Leviste vs. Court of Appeals

precise degree of his culpability, and, (3) it must ask the
accused whether he desires to present evidence on his

behalf, and allow him to do so if he so desires. (People vs.
Gumimba, 517 SCRA 25 [2007])
——o0o——
G.R. No. 189122. March 17, 2010.*
JOSE ANTONIO LEVISTE, petitioner, vs. THE COURT

OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
Criminal Procedure; Bail; Bail acts as a reconciling

mechanism to accommodate both the accused’s interest in pretrial
liberty and society’s interest in assuring the accused’s presence at
trial.—Bail, the security given by an accused who is in the
custody of the law for his release to guarantee his appearance
before any court as may be required, is the answer of the criminal
justice system to a vexing question: what is to be done with the
accused, whose guilt has not yet been proven, in the “dubious
interval,” often years long, between arrest and final adjudication?
Bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the
accused’s interest in pretrial liberty and society’s interest in
assuring the accused’s presence at trial.
Same; Same; An erroneously convicted accused who is denied
bail loses his liberty to pay a debt to society he has never owed;
Under what circumstances an accused may obtain bail pending
appeal is a delicate balance between the interests of society and
those of the accused; In the exercise of discretion in the grant of
bail pending appeal, the proper courts are to be guided by the
fundamental principle that the allowance of bail pending appeal
should be exercised not with laxity but with grave caution and only
for strong reasons, considering that the accused has been in fact
convicted by the trial court.—Upon conviction by the Regional
Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, the
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
620
620 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Leviste vs. Court of Appeals
accused who has been sentenced to prison must typically begin

serving time immediately unless, on application, he is admitted to
bail. An accused not released on bail is incarcerated before an
appellate court confirms that his conviction is legal and proper.
An erroneously convicted accused who is denied bail loses his
liberty to pay a debt to society he has never owed. Even if the
conviction is subsequently affirmed, however, the accused’s
interest in bail pending appeal includes freedom pending judicial
review, opportunity to efficiently prepare his case and avoidance
of potential hardships of prison. On the other hand, society has a
compelling interest in protecting itself by swiftly incarcerating an
individual who is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a crime
serious enough to warrant prison time. Other recognized societal
interests in the denial of bail pending appeal include the
prevention of the accused’s flight from court custody, the
protection of the community from potential danger and the
avoidance of delay in punishment. Under what circumstances an
accused may obtain bail pending appeal, then, is a delicate
balance between the interests of society and those of the accused.
Our rules authorize the proper courts to exercise discretion in the
grant of bail pending appeal to those convicted by the Regional
perpetua or life imprisonment. In the exercise of that discretion,
the proper courts are to be guided by the fundamental principle
that the allowance of bail pending appeal should be
exercised not with laxity but with grave caution and only
for strong reasons, considering that the accused has been in
fact convicted by the trial court.
Same; Judgments; Certiorari; Grave Abuse of Discretion;
Words and Phrases; Grave abuse of discretion is not simply an
error in judgment but it is such a capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment which is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction—
ordinary abuse of discretion is insufficient.—It cannot be said that
the Court of Appeals issued the assailed resolution without or in
excess of its jurisdiction. One, pending appeal of a conviction by
the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is
expressly declared to be discretionary. Two, the discretion to
allow or disallow bail pending appeal in a case such as this where
the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the
nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable is exclusively
lodged by the rules with the appellate court. Thus, the Court of
Appeals had jurisdiction to hear and
621
VOL. 615, March 17, 2010 621
resolve petitioner’s urgent application for admission to bail

pending appeal. Neither can it be correctly claimed that the Court
of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied
petitioner’s application for bail pending appeal. Grave abuse of
discretion is not simply an error in judgment but it is such a
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment which is
tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. Ordinary abuse of
discretion is insufficient. The abuse of discretion must be
grave, that is, the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. It must be so
patent and gross as to amount to evasion of positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in
contemplation of the law. In other words, for a petition for
certiorari to prosper, there must be a clear showing of caprice and
arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion.
Same; Same; Appeals; The extraordinary writ of certiorari
will not be issued to cure errors in proceedings or erroneous
conclusions of law or fact.—Petitioner only points out the Court of
Appeal’s erroneous application and interpretation of Section 5,
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. However, the extraordinary
writ of certiorari will not be issued to cure errors in
proceedings or erroneous conclusions of law or fact. In this
connection, Lee v. People, 393 SCRA 397 (2002) is apropos: …
Certiorari may not be availed of where it is not shown that
the respondent court lacked or exceeded its jurisdiction
over the case, even if its findings are not correct. Its
questioned acts would at most constitute errors of law and not
abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari.
Same; Same; Penalties; The third paragraph of Section 5,
Rule 114 applies to two scenarios where the penalty imposed on the
appellant applying for bail is imprisonment exceeding six years—
the first scenario deals with the circumstances enumerated in the
said paragraph, and the second scenario contemplates the
existence of at least one of the said circumstances.—The third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 applies to two scenarios where
the penalty imposed on the appellant applying for bail is
imprisonment exceeding six years. The first scenario deals with
the circumstances enumerated in the said paragraph (namely,
recidivism, quasi-recidivism, habitual delinquency or commission
of the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
previous escape from legal confinement, evasion of sentence or
violation of the conditions of his bail without a valid
622
justification; commission of the offense while under probation,

parole or conditional pardon; circumstances indicating the
probability of flight if released on bail; undue risk of committing
another crime during the pendency of the appeal; or other similar
circumstances) not present. The second scenario contemplates the
existence of at least one of the said circumstances. The
implications of this distinction are discussed with erudition and
clarity in the commentary of retired Supreme Court Justice
Florenz D. Regalado, an authority in remedial law: Under the
present revised Rule 114, the availability of bail to an accused
may be summarized in the following rules: x x x x x x x x x e.
After conviction by the Regional Trial Court wherein a penalty of
imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not more than 20 years is
imposed, and not one of the circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or any
other similar circumstance is present and proved, bail is a
matter of discretion (Sec. 5); f. After conviction by the Regional
Trial Court imposing a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 years
but not more than 20 years, and any of the circumstances stated
in Sec. 5 or any other similar circumstance is present and proved,
no bail shall be granted by said court (Sec. 5); x x x.
Same; Same; Judicial Discretion; Words and Phrases;
Judicial discretion has been defined as “choice”—choice occurs
where, between “two alternatives or among a possibly infinite
number (of options),” there is “more than one possible outcome,
with the selection of the outcome left to the decision maker”; The
establishment of a clearly defined rule of action is the end of
discretion.—Petitioner’s theory therefore reduces the appellate
court into a mere fact-finding body whose authority is limited to
determining whether any of the five circumstances mentioned in
the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 exists. This unduly
constricts its “discretion” into merely filling out the checklist of
circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 in all
instances where the penalty imposed by the Regional Trial Court
on the appellant is imprisonment exceeding six years. In short,
petitioner’s interpretation severely curbs the discretion of the
appellate court by requiring it to determine a singular factual
issue—whether any of the five bail-negating circumstances is
present. However, judicial discretion has been defined as “choice.”
Choice occurs where, between “two alternatives or among a
possibly infinite number (of options),” there is “more than one
possible outcome, with the selection of the outcome left to the
decision maker.” On the other hand, the establishment of a clearly
defined rule of
623
VOL. 615, March 17, 2010 623
action is the end of discretion. Thus, by severely clipping the

appellate court’s discretion and relegating that tribunal to a mere
fact-finding body in applications for bail pending appeal in all
instances where the penalty imposed by the trial court on the
appellant is imprisonment exceeding six years, petitioner’s theory
effectively renders nugatory the provision that “upon conviction
by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to
bail is discretionary.”
Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Laws and rules
should not be interpreted in such a way that leads to unreasonable
or senseless consequences.—Laws and rules should not be
interpreted in such a way that leads to unreasonable or senseless
consequences. An absurd situation will result from adopting
petitioner’s interpretation that, where the penalty imposed by the
trial court is imprisonment exceeding six years, bail ought to be
granted if none of the listed bail-negating circumstances exists.
Allowance of bail pending appeal in cases where the penalty
imposed is more than six years of imprisonment will be more
lenient than in cases where the penalty imposed does not exceed
six years. While denial or revocation of bail in cases where the
penalty imposed is more than six years’ imprisonment must be
made only if any of the five bail-negating conditions is present,
bail pending appeal in cases where the penalty imposed does not
exceed six years imprisonment may be denied even without those
conditions.
Same; Same; Same; Legal Research; The development over
time of the rules reveals an orientation towards a more restrictive
approach to bail pending appeal—bail pending appeal should be
allowed not with leniency but with grave caution and only for
strong reasons.—The development over time of these rules reveals
an orientation towards a more restrictive approach to bail
pending appeal. It indicates a faithful adherence to the bedrock
principle, that is, bail pending appeal should be allowed not with
leniency but with grave caution and only for strong reasons.
Same; Same; Same; Penalties; Under the present rule, bail is
a matter of discretion upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court
of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment—pursuant to the “tough on bail pending appeal”
policy, the
624
presence of bail-negating conditions mandates the denial or

revocation of bail pending appeal such that those circumstances
are deemed to be as grave as conviction by the trial court for an
offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment where bail is prohibited.—A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC
modified Administrative Circular No. 12-94 by clearly identifying
which court has authority to act on applications for bail pending
appeal under certain conditions and in particular situations. More
importantly, it reiterated the “tough on bail pending appeal”
configuration of Administrative Circular No. 12-94. In particular,
it amended Section 3 of the 1988 Rules on Criminal Procedure
which entitled the accused to bail as a matter of right before final
conviction. Under the present rule, bail is a matter of discretion
upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
Indeed, pursuant to the “tough on bail pending appeal” policy, the
presence of bail-negating conditions mandates the denial or
revocation of bail pending appeal such that those circumstances
are deemed to be as grave as conviction by the trial court for an
imprisonment where bail is prohibited.
Same; Same; Same; Legal Research; The present inclination of
the rules on criminal procedure to frown on bail pending appeal
parallels the approach adopted in the United States where our
original constitutional and procedural provisions on bail
emanated.—The present inclination of the rules on criminal
procedure to frown on bail pending appeal parallels the approach
adopted in the United States where our original constitutional
and procedural provisions on bail emanated. While this is of
course not to be followed blindly, it nonetheless shows that our
treatment of bail pending appeal is no different from that in other
democratic societies. In our jurisdiction, the trend towards a strict
attitude towards the allowance of bail pending appeal is anchored
on the principle that judicial discretion—particularly with respect
to extending bail—should be exercised not with laxity but with
caution and only for strong reasons. In fact, it has even been
pointed out that “grave caution that must attend the exercise of
judicial discretion in granting bail to a convicted accused is best
illustrated and exemplified in Administrative Circular No. 12-94
amending Rule 114, Section 5.”
625
VOL. 615, March 17, 2010 625

Same; Same; Same; Presumption of Innocence; The
importance attached to conviction is due to the underlying
principle that bail should be granted only where it is uncertain
whether the accused is guilty or innocent, and therefore, where
that uncertainty is removed by conviction it would, generally
speaking, be absurd to admit to bail.—This Court has been guided
by the following: The importance attached to conviction is due to
the underlying principle that bail should be granted only where it
is uncertain whether the accused is guilty or innocent, and
therefore, where that uncertainty is removed by conviction it
would, generally speaking, be absurd to admit to bail. After a
person has been tried and convicted the presumption of
innocence which may be relied upon in prior applications
is rebutted, and the burden is upon the accused to show
error in the conviction. From another point of view it may be
properly argued that the probability of ultimate punishment is so
enhanced by the conviction that the accused is much more likely
to attempt to escape if liberated on bail than before conviction.
Same; Same; Same; Same; After conviction by the trial court,
the presumption of innocence terminates and, accordingly, the
constitutional right to bail ends—from then on, the grant of bail is
subject to judicial discretion.—After conviction by the trial court,
the presumption of innocence terminates and, accordingly, the
constitutional right to bail ends. From then on, the grant of bail is
subject to judicial discretion. At the risk of being repetitious, such
discretion must be exercised with grave caution and only for
strong reasons. Considering that the accused was in fact convicted
by the trial court, allowance of bail pending appeal should be
guided by a stringent-standards approach. This judicial
disposition finds strong support in the history and evolution of the
rules on bail and the language of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules
of Court. It is likewise consistent with the trial court’s initial
determination that the accused should be in prison. Furthermore,
letting the accused out on bail despite his conviction may destroy
the deterrent effect of our criminal laws. This is especially
germane to bail pending appeal because long delays often
separate sentencing in the trial court and appellate review. In
addition, at the post-conviction stage, the accused faces a certain
prison sentence and thus may be more likely to flee regardless of
bail bonds or other release conditions. Finally, permitting bail too
freely in spite of conviction invites frivolous and time-wasting
appeals
626
which will make a mockery of our criminal justice system and

court processes.
Peralta, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Bail; Bail Pending Appeal; Cases when an accused is charged
with Murder but was convicted with Homicide mean only one
thing, that the lower court found the evidence for the crime
charged not strong, hence, the accused’s conviction of a lesser
offense—the denial of the same accused’s application for bail
pending appeal on the ground that the evidence of his guilt for the
crime charged is strong, would unintentionally be suggestive of the
outcome of the appealed decision of the lower court.—The
Philippine Constitution itself emphasizes the right of an accused
to bail with the sole exception of those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong.
Cases, like in the present case, when an accused is charged with
Murder but was convicted with Homicide, mean only one thing,
that the lower court found the evidence for the crime charged not
strong, hence, the accused’s conviction of a lesser offense.
Therefore, the denial of the same accused’s application for bail
pending appeal on the ground that the evidence of his guilt for the
crime charged is strong, would unintentionally be suggestive of
the outcome of the appealed decision of the lower court. The
discretion whether to grant the application for bail or not is given
to the CA in cases such as the present one, on the reason that the
same appellate court can review the factual findings of the lower
court. However, this will no longer be the case if a Petition for
Certiorari is filed with this Court as it is not a trier of facts.
Hence, the existence of those queries brought about by the
majority opinion casts confusion rather than an enlightenment on
the present case.
Same; Same; The set of circumstances succinctly provided in
Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court has been provided as a
guide for the exercise of the appellate court’s discretion in granting
or denying the application for bail, pending the appeal of an
accused who has been convicted of a crime where the penalty
imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years,
otherwise, if it is intended that the said discretion be absolute, no
such set of circumstances would have been necessarily included in
the Rules.—The CA should have applied the provisions of Section
5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, wherein the appellate court is
given the discretion to grant bail to the petitioner after
considering the enumerated circum-
627
VOL. 615, March 17, 2010 627
stances, the penalty imposed by the trial court having exceeded

six years. Although this Court has held that the discretion to
extend bail during the course of the appeal should be exercised
with grave caution and for strong reasons, considering that the
accused has been in fact convicted by the trial court, the set of
circumstances succinctly provided in Section 5, Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court should be considered. The said set of circumstances
has been provided as a guide for the exercise of the appellate
court’s discretion in granting or denying the application for bail,
pending the appeal of an accused who has been convicted of a
crime where the penalty imposed by the trial court is
imprisonment exceeding six (6) years. Otherwise, if it is intended
that the said discretion be absolute, no such set of circumstances
would have been necessarily included in the Rules. Thus, if the
present ruling of the CA is upheld, anyone who has been charged
with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment but convicted by the trial court of a
lesser offense, would no longer be able to apply for bail pending
one’s appeal. And by that premise, the discretion accorded to the
appellate court in granting or denying applications for bail for
those who have been convicted by the trial court with
imprisonment exceeding six (6) years as penalty would have to be
rendered nugatory and the provisions of Section 5, Rule 114 of the
2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure would also be rendered
useless.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.

Certiorari.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Esguerra & Blanco for petitioner.
Capelan Law Firm collaborating counsel for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
CORONA, J.:
Bail, the security given by an accused who is in the
custody of the law for his release to guarantee his
appearance before any court as may be required,1 is the
answer of the criminal justice system to a vexing question:
what is to be done with
_______________
1 Section 1, Rule 114, RULES OF COURT.
628

the accused, whose guilt has not yet been proven, in the
“dubious interval,” often years long, between arrest and
final adjudication?2 Bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to
accommodate both the accused’s interest in pretrial liberty
and society’s interest in assuring the accused’s presence at
trial.3
Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an
offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, the accused who has been sentenced to
prison must typically begin serving time immediately
unless, on application, he is admitted to bail.4 An accused
not released on bail is incarcerated before an appellate
court confirms that his conviction is legal and proper. An
erroneously convicted accused who is denied bail loses his
liberty to pay a debt to society he has never owed.5 Even if
the conviction is subsequently affirmed, however, the
accused’s interest in bail pending appeal includes freedom
pending judicial review, opportunity to efficiently prepare
his case and avoidance of potential hardships of prison.6 On
the other hand, society has a compelling interest in
protecting itself by swiftly incarcerating an individual who
is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a crime serious
enough to warrant prison time.7 Other recognized societal
interests in the denial of bail pending appeal include the
prevention of the accused’s flight from court custody, the
protection of the community from potential danger and the
avoidance of delay in punishment.8 Under what
circumstances an
_______________
2 Verilli, Donald, The Eighth Amendment and the Right to Bail:

Historical Perspectives, 82 Columbia L.Rev. 328 (1982).
3 Id.
4 See Section 5, Rule 114, Rules of Court.
5 Keller, Doug, Resolving A “Substantial Question”: Just Who Is
Entitled to Bail Pending Appeal Under the Bail Reform Act of 1984?, 60
Fla. L. Rev. 825 (2008).
6 Leibowitz, Debra, Release Pending Appeal: A Narrow Definition of
‘Substantial Question’ Under the Bail Reform Act, 54 FDMLR 1081 (1986).
7 Keller, supra.
8 Leibowitz, supra note 6.
629
VOL. 615, March 17, 2010 629

accused may obtain bail pending appeal, then, is a delicate

balance between the interests of society and those of the
accused.9
Our rules authorize the proper courts to exercise
discretion in the grant of bail pending appeal to those
convicted by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. In the exercise of that discretion, the proper
courts are to be guided by the fundamental principle that
the allowance of bail pending appeal should be
exercised not with laxity but with grave caution and
only for strong reasons, considering that the accused
has been in fact convicted by the trial court.10
The Facts
Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas,

petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste was convicted by the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City for the lesser crime of
homicide and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty
of six years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to 12
years and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum.11
He appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals.12
Pending appeal, he filed an urgent application for
admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age
and health condition, and claiming the absence of any risk
or possibility of flight on his part.
The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s application for
bail.13 It invoked the bedrock principle in the matter of bail
_______________
9 Keller, supra.
10 Yap v. Court of Appeals, 411 Phil. 190, 202; 358 SCRA 564, 573
(2001).
11 Decision dated January 14, 2009 in Criminal Case No. 07-179
penned by Judge Elmo M. Alameda. Rollo, pp. 198-235.
12 Notice of Appeal dated January 14, 2009. Id., at p. 238-241.
13 Resolution dated April 8, 2009 in CA-G.R. CR No. 32159 penned by
Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. (now a member
630

pending appeal, that the discretion to extend bail during

the course of appeal should be exercised “with grave
caution and only for strong reasons.” Citing well-
established jurisprudence, it ruled that bail is not a sick
pass for an ailing or aged detainee or a prisoner needing
medical care outside the prison facility. It found that
petitioner.
“… failed to show that he suffers from ailment of such gravity

that his continued confinement during trial will permanently
impair his health or put his life in danger. x x x Notably, the
physical condition of [petitioner] does not prevent him from
seeking medical attention while confined in prison, though he
clearly preferred to be attended by his personal physician.”14
For purposes of determining whether petitioner’s

application for bail could be allowed pending appeal, the
Court of Appeals also considered the fact of petitioner’s
conviction. It made a preliminary evaluation of petitioner’s
case and made a prima facie determination that there was
no reason substantial enough to overturn the evidence of
petitioner’s guilt.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.15
Petitioner now questions as grave abuse of discretion the
denial of his application for bail, considering that none of
the conditions justifying denial of bail under the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was
present. Petitioner’s theory is that, where the penalty
imposed by the trial court is more than six years but not
more than 20 years and the circumstances mentioned in
the third paragraph of Section 5 are absent, bail must be
granted to an appellant pending appeal.
_______________
of this Court) and concurred in by Associate Justices Jose C. Reyes, Jr.

and Normandie B. Pizarro of the third Division of the Court of Appeals.
Id., at pp. 36-45.
14 Id., at p. 43.
15 Id., at p. 47.
631
VOL. 615, March 17, 2010 631

The Issue
The question presented to the Court is this: in an
application for bail pending appeal by an appellant
sentenced by the trial court to a penalty of imprisonment
for more than six years, does the discretionary nature of
the grant of bail pending appeal mean that bail should
automatically be granted absent any of the circumstances
mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of
the Rules of Court?
Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides:
“Sec. 5. Bail, when discretionary.—Upon conviction by the

Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission
to bail is discretionary. The application for bail may be filed
and acted upon by the trial court despite the filing of a notice of
appeal, provided it has not transmitted the original record to the
appellate court. However, if the decision of the trial court
convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from
non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed
with and resolved by the appellate court.
Should the court grant the application, the accused may be
allowed to continue on provisional liberty during the pendency of
the appeal under the same bail subject to the consent of the
bondsman.
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is
imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the accused shall be
denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing
by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the
following or other similar circumstances:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or
habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime
aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal
confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the
conditions of his bail without a valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under
probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
632

(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate

the probability of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit
another crime during the pendency of the appeal.
The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any
party, review the resolution of the Regional Trial Court after
notice to the adverse party in either case.” (emphasis supplied)
Petitioner claims that, in the absence of any of the

circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section
5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, an application for bail by
an appellant sentenced by the Regional Trial Court to a
penalty of more than six years’ imprisonment should
automatically be granted.
Petitioner’s stance is contrary to fundamental
considerations of procedural and substantive rules.
Basic Procedural Concerns
Forbid Grant of Petition
Petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to assail the denial by
the Court of Appeals of his urgent application for
admission to bail pending appeal. While the said remedy
may be resorted to challenge an interlocutory order, such
remedy is proper only where the interlocutory order was
rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.16
Other than the sweeping averment that “[t]he Court of
Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioner’s application for bail pending appeal despite the
fact that none of the conditions to justify the denial thereof
under Rule 114, Section 5 [is] present, much less proven by
the prosecution,”17 however, petitioner actually failed to
establish
_______________
16 See Section 1, Rule 65, RULES OF COURT.

17 See Petition, p. 14. Rollo, p. 16.
633
VOL. 615, March 17, 2010 633

that the Court of Appeals indeed acted with grave abuse of

discretion. He simply relies on his claim that the Court of
Appeals should have granted bail in view of the absence of
any of the circumstances enumerated in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.
Furthermore, petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals
committed a grave error and prejudged the appeal by
denying his application for bail on the ground that the
evidence that he committed a capital offense was strong.
We disagree.
It cannot be said that the Court of Appeals issued the
assailed resolution without or in excess of its jurisdiction.
One, pending appeal of a conviction by the Regional Trial
Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is
expressly declared to be discretionary. Two, the
discretion to allow or disallow bail pending appeal in a case
such as this where the decision of the trial court convicting
the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-
bailable to bailable is exclusively lodged by the rules with
the appellate court. Thus, the Court of Appeals had
jurisdiction to hear and resolve petitioner’s urgent
application for admission to bail pending appeal.
Neither can it be correctly claimed that the Court of
Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion when it
denied petitioner’s application for bail pending appeal.
Grave abuse of discretion is not simply an error in
judgment but it is such a capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment which is tantamount to lack of
jurisdiction.18 Ordinary abuse of discretion is
insufficient. The abuse of discretion must be grave, that
is, the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility.19 It must
be so patent and gross as to amount to evasion of posi-
_______________
18 Dueñas, Jr. v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No.

185401, 21 July 2009, 593 SCRA 316, 344.
19 Id.
634

tive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty

enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of the law. In
other words, for a petition for certiorari to prosper, there
must be a clear showing of caprice and arbitrariness in the
exercise of discretion.20
Petitioner never alleged that, in denying his application
for bail pending appeal, the Court of Appeals exercised its
judgment capriciously and whimsically. No capriciousness
or arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion was ever
imputed to the appellate court. Nor could any such
implication or imputation be inferred. As observed earlier,
the Court of Appeals exercised grave caution in the exercise
of its discretion. The denial of petitioner’s application for
bail pending appeal was not unreasonable but was the
result of a thorough assessment of petitioner’s claim of ill
health. By making a preliminary appraisal of the merits of
the case for the purpose of granting bail, the court also
determined whether the appeal was frivolous or not, or
whether it raised a substantial question. The appellate
court did not exercise its discretion in a careless manner
but followed doctrinal rulings of this Court.
At best, petitioner only points out the Court of Appeal’s
erroneous application and interpretation of Section 5, Rule
114 of the Rules of Court. However, the extraordinary
writ of certiorari will not be issued to cure errors in
proceedings or erroneous conclusions of law or
fact.21 In this connection, Lee v. People22 is apropos:
“… Certiorari may not be availed of where it is not shown

that the respondent court lacked or exceeded its
jurisdiction over the case, even if its findings are not
correct. Its questioned acts would at most constitute errors of
law and not abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari.
_______________
20 Id., at p. 345.
21 Fortich v. Corona, 352 Phil. 461; 289 SCRA 624 (1998).
22 441 Phil. 705; 393 SCRA 397 (2002).
635
VOL. 615, March 17, 2010 635

In other words, certiorari will issue only to correct errors of

jurisdiction and not to correct errors of procedure or mistakes in
the court’s findings and conclusions. An interlocutory order may
be assailed by certiorari or prohibition only when it is shown that
the court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion. However, this Court generally frowns upon
this remedial measure as regards interlocutory orders. To tolerate
the practice of allowing interlocutory orders to be the subject of
review by certiorari will not only delay the administration of
justice but will also unduly burden the courts.”23 (emphasis
supplied)
Wording of Third Paragraph of Section

5, Rule 114 Contradicts Petitioner’s
Interpretation
The third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 applies to
two scenarios where the penalty imposed on the appellant
applying for bail is imprisonment exceeding six years. The
first scenario deals with the circumstances enumerated in
the said paragraph (namely, recidivism, quasi-recidivism,
habitual delinquency or commission of the crime
aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration; previous
escape from legal confinement, evasion of sentence or
violation of the conditions of his bail without a valid
justification; commission of the offense while under
probation, parole or conditional pardon; circumstances
indicating the probability of flight if released on bail; undue
risk of committing another crime during the pendency of
the appeal; or other similar circumstances) not present.
The second scenario contemplates the existence of at least
one of the said circumstances.
The implications of this distinction are discussed with
erudition and clarity in the commentary of retired Supreme
Court Justice Florenz D. Regalado, an authority in
remedial law:
_______________
23 Id.
636

“Under the present revised Rule 114, the availability of bail to

an accused may be summarized in the following rules:
xxx xxx xxx
e. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court wherein a
penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not more than 20
years is imposed, and not one of the circumstances stated in Sec. 5
or any other similar circumstance is present and proved, bail is a
matter of discretion (Sec. 5);
f. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court imposing a
penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not more than 20
years, and any of the circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or any other
similar circumstance is present and proved, no bail shall be
granted by said court (Sec. 5); x x x”24 (emphasis supplied)
Retired Court of Appeals Justice Oscar M. Herrera,

another authority in remedial law, is of the same thinking:
“Bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of

right when the offense charged is not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. On the other hand, upon
conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, bail
becomes a matter of discretion.
Similarly, if the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment
exceeding six (6) years then bail is a matter of discretion,
except when any of the enumerated circumstances under
_______________
24 Regalado, Florenz, II REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM 417 (Tenth Revised Edition

[2004]).
Justice Regalado was Vice-Chairman and, later, Co-Chairman of the Committee
on Revision of the Rules of Court which proposed the present (2000) rules on
criminal procedure (Rules 110-127 of the Rules of Court).
It should be noted, however, that Justice Regalado speaks of application for bail
pending appeal in cases “wherein a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 years but
not more than 20 years is imposed.” (Emphasis supplied) A careful reading of
the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 does not impose the limit of “not more
than 20 years.”
637
VOL. 615, March 17, 2010 637

paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present then bail

shall be denied.”25 (emphasis supplied)
In the first situation, bail is a matter of sound judicial

discretion. This means that, if none of the circumstances
mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is
present, the appellate court has the discretion to grant or
deny bail. An application for bail pending appeal may be
denied even if the bail-negating26 circumstances in the
third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 are absent. In other
words, the appellate court’s denial of bail pending appeal
where none of the said circumstances exists does not, by
and of itself, constitute abuse of discretion.
On the other hand, in the second situation, the appellate
court exercises a more stringent discretion, that is, to
carefully ascertain whether any of the enumerated
circumstances in fact exists. If it so determines, it has no
other option except to deny or revoke bail pending appeal.
Conversely, if the appellate court grants bail pending
appeal, grave abuse of discretion will thereby be
committed.
Given these two distinct scenarios, therefore, any
application for bail pending appeal should be viewed from
the perspective of two stages: (1) the determination of
discretion stage, where the appellate court must determine
whether any of the circumstances in the third paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 114 is present; this will establish whether
or not the appellate court will exercise sound discretion or
stringent discretion in resolving the application for bail
pending appeal and (2) the exercise of discretion stage
where, assuming the appellant’s
_______________
25 Herrera, Oscar, IV REMEDIAL LAW 455-456 (2007).

Justice Herrera was Consultant to the Committee on Revision of the
Rules of Court which proposed the present (2000) rules on criminal
procedure (Rules 110-127 of the Rules of Court).
26 These circumstances are herein referred to as “bail-negating”
because the presence of any of them will negate the allowance of bail.
638

case falls within the first scenario allowing the exercise of

sound discretion, the appellate court may consider all
relevant circumstances, other than those mentioned in the
third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114, including the
demands of equity and justice;27 on the basis thereof, it
may either allow or disallow bail.
On the other hand, if the appellant’s case falls within
the second scenario, the appellate court’s stringent
discretion requires that the exercise thereof be primarily
focused on the determination of the proof of the presence of
any of the circumstances that are prejudicial to the
allowance of bail. This is so because the existence of any of
those circumstances is by itself sufficient to deny or revoke
bail. Nonetheless, a finding that none of the said
circumstances is present will not automatically
result in the grant of bail. Such finding will simply
authorize the court to use the less stringent sound
discretion approach.
Petitioner disregards the fine yet substantial distinction
between the two different situations that are governed by
the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114. Instead,
petitioner insists on a simplistic treatment that unduly
dilutes the import of the said provision and trivializes the
established policy governing the grant of bail pending
appeal.
In particular, a careful reading of petitioner’s arguments
reveals that it interprets the third paragraph of Section 5,
Rule 114 to cover all situations where the penalty
imposed by the trial court on the appellant is imprisonment
exceeding six years. For petitioner, in such a situation, the
grant of bail pending appeal is always subject to limited
discretion, that is,
_______________
27 Discretion implies that, in the absence of a positive law or fixed rule,

the judge is to decide by his view of expediency or by the demands of
equity and justice. (Negros Oriental Planters Association, Inc. v. Presiding
Judge of RTC-Negros Occidental, Branch 52, Bacolod City , G.R. No.
179878, 24 December 2008, 575 SCRA 575 and Luna v. Arcenas, 34 Phil.
80 [1916] both citing Goodwin v. Prime [92 Me., 355]).
639
VOL. 615, March 17, 2010 639

one restricted to the determination of whether any of
the five bail-negating circumstances exists. The
implication of this position is that, if any such circumstance
is present, then bail will be denied. Otherwise, bail will be
granted pending appeal.
Petitioner’s theory therefore reduces the appellate court
into a mere fact-finding body whose authority is limited to
determining whether any of the five circumstances
mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114
exists. This unduly constricts its “discretion” into merely
filling out the checklist of circumstances in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 in all instances where the
penalty imposed by the Regional Trial Court on the
appellant is imprisonment exceeding six years. In short,
petitioner’s interpretation severely curbs the discretion of
the appellate court by requiring it to determine a singular
factual issue—whether any of the five bail-negating
circumstances is present.
However, judicial discretion has been defined as
“choice.”28 Choice occurs where, between “two alternatives
or among a possibly infinite number (of options),” there is
“more than one possible outcome, with the selection of the
outcome left to the decision maker.”29 On the other hand,
the establishment of a clearly defined rule of action is the
end of discretion.30 Thus, by severely clipping the appellate
court’s discretion and relegating that tribunal to a mere
fact-finding body in applications for bail pending appeal in
all instances where the penalty imposed by the trial court
on the appellant is imprisonment exceeding six years,
petitioner’s theory effectively ren-
_______________
28 Rosenberg, Maurice, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed

from Above, 22 Syracuse L. Rev. 635, 659 (1971) cited in Painter, Mark
and Welker, Paula, Abuse of Discretion: What Should It Mean in Ohio
Law?, 29 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 209 (2002).
29 Steven Alan Childress & Martha S. Davis, 2 Standards of Review §
15.8, at 296 (1986) cited in Painter and Welker, supra.
30 Negros Oriental Planters Association, Inc. v. Presiding Judge of
RTC-Negros Occidental, Branch 52, Bacolod City, supra note 21.
640
ders nugatory the provision that “upon conviction by the

Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission
to bail is discretionary.
”The judicial discretion granted to the proper court (the
Court of Appeals in this case) to rule on applications for
bail pending appeal must necessarily involve the exercise of
judgment on the part of the court. The court must be
allowed reasonable latitude to express its own view of the
case, its appreciation of the facts and its understanding of
the applicable law on the matter.31 In view of the grave
caution required of it, the court should consider whether or
not, under all circumstances, the accused will be present to
abide by his punishment if his conviction is affirmed.32 It
should also give due regard to any other pertinent matters
beyond the record of the particular case, such as the record,
character and reputation of the applicant,33 among other
things. More importantly, the discretion to determine
allowance or disallowance of bail pending appeal
necessarily includes, at the very least, an initial
determination that the appeal is not frivolous but raises a
substantial question of law or fact which must be
determined by the appellate court.34 In other words, a
threshold requirement for the grant of bail is a showing
that the appeal is not pro forma and merely intended for
delay but presents a fairly debatable issue.35 This must be
so; otherwise,
_______________
31 Morada v. Tayao, A.M. No. RTJ-93-978, 07 February 1994, 229

SCRA 723.
32 Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 83 Phil. 658 (1949).
33 Id.
34 United States v. Motlow, 10 F.2d 657 (1926) (Butler, Circuit Justice).
35 See D’Aquino v. United States, 180 F.2d 271, 272 (1959) (Douglas,
Circuit Justice).
Justice Douglas of the United States Supreme Court, in his capacity as
a Circuit Justice, was one of the first judges to discuss the definition of
“substantial question.” He equated the phrase with an
641
VOL. 615, March 17, 2010 641

the appellate courts will be deluged with frivolous and

time-wasting appeals made for the purpose of taking
advantage of a lenient attitude on bail pending appeal.
Even more significantly, this comports with the very strong
presumption on appeal that the lower court’s exercise of
discretionary power was sound,36 specially since the rules
on criminal procedure require that no judgment shall be
reversed or modified by the Court of Appeals except for
substantial error.37
Moreover, to limit the bail-negating circumstances to the
five situations mentioned in the third paragraph of Section
5, Rule 114 is wrong. By restricting the bail-negating
circumstances to those expressly mentioned, petitioner
applies the
_______________
issue that is “fairly debatable.” Later, he provided additional guidance to

district courts trying to determine whether a defendant’s appeal would
raise a fairly debatable issue:
[T]he first consideration is the soundness of the errors alleged. Are

they, or any of them, likely to command the respect of the appellate
judges? It is not enough that I am unimpressed. I must decide whether
there is a school of thought, a philosophical view, a technical argument, an
analogy, an appeal to precedent or to reason commanding respect that
might possibly prevail.(Herzog v. United States, 75 S. Ct. 349, 351 (1955)
(Douglas, Circuit Justice)
See also United States v. Barbeau, 92 F. Supp. 196, 202 (D. Alaska
1950), aff’d, 193 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 968 (1952);
Warring v. United States, 16 F.R.D. 524, 526 (D. Md. 1954); United States
v. Goo, 10 F.R.D. 337, 338 (D. Hawaii 1950).
36 Luna v. Arcenas, supra note 21 quoting 2 Encyclopedia of Pleading
and Practice 416, 418.
Thus, the general rule and one of the fundamental rules of appellate
procedure is that decisions of a trial court which “lie in discretion” will not
be reviewed on appeal, whether the case be civil or criminal, at law or in
equity (Cuan v. Chiang Kai Shek College, Inc, G.R. No. 175936, 03
September 2007, 532 SCRA 172, 187-188).
37 Section 10, Rule 114, Rules of Court.

642

expressio unius est exclusio alterius38 rule in statutory

construction. However, the very language of the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 contradicts the idea that
the enumeration of the five situations therein was meant to
be exclusive. The provision categorically refers to “the
following or other similar circumstances.” Hence, under
the rules, similarly relevant situations other than those
listed in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 may be
considered in the allowance, denial or revocation of bail
pending appeal.
Finally, laws and rules should not be interpreted in such
a way that leads to unreasonable or senseless
consequences. An absurd situation will result from
adopting petitioner’s interpretation that, where the penalty
imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six
years, bail ought to be granted if none of the listed bail-
negating circumstances exists. Allowance of bail pending
appeal in cases where the penalty imposed is more than six
years of imprisonment will be more lenient than in cases
where the penalty imposed does not exceed six years. While
denial or revocation of bail in cases where the penalty
imposed is more than six years’ imprisonment must be
made only if any of the five bail-negating conditions is
present, bail pending appeal in cases where the penalty
imposed does not exceed six years imprisonment may be
denied even without those conditions.
Is it reasonable and in conformity with the dictates of
justice that bail pending appeal be more accessible to those
convicted of serious offenses, compared to those convicted of
less serious crimes?
_______________
38 The express mention of one implies the exclusion of all others not
mentioned.
643
VOL. 615, March 17, 2010 643

Petitioner’s Theory Deviates from History and

Evolution of Rule on Bail Pending Appeal
Petitioner’s interpretation deviates from, even radically
alters, the history and evolution of the provisions on bail
pending appeal.
The relevant original provisions on bail were provided
under Sections 3 to 6, Rule 110 of the 1940 Rules of
Criminal Procedure:
“Sec. 3. Offenses less than capital before conviction by the

Court of First Instance.—After judgment by a municipal judge
and before conviction by the Court of First Instance, the
defendant shall be admitted to bail as of right.
Sec. 4. Non-capital offenses after conviction by the Court of
First Instance.—After conviction by the Court of First Instance,
defendant may, upon application, be bailed at the discretion of the
court.
Sec. 5. Capital offense defined.—A capital offense, as the
term is used in this rule, is an offense which, under the law
existing at the time of its commission, and at the time of the
application to be admitted to bail, may be punished by death.
Sec. 6. Capital offense not bailable.—No person in custody for
the commission of a capital offense shall be admitted to bail if the
evidence of his guilt is strong.”
The aforementioned provisions were reproduced as

Sections 3 to 6, Rule 114 of the 1964 Rules of Criminal
Procedure and then of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure. They were modified in 1988 to read as follows:
“Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right; exception.—All persons in

custody, shall before final conviction be entitled to bail as a
matter of right, except those charged with a capital offense or an
offense which, under the law at the time of its commission and at
the time of the application for bail, is punishable by reclusion
perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong.
644

Sec. 4. Capital offense, defined.—A capital offense, as the

term is used in this Rules, is an offense which, under the law
existing at the time of its commission, and at the time of the
application to be admitted to bail, may be punished by death.”
(emphasis supplied)
The significance of the above changes was clarified in

Administrative Circular No. 2-92 dated January 20, 1992
as follows:
“The basic governing principle on the right of the accused to

bail is laid down in Section 3 of Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, as amended, which provides:
Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right; exception.—All persons in
custody, shall before final conviction, be entitled to bail as a
Pursuant to the aforecited provision, an accused who is
charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua, shall no longer be entitled to bail as a matter
of right even if he appeals the case to this Court since his
conviction clearly imports that the evidence of his guilt of the
offense charged is strong.
Hence, for the guidelines of the bench and bar with respect to
future as well as pending cases before the trial courts, this Court
en banc lays down the following policies concerning the effectivity
of the bail of the accused, to wit:
1) When an accused is charged with an offense which under
the law existing at the time of its commission and at the time of
the application for bail is punishable by a penalty lower than
reclusion perpetua and is out on bail, and after trial is convicted
by the trial court of the offense charged or of a lesser offense than
that charged in the complaint or information, he may be allowed
to remain free on his original bail pending the resolution of his
appeal, unless the proper court directs otherwise pursuant to Rule
114, Sec. 2 (a) of the Rules of Court, as amended;
2) When an accused is charged with a capital offense or
an offense which under the law at the time of its commis-
645
VOL. 615, March 17, 2010 645

sion and at the time of the application for bail is

punishable by reclusion perpetua and is out on bail, and
after trial is convicted by the trial court of a lesser offense
than that charged in the complaint or information, the
same rule set forth in the preceding paragraph shall be
applied;
3) When an accused is charged with a capital offense or an
offense which under the law at the time of its commission and at
the time of the application for bail is punishable by reclusion
perpetua and is out on bail and after trial is convicted by the trial
court of the offense charged, his bond shall be cancelled and the
accused shall be placed in confinement pending resolution of his
appeal.
As to criminal cases covered under the third rule abovecited,
which are now pending appeal before his Court where the accused
is still on provisional liberty, the following rules are laid down:
1) This Court shall order the bondsman to surrender the
accused within ten (10) days from notice to the court of origin. The
bondsman thereupon, shall inform this Court of the fact of
surrender, after which, the cancellation of the bond shall be
ordered by this Court;
2) The RTC shall order the transmittal of the accused to the
National Bureau of Prisons thru the Philippine National Police as
the accused shall remain under confinement pending resolution of
his appeal;
3) If the accused-appellant is not surrendered within the
aforesaid period of ten (10) days, his bond shall be forfeited and
an order of arrest shall be issued by this Court. The appeal taken
by the accused shall also be dismissed under Section 8, Rule 124
of the Revised Rules of Court as he shall be deemed to have
jumped his bail.” (emphasis supplied)
Amendments were further introduced in Administrative

Circular No. 12-94 dated August 16, 1994 which brought
about important changes in the said rules as follows:
“SECTION 4. Bail, a matter of right.—All persons in custody
shall: (a) before or after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial
Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities and
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before conviction by the
Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua
646

or life imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter of right, with

sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as prescribed by
law of this Rule. (3a)
SECTION 5. Bail, when discretionary.—Upon conviction
by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable
by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the
court, on application, may admit the accused to bail.
The court, in its discretion, may allow the accused to continue
on provisional liberty under the same bail bond during the period
of appeal subject to the consent of the bondsman.
If the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment
exceeding six (6) years but not more than twenty (20)
years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail
previously granted shall be cancelled, upon a showing by
the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the
following or other similar circumstances:
(a) That the accused is a recidivist, quasi-
recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed
the crime aggravated by the circumstance of
reiteration;
(b) That the accused is found to have previously
escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence or
has violated the conditions of his bail without valid
justification;
(c) That the accused committed the offense while
on probation, parole, under conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of the accused or his
case indicate the probability of flight if released on
bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that during the
pendency of the appeal, the accused may commit
another crime.
The appellate court may review the resolution of the Regional
Trial Court, on motion and with notice to the adverse party. (n)
SECTION 6. Capital offense, defined.—A capital offense, as
the term is used in these Rules, is an offense which, under the law
existing at the time of its commission and at the time of the
application to be admitted to bail, maybe punished with death. (4)
647
VOL. 615, March 17, 2010 647

SECTION 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by

reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable.—No person
charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the
criminal prosecution.” (emphasis supplied)
The above amendments of Administrative Circular No.

12-94 to Rule 114 were thereafter amended by A.M. No. 00-
5-03-SC to read as they do now.
The development over time of these rules reveals an
orientation towards a more restrictive approach to bail
pending appeal. It indicates a faithful adherence to the
bedrock principle, that is, bail pending appeal should be
allowed not with leniency but with grave caution and only
for strong reasons.
The earliest rules on the matter made all grants of bail
after conviction for a non-capital offense by the Court of
First Instance (predecessor of the Regional Trial Court)
discretionary. The 1988 amendments made applications for
bail pending appeal favorable to the appellant-applicant.
Bail before final conviction in trial courts for non-capital
offenses or offenses not punishable by reclusion perpetua
was a matter of right, meaning, admission to bail was a
matter of right at any stage of the action where the charge
was not for a capital offense or was not punished by
reclusion perpetua.39
The amendments introduced by Administrative Circular
No. 12-94 made bail pending appeal (of a conviction by the
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment) discretionary.
Thus, Administrative Circular No. 12-94 laid down more
stringent rules on the matter of post-conviction grant of
bail.
A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC modified Administrative Circular
No. 12-94 by clearly identifying which court has authority
to act
_______________
39 Regalado, Florenz, II Remedial Law Compendium 273 (Fifth

Revised Edition [1988]).
648

on applications for bail pending appeal under certain

conditions and in particular situations. More importantly,
it reiterated the “tough on bail pending appeal”
configuration of Administrative Circular No. 12-94. In
particular, it amended Section 3 of the 1988 Rules on
Criminal Procedure which entitled the accused to bail as a
matter of right before final conviction.40 Under the present
rule, bail is a matter of discretion upon conviction by the
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Indeed, pursuant
to the “tough on bail pending appeal” policy, the presence of
bail-negating conditions mandates the denial or revocation
of bail pending appeal such that those circumstances are
deemed to be as grave as conviction by the trial court for an
imprisonment where bail is prohibited.
Now, what is more in consonance with a stringent
standards approach to bail pending appeal? What is more
in conformity with an ex abundante cautelam view of bail
pending appeal? Is it a rule which favors the automatic
grant of bail in the absence of any of the circumstances
under the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114? Or is it a
rule that authorizes the denial of bail after due
consideration of all relevant circumstances, even if none of
the circumstances under the third paragraph of Section 5,
Rule 114 is present?
The present inclination of the rules on criminal
procedure to frown on bail pending appeal parallels the
approach adopted in the United States where our original
constitutional and procedural provisions on bail
emanated.41 While
_______________
40 See Herrera, supra note 19, p. 457.

41 In particular, in the United States, the history of bail pending
appeal has been divided by one scholar on the matter into four distinct
periods: (1st period) 1879 to 1934, (2nd period) 1934 to 1956, (third period)
1956 to 1984 and (post-1984 period) 1984 to present. The first period,
during which the rules on the matter were just being developed, showed
liberality in the grant of bail pending appeal. The second period produced
a more restrictive rule, one which
469
VOL. 615, March 17, 2010 469

this is of course not to be followed blindly, it nonetheless

shows that our treatment of bail pending appeal is no
different from that in other democratic societies.
In our jurisdiction, the trend towards a strict attitude
towards the allowance of bail pending appeal is anchored
on the principle that judicial discretion—particularly with
respect to extending bail—should be exercised not with
laxity but with caution and only for strong reasons.42 In
fact, it has even been pointed out that “grave caution that
must attend the exercise of judicial discretion in granting
bail to a convicted accused is best illustrated and
exemplified in Administrative Circular No. 12-94 amending
Rule 114, Section 5.”43
Furthermore, this Court has been guided by the
following:
“The importance attached to conviction is due to the underlying

principle that bail should be granted only where it is uncertain
whether the accused is guilty or innocent, and therefore, where
that uncertainty is removed by conviction it would, generally
speaking, be absurd to admit to bail. After a person has been
tried and convicted the presumption of innocence which
may be relied upon in prior applications is rebutted, and
the burden is
_______________
limited bail to defendants who could prove that their appeal would raise “a
substantial question which should be determined by the appellate court.” The
third period saw the enactment of the Bail Reform Act of 1966 establishing a
standard wherein bail may be allowed pending appeal unless it appears that the
appeal is frivolous or taken for delay. Under that standard, the court could deny
bail if the defendant was a flight risk or a danger to the community. Hence, bail
pending appeal was again favored. The post-1984 period is determined by the
enactment and implementation of the Bail Reform Act of 1984. The law was
purposely designed to make restrictive the allowance of bail pending appeal. As
the Act’s legislative history explains, prior law had “a presumption in favor of bail
even after conviction” and Congress wanted to “eliminate” that presumption.
(Keller, supra note 5.)
42 Obosa v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114350, 16 January 1997, 266 SCRA
281.
43 Id.
650

upon the accused to show error in the conviction. From

another point of view it may be properly argued that the
probability of ultimate punishment is so enhanced by the
conviction that the accused is much more likely to attempt to
escape if liberated on bail than before conviction.”44 (emphasis
supplied)
As a matter of fact, endorsing the reasoning quoted

above and relying thereon, the Court declared in Yap v.
Court of Appeals45 (promulgated in 2001 when the present
rules were already effective), that denial of bail pending
appeal is “a matter of wise discretion.”
A Final Word
Section 13, Article II of the Constitution provides:
“SEC. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses

punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong,
shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. x x “
(emphasis supplied)
After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of

innocence terminates and, accordingly, the constitutional
right to bail ends.46 From then on, the grant of bail is
subject to judicial discretion. At the risk of being
repetitious, such discretion must be exercised with grave
caution and only for strong reasons. Considering that the
accused was in fact convicted by the trial court, allowance
of bail pending appeal should be guided by a stringent-
standards approach. This judicial disposition finds strong
support in the history and evolution of the rules on bail and
the language of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. It
is likewise consistent with the trial
_______________
44 Id. See also Yap v. Court of Appeals, supra note 10.

45 Id.
46 See Obosa v. Court of Appeals and Yap v. Court of Appeals, supra.
See also Bernas, Joaquin, The 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES: A COMMENTARY, p. 492 (2009).
651
VOL. 615, March 17, 2010 651

court’s initial determination that the accused should be in

prison. Furthermore, letting the accused out on bail despite
his conviction may destroy the deterrent effect of our
criminal laws. This is especially germane to bail pending
appeal because long delays often separate sentencing in the
trial court and appellate review. In addition, at the post-
conviction stage, the accused faces a certain prison
sentence and thus may be more likely to flee regardless of
bail bonds or other release conditions. Finally, permitting
bail too freely in spite of conviction invites frivolous and
time-wasting appeals which will make a mockery of our
criminal justice system and court processes.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
The Court of Appeals is hereby directed to resolve and
decide, on the merits, the appeal of petitioner Jose Antonio
Leviste docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 32159, with dispatch.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr. and Nachura, JJ., concur.

Peralta, J., See Dissenting Opinion.
Mendoza, J., I Join The Dissent For Reasons Stated.
DISSENTING OPINION
PERALTA, J.:
The denial of an application for bail pending appeal on a
case where the accused was charged with Murder but was
convicted with Homicide seriously poses some important
questions.
By denying the application for bail pending appeal of an
accused who was charged with the crime of Murder but was
convicted of the crime of Homicide, is this Court, in effect,
saying that the evidence of guilt for the crime of Murder is
652

strong despite the lower court’s finding of proof beyond

reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide, a bailable
offense?
By denying the application for bail pending appeal on
the ground that the evidence of guilt for the crime of Murder
is strong, is this court, in a way, unknowingly preempting
the judgment of the Court of Appeals as to the main case?
In the event that the Court of Appeals sustains the
conviction of the accused of the crime of Homicide, a
bailable offense and the accused decides to file a Petition for
Certiorari before this Court, will the denial of the
application for bail of the accused still be effective?
With due respect to the present ponencia, an affirmative
response to the above questions would bring about some
absurdities.
Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution provides the following:
“Sec. 13. ALL PERSONS, EXCEPT THOSE CHARGED

WITH OFFENSES PUNISHABLE BY RECLUSION PERPETUA
WHEN EVIDENCE OF GUILT IS STRONG, SHALL, BEFORE
CONVICTION, BE BAILABLE BY SUFFICIENT SURETIES, OR
BE RELEASED ON RECOGNIZANCE AS MAY BE PROVIDED
BY LAW. THE RIGHT TO BAIL SHALL NOT BE IMPAIRED
EVEN WHEN THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS IS SUSPENDED. EXCESSIVE BAIL SHALL NOT BE
REQUIRED.”
The Philippine Constitution itself emphasizes the right

of an accused to bail with the sole exception of those
charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua
when evidence of guilt is strong. Cases, like in the present
case, when an accused is charged with Murder but was
convicted with Homicide, mean only one thing, that the
lower court found the evidence for the crime charged not
strong, hence, the accused’s conviction of a lesser offense.
Therefore, the denial of the same accused’s application for
bail pending appeal on the ground that the evidence of his
guilt for the crime charged is strong, would unintentionally
be suggestive of the outcome of the
653
VOL. 615, March 17, 2010 653

appealed decision of the lower court. The discretion

whether to grant the application for bail or not is given to
the CA in cases such as the present one, on the reason that
the same appellate court can review the factual findings of
the lower court. However, this will no longer be the case if
a Petition for Certiorari is filed with this Court as it is not
a trier of facts. Hence, the existence of those queries
brought about by the majority opinion casts confusion
rather than an enlightenment on the present case.
The following discussion, in my opinion, should shed
light on the matter:
Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule
65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which seeks to
nullify and set aside the Resolutions1 dated April 8, 2009
and July 14, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA).
The antecedent facts are the following:
Arising from a shooting incident that happened on
January 12, 2007 at petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste’s office
where Rafael de las Alas died of gunshot wounds,
petitioner was charged with murder under the Amended
Information dated March 15, 2007 in Criminal Case No.
07-179 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City,
Branch 150.
Petitioner, on February 23, 2007, filed an Urgent
Application for Admission to Bail Ex Abundanti Cautela2
on the ground that the evidence of the prosecution was not
strong. The trial court, in its Order3 dated May 21, 2007,
granted petitioner’s application for bail.
Subsequently, trial ensued and, on January 14, 2009,
the trial court rendered its Decision4 finding petitioner
guilty
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 36-45.

2 Id., at pp. 150-154.
3 Id., at pp. 164-197.
4 Id., at pp. 198-235.
654

beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide, the

dispositive portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, accused Jose

Antonio Leviste y Casals is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of homicide and is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal as maximum. Accused is further ordered to
pay the heirs of the victim, Rafael de las Alas, the amount of
Php50,000.00 as death indemnity and Php50,000.00 as moral
damages.
Accused Jose Antonio Leviste y Casals shall be credited in the
service of his sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty, with
the full time during which he had undergone preventive
imprisonment at the Makati City Jail from February 7, 2007 up to
May 22, 2007 up provided that he agreed voluntarily in writing to
abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted
prisoners.
SO ORDERED.”
Consequently, in its Order5 dated January 14, 2009, the

trial court canceled petitioner’s bail bond, ruling that:
“Accused Jose Antonio Leviste y Casals was charged with the

crime of Murder, a capital offense or an offense which under the
law at the time of its commission and at the time of the
application for bail is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.
The accused is presently out on bail. After trial, the accused was
however convicted of Homicide, a lesser offense than that charged
in the Information. Accused was accordingly sentenced to suffer
the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal as maximum.
Sec. 5, Rule 114 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure which is
deemed to have modified SC Administrative Circular No. 2-92
dated January 20, 1992, provides:
Bail, when discretionary.—Upon conviction by the Regional
perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is
discretion-
_______________
5 Id., at pp. 236-237.
655
VOL. 615, March 17, 2010 655

ary. The application for bail may be filed and acted upon by
the trial court despite the filing of a notice of appeal,
provided it has not transmitted the original record to the
appellate court. However, if the decision of the trial court
convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense
from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can
only be filed with and resolved by the appellate court.
In Obosa v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114350, January 16,
1997, 266 SCRA 281, 78 SCAD 17, the Supreme Court, speaking
thru the Third Division, stated:
x x x that bail cannot be granted as a matter of right even
after an accused, who is charged with a capital offense,
appeals his conviction for a non-capital crime. Courts must
exercise utmost caution in deciding applications for bail
considering that the accused on appeal may still be
convicted of the original capital offense charged and that
the risk attendant to jumping bail still subsists. In fact,
trial courts would be well advised to leave the matter of
bail, after conviction for a lesser crime than the capital
offense originally charged, to the appellate court’s sound
discretion.
In view of the aforecited rules and prevailing jurisprudence on
the matter, the bailbond posted by the accused for his provisional
liberty is deemed cancelled. Accused being considered a national
prisoner is ordered committed to the Makati City Jail, Makati
City, pending his transfer to the New Bilibid Prison at
Muntinlupa City.
SO ORDERED.”
Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal6 dated January 14,

2009 and on January 15, 2009, filed with the CA an Urgent
Application for Admission to Bail Pending Appeal and an
Urgent Ex Parte Motion for Special Raffle and to Resolve
the Attached Application for Admission to Bail. The CA, in
its Resolution dated April 8, 2009, denied petitioner’s
application for bail pending appeal, the disposition reading:
“IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING REASONS, “the Urgent

Application for Admission to Bail Pending Appeal” is hereby
DENIED.
_______________
6 Id., at pp. 238-239.
656

SO ORDERED.”
The CA also denied petitioner’s Motion for

Reconsideration dated April 14, 2009 in its Resolution7
dated July 14, 2009.
Hence, the present petition.
Petitioner states the following arguments:
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE

OF DISCRETION IN DENYING PETITIONER’S APPLICATION
FOR BAIL PENDING APPEAL DESPITE THE FACT THAT
NONE OF THE CONDITIONS TO JUSTIFY THE DENIAL
THEREOF UNDER RULE 114, SECTION 5 ARE PRESENT,
MUCH LESS PROVEN BY THE PROSECUTION.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
IGNORING THE FACT THAT PETITIONER WAS CONVICTED
OF HOMICIDE, A BAILABLE OFFENSE, AND THAT AS
TWICE SHOWN IN THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW, THE
EVIDENCE THAT PETITIONER COMMITTED THE CRIME OF
MURDER IS NOT STRONG. THE COURT OF APPEALS
UNJUSTLY PREJUDGED PETITIONER’S APPEAL BY
CONCLUDING THAT THE EVIDENCE OF GUILT FOR
MURDER IS STRONG, DESPITE THE FINDINGS OF THE
TRIAL COURT TO THE CONTRARY.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOWED UNJUST BIAS IN
ALLOWING PROSECUTOR VELASCO TO PARTICIPATE IN
THE APPELLATE PROCEEDINGS.8
According to petitioner, the CA should have granted bail

in view of the absence of any of the circumstances
enumerated under paragraphs (a) to (e), Section 5, Rule
114. He adds that he is neither a recidivist, a quasi-
recidivist or habitual delinquent, nor a flight risk; and
there is no undue risk that he would commit another crime
during the pendency of his appeal.
Petitioner further argues that the CA committed a grave
error and prejudged the appeal by denying his application
for
_______________
7 Id., at p. 47.
8 Id., at p. 16.
657
VOL. 615, March 17, 2010 657

bail on the ground that the evidence that he committed a
capital offense was strong. He points out that the records
show that the trial court already granted him bail, since it
found that the prosecution had failed to demonstrate that
the evidence of his guilt for the crime of murder was strong;
and this was further confirmed when the trial court
convicted him of the crime of homicide instead of murder.
Hence, petitioner insists that the trial court’s
determination that he is not guilty of a capital offense
should subsist even on appeal.
Anent the third issue, petitioner claims that the CA
allowed Prosecutor Emmanuel Velasco to delay his
application for bail by filing mere manifestations
requesting the CA to provide him with copies of petitioner’s
motions and written submissions.
In its Comment dated November 20, 2009, the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that the CA
committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioner’s application for bail pending appeal. Although
the grant of bail is discretionary in non-capital offenses, if,
as in this case, imprisonment has been imposed on the
petitioner in excess of six (6) years and circumstances point
to a considerable likelihood that he may flee if released on
bail, then he must be denied bail, or his bail previously
granted should be canceled. The OSG also reiterates the
ruling in Obosa v. Court of Appeals,9 which was relied upon
by the CA in denying the application for bail, stating that
after an accused has been tried and convicted, the
presumption of innocence, which may be relied upon if
prior application is rebutted, the burden is upon the
accused to show error in the conviction. As to the claim of
petitioner that the CA gravely abused its discretion in
allowing Prosecutor Velasco to participate in the appellate
proceedings, the OSG dismissed the said argument as
without merit.
In his Manifestation and Motion dated December 9,
2009, petitioner contends that the OSG’s arguments in its
Comment
_______________
9 334 Phil. 253; 266 SCRA 305 (1997).
658
are a mere rehash of the baseless justifications and

arguments made by the CA in denying his application for
bail, arguments which have already been tackled and
refuted by him in the present petition.
Petitioner, in a Manifestation dated November 25, 2009,
notified this Court that he had filed a Very Urgent Motion
for a Medical Pass before the CA, as he had to undergo
medical treatment at the soonest possible time.
In his December 21, 2009 Reply [to Respondent People
of the Philippines’ Comment dated 20 November 2009],
petitioner reiterated the arguments he raised in his
petition.
In a letter dated November 25, 2009, which was received
by the Office of the Chief Justice on December 7, 2009,
Mrs. Teresita C. de las Alas (wife), Ms. Dinna de las Alas-
Sanchez (daughter), and Ms. Nazareth H. de las Alas
(daughter) expressed consent to the grant of bail to the
petitioner.
The petition is impressed with merit.
Sections 5 and 7, Rule 114 of the 2000 Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure, as amended, provide that:
“Sec. 5. Bail, when discretionary.—Upon conviction by the

reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is
discretionary. The application for bail may be filed and acted upon
by the trial court despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided
it has not transmitted the original record to the appellate court.
However, if the decision of the trial court convicting the
accused changed the nature of the offense from non-
bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be
filed with and resolved by the appellate court.
Should the court grant the application, the accused may be
allowed to continue on provisional liberty during the pendency of
the appeal under the same bail subject to the consent of the
bondsman.
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is
imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the accused shall be
denied bail, or his bail shall be canceled upon a showing
by the prosecu-
659
VOL. 615, March 17, 2010 659

tion, with notice to the accused, of the following or other

similar circumstances:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual
delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the
circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement,
evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without a
valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation,
parole, or conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability
of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another
crime during the pendency of the appeal.
The appellate court may, motu propio or on motion of any
party, review the resolution of the Regional Trial Court after
notice to the adverse party in either case.
SEC. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable.—No person
charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted
to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the
stage of the criminal prosecution.”
Prior to the affectivity of the above provisions, the

governing rule in the granting or cancellation of bail was
encapsulated in Administrative Circular No. 12-94,10
stating that:
“Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right; exception.—All persons in

custody shall, before final conviction, be entitled to bail as a
_______________
10 Dated October 1, 1994, amending the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure.

660

x x x x
SEC. 5. Bail, When Discretionary.—Upon conviction by the
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the court, on application,
may admit the accused to bail.
The court, in its discretion, may allow the accused to continue
on provisional liberty under the same bail bond during the period
of appeal subject to the consent of the bondsman.
If the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six
(6) years but not more than twenty (20) years, the accused shall
be denied bail, or his bail previously granted shall be canceled,
upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of
the following or other similar circumstances:
(a) That the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or
habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated
by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That the accused is found to have previously
escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or has
violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;
(c) That the accused committed the offense while on
probation, parole, or under conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of the accused or his case
indicate the probability if flight of released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that during the pendency of
the appeal, the accused may commit another crime.
The appellate court may review the resolution of the Regional
Trial Court, on motion and with notice to the adverse party.”
As can be gleaned above, the set of circumstances

appearing in Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court
brought about by Administrative Circular No. 12-94 has
been retained in the present Rules. Notably, it was after
the ruling of this Court in Obosa v. Court of Appeals11 that
the present provisions of Secs. 5 and 7, Rule 114 of the
2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure became
effective.
_______________
11 Supra note 9.
661
VOL. 615, March 17, 2010 661

In canceling petitioner’s bail bond and denying his

application for bail pending appeal, the trial court and the
CA, as well as the OSG in its Comment to the petition,
relied on Obosa v. CA,12 where this Court ruled that bail
cannot be granted as a matter of right even after an
accused, who is charged with a capital offense, appeals his
conviction for a non-capital crime. The said case, however,
is not applicable. In Obosa, the petitioner therein was
convicted and applied for bail pending appeal prior to the
affectivity of the amendments brought about by
Administrative Circular No. 12-94; thus, the set of
circumstances, as now seen in the present Rules, was yet to
be present. Granting arguendo that the present provisions
of Section 5, Rule 114 can be made applicable to petitioner
Obosa, this Court, in that same case, still deemed him to be
disqualified from the grant of bail on the basic reason that,
aside from Obosa being convicted of two counts of homicide,
circumstances a, b, d and e of Section 5, Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court were present. In the present case, as will be
discussed later, not one of the circumstances that would
warrant the denial of bail is present.
Incidentally, magnified in the denial of petitioner’s
application for bail pending appeal was the reliance of the
CA on the judgment of conviction rendered by the trial
court. According to the CA, the evidence of guilt of the
petitioner, as found by the trial court, was strong,
therefore, the provisions of Section 7 of Rule 114 of the
2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure were applicable,
the crime charged being murder.
However, it must be remembered that although
petitioner was charged with the crime of murder, he was
convicted of the crime of homicide. Prior to the said
conviction, the trial court, after bail hearing, granted bail
to petitioner, thus:
“Accordingly, for failure of the prosecution to

demonstrate that the evidence of guilt of the accused Jose
Antonio J. Leviste for the crime of Murder is strong to
foreclose his right
_______________
12 Id.
662

to bail, the court hereby grants the motion and, allows the
accused to post bail in the amount of P300,000.00 for his
provisional liberty. Accused shall be discharged or released only
upon the approval of his bail by the Court.
SO ORDERED.”13
Ultimately, after the trial of the case, the trial court

found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of homicide, not murder as originally charged,
demonstrating the consistency of the trial court’s findings
in the bail hearing and in the actual trial of the said case.
Nevertheless, the CA, in denying petitioner’s application
for bail, relied on Section 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court
insisting that the evidence of guilt of the petitioner was
strong. By ruling thus, the CA has not accorded respect to
the factual findings of the trial court. It is a time-honored
legal precept, in this regard that the findings of fact of the
trial court are accorded great respect by appellate courts
and should not be disturbed on appeal unless the trial
court has overlooked, ignored, or disregarded some fact or
circumstance of sufficient weight or significance which, if
considered, would alter the situation.14 Moreover, there
seems to be a disparity between the pronouncement of the
CA that the trial court found the evidence of guilt of the
petitioner strong and the explanation of why the former
considered it to be so. The CA ruled that:
“From the judgment of conviction rendered by the trial court,

the prosecution had demonstrated that appellant’s guilt is
strong, after finding that accused failed to satisfy the
requirements of self-defense to justify the shooting of the
victim. Said court carefully and meticulously evaluated the
evidence on record and ruled that the claim of appellant that the
victim was the agressor deserves disbelief considering that
evidence at the scene of the crime indicated that the victim could
not have fired the gun
_______________
13 Rollo, p. 197. (Emphasis supplied.)

14 People v. Dizon, 329 Phil. 685, 695; 260 SCRA 851, 858 (1996), citing People
v. Gomez, 229 SCRA 138 (1994).
663
VOL. 615, March 17, 2010 663

apparently placed in his hand; appellant’s conduct in refusing to

be subjected to paraffin test is not the natural tendency of a
person claiming self-defense; and neither was appellant
threatened or intimidated by the victim’s averred pugnacious,
quarrelsome or trouble-seeking character of the victim. And even
assuming arguendo that there was unlawful aggression, the trial
court found that the five (5) gunshot wounds (four) [4] shots even
aimed at head, a vital organ) were not reasonable means to repel
the same, and the evidence demonstrated a determined effort on
the part of the appellant to kill the victim and not just to defend
himself. However, appellant was convicted of the lesser
offense (homicide) since the qualifying circumstances of
treachery, evident premeditation and cruelty or ignominy,
alleged in the Amended Information, were not duly proven
at the trial.”15
The above observation of the CA serves nothing but to

bolster the earlier finding of the trial court that the
prosecution was not able to present evidence that would
prove that the guilt of the petitioner as to the crime
charged (murder) was strong. Section 7, Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court, clearly mandates that no person charged
with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail
when evidence of guilt is strong. The provision distinctly
refers to the crime charged and not the crime proven. The
failure then of the prosecution to prove the existence of the
circumstances to qualify the crime committed to murder,
the crime charged, necessarily means that the evidence of
his guilt of the said crime is not strong.
Ideally, what the CA should have done was to
consolidate the application for bail with the petition filed
before it because it is only in that manner by which the
appellate court may ascertain whether the evidence of guilt
of the accused for the crime charged is indeed strong, or in
reverse, whether the lower court was right in convicting
the accused of a lesser offense.
_______________
15 Rollo, p. 44. (Emphasis supplied.)
664

Above all else, the CA should have applied the

provisions of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court,
wherein the appellate court is given the discretion to grant
bail to the petitioner after considering the enumerated
circumstances, the penalty imposed by the trial court
having exceeded six years. Although this Court has held
that the discretion to extend bail during the course of the
appeal should be exercised with grave caution and for
strong reasons, considering that the accused has been in
fact convicted by the trial court,16 the set of circumstances
succinctly provided in Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court should be considered.
The said set of circumstances has been provided as a
guide for the exercise of the appellate court’s discretion in
granting or denying the application for bail, pending the
appeal of an accused who has been convicted of a crime
where the penalty imposed by the trial court is
imprisonment exceeding six (6) years. Otherwise, if it is
intended that the said discretion be absolute, no such set of
circumstances would have been necessarily included in the
Rules. Thus, if the present ruling of the CA is upheld,
anyone who has been charged with a capital offense, or an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment but convicted by the trial court of a lesser
offense, would no longer be able to apply for bail pending
one’s appeal. And by that premise, the discretion accorded
to the appellate court in granting or denying applications
for bail for those who have been convicted by the trial court
with imprisonment exceeding six (6) years as penalty
would have to be rendered nugatory and the provisions of
Section 5, Rule 114 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure would also be rendered useless.
Therefore, applying the provisions of Section 5, Rule 114
of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and after
a careful perusal of the records and a learned consideration
of
_______________
16 Yap, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 411 Phil. 190, 202; 358 SCRA 564, 573
(2001), citing Obosa v. Court of Appeals, supra note 9.
665
VOL. 615, March 17, 2010 665

the arguments of the parties, this Court finds no reason to

deny petitioner his application for bail pending appeal.
Petitioner is indisputably not a recidivist, quasi-recidivist,
or habitual delinquent, or has he committed the crime
aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration. He has also
not previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded
sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without a
valid justification. He did not commit the offense charged
while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon.
Lastly, as shown by his previous records and pointed out by
petitioner,17 considering his conduct while out on bail
during the trial of his case, his advanced age,18 and his
current health condition,19 the probability of flight is nil
and there is no risk that he may commit another crime
during the pendency of the appeal.
Also noted by this Court is the letter of the heirs of
Rafael de las Alas giving their consent and stating that
they have no objection to petitioner’s application for bail.
Although the said letter or consent can never be a basis for
the grant of the application for bail, it serves as a reference
for the petitioner’s improbability to evade whatever
negative result the grant of his appeal might bring.
Nonetheless, what governs in this case is the discretion of
the appellate court as guided by the provisions of Section 5,
Rule 114 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Necessarily, due to the above discussion, I humbly
dissent.
Petition dismissed.
Notes.—The rule stands that until a promulgation of

final conviction is made, the constitutional mandate of
presumption of innocence prevails. (Trillanes IV vs.
Pimentel, Sr., 556 SCRA 471 [2008])
_______________
17 Rollo, p. 22.
18 69 years and 7 months old upon the filing of his petition.
19 Manifestation dated November 25, 2009; Rollo, pp. 327-328.
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precise degree of his culpability, and, (3) it must ask the

accused whether he desires to present evidence on his

G.R. No. 189122. March 17, 2010.*

JOSE ANTONIO LEVISTE, petitioner, vs. THE COURT

Criminal Procedure; Bail; Bail acts as a reconciling

620 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED