Department of Foreign Affairs v. National Labor Relations Commission
Department of Foreign Affairs v. National Labor Relations Commission
Department of Foreign Affairs v. National Labor Relations Commission
SYLLABUS
DECISION
VITUG , J : p
The questions raised in the petition for certiorari are a few coincidental matters
relative to the diplomatic immunity extended to the Asian Development Bank ("ADB").
On 27 January 1993, private respondent initiated NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-01-0690-
93 for his alleged illegal dismissal by ADB and the latter's violation of the "labor-only"
contracting law. Two summonses were served, one sent directly to the ADB and the other
through the Department of Foreign Affairs ("DFA"), both with a copy of the complainant.
Forthwith, the ADB and the DFA noti ed respondent Labor Arbiter that the ADB, as well as
its President and O cers, were covered by an immunity from legal process except for
borrowings, guaranties or the sale of securities pursuant to Article 50(1) and Article 55 of
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t h e Agreement Establishing the Asian Development Bank (the "Charter") in relation to
Section 5 and Section 44 of the Agreement Between The Bank And The Government Of
The Philippines Regarding The Bank's Headquarters (the "Headquarters Agreement").
The Labor Arbiter took cognizance of the complaint on the impression that the ADB
had waived its diplomatic immunity from suit. In time, the Labor Arbiter rendered his
decision, dated 31 August 1993, that concluded:
"WHEREFORE, above premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
declaring the complainant as a regular employee of respondent ADB, and the
termination of his services as illegal. Accordingly, respondent Bank is hereby
ordered:
The ADB did not appeal the decision. Instead, on 03 November 1993, the DFA
referred the matter to the National Labor Relations Commission ("NLRC"); in its referral, the
DFA sought a "formal vacation of the void judgment." Replying to the letter, the NLRC
Chairman, wrote:
"The undersigned submits that the request for the 'investigation' of Labor
Arbiter Nieves de Castro, by the National Labor Relations Commission, has been
erroneously premised on Art. 218(c) of the Labor Code, as cited in the letter of
Secretary Padilla, considering that the provision deals with 'a question, matter or
controversy within its (the Commission) jurisdiction' obviously referring to a labor
dispute within the ambit of Art. 217 (on jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the
Commission over labor cases).
"The procedure, in the adjudication of labor cases, including raising of
defenses, is prescribed by law. The defense of immunity could have been raised
before the Labor Arbiter by a special appearance which, naturally, may not be
considered as a waiver of the very defense being raised. Any decision thereafter is
subject to legal remedies, including appeals to the appropriate division of the
Commission and/or a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court. Except where an appeal is seasonably and properly made,
neither the Commission nor the undersigned may review, or even question, the
propriety of any decision by a Labor Arbiter. Incidentally, the Commission sits en
banc (all fteen Commissioners) only to promulgate rules of procedure or to
formulate policies (Art. 213, Labor Code).
"On the other hand, while the undersigned exercises 'administrative
supervision over the Commission and its regional branches and all its personnel,
including the Executive Labor Arbiters and Labor Arbiters' (penultimate paragraph,
Art. 213, Labor Code), he does not have the competence to investigate or review
any decision of a Labor Arbiter. However, on the purely administrative aspect of
the decision-making process, he may cause that an investigation be made of any
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misconduct, malfeasance or misfeasance, upon complaint properly made.
"If the Department of Foreign Affairs feels that the action of Labor Arbiter
Nieves de Castro constitutes misconduct, malfeasance or misfeasance, it is
suggested that an appropriate complaint be lodged with the O ce of the
Ombudsman.
Dissatis ed, the DFA lodged the instant petition for certiorari. In this Court's
resolution of 31 January 1994, respondents were required to comment. Petitioner was
later constrained to make an application for a restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction following the issuance, on 16 March 1994, by the Labor Arbiter of a writ of
execution. In a resolution, dated 07 April 1994, the Court issued the temporary restraining
order prayed for.
The O ce of the Solicitor General ("OSG"), in its comment of 26 May 1994, initially
assailed the claim of immunity by the ADB. Subsequently, however, it submitted a
Manifestation (dated 20 June 1994) stating, among other things, that "after a thorough
review of the case and the records," it became convinced that ADB, indeed, was correct in
invoking its immunity from suit under the Charter and the Headquarters Agreement.
The Court is of the same view.
Article 50(1) of the Charter provides:
"The Bank shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process, except in
cases arising out of or in connection with the exercise of its powers to borrow
money, to guarantee obligations, or to buy and sell or underwrite the sale of
securities." 3
Like provisions are found in the Headquarters Agreement. Thus, its Section 5 reads:
"The Bank shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process, except in
cases arising out of, or in connection with, the exercise of its powers to borrow
money, to guarantee obligations, or to buy and sell or underwrite the sale of
securities." 5
And, with respect to certain o cials of the bank, Section 44 of the agreement
states:
"Governors, other representatives of Members, Directors, the President,
Vice-President and executive o cers as may be agreed upon between the
Government and the Bank shall enjoy, during their stay in the Republic of the
Philippines in connection with their official duties with the Bank:
"xxx xxx xxx
The above stipulations of both the Charter and Headquarters Agreement should be
able, nay well enough, to establish that, except in the speci ed cases of borrowing and
guarantee operations, as well as the purchase, sale and underwriting of securities, the
ADB enjoys immunity from legal process of every form. The Bank's o cers, on their
part, enjoy immunity in respect of all acts performed by them in their o cial capacity.
The Charter and the Headquarters Agreement granting these immunities and privileges
are treaty covenants and commitments voluntarily assumed by the Philippine
government which must be respected.
In World Health Organization vs. Aquino, 7 we have declared:
"It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of
separation of powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question
and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch
of the government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and
a rmed by the executive branch of the government. . . it is then the duty of the
courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the
principal law o cer of the government, . . . or other o cer acting under his
direction. Hence, in adherence to the settled principle that courts may not so
exercise their jurisdiction . . . as to embarrass the executive arm of the
government in conducting foreign relations, it is accepted doctrine that 'in such
cases the judicial department of government follows the action of the political
branch and will not embarrass the latter by assuming an antagonistic
jurisdiction." 8
Contrary to private respondent's assertion, the claim of immunity is not here being
raised for the rst time; it has been invoked before the forum of origin through
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communications sent by petitioner and the ADB to the Labor Arbiter, as well as before the
NLRC following the rendition of the questioned judgment by the Labor Arbiter, but
evidently to no avail.
In its communication of 27 May 1993, the DFA, through the O ce of Legal Affairs,
has advised the NLRC:
"Respectfully returned to the Honorable Domingo B. Mabazza, Labor
Arbitration Associate, National Labor Relations Commission, National Capital
Judicial Region, Arbitration Branch, Associated bank Bldg., T.M. Kalaw St., Ermita,
Manila, the attached Notice of Hearing addressed to the Asian Development Bank,
in connection with the aforestated case, for the reason stated in the Department's
1st Indorsement dated 23 March 1993, copy attached, which is self-explanatory.
"In view of the fact that the Asian Development Bank (ADB) invokes its
immunity which is sustained by the Department of Foreign Affairs, a continuous
hearing of this case erodes the credibility of the Philippine government before the
international community, let alone the negative implication of such a suit on the
official relationship of the Philippine government with the ADB.
"For the Secretary of Foreign Affairs.
(Sgd.)
"SIME D. HIDALGO
Assistant Secretary" 1 4
The O ce of the President, likewise, has issued on 18 May 1993 a letter to the
Secretary of Labor, viz:
"Dear Secretary Confesor,
"I am writing to draw your attention to a case led by a certain Jose C.
Magnayi against the Asian Development Bank and its President, Kimimasa
Tarumizu, before the National Labor Relations Commission, National Capital
Region Arbitration Board (NLRC NCR Case No. 00-01690-93).
"Last March 8, the Labor Arbiter charged with the case, Ms. Nieves V. de
Castro, addressed a Notice of Resolution/Order to the Bank which brought it to
the attention of the Department of Foreign Affairs on the ground that the service
of such notice was in violation of the RP-ADB Headquarters Agreement which
provided, inter-alia, for the immunity of the Bank, its President and o cers from
every form of legal process, except only, in cases of borrowings, guarantees or the
sale of securities.
"The Department of Foreign Affairs, in turn, informed Labor Arbiter Nieves
V. de Castro of this fact by letter dated March 22, copied to you.
"Despite this, the labor arbiter in question persisted to send summons, the
latest dated May 4, herewith attached, regarding the Magnayi case.
"The Supreme Court has long settled the matter of diplomatic immunities.
I n WHO vs. Aquino, SCRA 48, it ruled that courts should respect diplomatic
immunities of foreign o cials recognized by the Philippine government. Such
decision by the Supreme Court forms part of the law of the land.
"Perhaps you should point out to Labor Arbiter Nieves V. de Castro that
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ignorance of the law is a ground for dismissal.
"Very truly yours,
(Sgd.)
JOSE B. ALEJANDRINO
Chairman, PCC-ADB" 1 5
Private respondent argues that, by entering into service contracts with different
private companies, ADB has descended to the level of an ordinary party to a commercial
transaction giving rise to a waiver of its immunity from suit. In the case of Holy See vs.
Hon. Rosario, Jr., 1 6 the Court has held:
"There are two con icting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely
held and rmly established. According to the classical or absolute theory, a
sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a respondent in the Courts of
another sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of
the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a
state, but not with regard to private act or acts jure gestionis.
The service contracts referred to by private respondent have not been intended by
the ADB for pro t or gain but are o cial acts over which a waiver of immunity would not
attach.
With regard to the issue of whether or not the DFA has the legal standing to le
the present petition, and whether or not petitioner has regarded the basic rule that
certiorari can be availed of only when there is no appeal nor plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, we hold both in the affirmative.
The DFA's function includes, among its other mandates, the determination of
persons and institutions covered by diplomatic immunities, a determination which, when
challenged, entitles it to seek relief from the court so as not to seriously impair the
conduct of the country's foreign relations. The DFA must be allowed to plead its case
whenever necessary or advisable to enable it to help keep the credibility of the Philippine
government before the international community. When international agreements are
concluded, the parties thereto are deemed to have likewise accepted the responsibility of
seeing to it that their agreements are duly regarded. In our country, this task falls
principally on the DFA as being the highest executive department with the competence and
authority to so act in this aspect of the international arena. 1 8 In Holy See vs. Hon. Rosario,
Jr., 1 9 this Court has explained the matter in good detail; viz:
"In Public International Law, when a state or international agency wishes to
plead sovereign or diplomatic immunity in a foreign court, it requests the Foreign
O ce of the state where it is sued to convey to the court that said defendant is
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entitled to immunity.
"In the United States, the procedure followed is the process of 'suggestion,'
where the foreign state or the international organization sued in an American
court requests the Secretary of State to make a determination as to whether it is
entitled to immunity. If the Secretary of State nds that the defendant is immune
from suit, he, in turn, asks the Attorney General to submit to the court a
'suggestion' that the defendant is entitled to immunity. In England, a similar
procedure is followed, only the Foreign O ce issues a certi cation to that effect
instead of submitting a 'suggestion' (O'Connell, I International Law 130 [1965];
Note: Immunity from Suit of Foreign Sovereign Instrumentalities and Obligations,
50 Yale Law Journal 1088 [1941]).
"In the Philippines, the practice is for the foreign government or the
international organization to rst secure an executive endorsement of its claim of
sovereign or diplomatic immunity. But how the Philippine Foreign O ce conveys
its endorsement to the courts varies. In International Catholic Migration
Commission vs. Calleja, 190 SCRA 130 (1990), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs
just sent a letter directly to the Secretary of Labor and Employment, informing the
latter that the respondent-employer could not be sued because it enjoyed
diplomatic immunity. In World Health Organization vs. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242
(1972), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs sent the trial court a telegram to that
effect. In Baer vs. Tizon, 57 SCRA 1 (1974), the U.S. Embassy asked the Secretary
of Foreign Affairs to request the Solicitor General to make, in behalf of the
Commander of the United States Naval Base at Olongapo City, Zambales, a
'suggestion' to respondent Judge. The Solicitor General embodied the 'suggestion'
in a manifestation and memorandum as amicus curiae.
"In the case at bench, the Department of Foreign Affairs, through the O ce
of Legal Affairs moved with this Court to be allowed to intervene on the side of
petitioner. The Court allowed the said Department to le its memorandum in
support of petitioner's claim of sovereign immunity.
"In some cases, the defense of sovereign immunity was submitted directly
to the local courts by the respondents through their private counsels (Raquiza vs.
Bradford, 75 Phil. 50 [1945]; Miquiabas vs. Philippine-Ryukyus Command, 80 Phil.
262 [1948]; United States of America vs. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644 [1990] and
companion cases). In cases where the foreign states bypass the Foreign O ce,
the courts can inquire into the facts and make their own determination as to the
nature of the acts and transactions involved." 2 0
Relative to the propriety of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, the Court has,
under special circumstances, so allowed and entertained such a petition when (a) the
questioned order or decision is issued in excess of or without jurisdiction, 2 1 or (b) where
the order or decision is a patent nullity, 2 2 which, verily, are the circumstances that can be
said to obtain in the present case. When an adjudicator is devoid of jurisdiction on a matter
before him, his action that assumes otherwise would be a clear nullity.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED, and the decision of the Labor
Arbiter, dated 31 August 1993 is VACATED for being NULL AND VOID. The temporary
restraining order issued by this Court on 07 April 1994 is hereby made permanent. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Footnotes
21. Aguilar vs. Tan, 31 SCRA 205; Bautista, et al. vs. Sarmiento, 138 SCRA 587.
22. Marcelo vs. De Guzman, 114 SCRA 657.