Analytical School

2.3: JURISPRUDENCE

Submitted To
Ragini khubalkar
Assistant professor of law

Mr C.Ramesh Kumar
OSD (Academics)

Submitted by
Mohd Shahid khan
UID: UG-2017-60
B.A.LL.B. (Hons.)1st Year-2nd Semester

MAHARASHTRA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY, NAGPUR

 Table of Contents
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................................ 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY .................................................................................................................. 6
PURPOSE OF ANALYTICAL SCHOOL OF LAW ................................................................................... 7
MAIN EXPONENTS OF ANALYTICAL SCHOOL OF LAW .................................................................. 9
JEREMY BENTHAM (1748-1832):- ....................................................................................................... 9
BENTHAM ANALYTICAL POSITIVISM ANTI-NATURAL LAW:- ................................................. 9
CENSORIAL AND EXPOSITORY JURISPRUDENCE:-...................................................................... 9
BENTAM’S CONTRIBUTION TO ANALYTICAL JURISPRUDENCE:- ......................................... 10
AUSTIN’S POSITIVE LAW:- ................................................................................................................... 10
AUSTIN SEPERATION OF LAW AND MORALS RATIONALE ..................................................... 11
AUSTIN’S NATURE OF LAW:-........................................................................................................... 11
H.L.A. HART (1907):- ........................................................................................................................... 11
HART’S NATURE OF LAW:- .............................................................................................................. 12
PRIMARY RULE:- ................................................................................................................................ 12
DEFECTS OF PRIMARY RULES:- ...................................................................................................... 13
SECONDARY RULES:- ........................................................................................................................ 13
HANS KELSEN (1881-1973):- .................................................................................................................. 13
KELSON’S POSITIVISM:- ................................................................................................................... 14
LEGAL NORMS:- .................................................................................................................................. 14
KELSEN’S CRITICISM:- ...................................................................................................................... 14
CONCLUSION:- ........................................................................................................................................ 14
BIBLIOGRAPHY .......................................................................................................................................xvi

ii
INTRODUCTION
In 1957, during his extended visit at the Harvard Law School, H. L. A. Hart delivered his
Holmes lecture, later published under the title, “Positivism and the Separation of Law and
Morals,” in which he sketched a profile of his landmark theory of law. As a listener might have
expected, Hart opened his lecture with praise for the jurist and justice after whom the lectureship
was named (Hart 1983, 49-50). Holmes will always be regarded in English legal circles as “a
heroic figure in jurisprudence,” Hart acknowledged, because he “magically combined” two
qualities: clarity and imaginative power. English jurisprudence always prided itself on the
former, he maintained, but imaginative power it surely lacked. Like Bentham, who sought “to
pluck the mask of Mystery from the face of Jurisprudence” (Bentham 1977, 410), Holmes looked
to careful analysis of law and the language used in it to expose fallacies of thought and practice.
In particular, Holmes shared with Bentham, Austin, and much of English “positivist”
jurisprudence that followed them the conviction that clarity and precision required that what law
is must not be confused with what it ought to be. Hart went on in the remainder of the lecture to
articulate the positivist doctrine of the separation of law and morals and defend it against a
variety of what Hart thought to be misdirected criticisms.

From a historical point of view, it is remarkable that the only representatives of English
jurisprudence who warranted serious discussion in The Concept of Law are Bentham and Austin,
as if jurisprudence had gone on holiday since the publication of Austin’s Lectures in 1863. This
was no accident. Most observers of the history of English-speaking jurisprudence since the late
nineteenth century generally agree that, while legal theory in the United States in the period
before the late 1950s was a bold, bustling, and rambunctious frontier town, jurisprudence in the
common-law world outside of North America in that same period was a sleepy, contented,
complacent village, dominated by Austinian jurisprudence, and showing no significant
movement beyond Austinian orthodoxy or even any desire to challenge it.1

There is a good deal of truth in this characterization, but it obscures from view significant, if
subtle, movement and challenges that did occur over these years. To approximate more closely
the truth about jurisprudence in the period between Austin and Hart, the above characterization

1
Jurisprudence in the years between Austin and Hart was, according to Duxbury, “a one-house town” (Duxbury
2005, 29).

3
must be qualified in two respects. First, it was not Austin’s work itself that exercised this
remarkable control, but rather the work of those writing in the generation following the
publication of his Lectures on Jurisprudence in 1863, most notably T.E. Holland’s Elements of
Jurisprudence (1924; first published 1880). It is doubtful that Austin’s ponderous work was
much read, but Holland’s book, an accessible statement of core Austinian themes, and others like
it, secured the dominance of Austinian thought in English jurisprudence, and through the
influential work of Dicey, Austinian ideas came likewise to dominate constitutional theory of the
English Commonwealth.

Second, Austin’s was not the only jurisprudential voice heard in this period and it did not escape
serious criticism. As Michael Lobban has shown, 2Maine challenged the Austinian command
model of law, arguing that it failed utterly to fit working law in Indian and other nonwestern
legal systems. This attack was carried forward by representatives of historical jurisprudence, like
Vinogradoff (1920). In like fashion, Scottish legal theorists at the turn of the century, especially
Miller (1884, 1903) and Bryce (1901), challenged the methodological abstemiousness of
Austinian jurisprudence. While Maine and Vinogradoff urged a wider role for comparative and
historical research in jurisprudence, the Scots urged a more serious engagement with systematic
philosophy of law. However, these criticisms were summarily dismissed by mainstream English
jurisprudence because its constituency, practicing lawyers and students preparing for practice,
had little patience with the scholarly or philosophical study of law.

A more successful challenge to the orthodox Austinian doctrine of law, although not to its
characteristic methodology, came from New Zealand’s John Salmond, whose textbook on
jurisprudence (1924, first published 1902) was widely studied. With the kind of reserve
appreciated by English lawyers with their noses close to the doctrinal grindstone, he engineered a
significant if subtle shift in English legal positivism, but the full impact of this shift was not felt
until half a century later when H.L.A. Hart systematically articulated and defended the view
(with only the barest acknowledgement of Salmond) in The Concept of Law. Yet even Salmond
saw little reason to challenge the basic methodological assumptions of Austinian orthodoxy.
Dissenting voices did raise questions about these assumptions, some more radical than others,
but these voices rarely received a serious hearing. Philosophy was driven from the province of

2
Lobban, volume 8 of this Treatise, secs. 7.2-7.3

4
jurisprudence before the turn of the twentieth century; it returned at mid-century, but even then
not because of changes in prevailing jurisprudential attitudes but rather because of changes in the
prevailing methods and aims of philosophy.

John Austin may be regarded as the founder of the Analytical School, though he drew his
inspiration from Hobbes, and Bentham, his teacher. To him law is a command given by a
superior to an inferior and enforced by material sanctions. School of Analytical Jurisprudence
Analytical jurisprudence is a legal theory that draws on the resources of modern analytical
philosophy to try to understand the nature of law. Analytic jurisprudence uses a neutral point of
view and descriptive language when referring to the aspects of legal systems. Many times jurist
have made their effort to define law, it sources and nature. For the purpose of finding their points
of view, the jurists are divided on the basis of their approaches to law.3 This division has been
helpful in understanding the evolution of legal philosophy. One class of this jurist came to be
known as “analysts” who had little to do with vague and abstract nations of natural law. These
were the believers of analytical school, who propounded positivism. The exponents of this
school are not concerned with the past and also it is not with the future of law but with the law as
it exists that means the law “as it is”.

3
Analytical jurisprudence available at https://definitions.uslegal.com/a/analytical-jurisprudence (last visited on
02/02/2018)

5
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
For this particular research work, the researcher has referred to the secondary data available in
various published and established books. Most of the books have contained primary research
material. The research has mainly referred to reference books relevant to the topic, but along
with it a few website have also been referred to. Through the various secondary sources, an
analysis of privacy a dignitary tort and need of the hour for some law was drawn. The researcher
has employed doctrinal method of research in the project, keeping in mind the conceptual and
evaluative nature of the topic. Non-doctrinal methodology would not have been possible as it
does not suit the demand of the topic. The sources of research mainly include secondary sources
which are the relevant books relating to jurisprudence available in the NLUN Law Library.
Moreover, the source of internet has also been widely utilized.

6
PURPOSE OF ANALYTICAL SCHOOL OF LAW
Salient features of Analytical school of jurisprudence- The jurists of Analytical school consider
that the most important aspect of law is its relation to the state. Law is treated as an imperative or
command emanating from the state. For this reason this school is known as the Imperative
school. The exponents of this school are concerned neither with the past nor with the future of
law but with law as it exists, i.e., with law “as it is” (positus). For this reason, this school is
termed as the ‘positive school’. Its founder is John Austin who was the professor of
jurisprudence in the University of London. The positive school takes for granted the developed
legal system and proceeds logically to analyze its basic concepts and classify them so as to bring
out their relations to one another. This concentration on the systematic analysis of the legal
concepts has given this school the name of Analytical school of jurisprudence. In 1832, John
Austin, after a course of lectures at the London University, published a work which he entitled,
The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, and what he determined came out with great vigour
of analysis. After his death he achieved greater fame and became the founder of what was
popularly called the analytical school. This title seems to be misleading as it suggests that
analysis is the exclusive property of this school instead of being (as it is) a method used
throughout jurisprudence. Hence Allen prefers to speak of the imperative schools, for this
emphasizes Austin’s particular conception of law.

Austin was not unmindful of the part played by ethics in the evolution of law. Indeed, he devoted
several lectures to the theory of utility. But, finding works on jurisprudence full of confusion,
Austin decided to confine jurisprudence to a study of law as it is, leaving the study of the ideal
forms of law to the science of legislation. Austin’s followers were even more rigorous than their
master in confining jurisprudence to an analysis of rules in force. The leading exponents of the
Analytical school in England are Markby,4Holland and Salmond. Markby was a judge of the
Calcutta High Court (1866-1878) and his “Elements of Law” was published in 1871. Holland
published his Elements of Jurisprudence in 1880. Salmond was a judge of the Supreme Court of
New Zealand and his great work Jurisprudence or Theory of Law was published in 1902. The
works of these authors are regarded as standard works on Analytical Jurisprudence. The defects

4
Distinct features of analytical school available at http://www.infipark.com/articles/discuss-the-main-
characteristics-of-analytical-school-why-is-it-called-analytical/ (last visited on 02/02/2018)

7
of analytical method are obviously enough. It restricts itself to the facts of matured legal systems
and traits of law as it is. Analysis reveals Austin’s foundation to be rather unstable. Firstly, it is
clear that there are no universal rules of law—hardly a rule today but may be matched by its
opposite of yesterday. Secondly, there are few concepts which are common to all legal systems,
and if we confine our analysis to such as we think are universal, we run two dangers; firstly, if
further research shows that there are no concepts which are common to all systems, then there is
no basis for general jurisprudence at all; secondly, even if a few notions are proved to be
universal they form a somewhat narrow basis for a science of law. Rules of property that were
considered axiomatic in 1850 do not apply in Russia or other Soviet nations, nor in many other
countries. Today it is increasingly recognized that useful as analysis may be, it will not suffice to
answer all problems of jurisprudence. The influence of the analytical school waned-began to
diminish in the period of ascendancy of the Historical school, but the latter too lost its hold on
the world of thought by becoming fatalistic, insisting too much on the unconscious growth of law
and repudiating the element of purposeful effort as a factor in legal evolution. This led to the
development of sociological jurisprudence

The main purpose of analytical jurisprudence is to analyze or to see the first principle of law
without referring either to their historical origin or on the bases of development or their validity.
The purpose of analytical jurisprudence is to analyze the first principles of law without reference
either to their historical origin or development or their validity. Another purpose of this is to gain
an accurate understanding of the fundamental working concepts of all the logical and legal
reasoning. The positive law takes law as a command of sovereign and it also the importance to
legislation or puts emphasis on legislation as the source of law. It treats law as a closed system of
pure facts from which all the norms and value comes out or executed.

Talking about the norm:- Norm is formal rule or standard laid down by legal, religious, or social
authority against which we came to know appropriateness or in other words what is right and
what is wrong of an individual is judged.5

5
Norms and facts available at http://notesforfree.com/2017/12/16/hans-kelsen-normative-theory-grundnorm-
jurisprudence-notes/ (last visited on 02/02/2018)

8
MAIN EXPONENTS OF ANALYTICAL SCHOOL OF LAW
The main exponents of Analytical school of law are:-6

A.) Jeremy Bentham

B.) John Austin

C.) Hart

D.)Hans kelsen

JEREMY BENTHAM (1748-1832):-

To access the significance of John Austin, it is necessary to study Jeremy Bentham who was his
intellectual god father from whom John Austin borrowed, developed and completed his theory of
analytical positivism. Unlike Austin, Bentham theory had made many splendors sides, besides
being a jurist he was the reformer of law and legislation, a moralist and also a philosopher.
Indeed his whole life was devoted in the improvement of law for promoting happiness in of
individuals.

BENTHAM ANALYTICAL POSITIVISM ANTI-NATURAL LAW:-

From the point of view Bentham was the leader or head of analytical positivism, the real founder
of analytical school of jurisprudence and he also polished the method, techniques of this
analytical school.

CENSORIAL AND EXPOSITORY JURISPRUDENCE:-

Bentham as a legal jurist and positivist made a sharp difference and distinction between the law
as it is and the law that ought to be. As a positivist he laid the foundation of analytical
jurisprudence by distinguishing it from what he calls censorial jurisprudence. To be more precise
Bentham divided this jurisprudence into two:-

“Expository and censorial” Expository which told as what the law is and on the other hand
censorial tells what law ought to be.

6
Exponents of analytical school available at https://www.legalbites.in/schools-of-jurisprudence-notes/
(last visited on 04/02/2018)

9
BENTAM’S CONTRIBUTION TO ANALYTICAL JURISPRUDENCE:-
Jeremy Bentham in his monumental work “The limits of jurisprudence defined 1872” and “the
law in general” expounded the analytical positivism which subsequently became the analytical
school of jurisprudence. In these work he invented as well as perfected the tools of analysis to
determine the nature of law as well as its purposes. He delineated the subject matter of law by
testing legal principles and action on the matrix of his hedonistic doctrine of utility. One of the
cardinal purposes of law according to Bentham being to provide security and protection, besides
aiming, abundance and equality. As already observed Bentham was the Newton of analytical
/school, as he based law on sovereign’s command and coercion without regards to its moral
nature. However, there is one remarkable thing about Bentham’s philosophy was that he had a
great sway during the nineteenth century so as far as individual freedom and justice and
protection of public interest. However it was shocking that his theory was altogether rejected in
that century as for which Paton said” it was a great disaster for English jurisprudence that
Bentham was not taken into consideration for his theory while there are many ideas of Bentham
only taken by Austin and yet there is strong contrast between the two. The transfer of his
working rule from legislation to morality seems to me the true ground of criticism to which
Bentham was justly open as analyst of moral facts. John Austin was popularly credited for
founding analytical positivism in legal theory and for this he was also called as the father of
English jurisprudence, therefore it is necessary in order to understand his attitude and philosophy
concerning with law.7

AUSTIN’S POSITIVE LAW:-

Austin aim is to determine and characterize the nation of law that is “law properly so-called”
which has a difference or distinct from other laws that are “laws improperly so-called”. Austin’s
model law was positive law which he distinguishes or differentiates between the morality or
other kinds of laws such as the latter lacking force, coercion of the state. He describes positive
law on the other hand that are the rules set by the men who are politically superior to men as
politically inferior. For Austin positive law is the matter of jurisprudence and rejects the law that
ought to be which Austin describes as “science of legislation”. In different categories he also

7
John Austin’s Analytical Jurisprudence available at http://ijlljs.in/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Legal-Positivism-
An-analysis-of-Austin-and-Bentham.pdf (last visited on 04/02/2018)

10
includes different types of rules such as rules of clubs, laws of fashion, laws of different sciences
etc. As per Austin existence of law is one thing and its merits and demerits is other, whether it be
or be not confirmable to an assumed standard, is a different enquiry. A law which exists has to be
followed by everybody so that everybody in the society lives in rules and regulations.

AUSTIN SEPERATION OF LAW AND MORALS RATIONALE:-

The major theory of Austin is based on the separation between law and morals. Austin did a
sharp differentiation and distinction between science of jurisprudence and science of legislation.
The former is concern with positive laws irrespective of their goodness and badness, and the law
exists and everybody has to follow the law. Amos says that “by making the difference between
the positive law and morals, Austin not only laid the foundation of science of law but also
cleared the conceptions of law.

AUSTIN’S NATURE OF LAW:-

It is already observed that Austin created the system of law which is not concerned with the
normative aspect. As per Austin every positive law is a set by a sovereign person or a sovereign
body of person, to the member and members of independent political society wherein its
important that person is a sovereign or supreme. Thus the great contribution of Austin over
Hobbes is concept of law and once law is made, everybody has to follow that law and has to live
within the rules and regulations.

H.L.A. HART (1907):-

H. L. A. Hart's the concept of law (1961) is one of the most important contributions to Analytical
Jurisprudence to have been made in England since the appearance of Austin's the province of
jurisprudence determined in 1832. Indeed Hart's Concept of Law has come as an alternative to,
and to a great-measure has developed a new theory of, British positivism by rejecting Austin's
command-duty-sanction them. In the concept of law he presents a positivist account of law that
is designed to give a more adequate idea of the notion of law by dealing with various difficulties
besetting Austin's philosophy of law.8 At the centre of Hart's analysis of the concept of law is the
concept of rules and in particular the concept of a social rule, the former being a kind of directive
which sets out directions for behavior and the latter being different kinds or more or less wide

8
HLA HART concept of law available at http://www.angelfire.com/md2/timewarp/hart.html (last visited on
04/02/2018)

11
practices or habitual behavior of a community which require compliance. His works have
initiated a renaissance in Analytical Jurisprudence in England.

HART’S NATURE OF LAW:-

As Austin had claimed that trilogy of command, sanction and sovereign constitutes essence or
nature of law Hart law is a system of rules

A.) primary

B.) secondary

The union of which explains the nature of law and provides ‘key to science of jurisprudence'.
The primary rules are duty imposing rules (example in a primitive society) and the secondary
rules are power conferring which provide for the creation or variation of duties or obligations by
removing defects of the primary rules.

Thus supplementation of primary rules with secondary rules, says Hart, is the step from pre-legal
to legal world. The secondary rules provide all the three remedies, the rules of recognition, the
rules of change and the rules of adjudication for removing the uncertainty, static character and
inefficiency inherent in the primary rules and “convert the regime of primary rules into what is
indisputably a legal system”. His legal system— a union of primary and secondary rules, cannot
be complete without the minimum content of Natural Law shared both by law and morals. His
positivism contains within it a “minimal version” of Natural Law which Hart says every legal
system must have as a natural necessity.

PRIMARY RULE:-
According to Hart primary rules are those rules that impose duty upon an individuals and are
binding because it consist practices of acceptance which people are required to do or to follow or
to abstain from certain actions . 9Hart ask to imagine a community in which only primary rexists
without legislation, without courts or officials of any kind, by this there will only be confusion
that what is to be followed and what not to be followed.

9
Legal Theory Lexicon 039: Primary and Secondary Rules available at
http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2004/06/legal_theory_le_2.html (last visited on 04/02/2018)

12
DEFECTS OF PRIMARY RULES:-
The first defect of this primary rule is what we can call is “uncertainty”, For such a society there
is no systematic procedure for solving the doubts of the people of that concern community The
second defect is the “static character”, change can be seen only by the slow process of growth
and decay and lastly the third defect of primary function is “inefficiency” which says that the
rules are only maintained by diffusing social pressure and there is no agency to determine
disputes of that particular rule.

SECONDARY RULES:-
The remedy of these three main defects is the supplementation or the mixture of primary rules
and secondary rules. According to Hart he describes secondary rule as a step from pre legal
world to legal world. He observes introduction of secondary rule is to add or to change the judge
to determine when the rule have been broken as step forward as important to society for making
the rules and regulations chain so that people lives in harmony and peace. Hart remarks “law is a
union of primary and secondary rule and in this manner the law is born. In short, H. L. A. Hart at
best can be described both a positivist and naturalist who by correlating law and morality
conceived what Austin and Kelsen failed to conceive in legal theory.10

HANS KELSEN (1881-1973):-

KELSEN’S CONTRIBUTION IN THE ANALYTICAL SCHOOL OF LAW:-

Kelsen works to expel all non-legal, historical and sociological notions from science of law in
order to make it formal and that of making it common for everyone and everybody has to follow
it and should not be denied by anyone. Kelsen’s theory was parallel to the theory of John Austin
who did something in 1832 to save jurisprudence from confusion. Kelson’s theory of law in
some respect is similar to that of Austin but still kelsen was unaware when he originated his
theory and hence he rejects many Austinian concepts. Similarly kelsen was also influenced by
Kant and made fundamental distinction and difference between man as apart of the subject and
laws of caution.

10
Legal Theory Lexicon 039: Primary and Secondary Rules available at
http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2004/06/legal_theory_le_2.html (last visited on 04/02/2018)

13
KELSON’S POSITIVISM:-
Kelsen rebuilt the structure of legal system which are much similar to the theory of John Austin,
in his theory of law legal system are as distinguished from moral norms and he was also in
complete agreement with Austin as both are jurists and are not concern with the moral, ideas and
many other things. Austin separated jurisprudence from science of legislation and positive law.
Kelson was also a pure theorist of law rigidly which excludes politics, sociology from legal
science. Like Austin kelsen also wants to separate the ring of jurisprudence from that natural
sciences and he also points out many other sciences besides law are normative such as all
philosophy, economics, logic and his grund’s norm theory. For Austin law is a command backed
up by threat of forces while on other hand for kelsen it is the norm that directs an official to
apply force under certain instant circumstances.

LEGAL NORMS:-
Before saying something about norm the question arises what is the rule of law? Rules and
norms are the kinds of directives which tell us about the directions for behavior. The norms as
per kelsen are set of rules set by the law which has to be followed by all the people of the
society. A norm says kelsen is a rule prescribing certain behavior. In Kelsen’s thought norms
belongs to that particular rule that has no ethical moral or natural law. The structure of legal
norm is totally different from the moral norm.

KELSEN’S CRITICISM:-
Kelsen did his last contribution towards the legal theory so that it should not be affected by the
political interests. In his theory he kept law as a tool of political, ideological manipulations by
which law remain pure and free from the bases of political, ideological and economic doctrine
and theories. As Kelsen theory was not free from criticism and the first thing that arises is the
purity of norms. That is attempting to delete or exclude all the reference of social facts and social
justice. Moreover Kelsen’s said that grundnorm in the nature of being a hypothesis is the
combination of various social and political considerations. According to kelsen all the norms are
pure norms excluding basic norm or grundnorm and it is not understandable how the norms can
be pure when basic norm itself is adulterated. Kelsen theory of law is quite positivism excluding
all domains of jurisprudence and the ideal of justice are mere emotions and legal system devoid
either a moral or immoral one or law can be alienated from social and moral values and pressure.

14
CONCLUSION:-

The topic of mine “the analytical school of law” gives me a lot to learn. It tells me about
different-different jurists and there different opinions. This topic is very important as it tells us
about legal theory that draws on the resources of modern analytical philosophy to try to
understand the nature of law. Since the boundaries of analytical philosophy are somewhat vague,
it is difficult to say how far it extends. H.L.A Hart was probably the most influential writer in the
modern school of analytical jurisprudence, though its history goes back at least to Jeremy
Bentham. Analytical jurisprudence is not to be mistaken for legal formalism (the idea that legal
reasoning is or can be modeled as a mechanical, algorithmic process). Indeed, it was the
analytical jurists who first pointed out that legal formalism is fundamentally mistaken as a theory
of law. Analytical jurisprudence uses a neutral point of view and descriptive language when
referring to the aspects of legal systems. This was a philosophical development that rejected
natural law's fusing of what law is and what it ought to be. David Hume famously argued in A
Treatise of Human Nature that people invariably slip between describing that the world is a
certain way to saying therefore we ought to conclude on a particular course of action. But as a
matter of pure logic, one cannot conclude that we ought to do something merely because
something is the case. 11

11
Analytical school of jurisprudence available at https://www.scribd.com/doc/70136931/Analytical-School-of-
Jurisprudence (last visited on 05/02/2018)

15
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1.) Fundamentals of jurisprudence

2.) Jurisprudence and legal theories

3.) Lawyersupdate.co.in

4.) www.grkarelawlibrary.yolasite.com

5.) [email protected]

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