G.R. Nos.

154470-71 September 24, 2012

BANK OF COMMERCE, Petitioner,

vs.
PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK and BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. Nos. 154589-90

BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS, Petitioner,

vs.
PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before the Court are two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45,1 on pure questions
of law, filed by the petitioners Bank of Commerce (BOC) and the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). They
assail the January 10, 2002 and July 23, 2002 Orders (assailed orders) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Makati City, Branch 143, in Civil Case Nos. 94-3233 and 94-3254. These orders dismissed (i) the
petition filed by the Planters Development Bank (PDB), (ii) the "counterclaim" filed by the BOC, and (iii)
the counter-complaint/cross-claim for interpleader filed bythe BSP; and denied the BOC’s and the BSP’s
motions for reconsideration.

THE ANTECEDENTS

The Central Bank bills

I. First set of CB bills

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The Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) was the registered owner of seven Central Bank (CB)
bills with a total face value of ₱ 70 million, issued on January 2, 1994 and would mature on January 2,
1995.2 As evidenced by a "Detached Assignment" dated April 8, 1994,3 the RCBC sold these CB bills to the
BOC.4 As evidenced by another "Detached Assignment"5 of even date, the BOC, in turn, sold these CB bills
to the PDB.6 The BOC delivered the Detached Assignments to the PDB.7

On April 15, 1994 (April 15 transaction), the PDB, in turn, sold to the BOC Treasury Bills worth ₱ 70
million, with maturity date of June 29, 1994, as evidenced by a Trading Order8 and a Confirmation of
Sale.9 However, instead of delivering the Treasury Bills, the PDB delivered the seven CB bills to the BOC,
as evidenced by a PDB Security Delivery Receipt, bearing a "note: ** substitution in lieu of 06-29-94" –
referring to the Treasury Bills.10 Nevertheless, the PDB retained possession of the Detached Assignments.
It is basically the nature of this April 15 transaction that the PDB and the BOC cannot agree on.

The transfer of the first set of seven CB bills

i. CB bill nos. 45351-53

On April 20, 1994, according to the BOC, it "sold back"11 to the PDB three of the seven CB bills. In turn,
the PDB transferred these three CB bills to Bancapital Development Corporation (Bancap). On April 25,
1994, the BOC bought the three CB bills from Bancap – so, ultimately, the BOC reacquired these three CB
bills,12 particularly described as follows:

Serial No.: 2BB XM 045351

2BB XM 045352
2BB XM 045353

Quantity: Three (3)

Denomination: Php 10 million

Total Face Value: Php 30 million

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ii. CB bill nos. 45347-50

On April 20, 1994, the BOC sold the remaining four (4) CB bills to Capital One Equities Corporation 13 which
transferred them to All-Asia Capital and Trust Corporation (All Asia). On September 30, 1994, All Asia
further transferred the four CB bills back to the RCBC.14

On November 16, 1994, the RCBC sold back to All Asia one of these 4 CB bills. When the BSP refused to
release the amount of this CB bill on maturity, the BOC purchased from All Asia this lone CB
bill,15 particularly described as follows:16

Serial No.: 2BB XM 045348

Quantity: One (1)

Denomination: Php 10 million

Total Face Value: Php 10 million

As the registered owner of the remaining three CB bills, the RCBC sold them to IVI Capital and Insular
Savings Bank. Again, when the BSP refused to release the amount of this CB bill on maturity, the RCBC
paid back its transferees, reacquired these three CB bills and sold them to the BOC – ultimately, the BOC
acquired these three CB bills.

All in all, the BOC acquired the first set of seven CB bills.

II. Second set of CB bills

On April 19, 1994, the RCBC, as registered owner, (i) sold two CB bills with a total face value of ₱ 20
million to the PDB and (ii) delivered to the PDB the corresponding Detached Assignment. 17 The two CB bills
were particularly described as follows:

3
 Serial No.: BB XM 045373
BB XM 045374

Issue date: January 3, 1994

Maturity date: January 2, 1995

Denomination: Php 10 million

Total Face value: Php 20 million

On even date, the PDB delivered to Bancap the two CB bills18 (April 19 transaction). In turn, Bancap sold
the CB bills to Al-Amanah Islamic Investment Bank of the Philippines, which in turn sold it to the BOC.19

PDB’s move against the transfer of

the first and second sets of CB bills

On June 30, 1994, upon learning of the transfers involving the CB bills, the PDB informed20 the Officer-in-
Charge of the BSP’s Government Securities Department,21 Lagrimas Nuqui, of the PDB’s claim over these
CB bills, based on the Detached Assignments in its possession. The PDB requested the BSP22 to record its
claim in the BSP’s books, explaining that its non-possession of the CB bills is "on account of imperfect
negotiations thereof and/or subsequent setoff or transfer."23

Nuqui denied the request, invoking Section 8 of CB Circular No. 28 (Regulations Governing Open Market
Operations, Stabilization of the Securities Market, Issue, Servicing and Redemption of the Public
Debt)24 which requires the presentation of the bond before a registered bond may be transferred on the
books of the BSP.25

In a July 25, 1994 letter, the PDB clarified to Nuqui that it was not "asking for the transfer of the CB
Bills…. rather it intends to put the BSP on formal notice that whoever is in possession of said bills is not a
holder in due course," and, therefore the BSP should not make payment upon the presentation of the CB
bills on maturity.26 Nuqui responded that the BSP was "not in a position at that point in time to determine

4
who is and who is not the holder in due course since it is not privy to all acts and time involving the
transfers or negotiation" of the CB bills. Nuqui added that the BSP’s action shall be governed by CB
Circular No. 28, as amended.27

On November 17, 1994, the PDB also asked BSP Deputy Governor Edgardo Zialcita that (i) a notation in
the BSP’s books be made against the transfer, exchange, or payment of the bonds and the payment of
interest thereon; and (ii) the presenter of the bonds upon maturity be required to submit proof as a holder
in due course (of the first set of CB bills). The PDB relied on Section 10 (d) 4 of CB Circular No. 28.28 This
provision reads:

(4) Assignments effected by fraud – Where the assignment of a registered bond is secured by fraudulent
representations, the Central Bank can grant no relief if the assignment has been honored without notice of
fraud. Otherwise, the Central Bank, upon receipt of notice that the assignment is claimed to have been
secured by fraudulent representations, or payment of the bond the payment of interest thereon, and when
the bond is presented, will call upon the owner and the person presenting the bond to substantiate their
respective claims.If it then appears that the person presenting the bond stands in the position of bonafide
holder for value, the Central Bank, after giving the owner an opportunity to assert his claim, will pass the
bond for transfer, exchange or payments, as the case may be, without further question.

In a December 29, 1994 letter, Nuqui again denied the request, reiterating the BSP’s previous stand.

In light of these BSP responses and the impending maturity of the CB bills, the PDB filed29 with the RTC
two separate petitions for Mandamus, Prohibition and Injunction with prayer for Preliminary Injunction and
Temporary Restraining Order, docketed as Civil Case No. 94-3233 (covering the first set of CB bills) and
Civil Case 94-3254 (covering the second set of CB bills) against Nuqui, the BSP and the RCBC.30

The PDB essentially claims that in both the April 15 transaction (involving the first set of CB bills) and the
April 19 transaction (involving the second set of CB bills), there was no intent on its part to transfer title of
the CB bills, as shown by its non-issuance of a detached assignment in favor of the BOC and Bancap,
respectively. The PDB particularly alleges that it merely "warehoused"31 the first set of CB bills with the
BOC, as security collateral.

5
On December 28, 1994, the RTC temporarily enjoined Nuqui and the BSP from paying the face value of
the CB bills on maturity.32 On January 10, 1995, the PDB filed an Amended Petition, additionally
impleading the BOC and All Asia.33 In a January 13, 1995 Order, the cases were consolidated.34 On
January 17, 1995, the RTC granted the PDB’s application for a writ of preliminary prohibitory
injunction.35 In both petitions, the PDB identically prayed:

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed x x x that, after due notice and hearing, the Writs of Mandamus,
Prohibition and Injunction, be issued; (i) commanding the BSP and Nuqui, or whoever may take her place
-

(a) to record forthwith in the books of BSP the claim of x x x PDB on the [two sets of] CB Bills in
accordance with Section 10 (d) (4) of revised C.B. Circular No. 28; and

(b) also pursuant thereto, when the bills are presented on maturity date for payment, to call (i) x x x PDB,
(ii) x x x RCBC x x x, (iii) x x x BOC x x x, and (iv) x x x ALL-ASIA x x x; or whoever will present the [first
and second sets of] CB Bills for payment, to submit proof as to who stands as the holder in due course of
said bills, and, thereafter, act accordingly;

and (ii) ordering the BSP and Nuqui to pay jointly and severally to x x x PDB the following:

(a) the sum of ₱ 100,000.00, as and for exemplary damages;

(b) the sum of at least ₱ 500,000.00, or such amount as shall be proved at the trial, as and for
attorney’s fees;

(c) the legal rate of interest from the filing of this Petition until full payment of the sums mentioned
in this Petition; and

(d) the costs of suit.36

After the petitions were filed, the BOC acquired/reacquired all the nine CB bills – the first and second sets
of CB bills (collectively, subject CB bills).

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Defenses of the BSP and of the BOC37

The BOC filed its Answer, praying for the dismissal of the petition. It argued that the PDB has no cause of
action against it since the PDB is no longer the owner of the CB bills. Contrary to the PDB’s "warehousing
theory,"38 the BOC asserted that the (i) April 15 transaction and the (ii) April 19 transaction – covering
both sets of CB bills - were valid contracts of sale, followed by a transfer of title (i) to the BOC (in the April
15 transaction) upon the PDB’s delivery of the 1st set of CB bills in substitution of the Treasury Bills the
PDB originally intended to sell, and (ii) to Bancap (in the April 19 transaction) upon the PDB’s delivery of
the 2nd set of CB bills to Bancap, likewise by way of substitution.

The BOC adds that Section 10 (d) 4 of CB Circular No. 28 cannot apply to the PDB’s case because (i) the
PDB is not in possession of the CB bills and (ii) the BOC acquired these bills from the PDB, as to the 1st
set of CB bills, and from Bancap, as to the 2nd set of CB bills, in good faith and for value. The BOC also
asserted a compulsory counterclaim for damages and attorney’s fees.

On the other hand, the BSP countered that the PDB cannot invoke Section 10 (d) 4 of CB Circular No. 28
because this section applies only to an "owner" and a "person presenting the bond," of which the PDB is
neither. The PDB has not presented to the BSP any assignment of the subject CB bills, duly recorded in
the BSP’s books, in its favor to clothe it with the status of an "owner."39 According to the BSP –

Section 10 d. (4) applies only to a registered bond which is assigned. And the issuance of CB Bills x x x
are required to be recorded/registered in BSP’s books. In this regard, Section 4 a. (1) of CB Circular 28
provides that registered bonds "may be transferred only by an assignment thereon duly executed by the
registered owner or his duly authorized representative x x x and duly recorded on the books of the Central
Bank."

xxxx

The alleged assignment of subject CB Bills in PDB’s favor is not recorded/registered in BSP’s
books.40 (underscoring supplied)

7
Consequently, when Nuqui and the BSP refused the PDB’s request (to record its claim), they were merely
performing their duties in accordance with CB Circular No. 28.

Alternatively, the BSP asked that an interpleader suit be allowed between and among the claimants to the
subject CB bills on the position that while it is able and willing to pay the subject CB bills’ face value, it is
duty bound to ensure that payment is made to the rightful owner. The BSP prayed that judgment be
rendered:

a. Ordering the dismissal of the PDB’s petition for lack of merit;

b. Determining which between/among [PDB] and the other claimants is/are lawfully entitled to the
ownership of the subject CB bills and the proceeds thereof;

c. x x x;

d. Ordering PDB to pay BSP and Nuqui such actual/compensatory and exemplary damages… as the
RTC may deem warranted; and

e. Ordering PDB to pay Nuqui moral damages… and to pay the costs of the suit.41

Subsequent events

The PDB agreed with the BSP’s alternative response for an interpleader –

4. PDB agrees that the various claimants should now interplead and substantiate their respective claims
on the subject CB bills. However, the total face value of the subject CB bills should be deposited in escrow
with a private bank to be disposed of only upon order of the RTC.42

Accordingly, on June 9, 199543 and August 4, 1995,44 the BOC and the PDB entered into two separate
Escrow Agreements.45 The first agreement covered the first set of CB bills, while the second agreement
covered the second set of CB bills. The parties agreed to jointly collect from the BSP the maturity
proceeds of these CB bills and to deposit said amount in escrow, "pending final determination by Court

8
judgment, or amicable settlement as to who shall be eventually entitled thereto."46 The BOC and the PDB
filed a Joint Motion,47 submitting these Escrow Agreements for court approval. The RTC gave its approval
to the parties’ Joint Motion.48 Accordingly, the BSP released the maturity proceeds of the CB bills by
crediting the Demand Deposit Account of the PDB and of the BOC with 50% each of the maturity proceeds
of the amount in escrow.49

In view of the BOC’s acquisition of all the CB bills, All Asia50 moved to be dropped as a respondent (with
the PDB’s conformity51 ), which the RTC granted.52 The RCBC subsequently followed suit.53

In light of the developments, on May 4, 1998, the RTC required the parties to manifest their intention
regarding the case and to inform the court of any amicable settlement; "otherwise, th[e] case shall be
dismissed for lack of interest."54 Complying with the RTC’s order, the BOC moved (i) that the case be set
for pre-trial and (ii) for further proceeding to resolve the remaining issues between the BOC and the PDB,
particularly on "who has a better right over the subject CB bills."55 The PDB joined the BOC in its motion.56

On September 28, 2000, the RTC granted the BSP’s motion to interplead and, accordingly, required the
BOC to amend its Answer and for the conflicting claimants to comment thereon.57 In October 2000, the
BOC filed its Amended Consolidated Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, reiterating its earlier
arguments asserting ownership over the subject CB bills.58

In the alternative, the BOC added that even assuming that there was no effective transfer of the nine CB
bills ultimately to the BOC, the PDB remains obligated to deliver to the BOC, as buyer in the April 15
transaction and ultimate successor-in-interest of the buyer (Bancap) in the April 19 transaction, either the
original subjects of the sales or the value thereof, plus whatever income that may have been earned
during the pendency of the case.59

That BOC prayed:

1. To declare BOC as the rightful owner of the nine (9) CB bills and as the party entitled to the
proceeds thereof as well as all income earned pursuant to the two (2) Escrow Agreements entered
into by BOC and PDB.

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 2. In the alternative, ordering PDB to deliver the original subject of the sales transactions or the
value thereof and whatever income earned by way of interest at prevailing rate.

Without any opposition or objection from the PDB, on February 23, 2001, the RTC admitted60 the BOC’s
Amended Consolidated Answer with Compulsory Counterclaims.

In May 2001, the PDB filed an Omnibus Motion,61 questioning the RTC’s jurisdiction over the BOC’s
"additional counterclaims." The PDB argues that its petitions pray for the BSP (not the RTC) to determine
who among the conflicting claimants to the CB bills stands in the position of the bona fide holder for value.
The RTC cannot entertain the BOC’s counterclaim, regardless of its nature, because it is the BSP which has
jurisdiction to determine who is entitled to receive the proceeds of the CB bills.

The BOC opposed62 the PDB’s Omnibus Motion. The PDB filed its Reply.63

In a January 10, 2002 Order, the RTC dismissed the PDB’s petition, the BOC’s counterclaim and the BSP’s
counter-complaint/cross-claim for interpleader, holding that under CB Circular No. 28, it has no
jurisdiction (i) over the BOC’s "counterclaims" and (ii) to resolve the issue of ownership of the CB
bills.64 With the denial of their separate motions for Reconsideration,65 the BOC and the BSP separately
filed the present petitions for review on certiorari.66

THE BOC’S and THE BSP’S PETITIONS

The BOC argues that the present cases do not fall within the limited provision of Section 10 (d) 4 of CB
Circular No. 28, which contemplates only of three situations: first, where the fraudulent assignment is not
coupled with a notice to the BSP, it can grant no relief; second, where the fraudulent assignment is
coupled with a notice of fraud to the BSP, it will make a notation against the assignment and require the
owner and the holder to substantiate their claims; and third, where the case does not fall on either of the
first two situations, the BSP will have to await action on the assignment pending settlement of the case,
whether by agreement or by court order.

The PDB’s case cannot fall under the first two situations. With particular regard to the second situation, CB
Circular No. 28 requires that the conflict must be between an "owner" and a "holder," for the BSP to

10
exercise its limited jurisdiction to resolve conflicting claims; and the word "owner" here refers to the
registered owner giving notice of the fraud to the BSP. The PDB, however, is not the registered owner nor
is it in possession (holder) of the CB bills.67 Consequently, the PDB’s case can only falls under the third
situation which leaves the RTC, as a court of general jurisdiction, with the authority to resolve the issue of
ownership of a registered bond (the CB bills) not falling in either of the first two situations.

The BOC asserts that the policy consideration supportive of its interpretation of CB Circular No. 28 is to
have a reliable system to protect the registered owner; should he file a notice with the BSP about a
fraudulent assignment of certain CB bills, the BSP simply has to look at its books to determine who is the
owner of the CB bills fraudulently assigned. Since it is only the registered owner who complied with the
BSP’s requirement of recording an assignment in the BSP’s books, then "the protective mantle of
administrative proceedings" should necessarily benefit him only, without extending the same benefit to
those who chose to ignore the Circular’s requirement, like the PDB.68

Assuming arguendo that the PDB’s case falls under the second situation – i.e., the BSP has jurisdiction to
resolve the issue of ownership of the CB bills – the more recent CB Circular No. 769-80 (Rules and
Regulations Governing Central Bank Certificates of Indebtedness) already superseded CB Circular No. 28,
and, in particular, effectively amended Section 10 (d) 4 of CB Circular No. 28. The pertinent provisions of
CB Circular No. 769-80 read:

Assignment Affected by Fraud. – Any assignment for transfer of ownership of registered certificate
obtained through fraudulent representation if honored by the Central Bank or any of its authorized service
agencies shall not make the Central Bank or agency liable therefore unless it has previous formal notice of
the fraud. The Central Bank, upon notice under oath that the assignment was secured through fraudulent
means, shall immediately issue and circularize a "stop order" against the transfer, exchange, redemption
of the Certificate including the payment of interest coupons. The Central Bank or service agency
concerned shall continue to withhold action on the certificate until such time that the conflicting claims
have been finally settled either by amicable settlement between the parties or by order of the Court.

Unlike CB Circular No. 28, CB Circular No. 769-80 limited the BSP’s authority to the mere issuance and
circularization of a "stop order" against the transfer, exchange and redemption upon sworn notice of a
fraudulent assignment. Under this Circular, the BSP shall only continue to withhold action until the dispute

11
is ended by an amicable settlement or by judicial determination. Given the more passive stance of the BSP
– the very agency tasked to enforce the circulars involved - under CB Circular No. 769-80, the RTC’s
dismissal of the BOC’s counterclaims is palpably erroneous.

Lastly, since Nuqui’s office (Government Securities Department) had already been abolished,69 it can no
longer adjudicate the dispute under the second situation covered by CB Circular No. 28. The abolition of
Nuqui’s office is not only consistent with the BSP’s Charter but, more importantly, with CB Circular No.
769-80, which removed the BSP’s adjudicative authority over fraudulent assignments.

THE PDB’S COMMENT

The PDB claims that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint/petition and not by the
defenses set up in the answer.70 In filing the petition with the RTC, the PDB merely seeks to compel the
BSP to determine, pursuant to CB Circular No. 28, the party legally entitled to the proceeds of the subject
CB bills, which, as the PDB alleged, have been transferred through fraudulent representations – an
allegation which properly recognized the BSP’s jurisdiction to resolve conflicting claims of ownership over
the CB bills.

The PDB adds that under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts should refrain from determining a
controversy involving a question whose resolution demands the exercise of sound administrative
discretion. In the present case, the BSP’s special knowledge and experience in resolving disputes on
securities, whose assignment and trading are governed by the BSP’s rules, should be upheld.

The PDB counters that the BOC’s tri-fold interpretation of Section 10 (d) 4 of CB Circular No. 28 sanctions
split jurisdiction which is not favored;but even this tri-fold interpretation which, in the second situation,
limits the meaning of the "owner" to the registered owner is flawed. Section 10 (d) 4 aims to protect not
just the registered owner but anyone who has been deprived of his bond by fraudulent representation in
order to deter fraud in the secondary trading of government securities.

The PDB asserts that the existence of CB Circular No. 769-80 or the abolition of Nuqui’s office does not
result in depriving the BSP of its jurisdiction: first, CB Circular No. 769-80 expressly provides that CB

12
Circular No. 28 shall have suppletory application to CB Circular No. 769-80; and second, the BSP can
always designate an office to resolve the PDB’s claim over the CB bills.

Lastly, the PDB argues that even assuming that the RTC has jurisdiction to resolve the issue of ownership
of the CB bills, the RTC has not acquired jurisdiction over the BOC’s so-called "compulsory" counterclaims
(which in truth is merely "permissive") because of the BOC’s failure to pay the appropriate docket fees.
These counterclaims should, therefore, be dismissed and expunged from the record.

THE COURT’S RULING

We grant the petitions.

At the outset, we note that the parties have not raised the validity of either CB Circular No. 28 or CB
Circular No. 769-80 as an issue. What the parties largely contest is the applicable circular in case of an
allegedly fraudulently assigned CB bill. The applicable circular, in turn, is determinative of the proper
remedy available to the PDB and/or the BOC as claimants to the proceeds of the subject CB bills.

Indisputably, at the time the PDB supposedly invoked the jurisdiction of the BSP in 1994 (by requesting
for the annotation of its claim over the subject CB bills in the BSP’s books), CB Circular No. 769-80 has
long been in effect. Therefore, the parties’ respective interpretations of the provision of Section 10 (d) 4 of
CB Circular No. 28 do not have any significance unless it is first established that that Circular governs the
resolution of their conflicting claims of ownership. This conclusion is important, given the supposed repeal
or modification of Section 10 (d) 4 of CB Circular No. 28 by the following provisions of CB Circular No.
769-80:

ARTICLE XI
SUPPLEMENTAL RULES

Section 1. Central Bank Circular No. 28 – The provisions of Central Bank Circular No. 28 shall have
suppletory application to matters not specially covered by these Rules.

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 ARTICLE XII
EFFECTIVITY

Effectivity – The rules and regulations herein prescribed shall take effect upon approval by the Monetary
Board, Central Bank of the Philippines, and all circulars, memoranda, or office orders inconsistent herewith
are revoked or modified accordingly. (Emphases added)

We agree with the PDB that in view of CB Circular No. 28’s suppletory application, an attempt to
harmonize the apparently conflicting provisions is a prerequisite before one may possibly conclude that an
amendment or a repeal exists.71 Interestingly, however, even the PDB itself failed to submit an
interpretation based on its own position of harmonization.

The repealing clause of CB Circular No. 769-80 obviously did not expressly repeal CB Circular No. 28; in
fact, it even provided for the suppletory application of CB Circular No. 28 on "matters not specially
covered by" CB Circular No. 769-80. While no express repeal exists, the intent of CB Circular No. 769-80
to operate as an implied repeal,72 or at least to amend earlier CB circulars, is supported by its text
"revoking" or "modif[ying" "all circulars" which are inconsistent with its terms.

At the outset, we stress that none of the parties disputes that the subject CB bills fall within the category
of a certificate or evidence of indebtedness and that these were issued by the Central Bank, now the BSP.
Thus, even without resorting to statutory construction aids, matters involving the subject CB bills should
necessarily be governed by CB Circular No. 769-80. Even granting, however, that reliance on CB Circular
No. 769-80 alone is not enough, we find that CB Circular No. 769-80 impliedly repeals CB Circular No. 28.

An implied repeal transpires when a substantial conflict exists between the new and the prior laws. In the
absence of an express repeal, a subsequent law cannot be construed as repealing a prior law unless an
irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and the old laws.73 Repeal by
implication is not favored, unless manifestly intended by the legislature, or unless it is convincingly and
unambiguously demonstrated, that the laws or orders are clearly repugnant and patently inconsistent with
one another so that they cannot co-exist; the legislature is presumed to know the existing law and would
express a repeal if one is intended.74

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There are two instances of implied repeal. One takes place when the provisions in the two acts on the
same subject matter are irreconcilably contradictory, in which case, the later act, to the extent of the
conflict, constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one. The other occurs when the later act covers the
whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute; thus, it will operate to repeal the
earlier law.75

A general reading of the two circulars shows that the second instance of implied repeal is present in this
case. CB Circular No. 28, entitled "Regulations Governing Open Market Operations, Stabilization of
Securities Market, Issue, Servicing and Redemption of Public Debt," is a regulation governing the servicing
and redemption of public debt, including the issue, inscription, registration, transfer, payment and
replacement of bonds and securities representing the public debt.76 On the other hand, CB Circular No.
769-80, entitled "Rules and Regulations Governing Central Bank Certificate of Indebtedness," is the
governing regulation on matters77 (i) involving certificate of indebtedness78 issued by the Central Bank
itself and (ii) which are similarly covered by CB Circular No. 28.

The CB Monetary Board issued CB Circular No. 28 to regulate the servicing and redemption of public debt,
pursuant to Section 124 (now Section 119 of Republic Act R.A. No. 7653) of the old Central Bank
law79 which provides that "the servicing and redemption of the public debt shall also be effected through
the Bangko Sentral." However, even as R.A. No. 7653 continued to recognize this role by the BSP, the law
required a phase-out of all fiscal agency functions by the BSP, including Section 119 of R.A. No. 7653.

In other words, even if CB Circular No. 28 applies broadly to both government-issued bonds and securities
and Central Bank-issued evidence of indebtedness, given the present state of law, CB Circular No. 28 and
CB Circular No. 769-80 now operate on the same subject – Central Bank-issued evidence of indebtedness.
Under Section 1, Article XI of CB Circular No. 769-80, the continued relevance and application of CB
Circular No. 28 would depend on the need to supplement any deficiency or silence in CB Circular No. 769-
80 on a particular matter.

In the present case, both CB Circular No. 28 and CB Circular No. 769-80 provide the BSP with a course of
action in case of an allegedly fraudulently assigned certificate of indebtedness. Under CB Circular No. 28,
in case of fraudulent assignments, the BSP would have to "call upon the owner and the person presenting
the bond to substantiate their respective claims" and, from there, determine who has a better right over

15
the registered bond. On the other hand, under CB Circular No. 769-80, the BSP shall merely "issue and
circularize a ‘stop order’ against the transfer, exchange, redemption of the [registered] certificate" without
any adjudicative function (which is the precise root of the present controversy). As the two circulars stand,
the patent irreconcilability of these two provisions does not require elaboration. Section 5, Article V of CB
Circular No. 769-80 inescapably repealed Section 10 (d) 4 of CB Circular No. 28.

The issue of BSP’s jurisdiction, lay hidden

On that note, the Court could have written finis to the present controversy by simply sustaining the BSP’s
hands-off approach to the PDB’s problem under CB Circular No. 769-80. However, the jurisdictional
provision of CB Circular No. 769-80 itself, in relation to CB Circular No. 28, on the matter of fraudulent
assignment, has given rise to a question of jurisdiction - the core question of law involved in these
petitions - which the Court cannot just treat sub-silencio.

Broadly speaking, jurisdiction is the legal power or authority to hear and determine a cause. 80 In the
exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial power, it refers to the authority of a court to hear and decide a
case.81 In the context of these petitions, we hark back to the basic principles governing the question of
jurisdiction over the subject matter.

First, jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined only by the Constitution and by law.82 As a matter
of substantive law, procedural rules alone can confer no jurisdiction to courts or administrative
agencies.83 In fact, an administrative agency, acting in its quasi-judicial capacity, is a tribunal of limited
jurisdiction and, as such, could wield only such powers that are specifically granted to it by the enabling
statutes. In contrast, an RTC is a court of general jurisdiction, i.e., it has jurisdiction over cases whose
subject matter does not fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.84

Second, jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined not by the pleas set up by the defendant in his
answer85 but by the allegations in the complaint,86 irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to
favorable judgment on the basis of his assertions.87 The reason is that the complaint is supposed to
contain a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's causes of action.88

16
Third, jurisdiction is determined by the law in force at the time of the filing of the complaint.89

Parenthetically, the Court observes that none of the parties ever raised the issue of whether the BSP can
simply disown its jurisdiction, assuming it has, by the simple expedient of promulgating a new circular
(specially applicable to a certificate of indebtedness issued by the BSP itself), inconsistent with an old
circular, assertive of its limited jurisdiction over ownership issues arising from fraudulent assignments of a
certificate of indebtedness. The PDB, in particular, relied solely and heavily on CB Circular No. 28.

In light of the above principles pointing to jurisdiction as a matter of substantive law, the provisions of the
law itself that gave CB Circular 769-80 its life and jurisdiction must be examined.

The Philippine Central Bank

On January 3, 1949, Congress created the Central Bank of the Philippines (Central Bank) as a corporate
body with the primary objective of (i) maintaining the internal and external monetary stability in the
Philippines; and (ii) preserving the international value and the convertibility of the peso.90 In line with
these broad objectives, the Central Bank was empowered to issue rules and regulations "necessary for the
effective discharge of the responsibilities and exercise of the powers assigned to the Monetary Board and
to the Central Bank."91 Specifically, the Central Bank is authorized to organize (other) departments for the
efficient conduct of its business and whose powers and duties "shall be determined by the Monetary
Board, within the authority granted to the Board and the Central Bank"92 under its original charter.

With the 1973 Constitution, the then Central Bank was constitutionally made as the country’s central
monetary authority until such time that Congress93 shall have established a central bank. The 1987
Constitution continued to recognize this function of the then Central Bank until Congress, pursuant to the
Constitution, created a new central monetary authority which later came to be known as the Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas.

Under the New Central Bank Act (R.A. No. 7653),94 the BSP is given the responsibility of providing policy
directions in the areas of money, banking and credit; it is given, too, the primary objective of maintaining
price stability, conducive to a balanced and sustainable growth of the economy, and of promoting and
maintaining monetary stability and convertibility of the peso.95

17
The Constitution expressly grants the BSP, as the country’s central monetary authority, the power of
supervision over the operation of banks, while leaving with Congress the authority to define the BSP’s
regulatory powers over the operations of finance companies and other institutions performing similar
functions. Under R.A. No. 7653, the BSP’s powers and functions include (i) supervision over the operation
of banks; (ii) regulation of operations of finance companies and non-bank financial institutions performing
quasi banking functions; (iii) sole power and authority to issue currency within the Philippine territory; (iv)
engaging in foreign exchange transactions; (v) making rediscounts, discounts, loans and advances to
banking and other financial institutions to influence the volume of credit consistent with the objective of
achieving price stability; (vi) engaging in open market operations; and (vii) acting as banker and financial
advisor of the government.1âwphi1

On the BSP’s power of supervision over the operation of banks, Section 4 of R.A. No. 8791 (The General
Banking Law of 2000) elaborates as follows:

CHAPTER II
AUTHORITY OF THE BANGKO SENTRAL

SECTION 4. Supervisory Powers. — The operations and activities of banks shall be subject to supervision
of the Bangko Sentral. "Supervision" shall include the following:

4.1. The issuance of rules of conduct or the establishment of standards of operation for uniform
application to all institutions or functions covered, taking into consideration the distinctive character
of the operations of institutions and the substantive similarities of specific functions to which such
rules, modes or standards are to be applied;

4.2. The conduct of examination to determine compliance with laws and regulations if the
circumstances so warrant as determined by the Monetary Board;

4.3. Overseeing to ascertain that laws and regulations are complied with;

4.4. Regular investigation which shall not be oftener than once a year from the last date of
examination to determine whether an institution is conducting its business on a safe or sound basis:

18
 Provided, That the deficiencies/irregularities found by or discovered by an audit shall be immediately
addressed;

4.5. Inquiring into the solvency and liquidity of the institution (2-D); or

4.6. Enforcing prompt corrective action. (n)

The Bangko Sentral shall also have supervision over the operations of and exercise regulatory powers over
quasi-banks, trust entities and other financial institutions which under special laws are subject to Bangko
Sentral supervision. (2-Ca)

For the purposes of this Act, "quasi-banks" shall refer to entities engaged in the borrowing of funds
through the issuance, endorsement or assignment with recourse or acceptance of deposit substitutes as
defined in Section 95 of Republic Act No. 7653 (hereafter the "New Central Bank Act") for purposes of
relending or purchasing of receivables and other obligations. [emphasis ours]

While this provision empowers the BSP to oversee the operations and activities of banks to "ascertain that
laws and regulations are complied with," the existence of the BSP’s jurisdiction in the present dispute
cannot rely on this provision. The fact remains that the BSP already made known to the PDB its
unfavorable position on the latter’s claim of fraudulent assignment due to the latter’s own failure to
comply96 with existing regulations:

In this connection, Section 10 (b) 2 also requires that a "Detached assignment will be recognized or
accepted only upon previous notice to the Central Bank x x x." In fact, in a memo dated September 23,
1991 xxx then CB Governor Jose L. Cuisia advised all banks (including PDB) xxx as follows:

In view recurring incidents ostensibly disregarding certain provisions of CB circular No. 28 (as amended)
covering assignments of registered bonds, all banks and all concerned are enjoined to observe strictly the
pertinent provisions of said CB Circular as hereunder quoted:

xxxx

19
Under Section 10.b. (2)

x x x Detached assignment will be recognized or accepted only upon previous notice to the Central Bank
and its use is authorized only under the following circumstances:

(a) x x x

(b) x x x

(c) assignments of treasury notes and certificates of indebtedness in registered form which are not
provided at the back thereof with assignment form.

(d) Assignment of securities which have changed ownership several times.

(e) x x x

Non-compliance herewith will constitute a basis for non-action or withholding of action on

redemption/payment of interest coupons/transfer transactions or denominational exchange that may be
directly affected thereby. [Boldfacing supplied]

Again, the books of the BSP do not show that the supposed assignment of subject CB Bills was ever
recorded in the BSP’s books. [Boldfacing supplied]

However, the PDB faults the BSP for not recording the assignment of the CB bills in the PDB’s favor
despite the fact that the PDB already requested the BSP to record its assignment in the BSP’s books as
early as June 30, 1994.97

The PDB’s claim is not accurate. What the PDB requested the BSP on that date was not the recording of
the assignment of the CB bills in its favor but the annotation of its claim over the CB bills at the time when
(i) it was no longer in possession of the CB bills, having been transferred from one entity to another and
(ii) all it has are the detached assignments, which the PDB has not shown to be compliant with Section 10
(b) 2 above-quoted. Obviously, the PDB cannot insist that the BSP take cognizance of its plaint when the

20
basis of the BSP’s refusal under existing regulation, which the PDB is bound to observe, is the PDB’s own
failure to comply therewith.

True, the BSP exercises supervisory powers (and regulatory powers) over banks (and quasi banks). The
issue presented before the Court, however, does not concern the BSP’s supervisory power over banks as
this power is understood under the General Banking Law. In fact, there is nothing in the PDB’s petition
(even including the letters it sent to the BSP) that would support the BSP’s jurisdiction outside of CB
Circular No. 28, under its power of supervision, over conflicting claims to the proceeds of the CB bills.

BSP has quasi-judicial powers over a

class of cases which does not include
the adjudication of ownership of the
CB bills in question

In United Coconut Planters Bank v. E. Ganzon, Inc.,98 the Court considered the BSP as an administrative
agency,99 exercising quasi-judicial functions through its Monetary Board. It held:

A quasi-judicial agency or body is an organ of government other than a court and other than a legislature,
which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule-making. The very definition
of an administrative agency includes its being vested with quasi-judicial powers. The ever increasing
variety of powers and functions given to administrative agencies recognizes the need for the active
intervention of administrative agencies in matters calling for technical knowledge and speed in countless
controversies which cannot possibly be handled by regular courts. A "quasi-judicial function" is a term
which applies to the action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies, who are required to
investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a
basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.

Undoubtedly, the BSP Monetary Board is a quasi-judicial agency exercising quasi-judicial powers or
functions. As aptly observed by the Court of Appeals, the BSP Monetary Board is an independent central
monetary authority and a body corporate with fiscal and administrative autonomy, mandated to provide
policy directions in the areas of money, banking and credit. It has power to issue subpoena, to sue for
contempt those refusing to obey the subpoena without justifiable reason, to administer oaths and compel

21
presentation of books, records and others, needed in its examination, to impose fines and other sanctions
and to issue cease and desist order. Section 37 of Republic Act No. 7653, in particular, explicitly provides
that the BSP Monetary Board shall exercise its discretion in determining whether administrative sanctions
should be imposed on banks and quasi-banks, which necessarily implies that the BSP Monetary Board
must conduct some form of investigation or hearing regarding the same. [citations omitted]

The BSP is not simply a corporate entity but qualifies as an administrative agency created, pursuant to
constitutional mandate,100 to carry out a particular governmental function.101 To be able to perform its role
as central monetary authority, the Constitution granted it fiscal and administrative autonomy. In general,
administrative agencies exercise powers and/or functions which may be characterized as administrative,
investigatory, regulatory, quasi-legislative, or quasi-judicial, or a mix of these five, as may be conferred
by the Constitution or by statute.102

While the very nature of an administrative agency and the raison d'être for its creation103 and proliferation
dictate a grant of quasi-judicial power to it, the matters over which it may exercise this power must find
sufficient anchorage on its enabling law, either by express provision or by necessary implication. Once
found, the quasi-judicial power partakes of the nature of a limited and special jurisdiction, that is, to hear
and determine a class of cases within its peculiar competence and expertise. In other words, the
provisions of the enabling statute are the yardsticks by which the Court would measure the quantum of
quasi-judicial powers an administrative agency may exercise, as defined in the enabling act of such
agency.104

Scattered provisions in R.A. No. 7653 and R.A. No. 8791, inter alia, exist, conferring jurisdiction on the
BSP on certain matters.105 For instance, under the situations contemplated under Section 36, par.
2106 (where a bank or quasi bank persists in carrying on its business in an unlawful or unsafe manner) and
Section 37107 (where the bank or its officers willfully violate the bank’s charter or by-laws, or the rules and
regulations issued by the Monetary Board) of R.A. No. 7653, the BSP may place an entity under
receivership and/or liquidation or impose administrative sanctions upon the entity or its officers or
directors.

22
Among its several functions under R.A. No. 7653, the BSP is authorized to engage in open market
operations and thereby "issue, place, buy and sell freely negotiable evidences of indebtedness of the
Bangko Sentral" in the following manner.

SEC. 90. Principles of Open Market Operations. – The open market purchases and sales of securities by
the Bangko Sentral shall be made exclusively in accordance with its primary objective of achieving price
stability.

xxxx

SEC. 92. Issue and Negotiation of Bangko Sentral Obligations. – In order to provide the Bangko Sentral
with effective instruments for open market operations, the Bangko Sentral may, subject to such rules and
regulations as the Monetary Board may prescribe and in accordance with the principles stated in Section
90 of this Act, issue, place, buy and sell freely negotiable evidences of indebtedness of the Bangko
Sentral: Provided, That issuance of such certificates of indebtedness shall be made only in cases of
extraordinary movement in price levels. Said evidences of indebtedness may be issued directly against the
international reserve of the Bangko Sentral or against the securities which it has acquired under the
provisions of Section 91 of this Act, or may be issued without relation to specific types of assets of the
Bangko Sentral.

The Monetary Board shall determine the interest rates, maturities and other characteristics of said
obligations of the Bangko Sentral, and may, if it deems it advisable, denominate the obligations in gold or
foreign currencies.

Subject to the principles stated in Section 90 of this Act, the evidences of indebtedness of the Bangko
Sentral to which this section refers may be acquired by the Bangko Sentral before their maturity, either
through purchases in the open market or through redemptions at par and by lot if the Bangko Sentral has
reserved the right to make such redemptions. The evidences of indebtedness acquired or redeemed by the
Bangko Sentral shall not be included among its assets, and shall be immediately retired and
cancelled.108 (italics supplied; emphases ours)

23
The primary objective of the BSP is to maintain price stability.109 The BSP has a number of monetary
policy instruments at its disposal to promote price stability. To increase or reduce liquidity in the financial
system, the BSP uses open market operations, among others.110 Open market operation is a monetary tool
where the BSP publicly buys or sells government securities111 from (or to) banks and financial institutions
in order to expand or contract the supply of money. By controlling the money supply, the BSP is able to
exert some influence on the prices of goods and services and achieve its inflation objectives.112

Once the issue and/or sale of a security is made, the BSP would necessarily make a determination, in
accordance with its own rules, of the entity entitled to receive the proceeds of the security upon its
maturity. This determination by the BSP is an exercise of its administrative powers113 under the law as an
incident to its power to prescribe rules and regulations governing open market operations to achieve the
"primary objective of achieving price stability."114 As a matter of necessity, too, the same rules and
regulations facilitate transaction with the BSP by providing for an orderly manner of, among others,
issuing, transferring, exchanging and paying securities representing public debt.

Significantly, when competing claims of ownership over the proceeds of the securities it has issued are
brought before it, the law has not given the BSP the quasi-judicial power to resolve these competing
claims as part of its power to engage in open market operations. Nothing in the BSP’s charter confers on
the BSP the jurisdiction or authority to determine this kind of claims, arising out of a subsequent transfer
or assignment of evidence of indebtedness – a matter that appropriately falls within the competence of
courts of general jurisdiction. That the statute withholds this power from the BSP is only consistent with
the fundamental reasons for the creation of a Philippine central bank, that is, to lay down stable monetary
policy and exercise bank supervisory functions. Thus, the BSP’s assumption of jurisdiction over competing
claims cannot find even a stretched-out justification under its corporate powers "to do and perform any
and all things that may be necessary or proper to carry out the purposes" of R.A. No. 7653. 115

To reiterate, open market operation is a monetary policy instrument that the BSP employs, among others,
to regulate the supply of money in the economy to influence the timing, cost and availability of money and
credit, as well as other financial factors, for the purpose of stabilizing the price level.116 What the law
grants the BSP is a continuing role to shape and carry out the country’s monetary policy – not the
authority to adjudicate competing claims of ownership over the securities it has issued – since this
authority would not fall under the BSP’s purposes under its charter.

24
While R.A. No. 7653117 empowers the BSP to conduct administrative hearings and render judgment for or
against an entity under its supervisory and regulatory powers and even authorizes the BSP Governor to
"render decisions, or rulings x x x on matters regarding application or enforcement of laws pertaining to
institutions supervised by the BSP and laws pertaining to quasi-banks, as well as regulations, policies or
instructions issued by the Monetary Board," it is precisely the text of the BSP’s own regulation (whose
validity is not here raised as an issue) that points to the BSP’s limited role in case of an allegedly
fraudulent assignment to simply (i) issuing and circularizing a ‘"stop order" against the transfer, exchange,
redemption of the certificate of indebtedness, including the payment of interest coupons, and (ii)
withholding action on the certificate.

A similar conclusion can be drawn from the BSP’s administrative adjudicatory power in cases of "willful
failure or refusal to comply with, or violation of, any banking law or any order, instruction or regulation
issued by the Monetary Board, or any order, instruction or ruling by the Governor."118 The non-compliance
with the pertinent requirements under CB Circular No. 28, as amended, deprives a party from any right to
demand payment from the BSP.

In other words, the grant of quasi-judicial authority to the BSP cannot possibly extend to situations which
do not call for the exercise by the BSP of its supervisory or regulatory functions over entities within its
jurisdiction.119

The fact alone that the parties involved are banking institutions does not necessarily call for the exercise
by the BSP of its quasi-judicial powers under the law.120

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction

argues against BSP’s purported
authority to adjudicate ownership
issues over the disputed CB bills

Given the preceding discussions, even the PDB’s invocation of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is
misplaced.

25
In the exercise of its plenary legislative power, Congress may create administrative agencies endowed
with quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers. Necessarily, Congress likewise defines the limits of an
agency’s jurisdiction in the same manner as it defines the jurisdiction of courts.121 As a result, it may
happen that either a court or an administrative agency has exclusive jurisdiction over a specific matter or
both have concurrent jurisdiction on the same. It may happen, too, that courts and agencies may willingly
relinquish adjudicatory power that is rightfully theirs in favor of the other. One of the instances when a
court may properly defer to the adjudicatory authority of an agency is the applicability of the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction.122

As early as 1954, the Court applied the doctrine of primary jurisdiction under the following terms:

6. In the fifties, the Court taking cognizance of the move to vest jurisdiction in administrative commissions
and boards the power to resolve specialized disputes xxx ruled that Congress in requiring the Industrial
Court's intervention in the resolution of labor-management controversies xxx meant such jurisdiction to be
exclusive, although it did not so expressly state in the law. The Court held that under the "sense-making
and expeditious doctrine of primary jurisdiction ... the courts cannot or will not determine a controversy
involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, where the question
demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and
services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a
uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the purposes of the regulatory statute
administered."123 (emphasis ours)

In Industrial Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,124 the Court ruled that while an action for rescission of a
contract between coal developers appears to be an action cognizable by regular courts, the trial court
remains to be without jurisdiction to entertain the suit since the contract sought to be rescinded is
"inextricably tied up with the right to develop coal-bearing lands and the determination of whether or not
the reversion of the coal operating contract over the subject coal blocks to [the plaintiff] would be in line
with the country’s national program and objective on coal-development and over-all coal-supply-demand
balance." It then applied the doctrine of primary jurisdiction –

In recent years, it has been the jurisprudential trend to apply the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in many
cases involving matters that demand the special competence of administrative agencies. It may occur that

26
the Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular case, which means that the matter involved is
also judicial in character. However, if the case is such that its determination requires the expertise,
specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate
questions of facts are involved, then relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a
remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court.
This is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. It applies "where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts,
and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a
regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body."

Clearly, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction finds application in this case since the question of what coal
areas should be exploited and developed and which entity should be granted coal operating contracts over
said areas involves a technical determination by the Bureau of Energy Development as the administrative
agency in possession of the specialized expertise to act on the matter. The Trial Court does not have the
competence to decide matters concerning activities relative to the exploration, exploitation, development
and extraction of mineral resources like coal. These issues preclude an initial judicial determination.
[emphases ours]

The absence of any express or implied statutory power to adjudicate conflicting claims of ownership or
entitlement to the proceeds of its certificates of indebtedness finds complement in the similar absence of
any technical matter that would call for the BSP’s special expertise or competence.125 In fact, what the
PDB’s petitions bear out is essentially the nature of the transaction it had with the subsequent transferees
of the subject CB bills (BOC and Bancap) and not any matter more appropriate for special determination
by the BSP or any administrative agency.

In a similar vein, it is well-settled that the interpretation given to a rule or regulation by those charged
with its execution is entitled to the greatest weight by the courts construing such rule or
regulation.126 While there are exceptions127 to this rule, the PDB has not convinced us that a departure is
warranted in this case. Given the non-applicability of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the BSP’s own
position, in light of Circular No. 769-80, deserves respect from the Court.

Ordinarily, cases involving the application of doctrine of primary jurisdiction are initiated by an action
invoking the jurisdiction of a court or administrative agency to resolve the substantive legal conflict

27
between the parties. In this sense, the present case is quite unique since the court’s jurisdiction was,
originally, invoked to compel an administrative agency (the BSP) to resolve the legal conflict of ownership
over the CB bills - instead of obtaining a judicial determination of the same dispute.

The remedy of interpleader

Based on the unique factual premise of the present case, the RTC acted correctly in initially assuming
jurisdiction over the PDB’s petition for mandamus, prohibition and injunction.128 While the RTC agreed
(albeit erroneously) with the PDB’s view (that the BSP has jurisdiction), it, however, dismissed not only
the BOC’s/the BSP’s counterclaims but the PDB’s petition itself as well, on the ground that it lacks
jurisdiction.

This is plain error.

Not only the parties themselves, but more so the courts, are bound by the rule on non-waiver of
jurisdiction.129 believes that jurisdiction over the BOC’s counterclaims and the BSP’s
counterclaim/crossclaim for interpleader calls for the application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the
allowance of the PDB’s petition even becomes imperative because courts may raise the issue of primary
jurisdiction sua sponte.130

Of the three possible options available to the RTC, the adoption of either of these two would lead the trial
court into serious legal error: first, if it granted the PDB’s petition, its decision would have to be set aside
on appeal because the BSP has no jurisdiction as previously discussed; and second when it dismissed the
PDB’s petitions and the BOC’s counterclaims on the ground that it lacks jurisdiction, the trial court
seriously erred because precisely, the resolution of the conflicting claims over the CB bills falls within its
general jurisdiction.

Without emasculating its jurisdiction, the RTC could have properly dismissed the PDB’s petition but on the
ground that mandamus does not lie against the BSP; but even this correct alternative is no longer
plausible since the BSP, as a respondent below, already properly brought before the RTC the remaining
conflicting claims over the subject CB bills by way of a counterclaim/crossclaim for interpleader. Section 1,
Rule 62 of the Rules of Court provides when an interpleader is proper:

28
SECTION 1. When interpleader proper. – Whenever conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are or
may be made against a person who claims no interest whatever in the subject matter, or an interest which
in whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants, he may bring an action against the conflicting
claimants to compel them to interplead and litigate their several claims among themselves.

The remedy of an action of interpleader131 is designed to protect a person against double vexation in
respect of a single liability.7 It requires, as an indispensable requisite, that conflicting claims upon the
same subject matter are or may be made against the stakeholder (the possessor of the subject matter)
who claims no interest whatever in the subject matter or an interest which in whole or in part is not
disputed by the claimants.132

Through this remedy, the stakeholder can join all competing claimants in a single proceeding to determine
conflicting claims without exposing the stakeholder to the possibility of having to pay more than once on a
single liability.133

When the court orders that the claimants litigate among themselves, in reality a new action
arises,134 where the claims of the interpleaders themselves are brought to the fore, the stakeholder as
plaintiff is relegated merely to the role of initiating the suit. In short, the remedy of interpleader, when
proper, merely provides an avenue for the conflicting claims on the same subject matter to be threshed
out in an action. Section 2 of Rule 62 provides:

SEC. 2. Order. – Upon the filing of the complaint, the court shall issue an order requiring the conflicting
claimants to interplead with one another. If the interests of justice so require, the court may direct in such
order that the subject matter be paid or delivered to the court.

This is precisely what the RTC did by granting the BSP’s motion to interplead. The PDB itself "agreed that
the various claimants should now interplead." Thus, the PDB and the BOC subsequently entered into two
separate escrow agreements, covering the CB bills, and submitted them to the RTC for approval.

In granting the BSP’s motion, the RTC acted on the correct premise that it has jurisdiction to resolve the
parties’ conflicting claims over the CB bills - consistent with the rules and the parties’ conduct - and
accordingly required the BOC to amend its answer and for the PDB to comment thereon. Suddenly,

29
however, the PDB made an about-face and questioned the jurisdiction of the RTC. Swayed by the PDB’s
argument, the RTC dismissed even the PDB’s petition - which means that it did not actually compel the
BSP to resolve the BOC’s and the PDB’s claims.

Without the motion to interplead and the order granting it, the RTC could only dismiss the PDB’s petition
since it is the RTC which has jurisdiction to resolve the parties’ conflicting claims – not the BSP. Given that
the motion to interplead has been actually filed, the RTC could not have really granted the relief originally
sought in the PDB’s petition since the RTC’s order granting the BSP’s motion to interplead - to which the
PDB in fact acquiesced into - effectively resulted in the dismissal of the PDB’s petition. This is not altered
by the fact that the PDB additionally prayed in its petition for damages, attorney’s fees and costs of suit
"against the public respondents" because the grant of the order to interplead effectively sustained the
propriety of the BSP’s resort to this procedural device.

Interpleader

1. as a special civil action

What is quite unique in this case is that the BSP did not initiate the interpleader suit through an original
complaint but through its Answer. This circumstance becomes understandable if it is considered that
insofar as the BSP is concerned, the PDB does not possess any right to have its claim recorded in the
BSP’s books; consequently, the PDB cannot properly be considered even as a potential claimant to the
proceeds of the CB bills upon maturity. Thus, the interpleader was only an alternative position, made only
in the BSP’s Answer.135

The remedy of interpleader, as a special civil action, is primarily governed by the specific provisions in
Rule 62 of the Rules of Court and secondarily by the provisions applicable to ordinary civil
actions.136 Indeed, Rule 62 does not expressly authorize the filing of a complaint-in-interpleader as part of,
although separate and independent from, the answer. Similarly, Section 5, Rule 6, in relation to Section 1,
Rule 9 of the Rules of Court137 does not include a complaint-in-interpleader as a claim,138 a form of
defense,139 or as an objection that a defendant may be allowed to put up in his answer or in a motion to
dismiss. This does not mean, however, that the BSP’s "counter-complaint/cross-claim for interpleader"
runs counter to general procedures.

30
Apart from a pleading,140 the rules141 allow a party to seek an affirmative relief from the court through the
procedural device of a motion. While captioned "Answer with counter complaint/cross-claim for
interpleader," the RTC understood this as in the nature of a motion,142 seeking relief which essentially
consists in an order for the conflicting claimants to litigate with each other so that "payment is made to
the rightful or legitimate owner"143 of the subject CB bills.

The rules define a "civil action" as "one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of
a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong." Interpleader may be considered as a stakeholder’s
remedy to prevent a wrong, that is, from making payment to one not entitled to it, thereby rendering
itself vulnerable to lawsuit/s from those legally entitled to payment.

Interpleader is a civil action made special by the existence of particular rules to govern the uniqueness of
its application and operation. Under Section 2, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court, governing ordinary civil
actions, a party’s claim is asserted "in a complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, third (fourth, etc.)-party
complaint, or complaint-in-intervention." In an interpleader suit, however, a claim is not required to be
contained in any of these pleadings but in the answer-(of the conflicting claimants)-in-interpleader. This
claim is different from the counter-claim (or cross-claim, third party-complaint) which is separately
allowed under Section 5, par. 2 of Rule 62.

2. the payment of docket fees covering BOC’s counterclaim

The PDB argues that, even assuming that the RTC has jurisdiction over the issue of ownership of the CB
bills, the BOC’s failure to pay the appropriate docket fees prevents the RTC from acquiring jurisdiction
over the BOC’s "counterclaims."

We disagree with the PDB.

To reiterate and recall, the order granting the "PDB’s motion to interplead," already resulted in the
dismissal of the PDB’s petition. The same order required the BOC to amend its answer and for the
conflicting claimants to comment, presumably to conform to the nature of an answer-in interpleader.
Perhaps, by reason of the BOC’s denomination of its claim as a "compulsory counterclaim" and the PDB’s
failure to fully appreciate the RTC’s order granting the "BSP’s motion for interpleader" (with the PDB’s

31
conformity), the PDB mistakenly treated the BOC’s claim as a "permissive counterclaim" which
necessitates the payment of docket fees.

As the preceding discussions would show, however, the BOC’s "claim" - i.e., its assertion of ownership
over the CB bills – is in reality just that, a "claim" against the stakeholder and not as a
"counterclaim,"144 whether compulsory145 or permissive. It is only the BOC’s alternative prayer (for the
PDB to deliver to the BOC, as the buyer in the April 15 transaction and the ultimate successor-in-interest
of the buyer in the April 19 transaction, either the original subjects of the sales or the value thereof plus
whatever income that may have been earned pendente lite) and its prayer for damages that are obviously
compulsory counterclaims against the PDB and, therefore, does not require payment of docket fees.146

The PDB takes a contrary position through its insistence that a compulsory counterclaim should be one
where the presence of third parties, of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction, is not required. It
reasons out that since the RCBC and All Asia (the intervening holders of the CB bills) have already been
dropped from the case, then the BOC’s counterclaim must only be permissive in nature and the BOC
should have paid the correct docket fees.

We see no reason to belabor this claim. Even if we gloss over the PDB’s own conformity to the dropping of
these entities as parties, the BOC correctly argues that a remedy is provided under the Rules. Section 12,
Rule 6 of the Rules of Court reads:

SEC. 12. Bringing new parties. – When the presence of parties other than those to the original action is
required for the granting of complete relief in the determination of a counterclaim or cross-claim, the court
shall order them to be brought in as defendants, if jurisdiction over them can be obtained.

Even then, the strict characterization of the BOC’s counterclaim is no longer material in disposing of the
PDB’s argument based on non-payment of docket fees.

When an action is filed in court, the complaint must be accompanied by the payment of the requisite
docket and filing fees by the party seeking affirmative relief from the court. It is the filing of the complaint
or appropriate initiatory pleading, accompanied by the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a
trial court with jurisdiction over the claim or the nature of the action.147 However, the non-payment of the

32
docket fee at the time of filing does not automatically cause the dismissal of the case, so long as the fee is
paid within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period, especially when the claimant demonstrates
a willingness to abide by the rules prescribing such payment.148

In the present case, considering the lack of a clear guideline on the payment of docket fee by the
claimants in an interpleader suit, compounded by the unusual manner in which the interpleader suit was
initiated and the circumstances surrounding it, we surely cannot deduce from the BOC’s mere failure to
specify in its prayer the total amount of the CB bills it lays claim to (or the value of the subjects of the
sales in the April 15 and April 19 transactions, in its alternative prayer) an intention to defraud the
government that would warrant the dismissal of its claim.149

At any rate, regardless of the nature of the BOC’s "counterclaims," for purposes of payment of filing fees,
both the BOC and the PDB, properly as defendants-in-interpleader, must be assessed the payment of the
correct docket fee arising from their respective claims. The seminal case of Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v.
Judge Asuncion150 provides us guidance in the payment of docket fees, to wit:

1. x x x Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee,
the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and similar pleadings,
which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The
court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. [underscoring ours]

This must be the rule considering that Section 7, Rule 62 of which reads:

SEC. 7. Docket and other lawful fees, costs and litigation expenses as liens. – The docket and other lawful
fees paid by the party who filed a complaint under this Rule, as well as the costs and litigation expenses,
shall constitute a lien or charge upon the subject matter of the action, unless the court shall order
otherwise.

33
only pertain to the docket and lawful fees to be paid by the one who initiated the interpleader suit, and
who, under the Rules, actually "claims no interest whatever in the subject matter." By constituting a lien
on the subject matter of the action, Section 7 in effect only aims to actually compensate the complainant-
in-interpleader, who happens to be the stakeholder unfortunate enough to get caught in a legal crossfire
between two or more conflicting claimants, for the faultless trouble it found itself into. Since the
defendants-in-interpleader are actually the ones who make a claim - only that it was extraordinarily done
through the procedural device of interpleader - then to them devolves the duty to pay the docket fees
prescribed under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended.151

The importance of paying the correct amount of docket fee cannot be overemphasized:

The matter of payment of docket fees is not a mere triviality. These fees are necessary to defray court
expenses in the handling of cases. Consequently, in order to avoid tremendous losses to the judiciary, and
to the government as well, the payment of docket fees cannot be made dependent on the outcome of the
case, except when the claimant is a pauper-litigant.152

WHEREFORE, premises considered the consolidated PETITIONS are GRANTED. The Planters Development
Bank is hereby REQUIRED to file with the Regional Trial Court its comment or answer-in-interpleader to
Bank of Commerce’s Amended Consolidated Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, as previously ordered
by the Regional Trial Court. The Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 143, is hereby ORDERED to
assess the docket fees due from Planters Development Bank and Bank of Commerce and order their
payment, and to resolve with DELIBERATE DISPATCH the parties’ conflicting claims of ownership over the
proceeds of the Central Bank bills.

The Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 143, or his duly authorized
representative is hereby ORDERED to assess and collect the appropriate amount of docket fees separately
due the Bank of Commerce and Planters Development Bank as conflicting claimants in Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas’ interpleader suit, in accordance with this decision.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

34
 [G.R. NO. 150806 - January 28, 2008]

EUFEMIA ALMEDA and ROMEL ALMEDA, Petitioners, v. BATHALA MARKETING INDUSTRIES,

INC., Respondent.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, of the Decision1 of the Court
of Appeals (CA), dated September 3, 2001, in CA-G.R. CV No. 67784, and its Resolution2 dated November
19, 2001. The assailed Decision affirmed with modification the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Makati City, Branch 136, dated May 9, 2000 in Civil Case No. 98-411.

Sometime in May 1997, respondent Bathala Marketing Industries, Inc., as lessee, represented by its
president Ramon H. Garcia, renewed its Contract of Lease4 with Ponciano L. Almeda (Ponciano), as lessor,
husband of petitioner Eufemia and father of petitioner Romel Almeda. Under the said contract, Ponciano
agreed to lease a portion of the Almeda Compound, located at 2208 Pasong Tamo Street, Makati City,
consisting of 7,348.25 square meters, for a monthly rental of P1,107,348.69, for a term of four (4) years
from May 1, 1997 unless sooner terminated as provided in the contract.5 The contract of lease contained
the following pertinent provisions which gave rise to the instant case:

SIXTH - It is expressly understood by the parties hereto that the rental rate stipulated is based on the
present rate of assessment on the property, and that in case the assessment should hereafter be
increased or any new tax, charge or burden be imposed by authorities on the lot and building where the
leased premises are located, LESSEE shall pay, when the rental herein provided becomes due, the
additional rental or charge corresponding to the portion hereby leased; provided, however, that in the
event that the present assessment or tax on said property should be reduced, LESSEE shall be entitled to
reduction in the stipulated rental, likewise in proportion to the portion leased by him;

SEVENTH - In case an extraordinary inflation or devaluation of Philippine Currency should supervene, the
value of Philippine peso at the time of the establishment of the obligation shall be the basis of payment;6

35
During the effectivity of the contract, Ponciano died. Thereafter, respondent dealt with petitioners. In a
letter7 dated December 29, 1997, petitioners advised respondent that the former shall assess and collect
Value Added Tax (VAT) on its monthly rentals. In response, respondent contended that VAT may not be
imposed as the rentals fixed in the contract of lease were supposed to include the VAT therein, considering
that their contract was executed on May 1, 1997 when the VAT law had long been in effect.8

On January 26, 1998, respondent received another letter from petitioners informing the former that its
monthly rental should be increased by 73% pursuant to condition No. 7 of the contract and Article 1250 of
the Civil Code. Respondent opposed petitioners' demand and insisted that there was no extraordinary
inflation to warrant the application of Article 1250 in light of the pronouncement of this Court in various
cases.9

Respondent refused to pay the VAT and adjusted rentals as demanded by petitioners but continued to pay
the stipulated amount set forth in their contract.

On February 18, 1998, respondent instituted an action for declaratory relief for purposes of determining
the correct interpretation of condition Nos. 6 and 7 of the lease contract to prevent damage and
prejudice.10 The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 98-411 before the RTC of Makati.

On March 10, 1998, petitioners in turn filed an action for ejectment, rescission and damages against
respondent for failure of the latter to vacate the premises after the demand made by the former.11 Before
respondent could file an answer, petitioners filed a Notice of Dismissal.12 They subsequently refiled the
complaint before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati; the case was raffled to Branch 139 and was
docketed as Civil Case No. 53596.

Petitioners later moved for the dismissal of the declaratory relief case for being an improper remedy
considering that respondent was already in breach of the obligation and that the case would not end the
litigation and settle the rights of the parties. The trial court, however, was not persuaded, and
consequently, denied the motion.

After trial on the merits, on May 9, 2000, the RTC ruled in favor of respondent and against petitioners.
The pertinent portion of the decision reads:

36
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court renders judgment on the case as follows:

1) declaring that plaintiff is not liable for the payment of Value-Added Tax (VAT) of 10% of the rent for
[the] use of the leased premises;

2) declaring that plaintiff is not liable for the payment of any rental adjustment, there being no
[extraordinary] inflation or devaluation, as provided in the Seventh Condition of the lease contract, to
justify the same;

3) holding defendants liable to plaintiff for the total amount of P1,119,102.19, said amount representing
payments erroneously made by plaintiff as VAT charges and rental adjustment for the months of January,
February and March, 1999; andcralawlibrary

4) holding defendants liable to plaintiff for the amount of P1,107,348.69, said amount representing the
balance of plaintiff's rental deposit still with defendants.

SO ORDERED.13

The trial court denied petitioners their right to pass on to respondent the burden of paying the VAT since it
was not a new tax that would call for the application of the sixth clause of the contract. The court,
likewise, denied their right to collect the demanded increase in rental, there being no extraordinary
inflation or devaluation as provided for in the seventh clause of the contract. Because of the payment
made by respondent of the rental adjustment demanded by petitioners, the court ordered the restitution
by the latter to the former of the amounts paid, notwithstanding the well-established rule that in an action
for declaratory relief, other than a declaration of rights and obligations, affirmative reliefs are not sought
by or awarded to the parties.

Petitioners elevated the aforesaid case to the Court of Appeals which affirmed with modification the RTC
decision. The fallo reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is DISMISSED and the appealed decision in Civil
Case No. 98-411 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the order for the return of the balance

37
of the rental deposits and of the amounts representing the 10% VAT and rental adjustment, is hereby
DELETED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.14

The appellate court agreed with the conclusions of law and the application of the decisional rules on the
matter made by the RTC. However, it found that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in granting
affirmative relief to the respondent, particularly the restitution of its excess payment.

Petitioners now come before this Court raising the following issues:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT ARTICLE 1250 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE DOCTRINE ENUNCIATED IN FILIPINO PIPE AND FOUNDRY CORP. v. NAWASA
CASE, 161 SCRA 32 AND COMPANION CASES ARE (sic) APPLICABLE IN THE CASE AT BAR.

III.

WHETHER OR NOT IN NOT APPLYING THE DOCTRINE IN THE CASE OF DEL ROSARIO v. THE SHELL
COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES, 164 SCRA 562, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED
ON A QUESTION OF LAW.

IV.

WHETHER OR NOT THE FINDING OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS THAT RESPONDENT IS NOT
LIABLE TO PAY THE 10% VALUE ADDED TAX IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MANDATE OF RA 7716.

38
 V.

WHETHER OR NOT DECLARATORY RELIEF IS PROPER SINCE PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE WAS IN BREACH WHEN
THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF WAS FILED BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT.

In fine, the issues for our resolution are as follows: 1) whether the action for declaratory relief is proper;
2) whether respondent is liable to pay 10% VAT pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 7716; and 3) whether the
amount of rentals due the petitioners should be adjusted by reason of extraordinary inflation or
devaluation.

Declaratory relief is defined as an action by any person interested in a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, executive order or resolution, to determine any question of construction or validity arising
from the instrument, executive order or regulation, or statute, and for a declaration of his rights and
duties thereunder. The only issue that may be raised in such a petition is the question of construction or
validity of provisions in an instrument or statute. Corollary is the general rule that such an action must be
justified, as no other adequate relief or remedy is available under the circumstances.15

Decisional law enumerates the requisites of an action for declaratory relief, as follows: 1) the subject
matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute, executive
order or regulation, or ordinance; 2) the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and
require judicial construction; 3) there must have been no breach of the documents in question; 4) there
must be an actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening seeds" of one between persons whose interests
are adverse; 5) the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and 6) adequate relief is not available
through other means or other forms of action or proceeding.16

It is beyond cavil that the foregoing requisites are present in the instant case, except that petitioners
insist that respondent was already in breach of the contract when the petition was filed.

We do not agree.

After petitioners demanded payment of adjusted rentals and in the months that followed, respondent
complied with the terms and conditions set forth in their contract of lease by paying the rentals stipulated

39
therein. Respondent religiously fulfilled its obligations to petitioners even during the pendency of the
present suit. There is no showing that respondent committed an act constituting a breach of the subject
contract of lease. Thus, respondent is not barred from instituting before the trial court the petition for
declaratory relief.

Petitioners claim that the instant petition is not proper because a separate action for rescission, ejectment
and damages had been commenced before another court; thus, the construction of the subject contractual
provisions should be ventilated in the same forum.

We are not convinced.

It is true that in Panganiban v. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation17 we held that the petition for
declaratory relief should be dismissed in view of the pendency of a separate action for unlawful detainer.
However, we cannot apply the same ruling to the instant case. In Panganiban, the unlawful detainer case
had already been resolved by the trial court before the dismissal of the declaratory relief case; and it was
petitioner in that case who insisted that the action for declaratory relief be preferred over the action for
unlawful detainer. Conversely, in the case at bench, the trial court had not yet resolved the
rescission/ejectment case during the pendency of the declaratory relief petition. In fact, the trial court,
where the rescission case was on appeal, itself initiated the suspension of the proceedings pending the
resolution of the action for declaratory relief.

We are not unmindful of the doctrine enunciated in Teodoro, Jr. v. Mirasol18 where the declaratory relief
action was dismissed because the issue therein could be threshed out in the unlawful detainer suit. Yet,
again, in that case, there was already a breach of contract at the time of the filing of the declaratory relief
petition. This dissimilar factual milieu proscribes the Court from applying Teodoro to the instant case.

Given all these attendant circumstances, the Court is disposed to entertain the instant declaratory relief
action instead of dismissing it, notwithstanding the pendency of the ejectment/rescission case before the
trial court. The resolution of the present petition would write finis to the parties' dispute, as it would settle
once and for all the question of the proper interpretation of the two contractual stipulations subject of this
controversy.

40
Now, on the substantive law issues.

Petitioners repeatedly made a demand on respondent for the payment of VAT and for rental adjustment
allegedly brought about by extraordinary inflation or devaluation. Both the trial court and the appellate
court found no merit in petitioners' claim. We see no reason to depart from such findings.

As to the liability of respondent for the payment of VAT, we cite with approval the ratiocination of the
appellate court, viz.:

Clearly, the person primarily liable for the payment of VAT is the lessor who may choose to pass it on to
the lessee or absorb the same. Beginning January 1, 1996, the lease of real property in the ordinary
course of business, whether for commercial or residential use, when the gross annual receipts
exceed P500,000.00, is subject to 10% VAT. Notwithstanding the mandatory payment of the 10% VAT by
the lessor, the actual shifting of the said tax burden upon the lessee is clearly optional on the part of the
lessor, under the terms of the statute. The word "may" in the statute, generally speaking, denotes that it
is directory in nature. It is generally permissive only and operates to confer discretion. In this case,
despite the applicability of the rule under Sec. 99 of the NIRC, as amended by R.A. 7716, granting the
lessor the option to pass on to the lessee the 10% VAT, to existing contracts of lease as of January 1,
1996, the original lessor, Ponciano L. Almeda did not charge the lessee-appellee the 10% VAT nor
provided for its additional imposition when they renewed the contract of lease in May 1997. More
significantly, said lessor did not actually collect a 10% VAT on the monthly rental due from the lessee-
appellee after the execution of the May 1997 contract of lease. The inevitable implication is that the lessor
intended not to avail of the option granted him by law to shift the 10% VAT upon the lessee-appellee. x x
x.19

In short, petitioners are estopped from shifting to respondent the burden of paying the VAT.

Petitioners' reliance on the sixth condition of the contract is, likewise, unavailing. This provision clearly
states that respondent can only be held liable for new taxes imposed after the effectivity of the contract of
lease, that is, after May 1997, and only if they pertain to the lot and the building where the leased
premises are located. Considering that RA 7716 took effect in 1994, the VAT cannot be considered as a
"new tax" in May 1997, as to fall within the coverage of the sixth stipulation.

41
Neither can petitioners legitimately demand rental adjustment because of extraordinary inflation or
devaluation.

Petitioners contend that Article 1250 of the Civil Code does not apply to this case because the contract
stipulation speaks of extraordinary inflation or devaluation while the Code speaks of extraordinary inflation
or deflation. They insist that the doctrine pronounced in Del Rosario v. The Shell Company, Phils.
Limited20 should apply.

Essential to contract construction is the ascertainment of the intention of the contracting parties, and such
determination must take into account the contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the parties. This
intention, once ascertained, is deemed an integral part of the contract.21

While, indeed, condition No. 7 of the contract speaks of "extraordinary inflation or devaluation" as
compared to Article 1250's "extraordinary inflation or deflation," we find that when the parties used the
term "devaluation," they really did not intend to depart from Article 1250 of the Civil Code. Condition No.
7 of the contract should, thus, be read in harmony with the Civil Code provision.

That this is the intention of the parties is evident from petitioners' letter22 dated January 26, 1998, where,
in demanding rental adjustment ostensibly based on condition No. 7, petitioners made explicit reference to
Article 1250 of the Civil Code, even quoting the law verbatim. Thus, the application of Del Rosario is not
warranted. Rather, jurisprudential rules on the application of Article 1250 should be considered.

Article 1250 of the Civil Code states:

In case an extraordinary inflation or deflation of the currency stipulated should supervene, the value of
the currency at the time of the establishment of the obligation shall be the basis of payment, unless there
is an agreement to the contrary.

Inflation has been defined as the sharp increase of money or credit, or both, without a corresponding
increase in business transaction. There is inflation when there is an increase in the volume of money and
credit relative to available goods, resulting in a substantial and continuing rise in the general price

42
level.23 In a number of cases, this Court had provided a discourse on what constitutes extraordinary
inflation, thus:

[E]xtraordinary inflation exists when there is a decrease or increase in the purchasing power of the
Philippine currency which is unusual or beyond the common fluctuation in the value of said currency, and
such increase or decrease could not have been reasonably foreseen or was manifestly beyond the
contemplation of the parties at the time of the establishment of the obligation.24

The factual circumstances obtaining in the present case do not make out a case of extraordinary inflation
or devaluation as would justify the application of Article 1250 of the Civil Code. We would like to stress
that the erosion of the value of the Philippine peso in the past three or four decades, starting in the mid-
sixties, is characteristic of most currencies. And while the Court may take judicial notice of the decline in
the purchasing power of the Philippine currency in that span of time, such downward trend of the peso
cannot be considered as the extraordinary phenomenon contemplated by Article 1250 of the Civil Code.
Furthermore, absent an official pronouncement or declaration by competent authorities of the existence of
extraordinary inflation during a given period, the effects of extraordinary inflation are not to be applied. 25

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 67784, dated September 3, 2001, and its Resolution dated November 19, 2001,
are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. NO. 185320, April 19, 2017

43
ROSENDO DE BORJA, Petitioner, v. PINALAKAS NA UGNAYAN NG MALILIIT NA MANGINGISDA NG
LUZON, MINDANAO AT VISAYAS ("PUMALU-MV"), PAMBANSANG KATIPUNAN NG MGA
SAMAHAN SA KANAYUNAN ("PKSK") AND TAMBUYOG DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC.
("TDCI"), Respondents; REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Oppositor.

G.R. NO. 185348

TAMBUYOG DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC., REPRESENTED BY DINNA L.

UMENGAN, Petitioner, v. ROSENDO DE BORJA, PINALAKAS NA UGNAYAN NG MALILIIT NA
MANGINGISDA NG LUZON, MINDANAO AT VISAYAS ("PUMALU-MV"), REPRESENTED BY CESAR
A. HAWAK, AND PAMBANSANG KATIPUNAN NG MGA SAMAHAN SA KANAYUNAN ("PKSK"),
REPRESENTED BY RUPERTO B. ALEROZA, Respondents; REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Oppositor.

JARDELEZA, J.:

Petitioners call upon us to disregard procedural rules on account of the alleged novelty and transcendental
importance of the issue involved here. However, the transcendental importance doctrine cannot remedy
the procedural defects that plague this petition. In the words of former Supreme Court Chief Justice
Reynato Puno, "no amount of exigency can make this Court exercise a power where it is not proper."1 A
petition for declaratory relief, like any other court action, cannot prosper absent an actual controversy that
is ripe for judicial determination.

In these consolidated petitions,2 petitioners Rosendo De Borja (De Borja) and Tambuyog Development
Center, Inc. (TDCI) seek to nullify the February 21, 2008 Decision3 and November 3, 2008 Resolution4 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 87391. The CA reversed the March 31, 2006 Decision5 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malabon City-Branch 74 and dismissed, on the ground of prematurity, the
petition for declaratory relief filed by De Borja and the petition-in-intervention filed by respondents
Pinalakas na Ugnayan ng Maliiiit na Mangingisda ng Luzon, Mindanao at Visayas (PUMALU-MV),
Pambansang Katipunan ng mga Samahan sa Kanayunan (PKSK), and TDCI.6

On February 16, 2004, De Borja, a commercial fishing operator, filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief7 (De

44
Borja's petition) with the RTC of Malabon City. He asked the court to construe and declare his rights under
Section 4(58) of Republic Act No. 8550 or The Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998 (1998 Fisheries Code). De
Borja asked the court to determine the reckoning point of the 15-kilometer range of municipal waters, as
provided under Section 4(58) of the 1998 Fisheries Code, in relation with Rule 4.1 (a) of its Implementing
Rules and Regulations (IRR).8 Section 4(58) of the 1998 Fisheries Code and Rule 4.1 (a) of the IRR
respectively read:

Sec. 4(58). Municipal waters – include not only streams, lakes, inland bodies of water and tidal waters
within the municipality which are not included within the protected areas as defined under Republic Act
No. 7586 (The NIPAS Law), public forest, timber lands, forest reserves or fishery reserves, but
also marine waters included between two (2) lines drawn perpendicular to the general
coastline from points where the boundary lines of the municipality touch the sea at low tide
and a third line parallel with the general coastline including offshore islands and fifteen (15)
kilometers from such coastline. Where two (2) municipalities are so situated on opposite shores that
there is less than thirty (30) kilometers of marine waters between them, the third line shall be equally
distant from opposite shore of the respective municipalities. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

Rule 4.1 (a) Coastline – refers to the outline of the mainland shore touching the sea at mean lower low
tide.

De Borja pleaded that the construction of the reckoning point of the 15-kilometer range affects his rights
because he is now exposed to apprehensions and possible harassments that may be brought by conflicting
interpretations of the 1998 Fisheries Code.9 He further claimed that varying constructions of the law would
spark conflict between fishermen and law enforcers, and would ultimately affect food security and defeat
the purpose of the 1998 Fisheries Code.10

De Borja, however, did not implead any party as respondent in his petition. The RTC, in an Order 11 dated
March 9, 2004, directed the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file a comment.

Meanwhile, the National Mapping and Resource Information Authority (NAMRIA), through Engr. Enrique A.
Macaspac, Chief of Geodesy and Geophysics Division, filed a letter-request to intervene and comment on

45
the petition.12 In its Comment,13 NAMRIA stated that Rule 4.1 (a) used the term "coastline," while Section
4(58) specified "general coastline." It thus concluded that the definition of "coastline" in Rule 4.1 (a) is
valid only for municipalities without any island. NAMRIA explained that by definition, the "general
coastline" of a municipality without any island is simply the coastline of the mainland (or mainland shore)
of that municipality. On the other hand, a municipality with island/s has the coastline/s of its island/s;
hence, its general coastline consists of not only the coastline of its mainland (or mainland shore) but also
the coastline/s of its island/s.14 Thus, where the municipality is archipelagic, the archipelagic principle shall
apply in delineating municipal waters, i.e., the 15-kilometer range of the municipal waters of an
archipelagic municipality shall be reckoned not only from the coastline of the mainland but also from the
coastline/s of the island/s of that municipality, such coastline/s of the island/s being part and parcel of the
general coastline of that municipality.15

NAMRIA also gave their opinion as to whether the phrase "including offshore islands" in the phrase "a third
line parallel with the general coastline including offshore islands and fifteen (15) kilometers from such
coastline" refer to the "third line" (meaning, the third line includes or encloses the islands) or to the
"general coastline" (meaning, the general coastline includes the coastline/s of the island/s). NAMRIA noted
that "general coastline" precedes the word "including;" thus, "including offshore islands" must be referring
to the "general coastline." NAMRIA also noted that the "third line" is qualified by two conditions: the third
line is (1) parallel with the general coastline including offshore islands and (2) 15 kilometers from such
coastline. NAMRIA concluded that to satisfy both conditions, the phrase "including offshore islands" must
refer to the "general coastline," or in other words, must use the archipelagic principle.16 NAMRIA stated
that "including offshore islands" appeared only in the 1998 Fisheries Code. Earlier laws, which defined
municipal waters, did not have it. NAMRIA then theorized that its presence in Section 4(58) of the 1998
Fisheries Code does not rule out the applicability of the archipelagic principle in delineating municipal
waters. This interpretation is technically correct and consistent with the procedure in delimiting maritime
boundaries under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.17

In its Comment,18 the OSG narrated the events that led De Borja to file the petition. The OSG averred that
the root cause of the petition was the adoption of the archipelagic principle in delineating and delimiting
municipal waters of municipalities with offshore islands under Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) Administrative Order No. 2001-1719 (DAO 17).20 Specifically, Section 5(B)(l)(c) of DAO
17 provides:

46
Sec. 5. Systems and Procedures, x x x
B. Procedure for Delineation and Delimitation of Municipal Waters
1. Delineation of Municipal Waters
xxx

c) Use of Municipal archipelagic baselines

i. Where the territory of a municipality includes several islands, the outermost points of such
islands shall be used as basepoints and connected by municipal archipelagic baselines,
provided that the length of such baselines shall not exceed thirty (30) kilometers.

ii. The municipal archipelagic baselines shall determine the general coastline of the
municipality for purposes of delineation and delimitation.

iii. Islands, isles, or islets located more than thirty (30) kilometers from the mainland of the municipality
shall have their own separate coastlines.

iv. Rocks, reefs, cays, shoals, sandbars, and other features which are submerged during high tide shall
not be used as basepoints for municipal archipelagic baselines. Neither shall they have their own
coastlines.

v. The outer limits of the municipal waters of the municipality shall be enclosed by a line parallel to the
municipal archipelagic baselines and fifteen (15) kilometers therefrom. (Emphasis supplied.)

The OSG detailed that on September 21, 2001, the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives adopted Committee Resolution No. 2001-01 (House Committee Resolution) which
recommended the revocation of DAO 17 for being tainted with legal infirmities.21 The House Committee
Resolution stated that the DENR has no jurisdiction to issue DAO 17 because Section 123 22 of the 1998
Fisheries Code clearly referred to the Department of Agriculture (DA) as the department which shall

47
determine the outer limits of municipal waters.23 More importantly, the House Committee Resolution
claimed that DAO 17 directly contravened the 1998 Fisheries Code and the Local Government Code (LGC).
The House Committee Resolution explained that the phrase "including offshore islands" in Section 4(58) of
the 1998 Fisheries Code means that offshore islands are deemed to be within 15 kilometers from the
shorelines; therefore, negating the applicability of the archipelagic principle.24 DAO 17, however,
authorized otherwise. The implementation of DAO 17, therefore, would vastly reduce the fishing grounds
already defined under the 1998 Fisheries Code and result in adverse effects to the fishing industry and the
nation's food security.25

The House Committee Resolution was also sent to the DENR for appropriate action. The DENR, however,
did not act on it. Thus, upon request of the House Committee on Appropriations, the Legal Affairs Bureau
(LAB) of the House of Representatives issued a legal opinion on the validity of DAO 17. The LAB echoed
the legal arguments contained in the House Committee Resolution. It asserted that the employment of the
phrase "including offshore islands" was intentional to remove any doubt as to where the 15 kilometers
should be reckoned from—that is, from the general coastline of the actual mainland and not from the
archipelagic baseline.26

The matter was also referred to the Department of Justice (DOJ) for opinion. On November 27, 2002, the
DOJ issued Opinion No. 100, which stated that the DA, not the DENR, has jurisdiction to authorize the
delineation of municipal waters.27 The DOJ then dispensed with the determination of whether DAO 17,
which adopted the archipelagic principle in the delineation of municipal waters, was consistent with the
provisions of the 1998 Fisheries Code.28 As a result of the DOJ Opinion, the DENR Secretary revoked DAO
17 through DENR Administrative Order No. 2003-07.29

The OSG stressed that the DA was in the process of formulating guidelines for the delineation and
delimitation of municipal waters. In fact, the DA conducted a Fisheries Summit on November 12 to 13,
2003 to consult small fisherfolk and the commercial fishing sector on the definition of municipal waters.
However, these negotiations reached an impasse, which then triggered De Borja's filing of the petition
before the RTC.30

The OSG explained the two conflicting views on the delineation of municipal waters, namely: (1) the

48
archipelagic principle espoused by the Municipalities of the Philippines and small fisher folk; and (2) the
mainland principle favored by the commercial fishing sector.31 Under the mainland principle, the 15-
kilometer range shall be reckoned from the municipality's coastline including offshore islands. The
archipelagic principle, on the other hand, reckons the 15-kilometer range of municipal waters from the
outermost offshore islands, and not the mainland. The outer limits of the municipal waters of the
municipality shall be enclosed by a line parallel to the municipal archipelagic baseline and 15 kilometers
therefrom.32

The OSG argued that the mainland principle should be adopted. It stated that the adoption of the
archipelagic principle found in Article I of the 1987 Constitution, which is utilized in defining the Philippine
territory vis-a-vis other states, is relevant only when the issue of intrusion into Philippine territorial water
arises—that is, when foreign fishing vessels enter Philippine territorial waters.33

The OSG further explained that:

The phrase "including offshore islands" used to modify general coastline in Section 4(58) of R.A. No.
8550 shows the legislative intent that the mainland shall be the reckoning point of the fifteen kilometer
range of municipal waters, and not the archipelagic municipal baseline. To adopt the archipelagic
municipal baseline as the reckoning point would be to render the phrase "including offshore islands"
redundant because offshore islands would be deemed already included in drawing the archipelagic
baseline.

A correct grammatical construction of the questioned provision would indicate that the word "such" in the
phrase "including offshore islands and fifteen kilometers from such coastline" refers to the general
coastline, and not to an archipelagic municipal baseline. Coastline as defined under Rule 4.1 (a) of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 8550 "refers to the outline of the mainland shore
touching the sea at mean lower tide." x x x34

The OSG also cited the House of Representatives Committee Deliberations on the 1998 Fisheries Code to
show that the intent of the lawmakers is to reckon the 15-kilometer range of the municipal waters from
the "shoreline."35

49
On August 16, 2004, PUMALU-MV, PKSK and TDCI (collectively, the intervenors) filed a Motion for Leave
to File Intervention,36 which the RTC granted. In their Petition-in-Intervention,37 the intervenors claimed
that, as small fisherfolk engaged in community-based coastal resource management, they have
substantial rights over the issue of delineation of municipal waters.38 They maintained that Section 4(58)
of the 1998 Fisheries Code should be construed in a manner that would give effect to the intent of
delineating and delimiting municipal waters of a municipality with or without offshore islands. They posited
that to apply the mainland principle to municipalities with offshore islands would result in the latter's
dismemberment of their own islands or islets.39 The intervenors also contended that the application of the
mainland principle to municipalities with offshore islands would deny the local government units of their
water and territorial jurisdiction, which would not be in keeping with the principle of autonomy under the
LGC.40

As to municipalities with offshore islands, the intervenors averred that the archipelagic principle should be
applied for consistency and congruence of the legal framework, considering that Article I of the 1987
Constitution adopts the archipelagic principle.41 They argued that the application of the archipelagic
principle in delimiting municipal waters is evident in the previous administrative issuances of the DA
through the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR), namely: Fisheries Administrative Order
No. (FAO) 164,42 and FAO 156.43 The intervenors noted that in defining the municipal waters under the
regime of Presidential Decree No. 704,44 FAO 164 and FAO 156 reckoned municipal waters of
municipalities with islands and islets from the outer shorelines of such group of islands or islets.45

Finally, the intervenors revealed that after the revocation of DAO 17, the DA issued Department Order No.
01-0446 (DAO 1) providing the guidelines for delineating municipal waters for municipalities and
cities without offshore islands.47 DAO 1, in effect, recognizes the need to distinguish between
municipalities with and without offshore islands.

In its Decision dated March 31, 2006, the RTC agreed with the position of the OSG. It noted that the
issuance of DAO 1 cited by the intervenors does not tacitly indicate that the archipelagic principle must be
adopted as a means of delimitation or delineation of municipal waters in municipalities or cities with
offshore islands. The RTC found an existing controversy regarding the definition of municipal waters for
municipalities and cities with offshore islands, which the DA has yet to settle through an administrative

50
directive. The RTC observed that the DA, through the OSG, opted to leave the matter of interpretation to
the court.48 Thus, the RTC disposed of the case in this wise:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that in interpreting the phrase "and a third line
parallel with the general coastline including offshore islands and fifteen (15) kilometers from such
coastline,["] the "mainland principle] and not the "archipelagic principle" should be applied.49

The intervenors appealed to the CA.

In its Decision dated February 21, 2008, the CA reversed and set aside the Decision of the RTC. According
to the CA, De Borja's petition for declaratory relief and the request for intervention should have been
dismissed due to prematurity.50

The CA ruled that De Borja's petition did not meet the two requisites of a petition for declaratory relief,
namely: justiciable controversy and ripeness for judicial determination. It noted that there is no actual
case or controversy regarding the definition of municipal waters for municipalities with offshore islands
because the DA has yet to issue guidelines with respect to these.51

De Borja filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion for Clarification.52 He argued that Section 1, Rule
63 of the Rules of Court allows any interested person to bring an action for declaratory relief for the
construction of a statute, such as the 1998 Fisheries Code. Hence, it may be the subject of a petition for
declaratory relief independent and regardless of the issuance of implementing guidelines, since
implementing rules only flow from the statute.53

De Borja further asserted that the controversy is ripe for judicial determination considering the diverse
interpretations of the parties on the scope of the phrase "and a third line parallel with the general
coastline including offshore islands and fifteen (15) kilometers from such coastline."54 He also claimed that
the construction of the reckoning point of the 15-kilometer range of municipal waters under the law is, in
any case, of national importance with transcendental implications because it affects the entire local fishing
industry. He thus prayed for the CA to relax procedural rules and take cognizance of the petition.55

51
TDCI also filed its Motion for Reconsideration56 of the CA Decision. It argued that the petition should have
been given due course because the issues in the case are not only novel, but are of transcendental
importance. They involve the protection of small and marginal fisherfolk, and the delimitation of municipal
waters throughout the country for fisheries or coastal resource management and law enforcement. TDCI
prayed for the CA to declare the archipelagic doctrine as adopted in interpreting Section 4(58) of the 1998
Fisheries Code, with respect to municipalities with offshore islands.57

PKSK, on the other hand, filed its Comment58 to De Borja's Motion for Reconsideration with Motion for
Clarification, praying that it be dismissed for lack of merit. PKSK insisted that there is no actual case or
controversy between the parties as to the provisions of the 1998 Fisheries Code, and that De Borja simply
wants an interpretation by the court.59 PKSK, however, argued that the dismissal of the petition meant
that the archipelagic doctrine is the prevailing interpretation.60

In its Resolution61 dated November 3, 2008, the CA denied De Borja's and TDCI's motions. The CA held:

x x x At present, the DA has yet to issue guidelines for delineating/delimiting municipal waters for
municipalities and cities with offshore islands. Since the DA still has to issue such guidelines to carry into
effect the requirement imposed by Rule 123.2 of the IRR of RA No. 8550, whatever ramifications
petitioner-appellee [De Borja] and intervenors-appellants fear may result from the enforcement of the
questioned provision of RA No. 8550 remain to be merely hypothetical.

While this Court acknowledges the importance of the issue raised by petitioner-appellee and intervenors-
appellants in SP Civil Action No. 04-007-MN as well as in the present case it must be emphasized that this
Court may not act upon a hypothetical issue that has not yet ripened into a justiciable
controversy.62 (Citations omitted.)

Thus, De Borja and TDCI filed their own petitions for review before us, which we consolidated in our
Resolution63 dated January 14, 2009. De Borja and TDCI both insist that the CA erred in dismissing the
petition for declaratory relief on the ground of prematurity. They assert that only a judicial declaration will
finally settle the different interpretations of Section 4(58) of the 1998 Fisheries Code. According to De
Borja, a petition for declaratory relief is the proper remedy for the construction of the provision regardless

52
of the issuance of implementing guidelines. As for TDCI, it maintains that all the requisites for a valid
petition for declaratory relief are present.

De Borja and TDCI also both reiterate the issues' national significance and transcendental implications to
the entire local fishing industry. They, however, differ in the principle they want the court to uphold in
interpreting Section 4(58) of the 1998 Fisheries Code, respecting municipalities of cities with offshore
islands. De Borja opines that the provision unqualifiedly adopts only the mainland principle in defining
municipal waters.64 TDCI, on the other hand, maintains that using the mainland principle in interpreting
the provision would violate the constitutional rights of simple fisherfolk to subsistence fishing, and of
municipalities and cities with offshore islands to meaningful autonomy in managing their resources.65

In its Comment66 dated June 10, 2009, the OSG concurs with the CA that De Borja's petition before the
RTC failed to allege a justiciable controversy. The OSG avers that the petition must fail because it was
based on mere speculations, contingent events, and hypothetical issues that have not yet ripened into an
actual controversy.67 Notwithstanding this position, the OSG still submits that the mainland principle, and
not the archipelagic principle, should be adopted in defining municipal waters under the 1998 Fisheries
Code.68

The sole issue presented is whether De Borja's petition for declaratory relief should prosper.

We deny the petition.

For a petition for declaratory relief69 to prosper, it must be shown that (a) there is a justiciable
controversy, (b) the controversy is between persons whose interests are adverse, (c) the party seeking
the relief has a legal interest in the controversy, and (d) the issue invoked is ripe for judicial
determination.70 We agree with the CA when it dismissed De Borja's petition for being premature as it
lacks the first and fourth requisites. We hasten to add that the petition, in fact, lacks all four requisites.

First, we find that De Borja's petition does not present a justiciable controversy or the "ripening seeds" of
one as to warrant a court's intervention. A justiciable controversy is a definite and concrete dispute
touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests, which may be resolved by a court
of law through the application of a law.71 It must be appropriate or ripe for judicial determination,

53
admitting of specific relief through a decree that is conclusive in character. It must not be conjectural or
merely anticipatory, which only seeks for an opinion that advises what the law would be on a hypothetical
state of facts.72

In his five-page petition for declaratory relief, De Borja failed to provide factual allegations showing that
his legal rights were the subject of an imminent or threatened violation that should be prevented by the
declaratory relief sought. He simply went on to conclude that the construction or interpretation of the
reckoning point of the 15-kilometer range of municipal waters under the 1998 Fisheries Code would affect
his rights as he is "now exposed to apprehensions and possible harassments that may be brought about
by conflicting interpretations of the said statute x x x."73 As to how these apprehensions and harassments
shall come about, De Borja did not elaborate. Clearly, therefore, there is no actual or imminent threat to
his rights which is ripe for judicial review. As we have explained in Republic v. Roque:74

A perusal of private respondents' petition for declaratory relief would show that they have
failed to demonstrate how they are left to sustain or are in immediate danger to sustain some
direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the assailed provisions of RA 9372. Not far
removed from the factual milieu in the Southern Hemisphere cases, private respondents only assert
general interests as citizens, and taxpayers and infractions which the government could
prospectively commit if the enforcement of the said law would remain untrammelled. As their
petition would disclose, private respondents' fear of prosecution was solely based on remarks of certain
government officials which were addressed to the general public. They, however, failed to show how these
remarks tended towards any prosecutorial or governmental action geared towards the implementation of
RA 9372 against them. In other words, there was no particular, real or imminent threat to any of them. As
held in Southern Hemisphere:

Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have become pleas for declaratory relief, over which the
Court has no original jurisdiction. Then again, declaratory actions characterized by "double contingency,"
where both the activity the petitioners intend to undertake and the anticipated reaction to it of a public
official are merely theorized, lie beyond judicial review for lack of ripeness.

The possibility of abuse in the implementation of RA 9372 does not avail to take the present
petitions out of the realm of the surreal and merely imagined. Such possibility is not peculiar to

54
RA 9372 since the exercise of any power granted by law may be abused. Allegations of abuse
must be anchored on real events before courts may step in to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable.[75] (Emphasis supplied; citations
omitted.)

De Borja neither established his legal interest in the controversy nor demonstrated the adverse interests
between him and others. He did not even implead any respondent and merely stated that he was engaged
in fishing operations in various fishing grounds within the internal waters of the Philippines. He simply
made a general statement that there are varying interpretations of the reckoning point of the 15-kilometer
range of municipal waters under the 1998 Fisheries Code, without elaborating as to what these conflicting
interpretations of the law were.

In the early case of Delumen v. Republic,76 we concurred with the Solicitor General's contention that a
justiciable controversy is one involving an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right on one side and a
denial thereof on the other concerning a real and not a merely theoretical question or issue.77 We held
that the petitioners in Delumen were not entitled to a declaratory relief because their petition did not
mention any specific person having or claiming adverse interest in the matter. As such, they were
invoking an action for declaratory judgment solely to determine a hypothetical, abstract, theoretical, or
uncertain claim, which we cannot allow.78

We stress that neither the OSG's filing of its Comment nor the petition-in-intervention of PUMALU-MV,
PKSK, and TDCI endowed De Borja's petition with an actual case or controversy. The Comment, for one,
did not contest the allegations in De Borja's petition. Its main role was to supply De Borja's petition with
the factual antecedents detailing how the alleged controversy reached the court. It also enlightened the
RTC as to the two views, the mainland principle versus the archipelagic principle, on the definition of
municipal waters. Even if the Comment did oppose the petition, there would still be no justiciable
controversy for lack of allegation that any person has ever contested or threatened to contest De Borja's
claim of fishing rights.79

The petition-in-intervention, on the other hand, also did not dispute or oppose any of the allegations in De
Borja's petition. While it did espouse the application of the archipelagic principle in contrast to the

55
mainland principle advocated by the OSG, it must be recalled that De Borja did not advocate for any of
these principles at that time. He only adopted the OSG's position in his Memorandum before the RTC.
Thus, the petition-in-intervention did not create an actual controversy in this case as the cause of action
for declaratory relief must be made out by the allegations of the petition without the aid of on any other
pleading.80

Simply put, De Borja's petition does not contain ultimate facts to support his cause of action. De Borja
merely wants the court to give him an opinion on the proper interpretation of the definition of municipal
waters. This is a prayer which we cannot grant. Our constitutional mandate to settle only actual
controversies involving rights that are legally demandable and enforceable81 proscribes us from giving an
advisory opinion.

Second, closely associated with the requirement of actual or justiciable controversy is the requirement of
ripeness for adjudication. In this regard, we cite our ruling in Lozano v. Nograles,82 viz.:

An aspect of the "case-or-controversy" requirement' is the requisite of "ripeness." x x x In our jurisdiction,

the issue of ripeness is generally treated in terms of actual injury to the plaintiff. Hence, a question is ripe
for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual
challenging it. An alternative road to review similarly taken would be to determine whether an action has
already been accomplished or performed by a branch of government before the courts may step
in.83 (Emphasis and citations omitted.)

The requisite of ripeness has a two-fold aspect: fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship
to the parties entailed by withholding court consideration.84 The first aspect requires that the issue
tendered is a purely legal one and that the regulation subject of the case is a "final agency action." The
second aspect mandates that the effects of the regulation are felt in a concrete way by the challenging
parties.85 Applying these tests, we find that De Borja's petition is not ripe for adjudication.

The question calling for the interpretation of the definition of municipal waters for municipalities with
offshore islands is not a purely legal question because the given set of facts from which our interpretation
will be based are not yet complete. In other words, the question demands an agency action from the DA.

56
An agency action is defined in Book VII, Chapter I, Section 2(15) of the Administrative Code of 1987 86 as
referring to the whole or part of every agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief or its equivalent or
denial thereof. As applied here, the action required from the DA involves further factual determination of a
kind that necessitates the application of the Department's expertise and authority, both of which we do
not have.

Under Section 123 of the 1998 Fisheries Code (now Section 157 of the 1998 Fisheries Code as amended
by Republic Act No. 1065487 [hereinafter, the Amended Fisheries Code]), the DA has the mandate to
authorize the NAMRIA to designate and chart navigational lanes in fisheries areas and to delineate
municipal waters. In the legitimate exercise of its power of subordinate legislation, the DA issued the IRR
of the Amended Fisheries Code.88 The IRR of the Amended Fisheries Code, particularly Sections 157.1 to
157.4, echoes the mandate of the DA and NAMRIA under Section 157 of the law. It provides the details
and the process of delineation of municipal waters, to wit:

Sec. 157. Charting of Navigational Lanes and Delineation of Municipal Waters. – The Department shall
authorize the National Mapping and Resource Information Authority (NAMRIA) for the
designation and charting of navigational lanes in fishery areas and delineation of municipal
waters. The Philippine Coast Guard shall exercise control and supervision over such designated
navigational lanes.

Rule 157.1. Delineation of Municipal Waters. - Recognizing that all municipal waters have not
yet been delineated, the DA-BFAR shall issue guidelines for the delineation of all municipal
waters in the Philippines following the process stated in Rule 65.2.

Rule 157.2. Navigational Lanes. - The DA-BFAR, shall facilitate the designation and charting of
navigational lanes in fishery areas, by convening an Inter-Agency committee composed of NAMRIA, PN,
PCG, MARINA, other concerned agencies and the NFARMC.

Rule 157.3. Mapping. – The DA-BFAR, in coordination with the NAMRIA and with the
participation of local government units concerned shall determine the outer limits of the
municipal waters. Overlapping boundaries in municipal waters shall be governed by the Rules
embodied in this law and the Local Government Code of 1991.

57
Rule 157.4. Navigational Charts. – Charts of navigational lane and outer limits of municipal waters shall be
produced, published and regularly updated by NAMRIA.

Rule 157.5. Funding. – The Department, through DBM, shall allocate sufficient funds for these purposes.
(Emphasis supplied.)

Pertinently, Rule 65.2 provides:

Rule 65.2. Formulation of Rules and Regulations. - In formulating rules and regulations, the DA-BFAR shall
observe these principles:

a. The regulation shall be based on scientific studies. In the conduct of scientific studies,
stakeholders in the affected region shall be informed of the conduct of the study, its
duration and the expert/s who will conduct the same. The stakeholders may nominate
their own scientist/s to participate in the study or will be given the chance to provide
comments on the scientist who will conduct the study;

b. The consultation shall be conducted in all affected regions as may be practicable, taking into
consideration the safety and accessibility of the venue to the stakeholders;

c. Stakeholders shall be given at least fifteen (15) days prior notice of the date and
venue of the consultation including the subject matter of the proposed
regulation. The notice shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the region,
where feasible; and,

d. The proposed regulation shall be made publicly available at the BFAR website and BFAR
Regional Offices at least seven (7) days prior to the consultation. (Emphasis supplied.)

58
The DA, however, has not yet performed any of the above acts. The record shows that no rule, regulation,
or guidelines have been issued by the DA to date, in coordination with BFAR, as regards municipalities
with offshore islands. There are serious gaps in the implementation of the law which the DA and the
concerned agencies would still need to fill in. As it stands, therefore, there is no agency action to speak of,
much less a "final agency action" required under the ripeness doctrine.

Equally significant, we find that if we were to grant the petition for declaratory relief, it would mean an
intrusion into the domain of the executive, preempting the actions of the DA and other concerned
government agencies and stakeholders. As clearly set out in the provisions of the IRR, the primary duty of
determining the reckoning point of the 15-kilometer range of municipal waters of municipalities with
offshore islands falls with the DA, NAMRIA, and the BFAR. They shall do so through public consultation or
with the participation of stakeholders, such as the concerned municipalities, fishing operators, and
fisherfolk.

Nonetheless, De Borja insists that a statute may be the subject of a petition for declaratory relief
regardless of the issuance of an implementing guideline. He pleads that the "persisting and actual
confusion brought about by the different interpretations of the interested groups in the local fishing
industry is ripe for judicial action."89 We disagree. In Garcia v. Executive Secretary,90 we ruled that a
petition assailing the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7042 or the Foreign Investments Act of 1991 is
not ripe for adjudication, there being "no actual case or controversy, particularly because of the absence
of the implementing rules that are supposed to carry the Act into effect."91

In Bayan Telecommunications, Inc. v. Republic,92 we affirmed the ruling of the CA in dismissing a petition
for declaratory relief after we found that Bayantel's fear of sanction under Section 21 of Republic Act No.
792593 was merely hypothetical, as there are yet no implementing rules or guidelines to carry into effect
the requirement imposed by the said provision.94

Likewise, in Lozano,95 we noted that judicial intervention96 was premature because the House of
Representatives has yet to adopt rules of procedure in relation to Resolution No. 1109.97

59
Corollarily, since no implementing rule or agency action is involved in this case, no real hardship may be
felt by De Borja if we were to withhold judicial consideration. As earlier discussed, the petition did not
state any specific right to which De Borja was entitled, and which was threatened to be violated,
prejudiced or denied by the DA. We emphasize that court action is discretionary in petitions for
declaratory relief.98 We may refuse to construe the instrument, or in this case, the statute involved, if the
construction is not necessary and proper under the circumstances and/or if the construction would not
terminate the controversy.99 Here, the lack of a purely legal question, the absence of agency action, and
the nonexistence of a threatened direct injury, make the construction of Section 4(58) of the 1998
Fisheries Code inappropriate and unripe for judicial resolution at this time. We cannot give relief merely
because De Borja has a "real problem" and "a genuine need for legal advice."100 As aptly put in Abbott
Laboratories v. Gardner:101

x x x Without undertaking to survey the intricacies of the ripeness doctrine, it is fair to say that its basic
rationale is to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling
themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from
judicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete
way by the challenging parties. (Citation omitted.)

Considering the foregoing, the DA's decision, through the OSG, to submit the interpretation of municipal
waters to the court's wisdom and discretion was improper. The executive cannot simply pass the buck to
the judiciary. As we have explained in Tan v. Macapagal:102

x x x The doctrine of separation of powers calls for the other departments being left alone to discharge
their duties as they see fit. The judiciary as Justice Laurel emphatically asserted "will neither direct nor
restrain executive [or legislative] action x x x." The legislative and executive branches are not
bound to seek its advice as to what to do or not to do. Judicial inquiry has to be postponed in
the meanwhile. It is a prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished or
performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, At such a time, it may pass
on the validity of what was done but only "when xxx properly challenged in an appropriate legal
proceeding."103 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.)

60
Finally, in their attempt to salvage the case, both De Borja and intervenor TDCI invoked transcendental
importance. However, their contention is misplaced. The transcendental importance doctrine dispenses
only with the requirement of locus standi.104 It cannot and does not override the requirements of actual
and justiciable controversy and ripeness for adjudication, which are conditions sine qua non for the
exercise of judicial power.

WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions are DENIED. The February 21, 2008 Decision and November 3,
2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 87391 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. NO. 181303 : September 17, 2009]

CARMEN DANAO MALANA, MARIA DANAO ACORDA, EVELYN DANAO, FERMINA DANAO, LETICIA
DANAO and LEONORA DANAO, the last two are represented herein by their Attorney-in-Fact,
MARIA DANAO ACORDA, Petitioners, v. BENIGNO TAPPA, JERRY REYNA, SATURNINO CAMBRI
and SPOUSES FRANCISCO AND MARIA LIGUTAN, Respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Orders1 dated 4 May
2007, 30 May 2007, and 31 October 2007, rendered by Branch 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Tuguegarao City, which dismissed, for lack of jurisdiction, the Complaint of petitioners Carmen Danao
Malana, Leticia Danao, Maria Danao Accorda, Evelyn Danao, Fermina Danao, and Leonora Danao, against
respondents Benigno Tappa, Jerry Reyna, Saturnino Cambri, Francisco Ligutan and Maria Ligutan, in Civil
Case No. 6868.

61
Petitioners filed before the RTC their Complaint for Reivindicacion, Quieting of Title, and Damages2 against
respondents on 27 March 2007, docketed as Civil Case No. 6868. Petitioners alleged in their Complaint
that they are the owners of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-
1279373 situated in Tuguegarao City, Cagayan (subject property). Petitioners inherited the subject
property from Anastacio Danao (Anastacio), who died intestate.4 During the lifetime of Anastacio, he had
allowed Consuelo Pauig (Consuelo), who was married to Joaquin Boncad, to build on and occupy the
southern portion of the subject property. Anastacio and Consuelo agreed that the latter would vacate the
said land at any time that Anastacio and his heirs might need it.5

Petitioners claimed that respondents, Consuelo's family members,6 continued to occupy the subject
property even after her death, already building their residences thereon using permanent materials.
Petitioners also learned that respondents were claiming ownership over the subject property. Averring that
they already needed it, petitioners demanded that respondents vacate the same. Respondents, however,
refused to heed petitioners' demand.7

Petitioners referred their land dispute with respondents to the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay
Annafunan West for conciliation. During the conciliation proceedings, respondents asserted that they
owned the subject property and presented documents ostensibly supporting their claim of ownership.

According to petitioners, respondents' documents were highly dubious, falsified, and incapable of proving
the latter's claim of ownership over the subject property; nevertheless, they created a cloud upon
petitioners' title to the property. Thus, petitioners were compelled to file before the RTC a Complaint to
remove such cloud from their title.8 Petitioners additionally sought in their Complaint an award against
respondents for actual damages, in the amount of P50,000.00, resulting from the latter's baseless claim
over the subject property that did not actually belong to them, in violation of Article 19 of the Civil Code
on Human Relations.9 Petitioners likewise prayed for an award against respondents for exemplary
damages, in the amount of P50,000.00, since the latter had acted in bad faith and resorted to unlawful
means to establish their claim over the subject property. Finally, petitioners asked to recover from
respondents P50,000.00 as attorney's fees, because the latter's refusal to vacate the property constrained
petitioners to engage the services of a lawyer.10

62
Before respondents could file their answer, the RTC issued an Order dated 4 May 2007 dismissing
petitioners' Complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The RTC referred to Republic Act No.
7691,11 amending Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980, which vests the RTC with jurisdiction over real actions, where the assessed value of the property
involved exceeds P20,000.00. It found that the subject property had a value of less than P20,000.00;
hence, petitioners' action to recover the same was outside the jurisdiction of the RTC. The RTC decreed in
its 4 May 2007 Order that:

The Court has no jurisdiction over the action, it being a real action involving a real property with assessed
value less than P20,000.00 and hereby dismisses the same without prejudice.12

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforementioned RTC Order dismissing their Complaint.
They argued that their principal cause of action was for quieting of title; the accion reivindicacion was
included merely to enable them to seek complete relief from respondents. Petitioner's Complaint should
not have been dismissed, since Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court13 states that an action to quiet
title falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC.14

In an Order dated 30 May 2007, the RTC denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration. It reasoned that
an action to quiet title is a real action. Pursuant to Republic Act No. 7691, it is the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) that exercises exclusive jurisdiction over real actions where the assessed value of real property
does not exceed P20,000.00. Since the assessed value of subject property per Tax Declaration No, 02-
48386 was P410.00, the real action involving the same was outside the jurisdiction of the RTC.15

Petitioners filed another pleading, simply designated as Motion, in which they prayed that the RTC Orders
dated 4 May 2007 and 30 May 2007, dismissing their Complaint, be set aside. They reiterated their earlier
argument that Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court states that an action to quiet title falls under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC. They also contended that there was no obstacle to their joining the two
causes of action, i.e., quieting of title and reivindicacion, in a single Complaint, citing Rumarate v.
Hernandez.16 And even if the two causes of action could not be joined, petitioners maintained that the
misjoinder of said causes of action was not a ground for the dismissal of their Complaint.17

63
The RTC issued an Order dated 31 October 2007 denying petitioners' Motion. It clarified that their
Complaint was dismissed, not on the ground of misjoinder of causes of action, but for lack of jurisdiction.
The RTC dissected Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

Section 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any
other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate
Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of
his rights or duties, thereunder.

An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real property or remove clouds therefrom,
or to consolidate ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil Code, may be brought under this Rule.

The RTC differentiated between the first and the second paragraphs of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of
Court. The first paragraph refers to an action for declaratory relief, which should be brought before the
RTC. The second paragraph, however, refers to a different set of remedies, which includes an action to
quiet title to real property. The second paragraph must be read in relation to Republic Act No. 7691, which
vests the MTC with jurisdiction over real actions, where the assessed value of the real property involved
does not exceed P50,000.00 in Metro Manila and P20,000.00 in all other places.18 The dispositive part of
the 31 October 2007 Order of the RTC reads:

This Court maintains that an action to quiet title is a real action. [Herein petitioners] do not dispute the
assessed value of the property at P410.00 under Tax Declaration No. 02-48386. Hence, it has no
jurisdiction over the action.

In view of the foregoing considerations, the Motion is hereby denied.19

Hence, the present Petition, where petitioners raise the sole issue of:

64
WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DISMISSING
THE COMPLAINT OF THE PETITIONERS MOTU PROPRIO.20

Petitioners' statement of the issue is misleading. It would seem that they are only challenging the fact that
their Complaint was dismissed by the RTC motu proprio. Based on the facts and arguments set forth in the
instant Petition, however, the Court determines that the fundamental issue for its resolution is whether
the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners' Complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

The Court rules in the negative.

An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed, a will, a contract or
other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, an executive order, a regulation or
an ordinance. The relief sought under this remedy includes the interpretation and determination of the
validity of the written instrument and the judicial declaration of the parties' rights or duties thereunder. 21

Petitions for declaratory relief are governed by Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. The RTC correctly made a
distinction between the first and the second paragraphs of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court.

The first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, describes the general circumstances in
which a person may file a petition for declaratory relief, to wit:

Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are
affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may,
before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any
question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
(Emphasis ours.)

As the afore-quoted provision states, a petition for declaratory relief under the first paragraph of Section
1, Rule 63 may be brought before the appropriate RTC.

Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court further provides in its second paragraph that:

65
An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real property or remove clouds therefrom,
or to consolidate ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil Code, may be brought under this Rule.
(Emphasis ours.)

The second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court specifically refers to (1) an action for the
reformation of an instrument, recognized under Articles 1359 to 1369 of the Civil Code; (2) an action to
quiet title, authorized by Articles 476 to 481 of the Civil Code; and (3) an action to consolidate ownership
required by Article 1607 of the Civil Code in a sale with a right to repurchase. These three remedies are
considered similar to declaratory relief because they also result in the adjudication of the legal rights of
the litigants, often without the need of execution to carry the judgment into effect.22

To determine which court has jurisdiction over the actions identified in the second paragraph of Section 1,
Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, said provision must be read together with those of the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended.

It is important to note that Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court does not categorically require that an
action to quiet title be filed before the RTC. It repeatedly uses the word "may" - that an action for quieting
of title "may be brought under [the] Rule" on petitions for declaratory relief, and a person desiring to file a
petition for declaratory relief "may x x x bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court." The use
of the word "may" in a statute denotes that the provision is merely permissive and indicates a mere
possibility, an opportunity or an option.23

In contrast, the mandatory provision of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended, uses the
word "shall" and explicitly requires the MTC to exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions
which involve title to or possession of real property where the assessed value does not
exceed P20,000.00, thus:

Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts in Civil Cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
shall exercise:

xxx

66
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, possession of, real property, or
any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not
exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's
fees, litigation expenses and costs: x x x (Emphasis ours.)

As found by the RTC, the assessed value of the subject property as stated in Tax Declaration No. 02-
48386 is only P410.00; therefore, petitioners' Complaint involving title to and possession of the said
property is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the MTC, not the RTC.

Furthermore, an action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach of the
instruments involved or of rights arising thereunder.24 Since the purpose of an action for declaratory relief
is to secure an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed,
or contract for their guidance in the enforcement thereof, or compliance therewith, and not to settle issues
arising from an alleged breach thereof, it may be entertained only before the breach or violation of the
statute, deed, or contract to which it refers. A petition for declaratory relief gives a practical remedy for
ending controversies that have not reached the state where another relief is immediately available; and
supplies the need for a form of action that will set controversies at rest before they lead to a repudiation
of obligations, an invasion of rights, and a commission of wrongs.25

Where the law or contract has already been contravened prior to the filing of an action for declaratory
relief, the courts can no longer assume jurisdiction over the action. In other words, a court has no more
jurisdiction over an action for declaratory relief if its subject has already been infringed or transgressed
before the institution of the action.26

In the present case, petitioners' Complaint for quieting of title was filed after petitioners already
demanded and respondents refused to vacate the subject property. In fact, said Complaint was filed only
subsequent to the latter's express claim of ownership over the subject property before the Lupong
Tagapamayapa, in direct challenge to petitioners' title.

Since petitioners averred in the Complaint that they had already been deprived of the possession of their
property, the proper remedy for them is the filing of an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, not

67
a case for declaratory relief. An accion publiciana is a suit for the recovery of possession, filed one year
after the occurrence of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty. An
accion reivindicatoria is a suit that has for its object one's recovery of possession over the real property as
owner.27 ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

Petitioners' Complaint contained sufficient allegations for an accion reivindicatoria. Jurisdiction over such
an action would depend on the value of the property involved. Given that the subject property herein is
valued only at P410.00, then the MTC, not the RTC, has jurisdiction over an action to recover the same.
The RTC, therefore, did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing, without prejudice, petitioners'
Complaint in Civil Case No. 6868 for lack of jurisdiction.

As for the RTC dismissing petitioners' Complaint motu proprio, the following pronouncements of the Court
in Laresma v. Abellana28 proves instructive:

It is axiomatic that the nature of an action and the jurisdiction of a tribunal are determined by the
material allegations of the complaint and the law at the time the action was commenced. Jurisdiction of
the tribunal over the subject matter or nature of an action is conferred only by law and not by the consent
or waiver upon a court which, otherwise, would have no jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of
an action. Lack of jurisdiction of the court over an action or the subject matter of an action cannot be
cured by the silence, acquiescence, or even by express consent of the parties. If the court has no
jurisdiction over the nature of an action, it may dismiss the same ex mero motu or motu proprio. x x x.
(Emphasis supplied.)

Since the RTC, in dismissing petitioners' Complaint, acted in complete accord with law and jurisprudence,
it cannot be said to have done so with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. An act of a court or tribunal may only be considered to have been committed in grave abuse
of discretion when the same was performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment, which is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility.29 No such circumstances exist herein as to justify the issuance of a writ
of certiorari.

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IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is DISMISSED. The Orders dated 4 May 2007, 30 May
2007 and 31 October 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao City, Branch 3, dismissing the
Complaint in Civil Case No. 6868, without prejudice, are AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court is ordered to
REMAND the records of this case to the Municipal Trial Court or the court of proper jurisdiction for proper
disposition. Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 202242 April 16, 2013

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner,

vs.
JUDICIALAND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS,
JR., Respondents.

RESOLUTION

MENDOZA, J.:

This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration1 filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) on behalf of
the respondents, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents),
duly opposed2 by the petitioner, former Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez (petitioner).

By way of recapitulation, the present action stemmed from the unexpected departure of former Chief
Justice Renato C. Corona on May 29, 2012, and the nomination of petitioner, as his potential successor. In
his initiatory pleading, petitioner asked the Court to determine 1] whether the first paragraph of Section 8,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution allows more than one (1) member of Congress to sit in the JBC; and

69
2] if the practice of having two (2) representatives from each House of Congress with one (1) vote each is
sanctioned by the Constitution.

On July 17, 2012, the Court handed down the assailed subject decision, disposing the same in the
following manner:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The current numerical composition of the Judicial and Bar Council
is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Judicial and Bar Council is hereby enjoined to reconstitute itself so
that only one (1) member of Congress will sit as a representative in its proceedings, in accordance with
Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.

This disposition is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

On July 31, 2012, following respondents’ motion for reconsideration and with due regard to Senate
Resolution Nos. 111,3 112,4 113,5 and 114,6 the Court set the subject motion for oral arguments on
August 2, 2012.7 On August 3, 2012, the Court discussed the merits of the arguments and agreed, in the
meantime, to suspend the effects of the second paragraph of the dispositive portion of the July 17, 2012
Decision which decreed that it was immediately executory. The decretal portion of the August 3, 2012
Resolution8 reads:

WHEREFORE, the parties are hereby directed to submit their respective MEMORANDA within ten (10) days
from notice. Until further orders, the Court hereby SUSPENDS the effect of the second paragraph of the
dispositive portion of the Court’s July 17, 2012 Decision, which reads: "This disposition is immediately
executory."9

Pursuant to the same resolution, petitioner and respondents filed their respective memoranda.10

Brief Statement of the Antecedents

70
In this disposition, it bears reiterating that from the birth of the Philippine Republic, the exercise of
appointing members of the Judiciary has always been the exclusive prerogative of the executive and
legislative branches of the government. Like their progenitor of American origins, both the Malolos
Constitution11 and the 1935 Constitution12 vested the power to appoint the members of the Judiciary in
the President, subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. It was during these times that
the country became witness to the deplorable practice of aspirants seeking confirmation of their
appointment in the Judiciary to ingratiate themselves with the members of the legislative body.13

Then, under the 1973 Constitution,14 with the fusion of the executive and legislative powers in one body,
the appointment of judges and justices ceased to be subject of scrutiny by another body. The power
became exclusive and absolute to the Executive, subject only to the condition that the appointees must
have all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications.

Prompted by the clamor to rid the process of appointments to the Judiciary of the evils of political
pressure and partisan activities,15 the members of the Constitutional Commission saw it wise to create a
separate, competent and independent body to recommend nominees to the President.

Thus, it conceived of a body, representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial appointment process,
and called it the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC). The Framers carefully worded Section 8, Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution in this wise:

Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court
composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the
Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired
Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.

From the moment of the creation of the JBC, Congress designated one (1) representative to sit in the JBC
to act as one of the ex-officio members.16 Pursuant to the constitutional provision that Congress is entitled
to one (1) representative, each House sent a representative to the JBC, not together, but alternately or by
rotation.

71
In 1994, the seven-member composition of the JBC was substantially altered.1âwphi1 An eighth member
was added to the JBC as the two (2) representatives from Congress began sitting simultaneously in the
JBC, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote.17

In 2001, the JBC En Banc decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of
Representatives one full vote each.18 It has been the situation since then.

Grounds relied upon by Respondents

Through the subject motion, respondents pray that the Court reconsider its decision and dismiss the
petition on the following grounds: 1] that allowing only one representative from Congress in the JBC would
lead to absurdity considering its bicameral nature; 2] that the failure of the Framers to make the proper
adjustment when there was a shift from unilateralism to bicameralism was a plain oversight; 3] that two
representatives from Congress would not subvert the intention of the Framers to insulate the JBC from
political partisanship; and 4] that the rationale of the Court in declaring a seven-member composition
would provide a solution should there be a stalemate is not exactly correct.

While the Court may find some sense in the reasoning in amplification of the third and fourth grounds
listed by respondents, still, it finds itself unable to reverse the assailed decision on the principal issues
covered by the first and second grounds for lack of merit. Significantly, the conclusion arrived at, with
respect to the first and second grounds, carries greater bearing in the final resolution of this case.

As these two issues are interrelated, the Court shall discuss them jointly.

Ruling of the Court

The Constitution evinces the direct action of the Filipino people by which the fundamental powers of
government are established, limited and defined and by which those powers are distributed among the
several departments for their safe and useful exercise for the benefit of the body politic.19 The Framers
reposed their wisdom and vision on one suprema lex to be the ultimate expression of the principles and
the framework upon which government and society were to operate. Thus, in the interpretation of the
constitutional provisions, the Court firmly relies on the basic postulate that the Framers mean what they

72
say. The language used in the Constitution must be taken to have been deliberately chosen for a definite
purpose. Every word employed in the Constitution must be interpreted to exude its deliberate intent which
must be maintained inviolate against disobedience and defiance. What the Constitution clearly says,
according to its text, compels acceptance and bars modification even by the branch tasked to interpret it.

For this reason, the Court cannot accede to the argument of plain oversight in order to justify
constitutional construction. As stated in the July 17, 2012 Decision, in opting to use the singular letter "a"
to describe "representative of Congress," the Filipino people through the Framers intended that Congress
be entitled to only one (1) seat in the JBC. Had the intention been otherwise, the Constitution could have,
in no uncertain terms, so provided, as can be read in its other provisions.

A reading of the 1987 Constitution would reveal that several provisions were indeed adjusted as to be in
tune with the shift to bicameralism. One example is Section 4, Article VII, which provides that a tie in the
presidential election shall be broken "by a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress,
voting separately."20 Another is Section 8 thereof which requires the nominee to replace the Vice-
President to be confirmed "by a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting
separately."21 Similarly, under Section 18, the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus may be revoked or continued by the Congress, voting separately, by
a vote of at least a majority of all its Members."22 In all these provisions, the bicameral nature of Congress
was recognized and, clearly, the corresponding adjustments were made as to how a matter would be
handled and voted upon by its two Houses.

Thus, to say that the Framers simply failed to adjust Section 8, Article VIII, by sheer inadvertence, to
their decision to shift to a bicameral form of the legislature, is not persuasive enough. Respondents cannot
just lean on plain oversight to justify a conclusion favorable to them. It is very clear that the Framers were
not keen on adjusting the provision on congressional representation in the JBC because it was not in the
exercise of its primary function – to legislate. JBC was created to support the executive power to appoint,
and Congress, as one whole body, was merely assigned a contributory non-legislative function.

The underlying reason for such a limited participation can easily be discerned. Congress has two (2)
Houses. The need to recognize the existence and the role of each House is essential considering that the
Constitution employs precise language in laying down the functions which particular House plays,

73
regardless of whether the two Houses consummate an official act by voting jointly or separately. Whether
in the exercise of its legislative23 or its non-legislative functions such as inter alia, the power of
appropriation,24 the declaration of an existence of a state of war,25 canvassing of electoral returns for the
President and Vice-President,26 and impeachment,27 the dichotomy of each House must be acknowledged
and recognized considering the interplay between these two Houses. In all these instances, each House is
constitutionally granted with powers and functions peculiar to its nature and with keen consideration to 1)
its relationship with the other chamber; and 2) in consonance with the principle of checks and balances,
as to the other branches of government.

In checkered contrast, there is essentially no interaction between the two Houses in their participation in
the JBC. No mechanism is required between the Senate and the House of Representatives in the screening
and nomination of judicial officers. Rather, in the creation of the JBC, the Framers arrived at a unique
system by adding to the four (4) regular members, three (3) representatives from the major branches of
government - the Chief Justice as ex-officio Chairman (representing the Judicial Department), the
Secretary of Justice (representing the Executive Department), and a representative of the Congress
(representing the Legislative Department). The total is seven (7), not eight. In so providing, the Framers
simply gave recognition to the Legislature, not because it was in the interest of a certain constituency, but
in reverence to it as a major branch of government.

On this score, a Member of Congress, Hon. Simeon A. Datumanong, from the Second District of
Maguindanao, submitted his well-considered position28 to then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno:

I humbly reiterate my position that there should be only one representative of Congress in the JBC in
accordance with Article VIII, Section 8 (1) of the 1987 Constitution x x x.

The aforesaid provision is clear and unambiguous and does not need any further interpretation. Perhaps, it
is apt to mention that the oft-repeated doctrine that "construction and interpretation come only after it
has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them."

Further, to allow Congress to have two representatives in the Council, with one vote each, is to negate the
principle of equality among the three branches of government which is enshrined in the Constitution.

74
In view of the foregoing, I vote for the proposition that the Council should adopt the rule of single
representation of Congress in the JBC in order to respect and give the right meaning to the above-quoted
provision of the Constitution. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

On March 14, 2007, then Associate Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing, also a JBC Consultant, submitted to
the Chief Justice and ex-officio JBC Chairman his opinion,29 which reads:

8. Two things can be gleaned from the excerpts and citations above: the creation of the JBC is intended to
curtail the influence of politics in Congress in the appointment of judges, and the understanding is that
seven (7) persons will compose the JBC. As such, the interpretation of two votes for Congress runs
counter to the intendment of the framers. Such interpretation actually gives Congress more influence in
the appointment of judges. Also, two votes for Congress would increase the number of JBC members to
eight, which could lead to voting deadlock by reason of even-numbered membership, and a clear violation
of 7 enumerated members in the Constitution. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

In an undated position paper,30 then Secretary of Justice Agnes VST Devanadera opined:

As can be gleaned from the above constitutional provision, the JBC is composed of seven (7)
representatives coming from different sectors. From the enumeration it is patent that each category of
members pertained to a single individual only. Thus, while we do not lose sight of the bicameral nature of
our legislative department, it is beyond dispute that Art. VIII, Section 8 (1) of the 1987 Constitution is
explicit and specific that "Congress" shall have only "xxx a representative." Thus, two (2) representatives
from Congress would increase the number of JBC members to eight (8), a number beyond what the
Constitution has contemplated. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

In this regard, the scholarly dissection on the matter by retired Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, a
former JBC consultant, is worth reiterating.31 Thus:

A perusal of the records of the Constitutional Commission reveals that the composition of the JBC reflects
the Commission’s desire "to have in the Council a representation for the major elements of the
community." xxx The ex-officio members of the Council consist of representatives from the three main
branches of government while the regular members are composed of various stakeholders in the judiciary.

75
The unmistakeable tenor of Article VIII, Section 8(1) was to treat each ex-officio member as representing
one co-equal branch of government. xxx Thus, the JBC was designed to have seven voting members with
the three ex-officio members having equal say in the choice of judicial nominees.

xxx

No parallelism can be drawn between the representative of Congress in the JBC and the exercise by
Congress of its legislative powers under Article VI and constituent powers under Article XVII of the
Constitution. Congress, in relation to the executive and judicial branches of government, is constitutionally
treated as another co-equal branch in the matter of its representative in the JBC. On the other hand, the
exercise of legislative and constituent powers requires the Senate and the House of Representatives to
coordinate and act as distinct bodies in furtherance of Congress’ role under our constitutional scheme.
While the latter justifies and, in fact, necessitates the separateness of the two Houses of Congress as they
relate inter se, no such dichotomy need be made when Congress interacts with the other two co-equal
branches of government.

It is more in keeping with the co-equal nature of the three governmental branches to assign the same
weight to considerations that any of its representatives may have regarding aspiring nominees to the
judiciary. The representatives of the Senate and the House of Representatives act as such for one branch
and should not have any more quantitative influence as the other branches in the exercise of prerogatives
evenly bestowed upon the three. Sound reason and principle of equality among the three branches
support this conclusion. [Emphases and underscoring supplied]

The argument that a senator cannot represent a member of the House of Representatives in the JBC and
vice-versa is, thus, misplaced. In the JBC, any member of Congress, whether from the Senate or the
House of Representatives, is constitutionally empowered to represent the entire Congress. It may be a
constricted constitutional authority, but it is not an absurdity.

From this score stems the conclusion that the lone representative of Congress is entitled to one full vote.
This pronouncement effectively disallows the scheme of splitting the said vote into half (1/2), between two
representatives of Congress. Not only can this unsanctioned practice cause disorder in the voting process,
it is clearly against the essence of what the Constitution authorized. After all, basic and reasonable is the

76
rule that what cannot be legally done directly cannot be done indirectly. To permit or tolerate the splitting
of one vote into two or more is clearly a constitutional circumvention that cannot be countenanced by the
Court. Succinctly put, when the Constitution envisioned one member of Congress sitting in the JBC, it is
sensible to presume that this representation carries with him one full vote.

It is also an error for respondents to argue that the President, in effect, has more influence over the JBC
simply because all of the regular members of the JBC are his appointees. The principle of checks and
balances is still safeguarded because the appointment of all the regular members of the JBC is subject to a
stringent process of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, which is composed of members of
Congress.

Respondents’ contention that the current irregular composition of the JBC should be accepted, simply
because it was only questioned for the first time through the present action, deserves scant consideration.
Well-settled is the rule that acts done in violation of the Constitution no matter how frequent, usual or
notorious cannot develop or gain acceptance under the doctrine of estoppel or laches, because once an act
is considered as an infringement of the Constitution it is void from the very beginning and cannot be the
source of any power or authority.

It would not be amiss to point out, however, that as a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it
confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it
has not been passed at all. This rule, however, is not absolute. Under the doctrine of operative facts,
actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not nullified. This
is essential in the interest of fair play. To reiterate the doctrine enunciated in Planters Products, Inc. v.
Fertiphil Corporation:32

The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and
fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute
prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences which
cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The doctrine is
applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who have relied
on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a criminal case when a declaration of unconstitutionality would

77
put the accused in double jeopardy or would put in limbo the acts done by a municipality in reliance upon
a law creating it.33

Under the circumstances, the Court finds the exception applicable in this case and holds that
notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all its prior official
actions are nonetheless valid.

Considering that the Court is duty bound to protect the Constitution which was ratified by the direct action
of the Filipino people, it cannot correct what respondents perceive as a mistake in its mandate. Neither
can the Court, in the exercise of its power to interpret the spirit of the Constitution, read into the law
something that is contrary to its express provisions and justify the same as correcting a perceived
inadvertence. To do so would otherwise sanction the Court action of making amendment to the
Constitution through a judicial pronouncement.

In other words, the Court cannot supply the legislative omission. According to the rule of casus omissus "a
case omitted is to be held as intentionally omitted."34 "The principle proceeds from a reasonable certainty
that a particular person, object or thing has been omitted from a legislative enumeration."35 Pursuant to
this, "the Court cannot under its power of interpretation supply the omission even though the omission
may have resulted from inadvertence or because the case in question was not foreseen or
contemplated."36 "The Court cannot supply what it thinks the legislature would have supplied had its
attention been called to the omission, as that would be judicial legislation."37

Stated differently, the Court has no power to add another member by judicial construction.

The call for judicial activism fails to stir the sensibilities of the Court tasked to guard the Constitution
against usurpation. The Court remains steadfast in confining its powers in the sphere granted by the
Constitution itself. Judicial activism should never be allowed to become judicial exuberance.38 In cases like
this, no amount of practical logic or convenience can convince the Court to perform either an excision or
an insertion that will change the manifest intent of the Framers. To broaden the scope of congressional
representation in the JBC is tantamount to the inclusion of a subject matter which was not included in the
provision as enacted. True to its constitutional mandate, the Court cannot craft and tailor constitutional

78
provisions in order to accommodate all of situations no matter how ideal or reasonable the proposed
solution may sound. To the exercise of this intrusion, the Court declines.

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondents is hereby DENIED.

The suspension of the effects of the second paragraph of the dispositive portion of the July 17, 2012
Decision of the Court, which reads, "This disposition is immediately executory," is hereby LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 181359 August 5, 2013

SPOUSES CLEMENCIO C. SABITSANA, JR. and MA. ROSARIO M. SABITSANA, Petitioners,

vs.
JUANITO F. MUERTEGUI, represented by his Attorney-in-Fact DOMINGO A. MUERTEGUI,
JR., Respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

A lawyer may not, for his own personal interest and benefit, gamble on his client's word, believing it at
one time and disbelieving it the next. He owes his client his undivided loyalty.

Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 are the January 25, 2007 Decision2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) which denied the appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 79250, and its January 11, 2008
Resolution3 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.4

Factual Antecedents

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On September 2, 1981, Alberto Garcia (Garcia) executed an unnotarized Deed of Sale 5 in favor of
respondent Juanito Muertegui6 (Juanito) over a 7,500-square meter parcel of unregistered land (the lot)
located in Dalutan Island, Talahid, Almeira, Biliran, Leyte del Norte covered by Tax Declaration (TD) No.
1996 issued in 1985 in Garcia’s name.7

Juanito’s father Domingo Muertegui, Sr. (Domingo Sr.) and brother Domingo Jr. took actual possession of
the lot and planted thereon coconut and ipil-ipil trees. They also paid the real property taxes on the lot for
the years 1980 up to 1998.

On October 17, 1991, Garcia sold the lot to the Muertegui family lawyer, petitioner Atty. Clemencio C.
Sabitsana, Jr. (Atty. Sabitsana), through a notarized deed of absolute sale.8 The sale was registered with
the Register of Deeds on February 6, 1992.9 TD No. 1996 was cancelled and a new one, TD No.
5327,10 was issued in Atty. Sabitsana’s name. Although Domingo Jr. and Sr. paid the real estate taxes,
Atty. Sabitsana also paid real property taxes in 1992, 1993, and 1999. In 1996, he introduced concrete
improvements on the property, which shortly thereafter were destroyed by a typhoon.

When Domingo Sr. passed away, his heirs applied for registration and coverage of the lot under the Public
Land Act or Commonwealth Act No. 141. Atty. Sabitsana, in a letter11 dated August 24, 1998 addressed to
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources’ CENRO/PENRO office in Naval, Biliran, opposed
the application, claiming that he was the true owner of the lot. He asked that the application for
registration be held in abeyance until the issue of conflicting ownership has been resolved.

On April 11, 2000, Juanito, through his attorney-in-fact Domingo Jr., filed Civil Case No. B-109712 for
quieting of title and preliminary injunction, against herein petitioners Atty. Sabitsana and his wife,
Rosario, claiming that they bought the lot in bad faith and are exercising acts of possession and ownership
over the same, which acts thus constitute a cloud over his title. The Complaint13 prayed, among others,
that the Sabitsana Deed of Sale, the August 24, 1998 letter, and TD No. 5327 be declared null and void
and of no effect; that petitioners be ordered to respect and recognize Juanito’s title over the lot; and that
moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and litigation expenses be awarded to him.

In their Answer with Counterclaim,14 petitioners asserted mainly that the sale to Juanito is null and void
absent the marital consent of Garcia’s wife, Soledad Corto (Soledad); that they acquired the property in

80
good faith and for value; and that the Complaint is barred by prescription and laches. They likewise
insisted that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naval, Biliran did not have jurisdiction over the case, which
involved title to or interest in a parcel of land the assessed value of which is merely ₱1,230.00.

The evidence and testimonies of the respondent’s witnesses during trial reveal that petitioner Atty.
Sabitsana was the Muertegui family’s lawyer at the time Garcia sold the lot to Juanito, and that as such,
he was consulted by the family before the sale was executed; that after the sale to Juanito, Domingo Sr.
entered into actual, public, adverse and continuous possession of the lot, and planted the same to coconut
and ipil-ipil; and that after Domingo Sr.’s death, his wife Caseldita, succeeded him in the possession and
exercise of rights over the lot.

On the other hand, Atty. Sabitsana testified that before purchasing the lot, he was told by a member of
the Muertegui family, Carmen Muertegui Davies (Carmen), that the Muertegui family had bought the lot,
but she could not show the document of sale; that he then conducted an investigation with the offices of
the municipal and provincial assessors; that he failed to find any document, record, or other proof of the
sale by Garcia to Juanito, and instead discovered that the lot was still in the name of Garcia; that given
the foregoing revelations, he concluded that the Muerteguis were merely bluffing, and that they probably
did not want him to buy the property because they were interested in buying it for themselves considering
that it was adjacent to a lot which they owned; that he then proceeded to purchase the lot from Garcia;
that after purchasing the lot, he wrote Caseldita in October 1991 to inform her of the sale; that he then
took possession of the lot and gathered ipil-ipil for firewood and harvested coconuts and calamansi from
the lot; and that he constructed a rip-rap on the property sometime in 1996 and 1997.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On October 28, 2002, the trial court issued its Decision15 which decrees as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, this Court finds in favor of the plaintiff and against
the defendants, hereby declaring the Deed of Sale dated 2 September 1981 as valid and preferred while
the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 17 October 1991 and Tax Declaration No. 5327 in the name of Atty.
Clemencio C. Sabitsana, Jr. are VOID and of no legal effect.

81
The Provincial Assessor and the Municipal Assessor of Naval are directed to cancel Tax Declaration No.
5327 as void and done in bad faith.

Further, Atty. Clemencio C. Sabitsana, Jr. is ordered to pay plaintiff Juanito Muertigui, represented by his
attorney-in-fact Domingo Muertigui, Jr. the amounts of:

a) ₱30,000.00 as attorney’s fees;

b) ₱10,000.00 as litigation expenses; and

c) Costs.

SO ORDERED.16

The trial court held that petitioners are not buyers in good faith. Petitioner Atty. Sabitsana was the
Muertegui family’s lawyer, and was informed beforehand by Carmen that her family had purchased the
lot; thus, he knew of the sale to Juanito. After conducting an investigation, he found out that the sale was
not registered. With this information in mind, Atty. Sabitsana went on to purchase the same lot and raced
to register the sale ahead of the Muerteguis, expecting that his purchase and prior registration would
prevail over that of his clients, the Muerteguis. Applying Article 1544 of the Civil Code,17 the trial court
declared that even though petitioners were first to register their sale, the same was not done in good
faith. And because petitioners’ registration was not in good faith, preference should be given to the sale in
favor of Juanito, as he was the first to take possession of the lot in good faith, and the sale to petitioners
must be declared null and void for it casts a cloud upon the Muertegui title.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration18 but the trial court denied19 the same.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Petitioners appealed to the CA20 asserting that the sale to Juanito was null and void for lack of marital
consent; that the sale to them is valid; that the lower court erred in applying Article 1544 of the Civil
Code; that the Complaint should have been barred by prescription, laches and estoppel; that respondent

82
had no cause of action; that respondent was not entitled to an award of attorney’s fees and litigation
expenses; and that they should be the ones awarded attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.

The CA, through its questioned January 25, 2007 Decision,21 denied the appeal and affirmed the trial
court’s Decision in toto. It held that even though the lot admittedly was conjugal property, the absence of
Soledad’s signature and consent to the deed did not render the sale to Juanito absolutely null and void,
but merely voidable. Since Garcia and his wife were married prior to the effectivity of the Family Code,
Article 173 of the Civil Code22 should apply; and under the said provision, the disposition of conjugal
property without the wife’s consent is not void, but merely voidable. In the absence of a decree annulling
the deed of sale in favor of Juanito, the same remains valid.

The CA added that the fact that the Deed of Sale in favor of Juanito was not notarized could not affect its
validity. As against the notarized deed of sale in favor of petitioners, the CA held that the sale in favor of
Juanito still prevails. Applying Article 1544 of the Civil Code, the CA said that the determining factor is
petitioners’ good faith, or the lack of it. It held that even though petitioners were first to register the sale
in their favor, they did not do so in good faith, for they already knew beforehand of Garcia’s prior sale to
Juanito. By virtue of Atty. Sabitsana’s professional and confidential relationship with the Muertegui family,
petitioners came to know about the prior sale to the Muerteguis and the latter’s possession of the lot, and
yet they pushed through with the second sale. Far from acting in good faith, petitioner Atty. Sabitsana
used his legal knowledge to take advantage of his clients by registering his purchase ahead of them.

Finally, the CA declared that Juanito, as the rightful owner of the lot, possessed the requisite cause of
action to institute the suit for quieting of title and obtain judgment in his favor, and is entitled as well to
an award for attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, which the trial court correctly held to be just and
equitable under the circumstances.

The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DENIED and the Decision dated October 28, 2002
of the Regional Trial Court, 8th Judicial Region, Branch 16, Naval, Biliran, is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs
against defendants-appellants.

83
SO ORDERED.23

Issues

Petitioners now raise the following issues for resolution:

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DID NOT
HAVE JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT THE ASSESSED VALUE OF THE
SUBJECT LAND WAS ONLY ₱1,230.00 (AND STATED MARKET VALUE OF ONLY ₱3,450.00).

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING ART. 1544 OF THE CIVIL CODE INSTEAD OF THE
PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE (P.D. NO. 1529) CONSIDERING THAT THE SUBJECT LAND WAS
UNREGISTERED.

III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE COMPLAINT WAS ALREADY
BARRED [BY] LACHES AND THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
ORDERING THE PETITIONERS TO PAY ATTORNEY’S FEES AND LITIGATION EXPENSES TO THE
RESPONDENT.24

Petitioners’ Arguments

Petitioners assert that the RTC of Naval, Biliran did not have jurisdiction over the case. They argue that
since the assessed value of the lot was a mere ₱1,230.00, jurisdiction over the case lies with the first level
courts, pursuant to Republic Act No. 7691,25 which expanded their exclusive original jurisdiction to include
"all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the
assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000.00)
or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos
(₱50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and
costs."26 Petitioners thus conclude that the Decision in Civil Case No. B-1097 is null and void for lack of
jurisdiction.

84
Petitioners next insist that the lot, being unregistered land, is beyond the coverage of Article 1544 of the
Civil Code, and instead, the provisions of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529 should apply. This being the
case, the Deed of Sale in favor of Juanito is valid only as between him and the seller Garcia, pursuant to
Section 113 of PD 1529;27 it cannot affect petitioners who are not parties thereto.

On the issue of estoppel, laches and prescription, petitioners insist that from the time they informed the
Muerteguis in writing about their purchase of the lot, or in October 1991, the latter did not notify them of
their prior purchase of the lot, nor did respondent interpose any objection to the sale in their favor. It was
only in 1998 that Domingo Jr. showed to petitioners the unnotarized deed of sale. According to
petitioners, this seven-year period of silence and inaction on the Muerteguis’ part should be taken against
them and construed as neglect on their part to assert their rights for an unreasonable length of time. As
such, their action to quiet title should be deemed barred by laches and estoppel.

Lastly, petitioners take exception to the award of attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, claiming that
since there was no bad faith on their part, such award may not be considered just and equitable under the
circumstances. Still, an award of attorney’s fees should remain the exception rather than the rule; and in
awarding the same, there must have been an express finding of facts and law justifying such award, a
requirement that is absent in this case.

Petitioners thus pray for the reversal of the questioned CA Decision and Resolution; the dismissal of the
Complaint in Civil Case No. B-1097; the deletion of the award of attorney’s fees and litigation expenses in
respondent’s favor; and a declaration that they are the true and rightful owners of the lot.

Respondent’s Arguments

Respondent, on the other hand, counters that a suit for quieting of title is one whose subject matter is
incapable of pecuniary estimation, and thus falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC. He likewise insists that
Article 1544 applies to the case because there is a clear case of double sale of the same property to
different buyers, and the bottom line thereof lies in petitioners’ lack of good faith in entering into the
subsequent sale. On the issue of laches/estoppel, respondent echoes the CA’s view that he was persistent
in the exercise of his rights over the lot, having previously filed a complaint for recovery of the lot, which
unfortunately was dismissed based on technicality.

85
On the issue of attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, respondent finds refuge in Article 2208 of the Civil
Code,28 citing three instances which fortify the award in his favor – petitioners’ acts compelled him to
litigate and incur expenses to protect his interests; their gross and evident bad faith in refusing to
recognize his ownership and possession over the lot; and the justness and equitableness of his case.

Our Ruling

The Petition must be denied.

The Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the suit for quieting of title.

On the question of jurisdiction, it is clear under the Rules that an action for quieting of title may be
instituted in the RTCs, regardless of the assessed value of the real property in dispute. Under Rule 63 of
the Rules of Court,29 an action to quiet title to real property or remove clouds therefrom may be brought
in the appropriate RTC.

It must be remembered that the suit for quieting of title was prompted by petitioners’ August 24, 1998
letter-opposition to respondent’s application for registration. Thus, in order to prevent30 a cloud from
being cast upon his application for a title, respondent filed Civil Case No. B-1097 to obtain a declaration of
his rights. In this sense, the action is one for declaratory relief, which properly falls within the jurisdiction
of the RTC pursuant to Rule 63 of the Rules.

Article 1544 of the Civil Code does not apply to sales involving unregistered land.

Both the trial court and the CA are, however, wrong in applying Article 1544 of the Civil Code. Both courts
seem to have forgotten that the provision does not apply to sales involving unregistered land. Suffice it to
state that the issue of the buyer’s good or bad faith is relevant only where the subject of the sale is
registered land, and the purchaser is buying the same from the registered owner whose title to the land is
clean. In such case, the purchaser who relies on the clean title of the registered owner is protected if he is
a purchaser in good faith for value.31

Act No. 3344 applies to sale of unregistered lands.

86
What applies in this case is Act No. 3344,32 as amended, which provides for the system of recording of
transactions over unregistered real estate. Act No. 3344 expressly declares that any registration made
shall be without prejudice to a third party with a better right. The question to be resolved therefore is:
who between petitioners and respondent has a better right to the disputed lot?

Respondent has a better right to the lot.

The sale to respondent Juanito was executed on September 2, 1981 via an unnotarized deed of sale, while
the sale to petitioners was made via a notarized document only on October 17, 1991, or ten years
thereafter. Thus, Juanito who was the first buyer has a better right to the lot, while the subsequent sale to
petitioners is null and void, because when it was made, the seller Garcia was no longer the owner of the
lot. Nemo dat quod non habet.

The fact that the sale to Juanito was not notarized does not alter anything, since the sale between him
and Garcia remains valid nonetheless. Notarization, or the requirement of a public document under the
Civil Code,33 is only for convenience, and not for validity or enforceability.34 And because it remained valid
as between Juanito and Garcia, the latter no longer had the right to sell the lot to petitioners, for his
ownership thereof had ceased.

Nor can petitioners’ registration of their purchase have any effect on Juanito’s rights. The mere
registration of a sale in one’s favor does not give him any right over the land if the vendor was no longer
the owner of the land, having previously sold the same to another even if the earlier sale was
unrecorded.35 Neither could it validate the purchase thereof by petitioners, which is null and void.
Registration does not vest title; it is merely the evidence of such title. Our land registration laws do not
give the holder any better title than what he actually has.36

Specifically, we held in Radiowealth Finance Co. v. Palileo37 that:

Under Act No. 3344, registration of instruments affecting unregistered lands is ‘without prejudice to a third
party with a better right.’ The aforequoted phrase has been held by this Court to mean that the mere
registration of a sale in one’s favor does not give him any right over the land if the vendor was not

87
anymore the owner of the land having previously sold the same to somebody else even if the earlier sale
was unrecorded.

Petitioners’ defense of prescription, laches and estoppel are unavailing since their claim is based on a null
and void deed of sale. The fact that the Muerteguis failed to interpose any objection to the sale in
petitioners’ favor does not change anything, nor could it give rise to a right in their favor; their purchase
remains void and ineffective as far as the Muerteguis are concerned.

The award of attorney’s fees and litigation expenses is proper because of petitioners’ bad faith.

Petitioners’ actual and prior knowledge of the first sale to Juanito makes them purchasers in bad faith. It
also appears that petitioner Atty. Sabitsana was remiss in his duties as counsel to the Muertegui family.
Instead of advising the Muerteguis to register their purchase as soon as possible to forestall any legal
complications that accompany unregistered sales of real property, he did exactly the opposite: taking
advantage of the situation and the information he gathered from his inquiries and investigation, he bought
the very same lot and immediately caused the registration thereof ahead of his clients, thinking that his
purchase and prior registration would prevail. The Court cannot tolerate this mercenary attitude. Instead
of protecting his client’s interest, Atty. Sabitsana practically preyed on him.

Petitioner Atty. Sabitsana took advantage of confidential information disclosed to him by his client, using
the same to defeat him and beat him to the draw, so to speak. He rushed the sale and registration thereof
ahead of his client. He may not be afforded the excuse that he nonetheless proceeded to buy the lot
because he believed or assumed that the Muerteguis were simply bluffing when Carmen told him that they
had already bought the same; this is too convenient an excuse to be believed. As the Muertegui family
lawyer, he had no right to take a position, using information disclosed to him in confidence by his client,
that would place him in possible conflict with his duty. He may not, for his own personal interest and
benefit, gamble on his client’s word, believing it at one time and disbelieving it the next. He owed the
Muerteguis his undivided loyalty. He had the duty to protect the client, at all hazards and costs even to
himself.38

88
Petitioner Atty. Sabitsana is enjoined to "look at any representation situation from the point of view that
there are possible conflicts, and further to think in terms of impaired loyalty, that is, to evaluate if his
representation in any way will impair his loyalty to a client."39

Moreover, as the Muertegui family’s lawyer, Atty. Sabitsana was under obligation to safeguard his client's
property, and not jeopardize it. Such is his duty as an attorney, and pursuant to his general agency.40

Even granting that Atty. Sabitsana has ceased to act as the Muertegui family's lawyer, he still owed them
his loyalty.1âwphi1 The termination of attorney-client relation provides no justification for a lawyer to
represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client on a matter involving
confidential information which the lawyer acquired when he was counsel. The client's confidence once
reposed should not be divested by mere expiration of professional employment.41 This is underscored by
the fact that Atty. Sabitsana obtained information from Carmen which he used to his advantage and to the
detriment of his client.

from the foregoing disquisition, it can be seen that petitioners are guilty of bad faith in pursuing the sale
of the lot despite being apprised of the prior sale in respondent's favor. Moreover, petitioner Atty.
Sabitsana has exhibited a lack of loyalty toward his clients, the Muerteguis, and by his acts, jeopardized
their interests instead of protecting them. Over and above the trial court's and the CA's findings, this
provides further justification for the award of attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs in favor of the
respondent.

Thus said, judgment must be rendered in favor of respondent to prevent the petitioners' void sale from
casting a cloud upon his valid title.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The January 25, 2007 Decision and the
January 11, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 79250 are AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

89
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 209331, August 24, 2015

DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, REPRESENTED BY HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA IN HIS OFFICIAL

CAPACITY AS SECRETARY, AND THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, REPRESENTED BY HON. ROZZANO
RUFINO B. BIAZON, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS COMMISSIONER OF
CUSTOMS, Petitioners, v. HON. MARINO M. DELA CRUZ, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE
JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, MANILA, HON. FELICITAS O. LARON-CACANINDIN, IN HER
CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, MANILA, BRANCH 17, RONNIE C.
SILVESTRE, EDWARD P. DELA CUESTA, ROGEL C. GATCHALIAN, IMELDA D.CRUZ, LILIBETH S.
SANDAG, RAYMOND P. VENTURA, MA. LIZA S. TORRES, ARNEL C. ALCARAZ, MA. LOURDES V.
MANGAOANG, FRANCIS AGUSTIN Y. ERPE, CARLOS T. SO, MARIETTA D. ZAMORANOS,
CARMELITA M. TALUSAN,1] AREFILES H. CARREON,2] AND ROMALINO G. VALDEZ, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Petitioners assail the Order dated 4 October 20133 issued by Judge Felicitas O. Laron-Cacanindin (Judge
Laron-Cacanindin) of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 17 (RTC Branch 17), in Civil Case No. 13-
130820. The Order extended the 72-hour Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) issued by Executive Judge
Marino M. Dela Cruz, Jr. (Executive Judge Dela Cruz) in favor of respondents Silvestre, et al.4 to 20 days
or until 21 October 2013 without need of posting bond.

90
 The Antecedent Facts

The case stemmed from the issuance of Executive Order No. 140 (EO 140) on 2 September 2013, which
created the Customs Policy Research Office (CPRO) in the Department of Finance (DOF). EO 140 states
that the CPRO "shall be responsible for reviewing the customs administration policies, rules and
procedures, and thereafter providing sound recommendations for the improvement of the same." Section
3 of EO 140 provides that "CPRO shall be composed of its organic personnel, as approved by the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) upon recommendation of the DOF Secretary, augmented
and reinforced by DOF and BOC personnel as well as those detailed or seconded from other agencies,
whether attached to the DOF or not. x x x." Section 9 of EO 140 states that it shall "take effect
immediately upon publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation." EO 140 was published
in Manila Bulletin and Philippine Star on 17 September 2013.

On the same day of the publication of EO 140, Bureau of Customs (BOC) Commissioner Rozzano Rufino B.
Biazon (Commissioner Biazon) issued Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013 (CPO 189-2013) detailing
27 BOC personnel holding the positions of Collector of Customs V and VI, including respondents in this
case, to CPRO "effective immediately and valid until sooner revoked." CPO 189-2013 was approved by
DOF Secretary Cesar V. Purisima (Secretary Purisima).

On 30 September 2013, respondents filed an action for Declaratory Relief with Application for Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. On
1 October 2013, Executive Judge Dela Cruz issued a TRO for a period of 72 hours enjoining petitioners or
any person acting for and in their behalf from implementing CPO 189-2013. Thereafter, the case was
raffled to the sala of Judge Laron-Cacanindin.

In the assailed Order of 4 October 2013, Judge Laron-Cacanindin extended Executive Judge Dela Cruz's
72-hour TRO for 20 days or until 21 October 2013. She then set the hearing for the issuance of a
preliminary injunction on 18 October 2013.

On 21 October 2013, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before this Court, with prayer
for the issuance of a TRO or a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. Petitioners alleged that the case
involves personnel action affecting public officers which is under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Civil

91
Service Commission (CSC). Petitioners also alleged that respondents failed to exhaust all administrative
remedies available to them before filing the petition before the RTC. Petitioners also alleged that CPO 189-
2013 is an internal personnel order with application that is limited to and only within BOC and as such, it
cannot be the subject of an action for declaratory relief.

In their Comment, respondents alleged that the case involves the validity and constitutionality of CPO
189-2013, and thus, it is beyond the jurisdiction of the CSC. Respondents further alleged that EO 140
violated Article 2 of the Civil Code when it became effective immediately after its publication.

In their Reply, petitioners alleged that respondents only assailed the validity of EO 140 to justify their
filing of an action for declaratory relief. As regards its effectivity, petitioners alleged that EO 140 states
that it shall "take effect immediately upon publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation."

In an Order dated 21 October 2013, Judge Laron-Cacanindin denied respondents' application for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.

In an Order dated 5 November 2013, Judge Laron-Cacanindin inhibited herself from further hearing the
case.

The Issues

The issues for determination by this Court are the following:cralawlawlibrary

1. Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the action for declaratory relief filed by respondents;

2. Whether respondents failed to exhaust administrative remedies in filing the action before the RTC;

3. Whether EO 140 violated Article 2 of the Civil Code when it became effective immediately after its
publication; and

4. Whether CPO 189-2013 was validly issued.

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 The Ruling of this Court

Jurisdiction over the Petition

The CSC has jurisdiction over all employees of government branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and
agencies, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.5 The CSC is the
sole arbiter of controversies relating to the civil service.6 The rule is that disciplinary cases and cases
involving personnel actions, including "appointment through certification, promotion, transfer,
reinstatement, reemployment, detail, reassignment, demotion, and separation," are within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the CSC.7 This rule is embodied in Section 1, Rule V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing
Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws (Omnibus Rules) which
states:cralawlawlibrary
SECTION 1. x x x.

As used in these Rules, any action denoting movement or progress of personnel in the civil service shall be
known as personnel action. Such action shall include promotion, transfer, reinstatement, reemployment,
detail, secondment, reassignment, demotion and separation, x x x.
Under Section 8, Rule VII of the Omnibus Rules, "[a] detail is the movement of an employee from one
department or agency which is temporary in nature, which does not involve a reduction in rank, status or
salary and does not require the issuance of another appointment." CPO 189-2013 is an order detailing
personnel from the BOC to CPRO under the DOF.

A reading of the petition filed before the RTC shows that respondents were questioning their mass detail
and reassignment to CPRO. According to respondents, their detail was carried out in bad faith and was
meant to remove them from their permanent positions in the BOC. The action appears to be a personnel
action under the jurisdiction of the CSC.

However, the petition went beyond questioning the detail of respondents. Respondents further assailed
the validity and constitutionality of CPO 189-2013. Respondents alleged that CPO 189-2013 was issued
even before EC) 140, pursuant to which CPO 189-2013 was issued, became effective. Respondents alleged
that CPO 189-2013 was issued to beat the deadline of the Commission on Elections' ban on personnel

93
movement from 28 September 2013 to 20 October 2013 due to the scheduled barangay elections. When
respondents raised the issue of validity and constitutionality of CPO 189-2013, the issue took the case
beyond the scope of the CSC's jurisdiction because the matter is no longer limited to personnel action.
Thus, the RTC did not abuse its discretion in taking cognizance of the action.

Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

Petitioners allege that respondents failed to exhaust their administrative remedies before filing the case
with the RTC.

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies allows administrative agencies to carry out their
functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective
competence.8 The doctrine entails lesser expenses and provides for the speedier resolution of
controversies.9 Therefore, direct recourse to the trial court, when administrative remedies are available, is
a ground for dismissal of the action.

The doctrine, however, is not without exceptions. Among the exceptions are: (1) where there is estoppel
on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (2) where the challenged administrative act is patently
illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (3) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will
irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (4) where the amount involved is relatively so small as to make
the rule impractical and oppressive; (5) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately
have to be decided by the courts of justice; (6) where judicial intervention is urgent; (7) where the
application of the doctrine may cause great and irreparable damage; (8) where the controverted acts
violate due process; (9) where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies had been rendered
moot; (10) where there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (11) where strong public interest
is involved; and (12) in quo warranto proceedings.10cralawrednad

In this case, respondents allege that CPO 189-2013 is contrary to law and unconstitutional. Respondents
assail CPO 189-2013 as patently illegal, arbitrary, and oppressive. This case clearly falls within the
exceptions where exhaustion of administrative remedies need not be resorted to by respondents.

Effectivity of EO 140

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Respondents allege that EO 140 took effect only on 2 October 2013, fifteen days after its publication in
two newspapers of general circulation. Hence, respondents argue that when CPO 189-2013 was issued,
EO 140 was not yet effective.

Article 2 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, as amended by Executive Order No. 200,11 is clear on this
issue. It states:cralawlawlibrary
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication either in the
Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided.
The proviso "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to an effectivity date other than after fifteen days
following the completion of the law's publication.12 Thus, it is within the discretion of the legislature, or the
Executive Department in this case, whether to shorten or extend the fifteen-day period13 as long as there
is compliance with the requirement of publication.

Here, Section 9 of EO 140 provides that the "order shall take effect immediately upon publication in two
(2) newspapers of general circulation." EO 140 was published in Manila Bulletin and Philippine Star on 17
September 2013. As such, EO 140 took effect on 17 September 2013.

In addition, the Court already ruled that "[interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature,
that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be
published."14 EO 140 is an internal regulation that affects primarily the personnel of the DOF and the BOC.
It remains valid even without publication.

Validity of CPO 189-2013

Respondents assail the validity of CPO 189-2013. Respondents allege that under EO 140, CPRO shall be
composed of its organic personnel, as approved by the DBM upon recommendation of the DOF Secretary.
The organic personnel was supposed to be augmented and reinforced by DOF and BOC personnel.
Respondents allege that they were detailed to CPRO even before its organic personnel could be
constituted.

We rule for respondents.

95
Section 3 of EO 140 provides:cralawlawlibrary
SECTION 3. Personnel and Staffing Complement. The CPRO shall be composed of its organic personnel, as
approved by the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) upon recommendation of the DOF
Secretary, augmented and reinforced by DOF and BOC personnel as well as those detailed or seconded
from other agencies, whether attached to the DOF or not. In addition, the CPRO, upon approval of the
DOF Secretary, may hire or engage technical consultants to provide necessary support in the performance
of its mandate.
Respondents were supposed to augment and reinforce the existing organic personnel of CPRO. Yet, at the
time of respondents' detail, CPRO had not been formally organized. CPRO had no organic personnel that
had been approved by the DBM upon recommendation of the DOF Secretary. The DOF Secretary had yet
to promulgate rules and regulations and to prescribe procedures and processes to enable CPRO to
effectively exercise its powers and duties, as required by Section 4 of EO 140.

In addition, under Section 8, Rule VII of the Omnibus Rules, a detail is temporary in nature. In fact, detail
of employees is only allowed for a maximum, period for those occupying professional, technical, and
scientific positions.15 Section 8, Rule VII of the Omnibus Rules provides:cralawlawlibrary
SEC. 8. A detail is the movement of an employee from one department or agency to another which is
temporary in nature, which does not involve a reduction in rank, status or salary and does not require the
issuance of another appointment.

The employee detailed receives his salary only from his mother unit/agency.

Detail shall be allowed only for a maximum period in the case of employees occupying professional,
technical and scientific position. If the employee believes that there is no justification for the detail, he
may appeal his case to the Commission. Pending appeal, the decision to detail the employee shall be
executory unless otherwise ordered by the Commission.
Section 2 of CSC Resolution No. 021181, dated 13 September 2002,16 clarified the maximum period of
detail of employees. It states:cralawlawlibrary
Section 2. Duration of the detail. The detail shall be allowed only for a maximum period of one year.
Details beyond one year may be allowed provided it is with the consent of the detailed employee. The
extension or renewal of the period of the detail shall be within the authority of the mother agency.

96
If the employee believes that there is no justification for the detail, he/she may appeal his/her case to the
proper Civil Service Commission Regional Office. Pending appeal, the detail shall be executory unless
otherwise ordered by said regional office. Decision of said regional office may be further appealed to the
Commission en banc.
In this case, CPO 189-2013 did not provide for the period of respondents' detail. It only provided that the
order "shall be effective immediately and valid until sooner revoked," making the detail of respondents
indefinite. There was nothing to show that respondents were occupying professional, technical, and
scientific positions that would have allowed their detail for the maximum period provided under Section 8,
Rule VII of the Omnibus Rules. Further, CSC Resolution No. 021181 did not distinguish between an
ordinary employee and an employee occupying professional, technical, and scientific position. Hence, it
should have been specified that the maximum period of respondents' detail should not exceed one year.

Petitioners assert, and we quote:cralawlawlibrary

There is a cancer of corruption we must extinguish. The drive to rid the government of graft and
corruption deserves the support of everyone.

The principle of good governance cannot, should not, be trivialized nor oversimplified by tenuous
whimpering and individualism intended to detract from the urgent need to cleanse the Republic from a
mainstream culture of unabated corruption, perpetuated with impunity and sense of self-entitlement. The
issue at hand is not about who, but what; it is not about individual loss, but about national gain. Whether
from the birth pains of reform, this nation can gain a foothold, nay, a stride into restoring this nation into
its prideful place from the clutches of a "kleptocratic mafia" that had gained a strangehold into one of the
nation's primary sources of revenue.17
Indeed, we commend and support the reforms being undertaken in the different agencies of the
government. However, we cannot allow department heads to take shortcuts that will undermine and
disregard the basic procedures of the law.

WHEREFORE, we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. We sustain the validity of Executive Order No. 140.
We rule that the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the action for declaratory relief filed by
respondents. We further rule that Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013 was not validly issued.

97
SO ORDERED

A.M. No. RTJ-15-2407

EDGAR R. ERICE, Complainant

vs.
PRESIDING JUDGE DIONISIO C. SISON, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 125, CALOOCAN
CITY, Respondent

DECISION

CAGUIOA, J.:

This is an administrative matter1 filed by Edgar R. Erice (Erice) against the now-retired Judge Dionisio C.
Sison (Judge Sison) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 125, Caloocan City, for violation of Section
8, paragraphs 3, 4 and 9 of A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC,2 in particular: (i) gross misconduct constituting
violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct, (ii) knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or order as
determined by a competent court in an appropriate proceeding, and (iii) gross ignorance of the law or
procedure.3

BACKGROUND

The facts leading to the filing of the complaint are as follows:

Complainant Erice, then Vice Mayor of Caloocan City, filed a complaint against then Mayor Enrico R.
Echiverri, City Treasurer Evelina Garma, Budget Officer Jesusa Garcia and City Accountant Edna Centeno
(Echiverri, et al.) before the Office of the Ombudsman, for alleged violation of the Government Service
Insurance System Act.4 Acting on the complaint, the Ombudsman issued an Order5 of Preventive
Suspension (Order of Suspension) on July 18, 2011 against Echiverri, et al., to last until the administrative
adjudication is completed but not to exceed six (6) months.6

98
Aggrieved by the Order of Suspension, Echiverri, et al. elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA).
While Echiverri, et al. were able to obtain a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a writ of preliminary
injunction from the CA Special 14th Division, nevertheless, in its Decision7 dated January 2, 2012, the
CA affirmed the Order of Suspension of the Ombudsman and lifted and set aside the TRO. The decretal
portion of the CA Decision of January 2, 2012 provides:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by this Court is
hereby LIFTED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the assailed Order dated July 18, 2011 issued by the Office
of the Ombudsman in OMB-C-A-11-0401-G is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.8

A week later, or on January 9, 2012, Echiverri, et al. filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for
TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction9 with the RTC of Caloocan City, which was docketed as Special
Civil Action No. C-1060 (2012)10 Named as Respondents in the Petition/or Declaratory Relief were Erice
(Complainant in the present administrative matter) and the Department of Interior and Local Government
(DILG). Echiverri, et al. prayed that the RTC "make a definite judicial declaration on the rights and
obligations of the parties asserting adverse legal interests with respect to the implementation of [their]
suspension."11

On even date, RTC Executive Judge Eleanor R. Kwong issued a 72- hour ex-parte Order to enjoin the DILG
and Erice from implementing the Order of Suspension. Subsequently, the case was raffled and assigned to
Judge Lorenza R. Bordios.12

In the summary hearing held on January 10, 2012, Erice and the DILG questioned the jurisdiction of the
RTC to hear the matter, considering that the object of the Petition for Declaratory Relief were the
CA Decision and the Order of Suspension of the Ombudsman. They also raised the matter of forum
shopping, with Erice and the DILG pointing out that Echiverri, et al. had a pending Motion for
Reconsideration13 filed with the CA and a Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Implementation of the Order of
Preventive Suspension14 with the Office of the Ombudsman.15

99
However, Judge Bordios inhibited herself from proceeding with the case on January 11, 2012. The case
was subsequently re-raffled to herein Respondent Judge Sison.16

On the same day, January 11, 2012, with the case now pending before Judge Sison, Erice and the DILG
reiterated their Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Dissolve. That afternoon, Judge Sison noted that the 72-
hour TRO of the Order of Suspension would be expiring the next day, on January 12, 2012, and that the
parties ought to finish with the presentation of evidence before noon of January 12, 2012. Counsel for the
DILG informed Judge Sison that the OSG was not informed that the summary hearing would proceed at
2:00 p.m. of January 11, 2012 before Branch 125. Nevertheless, Judge Sison proceeded with the hearing
and allowed Echiverri, et al. to present their evidence until 5:00 p.m. that day.17

The next day, at 8:00 a.m., the summary hearing continued. The OSG invoked its right to cross-examine
the witnesses earlier presented by Echiverri, et al. but Judge Sison denied the same, allegedly without
consulting the records from Branch 126 that would indicate that the OSG had made reservations to this
effect on January 10, 2012. At 9:15 a.m., Judge Sison issued an Order18 extending the TRO to 20 days,
inclusive of the 72-hour TRO earlier granted by Judge Kwong.19

On the day scheduled for the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss, January 17, 2012, Judge Sison stated that
he would hear evidence in support of the application for a writ of preliminary injunction. This compelled
Erice to file an Urgent Motion to lnhibit.20 Without ruling on the Motion to Inhibit, Judge Sison issued
the Order21 granting the writ of preliminary injunction.22

For his part, in refuting the charges against him, Judge Sison denied any allegations of the violation of the
right to due process of Erice and the DILG in allowing the summary hearing to proceed and Echiverri, et
al. to present evidence even though the OSG was not informed of said hearing.23 Judge Sison submitted
that:

1. There is no basis for the claim of bias and partiality because the reason for the extension of the 72-hour
TRO to a 20-day TRO was to accord Echiverri, et al. due process in allowing them to file their written
comment and to argue against the Motion to Dissolve.24

100
2. There was no "deplorable haste" in issuing the TRO and writ of preliminary injunction because "of the
limited time provided by the Rules of Court," in particular, Rule 58, Section 5; and that Erice' s counsel,
"knowing this time constraint x x x should have made himself always ready to go to trial and to present
his testimonial and documentary evidences (sic)."25

3. While admitting that the DILG's counsel appeared before him and that he denied the OSG's claim of the
right to cross-examine, Judge Sison claims that Erice failed to produce evidence that he made such rulings
and therefore "should not be believed."26

The Office of the Court

Administrator (OCA) Report dated
November 4, 2014

In its Report27 dated November 4, 2014, the OCA recommended that:

x x x [R]espondent Judge be found GUILTY of Gross Ignorance of the Law and FINED in the amount
equivalent to his one (1) month salary with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be
dealt with more severely.28

The basis for the OCA's recommendation are as follows:

First, insofar as the alleged haste is concerned, indeed, this Court had ruled in Leviste v. Alameda29 that
"the pace in resolving incidents of the case is not per se an indication of bias."30 Nevertheless, Judge
Sison's act of issuing a TRO and writ of preliminary injunction against Erice and the DILG to enjoin the
latter from enforcing the Ombudsman's Order of Suspension constitutes a violation of Section 14 of
Republic Act No. (RA) 6770,31 which provides:

SEC. 14. Restrictions. - No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay an investigation being
conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a prima facie evidence that the subject
matter of the investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.

101
No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the
Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law.

Second, in a similar case, Ogka Benito v. Balindong,32 therein Respondent Judge Balindong issued a 72-
hour TRO and extended the same for 20 days, against the enforcement of a DILG Department Order
implementing a decision to suspend an official for nine months. This Court found that Judge Balindong's
act constituted gross ignorance of the law for violating Section 14 of RA 6770. Judge Balindong was fined
₱30,000.00.33

Third, the OCA observed that although denominated as a Petition for Declaratory Relief, it was clear that
Echiverri, et al. merely sought the injunction to prevent the implementation of the Ombudsman's Order of
Suspension. In this regard, it is the CA that has appellate jurisdiction over the administrative cases
resolved by the Ombudsman. Thus, Judge Sison cannot relax the rules, take cognizance of the case, and
issue a TRO and writ of injunction which are beyond his authority.34

The OCA noted that this is Judge Sison's second offense. In A.M. No. RTJ-07-2050, he was found guilty of
Gross Ignorance of the Law and was fined ₱l0,000.00. Considering that this is Judge Sison's second
offense, the penalty of suspension should have been imposed on him; however, since he was due for
compulsory retirement on December 9, 2014, the OCA recommended that in lieu of suspension, Judge
Sison should be meted a penalty of fine equivalent to one (1) month's salary.35

This Court's Resolutions

In a Resolution dated February 23, 2015, this Court noted the OCA Report dated November 4, 2014
recommending that Judge Sison be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and be fined an amount
equivalent to one (1) month's salary, with a warning that repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt
with more severely.36

Subsequently, in a Resolution dated August 5, 2015, this Court, acting on Judge Sison's request for the
payment of his terminal leave, resolved the same in his favor, and released the terminal leave benefits
after retaining the amount equivalent to his two (2) months' salary, to answer for whatever penalty the
Court may impose against him in his pending administrative cases.37

102
 DISCUSSION

The Court agrees with the findings of the OCA, with a modification on the penalty imposed on Judge
Sison.1awp++i1

Gross ignorance of the law is a serious charge under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court as amended
by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC. It requires the judge to perform his/her duty to be acquainted with the basic
legal command of law and rules.38 Consequently, a judge becomes liable for gross ignorance of the law
when there is a patent disregard for well-known rules so as to produce an inference of bad faith,
dishonesty and corruption.39

Against these parameters, Judge Sison failed to perform his basic duty to be acquainted with the
fundamentals of the very law he was tasked to uphold, and this conclusion remains unchanged
notwithstanding the Court's supervening Decision in Carpio Morales v. Court of Appeals.40 In Carpio
Morales, the Court: (1) declared as unconstitutional Section 14(2)41 of RA 6770, and (2) declared as
ineffective the policy in Section 14(1)42 of RA 6770 against the issuance of a provisional injunctive writ by
courts other than the Supreme Court to enjoin an investigation conducted by the Office of the
Ombudsman until the Court adopts the same as part of the rules of procedure through an administrative
circular duly issued therefor.43

Be that as it may, the subsequent declaration of the policy in Section 14(1) of RA 6770 as ineffective and
of Section 14(2) as invalid, does not serve to exonerate Judge Sison from administrative liability because
he failed to consider and act in accordance with the basic principle of judicial stability or non-
interference.44 Pursuant to this principle, where decisions of certain administrative bodies are appealable
to the CA, these adjudicative bodies are co-equal with the RTCs and their actions are logically beyond the
control of the RTC.45

Notably, the Ombudsman's decisions in disciplinary cases are appealable to the CA under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court. Consequently, the RTC had no jurisdiction to interfere with or restrain the execution of the
Ombudsman's decisions in disciplinary cases,46 more so, because at the time Judge Sison issued the TRO
on January 10, 2012 and proceeded with the writ of preliminary injunction on January 17, 2012 against

103
the enforcement of the Ombudsman Order of Suspension, the CA had already affirmed that very
same Order of Suspension in its Decision dated January 2, 2012.

In any event, Judge Sison should have, at the very least, been aware that court orders or
decisions cannot be the subject matter of a petition for declaratory relief.47 They are not included within
the purview of the words "other written instrument"48 in Rule 6349 of the Rules of Court governing
petitions for declaratory relief. The same principle applies to orders, resolutions, or decisions of quasi-
judicial bodies,50 and this is anchored on the principle ofresjudicata.51 Consequently, a judgment rendered
by a court or a quasi-judicial body is conclusive on the parties, subject only to appellate authority. 52 The
losing party cannot modify or escape the effects of judgment under the guise of an action for declaratory
relief.53

Here, Echiverri, et al.'s Petition for Declaratory Relief specifically prayed that the RTC "make a definite
judicial declaration on the rights and obligations of the parties asserting adverse legal interests with
respect to the implementation of the [order of] preventive suspension,"54 effectively putting into question
the CA-affirmed Ombudsman Order of Suspension - a matter clearly beyond the ambit of the RTC's
jurisdiction. This, coupled with the deference to the basic precepts of jurisdiction required of judges, leads
to no other conclusion than that Judge Sison acted in gross ignorance of the law in proceeding with the
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction.1âwphi1

As a serious charge under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, the
penalty for gross ignorance of the law or procedure ranges from a fine of more than ₱20,000.00 but not
exceeding ₱40,000.00 to dismissal.55 Inasmuch as Judge Sison had already retired on December 9, 2014,
the imposition of the penalty of suspension is no longer feasible. In lieu of suspension, a fine may still be
imposed.56 Considering that this is not Judge Sison's first offense, the Court finds that the fine of Forty
Thousand Pesos (₱40,000.00) is justified under the circumstances.57 In light of this Court's Resolution
dated August 5, 2015, the fine shall be charged against the retained amounts from Judge Sison.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds retired Judge Dionisio C. Sison GUILTY of gross ignorance of the
law under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, and is hereby
ordered to PAY A FINE of Forty Thousand Pesos (₱40,000.00), to be deducted from his terminal leave

104
benefits earlier retained pursuant to this Court's Resolution dated August 5, 2015, with the remaining
amount to be released to Judge Sison immediately.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 206987 September 10, 2013

ALLIANCE FOR NATIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY (ANAD), Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari with Urgent Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order and Writ of Mandamus, seeking to compel the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to canvass the
votes cast for petitioner Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy (ANAD) in the recently held 2013 Party-
List Elections.

On 7 November 2012, the COMELEC En Banc promulgated a Resolution canceling petitioner’s Certificate of
Registration and/or Accreditation on three grounds, to wit:1

I.

Petitioner ANAD does not belong to, or come within the ambit of, the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors enumerated in Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 and espoused in the cases of
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections and Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v.
Commission on Elections.

II.

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 There is no proof showing that nominees Arthur J. Tariman and Julius D. Labandria are actually
nominated by ANAD itself. The Certificate of Nomination, subscribed and sworn to by Mr. Domingo
M.Balang, shows that ANAD submitted only the names of Pastor Montero Alcover, Jr., Baltaire Q.
Balangauan and Atty. Pedro Leslie B. Salva. It necessarily follows, that having only three (3)
nominees, ANAD failed to comply with the procedural requirements set forth in Section 4, Rule 3 of
Resolution No. 9366.

III.

ANAD failed to submit its Statement of Contributions and Expenditures for the 2007 National and Local
Elections as required by Section 14 of Republic Act No. 7166 ("R.A. No. 7166").

ANAD went before this Court challenging the above-mentioned resolution. In Atong Paglaum, Inc. v.
Comelec,2 the Court remanded the case to the COMELEC for re-evaluation in accordance with the
parameters prescribed in the aforesaid decision.

In the assailed Resolution dated 11 May 2013,3 the COMELEC affirmed the cancellation of petitioner’s
Certificate of Registration and/or Accreditation and disqualified it from participating in the 2013 Elections.
The COMELEC held that while ANAD can be classified as a sectoral party lacking in well-defined political
constituencies, its disqualification still subsists for violation of election laws and regulations, particularly
for its failure to submit at least five nominees, and for its failure to submit its Statement of Contributions
and Expenditures for the 2007 Elections.

Hence, the present petition raising the issues of whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion
in promulgating the assailed Resolution without the benefit of a summary evidentiary hearing mandated
by the due process clause, and whether or not the COMELEC erred in finding that petitioner submitted
only three nominees and that it failed to submit its Statement of Contributions and Expenditures in the
2007Elections.4

We dismiss the petition.

106
The only question that may be raised in a petition for certiorari under Section 2, Rule 64 of the Rules of
Court is whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. For a petition for certiorari to prosper, there must be a clear showing of caprice and
arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion.5

"Grave abuse of discretion," under Rule 65, has a specific meaning. It is the arbitrary or despotic exercise
of power due to passion, prejudice or personal hostility; or the whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious exercise
of power that amounts to an evasion or a refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or to act at all
in contemplation of law. For an act to be struck down as having been done with grave abuse of discretion,
the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross.6

ANAD claims that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it promulgated the assailed Resolution
without giving ANAD the benefit of a summary evidentiary hearing, thus violating its right to due process.
It is to be noted, however, that ANAD was already afforded a summary hearing on23 August 2013, during
which Mr. Domingo M. Balang, ANAD’s president, authenticated documents and answered questions from
the members of the COMELEC pertinent to ANAD’s qualifications.7

ANAD, nonetheless, insists that the COMELEC should have called for another summary hearing after this
Court remanded the case to the COMELEC for re-evaluation in accordance with the parameters laid down
in Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. Comelec . This is a superfluity.

ANAD was already given the opportunity to prove its qualifications during the summary hearing of 23
August 2012, during which ANAD submitted documents and other pieces of evidence to establish said
qualifications. In re-evaluating ANAD’s qualifications in accordance with the parameters laid down in Atong
Paglaum, Inc. v. COMELEC , the COMELEC need not have called another summary hearing. The Comelec
could, as in fact it did,8 readily resort to documents and other pieces of evidence previously submitted by
petitioners in re-appraising ANAD’s qualifications. After all, it can be presumed that the qualifications, or
lack thereof, which were established during the summary hearing of 23 August2012 continued until
election day and even there after.

As to ANAD’s averment that the COMELEC erred in finding that it violated election laws and regulations,
we hold that the COMELEC, being a specialized agency tasked with the supervision of elections all over the

107
country, its factual findings, conclusions, rulings and decisions rendered on matters falling within its
competence shall not be interfered with by this Court in the absence of grave abuse of discretion or any
jurisdictional infirmity or error of law.9

As found by the COMELEC, ANAD, for unknown reasons, submitted only three nominees instead of five, in
violation of Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 7941( An Act Providing for the Election of Party-List Representatives
through the Party-List System, and Appropriating Funds Therefor).10 Such factual finding of the COMELEC
was based on the Certificate of Nomination presented and marked by petitioner during the 22 and 23
August 2012summary hearings.11

Compliance with Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 is essential as the said provision is a safeguard against
arbitrariness.1âwphi1 Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941rids a party-list organization of the prerogative to
substitute and replace its nominees, or even to switch the order of the nominees, after submission of the
list to the COMELEC.

In Lokin, Jr. v. Comelec,12 the Court discussed the importance of Sec.8 of R.A. No. 7941 in this wise:

The prohibition is not arbitrary or capricious; neither is it without reason on the part of lawmakers. The
COMELEC can rightly presume from the submission of the list that the list reflects the true will of the
party-list organization. The COMELEC will not concern itself with whether or not the list contains the real
intended nominees of the party-list organization, but will only determine whether the nominees pass all
the requirements prescribed by the law and whether or not the nominees possess all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications. Thereafter, the names of the nominees will be published in newspapers of
general circulation. Although the people vote for the party-list organization itself in a party-list system of
election, not for the individual nominees, they still have the right to know who the nominees of any
particular party-list organization are. The publication of the list of the party-list nominees in newspapers of
general circulation serves that right of the people, enabling the voters to make intelligent and informed
choices. In contrast, allowing the party-list organization to change its nominees through withdrawal of
their nominations, or to alter the order of the nominations after the submission of the list of nominees
circumvents the voters’ demand for transparency. The lawmakers’ exclusion of such arbitrary withdrawal
has eliminated the possibility of such circumvention.

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Moreover, the COMELEC also noted ANAD’s failure to submit a proper Statement of Contributions and
Expenditures for the 2007 Elections, in violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 9476, viz:

Rule 8, Sec. 3. Form and contents of statements. – The statement required in next preceding section shall
be in writing, subscribed and sworn to by the candidate or by the treasurer of the party. It shall set forth
in detail the following:

a. The amount of contribution, the date of receipt, and the full name, profession, business, taxpayer
identification number (TIN) and exact home and business address of the person or entity from
whom the contribution was received; (See Schedule of Contributions Received, Annex "G")

b. The amount of every expenditure, the date thereof, the full name and exact address of the person
or entity to whom payment was made, and the purpose of the expenditure; (See Schedule of
Expenditures, Annex "H")

A Summary Report of Lawful Expenditure categorized according to the list specified above shall be
submitted by the candidate or party treasurer within thirty (30) days after the day of the election.
The prescribed form for this Summary Report is hereby attached to these Rules as Annex "H-1."

c. Any unpaid obligation, its nature and amount, the full name and exact home and business
address of the person or entity to whom said obligation is owing; and (See Schedule of Unpaid
Obligations, Annex "I")

d. If the candidate or treasurer of the party has received no contribution, made no expenditure, or
has no pending obligation, the statement shall reflect such fact;

e. And such other information that the Commission may require.

The prescribed form for the Statement of Election Contributions and Expenses is attached to these Rules
as Annex "F." The Schedules of Contributions and Expenditures (Annexes "G" and "H", respectively)
should be supported and accompanied by certified true copies of official receipts, invoices and other
similar documents.

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An incomplete statement, or a statement that does not contain all the required information and
attachments, or does not conform to the prescribed form, shall be considered as not filed and shall subject
the candidate or party treasurer to the penalties prescribed by law.

As found by the COMELEC, ANAD failed to comply with the above-mentioned requirements as the exhibits
submitted by ANAD consisted mainly of a list of total contributions from other persons, a list of official
receipts and amounts without corresponding receipts, and a list of expenditures based on order slips and
donations without distinction as to whether the amounts listed were advanced subject to reimbursement
or donated.13 This factual finding was neither contested nor rebutted by ANAD.

We herein take the opportunity to reiterate the well-established principle that the rule that factual findings
of administrative bodies will not be disturbed by the courts of justice except when there is absolutely no
evidence or no substantial evidence in support of such findings should be applied with greater force when
it concerns the COMELEC, as the framers of the Constitution intended to place the COMELEC – created and
explicitly made independent by the Constitution itself – on a level higher than statutory administrative
organs. The COMELEC has broad powers to ascertain the true results of the election by means available to
it. For the attainment of that end, it is not strictly bound by the rules of evidence.14

As empowered by law, the COMELEC may motu proprio cancel, after due notice and hearing, the
registration of any party-list organization if it violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations
relating to elections.15 Thus, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC when it
issued the assailed Resolution dated 11 May 2013.

In any event, the official tally results of the COMELEC show that ANAD garnered 200,972 votes.16 As such,
even if petitioner is declared qualified and the votes cast for it are canvassed, statistics show that it will
still fail to qualify for a seat in the House of Representatives.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court Resolves to DISMISS the Petition, finding no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Commission on Elections.

SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No. 192685 July 31, 2013

OSCAR R. AMPIL, Petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, POLICARPIO L. ESPENESIN, Registrar, Register of
Deeds, Pasig City, FRANCIS SERRANO, YVONNE S. YUCHENGCO, and GEMA O.
CHENG, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 199115

OSCAR R. AMPIL, Petitioner,

vs.
POLICARPIO L. ESPENESIN, Respondent.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

No less than the Constitution maps out the wide grant of investigatory powers to the Ombudsman.1 Hand
in hand with this bestowal, the Ombudsman is mandated to investigate and prosecute, for and in behalf of
the people, criminal and administrative offenses committed by government officers and employees, as
well as private persons in conspiracy with the former.2 There can be no equivocation about this power-
and-duty function of the Ombudsman.

Before us are consolidated petitions separately filed by Oscar R. Ampil (Ampil): (1) one is for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court docketed as G.R. No. 192685; and (2) the other is for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court docketed as G.R. No. 199115.

Challenged in the petition for certiorari is the Resolution3 of the Ombudsman in OMB-C-C-07-0444-J,
dismissing the criminal complaint filed by Ampil against respondents Policarpio L. Espenesin (Espenesin),

111
Francis Serrano (Serrano), Yvonne S. Yuchengco (Yuchengco) and Gema O. Cheng (Cheng), and the
Order4 denying Ampil’s motion for reconsideration thereof. Ampil’s complaint charged respondents with
Falsification of Public Documents under Article 171(6) of the Revised Penal Code and violation of Sections
3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended.

The appeal by certiorari, on the other hand, assails the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No.
113171, which affirmed the Order dated 13 July 2009 of the Ombudsman in OMB-C-A-07-0474-J on the
administrative aspect of the mentioned criminal complaint for Falsification and violation of Republic Act
No. 3019 against the Registrar of Deeds, respondent Espenesin. Initially, the Ombudsman issued a
Decision dated 30 April 2008, finding Espenesin guilty of Simple Misconduct and meting on Espenesin the
penalty of one (1) month suspension. On motion for reconsideration of Ampil, the Ombudsman favored
Espenesin’s arguments in his Opposition, and recalled the one-month suspension the Ombudsman had
imposed on the latter.

These consolidated cases arose from the following facts.

On 9 November 1995, ASB Realty Corporation (ASB) and Malayan Insurance Company (MICO) entered
into a Joint Project Development Agreement (JPDA) for the construction of a condominium building to be
known as "The Malayan Tower." Under the JPDA, MICO shall provide the real property located at the heart
of the Ortigas Business District, Pasig City, while ASB would construct, and shoulder the cost of
construction and development of the condominium building.

A year thereafter, on 20 November 1996, MICO and ASB entered into another contract, with MICO selling
to ASB the land it was contributing under the JPDA. Under the Contract to Sell, ownership of the land will
vest on ASB only upon full payment of the purchase price.

Sometime in 2000, ASB, as part of the ASB Group of Companies, filed a Petition for Rehabilitation with
Prayer for Suspension of Actions and Proceedings before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
As a result, the SEC issued a sixty (60) day Suspension Order (a) suspending all actions for claims against
the ASB Group of Companies pending or still to be filed with any court, office, board, body, or tribunal; (b)
enjoining the ASB Group of Companies from disposing of their properties in any manner, except in the
ordinary course of business, and from paying their liabilities outstanding as of the date of the filing of the

112
petition; and (c) appointing Atty. Monico V. Jacob as interim receiver of the ASB Group of
Companies.5 Subsequently, the SEC, over the objections of creditors, approved the Rehabilitation Plan
submitted by the ASB Group of Companies, thus:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the objections to the rehabilitation plan raised by the creditors are hereby
considered unreasonable.

Accordingly, the Rehabilitation Plan submitted by petitioners is hereby APPROVED, except those pertaining
to Mr. Roxas’ advances, and the ASB-Malayan Towers. Finally, Interim Receiver Mr. Fortunato Cruz is
appointed as Rehabilitation Receiver.6 (Emphasis supplied).

Because of the obvious financial difficulties, ASB was unable to perform its obligations to MICO under the
JPDA and the Contract to Sell. Thus, on 30 April 2002, MICO and ASB executed their Third contract, a
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA),7 allowing MICO to assume the entire responsibility for the
development and completion of The Malayan Tower. At the time of the execution of the MOA, ASB had
already paid MICO ₱427,231,952.32 out of the ₱640,847,928.48 purchase price of the realty.8

The MOA specifies the entitlement of both ASB and MICO to net saleable areas of The Malayan Tower
representing their investments. It provides, in pertinent part:

Section 4. Distribution and Disposition of Units. (a) As a return of its capital investment in the Project,
each party shall be entitled to such portion of all the net saleable area of the Building that their respective
contributions to the Project bear to the actual construction cost. As of the date of the execution hereof,
and on the basis of the total costs incurred to date in relation to the Remaining Construction Costs (as
defined in Section 9(a) hereof), the parties shall respectively be entitled to the following (which
entitlement shall be conditioned on, and subject to, adjustments as provided in sub-paragraph (b) of
Section 4 in the event that the actual remaining cost of construction exceeds the Remaining Construction
Cost):

(i) MICO – the net saleable area particularly described in Schedule 2 hereof.

(ii) ASB – the following net saleable area:

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 (A) the net saleable area which ASB had pre-sold for an aggregate purchase price of
₱640,085,267.30 as set forth in Schedule 1 (including all paid and unpaid proceeds of
said presales);

(B) the net saleable area particularly described in Schedule 3 hereof which shall be
delivered to ASB upon completion of the Project; and,

(C) provided that the actual remaining construction costs do not exceed the Remaining
Construction Cost, the net saleable area particularly described in Schedule 4 hereof
which shall be delivered to ASB upon completion of the Project and determination of its
actual construction costs. If the actual remaining construction costs exceed the
Remaining Construction Cost, sub-paragraph (b) of this Section 4 shall apply.

(b) In the event that the actual remaining construction costs exceed the Remaining Construction
Cost as represented and warranted by ASB to MICO under Section 9(a) hereof, and MICO pays for
such excess, the pro-rata sharing in the net saleable area of the Building, as provided in sub-
paragraph (a) of this Section 4 shall be adjusted accordingly. In such event, MICO shall be entitled
to such net saleable area in Schedule 4 that corresponds to the excess of the actual remaining cost
over the Remaining Construction Cost.

(c) To ensure the viability of the Project, the parties agree on a single pricing system, which MICO
shall have the exclusive right to fix and periodically adjust based on prevailing market conditions in
consultation with, but without need of consent of, ASB, for each party’s primary sale or other
disposition of its share in the net saleable area of the Building. In accordance with the immediately
preceding provision, MICO hereby adopts the selling prices set forth in Schedule 5 hereof. Each
party or its officers, employees, agents or representatives shall not sell or otherwise dispose any
share of said party in the net saleable area of the Building below the prices fixed by MICO in
accordance with this Section 4 (c). MICO shall have the exclusive right to adopt financing and
discounting schemes to enhance marketing and sales of units in the Project and such right of MICO
shall not be restricted or otherwise limited by the foregoing single pricing system provision.

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 (d) Each party shall bear the profits earned and losses incurred as well as any and all taxes and
other expenses in connection with the allocation or sale of, or other transaction relating to, the units
allotted to each party.9

On 11 March 2005, Condominium Certificates of Title (CCTs) for 38 units10 and the allotted parking spaces
were issued in the name of ASB. On even date but prior to its release, another set of CCTs covering the
same subject units but with MICO as registered owner thereof, was signed by Espenesin in his capacity as
Registrar of Deeds of Pasig City. Notably, Espenesin had likewise signed the CCTs which were originally
issued in ASB’s name.

On 2 April 2006, counsel for ASB wrote Espenesin calling his attention to the supposed amendment in the
CCTs which he had originally issued in ASB’s name.11 Counsel for ASB demanded that Espenesin effect in
the second set of CCTs, the registration of the subject units in The Malayan Tower back to ASB’s name.

On 17 May 2006, Espenesin replied and explained, thus:

The registration of the Malayan-ASB Realty transaction, from its inception up to the issuance of titles,
were all handled by respondent Atty. Francis Serrano. He therefore appeared and we have considered him
the legitimate representative of both parties (sic). His representation, we gathered, covers the interest of
both MICO and ASB in as far as the titling of the condominium units are concerned.

Sometime ago Serrano requested that condominium titles over specified units be issued in consonance
with the sharing in the joint venture MOA. Titles were correspondingly issued as per request, some in the
name of MICO and some in the name of ASB. Before its release to the parties, Atty. Serrano came back
and requested that some titles issued in the name of ASB be changed to MICO because allegedly there
was error in the issuance.

Believing it was a simple error and on representation of the person we came to know and considered the
representative of both parties, we erased the name ASB Realty Corporation on those specified titles and
placed instead the name Malayan Insurance Company.

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To our mind, the purpose was not to transfer ownership but merely to rectify an error committed in the
issuance of titles. And since they were well within our capacity to do, the titles not having been released
yet to its owner, we did what we believed was a simple act of rectifying a simple mistake.12

After learning of the amendment in the CCTs issued in ASB’s name, Ampil, on 23 January 2007, wrote
respondents Yuchengco and Cheng, President and Chief Financial Officer of MICO, respectively,
introducing himself as an unsecured creditor of ASB Holdings, Inc., one of the corporations forming part of
the ASB Group of Companies.13 Ampil averred that MICO had illegally registered in its name the subject
units at The Malayan Tower which were reserved for ASB under the MOA, and actually, already registered
in ASB’s name with the Register of Deeds of Pasig City. Ampil pointed out that the "condominium units
should have benefited him and other unsecured creditors of ASB because the latter had categorically
informed them previously that the same would be contributed to the Asset Pool created under the
Rehabilitation Plan of the ASB Group of Companies." Ultimately, Ampil demanded that Yuchengco and
Cheng rectify the resulting error in the CCTs, and facilitate the registration of the subject units back to
ASB’s name.

Respondents paid no heed to ASB’s and Ampil’s demands.

As previously adverted to, Ampil charged respondents with Falsification of Public Documents under Article
171(6) of the Revised Penal Code and violation of Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 before
the Office of the Ombudsman, alleging the following:

1. Respondents, in conspiracy, erased the name of ASB, and intercalated and substituted the name
of MICO under the entry of registered owner in the questioned CCTs covering the subject units of
The Malayan Tower;

2. The alterations were done without the necessary order from the proper court, in direct violation of
Section 10814 of Presidential Decree No. 1529;

3. Respondents violated Article 171(6) of the Revised Penal Code by:

3.1 Altering the CCTs which are public documents;

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 3.2 Effecting the alterations on genuine documents;

3.3 Changing the meaning of the CCTs with MICO now appearing as registered owner of the
subject units in Malayan Tower; and

3.4 Effectively, making the documents speak something false when ASB is the true owner of
the subject units, and not MICO.

4. Ampil, as unsecured creditor of ASB, was unjustly prejudiced by the felonious acts of
respondents;

5. Respondents violated Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019:

5.1 Respondent Espenesin, as Registrar of the Pasig City Registry of Deeds, committed an
offense in connection with his official duties by allowing himself to be persuaded, induced or
influenced by respondent Serrano into altering the questioned CCTs; and

5.2 The actions of respondent Espenesin demonstrate manifest partiality, evident bad faith
and/or, at the least, gross inexcusable negligence.

6. Respondents Yuchengco and Cheng, being responsible officers of MICO, as principals by

inducement and conspirators of Espenesin and Serrano, are likewise liable for falsification of the
CCTs and violation of Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019.15

As required by the Ombudsman, respondents filed their counter-affidavits: Espenesin and Serrano filed
individually, while Yuchengco and Cheng filed jointly. Respondents’ respective counter-affidavits uniformly
denied petitioner’s charges and explicated as follows:

Respondent Espenesin countered, among others, (i) that their intention was only to cause the necessary
rectification on certain errors made on the CCTs in issue; (ii) that since the CCTs were not yet issued and
released to the parties, it is still within his authority, as part of the registration process, to make the
necessary amendments or corrections thereon; (iii) that no court order would be necessary to effect such

117
changes, the CCTs still being within the control of the Register of Deeds and have not yet been released to
the respective owners; (iv) that the amendments were made not for the purpose of falsifying the CCTs in
issue but to make the same reflect and declare the truth; and (v) that he merely made the corrections in
accordance with the representations of respondent Serrano who he believed to be guarding and
representing both the interests of MICO and ASB.

Respondent Serrano, on the other hand, argued: (i) that the units in issue are not yet owned by ASB; (ii)
that these units were specifically segregated and reserved for MICO in order to answer for any excess in
the estimated cost that it will expend in the completion of the Malayan Tower; (iii) that ASB is only
entitled to these reserved units only after the Malayan Tower is completed and that the units are not
utilized to cover for the increase in the cost expended by MICO pursuant to Section 4(c) of the MOA; (iv)
that the Malayan Tower was still incomplete at the time when the alterations were made on the CCT,
hence, the claim of ownership of ASB over the reserved units is premature and totally baseless; (v) that
prior to the fulfillment of the resolutory condition, that is, after the completion of the Malayan Tower and
there remains a balance in the Remaining Construction Cost, the units still rightfully belongs to MICO; and
(vi) that the alteration was made merely for the purpose of correcting an error.

Respondents Cheng and Yuchengco, while adopting the foregoing arguments of Espenesin and Serrano,
further averred that: (i) Ampil has no legal personality to file this suit, he being merely an unsecured
creditor of ASB whose interest was not definitively shown to have been damaged by the subject
controversy; (ii) that their participation as respondents and alleged co-conspirators of Serrano and
Espenesin was not clearly shown and defined in the complaint; (iii) the CCTs issued in the name of ASB
have not yet been entered in the Registration Book at the time when the alterations were effected, hence,
the same could still be made subject of appropriate amendments; (iv) that the CCTs in issue named in
favor of ASB were mere drafts and cannot legally be considered documents within the strict definition of
the law; (v) that court order authorizing to amend a title is necessary only if the deed or document sought
to be registered has already been entered in the registration book; and (vi) that MICO is the duly
registered owner of the land on which Malayan Tower stands and ASB was merely referred to as the
developer.16

Thereafter, the Ombudsman issued the assailed Resolution in G.R. No. 192685 dismissing Ampil’s
complaint. For the Ombudsman, the resolution of whether respondents falsified the CCTs must be

118
prefaced by a determination of who, between MICO and ASB, is the rightful owner of the subject units.
The Ombudsman held that it had no authority to interpret the provisions of the MOA and, thus, refrained
from resolving the preliminary question of ownership. Given the foregoing, the Ombudsman was hard
pressed to make a categorical finding that the CCTs were altered to speak something false. In short, the
Ombudsman did not have probable cause to indict respondents for falsification of the CCTs because the
last element of the crime, i.e., that the change made the document speak something false, had not been
established.

Significantly, the Ombudsman did not dispose of whether probable cause exists to indict respondents for
violation of Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019.

Ampil filed a Motion for Reconsideration. However, in yet another setback, the Ombudsman denied Ampil’s
motion and affirmed the dismissal of his complaint.

On the administrative litigation front and as previously narrated, the Ombudsman found Espenesin liable
for Simple Misconduct. However, on motion for reconsideration of Ampil praying for a finding of guilt
against Espenesin for Grave Misconduct and Dishonesty, the Ombudsman reconsidered its earlier
resolution and recalled the one-month suspension meted on Espenesin.

Thereafter, Ampil filed a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court before the appellate court.
And as already stated, the appellate court affirmed the Ombudsman’s resolution absolving Espenesin of
not just Grave Misconduct and Dishonesty, but also of Simple Misconduct.

Hence, this dual recourse by Ampil: first, alleging grave abuse of discretion in the Ombudsman’s failure to
find probable cause to indict respondents for Falsification of Public Documents under Article 171(6) of the
Revised Penal Code, and for their commission of corrupt practices under

Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019; and second, raising grievous error of the Court of Appeals
in affirming the Ombudsman’s absolution of Espenesin from administrative liability.

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To obviate confusion, we shall dispose of the first issue, i.e., whether probable cause exists to indict
respondents for Falsification of Public Documents under Article 171(6) of the Revised Penal Code and for
their commission of corrupt practices under Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019.

Despite the Ombudsman’s categorical dismissal of his complaint, Ampil is adamant on the existence of
probable cause to bring respondents to trial for falsification of the CCTs, and for violation of Sections 3(a)
and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019. In fact, he argues that Espenesin has been held administratively liable
by the Ombudsman for altering the CCTs. At the time of the filing of G.R. No. 192685, the Ombudsman
had not yet reversed its previous resolution finding Espenesin liable for simple misconduct. He insists that
the admission by respondents Espenesin and Serrano that they altered the CCTs should foreclose all
questions on all respondents’ (Espenesin’s, Serrano’s, Yuchengco’s and Cheng’s) liability for falsification
and their commission of corrupt practices, under the Revised Penal Code and Republic Act No. 3019,
respectively. In all, Ampil maintains that the Ombudsman’s absolution of respondents is tainted with grave
abuse of discretion.

G.R. No. 192685 is partially impressed with merit. Accordingly, we find grave abuse of discretion in the
Ombudsman’s incomplete disposition of Ampil’s complaint.

That the Ombudsman is a constitutional officer duty bound to "investigate on its own, or on complaint by
any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient"17 brooks no objection. The Ombudsman’s
conduct of preliminary investigation is both power and duty. Thus, the Ombudsman and his Deputies, are
constitutionalized as protectors of the people, who "shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or
manner against public officials or employees of the government x x x, and shall, x x x notify the
complainants of the action taken and the result thereof."18

The raison d'être for its creation and endowment of broad investigative authority is to insulate the Office
of the Ombudsman from the long tentacles of officialdom that are able to penetrate judges’ and fiscals’
offices, and others involved in the prosecution of erring public officials, and through the execution of
official pressure and influence, quash, delay, or dismiss investigations into malfeasances and misfeasances
committed by public officers.19

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Plainly, the Ombudsman has "full discretion," based on the attendant facts and circumstances, to
determine the existence of probable cause or the lack thereof.20 On this score, we have consistently
hewed to the policy of non-interference with the Ombudsman’s exercise of its constitutionally mandated
powers.21 The Ombudsman’s finding to proceed or desist in the prosecution of a criminal case can only be
assailed through certiorari proceedings before this Court on the ground that such determination is tainted
with grave abuse of discretion which contemplates an abuse so grave and so patent equivalent to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.22

However, on several occasions, we have interfered with the Ombudsman’s discretion in determining
probable cause:

(a) To afford protection to the constitutional rights of the accused;

(b) When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of
actions;

(c) When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice;

(d) When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;

(e) Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation;

(f) When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;

(g) Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;

(h) Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;

(i) Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance.23 (Emphasis
supplied).

The fourth circumstance is present in G.R. No. 192685.

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While we agree with the Ombudsman’s disquisition that there is no probable cause to indict respondents
for Falsification of Public Documents under Article 171(6) of the Revised Penal Code, we are puzzled why
the Ombudsman completely glossed over Ampil’s charge that respondents committed prohibited acts
listed in Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019. Nowhere in the Resolution or in the Order
denying reconsideration thereof did the Ombudsman tackle and resolve the issue of whether respondents
violated the particular provisions of Republic Act No. 3019.

Curiously, the Ombudsman docketed Ampil’s complaint-affidavit as one "for: Falsification of Public
Documents and Violation of Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended."24 The
Ombudsman even prefaced the Resolution, thus: "this has reference to the complaint filed by Oscar Ampil
on 17 September 2007 against respondents, for Falsification of Public Documents and Violation of Sections
3, paragraphs (a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, as amended."25

The Ombudsman’s silence on the component anti-graft charges is pointed up by the specific allegations in
Ampil’s complaint-affidavit that:

18. The acts of ATTY. ESPENESIN and his co-conspirators are clear violations of Section 3 paragraph (a)
and/or (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act x x x;

xxxx

19. On the basis of the evidence x x x and the admissions of the conspirators themselves, ATTY.
ESPENESIN is liable under both pars. (a) and (e) thereof or either of the two. By maliciously and
feloniously altering the subject CCT’s (sic), contrary to law and to the prejudice of ASB and Ampil, ATTY.
ESPENESIN committed an offense in connection with his official duties and he admitted having done so in
conspiracy with his co-respondents. x x x ATTY. ESPENESIN allowed himself to be persuaded, induced or
influenced into committing such violation or offense which is the substance of par. (a) of RA 3019;

20. In committing such unauthorized and unlawful alterations on the subject CCT’s (sic), ATTY.
ESPENESIN caused undue injury to ASB and to AMPIL as an unsecured creditor, who is ultimately one of
the beneficiaries of said CCT from the ASSET POOL created by the SEC, and gave MICO unwarranted

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benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official duties as Register of Deeds of Pasig City.
Such acts were admitted by ATTY. ESPENESIN in his letter to ASB x x x. Such acts, taken together with
his admission, indubitably show ATTY. ESPENESIN’s manifest partiality, evident bad faith and/or, at the
least, his gross inexcusable negligence in doing the same;

21. ATTY. ESPENESIN is liable under Section 3 pars. (a) and/or (e) of RA 3019, as well as under Article
171 par. 6 of the RPC. ATTY. SERRANO, YVONNE S. YUCHENGCO and (sic) GEMMA O. CHENG are also
liable for violation of the said provisions of law in conspiracy with ATTY. ESPENESIN, the latter as a
principal via direct participation, ATTY. SERRANO, as principal by inducement and YUCHENGCO and
CHENG, also by inducement, who being responsible officers of MICO ultimately benefited from said
unlawful act.26 and the pith of the Resolution which carefully and meticulously dissected the presence of
the first three definitive elements of the crime of falsification under Article 171(6) of the Revised Penal
Code:

The first three definitive elements of the crime, albeit present, are defeated by the absence of the fourth.

The respondents readily admitted that an alteration was indeed made on the CCTs in issue allegedly for
the purpose of correcting a mistake in the name of the registered owner of the condominium units
involved. Said alteration had obviously changed the tenor of the CCTs considering that ASB, the initially
named owner, was changed into MICO. The first and third elements are undeniably present.

Anent the second element, the respondents argued that the CCTs in issue were mere drafts and are not
legally considered "genuine documents" within the strict definition of the law. Albeit the contention is
partially true, no proof has been shown to prove that the CCTs issued in favor of ASB were mere drafts.

The CCTs of ASB are obviously complete. If we are to compare it with the appearance and contents of the
CCTs issued in favor of MICO, one will notice no definitive difference between the two except that one set
was named in favor of ASB and the other set, in favor of MICO. Nothing is shown that will clearly prove
that the former were mere drafts and the latter are the final copies. As far as the appearance of the CCTs
of ASB is concerned, all appear to be complete and genuine. Proof to the contrary must be shown to prove
otherwise.

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Delivery of the titles to the named owners is not a pre-requisite before all these CCTs can be legally
categorized as genuine documents. The fact that the same had already been signed by respondent
Espenesin in his capacity as Registrar of Deeds of Pasig City and the notations imprinted thereon appeared
to have been entered on March 11, 2005 at 11:55 a.m. at the Registry Books of Pasig City, the CCTs in
issue are bound to be treated as genuine documents drafted and signed in the regular performance of
duties of the officer whose signature appears thereon.27

On the whole, the Ombudsman’s discussion was straightforward and categorical, and ultimately
established that Espenesin, at the urging of Serrano, altered the CCTs issued in ASB’s name resulting in
these CCTs ostensibly declaring MICO as registered owner of the subject units at The Malayan Tower.

Despite the admission by Espenesin that he had altered the CCTs and the Ombudsman’s findings thereon,
the Ombudsman abruptly dismissed Ampil’s complaint-affidavit, resolving only one of the charges
contained therein with nary a link regarding the other charge of violation of Sections 3(a) and (e) of
Republic Act No. 3019. Indeed, as found by the Ombudsman, the 4th element of the crime of Falsification
of Public Documents is lacking, as the actual ownership of the subject units at The Malayan Tower has yet
to be resolved. Nonetheless, this circumstance does not detract from, much less diminish, Ampil’s charge,
and the evidence pointing to the possible commission, of offenses under Sections 3(a) and (e) of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 reads:

Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. – In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are
hereby declared to be unlawful:

(a) Persuading, inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an act constituting a violation of
rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent authority or an offense in connection with the
official duties of the latter, or allowing himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced to commit such
violation or offense.

xxxx

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(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision
shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of
licenses or permits or other concessions.

The elements of Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019 are:

(1) the offender is a public officer;

(2) the offender persuades, induces, or influences another public officer to perform an act or the
offender allows himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced to commit an act;

(3) the act performed by the other public officer or committed by the offender constitutes a violation
of rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent authority or an offense in connection with
the official duty of the latter. (Emphasis supplied).

Whereas, paragraph (e) of the same section lists the following elements:

(1) the offender is a public officer;

(2) the act was done in the discharge of the public officer’s official, administrative or judicial
functions;

(3) the act was done through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence;
and

(4) the public officer caused any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or gave any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference.28

As Registrar of the Registry of Deeds of Pasig City, Espenesin is tasked, among others, to review deeds
and other documents for conformance with the legal requirements of registration.29 Section 10 of

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Presidential Decree No. 1529, Amending and Codifying the Laws Relative to Registration of Property and
for Other Purposes provides:

Section 10. General functions of Registers of Deeds. – The office of the Register of Deeds constitutes a
public repository of records of instruments affecting registered or unregistered lands and chattel
mortgages in the province or city wherein such office is situated.

It shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds to immediately register an instrument presented for
registration dealing with real or personal property which complies with all the requisites for registration.
He shall see to it that said instrument bears the proper documentary and science stamps and that the
same are properly cancelled. If the instrument is not registerable, he shall forthwith deny registration
thereof and inform the presentor of such denial in writing, stating the ground or reason therefore, and
advising him of his right to appeal by consulta in accordance with Section 117 of the Decree.

Most importantly, a Registrar of the Registry of Deeds is charged with knowledge of Presidential Decree
No. 1529, specifically Sections 5730 and 108.31

In the instant case, the elements of the offenses under Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019,
juxtaposed against the functions of a Registrar of the Registry of Deeds establish a prima facie graft case
against Espenesin and Serrano only. Under Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019, there is a prima facie
case that Espenesin, at the urging of Serrano, allowed himself to be persuaded to alter the CCTs originally
issued in ASB’s name, against the procedure provided by law for the issuance of CCTs and registration of
property. In addition, under Section 3(e) of the same law, there is likewise a prima facie case that
Espenesin, through gross inexcusable negligence, by simply relying on the fact that all throughout the
transaction to register the subject units at The Malayan Tower he liaised with Serrano, gave MICO an
unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference in the registration of the subject units.

In Sison v. People of the Philippines, we expounded on Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019:

The third element of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 may be committed in three ways, i.e., through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. Proof of any of these three in connection with
the prohibited acts mentioned in Section 3(e) of RA 3019 is enough to convict.

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Explaining what "partiality," "bad faith" and "gross negligence" mean, we held:

"Partiality" is synonymous with "bias" which "excites a disposition to see and report matters as they are
wished for rather than as they are." "Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it
imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn
duty through some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud." "Gross negligence has
been so defined as negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a
situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally with a conscious
indifference to consequences in so far as other persons may be affected. It is the omission of that care
which even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to take on their own property."

In the instant case, petitioner was grossly negligent in all the purchases that were made under his watch.
Petitioner’s admission that the canvass sheets sent out by de Jesus to the suppliers already contained his
signatures because he pre-signed these forms only proved his utter disregard of the consequences of his
actions. Petitioner also admitted that he knew the provisions of RA 7160 on personal canvass but he did
not follow the law because he was merely following the practice of his predecessors. This was an
admission of a mindless disregard for the law in a tradition of illegality. This is totally unacceptable,
considering that as municipal mayor, petitioner ought to implement the law to the letter. As local chief
executive, he should have been the first to follow the law and see to it that it was followed by his
constituency. Sadly, however, he was the first to break it.

Petitioner should have complied with the requirements laid down by RA 7160 on personal canvass, no
matter how strict they may have been. Dura lex sed lex. The law is difficult but it is the law. These
requirements are not empty words but were specifically crafted to ensure transparency in the acquisition
of government supplies, especially since no public bidding is involved in personal canvass. Truly, the
requirement that the canvass and awarding of supplies be made by a collegial body assures the general
public that despotic, irregular or unlawful transactions do not occur. It also guarantees that no personal
preference is given to any supplier and that the government is given the best possible price for its
procurements.

The fourth element is likewise present. While it is true that the prosecution was not able to prove any
undue injury to the government as a result of the purchases, it should be noted that there are two ways

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by which Section 3(e) of RA 3019 may be violated—the first, by causing undue injury to any party,
including the government, or the second, by giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage
or preference. Although neither mode constitutes a distinct offense, an accused may be charged under
either mode or both. The use of the disjunctive "or’ connotes that the two modes need not be present at
the same time. In other words, the presence of one would suffice for conviction.

Aside from the allegation of undue injury to the government, petitioner was also charged with having
given unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference to private suppliers. Under the second mode, damage
is not required.

The word "unwarranted" means lacking adequate or official support; unjustified; unauthorized or without
justification or adequate reason. "Advantage" means a more favorable or improved position or condition;
benefit, profit or gain of any kind; benefit from some course of action. "Preference" signifies priority or
higher evaluation or desirability; choice or estimation above another.

In order to be found guilty under the second mode, it suffices that the accused has given unjustified favor
or benefit to another, in the exercise of his official, administrative or judicial functions. Petitioner did just
that. The fact that he repeatedly failed to follow the requirements of RA 7160 on personal canvass proves
that unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference was given to the winning suppliers. These suppliers
were awarded the procurement contract without the benefit of a fair system in determining the best
possible price for the government. The private suppliers, which were all personally chosen by respondent,
were able to profit from the transactions without showing proof that their prices were the most beneficial
to the government. For that, petitioner must now face the consequences of his acts.32 (Emphasis
supplied).

We stress that the Ombudsman did not find probable cause to indict respondents for falsification simply
because the Ombudsman could not categorically declare that the alteration made the CCT speak falsely as
the ownership of the subject units at The Malayan Tower had yet to be determined. However, its initial
factual findings on the administrative complaint categorically declared, thus:

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x x x Espenesin justified his action by asseverating that since the CCTs were still under the possession and
control of the Register of Deeds and have not yet been distributed to the owners, amendments can still be
made thereon.

It is worthy to note that the CCTs of ASB, at the time when the amendment was made, were obviously
complete. From its face, we can infer that all have attained the character of a binding public document.
The signature of Espenesin is already affixed thereon, and on its face, it was explicitly declared that the
titles have already been entered in the Registration Book of the Register of Deeds of Pasig City on March
11, 2005 at 11:55 a.m. Allegations to the contrary must be convincingly and positively proven, otherwise,
the presumption holds that the CCTs issued in the name of ASB were regular and the contents thereon
binding.

Stated in a different light, delivery of the titles to the named owners is not a pre-requisite before all these
CCTs can be legally categorized as genuine documents. The fact that the same had already been signed
by x x x Espenesin in his capacity as Register of Deeds of Pasig City and the notations imprinted thereon
appeared to have been entered on March 11, 2005 at 11:55 a.m. at the Registry Books of Pasig City, the
CCTs in issue are bound to be treated as genuine documents drafted and signed in the regular
performance of duties of the officer whose signature appears thereon. The law has made it so clear that it
is the entry of the title in the Registration Book that controls the discretion of the Register of Deeds to
effect the necessary amendments and not the actual delivery of the titles to the named owners.

This being the case, strict compliance with the mandates of Section 108 of P.D. 1529 is strictly called for.
The provision is clear that upon entry of a certificate of title (which definitely includes Condominium
Certificate of Title) attested to by the Register of Deeds, no amendment shall be effected thereon except
upon lawful order of the court.

In the instant case, it became obvious that after the CCTs of ASB were entered in the Registration Book on
March 11, 2005 at exactly 11:55 a.m., the notations thereon were thereafter amended by Espenesin when
Atty. Serrano purportedly informed him of the alleged error inscribed therein. The proper remedy that
should have been undertaken by Espenesin soon after he was informed of the error is to either initiate the
appropriate petition himself or to suggest to the parties to the MOA to file said petition in court for the

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amendment of the CCTs. An amendment by way of a shortcut is not allowed after entry of the title in the
Registration Book.

xxxx

If the Regional Trial Court sitting as a land registration court is not legally authorized to determine the
respective rights of the parties to the MOA when deciding on the petition for amendment and cancellation
of title, all the more with the Registrar of Deeds who is legally not empowered to make such determination
and to cause an automatic amendment of entries in the Registration Book on the basis of his unauthorized
determination.

Espenesin’s liability is grounded on the untimely and unauthorized amendment of the CCTs in issue. This
is regardless of whether the amendment had made the CCTs speak of either a lie or the truth. What
defines his error is his inability to comply with the proper procedure set by law.33 (Emphasis supplied).

We likewise stress that the determination of probable cause does not require certainty of guilt for a crime.
As the term itself implies, probable cause is concerned merely with probability and not absolute or even
moral certainty;34 it is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief.35 It is sufficient that based on the
preliminary investigation conducted, it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the
offense charged. Well-settled in jurisprudence, as in Raro v. Sandiganbayan,36 that:

x x x Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite
the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the
person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.37

Probable cause is a reasonable ground for presuming that a matter is or may be well-founded on such
state of facts in the prosecutor's mind as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe
— or entertain an honest or strong suspicion — that it is so.38

A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has
been committed and there is enough reason to believe that it was committed by the accused. It need not

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be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing absolute certainty of
guilt.39

A finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure
a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense
charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of evidence of the prosecution in support of the
charge.40

A finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of
guilt.

The term does not mean "actual and positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely
based on opinion and reasonable belief. x x x Probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether
there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction.41 (Emphasis and italics supplied).

In this instance, Espenesin explains and categorically admits that he altered, nay corrected, 38 certificates
of title which we again reproduce for easy reference:

Sometime ago Serrano requested that condominium titles over specified units be issued in consonance
with the sharing in the joint venture MOA. Titles were correspondingly issued as per request, some in the
name of MICO and some in the name of ASB. Before its release to the parties, Atty. Serrano came back
and requested that some titles issued in the name of ASB be changed to MICO because allegedly there
was error in the issuance.

Believing it was a simple error and on representation of the person we came to know and considered the
representative of both parties, we erased the name ASB Realty Corporation on those specified titles and
placed instead the name Malayan Insurance Company.

To our mind, the purpose was not to transfer ownership but merely to rectify an error committed in the
issuance of titles. And since they were well within our capacity to do, the titles not having been released
yet to its owner, we did what we believed was a simple act of rectifying a simple mistake.42

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The letter of Espenesin itself underscores the existence of a prima facie case of gross negligence:

1. Serrano transacted the registration of the units in The Malayan Tower with the Office of the
Register of Deeds, Pasig City;

2. Serrano had previously presented a joint venture agreement, the MOA, which Espenesin followed
in the initial preparation and issuance of the titles;

3. Before some CCTs initially issued in ASB’s name were released, Serrano returned and requested
that some titles issued in the name of ASB be changed to MICO because those titles were
supposedly erroneously registered to ASB; and

4. Just on Serrano’s utterance and declaration which Espenesin readily believed because he
considered Serrano the representative of both parties, and without any other documentation to base
the amendment on, Espenesin erased the name of ASB on those specified titles and replaced it with
the name of MICO.

Espenesin, a Registrar of Deeds, relied on Serrano’s word alone that a supposed error has been
committed. Even if ownership of the units covered by the amended CCTs has not been categorically
declared as ASB’s given the ongoing dispute between the parties, the MOA which Espenesin had
previously referred to, allocates those units to ASB:

Section 4. Distribution and Disposition of Units. (a) As a return of its capital investment in the Project,
each party shall be entitled to such portion of all the net saleable area of the Building that their respective
contributions to the Project bear to the actual construction cost. As of the date of the execution hereof,
and on the basis of the total costs incurred to date in relation to the Remaining Construction Costs (as
defined in Section 9(a) hereof), the parties shall respectively be entitled to the following (which
entitlement shall be conditioned on, and subject to, adjustments as provided in sub-paragraph (b) of
Section 4 in the event that the actual remaining cost of construction exceeds the Remaining Construction
Cost):

(i) MICO – the net saleable area particularly described in Schedule 2 hereof.

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 (ii) ASB – the following net saleable area:

(A) the net saleable area which ASB had pre-sold for an aggregate purchase price of
₱640,085,267.30 as set forth in Schedule 1 (including all paid and unpaid proceeds of said pre-
sales);

(B) the net saleable area particularly described in Schedule 3 hereof which shall be delivered to ASB
upon completion of the Project; and,

(C) provided that the actual remaining construction costs do not exceed the Remaining Construction
Cost, the net saleable area particularly described in Schedule 4 hereof which shall be delivered to
ASB upon completion of the Project and determination of its actual construction costs. If the actual
remaining construction costs exceed the Remaining Construction Cost, sub-paragraph (b) of this
Section 4 shall apply.43

The MOA even recognizes and specifies that:

E. ASB has pre-sold a number of condominium units in the Project to certain buyers as set forth in
Schedule 1 hereof, and in order to protect the interests of these buyers and preserve the interest in the
Project, the goodwill and business reputation of Malayan, Malayan has proposed to complete the Project,
and ASB has accepted such proposal, subject to the terms and conditions contained herein, including the
contribution to the Project (a) by Malayan of the Lot and (b) by ASB of its interest as buyer under the
Contract to Sell.

xxxx

Section 3. Recognition of ASB’s Investment. The parties confirm that as of the date hereof, ASB invested
in the Project an amount equivalent to its entitlement to the net saleable area of the Building under
Section 4 below, including ASB’s interest as buyer under the Contract to Sell.44

One fact deserves emphasis. The ownership of the condominium units remains in dispute and, by
necessary inference, does not lie as well in MICO. By his baseless reliance on Serrano’s word and

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representation, Espenesin allowed MICO to gain an unwarranted advantage and benefit in the titling of the
38 units in The Malayan Tower.

That a prima facie case for gross negligence amounting to violation of Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic
Act No. 3019 exists is amply supported by the fact that Espenesin disregarded the well-established
practice necessitating submission of required documents for registration of property in the Philippines:

Documents Required for Registration of Real Property with the Register of Deeds:

1. Common Requirements

o Original copy of the Deed or Instrument (Original Copy + 2 duplicate copies)If the original copy
cannot be produced, the duplicate original or certified true copy shall be presented accompanied
with a sworn affidavit executed by the interested party why the original copy cannot be presented.

o Owner’s copy of the Certificate of Title or Co-owner’s copy if one has been issued. (Original Copy
+ 2 duplicate copies)

o Latest Tax Declaration if the property is an unregistered land. (Original Copy + 2 duplicate copies)

2. Specific Requirements

1. Deed of Sale/Transfer

xxxx

 For Corporation

1. Secretary’s Certificate or Board Resolution to Sell or Purchase (Original Copy + Duplicate

Copy)

2. Articles of Incorporation (for transferee corporation) (1 Certified Copy of the Original)

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 3. Certificate of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) that the Articles of
Incorporation had been registered . (1 Certified Copy of the Original)

4. For Condominium or Condominium Certificate of Transfer, affidavit/certificate of the

Condominium Corporation that the sale/transfer does not violate the 60-40 rule.(Original Copy
+ 1 Duplicate Copy)

5. Subsequent transfer of CCT requires Certificate of the Condominium Management. (Original

Copy)

6. Sale by a Corporation Sole, court order is required.(Original copy of the Court Order)

Additional Requirements

xxxx

11. Condominium Projects

 Master Deed (Original Copy + 1 Duplicate Copy)

 Declaration of Restriction (Original Copy + 1 Duplicate Copy)

 Diagrammatic Floor Plan (Original Copy + 1 Duplicate Copy)

If the Condominium Certificate of Title is issued for the first time in the name of the registered
owner, require the following:

o Certificate of Registration with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (Original Copy +
1 Duplicate Copy)

o Development Permit (Original Copy + 1 Duplicate Copy)

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 o License to Sell (Original Copy + 1 Duplicate Copy)45

Espenesin, by his own explanation, relied on nothing more than Serrano, who he "came to know and
considered as representative of both parties," and Serrano’s interpretation of the MOA that Serrano had
brought with him.

On the whole, there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that respondents Espenesin and
Serrano committed prohibited acts listed in Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019.

As regards Yuchengco and Cheng, apart from Ampil’s general assertions that the two, as officers of MICO,
benefited from the alteration of the CCTs, there is a dearth of evidence pointing to their collective
responsibility therefor. While the fact of alteration was admitted by respondents and was affirmed in the
Ombudsman’s finding of fact, there is nothing that directly links Yuchengco and Cheng to the act.

We are aware that the calibration of evidence to assess whether a prima facie graft case exists against
respondents is a question of fact. We have consistently held that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts,
more so in the consideration of the extraordinary writ of certiorari where neither questions of fact nor law
are entertained, but only questions of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion.46 In this
case, however, certiorari will lie, given that the Ombudsman made no finding at all on respondents
possible liability for violation of Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019.

We hasten to reiterate that we are only dealing herein with the preliminary investigation aspect of this
case. We do not adjudge respondents’ guilt or the lack thereof. The assertions of Espenesin and Serrano
on the former’s good faith in effecting the alteration and the pending arbitration case before the
Construction Industry Arbitration Commission involving the correct division of MICO’s and ASB’s net
saleable areas in The Malayan Tower are matters of defense which they should raise during trial of the
criminal case.

As regards the administrative liability of Espenesin, the basic principle in the law of public officers is the
three-fold liability rule, which states that the wrongful acts or omissions of a public officer, Espenesin in
these cases, may give rise to civil, criminal and administrative liability. An action for each can proceed
independently of the others.47

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On this point, we find that the appellate court erred when it affirmed the Ombudsman’s last ruling that
Espenesin is not administratively liable.

Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful
behavior or gross negligence by a public officer.48

In Grave Misconduct, as distinguished from Simple Misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to
violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rules, must be manifest49 and established by
substantial evidence. Grave Misconduct necessarily includes the lesser offense of Simple
Misconduct.50 Thus, a person charged with Grave Misconduct may be held liable for Simple Misconduct if
the misconduct does not involve any of the elements to qualify the misconduct as grave.51

In (G.R. No. 199115), the elements particular to Grave Misconduct are, by the Ombudsman’s own finding,
present. Corruption, as an element of Grave Misconduct, consists in the act of an official or fiduciary
person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some benefit for himself or
for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others.52 This has already been demonstrated as
discussed above. And, there is here a manifest disregard for established rules on land registration by a
Register of Deeds himself. As he himself admits in his letter, Espenesin erased the name of ASB on the
specified CCTs because he believed that Serrano’s request for the re-issuance thereof in MICO’s name
constituted simple error.

Section 108 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 provides:

Section 108. Amendment and alteration of certificates. No erasure, alteration, or amendment shall be
made upon the registration book after the entry of a certificate of title or of a memorandum thereon and
the attestation of the same be Register of Deeds, except by order of the proper Court of First Instance. A
registered owner of other person having an interest in registered property, or, in proper cases, the
Register of Deeds with the approval of the Commissioner of Land Registration, may apply by petition to
the court upon the ground that the registered interests of any description, whether vested, contingent,
expectant or inchoate appearing on the certificate, have terminated and ceased; or that new interest not
appearing upon the certificate have arisen or been created; or that an omission or error was made in
entering a certificate or any memorandum thereon, or, on any duplicate certificate; or that the same or

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any person on the certificate has been changed; or that the registered owner has married, or, if registered
as married, that the marriage has been terminated and no right or interests of heirs or creditors will
thereby be affected; or that a corporation which owned registered land and has been dissolved has not
convened the same within three years after its dissolution; or upon any other reasonable ground; and the
court may hear and determine the petition after notice to all parties in interest, and may order the entry
or cancellation of a new certificate, the entry or cancellation of a memorandum upon a certificate, or grant
any other relief upon such terms and conditions, requiring security or bond if necessary, as it may
consider proper; Provided, however, That this section shall not be construed to give the court authority to
reopen the judgment or decree of registration, and that nothing shall be done or ordered by the court
which shall impair the title or other interest of a purchaser holding a certificate for value and in good faith,
or his heirs and assigns, without his or their written consent. Where the owner's duplicate certificate is not
presented, a similar petition may be filed as provided in the preceding section.

The foregoing clearly speaks of a court order prior to any erasure, alteration or amendment upon a
certificate of title.

In reversing its prior ruling, the Ombudsman cavalierly dismisses the fact of Espenesin already signing the
CCTs issued in ASB’s name as "only a part of the issuance process because the final step in the titling
procedure is indeed the release of the certificate of title."53 The Ombudsman further ruled:

Considering that prior to the release of titles, Espenesin merely rectified what was represented to this
office as error in the preparation of typing or the certificates, hence, it is wrong to subject him to an
administrative sanction. This is bolstered by the fact that, at the time of release (and perhaps even up to
the present time), there was no final determination yet from the land registration court as to who has a
better right to the property in question.54 (Emphasis supplied).

This statement of the Ombudsman is virtually a declaration of Espenesin’s misconduct. It highlights

Espenesin’s awareness and knowledge that ASB and MICO are two different and separate entities, albeit
having entered into a joint venture for the building of "The Malayan Tower."

As Registrar of Deeds, Espenesin was duty bound to inquire and ascertain the reason for Serrano’s new
instruction on those specific set of CCTs and not just heed Serrano’s bidding. He heads the Office of

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Register of Deeds which is constituted by law as "a public repository of records of instruments affecting
registered or unregistered lands x x x in the province or city wherein such office is situated." He should
not have so easily taken Serrano’s word that the amendment Serrano sought was to correct simple and
innocuous error. Espenesin could have then easily asked, as he is obliged to, for a contract or an
authenticated writing to ascertain which units and parking slots were really allotted for ASB and MICO. His
actions would then be based on what is documented and not merely by a lame claim of bona fides
mistake.

Moreover, Espenesin was previously presented a MOA, and consulted this same MOA, in the initial
preparation and issuance of the 38 CCTs in ASB’s name. Certainly, a Registrar of Deeds who is required by
law to be a member of the legal profession,55 possesses common sense and prudence to ask for
documents on which to base his corrections. Reliance on the mere word of even the point person for the
transaction, smacks of gross negligence when all transactions with the Office of the Register of Deeds,
involving as it does registration of property, ought to be properly recorded and documented.

That the Office of the Register of Deeds requires documentation in the registration of property, whether as
an original or a subsequent registration, brooks no argument. Again, and it cannot be overlooked that,
Espenesin initially referred to a MOA albeit Serrano worked on the registration transaction for both ASB
and MICO. Subsequently, Serrano returns, bearing ostensible authority to transact even for ASB, and
Espenesin fails to ask for documentation for the correction Serrano sought to be made, and simply relies
on Serrano’s word.

We are baffled by the Registrar of Deeds’ failure to require documentation which would serve as his basis
for the correction. The amendment sought by Serrano was not a mere clerical change of registered name;
it was a substantial one, changing ownership of 38 units in The Malayan Tower from one entity, ASB, to
another, MICO. Even just at Serrano’s initial request for correction of the CCTs, a red flag should have
gone up for a Registrar of Deeds.1âwphi1

Espenesin splits hairs when he claims that it is "in the Registration Book where the prohibition to erase,
alter, or amend, without court order, applies." We disagree with Espenesin. Chapter IV on Certificate of
Title of Presidential Decree No. 1529,56 specifically Sections 40, 42 and 43 belie the claim of Espenesin:

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Section 40. Entry of Original Certificate of Title. Upon receipt by the Register of Deeds of the original and
duplicate copies of the original certificate of title the same shall be entered in his record book and shall be
numbered, dated, signed and sealed by the Register of Deeds with the seal of his office. Said certificate of
title shall take effect upon the date of entry thereof. The Register of Deeds shall forthwith send notice by
mail to the registered owner that his owner's duplicate is ready for delivery to him upon payment of legal
fees.

Section 42. Registration Books. The original copy of the original certificate of title shall be filed in the
Registry of Deeds. The same shall be bound in consecutive order together with similar certificates of title
and shall constitute the registration book for titled properties.

Section 43. Transfer Certificate of Title. The subsequent certificate of title that may be issued by the
Register of Deeds pursuant to any voluntary or involuntary instrument relating to the same land shall be
in like form, entitled "Transfer Certificate of Title", and likewise issued in duplicate. The certificate shall
show the number of the next previous certificate covering the same land and also the fact that it was
originally registered, giving the record number, the number of the original certificate of title, and the
volume and page of the registration book in which the latter is found.

Recording or entry of the titles, whether an original or a subsequent transfer certificate of title in the
record, is simultaneous with the signing by the Register of Deeds. The signature on the certificate by the
Registrar of Deeds is accompanied by the dating, numbering and sealing of the certificate. All these are
part of a single registration process. Where there has been a completed entry in the Record Book, as in
this case where the Ombudsman found that "the signature of Espenesin is already affixed on the CCTs,
and on its face, it was explicitly declared that the titles have already been entered in the Registration Book
of the Register of Deeds of Pasig City on March 11, 2005 at 11:55 a.m.," the Register of Deeds can no
longer tamper with entries, specially the very name of the titleholder. The law says that the certificate of
title shall take effect upon the date of entry thereof.

To further drive home the point, as Registrar of Deeds, Espenesin knew full well that "there is no final
determination yet from the land registration court as to who has a better right to the property in
question." Espenesin’s attempt to minimize the significance of a Registrar of Deed’s signature on a CCT
only aggravates the lack of prudence in his action. The change in the titleholder in the CCTs from ASB to

140
MICO was an official documentation of a change of ownership. It definitely cannot be characterized as
simple error.

Grave misconduct, of which Espenesin has been charged, consists in a public officer’s deliberate violation
of a rule of law or standard of behavior. It is regarded as grave when the elements of corruption, clear
intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rules are present.57 In particular, corruption
as an element of grave misconduct consists in the official’s unlawful and wrongful use of his station or
character to procure some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of
others.58

In sum, the actions of Espenesin clearly demonstrate a disregard of well-known legal rules.59 The penalty
for Grave Misconduct is dismissalfrom service with the accessory penalties of forfeiture of retirement
benefits, cancellation of eligibility, and perpetual disqualification from reemployment in the government
service, including government-owned or controlled corporation.60

WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 192685 is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Resolution of the Ombudsman
dated 30 April 2008 in OMB-C-C-07-0444-J is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Ombudsman is hereby
directed to file the necessary Information for violation of Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019
against public respondent Policarpio L. Espenesin and private respondent Francis Serrano.

The petition in G.R. No. 199115 is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 28 September
2011 in CA-G.R. SP No. 113171 and the Order dated 13 July 2009 of the Ombudsman in OMB-C-A-07-
0474-J are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Policarpio L. Espenesin is GUlLTY of Grave Misconduct
and we, thus, impose the penalty of DIMISSAL from service. However, due to his retirement from the
service, we order forfeiture of all his retirement pay and benefits.

G.R. No. 200804 January 22, 2014

A.L. ANG NETWORK, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
EMMA MONDEJAR, accompanied by her husband, EFREN MONDEJAR, Respondent.

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 RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This is a direct recourse1 to the Court from the Decision2 dated November 23, 2011and Order3 dated
February 16, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 45 (RTC) in RTC Case No. 11-13833
which dismissed, on the ground of improper remedy, petitioner A.L. Ang Network, Inc.'s (petitioner)
petition for certiorari from the Decision4 dated June 10, 2011 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of
Bacolod City, Branch 4 (MTCC) in Civil Case No. SCC-1436, a small claims case for sum of money against
respondent Emma Mondejar (respondent).

The Facts

On March 23, 2011, petitioner filed a complaint5 for sum of money under the Rule of Procedure for Small
Claims Cases6 before the MTCC, seeking to collect from respondent the amount of ₱23,111.71 which
represented her unpaid water bills for the period June 1, 2002 to September 30, 2005. 7

Petitioner claimed that it was duly authorized to supply water to and collect payment therefor from the
homeowners of Regent Pearl Subdivision, one of whom is respondent who owns and occupies Lot 8, Block
3 of said subdivision. From June 1, 2002 until September 30, 2005, respondent and her family consumed
a total of 1,150 cubic meters (cu. m.) of water, which upon application of the agreed rate of ₱113.00 for
every 10 cu. m. of water, plus an additional charge of ₱11.60 for every additional cu. m. of water,
amounted to ₱28,580.09.8 However, respondent only paid the amount of ₱5,468.38, thus, leaving a
balance of ₱23,111.71 which was left unpaid despite petitioner’s repeated demands.9

In defense, respondent contended that since April 1998 up to February 2003, she religiously paid
petitioner the agreed monthly flat rate of ₱75.00 for her water consumption. Notwithstanding their
agreement that the same would be adjusted only upon prior notice to the homeowners, petitioner
unilaterally charged her unreasonable and excessive adjustments (at the average of 40 cu. m. of water
per month or 1.3 cu. m. of water a day) far above the average daily water consumption for a household of
only 3 persons. She also questioned the propriety and/or basis of the aforesaid ₱23,111.71 claim.10

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In the interim, petitioner disconnected respondent’s water line for not paying the adjusted water charges
since March 2003 up to August 2005.11

The MTCC Ruling

On June 10, 2011, the MTCC rendered a Decision12 holding that since petitioner was issued a Certificate of
Public Convenience (CPC)13 by the National Water Resources Board (NWRB) only on August 7, 2003,
then, it can only charge respondent the agreed flat rate of ₱75.00 per month prior thereto or the sum of
₱1,050.00 for the period June 1, 2002 to August 7, 2003. Thus, given that respondent had made total
payments equivalent to ₱1,685.99 for the same period, she should be considered to have fully paid
petitioner.14

The MTCC disregarded petitioner’s reliance on the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board’s (HLURB)
Decision15 dated August 17, 2000 in HLURB Case No. REM C6-00-001 entitled Nollie B. Apura, et al. v.
Dona Carmen I Subdivision, et al., as source of its authority to impose new water consumption rates for
water consumed from June 1, 2002 to August 7, 2003 in the absence of proof (a) that petitioner complied
with the directive to inform the HLURB of the result of its consultation with the concerned homeowners as
regards the rates to be charged, and (b) that the HLURB approved of the same.16

Moreover, the MTCC noted that petitioner failed to submit evidence showing (a) the exact date when it
actually began imposing the NWRB approved rates; and (b) that the parties had a formal agreement
containing the terms and conditions thereof, without which it cannot establish with certainty respondent’s
obligation.17 Accordingly, it ruled that the earlier agreed rate of ₱75.00 per month should still be the basis
for respondent’s water consumption charges for the period August 8, 2003 to September 30,
2005.18 Based on petitioner’s computation, respondent had only paid ₱300.00 of her ₱1,500.00 obligation
for said period. Thus, it ordered respondent to pay petitioner the balance thereof, equivalent to ₱1,200.00
with legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum from date of receipt of the extrajudicial demand on
October 14, 2010 until fully paid.19

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari20 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the RTC,
ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MTCC in finding that it (petitioner) failed to establish

143
with certainty respondent’s obligation, and in not ordering the latter to pay the full amount sought to be
collected.

The RTC Ruling

On November 23, 2011, the RTC issued a Decision21 dismissing the petition for certiorari, finding that the
said petition was only filed to circumvent the non-appealable nature of small claims cases as provided
under Section 2322 of the Rule of Procedure on Small Claims Cases. To this end, the RTC ruled that it
cannot supplant the decision of the MTCC with another decision directing respondent to pay petitioner a
bigger sum than that which has been awarded.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration23 but was denied in an Order24 dated February 16, 2012, hence, the
instant petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The sole issue in this case is whether or not the RTC erred in dismissing petitioner’s recourse under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court assailing the propriety of the MTCC Decision in the subject small claims case.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

Section 23 of the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases states that:

SEC. 23. Decision. — After the hearing, the court shall render its decision on the same day, based on the
facts established by the evidence (Form 13-SCC). The decision shall immediately be entered by the Clerk
of Court in the court docket for civil cases and a copy thereof forthwith served on the parties.

The decision shall be final and unappealable.

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Considering the final nature of a small claims case decision under the above-stated rule, the remedy of
appeal is not allowed, and the prevailing party may, thus, immediately move for its
execution.25 Nevertheless, the proscription on appeals in small claims cases, similar to other proceedings
where appeal is not an available remedy,26 does not preclude the aggrieved party from filing a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. This general rule has been enunciated in the case of Okada
v. Security Pacific Assurance Corporation,27 wherein it was held that:

In a long line of cases, the Court has consistently ruled that "the extraordinary writ of certiorari is always
available where there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law." In Jaca v. Davao Lumber Co., the Court ruled:

x x x Although Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that the special civil action of certiorari
may only be invoked when "there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course
of law," this rule is not without exception. The availability of the ordinary course of appeal does not
constitute sufficient ground to prevent a party from making use of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari
where appeal is not an adequate remedy or equally beneficial, speedy and sufficient. It is the inadequacy
– not the mere absence – of all other legal remedies and the danger of failure of justice without the writ
that usually determines the propriety of certiorari.

This ruling was reiterated in Conti v. Court of Appeals:

Truly, an essential requisite for the availability of the extraordinary remedies under the Rules is an
absence of an appeal nor any "plain, speedy and adequate remedy" in the ordinary course of law, one
which has been so defined as a "remedy which (would) equally (be) beneficial, speedy and sufficient not
merely a remedy which at some time in the future will bring about a revival of the judgment x x x
complained of in the certiorari proceeding, but a remedy which will promptly relieve the petitioner from
the injurious effects of that judgment and the acts of the inferior court or tribunal" concerned. x x x
(Emphasis supplied)

In this relation, it may not be amiss to placate the RTC’s apprehension that respondent’s recourse before
it (was only filed to circumvent the non-appealable nature of [small claims cases], because it asks [the
court] to supplant the decision of the lower [c]ourt with another decision directing the private respondent

145
to pay the petitioner a bigger sum than what has been awarded."28 Verily, a petition for certiorari, unlike
an appeal, is an original action29 designed to correct only errors of jurisdiction and not of judgment. Owing
to its nature, it is therefore incumbent upon petitioner to establish that jurisdictional errors tainted the
MTCC Decision. The RTC, in turn, could either grant or dismiss the petition based on an evaluation of
whether or not the MTCC gravely abused its discretion by capriciously, whimsically, or arbitrarily
disregarding evidence that is material to the controversy.30

In view of the foregoing, the Court thus finds that petitioner correctly availed of the remedy of certiorari to
assail the propriety of the MTCC Decision in the subject small claims case, contrary to the RTC’s ruling.

Likewise, the Court finds that petitioner filed the said petition before the proper forum (i.e., the
RTC).1âwphi1 To be sure, the Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent
jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari.31 Such concurrence of jurisdiction, however, does not give a party
unbridled freedom to choose the venue of his action lest he ran afoul of the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts. Instead, a becoming regard for judicial hierarchy dictates that petitions for the issuance of writs of
certiorari against first level courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the
latter, with the Court of Appeals, before resort may be had before the Court.32 This procedure is also in
consonance with Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.33

Hence, considering that small claims cases are exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts,34 certiorari petitions assailing its dispositions should be filed before their corresponding Regional
Trial Courts. This petitioner complied with when it instituted its petition for certiorari before the RTC
which, as previously mentioned, has jurisdiction over the same. In fine, the RTC erred in dismissing the
said petition on the ground that it was an improper remedy, and, as such, RTC Case No. 11-13833 must
be reinstated and remanded thereto for its proper disposition.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 23, 2011 and Resolution dated
February 16, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 45 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
RTC Case No. 11-13833 is hereby REINSTATED and the court a quo is ordered to resolve the same with
dispatch.

146
SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 190566 December 11, 2013

MARK JEROME S. MAGLALANG, Petitioner,

vs.
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR), as represented by its
incumbent Chairman EFRAIM GENUINO, Respondent.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before this Court is a petition1 for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
as amended, seeking the reversal of the Resolution2 dated September 30, 2009 issued by the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA"".G.R. SP No. 110048, which outrightly dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by
herein petitioner Mark Jerome S. Maglalang (petitioner). Also assailed is the appellate court's
Resolution3 dated November 26, 2009 which denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

The facts follow.

Petitioner was a teller at the Casino Filipino, Angeles City Branch, Angeles City, which was operated by
respondent Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), a government-owned or controlled
corporation existing by virtue of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1869.4

Petitioner alleged that in the afternoon of December 13, 2008, while he was performing his functions as
teller, a lady customer identified later as one Cecilia Nakasato5 (Cecilia) approached him in his booth and
handed to him an undetermined amount of cash consisting of mixed ₱1,000.00 and ₱500.00 bills. There
were 45 ₱1,000.00 and ten ₱500.00 bills for the total amount of ₱50,000.00. Following casino procedure,
petitioner laid the bills on the spreading board. However, he erroneously spread the bills into only four

147
clusters instead of five clusters worth ₱10,000.00 per cluster. He then placed markers for ₱10,000.00 each
cluster of cash and declared the total amount of ₱40,000.00 to Cecilia. Perplexed, Cecilia asked petitioner
why the latter only dished out ₱40,000.00. She then pointed to the first cluster of bills and requested
petitioner to check the first cluster which she observed to be thicker than the others. Petitioner performed
a recount and found that the said cluster contained 20 pieces of ₱1,000.00 bills. Petitioner apologized to
Cecilia and rectified the error by declaring the full and correct amount handed to him by the latter.
Petitioner, however, averred that Cecilia accused him of trying to shortchange her and that petitioner tried
to deliberately fool her of her money. Petitioner tried to explain, but Cecilia allegedly continued to berate
and curse him. To ease the tension, petitioner was asked to take a break. After ten minutes, petitioner
returned to his booth. However, Cecilia allegedly showed up and continued to berate petitioner. As a
result, the two of them were invited to the casino’s Internal Security Office in order to air their respective
sides. Thereafter, petitioner was required to file an Incident Report which he submitted on the same day
of the incident.6

On January 8, 2009, petitioner received a Memorandum7 issued by the casino’s Branch Manager,
Alexander Ozaeta, informing him that he was being charged with Discourtesy towards a casino customer
and directing him to explain within 72 hours upon receipt of the memorandum why he should not be
sanctioned or dismissed. In compliance therewith, petitioner submitted a letter-explanation8 dated
January 10, 2009.

On March 31, 2009, petitioner received another Memorandum9 dated March 19, 2009, stating that the
Board of Directors of PAGCOR found him guilty of Discourtesy towards a casino customer and imposed on
him a 30-day suspension for this first offense. Aggrieved, on April 2, 2009, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration10 seeking a reversal of the board’s decision and further prayed in the alternative that if he
is indeed found guilty as charged, the penalty be only a reprimand as it is the appropriate penalty. During
the pendency of said motion, petitioner also filed a Motion for Production11 dated April 20, 2009, praying
that he be furnished with copies of documents relative to the case including the recommendation of the
investigating committee and the Decision/Resolution of the Board supposedly containing the latter’s
factual findings. In a letter-reply12 dated June 2, 2009, one Atty. Carlos R. Bautista, Jr. who did not
indicate his authority therein to represent PAGCOR, denied the said motion. Petitioner received said letter-
reply on June 17, 2009.

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Subsequently, on June 18, 2009, PAGCOR issued a Memorandum13 dated June 18, 2009 practically
reiterating the contents of its March 19, 2009 Memorandum. Attached therewith is another
Memorandum14 dated June 8, 2009 issued by PAGCOR’s Assistant Vice President for Human Resource and
Development, Atty. Lizette F. Mortel, informing petitioner that the Board of Directors in its meeting on
May 13, 2009 resolved to deny his appeal for reconsideration for lack of merit. Petitioner received said
memoranda on the same date of June 18, 2009.

On August 17, 2009, petitioner filed a petition15 for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, before the CA, averring that there is no evidence, much less factual and legal
basis to support the finding of guilt against him. Moreover, petitioner ascribed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction to the acts of PAGCOR in adjudging him guilty of the charge, in
failing to observe the proper procedure in the rendition of its decision and in imposing the harsh penalty of
a 30-day suspension. Justifying his recourse to the CA, petitioner explained that he did not appeal to the
Civil Service Commission (CSC) because the penalty imposed on him was only a 30-day suspension which
is not within the CSC’s appellate jurisdiction. He also claimed that discourtesy in the performance of
official duties is classified as a light offense which is punishable only by reprimand.

In its assailed Resolution16 dated September 30, 2009, the CA outrightly dismissed the petition for
certiorari for being premature as petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking
recourse from the CA. Invoking Section 2(1), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution,17 the CA held that the
CSC has jurisdiction over issues involving the employer-employee relationship in all branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters such as PAGCOR. Petitioner filed his Motion for
Reconsideration18 which the CA denied in the assailed Resolution19 dated November 26, 2009. In denying
the said motion, the CA relied on this Court’s ruling in Duty Free Philippines v. Mojica20 citing Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corp. v. CA,21 where this Court held as follows:

It is now settled that, conformably to Article IX-B, Section 2(1), [of the 1987 Constitution] government-
owned or controlled corporations shall be considered part of the Civil Service only if they have original
charters, as distinguished from those created under general law.

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PAGCOR belongs to the Civil Service because it was created directly by PD 1869 on July 11, 1983.
Consequently, controversies concerning the relations of the employee with the management of PAGCOR
should come under the jurisdiction of the Merit System Protection Board and the Civil Service Commission,
conformably to the Administrative Code of 1987.

Section 16(2) of the said Code vest[s] in the Merit System Protection Board the power inter alia to:

a) Hear and decide on appeal administrative cases involving officials and employees of the Civil Service.
Its decision shall be final except those involving dismissal or separation from the service which may be
appealed to the Commission.

Hence, this petition where petitioner argues that the CA committed grave and substantial error of
judgment

1. IN OUTRIGHTLY DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED BY PETITIONER AND IN

DENYING THE LATTER’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION[;]

2. IN RULING THAT THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION HAS APPELLATE JURISDICTION OVER THE
SUSPENSION OF THE PETITIONER DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE PENALTY INVOLVED IS NOT MORE
THAN THIRTY (30) DAYS[;]

3. IN RESOLVING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED BY PETITIONER IN A MANNER WHICH IS

UTTERLY CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE[;]

4. IN UNJUSTIFIABLY REFUSING TO RENDER A DECISION AS TO THE PROPRIETY OR VALIDITY OF

THE SUSPENSION OF THE PETITIONER BY THE RESPONDENT[;]

5. IN UNDULY REFUSING TO RENDER A DECISION DECLARING THAT THE ASSAILED

DECISIONS/RESOLUTIONS OF THE RESPONDENT ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON
RECORD[; AND]

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 6. IN UNJUSTIFIABLY REFUSING TO RENDER A DECISION DECLARING THAT THE ASSAILED
DECISIONS/RESOLUTIONS OF RESPONDENT WERE ISSUED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION.22

Petitioner claims that the CA clearly overlooked the applicable laws and jurisprudence that provide that
when the penalty involved in an administrative case is suspension for not more than 30 days, the CSC has
no appellate jurisdiction over the said administrative case. As authority, petitioner invokes our ruling in
Geronga v. Hon. Varela23 which cited Section 47,24 Chapter 1, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of Executive
Order (E.O.) No. 292 otherwise known as The Administrative Code of 1987. Said Section 47 provides that
the CSC may entertain appeals only, among others, from a penalty of suspension of more than 30 days.
Petitioner asserts that his case, involving a 30-day suspension penalty, is not appealable to the CSC.
Thus, he submits that his case was properly brought before the CA via a petition for certiorari.25

On the other hand, PAGCOR alleges that petitioner intentionally omitted relevant matters in his statement
of facts. PAGCOR essentially claims that petitioner refused to apologize to Cecilia; that he treated Cecilia’s
complaint with arrogance; and that before taking the aforementioned 10-minute break, petitioner
slammed the cash to the counter window in giving it back to the customer. PAGCOR argues that the
instant petition raises questions of fact which are not reviewable in a petition for review on certiorari.
PAGCOR maintains that the CA’s ruling was in accordance with law and jurisprudence. Moreover, PAGCOR
counters that petitioner’s remedy of appeal is limited as Section 37 of the Revised Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service provides that a decision rendered by heads of agencies whereby
a penalty of suspension for not more than 30 days is imposed shall be final and executory. PAGCOR opines
that such intent of limiting appeals over such minor offenses is elucidated in the Concurring Opinion of
former Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in CSC v. Dacoycoy26 and based on the basic premise that appeal is
merely a statutory privilege. Lastly, PAGCOR submits that the 30-day suspension meted on petitioner is
justified under its own Code of Discipline.27 Prescinding from the foregoing, the sole question for resolution
is: Was the CA correct in outrightly dismissing the petition for certiorari filed before it on the ground of
non-exhaustion of administrative remedies?

We resolve the question in the negative.

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Our ruling in Public Hearing Committee of the Laguna Lake Development Authority v. SM Prime Holdings,
Inc.28 on the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is instructive, to wit:

Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is allowed to seek the
intervention of the court, he or she should have availed himself or herself of all the means of
administrative processes afforded him or her. Hence, if resort to a remedy within the administrative
machinery can still be made by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on
a matter that comes within his or her jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the
court's judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of the intervention of the court is fatal to
one’s cause of action. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is based on practical and
legal reasons. The availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier
disposition of controversies. Furthermore, the courts of justice, for reasons of comity and convenience, will
shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied
with, so as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and dispose
of the case.

However, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute as it admits of the
following exceptions:

(1) when there is a violation of due process; (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question; (3)
when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; (4) when
there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned; (5) when there is irreparable injury;
(6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the
implied and assumed approval of the latter; (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies
would be unreasonable; (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim; (9) when the subject
matter is a private land in land case proceedings; (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention,
and unreasonable delay would greatly prejudice the complainant; (12) where no administrative review is
provided by law; (13) where the rule of qualified political agency applies and (14) where the issue of non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot.29

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The case before us falls squarely under exception number 12 since the law per se provides no
administrative review for administrative cases whereby an employee like petitioner is covered by Civil
Service law, rules and regulations and penalized with a suspension for not more than 30 days.

Section 37 (a) and (b) of P.D. No. 807, otherwise known as the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines,
provides for the unavailability of any appeal:

Section 37. Disciplinary Jurisdiction.

(a) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary cases involving the
imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding
thirty days’ salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from Office. A
complaint may be filed directly with the Commission by a private citizen against a government
official or employee in which case it may hear and decide the case or it may deputize any
department or agency or official or group of officials to conduct the investigation. The results of the
investigation shall be submitted to the Commission with recommendation as to the penalty to be
imposed or other action to be taken.

(b) The heads of departments, agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities and municipalities
shall have jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary action against officers
and employees under their jurisdiction. Their decisions shall be final in case the penalty imposed is
suspension for not more than thirty days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days’ salary. In
case the decision rendered by a bureau or office head is appealable to the Commission, the same
may be initially appealed to the department and finally to the Commission and pending appeal, the
same shall be executory except when the penalty is removal, in which case the same shall be
executory only after confirmation by the department head. (Emphasis supplied.)

Similar provisions are reiterated in the aforequoted Section 4730 of E.O. No. 292 essentially providing that
cases of this sort are not appealable to the CSC. Correlatively, we are not unaware of the Concurring
Opinion of then Chief Justice Puno in CSC v. Dacoycoy,31 where he opined, to wit:

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In truth, the doctrine barring appeal is not categorically sanctioned by the Civil Service Law.1âwphi1 For
what the law declares as "final" are decisions of heads of agencies involving suspension for not more than
thirty (30) days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty (30) days salary. But there is a clear policy
reason for declaring these decisions final. These decisions involve minor offenses. They are numerous for
they are the usual offenses committed by government officials and employees. To allow their multiple
level appeal will doubtless overburden the quasijudicial machinery of our administrative system and defeat
the expectation of fast and efficient action from these administrative agencies. Nepotism, however, is not
a petty offense. Its deleterious effect on government cannot be over-emphasized. And it is a stubborn
evil. The objective should be to eliminate nepotic acts, hence, erroneous decisions allowing nepotism
cannot be given immunity from review, especially judicial review. It is thus non sequitur to contend that
since some decisions exonerating public officials from minor offenses can not be appealed, ergo, even a
decision acquitting a government official from a major offense like nepotism cannot also be appealed.

Nevertheless, decisions of administrative agencies which are declared final and unappealable by law are
still subject to judicial review. In Republic of the Phils. v. Francisco,32 we held:

Since the decision of the Ombudsman suspending respondents for one (1) month is final and
unappealable, it follows that the CA had no appellate jurisdiction to review, rectify or reverse the same.
The Ombudsman was not estopped from asserting in this Court that the CA had no appellate jurisdiction
to review and reverse the decision of the Ombudsman via petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court. This is not to say that decisions of the Ombudsman cannot be questioned. Decisions of
administrative or quasi-administrative agencies which are declared by law final and
unappealable are subject to judicial review if they fail the test of arbitrariness, or upon proof of
gross abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law. When such administrative or quasi-judicial bodies
grossly misappreciate evidence of such nature as to compel a contrary conclusion, the Court will not
hesitate to reverse the factual findings. Thus, the decision of the Ombudsman may be reviewed,
modified or reversed via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, on a finding
that it had no jurisdiction over the complaint, or of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction.It bears stressing that the judicial recourse petitioner availed of in this
case before the CA is a special civil action for certiorari ascribing grave abuse of discretion, amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of PAGCOR, not an appeal. Suffice it to state that an appeal and a
special civil action such as certiorari under Rule 65 are entirely distinct and separate from each other. One

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cannot file petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules where appeal is available, even if the ground
availed of is grave abuse of discretion. A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 lies only when
there is no appeal, or plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Certiorari cannot
be allowed when a party to a case fails to appeal a judgment despite the availability of that remedy, as
the same should not be a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal. The remedies of appeal and certiorari
are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive.33

In sum, there being no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law in
view of petitioner's allegation that P AGCOR has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the CA's outright dismissal of the petition
for certiorari on the basis of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies is bereft of any legal standing and
should therefore be set aside.

Finally, as a rule, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is valid only when the question involved is an error
of jurisdiction, or when there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of the court or tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions. Hence, courts exercising certiorari
jurisdiction should refrain from reviewing factual assessments of the respondent court or agency.
Occasionally, however, they are constrained to wade into factual matters when the evidence on record
does not support those factual findings; or when too much is concluded, inferred or deduced from the bare
or incomplete facts appearing on record.34 Considering the circumstances and since this Court is not a trier
of facts, 35 remand of this case to the CA for its judicious resolution is in order.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Resolutions dated September 30, 2009 and November
26, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 110048 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
instant case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-46306 February 27, 1979

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MARIANO C. CASTAÑEDA, JR., as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga,
Branch III, and BENJAMIN F. MANALOTO, respondents.

Fiscal Regidor Y Aglipay and Special Counsel Vicente Macalino for petitioner.

Moises Sevilla Ocampo for private petitioner.

Cicero J. Punzalan for respondent.

SANTOS, J.:

On the basis of the complaint 1 of his wife, Victoria M. Manaloto, herein private respondent Benjamin
Manaloto was charged before the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, presided by respondent Judge,
Hon. Mariano C. Castaneda Jr., with the crime of Falsification of Public Document committed, according to
the Information, as follows:

That on or about the 19th day of May, 1975, in the Municipality of San Fernando, province of
Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named a
BENJAMIN F. MANALOTO, with deliberate intent to commit falsification, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously counterfeit, imitate and forge the signature of his spouse
Victoria M. Manaloto in a deed of sale executed by said accused wherein he sold a house and
lot belonging to the conjugal partnership of said spouse in favor of Ponciano Lacsamana under
Doc. No. 1957, Page No. 72, Book No. LVII, Series of 1975, notarized by Notary Public
Abraham Pa. Gorospe, thereby making it appear that his spouse Victoria M. Manaloto gave her
marital consent to said sale when in fact and in truth she did not. 2

At the trial, the prosecution called the complaint-wife to the witness stand but the defense moved to
disqualify her as a witness, invoking Sec. 20, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules Of Court which provides:

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 SEC. 20. Disqualification by reason of interest or relationship — The following persons cannot
testify as to matters in which they are interested, directly or indirectly as herein enumerated.

xxx xxx xxx

(b) A husband can not be examined for or at his wife without her consent; nor a wife for or
against her husband without his consent, except in a civil case by one against the other or in a
criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other.

The prosecution opposed said motion to disquality on the ground that the case falls under the exception to
the rule, contending that it is a "criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other."
Notwithstanding such opposition, respondent Judge granted the motion, disqualifying Victoria Manaloto
from testifying for or against her husband, in an order dated March 31, 1977. A motion for reconsideration
petition was filed but was denied by respondent Judge in an order dated May 19, 1977.

Hence, this petition for certiorari file by the office of the Provincial Fiscal, on behalf of the People of the
Philippines, seeking set aside the aforesaid order of the respondent Judge and praying that a preliminary
injunction or a ternporary restraining order be issued by this Court enjoining said judge from further
proceeding with the trial of aforesaid Criminal Case No. 1011.

On June 20, 1977, this Court resolved — (a) to issue a temporary restraining order, and (b) to require the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the petitioner. 3 The Office of the Solicitor General filed its
Notice of Appearance on June 27, 1977, 4 and its Memorandum in support of the Petition on August 30,
1977. 5 The respondents filed their Memorandum on September 5, 1977. 6 Whereupon, the case was
considered submitted for decision. 7

From the foregoing factual and procedural antecedents emerges the sole issues determinative of the
instant petition, to wit: Whether or not the criminal case for Falsification of Public Document filed against
herein private respondent Benjamin F. Manaloto — who allegedly forged the signature of his wife, Victoria
M. Manaloto, in a deed of sale, thereby making it appear that the latter gave her marital consent to the
sale of a house and lot belonging to their conjugal partnership when in fact and in truth she did not —

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may be considered as a criminal case for a crime committed by a husband against his wife and, therefore,
an exception to the rule on marital disqualification.

We sustain petitioner's stand that the case is an exception to the marital disqualification rule, as a criminal
case for a crime committed by the accused-husband against the witness-wife.

1. The act complained of as constituting the crime of Falsification of Public Document is the forgery by the
accused of his wife's signature in a deed of sale, thereby making it appear therein that said wife consented
to the sale of a house and lot belonging to their conjugal partnership when in fact and in truth she did not.
It must be noted that had the sale of the said house and lot, and the signing of the wife's name by her
husband in the deed of sale, been made with the consent of the wife, no crime could have been charged
against said husband Clearly, therefore, it is the husband's breach of his wife's confidence which gave rise
to the offense charged. And it is this same breach of trust which prompted the wife to make the necessary
complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal which, accordingly, filed the aforesaid criminal case with
the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. To rule, therefore, that such criminal case is not one for a crime
committed by one spouse against the other is to advance a conclusion which completely disregards the
factual antecedents of the instant case.

2. This is not the first time that the issue of whether a specific offense may be classified as a crime
committed by one spouse against the other is presented to this Court for resolution. Thus, in the case
of Ordoño v. Daquigan, 8 this Court, through Mr. Justice Ramon C. Aquino, set up the criterion to be
followed in resolving the issue, stating that:

We think that the correct rule, which may be adopted in this jurisdiction, is that laid down in Cargill v.
State, 35 ALR, 133, 220, Pac 64,26 OkL 314, wherein the court said:

The rule that the injury must amount to a physical wrong upon the is too narrow; and the rule
that any offense remotely or indirectly affecting domestic within the exception is too broad.
The better rule is that, WHEN AN OFFENSE DIRECTLY ATTACKS, OR DIRECTLY AND VITALLY
IMPAIRS, THE CONJUGAL RELATION, IT COMES WITHIN THE EXCEPTION to the statute that
one shall not be a witness against the other except in a criminal prosecution for a crime
committed (by) one against the other.

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Applying the foregoing criterion in said case of Ordoño v. Daquigan this Court held that the rape
committed by the husband of the witness-wife against their daughter was a crime committed by the
husband against his wife. Although the victim of the crime committed by the accused in that can was not
his wife but their daughter, this Court, nevertheless, applied the exception for the reason that said
criminal act "Positively undermine(d) the connubial relationship. 9

With more reason must the exception apply to the instant case where the victim of the crime and the
person who stands to be directly prejudiced by the falsification is not a third person but the wife herself.
And it is undeniable that the act comp of had the effect of directly and vitally impairing the conjugal
relation. This is apparent not only in the act Of the wife in personally lodging her complaint with the Office
of the Provincial Fiscal, but also in her insistent efforts 10 in connection with the instant petition, which
seeks to set aside the order disqualified her from testifying against her husband. Taken collectively, the
actuations of the witness-wife underacore the fact that the martial and domestic relations between her
and the accused-husband have become so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved said
nor peace and tranquility which may be disturbed. In such a case, as We have occasion to point out in
previous decisions, "identity of interests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on that
Identity is nonexistent. Likewise, in such a situation, the security and confidence of private life which the
law aims at protecting will be nothing but Ideals which, through their absence, merely leave a void in the
unhappy home. 11 Thus, there is no reason to apply the martial disqualification rule.

3. Finally, overriding considerations of public policy demand that the wife should not be disqualified from
testifying against her husband in the instant case. For, as aptly observed by the Solicitor General," (t)o
espouse the contrary view would spawn the dangerous precedent of a husband committing as many
falsifications against his wife as he could conjure, seeking shelter in the anti-marital privilege as a license
to injure and prejudice her in secret — all with unabashed and complete impunity.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the order of the lower court dated March 31, 1977, disqualifying
Victoria Manaloto from testifying for or against her husband, Benjamin Manaloto, in Criminal Case No.
1011, as well as the order dated May 19, 1977, denying the motion for reconsideration are hereby SET
ASIDE. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court is hereby lifted and the respondent Judge is
hereby ordered to proceed with the trial of the case, allowing Victoria Manaloto to testify against her
husband.

159
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 110280 October 12, 1993

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES BOARD OF REGENTS and DR. OLIVIA C. CAOILI in her
capacity as Secretary of the Board, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ELSIE LIGOT-TELAN in her capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 87, Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City and RAMON P. NADAL, respondents.

U.P. Office of Legal Services for petitioners.

Bonifacio A. Alentajon for private respondent.

ROMERO, J.:

In an effort to make the University of the Philippines (U.P.) truly the university of the people, the U.P.
administration conceptualized and implemented the socialized scheme of tuition fee payments through the
Socialized Tuition Fee and Assistance Program (STFAP), popularly known as the "Iskolar ng Bayan"
program. Spawned by the public clamor to overcome what was perceived as the sharpening elitist profile
of the U.P studentry, the STFAP aspired to expand the coverage of government educational subsidies so
as to include the deserving in the lower rungs of the socio-economic ladder.

After broad consultations with the various university constituencies by U.P. President Jose V. Abueva, the
U.P. Board of Regents issued on April 28, 1988 a Resolution establishing the STFAP. A year later, it was
granted official recognition when the Congress of the Philippines allocated a portion of the National Budget
for the implementation of the program.

160
In the interest of democratizing admission to the State University, all students are entitled to apply for
STFAP benefits which include reduction in fees, living and book subsidies and student assistantships which
give undergraduate students the opportunity to earn P12.00 per hour by working for the University.

Applicants are required to accomplish a questionnaire where, among others, they state the amount and
source of the annual income of the family, their real and personal properties and special circumstances
from which the University may evaluate their financial status and need on the basis of which they are
categorized into brackets. At the end the application form, the student applicant, as well as his parent,
signs a sworn statement, as follows:

Statement of the Student

I hereby certify, upon my honor, that all the data and information which I have furnished are
accurate and complete. I understand that any willful misinformation and/or withholding of
information will automatically disqualify me from receiving any financial assistance or subsidy,
and may serve as ground for my expulsion from the University. Furthermore, is such
misinformation and/or withholding of information on my part is discovered after I have been
awarded tuition scholarship or any form of financial assistance, I will be required to reimburse
all financial benefits plus the legal rate of interest prevailing at the time of the reimbursement
without prejudice to the filing of charges against me. (Emphasis supplied for emphasis)

Moreover, I understand that the University may send a fact-finding team to visit my
home/residence to verify the veracity of the information provided in this application and I will
give my utmost cooperation in this regard. I also understand that my refusal to cooperate with
the fact-finding team may mean suspension of withdrawal of STFAP benefits and privileges.

Student Signature

Statement of the Applicant's Parent or Guardian

I hereby certify to the truthfulness and completeness of the information which my

son/daughter/dependent has furnished in this application together with all the documents

161
 attached. I further recognize that in signing this application form, I share with my
son/daughter/dependent the responsibility for the truthfulness and completeness of the
information supplied herein. (Emphasis supplied for emphasis)

Moreover, I understand that the University may send a fact-finding team to visit my
home/residence to verify the information provided in this application and I will give my utmost
cooperation in this regard. I also understand that my refusal to cooperate with the fact-finding
team may mean suspension or withdrawal of STFAP benefits and privileges of my
son/daughter/dependent.

—————————————————
Parent's/Legal Guardian's/Spouse's Signature1

From the early stages of its implementation, measures were adopted to safeguard the integrity of the
program. One such precautionary measure was the inclusion as one of the punishable acts under Section
2 (a) of the Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline of the University the deliberate
falsification or suppression/withholding of any material information required in the application form.

To further insure the integrity of the program, a random sampling scheme of verification of data indicated
in a student's application form is undertaken. Among those who applied for STFAP benefits for School Year
1989-90 was Ramon P. Nadal, a student enrolled in the College of Law.

On March 14, 1991, a team composed of Arsenio L. Dona and Jose Carlo Manalo conducted a home
investigation at the residence of Nadal at 31 Twinpeaks Drive, Blue Ridge, Quezon City.

Ms. Cristeta Packing, Nadal's aunt, was interviewed and the team submitted a home visit report.
Consolacion Urbino, Scholarship Affairs Officer II, found discrepancies between the report and Nadal's
application form. Forthwith, she and Bella M. Villanueva, head of the Office of Scholarships and Student
Services, presented the matter to the Diliman Committee on Scholarships and Financial Assistance.2

In compliance with the said Committee's directive, Bella Villanueva wrote Nadal informing him that the
investigation showed that he had failed to declare, not only the fact that he had been maintaining a 1977

162
Corolla car which was owned by his brother but also the income of his mother who was supporting his
brothers Antonio and Federico. Nadal was likewise informed that the Diliman Committee had reclassified
him to Bracket 9 (from Bracket 4), retroactive to June 1989, unless he could submit "proofs to the
contrary." Nadal was required "to pay back the equivalent amount of full school fees" with "interest based
on current commercial rates." Failure to settle his account would mean the suspension of his registration
privileges and the withholding of clearance and transcript of records. He was also warned that his case
might be referred to the Student Disciplinary Tribunal for further investigation.3

On July 12, 1991, Nadal issued a certification stating, among other things, that his mother migrated to the
United States in 1981 but because her residency status had not yet been legalized, she had not been able
to find a "stable, regular, well-paying employment." He also stated that his mother, jointly with his
brother Virgilio, was shouldering the expenses of the college education of his two younger brothers.4

Noting further discrepancies between Nadal's application form and the certification, the U.P. charged Nadal
before the Student Disciplinary Tribunal (SDT) on August 23, 1991 with the following:

That respondent RAMON P. NADAL (UP Student No. 83-11640), a student of the College of
Law, UP System, Diliman, Quezon City, and STFAP (ISKOLAR NG BAYAN) recipient (Bracket 4
for SY 1989-1990; Bracket 5 for SY 1990-1991) in his applications for STFAP (ISKOLAR NG
BAYAN) benefits which he filed for schoolyear 1989-1990, and schoolyear 1990-1991, with the
Office of Scholarship and Student Services (formerly Scholarship and Financial Assistance
Service) voluntarily and willfully withheld and did not declare the following:

(a) That he has and maintains a car (Toyota Corolla, Model 1977); and

(b) The income of his mother (Natividad Packing Nadal) in the U.S.A., in support
of the studies of his brothers Antonio and Federico,

which acts of willfully withholding information is tantamount to acts of dishonesty in relation to

his studies, in violation of paragraph (a), Section 2, of the Rules and Regulations on Student
Conduct and Discipline, as amended. (Approved by the B.O.R. at its 876th meeting on 02

163
 September 1976, amended at the 923rd B.O.R. meeting on 31 January 1980, and further
amended at its 1017th B.O.R. meeting on 08 December 1988).5

On October 27, 1992, after hearing, the SDT6 rendered a decision in SDT Case No. 91-026 exculpating
Nadal of the charge of deliberately withholding in his STFAP application form information that he was
maintaining a Toyota Corolla car, but finding him guilty of "wilfully and deliberately withholding
information about the income of his mother, who is living abroad, in support of the studies of his brothers
Antonio and Federico, 7 which is tantamount to acts of dishonesty in relation to his studies in violation of
paragraph [a], Section 2 of the Rules [now covered by paragraph (i), Section 2 of the Rules, as amended
25 June 1992]." As such, the SDT imposed upon Nadal the penalty of expulsion from the University and
required him to reimburse all STFAP benefits he had received but if he does not voluntarily make
reimbursement, it shall be "effected by the University thru outside legal action."8

The SDT decision was thereafter automatically elevated to the Executive Committee of U.P. Diliman for
review pursuant to Sec. 20 of the U.P. Rules on Student Conduct and Discipline. On November 26, 1992,
the Executive Committee, voting 13:4, affirmed the decision of the SDT; whereupon, Nadal appealed to
the Board of Regents (BOR). The appeal was included in the agenda of the BOR meeting on January 25,
1993.9

On January 18, 1993, upon her assumption to the Chairmanship of the Senate Committee on Education,
thereby making her automatically a member of the BOR, Senator Leticia Ramos-Shahani wrote the BOR a
letter expressing her view that, after a close review of Nadal s case by her legal staff, "it is only fair and
just to find Mr. Nadal's appeal meritorious and his arguments worthy of belief. Consequently, he should be
allowed to graduate and take the bar examinations this year." 10

At its January 25, 1993 meeting, the BOR affirmed the decision of the SDT but because "the Board was
willing to grant a degree of compassion to the appellant in view of the alleged status and predicament of
the mother as an immigrant 'TNT' in the United States," the penalty was modified "from Expulsion to One
Year- Suspension, effective immediately, plus reimbursement of all benefits received from the STFAP, with
legal interest." The BOR also decided against giving Nadal, a certification of good moral character. 11

164
Nadal forthwith filed a motion for reconsideration of the BOR decision, allegedly against the advice of his
counsel. 12 The motion was placed on the agenda of the February 25, 1993 meeting of the BOR. A day
before said date, Senator Shahani wrote the BOR another letter requesting that deliberation on Nadal's
case be deferred until such time as she could attend a BOR meeting.

On March 15, 1993, the U.P. filed an opposition to Nadal's motion for reconsideration. Thereafter, the BOR
held a special meeting to accommodate the request of Regent Shahani with Nadal's case as the sole item
on its agenda. Again, Nadal's motion for reconsideration was included in the March 23, 1993 agenda but in
view of the absence of Senator Shahani, the decision thereon was deferred.

At the special meeting of the BOR on March 28, 1993 at the Board Room of the Manila Polo Club in Forbes
Park, Makati, Regent Antonio T. Carpio raised the "material importance" of verifying the truth of Nadal's
claim that earlier, he was a beneficiary of a scholarship and financial aid from the Ateneo de Manila
University (AdeMU). Learning that the "certification issued by the AdeMU that it had not given Nadal
financial aid while he was a student there was made through a telephone call," Regent Carpio declared
that there was as yet "no direct evidence in the records to substantiate the charge." According to Carpio,
if it should be disclosed that Nadal Falsely stated that he received such financial aid, it would be a clear
case of gross and material misrepresentation that would even warrant the penalty of expulsion. Hence, he
cast a conditional vote that would depend on the verification of Nadal's claim on the matter.

U.P. President and concurrently Regent Jose V. Abueva countered by stating that "a decision should not be
anchored solely on one piece of information which he considered irrelevant, and which would ignore the
whole pattern of the respondent's dishonesty and deception from 1989 which had been established in the
investigation and the reviews." He added that "the respondent's eligibility for his AdeMU high school
scholarship and financial assistance from 1979 to 1983 does not in any way establish that he is 'not guilty
as charged' before the SDT," since the formal charges against him do not include withholding of
information regarding scholarship grants received from other schools.

At the said March 28, 1993 special meeting, the Board decided to go into executive session where the
following transpired:

165
 The Chairman of the Board, together with the President, directed the Secretary to reflect in
the minutes of the meeting the following decisions of the Board in executive session, with only
the Board members present.

A vote was held by secret ballot on whether Ramon P. Nadal was guilty or not guilty as
charged of willful withholding of information in relation to his application for Socialized Tuition
and Financial Assistance Program (STFAP) benefits which he filed for Schoolyears 1989-1990
and 1990-1991 which is tantamount to act of dishonesty in relation to his studies, in violation
of paragraph (a), Section 2 of the Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline,
as amended.

The Chairman gave the following results of the Board action during the Executive Session: four
(4) voted guilty; three (3) voted not guilty; and three (3) gave conditional votes, pending
verification with Father Raymond Holscher of Ateneo de Manila University of Ramon P. Nadal's
statement in his STFAP application that he was granted scholarship while he was in high
school. Should Ateneo confirm that Nadal had not received financial assistance, then the
conditional votes would be considered as guilty, and if otherwise, then not guilty. The
Chairman requested the President to make the verification as soon as possible the next day.
In answer to a query, the Chairman clarified that once the information was received from
Ateneo, there would be no need for another meeting to validate the decision.

The President reiterated his objections to the casting of conditional votes.

The Chairman himself did not vote. 13

In the morning of March 29, 1993, the AdeMU issued a certification to the effect that Nadal was indeed a
recipient of a scholarship grant from 1979 to 1983. That evening, the BOR met again at a special meeting
at the Westin Philippine Plaza Hotel. According to Regent Carpio, in executive session, the BOR found
Nadal "guilty" as the members voted as follows: six members — guilty, three members — not guilty, and
three members abstained. 14 Consequently, the BOR imposed on Nadal the penalties of suspension for one
(1) year effective March 29, 1993, non-issuance of any certificate of good moral character during the
suspension and/or as long as Nadal has not reimbursed the STFAP benefits he had received with 12%

166
interest per annum from march 30, 1993 and non-issuance of his transcript of records until he has settled
his financial obligations with the university. 15

On March 30, 1993, Nadal wrote President Abueva a handwritten letter stating that "after learning of the
latest decision" of the BOR, he had been "intensely concentrating on (his) job so that (he) can earn
enough to pay for (his) financial obligations to the University." Alleging that he was "now letting nature
take its course," Nadal begged President Abueva not to issue any press release regarding the case. 16

However, on April 22, 1993, Nadal filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a petition
for mandamus with preliminary injunction and prayer for a temporary restraining order against President
Abueva, the BOR, Oscar M. Alfonso, Cesar A. Buenaventura, Armand V. Fabella and Olivia C. Caoili. The
petition prayed:

After trial on the merits, judgment be rendered as follows:

a. Making the preliminary injunction permanent;

b. Ordering respondents 'to uphold and implement their decision rendered on 28 March 1993,
exonerating petitioner from all the charges against him, and accordingly dismissing SDT No.
91-026;

c. Ordering respondents jointly and severally to pay petitioner litigation expenses of at least
P150,000.00.

Other just and equitable reliefs are likewise prayed for. 17

The motion for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and the writ of preliminary injunction was
immediately set for hearing. At the May 10, 1993 hearing, the lower court declared that the only issue to
be resolved was "whether or not the respondents in Civil Case No. 93-15665 violated (Nadal's) right to
due process when it rendered a decision finding Nadal guilty of the charges against him" during the March
29, 1993 meeting. After the respondents had presented their first witness, Dr. Olivia C. Caoili, the lower
court asked respondents' counsel whether they were amenable to maintaining the status quo. Said

167
counsel replied in the negative, asserting the University's prerogative to discipline students found guilty of
violating its rules of discipline.18

On the same day, the lower court 19 issued the following Order:

The parties were heard on their respective positions on the incident (application for
preliminary injunction and prayer for temporary restraining order and opposition thereto). For
lack of material time set this for continuation on May 17 and 18, 1993 both at 2:30 p.m.

In the meantime, in order that the proceedings of this case may not be rendered moot and
academic, the respondents herein, namely: Jose V. Abueva, President of the University of the
Philippines and Vice-Chairman of the U.P. Board of Regents, Oscar M. Alfonso, Cesar A.
Buenaventura and Armand V. Fabella, members of the U.P. Board of Regents, Olivia C. Caoili,
the officers, agents, representatives, and all persons acting in their behalf, are hereby
temporarily restrained from implementing their decision rendered on March 29, 1993 in
Administrative SDT Case No. 91-026 entitled University of the Philippines vs. Ramon P. Nadal,
as reflected in the Minutes of the 1062nd meeting of the Board of Regents, U.P. held at the
Romblon Room, Westin Phil. Plaza, Manila, until further order from this Court.

SO ORDERED.

Thereafter, Nadal presented as witnesses Regents Emerenciana Y. Arcellana, Ariel P. Tanangonan, Leticia
R. Shahani and Antonio T. Carpio. The University, on the other hand, presented Dr. Olivia Caoili and Nadal
himself as a hostile witness. On May 29, 1993, the lower court issued the following Order:

The petitioner complains that he was not afforded due process when, after the Board Meeting
on SDT Case No. 91-026 on March 28, 1993 that resulted in a decision of "NOT GUILTY" in his
favor, the Chairman of the U.P. Board of Regents, without notice to the herein petitioner,
called another meeting the following day to deliberate on his (the Chairman's) MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION, which this time resulted in a decision of "GUILTY." While he main issue of
violation of due process raised in the petition pends trial and resolution, the petitioner prays

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for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction prohibiting the respondents from further
proceeding with SDT Case No. 21-026 and from suspending the petitioner for one year.

It is a basic requirement in the issuance of the preliminary injunctive writ that there must be a
right to be protected. As the issue in the case at bar is due process in the March 29 Board
meeting, there is, indeed, a right to be protected for, in administrative proceedings, a
respondent's right to due process exists not only at the early stages but also at the final stage
thereof.

With the circulation to the members of the Board of Regents, as well as to other UP personnel,
of the Minutes of the March 29, 1993 meeting, even after this case had already been filed, the
Court is convinced that there now exists a threat to the petitioner (respondent in SDT Case
No, 91-026) that the decision of the Board of Regents finally finding him guilty of willfully
withholding information material to his application for Socialized Tuition and Financial
Assistance Program (STFAP) benefits, will be implemented at any time, especially during the
enrollment period, and this implementation would work injustice to the petitioner as it would
delay him in finishing his course, and, consequently, in getting a decent and good paying job.
The injury thus caused would be irreparable.

"Damages are irreparable within the meaning of the rule where there is no
standard by which their amount can be measured with reasonable accuracy.
Where the damage is susceptible of mathematical computation, it is not
irreparable." (Social Security Commission v. Bayona, et al., G.R. No. L-13555, May
30, 1962).

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, and so as not to render moot the issues in the instant
proceedings, let a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining the respondents, their
officers, agent(s), representatives, and all persons acting in their behalf, from further
proceeding with SDT Case No. 91-026, and from suspending petitioner, upon the latter's filing
a bond in the amount of P3,000.00.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 20

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Dispensing with the filing of a motion for reconsideration, the petitioners filed the instant petition
for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of an injunction or temporary restraining order,
raising the following issues: whether or not Nadal was denied due process in the administrative
disciplinary proceedings against him, and, whether or not the respondent judge gravely abused her
discretion in issuing the May 29, 1993 writ of preliminary injunction thereby preventing the BOR from
implementing the suspension penalty it had imposed on Nadal.

Before proceeding with the discussion of the merits of the instant petition, we shall confront a threshold
issue raised by private respondent, namely, that Dr. Caoili, not having been authorized by the Board of
Regents as a collegial body to file the instant petition, and Dr. Abueva, who verified the petition, not being
the "Board of Regents" nor "the University of the Philippines," they are not real parties in interest who
should file the same. 21

A real party in interest is one "who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment or the party entitled
to the avails of the suit. 'Interest' within the meaning of the rule means material interest, an interest in
issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a
mere incidental interest."22 Undoubtedly, the U.P. Board of Regents has an interest to protect inasmuch as
what is in issue here is its power to impose disciplinary action against a student who violated the Rules
and Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline by withholding information in connection with his
application for STFAP benefits, which information, if disclosed, would have sufficed to disqualify him from
receiving the financial assistance he sought. Such dishonesty, if left unpunished, would have the effect of
subverting a commendable program into which the University officials had devoted much time and
expended precious resources, from the conceptualization to the implementation stage, to rationalize the
socialized scheme of tuition fee payments in order that more students may benefit from the public funds
allocated to the State University.

Having specifically named Drs. Abueva and Caoili as respondents in the petition for mandamus that he
filed below, Nadal is now estopped from questioning their personality to file the instant
petition.23 Moreover, under Sec. 7 of the U.P. Charter (Act 1870) and Sec. 11 of the University Code "all
process" against the BOR shall be served on "the president or secretary thereof'." It is in accordance with
these legal provisions that Dr. Caoili is named as a petitioner. Necessarily, Dr. Abueva, the University
President and member of the BOR, has to verify the petition. It is not mandatory, however, that each and

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every member of the BOR be named petitioners. As the Court has time and again held, an action may be
entertained, notwithstanding the failure to include an indispensable party where it appears that the
naming of the party would be but a formality. 24

No longer novel, as this is not a case of first impression, is the issue on the right of an academic
institution to refuse admission to a student arising from the imposition upon him of an administrative
disciplinary sanction. In our recent decision in Ateneo de Manila University v. Hon. Ignacio
M. Capulong,25 wherein certain law students were dismissed for hazing resulting in the death of another,
we held that the matter of admission of students is within the ambit of academic freedom and therefore,
beyond the province of the courts to decide. Certain fundamental principles bear stressing.

One of the arguments of Nadal in his petition for mandamus below was that he was denied due process.
To clarify, the so-called lack of due process referred only to the March 29, 1993 meeting of the BOR. As
stated by respondent's counsel: "What was conceded by undersigned counsel was that Nadal was afforded
due process from the start of the administrative proceeding up to the meeting of the Board of Regents on
March 28, 1993."26

With respect to the March 29, 1993 meeting, respondent considers the same as "unquestionably void for
lack of due process" inasmuch as he was not sent a notice of said meeting. Counsel cites the ruling in Non
v. Dames II 27 that imposition of sanctions on students requires "observance of procedural due
process," 28 the phrase obviously referring to the sending of notice of the meeting.

Attention is drawn to the disparate factual environments obtaining in Non v. Dames II and in the instant
case. In the former case, the students were refused admission for having led or participated in student
mass actions against the school, thereby posing a collision between constitutionally cherished rights —
freedom of expression and academic freedom. In the case at bar, Nadal was suspended for having
breached the University's disciplinary rules. In the Non case, the Court ruled that the students were not
afforded due process for even the refusal to re-enroll them appeared to have been a mere afterthought on
part of the school administrators. Here, Nadal does not dispute the fact that his right to due process was
held inviolate until the BOR decided to meet on March 29, 1993 with his case as the sole item on the
agenda.

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In any event it is gross error to equate due process in the instant case with the sending of notice of the
March 29, 1993 BOR meeting to respondent. University rules do not require the attendance in BOR
meetings of individuals whose cases are included as items on the agenda of the Board. This is not
exclusive of students whose disciplinary cases have been appealed to the Board of Regents as the final
review body. At no time did respondent complain of lack of notice given to him to attend any of the
regular and special BOR meetings where his case was up for deliberation. He would make an exception of
the March 29, 1993 meeting for it was "supposed to reconsider the decision made on March 28, 1993
exonerating respondent Nadal from all administrative charges against him." 29

Regent Antonio T. Carpio, in his testimony before the lower court on May 25, 1993 admitted that there
was no final verdict at the March 28, 1993 meeting in view of the conditional votes resulting from his
assertion that he was "not morally convinced that there was sufficient evidence to make a finding of guilty
against Nadal because there was no direct evidence that his mother received income from the United
States and this income was sent to the Philippines to support the studies of the children." 30 Two regents
shared the view of Regent Carpio, with the following result: four voted guilty, three, not guilty, and three
cast conditional votes. The BOR agreed that, upon the suggestion of Regent Carpio, they would still verify
from the AdeMU about Nadal's alleged scholarship as a student in said institution. Consequently, no
definitive decision was arrived at by the BOR on March 28, 1993, Much less was a verdict of exoneration
handed down as averred by respondent.

Regent Carpio testified, with respect to the March 29, 1993 meeting where all twelve members of the BOR
were present, that all of them participated in the voting held to reconsider the previous day's decision. He
stated "I remember Regent Arcellana questioning the voting again on the ground that there was already a
final decision, but there was a vote taken on whether a motion for reconsideration can be decided by the
board, and a majority of the board ruled that the matter can be reconsidered again upon motion of the
chairman." 31

At said meeting, six (6) regents voted to find respondent guilty, three (3) voted that he was not guilty and
three (3) abstained. As succinctly announced by Regent Carpio, the final decision was that which was
rendered on March 29, 1993 as "no other decision was made by the Board with respect to the same
issue." 32

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Counsel for Nadal charged before the lower court that his client was "not given due process in the March
29 meeting because the ground upon which he was again convicted was not the same as the original
charge."33 Obviously, he was referring to the basis of the conditional votes on March 28, i.e., whether or
not Nadal was telling the truth when he claimed that he received a scholarship grant from the AdeMU.
However, Regent Carpio himself testified that the charge considered was "exactly the same charge" of
withholding information on the income of Nadal's mother. 34 It should be stressed that the reason why
Regent Carpio requested a verification of Nadal's claim that he was a scholar at the AdeMU was that
Regent Carpio was not "morally convinced" yet as to the guilt of Nadal. In other words, he sought
additional insights into the character of Nadal through the information that would be obtained from the
AdeMU.

In this regard, we find such information to be irrelevant and a mere superfluity. In his July, 12, 1991
certification aforementioned, Nadal admitted, although inconsistently, that his mother was a "TNT" who
could not find a "stable, regular, well-paying employment" but that she was supporting the education of
his brothers with the help of another son. To our mind, this constitutes sufficient admission that Nadal
withheld information on the income, however measly and irregular, of his mother. Unlike in criminal cases
which require proof beyond reasonable doubt as basis for a judgment, in administrative or quasi-
judicial proceedings, only substantial evidence is required, that which means more than a mere scintilla or
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other
minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise. 35 In light of the foregoing circumstances,
we find that Nadal has been sufficiently proven to have violated his undertaking to divulge all information
needed when he applied for the benefits of the STFAP.

Let it not be forgotten that respondent aspires to join the ranks of the professionals who would uphold
truth at all costs so that justice may prevail. The sentinels who stand guard at the portals leading to the
hallowed Temples of Justice cannot be overzealous in admitting only those who are intellectually and
morally fit. In those who exhibit duplicity in their student days, one spots the shady character who is
bound to sow the seeds of chicanery in the practice of his profession.

Having reached his senior year, respondent is presumably aware that the bedrock axiom, Canon I, Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states: "A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct." Further on, Canon 7, Rule 7.01 provides: "A lawyer shall be answerable for

173
knowingly making a false statement or suppressing a material fact in connection with his application for
admission to the bar." (Emphasis supplied for emphasis)

Surely, it is not too early to warn entrants to the noble profession of law that honesty and integrity are
requirements no less weighty than hurdling the Bar examinations. This is the reason why a certification of
good moral character is one of the documents that must be submitted in applying to take said
examination. In fact, a charge of immoral or deceitful conduct on the part of an applicant, when proved, is
a ground for disqualifying him.

To revert to the instant case, inasmuch as it has been shown sufficiently that respondent has committed
an act of dishonesty in withholding vital information in connection with his application for STFAP benefits,
all in blatant violation of the Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline of petitioner
University, the latter's inherent power and authority to impose disciplinary sanction may be invoked and
rightfully exercised.

As a Bohemian proverb puts it: "A school without discipline is like a mill without water." Insofar as the
water turns the mill, so does the school's disciplinary power assure its right to survive and continue
operating. In more relevant terms, through its power to impose disciplinary sanctions, an educational
institution is able to exercise its academic freedom which is, in the case at bar, the right to suspend and
refuse admission to a student who has subverted its authority in the implementation of the critically
important STFAP.

At the risk of being repetitious, the matter of admission to a University is encompassed by the right of
academic freedom. In Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology 36 the Court
stated that a school or college which is possessed of the right of academic freedom "decides for itself its
aims and objectives and how best to attain them. It is free from outside coercion or interference save
possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. It has a wide sphere of autonomy
certainly extending to the choice of students." Elucidating, in Ateneo de Manila University v. Hon. Ignacio
M. Capulong, 37 the Court further expounded:

Since Garcia v. Loyola School of Theology, we have consistently upheld the salutary
proposition that admission to an institution of higher learning is discretionary upon a school,

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 the same being a privilege on the part of the student rather than a right. While under the
Education Act of 1982, students have a right "to freely choose their field of study, subject to
existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to graduation," such right is subject,
as all rights are, to the established academic and disciplinary standards laid down by the
academic institution.

For private schools have the right to establish reasonable rules and regulations for the
admission, discipline and promotion of students. This right . . . extends as well to parents . . .
as parents are under a social and moral (if not legal) obligation, individually and collectively,
to assist and cooperate with the schools.

Such rules are "incident to the very object of incorporation and indispensable to the successful
management of the college. The rules may include those governing student discipline." Going
a step further, the establishment of rules governing university-student relations, particularly
those pertaining to student discipline, may be regarded as vital, if not merely to the smooth
and efficient operation of the institution, but to its very survival.

Within memory of the current generation is the eruption of militancy in the academic groves
as collectively, the students demanded and plucked for themselves from the panoply of
academic freedom their own rights encapsulized under the rubric of "right to education"
forgetting that, in Hohfeldian terms, they have a concomitant duty, that is, their duty to learn
under the rules laid down by the school. (Emphasis supplied.)

On the second issue presented for adjudication, the Court finds that the lower court gravely abused its
discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction of May 29, 1993. The issuance of the said writ was
based on the lower court's finding that the implementation of the disciplinary sanction of suspension on
Nadal "would work injustice to the petitioner as it would delay him in finishing his course, and
consequently, in getting a decent and good paying job." Sadly, such a ruling considers only the situation
of Nadal without taking into account the circumstances clearly of his own making, which led him into such
a predicament. More importantly, it has completely disregarded the overriding issue of academic freedom
which provides more than ample justification for the imposition of a disciplinary sanction upon an erring
student of an institution of higher learning.

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From the foregoing arguments, it is clear that the lower court should have restrained itself from assuming
jurisdiction over the petition filed by Nadal. Mandamus is never issued in doubtful cases, a showing of a
clear and certain right on the part of the petitioner being required. 38 It is of no avail against an official or
government agency whose duty requires the exercise of discretion or judgment. 39

Hence, by issuing the writ of preliminary injunction, the lower court dared to tread upon legally forbidden
grounds. For, by virtue of the writ, the University's exercise of academic freedom was peremptorily
curtailed. Moreover, the door was flung wide open for Nadal to do exactly what the decision of the BOR
prohibited him from doing and that is, to violate the suspension order by enrolling for the first semester of
1993-1994. It must have been with consternation that the University officials helplessly watching him
complete his academic requirements for taking the Bar. 40 In the event that he be allowed to continue with
his studies he would, in effect render moot and academic the disciplinary sanction of suspension legally
imposed upon him by the BOR's final decision of March 29, 1993. What is to prevent other aspirants for
STFAP scholarships from misleading the University authorities by misrepresenting certain facts or as in
instant case, withholding vital information and stating downright falsehoods, in their application forms with
impunity? Not only would this undermine the authority of the U.P. to discipline its students who violated
the rules and regulations of the institution but, more importantly, subvert the very concept and lofty
intent to give financial assistance to poor but deserving students through the STFAP which, incidentally,
has not ceased refining and modifying it's operations.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and the lower court is hereby ordered to DISMISS the
petition for mandamus.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 70484 January 29, 1988

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ROMAN C. TUASON and REMEDIOS V. TUASON, by attorney-in-fact Trinidad S. Viado, petitioners,
vs.
REGISTER OF DEEDS, CALOOCAN City, MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, and the NATIONAL TREASURER,
respondents. TOMASA BARTOLOME, in her own behalf and in behalf of the other members of
the "Consuelo Heights Homeowners Association," petitioners-intervenors.

Orlando A. Rayos for petitioners-intervenors.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

NARVASA, J.:

A more despotic, capricious, oppressive and unjustifiable exercise of government power than that
manifested in this case can scarcely be found in the sordid annals of the martial law regime. Relief to the
victims must be as it is hereby extended by the grant to them of the extraordinary writ of certiorari and
prohibition condemning as unconstitutional, and annulling and perpetually enjoining the acts complained
of.

Petitioner spouses, the Tuasons, were retired public school teachers. On April 6, 1965, with funds pooled
from their retirement benefits and savings, they bought from Carmel Farms, Inc. (hereafter simply,
Carmel) a piece of land measuring about 8,756 square meters, in the latter's subdivision in Barrio
Makatipo, Caloocan City. In virtue of this sale, Carmel's Torrens title (No. 64007) over the lot was
cancelled and a new one (No. 8314) issued in the name of the Tuasons. The Tuasons took possession of
their property.

Some eight (8) years thereafter, the Tuasons' travails began. They woke up one morning to discover that
by presidential flat, they were no longer the owners of the land they had purchased with their hard-earned
money, and that their land and the other lots in the subdivision had been "declared open for disposition
and sale to the members of the Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc., the present bona
fide occupants thereof."

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On September 14, 1973-a year almost to the day after the declaration of martial law Mr. Ferdinand
Marcos, then president of the country, invoking his emergency powers, issued Presidential Decree No. 293
with immediate effect. The decree invalidated inter alia the title of the Tuasons' vendor, Carmel, which
had earlier purchased from the Government the land it had subsequently subdivided into several lots for
sale to the public (the Tuasons being among the buyers). The land bought by Carmel was part of the Tala
Estate (one of the so-called "Friar Lands"). Carmel had bought the land under Act No. 1120 and C.A. No.
32, as amended. Under these statutes:

1) a bona fide settler or occupant was allowed to purchase (if he did not wish to lease) the portion
occupied by him at the price fixed by the Government, in cash or on installment; the interested buyer was
given a certificate of sale, which was regarded as an agreement by him to pay the purchase price in the
and at the interest specified, the acceptance of such certificate making the occupant a debtor of the
government;

2) until the price was fully paid however, title was reserved in the Government, and any sale or
encumbrance made by the purchaser prior to such full payment was explicitly declared to 'be invalid as
against the Government ... and ... in all respects subordinate to its prior claim;"

3) in the event of default by a purchaser to pay any installment of purchase money and interest thereon,
the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands (now Director of Lands) had the duty at once to protect the
Government from loss by bringing suit to obtain judicial authority to enforce the Government's lien on the
"and by selling it in the same manner as for foreclosure of mortgages, the purchaser at such sale being
deemed to acquire a good and indefeasible title, and the proceeds of the sale being applied to the
payment of the costs of the court and all installments due or to become due; and

4) in the event of completion of payment, the Government transferred title to the land to the purchaser
"by proper instrument of conveyance," the certificate of title over the land to issue and become effective
in the manner provided by the Land Registration Act. 1

Said Presidential Decree No. 293 made the finding 2 that Carmel had failed to complete payment of the
price. It adjudged that —

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 ... according to the records of the Bureau of Lands, neither the original purchasers nor their
subsequent transferees have made full payment of all installments of the purchase money and
interest on the lots claimed by the Carmel Farms, Inc., including those on which the dwellings
of the members of said Association 3 stand. Hence, title to said land has remained with the
Government, and the land now occupied by the members of said association has never ceased
to form part of the property of the Republic of the Philippines, any and all acts affecting said
land and purporting to segregate it from the said property of the Republic of the Philippines
being therefore null and void ab initio as against the law and public policy.

Upon this adjudgment, Mr. Marcos invalidated the titles of Carmel Farms, Inc. and all those derived
therefrom, and declared as aforestated "the members of the Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc.
the present bona fide occupants" of the lots which, in consequence, thereby became open to them for
"disposition and sale ... pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 32, as amended." 4

It seems to have completely escaped Mr. Marcos' attention that his decree contained contradictory
declarations. While acknowledging on the one hand that the lots in the Carmel Subdivision were occupied
by the buyers thereof, and in fact the latter's dwellings stood thereon, he states on the other that
the "members of the Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc. (are) the present bona fide occupants" of
all said lots. The latter averment is not only essentially inconsistent with the former but is both a physical
and legal fallacy. Well known is the rule of physics that two objects cannot occupy the same space at the
same time. And the absurdity of the subsumed proposition is self-evident for persons not in possession of
land, who probably have not even set foot thereon, cannot be deemed "occupants" thereof, much less
"bona fide" occupants.

But this notwithstanding, and upon the factual premise already indicated, Mr. Marcos disposed of the land
of the petitioner spouses and others similarly situated as they, in the following imperious manner:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the

powers vested in me by the Constitution as Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, and pursuant to Proclamation 1081, dated September 21, 1972, and General
Order No. 1, dated September 22, 1972, do hereby order and decree that any and all sales
contracts between the government and the original purchasers, are hereby cancelled, and

179
 those between the latter and the subsequent transferees, and any and all transfers thereafter,
covering lots 979, 981, 982, 985, 988, 989, 990, 991 new, 1226, 1228, 1230, and 980-C-2
(LRC PSD-1730), all of Tala Estate, Caloocan City, are hereby declared invalid and null and
void ab initio as against the Government; that Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 62603,
62604, 62605, covering lots 1, 2 and 3, PCS-4383, all in the name of Carmel Farms, Inc.,
which are a consolidation and subdivision survey of the lots hereinbefore enumerated, are
declared invalid and considered cancelled as against the Government; and that said lots are
declared open for disposition and sale to the members of the Malacanang Homeowners
Association, Inc., the present bona fide occupants thereof, pursuant to Commonwealth Act No.
32, as amended.

On the strength of this presidential decree, the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City caused the inscription
on the Tuasons' title, TCT No. 8314, of the following:

MEMORANDUM. — Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 293, this certificate of title is declared
invalid and null and void ab initio and considered cancelled as against the Government and the
property described herein is declared open for disposition and sale to the members of the
Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc.

The Tuason Spouses thereupon filed with this Court a petition for certiorari assailing the Marcos decree as
an arbitrary measure which deprived them of their property in favor of a selected group, in violation not
only of the constitutional provisions on due process and eminent domain 5 but also of the provisions of the
Land Registration Act on the indefeasibility of Torrens titles; 6 and they prayed that the Register of Deeds
be directed to cancel the derogatory inscription on their title and restore its efficacy, or in the alternative,
that they be compensated for the loss from the Assurance Fund.

Mr. Marcos' Solicitor General sought to sustain the decree. In his comment on the petition, 7 he
questioned the propriety of the remedy of certiorari resorted to by the petitioners, it not appearing that
the public respondents were being sued as judicial or quasi-judicial officers who had acted without or in
excess of their jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. He opined that the petitioner spouses had no
cause to complain of unjust deprivation of property because in legal contemplation 8 they had never
become owners thereof because of non-payment of the purchase price by their predecessor-in-interest;

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and the decree was justifiable under the social justice clause of the Constitution and the police power,
being in response to the pressing housing need of the employees of the Office of the President who were
left homeless and landless after they were asked to vacate Malacanang Park where they had theretofore
been residing. He expressed the view, too, that petitioner spouses were not entitled to recover anything
from the Assurance Fund.

Petitions for intervention have of late been filed by sixty-four (64) persons, members of the "Consuelo
Heights Homeowners Association" headed by Tomasa Bartolome, on the claim that they, too, had been
divested of their lands by the same Presidential Decree No. 293, adopting as their own the allegations and
prayer embodied in the Tuasons' petition.

The procedural issue is quite easily disposed of. It is true that the extraodinary writ of certiorari 9 may
properly issue to nullify only judicial or quasi-judicial acts, unlike the writ of prohibition which may be
directed against acts either judicial or ministerial. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court deals with the
writ of certiorari in relation to "any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions, while Section 2
of the same Rule treats of the writ of prohibition in relation to "proceedings of any tribunal, corporation,
board, or person ... exercising functions judicial or ministerial." But the petition will be shown upon
analysis to be in reality directed against an unlawful exercise of judicial power.

The decree reveals that Mr. Marcos exercised an obviously judicial function. He made a determination of
facts, and applied the law to those facts, declaring what the legal rights of the parties were in the
premises. These acts essentially constitute a judicial function, 10 or an exercise of jurisdiction — which is
the power and authority to hear or try and decide or determine a cause. 11 He adjudged it to be an
established fact that neither the original purchasers nor their subsequent transferees have made full
payment of all installments of the purchase money and interest on the lots claimed by Carmel Farms, Inc.,
including those on which the dwellings of the members of ... (the) Association (of homeowners) stand."
And applying the law to that situation, he made the adjudication that "title to said land has remained with
the Government, and the land now occupied by the members of said association has never ceased to form
part of the property of the Republic of the Philippines," and that 'any and all acts affecting said land and
purporting to segregate it from the said property of the Republic ... (were) null and void ab initio as
against the law and public policy.

181
These acts may thus be properly struck down by the writ of certiorari, because done by an officer in the
performance of what in essence is a judicial function, if it be shown that the acts were done without or in
excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. Since Mr. Marcos was never vested with judicial
power, such power, as everyone knows, being vested in the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as
may be established by law 12 — the judicial acts done by him were in the circumstances indisputably
perpetrated without jurisdiction. The acts were completely alien to his office as chief executive, and utterly
beyond the permissible scope of the legislative power that he had assumed as head of the martial law
regime.

Moreover, he had assumed to exercise power — i.e. determined the relevant facts and applied the law
thereto without a trial at which all interested parties were accorded the opportunity to adduce evidence to
furnish the basis for a determination of the facts material to the controversy. He made the finding
ostensibly on the basis of "the records of the Bureau of Lands." Prescinding from the fact that there is no
indication whatever the nature and reliability of these records and that they are in no sense conclusive, it
is undeniable that the petitioner Tuasons (and the petitioners in intervention) were never confronted with
those records and afforded a chance to dispute their trustworthiness and present countervailing evidence.
This is yet another fatal defect. The adjudication was patently and grossly violative of the right to due
process to which the petitioners are entitled in virtue of the Constitution. Mr. Marcos, in other words, not
only arrogated unto himself a power never granted to him by the Constitution or the laws but had in
addition exercised it unconstitutionally.

In any event, this Court has it in its power to treat the petition for certiorari as one for prohibition if the
averments of the former sufficiently made out a case for the latter. 13 Considered in this wise, it will also
appear that an executive officer had acted without jurisdiction — exercised judicial power not granted to
him by the Constitution or the laws — and had furthermore performed the act in violation of the
constitutional rights of the parties thereby affected. The Court will grant such relief as may be proper and
efficacious in the premises even if not specifically sought or set out in the prayer of the appropriate
pleading, the permissible relief being determined after all not by the prayer but by the basic averments of
the parties' pleadings. 14

There is no dispute about the fact that title to the land purchased by Carmel was actually issued to it by
the Government. This of course gives rise to the strong presumption that official duty has been regularly

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performed, 15 that official duty being in this case the ascertainment by the Chief of the Bureau of Public
Lands of the fulfillment of the condition prescribed by law for such issuance, i.e., the payment in full of the
price, together with all accrued interest. Against this presumption there is no evidence. It must hence be
accorded full sway in these proceedings. Furthermore, the title having been duly issued to Carmel, it
became "effective in the manner provided in section one hundred and twenty-two of the Land Registration
Act." 16

It may well be the fact that Carmel really did fail to make full payment of the price of the land purchased
by it from the Government pursuant to the provisions of Act 1120. This is a possibility that cannot be
totally discounted. If this be the fact, the Government may bring suit to recover the unpaid installments
and interest, invalidate any sale or encumbrance involving the land subject of the sale, and enforce the
lien of the Government against the land by selling the same in the manner provided by Act Numbered One
Hundred and Ninety for the foreclosure of mortgages. 17 This it can do despite the lapse of a considerable
period of time. Prescription does not lie against the Government. But until and unless such a suit is
brought and results in a judgment favorable to the Government, the acquisition of title by Carmel and the
purchases by the petitioners and the petitioners-intervenors from it of portions of the land covered by its
original title must be respected. At any rate, the eventuation of that contingency will not and cannot in
any manner affect this Court's conclusion, herein affirmed, of the unconstitutionality and invalidity of
Presidential Decree No. 293, and the absolute lack of any right to the land or any portion thereof on the
part of the members of the so-called "Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc." The decree was not as
claimed a licit instance of the application of social justice principles or the exercise of police power. It was
in truth a disguised, vile stratagem deliberately resorted to favor a few individuals, in callous and
disdainful disregard of the rights of others. It was in reality a taking of private property without due
process and without compensation whatever, from persons relying on the indefeasibility of their titles in
accordance with and as explicitly guaranteed by law.

One last word, respecting the petitioners in intervention, Their petition to intervene substantially fulfilled
the requirements laid down for a class suit 18 and was consequently given due course by the Court. They
are therefore covered by this judgment.

WHEREFORE, Presidential Decree No. 293 is declared to be unconstitutional and void ab initio in all its
parts. The public respondents are commanded to cancel the inscription on the titles of the petitioners and

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the petitioners in intervention of the memorandum declaring their titles null and void and declaring the
property therein respectively described open for disposition and sale to the members of the Malacanang
Homeowners Association, Inc. to do whatever else is needful to restore the titles to full effect and efficacy;
and henceforth to refrain, cease and desist from implementing any provision or part of said Presidential
Decree No. 293. No pronouncement as to costs.

Yap, Fernan, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes
JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 230953, June 20, 2018

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM BOARD OF TRUSTEES AND CRISTINA V.

ASTUDILLO, Petitioners, v. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS - CEBU CITY AND FORMER JUDGE MA.
LORNA P. DEMONTEVERDE, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking the review and nullification
of the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated February 17, 20161 and February 16, 20172 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 08362, for allegedly having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.

The facts are as follows:

Private respondent, retired Judge Ma. Lorna P. Demonteverde (Demonteverde) started her service in the
government on July 1, 1963 with the National Electrification Administration (NEA) until her resignation on.
February 15, 1967.3 She then transferred to the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) - Bacolod and
served until December 31, 1986. On January 29, 1987, she transferred to the Public Attorney's Office

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(PAO) where she served until June 29, 1995. All in all, Demonteverde served in the said government
agencies for a total of 32 years, from 1963 to 1995.

On June 30, 1995, Demonteverde joined the Judiciary as Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC) of Bacolod City until her retirement on February 22, 2011.

In a letter dated July 28, 1995, Demonteverde requested from the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) a refund of the retirement premiums she paid under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 11464 and
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6605 in excess of the retirement premiums that she should pay under R.A. No.
910, as amended, the law on retirement benefits for Judges and Justices applicable to her when she
joined the Judiciary on June 30, 1995.

However, instead of issuing a refund only of the excess of the contributions paid, the GSIS, on August 23,
1995, refunded to Demonteverde the amount of P16,836.60 representing her retirement premiums, or her
total personal share with interest, under R.A. No. 660.

On February 11,2011, Demonteverde filed with the Supreme Court her retirement application under R.A.
No. 910,6 as amended, for her service in the Judiciary from June 30, 1995 until her retirement on
February 22, 2011.

On March 3, 2011, Demonteverde likewise filed an application with the GSIS for retirement benefits under
R.A. No. 82917 covering her government service outside of the Judiciary from July 1, 1963 until June 29,
1995.

In a letter dated October 14, 2011, the manager of the GSIS Bacolod informed Demonteverde that the
retirement laws covering her service in the government from July 1, 1963 to June 29, 1995 were P.D. No.
1146,8 R.A. No. 660, and R.A. No. 1616. The GSIS thus returned the application of Demonteverde so that
she may choose from the modes of retirement enumerated.

On November 28, 2011, Demonteverde wrote a letter to the GSIS requesting a re-evaluation of her
application for retirement under R.A. No. 8291.

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Demonteverde's request was referred to the GSIS Committee on Claims (COC) for evaluation, and on May
18, 2012, GSIS Bacolod informed her of the COC's issuance of Resolution No. 021-2012 denying her
request to retire under R.A. No. 8291. Demonteverde then appealed the COC's Resolution to the GSIS
Board of Trustees (GSIS BOT).

Given the issues raised in Demonteverde's case, the GSIS inquired with both the PAO and the Supreme
Court as to whether Demonteverde received gratuity benefits and if her entire government service was
covered in her retirement under R.A. No. 910, respectively.

In response to the inquiry, the PAO replied that Demonteverde did not apply for nor receive gratuity
benefits from the said agency when she transferred to the Judiciary in 1995.9

On the other hand, the Supreme Court, through the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), advised the
GSIS that pursuant to R.A. No. 910, as amended by R.A. No. 9946, and its implementing guidelines,
judges who have rendered at least fifteen (15) years of service in the Judiciary or in any branch of the
government, or both, and who retired compulsorily upon reaching the age of seventy (70) years, shall,
upon retirement, be automatically entitled to a lump sum of five (5) years' gratuity computed on the basis
of the highest monthly salary, plus the highest monthly Representation and Transportation Allowance and
other allowances which they were receiving on the date of their retirement.10

The OCA confirmed that:

3. Judge Demonteverde was able to meet the minimum fifteen (15) years government service required to
be entitled to full pension benefits under Section 1 of R.A. No. 910, as amended, and thus, her services
rendered outside of the Judiciary is no longer needed in the determination/computation of her retirement
benefits under R.A. No. 910, as amended.11
The OCA likewise clarified that the monetary value of the accrued terminal leave benefits that
Demonteverde earned in her government service prior to joining the Judiciary was already included by this
Court in the payment of her retirement benefits under R.A. No. 910. The OCA added that this Court will
request reimbursement from Demonteverde if the GSIS decides to grant retirement benefits.12

In a Decision dated October 10, 2013, the GSIS BOT granted Demonteverde's petition, to wit:

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Wherefore, all the foregoing considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The Petitioner is allowed to retire under
R.A. No. 8291 for her period of services outside the judiciary from 01 July 1963 to 29 June 1995. The
payment of her benefits shall be reckoned from 22 February 2011, the date when her actual separation
from service took place.

SO ORDERED.13
On December 12, 2013, Demonteverde filed a Motion for Execution14 of the Decision of the GSIS BOT,
stating therein that she received a notice of the October 14, 2013 Decision on November 11, 2013; that
more than 15 days had elapsed since her receipt of the copy of the decision; and that the same had
become final and executory and ripe for implementation.15 Said Motion for Execution was granted by the
GSIS BOT on even date.

However, on January 6, 2014, Demonteverde filed a Motion for Reconsideration (Partial MR) and
Withdrawal of Motion for Execution16 of the October 10, 2013 GSIS BOT Decision. She questioned the
accrual date of her retirement benefits under R.A. No. 8291, arguing that the date of her retirement
should be the date when she reached sixty (60) years of age, even when she was still in active
government service at that time, and not on February 22, 2011, or the date of her actual retirement from
government service. Demonteverde likewise denied receiving a copy of the GSIS BOT Decision, and
denied that the later Notice of Decision dated November 19, 2013 contained a copy of the GSIS BOT
Decision.

In its Resolution No. 1217 dated February 13, 2014, the GSIS BOT denied Demonteverde's Partial MR and
Withdrawal of Motion for Execution, for allegedly having been filed out of time.

Aggrieved, Demonteverde filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus, and Prohibition under
Rule 65 dated March 21, 2014, seeking to modify and set aside the October 10, 2013 Decision and
Resolution No. 12 dated February 13, 2014 of the GSIS BOT.18

In a Resolution19 dated June 19, 2014, the CA dismissed the said petition, ratiocinating that the course of
action taken by Demonteverde was erroneous as the proper mode of appeal from a decision of a quasi-
judicial agency such as the GSIS is by filing a verified petition for review with the CA under Rule 43. The
appellate court added that a perusal of Demonteverde's petition showed procedural defects, to wit:

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a. Petitioner failed to incorporate therein a written explanation why the preferred personal mode of
filing the petition under Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Court was not availed of.

b. Petitioner failed to attach a clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the assailed
October 10, 2013 Decision, December 12, 2013 Order and February 13, 2014 Resolution of the
GSIS, in violation of Section 3, Rule 46 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. While petitioner
appended to the Petition copy of the assailed October 10, 2013 Decision and February 13, 2014
Resolution of the GSIS they were mere photocopies. The assailed December 12, 2013 Order of the
Hearing Officer of the GSIS appears also to be a mere photocopy.

c. Petitioner failed to properly verify the Petition in accordance with A.M. No. 00-2-10-SC amending
Section 4, Rule 7 in relation to Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which now
requires that a pleading must be verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and
the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records.
Petitioner did not to (sic) incorporate in the Verification and Certification of Non Forum Shopping the
phrase "or based on authentic records."

d. Petitioner failed to attach copies of all pleadings and documents, which are necessary for a thorough
understanding and resolution of the instant Petition, such as, but not limited to, following:
1. Petitioner's July 28, 1995 letter to the GSIS requesting for a refund of her retirement
premiums.

2. Petitioner's February 11, 2011 and March 3, 2011 applications for claim of retirement benefits
field (sic) with the GSIS, Baco1od Branch.

3. The October 14, 2011 letter of the GSIS' Bacolod Branch Manager, Ms. Vilma Fuentes.

4. Petitioner's November 28, 2011 letter to the GSIS requesting for a re-evaluation of her
application for retirement benefits.

5. Petitioner's Petition filed with the GSIS [C]ommittee on Claims.

6. The GSIS Committee on Claims' Answer to petitioner's Petition.

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 7. The March 26, 2013 letter of the Public Attorney's Office (PAO Chief Administrative Officer.
(sic)

8. The July 23, 2013 and September 17, 2013 letters of the Office of the Court Administrator of
the Supreme Court.

e. The Notarial Certificate in the Verification and Certification of Non Forum Shopping and in the
Affidavit of Service did not contain the province or city where the notary public was commissioned,
the office address of the notary public, in violation of Section 2(c) and (d), Rule VIII of the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice.20

Upon Demonteverde's motion for reconsideration, the CA, in the assailed February 17, 2016 Resolution,
reversed itself and reinstated Demonteverde's Petition. It agreed with Demonteverde that the case may
be classified as an exception to the general rule that certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal under
any of the following grounds: where appeal does not constitute a speedy and adequate remedy, and for
certain special considerations, such as public welfare or public policy.21 Thus:
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to:

1. GRANT the Motion for Extension to file Comment and the Second Motion for Extension of Time to File
Comment filed by respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS).

2. ADMIT the Comment and Opposition (To the Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated June
19, 2014) filed by the GSIS.

3. GRANT the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner and SET ASIDE the June 19, 2014 Resolution.

4. REINSTATE the instant petition and DIRECT respondents to FILE their COMMENT (not a Motion to
Dismiss) to the petition within TEN (10) days from receipt of this Resolution. Petitioner is given five (5)
days from receipt of Comment within which to file a Reply, if petitioner so desires.

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SO ORDERED.22
GSIS BOT moved for reconsideration and filed an Opposition to the Petition, but the CA, in its February
16, 2017 Resolution, denied the said motion for reconsideration and directed the GSIS BOT to file its
comment to Demonteverde's petition.

Hence, this petition for certiorari, with the GSIS BOT raising the issue of whether the CA acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its February 17, 2016 Resolution
reinstating Demonteverde's Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus; and February 16, 2017
Resolution denying GSIS' Motion for Reconsideration of the February 17, 2016 Resolution. It alleges the
following issues in support of its petition:
I.

THE ASSAILED GSIS BOT DECISION IS FINAL AND EXECUTORY AND NOT SUBJECT TO ANY MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION OR APPEAL.

II.

A SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 IS NOT AN ALTERNATE REMEDY FOR LOST
APPEALS UNDER RULE 43 AND THE TWO ACTIONS ARE MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE.

III.

THE ISSUES RAISED IN FORMER JUDGE DEMONTEVERDE'S PETITION DO NOT AFFECT PUBLIC POLICY.

IV.

THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI IS TAINTED WITH MANY PROCEDURAL INFIRMITIES WHICH ARE FATAL
TO THE PETITION.23
The main issue for resolution is whether the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in issuing its Resolution dated February 17, 2016 reinstating Demonteverde's
Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus; and Resolution dated February 16, 2017 denying GSIS

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BOT's Motion for Reconsideration of the February 17, 2016 Resolution.

This Court resolves to grant the instant petition.

A special civil action for certiorari, under Rule 65, is an independent action based on the specific grounds
therein provided and will lie only if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law.24 A petition for certiorari will prosper only if grave abuse of discretion is alleged
and proved to exist.

"Grave abuse of discretion," under Rule 65, refers to the arbitrary or despotic exercise of power due to
passion, prejudice or personal hostility; or the whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious exercise of power that
amounts to an evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or to act at all in
contemplation of law. For an act to be struck down as having been done with grave abuse of discretion,
the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross.25

Having said this, there is a preliminary need to address the GSIS-BOT's argument that Demonteverde
should have filed an appeal under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court instead of filing the certiorari suit before
the CA.

A special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court will not be a cure for failure to timely file an
appeal under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.26 Rule 65 is an independent action that cannot be availed of as
a substitute for the lost remedy of an ordinary appeal, especially if such loss or lapse was occasioned by
one's own neglect or error in the choice of remedies.27 As this Court held in Butuan Development
Corporation v. CA:28
A party cannot substitute the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for the
remedy of appeal. The existence and availability of the right of appeal are antithetical to the availability of
the special civil action of certiorari. Remedies of appeal (including petitions for review) and certiorari are
mutually exclusive, not alternative or successive. Hence, certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for an
appeal, especially if one's own negligence or error in one's choice of remedy occasioned such loss or lapse.
One of the requisites of certiorari is that there be no available appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy. Where an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefor is grave
abuse of discretion.

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Nonetheless, the general rule that an appeal and a certiorari are not interchangeable admits of exceptions.
This Court has, before, treated a petition for certiorari as a petition for review on certiorari, particularly:
(1) if the petition for certiorari was filed within the reglementary period within which to file a petition for
review on certiorari; (2) when errors of judgment are averred; and (3) when there is sufficient reason to
justify the relaxation of rules.29

Likewise, in Department of Education v. Cuanan,30 where this Court exercised liberality and considered the
petition for certiorari filed therein as an appeal, the Court identified exceptions to the general rule. Thus:
The remedy of an aggrieved party from a resolution issued by the CSC is to file a petition for review
thereof under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court within fifteen days from notice of the resolution. Recourse to a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 renders the petition dismissible for being the wrong remedy.
Nonetheless, there are exceptions to this rule, to wit: (a) when public welfare and the advancement of
public policy dictates; (b) when the broader interest of justice so requires; (c) when the writs issued are
null and void; or (d) when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority.
In the instant case, the CA itself, in its June 19, 2014 Resolution, initially dismissed Demonteverde's
special civil action for certiorari, reasoning that Demonteverde had the remedy of appeal under Rule 43 of
the Rules of Court. Citing the case of Madrigal Transport, Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings Corporation,31 the CA
thus said:
Where appeal is available to the aggrieved party, the action for certiorari will not be entertained.
Remedies of appeal (including petitions for review) and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not alternative or
successive. Hence, certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal, especially if one's own
negligence or error in one's choice of remedy occasioned such loss or lapse. One of the requisites
of certiorari is that there be no available appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy. Where an
appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefore is grave abuse of discretion.
The CA even categorically ruled that the present circumstances in Demonteverde's case did not warrant
the application of the exceptions to the general rule provided by Rule 43,32 thereafter proceeding to
identify the aforementioned procedural defects in the petition.

Yet, when the CA, upon Demonteverde's motion for reconsideration, reversed itself and reinstated the
latter's Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus, and Prohibition in the assailed February 17, 2016 Resolution, it
failed to substantiate its decision to grant the said motion and set aside its June 19, 2014 Resolution.
Apart from Demonteverde's bare allegations in her pleadings and her own testimony that her case falls

192
under the exception to the general rule that if appeal is available, certiorari is not a remedy, there is
nothing on record that would warrant the grant of her motion for reconsideration and the setting aside of
the CA's June 19, 2014 Resolution.

A reading of the CA's assailed February 16, 2017 Resolution reveals that Demonteverde's motion for
resolution of the CA's June 19, 2014 Resolution was approved hastily. While the CA appears to have ruled
on the merits of Demonteverde's motion, its ratiocination merely consists of two paragraphs and it
summarily made a conclusion that Demonteverde's case may be classified as an exception to the general
rule that certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal. In doing so, the CA did not clearly and distinctly
explain how it reached such conclusion. To wit:
In the case of Andrew James Mcburnie vs. Eulalio Ganzon, EGI-Managers, Inc. and E. Ganzon, Inc., the
Supreme Court held that the Rules of Court was conceived and promulgated to set forth guidelines in the
dispensation of justice but not to bind and chain the hand that dispenses it, for otherwise, court will be
mere slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. That is precisely why courts in
rendering real justice have always been, as they in fact ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm
that when on the balance, technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights, and not the other way
around. Truly then, technicalities, in the appropriate language of Justice Makalintal, should give way to the
realities of the situation.

Applying the above-cited jurisprudence in Andrew James Mcburnie vs. Eulalia Ganzon, EGI-Managers, Inc.
and E. Ganzon, Inc., and upon perusal of the arguments contained in the instant Motion for
Reconsideration, there is basis to reconsider the dismissal of the instant Petition. The Court agrees with
petitioner, that the instant case may be classified as an exception to the general rule that certiorari is not
a substitute for a lost appeal under any of the following grounds: where appeal does not constitute a
speedy and adequate remedy and for certain special considerations as public welfare or public policy. In
this case, the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration on the assailed GSIS decision maybe [sic] dispensed
with on the same cited grounds of public welfare and the advancement of public policy and in addition, in
the broader interests of justice.33
"Public policy" has a specific definition in jurisprudence. It has been defined as that principle of the law
which holds that no subject or citizen can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the
public of against public good.34 It is the principle under which freedom of contract or private dealing is
restricted for the good of the community.35

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Demonteverde's claim of public policy as a justification of her inability to comply with the general rule on
appeal is unacceptable in the absence of legal and factual bases for its invocation. The assumption of the
appellate court that Demonteverde could possibly face "a grim prospect of a lengthy appeal as it is very
likely that the resolution will not happen during her lifetime as she is already seventy-three years old" is
inconsistent with the aforementioned definition of public policy. Demonteverde failed to substantiate
through clear and well-established grounds exactly how her case warrants a deviation from the general
rule that a writ of certiorari will not issue where the remedy of appeal is available to an aggrieved party.

Moreover, Demonteverde failed to overcome in her petition the. presumption of regularity in the
performance of official functions of public officers. She failed to present clear and convincing evidence to
corroborate her claim that the notice of decision as regards the October 10, 2013 Decision of the GSIS
BOT failed to attach a copy of the written decision.36 As petitioner GSIS BOT pointed out, Demonteverde
could not have claimed in her Motion for Execution - which she ultimately attempted to withdraw - that
the GSIS BOT October 10, 2013 Decision had attained finality if she indeed had not received a copy of it
and read its full text.

In her Motion for Reconsideration37 of the CA's June 19, 2014 Resolution, Demonteverde claims that the
GSIS BOT Decision had not yet attained finality because the GSIS BOT "did not rule on the merits of the
petitioner's motion for reconsideration."38 To wit:
Petitioner's mode of appeal via Rule 65 of the Rules was guided by the pronouncements of the court in the
case of Page-Tenorio vs. Tenorio, G.R. No. 138490, November 24, 2004. Her motion for partial
reconsideration and withdrawal of motion for execution dated 2 January 2014 was denied by
respondents on a dubious technical ground of having been filed out of time, without resolving on
the merits the reckoning period that were never taken up during the proceedings, thus denying her due
process. Petitioner was never given a chance to be heard on the matter.39
While the CA gave credence to this claim and granted Demonteverde's motion, this Court cannot sustain
the CA's resolution.

It should be emphasized that the resort to a liberal application, or suspension of the application of
procedural rules, must remain as the exception to the well-settled principle that rules must be complied
with for the orderly administration of justice.40 While procedural rules may be relaxed in the interest of

194
justice, it is well settled that these are tools designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. The relaxation
of procedural rules in the interest of justice was never intended to be a license for erring litigants to
violate the rules with impunity. Liberality in the interpretation and application of the rules can be invoked
only in proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While litigation is not a game of
technicalities, every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to ensure an
orderly and speedy administration of justice.41

Applying this to the instant case, there is nothing dubious about the GSIS BOT's denial of her Partial
Motion for Reconsideration and Withdrawal of Motion for Execution on the ground that the said motion was
filed out of time. Demonteverde filed her Partial Motion for Reconsideration and Withdrawal of Motion for
Execution only on January 6, 2014, fifty-six (56) days after November 11, 2013, which is the date of
receipt of the GSIS BOT Decision indicated in her Motion for Execution, and forty-eight (48) days after
November 19, 2013, when she officially received a copy of the GSIS BOT Decision. Clearly, Demonteverde
had, by then, lost her right to question the Decision of the GSIS BOT through a motion for reconsideration
or through any other form of appeal. Thus, the CA should have dismissed her petition outright on the
ground of erroneous cause of action as the remedies of appeal and certiorari under Rule 65 are mutually
exclusive and not alternative or cumulative.

This Court likewise rejects Demonteverde's assertion that she was never given a chance to be heard on
the matter. On the contrary, the records show that she was given ample opportunity to present her
retirement claims and her arguments before the GSIS COC, the GSIS BOT, and the CA. In fact, the GSIS
BOT even approved her request to retire under R.A. No. 8291 for her period of services outside the
Judiciary from July 1, 1963 to June 29, 1995. The only issue that protracted the instant case is
Demonteverde's single-minded insistence that the accrual date of her retirement benefits under R.A. No.
8291 should be the date when she reached sixty (60) years of age, even. when she was still in active
government service at that time, and not on February 22, 2011, or the date of her actual retirement from
government service.

To give merit to this argument would be preposterous.

The reason for providing retirement benefits is to compensate service to the government. Retirement
benefits to government employees are part of emolument to encourage and retain qualified employees in

195
the government service. These benefits are meant to reward them for giving the best years of their lives
in the service of their country.42

However, the right to retirement benefits accrues only upon certain prerequisites. First, the conditions
imposed by the applicable law must be fulfilled. Second, there must be actual retirement.43 Prior to
retirement, an employee who has served the requisite number of years, such as Demonteverde, is only
eligible for, but not yet entitled to, retirement benefits.44 Retirement means there is a bilateral act of
the parties, a voluntary agreement between the employer and the employees whereby the latter after
reaching a certain age agrees and/or consents to sever his or her employment with the former.45

Severance of employment is a condition sine qua non for the release of retirement benefits. Retirement
benefits are not meant to recompense employees who are still in the employ of the government; that is
the function of salaries and emoluments. Retirement benefits are in the nature of a reward granted by the
State to a government employee who has given the best years of his life to the service of his country.

While Demonteverde met the two conditions for entitlement to benefits under R.A. No. 8291 in 2001, i.e.,
she had rendered at least fifteen (15) years in government service as a regular member, and she turned
sixty (60) years of age, she continued to serve the government and did not, at that time, sever her
employment with the government. Thus, not having retired from service when she turned 60 on February
22, 2001, she cannot claim that her right to retirement benefits had already accrued then.

In fine, this Court finds it proper to emphasize that Demonteverde's filing of separate retirement claims
for her government service outside of the Judiciary and in the Judiciary was unnecessary and
unwarranted. Apart from the fact that she continued to serve the government as a trial court judge after
serving the NEA, the DBP, and the PAO for a total of 32 years, her service in these government agencies is
creditable as part ofher overall government service for retirement purposes under R.A. No. 910, as
amended.

Section 1 of R.A. No. 910, as amended by R.A. No. 9946, provides:

SECTION 1. When a Justice of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, or of the
Court of Tax Appeals, or a Judge of the regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court,
municipal circuit trial court, shari'a district court, shari'a circuit court, or any other court hereafter

196
established who has rendered at least fifteen (15) years service in the Judiciary or in any other
branch of the Government, or in both, (a) retires for having attained the age of seventy years x x x
he/she shall receive during the residue of his/her natural life, in the manner hereinafter provided, the
salary which plus the highest monthly aggregate of transportation, representation and other allowances
such as personal economic relief allowance (PERA) and additional compensation allowance which he/she
was receiving at the time of his/her retirement x x x
Considering the express wordings of R.A. No. 910, which include service "in any other branch of the
Government" as creditable service in the computation of the retirement benefits of a justice or judge,
Demonteverde's years of service as in the NEA, the DBP, and the PAO were already correctly credited by
the OCA as part of her government service when it granted her retirement application for her service in
the Judiciary from June 30, 1995 until her retirement on February 22, 2011.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court GRANTS the petition and NULLIFIES AND SETS
ASIDE the Resolutions dated February 17, 2016 and February 16, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 08362 for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; and DISMISSES the Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus, and Prohibition under Rule 65 dated
March 21, 2014 of private respondent Ma. Lorna P. Demonteverde, former Judge of the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities, Bacolod City, which sought to set aside the October 10, 2013 Decision and Resolution No.
12 dated February 13, 2014 of the GSIS BOT.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 203797-98, June 27, 2018

CARMENCITA O. REYES, Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION), OFFICE OF THE

SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, AND THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

197
 REYES, JR., J.:

This is a Petition for Certiorari1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction
and/or Temporary Restraining Order, seeking to set aside the Resolutions dated February 29, 2012 2 and
August 13, 20123 of the First (1st) Division of the Sandiganbayan in Case Nos. SB-11-CRM-0089 to 0101
and SB-11-CRM-0111 to 0113. The said Resolution dated February 29, 2012 denied petitioner's Urgent
Omnibus Motion dated July 19, 2011,4 while the Resolution dated August 13, 20125 denied the Motion for
Reconsideration thereof.

THE ANTECEDENTS

This case stemmed from the investigation of various transactions of the famous P728,000,000.00 fertilizer
fund allegedly involving public officers from the Department of Agriculture (DA) and others.

On July 9, 2008, the Task Force Abono, Field Investigation Office (FIO) of the Office of the Ombudsman
filed a Complaint6 with the Office of the Ombudsman against some persons which included petitioner
Carmencita O. Reyes (Reyes).

Reyes was charged for alleged violation of Article 220 (Illegal Use of Public Funds or Property, commonly
known as Technical Malversation) of Act 3135, otherwise known as the "Revised Penal Code of the
Philippines" (RPC); and Section 3(e) and (g) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise known as the
"Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act." Thereafter, Reyes then filed a consolidated counter affidavit7 upon
which Task Force Abono filed its Reply8 on November 26, 2008.

Based on the said Complaint, the Ombudsman filed two (2) Informations against Reyes, one for violation
of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 30199 docketed as Criminal Case No. SB-11-CRM-0100; and the other for
violation of Article 220 of the RPC10 docketed as Criminal Case No. SB-11-CRM-0113, both of which were
allegedly committed during the incumbency of Reyes as Provincial Governor of Marinduque. The
Informations were consolidated into one case with the First (1st) Division of the Sandiganbayan
(Sandiganbayan). The accusatory portion of the said Informations read as follows:

Criminal Case No. SB-11-CRM-0100

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That on or about the period covering 30 April to 08 December 2004, or sometime prior or subsequent
thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused
CARMENCITA O. REYES, a high ranking official being then the Governor of the Province of Marinduque,
DENNIS B. ARAULLO, a high ranking official being a Regional Executive Director with Salary Grade 28,
RODOLFO M. GUIEB, MARIE PAZ JASMINE M. CABUCOL, RAYMUNDO E. BRAGANZA, GROVER L. DINO,
DORY A. IRANZO, ABELARDO BRAGAS, FELIX RAMOS, OFELIA MONTILLA and GREGORIO SANGALANG; all
of the Department of Agriculture Regional Field Unit IV (DA-RFU IV), while in the performance of their
official functions and committing the offense in relation to their office, taking advantage of their official
positions, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, acting with manifest partiality and
evident bad faith or through gross inexcusable negligence, at the very least, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and criminally cause undue injury to the government, through the issuance of Bids and Awards
Committee (BAC) Resolution No. 290, dated 30 April 2004, upon the order of accused REYES as evidenced
by her letter and purchase requests dated 30 April 2004 and 03 May 2004, respectively, which requests
have induced the accused DA-RFU IV employees to transact with LCV Design and Fabrication Corporation
(LCV), with accused REMUS C. VILLANUEVA as president, in whose favor the purchase order and payment
for one (1) unit Shredding Machine, one (1) unit Hammermill/Shifter, one (1) unit Pelletizer and one (1)
unit Tornado Brush Chipper/Shredder as listed under Purchase Order No. 119-04, dated 05 May 2004,
duly signed by accused MARIE PAZ JASMINE M. CABUCOL, amounting to Five Million Pesos
(Php5,000,000.00), Philippine currency, charged against the Farm Input Fund for the Ginintuang
Masaganang Ani Program of the DA as covered by SARO No. E-04-00164, has been awarded by accused
BAC Members ABELARDO BRAGAS, FELIX RAMOS, OFELIA MONTILLA and GREGORIO SANGGALANG;
without the conduct of a public bidding, thereby resorting to Direct Contracting, thus, giving said
corporation unwarranted benefit, preference or advantage, knowing fully well that at the time of
procurement, the patent application of said corporation for the equipment purchased has not yet been
approved as evidenced by a notation "Subject to the condition that the patent will be approved by the
Bureau of Patent. Patent of the ff: 12) Shredding Machine 2) Hammermill 3) Pelletizer 4) Brush
Chipper" appearing on Disbursement Voucher Nos. 2004-07-2941 dated 30 July 2004, and 2004-12-6056
dated 08 December 2004, duly signed by accused DENNIS B. ARAULLO, RODOLFO M. GUIEB and
RAYMUNDO E. BRAGANZA, hence, said corporation cannot as yet then be considered as the exclusive
distributor of the equipment purchased and public bidding should have been conducted, aside from the
fact that the purchase of said equipment was not in accordance with the purpose for which said funds as
covered by SARO No. E-04-00164 has been appropriated, to the damage and prejudice of the government

199
in the amount of Five Million Pesos(Php5,000,000.00), Philippine currency, covered by check nos. 270843-
CL dated 30 July 2004 as signed by accused DORY A. IRANZO and DENNIS B. ARAULLO and 274415-CL
dated 08 December 2004 as signed by accused GROVER L. DINO and DENNIS B. ARAULLO.

CONTRARY TO LAW.11

Criminal Case No. SB-11-CRM-0113

That from the period covering 30 April to 08 December 2004, or for some time prior or subsequent
thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
CARMENCITA O. REYES, a high ranking public officer being then the Governor and now the Representative
of the Province of Marinduque, DENNIS B. ARAULLO, also a high ranking public officer being the Regional
Executive Director (Salary Grade 28), Department of Agriculture-Regional Field Unit No. IV, RODOLFO M.
GUIEB, MARIE PAZ JASMINE M. CABUCOL, RAYMUNDO E. BRAGANZA, GROVER L. DINO, DORY A IRANZO,
ABELARDO BRAGAS, FELIX RAMOS, OFELIA MONTILLA and GREGORIO SANGALANG, all employees of the
Department of Agriculture Regional Field Unit IV (DA-RFU IV), being the OIC-Regional Executive Director
(Salary Grade 26), Chief Accountant (Salary Grade 15), Regional Accountant (Salary Grade 18), Cashier I,
Cashier IV-B (Salary Grade 14), members of the Bids and Awards Committee-CALABARZON, respectively,
and as such is responsible/accountable for the P5,000,000.00 which they received from DA-Central Office
by reason of their office, which amount is part of the P728 Million Fertilizer Fund released by the
Department of Budget and Management to the Department of Agriculture under SARO No. E-04-00164
dated February 3, 2004 and allocated by Republic Act No. 8435, otherwise known as the "Agricultural and
Fisheries Modernization Act (AFMA) for the purchase of fertilizer by the identified beneficiaries/proponent
in different regions of the country in line with the "Ginintuang Masaganang Ani Program" of the
Department of Agriculture, while in the performance of their official functions and committing the offense
in relation to their office, taking advantage of their official positions, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another, either by awarding the transaction to LCV Design and Fabrication
Corporation through Bids and Awards Committee Resolution No. 290, dated 30 April 2004, signing,
certifying, or approving, Purchase Request 119-04, dated 05 May 2004, Disbursement Voucher Nos. 2004-
07-2941, dated 30 July 2004, and 2004-12-6056, dated 08 December 2004, and Check Nos. 270843-CL,
dated 30 July 2004, or accepting the items delivered by LCV Design and Fabrication Corporation , did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously allow/cause the diversion/conversion of the said

200
P5,000,000.00 fertilizer fund for the purpose for which it was intended, i.e. purchase of fertilizer, by
purchasing, upon request/inducement of accused Reyes and in fact she received, one (1) unit Shredding
Machine, one unit (1) unit Hammermill/Shifter, one (1) unit Pelletizer and one (1) unit Tornado Brush
Chipper/Shredder from LCV Design and Fabrication Corporation, without the benefit of public bidding and
knowing fully well that the equipment purchase was not in accordance with the purpose for which the fund
was appropriated under Republic Act No. 8435, to the damage and prejudice of the government in the
aforementioned amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW.12

On July 19, 2011, Reyes filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion (For Judicial Determination of Probable Cause
and Deferment of Arraignment set for 28 July 2011)13 in the anti-graft case, and another Urgent Omnibus
Motion (For Judicial Determination of Probable Cause; and Deferment of/Holding in Abeyance the
Arraignment) on September 12, 201114 in the technical malversation case.

The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) filed a Consolidated Opposition/Comment dated August 18,
201115 and an Opposition/Comment dated October 5, 201116 upon which Reyes filed her Consolidated
Reply.17

In a Resolution dated February 29, 2012,18 the Sandiganbayan resolved the said Urgent Omnibus Motions
denying both motions. The said Resolution dated February 12, 2012 disposed thus:

WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing, the Court hereby resolves as follows:

xxxx

7. To FIND THAT PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTS to issue warrant of arrest against accused Reyes [herein
Petitioner] in Crim. Cases No. SB-11-CRM-0100 and No. SB-11-CRM-0113; x x x.

However, considering that the accused had already posted their bail bonds, the Court will no longer issue
a warrant of arrest against them.

201
xxxx

SO ORDERED." 19

On March 29, 2012, Reyes filed a Motion for Reconsideration20 of the said Resolution dated Febn1ary 29,
2012. However, it was denied in a Resolution dated August 13, 2012.

Hence, this petition.

Issues

Reyes submits the following issues for Our Resolution:

1. Does the evidence, relied on by the Ombudsman, justify the conclusion that there is probable cause
to charge the petitioner for the violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended?

2. Does the evidence, relied on by the Ombudsman, justify the conclusion that there is probable cause
to charge the petitioner for the Illegal Use of Public Funds/Technical Malversation under Article 220
of the RPC?

3. Did the respondent court commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it denied the assertion of the petitioner that no probable cause exists for either
case?

4. Is the petitioner entitled to injunctive relief?21

In the petition, Reyes argues that there is no probable cause to charge her for the violation of Section 3(e)
of R.A. No. 3019.22 She claims that among the elements to hold a person criminally liable under Sec. 3(e)
of R.A. No. 3019, no other element is present in this case except that she was a public officer.23 She
explains that the primary evidence as per Information, i.e. the letter request24 and the purchase
request,25 merely show the letter is simply a request and the purchase request shows on its face that it

202
was the DA officials who made the same. Reyes likewise claims that no real evidence of conspiracy was
found or established by the evidence.26

Moreover, Reyes argues that there is no probable cause to charge her under Article 220 of the RPC.27 She
claims that she is not the administrator of the funds in question with whom it remains.28 She further
claims that nothing of inducement is stated in the letter request29 She concluded in accordance with
Article 220 of the RPC, it is already clear that not all the elements of the crime charged are met.30

Reyes further argues that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it denied her assertion that no probable cause exists for either case. Reyes
assails the Sandigabayan's reliance on the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Report being not part of the
record of the case and considers it hearsay, as well as the finding that the "arguments propounded by the
accused-movants reveal that they are matters of defense."31

Ruling of this Court

The petition is without merit.

At the outset, it bears to stress that a certiorari proceeding is limited in scope and narrow in character.
The special civil action for certiorari lies only to correct acts rendered without jurisdiction, in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction, not
errors of procedure or mistakes in the findings or conclusions of the lower court.32

After a careful and thorough review of the facts and the issue at hand, as well as the law and
jurisprudence pertinent thereto, this Court finds that the First Division of the Sandiganbayan did not
commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it the denied
peititioner's Urgent Omnibus Motion/s (For Judicial Determination of Probable Cause).

As to the first two issues, Reyes contends that the letter request and purchase request are incomplete to
show that the elements are present for charges of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and Article
220 of the RPC, further claiming no evidence to show conspiracy.

203
We are not persuaded.

In this case, Reyes's contentions are matters of defense that should be resolved in a trial.

As public respondent correctly contends:

At first glance and on its face, petitioner Reyes' request had the appearance of being regular. But after a
careful analysis, her request was actually inducing and/or even ordering the DA to procure the subject
equipments from the LCV as the latter, according to petitioner Reyes, was "the inventor, manufacturer
and exclusive distributor" thereof. Indeed, petitioner Reyes' mere mention in her letter of the name "LCV"
as the alleged "inventor; manufacturer and exclusive distributor" of the equipment could be considered as
a strong indication that she seriously wanted DA to procure the equipments with LCV. As a matter of fact,
in the Purchase Request dated May 3, 2004, and the Requisition and Issue Slip dated May 5, 2004,
petitioner Reyes had categorically mentioned the brand name "TORNADO" Brush Chipper/ Shredder, which
was the brand claimed to be exclusively distributed by LCV Moreover, no less than her co-respondents in
the case, the DA FRFU-IV employees, in their Joint-Counter-Affidavit, openly alleged that the proponents,
petitioner Reyes included, had a direct hand in the purchase of the equipments, viz:

11.) With respect to paragraph 13, it must be pointed out that the four (4) proponents (Congressmen
Nanette Daza, Federico Sandoval, and Oscar Gozos, and Governor Carmencita Reyes) not only had direct
hand in the questioned transactions but much more than that. They were not only ordinary proponents or
endorsers of the farm implements in question, but they actually initiated the transactions in question as
borne out by their respective letters to Respondent Dennis B. Araullo, then the Regional Executive Director
of the DA RFU No. IV The four (4) elective public officials concerned categorically and unmistakably
manifested in their respective letters the extent of their participation and the fact their sole determination
of the specifications (and even the supplier) of the items purchased, purpose and justification why the
various farm implements or machines were purchased for their constituencies, ...33

From the foregoing, it is shown that the letter request and purchase request are enough to engender a
well-founded belief that the crime charged may have been committed by Reyes and that any assertion by
Reyes that negates the complication of the documents are matters of defense. Besides, the Requisition
and Issue Slip34 dated May 5, 2004, as alluded to by the Ombudsman, would show that petitioner Reyes

204
had categorically mentioned the brand name "TORNADO" Brush Chipper/Shredder, which was the brand
claimed to be exclusively distributed by LCV Design and Fabrication Corporation. On this score, said
connections can also establish probable cause which the Sandiganbayan may disprove during the trial.
Under these circumstances, We concur with the Sandiganbayan as it aptly found, thus:

A judicious reading of the arguments propounded by the accused-movants reveal that they are matters of
defense which should be ventilated during the trial proper. Indubitably, whether or not undue injury was
caused or unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference was extended to any party when direct
contracting was resorted to instead of public bidding in the acquisition of the subject equipment from LCV
in the case of DA RFU IV, and whether or not said supplier was indeed its exclusive distributor of the
equipment which could be considered as farm inputs/farm implements to fall under the category provided
under the GMA program, and which in effect would help settle the issue if there was illegal use of public
funds or not, are matters of defense which are not relevant considerations during the initial stage of the
proceedings.35

As to the third issue, Reyes contends that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied her assertion that no probable cause exists for
both cases. In addition to her previous contentions, Reyes assails the Sandigabayan's reliance on the
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Report being not part of the record of the case and considers it hearsay.
She considers such as highly irregular and improper for the Sandiganbayan to have used the findings of
such report as bases for upholding the existence of probable cause.36

Reyes's contention is misplaced.

It must be emphasized that the Ombudsman itself conducted its own preliminary investigation in this
case. It was during this investigation that the Ombudsman, faced with the facts and circumstances extant
herein, was led to believe that (1) a crime has been committed; and (2) there is probable cause that
Reyes was guilty thereof. That the Ombudsman referred to the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Report as
additional basis for its findings does nothing to refute the validity of the preliminary investigation, the
evidence gathered therein, or the conclusion of the Ombudsman after that investigation.

Thus, We once more find favor m the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, viz:

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The Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Office of the Ombudsman when it found
probable cause to file the Information against the accused in these cases. x x x It is noteworthy that aside
from its own exhaustive investigation, the Office of the Ombudsman also referred to the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee Report to supplement its findings of probable cause, on the basis of which the
investigating prosecutors were able to determine that an offense had probably been committed and that
the accused probably perpetrated it.37

On the basis of these findings, the Sandiganbayan cannot be said to have committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied Reyes's assertion that no probable
cause exists for both cases.

In a petition for certiorari, the public respondent acts without jurisdiction if it does not have the legal
power to determine the case; there is excess of jurisdiction where the respondent, being clothed with the
power to determine the case, oversteps its authority as determined by law. There is grave abuse of
discretion where the public respondent acts in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the
exercise of its judgment as to be said to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is
not enough.38 Here, there is none.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Resolutions dated February 29, 2012 and August 13, 2012 of
the First (1st) Division of the Sandiganbayan in Case Nos. SB-11-CRM-0089 to 0101, and SB-11-CRM-
0111 to 0113 insofar as the petitioner in this case is concerned, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 191424 August 7, 2013

ALFEO D. VIVAS, ON HIS BEHALF AND ON BEHALF OF THE SHAREHOLDERS OF EUROCREDIT

COMMUNITY BANK, PETITIONER,
vs.
THE MONETARY BOARD OF THE BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS AND THE PHILIPPINE
DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS.

206
 DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a status quo ante order or writ of
preliminary injunction ordering the respondents to desist from closing EuroCredit Community Bank,
Incorporated (ECBI) and from pursuing the receivership thereof. The petition likewise prays that the
management and operation of ECBI be restored to its Board of Directors (BOD) and its officers.

The Facts

The Rural Bank of Faire, Incorporated (RBFI) was a duly registered rural banking institution with principal
office in Centro Sur, Sto. Niño, Cagayan. Record shows that the corporate life of RBFI expired on May 31,
2005.1 Notwithstanding, petitioner Alfeo D. Vivas (Vivas) and his principals acquired the controlling
interest in RBFI sometime in January 2006. At the initiative of Vivas and the new management team, an
internal audit was conducted on RBFI and results thereof highlighted the dismal operation of the rural
bank. In view of those findings, certain measures calculated to revitalize the bank were allegedly
introduced.2 On December 8, 2006, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) issued the Certificate of
Authority extending the corporate life of RBFI for another fifty (50) years. The BSP also approved the
change of its corporate name to EuroCredit Community Bank, Incorporated, as well as the increase in the
number of the members of its BOD, from five (5) to eleven (11).3

Pursuant to Section 28 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7653, otherwise known as The New Central Bank Act,
the Integrated Supervision Department II (ISD II) of the BSP conducted a general examination on ECBI
with the cut-off date of December 31, 2007. Shortly after the completion of the general examination, an
exit conference was held on March 27, 2008 at the BSP during which the BSP officials and examiners
apprised Vivas, the Chairman and President of ECBI, as well as the other bank officers and members of its
BOD, of the advance findings noted during the said examination. The ECBI submitted its comments on
BSP’s consolidated findings and risk asset classification through a letter, dated April 8, 2008.4

Sometime in April 2008, the examiners from the Department of Loans and Credit of the BSP arrived at the
ECBI and cancelled the rediscounting line of the bank. Vivas appealed the cancellation to BSP.5 Thereafter,

207
the Monetary Board (MB) issued Resolution No. 1255, dated September 25, 2008, placing ECBI under
Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) framework because of the following serious findings and supervisory
concerns noted during the general examination: 1] negative capital of ?14.674 million and capital
adequacy ratio of negative 18.42%; 2] CAMEL (Capital Asset Management Earnings Liquidity) composite
rating of "2" with a Management component rating of "1"; and 3] serious supervisory concerns particularly
on activities deemed unsafe or unsound.6 Vivas claimed that the BSP took the above courses of action due
to the joint influence exerted by a certain hostile shareholder and a former BSP examiner. 7

Through its letter, dated September 30, 2008, the BSP furnished ECBI with a copy of the Report of
Examination (ROE) as of December 31, 2007. In addition, the BSP directed the bank’s BOD and senior
management to: 1] infuse fresh capital of ?22.643 million; 2] book the amount of ?28.563 million
representing unbooked valuation reserves on classified loans and other risks assets on or before October
31, 2008; and 3] take appropriate action necessary to address the violations/exceptions noted in the
examination.8

Vivas moved for a reconsideration of Resolution No. 1255 on the grounds of non-observance of due
process and arbitrariness. The ISD II, on several instances, had invited the BOD of ECBI to discuss
matters pertaining to the placement of the bank under PCA framework and other supervisory concerns
before making the appropriate recommendations to the MB. The proposed meeting, however, did not
materialize due to postponements sought by Vivas.9

In its letter, dated February 20, 2009, the BSP directed ECBI to explain why it transferred the majority
shares of RBFI without securing the prior approval of the MB in apparent violation of Subsection X126.2 of
the Manual of Regulation for Banks (MORB).10 Still in another letter,11 dated March 31, 2009, the ISD II
required ECBI to explain why it did not obtain the prior approval of the BSP anent the establishment and
operation of the bank’s sub-offices.

Also, the scheduled March 31, 2009 general examination of the books, records and general condition of
ECBI with the cut-off date of December 31, 2008, did not push through. According to Vivas, ECBI asked
for the deferment of the examination pending resolution of its appeal before the MB. Vivas believed that
he was being treated unfairly because the letter of authority to examine allegedly contained a clause
which pertained to the Anti-Money Laundering Law and the Bank Secrecy Act.12

208
The MB, on the other hand, posited that ECBI unjustly refused to allow the BSP examiners from examining
and inspecting its books and records, in violation of Sections 25 and 34 of R.A. No. 7653. In its
letter,13 dated May 8, 2009, the BSP informed ECBI that it was already due for another annual
examination and that the pendency of its appeal before the MB would not prevent the BSP from
conducting another one as mandated by Section 28 of R.A. No. 7653.

In view of ECBI’s refusal to comply with the required examination, the MB issued Resolution No.
726,14 dated May 14, 2009, imposing monetary penalty/fine on ECBI, and referred the matter to the Office
of the Special Investigation (OSI) for the filing of appropriate legal action. The BSP also wrote a
letter,15 dated May 26, 2009, advising ECBI to comply with MB Resolution No. 771, which essentially
required the bank to follow its directives. On May 28, 2009, the ISD II reiterated its demand upon the
ECBI BOD to allow the BSP examiners to conduct a general examination on June 3, 2009.16

In its June 2, 2009 Letter-Reply,17 ECBI asked for another deferment of the examination due to the
pendency of certain unresolved issues subject of its appeal before the MB, and because Vivas was then
out of the country. The ISD II denied ECBI’s request and ordered the general examination to proceed as
previously scheduled.18

Thereafter, the MB issued Resolution No. 823,19 dated June 4, 2009, approving the issuance of a cease
and desist order against ECBI, which enjoined it from pursuing certain acts and transactions that were
considered unsafe or unsound banking practices, and from doing such other acts or transactions
constituting fraud or might result in the dissipation of its assets.

On June 10, 2009, the OSI filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ) a complaint for Estafa Through
Falsification of Commercial Documents against certain officials and employees of ECBI. Meanwhile, the MB
issued Resolution No. 1164,20 dated August 13, 2009, denying the appeal of ECBI from Resolution No.
1255 which placed it under PCA framework. On November 18, 2009, the general examination of the books
and records of ECBI with the cut-off date of September 30, 2009, was commenced and ended in
December 2009. Later, the BSP officials and examiners met with the representatives of ECBI, including
Vivas, and discussed their findings.21 On December 7, 2009, the ISD II reminded ECBI of the non-
submission of its financial audit reports for the years 2007 and 2008 with a warning that failure to submit
those reports and the written explanation for such omission shall result in the imposition of a monetary

209
penalty.22 In a letter, dated February 1, 2010, the ISD II informed ECBI of MB Resolution No. 1548 which
denied its request for reconsideration of Resolution No. 726.

On March 4, 2010, the MB issued Resolution No. 27623 placing ECBI under receivership in accordance with
the recommendation of the ISD II which reads:

On the basis of the examination findings as of 30 September 2009 as reported by the Integrated
Supervision Department (ISD) II, in its memorandum dated 17 February 2010, which findings showed
that the Eurocredit Community Bank, Inc. – a Rural Bank (Eurocredit Bank) (a) is unable to pay its
liabilities as they become due in the ordinary course of business; (b) has insufficient realizable assets to
meet liabilities; (c) cannot continue in business without involving probable losses to its depositors and
creditors; and (d) has willfully violated a cease and desist order of the Monetary Board for acts or
transactions which are considered unsafe and unsound banking practices and other acts or transactions
constituting fraud or dissipation of the assets of the institution, and considering the failure of the Board of
Directors/management of Eurocredit Bank to restore the bank’s financial health and viability despite
considerable time given to address the bank’s financial problems, and that the bank had been accorded
due process, the Board, in accordance with Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7653 (The New Central Bank
Act), approved the recommendation of ISD II as follows:

To prohibit the Eurocredit Bank from doing business in the Philippines and to place its assets and affairs
under receivership; and

To designate the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation as Receiver of the bank.

Assailing MB Resolution No. 276, Vivas filed this petition for prohibition before this Court, ascribing grave
abuse of discretion to the MB for prohibiting ECBI from continuing its banking business and for placing it
under receivership. The petitioner presents the following

ARGUMENTS:

(a)

210
It is grave abuse of discretion amounting to loss of jurisdiction to apply the general law embodied in
Section 30 of the New Central Bank Act as opposed to the specific law embodied in Sections 11 and 14 of
the Rural Banks Act of 1992.

(b)

Even if it assumed that Section 30 of the New Central Bank Act is applicable, it is still the gravest abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction to execute the law with manifest arbitrariness, abuse
of discretion, and bad faith, violation of constitutional rights and to further execute a mandate well in
excess of its parameters.

(c)

The power delegated in favor of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas to place rural banks under receiverships is
unconstitutional for being a diminution or invasion of the powers of the Supreme Court, in violation of
Section 2, Article VIII of the Philippine Constitution.24

Vivas submits that the respondents committed grave abuse of discretion when they erroneously applied
Section 30 of R.A. No. 7653, instead of Sections 11 and 14 of the Rural Bank Act of 1992 or R.A. No.
7353. He argues that despite the deficiencies, inadequacies and oversights in the conduct of the affairs of
ECBI, it has not committed any financial fraud and, hence, its placement under receivership was
unwarranted and improper. He posits that, instead, the BSP should have taken over the management of
ECBI and extended loans to the financially distrained bank pursuant to Sections 11 and 14 of R.A. No.
7353 because the BSP’s power is limited only to supervision and management take-over of banks.

He contends that the implementation of the questioned resolution was tainted with arbitrariness and bad
faith, stressing that ECBI was placed under receivership without due and prior hearing in violation of his
and the bank’s right to due process. He adds that respondent PDIC actually closed ECBI even in the
absence of any directive to this effect. Lastly, Vivas assails the constitutionality of Section 30 of R.A. No.
7653 claiming that said provision vested upon the BSP the unbridled power to close and place under
receivership a hapless rural bank instead of aiding its financial needs. He is of the view that such power

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goes way beyond its constitutional limitation and has transformed the BSP to a sovereign in its own
"kingdom of banks."25

The Court’s Ruling

The petition must fail.

Vivas Availed of the Wrong Remedy

To begin with, Vivas availed of the wrong remedy. The MB issued Resolution No. 276, dated March 4,
2010, in the exercise of its power under R.A. No. 7653. Under Section 30 thereof, any act of the MB
placing a bank under conservatorship, receivership or liquidation may not be restrained or set aside
except on a petition for certiorari. Pertinent portions of R.A. 7653 read:

Section 30. –

x x x x.

The actions of the Monetary Board taken under this section or under Section 29 of this Act shall be final
and executory, and may not be restrained or set aside by the court except on petition for certiorari on the
ground that the action taken was in excess of jurisdiction or with such grave abuse of discretion as to
amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The petition for certiorari may only be filed by the stockholders of
record representing the majority of the capital stock within ten (10) days from receipt by the board of
directors of the institution of the order directing receivership, liquidation or conservatorship.

x x x x. [Emphases supplied]

Prohibition is already unavailing

Granting that a petition for prohibition is allowed, it is already an ineffective remedy under the
circumstances obtaining. Prohibition or a "writ of prohibition" is that process by which a superior court
prevents inferior courts, tribunals, officers, or persons from usurping or exercising a jurisdiction with

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which they have not been vested by law, and confines them to the exercise of those powers legally
conferred. Its office is to restrain subordinate courts, tribunals or persons from exercising jurisdiction over
matters not within its cognizance or exceeding its jurisdiction in matters of which it has cognizance.26 In
our jurisdiction, the rule on prohibition is enshrined in Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules on Civil Procedure,
to wit:

Sec. 2. Petition for prohibition - When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its or
his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is
no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that the judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to desist from further proceedings in
the action or matter specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as the law and justice
require.

x x x x.

Indeed, prohibition is a preventive remedy seeking that a judgment be rendered which would direct the
defendant to desist from continuing with the commission of an act perceived to be illegal.27 As a rule, the
proper function of a writ of prohibition is to prevent the doing of an act which is about to be done. It is not
intended to provide a remedy for acts already accomplished.28

Though couched in imprecise terms, this petition for prohibition apparently seeks to prevent the acts of
closing of ECBI and placing it under receivership. Resolution No. 276, however, had already been issued
by the MB and the closure of ECBI and its placement under receivership by the PDIC were already
accomplished. Apparently, the remedy of prohibition is no longer appropriate. Settled is the rule that
prohibition does not lie to restrain an act that is already a fait accompli.29

The Petition Should Have Been Filed in the CA

Even if treated as a petition for certiorari, the petition should have been filed with the CA. Section 4 of
Rule 65 reads:

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Section 4. When and where petition filed. — The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from
notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely
filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the
denial of said motion.

The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or
of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the
territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or
not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by
law or these Rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals. [Emphases
supplied]

That the MB is a quasi-judicial agency was already settled and reiterated in the case of Bank of Commerce
v. Planters Development Bank And Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas.30

Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts

Even in the absence of such provision, the petition is also dismissible because it simply ignored the
doctrine of hierarchy of courts. True, the Court, the CA and the RTC have original concurrent jurisdiction
to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. The concurrence of jurisdiction, however, does not
grant the party seeking any of the extraordinary writs the absolute freedom to file a petition in any court
of his choice. The petitioner has not advanced any special or important reason which would allow a direct
resort to this Court. Under the Rules of Court, a party may directly appeal to this Court only on pure
questions of law.31 In the case at bench, there are certainly factual issues as Vivas is questioning the
findings of the investigating team.

Strict observance of the policy of judicial hierarchy demands that where the issuance of the extraordinary
writs is also within the competence of the CA or the RTC, the special action for the obtainment of such writ
must be presented to either court. As a rule, the Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the
redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate lower courts; or where exceptional and compelling
circumstances, such as cases of national interest and with serious implications, justify the availment of the

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extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus calling for the exercise of its primary
jurisdiction.32 The judicial policy must be observed to prevent an imposition on the precious time and
attention of the Court.

The MB Committed No Grave Abuse of Discretion

In any event, no grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the MB for the issuance of the assailed
Resolution No. 276.

Vivas insists that the circumstances of the case warrant the application of Section 11 of R.A. No. 7353,
which provides:

Sec. 11. The power to supervise the operation of any rural bank by the Monetary Board as herein
indicated shall consist in placing limits to the maximum credit allowed to any individual borrower; in
prescribing the interest rate, in determining the loan period and loan procedures, in indicating the manner
in which technical assistance shall be extended to rural banks, in imposing a uniform accounting system
and manner of keeping the accounts and records of rural banks; in instituting periodic surveys of loan and
lending procedures, audits, test-check of cash and other transactions of the rural banks; in conducting
training courses for personnel of rural banks; and, in general, in supervising the business operations of
the rural banks.

The Central Bank shall have the power to enforce the laws, orders, instructions, rules and regulations
promulgated by the Monetary Board, applicable to rural banks; to require rural banks, their directors,
officers and agents to conduct and manage the affairs of the rural banks in a lawful and orderly manner;
and, upon proof that the rural bank or its Board of Directors, or officers are conducting and managing the
affairs of the bank in a manner contrary to laws, orders, instructions, rules and regulations promulgated
by the Monetary Board or in a manner substantially prejudicial to the interest of the Government,
depositors or creditors, to take over the management of such bank when specifically authorized to do so
by the Monetary Board after due hearing process until a new board of directors and officers are elected
and qualified without prejudice to the prosecution of the persons responsible for such violations under the
provisions of Sections 32, 33 and 34 of Republic Act No. 265, as amended.

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 x x x x.

The thrust of Vivas’ argument is that ECBI did not commit any financial fraud and, hence, its placement
under receivership was unwarranted and improper. He asserts that, instead, the BSP should have taken
over the management of ECBI and extended loans to the financially distrained bank pursuant to Sections
11 and 14 of R.A. No. 7353 because the BSP’s power is limited only to supervision and management take-
over of banks, and not receivership.

Vivas argues that implementation of the questioned resolution was tainted with arbitrariness and bad
faith, stressing that ECBI was placed under receivership without due and prior hearing, invoking Section
11 of R.A. No. 7353 which states that the BSP may take over the management of a rural bank after due
hearing.33 He adds that because R.A. No. 7353 is a special law, the same should prevail over R.A. No.
7653 which is a general law.

The Court has taken this into account, but it appears from all over the records that ECBI was given every
opportunity to be heard and improve on its financial standing. The records disclose that BSP officials and
examiners met with the representatives of ECBI, including Vivas, and discussed their findings.34 There
were also reminders that ECBI submit its financial audit reports for the years 2007 and 2008 with a
warning that failure to submit them and a written explanation of such omission shall result in the
imposition of a monetary penalty.35 More importantly, ECBI was heard on its motion for reconsideration.
For failure of ECBI to comply, the MB came out with Resolution No. 1548 denying its request for
reconsideration of Resolution No. 726. Having been heard on its motion for reconsideration, ECBI cannot
claim that it was deprived of its right under the Rural Bank Act.

Close Now, Hear Later

At any rate, if circumstances warrant it, the MB may forbid a bank from doing business and place it under
receivership without prior notice and hearing. Section 30 of R.A. No. 7653 provides, viz:

Sec. 30. Proceedings in Receivership and Liquidation. – Whenever, upon report of the head of the
supervising or examining department, the Monetary Board finds that a bank or quasi-bank:

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 (a) is unable to pay its liabilities as they become due in the ordinary course of business: Provided,
That this shall not include inability to pay caused by extraordinary demands induced by financial
panic in the banking community;

(b) has insufficient realizable assets, as determined by the Bangko Sentral, to meet its liabilities; or

(c) cannot continue in business without involving probable losses to its depositors or creditors; or

(d) has wilfully violated a cease and desist order under Section 37 that has become final, involving
acts or transactions which amount to fraud or a dissipation of the assets of the institution; in which
cases, the Monetary Board may summarily and without need for prior hearing forbid the institution
from doing business in the Philippines and designate the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation as
receiver of the banking institution. [Emphases supplied.]

x x x x.

Accordingly, there is no conflict which would call for the application of the doctrine that a special law
should prevail over a general law. It must be emphasized that R.A .No. 7653 is a later law and under said
act, the power of the MB over banks, including rural banks, was increased and expanded. The Court, in
several cases, upheld the power of the MB to take over banks without need for prior hearing. It is not
necessary inasmuch as the law entrusts to the MB the appreciation and determination of whether any or
all of the statutory grounds for the closure and receivership of the erring bank are present. The MB, under
R.A. No. 7653, has been invested with more power of closure and placement of a bank under receivership
for insolvency or illiquidity, or because the bank’s continuance in business would probably result in the
loss to depositors or creditors. In the case of Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas Monetary Board v. Hon. Antonio-
Valenzuela,36 the Court reiterated the doctrine of "close now, hear later," stating that it was justified as a
measure for the protection of the public interest. Thus:

The "close now, hear later" doctrine has already been justified as a measure for the protection of the
public interest. Swift action is called for on the part of the BSP when it finds that a bank is in dire straits.
Unless adequate and determined efforts are taken by the government against distressed and mismanaged
banks, public faith in the banking system is certain to deteriorate to the prejudice of the national economy

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itself, not to mention the losses suffered by the bank depositors, creditors, and stockholders, who all
deserve the protection of the government.37 [Emphasis supplied]

In Rural Bank of Buhi, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,38 the Court also wrote that

x x x due process does not necessarily require a prior hearing; a hearing or an opportunity to be heard
may be subsequent to the closure. One can just imagine the dire consequences of a prior hearing: bank
runs would be the order of the day, resulting in panic and hysteria. In the process, fortunes may be wiped
out and disillusionment will run the gamut of the entire banking community.39

The doctrine is founded on practical and legal considerations to obviate unwarranted dissipation of the
bank’s assets and as a valid exercise of police power to protect the depositors, creditors, stockholders,
and the general public.40 Swift, adequate and determined actions must be taken against financially
distressed and mismanaged banks by government agencies lest the public faith in the banking system
deteriorate to the prejudice of the national economy.

Accordingly, the MB can immediately implement its resolution prohibiting a banking institution to do
business in the Philippines and, thereafter, appoint the PDIC as receiver. The procedure for the involuntary
closure of a bank is summary and expeditious in nature. Such action of the MB shall be final and
executory, but may be later subjected to a judicial scrutiny via a petition for certiorari to be filed by the
stockholders of record of the bank representing a majority of the capital stock. Obviously, this procedure
is designed to protect the interest of all concerned, that is, the depositors, creditors and stockholders, the
bank itself and the general public. The protection afforded public interest warrants the exercise of a
summary closure.

In the case at bench, the ISD II submitted its memorandum, dated February 17, 2010, containing the
findings noted during the general examination conducted on ECBI with the cut-off date of September 30,
2009. The memorandum underscored the inability of ECBI to pay its liabilities as they would fall due in the
usual course of its business, its liabilities being in excess of the assets held. Also, it was noted that ECBI’s
continued banking operation would most probably result in the incurrence of additional losses to the
prejudice of its depositors and creditors. On top of these, it was found that ECBI had willfully violated the
cease-and-desist order of the MB issued in its June 24, 2009 Resolution, and had disregarded the BSP

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rules and directives. For said reasons, the MB was forced to issue the assailed Resolution No. 276 placing
ECBI under receivership. In addition, the MB stressed that it accorded ECBI ample time and opportunity to
address its monetary problem and to restore and improve its financial health and viability but it failed to
do so.

In light of the circumstances obtaining in this case, the application of the corrective measures enunciated
in Section 30 of R.A. No. 7653 was proper and justified. Management take-over under Section 11 of R.A.
No. 7353 was no longer feasible considering the financial quagmire that engulfed ECBI showing serious
conditions of insolvency and illiquidity. Besides, placing ECBI under receivership would effectively put a
stop to the further draining of its assets.

No Undue Delegation of Legislative Power

Lastly, the petitioner challenges the constitutionality of Section 30 of R.A. No. 7653, as the legislature
granted the MB a broad and unrestrained power to close and place a financially troubled bank under
receivership. He claims that the said provision was an undue delegation of legislative power. The
contention deserves scant consideration.

Preliminarily, Vivas’ attempt to assail the constitutionality of Section 30 of R.A. No. 7653 constitutes
collateral attack on the said provision of law. Nothing is more settled than the rule that the
constitutionality of a statute cannot be collaterally attacked as constitutionality issues must be pleaded
directly and not collaterally.41 A collateral attack on a presumably valid law is not permissible. Unless a law
or rule is annulled in a direct proceeding, the legal presumption of its validity stands.42

Be that as it may, there is no violation of the non-delegation of legislative power.1âwphi1 The rationale for
the constitutional proscription is that "legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law
cannot be delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced,
not what the law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This
prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate."43

"There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power,
viz, the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete

219
in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the
only thing he will have to do is enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate
guidelines or stations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot. Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative
authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power
essentially legislative."44

In this case, under the two tests, there was no undue delegation of legislative authority in the issuance of
R.A. No. 7653. To address the growing concerns in the banking industry, the legislature has sufficiently
empowered the MB to effectively monitor and supervise banks and financial institutions and, if
circumstances warrant, to forbid them to do business, to take over their management or to place them
under receivership. The legislature has clearly spelled out the reasonable parameters of the power
entrusted to the MB and assigned to it only the manner of enforcing said power. In other words, the MB
was given a wide discretion and latitude only as to how the law should be implemented in order to attain
its objective of protecting the interest of the public, the banking industry and the economy.

WHEREFORE, the petition for prohibition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 186613, August 27, 2013

ROSENDO R. CORALES, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS MUNICIPAL MAYOR OF NAGCARLAN,

LAGUNA, AND DR. RODOLFO R. ANGELES, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS MUNICIPAL
ADMINISTRATOR OF NAGCARLAN, LAGUNA Petitioners, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
REPRESENTED BY THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, AS REPRESENTED BY PROVINCIAL STATE
AUDITOR OF LAGUNA MAXIMO L. ANDAL, Respondent.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

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This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to nullify the Decision1 and
Resolution2 dated 15 September 2008 and 20 February 2009, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 101296 and, in effect, to reinstate the Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus3 filed by herein
petitioners Rosendo R. Corales (Corales) and Dr. Rodolfo R. Angeles (Dr. Angeles) with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of San Pablo City, Laguna. The assailed Decision annulled and set aside the Order4 dated 17
May 2007 of Branch 32, and the Order5 dated 5 September 2007 of Branch 29, both of the RTC of San
Pablo City, Laguna in Civil Case No. SP-6370 (07), which respectively denied herein respondent Republic
of the Philippines’ (Republic) Motion to Dismiss petitioners’ Petition for Prohibition and the subsequent
Motion for Reconsideration thereof. The Court of Appeals thereby ordered the dismissal of petitioners’
Petition for Prohibition with the court a quo. The questioned Resolution, on the other hand, denied for lack
of merit petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration of the assailed Decision.

The antecedents, as culled from the records, are as follows:cralawlibrary

Petitioner Corales was the duly elected Municipal Mayor of Nagcarlan, Laguna for three (3) consecutive
terms, i.e., the 1998, 2001 and 2004 elections. In his first term as local chief executive, petitioner Corales
appointed petitioner Dr. Angeles to the position of Municipal Administrator, whose appointment was
unanimously approved by the Sangguniang Bayan of Nagcarlan, Laguna (Sangguniang Bayan) per
Resolution No. 98-646 dated 22 July 1998. During his second and third terms as municipal mayor,
petitioner Corales renewed the appointment of petitioner Dr. Angeles. But, on these times,
the Sangguniang Bayan per Resolution No. 2001-0787 dated 12 July 2001 and 26 subsequent Resolutions,
disapproved petitioner Dr. Angeles’ appointment on the ground of nepotism, as well as the latter’s
purported unfitness and unsatisfactory performance. Even so, petitioner Dr. Angeles continued to
discharge the functions and duties of a Municipal Administrator for which he received an annual salary of
P210,012.00.8cralaw virtualaw library

Following an audit on various local disbursements, Maximo Andal (Andal), the Provincial State Auditor of
Laguna, issued an Audit Observation Memorandum (AOM) No. 2006-007-1009 dated 6 October 2006
addressed to petitioner Corales who was asked to comment/reply. The aforesaid AOM, in sum, states that:
1) petitioner Dr. Angeles’ appointment as Municipal Administrator (during the second and third terms of

221
petitioner Corales) was without legal basis for having been repeatedly denied confirmation by
the Sangguniang Bayan; 2) petitioner Dr. Angeles can be considered, however, as a de facto officer
entitled to the emoluments of the office for the actual services rendered; 3) nonetheless, it is not the
Municipality of Nagcarlan that should be made liable to pay for petitioner Dr. Angeles’ salary; instead, it is
petitioner Corales, being the appointing authority, as explicitly provided for in Article 169(I) of the Rules
and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991,10 as well as Section 5, Rule IV of the
Omnibus Rules of Appointments and Other Personnel Actions;11 4) a post audit of payrolls pertaining to
the payment of salaries, allowances and other incentives of petitioner Dr. Angeles from 15 July 2001 up to
31 May 200612 partially amounted to P1,282,829.99; and 5) in view thereof, it is recommended that an
appropriate Notice of Disallowance be issued for the payment of salary expenses incurred without legal
basis by the Municipality of Nagcarlan in the aforestated amount.13cralaw virtualaw library

Instead of submitting his comment/reply thereon, petitioner Corales, together with petitioner Dr. Angeles,
opted to file a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus against Andal and the then members of
the Sangguniang Bayan before the RTC of San Pablo City, Laguna, docketed as Civil Case No. SP-6370
(07) and originally raffled to Branch 32. Petitioners sought, by way of prohibition, to require the Office of
the Provincial Auditor, through Andal, to recall its AOM and to eventually desist from collecting
reimbursement from petitioner Corales for the salaries paid to and received by petitioner Dr. Angeles for
the latter’s services as Municipal Administrator. Petitioners similarly sought, by way of mandamus, to
compel the then members of the Sangguniang Bayan, as a collegial body, to recall its Resolutions denying
confirmation to petitioner Dr. Angeles’ appointment as Municipal Administrator and in their stead to
confirm the validity and legitimacy of such appointment.14cralaw virtualaw library

In its turn, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on Andal’s behalf, who was impleaded in his official
capacity, filed a Motion to Dismiss petitioners’ Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus grounded on lack of
cause of action, prematurity and non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. It was specifically contended
therein that: (1) the issuance of the AOM was merely an initiatory step in the administrative investigation
of the Commission on Audit (COA) to allow petitioner Corales to controvert the findings and conclusions of
the Sangguniang Bayan in its Resolution No. 2001-078, as well as those of then Secretary Jose D. Lina, Jr.
in Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) Opinion No. 124 s. 2002; (2) it was only after the
completion of the said investigation that a resolution will be issued as regards the propriety of the
disbursements made by the Municipality of Nagcarlan in the form of salaries paid to petitioner Dr. Angeles

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during his tenure as Municipal Administrator; and (3) instead of resorting to judicial action, petitioner
Corales should have first responded to the AOM and, in the event of an adverse decision against him,
elevate the matter for review to a higher authorities in the COA.15 With these, petitioners’ petition should
be dismissed, as petitioner Corales has no cause of action against Andal - his resort to judicial intervention
is premature and he even failed to avail himself of, much less exhaust, the administrative remedies
available to him.16cralaw virtualaw library

In its Order dated 17 May 2007, the trial court denied the said Motion to Dismiss on the ground that Andal
was merely a nominal party.17 The subsequent motion for its reconsideration was also denied in another
Order dated 5 September 2007.18cralaw virtualaw library

Respondent Republic, as represented by COA, as represented by Andal, consequently filed a Petition

for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals ascribing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the trial court in rendering the Orders dated 17 May 2007 and 5 September
2007, as it unjustly denied respondent’s right to actively prosecute the case through a mere declaration
that it was a nominal party despite a clear showing that the Petition for Prohibition referred to the
respondent as a real party in interest.19cralaw virtualaw library

On 15 September 2008, the Court of Appeals rendered its now assailed Decision granting respondent’s
Petition for Certiorari, thereby annulling and setting aside the RTC Orders dated 17 May 2007 and 5
September 2007 and, accordingly, dismissing petitioners’ Petition for Prohibition with the court a
quo.20 The Court of Appeals justified its decision in the following manner:
x x x We agree with the OSG’s contention that the [herein respondent Republic], herein represented
by the COA and specifically by Andal in the latter’s capacity as Provincial State Auditor of Laguna, is not
merely a nominal party to the petition for prohibition. x x x. That the [respondent] naturally has
an interest in the disposition/disbursement of said public funds as well as in the recovery
thereof should the ongoing investigative audit confirm the illegality thereof cannot be gainsaid.
Rather than a mere nominal party, therefore, the [respondent] is an indispensable party to the
petition for prohibition and may thus seek its dismissal, given that under the attendant facts
there is a yet no actual case or controversy calling for [therein] respondent court’s exercise of
its judicial power.

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Judicial review cannot be exercised in vacuo. Thus, as a condition precedent for the exercise of
judicial inquiry, there must be an actual case or controversy, which exists when there is a conflict
of legal rights or an assertion of opposite legal claims, which can be resolved on the basis of existing law
and jurisprudence. x x x. An actual case or controversy thus means an existing case or controversy that is
appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court
would amount to an advisory opinion.

[Herein petitioners] x x x have failed to show the existence of an actual case or

controversy that would necessitate judicial inquiry through a petition for prohibition. As the OSG aptly
observed, the issuance of the AOM is just an initiatory step in the investigative audit being then
conducted by Andal[,] as Provincial State Auditor of Laguna to determine the propriety of the
disbursements made by the Municipal Government of Nagcarlan. While Andal may have stated
an opinion in the AOM that [herein petitioner] Corales should reimburse the government
treasury for the salaries paid to [herein petitioner Dr. Angeles] in light of the repeated
disapproval and/or rejection of the latter’s appointment by the Sangguniang [Bayan] of
Nagcarlan, there is no showing whatsoever of any affirmative action taken by Andal to enforce
such audit observation. What Andal did, as the AOM unmistakably shows, was to merely
request [petitioner] Corales to submit a reply/comment to the audit observation and in the
process afford the latter an opportunity to controvert not only Andal’s opinion on salary reimbursement
but the other statements therein expressed by the other members of the audit team.

In the absence moreover of a showing that [petitioners], particularly [petitioner] Corales, sustained actual
or imminent injury by reason of the issuance of the AOM, there is no reason to allow the continuance of
the petition for prohibition which was, after all, manifestly conjectural or anticipatory, filed for a
speculative purpose and upon the hypothetical assumption that [petitioner] Corales would be eventually
compelled to reimburse the amounts paid as [petitioner Dr. Angeles’] salaries should the audit
investigation confirm the irregularity of such disbursements. This Court will not engage in such speculative
guesswork and neither should respondent court x x x.21 (Emphasis and italics supplied).
Disgruntled, petitioners moved for its reconsideration but it was denied for lack of merit in a Resolution
dated 20 February 2009.

Hence, this petition.

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In their Memorandum, petitioners raise the following issues:
I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A PALPABLY ERRONEOUS RESOLUTION

OF A SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION OF LAW WHEN IT ORDERED THE DISMISSAL OF PETITIONERS’
SUIT FOR PROHIBITION.

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED UNJUSTLY AND INJUDICIOUSLY WHEN IT
HELD THAT THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE SUIT FOR PROHIBITION IS
NOT YET RIPE FOR JUDICIAL DETERMINATION.

III.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
THE INTERPRETATION AND RESOLUTION OF A PIVOTAL LEGAL ISSUE WHEN IT CONCLUDED
THAT THERE IS NO ACTUAL DISPUTE OR CONCRETE CONTROVERSY WHICH MAY BE THE
PROPER SUBJECT MATTER OF A SUIT FOR PROHIBITION.

IV.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS UNJUSTIFIABLY TRANSGRESSED AND TRAMPLED

UPON A CATEGORICAL JURISPRUDENTIAL DOCTRINE WHEN IT TOOK COGNIZANCE OF AND
FAVORABLY RESOLVED THE [HEREIN RESPONDENT’S] PETITION FOR CERTIORARI, IN
BLATANT VIOLATION OF THE RULE LAID DOWN IN THE APROPOS CASE OF CHINA ROAD AND
BRIDGE CORPORATION [V.] COURT OF APPEALS (348 SCRA 401).

V.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERSTEPPED AND WENT BEYOND THE

225
BOUNDARIES OF ITS LEGITIMATE DISCRETION WHEN IT DEVIATED AND VEERED AWAY FROM
THE PRINCIPAL ISSUES OF THE CASE, INSTEAD OF PRONOUNCING THAT PETITIONERS HAVE A
VALID, PERFECT AND LEGITIMATE CAUSE OF ACTION FOR PROHIBITION.22 (Italics supplied).
The Petition is bereft of merit.

The issues will be discussed in seriatim.

The first three issues concern the ripeness or prematurity of the Petition for Prohibition assailing the AOM
issued by Andal to petitioner Corales. Petitioners argue that from the tenor of the AOM it is clear that
petitioner Corales is being adjudged liable and personally accountable to pay or to reimburse, in his
private capacity, the salaries paid to and received by petitioner Dr. Angeles for the latter’s services as
Municipal Administrator, as his appointment thereto was considered invalid for lack of necessary
confirmation from the Sangguniang Bayan. It is further argued that contrary to the claim of respondent
Republic that such AOM is a mere initiatory step in the course of an investigative auditing process, the
wordings thereof unmistakably reveal that the same is a categorical disposition and enforcement measure
requiring petitioner Corales to reimburse the money disbursed by the Municipality of Nagcarlan to pay
petitioner Dr. Angeles’ salaries as Municipal Administrator. Such AOM is a firm, clear and affirmative
official action on the part of the Provincial State Auditor to hold petitioner Corales liable for
reimbursement; thus, to require the latter to still comment or controvert the findings thereon is a mere
frivolous and useless formality. Since the requirement for petitioner Corales to pay and reimburse the
salaries of petitioner Dr. Angeles is actual, direct and forthcoming, the same may be the proper subject of
an action for prohibition. Otherwise stated, such imposition of liability for reimbursement against
petitioner Corales presents a concrete justiciable controversy and an actual dispute of legal rights.

Petitioners’ contention is unavailing.

To begin with, this Court deems it proper to quote the significant portions of the questioned AOM, to wit:
FOR: Hon. ROSENDO R. CORALES
Municipal Mayor
Nagcarlan, Laguna
FROM: Mr. MAXIMO L. ANDAL
State Auditor IV

226
 Audit Team Leader

May we have your comment/reply on the following audit observation. Please return the duplicate
within fifteen (15) days upon receipt by filling up the space provided for with your comments.

AUDIT OBSERVATION
The appointment of [herein
petitioner Dr. Angeles] as
Municipal Administrator was
repeatedly denied not confirmed/
concurred by Sangguniang
Bayan hence, the validity of the
appointment as per
opinion/rulings by the then
Secretary Jose D. Lina, Jr. of the
DILG in opinion No. 124 s.2002
was without legal basis.

DILG Opinion No. 124 s[.]2002

states that the continued
discharge of powers by [petitioner
Dr. Angeles] as Municipal
Administrator appears to have no
legal basis. A person may assume
public office once his appointment
is already effective. The Supreme
Court in one case (Atty. David B.
Corpuz [v.] Court of Appeals, et
al[.], G.R. No. 123989, 26
January 1998) held that where
the assent or confirmation of
some other office or body is

227
required, the appointment may be
complete only when such assent
or confirmation is obtained. Until
the process is completed, the
appointee can claim no vested
right in the office nor invoke
security of tenure. Since the
appointment of a Municipal
Administrator requires sanggunian
concurrence (Section 443 (d), RA
7160) and considering that the
appointment never became
effective. As such, his assumption
and continued holding of the
office of the Municipal
Administrator find no legal basis.

However, [petitioner Dr. Angeles]

may claim salary for the services
he has actually rendered. As held
in one case (Civil Liberties Union
[v.] Executive Secretary, 194
SCRA 317), a de facto officer is
entitled to emoluments of the
office for the actual services
rendered. Here, [petitioner Dr.
Angeles] can be considered as
a de facto officer. x x x, as held in
the Corpuz case cited above, the
Supreme Court ruled that a public
official who assumed office under
an incomplete appointment is

228
merely a de facto officer for the
duration of his occupancy of the
office for the reason that he
assumed office under color of a
known appointment which is void
by a reason of some defect or
irregularity in its exercise.

It is worthy to emphasize along

that line that while [petitioner Dr.
Angeles] may be entitled to the
salary as a de facto officer, the
municipality cannot be made
liable to pay his salaries.
Instructive on this point is Article
169 (I) of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the
Local Government Code of 1991
which explicitly provides, thus:

“The appointing authority

shall be liable for the payment
of salary of the appointee for
actual services rendered if the
appointment is disapproved
because the appointing
authority issued it in willful
violation of applicable laws,
rules and regulations thereby
making the appointment
unlawful.”

229
Corollary, Section 5 of Rule IV of
the Omnibus Rules of
Appointments and Other
Personnel Actions provides, thus:

“The services rendered by any

person who was required to
assume the duties and
responsibilities of any position
without appointment having
been issued by the appointing
authority shall not be credited
nor recognized by the
Commission and shall be the
personal accountability of the
person who made him assume
office.

Hence, [herein petitioner Corales]

shall pay the salaries of
[petitioner Dr. Angeles] for the
services the latter has actually
rendered.

xxxxxxxxxxxx

Clearly, the appointment of

[petitioner Dr. Angeles] per se
was bereft of legal basis in
view of the absence of the
concurrence of the legislative
body thus payment of his salaries

230
from the funds of the Municipality
for actual services rendered
remained unlawful.

Further, in paragraph 4 of the

letter of Mr. Allan Poe M.
Carmona, Director II of the CSC
dated [1 December 2004] to Mr.
Ruben C. Pagaspas, OIC, Regional
Cluster Director, COA, Cluster III,
Sub-Cluster VI stated that
[petitioner Dr. Angeles] cannot be
appointed to Municipal
Administrator without the
concurrence of the Sangguniang
Bayan as provided under RA
7160.

Post audit of payrolls pertaining to

the payment of salaries,
allowances and other incentives of
[petitioner Dr. Angeles] as
Municipal Administrator for the
period from [15 July 2001] up to
[31 May 2006] excluding the
period from [1 November 2001]
to [31 December 2001], [16
March 2002] to [15 May 2002],
[1-31 August 2002], [16-30 June
2003], [1-31 December 2003],
[1-31 September 2004] and [1
June 2006] to [30 September

231
2006] were partially amounted to
P1,282,829.99. x x x.

Issuance of Notice of Disallowance

was suggested by Atty. Eden T.
Rafanan, Regional Cluster Director
for [L]egal and Adjudication Office
in her 2nd Indorsement dated [3
July 2006].

In view hereof, it is
recommended that
appropriate Notice of
Disallowance be issued for the
payment of the salary expenses
incurred without legal basis by the
municipality in the amount
mentioned in the above
paragraph.23 (Emphasis, italics
and underscoring supplied).
As can be gleaned therefrom, petitioner Corales was simply required to submit his comment/reply on
the observations stated in the AOM. As so keenly observed by the Court of Appeals, any mention in the
AOM that petitioner Corales shall reimburse the salaries paid to petitioner Dr. Angeles in light of the
repeated disapproval or rejection by the Sangguniang Bayan of his appointment as Municipal
Administrator was merely an initial opinion, not conclusive, as there was no showing that Andal had taken
any affirmative action thereafter to compel petitioner Corales to make the necessary reimbursement.
Otherwise stated, it has not been shown that Andal carried out or enforced what was stated in the AOM.
On the contrary, petitioner Corales was given an opportunity to refute the findings and observations in the
AOM by requesting him to comment/reply thereto, but he never did. More so, even though the AOM
already contained a recommendation for the issuance of a Notice of Disallowance of the payment of salary
expenses, the records are bereft of any evidence to show that a Notice of Disallowance has, in fact, been
issued. Concomitantly, the AOM did not contain any recommendation to the effect that petitioner Corales

232
would be held personally liable for the amount that would be disallowed. It is, therefore, incongruous to
conclude that the said AOM is tantamount to a directive requiring petitioner Corales to reimburse the
salaries paid to and received by petitioner Dr. Angeles during the latter’s stint as Municipal Administrator
after his appointment thereto was held invalid for want of conformity from the Sangguniang Bayan.

In relation thereto, as aptly observed by the OSG, to which the Court of Appeals conformed, the issuance
of the AOM is just an initiatory step in the investigative audit being conducted by Andal as
Provincial State Auditor to determine the propriety of the disbursements made by the Municipal
Government of Laguna. That the issuance of an AOM can be regarded as just an initiatory step in the
investigative audit is evident from COA Memorandum No. 2002-053 dated 26 August 2002.24 A perusal of
COA Memorandum No. 2002-053, particularly Roman Numeral III, Letter A, paragraphs 1 to 5 and 9,
reveals that any finding or observation by the Auditor stated in the AOM is not yet conclusive, as the
comment/justification25 of the head of office or his duly authorized representative is still necessary before
the Auditor can make any conclusion. The Auditor may give due course or find the comment/justification
to be without merit but in either case, the Auditor shall clearly state the reason for the conclusion reached
and recommendation made. Subsequent thereto, the Auditor shall transmit the AOM, together with the
comment or justification of the Auditee and the former’s recommendation to the Director, Legal and
Adjudication Office (DLAO), for the sector concerned in Metro Manila and/or the Regional Legal and
Adjudication Cluster Director (RLACD) in the case of regions. The transmittal shall be coursed through the
Cluster Director concerned and the Regional Cluster Director, as the case may be, for their own comment
and recommendation. The DLAO for the sector concerned in the Central Office and the RLACD shall make
the necessary evaluation of the records transmitted with the AOM. When, on the basis thereof, he finds
that the transaction should be suspended or disallowed, he will then issue the corresponding Notice of
Suspension (NS), Notice of Disallowance (ND) or Notice of Charge (NC), as the case may be, furnishing a
copy thereof to the Cluster Director. Otherwise, the Director may dispatch a team to conduct further
investigation work to justify the contemplated action. If after in-depth investigation, the DLAO for each
sector in Metro Manila and the RLACD for the regions find that the issuance of the NS, ND, and NC is
warranted, he shall issue the same and transmit such NS, ND or NC, as the case may be, to the agency
head and other persons found liable therefor.

From the foregoing, it is beyond doubt that the issuance of an AOM is, indeed, an initial step in the

233
conduct of an investigative audit considering that after its issuance there are still several steps to be
conducted before a final conclusion can be made or before the proper action can be had against the
Auditee. There is, therefore, no basis for petitioner Corales’ claim that his comment thereon would be a
mere formality. Further, even though the AOM issued to petitioner Corales already contained a
recommendation for the issuance of a Notice of Disallowance, still, it cannot be argued that his
comment/reply to the AOM would be a futile act since no Notice of Disallowance was yet issued. Again, the
records are bereft of any evidence showing that Andal has already taken any affirmative action against
petitioner Corales after the issuance of the AOM.

Viewed in this light, this Court can hardly see any actual case or controversy to warrant the exercise of its
power of judicial review. Settled is the rule that for the courts to exercise the power of judicial review, the
following must be extant: (1) there must be an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2)
the question must be ripe for adjudication; and (3) the person challenging must have the “standing.” An
actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims,
susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a mere hypothetical or abstract difference or
dispute. There must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of
existing law and jurisprudence. Closely related thereto is that the question must be ripe for
adjudication. A question is considered ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has
had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. The third requisite is legal standing
or locus standi, which has been defined as a personal or substantial interest in the case such that the
party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged, alleging more than a generalized grievance. The gist of the question of standing is whether a
party alleges “such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions.” Unless a person is injuriously affected in any of his constitutional rights
by the operation of statute or ordinance, he has no standing.26cralaw virtualaw library

The requisites of actual case and ripeness are absent in the present case. To repeat, the AOM issued by
Andal merely requested petitioner Corales to comment/reply thereto. Truly, the AOM already contained a
recommendation to issue a Notice of Disallowance; however, no Notice of Disallowance was yet issued.
More so, there was no evidence to show that Andal had already enforced against petitioner Corales the
contents of the AOM. Similarly, there was no clear showing that petitioners, particularly petitioner Corales,

234
would sustain actual or imminent injury by reason of the issuance of the AOM. The action taken by the
petitioners to assail the AOM was, indeed, premature and based entirely on surmises, conjectures and
speculations that petitioner Corales would eventually be compelled to reimburse petitioner Dr. Angeles’
salaries, should the audit investigation confirm the irregularity of such disbursements. Further, as
correctly pointed out by respondent Republic in its Memorandum, what petitioners actually assail is
Andal’s authority to request them to file the desired comment/reply to the AOM, which is beyond the
scope of the action for prohibition, as such request is neither an actionable wrong nor constitutive of an
act perceived to be illegal. Andal, being the Provincial State Auditor, is clothed with the authority to audit
petitioners’ disbursements, conduct an investigation thereon and render a final finding and
recommendation thereafter. Hence, it is beyond question that in relation to his audit investigation
function, Andal can validly and legally require petitioners to submit comment/reply to the AOM, which the
latter cannot pre-empt by prematurely seeking judicial intervention, like filing an action for prohibition.

Moreover, prohibition, being a preventive remedy to seek a judgment ordering the defendant to desist
from continuing with the commission of an act perceived to be illegal, may only be resorted to when there
is “no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.”27cralaw virtualaw library

In this case, petitioners insist that it is no longer necessary to exhaust administrative remedies
considering that there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and appropriate remedial measure to assail
the imposition under the AOM aside from an action for prohibition.

This Court finds the said contention plain self-deception.

As previously stated, petitioners’ action for prohibition was premature. The audit investigative process was
still in its initial phase. There was yet no Notice of Disallowance issued. And, even granting that the AOM
issued to petitioner Corales is already equivalent to an order, decision or resolution of the Auditor or that
such AOM is already tantamount to a directive for petitioner Corales to reimburse the salaries paid to
petitioner Dr. Angeles, still, the action for prohibition is premature since there are still many
administrative remedies available to petitioners to contest the said AOM. Section 1, Rule V of the 1997
Revised Rules of Procedure of the COA, provides: “[a]n aggrieved party may appeal from an order or
decision or ruling rendered by the Auditor embodied in a report, memorandum, letter, notice of

235
disallowances and charges, Certificate of Settlement and Balances, to the Director who has jurisdiction
over the agency under audit.” From the final order or decision of the Director, an aggrieved party may
appeal to the Commission proper.28 It is the decision or resolution of the Commission proper which can be
appealed to this Court.29cralaw virtualaw library

Clearly, petitioners have all the remedies available to them at the administrative level but they failed to
exhaust the same and instead, immediately sought judicial intervention. Otherwise stated, the auditing
process has just begun but the petitioners already thwarted the same by immediately filing a Petition for
Prohibition. In Fua, Jr. v. COA,30 citing Sison v. Tablang,31 this Court declared that the general rule is that
before a party may seek the intervention of the court, he should first avail himself of all the means
afforded him by administrative processes. The issues which administrative agencies are authorized to
decide should not be summarily taken from them and submitted to the court without first giving such
administrative agency the opportunity to dispose of the same after due deliberation. Also, in The Special
Audit Team, Commission on Audit v. Court of Appeals and Government Service Insurance System,32 this
Court has extensively pronounced that:
If resort to a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be made by giving the administrative
officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his or her jurisdiction, then
such remedy should be exhausted first before the court’s judicial power can be sought. The premature
invocation of the intervention of the court is fatal to one’s cause of action. The doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies is based on practical and legal reasons. The availment of
administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies.
Furthermore, the courts of justice, for reasons of comity and convenience, will shy away from a
dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with, so as
to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and dispose
of the case. x x x.

Moreover, courts have accorded respect for the specialized ability of other agencies of
government to deal with the issues within their respective specializations prior to any court
intervention. The Court has reasoned thus:
We have consistently declared that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a cornerstone
of our judicial system. The thrust of the rule is that courts must allow administrative agencies to carry out
their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective

236
competence. The rationale for this doctrine is obvious. It entails lesser expenses and provides for the
speedier resolution of controversies. Comity and convenience also impel courts of justice to shy away from
a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed.
The 1987 Constitution created the constitutional commissions as independent constitutional bodies, tasked
with specific roles in the system of governance that require expertise in certain fields. For COA, this role
involves:
The power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and
receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to,
the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, instrumentalities, including government-owned and
controlled corporations with original charter. x x x.
As one of the three (3) independent constitutional commissions, COA has been empowered to define
the scope of its audit and examination and to establish the techniques and methods required
therefor; and to promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for
the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or
unconscionable expenditures or uses of government funds and properties.

Thus, in the light of this constitutionally delegated task, the courts must exercise caution when intervening
with disputes involving these independent bodies, for the general rule is that before a party may seek
the intervention of the court, he should first avail of all the means afforded him by
administrative processes. The issues which administrative agencies are authorized to decide
should not be summarily taken from them and submitted to a court without first giving such
administrative agency the opportunity to dispose of the same after due deliberation.33 (Emphasis
supplied).
In their futile attempt to convince this Court to rule in their favor, petitioners aver that by filing a Motion
to Dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of action, respondent Republic, in essence, admitted all the
material averments and narration of facts stated in the Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus. As such,
there is no longer any question of fact to speak of and what remains is a pure question of law. The
judgment, therefore, of the trial court denying the Motion to Dismiss is no longer subject to any appeal or
review by the Court of Appeals. Instead, it is already appealable and reviewable by this Court under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, where only pure questions of law may be raised and dealt with. This is in line
with the pronouncement in China Road and Bridge Corporation v. Court of Appeals34 (China Road Case).
The Court of Appeals should have dismissed respondent Republic’s Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of

237
the Rules of Court for being an improper and inappropriate mode of review.

Petitioners’ above argument is misplaced.

China Road Case is not at all applicable in the case at bench. Therein, the Motion to Dismiss the Complaint
was granted. As the order granting the motion to dismiss was a final, as distinguished from an
interlocutory order, the proper remedy was an appeal in due course.35 Thus, this Court in China Road
Case held that:
x x x Applying the test to the instant case, it is clear that private respondent raises pure questions of law
which are not proper in an ordinary appeal under Rule 41, but should be raised by way of a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45.

We agree with private respondent that in a motion to dismiss due to failure to state a cause of action, the
trial court can consider all the pleadings filed, including annexes, motions and the evidence on record.
However in so doing, the trial court does not rule on the truth or falsity of such documents. It merely
includes such documents in the hypothetical admission. Any review of a finding of lack of cause of action
based on these documents would not involve a calibration of the probative value of such pieces of
evidence but would only limit itself to the inquiry of whether the law was properly applied given the facts
and these supporting documents. Therefore, what would inevitably arise from such a review are
pure questions of law, and not questions of fact.36 (Emphasis supplied).
In the case at bench, however, the Motion to Dismiss was denied. It is well-entrenched that an order
denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order which neither terminates nor finally disposes of a
case as it leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the
merits.37 Therefore, contrary to the claim of petitioners, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss is not
appealable, not even via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The only remedy for the denial of the Motion to
Dismiss is a special civil action for certiorari showing that such denial was made with grave abuse of
discretion.38cralaw virtualaw library

Taking into consideration all the foregoing, this Court finds no reversible error on the part of the Court of
Appeals in reversing the Orders of the court a quo and consequently dismissing petitioners’ Petition for
Prohibition filed thereat.

238
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision and Resolution dated 15 September 2008 and 20
February 2009, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101296 are hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 193150, January 23, 2017

LOIDA M. JAVIER, Petitioner, v. PEPITO GONZALES, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, C.J.:

Two Decisions were promulgated by the trial court in this case: the first one for conviction, and the second
for acquittal. We are called upon to resolve the procedural question of whether the promulgation in
absentia of the earlier judgment of conviction was valid.

This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeks a reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA)
Decision1 and Resolution2 in CA-G.R. SP No. 97629. The CA affirmed the Decision3 of Branch 40 of the
Regional Trial Court of Palayan City, Nueva Ecija (the RTC of Palayan City) in Criminal Case No. 1066-P,
penned by Judge Corazon D. Soluren (Judge Soluren). Judge Soluren reversed a previous
Decision4 penned by Judge Erlinda P. Buted (Judge Buted). In the earlier Decision, respondent was
convicted of murder with frustrated murder and multiple attempted murder, and was meted the death
penalty.

The Antecedents Facts

239
This case originated from a criminal case for murder with frustrated murder and multiple attempted
murder lodged in Branch 96 of the Regional Trial Court of Baler, Aurora (the RTC of Baler). The
Information charged respondent Pepito Gonzales as follows:

That on December 25, 1997 at around 11:30 o'clock in the evening in Barangay Diarabasin, Municipality
of Dipaculao, Province of Aurora, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
accused with intent to kill and with the use of treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously throw a grenade inside the house of one Leonardo Hermenigildo while
the latter and his companions Rulino Concepcion, who sustained mortal wounds which were the direct and
immediate cause of his death thereafter; that as further consequence of said explosion, Leonardo
Hermenigildo was also hit and sustained physical injuries fatal enough to cause his death without
immediate and able medical attendance; that Julio Toledo, Ariel Cabasal and Jesus Macatiag were also hit
and likewise sustained physical injuries, but the said accused did not perform all the acts of execution
which should have produced the crime of multiple murder as a consequence, by reason of causes other
than his own spontaneous desistance, that is, the injuries sustained by said Julio Toledo, Ariel Cabasal and
Jesus Macatiag were not necessarily mortal.5

Gonzales filed a Motion for Bail6 with the RTC of Baler. Private complainant Carmen Macatiag (Macatiag)—
sister of the deceased victim, Rufino Concepcion —filed her Opposition7 to Gonzales's Motion for Bail
Gonzales then filed a Comment8 to which Macatiag filed her Reply.9 The RTC Baler issued an
Order10 granting Gonzales bail.

Thereafter, Macatiag filed with this Court an Urgent Petition for Transfer of Venue.11 While her petition was
pending, she filed a Motion for Reconsideration12 of the Order of the RTC of Baler granting bail to
Gonzales, who filed his Opposition13 to her motion. The RTC of Baler denied14 the Motion for
Reconsideration and upheld its Order granting bail. Macatiag also filed with the RTC of Baler a
Manifestation and Motion to Suspend Proceedings15 pending the resolution of her previous petition for
transfer of venue.

On 17 August 1999, the Court granted the transfer of venue and reassigned the case to the RTC of
Palayan City, which was then presided by Judge Erlinda Buted.16 Trial on the merits ensued.

240
The RTC admitted the prosecution's Formal Offer of Evidence.17 Gonzales filed an Urgent Motion for Leave
to File Demurrer to Evidence.18 To this motion he attached a Demurrer to Evidence,19 which the RTC
denied.20 Following the denial, Gonzales presented his evidence and witnesses and filed his Formal Offer of
Evidence.21

Thereafter, on 30 November 2005, the RTC issued an Order22 setting the promulgation of the case on 15
December 2005. The Return of Service23 indicated that the Order dated 30 November 2005 and the Notice
of Promulgation dated 6 December 2005 were received on 7 and 12 December 2005 by the sister of
private respondent, who refused to sign the Return.

On 15 December 2005, the scheduled date of promulgation, Gonzales failed to appear. His lawyer, Atty.
Mario Benitez (Atty. Benitez), personally filed a "Withdrawal of Counsel"24 with his client's
conformity.25 The promulgation was rescheduled to 22 December 2005.26 On the same date, a warrant of
arrest27 was issued and the bond forfeited in view of the nonappearance of the accused, who was deemed
to have jumped bail.

A Notice of Hearing/Subpoena and Notice of Promulgation of Judgment28 was issued on 15 December

2005 commanding the parties to appear before the Court on 22 December 2015. Notices were sent to
Gonzales and Macatiag.29

On 22 December 2005, Gonzales still failed to appear without any justification. Judge Buted appointed a
counsel de oficio in lieu of Atty. Benitez.30 The Branch Clerk of Court thereafter read the dispositive portion
of Judge Buted's Decision in the presence of the public prosecutor, the counsel de oficio, and the heirs of
Macatiag. Macatiag had been killed on 14 December 2005, just a day before the first promulgation date,
and Gonzales was also an accused in her killing. Gonzales was convicted of the murder charges:

WHEREFORE, the Accused is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime
of MURDER with FRUSTRATED MURDER and MULTIPLE ATTEMPTED MURDER and is hereby
sentenced to a single indivisible penalty of DEATH.31

Thereafter, the Clerk of Court was directed to enter the judgment of conviction in the RTC's criminal
docket pursuant to paragraph 4, Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.32 Since

241
the death penalty was still in force at the time the judgment was promulgated, Judge Buted also ordered
that the records of the case be immediately forwarded to the CA for automatic review.33

In less than a month after the judgment of conviction was rendered, or on 6 January 2006, private
respondent Gonzales filed, through Atty. Benitez, an Omnibus Motion34 asking that the judgment
promulgated on 22 December 2005 be reconsidered and set aside. Gonzales argued that he had not been
properly notified of the promulgation of judgment; that he had not been represented by counsel; and that
the RTC had proceeded with deliberate haste in convicting him.

The trial court, now presided by Judge Soluren, gave due course to the motion of Gonzales and granted it
through an Order dated 18 April 2006. The Order set aside the judgment of conviction and reinstated his
bail.35

On 20 November 2006, petitioner Javier, Macatiag's daughter, discovered that the RTC had rendered a
Decision36 dated 31 October 2006 acquitting Gonzales of all charges.37 On 16 January 2007, she filed a
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA, citing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of Judge Soluren. The Office of the Solicitor General filed a
Comment38 dated 12 October 2007 praying that the Petition be denied due course and dismissed for lack
of merit. The OSG opined that Judge Soluren did not commit grave abuse of discretion in reversing the
earlier Decision of Judge Buted.

The CA Ruling

In its assailed Decision, the CA dismissed the Petition for Certiorari. It ruled out grave abuse of discretion
on the part of respondent Judge Soluren in granting private respondent's Omnibus Motion and rendering a
new judgment of acquittal. It agreed with the theory of the OSG that the promulgation was void, because
respondent Gonzales had not been validly notified of the rescheduled promulgation of judgment on 22
December 2005; that since Gonzales's lawyer, Atty. Benitez, had already withdrawn his representation on
the first scheduled date of promulgation, respondent had no knowledge that the promulgation had been
rescheduled to 22 December 2005; that since he was no longer Gonzales's lawyer, Atty. Benitez was
relieved of the duty to inform his client of court notices and processes; that since respondent was not
personally notified of the rescheduled promulgation, Judge Buted's promulgation in absentia was invalid.

242
The CA further adopted the OSG's stance that before resorting to a Rule 65 petition for certiorari to
question respondent judge's act of acquitting private respondent, petitioner should have first filed a
motion for reconsideration. It ruled that a motion for reconsideration is not only a plain and adequate
remedy available under the law, but is an indispensible condition that must be satisfied before an
aggrieved party can resort to a special civil action for certiorari. The appellate court held that since the
remedy of filing a motion for reconsideration was available to petitioner, and none of the exceptions to the
filing of that motion existed, the Petition must be dismissed.

The Issues

The main issue in this case is whether the CA erred in affirming the Decision of acquittal issued by Judge
Soluren, who had ruled that there was no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on her part when she gave due course to the Omnibus Motion of private respondent
questioning his prior conviction.

In order to resolve the main issue, the following issues have to be addressed:

A. Whether there was a valid promulgation of judgment by Judge Buted in her prior Decision of
conviction;chanrobleslaw

B. Whether Judge Soluren's subsequent judgment of acquittal is valid;chanrobleslaw

C. Whether a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy to question a decision
of acquittal

The Court's Ruling

The Petition is impressed with merit.

As a prologue to our ruling, We take cognizance of the unusual circumstances surrounding this case.
Petitioner is the daughter of the original private complainant, Carmen Macatiag, who was in turn the sister
of the first victim, Rufino Concepcion. When petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review with this Court,

243
the OSG filed a Manifestation and Motion39 praying that the People of the Philippines be removed as a co-
petitioner because the OSG was not joining petitioner in this Petition. The pertinent portion 40 of the OSG's
Manifestation and Motion reads:

[T]he records will show that the OSG already took on a position different from that of the petitioner Loida
M. Javier when the case was elevated to the Court of Appeals. Specifically, the OSG in its Comment dated
October 12, 2007 and Memorandum dated November 24, 2008 was of the position that Honorable Judge
Soluren did not commit grave abuse of discretion when she ruled to acquit Pepito Gonzales. In this regard,
the arguments raised by the OSG in the aforementioned pleadings were in fact, adopted by the Court of
Appeals in its Decision dated May 22, 2010.

While the OSG ordinarily represents the People in proceedings before this Court, We have in the past
allowed private parties to file certiorari petitions assailing rulings and orders of the RTC in criminal
cases.41 As early as 1969, in Paredes v. Gopengco,42 the Court already held that offended parties in
criminal cases have sufficient interest and personality as "persons aggrieved" to file a special civil action of
prohibition and certiorari under Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 65. That ruling was in line with the underlying
spirit of adopting a liberal construction of the Rules of Court in order to promote their object. Recently, We
reiterated this ruling in Almero v. People.43 Similarly, in the case at bar, We find that the ends of
substantial justice would be better served and the issues determined in a more just, speedy, and
inexpensive manner, by entertaining the present Petition.

We now proceed to the merits of the case.

There are two divergent RTC Decisions: one for conviction, and another for acquittal. Our resolution of this
Petition for Review hinges on the validity of the second RTC Decision.

After review of the case and the records, We rule that the Court of Appeals, in affirming Judge Soluren's
Decision of acquittal, committed reversible error, which can be remedied by granting this Petition for
Review on Certiorari.

Judge Buted's Decision convicting

respondent was validly promulgated.

244
Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure allows a court to promulgate a judgment in
absentia and gives the accused the opportunity to file an appeal within a period of fifteen (15) days from
notice to the latter or the latter's counsel; otherwise, the decision becomes final.

Records show that respondent was properly informed of the promulgation scheduled on 15 December
2005. The RTC Order dated 30 November 200544 documents the presence of his counsel during the
hearing. It is an established doctrine that notice to counsel is notice to client.45 In addition, the Return of
Service states that the Order and Notice of Promulgation were personally delivered to respondent's
address.

During the promulgation of judgment on 15 December 2005, when respondent did not appear despite
notice, and without offering any justification for his absence, the trial court should have immediately
promulgated its Decision.46 The promulgation of judgment in absentia is mandatory pursuant to the fourth
paragraph of Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 6. Promulgation of judgment.

xxxx

In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment despite notice, the
promulgation shall be made by recording the judgment in the criminal docket and serving him a copy
thereof at his last known address or thru his counsel. (Emphasis supplied)

If the accused has been notified of the date of promulgation, but does not appear, the promulgation of
judgment in absentia is warranted. This rule is intended to obviate a repetition of the situation in the past
when the judicial process could be subverted by the accused by jumping bail to frustrate the promulgation
of judgment.47 The only essential elements for its validity are as follows: (a) the judgment was recorded in
the criminal docket; and (b) a copy thereof was served upon the accused or counsel.

In Almuete v. People,48 petitioner's counsel informed the trial court that the accused were either ill or not
notified of the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment. The RTC, however, found their absence
inexcusable and proceeded to promulgate its Decision as scheduled. The accused went up to the CA,

245
which acquitted them of the charge. This Court reversed the CA and upheld the validity of the
promulgation.

In Estrada v. People,49 this Court also affirmed the validity of the promulgation of judgment in absentia,
given the presence of the essential elements.

Judge Buted's Order dated 22 December 200550 fulfilled the requirements set forth by the Rules and
prevailing jurisprudence. Pertinent portions of the Order read:

The judgment of conviction which carries the death penalty was pronounced in the presence of the Public
Prosecutor, the counsel de oficio of accused and the heirs of complainant Carmen Macatiag, the dispositive
portion of which, the OIC Clerk of Court is directed to enter into the Criminal Docket.

xxxx

Let copy of the Decision furnished each the Public Prosecutor, the counsel de oficio of the accused, Atty.
Bembol Castillo, and the accused at his last known address.

Respondent was not left without remedy. The fifth paragraph of Section 6, Rule 120, states:

If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without justifiable cause, he
shall lose the remedies available in these rules against the judgment and the court shall order his arrest.
Within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of judgment, however, the accused may surrender and file a
motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall state the reasons for his absence at the
scheduled promulgation and if he proves that his absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed
to avail of said remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice.

However, instead of surrendering and filing a motion for leave to explain his unjustified absence,
respondent, through Atty. Benitez, filed an Omnibus Motion before the RTC praying that the promulgation
be set aside.51 We cannot countenance this blatant circumvention of the Rules.

246
Judge Soluren's Decision acquitting
respondent is void and has no legal
effect.

Judge Soluren acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she
gave due course to respondent's Omnibus Motion. Aside from being the wrong remedy, the motion lacked
merit.

The filing of a motion for reconsideration to question a decision of conviction can only be resorted to if the
accused did not jump bail, but appeared in court to face the promulgation of judgment. Respondent did
not appear during the scheduled promulgation and was deemed by the judge to have jumped bail. The
fifth paragraph of Section 6, Rule 120, states that if the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the
accused to appear was without justifiable cause, he shall lose the remedies available in the Rules against
the judgment, and the court shall order his arrest.

The Court underscores the fact that following Gonzales's waiver of the remedies under the Rules, Judge
Buted issued an Order dated 22 December 2005. According to the Order, the case records shall be
immediately forwarded to the CA for its automatic review of convictions meting out the death
penalty.52 This automatic review was pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Circular 20-2005 (dated
15 April 2005) as implemented by OCA Circular No. 57-2005 (dated 12 May 2005).

Supreme Court Administrative Circular 20-2005 mandates as follows:

[A]ll Regional Trial Courts concerned, through the Presiding Judges and Clerks of Court, are hereby
DIRECTED to henceforth DIRECTLY forward to the COURT OF APPEALS (Manila for Luzon cases, Cebu
Station for Visayas cases, and Cagayan de Oro Station for Mindanao cases) the records of criminal cases
whose decisions are subject to (a) automatic review because the penalty imposed is death or (b) ordinary
appeals (by notices of appeal) because the penalty imposed is either reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, notwithstanding a statement in the notice of appeal that the appeal is to the Supreme
Court.

Meanwhile, OCA Circular No. 57-2005 gives the following directive:

247
[A]ll Judges and Clerks of Court of the Regional Trial Courts are hereby reminded that failure to comply
with the above-cited Administrative Circular shall warrant appropriate disciplinary action pursuant to Rule
140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. 01-8-10-SC, which took effect on 11 September 2001, as
well as the pertinent rules and regulations of the Civil Service Commission.

This Administrative Circular took effect on 19 April 2005, strict compliance herewith is hereby enjoined.

In utter disregard of this Court's circulars, Judge Soluren capriciously, whimsically, and arbitrarily took
cognizance of private respondent's Omnibus Motion, granted it, and rendered a totally opposite Decision of
acquittal. What she should have done was dismiss the Omnibus Motion outright, since Judge Buted's
Decision of conviction was already subject to automatic review by the CA. By acting on the wrong remedy,
which led to the reversal of the conviction, Judge Soluren contravened the express orders of this Court.
Her blatant abuse of authority was so grave and so severe that it deprived the court of its very power to
dispense justice.

We take this opportunity to correct a capricious, patent, and abusive judgment by reversing and setting
aside the Decision.

Judge Soluren retired compulsorily in 2012. Had she still been in the service, some members of this Court
would have been minded to refer this matter to the Office of the Court Administrator for investigation into
and evaluation of the question of whether the above acts call for the application of administrative
sanctions.

Double jeopardy is not triggered

when the order of acquittal is void.

Grave abuse of discretion amounts to lack of jurisdiction, and lack of jurisdiction prevents double jeopardy
from attaching.53

In People v. Hernandez,54 this Court explained that "an acquittal rendered in grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction does not really 'acquit' and therefore does not terminate the
case as there can be no double jeopardy based on a void indictment."

248
Considering that Judge Soluren's order of acquittal was void from the very beginning, it necessarily follows
that the CA ruling dismissing the Petition for Certiorari must likewise be reversed and set aside.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 97629 dated 22 March 2010 and Resolution dated 30 July 2010 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.

The Decision of Branch 40 of the Regional Trial Court of Palayan City, Nueva Ecija dated 31 October 2006
and Order dated 18 April 2006, rendered by public respondent Judge Corazon D. Soluren acquitting
respondent Pepito Gonzales, are likewise REVERSED and SET ASIDE for having been issued with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The Decision dated 22 December 2005
rendered by Judge Erlinda P. Buted is REINSTATED.

The Court of Appeals is hereby ordered to conduct the mandatory and automatic review of the Decision
dated 22 December 2005 pursuant to Sections 3 and 10, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court. Let the entire
records of Criminal Case No. 1066-P entitled People of the Philippines v. Pepito Gonzales be
immediately TRANSMITTED to the Court of Appeals.

The bail granted to respondent Pepito Gonzales is CANCELLED. Let copies of this Decision be furnished
the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation and the Director-General of the Philippine National
Police. The National Bureau of Investigation and the Philippine National Police are hereby DIRECTED to
cause the IMMEDIATE ARREST and DETENTION of respondent Pepito Gonzales.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 197762

CAREER EXECUTIVE SERVICE BOARD represented by CHAIRPERSON BERNARDO P. ABESAMIS,

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR MA. ANTHONETTE VELASCO-ALLONES, and DEPUTY EXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR ARTURO M. LACHICA, Petitioner
vs
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION represented by CHAIRMAN FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III AND PUBLIC

249
ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, CHIEF PUBLIC ATTORNEY PERSIDA V. RUEDA-ACOSTA, DEPUTY CHIEF
PUBLIC ATTORNEYS MACAPANGCAT A. MAMA, SYLVESTRE A. MOSING, REGIONAL PUBLIC
ATTORNEYS CYNTHIA M. VARGAS, FRISCO F. DOMALSIN, TOMAS B. PADILLA, RENATO T.
CABRIDO, SALVADOR S. HIPOLITO, ELPIDIO C. BACUYAG, DIOSDADO S. SAVELLANO, RAMON
N. GOMEZ, MARIE G-REE R. CALINAWAN, FLORENCIO M. DILOY, EDGARDO D. GONZALEZ,
NUNILA P. GARCIA, FRANCIS A. CALATRAVA, DATUMANONG A. DUMAMBA, EDGAR Q.
BALANSAG, PUBLIC ATTORNEY IV MARVIN R. OSIAS, PUBLIC ATTORNEY IV HOWARD B. AREZA,
PUBLIC ATTORNEY IV IMELDA C. ALFORTE-GANANCIAL, Respondents

DECISION

SERENO, CJ.:

The dispute in this case concerns the classification of certain positions in the Public Attorney's Office
(PAO).The Court is asked to determine, in particular, whether these positions are properly included in the
Career Executive Service (CES); and whether the occupants of these positions must obtain third-level
eligibility to qualify for permanent appointment. To resolve these questions, the Court must also delineate
the respective jurisdictions granted by law to the competing authorities involved in this case - the Civil
Service Commission (CSC) and the Career Executive Service Board (CESB).

FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS

In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,1 the CESB2 seeks the reversal of the Decision3 and
Resolution4 of the CSC declaring that (a) it had the jurisdiction to resolve an appeal from a CESB
Resolution5 refusing to declassify certain positions in PAO; and (b) the PAO positions involved in the
appeal do not require third-level eligibility.

The facts leading to the controversy are not in dispute.

On 24 September 2010, the PAO received a copy of the CESB Report on the CES Occupancy of the
Department of Justice (DOJ).6 This document stated, among others, that out of 35 filled positions in the
PAO, 33 were occupied by persons without the required CES eligibility.

250
In response to the report, PAO Deputy Chief Public Attorney Silvestre A. Mosing (Deputy Chief Mosing)
sent a letter7 to CESB Executive Director Maria Anthonette V. Allones. He informed her that the positions
of Chief Public Attorney, Deputy Chief Public Attorneys, and Regional Public Attorneys (subject positions)
were already permanent in nature pursuant to Section 68 of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9406, which accorded
security of tenure to the occupants thereof.

A second letter dated 9 November 20109 was sent to the CESB by Deputy Chief Mosing to reiterate its
earlier communication. The letter also contained supplementary arguments in support of the assertion that
the subject positions were permanent posts; hence, their occupants may only be removed for cause
provided by law. Based on the foregoing premises, the PAO requested the deletion of its office from the
Data on CES Occupancy for the Department of Justice (DOJ).

On 18 November 2010, the PAO received the reply sent to Deputy Chief Mosing by the CESB, through
Deputy Executive Director Arturo M. Lachica.10 The latter informed Deputy Chief Mosing that the CESB
would conduct a position classification study on the specified PAO positions to determine whether they
may still be considered CES positions in the DOJ.

The DOJ Legal Opinion

While the matter was pending, PAO Deputy Chief Mosing wrote a letter to then DOJ Secretary Leila M. de
Lima to inform her about the communications sent by the PAO to the CESB.11 He also reiterated the PAO's
opinion that the subject positions must be considered permanent in nature, and not subject to CES
requirements.12

In a letter13 sent to Chief Public Attorney Persida V. Rueda-Acosta on 3 January 2011, Chief State Counsel
Ricardo V. Paras III elucidated the legal opinion of the DOJ on the matter:

Based on the foregoing, your claim that the appointments of the top-level officials of the PAO are
permanent is without merit. For one, the positions of the Chief Public Attorney, Deputy Chief Public
Attorney and Regional Public Attorneys are part of the CES. xxx

xxxx

251
Secondly, since the Chief Public Attorney, Deputy Chief Public Attorneys and Regional Public Attorneys are
occupying CES positions, it is required by law that they should be CES eligibles to become permanent
appointees to the said position. x x x.

xxxx

This leads to the inevitable conclusion that the appointments of the Chief Public Attorney, Deputy Chief
Public Attorneys and Regional Public Attorneys are not permanent, despite your claims to the contrary,
considering that they do not possess the required CES eligibility for the said positions. As such, they
cannot invoke their right to security of tenure even if it was expressly guaranteed to them by the PAO
Law.

xxxx

Considering that the appointments of the Chief Public Attorney, Deputy Chief Public Attorneys and
Regional Public Attorneys are temporary, they are required to subsequently take the CES examination. In
the absence of any evidence that would show compliance with the said condition, it is presumed that the
top-level officials of the PAO are non-CES eligibles; therefore they may be removed from office by the
appointing authority without violating their constitutional and statutory rights to security of tenure. 14

The DOJ also noted that the permanent nature of an appointment does not automatically translate to an
exemption from CES coverage, as it is only the CESB that has the authority to exempt certain positions
from CES requirements.15 The DOJ further rejected the claim that the occupants of the subject positions
were exercising quasi-judicial functions. It explained that while the lawyers of the PAO regularly conduct
mediation, conciliation or arbitration of disputes, their functions do not entail the rendition of judgments or
decisions - an essential element of the exercise of quasi-judicial functions.16

The CSC Legal Opinion

It appears that while waiting for the CESB to respond to its letters, the PAO wrote to the CSC to request a
legal opinion on the same matter.17 The PAO thereafter informed the CESB of the former's decision to seek

252
the opinion and requested the latter to issue no further opinion or statement, oral or written, relative to
the qualifications of the PAO officials.18

On 7 January 2011, the CSC issued the requested legal opinion.19 Citing its mandate as an independent
constitutional commission and its authority under the Administrative Code to "render opinions and rulings
on all personnel and other civil service matters," the CSC declared that third-level eligibility is not required
for the subject positions in the PAO:

The law is explicit that the positions [of] Chief Public Attorney, Deputy Chief Public Attorney and Regional
Public Attorney in PAO shall have the same qualifications for appointment, among other things, as those of
the Chief State Prosecutor, Assistant Chief State Prosecutor and Regional State Prosecutor, respectively.
These, of course include, the eligibility requirement for these positions. x x x.

xxxx

The Prosecution Service Act of 2010 explicitly provides that the Prosecutor General (the retitled position of
Chief State Prosecutor) has the same qualifications for appointment, among other things, as those of the
Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals (CA). Further, the Senior Deputy State Prosecutor and the
Regional Prosecutor have the same qualifications as those of an associate justice of the CA. x x x.

xxxx

No less than the Constitution provides that justices and judges in the judiciary are required, among other
things, practice of law as requirement for appointment thereto. Pointedly, the Presiding Justice and the
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals (CA) have the same qualifications as those provided for in the
Constitution for Justices of the Supreme Court[,] which includes, among other requirements, practice of
law. This means that the Constitution and the Civil Service Law prescribe RA 1080 (BAR) as the
appropriate civil service eligibility therefor. Accordingly, any imposition of a third-level eligibility (e.g.
CESE, CSEE) is not proper, if not, illegal under the circumstances. In fact, even in the 1997 Qualification
Standards Manual of the Commission, all of these positions require RA 1080 BAR eligibility for purposes of
appointment.

253
 xxxx

Thus, it is the Commission's op1mon that for purposes of permanent appointment to the positions of Chief
Public Attorney, Deputy Chief Public Attorney and Regional Public Attorney, no thirdlevel eligibility is
required but only RA 1080 (BAR) civil service eligibility.20

CESB Resolution No. 918

On 12 January 2011, the CESB issued Resolution No. 91821 (CESB Resolution No, 918) denying the PAO's
request to declassify the subject positions. Citing the Position Classification Study22 submitted by its
secretariat, the CESB noted that the positions in question "require leadership and managerial
competence"23 and were thus part of the CES. Hence, the appointment of persons without third-level
eligibility for these posts cannot be considered permanent. The CESB explained:

WHEREAS, pursuant to its mandate to identify positions of equivalent rank as CES positions, the
Secretariat revisited its previous classification as part of the CES [ ofj the above positions of PAO and
conducted a position classification of the above positions and arrived at the following findings:

1. The positions of Chief Public Attorney, Deputy Chief Public Attorneys, Regional Public Attorneys and
Assistant Regional Public Attorneys who are all presidential appointees fall within the criteria set under
CESB Resolution No. 299, s. 2009, namely:

a. The position is a career position;

b. The position is above division chief level;

c. The duties and responsibilities of the position require the performance of executive or managerial
functions.

2. While Section 3 of Republic Act 9406 which provides that:

254
SEC. 3. A new Section 14-A, is hereby inserted in Chapter 5, Title III, Book IV of Executive Order No. 292,
otherwise known as the "Administrative Code of 1987", to read as follows:

"SEC. 14-A Powers and Functions. - The PAO shall independently discharge its mandate to render, free of
charge, legal representation, assistance, and counselling to indigent persons in criminal, civil, labor,
administrative and other quasi-judicial cases. In the exigency of the service, the PAO may be called upon
by proper government authorities to render such service to other persons, subject to existing laws, rules
and regulations."

The aforecited provision does not limit the mandate of PAO to perform only non-executive functions. All
that the aforecited provision states is that the PAO is mandated to render legal representation, assistance
and counseling to indigent persons in criminal, civil, labor, administrative and other quasi-judicial cases,
free of charge. Notably, the positions of Chief Public Attorney, Deputy Chief Public Attorney, Regional
Public Attorneys and Assistant Regional Public Attorneys evidently require leadership and managerial
competence.

xxxx

WHEREAS, it is undisputed that the subject pos1t10ns are CES in nature and as such, the eligibility
requirement for appointment thereto is CES eligibility.

With regard to the question of its jurisdiction over the matter as against that of the CSC, the CESB stated:

WHEREAS, under Section 8, Chapter 2, Book V of EO 292, it is the Board which has the mandate over
Third-level positions in the Career Service and not the CSC. Section 8, Chapter 2, Book V of EO 292
provides:

Section 8. Classes of Positions in the Civil Service. - (l) Classes of positions in the career service,
appointment to which requires examinations shall be grouped into three major levels as follows:

xxxx

255
(c) The third-level shall cover positions in the Career Executive Service.

(2) x x x Entrance to the third-level shall be prescribed by the Career Executive Service Board.

WHEREAS, in the case of De Jesus v. People, G.R. No. 61998, February 22, 1983, 120 SCRA 760, the
Supreme Court ruled that "where there are two acts, one of which is special and particular and the other
general which, if standing alone, would include the same matter and thus conflict with the special act, the
special must prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than that of a general statute and
must be taken as intended to constitute an exception to the general act."

WHEREAS, following the above-cited rule, it is clear that Section 8, Chapter 2, Book V of EO 292 is the
exception to [the] general act pertaining to the authority of the CSC;

xxxx

WHEREAS, it is clear that the mandate of the Board is in accordance with existing laws and pertinent
jurisprudence on matters pertaining to the CES[.]24

Aggrieved by the CESB Resolution, the PAO filed a Verified Notice of Appeal25 and an Urgent Notice of
Appeal26 with the CSC.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE CSC

Before the CSC, the PAO assailed CESB Resolution No. 918 on the following grounds: (a) the resolution
was rendered contrary to R.A. 9406 in relation to R.A. 10071,27 the 1987 Constitution and the CSC letter-
opinion; and (b) the CESB usurped the legislative function of Congress when the former required
additional qualifications for appointment to certain PAO positions. The PAO likewise asserted that its
appeal had been brought to the CSC, because the latter had the power to review decisions and actions of
one of its attached agencies - the CESB.

In an Order28 dated 17 January 2011, the CSC directed the CESB to comment on the appeal.

256
Instead of submitting a comment, however, the CESB filed a Motion for Clarification29 to assail the
authority of the CSC to review its Decision. It asserted that the CSC had no jurisdiction to decide the
appeal given that (a) the appeal involved a controversy between two government entities regarding
questions of law;30 and (b) the CESB was an autonomous agency whose actions were appealable to the
Office of the President.31 In addition, the CESB emphasized the inability of the CSC to render an unbiased
ruling on the case, considering the latter's previous legal opinion on the appropriate eligibility for key
positions in the PA0.32

In a Decision33 dated 15 February 2011, the CSC granted the appeal and reversed CESB Resolution No.
918.

As a preliminary matter, the CSC ruled that it could assume jurisdiction over the appeal, which involved
the employment status and qualification standards of employees belonging to the civil service. It was
supposedly a matter falling within its broad and plenary authority under the Constitution and the
Administrative Code. The CSC also declared that the authority of the CESB over third-level employees was
limited to the imposition of entry requirements and "should not be interpreted as cutting off the reach of
the Commission over this particular class of positions."34 Moreover, the CESB was declared subject to the
revisory power of the CSC, given that an attached office is not entirely and totally insulated from its
mother agency.35 With respect to the provision in the Integrated Reorganization Plan36 on appeals from
the CESB to the Office of the President, the CSC construed this requirement as pertaining only to
disciplinary proceedings.37

On the merits, the CSC ruled in favor of the PAO officials. It declared that the CESB would be in violation
of R.A. 9406 if the latter would require an additional qualification - in this case, third-level eligibility - for
purposes of permanent appointments to certain PAO positions:

The foregoing elaboration shows the qualifications of the subject PAO positions under the existing laws. It
is gleaned that nowhere in these laws is there a reference to third-level eligibility and CESO rank as
qualification requirements for attaining tenurial security. All that the laws uniformly prescribe for the
positions in question is practice of law for certain period of time, which presupposes a bar license. This
being the case, the CESB cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering the policies of the third-level,
validly impose qualifications in addition to what the laws prescribe. It cannot add another layer of

257
qualification requirement which is not otherwise specified in the statutes. As an administrative agency, the
CESB can only promulgate rules and regulations which must be consistent with and in harmony with the
provisions of the laws, and it cannot add or subtract thereto. Most evidently, therefore, in promulgating
the assailed resolution, which sets out additional qualifications for the subject positions in the PAO, the
CESB has overstepped the bounds of its authority. x x x.

In so saying, the Commission does not lose sight of the power of the CESB to identify other positions
equivalent to those enumerated in the Administrative Code of 1987 as being part of the third-level or CES
for as long as they come within the ambit of the appointing prerogative of the President. Yet, such grant
of authority is derived from a general law (the Administrative Code) and hence, it must be deemed
circumscribed or qualified by the special law governing the PAO. Reiteratively, the PAO Law, in conjunction
with other laws, merely fixes practice of law as the principal qualification requirement for the positions of
Acosta, et al.

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the
CESB Resolution No. 918 dated Jnaury 12, 2011 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE for not being in conformity
with law and jurisprudence. It is declared that the following key positions in the Public Attorney's Office do
not require third-level eligibility and CESO rank for purposes of tenurial security:

1. Chief Public Attorney;

2. Deputy Chief Public Attorneys;

3. Regional Public Attorneys; and

4. Assistant Regional Public Attorneys.38

The CESB sought reconsideration of the Decision, but its motion was denied.39

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THIS COURT

258
On 9 August 2011, the CESB filed the instant Petition40 imputing grave abuse of discretion to respondent
CSC. It asserts that (a) the CSC has no jurisdiction to review the Resolution of the CESB, given the latter's
autonomy as an attached agency; (b) CESB Resolution No. 918 should have been appealed to the Office
of the President, and not to the CSC, in accordance with Article IV, Part III of the Integrated
Reorganization Plan. The subject PAO positions are supposedly part of the CES, based on criteria
established by the CESB.41 These criteria were set pursuant to the latter's power to identify positions
belonging to the third-level of the civil service and to prescribe the requirements for entry thereto. The
Petition further reiterates the alleged inability of the CSC to decide the case with impartiality.

In its Comment,42 the CSC contends that the Petition filed by the CESB before this Court should be
dismissed outright for being an improper remedy and for violating the hierarchy of courts. The CSC further
asserts its jurisdiction over the PAO's appeal from the CESB Resolution in this case. Citing its mandate as
the central personnel agency of the government based on the 1987 Constitution and the Administrative
Code, the CSC insists that it has broad authority to administer and enforce the constitutional and statutory
provisions on the merit system for all levels and ranks of the civil service. This authority allegedly
encompasses the power to review and revise the decisions and actions of offices attached to it, such as
the CESB. It also claims that the present dispute involves a personnel action that is within its jurisdiction.

Respondents PAO and its officials have also filed their own Comment43 on the Petition. They assert that (a)
the Petition should be dismissed outright as it is tainted with serious procedural and jurisdictional flaws;
(b) the CSC properly exercised its jurisdiction when it resolved the appeal in this case; and (c) CESB
Resolution No. 918 contravened R.A. 9406 in relation to the 1987 Constitution, R.A. 10071 and the CSC
letteropinion dated 7 January 2011.

Because the instant case involves the contradictory views of two government offices, the Court likewise
required the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to comment on the matter as the lawyer of the
government tasked to uphold the best interest of the latter.

On 28 February 2012, the OSG filed the required Comment.44 On the issue of jurisdiction, it supports the
view of the CSC and the PAO. It cites the Constitution and the Administrative Code as the sources of the
authority of the CSC to review rulings of the CESB, particularly with regard to personnel matters such as
the reclassification of positions.

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As to the merits of the case, the OSG asserts that the subject positions in the PAO should be declassified
from the CES. It points out that the primary function of these PAO officials -- the provision of legal
assistance to the indigent - is specialized in nature; in contrast, their managerial functions are merely
incidental to their role. The OSG further contends that the manifest intent of the law is to require PAO
officials to have the same qualifications as their counterpmis in the National Prosecution Service (NPS).
Consequently, the OSG argued that the decision of the CESB to declassify certain posts in the NPS should
have likewise resulted in the declassification of the corresponding positions in the PAO.

In its Reply to the Comment of the OSG,45 the CESB urges the Court to adhere to the alleged limitations
on the general authority of the CSC over all matters concerning the civil service. In particular, the CESB
asserts its specific and exclusive mandate to administer all matters pertaining to the third-level of the
career service. Included in these matters is the power to promulgate rules, standards and procedures for
the selection, classification, compensation and career development of its members. Moreover, the CESB
insists that it is an agency within the Executive Department under the Integrated Reorganization Plan;
hence, its decisions are appealable only to the Office of the President. Lastly, the CESB maintains that the
subject positions properly belong to the CES, considering that executive and managerial functions must be
exercised by the occupants thereof.

ISSUES

The following issues are presented for resolution:

(1) Whether a petition for certiorari and prohibition was the proper remedy to question the assailed CSC
Decision and Resolution

(2) Whether the CSC had the jurisdiction to resolve the appeal filed by the PAO and to reverse CESB
Resolution No. 918

(3) Whether the CSC acted in accordance with law when it reversed the CESB and declared that third-level
eligibility is not required for occupants of the subject PAO positions

OUR RULING

260
We DENY the Petition.

At the outset, we note that the CESB availed itself of an improper remedy to challenge the ruling of the
CSC. In any event, after a judicious consideration of the case, we find that the CSC acted within its
jurisdiction when it resolved the PAO's appeal and reversed CESB Resolution No. 918. The CSC also
correctly ruled that third-level eligibility is not required for the subject positions.

A petition for certiorari and prohibitinn is

not the appropriate remedy to challenge
the ruling of the CSC.

As a preliminary matter, this Court must address the objections of respondents to the remedy availed of
by the CESB to question the ruling of the CSC.

Respondents contend that the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by the CESB before this Court
was improper, because the remedy of appeal was available via a petition for review under Rule 43. On the
other hand, the CESB insists that a Rule 65 petition is proper, because it is disputing the authority and
jurisdiction of the CSC.

We find in favor of respondents.

It is settled that a resort to the extraordinary remedies of certiorari and prohibition is proper only in cases
where (a) a tribunal, a board or an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without
or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;
and (b) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Rule
65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure requires the concurrence of both these requisites:

Section l. Petition for certiorari. - When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the

261
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may
require.1âwphi1

The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject
thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of
non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46.

Section 2. Petition for prohibition. - When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its or
his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is
no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that judgment he rendered commanding the respondent to desist from further proceedings in the
action or matter specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may
require.

The petition shall likewise be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution
subject thereof copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn
certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46. (Emphasis
supplied)

In this case, the second requirement is plainly absent. As respondents correctly observed, there was an
appeal available to the CESB in the form of a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure. Section 1 of Rule 43 specifically provides for appeals from decisions of the CSC:

Section 1. Scope. - This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax
Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial
agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Among these agencies are the Civil Service
Commission, Central Board of Assessment Appeals, Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of the
President, Land Registration Authority, Social Security Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of
Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer, National Electrification Administration, Energy Regulatory
Board, National Telecommunications Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform under Republic Act No.

262
6657, Government Service Insurance System, Employees Compensation Commission, Agricultural
Invention Board, Insurance Commission, Philippine Atomic Energy Commission, Board of Investments,
Construction Industry Arbitration Commission, and voluntary arbitrators authorized by law.

xxxx

Section 5. How appeal taken. - Appeal shall be taken by filing a verified petition for review in seven (7)
legible copies with the Court of Appeals, with proof of service of a copy thereof on the adverse party and
on the court or agency a quo. The original copy of the petition intended for the Court of Appeals shall be
indicated as such by the petitioner.

Upon the filing of the petition, the petitioner shall pay to the clerk of court of the Court of Appeals the
docketing and other lawful fees and deposit the sum of ₱500.00 for costs. Exemption from payment of
docketing and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs may be granted by the Court of Appeals upon a
verified motion setting forth valid grounds therefor. If the Court of Appeals denies the motion, the
petitioner shall pay the docketing and other lawful fees and deposit for costs within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the denial. (Emphasis supplied)

In an attempt to justify its resort to certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65, the CESB asserts that the
allegations in its Petition - the patent illegality of the assailed Decision and Resolution of the CSC, as well
as the lack of jurisdiction and the grave abuse of discretion attending the latter's ruling - are not suitable
for an appeal under Rule 43. It argues that since these grounds properly pertain to a petition
for certiorari and prohibition, this remedy is more appropriate.

We find the CESB's contention untenable. As previously stated, certiorari and prohibition are proper only if
both requirements are present, that is, if the appropriate grounds are invoked; and an appeal or any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy is unavailable. Mere reference to a ground under Rule 65 is not
sufficient. This Court has, in fact, dismissed a Petition for Certiorari assailing another CSC Resolution
precisely on this ground. In Mahinay v. Court of Appeals,46 the Court ruled:

As provided by Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, the proper mode of appeal from the decision of a quasi-
judicial agency, like the CSC, is a petition for review filed with the CA.

263
The special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court may be resorted to only when any
tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of
its/his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there
is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

In this case, petitioner clearly had the remedy of appeal provided by Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court. Madrigal Tran.\port, Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings Corporation held:

Where appeal is available to the aggrieved party, the action for certiorari will not be entertained.
Remedies of appeal (including petitions for review) and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not alternative or
successive. Hence, certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal, especially if one's own
negligence or error in one's choice of remedy occasioned such loss or lapse. One of the requisites
of certiorari is that there be no available appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy. Where an
appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefor is grave abuse of discretion.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Here, the CESB could have appealed the CSC Decision and Resolution to the CA via a petition for review
under Rule 43. Hence, the filing of the instant Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is improper regardless
of the grounds invoked therein.

Moreover, we find no reason to allow the CESB to avail itself of the extraordinary remedies
of certiorari and prohibition. Indeed, the petition itself cites no exceptional circumstance47 other than the
supposed transcendental importance of the issues raised, "as the assailed CSC Decision is gravely
prejudicial to the mandate of the Petitioner." Even when confronted by respondents with regard to the
availability of an appeal, the CESB still failed to cite any special justification for its refusal to avail itself of
an appeal. Instead, it opted to focus on the nature of the grounds asserted in its Petition. For the reasons
stated above, a mere reference to grave abuse of discretion cannot justify a resort to a petition under Rule
65.

Considering the failure of the CESB to offer a compelling explanation for its insistence upon the special
remedies of certiorari and prohibition, the Court finds no justification for a liberal application of the rules.

264
In any event, the contentions of the CESB are without merit. As will be further explained, we find no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the CSC. In resolving the appeal filed by the PAO, the CSC merely
exercised the authority granted to it by the Constitution as the central personnel agency of the
government.

The CSC acted within its }urisdiction

when it resolved the PAO's appeal and
reversed CESB Resolution No. 918.

At its core, this case requires the Court to delineate the respective authorities granted by law to two
agencies involved in the management of government personnel - the CSC and the CESB. This particular
dispute involves not only the jurisdiction of each office over personnel belonging to the third-level of the
civil service, but also the relationship between the two offices.

On the one hand, the CESB asserts its jurisdiction over members of the CES. Specifically, it refers to the
identification and classification of positions belonging to the third-level, as well as the establishment of the
qualifications for appointment to those posts. The CESB further emphasizes its autonomy from the CSC on
the basis of this Court's ruling that its status as an attached agency only pertains to policy and program
coordination.

The CSC, on the other hand, defends its authority to review actions and decisions of its attached agencies,
including the CESB. The CSC further claims original and appellate jurisdiction over administrative cases
involving contested appointments, pursuant to its constitutional mandate as the central personnel agency
of the government.

In the interest of the effective and efficient organization of the civil service, this Court must ensure that
the respective powers and functions of the CSC and the CESB are well-defined. After analyzing and
harmonizing the legal provisions pertaining to each of these two agencies, the Court concludes that the
CSC has the authority to review CESB Resolution No. 918. We have arrived at this conclusion after a
consideration of (a) the broad mandate of the CSC under the Constitution and the Administrative Code;
and (b) the specific and narrowly tailored powers granted to the CESB in the Integrated Reorganization
Plan and the Administrative Code.

265
As the central personnel agency of the
government, the CSC has broad authority
to pass upon all civil service matters.

Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution entrusts to the CSC48 the administration of the civil service, which is
comprised of "all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters."49 In particular, Section 3 of Article
IX-B provides for the mandate of this independent constitutional commission:

SECTION 3. The Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the Government, shall
establish a career service and adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness,
progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service. It shall strengthen the merit and rewards system,
integrate all human resources development programs for all levels and ranks, and institutionalize a
management climate conducive to public accountability. It shall submit to the President and the Congress
an annual report on its personnel programs. (Emphases supplied)

The proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission reveal the intention to emphasize the status of
the CSC as the "central personnel agency of the Government with all powers and functions inherent in and
incidental to human resources management."50 As a matter of fact, the original proposed provision on the
functions of the CSC reads:

Sec. 3. The Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the government. shall establish a
career service, promulgate and enforce policies on personnel actions, classif[y] positions, prescribe
conditions of employment except as to compensation and other monetary benefits which shall be provided
by law, and exercise alt powers and functions inherent in and incidental to human resources management,
to promote morale, efficiency, and integrity in the Civil Service. It shall submit to the President and the
Congress an aimual report on its personnel programs, and perform such other functions as may be
provided by law.51 (Emphases supplied)

Although the specific powers of the CSC are not enumerated in the final version of 1987 Constitution,52 it
is evident from the deliberations of the framers that the concept of a "central personnel agency" was
considered all-encompassing. The concept was understood to be sufficiently broad as to include the

266
authority to promulgate and enforce policies on personnel actions, to classify positions, and to exercise all
powers and functions inherent in and incidental to human resources management:

MR. FOZ. Will the amendment reduce the powers and functions of the Civil Service as embodied in our
original draft?

MS. AQUINO: No, it will not. The proposed deletion of lines 35 to 40 of page 2 until line 1 of page 3 would
not in any way minimize the powers of the Civil Service (Commission] because they are deemed implicitly
included in the all-embracing definition and concept of "central personnel agency of the government." I
believe that the lines we have mentioned are but redundant articulation of that same concept,
unnecessary surplusage.

MR. FOZ. For instance, will the power or function to promulgate policies on personnel actions be
encompassed by the Commissioner's amendment?

MS. AQUINO. It is not an amendment because I am retaining lines 33 to 35. I proposed an amendment
after the words "career service.'' I am only doing away with unnecessary redundancy.

MR. FOZ. Can we say that all of the powers enumerated in the original provision are still being granted by
the Civil Service Commission despite the elimination of the listing of these powers and functions?

MS. AQUINO. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer, in the nature of a central personnel agency, it would have to
necessarily execute all of these functions.

MR. FOZ. And will the elimination of all these specific functions be a source of ambiguity and controversies
later on as to the extent of the powers and functions of the commission?

MS. AQUINO. I submit that this would not be susceptible of ambiguity because the concept of a central
personnel agency is a generally accepted concept and as experience would bear out, this function is
actually being carried out already by the Civil Service Commission, except that we are integrating this
concept. I do not think that it would be susceptible of any ambiguity.

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MR. REGALADO. Mr. Presiding Officer.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treñas). Yes, Commissioner Regalado is recognized.

MR. REGALADO. This is more for clarification.

The original Section 3 states, among others, the functions of the Civil Service Commission - to promulgate
and enforce policies on personnel actions. Will Commissioner Aquino kindly indicate to us the
corresponding provisions and her proposed amendment which would encompass the powers to promulgate
and enforce policies on personnel actions?

MS. AQUINO. It is my submission that the same functions are already subsumed under the concept of a
central personnel agency.

MR. REGALADO. In other words, all those functions enumerated from line 35 on page 2 to line I of page 3
inclusive, are understood to be encompassed in the phrase "central personnel agency of the government."

MS. AQUINO. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer, except that on line 40 of page 2 and line 1 of the subsequent
page, it was only subjected to a little modification.

MR. REGALADO. May we, therefore, make it of record that the phrase"... promulgate and enforce policies
on personnel actions, classify positions, prescribe conditions of employment except as to compensation
and other monetary benefits which shall be provided by law" is understood to be subsumed under and
included in the concept of a central personnel agency.

MS. AQUINO. I would have no objection to that.53 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

In accordance with the foregoing deliberations, the mandate of the CSC should therefore be read as the
comprehensive authority to perform all functions necessary to ensure the efficient administration of
the entire civil service, including the CES.

268
The Administrative Code of 1987 further reinforces this view. Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 3,
Section 12 thereof enumerates the specific powers and functions of the CSC while recognizing its
comprehensive authority over all civil service matters. Section 12, Items (1) to (5), (11), (14), and (19),
are of particular relevance to this dispute:

SECTION 12. Powers and Functions.-The Commission shall have the following powers and functions:

(1) Administer and enforce the constitutional and statutory provisions on the merit system for all levels
and ranks in the Civil Service;

(2) Prescribe, amend and enforce rules and regulations for carrying into effect the provisions of the Civil
Service Law and other pertinent laws;

(3) Promulgate policies, standards and guidelines for the Civil Service and adopt plans and programs to
promote economical, efficient and effective personnel administration in the government;

(4) Formulate policies and regulations for the administration, maintenance and implementation of position
classification and compensation and set standards for the establishment, allocation and reallocation of pay
scales, classes and positions;

(5) Render opinion and rulings on all personnel and other Civil Service matters which shall be binding on
all heads of departments, offices and agencies and which may be brought to the Supreme Court
on certiorari;

xxxx

(11) Hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal,
including contested appointments, and review decisions and actions of its offices and of the agencies
attached to it. Officials and employees who fail to comply with such decisions, orders, or rulings shall be
liable for contempt of the Commission. Its decisions, orders, or rulings shall be final and executory. Such
decisions, orders, or rulings may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party
within thirty (30) days from receipt of a copy thereof;

269
 xxxx

(14) Take appropriate action on all appointments and other personnel matters in the Civil Service
including extension of Service beyond retirement age;

xxxx

(19) Perform all functions properly belonging to a central personnel agency and such other functions as
may be provided by law.

It is evident from the foregoing constitutional and statutory provisions that the CSC, as the central
personnel agency of the government, has been granted the broad authority and the specific powers to
pass upon all civil service matters. The question before the Court today is whether this broad authority
encompasses matters pertaining to the CES and are, as such, recognized to be within the jurisdiction of
the CESB.

To allow us to understand the legal framework governing the two agencies and to harmonize the
provisions of law, it is now necessary for the Court to examine the history and the mandate of the CESB.
It may thereby determine the proper relation between the CSC and the CESB.

The CESB has been granted specific and limited powers under the law.

On 9 September 1968, Congress enacted R.A. 5435 authorizing the President to reorganize different
executive departments, bureaus, offices, agencies, and instrumentalities of the government. The statute
also created a Commission on Reorganization with the mandate to study and investigate the status of all
offices in the executive branch. This commission was also tasked to submit an integrated reorganization
plan to the President, and later on to Congress, for approval. The Commission was given until 31
December 1970 to present its plan to the President.54

After the conduct of hearings and intensive studies, a proposed Integrated Reorganization Plan55 was
submitted to then President Ferdinand E. Marcos on 31 December 1970. The plan included a proposal to
develop a professionalized and competent civil service through the establishment of the CES - a group of

270
senior administrators carefully selected for managerial posts in the higher levels.56 To promulgate
standards for the CES, the Commission on Reorganization recommended the creation of the CESB:

To promulgate standards, rules and procedures regarding the selection, classification, compensation and
career development of members of the Career Executive Service, a Board is proposed to be established.
The Board shall be composed of high-level officials to provide a government-wide view and to ensure
effective support for the establishment and development of a corps of highly competent, professional
administrators.57

The plan was referred to a presidential commission for review, but Martial Law was declared before the
proposal could be acted upon. Four days after the declaration of Martial Law, however, the Integrated
Reorganization Plan was approved by former President Marcos through Presidential Decree No. 1.58 This
approved plan included the creation of the CES and the CESB.

The CES was created to "form a continuing pool of well-selected and development-oriented career
administrators who shall provide competent and faithful service."59 The CESB was likewise established to
serve as the governing body of the CES60 with the following functions: (a) to promulgate rules, standards
and procedures for the selection, classification, compensation and career development of members of the
CES;61 (b) to set up the organization and operation of the civil service in accordance with the guidelines
provided in the plan;62 (c) to prepare a program of training and career development for members of the
CES;63 (d) to investigate and adjudicate administrative complaints against members of the CES.64

When the Administrative Code was enacted in 1987, the CESB was given the additional authority to (a)
identify other officers belonging to the CES in keeping with the conditions imposed by law; 65 and (b)
prescribe requirements for entrance to the third-level.66

Based on the foregoing provisions, it is clear that the powers granted to the CESB are specific and limited.
This Court must now determine whether it is possible to interpret these powers in harmony with the broad
constitutional mandate of the CSC.

The specific powers of the CESB must be

narrowly interpreted as exceptions to the

271
comprehensive authority granted to the
CSC by the Constitution and relevant
statutes.

As we have earlier observed, the interplay between the broad mandate of the CSC and the specific
authority granted to the CESB is at the root of this controversy. The question we must resolve, in
particular, is whether the CSC had the authority to review and ultimately reverse CESB Resolution No.
918, upon the appeal of the PAO.

For its part, the CESB contends that the Integrated Reorganization Plan and the Administrative Code have
granted it the exclusive authority to identify the positions belonging to the third-level of the civil service
and to prescribe the eligibility requirements for appointments thereto.67 It thus asserts that the foregoing
matters are beyond the revisory jurisdiction of the CSC, and must instead be appealed to the Office of the
President in accordance with the specific provisions of the aforementioned laws. This special mandate
must allegedly prevail over the general authority granted to the CSC.

As to its status as an attached agency, the CESB cites this Court's pronouncement in Eugenio v. CSC68 on
its autonomy from its mother agency. The CESB contends that its attachment to the CSC is only for the
purpose of "policy and program coordination."69 Allegedly, this attachment does not mean that the
former's decisions, particularly CESB Resolution No. 918, are subject to the CSC's review.

On the other hand, the CSC asserts its jurisdiction to act upon the appeal from CESB Resolution No. 918
by virtue of its status as the central personnel agency of the government. It contends that the CESB 's
authority to prescribe entrance requirements for the third-level of the civil service does not mean that the
CSC no longer has jurisdiction over that class of positions. It also points out that the case involves a
personnel action that is within the jurisdiction conferred upon it by law.

We uphold the position of the CSC.

It is a basic principle in statutory construction that statutes must be interpreted in harmony with the
Constitution and other laws.70 In this case, the specific powers of the CESB over members of the CES

272
must be interpreted in a manner that takes into account the comprehensive mandate of the CSC under
the Constitution and other statutes.

The present case involves the classification of positions belonging to the CES and the qualifications for
these posts. These are matters clearly within the scope of the powers granted to the CESB under the
Administrative Code and the Integrated Reorganization Plan. However, this fact alone does not push the
matter beyond the reach of the CSC.

As previously discussed, the CSC, as the central personnel agency of the government, is given the
comprehensive mandate to administer the civil service under Article IX-B, Section 3 of the 1987
Constitution; and Section 12, Items (4), (5), and (14) of the Administrative Code. It has also been
expressly granted the power to promulgate policies, standards, and guidelines for the civil service; and to
render opinions and rulings on all personne1 and other civilservice matters.71

Here, the question of whether the subject PAO positions belong to the CES is clearly a civil service matter
falling within the comprehensive jurisdiction of the CSC. Further, considering the repercussions of the
issue concerning the appointments of those occupying the posts in question, the jurisdiction of the CSC
over personnel actions is implicated.

It must likewise be emphasized that the CSC has been granted the authority to review the decisions of
agencies attached to it under Section 12(11), Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative
Code:

SECTION 12. Powers and Functions.--The Commission shall have the following powers and functions:

(11) Hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal,
including contested appointments, and review decisions and actions of its offices and of the agencies
attached to it. Officials and employees who fail to comply with such decisions, orders, or rulings shall be
liable for contempt of the Commission. Its decisions, orders, or rulings shall be final and executory. Such
decisions, orders, or rulings may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party
within thirty (30) days from receipt of a copy thereof;

273
Since the CESB is an attached agency of the CSC,72 the former's decisions are expressly subject to the
CSC's review on appeal.

Against the express mandate given to the CSC in the foregoing provision, the contention of the CESB that
its decisions may only be appealed to the Office of the President must fail. We note that the supporting
provision73 cited by the CESB in support of its argument refers only to administrative cases involving
the discipline of members of the CES:

5. The Board shall promulgate rules, standards and procedures on the selection, classification,
compensation and career development of members of the Career Executive Service. The Board shall set
up the organization and operation of the Service in accordance with the following guidelines:

xxxx

h. Discipline. Investigation and adjudication of administrative complaints against members of the Career
Executive Service shall be governed by Article VI, Chapter II and Paragraph I (d) of Article II, Chapter III
of this Part; provided that appeals shall be made to the Career Executive Service Board instead of the Civil
Service Commission. Administrative cases involving members of the Service on assignment with the Board
shall be investigated and adjudicated by the Board with the right to appeal to the Office of the President.
(Emphasis supplied)

In our view, the foregoing rule on appeals to the Office of the President only covers disciplinary
cases involving members of the CES. It is evident that this special rule was created for that particular type
of case, because members of the CES arc all presidential appointees. Given that the power to appoint
generally carries with it the power to discipline,74 it is only reasonable for the president to be given the
ultimate authority to discipline presidential appointees. But this special rule cannot apply to the matter at
hand, because CESB Resolution No. 918 did not involve a disciplinary case. Since it was clearly outside the
scope of the foregoing provision, the Resolution did not come within the jurisdiction of the Office of the
President. It was therefore correctly appealed to the CSC.

From the above discussion, it is evident that the CSC acted within its jurisdiction when it resolved the
PAO's appeal. The arguments of the CESB on this point must perforce be rejected.

274
The CSC correctly ruled that third level
eligibility is not required for the subject
positions.

The Court now comes to the final issue for resolution - whether the CSC ruled in accordance with law
when the latter declared that it was not necessary for occupants of the subject PAO posts to possess third-
level eligibility.

On this point, the CESB argues that third-level eligibility is required for the positions pursuant to R.A.
9406 in relation to R.A. 10071. It avers that R.A. 9406 requires the Chief Public Attorney, Deputy Chief
Public Attorneys, Regional Public Attorneys and Assistant Regional Public Attorneys to have the same
qualifications for appointment, rank, salaries, allowances and retirement privileges as the Chief State
Prosecutor, Assistant Chief State Prosecutor, Regional State Prosecutor and Assistant Regional State
Prosecutor of the NPS under P.D. 1275. The latter law is the old one that governs the NPS and requires
third-level eligibility for senior prosecutorial posts. According to the CESB, R.A. 10071 cannot apply,
because R.A. 9406 could not have referred to a law that had not yet been enacted at the time. It also
asserts that the subsequent declassification of prosecutors cannot benefit members of the PAO, because
the prosecutors exercise quasi-judicial functions while the PAO members do not.

On the other hand, the CSC argues that nowhere in R.A. 9406, P.D. 1275, R.A. 10071 or Batas Pambansa
Blg. (B.P.) 129 is there a reference to third-level eligibility and CESO rank as qualification requirements. It
emphasizes that the CESB cannot add to the provisions of these laws, which only require the practice of
law for a certain period of time and presuppose a bar license. The PAO, for its part, maintains that the
posts concerned are highly technical in nature because they primarily involve legal practice, and any
managerial functions performed are merely incidental to their principal roles. It also claims that the
legislature could never have intended to require third-level eligibility for occupants of the subject posts
when it enacted R.A. 9406.

After a careful consideration of the relevant statutes and rules, this Court agrees with the conclusion of
the CSC. To require the occupants of the subject PAO positions to possess third-level eligibility would be to
amend the law and defeat its spirit and intent.

275
The CESB effectively amended the
law when it required the occupants
of the subject PAO positions to
obtain third-level eligibility.

The authority to prescribe qualifications for pos1t10ns in the government is lodged in Congress 75 as part
of its plenary legislative power to create, abolish and modify public offices to meet societal
demands.76 From this authority emanates the right to change the qualifications for existing statutory
offices.77

It was in the exercise of this power that the legislature enacted Section 5 of R.A. 9406, which provides for
the qualifications for the Chief Public Attorney, Deputy Chief Public Attorneys, Regional Public Attorneys
and Assistant Regional Public Attorneys:

SEC. 5. Section 16, Chapter 5, Title III, Book IV of Executive Order No. 292, as amended, is hereby
further amended to read as follows:

SEC. 16. The Chief Public Attorney and Other PAO Officials. - The PAO shall be headed by a Chief Public
Attorney and shall be assisted by two (2) Deputy Chief Public Attorneys. Each

PAO Regional Office established in each of the administrative regions of the country shall be headed by a
Regional Public Attorney who shall be assisted by an Assistant Regional Public

Attorney. The authority and responsibility for the exercise of the mandate of the PAO and for the
discharge of its powers and functions shall be vested in the Chief Public Attorney.

xxxx

The Chief Public Attorney shall have the same qualifications for appointment, rank, salaries, allowances,
and retirement privileges as those of the Chief State Prosecutor of the National Prosecution Service. The
Deputy Chief Public Attorneys shall have the same qualifications for appointment, rank, salaries,

276
allowances, and retirement privileges as those of the Assistant Chief State Prosecutor of the National
Prosecution Service.

xxxx

The Regional Public Attorney and the Assistant Regional Public Attorney shall have the same qualifications
for appointment, rank, salaries, allowances, and retirement privileges as those of a Regional State
Prosecutor and the Assistant Regional State Prosecutor of the National Prosecution Service respectively.

At the time of the enactment of R.A. 9406, the qualifications of officials of the NPS, to which the foregoing
provision referred, were provided by Section 3 of P.D. 1275:

Section 3. Prosecution Staff; Organization, Qualifications, Appointment. The Prosecution Staff shall be
composed of prosecuting officers in such number as hereinbelow determined. It shall be headed by a Chief
State Prosecutor who shall be assisted by three Assistants Chief State Prosecutors.

The Chief State Prosecutor, the three Assistants Chief State Prosecutors; and the members of the
Prosecution Staff shall be selected from among qualified and professionally trained members of the legal
profession who arc of proven integrity and competence and have been in the actual practice of the legal
profession for at least five (5) years prior to their appointment or have held during like period, any
position requiring the qualifications of a lawyer. (Emphases supplied)

Soon after, R.A. 10071 or the Prosecution Service Act of 201078 was passed. In updating the qualifications
for senior positions in the NPS, Congress again opted to refer to another set of positions, this time in the
judiciary:

SECTION 14. Qualifications, Rank and Appointment of the Prosecutor General. - The Prosecutor General
shall have the same qualifications for appointment, rank, category, prerogatives, salary grade and
salaries, allowances, emoluments and other privileges, shall be subject to the same inhibitions and
disqualifications, and shall enjoy the same retirement and other benefits as those of the Presiding Justice
of the Court of Appeals and shall be appointed by the President.

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SECTION 15. Ranks of Prosecutors. - The Prosecutors m the National Prosecution Service shall have the
following ranks:

Rank Position/Title

Prosecutor V (I) Senior Deputy State Prosecutors;

(2) Regional Prosecutors; and

(3) Provincial Prosecutors or City Prosecutors of provinces or cities with at least twenty-five

(25) prosecutors and City Prosecutors of cities within a metropolitan area established by law Prosecutor IV
(1) Deputy State Prosecutors;

(2) Deputy Regional Prosecutors

(3) Provincial Prosecutors or City Prosecutors of provinces or cities with less than twenty-five (25)
prosecutors; and

(4) Deputy Provincial Prosecutors or Deputy City Prosecutors of provinces or cities with at least twenty-
five (25) prosecutors; and Deputy City Prosecutors of cities within a metropolitan area established by law.

xxxx

SECTION 16. Qualifications, Ranks and Appointments of Prosecutors and Other Prosecution Officers. -
Prosecutors with the rank of Prosecutor V shall have the same qualifications for appointment, rank,
category, prerogatives, salary grade and salaries, allowances, emoluments and other privileges, shall be
subject to the same inhibitions and disqualifications, and shall enjoy the same retirement and other
benefits as those of an Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals.

Prosecutors with the rank of Prosecutor IV shall have the same qualifications for appointment, rank,
category, prerogatives, salary grade and salaries, allowances, emoluments and other privileges, shall be

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subject to the same inhibitions and disqualifications, and shall enjoy the same retirement and other
benefits as those of a Judge of the

Regional Trial Court.

A reading of B.P. 129 reveals, in turn, that the Presiding Justice and the Associate Justices of the Court of
Appeals79 are required to have the same qualifications as the members of this Court. 80 On the other hand,
judges of the regional trial courts are governed by a separate provision.81

Based on the foregoing, it is clear that occupants of the subject PAO positions are only mandated to
comply with requirements as to age, citizenship, education, and experience. Since third-level eligibility is
not at all mentioned in the law, it would be improper for the CESB to impose this additional qualification as
a prerequisite to permanent appointments.82 To do so would be to amend the law and to overrule
Congress.

While the CESB has been granted the power to prescribe entrance requirements for the third-level of the
civil service, this power cannot be construed as the authority to modify the qualifications specifically set by
law for certain positions. Hence, even granting that the occupants of the subject positions indeed exercise
managerial and executive functions as incidents of their primary roles, the CESB has no power to impose
additional qualifications for them. It cannot use the authority granted to it by Congress itself to defeat the
express provisions of statutes enacted by the latter.

It is also beyond the power of the CESB to question or overrule the specific qualifications imposed by
Congress for the subject positions. The legislature must be deemed to have considered the entirety of the
functions attendant to these posts when it enacted R.A. 9406 and prescribed the relevant qualifications for
each position. The choice not to require third level eligibility in this instance must be respected - not only
by the CESB but also by this Court - as a matter that goes into the wisdom and the policy of a statute.83

The intent of R.A. 9406 to establish

and maintain the parity in
qualifications between the senior

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officials of the PAO and the NPS
must he respected.

This Court must likewise reject the CESB's contention that the declassification of positions in the NPS (as a
result of the enactment of R.A. 10071) cannot benefit the PAO because of a supposed difference in their
functions. This argument goes against the express terms and the clear intent of R.A. 9406 and is therefore
untenable.

As stated previously, Section 5 of R.A. 9406 amended the Administrative Code of 1987. The amendment
was done to provide for "the same qualifications for appointment, rank, salaries, allowances, and
retirement privileges" of senior officials of both the PAO and the NPS. The deliberations of Congress on
R.A. 9406 reveal its intention to establish parity between the two offices. The lawmakers clearly viewed
these officers as counterparts in the administration of justice:

Senator Enrile. Well, I agree with the gentleman. As I said, we should equalize the prosecution and the
defense. The PAO Office is actually an arm of the same government to protect those who need protection.

Senator Pimentel. That is right.

Senator Enrile. At the same time, the Prosecution Service is the arm of the government to punish those
who would need punishment. So, these two perform the same class of service for the nation and they
should be equalized.

Senator Pimentel. Yes, I totally agree with that, that is why precisely I made this observation that talking
alone of starting pay, the level of starting pay of a PAO lawyer should not be lower than the starting pay
of a prosecutor.

Now maybe at the proper time we can insert that amendment.

Senator Enrile. I will be glad to receive the proposed amendment.84 (Emphases supplied)

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During the bicameral conference on the proposed bill, Senator Franklin M. Drilon explained that equal
treatment of the two offices was essential:

SEN. DRILON. Yes, this is our amendment that the PAO chief should have the same salary as the Chief
State Prosecutor and down the line, the Assistant Chief State Prosecutor, etcetera. And I want to put this
on record because there are PAO lawyers here. There are PAO lawyers here before us and we want to
explain why we have placed this.

xxxx

SEN. DRILON. All right. As I said - you know, I want to put on record why we had tried to streamline the
salary structure and place it at the same level as the Chief State Prosecutor. Because we do not want a
salary distortion in the Department of Justice where you have the PAO higher than the prosecutors. That's
why we want to put them on equal footing rather than mag - you know, there'll be whipsawing. You place
the prosecutors below the PAO. I can assure you that tomorrow the PAO will come to us - the prosecutors
will come to us and say, "Put us higher than the PAO lawyers." So you will have whipsawing here.85

Although these statements were made to address the specific issue of salary, this Court considers them as
manifestations of the intent to create and maintain parity between prosecutors and public attorneys.
In Re: Vicente S. E. Veloso,86 this Court considered similar provisions in other laws as confirmations of the
legislative intent to grant equal treatment to certain classes of public officers:

Nonetheless, there are existing laws which expressly require the qualifications for appointment, confer the
rank, and grant the salaries, privileges, and benefits of members of the Judiciary on other public officers in
the Executive Department, such as the following:

(a) the Solicitor General and Assistant Solicitor Generals of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG); and

(b) the Chief Legal Counsel and the Assistant Chief Legal Counsel, the Chief State Prosecutor, and the
members of the National Prosecution Service (NPS) in the Department of Justice.

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The intention of the above laws is to establish a parity in qualifications required, the rank conferred, and
the salaries and benefits given to members of the Judiciary and the public officers covered by the said
laws. The said laws seek to give equal treatment to the specific public officers in the executive department
and the Judges and Justices who are covered by Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, and other
relevant laws. In effect, these laws recognize that public officers who are expressly identified in the laws
by the special nature of their official functions render services which are as important as the services
rendered by the Judges and Justices. They acknowledge the respective roles of those public officers and of
the members of the Judiciary in the promotion of justice and the proper functioning of our legal and
judicial systems.

To fulfill the legislative intent to accord equal treatment to senior officials of the PAO and the NPS, parity
in their qualifications for appointment must be maintained. Accordingly, the revised qualifications of those
in the NPS must also be considered applicable to those in the PAO. The declassification of positions in the
NPS should thus benefit their counterpart positions in the PAO. There is no justification for treating the
two offices differently, given the plain provisions and the rationale of the law.

This Court would render nugatory both the terms and the intent of the law if it sustains the view of the
CESB. We cannot construe R.A. 9046 in relation to P.D. 1275 only, while disregarding the amendments
brought about by R.A. 10071. To do so would defeat the legislature's very purpose, which is to equalize
the qualifications of the NPS and the PAO.

Based on the foregoing discussion, it is evident that the CSC acted within its jurisdiction and authority as
the central personnel agency of the government when it passed upon the appeal filed by the PAO from
CESB Resolution No. 918. Further, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CSC when it
reversed the said resolution, which refused to declassify the subject PAO positions. As the CSC noted, the
third-level eligibility required by the CESB as an additional qualification for these posts contravened not
only the express terms, but also the clear intent of R.A. 9406.

For the reasons stated above, and as a consequence of the improper remedy the CESB has resorted to,
this Court must dismiss the instant petition.

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WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. CSC Decision
No. 110067 and Resolution No. 1100719 dated 15 February 2011 and 1 June 2011, respectively, are
hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P.

G.R. Nos. 174813-15 March 17, 2009

NILO HIPOS, SR. REPRESENTING DARRYL HIPOS, BENJAMIN CORSIÑO REPRESENTING JAYCEE
CORSIÑO, and ERLINDA VILLARUEL REPRESENTING ARTHUR VILLARUEL, Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE RTC JUDGE TEODORO A. BAY, Presiding Judge, RTC, Hall of Justice, Quezon City,
Branch 86, Respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a Petition for Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking a reversal of the Order dated
2 October 2006 of respondent Judge Teodoro A. Bay of Branch 86 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City, which denied the Motion to Withdraw Informations of the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City.

The facts of the case are as follows.

On 15 December 2003, two Informations for the crime of rape and one Information for the crime of acts
of lasciviousness were filed against petitioners Darryl Hipos, Jaycee Corsiño, Arthur Villaruel and two
others before Branch 86 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, acting as a Family Court, presided by
respondent Judge Bay. The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases No. Q-03-123284, No. Q-03-123285
and No. Q-03-123286. The Informations were signed by Assistant City Prosecutor Ronald C. Torralba.

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On 23 February 2004, private complainants AAA1 and BBB filed a Motion for Reinvestigation asking Judge
Bay to order the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to study if the proper Informations had been filed against
petitioners and their co-accused. Judge Bay granted the Motion and ordered a reinvestigation of the cases.

On 19 May 2004, petitioners filed their Joint Memorandum to Dismiss the Case[s] before the City
Prosecutor. They claimed that there was no probable cause to hold them liable for the crimes charged.

On 10 August 2004, the Office of the City Prosecutor issued a Resolution on the reinvestigation affirming
the Informations filed against petitioners and their co-accused in Criminal Cases No. Q-03-123284-86. The
Resolution was signed by Assistant City Prosecutor Raniel S. Cruz and approved by City Prosecutor Claro
A. Arellano.

On 3 March 2006, 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Lamberto C. de Vera, treating the Joint Memorandum to
Dismiss the Case as an appeal of the 10 August 2004 Resolution, reversed the Resolution dated 10 August
2004, holding that there was lack of probable cause. On the same date, the City Prosecutor filed a Motion
to Withdraw Informations before Judge Bay.

On 2 October 2006, Judge Bay denied the Motion to Withdraw Informations in an Order of even date.

Without moving for a reconsideration of the above assailed Order, petitioners filed the present Petition for
Mandamus, bringing forth this lone issue for our consideration:

CAN THE HON. SUPREME COURT COMPEL RESPONDENT JUDGE BAY TO DISMISS THE CASE THROUGH A
WRIT OF MANDAMUS BY VIRTUE OF THE RESOLUTION OF THE OFFICE OF THE CITY PROSECUTOR OF
QUEZON CITY FINDING NO PROBABLE CAUSE AGAINST THE ACCUSED AND SUBSEQUENTLY FILING A
MOTION TO WITHDRAW INFORMATION?2

Mandamus is an extraordinary writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person,

immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done, when the respondent
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from
an office, trust, or station; or when the respondent excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a

284
right or office to which the latter is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law.3

As an extraordinary writ, the remedy of mandamus lies only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial
duty, not a discretionary one; mandamus will not issue to control the exercise of discretion by a public
officer where the law imposes upon him the duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any manner in
which he is required to act, because it is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court.4

In the case at bar, the act which petitioners pray that we compel the trial court to do is to grant the Office
of the City Prosecutor’s Motion for Withdrawal of Informations against petitioners. In effect, petitioners
seek to curb Judge Bay’s exercise of judicial discretion.

There is indeed an exception to the rule that matters involving judgment and discretion are beyond the
reach of a writ of mandamus, for such writ may be issued to compel action in those matters, when
refused.5 However, mandamus is never available to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a
particular way or the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of either.6 In other
words, while a judge refusing to act on a Motion to Withdraw Informations can be compelled by
mandamus to act on the same, he cannot be compelled to act in a certain way, i.e., to grant or deny such
Motion. In the case at bar, Judge Bay did not refuse to act on the Motion to Withdraw Informations; he
had already acted on it by denying the same. Accordingly, mandamus is not available anymore. If
petitioners believed that Judge Bay committed grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of such Order
denying the Motion to Withdraw Informations, the proper remedy of petitioners should have been to file a
Petition for Certiorari against the assailed Order of Judge Bay.

Petitioners counter that the above conclusion, which has been argued by the Solicitor General, is contrary
to a ruling of this Court, which allegedly states that the proper remedy in such cases is a Petition for
Mandamus and not Certiorari. Petitioners cite the following excerpt from our ruling in Sanchez v.
Demetriou7:

The appreciation of the evidence involves the use of discretion on the part of the prosecutor, and we do
not find in the case at bar a clear showing by the petitioner of a grave abuse of such discretion.

285
The decision of the prosecutor may be reversed or modified by the Secretary of Justice or in special cases
by the President of the Philippines. But even this Court cannot order the prosecution of a person against
whom the prosecutor does not find sufficient evidence to support at least a prima facie case. The courts
try and absolve or convict the accused but as a rule have no part in the initial decision to prosecute him.

The possible exception is where there is an unmistakable showing of grave abuse of discretion that will
justify a judicial intrusion into the precincts of the executive. But in such a case the proper remedy to call
for such exception is a petition for mandamus, not certiorari or prohibition.8 (Emphases supplied.)

Petitioners have taken the above passage way out of its context. In the case of Sanchez, Calauan Mayor
Antonio Sanchez brought a Petition for Certiorari before this Court, challenging the order of the
respondent Judge therein denying his motion to quash the Information filed against him and six other
persons for alleged rape and homicide. One of the arguments of Mayor Sanchez was that there was
discrimination against him because of the non-inclusion of two other persons in the Information. We held
that even this Court cannot order the prosecution of a person against whom the prosecutor does not find
sufficient evidence to support at least a prima facie case. However, if there was an unmistakable showing
of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the prosecutors in that case, Mayor Sanchez should have filed a
Petition for Mandamus to compel the filing of charges against said two other persons.

In the case at bar, the Petition for Mandamus is directed not against the prosecution, but against the trial
court, seeking to compel the trial court to grant the Motion to Withdraw Informations by the City
Prosecutor’s Office. The prosecution has already filed a case against petitioners. Recently, in Santos v.
Orda, Jr.,9 we reiterated the doctrine we established in the leading case of Crespo v. Mogul,10 that once a
criminal complaint or an information is filed in court, any disposition or dismissal of the case or acquittal
or conviction of the accused rests within the jurisdiction, competence, and discretion of the trial court.
Thus, we held:

In Crespo v. Mogul, the Court held that once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court, any
disposition of the case or dismissal or acquittal or conviction of the accused rests within the exclusive
jurisdiction, competence, and discretion of the trial court. The trial court is the best and sole judge on
what to do with the case before it. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the public prosecutor should be
addressed to the court who has the option to grant or deny the same. Contrary to the contention of the

286
petitioner, the rule applies to a motion to withdraw the Information or to dismiss the case even before or
after arraignment of the accused. The only qualification is that the action of the court must not impair the
substantial rights of the accused or the right of the People or the private complainant to due process of
law. When the trial court grants a motion of the public prosecutor to dismiss the case, or to quash the
Information, or to withdraw the Information in compliance with the directive of the Secretary of Justice, or
to deny the said motion, it does so not out of subservience to or defiance of the directive of the Secretary
of Justice but in sound exercise of its judicial prerogative.

Petitioners also claim that since Judge Bay granted a Motion for Reinvestigation, he should have "deferred
to the Resolution of Asst. City Prosecutor De Vera withdrawing the case."11 Petitioners cite the following
portion of our Decision in People v. Montesa, Jr.12:

In the instant case, the respondent Judge granted the motion for reinvestigation and directed the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan to conduct the reinvestigation. The former was, therefore, deemed to
have deferred to the authority of the prosecution arm of the Government to consider the so-called new
relevant and material evidence and determine whether the information it had filed should stand.13

Like what was done to our ruling in Sanchez, petitioners took specific statements from our Decision,
carefully cutting off the portions which would expose the real import of our pronouncements. The Petition
for Certiorari in Montesa, Jr. was directed against a judge who, after granting the Petition for
Reinvestigation filed by the accused, proceeded nonetheless to arraign the accused; and, shortly
thereafter, the judge decided to dismiss the case on the basis of a Resolution of the Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor recommending the dismissal of the case. The dismissal of the case in Montesa, Jr. was done
despite the disapproval of the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor’s Resolution by the Provincial Prosecutor
(annotated in the same Resolution), and despite the fact that the reinvestigation the latter ordered was
still ongoing, since the Resolution of the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor had not yet attained finality. We
held that the judge should have waited for the conclusion of the Petition for Reinvestigation he ordered,
before acting on whether or not the case should be dismissed for lack of probable cause, and before
proceeding with the arraignment. Thus, the continuation of the above paragraph of our Decision in
Montesa, Jr. reads:

287
Having done so, it behooved the respondent Judge to wait for a final resolution of the incident. In Marcelo
vs. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled:

Accordingly, we rule that the trial court in a criminal case which takes cognizance of an accused's motion
for review of the resolution of the investigating prosecutor or for reinvestigation and defers the
arraignment until resolution of the said motion must act on the resolution reversing the investigating
prosecutor's finding or on a motion to dismiss based thereon only upon proof that such resolution is
already final in that no appeal was taken thereon to the Department of Justice.

The resolution of Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Rutor recommending the dismissal of the case never
became final, for it was not approved by the Provincial Prosecutor. On the contrary, the latter disapproved
it. As a consequence, the final resolution with respect to the reinvestigation is that of the Provincial
Prosecutor, for under Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, no complaint or information may be filed
or dismissed by an investigating fiscal without the prior written authority or approval of the provincial or
city fiscal or chief state prosecutor. Also, under Section l(d) of R.A. No. 5180, as amended by P.D. No. 77
and P.D. No. 911.14

As can be clearly seen, the statement quoted by petitioners from Montesa, Jr. is not meant to establish a
doctrine that the judge should just follow the determination by the prosecutor of whether or not there is
probable cause. On the contrary, Montesa, Jr. states:

The rule is settled that once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition thereof,
such as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused, rests in the sound discretion of the
court. While the prosecutor retains the discretion and control of the prosecution of the case, he cannot
impose his opinion on the court. The court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case.
Accordingly, a motion to dismiss the case filed by the prosecutor before or after the arraignment, or after
a reinvestigation, or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records upon
reinvestigation, should be addressed to the discretion of the court. The action of the court must not,
however, impair the substantial rights of the accused or the right of the People to due process of law.15

In a seemingly desperate attempt on the part of petitioners’ counsel, he tries to convince us that a judge
is allowed to deny a Motion to Withdraw Informations from the prosecution only when there is grave

288
abuse of discretion on the part of the prosecutors moving for such withdrawal; and that, where there is no
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the prosecutors, the denial of the Motion to Withdraw
Informations is void. Petitioners’ counsel states in the Memorandum:

6.10. Furthermore, the ORDER dated October 2, 2006 of the Respondent Judge BAY consisting of 9 pages
which was attached to the URGENT PETITION did not point out any iota of grave abuse of discretion
committed by Asst. City Prosecutor De Vera in issuing his Resolution in favor of the sons of the
Petitioners. Hence, the ORDER issued by RJBAY is NULL and VOID in view of the recent ruling of the Hon.
Supreme Court in Ledesma vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113216, September 5, 1997, 86 SCAD 695, 278
SCRA 657 which states that:

"In the absence of a finding of grave abuse of discretion, the court’s bare denial of a motion to withdraw
information pursuant to the Secretary’s resolution is void." (Underscoring ours).

6.11. It is therefore respectfully submitted that the Hon. Supreme Court disregard the argument of the
OSG because of its falsity.16

This statement of petitioners’ counsel is utterly misleading. There is no such statement in our Decision in
Ledesma.17 The excerpt from Ledesma, which appears to have a resemblance to the statement allegedly
quoted from said case, provides:

No Grave Abuse of Discretion in the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice

In the light of recent holdings in Marcelo and Martinez; and considering that the issue of the correctness of
the justice secretary's resolution has been amply threshed out in petitioner's letter, the information, the
resolution of the secretary of justice, the motion to dismiss, and even the exhaustive discussion in the
motion for reconsideration - all of which were submitted to the court - the trial judge committed grave
abuse of discretion when it denied the motion to withdraw the information, based solely on his bare and
ambiguous reliance on Crespo. The trial court's order is inconsistent with our repetitive calls for an
independent and competent assessment of the issue(s) presented in the motion to dismiss. The trial judge
was tasked to evaluate the secretary's recommendation finding the absence of probable cause to hold

289
petitioner criminally liable for libel. He failed to do so. He merely ruled to proceed with the trial without
stating his reasons for disregarding the secretary's recommendation.18 (Emphasis supplied.)

It very much appears that the counsel of petitioners is purposely misleading this Court, in violation of Rule
10.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:

Rule 10.02 – A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, the language
or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as law a
provision already rendered inoperative by repel or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been
proved.

Counsel’s use of block quotation and quotation marks signifies that he intends to make it appear that the
passages are the exact words of the Court. Furthermore, putting the words "Underscoring ours" after the
text implies that, except for the underscoring, the text is a faithful reproduction of the original.
Accordingly, we are ordering Atty. Procopio S. Beltran, Jr. to show cause why he should not be disciplined
as a member of the Bar.

To clarify, we never stated in Ledesma that a judge is allowed to deny a Motion to Withdraw Information
from the prosecution only when there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of the prosecutors moving
for such withdrawal. Neither did we rule therein that where there is no grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the prosecutors, the denial of the Motion to Withdraw Information is void. What we held therein is
that a trial judge commits grave abuse of discretion if he denies a Motion to Withdraw Information without
an independent and complete assessment of the issues presented in such Motion. Thus, the opening
paragraph of Ledesma states:

When confronted with a motion to withdraw an information on the ground of lack of probable cause based
on a resolution of the secretary of justice, the bounden duty of the trial court is to make an independent
assessment of the merits of such motion. Having acquired jurisdiction over the case, the trial court is not
bound by such resolution but is required to evaluate it before proceeding further with the trial. While the
secretary's ruling is persuasive, it is not binding on courts. A trial court, however, commits reversible error
or even grave abuse of discretion if it refuses/neglects to evaluate such recommendation and simply

290
insists on proceeding with the trial on the mere pretext of having already acquired jurisdiction over the
criminal action.19 (Emphases supplied.)1avvphi1.zw+

Petitioners also try to capitalize on the fact that the dispositive portion of the assailed Order apparently
states that there was no probable cause against petitioners:

WHEREFORE, finding no probable cause against the herein accused for the crimes of rapes and acts of
lasciviousness, the motion to withdraw informations is DENIED.

Let the case be set for arraignment and pre-trial on October 24, 2006 at 8:30 o’clock in the
morning.20 (Underscoring ours.)

Thus, petitioners claim that since even the respondent judge himself found no probable cause against
them, the Motion to Withdraw Informations by the Office of the City Prosecutor should be granted.21

Even a cursory reading of the assailed Order, however, clearly shows that the insertion of the word "no" in
the above dispositive portion was a mere clerical error. The assailed Order states in full:

After a careful study of the sworn statements of the complainants and the resolution dated March 3, 2006
of 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Lamberto C. de Vera, the Court finds that there was probable cause
against the herein accused. The actuations of the complainants after the alleged rapes and acts of
lasciviousness cannot be the basis of dismissal or withdrawal of the herein cases. Failure to shout or offer
tenatious resistance did not make voluntary the complainants’ submission to the criminal acts of the
accused (People v. Velasquez, 377 SCRA 214, 2002). The complainants’ affidavits indicate that the
accused helped one another in committing the acts complained of. Considering that the attackers were not
strangers but their trusted classmates who enticed them to go to the house where they were molested,
the complainants cannot be expected to react forcefully or violently in protecting themselves from the
unexpected turn of events. Considering also that both complainants were fifteen (15) years of age and
considered children under our laws, the ruling of the Supreme Court in People v. Malones, G.R. Nos.
124388-90, March 11, 2004 becomes very relevant. The Supreme Court ruled as follows:

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Rape victims, especially child victims, should not be expected to act the way mature individuals would
when placed in such a situation. It is not proper to judge the actions of children who have undergone
traumatic experience by the norms of behavior expected from adults under similar circumstances. The
range of emotions shown by rape victim is yet to be captured even by calculus. It is, thus, unrealistic to
expect uniform reactions from rape victims (People v. Malones, G.R. Nos. 124388-90, March 11, 2004).

The Court finds no need to discuss in detail the alleged actuations of the complainants after the alleged
rapes and acts of lasciviousness. The alleged actuations are evidentiary in nature and should be evaluated
after full blown trial on the merits. This is necessary to avoid a suspicion of prejudgment against the
accused.22

As can be seen, the body of the assailed Order not only plainly stated that the court found probable cause
against the petitioners, but likewise provided an adequate discussion of the reasons for such finding.
Indeed, the general rule is that where there is a conflict between the dispositive portion or the fallo and
the body of the decision, the fallo controls. However, where the inevitable conclusion from the body of the
decision is so clear as to show that there was a mistake in the dispositive portion, the body of the decision
will prevail.23

In sum, petitioners’ resort to a Petition for Mandamus to compel the trial judge to grant their Motion to
Withdraw Informations is improper. While mandamus is available to compel action on matters involving
judgment and discretion when refused, it is never available to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion
in a particular way or the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of either.24 The
trial court, when confronted with a Motion to Withdraw an Information on the ground of lack of probable
cause, is not bound by the resolution of the prosecuting arm of the government, but is required to make
an independent assessment of the merits of such motion, a requirement satisfied by the respondent judge
in the case at bar.25

Finally, if only to appease petitioners who came to this Court seeking a review of the finding of probable
cause by the trial court, we nevertheless carefully reviewed the records of the case. After going through
the same, we find that we are in agreement with the trial court that there is indeed probable cause
against the petitioners sufficient to hold them for trial. We decided to omit a detailed discussion of the

292
merits of the case, as we are not unmindful of the undue influence that might result should this Court do
so, even if such discussion is only intended to focus on the finding of probable cause.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Mandamus is DISMISSED. Let the records of this case be remanded
to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for the resumption of the proceedings therein. The Regional
Trial Court is directed to act on the case with dispatch.

Atty. Procopio S. Beltran, Jr. is ORDERED to SHOW CAUSE why he should not be disciplined as a member
of the Bar for his disquieting conduct as herein discussed.

SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 9178. March 30, 1914. ]

THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FELIPE LASTIMOSA, Defendant-Appellant.

Marcelino Lontok for Appellant.

Attorney-General Avanceña for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. MURDER; PRINCIPALS; CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY. — The defendant in this case declared criminally
responsible for the death of the victim as a principal, even though he might not have himself physically
caused it, because he took direct part in the execution of the deed and cooperated therein by acts without
which it could not have been accomplished. (U. S. v. Ancheta, 1 Phil. Rep., 165; U. S. v. Santos, 2 Phil.
Rep., 453; U. S. v. Balisacan, 4 Phil. Rep., 545.)

2. ID.; TREACHERY. — The defendant and his companions having bound the deceased before mortally

293
 wounding him, thus assuring accomplishment of the deed without risk to their persons from any defense
the victim might put up, the criminal act is qualified by this circumstance and constitutes murder.

3. ID.; DWELLING. — The defendant and his companions having begun the aggression of which the
deceased was the victim in the latter’s own dwelling, by binding his hands and taking him so to a place
near the house where the crime was consummated, it must be held to have been attended by the generic
aggravating circumstance of having been committed in the dwelling of the victim, since the act performed
cannot be divided or the unity resulting from its details be broken up.

4. ID.; AMNESTY PROCLAMATION. — The crime in question not having been perpetrated for political
reasons or as a consequence of hatreds, feuds, or dissensions of a political character between the
deceased and the defendant, and having been solely a means of personal revenge put into execution by
the defendant, he cannot be regarded as entitled to the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation of July 4,
1902.

DECISION

ARAULLO, J. :

The defendant was sentenced by a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, dated June 11, 1913,
as guilty of the crime of murder, to the penalty of twenty years of cadena temporal, to indemnify the
family of the deceased Lucas Prieto in the sum of P500, and to pay the costs. Appealing from said
judgment, he alleges in his defense in this instance that the trial court erred in weighing the evidence
submitted by the prosecution, as well as in not finding as a result of such evidence a very grave and
reasonable doubt in his favor and in not declaring him to be entitled to the benefits of the amnesty
proclaimed by the President of the United States on July 4, 1902.

The deed with which Felipe Lastimosa was charged in the complaint, is that he did willfully, unlawfully and
criminally, with deliberate premeditation and assisted by a certain Pedro and one Isco, treacherously inflict

294
death upon Lucas Prieto one day in the month of February, 1901, in the municipality of Baybay, Province
of Leyte, in these Islands, by slashing said Prieto in the abdomen with a bolo and cutting his throat, while
he was bound and held by the said Pedro and Isco.

According to the testimony of Demetria Prieto, daughter of the deceased, her father was inside their house
in the mountains of Baybay when the men named Pedro and Isco bound him up by order of Iping
Lastimosa, that is, the defendant Felipe Lastimosa. Upon seeing this she fled in fear and did not
afterwards see her father. She added that her mother at that time also ordered her to run away, because
her father had been caught by Iping, who falsely attributed to him the theft of a carabao of his. Finally,
since that date, she had not again seen Pedro, or Isco, or the defendant, nor had she returned to her
home; and her mother, now deceased, had told her in her aunt’s house the morning after the crime that
Felipe was the one who had killed her father.

Hilario Laguna, a neighbor of Lucas Prieto’s, whose house was about 10 brazas from his, testified that on
that occasion he saw Prieto and Felipe engaged in a dispute, and when he casually left his house he saw
four persons, the deceased, the defendant Iping, Pedro, and Isco, also leaving Prieto’s house; the latter’s
two hands were tied with a rope which was held by Pedro, who was behind him, the other two being on
each side, that is, Isco on his left and the defendant Felipe on his right. The latter struck Prieto a blow
with his bolo on the right side of the neck, so that only a very small portion of his head was left attached
to his body and he died immediately after the blow. The witness then took to flight and did not again see
Felipe Lastimosa and his companions, because they fled from the place. This witness added that the
occurrence took place at 7 o’clock in the evening; that there was a light in the deceased’s house which
illuminated that spot; that he was at a distance of 7 brazas from them; and finally, that he had previously
known the accused and his two companions. He had been informed by the wife of the deceased that the
cause of the occurrence was that her husband was charged with the theft of a carabao.

According to another neighbor of the deceased, one Mateo Montajes, whose house was opposite at a
distance of 10 brazas, the wife of the deceased had run to it about 7 o’clock in the evening of the day in
question begging him to help her husband because he was being killed. He went toward the place of the
occurrence, concealing himself about 3 brazas from the place where the defendant Felipe Lastimosa and
his companions Pedro and Isco, whom he had known previously, were; he saw them going away and
Lucas Prieto dead, with his neck almost completely cut through and a very small portion of his head

295
attached to his body. The corpse was picked up by the deceased’s own brothers about 10 o’clock the next
morning. When asked if he had testified before the justice of the peace that Lucas’ corpse bore two
wounds, one in the abdomen and the other in the neck, this same witness replied that blood showed on
the body but that he had not ascertained whether there was a wound or not.

Finally, the defendant himself, in testifying as a witness in his own behalf, stated that Lucas Prieto had
stolen a carabao from him; that he went to his house to ask him if he had stolen it, and Prieto had replied
in the affirmative, adding: "You and all the strangers here and your master are marked to be killed." He
decided to go to the town hall of Baybay to report the theft to the revolutionary leader called Capili,
because the revolution was then in full swing, and having done so, Capili gave him an order, saying: "All
right, you go back to the place, accompanied by these two whom I send with you, to get the carabao and
if he does not deliver it to you, kill him." He them went back to Lucas Prieto’s house, accompanied by two
insurgents who belonged to Capili’s band, one of them called Isco, all three being armed with bolos.

When they reached the house and called up a greeting from below, Lucas, came down carrying a reaping
hook and immediately asked them: "Who are you?" When his two companions replied, "We’ve come to get
the carabao," Lucas said, "Yes, you can get the carabao, but choose between your lives and the carabao."
His companions then retreated, because it appeared that Luca’s intention was to kill them, and as he
observed that a quarrel was arising between the two who had accompanied him and Lucas, who was the
one that began the attack, he retreated a distance of about 3 brazas; he did not know which of his two
companions it was that slashed Lucas, who was not then bound. He added that there was a light in the
house but that it did not illuminate the place where they were, and finally that he saw there the corpse of
Lucas, which had only a single wound in the neck.

As appears from the evidence taken at the trial, the defendant has corroborated the story of the
prosecution’s witnesses with reference to the fact that Lucas Prieto was violently killed on the occasion
they speak of, and for the motive assigned by some of them, although by hearsay from the wife of the
deceased. The defendant himself has also explicitly acknowledged that he was the person directly
interested in the matter that furnished the motive for the crime, which was the recovery of the carabao
that, according to him, Lucas Prieto had stolen from him; and that it was he to whom Capili gave the
order to go to the place, accompanied by the two insurgents or revolutionists, in order to recover the
carabao or kill Prieto if he did not deliver the animal to them. On the other hand, it is unlikely that Prieto

296
would have dared to threaten and attack the defendant and his two companions, the three of them being
armed as they were with bolos, when they appeared at his house to demand of him the return of the
carabao. If to all this be added the consideration that there is no proof nor a single circumstance in the
case which would indicate that either the daughter of the deceased or the other two witnesses took any
special interest in incriminating the defendant, for the former confined herself to telling solely what she
had seen, when she might also have said, without fear that any one would contradict her, that she saw
the defendant himself wound her father with the bolo; and the other two witnesses told what, under the
circumstances, each one of them could have see, the conclusion is reached that it is proven beyond a
reasonable doubt that it was the defendant who killed Lucas Prieto with the bolo he carried, while the
victim had his hands tied with a cord held by one of defendant’s companions and he was watched by the
other, the three having bound the deceased inside his own house before taking him downstairs under the
same house, where they accomplished his death.

The accused, then, is criminally responsible therefor as a principal, and would be responsible as such
although he had not materially committed the crime himself. For it was proven that he took a direct part
in its execution and cooperated therein by acts without which it could not have been accomplished. In the
first place he went to lay his complaint against Lucas Prieto before the revolutionary leader Capili; from
him he secured the order to go with his companions to either recover the carabao or kill Prieto; with his
comrades he repaired to Lucas Prieto’s house to carry out the order and lastly, he witnessed the execution
of that part of the order that related to the killing of Prieto, always supposing that it was not he himself
who carried it out but one of his said two companions. He did not prevent it, as he might well have done,
seeing that the order was issued by Capili for defendant’s benefit. On the contrary, he required compliance
with the order, for no other meaning could be attached to his presence in the act, interested as he was in
securing the recovery of the carabao from decedent whom he accused of stealing the beast.

"Persons who are present during the commission of a crime and lend their moral support thereto without
actively participating therein are nevertheless guilty as principals." (U. S. v. Ancheta, 1 Phil. Rep., 165.)

"One who shares the guilty purpose and encourages and abets the crime by his presence at the time of its
perpetration is guilty as principal even though he may have taken no part in its material execution." (U. S.
v. Santos, 2 Phil. Rep., 453.)

297
"In order to warrant a conviction as principal in the crime of murder, it is not necessary that the
defendants should have taken an active and material part in its commission, but such conviction will also
be sustained if it appears that the defendant did willingly stay with those who took a material part and
was voluntarily present from the time the crime was commenced until it was consummated." (U. S. v.
Balisacan, 4 Phil. Rep., 545).

It having been conclusively proven that the deceased had his hands tied when he was mortally wounded
in the neck, by which means the perpetrators of the crime especially and directly assured the
consummation of their purpose without any risk to their own persons that could proceed from any defense
he might put up, the crime committed by the defendant must be classified as murder, under article 403 of
the Penal Code, by reason of the concurrence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery, and there must
be imposed upon him the penalty set forth in said article for that crime.

He cannot be considered as entitled to the benefits of the amnesty granted on July 4, 1902, because the
crime in question was not perpetrated for political reasons or as a consequence of hatreds, feuds, or
dissensions of a political character between the deceased and the defendant or between the former and
the revolutionary leader Capili, it having been merely a means of personal revenge put into execution by
the defendant against the deceased on the supposition that the latter had stolen an animal belonging to
him.

The trial court has not, therefore, in the judgment appealed from, incurred any of the errors assigned by
the defense in its brief. In the commission of said crime there has concurred the generic aggravating
circumstance that the deed was executed in the dwelling of the offended party without provocation on the
part of the victim, for the defendant and his companions bound him inside his own house and later took
him in that manner to a place near by, where the crime was consummated, a fact which cannot hinder the
holding of said circumstance, because, as the supreme court of Spain has declared in a decision of
October 9, 1875, the act performed cannot, for the purposes of such holding, be divided or its unity be
broken up, when the offender began the aggression in the dwelling of the offended party and ended it in
the street or outside of said dwelling. Nevertheless, the defendant must be given the benefit of the
provisions of article 11 of the Penal Code, as amended by Act No. 2142. This extenuating circumstance
will offset the generic aggravating one set forth above, wherefore the penalty fixed for the crime ought to
be imposed in its medium degree.

298
Therefore, we sentence the defendant to the penalty of life imprisonment (cadena perpetua), with the
accessories of article 54 of the said Code, to such extent modifying the judgment appealed therein upon
him, and affirming it in other respects with the addition that he shall not suffer subsidiary imprisonment
for insolvency of the indemnity, in view of the nature of the principal penalty; with the costs of both
instances against the Appellant.

Arellano, C.J., Carson, Moreland and Trent, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 156052 March 7, 2007

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), VLADIMIR ALARIQUE T. CABIGAO, and BONIFACIO S.

TUMBOKON, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., in his capacity as Mayor of the City of Manila, Respondent.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

In this original petition for mandamus,1 petitioners Social Justice Society (SJS), Vladimir Alarique T.
Cabigao and Bonifacio S. Tumbokon seek to compel respondent Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., mayor of the
City of Manila, to enforce Ordinance No. 8027.

The antecedents are as follows.

On November 20, 2001, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8027.2 Respondent
mayor approved the ordinance on November 28, 2001.3 It became effective on December 28, 2001, after
its publication.4

299
Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted pursuant to the police power delegated to local government units, a
principle described as the power inherent in a government to enact laws, within constitutional limits, to
promote the order, safety, health, morals and general welfare of the society.5 This is evident from
Sections 1 and 3 thereof which state:

SECTION 1. For the purpose of promoting sound urban planning and ensuring health, public safety, and
general welfare of the residents of Pandacan and Sta. Ana as well as its adjoining areas, the land use of
[those] portions of land bounded by the Pasig River in the north, PNR Railroad Track in the east, Beata St.
in the south, Palumpong St. in the southwest, and Estero de Pancacan in the west[,] PNR Railroad in the
northwest area, Estero de Pandacan in the [n]ortheast, Pasig River in the southeast and Dr. M.L. Carreon
in the southwest. The area of Punta, Sta. Ana bounded by the Pasig River, Marcelino Obrero St., Mayo 28
St., and F. Manalo Street, are hereby reclassified from Industrial II to Commercial I.

xxx xxx xxx

SEC. 3. Owners or operators of industries and other businesses, the operation of which are no longer
permitted under Section 1 hereof, are hereby given a period of six (6) months from the date of effectivity
of this Ordinance within which to cease and desist from the operation of businesses which are hereby in
consequence, disallowed.

Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described therein from industrial to commercial and directed the
owners and operators of businesses disallowed under Section 1 to cease and desist from operating their
businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among the businesses situated
in the area are the so-called "Pandacan Terminals" of the oil companies Caltex (Philippines), Inc., Petron
Corporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation.

However, on June 26, 2002, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a
memorandum of understanding (MOU)6 with the oil companies in which they agreed that "the scaling
down of the Pandacan Terminals [was] the most viable and practicable option." Under the MOU, the oil
companies agreed to perform the following:

300
Section 1. - Consistent with the objectives stated above, the OIL COMPANIES shall, upon signing of this
MOU, undertake a program to scale down the Pandacan Terminals which shall include, among others, the
immediate removal/decommissioning process of TWENTY EIGHT (28) tanks starting with the LPG spheres
and the commencing of works for the creation of safety buffer and green zones surrounding the Pandacan
Terminals. xxx

Section 2. – Consistent with the scale-down program mentioned above, the OIL COMPANIES shall
establish joint operations and management, including the operation of common, integrated and/or shared
facilities, consistent with international and domestic technical, safety, environmental and economic
considerations and standards. Consequently, the joint operations of the OIL COMPANIES in the Pandacan
Terminals shall be limited to the common and integrated areas/facilities. A separate agreement covering
the commercial and operational terms and conditions of the joint operations, shall be entered into by the
OIL COMPANIES.

Section 3. - The development and maintenance of the safety and green buffer zones mentioned therein,
which shall be taken from the properties of the OIL COMPANIES and not from the surrounding
communities, shall be the sole responsibility of the OIL COMPANIES.

The City of Manila and the DOE, on the other hand, committed to do the following:

Section 1. - The City Mayor shall endorse to the City Council this MOU for its appropriate action with the
view of implementing the spirit and intent thereof.

Section 2. - The City Mayor and the DOE shall, consistent with the spirit and intent of this MOU, enable
the OIL COMPANIES to continuously operate in compliance with legal requirements, within the limited area
resulting from the joint operations and the scale down program.

Section 3. - The DOE and the City Mayor shall monitor the OIL COMPANIES’ compliance with the
provisions of this MOU.

301
Section 4. - The CITY OF MANILA and the national government shall protect the safety buffer and green
zones and shall exert all efforts at preventing future occupation or encroachment into these areas by
illegal settlers and other unauthorized parties.

The Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the MOU in Resolution No. 97.7 In the same resolution,
the Sanggunian declared that the MOU was effective only for a period of six months starting July 25,
2002.8 Thereafter, on January 30, 2003, the Sanggunian adopted Resolution No. 139 extending the
validity of Resolution No. 97 to April 30, 2003 and authorizing Mayor Atienza to issue special business
permits to the oil companies. Resolution No. 13, s. 2003 also called for a reassessment of the ordinance.10

Meanwhile, petitioners filed this original action for mandamus on December 4, 2002 praying that Mayor
Atienza be compelled to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the immediate removal of the terminals of
the oil companies.11

The issues raised by petitioners are as follows:

1. whether respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the
removal of the Pandacan Terminals, and

2. whether the June 26, 2002 MOU and the resolutions ratifying it can amend or repeal Ordinance
No. 8027.12

Petitioners contend that respondent has the mandatory legal duty, under Section 455 (b) (2) of the Local
Government Code (RA 7160),13 to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan
Terminals of the oil companies. Instead, he has allowed them to stay.

Respondent’s defense is that Ordinance No. 8027 has been superseded by the MOU and the
resolutions.14 However, he also confusingly argues that the ordinance and MOU are not inconsistent with
each other and that the latter has not amended the former. He insists that the ordinance remains valid
and in full force and effect and that the MOU did not in any way prevent him from enforcing and
implementing it. He maintains that the MOU should be considered as a mere guideline for its full
implementation.15

302
Under Rule 65, Section 316 of the Rules of Court, a petition for mandamus may be filed when any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station. Mandamus is an extraordinary writ
that is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty that is already imposed
on the respondent and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
The petitioner should have a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the performance of the act and it
must be the clear and imperative duty of respondent to do the act required to be done.17

Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right, or to compel compliance with a duty, which is questionable or
over which a substantial doubt exists. The principal function of the writ of mandamus is to command and
to expedite, not to inquire and to adjudicate; thus, it is neither the office nor the aim of the writ to secure
a legal right but to implement that which is already established. Unless the right to the relief sought is
unclouded, mandamus will not issue.18

To support the assertion that petitioners have a clear legal right to the enforcement of the ordinance,
petitioner SJS states that it is a political party registered with the Commission on Elections and has its
offices in Manila. It claims to have many members who are residents of Manila. The other petitioners,
Cabigao and Tumbokon, are allegedly residents of Manila.

We need not belabor this point. We have ruled in previous cases that when a mandamus proceeding
concerns a public right and its object is to compel a public duty, the people who are interested in the
execution of the laws are regarded as the real parties in interest and they need not show any specific
interest.19 Besides, as residents of Manila, petitioners have a direct interest in the enforcement of the
city’s ordinances. Respondent never questioned the right of petitioners to institute this proceeding.

On the other hand, the Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as city mayor, to
"enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city.">20 One of these is Ordinance No.
8027. As the chief executive of the city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has
not been repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts.21 He has no other choice. It is his ministerial duty to do so.
In Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr.,22 we stated the reason for this:

303
These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It
might seriously hinder the transaction of public business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and
ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been declared unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest to the lowest
are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it.23

The question now is whether the MOU entered into by respondent with the oil companies and the subsequent resolutions passed by the Sanggunian have made
the respondent’s duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 doubtful, unclear or uncertain. This is also connected to the second issue raised by petitioners, that is,
whether the MOU and Resolution Nos. 97, s. 2002 and 13, s. 2003 of the Sanggunian can amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8027.

We need not resolve this issue. Assuming that the terms of the MOU were inconsistent with Ordinance No. 8027, the resolutions which ratified it and made it
binding on the City of Manila expressly gave it full force and effect only until April 30, 2003. Thus, at present, there is nothing that legally hinders
respondent from enforcing Ordinance No. 8027.24

Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted right after the Philippines, along with the rest of the world, witnessed the horror of the September 11, 2001 attack on the
Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York City. The objective of the ordinance is to protect the residents of Manila from the catastrophic devastation
that will surely occur in case of a terrorist attack25 on the Pandacan Terminals. No reason exists why such a protective measure should be delayed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Respondent Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., as mayor of the City of Manila, is directed to immediately enforce
Ordinance No. 8027.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 188448, January 11, 2017

RODOLFO LAYGO AND WILLIE LAYGO, Petitioners, v. MUNICIPAL MAYOR OF SOLANO, NUEVA
VIZCAYA, Respondent.

DECISION

JARDELEZA, J.:

304
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court from the
Decision2 dated December 16, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 103922 and its
Resolution3 dated June 19, 2009.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Facts

In July 2005, Aniza Bandrang (Bandrang) sent two letter-complaints4 to then Municipal Mayor Santiago O.
Dickson (Mayor Dickson) and the Sangguniang Bayan of Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, informing them of the
illegal sublease she entered into with petitioners Rodolfo Laygo and Willie Laygo over Public Market Stalls
No. 77-A, 77-B, 78-A, and 78-B, which petitioners leased from the Municipal Government. Bandrang
claimed that petitioners told her to vacate the stalls, which they subsequently subleased to another.
Bandrang expressed her willingness to testify against petitioners if need be, and appealed that she be
given priority in the future to lease the stalls she vacated.5

In August 2005, the Sangguniang Bayan endorsed the letter of Bandrang and a copy of Resolution No.
183-20046 to Mayor Dickson for appropriate action. The Sangguniang informed Mayor Dickson that the
matter falls under the jurisdiction of his office since it (Sangguniang) has already passed and approved
Resolution No. 183-2004, which authorized Mayor Dickson to enforce the provision against subleasing of
stalls in the public market.7

Mayor Dickson, in response, informed the Sangguniang that the stalls were constructed under a Build-
Operate-Transfer (BOT) scheme, which meant that the petitioners had the right to keep their stalls until
the BOT agreement was satisfied. He then asked the Sangguniang if provisions were made to sanction
lessees under the BOT scheme similar to the provision against subleasing (Item No. 9) in the contract of
lease.8

Thereafter, Bandrang wrote another letter to the Sangguniang, praying and recommending to Mayor
Dickson, by way of a resolution, the cancellation of the lease contract between the Municipality and
petitioners for violating the provision on subleasing. She suggested that after which, the stalls can be
bidded upon anew and leased to the successful bidder. She made the suggestion because Mayor Dickson
did not act on her concerns even after the Sangguniang referred them to him.9

305
The Sangguniang once again referred the letter of Bandrang, together with a copy of Resolution No. 183-
2004, to Mayor Dickson for appropriate action. The Sangguniang opined that they no longer need to make
any recommendation to Mayor Dickson because Resolution No. 183-2004 already empowered and
authorized him to cancel the lease contracts pursuant to its pertinent provisions.10

Mayor Dickson, however, did not act on the letter of Bandrang and on the referrals of the Sangguniang.
Thus, Bandrang filed a Petition for Mandamus11 against him before the Regional Trial Court of Bayombong,
Nueva Vizcaya (RTC). Subsequently, she amended her petition to implead petitioners.12 Bandrang alleged
that despite already being aware of the violations of the lease contracts of petitioners with the
Municipality, Mayor Dickson still refused to enforce the provisions of the lease contracts against
subleasing. Bandrang concluded that Mayor Dickson's inaction can only be construed as an unlawful
neglect in the performance and enforcement of his public duty as the Chief Executive of Solano, Nueva
Vizcaya. Thus, she sought an order directing Mayor Dickson to immediately cancel the lease between the
Municipal Government and petitioners over Public Market Stall Nos. 77-A, 77-B, 78-A, and 78-B, and to
lease the vacated stalls to interested persons.13

In his Answer with Special and Affirmative Defenses,14 Mayor Dickson claimed that under the principle
of pari delicto, Bandrang had no right to seek remedy with the court as she was guilty herself in leasing
the market stalls. Mayor Dickson insisted that he acted in accordance with law by referring the matter to
the Sangguniang for appropriate action. He also argued that Bandrang had no cause of action against him
and that she was not a real-party-in-interest. He likewise asserted that the subject of the mandamus was
not proper as it entailed an act which was purely discretionary on his part.15

In his Pre-Trial Brief,16 Mayor Dickson elaborated that Bandrang had no cause of action because the stalls
were on a BOT scheme covered by an ordinance. During the hearing, Mayor Dickson presented a copy of
the resolution of the Sangguniang indicating that there was a directive to all stall owners in the public
market of Solano, Nueva Vizcaya to build their own stalls after a fire gutted the public market.17

On the other hand, petitioners denied that they were the lessees of Stalls 77 A and B and 78 A and B.
They clarified that Clarita Laygo (Clarita), their mother, was the lessee of the stalls by virtue of a BOT
scheme of the Municipality. At the time they entered into a contract of lease with Bandrang, it was agreed
that the contract was subject to the consent of the other heirs of Clarita. The consent, however, was never

306
given; hence, there was no subleasing to speak of. Even on the assumption that there was, petitioners
maintained that the prohibition on subleasing would not apply because the contract between the
Municipality and Clarita was one under a BOT scheme. Resolution No. 183-2004 only covered stall holders
who violated their lease contracts with the Municipal Government. Since their contract with the Municipal
Government was not a lease contract but a BOT agreement, Resolution No. 183-2004 would neither apply
to them, nor be enforced against them.18 Further, even granting arguendo that the prohibition would
apply, petitioners claimed that there was no more ground for the revocation of the lease because the
subleasing claimed by Bandrang had ended and the subsequent receipt by the Municipality of payments
ratified the contract with petitioners.19

Meanwhile, on July 23, 2007, the RTC issued an Order directing the substitution of then incumbent mayor
Hon. Philip A. Dacayo (Mayor Dacayo) as respondent in place of Mayor Dickson.20

Bandrang filed a Motion for Summary Judgment21 on January 8, 2008 arguing that no genuine factual
issues existed to necessitate trial. Bandrang reiterated the violation of petitioners against subletting in
their lease contracts with the Municipal Government. She stated that the will of the Sangguniang to
enforce the policy against subleasing was bolstered by the fact that it passed two more resolutions,
Resolution No. 017-2006 and Resolution No. 135-2007, reiterating the implementation of Resolution No.
183-2004.22 She also alleged for the first time that after the filing of the case, another violation besides
the prohibition on subletting surfaced: the nonpayment of stall rental fees. She pointed out that
petitioners admitted this violation when they exhibited during a hearing the receipt of payment of rentals
in arrears for over 17 months. Bandrang quoted Section 7B.06 (a) of Municipal Ordinance No. 164, Series
of 1994, which stated that failure to pay the rental fee for three consecutive months shall cause automatic
cancellation of the contract of lease of space or stall. She then concluded that this section left Mayor
Dickson with no choice but to comply.23chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

RTC Ruling

In its Resolution dated January 28, 2008, the RTC granted the petition. Thus:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, let a Writ of Mandamus to issue ordering the Municipal Mayor of
Solano to implement Nos. 9 and 11 of the provisions of the Contract of lease of stall between the

307
Municipal Government of Solano and private respondents Rodolfo and Willie Laygo.

The Municipal Mayor of Solano, Hon. Philip A. Dacayo, is hereby ordered as it is his duty to enforce
[Sangguniang Bayan] Resolution Nos. 183-2004 and (135]-2007 immediately and without further delay.

SO ORDERED."24ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The RTC held that the contract between petitioners and the Municipal Government was a lease contract,
as evidenced by a certification signed by Mayor Epifanio LD. Galima (Mayor Galima) dated September 17,
2006.25cralawred The RTC brushed aside the non-presentation of the written contract of lease, noting that
public policy and public interest must prevail. The RTC also held that even on the assumption that there
was a BOT agreement between petitioners and the Municipal Government, petitioners had already been
compensated for it, as evidenced by certifications of the Municipal Government dated August 28, 2006 and
September 17, 2006.26

As regards the non-payment of stall rentals, the RTC ruled that petitioners deemed to have admitted the
allegation when they exhibited to the court the receipt of payment of rentals in arrears.27

The RTC, thus, concluded that petitioners clearly violated the terms and conditions of the lease contract,
which gave rise to the enactment of Resolution No. 183-2004. Since Mayor Dickson failed in his duty to
enforce the resolution and delayed its implementation without valid reason, mandamus is a proper
remedy.28

Petitioners appealed to the CA, while then incumbent Mayor Dacayo filed a manifestation expressing his
willingness to implement Resolutions No. 183-2004 and 135-2007.29chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Court of Appeals Ruling

On December 16, 2008, the CA rendered the now assailed Decision30 dismissing the appeal and sustaining
the resolution of the RTC.

The CA affirmed the finding of the RTC that the contract between petitioners and the Municipal

308
Government is a lease contract and, thus, Resolution No. 183-2004 applies to them.31

On the issue of whether mandamus is proper, the CA also affirmed the ruling of the RTC stating that
although mandamus is properly availed of to compel a ministerial duty, it is also available to compel action
in matters involving judgment and discretion but not to direct an action in a particular way, to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
x x x However, mandamus is available to compel action, when refused, in matters involving
judgment and discretion, though not to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way
or the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of either.

In the case at bar, the Sangguniang Bayan of Solano ("Sangguniang") delegated to Mayor Dickson and
subsequently to incumbent Mayor Dacayo, the power to cancel the lease contracts of those market
stallholders who violated their contracts with the Municipality. Inferred from this power is the
power of the Mayor to determine who among the market stallholders violated their lease contracts with
the Municipality. Such power connotes an exercise of discretion.

When then Mayor Dickson refused to exercise this discretion, even after the Sangguniang assured him
that the subject resolution empowered him to have the lease contracts of the Laygos cancelled, said act of
refusal became proper subject of mandamus, as it involved a duty expected of him to be performed. So
with the incumbent Mayor, the Hon. Philip Dacayo, as was ordered by the Court
below.32ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Willie Laygo filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated January 20, 2009, which was denied by theCA in a
Resolution33 dated June 19, 2009.

Hence, this petition, which raised the following questions:

1. May the Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 183-2004 be applied against petitioners despite the
absence of a contract of lease between them and the Municipal Government of Solano, Nueva
Vizcaya?

2. May the Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 183-2004 be enforced by anybody else, except Mayor
Dickson?

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Petitioners reiterate their position that Resolution No. 183-2004 cannot be enforced against them because
there was no contract of lease between them and the Municipal Government and therefore, there cannot
be any occasion for petitioner to violate any provision.

Moreover, petitioners argue that the resolution can only be enforced by Mayor Dickson because it specified
Mayor Dickson and no other. Consequently, since Mayor Dickson is no longer in office, he cannot now
enforce Resolution No. 183-2004.34

The Municipal Government, through the Provincial Legal Officer of Nueva Vizcaya, stated in its
Comment35 that the policy against subleasing was bolstered by the enactment of the Sangguniang of
another resolution, Resolution No. 135-2007, with the same purpose, but authorizing then Mayor Dacayo
to implement the No.9 and No. 11 provisions. in the contract of lease.36chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Our Ruling

We grant the petition.

There is preponderant evidence that the contract between petitioners and the Municipal Government is
one of lease.

The type of contract existing between petitioners and the Municipal Government is disputed. The Municipal
Government asserts that it is one of lease, while petitioners insist that it is a BOT agreement. Both
parties, however, failed to present the contracts which they purport to have. It is likewise uncertain
whether the contract would fall under the coverage of the Statute of Frauds and would, thus, be only
proven through written evidence. In spite of these, we find that the Municipal Government was able to
prove its claim, through secondary evidence, that its contract with petitioners was one of lease.

We have no reason to doubt the certifications of the former mayor of Solano, Mayor Galima, and the
Municipal Planning and Development Office (MPDO)37 which show that the contract of the Municipal
Government with petitioners' mother, Clarita, was converted into a BOT agreement for a time in 1992 due
to the fire that razed the public market. These certifications were presented and offered in evidence by
petitioners themselves. They prove that Clarita was allowed to construct her stalls that were destroyed

310
using her own funds, and with the payment of the lease rentals being suspended until she recovers the
cost she spent on the construction. The construction was, in fact, supervised by the MPDO for a period of
three months. The stalls were eventually constructed completely and awarded to Clarita. She thereafter
reoccupied the stalls under a lease contract with the Municipal Government. In fact, in his Notice dated
August 21, 2007, the Municipal Treasurer of Solano reminded petitioners of their delinquent stall rentals
from May 2006 to July 2007.38 As correctly posited by the Municipal Government, if the stalls were under
a BOT scheme, the Municipal Treasurer could not have assessed petitioners of any delinquency.39

Also, petitioners themselves raised, for the sake of argument, that even if the contract may be conceded
as one of lease, the municipality is nonetheless estopped from canceling the lease contract because it
subsequently accepted payment of rentals until the time of the filing of the case.40

In the same vein, the Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 183-2004, which quoted Items No. 9 and 11 of
the lease contract on the absolute prohibition against subleasing and the possible termination of the
contract in view of back rentals or any violation of the stipulations in the contract, is presumed to have
been regularly issued. It deserves weight and our respect, absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the members of the Sangguniang.

Mandamus, however, is not proper.

Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of competent jurisdiction, in the name of the state or the
sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or person requiring
the performance of a particular duty therein specified, which duty results from the official station of the
party to whom the writ is directed or from operation of law.41 As a rule, mandamus will not lie in the
absence of any of the following grounds: [a] that the court, officer, board, or person against whom the
action is taken unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from office, trust, or station; or [b] that such court, officer, board, or person has unlawfully
excluded petitioner/relator from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which he is
entitled.42 Neither will the extraordinary remedy of mandamus lie to compel the performance of duties
that are discretionary in nature.43 In Roble Arrastre, Inc. v. Villaflor,44 we explained the difference
between the exercise of ministerial and discretionary powers, to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

311
"Discretion," when applied to public functionaries, means a power or right conferred upon them by law or
acting officially, under certain circumstances, uncontrolled by the judgment or conscience of others. A
purely ministerial act or duty in contradiction to a discretional act is one which an officer or tribunal
performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal
authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the
act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when
the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only
when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment.45 (Citation
omitted.)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Applying the foregoing distinction, we find that the Petition for Mandamus must fail because the acts
sought to be done are discretionary in nature.

The petition sought an order to direct Mayor Dickson to cancel the lease contract of petitioners with the
Municipal Government and to lease the vacated market stalls to interested persons. We have already
settled in the early case of Aprueba v. Ganzon46 that the privilege of operating a market stall under license
is always subject to the police power of the city government and may be refused or granted for reasons of
public policy and sound public administration.47 Being a delegated police power falling under the general
welfare clause of Section 16 of the Local Government Code, the grant or revocation of the privilege is,
therefore, discretionary in nature.48

Moreover, Resolution No. 183-2004, or even its subsequent equivalent, Resolution No. 135-2007, merely
authorizes the mayor "to enforce the No. 11 provision of the contract of lease of market stalls between the
Municipal Government and the stallholders at the Solano [P]ublic Market who violated the No. 9 provision
of said contract x x x."49 Item No. 11 provides that "[i]f any back rental remains unpaid for more than
[15] days or if any violation be made of any of the stipulations of this lease by the LESSEE, the LESSOR
may declare this lease terminated and, thereafter, reenter the leased premises and repossess the same,
and expel the LESSEE or others claiming under him/her from the leased premises."50 Clearly, Item No. 11
does not give the mayor a mandate to motu propio or automatically terminate or cancel the lease with a
lessee who is delinquent in the payment of rentals or who is in violation of any of the provisions of the
contract. This is apparent from the permissive word "may" used in the provision. It does not specifically
enjoin the mayor to cancel the lease as a matter of "duty." Where the words of a statute are clear, plain,
and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted

312
interpretation.51

We do not discount, however, our ruling in previous cases where we cited exceptions to the rule that only
a ministerial duty can be compelled by a writ of mandamus. In Republic v. Capulong,52 we held that as a
general rule, a writ of mandamus will not issue to control or review the exercise of discretion of a public
officer since it is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court. 53 Courts will not interfere
to modify, control or inquire into the exercise of this discretion unless it be alleged and proven that there
has been an abuse or an excess of authority on the part of the officer concerned.54

In Angchango, Jr. v. Ombudsman,55 we also held that in the performance of an official duty or act
involving discretion, the corresponding official can only be directed by mandamus to act, but not to act
one way or the other. However, this rule admits of exceptions such as in cases where there is gross abuse
of discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable excess of authority.56 These exceptions do not apply in this
case.

Firstly, while Mayor Dickson may be compelled to act on the directive provided in Resolution No. 135-
2007, he may not be compelled to do so in a certain way, as what was prayed for by Bandrang in seeking
the cancellation of the contract and to re-lease the vacated market stalls to interested persons. It was
enough that Mayor Dickson be reminded of his authority to cancel the contract under Item No. 11, but
whether or not his decision would be for or against Bandrang would be for Mayor Dickson alone to decide.
Not even the Court can substitute its own judgment over what he had chosen.

As it was, Mayor Dickson did act on the matter before him. He exercised his discretion by choosing not to
cancel the contract on the ground of pari delicto, explaining that Bandrang, as the sub-lessee herself, was
in violation of the same policy on subleasing. The complaint does not allege that in deciding this way,
Mayor Dickson committed grave abuse of discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable excess of authority.
Neither did Bandrang present proof that Mayor Dickson acted arbitrarily, wantonly, fraudulently, and
against the interest of the public when he chose not to cancel the lease contract of petitioners.57

Further, aside from the imperative duty of the respondent in a petition for mandamus to perform that
which is demanded of him, it is essential that, on the one hand, the person petitioning for it has a clear
legal right to the claim that is sought.58 To be given due course, a petition for mandamus must have been

313
instituted by a party aggrieved by the alleged inaction of any tribunal, corporation, board or person which
unlawfully excludes said party from the enjoyment of a legal right. The petitioner in every case must
therefore be an aggrieved party, in the sense that he possesses a clear right to be enforced and a direct
interest in the duty or act to be performed. The Court will exercise its power of judicial review only if the
case is brought before it by a party who has the legal standing to raise the constitutional or legal question.
"Legal standing" means a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained
or will sustain direct injury as a result of the government act that is being challenged.59 Does Bandrang
have such legal standing to institute the petition? We answer in the negative.

Following our ruling in the early case of Almario v. City Mayor, et al.,60 where we ruled that the petitioner
seeking to compel the city mayor to eject occupants of stalls in the public market had no locus standi to
file the petition for mandamus, we also arrive here with the same conclusion. Similarly with Almario,
Bandrang is not an applicant for any stall in the public market which is the subject of the controversy. She
is neither a representative of any such applicant, stall holder, or any association of persons who are
deprived of their right to occupy a stall in said market. As we have deduced in Almario:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
x x x Verily, he is not the real party in interest who has the capacity, right or personality to institute the
present action. As this Court has well said in an analogous case, "the petitioner does not have any special
or individual interest in the subject matter of the action which would enable us to say that he is entitled to
the writ as a matter.of right. His interest is only that a citizen at large coupled with the fact that in his
capacity a[s] president of the Association of Engineers it is his duty to safeguard the interests of the
members of his association."61 (Italics in the original, citation omitted.)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated December 16, 2008
and Resolution dated June 19, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 103922, and the Resolution
dated January 28, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Petition for Mandamus against Mayor Santiago O. Dickson
is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

314
G.R. No. 211362 February 24, 2015

FIRST CLASS CADET ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA of the Philippine Military Academy, represented by
his father RENATO P. CUDIA, who also acts on his own behalf, and BERTENI CATALUNA
CAUSING, Petitioners,
vs.
THE SUPERINTENDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY (PMA), THE HONOR
COMMITTEE (HC) OF 2014 OF THE PMA and HC MEMBERS, and the CADET REVIEW AND
APPEALS BOARD (CRAB), Respondents.

x-----------------------x

FILIPINA P. CUDIA, in behalf of CADET FIRST CLASS ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA, and on her own
behalf, Petitioner-Intervenor.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

The true test of a cadet's character as a leader rests on his personal commitment to uphold what is
morally and ethically righteous at the most critical and trying times, and at the most challenging
circumstances. When a cadet must face a dilemma between what is true and right as against his security,
well-being, pleasures and comfort, or dignity, what is at stake is his honor and those that [define] his
values. A man of an honorable character does not think twice and chooses the fore. This is the essence of
and. the Spirit of the Honor Code - it is championing truth and righteousness even if it may mean the
surrender of one's basic rights and privileges.1

The Procedural Antecedents

Six days prior to the March 16, 2014 graduation ceremonies of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA),
petitioners Renato P. Cudia, acting for himself and in behalf of his son, Cadet First Class Aldrin Jeff P.

315
Cudia (Cadet JCL Cudia), and Berteni Catalufta Causing filed this petition for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus with application for extremely urgent temporary restraining order (TRO).2

In a Resolution dated March 1 7, 2014, the Court denied the prayer for TRO and instead, required
respondents to file their comment on the petition.3

On March 25, 2014, Filipina P. Cudia, acting for herself and in behalf of her son Cadet 1 CL Cudia, filed a
motion for leave to intervene, attaching thereto the petition-in-intervention.4 Per Resolution dated March
31, 2014, the Court granted the motion and resolved to await respondents' comment on the petition.5

A manifestation was then filed by petitioners on April 3, 2014, recommending the admission of the
petition-in-intervention and adopting it as an integral part of their petition.6 On May 20, 2014, petitioner-
intervenor filed a manifestation with motion for leave to admit the Final Investigation Report of the
Commission on Human Rights (CHR) dated April 25, 2014.7 The Report8 was relative to CHR-CAR Case No.
2014-0029 filed by the spouses Renato and Filipina Cudia (Spouses Cudia), for themselves and in behalf
of their son, against the PMA Honor Committee (HC) members and Major Vladimir P. Gracilla (Maj.
Gracilla)9 for violation of Cadet lCL Cudia's rights to due process, education, and privacy of
communication. Subsequently, on June 3, 2014, petitioners filed a motion for leave to adopt the
submission of the CHR Report.10 The manifestation was granted and the motion was noted by the Court in
its Resolution dated July 7, 2014.

After filing three motions for extension of time,11 respondents filed their Consolidated Comment12 on June
19, 2014. In a motion, petitioner-intervenor filed a Reply, which was later adopted by
petitioners.13 Submitted as Annex "A" of the Reply was a copy of the CHR Resolution dated May 22, 2014
regarding CHR-CAR Case No. 2014-0029.14 We noted and granted the same on August 11, 2014 and
October 13, 2014.

Petitioner-intervenor twice filed a manifestation with motion to submit the case for early
resolution,15 which the Court noted in a Resolution dated August 11, 2014 and October 3, 2014.16

The Facts

316
Cadet 1 CL Cudia was a member of Siklab Diwa Class of 2014 of the PMA, the country's premiere military
academy located at Fort Gregorio del Pilar in Baguio City. He belonged to the "A" Company and was the
Deputy Baron of his class. As claimed by petitioners and petitioner-intervenor (hereinafter collectively
called "petitioners," unless otherwise indicated), he was supposed to graduate with honors as the class
salutatorian, receive the Philippine Navy Saber as the top Navy cadet graduate, and be commissioned as
an ensign of the Philippine Navy.

On November 14, 2013, the combined classes of the Navy and Air Force 1 CL cadets had a lesson
examination (LE) on Operations Research (OR432) under Dr. Maria Monica C. Costales (Dr. Costales) at
the PMAFI Room. Per published schedule from the Headquarters Academic Group, the 4th period class in
OR432 was from 1 :30-3:00 p.m. (1330H-1500H), while the 5th period class in ENG412 was from 3:05-
4:05 p.m. (1505H-1605H).

Five days after, Professor Juanita Berong (Prof. Berong) of the 5th period class issued a Delinquency
Report (DR) against Cadet 1 CL Cudia because he was "[/]ate for two (2) minutes in his Eng 412 class x x
x. "17 Cadets 1 CL Narciso, Arcangel, Miranda, Pontillas, Diaz, Otila, and Dela Cruz were also reported late
for five minutes.18

On December 4, 2013, the DRs reached the Department of Tactical Officers. They were logged and
transmitted to the Company Tactical Officers ( CTO) for explanation of the concerned cadets. Two days
later, Cadet lCL Cudia received his DR.

In his Explanation of Report dated December 8, 2013, Cadet lCL Cudia reasoned out that: "I came directly
from OR432 Class. We were dismissed a bit late by our instructor Sir."19

On December 19, 2013, Major Rommel Dennis Hindang (Maj. Hindang), the CTO of Cadet 1 CL Cudia,
meted out to him the penalty of 11 demerits and 13 touring hours. Immediately, Cadet lCL Cudia clarified
with Maj. Hindang his alleged violation. The latter told him that the basis of the punishment was the result
of his conversation with Dr. Costales, who responded that she never dismissed her class late, and the
protocol to dismiss the class 10-15 minutes earlier than scheduled. When he expressed his intention to
appeal and seek reconsideration of the punishment, he was · advised to put the request in writing. Hence,

317
that same day, Cadet 1 CL Cudia addressed his Request for Reconsideration of Meted Punishment to Maj.
Benjamin L. Leander, Senior Tactical Officer (STO), asserting:

I strongly believe that I am not in control of the circumstances, our 4th period class ended 1500H and our
5th period class, which is ENG412, started 1500H also. Immediately after 4t period class, I went to my
next class without any intention of being late Sir.20

A day after, Maj. Leander instructed Maj. Hindang to give his comments on the request of Cadet 1 CL
Cudia and to indicate if there were other cadets belonging to the same section who were also late.

On December 28, 2013, Maj. Hindang submitted his reply to Maj. Leander pointing out that, based on his
investigation, the 4th period class was not dismissed late. As a result, Maj. Leander sustained the penalty
imposed. Petitioners alleged that Cadet 1 CL Cudia came to know of the denial of his request only on
January 24, 2014 upon inquiry with Maj. Leander.

Several days passed, and on January 7, 2014, Cadet lCL Cudia was informed that Maj. Hindang reported
him to the HC21 for violation of the Honor Code. The Honor Report stated:

Lying that is giving statement that perverts the truth in his written appeal, stating that his 4th period class
ended at l 500H that made him late in the succeeding class.22

Upon asking the HC Chairman, Cadet 1 CL Mike Anthony P. Mogol (Cadet 1 CL Mogol), as to what Maj.
Hindang meant in his Report, Cadet lCL Cudia learned that it was based on Maj. Hindang's conversations
with their instructors and classmates as well as his statement in the request for reconsideration to Maj.
Leander. He then verbally applied for and was granted an extension of time to answer the charge against
him because Dr. Costales, who could shed light on the matter, was on emergency leave.

On January 13, 2014, Dr. Costales sent text messages to Cadet lCL Cudia, conveying:

Gud pm cdt cudia. Mam belandres gave me bkground na. She told me its a report dated november. When
maj hindang ask me, no time referens. (04:25:11 P.M.)

318
All the while I thot he was refering to dismisal during last day last december. Whc i told, i wud presume
they wil finish early bee its grp work. (04:29:21 P.M.)23

The next day, Cadets lCL Cudia and Arcangel approached Dr. Costales, who reaffirmed that she and Maj.
Hindang were not in the same time reference when the latter asked her.

Later, Cadet 1 CL Cudia submitted his letter of explanation on the Honor Report. He averred:

Sir, We had an LE that day (14 November 2013) in OR432 class. When the first bell rang (1455), I stood
up, reviewed my paper and submitted it to my instructor, Ms. Costales. After which, I and Cadet lcl
Arcangel asked for some query with regards (sic) to the deductions of our previous LE. Our instructor
gladly answered our question. She then told me that she will give the copy of our section grade, so I
waited at the hallway outside the ACAD5 office, and then she came out of the room and gave me a copy
of the grades. Cadet Arcangel, Cadet Narciso and I immediately went to our 5ti period class which is
ENG412.

With these statements, I would like to clarify the following:

1. How could this be lying?

2. What is wrong with the side of Maj. Hindang (why did he come up to that honor report)?

3. What are his assumptions?

I appeal, in the name of clarity, fairness and truth[,] that my case be reopened and carefully reviewed for
I did not violate the honor code/system, I can answer NO to both questions (Did I intend to deceive? Did I
intend to take undue advantage?) and for the following reasons:

1. The honor report of Maj. Hindang was already settled and finalized given the fact that no
face-to-face personal conversation with Ms. Costales was conducted to clarify what and when
exactly was the issue at hand.

319
2. Statements of the respondents support my explanation.

3. My explanation to my appeal to my DR (Request for reconsideration of meted punishment)

further supports my explanation in my delinquency report.

4. My understanding of the duration of the "CLASS" covers not just a lecture in a typical
classroom instruction but includes every transaction and communication a teacher does with
her students, especially that in our case some cadets asked for queries, and I am given
instruction by which (sic) were directly related to our CLASS. Her transaction and
communication with our other classmates may have already ended but ours extended for a
little bit.

I agree and consider that because Cadet CUDIA is under my instruction to wait, and the
other cadets still have business with me, it is reasonable enough for him to say that
"Our class was dismissed a bit late" (dealing with matter of seconds or a minute
particularly 45 seconds to 1 minute and 30 seconds)

And with concern to (sic) OR432 class, I can say it ended on time (1500H).

(signed)
M COSTALES

w/ attached certification

5. I was transparent and honest in explaining the 2-minute delay and did not attempt to
conceal anything that happened or I did.

6. Furthermore, CPT DULA WAN PA, the Tactical Officer of Hawk Company[,] and I had a
conversation with regards (sic) to the same matter for which he can give important points of
my case.

7. Cadet lcl DIAZ "D" Co can also stand as a witness that I waited for Ms. Costales. 24

320
On January 15, 2014, the HC constituted a team to conduct a preliminary investigation on the reported
honor violation of Cadet 1 CL Cudia. The Foxtrot Company was designated as the investigating team and
was composed of Cadet 1 CL Hasigan as Presiding Officer, and Cadets 1 CL Mogol, lCL Raguindin, 2CL
Gumilab, 2CL Saldua, 3CL Espejo, and 3CL Poncardas as members.25 Soon after, the team submitted its
Preliminary Investigation Report recommending that the case be formalized.

The formal investigation against Cadet 1 CL Cu di a then ensued. The Presiding Officer was Cadet 1 CL
Rhona K. Salvacion, while the nine (9) voting members were Cadets lCL Jairus 0. Fantin, lCL Bryan Sonny
S. Arlegui, 1 CL Kim Adrian R. Martal, 1 CL J eanelyn P. Cabrido, 1 CL ShuAydan G. Ayada, 1 CL Dalton
John G. Lagura, 2CL Renato A. Carifio, Jr., 2CL Arwi C. Martinez, and 2CL Niko Angelo C. Tarayao.26 Acting
as recorders tasked to document the entire proceedings were 4CL Jennifer A. Cuarteron and 3CL Leoncio
Nico A. de Jesus 11.27 Those who observed the trial were Cadets 1 CL Balmeo, Dag-uman, Hasigan,
Raguindin, Paulino, Arcangel, and Narciso; Cadets 2CL Jocson and Saldua, Jr.; and Cadet 3CL Umaguing.28

The first formal hearing started late evening of January 20, 2014 and lasted until early morning the next
day. Cadet lCL Cudia was informed of the charge against him, as to which he pleaded "Not Guilty." Among
those who testified were Cadet 1 CL Cudia, Maj. Hindang, and Cadets 1 CL Arcangel and Narciso. On the
second night of the hearing held on January 21, 2014, Cadet 1 CL Cudia again appeared and was called to
the witness stand along with Cadets Brit and Barrawed. Dr. Costales also testified under oath via phone on
a loudspeaker. Deliberation among the HC voting members followed. After that, the ballot sheets were
distributed. The members cast their votes through secret balloting and submitted their accomplished ballot
sheets together with their written justification. The result was 8-1 in favor of a guilty verdict. Cadet lCL
Dalton John G. Lagura (Cadet lCL Lagura) was the lone dissenter. Allegedly, upon the order ofHC
Chairman Cadet 1 CL Mogol, the Presiding Officer and voting members went inside a chamber adjoining
the court room for further deliberation. After several minutes, they went out and the Presiding Officer
announced the 9-0 guilty verdict. Cadet 1 CL Cudia, who already served nine (9) touring hours, was then
informed of the unanimous votes finding him guilty of violating the Honor Code. He was immediately
placed in the PMA Holding Center until the resolution of his appeal.

On January 24, 2014, Cadet ICL Cudia filed a written appeal addressed to the HC Chairman, the full text
of which stated:

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 WRITTEN APPEAL

14 NOVEMBER 2013

This is when I was reported for "Late for two (2) minutes in Eng412 class", my explanation on this
delinquency report when I received it, is that "Our class was dismissed a (little) bit late and I came
directly from 4th period class ... etc". Knowing the fact that in my delinquency report, it is stated that
ENG412 classes started 1500H and I am late for two minutes, it is logical enough for I (sic) to interpret it
as "I came 1502H during that class". This is the explanation that came into my mind that time. (I just
cannot recall the exact words I used in explaining that delinquency report, but what I want to say is that I
have no intention to be late). In my statements, I convey my message as "since I was not the only one
left in that class, and the instructor is with us, I used the term "CLASS", I used the word "DISMISSED"
because I was under instruction (to wait for her to give the section grade) by the instructor, Ms. Costales.
The other cadets (lCL MIRANDA, lCL ARCANGEL) still have queries and business with her that made me
decide to use the word "CLASS", while the others who don't have queries and business with her (ex: lCL
NARCISO and 1 CL DIAZ) were also around.

Note:

The four named cadets were also reported late.

Reference: Para 171. 0. (Leaving the Classroom Prior to Dismissal Time)(Sec XVII, CCAFPR s2008)

It is stated in this reference that "Cadets shall not linger in the place of instruction after the section has
been dismissed. EXCEPT when told or allowed to do so by the instructor or by any competent authority for
official purposes. "

The instruction by Ms. Costales was given to me before the two bells rang (indicating the end of class
hour, 1500H). I waited for her for about 45 seconds to 1 minute and 30 seconds, that made me to decide
to write "a little bit late" in my explanation. Truly, the class ENDED 1500H but due to official purpose
(instruction by Ms. Costales to wait) and the conflict in academic schedule (to which I am not in control of

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the circumstances, 4th PD class 1330H-1500H and 5th PD class 1500H-1 600H), and since Ms. Costales,
my other classmates, and I were there, I used the word "CLASS".

19 December 2013

I was informed that my delinquency report was awarded, 11 Demerits and 13 Touring hours. Not because
I don't want to serve punishment, but because I know I did nothing wrong, I obeyed instruction, and
believing that my reason is justifiable and valid, that is why I approached our tactical officer, MAJ
HINDANG PAF, to clarify and ask why it was awarded that day.

In our conversation, he said that he had a phone call to my instructor and he even added that they have a
protocol to dismiss the class, 15 minutes or 10 minutes before 1500H. I explained:

Sir, I strongly believe that I am not in control of the circumstances, our 4th period class ended 1500H and
our 5th period class, which is ENG412, started 1500H also. Immediately after 4th period class, I went to
my next class without any intention of being late Sir.

These statements are supplementary to my explanation in my delinquency report, in here, I specified the
conflict in the schedule and again, I have no intention to be late. After explaining it further with these
statements, my tactical officer said that since I was reported in a written form, I should make an appeal in
a written form. Thinking that he already understood what I want to say, I immediately made an appeal
that day stating the words that I used in having conversation with him.29

Attached to the written appeal was a Certification dated January 24, 2014, wherein Dr. Costales attested:

1. That Cadet MIRANDA, ARCANGEL, [and] NARCISO was (sic) with Cadet CUDIA in making query
about their latest grades in OR432 and/or results of UEl outside the ACADS office. The following
facts may explain their queries on 14 November 2013:

a. That I held my class in the PMAFI room instead of room 104.

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 b. That OR432 releases grades every Wednesday and cadets are informed during Thursday,
either in class or posted grades in the bulletin board (grades released was [sic J based on the
previous LEs: latest LE before UE was Decision Trees).

c. That UE papers were already checked but not yet recorded due to (sic) other cadets have
not taken the UE. Cadets were allowed to verify scores but not to look at the papers.

d. Last 23 January 2014, Captain Dulawan clarified if indeed Cadet NARCISO and ARCANGEL
verified grades. The two cadets said that they verified something with me after the OR432
class and they were with Cadet CUD IA. That the statements of the three (3) cadets are all the
same and consistent, thus[,] I honor that as true.

2. As to the aspect of dismissing late, I could not really account for the specific time that I dismissed
the class. To this date, I [cannot] really recall an account that is more than two (2) months earlier.
According to my records, there was a lecture followed by an LE during (sic) on 14 November 2013.
To determine the time of my dismissal, maybe it can be verified with the other members of class I
was handling on that said date.30

Respondents contend that the HC denied the appeal the same day, January · 24, as it found no reason to
conduct a re-trial based on the arguments and evidence presented.31 Petitioners, however, claim that the
written appeal was not acted upon until the filing of the petition-in-intervention.32

From January 25 to February 7, 2014, respondents allege that the Headquarters Tactics Group (HTG)
conducted an informal review to check the findings of the HC. During the course of the investigation, Prof.
Berong was said to have confirmed with the Officer-in-Charge of the HC that classes started as scheduled
(i.e., 3:05 p.m. or 1505H), and that Cadet lCL Barrawed, the acting class marcher of ENG412, verified
before the Commandant, Assistant Commandant, and STO that the class started not earlier than
scheduled.

Meantime, on February 4, 2014, the OIC of the HC forwarded the Formal Investigation Report to the Staff
Judge Advocate (SJA) for review. The next day, the SJA found the report to be legally in order.

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On February 8, 2014, Colonel Rozzano D. Briguez (Col. Briguez), the Commandant of Cadets, affirmed the
HC findings and recommended to Vice Admiral Edgar Abogado, then PMA Superintendent, the separation
from the PMA of Cadet lCL Cudia for violation of the First Tenet of the Honor Code (Lying, pursuant to Sec.
VII.12.b of the CCAFPR S-2008). On the same date, Special Orders No. 26 was issued by the PMA
Headquarters placing Cadet 1 CL Cudia on indefinite leave of absence without pay and allowances effective
February 10, 2014 pending approval of his separation by the AFPGHQ, barring him from future
appointment and/or admission as cadet, and not permitting him to qualify for any entrance requirements
to the PMA. 33

Two days later, Vice Admiral Abogado approved the recommendation to dismiss Cadet 1 CL Cudia.

On February 13, 2014, Cadet lCL Cudia submitted a letter to the Office of the Commandant of Cadets
requesting for reinstatement by the PMA of his status as a cadet.34

Four days passed, Annavee P. Cudia (Annavee ), the sister of Cadet 1 CL Cudia, posted his plight in her
Face book account. The day after, the Spouses Cudia gave a letter to Major General Oscar Lopez (Maj.
Gen. Lopez), the new PMA Superintendent, asking to recognize the 8-1 voting of the HC.35 Copies of which
were furnished to the AFP Chief of Staff and other concerned military officials. Subsequently, Maj. Gen.
Lopez was directed to review Cadet lCL Cudia's case. The latter, in turn, referred the matter to the Cadet
Review and Appeals Board (CRAB).

On February 19, 2014, Cadet lCL Cudia made his personal appeal letter to Maj. Gen. Lopez. On even date,
the AFP Chief of Staff ordered a reinvestigation following the viral Facebook post of Annavee demanding
the intervention of the military leadership.

Petitioners claim that, on February 21, 2014, Special Order No. 1 was issued directing all PMA cadets to
ostracize Cadet 1 CL Cudia by not talking to him and by separating him from all activities/functions of the
cadets. It is said that any violation shall be a "Class 1" offense entailing 45 demerits, 90 hours touring,
and 90 hours confinement. Cadet 1 CL Cudia was not given a copy of the order and learned about it only
from the media.36 According to an alleged news report, PMA Spokesperson Major Agnes Lynette Flores
(Maj. Flores) confirmed the HC order to ostracize Cadet 1 CL Cudia. Among his offenses were: breach of

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confidentiality by putting documents in the social media, violation of the PMA Honor Code, lack of initiative
to resign, and smearing the name of the PMA.37

On February 24, 2014, Cadet 1CL Cudia requested the CRAB for additional time, until March 4, 2014, to
file an appeal on the ground that his intended witnesses are in on-the-job training ( OJT).38 As additional
evidence to support his appeal, he also requested for copies of the Minutes of the HC proceedings,
relevant documents pertaining to the case, and video footages and recordings of the HC hearings.

The next day, Cadet 1 CL Cudia and his family engaged the services of the Public Attorney's Office (PAO)
in Baguio City.

The CRAB conducted a review of the case based on the following: (a) letter of appeal of the Spouses Cudia
dated February 18, 2014; (b) directive from the AFP-GHQ to reinvestigate the case; and ( c) guidance
from Maj. Gen. Lopez.

On February 26, 2014, Brigadier General Andre M. Costales, Jr. (Brig. Gen. Costales, Jr.), the CRAB
Chairman, informed Cadet lCL Cudia that, pending approval of the latter's request for extension, the CRAB
would continue to review the case and submit its recommendations based on whatever evidence and
testimonies received, and that it could not favorably consider his request for copies of the HC minutes,
relevant documents, and video footages and recordings of the HC hearings since it was neither the
appropriate nor the authorized body to take action thereon.39 Subsequently, upon verbal advice, Cadet 1
CL Cudia wrote a letter to Maj. Gen. Lopez reiterating his request.40

Two days after, the Spouses Cudia filed a letter-complaint before the CHR-Cordillera Administrative Region
(CAR) Office against the HC members and Maj. Gracilla for alleged violation of the human rights of Cadet
lCL Cudia, particularly his rights to due process, education, and privacy of communication.41

On March 4, 2014, Cadet 1 CL Cudia, through the PAO, moved for additional time, until March 19, 2014,
to file his appeal and submit evidence. PAO also wrote a letter to AFP Chief of Staff General Emmanuel T.
Bautista (Gen. Bautista) seeking for immediate directive to the PMA to expeditiously and favorably act on
Cadet 1CL Cudia's requests.42

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Exactly a week prior to the commencement exercises of Siklab Diwa Class, the following events
transpired:

On March 10, 2014, Annavee sought the assistance of PAO Chief Public Attorney Persida V. Rueda-
Acosta.43 On the other hand, the CRAB submitted a report to the AFP-GHQ upholding the dismissal of
Cadet 1 CL Cudia.44

On March 11, 2014, PAO received a letter from Maj. Gen. Lopez stating the denial of Cadet 1CL Cudia's
requests for extension of time to file an Appeal Memorandum in view of the ample time already given, and
to be furnished with a copy of relevant documents because of confidentiality and presumption of regularity
of the HC proceedings.45 Cadet 1CL Cudia, through PAO, then filed an Appeal Memorandum46 before the
CRAB.

On March 12, 2014, Spouses Cudia wrote a letter to President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III (Pres.
Aquino), who is the Commander-in-Chief of the AFP, attaching thereto the Appeal Memorandum.47 On the
same day, Special Orders No. 48 was issued by the PMA constituting a Fact-Finding Board/Investigation
Body composed of the CRAB members and PMA senior officers to conduct a deliberate investigation
pertaining to Cadet 1CL Cudia's Appeal Memorandum.48 The focus of the inquiry was not just to find out
whether the appeal has merit or may be considered but also to investigate possible involvement of other
cadets and members of the command related to the incident and to establish specific violation of policy or
regulations that had been violated by other cadets and members of the HC.49

On March 13, 2014, the Cudia family and the Chief Public Attorney had a dialogue with Maj. Gen. Lopez.
On March 14, 2014, the CHR-CAR came out with its preliminary findings, which recommended the
following:

a. For the PMA and the Honor Committee to respect and uphold the 8 Guilty - 1 Not guilty vote;

b. For the PMA and the Honor Committee to officially pronounce Cdt Cudia as Not Guilty of the
charge filed against him before the Honor Committee;

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 c. For the PMA to restore Cadet Cudia's rights and entitlements as a full-fledge graduating cadet and
allow him to graduate on Sunday, 16 March 2014;

d. For the PMA to fully cooperate with the CHR in the investigation of Cudia's Case.50

On March 15, 2014, Cadet 1CL Cudia and his family had a meeting with Pres. Aquino and Department of
National Defense (DND) Secretary Voltaire T. Gazmin. The President recommended that they put in
writing their appeal, requests, and other concerns. According to respondents, the parties agreed that
Cadet 1 CL Cudia would not join the graduation but it was without prejudice to the result of the appeal,
which was elevated to the AFP Chief of Staff. The President then tasked Gen. Bautista to handle the
reinvestigation of the case, with Maj. Gen. Oscar Lopez supervising the group conducting the review.

Four days after Siklab Diwa Class' graduation day, petitioner Renato S. Cudia received a letter dated
March 11, 2014 from the Office of the AFP Adjutant General and signed by Brig. Gen. Ronald N. Albano for
the AFP Chief of Staff, affirming the CRAB' s denial of Cadet 1 CL Cudia' s appeal. It held:

After review, The Judge Advocate General, APP finds that the action of the PMA CRAB in denying the
appeal for reinvestigation is legally in order. There was enough evidence to sustain the finding of guilt and
the proprietary (sic) of the punishment imposed. Also, your son was afforded sufficient time to file his
appeal from the date he was informed of the final verdict on January 21, 2014, when the decision of the
Honor Committee was read to him in person, until the time the PMA CRAB conducted its review on the
case. Moreover, the continued stay of your son at the Academy was voluntary. As such, he remained
subject to the Academy's policy regarding visitation. Further, there was no violation of his right to due
process considering that the procedure undertaken by the Honor Committee and PMA CRAB was
consistent with existing policy. Thus, the previous finding and recommendation of the Honor Committee
finding your son, subject Cadet guilty of "Lying" and recommending his separation from the Academy is
sustained.

In view of the foregoing, this Headquarters resolved to deny your appeal for lack of merit.51 Thereafter,
the Fact-Finding Board/Investigating Body issued its Final Investigation Report on March 23, 2014 denying
Cadet 1 CL Cudia's appeal.52 Subsequently, on April 28, 2014, the special investigation board tasked to
probe the case submitted its final report to the President.53 Pursuant to the administrative appeals

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process, the DND issued a Memorandum dated May 23, 2014, directing the Office of AFP Chief of Staff to
submit the complete records of the case for purposes of DND review and recommendation for disposition
by the President.54

Meanwhile, on May 22, 2014, the CHR-CAR issued its Resolution with respect to CHR-CAR Case No. 2014-
0029, concluding and recommending as follows:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Commission on Human Rights-CAR Office finds PROBABLE
CAUSE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS against the officers and members of the PMA Honor Committee
and .. certain PMA officials, specifically for violations of the rights of CADET ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA to
dignity, due process, education, privacy/privacy of communication, and good life.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the CHR-CAR Office RESOLVED to indorse to competent authorities for their
immediate appropriate action on the following recommendations:

1. The Philippine Military Academy must set aside the "9-Guilty, 0-Not Guilty" verdict against
Cadet Aldrin Jeff P. Cudia, for being null and void; to uphold and respect the "8-Guilty, 1-Not
Guilty" voting result and make an official pronouncement of NOT GUILTY in favor of Cadet
Cudia;

2. The PMA, the AFP Chief of Staff, and the President in whose hands rest the ends of justice
and fate of Cadet Cudia, to:

2.1 officially proclaim Cadet Cudia a graduate and alumnus of the Philippine Military
Academy;

2.2 issue to Cadet Cudia the corresponding Diploma for the degree of Bachelors of
Science; and

2.3 Issue to Cadet Cudia the corresponding official transcript 'of his academic records for
his BS degree, without conditions therein as to his status as a PMA cadet.

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3. The Public Attorneys' Office to provide legal services to Cadet Cudia in pursuing
administrative, criminal and civil suits against the officers and members of the Honor
Committee named hereunder, for violation of the Honor Code and System and the Procedure
in Formal Investigation, dishonesty, violation of the secrecy of the ballot, tampering the true
result of the voting, perjury, intentional omission in the Minutes of substantive part of the
formal trial proceedings which are prejudicial to the interest of justice and Cadet Cudia's
fundamental rights to dignity, non-discrimination and due process, which led to the
infringement of his right to education and even transgressing his right to a good life.

3.1 Cdt lCL MIKE ANTHONY MOGUL, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP

3.2 Cdt lCL RHONA K. SALVACION, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP

3.3 Cdt 2CL ARWI C. MARTINEZ

3.4 Cdt 2CL RENATO A. CARINO, JR.

3.5 Cdt 2CL NIKOANGELOC. TARAYAO

3.6 Cdt lCL JEANEL YN P. CABRIDO, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP

3.7 Cdt lCL KIM ADRIAN R. MARTAL, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP

3.8 Cdt lCL JAIRUS 0. FANTIN, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP

3.9 Cdt lCL BRYAN SONNY S. ARLEGUI, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP

3.10 Cdt lCL DALTON JOHN G. LAGURA, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP

3.11 Cdt 1 CL BIANCHIHEIMER L. EDRA, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP

3.12 Cdt 4CL JENNIFER A. CUARTERON (recorder)

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 3.13 Cdt 3CL LEONCIO NICO A. DE JESUS II (record)

4. The Office of the AFP Chief of Staff and the PMA competent authorities should investigate
and file appropriate charges against Maj. VLADIMIR P. GRACILLA, for violation of the right to
privacy of Cadet Cudia and/or failure, as intelligence officer, to ensure the protection of the
right to privacy of Cudia who was then billeted at the PMA Holding Center;

5. The Office of the AFP Chief of Staff and PMA competent authorities should investigate Maj.
DENNIS ROMMEL HINDANG for his failure and ineptness to exercise his responsibility as a
competent Tactical Officer and a good father of his cadets, in this case, to Cadet Cudia; for
failure to respect exhaustion of administrative remedies;

6. The Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philppines,
the PMA Superintendent, to immediately cause the comprehensive review of all rules of
procedures, regulations, policies, including the so-called practices in the implementation of the
Honor Code; and, thereafter, adopt new policies, rules of procedures and relevant regulations
which are human-rights based and consistent with the Constitution and other applicable laws;

7. The Congress of the Philippines to consider the enactment of a law defining and penalizing
ostracism and discrimination, which is apparently being practiced in the PMA, as a criminal
offense in this jurisdiction;

8. His Excellency The President of the Philippines to certify as priority, the passage of an anti-
ostracism and/or anti-discrimination law; and

9. Finally, for the AFP Chief of Staff and the PMA authorities to ensure respect and protection
of the rights of those who testified for the cause of justice and truth as well as human rights of
Cadet Cudia.

RESOLVED FURTHER, to monitor the actions by the competent authorities on the foregoing CHR
recommendations.

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Let copy of this resolution be served by personal service or by substituted service to the complainants (the
spouses Renato and Filipina Cudia; and Aldrin Jeff P. Cudia), and all the respondents. Also, to the PMA
Superintendent, the AFP Chief of Staff, the Secretary of National Defense, His Excellency The President of
the Philippines, The Public Attorneys' Office.

SO RESOLVED.55

On June 11, 2014, the Office of the President sustained the findings of the AFP Chief of Staff and the
CRAB. The letter, which was addressed to the Spouses Cudia and signed by Executive Secretary Paquito
N. Ochoa, Jr., stated in whole:

This refers to your letters to the President dated 12 March 2014 and 26 March 2014 appealing for a
reconsideration of the decision of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) Honor Committee on the case of
your son, Cadet 1 CL Aldrin Jeff Cudia.

After carefully studying the records of the case of Cadet Cudia, the decision of the Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Honor Code System of the AFP Cadet Corps, this Office has
found no substantial basis to disturb the findings of the AFP and the PMA Cadet Review Appeals Board
(CRAB). There is no competent evidence to support the claim that the decision of the Honor Committee
members was initially at 8 "Guilty" votes and 1 "Not Guilty" vote. The lone affidavit of an officer, based on
his purported conversation with one Honor Committee member, lacks personal knowledge on the
deliberations of the said Committee and is hearsay at best.

Similarly, the initial recommendations of the Commission on Human Rights cannot be adopted as basis
that Cadet Cudia's due process rights were violated. Apart from being explicitly preliminary in nature, such
recommendations are anchored on a finding that there was an 8-1 vote which, as discussed above, is not
supported by competent evidence.

In the evaluation of Cadet Cudia's case, this Office has been guided by the precept that military law is
regarded to be in a class of its own, "applicable only to military personnel because the military constitutes
an armed organization requiring a system of discipline separate from that of civilians" (Gonzales v. Abaya,
G.R. No. 164007, 10 August 2005 citing Calley v. Callaway, 519 F. 2d 184 [1975] and Orloff v.

332
Willoughby, 345 US 83 [1953]). Thus, this Office regarded the findings of the AFP Chief, particularly his
conclusion that there was nothing irregular in the proceedings that ensued, as carrying great weight.

Accordingly, please be informed that the President has sustained the findings of the AFP Chief and the
PMA CRAB.56

The Issues

To petitioners, the issues for resolution are:

I.

WHETHER THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY, THE HONOR COMMITTEE AND THE CADET REVIEW AND
APPEALS BOARD COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DISMISSING CADET FIRST CLASS
ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA FROM THE ACADEMY IN UTTER DISREGARD OF HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS
CONSIDERING THAT:

A. Despite repeated requests for relevant documents regarding his case, Cadet First Class Aldrin Jeff
Cudia was deprived of his right to have access to evidence which would have proven his defense,
would have totally belied the charge against him, and more importantly, would have shown the
irregularity in the Honor Committee's hearing and rendition of decision

B. Cadet First Class Aldrin Jeff Cudia was vaguely informed of the decisions arrived at by the Honor
Committee, the Cadet Review and Appeals Board and the Philippine Military Academy

C. The Honor Committee, the Cadet Review and Appeals Board and the Philippine Military Academy
have afforded Cadet First Class Aldrin Jeff Cudia nothing but a sham trial

D. The Honor Committee, the Cadet Review and Appeals Board and the Philippine Military Academy
violated their own rules and principles as embodied in the Honor Code

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 E. The Honor Committee, the Cadet Review and Appeals Board and the Philippine Military Academy,
in deciding Cadet First Class Aldrin Jeff Cudia's case, grossly and in bad faith, misapplied the Honor
Code so as to defy the 1987 Constitution, notwithstanding the unquestionable fact that the former
should yield to the latter.

II

WHETHER THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY, THE HONOR COMMITTEE AND THE CADET REVIEW AND
APPEALS BOARD COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT CADET FIRST CLASS
ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA LIED, THEREBY VIOLATING THE HONOR CODE

III

WHETHER THE RESULT OF THE FACT-FINDING INVESTIGATION INDEPENDENTLY CONDUCTED BY THE

COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS IS OF SUCH GREAT WEIGHT AND PERSUASIVE NATURE THAT THIS
HONORABLE COURT MAY HONOR, UPHOLD AND RESPECT57

On the other hand, in support of their prayer to dismiss the petition, respondents presented the issues
below:

PROCEDURAL GROUNDS

I.

THE MANDAMUS PETITION PRAYING THAT CADET CUDIA BE INCLUDED IN THE LIST OF GRADUATES OF
SIKLAB DIWA CLASS OF 2014 AND BE ALLOWED TO TAKE PART IN THE COMMENCEMENT EXERCISES HAS
ALREADY BEEN RENDERED MOOT.

II.

THE ISSUES RAISED IN THE PETITIONS ARE ACTUALLY FACTUAL WHICH ARE BEYOND THE SCOPE OF A
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS.

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 III.

MANDAMUS DOES NOT LIE TO COMPEL RESPONDENTS TO GRANT THE RELIEFS PRAYED FOR. IV. IT IS
PREMATURE TO INVOKE JUDICIAL REDRESS PENDING THE DECISION OF THE PRESIDENT ON CADET
CUDIA'S APPEAL.

V.

WITH UTMOST DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT MUST EXERCISE CAREFUL RESTRAINT AND
REFRAIN FROM UNDULY OR PREMATURELY INTERFERING WITH LEGITIMATE MILITARY MATTERS.

SUBSTANTIVE GROUNDS

VI.

CADET CUDIA HAS NECESSARILY AND VOLUNTARILY RELINQUISHED CERTAIN CIVIL LIBERTIES BY
VIRTUE OF HIS ENTRY INTO THE PMA.

VII.

THE PMA ENJOYS THE ACADEMIC FREEDOM WHICH AUTHORIZES IT TO IMPOSE DISCIPLINARY
MEASURES AND PUNISHMENT AS IT DEEMS FIT AND CONSISTENT WITH THE PECULIAR NEEDS OF THE
ACADEMY.

VIII.

CADET CUDIA WAS PROPERLY AFFORDED PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS.

The PMA has regulatory authority to administratively terminate cadets despite the absence of statutory
authority.

Violation of the Honor Code warrants the administrative dismissal of a guilty cadet.

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Cadet Cudia violated the first tenet of the Honor Code by providing untruthful statements in the
explanation for his tardiness.

The higher authorities of the PMA did not blindly adopt the findings of the Honor Committee.

The procedural safeguards in a student disciplinary case were properly accorded to Cadet Cudia.

The subtle evolution in the voting process of the Honor Committee, by incorporating executive
session/chambering, was adopted to further strengthen the voting procedure of the Honor Committee.
Cadet Lagura voluntarily changed his vote without any pressure from the other voting members of the
Honor Committee.

Ostracism is not a sanctioned practice of the PMA.

The findings of the Commission on Human Rights are not binding on the Honorable Court, and are, at
best, recommendatory.

Cadet Cudia was not effectively deprived of his future when he was dismissed from the PMA.58

The Ruling of the Court

PROCEDURAL GROUNDS

Propriety of a petition for mandamus

Respondents argue that the mandamus aspect of the petition praying that Cadet 1 CL Cudia be included in
the list of graduating cadets and for him to take part in the commencement exercises was already
rendered moot and academic when the graduation ceremonies of the PMA Siklab Diwa Class took place on
March 16, 2014. Also, a petition for mandamus is improper since it does not lie to compel the performance
of a discretionary duty. Invoking Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of
Theology,59 respondents assert that a mandamus petition could not be availed of to compel an academic
institution to allow a student to continue studying therein because it is merely a privilege and not a right.

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In this case, there is a clear failure on petitioners' part to establish that the PMA has the, ministerial duty
to include Cadet 1 CL Cudia in the list, much less award him with academic honors and commission him to
the Philippine Navy. Similar to the case of University of San Agustin, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,60 it is
submitted that the PMA may rightfully exercise its discretionary power on who may be admitted to study
pursuant to its academic freedom.

In response, petitioners contend that while the plea to allow Cadet 1 CL Cudia to participate in the PMA
2014 commencement exercises could no longer be had, the Court may still grant the other reliefs prayed
for. They add that Garcia enunciated that a respondent can be ordered to act in a particular manner when
there is a violation of a constitutional right, and that the certiorari aspect of the petition must still be
considered because it is within the province of the Court to determine whether a branch of the
government or any of its officials has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess thereof.

We agree that a petition for mandamus is improper.

Under Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a petition for mandamus may be filed when any
tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. It may also be filed when any
tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of
a right or office to which such other is entitled.

For mandamus to lie, the act sought to be enjoined must be a ministerial act or duty. An act is ministerial
if the act should be performed "[under] a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the
mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of [the tribunal or corporation's] own
judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done." The tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or
person must have no choice but to perform the act specifically enjoined by law. This is opposed to a
discretionary act whereby the officer has the choice to decide how or when to perform the duty.61

In this case, petitioners pray for, among others: Also, after due notice and hearing, it is prayed of the
Court to issue a Writ of Mandamus to:

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 1. direct the PMA to include Cadet Cudia in the list of graduates of Siklab Diwa Class of 2014 of the
PMA, including inclusion in the yearbook;

2. direct the PMA to allow Cadet Cudia to take part in the commencement exercises if he completed
all the requirements for his baccalaureate degree;

3. direct the PMA to award unto Cadet Cudia the academic honors he deserves, and the commission
as a new Philippine Navy ensign;

4. direct the Honor Committee to submit to the CRAB of the PMA all its records of the proceedings
taken against Cadet Cudia, including the video footage and audio recordings of the deliberations and
voting, for the purpose of allowing the CRAB to conduct intelligent review of the case of Cadet
Cudia;

5. direct the PMA's CRAB to conduct a review de nova of all the records without requiring Cadet
Cudia to submit new evidence if it was physically impossible to do so;

6. direct the PMA's CRAB to take into account the certification signed by Dr. Costales, the new
evidence consisting of the affidavit of a military officer declaring under oath that the cadet who
voted "not guilty" revealed to this officer that this cadet was coerced into changing his vote, and
other new evidence if there is any;

7. direct the PMA's CRAB to give Cadet Cudia the right to a counsel who is allowed to participate
actively in the proceedings as well as in the cross-examinations during the exercise of the right to
confront witnesses against him; and

8. direct the Honor Committee in case of remand of the case by the CRAB to allow Cadet Cudia a
representation of a counsel.62

Similarly, petitioner-intervenor seeks for the following reliefs:

A. xxx

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 B. a Writ of Mandamus be issued commanding:

a.) The PMA, Honor Committee, and CRAB to respect and uphold the 8 Guilty -1 Not Guilty
vote;

b.) The PMA, Honor Committee, and CRAB to officially pronounce Cadet Cudia as Not Guilty of
the charge filed against him before the Honor Committee;

c.) The PMA to restore Cadet Cudia's rights and entitlements as a full-fledged graduating
cadet, including his diploma and awards.63

Anent the plea to direct the PMA to include Cadet 1 CL Cudia in the list of graduates of Siklab Diwa Class
of 2014 and to allow him to take part in the commencement exercises, the same was rendered moot and
academic when the graduation ceremonies pushed through on March 16, 2014 without including Cadet 1
CL Cudia in the roll of graduates.

With respect to the prayer directing the PMA to restore Cadet 1 CL Cudia's rights and entitlements as a
full-fledged graduating cadet, including his diploma, awards, and commission as a new Philippine Navy
ensign, the same cannot be granted in a petition for mandamus on the basis of academic freedom, which
We shall discuss in more detail below. Suffice it to say at this point that these matters are within the
ambit of or encompassed by the right of academic freedom; therefore, beyond the province of the Court
to decide.64 The powers to confer degrees at the PMA, grant awards, and commission officers in the
military service are discretionary acts on the part of the President as the AFP Commander-in-Chief.
Borrowing the words of Garcia:

There are standards that must be met. There are policies to be pursued. Discretion appears to be of the
essence. In terms of Hohfeld's terminology, what a student in the position of petitioner possesses is a
privilege rather than a right. She [in this case, Cadet 1 CL Cudia] cannot therefore satisfy the prime and
indispensable requisite of a mandamus proceeding.65

Certainly, mandamus is never issued in doubtful cases. It cannot be availed against an official or
government agency whose duty requires the exercise of discretion or judgment.66 For a writ to issue,

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petitioners should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded, and there should be an imperative duty
on the part of respondents to perform the act sought to be mandated.67

The same reasons can be said as regards the other reliefs being sought by petitioners, which pertain to
the HC and the CRAB proceedings. In the absence of a clear and unmistakable provision of a law, a
mandamus petition does not lie to require anyone to a specific course of conduct or to control or review
the exercise of discretion; it will not issue to compel an official to do anything which is not his duty to do
or which is his duty not to do or give to the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law. 68

The foregoing notwithstanding, the resolution of the case must proceed since, as argued by petitioners,
the Court is empowered to settle via petition for certiorari whether there is grave abuse of discretion on
the part of respondents in dismissing Cadet 1 CL Cudia from the PMA.

Factual nature of the issues

According to respondents, the petition raises issues that actually require the Court to make findings of fact
because it sets forth several factual disputes which include, among others: the tardiness of Cadet 1 CL
Cudia in , his ENG412 class and his explanation thereto, the circumstances that transpired in the
investigation of his Honor Code violation, the proceedings before the HC, and the allegation that Cadet 1
CL Lagura was forced to change his vote during the executive session/"chambering."

In opposition, petitioners claim that the instant controversy presents legal issues. Rather than determining
which between the two conflicting versions of the parties is true, the case allegedly centers on the
application, appreciation, and interpretation of a person's rights to due process, to education, and to
property; the interpretation of the PMA Honor Code and Honor System; and the conclusion on whether
Cadet 1 CL Cudia's explanation constitutes lying. Even if the instant case involves questions of fact,
petitioners still hold that the Court is empowered to settle mixed questions of fact and law. Petitioners are
correct.

There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of
evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted and the doubt concerns the correct
application of law and jurisprudence on the matter. On the other hand, there is a question of fact when

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the doubt or controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. When there is no dispute as
to fact, the question of whether or not the conclusion drawn therefrom is correct is a question of
law.69 The petition does not exclusively present factual matters for the Court to decide. As pointed out, the
all-encompassing issue of more importance is the determination of whether a PMA cadet has rights to due
process, to education, and to property in the context of the Honor Code and the Honor System, and, if in
the affirmative, the extent or limit thereof. Notably, even respondents themselves raise substantive
grounds that We have to resolve. In support of their contention that the Court must exercise careful
restraint and should refrain from unduly or prematurely interfering in legitimate military matters, they
argue that Cadet 1 CL Cudia has necessarily and voluntarily relinquished certain civil liberties by virtue of
his entry into the PMA, and that the Academy enjoys academic freedom authorizing the imposition of
disciplinary measures and punishment as it deems fit and consistent with the peculiar needs of the PMA.
These issues, aside from being purely legal being purely legal questions, are of first impression; hence,
the Court must not hesitate to make a categorical ruling.

Exhaustion of administrative remedies

Respondents assert that the Court must decline jurisdiction over the petition pending President Aquino’s
resolution of Cadet 1 CL Cudia' appeal. They say that there is an obvious non-exhaustion of the full
administrative process. While Cadet 1 CL Cudia underwent the review procedures of his guilty verdict at
the Academy level - the determination by the SJA of whether the HC acted according to the established
procedures of the Honor System, the assessment by the Commandant of Cadets of the procedural and
legal correctness of the guilty verdict, the evaluation of the PMA Superintendent to warrant the
administrative separation of the guilty cadet, and the appellate review proceedings before the CRAB - he
still appealed to the President, who has the utmost latitude in making decisions affecting the military. It is
contended that the President's power over the persons and actions of the members of the armed forces is
recognized in B/Gen. (Ret.) Gudani v. Lt./Gen. Senga70 and in Section 3171 of Commonwealth Act (CA.)
No. 1 (also known as "The National Defense Act''). As such, the President could still overturn the decision
of the PMA. In respondents' view, the filing of this petition while the case is pending resolution of the
President is an irresponsible defiance, if not a personal affront. For them, comity dictates that courts of
justice should shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed.

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From the unfolding of events, petitioners, however, consider that President Aquino effectively denied the
appeal of Cadet 1 CL Cudia. They claim that his family exerted insurmountable efforts to seek
reconsideration of the HC recommendation from the APP officials and the President, but was in vain. The
circumstances prior to, during, and after the PMA 2014 graduation rites, which was attended by President
Aquino after he talked to Cadet lCL Cudia's family the night before, foreclose the possibility that the
challenged findings would still be overturned. In any case, petitioners insist that the· rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies is not absolute based on the Corsiga v. Defensor72 and Verceles v. BLR-
DOLE73 rulings.

We rule for petitioners.

In general, no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed
administrative remedy has been exhausted. The rationale behind the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies is that "courts, for reasons of law, comity, and convenience, should not entertain
suits unless the available administrative remedies have first been resorted to and the proper authorities,
who are competent to act upon the matter complained of, have been given the appropriate opportunity to
act and correct their alleged errors, if any, committed in the administrative forum."74 In the U.S. case of
Ringgold v. United States,75 which was cited by respondents, it was specifically held that in a typical case
involving a decision by military authorities, the plaintiff must exhaust his remedies within the military
before appealing to the court, the doctrine being designed both to preserve the balance between military
and civilian authorities and to conserve judicial resources.

Nonetheless, there are exceptions to the rule. In this jurisdiction, a party may directly resort to judicial
remedies if any of the following is present:

1. when there is a violation of due process;

2. when the issue involved is purely a legal question;

3. when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;

4. when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned;

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 5. when there is irreparable injury;

6. when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bear
the implied and assumed approval of the latter;

7. when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable;

8. when it would amount to a nullification of a claim;

9. when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings;

10. when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy; and

11. when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.76

Petitioners essentially raise the lack of due process in the dismissal of Cadet 1 CL Cudia from the PMA.
Thus, it may be a ground to give due course to the petition despite the non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies. Yet more significant is the fact that during the pendency of this case, particularly on June 11,
2014, the Office of the President finally issued its ruling, which sustained the findings of the AFP Chief and
the CRAB. Hence, the occurrence of this supervening event bars any objection to the petition based on
failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

Court's interference within military affairs

Respondents cite the U.S. cases of Bois v. Marsh77 and Schlesinger v. Councilman78 to support their
contention that judicial intervention would pose substantial threat to military discipline and that there
should be a deferential review of military statutes and regulations since political branches have particular
expertise and competence in assessing military needs. Likewise, in Orloff v. Willoughby79 and Parker v.
Levy,80 it was allegedly opined by the U.S. Supreme Court that the military constitutes a specialized
community governed by a separate discipline from that of the civilian. According to respondents, the U.S.
courts' respect to the military recognizes that constitutional rights may apply differently in the military

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context than in civilian society as a whole. Such military deference is exercised either by refusing to apply
due process and equal protection doctrines in military cases or applying them but with leniency.

In respondents' view, although Philippine courts have the power of judicial review in cases attended with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, policy considerations call for the
widest latitude of deference to military affairs. Such respect is exercised by the court where the issues to
be resolved entail a substantial consideration of legitimate governmental interest. They suppose that
allowing Cadet 1 CL Cudia's case to prosper will set an institutionally dangerous precedent, opening a
Pandora's box of other challenges against the specialized system of discipline of the PMA. They state that
with the PMA's mandate to train cadets for permanent commission in the AFP, its disciplinary rules and
procedure necessarily must impose h different standard of conduct compared with civilian institutions.

Petitioners, on the other hand, consider that this Court is part of the State's check-and-balance
machinery, specifically mandated by Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution to ensure that no branch of the
government or any of its officials acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of, discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. They assert that judicial non-interference in military affairs is
not deemed as absolute even in the U.S. They cite Schlesinger and Parker, which were invoked by
respondents, as well as Burns v. Wilson81 and Harmon v. Brucker,82 wherein the U.S. Supreme Court
reviewed the proceedings of military tribunals on account of issues posed concerning due process and
violations of constitutional rights. Also, in Magno v. De Villa83 decided by this Court, petitioners note that
We, in fact, exercised the judicial power to determine whether the APP and the members of the court
martial acted with grave abuse o.f discretion in their military investigation.

Petitioners' contentions are tenable.

Admittedly, the Constitution entrusts the political branches of the government, not the courts, with
superintendence and control over the military because the courts generally lack the competence and
expertise necessary to evaluate military decisions and they are ill-equipped to determine the impact upon
discipline that any particular intrusion upon military authority might have.84 Nevertheless, for the sake of
brevity, We rule that the facts as well as the legal issues in the U.S. cases cited by respondents are not on
all fours with the case of Cadet 1 CL Cudia. Instead, what applies is the 1975 U.S. case of Andrews v.
Knowlton,85 which similarly involved cadets who were separated from the United States Military Academy

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due to Honor Code violations. Following Wasson v. Trowbridge86 and Hagopian v. Knowlton,87 Andrews re-
affirmed the power of the district courts to review procedures used at the service academies in the
separation or dismissal of cadets and midshipmen. While it recognized the "constitutional permissibility of
the military to set and enforce uncommonly high standards of conduct and ethics," it said that the courts
"have expanded at an accelerated pace the scope of judicial access for review of military determinations."
Later, in Kolesa v. Lehman,88 it was opined that it has been well settled that federal courts have
jurisdiction "where there is a substantial claim that prescribed military procedures violates one's
constitutional rights." By 1983, the U.S. Congress eventually made major revisions to the Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ) by expressly providing, among others; for a direct review by the U.S. Supreme
Court of decisions by the military's highest appellate authority.89

Even without referring to U.S. cases, the position of petitioners is still formidable. In this jurisdiction,
Section 1 Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution expanded the scope of judicial power by mandating that the
duty of the courts of justice includes not only "to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable" but also "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government" even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.90 Grave
abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, which must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.91

The proceedings of the Cadet Honor Committee can, for purposes of the Due Process Clause, be
considered a governmental activity. As ruled in Andrews:

The relationship between the Cadet Honor Committee and the separation process at the Academy has
been sufficiently formalized, and is sufficiently interdependent, so as to bring that committee's activities
within the definition of governmental activity for the purposes of our review. While the Academy has long
had the informal practice of referring all alleged violations to the Cadet Honor Committee, the relationship
between that committee and the separation process has to a degree been formalized. x x x

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Regardless of whether the relationship be deemed formal or informal, the Honor Committee under its own
procedures provides that a single "not guilty" vote by a member ends the matter, while a "guilty" finding
confronts a cadet with the hard choice of either resigning or electing to go before a Board of Officers. An
adverse finding there results not only in formal separation from the Academy but also in a damaging
record that will follow the cadet through life. Accordingly, we conclude that the Cadet Honor Committee,
acting not unlike a grand jury, is clearly part of the process whereby a cadet can ultimately be adjudged
to have violated the Cadet Honor Code and be separated from the Academy. Therefore, the effect of the
committee's procedures and determinations on the separation process is sufficiently intertwined with the
formal governmental activity which may follow as to bring it properly under judicial review 92

No one is above the law, including the military. In fact, the present Constitution declares it as a matter of
principle that civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military.93 Consistent with the republican
system of checks and balances, the Court has been entrusted, expressly or by necessary implication, with
both the duty and the obligation of determining, in appropriate cases, the validity of any assailed
legislative or executive action.94

SUBSTANTIVE GROUNDS

Cadet's relinquishment of certain civil liberties

Respondents assert that the standard of rights applicable to a cadet is not the same as that of a civilian
because the former' s rights have already been recalibrated to best serve the military purpose and
necessity. They claim that both Gudani and Lt. Col. Kapunan, Jr. v. Gen. De Villa95 recognized that, to a
certain degree, individual rights of persons in the military service may be curtailed by the rules of military
discipline in order to ensure its effectiveness in fulfilling the duties required to be discharged under the
law. Respondents remind that, as a military student aspiring to a commissioned post in the military
service, Cadet 1 CL Cudia voluntarily gave up certain civil and political rights which the rest of the civilian
population enjoys. The deliberate surrender of certain freedoms on his part is embodied in the cadets'
Honor Code Handbook. It is noted that at the beginning of their academic life in the PMA, Cadet 1 CL
Cudia, along with the rest of Cadet Corps, took an oath and undertaking to stand by the Honor Code and
the Honor System.

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To say that a PMA cadet surrenders his fundamental human rights, including the right to due process, is,
for petitioners, contrary to the provisions of Section 3, Article II of the 1987 Constitution,96 Executive
Order (E.O.) No. 17897 (as amended by E.O. No. 100598), AFP Code of Ethics, Oath of Cadet Corps to the
Honor Code and the Honor System, military professionalism, and, in general, military culture. They
maintain that the HC, the CRAB, and the PMA, grossly and in bad faith misapplied the Honor Code and the
Honor System in deciding Cadet lCL Cudia's case considering that these should not be implemented at the
expense of human rights, due process, and fair play. Further, under the doctrine of constitutional
supremacy, they can never overpower or defy the 1987 Constitution since the former should yield to the
latter. Petitioners stress that the statement that "a cadet can be compelled to surrender some civil rights
and liberties in order for the Code and System to be implemented" simply pertains to what cadets have to
sacrifice in order to prove that they are men or women of integrity and honor, such as the right to
entertain vices and the right to freely choose what they want to say or do. In the context of disciplinary
investigation, it does not contemplate a surrender of the right to due process but, at most, refers to the
cadets' rights to privacy and to remain silent.

We concur with the stand of petitioners.

Of course, a student at a military academy must be prepared to subordinate his private interests for the
proper functioning of the educational institution he attends to, one that is with a greater degree than a
student at a civilian public school.99 In fact, the Honor Code and Honor System Handbook of the PMA
expresses that, "[as] a training environment, the Cadet Corps is a society which has its own norms. Each
member binds himself to what is good for him, his subordinates, and his peers. To be part of the Cadet
Corps requires the surrender of some basic rights and liberties for the good of the group."100

It is clear, however, from the teachings of Wasson and Hagopian, which were adopted by Andrews, that a
cadet facing dismissal from the military academy for misconduct has constitutionally protected private
interests (life, liberty, or property); hence, disciplinary proceedings conducted within the bounds of
procedural due process is a must.101 For that reason, the PMA is not immune from the strictures of due
process. Where a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the
government is doing to him, the minimal requirements of the due process clause must be
satisfied.102 Likewise, the cadet faces far more severe sanctions of being expelled from a course of college
instruction which he or she has pursued with a view to becoming a career officer and of probably

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being forever denied that career.103

The cases of Gudani and Kapunan, Jr. are inapplicable as they do not specifically pertain to dismissal
proceedings of a cadet in a military academy due to honor violation. In Gudani, the Court denied the
petition that sought to annul the directive from then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, which' enjoined
petitioners from testifying before the Congress without her consent. We ruled that petitioners may be
subjected to military discipline for their defiance of a direct order of the AFP Chief of Staff. On the other
hand, in Kapunan, Jr., this Court upheld the restriction imposed on petitioner since the conditions for his
"house arrest" (particularly, that he may not issue any press statements or give any press conference
during the period of his detention) are justified by the requirements of military discipline. In these two
cases, the constitutional rights to information, transparency in matters of public concern, and to free
speech - not to due process clause - were restricted to better serve the greater military purpose.
Academic freedom of the PMA

Petitioners posit that there is no law providing that a guilty finding by the HC may be used by the PMA to
dismiss or recommend the dismissal of a cadet from the PMA. They argue that Honor Code violation is not
among those listed as justifications for the attrition of cadets considering that the Honor Code and the
Honor System do not state that a guilty cadet is automatically terminated or dismissed from service. To
them, the Honor Code and Honor System are "gentleman's agreement" that cannot take precedence over
public interest - in the defense of the nation and in view of the taxpayer's money spent for each cadet.
Petitioners contend that, based on the Civil Code, all written or verbal agreements are null and void if they
violate the law, good morals, good customs, public policy, and public safety.

In opposition, respondents claim that the PMA may impose disciplinary measures and punishment as it
deems fit and consistent with the peculiar needs of the Academy. Even without express provision of a law,
the PMA has regulatory authority to administratively dismiss erring cadets since it is deemed reasonably
written into C.A. No. 1. Moreover, although said law grants to the President the authority of terminating a
cadet's appointment, such power may be delegated to the PMA Superintendent, who may exercise direct
supervision and control over the cadets.

Respondents likewise contend that, as an academic institution, the PMA has the inherent right to
promulgate reasonable norms, rules and regulations that it may deem necessary for the maintenance of

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school discipline, which is specifically mandated by Section 3 (2),104 Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution.
As the premiere military educational institution of the AFP in accordance with Section 30,105 Article III of
C.A. No. 1 and Sections 58 and 59,106 Chapter 9, Subtitle II, Title VIII, Book IV of E.O. No. 292
("Administrative Code of 1987"), the PMA is an institution that enjoys academic freedom guaranteed by
Section 5 (2),107 Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution. In Miriam College Foundation, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals,108 it was held that concomitant with such freedom is the right and duty to instill and impose
discipline upon its students. Also, consistent with lsabelo, Jr. v. Perpetual Help College of Rizal, Inc. 109 and
Ateneo de Manila University v. Capulong,110 the PMA has the freedom on who to admit (and, conversely,
to expel) given the high degree of discipline and honor expected from its students who are to form part of
the AFP.

For respondents, Cadet 1 CL Cudia cannot, therefore, belatedly assail the Honor Code as basis of the HC' s
decision to recommend his dismissal from the PMA. When he enlisted for enrolment and studied in the
PMA for four years, he knew or should have been fully aware of the standards of discipline imposed on all
cadets and the corresponding penalty for failing to abide by these standards.

In their Reply, petitioners counter that, as shown in lsabelo, Jr. and Ateneo, academic freedom is not
absolute and cannot be exercised in blatant disregard of the right to due process and the 1987
Constitution. Although schools have the prerogative to choose what to teach, how to teach, and who to
teach, the same does not go so far as to deprive a student of the right to graduate when there is clear
evidence that he is entitled to the same since, in such a case, the right to graduate becomes a vested
right which takes precedence over the limited and restricted right of the educational institution.

While both parties have valid points to consider, the arguments of respondents are more in line with the
facts of this case. We have ruled that the school-student relationship is contractual in nature. Once
admitted, a student's enrolment is not only semestral in duration but for the entire period he or she is
expected to complete it.111 An institution of learning has an obligation to afford its students a fair
opportunity to complete the course they seek to pursue.112 Such contract is imbued with public interest
because of the high priority given by the Constitution to education and the grant to the State of
supervisory and regulatory powers over a educational institutions.113

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The school-student relationship has also been held as reciprocal. "[It] has consequences appurtenant to
and inherent in all contracts of such kind -it gives rise to bilateral or reciprocal rights and obligations. The
school undertakes to provide students with education sufficient to enable them to pursue higher education
or a profession. On the other hand, the students agree to abide by the academic requirements of the
school and to observe its rules and regulations."114

Academic freedom or, to be precise, the institutional autonomy of universities and institutions of higher
learning,115 has been enshrined in our Constitutions of 1935, 1973, and 1987.116 In Garcia, this Court
espoused the concurring opinion of U.S. Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter in Sweezy v. New
Hampshire,117 which enumerated "the four essential freedoms" of a university: To determine for itself on
academic grounds (1) who may teach, (2) what may be taught, (3) how it shall be taught, and (4) who
may be admitted to study.118 An educational institution has the power to adopt and enforce such rules as
may be deemed expedient for its government, this being incident to the very object of incorporation, and
indispensable to the successful management of the college.119 It can decide for itself its aims and
objectives and how best to attain them, free from outside coercion or interference except when there is an
overriding public welfare which would call for some restraint.120 Indeed, "academic freedom has never
been meant to be an unabridged license. It is a privilege that assumes a correlative duty to exercise it
responsibly. An equally telling precept is a long recognized mandate, so well expressed in Article 19 of the
Civil Code, that every 'person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith."'121

The schools' power to instill discipline in their students is subsumed in their academic freedom and that
"the establishment of rules governing university-student relations, particularly those pertaining to student
discipline, may be regarded as vital, not merely to the smooth and efficient operation of the institution,
but to its very survival."122 As a Bohemian proverb puts it: "A school without discipline is like a mill
without water." Insofar as the water turns the mill, so does the school's disciplinary power assure its right
to survive and continue operating.123 In this regard, the Court has always recognized the right of schools
to impose disciplinary sanctions, which includes the power to dismiss or expel, on students who violate
disciplinary rules.124 In Miriam College Foundation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,125 this Court elucidated:

The right of the school to discipline its students is at once apparent in the third freedom, i.e., "how it shall
be taught." A school certainly cannot function in an atmosphere of anarchy.

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Thus, there can be no doubt that the establishment of an educational institution requires rules and
regulations necessary for the maintenance of an orderly educational program and the creation of an
educational environment conducive to learning. Such rules and regulations are equally necessary for the
protection of the students, faculty, and property.

Moreover, the school has an interest in teaching the student discipline, a necessary, if not indispensable,
value in any field of learning. By instilling discipline, the school teaches discipline. Accordingly, the right to
discipline the student likewise finds basis in the freedom "what to teach." Incidentally, the school not only
has the right but the duty to develop discipline in its students. The Constitution no less imposes such duty.

[All educational institutions] shall inculcate patriotism and nationalism, foster love of humanity, respect for
human rights, appreciation of the role of national heroes in the historical development of the country,
teach the rights and duties of citizenship, strengthen ethical and spiritual values, develop moral character
and personal discipline, encourage critical and creative thinking, broaden scientific and technological
knowledge, and promote vocational efficiency.

In Angeles vs. Sison, we also said that discipline was a means for the school to carry out its responsibility
to help its students "grow and develop into mature, responsible, effective and worthy citizens of the
community."

Finally, nowhere in the above formulation is the right to discipline more evident than in "who may be
admitted to study." If a school has the freedom to determine whom to admit, logic dictates that it also has
the right to determine whom to exclude or expel, as well as upon whom to impose lesser sanctions such
as suspension and the withholding of graduation privileges.126

The power of the school to impose disciplinary measures extends even after graduation for any act done
by the student prior thereto. In University of the Phils. Board of Regents v. Court of Appeals,127 We upheld
the university's withdrawal of a doctorate degree already conferred on a student who was found to have
committed intellectual dishonesty in her dissertation. Thus:

Art. XIV, §5 (2) of the Constitution provides that "[a]cademic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions
of higher learning." This is nothing new. The 1935 Constitution and the 1973 Constitution likewise

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provided for the academic freedom or, more precisely, for the institutional autonomy of universities and
institutions of higher learning. As pointed out by this Court in Garcia v. Faculty Admission Committee,
Loyola School of Theology, it is a freedom granted to "institutions of higher learning" which is thus given
"a wide sphere of authority certainly extending to the choice of students." If such institution of higher
learning can decide who can and who cannot study in it, it certainly can also determine on whom it can
confer the honor and distinction of being its graduates.

Where it is shown that the conferment of an honor or distinction was obtained through fraud, a university
has the right to revoke or withdraw the honor or distinction it has thus conferred. This freedom of a
university does not terminate upon the "graduation" of a student, .as the Court of Appeals held. For it is
precisely the "graduation" of such a student that is in question. It is noteworthy that the investigation of
private respondent's case began before her graduation. If she was able to join the graduation ceremonies
on April 24, 1993, it was because of too many investigations conducted before the Board of Regents finally
decided she should not have been allowed to graduate.

Wide indeed is the sphere of autonomy granted to institutions of higher learning, for the constitutional
grant of academic freedom, to quote again from Garcia v. Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of
Theology, "is not to be construed in a niggardly manner or in a grudging fashion."

Under the U.P. Charter, the Board of Regents is the highest governing body of the University of the
Philippines. It has the power to confer degrees upon the recommendation of the University Council. It
follows that if the conferment of a degree is founded on error or fraud, the Board of Regents is also
empowered, subject to the observance of due process, to withdraw what it has granted without violating a
student's rights. An institution of higher learning cannot be powerless if it discovers that an academic
degree it has conferred is not rightfully deserved. Nothing can be more objectionable than bestowing a
university's highest academic degree upon an individual who has obtained the same through fraud or
deceit. The pursuit of academic excellence is the university's concern. It should be empowered, as an act
of self-defense, to take measures to protect itself from serious threats to its integrity.

While it is true that the students are entitled to the right to pursue their education, the USC as an
educational institution is also entitled to pursue its academic freedom and in the process has the
concomitant right to see to it that this freedom is not jeopardized.128

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It must be borne in mind that schools are established, not merely to develop the intellect and skills of the
studentry, but to inculcate lofty values, ideals and attitudes; nay, the development, or flowering if you
will, of the total man.129 Essentially, education must ultimately be religious, i.e., one which inculcates duty
and reverence.130 Under the rubric of "right to education," students have a concomitant duty to learn
under the rules laid down by the school.131 Every citizen has a right to select a profession or, course of
study, subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements.132 The PMA is not
different. As the primary training and educational institution of the AFP, it certainly has the right to invoke
academic freedom in the enforcement of its internal rules and regulations, which are the Honor Code and
the Honor System in particular.

The Honor Code is a set of basic and fundamental ethical and moral principle. It is the minimum standard
for cadet behavior and serves as the guiding spirit behind each cadet's action. It is the cadet's
responsibility to maintain the highest standard of honor. Throughout a cadet's stay in the PMA, he or she
is absolutely bound thereto. It binds as well the members of the Cadet Corps from its alumni or the
member of the so-called "Long Gray Line."

Likewise, the Honor Code constitutes the foundation for the cadets' character development. It defines the
desirable values they must possess to remain part of the Corps; it develops the atmosphere of trust so
essential in a military organization; and it makes them professional military soldiers.133 As it is for
character building, it should not only be kept within the society of cadets. It is best adopted by the Cadet
Corps with the end view of applying it outside as an officer of the AFP and as a product of the PMA.134

The Honor Code and System could be justified as the primary means of achieving the cadets' character
development and as ways by which the Academy has chosen to identify those who are deficient in
conduct.135 Upon the Code rests the ethical standards of the Cadet Corps and it is also an institutional
goal, ensuring that graduates have strong character, unimpeachable integrity, and moral standards of the
highest order.136 To emphasize, the Academy's disciplinary system as a whole is characterized as
"correctional and educational in nature rather than being legalistic and punitive." Its purpose is to teach
the cadets "to be prepared to accept full responsibility for all that they do or fail to do and to place loyalty
to the service above self-interest or loyalty to friends or associates. "137 Procedural safeguards in a
student disciplinary case

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Respondents stress that Guzman v. National University138 is more appropriate in determining the
minimum standards for the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions. Similarly, with the
guideposts set in Andrews, they believe that Cadet 1 CL Cudia was accorded due process.

On the other hand, petitioners argue that the HC, the CRAB and the PMA fell short in observing the
important safeguards laid down in Ang Tibay v. CIR139 and Non v. Judge Dames II,140 which set the
minimum standards to satisfy the demands of procedural due process in the imposition of disciplinary
sanctions. For them, Guzman did not entirely do away with the due process requirements outlined in Ang
Tibay as the Court merely stated that the minimum requirements in the Guzman case are more apropos.

Respondents rightly argued.

Ateneo de Manila University v. Capulong141 already settled the issue as it held that although both Ang
Tibay and Guzman essentially deal with the requirements of due process, the latter case is more apropos
since it specifically deals with the minimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary
sanctions in academic institutions. That Guzman is the authority on the procedural rights of students in
disciplinary cases was reaffirmed by the Court in the fairly recent case of Go v. Colegio De San Juan De
Letran.142

In Guzman, the Court held that there are minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the demands
of procedural due process, to wit:

(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2)
they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired;
(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them; ( 4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence
in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or
official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.143

We have been consistent in reminding that due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not
entail proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of
justice;144 that the proceedings may be summary;145 that cross-examination is not an essential part of the
investigation or hearing;146 and that the required proof in a student disciplinary action, which is an

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administrative case, is neither proof beyond reasonable doubt nor preponderance of evidence but only
substantial evidence or "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion."147

What is crucial is that official action must meet minimum standards of fairness to the individual, which
generally encompass the right of adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard.148 As held in
De La Salle University, Inc. v. Court of Appeals:149

Notice and hearing is the bulwark of administrative due process, the right to which is among the primary
rights that must be respected even in administrative proceedings. The essence of due process is simply an
opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side
or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. So long as the party is
given the opportunity to advocate her cause or defend her interest in due course, it cannot be said that
there was denial of due process.

A formal trial-type hearing is not, at all times and in all instances, essential to due process - it is enough
that the parties are given a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the
controversy and to present supporting evidence on which a fair decision can be based. "To be heard" does
not only mean presentation of testimonial evidence in court - one may also be heard through pleadings
and where the opportunity to be heard through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of due process.150

The PMA Honor Code explicitly recognizes that an administrative proceeding conducted to investigate a
cadet's honor violation need not be clothed with the attributes of a judicial proceeding. It articulates that –
The Spirit of the Honor Code guides the Corps in identifying and assessing misconduct. While cadets are
interested in legal precedents in cases involving Honor violations, those who hold the Spirit of the Honor
Code dare not look into these precedents for loopholes to justify questionable acts and they are not to
interpret the system to their own advantage.

The Spirit of the Honor Code is a way for the cadets to internalize Honor in a substantive way. Technical
and procedural misgivings of the legal systems may avert the true essence of imparting the Spirit of the
Code for the reason that it can be used to make unlawful attempt to get into the truth of matters
especially when a cadet can be compelled to surrender some civil rights and liberties in order for the Code

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and System to be implemented. By virtue of being a cadet, a member of the CCAFP becomes a subject of
the Honor Code and System. Cadet's actions are bound by the existing norms that are logically applied
through the Code and System in order to realize the Academy's mission to produce leaders of character -
men of integrity and honor.151

One of the fundamental principles of the Honor System also states:

2. The Honor System correlates with legal procedures of the state's Justice System but it does not demean
its Spirit by reducing the Code to a systematic list of externally observed rules. Where misinterpretations
and loopholes arise through legalism and its technicalities, the objective of building the character of the
cadets becomes futile. While, generally, Public Law penalizes only the faulty acts, the Honor System tries
to examine both the action and the intention.152

Like in other institutions of higher learning, there is aversion towards undue judicialization of an
administrative hearing in the military academy. It has been said that the mission of the military is unique
in the sense that its primary business is to fight or be ready to fight wars should the occasion arise, and
that over-proceduralizing military determinations necessarily gives soldiers less time to accomplish this
task.153 Extensive cadet investigations and complex due process hearing could sacrifice simplicity,
practicality, and timeliness. Investigations that last for several days or weeks, sessions that become
increasingly involved with legal and procedural' points, and legal motions and evidentiary objections that
are irrelevant and inconsequential tend to disrupt, delay, and confuse the dismissal proceedings and make
them unmanageable. Excessive delays cannot be tolerated since it is unfair to the accused, to his or her
fellow cadets, to the Academy, and, generally, to the Armed Forces. A good balance should, therefore, be
struck to achieve fairness, thoroughness, and efficiency.154 Considering that the case of Cadet 1 CL Cudia
is one of first impression in the sense that this Court has not previously dealt with the particular issue of a
dismissed cadet's right to due process, it is necessary for Us to refer to U.S. jurisprudence for some
guidance. Notably, our armed forces have been patterned after the U.S. Army and the U.S. military code
produced a salutary effect in the military justice system of the Philippines.155 Hence, pertinent case laws
interpreting the U.S. military code and practices have persuasive, if not the same, effect in this
jurisdiction.

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We begin by stating that U.S. courts have uniformly viewed that "due process" is a flexible concept,
requiring consideration in each case of a variety of circumstances and calling for such procedural
protections as the particular situation demands.156 Hagopian opined:

In approaching the question of what process is due before governmental action adversely affecting private
interests may properly be taken, it must be recognized that due process is not a rigid formula or simple
rule of thumb to be applied undeviatingly to any given set of facts. On the contrary, it is a flexible concept
which depends upon the balancing of various factors, including the nature of the private right or interest
that is threatened, the extent to which the proceeding is adversarial in character, the severity and
consequences of any action that might be taken, the burden that would be imposed by requiring use of all
or part of the full panoply of trial-type procedures, and the existence of other overriding interests, such as
the necessity for prompt action in the conduct of crucial military operations. The full context must
therefore be considered in each case.157 (Emphasis supplied)

Wasson, which was cited by Hagopian, broadly outlined the minimum standards of due process required in
the dismissal of a cadet. Thus:

[W]hen the government affects the private interests of individuals, it may not proceed arbitrarily but must
observe due process of law. x x x Nevertheless, the flexibility which is inherent in the concept of due
process of law precludes the dogmatic application of specific rules developed in one context to entirely
distinct forms of government action. "For, though 'due process of law' generally implies and includes
actor, reus, judex, regular allegations, opportunity to answer, and a trial according to some settled course
of judicial proceedings, * * * yet, this is not universally true." x x x Thus, to determine in any given case
what procedures due process requires, the court must carefully determine and balance the nature of the
private interest affected and of the government interest involved, taking account of history and the
precise circumstances surrounding the case at hand.

While the government must always have a legitimate concern with the subject matter before it may validly
affect private interests, in particularly vital and sensitive areas of government concern such as national
security and military affairs, the private interest must yield to a greater degree to the governmental. x x x
Few decisions properly rest so exclusively within the discretion of the appropriate government officials
than the selection, training, discipline and dismissal of the future officers of the military and Merchant

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Marine. Instilling and maintaining discipline and morale in these young men who will be required to bear
weighty responsibility in the face of adversity -- at times extreme -- is a matter of substantial national
importance scarcely within the competence of the judiciary. And it cannot be doubted that because of
these factors historically the military has been permitted greater freedom to fashion its disciplinary
procedures than the civilian authorities.

We conclude, therefore, that due process only requires for the dismissal of a Cadet from the Merchant
Marine Academy that he be given a fair hearing at which he is apprised of the charges against him and
permitted a defense. x x x For the guidance of the parties x x x the rudiments of a fair hearing in broad
outline are plain. The Cadet must be apprised of the specific charges against him. He must be given an
adequate opportunity to present his defense both from the point of view of time and the use of witnesses
and other evidence. We do not suggest, however, that the Cadet must be given this opportunity both
when demerits are awarded and when dismissal is considered. The hearing may be procedurally informal
and need not be adversarial.158 (Emphasis supplied)

In Andrews, the U.S. Court of Appeals held that Wasson and Hagopian are equally controlling in cases
where cadets were separated from the military academy for violation of the Honor Code. Following the two
previous cases, it was ruled that in order to be proper and immune from constitutional infirmity, a cadet
who is sought to be dismissed or separated from the academy must be afforded a hearing, be apprised of
the specific charges against him, and be given an adequate opportunity to present his or her defense both
from the point of view of time and the use of witnesses and other evidence.159 Conspicuously, these vital
conditions are not too far from what We have already set in Guzman and the subsequent rulings in Alcuaz
v. Philippine School of Business Administration160 and De La Salle University, Inc. v. Court of Appeals.161

In this case, the investigation of Cadet 1 CL Cudia' s Honor Code violation followed the prescribed
procedure and existing practices in the PMA. He was notified of the Honor Report from Maj. Hindang. He
was then given the opportunity to explain the report against him. He was informed about his options and
the entire process that the case would undergo. The preliminary investigation immediately followed after
he replied and submitted a written explanation. Upon its completion, the investigating team submitted a
written report together with its recommendation to the HC Chairman. The HC thereafter reviewed the
findings and recommendations. When the honor case was submitted for formal investigation, a new team
was assigned to conduct the hearing. During the formal investigation/hearing, he was informed of the

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charge against him and given the right to enter his plea. He had the chance to explain his side, confront
the witnesses against him, and present evidence in his behalf. After a thorough discussion of the HC
voting members, he was found to have violated the ' Honor Code. Thereafter, the guilty verdict underwent
the review process at the Academy level - from the OIC of the HC, to the SJA, to the Commandant of
Cadets, and to the PMA Superintendent. A separate investigation was also conducted by the HTG. Then,
upon the directive of the AFP-GHQ to reinvestigate the case, a review was conducted by the CRAB.
Further, a Fact-Finding Board/Investigation Body composed of the CRAB members and the PMA senior
officers was constituted to conduct a deliberate investigation of the case. Finally, he had the opportunity
to appeal to the President. Sadly for him, all had issued unfavorable rulings.

It is well settled that by reason of their special knowledge and expertise gained from the handling of
specific matters falling under their respective jurisdictions, the factual findings of administrative tribunals
are ordinarily accorded respect if not finality by the Court, unless such findings are not supported by
evidence or vitiated by fraud, imposition or collusion; where the procedure which led to the findings is
irregular; when palpable errors are committed; or when a grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or
capriciousness is manifest.162 In the case of Cadet 1 CL Cudia, We find no reason to deviate from the
general rule. The grounds therefor are discussed below seriatim:

As to the right to be represented by a counsel –

For petitioners, respondents must be compelled to give Cadet 1 CL Cudia the right to be represented by a
counsel who could actively participate in the proceedings like in the cross-examination of the witnesses
against him before the CRAB or HC, if remanded. This is because while the CRAB allowed him to be
represented by a PAO lawyer, the counsel was only made an observer without any right to intervene and
demand respect of Cadet 1 CL Cudia's rights.163 According to them, he was not sufficiently given the
opportunity to seek a counsel and was not even asked if he would like to have one. He was only properly
represented when it was already nearing graduation day after his family sought the assistance of the PAO.
Petitioners assert that Guzman is specific in stating that the erring student has the right to answer the
charges against him or her with the assistance of counsel, if desired.

On the other hand, respondents cited Lumiqued v. Exevea164 and Nera v. The Auditor General165 in
asserting that the right to a counsel is not imperative in administrative investigations or non-criminal

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proceedings. Also, based on Cadet lCL Cudia's academic standing, he is said to be obviously not untutored
to fully understand his rights and express himself. Moreover, the confidentiality of the HC proceedings
worked against his right to be represented by a counsel. In any event, respondents claim that Cadet 1 CL
Cudia was not precluded from seeking a counsel's advice in preparing his defense prior to the HC hearing.

Essentially, petitioners claim .. that Cadet lCL Cudia is guaranteed the right to have his counsel not just in
assisting him in the preparation for the investigative hearing before the HC and the CRAB but in
participating fully in said hearings. The Court disagrees.

Consistent with Lumiqued and Nera, there is nothing in the 1987 Constitution stating that a party in a
non-litigation proceeding is entitled to be represented by counsel. The assistance of a lawyer, while
desirable, is not indispensable. Further, in Remolona v. Civil Service Commission,166 the Court held that "a
party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the
charges and of the respondent's capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on such body to furnish
the person being investigated with counsel." Hence, the administrative body is under no duty to provide
the person with counsel because assistance of counsel is not an absolute requirement.

More in point is the opinion in Wasson, which We adopt. Thus:

The requirement of counsel as an ingredient of fairness is a function of all of the other aspects of the
hearing. Where the proceeding is non-criminal in nature, where the hearing is investigative and not
adversarial and the government does not proceed through counsel, where the individual concerned is
mature and educated, where his knowledge of the events x x x should enable him to develop the facts
adequately through available sources, and where the other aspects of the hearing taken as a whole are
fair, due process does not require representation by counsel.167

To note, U.S. courts, in general, have declined to recognize a right to representation by counsel, as a
function of due process, in military academy disciplinary proceedings.168 This rule is principally motivated
by the policy of "treading lightly on the military domain, with scrupulous regard for the power and
authority of the military establishment to govern its own affairs within the broad confines of constitutional
due process" and the courts' views that disciplinary proceedings are not judicial in nature and should be
kept informal, and that literate and educated cadets should be able to defend themselves.169 In Hagopian,

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it was ruled that the importance of informality in the proceeding militates against a requirement that the
cadet be accorded the right to representation by counsel before the Academic Board and that unlike the
welfare recipient who lacks the training and education needed to understand his rights and express
himself, the cadet should be capable of doing so.170 In the subsequent case of Wimmer v. Lehman,171 the
issue was not access to counsel but the opportunity to have counsel, instead of oneself, examine and
cross-examine witnesses, make objections, and argue the case during the hearing. Disposing of the case,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit was not persuaded by the argument that an individual of a
midshipman's presumed intelligence, selected because he is expected to be able to care for himself and
others, often under difficult circumstances, and who has full awareness of what he is facing, with counsel's
advice, was deprived of due process by being required to present his defense in person at an investigatory
hearing.

In the case before Us, while the records are bereft of evidence that Cadet 1 CL Cudia was given the option
or was able to seek legal advice prior to and/or during the HC hearing, it is indubitable that he was
assisted by a counsel, a PAO lawyer to be exact, when the CRAB reviewed and reinvestigated the case.
The requirement of due process is already satisfied since, at the very least, the counsel aided him in the
drafting and filing of the Appeal Memorandum and even acted as an observer who had no right to actively
participate in the proceedings (such as conducting the cross-examination). Moreover, not to be missed out
are the facts that the offense committed by Cadet 1 CL Cudia is not criminal in nature; that the hearings
before the HC and the CRAB were investigative and not adversarial; and that Cadet lCL Cudia's excellent-
academic standing puts him in the best position to look after his own vested interest in the Academy.

As to the confidentiality of records of the proceedings –

Petitioners allege that when Maj. Gen. Lopez denied in his March 11, 2014 letter Cadet lCL Cudia's request
for documents, footages, and recordings relevant to the HC hearings, the vital evidence negating the
regularity of the HC trial and supporting his defense have been surely overlooked by the CRAB in its case
review. Indeed, for them, the answers on whether Cadet 1 CL Cudia was deprived of due process and
whether he lied could easily be unearthed from the video and other records of the HC investigation.
Respondents did not deny their existence but they refused to present them for the parties and the Court
to peruse. In particular, they note that the Minutes of the HC dated January 21, 2014 and the HC Formal
Investigation Report dated January 20, 2014 were considered by the CRAB but were not furnished to

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petitioners and the Court; hence, there is no way to confirm the truth of the alleged statements therein.
In their view, failure to furnish these documents could only mean that it would be adverse if produced
pursuant to Section 3 (e), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court.172

For lack of legal basis on PMA' s claim of confidentiality of records, petitioners contend that it is the
ministerial duty of the HC to submit to the CRAB, for the conduct of intelligent review of the case, all its
records of the proceedings, including video footages of the deliberations and voting. They likewise argue
that PMA' s refusal to release relevant documents to Cadet 1 CL Cudia under the guise of confidentiality
reveals another misapplication of the Honor Code, which merely provides: "A cadet who becomes part of
any investigation is subject to the existing regulations pertaining to rules of confidentiality and, therefore,
must abide to the creed of secrecy. Nothing shall be disclosed without proper guidance from those with
authority" (IV. The Honor System, Honor Committee, Cadet Observer). This provision, they say, does not
deprive Cadet 1 CL Cudia of his right to obtain copies and examine relevant documents pertaining to his
case.

Basically, petitioners want Us to assume that the documents, footages, and recordings relevant to the HC
hearings are favorable to Cadet 1 CL Cudia's cause, and, consequently, to rule that respondents' refusal to
produce and have them examined is tantamount to the denial of his right to procedural due process. They
are mistaken.

In this case, petitioners have not particularly identified any documents, witness testimony, or oral or
written presentation of facts submitted at the hearing that would support Cadet 1 CL Cudia's defense. The
Court may require that an administrative record be supplemented, but only "where there is a 'strong
showing or bad faith or improper behavior' on the part of the agency,"173 both of which are not present
here. Petitioners have not specifically indicated the nature of the concealed evidence, if any, and the
reason for withholding it. What they did was simply supposing that Cadet 1 CL Cudia's guilty verdict would
be overturned with the production and examination of such documents, footages, and recordings. As will
be further shown in the discussions below, the requested matters, even if denied, would not relieve Cadet
1 CL Cudia's predicament. If at all, such denial was a harmless procedural error since he was not seriously
prejudiced thereby.

As to the ostracism in the PMA –

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To petitioners, the CRAB considered only biased testimonies and evidence because Special Order No. 1
issued on February 21, 2014, which directed the ostracism of Cadet 1 CL Cudia, left him without any
opportunity, to secure statements of his own witnesses. He could not have access to or approach the
cadets who were present during the trial and who saw the 8-1 voting result. It is argued that the Order
directing Cadet 1 CL Cudia's ostracism is of doubtful legal validity because the Honor Code unequivocally
announced: "x x x But by wholeheartedly dismissing the cruel method of ostracizing Honor Code violators,
PMA will not have to resort to other humiliating means and shall only have the option to make known
among its alumni the names of those who have not sincerely felt remorse for violating the Honor Code."

On their part, respondents assert that neither the petition nor the petition-in-intervention attached a full
text copy of the alleged Special Order No. 1. In any case, attributing its issuance to PMA is improper and
misplaced because of petitioners' admission that ostracism has been absolutely dismissed as an Academy-
sanctioned activity consistent with the trend in International Humanitarian Law that the PMA has included
in its curriculum. Assuming that said Order was issued, respondents contend that it purely originated from
the cadets themselves, the sole purpose of which was to give a strong voice to the Cadet Corps by
declaring that they did not tolerate Cadet 1 CL Cudia's honor violation and breach of confindentiality of the
HC proceedings.

More importantly, respondents add that it is highly improbable and unlikely that Cadet 1 CL Cudia was
ostracized by his fellow cadets. They manifest that as early as January 22, 2014, he was already
transferred to the Holding Center. The practice of billeting an accused cadet at the Holding Center is
provided for in the Honor Code Handbook. Although within the PMA compound, the Holding Center is off-
limits to cadets who do not have any business to conduct therein. The cadets could not also ostracize him
during mess times since Cadet 1 CL Cudia opted to take his meals at the Holding Center. The
circumstances obtaining when Special Order No. 1 was issued clearly foreclose the possibility that he was
ostracized in common areas accessible to other cadets. He remained in the Holding Center until March 16,
2014 when he voluntarily left the PMA. Contrary to his claim, guests were also free to visit him in the
Holding Center.

However, petitioners swear that Cadet 1 CL Cudia suffered from ostracism in the PMA. The practice was
somehow recognized by respondents in their Consolidated Comment and by PMA Spokesperson Maj.
Flores in a news report. The CHR likewise confirmed the same in its Resolution dated May 22, 2014. For

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them, it does not matter where the ostracism order originated from because the PMA appeared to sanction
it even if it came from the cadets themselves. There was a tacit approval of an illegal act. If not, those
cadets responsible for ostracism would have been charged by the PMA officials. Finally, it is claimed that
Cadet 1 CL Cudia did not choose to take his meals at the Holding Center as he was not allowed to leave
the place. Petitioners opine that placing the accused cadet in the Holding Center is inconsistent with his or
her presumed innocence and certainly gives the implication of ostracism.

We agree with respondents. Neither the petition nor the petition-inintervention attached a full text copy or
even a pertinent portion of the alleged Special Order No. 1, which authorized the ostracism of Cadet 1 CL
Cudia. Being hearsay, its existence and contents are of doubtful veracity. Hence, a definite ruling on the
matter can never be granted in this case.

The Court cannot close its eyes though on what appears to be an admission of Cadet 1 CL Mogol during
the CHR hearing that, upon consultation with the entire class, the baron, and the Cadet Conduct Policy
Board, they issued an ostracism order against Cadet 1 CL Cudia.174 While not something new in a military
academy,175 ostracism's continued existence in the modem times should no longer be countenanced.
There are those who argue that the "silence" is a punishment resulting in the loss of private interests,
primarily that of reputation, and that such penalty may render illusory the possibility of vindication by the
reviewing body once found guilty by the HC.176 Furthermore, in Our mind, ostracism practically denies the
accused cadet's protected rights to present witnesses or evidence in his or her behalf and to be presumed
innocent until finally proven otherwise in a proper proceeding.

As to Cadet 1 CL Cudia's stay in the Holding Center, the Court upholds the same. The Honor Code and
Honor System Handbook provides that, in case a cadet has been found guilty by the HC of violating the
Honor Code and has opted not to resign, he or she may stay and wait for the disposition of the case. In
such event, the cadet is not on full-duty status and shall be billeted at the HTG Holding
Center.177 Similarly, in the U.S., the purpose of "Boarders Ward" is to quarter those cadets who are
undergoing separation actions. Permitted to attend classes, the cadet is sequestered , therein until final
disposition of the case. In Andrews, it was opined that the segregation of cadets in the Ward was a proper
exercise of the discretionary authority of Academy officials. It relied on the traditional doctrine that "with
respect to decisions made by Army authorities, 'orderly government requires us to tread lightly on the
military domain, with scrupulous regard for the power and authority of the military establishment to

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govern its own affairs within the broad confines of constitutional due process.'" Also, in Birdwell v.
Schlesinger,178 the "administrative segregation" was held to be a reasonable exercise of military discipline
and could not be considered an invasion of the rights to freedom of speech and freedom of association.

Late and vague decisions –

It is claimed that Cadet 1 CL Cudia was kept in the dark as to the charge against him and the decisions
arrived at by the HC, the CRAB, and the PMA. No written decision was furnished to him, and if any, the
information was unjustly belated and the justifications for the decisions were vague. He had to constantly
seek clarification and queries just to be apprised of what he was confronted with.

Petitioners relate that upon being informed of the "guilty" verdict, Cadet 1 CL Cudia immediately inquired
as to the grounds therefor, but Cadet 1 CL Mogol answered that it is confidential since he would still
appeal the same. By March 11, 2014, Maj. Gen. Lopez informed Cadet 1 CL Cudia that the CRAB already
forwarded their recommendation for his dismissal to the General Headquarters sometime in February-
March 2014. Even then, he received no decision/recommendation on his case, verbally or in writing. The
PMA commencement exercises pushed through with no written decision from the CRAB or the PMA on his
appeal. The letter from the Office of the Adjutant General of the AFP was suspiciously delayed when the
Cudia family received the same only on March 20, 2014. Moreover, it fell short in laying down with
specificity the factual and legal bases used by the CRAB and even by the Office of the Adjutant General.
There remains no proof that the CRAB and the PMA considered the evidence presented by Cadet 1 CL
Cudia, it being uncertain as to what evidence was weighed by the CRAB, whether the same is substantial,
and whether the new evidence submitted by him was ever taken into account.

In refutation, respondents allege the existence of PMA's· practice of orally declaring the HC finding, not
putting it in a written document so as to protect the integrity of the erring cadet and guard the
confidentiality of the HC proceedings pursuant to the Honor System. Further, they aver that a copy of the
report of the CRAB, dated March 10, 2014, was not furnished to Cadet 1 CL Cudia because it was his
parents who filed the appeal, hence, were the ones who were given a copy thereof.

Petitioners' contentions have no leg to stand on. While there is a constitutional mandate stating that "[no]
decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the

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law on which it is based,"179 such provision does not apply in Cadet 1 CL Cudia's case. Neither Guzman nor
Andrews require a specific form and content of a decision issued in disciplinary proceedings. The Honor
Code and Honor System Handbook also has no written rule on the matter. Even if the provision applies,
nowhere does it demand that a point-by-point consideration and resolution of the issues raised by the
parties are necessary.180 What counts is that, albeit furnished to him late, Cadet 1 CL Cudia was informed
of how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of
the reviewing body, assuring that it went through the processes of legal reasoning. He was not left in the
dark as to how it was reached and he knows exactly the reasons why he lost, and is able to pinpoint the
possible errors for review.

As to the blind adoption of the HC findings –

Petitioners assert that, conformably with Sections 30 and 31 of C.A. No. 1, only President Aquino as the
Commander-in-Chief has the power to appoint and remove a cadet for a valid/legal cause. The law gives
no authority to the HC as the sole body to determine the guilt or innocence of a cadet. It also does not
empower the PMA to adopt the guilty findings of the HC as a basis for recommending the cadet's
dismissal. In the case of Cadet 1 CL Cudia, it is claimed that the PMA blindly followed the HC's finding of
guilt in terminating his military service.

Further, it is the ministerial duty of the CRAB to conduct a review de nova of all records without requiring
Cadet 1 CL Cudia to submit new evidence if it is physically impossible for him to do so. In their minds,
respondents cannot claim that the CRAB and the PMA thoroughly reviewed the HC recommendation and
heard Cadet lCL Cudia's side. As clearly stated in the letter from the Office of the AFP Adjutant General,
"[in] its report dated March 10, 2014, PMA CRAB sustained the findings and recommendations of the
Honor Committee x x x It also resolved the appeal filed by the subject Cadet." However, the Final
Investigation Report of the CRAB was dated March 23, 2014. While such report states that a report was
submitted to the AFP General Headquarters on March 10, 2014 and that it was only on March 12, 2014
that it was designated as a Fact-Finding Board/Investigating Body, it is unusual that the CRAB would do
the same things twice. This raised a valid and well-grounded suspicion that the CRAB never undertook an
in-depth investigation/review the first time it came out with its report, and the Final Investigation Report
was drafted merely as an afterthought when the lack of written decision was pointed out by petitioners so
as to remedy the apparent lack of due process during the CRAB investigation and review.

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Despite the arguments, respondents assure that there was a proper assessment of the procedural and
legal correctness of the guilty verdict against Cadet 1 CL Cudia. They assert that the higher authorities of
the PMA did not merely rely on the findings of the HC, noting that there was also a separate investigation
conducted by the HTG from January 25 to February 7, 2014. Likewise, contrary to the contention of
petitioners that the CRAB continued with the review of the case despite the absence of necessary
documents, the CRAB conducted its own review of the case and even conducted another investigation by
constituting the Fact-Finding Board/Investigating Body. For respondents, petitioners failed to discharge
the burden of proof in showing bad faith on the part of the PMA. In the absence of evidence to the
contrary and considering further that petitioners' allegations are merely self-serving and baseless, good
faith on the part of the PMA' s higher authorities is presumed and should, therefore, prevail.

We agree with respondents.

The Honor Committee, acting on behalf of the Cadet Corps, has a limited role of investigating and
determining whether or not the alleged offender has actually violated the Honor Code.181 It is given the
responsibility of administering the Honor Code and, in case of breach, its task is entirely investigative,
examining in the first instance a suspected violation. As a means of encouraging self-discipline, without
ceding to it any authority to make final adjudications, the Academy has assigned it the function of
identifying suspected violators.182 Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the HC does not have the authority to
order the separation of a cadet from the Academy. The results of its proceedings are purely
recommendatory and have no binding effect. The HC determination is somewhat like an indictment, an
allegation, which, in Cadet 1 CL Cudia's case, the PMA-CRAB investigated de novo.183 In the U.S., it was
even opined that due process safeguards do not actually apply at the Honor Committee level because it is
only a "charging body whose decisions had no effect other than to initiate de nova proceedings before a
Board of Officers."184

Granting, for argument's sake, that the HC is covered by the due process clause and that irregularities in
its proceedings were in fact committed, still, We cannot rule for petitioners. It is not required that
procedural due process be afforded at every stage of developing disciplinary action. What is required is
that an adequate hearing be held before the final act of dismissing a cadet from the military
academy.185 In the case of Cadet 1 CL Cudia, the OIC of HC, the SJA, the Commandant of Cadets, and the
PMA Superintendent reviewed the HC findings. A separate investigation was also conducted by the HTG.

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Then, upon the directive of the AFP-GHQ to reinvestigate the case, a review was conducted by the CRAB.
Finally, a Fact-Finding Board/Investigating Body composed of the CRAB members and the PMA senior
officers was constituted to conduct a deliberate investigation of the case. The Board/Body actually held
hearings on March 12, 13, 14 and 20, 2014. Instead of commendation, petitioners find it "unusual" that
the CRAB would do the same things twice and suspect that it never undertook an in-depth
investigation/review the first time it came out with its report. Such assertion is mere conjecture that
deserves scant consideration.

As to the dismissal proceedings as sham trial –

According to petitioners, the proceedings before the HC were a sham. The people behind Cadet ICL
Cudia's charge, investigation, and conviction were actually the ones who had the intent to deceive and
who took advantage of the situation. Cadet 1 CL Raguindin, who was a senior HC member and was the
second in rank to Cadet 1 CL Cudia in the Navy cadet 1 CL, was part of the team which conducted the
preliminary investigation. Also, Cadet I CL Mogol, the HC Chairman, previously charged Cadet 1 CL Cudia
with honor violation allegedly for cheating (particularly, conniving with and tutoring his fellow cadets on a
difficult topic by giving solutions to a retake exam) but the charge was dismissed for lack of merit. Even if
he was a non-voting member, he was in a position of influence and authority. Thus, it would be a futile
exercise for Cadet 1 CL Cudia to resort to the procedure for the removal of HC members.186

Further, no sufficient prior notice of the scheduled CRAB hearing was given to Cadet I CL Cudia, his family,
or his PAO counsel. During one of her visits to him in the Holding Center, petitioner-intervenor was
advised to convince his son to resign and immediately leave the PMA. Brig. Gen. Costales, who later
became the CRAB Head, also categorically uttered to Annavee: "Your brother, he lied!" The CRAB
conferences were merely used to formalize his dismissal and the PMA never really intended to hear his
side. For petitioners, these are manifestations of PMA's clear resolve to dismiss him no matter what.

For their part, respondents contend that the CllR's allegation that Maj. Hindang acted in obvious bad faith
and that he failed to discharge his duty to be a good father of cadets when he "paved the road to [Cadet 1
CL Cudia's] sham trial by the Honor Committee" is an unfounded accusation. They note that when Maj.
Hindang was given the DR of Cadet 1 CL Cudia, he revoked the penalty awarded because of his
explanation. However, all revocations of awarded penalties are subject to the review of the STO.

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Therefore, it was at the instance of Maj. Leander and the established procedure followed at the PMA that
Maj. Hindang was prompted to investigate the circumstances surrounding Cadet 1 CL Cudia's tardiness.
Respondents add that bad faith cannot likewise be imputed against Maj. Hindang by referring to the
actions taken by Maj. Jekyll Dulawan, the CTO of Cadets 1 CL Narciso and Arcangel who also arrived late
for their next class. Unlike the other cadets, Cadet 1 CL Cudia did not admit his being late and effectively
evaded responsibility by ascribing his tardiness to Dr. Costales.

As to the CHR' s finding that Cadet 1 CL Mogol was likewise "in bad faith and determined to destroy
[Cadet 1 CL] Cudia, for reasons of his own" because the former previously reported the latter for an honor
violation in November 2013, respondents argue that the bias ascribed against him is groundless as there
is failure to note that Cadet 1 CL Mogol was a non-voting member of the HC. Further, he cannot be faulted
for reporting a possible honor violation since he is the HC Chairman and nothing less is expected of him.
Respondents emphasize that the representatives of the HC are elected from each company, while the HC
Chairman is elected by secret ballot from the incoming first class representatives. Thus, if Cadet 1 CL
Cu'dia believed that there was bias against him, he should have resorted to the procedure for the removal
of HC members provided for in the Honor Code Handbook.

Finally, respondents declare that there is no reason or ill-motive on the part of the PMA to prevent Cadet 1
CL Cudia from graduating because the Academy does not stand to gain anything from his dismissal. On
the contrary, in view of his academic standing, the separation militates against PMA' s mission to produce
outstanding, honorable, and exceptional cadets.

The Court differs with petitioners.

Partiality, like fraudulent intent, can never be presumed. Absent some showing of actual bias, petitioners'
allegations do not hold water. The mere imputation of ill-motive without proof is speculative at best.
Kolesa teaches us that to sustain the challenge, specific evidence must be presented to overcome

a presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators; and it must convince that, under
a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weaknesses, conferring investigative and
adjudicative powers on the same individual poses such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the
practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be implemented.187

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Although a CTO like Maj. Hindang must decide whether demerits are to be awarded, he is not an
adversary of the cadet but an educator who shares an identity of interest with the cadet, whom he
counsels from time to time as a future leader.188 When the occasion calls for it, cadets may be questioned
as to the accuracy or completeness of a submitted work. A particular point or issue may be clarified. In
this case, the question asked of Cadet 1 CL Cudia concerning his being late in class is proper, since there
is evidence indicating that a breach of regulation may have occurred and there is reasonable cause to
believe that he was involved in the breach of regulations.189

For lack of actual proof of bad faith or ill-motive, the Court shall rely on the non-toleration clause of the
Honor Code, i.e., "We do not tolerate those who violate the Code." Cadets are reminded that they are
charged with a tremendous duty far more superior to their personal feeling or friendship.190 They must
learn to help others by guiding them to accept the truth and do what is right, rather than tolerating
actions against truth and justice.191 Likewise, cadets are presumed to be characteristically honorable; they
cannot overlook or arbitrarily ignore the dishonorable action of their peers, seniors, or
subordinates.192 These are what Cadet 1 CL Mogol exactly did, although he was later proven to have erred
in his accusation. Note that even the Honor Code and Honor System Handbook recognizes that
interpretation of one's honor is generally subjective.193

Moreover, assuming, for the sake of argument, that Cadets 1 CL' Raguindin and Mogol as well as Brig.
Gen. Costales have an axe to grind against Cadet 1 CL Cudia and were bent on causing, no matter what,
the latter's downfall, their nefarious conduct would still be insignificant. This is so since the HC (both the
preliminary and formal investigation), the CRAB, and the Fact-Finding Board/Investigating Body are
collegial bodies. Hence, the claim that the proceedings/hearings conducted were merely a farce because
the three personalities participated therein is tantamount to implying the existence of a conspiracy,
distrusting the competence, independence, and integrity of the other members who constituted the
majority. Again, in the absence of specifics and substantial evidence, the Court cannot easily give
credence to this baseless insinuation.

As to the HC executive session/chambering –

Petitioners narrate that there was an irregular administrative hearing in the case of Cadet 1 CL Cudia
because two voting rounds took place. After the result of the secret balloting, Cadet 1 CL Mogol ordered

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the voting members to go to a room without the cadet recorders. Therein, the lone dissenter, Cadet lCL
Lagura, was asked to explain his "not guilty" vote. Pressured to change his vote, he was made to cast a
new one finding Cadet 1 CL Cudia guilty. The original ballot was discarded and replaced. There was no
record of the change in vote from 8-1 to 9-0 that was mentioned in the HC formal report.

The Affidavit of Commander Junjie B. Tabuada executed on March 6, 2014 was submitted by petitioners
since he purportedly recalled Cadet 1 CL Lagura telling him that he was pressured to change his "not
guilty" vote after the voting members were "chambered." In the sworn statement, Commander Tabuada
said:

1. That after CDT lCL CUDIA [was] convicted for honor violation, I [cannot] remember exactly the
date but sometime in the morning of 23rd or 24th of January 2014, I was in my office filling up
forms for the renewal of my passport, CDT 1CL LAGURA entered and had business with my staff;

2. When he was about to leave I called him. "Lags, halika muna dito," and he approached me and I
let him sit down on the chair in front of my table. I told and asked him, "Talagang nadali si Cudia ah
... ano ha ang nangyari? Mag-Tagalog or mag-Bisaya ka." He replied, "Talagang NOT GUILTY ang
vote ko sa kanya sir", and I asked him, "Oh, bakit naging guilty di ha pag may isang nag NOT
GUILTY, abswelto na? He replied "Chinamber ako sir, bale pinapa-justify kung bakit NOT GUILTY
vote ko, at na-pressure din ako sir kaya binago ko, sir." So, I told him, "Sayang sya, matalino at
mabait pa naman" and he replied "oo nga sir". After that conversation, I let him go.194

It is claimed that the HC gravely abused its discretion when it committed voting manipulation since, under
the rules, it is required to have a unanimous nine (9) votes finding an accused cadet guilty. There is
nothing in the procedure that permits the HC Chairman to order the "chambering" of a member who voted
contrary to the majority and subjects him or her to reconsider in order to reflect a unanimous vote.
Neither is there an order from the Chief of Staff or the President sanctioning the HC procedure or
approving any change therein pursuant to Sections 30 and 31 of C.A. No. 1. The HC, the CRAB, and the
PMA violated their own rules and principles as embodied in the Honor Code. Being a clear deviation from
the established procedures, the second deliberation should be considered null and void.

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Petitioners further contend that the requirement of unanimous vote involves a substantive right which
cannot be unceremoniously changed without a corresponding amendment/revision in the Honor Code and
Honor System Handbook. In their view, "chambering" totally defeats the purpose of voting by secret ballot
as it glaringly destroys the very essence and philosophy behind the provisions of the Honor System, which
is to ensure that the voting member is free to vote what is in his or her heart and mind and that no one
can pressure or persuade another to change his or her vote. They suggest that if one voting member
acquits an accused cadet who is obviously guilty of the offense, the solution is to remove him or her from
the HC through the vote of non-confidence as provided for in the Honor Code.195 Anent the above
arguments, respondents contend that a distinction must be made between the concepts of the Honor Code
and the Honor System. According to them, the former sets the standard for a cadet's, minimum ethical
and moral behavior and does not change, while the latter is a set of rules for the conduct of the
observance and implementation of the· Honor Code and may undergo necessary adjustments as may be
warranted by the incumbent members of the HC in order to be more responsive to the moral training and
character development of the cadets. The HC may provide guidelines when the Honor System can be used
to supplement regulations. This being so, the voting process is continuously subject to change.

Respondents note that, historically, a non-unanimous guilty verdict automatically acquits a cadet from the
charge of Honor violation. The voting members only write either "guilty" or "not guilty" in the voting
sheets without stating their name or their justification. However, this situation drew criticisms since there
were instances where a reported cadet already admitted his honor violation but was acquitted due to the
lone vote of a sympathetic voting member.

In the case of Cadet 1 CL Cudia, the HC adopted an existing practice that should the voting result in 7-2
or 8-1 the HC would automatically sanction a jury type of discussion called "executive session" or
"chambering," which is intended to elicit the explanation and insights of the voting member/s. This
prevents the tyranny of the minority or lone dissenter from prevailing over the manifest proof of guilt. The
assailed voting practice has been adopted and widely accepted by the PMA Siklab Diwa Class of 2014 since
their first year in the Academy. The allegations of conspiracy and sham trial are, therefore, negated by the
fact that such practice was in place and applied to all cases of honor violations, not solely to the case of
Cadet 1CL Cudia.

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It is emphasized by respondents that any decision to change vote rests solely on the personal conviction
of the dissenter/s, without any compulsion from the other voting members. There can also be no
pressuring to change one's vote to speak of since a vote may only be considered as final when the
Presiding Officer has affixed his signature.

To debunk Commander Tabuada's statements, respondents raise the argument that the Fact-Finding
Board/Investigating Body summoned Cadet 1 CL Lagura for inquiry. Aside from his oral testimony made
under oath, he submitted to the Board/Body an affidavit explaining that:

11. Sometime on 23rd or 24th of January 2014, I went to the Department of Naval Warfare to ask
permission if it is possible not to attend the Navy duty for the reason that I will be attending our baseball
game outside the Academy.

12. After I was permitted not to attend my Navy Duty and when I was about to exit out of the Office, CDR
JUNJIE B T ABU ADA PN, our Head Department Naval Warfare Officer, called my attention. I approached
him and he said: "Talagang nadali si Cudia ah. Ano ba talaga ang nangyari?" At first, I was hesitant to
answer because of the confidentiality of the Honor Committee proceedings. He again said: "Wag kang
mag-alala, atin, atin lang ito, alam ko naman na bawal magsabi." Then I answered: "Ako yung isang not
guilty Sir. Kaya [yung] Presiding Officer nagsabi na pumunta muna kami sa Chamber. Nung nasa chamber
kami, nagsalita [yung] mga nagvote ng Guilty tapos isa-isa nagsabi kung bakit ang boto nila Guilty. Nung
pakinggan ko, eh naliwanagan ako. Pinalitan ko yung boto ko from Not Guilty to Guilty Sir." He replied:
"Sayang si Cudia ano?" And I said: "Oo nga sir, [s]ayang si Cudia, mabait pa naman at matalino."196

Cadet 1 CL Lagura restated the above in the Counter-Affidavit executed on March 12, 2014, which he
submitted before the CHR wherein he attested to the following:

3. I was chosen to be a voting member of the Honor Committee for Honor Code violation committed
by Cadet Cudia, for "lying". As a voting member, we are the one who assess or investigate the case
whether the reported Cadet is Guilty for his actions or not.

4. I was the only one who INITIALLY voted "NOT GUILTY" among the nine (9) voting members of
the Honor Committee in the case of Cdt Cudia for Lying.

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5. I initially voted "NOT GUILTY" for the reason that after the proceedings and before the presiding
Officer told the members to vote, I was confused of the case of Cadet Cudia. I have gathered some
facts from the investigation to make my decision but for me it is not yet enough to give my verdict
of guilty to Cdt Cudia so I decided to vote "NOT GUILTY" with a reservation in my mind that we will
still be discussing our verdicts if we will arrive at 8-1 or 7-2. Thus, I can still change my vote if I
may be enlightened with the other's justifications.

6. After the votes were collected, the Presiding Officer told us that the vote is 8 for guilty and 1 for
not guilty. By way of practice and as I predicted, we were told to go inside the anteroom for
executive meeting and to discuss our respective justifications. I have been a member for two (2)
years and the voting committee will always go for executive meeting whenever it will meet 8-1 or 7-
2 votes.

7. I listened to them and they listened to me, then I saw things that enlightened my confusions that
time. I gave a thumbs-up sign and asked for another sheet of voting paper. I then changed my vote
from "NOT GUILTY" to "GUILTY" and the voting members of the Honor Committee came up with the
final vote of nine (9) votes for guilty and zero (0) votes for not guilty.

9. Cdt Cudia was called inside the courtroom and told that the verdict was GUILTY of LYING. After
that, all persons inside the courtroom went back to barracks.

10. Right after I changed to sleeping uniform, I was approached by Cdt Jocson and Cdt Cudia,
inquiring and said: "Bakit ka naman nagpalit ng boto? ., I answered: "Nasa process yan, may mali
talaga sa rason mo." They also asked who were inside the Chamber and I mentioned only Cdt
Arlegui and Cdt Mogol. That was the last time that Cdt Cudia and Cdt Jocson talked to me.

11. Sometime on 23rd or 24th of January 2014, I went to the Department of Naval Warfare to asked
(sic) permission if it is possible not to attend the Navy duty for the reason that I will be attending
our baseball game outside the Academy.

12. After I was permitted not to attend my Navy Duty and when I was about to exit out of the
Office, CDR JUNJIE B TABUADA PN, our Head Department Naval Warfare Officer, called my

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 attention. I approached him and he said: "Talagang nadali si Cudia ah. Ano ba talaga ang nangyari?"
At first, I was hesitant to answer because of the confidentiality of the Honor Committee proceedings.
He again said: "Wag kang mag-alala, atin, atin lang ito, alam ko naman na bawal magsabi. " Then I
answered: "Ako yung isang not guilty Sir. Kaya [yung} Presiding Officer nagsabi na pumunta muna
kami sa Chamher. Nung nasa chamber kami, nagsalita [yung] mga nagvote ng Guilty tapos isa-isa
nagsabi kung bakit ang boto nila Guilty. Nung pakinggan ko, eh naliwanagan aka. Pinalitan ko yung
boto ko from Not Guilty to Guilty Sir. " He replied: "Sayang si Cudia ano?" And I said: "Oo nga sir,
[s]ayang si Cudia, mabait pa naman at matalino. "197

Still not to be outdone, petitioners argue that the very fact that Cadet 1 CL Lagura, as the lone dissenter,
was made to explain in the presence of other HC members, who were in disagreement with him, gives a
semblance of intimidation, force, or pressure. For them, the records of the HC proceedings, which were
not presented assuming they actually exist, could have been the best way to ensure that he was free to
express his views, reject the opinion of the majority, and stick to his decision. Also, it was pointed out that
Cadet 1 CL Lagura failed to clearly explain in his affidavit why he initially found Cadet 1 CL Cudia "not
guilty" and what made him change his mind. His use of general statements like he "was confused of the
case " and "saw things that enlightened my confusions " could hardly suffice to establish why he changed
his vote. Finally, petitioners note the admission of ·Cadet 1 CL Lagura during the CHR investigation that he
was the only one who was given another ballot sheet while in the chamber and that he accomplished it in
the barracks which he only submitted the following day. However, as the CHR found, the announcement of
the 9-0 vote was done immediately after the HC came out from the chamber and before Cadet 1 CL
Lagura submitted his accomplished ballot sheet.

We rule for respondents.

As to the manner of voting by the HC members, the Honor Code tersely provides:

After a thorough discussion and deliberation, the presiding member of the Board will call for the members
to vote whether the accused is GUILTY or NOT GUILTY. A unanimous vote (9 votes) of GUILTY decides
that a cadet is found guilty of violating the Honor Code.198

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From the above-quoted provision, it readily appears that the HC practice of conducting "executive session"
or "chambering" is not at all prohibited. The HC is given leeway on the voting procedures in' actual cases
taking into account the exigency of the times. What is important is that, in the end, there must be a
unanimous nine votes in order to hold a cadet guilty of violating the Honor Code.

Granting, for argument's sake, that the HC violated its written procedure,199 We still rule that there is
nothing inherently wrong with the practice of "chambering" considering that the presence of intimidation
or force cannot automatically be inferred therefrom. The essence of secret balloting and the freedom to
vote based on what is in the heart and mind of the voting member is not necessarily diluted by the fact
that a second/final voting was conducted. As explained by Cadet 1CL Mogol before the CRAB:

13. x x x [The] dissenting voter would have to explain his side and insights regarding the case at hand.
The other members, on the other hand, would be given the chance to explain their votes as well as their
insights to the dissenting voter. The decision to change the vote of the dissenting voter rests solely on his
personal conviction. Thus, if he [or she] opted not to change his/her vote despite the discussion, his [or
her] vote is accorded respect by the Honor Committee.200

It is elementary that intimidation or force is never presumed. Mere allegation is definitely not
evidence.1âwphi1 It must be substantiated and proved because a person is presumed to be innocent of a
crime or wrong and that official duty has been regularly performed.201

The oral and written statements of Cadet 1 CL Lagura should settle the issue. Before the Fact-Finding
Board/Investigating Body and the CHR, he consistently denied that he was pressured by the other voting
members of the HC. His representation must be accepted as it is regardless of whether he has
satisfactorily elaborated his decision to change his vote. Being the one who was "chambered," he is more
credible to clarify the issue. In case of doubt, We have to rely on the faith that Cadet 1 CL Lagura
observed the Honor Code, which clearly states that every cadet must be his or her own Final' Authority in
honor; that he or she should not let other cadets dictate on him or her their sense of honor. 202 Moreover,
the Code implies that any person can have confidence that a cadet and any graduate of the PMA will be
fair and just in dealing with him; that his actions, words and ways are sincere and true.203

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As to the other alleged "irregularities" committed such as not putting on record the initial/first voting and
Cadet 1CL Lagura's bringing of his ballot sheet to and accomplishing it in the barracks, the Court shall no
longer dwell on the same for being harmless procedural errors that do not materially affect the validity of
the HC proceedings.

Cadet 1 CL Cudia 's alleged untruthful statements

Petitioners insist that Cadet 1 CL Cudia did not lie. According to them, there is no clear time reference as
to when was the actual dismissal or what was the exact time of dismissal - whether it should be the
dismissal inside the room or the dismissal after the section grade was given by Dr. Costales -in the minds
of Cadet 1 CL Cudia, Maj. Hindang, and the HC investigators and voting members. They claim that during
long examinations, the time of dismissal was usually five minutes before the class was set to end and the
protocol of dismissing the class 15 minutes earlier was not observed. When Maj. Hindang stated in
accusatory language that Cadet 1 CL Cudia perverted the truth by stating that OR432 class ended at
1500H, he did not state what was the true time of dismissal. He did not mention whether the truth he was
relying on was 5 or 15 minutes before the scheduled end of class.

It is also averred that Cadet 1 CL Cudia's only business was to ask Dr. Costales a query such that his
business was already finished as soon as she gave an answer. However, a new business was initiated by
Dr. Costales, which is, Cadet 1 CL Cudia must stay and wait for the section grade. At that point in time, he
was no longer in control of the circumstances. Petitioners claim that Dr. Costales never categorically
stated that Cadet lCL Cudia was lying. She recognized the confusion. Her text messages to him clarified
his alleged violation. Also, the CHR noted during its investigation that she could not exactly recall what
happened in her class on November 14, 2013.

Furthermore, petitioners reasoned out that when respondents stated that ENG412 class started at 3:05
p.m., it proves that Cadet 1 CL Cudia was obviously not late. If, as indicated in his Delinquency Report, he
was late two (2) minutes in his 1500-1600H class in ENG 412, he must have arrived 3:02 p.m.
Respondents, however, claim that the class started at 3:05 p.m. Thus, Cadet 1 CL Cudia was not late.

Relative to his explanation to the delinquency report, petitioners were of the view that what appears to
have caused confusion in the minds of respondents is just a matter of semantics; that the entire incident

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was a product of inaccuracy, not lying. It is malicious for them to insinuate that Cadet 1 CL Cudia
purposely used incorrect language to hide the truth. Citing Merriam Webster's Dictionary, petitioners
argue that "dismiss" means to permit or cause to leave, while "class" refers to a body of students meeting
regularly to study the same subject. According to them, these two words do not have definite and precise
meanings but are generic terms. Other than the words "class" and "dismiss" used by Cadet 1 CL Cudia,
which may actually be used in their generic sense, there is nothing deceiving about what he said. Thus,
the answer he chose might be wrong or not correct, but it is not false or not true.

For petitioners, Cadet lCL Cudia's explanations are evidently truthful and with no intent to deceive or
mislead. He did not manipulate any fact and was truthful of his explanation. His .. statements were clear
and unambiguous but were given a narrow-minded interpretation. Even the Honor Code acknowledges
that "[e]xperience demonstrates that human communication is imperfect at best, and some actions are
often misinterpreted."

Lastly, petitioners contend that Cadet 1 CL Cudia's transcript of records reflects not only his outstanding
academic performance but proves his good conduct during his four-year stay in the Academy. He has
above-average grades in Conduct, with grades ranging from 96 to 100 in Conduct I to XI. His propensity
to lie is, therefore, far from the truth.

On the other hand, respondents were equally adamant to contend that Cadet 1 CL Cudia was obviously
quibbling, which, in the military parlance, is tantamount to lying. He fell short in telling a simple truth. He
lied by making untruthful statements in his written explanation. Respondents want Us to consider the
following:

First, their OR432 class was not dismissed late. During the formal investigation, Dr. Costales testified that
a class is dismissed as long as the instructor is not there and the bell has rung. In cases of lesson
examinations (LE), cadets are dismissed from the time they have answered their respective LEs. Here, as
Cadet Cudia stated in his Request for Reconsideration of Meted Punishment, "We had an LE that day (14
November 2013) in OR432 class. When the first bell rang (1455), I stood up, reviewed my paper and
submitted it to my instructor, Ms. Costales. xxx" Clearly, at the time Cadet Cudia submitted his papers, he
was already considered dismissed. Thus, he cannot claim that his [OR432] class ended at 3:00 in the
afternoon (1500H) or "a bit late."

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Second, Cadet Cudia was in control of the circumstances leading to his tardiness. After submitting his
paper, Cadet Cudia is free to leave and attend his next class. However, he initiated a conversation with Dr.
Costales regarding their grades. He was not under instruction by Dr. Costales to stay beyond the period of
her class.

Furthermore, during the investigation of the Fact-Finding Board/Investigating Body, Dr. Costales clarified
her statements in her written explanation. She explained that the "instruction to wait" is a response to
Cadet Cudia' s request and that it was not her initiated instruction. Clearly, there was no directive from
Dr. Costales for Cadet Cudia and the other cadets to stay. On the contrary, it was them who wanted to
meet with the instructor. Third, contrary to Cadet Cudia's explanation, his subsequent class, ENG412, did
not exactly start at 3:00 in the afternoon (1500H). In the informal review conducted by the HTG to check
the findings of the HC, Professor Berong confirmed that her English class started as scheduled (3:05 in the
afternoon, or 1505H) and not earlier. Cadet 1 CL Barrawed, the acting class marcher of ENG412 also
testified that their class started as scheduled (3 :05 in the afternoon, or 1505) and not earlier.204

Respondents were unimpressed with the excuse that Cadet 1 CL Cudia had no intention to mislead or
deceive but merely used wrong and unfitting words in his explanations. For them, considering his
academic standing, it is highly improbable that he used incorrect language to justify his mistake.
Respondents' arguments are tenable.

The issue of whether Cadet 1 CL Cudia committed lying is an issue of fact. Unfortunately for petitioners,
the Court, not being a trier of facts, cannot pass upon factual matters as it is not duty-bound to analyze
and weigh again the evidence considered in the proceedings below. Moreover, We reiterate the long
standing rule that factual findings of administrative tribunals are ordinarily accorded respect if not finality
by the Court. In this case, as shown in the previous discussions, there is no evidence that the findings of
the investigating and reviewing bodies below are not supported by evidence or vitiated by fraud,
imposition or collusion; that the procedure which led to the findings is irregular; that palpable errors were
committed; or that a grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or capriciousness is manifest. With respect
to the core issue of whether lying is present in this case, all investigating and reviewing bodies are in
consonance in holding that Cadet 1 CL Cudia in truth and in fact lied.

For purposes of emphasis though, We shall supplement some points.

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As succinctly worded, the Honor Code of the Cadet Corps Armed Forces of the Philippines (CCAFP) states:
"We, the Cadets, do not lie, cheat, steal, nor tolerate among us those who do. "

The First Tenet of the Honor-Code is "We do not lie. " Cadets violate the Honor Code by lying if they make
an oral or written statement which is contrary to what is true or use doubtful information with the intent
to deceive or mislead.205 It is expected that every cadet's word is accepted without challenge on its
truthfulness; that it is true without qualification; and that the cadets must answer directly, completely and
truthfully even though the answer may result in punitive action under the CCPB and CCAFPR.206

To refresh, in his Explanation of Report dated December 8, 2013, Cadet 1 CL Cudia justified that: "I came
directly from OR432 Class. We were dismissed a bit late by our instructor Sir." Subsequently, in his
Request for Reconsideration of Meted Punishment to Maj. Leander, he reasoned out as follows:

I strongly believe that I am not in control of the circumstances, our 4th period class ended 1500H and our
5th period class, which is ENG412, started 1500H also. Immediately after 4t period class, I went to my
next class without any intention of being late Sir.207

In this case, the Court agrees with respondents that Cadet 1 CL Cudia committed quibbling; hence, he lied
in violation of the Honor Code.

Following an Honor Reference Handbook, the term "Quibbling" has been defined in one U.S. case as
follows:

A person can easily create a false impression in the mind of his listener by cleverly wording what he says,
omitting relevant facts, or telling a partial truth. When he knowingly does so with the intent to deceive or
mislead, he is quibbling. Because it is an intentional deception, quibbling is a form of lying.208

The above definition can be applied in the instant case. Here, instead of directly and completely telling the
cause of his being late in the ENG412 class of Prof. Berong, Cadet 1 CL Cudia chose to omit relevant facts,
thereby, telling a half-truth.

The two elements that must be presented for a cadet to have committed an honor violation are:

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 1. The act and/or omission, and

2. The intent pertinent to it.

Intent does not only refer to the intent to violate the Honor Code, but intent to commit or omit the act
itself.209

The basic questions a cadet must always seek to answer unequivocally are:

1. Do I intend to deceive?

2. Do I intend to take undue advantage?

If a cadet can answer NO to BOTH questions, he or she is doing the honorable thing.210

Intent, being a state of mind, is rarely susceptible of direct proof, but must ordinarily be inferred from the
facts, and therefore, can only be proved by unguarded expressions, conduct and circumstances
generally.211 In this case, Cadet 1 CL Cudia's intent to deceive is manifested from the very act of
capitalizing on the use of the words "dismiss" and "class." The truth of the matter is that the ordinary
usage of these two terms, in the context of an educational institution, does not correspond to what Cadet
1 CL Cudia is trying to make it appear. In that sense, the words are not generic and have definite and
precise meaning.

By no stretch of the imagination can Cadets 1 CL Cudia, Miranda, Arcangel, and Narciso already constitute
a "class." The Court cannot agree that such term includes "every transaction and communication a teacher
does with her students." Clearly, it does not take too much intelligence to conclude that Cadet 1 CL Cudia
should have been accurate by pinpointing who were with him when he was late in the next class. His
deceptive explanation is made more obvious when compared with what Cadets 1 CL Archangel and
Narciso wrote in their DR explanation, which was: "We approached our instructor after our class."212

Further, it is unimportant whether the time of dismissal on November 14, 2013 was five or fifteen minutes
ahead of the scheduled end of class. Worth noting is that even Dr. Costales, who stood as a witness for

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Cadet 1 CL Cudia, consistently admitted before the HC, the Fact-Finding Board/Investigating Body, and
the CHR that he was already dismissed when he passed his LE paper.213 During the hearing of the
Board/Body, she also declared that she merely responded to his request to see the results of the UE 1 and
that she had reservations on the phrases "under my instruction" and "dismissed a bit late" used in his
letter of explanation to the HC. In addition, Dr. Costales manifested her view before the CHR that the act
of Cadet 1 CL Cudia of inquiring about his grade outside their classroom after he submitted his LE paper is
not part of the class time because the consultation, being cadet-initiated, is voluntary.214 Assuming, for
the sake of argument, that a new business was initiated by Dr. Costales when Cadet 1 CL Cudia was asked
to stay and wait for the section grade, still, this does not acquit him. Given such situation, a responsible
cadet who is fully aware of the time constraint has the last say, that is, to politely decline the invitation
and immediately go to the next class. This was not done by Cadet 1 CL Cudia. Thus, it cannot be said that
he already lost control over the circumstances.

It is apparent, therefore, that Cadet 1 CL Cudia cunningly chose words which led to confusion in the minds
of respondents and eventually commenced the HC inquiry. His case is not just a matter of semantics and a
product of plain and simple inaccuracy. There is manipulation of facts and presentation of untruthful
explanation constitutive of Honor Code violation.

Evidence of prior good conduct cannot clear Cadet 1 CL Cudia .. While his Transcript of Records (TOR)
may reflect not only his outstanding academic performance but his excellent grade in subjects on Conduct
during his four-year stay in the PMA,215 it does not necessarily follow that he is innocent of the offense
charged. It is enough to say that "evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not
admissible to prove that he did or did not do the same or similar thing at another time." 216 While the TOR
may be received to prove his identity or habit as an exceptional PMA student, it does not show his specific
intent, plan, or scheme as cadet accused of committing a specific Honor Code violation.

Dismissal from the PMA as unjust and cruel punishment

Respondents insist that violation of the Honor Code warrants separation of the guilty cadet from the cadet
corps. Under the Cadet Corps Armed Forces of the Philippines Regulation (CCAFPR), a violation of the
Cadet Honor Code is considered Grave (Class 1) delinquency which merits a recommendation for a cadet's
dismissal from the PMA Superintendent. The same is likewise clear from the Honor Code and Honor

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System Handbook. Cadet 1 CL Cudia is, therefore, presumed to know that the Honor Code does not
accommodate a gradation or degree of offenses. There is no difference between a little lie and a huge
falsehood. Respondents emphasize that the Honor Code has always been considered as an absolute
yardstick against which cadets have measured themselves ever since the PMA began and that the Honor
Code and System seek to assure that only those who are able to meet the high standards of integrity and
honor are produced by the PMA. As held in Andrews, it is constitutionally permissible for the military "to
set and enforce uncommonly high standards of conduct and ethics. " Thus, in violating the Honor Code,
Cadet 1 CL Cudia forfeits his privilege to graduate from the PMA.

On their part, petitioners concede that if it is proven that a cadet breached the Honor Code, the offense
warrants his or her dismissal since such a policy may be the only means to maintain and uphold the spirit
of integrity in the military.217 They maintain though that in Cadet 1 CL Cudia's case there is no need to
distinguish between a "little lie" and a "huge falsehood" since he did not lie at all. Absent any intent to
deceive and to take undue advantage, the penalty imposed on him is considered as unjust and cruel.
Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, the penalty of dismissal is not commensurate to the fact
that he is a graduating cadet with honors and what he allegedly committed does not amount to an
academic deficiency or an intentional and flagrant violation of the PMA non-academic rules and
regulations. Citing Non, petitioners argue that the penalty imposed must be proportionate to the offense.
Further, lsabelo, Jr. is squarely applicable to the facts of the case. Cadet 1 CL Cudia was deprived of his
right to education, the only means by which he may have a secure life and future.

Considering Our finding that Cadet 1 CL Cudia in truth and in fact lied and his acceptance that violation of
the Honor Code warrants the ultimate penalty of dismissal from the PMA, there is actually no more dispute
to resolve. Indeed, the sanction is clearly set forth and Cadet 1 CL Cudia, by contract, risked this when he
entered the Academy.218 We adopt the ruling in Andrews219 wherein it was held that, while the penalty is
severe, it is nevertheless reasonable and not arbitrary, and, therefore, not in violation of due process. It
quoted the disposition of the district court, thus:

The fact that a cadet will be separated from the Academy upon a finding that he has violated the Honor
Code is known to all cadets even prior to the beginning of their careers there. The finding of a Code
violation by hypothesis includes a finding of scienter on the part of the offender. While separation is
admittedly a drastic and tragic consequence of a cadet's transgression, it is not an unconstitutionally

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arbitrary one, but rather a reasonable albeit severe method of preventing men who have suffered ethical
lapses from becoming career officers. That a policy of admonitions or lesser penalties for single violations
might be more compassionate --or even more effective in achieving the intended result --is quite
immaterial to the question of whether the harsher penalty violates due process.220

Nature of the CHR Findings

Petitioners contend that the PMA turned a blind eye on the CHR's recommendations. The CHR, they note,
is a constitutional body mandated by the 1987 Constitution to investigate all forms of human rights
violations involving civil and political rights, and to conduct investigative monitoring of economic, social,
and cultural rights, particularly of vulnerable sectors of society. Further, it was contended that the results
of CHR's investigation and recommendations are so persuasive that this Court, on several occasions like in
the cases of Cruz v. Sec. of Environment & Natural Resources221 and Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v.
Commission on Elections,222 gave its findings serious consideration. It is not, therefore, too late for the
Court to hear what an independent and unbiased fact-finding body has to say on the case.

In opposition, respondents assert that Simon, Jr. v. Commission on Human Rights223 ruled that the CHR is
merely a recommendatory body that is not empowered to arrive at a conclusive determination of any
controversy.

We are in accord with respondents.

The findings of fact and the conclusions of law of the CHR are merely recommendatory and, therefore, not
binding to this Court. The reason is that the CHR's constitutional mandate extends only to the
investigation of all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights.224 As held in Cariño
v. Commission on Human Rights225 and a number of subsequent cases,226 the CHR is only a fact-finding
body, not a court of justice or a quasi-judicial agency. It is not empowered to adjudicate claims on the
merits or settle actual case or controversies. The power to investigate is not the same as adjudication:

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may
investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations
involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial

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function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence
and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be
considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must
be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the
controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals
or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.

xxxx

[i]t cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial
bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the popular or the technical sense,
these terms have well understood and quite distinct meanings.

"Investigate, "commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research
on, study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study closely: inquire into
systematically: "to search or inquire into: x x x to subject to an official probe x x x: to conduct an official
inquiry;" The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information.
Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the
facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry.

The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry
or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to
find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to make
an investigation," "investigation" being in turn described as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of
which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; xx x an inquiry, judicial or
otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters."

"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine,
resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the
parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: xx to pass judgment on: settle judicially: x x x act
as judge." And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial
powers: xx to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy x x x."

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In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority.1âwphi1 To
determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on
judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. xx Implies a judicial determination of a
fact, and the entry of a judgment. "226

All told, petitioners are not entitled to moral and exemplary damages in accordance with Articles 19, 2217,
2219 and 2229 of the Civil Code. The dismissal of Cadet 1 CL Cudia from the PMA did not effectively
deprive him of a future. Cliche though it may sound, being a PMA graduate is not the "be-all and end-all"
of his existence. A cadet separated from the PMA may still continue to pursue military or civilian career
elsewhere without suffering the stigma attached to his or her dismissal. For one, as suggested by
respondents, DND-AFP Circular No. 13, dated July 15, 1991, on the enlistment and reenlistment in the
APP Regular Force, provides under Section 14 (b) thereof that priority shall be given to, among others, the
ex-PMA or PAFFFS cadets.227 If the positions open does not appeal to his interest for being way below the
rank he could have achieved as a PMA graduate, Cadet 1 CL Cudia could still practice other equally noble
profession or calling that is best suited to his credentials, competence, and potential. Definitely, nobody
can deprive him of that choice.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The dismissal of Cadet First Class Aldrin Jeff P. Cudia from the
Philippine Military Academy is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

G.R. No. 211833, April 07, 2015

FERDINAND R. VILLANUEVA, PRESIDING JUDGE, MCTC, COMPOSTELA-NEW BATAAN,

COMPOSTELA VALLEY PROVINCE, Petitioner, v. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, Respondent.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

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Presiding Judge Ferdinand R. Villanueva (petitioner) directly came to this Court via a Petition for
Prohibition, Mandamus, and Certiorari, and Declaratory Relief1 under Rules 65 and 63 of the Rules of
Court, respectively, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction, to assail the policy of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC), requiring five years of
service as judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as applicant to second-level courts, on the
ground that it is unconstitutional, and was issued with grave abuse of
discretion.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The Facts

The petitioner was appointed on September 18, 2012 as the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, Compostela-New Bataan, Poblacion, Compostela Valley Province, Region XI, which is a first-level
court. On September 27, 2013, he applied for the vacant position of Presiding Judge in the following
Regional Trial Courts (RTCs): Branch 31, Tagum City; Branch 13, Davao City; and Branch 6, Prosperidad,
Agusan Del Sur.

In a letter2 dated December 18, 2013, JBC's Office of Recruitment, Selection and Nomination, informed
the petitioner that he was not included in the list of candidates for the said stations. On the same date,
the petitioner sent a letter, through electronic mail, seeking reconsideration of his non-inclusion in the list
of considered applicants and protesting the inclusion of applicants who did not pass the prejudicature
examination.

The petitioner was informed by the JBC Executive Officer, through a letter3 dated February 3, 2014, that
his protest and reconsideration was duly noted by the JBC en banc. However, its decision not to include
his name in the list of applicants was upheld due to the JBC's long-standing policy of opening the chance
for promotion to second-level courts to, among others, incumbent judges who have served in their current
position for at least five years, and since the petitioner has been a judge only for more than a year, he
was excluded from the list. This caused the petitioner to take recourse to this Court.

In his petition, he argued that: (1) the Constitution already prescribed the qualifications of an RTC judge,
and the JBC could add no more; (2) the JBC's five-year requirement violates the equal protection and due
process clauses of the Constitution; and (3) the JBC's five-year requirement violates the constitutional

387
provision on Social Justice and Human Rights for Equal Opportunity of Employment. The petitioner also
asserted that the requirement of the Prejudicature Program mandated by Section 10 4 of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 85575 should not be merely directory and should be fully implemented. He further alleged that
he has all the qualifications for the position prescribed by the Constitution and by Congress, since he has
already complied with the requirement of 10 years of practice of law.

In compliance with the Court's Resolution6 dated April 22, 2014, the JBC7 and the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG)8separately submitted their Comments. Summing up the arguments of the JBC and the
OSG, they essentially stated that the petition is procedurally infirm and that the assailed policy does not
violate the equal protection and due process clauses. They posited that: (1) the writ of certiorari and
prohibition cannot issue to prevent the JBC from performing its principal function under the Constitution to
recommend appointees to the Judiciary because the JBC is not a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial function; (2) the remedy of mandamus and declaratory relief will not lie because the petitioner has
no clear legal right that needs to be protected; (3) the equal protection clause is not violated because the
classification of lower court judges who have served at least five years and those who have served less
than five years is valid as it is performance and experience based; and (4) there is no violation of due
process as the policy is merely internal in nature.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The Issue

The crux of this petition is whether or not the policy of JBC requiring five years of service as judges of
first-level courts before they can qualify as applicant to second-level courts is constitutional.

Ruling of the Court

Procedural Issues:

Before resolving the substantive issues, the Court considers it necessary to first determine whether or not
the action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, and declaratory relief commenced by the petitioner
was proper.

One. The remedies of certiorari and prohibition are tenable. "The present Rules of Court uses two special
civil actions for determining and correcting grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of

388
jurisdiction. These are the special civil actions for certiorari and prohibition, and both are governed by Rule
65."9 As discussed in the case of Maria Carolina P. Araullo, etc., et al. v. Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III,
etc., et al.,10 this Court explained that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily broader in
scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction
committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions but also to set right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if
the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. This application is expressly
authorized by the text of the second paragraph of Section 1, supra.

Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to
review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and executive officials.11 (Citation omitted)
In this case, it is clear that the JBC does not fall within the scope of a tribunal, board, or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions. In the process of selecting and screening applicants, the JBC neither
acted in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor assumed unto itself any performance of judicial or
quasi-judicial prerogative. However, since the formulation of guidelines and criteria, including the policy
that the petitioner now assails, is necessary and incidental to the exercise of the JBC's constitutional
mandate, a determination must be made on whether the JBC has acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing and enforcing the said policy.

Besides, the Court can appropriately take cognizance of this case by virtue of the Court's power of
supervision over the JBC. Jurisprudence provides that the power of supervision is the power of oversight,
or the authority to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. It ensures that the laws and the
rules governing the conduct of a government entity are observed and complied with. Supervising officials
see to it that rules are followed, but they themselves do not lay down such rules, nor do they have the
discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, they may order the work done or
redone, but only to conform to such rules. They may not prescribe their own manner of execution of the
act. They have no discretion on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed. 12

Following this definition, the supervisory authority of the Court over the JBC is to see to it that the JBC
complies with its own rules and procedures. Thus, when the policies of the JBC are being attacked, then

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the Court, through its supervisory authority over the JBC, has the duty to inquire about the matter and
ensure that the JBC complies with its own rules.

Two. The remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by the petitioner in assailing JBC's policy. The
petitioner insisted that mandamus is proper because his right was violated when he was not included in
the list of candidates for the RTC courts he applied for. He said that his non-inclusion in the list of
candidates for these stations has caused him direct injury.

It is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that the applicant should have a clear legal right to
the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act
required.13 The petitioner bears the burden to show that there is such a clear legal right to the
performance of the act, and a corresponding compelling duty on the part of the respondent to perform the
act. The remedy of mandamus, as an extraordinary writ, lies only to compel an officer to perform a
ministerial duty, not a discretionary one.14 Clearly, the use of discretion and the performance of a
ministerial act are mutually exclusive.

The writ of mandamus does not issue to control or review the exercise of discretion or to compel a course
of conduct, which, it quickly seems to us, was what the petitioner would have the JBC do in his favor. The
function of the JBC to select and recommend nominees for vacant judicial positions is discretionary, not
ministerial. Moreso, the petitioner cannot claim any legal right to be included in the list of nominees for
judicial vacancies. Possession of the constitutional and statutory qualifications for appointment to the
judiciary may not be used to legally demand that one's name be included in the list of candidates for a
judicial vacancy. One's inclusion in the list of the candidates depends on the discretion of the JBC,
thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The fact that an individual possesses the constitutional and statutory qualifications for appointment to the
Judiciary does not create an entitlement or expectation that his or her name be included in the list of
candidates for a judicial vacancy. By submitting an application or accepting a recommendation, one
submits to the authority of the JBC to subject the former to the search, screening, and selection process,
and to use its discretion in deciding whether or not one should be included in the list. Indeed, assuming
that if one has the legal right to be included in the list of candidates simply because he or she possesses
the constitutional and statutory qualifications, then the application process would then be reduced to a

390
mere mechanical function of the JBC; and the search, screening, and selection process would not only be
unnecessary, but also improper. However, this is clearly not the constitutional intent. One's inclusion in
the list of candidates is subject to the discretion of the JBC over the selection of nominees for a
particular judicial post. Such candidate's inclusion is not, therefore, a legally demandable right, but
simply a privilege the conferment of which is subject to the JBC's sound discretion.

Moreover, petitioner is essentially seeking a promotional appointment, that is, a promotion from a first-
level court to a second level court. There is no law, however, that grants him the right to a
promotion to second-level courts.15 (Emphasis in the original)
Clearly, to be included as an applicant to second-level judge is not properly compellable by mandamus
inasmuch as it involves the exercise of sound discretion by the JBC.

Three. The petition for declaratory relief is improper. "An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a
person interested under a deed, a will, a contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are
affected by a statute, an executive order, a regulation or an ordinance. The relief sought under this
remedy includes the interpretation and determination of the validity of the written instrument and the
judicial declaration of the parties' rights or duties thereunder."16 "[T]he purpose of the action is to secure
an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed,
contract, etc., for their guidance in its enforcement or compliance and not to settle issues arising from its
alleged breach."17

In this case, the petition for declaratory relief did not involve an unsound policy. Rather, the petition
specifically sought a judicial declaration that the petitioner has the right to be included in the list of
applicants although he failed to meet JBC's five-year requirement policy. Again, the Court reiterates that
no person possesses a legal right under the Constitution to be included in the list of nominees for vacant
judicial positions. The opportunity of appointment to judicial office is a mere privilege, and not a judicially
enforceable right that may be properly claimed by any person. The inclusion in the list of candidates,
which is one of the incidents of such appointment, is not a right either. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim
any right that could have been affected by the assailed policy.

Furthermore, the instant petition must necessarily fail because this Court does not have original

391
jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief even if only questions of law are involved.18 The special
civil action of declaratory relief falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the appropriate RTC pursuant to
Section 1919 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by R.A.No. 7691.20

Therefore, by virtue of the Court's supervisory duty over the JBC and in the exercise of its expanded
judicial power, the Court assumes jurisdiction over the present petition. But in any event, even if the
Court will set aside procedural infirmities, the instant petition should still be
dismissed.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Substantive Issues

As an offspring of the 1987 Constitution, the JBC is mandated to recommend appointees to the judiciary
and only those nominated by the JBC in a list officially transmitted to the President may be appointed by
the latter as justice or judge in the judiciary. Thus, the JBC is burdened with a great responsibility that is
imbued with public interest as it determines the men and women who will sit on the judicial bench. While
the 1987 Constitution has provided the qualifications of members of the judiciary, this does not preclude
the JBC from having its own set of rules and procedures and providing policies to effectively ensure its
mandate.

The functions of searching, screening, and selecting are necessary and incidental to the JBC's principal
function of choosing and recommending nominees for vacancies in the judiciary for appointment by the
President. However, the Constitution did not lay down in precise terms the process that the JBC shall
follow in determining applicants' qualifications. In carrying out its main function, the JBC has the authority
to set the standards/criteria in choosing its nominees for every vacancy in the judiciary, subject only to
the minimum qualifications required by the Constitution and law for every position. The search for these
long held qualities necessarily requires a degree of flexibility in order to determine who is most fit among
the applicants. Thus, the JBC has sufficient but not unbridled license to act in performing its duties.

JBC's ultimate goal is to recommend nominees and not simply to fill up judicial vacancies in order to
promote an effective and efficient administration of justice. Given this pragmatic situation, the JBC had to
establish a set of uniform criteria in order to ascertain whether an applicant meets the minimum
constitutional qualifications and possesses the qualities expected of him and his office. Thus, the adoption

392
of the five-year requirement policy applied by JBC to the petitioner's case is necessary and incidental to
the function conferred by the Constitution to the JBC.

Equal Protection

There is no question that JBC employs standards to have a rational basis to screen applicants who cannot
be all accommodated and appointed to a vacancy in the judiciary, to determine who is best qualified
among the applicants, and not to discriminate against any particular individual or class.

The equal protection clause of the Constitution does not require the universal application of the laws to all
persons or things without distinction; what it requires is simply equality among equals as determined
according to a valid classification. Hence, the Court has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a
fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, the classification stands as long as it bears a rational
relationship to some legitimate government end.21ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

"The equal protection clause, therefore, does not preclude classification of individuals who may be
accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is reasonable and not
arbitrary."22 "The mere fact that the legislative classification may result in actual inequality is not violative
of the right to equal protection, for every classification of persons or things for regulation by law produces
inequality in some degree, but the law is not thereby rendered invalid."23

That is the situation here. In issuing the assailed policy, the JBC merely exercised its discretion in
accordance with the constitutional requirement and its rules that a member of the Judiciary must be of
proven competence, integrity, probity and independence.24"To ensure the fulfillment of these standards in
every member of the Judiciary, the JBC has been tasked to screen aspiring judges and justices, among
others, making certain that the nominees submitted to the President are all qualified and suitably best for
appointment. In this way, the appointing process itself is shielded from the possibility of extending judicial
appointment to the undeserving and mediocre and, more importantly, to the ineligible or disqualified." 25

Consideration of experience by JBC as one factor in choosing recommended appointees does not
constitute a violation of the equal protection clause. The JBC does not discriminate when it employs
number of years of service to screen and differentiate applicants from the competition. The number of

393
years of service provides a relevant basis to determine proven competence which may be measured by
experience, among other factors. The difference in treatment between lower court judges who have
served at least five years and those who have served less than five years, on the other hand, was
rationalized by JBC as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Formulating policies which streamline the selection process falls squarely under the purview of the JBC. No
other constitutional body is bestowed with the mandate and competency to set criteria for applicants that
refer to the more general categories of probity, integrity and independence.

The assailed criterion or consideration for promotion to a second-level court, which is five years
experience as judge of a first-level court, is a direct adherence to the qualities prescribed by the
Constitution. Placing a premium on many years of judicial experience, the JBC is merely applying one of
the stringent constitutional standards requiring that a member of the judiciary be of "proven
competence." In determining competence, the JBC considers, among other
qualifications, experience and performance.

Based on the JBC's collective judgment, those who have been judges of first-level courts for five (5) years
are better qualified for promotion to second-level courts. It deems length of experience as a judge as
indicative of conversance with the law and court procedure. Five years is considered as a sufficient span of
time for one to acquire professional skills for the next level court, declog the dockets, put in place
improved procedures and an efficient case management system, adjust to the work environment, and gain
extensive experience in the judicial process.

A five-year stint in the Judiciary can also provide evidence of the integrity,
probity, and independence of judges seeking promotion. To merit JBC's nomination for their promotion,
they must have had a "record of, and reputation for, honesty, integrity, incorruptibility, irreproachable
conduct, and fidelity to sound moral and ethical standards." Likewise, their decisions must be reflective of
the soundness of their judgment, courage, rectitude, cold neutrality and strength of character.

Hence, for the purpose of determining whether judges are worthy of promotion to the next level court, it
would be premature or difficult to assess their merit if they have had less than one year of service on the
bench.26 (Citations omitted and emphasis in the original)

394
At any rate, five years of service as a lower court judge is not the only factor that determines the selection
of candidates for RTC judge to be appointed by the President. Persons with this qualification are neither
automatically selected nor do they automatically become nominees. The applicants are chosen based on
an array of factors and are evaluated based on their individual merits. Thus, it cannot be said that the
questioned policy was arbitrary, capricious, or made without any basis.

Clearly, the classification created by the challenged policy satisfies the rational basis test. The foregoing
shows that substantial distinctions do exist between lower court judges with five year experience and
those with less than five years of experience, like the petitioner, and the classification enshrined in the
assailed policy is reasonable and relevant to its legitimate purpose. The Court, thus, rules that the
questioned policy does not infringe on the equal protection clause as it is based on reasonable
classification intended to gauge the proven competence of the applicants. Therefore, the said policy is
valid and constitutional.

Due Process

The petitioner averred that the assailed policy violates procedural due process for lack of publication and
non-submission to the University of the Philippines Law Center Office of the National Administrative
Register (ONAR). The petitioner said that the assailed policy will affect all applying judges, thus, the said
policy should have been published.

Contrary to the petitioner's contention, the assailed JBC policy need not be filed in the ONAR because the
publication requirement in the ONAR is confined to issuances of administrative agencies under the
Executive branch of the government.27 Since the JBC is a body under the supervision of the Supreme
Court,28 it is not covered by the publication requirements of the Administrative Code.

Nevertheless, the assailed JBC policy requiring five years of service as judges of first-level courts before
they can qualify as applicants to second-level courts should have been published. As a general rule,
publication is indispensable in order that all statutes, including administrative rules that are intended to
enforce or implement existing laws, attain binding force and effect. There are, however, several
exceptions to the requirement of publication, such as interpretative regulations and those merely internal
in nature, which regulate only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public. Neither is

395
publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning
the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.29

Here, the assailed JBC policy does not fall within the administrative rules and regulations exempted from
the publication requirement. The assailed policy involves a qualification standard by which the JBC shall
determine proven competence of an applicant. It is not an internal regulation, because if it were, it would
regulate and affect only the members of the JBC and their staff. Notably, the selection process involves a
call to lawyers who meet the qualifications in the Constitution and are willing to serve in the Judiciary to
apply to these vacant positions. Thus, it is but a natural consequence thereof that potential applicants be
informed of the requirements to the judicial positions, so that they would be able to prepare for and
comply with them.

The Court also noted the fact that in JBC-009, otherwise known as the Rules of the Judicial and Bar
Council, the JBC had put its criteria in writing and listed the guidelines in determining competence,
independence, integrity and probity. Section 1, Paragraph 1 of Rule 9 expressly provides that applicants
for the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan, should, as a general rule, have at least five years of
experience as an RTC judge, thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
RULE 9 - SPECIAL GUIDELINES FOR NOMINATION TO A VACANCY IN THE COURT OF APPEALS AND
SANDIGANBAYAN

Section 1. Additional criteria for nomination to the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan. - In addition
to the foregoing guidelines the Council should consider the following in evaluating the merits of applicants
for a vacancy in the Court of Appeals and Sandiganbayan:

1. As a general rule, he must have at least five years of experience as a judge of Regional Trial
Court, except when he has in his favor outstanding credentials, as evidenced by, inter alia, impressive
scholastic or educational record and performance in the Bar examinations, excellent reputation for
honesty, integrity, probity and independence of mind; at least very satisfactory performance rating for
three (3) years preceding the filing of his application for nomination; and excellent potentials for appellate
judgeship.

x x x x (Emphasis ours)

396
The express declaration of these guidelines in JBC-009, which have been duly published on the website of
the JBC and in a newspaper of general circulation suggests that the JBC is aware that these are not mere
internal rules, but are rules implementing the Constitution that should be published. Thus, if the JBC were
so-minded to add special guidelines for determining competence of applicants for RTC judges, then it
could and should have amended its rules and published the same. This, the JBC did not do as JBC-009 and
its amendatory rule do not have special guidelines for applicants to the RTC.

Moreover, jurisprudence has held that rules implementing a statute should be published. Thus, by
analogy, publication is also required for the five-year requirement because it seeks to implement a
constitutional provision requiring proven competence from members of the judiciary.

Nonetheless, the JBC's failure to publish the assailed policy has not prejudiced the petitioner's private
interest. At the risk of being repetitive, the petitioner has no legal right to be included in the list of
nominees for judicial vacancies since the possession of the constitutional and statutory qualifications for
appointment to the Judiciary may not be used to legally demand that one's name be included in the list of
candidates for a judicial vacancy. One's inclusion in the shortlist is strictly within the discretion of the
JBC.30

As to the issue that the JBC failed or refused to implement the completion of the prejudicature program as
a requirement for appointment or promotion in the judiciary under R.A. No. 8557, this ground of the
petition, being unsubstantiated, was unfounded. Clearly, it cannot be said that JBC unlawfully neglects the
performance of a duty enjoined by law.

Finally, the petitioner argued but failed to establish that the assailed policy violates the constitutional
provision under social justice and human rights for equal opportunity of employment. The OSG
explained:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
[T]he questioned policy does not violate equality of employment opportunities. The constitutional
provision does not call for appointment to the Judiciary of all who might, for any number of reasons, wish
to apply. As with all professions, it is regulated by the State. The office of a judge is no ordinary office. It
is imbued with public interest and is central in the administration of justice x x x. Applicants who meet the
constitutional and legal qualifications must vie and withstand the competition and rigorous screening and
selection process. They must submit themselves to the selection criteria, processes and discretion of

397
respondent JBC, which has the constitutional mandate of screening and selecting candidates whose names
will be in the list to be submitted to the President. So long as a fair opportunity is available for all
applicants who are evaluated on the basis of their individual merits and abilities, the questioned policy
cannot be struck down as unconstitutional.31 (Citations omitted)
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the petitioner has not established a clear legal right to justify the
issuance of a preliminary injunction. The petitioner has merely filed an application with the JBC for the
position of RTC judge, and he has no clear legal right to be nominated for that office nor to be selected
and included in the list to be submitted to the President which is subject to the discretion of the JBC. The
JBC has the power to determine who shall be recommended to the judicial post. To be included in the list
of applicants is a privilege as one can only be chosen under existing criteria imposed by the JBC itself. As
such, prospective applicants, including the petitioner, cannot claim any demandable right to take part in it
if they fail to meet these criteria. Hence, in the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of an injunctive
writ is not justified.

As the constitutional body granted with the power of searching for, screening, and selecting applicants
relative to recommending appointees to the Judiciary, the JBC has the authority to determine how best to
perform such constitutional mandate. Pursuant to this authority, the JBC issues various policies setting
forth the guidelines to be observed in the evaluation of applicants, and formulates rules and guidelines in
order to ensure that the rules are updated to respond to existing circumstances. Its discretion is freed
from legislative, executive or judicial intervention to ensure that the JBC is shielded from any outside
pressure and improper influence. Limiting qualified applicants in this case to those judges with five years
of experience was an exercise of discretion by the JBC. The potential applicants, however, should have
been informed of the requirements to the judicial positions, so that they could properly prepare for and
comply with them. Hence, unless there are good and compelling reasons to do so, the Court will refrain
from interfering with the exercise of JBC's powers, and will respect the initiative and independence
inherent in the latter.cralawred

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The Court, however, DIRECTS that the
Judicial and Bar Council comply with the publication requirement of (1) the assailed policy requiring five
years of experience as judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as applicant to the Regional Trial
Court, and (2) other special guidelines that the Judicial and Bar Council is or will be implementing.

398
SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 131977. February 4, 1999]

PEDRO MENDOZA, Petitioner, v. RAY ALLAS and GODOFREDO OLORES, Respondents.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

Before us, petitioner prays for the execution of the decision of the trial court1 granting his petition for quo
warranto which ordered his reinstatement as Director III, Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service,
and the payment of his back salaries and benefits.

Petitioner Pedro Mendoza joined the Bureau of Customs in 1972. He held the positions of Port Security
Chief from March 1972 to August 1972, Deputy Commissioner of Customs from August 1972 to
September 1975, Acting Commissioner of Customs from September 1975 to April 1977 and Customs
Operations Chief I from October 1987 to February 1988.2 On March 1, 1988, he was appointed Customs
Service Chief of the Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service (CIIS). In 1989, the position of
Customs Service Chief was reclassified by the Civil Service as "Director III" in accordance with Republic
Act No. 6758 and National Compensation Circular No. 50. Petitioner's position was thus categorized as
"Director III, CIIS" and he discharged the function and duties of said office.

On April 22, 1993, petitioner was temporarily designated as Acting District Collector, Collection District X,
Cagayan de Oro City. In his place, respondent Ray Allas was appointed as "Acting Director III" of the CIIS.
Despite petitioner's new assignment as Acting District Collector, however, he continued to receive the
salary and benefits of the position of Director III.

399
In September 1994, petitioner received a letter from Deputy Customs Commissioner Cesar Z. Dario,
informing him of his termination from the Bureau of Customs, in view of respondent Allas' appointment as
Director III by President Fidel V. Ramos. The pertinent portion of the letter reads:

"Effective March 4, 1994, Mr. Ray Allas was appointed Director III by President Fidel V. Ramos and as a
consequence, [petitioner's] services were terminated without prejudice to [his] claim for all government
benefits due [him]."

Attached to the letter was the appointment of respondent Ray Allas as "Director III, CIIS, Bureau of
Customs, vice Pedro Mendoza."

Petitioner wrote the Customs Commissioner demanding his reinstatement with full back wages and
without loss of seniority rights. No reply was made.

On December 2, 1994, petitioner filed a petition for quo warranto against respondent Allas before the
Regional Trial Court, Paranaque, Branch 258.3 The case was tried and on September 11, 1995, a decision
was rendered granting the petition. The court found that petitioner was illegally terminated from office
without due process of law and in violation of his security of tenure, and that as he was deemed not to
have vacated his office, the appointment of respondent Allas to the same office was void ab initio. The
court ordered the ouster of respondent Allas from the position of Director III, and at the same time
directed the reinstatement of petitioner to the same position with payment of full back salaries and other
benefits appurtenant thereto.

Respondent Allas appealed to the Court of Appeals. On February 8, 1996, while the case was pending
before said court, respondent Allas was promoted by President Ramos to the position of Deputy
Commissioner of Customs for Assessment and Operations. As a consequence of this promotion, petitioner
moved to dismiss respondent's appeal as having been rendered moot and academic. The Court of Appeals
granted the motion and dismissed the case accordingly. The order of dismissal became final and entry of
judgment was made on March 19, 1996.4cräläwvirtualibräry

On May 9, 1996, petitioner filed with the court a quo a Motion for Execution of its decision. On July 24,
1996, the court denied the motion on the ground that the contested position vacated by respondent Allas

400
was now being occupied by respondent Godofredo Olores who was not a party to the quo
warranto petition.5cräläwvirtualibräry

Petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari and mandamus with the Court of Appeals questioning the
order of the trial court.6 On November 27, 1997, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition.7 Hence, this
recourse.

Petitioner claims that:

"The Court of Appeals grossly erred in holding that a writ of execution may no longer be issued,
considering that respondent Olores who was not a party to the case now occupies the subject position." 8

The instant petition arose from a special civil action for quo warranto under Rule 66 of the Revised Rules
of Court. Quo warranto is a demand made by the state upon some individual or corporation to show by
what right they exercise some franchise or privilege appertaining to the state which, according to the
Constitution and laws of the land, they cannot legally exercise except by virtue of a grant or authority
from the state.9 In other words, a petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a
person to the use or exercise of a franchise or office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, if his claim
is not well-founded, or if he has forfeited his right to enjoy the privilege.10 The action may be commenced
for the Government by the Solicitor General or the fiscal11 against individuals who usurp a public office,
against a public officer whose acts constitute a ground for the forfeiture of his office, and against an
association which acts as a corporation without being legally incorporated.12 The action may also be
instituted by an individual in his own name who claims to be entitled to the public office or position
usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another.13cräläwvirtualibräry

Where the action is filed by a private person, he must prove that he is entitled to the controverted
position, otherwise respondent has a right to the undisturbed possession of the office.14 If the court finds
for the respondent, the judgment should simply state that the respondent is entitled to the office. 15 If,
however, the court finds for the petitioner and declares the respondent guilty of usurping, intruding into,
or unlawfully holding or exercising the office, judgment may be rendered as follows:

401
"Sec. 10. Judgment where usurpation found.-- When the defendant is found guilty of usurping, intruding
into, or unlawfully holding or exercising an office, position, right, privilege, or franchise, judgment shall be
rendered that such defendant be ousted and altogether excluded therefrom, and that the plaintiff or
relator, as the case may be, recover his costs. Such further judgment may be rendered determining the
respective rights in and to the office, position, right, privilege, or franchise of all the parties to the action
as justice requires."

If it is found that the respondent or defendant is usurping or intruding into the office, or unlawfully holding
the same, the court may order:

(1) The ouster and exclusion of the defendant from office;

(2) The recovery of costs by plaintiff or relator;

(3) The determination of the respective rights in and to the office, position, right, privilege or franchise of
all the parties to the action as justice requires.16

The character of the judgment to be rendered in quo warranto rests to some extent in the discretion of the
court and on the relief sought.17 In the case at bar, petitioner prayed for the following relief:

"WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that respondent be ousted and altogether excluded from the
position of Director III, Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service of the Bureau of Customs, and
petitioner be seated to the position as the one legally appointed and entitled thereto.

Other reliefs, just or equitable in the premises, are likewise prayed for."18

In granting the petition, the trial court ordered that:

"WHEREFORE, viewed in the light of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered granting this petition for
quo warranto by:

402
1. Ousting and excluding respondent Ray Allas from the position of Director III, Customs Intelligence and
Investigation Service of the Bureau of Customs; and

2. Reinstating petitioner Pedro C. Mendoza, Jr. to the position of Director III, Customs Intelligence and
Investigation Service of the Bureau of Customs with full back wages and other monetary benefits
appurtenant thereto from the time they were withheld until reinstated."19

The trial court found that respondent Allas usurped the position of "Director III, Chief of the Customs
Intelligence and Investigation Service." Consequently, the court ordered that respondent Allas be ousted
from the contested position and that petitioner be reinstated in his stead. Although petitioner did not
specifically pray for his back salaries, the court ordered that he be paid his "full back wages and other
monetary benefits" appurtenant to the contested position "from the time they were withheld until
reinstated."

The decision of the trial court had long become final and executory, and petitioner prays for its execution.
He alleges that he should have been reinstated despite respondent Olores' appointment because the
subject position was never vacant to begin with. Petitioner's removal was illegal and he was deemed never
to have vacated his office when respondent Allas was appointed to the same. Respondent Allas'
appointment was null and void and this nullity allegedly extends to respondent Olores, his successor-in-
interest.20cräläwvirtualibräry

Ordinarily, a judgment against a public officer in regard to a public right binds his successor in office. This
rule, however, is not applicable in quo warranto cases.21 A judgment in quo warranto does not bind the
respondent's successor in office, even though such successor may trace his title to the same source. This
follows from the nature of the writ of quo warranto itself. It is never directed to an officer as such, but
always against the person-- to determine whether he is constitutionally and legally authorized to perform
any act in, or exercise any function of the office to which he lays claim.22 In the case at bar, the petition
for quo warranto was filed by petitioner solely against respondent Allas. What was threshed out before
the trial court was the qualification and right of petitioner to the contested position as against respondent
Ray Allas, not against Godofredo Olores. The Court of Appeals did not err in denying execution of the trial
court's decision.

403
Petitioner has apprised this Court that he reached the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five (65) years
on November 13, 1997. Reinstatement not being possible, petitioner now prays for the payment of his
back salaries and other benefits from the time he was illegally dismissed until finality of the trial court's
decision.23cräläwvirtualibräry

Respondent Allas cannot be held personally liable for petitioner's back salaries and benefits. He was
merely appointed to the subject position by the President of the Philippines in the exercise of his
constitutional power as Chief Executive. Neither can the Bureau of Customs be compelled to pay the said
back salaries and benefits of petitioner. The Bureau of Customs was not a party to the petition for quo
warranto.24cräläwvirtualibräry

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is denied and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
41801 is affirmed.

SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. NO. 168696 : February 28, 2006]

MA. LUTGARDA P. CALLEJA, JOAQUIN M. CALLEJA, JR., JADELSON PETER P. CALLEJA, MA.
JESSICA T. FLORES, MERCIE C. TIPONES and PERFECTO NIXON C. TABORA, Petitioners, v. JOSE
PIERRE A. PANDAY, AUGUSTO R. PANDAY and MA. THELNA P. MALLARI, Respondents.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Order1 of the Regional Trial Court of San
Jose, Camarines Sur, Branch 58 (RTC-Br. 58) issued on July 13, 2005.

The antecedent facts are as follows.

404
On May 16, 2005, respondents filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Camarines Sur
for quo warranto with Damages and Prayer for Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction, Damages and
Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order against herein petitioners. Respondents alleged that from 1985
up to the filing of the petition with the trial court, they had been members of the board of directors and
officers of St. John Hospital, Incorporated, but sometime in May 2005, petitioners, who are also among
the incorporators and stockholders of said corporation, forcibly and with the aid of armed men usurped the
powers which supposedly belonged to Respondents.

On May 24, 2005, RTC-Br. 58 issued an Order transferring the case to the Regional Trial Court in Naga
City. According to RTC-Br. 58, since the verified petition showed petitioners therein (herein respondents)
to be residents of Naga City, then pursuant to Section 7, Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the
action for quo warranto should be brought in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the
territorial area where the respondents or any of the respondents resides. However, the Executive Judge of
RTC, Naga City refused to receive the case folder of the subject case for quo warranto, stating that
improper venue is not a ground for transferring a quo warranto case to another administrative jurisdiction.

The RTC-Br. 58 then proceeded to issue and serve summons on herein petitioners (respondents below).
Petitioner Tabora filed his Answer dated June 8, 2005, raising therein the affirmative defenses of (1)
improper venue, (2) lack of jurisdiction, and (3) wrong remedy of quo warranto. Thereafter, the other
petitioners also filed their Answer, also raising the same affirmative defenses. All the parties were then
required to submit their respective memoranda.

On July 13, 2005, RTC-Br. 58 issued the assailed Order, the pertinent portions of which read as follows:

It is undisputed that the plaintiffs' cause of action involves controversies arising out of intra-corporate
relations, between and among stockholders, members or associates of the St. John Hospital Inc. which
originally under PD 902-A approved on March 11, 1976 is within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of
the Securities and Exchange Commission to try and decide in addition to its regulatory and adjudicated
functions (Section 5, PD 902-A). Upon the advent of RA 8799 approved on July 19, 2000, otherwise
known as the Securities and Regulation Code, the Commission's jurisdiction over all cases enumerated in
Section 5, Presidential Decree 902-A were transferred ["]to the Court of general jurisdiction or the
appropriate Regional Trial Court with a proviso that the "Supreme Court in the exercise of its authority

405
may designate the Regional Trial Court branches that shall exercise jurisdiction over these cases."
Pursuant to this mandate of RA 8799, the Supreme Court in the exercise of said mandated authority,
promulgated on November 21, 2000, A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC which took effect 15 December 2000
designated certain branches of the Regional Trial Court to try and decide Securities and Exchange
Commission Cases arising within their respective territorial jurisdiction with respect to the National Capital
Region and within the respective provinces in the First to Twelve Judicial Region. Accordingly, in the
Province of Camarines Sur, (Naga City) RTC Branch 23 presided by the Hon. Pablo M. Paqueo, Jr. was
designated as "special court" (Section 1, A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC).

Subsequently, on January 23, 2001, supplemental Administrative Circular No. 8-01 which took effect on
March 1, 2001 was issued by the Supreme Court which directed that "all SEC cases originally assigned or
transmitted to the regular Regional Trial Court shall be transferred to branches of the Regional Trial Court
specially designated to hear such cases in accordance with A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC.

On March 13, 2001, A.M. No. 01-2-04 SC was promulgated and took effect on April 1, 2001.

From the foregoing discussion and historical background relative to the venue and jurisdiction to try and
decide cases originally enumerated in Section 5 of PD 902-A and later under Section 5.2 of RA 8799, it is
evident that the clear intent of the circular is to bestow the juridiction "to try and decide these cases to
the "special courts" created under A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC. . . .

Under Section 8, of the Interim Rules, [a] Motion to Dismiss is among the prohibited pleadings. On the
otherhand, the Supreme Court under Administrative Order 8-01 has directed the transfer from the regular
courts to the branches of the Regional Trial Courts specially designated to try and decide intra-corporate
dispute.

In the light of the above-noted observations and discussion, the Motion to Dismiss is DENIED pursuant to
the Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies (A.M. No. 01-2-04-SC) which mandates
that motion to dismiss is a prohibited pleading (Section 8) and in consonance with Administrative Order 8-
01 of the Supreme Court dated March 1, 2001, this case is hereby ordered remandedto the Regional Trial
Court Branch 23, Naga City which under A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC has been designated as special court to try
and decide intra-corporate controversies under R.A. 8799.

406
The scheduled hearing on the prayer for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction set on July
18, 2005 is hereby cancelled.

For reasons of comity the issue of whether Quo Warranto is the proper remedy is better left to the court of
competent jurisdiction to rule upon.

SO ORDERED.2

Petitioners no longer moved for reconsideration of the foregoing Order and, instead, immediately elevated
the case to this Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorariunder Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.

The petition raises the following issues:

WHETHER A BRANCH OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT WHICH HAS NO JURISDICTION TO TRY AND
DECIDE A CASE HAS AUTHORITY TO REMAND THE SAME TO ANOTHER CO-EQUAL COURT IN ORDER TO
CURE THE DEFECTS ON VENUE AND JURISDICTION

II

WHETHER OR NOT ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 8-01 DATED JANUARY 23, 2001 WHICH TOOK
EFFECT ON MARCH 1, 2001 MAY BE APPLIED IN THE PRESENT CASE WHICH WAS FILED ON MAY 16,
2005.3

In their Comment, respondents argue that the present petition should be denied due course and dismissed
on the grounds that (1) an appeal under Rule 45 is inappropriate in this case because the Order dated July
13, 2005 is merely an interlocutory order and not a final order as contemplated under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure; (2) a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 is the wrong remedy under
A.M. No. 04-9-07-SC, which provides that "all decisions and final orders in cases falling under the Interim
Rules of Corporate Rehabilitation and the Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate

407
Controversies under Republic Act No. 8799 shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals through a Petition
for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court;" and (3) the petition was intended merely to delay the
proceedings in the trial court because when the case was transferred to Branch 21 of the Regional Trial
Court, said court granted petitioners' motion to hold the proceedings in view of the present petition
pending before this Court.

Subsequently, petitioners also filed an Urgent Motion to Restore Status Quo Ante, alleging that on January
12, 2006, respondent Jose Pierre Panday, with the aid of 14 armed men, assaulted the premises of St.
John Hospital in Naga City, taking away the daily hospital collections estimated at P400,000.00.

The Court notes that, indeed, petitioners chose the wrong remedy to assail the Order of July 13, 2005. It
is hornbook principle that Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure governs appeals from judgments or
final orders.4 The Order dated July 13, 2005 is basically a denial of herein petitioners' prayer in their
Answer for the dismissal of respondents' case against them. As a consequence of the trial court's refusal
to dismiss the case, it then directed the transfer of the case to another branch of the Regional Trial Court
that had been designated as a special court to hear cases formerly cognizable by the SEC. Verily, the
order was merely interlocutory as it does not dispose of the case completely, but leaves something more
to be done on its merits. Such being the case, the assailed Order cannot ordinarily be reviewed through a
petition under Rule 45. As we held in Tolentino v. Natanauan, 5 to wit:

In the case of Bangko Silangan Development Bank v. Court of Appeals, the Court reiterated the well-
settled rule that:

. . . an order denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory and therefore not appealable, nor can it
be the subject of a Petition for Review on Certiorari . Such order may only be reviewed in the ordinary
course of law by an appeal from the judgment after trial. The ordinary procedure to be followed in that
event is to file an answer, go to trial, and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the
final judgment.6

It appears, however, that the longer this case remains unresolved, the greater chance there is for more
violence between the parties to erupt. In Philippine Airlines v. Spouses Kurangking,7 the Court proceeded
to give due course to a case despite the wrong remedy resorted to by the petitioner therein, stating thus:

408
While a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 would ordinarily be inappropriate to assail an
interlocutory order, in the interest, however, of arresting the perpetuation of an apparent error committed
below that could only serve to unnecessarily burden the parties, the Court has resolved to ignore the
technical flaw and, also, to treat the petition, there being no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy, as
a special civil action for certiorari . Not much, after all, can be gained if the Court were to refrain from now
making a pronouncement on an issue so basic as that submitted by the parties.8

In this case, the basic issue of which court has jurisdiction over cases previously cognizable by the SEC
under Section 5, Presidential Decree No. 902-A (P.D. No. 902-A), and the propensity of the parties to
resort to violence behoove the Court to look beyond petitioners' technical lapse of filing a Petition for
Review on Certiorari instead of filing a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 with the proper court. Thus,
the Court shall proceed to resolve the case on its merits.

It should be noted that allegations in a complaint for quo warranto that certain persons usurped the
offices, powers and functions of duly elected members of the board, trustees and/or officers make out a
case for an intra-corporate controversy.9 Prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 8799, the Court, adopting
Justice Jose Y. Feria's view, declared in Unilongo v. Court of Appeals 10 that Section 1, Rule 66 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure is "limited to actions of quo warranto against persons who usurp a public office,
position or franchise; public officers who forfeit their office; and associations which act as corporations
without being legally incorporated," while "[a]ctions of quo warranto against corporations, or against
persons who usurp an office in a corporation, fall under the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange
Commission and are governed by its rules. (P.D. No. 902-A as amended)."11

However, R.A. No. 8799 was passed and Section 5.2 thereof provides as follows:

5.2. The Commission's jurisdiction over all cases enumerated under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No.
902-A is hereby transferred to the Courts of general jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial Court:
Provided, That the Supreme Court in the exercise of its authority may designate the Regional Trial Court
branches that shall exercise jurisdiction over these cases. xxx

Therefore, actions of quo warranto against persons who usurp an office in a corporation, which were
formerly cognizable by the Securities and Exchange Commission under PD 902-A, have been transferred

409
to the courts of general jurisdiction. But, this does not change the fact that Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure does not apply to quo warranto cases against persons who usurp an office in a private
corporation. Presently, Section 1(a) of Rule 66 reads thus:

Section 1. Action by Government against individuals. - An action for the usurpation of a public office,
position or franchise may be commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines against

(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, position or
franchise;

xxx

As explained in the Unilongo12 case, Section 1(a) of Rule 66 of the present Rules no longer contains the
phrase "or an office in a corporation created by authority of law" which was found in the old Rules. Clearly,
the present Rule 66 only applies to actions of quo warranto against persons who usurp a public office,
position or franchise; public officers who forfeit their office; and associations which act as corporations
without being legally incorporated despite the passage of R.A. No. 8799. It is, therefore, The Interim Rules
of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies Under R.A. No. 8799 (hereinafter the Interim
Rules) which applies to the petition for quo warranto filed by respondents before the trial court since what
is being questioned is the authority of herein petitioners to assume the office and act as the board of
directors and officers of St. John Hospital, Incorporated.

The Interim Rules provide thus:

Section 1. (a) Cases covered. - These Rules shall govern the procedure to be observed in civil cases
involving the following:

xxx

(2) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate, partnership, or association relations, between

and among stockholders, members, or associates, and between, any or all of them and the

410
corporation, partnership, or association of which they are stockholders, members, or associates,
respectively;

(3) Controversies in the election or appointment of directors, trustees, officers, or managers of

corporations, partnerships, or associations;

xxx

SEC. 5. Venue. - All actions covered by these Rules shall be commenced and tried in the Regional Trial
Court which has jurisdiction over the principal office of the corporation, partnership, or association
concerned. xxx (Emphasis ours)

Pursuant to Section 5.2 of R.A. No. 8799, the Supreme Court promulgated A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC
(effective December 15, 2000) designating certain branches of the Regional Trial Courts to try and decide
cases formerly cognizable by the Securities and Exchange Commission. For the Fifth Judicial Region, this
Court designated the following branches of the Regional Trial Court, to wit:

Camarines Sur (Naga City) Branch 23, Judge Pablo M. Paqueo, Jr.
Albay (Legaspi City) Branch 4, Judge Gregorio A. Consulta
Sorsogon (Sorsogon) Branch 52, Judge Honesto A. Villamor

Subsequently, the Court promulgated A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC, effective July 1, 2003, which provides that:

1. The Regional Courts previously designated as SEC Courts through the: (a) Resolutions of this
Court dated 21 November 2000, 4 July 2001, 12 November 2002, and 9 July 2002, all issued in A.M. No.
00-11-03-SC, (b) Resolution dated 27 August 2001 in A.M. No. 01-5-298-RTC; and (c) Resolution dated 8
July 2002 in A.M. No. 01-12-656-RTC are hereby DESIGNATED and shall be CALLED as Special
Commercial Courts to try and decide cases involving violations of Intellectual Property Rights which
fall within their jurisdiction and those cases formerly cognizable by the Securities and Exchange
Commission;

xxx

411
4. The Special Commercial Courts shall have jurisdiction over cases arising within their
respective territorial jurisdiction with respect to the National Capital Judicial Region and within the
respective provinces with respect to the First to Twelfth Judicial Regions. Thus, cases shall be filed in
the Office of the Clerk of Court in the official station of the designated Special Commercial
Court; (Emphasis ours)

The next question then is, which branch of the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the present action
for quo warrato? Section 5 of the Interim Rules provides that the petition should be commenced and tried
in the Regional Trial Court that has jurisdiction over the principal office of the corporation. It is undisputed
that the principal office of the corporation is situated at Goa, Camarines Sur. Thus, pursuant to A.M. No.
00-11-03-SC and A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC, it is the Regional Trial Court designated as Special Commercial
Courts in Camarines Sur which shall have jurisdiction over the petition for quo warranto filed by
herein Respondents.

Evidently, the RTC-Br. 58 in San Jose, Camarines Sur is bereft of jurisdiction over respondents' petition
for quo warranto. Based on the allegations in the petition, the case was clearly one involving an intra-
corporate dispute. The trial court should have been aware that under R.A. No. 8799 and the
aforementioned administrative issuances of this Court, RTC-Br. 58 was never designated as a Special
Commercial Court; hence, it was never vested with jurisdiction over cases previously cognizable by the
SEC.

Such being the case, RTC-Br. 58 did not have the requisite authority or power to order the transfer of the
case to another branch of the Regional Trial Court. The only action that RTC-Br. 58 could take on the
matter was to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction. In HLC Construction and Development Corp. v.
Emily Homes Subdivision Homeowners' Association,13 the Court held that the trial court, having no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint, should dismiss the same so the issues therein could
be expeditiously heard and resolved by the tribunal which was clothed with jurisdiction.

Note, further, that respondents' petition for quo warranto was filed as late as 2005. A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC
took effect as early as July 1, 2003 and it was clearly provided therein that such petitions shall be filed
in the Office of the Clerk of Court in the official station of the designated Special Commercial
Court. Since the official station of the designated Special Commercial Court for Camarines Sur is the

412
Regional Trial Court in Naga City, respondents should have filed their petition with said court. A.M. No. 00-
11-03-SC having been in effect for four years and A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC having been in effect for almost
two years by the time respondents filed their petition, there is no cogent reason why respondents were
not aware of the appropriate court where their petition should be filed.

The ratiocination of RTC-Br.58 that Administrative Circular No. 08-2001 authorized said trial court to order
the transfer of respondents' petition to the Regional Trial Court of Naga City is specious because as of the
time of filing of the petition, A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC, which clearly stated that cases formerly cognizable by
the SEC should be filed with the Office of the Clerk of Court in the official station of the designated
Special Commercial Court, had been in effect for almost two years. Thus, the filing of the petition with
the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Camarines Sur, which had no jurisdiction over those kinds of actions,
was clearly erroneous.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE and GRANTED. The Order of the Regional Trial Court
of San Jose, Camarines Sur dated July 13, 2005 is SET ASIDE for being NULL and VOID. The petition
for quo warranto in Civil Case No. T-1007 (now re-docketed as SEC Case No. RTC 2005-0001), entitled
"Jose Pierre A. Panday, et al. v. Sps. Joaquin M. Calleja, Jr., et al." is ordered DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 179431-32 June 22, 2010

LUIS K. LOKIN, JR., as the second nominee of CITIZENS BATTLE AGAINST CORRUPTION
(CIBAC), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and the HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 180443

413
LUIS K. LOKIN, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC), EMMANUEL JOEL J. VILLANUEVA, CINCHONA C.
GONZALES and ARMI JANE R. BORJE, Respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The principal question posed in these consolidated special civil actions for certiorari and mandamus is
whether the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) can issue implementing rules and regulations (IRRs)
that provide a ground for the substitution of a party-list nominee not written in Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7941,1 otherwise known as the Party-List System Act, the law that the COMELEC thereby implements.

Common Antecedents

The Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) was one of the organized groups duly registered under the
party-list system of representation that manifested their intent to participate in the May 14, 2007
synchronized national and local elections. Together with its manifestation of intent to participate,2 CIBAC,
through its president, Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva, submitted a list of five nominees from which its
representatives would be chosen should CIBAC obtain the required number of qualifying votes. The
nominees, in the order that their names appeared in the certificate of nomination dated March 29,
2007,3 were: (1) Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva; (2) herein petitioner Luis K. Lokin, Jr.; (3) Cinchona C.
Cruz-Gonzales; (4) Sherwin Tugna; and (5) Emil L. Galang. The nominees’ certificates of acceptance were
attached to the certificate of nomination filed by CIBAC. The list of nominees was later published in two
newspapers of general circulation, The Philippine Star News4 (sic) and The Philippine Daily Inquirer.5

Prior to the elections, however, CIBAC, still through Villanueva, filed a certificate of nomination,
substitution and amendment of the list of nominees dated May 7, 2007,6 whereby it withdrew the
nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and substituted Armi Jane R. Borje as one of the nominees. The
amended list of nominees of CIBAC thus included: (1) Villanueva, (2) Cruz-Gonzales, and (3) Borje.

414
Following the close of the polls, or on June 20, 2007, Villanueva sent a letter to COMELEC Chairperson
Benjamin Abalos,7 transmitting therewith the signed petitions of more than 81% of the CIBAC members,
in order to confirm the withdrawal of the nomination of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and the substitution of
Borje. In their petitions, the members of CIBAC averred that Lokin and Tugna were not among the
nominees presented and proclaimed by CIBAC in its proclamation rally held in May 2007; and that Galang
had signified his desire to focus on his family life.

On June 26, 2007, CIBAC, supposedly through its counsel, filed with the COMELEC en banc sitting as the
National Board of Canvassers a motion seeking the proclamation of Lokin as its second nominee.8 The
right of CIBAC to a second seat as well as the right of Lokin to be thus proclaimed were purportedly based
on Party-List Canvass Report No. 26, which showed CIBAC to have garnered a grand total of 744,674
votes. Using all relevant formulas, the motion asserted that CIBAC was clearly entitled to a second seat
and Lokin to a proclamation.

The motion was opposed by Villanueva and Cruz-Gonzales.

Notwithstanding Villanueva’s filing of the certificate of nomination, substitution and amendment of the list
of nominees and the petitions of more than 81% of CIBAC members, the COMELEC failed to act on the
matter, prompting Villanueva to file a petition to confirm the certificate of nomination, substitution and
amendment of the list of nominees of CIBAC on June 28, 2007.9

On July 6, 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8219,10 whereby it resolved to set the matter
pertaining to the validity of the withdrawal of the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and the
substitution of Borje for proper disposition and hearing. The case was docketed as E.M. No. 07-054.

In the meantime, the COMELEC en banc, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, issued National
Board of Canvassers (NBC) Resolution No. 07-60 dated July 9, 200711 to partially proclaim the following
parties, organizations and coalitions participating under the Party-List System as having won in the May
14, 2007 elections, namely: Buhay Hayaan Yumabong, Bayan Muna, CIBAC, Gabriela Women's Party,
Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives, Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment Through Action,
Cooperation and Harmony Towards Educational Reforms, Inc., Akbayan! Citizen's Action Party, Alagad,
Luzon Farmers Party, Cooperative-Natco Network Party, Anak Pawis, Alliance of Rural Concerns and

415
Abono; and to defer the proclamation of the nominees of the parties, organizations and coalitions with
pending disputes until final resolution of their respective cases.

The COMELEC en banc issued another resolution, NBC Resolution No. 07-72 dated July 18,
2007,12 proclaiming Buhay Hayaan Yumabong as entitled to 2 additional seats and Bayan Muna, CIBAC,
Gabriela Women's Party, and Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives to an additional seat each;
and holding in abeyance the proclamation of the nominees of said parties, organizations and coalitions
with pending disputes until the final resolution of their respective cases.

With the formal declaration that CIBAC was entitled to an additional seat, Ricardo de los Santos,
purportedly as secretary general of CIBAC, informed Roberto P. Nazareno, Secretary General of the House
of Representatives, of the promulgation of NBC Resolution No. 07-72 and requested that Lokin be formally
sworn in by Speaker Jose de Venecia, Jr. to enable him to assume office. Nazareno replied, however, that
the request of Delos Santos could not be granted because COMELEC Law Director Alioden D. Dalaig had
notified him of the pendency of E.M. 07-054.

On September 14, 2007, the COMELEC en banc resolved E.M. No. 07-05413 thuswise:

WHEREFORE, considering the above discussion, the Commission hereby approves the withdrawal of the
nomination of Atty. Luis K. Lokin, Sherwin N. Tugna and Emil Galang as second, third and fourth nominees
respectively and the substitution thereby with Atty. Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales as second nominee and
Atty. Armi Jane R. Borje as third nominee for the party list CIBAC. The new order of CIBAC's nominees
therefore shall be:

1. Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva

2. Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales

3. Armi Jane R. Borje

SO ORDERED.

416
The COMELEC en banc explained that the actions of Villanueva in his capacity as the president of CIBAC
were presumed to be within the scope of his authority as such; that the president was charged by Section
1 of Article IV of the CIBAC By-Laws to oversee and direct the corporate activities, which included the act
of submitting the party's manifestation of intent to participate in the May 14, 2007 elections as well as its
certificate of nominees; that from all indications, Villanueva as the president of CIBAC had always been
provided the leeway to act as the party's representative and that his actions had always been considered
as valid; that the act of withdrawal, although done without any written Board approval, was accomplished
with the Board’s acquiescence or at least understanding; and that the intent of the party should be given
paramount consideration in the selection of the nominees.

As a result, the COMELEC en banc proclaimed Cruz-Gonzales as the official second nominee of
CIBAC.14 Cruz-Gonzales took her oath of office

as a Party-List Representative of CIBAC on September 17, 2007.15

Precís of the Consolidated Cases

In G.R. No. 179431 and G.R. No. 179432, Lokin seeks through mandamus to compel respondent
COMELEC to proclaim him as the official second nominee of CIBAC.

In G.R. No. 180443, Lokin assails Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 promulgated on January 12,
2007;16 and the resolution dated September 14, 2007 issued in E.M. No. 07-054 (approving CIBAC’s
withdrawal of the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang as CIBAC’s second, third and fourth nominees,
respectively, and the substitution by Cruz-Gonzales and Borje in their stead, based on the right of CIBAC
to change its nominees under Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804).17 He alleges that Section 13 of
Resolution No. 7804 expanded Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941.18 the law that the COMELEC seeks to thereby
implement.

In its comment, the COMELEC asserts that a petition for certiorari is an inappropriate recourse in law due
to the proclamation of Cruz-Gonzales as Representative and her assumption of that office; that Lokin’s
proper recourse was an electoral protest filed in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET);
and that, therefore, the Court has no jurisdiction over the matter being raised by Lokin.

417
For its part, CIBAC posits that Lokin is guilty of forum shopping for filing a petition for mandamus and a
petition for certiorari, considering that both petitions ultimately seek to have him proclaimed as the
second nominee of CIBAC.

Issues

The issues are the following:

(a) Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the controversy;

(b) Whether or not Lokin is guilty of forum shopping;

(c) Whether or not Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 is unconstitutional and violates the Party-List
System Act; and

(d) Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in approving the withdrawal of the nominees of CIBAC and allowing the amendment of
the list of nominees of CIBAC without any basis in fact or law and after the close of the polls, and in
ruling on matters that were intra-corporate in nature.

Ruling

The petitions are granted.

A
The Court has jurisdiction over the case

The COMELEC posits that once the proclamation of the winning party-list organization has been done and
its nominee has assumed office, any question relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
candidates to the House of Representatives falls under the jurisdiction of the HRET pursuant to Section 17,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Thus, Lokin should raise the question he poses herein either in an

418
election protest or in a special civil action for quo warranto in the HRET, not in a special civil action for
certiorari in this Court.

We do not agree.

An election protest proposes to oust the winning candidate from office. It is strictly a contest between the
defeated and the winning candidates, based on the grounds of electoral frauds and irregularities, to
determine who between them has actually obtained the majority of the legal votes cast and is entitled to
hold the office. It can only be filed by a candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has
been voted for in the preceding elections.

A special civil action for quo warranto refers to questions of disloyalty to the State, or of ineligibility of the
winning candidate. The objective of the action is to unseat the ineligible person from the office, but not to
install the petitioner in his place. Any voter may initiate the action, which is, strictly speaking, not a
contest where the parties strive for supremacy because the petitioner will not be seated even if the
respondent may be unseated.

The controversy involving Lokin is neither an election protest nor an action for quo warranto, for it
concerns a very peculiar situation in which Lokin is seeking to be seated as the second nominee of CIBAC.
Although an election protest may properly be available to one party-list organization seeking to unseat
another party-list organization to determine which between the defeated and the winning party-list
organizations actually obtained the majority of the legal votes, Lokin’s case is not one in which a nominee
of a particular party-list organization thereby wants to unseat another nominee of the same party-list
organization. Neither does an action for quo warranto lie, considering that the case does not involve the
ineligibility and disloyalty of Cruz-Gonzales to the Republic of the Philippines, or some other cause of
disqualification for her.

Lokin has correctly brought this special civil action for certiorari against the COMELEC to seek the review
of the September 14, 2007 resolution of the COMELEC in accordance with Section 7 of Article IX-A of the
1987 Constitution, notwithstanding the oath and assumption of office by Cruz-Gonzales. The constitutional
mandate is now implemented by Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides for the
review of the judgments, final orders or resolutions of the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit. As

419
Rule 64 states, the mode of review is by a petition for certiorari in accordance with Rule 65 to be filed in
the Supreme Court within a limited period of 30 days. Undoubtedly, the Court has original and exclusive
jurisdiction over Lokin’s petitions for certiorari and for mandamus against the COMELEC.

B
Petitioner is not guilty of forum shopping

Forum shopping consists of the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of
action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. Thus,
forum shopping may arise: (a) whenever as a result of an adverse decision in one forum, a party seeks a
favorable decision (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another; or (b) if, after having filed a petition in
the Supreme Court, a party files another petition in the Court of Appeals, because he thereby deliberately
splits appeals "in the hope that even as one case in which a particular remedy is sought is dismissed,
another case (offering a similar remedy) would still be open"; or (c) where a party attempts to obtain a
writ of preliminary injunction from a court after failing to obtain the writ from another court.19

What is truly important to consider in determining whether forum shopping exists or not is the vexation
caused to the courts and the litigants by a party who accesses different courts and administrative agencies
to rule on the same or related causes or to grant the same or substantially the same reliefs, in the process
creating the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the different fora upon the same issue. 20

The filing of identical petitions in different courts is prohibited, because such act constitutes forum
shopping, a malpractice that is proscribed and condemned as trifling with the courts and as abusing their
processes. Forum shopping is an improper conduct that degrades the administration of justice.21

Nonetheless, the mere filing of several cases based on the same incident does not necessarily constitute
forum shopping. The test is whether the several actions filed involve the same transactions and the same
essential facts and circumstances.22 The actions must also raise identical causes of action, subject matter,
and issues.23 Elsewise stated, forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present, or
where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other.24

420
Lokin has filed the petition for mandamus to compel the COMELEC to proclaim him as the second nominee
of CIBAC upon the issuance of NBC Resolution No. 07-72 (announcing CIBAC’s entitlement to an additional
seat in the House of Representatives), and to strike down the provision in NBC Resolution No. 07-60 and
NBC Resolution No. 07-72 holding in abeyance "all proclamation of the nominees of concerned parties,
organizations and coalitions with pending disputes shall likewise be held in abeyance until final resolution
of their respective cases." He has insisted that the COMELEC had the ministerial duty to proclaim him due
to his being CIBAC’s second nominee; and that the COMELEC had no authority to exercise discretion and
to suspend or defer the proclamation of winning party-list organizations with pending disputes.

On the other hand, Lokin has resorted to the petition for certiorari to assail the September 14, 2007
resolution of the COMELEC (approving the withdrawal of the nomination of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and
the substitution by Cruz-Gonzales as the second nominee and Borje as the third nominee); and to
challenge the validity of Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804, the COMELEC’s basis for allowing CIBAC’s
withdrawal of Lokin’s nomination.

Applying the test for forum shopping, the consecutive filing of the action for certiorari and the action for
mandamus did not violate the rule against forum shopping even if the actions involved the same parties,
because they were based on different causes of action and the reliefs they sought were different.

C
Invalidity of Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804

The legislative power of the Government is vested exclusively in the Legislature in accordance with the
doctrine of separation of powers. As a general rule, the Legislature cannot surrender or abdicate its
legislative power, for doing so will be unconstitutional. Although the power to make laws cannot be
delegated by the Legislature to any other authority, a power that is not legislative in character may be
delegated.25

Under certain circumstances, the Legislature can delegate to executive officers and administrative boards
the authority to adopt and promulgate IRRs. To render such delegation lawful, the Legislature must
declare the policy of the law and fix the legal principles that are to control in given cases. The Legislature
should set a definite or primary standard to guide those empowered to execute the law. For as long as the

421
policy is laid down and a proper standard is established by statute, there can be no unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power when the Legislature leaves to selected instrumentalities the duty of
making subordinate rules within the prescribed limits, although there is conferred upon the executive
officer or administrative board a large measure of discretion. There is a distinction between the delegation
of power to make a law and the conferment of an authority or a discretion to be exercised under and in
pursuance of the law, for the power to make laws necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be.26

The authority to make IRRs in order to carry out an express legislative purpose, or to effect the operation
and enforcement of a law is not a power exclusively legislative in character, but is rather administrative in
nature. The rules and regulations adopted and promulgated must not, however, subvert or be contrary to
existing statutes. The function of promulgating IRRs may be legitimately exercised only for the purpose of
carrying out the provisions of a law. The power of administrative agencies is confined to implementing the
law or putting it into effect. Corollary to this is that administrative regulation cannot extend the law and
amend a legislative enactment. It is axiomatic that the clear letter of the law is controlling and cannot be
amended by a mere administrative rule issued for its implementation. Indeed, administrative or executive
acts shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.27

To be valid, therefore, the administrative IRRs must comply with the following requisites to be valid:28

1. Its promulgation must be authorized by the Legislature;

2. It must be within the scope of the authority given by the Legislature;

3. It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure; and

4. It must be reasonable.

The COMELEC is constitutionally mandated to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to
the conduct of an election, a plebiscite, an initiative, a referendum, and a recall.29 In addition to the
powers and functions conferred upon it by the Constitution, the COMELEC is also charged to promulgate
IRRs implementing the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code or other laws that the COMELEC enforces
and administers.30

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The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7804 pursuant to its powers under the Constitution, Batas Pambansa
Blg. 881, and the Party-List System Act.31 Hence, the COMELEC met the first requisite.

The COMELEC also met the third requisite. There is no question that Resolution No. 7804 underwent the
procedural necessities of publication and dissemination in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the
resolution itself.

Whether Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 was valid or not is thus to be tested on the basis of whether
the second and fourth requisites were met. It is in this respect that the challenge of Lokin against Section
13 succeeds.

As earlier said, the delegated authority must be properly exercised. This simply means that the resulting
IRRs must not be ultra vires as to be issued beyond the limits of the authority conferred. It is basic that
an administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress,32 for administrative IRRs are solely intended
to carry out, not to supplant or to modify, the law. The administrative agency issuing the IRRs may not
enlarge, alter, or restrict the provisions of the law it administers and enforces, and cannot engraft
additional non-contradictory requirements not contemplated by the Legislature.33

Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:

Section 8. Nomination of Party-List Representatives.-Each registered party, organization or coalition shall

submit to the COMELEC not later that forty-five (45) days before the election a list of names, not less than
five (5), from which party-list representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains the required number of
votes.

A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who have given their consent in writing may
be named in the list. The list shall not include any candidate of any elective office or a person who has lost
his bid for an elective office in the immediately preceding election. No change of names or alteration of the
order of nominees shall be allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the COMELEC except in
cases where the nominee dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination, becomes incapacitated in which
case the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list. Incumbent sectoral

423
representatives in the House of Representatives who are nominated in the party-list system shall not be
considered resigned.

The provision is daylight clear. The Legislature thereby deprived the party-list organization of the right to
change its nominees or to alter the order of nominees once the list is submitted to the COMELEC, except
when: (a) the nominee dies; (b) the nominee withdraws in writing his nomination; or (c) the nominee
becomes incapacitated. The provision must be read literally because its language is plain and free from
ambiguity, and expresses a single, definite, and sensible meaning. Such meaning is conclusively presumed
to be the meaning that the Legislature has intended to convey. Even where the courts should be
convinced that the Legislature really intended some other meaning, and even where the literal
interpretation should defeat the very purposes of the enactment, the explicit declaration of the Legislature
is still the law, from which the courts must not depart.34 When the law speaks in clear and categorical
language, there is no reason for interpretation or construction, but only for application.35 Accordingly, an
administrative agency tasked to implement a statute may not construe it by expanding its meaning where
its provisions are clear and unambiguous.36

The legislative intent to deprive the party-list organization of the right to change the nominees or to alter
the order of the nominees was also expressed during the deliberations of the Congress, viz:

MR. LAGMAN: And again on Section 5, on the nomination of party list representatives, I do not see any
provision here which prohibits or for that matter allows the nominating party to change the nominees or to
alter the order of prioritization of names of nominees. Is the implication correct that at any time after
submission the names could still be changed or the listing altered?

MR. ABUEG: Mr. Speaker, that is a good issue brought out by the distinguished Gentleman from Albay and
perhaps a perfecting amendment may be introduced therein. The sponsoring committee will gladly
consider the same.

MR. LAGMAN: In other words, what I would like to see is that after the list is submitted to the COMELEC
officially, no more changes should be made in the names or in the order of listing.

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MR. ABUEG: Mr. Speaker, there may be a situation wherein the name of a particular nominee has been
submitted to the Commission on Elections but before election day the nominee changed his political party
affiliation. The nominee is therefore no longer qualified to be included in the party list and the political
party has a perfect right to change the name of that nominee who changed his political party affiliation.

MR. LAGMAN: Yes of course. In that particular case, the change can be effected but will be the exception
rather than the rule. Another exception most probably is the nominee dies, then there has to be a change
but any change for that matter should always be at the last part of the list so that the prioritization made
by the party will not be adversely affected.37

The usage of "No" in Section 8 – "No change of names or alteration of the order of nominees shall be
allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the COMELEC except in cases where the nominee
dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination, or becomes incapacitated, in which case the name of the
substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list" – renders Section 8 a negative law, and is indicative of
the legislative intent to make the statute mandatory. Prohibitive or negative words can rarely, if ever, be
directory, for there is but one way to obey the command "thou shall not," and that is to completely refrain
from doing the forbidden act,38 subject to certain exceptions stated in the law itself, like in this case.

Section 8 does not unduly deprive the party-list organization of its right to choose its nominees, but
merely divests it of the right to change its nominees or to alter the order in the list of its nominees’ names
after submission of the list to the COMELEC.

The prohibition is not arbitrary or capricious; neither is it without reason on the part of lawmakers. The
COMELEC can rightly presume from the submission of the list that the list reflects the true will of the
party-list organization. The COMELEC will not concern itself with whether or not the list contains the real
intended nominees of the party-list organization, but will only determine whether the nominees pass all
the requirements prescribed by the law and whether or not the nominees possess all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications. Thereafter, the names of the nominees will be published in newspapers of
general circulation. Although the people vote for the party-list organization itself in a party-list system of
election, not for the individual nominees, they still have the right to know who the nominees of any
particular party-list organization are. The publication of the list of the party-list nominees in newspapers of
general circulation serves that right of the people, enabling the voters to make intelligent and informed

425
choices. In contrast, allowing the party-list organization to change its nominees through withdrawal of
their nominations, or to alter the order of the nominations after the submission of the list of nominees
circumvents the voters’ demand for transparency. The lawmakers’ exclusion of such arbitrary withdrawal
has eliminated the possibility of such circumvention.

D
Exceptions in Section 8 of R.A. 7941 are exclusive

Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 enumerates only three instances in which the party-list organization can
substitute another person in place of the nominee whose name has been submitted to the COMELEC,
namely: (a) when the nominee dies; (b) when the nominee withdraws in writing his nomination; and (c)
when the nominee becomes incapacitated.

The enumeration is exclusive, for, necessarily, the general rule applies to all cases not falling under any of
the three exceptions.

When the statute itself enumerates the exceptions to the application of the general rule, the exceptions
are strictly but reasonably construed. The exceptions extend only as far as their language fairly warrants,
and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provision rather than the exceptions. Where the
general rule is established by a statute with exceptions, none but the enacting authority can curtail the
former. Not even the courts may add to the latter by implication, and it is a rule that an express exception
excludes all others, although it is always proper in determining the applicability of the rule to inquire
whether, in a particular case, it accords with reason and justice.391avvphi1

The appropriate and natural office of the exception is to exempt something from the scope of the general
words of a statute, which is otherwise within the scope and meaning of such general words. Consequently,
the existence of an exception in a statute clarifies the intent that the statute shall apply to all cases not
excepted. Exceptions are subject to the rule of strict construction; hence, any doubt will be resolved in
favor of the general provision and against the exception. Indeed, the liberal construction of a statute will
seem to require in many circumstances that the exception, by which the operation of the statute is limited
or abridged, should receive a restricted construction.

426
 E
Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 expanded
the exceptions under Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941

Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 states:

Section 13. Substitution of nominees. – A party-list nominee may be substituted only when he dies,
or his nomination is withdrawn by the party, or he becomes incapacitated to continue as such,
or he withdraws his acceptance to a nomination. In any of these cases, the name of the substitute
nominee shall be placed last in the list of nominees.

No substitution shall be allowed by reason of withdrawal after the polls.

Unlike Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941, the foregoing regulation provides four instances, the fourth being when
the "nomination is withdrawn by the party."

Lokin insists that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in expanding to four the three statutory
grounds for substituting a nominee.

We agree with Lokin.

The COMELEC, despite its role as the implementing arm of the Government in the enforcement and
administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,40 has neither the authority
nor the license to expand, extend, or add anything to the law it seeks to implement thereby. The IRRs the
COMELEC issues for that purpose should always accord with the law to be implemented, and should not
override, supplant, or modify the law. It is basic that the IRRs should remain consistent with the law they
intend to carry out.41

Indeed, administrative IRRs adopted by a particular department of the Government under legislative
authority must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of
carrying the law’s general provisions into effect. The law itself cannot be expanded by such IRRs, because
an administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress.42

427
The COMELEC explains that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 has added nothing to Section 8 of R.A. No.
7941,43 because it has merely reworded and rephrased the statutory provision’s phraseology.

The explanation does not persuade.

To reword means to alter the wording of or to restate in other words; to rephrase is to phrase anew or in
a new form.44 Both terms signify that the meaning of the original word or phrase is not altered.

However, the COMELEC did not merely reword or rephrase the text of Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941, because
it established an entirely new ground not found in the text of the provision. The new ground granted to
the party-list organization the unilateral right to withdraw its nomination already submitted to the
COMELEC, which Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 did not allow to be done. Neither was the grant of the
unilateral right contemplated by the drafters of the law, who precisely denied the right to withdraw the
nomination (as the quoted record of the deliberations of the House of Representatives has indicated). The
grant thus conflicted with the statutory intent to save the nominee from falling under the whim of the
party-list organization once his name has been submitted to the COMELEC, and to spare the electorate
from the capriciousness of the party-list organizations.

We further note that the new ground would not secure the object of R.A. No. 7941 of developing and
guaranteeing a full, free and open party-list electoral system. The success of the system could only be
ensured by avoiding any arbitrariness on the part of the party-list organizations, by seeing to the
transparency of the system, and by guaranteeing that the electorate would be afforded the chance of
making intelligent and informed choices of their party-list representatives.

The insertion of the new ground was invalid. An axiom in administrative law postulates that administrative
authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of their IRRs, but must ensure that
their IRRs are reasonable and fairly adapted to secure the end in view. If the IRRs are shown to bear no
reasonable relation to the purposes for which they were authorized to be issued, they must be held to be
invalid and should be struck down.45

F
Effect of partial nullity of Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804

428
An IRR adopted pursuant to the law is itself law.46 In case of conflict between the law and the IRR, the law
prevails. There can be no question that an IRR or any of its parts not adopted pursuant to the law is no
law at all and has neither the force nor the effect of law.47 The invalid rule, regulation, or part thereof
cannot be a valid source of any right, obligation, or power.

Considering that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 – to the extent that it allows the party-list organization
to withdraw its nomination already submitted to the COMELEC – was invalid, CIBAC’s withdrawal of its
nomination of Lokin and the others and its substitution of them with new nominees were also invalid and
ineffectual. It is clear enough that any substitution of Lokin and the others could only be for any of the
grounds expressly stated in Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941. Resultantly, the COMELEC’s approval of CIBAC’s
petition of withdrawal of the nominations and its recognition of CIBAC’s substitution, both through its
assailed September 14, 2007 resolution, should be struck down for lack of legal basis. Thereby, the
COMELEC acted without jurisdiction, having relied on the invalidly issued Section 13 of Resolution No.
7804 to support its action.

WHEREFORE, we grant the petitions for certiorari and mandamus.

We declare Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 invalid and of no effect to the extent that it authorizes a
party-list organization to withdraw its nomination of a nominee once it has submitted the nomination to
the Commission on Elections.

Accordingly, we annul and set aside:

(a) The resolution dated September 14, 2007 issued in E. M. No. 07-054 approving Citizens’ Battle
Against Corruption’s withdrawal of the nominations of Luis K. Lokin, Jr., Sherwin N. Tugna, and Emil
Galang as its second, third, and fourth nominees, respectively, and ordering their substitution by
Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales as second nominee and Armi Jane R. Borje as third nominee; and

(b) The proclamation by the Commission on Elections of Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales as a Party-List

Representative representing Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption in the House of Representatives.

429
We order the Commission on Elections to forthwith proclaim petitioner Luis K. Lokin, Jr. as a Party-List
Representative representing Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption in the House of Representatives.

We make no pronouncements on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-2354. December 13, 1949.]

ALFONSO ARANETA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MARTA CUI VDA. DE SANSON, Defendant-Appellee.

Tomas Alonso and Gaudioso O. Sosmeña for Appellant.

Hipolito Alo for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. MORATORIUM LAW, NATURE OF; WAIVABLE. — The law on debt moratorium does not condone debts or
the payments of obligations. It merely suspends collection and payment. The right to such suspension
may be invoked by the debtor; but he may also waive or renounce it (Doctrine in Ma-ao Sugar Central Co.
v. Barrious, 45 Off. Gaz., p. 2444, 2 reiterated.)

DECISION

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

430
On June 17, 1941, Alfonso Araneta and his wife Dolores Bobadilla sold two parcels of land with the
improvements thereon, located in the City of Cebu, to Julian Sanson and his wife Marta Cui for P2,000,
with right to repurchase within one year, with the condition that pending repurchase, the vendors as
lessees could continue occupying the property by paying rent at the rate of P20 a month (Exhibit A). The
period of one year expired without the vendors exercising their right of repurchase. Legally, the vendees
became absolute owners of the two parcels, but on June 24, 1946, Marta Cui Vda. de Sanson (her
husband Julian being already dead) as an act of charity or generosity, resold the said two parcels to the
vendors Alfonso and Dolores for the same amount of P2,000, plus P1,000 as rents unpaid.

Afterwards, and after consulting some lawyers who were supposed to have advised him that he was not
under obligation to pay the P1,000 as back rents, Alfonso Araneta sought to recover the said amount from
Marta and upon her refusal, he brought the corresponding action to collect from Marta in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu (civil case No. R-27). Judgment was rendered absolving the defendant Marta Cui Vda. de
Sanson and Alfonso is now appealing from that decision.

Appellant’s contention is that under the provisions of Executive Order No. 25, as amended by Executive
Order No. 32 on debt moratorium, his payment of P1,000 was prematurely made and that the said
amount should be returned to him by the defendant-appellee. This contention is clearly untenable. We
quote with approval a portion of Judge Felix Martinez’ decision appealed from on this point of the
moratorium law.

"Si el demandante debia por alquileres esa cantidad a la demandada, bien hecho estaba que a
requerimiento de esta, aquel la pagara. La orden de moratoria no condonaba lo adeudado; posponia
solamente la obligacion de pagarlo por el periodo de su vigencia. La moratoria trataba de aliviar las
dificultades en que un deudor podria hallarse con ocasion de la guerra; pero si de todos modos el aqui
demandante, siendo deudor, estaba en situacion de pagar su deuda, y de hecho la pago; no hay razon, ni
se le debe permitir, que volviese atras, ya que de todos modos tenia que hacerlo tarde o
temprano."cralaw virtua1aw library

The law of debt moratorium does not condone debts on the payments of obligations. It merely suspends
collection and payment. The right to such suspension may be invoked by the debtor; but he may also
waive or renounce it. Plaintiff herein in voluntarily paying the P1,000 waived his right to suspend or

431
postpone. As was said by this Court in the case of Ma-ao Sugar Central Co. v. Barrios, 45 Off. Gaz., No. 6,
p. 2444, 1 the right granted by Executive Order No. 25, as amended by Executive Order No. 32, is a right
granted by law to debtors and such right may be waived because its waiver does not affect the public
interest or the rights of third parties.

But there is yet another reason against the contention of the appellant. According to the deed of sale
(Exhibit A) by virtue of which Alfonso Araneta and his wife sold the two parcels to the appellee and her
husband in 1941, and wherein it was agreed that the vendors were to continue occupying the property as
lessees by paying P20 monthly rent, said vendors may not exercise the right of redemption if they were
delinquent in the payment of any rent. Consequently, the right of appellant Alfonso to redeem the
property in question was conditioned on his paying the back rent amounting to P1,000. In other words,
the appellee was under no obligation to resell the property to him unless and until he first paid the P1,000
back rents. This, aside from the fact that as already stated, the period for repurchase had long expired as
far back as June, 1942, and that it was only out of consideration and charity that the appellee reconveyed
the property to appellant. We repeat that the contention of the appellant in this case is absolutely
untenable, not to say, savoring of the ingratitude and lack of appreciation.

Finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed. No pronouncement
as to costs.

Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Reyes and Torres, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 194994 April 16, 2013

EMMANUEL A. DE CASTRO, Petitioner,

vs.
EMERSON S. CARLOS, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, CJ.:

432
Before us is a Petition for the issuance of a writ of quo warranto under Rule 66 filed by Emmanuel A. de
Castro (petitioner) seeking to oust respondent Emerson S. Carlos (respondent) from the position of
assistant general manager for operations (AGMO) of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority
(MMDA).

On 29 July 2009, then President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo appointed petitioner as AGM0.1 His appointment
was concurred in by the members of the Metro Manila Council in MMDA Resolution No. 09-10, Series of
2009.2 He took his oath on 17 August 2009 before then Chairperson Bayani F. Fernando.3

Meanwhile, on 29 July 2010, Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa issued Office of the President (OP)
Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 2010, amending OP Memorandum Circular No. 1, Series of 2010.

OP Memorandum Circular No. 2 states:

2. All non-Career Executive Service Officials (non-CESO) occupying Career Executive Service (CES)
positions in all agencies of the executive branch shall remain in office and continue to perform their duties
and discharge their responsibility until October 31, 2010 or until their resignations have been accepted
and/or until their respective replacements have been appointed or designated, whichever comes first,
unless they are reappointed in the meantime.4

On 30 July 2010, Atty. Francis N. Tolentino, chairperson of the MMDA, issued Office Order No.
106,5 designating Corazon B. Cruz as officer-in-charge (OIC) of the Office of the AGMO. Petitioner was
then reassigned to the Legal and Legislative Affairs Office, Office of the General Manager. The service
vehicle and the office space previously assigned to him were withdrawn and assigned to other employees.

Subsequently, on 2 November 2010, Chairperson Tolentino designated respondent as OIC of the Office of
the AGMO by virtue of Memorandum Order No. 24,6 which in turn cited OP Memorandum Circular No. 2 as
basis. Thereafter, the name of petitioner was stricken off the MMDA payroll, and he was no longer paid his
salary beginning November 2010.

Petitioner sought a clarification7 from the Career Executive Service Board (CESB) as to the proper
classification of the position of AGMO. In her reply,8 Executive Director Maria Anthonette Allones

433
(Executive Director Allones), CESO I, stated that the position of AGMO had not yet been classified and
could not be considered as belonging to the Career Executive Service (CES). She further stated that a
perusal of the appointment papers of petitioner showed that he was not holding a coterminous position. In
sum, she said, he was not covered by OP Memorandum Circular Nos. 1 and 2.

Petitioner was later offered the position of Director IV of MMDA Public Health and Safety Services and/or
MMDA consultant. He turned down the offer, claiming that it was a demotion in rank.

Demanding payment of his salary and reinstatement in the monthly payroll,9 petitioner sent a letter on 5
December 2010 to Edenison Faisan, assistant general manager (AGM) for Finance and Administration; and
Lydia Domingo, Director III, Administrative Services. For his failure to obtain an action or a response from
MMDA, he then made a formal demand for his reinstatement as AGMO through a letter addressed to the
Office of the President on 17 December 2010.10

However, on 4 January 2011, President Benigno S. Aquino III (President Aquino) appointed respondent as
the new AGMO of the MMDA.11 On 10 January 2011, the latter took his oath of office.

Hence, the instant Petition.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing respondent, filed its Comment on 19 August
2011.12 However, upon motion of petitioner, it was disqualified from representing respondent. Thus, a
private law firm13 entered an appearance as counsel for respondent and adopted the Comment filed by the
OSG.14

Petitioner filed his Reply on 17 November 2011.

ISSUES

Petitioner raises the following issues15 for the consideration of this Court:

(1) Whether respondent Emerson S. Carlos was validly appointed by President Aquino to the position of
AGMO of the MMDA;

434
(2) Whether petitioner Emmanuel A. de Castro is entitled to the position of AGMO; and

(3) Whether or not respondent should pay petitioner the salaries and financial benefits he received during
his illegal tenure as AGMO of the MMDA.

THE COURT’S RULING

Petitioner contends that Section 2(3), Article IX(B) of the 1987 Constitution guarantees the security of
tenure of employees in the civil service. He further argues that his appointment as AGMO is not covered
by OP Memorandum Circular No. 2, since it is not a CES position as determined by the CESB.

On the other hand, respondent posits that the AGMO position belongs to the CES; thus, in order to have
security of tenure, petitioner, must be a Career Executive Service official (CESO). Respondent maintains
that the function of an AGM is executive and managerial in nature. Thus, considering that petitioner is a
non-CESO occupying a CES position, he is covered by OP Memorandum Circular Nos. 1 and 2. Respondent
likewise raises the issue of procedural infirmity in the direct recourse to the Supreme Court by petitioner,
who thereby failed to adhere to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.

Hierarchy of Courts

As to the procedural issue, petitioner submits that a direct recourse to this Court is warranted by the
urgent demands of public interest, particularly the veritable need for stability in the civil service and the
protection of the rights of civil servants. Moreover, considering that no other than the President of the
Philippines is the appointing authority, petitioner doubts if a trial court judge or an appellate court justice,
with a prospect of promotion in the judiciary would be willing to go against a presidential appointment.

Although Section 5(1) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that the Supreme Court
has original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas
corpus, the jurisdiction of this Court is not exclusive but is concurrent with that of the Court of Appeals
and regional trial court and does not give petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.16 The
hierarchy of courts must be strictly observed.

435
Settled is the rule that "the Supreme Court is a court of last resort and must so remain if it is to
satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter and immemorial
tradition."17 A disregard of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts warrants, as a rule, the outright dismissal of
a petition.18

A direct invocation of this Court’s jurisdiction is allowed only when there are special and important reasons
that are clearly and specifically set forth in a petition.19 The rationale behind this policy arises from the
necessity of preventing (1) inordinate demands upon the time and attention of the Court, which is better
devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction; and (2) further overcrowding of the Court’s
docket.20

In this case, petitioner justified his act of directly filing with this Court only when he filed his Reply and
after respondent had already raised the procedural infirmity that may cause the outright dismissal of the
present Petition. Petitioner likewise cites stability in the civil service and protection of the rights of civil
servants as rationale for disregarding the hierarchy of courts.

Petitioner’s excuses are not special and important circumstances that would allow a direct recourse to this
Court. More so, mere speculation and doubt to the exercise of judicial discretion of the lower courts are
not and cannot be valid justifications to hurdle the hierarchy of courts. Thus, the Petition must be
dismissed.

Nature of the AGMO Position

Even assuming that petitioner’s direct resort to this Court is permissible, the Petition must still be
dismissed for lack of merit.

"A petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a person to use or exercise a
franchise or an office and to oust the holder from the enjoyment, thereof, if the claim is not well-founded,
or if his right to enjoy the privilege has been forfeited."21 Where the action is filed by a private person, in
his own name, he must prove that he is entitled to the controverted position, otherwise, respondent has a
right to the undisturbed possession of the office.22

436
The controversy arose from the issuance of OP Memorandum Circular Nos. 1 and 2, which applies to all
non-CESO’s occupying CES positions in all agencies of the executive branch. Petitioner, being a non-CESO,
avers that he is not covered by these OP memoranda considering that the AGMO of the MMDA is a non-
CES position.

In order to settle the controversy, there is a need to determine the nature of the contentious position of
AGMO of the MMDA.

Career vs. non-career

Section 4 of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 7924,23 otherwise known as the MMDA Charter, specifically created
the position of AGMO. It reads as follows:

Sec. 4 Metro Manila Council. x x x.

xxxx

The Council shall be headed by a Chairman, who shall be appointed by the President and who shall
continue to hold office at the discretion of the appointing authority. He shall be vested with the rank,
rights, privileges, disqualifications, and prohibitions of a Cabinet member.

The Chairman shall be assisted by a General Manager, an Assistant General Manager for Finance and
Administration, an Assistant General Manager for Planning and an Assistant General Manager for
Operations, all of whom shall be appointed by the President with the consent and concurrence of the
majority of the Council, subject to civil service laws and regulations. They shall enjoy security of tenure
and may be removed for cause in accordance with law. (Emphasis supplied)

Executive Order No. (E.O.) 292, otherwise known as The Revised Administrative Code of 1987, provides
for two classifications of positions in the civil service: career and non-career.24

Career service is characterized by the existence of security of tenure,25 as contradistinguished from non-
career service whose tenure is coterminous with that of the appointing authority; or subject to the latter’s

437
pleasure; or limited to a period specified by law or to the duration of a particular project for which purpose
the appointment was made.26

Applying the foregoing distinction to the instant case, this Court finds that an AGMO holds a career
position, considering that the MMDA Charter specifically provides that AGMs enjoy security of tenure – the
core characteristic of a career service, as distinguished from a non-career service position.

CES vs. non-CES

Career service includes the following:

(1) Open Career positions for appointment to which prior qualification in an appropriate examination is
required;

(2) Closed Career positions which are scientific, or highly technical in nature; these include the faculty and
academic staff of state colleges and universities, and scientific and technical positions in scientific or
research institutions which shall establish and maintain their own merit systems;

(3) Positions in the Career Executive Service; namely, Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau
Director, Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director, Chief of Department
Service and other officers of equivalent rank as may be identified by the Career Executive Service Board,
all of whom are appointed by the President;

(4) Career officers, other than those in the Career Executive Service, who are appointed by the President,
such as the Foreign Service Officers in the Department of Foreign Affairs;

(5) Commissioned officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces which shall maintain a separate merit
system;

(6) Personnel of government-owned or controlled corporations, whether performing governmental or

proprietary functions, who do not fall under the non-career service; and

438
(7) Permanent laborers, whether skilled, semi-skilled, or unskilled.27 (Emphasis supplied)

In Civil Service Commission v. Court of Appeals and PCSO,28 the Court clarified the positions covered by
the CES:

Thus, from the long line of cases cited above, in order for a position to be covered by the CES, two
elements must concur. First, the position must either be (1) a position enumerated under Book V, Title I,
Subsection A, Chapter 2, Section 7(3) of the Administrative Code of 1987, i.e., Undersecretary, Assistant
Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director, Chief
of Department Service, or (2) a position of equal rank as those enumerated, and identified by the Career
Executive Service Board to be such position of equal rank. Second, the holder of the position must be a
presidential appointee. Failing in any of these requirements, a position cannot be considered as one
covered by the third-level or CES. (Emphasis supplied)

In sum, there are two elements required for a position to be considered as CES:

1) The position is among those enumerated under Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 2, Section 7(3) of
the Administrative Code of 1987 OR a position of equal rank as those enumerated and identified by the
CESB to be such position of equal rank; AND

2) The holder of the position is a presidential appointee. Records show that in reply29 to Chairperson
Tolentino’s query on whether the positions of general manager and AGM of the MMDA are covered by the
CES,30 the CESB – thru Executive Director Allones – categorically stated that these positions are not
among those covered by the CES.

Upon petitioner’s separate inquiry on the matter,31 the CESB similarly responded that the AGMO’s position
could not be considered as belonging to the CES.32 Additionally, Executive Director Allones said that
petitioner was not covered by OP Memorandum Circular Nos. 1 and 2, to wit:

A cursory perusal of your appointment papers would show that it does not bear any indication that you are
holding a coterminous appointment. Neither your position as AGMO can be considered as created in
excess of the authorized staffing pattern since RA 7924, the law that created the MMDA clearly provided

439
for such position. As further stated above, your position will not fall under paragraph No. 2 of OP MC 1
because it is not yet considered as belonging to the CES. Hence, we posit that you are not covered by OP
MC 1 and 2.33

However, contrary to Executive Director Allones’ statement, the CESB, through Resolution No. 799 already
declared certain positions meeting the criteria set therein as embraced within the CES.

It is worthy of note that CESB Resolution No. 799 was issued on 19 May 2009, even prior to petitioner’s
appointment on 29 July 2009. Moreover, as early as 31 May 1994, the above classification was already
embodied in CSC Resolution No. 34-2925, circularized in CSC Memorandum Circular 21, Series of 1994.

Resolution No. 799 classified the following positions as falling within the coverage of the CES:

a. The Career Executive Service includes the positions of Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau
director, Assistant Bureau Director, regional Director (department-wide and bureau-wide), Assistant
Regional Director (department-wide and bureau-wide), and Chief of Department Service;

b. Unless provided otherwise, all other managerial or executive positions in the government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters are embraced within the CES provided
that they meet the following criteria:

i.) The position is a career position;

ii.) The position is above division chief level; and,

iii.) The duties and responsibilities of the position require performance of executive and managerial
functions.

Without a doubt, the AGMO position is not one of those enumerated in the above-cited paragraph(a) but it
clearly falls under paragraph(b) considering that it belongs to a government-owned and controlled
corporation with an original charter. The nature of AGMO is clear from the provisions of the MMDA
Charter.

440
First, we have already determined that an AGMO is a career position that enjoys security of tenure by
virtue of the MMDA Charter.

Second, it is undisputed that the position of AGMO is above the division chief level, which is equivalent to
the rank of assistant secretary with Salary Grade 29.34

Third, a perusal of the MMDA Charter readily reveals that the duties and responsibilities of the position
require the performance of executive and managerial functions.

Section 12.4, Rule IV of the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. 7924 provides the powers,
functions, duties and responsibilities of an AGMO, as follows:

12.4 Assistant General Manager for Operations

The Assistant General Manager for Operations shall perform the following functions:

a. Establish a mechanism for coordinating and operationalizing the delivery of metro-wide basic services;

b. Maintain a monitoring system for the effective evaluation of the implementation of approved policies,
plans and programs for the development of Metropolitan Manila;

c. Mobilize the participation of local government units, executive departments or agencies of the national
government, and the private sector in the delivery of metro-wide services; and

d. Operate a central radio communication system.

He shall perform such other duties as are incidental or related to the above functions or as may be
assigned from time to time.

An AGMO performs functions that are managerial in character; exercises management over people,
resource, and/or policy; and assumes functions like planning, organizing, directing, coordinating,
controlling, and overseeing the activities of MMDA. The position requires the application of managerial or

441
supervisory skills necessary to carry out duties and responsibilities involving functional guidance,
leadership, and supervision.

For the foregoing reasons, the position of AGMO is within the coverage of the CES.

In relation thereto, positions in the career service, for which appointments require examinations, are
grouped into three major levels:35

Sec. 8. Classes of positions in the Career Service. — (1) Classes of positions in the career service
appointment to which requires examinations shall be grouped into three major levels as follows:

(a) The first level shall include clerical, trades, crafts and custodial service positions which involve non-
professional or sub-professional work in a non-supervisory or supervisory capacity requiring less than four
years of collegiate studies;

(b) The second level shall include professional, technical, and scientific positions which involve
professional, technical or scientific work in a non-supervisory or supervisory capacity requiring at least
four years of college work up to Division Chief levels; and

(c) The third level shall cover positions in the Career Executive Service. (Emphasis supplied)

Entrance to different levels requires corresponding civil service eligibilities.36 Those at the third level (CES
positions) require career service executive eligibility (CSEE) as a requirement for permanent
appointment.37

Evidently, an AGMO should possess all the qualifications required by third-level career service within the
CES. In this case, petitioner does not have the required eligibility. Therefore, we find that his appointment
to the position of AGMO was merely temporary.

Amores v. Civil Service Commission38 is instructive as to the nature of temporary appointments in the
CES. The Court held therein that an appointee cannot hold a position in a permanent capacity without the
required CES eligibility:

442
We begin with the precept, firmly established by law and jurisprudence that a permanent appointment in
the civil service is issued to a person who has met the requirements of the position to which the
appointment is made in accordance with law and the rules issued pursuant thereto. An appointment is
permanent where the appointee meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being
appointed, including the appropriate eligibility prescribed, and it is temporary where the appointee meets
all the requirements for the position except only the appropriate civil service eligibility.

xxxx

With particular reference to positions in the career executive service (CES), the requisite civil service
eligibility is acquired upon passing the CES examinations administered by the CES Board and the
subsequent conferment of such eligibility upon passing the examinations. Once a person acquires
eligibility, he either earns the status of a permanent appointee to the CES position to which he has
previously been appointed, or he becomes qualified for a permanent appointment to that position provided
only that he also possesses all the other qualifications for the position. Verily, it is clear that the
possession of the required CES eligibility is that which will make an appointment in the career executive
service a permanent one. Petitioner does not possess such eligibility, however, it cannot be said that his
appointment to the position was permanent.

Indeed, the law permits, on many occasions, the appointment of non-CES eligibles to CES positions in the
government in the absence of appropriate eligibles and when there is necessity in the interest of public
service to fill vacancies in the government. But in all such cases, the appointment is at best merely
temporary as it is said to be conditioned on the subsequent obtention of the required CES eligibility. This
rule, according to De Leon v. Court of Appeals, Dimayuga v. Benedicto, Caringal v. Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office, and Achacoso v. Macaraig, is invariable even though the given appointment may have
been designated as permanent by the appointing authority.

xxxx

Security of tenure in the career executive service, which presupposes a permanent appointment, takes
place upon passing the CES examinations administered by the CES Board x x x.

443
Petitioner undisputedly lacked CES eligibility. Thus, he did not hold the position of AGMO in a permanent
capacity or acquire security of tenure in that position. Otherwise stated, his appointment was temporary
and "co-terminus with the appointing authority."39 In Carillo v. CA,40 this Court ruled that "one who holds
a temporary appointment has no fixed tenure of office; his employment can be terminated at the pleasure
of the appointing power, there being no need to show that the termination is for cause." Therefore, we
find no violation of security of tenure when petitioner was replaced by respondent upon the latter’s
appointment to the position of AGMO by President Aquino.

Even granting for the sake of argument that the position of AGMO is yet to be classified by the CESB,
petitioner’s appointment is still deemed coterminous pursuant to CESB Resolution No. 945 issued on 14
June 2011, which reads:

WHEREAS, on November 23, 2010, the Supreme Court in the case of PCSO v. CSC, G.R. NO. 185766 and
G.R. No. 185767 limited the coverage of positions belonging to the CES to positions requiring Presidential
appointments.

WHEREAS, in the same vein, CES positions have now become synonymous to third level positions by
virtue of the said ruling.

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Board RESOLVES, as it is hereby RESOLVED, to issue
the following guidelines to clarify the policy on the coverage of CES and its classification:

1. For career service positions requiring Presidential appointments expressly enumerated under Section
7(3), Chapter 2, Subtitle A, Title 1, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 namely:

Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director,
Assistant Regional Director, and Chief of Department Service, no classification of position is necessary to
place them under the coverage of the CES, except if they belong to Project Offices, in which case a
position classification is required, in consultation with the Department of Budget and Management (DBM).

2. For positions requiring Presidential appointments other than those enumerated above, a classification of
positions is necessary which shall be conducted by the Board, upon request of the head of office of the

444
government department/agency concerned, to place them under the coverage of the CES provided they
comply with the following criteria:

i.) The position is a career position;

ii.) The position is above division chief level; and,

iii.)The duties and responsibilities of the position require the performance of executive and managerial
functions.

All appointments to positions which have not been previously classified as part of the CES would be
deemed co-terminus with the appointing authority. (Emphasis supplied)

Therefore, considering that petitioner is an appointee of then President Arroyo whose term ended on 30
June 2010, petitioner’s term of office was also deemed terminated upon the assumption of President
Aquino.

Likewise, it is inconsequential that petitioner was allegedly replaced by another non-CESO eligible. In a
quo warranto proceeding, the person suing must show that he has a clear right to the office allegedly held
unlawfully by another. Absent a showing of that right, the lack of qualification or eligibility of the supposed
usurper is immaterial.41

All the foregoing considered, the petition merits an outright dismissal for disregarding the hierarchy of
courts and petitioner’s lack of cause of action against respondent for failure to sufficiently show that he
has undisturbed rights to the position of AGMO of the MMDA.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 211140

445
LORD ALLAN JAY Q. VELASCO, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. SPEAKER FELICIANO R. BELMONTE, JR., SECRETARY GENERAL MARILYN1 B. BARUA-YAP
AND REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, Respondents.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

In the same manner that this Court is cautioned to be circumspect because one party is the son of a
sitting Justice of this Court, so too must we avoid abjuring what ought to be done as dictated by law and
justice solely for that reason.

Before this Court is a Petition for Mandamus filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, by
Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco (Velasco) against Hon. Feliciano R. Belmonte, Jr. (Speaker Belmonte,
Jr.), Speaker, House of Representatives, Hon. Marilyn B. Barua-Yap (Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap ), Secretary
General, House of Representatives, and Hon. Regina Ongsiako Reyes (Reyes), Representative, Lone
District of the Province of Marinduque .

Velasco principally alleges that he is the "legal and rightful winner during the May 13, 2013 elections in
accordance with final and executory resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and [this]
Honorable Court;"2 thus, he seeks the following reliefs:

a. that a WRIT OF MANDAMUS against the HON. SPEAKER FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR. be issued
ordering said respondent to administer the proper OATH in favor of petitioner Lord Allan Jay Q.
Velasco for the position of Representative for the Lone District of Marinduque; -and allow petitioner
to assume the position of representative for Marinduque and exercise the powers and prerogatives
of said position of Marinduque representative;

b. that a WRIT OF MANDAMUS against SECRETARY-GENERAL [MARILYN] BARUA-YAP be issued

ordering said respondent to REMOVE the name of Regina 0. Reyes in the Roll of Members of the

446
 House of Representatives and to REGISTER the name of petitioner Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco, herein
petitioner, in her stead; and

c. that a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER be issued to RESTRAIN, PREVENT and PROHIBIT

respondent REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES from usurping the position of Member of the House of
Representatives for the Lone District of Marinduque and from further exercising the prerogatives of
said position and performing the duties pertaining thereto, and DIRECTING her to IMMEDIATELY
VACATE said position.3

The pertinent facts leading to the filing of the present petition are:

On October 10, 2012, one Joseph Socorro Tan (Tan), a registered voter and resident of the Municipality of
Torrijos, Marinduque, filed with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a petition4 to deny due course or
cancel the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of Reyes as candidate for the position of Representative of the
Lone District of the Province of Marinduque. In his petition, Tan alleged that Reyes made several
material misrepresentations in her COC, i.e., "(i) that she is a resident of Brgy. Lupac, Boac,
Marinduque; (ii) that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen; (iii) that she is not a permanent resident of, or
an immigrant to, a foreign country; (iv) that her date of birth is July 3, 1964; (v) that her civil status is
single; and finally (vi) that she is eligible for the office she seeks to be elected to."5 The case was
docketed as SPA No. 13-053 (DC), entitled "Joseph Socorro B. Tan v. Atty. Regina Ongsiako Reyes."

On March 27, 2013, the COMELEC First Division resolved to grant the petition; hence, Reyes's COC was
accordingly cancelled. The dispositive part of said resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Certificate of
Candidacy of respondent REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES is hereby CANCELLED.6

Aggrieved, Reyes filed a motion for reconsideration thereto.

But while said motion was pending resolution, the synchronized local and national elections were held on
May 13, 2013.

447
The day after, or on May 14, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the resolution of the COMELEC First
Division, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
The March 27, 2013 Resolution of the Commission (First Division) is hereby AFFIRMED.7

A copy of the foregoing resolution was received by the Provincial Election Supervisor of Marinduque,
through Executive Assistant Rossini M. Oscadin, on May 15, 2013.

Likewise, Reyes's counsel, Atty. Nelia S. Aureus, received a copy of the same on May 16, 2013.

On May 18, 2013, despite its receipt of the May 14, 2013 COMELEC Resolution, the Marinduque Provincial
Board of Canvassers (PBOC) proclaimed Reyes as the winner of the May 13, 2013 elections for the
position of Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque.

On May 31, 2013, Velasco filed an Election Protest Ad Cautelam against Reyes in the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) docketed as HRET Case No. 13-028, entitled "Lord Allan Jay
Q. Velasco v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes."

Also on the same date, a Petition for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam was also filed against Reyes in the HRET
docketed as HRET Case No. 13-027, entitled "Christopher P Matienzo v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes."

On June 5, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Certificate of Finality8 in SPA No. 13-053 (DC), which
provides:

NOW, THEREFORE, considering that more than twenty-one (21) days have lapsed since the date of the
promulgation with no Order issued by the Supreme Court restraining its execution, the Resolution of the
Commission en banc promulgated on May 14, 2013 is hereby declared FINAL and EXECUTORY.9

On June 7, 2013, Speaker Belmonte, Jr. administered the oath of office to Reyes.

448
On June 10, 2013, Reyes filed before this Court a Petition for Certiorari docketed as GR. No. 207264,
entitled "Regina Ongsiako Reyes v. Commission on Elections and Joseph Socorro Tan," assailing (i) the
May 14, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc, which denied her motion for reconsideration of the
March 27, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division cancelling her . Certificate of Candidacy (for
material misrepresentations made therein); and (ii) the June 5, 2013 Certificate of Finality.

In the meantime, it appears that Velasco filed a Petition for Certiorari before the COMELEC docketed
as SPC No. 13-010, entitled "Rep. Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco vs. New Members/Old Members of the
Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) of the Lone District of Marinduque and Regina Ongsiako
Reyes," assailing the proceedings of the PBOC and the proclamation of Reyes as null and void.

On June 19, 2013, however, the COMELEC denied the aforementioned petition in SPC No. 13-010.

On June 25, 2013, in G.R. No. 207264, this Court promulgated a Resolution dismissing Reyes's
petition, viz.:

IN VIEW OF THE· FOREGOING, the instant petition is DISMISSED, finding no grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the Commission on Elections. The 14 May 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC En
Banc affirming the 27 March 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division is upheld.10

Significantly, this Court held that Reyes cannot assert that it is the HRET which has jurisdiction over her
since she is not yet considered a Member of the House of Representatives. This Court explained that to be
considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there must be a concurrence of the following
requisites: (i) a valid proclamation, (ii) a proper oath, and (iii) assumption of office.11

On June 28, 2013, Tan filed a Motion for Execution (of the March 27, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC
First Division and the May 14, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc) in SPA No. 13-053 (DC),
wherein he prayed that:

[A]n Order be issued granting the instant motion; and cause the immediate EXECUTION of this Honorable
Commission's Resolutions dated March 27, 2013 and May 14, 2013; CAUSE the PROCLAMATION of LORD

449
ALLAN JAY Q. VELASCO as the duly elected Member of the House of Representatives for the Lone District
of Marinduque, during the May 2013 National and Local Elections.12

At noon of June 30, 2013, it would appear that Reyes assumed office and started discharging the functions
of a Member of the House of Representatives.

On July 9, 2013, in SPC No. 13-010, acting on the motion for reconsideration of Velasco, the
COMELEC En Banc reversed the June 19, 2013 denial of Velasco's petition and declared null and void and
without legal effect the proclamation of Reyes. The dispositive part reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant motion for reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. The
assailed June 19, 2013 Resolution of the First Division is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Corollary thereto, the May 18, 2013 proclamation of respondent REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES is declared
NULL and VOID and without any legal force and effect. Petitioner LORD ALLAN JAY Q. VELASCO is
hereby proclaimed the winning candidate for the position of representative in the House of
Representatives for the province of Marinduque.13 (Emphasis supplied.)

Significantly, the aforequoted Resolution has not been challenged in this Court.

On July 10, 2013, in SPA No. 13-053 (DC), the COMELEC En Banc, issued an Order (i) granting Tan's
motion for execution (of the May 14, 2013 Resolution); and (ii) directing the reconstitution of a new PBOC
of Marinduque, as well as the proclamation by said new Board of Velasco as the duly elected
Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque. The fallo of which states:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Commission hereby GRANTS the instant Motion. Accordingly, a new
composition of the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Marinduque is hereby constituted to be composed of
the following:

1. Atty. Ma. Josefina E. Dela Cruz - Chairman

2. Atty. Abigail Justine Cuaresma-Lilagan - Vice Chairman

450
 3. Dir. Ester Villaflor-Roxas - Member

4. Three (3) Support Staffs

For this purpose, the Commission hereby directs, after due notice to the parties, the convening of the New
Provincial Board of Canvassers of Marinduque on July 16, 2013 (Tuesday) at 2:00 p.m., at the COMELEC
Session Hall. gth Floor. PDG Intramuros, Manila and to PROCLAIM LORD ALLAN JAY Q. VELASCO as the
duly elected Member of the House of Representatives for the Lone District of Marinduque in the May 13,
2013 National and Local Elections.

Further, Director Ester Villaflor-Roxas is directed to submit before the New Provincial Board of Canvassers
(NPBOC) a certified true copy of the votes of congressional candidate Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco in the
2013 National and Local Elections.

Finally, the NPBOC of the Province of Marinduque is likewise directed to furnish copy of the Certificate of
Proclamation to the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) and the House of
Representatives.14

On July 16, 2013, the newly constituted PBOC of Marinduque proclaimed herein petitioner Velasco as the
duly elected Member of the House of Representatives for the Lone District of Marinduque with 48,396
votes obtained from 245 clustered precincts.15

On July 22, 2013, the 16th Congress of the Republic of the Philippines formally convened in a joint
session. On the same day, Reyes, as the recognized elected Representative for the Lone District of
Marinduque, along with the rest of the Members of the House of Representatives, took their oaths in open
session before Speaker Belmonte, Jr.

On July 23, 2013, Reyes filed a Manifestation and Notice of Withdrawal of Petition "without waiver of her
arguments, positions, defenses/causes of action as will be articulated in the HRET which is now the proper
forum."16

451
On October 22, 2013, Reyes's motion for reconsideration17 (of this Court's June 25, 2013 Resolution
in GR. No. 207264) filed on July 15, 2013, was denied by this Court, viz.:

WHEREFORE, The Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. The dismissal of the petition is affirmed. Entry
of Judgment is ordered.18

On November 27, 2013, Reyes filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File and Admit Motion for
Reconsideration in G.R. No. 207264.

On December 3, 2013, said motion was treated as a second motion for reconsideration and was denied by
this Court.

On December 5, 2013 and January 20, 2014, respectively, Velasco sent two letters to Reyes essentially
demanding that she vacate the office of Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque and to
relinquish the same in his favor.

On December 10, 2013, Velasco wrote a letter to Speaker Belmonte, Jr. requesting, among others, that
he be allowed to assume the position of Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque.

On December 11, 2013, in SPC No. 13-010, acting .on the Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution
filed by Velasco on November 29, 2013, praying that:

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that a writ of execution be ISSUED to implement and enforce the
May 14, 2013 Resolution in SPA No. 13-053, the July 9, 2013 Resolution in SPC No. 13-010 and the July
16, 2013 Certificate of Proclamation of Petitioner Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco as Representative of
Marinduque. It is further prayed that a certified true copy of the writ of execution be personally served
and delivered by the Commission's bailiff to Speaker Feliciano Belmonte for the latter's implementation
and enforcement of the aforementioned May 14, 2013 Resolution and July 9, 2013 Resolution and the July
16, 2013 Certificate of Proclamation issued by the Special Board of Canvassers of the Honorable
Commission.19

452
the COMELEC issued an Order20 dated December 11, 2013 directing, inter alia, that all copies of its
Resolutions in SPA No. 13-053 (DC) and SPC No. 13-010, the Certificate of Finality dated June 5, 2013,
the Order dated July 10, 2013, and the Certificate of Proclamation dated July 16, 2013 be forwarded and
furnished to Speaker Belmonte, Jr. for the latter's information and guidance.

On February 4, 2014, Velasco wrote another letter to Speaker Belmonte, Jr. reiterating the above-
mentioned request but to no avail.

On February 6, 2014, Velasco also wrote a letter to Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap reiterating his earlier requests
(July 12 and 18, 2013) to delete the name of Reyes from the Roll of Members and register his name in her
place as the duly elected Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque.

However, Velasco relates that his efforts proved futile. He alleges that despite all the letters and requests
to Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap, they refused to recognize him as the duly elected
Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque. Likewise, in the face of numerous written demands for
Reyes to vacate the position and office of the Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque, she
continues to discharge the duties of said position.

Hence, the instant Petition for Mandamus with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or
injunction anchored on the following issues:

A. Whether or not Speaker Belmonte, Jr. can be COMPELLED, DIRECTED and ORDERED by a Writ of
Mandamus to administer the oath in favor of petitioner as duly elected Marinduque Representative
and allow him to assume said position and exercise the prerogatives of said office.

B. Whether or not respondent SG Barna-Yap can be COMPELLED, DIRECTED and ORDERED by a Writ
of Mandamus to delete the name of respondent Reyes from the Roll of Members of the House and
include the name of the Petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives.

C. Whether or not a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER (TRO) and a Writ of PERMANENT.

INJUNCTION can be issued to prevent, restrain and prohibit respondent Reyes from exercising the

453
 prerogatives and performing the functions as Marinduque Representative, and to order her to
VACATE the said office.21

As to the first and second issues, Velasco contends that he "has a well-defined and clear legal right and
basis to warrant the grant of the writ of mandamus."22 He insists that the final and executory decisions of
the COMELEC in SPA No. 13-053 (DC), and this Court in G.R. No. 207264, as well as the nullification of
respondent Reyes's proclamation and his subsequent proclamation as the duly elected Representative of
the Lone District of Marinduque, collectively give him the legal right to claim the congressional seat.

Thus, he contends that it is the ministerial duty of (i) respondent Speaker Belmonte, Jr. "to administer the
oath to [him] and to allow him to assume and exercise the prerogatives of the congressional seat for
Marinduque representative;"23 and (ii) respondent Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap "to register [his] name xx x as the
duly elected member of the House and delete the name of respondent Reyes from the Roll ofM
embers." 24 Velasco anchors his position on Codilla, Sr. v. De Venecia,25 citing a statement of this Court to
the effect that the Speaker of the House of Representatives has the ministerial duty to recognize the
petitioner therein (Codilla) as the duly elected Representative of the Fourth District of Leyte.

Despite the foregoing, Velasco asserts that both respondents Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-
Yap are unlawfully neglecting the performance of their alleged ministerial duties; thus, illegally excluding
him (Velasco) from the enjoyment of his right as the duly elected Representative of the Lone District of
Marinduque.26

With respect to the third issue, Velasco posits that the "continued usurpation and unlawful holding of such
position by respondent Reyes has worked injustice and serious prejudice to [him] in that she has already
received the salaries, allowances, bonuses and emoluments that pertain to the position of Marinduque
Representative since June 30, 2013 up to the present in the amount of around several hundreds of
thousands of pesos." Therefore, he prays for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of
permanent injunction against respondent Reyes to "restrain, prevent and prohibit [her] from usurping the
position."27

In her Comment, Reyes contends that the petition is actually one for quo warranto and not mandamus
given that it essentially seeks a declaration that she usurped the subject office; and the installation of

454
Velasco in her place by Speaker Belmonte, Jr. when the latter administers his oath of office and enters his
name in the Roll of Members. She argues that, being a collateral attack on a title to public office, the
petition must be dismissed as enunciated by the Court in several cases.28

As to the issues presented for resolution, Reyes questions the jurisdiction of the Court over Quo
Warranto cases involving Members of the House of Representatives. She posits that "even if the Petition
for Mandamus be treated as one of Quo Warranto, it is still dismissible for lack of jurisdiction and absence
of a clear legal right on the part of [Velasco]. "29 She argues that numerous jurisprudence have already
ruled that it is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal that has the sole and exclusive jurisdiction
over all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Members of the House of
Representatives. Moreover, she insists that there is also an abundance of case law that categorically
states that the COMELEC is divested of jurisdiction upon her proclamation as the winning candidate, as, in
fact, the HRET had already assumed jurisdiction over quo warranto cases30 filed against Reyes by several
individuals.

Given the foregoing, Reyes concludes that this Court is "devoid of original jurisdiction to annul [her]
proclamation. "31 But she hastens to point out that (i) "[e]ven granting for the sake of argument that the
proclamation was validly nullified, [Velasco] as second placer cannot be declared the winner x x x" as he
was not the choice of the people of the Province of Marinduque; and (ii) Velasco is estopped from
asserting the jurisdiction of this Court over her (Reyes) election because he (Velasco) filed an Election
Protest Ad Cautelam in the HRET on May 31, 2014.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), arguing for Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap,
opposed Velasco's petition on the following grounds:

I.

UPON RESPONDENT REYES' PROCLAMATION ON MAY 18, 2013, EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION TO RESOLVE
ELECTION CONTESTS INVOLVING RESPONDENT REYES, INCLUDING THE VALIDITY OF HER
PROCLAMATION AND HER ELIGIBILITY FOR OFFICE, VESTED IN THE HRET.

455
Hence, until and unless the HRET grants any quo warranto petition or election protest filed against
respondent Reyes, and such HRET resolution or resolutions become final and executory, respondent Reyes
may not be restrained from exercising the prerogatives of Marinduque Representative, and respondent
Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap may not be compelled by mandamus to remove respondent Reyes :S name from the
Roll of Members of the House.

II.

CODILLA v. COMELEC IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE, GIVEN THAT PETITIONER, BEING MERELY THE
SECOND PLACER IN THE MAY 13, 2013 ELECTIONS, CANNOT VALIDLY ASSUME THE POST OF
MARINDUQUE REPRESENTATIVE.

Hence, respondents Speaker Belmonte and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap may not be compelled by mandamus to,
respectively, administer the proper oath to petitioner and register the latter's name in the Roll of Members
of the House.

III.

PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE INJUNCTIVE RELIEFS PRAYED FOR.32

The OSG presents the foregoing arguments on the premise that there is a need for this Court to revisit its
twin Resolutions dated June 25, 2013 and October 22, 2013 both in GR. No. 207264, given that (i) this
Court was "divided" when it issued the same; and (ii) there were strong dissents to the majority opinion.
It argues that this Court has in the past revisited decisions already final and executory; there is no
hindrance for this Court to do the same in G.R. No. 207264.

Moreover, the OSG contends that:

Despite the finality of the June 25, 2013 Resolution and the October 22, 2013 Resolution, upholding the
cancellation of respondent Reyes's CoC, there has been no compelling reason for the House to withdraw
its recognition of respondent Reyes as Marinduque Representative, in the absence· of any specific order or
directive to the House. To be sure, there was nothing in the Honorable Court's disposition in Reyes v.

456
COMELEC that required any action from the House. Again, it bears emphasis that neither petitioner nor
respondents Speaker Belmonte and Sec. Gen. Barna-Yap were parties in Reyes v. COMELEC.

Further, records with the HRET show that the following cases have been filed against respondent Reyes:

(i) Case No. 13-036 (Quo Warranto), entitled Noeme Mayores Tan & Jeasseca L. Mapacpac v. Regina
Ongsiako Reyes;

(ii) Case No. 13-037 (Quo Warranto), entitled Eric D. Junio v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes;

(iii) Case No. 13-027 (Quo Warranto ), entitled Christopher Matienzo v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes; and

(iv) Case No. 13-028 (Election Protest), entitled Lord Allan Jay Velasco v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes.33

And in view of the cases filed in the HRET, the OSG insists that:

If the jurisdiction of the COMELEC were to be retained until the assumption of office of the winner, at noon
on the thirtieth day of June next following the election, then there would obviously be a clash of
jurisdiction between the HRET and the COMELEC, given that the 2011 HRET Rules provide that the
appropriate cases should be filed before it within 15 days from the date of proclamation of the winner. If,
as the June 25, 2013 Resolution provides, the HRET's jurisdiction begins only after assumption of office, at
noon of June 30 following the election, then quo warranto petitions and election protests filed on or after
said date would be dismissed outright by the HRET under its own rules for having been filed out of time,
where the winners have already been proclaimed within the period after the May elections and up to June
14.34

In recent development, however, the HRET promulgated a Resolution on December 14, 2015 dismissing
HRET Case Nos. 13-036 and 13-037,35 the twin petitions for quo warranto filed against Reyes, to wit:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the September 23, 2014 Motion for Reconsideration of Victor Vela
Sioco is hereby GRANTED. The September 11, 2014 Resolution of [the] Tribunal is hereby REVERSED

457
and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the present Petitions for Quo Warranto are hereby DISMISSED for lack of
jurisdiction.36

In the said Resolution, the HR.ET held that "the final Supreme Court ruling in GR. No. 207264 is the
COGENT REASON to set aside the September 11, 2014 Resolution."37

To make clear, the September 11, 2014 Resolution of the HRET ordered the dismissal of a Petition-In-
Intervention filed by one Victor Vela Sioco (Sioco) in the twin petitions for quo warranto, for "lack of
merit." Further, the HRET directed "the hearing and reception of evidence of the two Petitions for Quo
Warranto against x x x Respondent [Reyes] to proceed. "38 Sioco, however, moved for the reconsideration
of the said September 11, 2014 HR.ET Resolution based on the argument that the latter was contrary to
law and jurisprudence given the Supreme Court ruling in G.R. No. 207264.

Subsequently, the December 14, 2015 Resolution of the HRET held that-

The Tribunals Jurisdiction

It is necessary to clarify the Tribunal's jurisdiction over the present petitions for quo warranto, considering
the parties' divergent postures on how the Tribunal should resolve the same vis-a-vis the Supreme Court
ruling in G.R. No. 207264.

The petitioners believe that the Tribunal has jurisdiction over their petitions. They pray that "after due
proceedings," the Tribunal "declare Respondent REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES DISQUALIFIED/INELIGIBLE to
sit as Member of the House of Representatives, representing the Province of Marinduque." In addition, the
petitioner Eric Del Mundo Junio urges the Tribunal to follow the Supreme Court pronouncement in G.R. No.
207264.

On the other hand, Victor Vela Sioco, in his Petition-In-Intervention, pleads for the outright dismissal of
the present petitions considering the Supreme Court final ruling in G.R. No. 207264. For her part,
respondent Regina Reyes prays too for the dismissal of the present petitions, albeit after reception of
evidence by the contending parties.

458
The constitutional mandate of the Tribunal is clear: It is "the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of [House] Members." Such power or authority of the Tribunal is
echoed in its 2011 Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal: "The Tribunal is the sole
judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of the Members of the House of
Representatives."

xxxx

In the present cases, before respondent Regina Reyes was proclaimed on May 18, 2013, the COMELEC En
Banc, in its Resolution of May 14, 2013 in SPA No. 13-053 (DC), had already resolved that the COMELEC
First Division correctly cancelled her COC on the ground that she lacked the Filipino citizenship and
residency requirements. Thus, the COMELEC nullified her proclamation. When Regina Reyes challenged
the COMELEC actions, the Supreme Court En Banc, in its Resolution of June 25, 2013 in G.R. No. 207246,
upheld the same.

With the COMELEC's cancellation of respondent Regina Reyes' COC, resulting in the nullification of her
proclamation, the Tribunal, much as we would want to, cannot assume jurisdiction over the present
petitions. The jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is considered a Member of the
House of Representatives. And to be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there must be
a concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption
of office, so the Supreme Court pronounced in its Resolution of June 25, 2013 in G.R. No. 207264, thus:

x x x, the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is considered a Member of the House of
Representatives, as stated in Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution:

xxxx

As held in Marcos v. COMELEC, the HRET does not have jurisdiction over a candidate who is not a member
of the House of Representatives x x x.

xxxx

459
The next inquiry, then, is when is a candidate considered a Member of the House of Representatives?

In Vinzons-Chato v. COMELEC, citing Aggabao v. COMELEC and Guerrero v. COMELEC, the Court ruled
that:

The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and
assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over election
contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction
begins.xx x

From the foregoing, it is then clear that to be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there
must be a concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3)
assumption of office x x x.

Based on the above-quoted ruling of the Supreme Court, a valid proclamation is the first essential element
before a candidate can be considered a Member of the House of Representatives over which the Tribunal
could assume jurisdiction. Such element is obviously absent in the present cases as Regina Reyes'
proclamation was nullified by the COMELEC, which nullification was upheld by the Supreme Court. On this
ground alone, the Tribunal is without power to assume jurisdiction over the present petitions since Regina
Reyes "cannot be considered a Member of the House of Representatives," as declared by the Supreme
Court En Banc in G.R. No. 207264. It further stresses:

"x x x there was no basis for the proclamation of petitioner [Regina Reyes] on 18 May 2013. Without the
proclamation, the petitioner's oath of office is likewise baseless, and without a precedent oath of office,
there can be no valid and effective assumption of office."

The Supreme Court has spoken. Its pronouncements must be respected. Being the ultimate guardian of
the Constitution, and by constitutional design, the Supreme Court is "supreme in its task of adjudication;
x x x. As a rule, all decisions and determinations in the exercise of judicial power ultimately go to and stop
at the Supreme Court whose judgment is final." This Tribunal, as all other courts, must take their bearings
from the decisions and rulings of the Supreme Court.39

460
Incidentally, it appears that an Information against Reyes for violation of Article 1 77 (Usurpation of
Official Functions) of the Revised Penal Code, dated August 3, 2015, has been filed in
court,40 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes. "41

The Issue

The issue for this Court's resolution boils down to the propriety of issuing a writ of mandamus to compel
Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap to perform the specific acts sought by Velasco in this
petition.

The Ruling

The petition has merit.

At the outset, this Court observes that the respondents have taken advantage of this petition to re-litigate
what has been settled in G.R. No. 207264. Respondents are reminded to respect the Entry of
Judgment that has been issued therein on October 22, 2013.

After a painstaking evaluation of the allegations in this petition, it is readily apparent that this special civil
action is really one for mandamus and not a quo warranto case, contrary to the asseverations of the
respondents.

A petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a person to the use or exercise of a
franchise or office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, if his claim is not well-founded, or if he has
forfeited his right to enjoy the privilege. Where the action is filed by a private person, he must prove that
he is entitled to the controverted position; otherwise, respondent has a right to the undisturbed
possession of the office.42 In this case, given the present factual milieu, i.e., (i) the final and executory
resolutions of this Court in G.R. No. 207264; (ii) the final and executory resolutions of the COMELEC in
SPA No. 13-053 (DC) cancelling Reyes's Certificate of Candidacy; and (iii) the final and executory
resolution of the COMELEC in SPC No. 13-010 declaring null and void the proclamation of Reyes and
proclaiming Velasco as the winning candidate for the position of Representative for the Lone District of the

461
Province of Marinduque - it cannot be claimed that the present petition is one for the determination of the
right of Velasco to the claimed office.

To be sure, what is prayed for herein is merely the enforcement of clear legal duties and not to try
disputed title. That the respondents make it appear so will not convert this petition to one for quo
warranto.

Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides that any person may file a verified petition
for mandamus "when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or
station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other
is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." A
petition for mandamus will prosper if it is shown that the subject thereof is a ministerial act or duty,
and not purely discretionary on the part of the board, officer or person, and that the petitioner has a well-
defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant thereof.43

The difference between a ministerial and discretionary act has long been established. A purely ministerial
act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in
obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon
the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him
the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not
ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of
official discretion or judgment.44

As the facts stand in this case, Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Y ap have no discretion
whether or not to administer the oath of office to Velasco and to register the latter's name in the Roll of
Members of the House of Representatives, respectively. It is beyond cavil that there is in existence final
and executory resolutions of this Court in G.R. No. 207264 affirming the final and executory resolutions of
the COMELEC in SPA No. 13-053 (DC) cancelling Reyes's Certificate of Candidacy. There is likewise a final
and executory resolution of the COMELEC in SPC No. 13-010 declaring null and void the proclamation of
Reyes, and proclaiming Velasco as the winning candidate for the position of Representative for the Lone
District of the Province of Marinduque.

462
The foregoing state of affairs collectively lead this Court to consider the facts as settled and beyond
dispute - Velasco is the proclaimed winning candidate for the Representative of the Lone District
of the Province of Marinduque.

Reyes argues in essence that this Court is devoid of original jurisdiction to annul her proclamation.
Instead, it is the HRET that is constitutionally mandated to resolve any questions regarding her election,
the returns of such election, and her qualifications as a Member of the House of Representatives especially
so that she has already been proclaimed, taken her oath, and started to discharge her duties as a Member
of the House of Representatives representing the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque. But the
confluence of the three acts in this case - her proclamation, oath and assumption of office - has not
altered the legal situation between Velasco and Reyes.

The important point of reference should be the date the COMELEC finally decided to cancel the Certificate
of Candidacy (COC) of Reyes which was on May 14, 2013. The most crucial time is when Reyes's COC
was cancelled due to her non-eligibility to run as Representative of the Lone District of the Province of
Marinduque - for without a valid COC, Reyes could not be treated as a candidate in the election
and much less as a duly proclaimed winner. That particular decision of the COMELEC was
promulgated even before Reyes' s proclamation, and which was affirmed by this Court's final and
executory Resolutions dated June 25, 2013 and October 22, 2013.

This Court will not give premium to the illegal actions of a subordinate entity of the COMELEC, the PBOC
who, despite knowledge of the May 14, 2013 resolution of the COMELEC En Banc cancelling Reyes' s COC,
still proclaimed her as the winning candidate on May 18, 2013. Note must also be made that as early as
May 16, 2013, a couple of days before she was proclaimed, Reyes had already received the said decision
cancelling her COC. These points clearly show that the much argued proclamation was made in clear
defiance of the said COMELEC En Banc Resolution.

That Velasco now has a well-defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant of the present petition
for mandamus is supported by the following undisputed facts that should be taken into consideration:

First. At the time of Reyes's proclamation, her COC was already cancelled by the COMELEC En
Banc in its final finding in its resolution dated May 14, 2013, the effectivity of which was not

463
 enjoined by this Court, as Reyes did not avail of the prescribed remedy which is to seek a
restraining order within a period of five (5) days as required by Section 13(b), Rule 18 of COMELEC
Rules. Since no restraining order was forthcoming, the PBOC should have refrained from proclaiming
Reyes.

Second. This Court upheld the COMELEC decision cancelling respondent Reyes's COC in its
Resolutions of June 25, 2013 and October 22, 2013 and these Resolutions are already final and
executory.

Third. As a consequence of the above events, the COMELEC in SPC No. 13-010 cancelled
respondent Reyes's proclamation and, in turn, proclaimed Velasco as the duly elected Member of the
House of Representatives in representation of the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque. The
said proclamation has not been challenged or questioned by Reyes in any proceeding.

Fourth. When Reyes took her oath of office before respondent Speaker Belmonte, Jr. in open
session, Reyes had NO valid COC NOR a valid proclamation.

Thus, to consider Reyes' s proclamation and treating it as a material fact in deciding this case will
paradoxically alter the well-established legal milieu between her and Velasco.

Fifth. In view of the foregoing, Reyes HAS ABSOLUTELY NO LEGAL BASIS to serve as a Member
of the House of Representatives for the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque, and therefore,
she HAS NO LEGAL PERSONALITY to be recognized as a party-respondent at a quo
warranto proceeding before the HRET.

And this is precisely the basis for the HRET' s December. 14, 2015 Resolution acknowledging and ruling
that it has no jurisdiction over the twin petitions for quo warranto filed against Reyes. Its finding was
based on the existence of a final and executory ruling of this Court in G.R. No. 207264 that Reyes is not
a bona fide member of the House of Representatives for lack of a valid proclamation. To reiterate this
Court's pronouncement in its Resolution, entitled Reyes v. Commission on Elections45-

464
The averred proclamation is the critical pointer to the correctness of petitioner's submission. The crucial
question is whether or not petitioner [Reyes] could be proclaimed on 18 May 2013. Differently stated, was
there basis for the proclamation of petitioner on 18 May 2013?

Dates and events indicate that there was no basis for the proclamation of petitioner on 18 May 2013.
Without the proclamation, the petitioner's oath of office is likewise baseless, and without a precedent oath
of office, there can be no valid and effective assumption of office.

xxxx

"More importantly, we cannot disregard a fact basic in this controversy - that before the proclamation of
petitioner on 18 May 2013, the COMELEC En Banc had already finally disposed of the issue of petitioner's
[Reyes] lack of Filipino citizenship and residency via its Resolution dated 14 May 2013. After 14 May 2013,
there was, before the COMELEC, no longer any pending case on petitioner's qualifications to run for the
position of Member of the House of Representatives. x x x."

As the point has obviously been missed by the petitioner [Reyes] who continues to argue on the basis of
her "due proclamation," the instant motion gives us the opportunity to highlight the undeniable fact we
here repeat that the proclamation which petitioner secured on 18 May 2013 was WITHOUT ANY
BASIS." (Emphasis supplied.)

Put in another way, contrary to the view that the resort to the jurisdiction of the HRET is a plain, speedy
and adequate remedy, such recourse is not a legally available remedy to any party, specially to Velasco,
who should be the sitting Member of the House of Representatives if it were not for the disregard by the
leadership of the latter of the binding decisions of a constitutional body, the COMELEC, and the Supreme
Court

Though the earlier existence of the twin quo warranto petitions filed against Reyes before the HRET had
actually no bearing on the status of finality of the decision of the COMELEC in SPC No. 13-010.
Nonetheless, their dismissal pursuant to the HRET' s December 14, 2015 Resolution sustained Velasco's
well-defined, clear and certain right to the subject office.

465
The present Petition for Mandamus seeks the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel respondents
Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap to acknowledge and recognize the final and executory
Decisions and Resolution of this Court and of the COMELEC by administering the oath of office to Velasco
and entering the latter's name in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives. In other words, the
Court is called upon to determine whether or not the prayed for acts, i.e., (i) the administration of the
oath of office to Velasco; and (ii) the inclusion of his name in the Roll of Members, are ministerial in
character vis-a-vis the factual and legal milieu of this case. As we have previously stated, the
administration of oath and the registration of Velasco in the Roll of Members of the House of
Representatives for the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque are no longer a matter of
discretion or judgment on the part of Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap. They are legally
duty-bound to recognize Velasco as the duly elected Member of the House of Representatives for the Lone
District of Marinduque in view of the ruling rendered by this Court and the COMELEC'S compliance with the
said ruling, now both final and executory.

It will not be the first time that the Court will grant Mandamus to compel the Speaker of the House of
Representatives to administer the oath to the rightful Representative of a legislative district and the
Secretary-General to enter said Representative's name in the Roll of Members of the House of
Representatives. In Codilla, Sr. v. De Venecia,46 the Court decreed:

Under Rule 65, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, any person may file a verified petition
for mandamus "when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or
station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other
is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." For a
petition for mandamus to prosper, it must be shown that the subject of the petition for mandamus is
a ministerial act or duty, and not purely discretionary on the part of the board, officer or person, and that
the petitioner has a well-defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant thereof.

The distinction between a ministerial and discretionary act is well delineated. A purely ministerial act or
duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in
obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon
the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him

466
the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not
ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of
official discretion or judgment.

In the case at bar, the administration of oath and the registration of the petitioner in the Roll of Members
of the House of Representatives representing the 4th legislative district of Leyte is no longer a matter of
discretion on the part of the public respondents. The facts are settled and beyond dispute: petitioner
garnered 71,350 votes as against respondent Locsin who only got 53,447 votes in the May 14, 2001
elections. The COMELEC Second Division initially ordered the proclamation of respondent Locsin; on
Motion for Reconsideration the COMELEC en banc set aside the order of its Second Division and ordered
the proclamation of the petitioner. The Decision of the COMELEC en banc has not been challenged before
this Court by respondent Locsin and said Decision has become final and executory.

In sum, the issue of who is the rightful Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte has been
finally settled by the COMELEC en banc, the constitutional body with jurisdiction on the matter. The rule of
law demands that its Decision be obeyed by all officials of the land There is no alternative to the rule of
law except the reign of chaos and confusion.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition for Mandamus is granted. Public Speaker of the House of
Representatives shall administer the oath of petitioner EUFROCINO M. CODILLA, SR., as the duly-elected
Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte. Public respondent Secretary-General shall likewise
register the name of the petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives after he has
taken his oath of office. This decision shall be immediately executory. (Citations omitted.)

Similarly, in this case, by virtue of (i) COMELEC en bane Resolution dated May 14, 2013 in SPA No. 13-
053 (DC); (ii) Certificate of Finality dated June 5, 2013 in SPA No. 13-053 (DC); (iii) COMELEC en
banc Resolution dated June 19, 2013 in SPC No. 13-010; (iv) COMELEC en banc Resolution dated July 10,
2013 in SPA No. 13-053 (DC); and (v) Velasco's Certificate of Proclamation dated July 16, 2013, Velasco
is the rightful Representative of the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque; hence,
entitled to a writ of Mandamus.

467
As to the view of Reyes and the OSG that since Velasco, Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barna-Yap
are not parties to G.R. No. 207264, Velasco can neither ask for the enforcement of the Decision rendered
therein nor argue that the doctrine of res judieata by conclusiveness of judgment applies to him and the
public respondents, this Court maintains that such contention is incorrect. Velasco, along with public
respondents Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barna-Yap, are all legally bound by this Court's
judgment in G.R. No. 207264, i.e., essentially, that the COMELEC correctly cancelled Reyes' s COC for
Member of the House of Representatives for the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque on the ground
that the latter was ineligible for the subject position due to her failure to prove her Filipino citizenship and
the requisite one-year residency in the Province of Marinduque. A contrary view would have our dockets
unnecessarily clogged with petitions to be filed in every direction by any and all registered voters not a
party to a case to question the final decision of this Court. Such restricted interpretation of res judieata is
intolerable for it will defeat this Court's ruling in G.R. No. 207264. To be sure, Velasco who was duly
proclaimed by COMELEC is a proper party to invoke the Court's final judgment that Reyes was ineligible
for the subject position.47

It is well past the time for everyone concerned to accept what has been adjudicated and take judicial
notice of the fact that Reyes's ineligibility to run for and be elected to the subject position had already
been long affirmed by this Court. Any ruling deviating from such established ruling will be contrary to
the Rule of Law and should not be countenanced.

In view of finality of the rulings in G.R. No. 207264, SPA No. 13-053 (DC) and SPC No. 13-010, there is no
longer any issue as to who is the rightful Representative of the Lone District of the Province of
Marinduque; therefore, to borrow the pronouncement of this Court, speaking through then Associate
Justice Reynato S. Puno, in Codilla, Sr. v. De Venecia,48 "[t]he rule of law demands that its Decision be
obeyed by all officials of the land. There is no alternative to the rule of law except the reign of chaos and
confusion."

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Mandamus is GRANTED. Public respondent Hon. Feliciano R. Belmonte,
Jr., Speaker, House of Representatives, shall administer the oath of office of petitioner Lord Allan Jay Q.
Velasco as the duly-elected Representative of the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque. And public
respondent Hon. Marilyn B. Barua-Yap, Secretary General, House of Representatives, shall register the

468
name of petitioner Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives after
he has taken his oath of office. This Decision shall be IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.

SO ORDERED.

469