The Battle of Bataan (Filipino: Labanan sa Bataan) (7 January – 9 April 1942) was a battle fought by the United States

and
the Philippine Commonwealth against Japan during World War II. The battle represented the most intense phase of the
Japanese invasion of the Philippines during World War II. In January 1942, forces of the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy
invaded Luzon along with several islands in the Philippine Archipelago after the bombing of the American naval base at
Pearl Harbor.

The commander-in-chief of all U.S. and Filipino forces in the islands, General Douglas MacArthur, consolidated all of his
Luzon-based units on the Bataan Peninsula to fight against the Japanese army. By this time, the Japanese controlled nearly
all of Southeast Asia. The Bataan Peninsula and the island of Corregidor were the only remaining Allied strongholds in the
region.

Despite a lack of supplies, American and Filipino forces managed to fight the Japanese for three months, engaging them
initially in a fighting retreat southward. As the combined American and Filipino forces made a last stand, the delay cost the
Japanese valuable time and prevented immediate victory across the Pacific. The American surrender at Bataan to the
Japanese, with 76,000 soldiers surrendering in the Philippines altogether,[1] was the largest in American and Filipino
military histories, and was the largest United States surrender since the American Civil War's Battle of Harper's Ferry.[4]
Soon afterwards, U.S. and Filipino prisoners of war were forced into the Bataan Death March

Background

The capture of the Philippine Islands was crucial to Japan's effort to control the Southwest Pacific, seize the resource-rich
Dutch East Indies, and protect its Southeast Asian flank. After Japanese carrier planes attacked the United States Pacific
Fleet at Pearl Harbor on the morning of 7 December 1941 (8 December, Manila time), Taiwan-based aircraft, within seven
hours, pounded the main bases of the American Far East Air Force at Clark Field in Pampanga, Iba Field in Zambales,
Nichols Field near Manila, and the headquarters of the United States Asiatic Fleet in the Philippines, at Cavite. Many
American planes were caught on the ground and summarily destroyed. In one day, the Japanese had gained air superiority
over the Philippine Islands. This forced the U.S. Asiatic Fleet to withdraw its surface ships from its naval base in Cavite and
retreat southwards, leaving only the submarine force to resist the Japanese.

From 8 to 10 December, scattered resistance by ground troops and remaining American air and naval forces failed to stop
preliminary landings to seize airfields at Batan Island, Aparri, and Vigan City. Army air force B-17s, often with little if any
fighter escort, attacked Japanese ships offloading at Gonzaga and the Vigan landings on Luzon. Submarines of the Asiatic
Fleet were also assigned to the effort.

In one last coordinated action by the Far East Air Force, U.S. planes damaged two Japanese transports, the flagship
Nagato, and a destroyer, and sank one minesweeper. These air attacks and naval actions, however, did not significantly
delay the Japanese assault.

These small-scale landings preceded the main assault on 22 December 1941, at Lingayen Gulf in Pangasinan and Lamon
Bay, Tayabas, by the 14th Japanese Imperial Army, led by Lieutenant General Masaharu Homma.

By effectively neutralizing U.S. air and naval power in the Philippines, the Japanese gained supremacy that isolated the
Philippines from reinforcement and resupply, and provided itself with both airfields for support of its invasion forces and
staging bases for further operations in the Dutch East Indies.
War Plan Orange-3

When MacArthur returned to active duty, the latest revision plans for the defense of the Philippine Islands had been
completed in April 1941 and was called WPO-3, based on the joint Army-Navy War Plan Orange of 1938, which involved
hostilities between the United States and Japan.[6] Under WPO-3, the Philippine garrison was to hold the entrance to
Manila Bay and deny its use to Japanese naval forces and ground forces were to prevent enemy landings. If the enemy
prevailed, they were to withdraw to the Bataan Peninsula, which was recognized as the key to the control of Manila Bay. It
was to be defended to the "last extremity".[6] In addition to the regular U.S. Army troops, the defenders could rely on the
Philippine Army, which had been organized and trained by General MacArthur.[6]

However, in April 1941, the Navy estimated that it would require at least two years for the Pacific Fleet to fight its way
across the Pacific. Army planners in early 1941 believed supplies would be exhausted within six months and the garrison
would fall.[6] MacArthur assumed command of the Allied army in July 1941 and rejected WPO-3 as defeatist, preferring a
more aggressive course of action.[7] He recommended—among other things—a coastal defense strategy that would
include the entire archipelago. His recommendations were followed in the plan that was eventually approved.[6] Due to
MacArthur's decision, with tacit approval from Washington, to change the plan under War Plan Rainbow 5, it was ordered
that the entire archipelago would be defended, with the necessary supplies dispersed behind the beachheads for
defending forces to use while defending against the landings. With the return to War Plan Orange 3, the necessary
supplies to support the defenders for the anticipated six-month-long defensive position were not available in the
necessary quantities for the defenders who would withdraw to Bataan.[8]

Battle

When the Japanese made their first landings on 10 and 12 December at the northern and southern extremities of Luzon,
General MacArthur made no disposition to contest them. He correctly surmised that these landings were designed to
secure advance air bases and that the Japanese had no intention of driving on Manila from any of these beachheads. He
did not regard the situation as serious enough to warrant a change in his plan to oppose the main attack, when it came,
with an all-out defense at the beaches. The MacArthur Plan, then, remained in effect.[6]

On December 20, US Navy submarine USS Stingray spotted a large convoy of troop ships with escorts. This was General
Homma's landing force, and included 85 troop transports, two battleships, six cruisers, and two dozen destroyers. The
convoy was engaged by three submarines: USS Stingray, USS Saury, and USS Salmon, who fired torpedo after torpedo into
the convoy, most of which failed to explode, due to the Mark XIV torpedo's defective detonators. In all, just two troop
ships were sunk before Japanese destroyers chased the submarines away.[9]

Fighting retreat

Japanese troops occupy Manila, as it is declared an open city to avoid its destruction, 2 January 1942.

General MacArthur intended to move his men with their equipment and supplies in good order to their defensive
positions. He charged the North Luzon Force under Maj. Gen. Jonathan Mayhew Wainwright IV with holding back the main
Japanese assault and keeping the road to Bataan open for use by the South Luzon Force of Maj. Gen. George Parker, which
proceeded quickly and in remarkably good order, given the chaotic situation. To achieve this, Wainwright deployed his
forces in a series of five defensive lines outlined in WPO-3:
 D1: Aguilar to San Carlos to Urdaneta City

D2: Agno River

D3: Santa Ignacia to Gerona to Guimba to San Jose

D4: Tarlac to Cabanatuan City

D5: Bamban to Sibul Springs

Layac Line

WWII First Line of Defense Memorial (Dinalupihan, Bataan, Philippines)

The main force of General Masaharu Homma's 14th Area Army came ashore at Lingayen Gulf on the morning of 22
December. The defenders failed to hold the beaches. By the end of the day, the Japanese had secured most of their
objectives and were in position to emerge onto the central plain.[6] Facing Homma's troops were four Filipino divisions:
the 21st, the 71st, the 11th, and the 91st, as well as a battalion of Philippine Scouts backed by a few tanks.[9] Along Route
3—a cobblestone road that led directly to Manila[9]—the Japanese soon made contact with the Filipino 71st Division. At
this point the action of the American artillery stalled the Japanese attack. However, Japanese planes and tanks entering
the action routed the Filipino infantry, leaving the artillery uncovered.[6] A second Japanese division landed at Lamon Bay,
south of Manila, on December 23 and advanced north.[10]

It was now evident to General Wainwright that he could no longer hold back the Japanese advance. Late on the afternoon
of the 23rd, Wainwright telephoned General MacArthur's headquarters in Manila and informed him that any further
defense of the Lingayen beaches was "impracticable." He requested and was given permission to withdraw behind the
Agno River.[6] MacArthur weighed two choices: either make a firm stand on the line of the Agno and give Wainwright his
best unit, the Philippine Division, for a counterattack; or withdraw all the way to Bataan in planned stages. He decided on
the latter, thus abandoning his own plan for defense and reverting to the old ORANGE plan. Having made his decision to
withdraw to Bataan, MacArthur notified all force commanders on the night of 23 December that "WPO-3 is in effect."[6]

Meanwhile, Manuel L. Quezon, the President of the Philippine Commonwealth, together with his family and government
staff were evacuated to Corregidor, along with MacArthur's United States Army Forces in the Far East (USAFFE)
headquarters, on the night of 24 December 1941, while all USAFFE military personnel were removed from the major urban
areas. On the 26th Manila was officially declared an open city and MacArthur's proclamation was published in the
newspapers and broadcast over the radio. The Japanese were not notified officially of the proclamation but learned of it
through radio broadcasts. The next day, and thereafter, they bombed the port area, from which supplies were being
shipped to Bataan and Corregidor.[6]

Defense of the Layac Junction approach to Bataan 2–6 January 1942

After General Douglas MacArthur had withdrawn his army down the island of Luzon's central plain into the Bataan
Peninsula, one last line existed before the Japanese invaders reached the main line of resistance. The Americans
attempted to slow the Japanese entry into Bataan by fighting a delaying action at Layac, thus gaining time and deceiving
the enemy as to the location of the main defensive positions. For the first time in World War II, American troops faced
Japanese soldiers on the ground.

Porac–Guagua Line

Historical Marker (6 January 1942)

From 1 to 5 January 1942, as the entire USAFFE converged from south and north, delaying actions were fought to allow
the struggling withdrawal to Bataan. The fiercest fighting occurred at the hastily emplaced Porac–Guagua Line, where the
11th and 21st divisions, respectively led by Brigadier Generals William E. Brougher and Mateo Capinpin, with the 26th
Cavalry Regiment of Colonel Clinton A. Pierce in reserve, held the line, mostly on open and unprepared ground, against
massive aerial and artillery bombardment, strong tank assaults, and infantry banzai attacks by the Takahashi and Tanaka
detachments. Both sides suffered heavy casualties.[citation needed]

Overlooked in this report are the actions of the 23rd Infantry Regiment of the PA, led by senior instructor Col. Wallace A
Mead. The 23rd Regiment established the defensive line at Porac-Pampanga on or around 2 January 1942. Colonel Mead
was later awarded the Silver Star for his actions there. The 23rd's defense allowed Capinpin's forces to withdraw and
establish new defensive positions. It was Capinpin's recount of the fighting that day that was offered as support for Mead's
citation.

Abucay–Mauban Line

The Abucay Line 9–23 January 1942

War Plan Orange 3 called for two defensive lines across Bataan. The first extended across the peninsula from Mauban in
the west to Mabatang, Abucay in the east. General Wainwright, commanding the newly organised I Philippine Corps of
22,500 troops, held the western sector. I Corps included the Philippine Army's 1st Regular, 31st, and 91st Divisions, the
26th Cavalry (Philippine Scouts (PS)) and a battery of field artillery and self-propelled guns. General Parker and the new II
Philippine Corps, which included the Philippine Army's 11th, 21st, 41st, and 51st divisions and the 57th Infantry (PS), and
numbered 25,000 men, defended the eastern sector. All of the divisions, already under strength at the onset of war, had
suffered serious combat losses, particularly to desertions. The U.S. Army's Philippine Division, made up of the 31st
Infantry, the 45th Infantry (PS), and supporting units became the "Bataan Defense Force Reserve". Mount Natib, a 4,222-
foot (1,287 m)-high mountain that split the peninsula, served as the boundary line between the two corps. The
commanders anchored their lines on the mountain, but, since they considered the rugged terrain impassable, they did not
extend their forces far up its slopes. The two corps were therefore not in direct contact with each other, leaving a serious
gap in the defense line. With the fighting withdrawal completed, the Abucay–Mauban Line, the USAFFE's main battle
position was now in place.

Stand

The Mauban Line positions 18–25 January 1942

On 9 January, Japanese forces under Lieutenant General Susumu Morioka assaulted the eastern flank of the Abucay–
Mauban Line, and were repulsed by the 91st Division of Brigadier General Luther Stevens and Colonel George S. Clark's
57th Infantry (PS). On 12 January, amid fierce fighting, 2nd Lieutenant Alexander R. Nininger, a platoon leader in the 57th
Infantry, sacrificed his life when, armed with only a rifle and hand grenades, he forced his way into enemy foxholes during
hand-to-hand combat, permitting his unit to retake Abucay Hacienda; for his actions, he was posthumously awarded the
Medal of Honor. Another extreme act of bravery was put forth by a Filipino named Narcisco Ortilano.[11] He was on a
water-cooled heavy machine gun when the Japanese burst out of a canebrake in a banzai attack. He shot dozens of the
Japanese with his machine gun, then pulled out his Colt .45 and shot five more when the machine gun jammed. Then,
when one Japanese soldier stabbed at him with a bayonet, he desperately tried to grab the gun, got his thumb cut off, but
still held on, and then with a sudden burst of adrenaline he turned the gun on the enemy soldier and stabbed him in the
chest. When another Japanese soldier swung a bayonet at him, he turned his rifle on the soldier and shot him dead.
Narcisco received the Distinguished Service Cross.[11]

Another attack on 14 January at the boundary of positions held by the 41st and 51st Divisions of Brigadier Generals
Vicente Lim and Albert M. Jones, respectively, aided by the 43rd and Colonel Wallace A Mead's 23rd Infantry, stubbornly
refused the Japanese their left flank. The Japanese advanced to the Salian River Valley through a gap made by the 51st
Infantry's withdrawal. But a patrol discovered the infiltration, and units of the 21st Division rushed to the valley and
repulsed the attackers after a savage encounter.

At another engagement farther to the west, a Japanese force surprised and routed the 53rd Infantry of Colonel John R.
Boatwright. This force also penetrated deep behind the Abucay–Mauban Line along the Abo-Abo River Valley, but their
advance was held up by combined units of the 21st and 51st Divisions, the 31st Division of Brigadier General Clifford
Bluemel, and Colonel John H. Rodman's 92nd Infantry at the Bani-Guirol Forest area. The 31st Infantry and the 45th
Infantry, Philippine scouts of Colonel Thomas W. Doyle, partially restored the abandoned line of the 51st Division.

On 15 January, the reinforced 1st Regular Division of Brigadier General Fidel Segundo, defending the Morong sector, came
under heavy bombardment, but held the line. The Japanese penetrated through a huge gap in the Silangan-Natib area and
established a roadblock on Mauban Ridge, threatening to cut off the division's rear. Repeated attacks by the 91st Division
and 71st Division, and 92nd Infantry failed to dislodge the Japanese. The attackers' nightly raids and infiltration tactics
became more frequent. Previously, General Parker's II Corps had prevented a similar encirclement at the Salian River
battle, but the position of General Wainwright's I Corps was deemed indefensible, and the Abucay–Mauban Line was
abandoned on 22 January.

Battle of Trail Two

Japanese flamethrower in action against a bunker on the Orion-Bagac Line

Within four days, the Orion-Bagac Line was formed. But the defenders had yet to complete their withdrawal to the reserve
battle position when the Japanese struck again, through a gap held by I Corps. General Bluemel hastily organized a
defense along Trail Two, consisting of 32nd Infantry, 41st Infantry and 51st Division reinforcements, in time to stop a
major offensive and plug the gap.

Battle of the Pockets

The Orion–Bagac line showing the U.S. positions around 27 January 1942

The remaining Japanese troops managed to get through, however, and held out at some rear sectors of the Orion-Bagac
Line at the Tuol River Valley behind the 11th Division, and in the Gogo-Cotar River behind the 1st Regular Division. From 23
January to 17 February, coordinated action by the defenders to eliminate these salients of resistance became known as
the "Battle of the pockets". Fierce fighting marked the action. Captain Alfredo M. Santos, of the 1st Regular Division,
outmaneuvered the enemy during their attempt to pocket the area. In both attempts, his unit successfully broke through
the Gogo-Cotar and Tuol pockets, thus earning for himself the moniker "hero of the pockets". For his successes, he was
promoted to major in the field. Major Santos was then given the hazardous mission of closing the gaps and annihilating
the enemy troops who had infiltrated the lines, as the gap posed a serious threat to the positions and the security of the
division. He led a counterattack against the strong and numerically superior Japanese forces positioned between the MLR
and the Regimental Reserve Line (RRL). The fighting began at dawn on 29 January 1942, and the Americans restored the
defensive sector assigned to the 1st Regular Division. On 3 February 1942, 1st Lieutenant Willibald C. Bianchi of the 45th
Infantry, Philippine scouts, led a reinforced platoon forward against two enemy machine-gun nests, silenced them with
grenades, and then manned an antiaircraft machine gun until dying of his wounds. His Medal of Honor was awarded
posthumously. Of the 2,000 Japanese soldiers engaged, 377 were reported to have escaped.

Battle of the Pockets on the Orion-Bagac Line

General Homma, on 8 February, ordered the suspension of offensive operations in order to reorganize his forces. This
could not be carried out immediately, because the 16th Division remained engaged trying to extricate the pocketed 3rd
Battalion, 20th Infantry. With further casualties, the remnants of the 3rd Battalion, 378 officers and men, were extricated
on 15 February. On 22 February, the 14th Army line was withdrawn a few miles to the north, with USAFFE forces re-
occupying positions evacuated by the Japanese.

Battle of the Points

Japanese landings on Bataan 23 January – 1 February 1942

In an attempt to outflank I Corps and isolate the service command area commanded by USAFFE deputy commander
Brigadier General Allan C. McBride, Japanese troops of the 2nd Battalion, 20th Infantry, 16th Division, were landed on the
west coast of southern Bataan on the night of 22 January. Intercepted by U.S. PT-34, two barges were sunk and the rest
scattered in two groups, neither of which landed on the objective beach. The Japanese forces were contained on their
beachheads by members of Philippine constabulary units, a hastily organized naval infantry battalion, and by personnel of
several U.S. Army Air Corps pursuit squadrons fighting as infantry, including Ed Dyess and Ray C. Hunt.[12][13]

The naval infantry consisted of 150 ground crewmen from Patrol Wing Ten, 80 sailors from the Cavite Naval Ammunition
Depot, and 130 sailors from USS Canopus (AS-9), with 120 sailors from the base facilities at Cavite, Olongapo, and
Mariveles, and 120 Marines from an antiaircraft battery. Sailors used the Canopus machine shop to fabricate makeshift
mountings for machine guns salvaged from Patrol Wing Ten's damaged aircraft. The Marines were distributed through the
ranks, and the sailors were told to "watch them and do as they do." The sailors attempted to make their white uniforms
more suitable for jungle combat by dying them with coffee grounds. The result was closer to yellow than khaki, and the
diary of a dead Japanese officer described them as a suicide squad dressed in brightly colored uniforms and talking loudly
in an attempt to draw fire and reveal the enemy positions.[14]

Japanese commanders, in an attempt to hold onto their lodgements, reinforced the beachheads piecemeal, but could not
break out. Battles were fought ferociously against a company-sized group at the Lapay-Longoskawayan points from 23 to
29 January, at the Quinawan-Aglaloma points from 22 January to 8 February, and at the Silalim-Anyasan points from 27
January to 13 February. Out of the 2,000 Japanese troops committed to these battles, only 43 wounded returned to their
lines. These engagements were collectively termed the "Battle of the Points".

Fall of Bataan

On the night of 12 March, General MacArthur, his family, and several USAFFE staff officers left Corregidor for Mindanao
aboard four PT boats commanded by Lieutenant Commander John D. Bulkeley. For this, and a number of other feats over
the course of four months and eight days, Bulkeley was awarded the Medal of Honor, the Navy Cross, the Distinguished
Service Cross and other citations.

MacArthur was eventually flown to Australia where he broadcast to the Filipino people his famous "I Shall Return"
promise. MacArthur's departure marked the end of the USAFFE, and by 22 March, the defending army was renamed the
United States Forces in the Philippines (USFIP), and Lieutenant General Jonathan Mayhew Wainwright IV was placed in
command.

After the failure of their first attack against Bataan, the Japanese general headquarters sent strong artillery forces to the
Philippines in order to smash the American fortifications. They had 190 artillery pieces, which included bigger guns like 150
mm cannons and the rare Type 45 240 mm howitzer. The 1st Artillery headquarters, under Major General Kineo Kitajima,
who was a known authority on IJA artillery, also moved to the Philippines along with the main forces to command and
control these artillery units. Also, the Japanese high command reinforced General Homma's 14th Imperial Army, and
toward the end of March, the Japanese forces prepared for the final assault.

On 3 April, the entire Orion-Bagac Line was subjected to incessant bombings by 100 aircraft and artillery bombardment by
300 artillery pieces from 9:00 a.m. to 3:00 pm, which turned the Mount Samat stronghold into an inferno. Over the course
of the next three days (Good Friday to Easter Sunday, 1942), the Japanese 65th Brigade and 4th Division spearheaded the
main attack at the left flank of II Corps. Everywhere along the line, the American and Filipino defenders were driven back
by Japanese tanks and infantry.

Based on his two prior attempts, General Homma had estimated that the final offensive would require a week to breach
the Orion-Bagac Line and a month to liquidate two final defense lines he believed had been prepared on Bataan. When the
opening attack required just three days, he pushed his forces on 6 April to meet expected counterattacks head-on. The
Japanese launched a drive into the center, penetrated into flanks held by the 22nd and 23rd Regiments of the 21st
Division, captured Mount Samat and outflanked all of II Corps. Counterattacks by the U.S. Army and Philippine Scout
regulars held in reserve were futile; only the 57th Infantry gained any ground, soon lost.

All along the battle front, units of I Corps, together with the devastated remnants of II Corps, crumbled and straggled to
the rear. The commanders on Bataan lost all contact with their units, except by runner in a few instances. In the last two
days of the defense of Bataan, the entire Allied defense progressively disintegrated and collapsed, clogging all roads with
refugees and fleeing troops. By 8 April, the senior U.S. commander on Bataan, Major General Edward P. King, saw the
futility of further resistance, and put forth proposals for capitulation.

The next morning, 9 April 1942, General King met with Major General Kameichiro Nagano and, after several hours of
negotiations, the remaining weary, starving and emaciated American and Filipino defenders on the battle-swept Bataan
Peninsula surrendered.
Radio broadcast – Voice of Freedom – Malinta Tunnel – Corregidor – 9 April 1942:

Bataan has fallen. The Philippine-American troops on this war-ravaged and bloodstained peninsula have laid down their
arms. With heads bloody but unbowed, they have yielded to the superior force and numbers of the enemy.

The world will long remember the epic struggle that Filipino and American soldiers put up in the jungle fastness and
along the rugged coast of Bataan. They have stood up uncomplaining under the constant and grueling fire of the enemy
for more than three months. Besieged on land and blockaded by sea, cut off from all sources of help in the Philippines and
in America, the intrepid fighters have done all that human endurance could bear.

For what sustained them through all these months of incessant battle was a force that was more than merely physical. It
was the force of an unconquerable faith—something in the heart and soul that physical hardship and adversity could not
destroy. It was the thought of native land and all that it holds most dear, the thought of freedom and dignity and pride in
these most priceless of all our human prerogatives.

The adversary, in the pride of his power and triumph, will credit our troops with nothing less than the courage and
fortitude that his own troops have shown in battle. Our men have fought a brave and bitterly contested struggle. All the
world will testify to the most superhuman endurance with which they stood up until the last in the face of overwhelming
odds.

But the decision had to come. Men fighting under the banner of unshakable faith are made of something more than
flesh, but they are not made of impervious steel. The flesh must yield at last, endurance melts away, and the end of the
battle must come.

Bataan has fallen, but the spirit that made it stand—a beacon to all the liberty-loving peoples of the world—cannot fall!
Aftermath
The continued resistance of the force on Bataan after Singapore and the Indies had fallen made heartening news among
the Allied peoples. However, the extension of time gained by the defence was very largely a result of the transfer of the
48th Division from Homma's army at a critical time, and the exhaustion of the weakened force that remained. It cost a far
stronger Japanese army as many days of actual combat to take Malaya and Singapore Island as it cost Homma to take
Bataan and Corregidor.[16]

The surrender of Bataan hastened the fall of Corregidor a month later. There is a suggestion that without the stand, the
Japanese might have quickly overrun all of the U.S. bases in the Pacific and could have quickly invaded Australia.[17]
Willoughby, MacArthur's Intelligence Officer, asserted after the war that the epic operation in Bataan and Corregidor
became a decisive factor in the ultimate winning of the war, that it disrupted the Japanese timetable "in a way that was to
prove crucial" and that "because of Bataan the Japanese never managed to detach enough men, planes, ships, and
material to nail down Guadalcanal." That assertion is contradicted by simple facts of history, geography and arithmetic.
Rather than allowing the operations on Luzon to upset their general timetable, the Japanese took steps that resulted in
prolonging the resistance of Luzon in order to speed up their conquest of the Indies. Between the time of their advance
into the Solomons and the American counter-landing on Guadalcanal in August, three months after the fall of Corregidor,
they had ample troops available to build up their strength in the South Seas.[16]
However, historian Teodoro Agoncillo argues that the battle was "unnecessary in so far as the throwing away of precious
lives was concerned, for it served no strategic purpose." It was only Yamashita who thought of invading Australia,
something that Tojo did not support. Finally, not only did the USAFFE possess numerical superiority, it could have
recaptured Manila easily (according to Homma).[18]

Ultimately, more than 60,000 Filipino and 15,000 American prisoners of war were forced into the Bataan Death March.[5]
However, about 10,000–12,000 of these eventually escaped from the march to form guerrilla units in the mountains, tying
down the occupying Japanese. On 7 September 1944, the Japanese ship Shinyo Maru was sunk by USS Paddle; on board
the Shinyo Maru were U.S. POWs, of whom 668 died and 82 survived.

After more than two years of fighting in the Pacific, General Douglas MacArthur initiated the Campaign for the Liberation
of the Philippines, fulfilling his promise to return to the country he had left in 1942. As part of the campaign, the Battle for
the recapture of Bataan (31 January to 21 February 1945) by Allied forces and Philippine guerrillas avenged the surrender
of the defunct United States Armed Forces in the Far East (USAFFE) to invading Japanese forces.