DIGNITY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMAN WELL BEING: THE PLIGHT OF

REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PEOPLE IN THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR

OGUNNIYI, Olayemi Jacob

Department of History, Faculty of Arts, University of Ibadan,
Ibadan, Nigeria +2348033207633, [email protected],
[email protected]

AKPU, James Onochie

Department of History, Faculty of Arts, University of Ibadan,
Ibadan, Nigeria +2348027725534, [email protected]
&
OSHODI, Gbenga Adio
Department of History & International Studies, Faculty of Arts,
Lagos State University, Ojo, Lagos, Nigeria +2348173240938,
[email protected]

Abstract
This paper examines the dignity, human rights and human well-being in the face of the plight of
refugees and displaced persons during the Nigerian Civil War (1967-70). We argue that Eastern
Nigeria during the 30-month old war witnessed various degrees of suspicion, intimidation,
distrust, arrest, detention, physical and psychological violence, blackmail, forceful population
displacement, killings, inter alia. The paper reveals that the inhabitants of Eastern Nigeria were
further confronted with the problems of exploitation, marginalization, forceful enlistment into
the Biafra army, hostilities and discrimination in the Biafra Refugees camps and food
distribution centers. They became the worst refugees as they were trapped between the retreating
Biafra soldiers and the advancing federal troops. Besides, they were constantly accused of
harbouring and collaborating with either the Biafra or the federal troops. Hence the massive
exodus of some of these refugees and displaced persons of the then Eastern Nigeria across
borders to neighbouring countries like Cameroon, Fernando Po and others which were not only
close but also had historical links with Eastern and some parts of Western Nigeria. We conclude
by recommending far reaching measures that will ensure and sustain equal representation, fair
treatment, true federalism and true justice in a multi-ethnic country like Nigeria.

Key words: Eastern Nigeria, Biafra, Federal, Refugees.

1
Introduction

It has been argued that Nigerian political, social and economic quagmire sprang from the
defective and faulty foundation the British laid in “uniting” Nigeria. The British created a
lopsided country as there were majorities and minorities. Minority ethnic nationality in the
Nigerian context seems to locate itself in that which is imputed inferior status and takes the form
of systematic exploitation, discrimination, domination and marginalization on account of its
small size irrespective of its huge contribution to the stability, growth and development of the
country. It is germane to quickly usher in here that there are mammoth cases of „mini-
minorities‟, „micro-minorities‟ and „macro-minorities‟ in these minority ethnic groups in
Nigeria. In fact, minority ethnic groups in Nigeria are groups other than the Hausa-Fulani,
Yoruba, and Igbo with huge political, social and numerical advantage.

On the contrary, Akpan (1989:128) had argued that “there is hardly any ethnic group in Nigeria,
major or minor, which cannot see itself at one point or another as being in the category of an
“ethnic minority”, adding that it pervades the Nigerian political system and manifests itself in
numerical, political or factorial. According to him, factorial refers to factors as trained talents
and professionals; the ownership and operation of individual, commercial and other economic
enterprises, factors of development in terms of roads, schools, scholarship awards, employment
in the public sector, and publicly owned industrial establishment. The Igbo people are not done
with this claim of marginalization. Currently, they have formed ethnic associations to advance
their ethnic interest. There exist the Igbo’s Movement for the Actualization of Sovereign State of
Biafra (MASSOB), Biafra Defence Force, and Eastern Mandate Union (EMU). The Hausa-
Fulani also formed associations to protect their hegemonic interest. The Northern Elder’s Forum
and the Arewa People’s Congress (APC) are notable examples. The Yoruba people were not left
out with the formation of the Odua Liberation Movement, the Odua People’s Congress (OPC)
and the National Democratic Coalition (NADECO).

Our analysis also reveals abundantly that there is what Akpan (1989:129) calls “reversed
minorities”. This resulted in a situation where the majority ethnic group in a society is controlled
by the minority ethnic nationality especially in economic and political spheres. They are heavily
represented in all state organs. This is clearly exemplified in the lordship of the minority Tutsi

2
over the majority Hutu in Rwanda. This unique domination had caused several mayhems with
dire consequences like the 1959 fratricidal war, the 1994 genocide with the genocidaires forming
the bulk of the refugees, just to mention but a few. No doubt, there exists wide disparity in the
majority – minority relations. Yetman (1991) is quick to point up that since the 1930s, the term
„Minority‟ has been used to denote social groups that are oppressed, stigmatized and
discriminated against based on ethnic, racial, biological, cultural, religious and other
characteristics. Stavenhangen (1983:122) vividly testifies that the exploitative relationship which
often characterizes the interaction between the minority and the majority ethnic groups can take
the form of “unequal regional development (which ethnic groups are geographically localized) or
of differential access or different forms of segregation and discrimination in social economic and
political life”. Barron (1967) correctly contends that in the course of their interaction, the
dominant group tends to assign a definite minority status to the subordinate groups and to
consider them as outsiders or those of the periphery. The condition is exacerbated when, as
Osaghae (1994) asserts, the majority assumes the „natural right to dominate, control and direct
the activities of the state to the exclusion of the minorities which produces the wealth of the state
as in the case of Nigeria and this becomes a constant source of opposition by the minority
groups.

Accordingly, the minorities of Nigeria especially those inhabiting the former Eastern Region of
Nigeria became the „anvil‟ upon which the Nigerian Civil War (1967-70) was structured and the
majorities became the strong „hammer‟. The power play between and among the majorities
during the period under review made the minorities the actual victims whose fate is yet to be
determined forty three years after they were traumatized and brutalized. What is of note is that it
is the business of this paper to explicitly demonstrate how and why the wealth and minorities of
the former Eastern Nigeria were manipulated by the majority ethnic groups, the principal groups,
to their advantage in a political debacle that had kept them the most oppressed people of the
world.

3
The Nigerian Civil War and the Majority – Minority Politics
The clashes of majority interest and principles coupled with the feud between the two principal
actors – Gowon and Ojukwu – have been largely attributed to the major causes of the war that
ravaged the country for 30 solid months. Little or no attention has been given to the urge and
desire of the two main actors from the majority ethnic groups to control the oil wealth of the
minorities living in the former Eastern Region of Nigeria. It is historically plausible to argue that
the region was declared a theatre of war where the indigenes were “bruised, battered and
bloodied” because of their God-given wealth. Leo (1975) has given the hint that distribution of
wealth and resources is a very important factor in either fomenting or taming of conflict in the
society. Oil politics was, indeed, central to the execution of Ojukwu’s dream of Biafra and
Gowon’s pursuit of “One Nigeria‟. This paper reveals that the desire to control the petrol dollars
in the minorities‟ territories of the former Eastern Nigeria that compelled Ojukwu on May 27,
1967 to unilaterally declare the secession of the Former Eastern Region and christened it “The
Republic of Biafra”. Queerly enough, Ojukwu excluded the minorities in this region and
channeled all the political and economic power to himself and his people.

The point has to be made here that oil was discovered in commercial quantity in Oloibiri, Ogbia
Local Government Area of the present day Bayelsa state in 1956. By the outbreak of the Civil
War, the black gold has been discovered in many parts of the former Eastern Region. This is true
of Bomu (1958) Afam, Korokoro and Ebubu-Eleme in the early 1960s. Other oil fields were
found at Bodo West, Yorla and Lubara Creek (N-Ue, 2012: 17). Other discoveries were made in
other communities. Before the war, oil has emerged as the dominant revenue earner for the
Nigerian Government. Nigeria’s crude oil production contributions to the national economy
between 1960 to 1970 revealed a steady increase from N8.8 million in 1960 to N139.2 million in
1965 and to N510.0 million in 1970 (Ikein, 1991:267). Ogbemudia (1991:81) masterly paints the
picture clearer when he tersely remarked that “By 1968, oil production in Nigeria had reached
the twenty million ton mark, and an estimated fifty million ton mark by the seventies was a just
expectation. As most oil installation and, at least, two well-known sea ports were in the former
Eastern Region”. Ojukwu is entitled to the royalties by the shell-B.P operating in Port-Harcourt
and Bonny if he continued to maintain his firm grip on his Biafra’s kingdom. It was against this
backdrop that Ojukwu took practical step to control the oil revenue. He immediately

4
promulgated the Revenue Collection Edict 11, 1967 which stipulated that “any revenue due from
any source whatsoever in Eastern Nigeria and collected in Eastern Nigeria for or on behalf of or
payable to the federal Government… shall be paid…to the Government of Eastern Nigeria”. By
this directive, all oil revenue in the East estimated at N2, 000.000.00 should be paid to Enugu
instead of Lagos (Ogbemudia, 1991:82, Ademoyega, 1981:187). Little surprise, that when Port
Harcourt was liberated by the federal troop, he (Ojukwu) retaliated by placing the General
Manager of shell-B.P company, Mr. Stanley Gray, under some form of arrest. When this attempt
yielded no tangible result, he went further to confiscate all shell-B/P installations in his kingdom
and placed them under a Petroleum Management Committee headed by the late Professor
EniNjoku (Saro-wiwa, 1989:98-99).

Gowon who was also quick to realize the emerging importance of oil in the economy wasted no
time to carve out two states out of the minority ethnic groups in the former Eastern Region. Thus
he created the Rivers and South-Eastern states with headquarters at Port Harcourt and Calabar
respectively on 27th May 1967. Okigbo (1989:201) avers that it was calculated to give a sense of
identity to the minority groups in Eastern Nigeria in relation to the Ibo majority around them.
This position was shared by Ademoyega (1981:187-188) who held that …”the Federal
Government announce that it would take stern measures” against the Eastern Region. These were
economic, political and diplomatic measures. At the same time, Gowon threatened to use force to
protect the minorities, if the East seceded”. Our investigations revealed Gowon’s interest to
create the two minority states out of the Eastern Region and the threat to protect them was borne
out of the desire to control oil in these areas. As argued above, the oil profile was rising steadily
in the economy of the country.

Gowon successfully recovered the crude oil installations in the minority states and used the
proceeds to execute his policy of “one Nigeria‟ to a logical conclusion. The taken over of Bonny,
Calabar and Port Harcourt turned the table against the secessionist Biafra. In another sense,
Gowon in the words of Achebe (2012:210) “had succeeded in cutting Biafra off from the sea,
robbing its inhabitants of shipping ports to receive military and humanitarian suppliers”. Of
sentimental importance was the transfer of the ownership of oil wealth from the owners-
minorities to the majorities. This was provided for by the promulgation of a degree on 1st April

5
1970, modifying the system of revenue allocation in favour of the majority ethnic groups. In the
light of this, the Nigerian Civil War did shape or reshape the nature of Nigerian politics in favour
of the minorities for the sheer insensitivity of the federal Government to the Eastern minorities;
The minorities were further meant to declare their unalloyed patriotism and pay supreme
sacrifice with the granting of state Pardon to one of its son, Isaac Jasper Adaka Boro. Although,
political detainees like Chief Obafemi Awolowo, his followers as well as Dr. M. I. Okpara and
his colleagues were granted amnesty but the remission of the death sentence of Boro and his
lieutenants such as Samuel Owonaru and Nothingham Dick endeared Gowon to the minorities.

The old war-horses of the minorities like chiefs Murphy and E. O. Eyo from Calabar – Ogoja,
and Chief Harold Dappa-Biriye, Ken Saro Wiwa, Wenike Briggs, from the Rivers area, among
others therefore supported the federal with the hope of a better future for the Eastern minorities.
Nabo B. Graham-Douglas in his work: Ojukwu‟s Rebellion and World Opinion captures this
prism when he undermined the case of united Biafra and asserted the autonomy and desire of the
ethnic minorities in Eastern Nigeria to remain within United Nigeria where they felt they would
be able to realize their legitimate aspirations rather than stay in Biafra where their land would be
regarded as a natural lebensraum by the much more numerous Igbo whose treatment of the
minorities in the past and even during the war, had left much to be desired (Cited in Osuntokun,
1989:88-89). In retrospect, Isaac, Jasper Akaka Boro waged a war of independence against
Major-General J.T.U. Ironsi on 23rd February, 1966 by declaring the Niger Delta Republic and a
state of emergency. The Twelve-Day Revolution, which was to bring the Ibo domination,
neglect, intimidation and oppression to a logical end, was prevented from becoming a reality.
Consequently, Boro and his two lieutenants were on June 21, 1966 sentenced to death by Justice
John Philip Ebosise, presiding at the Port Harcourt High Court after a marathonic sixty days trail.
Major-General Gowon magnanimously commuted their death sentences to life imprisonment and
later granted them complete remission of their sentences (N-Ue, 2012:178).

To reciprocate this kind gesture and to find a place for his beloved people after the war, Boro
joined the Nigerian Army’s Third Marine Commando as a Major and made brave exploits,
leading to the liberation of most minority ethnic groups like Bonny, Asaba and Port Harcourt in
the then Eastern Nigeria. Saro-wiwa (1989:170) beautifully writes of Boro, “He… alone had

6
volunteered to make the dangerous crossing from Egwanga (now Ikot Abasi, Akwa Ibom State)
to Kono (Ogoni, Rivers State). He has taken Opobo, Nkoro, Kono and Okirika”. This was not
surprising as most federal combatants in the “Tiger claw Division” knew next to nothing of the
critical Knowledge of Niger Delta terrain (Enemugwem 2002: 353, Nwajia Ku-Dahou, 2008:
324) while Isaac Boro knew every inch of the Niger Delta region as an indigene and as a former
police officer who had served in the region. The minorities were denied this special gift and
messiah when he was shot dead in action on his way to Bodo (Ogoni) from Okirika on 17th May,
1969 shortly before the war ended (Saro-wiwa 1989:170, Naanen 2002:347). His untimely death
provoked wide condemnation and much controversy. A strand of this argument has it that Boro
was murdered by his commanding officer, Col. Benjamin Adekunle (Known in the military
circle as “Benjy”). He was said to be jealous of Boro’s rapid promotion to the position of
“Major” (Obasanjo, 1980 cited by Nwajiaku-Dahou 2008: 325). If this is anything to so by, it
seems probably to infer that it was a calculated attempt by the Majority to exterminate the
minority from the corridor of power or position of considerable influence. To also prove that it
was the game plan of the majority to render the minority powerless, the Ibo at the incipient stage
of the war rendered the minority ethnic groups of the Eastern Region defence less, impotent,
confused, dejected and disunited. From the account of Akpan, it can hardly be contested that a
significant number of both “official” and “unofficial” actions were for the above stated purpose
against the minorities. According to him, the first “official action” was to employ their “divide
and rule” tactics as a way of weakening the attraction and demands of state creation as well as
breaking the very basis of their bond of solidarity and unity of purpose among the minority
ethnic groups. They attempted to persuade the minority ethnic groups that their political
aspirations would be satisfied within the confines of Eastern Nigeria rather than in the federal
Nigeria. It is most heartening to note that another „Official Actions‟ taken against the minorities
was the policy of disarmament.

The “unofficial actions” took the forms of blackmail, falsehood, and the arrest and detention of
real or perceived “saboteur”, invented to settle old squabble between the minority border
territories and the majority ethnic groups. As far as the Biafra’s were concerned, “all members of
the minority ethnic groups were potential saboteurs. Military failures were caused by saboteurs.
The worst federal air raids were guided by saboteurs”. This exposed the minorities as the main

7
object of “mob justice” and the real victims of the war. It must be placed on record that most
personalities from the minority ethnic nationalities contributed immensely to the 30 months old
Republic of Biafra. For instance, Chief Ntieyong U. Akpan served Biafra meritoriously as the
Chief Secretary before and during the Civil War years and Major General P. Effiong, who
ostensibly mid- wifed the unity of Nigeria when he surrendered Biafra to Nigeria on January 12,
1970, served Biafra as the Chief of General Staff. Other prominent minority elements from
Ogoni who made tangible contributions were ex-parliamentarian Chief Hon. Kemte Giadom,
Chief E.N. Kobani, Dr. Garrick Barile Leton, Mr. I.S. Kogbara, Mr. Peter Akere, Mr. Pius Dornu
Kinako, among others. Our investigation reveals that Mr. Ignatius Kogbara who read Political
Science and History from the University of Leicester, England in 1960 served as Biafra’s
Ambassador in London. He therefore formed the nucleus of what Achebe (2012:160), aptly
described as the Biafra diplomatic service whose duty included the framing of the “Biafra
argument”. Mr. Pius Dornu Kinako dutifully served the Biafra secessionist Government as a
senior officer in the Ministry of Agriculture, Mbawi in Aba and Dr. G. B. Leton who obtained
his doctorate in Analytical Chemistry from University of London in 1963 served as a Lecturer in
Physical and Modern Inorganic Chemistry Department of the University of Nigeria, Nsukka
(1963-1970). The genius must have served in the Research and Production Units (RAP) and
contributed to the making of the Igbo unique and notorious war machine, Ogbunigwe (which
literally means “killer in groups”). Nwankwo (1980:29) says “it killed in large numbers and
when used, could kill as many as sixty people”. In spite of these huge contributions, the minority
ethnic groups were discriminated against, massacred, rejected and abandoned to their fate.

The Nigerian Civil War and the Refugees’ Crisis

The fate of the Eastern Region minorities was again left hanging rather loosely in the balance in
the refugee’s crisis of the majority dominated Nigeria. History has it that the first well
established case of refugee in independent Nigeria dates back to the first military coup d’état in
the political calendar of the country and this took place on 15th January, 1966. This military
coup d’état claimed several lives and forced about 2,200 to migrate across the Nigeria-Benin
Border to neighbouring Benin Republic for security and safety purposes. The refugees who
refused to return home for fear that their political “enemies‟ would prey on them were persuaded

8
and repatriated home after intense negotiations with the Beninois Government. The returnees
were about 2,300 (Mohammed, 1989:236).

Accordingly, the Nigerian Red Cross society was effectively mobilized and they offered
essential humanitarian aid to the refugee in Cotonou. The services of the Nigerian Army and
Nigeria Police were procured and these helped to facilitate the repatriation operation to Ibadan
and other towns in the Western Region. It is deducible from the above that the refugees who
were mainly involved in this first mass exodus movement were the majority Yoruba living in the
western part of Nigeria. However, the eruption of bestial massacre of thousands of peoples of
southern Nigeria especially the people of the former Eastern Nigeria in the Northern towns of
Zaria, Kano, Gusau, Funtua and Sokoto actually captured the essence of this paper. The
countercoup of July 1966 which was like a retaliatory move unfortunately went too far and
degenerated into the mass killings, looting and burning of August and September of 1966. The
tensed situation was further infuriated with the news of the killing of the northerners, living in
the Eastern towns of Enugu, Onitsha, and Port-Harcourt.

Mohammed (1989:237) reminds us that from the end of September to the end of October 1966,
there ensued a mass movement of people from the North to the South, particularly to the East
and Mid-West. Over one million displaced persons were evacuated from the North to the South
during this period of only one month. Of these figures, there were 12,000 refugee railway
employees alone (Forsyth 2011:81). The roles of the Nigerian Red Cross and the Nigerian
Airways made the Easterners to escape the sharp edge of the daggers of the bellicose
Northerners. While the Nigerian Red Cross readily provided emergency and humanitarian
services, the Nigerian Airways provided free airlift of relief materials from Lagos to designated
centers of the victims of the massacre in Kaduna and Kano. Ademoyega (1981:183) opines that it
was the report of this fresh outbreak of “pogrom” against the Ibo that made civil war inevitable.
The pogrom, no doubt, drove the regions poles apart and resulted in the secession of the Eastern
Region on May 27, 1967 which Ojukwu prefer to call the “Republic of Biafra”. By taking this
action, as Achebe (2012:92) sharply observed, “Ojukwu had committed us to full-blown war.
Nigeria would never be the same again”. Perhaps, it was against this background that the Biafran
War Lord, Lt. Col. Ojukwu had consistently maintained that “the Biafran people never declared

9
war on Nigeria. Rather, they reacted in self-defence and continued reacting in self-defence until
it was impossible to continue” (Ojukwu 2011:179).

The point to note here is that minorities of the Eastern Region were killed mercilessly as Igbo
people in the North because of ignorance. There are several bulks of Nigerian population who
are yet to know that in Eastern Nigeria there are ethnic nationalities other than the Igbo, or that
there were minority ethnic groups other than the dominant Hausa/Fulani in the north. It needs to
be stressed that all the inhabitants of the former Eastern Region were not all Ibo people so also
those killed, harassed, maimed, and brutalized in the north. The minorities of the Eastern Region
became the “scape goat” of the majority – Hausa/Fulani and Ibo – power play. Sadly enough,
they were discriminated against in the scheme of things even when they (i.e. minorities)
contributed hugely to the Defence Fund. The Fund was the Eastern Government grand design to
raise financial support for the purpose of rehabilitating the evacuated Easterners who fled the
north. As it were, there was the need for housing, hospital, job opportunities for employees who
have been forced to become unemployed and other resettlement problems.

To check this short – changing, exploitation and discrimination, a group of the leaders of the
minority peoples of Eastern Nigeria led by chief E.O. Eyo petitioned Major Hassan U. Katsina,
the Governor of Northern Nigeria, to bring his force into Eastern Nigeria in order to free them
from the clutches of the Ibo (Ademoyega (1981:180). The fate of the Eastern minorities was
further tossed at the outbreak of the Civil War on Thursday July 6, 1967. As discussed above, the
minorities were treated to doses of intimidations, psychological and physical violence and
systemic exploitation before the hostilities kick-started. But after the start of hostilities and in the
course of it, the minorities in the Eastern Region became the stark objects of blackmail, forceful
population displacements, killings, suspicion, surveillance, distrust and embarrassments
everywhere in the region. As Akpan (1989:139) puts it frontally “They were indiscriminately
harassed, abused and assaulted at the ubiquitous checkpoints which littered the region. The only
passport to some form of respect was the ability to speak the Ibo language”. Ogbemudia (1991:
74) agrees that the new order brought sorrow to many families, and untold sufferings to millions
of Nigerians, especially the minorities. This was the price they must pay for their insignificant
number in a country mostly dominated by majority ethnic groups. As the conflict dovetailed into

10
a large scale war, the minority border communities were forced to massively cook for the forces
each day. This did not deter them from looting and raiding the border communities for money,
wine, food and women.

More importantly, the minorities of the territories were coerced into the Biafran rebel forces like
the Combat Units, Militia bands, and many others. In fact, forceful conscription into the Biafran
Army became the order of the day when the grass could no longer fight. Added to the above
problem of lack of modern war equipment, and better remuneration was the issue of what they
chose to call “No.6”. The “idea was that self-preservation must take precedent over Biafran
survival and not the latter over the former as had been the case”. In fact, to the amazement of the
Biafran Personnel Department, Statistics Division of the Army Headquarters, (variously situated
at Enugu, Owerri and Umuahia according to the tide of the war). It was discovered that “there
were more soldiers on paper than were available for deployment”. Hence, the adoption of
conscription of minorities as a main policy of recruitment to fill the blank spaces (Saro-Wiwa,
1967:197). By the end of 1967 and middle of 1968, the minorities had been pushed out of their
own homes by the secessionist Biafra. The reason was the advancement of the Federal
Government forces that were recapturing “their‟ territories. The natives were to meet atrocities
and cruelties of the highest order.

The order to evacuate from the advancing Federal side, as Peter Akere aptly noted, was
immediately backed up with force and as men and women were evacuated in Government vans,
army personnel were carefully and systematically supervising every inch of the evacuation to
make sure that it was thorough (quoted in Saro-Wiwa, 1989: 190). It is also instructive to say
here that most of them were not so lucky especially those fleeing from evacuation, arrest,
detention, torture and /or forceful conscription into the Biafran army. This category suffered and
consequently met their untimely death as they embarked on a hazardous journey without known
destination, adequate preparation and guidance or directive. They died in their numbers as they
were not advised by the Civil Defence Corps to take cover in the bushes during air raids or
privileged to hear the public safety warning issued by the Biafran Government. Achebe (2012:
190) reveals that “the Biafran Government had issued a public safety warning to all citizens to
abstain from wearing clothes of light colours like white or cream or sharp colours such as

11
orange, purple, or red that could be easily spotted by the Nigerian Air Force”. The resultant
effect was the high mortality rate of the minorities. One was the Ogoni ethnic nationality of
which Saro-Wiwa (1989: 199) estimated that about thirty thousand which were over ten percent
of the total population of the ethnic group was lost to the Biafran onslaught. They were to pay
heavily for allowing their territory to be used by the Federal troops as well as the anti-Biafra
activities of their leader K. B. Saro-Wiwa.

At the onset of the war, Saro-Wiwa was an informed personality so he sneaked through Bonny to
Lagos to declare the loyalty, solidarity and support of his people to the Federal Government’s
cause of “One Nigeria”. The survivors of the evacuation saga were sent to the Food Distribution
Centers and Refugee Camps located in Igbo villages like Mbieri, Nsu, Mbano, Aba, Orlu, Ngwa,
Umuahia, Enugu, Aboh-Mbaise, Ohaji farm settlement among others. The Camp Government or
Administration was headed by a Director which of course was an Ibo man, an ardent supporter of
Biafra. He was supported by a handful of other Ibo ancillary officers like store keepers, wardens,
welfare officers and security officers. They together formed the policy making body in each
camp. They were also to give an account of the refugees, deliver aid, and control food
distribution. Each Minority Group that cohabited together with other ethnic groups had its own
leader and the family heads that were to assist the group leader (Anokari, 1986: 156). This
implies that the organization was based on a divisional basis. Besides, there were oppositions and
lack of understanding from the indigenes who claimed that they had never benefited from the
Eastern Government and so they will not share their hard earned resources with the displaced
minority people. The condition of these minorities was made worse in these camps as they were
labeled saboteurs. This provided them ample opportunity to pilfer their little belongings.
Although, the minorities who were influential on the Biafran side greatly contributed to the
survival of their kith and kin, who were like them, forced against their will to live as refugees but
corruption and ethnicity left the previously healthy, strong, wealthy, promising people wretched,
pale, hungry, malnourished and poor. Kwashiorkor, which is defined as the absence of protein in
the diet, and the outbreak of epidemic disease like diarrhea, cholera, to mention but a few, took a
great deal of advantage of the minority traumatized population.

12
There were rampant and obvious cases of misappropriation and diversion of the relief materials
donated by the sympathetic World Relief Agencies and Voluntary Organizations to ameliorate
the sufferings of the refugees found in the Biafran enclave. Peter Akere (cited in Saro-Wiwa,
1989: 195-197) gives us an insight . . . “Army officers had their own special share of anything
that was brought in. Kwashiorkor clinics and feeding centers were established ostensibly to drain
into private hands the food that was assigned to refugees… They then swooped on relief food,
articles of clothing and money and diverted as much as pleased them to private use, not minding
the plight of those for whom those things were intended. The most lucrative appointment then
was Camp Director and it was given to the highest bidder. Once appointed, he would normally
hasten to recover the money spent on obtaining his post”. The minority refugees were at the
receiving end of all these because they were powerless victims of circumstances. There is the
likelihood that they occupied the camps Achebe (2012: 170) meant when he said “other camps
could only be described as deplorable-epidemic ridden graveyards. In these camps the
combination of poor sanitation, high population density, and shortage of supplies created a bitter
cocktail of despair, giving rise to social pathologies and psychological traumas of all kinds-
violence, extortion and physical and sexual abuse. In sum, the camp experience of the minority
ethnic groups in the majority Ibo Biafran enclave was not far from Seymour-Jones (1992: 25)
findings. He had succinctly established that:
(a) Health risk is rampant in camp populations as they are exposed to disease.
(b) There is unemployment as there is often no work for camp populations.
(c) Dependency rate is high as camp populations lose control over their own lives.
(d) The camp populations are exposed to local hostility. Local communities disliked camps in
their midst, which strain local resources. Integration into host country is more difficult in camps.

On a broad level, the Federal Government’s economic blockade and “starve them into
submission” policy (Achebe, 2012: 210) had a remarkable impact on the secessionist Biafran.
The Federal Government was angered by the increasingly double standards of the foreign relief
organizations especially the activities of Dr. August Lindt of the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC). For this reason, he was declared persona non-grata and the Federal Military
Government decided to take personal delivery of the aid. It was revealed that these international
agencies like Oxfam, the International Committee of the Red Cross or Red Crescent based in

13
Geneva, African Concern, the French Red Cross Caritas International based in the Vatican, Joint
Church Aid, the Catholic Relief Organization, the World Council of Churches, to mention but a
few, aided the penetration of arms and ammunition as well as food to the Biafran soldiers since
the food carried to the enclave only went to strengthen the soldiers rather than the suffering and
dying masses (Elaigwu, 2009: 188-189, Mohammed 1989: 235). The dire consequence of this
action was acute food shortage which invited the merciless claws of hunger. More than three
million Biafrans including children died in Biafra (Achebe, 2012: 226). And on a more serious
note, starvation helped to bring the 30 months of a cascading blood basin to an unofficial end.
Nwankwo (1980: 68) remarked that “… the mid 1969 many soldiers died on their foot,
shooting… They were killed not by bullets or shells, but by hunger”. It is also shocking to reveal
that after the minority, especially elements like Lt Col. Phillip Effiong and UkpabiAsika, a
former Social Science Lecturer at the University of Ibadan, assisted the Federal side to bring
about the return of peace to the war-torn country, the Gowon‟s Amnesty as found in “No Victor,
No Vanquished” and the 3R–rehabilitation, reconstruction and reconciliation which followed
was never extended to the minorities.

Little or no attempts were made by the Federal Government to really integrate these minorities
even as our analysis has shown that they were really the victims of the bitterest conflict in West
Africa. The people of the border communities who were cruelly evacuated to the Biafran
heartland as refugees were never taken into consideration. Most of the minorities were assisted to
return home, courtesy of the generosity of their fellow minorities. Anokari (1986:159-160)
discloses that: the Ogoni returnees on their journey from Mbieri, Mbano, Mbaise and other
hinterlands were given express permission by the Efik, Annang and other neighbours not only to
pass and settle but also make use of some of their available social facilities like school, farm
settlements and transport.

Nigerian Civil War, Refugees and Neighbouring countries.

Like the First World War (1914-18), the Nigerian Civil War (1969-70) brought flood of refugees
which are mainly minority border communities especially in the present states of Rivers,
Bayelsa, AkwaIbom and Cross River States to wander across the borders of Biafra (now Nigeria)

14
to neighbouring countries like Cameroon, Fernando Po, an Island, which formed part of the
Spanish Empire and later Equatorial Guinean when the later gained independent in October,
1968. As stated earlier, the minorities experienced intense fear or repugnance before and during
the dreaded Civil War, hence, the movement of the border communities to seek safety and
security across the Bight of Biafra (now Bight of Bonny). During this time of forceful
evacuation, any form of makeshift transport was used to ferry their remaining possessions. It was
possible for the displaced populations to have migrated without any meaningful possession.

Needless to say that some of the refugees crossed the border in order to escape being conscripted
into the Biafran army. However, in most cases, some roam the rivers, valleys, rivulets and many
others in search of help. It has to be documented that certain factors were at work to make this
escape, migration and movement possible. The first was based on historical factors. The
minorities have for long established historical economic ties with the peoples of Cameroon,
Fernando Po, Equatorial Guinea and Santa Isabel (N-Ue, 2012:81). This took the forms of trade
and fishing activities. It was the practice of the minorities occupying the southern part of today’s
Nigeria to find fortunes and exploits in the above mentioned countries. The fisher-folks also
migrated along with fishes into these countries. This contact was facilitated by the locally dug-
out canoes which bridged the short distances between and among these peoples. Mahadi
(1989:267) stipulates that “the Island of Fernando Po lies less than 125 miles south of Eastern
Nigeria”. Okoro (2002:97-98) attests that the distance from Calabar in Cross Rivers State,
Nigeria to Equatorial Guinea is a few Kilometers. The former Bight of Biafra (now renamed the
Bight of Bonny after the Nigerian Civil War) extends from the estuary to Guinea. Many native
Bube and settler (Creole) as it was formerly called share common affinity with some Nigerian
peoples, especially Eastern Nigerians. No doubt proximity, strong cultural affinity and historical
economic relations coupled with their kith and kin still residing in these countries made their
movement from the clutches of bloody civil strife easier.

The European imperialists also grafted their forced Labour Policy on the already established
relationship. N-Ue (2012:77) discloses that in 1923 a treaty was established between the Spanish
Government. The purpose of the Treaty was for the Nigerian Government to provide labour to
plantation in Fernando Po. By 1929 the Fernando Po forced Labour law has been enacted. The

15
colonial Government of Nigeria received commission for any number of labour supplied.
Interestingly, most of the Nigerian workers were recruited from Owerri, Calabar and Ogoja
(Fadeiye, 1978: 140). As West Africa (1960:1271) revealed “the immigrants from Eastern
Nigeria far outnumbered the indigenous population”. N-Ue (2012:78) argued that due to their
dominant population all the immigrants were called “Calabar boys”. For the minorities, these
nieghbouring countries were a sort of home away from home. The point has to be made here that
the minorities of former Eastern Nigeria also formed the nucleus of the large scale influx of
Nigerians into the Southern Cameroons: By 1954, following the Post-war expansion of the
plantation industry, some 25,000 men were employed in the Victoria plantation, and 6,000 or
7,000 were employed in Kumba division (Mahadi, 1989:254).

What is to note is that the English-speaking Cameroon, formerly known as the Western
Cameroon, was a part of Eastern Nigeria until 1962 when Western Cameron opted to join
Eastern Cameroon after a referendum (Okoro, 2002: 94-95). These colonial economic and
political relations continued to foster unity between these peoples in the post colonial era. Upon
the attainment of independence on 1st October, 1960, the Nigerian Government as well as the
State Governments of former Eastern Nigeria has continued to maintain and strengthen these
pre-colonial and colonial relationships which were of immense value till date. There are many of
these minorities still living and doing legitimate business in Cameroon, and Equatorial Guinea.
In addition, the University of Calabar, Nigeria has trained many medical doctors from
Cameroon. There is also evidence of bilateral educational exchange progammes for students and
lecturers of institutions of higher learning in these countries (Okoro, 2002: 96). Other evidence
of economic and socio-cultural ties have continued to be sustained in the post independence era.
The large scale movement of Eastern Nigerians to and fro Fernando Po led to the development of
Annual Sports which were organized between Fernando Po and Nigeria’s Eastern Region and
was financed by the Spaniards. Perhaps, this could be a way to appreciate the huge Nigeria’s
cheap labour contribution (Mahadi, 1989:255). Until recently, Eastern (now Southern) Nigerians
which the former Nigerian Ambassador to Equatorial Guinea, Navy captain Festus Probeni
speculated to be about 60 percent, controls the commercial activities of the Equatorial Guinea.
What is more, Nigerian Government has continued to strengthen her cordial link with Equatorial
Guinea with the establishment of a school for the training of Nigerian children in Equatorial

16
Guinea, Nigeria has further cemented the ties by providing air services to Equatorial Guinea
through Calabar and Port Harcourt international Airport (Okoro 2002:99).

Reflecting on these and many other historical links, the Governments of Cameroon and
Equatorial Guinea played pivotal roles during the Nigerian – civil war in order to bring about
lasting peace in the war- torn country – Nigeria. This was showcased in the sympathetic manner
and feeling which they expressed and reviewed the political impasse in Nigeria. A pointer to
show their support for Nigeria was Cameroon’s non-recognition of the rebel’s independence as
Tanzania, Ivory Coast, Gabon, South Africa and Zambia did. The president, Ahidjo, went further
to take active part in the OAU‟s (now AU) efforts to reconcile Nigeria and Biafra. He was the
foremost initiators of the Kinshasa Resolution. He collaborated with President Mobutu of Zaire
to deny the rebel O.A.U offices (Mahadi, 1986:265). Fernando Po also demonstrated her love for
the Slogan „One Nigeria‟ when the new president Francisco Marcia Nguema stopped the
activities of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on the Island in January, 1969.
According to Mahadi (1989:267) “we suspected their [ICRC] commitment to humanitarian
action was not genuine. We wanted to respect the sovereignty of our friendly next door
neighbor”. The point being made is that given the pro-federal military Government posture of the
neighbouring countries especially Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea, the minorities of the former
Eastern Nigeria found it expedient to migrate en masse (although there is no available statistics)
to these countries for safety and security.

The evacuation of the minorities between 1975/76 in the post independence era can bear
eloquent testimony to this assertion. They indeed formed the majority of labourers in the cocoa
plantations. Their expulsion was sequel to the diplomatic row between Nigeria and Equatorial
Guinea. Equatorial Guinea was accused of killing and expelling Nigerians from their country as
well as having dealing with the racist Southern Africa (Okoro, 2002:98). A bulk of the Ogoni
returnees was given settlement farms akin to the ones in Fernando Po at Ebubu-Eleme in Rivers
State by the State Military Government (Ziinu, 1993:103). The main thrust of our discourse is
that the Nigerian Civil War, other than the pre-colonial desire to exploit the natural resources of
the neighbouring countries and the colonial forced Labour policy, led to the massive exodus of

17
the minorities of the Eastern Nigeria to the neighbouring countries so as to avoid the sledge
hammer of hostilities, hunger, atrocities and death.

Conclusion and Recommendations

We have in this paper looked at the causes of the Nigerian Civil War and discovered that being
abandoned to their fate, the minorities migrated across the borders to neighbouring countries
with the aid of locally assembled canoes. This paper also showed that the refugees did not only
out-number the locals but also formed the bedrock of the economy of the host country. Based on
our analysis, we hereby recommend that:

(1)Nigerian leaders should eschew self, party or regional interest and ponder on the things that
will further unity, peaceful co-existence and patriotism so as to take Nigeria to greater height.

(2)Minority ethnic groups in Nigeria are yet to be adequately represented in the socio-economic
and political areas. They are left on the periphery even as they produced the bulk of what
sustains the Nigerian economy. The minority should be treated as equal part of the Nigerian
system. Nigeria like other federal states should jettison the politics of majority – minority and
adopt true federalism.

(3) There is a call on all the Igbo and those concerned to forget the past, make peace with all
Nigerians and avoid divisive tendencies. After all, Gowon had shown compassion and
magnanimity in trump by declaring “no victors, no vanquished”, which was suppressed in many
civil wars in recorded history. There were no summary trails and executions.

(4) The heroic roles played by the international Relief Agencies must be commended but at the
same time the Nigerian Government is urged to depend less on these organizations in order to
safeguard her national interest. This is because, as Carvenka (1972:112) noted, the US
humanitarian Intervention in the Nigerian civil war had distinctly political implications.
Certainly, to meet the humanitarian and emergency aid of Nigerians since international aid are
not without condition, Nigerian Government should adopt economic policies that are geared
towards self-reliance in the Comity of Nations.

18
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