. BARBASO AND NOLI G.

CEMENTTNA; * LOLITA A. DE GUZMAN; ESTHER G.MILAN; BANAAG A. DE GUZMAN; AMOR G.
APOLO, AS SUBSTITUTED BY HIS HEIRS ALBERTO T. APOLO, MARK APOLO AND GEORGE
APOLO; * HERMINIO A. DE GUZMAN; LEONOR G. VTVENCIO; NORMA A. DE GUZMAN; AND
JOSEFINA G. HERNANDEZ, Petitioners, - versus - FBLINVEST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 191710, SECOND DIVISION, January 14, 2015, DEL CASTILLO, J.
It is the needs of the dominant estate which ultimately determines the width of the passage. Article 651
of the Civil Code provides: The width of the easement of right of way shall be that which is sufficient for
the needs of the dominant estate and may accordingly be changed from time to time.
To the Court's mind, the 10- meter width of the affected road lots is unnecessary and inordinate for the
intended use of the easement. At most, a 3-meter wide right of way can already sufficiently meet
petitioners' need for vehicular access. It would thus be unfair to assess indemnity based on the 10-meter
road width when a three-meter width can already sufficiently answer the needs of the dominant estate.
Therefore, bearing in mind Article 651, the Court finds proper a road width of 3 meters in computing
the proper indemnity.
FACTS:
Petitioners De Guzman et al, are co-owners of a parcel of land. The property is enclosed and
surrounded by other real properties belonging to various owners. One of its adjoining properties is
Filinvest Home Subdivision Phase IV-A (respondent) which, coming from petitioners' property, has
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a potential direct access to Marcos highway either by foot or vehicle. As such, petitioners filed
Complaint for Easement of Right of Way.
Respondent alleged in its Answer that petitioners have access to Sumulong Highway through another
property adjoining the latter's property. In fact, the distance from petitioners' property to Sumulong
Highway using the said other property is only 1,500 meters or shorter as compared to the 2,500-
meter distance between petitioners' property and Marcos Highway using respondent's subdivision.
The RTC granted the right of way. According to the RTC, the adverted route by respondent is
unfeasible and unavailing whereas if petitioners would pass through the respondent's road lot
particularly Lot 15 access to the Marcos Highway is readily available to petitioners' property. Only a
fence (located at Lot 15) separates the Filinvest Subdivision and the petitioners'property which could
be removed x x x anytime. The RTC granted an indemnity in favor of respondent in the amount of
400,000.
The CA affirmed the granting of the right of way. However, the CA remanded the case to the RTC for
lack of justification on the amount of indemnity. Established during the remand proceedings was the
fair market value of respondent's property which was pegged by the Municipal Assessor's Office of
Cainta at P1,620.00 per square meter. In terms of the extent of the easement, the parties disagree.
Petitioners insisted that the right of way pertains only to Road Lot 15 where the fence separating
their property from respondent's subdivision, which was supposed to be removed to grant them
access thereto, is located. On the other hand, it was respondent's contention that the right of way
covers the whole stretch from petitioners' property all the way to its subdivision's gate leading to
Marcos Highway. Petitioners further question the amount of indemnity, they contend that if the
indemnity is equivalent to the fair market value of the property, it is already equivalent to
appropriation.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the extent of the easement covers only Lot 15. (NO)
2. Whether the indemnity should be equivalent to the fair market value of the property. (YES)
RULING:
1. The right of way granted to petitioners covers the network of roads within respondent's
subdivision and not merely Road Lot 15. It is not difficult to conclude therefrom that what
was intended to serve as petitioners' right of way consisted of the road network within
respondent's subdivision and not merely of Road Lot 15. As may be recalled, the RTC then in
resolving the complaint for easement of right of way was confronted with the contentious
issue as to which between the two routes from petitioners' property, i.e., the one passing
through respondent's subdivision leading to Marcos Highway or the one passing through
another property leading to Sumulong Highway, is the more adequate and less prejudicial
route pursuant to the requirement of the law. Thus, when it made the following comparison
and eventually concluded that the route passing through respondent's subdivision is the
more adequate and the less prejudicial way, what it obviously had in mind was the road
network in respondent's subdivision since the measurement thereof in meters corresponds
with that mentioned by the RTC.
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Besides and logically speaking, if petitioners would indemnify respondent only for Road Lot
15, it follows then that said particular road lot should be the only road lot for which they shall
be allowed access. They cannot be allowed access to the other road lots leading to and from
the highway as they are not willing to pay indemnity for it. In such a case, the purpose of the
right of way, that is, for petitioners to have access to the highway, would thus be defeated.
2. Per the case of Woodridge School, Inc. v. ARB Construction, the Court said:
In the case of a legal easement, Article 649 of the Civil Code prescribes the parameters
by which the proper indemnity may be fixed. Since the intention of petitioners is to
establish a permanent passage, the second paragraph of Article 649 of the Civil Code
particularly applies:
Art. 649 xxx Should this easement be established in such a manner that its use may
be continuous for all the needs of the dominant estate, establishing a permanent
passage, the indemnity shall consist of the value of the land occupied and the amount
of the damage caused to the servient estate. Xxx
The Civil Code categorically provides for the measure by which the proper indemnity
may be computed: value of the land occupied plus the amount of the damage
caused to the servient estate. Settled is the rule in statutory construction that 'when
the law is clear, the function of the courts is simple application.' Thus, to award
indemnity using factors different from [those] given by the law is a complete
disregard of these clear statutory provisions and is evidently arbitrary.
HOWEVER, the Court, however, deems it necessary to modify the width of the easement
which would serve as basis in fixing the value of the land as part of the proper indemnity. It
is the needs of the dominant estate which ultimately determines the width of the
passage. Article 651 of the Civil Code provides: The width of the easement of right of way
shall be that which is sufficient for the needs of the dominant estate and may accordingly be
changed from time to time.
The right of way constituting the easement in this case consists of existing and developed
network of roads. This means that in their construction, the needs of the dominant estate
were not taken into consideration precisely because they were constructed prior to the grant
of the right of way. During the remand proceedings, it was established that the width of the
affected roads is 10 meters. Multiplied by the distance of 2,350 meters, the total area to be
indemnified is 23,500 square meters and at a price of P1,620.00 per square meter, petitioners
must pay respondent the whopping amount of P38,070,000.00 for the value of the land.
Under the circumstances, the Court finds it rather iniquitous to compute the proper
indemnity based on the 10-meter width of the existing roads. To stress, it is the needs of the
dominant estate which determines the width of the passage. And per their complaint,
petitioners were simply asking for adequate vehicular and other similar access to the
highway. To the Court's mind, the 10- meter width of the affected road lots is unnecessary
and inordinate for the intended use of the easement. At most, a 3-meter wide right of way can
already sufficiently meet petitioners' need for vehicular access. It would thus be unfair to
assess indemnity based on the 10-meter road width when a three-meter width can already
sufficiently answer the needs of the dominant estate. Therefore, bearing in mind Article 651,
the Court finds proper a road width of 3 meters in computing the proper indemnity. Thus,
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multiplying the road length of 2,350 meters by a road width of 3 meters, the total area to be
indemnified is 7,050 square meters. At a value of P1,620.00 per square meter, the total value
of the land to form part of the indemnity amounts to P11,421,000.00.
In easement of right of way, there is no alienation of the land occupied. Payment of the value
of the land for permanent use of the easement does not mean an alienation of the land
occupied. In fact under the law and unlike in purchase of a property, should the right of way
no longer be necessary because the owner of the dominant estate has joined it to another
abutting on a public highway, and the servient estate demands that the easement be
extinguished, the value of the property received by the servient estate by way of indemnity
shall be returned in full to the dominant estate. This only reinforces the concept that the
payment of indemnity is merely for the use of the right of way and not for its alienation.
SPOUSES LARRY AND ROSARITA WILLIAMS, Petitioners, - versus - RAINERO A. ZERDA,

Respondent.
G.R. No. 207146, SECOND DIVISION, March 15, 2017, MENDOZA, J.
The conferment of the legal easement of right of way is governed by Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil
Code. In summary, an entitlement to the easement of right of way requires that the following requisites
must be met.
1. The dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public
highway (Art. 649, par. 1);
2. There is payment of proper indemnity (Art. 649, par. 1);
3. The isolation is not due to the acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate (Art. 649, last par.);
and
4. The right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and insofar as
consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may
be the shortest (Art. 650).
All the above requisites are present in this case. As regards the first requisite, there is no dispute that the
respondent's property was surrounded by other immovables owned by different individuals, including
Spouses Williams. The second requisite of payment of indemnity was also complied with by the
respondent when he wrote Spouses Williams on January 27, 2004, formally asking them to provide him
with a right of way, for which he was in willing to pay a reasonable value or to swap a portion of his
property. Anent the third requisite, the isolation of the dominant estate was not due to the respondent's
own acts. As to the fourth requisite, the Court finds that the right of way sought by the respondent is at
the point least prejudicial to the servient estate and it is the shortest distance to the national highway.
This is evident in the Sketch Plan showing that the requested right of way was alongside the perimeter
of Spouses Williams' property
FACTS:
Respondent Rainero A. Zerda (Zerda) was the owner of a parcel of land (dominant estate).
Immediately behind the dominant estate was Lot a swampy mangrove area. On both sides were
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properties belonging to different owners. In front was Lot No. 1201-A owned by petitioner-spouses
Larry and Rosarita Williams (Spouses Williams), where the national highway ran along.
On July 28, 2004, Zerda filed a complaint against Spouses Williams for easement of right of way Zerda
alleged that on January 27, 2004, Zerda wrote to Spouses Williams formally asking them to provide
him with right of way, for which he was willing to pay its reasonable value or to swap a portion of his
property, but Spouses Williams refused. Spouses Williams countered that the complaint should be
dismissed because Zerda failed to establish the requisites for the existence of right of way. They
claimed that sometime in May 2003, they were in negotiation with Agripino Sierra (Sierra), the
former owner of the dominant estate, for its sale to them but the sale did not materialize due to the
intervention of Zerda. Spouses Williams further averred that they undertook visible development
projects on their property as early as May 2003 that the isolation of the dominant estate was Zerda's
fault; and that his requested right of way would cause great damage and prejudice to them.
The RTC ruled in favor of Spouses Williams. It found that the isolation of Zerda's lot was due to his
own acts because when he bought the said property, he was aware that Spouses Williams had already
started introducing improvements on their own property. It stated that Spouses Williams were able
to prove that while they were in negotiation with Sierra for the purchase of the dominant estate,
Zerda intervened and bought the land himself, knowing full well that the land was surrounded by
other immovables.
ISSUE:
Whether Zerda is entitled to an easement of right of way. (YES)
RULING:
The conferment of the legal easement of right of way is governed by Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil
Code. In summary, an entitlement to the easement of right of way requires that the following
requisites must be met.
1. The dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public
2. There is payment of proper indemnity (Art. 649, par. 1);
3. The isolation is not due to the acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate (Art. 649, last par.); and
4. The right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and insofar as
consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be
the shortest (Art. 650).
All the above requisites are present in this case. As regards the first requisite, there is no dispute that
the respondent's property was surrounded by other immovables owned by different individuals,
including Spouses Williams. The second requisite of payment of indemnity was also complied with
by the respondent when he wrote Spouses Williams on January 27, 2004, formally asking them to
provide him with a right of way, for which he was in willing to pay a reasonable value or to swap a
portion of his property. Anent the third requisite, the isolation of the dominant estate was not due to
the respondent's own acts. The property he purchased was already surrounded by other immovables
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leaving him no adequate ingress or egress to a public highway. Spouses Williams refused to grant a
right of way and averred that the isolation of the dominant estate was attributable to the
respondent's own acts. They pointed out that when the respondent purchased the dominant estate,
he knew that Sierra was in negotiation with them for the sale of the dominant estate, thus, he was in
bad faith. Nonetheless, it cannot be used to defeat the respondent's claim for a right of way. Sierra
had every right to sell his property to anybody. Further, when the respondent bought the dominant
estate there could have been no existing contract of sale yet considering that Spouses Williams and
Sierra were still in negotiation. Hence, consent, one of the essential requisites for a valid contract,
was lacking. As to the fourth requisite, the Court finds that the right of way sought by the respondent
is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate and it is the shortest distance to the national
highway. This is evident in the Sketch Plan showing that the requested right of way was alongside
the perimeter of Spouses Williams' property
Even assuming that the right of way being claimed by the respondent is not the shortest distance
from the dominant estate to the public highway, it is well-settled that "[t]he criterion of least
prejudice to the servient estate must prevail over the criterion of shortest distance although this is a
matter of judicial appreciation, xxx In other words, where the easement may be established on any
of several tenements surrounding the dominant estate, the one where the way is shortest and will
cause the least damage should be chosen. If having these two (2) circumstances do not concur in a
single tenement, the way which will cause the least damage should be used, even if it will not be the
shortest."
ERLINDA M. VILLANUEVA, herein represented by her Attorney-in-fact LEOPOLDO SAN

BUENAVENTURA, TEOFILA N. ALBERTO, HARRY ASAÑA, ANGEL CHENG, MA. LOURDES NG,
DOMINGO F. ISRAEL and CATALINO IMPERIAL, JR., petitioners, vs. HON. ANGEL S. MALAYA, as
Judge of RTC of Naga City, Branch XXII, ROSARIO B. TORRECAMPO, ANASTACIO BONGON,
ROQUE ANGELES, REGISTER OF DEEDS of Naga City and RUBEN SIA, respondents.
ERLINDA M. VILLANUEVA, herein represented by her Attorney-in-fact LEOPOLDO E. SAN
BUENAVENTURA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ANGEL S. MALAYA, as Judge RTC
of Naga City, Branch XXII, ROSARIO B. TORRECAMPO, ANASTACIO BONGON, ROQUE ANGELES,
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF NAGA CITY and RUBEN SIA, respondents.
G.R. No. 94617 and G.R. No. 95281, THIRD DIVISION, April 12, 2000, GONZAGA-REYES, J
The right of redemption over property sold on execution may be exercised within twelve months from
the date of registration of the certificate of sale. Where tender is made of the redemption price within
the period to redeem and the same is refused, the same constitutes a valid exercise of the right to redeem
and it is not necessary that it be followed by the deposit or consignation of the money in court. No
interest after such tender is demandable on the redemption money.
In the instant case, petitioner Erlinda exercised her right to redeem as of November 22, 1989 (or before
the expiration of the twelve-month period of redemption on December 7, 1989) when she tendered a
cashier's check equivalent to the redemption price to private respondent Sia.
FACTS:
In Civil Case No. R-570, the subject property owned by the late Irene Mariano was sold on execution
to one Ruben Sia. Later, Irene's adoptive children, Jose and Erlinda, were declared legal
representatives of Irene. Whether Erlinda was qualified to redeem the property sold on execution,
the Court ruled in the affirmative on the basis of Section 29, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Erlinda,
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being a compulsory heir, qualifies as a successor-in-interest of Irene. Corollarily, the subsequent

vendee to the property, allegedly from a sale executed by Irene, whose right is being litigated in
another case and who is a stranger in Civil Case R-570, cannot redeem the subject property. And
whether Erlinda exercised her right to redeem properly and seasonably, the Court again ruled in the
affirmative. Erlinda tendered a cashier's check equivalent to the redemption price to Sia before the
expiration of the twelve month from the date of registration of the certificate of sale. The tender was
effected before she was enjoined to do so by an ineffective TRO.|||
ISSUE: Whether or not Erlinda exercised her right to redeem properly and seasonably.
RULING:
The right of redemption over property sold on execution may be exercised within twelve months
from the date of registration of the certificate of sale. Where tender is made of the redemption price
within the period to redeem and the same is refused, the same constitutes a valid exercise of the right
to redeem and it is not necessary that it be followed by the deposit or consignation of the money in
court. No interest after such tender is demandable on the redemption money.
In the instant case, petitioner Erlinda exercised her right to redeem as of November 22, 1989 (or
before the expiration of the twelve-month period of redemption on December 7, 1989) when she
tendered a cashier's check equivalent to the redemption price to private respondent Sia. Notably, the
tender was effected before the RTC, Branch 28 of Camarines Sur issued a TRO on December 1, 1989
enjoining Erlinda from redeeming the property. In point of time, nothing prevented Erlinda from
redeeming the property on November 22, 1989; besides, the TRO is clearly void and of no effect as to
her, since it was issued in favor of Godofredo Uy on the basis of his being the assignee to the
redemption rights of Jose Mariano over the property. Such ground does not and should not impinge
upon Erlinda's own right of redemption.
In declaring as valid Erlinda's redemption of the property, we find it no longer necessary to pass upon
the other assignments of error in G.R. No. 95281.xxx
ANASTACIA QUIMEN, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and YOLANDA Q. OLIVEROS,

respondents.
G.R. No. 112331, FIRST DIVISION, May 29, 1996, BELLOSILLO, J.
Petitioner finally insists that respondent court erroneously concluded that the right of way proposed by
private respondent is the least onerous to the parties. We cannot agree. Article 650 of the New Civil Code
explicitly states that the easement of right of way shall be established at the point least prejudicial to
the servient estate and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate
to a public highway may be the shortest. The criterion of least prejudice to the servient estate must
prevail over the criterion of shortest distancealthough this is a matter of judicial appreciation. While
shortest distance may ordinarily imply least prejudice, it is not always so as when there are permanent
structures obstructing theshortest distance; while on the other hand, the longest distance may be free
of obstructions and the easiest or most convenient to pass through. In other words, where the easement
may be established on any of several tenements surrounding the dominant estate, the one where the
way is shortest and will cause the least damage should be chosen. However, as elsewhere stated, if these
two (2) circumstances do not concur in a single tenement, the way which will cause the least damage
should be used, even if it will not be the shortest.
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FACTS:
In February 1982 Yolanda purchased Lot No. 1448-B-6-A. According to Yolanda, when petitioner
offered her the property for sale she was hesitant to buy as it had no access to a public road. But
Anastacia prevailed upon her to buy the lot with the assurance that she would give her a right of way
on her adjoining property. Thereafter, Yolanda constructed a house on the lot she bought using as
her passageway to the public highway a portion of Anastacia's property. But when Yolanda finally
offered to pay for the use of the pathway Anastacia refused to accept the payment. In fact she was
thereafter barred by Anastacia from passing through her property.
In February 1986 Yolanda purchased the other lot, Lot No. 1448-B-6-B, located directly behind the
property of her parents who provided her a pathway gratis et amore between their house, extending
about nineteen (19) meters from the lot of Yolanda behind the sari sari store of Sotero (Anastacia’s
brother), and Anastacia's perimeter fence. The store is made of strong materials and occupies the
entire frontage of the lot measuring four (4) meters wide and nine meters (9) long. Although the
pathway leads to the municipal road it is not adequate for ingress and egress. The municipal road
cannot be reached with facility because the store itself obstructs the path so that one has to pass
through the back entrance and the facade of the store to reach the road.
Yolanda filed an action with the proper court praying for a right of way through Anastacia's property.
An ocular inspection upon instruction was conducted. The report was that the proposed right of way
was at the extreme right of Anastacia's property facing the public highway, starting from the back of
Sotero's sari sari store and extending inward by one (1) meter to her property and turning left for
about five (5) meters to avoid the store of Sotero in order to reach the municipal road and the way
was unobstructed except for an avocado tree standing in the middle.
RTC: dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action. It concluded that it was more practical to
extend the existing pathway to the public road by removing that portion of the store blocking the
path as that was the shortest route to the public road and the least prejudicial to the parties
concerned than passing through Anastacia's property.
CA: reversed the lower court and held that Yolanda was entitled to a right of way on petitioner's
property and that the way proposed by Yolanda would cause the least damage and detriment to the
servient estate.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in granting the right of way to Yolanda through Quimen’s
property. (NO)
RULING:
In fact, as between petitioner Anastacia and respondent Yolanda their agreement has already been
rendered moot insofar as it concerns the determination of the principal issue herein presented. The
voluntary easement in favor of private respondent, which petitioner now denies but which the court
is inclined to believe, has in fact become a legal easement or an easement by necessity constituted by
law. xxx
The conditions sine qua non for a valid grant of an easement of right of way are: (a) the dominant
estate is surrounded by other immovables without an adequate outlet to a public highway; (b) the
dominant estate is willing to pay the proper indemnity; (c) the isolation was not due to the acts of the
93
dominant estate; and, (d) the right of way being claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient
estate. Xxx
The evidence clearly shows that the property of private respondent is hemmed in by the estates of
other persons including that of petitioner; that she offered to pay P200.00 per square meter for her
right of way as agreed between her and petitioner; that she did not cause the isolation of her
property; that the right of way is the least prejudicial to the servient estate. xxx
Petitioner finally insists that respondent court erroneously concluded that the right of way proposed
by private respondent is the least onerous to the parties. We cannot agree. xxx
The criterion of least prejudice to the servient estate must prevail over the criterion of shortest
distance although this is a matter of judicial appreciation. While shortest distance may ordinarily
imply least prejudice, it is not always so as when there are permanent structures obstructing the
shortest distance; while on the other hand, the longest distance may be free of obstructions and the
easiest or most convenient to pass through. In other words, where the easement may be established
on any of several tenements surrounding the dominant estate, the one where the way is shortest and
will cause the least damage should be chosen. However, as elsewhere stated, if these two (2)
circumstances do not concur in a single tenement, the way which will cause the least damage should
be used, even if it will not be the shortest. This is the test. xxx
In applying Art. 650 of the New Civil Code, respondent Court of Appeals declared that the proposed
right of way of Yolanda, which is one (1) meter wide and five (5) meters long at the extreme right of
petitioner's property, will cause the least prejudice and/or damage as compared to the suggested
passage through the property of Yolanda's father which would mean destroying the sari sari store
made of strong materials. xxx
FLORCERFIDA STA. MARIA, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and SPOUSES ARSENIO and
ROSLYNN FAJARDO, respondents
G.R. No. 127549, FIRST DIVISION, January 28, 1998, DAVIDE, JR., J.
Under Article 650 of the Civil Code, the easement of right of way shall be established at the point least
prejudicial to the servient estate, and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the
dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest. Where there are several tenements
surrounding the dominant estate, and the easement may be established on any of them, the one where
the way is shortest and will cause the least damage should be chosen. The conditions of "least damage"
and "shortest distance" are both established in one tenement — petitioners' property.
FACTS:
Plaintiff-respondent spouses Arsenio and Roslynn Fajardo are the registered owners of a piece of
land entirely surrounded by pieces of lots belonging to different owners, one of them are herein
petitioners, spouses Raquel and Cesar Sta. Maria and Florcerfida Sta. Maria.
Plaintiff-respondent spouses Fajardo filed before the Regional Trial Court a complaint against
petitioners for the establishment of an easement of right of way passing through eitherof the
alternative defendants' (petitioners) properties which are directly abutting the provincial road. They
further allege that it is the only convenient, direct and shortest access to and from the provincial road;
94
and that despite plaintiff-respondents' request for a right of way and referral of the dispute to the
barangay officials, petitioners refused to grant them an easement.
Petitioners in their answer alleged that the granting of the easement in favor of plaintiff-respondent
spouses would cause them great damage and inconvenience; and that there is another access route
from plaintiff-respondents' property to the main road.
The trial court in a decision ruled in favor of plaintiff-respondents, which was affirmed by the Court
of Appeals.
Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower courts erred in ruling in favor of plaintiff-respondents. (NO)
RULING:
All told, the findings of fact of both courts satisfied the following requirements for an estate to be
entitled to a compulsory servitude of right of way under the Civil Code, to wit:
1. the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public
2. there is payment of proper indemnity (Art. 649, par. 1);
3. the isolation is not due to the acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate (Art. 649, last par.); and
4. the right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and insofar as
consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be
the shortest (Art. 650). xxx
Going now to the fourth requisite of "least prejudice" and "shortest distance," We agree with the
lower court that this twin elements have been complied with in establishing the easement of right of
way on defendants-appellants' properties.
It has been commented upon that where there are several tenements surrounding the dominant
estate, and the easement may be established on any of them, the one where the way is shortest and
will cause the least damage should be chosen. But if these two circumstances do not concur in a single
tenement, the way which will cause the least damage should be used, even if it will not be the shortest.
And if the conditions of the various tenements are the same, all the adjoining owners should be cited
and experts utilized to determine where the easement shall be established (Tolentino, ibid., pp. 108-
109, citing Casals Colldecarrera).
In the case at bar, the ocular inspection disclosed that there are three options open to the plaintiffs-
appellees as a route to reach the national road xxx
Among the three (3) possible servient estates, it is clear that defendants-appellants' property would
afford the shortest distance from plaintiffs-appellees' property to the provincial road. Moreover, it is
the least prejudicial since as found by the lower court, "(i)t appears that there would be no significant
structures to be injured in the defendants' property and the right-of-way to be constructed thereon
95
would be the shortest of all the alternative routes pointed to by the defendants" (p. 4, RTC, Decision;
p. 223, ibid.). xxx
Under Article 650 of the Civil Code, the easement of right of way shall be established at the point least
prejudicial to the servient estate, and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from
the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest. Where there are several tenements
surrounding the dominant estate, and the easement may be established on any of them, the one
where the way is shortest and will cause the least damage should be chosen. The conditions of "least
damage" and "shortest distance" are both established in one tenement — petitioners' property. H
As to the "daang tao" at the back of private respondents' property, it must be stressed that under
Article 651 the width of the easement of right of way shall be that which is sufficient for the needs of
the dominant estate, and may accordingly be changed from time to time. Therefore, the needs of the
dominant estate determine the width of the easement. The needs of private respondents' property
could hardly be served by this "daang tao" located at the back and which is bordered by a fishpond.
xxx
CRESENCIA CRISTOBAL, ROBERTO MAKIMKIM, DAMASOMAKIMKIM, SPOUSES SALVADOR

HERMALINO and PONCIANAMAKIMKIM, MILAGROS MAKIMKIM, REMEDIOS
MAKIMKIM,SPOUSES FRANCISCO ESTANISLAO and FLORDELIZA MAKIMKIM, ERLINDA
MAKIMKIM, JOSEMAKIMKIM and GINA MAKIMKIM, P e t i t i o n e r s , V . COURT
OFAPPEALS, CESAR LEDESMA, INC., SPOUSES JESUS C.PACIONE and LERMA B. PACIONE,
Respondents
G.R. No. 125339, FIRST DIVISION, June 22, 1998, BELLOSILLO, J.
An easement involves an abnormal restriction on the property rights of the servient owner and is
regarded as a charge or encumbrance on the servient estate. Thus, it is incumbent upon the owner of
the dominant estate to establish by clear and convincing evidence the presence of all the preconditions
before his claim for easement of right of way be granted.
FACTS:
Cristobal owned a house and lot in Visayas Avenue Extension. Ledesma on the other hand was the
owner of the adjoining subdivision, which included the disputed lots 1 and 2. Lots 1 and 2 were
originally a part of the private road. Upon the making of Visayas Avenue as a public road, Ledesma
petitioned the exclusion of the two disputed lots from the road. He was granted to do so. Upon the
sale of the lots to a third person, it was discovered that there were squatters on the land and that it
was being used as a passageway by petitioners. This prompted the new owner to enclose the lot.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the easement may be granted.
RULING:
The essential requisites for the compulsory right of way are as follows—
1. The property is surrounded by estate of others and there is no adequate outlet to a public
highway
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2. It must be established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate and insofar as
consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway
may be the shortest
3. There must be payment of the proper indemnity
4. The isolation should not be due to the proprietor’s own acts In consideration of the above,
mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what is required by law as the basis for
setting up the compulsory right of way.
In the present case, the first element is clearly absent. As found by the trial court and the Court of
Appeals, an outlet already exist, which is a path walk located at the left side of petitioners' property
and which is connected to a private road about five hundred (500) meters long. The private road, in
turn, leads to Ma. Elena Street which is about 2.5 meters wide and, finally, to Visayas Avenue. This
outlet was determined by the court a quo to be sufficient for the needs of the dominants estate, hence
petitioners have no cause to complain that they have no adequate outlet to Visayas Avenue.
Further, no evidence was adduced by petitioners to prove that the easement they seek to impose on
private respondents' property is to be established at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate.
For emphasis, Lot 1 is only 164 square meters and an improvident imposition of the easement on the
lot may unjustly deprive private respondents of the optimum use and enjoyment of their property,
considering that its already small area will be reduced further by the easement. Worse, it may even
render the property useless for the purpose for which private respondents purchased the same.
An easement involves an abnormal restriction on the property rights of the servient owner and is
regarded as a charge or encumbrance on the servient estate. Thus, it is incumbent upon the owner of
the dominant estate to establish by clear and convincing evidence the presence of all the
preconditions before his claim for easement of right of way be granted. Petitioners miserably failed
in this regard.
CAMARINES NORTE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (CANORECO), petitioner,

vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. LUIS L. DICTADO, Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 39, Daet,
Camarines Norte, EDUARDO R. MORENO, LT. COL. RUFINO CHAVEZ, CAPT. ALFREDO BORJA,
CONRAD C. LEVISTE and VINES REALTY CORPORATION, respondents.
G.R. No. 109338, FIRST DIVISION, November 20, 2000, PARDO, J.
The acquisition of an easement of a right-of-way falls within the purview of the power of eminent
domain.
FACTS:
On May 18, 1989, Conrad L. Leviste filed with the Regional Trial Court, Daet, Camarines Norte, a
complaint for collection of a sum of money and foreclosure of mortgage against Philippine Smelter
Corporation (PSC).
For failure to file an answer to the complaint, the trial court declared PSC in default and allowed
plaintiff Leviste to present evidence ex-parte.
When the decision became final and executory, the trial court issued a writ of execution and
respondent sheriff Eduardo R. Moreno levied upon two (2) parcels of land covered TCT Nos. T-13505
and T-13514 issued by the Registrar of Deeds in the name of PSC. On April 24, 1990, the parcels of
97
land were sold at public auction in favor of Vines Realty Corporation (Vines Realty). On April 25,
1990, the Clerk of Court, as ex-officio Provincial Sheriff, issued a Certificate of Sale, which Judge Luis
D. Dictado, in his capacity as executive judge, approved.
On June 23, 1992, Vines Realty moved for the issuance of a writ of possession over said property. On
June 25, 1992, the trial court granted the motion.
On August 7, 1992, copy of the writ of possession was served on petitioner as owner of the power
lines standing on certain portions of the subject property. Later, on August 12, 1992, Vines Realty
filed an amended motion for an order of demolition and removal of improvements on the subject
land.
Among the improvements for removal were the power lines and electric posts belonging to
petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner is entitled to retain possession of the power lines located in the land sold at public
auction as a result of extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage.
RULING:
The most basic tenet of due process is the right to be heard. A court denies a party due process if it
renders its orders without giving such party an opportunity to present its evidence.
We find that petitioner was denied due process. Petitioner could have negated private respondent’s
claims by showing the absence of legal or factual basis therefor if only the trial court in the exercise
of justice and equity reset the hearing instead of proceeding with the trial and issuing an order of
demolition on the same day.
It is incumbent upon the trial court to receive evidence on petitioner’s right over the property to be
demolished.
Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to,
and possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why said power may not
be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title
and possession. It is unquestionable that real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to
an easement of right-of-way."
However, a simple right-of-way easement transmits no rights, except the easement. Vines Realty
retains full ownership and it is not totally deprived of the use of the land. It can continue doing what
it wants to do with the land, except those that would result in contact with the wires.
The acquisition of this easement, nevertheless, is not gratis.1âwphi1 Considering the nature and
effect of the installation power lines, the limitations on the use of the land for an indefinite period
deprives private respondents of its ordinary use. For these reasons, Vines Realty is entitled to
payment of just compensation, which must be neither more nor less than the money equivalent of
the property.
98
BRYAN U. VILLANUEVA, petitioner, vs.HON. TIRSO D.C. VELASCO in his capacity as Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 88, JULIO N. SEBASTIAN and
SHIRLEY LORILLA, respondents.
G.R. No. 130845, SECOND DIVISION, November 27, 2000, QUISUMBING, J.
A legal easement is one mandated by law, constituted for public use or for private interest and becomes
a continuing property right unless its removal is provided for in a title of conveyance or the sign of the
easement is removed before the execution of the conveyance;
FACTS:
Petitioner Bryan Villanueva bought a parcel of land in QC from Pacific Banking Corporation which it
acquired from the spouses Maximo and Justina Gabriel. When he bought it, there was a small house
on its southeastern portion. It occupies one meter of two meter wide easement of right of way the
Gabriel spouses granted to Espinolas, predecessors-in-interest of the private respondents, in a
contract of easement of right of way. Amongst others, the contract provides that the easement’s
purpose is to have an outlet to Tandang Sora which is the nearest public road and the least
burdensome (Espinolas’s property being the dominant estate and Gabriel spouses’s as the servient
estate.) It was also provided in the contract that the easement “shall be binding to the successors,
assigns without prejudice in cases of sale of subject property that will warrant the circumstances.”
The private respondents were able to acquire a writ of demolition on the house obstructing the
easement against the Spouses Gabriel. The petitioner filed a third party claim with prayer to quash
the writ saying that he was not made a party to the civil case and that the writ of demolition should
not prosper since the easement which is meant to protect was not annotated in the petitioner’s title.
CA ruled in favor of the private respondents saying that the easement exists even though it was not
annotated in the torrens title because servitudes are inseparable from the estate to which they
actively or passively belong. And that Villanueva is bound by the contact of easement, not only as a
voluntary easement but as a legal easement.
ISSUE: Whether or not the easement on the property binds petitioner?
RULING:
YES. A legal easement is mandated by law, and continues to exists unless its removal is provided for
in a title of conveyance or the sign of the easement is removed before the execution of the conveyance
conformably with Art 647 in accordance with Article 617 of the Civil Code.
Essential requisites for an easement to be compulsory are: (1) the dominant estate is surrounded by
other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) proper indemnity has been
paid; (3) the isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate; (4) the right of
way claimed is at point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and (5) to the extent consistent with
the foregoing rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the
shortest.
The existence of the easement has been established by the lower courts and the same has become
conclusive to the SC. The small house occupying one meter of the two-meter wide easement obstructs
99
the entry of private respondent’s cement mixer and motor vehicle (no mention of what kind.)
Accordingly, the petitioner has to demolish the house to make way for the easement.
COSTABELLA CORPORATION, Petitioner, -versus- COURT OF APPEALS, KATIPUNAN LUMBER

CO., INC., AURORA BUSTOS LOPEZ, MANUEL S. SATORRE, JR., JOSEFA C. REVILLES, FELIX
TIUKINHOY, JR., PERFECTA L. CHUANGCO, and CESAR T. ESPINA,Respondents.
G.R. No. 80511, SECOND DIVISION, January 25, 1991, SARMIENTO, J.
Under Articles 649 and 650 of the New Civil Code, the owner of the dominant estate may validly claim a
compulsory right of way only after he has established the existence of four requisites, to wit: (1) the
(dominant) estate is surrounded by other immovables and is without adequate outlet to a public
highway; (2) after payment of the proper indemnity; (3) the isolation was not due to the proprietor's
own acts; and (4) the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate.
Additionally, the burden of proving the existence of the foregoing pre-requisites lies on the owner of the
dominant estate.
Here, there is absent any showing that the private respondents had established the existence of the four
requisites mandated by law. For one, they failed to prove that there is no adequate outlet from their
respective properties to a public highway. Further, the private respondents failed to indicate in their
complaint or even to manifest during the trial of the case that they were willing to indemnify fully the
petitioner for the right of way to be established over its property. Neither have the private respondents
been able to show that the isolation of their property was not due to their personal or their predecessors-
in-interest's own acts. Finally, the private respondents failed to allege, much more introduce any
evidence, that the passageway they seek to be re-opened is at a point least prejudicial to the petitioner.
FACTS:
It is admitted that the petitioner owns the real estate properties designated as Lots Nos. 5122 and
5124 of the Opon Cadastre, situated at Sitio Buyong, Maribago, Lapu-Lapu City, on which it had
constructed a resort and hotel. The private respondents, on the other hand, are the owners of
adjoining properties more particularly known as Lots Nos. 5123-A and 5123-C of the Opon Cadastre.
Before the petitioner began the construction of its beach hotel, the private respondents, in going to
and from their respective properties and the provincial road, passed through a passageway which
traversed the petitioner's property. In 1981, the petitioner closed the aforementioned passageway
when it began the construction of its hotel, but nonetheless opened another route across its property
through which the private respondents, as in the past, were allowed to pass. (Later, or sometime in
August, 1982, when it undertook the construction of the second phase of its beach hotel, the
petitioner fenced its property thus closing even the alternative passageway and preventing the
private respondents from traversing any part of it.)
As a direct consequence of these closures, an action for injunction with damages was filed against the
petitioner by the private respondents on September 2, 1982 before the then Court of First Instance
of Cebu.
After trial, the court a quo rendered a decision on March 15, 1984 finding that the private
respondents had acquired a vested right over the passageway in controversy based on its long
existence and its continued use and enjoyment not only by the private respondents, but also by the
100
community at large. The petitioner in so closing the said passageway, had accordingly violated the
private respondents' vested right.
In its decision, the respondent Appellate Court held as without basis the trial court's finding that the
private respondents had acquired a vested right over the passageway in question by virtue of
prescription. The appellate court pointed out that an easement of right of way is a discontinuous one
which, under Article 622 of the New Civil Code, may only be acquired by virtue of a title and not by
prescription. That notwithstanding, the appellate court went on to rule that ". . . in the interest of
justice and in the exercise by this Court of its equity jurisdiction, there is no reason for Us in not
treating the easement here sought by appellees Katipunan Lumber Co., Inc. and Perfecta Guangco as
one that is not dependent upon the claims of the parties but a compulsory one that is legally
demandable by the owner of the dominant estate from the owner of the servient estate." Thus the
appellate court: (1) granted the private respondents the right to an easement of way on the
petitioner's property using the passageway in question, unless the petitioner should provide another
passageway equally accessible and convenient as the one it closed; (2) remanded the case to the trial
court for the determination of the just and proper indemnity to be paid to the petitioner by the
private respondents for the said easement; and (3) set aside the trial court's award of actual damages
and attorney's fees.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the decision of the respondent appellate court is grossly erroneous and not in accord
with the provisions of Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code on easements and the prevailing
jurisprudence on the matter. (YES)
RULING:
It is already well-established that an easement of right of way, as is involved here, is discontinuous

and as such can not be acquired by prescription. Insofar therefore as the appellate court adhered to
the foregoing precepts, it stood correct. Unfortunately, after making the correct pronouncement, the
respondent Appellate Court did not order the reversal of the trial court's decision and the dismissal
of the complaint after holding that no easement had been validly constituted over the petitioner's
property. Instead, the Appellate Court went on to commit a reversible error by considering the
passageway in issue as a compulsory easement which the private respondents, as owners of the
"dominant" estate, may demand from the petitioner the latter being the owner of the "servient"
estate.
Under Articles 649 and 650 of the New Civil Code, the owner of the dominant estate may validly claim
a compulsory right of way only after he has established the existence of four requisites, to wit: (1)
the (dominant) estate is surrounded by other immovables and is without adequate outlet to a public
highway; (2) after payment of the proper indemnity; (3) the isolation was not due to the proprietor's
own acts; and (4) the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate.
Additionally, the burden of proving the existence of the foregoing pre-requisites lies on the owner of
the dominant estate.
Here, there is absent any showing that the private respondents had established the existence of the
four requisites mandated by law. For one, they failed to prove that there is no adequate outlet from
their respective properties to a public highway. On the contrary, as alleged by the petitioner in its
answer to the complaint, and confirmed by the appellate court, "there is another outlet for the
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plaintiffs (private respondents) to the main road." Thus, the respondent Court of Appeals likewise
admitted that "legally the old road could be closed." Yet, it ordered the reopening of the old
passageway on the ground that "the existing outlet (the other outlet) is inconvenient to the plaintiff."
On this score, it is apparent that the Court of Appeals lost sight of the fact that the convenience of the
dominant estate has never been the gauge for the grant of compulsory right of way. To be sure, the
true standard for the grant of the legal right is "adequacy." Hence, when there is already an existing
adequate outlet from the dominant estate to a public highway, even if the said outlet, for one reason
or another, be inconvenient, the need to open up another servitude is entirely unjustified. For to
justify the imposition of an easement or right of way, "there must be a real, not a fictitious or artificial
necessity for it."
Further, the private respondents failed to indicate in their complaint or even to manifest during the
trial of the case that they were willing to indemnify fully the petitioner for the right of way to be
established over its property. Neither have the private respondents been able to show that the
isolation of their property was not due to their personal or their predecessors-in-interest's own acts.
Finally, the private respondents failed to allege, much more introduce any evidence, that the
passageway they seek to be re-opened is at a point least prejudicial to the petitioner. Considering
that the petitioner operates a hotel and beach resort in its property, it must undeniably maintain a
strict standard of security within its premises. Otherwise, the convenience, privacy, and safety of its
clients and patrons would be compromised. That indubitably will doom the petitioner's business. It
is therefore of great importance that the claimed light of way over the petitioner's property be located
at a point least prejudicial to its business.
Hence, the Private respondents' properties can not be said to be isolated, for which a compulsory
easement is demandable. Insofar therefore as the Appellate Court declared the case to be proper as
a controversy for a compulsory right of way, this Court is constrained to hold that it was in error.
As also earlier indicated, there must be a real necessity therefor, and not mere convenience for the
dominant estate. Hence, if there is an existing outlet, otherwise adequate, to the highway, the
"dominant" estate can not demand a right of way, although the same may not be convenient. Of
course, the question of when a particular passage may be said to be "adequate" depends on the
circumstances of each case. Manresa, however, says: "In truth, not only the estate which absolutely
does not possess it should be considered in this condition, but also that which does not have one
sufficiently safe or serviceable; an estate bordering a public road through an inaccessible slope or
precipice, is in fact isolated for all the effects of the easement requested by its owner. On the other
hand, an estate which for any reason has necessarily lost its access to a public road during certain
periods of the year is in the same condition. . . . There are some who propound the query as to whether
the fact that a river flows between the estate and the public road should be considered as having the
effect of isolating the estate. . . . If the river may be crossed conveniently at all times without the least
danger, it cannot be said that the estate is isolated; in any other case, the answer is in the affirmative."
The isolation of the dominant estate is also dependent on the particular need of the dominant owner,
and the estate itself need not be totally landlocked. What is important to consider is whether or not
a right of way is necessary to fill a reasonable need therefor by the owner. Thus, as Manresa had
pointed out, if the passageway consists of an "inaccessible slope or precipice," it is as if there is no
passageway, that is, one that can sufficiently fulfill the dominant owner's necessities, although by the
existence of that passageway the property can not be truly said that the property is isolated. So also,
while an existing right of way may have proved adequate at the start, the dominant owner's need
may have changed since then, for which Article 651 of the Code allows adjustments as to width.
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But while a right of way is legally demandable, the owner of the dominant estate is not at liberty to
impose one based on arbitrary choice. Under Article 650 of the Code, it shall be established upon two
criteria: (1) at the point least prejudicial to the servient state; and (2) where the distance to a public
highway may be the shortest. According, however, to one commentator, "least prejudice" prevails
over "shortest distance." Yet, each case must be weighed according to its individual merits, and
judged according to the sound discretion of the court. "The court," says Tolentino, "is not bound to
establish what is the shortest; a longer way may be established to avoid injury to the servient
tenement, such as when there are constuctions or walls which can be avoided by a roundabout way,
or to secure the interest of the dominant owner, such as when the shortest distance would place the
way on a dangerous decline."
TOMAS ENCARNACION, Petitioner, -versus- THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE
INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE EUSEBIO DE SAGUN and THE HEIRS OF THE LATE ANICETA
MAGSINO VIUDA DE SAGUN,* Respondents.
G.R. No. 77628, THIRD DIVISION, March 11, 1991, FERNAN, C.J.
Article 651 of the Civil Code provides that "(t)he width of the easement of right of way shall be that
which is sufficient for the needs of the dominant estate, and may accordingly be changed from time to
time." This is taken to mean that under the law, it is the needs of the dominant property which ultimately
determine the width of the passage. And these needs may vary from time to time.
When petitioner started out as a plant nursery operator, he and his family could easily make do with a
few pushcarts to tow the plants to the national highway. But the business grew and with it the need for
the use of modern means of conveyance or transport. Manual hauling of plants and garden soil and use
of pushcarts have become extremely cumbersome and physically taxing. To force petitioner to leave his
jeepney in the highway, exposed to the elements and to the risk of theft simply because it could not pass
through the improvised pathway, is sheer pigheadedness on the part of the servient estate and can only
be counter-productive for all the people concerned. Petitioner should not be denied a passageway wide
enough to accomodate his jeepney since that is a reasonable and necessary aspect of the plant nursery
business.
FACTS:
Petitioner Tomas Encarnacion and private respondent Heirs of the late Aniceta Magsino Viuda de
Sagun are the owners of two adjacent estates situated in Buco, Talisay, Batangas. ** Petitioner owns
the dominant estate which has an area of 2,590 square meters and bounded on the North by Eusebio
de Sagun and Mamerto Magsino, on the south by Taal Lake, on the East by Felino Matienzo and on
the West by Pedro Matienzo. Private respondents co-own the 405-square-meter servient estate
which is bounded on the North by the National Highway (Laurel-Talisay Highway), on the South by
Tomas Encarnacion, on the East by Mamerto Magsino and on the West by Felipe de Sagun. In other
words, the servient estate stands between the dominant estate and the national road.
Prior to 1960, when the servient estate was not yet enclosed with a concrete fence, persons going to
the national highway just crossed the servient estate at no particular point. However, in 1960 when
private respondents constructed a fence around the servient estate, a roadpath measuring 25 meters
long and about a meter wide was constituted to provide access to the highway. One-half meter width
of the path was taken from the servient estate and the other one-half meter portion was taken from
another lot owned by Mamerto Magsino. No compensation was asked and non was given for the
portions constituting the pathway.
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It was also about that time that petitioner started his plant nursery business on his land where he
also had his abode. He would use said pathway as passage to the highway for his family and for his
customers.
Petitioner's plant nursery business through sheer hard work flourished and with that, it became
more and more difficult for petitioner to haul the plants and garden soil to and from the nursery and
the highway with the use of pushcarts. In January, 1984, petitioner was able to buy an owner-type
jeep which he could use for transporting his plants. However, that jeep could not pass through the
roadpath and so he approached the servient estate owners (Aniceta Vda. de Sagun and Elena Romero
Vda. de Sagun) and requested that they sell to him one and one-half (1 1/2) meters of their property
to be added to the existing pathway so as to allow passage for his jeepney. To his utter consternation,
his request was turned down by the two widows and further attempts at negotiation proved futile.
Petitioner then instituted an action before the Regional Trial Court of Batangas, Branch 6 (Tanauan)
to seek the issuance of a writ of easement of a right of way over an additional width of at least two (2)
meters over the De Saguns' 405-square-meter parcel of land.
On December 2, 1985, the lower court rendered judgment dismissing petitioner's complaint.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court on January 28, 1987 and
rejected petitioner's claim for an additional easement.
In sustaining the trial court, the Court of Appeals opined that the necessity interposed by petitioner
was not compelling enough to justify interference with the property rights of private respondents.
The Appellate Court took into consideration the presence of a dried river bed only eighty (80) meters
away from the dominant estate and conjectured that petitioner might have actually driven his jeep
through the river bed in order to get to the highway, and that the only reason why he wanted a wider
easement through the De Sagun's estate was that it was more convenient for his business and family
needs.
ISSUE:
Whether or no petitioner has sufficiently established his claim for an additional easement of right of
way, contrary to the conclusions of the courts a quo. (YES)
RULING:
While there is a dried river bed less than 100 meters from the dominant tenement, that access is
grossly inadequate. Generally, the right of way may be demanded: (1) when there is absolutely no
access to a public highway, and (2) when, even if there is one, it is difficult or dangerous to use or is
grossly insufficient. In the present case, the river bed route is traversed by a semi-concrete bridge
and there is no ingress nor egress from the highway. For the jeep to reach the level of the highway, it
must literally jump four (4) to five (5) meters up. Moreover, during the rainy season, the river bed is
impassable due to the floods. Thus, it can only be used at certain times of the year. With the inherent
disadvantages of the river bed which make passage difficult, if not impossible, it is if there were no
outlet at all.
Where a private property has no access to a public road, it has the right of easement over adjacent
servient estates as a matter of law.
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With the non-availability of the dried river bed as an alternative route to the highway, we transfer
our attention to the existing pathway which straddles the adjoining properties of the De Sagun heirs
and Mamerto Magsino.
The courts below have taken against petitioner his candid admission in open court that he needed a
wider pathway for the convenience of his business and family. (TSN, August 2, 1985, pp. 24-26). We
cannot begrudge petitioner for wanting that which is convenient. But certainly that should not
detract from the more pressing consideration that there is a real and compelling need for such
servitude in his favor.
Article 651 of the Civil Code provides that "(t)he width of the easement of right of way shall be that
which is sufficient for the needs of the dominant estate, and may accordingly be changed from time
to time." This is taken to mean that under the law, it is the needs of the dominant property which
ultimately determine the width of the passage. And these needs may vary from time to time. When
petitioner started out as a plant nursery operator, he and his family could easily make do with a few
pushcarts to tow the plants to the national highway. But the business grew and with it the need for
the use of modern means of conveyance or transport. Manual hauling of plants and garden soil and
use of pushcarts have become extremely cumbersome and physically taxing. To force petitioner to
leave his jeepney in the highway, exposed to the elements and to the risk of theft simply because it
could not pass through the improvised pathway, is sheer pigheadedness on the part of the servient
estate and can only be counter-productive for all the people concerned. Petitioner should not be
denied a passageway wide enough to accomodate his jeepney since that is a reasonable and
necessary aspect of the plant nursery business.
We are well aware that an additional one and one-half (1 1/2) meters in the width of the pathway
will reduce the servient estate to only about 342.5 square meters. But petitioner has expressed
willingness to exchange an equivalent portion of his land to compensate private respondents for their
loss. Perhaps, it would be well for respondents to take the offer of petitioner seriously. But unless
and until that option is considered, the law decrees that petitioner must indemnify the owners of the
servient estate including Mamerto Magsino from whose adjoining lot 1/2 meter was taken to
constitute the original path several years ago. Since the easement to be established in favor of
petitioner is of a continuous and permanent nature, the indemnity shall consist of the value of the
land occupied and the amount of the damage caused to the servient estate pursuant to Article 649 of
the Civil Code.
ADRIANA DIONISIO, ET AL., Petitioners, -versus- JUDGE RODOLFO ORTIZ OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 89 AND PABLO TAN GONZAGA, et al., Respondents.
G.R. No. 95738, THIRD DIVISION, December 10, 1991, GUTIERREZ, JR., J.
Article 649 of Civil Code justifies petitioners' claim, to wit:
Art. 649. The owner, or any person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or use any
immovable, which is surrounded by other immovables pertaining to other persons and
without adequate outlet to a public highway, is entitled to demand a right of way
through the neigboring estates, after payment of the proper indemnity.
Should this easement be established in such a manner that its use may be continuous for
all the needs of the dominant estate, establishing a permanent passage, the indemnity
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shall consist of the value of the land occupied and the amount of the damage caused to
the servient estate.
In case the right of way is limited to the necessary passage for the cultivation of the
estate surrounded by others and for the gathering of its crops through the servient
estate without a permanent way, the indemnity shall consist in the payment of the
damage caused by such encumbrance.
This easement is not compulsory if the isolation of the immovable is due to the
proprietor's own acts.
The construction of a wall between the 2 lots leaving only a small passageway between them is an act
imputable to the private respondents which precludes them from asserting a right of way. The opening
of the new gate would definitely be very convenient to the private respondents but mere convenience is
not enough to serve as basis for the assertion of a right of way.
It was therefore inaccurate for the lower court to state that the private respondents have shown a clear
right to justify the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction when the facts and circumstances of
the case do not warrant it.
FACTS:
The petitioners are co-owners of lots contiguous to each other situated in the Sitio of Kangkong,
District of Balintawak, Quezon City.
The private respondents are also co-owners of lots which are adjacent to the lots owned by the
petitioners. Lot 272-B has an area of 1,427 sq. m. which was later subdivided into two lots where Lot
272-A was assigned to Chua Lee and Chua Bun Tong pursuant to a memorandum agreement executed
by and between them. They are also owners of another lot at the upper portion of Lot 272-B with an
area of 914 sq. m.
By virtue of an agreement entered intobetween the owners of the contiguous lots and the members
of the Quezon City Industrial Estates Association (QCIEA), a right of way was granted over Howmart
Road which is a private road traversing the contiguous lots owned by the petitioners, among others,
in favor of the QCIEA members. In return for its use, QCIEA paid compensation to the petitioners for
this right of way. The private respondents are bona fide members of the QCIEA.
In order to have access to Howmart Road, there is a gate in private respondents' 914 sq. m. lot
fronting Howmart Road and another gate in Lot 272-A. As a result of the subdivision of Lot 272, the
private respondents opened a new gate in Lot 272-B also fronting Howmart Road which is now the
gate in question.
On October 5, 1989, under the instructions of Maxima Dionisio, certain persons commenced the
digging of four holes in a parallel line and afterwards put up steel posts wielded to a steel plate in
front of the newly constructed gate of private respondents amidst the latter's protestations.The
petitioners claim that the surreptitiously constructed gate opened directly into the house of Maxima
Dionisio, exposing them to air and noise pollution arising from the respondents' delivery trucks and
service vehicles.
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On November 7, 1989, the private respondents instituted a civil action for damages against the
petitioners. The complaint sought the immediate issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
ordering the petitioner to remove the barricade erected by them in front of the iron gate.
On January 8, 1990, respondent Judge Ortiz issued an Order granting the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction.
The petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals assailing the Order of
Judge Ortiz.
Fifteen days later, the petitionersremoved the barricade in front of the gate of the private
respondents after they failed to obtain a temporary restraining order (TRO) from the Court of
Appeals enjoining the lower court from implementing its order.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on the ground that the issue has already become moot
and academic since the petitioners have already complied with the Order of the lower court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the private respondents have an easement of right of way over Howmart Road. (NO)
RULING:
There is no question that a right of way was granted in favor of the private respondents over
Howmart Road but the records disclose that such right of way expired in December, 1988. The
continued use of the easement enjoyed by QCIEAincluding the private respondents is by the mere
tolerance of the owners pending the renegotiation of the terms and conditions of said right of way.
This is precisely shown by the two letters to the QCIEA requesting for an increase in compensation
for the use of Howmart Road. Absent an agreement of the parties as to the consideration, among
others, no contract of easement of right of way has been validly entered into by the petitioners and
QCIEA (see Robleza v. Court of Appeals, (74 SCRA 354 [1989]). Thus, the private respondents' claim
of an easement of right of way over Howmart Road has no legal or factual basis.
Not having any right, the private respondents arenot entitled to the injunctive relief granted by the
lower court.
We have held in several cases that in order to be entitled to an injunctive writ, one must show an
unquestionable right over the premises and that such right has been violated.
The party applying for preliminary injunction must show that (a) the invasion of the right sought to
be protected is material and substantial; (b) the right of complainant is clear and unmistakable; and
(c) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.
In the case at bar, the private respondents have not shown that there is an urgent and paramount
necessity for the issuance of the writ.
The records show that there are two (2) gates through which the private respondents may pass to
have direct access to EDSA: (1) the northern gate which opens directly to EDSA; and (2) the southern
gate along Howmart Road. The records also disclose that the petitioners and the other lot owners
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previously prohibited and prevented members of QCIEA from opening new gates. The claim that they
were forced to open a new gate by reason of the subdivision of Lot 272 where a wall was constructed
between these 2 lots is untenable. The private respondents can not assert a right of way when by
their own or voluntary act, they themselves have caused the isolation of their property from the
access road. Article 649 of Civil Code justifies petitioners' claim, to wit:
Art. 649. The owner, or any person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or use
any immovable, which is surrounded by other immovables pertaining to other
persons and without adequate outlet to a public highway, is entitled to demand a right
of way through the neigboring estates, after payment of the proper indemnity.
Should this easement be established in such a manner that its use may be continuous
for all the needs of the dominant estate, establishing a permanent passage, the
indemnity shall consist of the value of the land occupied and the amount of the
damage caused to the servient estate.
In case the right of way is limited to the necessary passage for the cultivation of the
estate surrounded by others and for the gathering of its crops through the servient
estate without a permanent way, the indemnity shall consist in the payment of the
damage caused by such encumbrance.
This easement is not compulsory if the isolation of the immovable is due to the
proprietor's own acts.
The construction of a wall between the 2 lots leaving only a small passageway between them is an
act imputable to the private respondents which precludes them from asserting a right of way. The
opening of the new gate would definitely be very convenient to the private respondents but mere
convenience is not enough to serve as basis for the assertion of a right of way.
It was therefore inaccurate for the lower court to state that the private respondents have shown a
clear right to justify the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction when the facts and
circumstances of the case do not warrant it. The respondent Court, however, dismissed the petition
on the ground that the issue was already moot and academic upon the petitioners' compliance with
the Order of the respondent Judge.
The Court of Appeals has the power to recallor lift the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction so
issued if it finds that the party is not so entitled. However, in dismissing the petition the court, in
effect affirmed the lower court's finding that the private respondents were indeed entitled to the writ
of preliminary injunction. But as we have earlier found, the private respondents are not entitled to
the injunctive relief considering that they have no clear right over Howmart Road.
HELEN CALIMOSO, MARILYN P. CALIMOSO AND LIBY P. CALIMOSO, Petitioners, -versus- AXEL
D. ROULLO, Respondent.
G.R. No. 198594, SECOND DIVISION, January 25, 2016, BRION, J.
Article 650 of the Civil Code provides that the easement of right-of-way shall be established at the point
least prejudicial to the servient estate, and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from
the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest. Under this guideline, whenever there are
several tenements surrounding the dominant estate, the right-of-way must be established on the
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tenement where the distance to the public road or highway is shortest and where the least damage
would be caused. If these two criteria (shortest distance and least damage) do not concur in a single
tenement, we have held in the past that the least prejudice criterion must prevail over the shortest
distance criterion.
FACTS:
In his Complaint for Easement of Right of Way, the respondent mainly alleged: that he is the owner
of Lot 1462-C-1 situated in Brgy. Sambag, Jaro, Iloilo City; that his lot is isolated by several
surrounding estates, including Lot 1454-B-25 owned by petitioners Helen, Marilyn, and Liby, all
surnamed Calimoso; that he needs a right-of-way in order to have access to a public road; and that
the shortest and most convenient access to the nearest public road, i.e., Fajardo Subdivision Road,
passes through the petitioners' lot.
The petitioners objected to the establishment of the easement because it would cause substantial
damage to the 2 houses already standing on their property. They alleged that the respondent has
other right-of-way alternatives, such as the existing wooden bridge over Sipac Creek bounding the
respondent's lot on the northeast; that the bridge, if made concrete, could provide ingress or egress
to the Fajardo Subdivision Road.
In a decision dated September 29, 2003, the RTC granted the respondent's complaint and ordered
the petitioners to provide the respondent an easement of right-of-way "measuring 14 meters in
length and 3 meters in width (42 square meters, more or less) over Lot1454-B-25, specifically at
the portion adjoining the bank of Sipac Creek." The petitioners appealed the RTC's decision to the CA.
The CA, in its assailed December 15, 2010 decision, affirmed in toto the RTC's decision and held that
all the requisites for the establishment of a legal or compulsory easement of right-of-way were
present in the respondent's case: first, that the subject lot is indeed surrounded by estates owned by
different individuals and the respondent has no access to any existing public road; second, that the
respondent has offered to compensate the petitioners for the establishment of the right-of-way
through the latter's property; third, that the isolation of the subject lot was not caused by the
respondent as he purchased the lot without any adequate ingress or egress to a public highway;
and, fourth and last, given the available options for the right-of-way, the route that passes through
the petitioners' lot requires the shortest distance to a public road and can be established at a
point least prejudicial to the petitioners' property.
The petitioners moved to reconsider the CA's decision arguing that, while the establishment of the
easement through their lot provided for the shortest route, the adjudged right-of-way would cause
severe damage not only to the nipa hut situated at the corner of the petitioners' lot, but also to the
bedroom portion of the other concrete house that stood on the property. The CA, however, did not
consider the petitioners' arguments on the ground that the matters alleged were not raised or proven
before the trial court, thus, it denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether the right-of-way passing through the petitioners' lot satisfies the fourth requirement of
being established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate. (NO)
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RULING:
Three options were then available to the respondent for the demanded right-of-way: the first
option is to traverse directly through the petitioners' property, which route has an approximate
distance of 14 meters from the respondent's lot to the Fajardo Subdivision Road; the second option is
to pass through two vacant lots (Lots 1461-B-l and 1461-B-2) located on the southwest of the
respondent's lot, which route has an approximate distance of 43 meters to another public highway,
the Diversion Road; and the third option is to construct a concrete bridge over Sipac Creek and ask
for a right-of-way on the property of a certain Mr. Basa in order to reach the Fajardo Subdivision
Road.
Among the right-of-way alternatives, the CA adopted the first option, i.e., passing through the
petitioner's lot, because it offered the shortest distance (from the respondent's lot) to the Fajardo
Subdivision Road and the right-of-way would only affect the "nipa hut" standing on the petitioners'
property.
Article 650 of the Civil Code provides that the easement of right-of-way shall be established at the
point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the
distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest. Under this guideline,
whenever there are several tenements surrounding the dominant estate, the right-of-way must be
established on the tenement where the distance to the public road or highway is shortest and where
the least damage would be caused. If these two criteria (shortest distance and least damage) do not
concur in a single tenement, we have held in the past that the least prejudice criterion must prevail
over the shortest distance criterion.
In this case, the establishment of a right-of-way through the petitioners' lot would cause the
destruction of the wire fence and a house on the petitioners' property. Although this right-of-way has
the shortest distance to a public road, it is not the least prejudicial considering the destruction
pointed out, and that an option to traverse two vacant lots without causing any damage, albeit longer,
is available.
We have held that "mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what is required by law as the
basis of setting up a compulsory easement;" that "a longer way may be adopted to avoid injury to the
servient estate, such as when there are constructions or walls which can be avoided by a roundabout
way."
NATIVIDAD C. CRUZ AND BENJAMIN DELA CRUZ, Petitioners, -versus- PANDACAN HIKER'S
CLUB, INC., REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, PRISCILA ILAO, Respondent.
G.R. No. 188213, THIRD DIVISION, January 11, 2016, PERLATA, J.
A nuisance is classified in two ways: (1) according to the object it affects; or (2) according to its
susceptibility to summary abatement.
As for a nuisance classified according to the object or objects that it affects, a nuisance may either be:
(a) a public nuisance, i.e., one which “affects a community or neighborhood or any considerable number
of persons, although the extent of the annoyance, danger or damage upon individuals may be unequal”;
or (b) a private nuisance, or one “that is not included in the foregoing definition” which, in jurisprudence,
is one which “violates only private rights and produces damages to but one or a few persons.”
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A nuisance may also be classified as to whether it is susceptible to a legal summary abatement, in which
case, it may either be: (a) a nuisance per se, when it affects the immediate safety of persons and property,
which may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity; or, (b) a nuisance per accidens,
which “depends upon certain conditions and circumstances, and its existence being a question of fact, it
cannot be abated without due hearing thereon in a tribunal authorized to decide whether such a thing
does in law constitute a nuisance;” it may only be so proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose and
may not be summarily abated without judicial intervention.
FACTS:
Petitioner Natividad C. Cruz was the Chairperson of Barangay 848, Zone 92, City of Manila. On
November 10, 2006, around five o'clock in the afternoon, and along Central Street, Pandacan, Manila,
within the vicinity of her barangay, she allegedly confronted persons playing basketball with the
following statements: “Bakit nakabukas ang (basketball) court? Wala kayong karapatang maglaro sa
court na 'to, barangay namin ito! xxx xxx xxx Wala kayong magagawa. Ako ang chairman dito. Mga
walanghiya kayo, patay gutom! Hindi ako natatakot! Kaya kong panagutan lahat!”
Thereafter, she gave an order to Benjamin Dela Cruz, a Barangay Tanod of the said barangay, to
destroy the basketball ring by cutting it up with a hacksaw which Dela Cruz promptly complied with.
The acts of petitioners prompted the filing of a Complaint (for Malicious Mischief, Grave Misconduct,
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and Abuse of Authority) before the Prosecutor's
Office and the Office of the Ombudsman by the group that claims to be the basketball court's owners,
herein respondents Pandacan Hiker's Club, Inc. and its president Priscila Ilao. In the complaint, they
alleged that PHC, a non-stock, non-profit civic organization engaged in "health, infrastructure, sports
and other so-called poverty alleviation activities" in the Pandacan area of Manila, is the group that
had donated, administered and operated the subject basketball court for the Pandacan community
until its alleged destruction by petitioners.
In answer to the complaint, Cruz alleged that the basketball court affected the peace in the barangay
and was the subject of many complaints from residents asking for its closure. She alleged that the
playing court blocked jeepneys from passing through and was the site of rampant bettings and fights
involving persons from within and outside the barangays. She claimed that innocent persons have
been hurt and property had been damaged by such armed confrontations, which often involved the
throwing of rocks and improvised “molotov” bombs. She also averred that noise from the games
caused lack of sleep among some residents and that the place's frequent visitors used the
community's fences as places to urinate.
On April 26, 2007, the Office of the Ombudsman rendered its Decision dismissing the complaint. The
Ombudsman found that the act of destroying the basketball ring was only motivated by Cruz and Dela
Cruz performing their sworn duty, as defined in the Local Government Code. It found the act to be a
mere response to the clamor of constituents. The office found that though the cutting of the ring was
“drastic,” it was done by the barangay officials within their lawful duties, as the act was only the result
of the unauthorized removal of and failure to return the steel bar and padlock that were earlier placed
thereon.
A Petition for Review was filed before the Court of Appeals praying for the said court to nullify the
Ombudsman’s decision. On March 31, 2008, the appellate court reversed the Ombudsman’s Decision
stating that Cruz and Dela Cruz performed an abatement of what they thought was a public nuisance
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but did the same without following the proper legal procedure, thus making them liable for said acts.
Moreover, it held Cruz to be without the power to declare a thing a nuisance unless it is a nuisance
per se. It declared the subject basketball ring as not such a nuisance and, thus, not subject to summary
abatement. The court added that even if the same was to be considered a nuisance per accidens, the
only way to establish it as such is after a hearing conducted for that purpose.
A motion for reconsideration, filed by Cruz and Dela Cruz, was likewise denied by the appellate court.
ISSUE:
Whether there is a nuisance which the Barangay Chairperson may summarily abate. (NO)
RULING:
There is a nuisance when there is "any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property,
or anything else which: (1) injures or endangers the health or safety of others; or (2) annoys or
offends the senses; or (3) shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; or (4) obstructs or
interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water; or (5) hinders
or impairs the use of property." But other than the statutory definition, jurisprudence recognizes that
the term "nuisance" is so comprehensive that it has been applied to almost all ways which have
interfered with the rights of the citizens, either in person, property, the enjoyment of his property, or
his comfort.
A nuisance is classified in two ways: (1) according to the object it affects; or (2) according to its
susceptibility to summary abatement.
As for a nuisance classified according to the object or objects that it affects, a nuisance may either be:
(a) a public nuisance, i.e., one which “affects a community or neighborhood or any considerable
number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance, danger or damage upon individuals may
be unequal”; or (b) a private nuisance, or one “that is not included in the foregoing definition” which,
in jurisprudence, is one which “violates only private rights and produces damages to but one or a few
persons.”
A nuisance may also be classified as to whether it is susceptible to a legal summary abatement, in

which case, it may either be: (a) a nuisance per se, when it affects the immediate safety of persons
and property, which may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity; or, (b) a
nuisance per accidens, which “depends upon certain conditions and circumstances, and its existence
being a question of fact, it cannot be abated without due hearing thereon in a tribunal authorized to
decide whether such a thing does in law constitute a nuisance;” it may only be so proven in a hearing
conducted for that purpose and may not be summarily abated without judicial intervention.
In the case at bar, none of the tribunals below made a factual finding that the basketball ring was a
nuisance per se that is susceptible to a summary abatement. And based on what appears in the
records, it can be held, at most, as a mere nuisance per accidens, for it does not pose an immediate
effect upon the safety of persons and property, the definition of a nuisance per se. Culling from
examples cited in jurisprudence, it is unlike a mad dog on the loose, which may be killed on sight
because of the immediate danger it poses to the safety and lives of the people; nor is it like
pornographic materials, contaminated meat and narcotic drugs which are inherently pernicious and
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which may be summarily destroyed; nor is it similar to a filthy restaurant which may be summarily
padlocked in the interest of the public health. A basketball ring, by itself, poses no immediate harm
or danger to anyone but is merely an object of recreation. Neither is it, by its nature, injurious to
rights of property, of health or of comfort of the community and, thus, it may not be abated as a
nuisance without the benefit of a judicial hearing. But even if it is assumed, ex gratia argumenti, that
the basketball ring was a nuisance per se, but without posing any immediate harm or threat that
required instantaneous action, the destruction or abatement performed by petitioners failed to
observe the proper procedure for such an action which puts the said act into legal question.
JAIME S. PEREZ, both in his personal and official capacity as Chief, Marikina Demolition
Office, Petitioner, -versus- SPOUSES FORTUNITO L. MADRONA and YOLANDA B.
PANTE, Respondents.
G.R. No. 184478, FIRST DIVISION, March 21, 2012, VILLARAMA, JR., J.
If petitioner indeed found respondents’ fence to have encroached on the sidewalk, his remedy is not to
demolish the same summarily after respondents failed to heed his request to remove it. Instead, he
should go to court and prove respondents’ supposed violations in the construction of the concrete fence.
Indeed, unless a thing is a nuisance per se, it may not be abated summarily without judicial intervention.
Our ruling in Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. v. JAC Liner, Inc., on the need for judicial intervention
when the nuisance is not a nuisance per se, is well worth mentioning. In said case, we ruled:
Respondents can not seek cover under the general welfare clause authorizing the abatement of
nuisances without judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance per se, or one which
affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may be summarily abated under the
undefined law of necessity (Monteverde v. Generoso, 52 Phil. 123 [1982]). The storage of copra
in the quonset building is a legitimate business. By its nature, it can not be said to be injurious
to rights of property, of health or of comfort of the community. If it be a nuisance per accidens
it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose. It is not per se a nuisance
warranting its summary abatement without judicial intervention.
FACTS:
Respondent-spouses Fortunito Madrona and Yolanda B. Pante are registered owners of a residential
property located in Lot 22, Block 5, France Street corner Italy Street, Greenheights Subdivision, Phase
II, Marikina City and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 169365 of the Registry of Deeds of
Marikina. In 1989, respondents built their house thereon and enclosed it with a concrete fence and
steel gate.
In 1999, respondents received the following letter dated May 25, 1999 from petitioner Jaime S. Perez,
Chief of the Marikina Demolition Office alleging that their structure violated several ordinances and
consequently advised to demolish their construction.
As response, respondent Madrona sent petitioner a three-page letter6 dated June 8, 1999 stating that
the May 25, 1999 letter (1) contained an accusation libelous in nature as it is condemning him and
his property without due process; (2) has no basis and authority since there is no court order
authorizing him to demolish their structure; (3) cited legal bases which do not expressly give
petitioner authority to demolish; and (4) contained a false accusation since their fence did not in fact
extend to the sidewalk.
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On February 28, 2001, petitioner sent another letter with the same contents as the May 25, 1999
letter but this time giving respondents ten days from receipt thereof to remove the structure
allegedly protruding to the sidewalk. This prompted respondents to file a complaint9 for injunction
before the Marikina City RTC on March 12, 2001.
In respondents’ injunction complaint, they alleged that (1) petitioner’s letters made it appear that
their fence was encroaching on the sidewalk and directed them to remove it, otherwise he would take
the corresponding action; (2) petitioner’s threat of action would be damaging and adverse to
respondents and appears real, earnest and imminent; (3) the removal of their fence, which would
include the main gate, would certainly expose the premises and its occupants to intruders or third
persons; (4) petitioner has no legal authority to demolish structures in private properties and the
laws he cited in his letters do not give him any authority to do so; (5) respondents enjoy the legal
presumption of rightful possession of every inch of their property; (6) if petitioner accuses them of
erroneous possession, he should so prove only through the proper forum which is the courts; (7)
their fence is beside the sidewalk and the land on which it stands has never been the subject of
acquisition either by negotiation or expropriation from the government; (8) petitioner’s intended act
of demolition even in the guise of a road right of way has no factual or legal basis since there is no
existing infrastructure project of the national government or Marikina City government; and (9)
petitioner’s letter and his intended act of demolition are malicious, unfounded, meant only to harass
respondents in gross violation of their rights and in excess and outside the scope of his authority,
thereby rendering him accountable both in his personal and official capacity.
Respondents likewise sought the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a writ of
preliminary injunction to enjoin petitioner and all persons acting under him from doing any act of
demolition on their property and that after trial, the injunction be made permanent. They also prayed
for moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.
On July 27, 2004, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of respondents. The RTC held that
respondents, being lawful owners of the subject property, are entitled to the peaceful and open
possession of every inch of their property and petitioner’s threat to demolish the concrete fence
around their property is tantamount to a violation of their rights as property owners who are entitled
to protection under the Constitution and laws. The RTC also ruled that there is no showing that
respondents’ fence is a nuisance per se and presents an immediate danger to the community’s
welfare, nor is there basis for petitioner’s claim that the fence has encroached on the sidewalk as to
justify its summary demolition.
Petitioner appealed the RTC decision to the CA. On March 31, 2008, the appellate court rendered the
assailed decision affirming the RTC decision.
ISSUE:
Whether the structure is a nuisance per se which may be abated summarily without judicial
intervention. (NO)
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RULING:
If petitioner indeed found respondents’ fence to have encroached on the sidewalk, his remedy is not
to demolish the same summarily after respondents failed to heed his request to remove it. Instead,
he should go to court and prove respondents’ supposed violations in the construction of the concrete
fence. Indeed, unless a thing is a nuisance per se, it may not be abated summarily without judicial
intervention. Our ruling in Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. v. JAC Liner, Inc., on the need for
judicial intervention when the nuisance is not a nuisance per se, is well worth mentioning. In said
case, we ruled:
Respondents can not seek cover under the general welfare clause authorizing the abatement
of nuisances without judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance per se, or one
which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may be summarily abated
under the undefined law of necessity (Monteverde v. Generoso, 52 Phil. 123 [1982]). The
storage of copra in the quonset building is a legitimate business. By its nature, it can not be
said to be injurious to rights of property, of health or of comfort of the community. If it be a
nuisance per accidens it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose. It is not
per se a nuisance warranting its summary abatement without judicial intervention.
Respondents’ fence is not a nuisance per se. By its nature, it is not injurious to the health or comfort
of the community. It was built primarily to secure the property of respondents and prevent intruders
from entering it. And as correctly pointed out by respondents, the sidewalk still exists. If petitioner
believes that respondents’ fence indeed encroaches on the sidewalk, it may be so proven in a hearing
conducted for that purpose. Not being a nuisance per se, but at most a nuisance per accidents, its
summary abatement without judicial intervention is unwarranted.
DONATION
MA. ESTELA MAGLASANG, NICOLAS CABATINGAN and MERLY S. CABATINGAN, Petitioners, -

versus - THE HEIRS OF CORAZON CABATINGAN, namely, LUZ M. BOQUIA, PERLA M. ABELLA,
ESTRELLA M. CAETE, LOURDES M. YUSON, and JULIA L. MAYOL, HEIRS OF GENOVIVA C.
NATIVIDAD namely, OSCAR C. NATIVIDAD, OLGA NATIVIDAD, ODETTE NATIVIDAD, OPHELIA
NATIVIDAD, RICHARD NATIVIDAD, RAYMUND NATIVIDAD, RICHIE NATIVIDAD, SONIA
NATIVIDAD and ENCARNACION CABATINGAN VDA. DE TRINIDAD, ALFREDO CABATINGAN
and JESUSA C. NAVADA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 131953, FIRST DIVISION, June 5, 2002, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
In a donation mortis causa, “the right of disposition is not transferred to the donee while the donor is
still alive. One of the decisive characteristics of a donation mortis causa is that the transfer should be
considered void if the donor should survive the donee. This is exactly what Cabatingan provided for in
her donations. The herein subject deeds expressly provide that the donation shall be rescinded in case
petitioners predecease Conchita Cabatingan.
FACTS:
On February 17, 1992, Conchita Cabatingan executed in favor of her brother, petitioner Nicolas
Cabatingan, a "Deed of Conditional of Donation Inter Vivos for House and Lot" covering one-half (½)
portion of the former's house and lot. Four other deeds of donation were subsequently executed by
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Conchita Cabatingan in favor of (a) petitioner Estela C. Maglasang, (b) petitioner Nicolas Cabatingan
and (c) petitioner Merly S. Cabatingan.
These deeds of donation contain similar provisions, to wit: “to become effective upon the death of the
DONOR; PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that in the event that the DONEE should die before the DONOR, the
present donation shall be deemed automatically rescinded and of no further force and effect.”
On May 9, 1995, Conchita Cabatingan died. Upon learning of the existence of the foregoing donations,
respondents filed with the RTC an action for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Deeds of
Donations and Accounting seeking the annulment of said four deeds of donation. Respondents allege
that the documents are void for failing to comply with the provisions of the Civil Code regarding
formalities of wills and testaments, considering that these are donations mortis causa. Petitioners
contend that Conchita Cabatingan freely, knowingly and voluntarily caused the preparation of the
instruments.
The RTC rendered a partial judgment in favor of respondent. It ruled that the donations are donations
mortis causa and therefore the four deeds in question executed failed to comply with the requisites
of Article 806 of the Civil Code on solemnities of wills and testaments. Petitioners insist that the
donations are inter vivos donations as these were made by the late Conchita Cabatingan "in
consideration of the love and affection of the donor" for the donee, and there is nothing in the deeds
which indicate that the donations were made in consideration of Cabatingan's death
ISSUE:
Whether the donation is inter vivos.
RULING:
The deeds in question although acknowledged before a notary public of the donor and the donee, the
documents were not executed in the manner provided for under the above-quoted provisions of law.
Thus, the trial court did not commit any reversible error in declaring the subject deeds of donation
null and void.
In a donation mortis causa, "the right of disposition is not transferred to the donee while the donor
is still alive." In determining whether a donation is one of mortis causa, the following characteristics
must be taken into account:
(1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or what
amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and
control of the property while alive;
(2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but
revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of
the properties conveyed; and
(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.
In the present case, the nature of the donations as mortis causa is confirmed by the fact that the
donations do not contain any clear provision that intends to pass proprietary rights to petitioners
prior to Cabatingan's death. The phrase "to become effective upon the death of the DONOR" admits
of no other interpretation but that Cabatingan did not intend to transfer the ownership of the
properties to petitioners during her lifetime.
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The herein subject deeds expressly provide that the donation shall be rescinded in case petitioners
predecease Conchita Cabatingan. As stated in Reyes v. Mosqueda, one of the decisive characteristics
of a donation mortis causa is that the transfer should be considered void if the donor should survive
the donee. This is exactly what Cabatingan provided for in her donations. If she really intended that
the donation should take effect during her lifetime and that the ownership of the properties donated
be transferrred to the donee or independently of, and not by reason of her death, she would have not
expressed such proviso in the subject deeds. Considering that the disputed donations are donations
mortis causa, the same partake of the nature of testamentary provisions and as such, said deeds must
be executed in accordance with the requisites on solemnities of wills and testaments under Articles
805 and 806 of the Civil Code,
IGNACIO GONZALES, LILIA R. GONZALES, GUSTAVO R. GONZALES, WIGBERTO R. GONZALES,

GILDA GONZALES-SALUTA, FERNANDO RAMIREZ, OCTAVIO RAMIREZ, JR., IGNACIO RAMIREZ,
ESMIRNA RAMIREZ, MERCEDES GONZALES-FAVIZ, JAIME GONZALES, FEDERICO GONZALES,
ROSARIO GONZALES, PATRICIA GONZALES, DANIEL GONZALES, ALDO GONZALES, CLAUDIA
GONZALES and AMANDA GONZALES, Petitioners, - versus - HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
ESTANISLAO SALVADOR, MATEO SALVADOR, ALBERTO SARMIENTO, MAXIMO ESGUERRA,
MAMERTO ANTONIO, VIRGILIO DE GUZMAN, ANGEL FAJARDO, ABAD DELA CRUZ, PEDRO
FAJARDO, JUANITO DE LARA, ELIGIO DE GUZMAN, SALVADOR MARTINEZ, EDUARDO DELA
CRUZ, JOSE MATIAS, SOLEDAD ESTRELLA, ROMAN GUINGON, CIRILO SALVADOR, CATALINA
DE LA CRUZ, BERNARDO ESGUERRA, JR., GLORIA CABANA, PAQUITO CHAVEZ, RENATO
GARCIA, FRANCISCO PASCUAL, WALDO SALVADOR, MARIO SALVADOR, PEDRO GARCIA,
ALBINO SALVADOR, ANTONIO DE GUZMAN, AMBROCIO SALVADOR, TERESITA CAPATE,
EDUARDO TALENS, BENIGNO CARAIG, ERNESTO BERNABE, SERGIO CARLOS, SIMEON
BALINGAY, ANTONIO NANGEL, TEOFILO BINUYA and WILFREDO DELA CRUZ, Respondents.
G.R. No. 110335, THIRD DIVISION, June 18, 2001, MELO, J.
As between the parties to a donation of an immovable property, all that is required is for said donation
to be contained in a public document. Registration is not necessary for it to be considered valid and
effective. However, in order to bind third persons, the donation must be registered in the Registry of
Property (now Registry of Land Titles and Deeds). Although the non-registration of a deed of donation
shall not affect its validity, the necessity of registration comes into play when the rights of third persons
are affected, as in the case at bar. The donation executed by Ignacio Gonzales in favor of his
grandchildren, although in writing and duly notarized, has not been registered in accordance with law.
For this reason, it shall not be binding upon private respondents who did not participate in said deed or
had no actual knowledge thereof.
FACTS:
Spouses Ignacio Gonzales and Marina Gonzales were the registered owners of two parcels of
agricultural Land situated at Barrio Fortaleza, Cabanatuan City. Herein petitioners are the
successors-in-interest or the children and grandchildren of said Gonzales spouses. On the other
hand, private respondents are the farmers and tenants of said spouses who have been cultivating the
parcels of land even before World War II either personally or through their predecessors-in-interest.
On May 7, 1969, Marina Gonzales died intestate and appointed as administratrix of her estate was
petitioner Lilia Gonzales. Prior to the partition of said estate, Ignacio Gonzales executed a Deed of
Donation on July 12, 1972 conveying his share of the property in favor of his 14 grandchildren. The
said donation was not registered.
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Thus, when Presidential Decree No. 27 took effect on October 21, 1972, the landholdings of the
spouses Gonzales were placed under Operation Land Transfer by virtue of said decree, and private
respondents were accordingly issued the corresponding Certificates of Land Transfer and
Emancipation Patents. Lilia Gonzales filed an application for retention with the then Ministry of
Agrarian Reform, requesting that their property be excluded from the coverage of Operation Land
Transfer.
On September 3, 1991, DAR Secretary Benjamin Leong issued an order declaring that the subject
landholdings covered by the deed of donation are exempt from Operation Land Transfer, and
cancelling the Certificates of Land Transfer issued in favor of private respondents. As the donation
had been duly accepted by the donees who were already of legal age on the date of the donation and
by the legal guardians of the donees who were still minors at that time, and the donor having known
of said acceptance, the donation had therefore been... perfected in accordance with the law, and the
donees had acquired a valid title to the portion donated on the date the instrument was executed.
The Court of Appeals reversed the action of the DAR and upheld the certificates of land transfer and
emancipation patents.
ISSUE:
Whether the property subject of the deed of donation which was not registered when P.D. No. 27 took
effect, should be excluded from the Operation Land Transfer.
RULING:
Article 749 of the Civil Code provides inter alia that "in order that the donation of an immovable may
be valid, it must be made in a public document, specifying therein the property donated and the value
of the charges which the donee must satisfy." Corollarily, Article 709 of the same Code explicitly
states that "the titles of ownership, or other rights over immovable property, which are not duly
inscribed or annotated in the Registry of property shall not prejudice third persons."
From the foregoing provisions, it may be inferred that as between the parties to a donation of an
immovable property, all that is required is for said donation to be contained in a public document.
Registration is not necessary for it to be considered valid and effective. However, in order to bind
third persons, the donation must be registered in the Registry of Property (now Registry of Land
Titles and Deeds). Although the non-registration of a deed of donation shall not affect its validity, the
necessity of registration comes into play when the rights of third persons are affected, as in the case
at bar.
Further, it is an entrenched doctrine in our jurisdiction that registration in a public registry creates
constructive notice to the whole world. It is undisputed in this case that the donation executed by
Ignacio Gonzales in favor of his grandchildren, although in writing and duly notarized, has not been
registered in accordance with law. For this reason, it shall not be binding upon private respondents
who did not participate in said deed or had no actual knowledge thereof. Hence, while the deed of
donation is valid between the donor and the donees, such deed, however, did not bind the tenants-
farmers who were not parties to the donation.
From the foregoing, the ineluctable conclusion drawn is that the unregistered deed of donation
cannot operate to exclude the subject land from the coverage of the Operation Land Transfer of P.D.
No. 27, which took effect on October 21, 1972. Accordingly, the Certificates of Land Transfer and the
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Emancipation Patents respectively issued to private respondents over the land in question cannot be
cancelled. It may, therefore, be said that private respondents became owners of the subject land.
The conclusion of the appellate court that the land subject of the donation is covered by Operation
Land Transfer was affirmed. The findings of fact made by the Court of Appeals are conclusive and
binding on the Supreme Court even if contrary to these of the trial courtnor the administrative
agency, so long as such findings are supported by the records or based on substantial evidence. While
the foregoing doctrine is not absolute, petitioners have not sufficiently proved that the findings
complained of are totally devoid of support in the records, or that they are so glaringly erroneous as
to constitute serious abuse of discretion.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, - versus - LEON SILIM and ILDEFONSA

MANGUBAT, Respondents.
G.R. No. 140487, FIRST DIVISION, April 2, 2001, KAPUNAN, J.
In this case, The written acceptance of the donation having been considered by the trial court in arriving
at its decision, there is the presumption that this exhibit was properly offered and admitted by the court.
With regard to the respondents' submission that the done violated the condition in the donation that
the lot be exclusively used for school purposes only, the condition for the donation was not in any way
violated when the lot donated was exchanged with another one.
FACTS:
On 17 December 1971, respondents, the Spouses Leon Silim and Ildefonsa Mangubat, donated a
parcel of land in favor of the Bureau of Public Schools, Municipality of Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur
(BPS). Respondents imposed the condition that the said property should "be used exclusively and
forever for school purposes only." This donation was accepted by Gregorio Buendia, the District
Supervisor of BPS.
Through a fund raising campaign spearheaded by the Parent-Teachers Association of Barangay

Kauswagan, a school building was constructed on the donated land. However, the Bagong Lipunan
school building that was supposed to be allocated for the donated parcel of land in Barangay
Kauswagan could not be released since the government required that it be built upon a 1 hectare
parcel of land. To remedy this predicament, Assistant School Division Superintendent authorized
District Supervisor Buendia to officially transact for the exchange of the one-half (1/2) hectare old
school site of Kauswagan Elementary School to a new and suitable location which would fit the
specifications of the government. The donated lot was exchanged with the bigger lot.
When respondent Leon Silim saw, to his surprise, that Vice-Mayor Wilfredo Palma was constructing
a house on the donated land, he asked the latter why he was building a house on the property he
donated to BPS. Vice Mayor Wilfredo Palma replied that he is already the owner of the said property.
Respondents filed a Complaint for Revocation and Cancellation of Conditional Donation, Annulment
of Deed of Exchange and Recovery of Possession and Ownership of Real Property with damages
against Vice Mayor Wilfredo Palma, Teresita Palma, District Supervisor Buendia and the BPS before
the RTC. The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.
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The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and declared the donation null and void
on the grounds that the donation was not properly accepted and the condition imposed on the
donation was violated. Hence, the present case
ISSUE:
1. Whether donation is null and void due to an invalid acceptance by the donee.
2. Whether the donation is null and void due to an alleged violation of a condition in the donation.
RULING:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in declaring the donation null and void for the reason that the
acceptance was not allegedly done in accordance with Articles 745[6] and 749[7] of the New Civil
Code. An onerous donation is that which imposes upon the donee a reciprocal obligation or, to be
more precise, this is the kind of donation made for a valuable consideration, the cost of which is equal
to or more than the thing donated.
Article 733 of the New Civil Code provides:
Art. 733. Donations with an onerous cause shall be governed by the rules on contracts, and
remuneratory donations by the provisions of the present Title as regards that portion which
exceeds the value of the burden imposed.
‘The donation involved in the present controversy is one which is onerous since there is a burden
imposed upon the donee to build a school on the donated property. There was a valid acceptance
of the donation.
Private respondents admit that in the offer of exhibits by the defendants in the trial court, an affidavit
of acceptance and/or confirmation of the donation, marked as Exhibit "8," was offered in evidence.
The written acceptance of the donation having been considered by the trial court in arriving at its
decision, there is the presumption that this exhibit was properly offered and admitted by the court.
Moreover, this issue was never raised in the Court of Appeals. Nowhere in their brief did respondents
question the validity of the donation on the basis of the alleged defect in the acceptance thereof. The
purpose of the formal requirement for acceptance of a donation is to ensure that such acceptance is
duly communicated to the donor.
In the case at bar, a school building was immediately constructed after the donation was executed.
Respondents had knowledge of the existence of the school building put up on the donated lot through
the efforts of the Parents-Teachers Association of Barangay Kauswagan. It was when the school
building was being dismantled and transferred to the new site and when Vice-Mayor Wilfredo Palma
was constructing a house on the donated property that respondents came to know of the Deed of
Exchange. The actual knowledge by respondents of the construction and existence of the school
building fulfilled the legal requirement that the acceptance of the donation by the donee be
communicated to the donor.
2. With regard to the respondents' submission that the done violated the condition in the donation
that the lot be exclusively used for school purposes only, the condition for the donation was not in
any way violated when the lot donated was exchanged with another one. The purpose for the
donation remains the same, which is for the establishment of a school. The exclusivity of the purpose
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was not altered or affected. In fact, the exchange of the lot for a much bigger one was in furtherance
and enhancement of the purpose of the donation. The acquisition of the bigger lot paved the way for
the release of funds for the construction of Bagong Lipunan school building which could not be
accommodated by the limited area of the donated lot.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND

HIGHWAYS (DPWH), Petitioner -versus- SPOUSES FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS and CARMELITA C.
LLAMAS, Respondents
G.R. No. 194190, SECOND DIVISION, January 25, 2017, LEONEN, J.
To be considered a donation, an act of conveyance must necessarily proceed freely from the donor's own,
unrestrained volition. A donation cannot be forced: it cannot arise from compulsion, be borne by a
requirement, or otherwise be impelled by a mandate imposed upon the donor by forces that are external
to him or her. Article 726 of the Civil Code reflects this commonsensical wisdom when it specifically
states that conveyances made in view of a "demandable debt" cannot be considered true or valid
donations.
Respondents have not made any positive act enabling the City Government of Parafiaque to acquire
dominion over the disputed road lots. Therefore, they retain their private character (albeit all parties
acknowledge them to be subject to an easement of right of way). Accordingly, just compensation must
be paid to respondents as the government takes the road lots in the course of a road widening project.
FACTS:
The DPWH initiated an action for expropriation for the widening of Dr. A. Santos Ave. in what was
then the Municipality of Paranaque, Metro Manila. The Commissioners appointed by the RTC in the
expropriation case submitted a resolution recommending that just compensation for the
expropriated areas be set to ₱12,000.00 per square meter. The Llamas Spouses filed before the RTC
a "Most Urgent and Respectful Motion for Leave to be Allowed Intervention as Defendants-
Intervenors-Oppositors." They claimed that they were excluded from the expropriation case despite
having properties affected by the road widening project. The Llamas Spouses filed their Answer-in-
Intervention. In it, they claimed that a total area of 298 square meters was taken from them during
the road widening project.
The Llamas Spouses filed a "Most Urgent Motion for the Issuance of [a]n Order Directing the
Immediate Payment of 40% of Zonal Value of Expropriated Land and Improvements." The DPWH
filed its Comment/Opposition. It noted that, from its verification with the project engineer, only 41
square meters in the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 179165 was affected by the road widening
project. Thus, it emphasized that the Llamas Spouses were entitled to just compensation only to the
extent of those 41 square meters. It added that the Llamas Spouses failed to adduce evidence of any
improvements on the affected area. It interposed no objection to the ₱12,000.00 per square meter as
valuation of just compensation. The RTC issued the Order directing the payment of the value of the
lots of the defendants in the expropriation case. The lots subject of the Llamas Spouses' intervention
were not included in this Order.
After years of not obtaining a favorable ruling, the Llamas Spouses filed a "Motion for Issuance of an
Order to Pay and/or Writ of Execution." In this Motion, the Llamas Spouses faulted the DPWH for
what was supposedly its deliberate failure to comply with the Regional Trial Court's previous Orders
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and even with its own undertaking to facilitate the payment of just compensation to the Llamas
Spouses.
The Department of Public Works and Highways and the Llamas Spouses filed a Joint Manifestation
and Motion seeking to suspend the Llamas Spouses' pending Motions. This Joint Motion stated that
the Department of Public Works and Highways and the Llamas Spouses had an understanding that
the resolution of the latter's claims required the submission of: (1) certified true copies of the TCTs
covering the lots; and (2) certified true copies of the tax declarations, tax clearances, and tax receipts
over the lots. The Department of Public Works and Highways manifested that the non-payment of
the Llamas Spouses' claims was due to their continued failure to comply with their undertaking.
The Regional Trial Court issued the Order directing the payment to the Llamas Spouses of just
compensation at ₱12,000.00 per square meter for 41 square meters for the lot covered by TCT No.
217267. It denied payment for areas covered by TCT No. 179165 and noted that these were
subdivision road lots, which the Llamas Spouses "no longer owned" and which "belong[ed] to the
community for whom they were made."
The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the assailed Orders of the Regional Trial Court and
ordered the Department of Public Works and Highways to pay the Llamas Spouses P12,000.00 per
square meter as just compensation for a total of 237 square meters across three (3) lots, inclusive of
the portions excluded by the Regional Trial Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not just compensation must be paid to respondents Francisco and Carmelita Llamas for
the subdivision road lots covered by TCT No. 179165. (YES)
RULING:
The Department of Public Works and Highways insists that the road lots are not compensable since
they have "already been withdrawn from the commerce of man." It relies chiefly on this Court's 1991
Decision in White Plains Association, Inc. v. Legaspi, which pertained to "the widening of the
Katipunan Road in the White Plains Subdivision in Quezon City." It capitalizes on the statement in the
1991 White Plains Decision that shows a compulsion for subdivision owners to set aside open spaces
for public use, such as roads, and for which they need not be compensated by government.
Petitioner's reliance on the 1991 White Plains Decision is misplaced. The same 1991 Decision was
not the end of litigation relating to the widening of Katipunan Road. The 1998 White Plains Decision
unequivocally repudiated the 1991 White Plains Decision's allusion to a compulsion on subdivision
developers to cede subdivision road lots to government, so much that it characterized such
compulsion as an "illegal taking." It did away with any preference for government's capacity to
compel cession and, instead, emphasized the primacy of subdivision owners' and developers'
freedom in retaining or disposing of spaces developed as roads.
In insisting on a compulsion on subdivision owners and developers to cede open spaces to

government, the Department of Public Works and Highways references Presidential Decree No. 957,
as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1216, otherwise known as the Subdivision and Condominium
Buyer's Protective Decree.
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The first paragraph of Section 31 of Presidential Decree No. 957 spells out the minimum area
requirement for roads and other open spaces in subdivision projects. Its second paragraph spells out
taxonomic or classification parameters for areas reserved for parks, playgrounds, and for
recreational use. It also requires the planting of trees. The last paragraph of Section 31 requires-note
the use of the word "shall"-subdivision developers to donate to the city or municipality with
territorial jurisdiction over the subdivision project all such roads, alleys, sidewalks, and open spaces.
It also imposes upon cities and municipalities the concomitant obligation or compulsion to accept
such donations.
The last paragraph of Section 31 is oxymoronic. One cannot speak of a donation and compulsion in
the same breath.
To be considered a donation, an act of conveyance must necessarily proceed freely from the donor's
own, unrestrained volition. A donation cannot be forced: it cannot arise from compulsion, be borne
by a requirement, or otherwise be impelled by a mandate imposed upon the donor by forces that are
external to him or her. Article 726 of the Civil Code reflects this commonsensical wisdom when it
specifically states that conveyances made in view of a "demandable debt" cannot be considered true
or valid donations.
Section 31's compulsion to donate (and concomitant compulsion to accept) cannot be sustained as
valid. Not only does it run afoul of basic legal concepts; it also fails to withstand the more elementary
test of logic and common sense. As opposed to this, the position that not only is more reasonable and
logical, but also maintains harmony between our laws, is that which maintains the subdivision
owner's or developer's freedom to donate or not to donate. This is the position of the 1998 White
Plains Decision. Moreover, as this 1998 Decision has emphasized, to force this donation and to
preclude any compensation-is to suffer an illegal taking.
The Court of Appeals correctly stated that a "positive act"must first be made by the "owner-developer
before the city or municipality can acquire dominion over the subdivision roads." As there is no such
thing as an automatic cession to government of subdivision road lots, an actual transfer must first be
effected by the subdivision owner: "subdivision streets belonged to the owner until donated to the
government or until expropriated upon payment of just compensation." Stated otherwise, "the local
government should first acquire them by donation, purchase, or expropriation, if they are to be
utilized as a public road."
The Department of Public Works and Highways makes no claim here that the road lots covered by
TCT No. 179165 have actually been donated to the government or that their transfer has otherwise
been consummated by respondents. It only theorizes that they have been automatically transferred.
Neither has expropriation ever been fully effected.
Respondents have not made any positive act enabling the City Government of Parafiaque to acquire
dominion over the disputed road lots. Therefore, they retain their private character (albeit all parties
acknowledge them to be subject to an easement of right of way). Accordingly, just compensation must
be paid to respondents as the government takes the road lots in the course of a road widening project.
123
ESPERANZA C. CARINAN, Petitioner, -versus- SPOUSES GAVINO CUETO and CARMELITA

CUETO,Respondents.
G.R. No. 198636, THIRD DIVISION, October 8, 2014, REYES, J.
In order to sufficiently substantiate her claim that the money paid by the respondents was actually a
donation, Esperanza should have also submitted in court a copy of their written contract evincing such
agreement.
As the Court ruled in Moreño-Lentfer v. Wolff, a donation must comply with the mandatory formal
requirements set forth by law for its validity. When the subject of donation is purchase money, Article
748 of the NCC is applicable. Accordingly, the donation of money as well as its acceptance should be in
writing. Otherwise, the donation is invalid for non-compliance with the formal requisites prescribed by
law.
FACTS:
The case originated from a complaint for specific performance with damages filed by Spouses Gavino
C. Cueto and Carmelita J. Cueto against Esperanza C. Carinan and her son, Jazer C. Carinan. The
respondents alleged that sometime in May 1986, Esperanza and her husband, Jose Carinan , acquired
from one Roberto Ventura the rights over a parcel of land formerly covered by TCT No. T-129128
under the name of the GSIS, measuring 180 square meters and more particularly described as Lot 24,
Block 20, Juana Complex I, Biñan, Laguna. Their transaction was covered by a Deed of Assignment
and Transfer of Rights with Assumption of Obligations. Esperanza and Jose were to assume the
payment of the applicable monthly amortizations for the subject land to the GSIS.
Several amortizations remained unpaid by Esperanza and Jose, resulting in an impending

cancellation in 2005 of GSIS’ conditional sale of the subject property to Roberto. It was then that
Esperanza, then already a widow, sought financial assistance from her brother, Gavino, in October
2005. The respondents then paid from their conjugal savings Esperanza’s total obligation of
₱785,680.37 under the subject deed of assignment.
The respondents alleged that Esperanza and Jazer undertook to execute a Deed of Absolute Sale in
favor of the respondents once the title over the subject property was transferred to their names,
subject to the condition that they would be given the first option to buy it back within three years by
reimbursing the expenses incurred by the respondents on the property. Besides satisfaction of the
unpaid amortizations to GSIS, the respondents paid for the transfer of the subject property from
Roberto to Esperanza, and the renovation of the residential house erected on the subject land,
resulting in additional expenses of ₱515,000.00. TCT No. T-636804 already under the name of
Esperanza was surrendered to the respondents. Sometime in 2006, the respondents demanded from
Esperanza and Jazer the fulfillment of their commitment to transfer the subject property to the
respondents’ names through the execution of a deed of sale. When Esperanza and Jazer failed to
comply despite efforts for an amicable settlement, the respondents filed with the RTC of Biñan,
Laguna the subject complaint for specific performance with damages.
The RTC of Biñan, Laguna, Branch 25 rendered its Decision in favor of the respondents. CA rendered
its Decision that affirmed the rulings of the RTC. The CA agreed with the RTC’s finding that the
respondents’ payment of the GSIS obligation could not have been gratuitous, considering its
substantial amount.
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ISSUE:
Whether or not the money paid by the respondents was a donation. (NO)
RULING:
There was a clear intention for a return of the amounts which the respondents spent for the
acquisition, transfer and renovation of the subject property. The respondents then reasonably
expected to get their money back from Esperanza. Esperanza’s claim that the expenses and payments
in her behalf were purely gratuitous remained unsupported by records.
Esperanza’s refusal to pay back would likewise result in unjust enrichment, to the clear disadvantage
of the respondents. "The main objective of the principle against unjust enrichment is to prevent one
from enriching himself at the expense of another without just cause or consideration." While
Esperanza claims that her brother’s generosity was the consideration for the respondents’ payment
of her obligations, this was not sufficiently established, that even the respondents vehemently denied
the allegation. In order to sufficiently substantiate her claim that the money paid by the respondents
was actually a donation, Esperanza should have also submitted in court a copy of their written
contract evincing such agreement. Article 748 of the New Civil Code (NCC), which applies to
donations of money, is explicit on this point as it reads:
Art. 748. The donation of a movable may be made orally or in writing.
An oral donation requires the simultaneous delivery of the thing or of the document representing the
right donated.
If the value of the personal property donated exceeds five thousand pesos, the donation and the
acceptance shall be made in writing.1âwphi1 Otherwise, the donation shall be void.
As the Court ruled in Moreño-Lentfer v. Wolff, a donation must comply with the mandatory formal
requirements set forth by law for its validity. When the subject of donation is purchase money, Article
748 of the NCC is applicable. Accordingly, the donation of money as well as its acceptance should be
in writing. Otherwise, the donation is invalid for non-compliance with the formal requisites
prescribed by law.
The respondents’ statement that they paid for Esperanza’s obligations because they wanted to help
her did not contradict an understanding for the return of the claimed amounts. Clearly, the aid then
needed by Esperanza was for the immediate production of the money that could pay for her
obligations to the GSIS and effect transfer of title, in order that her payments and interest over the
property would not be forfeited. The help accorded by the respondents corresponded to such need.
It did not follow that the respondents could no longer be allowed to later demand the repayment. In
disputing the claim against her, Esperanza imputed deceit upon the respondents and claimed that
they misled her into their real intention behind the payment of her obligations and possession of TCT
No. T-636804. Deceit, however, is a serious charge which must be proven by more than just bare
allegations.
Although the Court affirms the trial and appellate courts' ruling that, first, there was no donation in
this case and, second, the respondents are entitled to a return of the amounts which they spent for
the subject property, it still cannot sustain the respondents' plea for Esperanza's full conveyance of
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the subject property. To impose the property's transfer to the respondents' names would totally
disregard Esperanza's interest and the payments which she made for the property's purchase. Thus,
the principal amount to be returned to the respondents shall only pertain to the amounts that they
actually paid or spent. The Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the trial court's resolve to require
in its Decision dated December 15, 2009, around four years after the sums were paid for the subject
property's acquisition and renovation, the immediate return of the borrowed amounts.
THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA, THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF IMUS,
and the SPOUSES FLORENCIO IGNAO and SOLEDAD C. IGNAO, petitioners, -versus- HON.
COURT OF APPEALS, THE ESTATE OF DECEASED SPOUSES EUSEBIO DE CASTRO and
MARTINA RIETA, represented by MARINA RIETA GRANADOS and THERESA RIETA
TOLENTINO, respondents.
G.R. No. 77425, SECOND DIVISION, June 19, 1991, REGALADO, J.
When a deed of donation, as in this case, expressly provides for automatic revocation and reversion of
the property donated, the rules on contract and the general rules on prescription should apply, and not
Article 764 of the Civil Code. Since Article 1306 of said Code authorizes the parties to a contract to
establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions not contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order or public policy, we are of the opinion that, at the very least, that stipulation of the parties
providing for automatic revocation of the deed of donation, without prior judicial action for that
purpose, is valid subject to the determination of the propriety of the rescission sought. Where such
propriety is sustained, the decision of the court will be merely declaratory of the revocation, but it is not
in itself the revocatory act.
FACTS:
On November 29, 1984, private respondents as plaintiffs, filed a complaint for nullification of deed of
donation, rescission of contract and reconveyance of real property with damages against petitioners
Florencio and Soledad C. Ignao and the Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus, Cavite, together with the
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, before the Regional Trial Court. In their complaint, private
respondents alleged that on August 23, 1930, the spouses Eusebio de Castro and Martina Rieta, now
both deceased, executed a deed of donation in favor of therein defendant Roman Catholic Archbishop
of Manila covering a parcel of land, located at Kawit, Cavite, containing an area of 964 square meters,
more or less. The deed of donation allegedly provides that the donee shall not dispose or sell the
property within a period of one hundredyears from the execution of the deed of donation, otherwise
a violation of such condition would render ipso facto null and void the deed of donation and the
property would revert to the estate of the donors.
It is further alleged that on or about June 30, 1980, and while still within the prohibitive period to
dispose of the property, petitioner Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus, in whose administration all
properties within the province of Cavite owned by the Archdiocese of Manila was allegedly
transferred on April 26, 1962, executed a deed of absolute sale of the property subject of the donation
in favor of petitioners Florencio and Soledad C. Ignao in consideration of the sum of P114,000. 00. As
a consequence of the sale, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 115990 was issued by the Register of Deeds
of Cavite on November 15, 1980 in the name of said petitioner spouses.
The trial court issued an order dismissing the complaint on the ground that the cause of action has
prescribed. Respondent Court of Appeals, holding that the action has not yet prescibed, rendered a
decision in favor of private respondents.
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ISSUE:
Whether or not the cause of action of private respondents has already prescribed. (NO)
RULING:
Although it is true that under Article 764 of the Civil Code an action for the revocation of a donation
must be brought within four (4) years from the non-compliance of the conditions of the donation, the
same is not applicable in the case at bar. The deed of donation involved herein expressly provides for
automatic reversion of the property donated in case of violation of the condition therein, hence a
judicial declaration revoking the same is not necessary.
In support of its aforesaid position, respondent court relied on the rule that a judicial action for
rescission of a contract is not necessary where the contract provides that it may be revoked and
cancelled for violation of any of its terms and conditions. It called attention to the holding that there
is nothing in the law that prohibits the parties from entering into an agreement that a violation of the
terms of the contract would cause its cancellation even without court intervention, and that it is not
always necessary for the injured party to resort to court for rescission of the contract. It reiterated
the doctrine that a judicial action is proper only when there is absence of a special provision granting
the power of cancellation.
It is true that the aforesaid rules were applied to the contracts involved therein, but we see no reason
why the same should not apply to the donation in the present case. Article 732 of the Civil Code
provides that donations inter vivos shall be governed by the general provisions on contracts and
obligations in all that is not determined in Title III, Book III on donations. Now, said Title III does not
have an explicit provision on the matter of a donation with a resolutory condition and which is
subject to an express provision that the same shall be considered ipso factorevoked upon the breach
of said resolutory condition imposed in the deed therefor, as is the case of the deed presently in
question. The suppletory application of the foregoing doctrinal rulings to the present controversy is
consequently justified.
The rationale for the foregoing is that in contracts providing for automatic revocation, judicial
intervention is necessary not for purposes of obtaining a judicial declaration rescinding a contract
already deemed rescinded by virtue of an agreement providing for rescission even without judicial
intervention, but in order to determine whether or not the rescission was proper.
When a deed of donation, as in this case, expressly provides for automatic revocation and reversion
of the property donated, the rules on contract and the general rules on prescription should apply,
and not Article 764 of the Civil Code. Since Article 1306 of said Code authorizes the parties to a
contract to establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions not contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order or public policy, we are of the opinion that, at the very least, that
stipulation of the parties providing for automatic revocation of the deed of donation, without prior
judicial action for that purpose, is valid subject to the determination of the propriety of the rescission
sought. Where such propriety is sustained, the decision of the court will be merely declaratory of the
revocation, but it is not in itself the revocatory act.
On the foregoing ratiocinations, the Court of Appeals committed no error in holding that the cause of
action of herein private respondents has not yet prescribed since an action to enforce a written
contract prescribes in ten (10) years. It is our view that Article 764 was intended to provide a judicial
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remedy in case of non-fulfillment or contravention of conditions specified in the deed of donation if

and when the parties have not agreed on the automatic revocation of such donation upon the
occurrence of the contingency contemplated therein. That is not the situation in the case at bar.
Nonetheless, we find that although the action filed by private respondents may not be dismissed by
reason of prescription, the same should be dismissed on the ground that private respondents have
no cause of action against petitioners.
The cause of action of private respondents is based on the alleged breach by petitioners of the
resolutory condition in the deed of donation that the property donated should not be sold within a
period of one hundred (100) years from the date of execution of the deed of donation. Said condition,
in our opinion, constitutes an undue restriction on the rights arising from ownership of petitioners
and is, therefore, contrary to public policy.
Donation, as a mode of acquiring ownership, results in an effective transfer of title over the property
from the donor to the donee. Once a donation is accepted, the donee becomes the absolute owner of
the property donated. Although the donor may impose certain conditions in the deed of donation, the
same must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order and public policy. The
condition imposed in the deed of donation in the case before us constitutes a patently unreasonable
and undue restriction on the right of the donee to dispose of the property donated, which right is an
indispensable attribute of ownership. Such a prohibition against alienation, in order to be valid, must
not be perpetual or for an unreasonable period of time.
Certain provisions of the Civil Code illustrative of the aforesaid policy may be considered applicable
by analogy. Under the third paragraph of Article 494, a donor or testator may prohibit partition for a
period which shall not exceed twenty (20) years. Article 870, on its part, declares that the
dispositions of the testator declaring all or part of the estate inalienable for more than twenty (20)
years are void.
It is significant that the provisions therein regarding a testator also necessarily involve, in the main,
the devolution of property by gratuitous title hence, as is generally the case of donations, being an
act of liberality, the imposition of an unreasonable period of prohibition to alienate the property
should be deemed anathema to the basic and actual intent of either the donor or testator. For that
reason, the regulatory arm of the law is or must be interposed to prevent an unreasonable departure
from the normative policy expressed in the aforesaid Articles 494 and 870 of the Code.
In the case at bar, we hold that the prohibition in the deed of donation against the alienation of the
property for an entire century, being an unreasonable emasculation and denial of an integral
attribute of ownership, should be declared as an illegal or impossible condition within the
contemplation of Article 727 of the Civil Code. Consequently, as specifically stated in said statutory
provision, such condition shall be considered as not imposed. No reliance may accordingly be placed
on said prohibitory paragraph in the deed of donation. The net result is that, absent said proscription,
the deed of sale supposedly constitutive of the cause of action for the nullification of the deed of
donation is not in truth violative of the latter hence, for lack of cause of action, the case for private
respondents must fail.
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PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR, represented by GOVERNOR LUIS RAYMUND F. VILLAFUERTE,

JR., Petitioner,-versus-
BODEGA GLASSWARE, represented by its owner JOSEPH D. CABRAL, Respondent.
G.R. No. 194199, THIRD DIVISION, March 22, 2017, JARDELEZA, J.
We explained in De Luna that Article 1306 of the Civil Code allows the parties "to establish such
stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary
to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy." In contracts law, parties may agree to give
one or both of them the right to rescind a contract unilaterally. This is akin to an automatic revocation
clause in an onerous donation. The jurisprudence on automatic rescission in the field of contracts law
therefore applies in an automatic revocation clause.
When CASTEA leased the property to Bodega, it breached the first and second conditions. Thus, as
petitioner validly considered the donation revoked and CASTEA never contested it, the property donated
effectively reverted back to it as owner. In demanding the return of the property, petitioner sources its
right of possession on its ownership. Under Article 428 of the Civil Code, the owner has a right of action
against the holder and possessor of the thing in order to recover it.
FACTS:
Petitioner is the registered owner of a parcel of land in Peñafrancia, Naga City. On September 28,
1966, petitioner donated around 600 square meters thereof to the Camarines Sur Teachers'
Association, Inc. (CASTEA) through a Deed of Donation Inter Vivas. The Deed of Donation included an
automatic revocation clause. CASTEA accepted the donation.
Later, CASTEA leased the property to Bodega. The Provincial Legal Officer requested Bodega to show
any legal document as legal basis for his possession. Bodega failed to present any proof. Nevertheless,
petitioner left Bodega undisturbed and merely tolerated its possession of the property. Few years
after, petitioner, thru a letter, demanded that Bodega vacate the property and surrender its peaceful
possession. Bodega refused to comply with the demand.
Petitioner asserted that CASTEA violated the conditions in the Deed of Donation when it leased the
property to Bodega. Thus, invoking the automatic revocation clause in the Deed of Donation,
petitioner revoked, annulled and declared void the Deed of Donation. CASTEA never challenged this
revocation.
Petitioner filed an action for unlawful detainer against Bodega before the MTC Naga City. The MTC
Naga City ruled in favor of the petitioner. Bodega appealed this Decision to the RTC Naga City which
reversed it. The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC Naga City that the petitioner cannot demand that
Bodega vacate the property. The CA theorized that judicial intervention is necessary to ascertain if
the automatic revocation clause suffices to declare the donation revoked.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the automatic revocation clause suffices to declare the donation revoked (YES)
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RULING:
This Court has affirmed the validity of an automatic revocation clause in donations in the case of De
Luna v. Abrigo promulgated in 1990. We explained the nature of automatic revocation clauses by first
identifying the three categories of donation. In De Luna, we said that a donation may be simple,
remuneratory or onerous. A donation is simple when the cause is the donor's pure liberality. It is
remuneratory when the donor "gives something to reward past or future services or because of
future charges or burdens, when the value of said services, burdens or charges is less than the value
of the donation." A donation is onerous when it is "subject to burdens, charges, or future services
equal (or more) in value than that of the thing donated x x x. " This Court found that the donation in
De Luna was onerous as it required the donee to build a chapel, a nursery, and a kindergarten. We
then went on to explain that an onerous donation is governed by the law on contracts and not by the
law on donations. It is within this context that this Court found an automatic revocation clause as
valid.
We explained in De Luna that Article 1306 of the Civil Code allows the parties "to establish such
stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy." In contracts law, parties may
agree to give one or both of them the right to rescind a contract unilaterally. This is akin to an
automatic revocation clause in an onerous donation. The jurisprudence on automatic rescission in
the field of contracts law therefore applies in an automatic revocation clause.
Hence, in De Luna, we applied our rulings in University of the Philippines v. De las Angeles and Angeles
v. Calasanz where we held that an automatic rescission clause effectively rescinds the contract upon
breach without need of any judicial declaration.
We, however, clarified that the other party may contest the extrajudicial rescission in court in case of
abuse or error by the rescinder. It is only in this case where a judicial resolution of the issue becomes
necessary.
Applying this to the automatic revocation clause, we ruled in De Luna that:
It is clear, however, that judicial intervention is necessary not for purposes of obtaining a judicial
declaration rescinding a contract already deemed rescinded by virtue of an agreement providing for
rescission even without judicial intervention, but in order to determine whether or not the rescission
was proper.
While the ruling in De Luna applied specifically to onerous donations with an automatic revocation
clause, we extended this doctrine to apply to donations inter vivas in general in Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Manila. We explained in this case that Article 732 of the Civil Code states that the
general provisions on obligations and contracts shall govern donations inter vivas in all matters not
determined in Title III, Book III on donations. Title III has no explicit provisions for instances where
a donation has an automatic revocation clause. Thus, the rules in contracts law regarding automatic
rescission of contracts as well as the jurisprudence explaining it find suppletory application. We then
reiterated in Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila that where a donation has an automatic revocation
clause, the occurrence of the condition agreed to by the parties as to cause the revocation, is sufficient
for a party to consider the donation revoked without need of any judicial action. A judicial finding
that the revocation is proper is only necessary when the other party actually goes to court for the
specific purpose of challenging the propriety of the revocation. Nevertheless, even in such a case, "x
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x x the decision of the court will be merely declaratory of the revocation, but it is not in itself the
revocatory act." We also explained in this case that in ascertaining the prescription of actions arising
from an automatic revocation clause in donations, the general provisions on prescription under the
Civil Code apply. Article 764, which provides for a four-year prescriptive period to file an action to
revoke the donation in case of breach of a condition, governs an instance where the deed of donation
does not contain an automatic revocation clause.
In this case, the Deed of Donation identifies three conditions for the donation: (1) that the property
shall be used for "no other purpose except the construction of its building to be owned and to be
constructed by the above-named DONEE to house its offices to be used by the said Camarines Sur
Teachers' Association, Inc., in connection with its functions under its charter and bylaws and the Naga
City Teachers' Association as well as the Camarines Sur High School Alumni Association," (2) CASTEA
shall "not sell, mortgage or incumber the property herein donated including any and all
improvements thereon in favor of any party," and (3) "the construction of the building or buildings
referred to above shall be commenced within a period of one (1) year from and after the execution."
The last clause of this paragraph states that "otherwise, this donation shall be deemed automatically
revoked x x x." We read the final clause of this provision as an automatic revocation clause which
pertains to all three conditions of the donation. When CASTEA leased the property to Bodega, it
breached the first and second conditions.
Thus, as petitioner validly considered the donation revoked and CASTEA never contested it, the
property donated effectively reverted back to it as owner. In demanding the return of the property,
petitioner sources its right of possession on its ownership. Under Article 428 of the Civil Code, the
owner has a right of action against the holder and possessor of the thing in order to recover it.
This right of possession prevails over Bodega's claim which is anchored on its Contract of Lease with
CASTEA. CASTEA's act of leasing the property to Bodega, in breach of the conditions stated in the
Deed of Donation, is the very same act which caused the automatic revocation of the donation. Thus,
it had no right, either as an owner or as an authorized administrator of the property to lease it to
Bodega. While a lessor need not be the owner of the property leased, he or she must, at the very least,
have the authority to lease it out. None exists in this case. Bodega finds no basis for its continued
possession of the property.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, -versus-

DAVID REY GUZMAN, represented by his Attorney-in-Fact, LOLITA G. ABELA, and the
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BULACAN, MEYCAUAYAN BRANCH, Respondents.
G.R. No. 132964, SECOND DIVISION, February 18, 2000, BELLOSILLO, J.
Thus, in Santos v. Robledo we emphasized that when the deed of donation is recorded in the registry of
property the document that evidences the acceptance — if this has not been made in the deed of gift —
should also be recorded. And in one or both documents, as the case may be, the notification of the
acceptance as formally made to the donor or donors should be duly set forth. Where the deed of donation
fails to show the acceptance, or where the formal notice of the acceptance made in a separate
instrument is either not given to the donor or else noted in the deed of donation, and in the separate
acceptance, the donation is null and void.
These requisites, definitely prescribed by law, have not been complied with, and no proof of compliance
appears in the record. The two quitclaim deeds set out the conveyance of the parcels of land by Helen in
favor of David but its acceptance by David does not appear in the deeds, nor in the Special Power of
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Attorney. Further, the records reveal no other instrument that evidences such acceptance and notice
thereof to the donor in an authentic manner. Therefore, the provisions of the law not having been
complied with, there was no effective conveyance of the parcels of land by way of donation inter vivos.
FACTS:
David Rey Guzman, a natural-born American citizen, is the son of the spouses Simeon Guzman, a
naturalized American citizen, and Helen Meyers Guzman, an American citizen. Simeon died leaving
to his sole heirs Helen and David an estate consisting of several parcels of land in Bulacan. Helen and
David executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Simeon Guzman dividing and
adjudicating to themselves all the property belonging to the estate of Simeon. The parcels of land
were subsequently registered in the name of Helen and David in undivided equal shares.
Later, Helen executed a Quitclaim Deed assigning, transferring and conveying to her son David her
undivided one-half interest on all the parcels of land subject matter of the Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement. Helen executed another document, a Deed of Quitclaim, confirming the earlier deed of
quitclaim. David executed a Special Power of Attorney where he acknowledged that he became the
owner of the parcels of land subject of the Deed of Quitclaim executed by Helen, and empowered Atty.
Lolita G. Abela to sell or otherwise dispose of the lots.
The Government filed before the Regional Trial Court of Malolos Bulacan a Petition for Escheat
praying that one-half of David's interest in each of the subject parcels of land be forfeited in its favor.
The trial court and the appellate court ruled in favor of respondents.
In the instant petition, the Government asserts that David, being an American citizen, could not
validly acquire one-half interest in each of the subject parcels of land by way of the two deeds of
quitclaim as they are in reality donations inter vivos. It reasons out that the elements of donation are
present in the conveyance made by Helen in favor of David: first, Helen consented to the execution of
the documents; second, the dispositions were made in public documents; third, David manifested his
acceptance of the donation in the Special Power of Attorney he executed in favor of Atty. Lolita G.
Abela; fourth, the deeds were executed with the intention of benefiting David; and lastly, there was a
resultant decrease in the assets or patrimony of Helen, being the donor.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a valid donation (NO)
RULING:
same deed of donation or in a separate public document. In cases where the acceptance is made in a
separate instrument, it is mandated that the donor should be notified thereof in an authentic form,
to be noted in both instruments.
Not all the elements of a donation of an immovable property are present in the instant case. The
transfer of the property by virtue of the Deed of Quitclaim executed by Helen resulted in the reduction
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of her patrimony as donor and the consequent increase in the patrimony of David as donee. However,
Helen's intention to perform an act of liberality in favor of David was not sufficiently established. A
perusal of the two (2) deeds of quitclaim reveals that Helen intended to convey to her son David
certain parcels of land located in the Philippines, and to re-affirm the quitclaim she executed in 1981
which likewise declared a waiver and renunciation of her rights over the parcels of land. The
language of the deed of quitclaim is clear that Helen merely contemplated a waiver of her rights, title
and interest over the lands in favor of David, and not a donation. That a donation was far from Helen's
mind is further supported by her deposition which indicated that she was aware that a donation of
the parcels of land was not possible since Philippine law does not allow such an arrangement. She
reasoned that if she really intended to donate something to David it would have been more
convenient if she sold the property and gave him the proceeds therefrom. It appears that foremost in
Helen's mind was the preservation of the Bulacan realty within the bloodline of Simeon from where
they originated, over and above the benefit that would accrue to David by reason of her renunciation.
The element of animus donandi therefore was missing.
Likewise, the two deeds of quitclaim executed by Helen may have been in the nature of a public
document but they lack the essential element of acceptance in the proper form required by law to
make the donation valid. We find no merit in petitioner's argument that the Special Power of Attorney
executed by David in favor of Atty. Lolita G. Abela manifests his implied acceptance of his mother's
alleged donation as a scrutiny of the document clearly evinces the absence thereof. The Special Power
of Attorney merely acknowledges that David owns the property referred to and that he authorizes
Atty. Abela to sell the same in his name. There is no intimation, expressly or impliedly, that David's
acquisition of the parcels of land is by virtue of Helen's possible donation to him and we cannot look
beyond the language of the document to make a contrary construction as this would be inconsistent
with the parol evidence rule.
Moreover, it is mandated that if an acceptance is made in a separate public writing the notice of the
acceptance must be noted not only in the document containing the acceptance, but also in the deed
of donation. Commenting on Art. 633 of the Civil Code from whence Art. 749 came, Manresa said: "If
the acceptance does not appear in the same document, it must be made in another. Solemn words are
not necessary; it is sufficient if it shows the intention to accept . . . . it is necessary that formal notice
thereof be given to the donor, and the fact that due notice has been given must be noted in both
instruments. Then and only then is the donation perfected.
Thus, in Santos v. Robledo we emphasized that when the deed of donation is recorded in the registry
of property the document that evidences the acceptance — if this has not been made in the deed of
gift — should also be recorded. And in one or both documents, as the case may be, the notification of
the acceptance as formally made to the donor or donors should be duly set forth. Where the deed of
donation fails to show the acceptance, or where the formal notice of the acceptance made in a
separate instrument is either not given to the donor or else noted in the deed of donation, and in the
separate acceptance, the donation is null and void.
These requisites, definitely prescribed by law, have not been complied with, and no proof of
compliance appears in the record. The two quitclaim deeds set out the conveyance of the parcels of
land by Helen in favor of David but its acceptance by David does not appear in the deeds, nor in the
Special Power of Attorney. Further, the records reveal no other instrument that evidences such
acceptance and notice thereof to the donor in an authentic manner. Therefore, the provisions of the
law not having been complied with, there was no effective conveyance of the parcels of land by way
of donation inter vivos.
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However, the inexistence of a donation does not render the repudiation made by Helen in favor of
David valid. There is no valid repudiation of inheritance as Helen had already accepted her share of
the inheritance when she, together with David, executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the
Estate of Simeon Guzman on 29 December 1970. By virtue of such extrajudicial settlement, the
parcels of land were registered in her and her son's name in undivided equal share and for eleven
years they possessed the lands in the concept of owner.
Article 1056 of the Civil Code provides that “the acceptance or repudiation of an inheritance, once
made is irrevocable and cannot be impugned, except when it was made through any of the causes
that vitiate consent or when an unknown will appears.” Thus, Helen cannot belatedly execute an
instrument which has the effect of revoking or impugning her previous acceptance of her one-half
share of the subject property from Simeon's estate.
Nevertheless, the nullity of the repudiation does not ipso facto operate to convert the parcels of land
into res nullius to be escheated in favor of the Government. The repudiation being of no effect
whatsoever the parcels of land should revert to their private owner, Helen, who, although being an
American citizen, is qualified by hereditary succession to own the property subject of the litigation.
SPS. AGRIPINO GESTOPA and ISABEL SILARIO GESTOPA, Petitioners,

-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS and MERCEDES DANLAG y PILAPIL, Respondents.
G.R. No. 111904, SECOND DIVISION, October 5, 2000, QUISUMBING, J.
Note first that the granting clause shows that Diego donated the properties out of love and affection for
the donee. This is a mark of a donation inter vivos. Second, the reservation of lifetime usufruct indicates
that the donor intended to transfer the naked ownership over the properties. As correctly posed by the
Court of Appeals, what was the need for such reservation if the donor and his spouse remained the
owners of the properties? Third, the donor reserved sufficient properties for his maintenance in
accordance with his standing in society, indicating that the donor intended to part with the six parcels
of land. Lastly, the donee accepted the donation. In the case of Alejandro vs. Geraldez, 78 SCRA 245
(1977), we said that an acceptance clause is a mark that the donation is inter vivos. Acceptance is a
requirement for donations inter vivos. Donations mortis causa, being in the form of a will, are not
required to be accepted by the donees during the donors' lifetime.
Consequently, the Court of Appeals did not err in concluding that the right to dispose of the properties
belonged to the donee. The donor's right to give consent was merely intended to protect his usufructuary
interests. In Alejandro, we ruled that a limitation on the right to sell during the donors' lifetime implied
that ownership had passed to the donees and donation was already effective during the donors' lifetime.
FACTS:
Spouses Diego and Catalina Danlag were the owners of six parcels of unregistered lands. They
executed three deeds of donation mortis causa in favor of private respondent Mercedes Danlag-
Pilapil. The first deed pertained to parcels 1 & 2; the second deed, to parcel 3 and the the last deed,
to parcel 4. On January 16, 1973, Diego Danlag, with the consent of his wife executed a deed of
donation inter vivos covering the aforementioned parcels of land plus two other parcels, again in
favor of private respondent Mercedes. This contained two conditions, that (1) the Danlag spouses
shall continue to enjoy the fruits of the land during their lifetime, and that (2) the donee cannot sell
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or dispose of the land during the lifetime of the said spouses, without their prior consent and
approval.
Several years after, Diego and Catalina Danlag sold parcels 3 and 4 to herein petitioners, Mr. and Mrs.
Agripino Gestopa. The Danlags executed a deed of revocation recovering the six parcels of land
subject of the aforecited deed of donation inter vivos.
Mercedes Pilapil filed with the RTC a petition against the Gestopas and the Danlags, for quieting of
title over the above parcels of land. She alleged that she was an illegitimate daughter of Diego Danlag;
that she lived and rendered incalculable beneficial services to Diego and his mother, Maura Danlag,
when the latter was still alive. In recognition of the services she rendered, Diego executed a Deed of
Donation, conveying to her the six (6) parcels of land. She accepted the donation in the same
instrument, and caused the transfer of the tax declarations to her name. Said donation inter vivos was
coupled with conditions and, according to Mercedes, since its perfection, she had complied with all
of them; that she had not been guilty of any act of ingratitude; and that respondent Diego had no legal
basis in revoking the subject donation and then in selling the two parcels of land to the Gestopas.
In their opposition, the Gestopas and the Danlags averred that the deed of donation was null and void
because it was obtained by Mercedes through machinations and undue influence. Even assuming it
was validly executed, the intention was for the donation to take effect upon the death of the donor.
In finding for petitioners, the trial court observed that the reservation clause in all the deeds of
donation indicated that Diego Danlag did not make any donation; that Mercedes failed to rebut the
allegations of ingratitude she committed against Diego Danlag; and that Mercedes committed fraud
and machination in preparing all the deeds of donation without explaining to Diego Danlag their
contents. The appellate court reversed the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the donation was inter vivos (YES)
RULING:
Petitioners assert that the donor did not only reserve the right to enjoy the fruits of the properties,
but also prohibited the donee from selling or disposing the land without the consent and approval of
the Danlag spouses. This implied that the donor still had control and ownership over the donated
properties. Hence, the donation was post mortem.
Crucial in resolving whether the donation was inter vivos or mortis causa is the determination of
whether the donor intended to transfer the ownership over the properties upon the execution of the
deed. In ascertaining the intention of the donor, all of the deed's provisions must be read together.
The deed of donation dated January 16, 1973, in favor of Mercedes contained the following:
"That for and in consideration of the love and affection which the Donor inspires in the Donee and as
an act of liberality and generosity, the Donor hereby gives, donates, transfer and conveys by way of
donation unto the herein Donee, her heirs, assigns and successors, the above-described parcels of
land;
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That it is the condition of this donation that the Donor shall continue to enjoy all the fruits of the land
during his lifetime and that of his spouse and that the donee cannot sell or otherwise, dispose of the
lands without the prior consent and approval by the Donor and her spouse during their lifetime.
xxx
That for the same purpose as hereinbefore stated, the Donor further states that he has reserved for
himself sufficient properties in full ownership or in usufruct enough for his maintenance of a decent
livelihood in consonance with his standing in society.
That the Donee hereby accepts the donation and expresses her thanks and gratitude for the kindness
and generosity of the Donor."
Note first that the granting clause shows that Diego donated the properties out of love and affection
for the donee. This is a mark of a donation inter vivos. Second, the reservation of lifetime usufruct
indicates that the donor intended to transfer the naked ownership over the properties. As correctly
posed by the Court of Appeals, what was the need for such reservation if the donor and his spouse
remained the owners of the properties? Third, the donor reserved sufficient properties for his
maintenance in accordance with his standing in society, indicating that the donor intended to part
with the six parcels of land. Lastly, the donee accepted the donation. In the case of Alejandro vs.
Geraldez, 78 SCRA 245 (1977), we said that an acceptance clause is a mark that the donation is inter
vivos. Acceptance is a requirement for donations inter vivos. Donations mortis causa, being in the form
of a will, are not required to be accepted by the donees during the donors' lifetime.
Consequently, the Court of Appeals did not err in concluding that the right to dispose of the properties
belonged to the donee. The donor's right to give consent was merely intended to protect his
usufructuary interests. In Alejandro, we ruled that a limitation on the right to sell during the donors'
lifetime implied that ownership had passed to the donees and donation was already effective during
the donors' lifetime.
The attending circumstances in the execution of the subject donation also demonstrated the real
intent of the donor to transfer the ownership over the subject properties upon its execution. Prior to
the execution of donation inter vivos, the Danlag spouses already executed three donations mortis
causa. As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, the Danlag spouses were aware of the difference
between the two donations. If they did not intend to donate inter vivos, they would not again donate
the four lots already donated mortis causa. Petitioners' counter argument that this proposition was
erroneous because six years after, the spouses changed their intention with the deed of revocation,
is not only disingenious but also fallacious. Petitioners cannot use the deed of revocation to show the
spouses' intent because its validity is one of the issues in this case.
RODOLFO NOCEDA, Petitioner, -versus- COURT OF APPEALS and AURORA ARBIZO DIRECTO,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 119730, THIRD DIVISION, September 2, 1999, GONZAGA-REYES, J.
Art. 769 of the New Civil Code states that: "The action granted to the donor by reason of ingratitude
cannot be renounced in advance. This action prescribes within one year to be counted from the time the
donor had knowledge of the fact and it was possible for him to bring the action." As expressly stated, the
donor must file the action to revoke his donation within one year from the time he had knowledge of the
ingratitude of the donee. Also, it must be shown that it was possible for the donor to institute the said
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action within the same period. The concurrence of these two requisites must be shown by defendant
Noceda in order to bar the present action. Defendant Noceda failed to do so. He reckoned the one year
prescriptive period from the occurrence of the usurpation of the property of plaintiff Directo in the first
week of September, 1985, and not from the time the latter had the knowledge of the usurpation.
Moreover, defendant Noceda failed to prove that at the time plaintiff Directo acquired knowledge of his
usurpation, it was possible for plaintiff Directo to institute an action for revocation of her donation.
FACTS:
Plaintiff Aurora Directo, defendant Rodolfo Noceda, and Maria Arbizo, the daughter, grandson, and
widow, respectively, of the decedent Celestino Arbizo, extrajudicially settled a parcel of land, Lot
1121. Plaintiff Directo donated 625 square meters of her share to defendant Noceda, who is her
nephew. However, on August 17, 1981, another extrajudicial settlement-partition of Lot 1121 was
executed by plaintiff Directo, defendant Noceda, and Maria Arbizo. Three fifths of the said land went
to Maria Arbizo while plaintiff Directo and defendant Noceda got only one-fifth each.
Sometime in 1981, defendant Noceda constructed his house on the land donated to him by plaintiff
Directo. Plaintiff Directo fenced the portion allotted to her in the extrajudicial settlement, excluding
the donated portion, and constructed thereon three huts. But in 1985, defendant Noceda removed
the fence earlier constructed by plaintiff Directo, occupied the three huts and fenced the entire land
of plaintiff Directo without her consent. Plaintiff Directo demanded from defendant Noceda to vacate
her land, but the latter refused. Hence, plaintiff Directo filed a complaint for the recovery of
possession and ownership and rescission/annulment of donation, against defendant Noceda before
the lower court.
The Regional Trial Court of Zambales rendered a decision: declaring the Extra-Judicial Settlement-
Partition dated August 17, 1981, valid; Declaring the Deed of Donation, revoked; and ordering the
defendant to vacate and reconvey that donated portion of Lot 1121 to the plaintiff or her heirs or
assigns. Rodolfo Nocedo appealed to the respondent Court which affirmed the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the finding of usurpation on the part of petitioner is proper such that the revocation
of the donation on the ground of ingratitude is justified (YES)
RULING:
Petitioner argues that he did not usurp the property of respondent Directo since, to date, the metes
and bounds of the parcel of land left by their predecessor in interest, Celestino Arbizo, are still
undetermined since no final determination as to the exact areas properly pertaining to the parties
herein; hence they are still considered as co-owners thereof.
Petitioner claims that the subject property could not be partitioned based on the extrajudicial
settlement-partition dated August 17, 1981, since the distributive share of the heirs of the late
Celestino Arbizo and the area of Lot 1121 stated therein were different from the extrajudicial
settlement executed on June 1, 1981, and that the discrepancies between the two deeds of partition
with respect to the area of Lot 1121 and the respective share of the parties therein indicated that
they never intended that any of the deeds to be the final determination of the portions of Lot 1121
allotted to them.
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We do not agree.
In this case the source of co-ownership among the heirs was intestate succession. Where there are
two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by such
heirs subject to the payment of debts of the deceased. Partition, in general, is the separation, division
and assignment of a thing held in common among those to whom it may belong. The purpose of
partition is to put an end to co-ownership. It seeks a severance of the individual interest of each co-
owner, vesting in each a sole estate in specific property and giving to each one a right to enjoy his
estate without supervision or interference from the other. And one way of effecting a partition of the
decedent's estate is by the heirs themselves extrajudicially.
The heirs of the late Celestino Arbizo namely Maria Arbizo, Aurora A. Directo (private respondent)
and Rodolfo Noceda (petitioner) entered into an extrajudicial settlement of the estate on August 17,
1981 and agreed to adjudicate among themselves the property left by their predecessor-in-interest
in the following manner: to Rodolfo Noceda goes the northern one-fifth (1/5) portion containing an
area of 5,989 sq. meters; to Maria Arbizo goes the middle three-fifths (3/5) portion; and To Aurora
Arbizo goes the southern one-fifth (1/5) portion.
In the survey plan submitted by Engineer Quejada during trial, the portions indicated by red lines
and numbered alphabetically were based on the percentage proportion in the extrajudicial
settlement and the actual occupancy of each heir which resulted to these divisions as follows: Lot A,
the area is 12,957 sq.m., goes to Rodolfo A. Noceda (1/5); Lot B, 38,872 sq.m., to Maria Arbizo (3/5);
and Lot C, 12,957 sq.m., to Aurora Directo (1/5).
Thus, the areas allotted to each heir are now specifically delineated in the survey plan. There is no
co-ownership where portion owned is concretely determined and identifiable, though not technically
described, or that said portions are still embraced in one and the same certificate of title does not
make said portions less determinable or identifiable, or distinguishable, one from the other, nor that
dominion over each portion less exclusive, in their respective owners. A partition legally made
confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to him.
We thus find unmeritorious petitioner's argument that since there was no effective and real partition
of the subject lot, there exists no basis for the charge of usurpation and hence there is also no basis
for finding ingratitude against him. It was established that petitioner Noceda occupied not only the
portion donated to him by private respondent Aurora Arbizo-Directo but he also fenced the whole
area of Lot C which belongs to private respondent Directo, thus petitioner's act of occupying the
portion pertaining to private respondent Directo without the latter's knowledge and consent is an
act of usurpation which is an offense against the property of the donor and considered as an act of
ingratitude of a donee against the donor. The law does not require conviction of the donee; it is
enough that the offense be proved in the action for revocation.
Ultimately, petitioner contends that granting revocation is proper, the right to enforce the same had
already prescribed since as admitted by private respondent, petitioner usurped her property in the
first week of September 1985 while the complaint for revocation was filed on September 16, 1986,
thus more than one (1) year had passed from the alleged usurpation by petitioner of private
respondent's share in Lot 1121.
We are not persuaded. The respondent Court rejected such argument in this wise:
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Art. 769 of the New Civil Code states that: "The action granted to the donor by reason of ingratitude
cannot be renounced in advance. This action prescribes within one year to be counted from the time
the donor had knowledge of the fact and it was possible for him to bring the action." As expressly
stated, the donor must file the action to revoke his donation within one year from the time he had
knowledge of the ingratitude of the donee. Also, it must be shown that it was possible for the donor
to institute the said action within the same period. The concurrence of these two requisites must be
shown by defendant Noceda in order to bar the present action. Defendant Noceda failed to do so. He
reckoned the one year prescriptive period from the occurrence of the usurpation of the property of
plaintiff Directo in the first week of September, 1985, and not from the time the latter had the
knowledge of the usurpation. Moreover, defendant Noceda failed to prove that at the time plaintiff
Directo acquired knowledge of his usurpation, it was possible for plaintiff Directo to institute an
action for revocation of her donation.
ELOY IMPERIAL, Petitioner, -versus-

COURT OF APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF LEGASPI CITY, CESAR VILLALON, JR.,
TERESA VILLALON, ANTONIO VILLALON, AUGUSTO VILLALON, ROBERTO VILLALON,
RICARDO VILLALON and ESTHER VILLALON, Respondents.
G.R. No. 112483, THIRD DIVISION, October 8, 1999, GONZAGA-REYES, J.
Under Article 1144 of the Civil Code, actions upon an obligation created by law must be brought within
ten years from the time the right of action accrues. Thus, the ten-year prescriptive period applies to the
obligation to reduce inofficious donations, required under Article 771 of the Civil Code, to the extent that
they impair the legitime of compulsory heirs.
From when shall the ten-year period be reckoned? The case of Mateo vs. Lagua, 29 SCRA 864, which
involved the reduction for inofficiousness of a donation propter nuptias, recognized that the cause of
action to enforce a legitime accrues upon the death of the donor-decedent. Clearly so, since it is only
then that the net estate may be ascertained and on which basis, the legitimes may be determined.
It took private respondents 24 years since the death of Leoncio to initiate this case. The action, therefore,
has long prescribed.
FACTS:
Leoncio Imperial was the registered owner of a parcel of land, known as Lot 45. He sold the said lot
for P1.00 to his acknowledged natural son, petitioner herein, who then acquired title over the land.
Petitioner and private respondents admit that despite the contract's designation as one of "Absolute
Sale", the transaction was in fact a donation.
Barely two years after, Leoncio filed a complaint for annulment of the said Deed of Absolute Sale,
docketed as Civil Case No. 1177, on the ground that he was deceived by petitioner herein into signing
the said document. The dispute, however, was resolved through a compromise agreement, under
which terms: (1) Leoncio recognized the legality and validity of the rights of petitioner to the land
donated; and (2) petitioner agreed to sell a designated portion of the donated land, and to deposit
the proceeds thereof in a bank, for the convenient disposal of Leoncio.
Pending execution of the above judgment, Leoncio died, leaving only two heirs — the herein
petitioner, and an adopted son, Victor Imperial. Victor was substituted in place of Leoncio in the
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above-mentioned case, and it was he who moved for execution of judgment. The motion for execution
was duly granted.
Fifteen years thereafter, Victor died single and without issue, survived only by his natural father,
Ricardo Villalon. Four years hence, Ricardo died, leaving as his only heirs his two children, Cesar and
Teresa Villalon.
Five years thereafter, Cesar and Teresa filed a complaint for annulment of the donation. Petitioner
moved to dismiss on the ground of res judicata, by virtue of the compromise judgment. The trial court
granted the motion to dismiss, but the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's order and remanded
the case for further proceedings.
Cesar and Teresa filed an amended complaint in the same case, seeking the nullification of the Deed
of Absolute Sale affecting the above property, on grounds of fraud, deceit and inofficiousness. It was
alleged that petitioner caused Leoncio to execute the donation by taking undue advantage of the
latter's physical weakness and mental unfitness, and that the conveyance of said property in favor of
petitioner impaired the legitime of Victor Imperial, their natural brother and predecessor-in-interest.
The RTC held the donation to be inofficious and impairing the legitime of Victor, on the basis of its
finding that at the time of Leoncio's death, he left no property other than the parcel of land which he
had donated to petitioner. The trial court likewise held that the applicable prescriptive period is 30
years under Article 1141 of the Civil Code, reckoned from March 15, 1962, when the writ of execution
of the compromise judgment in Civil Case 1177 was issued, and that the original complaint having
been filed in 1986, the action has not yet prescribed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision
in toto.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents still have the right to contest the donation for being inofficious (NO)
RULING:
Petitioner questions the right of private respondents to contest the donation. Petitioner sources his
argument from Article 772 of the Civil Code, thus: “Only those who at the time of the donor's death
have a right to the legitime and their heirs and successors in interest may ask for the reduction of
inofficious donations . . . .” As argued by petitioner, when Leoncio died, it was only Victor who was
entitled to question the donation. However, instead of filing an action to contest the donation, Victor
asked to be substituted as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 1177 and even moved for execution of the
compromise judgment therein.
No renunciation of legitime may be presumed from the foregoing acts. It must be remembered that
at the time of the substitution, the judgment approving the compromise agreement has already been
rendered. Victor merely participated in the execution of the compromise judgment. He was not a
party to the compromise agreement.
More importantly, our law on succession does not countenance tacit repudiation of inheritance.
Rather, it requires an express act on the part of the heir. Thus, under Article 1051 of Civil Code: “The
repudiation of an inheritance shall be made in a public or authentic instrument, or by petition
presented to the court having jurisdiction over the testamentary or intestate proceedings.”
140
Thus, when Victor substituted Leoncio in Civil Case No. 1177 upon the latter's death, his act of moving
for execution of the compromise judgment cannot be considered an act of renunciation of his
legitime. He was, therefore, not precluded or estopped from subsequently seeking the reduction of
the donation, under Article 772. Neither are Victor's heirs, upon his death, precluded from doing so,
as their right to do so is expressly recognized under Article 772, and also in Article 1053: “If the heir
should die without having accepted or repudiated the inheritance, his right shall be transmitted to
his heirs.”
Having ascertained this action as one for reduction of an inofficious donation, we cannot sustain the
holding of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the applicable prescriptive period is
thirty years, under Article 1141 of the Civil Code, the sense of both courts being that this case is a
"real action over an immovable."
Unfortunately for private respondents, a claim for legitime does not amount to a claim of title. In the
recent case of Vizconde vs. Court of Appeals, we declared that what is brought to collation is not the
donated property itself, but the value of the property at the time it was donated. The rationale for
this is that the donation is a real alienation which conveys ownership upon its acceptance, hence, any
increase in value or any deterioration or loss thereof is for the account of the heir or donee.
What, then, is the prescriptive period for an action for reduction of an inofficious donation? The Civil
Code specifies the following instances of reduction or revocation of donations: (1) four years, in cases
of subsequent birth, appearance, recognition or adoption of a child; (2) four years, for non-
compliance with conditions of the donation; and (3) at any time during the lifetime of the donor and
his relatives entitled to support, for failure of the donor to reserve property for his or their support.
Interestingly, donations as in the instant case, the reduction of which hinges upon the allegation of
impairment of legitime, are not controlled by a particular prescriptive period, for which reason we
must resort to the ordinary rules of prescription.
Under Article 1144 of the Civil Code, actions upon an obligation created by law must be brought
within ten years from the time the right of action accrues. Thus, the ten-year prescriptive period
applies to the obligation to reduce inofficious donations, required under Article 771 of the Civil Code,
to the extent that they impair the legitime of compulsory heirs.
From when shall the ten-year period be reckoned? The case of Mateo vs. Lagua, 29 SCRA 864, which
involved the reduction for inofficiousness of a donation propter nuptias, recognized that the cause of
action to enforce a legitime accrues upon the death of the donor-decedent. Clearly so, since it is only
then that the net estate may be ascertained and on which basis, the legitimes may be determined.
It took private respondents 24 years since the death of Leoncio to initiate this case. The action,
therefore, has long prescribed.
SPOUSES ROMULO AND SALLY EDUARTE, Petitioners, -versus-

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEDRO CALAPINE (substituted by ALEXANDER
CALAPINE and ARTEMIS CALAPINE), Respondents.
G.R. No. 105944, THIRD DIVISION, February 9, 1996, FRANCISCO, J.
Offense Against Donor. - All crimes which offend the donor show ingratitude and are causes for
revocation. There is no doubt, therefore, that the donee who commits adultery with the wife of the donor,
gives cause for revocation by reason of ingratitude. The crimes against the person of the donor would
141
include not only homicide and physical injuries, but also illegal detention, threats, and coercion; those
against honor include offenses against chastity; and those against the property, include robbery, theft,
usurpation, swindling, arson, damages, etc. [Manresa 175-176].
Obviously, the first sentence was deleted by petitioners because it totally controverts their contention.
As noted in the aforecited opinion "all crimes which offend the donor show ingratitude and are causes
for revocation." Petitioners' attempt to categorize the offenses according to their classification under
the Revised Penal Code is therefore unwarranted considering that illegal detention, threats and coercion
are considered as crimes against the person of the donor despite the fact that they are classified as
crimes against personal liberty and security under the Revised Penal Code.
FACTS:
Pedro Calapine was the registered owner of a parcel of land. On April 26, 1984, he executed a deed
entitled "Pagbibigay-Pala (Donacion InterVivos)" ceding one-half portion thereof to his niece Helen
S. Doria. On July 26, 1984, another deed identically entitled was purportedly executed by Pedro
Calapine ceding unto Helen S. Doria the whole of the parcel of land, on the basis of which said original
certificate was cancelled, and a new TCT was issued in her name.
On March 25, 1988, Helen S. Doria sold, transferred and conveyed unto the spouses Romulo and Sally
Eduarte the subject parcel of land, save the portion of 700 square meters on which the vendor's house
had been erected, on the basis of which the transfer certificate was cancelled and a new one issued
in the name of the vendees.
Claiming that his signature to the deed of donation was a forgery and that she was unworthy of his
liberality, Pedro Calapine brought suit against Helen S. Doria, and the Spouses Romulo and Sally
Eduarte to revoke the donation made in favor of Helen S. Doria, and to declare null and void the deed
of sale that she had executed in favor of the spouses Eduarte.
After trial, the Regional Trial Court rendered judgment, declaring the revocation of the Deed of
Donation dated April 26, 1984; and voiding, setting aside and declaring of no force and effect the deed
of absolute sale executed on March 25, 1988 by and between spouses Eduartes and Helen Doria, and
the TCT issued under the name of spouses Romulo and Sally Eduarte. Respondent Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the trial court. It ruled that by falsifying Pedro Calapine's signature, Helen
Doria committed an act of ingratitude which is a valid ground for revocation of the donation made in
her favor in accordance with Article 765 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the revocation of the donation was proper (YES)
RULING:
Anent the revocation of the first deed of donation, petitioners submit that paragraph (1) of Article
765 of the Civil Code does not apply in this case because the acts of ingratitude referred to therein
pertain to offenses committed by the donee against the person or property of the donor. Petitioners
argue that as the offense imputed to herein donee Helen Doria - falsification of a public document - is
neither a crime against the person nor property of the donor but is a crime against public interest
under the Revised Penal Code, the same is not a ground for revocation.
142
In support of this contention, petitioners cite the following portions found in Tolentino's
Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code:
Offense against Donor - . . . The crimes against the person of the donor would include not only
homicide and physical injuries, but also illegal detention, threats and coercion; and those against
honor include offenses against chastity and those against the property, include robbery, theft,
usurpation, swindling, arson, damages, etc. (5 Manresa 175-176).
This assertion, however, deserves scant consideration. The full text of the very same commentary
cited by petitioners belies their claim that falsification of the deed of donation is not an act of
ingratitude, to wit:
Offense Against Donor. - All crimes which offend the donor show ingratitude and are causes for
revocation. There is no doubt, therefore, that the donee who commits adultery with the wife of the
donor, gives cause for revocation by reason of ingratitude. The crimes against the person of the donor
would include not only homicide and physical injuries, but also illegal detention, threats, and
coercion; those against honor include offenses against chastity; and those against the property,
include robbery, theft, usurpation, swindling, arson, damages, etc. [Manresa 175-176]. (Emphasis
supplied).
Obviously, the first sentence was deleted by petitioners because it totally controverts their
contention. As noted in the aforecited opinion "all crimes which offend the donor show ingratitude
and are causes for revocation." Petitioners' attempt to categorize the offenses according to their
classification under the Revised Penal Code is therefore unwarranted considering that illegal
detention, threats and coercion are considered as crimes against the person of the donor despite the
fact that they are classified as crimes against personal liberty and security under the Revised Penal
Code.
Proceeding to the crucial issue that directly affects herein petitioners, it is reiterated that petitioners
are buyers in good faith of the donated property, and therefore, it was grave error to annul and set
aside the deed of sale executed between petitioners and donee Helen Doria.
When herein petitioners purchased the subject property from Helen Doria, the same was already
covered by TCT No. T-23205 under the latter's name. And although Helen Doria's title was
fraudulently secured, such fact cannot prejudice the rights of herein petitioners absent any showing
that they had any knowledge or participation in such irregularity. Thus, they cannot be obliged to
look beyond the certificate of title which appeared to be valid on its face and sans any annotation or
notice of private respondents' adverse claim. Contrary therefore to the conclusion of respondent
Court, petitioners are purchasers in good faith and for value as they bought the disputed property
without notice that some other person has a right or interest in such property, and paid a full price
for the same at the time of the purchase or before they had notice of the claim or interest of some
other person in the property.
143
THE CITY OF ANGELES, Hon. ANTONIO ABAD SANTOS, in his capacity as MAYOR of Angeles
City, and the SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD OF THE CITY OF ANGELES, Petitioners,
-versus
COURT OF APPEALS and TIMOG SILANGAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondents.
G.R. No. 97882, THIRD DIVISION, August 28, 1996, PANGANIBAN, J.
We hold that any condition may be imposed in the donation, so long as the same is not contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order or public policy. The contention of petitioners that the donation
should be unconditional because it is mandatory has no basis in law. P.D. 1216 does not provide that the
donation the open space for parks and playgrounds should be unconditional. To rule that it should be
so is tantamount to unlawfully expanding the provisions of the decree.
FACTS:
Private respondent donated to the City of Angeles 51 parcels of land situated in City of Angeles, part
of a bigger area also belonging to private respondent. The amended deed provided, among others,
that:
2. The properties donated shall be devoted and utilized solely for the site of the Angeles City Sports
Center pursuant to the plans to be submitted within six months by the DONEE to the DONOR for the
latter's approval
3. No commercial building, commercial complex, market or any other similar complex, mass or
tenament (sic) housing/building(s) shall be constructed in the properties donated nor shall
cockfighting, be allowed in the premises.
xxx xxx xxx
6. The properties donated shall constitute the entire open space for DONOR's subdivision and all
other lands or areas previously reserved or designated
8. Any substantial breach of the foregoing provisos shall entitle the DONOR to revoke or rescind this
Deed of Donation, and in such eventuality, the DONEE agrees to vacate and return the premises,
together with all improvements, to the DONOR peacefully without necessity of judicial action.
On July 19, 1988, petitioners started the construction of a drug rehabilitation center on a portion of
the donated land. Upon learning thereof, private respondent protested such action for being violative
of the terms and conditions of the amended deed. However, petitioners ignored the protest,
maintaining that the construction was not violative of the terms of the donation.
Private respondent filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court against the petitioners, alleging
breach of the conditions imposed in the amended deed of donation and seeking the revocation of the
donation and damages.
In ruling for private respondent, the trial court first opined that there is no inconsistency between
the conditions imposed in the Deeds of Donation and the provision of the Subdivision Ordinance of
the City of Angeles requiring subdivisions in Angeles City to reserve at least one (1) hectare in the
subdivision as suitable sites known as open spaces for parks, playgrounds, playlots and/or other
areas to be rededicated to public use. On the other hand, the term "public use'" in the Subdivision
144
Ordinance should not be construed to include a Drug Rehabilitation Center as that would be contrary
to the primary purpose of the Subdivision Ordinance requiring the setting aside of a portion known
as "Open Space" for park, playground and playlots, since these are intended primarily for the benefit
of the residents of the subdivision.
Thus, the RTC, enjoined the petitioners to perpetually cease and desist from constructing a Drug
Rehabilitation Center or any other building or improvement on the Donated Land, as well as declared
the amended Deed of Donation revoked and rescinded and ordering defendants to peacefully vacate
and return the Donated Land to plaintiff, together with all the improvements existing thereon. The
respondent Court affirmed the ruling of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the revocation of the donation was proper (NO)
RULING:
The law involved in the instant case is Presidential Decree No. 1216, dated October 14, 1977. Sec. 2
thereof amended Section 31 of Presidential Decree No. 957, thus:
Upon their completion . . ., the roads, alleys, sidewalks and playgrounds shall be donated by the owner
or developer to the city or municipality and it shall be mandatory for the local government to accept;
provided, however, that the parks and playgrounds may be donated to the Homeowners Association
of the project with the consent of the city or must concerned. . . .
It is clear from the aforequoted amendment that it is now a legal obligation on the part of the
subdivision owner/developer to donate the grounds. Although there is a proviso that the donation of
the parks and playgrounds may be made to the homeowners association of the project with the
consent of the city of municipality, concerned, nonetheless, the owner/developer is still obligated
under the law to donate. The donation has to be made regardless of which donee is picked by the
owner/developer.
Petitioners argue that since the private respondent is required by law to donate the parks and
playgrounds, it has no right to impose the condition in the Amended Deed of Donation that "the
properties donated shall be devoted and utilized solely for the site of the Angeles City Sports Center."
It cannot prescribe any condition as to the use of the area donated because the use of the open spaces
is already governed by P.D. 1216. In other words, the donation should be absolute. Consequently, the
conditions in the amended deed which were allegedly violated are deemed not written.
However, the general law on donations does not prohibit the imposition of conditions on a donation
so long as the conditions are not illegal or impossible.
In regard to donations of open spaces, P.D. 1216 itself requires among other things that the
recreational areas to be donated be based, as aforementioned, on a percentage (3.5% 7%, or 9%) of
the total area of the subdivision depending on whether the division is low —, medium —, or high-
density. It further declares that such open space devoted to parks, playgrounds and recreational
areas are non-alienable public land and non-buildable. However, there is no prohibition in either P.D.
957 or P.D. 1216 against imposing conditions on such donation.
145
We hold that any condition may be imposed in the donation, so long as the same is not contrary to
law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. The contention of petitioners that the
donation should be unconditional because it is mandatory has no basis in law. P.D. 1216 does not
provide that the donation the open space for parks and playgrounds should be unconditional. To rule
that it should be so is tantamount to unlawfully expanding the provisions of the decree.
In the case at bar, one of the conditions imposed in the Amended Deed of Donation is that the donee
should build a sports complex on the donated land. Since P.D. 1216 clearly requires that the 3.5% to
9% of the gross area allotted for parks and playgrounds is "non-buildable", then the obvious question
arises whether or not such condition was validly imposed and is binding on the donee. It is clear that
the "non-buildable" character applies only to the 3.5% to 9% area set by law. If there is any excess
land over and above the 3.5% to 9% required by the decree, which is also used or allocated for parks,
playgrounds and recreational purposes, it is obvious that such excess area is not covered by the non-
buildability restriction. In the instant case, if there be an excess, then the donee would not be barred
from developing and operating a sports complex thereon, and the condition in the amended deed
would then be considered valid and binding.
To determine if the over 50,000 square meter area donated pursuant to the amended deed would
yield an excess over the area required by the decree, it is necessary to determine under which density
category the Timog Park subdivision falls.
Petitioners alleged (and private respondent did not controvert) that the subdivision in question is a
"medium-density or economic housing" subdivision based on the sizes of the family lots donated in
the amended deed, for which category the decree mandates that not less than 7% of gross area be set
aside. Since the donated land constitutes only a little more than 5% of the gross area of the
subdivision, which is less than the area required to be allocated for non-buildable open space,
therefore there is no "excess land" to speak of. This then means that the condition to build a sports
complex on the donated land is contrary to law and should be considered as not imposed.
The private respondent contends that the building of said drug rehabilitation center is violative of
the Amended Deed of Donation. Therefore, under Article 764 of the New Civil Code and stipulation
no. 8 of the amended deed, private respondent is empowered to revoke the donation when the donee
has failed to comply with any of the conditions imposed in the deed.
We disagree. Article 1412 of the Civil Code comes into play here. It provides that if the act in which
the unlawful or forbidden cause consists does not constitute a criminal offense, the following rules
shall be observed: (1) When the fault is on the part of both contracting parties, neither may recover
what he has given by virtue of the contract, or demand the performance of the other's undertaking x
xx
Both petitioners and private respondents are in violation of P.D. 957 as amended, for donating and
accepting a donation of open space less than that required by law, and for agreeing to build and
operate a sports complex on the non-buildable open space so donated; and petitioners, for
constructing a drug rehabilitation center on the same non-buildable area.
Moreover, since the condition to construct a sport complex on the donated land has previously been
shown to be contrary to law, therefore, stipulation no. 8 of the amended deed cannot be implemented
because (1) no valid stipulation of the amended deed had been breached, and (2) it is highly
improbable that the decree would have allowed the return of the donated land for open space under
146
any circumstance, considering the non-alienable character of such open space, in the light of the
second Whereas clause of P.D. 1216 which declares that . . . such open spaces, roads, alleys and
sidewalks in residential subdivisions are for public use and are, therefore, beyond the commerce of
men.
Further, as a matter of public policy, private respondent cannot be allowed to evade its statutory
obligation to donate the required open space through the expediency of invoking petitioners breach
of the aforesaid condition. There is therefore no legal basis whatsoever to revoke the donation of the
subject open space and to return the donated land to private respondent. The donated land should
remain with the donee as the law clearly intended such open spaces to be perpetually part of the
public domain, non-alienable and permanently devoted to public use as such parks, playgrounds or
recreation areas.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of appeals hereby MODIFIED as follows:
(2) Petitioner City of Angeles is ORDERED to undertake and removal of said drug rehabilitation
center within a period of three (3) months from finality of this Decision, and thereafter, to devote
public use as a park, playground or other recreational use.
(3) The Amended Deed of Donation dated November 26, 1984 is hereby declared valid and
subsisting, except that the stipulations or conditions therein concerning the construction of the
Sports Center or Complex are hereby declared void and as if not imposed, and therefore of no force
and effect.
147

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Civil Law – Property

UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS

Leung vs. Strong Machinery 37 Phil. 644

Cabatingan vs. Cabatingan June 5, 2002

LEUNG YEE, Plaintiff-appellant, -versus- FRANK L. STRONG MACHINERY COMPANY and J. G.

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, -versus- COURT OF APPEALS, MYLO O.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, -versus- DAMIAN ERMITAÑO DE GUZMAN,

Indeed, by virtue of Proclamation No. 2143 (erroneously referred to by respondent as Proclamation

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, (Represented by Sally A. Malabanan), Petitioners, -versus-

The petition was denied.

Petitioners and the Republic filed Motions for Reconsideration.

(a) is intended for public use; or

Whether or not there was a donation inter vivos (NO)

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, -versus- DIOSDADA I. GIELCZYK, Respondent.

FLORENTINO W. LEONG AND ELENA LEONG, ET AL., Petitioners, -versus- EDNA C.

Whether petitioners acquired the property through acquisitive prescription. (Yes)

Whether or not writ of possession should be issued in favor of Salinas?

Actual possession under claim of ownership raises a disputable presumption of ownership.

Whether petitioners acquired the property through acquisitive prescription?

FEDERICO GEMINIANO, MARIA GEMINIANO, ERNESTO GEMINIANO, ASUNCION GEMINIANO,

Whether the private respondents are builders in good faith. (NO)

SPOUSES CRISPIN AQUINO and TERESA V. AQUINO, HEREIN REPRESENTED BY THEIR

TECNOGAS PHILIPPINES MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, Petitioner, -versus- COURT OF

Tecnogas Philippines Manufacturing Corporation (petitioner) is the registered owner of a parcel of

PLEASANTVILLE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner, -versus – COURT OF APPEALS,

Petitioners contention is without merit.

Article 453 of the Civil Code relevantly states:

Article 453 of the Civil Code relevantly states:

Whether or not there was accretion. (NO)

HEIRS OF EMILIANO NAVARRO, PETITIONER, VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND

Validity of the Real Estate Mortgage

JENESTOR B. CALDITO and MARIA FILOMENA T. CALDITO, Petitioners - versus - ISAGANI V.

REY CASTIGADOR CATEDRILLA, PETITIONER, VS. MARIO AND MARGIE LAURON,

Hence, this petition.

Article 487 of the New Civil Code is explicit on this point:

“ART.487. Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment.

EXTRAORDINARY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. HERMINIA F. SAMSON-

The petition is denied.

NORMA C. MAGSANO, ISIDRO C. MAGSANO, RICARDO C. MAGSANO, ROQUE C. MAGSANO, JR.,

1) Whether the REM was void. (YES)

2) The Sps. Manuel were purchasers in bad faith.

VILMA QUINTOS, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact FIDEL I. QUINTOS, JR.; FLORENCIA I.

1. No, the petitioners were not able to prove their ownership.

2. No, respondents’ counterclaim for partition is not barred by res judicata.

HEIRS OF QUIRICO SERASPI AND PURIFICACION R. SERASPI, Petitioners, -versus- COURT OF

DOMINGO R. CATAPUSAN, MINELIO R. CATAPUSAN, and FILOMENO R. CATAPUSAN,

Whether Bonifacio had title to the Wawa lot. (NO)

of ownership thru acquisitive prescription. The possession contemplated as foundation for

Whether Socorro can redeem the property. (YES)

"The plaintiffs' evidence consists of the following:

The Court of Appeals upheld the findings of the trial court.

Whether private respondents are the owners of the land. (YES)

FERNANDA MENDOZA CEQUENA AND RUPERTA MENDOZA LIRIO, Petitioners, -versus-

the court a quo rendered its judgment in favor of [petitioners.

SUBIC BAY LEGEND RESORTS AND CASINOS, INC., Petitioner, vs.

LEVISTAE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, INC., Petitioner vs.

ALICIA B. REYES, Petitioner, - versus -. SPOUSES VALENTIN RAMOS, FRANCISCO S. AND

Whether Alicia Reyes is entitled to the easement of right of way. (NO)

1. An immovable is surrounded by other immovables belonging to other persons, and is without