Rule 75 76 Cases Complete Fulltext With Digest

REMEDIOS NUGUID VS. prescribed, are the questions solely to be presented, and to be acted upon, by the court.
FELIX NUGUID and PAZ SALONGA NUGUID Said court at this stage of the proceedings — is not called upon to rule on
G.R. No. L-23445 the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will, the legality of any devise or
June 23, 1966 legacy therein.1
SANCHEZ, J.: A peculiar situation is here thrust upon us. The parties shunted aside the question of
whether or not the will should be allowed probate. For them, the meat of the case is the
Rosario Nuguid, a resident of Quezon City, died on December 30, 1962, single, without intrinsic validity of the will. Normally, this comes only after the court has declared that the
descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate parents, Felix will has been duly authenticated.2 But petitioner and oppositors, in the court below and
Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, and six (6) brothers and sisters, namely: Alfredo, here on appeal, travelled on the issue of law, to wit: Is the will intrinsically a nullity?
Federico, Remedios, Conrado, Lourdes and Alberto, all surnamed Nuguid.
We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing will
On May 18, 1963, petitioner Remedios Nuguid filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal be gained. On the contrary, this litigation will be protracted. And for aught that appears in
a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario Nuguid on November 17, 1951, some the record, in the event of probate or if the court rejects the will, probability exists that the
11 years before her demise. Petitioner prayed that said will be admitted to probate and case will come up once again before us on the same issue of the intrinsic validity or
that letters of administration with the will annexed be issued to her. nullity of the will. Result: waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These are
the practical considerations that induce us to a belief that we might as well meet head-on
On June 25, 1963, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, concededly the legitimate the issue of the validity of the provisions of the will in question.3 After all, there exists a
father and mother of the deceased Rosario Nuguid, entered their opposition to the justiciable controversy crying for solution.
probate of her will. Ground therefor, inter alia, is that by the institution of petitioner
Remedios Nuguid as universal heir of the deceased, oppositors — who are compulsory 2. Petitioner's sole assignment of error challenges the correctness of the conclusion
heirs of the deceased in the direct ascending line — were illegally preterited and that in below that the will is a complete nullity. This exacts from us a study of the disputed will
consequence the institution is void. and the applicable statute.
On August 29, 1963, before a hearing was had on the petition for probate and objection Reproduced hereunder is the will:
thereto, oppositors moved to dismiss on the ground of absolute preterition.
Nov. 17, 1951
On September 6, 1963, petitioner registered her opposition to the motion to dismiss. 1äwphï1.ñët
I, ROSARIO NUGUID, being of sound and disposing mind and memory, having amassed
The court's order of November 8, 1963, held that "the will in question is a complete nullity a certain amount of property, do hereby give, devise, and bequeath all of the property
and will perforce create intestacy of the estate of the deceased Rosario Nuguid" and which I may have when I die to my beloved sister Remedios Nuguid, age 34, residing
dismissed the petition without costs. with me at 38-B Iriga, Q.C. In witness whereof, I have signed my name this seventh day
of November, nineteen hundred and fifty-one.
A motion to reconsider having been thwarted below, petitioner came to this Court on
appeal. (Sgd.) Illegible
1. Right at the outset, a procedural aspect has engaged our attention. The case is for the T/ ROSARIO NUGUID
probate of a will. The court's area of inquiry is limited — to an examination of, and
resolution on, the extrinsic validity of the will. The due execution thereof, the testatrix's The statute we are called upon to apply in Article 854 of the Civil Code which, in part,
testamentary capacity, and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities by law provides:
RULE 75 & 76- SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES- ATTY. VALDEZ- RMC COLLEGE OF LAW- COMPILED BY: M.A.G.Y. 1
ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs ANNUL. To reduce to nothing; annihilate; obliterate; to make void or of no effect;
in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born to nullify; to abolish; to do away with. Ex parte Mitchell, 123 W. Va. 283, 14 S.E.
after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises 2d. 771, 774.8
and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious. ...
And now, back to the facts and the law. The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no
Except for inconsequential variation in terms, the foregoing is a reproduction of Article descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. But she left forced heirs in the direct ascending
814 of the Civil Code of Spain of 1889, which is similarly herein copied, thus — line her parents, now oppositors Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid. And, the will
completely omits both of them: They thus received nothing by the testament; tacitly, they
Art. 814. The preterition of one or all of the forced heirs in the direct line, whether were deprived of their legitime; neither were they expressly disinherited. This is a clear
living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, case of preterition. Such preterition in the words of Manresa "anulara siempre la
shall void the institution of heir; but the legacies and betterments4 shall be valid, institucion de heredero, dando caracter absoluto a este ordenamiento referring to the
in so far as they are not inofficious. ... mandate of Article 814, now 854 of the Civil Code.9 The one-sentence will here institutes
petitioner as the sole, universal heir — nothing more. No specific legacies or bequests
A comprehensive understanding of the term preterition employed in the law becomes a are therein provided for. It is in this posture that we say that the nullity is complete.
necessity. On this point Manresa comments: Perforce, Rosario Nuguid died intestate. Says Manresa:
La pretericion consiste en omitar al heredero en el testamento. O no se le En cuanto a la institucion de heredero, se anula. Lo que se anula deja de existir,
nombra siquiera o aun nombrandole como padre, hijo, etc., no se le instituya en todo o en parte? No se añade limitacion alguna, como en el articulo 851, en el
heredero ni se le deshereda expresamente ni se le asigna parte alguna de los que se expresa que se anulara la institucion de heredero en cuanto prejudique a
bienes, resultando privado de un modo tacito de su derecho a legitima. la legitima del deseheredado Debe, pues, entenderse que la anulacion es
completa o total, y que este articulo como especial en el caso que le motiva rige
con preferencia al 817. 10
Para que exista pretericion, con arreglo al articulo 814, basta que en el
testamento omita el testador a uno cualquiera de aquellos a quienes por su
muerte corresponda la herencia forzosa. The same view is expressed by Sanchez Roman: —
Se necesita, pues, a) Que la omision se refiera a un heredero forzoso. b) Que la La consecuencia de la anulacion o nulidad de la institucion de heredero por
omision sea completa; que el heredero forzoso nada reciba en el testamento. pretericion de uno, varios o todos los forzosos en linea recta, es la apertura de la
sucesion intestada total o parcial. Sera total, cuando el testador que comete la
pretericion, hubiese dispuesto de todos los bienes por titulo universal de
It may now appear trite bat nonetheless helpful in giving us a clear perspective of the
herencia en favor de los herederos instituidos, cuya institucion se anula, porque
problem before us, to have on hand a clear-cut definition of the word annul:
asi lo exige la generalidad del precepto legal del art. 814, al determinar, como
efecto de la pretericion, el de que "anulara la institucion de heredero." ... 11
To "annul" means to abrogate, to make void ... In re Morrow's Estate, 54 A. 342,
343, 204 Pa. 484.6
Really, as we analyze the word annul employed in the statute, there is no escaping the
conclusion that the universal institution of petitioner to the entire inheritance results
The word "annul" as used in statute requiring court to annul alimony provisions of in totally abrogating the will. Because, the nullification of such institution of universal heir
divorce decree upon wife's remarriage means to reduce to nothing; to annihilate; — without any other testamentary disposition in the will — amounts to a declaration that
obliterate; blot out; to make void or of no effect; to nullify; to abolish. N.J.S.A. nothing at all was written. Carefully worded and in clear terms, Article 854 offers no
2:50 — 38 (now N.J.S. 2A:34-35). Madden vs. Madden, 40 A. 2d 611, 614, 136 leeway for inferential interpretation. Giving it an expansive meaning will tear up by the
N..J Eq. 132.7 roots the fabric of the statute. On this point, Sanchez Roman cites the "Memoria annual
del Tribunal Supreme, correspondiente a 1908", which in our opinion expresses the rule As aforesaid, there is no other provision in the will before us except the institution of
of interpretation, viz: petitioner as universal heir. That institution, by itself, is null and void. And, intestate
succession ensues.
... El art. 814, que preceptua en tales casos de pretericion la nulidad de la
institucion de heredero, no consiente interpretacion alguna favorable a la 4. Petitioner's mainstay is that the present is "a case of ineffective disinheritance rather
persona instituida en el sentido antes expuesto aun cuando parezca, y en algun than one of preterition". 15 From this, petitioner draws the conclusion that Article 854
caso pudiera ser, mas o menos equitativa, porque una nulidad no significa en "does not apply to the case at bar". This argument fails to appreciate the distinction
Derecho sino la suposicion de que el hecho o el acto no se ha realizado, between pretention and disinheritance.
debiendo por lo tanto procederse sobre tal base o supuesto, y
consiguientemente, en un testamento donde falte la institucion, es obligado Preterition "consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of
llamar a los herederos forzosos en todo caso, como habria que llamar a los de them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are
otra clase, cuando el testador no hubiese distribudo todos sus bienes en neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited." 16 Disinheritance, in turn, "is
legados, siendo tanto mas obligada esta consecuencia legal cuanto que, en a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a
materia de testamentos, sabido es, segun tiene declarado la jurisprudencia, con cause authorized by law. " 17 In Manresa's own words: "La privacion expresa de la
repeticion, que no basta que sea conocida la voluntad de quien testa si esta legitima constituye la desheredacion. La privacion tacita de la misma se
voluntad no aparece en la forma y en las condiciones que la ley ha exigido para denomina pretericion." 18 Sanchez Roman emphasizes the distinction by stating that
que sea valido y eficaz, por lo que constituiria una interpretacion arbitraria, disinheritance "es siempre voluntaria"; preterition, upon the other hand, is presumed to
dentro del derecho positivo, reputar como legatario a un heredero cuya be "involuntaria". 19 Express as disinheritance should be, the same must be supported by
institucion fuese anulada con pretexto de que esto se acomodaba mejor a la a legal cause specified in the will itself. 20
voluntad del testador, pues aun cuando asi fuese, sera esto razon para modificar
la ley, pero no autoriza a una interpretacion contraria a sus terminos y a los The will here does not explicitly disinherit the testatrix's parents, the forced heirs. It
principios que informan la testamentifaccion, pues no porque parezca mejor una simply omits their names altogether. Said will rather than be labeled ineffective
cosa en el terreno del Derecho constituyente, hay razon para convereste juicio disinheritance is clearly one in which the said forced heirs suffer from preterition.
en regla de interpretacion, desvirtuando y anulando por este procedimiento lo
que el legislador quiere establecer. 12
On top of this is the fact that the effects flowing from preterition are totally different from
those of disinheritance. Preterition under Article 854 of the Civil Code, we repeat, "shall
3. We should not be led astray by the statement in Article 854 that, annullment annul the institution of heir". This annulment is in toto, unless in the will there are, in
notwithstanding, "the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not addition, testamentary dispositions in the form of devises or legacies. In ineffective
inofficious". Legacies and devises merit consideration only when they are so expressly disinheritance under Article 918 of the same Code, such disinheritance shall also "annul
given as such in a will. Nothing in Article 854 suggests that the mere institution of a the institution of heirs", put only "insofar as it may prejudice the person disinherited",
universal heir in a will — void because of preterition — would give the heir so instituted a which last phrase was omitted in the case of preterition. 21 Better stated yet, in
share in the inheritance. As to him, the will is inexistent. There must be, in addition to disinheritance the nullity is limited to that portion of the estate of which the disinherited
such institution, a testamentary disposition granting him bequests or legacies apart and heirs have been illegally deprived. Manresa's expressive language, in commenting on
separate from the nullified institution of heir. Sanchez Roman, speaking of the two the rights of the preterited heirs in the case of preterition on the one hand and legal
component parts of Article 814, now 854, states that preterition annuls the institution of disinheritance on the other, runs thus: "Preteridos, adquiren el derecho a
the heir "totalmente por la pretericion"; but added (in reference to legacies and bequests) todo; desheredados, solo les corresponde un tercio o dos tercios, 22 el caso. 23
"pero subsistiendo ... todas aquellas otras disposiciones que no se refieren a la
institucion de heredero ... . 13 As Manresa puts it, annulment throws open to intestate
5. Petitioner insists that the compulsory heirs ineffectively disinherited are entitled to
succession the entire inheritance including "la porcion libre (que) no hubiese dispuesto
receive their legitimes, but that the institution of heir "is not invalidated," although the
en virtud de legado, mejora o donacion. 14
inheritance of the heir so instituted is reduced to the extent of said legitimes. 24
This is best answered by a reference to the opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Moran in
the Neri case heretofore cited, viz:
DIGEST: NUGUID VS. NUGUID
But the theory is advanced that the bequest made by universal title in favor of the (Special Proceedings – Difference between Preterition and Disinheritance)
children by the second marriage should be treated as legado and mejora and,
accordingly, it must not be entirely annulled but merely reduced. This theory, if FACTS:
adopted, will result in a complete abrogation of Articles 814 and 851 of the Civil Rosario died without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her
Code. If every case of institution of heirs may be made to fall into the concept of legitimate parents – Felix and Paz, and 6 brothers and sisters.
legacies and betterments reducing the bequest accordingly, then the provisions
of Articles 814 and 851 regarding total or partial nullity of the institution, would. be Remedios, one of the sister filed in court a holographic will allegedly executed by
absolutely meaningless and will never have any application at all. And the Rosario instituting the former as the sole, universal heir of all her properties. She prayed
remaining provisions contained in said article concerning the reduction of that said will be admitted to probate and that letter of administration be issued to her.
inofficious legacies or betterments would be a surplusage because they would be
absorbed by Article 817. Thus, instead of construing, we would be destroying Felix and Paz opposed to the probate of the will on the ground that by the
integral provisions of the Civil Code. institution of Remedios as universal heir of the deceased, oppositors – who are
compulsory heirs in the direct ascending line – were illegally preterited and that in
The destructive effect of the theory thus advanced is due mainly to a failure to consequence, the institution is void.
distinguish institution of heirs from legacies and betterments, and a general from
a special provision. With reference to article 814, which is the only provision Article 854 provides that preterition of one, some or all of the compulsory heirs in
material to the disposition of this case, it must be observed that the institution of the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the
heirs is therein dealt with as a thing separate and distinct from legacies or death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir.
betterments. And they are separate and distinct not only because they are
distinctly and separately treated in said article but because they are in Petitioners contention is that the present is a case of ineffective disinheritance
themselves different. Institution of heirs is a bequest by universal title of property rather than one of preterition drawing the conclusion that Article 854 does not apply in
that is undetermined. Legacy refers to specific property bequeathed by a the case at bar.
particular or special title. ... But again an institution of heirs cannot be taken as a
legacy. 25 ISSUE: WON the institution of one of the sister of the deceased as the sole, universal
heir preterited the compulsory heirs.
The disputed order, we observe, declares the will in question "a complete nullity". Article
854 of the Civil Code in turn merely nullifies "the institution of heir". Considering, HELD:
however, that the will before us solely provides for the institution of petitioner as universal YES. Where the deceased left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate, but she
heir, and nothing more, the result is the same. The entire will is null. left forced heirs in the direct ascending line – her parents, and her holographic will does
not explicitly disinherit them but simply omits their names altogether, the case is one of
preterition of the parents, not a case of ineffective disinheritance.
Upon the view we take of this case, the order of November 8, 1963 under review is
hereby affirmed. No costs allowed. So ordered.
PRETERITION “consists in the omission in the testator’s will of the forced heirs or
anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or, through mentioned,
they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited”. Disinheritance, in turn,
“is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir of his share in the legitime
for a cause authorized by law”. Where the one sentence will institutes the petitioner as
the sole, universal heir and preterits the parents of the testatrix, and it contains no
specific legacies or bequests, such universal institution of petitioner, by itself, is void. And capacity of the testatrix, this probate court finds no reason at all for the
intestate succession ensues. disallowance of the will for its failure to comply with the formalities
SPOUSES ROBERTO AND THELMA AJERO prescribed by law nor for lack of testamentary capacity of the testatrix.
VS. CA & CLEMENTE SAND
G.R. No. 106720 For one, no evidence was presented to show that the will in question is
September 15, 1994 different from the will actually executed by the testatrix. The only
objections raised by the oppositors . . . are that the will was not written in
PUNO, J.: the handwriting of the testatrix which properly refers to the question of its
This is an appeal by certiorari from the Decision of the Court of due execution, and not to the question of identity of will. No other will was
Appeals 1 in CA-G.R. CV No. 22840, dated March 30, 1992, the dispositive portion of alleged to have been executed by the testatrix other than the will herein
which reads; presented. Hence, in the light of the evidence adduced, the identity of the
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the questioned decision of November 19, will presented for probate must be accepted, i.e., the will submitted in
1988 of the trial court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Court must be deemed to be the will actually executed by the testatrix.
petition for probate is hereby DISMISSED. No costs.
xxx xxx xxx
The earlier Decision was rendered by the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 94, 2 in
Sp. Proc. No. Q-37171, and the instrument submitted for probate is the
While the fact that it was entirely written, dated and signed in the
holographic will of the late Annie Sand, who died on November 25, 1982.
handwriting of the testatrix has been disputed, the petitioners, however,
have satisfactorily shown in Court that the holographic will in question
In the will, decedent named as devisees, the following: petitioners Roberto and Thelma
was indeed written entirely, dated and signed in the handwriting of the
Ajero, private respondent Clemente Sand, Meriam S. Arong, Leah Sand, Lilia Sand,
testatrix. Three (3) witnesses who have convincingly shown knowledge of
Edgar Sand, Fe Sand, Lisa S. Sand, and Dr. Jose Ajero, Sr., and their children.
the handwriting of the testatrix have been presented and have explicitly
and categorically identified the handwriting with which the holographic will
On January 20, 1983, petitioners instituted Sp. Proc. No. Q-37171, for allowance of
in question was written to be the genuine handwriting and signature of
decedent's holographic will. They alleged that at the time of its execution, she was of
the testatrix. Given then the aforesaid evidence, the requirement of the
sound and disposing mind, not acting under duress, fraud or undue influence, and was in
law that the holographic will be entirely written, dated and signed in the
every respect capacitated to dispose of her estate by will.
handwriting of the testatrix has been complied with.
Private respondent opposed the petition on the grounds that: neither the testament's
xxx xxx xxx
body nor the signature therein was in decedent's handwriting; it contained alterations and
corrections which were not duly signed by decedent; and, the will was procured by
petitioners through improper pressure and undue influence. The petition was likewise As to the question of the testamentary capacity of the testratix, (private
opposed by Dr. Jose Ajero. He contested the disposition in the will of a house and lot respondent) Clemente Sand himself has testified in Court that the
located in Cabadbaran, Agusan Del Norte. He claimed that said property could not be testatrix was completely in her sound mind when he visited her during her
conveyed by decedent in its entirety, as she was not its sole owner. birthday celebration in 1981, at or around which time the holographic will
in question was executed by the testatrix. To be of sound mind, it is
sufficient that the testatrix, at the time of making the will, knew
Notwithstanding the oppositions, the trial court admitted the decedent's holographic will
the value of the estate to be disposed of, the proper object of her bounty,
to probate. It found, inter alia:
and the character of the testamentary act . . . The will itself shows that
the testatrix even had detailed knowledge of the nature of her estate. She
Considering then that the probate proceedings herein must decide only even identified the lot number and square meters of the lots she had
the question of identity of the will, its due execution and the testamentary
conveyed by will. The objects of her bounty were likewise identified Art. 813: When a number of dispositions appearing in a holographic will
explicitly. And considering that she had even written a nursing book are signed without being dated, and the last disposition has a signature
which contained the law and jurisprudence on will and succession, there and date, such date validates the dispositions preceding it, whatever be
is more than sufficient showing that she knows the character of the the time of prior dispositions.
testamentary act.
Art. 814: In case of insertion, cancellation, erasure or alteration in a
In this wise, the question of identity of the will, its due execution and the holographic will, the testator must authenticate the same by his full
testamentary capacity of the testatrix has to be resolved in favor of the signature.
allowance of probate of the will submitted herein.
It alluded to certain dispositions in the will which were either unsigned and undated, or
Likewise, no evidence was presented to show sufficient reason for the signed but not dated. It also found that the erasures, alterations and cancellations made
disallowance of herein holographic will. While it was alleged that the said thereon had not been authenticated by decedent.
will was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the
part of the beneficiary or of some other person, the evidence adduced Thus, this appeal which is impressed with merit.
have not shown any instance where improper pressure or influence was
exerted on the testatrix. (Private respondent) Clemente Sand has testified Section 9, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court provides that will shall be disallowed in any of
that the testatrix was still alert at the time of the execution of the will, i.e., the following cases:
at or around the time of her birth anniversary celebration in 1981. It was
also established that she is a very intelligent person and has a mind of
(a) If not executed and attested as required by law;
her own. Her independence of character and to some extent, her sense
of superiority, which has been testified to in Court, all show the
unlikelihood of her being unduly influenced or improperly pressured to (b) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable to make a
make the aforesaid will. It must be noted that the undue influence or will, at the time of its execution;
improper pressure in question herein only refer to the making of a will and
not as to the specific testamentary provisions therein which is the proper (c) If it was executed under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats;
subject of another proceeding. Hence, under the circumstances, this
Court cannot find convincing reason for the disallowance of the will (d) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on
herein. the part of the beneficiary, or of some other person for his benefit;
Considering then that it is a well-established doctrine in the law on (e) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or trick, and he
succession that in case of doubt, testate succession should be preferred did not intend that the instrument should be his will at the time of fixing
over intestate succession, and the fact that no convincing grounds were his signature thereto.
presented and proven for the disallowance of the holographic will of the
late Annie Sand, the aforesaid will submitted herein must be admitted to In the same vein, Article 839 of the New Civil Code reads:
probate. 3 (Citations omitted.)
Art. 839: The will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases;
On appeal, said Decision was reversed, and the petition for probate of decedent's will (1) If the formalities required by law have not been complied with;
was dismissed. The Court of Appeals found that, "the holographic will fails to meet the (2) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable of making
requirements for its validity." 4 It held that the decedent did not comply with Articles 813 a will, at the time of its execution;
and 814 of the New Civil Code, which read, as follows:
(3) If it was executed through force or under duress, or the influence of In the case of holographic wills, on the other hand, what assures authenticity is the
fear, or threats; requirement that they be totally autographic or handwritten by the testator himself, 7 as
(4) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on provided under Article 810 of the New Civil Code, thus:
the part of the beneficiary or of some other person;
(5) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud; A person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written,
(6) If the testator acted by mistake or did not intend that the instrument he dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no
signed should be his will at the time of affixing his signature thereto. other form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not
be witnessed. (Emphasis supplied.)
These lists are exclusive; no other grounds can serve to disallow a will. 5 Thus, in a
petition to admit a holographic will to probate, the only issues to be resolved are: (1) Failure to strictly observe other formalities will not result in the disallowance of a
whether the instrument submitted is, indeed, the decedent's last will and testament; (2) holographic will that is unquestionably handwritten by the testator.
whether said will was executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law; (3)
whether the decedent had the necessary testamentary capacity at the time the will was A reading of Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows that its requirement affects the
executed; and, (4) whether the execution of the will and its signing were the voluntary validity of the dispositions contained in the holographic will, but not its probate. If the
acts of the decedent. 6 testator fails to sign and date some of the dispositions, the result is that these
dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such failure, however, does not render the whole
In the case at bench, respondent court held that the holographic will of Anne Sand was testament void.
not executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. It held that Articles
813 and 814 of the New Civil Code, ante, were not complied with, hence, it disallowed Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate, notwithstanding non-
the probate of said will. This is erroneous. compliance with the provisions of Article 814. In the case of Kalaw vs. Relova 132 SCRA
237 242 (1984), this Court held:
We reiterate what we held in Abangan vs. Abangan, 40 Phil. 476, 479 (1919), that:
Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations made by
The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the testator in a holographic Will have not been noted under his signature, . . . the
the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and Will is not thereby invalidated as a whole, but at most only as respects the
testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore, the particular words erased, corrected or interlined. Manresa gave an identical
laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these commentary when he said "la omission de la salvedad no anula el testamento,
primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of segun la regla de jurisprudencia establecida en la sentencia de 4 de Abril de
the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the 1985." 8 (Citations omitted.)
exercise of the right to make a will. So when an interpretation already
given assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds Thus, unless the unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were made on
nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and the date of the holographic will or on testator's signature, 9 their presence does not
frustrative of the testator's last will, must be disregarded. invalidate the will itself. 10 The lack of authentication will only result in disallowance of
such changes.
For purposes of probating non-holographic wills, these formal solemnities include the It is also proper to note that the requirements of authentication of changes and signing
subscription, attestation, and acknowledgment requirements under Articles 805 and 806 and dating of dispositions appear in provisions (Articles 813 and 814) separate from that
of the New Civil Code. which provides for the necessary conditions for the validity of the holographic will (Article
810). The distinction can be traced to Articles 678 and 688 of the Spanish Civil Code,
from which the present provisions covering holographic wills are taken. They read as
follows:
Art. 678: A will is called holographic when the testator writes it himself in DIGEST: AJERO VS. CA
the form and with the requisites required in Article 688.
FACTS:
Art. 688: Holographic wills may be executed only by persons of full age. The instrument submitted for probate is the holographic will of the late Annie Sand,
who died on November 25, 1982. Petitioners instituted a special proceeding for
In order that the will be valid it must be drawn on stamped paper allowance of decedent's holographic will and alleged that at the time of its execution, she
corresponding to the year of its execution, written in its entirety by the was of sound and disposing mind, not acting under duress, fraud or undue influence.
testator and signed by him, and must contain a statement of the year, Private respondent opposed the petition on the grounds that the will contained alterations
month and day of its execution. and corrections which were not duly signed by decedent. The petition was likewise
opposed by Dr. Jose Ajero. He contested the disposition in the will of a house and lot
If it should contain any erased, corrected, or interlined words, the testator located in Cabadbaran, Agusan Del Norte. He claimed that said property could not be
must identify them over his signature. conveyed by decedent in its entirety, as she was not its sole owner.
Foreigners may execute holographic wills in their own language.
The Court of Appeals found that the decedent did not comply with Articles 813 and
This separation and distinction adds support to the interpretation that only the 814 of the New Civil Code. It alluded to certain dispositions in the will which were either
requirements of Article 810 of the New Civil Code — and not those found in Articles 813 unsigned and undated, or signed but not dated. It also found that the erasures,
and 814 of the same Code — are essential to the probate of a holographic will. alterations and cancellations made thereon had not been authenticated by decedent.
The Court of Appeals further held that decedent Annie Sand could not validly dispose of ISSUES:
the house and lot located in Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte, in its entirety. This is correct 1. Whether or not said will was executed in accordance with formalities prescribed
and must be affirmed. in law.
2. Whether or not the decedent could validly dispose of the house and lot located
in Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte, in its entirety.
As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to pass only upon the
extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated. However, in exceptional instances,
HELD:
courts are not powerless to do what the situation constrains them to do, and pass upon
YES. The will was executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed in law. In
certain provisions of the will. 11 In the case at bench, decedent herself indubitably stated
the case of holographic wills, what assures authenticity is the requirement that they be
in her holographic will that the Cabadbaran property is in the name of her late father,
totally autographic or handwritten by the testator himself, as provided under Article 810
John H. Sand (which led oppositor Dr. Jose Ajero to question her conveyance of the
of the New Civil Code.
same in its entirety). Thus, as correctly held by respondent court, she cannot validly
dispose of the whole property, which she shares with her father's other heirs.
A reading of Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows that its requirement affects
the validity of the dispositions contained in the holographic will, but not its probate. If the
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of testator fails to sign and date some of the dispositions, the result is that these
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 22840, dated March 30, 1992, is REVERSED and SET dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such failure, however, does not render the whole
ASIDE, except with respect to the invalidity of the disposition of the entire house and lot testament void, but at most only as respects the particular words erased, corrected or
in Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon interlined.
City, Branch 94 in Sp. Proc. No. Q-37171, dated November 19, 1988, admitting to
probate the holographic will of decedent Annie Sand, is hereby REINSTATED, with the Thus, unless the unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were
above qualification as regards the Cabadbaran property. No costs. SO ORDERED. made on the date of the holographic will or on testator's signature, their presence does
not invalidate the will itself. The lack of authentication will only result in disallowance of
such changes.
spouses PASTOR, JR. and his wife, Maria Elena Achaval de Pastor, who claimed to be
Moreover, the list enumerated in Article 839 of the New Civil Code is exclusive; no the owners thereof in their own rights, and not by inheritance. The action, docketed as
other grounds can serve to disallow a will. Civil Case No. 274-R, was filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch IX.
2. NO. Decedent herself indubitably stated in her holographic will that the Cabadbaran On February 2, 1971, PASTOR, JR. and his sister SOFIA filed their opposition to the
property is in the name of her late father, John H. Sand. Thus, as correctly held by petition for probate and the order appointing QUEMADA as special administrator.
respondent court, she cannot validly dispose of the whole property, which she shares
with her father's other heirs. On December 5, 1972, the PROBATE COURT issued an order allowing the will to
SPS. ALVARO PASTOR, JR. AND MA. ELENA ACHAVAL DE PASTOR probate. Appealed to the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 52961- R, the order was
VS. CA, JUAN Y. REYES, JUDGE OF BRANCH I, CFI OF CEBU AND LEWELLYN affirmed in a decision dated May 9, 1977. On petition for review, the Supreme Court in
BARLITO QUEMADA G.R. No. L-46645 dismissed the petition in a minute resolution dated November 1, 1977
G.R. NO. L-56340 and remanded the same to the PROBATE COURT after denying reconsideration on
JUNE 24, 1983 January 11, 1978.
PLANA, J.:
I. FACTS:
For two years after remand of the case to the PROBATE COURT, QUEMADA filed
pleading after pleading asking for payment of his legacy and seizure of the properties
This is a case of hereditary succession. subject of said legacy. PASTOR, JR. and SOFIA opposed these pleadings on the ground
of pendency of the reconveyance suit with another branch of the Cebu Court of First
Alvaro Pastor, Sr. (PASTOR, SR.), a Spanish subject, died in Cebu City on June 5, Instance. All pleadings remained unacted upon by the PROBATE COURT.
1966, survived by his Spanish wife Sofia Bossio (who also died on October 21, 1966),
their two legitimate children Alvaro Pastor, Jr. (PASTOR, JR.) and Sofia Pastor de On March 5, 1980, the PROBATE COURT set the hearing on the intrinsic validity of the
Midgely (SOFIA), and an illegitimate child, not natural, by the name of Lewellyn Barlito will for March 25, 1980, but upon objection of PASTOR, JR. and SOFIA on the e ground
Quemada QUEMADA PASTOR, JR. is a Philippine citizen, having been naturalized in of pendency of the reconveyance suit, no hearing was held on March 25. Instead, the
1936. SOFIA is a Spanish subject. QUEMADA is a Filipino by his mother's citizenship. PROBATE COURT required the parties to submit their respective position papers as to
how much inheritance QUEMADA was entitled to receive under the wig. Pursuant
On November 13, 1970, QUEMADA filed a petition for the probate and allowance of an thereto, PASTOR. JR. and SOFIA submitted their Memorandum of authorities dated April
alleged holographic will of PASTOR, SR. with the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch 10, which in effect showed that determination of how much QUEMADA should receive
I (PROBATE COURT), docketed as SP No. 3128-R. The will contained only one was still premature. QUEMADA submitted his Position paper dated April 20, 1980.
testamentary disposition: a legacy in favor of QUEMADA consisting of 30% of PASTOR, ATLAS, upon order of the Court, submitted a sworn statement of royalties paid to the
SR.'s 42% share in the operation by Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Pastor Group of tsn from June 1966 (when Pastor, Sr. died) to February 1980. The
Corporation (ATLAS) of some mining claims in Pina-Barot, Cebu. statement revealed that of the mining claims being operated by ATLAS, 60% pertained to
the Pastor Group distributed as follows:
On November 21, 1970, the PROBATE COURT, upon motion of QUEMADA and after an
ex parte hearing, appointed him special administrator of the entire estate of PASTOR, 1. A. Pastor, Jr. ...................................40.5%
SR., whether or not covered or affected by the holographic will. He assumed office as
such on December 4, 1970 after filing a bond of P 5,000.00. 2. E. Pelaez, Sr. ...................................15.0%
On December 7, 1970, QUEMADA as special administrator, instituted against PASTOR, 3. B. Quemada .......................................4.5%
JR. and his wife an action for reconveyance of alleged properties of the estate, which
included the properties subject of the legacy and which were in the names of the
On August 20, 1980, while the reconveyance suit was still being litigated in Branch IX of On December 9, 1980, PASTOR, JR. and his wife moved for reconsideration of the
the Court of First Instance of Cebu, the PROBATE COURT issued the now assailed Court of Appeal's decision of November 18, 1980, calling the attention of the appellate
Order of Execution and Garnishment, resolving the question of ownership of the royalties court to another order of the Probate Court dated November 11, 1980 (i.e., while their
payable by ATLAS and ruling in effect that the legacy to QUEMADA was not inofficious. petition for certiorari was pending decision in the appellate court), by which the
[There was absolutely no statement or claim in the Order that the Probate Order of oppositors' motion for reconsideration of the Probate Court's Order of August 20, 1980
December 5, 1972 had previously resolved the issue of ownership of the mining rights of was denied. [The November 11 Order declared that the questions of intrinsic validity of
royalties thereon, nor the intrinsic validity of the holographic will.] the will and of ownership over the mining claims (not the royalties alone) had been finally
adjudicated by the final and executory Order of December 5, 1972, as affirmed by the
The order of August 20, 1980 found that as per the holographic will and a written Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, thereby rendering moot and academic the suit
acknowledgment of PASTOR, JR. dated June 17, 1962, of the above 60% interest in the for reconveyance then pending in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch IX. It
mining claims belonging to the Pastor Group, 42% belonged to PASTOR, SR. and only clarified that only the 33% share of PASTOR, JR. in the royalties (less than 7.5% share
33% belonged to PASTOR, JR. The remaining 25% belonged to E. Pelaez, also of the which he had assigned to QUEMADA before PASTOR, SR. died) was to be garnished
Pastor Group. The PROBATE COURT thus directed ATLAS to remit directly to and that as regards PASTOR, SR.'s 42% share, what was ordered was just the transfer
QUEMADA the 42% royalties due decedent's estate, of which QUEMADA was of its possession to the custody of the PROBATE COURT through the special
authorized to retain 75% for himself as legatee and to deposit 25% with a reputable administrator. Further, the Order granted QUEMADA 6% interest on his unpaid legacy
banking institution for payment of the estate taxes and other obligations of the estate. from August 1980 until fully paid.] Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals denied
The 33% share of PASTOR, JR. and/or his assignees was ordered garnished to answer reconsideration.
for the accumulated legacy of QUEMADA from the time of PASTOR, SR.'s death, which
amounted to over two million pesos. Hence, this Petition for Review by certiorari with prayer for a writ of pre y injunction,
assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 18, 1980 as well as the
The order being "immediately executory", QUEMADA succeeded in obtaining a Writ of orders of the Probate Court dated August 20, 1980, November 11, 1980 and December
Execution and Garnishment on September 4, 1980, and in serving the same on ATLAS 17, 1980, Med by petitioners on March 26, 1981, followed by a Supplemental Petition
on the same day. Notified of the Order on September 6, 1980, the oppositors sought with Urgent Prayer for Restraining Order.
reconsideration thereof on the same date primarily on the ground that the PROBATE
COURT gravely abused its discretion when it resolved the question of ownership of the In April 1981, the Court (First Division) issued a writ of preliminary injunction, the lifting of
royalties and ordered the payment of QUEMADA's legacy after prematurely passing which was denied in the Resolution of the same Division dated October 18, 1982,
upon the intrinsic validity of the will. In the meantime, the PROBATE COURT ordered although the bond of petitioners was increased from P50,000.00 to P100,000.00.
suspension of payment of all royalties due PASTOR, JR. and/or his assignees until after
resolution of oppositors' motion for reconsideration. Between December 21, 1981 and October 12, 1982, private respondent filed seven
successive motions for early resolution. Five of these motions expressly prayed for the
Before the Motion for Reconsideration could be resolved, however, PASTOR, JR., this resolution of the question as to whether or not the petition should be given due course.
time joined by his wife Ma. ELENA ACHAVAL DE PASTOR, filed with the Court of
Appeals a Petition for certiorari and Prohibition with a prayer for writ of preliminary On October 18, 1982, the Court (First Division) adopted a resolution stating that "the
injunction (CA-G.R. No. SP- 11373-R). They assailed the Order dated August 20, 1980 petition in fact and in effect was given due course when this case was heard on the
and the writ of execution and garnishment issued pursuant thereto. The petition was merits on September 7, (should be October 21, 1981) and concise memoranda in
denied on November 18, 1980 on the grounds (1) that its filing was premature because amplification of their oral arguments on the merits of the case were filed by the parties
the Motion for Reconsideration of the questioned Order was still pending determination pursuant to the resolution of October 21, 1981 . . . " and denied in a resolution dated
by the PROBATE COURT; and (2) that although "the rule that a motion for December 13, 1982, private respondent's "Omnibus motion to set aside resolution dated
reconsideration is prerequisite for an action for certiorari is never an absolute rule," the October 18, 1982 and to submit the matter of due course to the present membership of
Order assailed is "legally valid. " the Division; and to reassign the case to another ponente."
Upon Motion for Reconsideration of the October 18, 1982 and December 13, 1982 On the procedural aspect, placed in issue is the propriety of certiorari as a means to
Resolutions, the Court en banc resolved to CONFIRM the questioned resolutions insofar assail the validity of the order of execution and the implementing writ.
as hey resolved that the petition in fact and in effect had been given due course.
III. DISCUSSION:
II. ISSUES:
1. Issue of Ownership —
Assailed by the petitioners in these proceedings is the validity of the Order of execution
and garnishment dated August 20, 1980 as well as the Orders subsequently issued (a) In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the issue by and large is restricted to
allegedly to implement the Probate Order of December 5, 1972, to wit: the Order of the extrinsic validity of the will, i.e., whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely
November 11, 1980 declaring that the Probate Order of 1972 indeed resolved the issues executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. (Rules of Court,
of ownership and intrinsic validity of the will, and reiterating the Order of Execution dated Rule 75, Section 1; Rule 76, Section 9.) As a rule, the question of ownership is an
August 20, 1980; and the Order of December 17, 1980 reducing to P2,251,516.74 the extraneous matter which the Probate Court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the
amount payable to QUEMADA representing the royalties he should have received from purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in
the death of PASTOR, SR. in 1966 up to February 1980. the inventory of estate properties, the Probate Court may pass upon the title thereto, but
such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a
The Probate Order itself, insofar as it merely allowed the holographic will in probate, is separate action to resolve title. [3 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court (1980 ed.), p.
not questioned. But petitioners denounce the Probate Court for having acted beyond its 458; Valero Vda. de Rodriguez vs. Court of Appeals, 91 SCRA 540.]
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion when it issued the assailed Orders. Their
argument runs this way: Before the provisions of the holographic win can be (b) The rule is that execution of a judgment must conform to that decreed in the
implemented, the questions of ownership of the mining properties and the intrinsic dispositive part of the decision. (Philippine-American Insurance Co. vs. Honorable
validity of the holographic will must first be resolved with finality. Now, contrary to the Flores, 97 SCRA 811.) However, in case of ambiguity or uncertainty, the body of the
position taken by the Probate Court in 1980 — i.e., almost eight years after the probate decision may be scanned for guidance in construing the judgment. (Heirs of Presto vs.
of the will in 1972 — the Probate Order did not resolve the two said issues. Therefore, Galang, 78 SCRA 534; Fabular vs. Court of Appeals, 119 SCRA 329; Robles vs.
the Probate Order could not have resolved and actually did not decide QUEMADA's Timario. 107 Phil. 809.)
entitlement to the legacy. This being so, the Orders for the payment of the legacy in
alleged implementation of the Probate Order of 1972 are unwarranted for lack of basis. The Order sought to be executed by the assailed Order of execution is the Probate Order
of December 5, 1972 which allegedly resolved the question of ownership of the disputed
Closely related to the foregoing is the issue raised by QUEMADA The Probate Order of mining properties. The said Probate Order enumerated the issues before the Probate
1972 having become final and executory, how can its implementation (payment of Court, thus:
legacy) be restrained? Of course, the question assumes that QUEMADA's entitlement to
the legacy was finally adjudged in the Probate Order. Unmistakably, there are three aspects in these proceedings: (1) the
probate of the holographic will (2) the intestate estate aspect; and (3) the
On the merits, therefore, the basic issue is whether the Probate Order of December 5, administration proceedings for the purported estate of the decedent in the
1972 resolved with finality the questions of ownership and intrinsic validity. A negative Philippines.
finding will necessarily render moot and academic the other issues raised by the parties,
such as the jurisdiction of the Probate Court to conclusively resolve title to property, and In its broad and total perspective the whole proceedings are being
the constitutionality and repercussions of a ruling that the mining properties in dispute, impugned by the oppositors on jurisdictional grounds, i.e., that the fact of
although in the name of PASTOR, JR. and his wife, really belonged to the decedent the decedent's residence and existence of properties in the Philippines
despite the latter's constitutional disqualification as an alien. have not been established.
Specifically placed in issue with respect to the probate proceedings are: (c) There is a necessity and propriety of a special administrator and later
(a) whether or not the holographic will (Exhibit "J") has lost its efficacy as on an executor and/or administrator in these proceedings, in spite of this
the last will and testament upon the death of Alvaro Pastor, Sr. on June Court's declaration that the oppositors are the forced heirs and the
5, 1966, in Cebu City, Philippines; (b) Whether or not the said will has petitioner is merely vested with the character of a voluntary heir to the
been executed with all the formalities required by law; and (c) Did the late extent of the bounty given to him (under) the will insofar as the same will
presentation of the holographic will affect the validity of the same? not prejudice the legitimes of the oppositor for the following reasons:
Issues In the Administration Proceedings are as follows: (1) Was the ex- 1. To submit a complete inventory of the estate of the decedent-
parte appointment of the petitioner as special administrator valid and testator Alvaro Pastor, Sr.
proper? (2) Is there any indispensable necessity for the estate of the
decedent to be placed under administration? (3) Whether or not petition 2. To administer and to continue to put to prolific utilization of the
is qualified to be a special administrator of the estate; and (4) Whether or properties of the decedent;
not the properties listed in the inventory (submitted by the special
administrator but not approved by the Probate Court) are to be excluded. 3. To keep and maintain the houses and other structures and
belonging to the estate, since the forced heirs are residing in
Then came what purports to be the dispositive portion: Spain, and prepare them for delivery to the heirs in good order
after partition and when directed by the Court, but only after the
Upon the foregoing premises, this Court rules on and resolves some of payment of estate and inheritance taxes;
the problems and issues presented in these proceedings, as follows:
(d) Subject to the outcome of the suit for reconveyance of ownership and
(a) The Court has acquired jurisdiction over the probate proceedings as possession of real and personal properties in Civil Case No. 274-T before
it hereby allows and approves the so-called holographic will of testator Branch IX of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, the intestate estate
Alvaro Pastor, Sr., executed on July 31, 1961 with respect to its extrinsic administration aspect must proceed, unless, however, it is duly proven by
validity, the same having been duly authenticated pursuant to the the oppositors that debts of the decedent have already been paid, that
requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. Let, therefore, a certificate of there had been an extrajudicial partition or summary one between the
its allowance be prepared by the Branch Clerk of this Court to be signed forced heirs, that the legacy to be given and delivered to the petitioner
by this Presiding Judge, and attested by the seal of the Court, and does not exceed the free portion of the estate of the testator, that the
thereafter attached to the will, and the will and certificate filed and respective shares of the forced heirs have been fairly apportioned,
recorded by the clerk. Let attested copies of the will and of the certificate distributed and delivered to the two forced heirs of Alvaro Pastor, Sr.,
of allowance thereof be sent to Atlas Consolidated Mining & Development after deducting the property willed to the petitioner, and the estate and
Corporation, Goodrich Bldg., Cebu City, and the Register of Deeds of inheritance taxes have already been paid to the Government thru the
Cebu or of Toledo City, as the case may be, for recording. Bureau of Internal Revenue.
(b) There was a delay in the granting of the letters testamentary or of The suitability and propriety of allowing petitioner to remain as special
administration for as a matter of fact, no regular executor and/or administrator or administrator of the other properties of the estate of the
administrator has been appointed up to this time and - the appointment of decedent, which properties are not directly or indirectly affected by the
a special administrator was, and still is, justified under the circumstances provisions of the holographic will (such as bank deposits, land in Mactan
to take possession and charge of the estate of the deceased in the etc.), will be resolved in another order as separate incident, considering
Philippines (particularly in Cebu) until the problems causing the delay are that this order should have been properly issued solely as a resolution on
decided and the regular executor and/or administrator appointed.
the issue of whether or not to allow and approve the aforestated will. since pre-war days and was engaged in the mine prospecting business since 1937
(Emphasis supplied.) particularly in the City of Toledo; and (3) PASTOR, JR. was only acting as dummy for his
father because the latter was a Spaniard.
Nowhere in the dispositive portion is there a declaration of ownership of specific
properties. On the contrary, it is manifest therein that ownership was not resolved. For it Based on the premises laid, the conclusion is obviously far-fetched.
confined itself to the question of extrinsic validity of the win, and the need for and
propriety of appointing a special administrator. Thus it allowed and approved the (f) It was, therefore, error for the assailed implementing Orders to conclude that the
holographic win "with respect to its extrinsic validity, the same having been duly Probate Order adjudged with finality the question of ownership of the mining properties
authenticated pursuant to the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law." It declared and royalties, and that, premised on this conclusion, the dispositive portion of the said
that the intestate estate administration aspect must proceed " subject to the outcome of Probate Order directed the special administrator to pay the legacy in dispute.
the suit for reconveyance of ownership and possession of real and personal properties in
Civil Case 274-T before Branch IX of the CFI of Cebu." [Parenthetically, although the 2. Issue of Intrinsic Validity of the Holographic Will -
statement refers only to the "intestate" aspect, it defies understanding how ownership by
the estate of some properties could be deemed finally resolved for purposes
(a) When PASTOR, SR. died in 1966, he was survived by his wife, aside from his two
of testate administration, but not so for intestate purposes. Can the estate be the owner
legitimate children and one illegitimate son. There is therefore a need to liquidate the
of a property for testate but not for intestate purposes?] Then again, the Probate Order
conjugal partnership and set apart the share of PASTOR, SR.'s wife in the conjugal
(while indeed it does not direct the implementation of the legacy) conditionally stated that
partnership preparatory to the administration and liquidation of the estate of PASTOR,
the intestate administration aspect must proceed "unless . . . it is proven . . . that the
SR. which will include, among others, the determination of the extent of the statutory
legacy to be given and delivered to the petitioner does not exceed the free portion of the
usufructuary right of his wife until her death. * When the disputed Probate order was issued on December
estate of the testator," which clearly implies that the issue of impairment of legitime (an 5, 1972, there had been no liquidation of the community properties of PASTOR, SR. and his wife.
aspect of intrinsic validity) was in fact not resolved. Finally, the Probate Order did not rule
on the propriety of allowing QUEMADA to remain as special administrator of estate (b) So, also, as of the same date, there had been no prior definitive determination of the
properties not covered by the holographic will, "considering that this (Probate) Order assets of the estate of PASTOR, SR. There was an inventory of his properties
should have been properly issued solely as a resolution on the issue of whether or not to presumably prepared by the special administrator, but it does not appear that it was ever
allow and approve the aforestated will. " the subject of a hearing or that it was judicially approved. The reconveyance or recovery
of properties allegedly owned but not in the name of PASTOR, SR. was still being
(c) That the Probate Order did not resolve the question of ownership of the properties litigated in another court.
listed in the estate inventory was appropriate, considering that the issue of ownership
was the very subject of controversy in the reconveyance suit that was still pending in (c) There was no appropriate determination, much less payment, of the debts of the
Branch IX of the Court of First Instance of Cebu. decedent and his estate. Indeed, it was only in the Probate Order of December 5, 1972
where the Probate Court ordered that-
(d) What, therefore, the Court of Appeals and, in effect, the Supreme Court affirmed en
toto when they reviewed the Probable Order were only the matters properly adjudged in ... a notice be issued and published pursuant to the provisions of Rule 86
the said Order. of the Rules of Court, requiring all persons having money claims against
the decedent to file them in the office of the Branch Clerk of this Court."
(e) In an attempt to justify the issuance of the Order of execution dated August 20, 1980,
the Probate Court in its Order of November 11, 1980 explained that the basis for its (d) Nor had the estate tax been determined and paid, or at least provided for, as of
conclusion that the question of ownership had been formally resolved by the Probate December 5, 1972.
Order of 1972 are the findings in the latter Order that (1) during the lifetime of the
decedent, he was receiving royalties from ATLAS; (2) he had resided in the Philippines
(e) The net assets of the estate not having been determined, the legitime of the forced (c) Neither has the estate tax been paid on the estate of PASTOR, SR. Payment
heirs in concrete figures could not be ascertained. therefore of the legacy to QUEMADA would collide with the provision of the National
Internal Revenue Code requiring payment of estate tax before delivery to any beneficiary
(f) All the foregoing deficiencies considered, it was not possible to determine whether the of his distributive share of the estate (Section 107 [c])
legacy of QUEMADA - a fixed share in a specific property rather than an aliquot part of
the entire net estate of the deceased - would produce an impairment of the legitime of (d) The assailed order of execution was unauthorized, having been issued purportedly
the compulsory heirs. under Rule 88, Section 6 of the Rules of Court which reads:
(g) Finally, there actually was no determination of the intrinsic validity of the will in other Sec. 6. Court to fix contributive shares where devisees, legatees, or heirs
respects. It was obviously for this reason that as late as March 5, 1980 - more than 7 have been in possession. — Where devisees, legatees, or heirs have
years after the Probate Order was issued the Probate Court scheduled on March 25, entered into possession of portions of the estate before the debts and
1980 a hearing on the intrinsic validity of the will. expenses have been settled and paid and have become liable to
contribute for the payment of such debts and expenses, the court having
3. Propriety of certiorari — jurisdiction of the estate may, by order for that purpose, after hearing,
settle the amount of their several liabilities, and order how much and in
Private respondent challenges the propriety of certiorari as a means to assail the validity what manner each person shall contribute, and may issue execution as
of the disputed Order of execution. He contends that the error, if any, is one of judgment, circumstances require.
not jurisdiction, and properly correctible only by appeal, not certiorari.
The above provision clearly authorizes execution to enforce payment of debts of estate.
Under the circumstances of the case at bar, the challenge must be rejected. Grave A legacy is not a debt of the estate; indeed, legatees are among those against whom
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction is much too evident in the actuations execution is authorized to be issued.
of the probate court to be overlooked or condoned.
... there is merit in the petitioners' contention that the probate court
(a) Without a final, authoritative adjudication of the issue as to what properties compose generally cannot issue a writ of execution. It is not supposed to issue a
the estate of PASTOR, SR. in the face of conflicting claims made by heirs and a non-heir writ of execution because its orders usually refer to the adjudication of
(MA. ELENA ACHAVAL DE PASTOR) involving properties not in the name of the claims against the estate which the executor or administrator may satisfy
decedent, and in the absence of a resolution on the intrinsic validity of the will here in without the necessity of resorting to a writ of execution. The probate
question, there was no basis for the Probate Court to hold in its Probate Order of 1972, court, as such, does not render any judgment enforceable by execution.
which it did not, that private respondent is entitled to the payment of the questioned
legacy. Therefore, the Order of Execution of August 20, 1980 and the subsequent The circumstances that the Rules of Court expressly specifies that the
implementing orders for the payment of QUEMADA's legacy, in alleged implementation probate court may issue execution (a) to satisfy (debts of the estate out
of the dispositive part of the Probate Order of December 5, 1972, must fall for lack of of) the contributive shares of devisees, legatees and heirs in possession
basis. of the decedent's assets (Sec. 6. Rule 88), (b) to enforce payment of the
expenses of partition (Sec. 3, Rule 90), and (c) to satisfy the costs when
(b) The ordered payment of legacy would be violative of the rule requiring prior a person is cited for examination in probate proceedings (Sec. 13, Rule
liquidation of the estate of the deceased, i.e., the determination of the assets of the 142) may mean, under the rule of inclusion unius est exclusion alterius,
estate and payment of all debts and expenses, before apportionment and distribution of that those are the only instances when it can issue a writ of execution.
the residue among the heirs and legatees. (Bernardo vs. Court of Appeals, 7 SCRA 367.) (Vda. de Valera vs. Ofilada, 59 SCRA 96, 108.)
(d) It is within a court's competence to order the execution of a final judgment; but to WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. No. SP-11373-R is
order the execution of a final order (which is not even meant to be executed) by reading reversed. The Order of execution issued by the probate Court dated August 20, 1980, as
into it terms that are not there and in utter disregard of existing rules and law, is manifest well as all the Orders issued subsequent thereto in alleged implementation of the
grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. Consequently, the rule that Probate Order dated December 5, 1972, particularly the Orders dated November 11,
certiorari may not be invoked to defeat the right of a prevailing party to the execution of a 1980 and December 17, 1980, are hereby set aside; and this case is remanded to the
valid and final judgment, is inapplicable. For when an order of execution is issued with appropriate Regional Trial Court for proper proceedings, subject to the judgment to be
grave abuse of discretion or is at variance with the judgment sought to be enforced rendered in Civil Case No. 274-R.
(PVTA vs. Honorable Gonzales, 92 SCRA 172), certiorari will lie to abate the order of
execution. SO ORDERED.
(e) Aside from the propriety of resorting to certiorari to assail an order of execution which DIGEST: PASTOR, JR. VS. CA
varies the terms of the judgment sought to be executed or does not find support in the
dispositive part of the latter, there are circumstances in the instant case which justify the FACTS:
remedy applied for. Spouses Alvaro Pastor, Sr. and Sofia Bossio were survived by their two legitimate
children Alvaro Pastor, Jr. (Pastor Jr.) and Sofia Pastor (Sofia), and an illegitimate child,
Petitioner MA. ELENA ACHAVAL DE PASTOR, wife of PASTOR, JR., is the holder in Lewellyn Quemada. Quemada filed a petition for the probate and allowance of an alleged
her own right of three mining claims which are one of the objects of conflicting claims of
holographic will of Pastor Sr. with the CFI which contained only one testamentary
ownership. She is not an heir of PASTOR, SR. and was not a party to the probate
disposition: a legacy in favor of Quemada consisting of 30% of Pastor Sr.’s 42% share in
proceedings. Therefore, she could not appeal from the Order of execution issued by the
Probate Court. On the other hand, after the issuance of the execution order, the urgency the operation by ATLAS. Thereafter, the probate court appointed Quemada as special
of the relief she and her co-petitioner husband seek in the petition for certiorari states administrator of the entire estate of Pastor Sr. whether or not covered or affected by the
against requiring her to go through the cumbersome procedure of asking for leave to holographic will. Consequently, Quemada instituted against Pastor Jr., and his wife an
intervene in the probate proceedings to enable her, if leave is granted, to appeal from the action for reconveyance of alleged properties of estate which included the properties
challenged order of execution which has ordered the immediate transfer and/or subject of the legacy which were in the names of spouses Pastor Sr. and Ma. Elena, who
garnishment of the royalties derived from mineral properties of which she is the duly claimed to be the owners in their own rights, and not by inheritance. The probate court
registered owner and/or grantee together with her husband. She could not have issued an order allowing the will to probate.
intervened before the issuance of the assailed orders because she had no valid ground
to intervene. The matter of ownership over the properties subject of the execution was The order was affirmed by CA and on petition for review, the SC dismissed the
then still being litigated in another court in a reconveyance suit filed by the special petition and remanded the same to the probate court after denying reconsideration. For
administrator of the estate of PASTOR, SR. two years after remand of the case to the probate court, all pleadings of both parties
remained unacted upon. Not long after, the probate court set the hearing on the intrinsic
Likewise, at the time petitioner PASTOR, JR. Med the petition for certiorari with the Court validity of the will but upon objection of Pastor Jr. and Sofia on the ground of pendency of
of Appeals, appeal was not available to him since his motion for reconsideration of the
the reconveyance suit, no hearing was held. Instead, the probate court required the
execution order was still pending resolution by the Probate Court. But in the face of
actual garnishment of their major source of income, petitioners could no longer wait for parties to submit their respective position papers. While the reconveyance suit was still
the resolution of their motion for reconsideration. They needed prompt relief from the pending in another court, the probate court issued Order of Execution and Garnishment,
injurious effects of the execution order. Under the circumstances, recourse to certiorari resolving the question of ownership of the royalties payable by ATLAS and ruling in
was the feasible remedy. effect that the legacy to Quemada was not inofficious.
Pursuant to said order, ATLAS was directed to remit directly to Quemada the 42%
royalties due to decedent’s estate, of which Quemada was authorized to retain 75% for
himself as legatee. Further, the 33% share of Pastor Jr. and/or his assignees was
ordered garnished to answer for the accumulated legacy of Quemada. Being The Probate Court did not resolve the question of ownership of the properties
“immediately executory”, Quemada succeeded in obtaining a Writ of Execution and listed in the estate inventory, considering that the issue of ownership was the very
Garnishment. The oppositors sought reconsideration thereof but in the meantime, the subject of controversy in the reconveyance suit that was still pending. It was, therefore,
probate court ordered suspension of payment of all royalties due Pastor Jr. and/or his error for the assailed implementing Orders to conclude that the Probate Order adjudged
assignees until after resolution of oppositor’s motion for reconsideration. Pending motion, with finality the question of ownership of the mining properties and royalties, and that,
Pastor Jr. and his wife filed with the CA a petition for certiorariand prohibition with a premised on this conclusion, the dispositive portion of the said Probate Order directed
prayer for writ of preliminary injunction assailing the writ of execution and garnishment special administrator to pay the legacy in dispute.
issued by the probate court. However, said petition was denied as well as their motion for
reconsideration. Hence, this petition for review by certiorari with prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction. PILAR S. VDA. DE MANALO, ANTONIO S. MANALO, ORLANDO S. MANALO, and
ISABELITA MANALO VS. CA, RTC MANILA (BRANCH 35), PURITA S. JAYME,
MILAGROS M. TERRE, BELEN M. ORILLANO, ROSALINA M. ACUIN, ROMEO S.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Probate Order resolved with finality the questions of MANALO, ROBERTO S. MANALO, AMALIA MANALO and IMELDA MANALO
G.R. NO. 129242
ownership and intrinsic validity.
January 16, 2001
DE LEON, JR., J.:

HELD:
NO. This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioners Pilar S. Vda De Manalo, et.
Al., seeking to annul the Resolution 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 affirming the Orders 3 of
In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the issue by and large is restricted the Regional Trial Court and the Resolution 4 which denied petitioner' motion for
to the extrinsic validity of the will. As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous reconsideration.
matter which the Probate Court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of
determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory The antecedent facts 5 are as follows:
of estate properties, the Probate Court may pass upon the title thereto, but such
determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a Troadio Manalo, a resident of 1996 Maria Clara Street, Sampaloc, Manila died intestate
separate action to resolve title. on February 14, 1992. He was survived by his wife, Pilar S. Manalo, and his eleven (11)
children, namely: Purita M. Jayme, Antonio Manalo, Milagros M. Terre, Belen M. Orillano,
The Order sought to be executed by the assailed Order of execution is the Probate Isabelita Manalo, Rosalina M. Acuin, Romeo Manalo, Roberto Manalo, Amalia Manalo,
Order allegedly resolved the question of ownership of the disputed mining properties. Orlando Manalo and Imelda Manalo, who are all of legal age. 1âwphi1.nêt
However, nowhere in the dispositive portion is there a declaration of ownership of

specific properties. On the contrary, it is manifested therein that ownership was not At the time of his death on February 14, 1992, Troadio Manalo left several real properties
resolved. For it confined itself to the question of extrinsic validity of the will, and the need located in Manila and in the province of Tarlac including a business under the name and
for and propriety of appointing a special administrator. Thus it allowed and approved the style Manalo's Machine Shop with offices at No. 19 Calavite Street, La Loma, Quezon
holographic will “with respect to its extrinsic validity, the same having been duly City and at NO. 45 General Tinio Street, Arty Subdivision, Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
authenticated pursuant to the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law.” It declared
that the intestate estate administration aspect must proceed subject to the outcome of On November 26, 1992, herein respondents, who are eight (8) of the surviving children
of the late Troadio Manalo, namely; Purita, Milagros, Belen Rocalina, Romeo, Roberto,
the suit for reconveyance of ownership and possession of real and personal properties.
Amalia, and Imelda filed a petition 6 with the respondent Regional Trial Court of
Manila 7 of the judicial settlement of the estate of their late father, Troadio Manalo, and for E. To set the application of Romeo Manalo for appointment as regular
the appointment of their brother, Romeo Manalo, as administrator thereof. administrator in the intestate estate of the deceased Troadio Manalo for hearing
on September 9, 1993 at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon.
On December 15, 1992, the trial court issued an order setting the said petition for
hearing on February 11, 1993 and directing the publication of the order for three (3) Herein petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, and further the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 39851, after the trial court in its
directing service by registered mail of the said order upon the heirs named in the petition Order 10 dated September 15, 1993. In their petition for improperly laid in SP. PROC. No.
at their respective addresses mentioned therein. 92-63626; (2) the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons; (3) the share
of the surviving spouse was included in the intestate proceedings; (4) there was absence
On February 11, 1993, the date set for hearing of the petition, the trial court issued an of earnest efforts toward compromise among members of the same family; and (5) no
order 'declaring the whole world in default, except the government," and set the reception certification of non-forum shopping was attached to the petition.
of evidence of the petitioners therein on March 16, 1993. However, the trial court upon
motion of set this order of general default aside herein petitioners (oppositors therein) Finding the contentions untenable, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for
namely: Pilar S. Vda. De Manalo, Antonio, Isabelita and Orlando who were granted then certiorari in its Resolution11 promulgated on September 30, 1996. On May 6, 1997 the
(10) days within which to file their opposition to the petition. motion for reconsideration of the said resolution was likewise dismissed.12
Several pleadings were subsequently filed by herein petitioners, through counsel, The only issue raised by herein petitioners in the instant petition for review is whether or
culminating in the filling of an Omnibus Motion8 on July 23, 1993 seeking; (1) to seat not the respondent Court of Appeals erred in upholding the questioned orders of the
aside and reconsider the Order of the trial court dated July 9, 1993 which denied the respondent trial court which denied their motion for the outright dismissal of the petition
motion for additional extension of time file opposition; (2) to set for preliminary hearing for judicial settlement of estate despite the failure of the petitioners therein to aver that
their affirmative defenses as grounds for dismissal of the case; (3) to declare that the trial earnest efforts toward a compromise involving members of the same family have been
court did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the oppositors; and (4) for the made prior to the filling of the petition but that the same have failed.
immediate inhibition of the presiding judge.
Herein petitioners claim that the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 is actually an
On July 30, 1993, the trial court issued an order9 which resolved, thus: ordinary civil action involving members of the same family. They point out that it contains
certain averments, which, according to them, are indicative of its adversarial nature, to
A. To admit the so-called Opposition filed by counsel for the oppositors on July wit:
20, 1993, only for the purpose of considering the merits thereof;
X X X
B. To deny the prayer of the oppositors for a preliminary hearing of their
affirmative defenses as ground for the dismissal of this proceeding, said Par. 7. One of the surviving sons, ANTONIO MANALO, since the death of his
affirmative defenses being irrelevant and immaterial to the purpose and issue of father, TROADIO MANALO, had not made any settlement, judicial or extra-
the present proceeding; judicial of the properties of the deceased father TROADIO MANALO.
C. To declare that this court has acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the Par. 8. xxx the said surviving son continued to manage and control the properties
oppositors; aforementioned, without proper accounting, to his own benefit and advantage
xxx.
D. To deny the motion of the oppositors for the inhibition of this Presiding Judge;
X X X
Par. 12. That said ANTONIO MANALO is managing and controlling the estate of WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed for of this Honorable Court:
the deceased TROADIO MANALO to his own advantage and to the damage and
prejudice of the herein petitioners and their co-heirs xxx. a. That after due hearing, letters of administration be issued to petitioner ROMEO
MANALO for the administration of the estate of the deceased TROADIO
X X X MANALO upon the giving of a bond in such reasonable sum that this Honorable
Court may fix.
Par. 14. For the protection of their rights and interests, petitioners were
compelled to bring this suit and were forced to litigate and incur expenses and b. That after all the properties of the deceased TROADIO MANALO have been
will continue to incur expenses of not less than, P250,000.00 and engaged the inventoried and expenses and just debts, if any, have been paid and the legal
services of herein counsel committing to pay P200,000.00 as and attorney's fees heirs of the deceased fully determined, that the said estate of TROADIO
plus honorarium of P2,500.00 per appearance in court xxx.13 MANALO be settled and distributed among the legal heirs all in accordance with
law.
Consequently, according to herein petitioners, the same should be dismissed under Rule
16, Section 1(j) of the Revised Rules of Court which provides that a motion to dismiss a c. That the litigation expenses of these proceedings in the amount of
complaint may be filed on the ground that a condition precedent for filling the claim has P250,000.00 and attorney's fees in the amount of P300,000.00 plus honorarium
not been complied with, that is, that the petitioners therein failed to aver in the petition in of P2,500.00 per appearance in court in the hearing and trial of this case and
SP. PROC. No. 92-63626, that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made costs of suit be taxed solely against ANTONIO MANALO.18
involving members of the same family prior to the filling of the petition pursuant to Article
222 14 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Concededly, the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 contains certain averments which
may be typical of an ordinary civil action. Herein petitioners, as oppositors therein, took
The instant petition is not impressed with merit. advantage of the said defect in the petition and filed their so-called Opposition thereto
which, as observed by the trial court, is actually an Answer containing admissions and
It is a fundamental rule that in the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, denials, special and affirmative defenses and compulsory counterclaims for actual, moral
the averments15 and the character of the relief sought 16 in the complaint, or petition, as in and exemplary damages, plus attorney's fees and costs 19 in an apparent effort to make
the case at bar, shall be controlling. A careful srutiny of the Petition for Issuance of out a case of an ordinary civil action and ultimately seek its dismissal under Rule 16,
Letters of Administration, Settlement and Distribution of Estatein SP. PROC. No. 92- Section 1(j) of the Rules of Court vis-à-vis, Article 222 of civil of the Civil Code.
63626 belies herein petitioners' claim that the same is in the nature of an ordinary civil
action. The said petition contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required in a petition for the It is our view that herein petitioners may not be allowed to defeat the purpose of the
settlement of estate of a deceased person such as the fat of death of the late Troadio essentially valid petition for the settlement of the estate of the late Troadio Manalo by
Manalo on February 14, 1992, as well as his residence in the City of Manila at the time of raising matters that as irrelevant and immaterial to the said petition. It must be
his said death. The fact of death of the decedent and of his residence within he country emphasized that the trial court, siting as a probate court, has limited and special
are foundation facts upon which all the subsequent proceedings in the administration of jurisdiction 20 and cannot hear and dispose of collateral matters and issues which may be
the estate rest.17 The petition is SP.PROC No. 92-63626 also contains an enumeration of properly threshed out only in an ordinary civil action. In addition, the rule has always
the names of his legal heirs including a tentative list of the properties left by the been to the effect that the jurisdiction of a court, as well as the concomitant nature of an
deceased which are sought to be settled in the probate proceedings. In addition, the action, is determined by the averments in the complaint and not by the defenses
relief's prayed for in the said petition leave no room for doubt as regard the intention of contained in the answer. If it were otherwise, it would not be too difficult to have a case
the petitioners therein (private respondents herein) to seek judicial settlement of the either thrown out of court or its proceedings unduly delayed by simple strategem.21 So it
estate of their deceased father, Troadio Manalo, to wit; should be in the instant petition for settlement of estate.
PRAYER
Herein petitioners argue that even if the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 were to be of Estate in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 is a special proceeding and, as such, it is a
considered as a special proceeding for the settlement of estate of a deceased person, remedy whereby the petitioners therein seek to establish a status, a right, or a particular
Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Rules of Court vis-à-vis Article 222 of the Civil Code of the fact. 26 the petitioners therein (private respondents herein) merely seek to establish the fat
Philippines would nevertheless apply as a ground for the dismissal of the same by virtue of death of their father and subsequently to be duly recognized as among the heirs of the
of ule 1, Section 2 of the Rules of Court which provides that the 'rules shall be liberally said deceased so that they can validly exercise their right to participate in the settlement
construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, and liquidation of the estate of the decedent consistent with the limited and special
speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and proceedings.' Petitioners jurisdiction of the probate court.
1âw phi 1.nêt
contend that the term "proceeding" is so broad that it must necessarily include special
proceedings. WHEREFORE, the petition in the above-entitled case, is DENIED for lack of merit, Costs
against petitioners.
The argument is misplaced. Herein petitioners may not validly take refuge under the
provisions of Rule 1, Section 2, of the Rules of Court to justify the invocation of Article SO ORDERED.
222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines for the dismissal of the petition for settlement of
the estate of the deceased Troadio Manalo inasmuch as the latter provision is clear DIGEST: VDA. DE MANALO VS. CA
enough. To wit:
Doctrines:
Art. 222. No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless  It is a fundamental rule that, in the determination of the nature of an action or
it should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the proceeding, the averments and the character of the relief sought in the complaint,
same have failed, subject to the limitations in Article 2035(underscoring supplied).22 or petition, as in the case at bar, shall be controlling. The fact of death of the decedent
and of his residence within the country are foundation facts upon which all the
The above-quoted provision of the law is applicable only to ordinary civil actions. This is subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate rest.
clear from the term 'suit' that it refers to an action by one person or persons against  It is our view that herein petitioners may not be allowed to defeat the purpose of the
another or other in a court of justice in which the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the essentially valid petition for the settlement of the estate of the late Troadio Manalo by
law affords him for the redress of an injury or the enforcement of a right, whether at law raising matters that are irrelevant and immaterial to the said petition.
or in equity. 23 A civil action is thus an action filed in a court of justice, whereby a party
sues another for the enforcement of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
wrong.24 Besides, an excerpt form the Report of the Code Commission unmistakably
reveals the intention of the Code Commission to make that legal provision applicable
only to civil actions which are essentially adversarial and involve members of the same FACTS:
family, thus: Troadio Manalo, a resident of 1966 Maria Clara Street, Sampaloc, Maniladied
intestate on February 14, 1992. He was survived by his wife,Pilar S. Manalo, and his 11
It is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle than a litigation children, namely: Purita M. Jayme, Antonio Manalo, Milagros M. Terre, Belen M. Orillano,
between members of the same family. It is necessary that every effort should be Isabelita Manalo, Rosalina M. Acuin, Romeo Manalo, Roberto Manalo, Amalia Manalo,
made toward a compromise before litigation is allowed to breed hate and passion Orlando Manalo and Imelda Manalo, who are all of legal age.
in the family. It is know that lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper
bitterness than stranger.25 At the time of his death, Troadio left several real properties located in Manila and in
the province of Tarlac including a business under the name and style Manalo’s Machine
Shop with offices in Quezon City and in Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
It must be emphasized that the oppositors (herein petitioners) are not being sued in SP.
PROC. No. 92-63626 for any cause of action as in fact no defendant was imploded On November 26, 1992, herein respondents, who are 8 of the surviving children
therein. The Petition for issuance of letters of Administration, Settlement and Distribution
of the late Troadiofiled a petition with the respondent RTC for the judicial settlement
of the estate of their late fatherand for the appointment of their brother, Romeo Par. 8. … the said surviving son continued to manage and control the properties
Manalo, as administrator thereof. aforementioned, without proper accounting, to his own benefit and advantage…
The trial court the issued an order setting the said petition for hearing and directing Par. 12. That said ANTONIO MANALO is managing and controlling the estate of
the publication of the order for 3 consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation the deceased TROADIO MANALO to his own advantage and to the damage and
in Metro Manila, and further directing service by registered mail of the said order upon prejudice of the herein petitioners and their coheirs…
the heirs named in the petition at their respective addresses mentioned therein.
Par. 14. For the protection of their rights and interests, petitioners were compelled
On the date of hearing, the trial court issued an order “declaring the whole world in to bring this suit and were forced to litigate and incur expensesand will continue to
default, except the government,” and set the reception of evidence of the petitioners incur expenses of not less than, P250,000.00 and engaged the services of herein
therein on March 16, 1993. counsel committing to pay P200,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees plus honorarium
of P2,500.00 per appearance in court …”
However,this order of general default was set aside by the trial court upon motion
of herein petitioners(oppositors therein) who were granted 10 days within which to file Even if the petition were to be considered as a special proceeding for the
their opposition to the petition. settlement of estate of a deceased person, Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Rules of Court
vis-à-vis Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines would nevertheless apply as a
Several pleadings were subsequently filed by herein petitioners, through counsel, ground for the dismissalof the same by virtue of Rule 1, Section 2 of the Rules of Court
culminating in the filing of an Omnibus Motionseeking: (1) to set aside and reconsider which provides that the “rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their object
the Order of the trial court dated which denied the motion for additional extension of time and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every
to file opposition; (2) to set for preliminary hearing their affirmative defenses as grounds action and proceeding.” The term “proceeding” is so broad that it must necessarily
for dismissal of the case; (3) to declare that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over include special proceedings.
the persons of the oppositors; and (4) for the immediate inhibition of the presiding judge.
Ruling of Lower Courts: ISSUE: Whether the settlement of estate of late Troadio is an ordinary civil action, which
RTC dismissed Petitioners’ Omnibus Motion is adversarial in nature.
CA affirmed
HELD: NO (Special proceeding = Non-adversarial)
Contentions of the PETITIONERS: THE SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE IS A SPECIAL
CA erred in upholding the RTC’s orders, which denied their motion for the outright PROCEEDINGS (DETERMINATION/NATURE).
dismissal of the petition for judicial settlement of estate despite the failure of the
petitioners therein to aver that earnest efforts toward a compromise involving members It is a fundamental rule that, in the determination of the nature of an action or
of the same family have been made prior to the filing of the petition but that the same proceeding, the averments and the character of the relief sought in the complaint,
have failed. (pursuant to Article 222 of the Civil Code) or petition, as in the case at bar, shall be controlling.
The proceeding in the settlement of estate is actually an ordinary civil action A careful scrutiny of the Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration,
involving members of same family. The case contains averments that are indicative of Settlement and Distribution of Estate in SP. PROC. No. 92- 63626 belies petitioners’
its adversarial nature: claim that the same is in the nature of an ordinary civil action. The said petition
“Par. 7. One of the surviving sons, ANTONIO MANALO, since the death of his contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required in a petition for the settlement of estate of
father, TROADIO MANALO, had not made any settlement, judicial or extra-judicial a deceased personsuch as the fact of death of the late Troadio Manalo on February 14,
of the properties of the deceased father, TROADIO MANALO. 1992, as well as his residence in the City of Manila at the time of his said death.
The fact of death of the decedent and of his residence within the country are “SUIT” MENTIONED IN ART. 222 OF THE CIVIL CODE ONLY PERTAINS TO
foundation facts upon which all the subsequent proceedings in the administration ORDINARY ACTIONS
of the estate rest.
Herein petitioners may not validly take refuge under the provisions of Rule 1,
The petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 also contains an enumeration of the Section 2, of the Rules of Court to justify the invocation of Article 222 of the Civil Code of
names of his legal heirs including a tentative list of the properties left by the the Philippines for the dismissal of the petition for settlement of the estate of the
deceasedwhich are sought to be settled in the probate proceedings. In addition, the deceased Troadio inasmuch as the latter provision is clear enough, to wit:
reliefs prayed for in the said petition leave no room for doubt as regard the intention of
the petitioners therein (private respondents herein) to seek judicial settlement of the Art. 222. No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family
estate of their deceased father, Troadio Manalo unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made,
but that the same have failed, subject to the limitations in Article 2035 (italics
ALTHOUGH THE CASE CONAINS AVERNMENTS TYPICAL OF AN ORDINARY supplied).
ACTION, PETITIONERS CANNOT DEFEAT THE PURPOSE OF A VALID PETITION
FOR SETTLEMENT BY RAISING IRRELEVANT AND IMMATERIAL The above-quoted provision of the law is applicable only to ordinary civil
MATTERS (PROBATE COURT’S LIMITED AND SPECIAL JURISDICTION) actions. This is clear from the term “suit” that it refers to an action by one person or
persons against another or others in a court of justice in which the plaintiff pursues the
Concededly, the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 contains certain averments remedy which the law affords him for the redress of an injury or the enforcement
which may be typical of an ordinary civil action. Herein petitioners, as oppositors therein, of a right, whether at law or in equity. A civil action is thus an action filed in a court of
took advantage of the said defect in the petition and filed their so-called Opposition justice, whereby a party sues another for the enforcement of a right, or the prevention or
thereto which, as observed by the trial court, is actually an Answer containing admissions redress of a wrong. Besides, an excerpt from the Report of the Code Commission
and denials, special and affirmative defenses and compulsory counterclaims for actual, unmistakably reveals the intention of the Code Commission to make that legal provision
moral and exemplary damages, plus attorney’s fees and costs in an apparent effort to applicable only to civil actions which are essentially adversarial and involve members of
make out a case of an ordinary civil action and ultimately seek its dismissal under Rule the same family, thus:
16, Section l(j) of the Rules of Court vis-á-vis, Article 222 of the Civil Code.
It is our view that herein petitioners may not be allowed to defeat the purpose
“It is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle than a litigation
of the essentially valid petition for the settlement of the estate of the late Troadio by
between members of the same family. It is necessary that every effort
raising matters that are irrelevant and immaterial to the said petition.
should be made toward a compromise before a litigation is allowed to breed
hate and passion in the family. It is known that lawsuit between close
It must be emphasized that the trial court, sitting as a probate court, has
relatives generates deeper bitterness than strangers.
limited and special jurisdiction and cannot hear and dispose of collateral matters
and issues which may be properly threshed out only in an ordinary civil action.
CASE AS SPECIAL PROCEEDING => ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACT OF
In addition, the rule has always been to the effect that the jurisdiction of a court, as DEATH, STATUS AS HEIRS OF SAID DECEASED, and RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE IN
well as the concomitant nature of an action, is determined by the averments in the THE SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE
complaint and not by the defenses contained in the answer. If it were otherwise, it would
not be too difficult to have a case either thrown out of court or its proceedings unduly It must be emphasized that the oppositors (herein petitioners) are not being
delayed by simple stratagem. So it should be in the instant petition for settlement of sued in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626for any cause of action as in fact no defendant was
estate. impleaded The Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration, Settlement and
Distribution of Estate in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 is a special proceeding and, as such, it
is a remedy whereby the petitioners therein seek to establish a status, a right, or a of Court. Upon the presentation of the said testimony and the above manifestation of
particular fact. counsel for petitioner, the court entered an order that same date, August 29, 1952,
appointing Eulogio Eusebio administrator of the estate of the deceased. Thereafter the
The petitioners therein (private respondents herein) merely seek to establish following proceedings for the settlement of the estate took place in rapid succession: (1)
the fact of death of their father and subsequently to be duly recognized as among September 3, 1952, oath of administrator and filing of bond by him; (2) September 5,
the heirs of the said deceased so that they can validly exercise their right to 1952, issuance of letters of administration; (3) September 6, 1952, notice issued by Clerk
participate in the settlement and liquidation of the estate of the decedent consistent of Court to creditors to file their claims; (4) November 29, 1952, inventory filed by
with the limited and special jurisdiction of the probate court. administrator; (5) March 6, 1953, supplemental inventory filed by the administrator; (6)
March 17, 1953, final accounts presented by administrator; (7) March 17, 1953, project of
partition filed by the administrator; (8) March 23, 1953, opposition of Domingo Valmores;
In the matter of the intestate estate of the deceased Rosalia Saquitan. EULOGIO S. and (11) November 23, 1953, approval of accounting and project of partition.
EUSEBIO
vs. On March 23, 1953 the surviving spouse Domingo Valmores presented an opposition
DOMINGO VALMORES dated March 20, 1953, impugning the appointment of Eulogio Eusebio as administrator
JACINTA SISCAR, widow of deceased on the ground that he is a stranger to the family and to himself, and praying that he be
G.R. No. L-7019 appointed administrator of the properties of the deceased, and that the case be set for
May 31, 1955 hearing so that he can present his evidence. On April 4, 1953 he presented an amended
opposition, alleging that Rosalia Saquitan had died more than two years before, that he
LABRADOR, J.: had been administering the properties of her deceased wife, that he is now the owner
and possessor of the properties in question, which was valued at P45,914. The
On July 31, 1952, the above-entitled proceedings were instituted in the Court of First opposition must have been denied because on April 29, 1953 counsel for Domingo
Instance of Rizal, upon petition of Francisco Valmores, who claims to be the adopted son Valmores filed a motion for reconsideration. Opposition to this motion for reconsideration
of the spouses Domingo Valmores and Rosalia Saquitan. The petition alleges that was filed by counsel for the administrator, and this was sustained on May 14, 1953.
Rosalia Saquitan died in Pasig, Rizal on October 1, 1950, without leaving any decendant Thereupon, counsel for Domingo Valmores presented an "Excepcion" and filed a Record
or ascendant; that the nearest relatives of said decedent are the husband, Domingo of Appeal, and asked that the case be certified to this court.
Valmores, and the petitioner Francisco Valmores; and that the surviving spouse
Domingo Valmores is more than 80 years of age and physically unfit to discharge the The oppositor-appellant has filed a brief and the first assignment of error made therein is
duties of administrator, so the petitioner recommends the appointment of Eulogio that the trial court deprived him of the right to present evidence to support his allegations,
Eusebio as administrator. On the same day of the presentation of the petition, the Clerk in violation of Sections 1, 3, 5 and 6 of Rule 80 of the Rules of Court. In the second
of court issued a notice setting a date (August 29, 1952) for the hearing of the petition assignment, it is claimed that the trial court erred in appointing a stranger as
and ordering the publication of the notice in the newspaper "La Opinion." On the day set administrator of the properties for the reason that the person to be appointed should be
for the hearing, no one appeared except counsel for the petitioner Francisco Valmores. her surviving spouse. The administrator-appellee has also filed a brief.
Francisco Valmores himself did not appear. Counsel for the petitioner proved the
publication of the notice of hearing and, afterwards, presented his witness, one by the Since the pendency of the case before this Court, the following events have happened:
name of Raymundo Delmindo, who declared that he is the brother of Francisco Valmores Domingo Valmores died on May 13, 1954. (According to the certificate of death, he was
that his brother had been adopted by the spouses Domingo Valmores and Rosalia 85 years old at the time of his death. It appears that the said oppositor was married for
Saquitan, that Rosalia Saquitan did not leave any will, that her nearest relative is her the second time to Jacinta Siscar on January 6, 1952). Upon being notified of the death
surviving husband who is 80 years of age and incapable of administering the estate. of Domingo Valmores, this Court ordered the widow substituted for the deceased
Counsel for petitioner also explained to the court that on June 23, 1952 the surviving appellant. This Court also granted the request of Atty. A. G. Gavieres to be separated as
spouse Domingo Valmores had filed an affidavit adjudicating to himself all the estate left counsel for the deceased Domingo Valmores. On July 23, 1954 Atty. Vicente Francisco
by the deceased wife, evidently under the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules entered his appearance for the widow, Jacinta Siscar, who was substituted for the
deceased Domingo Valmores. On permission of the Court, counsel for said Jacinta (Emphasis Ours)
Siscar filed a memorandum with the following annexes; Annex A and A-1, an order of the
court finding Atty. A. G. Gavieres to be physically unfit to handle the defense in civil case The evidence submitted in the hearing does not satisfactorily prove that the petitioner
No. 2103, Lati vs. Gavieres, et al. because of age; Annex B, the affidavit of adjudication was legally adopted; hence, he did not have any interest in the properties of the
of Domingo Valmores; Annex C, transcript of the stenographic notes during the trial and deceased Rosalia Saquitan. Under ordinary circumstances, such defect would authorize
hearing of the petition for the appointment of administrator; and Annex D, certification of the dismissal of the proceedings especially in view of the fact that the surviving spouse of
the Local Civil Registrar of Pasig, Rizal to the effect that there is no record of adoption of Rosalia Saguitan had filed an affidavit of adjudication under the provisions of Section 1 of
one Francisco Valmores by Domingo Valmores. Rule 74 of the Rules. Counsel for Domingo Valmores, however, had not objected to the
application for the appointment of an administrator; he only objected to the appointment
On January 26, 1955 Maximo Saquitan filed a petition in this Court, alleging that he is a of the said stranger Eulogio Eusebio as administrator, claiming to have the right as
nephew of the deceased Rosalia Saquitan and is her nearest heir; that the real name of surviving spouse to be appointed as such administrator. By this act of Doming Valmores,
Francisco Valmores, who filed the petition, is Francisco Delmindo; that Francisco surviving spouse of the deceased, therefore, the fatal defect in the petition may be
Delmindo changed his name and surreptitiously filed the petition for administration; that considered, as cured. In other words, the filing of the petition for the appointment of an
movant is the only nephew of Rosalia Saquitan and is the heir at law of the latter and administrator may be considered as having been ratified by the surviving husband,
Delmindo knew these facts; that despite said knowledge, Francisco Delmindo failed to Domingo Valmores, and for this reason the proceedings may not be dismissed.
give notice to him of the proceedings as required by the Rules; and that the newspaper
La Opinion is not a newspaper of general circulation in the province of Rizal (supporting A study of the records also discloses fatal irregularities in the notice required to be given.
said allegation with an affidavit of two newspaper agents of Pasig, Rizal). He, therefore, Thus nowhere does it appear from the record that Domingo Valmores was ever
prayed that the proceedings in the Court of First Instance, be set aside and the petition personally notified of the filing of the petition or of the time and place for hearing the
be reinstated for a trial de novo, and that the records be remanded to the court of origin same. His first opposition shows that he was not aware of the hearing at all. He was
for said purpose. notified of the proceedings for the first time when the inventory was sent him on
November 29, 1952. Section 3 of Rule 80 of the Rules of Court provides:
A careful perusal of the records of the case discloses the following irregularities: The
person who filed the original petition, whose real name appears to be Francisco When a petition for letters of administration is filed in the court having jurisdiction,
Delmindo, never appeared in court to prove the supposed adoption of him by the such court shall fix a time and place for hearing the petition, and shall
spouses Rosalia Saquitan and Domingo Valmores. The supposed adoption was also cause notice thereof to be given to the known heirs and creditors of the decedent
only testified to by the brother and no competent evidence thereof was presented as and to any other persons believed to have an interest in the estate, in the manner
required by law (Sec. 41, Rule 123, Rules of Court). If adoption was legally made, the provided in sections 3 and 4 of Rule 77. (Emphasis supplied.)
records thereof should have existed in the Court of First Instance. No such record were
presented at the hearing, or subsequent thereto. Neither was evidence submitted to The known heir in this case was Domingo Valmores and notice should have been given
prove that the records of the adoption proceedings were lost or destroyed. On the other him in accordance with Section 3 and 4 of Rule 77. Section 4 of Rule 77 specially
hand, there is the certification of the Local Civil Registrar to the effect that there is no provides:
record of adoption of Francisco Valmores by Domingo Valmores. These circumstances
engender the belief in our minds that the person who instituted the petition, Francisco
The Court shall also cause copies of the notice of the time and place fixed for
Delmindo, was not at all adopted by the deceased Rosalia Saquitan, or had any interest
proving the will to be addressed to the known heirs, legatees and devisees of the
in her properties. Section 2 of Rule 80 of the Rules of Court provides as follows:
testator resident in the Philippines at their place of residence, and deposited in
the post office with the postage prepaid at least twenty days before the hearing, if
A petition for letters of administration must be filed by an interested person and such places of residence be known.
must show, so far as known to the petitioner:
. . ..Personal service of copied of the notice at least ten days before the day of DIGEST: EUSEBIO VS. VALMORES
hearing shall be equivalent to mailing.
FACTS:
Section 5 of the same rule also requires: On July 31, 1952, the above-entitled proceedings were instituted in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, upon petition of Francisco Valmores, who claims to be the
At the hearing compliance with the provisions of the last two preceding sections adopted son of the spouses Domingo Valmores and RosaliaSaquitan. The petition
must be shown before the introduction of testimony in support of the will. All such alleges that RosaliaSaquitan died in Pasig, Rizal on October 1, 1950, without leaving any
testimony shall be taken under oath and reduced to writing. decendant or ascendant; that the nearest relatives of said decedent are the husband,
Domingo Valmores, and the petitioner Francisco Valmores; and that the surviving
spouse Domingo Valmores is more than 80 years of age and physically unfit to discharge
The records of the hearing do not show that the notices as above required had been
the duties of administrator, so the petitioner recommends the appointment of
given to Domingo Valmores or Maximo Saquitan.
EulogioEusebio as administrator. On the same day of the presentation of the petition,
the Clerk of court issued a notice setting a date (August 29, 1952) for the hearing of the
We, therefore, find that the error imputed to the trial court in oppositor-appellant's brief petition and ordering the publication of the notice in the newspaper "La Opinion." On the
that the court has failed to comply with the provisions of Section 3 and 5 of Rule 80 had day set for the hearing, no one appeared except counsel for the petitioner Francisco
not been complied with, was actually committed. The requirement as to notice is Valmores. Francisco Valmores himself did not appear. Counsel for the petitioner proved
essential to the validity of the proceedings in order that no person may be deprived of his the publication of the notice of hearing and, afterwards, presented his witness, one by
right or property without due process of law. The absence of notice to heirs becomes the the name of RaymundoDelmindo, who declared that he is the brother of Francisco
more apparent in the case at bar, where evidently a stranger has been able to railroad Valmores that his brother had been adopted by the spouses Domingo Valmores and
the proceedings in court without opportunity of the person most interested in the estate of RosaliaSaquitan, that RosaliaSaquitan did not leave any will, that her nearest relative is
the deceased to appear and contest in due time the right of the petitioner or the her surviving husband who is 80 years of age and incapable of administering the estate.
appointment of the person recommended as administrator. In a way, the failure of Thereafter the following proceedings for the settlement of the estate took place in rapid
Domingo Valmores to receive better treatment at the hands of the court a quo may be succession.
attributed to the unfortunate condition of the lawyer to whom he had entrusted the
defense of his rights. (Atty. A. G. Gavieres, who represented Domingo Valmores, had On March 23, 1953 the surviving spouse Domingo Valmores presented an
been found to be too old and thus unfit to handle a civil case [Annexes A and A-1 opposition dated March 20, 1953, impugning the appointment of EulogioEusebio as
attached to the Memorandum of counsel for Jacinta Siscar]). On the other hand, the administrator on the ground that he is a stranger to the family and to himself, and praying
failure on the part of the trial judge to exercise care in the consideration of the evidence that he be appointed administrator of the properties of the deceased, and that the case
adduced at the hearing and in following the procedure outlined by the rules had be set for hearing so that he can present his evidence. On April 4, 1953 he presented an
contributed to the irregularities. Perhaps, also counsel for the appellee had taken amended opposition, alleging that RosaliaSaquitan had died more than two years before,
advantage of the carelessness of the court and the incompetence of adverse counsel to that he had been administering the properties of her deceased wife, that he is now the
bring these proceedings to a stage where real heirs or persons in interest have been owner and possessor of the properties in question, which was valued at P45,914. Since
deprived of their rights. Be it as it may, there is still time to correct the errors committed the pendency of the case before this Court, the following events have happened:
and right the wrongs and injustices caused to the parties legally entitled to the estate. Domingo Valmores died on May 13, 1954. (According to the certificate of death, he was
85 years old at the time of his death. It appears that the said oppositor was married for
After consideration of the circumstances as above set forth, the Court finds that all the the second time to Jacinta Siscar on January 6, 1952). Upon being notified of the death
proceedings subsequent to the petition are void and should be, as they hereby are, of Domingo Valmores, this Court ordered the widow substituted for the deceased
annulled, and it is ordered that the case be remanded to the court of origin for the appellant.
hearing of the original petition together with the opposition thereto of Domingo Valmores,
with previous notice to all parties interest, including the widow of Domingo Valmores and ISSUES:
Maximo Saquitan, as required by the Rules. Without cost.
1. Whether the petitioner can be designated as the administrator of the estate of the
deceased. The records of the hearing do not show that the notices as above required had
2. Whether the notice to the persons having an interest in the properties of the been given to Domingo Valmores or Maximo Saquitan.
deceased can be dispense with.
We, therefore, find that the error imputed to the trial court in oppositor-appellant's
HELD: brief that the court has failed to comply with the provisions of Section 3 and 5 of Rule 80
The evidence submitted in the hearing does not satisfactorily prove that the had not been complied with, was actually committed. The requirement as to notice is
petitioner was legally adopted; hence, he did not have any interest in the properties of essential to the validity of the proceedings in order that no person may be deprived of his
the deceased Rosalia Saquitan. right or property without due process of law. The absence of notice to heirs becomes the
more apparent in the case at bar, where evidently a stranger has been able to railroad
A study of the records also discloses fatal irregularities in the notice required to be the proceedings in court without opportunity of the person most interested in the estate of
given. Thus nowhere does it appear from the record that Domingo Valmores was ever the deceased to appear and contest in due time the right of the petitioner or the
personally notified of the filing of the petition or of the time and place for hearing the appointment of the person recommended as administrator.
same. His first opposition shows that he was not aware of the hearing at all. He was
notified of the proceedings for the first time when the inventory was sent him on
November 29, 1952. Section 3 of Rule 80 of the Rules of Court provides: CYNTHIA C. ALABAN, FRANCIS COLLADO, JOSE P. COLLADO, JUDITH PROVIDO,
CLARITA PROVIDO, ALFREDO PROVIDO, MANUEL PROVIDO, JR., LORNA DINA E.
When a petition for letters of administration is filed in the court having jurisdiction, PROVIDO, SEVERO ARENGA, JR., SERGIO ARENGA, EDUARDO ARENGA, CAROL
such court shall fix a time and place for hearing the petition, and shall causenotice ARENGA, RUTH BABASA, NORMA HIJASTRO, DOLORES M. FLORES, ANTONIO
thereof to be given to the known heirs and creditors of the decedent and to any other MARIN, JR., JOSE MARIN, SR., and MATHILDE MARIN
persons believed to have an interest in the estate, in the manner provided in sections 3 VS. CA and FRANCISCO H. PROVIDO
and 4 of Rule 77. (Emphasis supplied.) G.R. NO. 156021
SEPTEMBER 23, 2005
The known heir in this case was Domingo Valmores and notice should have been
given him in accordance with Section 3 and 4 of Rule 77. Section 4 of Rule 77 specially DECISION
provides: Tinga, J.:
The Court shall also cause copies of the notice of the time and place fixed for This is a petition for review of the Resolutions1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
proving the will to be addressed to the known heirs, legatees and devisees of the testator SP No. 69221,2 dismissing petitioners’ petition for annulment of judgment.
resident in the Philippines at their place of residence, and deposited in the post office
with the postage prepaid at least twenty days before the hearing, if such places of On 8 November 2000, respondent Francisco Provido (respondent) filed a petition,
residence be known. docketed as SP Proc. No. 00-135, for the probate of the Last Will and Testament3 of the
. . ..Personal service of copied of the notice at least ten days before the day of late Soledad Provido Elevencionado ("decedent"), who died on 26 October 2000 in
hearing shall be equivalent to mailing. Janiuay, Iloilo.4 Respondent alleged that he was the heir of the decedent and the
executor of her will. On 30 May 2001, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 68, in P.D.
Section 5 of the same rule also requires: Monfort North, Dumangas, Iloilo, rendered its Decision,5 allowing the probate of the will of
the decedent and directing the issuance of letters testamentary to respondent.6
At the hearing compliance with the provisions of the last two preceding
sections must be shown before the introduction of testimony in support of
More than four (4) months later, or on 4 October 2001, herein petitioners filed a motion
the will. All such testimony shall be taken under oath and reduced to
for the reopening of the probate proceedings.7 Likewise, they filed an opposition to the
writing.
allowance of the will of the decedent, as well as the issuance of letters testamentary to
respondent,8 claiming that they are the intestate heirs of the decedent. Petitioners petition for relief from judgment in the RTC, the CA added.18 Petitioners sought
claimed that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition due to non-payment of reconsideration of the Resolution, but the same was denied by the CA for lack of merit.19
the correct docket fees, defective publication, and lack of notice to the other heirs.
Moreover, they alleged that the will could not have been probated because: (1) the Petitioners now come to this Court, asserting that the CA committed grave abuse of
signature of the decedent was forged; (2) the will was not executed in accordance with discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it dismissed their petition for the alleged
law, that is, the witnesses failed to sign below the attestation clause; (3) the decedent failure to show that they have not availed of or resorted to the remedies of new trial,
lacked testamentary capacity to execute and publish a will; (4) the will was executed by appeal, petition for relief from judgment or other remedies through no fault of their own,
force and under duress and improper pressure; (5) the decedent had no intention to and held that petitioners were not denied their day in court during the proceedings before
make a will at the time of affixing of her signature; and (6) she did not know the the RTC.20 In addition, they assert that this Court has yet to decide a case involving Rule
properties to be disposed of, having included in the will properties which no longer 47 of the Rules of Court and, therefore, the instant petition should be given due course
belonged to her. Petitioners prayed that the letters testamentary issued to respondent be for the guidance of the bench and bar.21
withdrawn and the estate of the decedent disposed of under intestate succession.9
For his part, respondent claims that petitioners were in a position to avail of the remedies
On 11 January 2002, the RTC issued an Order10 denying petitioners’ motion for being provided in Rules 37 and 38, as they in fact did when they filed a motion for new
unmeritorious. Resolving the issue of jurisdiction, the RTC held that petitioners were trial.22 Moreover, they could have resorted to a petition for relief from judgment since they
deemed notified of the hearing by publication and that the deficiency in the payment of learned of the RTC’s judgment only three and a half months after its
docket fees is not a ground for the outright dismissal of the petition. It merely required promulgation.23 Respondent likewise maintains that no extrinsic fraud exists to warrant
respondent to pay the deficiency.11 Moreover, the RTC’s Decision was already final and the annulment of the RTC’s Decision, since there was no showing that they were denied
executory even before petitioners’ filing of the motion to reopen.12 their day in court. Petitioners were not made parties to the probate proceedings because
the decedent did not institute them as her heirs.24 Besides, assuming arguendo that
Petitioners thereafter filed a petition13 with an application for preliminary injunction with petitioners are heirs of the decedent, lack of notice to them is not a fatal defect since
the CA, seeking the annulment of the RTC’s Decision dated 30 May 2001 personal notice upon the heirs is a matter of procedural convenience and not a
and Order dated 11 January 2002. They claimed that after the death of the decedent, jurisdictional requisite.25 Finally, respondent charges petitioners of forum–shopping, since
petitioners, together with respondent, held several conferences to discuss the matter of the latter have a pending suit involving the same issues as those in SP No. 00-135, that
dividing the estate of the decedent, with respondent agreeing to a one-sixth (1/6) portion is SP No. 118126 filed before Branch 23, RTC of General Santos City and subsequently
as his share. Petitioners allegedly drafted a compromise agreement to implement the pending on appeal before the CA in CA-G.R. No.74924.27
division of the estate. Despite receipt of the agreement, respondent refused to sign and
return the same. Petitioners opined that respondent feigned interest in participating in the It appears that one of the petitioners herein, Dolores M. Flores ("Flores"), who is a niece
compromise agreement so that they would not suspect his intention to secure the of the decedent, filed a petition for letters of administration with the RTC of General
probate of the will.14 They claimed that they learnt of the probate proceedings only in July Santos City, claiming that the decedent died intestate without any issue, survived by five
of 2001, as a result of which they filed their motion to reopen the proceedings and admit groups of collateral heirs. Flores, armed with a Special Power of Attorney from most of
their opposition to the probate of the will only on 4 October 2001. They argued that the the other petitioners, prayed for her appointment as administratrix of the estate of the
RTC Decision should be annulled and set aside on the ground of extrinsic fraud and lack decedent. The RTC dismissed the petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, stating
of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC.15 that the probate court in Janiuay, Iloilo has jurisdiction since the venue for a petition for
the settlement of the estate of a decedent is the place where the decedent died. This is
In its Resolution16 promulgated on 28 February 2002, the CA dismissed the petition. It also in accordance with the rule that the first court acquiring jurisdiction shall continue
found that there was no showing that petitioners failed to avail of or resort to the ordinary hearing the case to the exclusion of other courts, the RTC added.28 On 9 January 2002,
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment, or other appropriate Flores filed a Notice of Appeal 29 and on 28 January 2002, the case was ordered
remedies through no fault of their own.17 Moreover, the CA declared as baseless forwarded to the CA.30
petitioners’ claim that the proceedings in the RTC was attended by extrinsic fraud.
Neither was there any showing that they availed of this ground in a motion for new trial or
Petitioners maintain that they were not made parties to the case in which the decision proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, such that with the corresponding
sought to be annulled was rendered and, thus, they could not have availed of the publication of the petition the court's jurisdiction extends to all persons interested in said
ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment and other will or in the settlement of the estate of the decedent.39
appropriate remedies, contrary to the ruling of the CA. They aver that respondent’s offer
of a false compromise and his failure to notify them of the probate of the will constitute Publication is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its object to bar
extrinsic fraud that necessitates the annulment of the RTC’s judgment.31 indefinitely all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right
sought to be established. It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world
The petition is devoid of merit. as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it.40 Thus,
even though petitioners were not mentioned in the petition for probate, they eventually
Section 37 of the Rules of Court allows an aggrieved party to file a motion for new trial on became parties thereto as a consequence of the publication of the notice of hearing.
the ground of fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. The same
As parties to the probate proceedings, petitioners could have validly availed of the
Rule permits the filing of a motion for reconsideration on the grounds of excessive award remedies of motion for new trial or reconsideration and petition for relief from judgment.
of damages, insufficiency of evidence to justify the decision or final order, or that the In fact, petitioners filed a motion to reopen, which is essentially a motion for new trial,
decision or final order is contrary to law.32 Both motions should be filed within the period with petitioners praying for the reopening of the case and the setting of further
for taking an appeal, or fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order. proceedings. However, the motion was denied for having been filed out of time, long
after the Decision became final and executory.
Meanwhile, a petition for relief from judgment under Section 3 of Rule 38 is resorted to
when a judgment or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken, Conceding that petitioners became aware of the Decision after it had become final, they
against a party in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. could have still filed a petition for relief from judgment after the denial of their motion to
Said party may file a petition in the same court and in the same case to set aside the reopen. Petitioners claim that they learned of the Decision only on 4 October 2001, or
judgment, order or proceeding. It must be filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner almost four (4) months from the time the Decision had attained finality. But they failed to
learns of the judgment and within six (6) months after entry thereof.33 avail of the remedy.
A motion for new trial or reconsideration and a petition for relief from judgment are For failure to make use without sufficient justification of the said remedies available to
remedies available only to parties in the proceedings where the assailed them, petitioners could no longer resort to a petition for annulment of judgment;
otherwise, they would benefit from their own inaction or negligence.41
judgment is rendered.34 In fact, it has been held that a person who was never a party to
the case, or even summoned to appear therein, cannot avail of a petition for relief from Even casting aside the procedural requisite, the petition for annulment of judgment must
judgment.35 still fail for failure to comply with the substantive requisites, as the appellate court ruled.
However, petitioners in this case are mistaken in asserting that they are not or have not An action for annulment of judgment is a remedy in law independent of the case where
become parties to the probate proceedings. the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered.42 The purpose of such action is to
have the final and executory judgment set aside so that there will be a renewal of
Under the Rules of Court, any executor, devisee, or legatee named in a will, or any other litigation. It is resorted to in cases where the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal,
person interested in the estate may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition petition for relief from judgment, or other appropriate remedies are no longer available
the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed.36 Notice of the time and place for through no fault of the petitioner,43 and is based on only two grounds: extrinsic fraud, and
proving the will must be published for three (3) consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of lack of jurisdiction or denial of due process.44 A person need not be a party to the
general circulation in the province,37 as well as furnished to the designated or other judgment sought to be annulled, and it is only essential that he can prove his allegation
known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator.38 Thus, it has been held that a
that the judgment was obtained by the use of fraud and collusion and he would be well as in the appealed case before the CA, are the same. Both cases deal with the
adversely affected thereby.45 existence and validity of the alleged will of the decedent, with petitioners anchoring their
cause on the state of intestacy. In the probate proceedings, petitioners’ position has
An action to annul a final judgment on the ground of fraud lies only if the fraud is extrinsic always been that the decedent left no will and if she did, the will does not comply with the
or collateral in character.46 Fraud is regarded as extrinsic where it prevents a party from requisites of a valid will. Indeed, that position is the bedrock of their present petition. Of
having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or where it operates upon course, respondent maintains the contrary stance. On the other hand, in the petition for
matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is procured. letters of administration, petitioner Flores prayed for her appointment as administratrix of
The overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme the
of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court.47
estate on the theory that the decedent died intestate. The petition was dismissed on the
To sustain their allegation of extrinsic fraud, petitioners assert that as a result of ground of lack of jurisdiction, and it is this order of dismissal which is the subject of
respondent’s deliberate omission or concealment of their names, ages and residences review in CA-G.R. No. 74924. Clearly, therefore, there is forum-shopping.
as the other heirs of the decedent in his petition for allowance of the will, they were not
notified of the proceedings, and thus they were denied their day in court. In addition, they Moreover, petitioners failed to inform the Court of the said pending case in their
claim that respondent’s offer of a false compromise even before the filing of the petition certification against forum- shopping. Neither have they done so at any time thereafter.
prevented them from appearing and opposing the petition for probate. The Court notes that even in the petition for annulment of judgment, petitioners failed to
inform the CA of the pendency of their appeal in CA-G.R. No. 74924, even though the
The Court is not convinced. notice of appeal was filed way before the petition for annulment of judgment was
instituted.
According to the Rules, notice is required to be personally given to known heirs,
legatees, and devisees of the testator.48 A perusal of the will shows that respondent was WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioners.
instituted as the sole heir of the decedent. Petitioners, as nephews and nieces of the
decedent, are neither compulsory nor testate heirs49 who are entitled to be notified of the SO ORDERED.
probate proceedings under the Rules. Respondent had no legal obligation to mention
petitioners in the petition for probate, or to personally notify them of the same. DIGEST: ALABAN VS. CA
Besides, assuming arguendo that petitioners are entitled to be so notified, the purported FACTS:
infirmity is cured by the publication of the notice. After all, personal notice upon the heirs Respondent Francisco filed a petition, for the probate of the Last Will and
is a matter of procedural convenience and not a jurisdictional requisite.50 Testament of the late Soledad, alleging that he was the heir of the decedent and the
executor of her will. The RTC rendered its Decision, allowing the probate of the will of the
The non-inclusion of petitioners’ names in the petition and the alleged failure to decedent and directing the issuance of letters testamentary to respondent. More than
personally notify them of the proceedings do not constitute extrinsic fraud. Petitioners four months later, herein petitioners filed a motion for the reopening of the probate
were not denied their day in court, as they were not prevented from participating in the proceedings.
proceedings and presenting their case before the probate court.
The RTC issued an Order denying petitioners’ motion for being unmeritorious.
One other vital point is the issue of forum-shopping against petitioners. Forum-shopping Petitioners thereafter filed a petition with an application for preliminary injunction with the
consists of filing multiple suits in different courts, either simultaneously or successively, CA, seeking the annulment of the RTC’s Decision and Order. They claimed that they
involving the same parties, to ask the courts to rule on the same or related causes and/or learnt of the probate proceedings only in July of 2001. They argued that the RTC
to grant the same or substantially same reliefs,51 on the supposition that one or the other Decision should be annulled and set aside on the ground of extrinsic fraud and lack of
court would make a favorable disposition.52 Obviously, the parties in the instant case, as
jurisdiction on the part of the RTC due to non-payment of the correct docket fees, as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it. Thus,
defective publication, and lack of notice to the other heirs. even though petitioners were not mentioned in the petition for probate, they eventually
became parties thereto as a consequence of the publication of the notice of hearing.
The CA dismissed the petition. As parties to the probate proceedings, petitioners could have validly availed of the
remedies of motion for new trial or reconsideration and petition for relief from judgment.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA for lack of merit. In fact, petitioners filed a motion to reopen, which is essentially a motion for new trial,
Hence, this recourse. with petitioners praying for the reopening of the case and the setting of further
proceedings. However, the motion was denied for having been filed out of time, long
after the Decision became final and executory.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction when it dismissed their petition for the alleged failure to show that they have Conceding that petitioners became aware of the Decision after it had become final,
not availed of or resorted to the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from they could have still filed a petition for relief from judgment after the denial of their motion
judgment or other remedies through no fault of their own. to reopen.
For failure to make use without sufficient justification of the said remedies available
HELD: to them, petitioners could no longer resort to a petition for annulment of judgment;
NO. The petition is devoid of merit. otherwise, they would benefit from their own inaction or negligence.
Section 37 of the Rules of Court allows an aggrieved party to file a motion for new
trial on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. The same Rule In the Matter of the Petition to Approve the Will of Leodegaria Julian. FELIX
permits the filing of a motion for reconsideration on the grounds of excessive award of BALANAY, JR.
damages, insufficiency of evidence to justify the decision or final order, or that the VS. HON. ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao,
decision or final order is contrary to law. Branch VI; AVELINA B. ANTONIO and DELIA B. LANABAN
G.R. No. L-39247
Meanwhile, a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 is resorted to when a June 27, 1975
judgment or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken, against a
party in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. AQUINO, J.:
However, petitioners in this case are mistaken in asserting that they are not or have not Felix Balanay, Jr. appealed by certiorari from the order of the Court of First Instance of
become parties to the probate proceedings. Davao dated February 28, 1974, declaring illegal and void the will of his mother,
Leodegaria Julian, converting the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding and
In a petition for allowance of a will, notice of the time and place for proving the will ordering the issuance of the corresponding notice to creditors (Special Case No. 1808).
must be published for three consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of general circulation in
the province, as well as furnished to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and The antecedents of the appeal are as follows:
devisees of the testator.
Leodegaria Julian, a native of Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur, died on February 12, 1973 in Davao
Thus, it has been held that a proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, City at the age of sixty-seven. She was survived by her husband, Felix Balanay, Sr., and
such that with the corresponding publication of the petition the court’s jurisdiction extends by their six legitimate children named Felix Balanay, Jr., Avelina B. Antonio, Beatriz B.
to all persons interested in said will or in the settlement of the estate of the decedent. Solamo, Carolina B. Manguiob, Delia B. Lanaban and Emilia B. Pabaonon.
Publication is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its object to bar
indefinitely all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right Felix J. Balanay, Jr. filed in the lower court a petition dated February 27, 1973 for the
sought to be established. It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world probate of his mother's notarial will dated September 5, 1970 which is written in English.
In that will Leodegaria Julian declared (a) that she was the owner of the "southern half of In the meanwhile, another lawyer appeared in the case. David O. Montaña, Sr., claiming
nine conjugal lots (par. II); (b) that she was the absolute owner of two parcels of land to be the lawyer of petitioner Felix Balanay, Jr. (his counsel of record was Atty.
which she inherited from her father (par. III), and (c) that it was her desire that her Cabreros), filed a motion dated September 25, 1973 for "leave of court to withdraw
properties should not be divided among her heirs during her husband's lifetime and that probate of alleged will of Leodegaria Julian and requesting authority to proceed by
their legitimes should be satisfied out of the fruits of her properties (Par. IV). intestate estate proceeding." In that motion Montaña claimed to be the lawyer not only of
the petitioner but also of Felix Balanay, Sr., Beatriz B. Solamo, Carolina B. Manguiob
Then, in paragraph V of the will she stated that after her husband's death (he was eighty- and Emilia B. Pabaonon.
two years old in 1973) her paraphernal lands and all the conjugal lands (which she
described as "my properties") should be divided and distributed in the manner set forth in Montaña in his motion assailed the provision of the will which partitioned the conjugal
that part of her will. She devised and partitioned the conjugal lands as if they were all assets or allegedly effected a compromise of future legitimes. He prayed that the probate
owned by her. She disposed of in the will her husband's one half share of the conjugal of the will be withdrawn and that the proceeding be converted into an intestate
assets. * proceeding. In another motion of the same date he asked that the corresponding notice
to creditors be issued.
Felix Balanay, Sr. and Avelina B. Antonio opposed the probate of the will on the grounds
of lack of testamentary capacity, undue influence, preterition of the husband and alleged Avelina B. Antonio and Delia B. Lanaban, through Atty. Jose B. Guyo, in their comments
improper partition of the conjugal estate. The oppositors claimed that Felix Balanay, Jr. dated October 15, 1973 manifested their conformity with the motion for the issuance of a
should collate certain properties which he had received from the testatrix. notice to creditors. They prayed that the will be declared void for being contrary to law
and that an intestacy be declared.
Felix Balanay, Jr., in his reply to the opposition, attached thereto an affidavit of Felix
Balanay, Sr. dated April 18, 1973 wherein he withdrew his opposition to the probate of
The lower court, acting on the motions of Atty. Montaña, assumed that the issuance of a
the will and affirmed that he was interested in its probate. On the same date Felix
notice to creditors was in order since the parties had agreed on that point. It adopted the
Balanay, Sr. signed an instrument captioned "Conformation (sic) of Division and
view of Attys. Montaña and Guyo that the will was void. So, in its order of February 28,
Renunciation of Hereditary Rights" wherein he manifested that out of respect for his
1974 it dismissed the petition for the probate, converted the testate proceeding into an
wife's will he "waived and renounced' his hereditary rights in her estate in favor of their
intestate proceeding, ordered the issuance of a notice to creditors and set the intestate
six children. In that same instrument he confirmed the agreement, which he and his wife
proceeding for hearing on April 1 and 2, 1974. The lower court did not abrogate its prior
had perfected before her death, that their conjugal properties would be partitioned in the
orders of June 18 and October 15, 1973. The notice to creditors was issued on April 1,
manner indicated in her will.
1974 and published on May 2, 9 and 16 in the Davao Star in spite of petitioner's motion
of April 17, 1974 that its publication be held in abeyance.
Avelina B. Antonio, an oppositor, in her rejoinder contended that the affidavit and
"conformation" of Felix Balanay, Sr. were void. The lower court in its order of June 18,
Felix Balanay, Jr., through a new counsel, Roberto M. Sarenas, in a verified motion
1973 "denied" the opposition and reset for hearing the probate of the will. It gave effect to
dated April 15, 1974, asked for the reconsideration of the lower court's order of February
the affidavit and conformity of Felix Balanay, Sr. In an order dated August 28, 1973 it
28, 1974 on the ground that Atty. Montaña had no authority to withdraw the petition for
appointed its branch clerk of court as special administrator of the decedent's estate.
the allowance of the will. Attached to the motion was a copy of a letter dated March 27,
1974 addressed to Atty. Montaña and signed by Felix Balanay, Jr., Beatriz V. Solamo,
Mrs. Antonio moved for the reconsideration of the lower court's order of June 18, 1973 Carolina B. Manguiob and Emilia B. Pabaonon, wherein they terminated Montaña's
on the grounds (a) that the testatrix illegally claimed that she was the owner of the services and informed him that his withdrawal of the petition for the probate of the will
southern half of the conjugal lots and (b) that she could not partition the conjugal estate was without their consent and was contrary to their repeated reminder to him that their
by allocating portions of the nine lots to her children. Felix Balanay, Jr., through his mother's will was "very sacred" to them.
counsel, Hermenegildo Cabreros, opposed that motion. The lower court denied it in its
order of October 15, 1973.
Avelina B. Antonio and Delia B. Lanaban opposed the motion for reconsideration. The The provision of the will that the properties of the testatrix should not be divided among
lower court denied the motion in its order of June 29, 1974. It clarified that it declared the her heirs during her husband's lifetime but should be kept intact and that the legitimes
will void on the basis of its own independent assessment of its provisions and not should be paid in cash is contrary to article 1080 of the Civil Code which reads:
because of Atty. Montaña's arguments.
ART. 1080. Should a person make a partition of his estate by an act inter
The basic issue is whether the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic validity of vivos, or by will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not
the will, before ruling on its allowance or formal validity, and in declaring it void. prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs.
We are of the opinion that in view of certain unusual provisions of the will, which are of A parent who, in the interest of his or her family, to keep any agricultural,
dubious legality, and because of the motion to withdraw the petition for probate (which industrial, or manufacturing enterprise intact, may avail himself of the
the lower court assumed to have been filed with the petitioner's authorization), the trial right granted him in this article, by ordering that the legitime of the other
court acted correctly in passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even before its formal children to whom the property is not assigned be paid in cash. (1056a)
validity had been established. The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on
its face it appears to be intrinsically void. Where practical considerations demand that the The testatrix in her will made a partition of the entire conjugal estate among her six
intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should children (her husband had renounced his hereditary rights and his one-half conjugal
meet the issue (Nuguid vs. Nuguid, 64 O.G. 1527, 17 SCRA 449. Compare with share). She did not assign the whole estate to one or more children as envisaged in
Sumilang vs. Ramagosa, L-23135, December 26, 1967, 21 SCRA 1369; Cacho vs. article 1080. Hence, she had no right to require that the legitimes be paid in cash. On the
Udan, L-19996, April 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 693). 1äwphï1.ñët
other hand, her estate may remain undivided only for a period of twenty years. So, the
provision that the estate should not be divided during her husband's lifetime would at
But the probate court erred in declaring, in its order of February 28, 1974 that the will most be effective only for twenty years from the date of her death unless there are
was void and in converting the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding compelling reasons for terminating the coownership (Art. 1083, Civil Code).
notwithstanding the fact that in its order of June 18, 1973 , it gave effect to the surviving
husband's conformity to the will and to his renunciation of his hereditary rights which Felix Balanay, Sr. could validly renounce his hereditary rights and his one-half share of
presumably included his one-half share of the conjugal estate. the conjugal partnership (Arts. 179[1] and 1041, Civil Code) but insofar as said
renunciation partakes of a donation of his hereditary rights and his one-half share in the
The rule is that "the invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in a will does not conjugal estate (Art. 1060[1] Civil Code), it should be subject to the limitations prescribed
result in the invalidity of the other dispositions, unless it is to be presumed that the in articles 750 and 752 of the Civil Code. A portion of the estate should be adjudicated to
testator would not have made such other dispositions if the first invalid disposition had the widower for his support and maintenance. Or at least his legitime should be
not been made" (Art. 792, Civil Code). "Where some of the provisions of a will are valid respected.
and others invalid, the valid parts will be upheld if they can be separated from the invalid
without defeating the intention of the testator or interfering with the general testamentary Subject to the foregoing observations and the rules on collation, the will is intrinsically
scheme, or doing injustice to the beneficiaries" (95 C.J.S. 873). valid and the partition therein may be given effect if it does not prejudice the creditors
and impair the legitimes. The distribution and partition would become effective upon the
The statement of the testatrix that she owned the "southern half of the conjugal lands is death of Felix Balanay, Sr. In the meantime, the net income should be equitably divided
contrary to law because, although she was a coowner thereof, her share was inchoate among the children and the surviving spouse.
and proindiviso (Art. 143, Civil Code; Madrigal and Paterno vs. Rafferty and Concepcion,
38 Phil. 414). But That illegal declaration does not nullify the entire will. It may be It should be stressed that by reason of the surviving husband's conformity to his wife's
disregarded. will and his renunciation of his hereditary rights, his one-half conjugal share became a
part of his deceased wife's estate. His conformity had the effect of validating the partition
made in paragraph V of the will without prejudice, of course, to the rights of the creditors As aptly stated by Mr. Justice Barredo, "the very existence of a purported testament is in
and the legitimes of the compulsory heirs. itself prima facie proof that the supposed testator has willed that his estate should be
distributed in the manner therein provided, and it is incumbent upon the state that, if
Article 793 of the Civil Code provides that "property acquired after the making of a will legally tenable, such desire be given effect independent of the attitude of the parties
shall only pass thereby, as if the testator had it at the time of making the will, should it affected thereby" (Resolution, Vda. de Precilla vs. Narciso, L-27200, August 18, 1972, 46
expressly appear by the will that such was his intention". Under article 930 of the Civil SCRA 538, 565).
Code "the legacy or devise of a thing belonging to another person is void, if the testator
erroneously believed that the thing pertained to him. But if the thing bequeathed, though To give effect to the intention and wishes of the testatrix is the first and principal law in
not belonging to the testator when he made the will, afterwards becomes his, by the matter of testaments (Dizon-Rivera vs. Dizon, L-24561, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA
whatever title, the disposition shall take effect." 554, 561). Testacy is preferable to intestacy. An interpretation that will render a
testamentary disposition operative takes precedence over a construction that will nullify a
In the instant case there is no doubt that the testatrix and her husband intended to provision of the will (Arts. 788 and 791, Civil Code).
partition the conjugal estate in the manner set forth in paragraph V of her will. It is true
that she could dispose of by will only her half of the conjugal estate (Art. 170, Civil Code) Testacy is favored. Doubts are resolved in favor of testacy especially where the will
but since the husband, after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership, had assented to evinces an intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole estate.
her testamentary partition of the conjugal estate, such partition has become valid, So compelling is the principle that intestacy should be avoided and that the wishes of the
assuming that the will may be probated. testator should prevail that sometimes the language of the will can be varied for the
purpose of giving it effect (Austria vs. Reyes, L-23079, February 27, 1970, 31 SCRA 754,
The instant case is different from the Nuguid case, supra, where the testatrix instituted as 762).
heir her sister and preterited her parents. Her will was intrinsically void because it
preterited her compulsory heirs in the direct line. Article 854 of the Civil Code provides As far as is legally possible, the expressed desire of the testator must be followed and
that "the preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the dispositions of the properties in his will should be upheld (Estorque vs. Estorque, L-
the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the 19573, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 540, 546).
death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies, shall
be valid insofar as they are not inofficious." Since the preterition of the parents annulled The law has a tender regard for the wishes of the testator as expressed in his will
the institution of the sister of the testatrix and there were no legacies and devises, total because any disposition therein is better than that which the law can make (Castro vs.
intestacy resulted (.Art. 960[2], Civil Code).1äw phï1.ñët
Bustos, L-25913, February 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 327, 341).
In the instant case, the preterited heir was the surviving spouse. His preterition did not Two other errors of the lower court may be noticed. It erred in issuing a notice to
produce intestacy. Moreover, he signified his conformity to his wife's will and renounced creditors although no executor or regular administrator has been appointed. The record
his hereditary rights. . reveals that it appointed a special administrator. A notice to creditors is not in order if
only a special administrator has been appointed. Section 1, Rule 86 of the Rules of
It results that the lower court erred in not proceeding with the probate of the will as Court, in providing that "immediately after granting letters of testamentary or of
contemplated in its uncancelled order of June 18, 1973. Save in an extreme case where administration, the court shall issue a notice requiring all persons having money claims
the will on its face is intrinsically void, it is the probate court's duty to pass first upon the against the decedent to file them in the office of the clerk of said court" clearly
formal validity of the will. Generally, the probate of the will is mandatory (Art. 838, Civil contemplates the appointment of an executor or regular administrator and not that of a
Code; Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479 and 98 Phil. 249; Fernandez vs. Dimagiba, L- special administrator.
23638, October 12, 1967, 21 SCRA 428).
It is the executor or regular administrator who is supposed to oppose the claims against HELD:
the estate and to pay such claims when duly allowed (See. 10, Rule 86 and sec. 1, Rule NO.
88, Rules of Court).
The court agreed with the trial court and declared that the trial court acted correctly
We also take this occasion to point out that the probate court's appointment of its branch in passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even before its formal validity had been
clerk of court as special administrator (p. 30, Rollo) is not a salutary practice because it established. The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears
might engender the suspicion that the probate Judge and his clerk of court are in cahoots to be intrinsically void. However, the court also ruled that the probate court erred in
in milking the decedent's estate. Should the branch clerk of court commit any abuse or declaring that the will is void and in converting the testate proceeding into an intestate
devastavit in the course of his administration, the probate Judge might find it difficult to proceeding.
hold him to a strict accountability. A court employee should devote his official time to his
official duties and should not have as a sideline the administration of a decedent's estate. The Court cited the rules, "the invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in
a will does not result in the invalidity of the other dispositions, unless it is to be presumed
WHEREFORE, the lower court's orders of February 28, and June 29, 1974 are set aside that the testator would not have made such other dispositions if the first invalid
and its order of June 18, 1973, setting for hearing the petition for probate, is affirmed. disposition had not been made" (Art. 792, Civil Code). "Where some of the provisions of
The lower court is directed to conduct further proceedings in Special Case No. 1808 in a will are valid and others invalid, the valid parts will be upheld if they can be separated
consonance with this opinion. Costs, against the private respondents. from the invalid without defeating the intention of the testator or interfering with the
general testamentary scheme, or doing injustice to the beneficiaries" Testacy is favored.
Doubts are resolved in favor of testacy especially where the will evinces an intention on
SO ORDERED.
the part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole estate. So compelling is the
principle that intestacy should be avoided and that the wishes of the testator should
DIGEST: BALANAY VS. MARTINEZ prevail that sometimes the language of the will can be varied for the purpose of giving it
effect.
FACTS:
The case is about the probate of the will of Leodegaria Julian, who made
provisions in her will that after her husband's death all her paraphernal lands and all the SOFIA J. NEPOMUCENO
conjugal lands should be divided and distributed in the manner set forth in that part of her
VS. CA, RUFINA GOMEZ, OSCAR JUGO ANG, CARMELITA JUGO
will. She devised and partitioned the conjugal lands as if they were all owned by her. She
G.R. No. L-62952
disposed of in the will her husband's one half share of the conjugal assets. The private
October 9, 1985
respondent Antonio opposed the probate of the will on the grounds of lack of
GUTIERREZ , JR., J.:
testamentary capacity, undue influence, preterition of the husband and alleged improper
partition of the conjugal estate. Meanwhile, another lawyer who claims to be the counsel
for the petitoner seek to withdraw the probate of the will and convert the proceeding into This is a petition for certiorari to set aside that portion of the decision of the respondent
intestate proceeding. He assailed the provision of the will which partitioned the conjugal Court of Appeals (now intermediate Appellate Court) dated June 3, 1982, as amended by
assets or allegedly effected a compromise of future legitimes. the resolution dated August 10, 1982, declaring as null and void the devise in favor of the
petitioner and the resolution dated December 28, 1982 denying petitioner's motion for
The RTC agreed with the view of the lawyer that the will was void so it dismissed reconsideration.
the petition for probate and converted the testate proceeding into intestate.
Martin Jugo died on July 16, 1974 in Malabon, Rizal. He left a last Will and Testament
duly signed by him at the end of the Will on page three and on the left margin of pages 1,
ISSUE: Whether the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will, 2 and 4 thereof in the presence of Celestina Alejandro, Myrna C. Cortez, and Leandro
before ruling on its allowance or formal validity, and in declaring it void. Leano, who in turn, affixed their signatures below the attestation clause and on the left
margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 of the Will in the presence of the testator and of each other
and the Notary Public. The Will was acknowledged before the Notary Public Romeo until his death on July 16, 1974, the Will's admission to probate will be an Idle exercise
Escareal by the testator and his three attesting witnesses. because on the face of the Will, the invalidity of its intrinsic provisions is evident.
In the said Will, the testator named and appointed herein petitioner Sofia J. Nepomuceno The petitioner appealed to the respondent-appellate court.
as his sole and only executor of his estate. It is clearly stated in the Will that the testator
was legally married to a certain Rufina Gomez by whom he had two legitimate children, On June 2, 1982, the respondent court set aside the decision of the Court of First
Oscar and Carmelita, but since 1952, he had been estranged from his lawfully wedded Instance of Rizal denying the probate of the will. The respondent court declared the Will
wife and had been living with petitioner as husband and wife. In fact, on December 5, to be valid except that the devise in favor of the petitioner is null and void pursuant to
1952, the testator Martin Jugo and the petitioner herein, Sofia J. Nepomuceno were Article 739 in relation with Article 1028 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The
married in Victoria, Tarlac before the Justice of the Peace. The testator devised to his dispositive portion of the decision reads:
forced heirs, namely, his legal wife Rufina Gomez and his children Oscar and Carmelita
his entire estate and the free portion thereof to herein petitioner. The Will reads in part: WHEREFORE, the decision a quo is hereby set aside, the will in question declared valid
except the devise in favor of the appellant which is declared null and void. The properties
Art. III. That I have the following legal heirs, namely: my aforementioned legal wife, so devised are instead passed on in intestacy to the appellant in equal shares, without
Rufina Gomez, and our son, Oscar, and daughter Carmelita, both surnamed Jugo, whom pronouncement as to cost.
I declare and admit to be legally and properly entitled to inherit from me; that while I have
been estranged from my above-named wife for so many years, I cannot deny that I was On June 15, 1982, oppositors Rufina Gomez and her children filed a "Motion for
legally married to her or that we have been separated up to the present for reasons and Correction of Clerical Error" praying that the word "appellant" in the last sentence of the
justifications known fully well by them: dispositive portion of the decision be changed to "appellees" so as to read: "The
properties so devised are instead passed on intestacy to the appellees in equal shares,
Art. IV. That since 1952, 1 have been living, as man and wife with one Sofia J. without pronouncement as to costs." The motion was granted by the respondent court on
Nepomuceno, whom I declare and avow to be entitled to my love and affection, for all the August 10, 1982.
things which she has done for me, now and in the past; that while Sofia J. Nepomuceno
has with my full knowledge and consent, did comport and represent myself as her own On August 23, 1982, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. This was denied by
husband, in truth and in fact, as well as in the eyes of the law, I could not bind her to me the respondent court in a resolution dated December 28, 1982.
in the holy bonds of matrimony because of my aforementioned previous marriage;
The main issue raised by the petitioner is whether or not the respondent court acted in
On August 21, 1974, the petitioner filed a petition for the probate of the last Will and excess of its jurisdiction when after declaring the last Will and Testament of the
Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch deceased Martin Jugo validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the
XXXIV, Caloocan City and asked for the issuance to her of letters testamentary. testamentary provision in favor of herein petitioner.
On May 13, 1975, the legal wife of the testator, Rufina Gomez and her children filed an The petitioner submits that the validity of the testamentary provision in her favor cannot
opposition alleging inter alia that the execution of the Will was procured by undue and be passed upon and decided in the probate proceedings but in some other proceedings
improper influence on the part of the petitioner; that at the time of the execution of the because the only purpose of the probate of a Will is to establish conclusively as against
Will, the testator was already very sick and that petitioner having admitted her living in everyone that a Will was executed with the formalities required by law and that the
concubinage with the testator, she is wanting in integrity and thus, letters testamentary testator has the mental capacity to execute the same. The petitioner further contends
should not be issued to her. that even if the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 739 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines were applicable, the declaration of its nullity could only be made by the
On January 6, 1976, the lower court denied the probate of the Will on the ground that as proper court in a separate action brought by the legal wife for the specific purpose of
the testator admitted in his Will to cohabiting with the petitioner from December 1952
obtaining a declaration of the nullity of the testamentary provision in the Will in favor of xxx xxx xxx
the person with whom the testator was allegedly guilty of adultery or concubinage.
To establish conclusively as against everyone, and once for all, the facts that a will was
The respondents on the other hand contend that the fact that the last Will and Testament executed with the formalities required by law and that the testator was in a condition to
itself expressly admits indubitably on its face the meretricious relationship between the make a will, is the only purpose of the proceedings under the new code for the probate of
testator and the petitioner and the fact that petitioner herself initiated the presentation of a will. (Sec. 625). The judgment in such proceedings determines and can determine
evidence on her alleged ignorance of the true civil status of the testator, which led private nothing more. In them the court has no power to pass upon the validity of any provisions
respondents to present contrary evidence, merits the application of the doctrine made in the will. It can not decide, for example, that a certain legacy is void and another
enunciated in Nuguid v. Felix Nuguid, et al. (17 SCRA 449) and Felix Balanay, Jr. v. Hon. one valid. ... (Castaneda v. Alemany, 3 Phil. 426)
Antonio Martinez, et al. (G.R. No. L- 39247, June 27, 1975). Respondents also submit
that the admission of the testator of the illicit relationship between him and the petitioner The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the
put in issue the legality of the devise. We agree with the respondents. probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon
certain provisions of the Will.
The respondent court acted within its jurisdiction when after declaring the Will to be
validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the Will and declared the In Nuguid v. Nuguid (17 SCRA 449) cited by the trial court, the testator instituted the
devise in favor of the petitioner null and void. petitioner as universal heir and completely preterited her surviving forced heirs. A will of
this nature, no matter how valid it may appear extrinsically, would be null and void.
The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court's area of inquiry is limited to an Separate or latter proceedings to determine the intrinsic validity of the testamentary
examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the Will. The rule is expressed thus: provisions would be superfluous.
xxx xxx xxx Even before establishing the formal validity of the will, the Court in Balanay .Jr. v.
Martinez (64 SCRA 452) passed upon the validity of its intrinsic provisions.
... It is elementary that a probate decree finally and definitively settles all questions
concerning capacity of the testator and the proper execution and witnessing of his last Invoking "practical considerations", we stated:
Will and testament, irrespective of whether its provisions are valid and enforceable or
otherwise. (Fernandez v. Dimagiba, 21 SCRA 428) The basic issue is whether the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic validity of
the will, before ruling on its allowance or formal validity, and in declaring it void.
The petition below being for the probate of a Will, the court's area of inquiry is limited to
the extrinsic validity thereof. The testators testamentary capacity and the compliance We are of the opinion that in view of certain unusual provisions of the will, which are of
with the formal requisites or solemnities prescribed by law are the only questions dubious legality, and because of the motion to withdraw the petition for probate (which
presented for the resolution of the court. Any inquiry into the intrinsic validity or efficacy the lower court assumed to have been filed with the petitioner's authorization) the trial
of the provisions of the will or the legality of any devise or legacy is premature. court acted correctly in passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even before its formal
validity had been established. The probate of a will might become an Idle ceremony if on
xxx xxx xxx its face it appears to be intrinsically void. Where practical considerations demand that the
intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should
True or not, the alleged sale is no ground for the dismissal of the petition for probate. meet the issue (Nuguid v. Nuguid, 64 O.G. 1527, 17 SCRA 449. Compare with Sumilang
Probate is one thing; the validity of the testamentary provisions is another. The first vs. Ramagosa L-23135, December 26, 1967, 21 SCRA 1369; Cacho v. Udan L-19996,
decides the execution of the document and the testamentary capacity of the testator; the April 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 693).
second relates to descent and distribution (Sumilang v. Ramagosa, 21 SCRA 1369)
There appears to be no more dispute at this time over the extrinsic validity of the Will. In the case referred to in No. 1, the action for declaration of nullity may be brought by the
Both parties are agreed that the Will of Martin Jugo was executed with all the formalities spouse of the donor or donee; and the guilt of the donor and donee may be proved by
required by law and that the testator had the mental capacity to execute his Will. The preponderance of evidence in the same action.
petitioner states that she completely agrees with the respondent court when in resolving
the question of whether or not the probate court correctly denied the probate of Martin Article 1028 of the Civil Code provides:
Jugo's last Will and Testament, it ruled:
The prohibitions mentioned in Article 739, concerning donations inter vivos shall apply to
This being so, the will is declared validly drawn. (Page 4, Decision, Annex A of Petition.) testamentary provisions.
On the other hand the respondents pray for the affirmance of the Court of Appeals' In Article III of the disputed Will, executed on August 15, 1968, or almost six years before
decision in toto. the testator's death on July 16, 1974, Martin Jugo stated that respondent Rufina Gomez
was his legal wife from whom he had been estranged "for so many years." He also
The only issue, therefore, is the jurisdiction of the respondent court to declare the declared that respondents Carmelita Jugo and Oscar Jugo were his legitimate children.
testamentary provision in favor of the petitioner as null and void. In Article IV, he stated that he had been living as man and wife with the petitioner since
1952. Testator Jugo declared that the petitioner was entitled to his love and affection. He
We sustain the respondent court's jurisdiction. As stated in Nuguid v. Nuguid, (supra): stated that Nepomuceno represented Jugo as her own husband but "in truth and in fact,
as well as in the eyes of the law, I could not bind her to me in the holy bonds of
We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing will matrimony because of my aforementioned previous marriage.
be gained. On the contrary, this litigation will be protracted. And for aught that appears in
the record, in the record, in the event of probate or if the court rejects the will, probability There is no question from the records about the fact of a prior existing marriage when
exists that the case will come up once again before us on the same issue of the intrinsic Martin Jugo executed his Will. There is also no dispute that the petitioner and Mr. Jugo
validity or nullity of the will. Result, waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety. lived together in an ostensible marital relationship for 22 years until his death.
These are the practical considerations that induce us to a belief that we might as well
meet head-on the issue of the validity of the provisions of the will in question. (Section 2, It is also a fact that on December 2, 1952, Martin Jugo and Sofia J. Nepomuceno
Rule 1, Rules of Court. Case, et al. v. Jugo, et al., 77 Phil. 517, 522). After all, there contracted a marriage before the Justice of the Peace of Victoria, Tarlac. The man was
exists a justiciable controversy crying for solution. then 51 years old while the woman was 48. Nepomuceno now contends that she acted in
good faith for 22 years in the belief that she was legally married to the testator.
We see no useful purpose that would be served if we remand the nullified provision to
the proper court in a separate action for that purpose simply because, in the probate of a The records do not sustain a finding of innocence or good faith. As argued by the private
will, the court does not ordinarily look into the intrinsic validity of its provisions. respondents:
First. The last will and testament itself expressly admits indubitably on its face
Article 739 of the Civil Code provides: The following donations shall be void: the meretricious relationship between the testator and petitioner, the devisee.
(1) Those made between persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at Second. Petitioner herself initiated the presentation of evidence on her alleged
the time of the donation; ignorance of the true civil status of the testator, which led private respondents to
(2) Those made between persons found guilty of the same criminal offense, in present contrary evidence.
consideration thereof;
(3) Those made to a public officer or his wife, descendants and ascendants, by In short, the parties themselves dueled on the intrinsic validity of the legacy given in the
reason of his office. will to petitioner by the deceased testator at the start of the proceedings.
Whether or not petitioner knew that testator Martin Jugo, the man he had lived with as November 29, 1923 (Exh. 3). Petitioner married the testator only on December 5, 1952.
man and wife, as already married, was an important and specific issue brought by the There was a space of about 30 years in between. During those 30 years, could it be
parties before the trial court, and passed upon by the Court of Appeals. believed that she did not even wonder why Martin Jugo did not marry her nor contact her
anymore after November, 1923 - facts that should impel her to ask her groom before she
Instead of limiting herself to proving the extrinsic validity of the will, it was petitioner who married him in secrecy, especially so when she was already about 50 years old at the
opted to present evidence on her alleged good faith in marrying the testator. (Testimony time of marriage.
of Petitioner, TSN of August 1, 1982, pp. 56-57 and pp. 62-64).
THIRD: The fact that petitioner broke off from Martin Jugo in 1923 is by itself conclusive
Private respondents, naturally, presented evidence that would refute the testimony of demonstration that she new that the man she had openly lived for 22 years as man and
petitioner on the point. wife was a married man with already two children.
Sebastian Jugo, younger brother of the deceased testator, testified at length on the FOURTH: Having admitted that she knew the children of respondent Rufina Gomez, is it
meretricious relationship of his brother and petitioner. (TSN of August 18,1975). possible that she would not have asked Martin Jugo whether or not they were his
illegitimate or legitimate children and by whom? That is un-Filipino.
Clearly, the good faith of petitioner was by option of the parties made a decisive issue
right at the inception of the case. FIFTH: Having often gone to Pasig to the residence of the parents of the deceased
testator, is it possible that she would not have known that the mother of private
Confronted by the situation, the trial court had to make a ruling on the question. respondent Oscar Jugo and Carmelita Jugo was respondent Rufina Gomez, considering
that the houses of the parents of Martin Jugo (where he had lived for many years) and
that of respondent Rufina Gomez were just a few meters away?
When the court a quo held that the testator Martin Jugo and petitioner 'were deemed
guilty of adultery or concubinage', it was a finding that petitioner was not the innocent
woman she pretended to be. Such pretentions of petitioner Sofia Nepomuceno are unbelievable. They are, to say the
least, inherently improbable, for they are against the experience in common life and the
ordinary instincts and promptings of human nature that a woman would not bother at all
xxx xxx xxx
to ask the man she was going to marry whether or not he was already married to
another, knowing that her groom had children. It would be a story that would strain
3. If a review of the evidence must be made nonetheless, then private respondents human credulity to the limit if petitioner did not know that Martin Jugo was already a
respectfully offer the following analysis: married man in view of the irrefutable fact that it was precisely his marriage to
respondent Rufina Gomez that led petitioner to break off with the deceased during their
FIRST: The secrecy of the marriage of petitioner with the deceased testator in a town in younger years.
Tarlac where neither she nor the testator ever resided. If there was nothing to hide from,
why the concealment' ? Of course, it maybe argued that the marriage of the deceased Moreover, the prohibition in Article 739 of the Civil Code is against the making of a
with private respondent Rufina Gomez was likewise done in secrecy. But it should be donation between persons who are living in adultery or concubinage. It is
remembered that Rufina Gomez was already in the family way at that time and it would the donation which becomes void. The giver cannot give even assuming that the
seem that the parents of Martin Jugo were not in favor of the marriage so much so that recipient may receive. The very wordings of the Will invalidate the legacy because the
an action in court was brought concerning the marriage. (Testimony of Sebastian Jugo, testator admitted he was disposing the properties to a person with whom he had been
TSN of August 18, 1975, pp. 29-30) living in concubinage.
SECOND: Petitioner was a sweetheart of the deceased testator when they were still both WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of
single. That would be in 1922 as Martin Jugo married respondent Rufina Gomez on Appeals, now Intermediate Appellate Court, is AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED.
DIGEST: NEPUMOCENO VS. CA
There is no question from the records about the fact of a prior existing marriage
FACTS: when Martin Jugo executed his Will. The very wordings of the Will invalidate the legacy
Martin Jugo left a duly executed and notarized Last Will and Testament before he because the testator admitted he was disposing the properties to a person with whom he
died. Petitioner was named as sole executor. It is clearly stated in the Will that he was had been living in concubinage.
legally married to a certain Rufina Gomez by whom he had two legitimate children, but IN RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF
he had been estranged from his lawful wife. In fact, the testator Martin Jugo and the RUPERTA PALAGANAS WITH PRAYER FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL
petitioner were married despite the subsisting first marriage. The testator devised the ADMINISTRATOR, MANUEL MIGUEL PALAGANAS AND BENJAMIN GREGORIO
free portion of his estate to petitioner. On August 21, 1974, the petitioner filed a petition PALAGANAS, Petitioners, v. ERNESTO PALAGANAS, Respondent.
for probate. On May 13, 1975, Rufina Gomez and her children filed an opposition G.R. No. 169144
alleging undue and improper influence on the part of the petitioner; that at the time of the January 26, 2011
execution of the Will, the testator was already very sick and that petitioner having ABAD, J.:
admitted her living in concubinage with the testator.
This case is about the probate before Philippine court of a will executed abroad by a
The lower court denied the probate of the Will on the ground that as the testator foreigner although it has not been probated in its place of execution.
admitted in his Will to cohabiting with the petitioner. Petitioner appealed to CA. On June
2, 1982, the respondent court set aside the decision of the Court of First Instance of The Facts and the Case
Rizal denying the probate of the will. The respondent court declared the Will to be valid
except that the devise in favor of the petitioner is null and void. On November 8, 2001 Ruperta C. Palaganas (Ruperta), a Filipino who became a
naturalized United States (U.S.) citizen, died single and childless. In the last will and
testament she executed in California, she designated her brother, Sergio C. Palaganas
ISSUE: W/N the CA acted in excess of its jurisdiction when after declaring the last Will (Sergio), as the executor of her will for she had left properties in the Philippines and in
and Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the U.S.
the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provision.
On May 19, 2003 respondent Ernesto C. Palaganas (Ernesto), another brother of
HELD: Ruperta, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for the
NO. The respondent court acted within its jurisdiction when after declaring the probate of Ruperta's will and for his appointment as special administrator of her
Will to be validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the Will and estate.[1] On October 15, 2003, however, petitioners Manuel Miguel Palaganas (Manuel)
declared the devise in favor of the petitioner null and void. The general rule is that in and Benjamin Gregorio Palaganas (Benjamin), nephews of Ruperta, opposed the
probate proceedings, the court’s area of inquiry is limited to an examination and petition on the ground that Ruperta's will should not be probated in the Philippines but in
resolution of the extrinsic validity of the Will. The rule, however, is not inflexible and the U.S. where she executed it. Manuel and Benjamin added that, assuming Ruperta's
absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what will could be probated in the Philippines, it is invalid nonetheless for having been
the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the Will. executed under duress and without the testator's full understanding of the consequences
of such act. Ernesto, they claimed, is also not qualified to act as administrator of the
The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to estate.
be intrinsically void. Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of
the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue Meantime, since Ruperta's foreign-based siblings, Gloria Villaluz and Sergio, were on
(Nuguid v. Nuguid) The Will is void under Article 739. The following donations shall be separate occasions in the Philippines for a short visit, respondent Ernesto filed a motion
void: (1) Those made between persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the with the RTC for leave to take their deposition, which it granted. On April, 13, 2004 the
time of the donation; and Article 1028. The prohibitions mentioned in Article 739, RTC directed the parties to submit their memorandum on the issue of whether or not
concerning donations inter vivos shall apply to testamentary provisions. Ruperta's U.S. will may be probated in and allowed by a court in the Philippines.
A foreign will can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction. Article 816 of the Civil Code
On June 17, 2004 the RTC issued an order:[2] (a) admitting to probate Ruperta's last will; states that the will of an alienwho is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made in
(b) appointing respondent Ernesto as special administrator at the request of Sergio, the accordance with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place where he resides, or
U.S.-based executor designated in the will; and (c) issuing the Letters of Special according to the formalities observed in his country.[6]
Administration to Ernesto.
In this connection, Section 1, Rule 73 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that
if the decedent is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the RTC of the province where he
Aggrieved by the RTC's order, petitioner nephews Manuel and Benjamin appealed to the has an estate may take cognizance of the settlement of such estate. Sections 1 and 2 of
Court of Appeals (CA),[3] arguing that an unprobated will executed by an American citizen Rule 76 further state that the executor, devisee, or legatee named in the will, or any other
in the U.S. cannot be probated for the first time in the Philippines. person interested in the estate, may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition
the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the same be in his
On July 29, 2005 the CA rendered a decision,[4] affirming the assailed order of the possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.
RTC,[5] holding that the RTC properly allowed the probate of the will, subject to
respondent Ernesto's submission of the authenticated copies of the documents specified Our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance of a will must show, so far as
in the order and his posting of required bond. The CA pointed out that Section 2, Rule known to the petitioner: (a)the jurisdictional facts; (b) the names, ages, and residences of
76 of the Rules of Court does not require prior probate and allowance of the will in the the heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator or decedent; (c) the probable value and
country of its execution, before it can be probated in the Philippines. The present case, character of the property of the estate; (d) the name of the person for whom letters are
said the CA, is different from reprobate, which refers to a will already probated and prayed; and (e) if the will has not been delivered to the court, the name of the person
allowed abroad. Reprobate is governed by different rules or procedures. Unsatisfied having custody of it. Jurisdictional facts refer to the fact of death of the decedent, his
with the decision, Manuel and Benjamin came to this Court. residence at the time of his death in the province where the probate court is sitting, or if
he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the estate he left in such province.[7] The rules
The Issue Presented do not require proof that the foreign will has already been allowed and probated in the
country of its execution.
The key issue presented in this case is whether or not a will executed by a foreigner
abroad may be probated in the Philippines although it has not been previously probated In insisting that Ruperta's will should have been first probated and allowed by the court of
and allowed in the country where it was executed. California, petitioners Manuel and Benjamin obviously have in mind the procedure for
the reprobate of will before admitting it here. But, reprobate or re-authentication of a will
The Court's Ruling already probated and allowed in a foreign country is different from that probate where the
will is presented for the first time before a competent court. Reprobate is specifically
Petitioners Manuel and Benjamin maintain that wills executed by foreigners abroad must governed by Rule 77 of the Rules of Court. Contrary to petitioners' stance, since this
first be probated and allowed in the country of its execution before it can be probated latter rule applies only to reprobate of a will, it cannot be made to apply to the present
here. This, they claim, ensures prior compliance with the legal formalities of the country case. In reprobate, the local court acknowledges as binding the findings of the foreign
of its execution. They insist that local courts can only allow probate of such wills if the probate court provided its jurisdiction over the matter can be established.
proponent proves that: (a) the testator has been admitted for probate in such foreign
country, (b) the will has been admitted to probate there under its laws, (c) the probate Besides, petitioners' stand is fraught with impractically. If the instituted heirs do not have
court has jurisdiction over the proceedings, (d) the law on probate procedure in that the means to go abroad for the probate of the will, it is as good as depriving them
foreign country and proof of compliance with the same, and (e) the legal requirements for outright of their inheritance, since our law requires that no will shall pass either real or
the valid execution of a will. personal property unless the will has been proved and allowed by the proper court.[8]
But our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad although Notably, the assailed RTC order of June 17, 2004 is nothing more than an initial ruling
the same have not as yet been probated and allowed in the countries of their execution. that the court can take cognizance of the petition for probate of Ruperta's will and that, in
the meantime, it was designating Ernesto as special administrator of the estate. The HELD:
parties have yet to present evidence of the due execution of the will, i.e. the testator's YES.
state of mind at the time of the execution and compliance with the formalities required of
wills by the laws of California. This explains the trial court's directive for Ernesto to submit Our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad
the duly authenticated copy of Ruperta's will and the certified copies of the Laws of although the same have not as yet been probated and allowed in the countries of their
Succession and Probate of Will of California. execution. A foreign will can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction. Article 816 of the
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Court of Appeals Civil Code states that the will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines
decision in CA-G.R. CV 83564 dated July 29, 2005. if made in accordance with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place where he
resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country.
DIGEST: PALAGANAS VS. PALAGANAS
Section 1, Rule 73 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that if the
FACTS: decedent is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the RTC of the province where he has an
Ruperta Palaganas, a Filipino who became a naturalized U.S. citizen, died single estate may take cognizance of the settlement of such estate.
and childless. In the last will and testament she executed in California, she designated
her brother, Sergio, as the executor of her will for she had left properties in the Our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance of a will must show, so
Philippines and in the U.S. far as known to the petitioner:
(a) the jurisdictional facts;
Ernesto, another brother of Ruperta, filed with the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, a (b) the names, ages, and residences of the heirs, legatees, and devisees
petition for the probate of Ruperta’s will and for his appointment as special administrator of the testator or decedent;
of her estate. (c) the probable value and character of the property of the estate;
(d) the name of the person for whom letters are prayed; and
Manuel and Benjamin, nephews of Ruperta, opposed the petition on the ground (e) if the will has not been delivered to the court, the name of the person
that Ruperta’s will should not be probated in the Philippines but in the U.S. where she having custody of it.
executed it. They added that, assuming Ruperta’s will could be probated in the
Philippines, it is invalid nonetheless for having been executed under duress and without Jurisdictional facts refer to the fact of death of the decedent, his residence at the
the testator’s full understanding of the consequences of such act. They also claimed that time of his death in the province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an
Ernesto is not qualified to act as administrator of the estate. inhabitant of a foreign country, the estate he left in such province. The rules do not
require proof that the foreign will has already been allowed and probated in the country
The RTC admitted to probate Ruperta’s last will and appointed Ernesto as special of its execution.
administrator at the request of Sergio. The Letters of Special Administration was issued
to Ernesto. DY YIENG SEANGIO, BARBARA D. SEANGIO and VIRGINIA D. SEANGIO VS. HON.
AMOR A. REYES, in her capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Manuel and Benjamin appealed to the CA. National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 21, Manila, ALFREDO D. SEANGIO,
ALBERTO D. SEANGIO, ELISA D. SEANGIO-SANTOS, VICTOR D. SEANGIO,
The CA affirmed the RTC Decision. ALFONSO D. SEANGIO, SHIRLEY D. SEANGIO-LIM, BETTY D. SEANGIO-OBAS and
JAMES D. SEANGIO
G.R. NOS. 140371-72
ISSUE: Whether or not an unprobated will executed by an American citizen in the U.S. November 27, 2006
can be probated for the first time in the Philippines. AZCUNA, J.:
This is a Petition for Certiorari1 with application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary Ako si Segundo Seangio Filipino may asawa naninirahan sa 465-A Flores St., Ermita,
injunction and/or temporary restraining order seeking the nullification of the orders, dated Manila at nagtatalay ng maiwanag na pag-iisip at disposisyon ay tahasan at hayagang
August 10, 1999 and October 14, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21 inaalisan ko ng lahat at anumang mana ang paganay kong anak na si Alfredo Seangio
(the RTC), dismissing the petition for probate on the ground of preterition, in the dahil siya ay naging lapastangan sa akin at isan beses siya ng sasalita ng masama
consolidated cases, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 98-90870 and SP. Proc. No. 99-93396, harapan ko at mga kapatid niya na si Virginia Seangio labis kong kinasama ng loob ko at
and entitled, "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Segundo C. Seangio v. Alfredo D. sasabe rin ni Alfredo sa akin na ako nasa ibabaw gayon gunit daratin ang araw na ako
Seangio, et al." and "In the Matter of the Probate of the Will of Segundo C. Seangio v. Dy nasa ilalim siya at siya nasa ibabaw.
Yieng Seangio, Barbara D. Seangio and Virginia Seangio."
Labis kong ikinasama ng loob ko ang gamit ni Alfredo ng akin pagalan para
The facts of the cases are as follows: makapagutang na kuarta siya at kanya asawa na si Merna de los Reyes sa China
Bangking Corporation na millon pesos at hindi ng babayad at hindi ng babayad ito ay
On September 21, 1988, private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of the nagdulot sa aking ng malaking kahihiya sa mga may-ari at stockholders ng China
intestate estate of the late Segundo Seangio, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 98 90870 of the Banking.
RTC, and praying for the appointment of private respondent Elisa D. Seangio'Santos as
special administrator and guardian ad litem of petitioner Dy Yieng Seangio. At ikinagalit ko pa rin ang pagkuha ni Alfredo at ng kanyang asawa na mga custome[r]
ng Travel Center of the Philippines na pinagasiwaan ko at ng anak ko si Virginia.
Petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia, all surnamed Seangio, opposed the petition.
They contended that: 1) Dy Yieng is still very healthy and in full command of her Dito ako nagalit din kaya gayon ayoko na bilanin si Alfredo ng anak ko at hayanan kong
faculties; 2) the deceased Segundo executed a general power of attorney in favor of inaalisan ng lahat at anoman mana na si Alfredo at si Alfredo Seangio ay hindi ko siya
Virginia giving her the power to manage and exercise control and supervision over his anak at hindi siya makoha mana.
business in the Philippines; 3) Virginia is the most competent and qualified to serve as
the administrator of the estate of Segundo because she is a certified public accountant; Nila[g]daan ko ngayon ika 20 ng Setyembre 1995 sa longsod ng Manila sa harap ng
and, 4) Segundo left a holographic will, dated September 20, 1995, disinheriting one of tatlong saksi.3
the private respondents, Alfredo Seangio, for cause. In view of the purported holographic
will, petitioners averred that in the event the decedent is found to have left a will, the (signed)
intestate proceedings are to be automatically suspended and replaced by the
proceedings for the probate of the will.
Segundo Seangio
On April 7, 1999, a petition for the probate of the holographic will of Segundo, docketed
Nilagdaan sa harap namin
as SP. Proc. No. 99 93396, was filed by petitioners before the RTC. They likewise
reiterated that the probate proceedings should take precedence over SP. Proc. No. 98
90870 because testate proceedings take precedence and enjoy priority over intestate Dy Yieng Seangio (signed)
proceedings.2
Unang Saksi ikalawang saksi
The document that petitioners refer to as Segundo's holographic will is quoted, as
follows: ikatlong saksi
Kasulatan sa pag-aalis ng mana On May 29, 1999, upon petitioners' motion, SP. Proc. No. 98 90870 and SP. Proc. No.
99 93396 were consolidated.4
Tantunin ng sinuman
On July 1, 1999, private respondents moved for the dismissal of the probate WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion to Suspend Proceedings is hereby
proceedings5 primarily on the ground that the document purporting to be the holographic DENIED for lack of merit. Special Proceedings No. 99 93396 is hereby DISMISSED
will of Segundo does not contain any disposition of the estate of the deceased and thus without pronouncement as to costs.
does not meet the definition of a will under Article 783 of the Civil Code. According to
private respondents, the will only shows an alleged act of disinheritance by the decedent SO ORDERED.7
of his eldest son, Alfredo, and nothing else; that all other compulsory heirs were not
named nor instituted as heir, devisee or legatee, hence, there is preterition which would Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the RTC in its order dated October
result to intestacy. Such being the case, private respondents maintained that while 14, 1999.
procedurally the court is called upon to rule only on the extrinsic validity of the will, it is
not barred from delving into the intrinsic validity of the same, and ordering the dismissal
Petitioners contend that:
of the petition for probate when on the face of the will it is clear that it contains no
testamentary disposition of the property of the decedent.
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED IN EXCESS OF HER JURISDICTION OR WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
Petitioners filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss contending that: 1) generally,
JURISDICTION AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF LAW NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW
the authority of the probate court is limited only to a determination of the extrinsic validity
AND JURISPRUDENCE IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED ORDERS, DATED 10
of the will; 2) private respondents question the intrinsic and not the extrinsic validity of the
AUGUST 1999 AND 14 OCTOBER 1999 (ATTACHMENTS "A" AND "B" HEREOF)
will; 3) disinheritance constitutes a disposition of the estate of a decedent; and, 4) the
CONSIDERING THAT:
rule on preterition does not apply because Segundo's will does not constitute a universal
heir or heirs to the exclusion of one or more compulsory heirs.6
I
On August 10, 1999, the RTC issued its assailed order, dismissing the petition for
probate proceedings: THE RESPONDENT JUDGE, WITHOUT EVEN COMPLYING WITH SECTIONS 3 AND
4 OF RULE 76 OF THE RULES OF COURT ON THE PROPER PROCEDURE FOR
SETTING THE CASE FOR INITIAL HEARING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE
A perusal of the document termed as "will" by oppositors/petitioners Dy Yieng Seangio,
JURISDICTIONAL FACTS, DISMISSED THE TESTATE CASE ON THE ALLEGED
et al., clearly shows that there is preterition, as the only heirs mentioned thereat are
GROUND THAT THE TESTATOR'S WILL IS VOID ALLEGEDLY BECAUSE OF THE
Alfredo and Virginia. [T]he other heirs being omitted, Article 854 of the New Civil Code
EXISTENCE OF PRETERITION, WHICH GOES INTO THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF
thus applies. However, insofar as the widow Dy Yieng Seangio is concerned, Article 854
THE WILL, DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT IS A SETTLED RULE THAT THE
does not apply, she not being a compulsory heir in the direct line.
AUTHORITY OF PROBATE COURTS IS LIMITED ONLY TO A DETERMINATION OF
THE EXTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL, I.E., THE DUE EXECUTION THEREOF,
As such, this Court is bound to dismiss this petition, for to do otherwise would amount to THE TESTATOR'S TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY AND THE COMPLIANCE WITH THE
an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court in the case of Acain v. Intermediate REQUISITES OR SOLEMNITIES PRESCRIBED BY LAW;
Appellate Court [155 SCRA 100 (1987)] has made its position clear: "for - respondents to
have tolerated the probate of the will and allowed the case to progress when, on its face,
II
the will appears to be intrinsically void - would have been an exercise in futility. It would
have meant a waste of time, effort, expense, plus added futility. The trial court could
have denied its probate outright or could have passed upon the intrinsic validity of the EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS THE
testamentary provisions before the extrinsic validity of the will was AUTHORITY TO RULE UPON THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL OF THE
resolved (underscoring supplied). TESTATOR, IT IS INDUBITABLE FROM THE FACE OF THE TESTATOR'S WILL THAT
NO PRETERITON EXISTS AND THAT THE WILL IS BOTH INTRINSICALLY AND
EXTRINSICALLY VALID; AND,
III For disinheritance to be valid, Article 916 of the Civil Code requires that the same must
be effected through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified. With regard
RESPONDENT JUDGE WAS DUTY BOUND TO SUSPEND THE PROCEEDINGS IN to the reasons for the disinheritance that were stated by Segundo in his document, the
THE INTESTATE CASE CONSIDERING THAT IT IS A SETTLED RULE THAT Court believes that the incidents, taken as a whole, can be considered a form of
TESTATE PROCEEDINGS TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS. maltreatment of Segundo by his son, Alfredo, and that the matter presents a sufficient
cause for the disinheritance of a child or descendant under Article 919 of the Civil Code:
Petitioners argue, as follows:
Article 919. The following shall be sufficient causes for the disinheritance of children and
First, respondent judge did not comply with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76 of the Rules of descendants, legitimate as well as illegitimate:
Court which respectively mandate the court to: a) fix the time and place for proving the
will when all concerned may appear to contest the allowance thereof, and cause notice (1) When a child or descendant has been found guilty of an attempt against the life of the
of such time and place to be published three weeks successively previous to the testator, his or her spouse, descendants, or ascendants;
appointed time in a newspaper of general circulation; and, b) cause the mailing of said
notice to the heirs, legatees and devisees of the testator Segundo; (2) When a child or descendant has accused the testator of a crime for which the law
prescribes imprisonment for six years or more, if the accusation has been found
Second, the holographic will does not contain any institution of an heir, but rather, as its groundless;
title clearly states, Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, simply contains a disinheritance of a
compulsory heir. Thus, there is no preterition in the decedent's will and the holographic (3) When a child or descendant has been convicted of adultery or concubinage with the
will on its face is not intrinsically void; spouse of the testator;
Third, the testator intended all his compulsory heirs, petitioners and private respondents (4) When a child or descendant by fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence
alike, with the sole exception of Alfredo, to inherit his estate. None of the compulsory causes the testator to make a will or to change one already made;
heirs in the direct line of Segundo were preterited in the holographic will since there was
no institution of an heir; (5) A refusal without justifiable cause to support the parents or ascendant who disinherit
such child or descendant;
Fourth, inasmuch as it clearly appears from the face of the holographic will that it is both
intrinsically and extrinsically valid, respondent judge was mandated to proceed with the (6) Maltreatment of the testator by word or deed, by the child or descendant;8
hearing of the testate case; and,
(7) When a child or descendant leads a dishonorable or disgraceful life;
Lastly, the continuation of the proceedings in the intestate case will work injustice to
petitioners, and will render nugatory the disinheritance of Alfredo. (8) Conviction of a crime which carries with it the penalty of civil interdiction.
The purported holographic will of Segundo that was presented by petitioners was dated, Now, the critical issue to be determined is whether the document executed by Segundo
signed and written by him in his own handwriting. Except on the ground of preterition, can be considered as a holographic will.
private respondents did not raise any issue as regards the authenticity of the document.
A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil Code, must be entirely
The document, entitled Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, unmistakably showed written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other
Segundo's intention of excluding his eldest son, Alfredo, as an heir to his estate for the form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.
reasons that he cited therein. In effect, Alfredo was disinherited by Segundo.
Segundo's document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance In view of the foregoing, the trial court, therefore, should have allowed the holographic
instrument, conforms to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is will to be probated. It is settled that testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of
written, dated and signed by the hand of Segundo himself. An intent to dispose mortis the decedent take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose.18
causa[9] can be clearly deduced from the terms of the instrument, and while it does not
make an affirmative disposition of the latter's property, the disinheritance of Alfredo, WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court of
nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance results in Manila, Branch 21, dated August 10, 1999 and October 14, 1999, are set aside.
the disposition of the property of the testator Segundo in favor of those who would Respondent judge is directed to reinstate and hear SP Proc. No. 99-93396 for the
succeed in the absence of Alfredo.10 allowance of the holographic will of Segundo Seangio. The intestate case or SP. Proc.
No. 98-90870 is hereby suspended until the termination of the aforesaid testate
Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the testator, expressed proceedings. No costs.
in the form and within the limits prescribed by law, must be recognized as the supreme
law in succession. All rules of construction are designed to ascertain and give effect to DIGEST: GALLANOSA VS. ARCANGEL
that intention. It is only when the intention of the testator is contrary to law, morals, or
public policy that it cannot be given effect.11 FACTS:
On September 21, 1988, private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of
Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by one who is not learned in the law, the intestate estate of the late Segundo Seangio and praying for the appointment of
as illustrated in the present case, should be construed more liberally than the ones private respondent Elisa D. Seangio–Santos as special administrator and guardian ad
drawn by an expert, taking into account the circumstances surrounding the execution of litem of petitioner Dy Yieng Seangio.
the instrument and the intention of the testator.12 In this regard, the Court is convinced
that the document, even if captioned as Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, was intended Petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia, all surnamed Seangio, opposed the
by Segundo to be his last testamentary act and was executed by him in accordance with petition. They contended that Segundo left a holographic will, dated September 20, 1995,
law in the form of a holographic will. Unless the will is probated,13 the disinheritance disinheriting one of the private respondents, Alfredo Seangio, for cause. In view of the
cannot be given effect.14 purported holographic will, petitioners averred that in the event the decedent is found to
have left a will, the intestate proceedings are to be automatically suspended and
With regard to the issue on preterition,15 the Court believes that the compulsory heirs in replaced by the proceedings for the probate of the will.
the direct line were not preterited in the will. It was, in the Court's opinion, Segundo's last
expression to bequeath his estate to all his compulsory heirs, with the sole exception of The petitioner instituted a petition for the probation of the will. Private respondents
Alfredo. Also, Segundo did not institute an heir16 to the exclusion of his other compulsory moved for the dismissal of the probate proceedings5 primarily on the ground that the
heirs. The mere mention of the name of one of the petitioners, Virginia, in the document document purporting to be the holographic will of Segundo does not contain any
did not operate to institute her as the universal heir. Her name was included plainly as a disposition of the estate of the deceased and thus does not meet the definition of a will
witness to the altercation between Segundo and his son, under Article 783 of the Civil Code. According to private respondents, the will only shows
Alfredo.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ an alleged act of disinheritance by the decedent of his eldest son, Alfredo, and nothing
else; that all other compulsory heirs were not named nor instituted as heir, devisee or
Considering that the questioned document is Segundo's holographic will, and that the legatee, hence, there is preterition which would result to intestacy.
law favors testacy over intestacy, the probate of the will cannot be dispensed with. Article
838 of the Civil Code provides that no will shall pass either real or personal property RTC dismissed the petition for probate proceedings on the reason that there is
unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court. Thus, unless the preterition in the will.
will is probated, the right of a person to dispose of his property may be rendered
nugatory.17
ISSUE: Whether the court erred in dismissing the probate proceeding.
HELD: HITOSIS, FLORENTINO R. HITOSIS, VIRGINIA R. MITOSIS, DEBORAH R. HITOSIS,
YES. EDILBERTO R. HITOSIS, LEONOR R. HITOSIS, NORMA R. HITOSIS-VILLANUEVA,
LEONCIO R. HITOSIS, minors ANGEL R. HITOSIS and RODOLFO R. HITOSIS,
For disinheritance to be valid, Article 916 of the Civil Code requires that the same represented by their legal guardian and mother LOURDES RELUCIO VDA. DE
must be effected through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified. With HITOSIS, PETRONA HITOSIS-BALBIDO, MODESTO HITOSIS-GACILO, CLETO
regard to the reasons for the disinheritance that were stated by Segundo in his HITOSIS, AGUSTIN HITOSIS-FORTES, TOMASA HITOSIS-BANARES VDA. DE
document, the Court believes that the incidents, taken as a whole, can be considered a BORRAS, CONRADA HITOSIS-BANARES FRANCHE, RESTITUTO HITOSIS-
form of maltreatment of Segundo by his son, Alfredo, and that the matter presents a BANARES, DAMIAN HITOSIS-BANARES, FIDEL HITOSIS-BANARES, SUSANA
sufficient cause for the disinheritance of a child or descendant under Article 919 of the HITOSIS-BANARES RODRIGUEZ, JOSE HITOSIS, LOLITA HITOSIS-BANEGA,
Civil Code. minors MILAGROS HITOSIS-BANEGA, ALICIA HITOSIS-BANEGA AND ELISA
Segundo’s document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance HITOSIS-BANEGA, represented by their legal guardian and father ERNESTO
instrument, conforms to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is BANEGA, FELICITAS HITOSIS-PENAFLOR, GENOVEVA HITOSIS-ADRIATICO,
written, dated and signed by the hand of Segundo himself. An intent to dispose mortis MANUEL HITOSIS, PEDRO HITOSIS, LIBRATA HITOSIS-BALMES, JUANITA
causa can be clearly deduced from the terms of the instrument, and while it does not HITOSIS-GABITO VDA. DE GABAS, MAURA HITOSIS-GABITO VDA. DE GANOLA
make an affirmative disposition of the latter’s property, the disinheritance of Alfredo, and LEONA HITOSIS-GABITO GAMBA
nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance results in G.R. No. L-29300
the disposition of the property of the testator Segundo in favor of those who would June 21, 1978
succeed in the absence of Alfredo. AQUINO, J.:
With regard to the issue on preterition, the Court believes that the compulsory heirs
in the direct line were not preterited in the will. It was, in the Court’s opinion, Segundo’s In this special civil action of certiorari, filed on July 29, 1968, the petitioners seek to annul
last expression to bequeath his estate to all his compulsory heirs, with the sole exception the orders of respondent Judge dated May 3 trial June 17, 1968, wherein he
of Alfredo. Also, Segundo did not institute an heir16 to the exclusion of his other reconsidered his order of January 10, 1968, dismissing, on the ground of prescription,
compulsory heirs. Considering that the questioned document is Segundo’s holographic the complaint in Civil Case No. 2233 of the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon.
will, and that the law favors testacy over intestacy, the probate of the will cannot be
dispensed with. Article 838 of the Civil Code provides that no will shall pass either real or The case involves the sixty-one parcels of land in Sorsogon left by Florentino Hitosis,
personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court. with an estimated value of P50,000, trial claims for damages exceeding one million
Thus, unless the will is probated, the right of a person to dispose of his property may be pesos. The undisputed facts are as follows:
rendered nugatory.
1. Florentino Hitosis executed a will in the Bicol dialect on June 19, 1938 when he was
eighty years old. He died on May 26, 1939 at Irosin, Sorsogon. A childless widower, he
as survived by his brother, Leon Hitosis. His other brothers, named Juan, Tito (Juancito),
PEDRO D. H. GALLANOSA, CORAZON GRECIA-GALLONOSA and ADOLFO
Leoncio (Aloncio) trial Apolonio and only sister, Teodora, were all dead.
FORTAJADA, the deceased Pedro Gallanosa being substituted by his legal heirs,
namely his above-named widow and his children, ISIDRO GALLANOSA and LEDY
GALLANOSA, and grandchildren named IMELDA TECLA GALLANOSA and ROSARIO 2. On June 24, 1939 a petition for the probate of his will was filed in the Court of First
BRIGIDA GALLANOSA, children of the late SIKATUNA GALLANOSA, son of Pedro Instance of Sorsogon (Special Proceeding No. 3171). The notice of hearing was duly
D.H. GALLONOSA published. In that will, Florentino bequeathed his one-half share in the conjugal estate to
- VERSUS - his second wife, Tecla Dollentas, and, should Tecla predecease him, as was the case,
HON. UBALDO Y. ARCANGEL of CFI of Sorsogon and FLORENTINO G. HITOSIS, his one-half share would be assigned to the spouses Pedro Gallanosa and Corazon
CASIANO G. HITOSIS, TEOTIMO G. HITOSIS, VICTORIO G. HITOSIS, EMILIA G. Grecia, the reason being that Pedro, Tecla's son by her first marriage, grew up under the
HITOSIS VDA. DE CRUZ, JOAQUIN R. HITOSIS VDA. DE CRUZ, JOAQUIN R. care of Florentino; he had treated Pedro as his foster child, and Pedro has rendered
services to Florentino and Tecla. Florentino likewise bequeathed his separate properties the proceedings would have been converted into one of intestacy (Art. 960
consisting of three parcels of abaca land and parcel of riceland to his protege Civil Code) and the settlement of the estate of the said deceased would have
(sasacuyang ataman), Adolfo Fortajada, a minor. been made in accordance with the provisions of law governing legal or
intestate succession ... , in which case the said plaintiffs, as the nearest of
3. Opposition to the probate of the will was registered by the testator's legal heirs, kin or legal heirs of said Florentino Mitosis, would have succeeded to the
namely, his surviving brother, Leon, trial his nephews trial nieces. After a hearing, ownership and possession of the 61 parcels of land in question forming part
wherein the oppositors did not present any evidence in support of their opposition, Judge of his estate (art. 1003, Civil Code).
Pablo S. Rivera, in his decision of October 27, 1939, admitted the will to probate and
appointed Gallanosa as executor. Judge Rivera specifically found that the testator However, the derision of the Court was adverse to them, when it their
executed his last will "gozando de buena salud y facultades mentales y no obrando en opposition trial ordered the probate of his will. From this decision (Annex K)
virtud de amenaza, fraude o influencia indebida." legalizing the said will, the oppositors did not file any appeal within the period
fixed by law, despite the fact that they were duly notified thereof, so that the
4. On October 24, 1941, the testamentary heirs, the Gallanosa spouses trial Adolfo said decision had become final trial it now constitutes a bar to any action that
Fortajada, submitted a project of partition covering sixty-one parcels of land located in the plaintiffs may institute for the purpose of a redetermination of their rights
various parts of Sorsogon, large cattle trial several pieces of personal property which to inherit the properties of the late Florentino Hitosis.
were distributed in accordance with Florentino's will. The heirs assumed the obligations
of the estate amounting to P7,129.27 in the portion of P2,376.42 for Adolfo Fortajada and In other words, the said decision of this Court in Civil Case special ) No.
P4,752.85 for the Gallanosa spouses. The project of partition was approved by Judge 3171, in which the herein plaintiffs or their predecessors-in-interest had
Doroteo Amador in his order of March 13, 1943, thus confirming the heirs' possession of intervened as parties oppositors, constitutes a final judicial determination of
their respective shares. The testator's legal heirs did not appeal from the decree of the issue that the said plaintiffs, as ordinary heirs, have no legal rights to
probate trial from the order of partition trial distribution. succeed to any of the properties of the late Florentino Hitosis; consequently,
their present claim to the ownership trial possession of the 61 parcels of land
in question is without any legal merit or basis.
5. On February 20, 1952, Leon Hitosis trial the heirs of Florentino's deceased brothers
trial sisters instituted an action in the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon against Pedro
Gallanosa for the recovery of the said sixty-one parcels of land. They alleged that they, 7. The plaintiffs did not appeal from that order of dismissal which should have set the
by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in continuous matter at rest. But the same plaintiffs or oppositors to the probate of the will, trial their
possession of those lands en concepto de dueño trial that Gallanosa entered those lands heirs, with a persistence befitting a more meritorious case, filed on September 21, 1967,
in 1951 trial asserted ownership over the lands. They prayed that they be declared the or fifteen years after the dismissal of Civil Case No. 696 trial twenty-eight years after the
owners of the lands trial that they be restored to the possession thereof. They also probate of the will another action in the same court against the Gallanosa spouses trial
claimed damages (Civil Case No. 696). Adolfo Fortajada for the "annulment" of the will of Florentino Hitosis trial and for the
recovery of the same sixty-one parcels of land. They prayed for the appointment of a
receiver.
6. Gallanosa moved to dismiss the above complaint for lack of cause of action trial on the
ground of bar by the prior judgment in the probate proceeding. Judge Anatolio C.
Mañalac dismiss the complaint on the ground of res judicata in his order of August 14, 8. As basis of their complaint, they alleged that the Gallanosa spouses, through fraud
1952 wherein he said: trial deceit, caused the execution trial simulation of the document purporting to be the
last will trial testament of Florentino Hitosis. While in their 1952 complaint the game
plaintiffs alleged that they were in possession of the lands in question, in their 1967
It also appears that the plaintiffs and/or their predecessors-in-interest had
complaint they admitted that since 1939, or from the death of Florentino Hitosis, the
intervened in the testate proceedings in Civil Case No. 3171 of this Court for-
defendants (now the petitioners) have been in possession of the disputed lands (Par. XIV
the purpose of contesting the probate of the will of (the) late Florentino
of the complaint, p. 70, Rollo in Civil Case No. 555, Gubat Branch, which was transferred
Hitosis; trial had their opposition prospered trial the will denied of probate,
to Branch I in Sorsogon town where Special Proceeding No. 3171 trial Civil Case No. 1, Rule 75, formerly sec. 1, Rule 76, Rules of Court; Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479;
696 were decided trial which was re-docketed as Civil Case No. 2233). Guevara vs. Guevara, 98 Phil. 249).
9. As already stated, that 1967 complaint, upon motion of the defendants, now the The testamentary proceeding is a special proceeding for the settlement of the testator's
petitioners, was dismissed by respondent Judge. The plaintiffs filed a motion for estate. A special proceeding is distinct trial different from an ordinary action (Secs. 1 trial
reconsideration Respondent Judge. granted it trial set aside the order of dismissal. He 2, Rule 2 trial sec. 1, Rule 72, Rules of Court).
denied defendants' motion for the reconsideration of his order setting aside that dismissal
order. We say that the defense of res judicata, as a ground for the dismissal of plaintiffs' 1967
complaint, is a two-pronged defense because (1) the 1939 trial 1943 decrees of probate
The petitioners or the defendants below contend in this certiorari case that the lower trial distribution in Special Proceeding No. 3171 trial (2) the 1952 order of dismissal in
court has no jurisdiction to set aside the 1939 decree of probate trial the 1952 order of Civil Case No. 696 of the lower court constitute bars by former judgment, Rule 39 of the
dismissal in Civil Case No. 696 trial that it acted with grave abuse of discretion in not Rules of Court provides:
dismissing private respondents' 1967 complaint. SEC. 49. Effect of judgments. — The effect of a judgment or final order
rendered by a court or judge of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to
pronounce the judgment or order, may be as follows:
The issue is whether, under the facts set forth above, the private respondents have a
cause of action the "annulment" of the will of Florentino Hitosis trial for the recovery of
(a) In case of a judgment or order against a specific thing, or in respect to
the sixty-one parcels of land adjudicated under that will to the petitioners.
the probate of a will or the administration of the estate of a deceased
person, or in respect to the personal, political, or legal condition or status
We hold that the lower court committed a grave abuse of discretion in reconsideration its
of a particular person or his relationship to another, the judgment or order
order of dismissal trial in ignoring the 1939 testamentary case trial the 1952 Civil Case
is conclusive upon the title to the thing the will or administration, or the
No. 696 which is the same as the instant 1967 case.
condition, status or relationship of the person; however, the probate of a
will or granting of letters of administration shall only be prima facie
A rudimentary knowledge of substantive law trial procedure is sufficient for an ordinary
evidence of the death of the testator or intestate;
lawyer to conclude upon a causal perusal of the 1967 complaint that it is baseless trial
unwarranted.
(b) In other cases the judgment or order is, with respect to the matter
directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in
What the plaintiffs seek is the "annulment" of a last will trial testament duly probated in
relation thereto, conclusive between the parties trial their successors in
1939 by the lower court itself. The proceeding is coupled with an action to recover the
interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special
lands adjudicated to the defendants by the same court in 1943 by virtue of the probated
proceeding, litigating of the same thing trial under the same title trial in the
will, which action is a resuscitation of The complaint of the same parties that the same
same capacity;
court dismissed in 1952.
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in
It is evident from the allegations of the complaint trial from defendants' motion to dismiss
interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment
that plaintiffs' 1967 action is barred by res judicata, a double-barrelled defense, trial by
which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was
prescription, acquisitive trial extinctive, or by what are known in the jus civile trial the jus
actually trial necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.
gentium as usucapio, longi temporis possesio and praescriptio (See Ramos vs. Ramos,
L-19872, December 3, 1974, 61 SCRA 284).
The 1939 decree of probate is conclusive as to the due execution or
Our procedural law does not sanction an action for the "annulment" of a will. In order that formal validity of the will (Sec. 625, Act 190, sec. 1, Rule 76, now sec. 1,
a will may take effect, it has to be probated, legalized or allowed in the proper Rule 75, Rules of Court; Last par. of art. 838, Civil Code).
testamentary proceeding. The probate of the will is mandatory (Art. 838, Civil Code; sec.
That means that the testator was of sound trial disposing mind at the time when he It is not only the 1939 probate proceeding that can be interposed as res judicata with
executed the will and was not acting under duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence; respect to private respondents' complaint, The 1952 order of dismissal rendered by
that the will was signed by him in the presence of the required number of witnesses, and Judge Mañalac in Civil Case No. 696, a judgment in personam was an adjudication on
that the will is genuine trial is not a forgery. Accordingly, these facts cannot again be the merits (Sec. 4, Rule 30, old Rules of Court). It constitutes a bar by former judgment
questioned in a subsequent proceeding, not even in a criminal action for the forgery of under the aforequoted section 49(b) (Anticamara vs. Ong, L-29689. April 14, 1978).
the will. (3 Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Edition, p. 395; Manahan vs.
Manahan, 58 Phil. 448). The plaintiffs or private respondents did not even bother to ask for the annulment of the
testamentary proceeding trial the proceeding in Civil Case No. 696. Obviously, they
After the finality of the allowance of a will, the issue as to the voluntariness of its realized that the final adjudications in those cases have the binding force of res
execution cannot be raised anymore (Santos vs. De Buenaventura, L-22797, September judicata and that there is no ground, nor is it timely, to ask for the nullification of the final
22, 1966, 18 SCRA 47). orders trial judgments in those two cases.
In Austria vs. Ventenilla, 21 Phil. 180, a "petition for annulment of a will" was not It is a fundamental concept in the organization of every jural system, a principle of public
entertained after the decree of probate had become final. That case is summarized as policy, that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final at
follows: some definite date fixed by law. Interest rei publicae ut finis sit litum. "The very object for
which the courts were constituted was to put an end to controversies." (Dy Cay vs.
Wills; Probate; Alledged Fraudulent Will; Appeal.— V. died. His will was Crossfield and O'Brien, 38 Phil. 521: Peñalosa vs. Tuason, 22 Phil, 303; De la Cerna vs.
admitted to probate without objection. No appeal was taken from said order. It Potot, supra).
was admitted that due trial legal notice had been given to all parties. Fifteen
months after the date of said order, a motion was presented in the lower court After the period for seeking relief from a final order or judgment under Rule 38 of the
to have said will declared null and void, for the reason that fraud had been Rules of Court has expired, a final judgment or order can be set aside only on the
practised upon the deceased in the making of his will. grounds of (a) lack of jurisdiction or lack of due process of law or (b) that the judgment
Held: That under section 625 of Act No. 190, the only time given parties who was obtained by means of extrinsic or collateral fraud. In the latter case, the period for
are displeased with the order admitting to probate a will, for an appeal is the annulling the judgment is four years from the discovery of the fraud (2 Moran's
time given for appeals in ordinary actions; but without deciding whether or not Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Edition, pp. 245-246; Mauricio vs. Villanueva,
an order admitting a will to probate will be opened for fraud, after the time 106 Phil. 1159).
allowed for an appeal has expired, when no appeal is taken from an order
probating a will, the heirs can not, in subsequent litigation in the same To hurdle over the obstacle of prescription, the trial court, naively adopting the theory of
proceedings, raise questions relating to its due execution. The probate of a will plaintiffs' counsel, held that the action for the recovery of the lands had not prescribed
is conclusive as to its due execution trial as to the testamentary capacity of The because the rule in article 1410 of the Civil Code, that "the action or defense for the
testator. (See Austria vs. Heirs of Ventenilla. 99 Phil. 1069). declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe", applies to wills.
On the other hand, the 1943 decree of adjudication rendered by the trial court in the That ruling is a glaring error. Article 1410 cannot possibly apply to last wills trial
testate proceeding for the settlement of the estate of Florentino Hitosis, having been testaments. The trial court trial plaintiffs' counsel relied upon the case of Dingle vs.
rendered in a proceeding in rem, is under the abovequoted section 49(a), binding upon Guillermo, 48 0. G. 4410, allegedly decided by this Court, which cited the ruling in Tipton
the whole world (Manalo vs. Paredes, 47 Phil. 938; In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156; vs. Velasco, 6 Phil. 67, that mere lapse of time cannot give efficacy to void contracts, a
De la Cerna vs. Potot, 120 Phil. 1361, 1364; McMaster vs. Hentry Reissmann & Co., 68 ruling elevated to the category of a codal provision in article 1410. The Dingle case was
Phil. 142). decided by the Court of Appeals. Even the trial court did not take pains to verify the
misrepresentation of plaintiffs' counsel that the Dingle case was decided by this Court.
An elementary knowledge of civil law could have alerted the trial court to the egregious
error of plaintiffs' counsel in arguing that article 1410 applies to wills.
ISSUE: Whether the legal heirs have a cause of action for the “annulment” of the will of
WHEREFORE, the lower court's orders of May 3 trial June 17, 1968 are reversed trial set Florentino and for the recovery of the 61 parcels of land adjudicated under that will to the
aside trial its order of dismissal dated January 10, 1968 is affirmed. Costs against the petitioners.
private respondents. SO ORDERED.
HELD:
DIGEST: GALLANOSA VS. ARCANGEL NO.
FACTS: The SC held that the lower court committed a grave abuse of discretion in setting
Florentino Hitosis was a childless widower and was survived by his brother Lito. In aside its order of dismissal and ignoring the testamentary case and the first civil case
his will, Florentino bequeathed his ½ share in the conjugal estate to his second wife, which is the same as the instant case. It is evident that second civil case is barred by res
Tecla, and, should Tecla predecease him, as was the case, his ½ share would be judicata and by prescription.
assigned to spouses Gallanosa. Pedro Gallanosa was Tecla’s son by her first marriage
who grew up under the care of Florentino. His other properties were bequeathed to his The decree of probate is conclusive as to the due execution or formal validity of the
protégé Adolfo Fortajada. will. That means that the testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time he
executed the will and was not acting under duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence;
Upon his death, a petition for the probate of his will was wile. Opposition was that the will was signed by him in the presence of the required number of witnesses, and
registered by Florentino’s brother, nephews and nieces. that the will is genuine.
After a hearing, where the oppositors did not present any evidence, the Judge Accordingly, these facts cannot again be questioned in a subsequent proceeding,
admitted the will to probate. not even in a criminal action for the forgery of the will.
The testator’s legal heirs did not appeal from the decree of probate and from the After the finality of the allowance of a will, the issue as to the voluntariness of its
order of partition and distribution. execution cannot be raised anymore.
Later, the legal heirs filed a case for recovery of 61 parcels of land against Pedro The SC also held that the decree of adjudication, having rendered in a proceeding
alleging that they had been in continuous possession of those lands and praying that in rem, is binding upon the whole world. Moreover, the dismissal of the first civil case,
they be declared owners thereof. which is a judgment in personam, was an adjudication on the merits. Thus. It constitutes
a bar by former judgment under the Rules of Court.
Pedro moved for a dismissal which was later granted by the Judge on the ground
of res judicata. The SC also held that the lower court erred in saying that the action for the
recovery of the lands had not prescribed. The SC ruled that the Art. 1410 of NCC (the
The legal heirs did not appeal from the order of dismissal. action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe)
cannot apply to last wills and testaments.
15 years after the dismissal of the first civil case and 28 years after the probate of
the will, the legal heirs filed a case for “annulment of the will” alleging fraud and deceit. The Rules of Court does not sanction an action for “annulment” of a will.
The court dismissed said action. However, the court set aside the dismissal after A final decree of probate is conclusive as to the due execution of the will.
the heirs filed a motion for reconsideration. Hence, this appeal.
A decree of adjudication in a testate proceeding is binding on the whole world.
After the period for seeking relief from a final order or judgment under Rule 38 of the
Rules of court has expired, a final judgment or order can be set aside only on the In February 2000, respondent filed a complaint against Urian and petitioners Benigno
grounds of: (a) lack of jurisdiction or lack of due process of law or (b) that the judgment Que and Erlinda Que ("spouses Que")3 in the Regional Trial Court, Cabugao, Ilocos Sur,
was obtained by means of extrinsic or collateral fraud. In the latter case, the period for Branch 24 ("trial court") for "Annulment of Quitclaim[,] Ownership, Possession and
annulling the judgment is four (4) years from the discovery of fraud. Damages" ("Civil Case No. 503-KC"). Respondent claimed that she is Lorenzo’s
The Civil Law rule that an action for declaration of inexistence of a contract does not granddaughter and as such, she inherited Lot No. 6023 from him. Respondent sought
prescribe cannot be applied to last wills and testaments. the annulment of a Deed of Quitclaim4 dated 17 June 1999 and a handwritten
Acknowledgment5 dated 2 July 1999, both signed by one Isabel Arrieta ("Arrieta"). Under
the Deed of Quitclaim, Arrieta "renounce[d] all [her] rights, interests, participation, title
and possession" over Lot No. 6023 to the spouses Que while in the Acknowledgment,
Arrieta confirmed receiving ₱30,000 from Urian. Respondent alleged that she did not
sign these documents. Respondent also prayed that the trial court declare her owner of
Lot No. 6023 and order petitioners to pay damages.
When respondent filed her Complaint, the spouses Que had taken possession of Lot No.
6023. The spouses Que also declared the land in their name for tax purposes.
SPOUSES BENIGNO QUE AND ERLINDA QUE, AND ADELA URIAN
VS. CA & ISABEL COSTALES After petitioners received the complaint with the summonses on 21 March 2000, they
G.R. NO. 150739 hired the services of one Atty. Ronnie Ranot ("Atty. Ranot"). However, Atty. Ranot failed
AUGUST 18, 2005 to file petitioners’ Answer. On 4 May 2000, respondent moved to declare petitioners in
default. During the hearing of respondent’s motion on 18 May 2000, only Urian appeared
DECISION and manifested that Atty. Ranot was still preparing the Answer. The trial court found
CARPIO, J.: Urian’s manifestation unmeritorious and issued an Order in open court declaring
The Case petitioners in default. In its Order of 15 June 2000, the trial court granted respondent’s
motion to present her evidence ex parte and scheduled the presentation of evidence on
This is a petition for review1 of the Court of Appeals’ Decision2 dated 26 June 2001 and its 20 June 2000. Respondent presented her evidence accordingly, and the case was
Resolution dated 8 November 2001. The 26 June 2001 Decision dismissed petitioners’ submitted for judgment.
petition while the 8 November 2001 Resolution denied their motion for reconsideration.
The Trial Court’s Ruling
The Facts
On 6 September 2000, the trial court rendered judgment in respondent’s favor, the
Since 1960, respondent Isabel Arrieta-Costales ("respondent") has been occupying as dispositive portion of which provides:
owner a parcel of land in Sta. Monica, Magsingal, Ilocos Sur measuring 7,033 square
meters. Designated as Lot No. 6023, the property was originally owned by one Lorenzo WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
Cariño ("Lorenzo") who died in 1960. In 1997, respondent declared the property in her defendants, as follows:
name for taxation purposes.
1. Adjudging the plaintiff as the true and absolute owner of Lot 6023, located at Brgy.
Petitioner Adela Urian ("Urian") is Lorenzo’s grandniece, being the adopted daughter of Sta. Monica, Magsingal, Ilocos Sur and entitled to the exclusive possession thereof;
Lorenzo’s nephew Gonzalo Cariño ("Gonzalo"), son of Lorenzo’s brother Mariano Cariño.
2. Declaring the Deed of Quitclaim and the Acknowledgment Letter/Receipt of no legal In its Order of 27 December 2000, the trial court denied the petition for relief from
force and effect whatsoever and ordering the de[f]endant [s]pouses Benigno and Erlinda judgment. The trial court held that the negligence of their counsels bound petitioners. On
Que to vacate the land and restore the peaceful possession thereof to the plaintiff; the Deed of Adjudication With Sale, the trial court reiterated its finding in the Order of 17
November 2000 (denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration or new trial) that it has
3. Ordering the Municipal Assessor of Magsingal, Ilocos Sur to recall/[cancel] the Tax no merit.8
Declaration in the name of [s]pouses Benigno and Erlinda Que and to restore the tax
declaration in the name of plaintiff Isabel Costales; and Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals to set aside the trial court’s
27 December 2000 Order. Petitioners contended that: (1) the trial court should have
4. Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally to pay plaintiff, ₱10,000.00 as and for required respondent to file an Answer to their petition instead of dismissing it outright; (2)
[a]ttorney’s fees, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, ₱5,000.00 as exemplary damages and their previous counsels’ negligence denied them due process hence they should not be
the costs of this suit.6 bound by it; and (3) the Deed of Quitclaim is not incompatible with the Deed of
Adjudication With Sale as the former merely "strengthens" the spouses Que’s ownership
Urian received a copy of the trial court’s Decision on 15 September 2000. The records do of Lot No. 6023.9
not show when the spouses Que received theirs. On 10 October 2000, petitioners,
through a new counsel, Atty. Benjamin Bateria ("Atty. Bateria"), sought reconsideration or The Court of Appeals’ Ruling
new trial. Petitioners blamed their previous counsel for the non-filing of their Answer.
Petitioners attached to their motion a Deed of Adjudication With Sale in which Urian, as In its Decision of 26 June 2001, the Court of Appeals denied due course to and
alleged sole heir of Gonzalo, adjudicated to herself Lot No. 6023 and sold it to the dismissed petitioners’ petition. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not err in
spouses Que. Petitioners claimed that in his last will and testament, Lorenzo devised Lot outrightly dismissing the petition for relief from judgment for insufficiency in form and
No. 6023 to Gonzalo. substance under Section 4, Rule 38. The appellate court further held that petitioners filed
their petition for relief from judgment beyond the 60-day period under Section 3, Rule 38.
The trial court denied petitioners’ motion in its Order of 17 November 2000. The trial The Court of Appeals also noted that the Rules allow a petition for relief from judgment
court held that as to Urian, its Decision had become final because although she received only when there is no other available remedy and not when litigants, like petitioners, lose
a copy of its Decision on 15 September 2000, the motion for reconsideration or new trial a remedy by negligence.
was filed only on 10 October 2000. As to the spouses Que, the trial court held that the
motion was pro forma since no affidavit of merit accompanied the motion. Nor did the On petitioners’ claim that their counsels’ negligence should not bind them, the Court of
trial court find merit in the Deed of Adjudication With Sale. The trial court noted that Appeals held:
during the conciliation proceedings at the Office of the Municipal Mayor of Magsingal,
Ilocos Sur, the spouses Que relied solely on the Acknowledgment and Deed of Quitclaim The Petitioners heaped vituperation on their counsel for the latter’s ineptitude and
as basis for their claim of ownership of Lot No. 6023.7 betrayal of Petitioners[’] trust and confidence for not filing the appropriate pleading to
relieve the Petitioners of their having been declared in default. But then, the Petitioners
On 18 December 2000, petitioners, represented this time by one Atty. Oliver Cachapero were not themselves blameless. They were duty-bound to make periodic inquiries from
("Atty. Cachapero"), filed with the trial court a petition for relief from judgment under Rule their counsel o[n] the status of their case and as to whether the appropriate pleading had
38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure ("Rules"). Petitioners claimed that their failure to already been filed and the resolution of the Respondent Court, if any, on their pleadings
file an Answer and to seek reconsideration or new trial on time was due to the excusable xxx. If the Petitioners failed to do so and, as it turned out, their counsel failed to prepare
negligence of their previous counsels. Petitioners also invoked "mistake and fraud" as and file the appropriate pleading, then the Petitioners cannot complain. They are bound
they were allegedly under the impression that Atty. Ranot had prepared and filed "the by their ineptitude as well as their counsel’s. xxx
necessary pleading or that the necessary pleading to vacate the judgment and secure
new trial was prepared xxx and filed xxx." This time, petitioners submitted a joint affidavit It bears stressing that the Respondent Court came out with its Decision only on
of merit where they again invoked the Deed of Adjudication With Sale. September 6, 2000 or after the lapse of more than three (3) months after it issued its
Order [of 18 May 2000] declaring the Petitioners in default. In fine, the Petitioners had Under Section 1, Rule 3814 ("Section 1"), the court may grant relief from judgment only
more than ample time to file the appropriate pleadings before the appropriate Court.10 "[w]hen a judgment or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is taken against a
party in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence xxx." In
Hence, this petition.11 Petitioners contend that — their petition for relief from judgment in the trial court, petitioners contended that
judgment was entered against them through "mistake or fraud" because they were
(I) Respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation allegedly under the impression that Atty. Ranot had prepared and filed "the necessary
of facts and failed to appreciate that [the] Petition for Relief from judgment arose from a pleading." This is not the fraud or mistake contemplated under Section 1. As used in that
default order taken against petitioners due to [the] negligence of petitioners[’] counsel; provision, "mistake" refers to mistake of fact, not of law, which relates to the
[and] case.15 "Fraud," on the other hand, must be extrinsic or collateral, that is, the kind which
prevented the aggrieved party from having a trial or presenting his case to the
court.16 Clearly, petitioners’ mistaken assumption that Atty. Ranot had attended to his
(II) Respondent Court of Appeals fail[ed] to notice certain relevant facts that will justify a
professional duties is neither mistake nor fraud.
different conclusion that petitioners should not lose their case and [their] property through
technicality.12
On the other hand, what petitioners appear to be claiming in this petition is that this Court
should reverse the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the trial court for new trial
In reversal of their earlier stance in the Court of Appeals, petitioners no longer question
on the ground that their previous counsels’ negligence constitutes "excusable
the procedure the trial court followed in denying their petition for relief from judgment.
negligence" under Section 1.
Instead, they now claim that since that petition was an "offshoot" of the trial court’s Order
declaring them in default for their counsel’s negligence, petitioners seek excuse from
such negligence to avoid being deprived of property without due process of law. This claim is similarly without merit.
Petitioners also raise new matters regarding the merits of the trial court’s Decision of 6
September 2000.13 Under Section 1, the "negligence" must be excusable and generally imputable to the
party because if it is imputable to the counsel, it is binding on the client.17 To follow a
The Issue contrary rule and allow a party to disown his counsel’s conduct would render
proceedings indefinite, tentative, and subject to reopening by the mere subterfuge of
replacing counsel.18 What the aggrieved litigant should do is seek administrative sanctions
The issue is whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing petitioners’ petition.
against the erring counsel and not ask for the reversal of the court’s ruling.19
The Court’s Ruling
Petitioners nevertheless seek exemption from the above rule because their counsels’
negligence allegedly deprived them of their day in court and, if the ruling of the Court of
The petition has no merit. Appeals stands, they will suffer deprivation of property without due process of law.
Petitioners are not Entitled to Relief from Judgment Admittedly, this Court has relaxed the rule on the binding effect of counsel’s negligence
and allowed a litigant another chance to present his case "(1) where [the] reckless or
The Court of Appeals did not err in ruling that petitioners are not entitled to relief from gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law; (2) when [the
judgment because their petition was insufficient in form and substance, filed late, and rule’s] application will result in outright deprivation of the client’s liberty or property; or (3)
improperly availed of. where the interests of justice so require."20
Petitioners Failed to Prove Fraud, None of these exceptions obtains here.

Mistake, or Excusable Negligence
For a claim of counsel’s gross negligence to prosper, nothing short of clear abandonment The Court finds Eusebia’s affidavit insufficient to support petitioners’ claims.
of the client’s cause must be shown.21 Here, what petitioners’ first, second, and third
counsels did was fail to file the Answer, file a belated and defective motion for Under the Spanish Civil Code, the law governing Lorenzo’s alleged will, all wills must be
reconsideration or new trial, and belatedly and erroneously file a petition for relief from executed in writing27 except when the testator takes part in any military operation or when
judgment, respectively. While these acts and omissions can plausibly qualify as simple any warlike operation is imminent28 or when the testator29 is in danger of shipwreck.30 In
negligence, they do not amount to gross negligence to justify the annulment of the such cases, the testator can execute the will orally in the presence of at least two
proceedings below. witnesses.31 Failure to comply with these formalities renders the will void.32 Furthermore,
the Code of Civil Procedure requires that wills must be submitted to the proper court for
In Legarda v. Court of Appeals,22 where the Court initially held that the counsel’s failure probate otherwise the same shall not pass either real or personal property.33
to file pleadings at the trial court and later on appeal amounted to gross negligence, the
Court, on respondent’s motion, granted reconsideration and applied the general rule Here, petitioners neither presented a copy of Lorenzo’s will nor proved its oral execution
binding the litigant to her counsel’s negligence. The Court noted that the proceedings under the circumstances provided in the Spanish Civil Code. Petitioners similarly make
which led to the filing of the petition in that case "were not attended by any irregularity." no claim that Lorenzo’s will was allowed in probate. Thus, not only is there no proof that
The same observation squarely applies here. Neither can petitioners rely on Boyer- Lorenzo executed a will, there is also no basis to hold that such will, if indeed executed,
Roxas v. Court of Appeals23 because there, as here, the Court held that the petitioners’ passed Lot No. 6023 to Gonzalo. Significantly, Eusebia did not state in her affidavit that
counsel was not grossly negligent. Lorenzo executed a will. What Eusebia stated was that Lorenzo "instructed" (inbilin) that
Lot No. 6023 should be inherited by Gonzalo. This, if any, merely indicates Lorenzo’s
Nor were petitioners denied procedural due process. In essence, procedural due process intent to devise that piece of realty to Gonzalo but does not prove his execution of a will
is simply the opportunity to be heard.24 Petitioners were afforded such opportunity. Thus, instituting Gonzalo as heir to Lot No. 6023.
petitioners were served a copy of the complaint and the summonses and given 15 days
to file their Answer. While there is no showing from the records when petitioners received On the Deed of Quitclaim, the Court finds no reason to disturb the trial court’s finding that
their copy of the 18 May 2000 Order declaring them in default, there is no dispute that respondent’s signature in that document was forged.
Urian was present at the hearing when the trial court issued that Order in open court.
Petitioners were also served a copy of the trial court’s Decision of 6 September 2000 In contrast, respondent has been in continuous possession of Lot No. 6023 in the
from which they had 15 days to appeal, seek reconsideration, or new trial. Indeed, concept of an owner after Lorenzo died in 1960 until the spouses Que removed her from
petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration or new trial albeit belatedly and without that property shortly before respondent filed her complaint in February 2000. While it
complying with proper formalities. Plainly, there was no denial of due process to does not appear that respondent had registered the land in her name, her uninterrupted
petitioners. possession of Lot No. 6023 for nearly 40 years (beyond the 30-year extraordinary
acquisitive prescription34 ), coupled with the performance of acts of ownership, such as
But even assuming that the lapses of petitioners’ counsels amount to gross negligence payment of real estate taxes, suffices to prove her ownership by prescription.35
denying petitioners their day in court, petitioners’ contention that if we sustain the Court
of Appeals they will be deprived of property is baseless. The Petition for Relief from Judgment
was Filed Out of Time
The spouses Que anchor their claim of ownership to Lot No. 6023 on the Deed of
Adjudication With Sale Urian executed in their favor and on the Deed of Aside from petitioners’ failure to prove any of the grounds for granting relief from
Quitclaim.25 Urian’s claim of ownership over Lot No. 6023 is in turn based on Lorenzo’s judgment, they also sought relief belatedly. We quote with approval the Court of Appeals’
alleged testamentary disposition devising Lot No. 6023 to her adoptive parent, Gonzalo. ruling:
As proof of such testamentary disposition, petitioners submitted an affidavit,26 dated 20 [T]he "Petition for Relief" filed by the Petitioners with the Respondent Court was filed
October 1940, of Lorenzo’s sister Eusebia Cariño ("Eusebia"). beyond the reglementary period provided for in Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court,
quoted, infra:
Lastly, as an equitable remedy, a petition for relief from judgment is available only as a
"SEC. 3. Time for filing petition; contents and verification. – A petition provided for in last recourse, when the petitioner has no other remedy.37 This is not true here because
either of the preceding sections of this Rule must be verified, filed within sixty (60) days petitioners had at their disposal other remedies which they in fact availed of, albeit
after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or other proceeding to be belatedly or defectively, such as when they filed their motion for reconsideration or new
set aside, and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or final order was trial in the trial court. As the Court of Appeals held:
entered, or such proceeding was taken; and must be accompanied with affidavits
showing the fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts [A] "Petition for Relief from Judgment" is not a general utility tool in the procedural
constituting the petitioner’s good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case workshop. The relief granted under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court is of equitable
may be. xxx character and is allowed only when there is no other available or adequate remedy. It is
not regarded with favor. The judgment rendered will not be disturbed where the
As stated in the Order of the Respondent Court, xxx the Petitioner Adela Urian received complainant has or by exercising proper diligence would have had an adequate remedy
a copy of the Decision of the Respondent [Court], on September 15, 2000. Indeed, on at law. If the complainant lost a remedy at law from an adverse judgment by his xxx
the face of the Petition, the Petitioners admitted that the Petitioner Adela Urian received negligence, such inequitable conduct precludes him from relief under Rule 38 of the
a copy of the Decision of the Respondent Court on said date. However, the said Rules of Court.38 xxx
Petitioner filed her "Petition for Relief" with the Respondent Court only on December 18,
2000. By then, the sixty (60)-day period provided for under the said Rule had already ON THE NEW MATTERS PETITIONERS RAISE
elapsed. Case law has it that the periods provided for by the Rules are fixed, inextendible
and never interrupted and if the Petition is filed beyond the period provided for by the On petitioners’ allegations concerning the merits of the trial court’s Decision of 6
Rules, the Petition cannot be entertained and must be dismissed. September 2000, petitioners are barred from doing in this appeal what they failed to do in
the trial court, that is, present their case. In any event, none of petitioners’ contentions
xxx has merit.39
While it may be true that the Petitioner Adela Urian filed, on October 12, 2000 a "Motion WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 26 June 2001
for Reconsideration and New Trial", however, the same did not suspend the running of and the Resolution dated 8 November 2001 of the Court of Appeals.
the period under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court because it was filed beyond the period
therefor[.] xxx SO ORDERED.
Insofar as the Petitioners Benigno Que, et al., are concerned, they merely alleged, in
their Petition, that they received a copy of the Decision of the Respondent at a much
later date than September 15, 2000 without, however, specifying the date when they, in DIGEST: QUE VS. CA
fact, received the Decision of the Respondent Court.
FACTS:
xxx The property under controversy was originally owned by one Lorenzo Cariño who
died in 1960. Petitioner Adela Urian is Lorenzo’s grandniece, being the adopted
We are not impervious [to] the claim of the Petitioners Benigno Que, in their "Joint daughter of Lorenzo’s nephew Gonzalo Cariño, son of Lorenzo’s brother Mariano Cariño.
Affidavit of Merit" that they filed their "Petition for Relief from Judgment" seasonably. But Respondent filed a complaint against Urian and petitioners Spouses Que for "Annulment
such an allegation is merely a conclusion and not a sufficient showing that their Petition of Quitclaim, Ownership, Possession and Damages". Respondent claimed that she is
was filed within the period provided for in Rule 38 of the Rules.36 (Emphasis in the Lorenzo’s granddaughter and as such, she inherited the subject parcel of land from him.
original) Respondent sought the annulment of a Deed of Quitclaim.
RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT NOT PROPER The spouses Que anchor their claim of ownership to the subject parcel of land on
the ‘Deed of Adjudication with Sale’ Urian executed in their favor and on the Deed of
Quitclaim. Urian’s claim of ownership over the subject parcel of land is in turn based on issue shall be decided in favor of the just and deserving albeit according to the dictates
Lorenzo’s alleged testamentary disposition devising the subject parcel of land to her not of the heart but of the law.
adoptive parent, Gonzalo. As proof of such testamentary disposition, petitioners
submitted an affidavit, of Lorenzo’s sister Eusebia Cariño. The hero of this story we shall call Old Man Tumpao although at the time it all began he
was still a young and vigorous man. He had a first wife by whom he begot three children,
who are the private respondents in this case. 1 Upon her death, he took to himself a
ISSUE: Whether the affidavit of Eusebia Cariño regarding Lorenzo’s will is sufficient to second wife, by whom he had no issue but who had two children she had "adopted"
prove petitioner’s claim. according to the practice of the Igorots then. 2 It is their children who, with some others,
are the petitioners in this case.
HELD: The facts are as simple as the ancient hills.

NO. The Court found Eusebia’s affidavit insufficient to support petitioners’ claims.
On September 4, 1937, Old Man Tumpao executed what he called a "last will and
Under the Spanish Civil Code, the law governing Lorenzo’s alleged will, all wills
testament" the dispositive portion of which declared:
must be executed in writing except when the testator takes part in any military operation
or when any warlike operation is imminent or when the testator is in danger of shipwreck.
In such cases, the testator can execute the will orally in the presence of at least two Lastly, I appoint my son BANDO TUMPAO, whom I named, that after
witnesses. Failure to comply with these formalities renders the will void. departing from this life, he shall be the one to carry or fulfill my
Testament, and that he shall have the power to see and dispose all what
Here, petitioners neither presented a copy of Lorenzo’s will nor proved its oral execution I have stated, he shall not change what I have already stated in my
under the circumstances provided in the Spanish Civil Code. Petitioners similarly make Testament so that there is truth in my will. I will affix my right thumbmark
no claim that Lorenzo’s will was allowed in probate. Thus, not only is there no proof that at the end of my written name because I do not know how to read and
Lorenzo executed a will, there is also no basis to hold that such will, if indeed executed, write, after it has been read to me and affirm all what is my Win this 2:00
passed the subject parcel of land to Gonzalo. Significantly, Eusebia did not state in her o'clock in the afternoon this 4th day of September 1937, before those
affidavit that Lorenzo executed a will. What Eusebia stated was that Lorenzo instructed who are present and have heard what I have stated, Pico La Trinidad,
that the subject parcel of land should be inherited by Gonzalo. This, if any, merely Benguet, 4th September, 1937. 3
indicates Lorenzo’s intent to devise that piece of realty to Gonzalo but does not prove his
execution of a will instituting Gonzalo as heir to subject parcel of land. The contents of this document were read to the beneficiaries named therein who at the
time were already occupying the portions respectively allotted to them. In implementation
ANITA MANG-OY, assisted by her husband, WILLIAM MANG-OY; LEONORA of this document, they then, on September 7, 1937, executed an agreement providing as
MIGUEL, ASSISTED BY HER HUSBAND, MIGUEL OLILA; HELENA TAYNAN, AND follows:
JOSE TUMPAO VS. CA, BANDO TUMPAO, LAMBIA TUMPAO, married to SALMING
PIRAZO, AND ABITO TUMPAO We who are named children and who will inherit from our father
G.R. NO. L-27421 TUMPAO: BANDO TUMPAO, LAMBIA ABITO, JOSE and LABET, and
SEPTEMBER 12, 1986 we also whose lands are included, SUCDAD BUTIOG, TULINGAN PUL-
CRUZ, J.: OT and ANTHONY MENECIO all of legal age and residing in the town of
La Trinidad, Sub-Province of Benguet we say in truth after swearing
We are back to the early 1900's in the cool regions of the Mountain Province, setting of under oath in accordance to law that the testament of our father
many legends of adventure and romance among the highlanders of the North. Our story TUMPAO who is presently ill by virtue of our right to inherit and also
is not as fanciful, involving as it does not a rivalry for the hand of a beautiful Igorot acknowledge or recognize the lands as included in the area of said land
maiden but a prosaic dispute over a piece of land. Even so, as in those tales of old, the as appearing in Title No. 416 in the name of our father TUMPAO here in
La Trinidad, Barrio Pico, have heard and understood the Will as told by In deciding against them, the Court of Appeals held that the "will" executed by Old Man
him concerning our right to the land which we will inherit and also to Tumpao was null and void because it had not been probated The agreement of partition
those whose lands which were included in the said Title No. 416 because among the supposed beneficiaries of the will was nullified because it was a partition inter
we were all called be present and hear his wilt We heard and agreed to vivos and had not been approved by the Director of the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes.
his will as appearing in his testament regarding the land which we will It was likewise held that the land in dispute was acquired during Old Man Tumpao's first
inherit. We also recognized and agree to the appointment of our brother marriage although it was registered during his second marriage and so the petitioners
BANDO to whom the parcels of land is to be delivered and he will also be were liable in rentals for the lots occupied by them, as well as attorney's fees. 8
the one, to deliver to us our shares as soon as we will demand the
partition in accordance with the will of our father TUMPAO as soon in the After examining the musty records, we sustain the ruling-made both by the trial court and
Testament which we saw and have heard by all. the Court of Appeals-that the will, not having been probated as required by law, was
inoperative as such. The settled principle, as announced in a long line of decisions in
It is also agreed upon among us in this confirmation that when our accordance with the Rules of Court, is that no will shall pass either real or personal
brother BANDO who is appointed to distribute to us our shares we affirm property unless it is proved or allowed in court. 9
in this instrument that will answer for all the expenses when it shag be
surveyed so the share of each will be segregated so also with the We find, however, that the document may be sustained on the basis of Article 1056 of
approval of the title, which shall appear the name of each of us and that the Civil Code of 1899, which was in force at the time the said document was executed
we do not dispute the land which we are actually working shall pertain to by Old Man Tumpao in 1937. The said article reads as follows:
us as embodied in the said win of our father TUMPAO.
Art. 1056. If the testator should make a partition of his properties by an
We execute this deed of confirmation in the presence of the Notary Public act inter vivos, or by win, such partition shall stand in so far as it does not
here in Baguio so that this Will, be used as our agreement so also with prejudice the legitime of the forced heirs.
the wig of our father so that they be one to be followed as regard upon by
all and we affix our right thumbmark at the end of our written name On this score, we agree with the trial court. The applicable decision is Albela vs.
because we do not know how to read and write this 7th day of Albela, 10 also decided by the Court of Appeals, with Justice J.B.L. Reyes as the ponente.
September, 1937 in the City of Baguio. 4
In this case, Agustin Albela executed on January 19, 1935, a deed of partition dividing
Two days later, Old Man Tumpao died. two parcels of land between hisdaughters, Eduarda and Restituta, who indicated their
conformity by signing the instrument. The took possession of their respective shares
The parties remained in possession of the lots assigned to them, apparently in upon his death, but fourteen years later, Restituta ejected Eduarda from her lot, alleging
obedience to the wish of Old Man Tumpao as expressed in his last "will" and affirmed by title by purchase from a third party and denying the existence of the partition. Eduarda
the other abovequoted instrument. But things changed unexpectedly in 1960, twenty sued for recovery and was upheld by the trial court on the basis of the deed of partition.
three years later, that brought this matter to the courts.
Let Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who later became a distinguished member of this Court, take
On November 4, 1960, the respondents executed an extrajudicial partition in which they over at this point:
divided the property of Old Man Tumpao among the three of them only, to the exclusion
of the other persons mentioned in the above-quoted documents. 5 By virtue of this partition, Old In their argument, appellants do not question the authenticity of the above
6
Man Tumpao's title was cancelled and another one was issued in favor of the three respondents.
document, but argue against its validity, on the grounds summarized in
their brief (p. 7), as follows:
It is this title that is now being questioned by the petitioners, who are suing for
reconveyance. They had been sustained by the trial court, 7 which, however, was reversed by the
Court of Appeals. They are before this Court to challenge that reversal.
Therefore the allegations of the plaintiff-appellee, Eduarda Albela, rest on persons (Art. 1280), being valid between the parties who signed it in its
a document which defies classification. If it is a deed of partition, it is null present form.
and void because it is not embodied in a public document; if it is a simple
donation of realty, it is also null and void, because it is not in a public If any invalidity could be alleged against the partition, it would lie in the
document and there is no acceptance; if it is a donation Mortis Causa, absence of a previous testament preceding it (Legasto v. Verzosa, 54
certainly it is null and void because it does not follow the rules governing Phil. 766). And even this may not be indispensable in the present case,
testamentary succession; and if ever it is to be classified as a will, more for the testator's partition did not depart from the shares allotted to his
so, it is still null and void because it does not conform to the requirements heirs by the law of intestacy. Nor is a prior win necessary under Article
of Section 618, Act 190 as amended by Act 2645. 1080 of the new Civil Code, which replaced the word 'testator' in Article
1056 of the Code of 1889 with the broader term 'person.'
None of these objections is valid in law. The appellants evidently fail to
realize that Article 1056 of the Civil Code of 1889 authorizes a testator to Be that as it may, the nullity of the partition Exhibit A would not alter the
partition inter vivos his property, and distribute them among his heirs, and result. There being only two daughters surviving the deceased Agustin,
that this partition is not necessarily either a donation nor a testament, but each one of them would necessarily be entitled to one-half of each of the
an instrument of a special character, sui generis, which is revocable at two parcels he owned at his death, and Agustin's former ownership is no
any time by the causante during his lifetime, and does not operate as a longer disputed by the appellants in this instance. In addition, since both
conveyance of title until his death. It derives its binding force on the heirs daughters signed the partition Exhibit A, its terms would bind both, and
from the respect due to the will of the owner of the property, limited only estop them from asserting a different interest. Appellants' act; in
by his creditors and the intangibility of the legitime of the forced heirs. 'El appropriating the whole inheritance and its fruits can find no support in
testador es libre y sus herederos han de pasar por lo que haga en cuanto law or justice.
no perjudique la legitime de los forsozos. Inutil es sonar en otras
limitaciones que no existen.' (7 Manresa Commentaries, 6th Ed., p. 639. There is no difference in legal effect between Agustin Albela's deed of partition and Old
Man Tumpao's "last will and testament." Both are sustainable under Article 1056 of the
That such partition is not governed by the rules of wills or donations inter Civil Code, which was in force at the time they were executed Even as Agustin Albela's
vivos is a consequence of its special nature. Says the learned Manresa partition was signed by the two daughters themselves, so was Old Man Tumpao's "will"
on this point: affirmed by the beneficiaries in their agreement of September 7, 1937, which reiterated
and recognized the terms of such "will." While not valid as a partition inter vivos under
Con estas palabras (en acto entre vivos) la ley en el Articulo 1056, como Articles 816 and 1271 of the old Civil Code, it was nevertheless binding on the parties as
en el 1057, que despues examinaremos, alude a las formalidades con proof of their conformity to the dispositions made by Old Man Tumpao in his "last will and
que puede practicarse la particion, no a los efectos de esta, significando testament."
que para ella no es preciso que intervengan las formas solemnes que
todo testamento o acto de ultima voluntad en general requiere. Ni aun As the trial court put it:
sera preciso guardar las formalidades especiales de las
donaciones, porque no se trata de disponer a titulo gratuito, sino de The will alone, 'Exh. B', would be inoperative for the simple reason that it
divider aquellos bienes de que ya anteriormente sedispuso en forma was not probated, However, when the persons who were named therein
legal (Emphasis supplied. Op. Cit., p. 635) as heirs and beneficiaries voluntarily agreed in writing to abide by its
terms probably to save the expenses of probate. and furthermore, carried
It was sufficient, therefore, that the partition Exhibit A, should be in out its terms after the death of the testator until now, then it must be held
writing. It does not have to be in a public document except to affect third to be binding between them.
Said agreement was not a disposal of inheritance by a prospective heir Tumpao. Hence, they are not entitled to retain the entire land as their exclusive
before the death of the testator, but an agreement to carry out the will. It inheritance or to collect rentals for the lots occupied by the petitioners.
was not contested by the defendants and after the lapse of 25 years their
right, if any, to assail it has prescribed under Art. 1144 of the Civil Code. The trial judge, the Hon. Feliciano Belmonte, was correct in ordering the reconveyance to
the petitioners of their respective shares. We affirm his decision in toto.
Art. 1144-The following actions must be brought ten years from the time
the right of action accrues: How much simpler was life among the natives in the North during the early days, when
right and wrong were weighed according to the primal code of the ancient hills. Even so,
1) upon a written contract; though that past is gone forever, justice now, as it was then, is still for the deserving.
2) Upon an obligation created by law;
3) Upon a judgment. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and that of the trial
court reinstated, with costs against the respondents.
Any formal defect of the deed, 'Exh. 'C', was cured by the lapse of time.
SO ORDERED.
What the plaintiffs received had an aggregate area of less than 1/3 of the
land of Old Tumpao. It covers about 11,000 square meters while the total DIGEST: MANG-OY VS. CA
area was more than 35,000 square meters, Under the old Civil Code, it
was within the free disposable portion of ones' estate despite the FACTS:
existence of any forced heirs. (See old Civil Code, Art. 808) In 1937, Old Man Tumpao (Tumpao) executed a last will and testament appointing
his son, Bando Tumpao with the power to “see and dispose” of what was stated in the
In view of the foregoing considerations, the defendants are ordered to will exactly as it was stated. Tumpao’s beneficiaries then executed a deed of
execute a deed of conveyance in favor of the plaintiffs of the areas confirmation that they have heard and understood the will concerning their rights to the
respectively owned and occupied by them and to pay the costs. lands they would inherit. Two days later, Tumpao died.
Sucdad Butiog is ordered to pay the defendants P160.00 more as a The parties remained in possession of the lots assigned to them, apparently in
reasonable amount of his additional share in the expenses of segregating
obedience to the wish of Old Man Tumpao as expressed in his last "will" and affirmed by
his lot but the (defendants) are ordered to execute a deed of conveyance
the other abovequoted instrument. But things changed unexpectedly in 1960, twenty-
in his favor of the said lot owned by him.
three years later, that brought this matter to the courts.
The expenses of Survey and segregation must be borne by the plaintiffs.
On November 4, 1960, the respondents executed an extrajudicial partition in which
they divided the property of Old Man Tumpao among the three of them only, to the
We may add that the agreement entered into by the parties in implementation of Old Man
Tumpao's "will" did not have to be approved by the Director of the Bureau of Non- exclusion of the petitioners. Petitioners are suing for reconveyance.
Christian Tribes because the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu was not
extended to the Mountain Province. 11 Moreover, the document was not a conveyance of properties or The RTC sustained their claim for reconveyance, but it was reversed by the CA.
property right. 12 The CA held that the will executed by Tumpao was null and void because it had not been
probated.
It remains to state that the property in dispute having been registered in 1917, the
presumption is that it was acquired during the second marriage and so cannot be
claimed by the respondents as the conjugal property of their mother and Old Man ISSUES:
(1) Was the will of Tumpao valid? because the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu was not extended to the
(2) Can the will be sustained? Mountain Province.
HELD: It remains to state that the property in dispute having been registered in 1917, the
presumption is that it was acquired during the second marriage and so cannot be
(1) NO. The will, not having been probated as required by law, was inoperative as such. claimed by the respondents as the conjugal property of their mother and Old Man
The settled principle, as announced in a long line of decisions in accordance with the Tumpao. Hence, they are not entitled to retain the entire land as their exclusive
Rules of Court, is that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is inheritance or to collect rentals for the lots occupied by the petitioners.
proved or allowed in court.
(2) YES, on the basis of Article 1056 of the Civil Code of 1899, which was in force at the
time the said document was executed by Old Man Tumpao in 1937. It reads: LEONIDA CORONADO, FELIX BUENO, MELANIA RETIZOS, BERNARDINO
Art. 1056. If the testator should make a partition of his properties by an act inter vivos, or BUENASEDA AND JOVITA MONTEFALCON VS. CA AND JUANA BUENO
by win, such partition shall stand in so far as it does not prejudice the legitime of the ALBOVIAS
forced heirs. 191 SCRA 814
G.R. NO. 78778
DECEMBER 3, 1990
Article 1056 of the Civil Code of 1889 authorizes a testator to partition inter
vivos his property, and distribute them among his heirs, and that this partition is not DECISION
necessarily either a donation nor a testament, but an instrument of a special
character, sui generis, which is revocable at any time by the causante during his lifetime, PARAS, J.:
and does not operate as a conveyance of title until his death. It derives its binding force
on the heirs from the respect due to the will of the owner of the property, limited only by
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse the decision* of the
his creditors and the intangibility of the legitime of the forced heirs.
respondent appellate court dated March 3, 1987 CA-G.R. CV No. 06911 entitled "Juana
(Bueno) Albovias et al., v. Leonida Coronado, et al.," affirming the decision of the lower
While not valid as a partition inter vivos under Articles 816 and 1271 of the old Civil court, the decretal portion of which reads:: nad
Code, it was nevertheless binding on the parties as proof of their conformity to the
dispositions made by Old Man Tumpao in his "last will and testament." "WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
The will alone would be inoperative for the simple reason that it was not probated, 1. Declaring Leonida Coronado to have no title or interest over the property in
However, when the persons who were named therein as heirs and beneficiaries question, hence, has no authority to dispose of the same in favor of her co-
voluntarily agreed in writing to abide by its terms probably to save the expenses of defendants;
probate. and furthermore, carried out its terms after the death of the testator until now, 2. Declaring the sales executed by Coronado and subsequent transactions
then it must be held to be binding between them. involving the same property null and void ab initio;
Said agreement is not a disposal of inheritance by a prospective heir before the
death of the testator, but an agreement to carry out the will. 3. Declaring the plaintiff to be the true and legal owner of the subject parcel of
land;
The agreement entered into by the parties in implementation of Old Man Tumpao's "will" 4. Ordering the defendants to vacate the subject premises and to surrender
did not have to be approved by the Director of the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes possession thereof unto the plaintiff;
5. Ordering the defendants to jointly and severally pay unto the plaintiff the sum Moreover, JUANA claims that her property was included together with the two parcels of
of P2,000.00 as attorney's fees and P10,000.00 as moral and exemplary land owned by Dalmacio Monterola, which were sold by Monterola's successor-in-
damages. interest Leonida Coronado (now married to Felix Bueno) to Melania Retizos on April 18,
1970. Melania Retizos in turn sold the lots, including that one being claimed by JUANA,
Costs against the defendants." (Rollo, p. 17)
to the spouse Bernardino Buenaseda and Jovita Montefalcon, now the present
As found by the respondent appellate court, the property subject of this case is a parcel possessors thereof, sometime in 1974 (Ibid., pp. 16-17).
of land situated in Nagcarlan, Laguna, containing 277 square meters, more particularly
On the other hand, Leonida Coronado and her co-petitioners (CORONADO, for brevity)
described as follows:: nad
claim that the property in question was bequeathed to Leonida Coronado under a Will
"A parcel of land situated in the Poblacion, Municipality of Nagcarlan, province of executed by Dr. Dalmacio Monterola, who was allegedly in possession thereof even
Laguna. Bounded on the North, by property of Epifania Irlandez (formerly before the outbreak of World War II (Ibid., p. 107).
Bonifacio Formentera); on the East, by that of Julio Lopez; on the South, by that
Parenthetically, said will was probated under Sp. Proc. No. SC-283, entitled "Testate
of Dalmacio Monterola (formerly Domingo Bueno); and on the West, by C. Lirio
Estate of the Deceased Monterola Leonida F. Coronado, petitioner (Ibid., p. 105).
Street. Containing an area of two hundred seventy seven (277) square meters,
JUANA, together with her husband, opposed the said probate. Despite their opposition,
more or less. Assessed at P3,320.00 under tax declaration No. 241." (Ibid., p. 15)
however, the Will was allowed by the then Court of First Instance of Laguna, Sta. Cruz
Said parcel of land is being contested by Juana Albovias, herein private respondent, on Branch (Ibid., p. 106). On appeal, said decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in
the one hand, and Leonida-Coronado, Felix Bueno, Melania Retizos, Bernardino CA-G.R. No. 40353, entitled "Leonida F. Coronado, petitioner-appellee v. Heirs of Dr.
Buenseda and Jovita Montefalcon, herein petitioners, on the other hand. Dalmacio Monterola, oppositors-appellants" (Ibid.). It is not apparent, however, from the
record whether or not said decision has already become final and executory.
Juana Albovias (JUANA, for brevity) claims that the property in question is a portion of a
bigger lot referred to as Parcel G in the last will and testament executed in 1918 by As a result of the conflicting claims over the property in question, JUANA filed an action
Melecio Artiaga, grandfather of JUANA. This bigger lot was inherited under that will by for quieting of title, declaratory relief and damages against CORONADO in the Regional
JUANA, her brother Domingo Bueno, and two other grandchildren, namely Bonifacio and Trial Court of the Fourth Judicial Region, Branch XXVI, Sta. Cruz, Laguna, docketed as
Herminigildo, both surnamed Formentera. Parcel G is described as follows: Civil Case No. 7345 (Ibid., p. 4).
"Isang lagay na lupa na ang bahagi ay walang tanim na halaman at ang bahagi naman As adverted to above (first par.), the lower court rendered judgment in favor of JUANA.
ay may tanim na saguing, tumatayo sa gawin Canloran ng Calle Avenida Rizal nitong
Not satisfied with the decision of the lower court, CORONADO elevated the case to the
Nagcarlan, at humahangan sa Ibaba; sa ari cong Testador; sa Silangan, sa cay Enrique
Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision appealed from (Ibid., p. 20). Hence, this
Jovellano; sa Ilaya, sa namatay na Perfecto Nanagas, at sa Canloran, tubig na
petition.:-cralaw
pinamamagatang San Cido." (Ibid., p. 16)
CORONADO raised the following assigned errors:
JUANA further claims that sometime in 1925 or 1926, C. Lirio Street was created by the
Municipality of Nagcarla traversing said Parcel G and thus dividing it into two portions, I
one on the west of C. Lirio St. and the other to the east of said street. Parcel G was
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN ARRIVING AT A
divided by the heirs in the following manner; the land was divided into two portions, the
CONCLUSION WHICH IS CONTRARY TO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF
northern portion of which was adjudicated in favor of the Formenteras and the southern
THE CASE AND IN NOT APPLYING THE APPLICABLE PROVISION OF LAW AND
portion was given to JUANA and Doming Bueno. The southern portion in turn was
JURISPRUDENCE LAID DOWN BY THIS HONORABLE COURT. (Ibid., p. 108)
partitioned between JUANA and Domingo Bueno, the former getting the northern part
adjoining the lot of the Formenteras, and the latter the southern part which adjoins the lot II
of Perfecto Nanagas (not owned by Dalmacio Monterola). The part allocated to Domingo
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO SHOW THAT THE LAND IN QUESTION
was later sold by him to Dalmacio Monterola, owner of the adjoining property (Ibid.).: nad
CLAIMED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS THE SAME PROPERTY ADJUDICATED TO
JUANA BUENO UNDER THE WILL OF THE DECEASED MELECIO ARTIAGA;
NEITHER IS THERE EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT SAID WILL HAD BEEN PROBATED. property conveyed to her is JUANA. This is precisely the reason why during the lifetime
(Ibid., p. 114) of the late Dalmacio Monterola, JUANA had always been allowed to enter and reap the
benefits or produce of the said property. It was only after the death of said Monterola in
III
1970 that Leonida Coronado prohibited JUANA from entering it (Ibid., p. 18).:- nad
PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS IN ESTOPPEL FROM QUESTIONING THE OWNERSHIP
Even assuming arguendo that Monterola was indeed in continued possession of the said
OF THE PETITIONER OVER THE LAND IN QUESTION HAVING FAILED TO RAISE
property for over ten years since 1934, said possession is insufficient to constitute the
THE SAME IN THE ESTATE PROCEEDING IN THE TRIAL COURT AND EVEN ON
fundamental basis of the prescription. Possession, under the Civil Code, to constitute the
APPEAL. (Ibid., p. 119)
foundation of a prescriptive right, must be possession under claim of title (en concepto
IV de dueno), or to use the common law equivalent of the term, it must be adverse. Acts of
possessory character performed by one who holds by mere tolerance of the owner are
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS MISAPPRECIATED THE EVIDENCE
clearly not en concepto de dueno, and such possessory acts, no matter how long so
SUBMITTED AND FACTS ADMITTED ON RECORD. IT THEREFORE COMMITTED
continued, do not start the running of the period of prescription (Manila Electric Company
GRAVE AND SERIOUS ERROR. (Ibid., p. 121)
v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. 71393, June 28, 1989).
As required by this Court, CORONADO filed their memorandum on May 8, 1989 (Ibid., p.
In this case, Monterola, as found by the respondent appellate court and the lower court,
105); while that of JUANA was filed on October 13, 1989 (Ibid., p. 139).
never categorically claimed ownership over the property in question, much less his
The petition is devoid of merit. possession thereof en concepto de dueno. Accordingly, he could not have acquired said
property by acquisitive prescription.
Under the first assigned error, CORONADO assails the respondent appellate court's
finding that Dr. Dalmacio Monterola could not have acquired the subject land by Anent the contention of CORONADO that Leonida Coronado could tack her possession
acquisitive prescription. Citing Art. 1116 of the New Civil Code in relation to Section 41 of to that of Monterola, so that claim of legal title or ownership over the subject property,
the Code of Civil Procedure, CORONADO claims that JUANA had already foreclosed even against the petitioners, the Buenasesas, who are purchasers for value and in good
whatever right or legal title she had over the property in question, the reason being that faith, is a foregone or settled issue, the respondent appellate court aptly answered the
Monterola's continued possession of the said property for over ten years since 1934 same in this wise:
ripened into full and absolute ownership (Ibid., p. 112).
"It follows that Leonida Coronado could not have derived ownership of the land in
The argument has no factual basis. question from her predecessor-in-interest Dalmacio Monterola, whether by prescription
or by some other title. Neither can she claim acquisitive prescription in her own name. It
Time and again, it has been ruled that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases
was only in 1970 after the death of Dalmacio Monterola that she asserted her claim of
brought to it from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing and revising the errors of
ownership adverse to that of plaintiff-appellee. Having knowledge that she had no title
law imputed to it, its findings of fact being conclusive. It is not the function of the
over the land in question, she must be deemed to have claimed it in bad faith. Under
Supreme Court to analyze or weigh such evidence all over again, its jurisdiction being
Article 1137 of the Civil Code, ownership and other real rights over immovables prescribe
limited to reviewing errors of law that might have been committed. Absent, therefore, a
through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or
showing that the findings complained of are totally devoid of support in the record, so
good faith. And even granting that she had no notice or defect in her title and was,
that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discretion, such
therefore, in good faith, a period of ten years of possession is necessary for her to
findings must stand, for the Supreme Court is not expected or required to examine or
acquire the land by ordinary prescription. (Article 1134, Civil Code). But she can claim to
contrast the oral and documentary evidence submitted by the parties (Andres v.
have possessed the land only in 1968, the year the Monterola lots were donated to her.
Manufacturers Hanover & Trust Corporation, G.R. 82670, September 15, 1989). There
The period, however, was interrupted in 1975, or 7 years after, when the complaint below
are no convincing reasons in the instant case to depart from this rule.
was filed." (Rollo, pp. 18-19)
As found by the respondent appellate court, Monterola never claimed ownership over the
Under the second assigned error, CORONADO claims that the will under which JUANA
property in question. As a matter of fact, one of the deeds of donation executed by
inherited the property in question from her grandfather, Melecio Artiaga, was never
Monterola in favor of Leonida Coronado acknowledged that the boundary owner on the
probated; hence, said transfer for ownership was ineffectual considering that under Rule
75, Sec. 1 of the Rules of Court (formerly Sec. 125 of Act No. 190, no will shall pass The fact that JUANA failed to identify the property in question and to explain the
either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in the proper court (Ibid., discrepancy in the boundary of said property, assuming they are true, is immaterial, in
p. 115). view of the findings of the lower court as to the identity of the property in question.
Moreover, the lower court found sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that the
The contention is without merit.chanrobles virtual law library
property in question is the same property adjudicated to JUANA under the will of Melecio
While it is true that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved Artiaga, and that CORONADO has no right whatsoever to said property (Ibid., p. 20).
and allowed in the proper court (Art. 838, Civil Code), the questioned will, however, may Such findings are conclusive upon this Court (Reynolds Philippine Corporation v. Court
be sustained on the basis of Article 1056 of the Civil Code of 1899, which was in force at of Appeals, 169 SCRA 220 [1989]).
the time said document was executed by Melecio Artiaga in 1918. The said article read
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.
as follows:
SO ORDERED.
"Article 1056. If the testator should make a partition of his properties by an act inter vivos,
or by will, such partition shall stand in so far as it does not prejudice the legitime of the
forced heir." (Mang-Oy v. Court of Appeals, 144 SCRA 33 [1986]) DIGEST: CORONADO VS. CA
In this case, nowhere was it alleged nor shown that Leonida Coronado is entitled to
legitime from Melecio Artiaga. The truth of the matter is that the record is bereft of any As found by the respondent appellate court, Monterola never claimed ownership
showing that Leonida Coronado and the late Melecio Artiaga were related to each other. over the property in question. As a matter of fact, one of the deeds of donation executed
by Monterola in favor of Leonida Coronado acknowledged that the boundary owner on
Under the third assigned error, CORONADO claims that JUANA is estopped from the property conveyed to her is JUANA. This is precisely the reason why during the
questioning the ownership of Leonida Coronado over the land in question having failed to lifetime of the late Dalmacio Monterola, JUANA had always been allowed to enter and
raise the same in the estate proceedings in the trial court and even on appeal (Rollo, p. reap the benefits or produce of the said property. It was only after the death of said
119). Monterola in 1970 that Leonida Coronado prohibited JUANA from entering it.
The contention is likewise without merit.
Even assuming arguendo that Monterola was indeed in continued possession of
Normally, the probate of a will does not look into its intrinsic validity. The authentication the said property for over ten years since 1934, said possession is insufficient to
of a will decides no other questions than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator constitute the fundamental basis of the prescription. Possession, under the Civil Code, to
and the compliance with those requisites or solemnities which the law prescribes for the constitute the foundation of a prescriptive right, must be possession under claim of title
validity of the wills. It does not determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity or (en concepto de dueno), or to use the common law equivalent of the term, it must be
efficiency of the provisions of the will, thus may be impugned as being vicious or null, adverse. Acts of possessory character performed by one who holds by mere tolerance of
notwithstanding its authentication. The question relating to these points remain entirely the owner are clearly not en concepto de dueno, and such possessory acts, no matter
unaffected, and may be raised even after the will has been authenticated (Maninang, et how long so continued, do not start the running of the period of prescription.
al., v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 473 [1982]). Consequently, JUANA is not estopped
from questioning the ownership of the property in question, notwithstanding her having While it is true that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is
objected to the probate of the will executed by Monterola under which Leonida Coronado proved and allowed in the proper court (Art. 838, Civil Code), the questioned will,
is claiming title to the said property.:-cralaw however, may be sustained on the basis of Article 1056 of the Civil Code of 1899, which
Under the fourth assigned error, it is alleged by CORONADO that JUANA's petition is was in force at the time said document was executed by Melecio Artiaga in 1918. The
weak for want of factual and legal support; the weakness of JUANA's position lies in the said article read as follows:
fact that she did not only fail to identify the subject land, but also failed to explain the
discrepancy in the boundary of the property she is claiming to be hers (Rollo, p. 125). "Article 1056. If the testator should make a partition of his properties by
an act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall stand in so far as it does
The contention is unavailing.
not prejudice the legitime of the forced heir." (Mang-Oy v. Court of liquidate the patriarch’s estate and to deliver to the legal heirs their respective
Appeals, 144 SCRA 33 [1986]) inheritance, but petitioner refused to do so without any justifiable reason.3
It does not determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity or efficiency of In her answer with counterclaim, petitioner traversed the allegations in the complaint and
the provisions of the will, thus may be impugned as being vicious or null, notwithstanding posited that the same be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action, for lack of cause
its authentication. The question relating to these points remain entirely unaffected, and of action, and for non-compliance with a condition precedent for the filing thereof.
may be raised even after the will has been authenticated (Maninang, et al., v. Court of Petitioner denied that she was in custody of the original holographic will and that she
Appeals, 114 SCRA 473 [1982]). Consequently, JUANA is not estopped from knew of its whereabouts. She, moreover, asserted that photocopies of the will were given
questioning the ownership of the property in question, notwithstanding her having to respondent and to his siblings. As a matter of fact, respondent was able to introduce,
objected to the probate of the will executed by Monterola under which Leonida Coronado as an exhibit, a copy of the will in Civil Case No. 224-V-00 before the RTC of Valenzuela
is claiming title to the said property. City. Petitioner further contended that respondent should have first exerted earnest
efforts to amicably settle the controversy with her before he filed the suit.4
Moreover, the lower court found sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that
the property in question is the same property adjudicated to JUANA under the will of The RTC heard the case. After the presentation and formal offer of respondent’s
Melecio Artiaga, and that CORONADO has no right whatsoever to said property (Ibid., p. evidence, petitioner demurred, contending that her son failed to prove that she had in her
20). Such findings are conclusive upon this Court (Reynolds Philippine Corporation v. custody the original holographic will. Importantly, she asserted that the pieces of
Court of Appeals, 169 SCRA 220 [1989]). documentary evidence presented, aside from being hearsay, were all immaterial and
irrelevant to the issue involved in the petition—they did not prove or disprove that she
unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoined as a
UY KIAO ENG duty resulting from an office, trust or station, for the court to issue the writ of mandamus.5
VS. NIXON LEE
G.R. NO. 176831
The RTC, at first, denied the demurrer to evidence.6 In its February 4, 2005
JANUARY 15, 2010
Order,7 however, it granted the same on petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Respondent’s motion for reconsideration of this latter order was denied on September
DECISION
20, 2005.8 Hence, the petition was dismissed.
NACHURA, J.:
Aggrieved, respondent sought review from the appellate court. On April 26, 2006, the CA
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
initially denied the appeal for lack of merit. It ruled that the writ of mandamus would issue
assailing the August 23, 2006 Amended Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
only in instances when no other remedy would be available and sufficient to afford
G.R. SP No. 91725 and the February 23, 2007 Resolution,2 denying the motion for
redress. Under Rule 76, in an action for the settlement of the estate of his deceased
reconsideration thereof.
father, respondent could ask for the presentation or production and for the approval or
probate of the holographic will. The CA further ruled that respondent, in the proceedings
The relevant facts and proceedings follow. before the trial court, failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that his mother had in
her custody the original copy of the will.91avvphi1
Alleging that his father passed away on June 22, 1992 in Manila and left a holographic
will, which is now in the custody of petitioner Uy Kiao Eng, his mother, respondent Nixon Respondent moved for reconsideration. The appellate court, in the assailed August 23,
Lee filed, on May 28, 2001, a petition for mandamus with damages, docketed as Civil 2006 Amended Decision,10 granted the motion, set aside its earlier ruling, issued the writ,
Case No. 01100939, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, to compel and ordered the production of the will and the payment of attorney’s fees. It ruled this
petitioner to produce the will so that probate proceedings for the allowance thereof could time that respondent was able to show by testimonial evidence that his mother had in her
be instituted. Allegedly, respondent had already requested his mother to settle and possession the holographic will.
Dissatisfied with this turn of events, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. The mere technical question will be disregarded if the right is clear and the case is
appellate court denied this motion in the further assailed February 23, 2007 Resolution.11 meritorious.19 As a rule, mandamus will not lie in the absence of any of the following
grounds: [a] that the court, officer, board, or person against whom the action is taken
Left with no other recourse, petitioner brought the matter before this Court, contending in unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a
the main that the petition for mandamus is not the proper remedy and that the testimonial duty resulting from office, trust, or station; or [b] that such court, officer, board, or person
evidence used by the appellate court as basis for its ruling is inadmissible.12 has unlawfully excluded petitioner/relator from the use and enjoyment of a right or office
to which he is entitled.20 On the part of the relator, it is essential to the issuance of a writ
The Court cannot sustain the CA’s issuance of the writ. of mandamus that he should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must
be the imperative duty of respondent to perform the act required.21
The first paragraph of Section 3 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court pertinently provides
that— Recognized further in this jurisdiction is the principle that mandamus cannot be used to
enforce contractual obligations.22 Generally, mandamus will not lie to enforce purely
private contract rights, and will not lie against an individual unless some obligation in the
SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
nature of a public or quasi-public duty is imposed.23 The writ is not appropriate to enforce
person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins
a private right against an individual.24 The writ of mandamus lies to enforce the execution
as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from
of an act, when, otherwise, justice would be obstructed; and, regularly, issues only in
the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no
cases relating to the public and to the government; hence, it is called a prerogative
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person
writ.25 To preserve its prerogative character, mandamus is not used for the redress of
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
private wrongs, but only in matters relating to the public.26
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent,
immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court, to do the act required to
be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the Moreover, an important principle followed in the issuance of the writ is that there should
petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent.13 be no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law other than the
remedy of mandamus being invoked.27 In other words, mandamus can be issued only in
cases where the usual modes of procedure and forms of remedy are powerless to afford
Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of competent jurisdiction, in the
relief.28 Although classified as a legal remedy, mandamus is equitable in its nature and
name of the state or the sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or board, or
its issuance is generally controlled by equitable principles.29 Indeed, the grant of the writ
to some corporation or person requiring the performance of a particular duty therein
of mandamus lies in the sound discretion of the court.
specified, which duty results from the official station of the party to whom the writ is
directed or from operation of law.14 This definition recognizes the public character of the
remedy, and clearly excludes the idea that it may be resorted to for the purpose of In the instant case, the Court, without unnecessarily ascertaining whether the obligation
enforcing the performance of duties in which the public has no interest.15 The writ is a involved here—the production of the original holographic will—is in the nature of a public
proper recourse for citizens who seek to enforce a public right and to compel the or a private duty, rules that the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by respondent
performance of a public duty, most especially when the public right involved is mandated Lee because there lies another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
by the Constitution.16 As the quoted provision instructs, mandamus will lie if the tribunal, course of law. Let it be noted that respondent has a photocopy of the will and that he
corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which seeks the production of the original for purposes of probate. The Rules of Court,
the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station.17 however, does not prevent him from instituting probate proceedings for the allowance of
the will whether the same is in his possession or not. Rule 76, Section 1 relevantly
provides:
The writ of mandamus, however, will not issue to compel an official to do anything which
is not his duty to do or which it is his duty not to do, or to give to the applicant anything to
which he is not entitled by law.18 Nor will mandamus issue to enforce a right which is in Section 1. Who may petition for the allowance of will.—Any executor, devisee, or legatee
substantial dispute or as to which a substantial doubt exists, although objection raising a named in a will, or any other person interested in the estate, may, at any time, after the
death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed,
whether the same be in his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed. FACTS:
Respondent Nixon Lee filed a petition for mandamus with damages against his
An adequate remedy is further provided by Rule 75, Sections 2 to 5, for the production of mother Uy Kiao Eng, herein petitioner, before the RTC of Manila to compel petitioner to
the original holographic will. Thus— produce the holographic will of his father so that probate proceedings for the allowance
thereof could be instituted. Respondent had already requested his mother to settle and
SEC. 2. Custodian of will to deliver.—The person who has custody of a will shall, within liquidate the patriarch’s estate and to deliver to the legal heirs their respective
twenty (20) days after he knows of the death of the testator, deliver the will to the court inheritance, but petitioner refused to do so without any justifiable reason. Petitioner
having jurisdiction, or to the executor named in the will. denied that she was in custody of the original holographic will and that she knew of its
whereabouts. The RTC heard the case. After the presentation and formal offer of
respondent’s evidence, petitioner demurred, contending that her son failed to prove that
SEC. 3. Executor to present will and accept or refuse trust.—A person named as
she had in her custody the original holographic will. The RTC, at first, denied the
executor in a will shall within twenty (20) days after he knows of the death of the testator,
demurrer to evidence. However, it granted the same on petitioner’s motion for
or within twenty (20) days after he knows that he is named executor if he obtained such
reconsideration. Respondent’s motion for reconsideration of this latter order was denied.
knowledge after the death of the testator, present such will to the court having
Hence, the petition was dismissed. Aggrieved, respondent sought review from the
jurisdiction, unless the will has reached the court in any other manner, and shall, within
appellate court. The CA initially denied the appeal for lack of merit. Respondent moved
such period, signify to the court in writing his acceptance of the trust or his refusal to
for reconsideration. The appellate court granted the motion, set aside its earlier ruling,
accept it.
issued the writ, and ordered the production of the will and the payment of attorney’s fees.
It ruled this time that respondent was able to show by testimonial evidence that his
SEC. 4. Custodian and executor subject to fine for neglect.—A person who neglects any mother had in her possession the holographic will. Dissatisfied with this turn of events,
of the duties required in the two last preceding sections without excuse satisfactory to the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. The appellate court denied this motion. Left
court shall be fined not exceeding two thousand pesos. with no other recourse, petitioner brought the matter before this Court, contending in the
main that the petition for mandamus is not the proper remedy and that the testimonial
SEC. 5. Person retaining will may be committed.—A person having custody of a will after evidence used by the appellate court as basis for its ruling is inadmissible.
the death of the testator who neglects without reasonable cause to deliver the same,
when ordered so to do, to the court having jurisdiction, may be committed to prison and
there kept until he delivers the will.30 ISSUE: Whether or not mandamus is the proper remedy of the respondent.
There being a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the
production of the subject will, the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of. Suffice it to HELD:
state that respondent Lee lacks a cause of action in his petition. Thus, the Court grants The Court cannot sustain the CA’s issuance of the writ.
the demurrer.
Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of competent jurisdiction, in
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. the name of the state or the sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or board,
The August 23, 2006 Amended Decision and the February 23, 2007 Resolution of the or to some corporation or person requiring the performance of a particular duty therein
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91725 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case specified, which duty results from the official station of the party to whom the writ is
No. 01100939 before the Regional Trial Court of Manila is DISMISSED. directed or from operation of law. This definition recognizes the public character of the
remedy, and clearly excludes the idea that it may be resorted to for the purpose of
SO ORDERED. enforcing the performance of duties in which the public has no interest. The writ is a
proper recourse for citizens who seek to enforce a public right and to compel the
performance of a public duty, most especially when the public right involved is mandated
DIGEST: UY KIAO ENG VS. LEE
by the Constitution. As the quoted provision instructs, mandamus will lie if the tribunal, that he seeks the production of the original for purposes of probate. The Rules of Court,
corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which however, does not prevent him from instituting probate proceedings for the allowance of
the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station. the will whether the same is in his possession or not.
The writ of mandamus, however, will not issue to compel an official to do anything There being a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for
which is not his duty to do or which it is his duty not to do, or to give to the applicant the production of the subject will, the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of. Suffice
anything to which he is not entitled by law. Nor will mandamus issue to enforce a right it to state that respondent Lee lacks a cause of action in his petition. Thus, the Court
which is in substantial dispute or as to which a substantial doubt exists, although grants the demurrer.
objection raising a mere technical question will be disregarded if the right is clear and the
case is meritorious. As a rule, mandamus will not lie in the absence of any of the
following grounds: [a] that the court, officer, board, or person against whom the action is SALUD TEODORO VDA. DE PEREZ
taken unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins VS. HON. ZOTICO A. TOLETE in his capacity as Presiding Judge, BRANCH 18, RTC,
as a duty resulting from office, trust, or station; or [b] that such court, officer, board, or BULACAN
person has unlawfully excluded petitioner/relator from the use and enjoyment of a right or G.R. NO. 76714
office to which he is entitled. On the part of the relator, it is essential to the issuance of a JUNE 2, 1994
writ of mandamus that he should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it
must be the imperative duty of respondent to perform the act required. QUIASON, J.:
Recognized further in this jurisdiction is the principle that mandamus cannot be This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to set aside
used to enforce contractual obligations. Generally, mandamus will not lie to enforce the Order dated November 19, 1986 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Bulacan
purely private contract rights, and will not lie against an individual unless some obligation presided by respondent Judge Zotico A. Tolete, in Special Proceedings No. 1793-M.
in the nature of a public or quasi-public duty is imposed. The writ is not appropriate to
enforce a private right against an individual.] The writ of mandamus lies to enforce the We grant the petition.
execution of an act, when, otherwise, justice would be obstructed; and, regularly, issues
only in cases relating to the public and to the government; hence, it is called a
II
prerogative writ. To preserve its prerogative character, mandamus is not used for the
redress of private wrongs, but only in matters relating to the public.
Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, who became American
Moreover, an important principle followed in the issuance of the writ is that there citizens, established a successful medical practice in New York, U.S.A. The Cunanans
should be no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law other lived at No. 2896 Citation Drive, Pompey, Syracuse, New York, with their children,
than the remedy of mandamus being invoked. In other words, mandamus can be issued Jocelyn, 18; Jacqueline, 16; and Josephine, 14.
only in cases where the usual modes of procedure and forms of remedy are powerless to
afford relief. Although classified as a legal remedy, mandamus is equitable in its nature On August 23, 1979, Dr. Cunanan executed a last will and testament, bequeathing to his
and its issuance is generally controlled by equitable principles. Indeed, the grant of the wife "all the remainder" of his real and personal property at the time of his death
writ of mandamus lies in the sound discretion of the court. "wheresoever situated" (Rollo, p. 35). In the event he would survive his wife, he
bequeathed all his property to his children and grandchildren with Dr. Rafael G.
In the instant case, the Court, without unnecessarily ascertaining whether the Cunanan, Jr. as trustee. He appointed his wife as executrix of his last will and testament
obligation involved here—the production of the original holographic will—is in the nature and Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as substitute executor. Article VIII of his will states:
of a public or a private duty, rules that the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by
respondent Lee because there lies another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the If my wife, EVELYN PEREZ-CUNANAN, and I shall die under such
ordinary course of law. Let it be noted that respondent has a photocopy of the will and circumstances that there is not sufficient evidence to determine the order
of our deaths, then it shall be presumed that I predeceased her, and my delivered to petitioner the amount of P49,765.85, representing the proceeds of the life
estate shall be administered and distributed, in all respects, in insurance policy of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan.
accordance with such presumption (Rollo, p. 41).
In a motion dated May 19, 1983, petitioner asked that Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr. be
Four days later, on August 27, Dr. Evelyn P. Cunanan executed her own last will and ordered to deliver to her a Philippine Trust Company passbook with P25,594.00 in
testament containing the same provisions as that of the will of her husband. Article VIII of savings deposit, and the Family Savings Bank time deposit certificates in the total
her will states: amount of P12,412.52.
If my husband, JOSE F. CUNANAN, and I shall die under such On May 31, Atty. Federico Alday filed a notice of appearance as counsel for the heirs of
circumstances that there is not sufficient evidence to determine the order Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, namely, Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr., Priscilla Cunanan Bautista, Lydia
of our deaths, then it shall be presumed that he predeceased me, and my Cunanan Ignacio, Felipe F. Cunanan and Loreto Cunanan Concepcion (Cunanan heirs).
estate shall be administered and distributed in all respects, in accordance He also manifested that before receiving petitioner's motion of May 19, 1983, his clients
with such presumption. (Rollo, p. 31). were unaware of the filing of the testate estate case and therefore, "in the interest of
simple fair play," they should be notified of the proceedings (Records, p. 110). He prayed
On January 9, 1982, Dr. Cunanan and his entire family perished when they were trapped for deferment of the hearing on the motions of May 19, 1983.
by fire that gutted their home. Thereafter, Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as trustee and
substitute executor of the two wills, filed separate proceedings for the probate thereof Petitioner then filed a counter manifestation dated June 13, 1983, asserting: (1) that the
with the Surrogate Court of the County of Onondaga, New York. On April 7, these two "Cunanan collaterals are neither heirs nor creditors of the late Dr. Jose F. Cunanan" and
wills were admitted to probate and letters testamentary were issued in his favor. therefore, they had "no legal or proprietary interests to protect" and "no right to
intervene"; (2) that the wills of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan,
On February 21, 1983, Salud Teodoro Perez, the mother of Dr. Evelyn P. Cunanan, and being American citizens, were executed in accordance with the solemnities and
petitioner herein, filed with the Regional P. Cunanan, and petitioner herein, filed with the formalities of New York laws, and produced "effects in this jurisdiction in accordance with
Regional Trial Court, Malolos, Bulacan a petition for the reprobate of the two bills Art. 16 in relation to Art. 816 of the Civil Code"; (3) that under Article VIII of the two wills,
ancillary to the probate proceedings in New York. She also asked that she be appointed it was presumed that the husband predeceased the wife; and (4) that "the Cunanan
the special administratrix of the estate of the deceased couple consisting primarily of a collaterals are neither distributees, legatees or beneficiaries, much less, heirs as heirship
farm land in San Miguel, Bulacan. is only by institution" under a will or by operation of the law of New York (Records, pp.
112-113).
On March 9, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Malolos, Bulacan, presided by Judge
Gualberto J. de la Llana, issued an order, directing the issuance of letters of special On June 23, the probate court granted petitioner's motion of May 19, 1983. However, on
administration in favor of petitioner upon her filing of a P10,000.00 bond. The following July 21, the Cunanan heirs filed a motion to nullify the proceedings and to set aside the
day, petitioner posted the bond and took her oath as special administration. appointment of, or to disqualify, petitioner as special administratrix of the estates of Dr.
Jose F. Cunanan and Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan. The motion stated: (1) that being the
As her first act of administration, petitioner filed a motion, praying that the Philippine Life "brothers and sisters and the legal and surviving heirs" of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, they had
Insurance Company be directed to deliver the proceeds in the amount of P50,000.00 of been "deliberately excluded" in the petition for the probate of the separate wills of the
the life insurance policy taken by Dr. Jose F. Cunanan with Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan Cunanan spouses thereby misleading the Bulacan court to believe that petitioner was the
and their daughter Jocelyn as beneficiaries. The trial court granted the motion. sole heir of the spouses; that such "misrepresentation" deprived them of their right to
"due process in violation of Section 4, Rule 76 of the Revised Rules of Court; (2) that Dr.
Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr., the executor of the estate of the Cunanan spouses, was likewise
Counsel for the Philippine American Life Insurance Company then filed a manifestation,
not notified of the hearings in the Bulacan court; (3) that the "misrepresentation and
stating that said company then filed a manifestation, stating that said company had
concealment committed by" petitioner rendered her unfit to be a special administratrix;
(4) that Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. had, by virtue of a verified power of attorney, on April 13, 1983, finding that "all assets are payable to Dr. Evelyn P. Cunanan’s
authorized his father, executor to be then distributed pursuant to EPTL4-1.1 subd [a] par [4]" (Rollo, p. 52).
Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr., to be his attorney-in-fact; and (5) that Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr.
is qualified to be a regular administrator "as practically all of the subject estate in the On their part, the Cunanan heirs replied that petitioner was estopped from claiming that
Philippines belongs to their brother, Dr. Jose F. Cunanan" (Records, pp. 118-122). they were heirs by the agreement to divide equally the estates. They asserted that by
Hence, they prayed: (1) that the proceedings in the case be declared null and void; (2) virtue of Section 2 of Rule 77 of the Rules of Court, the provisions of Sections 3, 4 and 5
that the appointment of petitioner as special administratrix be set aside; and (3) that Dr. of Rule 76 on the requirement of notice to all heirs, executors, devisees and legatees
Rafael Cunanan, Sr. be appointed the regular administrator of the estate of the deceased must be complied with. They reiterated their prayer: (1) that the proceedings in the case
spouses. be nullified; (2) that petitioner be disqualified as special administratrix; (3) that she be
ordered to submit an inventory of all goods, chattels and monies which she had received
Thereafter, the Cunanan heirs filed a motion requiring petitioner to submit an inventory or and to surrender the same to the court; and (4) that Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr. be
accounting of all monies received by her in trust for the estate. appointed the regular administrator.
In her opposition, petitioner asserted: (1) that she was the "sole and only heir" of her Petitioner filed a rejoinder, stating that in violation of the April 13, 1983 decision of the
daughter, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan to the exclusion of the "Cunanan collaterals"; American court Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. made "unauthorized disbursements from the
hence they were complete strangers to the proceedings and were not entitled to notice; estates as early as July 7, 1982" (Records, p. 231). Thereafter, petitioner moved for the
(2) that she could not have "concealed" the name and address of Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, suspension of the proceedings as she had "to attend to the settlement proceedings" of
Jr. because his name was prominently mentioned not only in the two wills but also in the the estate of the Cunanan spouses in New York (Records, p. 242). The Cunanans heirs
decrees of the American surrogate court; (3) that the rule applicable to the case is Rule opposed this motion and filed a manifestation, stating that petitioner had received
77, not Rule 76, because it involved the allowance of wills proved outside of the $215,000.00 "from the Surrogate’s Court as part of legacy" based on the aforesaid
Philippines and that nowhere in Section 2 of Rule 77 is there a mention of notice being agreement of November 24, 1982 (Records, p. 248).
given to the executor who, by the same provision, should himself file the necessary
ancillary proceedings in this country; (4) that even if the Bulacan estate came from the On February 21, 1984, Judge de la Llana issued an order, disallowing the reprobate of
"capital" of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, he had willed all his worldly goods to his wife and the two wills, recalling the appointment of petitioner as special administratrix, requiring
nothing to his brothers and sisters; and (5) that Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. had unlawfully the submission of petitioner of an inventory of the property received by her as special
disbursed $215,000.00 to the Cunanan heirs, misappropriated $15,000.00 for himself administratrix and declaring all pending incidents moot and academic. Judge de la Llana
and irregularly assigned assets of the estates to his American lawyer (Records, pp. 151- reasoned out that petitioner failed to prove the law of New York on procedure and
160). allowance of wills and the court had no way of telling whether the wills were executed in
accordance with the law of New York. In the absence of such evidence, the presumption
In their reply, the Cunanan heirs stressed that on November 24, 1982, petitioner and the is that the law of succession of the foreign country is the same as the law of the
Cunanan heirs had entered into an agreement in the United States "to settle and divide Philippines. However, he noted, that there were only two witnesses to the wills of the
equally the estates," and that under Section 2 of Rule 77 the "court shall fix a time and Cunanan spouses and the Philippine law requires three witnesses and that the wills were
place for the hearing and cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an original will not signed on each and every page, a requirement of the Philippine law.
presented for allowance" (Records, pp. 184-185).
On August 27, 1985, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order dated
Petitioner asked that Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. be cited for contempt of court for failure February 21, 1984, where she had sufficiently proven the applicable laws of New York
to comply with the Order of June 23, 1983 and for appropriating money of the estate for governing the execution of last wills and testaments.
his own benefit. She also alleged that she had impugned the agreement of November
24, 1982 before the Surrogate Court of Onondaga, New York which rendered a decision On the same day, Judge de la Llana issued another order, denying the motion of
petitioner for the suspension of the proceedings but gave her 15 days upon arrival in the
country within which to act on the other order issued that same day. Contending that the and that proceedings were held on a foreign tribunal and proofs taken by a competent
second portion of the second order left its finality to the discretion of counsel for judge who inquired into all the facts and circumstances and being satisfied with his
petitioner, the Cunanans filed a motion for the reconsideration of the objectionable findings issued a decree admitting to probate the wills in question." However, respondent
portion of the said order so that it would conform with the pertinent provisions of the Judge said that the documents did not establish the law of New York on the procedure
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 and the Interim Rules of Court. and allowance of wills (Records, p. 381).
On April 30, 1985, the respondent Judge of Branch 18 of the Regional Trial Court, On April 9, 1986, petitioner filed a motion to allow her to present further evidence on the
Malolos, to which the reprobate case was reassigned, issued an order stating that foreign law. After the hearing of the motion on April 25, 1986, respondent Judge issued
"(W)hen the last will and testament . . . was denied probate," the case was terminated an order wherein he conceded that insufficiency of evidence to prove the foreign law was
and therefore all orders theretofore issued should be given finality. The same Order not a fatal defect and was curable by adducing additional evidence. He granted petitioner
amended the February 21, 1984 Order by requiring petitioner to turn over to the estate 45 days to submit the evidence to that effect.
the inventoried property. It considered the proceedings for all intents and purposes,
closed (Records, However, without waiting for petitioner to adduce the additional evidence, respondent
p. 302). Judge ruled in his order dated June 20, 1986 that he found "no compelling reason to
disturb its ruling of March 31, 1986" but allowed petitioner to "file anew the appropriate
On August 12, petitioner filed a motion to resume proceedings on account of the final probate proceedings for each of the testator" (Records, p. 391).
settlement and termination of the probate cases in New York. Three days later, petitioner
filed a motion praying for the reconsideration of the Order of April 30, 1985 on the The Order dated June 20, 1986 prompted petitioner to file a second motion for
strength of the February 21, 1984 Order granting her a period of 15 days upon arrival in reconsideration stating that she was "ready to submit further evidence on the law
the country within which to act on the denial of probate of the wills of the Cunanan obtaining in the State of New York" and praying that she be granted "the opportunity to
spouses. On August 19, respondent Judge granted the motion and reconsidered the present evidence on what the law of the State of New York has on the probate and
Order of April 30, 1985. allowance of wills" (Records, p. 393).
On August 29, counsel for petitioner, who happens to be her daughter, Natividad, filed a On July 18, respondent Judge denied the motion holding that to allow the probate of two
motion praying that since petitioner was ailing in Fort Lee, New Jersey, U.S.A. and wills in a single proceeding "would be a departure from the typical and established mode
therefore incapacitated to act as special administratrix, she (the counsel) should be of probate where one petition takes care of one will." He pointed out that even in New
named substitute special administratrix. She also filed a motion for the reconsideration of York "where the wills in question were first submitted for probate, they were dealt with in
the Order of February 21, 1984, denying probate to the wills of the Cunanan spouses, separate proceedings" (Records, p. 395).
alleging that respondent Judge "failed to appreciate the significant probative value of the
exhibits . . . which all refer to the offer and admission to probate of the last wills of the On August 13, 1986, petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of the Order of July
Cunanan spouses including all procedures undertaken and decrees issued in connection 18, 1986, citing Section 3, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, which provides that no party may
with the said probate" (Records, pp. 313-323). institute more than one suit for a single cause of action. She pointed out that separate
proceedings for the wills of the spouses which contain basically the same provisions as
Thereafter, the Cunanans heirs filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order of August they even named each other as a beneficiary in their respective wills, would go against
19, 1985, alleging lack of notice to their counsel. "the grain of inexpensive, just and speedy determination of the proceedings" (Records,
pp. 405-407).
On March 31, 1986, respondent Judge to which the case was reassigned denied the
motion for reconsideration holding that the documents submitted by petitioner proved On September 11, 1986, petitioner filed a supplement to the motion for reconsideration,
"that the wills of the testator domiciled abroad were properly executed, genuine and citing Benigno v. De La Peña, 57 Phil. 305 (1932) (Records,
sufficient to possess real and personal property; that letters testamentary were issued; p. 411), but respondent Judge found that this pleading had been filed out of time and that
the adverse party had not been furnished with a copy thereof. In her compliance, (f) two certificates of authentication from the Consulate General of the
petitioner stated that she had furnished a copy of the motion to the counsel of the Philippines in New York (Exh. "H" and "F").
Cunanan heirs and reiterated her motion for a "final ruling on her supplemental motion"
(Records, p. 421). (g) certifications from the Secretary of State that Judge Reagan is duly
authorized to grant exemplified copies of the decree of probate, letters
On November 19, respondent Judge issued an order, denying the motion for testamentary and all proceedings had and proofs duly taken
reconsideration filed by petitioner on the grounds that "the probate of separate wills of (Exhs. "H-1" and "I-1");
two or more different persons even if they are husband and wife cannot be undertaken in
a single petition" (Records, pp. 376-378). (h) certificates of Judge Reagan and the Chief Clerk that letters
testamentary were issued to Rafael G. Cunanan (Exhs. "H-2" and "I-2");
Hence, petitioner instituted the instant petition, arguing that the evidence offered at the
hearing of April 11, 1983 sufficiently proved the laws of the State of New York on the (i) certification to the effect that it was during the term of Judge Reagan
allowance of wills, and that the separate wills of the Cunanan spouses need not be that a decree admitting the wills to probate had been issued and
probated in separate proceedings. appointing Rafael G. Cunanan as alternate executor (Exhs. "H-3" and
"I-10");
II
(j) the decrees on probate of the two wills specifying that proceedings
Petitioner contends that the following pieces of evidence she had submitted before were held and proofs duly taken (Exhs. "H-4" and "I-5");
respondent Judge are sufficient to warrant the allowance of the wills:
(k) decrees on probate of the two wills stating that they were properly
(a) two certificates of authentication of the respective wills of Evelyn and executed, genuine and valid and that the said instruments were admitted
Jose by the Consulate General of the Philippines (Exhs. "F" and "G"); to probate and established as wills valid to pass real and personal
property (Exhs. "H-5" and "I-5"); and
(b) two certifications from the Secretary of State of New York and
Custodian of the Great Seal on the facts that Judge Bernard L. Reagan is (l) certificates of Judge Reagan and the Chief Clerk on the genuineness
the Surrogate of the Country of Onondaga which is a court of record, that and authenticity of each other’s signatures in the exemplified copies of
his signature and seal of office are genuine, and that the Surrogate is the decrees of probate, letters testamentary and proceedings held in their
duly authorized to grant copy of the respective wills of Evelyn and Jose court (Exhs. "H-6" and "I-6") (Rollo, pp. 13-16).
(Exhs. "F-1" and "G-1");
Petitioner adds that the wills had been admitted to probate in the Surrogate Court’s
(c) two certificates of Judge Reagan and Chief Clerk Donald E. Moore Decision of April 13, 1983 and that the proceedings were terminated on November 29,
stating that they have in their records and files the said wills which were 1984.
recorded on April 7, 1982 (Exhs. "F-2" and "G-2");
The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were American citizens, will only be
(d) the respective wills of Evelyn and Jose (Exhs. "F-3", "F-6" and Exh. effective in this country upon compliance with the following provision of the Civil Code of
"G-3" — "G-6"); the Philippines:
(e) certificates of Judge Reagan and the Chief Clerk certifying to the Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the
genuineness and authenticity of the exemplified copies of the two wills Philippines if made with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place
(Exhs. "F-7" and "F-7");
in which he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his What the law expressly prohibits is the making of joint wills either for the testator’s
country, or in conformity with those which this Code prescribes. reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third person (Civil Code of the Philippines, Article
818). In the case at bench, the Cunanan spouses executed separate wills. Since the two
Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities prescribed by New York laws or wills contain essentially the same provisions and pertain to property which in all
by Philippine laws is imperative. probability are conjugal in nature, practical considerations dictate their joint probate. As
this Court has held a number of times, it will always strive to settle the entire controversy
The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which have been in a single proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation
probated outside of the Philippines are as follows: (1) the due execution of the will in (Motoomull v. Dela Paz, 187 SCRA 743 [1990]).
accordance with the foreign laws; (2) the testator has his domicile in the foreign country
and not in the Philippines; (3) the will has been admitted to probate in such country; (4) This petition cannot be completely resolved without touching on a very glaring fact —
the fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate court, and (5) the laws of a foreign country petitioner has always considered herself the sole heir of
on procedure and allowance of wills (III Moran Commentaries on the Rules of Court, Dr. Evelyn Perez Cunanan and because she does not consider herself an heir of Dr.
1970 ed., pp. 419-429; Suntay v. Suntay, 95 Phil. 500 [1954]; Fluemer v. Hix, 54 Phil. Jose F. Cunanan, she noticeably failed to notify his heirs of the filing of the proceedings.
610 [1930]). Except for the first and last requirements, the petitioner submitted all the Thus, even in the instant petition, she only impleaded respondent Judge, forgetting that a
needed evidence. judge whose order is being assailed is merely a nominal or formal party (Calderon v.
Solicitor General, 215 SCRA 876 [1992]).
The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon which the probate in the
foreign country is based is impelled by the fact that our courts cannot take judicial notice The rule that the court having jurisdiction over the reprobate of a will shall "cause notice
of them (Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank v. Escolin, 56 SCRA 266 [1974]). thereof to be given as in case of an original will presented for allowance" (Revised Rules
of Court, Rule 27, Section 2) means that with regard to notices, the will probated abroad
Petitioner must have perceived this omission as in fact she moved for more time to should be treated as if it were an "original will" or a will that is presented for probate for
submit the pertinent procedural and substantive New York laws but which request the first time. Accordingly, compliance with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76, which require
respondent Judge just glossed over. While the probate of a will is a special proceeding publication and notice by mail or personally to the "known heirs, legatees, and devisees
wherein courts should relax the rules on evidence, the goal is to receive the best of the testator resident in the Philippines" and to the executor, if he is not the petitioner,
evidence of which the matter is susceptible before a purported will is probated or denied are required.
probate (Vda. de Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 81 SCRA 393 [1978]).
The brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, contrary to petitioner's claim, are
There is merit in petitioner’s insistence that the separate wills of the Cunanan spouses entitled to notices of the time and place for proving the wills. Under Section 4 of Rule 76
should be probated jointly. Respondent Judge’s view that the Rules on allowance of wills of the Revised Rules of Court, the "court shall also cause copies of the notice of the time
is couched in singular terms and therefore should be interpreted to mean that there and place fixed for proving the will to be addressed to the designated or other known
should be separate probate proceedings for the wills of the Cunanan spouses is too heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator, . . . "
literal and simplistic an approach. Such view overlooks the provisions of Section 2, Rule
1 of the Revised Rules of Court, which advise that the rules shall be "liberally construed WHEREFORE, the questioned Order is SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge shall allow
in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and petitioner reasonable time within which to submit evidence needed for the joint probate of
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding." the wills of the Cunanan spouses and see to it that the brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F.
Cunanan are given all notices and copies of all pleadings pertinent to the probate
A literal application of the Rules should be avoided if they would only result in the delay proceedings.
in the administration of justice (Acain v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 155 SCRA 100
[1987]; Roberts v. Leonidas, 129 SCRA 33 [1984]). SO ORDERED.
Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities prescribed by New York laws or
CASE DIGEST: VDA. DE PEREZ VS. TOLETE by Philippine laws is imperative.
FACTS: Evidence for Reprobate of Wills Probated outside the Philippines

Dr. Jose Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, who became The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which have been
American citizens and residents of New York, each executed a will also in New York, probated outside of the Philippines are as follows: (1) the due execution of the will in
containing provisions on presumption of survivorship (in the event that it is not known accordance with the foreign laws; (2) the testator has his domicile in the foreign country
which one of the spouses died first, the husband shall be presumed to have and not in the Philippines; (3) the will has been admitted to probate in such country; (4)
predeceased his wife). Later, the entire family perished in a fire that gutted their home. the fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate court, and (5) the laws of a foreign country
Thus, Rafael, who was named trustee in Jose’s will, filed for separate probate on procedure and allowance of wills (III Moran Commentaries on the Rules of Court,
proceedings of the wills. 1970 ed., pp. 419-429; Suntay v. Suntay, 95 Phil. 500 [1954]; Fluemer v. Hix, 54 Phil.
610 [1930]). Except for the first and last requirements, the petitioner submitted all the
Later, Evelyn’s mother, Salud Perez, filed a petition for reprobate in Bulacan. needed evidence.
Rafael opposed, arguing that Salud was not an heir according to New York law. He
contended that since the wills were executed in New York, New York law should govern. The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon which the probate in the
He further argued that, by New York law, he and his brothers and sisters were Jose’s foreign country is based is impelled by the fact that our courts cannot take judicial notice
heirs and as such entitled to notice of the reprobate proceedings, which Salud failed to of them.
give.
On Lack of Notice to Jose’s Heirs
For her part, Salud said she was the sole heir of her daughter, Evelyn, and that the This petition cannot be completely resolved without touching on a very glaring fact -
two wills were in accordance with New York law. But before she could present evidence petitioner has always considered herself the sole heir of Dr. Evelyn Perez Cunanan and
to prove the law of New York, the reprobate court already issued an order, disallowing because she does not consider herself an heir of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, she noticeably
the wills. failed to notify his heirs of the filing of the proceedings. Thus, even in the instant petition,
she only impleaded respondent Judge, forgetting that a judge whose order is being
assailed is merely a nominal or formal party (Calderon v. Solicitor General, 215 SCRA
ISSUE: Whether or not the reprobate of the wills should be allowed. 876 [1992]).
The rule that the court having jurisdiction over the reprobate of a will shall "cause notice
HELD: thereof to be given as in case of an original will presented for allowance" (Revised Rules
of Court, Rule 27, Section 2) means that with regard to notices, the will probated abroad
Extrinsic Validity of Wills of Non-Resident Aliens should be treated as if it were an "original will" or a will that is presented for probate for
The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were American citizens, will only be the first time. Accordingly, compliance with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76, which require
effective in this country upon compliance with the following provision of the Civil Code of publication and notice by mail or personally to the "known heirs, legatees, and devisees
the Philippines: of the testator resident in the Philippines" and to the executor, if he is not the petitioner,
are required.
ART. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the
Philippines if made with the formalities prescribed by the law of the The brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, contrary to petitioner's claim, are
place in which he resides, or according to the formalities observed entitled to notices of the time and place for proving the wills. Under Section 4 of Rule 76
in his country, or in conformity with those which this Code of the Revised Rules of Court, the "court shall also cause copies of the notice of the time
prescribes. and place fixed for proving the will to be addressed to the designated or other known
heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator, . . . "
intestate estate of Fr. Rodriguez alleging, among other things, that Fr. Rodriguez
WHEREFORE, the questioned Order is SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge shall allow was a resident of Parañaque, Rizal, and died without leaving a will and praying
petitioner reasonable time within which to submit evidence needed for the joint probate of that Maria Rodriguez be appointed as Special Administratrix of the estate; and
the wills of the Cunanan spouses and see to it that the brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. that on March 12, 1963 Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan filed a petition
Cunanan are given all notices and copies of all pleadings pertinent to the probate in this Court for the probation of the will delivered by them on March 4, 1963. It
proceedings. was stipulated by the parties that Fr. Rodriguez was born in Parañaque, Rizal;
that he was Parish priest of the Catholic Church of Hagonoy, Bulacan, from the
SO ORDERED. year 1930 up to the time of his death in 1963; that he was buried in Parañaque,
and that he left real properties in Rizal, Cavite, Quezon City and Bulacan.
ANGELA RODRIGUEZ, MARIA RODRIGUEZ, ET AL.
VS. HON. DE BORJA OF CFI BULACAN, ANATOLIA PANGILINAN AND ADELAIDA The movants contend that since the intestate proceedings in the Court of First
JACALAN Instance of Rizal was filed at 8:00 A.M. on March 12, 1963 while the petition for
G.R. NO. L-21993 probate was filed in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan at 11:00 A.M. on the
JUNE 21, 1966 same date, the latter Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for probate,
REYES, J.B.L., J.: citing as authority in support thereof the case of Ongsingco Vda. de Borja vs. Tan
and De Borja, G.R. No. 7792, July 27, 1955.
Petitioners Angela, Maria, Abelardo and Antonio, surnamed Rodriguez, petition this
Court for a writ of certiorari and prohibition to the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, for The petitioners Pangilinan and Jacalan, on the other hand, take the stand that
its refusal to grant their motion to dismiss its Special Proceeding No. 1331, which said the Court of First Instance of Bulacan acquired jurisdiction over the case upon
Court is alleged to have taken cognizance of without jurisdiction. delivery by them of the will to the Clerk of Court on March 4, 1963, and that the
case in this Court therefore has precedence over the case filed in Rizal on March
The facts and issues are succinctly narrated in the order of the respondent court, dated 12, 1963.
June 13, 1963 (Petition, Annex 0), in this wise:
The Court of First Instance, as previously stated denied the motion to dismiss on the
It is alleged in the motion to dismiss filed by Angela, Maria, Abelardo and Antonio ground that a difference of a few hours did not entitle one proceeding to preference over
Rodriguez, through counsel, that this Court "has no jurisdiction to try the above- the other; that, as early as March 7, movants were aware of the existence of the
entitled case in view of the pendency of another action for the settlement of the purported will of Father Rodriguez, deposited in the Court of Bulacan, since they filed a
estate of the deceased Rev. Fr. Celestino Rodriguez in the Court of First petition to examine the same, and that movants clearly filed the intestate proceedings in
Instance of Rizal, namely, Sp. Proceedings No. 3907 entitled 'In the matter of the Rizal "for no other purpose than to prevent this Court (of Bulacan) from exercising
Intestate Estate of the deceased Rev. Fr. Celestino Rodriguez which was filed jurisdiction over the probate proceedings". Reconsideration having been denied,
ahead of the instant case". movants, now petitioners, came to this Court, relying principally on Rule 73, section 1 of
the Rules of Court, and invoking our ruling in Ongsingco vs. Tan and De Borja, L-7792,
The records show that Fr. Celestino Rodriguez died on February 12, 1963 in the July 27, 1955.
City of Manila; that on March 4, 1963, Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan
delivered to the Clerk of Court of Bulacan a purported last will and testament of SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. — If the decedent is an
Fr. Rodriguez; that on March 8, 1963, Maria Rodriguez and Angela Rodriguez, inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien,
through counsel filed a petition for leave of court to allow them to examine the his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled,
alleged will; that on March 11, 1963 before the Court could act on the petition, the in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his
same was withdrawn; that on March 12, 1963, aforementioned petitioners filed death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of
before the Court of First Instance of Rizal a petition for the settlement of the any province which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the
settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion revertendi to the place of his birth in Parañaque, Rizal, that detail would not imply that
of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, as far as it depends on the Bulacan court lacked jurisdiction. As ruled in previous decisions, the power to settle
the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not decedents' estates is conferred by law upon all courts of first instance, and the domicile
be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the of the testator only affects the venue but not the jurisdiction of the Court (In re Kaw
original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. Singco, 74 Phil. 239; Reyes vs. Diaz, 73 Phil. 484; Bernabe vs. Vergara, 73 Phil. 676).
Neither party denies that the late Fr. Rodriguez is deceased, or that he left personal
We find this recourse to be untenable. The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of property in Hagonoy, province of Bulacan (t.s.n. p. 46, hearing of June 11, 1963, Annex
Bulacan became vested upon the delivery thereto of the will of the late Father Rodriguez "H", Petition, Rec., p. 48). That is sufficient in the case before us.
on March 4, 1963, even if no petition for its allowance was filed until later, because upon
the will being deposited the court could, motu proprio, have taken steps to fix the time In the Kaw Singco case (ante) this Court ruled that:
and place for proving the will, and issued the corresponding notices conformably to what
is prescribed by section 3, Rule 76, of the Revised Rules of Court (Section 3, Rule 77, of "... If we consider such question of residence as one affecting the jurisdiction of
the old Rules): the trial court over the subject-matter, the effect shall be that the whole
proceedings including all decisions on the different incidents which have arisen in
SEC. 3. Court to appoint time for proving will. Notice thereof to be published. — court will have to be annulled and the same case will have to be commenced
When a will is delivered to, or a petition for the allowance of a will is filed in, the anew before another court of the same rank in another province. That this is of
Court having jurisdiction, such Court shall fix a time and place for proving the will mischievous effect in the prompt administration of justice is too obvious to require
when all concerned may appear to contest the allowance thereof, and shall comment. (Cf. Tanunchuan vs. Dy Buncio & Co., G.R. No. 48206, December 31,
cause notice of such time and place to be published three (3) weeks 1942). Furthermore, section 600 of Act No. 190, providing that the estate of a
successively, previous to the time appointed, in a newspaper of general deceased person shall be settled in the province where he had last resided,
circulation in the province. could not have been intended as defining the jurisdiction of the probate court
over the subject matter, because such legal provision is contained in a law of
But no newspaper publication shall be made where the petition for probate has procedure dealing merely with procedural matters, and, as we have said time and
been filed by the testator himself. again, procedure is one thing and jurisdiction over the subject matter is another.
(Attorney General vs. Manila Railroad Company, 20 Phil. 523.) The law of
The use of the disjunctive in the words "when a will is delivered to OR a petition for the jurisdiction — Act No. 136, Section 56, No. 5 — confers upon Courts of First
allowance of a will is filed" plainly indicates that the court may act upon the mere deposit Instance jurisdiction over all probate cases independently of the place of
therein of a decedent's testament, even if no petition for its allowance is as yet filed. residence of the deceased.1 Since, however, there are many Courts of First
Where the petition for probate is made after the deposit of the will, the petition is deemed Instance in the Philippines, the Law of Procedure, Act No. 190, section 600, fixes
to relate back to the time when the will was delivered. Since the testament of Fr. the venue or the place where each case shall be brought. Thus, the place of
Rodriguez was submitted and delivered to the Court of Bulacan on March 4, while residence of the deceased is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject
petitioners initiated intestate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Rizal only on matter but merely of venue. And it is upon this ground that in the new Rules of
March 12, eight days later, the precedence and exclusive jurisdiction of the Bulacan Court the province where the estate of a deceased person shall be settled is
court is incontestable.1äwphï1.ñët properly called "venue" (Rule 75, section 1.) Motion for reconsideration is denied.
But, petitioners object, section 3 of revised Rule 76 (old Rule 77) speaks of a will being The estate proceedings having been initiated in the Bulacan Court of First Instance
delivered to "the Court having jurisdiction," and in the case at bar the Bulacan court did ahead of any other, that court is entitled to assume jurisdiction to the exclusion of all
not have it because the decedent was domiciled in Rizal province. We can not disregard other courts, even if it were a case of wrong venue by express provisions of Rule 73 (old
Fr. Rodriguez's 33 years of residence as parish priest in Hagonoy, Bulacan (1930-1963); Rule 75) of the Rules of Court, since the same enjoins that:
but even if we do so, and consider that he retained throughout some animus
The Court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent We rule that the Bulacan Court of First Instance was entitled to priority in the settlement
shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. (Sec. 1) of the estate in question, and that in refusing to dismiss the probate. proceedings, said
court did not commit any abuse of discretion. It is the proceedings in the Rizal Court that
This disposition presupposes that two or more courts have been asked to take should be discontinued.
cognizance of the settlement of the estate. Of them only one could be of proper venue,
yet the rule grants precedence to that Court whose jurisdiction is first invoked, without DIGEST: VDA. DE PEREZ VS. TOLETE
taking venue into account.
FACTS:
There are two other reasons that militate against the success of petitioners. One is that Private respondents Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan delivered to the
their commencing intestate proceedings in Rizal, after they learned of the delivery of the Clerk of Court of Bulacan a purported last will and testament of Fr. Rodriguez,
decedent's will to the Court of Bulacan, was in bad faith, patently done with a view to meanwhile the petitioners filed a petition before the court to examine the purported will
divesting the latter court of the precedence awarded it by the Rules. Certainly the order but which was later withdrawn, and a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of
of priority established in Rule 73 (old Rule 75) was not designed to convert the Fr. Rodriguez was subsequently field in a another court in Rizal. The petitioners now
settlement of decedent's estates into a race between applicants, with the administration sought the dismissal of the special proceeding on the settlement of the decedent's estate
of the properties as the price for the fleetest. based on the purported will, questioning therefore the jurisdiction of CFI Bulacan.
The other reason is that, in our system of civil law, intestate succession is only subsidiary
or subordinate to the testate, since intestacy only takes place in the absence of a valid ISSUE: Does CFI Bulacan have jurisdiction to proceed with the testate proceedings?
operative will. Says Article 960 of the Civil Code of the Philippines:
HELD:
ART. 960. Legal or intestate succession takes place:
YES.
(1) If a person dies without a will, or with a void will, or one which has The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan became vested upon the
subsequently lost its validity; delivery thereto of the will of the late Father Rodriguez, even if no petition for its
allowance was filed until later, because upon the will being deposited the court could,
(2) When the will does not institute an heir to, or dispose of all the property motu proprio, have taken steps to fix the time and place for proving the will, and issued
belonging to the testator. In such case, legal succession shall take place only the corresponding notices conformably to what is prescribed by section 3, Rule 76, of the
with respect to the property in which the testator has not disposed; Revised Rules of Court. Moreover, aside from the rule that the Court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to the
(3) If the suspensive condition attached to the institution of heir does not happen exclusion of all other courts, intestate succession is only subsidiary or subordinate to the
or is not fulfilled, or if the heir dies before the testator, or repudiates the testate, since intestacy only takes place in the absence of a valid operative will.
inheritance, there being no substitution, and no right of accretion takes place;
(4) When the heir instituted is incapable of succeeding, except in cases provided OCTAVIO S. MALOLES II VS. PACITA DE LOS REYES PHILLIPS
in this Code. G.R. NO. 133359
JANUARY 31, 2000
Therefore, as ruled in Castro, et al. vs. Martinez, 10 Phil. 307, "only after final decision as
to the nullity of testate succession could an intestate succession be instituted in the form OCTAVIO S. MALOLES II VS. CA, HON. FERNANDO V. GOROSPE, JR., in his Official
of pre-established action". The institution of intestacy proceedings in Rizal may not thus Capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC-Makati, Branch 61, and PACITA PHILLIPS as the
proceed while the probate of the purported will of Father Rodriguez is pending. alleged executrix of the alleged will of the late Dr. Arturo de Santos
G.R. NO. 129505 voluntary will and that he was neither forced nor influenced by any other person in
JANUARY 31, 2000 signing it.
DECISION Furthermore, it appears from the petition and the evidence adduced that petitioner in his
MENDOZA, J.: lifetime, executed his Last Will and Testament (Exhs. "A", "A-1", "A-2", "A-4", "A-5") at his
residence situated at 9 Bauhinia corner Intsia Streets, Forbes Park, Makati City; said
These are petitions for review on certiorari of the decisions of the Thirteenth and the Last Will and Testament was signed in the presence of his three (3) witnesses, namely,
Special Eighth Divisions of the Court of Appeals which ruled that petitioner has no right to wit: Dr. Elpidio Valencia (Exhs. "A-6", "A-7", "A-8", "A-16", "A-16-A"), Atty. Edward J.
to intervene in the settlement of the estate of Dr. Arturo de Santos. The cases were Berenguer (Exhs. "A-3", "A-3-A", "A-9", "A-10", & "A-11"), and Atty. Victoria C. delos
consolidated considering that they involve the same parties and some of the issues Reyes (Exhs. "A-12", "A-13", "A-14", "A-17", & "A-18"), who in turn, in the presence of the
raised are the same. testator and in the presence of each and all of the witnesses signed the said Last Will
and Testament and duly notarized before Notary Public Anna Melissa L. Rosario (Exh.
The facts which gave rise to these two petitions are as follows: "A-15"); on the actual execution of the Last Will and Testament, pictures were taken
(Exhs. "B" to "B-3").
On July 20, 1995, Dr. Arturo de Santos, Filipino and a resident of Makati City, filed a
petition for probate of his will1 in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati, docketed Petitioner has no compulsory heirs and Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc., with address
as Sp. Proc. No. M-4223. In his petition, Dr. De Santos alleged that he had no at No. 9 Bauhinia corner Intsia Streets, Forbes Park, Makati City has been named as
compulsory heirs; that he had named in his will as sole legatee and devisee the Arturo sole legatee and devisee of petitioners properties, real and personal, approximately
de Santos Foundation, Inc.; that he disposed by his will his properties with an valued at not less than P2 million, Ms. Pacita de los Reyes Phillips was designated as
approximate value of not less than P2,000,000.00; and that copies of said will were in the executor and to serve as such without a bond.
custody of the named executrix, private respondent Pacita de los Reyes Phillips. A copy
of the will2 was annexed to the petition for probate. From the foregoing facts, the Court finds that the petitioner has substantially established
the material allegations contained in his petition. The Last Will and Testament having
On February 16, 1996, Judge Fernando V. Gorospe, Jr. of RTC-Makati, Branch 61 been executed and attested as required by law; that testator at the time of the execution
issued an order granting the petition and allowing the will. The order reads: of the will was of sane mind and/or not mentally incapable to make a Will; nor was it
executed under duress or under the influence of fear or threats; that it was in writing and
On 03 August 1995, the Court issued an Order setting the hearing of the petition on 12 executed in the language known and understood by the testator duly subscribed thereof
September 1995, at 8:30 oclock in the morning, copies of which were served to Arturo de and attested and subscribed by three (3) credible witnesses in the presence of the
Santos Foundation, Inc. and Ms. Pacita de los Reyes Phillips (Officers Return, dated 04 testator and of another; that the testator and all the attesting witnesses signed the Last
September 1995 attached to the records). When the case was called for hearing on the Will and Testament freely and voluntarily and that the testator has intended that the
date set, no oppositor appeared nor any written opposition was ever filed and on motion instrument should be his Will at the time of affixing his signature thereto.
of petitioner, he was allowed to adduce his evidence in support of the petition.
WHEREFORE, as prayed for by the petitioner (testator himself) the petition for the
Petitioner personally appeared before this Court and was placed on the witness stand allowance of the Last Will and Testament of Arturo de Santos is hereby APPROVED and
and was directly examined by the Court through "free wheeling" questions and answers ALLOWED.
to give this Court a basis to determine the state of mind of the petitioner when he
executed the subject will. After the examination, the Court is convinced that petitioner is Shortly after the probate of his will, Dr. De Santos died on February 26, 1996.
of sound and disposing mind and not acting on duress, menace and undue influence or
fraud, and that petitioner signed his Last Will and Testament on his own free and On April 3, 1996, petitioner Octavio S. Maloles II filed a motion for intervention claiming
that, as the only child of Alicia de Santos (testators sister) and Octavio L. Maloles, Sr., he
was the sole full-blooded nephew and nearest of kin of Dr. De Santos. He likewise case involving the Estate of Decedent Arturo de Santos pending before said court. The
alleged that he was a creditor of the testator. Petitioner thus prayed for the order reads:
reconsideration of the order allowing the will and the issuance of letters of administration
in his name. Acting on the ORDER dated 28 August 1996 of Branch 65, this Court, transferring this
case to this Branch 61 on the ground that this case is related with a case before this
On the other hand, private respondent Pacita de los Reyes Phillips, the designated Court, let this case be returned to Branch 65 with the information that there is no related
executrix of the will, filed a motion for the issuance of letters testamentary with Branch case involving the ESTATE OF DECEDENT ARTURO DE SANTOS pending before this
61. Later, however, private respondent moved to withdraw her motion. This was granted, Branch.
while petitioner was required to file a memorandum of authorities in support of his claim
that said court (Branch 61) still had jurisdiction to allow his intervention. There is, however, a case filed by ARTURO DE SANTOS, as petitioner under Rule 76 of
the Rules of Court for the Allowance of his will during his lifetime docketed as SP. PROC.
Petitioner filed his memorandum of authorities on May 13, 1996. On the other hand, NO. M-4223 which was already decided on 16 February 1996 and has become final.
private respondent, who earlier withdrew her motion for the issuance of letters
testamentary in Branch 61, refiled a petition for the same purpose with the Regional Trial It is noted on records of Case No. M-4223 that after it became final, herein Petitioner
Court, Makati, which was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 and assigned to Branch 65. Pacita de los Reyes Phillips filed a MOTION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF LETTERS
TESTAMENTARY, which was subsequently withdrawn after this Court, during the
Upon private respondents motion, Judge Salvador Abad Santos of Branch 65 issued an hearing, already ruled that the motion could not be admitted as the subject matter
order, dated June 28, 1996, appointing her as special administrator of Dr. De Santoss involves a separate case under Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, and movant withdrew her
estate. motion and filed this case (No. 4343).
On July 29, 1996, petitioner sought to intervene in Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 and to set aside Octavio de Santos Maloles [II] filed a MOTION FOR INTERVENTION before Case No.
the appointment of private respondent as special administrator. He reiterated that he was M-4223 and this motion was already DENIED in the order (Branch 61) of 26 August 1996
the sole and full blooded nephew and nearest of kin of the testator; that he came to know likewise for the same grounds that the matter is for a separate case to be filed under
of the existence of Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 only by accident; that the probate proceedings Rule 78 of the Rules of Court and cannot be included in this case filed under Rule 76 of
in Sp. Proc. No. M-4223 before Branch 61 of the same court was still pending; that the Rules of Court.
private respondent misdeclared the true worth of the testators estate; that private
respondent was not fit to be the special administrator of the estate; and that petitioner It is further noted that it is a matter of policy that consolidation of cases must be
should be given letters of administration for the estate of Dr. De Santos. approved by the Presiding Judges of the affected Branches.
On August 28, 1996, Judge Abad Santos ordered the transfer of Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 to Initially, in his decision dated September 23, 1996,5 Judge Abad Santos appeared firm in
Branch 61, on the ground that "[it] is related to the case before Judge Gorospe of RTC his position that " . . . it would be improper for (Branch 65) to hear and resolve the
Branch 61 . . ." petition (Sp. Proc. No. M-4343)," considering that the probate proceedings were
commenced with Branch 61. He thus ordered the transfer of the records back to the
It appears, however, that in Sp. Proc. No. M-4223, Judge Gorospe had denied on August latter branch. However, he later recalled his decision and took cognizance of the case "to
26, 1996 petitioners motion for intervention. Petitioner brought this matter to the Court of expedite the proceedings." Thus, in his Order, dated October 21, 1996, he stated:
Appeals which, in a decision4 promulgated on February 13, 1998, upheld the denial of
petitioners motion for intervention. Considering the refusal of the Hon. Fernando V. Gorospe, Jr. of Branch 61 to continue
hearing this case notwithstanding the fact that said branch began the probate
Meanwhile, Judge Gorospe issued an order, dated September 4, 1996, returning the proceedings of the estate of the deceased and must therefore continue to exercise its
records of Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 to Branch 65 on the ground that there was a pending jurisdiction to the exclusion of all others, until the entire estate of the testator had been
partitioned and distributed as per Order dated 23 September 1996, this branch (Regional Consequently, petitioner contends that Branch 65 could not lawfully act upon private
Trial Court Branch 65) shall take cognizance of the petition if only to expedite the respondents petition for issuance of letters testamentary.
proceedings, and under the concept that the Regional Trial Court of Makati City is but
one court. The contention has no merit.
Furnish a copy of this order to the Office of the Chief justice and the Office of the Court In cases for the probate of wills, it is well-settled that the authority of the court is limited to
Administrator, of the Supreme Court; the Hon. Fernando V. Gorospe, Jr.; Pacita De Los ascertaining the extrinsic validity of the will, i.e., whether the testator, being of sound
Reyes Phillips, Petitioner; and Octavio de Santos Maloles, Intervenor. mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law.
On November 4, 1996, Judge Abad Santos granted petitioners motion for intervention. Ordinarily, probate proceedings are instituted only after the death of the testator, so
Private respondent moved for a reconsideration but her motion was denied by the trial much so that, after approving and allowing the will, the court proceeds to issue letters
court. She then filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals which, on February testamentary and settle the estate of the testator. The cases cited by petitioner are of
26, 1997, rendered a decision6 setting aside the trial courts order on the ground that such nature. In fact, in most jurisdictions, courts cannot entertain a petition for probate of
petitioner had not shown any right or interest to intervene in Sp. Proc. No. M-4343. the will of a living testator under the principle of ambulatory nature of wills.
Hence, these petitions which raise the following issues: However, Art. 838 of the Civil Code authorizes the filing of a petition for probate of the
will filed by the testator himself. It provides:
1. Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court - Makati, Branch 61 has lost
jurisdiction to proceed with the probate proceedings upon its issuance of an order Civil Code, Art. 838. No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved
allowing the will of Dr. Arturo de Santos and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court.
2. Whether or not the Honorable (Regional Trial Court - Makati, Branch 65) acquired The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition the court having jurisdiction for the
jurisdiction over the petition for issuance of letters testamentary filed by (private) allowance of his will. In such case, the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court for the
respondent. allowance of wills after the testators death shall govern.
3. Whether or not the petitioner, being a creditor of the late Dr. Arturo de Santos, has a The Supreme Court shall formulate such additional Rules of Court as may be necessary
right to intervene and oppose the petition for issuance of letters testamentary filed by the for the allowance of wills on petition of the testator.
respondent.
Subject to the right of appeal, the allowance of the will, either during the lifetime of the
4. Whether or not (private) respondent is guilty of forum shopping in filing her petition for testator or after his death, shall be conclusive as to its due execution.
issuance of letters testamentary with the Regional Trial Court - Makati, Branch 65
knowing fully well that the probate proceedings involving the same testate estate of the Rule 76, 1 likewise provides:
decedent is still pending with the Regional Trial Court - Makati, Branch 61.
Sec. 1 Who may petition for the allowance of will. - Any executor, devisee, or legatee
First. Petitioner contends that the probate proceedings in Branch 61 of RTC-Makati did named in a will, or any other person interested in the estate, may, at any time after the
not terminate upon the issuance of the order allowing the will of Dr. De Santos. Citing the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed,
cases of Santiesteban v. Santiesteban7 and Tagle v. Manalo,8 he argues that the whether the same be in his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.
proceedings must continue until the estate is fully distributed to the lawful heirs,
devisees, and legatees of the testator, pursuant to Rule 73, 1 of the Rules of Court.
The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition in the court for the allowance of his testamentary, should have simply filed a manifestation for the same purpose in the
will. probate court.12cräläwvirtualibräry
The rationale for allowing the probate of wills during the lifetime of testator has been Petitioner, who defends the order of Branch 65 allowing him to intervene, cites Rule 73, 1
explained by the Code Commission thus: which states:
Most of the cases that reach the courts involve either the testamentary capacity of the Where estate of deceased persons settled. - If the decedent is an inhabitant of the
testator or the formalities adopted in the execution of wills. There are relatively few cases Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved,
concerning the intrinsic validity of testamentary dispositions. It is far easier for the courts or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in
to determine the mental condition of a testator during his lifetime than after his death. the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a
Fraud, intimidation and undue influence are minimized. Furthermore, if a will does not foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The
comply with the requirements prescribed by law, the same may be corrected at once. court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
The probate during the testators life, therefore, will lessen the number of contest upon jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far
wills. Once a will is probated during the lifetime of the testator, the only questions that as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate,
may remain for the courts to decide after the testators death will refer to the intrinsic shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the
validity of the testamentary dispositions. It is possible, of course, that even when the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
testator himself asks for the allowance of the will, he may be acting under duress or
undue influence, but these are rare cases. The above rule, however, actually provides for the venue of actions for the settlement of
the estate of deceased persons. In Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, it was held:
After a will has been probated during the lifetime of the testator, it does not necessarily
mean that he cannot alter or revoke the same before his death. Should he make a new The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75, Section 1), specifically the clause
will, it would also be allowable on his petition, and if he should die before he has had a "so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of the
chance to present such petition, the ordinary probate proceeding after the testators death state," is in reality a matter of venue, as the caption of the Rule indicates: "Settlement of
would be in order. Estate of Deceased Persons. Venue and Processes." It could not have been intended to
define the jurisdiction over the subject matter, because such legal provision is contained
Thus, after the allowance of the will of Dr. De Santos on February 16, 1996, there was in a law of procedure dealing merely with procedural matters. Procedure is one thing,
nothing else for Branch 61 to do except to issue a certificate of allowance of the will jurisdiction over the subject matter is another. The power or authority of the court over
pursuant to Rule 73, 12 of the Rules of Court. There is, therefore, no basis for the ruling the subject matter "existed was fixed before procedure in a given cause began." That
of Judge Abad Santos of Branch 65 of RTC-Makati that -Nex old power or authority is not altered or changed by procedure, which simply directs the
manner in which the power or authority shall be fully and justly exercised. There are
Branch 61 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati having begun the probate proceedings of cases though that if the power is not exercised conformably with the provisions of the
the estate of the deceased, it continues and shall continue to exercise said jurisdiction to procedural law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the power to exercise it
the exclusion of all others. It should be noted that probate proceedings do not cease legally. However, this does not amount to a loss of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
upon the allowance or disallowance of a will but continues up to such time that the entire Rather, it means that the court may thereby lose jurisdiction over the person or that the
estate of the testator had been partitioned and distributed. judgment may thereby be rendered defective for lack of something essential to sustain it.
The appearance of this provision in the procedural law at once raises a strong
The fact that the will was allowed during the lifetime of the testator meant merely that the presumption that it has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the court over the subject
partition and distribution of the estate was to be suspended until the latters death. In matter. In plain words, it is just a matter of method, of convenience to the parties.
other words, the petitioner, instead of filing a new petition for the issuance of letters
Indeed, the jurisdiction over probate proceedings and settlement of estates with His claim to being a creditor of the estate is a belated one, having been raised for the
approximate value of over P100,000.00 (outside Metro Manila) or P200,000.00 (in Metro first time only in his reply to the opposition to his motion to intervene, and, as far as the
Manila) belongs to the regional trial courts under B.P. Blg. 129, as amended. The records show, not supported by evidence.
different branches comprising each court in one judicial region do not possess
jurisdictions independent of and incompatible with each other. . . . . [T]he opposition must come from one with a direct interest in the estate or the will,
and the private respondent has none. Moreover, the ground cited in the private
It is noteworthy that, although Rule 73, 1 applies insofar as the venue of the petition for respondents opposition, that the petitioner has deliberately misdeclared the truth worth
probate of the will of Dr. De Santos is concerned, it does not bar other branches of the and value of the estate, is not relevant to the question of her competency to act as
same court from taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of the testator after his executor. Section 2, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court requires only an allegation of the
death. As held in the leading case of Bacalso v. Ramolote: probable value and character of the property of the estate. The true value can be
determined later on in the course of the settlement of the estate.
The various branches of the Court of First Instance of Cebu under the Fourteenth
Judicial District, are a coordinate and co-equal courts, and the totality of which is only Rule 79, 1 provides:
one Court of First Instance. The jurisdiction is vested in the court, not in the judges. And
when a case is filed in one branch, jurisdiction over the case does not attach to the Opposition to issuance of letters testamentary. Simultaneous petition for administration. -
branch or judge alone, to the exclusion of the other branches. Trial may be held or Any person interested in a will may state in writing the grounds why letters testamentary
proceedings continue by and before another branch or judge. It is for this reason that should not issue to the persons named therein as executors, or any of them, and the
Section 57 of the Judiciary Act expressly grants to the Secretary of Justice, the court, after hearing upon notice, shall pass upon the sufficiency of such grounds. A
administrative right or power to apportion the cases among the different branches, both petition may, at the same time, be filed for letters of administration with the will annexed.
for the convenience of the parties and for the coordination of the work by the different
branches of the same court. The apportionment and distribution of cases does not Under this provision, it has been held that an "interested person" is one who would be
involve a grant or limitation of jurisdiction, the jurisdiction attaches and continues to be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such
vested in the Court of First Instance of the province, and the trials may be held by any as a creditor, and whose interest is material and direct, not merely incidental or
branch or judge of the court. contingent.17cräläwvirtualibräry
Necessarily, therefore, Branch 65 of the RTC of Makati City has jurisdiction over Sp. Even if petitioner is the nearest next of kin of Dr. De Santos, he cannot be considered an
Proc. No. M-4343. "heir" of the testator. It is a fundamental rule of testamentary succession that one who
has no compulsory or forced heirs may dispose of his entire estate by will. Thus, Art. 842
Second. Petitioner claims the right to intervene in and oppose the petition for issuance of of the Civil Code provides:
letters testamentary filed by private respondent. He argues that, as the nearest next of
kin and creditor of the testator, his interest in the matter is material and direct. In ruling One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all his estate or any part of it in
that petitioner has no right to intervene in the proceedings before Branch 65 of RTC- favor of any person having capacity to succeed.
Makati City, the Court of Appeals held:
One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he does not
The private respondent herein is not an heir or legatee under the will of the decedent contravene the provisions of this Code with regard to the legitimate of said heirs.
Arturo de Santos. Neither is he a compulsory heir of the latter. As the only and nearest
collateral relative of the decedent, he can inherit from the latter only in case of intestacy.
Compulsory heirs are limited to the testators -
Since the decedent has left a will which has already been probated and disposes of all
his properties the private respondent can inherit only if the said will is annulled. His
interest in the decedents estate is, therefore, not direct or immediate. (1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and
ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their On the other hand, the petition for issuance of letters testamentary was filed by private
legitimate children and descendants; respondent, as executor of the estate of Dr. De Santos, for the purpose of securing
authority from the Court to administer the estate and put into effect the will of the testator.
(3) The widow or widower; The estate settlement proceedings commenced by the filing of the petition terminates
upon the distribution and delivery of the legacies and devises to the persons named in
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction; the will. Clearly, there is no identity between the two petitions, nor was the latter filed
during the pendency of the former. There was, consequently, no forum shopping.
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of the Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decisions of the Court of Appeals are
hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
Petitioner, as nephew of the testator, is not a compulsory heir who may have been
preterited in the testators will.
DIGEST: MALOLES VS. PHILIPPS
Nor does he have any right to intervene in the settlement proceedings based on his
FACTS:
allegation that he is a creditor of the deceased. Since the testator instituted or named an
On July 20, 1995, Dr. Arturo de Santos, Filipino and a resident of Makati City, filed
executor in his will, it is incumbent upon the Court to respect the desires of the testator.
a petition for probate of his will 1 in the Regional Trial Court. He alleged that he had no
As we stated in Ozaeta v. Pecson:
compulsory heirs; that he had named in his will as sole legatee and devisee
the Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc.; that he disposed by his will his properties with
The choice of his executor is a precious prerogative of a testator, a necessary an approximate value of not less than P2,000,000.00; and that copies of said will were
concomitant of his right to dispose of his property in the manner he wishes. It is natural in the custody of the named executrix, private respondent Pacita de los Reyes Phillips.
that the testator should desire to appoint one of his confidence, one who can be trusted
to carry out his wishes in the disposal of his estate. The curtailment of this right may be Petitioner Octavio S. Maloles II filed a motion for intervention claiming that, as
considered a curtailment of the right to dispose. the only child of Alicia de Santos (testator’s sister) and Octavio L. Maloles, Sr., he was
the sole full-blooded nephew and nearest of kin of Dr. De Santos. He likewise alleged
Only if the appointed executor is incompetent, refuses the trust, or fails to give bond may that he was a creditor of the testator. Petitioner thus prayed for the reconsideration of
the court appoint other persons to administer the estate.20 None of these circumstances the order allowing the will and the issuance of letters of administration in his name.
is present in this case.
Third. Petitioner contends that private respondent is guilty of forum shopping when she ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner, being a creditor of the late Dr. Arturo de
filed the petition for issuance of letters testamentary (Sp. Proc. No. M-4343) while the Santos, has a right to intervene and oppose the petition for issuance of letters
probate proceedings (Sp. Proc. No. M-4223) were still pending. According to petitioner, testamentary filed by the respondent
there is identity of parties, rights asserted, and reliefs prayed for in the two actions which
are founded on the same facts, and a judgment in either will result in res judicata in the HELD:
other. NO.
This contention has no merit. As stated earlier, the petition for probate was filed by Dr. The petitioner in this case avers that, as the nearest next of kin and creditor of the
De Santos, the testator, solely for the purpose of authenticating his will. Upon the testator, his interest in the matter is material and direct. Even if petitioner is the nearest
allowance of his will, the proceedings were terminated. next of kin of Dr. De Santos, he cannot be considered an “heir” of the testator. It is a
fundamental rule of testamentary succession that one who has no compulsory or forced
heirs may dispose of his entire estate by will. Thus, Article 842 of the Civil
Code provides:
For review on certiorari are the Decision1 dated July 31, 2003 and Resolution2 dated
1. “One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all his estate or any October 21, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55330, which affirmed the
part of it in favor of any person having capacity to succeed.” Order3 dated September 29, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 59, Makati
City, in SP Proc. No. M-2330 for the probate of a will.
2. “One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he does
not contravene the provisions of this Code with regard to the legitimate of said The facts are as follows.
heirs.”
On January 31, 1990, Dr. Werner Karl Johann Nittscher filed with the RTC of Makati City
Compulsory heirs are limited to the testator’s — a petition for the probate of his holographic will and for the issuance of letters
testamentary to herein respondent Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales.
Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate
parents and ascendants;
On September 19, 1991, after hearing and with due notice to the compulsory heirs, the
In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their
probate court issued an order allowing the said holographic will, thus:
legitimate children and descendants;
The widow or widower; WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Holographic Will of the petitioner-
testator Dr. Werner J. Nittscher executed pursuant to the provision of the second
Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction; paragraph of Article 838 of the Civil Code of the Philippines on January 25, 1990
in Manila, Philippines, and proved in accordance with the provision of Rule 76 of
Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of the Civil Code. the Revised Rules of Court is hereby allowed.
Petitioner, as nephew of the testator, is not a compulsory heir who may have SO ORDERED.4
been preterited in the testator’s will. Nor does he have any right to intervene in the
settlement proceedings based on his allegation that he is a creditor of the deceased. On September 26, 1994, Dr. Nittscher died. Hence, Atty. Nogales filed a petition for
Since the testator instituted or named an executor in his will, it is incumbent upon the letters testamentary for the administration of the estate of the deceased. Dr. Nittscher’s
Court to respect the desires of the testator. Only if the appointed executor is surviving spouse, herein petitioner Cynthia V. Nittscher, moved for the dismissal of the
incompetent, refuses the trust, or fails to give bond may the court appoint other persons said petition. However, the court in its September 29, 1995 Order denied petitioner’s
to administer the estate. None of these circumstances is present in this case. motion to dismiss, and granted respondent’s petition for the issuance of letters
testamentary, to wit:
In view of all the foregoing, the motion to dismiss is DENIED. The petition for the
CYNTHIA V. NITTSCHER issuance of Letters Testamentary, being in order, is GRANTED.
VS. DR. WERNER KARL JOHANN NITTSCHER (DECEASED), ATTY. ROGELIO P.
NOGALES AND THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI (BRANCH 59) Section 4, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court, provides "when a will has been
G.R. NO. 160530 proved and allowed, the court shall issue letters testamentary thereon to the
NOVEMBER 20, 2007 person named as executor therein, if he is competent, accepts the trust and gives
a bond as required by these rules." In the case at bar, petitioner Atty. Rogelio P.
DECISION Nogales of the R.P. Nogales Law Offices has been named executor under the
QUISUMBING, J.: Holographic Will of Dr. Werner J. Nittscher. As prayed for, let Letters
Testamentary be issued to Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, the executor named in the
Will, without a bond.
SO ORDERED.5 IV.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but her motion was denied for lack of merit. On THE CA ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE PETITIONER WAS NOT
May 9, 1996, Atty. Nogales was issued letters testamentary and was sworn in as DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW BY THE LOWER COURT.7
executor.
Petitioner contends that respondent’s petition for the issuance of letters testamentary
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals alleging that respondent’s petition for the lacked a certification against forum-shopping. She adds that the RTC has no jurisdiction
issuance of letters testamentary should have been dismissed outright as the RTC had no over the subject matter of this case because Dr. Nittscher was allegedly not a resident of
jurisdiction over the subject matter and that she was denied due process. the Philippines; neither did he leave real properties in the country. Petitioner claims that
the properties listed for disposition in her husband’s will actually belong to her. She
The appellate court dismissed the appeal, thus: insists she was denied due process of law because she did not receive by personal
service the notices of the proceedings.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED and
the assailed Order is AFFIRMED in toto. The court a quo is ordered to proceed Respondent Atty. Nogales, however, counters that Dr. Nittscher did reside and own real
with dispatch in the proceedings below. properties in Las Piñas, Metro Manila. He stresses that petitioner was duly notified of the
probate proceedings. Respondent points out that petitioner even appeared in court to
SO ORDERED.6 oppose the petition for the issuance of letters testamentary and that she also filed a
motion to dismiss the said petition. Respondent maintains that the petition for the
issuance of letters testamentary need not contain a certification against forum-shopping
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the aforequoted decision was denied for lack of
as it is merely a continuation of the original proceeding for the probate of the will.
merit. Hence, the present petition anchored on the following grounds:
We resolve to deny the petition.
I.
As to the first issue, Revised Circular No. 28-918 and Administrative Circular No. 04-
BOTH THE CA AND THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING
949 of the Court require a certification against forum-shopping for all initiatory pleadings
OUTRIGHT THE PETITION FOR LETTERS … TESTAMENTARY FILED BY
filed in court. However, in this case, the petition for the issuance of letters testamentary is
ATTY. NOGALES WHEN, OBVIOUSLY, IT WAS FILED IN VIOLATION OF
not an initiatory pleading, but a mere continuation of the original petition for the probate
REVISED CIRCULAR NO. 28-91 AND ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 04-94
of Dr. Nittscher’s will. Hence, respondent’s failure to include a certification against forum-
OF THIS HONORABLE COURT.
shopping in his petition for the issuance of letters testamentary is not a ground for
outright dismissal of the said petition.
II.
Anent the second issue, Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court provides:
THE CA ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE LOWER COURT [HAS] NO
JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE PRESENT SUIT.
SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. – If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an
III. alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his
estate settled, in the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) in
THE CA ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT SUMMONS WERE PROPERLY the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an
ISSUED TO THE PARTIES AND ALL PERSONS INTERESTED IN THE inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial
PROBATE OF THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL OF DR. NITTSCHER. Court) of any province in which he had estate. … (Emphasis supplied.)
In this case, the RTC and the Court of Appeals are one in their finding that Dr. Nittscher No pronouncement as to costs.
was a resident of Las Piñas, Metro Manila at the time of his death. Such factual finding,
which we find supported by evidence on record, should no longer be disturbed. Time and SO ORDERED.
again we have said that reviews on certiorari are limited to errors of law. Unless there is
a showing that the findings of the lower court are totally devoid of support or are glaringly
erroneous, this Court will not analyze or weigh evidence all over again.10
DIGEST: NITTSCHER VS. NITTSCHER
Hence, applying the aforequoted rule, Dr. Nittscher correctly filed in the RTC of Makati
City, which then covered Las Piñas, Metro Manila, the petition for the probate of his will FACTS:
and for the issuance of letters testamentary to respondent. Dr. Werner Karl Johann Nittscher filed with the RTC of Makati City a petition for the
probate of his holographic will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to herein
Regarding the third and fourth issues, we note that Dr. Nittscher asked for the allowance respondent Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales. the probate court issued an order allowing the said
of his own will. In this connection, Section 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court states: holographic will. On September 26, 1994, Dr. Nittscher died. Hence, Atty. Nogales filed a
petition for letters testamentary for the administration of the estate of the deceased. Dr.
SEC. 4. Heirs, devisees, legatees, and executors to be notified by mail or Nittscher’s surviving spouse Cynthia V. Nittscher, she moved for the dismissal of the said
personally. – … petition. However, the court petitioner’s motion to dismiss, and granted respondent’s
petition for the issuance of letters testamentary. Motion for reconsideration denied for
If the testator asks for the allowance of his own will, notice shall be sent only to lack of merit. On appeal, the CA dismissed the case.
his compulsory heirs.
Cynthia contends that Nogales petition lacked a certification against forum
In this case, records show that petitioner, with whom Dr. Nittscher had no child, and Dr. shopping. She adds, the RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter because Dr.
Nittscher’s children from his previous marriage were all duly notified, by registered mail, Werner was allegedly not a resident of the Philippines.
of the probate proceedings. Petitioner even appeared in court to oppose respondent’s
petition for the issuance of letters testamentary and she also filed a motion to dismiss the
said petition. She likewise filed a motion for reconsideration of the issuance of the letters ISSUE: WON Cynthia’s contentions are correct .
testamentary and of the denial of her motion to dismiss. We are convinced petitioner was
accorded every opportunity to defend her cause. Therefore, petitioner’s allegation that HELD:
she was denied due process in the probate proceedings is without basis. NO. Revised Circular No. 28-91 and Administrative Circular No. 04-94 of the Court
require a certification against forum-shopping for all initiatory pleadings filed in court.
However, in this case, the petition for the issuance of letters testamentary is not an
As a final word, petitioner should realize that the allowance of her husband’s will is
initiatory pleading, but a mere continuation of the original petition for the probate of Dr.
conclusive only as to its due execution.11 The authority of the probate court is limited to
Nittscher’s will. Hence, respondent’s failure to include a certification against forum-
ascertaining whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in
shopping in his petition for the issuance of letters testamentary is not a ground for
accordance with the formalities prescribed by law.12 Thus, petitioner’s claim of title to the
outright dismissal of the said petition.
properties forming part of her husband’s estate should be settled in an ordinary action
before the regular courts.
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. – If the
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision dated July decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death,
31, 2003 and Resolution dated October 21, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of
No. 55330, which affirmed the Order dated September 29, 1995 of the Regional Trial administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance
Court, Branch 59, Makati City, in SP Proc. No. M-2330 are AFFIRMED. (now Regional Trial Court) in the province in which he resides at the time
of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of Except as to alleged error in the admission of certain testimony as to the handwriting of
First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of any province in which he had the deceased, the appellant's assignment of errors deals exclusively with alleged errors
estate. … (Emphasis supplied.) of the trial court in accepting as true or declining to believe the testimony of certain
witnesses. The trial judge saw and heard these witnesses testify, and there is nothing in
In this case, the RTC and the Court of Appeals are one in their finding that Dr. Nittscher the record which would justify us in disturbing his findings as to the respective credibility
was a resident of Las Piñas, Metro Manila at the time of his death. or lack of credibility of the various witnesses. Accepting these findings as we do there
Hence, applying the aforequoted rule, Dr. Nittscher correctly filed in the RTC of can be no doubt as to the correctness of the conclusions of the court below touching the
Makati City, which then covered Las Piñas, Metro Manila, the petition for the probate of time, form, and manner in which the instrument in question was executed.
his will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to respondent.
It is not necessary to make an express ruling at this time as to whether or not certain
Furthermore, Dr. Nittscher asked for the allowance of his own will. In this witnesses who testified as to the genuineness of certain signatures of the deceased were
connection, Section 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court states: properly qualified as handwriting experts. The genuineness of the signatures in question
was duly established in the manner and form prescribed in section 327 of the Code of
SEC. 4. Heirs, devisees, legatees, and executors to be notified by mail Civil Procedure; and, indeed, these signatures appear to have been admitted in evidence
or personally. – … as genuine signatures of the deceased without objection by the appellant. In like manner
the other matters testified to by the alleged handwriting experts appear to have been
If the testator asks for the allowance of his own will, notice shall be sent only to established by other evidence in the record, and it is quite clear from the opinion filed by
his compulsory heirs. the trial judge that he relied rather on his own opinion, after comparison of the
undoubtedly genuine signature of the deceased with the signature attached to the
In this case, records show that petitioner, with whom Dr. Nittscher had no child, alleged will as authorized in the section of the Code of Civil Procedure just mentioned,
and Dr. Nittscher’s children from his previous marriage were all duly notified, by rather than upon the statements of the alleged experts. We agree with his conclusions in
registered mail, of the probate proceedings. Petitioner even appeared in court to oppose this regard and even if it were held that these handwriting experts had failed to qualify as
respondent’s petition for the issuance of letters testamentary and she also filed a motion such, the admission of their evidence in the record would at most be error without
to dismiss the said petition. She likewise filed a motion for reconsideration of the prejudice.
issuance of the letters testamentary and of the denial of her motion to dismiss. We are
convinced petitioner was accorded every opportunity to defend her cause. Therefore, At the conclusion of appellant's brief some question is raised as to whether the appellee
petitioner’s allegation that she was denied due process in the probate proceedings is had sufficient interest in the estate of the deceased to maintain his opposition to the
without basis. admission of the alleged will to probate. This question does not appear to have been
raised in the court below, and no error is assigned as to the action of the trial judge with
regard thereto. It is very clear that counsel for appellant cannot be heard to raise this
PRIMITIVA PARAS VS. LUDOVICO NARCISO question for the first time in a passing comment in his brief filed on appeal.
G.R. NO. 10959
NOVEMBER 2, 1916
We do not doubt that before any person may intervene in proceedings had in the Courts
CARSON, J.:
of First Instance for the probate of a will, he should be required to show an interest in the
will or in the property affected thereby either as executor or otherwise; and that strangers
This is an appeal from a judgment denying probate to a document purporting to be the should not be permitted. over the objection of the real parties in interest, to embarras the
last will and testament of Mariano Magsino, deceased, on the ground that it had not been proceedings by meddling or intruding themselves in matters with which they have no
executed by the deceased; that the signature thereto was forged; and that the instrument concern.
had been prepared and signed by the witnesses after the death of the alleged testator.
The admission to probate of a will may be opposed or contested by, and only by, DIGEST: PARAS VS. NARCISO
persons having some interest in the estate which will be affected and concluded by the
probate of the proposed will. (40 Cyc., 1230, and cases cited.). Topic/Doctrine: In relation to Allowance and Disallowance of Wills
But the mere fact that a stranger has been permitted to oppose or contest the probate of FACTS:
a will is not reversible error and does not invalidate the proceedings where no objection An appeal denying probate of a document purporting to be the last will and
is interposed by any of the parties in interest .The judgment of the court in probate testament of the deceased named Mariano Magsino, on the ground that the signature
proceedings is not based on the fact that there is or is not opposition to the probate of thereto was forged; and that the instrument had been prepared and signed by the
the will but upon the production of evidence which discloses that there are or are not witnesses after the death of the alleged testator. The alleged error in the admission of
sufficient grounds for the probate of the will as propounded; and the reason for the rule certain testimony as to the handwriting of the deceased, the appellant’s assignment of
excluding strangers from contesting the will, is not that thereby the court may be errors deals exclusively with alleged errors of the trial court in accepting as true or
prevented from learning facts which would justify or necessitate a denial of probate, but declining to believe the testimony of certain witnesses. The trial judge saw and heard
rather that the courts and the litigants should not be molested by the intervention in the these witnesses testify, and there is nothing in the record which would justify us in
proceedings of persons with no interest in the estate which would entitle them to be disturbing his findings as to the respective credibility or lack of credibility of the various
heard with relation thereto. witnesses.
In the case at bar no objection was made in the court below to the intervention of the
contestant, and no motion was made either in that court or in this to exclude the ISSUE: Whether or not certain witnesses who testified as to the genuineness of certain
contestant. We conclude therefore that, assuming that this contestant had no interest in signatures of the deceased were properly qualified as handwriting experts.
the estate, a fact which, is substantially conceded in the brief submitted by his counsel,
nevertheless, his intervention in the proceedings, in the absence of objection by any HELD:
interested party, did not constitute reversible error. The genuineness of the signatures in question was duly established in the
manner and form prescribed in section 327 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and, indeed,
It is to be observed further that the judgment of the court below, denying probate to the these signatures appear to have been admitted in evidence as genuine signatures of the
instrument propounded as the last will and testament of Mariano Magsino, deceased, deceased without objection by the appellant. In like manner the other matters testified to
was based on the evidence introduced at the hearing on the probate proceedings. That by the alleged handwriting experts appear to have been established by other evidence in
evidence, as we have said, fully sustains the findings of the probate judge that this the record, and it is quite clear from the opinion filed by the trial judge that he relied
instrument is not the last will and testament of the deceased .No objection was made to rather on his own opinion, after comparison of the undoubtedly genuine signature of the
the introduction of this evidence on the ground that it was submitted by a stranger who deceased with the signature attached to the alleged will as authorized in the section of
should not have been permitted to intervene in the proceedings .Having been admitted to the Code of Civil Procedure just mentioned, rather than upon the statements of the
record without objection, and being competent, relevant and material, and conclusive in alleged experts. It is to be observed further that the judgment of the court below, denying
support of the judgment of the trial court, it would be absurd for us to hold that the probate to the instrument propounded as the last will and testament of Mariano Magsino,
judgment below erred in basing his judgment thereon, merely on the ground that on deceased, was based on the evidence introduced at the hearing on the probate
appeal it is made to appear or is admitted that the contestant had no interest in the proceedings. That evidence, as we have said, fully sustains the findings of the probate
estate. Whether the contestant had or had not any right to intervene, the evidence judge that this instrument is not the last will and testament of the deceased.
submitted at the trial without objection, conclusively sustains the findings of the trial judge
on which he properly based his denial of probate.
CONSTANTINO C. ACAIN
The judgment entered in the court below should be affirmed, with costs of this instance VS. IAC, VIRGINIA A. FERNANDEZ AND ROSA DIONGSON
against the appellant .SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 72706
OCTOBER 27, 1987
Concepcion, Quirina, laura, Flores, Antonio and Jose, all
PARAS, J.: surnamed Acain.
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision * of respondent. Court of Appeals Obviously, Segundo pre-deceased Nemesio. Thus it is the children of Segundo who are
in AC-G.R. SP No. 05744 promulgated on August 30, 1985 (Rollo, p. 108) ordering the claiming to be heirs, with Constantino as the petitioner in Special Proceedings No. 591
dismissal of the petition in Special Proceedings No, 591 ACEB and its Resolution issued ACEB
on October 23, 1985 (Rollo, p. 72) denying respondents' (petitioners herein) motion for
reconsideration. After the petition was set for hearing in the lower court on June 25, 1984 the oppositors
(respondents herein Virginia A. Fernandez, a legally adopted daughter of tile deceased
The dispositive portion of the questioned decision reads as follows: and the latter's widow Rosa Diongson Vda. de Acain filed a motion to dismiss on the
following grounds for the petitioner has no legal capacity to institute these proceedings;
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted and respondent Regional (2) he is merely a universal heir and (3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been
Trial Court of the Seventh Judicial Region, Branch XIII (Cebu City), is pretirited. (Rollo, p. 158). Said motion was denied by the trial judge.
hereby ordered to dismiss the petition in Special Proceedings No. 591
ACEB No special pronouncement is made as to costs. After the denial of their subsequent motion for reconsideration in the lower court,
respondents filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
The antecedents of the case, based on the summary of the Intermediate Appellate Court, preliminary injunction which was subsequently referred to the Intermediate Appellate
now Court of Appeals, (Rollo, pp. 108-109) are as follows: Court by Resolution of the Court dated March 11, 1985 (Memorandum for Petitioner, p.
3; Rollo, p. 159).
On May 29, 1984 petitioner Constantino Acain filed on the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
City Branch XIII, a petition for the probate of the will of the late Nemesio Acain and for Respondent Intermediate Appellate Court granted private respondents' petition and
the issuance to the same petitioner of letters testamentary, docketed as Special ordered the trial court to dismiss the petition for the probate of the will of Nemesio Acain
Proceedings No. 591 ACEB (Rollo, p. 29), on the premise that Nemesio Acain died in Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB
leaving a will in which petitioner and his brothers Antonio, Flores and Jose and his sisters
Anita, Concepcion, Quirina and Laura were instituted as heirs. The will allegedly His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed this present petition
executed by Nemesio Acain on February 17, 1960 was written in Bisaya (Rollo, p. 27) for the review of respondent Court's decision on December 18, 1985 (Rollo, p. 6).
with a translation in English (Rollo, p. 31) submi'tted by petitioner without objection raised Respondents' Comment was filed on June 6, 1986 (Rollo, p. 146).
by private respondents. The will contained provisions on burial rites, payment of debts,
and the appointment of a certain Atty. Ignacio G. Villagonzalo as the executor of the On August 11, 1986 the Court resolved to give due course to the petition (Rollo, p. 153).
testament. On the disposition of the testator's property, the will provided: Respondents' Memorandum was filed on September 22, 1986 (Rollo, p. 157); the
Memorandum for petitioner was filed on September 29, 1986 (Rollo, p. 177).
THIRD: All my shares that I may receive from our properties.
house, lands and money which I earned jointly with my wife Rosa Petitioner raises the following issues (Memorandum for petitioner, p. 4):
Diongson shall all be given by me to my brother SEGUNDO
ACAIN Filipino, widower, of legal age and presently residing at (A) The petition filed in AC-G.R. No. 05744 for certiorari and prohibition with
357-C Sanciangko Street, Cebu City. In case my brother Segundo preliminary injunction is not the proper remedy under the premises;
Acain pre-deceased me, all the money properties, lands, houses
there in Bantayan and here in Cebu City which constitute my share
(B) The authority of the probate courts is limited only to inquiring into the
shall be given to me to his children, namely: Anita, Constantino,
extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated and it cannot pass upon the
intrinsic validity thereof before it is admitted to probate;
(C) The will of Nemesio Acain is valid and must therefore, be admitted to the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir, there is no preterition even if she is omitted
probate. The preterition mentioned in Article 854 of the New Civil Code from the inheritance, for she is not in the direct line. (Art. 854, Civil code) however, the
refers to preterition of "compulsory heirs in the direct line," and does not same thing cannot be said of the other respondent Virginia A. Fernandez, whose legal
apply to private respondents who are not compulsory heirs in the direct line; adoption by the testator has not been questioned by petitioner (.Memorandum for the
their omission shall not annul the institution of heirs; Petitioner, pp. 8-9). Under Article 39 of P.D. No. 603, known as the Child and Youth
Welfare Code, adoption gives to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he
(D) DICAT TESTATOR ET MERIT LEX. What the testator says will be the were a legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted person a legal heir of the
law; adopter. It cannot be denied that she has totally omitted and preterited in the will of the
testator and that both adopted child and the widow were deprived of at least their
(E) There may be nothing in Article 854 of the New Civil Code, that suggests legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were not expressly disinherited. Hence, this is
that mere institution of a universal heir in the will would give the heir so a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted child.
instituted a share in the inheritance but there is a definite distinct intention of
the testator in the case at bar, explicitly expressed in his will. This is what Pretention annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open to intestate
matters and should be in violable. succession the entire inheritance including "la porcion libre (que) no hubiese dispuesto
en virtual de legado mejora o donacion" Maniesa as cited in Nuguid v. Nuguid, supra;
(F) As an instituted heir, petitioner has the legal interest and standing to file Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA [1982]). The only provisions which do not
the petition in Sp. Proc. No. 591 ACEB for probate of the will of Nemesio result in intestacy are the legacies and devises made in the will for they should stand
Acain and valid and respected, except insofar as the legitimes are concerned.
(G) Article 854 of the New Civil Code is a bill of attainder. It is therefore The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters to the entire
unconstitutional and ineffectual. inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will because the nullification of
such institution of universal heirs-without any other testamentary disposition in the will-
amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written. Carefully worded and in clear
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not private respondents have been pretirited.
terms, Article 854 of the Civil Code offers no leeway for inferential interpretation (Nuguid
v. Nuguid), supra. No legacies nor devises having been provided in the will the whole
Article 854 of the Civil Code provides: property of the deceased has been left by universal title to petitioner and his brothers and
sisters. The effect of annulling the "Institution of heirs will be, necessarily, the opening of
Art. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory a total intestacy (Neri v. Akutin, 74 Phil. 185 [1943]) except that proper legacies and
heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or devises must, as already stated above, be respected.
born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the
devisees and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not; inofficious. We now deal with another matter. In order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a
probate proceeding he must have an interest iii the estate, or in the will, or in the property
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution to be affected by it either as executor or as a claimant of the estate and an interested
shall he effectual, without prejudice to the right of representation. party is one who would be benefited by the estate such as an heir or one who has a
claim against the estate like a creditor (Sumilang v. Ramagosa, 21 SCRA 1369/1967).
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of Petitioner is not the appointed executor, neither a devisee or a legatee there being no
them either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are mention in the testamentary disposition of any gift of an individual item of personal or real
neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited (Nuguid v. Nuguid, 17 SCRA 450 property he is called upon to receive (Article 782, Civil Code). At the outset, he appears
[1966]; Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478 [1982]). Insofar as the widow is to have an interest in the will as an heir, defined under Article 782 of the Civil Code as a
concerned, Article 854 of the Civil Code may not apply as she does not ascend or person called to the succession either by the provision of a will or by operation of law.
descend from the testator, although she is a compulsory heir. Stated otherwise, even if However, intestacy having resulted from the preterition of respondent adopted child and
the universal institution of heirs, petitioner is in effect not an heir of the testator. He has Result: waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These are the
no legal standing to petition for the probate of the will left by the deceased and Special practical considerations that induce us to a belief that we might as well meet
Proceedings No. 591 A-CEB must be dismissed. head-on the issue of the validity of the provisions of the will in question. After
all there exists a justiciable controversy crying for solution.
As a general rule certiorari cannot be a substitute for appeal, except when the
questioned order is an oppressive exercise of j judicial authority (People v. Villanueva, In Saguimsim v. Lindayag (6 SCRA 874 [1962]) the motion to dismiss the petition by the
110 SCRA 465 [1981]; Vda. de Caldito v. Segundo, 117 SCRA 573 [1982]; Co Chuan surviving spouse was grounded on petitioner's lack of legal capacity to institute the
Seng v. Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA 308 [1984]; and Bautista v. Sarmiento, 138 SCRA proceedings which was fully substantiated by the evidence during the hearing held in
587 [1985]). It is axiomatic that the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are not available connection with said motion. The Court upheld the probate court's order of dismissal.
where the petitioner has the remedy of appeal or some other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the course of law (DD Comendador Construction Corporation v. Sayo (118 In Cayetano v. Leonides, supra one of the issues raised in the motion to dismiss the
SCRA 590 [1982]). They are, however, proper remedies to correct a grave abuse of petition deals with the validity of the provisions of the will. Respondent Judge allowed the
discretion of the trial court in not dismissing a case where the dismissal is founded on probate of the will. The Court held that as on its face the will appeared to have preterited
valid grounds (Vda. de Bacang v. Court of Appeals, 125 SCRA 137 [1983]). the petitioner the respondent judge should have denied its probate outright. Where
circumstances demand that intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions be passed upon
Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB is for the probate of a will. As stated by respondent even before the extrinsic validity of the will is resolved, the probate court should meet the
Court, the general rule is that the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic issue. (Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals, supra; Nuguid v. Nuguid, supra).
validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the testator's testamentary capacity and the
compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of In the instant case private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition in Sp.
the will normally comes only after the Court has declared that the will has been duly Proceedings No. 591 ACEB of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu on the following
authenticated. Said court at this stage of the proceedings is not called upon to rule on the grounds: (1) petitioner has no legal capacity to institute the proceedings; (2) he is merely
intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will (Nuguid v. Nuguid, 17 SCRA 449 a universal heir; and (3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been preterited
[1966]; Sumilang v. Ramagosa, supra; Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478 (Rollo, p. 158). It was denied by the trial court in an order dated January 21, 1985 for the
[1982]; Cayetano v. Leonides, 129 SCRA 522 [1984]; and Nepomuceno v. Court of reason that "the grounds for the motion to dismiss are matters properly to be resolved
Appeals, 139 SCRA 206 [1985]). after a hearing on the issues in the course of the trial on the merits of the case (Rollo, p.
32). A subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court on February
The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Under exceptional circumstances, the 15, 1985 (Rollo, p. 109).
probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon
certain provisions of the will (Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals, supra). In Nuguid v. For private respondents to have tolerated the probate of the will and allowed the case to
Nuguid the oppositors to the probate moved to dismiss on the ground of absolute progress when on its face the will appears to be intrinsically void as petitioner and his
preteriton The probate court acting on the motion held that the will in question was a brothers and sisters were instituted as universal heirs coupled with the obvious fact that
complete nullity and dismissed the petition without costs. On appeal the Supreme Court one of the private respondents had been preterited would have been an exercise in
upheld the decision of the probate court, induced by practical considerations. The Court futility. It would have meant a waste of time, effort, expense, plus added futility. The trial
said: court could have denied its probate outright or could have passed upon the intrinsic
validity of the testamentary provisions before the extrinsic validity of the will was resolved
We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will, (Cayetano v. Leonides, supra; Nuquid v. Nuguid, supra. The remedies of certiorari and
nothing will be gained. On the contrary, this litigation will be protracted. And prohibition were properly availed of by private respondents.
for aught that appears in the record, in the event of probate or if the court
rejects the will, probability exists that the case will come up once again Thus, this Court ruled that where the grounds for dismissal are indubitable, the
before us on the same issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. defendants had the right to resort to the more speedy, and adequate remedies of
certiorari and prohibition to correct a grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devisees and legacies shall be valid
jurisdiction, committed by the trial court in not dismissing the case, (Vda. de Bacang v. insofar as they are not inofficious.
Court of Appeals, supra) and even assuming the existence of the remedy of appeal, the
Court harkens to the rule that in the broader interests of justice, a petition for certiorari If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall
may be entertained, particularly where appeal would not afford speedy and adequate be effectual, without prejudice to the right of representation. Preterition consists in the
relief. (Maninang Court of Appeals, supra). omission in the testator’s will of the forced heirs or anyone of them either because they
are not mentioned therein, or though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit and the are expressly disinherited. Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article 854 may not apply
questioned decision of respondent Court of Appeals promulgated on August 30, 1985 as she does not ascend or descend from the testator, although she is a compulsory heir.
and its Resolution dated October 23, 1985 are hereby AFFIRMED. However, the same thing cannot be said of the legally adopted daughter.
SO ORDERED. Under Article 39 of P.D. No. 603, known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code,
adoption gives to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a
legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter.
It cannot be denied that she was totally omitted and preterited in the will and that both
the adopted child and the widow were deprived of at least their legitime. Neither can it be
DIGEST: ACAIN VS. IAC denied that they were not expressly disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of preterition
of the legally adopted child.
FACTS:
Constantino Acain filed on the Regional Trial Court a petition for the probate of the The universal institution of Acain together with his brothers and sisters to the entire
will of his late Uncle, Nemesio Acain, on the premise that the latter died leaving a will in inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will because the nullification of
which the former and his brothers and sisters were instituted as heirs. After the petition such institution of universal heirs without any other testamentary disposition in the will
was set for hearing in the lower court, Virginia Fernandez and Rosa Diongson, a legally amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written.
adopted daughter and the widow of the deceased respectively, filed a motion to dismiss
on the grounds that: (1) Constantino Acain has no legal capacity to institute the
proceedings; (2) he is merely a universal heir; and (3) the widow and the adopted
daughter have been pretirited. Said motion was denied as well as the subsequent motion BENEDICTO LEVISTE VS. CA, CFI,
for reconsideration. Consequently, Fernandez and Diongson filed with the Supreme ROSA DEL ROSARIO, RITA BANU, CARMEN DE GUZMAN-MARQUEZ, JESUS R.
Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction which was DE GUZMAN, RAMON R. DE GUZMAN, JACINTO R. DE GUZMAN, & ANTONIO R.
subsequently referred to the Intermediate Appellate Court. IAC granted Fernandez and DE GUZMAN
Diongson’s petition and ordered the trial court to dismiss the petition for probate of the G.R. NO. 29184
will. Due to the denial of Acain’s motion for reconsideration, he then filed a petition for JANUARY 30, 1989
review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.
SYLLABUS
ISSUE: Whether or not Virginia Fernandez and Rosa Diongson have been preterited.
1. CIVIL LAW; SUCCESSION; REPUDIATION; ARTICLE 1052 OF THE CIVIL CODE
HELD: DOES NOT APPLY TO COUNSEL OF A PROSPECTIVE HEIR. — Article 1052 of the
Article 854 of the Civil Code: Civil Code protects the creditor of a repudiating heir. Petitioner is not a creditor of Rosa
del Rosario. The payment of his fees is contingent and dependent upon the successful
The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct probate of the holographic will. Since the petition for probate was dismissed by the lower
line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the court, the contingency did not occur.
It was agreed that petitioner’s contingent fee would be thirty-five per cent (35%) of the
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; AMOUNT OF SHARE, MERELY A BASIS FOR COMPUTATION OF property that Rosa may receive upon the probate of the will (Annex "A", p. 59, Rollo).
CONTINGENT ATTORNEY’S FEES. — Article 1052 presupposes that the obligor is an
heir. Rosa del Rosario is not a legal heir of the late Maxima C. Reselva. Upon the In accordance with their agreement, Leviste performed the following services as Del
dismissal of her petition for probate of the decedent’s will, she lost her right to inherit any Rosario’s counsel:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
part of the latter’s estate. There is nothing for the petitioner to accept in her name. This
Court had ruled in the case of Recto v. Harden, 100 Phil. 1427, that "the contract (for (1) Thoroughly researched and studied the law on probate and succession;
contingent attorney’s fees) neither gives, nor purports to give, to the appellee (lawyer) (2) Looked for and interviewed witnesses, and took their affidavits;
any right whatsoever, personal or real, in and to her (Mrs. Harden’s) aforesaid share in (3) Filed the petition for probate is Special Proceeding No. 58325;
the conjugal partnership. The amount thereof is simply a basis for the computation of (4) Made the proper publications;
said fees."cralaw (5) Presented at the trial the following witnesses:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
3. ID.; ID.; NOT EVERY WILL SHOULD BE FOLLOWED. — The Court of Appeals did a) Eleuterio de Jesus
not err in dismissing the petition for mandamus, for while it is true that, as contended by b) Lucita de Jesu
the petitioner, public policy favors the probate of a will, it does not necessarily follow that c) Purita L. Llane
every will that is presented for probate, should be allowed. The law lays down d) Rita Banu
procedures which should be observed and requisites that should be satisfied before a e) Jesus Lulod.
will may be probated. Those procedures and requirements were not followed in this case
resulting in the disallowance of the will. There being no valid will, the motion to withdraw On August 20, 1965, Leviste received a letter from Ms. Del Rosario, informing him that
the probate petition was inconsequential. she was terminating his services as her counsel due to "conflicting interest." This
consisted, according to the letter, in petitioner’s moral obligation to protect the interest of
4. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; PROBATE; PERSONS INDIRECTLY his brother-in-law, Gaudencio M. Llanes, whom Del Rosario and the other parties in the
EXCLUDED THEREIN. — In Paras v. Narciso, 35 Phil. 244, We had occasion to rule probate proceeding intended to eject as lessee of the property which was bequeathed to
that one who is only indirectly interested in a will may not interfere in its probate. Thus: ". Del Rosario under the will (Annex "B", p. 60, Rollo).
. . the reason for the rule excluding strangers from contesting the will, is not that thereby
the court maybe prevented from learning facts which would justify or necessitate a denial On September 20, 1965, petitioner filed a "Motion to Intervene to Protect His Rights to
of probate, but rather that the courts and the litigants should not be molested by the Fees for Professional Services." (Annex "B", p. 60, Rollo.).
intervention in the proceedings of persons with no interest in the estate which would
entitle them to be heard with relation thereto." (Paras v. Narciso, 35 Phil. 244, 246.) In an order dated November 12, 1965 the trial court denied his motion on the ground that
he had "not filed a claim for attorney’s fees nor recorded his attorney’s lien." (p. 3, Rollo.)
DECISION
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.: On November 23, 1965, petitioner filed a "Formal Statement of Claim or Attorney’s Fees
and Recording of Attorney’s Lien," which was noted in the court’s order of December 20,
The issue in this case is whether or not an attorney who was engaged on a contingent 1965 (Annexes "D" and "E", pp. 63 & 64, Rollo).
fee basis may, in order to collect his fees, prosecute an appeal despite his client’s refusal
to appeal the decision of the trial court. Although the order denying his motion to intervene had become final, petitioner
continued to receive copies of the court’s orders, as well as the pleadings of the other
On September 7, 1963, the petitioner, a practicing attorney, entered into a written parties in the case. He also continued to file pleadings. The case was submitted for
agreement with the private respondent Rosa del Rosario to appear as her counsel in a decision without the respondents’ evidence.
petition for probate of the holographic will of the late Maxima C. Reselva. Under the will,
a piece of real property at Sales Street, Quiapo, Manila, was bequeathed to Del Rosario.
On November 23, 1966, Del Rosario and Rita Banu, the special administratrix-legatee, 3. The Court of Appeals erred in not reversing the decision in Sp. Proc.
filed a "Motion To Withdraw Petition for Probate" alleging that Del Rosario waived her No. 58325 denying the probate of the holographic will of the late
rights to the devise in her favor and agreed that the De Guzman brothers and sisters who Maxima C. Reselva, said decision being patently erroneous.
opposed her petition for probate, shall inherit all the properties left by the decedent.
(Annex "F", p. 65, Rollo.) Under his first assignment of error, petitioner argues that by virtue of his contract of
services with Del Rosario, he is a creditor of the latter, and that under Article 1052 of the
In an order of April 13, 1967 the trial court denied the motion to withdraw the petition for Civil Code which provides:
being contrary to public policy (Annex "G", pp. 66-67, Rollo).
"ART. 1052. If the heir repudiates the inheritance to the prejudice of his own creditors,
Nonetheless, on August 28, 1967, the court disallowed the will, holding that the legal the latter may petition the court to authorize them to accept it in the name of the heir.
requirements for its validity were not satisfied as only two witnesses testified that the will
and the testatrix’s signature were in the handwriting of Maxima Reselva. "The acceptance shall benefit the creditors only to an extent sufficient to cover the
amount of their credits. The excess, should there be any, shall in no case pertain to the
The petitioner filed an appeal bond, notice of appeal, and record on appeal. The private renouncer, but shall be adjudicated to the persons to whom, in accordance with the rules
respondents filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that petitioner was not a established in this Code, it may belong."
party in interest.
he has a right to accept for his client Del Rosario to the extent of 35% thereof the devise
The petitioner opposed the motion to dismiss his appeal, claiming that he has a direct in her favor (which she in effect repudiated) to protect his contingent attorney’s fees.
and material interest in the decision sought to be reviewed. He also asked that he be
substituted as party-petitioner, in lieu of his former client, Ms. Del Rosario. The argument is devoid of merit. Article 1052 of the Civil Code does not apply to this
case. That legal provision protects the creditor of a repudiating heir. Petitioner is not a
On March 28, 1968, the trial judge dismissed the appeal and denied petitioner’s motion creditor of Rosa del Rosario. The payment of his fees is contingent and dependent upon
for substitution: the successful probate of the holographic will. Since the petition for probate was
dismissed by the lower court, the contingency did not occur. Attorney Leviste is not
The petitioner filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for mandamus (CA-G.R. No. 41248) entitled to his fee.
praying that the trial court be ordered to give due course to his appeal and to grant his
motion for substitution. Furthermore, Article 1052 presupposes that the obligor is an heir. Rosa del Rosario is
not a legal heir of the late Maxima C. Reselva. Upon the dismissal of her petition for
On May 22, 1968, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for being insufficient in probate of the decedent’s will, she lost her right to inherit any part of the latter’s estate.
form and substance as the petitioner did not appear to be the proper party to appeal the There is nothing for the petitioner to accept in her name.
decision in Special Proceeding No. 58325 (Annex I, p. 77, Rollo).
This Court had ruled in the case of Recto v. Harden, 100 Phil. 1427, that "the contract
Upon the denial of his motion for reconsideration, petitioner appealed by certiorari to this (for contingent attorney’s fees) neither gives, nor purports to give, to the appellee
Court, assigning the following errors against the Court of Appeals’ resolution: (lawyer) any right whatsoever, personal or real, in and to her (Mrs. Harden’s) aforesaid
1. The Court of Appeals erred in finding that the petitioner appears not share in the conjugal partnership. The amount thereof is simply a basis for the
to be the proper party to appeal the decision in Sp. Proc. No. 58325 of computation of said fees."cralaw virtua1aw library
the Court of First Instance of Manila.
The Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for mandamus, for while it is
2. Assuming the petitioner’s right of appeal is doubtful, the Court of true that, as contended by the petitioner, public policy favors the probate of a will, it does
Appeals erred in dismissing his petition for mandamus; and not necessarily follow that every will that is presented for probate, should be allowed.
The law lays down procedures which should be observed and requisites that should be
satisfied before a will may be probated. Those procedures and requirements were not
followed in this case resulting in the disallowance of the will. There being no valid will, the Petitioner Leviste received a letter from Ms. Del Rosario, informing him that she
motion to withdraw the probate petition was inconsequential.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual was terminating his services as her counsel due to "conflicting interest." (Llanes, the
law library lessee of the subject property whom respondent intends to eject is the brother-in-law of
Petitioner)
Petitioner was not a party to the probate proceeding in the lower court. He had no direct
interest in the probate of the will. His only interest in the estate is an indirect interest as
He filed a motion to intervene but was declined by the court. Despite the notice of
former counsel for a prospective heir. In Paras v. Narciso, 35 Phil. 244, We had occasion
to rule that one who is only indirectly interested in a will may not interfere in its probate. termination of his service, petitioner continued participating in the litigation. Even after
Thus: the will was disallowed by the probate court for failure to observe the formalities required
by law, petitioner appealed the case. He also asked that he be substituted as party-
". . . the reason for the rule excluding strangers from contesting the will, is petitioner, in lieu of his former client, Ms. Del Rosario. The trial judge dismissed the
not that thereby the court maybe prevented from learning facts which would appeal and denied petitioner's motion for substitution.
justify or necessitate a denial of probate, but rather that the courts and the
litigants should not be molested by the intervention in the proceedings of The petitioner filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for mandamus praying that
persons with no interest in the estate which would entitle them to be heard the trial court be ordered to give due course to his appeal and to grant his motion for
with relation thereto." (Paras v. Narciso, 35 Phil. 244, 246.) substitution.
Similary, in Morente v. Firmalino, 40 O.G. 21st Supp. 1, We held: ISSUE: May a person having indirect interest in a will interfere in its probate?
"We are of the opinion that the lower court did not err in holding that
HELD:
notice of an attorney’s lien did not entitle the attorney-appellant to
subrogate himself in lieu of his client. It only gives him the right to collect NO.
a certain amount for his services in case his client is awarded a certain
sum by the court." The dismissal of the petition for mandamus was proper, for while it is true that, as
contended by the petitioner, public policy favors the probate of a will, it does not
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is denied for lack of merit. Costs against the necessarily follow that every will that is presented for probate, should be allowed. The
petitioner. law lays down procedures which should be observed and requisites that should be
satisfied before a will may be probated. Those procedures and requirements were not
SO ORDERED. followed in this case resulting in the disallowance of the will. There being no valid will, the
motion to withdraw the probate petition was inconsequential.
DIGEST: LEVISTE VS. CA Petitioner was not a party to the probate proceeding in the lower court. He had no
direct interest in the probate of the will. His only interest in the estate is an indirect
FACTS:
interest as former counsel for a prospective heir. In Paras vs. Narciso, 35 Phil. 244, We
Petitioner, a practicing attorney, entered into a written agreement with the private
had occassion to rule that one who is only indirectly interested in a will may not interfere
respondent Rosa del Rosario to appear as her counsel in a petition for probate of the
in its probate. Thus:
holographic will of the late Maxima C. Reselva. Under the will, a piece of real property at
Sales Street, Quiapo, Manila, was bequeathed to Del Rosario. It was agreed that
... the reason for the rule excluding strangers from contesting the will, is not
petitioner's contigent fee would be thirty-five per cent (35%) of the property that Rosa
that thereby the court maybe prevented from learning facts which would
may receive upon the probate of the will.
justify or necessitate a denial of probate, but rather that the courts and the 2. The Order of 2 June 1980 finding the signature of the testatrix in the
litigants should not be molested by the intervention in the proceedings of last will and testament to be a forgery and (a) declaring the testatrix as
persons with no interest in the estate which would entitle them to be heard having died intestate; (b) declaring the testamentary dispositions in said
with relation thereto. (Paras vs. Narciso, 35 Phil. 244, 246.) last will and testament as null and void; (c) setting aside the order dated
10 September 1973 declaring the testate proceedings closed and
terminated; (d) revoking the appointment of Jesus Fran as executor while
appointing respondent Concepcion M. Espina as administratrix; and (e)
Similary, in Morente vs. Firmalino, 40 O.G. 21st Supp. 1, We held:
ordering the conversion of the proceedings to one of intestacy. 2 This
Order effectively annulled and set aside the probate judgment of 13
We are of the opinion that the lower court did not err in holding that notice November 1972.
of an attorney's lien did not entitle the attorney-appellant to subrogate
himself in lieu of his client. It only gives him the right to collect a certain Petitioners would also have this Court nullify all other actions of respondent
amount for his services in case his client is awarded a certain sum by the Judge in said Sp. Proc. No. 3309-R; restore the status quo therein prior to the
court. issuance of the foregoing orders; and permanently enjoin respondent Judge from
reopening said proceedings.
The following facts are not controverted:
Remedios M. Vda. de Tiosejo, a widow, died on 10 July 1972 in Cebu City with neither
THE HEIRS OF THE LATE JESUS FRAN AND CARMEN MEJIA RODRIGUEZ
descendants nor ascendants; she left real and personal properties located in Cebu City,
VS. HON. BERNARDO LL. SALAS, CONCEPCION MEJIA ESPINA and MARIA
Ormoc City and Puerto Bello, Merida, Leyte. Earlier, on 23 April 1972, she executed a
MEJIA GANDIONGCO
last will and testament 3 wherein she bequeathed to her collateral relatives (brothers,
G.R. NO. L-53546
sisters, nephews and nieces) all her properties, and designated Rosario Tan or, upon the
JUNE 25, 1992
latter's death, Jesus Fran, as executor to serve without bond. Instrumental witnesses to
the will were Nazario Pacquiao, Alcio Demerre and Primo Miro.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
On 15 July 1972, Jesus Fran filed a petition with the Court of First instance of Cebu for
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
the probate of Remedios' last will and testament. 4 The case was raffled to the original
Court, with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, to annul and set aside, for having
Branch VIII thereof which was then presided over by Judge Antonio D. Cinco. The
been issued without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
petition alleged that Rosario Tan is not physically well and, therefore, will not be
jurisdiction, the following Orders of the respondent Judge in Special Proceedings No.
assuming the position of administratrix. Tan signed a waiver in favor of Jesus Fran on
3309-R of Branch VIII of the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of
the third page of the said petition. The probate court issued an order setting the petition
Cebu entitled "In The Matter of the Petition for Probate of the Last Will and Testament of
for hearing on 18 September 1972. Meanwhile, on 31 July 1972, the court appointed
Remedios Mejia Vda. de Tiosejo:"
petitioner Jesus Fran as special administrator.
1. The Order of 26 February 1980 setting for hearing private respondents'
On 10 August 1972, the private respondents, who are sisters of the deceased, filed a
Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration 1 which was filed six (6) years, ten
manifestation 5 alleging that they needed time to study the petition because some heirs
(10) months and eighteen (18) days after the probate judgment was
who are entitled to receive their respective shares have been intentionally omitted
rendered and six (6) years and twenty-one (21) days after the testate
therein, and praying that they be given ample time to file their opposition, after which the
proceedings was declared closed and terminated; and
hearing be reset to another date.
Private respondents did not file any opposition. Instead, they filed on 18 September 1972 On 4 January 1973, petitioner Fran filed an Inventory of the Estate; 9 copies thereof were
a "Withdrawal of Opposition to the Allowance of Probate (sic) of the Will" wherein they furnished each of the private respondents.
expressly manifested, with their "full knowledge and consent that . . . they have no
objection of (sic) the allowance of the . . . will of the late Remedios Mejia Vda. de Subsequently, a Project of Partition based on the dispositions made in the will and
Tiosejo," and that they have "no objection to the issuance of letters testamentary in favor signed by all the devisees and legatees, with the exception of Luis Fran, Remedios C.
of petitioner, Dr. Jesus Fran." 6 Mejia and respondent Concepcion M. Espina, was submitted by the executor for the
court's approval. 10 Said legatees and devisees submitted certifications wherein they
No other party filed an opposition. The petition thus became uncontested. admit receipt of a copy of the Project of Partition together with the notice of hearing, and
state that they had no objection to its approval. 11
During the initial hearing, petitioner Fran introduced the requisite evidence to establish
the jurisdictional facts. The notice of hearing referred to in these certifications is the 6 August 1973 notice issued
by the Clerk of Court setting the hearing on the Project of Partition for 29 August
Upon a determination that the court had duly acquired jurisdiction over the uncontested 1973. 12
petition for probate, Judge Cinco issued in open court an order directing counsel for
petitioner to present evidence proving the authenticity and due execution of the will After the hearing on the Project of Partition, the court issued its Order of 10 September
before the Clerk of Court who was, accordingly, so authorized to receive the same. 1973 13 approving the same, declaring the parties therein as the only heirs entitled to the
estate of Remedios Mejia Vda. de Tiosejo, directing the administrator to deliver to the
The reception of evidence by the Clerk of Court immediately followed. Petitioner Fran's said parties their respective shares and decreeing the proceedings closed. The
first witness was Atty. Nazario R. Pacquiao, one at the subscribing witnesses to the will. dispositive portion thereof reads:
The original of the will, marked as Exhibit "F", and its English translation, marked as
Exhibit "F-Translation", were submitted to the Clerk of Court. 7 Petitioner Fran was the WHEREFORE, the signers (sic) to the project of partition are declared
second and also the last witness. He enumerated the names of the surviving heirs of the the only, heirs entitled to the estate; the project of partition submitted is
deceased. ordered approved and the administrator is ordered to deliver to each one
of them their respective aliquot parts as distributed in the said project of
On 13 November 1972, the probate court rendered a decision admitting to probate the partition. It is understood that if there are expenses incurred or to be
will of the testatrix, Remedios Mejia Vda. de Tiosejo, and appointing petitioner Fran as incurred as expenses of partition, Section 3 of Rule 90 shall be followed.
executor thereof. 8 The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
Let this proceedings be now declared closed.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered
declaring the last will and testament of the deceased Remedios Mejia SO ORDERED.
Vda. de Tiosejo marked as Exhibit F as admitted to probate. Dr. Jesus
Fran is hereby appointed as executor of the will. Let letters testamentary Thereafter, the aforesaid Branch VIII of the Court of First Instance of Cebu was
be issued in favor of Dr. Jesus Fran. The special administrator's bond put converted to a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court. On November 1978, by virtue of
up by Dr. Jesus Fran as special administrator duly approved by this Court Presidential Decree No. 1439, Branch XVII (Davao City) of the Court of First Instance of
shall serve and be considered as the executor's bond considering that the Cebu, presided over by herein respondent Judge, was officially transferred to Cebu City
special administrator and executor are one and the same person. and renumbered as Branch VIII.
The requisite notice to creditors was issued, but despite the expiration of the period On 1 October 1979, private respondents filed with the new Branch VIII an Omnibus
therein fixed, no claim was presented against the estate. Motion for Reconsideration of the probate judgment of 13 November 1972 and the Order
of partition of 10 September 1973, in said motion, they ask the court to declare the
proceedings still open and admit their opposition to the allowance of the will, 14 which considering that the probate judgment and the order approving the Project of Partition
they filed on 1 October 1979. They allege that: (a) they were not furnished with a copy of and terminating the proceedings had long become final and had in fact been executed.
the will; (b) the will is a forgery; (c) they were not notified of any resolution or order on Private respondents had long lost their right to appeal therefrom. The Omnibus Motion
their manifestation requesting time within which to file their opposition, or of the order for Reconsideration cannot likewise be treated as a petition for relief from judgment for
authorizing the clerk of court to receive the evidence for the petitioner, or of the order under Rule 38 of the Revised Rules of Court, the same must be filed within sixty (60)
closing the proceedings; (d) the reception of evidence by the clerk of court was void per days from receipt of notice of the judgment/order and within six (6) months from the date
the ruling in Lim Tanhu vs. Ramolete; 15 (e) the project of partition contains no notice of of said judgment. Therefore, this remedy can no longer be availed of.
hearing and they were not notified thereof; (f) the petitioner signed the project of partition
as administrator and not as executor, thereby proving that the decedent died intestate; On 8 April 1980, the date the instant petition was filed, respondent Judge proceeded with
(g) the petitioner did not submit any accounting as required by law; and (h) the petitioner the hearing of the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration. He received the testimonies of
never distributed the estate to the devisees and legatees. private respondents and one Romeo O. Varena, an alleged handwriting expert from the
Philippine Constabulary, who averred that the signature of the testatrix on the will is a
In a detailed opposition 16 to the above Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner forgery. The respondent Judge likewise issued an Order on the same date stating that
Fran refuted all the protestations of private respondents. Among other reasons, he unless he received a restraining order from this Court within twenty (20) days therefrom,
stresses therein that: (a) private respondents are in estoppel to question the will because he will reopen Sp. Proc. No. 3309-R.
they filed their Withdrawal Of Opposition To The Allowance of Will which states that after
thoroughly studying the petition, to which was attached a copy of the English translation On 14 April 1980, petitioners filed a Supplemental Petition asking this Court to restrain
of the will, they have no objection to its allowance; the order directing the clerk of court to respondent Judge from reopening the case. 20
receive the evidence was dictated in open court in the presence of private respondents;
private respondent Maria M. Gandiongco signed the Project of Partition and private In their voluminous Comments and Opposition to the petition and Supplemental
respondent Concepcion M. Espina submitted a certification stating therein that she Petition, 21 private respondents not only amplify in great detail the grounds raised in their
received the notice of hearing therefor and has no objection to its approval; (b) except for Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration, they also squarely raise for the first time the
some properties, either covered by a usufruct under the will or agreed upon by the following issues.
parties to be held in common by reason of its special circumstance, there was an actual
distribution of the estate in accordance with the Project of Partition; insofar as private
(a) The probate court never acquired jurisdiction over the case since
respondents are concerned, they not only received their respective shares, they even
petitioner Jesus Fran failed to submit to the court the original of the will.
purchased the shares of the other devisees. To top it all, private respondents' children,
namely Rodrigo M. Gandiongco, Jr. and Victor Espina, mortgaged their respective
(b) They were deprived of the opportunity to examine the will as petitioner
shares in favor of a bank
Jesus Fran did not attach it to the petition; what was attached was only the
English translation of the will.
Notwithstanding petitioners' objections, respondent Judge issued on 26 February 1980
an Order setting for hearing the said Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration on 8 April (c) Even assuming that the probate judge could validly delegate the
1980 so that "the witnesses and the exhibits (may be) properly ventilated." 17 reception of evidence to the Clerk of Court, the proceeding before the latter
would still be void as he failed to take an oath of office before entering upon
On 25 March 1980, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss the Omnibus and to Reconsider his duties as commissioner and failed to render a report on the matters
the 26 February 1980 Order setting it for hearing on 17 April 1980, 18 but the respondent submitted to him.
Judge prematurely denied it for lack of merit in his Order of 31 March 1980. 19
(d) Respondent Maria M. Vda. de Gandiongco was defrauded into (sic)
Consequently, on 8 April 1980, the instant petition was filed challenging the jurisdiction of signing the Project of Partition and respondent Concepcion M. Espina, her
the lower court in taking cognizance of the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration certification, when they were misled by petitioner Fran into believing that the
Agreement of Petition to be submitted to the court is the Extra Judicial signature of the testatrix was genuine, she, together with Concepcion M. Espina,
Partition they signed on 7 May 1973. withdrew her opposition; (d) she received her share of the estate of the late Remedios M.
Vda. de Tiosejo which was distributed in accordance with the provisions of the latter's
(e) Petitioner Fran is guilty of fraud in urdervaluing the estate of the late will; and (e) she did not authorize Atty. Numeriano Estenzo or other lawyers to present a
Remedios M. Vda. de Tiosejo by reporting properties worth only motion to this Court after 25 February 1981 when Estenzo withdrew as counsel for
P400,000.00 when in truth and in fact the estate has an aggregate value of private respondents. She then asks this Court to consider as withdrawn her Opposition to
P2,094,333.00. the Allowance of the Will, her participation in the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration
and her Opposition to this petition.
In the Resolution dated 2 June 1980, We issued a restraining order enjoining respondent
Judge from reopening Sp. Proc. No. 3309-R. 22 Due to this development, We required private respondent Concepcion M. Espina to
comment on the affidavit of private respondent Maria M. Vda. de Gandiongco.
However, on the same date, before the restraining order was served on him; respondent
Judge issued the impugned order declaring the testamentary dispositions of the will void, On 17 August 1985, private respondents filed a joint manifestation 29 wherein they claim
finding the signature of the late Remedios M. Vda. de Tiosejo to be a forgery, decreeing that Maria M. Vda. de Gandiongco does not remember, executing the affidavit. A few
the reopening of Sp. Proc. No. 3309-R and converting the same into an intestate weeks before the affidavit was filed, particularly on 17 June 1985, Maria M. Vda. de
proceeding. 23 Gandiongco was confined in the hospital; she could not recall having signed, during this
period, any affidavit or recognized her sisters and other relatives.
Hence, on 6 June 1980, petitioners filed their Second Supplemental Petition 24 asking
this Court to declare as null and void the Order of 2 June 1980 and, pending such On 19 September 1985, respondent Maria M. Vda. de Gandiongco, through special
declaration, to restrain respondent Judge from enforcing the same. Private respondents counsel, filed a Manifestation/Motion with a second Affidavit attached
filed their Comment and Opposition to the Second Supplemental Petition on 9 July 1980. thereto30 confessing that she signed the Joint Manifestation dated 16 August 1985
"without knowing or being informed of its contents, and only upon Mrs. Concepcion
Thereafter, as mandated in the resolution of 30 June 1980, 25 this Court gave due Espina's request." She reiterated her desire to withdraw from the Omnibus Motion for
course to this case and required the parties to file their respective Memoranda, which Reconsideration filed in Sp. Proc. No, 3309-R as well as from the instant petition.
private respondents complied with on 16 August 1980; 26 petitioners filed theirs on 27
August 1980. 27 Consequently, the parties continued to file several pleadings reiterating Despite the valiant attempt of private respondent Concepcion M. Espina to influence and
substantially the same allegations and arguments earlier submitted to this Court. control the action of Maria Gandiongco, there is nothing in the records that would cast
any doubt on the irrevocability of the latter's decision to withdraw her participation in the
On 22 March 1984, counsel for petitioners filed a manifestation informing this Court of Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and Opposition to this case. That decision,
the death of petitioner Fran on 29 February 1984 and enumerating therein his surviving however, is not a ground for dropping her as a private respondent as the respondent
heirs. On 2 April 1984, this Court resolved to have said heirs substitute him in this case. Judge had already issued the abovementioned Order of 2 June 1980.
Over a year later, respondent Maria M. Vda. de Gandiongco filed an affidavit, 28 sworn The petition and the supplemental petitions are impressed with merit.
to before the acting Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court in Cebu City, disclosing the
following material facts: (a) she signed the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration dated 1 We do not hesitate to rule that the respondent Judge committed grave abuse of
October 1979 without knowing or reading the contents thereof; (b) she saw the will of the discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when he granted the Omnibus Motion for
late Remedios M. Vda. de Tiosejo written in the Cebuano dialect after the same was Reconsideration and thereafter set aside the probate judgment of 13 November 1972 in
executed by the latter; the said will bearing the authentic signature of Remedios was the Sp. Proc. No. 3309-R, declared the subject will of the testatrix a forgery, nullified the
very one presented to the probate court by petitioner's counsel; (c) she received the testamentary dispositions therein and ordered the conversion of the testate proceedings
notice of hearing of the petition for probate and because she was convinced that the into one of intestacy.
It is not disputed that private respondents filed on the day of the initial hearing of the rests with the judge who is obliged to personally and directly prepare the
petition their "Withdrawal of Opposition To Allowance of Probate (sic) Will" wherein they decision based upon the evidence reported. 34
unequivocally state that they have no objection to the allowance of the will. For all legal
intents and purposes, they became proponents of the same. But where the proceedings before the clerk of court and the concomitant
result thereof, i.e., the judgment rendered by the court based on the
After the probate court rendered its decision on 13 November 1972, and there having evidence presented in such limited proceedings, prejudice the substantial
been no claim presented despite publication of notice to creditors, petitioner Fran rights of the aggrieved party, then there exists, sufficient justification to
submitted a Project of Partition which private respondent Maria M. Vda. de Gandiongco grant the latter complete opportunity to thresh out his case in court. 35
voluntarily signed and to which private respondent Espina expressed her conformity
through a certification filed with the probate court. Assuming for the sake of argument Monserrate vs. Court of Appeals, 36 decided on 29 September 1989, reiterated this
that private respondents did not receive a formal notice of the decision as they claim in rule. Lim Tanhu then cannot be used as authority to nullify the order of the probate court
their Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration, these acts nevertheless constitute indubitable authorizing the Clerk of Court to receive the evidence for the rule is settled that "when a
proof of their prior actual knowledge of the same. A formal notice would have been an doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine
idle ceremony. In testate proceedings, a decision logically precedes the project of should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on the
partition, which is normally an implementation of the will and is among the last operative old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof." 37 It may also be emphasized in this
acts to terminate the proceedings. If private respondents did not have actual knowledge connection that Lim Tanhu did not live long; it was subsequently overruled in Gochangco
of the decision, they should have desisted from performing the above acts and instead vs. Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, 38 wherein this Court, en banc, through
demanded from petitioner Fran the fulfillment of his alleged promise to show them the Justice, now Chief Justice, Andres R. Narvasa, in reference to what the trial court termed
will. The same conclusion refutes and defeats the plea that they were not notified of the as "the doctrinal rule laid down in the recent case of Lim Tan Hu (sic) vs. Ramolete,"
order authorizing the Clerk of Court to receive the evidence and that the Clerk of Court ruled:
did not notify them of the date of the reception of evidence. Besides, such plea must fail
because private respondents were present when the court dictated the said order. Now, that declaration does not reflect long observed and established
judicial practice with respect to default cases. It is not quite consistent,
Neither do We give any weight to the contention that the reception of evidence by the too, with the several explicitly authorized instances under the Rules
Clerk of Court is null and void per the doctrine laid, down in Lim Tanhu vs. where the function of receiving evidence and even of making
Ramolete. 31 In the first place, Lim Tanhu was decided on 29 August 1975, nearly four recommendatory findings of facts on the basis thereof may be delegated
(4) years after the probate court authorized the Clerk of Court to receive the evidence for to commissioners, inclusive of the Clerk of Court. These instances are set
the petitioner in this case. A month prior to Lim Tanhu, or on 30 July 1975, this Court, out in Rule 33, . . . ; Rule 67 and 69, . . . ; Rule 86, . . . ; Rule 136, . . . . In
in Laluan vs. Malpaya, 32 recognized and upheld the practice of delegating the reception all these instances, the competence of the clerk of court is assumed.
of evidence to Clerks of Court. Thus: Indeed, there would seem, to be sure, nothing intrinsically wrong in
allowing presentation of evidence ex parte before a Clerk of Court. Such
No provision of law or principle of public policy prohibits a court from a procedure certainly does not foreclose relief to the party adversely
authorizing its clerk of court to receive the evidence of a party litigant. affected who, for valid cause and upon appropriate and seasonable
After all, the reception of evidence by the clerk of court constitutes but a application, may bring about the undoing thereof or the elimination of
ministerial task — the taking down of the testimony of the witnesses and prejudice thereby caused to him; and it is, after all, the Court itself which
the marking of the pieces of documentary evidence, if any, adduced by is duty bound and has the ultimate responsibility to pass upon the
the party present. This task of receiving evidence precludes, on the part evidence received in this manner, discarding in the process such proofs
of the clerk of court the exercise of judicial discretion usually called for as are incompetent and then declare what facts have thereby been
when the other party who is present objects to questions propounded and established. In considering and analyzing the evidence preparatory to
to the admission of the documentary evidence proffered. 33 More rendition of judgment on the merits, it may not unreasonably be assumed
importantly, the duty to render judgment on the merits of the case still that any serious error in the ex-parte presentation of evidence, prejudicial
to any absent party, will be detected and duly remedied by the Court, of petitioner Fran and their sister, Rosario M. Tan, that the will would be shown to them
and/or may always, in any event, be drawn to its attention by any during the trial. These two grounds easily serve as the bases for the postulation that the
interested party. decision is null and void and so, therefore, their omnibus motion became all the more
timely and proper.
xxx xxx xxx
The contentions do not impress this Court.
It was therefore error for the Court a quo to have declared the judgment
by default to be fatally flawed by the fact that the plaintiff's evidence had In Santos vs. Castillo 39 and Salazar vs. Court of First Instance of Laguna, 40 decided
been received not by the Judge himself but by the clerk of court. six (6) months apart in 1937, this Court already ruled that it is not necessary that the
original of the will be attached to the petition. In the first, it ruled: "The original of said
The alternative claim that the proceedings before the Clerk of Court were likewise void document [the will] must be presented or sufficient reasons given to justify the
because said official did not take an oath is likewise untenable. The Clerk of Court acted nonpresentation of said original and the acceptance of the copy or duplicate
as such when he performed the delegated task of receiving evidence. It was not thereof." 41 In the second case, this Court was more emphatic in holding that:
necessary for him to take an oath for that purpose; he was bound by his oath of office as
a Clerk of Court. Private respondents are obviously of the impression that by the The law is silent as to the specific manner of bringing the jurisdictional
delegation of the reception of evidence to the Clerk of Court, the latter became allegations before the court, but practice and jurisprudence have
a commissioner as defined under Rule 33 of the Rules of Court entitled Trial by established that they should be made in the form of an application and
Commissioner. This is not correct; as this Court said in Laluan: filed with the original of the will attached thereto. It has been the practice
in some courts to permit attachment of a mere copy of the will to the
The provisions of Rule 33 of the Rules of Court invoked by both parties application, without prejudice to producing the original thereof at the
properly relate to the reference by a court of any or all of the issues in a hearing or when the court so requires. This precaution has been adopted
case to a person so commissioned to act or report thereon. These by some attorneys to forestall its disappearance, which has taken place
provisions explicitly spell out the rules governing the conduct of the court, in certain cases. 42
the commissioner, and the parties before, during, and after the reference
proceedings. Compliance with these rules of conduct becomes That the annexing of the original will to the petition is not a jurisdictional requirement is
imperative only when the court formally orders a reference of the case to clearly evident in Section 1, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court which allows the filing of a
a commissioner. Strictly speaking then, the provisions of Rule 33 find no petition for probate by the person named therein regardless of whether or not he is in
application to the case at bar where the court a quo merely directed the possession of the will, or the same is lost or destroyed. The section reads in full as
clerk of court to take down the testimony of the witnesses presented and follows:
to mark the documentary evidence proferred on a date previously set for
hearing. Sec. 1. Who may petition for the allowance of will. — Any executor,
devisee, or legatee named in a will, or any other person interested in the
Belatedly realizing the absence of substance of the above grounds, private respondents estate, may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition the court
now claim in their Comments to the Petition and the Supplemental Petition that the trial having jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the same be in his
court never acquired jurisdiction over the petition because only the English translation of possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.
the will — and not a copy of the same — was attached to the petition; the will was not
even submitted to the court for their examination within twenty (20) days after the death In the instant case, a copy of the original will and its English translation were attached to
of the testatrix; and that there was fraud in the procurement of the probate judgment the petition as Annex "A" and Annex "A-1", respectively, and made integral parts of the
principally because they were not given any chance to examine the signature of the same. It is to be presumed that upon the filing of the petition the Clerk of Court, or his
testatrix and were misled into signing the withdrawal of their opposition on the assurance duly authorized subordinate, examined the petition and found that the annexes
mentioned were in fact attached thereto. If they were not, the petition cannot be said to The availability of the will since 18 September 1972 for their examination renders
have been properly presented and the Clerk of Court would not have accepted it for completely baseless the private respondents' claim of fraud on petitioner Fran's part in
docketing. Under Section 6, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court, the Clerk of Court shall securing the withdrawal of their opposition to the probate of the will. If indeed such
receive and file all pleadings and other papers properly presented, endorsing on each withdrawal was conditioned upon Fran's promise that the private respondents would be
such paper the time when it was filed. The presumption of regularity in the performance shown the will during the trial, why weren't the appropriate steps taken by the latter to
of official duty militates against private respondents' claim that Annex "A" of the petition confront Fran about this promise before certifications of conformity to the project of
was not in fact attached thereto. partition were filed?
The certification of the Assistant Clerk of Court issued on 8 April Granting for the sake of argument that the non-fulfillment of said promise constitutes
1980, 43 or SIX (6) months after the filing of the motion for reconsideration, to the effect fraud, such fraud is not of the kind which provides sufficient justification for a motion for
that as per examination of the records of Sp. Proc. No. 3309-R, "the copy of the Will reconsideration or a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 37 and Rule 38,
mentioned in the petition as Annex "A" is not found to be attached as of this date in the respectively, of the Rules of Court, or even a separate action for annulment of judgment.
said petition; only the English Translation of said Will is attached thereof (sic) as Annex It is settled that for fraud to be invested with, sufficiency, it must be extrinsic or collateral
"A-1" does not even save the day for private respondents. It is not conclusive because it to the matters involved in the issues raised during the trial which resulted in such
fails to state the fact that as hereafter shown, the pages of the records which correspond judgment.
to the four (4) pages of Annex "A" were missing or were detached therefrom. As
emphatically asserted by the petitioners in their Reply to the Comments of private In Our jurisdiction, the following courses of action are open to an aggrieved party to set
respondents, 44 duly supported by a certification of the former Clerk of Court of the aside or attack the validity of a final judgment:
original Branch VIII of the court below, 45 and which private respondents merely
generally denied in their motion for reconsideration with comments and opposition to (1) Petition for relief under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court which must be
consolidated reply, 46 the four-page xerox copy of will, marked as Annex "A" of the filed within sixty (60) days after learning of the decision, but not more
petition, became, as properly marked by the personnel of the original Branch VIII of the than six (6) months after such decision is entered;
court below upon the filing of the petition, pages 5, 6, 7 and 8 while the translation
thereof, marked as Annex "A-1", became pages 9, 10, 11 and 12 of the records. The
(2) By direct action, via a special civil action for certiorari, or by collateral
markings were done in long hand. The records of the case were thereafter sent to the
attack, assuming that the decision is void for want of jurisdiction;
Clerk of Court, 14th Judicial District, Cebu City on 9 February 1978. These records, now
in the possession of the respondent Judge, show that said pages 5, 6, 7 and 8 in long
are missing. As a consequence thereof, petitioners filed with the Executive Judge of the (3) By an independent civil action under Article 1114 of the Civil Code,
court below an administrative complaint. assuming that the decision was obtained through fraud and Rule 38 can
not be applied. 49
It is not likewise disputed that the original of the will was submitted in evidence and
marked as Exhibit "F". It forms part of the records of the special proceedings — a fact It is not difficult to see that private respondents had lost their right to file a petition for
which private respondents admit in their Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration, thus: relief from judgment, it appearing that their omnibus motion for reconsideration was filed
exactly six (6) years, ten (10) months and twenty-two (22) days after the rendition of the
decision, and six (6) years, one (1) month and thirteen (13) days after the court issued
9. That an examination of the alleged will of our deceased sister has
the order approving the Project of Partition, to which they voluntarily expressed their
revealed that the signatures at the left hand margin of Exhibit "F", are
conformity through their respective certifications, and closing the testate proceedings.
written by (sic) different person than the signature appearing at the
bottom of said alleged will . . . 47
Private respondents did not avail of the other two (2) modes of attack.
The probate judgment of 13 November 1972, long final and undisturbed by any attempt WHEREFORE, the instant petition and supplemental petitions are GRANTED. The Order
to unsettle it, had inevitably passed beyond the reach of the court below to annul or set of respondent Judge of 2 June 1980 and all other orders issued by him in Sp. Proc. No.
the same aside, by mere motion, on the ground that the will is a forgery. Settled is the 3309-R, as well as all other proceedings had therein in connection with or in relation to
rule that the decree of probate is conclusive with respect to the due execution of the will the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration, are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
and it cannot be impugned on any of the grounds authorized by law, except that of fraud,
in any separate or independent action or proceeding. 50 We wish also to advert to the The restraining order issued on 2 June 1980 is hereby made PERMANENT.
related doctrine which holds that final judgments are entitled to respect and should not
be disturbed; otherwise, there would be a wavering of trust in the courts. 51 In Lee Bun
Ting vs. Aligaen, this Court had the occasion to state the rationale of this doctrine, thus: DIGEST: FRAN VS. SALAS
Reasons of public policy, judicial orderliness, economy and judicial time FACTS:
and the interests of litigants, as well as the peace and order of society, all Remedios Tiosejo died with neither descendants nor ascendants. She left real
require that stability be accorded the solemn and final judgments of the and personal properties. In her last will and testament, she bequeathed to her collateral
courts or tribunals of competent jurisdiction. relatives all her properties. When the will was presented before the probate court, private
respondents who are sisters of the deceased filed a manifestation, alleging that they
This is so even if the decision is incorrect 53 or, in criminal cases, the penalty imposed is needed time to study the petition because some heirs have been intentionally omitted.
erroneous. Equally baseless and unmeritorious is private respondents' contention that However, none file any opposition. The petition thus became uncontested. The probate
the order approving the Project of Partition and closing the proceedings is null and void court rendered a decision admitting the will to probate. Then, a Project of Partition was
because the Project of Partition did not contain a notice of hearing and that they were not submitted by the executor to the court. The private respondents still did not make any
notified of the hearing thereon. In truth, in her own certification 55 dated 5 September objections. Thereafter, the probate court issued its Order approving the partition. Later,
1973, private respondent Concepcion M. Espina admitted that she "received a copy of the aforesaid branch which issued the order was converted to a Juvenile and Domestic
the Project of Partition and the Notice of Hearing in the above-entitled proceeding, and Relations Court. The private respondents filed with the new branch a Motion for
that she has no objection to the approval of the said Project of Partition." The notice of Reconsideration of the probate judgment and the order of partition. The Petitions
hearing she referred to is the Notice of Hearing For Approval of Project of Partition challenged the jurisdiction of the court because only the English translation of the will
issued on 6 August 1973 by the Clerk of Court. 56 Private respondent Espina was lying was attached o the petition and the will was not even submitted to the court for their
through her teeth when she claimed otherwise. examination. Respondent Judge issued an order declaring the testamentary disposition
as void.
The non-distribution of the estate, which is vigorously denied by the petitioners, is not a
ground for the re-opening of the testate proceedings. A seasonable motion for execution ISSUE: Is it necessary that the original of the will be presented in order for the court to
should have been filed. In De Jesus vs. Daza, this Court ruled that if the executor or acquire jurisdiction?
administrator has possession of the share to be delivered, the probate court would have
jurisdiction within the same estate proceeding to order him to transfer that possession to
the person entitled thereto. This is authorized under Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of HELD:
Court. However, if no motion for execution is filed within the reglementary period, a NO.
separate action for the recovery of the shares would be in order. As We see it, the attack
of 10 September 1973 on the Order was just a clever ploy to give as semblance of In several rulings of the Supreme Court, it ruled that it is not necessary that the
strength and substance to the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration by depicting therein original of the will be attached to the petition That the annexing of the original will to the
a probate court committing a series of fatal, substantive and procedural blunders, which petition is not a jurisdictional requirement is clearly evident in Section 1, Rule 76 of the
We find to be imaginary, if not deliberately fabricated. Rules of Court which allows the filing of a petition for probate by the person named
therein regardless of whether or not he is in possession of the will, or the same is lost or
destroyed. In the instant case, a copy of the original will and its English translation were
attached to the petition and made integral parts of the same. It is to be presumed that Mercedes R-Infante Roxas de Lednicky residing at #386 P. Guevarra St.,
upon the filing of the petition the Clerk of Court, or his duly authorized subordinate, San Juan, Metro Manila;
examined the petition and found that the annexes mentioned were in fact attached
thereto. Hence, the order of partition issued by the old probate court is final and Alfredo R-Infante Roxas residing at #27 A Scout Tobias St., Quezon City,
executor. Metro Manila;
Teresita R-Infante Roxas residing at #121 9th Street, New Manila,

JOAQUINA R-INFANTE DE ARANZ, ANTONIO R-INFANTE, CARLOS R. INFANTE, Quezon City, Metro Manila;
MERCEDES R-INFANTE DE LEDNICKY, ALFREDO R-INFANTE, TERESITA R-
INFANTE, RAMON R-INFANTE, FLORENCIA R-INFANTE DE DIAS, MARTIN R-
Ramon R-Infante Roxas residing at #27 B Scout Tobias St., Quezon City,
INFANTE, JOSE R-INFANTE LINK AND JOAQUIN R-INFANTE CAMPBELL
Metro Manila;
VS. THE HON. NICOLAS GALING, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION, BRANCH NO. 166, PASIG, METRO
MANILA AND JOAQUIN R-INFANTE Florencia R-Infante Roxas de Diaz residing at Calle Sancho Davila, 13-
G.R. NO. 77047 19-D, Madrid, 28028 Spain;
MAY 28, 1988
Martin R-Infante Roxas residing at #2 Bongavilla St., Cubao, Quezon
PADILLA, J.: City, Metro Manila;
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals, dated Jose R-Infante Link residing at 174R-Pascual St., San Juan, Metro
13 January 1987, in CA-G.R. SP No. 09622, entitled "Joaquina R-Infante de Aranz, et Manila;
al., petitioners vs. Hon. Nicolas Galing, etc., et al., respondents," dismissing petitioners'
petition for certiorari and prohibition as-, sailing the orders 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Joaquin R-Infante Campbell C/O Pilar Campbell, 15 Briones, Makati,
Pasig, Branch 166, dated 12 May 1986 and 30 May 1986, respectively, in Sp. Proc. No. Metro Marta. 3
9995, entitled, "In the Matter of Petition for Approval of the Last Will and Testament of
Montserrat R-Infante y G-Pola Joaquin R. Infante, Petitioner." On 12 March 1986, the probate court issued an order selling the petition for hearing on 5
May 1986 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning. Said order was published in the "Nueva Era" A
On 3 March 1986, private respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila once a week for three (3) consecutive
166, a petition for the probate and allowance of the last will and testament of the late weeks. On the date of the hearing, no oppositor appeared. The hearing was then reset to
Montserrat R-Infante y G-Pola The petition specified the names and addresses of 12 May 1986, on which date, the probate court issued the following order:
herein petitioners as legatees and devisees, as follows:
There being no opposition to this instant case, as prayed for, the oner to-
Joaquina R-Infante Roxas de Aranz residing at No. 86 10th St., New receive Branch Clerk of Court is hereby designated Co evidence ex-parte
Manila, Quezon City, Metro Manila; of the petitioner.
Antonio R-Infante Roxas residing at #91 Cambridge, North Forbes, SO ORDERED. 4

Makati, Metro Manila;
On the same day (12 May 1986), private respondent presented his evidence ex-
Carlos R-Infante Roxas residing at #46 Washington St., Greenhills, San parte and placed Arturo Arceo one of the testamentary witnesses, on the witness stand.
Juan, Metro Manila; During the proceedings, private respondent was appointed executor.
On 14 May 1986, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of 12 May It is clear from the aforecited rule that notice of the time and place of the hearing for the
1986 alleging that, as named legatees, no notices were sent to them as required by Sec. allowance of a will shall be forwarded to the designated or other known heirs, legatees,
4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court and they prayed that they be given a period of ten (10) and devisees residing in the Philippines at their places of residence, if such places of
days within which to file their opposition to the probate of the will. residence be known. There is no question that the residences of herein petitioners
legatees and devisees were known to the probate court. The petition for the allowance of
On 30 May 1986, the probate court, acting on the opposition of private respondent and the wig itself indicated the names and addresses of the legatees and devisees of the
the reply thereto of petitioners, issued an order denying petitioners motion for testator. 7 But despite such knowledge, the probate court did not cause copies of the
reconsideration. notice to be sent to petitioners. The requirement of the law for the allowance of the will
was not satisfied by mere publication of the notice of hearing for three (3) weeks in a
Thereafter, petitioners filed with this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition which newspaper of general circulation in the province.
was, however, referred to the Court of Appeals. On 13 January 1987, the Court of
Appeals promulgated a decision dismissing the petition. 5 Hence, the instant petition. The case of Joson vs. Nable 8 cited by the Court of Appeals in its assailed decision to
support its theory is not applicable in the present case. In that case, petitioners
It is the view of petitioners that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that personal notice Purificacion Joson and Erotica Joson failed to contest the will of Tomas Joson because
of probate proceedings to the known legatees and devisees is not a jurisdictional they had not been notified of the hearing of the petition for probate. he the petition
requirement in the probate of a will. Contrary to the holding of the Court of Appeals that included the residence of petitioners as Dagupan Street No. 83, Manila, petitioners
the requirement of notice on individual heirs, legatees and devisees is merely a matter of claimed that their residence was not Dagupan Street No. 83, Manila. There the Court
procedural convenience to better satisfy in some instances the requirements of due said:
process, petitioners allege that under Sec. 4 of Rule 76 of the Rules of Court, said
requirement of the law is mandatory and its omission constitutes a reversible error for Petitioners maintain that no notice was received by them partly because
being constitutive of grave abuse of discretion. 6 their residence was not Dagupan Street No. 83 as alleged in the petition
for probate. If the allegation of the petition was wrong and the true
We grant the petition: residence of petitioners was not known, then notice upon them
individually was not necessary. Under the provision abovequoted,
individual notice upon heirs, legatees and devisees is necessary only
Sec. 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Cof reads:
when they are known or when their places of residence are known. In
other instances, such notice is not necessary and the court may acquire
SEC. 4. Heirs, devisees, legatees, and executors to be notified by mail or and exercise jurisdiction simply upon the publication of the notice in a
personally. — The court shag also cause copies of the notice of the time newspaper of general circulation. ... 9
and place fixed for proving the will to be addressed to the designated or
other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator resident in the
In Re: Testate Estate of Suntay, 10 the Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Sabino Padilla,
Philippines at their places of residence, and deposited in the post office
said:
with the postage thereon prepaid at least twenty (20) days before the
hearing, if such places of residence be known. A copy of the notice must
in like manner be mailed to the person named as executor, if he be not, ... It is a proceedings in rem and for the validity of such proceedings
the petitioner; also, to any person named as co-executor not petitioning, if personal notice or by publication or both to all interested parties must be
their places of residence be known. Personal service of copies of the made. The interested parties in the case were known to reside in the
notice at least ten (10) days before the day of hearing shall be equivalent Philippines. The evidence shows that no such notice was received by the
to mailing. interested parties residing in the Philippines (pp. 474, 476, 481, 503-4,
t.s.n., hearing of 24 February 1948). The proceedings had in the
municipal district court of Amoy, China, may be likened to a deposition or
to a perpetuation of testimony, and even if it were so it does not measure Petitioners allege that under Sec. 4 of Rule 76 of the Rules of Court, the
or come up to the standard of such proceedings in the Philippines for lack requirement of notice on individual heirs, legatees and devisees is mandatory and its
of notice to all interested parties and the proceedings were held at the omission constitutes a reversible error for being constitutive of grave abuse of discretion.
back of such interested parties.
xxx xxx xxx ISSUE: WON personal notice to petitioners, legatees and devisees, are required.
... In view thereof, the will and the alleged probate thereof cannot be said
to have been done in accordance with the accepted basic and HELD:
fundamental concepts and principles followed in the probate and YES, personal notice is required. It is clear from the afore-cited rule that notice of
allowance of wills. Consequently, the authenticated transcript of the time and place of the hearing for the allowance of a will shall be forwarded to the
proceedings held in the municipal district court of Amoy, China, cannot be designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees residing in the Philippines at
deemed and accepted as proceedings leading to the probate or their places of residence, if such places of residence be known. There is no question that
allowance of a will and, therefore, the will referred to therein cannot be the residences of herein petitioners, legatees and devisees were known to the probate
allowed, filed and recorded by a competent court of court. 11 court. The petition for the allowance of the will itself indicated the names and addresses
of the legatees and devisees of the testator. But despite such knowledge, the probate
court did not cause copies of the notice to be sent to petitioners. The requirement of the
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 13 January 1987 is hereby
law for the allowance of the will was not satisfied by mere publication of the notice of
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The case is hereby ordered remanded to the Regional
hearing for three (3) weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
Trial Court of Pasig for further proceedings in accordance with this decision. No costs.
Probate proceeding is a proceeding in rem and for the validity of such proceedings
SO ORDERED. personal notice or by publication or both to all interested parties must be made. The
interested parties in the case were known to reside in the Philippines.
DIGEST: ARANZ VS. GALING
FACTS: IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF RICARDO B.

Private respondent filed a petition for probate and allowance of the last will and BONILLA DECEASED, MARCELA RODELAS VS. AMPARO ARANZA, ET AL.
testament of the late Montserrat Infante y Pola with the RTC of Pasig containing the G.R. NO. L-58509
names and addresses of herein petitioners as legatees and devisees. The probate court DECEMBER 7, 1982
set the petition for hearing on May 5, 1986 at 8:30 AM which was published in the RELOVA, J.:
“Nueva Era” a newspaper of general circulation once a week for 3 consecutive weeks. This case was certified to this Tribunal by the Court of Appeals for final determination
On the date of the hearing, no oppositor appeared so the hearing was reset to May 12, pursuant to Section 3, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court.
1986 where respondent, Joaquin R. Infante presented his evidence ex-parte and was As found by the Court of Appeals:
then appointed executor. ... On January 11, 1977, appellant filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of
Rizal for the probate of the holographic will of Ricardo B. Bonilla and the issuance
On May 14, 1986, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that as of letters testamentary in her favor. The petition, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 8432,
legatees, no notices were sent to them and prayed that they be given 10 days to file their was opposed by the appellees Amparo Aranza Bonilla, Wilferine Bonilla Treyes
opposition on the probate of the will but was denied. A petition for certiorari and Expedita Bonilla Frias and Ephraim Bonilla on the following grounds:
prohibition was also dismissed by the CA. Hence the instant petition.
(1) Appellant was estopped from claiming that the deceased left a will by failing MOREOVER, this Court notes that the alleged holographic will was executed on
to produce the will within twenty days of the death of the testator as required by January 25, 1962 while Ricardo B. Bonilla died on May 13, 1976. In view of the
Rule 75, section 2 of the Rules of Court; lapse of more than 14 years from the time of the execution of the will to the
death of the decedent, the fact that the original of the will could not be located
(2) The alleged copy of the alleged holographic will did not contain a disposition shows to our mind that the decedent had discarded before his death his
of property after death and was not intended to take effect after death, and allegedly missing Holographic Will.
therefore it was not a will
Appellant's motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, an appeal to the Court of
(3) The alleged hollographic will itself,and not an alleged copy thereof, must be Appeals in which it is contended that the dismissal of appellant's petition is contrary to
produced, otherwise it would produce no effect, as held in Gam v. Yap, 104 law and well-settled jurisprudence.
Phil. 509; and On July 7, 1980, appellees moved to forward the case to this Court on the ground that
the appeal does not involve question of fact and alleged that the trial court committed the
(4 ) The deceased did not leave any will, holographic or otherwise, executed following assigned errors:
and attested as required by law.
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT A LOST
HOLOGRAPHIC WILL MAY NOT BE PROVED BY A COPY THEREOF;
The appellees likewise moved for the consolidation of the case with another case Sp.
Proc. No, 8275). Their motion was granted by the court in an order dated April 4, 1977. II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DECEDENT
On November 13, 1978, following the consolidation of the cases, the appellees moved HAS DISCARDED BEFORE HIS DEATH THE MISSING
again to dismiss the petition for the probate of the will. They argued that: HOLOGRAPHIC WILL;
(1) The alleged holographic was not a last will but merely an instruction as to III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING APPELLANT'S WILL.
the management and improvement of the schools and colleges founded by
decedent Ricardo B. Bonilla; and The only question here is whether a holographic will which was lost or cannot be found
can be proved by means of a photostatic copy. Pursuant to Article 811 of the Civil Code,
(2) Lost or destroyed holographic wills cannot be proved by secondary evidence probate of holographic wills is the allowance of the will by the court after its due
unlike ordinary wills. execution has been proved. The probate may be uncontested or not. If uncontested, at
least one Identifying witness is required and, if no witness is available, experts may be
Upon opposition of the appellant, the motion to dismiss was denied by the court in its resorted to. If contested, at least three Identifying witnesses are required. However, if the
order of February 23, 1979. holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other copy is available, the will cannot
be probated because the best and only evidence is the handwriting of the testator in said
The appellees then filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that the order was will. It is necessary that there be a comparison between sample handwritten statements
contrary to law and settled pronouncements and rulings of the Supreme Court, to which of the testator and the handwritten will. But, a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the
the appellant in turn filed an opposition. On July 23, 1979, the court set aside its order of holographic will may be allowed because comparison can be made with the standard
February 23, 1979 and dismissed the petition for the probate of the will of Ricardo B. writings of the testator. In the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 PHIL. 509, the Court ruled that
Bonilla. The court said: "the execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved
... It is our considered opinion that once the original copy of the holographic will by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will. The will itself
is lost, a copy thereof cannot stand in lieu of the original. must be presented; otherwise, it shall produce no effect. The law regards the document
In the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 Phil. 509, 522, the Supreme Court held that 'in itself as material proof of authenticity." But, in Footnote 8 of said decision, it says that
the matter of holographic wills the law, it is reasonable to suppose, regards the "Perhaps it may be proved by a photographic or photostatic copy. Even a mimeographed
document itself as the material proof of authenticity of said wills. or carbon copy; or by other similar means, if any, whereby the authenticity of the
handwriting of the deceased may be exhibited and tested before the probate court," ‘in the matter of holographic wills the law, it is reasonable to suppose, regards the
Evidently, the photostatic or xerox copy of the lost or destroyed holographic will may be document itself as the material proof of authenticity of said wills.”
admitted because then the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be
determined by the probate court. And that the alleged holographic will was executed on January 25, 1962 while
WHEREFORE, the order of the lower court dated October 3, 1979, denying appellant's Ricardo B. Bonilla died on May 13, 1976. The lapse of more than 14 years from the time
motion for reconsideration dated August 9, 1979, of the Order dated July 23, 1979, of the execution of the will to the death of the decedent and the fact that the original of
dismissing her petition to approve the will of the late Ricardo B. Bonilla, is hereby SET the will could not be located shows to that the decedent had discarded the
ASIDE. alleged holographic will before his death.
SO ORDERED. Rodelas filed an MR which was denied. Rodelas appealed to the CA. Aranza et al.
moved to forward the case to the SC as it involves a question of law not of fact.
DIGEST: RODELAS V. ARANZA
FACTS: ISSUE: W/N a holographic will which was lost or cannot be found can be proved by
Rodelas filed a petition with the CFI of Rizal for the probate of the holographic will means of a photostatic copy.
of Ricardo B. Bonilla and the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor.
Aranza, et al. filed a MTD on the grounds of: HELD:
If the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other copy is available,
1.Rodelas was estopped from claiming that the deceased left a will by the will cannot be probated because the best and only evidence is the handwriting of the
failing to produce the will within twenty days of the death of the testator testator in said will. It is necessary that there be a comparison between
as required by Rule 75, section 2 of the Rules of Court; sample handwritten statements of the testator and the handwritten will.
2.the copy of the alleged holographic will did not contain a disposition of But, a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic will may be
property after death and was not intended to take effect after death, and allowed because comparison can be made by the probate court with the standard
therefore it was not a will, it was merely an instruction as to the writings of the testator. The probate court would be able to determine the authenticity of
management and improvement of the schools and colleges founded by the handwriting of the testator.
the decedent;
In the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 PHIL. 509, the Court ruled that “the execution and
3.the hollographic will itself, and not an alleged copy thereof, must be the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare
produced, otherwise it would produce no effect because lost or testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will. The will itself must be
destroyed holographic wills cannot be proved by secondary evidence presented; otherwise, it shall produce no effect. The law regards the document itself as
unlike ordinary wills. material proof of authenticity.” But, in Footnote 8 of said decision, it says that “Perhaps it
may be proved by a photographic or photostatic copy. Even a mimeographed
4.the deceased did not leave any will, holographic or otherwise, executed or carbon copy; or by other similar means, if any, whereby the authenticity of the
and attested as required by law. handwriting of the deceased may be exhibited and tested before the probate court,”
MTD was denied. Aranza et al. filed an MR, Rodelas filed an opposition. IN THE MATTER OF THE PROBATE OF THE WILL OF CHRISTIAN HARRIS,
Deceased. PEDRO BUTIONG
The CFI set aside its order and dismissed the petition for the probate of the will VS. THE SURIGAO CONSOLIDATED MINING CO., INC.
stating that “in the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 Phil. 509, 522, the Supreme Court held that G.R. NO. L-13938
JULY 31, 1968
6) In allowing Exhibit G to probate, instead of declaring that the alleged
CONCEPCION, C.J.: signatures of Harris thereon are a "forgery."
Direct appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Surigao allowing a given Upon the other hand, Butiong maintains that the lower court erred in entertaining
instrument to probate as the last will and testament of Christian Harris. appellant's opposition and in not dismissing its appeal.
On September 7, 1954, Pedro Butiong commenced Special Proceedings No. 737 of said It is obvious that Butiong's contention is well taken. Indeed, it is well-settled that one who
Court for the probate of a document — attached to his petition, and later marked as has or can have no interest in succeeding a decedent cannot oppose the probate of his
Exhibit G — purporting to have been executed by Christian Harris as his last will and alleged will.1 Appellant herein does not claim to have such interest in the succession to
testament. Paragraph IV of said Exhibit G reads: Christian Harris. Accordingly, the lower court should not have considered its opposition
to the probate of Exhibit G, much less given due course to the present appeal.
I hereby make, appoint and constitute Pedro Butiong, who is my adopted son and
whom I have reared and brought up since he was still about two (2) years old, as Independently of the foregoing, appellant's assignment of errors are devoid of merit.
my sole and universal heir of all my properties located in the Philippines, Indeed, the notice of hearing issued by the Justice of the Peace of the provincial capital,
consisting of shares of stock and interest in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mining "for and in the absence of the District judge," states that the "Semana," in which said
Co., Inc., located at Mabuhay, Surigao, Surigao, and of shares of stock, interest notice was ordered and was in fact published, is of general circulation in the Province of
and one (1%) per cent royalty in the Surigao Consolidated Mining Co., Inc., Surigao, and there is no evidence to the contrary.
located at Siano, Surigao.
Again, the question whether or not Butiong and Sykimte are related to the deceased, and
The Surigao Consolidated Mining Co., Inc. opposed the probate of said Exhibit G upon whether the latter really owns the property and interests sought to be disposed of in
the ground of forgery. After appropriate proceedings, the lower court issued an order, Exhibit G, are immaterial to the probate thereof. At any rate, the testimony of Clemente
dated June 15, 1957, admitting the disputed document to probate. Hence, this appeal by Sykimte, who used to act as the secretary of Harris, during his lifetime and that of
said Company — hereinafter referred to as appellant — upon the ground that the lower appellant's general superintendent of operations, J.B. Harrison, have established the fact
court erred: that Harris had in his name four (4) mining claims, two (2) of which were operated by the
appellant. In fact, appellant's Articles of Incorporation show, also, that Harris was one of
1) In not holding that the "Semana," in which notice of the hearing of said petition its incorporators, with a subscription of 900,000 shares of stock. In addition thereof, he
had been published, is not a newspaper of general circulation in the Province of had 75,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mining Co., Inc.
Surigao;
It is true that, testifying as appellant's witness, Martin S. Ramos, as alleged handwriting
2) In finding that Pedro Butiong and Clementino Sykimte are the next of kin of expert, expressed the opinion that the supposed signature of Harris on Exhibit G is
Harris; forged. This negative evidence was more than offset, however, by the testimony of
Vicente C. Fernandez, Bernardino O. Almeda and Mateo Penafiel to the effect that, after
3) In holding that appellant had not proven that Harris did not own the property reading Exhibit G aloud and announcing that it was the true expression of his will, Harris
and interest disposed of in his last will; — who was of sound mind and spoke, as well as understood, both English and Spanish
— signed thereon in their presence, and they, in turn, signed on said instrument, in the
1äw phï1.ñët
presence of each other and that of Harris, in accordance with law. Besides, their
4) In giving credence to the testimony of the attesting witnesses;
testimony on the genuineness of the signature of Harris on Exhibit G was corroborated
by the testimony of Butiong and Sykimte, as well as by handwriting expert, Dr. Paul R.
5) In giving credence to Butiong's explanation regarding the temporary Verzosa, aside from having been confirmed by His Honor, the trial Judge, who compared
disappearance of Exhibit G; and said signature with the admittedly genuine signatures of Harris, used as standards in the
lower court. It is thus apparent that Butiong's evidence is much weightier than that of
appellant herein.  The lower court issued an order admitting the disputed document to probate.
Hence, this appeal by said Company.
As regards the delay in the filing of Exhibit G for probate, Butiong explained it as follows:
Harris died in Surigao, Surigao, on December 7, 1941, or on the eve of the outbreak of  Butiong maintains that the lower court erred in entertaining appellant’s opposition
war in the Pacific. Inasmuch as, soon thereafter, the Japanese forces occupied the and in not dismissing its appeal.
province of Surigao, Butiong evacuated from Surigao, Surigao, and transferred Exhibit G,
from a wooden trunk he has in his house, to a valise belonging to his uncle, Bernardino ISSUE: W/N the appeal should have been dismissed.
Butiong, with whom he lived, in the barrio of Alegria, Municipality of Mainit. After
liberation, neither he (Pedro Butiong) nor Bernardino could, however, find Exhibit G until HELD:
August 20, 1954, when Bernardino located it accidentally while looking for other papers. YES. It is well-settled that one who has or can have no interest in succeeding a
There upon Exhibit G was filed in court for probate. decedent cannot oppose the probate of his alleged will. Appellant herein does not claim
to have such interest in the succession to Christian Harris.
The records before us do not furnish sufficient data to warrant denying credence to the
testimony of Pedro Butiong and Bernardino Butiong, to this effect. At any rate, since the Accordingly, the lower court should not have considered its opposition to the
authenticity of the signature of Harris on Exhibit G and the due execution thereof, as his probate of Exhibit G, much less given due course to the present appeal.
last will and testament, have been satisfactorily established, the explanation for the delay
in its presentation for probate has become of minimal importance.
EUGENIA RAMONAL CODOY, AND MANUEL RAMONAL
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellant,
VS. EVANGELINE R. CALUGAY,
Surigao Consolidated Mining Co., Inc. It is so ordered.
JOSEPHINE SALCEDO, AND UEFEMIA PATIGAS
1äwphï1.ñët
G.R. NO. 123486

AUGUST 12, 1999
DIGEST: BUTIONG VS. SURIGAO CONSOLIDATED PARDO, J.:
FACTS:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals1 and
 Pedro Butiong commenced Special Proceedings No. 737 for the probate of a
its resolution denying reconsideration, ruling:
document purporting to have been executed by Harris as his last will and
testament.
Upon the unrebutted testimony of appellant Evangeline Calugay and witness
 Paragraph IV of said Exhibit G reads: Matilde Ramonal Binanay, the authenticity of testators holographic will has been
I hereby make, appoint and constitute Pedro Butiong, who is my adopted son and established and the handwriting and signature therein (exhibit S) are hers,
whom I have reared and brought up since he was still about 2 years old, as my enough to probate said will. Reversal of the judgment appealed from and the
sole and universal heir of all my properties located in the Philippines, consisting probate of the holographic will in question be called for. The rule is that after
of shares of stock and interest in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mining Co., Inc., plaintiff has completed presentation of his evidence and the defendant files a
located at Mabuhay, Surigao, Surigao, and of shares of stock, interest and 1% motion for judgment on demurrer to evidence on the ground that upon the facts
per cent royalty in the Surigao Consolidated Mining Co., Inc., located at Siano, and the law plaintiff has shown no right to relief, if the motion is granted and the
Surigao. order to dismissal is reversed on appeal, the movant loses his right to present
 The Surigao Consolidated Mining opposed the probate upon the ground of evidence in his behalf (Sec, 1 Rule 35 Revised Rules of Court). Judgment may,
forgery. therefore, be rendered for appellant in the instant case.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is REVERSED and judgment rendered WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, the Demurrer to Evidence
allowing the probate of the holographic will of the testator Matilde Seño Vda. de having being well taken, same is granted, and the petition for probate of the
Ramonal.2 document (Exhibit "S") on the purported Holographic Will of the late Matilde Seño
Vda. de Ramonal, is denied for insufficiency of evidence and lack of merits.7
The facts are as follows:
On December 12, 1990, respondents filed a notice of appeal,8 and in support of their
On April 6, 1990, Evangeline Calugay, Josephine Salcedo and Eufemia Patigas, appeal, the respondents once again reiterated the testimony of the following witnesses,
devisees and legatees of the holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seño Vda. de namely: (1) Augusto Neri; (2) Generosa Senon; (3) Matilde Ramonal Binanay; (4)
Ramonal, filed with the Regional Trial Court, Misamis Oriental, Branch 18, a petition 3 for Teresita Vedad; (5) Fiscal Rodolfo Waga; and (6) Evangeline Calugay.
probate of the holographic will of the deceased, who died on January 16, 1990.
To have a clear understanding of the testimonies of the witnesses, we recite an account
In the petition, respondents claimed that the deceased Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal, of their testimonies.
was of sound and disposing mind when she executed the will on August 30, 1978, that
there was no fraud, undue influence, and duress employed in the person of the testator, Augusto Neri, Clerk of Court, Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental, where the
and will was written voluntarily. special proceedings for the probate of the holographic will of the deceased was filed. He
produced and identified the records of the case. The documents presented bear the
The assessed value of the decedent's property, including all real and personal property signature of the deceased, Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal, for the purpose of laying the
was about P400,000.00, at the time of her death.4 basis for comparison of the handwriting of the testatrix, with the writing treated or
admitted as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered.
On June 28, 1990, Eugenia Ramonal Codoy and Manuel Ramonal filed an opposition5 to
the petition for probate, alleging that the holographic will was a forgery and that the same Generosa Senon, election registrar of Cagayan de Oro, was presented to produced and
is even illegible. This gives an impression that a "third hand" of an interested party other identify the voter's affidavit of the decedent. However, the voters' affidavit was not
than the "true hand" of Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal executed the holographic will. produced for the same was already destroyed and no longer available.
Petitioners argued that the repeated dates incorporated or appearing on will after every Matilde Ramonal Binanay, testified that the deceased Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal
disposition is out of the ordinary. If the deceased was the one who executed the will, and was her aunt, and that after the death of Matilde's husband, the latter lived with her in her
was not forced, the dates and the signature should appear at the bottom after the parent's house for eleven (11) years from 1958 to 1969. During those eleven (11) years
dispositions, as regularly done and not after every disposition. And assuming that the of close association the deceased, she acquired familiarity with her signature and
holographic will is in the handwriting of the deceased, it was procured by undue and handwriting as she used to accompany her (deceased Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal)
improper pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiaries, or through fraud and in collecting rentals from her various tenants of commercial buildings, and deceased
trickery.
1âwphi1.nêt
always issued receipts. In addition to this, she (witness Matilde Binanay) assisted the
deceased in posting the records of the accounts, and carried personal letters of the
Respondents presented six (6) witnesses and various documentary evidence. Petitioners deceased to her creditors.
instead of presenting their evidence, filed a demurrer6 to evidence, claiming that
respondents failed to establish sufficient factual and legal basis for the probate of the Matilde Ramonal Binanay further testified that at the time of the death of Matilde Vda. de
holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal. Ramonal, she left a holographic will dated August 30, 1978, which was personally and
entirely written, dated and signed, by the deceased and that all the dispositions therein,
On November 26, 1990, the lower Court issued an order, the dispositive portion of which the dates, and the signatures in said will, were that of the deceased.
reads:
Fiscal Rodolfo Waga testified that before he was appointed City Fiscal of Cagayan de 1. Eufemia Patigas
Oro, he was a practicing lawyer, and handled all the pleadings and documents signed by
the deceased in connection with the proceedings of her late husband, as a result of 2. Josefina Salcedo
which he is familiar with the handwriting of the latter. He testified that the signature
appearing in the holographic will was similar to that of the deceased, Matilde Seño Vda. 3. Evangeline Calugay
de Ramonal, but he can not be sure.
(Sgd) Matilde Vda de Ramonal
The fifth witness presented was Mrs. Teresita Vedad, an employee of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, Region 10. She testified that she processed the
August 30, 1978
application of the deceased for pasture permit and was familiar with the signature of the
deceased, since the signed documents in her presence, when the latter was applying for
pasture permit. 4. I bequeath my one (1) hectare land at Mandumol, Indahag to Evangeline R.
Calugay
Finally, Evangeline Calugay, one of the respondents, testified that she had lived with the
deceased since birth, and was in fact adopted by the latter. That after a long period of (Sgd) Matilde Vda de Ramonal
time she became familiar with the signature of the deceased. She testified that the
signature appearing in the holographic will is the true and genuine signature of Matilde August 30, 1978
Seño Vda. de Ramonal.
5. Give the 2,500 Square Meters at Sta. Cruz Ramonal Village in favor of
The holographic will which was written in Visayan, is translated in English as follows: Evangeline R. Calugay, Helen must continue with the Sta. Cruz, once I am no
longer around.
Instruction
August 30, 1978
August 30, 1978
1. My share at Cogon, Raminal Street, for Evangeline Calugay.
6. Bury me where my husband Justo is ever buried.
August 30, 1978
August 30, 1978
2. Josefina Salcedo must be given 1,500 square meters at Pinikan Street.
Gene and Manuel:
Follow my instruction in order that I will rest peacefully.
August 30, 1978
Mama
3. My jewelry's shall be divided among:
Matilde Vda de Ramonal
On October 9, 1995, the Court of Appeals, rendered decision9 ruling that the appeal was Again, under Art. 811, the resort to expert evidence is conditioned by the words
meritorious. Citing the decision in the case of Azaola vs. Singson, 109 Phil. 102, penned "if the court deem it necessary", which reveal that what the law deems essential
by Mr. Justice J. B. L. Reyes, a recognized authority in civil law, the Court of Appeals is that the court should be convinced of the will's authenticity. Where the
held: prescribed number of witnesses is produced and the court is convinced by their
testimony that the will is genuine, it may consider it unnecessary to call for expert
. . . even if the genuineness of the holographic will were contested, we are of the evidence. On the other hand, if no competent witness is available, or none of
opinion that Article 811 of our present civil code can not be interpreted as to those produced is convincing, the court may still, and in fact it should resort to
require the compulsory presentation of three witnesses to identify the handwriting handwriting experts. The duty of the court, in fine, is to exhaust all available lines
of the testator, under penalty of having the probate denied. Since no witness may of inquiry, for the state is as much interested as the proponent that the true
have been present at the execution of the holographic will, none being required intention of the testator be carried into effect.
by law (art. 810, new civil code), it becomes obvious that the existence of
witnesses possessing the requisite qualifications is a matter beyond the control of Paraphrasing Azaola vs. Singson, even if the genuineness of the holographic will
the proponent. For it is not merely a question of finding and producing any three were contested, Article 811 of the civil code cannot be interpreted as to require
witnesses; they must be witnesses "who know the handwriting and signature of the compulsory presentation of three witnesses to identify the handwriting of the
the testator" and who can declare (truthfully, of course, even if the law does not testator, under penalty of the having the probate denied. No witness need be
express) "that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator." present in the execution of the holographic will. And the rule requiring the
There may be no available witness acquainted with the testator's hand; or even if production of three witnesses is merely permissive. What the law deems
so familiarized, the witness maybe unwilling to give a positive opinion. essential is that the court is convinced of the authenticity of the will. Its duty is to
Compliance with the rule of paragraph 1 of article 811 may thus become an exhaust all available lines of inquiry, for the state is as much interested in the
impossibility. That is evidently the reason why the second paragraph of article proponent that the true intention of the testator be carried into effect. And
811 prescribes that — because the law leaves it to the trial court to decide if experts are still needed, no
unfavorable inference can be drawn from a party's failure to offer expert
in the absence of any competent witness referred to in the preceding paragraph, evidence, until and unless the court expresses dissatisfaction with the testimony
and if the court deems it necessary, expert testimony may be resorted to. of the lay witnesses.10
As can be see, the law foresees, the possibility that no qualified witness ma be According to the Court of Appeals, Evangeline Calugay, Matilde Ramonal Binanay and
found (or what amounts to the same thing, that no competent witness may be other witnesses definitely and in no uncertain terms testified that the handwriting and
willing to testify to the authenticity of the will), and provides for resort to expert signature in the holographic will were those of the testator herself.
evidence to supply the deficiency.
Thus, upon the unrebutted testimony of appellant Evangeline Calugay and witness
It may be true that the rule of this article (requiring that three witnesses be Matilde Ramonal Binanay, the Court of Appeals sustained the authenticity of the
presented if the will is contested and only one if no contest is had) was derived holographic will and the handwriting and signature therein, and allowed the will to
from the rule established for ordinary testaments (CF Cabang vs. Delfianado, 45 probate.
PHIL 291; Tolentino v. Francisco, 57 PHIL 742). But it can not be ignored that the
requirement can be considered mandatory only in case of ordinary testaments, Hence, this petition.
precisely because the presence of at least three witnesses at the execution of
ordinary wills is made by law essential to their validity (Art. 805). Where the will is The petitioners raise the following issues:
holographic, no witness need be present (art. 10), and the rule requiring
production of three witnesses must be deemed merely permissive if absurd (1) Whether or not the ruling of the case of Azaola vs. Singson, 109 Phil. 102,
results are to be avoided. relied upon by the respondent Court of Appeals, was applicable to the case.
(2) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that private respondents Q. And you said for eleven (11) years Matilde Vda de Ramonal resided with
had been able to present credible evidence to that the date, text, and signature your parents at Pinikitan, Cagayan de Oro City. Would you tell the court what
on the holographic will written entirely in the hand of the testatrix. was your occupation or how did Matilde Vda de Ramonal keep herself busy that
time?
(3) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not analyzing the signatures in
the holographic will of Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal. A. Collecting rentals.
In this petition, the petitioners ask whether the provisions of Article 811 of the Civil Code Q. From where?
are permissive or mandatory. The article provides, as a requirement for the probate of a
contested holographic will, that at least three witnesses explicitly declare that the A. From the land rentals and commercial buildings at Pabayo-Gomez streets.12
signature in the will is the genuine signature of the testator.
1âw phi 1.nêt
xxx xxx xxx

We are convinced, based on the language used, that Article 811 of the Civil Code is
mandatory. The word "shall" connotes a mandatory order. We have ruled that "shall" in a Q. Who sometime accompany her?
statute commonly denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of
discretion and that the presumption is that the word "shall," when used in a statute is
A. I sometimes accompany her.
mandatory.11
Q. In collecting rentals does she issue receipts?
Laws are enacted to achieve a goal intended and to guide against an evil or mischief that
aims to prevent. In the case at bar, the goal to achieve is to give effect to the wishes of
the deceased and the evil to be prevented is the possibility that unscrupulous individuals A. Yes, sir.13
who for their benefit will employ means to defeat the wishes of the testator.
xxx xxx xxx
So, we believe that the paramount consideration in the present petition is to determine
the true intent of the deceased. An exhaustive and objective consideration of the Q. Showing to you the receipt dated 23 October 1979, is this the one you are
evidence is imperative to establish the true intent of the testator. referring to as one of the receipts which she issued to them?
It will be noted that not all the witnesses presented by the respondents testified explicitly A. Yes, sir.
that they were familiar with the handwriting of testator. In the case of Augusto Neri, clerk
of court, Court of First Instance, Misamis Oriental, he merely identified the record of Q. Now there is that signature of Matilde vda. De Ramonal, whose signature is
Special Proceedings No. 427 before said court. He was not presented to declare that Mrs. Binanay?
explicitly that the signature appearing in the holographic was that of the deceased.
A. Matilde vda. De Ramonal.
Generosa E. Senon, the election registrar of Cagayan de Oro City, was presented to
identify the signature of the deceased in the voter's affidavit, which was not even Q. Why do you say that is the signature of Matilde Vda. De Ramonal?
produced as it was no longer available.
A. I am familiar with her signature.
Matilde Ramonal Binanay, on the other hand, testified that:
Q. Now, you tell the court Mrs. Binanay, whether you know Matilde vda de
Ramonal kept records of the accounts of her tenants?
A. Yes, sir. Q. Showing to you this exhibit "S", there is that handwritten "tugon", whose
handwriting is this?
Q. Why do you say so?
A. My Aunt.
A. Because we sometimes post a record of accounts in behalf of Matilde Vda.
De Ramonal. Q. Why do you say this is the handwriting of your aunt?
Q. How is this record of accounts made? How is this reflected? A. Because I am familiar with her signature.16
A. In handwritten.14 What Ms. Binanay saw were pre-prepared receipts and letters of the deceased, which
she either mailed or gave to her tenants. She did not declare that she saw the deceased
xxx xxx xxx sign a document or write a note.
Q. In addition to collection of rentals, posting records of accounts of tenants and Further, during the cross-examination, the counsel for petitioners elicited the fact that the
deed of sale which you said what else did you do to acquire familiarity of the will was not found in the personal belongings of the deceased but was in the possession
signature of Matilde Vda De Ramonal? of Ms. Binanay. She testified that:
A. Posting records. Q. Mrs. Binanay, when you were asked by counsel for the petitioners if the late
Matilde Seno vda de Ramonal left a will you said, yes?
Q. Aside from that?
A. Yes, sir.
A. Carrying letters.
Q. Who was in possession of that will?
Q. Letters of whom?
A. I.
A. Matilde.
Q. Since when did you have the possession of the will?
Q. To whom?
A. It was in my mother's possession.
15
A. To her creditors.
Q. So, it was not in your possession?
xxx xxx xxx
A. Sorry, yes.
Q. You testified that at time of her death she left a will. I am showing to you a
document with its title "tugon" is this the document you are referring to? Q. And when did you come into possession since as you said this was originally
in the possession of your mother?
A. Yes, sir.
A. 1985.17
xxx xxx xxx Q. Now, let us go to the third signature of Matilde Ramonal. Do you know that
there are retracings in the word Vda.?
Q. Now, Mrs. Binanay was there any particular reason why your mother left that
will to you and therefore you have that in your possession? A. Yes, a little. The letter L is continuous.
A. It was not given to me by my mother, I took that in the aparador when she Q. And also in Matilde the letter L is continued to letter D?
died.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. After taking that document you kept it with you?
Q. Again the third signature of Matilde Vda de Ramonal the letter L in Matilde is
A. I presented it to the fiscal. continued towards letter D.
Q. For what purpose? A. Yes, sir.
A. Just to seek advice. Q. And there is a retracing in the word Vda.?
Q. Advice of what? A. Yes, sir.20
A. About the will.18 xxx xxx xxx
In her testimony it was also evident that Ms. Binanay kept the fact about the will from Q. Now, that was 1979, remember one year after the alleged holographic will.
petitioners, the legally adopted children of the deceased. Such actions put in issue her Now, you identified a document marked as Exhibit R. This is dated January 8,
motive of keeping the will a secret to petitioners and revealing it only after the death of 1978 which is only about eight months from August 30, 1978. Do you notice that
Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal. the signature Matilde Vda de Ramonal is beautifully written and legible?
In the testimony of Ms. Binanay, the following were established: A. Yes, sir the handwriting shows that she was very exhausted.
Q. Now, in 1978 Matilde Seno Vda de Ramonal was not yet a sickly person is Q. You just say that she was very exhausted while that in 1978 she was healthy
that correct? was not sickly and she was agile. Now, you said she was exhausted?
A. Yes, sir. A. In writing.
Q. She was up and about and was still uprightly and she could walk agilely and Q. How did you know that she was exhausted when you were not present and
she could go to her building to collect rentals, is that correct? you just tried to explain yourself out because of the apparent inconsistencies?
A. Yes, sir.19 A. That was I think. (sic).
xxx xxx xxx Q. Now, you already observed this signature dated 1978, the same year as the
alleged holographic will. In exhibit I, you will notice that there is no retracing;
there is no hesitancy and the signature was written on a fluid movement. . . . And xxx xxx xxx
in fact, the name Eufemia R. Patigas here refers to one of the petitioners?
Q. Now, I am showing to you Exhibit S which is captioned "tugon" dated Agosto
A. Yes, sir. 30, 1978 there is a signature here below item No. 1, will you tell this court whose
signature is this?
Q. You will also notice Mrs. Binanay that it is not only with the questioned
signature appearing in the alleged holographic will marked as Exhibit X but in the A. Yes, sir, that is her signature.
handwriting themselves, here you will notice the hesitancy and tremors, do you
notice that? Q. Why do you say that is her signature?
A. Yes, sir.21 A. I am familiar with her signature.23
Evangeline Calugay declared that the holographic will was written, dated and signed in So, the only reason that Evangeline can give as to why she was familiar with the
the handwriting of the testator. She testified that: handwriting of the deceased was because she lived with her since birth. She never
declared that she saw the deceased write a note or sign a document.
Q. You testified that you stayed with the house of the spouses Matilde and
Justo Ramonal for the period of 22 years. Could you tell the court the services if The former lawyer of the deceased, Fiscal Waga, testified that:
any which you rendered to Matilde Ramonal?
Q. Do you know Matilde Vda de Ramonal?
A. During my stay I used to go with her to the church, to market and then to her
transactions. A. Yes, sir I know her because she is my godmother the husband is my
godfather. Actually I am related to the husband by consanguinity.
Q. What else? What services that you rendered?
Q. Can you tell the name of the husband?
A. After my college days I assisted her in going to the bank, paying taxes and to
her lawyer. A. The late husband is Justo Ramonal.24
Q. What was your purpose of going to her lawyer? xxx xxx xxx
A. I used to be her personal driver. Q. Can you tell this court whether the spouses Justo Ramonal and Matilde
Ramonal have legitimate children?
Q. In the course of your stay for 22 years did you acquire familiarity of the
handwriting of Matilde Vda de Ramonal? A. As far as I know they have no legitimate children.25
A. Yes, sir. xxx xxx xxx
Q. How come that you acquired familiarity? Q. You said after becoming a lawyer you practice your profession? Where?
A. Because I lived with her since birth.22 A. Here in Cagayan de Oro City.
Q. Do you have services rendered with the deceased Matilde vda de Ramonal? Q. This one, Matilde Vda de Ramonal, whose signature is this?
A. I assisted her in terminating the partition, of properties. A. I think this signature here it seems to be the signature of Mrs. Matilde vda de
Ramonal.
Q. When you said assisted, you acted as her counsel? Any sort of counsel as in
what case is that, Fiscal? Q. Now, in item No. 2 there is that signature here of Matilde Vda de Ramonal,
can you tell the court whose signature is this?
A. It is about the project partition to terminate the property, which was under the
court before.26 A. Well, that is similar to that signature appearing in the project of partition.
xxx xxx xxx Q. Also in item no. 3 there is that signature Matilde Vda de Ramonal, can you
tell the court whose signature is that?
Q. Appearing in special proceeding no. 427 is the amended inventory which is
marked as exhibit N of the estate of Justo Ramonal and there appears a A. As I said, this signature also seems to be the signature of Matilde vda de
signature over the type written word Matilde vda de Ramonal, whose signature is Ramonal.
this?
Q. Why do you say that?
A. That is the signature of Matilde Vda de Ramonal.
A. Because there is a similarity in the way it is being written.
Q. Also in exhibit n-3, whose signature is this?
Q. How about this signature in item no. 4, can you tell the court whose signature
A. This one here that is the signature of Mrs. Matilde vda de Ramonal.27 is this?
xxx xxx xxx A. The same is true with the signature in item no. 4. It seems that they are
similar.29
Q. Aside from attending as counsel in that Special Proceeding Case No. 427
what were the other assistance wherein you were rendering professional service xxx xxx xxx
to the deceased Matilde Vda de Ramonal?
Q. Mr. Prosecutor, I heard you when you said that the signature of Matilde Vda
A. I can not remember if I have assisted her in other matters but if there are de Ramonal Appearing in exhibit S seems to be the signature of Matilde vda de
documents to show that I have assisted then I can recall.28 Ramonal?
xxx xxx xxx A. Yes, it is similar to the project of partition.
Q. Now, I am showing to you exhibit S which is titled "tugon", kindly go over this Q. So you are not definite that this is the signature of Matilde vda de Ramonal.
document, Fiscal Waga and tell the court whether you are familiar with the You are merely supposing that it seems to be her signature because it is similar
handwriting contained in that document marked as exhibit "S"? to the signature of the project of partition which you have made?
A. I am not familiar with the handwriting. A. That is true.30
From the testimonies of these witnesses, the Court of Appeals allowed the will to probate IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE. The records are
and disregard the requirement of three witnesses in case of contested holographic will, ordered remanded to the court of origin with instructions to allow petitioners to adduce
citing the decision in Azaola vs. Singson,31 ruling that the requirement is merely directory evidence in support of their opposition to the probate of the holographic will of the
and not mandatory. deceased Matilde Seño vda. de Ramonal. 1âwphi1.nêt
In the case of Ajero vs. Court of Appeals,32 we said that "the object of the solemnities No costs.
surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to
avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. SO ORDERED.
Therefore, the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these
primordial ends. But on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is
not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. DIGEST: CODOY VS. CALUGAY
However, we cannot eliminate the possibility of a false document being adjudged as the FACTS:
will of the testator, which is why if the holographic will is contested, that law requires On April 6, 1990, Evangeline Calugay, Josephine Salcedo and Eufemia Patigas,
three witnesses to declare that the will was in the handwriting of the deceased. devisees and legatees of the holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seño Vda. de
Ramonal, filed a petition for probate of the will of the deceased who died on January 16,
The will was found not in the personal belongings of the deceased but with one of the 1990.
respondents, who kept it even before the death of the deceased. In the testimony of Ms.
Binanay, she revealed that the will was in her possession as early as 1985, or five years On June 28, 1990, Eugenia Ramonal Codoy and Manuel Ramonal filed an
before the death of the deceased. opposition to the petition alleging that the holographic will was a forgery and that the
same is illegible.
There was no opportunity for an expert to compare the signature and the handwriting of
the deceased with other documents signed and executed by her during her lifetime. The Respondents presented six (6) witnesses and various documentary evidence.
only chance at comparison was during the cross-examination of Ms. Binanay when the Petitioners instead of presenting their evidence filed a demurrer to evidence.
lawyer of petitioners asked Ms. Binanay to compare the documents which contained the
signature of the deceased with that of the holographic will and she is not a handwriting The lower Court granted the Demurrer to Evidence and denied the petition for
expert. Even the former lawyer of the deceased expressed doubts as to the authenticity probate of the document.
of the signature in the holographic will.
Respondents filed a notice of appeal and in support thereof, they reiterated the
A visual examination of the holographic will convince us that the strokes are different testimony of their witnesses, namely: Augusto Neri, Generosa Senon, Matilde Binanay,
when compared with other documents written by the testator. The signature of the Fiscal Rodolfo Waga, Mrs. Teresita Vedad, and Evangeline Calugay.
testator in some of the disposition is not readable. There were uneven strokes, retracing
and erasures on the will. The Court of Appeals citing the case of Azaola vs. Singson, 109 Phil. 102, held
that even if the genuineness of the holographic will were contested, Article 811 of the
civil code in requiring the production of three witnesses is merely permissive. Thus, the
Comparing the signature in the holographic will dated August 30, 1978,33 and the
Court of Appeals sustained the authenticity of the holographic will and allowed the will to
signatures in several documents such as the application letter for pasture permit dated
probate.
December 30, 1980,34 and a letter dated June 16, 1978,35 the strokes are different. In the
letters, there are continuous flows of the strokes, evidencing that there is no hesitation in
Hence, the instant petition.
writing unlike that of the holographic will. We, therefore, cannot be certain that ruling
holographic will was in the handwriting by the deceased.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the provisions of Article 811 of the Civil Code are permissive. there are continuous flows of the strokes, evidencing that there is no hesitation in writing
2. Whether or not the holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seño Vda. de unlike that of the holographic will. We, therefore, cannot be certain that the holographic
Ramonal is authentic. will was in the handwriting by the deceased.
HELD: IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE. The records are
1. Article 811 of the civil code is mandatory. ordered remanded to the court of origin with instructions to allow petitioners to adduce
The article provides, as a requirement for the probate of a contested holographic will, evidence in support of their opposition to the probate of the holographic will of the
that at least three witnesses explicitly declare that the signature in the will is the genuine deceased Matilde Seño vda. de Ramonal.
signature of the testator. The Supreme Court is convinced, based on the language used,
that Article 811 of the Civil Code is mandatory. The word "shall" connotes a mandatory
order. The SC has ruled that "shall" in a statute commonly denotes an imperative IN RE WILL OF JOSEFA ZALAMEA Y ABELLA, DECEASED.
obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that the presumption is that PEDRO UNSON
the word "shall," when used in a statute is mandatory. VS. ANTONIO ABELLA, ET AL
G.R. NO. 17857
2. Respondents failed to establish the authenticity of the holographic will. JUNE 12, 1922
In the case at bar, the goal is to give effect to the wishes of the deceased and the evil to VILLAMOR, J.:
be prevented is the possibility that unscrupulous individuals who for their benefit will
employ means to defeat the wishes of the testator. The paramount consideration in the On July 19, 1918, Doña Josefa Zalamea y Abella, single, 60 years old, who was residing
present petition is to determine the true intent of the deceased. in the municipality of Pagsanjan, Province of Laguna, executed her last will and
testament with an attached inventory of her properties, Exhibits A and A-1, in the
It will be noted that not all the witnesses were familiar with the handwriting of the testator. presence of three witnesses, who signed with her all the pages of said documents. The
In the case of Augusto Neri, he merely identified the record of the Special Proceedings testatrix died on the 6th of January, 1921, and, as the record shows, the executor
before the lower court. Generosa E. Senon was not even able produce the voter’s appointed in the will, Pedro Unson, filed in the court of First Instance of Laguna on the
affidavit to identify the signature of the deceased as it was no longer available. 19th of January of the same year an application for the probate of the will and the
Evangeline Calugay never declared that she saw the deceased write a note or sign a issuance of the proper letters of administration in his favor.
document. Even the former lawyer of the deceased, Fiscal Rodolfo Waga, expressed
doubts as to the authenticity of the signature. To said application an opposition was presently by Antonio Abella, Ignacia Abella,
Avicencia Abella, and Santiago Vito, alleging that the supposed will of the deceased
The will was found not in the personal belongings of the deceased but with one of the Zalamea was not executed in conformity with the provinces of the law, inasmuch as it
respondents, who kept it even before the death of the deceased. In the testimony of Ms. was not paged correlatively in letters, nor was there any attestation clause in it, nor was it
Binanay, she revealed that the will was in her possession as early as 1985, or five years signed by the testatrix and the witnesses in the presence of each other.
before the death of the deceased.
Trial having been held, the judge a quo overruled the opposition of the contestants, and
There was no opportunity for an expert to compare the signature and the handwriting of
ordered the probate of the will, Exhibit A, and the inventory, Exhibit A-1, holding that both
the deceased with other documents signed and executed by her during her lifetime. A
documents contained the true and last will of the deceased Josefa Zalamea.
visual examination of the holographic will convince us that the strokes are different.
There were uneven strokes, retracing and erasures on the will.
From the judgment of the court below, the contestants have appealed, and in their brief
Comparing the signature in the holographic will and the signatures in several documents they assign three errors, which, in their opinion, justify the reversal of the judgment
such as the application letter for pasture permit, the strokes are different. In the letters, appealed from.
The first error assigned by the appellants as committed by the court below is its finding to announcement of the trial of the petition for the probate of the will, said witness has been
the effect that Exhibit A, said to be the will of the deceased Josefa Zalamea, was in frequent communication with the contestants and their attorney, and has refused to
executed with all the solemnities required by the law. hold any conference with the attorneys for the proponent. In reply to this, the attorney for
the contestants, said to the court, "without discussing for the present whether or not in
The arguments advanced by appellants' counsel in support of the first assignment of view of those facts (the facts mentioned by the attorneys for the petitioner), in the
error tend to impeach the credibility of the witnesses for the proponent, specially that of hypothesis that the same are proven, they are relieved from producing that witness, for
Eugenio Zalamea. We have made a careful examination of the evidence, but have not while it is a matter not decided, it is a recognized rule that the fact that a witness is
found anything that would justify us in disturbing the finding of the court a quo. The hostile does not justify a party to omit his testimony; without discussing this, I say, I move
attesting witnesses, Eugenio Zalamea and Gonzalo Abaya, clearly testify that together that said statement be stricken out, and if the proponent wants these facts to stand to
with the other witness to the will, Pedro de Jesus, they did sign each and every page of stand in the record, let him prove them." The court a quo ruled, saying, "there is no
the will and of the inventory in the presence of each other and of the testatrix, as the need."
latter did likewise sign all the pages of the will and of the inventory in their presence.
To this ruling of the court, the attorney for the appellants did not take any exception.
In their brief the appellants intimate that one of the pages of the will was not signed by
the testatrix, nor by the witnesses on the day of the execution of the will, that is, on the In the case of Avera vs. Garcia and Rodriguez (42 Phil., 145), recently decided by this
19th of July, 1918, basing their contention on the testimony of Aurelio Palileo, who says court, in deciding the question whether a will can be admitted to probate, where
that on one occasion Gonzalo Abaya told him that one of the pages of the will had not opposition is made, upon the proof of a single attesting witness, without producing or
been signed by the witnesses, nor by the testatrix on the day of its execution. Palileo's accounting for the absence of the other two, it was said; "while it is undoubtedly true that
testimony is entirely contradicted by Gonzalo Abaya not only in the direct, but in the an uncontested will may be proved by the testimony of only one of the three attesting
rebuttal, evidence as well. To our mind, Palileo's testimony cannot prevail over that of the witnesses, nevertheless in Cabang vs. Delfinado (34 Phil., 291), this court declared after
attesting witnesses, Gonzalo Avaya and Eugenio Zalamea. The appellants impeach the an elaborate examination of the American and English authorities that when a contest is
credibility of Eugenio Zalamea, for having made a sworn declaration before the justice of instituted, all of the attesting witnesses must be examined, if alive and within reach of the
the peace of Santa Cruz, Laguna, before the trial of this case, to the effect that he was process of the court.
really one of the witnesses to the will in question, which fact was corroborated by himself
at the trial. The appellants take Zalamea's testimony in connection with the dismissal of a In the present case no explanation was made at the trial as to why all three of the
criminal case against a nephew of his, in whose success he was interested, and infer attesting witnesses were not produced, but the probable reason is found in the
from this fact the partiality of his testimony. We deem this allegation of little importance to fact that, although the petition for the probate of this will had been pending from
impeach the credibility of the witness Zalamea, especially because his testimony is December 21, 1917, until the date set for the hearing, which was April 5, 1919,
corroborated by the other attesting witness. Gonzalo Abaya, and by attorney Luis Abaya, no formal contest was entered until the very day set for the hearing; and it is
who had prepared the testament at the instance of the testatrix. The foregoing is probable that the attorney for the • proponent, believing in good faith that
sufficient for us to conclude that the first assignment of error made by the appellants is probate would not be contested, repaired to the court with only one of the three
groundless. attesting witnesses at hand, and upon finding that the will was contested,
incautiously permitted the case to go to proof without asking for a postponement
The appellants contend that the court below erred in admitting the will to probate of the trial in order that he might produce all the attesting witnesses.
notwithstanding the omission of the proponent to produce one of the attesting witnesses.
Although this circumstance may explain why the three witnesses were not
At the trial of this case the attorneys for the proponent stated to the court that they had produced, it does not in itself supply any basis for changing the rule expounded
necessarily to omit the testimony of Pedro de Jesus, one of the persons who appear to in the case above referred to; and were it not for a fact now to be mentioned, this
have witnessed the execution of the will, for there were reasonable grounds to believe court would probably be compelled to reverse this case on the ground that the
that said witness was openly hostile to the proponent, inasmuch as since the
execution of the will had not been proved by a sufficient number of attesting thus calling the error to the attention of the court and his adversary, the point is
witnesses. first raised by the appellant in this court. We hold that this is too late.
It appears, however, that this point was not raised by the appellant in the lower Properly understood, the case of Cabang vs. Delfinado, supra, contains nothing
court either upon the submission of the cause for determination in that court or inconsistent with the ruling we now make, for it appears from the opinion in that
upon the occasion of the filing of the motion for a new trial. Accordingly it is case that the proponent of the will had obtained an order for a republication and
insisted for the appellee that this question cannot now be raised for t he first time new trial for the avowed purpose of presenting the two additional attesting
in this court. We believe this point is well taken, and the first assignment of error witnesses who had not been previously examined, but nevertheless
must be declared not to be well taken. This exact question has been decided by subsequently failed without any apparent reason to take their testimony. Both
the Supreme Court of California adversely to the contention of the appellant, and parties in that case were therefore fully apprised that the question of the number
we see no reason why the same rule of practice should not be observed by us. of witnesses necessar to prove the will was in issue in the lower court.
(Estate of McCarty, 58 Cal., 335, 337.)
In the case at bar, we do not think this question properly to have been raised at the trial,
There are at least two reasons why the appellate tribunals are disinclined to but in the memorandum submitted by the attorney for the appellants to the trial court, he
permit certain questions to be raised for the first time in the second instance. In contended that the will could not be admitted to probate because one of the witnesses to
the first place it eliminates the judicial criterion of the Court of First Instance upon the will was not produced, and that the voluntary non-production of this witness raises a
the point there presented and makes the appellate court in effect a court of first presumption against the pretension of the proponent. The trial court found that the
instance with reference to that point, unless the case is remanded for a new trial. evidence introduced by the proponent, consisting of the testimony of the two attesting
In the second place, it permits, if it does not encourage, attorneys to trifle with the witnesses and the other witness who was present at the execution, and had charge of
administration of justice by concealing from the trial court and from their the preparation of the will and the inventory, Exhibits A and A-1, was sufficient. As
opponent the actual point upon which reliance is placed, while they are engaged announced in Cabang vs. Delfinado, supra, the general rule is that, where opposition is
in other discussions more simulated than real. These considerations are, we made to the probate of a will, the attesting witnesses must be produced. But there are
think, decisive. exceptions to this rule, for instance, when a witness is dead, or cannot be served with
process of the court, or his reputation for truth has been questioned or he appears hostile
In ruling upon the point above presented we do not wish to be understood as to the cause of the proponent. In such cases, the will may be admitted to probate without
laying down any hard and fast rule that would prove an embarrassment to this the testimony of said witness, if, upon the other proofs adduced in the case, the court is
court in the administration of justice in the future. In one way or another we are satisfied that the will has been duly executed. Wherefore, we find that the non-production
constantly here considering aspects of cases and applying doctrines which have of the attesting witness, Pedro de Jesus, as accounted for by the attorney for the
escaped the attention of all persons concerned in the litigation below; and this is proponent at the trial, does not render void the decree of the court a quo, allowing the
necessary if this court is to contribute the part due from it in the correct decision probate.
of the cases brought before it. What we mean to declare is that when we believe
that substantial justice has been done in the Court of First Instance, and the point But supposing that said witness, when cited, had testified adversely to the application,
relied on for reversal in this court appears to be one which ought properly to have this would not by itself have change the result reached by the court a quo, for section
been presented in that court, we will in the exercise of a sound discretion ignore 632 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that a will can be admitted to probate,
such question upon appeal; and this is the more proper when the question notwithstanding that one or more witnesses do not remember having attested it, provided
relates to a defect which might have been cured in the Court of First Instance if the court is satisfied upon the evidence adduced that the will has been executed and
attention had been called to it there. In the present case, if the appellant had signed in the manner prescribed by the law.
raised this question in the lower court, either at the hearing or upon a motion for a
new trial, that court would have had the power, and it would have been its duty,
considering the tardy institution of the contest, to have granted a new trial in
order that all the witnesses to the will might be brought into court. But instead of
The last error assigned by the appellants is made to consist in the probate of the we said: "It might be said that the object of the law in requiring that the paging be made
inventory, Exhibit A-1, despite the fact that this exhibit has no attestation clause in it, and in letters is to make falsification more difficult, but it should be noted that since all the
its paging is made in Arabic numerals and not in letters. pages of the testament are signed at the margin by the testatrix and the witnesses, the
difficulty of forging the signatures in either case remains the same. In other words the
In the third paragraph of the will, reference is made to the inventory, Exhibit A-1, and at more or less degree of facility to imitate the writing of the letters A, B, C, etc., does not
the bottom of said will, the testatrix Josefa Zalamea says: make for the easiness to forge the signatures. And as in the present case there exists
the guaranty of the authenticity of the testament, consisting in the signatures on the left
In witness whereof, I sign this will composed of ten folios including the page margins of the testament and the paging thereof as declared in the attestation clause,
containing the signatures and the attestation of the witnesses; I have likewise the holding of this court in Abangan vs. Abangan (40 Phil., 476), might as well be
signed the inventory attached to this will composed of ten folios in the presence repeated:
of Messrs. Gonzalo Abaya, Eugenio Zalamea, Pedro de Jesus, in this
municipality of Pagsanjan, Laguna, Philippine Islands, this 19th of July, 1918. "The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the
door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and
And the attestation clause is as follows: to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore the laws on this subject should
be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the other
hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to
The foregoing will composed of ten folios including this one whereunto we have
restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an
affixed our signatures, as well as the inventory of the properties of Doña Josefa
interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more requisites
Zalamea y Abella, was read to Doña Josefa Zalamea y Abella, and the latter
entirely unnecessary, useless, and frustrative of the testator's last will, must be
affixed her name to the last, and each and every page of this will and inventory
disregarded."
composed of ten folios in our presence; and she declared this to be her last will
and testament and at her request we have affixed hereunto our respective
signatures in her presence and in the presence of each other as witnesses to the In that case the testament was written on one page, and the attestation clause on
will and the inventory this 19th of July, 1918, at Pagsanjan, Laguna, P.I. another. Neither one of these pages was numbered in any way, and it was held: "In a will
consisting of two sheets the first of which contains all the testamentary dispositions and
is signed at the bottom by the testator and three witnesses, and the second contains only
(Sgd.) GONZALO ABAYA,
the attestation clause and is signed also at the bottom by the three witnesses it is not
EUGENIO ZALAMEA,
necessary that both sheets be further signed on their margins by the testator and the
PEDRO DE JESUS.
witnesses, or be paged."
In view of the fact that the inventory is referred to in the will as an integral part of it, we
This means that, according to the particular case, the emission of paging does not
find that the foregoing attestation clause is in compliance with section 1 of Act No. 2645,
necessarily render the testament invalid.
which requires this solemnity for the validity of a will, and makes unnecessary any other
attestation clause at the end of the inventory.
The law provides that the numbering of the pages should be in letters placed on the
upper part of the sheet, but if the paging should be placed in the lower part, would the
As to the paging of the will in Arabic numerals, instead of in letters, we adhere to the
testament be void for this sole reason? We believe not. The law also provides that the
doctrine announced in the case of Aldaba vs. Roque (p. 378, ante), recently decided by
testator and the witnesses must sign the left margin of each of the sheets of the
this court. In that case the validity of the will was assailed on the ground that its folios
testament; but if they should sign on the right margin, would this fact also annul the
were paged with the letters A, B, C, etc., instead of with the letters "one," two," "three,"
testament? Evidently not. This court has already held in Avera vs. Garcia and
etc. It was held that this way of numbering the pages of a will is in compliance with the
Rodriguez (42 Phi., 145):
spirit of the law, inasmuch as either one of these methods indicates the correlation of the
pages and serves to prevent the abstraction of any of them. In the course of the decision,
"It is true that the statute says that the testator and the instrumental witnesses Laguna on 19 January 1921 an application for the probate of the will and the issuance of
shall sign their names on the left margin of each and every page; and it is the proper letters of administration in his favor.
undeniable that the general doctrine is to the effect that all statutory requirements
as to the execution of wills must be fully complied with. The same execution for Opposition was presented by appellants Antonio Abella, Ignacia Abella, Avicencia
wills must be fully complied with. The same doctrine is also deducible from cases Abella, and Santiago Vito, alleging that the supposed will of the Zalamea was not
heretofore decided by this court." executed in conformity with the provinces of the law, for it was not paged correlatively in
letters, nor was there any attestation clause in it, nor was it signed by the testatrix and
"Still some details at time creep into legislative enactments which are so trivial the witnesses in the presence of each other.
that it would be absurd to suppose that the Legislature could have attached any
decisive importance to them. The provision to the effect that the signatures of the Trial court overruled the opposition and ordered the probate of the will and the
testator and witnesses shall be written on the left margin of each page — rather inventory, holding that both documents contained the true and last will of the deceased
than on the margin — seems to be of this character. So far as concerns the Josefa Zalamea. Oppositors appealed and assigned three errors:
authentication of the will, and of every part thereof, it can make no possible
difference whether the names appear on the left or on the right margin, provided 1. The court below erred in the finding to the effect that the will of the Josefa Zalamea,
they are on one or the other. In Craig vs. Tatlonghari (G. R. No. 12558, decided was executed with all the solemnities required by the law.
March 23, 1918, not reported), this court declared a will void which was totally 2. The court below erred in admitting the will to probate notwithstanding the omission
lacking in the signatures required to be written on its several pages; and in the of the proponent to produce one of the attesting witnesses.
case of Re Estate of Saguinsin (41 Phil., 875) a will was likewise declared void 3. The court below erred in the probate of the inventory, that it has no attestation
which contained the necessary signatures on the margin of each leaf (folio), but clause, and its paging is made in Arabic numerals and not in letters (main issue,
not in the margin of each page containing written matter." Art.827).
We do not desire to intimate that the numbering in letters is a requisite of no importance.

But since its principal object is to give the correlation of the pages, we hold that his object ISSUE: WON the will is void.
may be attained by writing one, two, three, etc., as well as by writing A, B, C, etc.
HELD:
We see no reason why the same rule should not be applied where the paging is in Arabic
(NO
numerals, instead of in letters, as in the inventory in question. So that, adhering to the
view taken by this court in the case of Abangan vs. Abangan, and followed in Aldava vs.
1. The appellants intimate that one of the pages of the will was not signed by the
Roque, with regard to the appreciation of the solemnities of a will, we find that the
testatrix, nor by the witnesses on the day of the execution of the will (19 July 1918).
judgement appealed from should be, as is hereby, affirmed with the costs against the
However, the attesting witnesses, Eugenio Zalamea and Gonzalo Abaya, clearly testify
appellants. So ordered.
that together with the other witness to the will, Pedro de Jesus, they did sign each and
every page of the will and of the inventory in the presence of each other and of the
testatrix, as the latter did sign all the pages of the will and of the inventory in their
DIGEST: UNSON VS. ABELLA presence.
FACTS: 2. The non-production of the attesting witness, Pedro de Jesus, does not render void the
Doña Josefa Zalamea y Abella, single, 60 years old, executed her last will and decree of the court a quo, allowing the probate.
testament with an attached inventory of her properties, in the presence of three
witnesses, who signed with her all the pages of said documents. The testatrix died on the In the case of Avera vs. Garcia and Rodriguez: "while it is undoubtedly true that
6 January 1921. The executor appointed in the will, Pedro Unson, filed in the CFI of an uncontested will may be proved by the testimony of only one of the three attesting
witnesses, nevertheless in Cabang vs. Delfinado, this court declared after an elaborate with the letters "one," two," "three," etc. The numbering of pages of a will is in compliance
examination of the American and English authorities that when a contest is instituted, all with the spirit of the law ... to make falsification more difficult, but it should be noted that
of the attesting witnesses must be examined, if alive and within reach of the process of since all the pages of the testament are signed at the margin by the testatrix and the
the court.” However, this point was not raised by appellant in the lower court thus this witnesses, the difficulty of forging the signatures in either case remains the same.”
question cannot now be raised for the first time in this court.
Abangan vs. Abangan: "The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution
Moreover in Cabang vs. Delfinado the general rule is that, where opposition is of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and
made to the probate of a will, the attesting witnesses must be produced. But there are testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. On the other hand, one must not
exceptions: when a witness is dead, or cannot be served with process of the court, or his lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise
reputation for truth has been questioned or he appears hostile to the cause of the of the right to make a will. So when an interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but
proponent. In such cases, the will may be admitted to probate without the testimony of demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless, and frustrative of the testator's
said witness, if upon the other proofs, the court is satisfied that the will has been duly last will, must be disregarded."
executed.
The court sees no reason why the same rule in the cases of Abangan vs. Abangan
3. In the third paragraph of the will and at the bottom of said will, the testatrix Josefa and Aldava vs. Roque, should not be applied, with regard to the appreciation of the
Zalamea says: solemnities of a will. The judgement appealed is hereby affirmed with the costs against
In witness whereof, I sign this will composed of ten folios including the page the appellants. So ordered.
containing the signatures and the attestation of the witnesses; I have likewise
signed the inventory attached to this will composed of ten folios in the presence of
Messrs. Gonzalo Abaya, Eugenio Zalamea, Pedro de Jesus, in this municipality of TESTATE ESTATE OF FELICIDAD ESGUERRA ALTO-YAP DECEASED. FAUSTO E.
Pagsanjan, Laguna, Philippine Islands, this 19th of July, 1918. GANVS. ILDEFONSO YAP, OPPOSITOR-APPELLEE.
G.R. NO. L-12190
And the attestation clause is as follows: AUGUST 30, 1958
The foregoing will composed of ten folios including this one whereunto we have BENGZON, J.:
affixed our signatures, as well as the inventory of the properties of Doña Josefa
Zalamea y Abella, was read to Doña Josefa Zalamea y Abella, and the latter On November 20, 1951, Felicidad Esguerra Alto Yap died of heart failure in the
affixed her name to the last, and each and every page of this will and inventory University of Santo Tomas Hospital, leaving properties in Pulilan, Bulacan, and in the
composed of ten folios in our presence; and she declared this to be her last will City of Manila.
and testament and at her request we have affixed hereunto our respective
signatures in her presence and in the presence of each other as witnesses to the On March 17, 1952, Fausto E. Gan initiated them proceedings in the Manila court of first
will and the inventory this 19th of July, 1918, at Pagsanjan, Laguna, P.I. instance with a petition for the probate of a holographic will allegedly executed by the
(Sgd.) GONZALO ABAYA, EUGENIO ZALAMEA, PEDRO DE JESUS. deceased, substantially in these words:
In view of the fact that the inventory in the will as an integral part of it, we find that
the foregoing attestation clause is in compliance with section 1 of Act No. 2645, which Nobyembre 5, 1951.
requires this solemnity for the validity of a will, and makes unnecessary any other
attestation clause at the end of the inventory.
Ako, si Felicidad E. Alto-Yap, may asawa, at ganap na pag-iisip, ay
As to the paging of the will in Arabic numerals, instead of in letters, we adhere to nagsasalaysay na ang aking kayamanan sa bayan ng Pulilan, Bulacan ay aking
the doctrine announced in the case of Aldaba vs. Roque: the validity of the will was ipinamamana sa aking mga kamag-anakang sumusunod:
assailed on the ground that its folios were paged with the letters A, B, C, etc., instead of
Vicente Esguerra, Sr. 5 Bahagi handwriting, signed and dated by her. Vicente Esguerra lost no time in transmitting the
............................................. information, and on the strength of it, in the morning of November 5, 1951, in her
residence at Juan Luna Street, Manila, Felicidad wrote, signed and dated a holographic
Fausto E. Gan 2 Bahagi will substantially of the tenor above transcribed, in the presence of her niece, Felina
......................................................... Esguerra (daughter of Vicente), who was invited to read it. In the afternoon of that day,
Rosario E. Gan 2 Bahagi Felicidad was visited by a distant relative, Primitivo Reyes, and she allowed him to read
......................................................... the will in the presence of Felina Esguerra, who again read it.
Filomena Alto 1 Bahagi
.......................................................... Nine days later, he had other visitors: Socorro Olarte a cousin, and Rosario Gan
Jimenez, a niece. To these she showed the will, again in the presence of Felina
Beatriz Alto 1 Bahagi
Esguerra, who read it for the third time.
..............................................................
When on November 19, 1951, Felicidad was confined at the U.S.T. Hospital for her last
At ang aking lahat ng ibang kayamanan sa Maynila at iba panglugar ay aking illness, she entrusted the said will, which was contained in a purse, to Felina Esguerra.
ipinamamana sa aking asawang si Idelfonso D. Yap sa kondisyong siya'y But a few hours later, Ildefonso Yap, her husband, asked Felina for the purse: and being
magpapagawa ng isang Health Center na nagkakahalaga ng di kukulangin sa afraid of him by reason of his well-known violent temper, she delivered it to him.
halagang P60,000.00 sa bayan ng Pulilan, Bulacan, na nakaukit ang aking Thereafter, in the same day, Ildefonso Yap returned the purse to Felina, only to demand
pangalang Felicidad Esguerra-Alto. At kung ito ay may kakulangan man ay it the next day shortly before the death of Felicidad. Again, Felina handed it to him but
bahala na ang aking asawa ang magpuno upang matupad ang aking not before she had taken the purse to the toilet, opened it and read the will for the last
kagustuhan. time.2
(Lagda) Felicidad E. Alto-Yap. From the oppositor's proof it appears that Felicidad Esguerra had been suffering from
heart disease for several years before her death; that she had been treated by prominent
physicians, Dr. Agerico Sison, Dr. Agustin Liboro and others; that in May 1950 husband
Opposing the petition, her surviving husband Ildefonso Yap asserted that the deceased and wife journeyed to the United States wherein for several weeks she was treated for
had not left any will, nor executed any testament during her lifetime. the disease; that thereafter she felt well and after visiting interesting places, the couple
returned to this country in August 1950. However, her ailment recurred, she suffered
After hearing the parties and considering their evidence, the Hon. Ramon R. San Jose, several attacks, the most serious of which happened in the early morning of the first
Judge,1 refused to probate the alleged will. A seventy-page motion for reconsideration Monday of November 1951 (Nov. 5). The whole household was surprised and alarmed,
failed. Hence this appeal. even the teachers of the Harvardian Colleges occupying the lower floors and of by the
Yap spouses. Physician's help was hurriedly called, and Dr. Tanjuaquio arrived at about
The will itself was not presented. Petitioner tried to establish its contents and due 8:00 a.m., found the patient hardly breathing, lying in bed, her head held high by her
execution by the statements in open court of Felina Esguerra, Primitivo Reyes, Socorro husband. Injections and oxygen were administered. Following the doctor's advice the
Olarte and Rosario Gan Jimenez, whose testimonies may be summarized as follows: patient stayed in bed, and did nothing the whole day, her husband and her personal
attendant, Mrs. Bantique, constantly at her side. These two persons swore that Mrs.
Felicidad Esguerra Yap made no will, and could have made no will on that day.
Sometime in 1950 after her last trip abroad, Felicidad Esguerra mentioned to her first
cousin, Vicente Esguerra, her desire to make a will. She confided however that it would
be useless if her husband discovered or knew about it. Vicente consulted with Fausto E. The trial judge refused to credit the petitioner's evidence for several reasons, the most
Gan, nephew of Felicidad, who was then preparing for the bar examinations. The latter important of which were these: (a) if according to his evidence, the decedent wanted to
replied it could be done without any witness, provided the document was entirely in her keep her will a secret, so that her husband would not know it, it is strange she executed it
in the presence of Felina Esguerra, knowing as she did that witnesses were The object of such requirements it has been said, is to close the door against bad faith
unnecessary; (b) in the absence of a showing that Felina was a confidant of the and fraud, to prevent substitution of wills, to guarantee their truth and authencity
decedent it is hard to believe that the latter would have allowed the former to see and (Abangan vs. Abangan, 40 Phil., 476) and to avoid those who have no right to succeed
read the will several times; (c) it is improbable that the decedent would have permitted the testator would succeed him and be benefited with the probate of same.
Primitivo Reyes, Rosario Gan Jimenez and Socorro Olarte to read her will, when she (Mendoza vs. Pilapil, 40 Off. Gaz., 1855). However, formal imperfections may be
precisely wanted its contents to remain a secret during her lifetime; (d) it is also brushed aside when authenticity of the instrument is duly proved. (Rodriguez vs Yap, 40
improbable that her purpose being to conceal the will from her husband she would carry Off. Gaz. 1st Supp. No. 3 p. 194.)
it around, even to the hospital, in her purse which could for one reason or another be
opened by her husband; (e) if it is true that the husband demanded the purse from Felina Authenticity and due execution is the dominant requirements to be fulfilled when such will
in the U.S.T. Hospital and that the will was there, it is hard to believe that he returned it is submitted to the courts for allowance. For that purpose the testimony of one of the
without destroying the will, the theory of the petitioner being precisely that the will was subscribing witnesses would be sufficient if there is no opposition (Sec. 5, Rule 77). If
executed behind his back for fear he will destroy it. there is, the three must testify, if available. (Cabang vs. Delfinado, 34 Phil., 291;
Tolentino vs. Francisco, 57 Phil., 742). From the testimony of such witnesses (and of
In the face of these improbabilities, the trial judge had to accept the oppositor's evidence other additional witnesses) the court may form its opinion as to the genuineness and
that Felicidad did not and could not have executed such holographic will. authenticity of the testament, and the circumstances its due execution.
In this appeal, the major portion of appellant's brief discussed the testimony of the Now, in the matter of holographic wills, no such guaranties of truth and veracity are
oppositor and of his witnesses in a vigorous effort to discredit them. It appears that the demanded, since as stated, they need no witnesses; provided however, that they are
same arguments, or most of them, were presented in the motion to reconsider; but they "entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself." The law, it is
failed to induce the court a quo to change its mind. The oppositor's brief, on the other reasonable to suppose, regards the document itself as material proof of authenticity, and
hand, aptly answers the criticisms. We deem it unnecessary to go over the same as its own safeguard, since it could at any time, be demonstrated to be — or not to be —
matters, because in our opinion the case should be decided not on the weakness of the in the hands of the testator himself. "In the probate of a holographic will" says the New
opposition but on the strength of the evidence of the petitioner, who has the burden of Civil Code, "it shall be necessary that at least one witness who knows the handwriting
proof. and signature of the testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in the
handwriting of the testator. If the will is contested, at least three such witnesses shall be
The Spanish Civil Code permitted the execution of holographic wills along with other required. In the absence of any such witnesses, (familiar with decedent's handwriting)
forms. The Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190) approved August 7, 1901, adopted only and if the court deem it necessary, expert testimony may be resorted to."
one form, thereby repealing the other forms, including holographic wills.
The witnesses so presented do not need to have seen the execution of the holographic
The New Civil Code effective in 1950 revived holographic wills in its arts. 810-814. "A will. They may be mistaken in their opinion of the handwriting, or they may deliberately lie
person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated, and signed in affirming it is in the testator's hand. However, the oppositor may present other
by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form and may be made in or witnesses who also know the testator's handwriting, or some expert witnesses, who after
out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed." comparing the will with other writings or letters of the deceased, have come to the
conclusion that such will has not been written by the hand of the deceased. (Sec. 50,
This is indeed a radical departure from the form and solemnities provided for wills under Rule 123). And the court, in view of such contradictory testimony may use its own visual
Act 190, which for fifty years (from 1901 to 1950) required wills to be subscribed by the sense, and decide in the face of the document, whether the will submitted to it has
testator and three credible witnesses in each and every page; such witnesses to attest to indeed been written by the testator.
the number of sheets used and to the fact that the testator signed in their presence and
that they signed in the presence of the testator and of each other.
Obviously, when the will itself is not submitted, these means of opposition, and of written by the testator (Art. 691). And if the judge considers that the identity of the will
assessing the evidence are not available. And then the only guaranty of authenticity3 — has been proven he shall order that it be filed (Art. 693). All these, imply presentation of
the testator's handwriting — has disappeared. the will itself. Art. 692 bears the same implication, to a greater degree. It requires that the
surviving spouse and the legitimate ascendants and descendants be summoned so that
Therefore, the question presents itself, may a holographic will be probated upon the they may make "any statement they may desire to submit with respect to the authenticity
testimony of witnesses who have allegedly seen it and who declare that it was in the of the will." As it is universally admitted that the holographic will is usually done by the
handwriting of the testator? How can the oppositor prove that such document was not in testator and by himself alone, to prevent others from knowing either its execution or its
the testator's handwriting? His witnesses who know testator's handwriting have not contents, the above article 692 could not have the idea of simply permitting such
examined it. His experts can not testify, because there is no way to compare the alleged relatives to state whether they know of the will, but whether in the face of the document
testament with other documents admittedly, or proven to be, in the testator's hand. The itself they think the testator wrote it. Obviously, this they can't do unless the will itself is
oppositor will, therefore, be caught between the upper millstone of his lack of knowledge presented to the Court and to them.
of the will or the form thereof, and the nether millstone of his inability to prove its falsity.
Again the proponent's witnesses may be honest and truthful; but they may have been Undoubtedly, the intention of the law is to give the near relatives the choice of either
shown a faked document, and having no interest to check the authenticity thereof have complying with the will if they think it authentic, or to oppose it, if they think it
taken no pains to examine and compare. Or they may be perjurers boldly testifying, in spurious.5 Such purpose is frustrated when the document is not presented for their
the knowledge that none could convict them of perjury, because no one could prove that examination. If it be argued that such choice is not essential, because anyway the
they have not "been shown" a document which they believed was in the handwriting of relatives may oppose, the answer is that their opposition will be at a distinct
the deceased. Of course, the competency of such perjured witnesses to testify as to the disadvantage, and they have the right and privilege to comply with the will, if genuine, a
handwriting could be tested by exhibiting to them other writings sufficiently similar to right which they should not be denied by withholding inspection thereof from them.
those written by the deceased; but what witness or lawyer would not foresee such a
move and prepare for it? His knowledge of the handwriting established, the witness (or We find confirmation of these ideas--about exhibition of the document itself--in the
witnesses) could simply stick to his statement: he has seen and read a document which decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of June 5, 1925, which denied protocolization or
he believed was in the deceased's handwriting. And the court and the oppositor would probate to a document containing testamentary dispositions in the handwriting of the
practically be at the mercy of such witness (or witnesses) not only as to the execution, deceased, but apparently mutilated, the signature and some words having been torn
but also as to the contents of the will. Does the law permit such a situation? from it. Even in the face of allegations and testimonial evidence (which was
controverted), ascribing the mutilation to the opponents of the will. The aforesaid tribunal
The Rules of Court, (Rule 77) approved in 1940 allow proof (and probate) of a lost or declared that, in accordance with the provision of the Civil Code (Spanish) the will itself,
destroyed will by secondary — evidence the testimony of witnesses, in lieu of the original whole and unmutilated, must be presented; otherwise, it shall produce no effect.
document. Yet such Rules could not have contemplated holographic wills which could
not then be validly made here. (See also Sec. 46, Rule 123; Art. 830-New Civil Code.) Considerando que sentado lo anterior, y estableciendose en el parrafo segundo
del articulo 688 del Codigo civil, que para que sea valido el testamento olografo
Could Rule 77 be extended, by analogy, to holographic wills? debera estar escrito todo el y firmado por testador, con expression del año, mes
y dia en que se otorque, resulta evidente que para la validez y eficacia de esos
Spanish commentators agree that one of the greatest objections to the holographic will is testamentos, no basta la demostracion mas o menos cumplida de que cuando
that it may be lost or stolen4 — an implied admission that such loss or theft renders it se otorgaron se Ilenaron todos esos requisitos, sino que de la expresada
useless.. redaccion el precepto legal, y por el tiempo en que el verbo se emplea,
se desprende la necesidad de que el documento se encuentre en dichas
This must be so, because the Civil Code requires it to be protocoled and presented to condiciones en el momento de ser presentado a la Autoridad competente, para
the judge, (Art. 689) who shall subscribe it and require its identity to be established by au adveracion y protocolizacion; y como consecuencia ineludible de ello, forzoso
the three witnesses who depose that they have no reasonable doubt that the will was es affirmar que el de autos carece de validez y aficacia, por no estarfirmado por
el testador, cualquiera que sea la causa de la falta de firma, y sin perjuicio de las
acciones que puedan ejercitar los perjudicados, bien para pedir indemnizacion authenticity is the handwriting itself; in the second, the testimony of the subscribing or
por el perjuicio a la persona culpable, si la hubiere, o su castigo en via criminal si instrumental witnesses (and of the notary, now). The loss of the holographic will entails
procediere, por constituir dicha omision un defecto insubsanable . . . . the loss of the only medium of proof; if the ordinary will is lost, the subscribing witnesses
are available to authenticate.
This holding aligns with the ideas on holographic wills in the Fuero Juzgo, admittedly the
basis of the Spanish Civil Code provisions on the matter.6 In the case of ordinary wills, it is quite hard to convince three witnesses (four with the
notary) deliberately to lie. And then their lies could be checked and exposed, their
PRECEDENTES LEGALES--Fuero Juzgo, libro segundo, titulo V, ley 15--E whereabouts and acts on the particular day, the likelihood that they would be called by
depues que los herederos e sus fijos ovieren esta manda, fasta ... annos the testator, their intimacy with the testator, etc. And if they were intimates or trusted
muestrenla al obispo de la tierra, o al juez fasta VI meses y el obispo o el juez friends of the testator they are not likely to end themselves to any fraudulent scheme to
tomen otros tales tres escritos, que fuesen fechos por su mano daquel que fizo la distort his wishes. Last but not least, they can not receive anything on account of the will.
manda; e por aquellos escriptos, si semjara la letra de la manda, sea confirmada
la manda. E depues que todo esto fuere connoscido, el obispo o el juez, o otras Whereas in the case of holographic wills, if oral testimony were admissible9 only one man
testimonios confirmen el escripto de la manda otra vez, y en esta manera vala la could engineer the fraud this way: after making a clever or passable imitation of the
manda. (Art. 689, Scaevola--Codigo Civil.) handwriting and signature of the deceased, he may contrive to let three honest and
credible witnesses see and read the forgery; and the latter, having no interest, could
(According to the Fuero above, the will itself must be compared with specimens of the easily fall for it, and in court they would in all good faith affirm its genuineness and
testators handwriting.) authenticity. The will having been lost — the forger may have purposely destroyed it in
an "accident" — the oppositors have no way to expose the trick and the error, because
All of which can only mean: the courts will not distribute the property of the deceased in the document itself is not at hand. And considering that the holographic will may consist
accordance with his holographic will, unless they are shown his handwriting and of two or three pages, and only one of them need be signed, the substitution of the
signature.7 unsigned pages, which may be the most important ones, may go undetected.
Parenthetically, it may be added that even the French Civil Law considers the loss of the If testimonial evidence of holographic wills be permitted, one more objectionable feature
holographic will to be fatal. (Planiol y Ripert, Derecho Civil Frances, traduccion por Diaz — feasibility of forgery — would be added to the several objections to this kind of wills
Cruz, 1946, Tomo V, page 555). listed by Castan, Sanchez Roman and Valverde and other well-known Spanish
Commentators and teachers of Civil Law.10
Taking all the above circumstances together, we reach the conclusion that the execution
and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare One more fundamental difference: in the case of a lost will, the three subscribing
testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will.8 witnesses would be testifying to a fact which they saw, namely the act of the testator of
subscribing the will; whereas in the case of a lost holographic will, the witnesses would
testify as to their opinion of the handwriting which they allegedly saw, an opinion which
Under the provisions of Art. 838 of the New Civil Code, we are empowered to adopt this
can not be tested in court, nor directly contradicted by the oppositors, because the
opinion as a Rule of Court for the allowance of such holographic wills. We hesitate,
handwriting itself is not at hand.
however, to make this Rule decisive of this controversy, simultaneously with its
promulgation. Anyway, decision of the appeal may rest on the sufficiency, rather the
insufficiency, of the evidence presented by petitioner Fausto E. Gan. Turning now to the evidence presented by the petitioner, we find ourselves sharing the
trial judge's disbelief. In addition to the dubious circumstances described in the appealed
decision, we find it hard to believe that the deceased should show her will precisely to
At this point, before proceeding further, it might be convenient to explain why, unlike
relatives who had received nothing from it: Socorro Olarte and Primitivo Reyes. These
holographic wills, ordinary wills may be proved by testimonial evidence when lost or
could pester her into amending her will to give them a share, or threaten to reveal its
destroyed. The difference lies in the nature of the wills. In the first, the only guarantee of
execution to her husband Ildefonso Yap. And this leads to another point: if she wanted ISSUE: May a holographic will be probated upon the testimony of witnesses who have
so much to conceal the will from her husband, why did she not entrust it to her allegedly seen it and who declare that it was in the handwriting of the testator?
beneficiaries? Opportunity to do so was not lacking: for instance, her husband's trip to
Davao, a few days after the alleged execution of the will. HELD:
The SC ruled that the execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed
In fine, even if oral testimony were admissible to establish and probate a lost holographic holographic will may not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen
will, we think the evidence submitted by herein petitioner is so tainted with improbabilities and/or read such will.
and inconsistencies that it fails to measure up to that "clear and distinct" proof required
by Rule 77, sec. 6.11 The New Civil Code effective in 1950 revived holographic wills in its arts. 810-814.
“A person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated, and
Wherefore, the rejection of the alleged will must be sustained. signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form and may be
made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.”
Judgment affirmed, with costs against petitioner.
Holographic will is a radical departure from the form and solemnities provided for
wills. With regard to holographic wills, no such guaranties of truth and veracity are
DIGEST: GAN VS. YAP demanded, since as stated, they need no witnesses; provided however, that they are
“entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself.”
FACTS:
Felicidad Yap died of a heart failure, leaving properties in Pulilan, Bulacan, and in “In the probate of a holographic will” says the New Civil Code, “it shall be
Manila. Fausto E. Gan, her nephew, initiated the proceedings in the Manila CFI with a necessary that at least one witness who knows the handwriting and signature of the
petition for the probate of a holographic will allegedly executed by the deceased. Her testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the
surviving husband Ildefonso Yap opposed the petition and asserted that the deceased testator. If the will is contested, at least three such witnesses shall be required. In the
had not left any will, nor executed any testament during her lifetime. absence of any such witnesses, (familiar with decedent’s handwriting) and if the court
deem it necessary, expert testimony may be resorted to.”
During the probate, the alleged will itself was not presented. Petitioner tried to
establish its contents and due execution by the statements in open court of Felina The witnesses need not have seen the execution of the holographic will, but they
Esguerra, Primitivo Reyes, Socorro Olarte and Rosario Gan Jimenez who testified must be familiar with the decedent’s handwriting. Obviously, when the will itself is not
Felicidad’s intention to make a will and allegedly saw it as well. According to the submitted, these means of opposition, and of assessing the evidence are not available.
witnesses, Felicidad did not want her husband to know about it, but she had made And then the only guaranty of authenticity — the testator’s handwriting — has
known to her other relatives that she made a will. disappeared.
After hearing the parties and considering their evidence, the Hon. Ramon R. San
Jose, Judge, refused to probate the alleged will on account of the discrepancies arising
from the facts. For one thing, it is strange that Felicidad made her will known to so many LETICIA VALMONTE ORTEGA
of her relatives when she wanted to keep it a secret and she would not have carried it in VS. JOSEFINA C. VALMONTE
her purse in the hospital, knowing that her husband may have access to it. G.R. NO. 157451
In the face of these improbabilities, the trial judge had to accept the oppositor’s DECEMBER 16, 2005
evidence that Felicidad did not and could not have executed such holographic will.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The law favors the probate of a will. Upon those who oppose it rests the burden of witnesses at the end of the attestation clause and again on the left hand margin. It
showing why it should not be allowed. In the present case, petitioner has failed to provides in the body that:
discharge this burden satisfactorily. For this reason, the Court cannot attribute any
reversible error on the part of the appellate tribunal that allowed the probate of the will. ‘LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF PLACIDO VALMONTE IN THE NAME OF THE
LORD AMEN:
The Case
‘I, PLACIDO VALMONTE, of legal age, married to Josefina Cabansag Valmonte, and a
Before the Court is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to resident of 9200 Catmon Street, Makati, Metro Manila, 83 years of age and being of
reverse and set aside the December 12, 2002 Decision2 and the March 7, 2003 sound and disposing mind and memory, do hereby declare this to be my last will and
Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 44296. The assailed Decision testament:
disposed as follows:
1. It is my will that I be buried in the Catholic Cemetery, under the auspices of the
"WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED, and the Decision appealed from Catholic Church in accordance with the rites and said Church and that a suitable
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In its place judgment is rendered approving and monument to be erected and provided my by executrix (wife) to perpetuate my memory
allowing probate to the said last will and testament of Placido Valmonte and ordering the in the minds of my family and friends;
issuance of letters testamentary to the petitioner Josefina Valmonte. Let this case be
remanded to the court a quo for further and concomitant proceedings."4 2. I give, devise and bequeath unto my loving wife, JOSEFINA C. VALMONTE, one half
(1/2) portion of the follow-described properties, which belongs to me as [co-owner]:
The assailed Resolution denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
a. Lot 4-A, Block 13 described on plan Psd-28575, LRC, (GLRO), situated in Makati,
The Facts Metro Manila, described and covered by TCT No. 123468 of the Register of Deeds of
Pasig, Metro-Manila registered jointly as co-owners with my deceased sister (Ciriaca
The facts were summarized in the assailed Decision of the CA, as follows: Valmonte), having share and share alike;
"x x x: Like so many others before him, Placido toiled and lived for a long time in the b. 2-storey building standing on the above-described property, made of strong and mixed
United States until he finally reached retirement. In 1980, Placido finally came home to materials used as my residence and my wife and located at No. 9200 Catmon Street,
stay in the Philippines, and he lived in the house and lot located at #9200 Catmon St., Makati, Metro Manila also covered by Tax Declaration No. A-025-00482, Makati, Metro-
San Antonio Village, Makati, which he owned in common with his sister Ciriaca Valmonte Manila, jointly in the name of my deceased sister, Ciriaca Valmonte and myself as co-
and titled in their names in TCT 123468. Two years after his arrival from the United owners, share and share alike or equal co-owners thereof;
States and at the age of 80 he wed Josefina who was then 28 years old, in a ceremony
solemnized by Judge Perfecto Laguio, Jr. on February 5, 1982. But in a little more than 3. All the rest, residue and remainder of my real and personal properties, including my
two years of wedded bliss, Placido died on October 8, 1984 of a cause written down savings account bank book in USA which is in the possession of my nephew, and all
as COR PULMONALE. others whatsoever and wherever found, I give, devise and bequeath to my said wife,
Josefina C. Valmonte;
"Placido executed a notarial last will and testament written in English and consisting of
two (2) pages, and dated June 15, 1983 but acknowledged only on August 9, 1983. The 4. I hereby appoint my wife, Josefina C. Valmonte as sole executrix of my last will and
first page contains the entire testamentary dispositions and a part of the attestation testament, and it is my will that said executrix be exempt from filing a bond;
clause, and was signed at the end or bottom of that page by the testator and on the left
hand margin by the three instrumental witnesses. The second page contains the IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 15th day of June 1983 in
continuation of the attestation clause and the acknowledgment, and was signed by the Quezon City, Philippines.’
"The allowance to probate of this will was opposed by Leticia on the grounds that: value of property both real and personal left by the testator is worth more or less
P100,000.00. Josefina declared too that the testator never suffered mental infirmity
1. Petitioner failed to allege all assets of the testator, especially those found in the USA; because despite his old age he went alone to the market which is two to three kilometers
from their home cooked and cleaned the kitchen and sometimes if she could not
2. Petitioner failed to state the names, ages, and residences of the heirs of the testator; accompany him, even traveled to Manila alone to claim his monthly pension. Josefina
or to give them proper notice pursuant to law; also asserts that her husband was in good health and that he was hospitalized only
because of a cold but which eventually resulted in his death.
3. Will was not executed and attested as required by law and legal solemnities and
formalities were not complied with; "Notary Public Floro Sarmiento, the notary public who notarized the testator’s will,
testified that it was in the first week of June 1983 when the testator together with the
three witnesses of the will went to his house cum law office and requested him to
4. Testator was mentally incapable to make a will at the time of the alleged execution he
prepare his last will and testament. After the testator instructed him on the terms and
being in an advance sate of senility;
dispositions he wanted on the will, the notary public told them to come back on June 15,
1983 to give him time to prepare it. After he had prepared the will the notary public kept it
5. Will was executed under duress, or the influence of fear or threats; safely hidden and locked in his drawer. The testator and his witnesses returned on the
appointed date but the notary public was out of town so they were instructed by his wife
6. Will was procured by undue and improper influence and pressure on the part of the to come back on August 9, 1983, and which they did. Before the testator and his
petitioner and/or her agents and/or assistants; and/or witnesses signed the prepared will, the notary public explained to them each and every
term thereof in Ilocano, a dialect which the testator spoke and understood. He likewise
7. Signature of testator was procured by fraud, or trick, and he did not intend that the explained that though it appears that the will was signed by the testator and his
instrument should be his will at the time of affixing his signature thereto;’ witnesses on June 15, 1983, the day when it should have been executed had he not
gone out of town, the formal execution was actually on August 9, 1983. He reasoned that
and she also opposed the appointment as Executrix of Josefina alleging her want of he no longer changed the typewritten date of June 15, 1983 because he did not like the
understanding and integrity. document to appear dirty. The notary public also testified that to his observation the
testator was physically and mentally capable at the time he affixed his signature on the
"At the hearing, the petitioner Josefina testified and called as witnesses the notary public will.
Atty. Floro Sarmiento who prepared and notarized the will, and the instrumental
witnesses spouses Eugenio Gomez, Jr. and Feliza Gomez and Josie Collado. For the "The attesting witnesses to the will corroborated the testimony of the notary public, and
opposition, the oppositor Leticia and her daughter Mary Jane Ortega testified. testified that the testator went alone to the house of spouses Eugenio and Feliza Gomez
at GSIS Village, Quezon City and requested them to accompany him to the house of
"According to Josefina after her marriage with the testator they lived in her parents house Atty. Floro Sarmiento purposely for his intended will; that after giving his instructions to
at Salingcob, Bacnotan, La Union but they came to Manila every month to get his Atty. Floro Sarmiento, they were told to return on June 15, 1983; that they returned on
$366.00 monthly pension and stayed at the said Makati residence. There were times June 15, 1983 for the execution of the will but were asked to come back instead on
though when to shave off on expenses, the testator would travel alone. And it was in one August 9, 1983 because of the absence of the notary public; that the testator executed
of his travels by his lonesome self when the notarial will was made. The will was the will in question in their presence while he was of sound and disposing mind and that
witnessed by the spouses Eugenio and Feliza Gomez, who were their wedding he was strong and in good health; that the contents of the will was explained by the
sponsors, and by Josie Collado. Josefina said she had no knowledge of the existence of notary public in the Ilocano and Tagalog dialect and that all of them as witnesses
the last will and testament of her husband, but just serendipitously found it in his attache attested and signed the will in the presence of the testator and of each other. And that
case after his death. It was only then that she learned that the testator bequeathed to her during the execution, the testator’s wife, Josefina was not with them.
his properties and she was named the executrix in the said will. To her estimate, the
"The oppositor Leticia declared that Josefina should not inherit alone because aside from "II.
her there are other children from the siblings of Placido who are just as entitled to inherit
from him. She attacked the mental capacity of the testator, declaring that at the time of Whether or not the signature of Placido Valmonte in the subject will was procured by
the execution of the notarial will the testator was already 83 years old and was no longer fraud or trickery, and that Placido Valmonte never intended that the instrument should be
of sound mind. She knew whereof she spoke because in 1983 Placido lived in the Makati his last will and testament.
residence and asked Leticia’s family to live with him and they took care of him. During
that time, the testator’s physical and mental condition showed deterioration, aberrations "III.
and senility. This was corroborated by her daughter Mary Jane Ortega for whom Placido
took a fancy and wanted to marry.
Whether or not Placido Valmonte has testamentary capacity at the time he allegedly
executed the subject will."8
"Sifting through the evidence, the court a quo held that [t]he evidence adduced, reduces
the opposition to two grounds, namely:
In short, petitioner assails the CA’s allowance of the probate of the will of Placido
Valmonte.
1. Non-compliance with the legal solemnities and formalities in the execution and
attestation of the will; and
This Court’s Ruling
2. Mental incapacity of the testator at the time of the execution of the will as he was then
The Petition has no merit.
in an advanced state of senility
Main Issue:
"It then found these grounds extant and proven, and accordingly disallowed probate."5
Probate of a Will
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
At the outset, we stress that only questions of law may be raised in a Petition for Review
Reversing the trial court, the appellate court admitted the will of Placido Valmonte to
under Section 1 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. As an exception, however, the
probate. The CA upheld the credibility of the notary public and the subscribing witnesses
evidence presented during the trial may be examined and the factual matters resolved by
who had acknowledged the due execution of the will. Moreover, it held that the testator
this Court when, as in the instant case, the findings of fact of the appellate court differ
had testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of the will. It added that his
from those of the trial court.9
"sexual exhibitionism and unhygienic, crude and impolite ways"6 did not make him a
person of unsound mind.
The fact that public policy favors the probate of a will does not necessarily mean that
every will presented for probate should be allowed. The law lays down the procedures
Hence, this Petition.7
and requisites that must be satisfied for the probate of a will.10 Verily, Article 839 of the
Civil Code states the instances when a will may be disallowed, as follows:
Issues
"Article 839. The will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases:
Petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:
(1) If the formalities required by law have not been complied with;
"I.
(2) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable of making a will, at the
Whether or not the findings of the probate court are entitled to great respect. time of its execution;
(3) If it was executed through force or under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats; of the will only upon a showing of credible evidence of fraud.15 Unfortunately in this case,
other than the self-serving allegations of petitioner, no evidence of fraud was ever
(4) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of the presented.
beneficiary or of some other person;
It is a settled doctrine that the omission of some relatives does not affect the due
(5) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud; execution of a will.16 That the testator was tricked into signing it was not sufficiently
established by the fact that he had instituted his wife, who was more than fifty years his
(6) If the testator acted by mistake or did not intend that the instrument he signed should junior, as the sole beneficiary; and disregarded petitioner and her family, who were the
be his will at the time of affixing his signature thereto." ones who had taken "the cudgels of taking care of [the testator] in his twilight years."17
In the present case, petitioner assails the validity of Placido Valmonte’s will by imputing Moreover, as correctly ruled by the appellate court, the conflict between the dates
fraud in its execution and challenging the testator’s state of mind at the time. appearing on the will does not invalidate the document, "because the law does not even
require that a [notarial] will x x x be executed and acknowledged on the same
occasion."18 More important, the will must be subscribed by the testator, as well as by
Existence of Fraud in the
three or more credible witnesses who must also attest to it in the presence of the testator
and of one another.19 Furthermore, the testator and the witnesses must acknowledge the
Execution of a Will will before a notary public.20 In any event, we agree with the CA that "the variance in the
dates of the will as to its supposed execution and attestation was satisfactorily and
Petitioner does not dispute the due observance of the formalities in the execution of the persuasively explained by the notary public and the instrumental witnesses."21
will, but maintains that the circumstances surrounding it are indicative of the existence of
fraud. Particularly, she alleges that respondent, who is the testator’s wife and sole The pertinent transcript of stenographic notes taken on June 11, 1985, November 25,
beneficiary, conspired with the notary public and the three attesting witnesses in 1985, October 13, 1986, and October 21, 1987 -- as quoted by the CA -- are reproduced
deceiving Placido to sign it. Deception is allegedly reflected in the varying dates of the respectively as follows:
execution and the attestation of the will.
"Atty. Floro Sarmiento:
Petitioner contends that it was "highly dubious for a woman at the prime of her young life
[to] almost immediately plunge into marriage with a man who [was] thrice her age x x x
Q You typed this document exhibit C, specifying the date June 15 when the testator and
and who happened to be [a] Fil-American pensionado,"11 thus casting doubt on the
his witnesses were supposed to be in your office?
intention of respondent in seeking the probate of the will. Moreover, it supposedly "defies
human reason, logic and common experience"12 for an old man with a severe
psychological condition to have willingly signed a last will and testament. A Yes sir.
We are not convinced. Fraud "is a trick, secret device, false statement, or pretense, by Q On June 15, 1983, did the testator and his witnesses come to your house?
which the subject of it is cheated. It may be of such character that the testator is misled
or deceived as to the nature or contents of the document which he executes, or it may A They did as of agreement but unfortunately, I was out of town.
relate to some extrinsic fact, in consequence of the deception regarding which the
testator is led to make a certain will which, but for the fraud, he would not have made."13 xxxxxxxxx
We stress that the party challenging the will bears the burden of proving the existence of Q The document has been acknowledged on August 9, 1983 as per acknowledgement
fraud at the time of its execution.14 The burden to show otherwise shifts to the proponent appearing therein. Was this the actual date when the document was acknowledged?
A Yes sir. A The reason why we went there three times is that, the first week of June was out first
time. We went there to talk to Atty. Sarmiento and Placido Valmonte about the last will
Q What about the date when the testator and the three witnesses affixed their respective and testament. After that what they have talked what will be placed in the testament,
signature on the first and second pages of exhibit C? what Atty. Sarmiento said was that he will go back on the 15th of June. When we
returned on June 15, Atty. Sarmiento was not there so we were not able to sign it, the
A On that particular date when it was acknowledged, August 9, 1983. will. That is why, for the third time we went there on August 9 and that was the time we
affixed our signature. (tsn, October 13, 1986, pp. 4-6)
Q Why did you not make the necessary correction on the date appearing on the body of
the document as well as the attestation clause? Josie Collado:
A Because I do not like anymore to make some alterations so I put it in my own Q When you did not find Atty. Sarmiento in his house on June 15, 1983, what transpired?
handwriting August 9, 1983 on the acknowledgement. (tsn, June 11, 1985, pp. 8-10)
A The wife of Atty. Sarmiento told us that we will be back on August 9, 1983.
Eugenio Gomez:
Q And on August 9, 1983 did you go back to the house of Atty. Sarmiento?
Q It appears on the first page Mr. Witness that it is dated June 15, 1983, whereas in the
acknowledgement it is dated August 9, 1983, will you look at this document and tell us A Yes, Sir.
this discrepancy in the date?
Q For what purpose?
A We went to Atty. Sarmiento together with Placido Valmonte and the two witnesses;
that was first week of June and Atty. Sarmiento told us to return on the 15th of June but A Our purpose is just to sign the will.
when we returned, Atty. Sarmiento was not there.
Q Were you able to sign the will you mentioned?
Q When you did not find Atty. Sarmiento on June 15, 1983, did you again go back?
A Yes sir. (tsn, October 21, 1987, pp. 4-5)"22
A We returned on the 9th of August and there we signed.
Notably, petitioner failed to substantiate her claim of a "grand conspiracy" in the
Q This August 9, 1983 where you said it is there where you signed, who were your commission of a fraud. There was no showing that the witnesses of the proponent stood
companions? to receive any benefit from the allowance of the will. The testimonies of the three
subscribing witnesses and the notary are credible evidence of its due execution.23 Their
A The two witnesses, me and Placido Valmonte. (tsn, November 25, 1985, pp. 7-8) testimony favoring it and the finding that it was executed in accordance with the
formalities required by law should be affirmed, absent any showing of ill motives.24
Felisa Gomez on cross-examination:
Capacity to Make a Will
Q Why did you have to go to the office of Atty. Floro Sarmiento, three times?
In determining the capacity of the testator to make a will, the Civil Code gives the
xxxxxxxxx following guidelines:
"Article 798. In order to make a will it is essential that the testator be of sound mind at the incapacity and while on one hand it has been held that mere weakness of mind, or partial
time of its execution. imbecility from disease of body, or from age, will not render a person incapable of
making a will; a weak or feebleminded person may make a valid will, provided he has
"Article 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full understanding and memory sufficient to enable him to know what he is about to do and
possession of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken, how or to whom he is disposing of his property. To constitute a sound and disposing
unimpaired, or shattered by disease, injury or other cause. mind, it is not necessary that the mind be unbroken or unimpaired or unshattered by
disease or otherwise. It has been held that testamentary incapacity does not necessarily
"It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know the require that a person shall actually be insane or of unsound mind."26
nature of the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character
of the testamentary act. WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
"Article 800. The law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the absence of
proof to the contrary. SO ORDERED.
"The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound mind at the time of making his DIGEST: ORTEGA VS. VALMONTE
dispositions is on the person who opposes the probate of the will; but if the testator, one
month, or less, before making his will was publicly known to be insane, the person who FACTS:
maintains the validity of the will must prove that the testator made it during a lucid Two years after the arrival of Placido from the United States and at the age of 80
interval." he wed Josefina who was then 28 years old. But in a little more than two years of
wedded bliss, Placido died. Placido executed a notarial last will and testament written
According to Article 799, the three things that the testator must have the ability to know in English and consisting of 2 pages, and dated 15 June 1983¸but acknowledged only on
to be considered of sound mind are as follows: (1) the nature of the estate to be 9 August 1983. The allowance to probate of this will was opposed by Leticia, Placido’s
disposed of, (2) the proper objects of the testator’s bounty, and (3) the character of the sister. According to the notary public who notarized the testator’s will, after the testator
testamentary act. Applying this test to the present case, we find that the appellate court instructed him on the terms and dispositions he wanted on the will, the notary public told
was correct in holding that Placido had testamentary capacity at the time of the execution them to come back on 15 August 1983 to give him time to prepare. The testator and his
of his will. witnesses returned on the appointed date but the notary public was out of town so they
were instructed by his wife to come back on 9 August 1983. The formal execution was
actually on 9 August 1983. He reasoned he no longer changed the typewritten date of 15
It must be noted that despite his advanced age, he was still able to identify accurately the
June 1983 because he did not like the document to appear dirty.
kinds of property he owned, the extent of his shares in them and even their locations. As
regards the proper objects of his bounty, it was sufficient that he identified his wife as
Petitioner’s argument:
sole beneficiary. As we have stated earlier, the omission of some relatives from the will
did not affect its formal validity. There being no showing of fraud in its execution, intent in
1. At the time of the execution of the notarial will Placido was already 83 years old
its disposition becomes irrelevant.
and was no longer of sound mind.
2. Josefina conspired with the notary public and the 3 attesting witnesses in
Worth reiterating in determining soundness of mind is Alsua-Betts v. CA,25 which held deceiving Placido to sign it. Deception is allegedly reflected in the varying dates of
thus: the execution and the attestation of the will.
"Between the highest degree of soundness of mind and memory which unquestionably ISSUES:
carries with it full testamentary capacity, and that degrees of mental aberration generally
known as insanity or idiocy, there are numberless degrees of mental capacity or
1. W/N Placido has testamentary capacity at the time he allegedly executed the
will.
2. W/N the signature of Placido in the will was procured by fraud or trickery.
HELD:
1. YES. Despite his advanced age, he was still able to identify accurately the kinds of
property he owned, the extent of his shares in them and even their location. As regards
the proper objects of his bounty, it was sufficient that he identified his wife as
sole beneficiary. The omission of some relatives from the will did not affect
its formal validity. There being no showing of fraud in its execution, intent in its
disposition becomes irrelevant.
2. NO. Fraud is a trick, secret devise, false statement, or pretense, by which the subject
of it is cheated. It may be of such character that the testator is misled or deceived as to
the nature or contents of the document which he executes, or it may relate to some
extrinsic fact, in consequence of the deception regarding which the testator is led to
make a certain will which, but for fraud, he would not have made.
The party challenging the will bears the burden of proving the existence of fraud at the
time of its execution. The burden to show otherwise shifts to the proponent of the will
only upon a showing of credible evidence of fraud.
Omission of some relatives does not affect the due execution of a will. Moreover, the
conflict between the dates appearing on the will does not invalidate the document,
“because the law does not even require that a notarial will be executed and
acknowledged on the same occasion. The variance in the dates of the will as to its
supposed execution and attestation was satisfactorily and persuasively explained by the
notary public and instrumental witnesses.

Rule 75 76 Cases Complete Fulltext With Digest

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Rule 75 76 Cases Complete Fulltext With Digest

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Rule 75 76 Cases Complete Fulltext With Digest

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

REMEDIOS NUGUID VS. prescribed, are the questions solely to be presented, and to be acted upon, by the court.

DE LEON, JR., J.:

However, nowhere in the dispositive portion is there a declaration of ownership of

Petitioners Failed to Prove Fraud, None of these exceptions obtains here.

HELD: The facts are as simple as the ancient hills.

FACTS: Evidence for Reprobate of Wills Probated outside the Philippines

The following facts are not controverted:

Teresita R-Infante Roxas residing at #121 9th Street, New Manila,

Antonio R-Infante Roxas residing at #91 Cambridge, North Forbes, SO ORDERED. 4

FACTS: IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF RICARDO B.

G.R. NO. 123486

xxx xxx xxx

Q. For what purpose? A. Yes, sir.

A. Just to seek advice. Q. And there is a retracing in the word Vda.?

Q. Advice of what? A. Yes, sir.20

A. About the will.18 xxx xxx xxx

A. Yes, sir. A. In writing.

A. Yes, sir.19 A. That was I think. (sic).

A. Yes, sir.21 A. I am familiar with her signature.23

A. Yes, sir. xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx A. Yes, it is similar to the project of partition.

A. I am not familiar with the handwriting. A. That is true.30

We do not desire to intimate that the numbering in letters is a requisite of no importance.

You might also like