A History of Japan, 1615-1867 - George Sansom

A HISTORY OF JAPAN
1615-1867
A HISTORY
OF
JAPAN
l 6 l ^ —l 8 6 7
George Sansom
CHARLES E. TUTTLE COMPANY

Suido i-chom e, 2-6, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo
Published by the C h arles E. Tuttle Com pany, Inc.
o f R utlan d , V erm ont & Tokyo, Ja p a n
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Su id o 1-chome, 2 - 6 , Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo, Ja p a n
by special arrang em en t with
B a rrie & Je n k in s L td ., London
C opyright © 1963 by the B oard o f Trustees o f the

Leland Stanford J u n io r U niversity
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w ithout perm ission in w riting from the publishers,
except by a reviewer, who m ay quote b rie f passages in a review
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First Tuttle edition, 1974

Seventh printing, 1990
P rinted in Ja p a n
PREFACE
The main purpose of this, the third (and last) volume of A History
o f Japan, is to describe the political and social development of which the
foundation was laid by Ieyasu, the first Tokugawa Shogun.
Ieyasu was a genius, who combined civil and military capacity of
the highest order; and although he died in 1616, after holding office as
Shogun for little more than a decade, his stamp is visible on the insti
tutions of his country as they developed during the two hundred and
fifty years after his demise.
The system of checks and balances by which he and his successors
(notably Iemitsu) kept the great feudatories in order was a political
feat combining strength and skill in a remarkable fashion, for Japan had
its Hotspurs and Glendowers in the seventeenth century, and the cen
tral government was anxious not to take arms against them. Indeed the
essential feature of government by the Tokugawa Shoguns was a deter
mination to keep the peace. After the Shimabara rising in 1637-38 the
country was free from civil war, and the energies of the nation were
devoted to increasing the production of goods in agriculture, manufac
tures, and mining.
The government at that time was concerned more with finding occu
pation for unemployed samurai than with promoting the military spirit
The Ordinances for the Military Class (Buke Sho-Hatto)—first issued in
1615, soon after the fall of Osaka—direct the samurai to cultivate both
military and civil virtues, since obviously there could not be useful mili
tary employment for all. Fortunately for the country, many of these
men were absorbed into civilian employment, principally of the admin
istrative type, since they were members of a class—it might be described
as a caste—consisting mainly of men of some education, a qualification
rare in other classes except the clergy. It was such men who eased the
transition from an age of war to an age of peace. They occupied posts
in the central and local government offices of the Bakufu or in the castle
towns of the Shogun’s vassals, the daimyos.
Thus, with some exceptions of course, the whole country was toler
ably well administered and the several barons, some of whom enjoyed a
substantial autonomy, were kept under close watch by Censors or other
intelligence officers appointed by Yedo. Furthermore, one of the main
vi PREFACE
reasons for closing the country in 1639 was the determination of the
Bakufu to prevent those feudatories with access to the sea from making
contacts with representatives of Western powers who might supply them
with powerful weapons.
It will be seen, therefore, that the country was firmly governed. It
was able to enjoy for the better part of two centuries not only freedom
from foreign aggression but also a steadily rising standard of living. It
is true that it suffered frequently from such natural calamities as plague
and famine, but on balance it prospered, as is clear from all available
evidence of material progress.
More difficult to measure and assess is the moral condition of society
in its various grades, from the samurai down to the farmer, the artisan
and (lowest in the scale) the trader. Here there is fairly reliable evi
dence, for most of the serious literature of the Yedo period deals with
what today we call sociology; and it is interesting to notice in this con
text that the Bakufu did not as a rule exercise a strict censorship of po
litical writings. Individual scholars were in general free to criticize the
government, but any attempt to form a school of political thought was
usually suppressed. In such circumstances it was natural for the discon
tented to resort to satire, and the literature of the period is rich in shafts
of wit aimed at official solemnity.
Yet from such evidence alone it is not easy to gather a fair impression
of the nature of life in Tokugawa Japan. Writing early in the seven
teenth century, Fujiwara Seika, a not very good poet, bewailed in verse
“this dreadful age.” Two centuries later—about 1800—a well-known
treatise on contemporary morals strikes a pessimistic note. “The ruler
is selfish,” it says. “The high officials are selfish. The samurai have no
idea of duty. No longer does a man sacrifice himself or his family for
the sake of his Lord. . . . As the saying goes, nowadays the only mem
bers of a samurai household who do not steal are the master and his
horse."
Such judgments are more entertaining than instructive; but we know
a great deal about the trend of city life as the seventeenth century gave
place to the eighteenth. This was the era known as Genroku, celebrated
for its gay costumes, which clearly reflected the mood of the citizens,
their interest in plays and novels and the plastic arts. Perhaps this was
the summit of political and cultural life under the Tokugawa Shoguns.
The Bakufu’s prestige was high, especially under the Shogun Yoshi-
mune, from 1716 to 1745. After this there seems to have been a decline
in its power, which may be ascribed less to a lack of competence than
to the difficulty of the problems with which it was now faced.
PREFACE vii
These were new and urgent, for they resulted from breaches in the
policy of isolation which were due to the arrival of foreign ships in
Japanese waters. The first intruders were Russians, when in 1792 an
envoy named Laxman sailed into the harbour of Nemuro in Yezo, later
proceeding to Hakodate. Throughout the closing years of the century
the Shogun’s officers were active in the protection of Japanese interests
in Sakhalin and the southern islands of the Kuriles. Thereafter the Ba-
kufu struggled to keep foreign ships away from Japanese ports, issuing
in 1825 to local authorities a strongly worded Expulsion Order, which
in fact could not be enforced. Before long the pressure of the Western
powers, culminating in the naval expedition of Commodore Perry in
1853, obliged Japan to abandon her exclusionist policy and to face the
dangers of international society.
Japan was then a well-governed state, fitted by past experience to
take this step, for the history of the Yedo period shows a truly remark
able development in almost every aspect of the national life. It was in
deed a great achievement
G. S.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I owe a great debt to my friends John Galvin and Stanley Smith,

whose generosity has made it possible for me to complete this three-
volume history of Japan in very favorable conditions.
For precious advice and assistance I have depended upon outstand
ing Japanese scholars. Among them I must mention in particular Pro
fessor Nakamura Kichiji of the University at Sendai, who came to Stan
ford from Japan to guide my studies for several weeks. I profited by
his wisdom and enjoyed his friendship.
Professor Yukio Yashiro, an old friend, in his capacity as Chairman
of the Commission for the Protection of Cultural Property (Bunkazai
Hogo Iinkai), gave valuable assistance in authorizing the reproduction
of important texts and pictures. In the collection of these, Professor
Takeshi Toyoda and Dr. Chisaburo Yamada gave generous help.
I owe especial thanks to Dr. Madoka Kanai for authorizing the
reproduction of material from the Historiographical Institute of Tokyo
University (Shiryo Hensanjo), over which he presides.
I am also indebted to the Director, Mr. Leon Seltzer, and the staff
of the Stanford University Press for skilled and patient editorial work.
CONTENTS
I. THE NATURE OF THE TOKUGAWA GOVERNMENT 3

1. Ieyasu’s Political Aims. 2. Ieyasu’s Methods. 3. Ieyasu’s Char
acter. 4. The Shogun and the Throne. 5. The Shogun and the
Vassals. 6. The Administrative Machine.
II. HIDETADA AND IEMITSU 25
1. Hidetada, 1616-23. 2. Iemitsu, 1623-51.
HI. THE FEUDAL SOCIETY 29
1. The Social Order. 2. The Ronin.
IV. FOREIGN RELATIONS 35
1. The Phase of Expansion. 2. The Exclusion Policy. 3. The Anti-
Christian Movement.
V. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FIEFS 46
1. Fudai and Tozama Daimyos. 2. The Internal Administration
of the Fiefs.
VI. IETSUNA, SHOGUN 1651-80 53
1. The New Bakufu. 2. The Ronin Conspiracy. 3. The Towns
people. 4. The Great Fire of Meireki. 5. Sakai Tadalayo in
Office. 6. Politics in the Fiefs. 7. Foreign Affairs. 8. Ietsuna's
Last Years.
VII. LEARNING AND THE ARTS 69
1. Confucian Philosophy. 2. Shinto and Confucianism. 3. The
Neo-Confucian Ethic. 4. Historical Studies.
VIII. RURAL LIFE 96
1. Farms and Farmers. 2. The Village. 3. Progress in Agronomy.
IX. URBAN LIFE 111
1. The Growth of Towns. 2. The Great Cities. 3. The Towns
people.
X. THE EXPANDING ECONOMY 120
1. Agriculture. 2. Handicrafts. 3. The Problem of Transport.
4. Growing Markets. 5. Capital Growth.
XI. THE SHOGUNATE, 1680-1716 130
1. Tsunayoshi, 1680-1709. 2. Ienobu, 1709-13. 3. Ietsugu,
1713-16. 4. Currency Reform. 5. Arai Hakuseld. 6. Arai Haku-
seki as an Historian.
X CONTENTS
XII. GENROKU 151

XIII. A NEW REGIME 154
1. Yoshimune’s Character. 2. Financial Problems. 3. Rural So
ciety. 4. Yoshimune’s Scientific Interests. 5. Yoshimune and the
Vassals. 6. Legal Reform.
XIV. THE BAKUFU IN DECLINE 173
1. Yoshimune’s Successors. 2. The Tanuma Regime (1767-86).
3. Anti-Bakufu Sentiment. 4. Agrarian Riots.
XV. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND SCIENTIFIC
KNOWLEDGE 181
1. Tanuma’s Policy. 2. Agrarian Distress. 3. The Condition of the
Samurai. 4. Rangaku. 5. Hiraga Gennai (1728-79).
XVI. THE KANSEI REFORM 193
1. Matsudaira Sadanobu (1758-1829). 2. Sadanobu’s Policies.
3. The Bakufu and the Court. 4. Intellectual Trends. 5. The Rus
sian Approach. 6. Sumptuary Laws.
XVII. THE FURTHER DECLINE OF THE BAKUFU 207
1. Ienari and His Associates. 2. Conditions in the Fiefs. 3. Cho-
shu and Satsuma. 4. Domestic Problems of the Bakufu.
XVIII. BREACHES IN THE SECLUSION POLICY 228
1. The Arrival of Foreign Vessels. 2. The Nature of Seclusionism.
3. Anti-Seclusion Opinion. 4. The End of Seclusion. 5. Anti-
Foreign Sentiment.
APPENDIX 245
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 249
INDEX 251
DESCRIPTIVE LIST OF PLATES
Plates 1 -6 follow p. SO. Plates 7 -1 2 follow p. 98.

Plates 1 3 -1 8 follow p. 162. Plates 1 9 -2 3 follow p. 194.
F R O N T IS P IE C E
T h e keep of Hirosald C astle. T h e castle was b uilt in 1 6 0 0 b y Tsugaru

N obuhiro, and it was occupied b y his descendants up to th e Restoration.
1. Tokugaw a Ieyasu ( 1 5 4 2 - 1 6 1 6 ) , first Tokugaw a Shogun.
2. T h e shrine at Nikko, erected in Ieyasu’s honour. H is body was carried

th ere, w ith great cerem ony, in 1 6 1 7 .
3. L icen se under th e Shogun’s verm ilion seal, perm itting a vessel from
Luzon to en ter a Jap an ese p ort ( 1 6 0 4 ) . T h e original is owned b y the
Shokoku-ji M onastery. Photograph furnished by th e H istoriographical
In stitu te o f T okyo University.
4. A typical Jap an ese m erchant ship, operating from N agasaki, in th e early

Tokugaw a period. T h e flag a t th e prow shows the em blen i of th e D u tch
E a s t Ind ia Com pany upside down (enlargem en t on le f t ) . T h e original
picture is owned by M r. K. M ori, Nagasaki. Photographs furnished b y
th e H istoriographical Institu te o f Tokyo University.
5. H im eji C astle (early seventeenth c e n tu ry ). Photograph furnished b y the

Com m ission for the P rotection of Cultural Property.
6. Clauses o f th e Bu ke Sh o-H atto, w hich was drafted b y the m onk Suden

in 1 6 1 5 . T h e original is owned by th e Konchi-in M onastery, Kyoto.
Photograph furnished b y th e H istoriographical Institu te o f Tokyo U ni
versity.
7. Yedo in th e Tokugaw a period.
8. A w ealthy farm er’s house in a village outside M atsuyam a. T h e building

is about 3 0 0 years old.
9. D etail of th e courtyard in th e sam e farm .
10. Arai H akuseki ( 1 6 5 6 - 1 7 2 5 ) , at the age of fifty-seven.
11. A farm er and his fam ily enjoying the evening b reeze, by M orikage (c a .
1 7 0 0 ).
12. An evening scene by Ryogoku Bridge, by Okam ura M asanobua (c a .

1 6 8 6 - 1 7 6 4 ) . Photograph furnished by the Honolulu Academ y of Arts.
13. M atsudaira Sadanobu ( 1 7 5 8 - 1 8 2 9 ) . T h e portrait is owned by the M a-

tsudaira fam ily.
xii LIST OF PLATES
14. Hiraga Gennai (1728-79).

15. A portrait by Watanabe Kazan (1793-1841) of his youngest brother,
aged five.
16. Three scenes of an uncut triptych (worked in the 1740’s). Photograph
furnished by the Honolulu Academy of Arts.
17. Bath girls. In Atami Museum.
18. Evening scene at Shinagawa, by Torii Kiyonaga (d. 1813), one of a
family of famous painters. Photograph furnished by the Honolulu Acad
emy of Arts.
19. Satsuma dancers (ca. 1830).
20. Luchu musicians in procession (ca. 1830).
21. A specimen of Bizen pottery, a speciality of the Ikeda fief in the province
of Bizen.
22. A portrait of Commodore Perry painted by Takagawa Korebumi in 1854.
Other portraits of Perry by Japanese painters seem to have been taken
from this one. Photograph furnished by the Historiographical Institute
of Tokyo University.
23. Mizuno Tadakuni, who became senior member of the Council of Elders in
1841.
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS IN T E X T
G eneral m ap o f Jap an , showing th e provinces xiv

Ieyasu’s cipher 9
H ayashi R azan 71
A rich m erchant 118
Ihara Saikaku 123
Tokugaw a Yoshim une 155
W om en’s h air styles, ca . 1 7 6 0 175
Scen e in L u chu gay quarter 209
Mission from th e L u chu Islands to Satsum a 232
A B
A k i B-4 Iw a k i D -a R ik u o k u D - i
A w a B -4 , D -3 I w a m i B -4 R ik u a c n D - a
A w a j i C -4 Iw a s h ir o D - a S a g a m i D -3
B in g o B -4 ly o B - 4 S a n u k i B -4
B itc h u B -3 / 4 Iz u D-3 S a tsu m a A -5
B i z c n B -4 I z u m i C -4 S c tts u C - 3 / 4
B u n go A /B -4 I z u m o B-3 S h i m o w D -3
B u z c n A -4 K a g a C .3 S h im o ts u k e D - a / 3
C h i k u g o A -4 K a i D -3 S h in a n o C / D - 3
C h i k u z e n A -4 K a w a c h i C -4 S u r u g a D *3
E c h ig o D -a K a z m a D -3 Suw 8 A /B -4
E c h izc n O 3 K iiC - 4 T a j i m a B -3
E t c h u C -3 K s u u k c D -3 T a m b a C -3
H a rim a B / C 3 / 4 M i k a w a C -3 T a n g o C -3
H id a C -3 M im a s a k a B -3 T o w B-4
H ig o A -4 /5 M in o C -3 T o to m i C / D -3
H i t a c h i D -a / 3 M usashi D -3 U g o D -i
H i z c n A -4 N a g a to A -4 U z c n D -a
H 6 k iB -3 N o to C -a /3 W a k a sa C -3
H yu ga A /B -s O m i C -3 Y a m a s h ir o C -3
ip c - 3 / 4 O su m i A *5 Y a m a to C -4
In a b a B-3 O w a r i C -3
IK O 3 /4 R ik u c h u D - i
T h e provinces o f Japan
A H ISTO R Y OF JAPAN
1615-1867
T he Tokugaw a Shoguns
1603-1618 Ieyasu (FirstShogun)

1616-1623 Hidetada ( Second Shogun)
1623-1651 Iemitsu (Third Shogun)
1651-1680 Ietsuna (Fourth Shogun)
1680-1709 Tsunayoshi (Fifth Shogun)
1709-1713 Ienobu ( Sixth Shogun)
1713-1716 Ietsugu ( Seventh Shogun)
1716-1745 Yoshimune (Eighth Shogun)
1745-1760 Ieshige (Ninth Shogun)
1760-1786 Ieharu (Tenth Shogun)
1787-1837 Ienari ( Eleventh Shdgun)
1837-1853 Ieyoshi (Twelfth Shogun)
1853-1858 Iesada (Thirteenth Shogun)
1858-1866 Iemochi ( Fourteenth Shogun)
1866-1867 Hitotsubashi Keiki (Fifteenth Shogun)
CHAPTER I
T HE N A T U R E OF THE T O K U G A W A
GOVERNMENT
1. Ieyasu s Political Aims

T he material foundations of the Tokugawa Bakufu, as well as
Ieyasu’s attitude towards problems of government during the last fifteen
years of his fife, have been described at the end of the preceding volume
of this work. The situation may be recapitulated here, while stating the
main features of his policy in further detail.
The foundations of the Tokugawa government were laid between the
years 1600 and 1616, the date of the battle of Sekigahara and the date of
Ieyasu’s death. After Sekigahara, Ieyasu’s first care was to increase and
consolidate his military strength to such a degree that even the most
powerful warrior houses in combination would not dare to challenge
him. This superiority he was able to attain, thanks to his immense pres
tige, by escheating the domains of his vanquished enemies and reward
ing his trusted vassals, the Fudai daimyos, with fiefs in strategic posi
tions where they could keep watch and ward upon the uncommitted
daimyos, the Tozama or Outside Lords.1
Numerical military strength was not sufficient. It was also necessary
that the wealth of the Tokugawa family should keep pace with its grow
ing political power. The basis of the Japanese economy was the feudal
village producing the staple foodstuff, rice; and the chief item in the
annual revenue of the Bakufu was the rice grown in the lands owned
by the Tokugawa family. This had been assessed at about 1,000,000
koku (of five bushels) in 1590, when Ieyasu first established himself in
the Kanto (the eight eastern provinces). It was increased by the incor
poration of new domains and had reached 2,557,000 koku by 1598, the
year of Hideyoshi’s death.
After the battle of Sekigahara Ieyasu was able to escheat revenues
of 3,830,000 koku, thus bringing his total holding to close upon 6,400,000
koku. This was about one-fourth of the total assessed revenue of the
whole country, then estimated at from 24 to 25 million koku.
The revenues escheated were not all retained by the Tokugawa
family. A great proportion was distributed among their vassals and re
tainers as a reward for service. It is difficult to state accurately the posi-
1 Large areas of land belonging to monasteries were also confiscated.

4 THE TOKUGAWA GOVERNMENT
tion at a given time, since the processes of confiscation and distribution

were continuous; but the following survey of the process called daimyd
no toritsubushi ( “smashing, or crushing, the daimyos”) will show how
Ieyasu and his successors increased the material wealth of the Bakufu
during the seventeenth century:
E sch eatm en t by M illion koku
Ieyasu ............................................................. 3.83
H idetada........................................................ 4 .5 3
Iemitsu ........................................................... 3 .8 5
Ietsuna ....................................................................77
Tsunayoshi.................................................... 1.70
Total at 1690 ............................................ 14.68

Since Ieyasu had a revenue of close on 3 million koku before Seki-
gahara, the total holding of the Tokugawa family at the end of the sev
enteenth century was of the order of 17 million koku. At that time the
total assessed revenue of the whole country was about 26 million koku,
so that there was left in the hands of the Tozama daimyos some 9 mil
lion koku.*
Apart from the growing agrarian economy, the Bakufu profited by
an accelerated development of domestic trade throughout the country,
which (owing to an increased use of currency and ease of transport)
had begun to create dining the sixteenth century a national market in
the place of a system of isolated local or regional markets. This change
had favoured a national control of the mercantile economy by the Ba
kufu in addition to its substantial share of the country’s arable land. It
was obviously to the advantage of the Tokugawa Shoguns to promote
domestic industry and trade; and much if not most of the recorded his
tory of Tokugawa government after the fall of Osaka Castle in 1615 has
to do with mercantile and industrial policy.
* A rough estimate of the position in 1600, after Sekigahara, is as follows:

Million koku
Total revenue of Tokugawa family from direct domains. . . 8 .5
Revenue from domains allotted to Fudai daimyos................. 6 .0
Balance for Tozama and miscellaneous holdings................... 1 0 .0
Total revenue from fiefs of 10,000 koku or m ore..........2 4 .5

Katsu Awa, in his Suijin-roku, says that the revenue from domains under direct
Tokugawa control rose from 3 million koku in 1603 to nearly 7 million in 1690. This
does not include the revenue of the Hatamoto (direct military retainers of Toku
gaw a). The Code of One Hundred Articles ( O S a d a m e G aki H yakka-jO) in its early
version states that ca. 1660 the total assessed yield of the country was 2 8 .1 9 million
koku. The actual yield was probably greater, and by 1860 it had reached about
35 million koku of rice or equivalent produce.
THE TOKUGAWA GOVERNMENT 5
Ieyasu increased his wealth at every opportunity. He confiscated the
gold and silver mines of Sado and the silver mine of Iwami, and by his
orders all mines were stimulated to increase their output By 1601 he
had begun to mint gold and silver coins in considerable quantities. He
already had in his castles vast stores of precious metals which he had
collected earlier, and when he died he left gold and silver estimated at
1,950,000 ryo.* Of this 750,000 ryo was bequeathed to junior branches
of the Tokugawa family, and the remainder was placed in the Bakufu
treasury.
A further substantial revenue was obtained from the leading com
mercial centres. The towns which, thanks to their immunities, had de
veloped a flourishing trade during the sixteenth century were now trans
ferred to the direct jurisdiction of the Bakufu, and their citizens were
made subject to the absolute rule of Bakufu officers—Shoshi-dai, or Dep
uties, in Kyoto and Bugyo, or Commissioners, in other former munici
palities. These measures abolished the privileges of the cities of Osaka,
Sakai, Fushimi, Nagasaki, Nara, and Yamada.
In consequence, at least in part, of this harsh treatment of private
enterprise, a new class of government contractor developed and enjoyed
a monopoly of large-scale commercial activity. Steps were taken to
apply controls to foreign as well as domestic trade. By an edict of 1604
the Bakufu assumed a monopoly of the sale of imported raw silk, then
the most important item of merchandise in the trade with China; and
this may be regarded as the first step towards a policy of full official
control of foreign trade.
Dining Ieyasu s lifetime the Bakufu continued to promote foreign
trade. Ieyasu maintained the strong interest in merchant shipping which
he had shown when he took Will Adams into his service in 1601. He
sanctioned the visits of Dutch (1606) and English (1613) ships and
traders. He approved of Japanese voyages to Luzon and Annam, and
welcomed envoys from those regions. In general he favoured a kind of
foreign commerce which, unlike the Portuguese trade, was free from the
influence of Christian missionaries; and he was gratified to learn that
Portuguese vessels were being attacked and captured by the Dutch in
* The ryo was the unit of gold currency. The coin called “koban,” minted in
1601 at die Fushimi Mint founded that year by Ieyasu, was worth one ry6, and the
“6ban” was worth ten ryd. It weighed 44 momme and contained 6 7 .7 per cent of
gold, 2 7 .8 per cent of silver, and 4 . 5 per cent of copper. T he total weight of 44
momme is equal to a litde over 6 oz. avoirdupois. The content and purchasing
power of gold coins fluctuated widely during the seventeenth century. The largest
unit in the calculation of value in gold was the "kan,” a weight equal to 1,000
momme.
Asian waters.4 Trade relations with Spain were opened from 1610, but
did not flourish.
By that time Ieyasu’s attention was occupied by domestic problems,
since he knew that there must soon be a final reckoning between himself
and the supporters of Hideyori. Since he was preparing for a decisive
military struggle, the supply of munitions by foreign merchants could
be of some importance, and therefore the outlook for them—the Dutch
in particular—seemed promising.
Apart from the specific task of destroying the Toyotomi party, the
general purpose of the Shogun’s government was to establish and main
tain its authority over all the orders of society which together consti
tuted the body politic. These were the Throne; the feudal baronies; the
peasantry; the artisans; and the traders. The Buddhist Church was no
longer an estate of the realm, and the Shinto establishment in the sev
enteenth century was lacking in political influence.
The first laws and regulations of the Tokugawa Shogunate were
addressed to each of these orders in turn, by Ieyasu and then by Hide-
tada and Iemitsu, the second and third Shoguns.
In an ordinance of 1611 Ieyasu exacted an oath of allegiance from
the daimyos of central and western Japan, and in 1612 he required simi
lar submission from the northern provinces. These were the first ordi
nances defining the duties of vassals of the Tokugawa Shogun:
Article 1 calls upon them to obey the laws laid down generation
after generation since the Shogun Yoritomo, thus invoking such codes
as the Joei Shikimoku (1232) and the Kemmu Shikimoku (1336) as
well as orders issued by Yedo.
Article 2 forbids giving shelter to persons guilty of breaking the
Shogun’s laws or disobeying his wishes.
Article 3 requires a daimyo to take action against any samurai or
person of lower rank in his fief who is guilty of rebellious conduct or
of murder.
At this time Ieyasu was in Kyoto, and the Toyotomi forces were in
Osaka. In exacting loyalty from the western daimyos he had especially
in mind Hosokawa Tadaoki, Ikeda Terumasu, Fukushima Masanori, and
Kato Kiyomasa, who had all fought for him at Sekigahara.
4 But the regular Japan voyage of a Portuguese vessel known as the "Great Ship
from Macao” was of special interest to Ieyasu, who habitually sent by it a large sum
in silver for the purchase in China of gold and expensive silks. This vessel carried a
license under the Shogun’s "vermilion seal,” and the Dutch were warned not to
attack it. For details of the Portuguese trade from 1555 to 1640, see C. R. Boxer,
T h e G reat Ship from A m acon ( Lisbon, 1 9 59).
In 1611 and again in 1613 he issued orders regulating the conduct
of Court nobles and limiting the rights of the Throne. And in the years
1611-14 he gave out ordinances banning the Christian religion and
ordered the expulsion of missionaries. In 1614 the Christian churches
in Kyoto were destroyed and their clergy arrested. Then followed the
siege of Osaka Castle, ending in its capture in 1615.
Now Ieyasu had only a year longer to live, but he continued to exe
cute his policy of gaining and preserving for his successors a decisive
military and economic superiority over any foreseeable combination
against him. In 1615, as the supreme commander, he laid down rules
for the behaviour of the whole military class. This legislation strikes
the keynote of the domestic policy of Ieyasu and his successors, for it
exacted from all members of that class an unconditional obedience. The
document, known as Buke Sho-Hatto, or Rules for the Military Houses,
was drawn up under the instructions of Ieyasu by the Zen monk Suden,
incumbent of the Nanzenji (the presiding Zen foundation), in collabo
ration with other scholars. It was read with a running commentary to
an assembly of daimyos in Fushimi Castle in the presence of Hidetada
on August 30, 1615.
It is a fundamental document, and although it was frequently re
vised in some particulars, it was never substantially changed. It was
always reaffirmed on the accession of a new Shogun. The principal in
junctions of its thirteen clauses may be summarized as follows:
1. The study of literature and the practice of the military arts must
be pursued side by side. ( “On the left hand learning, on the
right hand the use of weapons.”)
2. Drunkenness and licentious behaviour must be avoided. ( “In
the Codes such conduct is forbidden. Lewdness and gambling
bring the downfall of a State.”)
3. Those who break the laws are not to be given shelter in any fief.
( “Law is the basis of right conduct.”)
4. The greater and lesser feudatories and those who hold land un
der them as retainers must at once expel any soldier in their
service who is charged with treason or murder.
5. No sanctuary is to be given to men who plot rebellion or incite
risings. Hereafter residence in a fief shall be limited to men
born in that fief.
6. All building work on a castle, even if only by way of repairs,
must at once be reported, and all new construction is strictly
forbidden.
7. Should it be learned that in a neighbouring fief there are men

who plot changes and form parties or factions to carry them out,
they must at once be denounced [to the Bakufu].
8. Marriages are not to be privately contracted.
9. All daimyos in attendance at the Shogun’s court shall follow the
prescribed rules of conduct. They must not bring into the City
an escort of more than the number of men allowed for their re
spective ranks.
10. All costumes and ornaments are to be appropriate to the wearer’s
rank, and not extravagant in colour or pattern.
11. Common people are not to ride in palanquins without permis
sion. [“Common people” here means the lower orders—peas
ants, artisans, and traders.] Exception is made for physicians,
astrologers, aged persons, and invalids.
12. All samurai in all fiefs are to five frugally.
13. All daimyos are to choose capable persons to advise them in the
government of their fiefs.
It is an interesting feature of this ordinance that the comments on

its several clauses consist of more or less appropriate quotations from
classical sources, principally Chinese. The whole document thus has a
somewhat Confucian flavour, which is not characteristic of mediaeval
law-giving in Japan but is common in the later legislation of the Toku-
gawa Bakufu. In the foregoing translation, specimen comments on the
first three clauses only are given (in parentheses).
In its contents it conforms to an almost universal pattern, since an
authoritarian system of government is usually accompanied, if not by
an artificial state religion, at least by a code of belief and behaviour and
by a certain puritanical outlook expressed in sumptuary rules. Indeed
the clauses in the Buke Sho-Hatto enjoining frugality and laying down
standards of dress and food are an echo of the past, since both Yoritomo
and the Hojo Regents had attempted to regulate the style of living of
their vassals. Although it cannot be said that any of those rulers delib
erately promoted religious beliefs, they did strive to inculcate the mili
tary virtues of obedience and sacrifice.
2. Ieyasu s M ethods
This piece of legislation illustrates the determination of Ieyasu to

create an absolute state, governed in perpetuity by the Tokugawa. From
its beginning the Bakufu legislated against change—indeed in the sev
enth clause the word “change” means “revolt.”
Iey a su a c ip h er
This determination, according to some writers (including Rai San

yo), can be traced back to Ieyasu’s challenge of Hideyoshi at Komald
and Nagakute, when (they assume) he had already made up his mind
to destroy the Toyotomi family. The simple, popular view at the time
was sentimental rather than critical. It was felt that Ieyasu had delib
erately planned, as a matter of national policy, to kill or cause the death
of Hideyori. This was deplored but understood. Ieyasu was cruel, but
he had to be ruthless if he was to succeed.
This is true enough. He knew exactly what he was about, and what
action was unavoidable. He meant to build a government of the kind
known in recent times as “totalitarian,” or at least to lay its solid foun
dation. The working of his mind is revealed by his acts after the fall of
Osaka Castle in June 1615.
When the Tokugawa forces stormed through the castle apartments,
a Toyotomi warrior named Ono Harunaga rescued Ieyasu’s own grand
daughter Sen Hime from the flames. He therefore felt justified in beg
ging Ieyasu to spare the life of Hideyori s mother, Yodogimi. But Ieyasu
was unrelenting. With Hideyori’s death the Toyotomi family was de
stroyed save for two small children. The subsequent hunting down of
the surviving defenders of Osaka was merciless. Day after day at least
fifty or a hundred men were caught and killed, and soon their heads
were exposed by the thousand on the road between Fushimi and Kyoto.
Many tragic tales are told of the cruelty for which Ieyasu was respon
sible. The eight-year-old son of Hideyori by a concubine was decapi
tated on the public execution ground at Rokujo-Kawara. His elder sister
was spared, but she had to end her days in a nunnery at Kamakura.
Having destroyed his principal enemy, Ieyasu still had to secure the
submission of all potential rivals. This he achieved chiefly by the stra
tegic distribution of fiefs, by constant surveillance in a far-reaching sys
tem of espionage, and by imposing upon the most powerful daimyos
obligations designed to reduce their wealth and thus to limit their mili
tary strength.
But perhaps his most powerful weapon was his public reputation.
During his last years he was treated as an idol, an object of worship,

almost as a deity; and although he was thought by the ordinary citizen
to have murdered Hideyori, he was nonetheless regarded as supreme
beyond challenge. He built the solid base of a government which was
to last for more than two centuries; and his successors for generations
carried out what was called “the ancestral law”—the principles laid down
by him—which soon acquired the nature of holy writ. No previous Shd-
gun had reached such a pinnacle of glory, in life or in death. He was
buried with honours far beyond those accorded to Yoritomo or Takauji,
and was posthumously deified under the sacred title of Gongen, which
means an avatar of the Buddha. Gongen Sama was the name by which
he was known to the people of Japan until recent times.
It may be asked how he was able to impose his will upon the prin
cipal warlords. The answer is that by his victory at Sekigahara he had
settled the issue between a confused civil movement led by Ishida and
a military party led by himself and his great generals. He was able to
do this because unlike Hideyoshi, who had wasted his strength on the
Korean campaign, he had carefully created and fostered a great disci
plined force. Upon the fall of Osaka, though it was perhaps still pos
sible for his strongest enemies to resume the struggle, they dared not
challenge his moral ascendancy. Thereafter they abandoned hope of
dividing the country, regarding it (in the words of one of them, Nabe-
shima Nobushige) as “impossible, even in a dream.”
Ieyasu had little interest in administrative detail. He saw his prob
lems in a broad outline and wanted bold solutions. Consequently the
close organization of the Bakufu did not begin until after his death.
There was an extremely active period of transition from military to civil
government between 1600 and 1615, which merits close attention be
cause it reveals lively and original features of the national character and
a power to invent and improvise with which Japan is not usually cred
ited. It also brings into relief the somewhat finical nature of the system
developed a century later. During his last years Ieyasu depended not
upon a regular civil service but upon a number of gifted individuals
with whom he surrounded himself. It included such various figures as
the monks Tenkai and Suden; the Confucian scholar Hayashi Razan;
rich merchants like Goto Shozaburo, Chaya Shirojird, Suminokura Rydi,
Shimai Soshitsu, and Imai Sokun; the Englishman Will Adams; and a
few favourite vassals like Okubo Tadachika, who had been with him
since Mikawa days, not to speak of adherents like Honda Masanobu,
his onetime falconer.
All these were exceptional men, in refreshing contrast to regular
office-holders, and most of them deserve some special notice for their
interesting characters and the nature of the services they rendered to
Ieyasu. Chaya Shirojird is perhaps the best illustration of the type of
man whom Ieyasu found most useful. His father was a ronin ( a mas
terless warrior), crippled in the wars, who set up as a draper in Kyoto,
where he did business for Ieyasu’s father, and by arrangement sent
young Shirojiro to Mikawa to be an esquire and companion to Ieyasu.
Succeeding to his father’s business, Shirojiro became the purveyor to
the Tokugawa family in Yamashiro province and before long was one of
the wealthiest merchants in Kyoto, living in a grand style. As a con
tractor on a large scale he furnished military supplies to Ieyasu, and
was with him at his principal battles, from Mikatagahara (1572) to
Odawara (1590).
It was this Chaya who gave Ieyasu timely notice of the death of
Oda Nobunaga, and enabled him to escape from Sakai in 1582, on the
dangerous journey through Iga. He also acted as an intelligence agent
in Kyoto for Ieyasu; and year after year, while Hideyoshi was still in
power, he took secret messages and presents from Ieyasu to the Court
—a fact recorded in the Court noble Kajuji’s diary for 1591, which shows
that Ieyasu had long looked forward to a time when he would rise to
supreme power in the state.
It was Chaya, too, who helped to lay out the city of Yedo after
Ieyasu moved east from Mikawa. From 1595 he did not leave Ieyasu’s
side, and he more than once declined important posts as Governor of
Tokugawa domains, on the ground that he was not a soldier and did
not wish to change. He died in 1596 and was succeeded by his eldest
son, who fought at Sekigahara, and then by his next son, who went to
Nagasaki at Ieyasu’s request, to supervise foreign trade and doubtless
to pick up some bargains for himself and his master. He was also told
to keep on eye on the Christians.
Suminokura Ryoi, Shimai Soshitsu, and Imai Sokun were also men
who displayed great talents and accumulated great wealth as merchants
and contractors. Soshitsu (a Hakata merchant, 1537-1615) is known as
the author of a testament containing injunctions to his son, a work which
gives an idea of the creed of the reputable merchant in his day. He was
a brewer and a moneylender—a frequent combination which created
many great fortunes.
Goto Shozaburo, an officer of the mint, was the brain behind Ieyasu’s
currency policy. He had been contractor for Ieyasu’s armies before Se
kigahara.
A group of men including Okubo Nagayasu, Ina Tadatsugu, and
Itagald Katsushige advised on the vital problems of agrarian policy—

the control of the farming population and the land surveys. Ina was a
particularly able man, and was handsomely rewarded. He was a skilled
land surveyor and rendered remarkable service in irrigation and flood
control. At Sekigahara he had been in charge of the transport of sup
plies. He died in 1610, and the field was left to Okubo Nagayasu, who
now became Ieyasu’s chief adviser on agrarian policy, particularly on
mining matters.®
After his death Nagayasu was found to have engaged in peculation
on a vast scale, but for a time he was able to shelter unsuspected under
the protection of Okubo Tadachika, a trusted vassal who had no knowl
edge of his guilt. Ieyasu seems eventually to have become aware of
Nagayasu's cupidity but until he discovered its alarming extent to have
thought that the value of Nagayasu’s skill outweighed his errors.
Honda Masanobu, a favourite of Ieyasu, openly charged Nagayasu’s
protector, Tadachika, with covering up Nagayasu’s crimes. (Masanobu
was also under Tadachika’s patronage, but hated him.) The sad truth
was that nearly all these men were guilty of embezzlement, and had no
scruples.® It was the accepted practice among their kind, and it was
made easy by the very loose control of finance in the early days of the
Bakufu, before an audit office was established; but Nagayasu’s offense
was monumental.
His extravagance was amazing. When proceeding on tours of inspec
tion he would be accompanied by a retinue of servants, concubines, and
sangaku dancers numbering several hundred in all. Wherever they
stopped for the night there would be wild dancing and drinking, and
their calls upon peasants or townspeople for labour and supplies caused
great distress. Yet Nagayasu, justly confident of the value of his serv
ices, merely boasted of his excesses, which continued until his death in
1613 at the age of sixty-nine.
When, according to his will, he was about to be placed in a golden
coffin, and great men were about to attend his obsequies, Ieyasu sud
denly ordered the funeral rites to be stopped, pending an enquiry into
Nagayasu’s misdemeanours. The enquiry revealed that he was guilty
of treasonable conduct. His seven sons were sent to castles governed
by kinsmen or vassals of Ieyasu, there to be held in custody. They were
®Nagayasu was the son of a samgaku performer (a type of dance) in the prov
ince of Kai, where he was employed by Takeda Shingen. He attracted the attention
of Ieyasu and was engaged by him.
* Honda Tadakatsu, a soldier who had fought well at Sekigahara and had a low
opinion of civilians, referring to this situation observed: “A daikan [a Shfigun’s
deputy], like a bottle, should have a rope round his neck." The Japanese earthen
ware bottle, having a long neck and wide lip, could be slung on a rope.
THE T OKU GAW A GOVERNMENT 13
subsequently killed or ordered to commit suicide; and the doctrine of
complicity (renza) being invoked, punishment was extended to many
of Nagayasu’s relatives and associates. His patron, Okubo Tadachika,
who had given him his surname, was at this time engaged in anti-
Christian activities in Kyoto, and was deprived of his fief in absentia.
Many others received similar treatment.
It is not clear why Ieyasu ordered such severe retribution, for Naga
yasu’s services had been of great value; but it has been suggested that
Nagayasu was party to a conspiracy to overthrow Ieyasu in which a
number of foreign and Japanese Christians were involved. The evidence
here is not convincing, but no doubt an examination of Nagayasu’s papers
showed that he was dishonest in political as well as financial matters.
Another and perhaps more plausible explanation of Ieyasu’s wrath
is that he was appalled to discover the amount of Nagayasu’s accumu
lation of coin and bullion. Ieyasu himself, though his personal habits
were frugal, was a man of miserly temperament, in constant fear of
losing his treasure, which, he rightly supposed, was essential to the
maintenance of the Bakufu in its early stages. On his death it was
reckoned that he had two million ryo in gold coin and about twice that
amount in treasure of various lands. When he discovered that Naga
yasu had embezzled sums of the same order of magnitude he was natu
rally infuriated.
It was more than a fortunate accident that brought all these men
into action at a critical juncture in their country’s history. After Hide-
yoshi’s death Ieyasu looked forward to an era of peace. It is true that
he still had battles to fight, but he saw farther into the future than most
of his contemporaries, for he had always been a man to take a long
view. His vision was shared by his trusted familiars, and it is therefore
of interest to trace the links which bound them to him, for although they
were a heterogeneous band, they were united by one purpose, wanting
nothing better than the full exercise of their talents.
Honda Masanobu (Sado no Kami) was a retainer in the Mikawa
fief, and when Ieyasu was a youth he had been employed as his com
panion. Tadachika’s uncle, Okubo Hikozaemon, in his M ikawa M ono-
gatari,T relates that his elder brother, Okubo Tadayo, took a liking to7
7 Hikozaemon’s M ikaw a M onogatari is an interesting record of the relationship

of Ieyasu with the Okubo family. I t also contains a discussion of the mutual obliga
tions of lord and vassal which may be regarded as a forerunner of Bushidd, the
systematic code of chivalry developed by men like Yamaga Soko (1 6 2 2 -8 5 ). Hiko
zaemon’s treatment is individual and sentimental rather than philosophic, but it
shows that with a prospect of peaceful years men had begun to consider the future
of the samurai class in a new society.
Masanobu and helped him when he was in trouble for taking part in a
religious uprising in Mikawa. It was another Okubo who introduced
Masanobu to Ieyasu as a skilled falconer. Masanobu was not much of
a warrior, but he displayed a political acumen that encouraged Ieyasu
to make use of his talents. He was frank in the expression of his opin
ions, and Ieyasu was wise enough not to take offence but to trust him
entirely. He was of great assistance in deciding upon the transfers and
confiscations of fiefs which followed Sekigahara. He himself was with
out greed, and never rose beyond 20,000 koku as a small daimyo. He
argued that the Fudai daimyos, the hereditary vassals, who served
Ieyasu should be rewarded with important duties, rather than being
given lavish allowances. He died in 1616, ravaged by syphilis.
Some Fudai daimyos were discontented, among them the most hand
somely rewarded, Ii Naomasa and Honda Tadakatsu. They were proud
of their lineage and despised the upstarts with whom Ieyasu was sur
rounding himself. The upstarts, however, continued to flourish, and
Masanobu’s son, Masazumi, followed in his fathers footsteps. He at
tended Ieyasu in Sumpu, and took part in discussions of policy. He is
said to have deserved a share in the credit for plans to destroy the house
of Toyotomi. He naturally aroused envy among the proud military
heroes, and they plotted against him. He died in exile. His family’s
misfortunes were regarded as condign punishment for ingratitude to
Okubo Tadachika, their generous patron.
After Ieyasu’s death the organization of the Bakufu began to lose its
makeshift character. It could no longer be described as cut on the vil
lage headman pattern (shoya-jitate) or even the provincial pattern
(Mikawa-jitate). Ieyasu’s former comrades and associates were grow
ing old—he had died at the age of seventy-five—and the appointments
held by his intimates lapsed. New offices were created and filled, and
by 1634 were clearly defined. Doi Toshikatsu and the two Sakais, Ta
dakatsu and Tadayo, remained as “elders,” but their juniors, Matsudaira
Nobutsuna, Abe Tadakatsu, and others, occupied key positions under
them. A new bureaucracy was taking shape.
It is of interest in this context to quote from a document which shows
what kind of ideas about government—its essence and its forms—pre
vailed in the minds of Ieyasu’s advisers, who cannot have foreseen the
complex system which developed after his death.
The document, a study of the principles of government, is attributed
to Honda Masanobu on the authority of scholars like Kinoshita Junan,
Arai Hakuseki, and Muro Kyuso. It is known as Honsa Roku, and is
said to have been drawn up at the request of Ieyasu.8 A rather long-
winded and prosy essay, its line of argument is that good government
depends first of all upon the character of the ruler, who must always
strive for self-improvement. Masanobu condemns as causes of disorder
such systems of ethics as Buddhism, Shinto, and “modern” Confucian
ism, and goes back to the pristine virtue of the Sage Kings of Chinese
antiquity. He makes the obvious point that greed, ambition, and other
vices are obstacles to good government. He gives some examples of
what is needed for the purposes of good government, dwelling upon
the fact that high officials must not seek popularity. Their duty is to
serve the state faithfully and unselfishly. Officials such as stewards and
treasurers must combine great ability with integrity. They must pre
vent waste.
There is a good deal more of this land of homily, and although it is
commonplace there is no doubt that Masanobu, himself a righteous
man, was convinced of the importance of high moral standards. He
saw the dangers of vanity and corruption, those two ruinous evils in
public and private life.
After some observations on the duties of the military class and the
choice of men to hold important offices he turns to the treatment of the
peasants. It is here that there occurs the often-cited statement: “The
peasants (hyakusho) are the foundation of the State. There is a rule
for governing them. Each man must have the boundaries of his fields
clearly marked, and an estimate must be made of the amount needed
for his consumption. The rest must be paid as tax. It is right that the
peasants should be so treated that they have neither too much nor too
little. Further, during the months of October and November [after the
harvest] they must work on the roads, being maintained at official ex
pense. But no other corvee should be imposed upon them, for if they
are fatigued their crops will be poor.”
He condemns luxury and says that such pastimes as cha no tju ( the
tea ceremony) are incompatible with good government. He gives an
interesting brief sketch of Japanese history to show how after the hon
est and efficient administration of the Hojo Regents there was a sad de
terioration. The Ashikaga Shoguns were followed by Hosokawa, who
had some understanding of government; but after his death the country
fell into the hands of men like Nobunaga and the Taiko, great soldiers*
* H onsa stands for H onda Sado (no K am i); roku, of course, means a chronicle.
Another work attributed to him, Ji-ko k k a kon gen ( "on the Foundations of Govern
m ent"), is of doubtful authenticity.
but ignorant of the Way (the moral law). They had no ideals. They
led luxurious lives and oppressed the people.
It is not easy to trace Masanobu s influence in the legislation of the
early days of the Bakufu, although it is most probable that he suggested
the ordinances of 1611 and 1612 defining the duties of the vassals of the
Tokugawa family. He certainly stood for impartial judgment in matters
of controversy. He may also have suggested the general lines of the
Buke Sho-Hatto; but it is clear that he saw the future as a simple, im
proved version of the past.
3. Iey asu s Character

Ieyasu was loyal to both Nobunaga and Hideyoshi, but he was always
careful to preserve some degree of independence. His decision not to
send a contingent to take part in the invasion of Korea, though it may
not have angered Hideyoshi, nevertheless showed a bold and independ
ent spirit. It gave him a great advantage, for he was strong when other
important vassals were suffering severe losses.
He was at first reluctant to move to Yedo at Hideyoshi’s instance
after the fall of Odawara, since it meant the loss of his former prov
inces, especially of Mikawa, his own home and the breeding ground of
the Mikawa bushi. But he knew that he must bide his time, and pa
tience was one of his virtues, matched only by his far-sighted determi
nation.
Quite apart from his political wisdom, he was both a good fighter
and a bom strategist. He was a skilful archer, a man of robust consti
tution who enjoyed field sports and scarcely knew what illness meant.
At the age of sixty he was extremely active, and enjoyed hunting, riding,
swimming, or any other hard exercise. His body was small, but well-
developed, and he was inclined to corpulence—in this and other respects
resembling Napoleon.*
As to his generalship there can be no doubt. He gave Hideyoshi a
taste of his quality at Komakiyama and Nagakute. He is said to have
fought over forty-five battles in his lifetime. He did not win them all,
but at Mikatagahara he defeated a force twice as great as his own, led
by Takeda Shin gen, a warrior mistakenly reputed to have been the
greatest commander of his day.
He was a frugal man, but devoted much attention to the accumula
tion of wealth. His eastern provinces were valuable, and his invest
ments in trade and industry brought him immense profits. He admired•
• He had no serious illness until after the age of seventy. Before that he suffered
once or twice from boils, and once from a mild venereal complaint.
the character of Yoritomo, and read with care the Azuma Kagami, or
“Mirror of the East,” the Kamakura Bakufu’s official record of the period
from Yoritomo’s revolt in 1180 to 1266. He intoned the Nembutsu
(Buddha-calling) regularly.
The common traditional view of Ieyasu s achievement is that he ate
the pie which Nobunaga had prepared and Hideyoshi had baked. Like
most apophthegms, this is only half true. Ieyasu certainly built upon
foundations laid by his predecessors, whose military exploits had
brought about some measure of national unity, but it was Ieyasu who
completed the process by a combination of military and civil talent
amounting to genius. His will was as strong as theirs, his political judg
ment was much sounder, and in action, where they were often hasty and
violent, he was cool, patient, and far-sighted. Yet his character is not
attractive, for it lacked the warmth of his late sinful colleagues.
4. T he Shogun and the Throne
One of the first administrative orders of Hidetada on behalf of

Ieyasu was a regulation of the powers and duties of the Emperor and
the Court. This was of no great practical importance, seeing that the
Shoguns powers were such as he chose to assume; but it was desirable
to formulate the relation of the Bakufu to the Throne, if only as a warn
ing against conspiracy by the nobility.
There had been an order communicated in 1613 by Ieyasu to Itakura
Shigenori, one of his officers (the Shoshi-dai or Deputy) in Kyoto, in
which brief rules were laid down for the conduct of the nobles. They
must devote themselves to study and behave with decorum, eschewing
loose living, especially gambling and association with disorderly char
acters. Disobedience would be punished by exile.
A much more detailed ordinance was issued in 1615, soon after the
fall of Osaka, when Ieyasu s position was impregnable. Known as Kin-
chu Kuge Sho-Hatto (Rules for the Palace and the Court), it is of great
interest, because it shows clearly the attitude of the Tokugawa Shoguns
to the reigning Emperor and his nobles. The principal points in its sev
enteen articles may be summarized as follows:
The Emperor [to emphasize his birth but not his office, he is called
Tenshi, not Tenno] is to devote himself to learning. He must follow the
teaching of the classics and uphold the tradition of poetry.
Correct gradations of rank must be observed. The Great Ministers
[Dajo-Daijin, Sa-Daijin, and U-Daijin] are to have precedence over
princes of the blood royal.
The Court ranks and offices of members of the military houses are
to be additional to those held by the nobles.
Whatever their standing at Court, offenders shall be banished. The
scale of offences shall accord with the terms of the ancient codes
[ritsuryo].
Ecclesiastics of the highest rank [Daisojo] must be appointed ac
cording to precedent, but a man of great talent, even if he is of the
common people, may be raised to the rank below.
It will be seen that although attention is paid to the dignity of the

Sovereign and his nobles, they are deprived of almost all but ceremonial
functions. The hereditary claims of the great families are recognized,
but there is no freedom of action. All from the Emperor down are at
the mercy of the Shogun and his officers. Nevertheless the Emperor is
regarded as the fountain of honour, but it is a fountain of which the
Bakufu directs the flow. The revenues of the Throne had fallen very
low in Ashikaga times, but they were raised by Hideyoshi and Ieyasu
in turn.
In addition to its onerous regulations the Bakufu took steps to
strengthen its control by arranging marriages, notably that of Hide-
tada’s youngest child, Kazuko, to the Emperor Go-Mizunoo in 1620.
At this time military “aides” were assigned to the Emperor and to re
tired Emperors, to keep a close watch on the Court.
5. T he Shogun and the Vassals

Although Ieyasu was prompt to resolve those disputes among vas
sals which were of direct concern to him, he left most such matters to
the Hyojosho, a judicial council which consisted of a number of his
trusted officers. When he handed the title of Shogun to his son Hide-
tada, he enjoined the Council to be loyal to both Hidetada and himself,
and to judge all suits with complete impartiality. In 1614 the members
of the Council subscribed to an oath by which they swore to pronounce
sentence on any person whatever—even their own parents or relatives—
found guilty of treason against the Shogun or his family or of any breach
of his ordinances. The signatories were Sakai, Doi, and other high offi
cers.
In 1615 Doi, Sakai, and Ando sent a letter to Matsudaira Nagato no
Kami ( the western daimyo Mori, upon whom Ieyasu had conferred the
name of Matsudaira) instructing him to destroy all the castles in his fief
except one, which was to be kept as his residence. Similar orders, he
was informed, were being sent to all provinces. This was a cardinal
feature of Bakufu policy and the sort of measure which, one might sup
pose, would be announced in a solemn edict; but the simple method here
employed is characteristic of the early days of the Bakufu, when the
government of the country was likened to the rule of a village by its
headman.
After Ieyasu’s death in 1616, however, the organization of the Bakufu
proceeded apace. The Bakufu being the headquarters of the Tokugawa
government, it was necessary first to decide upon the rank and function
of the various branches of the Tokugawa family and to determine the
classification of their feudatories. The principal Tokugawa families were
the Three Houses (Go-Sanke) of Owari, Kii, and Mito provinces, re
spectively the domains of Ieyasu’s sons Yoshinao, Yorinobu, and Yori-
fusa. Below them in rank came the cadet branches known as Go-Kamon
(the Kinsmen), established after Ieyasu’s death and granted the name
of Matsudaira. Among them were Hideyasu, a son of Ieyasu, with a fief
of 670,000 koku, and Hoshina, a son of Hidetada, with a fief of 230,000
koku. Additions to this class were made by later Shoguns.
The vassals of the Tokugawa were of two kinds, the Fudai and the
Tozama. The distinction between them depended upon their relation
ship with Ieyasu after the death of Hideyoshi. Those who held the
eastern seaboard provinces, as well as others who had followed Ieyasu
at Seldgahara, were regarded as hereditary vassals and styled Fudai.
Those who had belonged to the Toyotomi faction but had submitted to
Ieyasu after Sekigahara and the fall of Osaka were regarded as vassals
who though presumed loyal must be kept under surveillance. These
were called Tozama ( “Outside Lords”).
The Fudai daimyos were for the most part holders of fiefs of 50,000
koku or less. Exceptional cases were those of the Ii family at Hikone
(150,000 koku, later raised to 250,000), the Sakai, the Okubo, and a few
others who had more than 100,000 koku; but the average revenue was
about 50,000. The number of Fudai vassals was from time to time in
creased by promotions. It was 37 before Sekigahara, and reached 145
at the end of the eighteenth century.
The Tozama, or Outside Lords, were powerful chieftains who had
been neutral or hostile to Ieyasu after the death of Hideyoshi. They
included the great houses of Maeda (1,020,000 koku), Shimazu of Sat-
suma (770,000 koku), Hosokawa, Kuroda, Asano, and Dat£, all of whom
had territories in provinces remote from Yedo. As a matter of policy the
Fudai were placed in strategic situations where they could keep watch
upon the Tozama and threaten their rear or flanks should they begin to
move troops; but the Fudai were frequently transferred from province
to province lest they should develop local connexions unfavourable to
the Bakufu.
It was a cardinal feature of Bakufu policy to guard against any in
crease in the strength of Outside Lords and indeed whenever possible
to impose upon them duties which would weaken them. The custom
of exacting a period of residence in Yedo was one of the methods by
which the Bakufu could involve rich Tozama daimyos in great expense
while at the same time keeping them under observation. These visits
were at first voluntary, and were paid by a number of daimyos from
central and western Japan who travelled to Yedo to declare their alle
giance to Ieyasu at the time of his appointment as Shogun in the spring
of 1603. A letter from Kuroda Nagamasa to a kinsman describes a visit
to Yedo in that year, when he was received and entertained by Hide-
tada. He accompanied Ieyasu to Kyoto for the ceremony of investiture
as Sei-i-Tai-Shdgun, and then returned to Yedo, where he was received
in the castle by Ieyasu.
The regular attendance of vassals had its remoter origin in the sys
tem of political hostages, of which the first example under the rule of
the Tokugawa Bakufu was the journey to Yedo in 1600 as a hostage of
the mother of Maeda Toshinaga, the most powerful of the Tozama dai
myos and a man greatly mistrusted by Ieyasu. Thereafter the vassals
were encouraged to journey to Yedo to declare fealty; and the practice,
once voluntary, became obligatory. It was laid down in specific terms
in the amended version of the Buke Sho-Hatto issued in 1635. The rele
vant clauses provide that vassals shall establish residences in Yedo,
which they are to occupy each year, or in some cases in alternate years,
for a period of four months, leaving their wives and children in Yedo
when they returned to their fiefs. This system of “alternate attendance”
(Sankin Kotai) was an effective method of keeping the daimyos under
observation. It also placed a heavy burden upon the wealthy Tozama,
who were expected to keep up a grand style.
The construction and repair of castles for the Bakufu was one of the
tasks imposed upon daimyos by the Bakufu with the object of reducing
their financial strength. Thus the daimyos of seven adjacent provinces
were called upon to assist Ii Naokatsu in building the great castle of
Hikone,10 which was designed to hold down the Home Provinces and
surrounding territory; and during the years from 1602 to 1614 the lead
ing daimyos had been called upon to contribute labour and materials
for the repair or enlargement not only of Bakufu strongholds but also
10 It took the place of Ishida Mitsunari’s castle of Sawayama.

of a number of Imperial residences. Work on the castle at Yedo went
on for ten years, while much effort was expended on Fushimi, Sumpu,
Nagoya, and other great edifices. Certain public works, such as the con
struction of roads and harbours, were also undertaken by vassals under
orders from Yedo.
T he Hatamoto. Below the daimyo in the feudal scale stood the Hata-
moto or Bannerman. The name (which originally stood for the head
quarters of a commander in the field) came to signify the bodyguard
of a general. In the Yedo period the hatamoto were those minor vassals
under the direct command of the Shogun whose revenues were less than
10,000 koku—usually much less. When Ieyasu was in Mikawa they
formed the mainstay of his armies, for they owed him a personal alle
giance. Their number is not exactly known, but after 1635, when rules
were laid down for their duties, their strength was about 5,000. They
had a right of direct access to the Shogun. When they were called to
active service by him, they had to join the colours with 13 men for the
first 500 koku of their revenue, and a similar number for each additional
500 koku. It was estimated that they could put into the field a total force
of 80,000 men. This figure included a lower grade of direct retainer, the
unfeoffed samurai called Go-kenin, who numbered about 17,000.
The Bakufu disapproved of any close association between the lower
grade hatamoto and the peasants working on their land. For fear of
uprising, or even of the formation of a class of local gentry like the ko-
kujin, who had caused trouble to previous governments, it was the policy
of most daimyos to withdraw the hatamoto of less than 500 koku from
the land by offering them a fixed stipend. This was as a rule willingly
accepted, and many of the hatamoto took to residence in the castle
towns, where they created a new problem, since being unemployed they
tended to make mischief.
Hatamoto of the highest rank had a revenue of 3,000 koku or even
more. They had to take part in the alternate attendance, and a number
of them obtained responsible official posts. The process of withdrawing
hatamoto and go-kenin from the land had gone so far by 1722 that only
about one-tenth of the total number (estimated at 22,000) were not
drawing stipends. The land of the hatamoto thus withdrawn was then
incorporated in Bakufu domains.
6. T he Administrative M achine
The administrative system, as we have seen, was built up gradually.
It took its more or less permanent form under the rule of the third Shd-
gun, Iemitsu (1623-51). For the convenience of readers, however, it

seems best to anticipate the later additions and to set forth in this pre
liminary chapter the main features of the system as it was developed
under the first three Shoguns.
The principal offices were the Tairo, or Great Elders; the Roju, or
Council of Elders; and the Hyojosho, or Judicial Council. Their respec
tive functions were as follows:
T he Tairo. The function of the Tairo, or Great Elders, was to advise
upon high policy and to act as Regents during the minority of a Shogun.
In Hideyoshi’s day there had been five such elders (Go-Tairo), but
under the Yedo Bakufu the number was reduced to three (in 1633),
then to two, and later to only one. The first holders of this office were
Doi Toshikatsu, Sakai Tadakatsu, and Sakai Tadayo. Subsequent ap
pointments were not made regularly, but only for some special purpose.
On such occasions an experienced Fudai daimyo of not less than 100,000
koku was selected.
T he Roju. The functions of the Roju were both advisory and ad
ministrative. Under Ieyasu there were only two Roju. There was little
change under Hidetada, but under Iemitsu, in a thorough revision of
the system of government, their number was increased to five and later
reduced to four. Their functions were clearly defined in an ordinance
of 1634, which may be summarized as follows:
1. Relations with the Throne, the Court, and the Prince-Abbots.
2. Supervision of daimyos of 10,000 koku and above.
3. Prescribing the forms of documents in official communications.
4. Supervising the internal affairs of the Shogun’s domains.
5. Gold and silver coinage.
6. Public works.
7. Enfeoffments.
8. The control of monasteries and shrines.
9. The compilation of maps, charts, etc.
The four Roju served in rotation, each for one month. They communi
cated with the Shogun through the Soba-yonin, chamberlains in per
sonal attendance upon him. They have sometimes been described as
constituting a sort of cabinet, but such analogies are misleading, for
when there is an elaborate organization of bureaux and councils, mili
tary men in authority are apt to find short cuts to action.
T he H yojosho was a council composed of the Roju and certain Com
missioners (Bugyo) in charge of executive departments of the Bakufu.
Such were the Machi-Bugyo (City Commissioners); the Jisha-Bugyo
(Commissioners for Monasteries and Shrines); the Kanjo-Bugyo; and
the O-Metsuke, the Chief Inspectors or Censors. The function of the
Hyojosho was partly administrative and partly judicial, since at this
time there was no clear distinction between the executive and legal
functions. It might be described as the Supreme Court.
Lower in the scale came certain officials with specific rather than
general functions. They were the Walcadoshiyori, the O-Metsuke, the
Jisha-Bugyo, the Yedo Machi-Bugyo, the Kanjo-Bugyo, and the officers
of various local government organs.
T he W akadoshiyori were first appointed ( the date is uncertain) in
1631. As their title ( “Junior Elders”) indicates, they were subordinate
to the Roju. In 1634 an instruction was sent to them, stating their duties.
Usually from four to six in number, they were to supervise the hata-
moto; to control craftsmen and physicians; to inspect public works and
buildings; and to regulate the activities of persons holding office in the
great castles of Kyoto, Osaka, Suruga, and elsewhere. They were also to
keep watch on vassals ( other than hatamoto) of less than 10,000 koku
of revenue. Their appointment was irregular until 1662.
The O-Metsuke were officials who may be described as Chief Inspec
tors or Censors. They were intelligence officers whose duty it was to
keep watch on all daimyos. They were directly responsible to the Roju.
There were four O-Metsuke, and under them sixteen subordinates called
Metsuke, who were responsible to the Wakadoshiyori. It was part of
their duty to keep watch on the hatamoto.
T he Jisha-Bugyo were Commissioners, four in number, responsible
for the control of religious establishments, both Buddhist and Shinto,
and for the supervision of the clergy.
T he Yedo Machi-Bugyo were Commissioners, two in number, re
sponsible for city government, police and justice.
T he Kanjo-Bugyo were Finance Commissioners, four in number, who
supervised the administration of Tokugawa domains. They also dealt
with suits or petitions from the eight Kanto provinces.
L ocal Government Organs. Since the country consisted of the direct
Tokugawa domains and the self-governing fiefs of vassals, there was
limited scope for local government officials appointed by Yedo. There
were four officers called Gundai, who administered Tokugawa estates
in certain key provinces, and there were forty or fifty officers, called Dai-
kan, or Deputies, exercising similar powers in other Tokugawa estates.
Apart from these there were Governors of castles, who, in Osaka, Kyoto,
and Sumpu, went by the title of Jodai.
Local government posts in the strict sense were those of the Shoshi-
dai in Kyoto, who was the military governor of the city, with jurisdic
tion in the Home Provinces; and of the Bugyo or Commissioners in other
important towns, such as Nagasaki, Yamada, Nara, and Nikko. All such
posts were held by Fudai daimyos or by men of the rank of hatamoto.
No Tozama daimyos were employed.
C H A P T E R II
HIDETADA AND IEMITSU
L H idetada, 1616-23
H i d g t a d a nominally succeeded to the office of Shogun in 1605,

but he did not decide policy during the lifetime of Ieyasu. From 1618,
however, he proceeded boldly with the consolidation of the Bakufu by
the “squeeze” of certain great feudatories, including his younger brother
Matsudaira Tadateru; the powerful daimyos Fukushima Masanori and
Honda Masanobu; and his nephew Matsudaira Tadanori. The total
revenue escheated by Hidetada amounted, as we have seen, to more
than four and a half million koku.
Hidetada did not remain long in office. He retired in favour of his
son lemitsu in 1623, but retained authority until his death in 1632.
While in power he reaffirmed and developed certain important policies
introduced during Ieyasu’s last years. He repeated in 1616 the ban
upon Christianity and the orders confining the entry of foreign ships
other than Chinese to the ports of Nagasaki and Hirado. In 1622 he
ordered the execution of fifty-five Christians in Nagasaki, and in 1628
he issued a similar decree. He also banned the importation of books
concerning the Christian religion. He continued the organization of the
Bakufu, as, for instance, by instituting the appointment of Wakado-
shiyori.
Although he seems to have been firm in his conduct of public affairs,
he was bullied by his wife, who favoured her second son as Hidetada’s
successor. Thanks, however, to the determination of the wet-nurse of
Takechiyo, the first-born, Ieyasu had ordered that he should not be
passed over. He succeeded in 1623 as the third Shogun, lemitsu; and
the wet-nurse, O-Fuku, acquired much influence in the Shogun’s Court,
where she was on familiar terms with the leading Bakufu officers of
the day. She somehow contrived to obtain the Court title of Tsubone,
or Lady-in-Waiting.
2. lemitsu, 1623-51
lemitsu while in office showed considerable self-confidence, con

ducting himself as if to the manner bom, especially in his attitude
towards the great Tozama vassals, whom even Ieyasu had treated with
26 HIDETADA AND IEMITSU
some measure of amiability. According to the Abbot Tenkai he was

intelligent and determined, but difficult to approach. He had a certain
showy side to his character. While ordering daimyo and hatamoto to
economize, and while expelling from his service persons whose dress
was especially gay, he maintained a fantastically numerous suite in the
inner apartments of the Yedo Castle—so numerous that after his death
some three thousand superfluous attendants, mostly women, were dis
missed. He was lavish in his expenditure. Once when a number of
hatamoto petitioned for loans, he ordered the contents of some chests
full of gold in his treasury to be distributed among them, saying that
the gold was doing no good shut up in a vault. This incident is recorded
less as an example of his generosity than as evidence of his ignorance
of money matters, for unlike his calculating grandfather he could not
understand the simple arithmetic which his accountants tried to explain.
Whether Iemitsu deserves credit for the administrative measures in
troduced during his term of office is a matter of small concern. It was
a period of importance in the development of Bakufu policy, and he
was no doubt guided by capable men, such as the Tairo Doi Toshi-
katsu and the leading Bakufu members of the Council of Elders. His
behaviour is of interest chiefly for the light it throws on the disciplinary
powers which the Shogun exercised over the vassals. One of Iemitsu s
first acts was the punishment of his younger brother Tadanaga (Kuni-
matsu) for outrageous treatment of his vassals. Tadanaga was stripped
of his great fief of half a million koku. He was probably insane, and
this drastic action was taken not by way of retribution for a crime but
rather because the first three Shoguns had no mercy for a daimyo guilty
of high-handed action. They were always on the lookout for insubor
dinate behaviour which might be the first step to active disobedience.
It was for such reasons that Iemitsu announced that no special favours
would be granted to the Outside Lords, who had been treated with
some show of courtesy by his predecessors. In 1634 Iemitsu led an army
of over 300,000 men to Kyoto to impress the Court and to remind the
Tozama of his military strength.
In 1632 the rights and duties of the Hatamoto ( Bannermen) were
laid down. They were to cultivate the warlike arts; to keep to their
station in life; to avoid gambling and extravagance; not to join fac
tions; not to engage in trade; and not to nominate heirs without per
mission. In 1633 the rules for military service were made stricter than
those that applied in 1600. For instance a daimyo of 100,000 koku had
(when ordered) to mobilize the following: 350 men with firearms; 60
men with bows; 150 men with spears; 20 men with banners; 170 mounted
men; and 2,150 foot soldiers.
HIDETADA AND IEMITSU 27
It was as part of the policy of keeping the daimyos under control
that in 1635 a new version of the Buke Sho-Hatto, or Rules for the Mili
tary Houses, was issued from Yedo. It was framed in more specific
terms than the original ordinance of 1615. One of its important changes
was a provision making the alternate atendance of feudal lords at the
Shogun's Court compulsory instead of optional.
At about the same time (1634) the organization of the Bakufu was
strengthened by the establishment of elders (Roju and Wakadoshiyori)
and Commissioners ( Bugyo) and by the formation of the Judicial Coun
cil, the Hyojoshu. This was equivalent to the Monchujo in the Kama
kura system. In 1636 its Council Chamber, the Yedo Hyojosho, was
established as a permanent office inside the castle enclosure.
The Bakufu continued to reduce the authority and even the dignity
of the Throne after the death of Ieyasu. In 1627 great offence was given
to the Emperor, Go-Mizunoo, whose powers had already been severely
diminished by the ordinances of 1615. Appointments to the highest
ecclesiastical rank and office had for long been a prerogative of the
Crown, but in 1627 the Kyoto Shoshi-dai, under orders from Yedo, can
celled a number of such appointments and withdrew the Emperors
power to select and nominate candidates for the “purple robe.”
Go-Mizunoo was deeply wounded and threatened to abdicate in
protest, but the Bakufu, far from giving way, deprived some seventy
prelates of their titles and vestments. Go-Mizunoo was helpless, and
on abdicating in 1629 expressed his despair in a verse which may be
translated:
O Land of Reed Plains,
If you must grow rank and wild
Then grow wild at will,
For this world is grown a wilderness,
In which the True Path can no longer be seen.1
This is an interesting political document, recognizing the bitter truth

that the Imperial House was at the mercy of the warlords and that
righteous government was at an end.
Go-Mizunoo was humiliated in several ways. His abdication was
forced, and he can hardly have been happy about the matter of the
1 The translation is kindly furnished by Robert Brower and Earl Miner. The
text is:
Ashihara yo
Shigeraba shigere
Ono ga mama
Totemo michi aru
Yo ni araba koso
28 HIDETADA AND IEMITSU
succession. He had at first intended to name his son by Hidetada's

daughter to succeed him, but when the young man died, he was obliged
to name the Princess Oki-ko, another child of the same marriage, and
she succeeded in 1630 as the Empress Myosho, the first female sovereign
since the Empress Shotoku (d. 770). Thus the Throne was occupied by
a grand-daughter of a Tokugawa Shogun.
It was not, however, the intention of Iemitsu entirely to humiliate
the Court or to deprive the Throne of all prestige, for that would have
offended many loyal subjects, in the military class as well as in the
priesthood. ( Despite their superior power, the leaders of the military
society were anxious to be received at Court, and indeed insistent.)
When he arrived in Kyoto with his great army in 1634, he gave fairly
liberal assistance to the Imperial family and to a number of Court
nobles. He raised the land revenue of the retired Emperor from 7,000
to 10,000 koku, and was lavish in his gifts to the citizens of Kyoto, where
he wished to make a good impression.
From this point on, though, the Throne had no political power, but
only the right to confer Court ranks and the duty to perform the tra
ditional ceremonies throughout the year. Since the Throne was short
of funds, the condition of the nobility was poor. The nobleman of the
highest rank was the head of the Konoye family, and his income was
about 2,000 koku, while most of the other noble families, numbering
about one hundred and thirty, were in a state of indigence and reduced
to earning a livelihood by teaching their respective arts or crafts, such
as painting, calligraphy, music, poetry, and embroidery, or by giving
instruction in deportment. More profitable in the long run was the
marriage of a daughter to a wealthy daimyo.
Further events during the rule of Iemitsu are described in the three
following chapters, which deal with the growth of urban societies; the
persecution of Christians; foreign trade; and the seclusion policy which
by 1640 closed the country to all but a limited quantity of imports and
a handful of Dutch merchants.
C H A P T E R III
THE F E U D A L SOCIETY
1. T he Social Order
T h e s o c i a l s y s t e m of the Tokugawa government was based

upon a rigid division of classes. In principle no man could rise above
the class in which he was born, for it was the purpose of the rulers by
legislating against change to found a self-perpetuating state.
This was by no means a new concept. It was implicit in the policy
of Hideyoshi, who by his Sword Hunt ( a measure of disarmament de
creed in 1588) fixed the separation of the farmer from the soldier; but
in the Tokugawa regime the distinction between classes, though not
strict at first, was most definite by the time of Iemitsu, the third Sho
gun. It was regarded as hereditary and unchangeable.
The four classes were in descending order the Soldier, the Farmer,
the Artisan, and the Trader. Of these the soldiers numbered less than
one-tenth—probably not much more than one-twentieth—of the total
population, and the peasants about eight-tenths. In Japan’s war-ridden
Middle Ages it had been natural that the mass of the people should
have been divided into warriors and producers, but the division went
further back, to the Yoro and Taiho codes of the eighth century, which
adopted Chinese social groupings of a similar nature. A strong feeling
for rank and social status is a marked characteristic of the Japanese
people throughout their history.
There were gradations within each class, so that there was room for
some social movement, though the division between classes was not
easily disregarded. The military class included all members of arms-
bearing families, from the great warlords to the poorest samurai.
Below the military class came first, as we have seen, the cultivators
of soil, a class which included the poor peasant labourer and the well-
to-do farmer. In the peaceful times that followed the fall of Osaka the
peasant was safe in his holding, but his life was hard and he was sub
ject to oppression by a harsh landlord. The attitude of the ruling class
was grimly expressed by an observation attributed to the Tairo Doi
Toshikatsu, who was the greatest man in the land after the Shogun. In
1640 he is said to have visited his estate after an absence of ten years
and, finding the villagers in well-built houses instead of the hovels which
he remembered, to have exclaimed: “These people are too comfort
able. They must be more heavily taxed.”
30 THE FEUDAL SOCIETY
Since the mediaeval economy of Japan was agrarian, the peasant was
the most numerous element in the population and, it might be argued,
the most important. Certainly Japanese history cannot be understood
without some knowledge of the part played by the great rural com
munities of which the workers on the land were the principal members.
The general trend of the policy of the military class was to keep the
peasant on the land, and to prevent him from leaving the particular
fields which he cultivated. The early Tokugawa legislation was not
severe, and it showed some concern for protection of the peasant against
oppressive landlords. An order issued by the Yedo magistrates in 1603
laid it down that a peasant might leave his land if the steward in a
Tokugawa domain, or the landlord of a private domain, should be guilty
of “excessive” conduct. In such cases the peasant must before leaving
make arrangement for the payment of tax due. He was then free to live
where he chose. A second clause in this order prohibited the use of vio
lence by a landlord against a peasant, and ordered that disputes about
tax must be taken to a magistrate s court for settlement.
It is clear that the treatment of peasants tended to grow more se
vere, although some landlords used persuasion rather than force. The
Bakufu took a moderate line. In 1643 an order was issued which con
tained the following interesting clause: “If the punishment inflicted by
a Steward or Daikan [Deputy] is wrongful and unbearable, the peas
ants may leave as soon as their tax payments are completed, and they
may reside in a neighbouring village, where they are to be free from
interference by those officers.” But it is clear that by this time the
orders of the Bakufu did not prevent the ill-treatment of peasants by
harsh landlords. Absconsion of peasants became more and more fre
quent, and we find, for example, in the year 1642 a law (horei) issued
by the daimyo of Okayama which places the responsibility for abscon
sion upon the Five-Man Groups (Gonin-gumi),1 and obliges the village
to cultivate the deserted plots.
Not all absconders were driven by ill-treatment, but most of them
saw prospects of less back-breaking employment in the towns. They
thus created a class of manual labourers or servants, which grew in size
as the peacetime economy expanded, or if they could develop some
special skill they were absorbed into the third social class, that of the
artisans.
The artisans—the workers in various handicrafts—were regarded as
1 Gonin-gumi were groups of citizens or villagers who were entrusted with

keeping the peace in town and country.
THE FEUDAL SOCIETY 31
lower in the social scale than the fanners, but those who possessed spe
cial knowledge and capacity were treated with some respect, particu
larly if their craft was of direct service to the military class. The ar
mourers in general, the swordsmiths in particular, were given special
treatment—well paid and well housed—by the Bakufu and the great
daimyos. The carpenter, too, was high in the scale, and we learn, for
instance, that the chief carpenter in Kyoto in 1698, one Nakai Mondo,
was given a stipend of 500 koku and allowed to wear one sword, thus
being half-way to the status of a samurai. Similar rights were granted
to specialists, such as goldsmiths, silversmiths, artists, clothiers, and
even confectioners who directly served the Shogun’s court.
The ordinary workers were not so fortunate. Those settled in a
castle town usually worked for the daimyo with little salary, in return
for the privilege of an assured market for their goods. Below them
came the journeymen, workers on call for a daily wage. These artisans
formed guilds to protect their interests—one guild for one trade, such
as guilds of carpenters, sawyers, smiths, tilers, masons, plasterers, and
so forth. Their system of apprenticeship was severe, but efficient.
Tradesmen—merchants and shopkeepers—came lowest in the social
scale,2 but as the economy of Japan developed and expanded in times
of peace, merchants in particular were to gain increasing power, until
by the eighteenth century they were able, by their financial strength,
to break down barriers in the social structure which the Tokugawa
Shoguns had erected. By then the rich merchants were employed regu
larly as government contractors, and their services were indispensable
to the members of the military class. Even trade guilds, to which the
government was in principle opposed, were used to collect certain taxes.
It should be added that there were multiple gradations in each class,
from the daimyo down to the lowest rank of samurai; from the rich
farmer down to the day labourer; from the skilled artisan down to the
apprentice; from the rich merchant down to the peddler. All such dis
tinctions were scrupulously observed, precedence and modes of address
at a meeting of village elders, for example, being matters of great con
cern. The complex social hierarchy demanded a strict etiquette in social
relations, which was burdensome but had the merit of encouraging
courteous behaviour.
Although the four classes here described included most of the popu
lation, there were certain persons or groups who did not fit into the
official categories. We have already noticed the floating population of
2 Except for the "hinin," or "not men,” who were outcasts.

manual labourers—the porters, navvies, boatmen, palanquin bearers,

and others who did work requiring strength rather than skill. They
were as a rule men who, like the absconding peasants, had escaped
the obligations of their class either from preference or from necessity.
But a more striking departure from social convention is that of mem
bers of the military class who, through misfortune or through discon
tent, rebelled against the established authority of their day. These were
the masterless samurai known as ronin, figures in feudal history who
deserve special study.
2. T he Ronin
Although the ordinances of the Tokugawa Shoguns placed members

of the military class under strict discipline both in Bakufu service and
in all feudal domains, there was one category which did not respond to
systematic treatment
The process of organizing the feudal state had an unfortunate sequel,
an internal contradiction which was revealed by the problem of the
Ronin, the unemployed samurai. The problem began with the distinc
tion made by Hideyoshi between the soldier and the farmer, a distinc
tion which debarred the soldiers from living in the villages. This was
part of the purpose of Hideyoshis land surveys; for he wanted the
farms to furnish national revenue and not to support a class of local
warrior-landlord who might foment rebellion. A more immediate cause,
however, was the reduction or abolition of the fiefs of Ieyasu’s antago
nists. Since the ronin thus created had as a rule no local attachment,
they raised no urgent problem until after the battle of Sekigahara, be
cause so long as the wars continued they could follow their calling.
But after Sekigahara the problem became acute, since the abolition or
reduction of fiefs and the transfer of daimyos now took place on a large
scale. The number of soldiers expelled, or otherwise deprived of mas
ters and livelihood, is said to have reached 500,000.
This great number is not surprising. In the fifty years from 1601 to
1650 the aggregate revenue from confiscated fiefs amounted to over 12
million koku, which gives an idea of how many daimyos were moved.
The Tokugawa Shoguns had a voracious appetite for land, and they
seized upon most specious excuses for confiscating fiefs, without re
gard for the welfare of their inhabitants. At one time, for instance, they
had refused to recognize the adoption of an heir by a daimyo or hata-
moto in his last years, and thus they were able to exercise the right of
THE FEUDAL SOCIETY 33
confiscation in cases of intestacy. On this account alone some sixty fiefs
with a total revenue of five million koku fell to the Shogun.
By such devices the number of samurai thrown out of employment
was swollen, as is clear from the fact that when, in 1651, the Yedo gov
ernment at last decided that it must take drastic action to reduce the
number of ronin, one of its first steps was to moderate the practice of
escheatment and to recognize the adoption of an heir by a daimyo or a
hatamoto not more than fifty years of age. All previous measures had
been ineffective.
In the early days of the Yedo Bakufu, not long after the fall of
Osaka, the Shogun’s council had already been alarmed by the diffi
culty of controlling the soldiers who, now out of employment, were
restless and inclined to make trouble. About 100,000 men are said to
have fought on the Toyotomi side, and since their casualties are reck
oned at 30,000, there were 70,000 in the Kinai, or Home Provinces,
alone, mostly in Kyoto, all hoping and some praying for more disturb
ance in the state. The number who had fought on the Tokugawa side
was even greater. All these were a constant source of anxiety to the
government, some of whose members favoured a violent policy of re
pression, designed to solve the problem by expelling ronin from the
cities. This ruling was at first applied indiscriminately, but later only
to men who showed no intention of taking service with a new master
or of earning a livelihood in some kind of civil employment.
An interesting example is that of men who had been retainers of
Fukushima Masanori, one of Ieyasu's most trusted generals. He was
stripped of his fief of some 500,000 koku for disobeying an order of
the Shogun. His retainers were thus out of employment, but those of
the highest rank were known to be capable men, and other daimyos
competed for their services. Such cases were not usual, but in general
a vassal taking over a vacated fief would not dismiss all its former samu
rai residents. Thus the real number of unemployed is difficult to esti
mate; but it was sufficient to embarrass the Bakufu, which at first
handled the situation in a clumsy fashion, for as well as ordering expul
sion from the towns, it instructed the daimyos to eject ronin who sought
employment in their fiefs. Similar action was enjoined upon monas
teries and other places where such men had taken refuge for the pur
pose or under pretence of preparing to enter holy orders by a course
of study.
An order of 1623, issued by the Shoshi-dai Itakura, referred espe
cially to ronin living in Kyoto, where they were most numerous. No
tices were to be posted up in the city, warning people not to take such
men into their service. Ronin who had long been settled in the city in
trade or other legitimate occupation, and had a wife and children living
there, need not be expelled. The same rule applied to men in other regu
lar employment, provided that they sought the approval of the city au
thorities. Similar rules were embodied in the Buke Sho-Hatto of 1631
and 1635, and both urban and rural officers throughout the country were
instructed to refuse accommodation to strangers.
To avoid such orders a number of ronin took refuge in the country
side, where they returned to farming, sometimes as hired workers,
sometimes as small holders, in the fief to which they had originally
belonged. There they were usually free from interference so long as
they went unobtrusively about their own business.
Some of the Bakufu s orders were aimed at Christian ronin, who
were among the most intractable. They played a leading part in resist
ance to the anti-Christian policy of the government as it was carried
out in Kyushu. They were known as Amakusa Rdnin or Shimabara
Ronin after the places where they had fought against Bakufu troops
in 1637. Most stubborn among them were the Christian samurai who
had been followers of Hideyoshi’s general, the Christian daimyo Koni-
shi Yukinaga, whose fief was in southern Higo. They were known as
Konishi Ronin.
Despite all the oppressive measures of the Bakufu the number of
ronin was not sensibly reduced. It may even have increased, for cer
tainly the grievances of the majority were not removed. The danger
of uprising was real, as is clear from the large-scale revolt that was
being planned by the ronin under the leadership of Yui Shosetsu, in
the last years of Iemitsu.
C H A P T E R IV
FOREIGN RELATIONS
1. T he Phase o f Expansion
I e y a s u, as we have seen, was enthusiastic in the promotion of for

eign trade, and the first decades of the seventeenth century saw a rapid
expansion of Japanese activity abroad. The Bakufu issued licenses for
the voyages of Japanese merchant vessels under the Shogun’s vermilion
seal, while individual Japanese traders and other adventurers found
their way to most countries in the western Pacific and beyond the Ma
lacca Straits to Burma. The number of licenses issued between 1604 and
1635 was of the order of three hundred, or an average of ten voyages
out and home each year. This was a fairly large number in a period
of very slow transport by sea. In addition to these licensed carriers,
Portuguese and Chinese ships carried both imports and exports, while
the western daimyos, especially Shimazu, Matsuura, Nabeshima, and
Omura, traded in licensed vessels on their own account from time to
time.
The behaviour of some of the licensed ships was almost piratical.
They would attack any ship or place for booty, and they were feared
in all parts of South-East Asia. Several countries protested and pressed
the Japanese government to take measures of control. At the request
of Luzon the visits of the licensed ships were reduced to four a year.
Some writers regard this action as a prelude to the exclusion policy
developed in the 1640’s.
The export cargoes consisted mainly of silver, copper, iron, sulphur,
camphor, rice, and other grains, as well as substantial quantities of
lacquer goods, fans, and similar works of handicraft. In return traders
brought to Japan raw silk (the most important item), silk fabrics of
high quality, cotton, shark skin, deer skin, scented woods, dyes, sugar,
lead, and tin.
There were Japanese settlements in most parts of eastern Asia, from
Formosa and Macao to the Moluccas, the Philippines, Borneo, Celebes
and Java, Siam and the Malay Peninsula. The largest were in Luzon,
Siam, and Indo-China. Many of the settlers were soldiers who could
find no suitable employment at home after the wars. Among them was
one Yamada Nagamasa (d. 1633), who lived in the Siamese capital of
Ayuthia, where he was trusted as an adviser by the King and appointed
36 FOREIGN RELATIONS
to high office. He was able by his military skill to suppress an outbreak
of revolt during a succession dispute.
2. T he Exclusion Policy
This thriving and promising phase of expansion came to a surprising

end upon the issue of certain orders closing the country to foreign trade
and travel with a few strictly limited exceptions. These orders, of 1633,
1635, and 1639, are often loosely described as the three Exclusion De
crees. This is not quite accurate, since in form they were not public
notices but letters of instruction to provincial officers directing them
how to carry out the policy of the central government.
It is of especial interest to examine and compare the contents of
these documents, since they show the gradual development of a policy
of almost complete isolation—an historical phenomenon which, while
simple in appearance, is by no means easily explained. They are akin
to the anti-Christian orders issued by Ieyasu in the years 1611-14, but
they are much more drastic and much wider in scope.
The order of 1633 is in the form of a memorandum addressed to the
two Governors of Nagasaki by the Roju Sakai Tadakatsu and three
other high officers of the Bakufu. Its main provisions ( there are seven
teen articles in all) are as follows:
1. It is strictly forbidden for any vessel without a valid license to

leave Japan for a foreign country.
2. No Japanese subject may leave for a foreign country in any ves
sel without a valid license.
3. Japanese subjects who have resided abroad shall be put to death
if they return to Japan. Exception is made for those who have
resided abroad for less than five years and have been unavoid
ably detained. They shall be exempt from punishment, but if
they attempt to go abroad again they are to be put to death.
The remaining articles deal principally with the search for Christian
converts and for missionaries already in hiding in Japan or being
smuggled in at Japanese ports. The treatment of foreign vessels apply
ing for entry is to be decided by reference to Yedo.
The order of 1635 is also addressed to the two Governors of Naga
saki. It contains seventeen articles, which resemble those of the 1633
order, but are stated in somewhat more specific terms. Thus Japanese
ships are strictly forbidden to make voyages abroad; Japanese subjects
may not go abroad, and those who are found secretly taking passage
FOREIGN RELATIONS 37
will be put to death, the ship concerned, with its master, to be held
pending reference to Yedo. The remaining articles deal chiefly with
the search for Christians and with the treatment of cargo. The last
article deals with the handling of consignments of raw silk from China.
This was the most valuable single item of import trade, and the order
provides that the Bakufu, or more specifically the Shogun, should enjoy
a monopoly of the sale of all raw silk. A further provision of interest
(Article 14) lays down rules for the treatment of foreign vessels enter
ing Japanese ports, and grants some special privilege to Portuguese and
Chinese vessels.
An order of 1636 ( not counted separately in our designation of three
orders) is substantially the same as that of 1635, except for three clauses
dealing with the children and grandchildren of foreigners by Japanese
mothers. By another notice of the same year all foreign residents were
ordered to move to Deshima, at the head of Nagasaki Bay, where lodg
ings had been prepared for them. This applied at first only to a few
Portuguese, who were expelled from Japan not long afterwards (1638).
Later Deshima was to become the permanent home of all Dutch resi
dents in Japan, who moved there from Hirado in 1641. They were
confined to a restricted area, and their families were obliged to leave
the country.
These documentary orders of 1633-36 together completed the isola
tion of Japan, except for an indirect contact with the outside world
through Chinese, Portuguese, and Dutch ships entering only designated
ports and subject to rigorous inspection and control. It will be seen that
most of the prohibitions are related to the anti-Christian policy as it had
developed since the death of Ieyasu, and it should be noted that in addi
tion to these orders issued to officials in Bakufu domains a clause in the
Buke Sho-Hatto of 1635 requires all daimyos strictly to forbid the prac
tice of Christianity in their fiefs.
The third and final measure in the exclusion policy, taken in 1639,
seems to have been stimulated by a rising in Kyushu in 1637-38 which
was regarded by the Bakufu as a revolt of Japanese Christians. This
was the Shimabara Revolt, in which an army of peasants from the island
of Amakusa and the near-by Shimabara peninsula held out for several
weeks against a powerful force mobilized by western barons at the
order of the Yedo government. The slaughter was dreadful. The in
surgents were for the most part poor country people, but they were
joined by a number of disaffected samurai and led by some soldiers
who had fought under Christian generals in the civil wars. Their total
number is usually given as 37,000 and it is said that only a hundred or
so escaped. These figures have been challenged, and it is probable that
the number of combatants on the rebel side was not more than 20,000.
The government forces are put at about 100,000, and their casualties
must have amounted to 10,000 or more. They appear to have fought
without much courage or skill, and they were not competently led.
Their failure to achieve an easy victory seems to indicate a decline in
the military spirit during the two decades after the siege of Osaka.
The revolt was not primarily a religious uprising, but a desperate
protest against the oppressive rule of feudal lords in a remote and back
ward region. Yet there can be no doubt that many of the insurgents
were inspired to feats of courage by the Christian faith of their leaders.
Their banners were inscribed with the names of saints and with such
legends as “Praise to the Blessed Sacrament.” Whatever its true nature,
this rebellion led to the end of overt Christian worship in Japan. It
doubtless hastened and redoubled the efforts of the authorities to track
down believers and to hunt out missionaries; and it must have strength
ened the trend towards exclusion which was already apparent in the
orders of 1633 and 1635.
The final exclusion order of 1639 was issued over the signatures of
the seven senior councillors. It states that in view of the continued
arrival of foreign priests and their teaching of the forbidden Christian
faith, the formation of leagues plotting against the government ( a capi
tal offence), and the fact that prohibited articles from abroad can be
sent to priests in hiding and their converts, no galliot ( Portuguese ves
sel) shall from now on be admitted to a Japanese port Should this
order be disobeyed the offending vessel will be destroyed and its crew
and passengers put to death. The substance of these orders is to be
communicated to Chinese and Dutch vessels arriving at a Japanese
port, with a promise of rewards for information regarding persons ille
gally entering the country.
In spite of this unqualified ban a Portuguese vessel entered Naga
saki Bay in July 1640. The 1639 expulsion had struck a serious blow
at the Macao trade, and the Senate of the island had decided to take
the great risk of sending a mission to Japan begging the government
there to reconsider its policy. But no sooner had the vessel arrived than
it was dismantled, and its crew and passengers taken into custody pend
ing the receipt of instructions from Yedo. Early in August the reply
came. I t was communicated to the Portuguese envoys in a solemn and
ceremonial manner. Accused of defying the laws of Japan, the envoys
replied that they were not a trade mission and had brought no cargo but
only a diplomatic memorial to the Japanese government. The Japanese
Commissioners then ordered the sentence to be read to them. It was a
sentence of death for disobeying a decree of the Shogun which had been
pronounced for the purpose of putting an end to Christianity in Japan.
Early next morning the envoys, bound and imprisoned, were offered
their lives if they would renounce the Christian faith. They all refused,
and were thereupon taken to the execution ground, where fifty-seven
of their number were decapitated. The remaining thirteen were spared,
so that they should carry a report of the punishment to Macao. Their
ship was burned.
Evidently the exclusion policy of which this drastic action was a clear
display was in some way connected with fear of foreign aggression; yet
the texts of the relevant exclusion orders all seem to indicate that their
main purpose is the destruction of Christianity in Japan. This view,
however, is not easy to reconcile with the condition of Christian evan
gelism in 1635-39, the years dining which the orders were issued. It is
therefore worth while to examine the development of anti-Christian
policy in Japan from the early days of Ieyasu’s government with a view
to understanding its motives.
3. T he Anti-Christian M ovement
It will be remembered that the first anti-Christian proi*>uncement
was made in 1611; this was a notice instructing officials to take steps
against converts. It was followed in 1612 by an order to Hasegawa
Fujihiro (Sahyoe), Governor of Nagasaki from 1606 to 1614, to punish
certain specified offenders. Then came a long decree in June 1613, ad
dressed to all monasteries and shrines, calling upon them to beware of
the Evil Sects, which were Christianity and a certain unorthodox branch
of the Nichiren or Lotus Sect. Finally in January 1614 the monk Suden
presented a memorial in which he described the evils of Christian belief
and the harm done by its teaching to the native religious tradition. This
document, in which a certain Confucian flavour can be detected, called
for the expulsion of foreign missionaries. It was approved by Hidetada
under his vermilion seal, and thus became the law.
It must be said that Ieyasu was quite patient with the foreign mis
sionaries until 1612, and even then his action was relatively mild. He
would not allow his officers, the members of the military class, to be
come Christians, but he did not interfere with the beliefs of the classes
beneath them—the farmers, craftsmen, and traders. It is true that in
1613 twenty-seven Japanese evangelists and catechists were executed;
but this was punishment for a deliberate breach of the law in the Sho
gun’s capital by a Spanish missionary named Sotelho, who in 1612 built
a chapel in Yedo and publicly celebrated mass. Sotelho was condemned

to death, but the sentence was not carried out
In 1614, however, the ban on Christianity was stated in positive
terms.1 At this time Ieyasu was willing to expel the Jesuits and other
missionaries, especially since he could now rely upon Dutch and Eng
lish traders, who were not subject to missionary pressure. Most of the
missionaries now left, but a few remained in hiding and others returned
to Japan secretly. It is known that there were several Fathers in the
castle at Osaka during the siege. Yet despite this flouting of the edicts
no foreign priest was punished by death during Ieyasu s lifetime. There
is indeed good reason to suppose that Ieyasu, preoccupied as he was
with the coming trial of strength at Osaka, was not much perturbed by
the Christian propaganda in Japan. The decrees issued dining his life
time do not bear the marks of his authorship, and those of 1613 and 1614
were thought by the Jesuits and by the resident English traders to be
the work of Hasegawa, the Governor of Nagasaki, who was bitterly
anti-foreign and responsible for cruel persecution of Christians in the
Arima fief, which he secured by mean trickery in 1614.
Ieyasu was a man of broad mind and calm judgment. He was more
interested in the expansion of trade than in the punishment of mission
aries. It was not until after his death that stringent action was taken
against Christians in Japan. A new edict was issued in October 1616 by
the Roju. It was addressed to all daimyos and ordered them to prevent
all their people, down to the farmers, from adopting the Christian faith.
Also in 1616, shortly after Ieyasu’s death, certain restrictions were placed
on the voyages of Japanese vessels licensed under the vermilion seal.
They were to obtain a special approval from the Roju.
This measure was the first step in a policy of seclusion which was
presently to be rigorously enforced by the Tokugawa Bakufu. In the
same year all foreign vessels, except Chinese, were forbidden to enter
any ports other than Hirado and Nagasaki. The anti-Christian move
ment, however, still had not reached its height, and at about this time
two Jesuit Fathers, de Angelis in 1618 and Carvalho in 1620, travelled
to Yezo and visited newly discovered gold mines. They said mass in
settlements of miners brought there from the mainland by a “gold rush”
of some 50,000 men a year.* In the years from 1618 to 1621 a large12
1 In 1606 there were about 120 Jesuits (6 6 Fathers and 56 Brothers) and some
30 members of Franciscan and other orders. The total number remaining or return
ing after the edict of 1614 is put at 47, and more were smuggled in from time to
time.
2 See H. Cieslik, H oppd Tankenki (Tokyo, 1 9 62).
number of Japanese Christians, both priests and converts, were exe
cuted in Kyoto and Nagasaki—over fifty in 1619—but no foreign Chris
tian was done to death until 1622, which was the year styled in the re
ports of the missions the year of the Great Martyrdom. At this time
thirty Christians were beheaded and twenty-five burned at the stake.
Of the latter, nine were foreign priests, the first to suffer the death pen
alty in Japan.
The tragic scene was described by an eyewitness, the English trader
Richard Cocks, a man who had no liking for the “papistical” mission
aries. He wrote: “I saw fifty-five of them martyred at one time at Mi-
yako. Among them were little children of five or six years, burned alive
in the arms of their mothers, who cried ‘Jesus, receive their souls!’ There
are many in prison who hourly await death, for very few return to their
idolatry.” No wonder that Cocks called the government of Japan “the
greatest and the most puissant tyranny the world has ever known.”*
In 1624 a number of missionaries from Luzon were allowed entry,
but Hidetada refused to approve the requests of an official mission from
the Philippines seeking for privileges for Spanish evangelists and trad
ers. In 1625 he forbade Spanish subjects to reside in Japan for pur
poses of trade, though he did not prohibit trade as such. His order did
not, however, prevent the smuggling of missionaries into Japan, and
at a somewhat later date Matsukura Shigemasa actually proposed an
expedition to destroy what he described as the missionary base in Luzon.
This may have been only a specious excuse for buccaneering voy
ages, but it is evident that some Bakufu officials were moved by a
genuine fear of the influence of Christian doctrine. It is true that most
of the converts were poor country people, but there were also among
them many samurai and city dwellers. Converts of every kind were
subjected to such fierce oppression that in the towns all the Christians
seem either to have recanted or to have vanished into obscurity. But
the countryfolk clung to their faith and disobeyed the edicts, meaning
to resist at the cost of their lives. The Bakufu resorted to cruel persecu
tion, seeking out believers in the remotest comers of the poorest prov
inces and subjecting them to torture. Yet while some recanted, many
withstood the agony inflicted upon them by ruthless pursuers. In some
parts of Kyushu the peasants formed leagues to prolong their revolt,
especially in poor regions where religious fervour was strongest.
* The total number of Christians executed in Japan between 1613 and 1626 is
given in missionary reports as about 750; and of course thousands more must have
suffered and died from imprisonment or exile and destitution.
By 1625 the persecution had reached its peak, and Christianity had
been either eradicated or driven underground in most parts of Japan,
though there were sporadic revivals and martyrdoms for two or three
decades more. In some places the peasants continued to worship in
secret, encouraged by missionaries in hiding.
In 1640 a board of enquiry was established in Yedo—a kind of
Inquisition—called Shumon-Aratame, the Examination of Sects. In 1664
all daimyos of 10,000 koku and above were ordered to establish a similar
office. The test of trampling on the Cross (fumie) was introduced. In
order to trace the religious beliefs of the people all monasteries and
chapels were ordered to keep a register of persons resident in their
parish, with particulars of birth, death, marriage, travel, occupation,
and so forth. Thus the Buddhist clergy were called upon to act as police
agents for the Bakufu in the pursuit of Christians.
It will be noticed that documents of 1633-39 clearly state that the

purpose of the exclusion edicts was the suppression of Christianity in
Japan. Since the teachings of the missionaries were incompatible with
the feudal principles upon which the power of the Bakufu was based,
the persecution of the priests and their converts, though morally evil,
might be defended on political grounds; but it could scarcely be argued
that it was necessary to close the country altogether in order to keep
out the influence of a foreign religion.
Evidently there are some anomalies here. In the first place, the
exclusion policy was not thoroughgoing, since it made exceptions for
China and Holland, in fact for any country that did not send Christian
missionaries to Japan. The Dutch, anxious to capture the Japan trade,
had been at pains to warn the Japanese against the Portuguese and the
Spanish, whom they accused of planning to seize Japanese territory or
at least to use force against Japan. The English traders would not have
been excluded, but they had already left Hirado (the centre of their
activities) in 1623, before the exclusion orders. Thus the effect desired
by the Bakufu could have been secured by the existing ban upon the
entry of Portuguese or Spanish persons, whether traders or missionaries.
The Spanish had been denied entry after 1624. And, as mentioned,
all foreign residents were ordered in 1636 to move to Deshima at the
head of Nagasaki Bay, where lodging was prepared for them. This
applied only to a few Portuguese, who were expelled from the country
in 1638, following the Shimabara rising. Moreover, by the time of the
third and final exclusion order of 1639, Christianity had been all but
entirely stamped out, and it would have been possible to prevent the
entry of missionaries by a systematic control at the ports. This, how
ever, would have required the collaboration of the daimyos in whose
territory the ports were situated; and here we have a further clue to
the policy of the Bakufu.
The Tozama daimyos in western Japan and Kyushu profited by
foreign trade, and if they were allowed to continue their trading they
might easily grow strong enough to endanger the primacy of the Bakufu
and even bold enough to call upon Portuguese or Spanish assistance.
The only way of preventing such rivalry was to prohibit all foreign
trade at ports other than Nagasaki, which was under the direct juris
diction of the Bakufu. In this way the Bakufu obtained not only a
control of foreign trade but also a monopoly of its profits; and whatever
other result was expected from the exclusion policy, it is quite clear
that this is exactly what the Shogun had been aiming at since Ieyasu’s
day. In retrospect it becomes evident that Tokugawa policy was directed
to creating a dictatorship, an authoritarian state, exercising full control
over all aspects of the national life, economic as well as social and moral.
Was the Bakufu’s fear of Christian propaganda genuine, or was it
a pretence by which the exclusion policy was justified? The number
of Japanese Christians, probably of the order of 300,000 before the great
persecutions, may have fallen by death and apostasy to far less than
100,000 men and women who practised their devotions in concealment
It is hard to believe that a man of the stature of Ieyasu would have been
deterred from his policy of expansion by fear of the influence of so small
and weak a community as the scattered Christians after 1625. But
neither Hidetada nor Iemitsu was cast in the heroic mould, and it is
probable that they and their advisers genuinely feared foreign aggres
sion. They were not men to take a great risk. They had no trust in the
loyalty of the Outside Lords, and what they had heard of the activities
of European states did not encourage them to join in the struggle for
territories and trade which was disturbing the Pacific Ocean.
There is an illuminating passage in a report of Fran§ois Caron, the
head of the Dutch trading station in Japan, who had given some lessons
in world geography to Iemitsu. Writing in 1641, Caron says that “after
investigating the size of the world, the multitude of its countries and
the smallness of Japan . . . he [Iemitsu] was greatly surprised and
heartily wished that his land had never been visited by any Christian.”4*
* This and other interesting data on the geographical conceptions of the Japa
nese at that time are to be found in C. R. Boxer’s Jan C om pagn ie in Japan. The
Japanese learned a great deal about navigation from the Dutch, and before the ex
clusion orders Dutch pilots were frequently carried by ships licensed under the Sho
gun’s vermilion seal.
Reflecting upon the history of the persecution of Christians in Japan

one cannot avoid the question of cruelty. The descriptions of torture
to which the converts were subjected are heart-rending, and evoke a
detestation of the very memory of those who ordered such atrocities.
It appears at first sight that religion calls forth bitter hatreds compared
with which secular animosities are almost gentle. In Japan, men, women,
and children died after agonies prolonged with a fiendish ingenuity
that, it seems, could not be matched elsewhere.® But the record of the
Christian Church in mediaeval Europe is no less sickening. It even gains
an increment of horror from the fact that the pain of the victims was
enjoyed. We learn of Savonarola that he suffered “many and assiduous
tortures” for many days; and that the Albigensian crusaders burned
“innumerable heretics with immense joy—[cum ingenti gaudio].”
It should be noted that the persecution of Christians in Japan was
not primarily of religious origin. It was not proposed by the Buddhist
Church nor did the Buddhist clergy play an important part in it. The
antagonism of the ruling class to Christianity was mainly political. So
cially, Christianity was inconsistent with the feudal hierarchy, and ethi
cally it was opposed to the code of the warrior class. It was the faith of
potential enemies of Japan.
But it is unlikely that fear of Christianity was the compelling reason
for the seclusion policy. There is interesting evidence on this point in
an account by a Ming scholar, Huang Tsung-hsi, of his visit to Japan
in about 1646, when he sought to obtain help for resistance against the
Manchus. He discusses the Japanese seclusion policy and agrees that
fear of Christianity and of Europeans was a motive, but says that the
underlying reason was the determination of the Tokugawa to secure
internal peace and prosperity, and to avoid any foreign involvement
likely to jeopardize those aims.
The lengths to which the Bakufu went in enforcing this policy seem
to confirm Huang’s view. The measures they took were typical of Con-
fucian China, which was always isolationist and preoccupied with inter
nal security, and especially typical of Ming China, which dismantled
its navy, closed its ports, and restricted trade to stations where it could
be closely regulated.®
One point which is often overlooked in considering the seclusion
8 In some cases, it is said, the executioners were ordered or bribed to finish off
tbe victim without such preliminaries.
8 The substance of these two paragraphs was kindly furnished by Professor
Theodore de Bary. Huang was a scholar, and also a great patriot. Receiving no
encouragement from Japan, he returned to China to take part in guerilla activities.
policy is the nature of Japan’s foreign trade in the seventeenth century.
The Portuguese, Dutch, and English vessels entering Japanese ports
did not carry Western goods, but articles from other parts of Asia,
principally China. When trade was limited to one port, Nagasaki, Japan
was not deprived of any essential articles, since these could still be
brought in by Dutch and English vessels and also by Chinese vessels
as before. Trade between China and Japan was not interrupted by the
Tokugawa Bakufu, although certain articles were at times excluded.
CHAPTER V
THE G O V E R N M E N T OF THE FIEFS
1. Fudai and Tozam a Daimyos
T h e c e n t r a l i z e d feudal government, developed during the

process of national unification begun by Nobunaga and completed by
Ieyasu, rested upon the overlordship of all land in the country exercised
by the Tokugawa Shogun. Every daimyo was subject to the power of
the Shogun. He could be deprived of his fief or obliged to exchange it
for another fief, and in principle he was bound to govern his fief in
accordance with the laws and orders of the Shogun.
In practice there were two classes of daimyo, distinguished by a
difference of origin and of treatment by the Bakufu. These have already
been described in Chapter I as the Fudai, hereditary vassals of Ieyasu
and his successors, and the Tozama, lords of great domains inherited
from their ancestors and not granted them by the Tokugawa family.
Let us now consider the situation in more detail.
Although the most trusted and in some ways the most protected of
all daimyos, the Fudai were not well treated, being frequently moved
about, while others were free. The practice was a bad one, since by
changing a ruler’s province (kunigae), the Bakufu deprived him of the
opportunity to get well acquainted with his people, and his fief was
therefore unlikely to be well governed, while the cost of moving was a
burden.
As the name suggests, the Tozama, or Outside Lords, were not
within the sphere of Ieyasu’s direct control during the years when he
was building up his power to the point which it reached after Seki-
gahara. They had been adherents of Hideyoshi, but after the destruction
of the Toyotomi family they had no national leader to follow, and were
therefore obliged to accept, however reluctantly, the dominance of the
Tokugawa family. They were potential enemies, and had to be care
fully watched; but Ieyasu treated them generously, rewarding them with
more land than they could have expected from Hideyoshi. He reserved
for himself and Fudai vassals the greater part of the Kanto (the eight
eastern provinces) and the whole of Kinai, or Home Provinces, with
Kyoto and Osaka. The Tozama were for the most part traditionally
strong in the remoter provinces, chief among them being such barons as
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FIEFS 47
Dat6 in the North, and Nabeshima and Shimazu in Kyushu.1 The
Fudai daimyos were placed mainly at points where they could, if
required, hamper any hostile movements that the Tozama daimyos,
either singly or in combination, might make.
The Bakufu, having made its strategic dispositions, gradually in
creased its pressure upon the Outside Lords, and their subjection was
completed by the measures already described—the Buke Sho-Hatto and
the rule of alternate attendance, or Sanldn Kotai. By this rule, it will be
remembered, all daimyos were compelled to spend four months of every
other year in attendance at Yedo, returning to their fiefs in the interval
but leaving their wives and families behind as hostages. The rule applied
to Fudai and Tozama alike, but in the case of the former obedience to it
may be regarded as an expression of loyalty, and in the case of the latter
as an act of submission. The practice began soon after 1615, but, as we
have seen, it was made a definite obligation from 1635. It was a burden
some duty involving the daimyos in double expenditure; and in some
cases of hardship exceptions were made.
The success of the methods by which the Bakufu imposed its author
ity becomes clear if one compares the somewhat cautious approach of
Ieyasu just after Sekigahara to the attitude expressed in a speech said
to have been addressed to the Tozama by Iemitsu upon his installation
as the third Shogun in 1623. He is reported to have used these words:
“My ancestor and his son regarded you as equals, and you have had
special privileges. But now I am the Shogun by right of succession, and
you will henceforward be treated as hereditary vassals [Fudai]. If you
do not like this, go back to your fiefs, and make up your minds. Then,
as tradition dictates, the clash of arms shall decide who is to be supreme
in the country.” This may not be true, but it is consistent with the firm
attitude taken by the Bakufu at that time.
1 The general position of Fudai in relation to Tozama was as follows:

1. Along the TokaidO, the main road from Kyoto to the eastern provinces, was
a string of Fudai vassals to Suruga and westward, protecting Kyoto, Osaka, and the
Kinai from attack.
2. In the North (Mutsu and D ew a), Tozama such as Dat6, Gamo, Uyesugi,
and Satake were screened by Tokugawa supporters in Mito, Utsunomiya, and the
like, thus protecting the Kanto from attack from the North.
3. Northwest from the Tokaido lay the powerful Maeda, holding Kaga', Echi-
zen, and Noto. To guard against incursions by him into the Eastern seaboard region
or the Kinai, Yuki Hideyasu was placed at Fukui and Matsudaira Tadateru at Takata.
4. In the central provinces (Chugoku) were placed Fukushima, Mori, Ikeda,
Asano, and others, protecting the Kinai against attack from the West.
5. In Kyushu the great barons were as far as possible separated from one an
other by daimyos friendly to the Bakufu. Before Ieyasu’s rule there had been no
Fudai in Kyushu.
48 THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FIEFS
The total assessed revenue of all daimyos midway in the seventeenth

century was approximately 19 million koku, or seven-tenths of the total
national assessment of 27 million koku. In the first decades of the Yedo
Bakufu, there were some 200 fiefs. The number was under 200 in 1614,
but rose subsequently. The distribution of revenue among the daimyos
fluctuated as fiefs were escheated or restored, but on a basis of 200 fiefs
the proportion was of the order of 50 with revenues of 100,000 koku
and over, to 150 with revenues of from 50,000 koku to 100,000 koku.
In return for their fiefs the daimyos had certain obligations to the
Bakufu, since in principle each fief was a grant which might be with
drawn, reduced, or exchanged. At a change of Shogun all vassals were
obliged to submit an inventory of their holdings and to renew their
oath of loyalty by swearing to observe the Buke Sho-Hatto. Their tenure
was then confirmed by a document under the vermilion seal. They were
committed to render specified military service, and they were also liable
to certain emergency services, such as contributing labour and materials
to the building of castles and other undertakings. Finally, they were
obliged to observe the rule of alternate attendance.
Apart from these obligations the daimyo was at liberty to govern
his fief at will, except when Bakufu interests were directly concerned,
or when there was a gross breach of the principles laid down in the
Buke Sho-Hatto and other fundamental documents. It is true that the
1635 version of the Buke Sho-Hatto established the rule that “in all
matters the laws of Yedo must be observed and applied at all places in
all provinces”; but in practice most of the daimyos issued laws and
regulations suitable to conditions in their own domains, and acted
as independent rulers. Admittedly, the Tozama daimyos were given
greater freedom than the Fudai, the Bakufu being generally reluctant
to interfere in Tozama affairs once the great “crushing” (toritsubushi)
which ended in Iemitsu’s day had taken place. Nevertheless, it can still
be said that the internal government of each fief, whether Fudai or
Tozama, was as a rule left to the daimyo. Oppressive government was
frowned upon but not punished as such; it was only in extreme cases
of bad government which might lead to dangerous quarrels within a
fief, or grave suspicion of disloyalty, that Yedo intervened.
The political intelligence system of the Bakufu was efficient. Intelli
gence officers (Metsuke) visited, and at times resided in, Tozama fiefs,
giving advice to the daimyo and information to Yedo. As for the Fudai
daimyos, it was not difficult for the Bakufu to ensure that they governed
their fiefs competently, since punishment for misbehaviour could be
prompt and severe, including either transfer to a less desirable fief or
plain dismissal. Such treatment could not be applied to Tozama dai-
myos, whose fiefs were usually distant from Yedo and who might resist
the Shogun by force if he pressed too hard. They could in most cases
have been overcome without great difficulty, but the mere fact of open
revolt would damage the Shogun’s prestige. It was easier to keep the
Tozama in order by such indirect methods as imposing costly tasks
upon them. The Tozama daimyos for their part were generally careful
to avoid action likely to offend the Tokugawa family. Those who were
ruling their fiefs during Ieyasu’s lifetime seem to have had friendly
feelings towards him, for Dat6, Maeda, and Shimazu were in tears by
his bedside during his last hours.
2. T he Internal Administration o f the F iefs

The inauguration of an era of peace in a society dominated by a
warrior class presented to its leaders a number of contradictions not
easily resolved. If the feudal character of that society was to be pre
served, the Shogun must be able to ensure the loyalty of his vassals while
granting them a large measure of autonomy. He must have overwhelm
ing strength at his command, but he must be careful not to get into a
situation where he has to use it, for that might wreck the whole struc
ture so patiently erected; and therefore he was obliged to aim in prac
tice at maintaining an apparent balance of power. There might be a
threat in the background, but it was concealed once Iemitsu had made
his gesture by marching a great army to Kyoto for purposes of demon
stration.
Consequently the autonomy enjoyed by most daimyos was consid
erable. Each had full control over the people in his domain, who had
to obey his laws and pay the taxes which he imposed. It is difficult to
define more exactly the powers and functions of a daimyo, since they
varied from place to place and from time to time; but his chief duties
were to develop the economic resources of his fief, to keep order among
its people, and to be prepared on call from the Shogun to mobilize an
armed force.
The daimyos task was not simple, for it usually involved reconciling
varied interests within a wide area. Each daimyo, whether Fudai or
Tozama, possessed and governed his domain. His retainers (and by
this term only the warrior class is intended) received from him either
land or rice. Those who received land were known as chigyo-tori (re
cipients of land revenue), and those who received rice as kuramai-tori

(recipients of rice from the daimyo's storehouse).
The chigyo-tori, who consisted of the upper class of family retainers,
received land ( and control of the peasants) from the total holding of
the daimyo, and this was known as kyuchi, or granted land. Granted
land was not necessarily all in one locality. It was often composed of
scattered lots, in respect of which the grantee could impose tax and
labour service upon the farmers. From all such lands the tax rice was
collected by the daimyo’s officers and made over to the respective
grantees; and the dimensions of the grant were expressed not in meas
urements of area but in terms of bushels of rice—the kokudaka.
The kuramai-tori, a lower level of retainers, received a fixed amount
of rice from land under the direct control of the daimyo, such land be
ing commonly described as kurairi-chi (storehouse land), because its
product went direct to the daimyo’s storehouses. Samurai of lower rank
received a small allowance of rice from this source, the land under the
daimyo’s direct control, and were usually referred to as fuchimai-tori,
a term which means stipendiaries. There were several social grades
among the warrior class, its members being distinguished by the amount
of their allowances or stipends.
The proportions of the cultivated area reserved for these two types
of tenantry varied from fief to fief, but the following table may be re
garded as showing a normal range:*
Kurairi-chi Kv&chl (under KyGchi (at per
(under dtdmyo’e retainer^ centage of total
Date Fief control) control) cultivated area)
1 625 H agi 3 7 0 ,0 0 0 koku 2 8 0 ,0 0 0 koku 41%
1631 Om ura 4 2 ,0 0 0 1 9 ,0 0 0 31
1632 Ow ari 1 5 0 ,0 0 0 4 5 0 ,0 0 0 75
1643 M ito 1 8 0 ,0 0 0 1 8 0 ,0 0 0 50
As a rule, the land held by the upper class of retainers ( “kashin,”

relatives of the daimyo) represented a smaller part of the total area
available for cultivation than that allotted for furnishing stipends to
the kuramai-tori, who were generally far more numerous than the
holders of granted land. For example, in the Hagi fief cited in the
table above, there were in 1625 a total of 1,764 grantees as against
4,465 stipendiaries.*
This division of a fief into two classes of tenantry naturally raised
* Based on figures given in an article by Fujino Tamotsu in Shigaku Zasshl,

Vol. LX V , No. 6.
* Miwa on the Hagi fief, K eizaishi Kenkyu, VoL XU , No. 3.
questions of jurisdiction. The holders of land by subinfeudation were
free, within reasonable limits, to administer their land according to their
own ideas. They could decide what crops were to be grown, and what
tax in kind should be collected from the peasants. They could also con
script labour for such work as clearing ground, cutting channels, or
sweeping snow. They could, and often did, punish delay in payment
of tax by torture or other harsh treatment, for which the peasant had
no redress.
It was the tendency—though rarely on humanitarian grounds—for
the daimyo to reduce the area of land grants and increase the number
of stipendiaries. This was a natural trend, since every acre of granted
land reduced pro tanto the power of the daimyo. The process was not
rapid, but changes were carried out in most fiefs between 1640 and
1660. An illuminating example is a reform of the system of subinfeuda
tion introduced in the domains of the Kishu clan in 1646. It ended in
an arrangement by which, although the grantee retained direct control
of the farmers on his land, the rate of tax was fixed by the daimyo, and
punishment for offences was not left to the grantee but made the re
sponsibility of a magistrate appointed by the daimyo. Further, the
grantee was forbidden to reside in the farm area, except in special cases.
The reform (if it may be so styled) of the subinfeudation system
was carried out in other fiefs at about the same time. Of special note
are those in Mito and Owari, which not only had particularly large
areas of granted land (see the table above), but were held by mem
bers of the Tokugawa family and therefore came under the direct no
tice of the Bakufu.
The purpose of this so-called reform of the system of subinfeuda
tion ( it is known as “chigydsei no kaikaku,” or “reform of the land rev
enue system”) was to reduce the area cultivated by grantees, so that
they should not, by remaining on the land, create a class of small landed
gentry in close touch with the peasants. This was a revival of the fear
of the jizamurai or dogo (yeoman farmers) which had moved Hide-
yoshi to order his Sword Hunt. But in many cases the grantees did
remain on the land and cultivated the fields themselves, this type of
arrangement being called tedzukuri, or real digging ( in contrast to ko-
saku, or tenant farming). In 1653, however, the Bakufu issued an order
to all daimyos, instructing a general reorganization similar to that in
troduced in the Kishu domains in 1646: grantees were to live in the
castle town and become stipendiaries, receiving the amount of rice for
which the land was assessed—so many koku less a fixed percentage for
tax. Most daimyos had put this order into effect by 1660.
All such “reforms” resulted in strengthening the authority of the

daimyo and reducing the danger of local uprisings. It will be noticed
in this context that the great revolt planned by the ronin in 1651, under
the leadership of Yui Shosetsu, was of urban and not rural origin,
although it is true that the rising was a protest against conditions
caused by an increase in the number of unemployed soldiers. Men
taken from the land to live in a castle town were likely to get restless.
The foregoing description of the fiefs should be supplemented by

some particulars of the administration of the Tokugawa domains, the
so-called Tenryo, a high-sounding name which might be translated as
“celestial estates.”
The government of towns in Tokugawa domains (including the
capital city) was in the hands of the machi-bugyo, city commissioners
appointed by the Bakufu. The Tokugawa lands were administered by
the officials known as “gundai” or “daikan” (deputies). The gundai,
of whom there were four, had charge of lands assessed at 10,000 koku
or more. The daikan, of whom there were from forty to fifty, had con
trol of lands assessed at from 5,000 to 10,000 koku. They may be re
garded as a sort of inferior daimyo, and in fact where their area was
assessed at 10,000 koku they were equal to daimyos, living in castles
and in other ways enjoying the rights of a feudal lord, although they
received fixed salaries and were paid officials. Originally they were
appointed for their knowledge of local conditions and were not neces
sarily members of the military class. Ieyasu gave such posts not only
to Fudai vassals but also to certain rich merchants, and even to big
farmers like Ina and Hikozaka, who figure prominently in the history
of Tokugawa fiefs.*
* Ina Tadatsugu, who has already been mentioned as one of Ieyasu’s trusted
assistants, came from a warrior family in Mikawa. He was rewarded for valuable
services to Ieyasu by the post of Kanto Gundai, which gave him control of the eight
eastern provinces on behalf of the Shogun. He was at the same time Daikan in the
province of Kai, and was thus in charge of Tokugawa domains assessed at one mil
lion koku. Ieyasu owed him a special debt for his handling of the transport of sup
plies in the Sekigahara campaign.
C H A P T E R VI
IETS UN A, SHOGUN 1651-80
1. The New Bakufu
T h e t h i r d Shogun, Iemitsu, died in 1651, and his place was taken

by Ietsuna, his son by a secondary wife. The boy was a minor, and the
task of guiding the nation through a transition from military to civil
principles in the conduct of its affairs fell to the high officers of the
Bakufu. At that time there were two Tairo, Sakai Tadakatsu and Hotta
Masamori, and three Rdju, chief of whom was Matsudaira Nobutsuna.
To these, in accordance with Iemitsu's directions, there was added Ho-
shina Masayuki, a Tokugawa and the half-brother of Iemitsu, a man of
recognized gifts and strong character.
Tadakatsu was growing old, and was therefore not well suited to
head the government in a difficult situation. Hotta, a younger man,
might have filled the office of Tair6 with success, but he was one of
several retainers chosen by Iemitsu to follow their overlord in death,
according to the barbarous custom known as “junshi.”1 Thus Nobu
tsuna was left to conduct government with Abe Tadaald, an upright
and experienced man, who was the remaining Roju.
The first important problem with which they had to deal was the
discontent of the ronin, a problem illustrated in a vivid way by the cir
cumstances of the rising of Yui Shosetsu, which took place only a few
weeks after Ietsuna’s accession. The Bakufu reacted by introducing
certain reforms which may in a general way be described as a depar
ture from the hitherto severe attitude of the ruler to his vassals. The
concession to daimyos of the right to adopt heirs at a late age is one
example of this charge; and another is the general moderation of the
official attitude towards the ronin, as it became constructive rather than
punitive.
When Ietsuna was named Shogun he was only ten years old. During
the remaining thirty years of his life he continued poor in health and
mild in spirit, but showed an engaging, gentle character, if one may
judge from some of his letters which have been preserved. The gov
ernment remained almost entirely in the hands of his ministers, who
were advised by Hoshina, a learned man who was no doubt partly re-
1 It was abolished in 1663.

54 IETSUNA
sponsible for the civil trend of policy during the next two decades. He
encouraged scholarship, respecting such men as Yamazaki Ansai, a Con-
fucian of the Sung school, and in general it may be said that learning
was highly esteemed in official circles.
This new government was faced with a new situation, not dangerous
but difficult, and dealt with it in a somewhat negative manner, quite
unlike the decisive policy of its predecessors, who had inherited some
thing of the dictatorial manner of a commander-in-chief addressing his
troops. Ietsuna’s advisers, in dealing with the ronin or the gangsters
and rowdies in the city streets, were cautious but adequate, and their
treatment of the great daimyos was on the whole firm but understand
ing.
The leading Bakufu officers at this time (ca. 1651-71) were as fol
lows:
Tairo Sakai Tadakatsu ................................... died 1656
Sakai T ad ak iy o.................................... 1666-1680
Roju Itakura Shigenori ................................. 1665-1677
Sakai T ad ak iy o.................................... 1656-1666
Abe Tadaaki ........................................ 1638-1671
Inaba M asanori.................................... 1657-1696
Of these men, Abe was distinguished by strong will, high principles,

and good administrative ability. Sakai Tadakatsu was growing old, and
Sakai Tadakiyo was experienced but crafty and of doubtful integrity.
Fortunately for Ietsuna his guardian Hoshina, thanks to his ability as
well as his family connexions, was able to exert influence in political
matters and to prevent great blunders; but the administration was timid
by the standards of some of his critics. It was, however, soon to be
tested by a very difficult problem raised by the discovery of a plot to
overthrow the Shogun’s government by force in 1651. This movement,
in which a number of ronin played the leading parts, may be dismissed
as a failure, for it was detected and suppressed with ease; but a study
of its growth and of the attitude of the authorities towards the ronin as
a class furnishes some useful evidence of the nature of government at
the end of the rule of Iemitsu.
2. T he Ronin Conspiracy
The ringleaders of the conspiracy were two remarkable men, Yui
Shosetsu and Marubashi Chuya. Yui was a man of humble origin, who
IETSUNA 55
had as a child been sent by his parents to a village school where he dis
played remarkable talents. He was taken up by some ronin who lived
near by, and from them he learned much about the history of the re
cent past. Moved by an ambitious spirit, he determined to rise to
heights of power, following the example of Hideyoshi, a poor lad who
had become master of all Japan. Marubashi was a samurai of good
family, a man of moderate talent and immense bodily strength, burn
ing with a wish to avenge the death of his father, who had been cap
tured and executed by soldiers of the investing army during the siege
of Osaka castle.
Each of these men was in his way a characteristic product of the
times, part of the flotsam and jetsam carried on the ebbing tide of war
in the early seventeenth century. Each was a man of parts, thwarted
by lack of opportunity; for, owing allegiance to no feudal superior, they
were both without place or emoluments. Many men in this predica
ment, looking for a means of livelihood, sought to make use of their
only asset by teaching military science. It seems at first sight strange
that so soon after long years of slaughter there would be a demand for
such instruction. But since most adult members of the warrior caste
had no other occupation, and since all were ordered by the Shogun’s
edicts to cultivate the arts of war alongside the arts of peace, there was
a demand for teachers of experience. In most cities and towns there
were flourishing schools where students could practise the use of weap
ons or learn the principles of tactics and strategy.
Such establishments naturally provided a meeting place for active
men, and became social as well as educational centres, where they could
exchange views on political matters. Some of these schools—academies,
they might be called—were attended by hundreds of disciples or pupils,
and they were obviously advantageous places for the ventilation of
grievances and the discussion of current affairs. They were attended
by men of all ranks in the warrior class, from small daimyos and ban-
nermen down to the lowest grade of samurai and even to the leaders
of bands of ashigaru (foot soldiers). Their number increased as the
Bakufu took measures to guard against subversive conduct by ordering
feudatories to expel from their fiefs men who were not in their service.
These provisions (which are to be found in the Buke Sho-Hatto) were
aimed at the ronin, and of course tended to increase the number of mas
terless men gathered together in cities and towns.
Both Yui Shosetsu and Marubashi Chuya found employment^ in
structors. Chuya, with his great strength, gave lessons in the use of the
halberd, a deadly weapon but not easy to wield, while Shosetsu joined
56 IETSUNA
a flourishing academy in which his talents soon brought promotion and

the trust of its master, whom he presently murdered and succeeded.
Shosetsu even established an ironworks and an armourer’s shop, sell
ing its products to well-placed samurai, and thus increasing his con
nexions with persons of importance in both town and country. His
establishment naturally attracted many ronin and other discontented
persons. One of these was Chuya, whom Shosetsu took into partner
ship. At what point Shosetsu began to plot a rising and to gather sup
port in secret is not quite clear, but it was during the rule of Iemitsu,
and probably soon after 1645. His plan was to choose a windy night and
by an explosion of gunpowder in the government magazine to start in
the inflammable city of Yedo a conflagration which would afford oppor
tunity of raiding the Castle and murdering high officials in the confu
sion. Similar action was to be taken in Kyoto, Osaka, and other cities.
This bold and desperate coup d it a t might have succeeded but for
the unforeseen obstacles that ruin most conspiracies. It had been in
tended to strike very soon after the death of Iemitsu, in June 1651, but
a delay was caused by a sudden illness of Chuya, who began to shout
secrets in his delirium. Action was postponed until the first days of
September. By that time details of the plot had come to the knowledge
of the Bakufu. Chuya was arrested in Yedo, and in Sumpu (Shizuoka)
Shosetsu disembowelled himself, along with several of his comrades, on
being surrounded by police. The corpse of Shosetsu was subjected to
the usual base indignities, while his aged parents and many close rela
tives were crucified. Chuya and his accomplices, after cruel tortures,
were crucified; their wives and children were decapitated.
Apart from its dramatic quality, this uprising of members of the
military class is of peculiar interest as evidence of the development of
the domestic policy of the Bakufu, which was bound to run into diffi
culties so long as it aimed at conserving the military spirit while pro
moting industry and trade.
The senior councillors, taken unawares by the conspiracy, met soon
after its suppression to discuss its origins and to decide what action
should be taken to prevent further disturbances. The majority opinion
was at first in favour of strong measures, including the expulsion of all
ronin from Yedo, but finally the view of the Roju Abe Tadaala prevailed.
He argued that the sensible course was not to use force against the
movement but to take steps which would reduce the number of ronin.
It was on his advice that the practice of escheatment was brought to
an end, and that an effort was made by Bakufu officials to find openings
IETSUNA 57
for employment suitable to the ronin. Prominent among such function
aries was the City Commissioner (Machi-Bugyo) who had arrested
Chuya. This was a man named Ishigaya Sadakiyo, who had been
wounded in fighting in Kyushu and understood the feelings of old
soldiers. He was able to find good places for more than a thousand
ronin in the next twenty years or so, and other veterans gave the same
kind of help.
These were not great numbers, but the fact that the Bakufu saw fit
to take a moderate line shows that it was inclined to move from a strict
military outlook and to develop a stronger civil administration. One of
the difficulties that had to be overcome was the distaste of many samurai
for clerical work. There were posts in the central and local government
offices which required a knowledge of composition and accounting, but
few of the older ronin had these qualifications. The celebrated scholar
Arai Hakuseki (1657-1725) was himself a ronin, and he held important
official posts, but he said that of the samurai he had known since his
childhood hardly one in ten had sufficient knowledge of writing and
arithmetic for even modest duties in the bureau of a minor Commis
sioner, whereas when he reached mature years almost all samurai even
of the lowest order had the necessary education.
Soon after the unsuccessful plot of Yui Shosetsu, another conspiracy
was discovered by a Bakufu agent in which several hundred ronin were
involved, and in the same year (1652) there was a small disturbance on
the island of Sado. But these were of little significance, for the prob
lem of the ronin was being solved as much by the lapse of time as by
the efforts of the government. The samurai who as youths had fought
at Osaka in 1615 were now between fifty and sixty years of age. They
had given place to their sons, who, having the advantage of some school
ing, could find posts in the numerous offices of a government which was
becoming increasingly bureaucratic in its constitution and its outlook.
By the close of the century the number of ronin was small. Most of
them were men who by temperament were not fitted to regular employ
ment and a quiet life. Some became fencing masters or teachers of mili
tary science, finding no lack of pupils in the rowdy element of urban
society; others were frankly disreputable characters, often on the edge
of crime. The word ronin is frequently used in a pejorative sense, but
it must be remembered that we learn not of the well-behaved majority,
but of the vagabonds and wastrels. They were few in number, but they
were conspicuous sources of trouble in the cities, where they stalked the
streets seeking quarrels, “flown with insolence and wine.” In striking
58 IETSUNA
contrast to such ne’er-do-wells were ronin scholars like Ogyu Sorai and
poets hke Matsuo Basho, leaders of philosophical or literary movements
in the late seventeenth century.
3. The Tow nspeople
The ronin were not the only people who gave trouble to the govern
ment. After the battle of Sekigahara there was a long interval of p eace-
broken, it is true, by the siege of Osaka—a half-century covered by the
rule of Ieyasu, Hidetada, and Iemitsu, lasting from 1601 to 1651, dinr
ing which the government devoted itself primarily to perfecting a civil
administration. This task involved some diminution of the privileges
which the military class had enjoyed at the expense of the civilian so
ciety.
In this period the economy of the whole country developed apace,
since all but the area of hostilities in the Osaka region was busily en
gaged in the increase of trade and industry for civil rather than for mili
tary purposes. As we have seen, both domestic and foreign trade flour
ished under the encouragement of Ieyasu, and much new wealth was
created by the increasing output of mines and the manufacture of goods
for peacetime consumption.
One of the results, or the concomitants, of this new activity was a
flow of population from the country to the towns, and this was espe
cially true of the eastern seaboard, since the Shogun’s choice of resi
dence, first in Sumpu and then in Yedo, shifted the centre of military
and political power away from the ancient capital of Kyoto. Once the
system of alternate attendance ( sankin kotai) was established, the vas
sals from all parts of Japan built houses in Yedo and brought there con
siderable retinues. They spent large sums annually, and gave employ
ment to many tradesmen, artisans, and labourers. The size of the
population of the city thus grew rapidly, while its character changed
as life became more varied and, on the whole, more attractive, especially
to men who wished to avoid hard work and a drab style of living.
Many such found their way to Yedo soon after 1615, and by the mid-
century the city population included a considerable element of ne’er-
do-wells, living on the fringe of respectable society and subsisting upon
dubious occupations. Such men were known as “kabukimono,” a term
which approximates to “eccentrics,” because their behaviour was of an
unusual and striking kind.2 Some of them were military men of good
2 “Kabuku” means to lean or to incline.

IETSUNA 59
standing who for lack of occupation in a time of peace sought excite
ment in street-fighting and robbery.
Forerunners of the kabukimono began to occupy the attention of the
Bakufu as early as 1612, that is before the siege of Osaka, when certain
members of the manservant class known as chugen killed a high officer
in revenge for his murder of a page. On enquiry it was found that there
were companies of these chugen throughout the city, banded together
for illicit purposes. In order to deal with them the Bakufu set up bar
riers in the streets, and in a battue were able to capture and kill several
hundred. They were men who had formed bands under leaders known
by such names as Arashi no Suke (Captain Tempest), and were sworn
to protect one another in any circumstances, even against their own par
ents or masters. They professed certain moral principles superior, they
said, to those of their elders, and they were in fact loyal to their com
rades.
The Bakufu was at first disposed not to treat them as criminals, and
no doubt their intentions were not entirely evil; but they wanted to
attract notice and for that purpose they resorted to extremes, challeng
ing the authority of the government by engaging in robbery with vio
lence and murderous street-fighting. The government was forced to
restore order by drastic measures. In 1628 watches were placed at all
cross-roads, and large numbers were thus cut off and arrested, some to
be put to death. But the abuses continued. A lampoon current in Yedo
about 1645 refers to two hatamoto of high rank (10,000 koku and 3,000
koku) as leaders of bands of yakko (varlets or underlings) known as
hatamoto-yakko, who would rove the streets after nightfall to rob and
murder unwary citizens. Their leaders wore fanciful costumes, and
their hair was dressed in fanciful styles. It was this departure from
ordinary habits that gained them the sobriquet of kabukimono. They
grew sidewhiskers (whereas the ordinary practice of the samurai was
to be cleanshaven to the crown of the head), and they carried extremely
long swords. Their bands had preposterous names, such as “Daisho-
jingi-Gumi,” meaning the Band of all the Gods, great and small, or the
Pantheon Band.
In considering the part played by hatamoto in these highly irregular
movements, it should be recalled that the Bakufu, in organizing the
hatamoto after 1635, had withdrawn from the land hatamoto of 500
koku or less, and given them a fixed stipend, which proved inadequate.
It was men of this kind who became ronin and leaders of gangs.
Opposed to the hatamoto bands were bands of young townsmen
known as machi-yakko who claimed to remedy injustice and to punish
60 IETSUNA
evil-doers. They had the same kind of habits in behaviour and costume
as the hatamoto-yakko, but their leaders were of a different social origin,
being for the most part members not of the military caste but of the class
of clerks, shopkeepers, innkeepers, and superior artisans. Their business
brought them into contact with military circles because many of them
acted as employment agents, finding body servants (chugen) for samu
rai who had been brought to Yedo by their daimyo. In literature the
most celebrated of the machi-yakko was one Banzui-In Chobei, a man
of great physical strength and courage who was killed in 1657 by the
leader of a band of hatamoto-yakko in a quarrel over some trifling mat
ter. Chobei owes his reputation to a stage play of much later date, in
which he is presented as being sliced to death “like a carp on a chopping
board.”* In the play he is a heroic character, a champion of the weak
and a scourge of the wicked.
For what reason it is not quite clear, the yakko are credited in ro
mantic literature with remarkable virtues. They are depicted as pat
terns of chivalry, and styled Otokodate, a word which means a brave
who stands up against injustice. It is true that some of the bands of
yakko were governed by severe codes of loyalty among themselves, and
no doubt from time to time they performed quixotic acts; but in real
life, if not in legend, they seem to have been disorderly rogues and to
owe their reputation chiefly to the eighteenth-century stage plays in
which they figure as heroes. It is indeed a curious fact that the theatre
in Japan owed its development to its portrayal of the kabuldmono and
their exploits. A play in which the Otokodate is the principal charac
ter is akin to the Beggar’s Opera.
The roving bands of yakko continued to harass the Yedo government
until late in the seventeenth century. In 1686 three hundred members
of the band called “Daishdjingi-Gumi” were rounded up and its ring
leaders executed. Thereafter the yakko seem to have lost their courage
and their influence, degenerating into groups of gamblers and loafers.
The formation of these youthful bands and the “gang warfare” in which
they engaged constitute a phenomenon which has its counterpart in the
great cities of Western countries today. The standard of behaviour of
the young men seems to be common to both societies. The attention to
costume and coiffure, the jargon, and the obedience to leaders are essen
tials, and what is perhaps most striking of all is the strict observance
of a code of loyalty within the band, concurrent with the pursuit of
illicit aims.
8T he story of Banzui-In Chobei is told at length in that excellent work, Bertram
Mitford’s T ales o f O ld Jap an , under the title “A Story of the Otokodate of Yedo.”
In this version he is parboiled in a hot bath and finished off by spear-thrusts.
IETSUNA 61
The yakko also furnish an interesting sidelight on the trend of urban
life in Japan after the wars. They, like the ronin (they were in fact often
led by ronin) were the product of a rapidly growing city population
and a rise in the cost, or it might be better to say the standard, of living.
The policy of the Bakufu inevitably moved from meeting wartime needs
to building up an efficient civil administration; and of necessity it sacri
ficed some of the privileges of the military class—especially its weakest
members—for the benefit of the lower orders.
One of the first causes of discontent among the hatamoto was a fall
in the purchasing power of their revenue, which, as we have noted, in
many cases was converted from a basis of the product of land under
cultivation to a fixed stipend. They were often left with no land to farm
and no duties to perform. An interesting episode in the year 1651 throws
light on the condition of samurai living upon a fixed income. A daimyo
named Matsudaira Sadamasa, holder of a fief in Mikawa, returned it
together with all his possessions to the Bakufu, with a memorial request
ing that all his property should be distributed among hatamoto in dis
tress, and that the Shogun should also make money payments to them
out of his treasure. He himself shaved his head and walked through the
streets of Yedo carrying a begging-bowl. The Bakufu treated Sadamasa
as a madman, and confiscated his fief, which they transferred to his elder
brother. It was only a few weeks after this that Yui Shosetsu s revolt
took place.
During the years from 1660 to about 1670 the government saw to it
that nearly all land formerly held or cultivated by hatamoto and go-
kenin in the provinces adjacent to Yedo was incorporated in the direct
Tokugawa domains. The occupants thus became stipendiaries, and
most of them moved to Yedo. By the end of the century nearly nine-
tenths of the total number of hatamoto and go-kenin were living on rice
allowances from the Bakufu granaries. Some of them found well-paid
employment as officials, but the openings available were not nearly suffi
cient to absorb the great numbers of people who were now forced to live
on a small fixed stipend.
4. T he Great Fire o f M eireki

The early years of Ietsuna s minority were saddened by a great dis
aster in the Shogun’s capital. In 1657 a conflagration lasting for three
days destroyed more than half the city, with a loss of life estimated at
100,000. The fire started on the eighteenth day of the new year, in the
Hongo district. At that time a north-west gale was blowing with hurri
cane force and the flames spread with appalling speed from street to
62 IETSUNA
street, consuming the wooden houses (dry from a year of drought) from
Kanda, south to Kydbashi, east to Fukagawa, and showed no sign of
abating. On the evening of the second day the wind veered and drove
the flames back from the southern outskirts of the city towards the
centre. Reaching Kojimachi they destroyed all the houses of the re
tainers and servants of the daimyos resident in the vicinity of the Sho
gun’s castle, and presently attacked the castle itself. Part of the outer
citadels was destroyed, but the keep, though damaged, was saved. The
mansions of the great daimyos which were adjacent to the castle were
all burned to the ground. The wind and the flames abated by the end
of the third day, though the smoke was so thick and the smouldering
ruins so widespread that it was difficult to move about the city for some
time; but by the 24th day of the month it was possible to collect a great
number of corpses and carry them by boat along the Sumida river and
then to a point beyond the situation of the Ryogoku bridge in the
suburb of Honjo. There great pits had been dug, and in these the bodies
were deposited as monks of different sects recited masses for the souls
of the dead. Here a memorial chapel was built. It was called the Eko-
In, the Hall of Prayer for the Dead, and it stood there until recent times,
a vulgar, gaudy structure, used for the spring and autumn wrestling
matches.
The city was restored, with wider streets and better planning, under
the supervision of Bakufu officials. The work took two years to com
plete. The Bakufu, taking a practical view, gave particular care to that
part of the city which had been the centre of wholesale trade. The
daimyos had been sent home, and the rebuilding of the Shogun’s castle
and palace was the last important undertaking to be completed. By
1659 the Shogun was installed with imposing ceremonies. Meanwhile
the government had paid special attention to the needs of the ordinary
citizen. They promptly organized the supply of food on a very generous
scale, and they advanced funds to the townspeople for rebuilding their
shops and dwelling houses. The Bakufu also advanced funds to dai
myos for rebuilding their residences, and made grants to hatamoto who
had suffered loss. Much of the credit for organizing measures of relief
and reconstruction was due to Matsudaira Nobutsuna, the leading Roju
at the time, who proved himself a very able administrator.5
5. Sakai T adakiyo in Office
Strictly speaking, Ietsuna’s minority ended in 1663, but Hoshina Ma-

sayuki continued to advise him until 1672. By that time able men like
IETSUNA 63
Nobutsuna, who would have resisted bad government, had died, and
the field was left to Sakai Tadakiyo, the senior Roju, who became Tairo
in 1666. Under him were the Roju Itakura Shigenori, Tsuchiya Kazu-
nao, Inaba Masanori, and Kuze Hiroyuki.
These men were of only mediocre ability, and Tadakiyo was not a
man of solid capacity, but rather an easy-going, self-indulgent, clever
man who rose to the highest office thanks to the decease of the stalwarts
who had served Iemitsu. The only survivor of that reliable band was
Abe Tadaaki, who had a low opinion of Tadakiyo and frequently re
buked him. But Tadaaki was growing old, and died in 1671, after
thirty-eight years of faithful service. It was Tadaaki, it will be remem
bered, who prevailed upon his colleagues not to persecute the ronin but
to take steps which would lessen their numbers by providing decent
employment.
Tadakiyo was not a man to devise and execute a policy of his own.
He dealt with problems as they arose. Notoriously given to taking
bribes, he was the object of scurrilous lampoons by the citizens of Yedo,
accusing him of greed and corrupt practices. Apart from Tadaaki’s re
bukes he was reproached by a powerful daimyo, Ikeda of Okayama, for
his ignorance of the people’s needs and his failure to show an example
by simple living. There was discontent throughout the country, said
Ikeda, and signs of popular uprisings. If these should take place, he
boldly hinted, some powerful daimyo might join them. Relations be
tween the Shogun and the daimyos were at that time of special impor
tance, because changes were taking place in the aims and methods of
administering the fiefs. It was natural that there should be disagree
ments among the advisers of the daimyos, conflicts of opinion between
progressive and conservative parties within the clan, and it was the duty
of the Bakufu to avert such troubles by cautious but firm diplomacy.
One of the most celebrated of such cases was a prolonged succession
dispute in the domain of the Date family, whose seat was at Sendai.
It was a difficult case, in which the Bakufu intervened at a time when
Sakai Tadakiyo was in office, and as such it deserves some detailed de
scription.6
6. Politics in the F iefs

As the daimyo of a fief, particularly a Tozama fief, progressed with
his plans for improving its organization and for that purpose strength
ening his own control, he was bound to arouse opposition from those
who thought their own interests to be in danger or who were on gen
eral grounds conservative. Thus the more land was taken under the
64 IETSUNA
daimyo’s direct control, the less was the relative strength of the impor
tant rear-vassals, even if their own holdings were not interfered with;
while the smaller tenants, on becoming stipendiaries, lost their local
influence to the officers of the daimyo.
The class of landholder known as “family retainers” (kashin) was
not homogeneous. It included, as well as relatives of modest standing,
kinsmen equal in rank and influence to the daimyo or his direct heir.
It was to be expected that the powerful rear-vassals would at any pros
pect of change readily believe that they were losing privileges to which
they were entitled. This feeling naturally became acute when a ques
tion of succession arose upon the death or retirement of a daimyo, and
during the seventeenth century several fiefs were disturbed by violent
quarrels between two or more parties, each supporting a different
claimant.
These disputes (known as On-lye Sddo or Noble Family Discords)
were the chief political events of the era, since after 1615, thanks to the
strict discipline of the Bakufu, they were virtually the only form of
political disturbance with which the country was troubled. Accord
ingly such quarrels were regarded seriously by Yedo, since they oc
curred principally in the great Tozama domains and threatened serious
consequences if they were not peacefully settled. Several of these dis
putes took place in the latter half of the seventeenth century. They
were rousing affairs, attracting popular attention throughout the coun
try and supplying the themes of numerous stage plays which stirred the
groundlings in the eighteenth century. In particular, the prolonged suc
cession quarrel in the domain of the Dat6 family deserves some notice
because it throws light upon the attitude of the Bakufu towards the
Outside Lords, and in general upon the clan politics of the period.
The succession to this fief (of 620,000 koku) was not necessarily
decided by primogeniture in a direct line from Datd Masamune, the
founder, who had been favoured by Ieyasu. There resided in the Dat6
domain a number of kinsmen and hereditary vassals, all of whom were
related, some closely, some distantly, and some by marriage, to the
actual head of the clan. Among them were holders of estates of 10,000
koku or more, who could justly claim to be qualified both by birth and
by capacity to rule the fief.
In 1658 Tadamune (who had followed his father Masamune) was
succeeded by his son Tsunamune, at that time in his eighteenth year.
A kinsman and an accomplished vassal was named to advise him. Some
two years later, in 1660, Tsunamune was in Yedo, engaged in the task
of clearing and deepening a waterway in the city—a corvee of the kind
IETSUNA 65
customarily imposed by the Bakufu on Tozama daimyos. He was sud
denly dismissed and placed under house arrest. The grounds for this
action are not quite clear, and there is a flavour of intrigue in the story;
but it seems that Tsunamune was accused of drunkenness and debauch
ery, and that the charge was correct. The accusation no doubt came
from home, for leading vassals had arrived from Sendai, the capital of
the Date country, and appealed to the Bakufu to force Tsunamune’s
resignation and to appoint in his place his infant son Kamechiyo.
This was agreed, but the Bakufu did not take this step without care
ful consideration. They were tolerably well-informed, since their Cen
sor (the Sendai Metsuke) visited Sendai regularly year after year from
1658 to 1674; and the Tairo Sakai Tadakiyo took a personal interest in
the case. He had been on friendly terms with Tadamune and was well
disposed towards the Date family. He was therefore loth to take ex
treme steps against the delinquent Tsunamune, but the pressure from
Sendai was very strong. In the summer of 1660 the Council of Elders
in Yedo received from Sendai a memorial signed by fourteen leading
vassals recommending the retirement of Tsunamune on grounds of
health; and accordingly the son Kamechiyo (now named Tsunamura)
became the daimyo under the guardianship of Munekatsu, his great-
uncle, and Muneyoshi, his uncle. The genealogy of the Dat£ clan is as
follows:
MASAMUNE
^______________ I________________
Munekatsu Munesane ta d am u n e
I |---------------- j---------------- 1
( Hyobu)
Munetomo Muneyoshi tsu n a m u n e Mitsumune

(Shikibu) (Ukyo) I
TSUNAMURA
During the next ten years there was much violent dissension in Sen
dai, reaching a climax in the spring of 1671, when a prominent member
of the Date family, Aki Muneshige, complained urgently to the Bakufu
of the misgovemment of Munekatsu and others acting in the name of
Tsunamura. The Sendai Metsuke tried to mediate between Aki and
Munekatsu, but Aki was obdurate, and began a lively campaign against
Tsunamura’s guardians. The Metsuke reported the situation to the Ba
kufu, and soon Aki was ordered to appear before a commission of en
quiry in Yedo. He duly proceeded and on arrival was summoned to a
meeting in the mansion of the Tairo, Sakai Tadakiyo. There were in
Yedo now present also several other visitors from Sendai, notably Ha-
66 IETSUNA
rada Kai Munesuke, one of the principal retainers of the Date family.
Aki Muneshige reached Yedo on the 13th day of the second month
and was directed by Harada to the Dat6 mansion in the Azabu district.
On the 16th an officer from the Bakufu examined him there. Aki at
once sent word of this to Sendai and was, in a roundabout way to avoid
leakage, advised by his friends to hold firm and to defeat Munekatsu
at all costs. From the 16th onwards Muneshige, Harada, Shibata, and
other officials from Sendai were time after time closely interrogated.
Early in the following month Muneshige was sent for and submitted
to a close examination by Itakura, the Roju on duty. Harada and Shi
bata were again questioned, and whereas Shibata’s statements were
accepted, Harada made a poor impression. He left in a despondent
mood.
Towards the end of the month Harada, Aki, and others were sum
moned to Itakura’s house early in the morning. At midday they were
told that an enquiry would be held at the Tairos mansion. They were
to be examined separately, by the Roju and by the Metsuke. Harada
found that his answers did not agree with those of Muneshige and
others, and was in a state of great distress and excitement. According
to one version of this trial, Harada after his examination was waiting
in an anteroom, when Aki approached and shouted insults. Then swords
were drawn. In a wild struggle Aki was killed by Harada, and Harada
was cut down by men who rushed in from the next room. Shibata died
of wounds.
Harada appears to have drawn first. The offence was aggravated by
having taken place in the house of a high Bakufu official. A trial was
held without delay, the issue being not the succession question but the
murder of Aki by Harada. The verdict was severe. The Harada family
was destroyed, and the family of Munekatsu was punished. The rule of
Tsunamura was confirmed. Harada’s four sons and two grandsons were
executed at Sendai in the summer of 1671, and his two grand-daughters
were punished. No action was taken against Aid’s family, since he was
regarded as a paragon of loyalty—a view with which many of his con
temporaries could not agree.
This is the usual version of the Dat6 affair, based upon reputable
chronicles; but some modem Japanese historians tend to disagree with
the treatment in which Aki is the hero and Harada the villain. The
question is of no great interest, since the existence of serious disagree
ments within the clan is proved and it is shown that a solution was
reached by the intervention of the Bakufu. It is in the theatrical ver
sions of the Date Sodo ( Disturbance) that the parts of hero and villain
IETSUNA 67
are most clearly allotted, and the play called M eiboku Sendai Hagi was
the most successful of its kind during the eighteenth century. Jt is an
interesting phenomenon in the history of the Japanese theatre that of
the forty or so plays written by the great dramatist Chikamatsu Mon-
zaemon (1653-1724) more than thirty deal with the succession quarrels
in the great fiefs. They are called On-lye Kyogen (Noble Family
Plays).*
There was no lack of material, for succession feuds like that which
split the Dat£ family were common throughout the country, the best
known of them being those in the great fiefs of Kuroda, Kaga, and Nabe-
shima. Although they often took the form of revolt by discontented vas
sals, they should be regarded as an expression not of disloyal, rebellious
sentiment but rather of a genuine desire to reform and improve the ad
ministration of the great fiefs. The natural trend was to strengthen the
daimyo, to concentrate power in his hands, and to remove weaknesses
which arose from a diversity of rights and functions within his territory.
Such a policy was bound to bear hard upon certain vested interests, such
as those of rear-vassals holding broad acres as almost independent rulers,
and it might, if not carefully carried out, injure the small cultivators and
the peasantry. But the process was inevitable, since administrative re
form was in the air, and a due regard for economic needs exacted some
unity in the control of the material resources of the fief. Competition in
trade and industry was taking the place of rivalry on the battlefield.
The Date affair is also interesting in that it illustrates the nature of
the relationship of the Bakufu with the Tozama daimyos. The Yedo
government was kept informed of conditions in the fiefs by its Censors,
who also at times acted as mediators. Whether the dispute could have
been settled more promptly is hard to say. There is no direct evidence
that Tadakiyo took bribes from Sendai, but since the Bakufu authorities
were well aware of the issue certainly as early as 1660, they should have
been able to force a solution long before 1671.
7. Foreign Affairs
Perhaps the most important decision made by Ietsuna’s advisers

during his minority concerned foreign rather than domestic affairs. In
South China there was a strong movement against the so-called Tartar
« See Kawatake Shigetoshi, C hikam atsu M onzaem on (Tokyo, 19 5 9 ). The first

play dealing with the Dat6 affair was performed in Yedo in 1713. Donald Keene’s
M ajor Plays o f C hikam atsu (New York, 1961) contains excellent translations and
valuable commentary.
68 IETSUN A
(Manchu) dynasty which had displaced the Ming. It was led by a

southern Chinese known as Coxinga, who commanded a great fleet and
was master of all the coastal regions. But he had no land force, and
therefore in 1658 he appealed to japan for military aid, being himself
half Japanese (he was bom in Nagasaki in 1624). One party in the
Japanese government favoured responding to this appeal on the grounds
that such an enterprise would keep the military class happy, many of
its members, from daimyo and hatamoto down to the indigent ronin,
being restless and dissatisfied. These men would readily exchange their
dull existence in a peaceful society for the possibilities of fame, promo
tion, and booty that foreign adventure would offer.
When the question was debated by the Shogun’s advisers, it was
decided not to intervene. To send an army abroad would be a reversal
of the national policy of seclusion. It would be costly and might end
in disaster. Those who voted against the proposed invasion must have
recalled the failure of Hideyoshi’s great enterprise in Korea, and they
no doubt had taken into account the fact that Japan had no naval
strength and would have to depend entirely upon Coxinga for safe
transport.
8. letsu u as Last Years

There is not much of political interest to record on the period from
1663 to 1680, when Ietsuna died. There were troubles in some of the
important fiefs of the kind that had visited Sendai, and in dealing with
one of these Tadakiyo came into collision with a Roju who would not
tolerate his methods. This was Hotta Masatoshi (a son of the Hotta
who had followed Iemitsu in death) who was appointed Roju in 1679.
At that time Ietsuna was very ill, and in the early summer of 1680 he
died. Tadakiyo then proposed that the next Shogun should be a prince
of the blood royal, according to the precedent of Kamakura in 1252,
when Munetaka, son of the Emperor Go-Saga, was appointed.
Tadakiyo obviously saw himself in the position held by the Hojo
Regents; but Hotta was infuriated by his presumption and raised such
violent objection that Tadakiyo hurriedly withdrew. That was the end
of Tadakiyo’s career. Within a few hours Tsunayoshi, Iemitsu’s fourth
son, was named Shogun, to be installed the following day.
C H A P T E R VII
L E A R N I N G AND THE ARTS
1. Confucian Philosophy
O u r p u r p o s e here is not to enquire into metaphysics, but to ex

amine the trends of philosophy during the seventeenth century mainly
in their bearing upon the political and social history of Tokugawa Japan.
By the middle of the century there was no scope for military adven
ture, and since the government was a closed bureaucracy, there were
few openings for talented men in the sphere of national politics. The
hereditary principle, tending to an increasing rigidity, was an obstacle
to ambitious youth in most careers, whereas in the past, throughout the
Middle Ages, warriors had risen in the world, while the Buddhist Church
had offered opportunities to poor young men and a high place to the
gifted few.
In the seventeenth century, however, the influence of Buddhism
declined, except for the popular Amidist (Jodo, or Pure Land) sects.
This trend was due partly to the attacks of Nobunaga and Hideyoshi
upon the great monastic foundations, but also to a lapse in the quality
of the clergy in general. The mass of the population, both citizens and
peasants, were practising Buddhists in so far as they followed Buddhist
ritual at funerals and other family ceremonies, and in all classes the
recital of the Nembutsu was common. Ieyasu himself was brought up
in a Jodo family and repeated the Nembutsu regularly. But if Buddhism
was still the established church, it cannot be said that it exercised any
spiritual leadership. Nor were the ruling military class entirely guided
by Buddhist doctrine, since their standards of behaviour, including sui
cide and the vendetta, were in conflict with the gentle teaching of the
Buddha.
Some of the ancient monasteries, notably those of the Zen sect,
continued in the mediaeval tradition as homes of high learning, secular
as well as sacred, and there came a curious sequel to their wide-ranging
studies; for in pursuing the history of religion in Japan, we discover
that it was students in Buddhist monasteries who called attention to a
secular philosophy that was to govern Japanese thought in one or other
of its manifestations for a century or more.
This was a form of Confucianism described as the Chu Hsi system
after one of its most celebrated exponents in China. It was developed
70 LEARNING AND THE ARTS
during the Sung dynasty (1130-1200), and it was well-known and dis
cussed in Japan in the fourteenth century, for we learn of arguments
by the young noblemen at Go-Daigo’s court soon after 1333, arguments
for and against the adoption of Chu Hsi teaching as a basis for the policy
of the new government. But the new government was ephemeral, and
except in erudite circles the new Confucianism seems to have been paid
no further attention until a revival of interest came about soon after the
establishment of the Tokugawa Bakufu by Ieyasu.1 Ieyasu’s 1614 proc
lamation against Christianity, drafted by the monk Suden, states that
Japan is the Land of the Gods. It goes on to identify those gods, the
national deities of the Shinto creed, with the Buddhas, and by ingen
ious argument contrives to introduce into the principles of government
which it is announcing a strong flavour of Confucian thought. This
proclamation of 1614 seems confused, but in fact its meaning is clear.
Its purpose was to secure the acceptance of an ethical code consistent
with the aims of the Bakufu, namely absolute rule over a disciplined
society.
Among the leaders of this new movement were several scholars who
had first studied in Buddhist establishments, where it was usual to
acquire some knowledge of Confucian teaching, not because of any link
between Buddhism and Confucianism, but simply because the leading
monasteries were seats of learning and had good libraries. In Japan
Confucian studies held a place not unlike that of classical studies in
Europe.
First in order of time among such scholars was Fujiwara Seika (1561-
1617), a former Zen monk of the Rinzai sect who took employment in
his native province of Harima as adviser to the daimyo on administrative
questions. There he found time for deep study and turned away from
Buddhism towards the new Confucianism. He had attracted the notice
of Ieyasu during Hideyoshi’s war on Korea, and in 1593 was invited to
Yedo. He did not stay, but was invited again after the battle of Seki-
gahara; this time he gave some lectures before Ieyasu, but would not
accept an official post. He was not fully persuaded of the truth of Chu
Hsi’s system, and wished to remain independent.
Before leaving he recommended to Ieyasu as his successor a scholar
1 An exception must be made for the printing (in 1481) of one of Chu Hsi’s
commentaries in Satsuma, where a Zen doctor named Keian had taken refuge from
the On in war and was welcomed by Shimazu. Other warlords at this time were also
inclined to favour Confucian studies, the M5ri clan, in particular, treating scholars
and artists with respect In studying the national history, events in the provinces
should not be overlooked. Indeed, in some matters the provinces were in advance
of the metropolis, where nonconformity was frowned upon.
LEARNING AND THE ARTS 71
H ayashi Kazan
named Hayashi Razan (1583-1657), who had been his disciple. As a

youth Razan had studied in the Kenninji, a leading Zen monastery in
Kyoto. He had met Ieyasu in 1605, and in 1607 he became an adviser
to the Bakufu in its early phase. He was responsible for most of the
secretarial work required by Ieyasu, his colleagues being Suden, Warden
of the Konchi-In, Supervisor of all Zen establishments, and Tenkai, an
Abbot of the Tendai sect.
According to some conventional histories of Japan, Ieyasu felt that
he needed a philosophical principle to explain and buttress the authori
tarian system of government which he intended to impose on the
country. What could be better than that which Chu Hsi described
when he stated that the fixed principle of the universe was the law of
obedience by the son to the father, the subject to the ruler? With very
little elaboration, it seemed, this could become the fundamental law
of the land. But it is doubtful whether the general trend of government
in any country follows a theory, still less a moral law, and we should
be careful not to assume a direct relationship between systematic
philosophy and political action.
In looking at the history of government in Japan, one cannot but
be struck by the fact that, despite the respect paid to Confucian teach
ing from the eighth century onwards, it is hard to detect any deliberate
application of a Confucian canon to the solution of political problems.
From early times and well into the middle ages the prevailing world
view, when not Buddhist, was Chinese, and all the complexities of
astrology and divination (which had a great, but not always benign,
influence upon the life of the ruling class) came under this rubric.
Certain features of the social order were also affected by early Confu
cian ideas, and some of the names and functions of institutions were
copied from Chinese originals. Yet it would be difficult to show that
outside the institutional field Confucian thought had any creative or
decisive influence on the actual conduct of government in Japan after

the eighth century until the seventeenth. The directive moral force
throughout that long period was Buddhism rather than any secular
practice or belief.
Regarding the position of Confucianism in seventeenth-century
Japan, there is a tendency to ascribe to Hayashi Razan an important
share in the political decisions of Ieyasu. Razan certainly took a leading
part in the promotion of Confucian studies, and perhaps also in the
planning of details of governmental institutions, but there is no evidence
to show that he was consulted on the initiation of policy. In considering
the influence of scholars upon the practical decisions of statesmen, one
should exercise some scepticism. The biographies of distinguished men
of letters or great churchmen often give the impression that they were
the authors of policy which the rulers put into practice; but biographers
tend to forget that great men make their own political decisions without
awaiting the approval of theorists.
Thus when we are told that men like the Buddhist dignitary Muso
Kokushi influenced the policy of the Ashikaga Shoguns and gave it a
certain Zen quality, we ought to accept such statements with caution.
Coming to the early days of the Yedo Bakufu, we find nothing to show
that Ieyasu consulted Razan on matters of policy, or even that he
regarded Razan’s doctrine as the official Confucianism. Ieyasu, though
not learned, had a lively intellectual curiosity and a great liking for
history, but his sympathies were with Buddhism, and ( though it is true
that he ordered new editions of Chinese and Japanese classical works)
he is unlikely to have taken an interest in the subtleties of Chinese philo
sophical reasoning. It is significant that he ordered Razan to shave his
head and wear a monastic robe, the conventional dress of a teacher.
We cannot undertake here a close study of the Neo-Confucian
philosophy by which Razan was guided, but we must take note at least
of its main features before discussing the growth of Confucianism in
general during this period. The most striking quality of the Chu Hsi
system is its rationalism. It resembles in some ways the positivism of
Comte, in that it deals with ascertained facts and observable phe
nomena. It may be that these features made it attractive to Japanese
thinkers. Apart from its simplicity, which is perhaps more apparent than
real, the reasons for its adoption in Japan could not be more lucidly
stated than in the following passage, quoted from the chapter entitled
“Neo-Confucian Orthodoxy” in Sources o f the Japan ese Tradition
(edited by William Theodore de Bary):
“Another important feature of Chu Hsi’s philosophy is its essential
humanism, which like his rationalism derives from the earlier Confucian
tradition. The moral doctrines of this school focus directly upon man
and his closest human relationships, not upon any supernatural or divine
law. These are expressed most concretely in the Five Human Relations
and their attendant obligations ( between father and son, ruler and sub
ject, husband and wife, older and younger brother, and between
friends). Such an emphasis upon human loyalties was obviously con
genial to the feudal society of Japan in this period and provided a
uniform, secular code by which the Tokugawa could maintain social
order in all their domains.”
These are obviously principles of value to the state, though it is
doubtful whether they were understood outside of learned circles, and
they are unlikely to have attracted the attention of the practical men
who were building the administrative system from its foundations in
the two busy decades before 1650; for, we must remember, it was soon
after 1630 that the principal organs of Bakufu government were estab
lished and put to work by Ieyasus old comrades-in-arms. The main
lines of the central administration had already been settled some years
before that, soon after the fall of Osaka. There can be no doubt as to
its character. It was a military government conducted by the leaders of
a feudal autocracy, and its policy was conservative, being directed
chiefly to upholding its authority over the vassals. Its treatment of
domestic problems was of an almost negative character, being in gen
eral confined to the maintenance of order. But if Confucianism, of the
Chu Hsi school or any other, cannot be regarded as the inspiration of
the system of government developed in the first decades of the seven
teenth century, there can be no doubt that Confucian thought, in one
form or another, soon began to dominate the intellectual life of the ruling
class in Japan.
The progress of Neo-Confucianism as accredited doctrine in Japan,
almost as an official creed, can be best traced by studying the activities
of Hayashi Razan, since he was its chief agent. Bom in 1587 he belonged
to the generation after Seika. He was a man of demonic energy, a vora
cious reader, and an indefatigable writer, firmly committed to Chu Hsi s
Neo-Confucianism and violently opposed to Buddhism. His antagonism
to Buddhism made little headway during the lifetime of Ieyasu, for he
was no match in debate with men like Tenkai, or Suden, both subtle
and accomplished scholars. In fact Razan was distinguished by the
breadth rather than the depth of his learning, and his method of argu
ment was loose; but he could overcome most adversaries by sheer weight
of knowledge.
His capacity for work was amazing. He wrote extensive treatises

on history and literature, as well as expounding at length both Confucian
philosophy and the national creed called Shinto. He was just the man
to introduce a new gospel, a propagandist of the first rank. Among his
major works was H oncho Hennen-Roku, a chronology of the national
history, followed by H oncho Tsugan, a historical survey which was
completed by his son. The purpose of these works was to legitimize the
position of the Shogun as the Emperor’s deputy.
His house on the hill called Shinobugaoka in the Ueno district of
Yedo became a Confucian college, with a great library. Thus he founded
a long line of official Confucianists. His son Gaho (1618-80) was an
able man, but from the time of his grandson Hoko (1644-1732) the
standard of scholarship of the Hayashi family declined. Their leader
ship was nominal, officially approved but exercised only in matters of
ceremonial.
Antagonism to the Hayashi school came from several quarters. It
first arose in important fiefs, where scholars in residence took issue with
Confucianists in the capital. Their attack was directed not against the
Chu Hsi philosophy which Razan and his sons professed, but against
them as individuals, who were given to compromise and avoided vital
issues. Prominent among these dissenters were Nakae Toju (1608-48)
and Yamazaki Ansai (1618-82).
Toju questioned Razan’s sincerity, arguing that his school of thought
was proud of its learning but showed no zeal for the pursuit of the Way—
that it to say, for the practice of the rules of conduct which it proclaimed.
Hayashi was like a parrot, he said, thus suggesting that Razan repeated
the words of the master but did not follow his ethical teaching.
Toju is one of the most engaging characters in the somewhat peppery
company of philosophers. Serving in a small fief in Iyo, he performed
his military duty by day and devoted the night to a secret study of the
Confucian Four Books. It was at the age of twenty-two that he started
to speak out against the Hayashi school. He remained in the fief for a
few years longer, and then (1634), evidently irked by the unfriendly
attitude of his colleagues, left without permission and went to his birth
place in Omi on the shore of Lake Biwa, to live with his aged mother in
poor circumstances. He worked hard at his Confucian studies, reaching
a point at which he abandoned the Chu Hsi position and turned to a
rival school of Confucian thought, that of Wang Yang-ming ( known in
Japan as O Yomei), who flourished from 1472 to 1529. Wang’s teaching
was subjective and idealist as opposed to the objective and realist official
Confucianism of Razan.
At the age of thirty-three Toju wrote a dialogue called Okina M ondo
explaining his views in simple language. His principal line of argument
was that (contrary to the postulates of Chu Hsi, which require the
operation of a principle and a force) in every man there is an inner
moral sense, and it is this intuitive knowledge which results in right
action. Reduced to simple terms this is a philosophy of deeds not words.
It is anti-scholastic and forthright, thus likely to appeal to earnest mem
bers of the military class, and Toju’s own life was an expression of his
unselfish nature. He was beloved of the poor among whom he lived and
was widely known as Omi Seijin, the Sage of Omi.
Yamazaki Ansai was another important critic of the Hayashi family.
He was bom in Kyoto and as a youth entered holy orders in Tosa, where
he studied in a Zen monastery. In that province a number of officials
were interested in Chu Hsi’s system, and Ansai, learning something of
it from them, decided to leave the Church and set up as a philosopher.
He returned to Kyoto in 1648 and opened with a violent attack upon
Buddhism. He described the Hayashi family as failing to practise the
Chu Hsi doctrine which they preached, called Razan a common Con-
fucianist drudge, and began to lecture on Confucianism himself.
There were many more figures of interest among the Confucianists
of this period. We must consider some of them later, in a slightly dif
ferent context, but for the present we should return to the general
question of the influence of Neo-Confucianism upon government. Some
interesting evidence is furnished in the decrees issued by the Bakufu
under the first three Shoguns, approximately from 1615 to 1650.
The first fundamental document is that which embodies the Rules
for the Military Houses ( Buke Sho-Hatto). It was issued in 1615, and its
first article says: “The study of literature and the practice of the mili
tary arts must be pursued side by side.” The revised version of 1635
contains no very marked change in this or the remaining articles, but
both versions might be argued to have a slight Confucian flavour in
certain clauses enjoining correct behaviour. It is true that the similar
Shoshi Sho-Hatto of the same date (1635), addressed to samurai of all
ranks (Shoshi) but particularly to hatamoto and go-kenin, opens with
a clause calling for loyalty, filial piety, and decorum, and these are
Confucian terms. But they were already in common use, and there is
no reason to suppose that they were due to any new teaching. This was
not a new thing. Some of the House Laws of the great families contain
an article insisting upon learning as well as military exercises—e.g.,
Shingen K aho and C hosokabe H yakkajo.
After the fall of Osaka, when the prospect of peace was assured, it
was natural for those faced with new problems of government to ask
themselves how best to deal with the warrior class. The most pressing
need was to provide them with some occupation other than the practice
of arms, and the most obvious course was to encourage them in the
pursuit of some field of learning which might fit them for a new profes
sion. A study of other decrees does not reveal any direct Confucian
influence, unless it can be assumed that edicts controlling monasteries
and monks are related in some way to the animus of Confucians against
Buddhists. We must therefore conclude that the Neo-Confucianism of
Chu Hsi, as expounded by the Hayashi family, did not sensibly influ
ence legislation from 1600 to about 1650 or even later. But it did begin
to influence the country’s intellectual life, and it also served to stabilize
the social order in a remarkable way, for it provided ethical principles
well suited to the maintenance of an authoritarian state.
The feudal system of Japan had at length reached its maturity under
the rule of Ieyasu after centuries of strife during which the country had
suffered from almost continuous warfare and the breakdown of ancient
institutions. Now an urgent need for peace was felt, not only by the
Shogun and his government, but also by a majority of the barons whom
he had enfeoffed and who wished to develop their own domains without
listening for a call to battle. Reason dictated that the system over which
Ieyasu presided must be supported and that its permanence must be
ensured by some kind of moral sanction. For such purposes Buddhism
in Japan no longer possessed the necessary authority, and the Shinto
cult was in a weak position. It was therefore felt necessary to adopt or
devise some system of thought, some ethical principles, which would
justify the absolute government of the country by a supreme overlord
and a social structure in which a small privileged military class enjoyed
rights denied to the remainder of the population. It would seem difficult
to find a school of philosophy which could be depended upon to support
so manifestly unjust a division, but in practice it was easy. It was there
to hand in the Confucian system in general, and in the Chu Hsi system
in particular. It was a question of emphasis on selected principles.
We have already noticed that an emphasis upon loyalty is one of
the central features of Chu Hsi’s philosophy. In its practical application
the theory of the Five Human Relations can be made to justify the
essential obligations of all members of the feudal society. It can be read
as providing an ethical basis for the social hierarchy already existing
in a loose form, namely the gradation of classes from the ruler to the
samurai, the farmer, the artisan, and the trader, with their several
responsibilities. The question of rights receives little attention, but
otherwise we have here the elements of a secular ethos, narrow to be
sure, but comprehensive in its scope.
Whether the supply of Confucian teachers followed a demand is
difficult to say; but in general it appears that the decline of Buddhism
gave a natural impetus to Confucian studies in Japan and thus increased
the number of scholars available for service in Yedo or the baronial
domains. That the study of Confucianism responded to no special
demand from political leaders in Yedo is clear from the fact that in the
first half of the seventeenth century the chief centre of Confucian studies
was not in Yedo, which was still a new city, but in Kyoto, a home of
learning since antiquity. Nevertheless, the energy with which Razan
and his successors propagated Chu Hsi doctrine soon raised the number
of scholars in Yedo, so that by the end of the century the Hayashi col
lege was the headquarters of official Confucianism.
Although the Confucianists in Yedo could furnish an intellectual
warrant for Tokugawa policy, it need not be supposed that a process of
rationalization or, we might say, justification was deliberately under
taken for political ends. Official adoption of the philosophy was a natural
outcome of contemporary circumstances, for Confucianism, irrespective
of purposes and doctrinal splits, already dominated the intellectual
scene. But this does not mean that Confucian scholars as such exercised
political authority in any important degree. There were Confucian
scholars in official service both in Yedo and the provinces. They gave
advice when it was asked for, and they were of course consulted on
questions of education, which was their chief concern; but it is clear
from their official grades that save in exceptional cases they were not
at the level of policy-makers. From their salaries they would appear to
have ranked not higher than the hatamoto in Tokugawa service and well
below the senior retainers (kashin) in a fief.
They presumably had some influence throughout the country in the
aggregate, but in such matters influence is easier to allege than to prove.
Looking at the political history of the period from, say, 1650 to 1700,
one finds little indication of an orthodox ideology approved by the Toku
gawa government; and if that is a correct view, it cannot be said that
the government depended upon an “official” Confucianism for the sup
port of its actions. The approved teaching in Yedo was that of the
Hayashi college, but its leadership, as we have seen, had dwindled by
about 1670. By that time a number of nonconformist voices could be
heard throughout the country. The two young men, Nakae Toju and
Yamazaki Ansai, who attacked Razan in the 1640’s were followed by
stronger objectors, Yamaga Soko (1622-85), Kumazawa Banzan (1619-
9 1), and others, who went so far as to denounce the orthodox versions
of Chu Hsi’s system without incurring much more than a sharp official
rebuke, coupled with a warning.
W e may take it, therefore, that the Tokugawa government did not
seriously object to criticism of its philosophy. Indeed it may even be
that the government was unable to define its own orthodoxy. The high
officials of the Bakufu at the mid-century were the heads of military
houses, such practised leaders as Sakai Tadakatsu and Hotta Masamori,
who were certainly not skilled in philosophic argument, while Razan
himself, the leader of official Confucianism, was from the point of view
of a strict follower of Chu Hsi somewhat shaky in doctrine. Perhaps it
is here that we should look for an explanation of the seeming leniency
of the government in its treatment of dissident thinkers. What the
Bakufu disliked was disagreement not with its ideas but with its policies.
A brief survey of the government’s attitude to some of the leading

nonconformists may help to make the situation clearer. The first of
them to attract the attention of the Bakufu was Yamaga Soko, a native
of Aizu, a brilliant student of Hayashi Razan. While acquiring a deep
understanding of both Buddhism and Neo-Confucianism he paid close
attention to military affairs, because he was concerned to find a solution
to the most serious contemporary problem, the anomalous position of
the warrior class in a time of peace. His lectures were attended by large
numbers, including daimyos and men of hatamoto rank. In 1652 he was
invited to the castle of Asano, the daimyo of Ako, where he served as
military instructor. Returning to Yedo in 1661, he wrote a work called
Seikyo Yorokti ( “The Essentials of Confucianism”), in which he called
for a return to the pure doctrine and a repudiation of the versions of
later dynasties. This was in effect a contradiction of the Neo-Confucian
ism which was the official creed, and the government could not but take
offence. Soko was sent back to Ako, where he remained in exile and
continued his studies.
All his writings display an interest in military science and in the
welfare of the military class. His work entitled Shidd, or “The Way of
the Warrior,” written under strong Confucian influence, contained his
views on the place which the warrior class was to occupy in the new
society. It described their duties and the moral purpose by which they
should be inspired. This and his other works in the same series are the
precursors of the teaching later to be known as Bushido. He was alive
to the difficulty of combining martial discipline and the civil arts, but
felt strongly that if the samurai as a class were not to decline into useless-
ness they must take a lead in service to the state according to its needs.
It will be remembered that it was already before 1650 that Iemitsu’s
government began to be seriously concerned by the problem of the
ronin. It was in 1651 that the great ronin conspiracy was revealed,
though it had been brewing for several years; and it is clear that its
ringleader, Yui Shosetsu, though not a samurai by birth, was able to find
support in many quarters because his rising was a demonstration on
behalf of unemployed samurai, the class which caused anxiety to Ya-
maga Soko. Yamaga Soko, Kumazawa Banzan (next in importance to
Soko as a supporter of the samurai cause), and Yui Shosetsu were known
as the Three Great Ronin—a description which shows the prominence
of the ronin problem in their time.
Kumazawa Banzan started his career in the service of the daimyo
of Okayama, Ikeda Mitsumasa. Following this, he sat at the feet of
Nakae Toju, and in 1647, after some years of study, returned to the
domain of Ikeda in Bizen province. His administrative reforms there
attracted the attention of persons of high rank in the Shogun’s capital,
and for a time he was in high favour. But his rivals in the Ikeda fief
undermined him, and he was at length obliged to resign.
An interesting aspect of Banzan’s term of office in the Bizen fief
is the nature of the work to which he devoted his efforts. He gave
advice on economic policy and was successful in such enterprises as
controlling water supply by riparian works and in forestry development.
He also organized education in the fief, and founded the Okayama Clan
School, the first of its kind. He was promoted in rank by Ikeda Mitsu
masa and was enjoying his success on a visit to Yedo when he came
under the suspicion of Sakai Tadakatsu, the Tairo at that time, because
his name was coupled with reform. It became clear that he must with
draw. He resigned his post in 1656 and went to Kyoto, but coming
under suspicion again (owing to his close relations with some of the
Court nobles to whom he lectured), he was obliged to leave and move
to one remote country retreat after another. He remained suspect and
was virtually banished for the rest of his life. He died in Shimosa in
1691, in the fief of a friendly daimyo, Matsudaira Nobuyuki.
It is clear that Tadakatsu did not coerce Banzan because of his un
orthodox philosophy. What moved the Tairo to action was the fact that
Banzan in his writings (the best known is Daigaku W akumon*) had
criticized the policy of the Bakufu. He had urged a relaxation of the
* This work is a dialogue on the Confucian classic T h e G reat Learning (one of

the Four Books), which Banzan uses as a medium for expressing his views on cur
rent problems, political and economic.
system of alternate attendance, so as to relieve the daimyos of expense;

he had proposed that the money thus saved should be devoted to the
relief of ronin; and he had recommended certain land reforms which
were successfully introduced in the Ikeda fief. Although Banzan had
not openly attacked the official Chu Hsi doctrine, he was openly ostra
cized by Hayashi Razan and his son, who proclaimed him a heretic.
They seem to have forgotten the moral lesson of their own school.
Seeing that the official philosophy was under attack from so many
men of high character and intellectual power, it is clear that it had some
serious weakness. The truth is that the new Confucianism was intolerant
and unpractical. It made no allowance for change. It gave a theoretical
support to the Tokugawa system of government, but could not defend
itself against shock, though of course the Five Human Relations re
mained unchallenged. It might therefore be said that its only success
lay in offering an acceptable ethical standard for the individual.
Following upon the dissensions which we have traced there came
a new trend, away from Neo-Confucian complexities to the original
Confucianism of the Analects, free from metaphysical lumber. The
leader of this movement, which was a natural reaction against learned
squabbles, was a remarkable scholar named ltd Jinsai (1627-1705).
He was a Kyoto man, a member of the merchant class, who was devoted
to teaching. He opened a school for the study of the major classics, and
attracted a great number of pupils. With Yamaga Soko he formed what
was called the Kogaku-Ha, the branch of Ancient Learning, which was
opposed to Neo-Confucianism and indeed to all departures from the
original doctrine.
The development of new schools or versions of Shinto is an inter
esting phase in the history of religion in Japan, which must be considered
later; but for the present we may conclude this survey of Confucianism
in Japan by some general observations on its practical effect, in both
political and social spheres.
Its direct effect upon Bakufu policy is scarcely discernible. If we
examine the main political events after Ieyasu’s death, we find the
development of an anti-Christian movement, following a series of seclu
sion orders culminating in 1639; the land survey order of 1649; and the
order known as Keian no Furegaki of the same year, which was prin
cipally concerned with agrarian problems and laid down some severe
rules for the treatment of peasants. In 1651 came the ronin conspiracy
of Yui Shosetsu. In 1658 six hundred Christians were killed in Omura,
and in 1683 two hundred in Owari—events which can scarcely be ex
amples of “Jinsei,” or Humane Government, which was a Confucian
ideal. From 1638 to 1656 Sakai Tadakatsu was Tairo, followed by
Tadakiyo, who was finally driven out of office in 1680. Neither of these
men was of a kind to be sympathetic to current philosophical issues;
both were conservative, and Tadakatsu, as we have seen, persecuted a
scholar for venturing to suggest changes in Bakufu policy; but it is only
fair to add that Tadakatsu was an upright man, interested in learning,
in whom Iemitsu had great confidence.
The idealism of Chu Hsi s system was not adapted to solving cur
rent political problems; for—to paraphrase the view of a modem Japa
nese historian, Kitajima Masamoto—its optimistic view of human nature
and its quietist attitude made it helpless when confronted with dis
turbances of order. But there can be no doubt of the value of Neo-
Confucian studies in strengthening the social structure of Tokugawa
Japan, and at the same time providing an ethical basis for the organized
society which was to replace the ill-regulated condition of a country
enjoying only intervals of peace. The doctrine of the Five Human Rela
tions, while supporting a system which made for harmony and order
in the state, furnished each individual with a rule of conduct suited to
his own position. The practical and the ethical were thus combined,
for the samurai as well as the peasant. The keynote to this system is of
course Duty, but it is to be noted that it includes the duty of the govern
ing class as well as the duty of the lower orders.
It was fortunate for Japan at this juncture that so many young men of
samurai origin took to study, for the administration of the whole country
and the management of fiefs both great and small required educated
men brought up with a sense of loyalty. Thus it may be said that Neo-
Confucianism furnished Tokugawa Japan with a civil service following
a strict code of behaviour. It may be objected that an acquaintance with
metaphysics is not a good preparation for official life, but it should be
remembered that in Western countries a good classical education is still
thought to be a qualification for responsible posts in government. To
quote the Chinese sages is like quoting Plato or Lucretius.
The number of Confucian scholars who served in the fiefs as advisers
or teachers was considerable, especially from about 1651, when the
country had settled down after the seclusion orders and the discovery
of the ronin conspiracy. By that time the daimyos, having carried out
certain reforms and made progress in the administration of their several
fiefs, were finding a need for competent officials.
The student essaying a general view of the growth of Confucianism

in seventeenth-century Japan is faced with two interesting questions of
cause and effect. In the first place, how was it that at a time when Japan
stood in need of a new system of government, a new system of thought
was ready at hand for its rationalization? In the second place, how was
it that the time for the adoption of such a system coincided with a phase
of intense intellectual activity among students of religion and philosophy
in Japan?
On reflection the answers are simple. It is obvious that we must look
for an explanation which does not assume a sudden conversion of
scholars to Confucian learning. That would be to deny a natural con
tinuity to scholarship in Japan and to suppose that students suddenly
sniffed in the air a new wind of doctrine; but we know that Neo-
Confucian philosophy had been studied in Japan on its own merits long
before its official adoption. It will be remembered that Fujiwara Seika,
who inspired the official school of Hayashi Razan, was himself a student
in a Zen monastery. He was bom forty years before Sekigahara. As for
the second question, it is easy to answer, since it was to be expected that
once the prospect of peace became clear, the minds of men, especially
young men, would turn in general to ideas of public and private morality
and in particular to their own future employment. Such a ferment would
naturally begin as soon as Ieyasu became Shogun and started to fashion
a new government.
It is difficult to devise a schematic treatment of the growth in Japan
of Neo-Confucian moral principles as distinct from institutions, since so
many issues are involved. For one thing there is a temptation to ascribe
all changes to the strength of the doctrine itself, although other im
portant influences were at work. There were, for example, vestiges of
the warrior code of obedience and self-sacrifice going back to Minamoto
times; but perhaps the commonest error is to suppose that Buddhism
declined as Confucianism prospered. It is true that Buddhism had lost
spiritual authority, but it still had a role of importance. It had charge
of all household registration, of burials, and of memorial services for
the dead; and many men in their late years tinned from Confucius to
the Buddha. The great monasteries were still centres of learning, and
a new Zen sect ( Obaku) was imported from China in 1655. Moreover,
despite an edict of 1631 prohibiting the erection of new monasteries,
chapels, and shrines, the total number of Buddhist buildings increased,
partly because of the growth of new sects and partly because of the
growth of towns and villages. Such buildings were generally small, but
they were spread widely over the country. It might therefore be said
that under Ieyasu Buddhism recovered some of the ground that it had
lost under Nobunaga and Hideyoshi.
Confucianism was stem and just, but it could not offer the consola
tions of religion, although it adopted some practices of a religious
character. Such were the ceremonies, seasonal or annual, by which
Confucius was worshipped in temples built for that purpose, not only
in Yedo but in the capitals of the leading feudal domains.8 Thus the lord
of Owari, Ieyasu’s ninth son, Yoshinao, employed a number of Confu-
cian scholars and built a hall ( seido) for the worship of Confucius in his
castle at Nagoya. He also provided a similar edifice at Ueno, an adjunct
to the Hayashi school, in 1632. It was used for ritual purposes. In this
connexion it should be noted that members of the Tokugawa family in
general did much to promote the worship of Confucius, such great lords
as Mitsukuni of Mito and Hoshina of Aizu, as well as Yoshinao, playing
a leading part. In Mito the Ming refugee Chu Shun-shui presided over
the ceremonies in 1672.
These ceremonies in honour of Confucius—they may be called the
worship of Confucius—were concentrated in Ueno, where they were
regularly performed until 1690, when, upon the order of Tsunayoshi, the
fifth Shogun, a great hall (Taiseiden) was built upon an eminence in
Kanda called the Shohei Hill.4 It was styled the Shoheiko (Shohei
Academy), and it became the centre of Confucian ritual for the whole
country, its Spring and Autumn ceremonies being attended by the Sho
gun and his great vassals.
It will be seen that Confucianism as an official cult was firmly estab
lished, but after Tsunayoshi’s death it declined in importance. It should
be remembered, however, that the Shohei Academy survived. It grew
in influence and efficiency as the leading educational institution in the
whole country, the centre of classical studies. It was the University for
all members of the Tokugawa family and all Fudai daimyos, as well as
the Hatamoto class.
Something should be said here about the attitude of the Imperial
Court to Confucian studies. Traditionally the Court had always pro
moted learning, and Emperors regarded this as part of their mission.
The three Emperors Go-Yozei, Go-Mizunoo, and Go-Komyo, whose
reigns covered the years from 1584 to 1654, paid special attention to
Chinese studies. Go-Yozei ordered fine new editions8 of the Four Books
as well as a copy of the “Classic of Filial Piety”; and Go-Komyo, an*
* The shrines in the feudal domains were erected either as separate buildings
or as part of the domain school.
* Shohei was the name of the birthplace of Confucius.
« They were known as Keicho-bon, having been produced in the KeichS era,
1596-1614.
earnest student of Chu Hsi, wrote a preface to the works of Seika, who
besides being a fine scholar belonged to the Reizei line of poets.
Reverting to the ideals of private and public morality that were
offered to the members of the most numerous category in the upper
class, the samurai, it is important to note that duties arising from the
Five Human Relations presented no difficulty to men bom in a tradi
tion of loyalty and obedience. They needed no instruction in those
human obligations, for it was on such a basis that the warrior society
had been founded. It could even be argued that the ethical standard,
the ideal way of life, of the samurai was closer to truth, more rooted
in history, than the precise dogma of a philosopher. This and other
aspects of Neo-Confucianism as it was brought to Tokugawa Japan seem
to be ill-suited to the native Japanese temperament, which was emo
tional and empiric rather than strictly rational. It may be for such rea
sons that in some respects the influence of Neo-Confucianism in Japan
began to diminish in the eighteenth century, because it could not be ap
plied to contemporary problems, which needed pragmatic treatment. As
we have seen, nonconformist opinion had begun to find expression in
1630 by Nakae Toju, and in different forms was continuously spread
thereafter, sometimes incurring official punishment upon the dissidents.
A glance at the list of dissidents will show that the official teaching
came under heavy fire:
Nakae Toju 1608-1648 Wang Yang-ming school
Yamazaki Ansai 1618- 1682 Refashioned Chu Hsi
Kumazawa Banzan 1619- 1691 Followed Toju
Yamaga Soko 1622-1685 Repudiated Neo-Confucianism
I to Jinsai 1627-1705 Against Neo-Confucianism
Kaibara Ekken 1630-1714 Qualified Chu Hsi
Among the defenders of Chu Hsi was a sturdy philosopher named

Muro Kyuso (1658-1734), who in his “Conversations” ( Shundai Zat-
suw a) explained how he came to his views after many years of study
and reflection. Men who venture to criticize the founders of Neo-Con-
fucianism, he says, are like the caterpillar who presumed to measure the
ocean, or like a man who sits at the bottom of a well and looking up at
the sky pronounces it small. He is also perturbed by the contemporary
condition of Japan, for he feels that the samurai are gradually being
corrupted by avarice. What he says on this score is of historical interest,
since it shows how moral standards had been affected by the growth of
commerce. He holds that the ideal warrior is a man who thinks first of
his duty, which comes before his life and his possessions. Consequently,
Kyuso argues, until recent times the samurai knew nothing of money
matters and lived a frugal life. “As I remember my youth,” he con
tinues, “young men of that time never mentioned prices, and there were
some who blushed when they heard lewd stories. Thus have social stand
ards changed in fifty years or so.”
There is no doubt that this kind of sentiment was genuine in the
samurai of the best type. The same rigid code governed the behaviour
of Arai Hakuseki, who, writing in his old age, described his own rigorous
upbringing and the almost inhuman self-control of his father, who died
in 1679. Such stoic standards continued to govern the conduct of con
servative samurai until recent times. On their contempt for money we
have the testimony of Fukuzawa Yukichi, who, writing in the mid
nineteenth century, described the wrath of his father when he learned
that his son Yukichi was being taught arithmetic at school. Numbers
were the tools of shopkeepers.
Kyuso can offer no remedy for the evils attending commerce. He
takes the classical view that countrymen if well treated are simple and
honest, while townspeople are greedy and profligate. He thinks that
severe laws should be promulgated forbidding extravagance and re
buking dissolute conduct; yet as a philosopher he ought to have known
that sumptuary legislation never works.
It is remarkable that the Japanese people should have adopted a

foreign doctrine which a priori one would suppose to be ill-suited to
their character; but it is no less remarkable that they borrowed and
discarded as seemed fit to them, performing eclectic feats which bear
witness to the toughness of their native tradition. Thus, in the promo
tion of their own views, as we have seen, men like Fujiwara Seika, Ha-
yashi Razan, and Nakae Toju found no difficulty in reconciling Shinto
beliefs with atheistic Confucian principles.
2. Shinto and Confucianism
In the galaxy of philosophers that illumined the Yedo firmament, no

star shone with such a lively radiance as Yamazaki Ansai (1618-1682).
The outlines of his life have already been given in connexion with his
criticism of the Hayashi family, but these may be recapitulated and
filled in here. Son of a ronin bom in Kyoto, Ansai became a Zen monk
as a youth. Later he studied Confucianism with a group of young men
in Tosa. In 1648, at the age of twenty-nine, he returned to lay life in
Kyoto. There he began with a deep study of Chu Hsi metaphysics, and
later developed a vocabulary of his own for the description of essen

tials of belief. He then turned to an interest in education, and towards
the end of his life he took up Shinto studies.
He figures in several anecdotes as a strong-minded eccentric. One
favourite story records that he asked his pupils what the Japanese dis
ciples of Confucius and Mencius should do if those sages came in com
mand of a great army to invade Japan, and when the pupils were silent,
he said that, for his part, he would have no fear, but would put on his
armour and with his spear would capture them alive. This, he said, was
in accordance with the teaching of Confucius and Mencius themselves.
Another comment on the wide range of his interests is attributed to Ito
Jinsai, who said in jest that Ansai’s enthusiasms went from one subject
to another so frequently that if he had lived longer he would no doubt
have become a Christian missionary.
Ansai was not alone in his enthusiasm for the national Shinto cult,
which in the Middle Ages had come to terms with Buddhism. Hayashi
Razan used Shinto as an ally of Confucianism against Buddhism, and
this was a general trend. It also became common to give a Confucian
colour to the native creed. Seika had already proclaimed a unity be
tween the two schools of thought, and Hayashi followed him, or indeed
went beyond him, saying in effect that they were identical. Tokugawa
Yoshinao was an ardent Shintoist.
Among the scholars of the O Yomei school of Confucianism, Nakae
Toju had written his Shinto Taii (The Meaning of Shinto), in which he
identified Shinto principles with those of certain concepts in the Con
fucian doctrine of the Mean. Kumazawa Banzan went even farther,
saying that Confucianism was not suited to the climate of Japan. His
laudatory language is startling, for he said that the Buddha, if he came
to Japan, would abandon his own view of an endless succession of
worlds and follow the teaching of Shinto. Similarly, the great sages of
China, and the very name of Confucianism, would be forgotten and
Shinto would take their place. But apart from mere words it was Yama-
zaki Ansai rather than Kumazawa Banzan who carried the Shinto move
ment to greater lengths in practice.
Ansai’s enthusiasm for the principles of Chu Hsi was of an emo
tional nature, and from a complex metaphysical system he selected a
single principle, that of “devotion,” which he made the foundation of
a worship, religious rather than secular. He thought that Confucian
principles in general could be combined with Shinto beliefs. He re
ceived the idea of an amalgam from a Shinto teacher and pursued it
impetuously. He is said to have preached with great vigour to his dis
ciples, who described his demeanour as alarming. His voice was vibrant
like a bell, his face inflamed as with anger.6*8 Sato Naokata, one of his
hearers, recorded that when they entered his doorway, they felt as if
they were going to prison, and that when they left, it was as if they had
escaped a tiger’s jaw.
There is not much to be said for Ansai’s reasoning, and the further
development of Shinto in combination with Confucianism was accom
plished by more rational arguments than his. One of the strongest fea
tures of the movement to amalgamate the native tradition with a bor
rowed philosophy from China is its element of nationalism. Ansai’s
attitude to a hypothetical invasion of Japan by Chinese sages is an
expression of this sentiment.
It is not easy to detect the early stages of this patriotic feeling. It
had of course existed from ancient times, but not in an active way; and
during the Middle Ages it was masked by internal strife. But with na
tional unification there came a strengthening of national consciousness,
hastened perhaps by the Korean campaign. The motives of the seclu
sion policy are not entirely clear, but a desire to protect the national
culture against foreign influence was doubtless one of them.
3. T he Neo-Confucian E thic
The last critique of Neo-Confucianism in the seventeenth century

was not an attack but a successful endeavour to make its essence intel
ligible to ordinary people. It was the work of Kaibara Ekken (1630-
1714), a native of Kyushu, who was trained as a physician. His study
of medicinal herbs led him to a general interest in natural science, which
coloured his philosophy. He believed in a single, benevolent creative
force, thus differing from the dualism of Chu Hsi. His simplification of
orthodox Neo-Confucianism reflected his own direct and single-minded
character. His writings set forth in easy script and in simple language
principles easily understood by people of all classes. He brought the
Confucian ethic to women and children. A later scholar—a man notori
ously sparing of praise, Dazai Shundai—said of Ekken that he was the
most learned man in Japan.
A work called Onna Daigaku (The Greater Learning for Women),
which may have been written by Ekken, sets forth the rule of subservi
ence and obedience to parents, parents-in-law, husband, and (when
6 A startling contrast to oratory in the West, where it could be said by an actor

(G arrick) that the preacher Whitefield could reduce a congregation to tears by the
one word Mesopotamia.
widowed) to a son. But Ekkens own wife (Token) was treated by

him as an equal, and it is said that she wrote the book. She was a very
gifted woman, and perhaps she and Ekken were jointly responsible.1
Ekken himself ranked high, perhaps the highest, among the Confu-
cianists of his day, since he combined great analytic power with prac
tical wisdom. In other words he was able to apply the rationalizing
principle of Chu Hsi to the formulation of a simple code of everyday
morals. Probably no Japanese thinker had so great an effect upon stand
ards of behaviour in Tokugawa society, especially in its middle classes.
The Tokugawa social order of four classes, shi, no, ko, sho (warrior,
farmer, artisan, trader), fitted well enough into a Confucian pattern-
in fact it was of Confucian origin. But the Confucian teaching was not
essentially concerned with such public matters, its stress being laid upon
morals within a family system. It should be understood that the moral
principles in question are not primarily concerned with the character
of the individual, but are directed to the welfare of the family, its
strengthening and its continuity. All members of the family must sub
ordinate their thoughts and their acts to those purposes. The virtue
upon which the family depends is filial piety, the duty of a son to the
head of his family rather than the allegiance of a vassal to his lord.
Filial piety is indeed the foundation of the feudal ethic, for it is by ex
tension of this virtue that submission and obedience to a superior come
to be regarded as an aspect of the pietas which the Chu Hsi system and
its variants require.
To understand the nature of filial piety, said Nakae Toju in his
Okina M ondo, we must consider the debt of gratitude owed to parents
for their affection—this is true at all times and in all places, for the natu
ral love binding parent and child is universally recognized. But the de
velopment of this theme in feudal Japan was carried to extremes by
treating filial gratitude not as a natural feeling but as a rule of conduct
imposed from outside, thus obliging the child to submit blindly to the
parent. It is somewhat surprising to find this doctrine propounded by
Kaibara Ekken, who (in his Doji-Kun, or Instructions for Children)
warns the parent that he must not be governed by instinct and must
guard against being soft and affectionate, for that, he argues, is con
trary to the teaching of the sages, because it means that the child does
not fear his parent. Therefore such affection must be repressed. In
Ekken’s words: “The child must accept in silence the censure of his
elders. He must listen respectfully to what they say, whether it is right
T B. H. Chamberlain's Things Ja p a n ese (London, 1927) has a translation of

Onna D aigaku.
or wrong. However violent and insulting their language may be, he
must not show the slightest trace of anger or resentment.”
This absolute submission to the will of the head of the family relates
to all aspects of daily life. It is the duty of the head of the family to
preserve its good name, and for that purpose he may punish any mem
ber of the family. In order to free the family relatives from joint re
sponsibility for an offence he may divorce or disown ( or even in some
cases kill) an offender.
The relationship between brothers is equally governed by age. The
younger brothers and sisters are distinguished from the eldest son. They
receive from their parents inferior treatment in food, clothing, lodging,
and their upbringing in general. This is a great change from the cus
tom of the Kamakura and Muromachi eras, when the heir was chosen
for his capacity and not by primogeniture. It illustrates a retrograde
aspect of Tokugawa conservatism, and compares ill with the ideal of
filial piety that had been familiar in Japan throughout the Middle Ages.
This severe code bore with great hardship upon the younger sons of
poor samurai. In all fiefs where the daimyo’s income was fixed it was
obviously not possible for samurai of the lower grades to be granted
stipends sufficient to keep both the eldest son and his brothers on the
same standard of living. The younger sons, however able, were obliged
to seek adoption in another family, or to five a life of poverty, or to
make their way to a city, where they could either find employment
(thereby losing their samurai status) or join the ranks of the ronin.
But the worst treatment of all was that to which a woman had to
submit. During her life she had to devote herself to what were called
the “three obediences” (sanju): to her parents when a child, to her hus
band when married, to her children when she grew old. Too much
learning was thought to spoil a girls character, but in the middle and
upper classes some education was approved, in literature, music, versi
fying, and handwriting. These arts were supposed to be exercised in
private, for the separation of the sexes was strict. There was even an
absurd rule, of Confucian origin, saying that after the age of seven boys
and girls could not sit together, even for meals.
Marriages were arranged by parents in the interest of the families
concerned, and a husband could divorce his wife on one of seven
grounds, barrenness, loose behaviour, and disease being the commonest.
It was permissible for the husband to declare as a proper ground for
divorce that his wife was out of harmony with his family’s customs.
No legal proceedings were necessary beyond handing to a wife or her
parents a short notice of divorce—so short that it was known as miku-
dari-han, “three lines and a half.” The private relationship between

husband and wife is a matter of secondary consideration, if it is con
sidered at all. The wife’s function is to give birth to children, or as it
was crudely put, “the womb is a borrowed thing” (hara wa karimono).
Such rules as these, if strictly applied, inflicted hardship to the point
of cruelty upon women and children, and there is no doubt that the life
of married women was often full of suffering. But it is clear that except
perhaps in the strict households of upper-class samurai, the rules were
only partially followed, so that affection and common sense could soften
their harsher aspects and make for a happy family life. The tyrant most
feared by a wife was usually not her husband but her widowed mother-
in-law, who after a lifetime of submission could at last give orders.
It should also be remembered that since family pride was strong, a
wife’s parents or brothers might take revenge upon a husband who wan
tonly ill-treated and disgraced her. The vendetta was a feature of life
in the warrior society. It might be supposed that during an era of peace
the warrior’s mind would turn away from such violent practices, but in
fact the adjustment of the warrior society to peaceful conditions was
one of the most difficult problems facing the Bakufu during the seven
teenth century. It was easy enough to find some theoretical justifica
tion of a class which produced nothing and had no occupation. The
practical difficulty was to find useful employment for men who had been
trained only for war.
As the organization of the central government and the fiefs pro
gressed after the foundation of the Bakufu, the position of the bushi
(warriors) in the lower ranks deteriorated. They began to look back
with regret to the old life of the camp and the battlefield, for they were
not at home in the new conditions. They were left behind by new men,
often men brought in from the other clans or ronin ready to serve a new
master. The new bushi was of a very different character. He lived in
a castle town, where, if he showed special ability, he worked as an offi
cial in the government of the fief. Officials familiar with accounts who
could plan revenue and expenditure or perform important administra
tive duties were regarded by the old-fashioned bushi as cowardly evad
ers of military service. Yet these were the men who rose in importance,
while a loyal retainer with no special ability could look forward to
little promotion.8
As the new bushi replaced the old in new circumstances, standards
8 According to Fukuzawa Yuldchi, whose father was a samurai of the lower rank
in the Okudaira fief, during the whole 200 years of the history of the fief only 35
samurai of the lower rank were promoted to the lowest grade in the upper rank.
of conduct of necessity changed; and it was for that reason that the
intellectual leaders (if we may so label the Confucianist scholars)
sought to develop a logical system of ethics which should apply to the
life of the military class, from the daimyo down to the samurai of the
lowest degree.
The first serious effort to lay down principles of this nature was made
by Yamaga Soko, whose work called Shido, or “The Way of the War
rior” (ca. 1665), has already been touched on. In this he opens his
argument by saying with great truth that the samurai is one who does
no work, whether as farmer or artisan or trader. What then, he asks, is
the samurai’s function? The answer is that the samurai is a leader,
showing the path by his own example in fulfilling the moral obligations
of loyalty and family piety. According to Soko’s argument, the samurai
is a teacher who thinks of his function in terms not of reward but only
of duty. The special interest of this and related treatises of Soko lies
in the fact that they propose a new concept of the place of the samurai
in society. He is no longer a military, but a civil, officer, charged with
the intellectual and moral guidance of the people at large. Soko further
postulates of the relation between the warrior and his lord that it is
something divinely decreed, absolute and inviolable, superior to all con
siderations of gratitude or reward.
This is a neatly constructed abstract system, but it will not stand up
to close examination. Soko himself, though ruling that the samurai
should not think in terms of reward, wrote when he was in exile that he
would not take employment for less than ten thousand koku. The
truth is that what was wanted from the samurai was not high-sounding
professions of loyalty and service but practical contributions to the gov
ernment by which they were employed. For this purpose obedience and
assiduity were required, and there was no need for a philosophical sup
port for such virtues. They were the traditional virtues of the samurai,
and they were still practised, imperfectly no doubt, but commonly
enough to exert influence as ideals.
Other Confucianists as well as Soko attempted to rationalize a situ
ation in which a class comprising rather less than one-tenth of the popu
lation produced nothing and lived as parasites on the more numerous
element consisting of farmers, artisans, and traders. In this sphere the
proposals of the philosophers were ineffectual if not positively harmful;
but they were right to oppose certain features of the older tradition of
the samurai.
The durability of the older code in some of its aspects is exhibited
in certain survivals which were in flat contradiction to the ethical teach-
ing of the Confucianists. Among them was the practice of “junshi,” or

self-immolation, in order to follow a warlord to the grave. It belonged
to an age when the bond between the leader and his liegeman who
fought by his side in battle was very close and personal, so close that
when the leader was killed the liegeman would at once seek death to
keep him company. It was perpetuated in the Yedo period by the sui
cide of several men on the death of a Shogun or a great Daimyo. From
any rational point of view this was regarded as wrong-doing, and it was
opposed by Ieyasu on general grounds and by most of the daimyos who
were influenced by Confucian teaching.
Early examples of junshi in the Yedo period were the suicide in 1607
of four pages on the death of Matsudaira Tadayoshi and of four re
tainers on the death of Matsudaira Hideyasu. After this, cases were
frequent for some time, and there were even examples of junshi in the
second degree, that is to say of junshi to follow a superior who had
already committed junshi.
The argument in support of this practice was that a warrior cannot
serve two masters, and therefore when his lord dies he must end his own
life. When the Shogun Hidetada died, one of the Roju followed him,
and when the Shogun Iemitsu died thirteen persons committed junshi,
among them being the two distinguished Roju Hotta Masamori and Abe
Shigetsugu. This ghastly habit was at last forbidden by enlightened
daimyos, such as Hoshina, Ii, Ikeda, and Kuroda, and finally by the
Bakufu in a decree of 1663. The ban was strictly enforced, and when
a certain vassal of Okudaira Tadamasa killed himself on Tadamasa’s
death in 1668, the vassal’s two children were executed, other relatives
were banished, and Okudaira’s heir was transferred to a less important
fief. This brought the practice of junshi to an end. The intervention of
the Bakufu here may be regarded as an instance where Confucian sen
timent influenced government policy.
A more common and less unnatural practice was the vendetta (ka-
taki-uchi), which was of ancient origin. The first recorded case of ka-
taki-uchi in the Yedo period was the Igagoe ( “crossing Iga”) encounter
of 1634, between one Watanabe Kazuma and Kawai Matagoro, who had
murdered Kazuma’s father. Kazuma, accompanied by a brother-in-law
and two young samurai, pursued Matagoro and more than a score of his
kinsmen into a lonely upland in the province of Iga. Kazuma’s small
party overcame their enemies, and Matagoro was killed. In this quarrel
there was a homosexual element. It was the theme of many stage plays.
Better known is the celebrated story of the Forty-Seven Ronin
(1702), where the motive was loyalty to a feudal lord. Theatrical ver-
sions of this act of vengeance have been the most popular plays ever
since it was committed, and there can be no doubt of its influence upon
the mind of all classes. It is a curious fact that whereas in the first half
of the Yedo period among the recorded cases of kataki-uchi most were
the work of bushi, in the second half (except in cases of single combat)
farmers and merchants were in a majority. It would thus appear that in
the beginning the militant spirit of the bushi had survived from the age
of the wars, but that with the lapse of time warriors became adjusted to
civilian life, while the middle and lower classes gradually came under
the influence of the Confucian pattern of behaviour; or perhaps the
theatre put ideas into their heads.
The attitude of the Bakufu towards the vendetta was not unfavour
able. Since a question of moral duty was involved, the government
could not forbid acts of vengeance inspired by Confucian ideals of
loyalty and piety. On the contrary, persons intending to execute ven
geance had to apply to the Bakufu for permission, which was usually
granted.
There is specific authority for this action in the Code of One Hun
dred Articles (sometimes called the Legacy of Ieyasu, though it be
longs to a later period, probably about 1650). This document is a land
of Constitution of the warrior society. Regarding the vendetta it is quite
clear. It says that a man “must not live under the same sky as one who
has injured his lord or his father” (Article 51). It goes on to state that
notice must be given to the authorities of the intention to kill an offender,
and that permission will be granted so long as there is no delay and so
long as no rioting is involved. The same document contains an article
stating that a samurai may kill a member of the lower class “who has
behaved offensively to him.” In this case, the authorities do not require
notification, the samurai being given “kirisute gomen,” or permission to
cut down and leave without further to-do (Article 44).
4. Historical Studies
When Ieyasu displayed an interest in the printing of new editions of
classical Chinese works on government, military science, and history,
and when Hayashi Razan and other scholars began to go deep into Con
fucian studies, they were not introducing a new kind of learning. They
were restoring their country's intellectual tradition after a lapse due to
the wars of the Middle Ages. Indeed they were leaders in an important
renaissance movement which encouraged not so much the fine arts as the
study of philosophy in general and of history in particular.
There had been no historical study of importance since the Gukan-

sho of 1223 (one of the great historical works of Japan and the first to
attempt a reasoned interpretation of the past), and it was to be ex
pected that at the beginning of a new dynasty—the Tokugawa—scholars
would wish to review the history of their country in the light of ideas
then current in Japan.® A leader in this movement, most appropriately,
was a Tokugawa of distinction, Mitsukuni (1628-1700), the daimyo of
the Mito fief and a grandson of leyasu. As a youth he is said to have
been a turbulent character, much given to dissipation; but from the age
of eighteen he appears to have reformed, and he was chosen to succeed
his father as daimyo of Mito. He thus became the head of one of the
Go-Sanke, the Three Great Families collateral to the main line of leyasu.
He plunged into classical studies and developed a strong feeling for
history. At the age of thirty (in 1657) he began the compilation of a
national history. His purpose was to displace the H oncho Tsugan, the
official history written for the Bakufu by Hayashi Razan, to which he
objected as a mere calendar of events. His own plan was to produce a
comprehensive work on the lines of the great Chinese histories. It was
to cover Japanese history from antiquity to the end of the Namboku-chd
period. It was to be entitled Dai Nihon Shi. The compilation made
good progress during Mitsukuni’s lifetime, but stopped in 1715 and was
not resumed until late in the nineteenth century. It is the only Japanese
work which resembles in form and quality the great Chinese histories,
since it includes their standard features and is extremely accurate.
Mitsukuni’s purpose was didactic. He hoped that a study of history
would improve the minds of the samurai in the fiefs, and show them the
importance of national unity. He was a firm follower of the school of
Chu Hsi, which holds that the purpose of the study of history is to
obtain moral guidance. The recorded actions of historical figures must
be examined in the light of the essence or true nature ( li) of virtue.
The early drafts of the portions relating to the conflict between the
Northern and Southern Courts contain a close enquiry into the true na
ture of taigi meibun, the moral law in the relations of ruler and subject.
These sections reach the conclusion that the Ashikaga Shoguns, by their
support of the Northern Court, were traitors. As the work proceeded
and new scholars were brought in—such men as Asaka Tampaku (1656-
1737) and Miyake Kanran (1674-1718)—the language used became
» The Jinnd ShotOki (1 3 3 9 ) of Kitabatake Chikafusa is a polemic treatise rather
than a history. It was written in difficult circumstances, without access to written
sources, and its truly historical value lies in the description of events within Chika-
fusa’s own direct knowledge, such as political and military incidents during Go-
Daigo’s reign. Its general attitude reveals influence of the Gukanshd.
more objective and temperate. Among the compilers of the Dai Nihon
Shi was the Chinese scholar Chu Shun-shui, who was living in Nagasaki
and whom Mitsukuni invited to take part.
Although the main purpose of this great undertaking was to relate
the history of the country in terms of the acts and policies of the legiti
mate sovereigns of the Imperial dynasty, the writers “did not condemn
the Shogunate as an institution, for it was an arm of Imperial rule. They
insisted that Shoguns were subjects, but they did not presume to deny an
emperor the right to delegate his authority to any officer of his choice.”10
10 From "W hat Is the Dai Nihon Shi?,” an essay by Dr. Herschel W ebb in
Journal o f Asian Studies, Vol. X IX , No. 2 (1 9 6 0 ).
CH A PTER VIII
RURAL LIFE
1. Farm s an d Farm ers
B e f o r e entering upon a survey of rural life in the seventeenth cen

tury, it is useful to gain some general acquaintance with its character
and its environment. The most remarkable feature of Japanese agri
culture is the small size of the holdings, their great area in aggregate,
and the intensive cultivation to which the land is subjected. The chief
crop is rice, grown in wet fields (paddy), and next in importance are
the grains and vegetables from the dry fields (hatake). The fields are
small. The measures of superficies are
1 cho = 10 tan = approximately 23%acres
and the product of one cho of first-class paddy is of the order of ten
koku, a koku being the equivalent of about five bushels dry measure in
England or the United States.
In all discussion of the amount and quality of the crop, the ruling
fact is that one koku of rice is the average annual consumption of one
person, so that since there is no import of food, the total production in
koku gives approximately the total population of the country.
To cultivate one cho of mixed (wet and dry) arable land required
the full-time labour of four or five men.1 In practice most of the hold
ings were small, and it might be said that the frequency of holdings was
in inverse proportion to their size. Thus a single village of twenty hold
ings might have the following distribution:
12 holdings under 5 koku
5 holdings from 5 to 10 koku
2 holdings from 10 to 20 koku
1 holding of 20 or more koku
This is a hypothetical distribution, but it gives a fair picture of the ele

ments of a rural community. An important point which these figures
1 This figure is conjectural, since the amount of labour required depended upon
the nature of the soil, the proportion of dry to wet fields, and other variables. A six
teenth-century work ( S eirydki) gives 800 man-days and 200 woman-days for an
area of one cho, of which one-fourth is dry. Allowances being made for seasonal
changes, this would give about four men for one cho, but an exact figure is not pos
sible; and changes in farming methods, with better implements, would tend to re
duce the number of workers per chd but to increase the acreage tilled.
RURAL LIFE 97
do not reveal is the high proportion of very small holdings, for in most
parts of the country many of the holdings of less than five koku would
be in dimensions of two or three tan, producing as little as two koku
and therefore of marginal utility.
A holding with a yield of twenty koku (an area of two cho) would
require the labour of from five to eight men, a number which the hold
er’s family could scarcely furnish. He would therefore be obliged to
depend upon collateral relatives, or upon persons not related but gen
erally treated as members of his family circle. Where further labour
was required, the family would call upon a class of workers of whom
some were hereditary servants ( called fu d a i) and others were bound
by contract. These servants (generally styled genin or “underlings”)
were part of the household of the landholder, living with him or in
adjacent dwelling places furnished by him. It is estimated that the
genin formed about 10 per cent of the peasant population of the country
in the seventeenth century. Where still further labour was required, it
would be furnished by persons known as nago or hikan (or equivalent
local names). These were men who held small plots and dwellings
allotted to them by the landholder in return for labour supplied as rent.
It will be clear from the foregoing summary that the large holdings
of arable land in the seventeenth century were farmed by families com
posed of several elements brought together not only by kinship but also
by economic need; but there can be no doubt that family feeling was
strong and comprehensive, and that the “underlings” were treated as
relatives, however humble.
2. T h e Village
To understand the agrarian society of Tokugawa Japan it is neces

sary to look back to the land policy of the sixteenth century, before the
great cadastral survey of Hideyoshi was accomplished.*
During the Middle Ages the farming population of Japan was het
erogeneous, since it included men of different classes who enjoyed free
dom of movement in the social scale. In other words the division of
classes was not the fixed partition it became when Hideyoshi’s policy
brought about the separation of the farmer from the soldier. The
farmer-soldier of the Middle Ages had considerable freedom for the
reason that in the aggregate the farm population had formidable mili
tary strength. Indeed it was to destroy this potential danger that Hide-
* This great survey, known as Taikd no Kenchi, was ordered by Hideyoshi in

1582 and continued until 1598.
98 RURAL LIFE
yoshi’s policy was intended. During the land survey which he inaugu
rated, every plot of farmland was inspected and registered. The survey
recorded the area, the class of land, the quantity of rice or other crop
which it was called upon to produce, and the name of the person re
sponsible for its cultivation.®
The result of Hideyoshi’s policy was to deprive the farming popu
lation of social mobility, to fix each man’s status, and thus to bind him
to the soil. During this process the lowest grade of farm worker gained
his independence in that he could not be deprived of the plot registered
in his name. But his freedom was only nominal, for the holdings of such
men were small and usually insufficient for their subsistence. Most of
them had plots of only one or two tan (the tan being .245 acres), which
would produce under five koku, an amount less (after tax) than the
consumption of a small family at the normal rate of one koku per head
per annum. Consequently such smallholders were obliged to work for
families owning much greater areas, usually by sending a son or daugh
ter or other relative out to service.
The owners of large holdings were generally families descended
from members of the rural gentry who, after Hideyoshi’s survey and
the announcement of his attention to disarm all but members of the
military class, decided to abandon their military status and devote them
selves to agriculture. By comparison with the smallholders these rich
farmers—gono as they were called—were not numerous. As we have
seen, small and medium holdings made up a very large proportion of
the total of the country’s arable land.
The condition and organization of the workers on the land is a matter
of great complexity which is not suited to treatment here, since it re
quires highly specialized knowledge. For our purpose a broad perspec
tive is appropriate, and it is sufficient to examine the village rather than
the single farm, premising that the principal mode of farming in the
seventeenth century was the working of a large holding by the owner
and his family and dependents. This was called “tedzukuri,” or hand-
cultivation, because it meant real digging by the owner’s men as con
trasted with “kosaku,” which was cultivation by tenants. The village
was the administrative unit with which the feudal officials dealt.
Before treating of the village, it is useful to consider briefly the atti
tude of the ruling class towards the peasantry. In theory the farmer
ranked next to the samurai and above the artisan and the trader. But*
* For an account of farm labour before Hideyoshi’s survey, see the section
"Rural Life” in Volume H of this work, pages 3 3 3 -35.
w :-~
\i—
3
RURAL LIFE 99
in practice the men who tilled the soil were heavily oppressed, and
their life was often wretched. It was the policy of the Bakufu and of
most daimyos to tax them to the point of exhaustion. Honda Masanobu,
Ieyasu’s trusted adviser, wrote that the peasant was the foundation of
the state and must be governed with care. He must be allowed neither
too much nor too little, but just enough rice to live on and to keep for
seed in the following year. The remainder must be taken from him as tax.
This unhappy situation is amply described in many official docu
ments, notably in the order known from its date as Keian no Furegala,
which was issued to all villages in 1649, following a shorter notice of
1642. The general purpose of these injunctions was to impress upon the
peasants the importance of unremitting toil and frugal living. The fol
lowing extracts will give a fair impression of the nature of the legisla
tion as a whole:
—Farm work must be done with the greatest diligence. Planting

must be neat, all weeds must be removed, and on the borders of both
wet and dry fields beans or similar foodstuffs are to be grown, however
small the space.
—Peasants must rise early and cut grass before cultivating the fields.
In the evening they are to make straw rope or straw bags, all such work
to be done with great care.
—They must not buy tea or sake to drink, nor must their wives.
—Men must plant bamboo or trees round the farmhouse and must use
the fallen leaves for fuel so as to save expense.
—Peasants are people without sense or forethought Therefore they
must not give rice to their wives and children at harvest time, but must
save food for the future. They should eat millet, vegetables, and other
coarse food instead of rice. Even the fallen leaves of plants should be
saved as food against famine. . . . During the seasons of planting and
harvesting, however, when the labour is arduous, the food taken may
be a little better than usual.
—The husband must work in the fields, the wife must work at the
loom. Both must do night work. However good-looking a wife may be,
if she neglects her household duties by drinking tea or sightseeing or
rambling on the hillsides, she must be divorced.
—Peasants must wear only cotton or hemp—no silk. They may not
smoke tobacco. It is harmful to health, it takes up time, and costs money.
It also creates a risk of fire.
The peasants were heavily taxed, and in addition to payments in

cash or in kind they were called upon to do work on the roads and
100 RURAL LIFE
embankments, to supply post horses, and to render other services with

out pay. Under what was known as the “sukego” (corvee), men and
horses were requisitioned from villages along the main highways some
times for days on end. These practices interfered with farming to such
an extent that a number of peasants were impoverished and deserted
their plots. Those who suffered most were the labourers dependent
upon small pieces of land.
The Bakufu and the several fiefs announced strong measures against
absconders. Thus in 1642 Ikeda, daimyo of the firmly governed Oka
yama fief, issued an order laying the responsibility for absconsions upon
the Five-Man Groups ( Gonin-gumi) in each village. Persons contrib
uting in any way to the escape of peasants or other offenders were to
be punished by fines levied upon individuals or upon a whole village.
The whole village, or the gonin-gumi, was obliged to cultivate the de
serted plots for a year or until a suitable cultivator could be found.
Here also the cost ( including the tax assessed upon the plots) must be
home by the village. The village as a whole was stronger and more
influential than its individual members, so that to a point it could resist
pressure from local authorities or at worst could negotiate with some
modest hope of success.
The village of the seventeenth century developed in a natural way
from the mediaeval village, which was of various origins. Its social
classes included the old settlements developed by rural gentry (myoshu,
dogo, or jizamurai) and later groups of farmers formed by warriors
taking refuge in remote country places after defeat in the civil wars.
But the commonest class was the group of farmers engaged in opening
up new farm land. This kind of enterprise was much encouraged by the
Bakufu and the leading daimyos. It was furthered by an increasing
supply of capital as the mercantile economy expanded, and by improve
ments in the techniques of civil engineering needed for surveying and
for constructing dykes and embankments.
In size the average village was a group of about fifty homesteads,
and towards the end of the sixteenth century its chief habitants were
independent farmers of the class called hon-byakusho ( landholders with
full membership in the village), some of whom were former well-to-do
soldier-farmers, who after Hideyoshi’s Sword Hunt of 1588 had sur
rendered their arms and become civilians, and might be described as
country squires. To this class should be added the small cultivators
(ko-sakunin), whom, as we have seen, the Sword Hunt had released
from their ties to the gentry and turned into independent landowners
chiefly of minimal areas of wet and dry fields.
This period of relative freedom for the village did not last long, for
RURAL LIFE 101
by the cadastral surveys of the years between 1574 and 1600,4 and par
ticularly the great survey ordered by Hideyoshi, which lasted for some
fifteen years, the village became the administrative unit to which the
feudal authority (central or provincial) applied its measures of control,
including the levy of land-tax assessed upon each separate field and the
determination of agricultural policy in general. The village for its part
was a corporation which acted for the cultivators in all matters such as
petitions, contracts, leases, and the management of common lands. It
was even at times held responsible for the wrongful acts of individual
villagers.
Local official agents (daikan and gundai) supervised the affairs of
the villages, but there were no officials resident in any village. The vil
lage headman, of whom there were three kinds ( nanushi or shoya,8 ku-
migashira, and hyakusho-dai), conducted village government in accord
ance with instructions from the official agents. The holders of these
three kinds of posts were nominally appointed by election or by the
decision of a committee, but in practice most of the appointments were
hereditary in the long-established influential families of the small rural
gentry.
In addition to these appointments there was usually selected a sub
ordinate, a kind of go-between, who assisted the headman particularly
in arranging the payment of taxes but generally in all matters pertaining
to the production of crops and the maintenance of order. Under the
nanushi or shoya, there were three or four assistants called kumigashira.
The hyakusho-dai was a village officer chosen to represent the interests
of the majority of the peasants, particularly in regard to liability for tax
or the sharing out of duties. It was customary in most parts of the coun
try for a number of villages to form a larger unity, the “go” or rural dis
trict, over which a senior headman, the O-Shoya, presided. This was a
post of great honour.8
(a) T he Five-Man Group (Gonin-gumi)
The Gonin-gumi were groups of five householders who were jointly

responsible for the actions of each member. Their functions were nu-*
* It should be remembered that surveys of agricultural land were ordered by

individual warlords long before this, as for example by the Hoj5 and Imagawa fami
lies early in the sixteenth century. Nobunaga ordered surveys of single provinces
from 1568.
5 The appellation nanushi means “name-master” and recalls the term my5shu,
which has the same meaning and was the title of mediaeval landowners of myoden,
or name-fields. In the Home Provinces the term shoya was in common use.
8 For further details on the organization of village and family life, see the
Appendix, pp. 24 5 -47.
102 RURAL LIFE
merous. They had to certify marriages, successions, testaments, and

contracts for sale, purchase, or loan. When tax payments of a member
were in arrear, they had had to give security for the amount due; and
when an offence was committed they had to accept responsibility for
the a c t In general their obligations included mutual aid and mutual
surveillance of all public and private actiivties within the group.
The Gonin-gumi was thus an agency of self-government not arising
from popular initiative but imposed upon communities by the governing
class. Its chief purpose was to preserve order and to keep the authori
ties informed of conditions in both town and village. It was in fact a
police organ for spying and delation, characteristic of the official atti
tude towards problems of administration.
Its duties were laid down in a preface (Zensho) to the register
(called Goningumi-cho) which every village possessed. This register
was signed by the headman and contained, for observance by members
of the groups, a list of positive duties and prohibited acts. Some of
these documents are simple and brief, others recite rules at considerable
length and in great detail. An early and comparatively brief example
(1658) contains fifteen articles, the chief of which may be summarized
as follows:
—Instructions for receiving visiting officials; for clearing roads; and

for tying up dogs and cats.
—All wells, ditches, and streams are to be cleaned and embankments
repaired early in the New Year.
—All arable land is to be cultivated, no empty spaces left.
—Trees and bamboo are not to be cut without permission. When
wood or bamboo is required for building, application must be made to
the authorities.
—No ronin, merchants, or beggars are to be allowed to spend a night
in the village if they come from another fief and are unknown.
—All bridges, roads, and paths must be kept in order by daily atten
tion.
—Rules for the sale of horses and oxen.
—Gambling and bribery are forbidden.
—Persons in a rural district who do not qualify as farmers, traders,
or members of other recognized occupations must be closely questioned
and the result reported to the authorities. They must be expelled if the
authorities so require.
—In a rural district not a single Christian priest or brother or other
member of a forbidden sect may be allowed entry. Care must be taken
to prevent such entry.
RURAL LIFE 103
—In case of fire or robbery in a village, help must at once be given
by another village if requested.
—No person must be bought or sold in breach of the law fixing the
lowest age at ten.
These regulations were read aloud to the villagers by the village

headman or other official several times a year.7 The Gonin-gumi as an
institution continued until as late as 1888, when it was replaced by a
new system of local government But the principle of group responsi
bility survived, and the neighbourhood group (Tonarigumi), a larger
and unofficial body, was used by the government in the 1930 s as a unit
in the organization of civil defence, food rationing, and other wartime
functions imposed upon local associations in town and country.8
Despite the elaborate nature of the regulations drawn up by the vil
lages, it is doubtful whether they were in practice observed by the
members of the Gonin-gumi except in a general way. They were de
vised to make a good impression upon the authorities rather than for
the guidance of the peasants, who had their ways of dealing with
offenders in their midst
( b ) Class Distinctions in th e Village
In the early land surveys the name registered was that of the actual
farmer (sakunin), that is to say the landholder or, as he was called, the
hon-byakusho. But actually there were in addition to him a number of
men, ranging from smallholders to serf-like labourers, whose names
did not appear in the register. These were common in backward areas,
and were known as hikan or nago or by similar names denoting their
dependent position. They were servants, not subject to tax and having
no say in village government. The only persons who could take part in
village meetings or belong to Five-Man Groups, or who could claim
preferential rights in the use of common land or in water supply were
the hon-byakusho.
Thus the village in the seventeenth century was by no means a simple
Arcadian settlement but a small community in which there were very
marked social gradations and a growing conflict of interest between rich
and poor. These class distinctions differed from place to place. In the
Home Provinces and central Japan in general, the scale of farms was
T A very full account of the Goningumi-cho, with texts, is in Goningumi H dki-

shii (3 vols.), edited by Hozumi Nobushige (Tokyo, 1 9 3 0 ).
•For the modem Tonarigumi, see R. P. Dore, City L ife in Jap an (Berkeley,
Calif., 1958).
104 RURAL LIFE
small and there were many non-cultivating landowners. In the East and
North there were many large holdings belonging to men of the landlord-
moneylender class and farmed by hikan, nago, or other subordinates,
who, in addition to working on their own small plots, were obliged to
furnish as rent not only payment in kind but also free labour for a speci
fied number of days each year.
The strict class divisions in the rural society are a remarkable feature
of village life. They depended not upon the amount of land held by a
family but upon the family’s pedigree. The farming community was
very conscious of distinctions of birth and rank. Most of the members
of the old and respected families were descendants of landowners who
in late mediaeval times had been active leaders of rural settlements
which cohered into villages. Their position was so firm that it was not
affected by variations in their incomes. Thus the heads of most old fami
lies occupied the important posts in the village government. They
exercised the strongest influence upon its decisions, as well as enjoying
preference in the use of common lands and irrigation works. Their
superior social position is well illustrated by their authority in the
“miyaza,” which were bodies of parishioners of the Shinto shrines in the
locality. In their meetings the old families took precedence over all
other members. They occupied so many ritual posts that there was little
room for the ordinary villager.
Since the peasant population provided the staple food of the whole
country it was essential for the government to keep control of agricul
ture. This control was best exercised by supervising the activity of the
village rather than of any greater or smaller unit, and the most effective
method was to make use of the procedure laid down in the cadastral
surveys by which the product of the farms was measured and assessed
for tax. This procedure involved a close examination of the land and its
yield by inspecting officers who were on the look-out for lazy farming.
Their treatment of the peasants was oppressive, but it must be remem
bered that the government was properly anxious to conserve and in
crease the food supply which was dangerously low in a country where
agricultural techniques were old-fashioned even towards the end of the
seventeenth century. A rising population called for rising production.
The basic tax was an annual levy upon the crop of wet fields ( paddy)
and dry fields (hatake), as assessed in the register (kenchicho) of the
survey. The rate of tax varied from 40 to 60 per cent of the crop, payable
usually in kind on rice, and partly in cash on the product of dry fields;
but allowance was made for deficits due to bad weather or other natural
causes. The fields were tested for quality of the crop by “tsubo gari,"
RURAL LIFE 105
that is by reaping and examining the grain from selected squares of one
tsubo (six feet square).
A specimen calculation of the tax would be as follows:
Class 1 fields (p ad d y ) ................................................................. 5 tan

Class 1 fields (d ry ) ....................................................................... 5 tan
H o m e s te a d ........................................................................................... 1 tan
Crop
Crop from paddy, 1 . 8 koku p er t a n ................................. 9 koku
Crop from dry fields, 1 koku p er t a n ............................... 5 koku
H om estead, assessed a t ............................................................ 1 koku
In this example, on the total of 15 koku the farmer would pay, say,
a 50 per cent tax, amounting to 7 .5 koku of rice, or the equivalent in
grain and cash. This leaves him little rice for his own consumption, but
fair supplies of other grain or vegetables. In addition to this tax there
was a miscellaneous levy to provide funds for post-stations and for the
transport of tax goods to official storehouses. There were also taxes
upon profits from the sale of articles made by the peasants or of special
local products such as fruit or fish; and there were occasional obliga
tions to contribute to the cost of riparian works. These additional im
posts were less onerous in Bakufu domains than in the fiefs of independ
ent daimyos, but the collection of the basic tax was uniform throughout
the country.
In order to perfect their system of taxation the daimyos in some fiefs
imposed further limits upon the freedom of the peasants. Thus in 1643
the sale or mortgage of arable land was forbidden in order to prevent
peasants not only from selling their rights and migrating to the towns,
but also from creating minimal holdings. A later order, of 1673, pro
hibited the subdivision of lands by ruling that a holder must retain
from one to two cho, or an area providing from ten to twenty koku.
At current rates of production to split a holding of less than one cho
would be to involve both parties in trouble.
Peasants were subjected to burdensome restrictions. They could not
change their occupation. They could not travel outside their own dis
trict, in search of employment or to attend a wedding, until they had
obtained a certificate from their parish shrine. Peasants who failed to
furnish the required amount of tax goods were sometimes very harshly
treated, and it was not uncommon for the village headman to be deemed
responsible and detained as a hostage. His property might be confis
cated and his person subjected to torture.9 Kumazawa Banzan wrote
8 One of Chikamatsu’s plays ( K eisei Shuten-doji) refers to a wooden horse
(m okuba), astride of which the victim was obliged to sit with heavy weights on
his legs.
106 RURAL LIFE
in one of his memoranda to the daimyo of Bizen: "Naturally the peas

ants hide their rice, knowing that they will in any event be cruelly
treated.” He meant that cruelty only served to create a desperate reac
tion; and it is true that as the administration of the fiefs improved ( per
haps under the influence of Confucian teaching), these methods of
violence were abandoned. But they were replaced by other forms of
pressure.
One of the victims of oppression was the village headman ( nanushi
or shoya). The classic case is that of Sakura Sogoro, a village headman
who presented a direct appeal to the Shogun, protesting against the
ill-treatment of peasants by the daimyo Hotta Masanobu. The ap
peal was granted, but the offence of approaching the Shogun’s palan
quin was punished by the execution of Sogoro, his wife, and their chil
dren. There is probably more legend than exact truth in this tale, which
was made into a rousing stage play; but there are many authentic ex
amples of revolt against heavy tax and other impositions.
These protests usually took the form of mass demonstrations, some
times accompanied by violence. An early example was a protest against
the survey of 1641, in which wealthy farmers led by village officials took
a part. For the offence of resistance in the fief (Uwajima) seven head
men were executed. There were also numerous risings by peasants of
the lower grades, but these were usually rather modest affairs, settled
without much difficulty. The most effective form of resistance was not
a threat of force but the planned desertion of villages. Here the farm
labourers of two or three or more villages would leave their fields and
scatter. They would then send a petition to the daimyo, adding that if
their requests were not granted they would all abscond. As a rule such
demonstrations were not punished so long as they were made through
proper channels. A good example is the case of the Obama fief ( in Wa-
kasa), where in 1652 the headman (shoya) Matsumoto Choso stub
bornly appealed for a reduction of the tax claimed from his village.
This was granted, but the headman was executed.
Protests of this kind were often unavailing because they had no
strong and unanimous support from the villages; but by the end of the
seventeenth century the peasantry were more conscious of their strength
and, as we shall see, at times made demonstrations in such force that
their daimyos were rebuked by the Bakufu for misgovemment.
3. Progress in Agronomy
The advances made by agriculture in the seventeenth century are

striking. The area cultivated grew from about 1,600,000 chobu to
RURAL LIFE 107
about 2,900,000 chobu, and the crop increased from about 18 million
koku to 25 million.
The change was most rapid in the latter half of the century. It
was made possible by the organization of the farms under the hon-
byakusho, and the tireless, intensive cultivation of farmlands which
was encouraged, and indeed exacted, by the Bakufu and the daimyos.
The opening up of new land was facilitated by newly acquired tech
niques which were applied to such works as the completion of irriga
tion channels from the upper waters of the Tamagawa (1655) and
from Lake Hakone (1670) to newly developed farmlands in the great
Kanto plain.10 This notable increase of the area under cultivation was
accompanied by important advances in husbandry, such as widespread
double-cropping, improved implements, more and better fertilizers, and
deeper cultivation. Treadmills for the raising of water from ditches,
and mechanical devices to save time and labour in threshing and other
operations, added to the efficiency of most farms.
In addition to these primary increases the peasants made profits
from the sale of products other than grain and vegetables. They grew
cotton, tobacco, oil seeds, vegetable wax, indigo, and mulberry for silk
worms. Such extra earnings had at one time been discouraged by the
authorities, who were intent upon the production of food; but pres
ently new enterprises came to be looked upon with favour as the dai
myos began to compete with one another in trade.
Evidence of a rising standard of living is the regular supply of deli
cacies to the towns from the country, such as oranges from Kishu,
grapes from Koshu, sweet com, melons, and other fruit and vegetables
from warm provinces. As we have noted, the total production of rice
may be taken as a crude index of population, since one koku of rice or
rice-equivalent is the average annual consumption per capita. Reliable
census figures are not available for the seventeenth century, but about
26 million is thought to be a reasonably accurate figure for 1721 (though
it excludes certain categories—the samurai and the classless persons).
We may therefore conclude that 25 million is a reasonable estimate for
the population in 1700. As to the proximate causes of this rapid popu
lation growth we can only speculate. The country was at peace after
1615, and both the Bakufu and the daimyos turned their attention to
improving their economic condition. Throughout the country the
growth of agriculture was matched by a great increase of mercantile
10 In 1631, in Shinshu, water was carried for miles through channels dug in
solid rock, and in part by underground channels pierced through rock for about
800 yards, by a technique borrowed from copper-mining. In consequence of such
irrigation systems the yield of rice in Musashi province rose from 667,000 koku to
1,167,000 koku during the seventeenth century.
108 RURAL LIFE
activity in the towns, especially the already populous cities of Osaka

and Kyoto and the growing capital of the Shogun at Yedo. No doubt
a rising standard of living—more and better food and security of em
ployment-contributed to a rising birth-rate.
But it is extremely difficult to distinguish here between cause and

effect or demand and supply. The increase in production cannot be
ascribed solely to new methods. It was due in part at least to an ex
pansion of travel and trade throughout the country which could not but
influence backward regions by bringing them into a national system.
Some explanation can be found in a book called N ogyo Zensho ( “The
Farmer’s Compendium”) written in 1696. This was the first really im
portant practical treatise on agriculture, although there were several
theoretical works tracing its foundation to Gods and Sages, as the in
vention of horticulture might be traced to Adam and Eve. N ogyo Zen
sho was a serious work, written by a remarkable man named Miyazaki
Antei, who had spent forty years in practical farming and forty years
in travel and study of the work of others.
He wrote the preface to this classic after consultation with Kaibara
Ekken on points of style and content. In it he said that hitherto there
had been no practical handbooks, because peasants were illiterate.
Lack of knowledge had not mattered so much in earlier times because
the demand was not so great. “But now,” he goes on, “there is no sur
plus. The demand is tenfold, and it is essential to produce more. Hard
work and tenacity are not enough. The truth is that peasants are not
aware of the real art of farming [sono jutsu kuwashikarazu]. The re
sult is frequent shortages, which are not due to poor soil or to lack
of effort. Knowledge and effort must go together. Japan has good soil
and a climate favourable to growth. A Chinese poet praising the Japa
nese sword once said that we are blessed with a bountiful land; but
if we do not make full use of those gifts of nature, there will not be
enough food, shelter, and money for the people. If we do make full
use of them, we shall not have to depend upon foreign countries.”
Antei’s work was widely read. There is no way of measuring its
influence, but it was regarded as important by his contemporaries, in
particular by Kaibara Ekken, a wise man who contributed a long appen
dix to the edition of 1697.
By the end of the century the character of the rural communities
had undergone a great change. Not only had the production of food
stuffs increased, but also the range and quantity of other farm products
had steadily expanded. As subsistence farming developed into commer
cial farming throughout the country (and particularly in the Home
RURAL LIFE 109
Provinces), the small quantities of local specialties such as lacquer and
paper grew into large amounts and greater variety of local products.
Cash crops of cotton and tobacco, for instance, together with cash re
ceipts for a diversity of articles manufactured in the villages from local
materials, changed the character of the rural economy in many respects
and improved the position of the landholder. It may be said that by
1700 the peasants were more self-confident and less yielding than be
fore. They were no longer under the thumb of the warriors. Govern
ment was more regular and predictable; the villages were better off.
The market for their commodities extended throughout the country,
from the centre to the remotest comers, as travel by land and sea be
came easier, and backward areas were drawn into the national economy
as sellers and buyers.
In the foregoing pages the life of the peasant has been described as
poor and wretched, and it is true that he was oppressed by the govern
ing class, sometimes to the point of sheer cruelty. But there is another
side to this picture. The wisest rulers were sensible enough to know
that harsh treatment did not produce good results, and some of them
took measures to alleviate distress in the villages; moreover, the vil
lagers themselves were often able to devise methods by which their
own hardships were reduced, and in this way they were helped by the
incompetence or the laziness or the dishonesty of the inspecting
officers.
In theory the surveys were repeated every ten years, but in practice
this duty was often neglected, and additions to the cultivated area easily
escaped the officials’ notice, especially if they were offered bribes.
Moreover the registers used were soon out of date. They did not show
the increased yields resulting from improved methods or from putting
new land under the plough. According to the rules laid down by the
government, the yield was to be assessed annually for the purpose of
tax, but in practice the annual tax was usually fixed for several years
ahead, so that the farmer profited by any increase in production
achieved during that period. In general, therefore, the tax burden was
far less than the nominal 40 or 50 per cent of the crop, and a large pro
portion escaped taxation altogether.
There can be little doubt that a farmer and his family cultivating a
modest holding of five acres lived a fairly agreeable life with no great
hardship, especially as production increased in quantity and variety
towards the turn of the century. It was the poor labourer and his patient
wife, toiling from dawn to dusk, of whom it may be truly said that they
carried an oppressive burden.
It may be asked how it came about that accounts of the misery of
110 RURAL LIFE
the peasants have been contradicted or qualified by recent studies of

the rural society. Japanese historians in the 1920’s were under the in
fluence of a somewhat fugitive post-war liberalism, and inclined to take
the side of the peasant against the capitalist. There was good material
to support this line of argument; but subsequent research has not borne
it out in all respects.11
11 Some scholars, writing after the war of 1941—45, have argued on Marxist
lines to show the "place of the Meiji Revolution in the agrarian history of Japan.”
See for example an important essay, thus entitled, by K. Takahashi in the R evue
H istorique, Vol. CCX (1 9 5 3 ). Its argument is not flawless.
C H A P T E R IX
URBAN LIFE
1. T he Growth o f Towns
P a r a l l e l i n g the growth of rural communities, there was a re

markable increase in the number and size of towns during the seven
teenth century, especially in its latter half. Until the foundation of the
Yedo Bakufu, Japan had been a country of incessant movement Great
armies were always on the march over the length and breadth of the
land. Then, as peace came with the fall of Osaka Castle, life took on
a more sedentary character. Small townships were strung along the
highways, now trodden by pedlars with their packs or by officers on
tours of inspection, and only rarely by armed men as a daimyo’s pro
cession passed on the way up to Yedo.
Now the Bakufu and the daimyos turned to the arts of peace. They
were filled with a desire, indeed a determination to increase their
strength by encouraging profitable enterprises within their respective
domains, and thus the castle town ( joka-m achi) tended to become a
commercial as well as a political centre.
The population figure of the castle towns was a function of the reve
nue of the fiefs. Yedo, of course, was the castle town par excellence, and
it was followed in size by the capitals of a few great baronies—Nagoya,
Sendai, Fukushima, Kumamoto, Wakayama, Shizuoka (Sumpu), Kago
shima, Fukuoka, and Kanazawa—all of which had a revenue of 500,000
koku or more towards the end of the seventeenth century. Next in order
of amount of revenue was a group of fiefs with from 200,000 koku to
500.000, whose capitals were: Tsu, Fukui, Kochi, Hiroshima, Hikone,
Okayama, Kurume, Mito, Kofu, Tokushima, and Saga. Finally came
about one hundred castle towns in fiefs of from 50,000 to 200,000 koku.
The population figure of Nagoya at the close of the century was
63.000, or about one-tenth of the revenue figure of 620,000 koku. The
same ratio applied roughly to most castle towns. Thus Himeji in a fief
of 150,000 koku had a population which fluctuated round 15,000 after
the year 1700. Ogald, capital of a fief of 100,000 koku, had fallen to
below 6,000 by the year 1700.
Of the fiefs in general it may be said that their administration was
of a conservative character and tended to place restrictions upon com
merce and industry which prevented the full growth of castle towns
112 URBAN LIFE
and thus encouraged the development of other urban centres. Conse

quently, in most castle towns, population was stationary or declining
in the last years of the century. The castle towns in fiefs of under
50,000 koku were unable to support a large population. To take an
extreme case, Ueda in Shinshu had a population of only 2,600 in the
year 1665, and this tended to decrease. It must be remembered that
the position of many daimyos was dictated by strategic needs, and was
not necessarily favourable to commerce. Where castle towns were suit
ably situated, they might attract wholesale and retail merchants, who
were granted monopolies or other privileges by the daimyos and found
the joka-machi a convenient centre for trade, both in the town and in
its vicinity; but small fiefs could not support a large population unless
they controlled some especially valuable product. If they depended
upon agriculture alone, they were likely to be financially weak. A fief
assessed at 10,000 koku would supply to the daimyo and his vassals a
tax revenue ( at 50 per cent) of only 5,000 koku, an amount which would
leave very little after the payment of the stipendiaries and the expense
of maintaining the household of the daimyo and the upkeep of the
castle, unless the fief as a whole could profit by the sale of commercial
crops. In such domains the lower rank of samurai would receive a very
small stipend.
Consequently, as growing centres of population, the castle towns
were less important than, for instance, the expanded villages in the
environs of Osaka. These ancient rural settlements were spread over
a large area in the provinces of Settsu, Kawachi, and Izumi; and, being
separated by only short distances from one another, they tended to co
alesce and form urban conglomerations. Another striking example of
the growth of a town is a place called Tondabayashi, which already in
the fourteenth century was of some importance owing to its position
on a road through Kawachi from Yamato.1 It was a convenient place
of residence for well-to-do merchants and for workmen whom they
employed in the cotton industry, which flourished in that neighbour
hood from about 1640. Similar country towns, such as Hirano, Tennoji,
Sumiyoshi, and Sakai, developed close relations, and towards the end of
the century had coalesced to form the great national market of which
Osaka was the axis.
Although the economic importance of castle towns tended to dimin
ish, their political development was of value to the nation as a whole.
They were first of all military bases, but they were also administrative
1 Tondabayashi was at a junction on the road from the Chihaya Pass ( defended
by Kusunoki in 1333) through Kawachi. See map in Volume II, page 124.
URBAN LIFE 113
capitals in which able members of the warrior class held important
posts and thus contributed to the spread of law and order through a
country only lately freed from civil war and vestiges of anarchy. With
out sacrificing their local characters these provincial centres contributed
to a certain cultural unity which had been lacking, or at best imperfect,
in mediaeval Japan; and no doubt this trend was amply reinforced by
the experiences of the daimyos and their advisers during their periods
of attendance in Yedo. In most fiefs, as we have seen, there were Con-
fucian scholars serving as advisers or as teachers, who kept the inhabi
tants of the castle towns aware of the intellectual movements of the day.
2. T he Great Cities
At the end of the seventeenth century the population of the leading
cities (excluding the military) was approximately as follows:
Date
Kyoto 400,000 1700+
Yedo 500,000 1700+
Osaka 350,000 1700
Kanazawa 65,000 1697
Nagasaki 64,000 1696
Nagoya 63,000 1692
The castle towns have already been described, but the character of the
three greatest cities calls for further attention.
Kyoto was the principal and largest city in Japan throughout the
Middle Ages, having been not only the capital of the empire and the
seat of the sovereign but also the centre of the most populous region—
the Home Provinces. From 1338 for more than two centuries it was the
seat of the military government of the Ashikaga Shoguns. It had long
been the home of learning and the arts, and of great Buddhist estab
lishments.
Yedo was a political centre, and its population consisted of the mem
bers of the Bakufu government, with a multitude of officials and serv
ants; a small garrison; the daimyos in alternate attendance with their
numerous following of samurai and servants; and a great number of
craftsmen, artisans, shopkeepers, labourers, and persons engaged in re
tail trade to meet the requirements of the city. Yedo was not an indus
trial city or a commercial entrepfit. It was a congregation not of pro
ducers but of consumers. It depended for supplies of food, building
materials, and other necessary articles upon sources in distant parts of
114 URBAN LIFE
Japan, notably the tax rice and local products from Tokugawa domains
in northern Japan, and rice stored in Yedo by daimyos in attendance.
Much was shipped from the city of Osaka, which was known as the
Kitchen of Japan (Tenka no Daidokoro).
Yedo began to increase in extent and population as the daimyos
established residences from about 1643, but its growth was checked in
1657 by the great Meireki fire, which destroyed more than half of the
city and part of the castle. It was not until well into the eighteenth
century that, fully restored and enlarged, it reached a population figure
of half a million—or, if the military families were included, close upon
one million.
Of its nature it was a centre of wholesale and retail trade on a grand
scale, and among its first new residents following the warrior families
and their dependents were merchants from Mikawa and Totomi, prov
inces which had once been ruled by Ieyasu. After them came men from
Omi, Ise, and Osaka, who opened markets for their own special prod
ucts. Thus trade began to flourish, assisted by the freight brought by
the annual voyages or in the “tarubune.”2 The articles most in demand
were rice, miso, charcoal, salt, sake, soy, oil, cotton goods, and haber
dashery. The busy wholesale and retail markets required much capital,
so that moneylenders and exchange brokers drove a thriving trade. One
lucrative business was the advance of cash by rice brokers to daimyos,
and also to hatamoto and go-kenin, against their rice stipends. The
leading merchants in Yedo were such men as Naraya Mozaemon and
Kinokuniya Banzaemon, speculative dealers in building materials,
which were in frequent demand in a growing city plagued by fires.*
They made great fortunes, partly through their close connexion with
government undertakings but also by their skill in seizing opportuni
ties for profit.
The true native of Yedo was not of this kind. He was (in the words
of Saikaku, the novelist) a gullible fellow, without any forethought and
thus liable to make bad bargains. It was common for the Osaka mer
chants to say that Yedo people were like children, and did not under
stand how to use money. Certainly they were not given to saving.
2 The "tarubune” were vessels which carried goods packed in barrels (tarn ).
They sailed regularly from Osaka to Yedo.
•Naraya was in Ieyasu’s service in Mikawa and followed him to Yedo. A mer
chant named Taruya was respected because his ancestor had fought well in Naga-
shino (1 5 7 5 ). Both these men played an important part in the early stages of the
development of Yedo and founded their fortunes there. Kitamura Bungord was
another pioneer who made money by seizing opportunities, especially after the
Meireki fire.
URBAN LIFE 115
Yedo indeed was a free-spending city, where shopkeepers could make
handsome profits. The Mitsui family, which had founded its fortunes
in Ise, added to its wealth by opening large and imposing drapery
shops, such as the celebrated Echigoya, where they sold cotton goods
in great variety at fixed prices for cash, a departure from the common
practice of chaffering. They aimed at attracting customers in great
numbers, they advertised freely, and they were ready to sell small
quantities to poor purchasers. They were thus forerunners of the mod
ern department store. Competing with the Echigoya was the Iseya,
which opened branches in every ward of the city.
That these great establishments prospered is evidence of a growing
population. The daimyos in residence were no doubt among the most
lavish customers, followed by their household staffs and by all the samu
rai who came in their retinues to Yedo. Even more numerous were the
servants, indoor and outdoor workers, employed in the city, not only by
the hatamoto and go-kenin but by the officials great and small of the
central and municipal government offices. Peasants and labourers from
the countryside, attracted by good wages, poured constantly into the
city, and there was no doubt a considerable floating population of trav
ellers from all provinces, as is evident from the list of inns and restau
rants catering for such visitors.
Yet the growth of population in a city without important industries
is not easy to explain, though it is evident that it exercised a great attrac
tion. No doubt most young men in the eastern and northern provinces
wanted to find work in the capital, and of the thousands who streamed
along the Tokaido (the eastern coast road) on errands from the mer
chant houses in the Home Provinces or as workmen in search of well-
paid jobs, many must have decided to stay in Yedo.
The great increase in agricultural production which took place after
about 1700 would at first sight seem to have required an increased
number of farm workers, and it is true that the working farm population
increased in some areas despite the introduction of labour-saving de
vices; but the ratio of increase was not such as to absorb all the new
population. The flow of surplus labour to the towns was great and con
tinuous. Another result of increased production on the farms was to de
velop a direct relationship between the village and the town. Since the
tax assessment remained unchanged, there was a surplus of rice which
the farmer could sell direct to merchants.
Osaka, the greatest commercial city in Japan, was originally a small
market ancillary to the Ishiyama Honganji, the headquarters of the Ikko
sect of Buddhism. This fortified cathedral, thanks to its strategic posi
116 URBAN LIFE
tion in the midst of swamps and waterways, held out against attack by
Nobunaga year after year until 1580.
Hideyoshi saw the value of its position as the site of a fortified mili
tary base, and he built his great castle there to command the approaches
to Kyoto from the west. He regarded it as his capital and encouraged
its growth as a trading centre. Besieged and reduced by Ieyasu in 1615,
it lost its political importance, but the topographical features that had
made it a great stronghold were equally favourable to its further growth
as a commercial metropolis. It had easy access to the sea, and was close
to the productive Home Provinces. Because the transport of heavy
goods by land was difficult and slow,4 it was ideally placed as the great
national entrep6t for the collection and distribution of supplies by sea,
and consequently as a financial centre of national importance. Its posi
tion was more central than that of Yedo, since it had the Inland Sea to
the west and the Tokaido to the east.
Apart from the three principal cities, a few others deserve mention.
Nagasaki did not come into the category of great cities, but it was of
special importance after the seclusion edicts, since it was the only port
of entry for foreign ships and cargoes. It was here also that the Dutch
merchants were allowed to reside under strict surveillance on the re
claimed ground—an artificial island—called Deshima. It was through the
Dutch settlement that Japan learned about the outside world, and that
the outside world gained some knowledge of Japan. Nagasaki was un
der direct Tokugawa rule, governed by two Commissioners in accord
ance with instructions from Yedo.
Chinese merchant ships called frequently at Nagasaki and through
their passengers the Japanese authorities got news of events in China,
from the decline of the Ming to the rise of the Manchu dynasty.
Nagoya and Kanazawa have already been mentioned as the greatest
castle towns. Nagoya was of importance as the capital of the great
Owari fief, held by one of the three Tokugawa collaterals (Go-Sanke).
It stood overlooking the vast and fertile plain of Owari and Mino. Its
position on the Tokaido gave it great commercial importance. Kana
zawa was the castle town of the head of the Maeda family, the richest
daimyo in Japan, with a revenue of over one million koku.
3. T he Tow nspeople
Some attention has already been paid (in Chapter IV ) to the char
acter of the populace in Yedo and the difficulty of controlling its lively
4 T he main roads were improved under Tokugawa rule, but much of the coun
try was too rough for wheeled traffic. A packhorse could not carry more than two
h ie s of rice. There were high passes to surmount and torrents to cross.
URBAN LIFE 117
and undisciplined members. Their behaviour was largely determined
by their surroundings, which were favourable to street-fighting and
robbery with violence, since Yedo was a new city with no tradition of
order, where the unemployed members of the warrior class and its de
pendents were always on the lookout for excitement. The Bakufu was
at length able to deal with these trouble-makers by drastic measures
after the ronin conspiracy of 1651, but they were not thoroughly sup
pressed until a generation or more later. Quarrelsome elements were
to be expected in a city populated principally by men-at-arms and their
servants, the more so since most of them had no important duties to
perform.
But it should not be supposed that the ordinary citizen was a man
of this rowdy habit. The chonin—so called because he dwelt in a city
ward (cho) and not under the shadow of the Castle—in general was a
respectable artisan or tradesman anxious to bring up his family in peace.
Because Yedo was a new city its population included a number of en
terprising migrants from all parts of the country, but chiefly from the
eastern provinces, which bred a tough and quarrelsome type of man.
There was also an admixture of enterprising traders from Mikawa, To-
tomi, Omi, and Ise, those from the last two in particular being so nu
merous and successful that they were called by their envious rivals Omi
Robbers and Ise Beggars. They were prominent in retail trade through
out the city, and contributed much to the mores of the chonin. Com
pounded of such elements, the Yedokko (the cockney, we might say)
was apt to be a self-reliant, outspoken man, not easy to get on with.
This was perhaps especially true of men of warrior origin, but the ordi
nary townsmen shared those qualities in some measure.
Since much that was written about the bourgeois society of Yedo in
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and much of its popular art,
portrayed the places of entertainment, the theatres, the restaurants, and
the gay quarters, a student is apt to gain the impression that these were
scenes of normal Yedo life. But because the quiet existence of the ordi
nary man goes unrecorded, we ought not to suppose that the Average
citizen was an indefatigable pleasure-hunter.
Yedo being the seat of government, a large proportion of its inhabi
tants were servants of the state, from the high officers of the Bakufu
down to the police, and these we may presume, whatever their private
lives, maintained a public decorum. Further, Yedo tended to replace
Kyoto as the intellectual centre of Japan, or at any rate the home of
philosophy as Kyoto had been the home of religion. Perhaps the most
interesting aspect of the life of the chonin is the influence of the Neo-
Confucian ethical standards which had come to govern the conduct of
118 URBAN LIFE
the warrior class. The Confucian virtues of filial piety and loyalty were
those which guided the serious members of the merchant class; and even
the dissolute recognized the power of the moral law, of giri or duty,
which was a concept of Confucian pedigree. It was the conflict of duty
and passion that thrilled the theatre-going citizens of Yedo and Osaka,
whether the hero was a samurai or an apprentice.
The population of Osaka was in many respects of a different charac
ter from that of Yedo. Osaka had a longer history than Yedo. It was
a commercial and not a political or military centre;
its citizens were nearly all engaged in trade and
grew in numbers while it developed from simple
beginnings as a local market to become the national
emporium, attracting goods to its warehouses from
most parts of the country and distributing them
widely by land and sea. The earliest great mer
chants in Osaka were those who (in competition
with merchants in Sakai) made fortunes as war con
tractors for Hideyoshi, among them being Yodoya
Keian, who founded a great family of purveyors,
which after 1600 supplied the needs of daimyos by
storing their rice and selling it on commission. Be
A rich m erchant,
fore Osaka reached the summit of its importance it
a llo w ed to w ear was the centre of a network of small towns or sea
on e sw ord ports which served as intermediaries between dis
tant provinces and the rice storehouses along the waterfront of the
growing city.
But there was a limit to the growth of Osaka because of the diffi
culty of overland transport of rice and other heavy goods. It was not
until this difficulty had been overcome that the great period of expan
sion began. In considering the character of the people of Osaka, there
fore, we have to distinguish between the early and the late members
of the mercantile community. In the first period the prominent Osaka
merchants were prosperous members of respectable families who filled
positions as City Elders (Toshiyori) with dignity. But as the city de
veloped, thanks to certain improved methods of transport which we
shall examine later, a change took place in the character of its citizens.
A new class of trader appeared, described by Saikaku in his Eitaigura
(1688) as follows: “In general prominent people in Osaka are no longer
the members of old families, but for the most part newcomers, Kichizo
and Sansuke [videlicet Tom, Dick, and Harry], who have risen in the
world.” These were lads from the farms of Yamato, Kawachi, Izumi,
URBAN LIFE 119
and Tsu, determined to become rich by their own exertions. “The suc
cessful merchants of today came here thirty years ago,” he adds, giving
as examples the names of Konoike and Sumitomo.
Engelbert Kaempfer, the scientist in Dutch employment who visited
Osaka in 1690, described the city as he saw it: the great traffic of boats
on the Yodo river, the teeming population, the crowded streets, the rich
supply of victuals, and all that which “tends to promote luxury and to
gratify all sensual pleasures.” There is no doubt that the citizens of
Osaka composed a pleasure-loving society, fond of good food and sen
timental plays, more epicurean than their Yedo counterparts. But as a
class the Osaka merchants were serious, hard-working men, and Osaka
life in all classes was penetrated by an urgent desire for profit. In this
last respect it differed from the dominant warrior society of Yedo, in
which money-making was despised.
CHAPTER X
THE E XPA ND ING E CO NO M Y
1. Agriculture
P e r h a p s the most remarkable feature of the early modem history

of Japan is the rapid growth of farm production in both quantity and
range which began with the improvement of farming methods late in
the seventeenth century. Production does not usually increase where
there is no rising demand, and there is some interest in enquiring what
set in motion this new activity. Probably the gradual improvement in
the condition of the farmers, their growing self-confidence, and their
relative freedom from interference by officials encouraged them to meet
demands from an obviously widening market.
Commercial farming had for long been the practice^ in the rich farm
lands serving consumers in the city of Kyoto, who required not only rice
but also such produce as vegetables and fruit. The farms were in fact
kitchen gardens. There followed demands for other crops, such as tea,
tobacco, hemp, mulberry leaves ( for silkworms), indigo, and ( especially
in the provinces of Settsu, Kawachi, Izumi, and Yamato) cotton. Cot
ton, indeed, was the principal item to increase at a great speed. In
those provinces, it is said, about one-fifth of the irrigated land was un
der cotton by the first decades of the eighteenth century.
Cotton was more profitable than rice, and there was also profit to
be had from subsidiary crops of tobacco or tea. Thus a change of tem
per in the villages becomes apparent, for the peasant is now impelled
not by anxiety to appease the tax collector but by a desire for profit.
Agriculture now becomes a business, a trade rather than an occupation.
Much farm work is done by hired men holding no land themselves; and
soon they or their relatives begin to leave for the city—for Sakai or
Osaka—in large numbers, hearing good news of prospects of employ
ment.
This change in the character of the village was noted by a Bakufu
official (a Daikan) named Tanaka Kyugu in his Minkan Shoyo, a de
scription of social conditions at the beginning of the eighteenth cen
tury. He observed that the old style of farm was uncommon. In most
villages, if there were prosperous farmers, they did not depend upon
their rice fields alone, but were engaged in buying and selling.
THE EXPANDING ECONOMY 121
2. Handicrafts
Although the great increase in agricultural production was directly
due to the efforts of the villages, it was encouraged by the enterprise
of merchants who sought new markets and stimulated output of any
commodity that might bring a profit. Here manufacturing industry
played a part in the expansion of the national economy. There was
little that could be called machinery apart from the rudimentary appa
ratus of the farm, and even there the water pump was unknown until
it was introduced by the Dutch; but an important exception must be
made for the craft of weaving, which had been practised since antiq
uity. Substantial advances had been made since the Middle Ages in
the manufacture of looms and the production of fine weaves of silk
(such as the celebrated Nishijinori) and of cotton in a seductive variety
of colour and pattern. Apart from these lovely fabrics, often matchless
in design, highly skilled artisans led the way to the manufacture of
porcelain and paper on a commercial scale. Brewing may be included
as an industry, and brands of sak£ from western centres (Nada, for
example) were much relished by the convivial citizens of Osaka and
Yedo.
Most of these products of craftsmen were easy to transport, or were
made in no larger quantities than met local needs. It was the harvest
of the farms that raised a difficult problem of transport. The convey
ance of heavy merchandise from Osaka to Yedo presented no great dif
ficulty; but a really serious problem was how to carry bulk supplies of
heavy goods, rice in particular, from distant parts of Japan to Osaka.
3. T he Problem, o f Transport
We have seen (in Chapter IX ) that there was a limit to the effi
cacy of Osaka as a collecting centre so long as it depended upon sup
plies carried overland. The great landlords at a long distance from
Osaka needed to dispose of their surpluses, but carriage by land was
always difficult, sometimes impossible, because the country was rough,
the roads poor, and rivers often in spate. A packhorse could carry only
two bales of rice.
Therefore the carriage of goods had to follow an indirect route de
termined by the accidents of topography. They were taken to the
nearest point where merchants were established, generally a small sea
port town. Such were Otsu on Lake Biwa; Hyogo, Onomichi, and Sa
kai on the Inland Sea; Obama, Tsuruga, and Mikuni on the Japan Sea
122 THE EXPANDING ECONOMY
coast; Kuwana, Yokkaichi, and Ominato on the Pacific coast; and Ha-
kata in Kyushu. In the Middle Ages these had been important points
where prosperous merchants were usually established, and where
freight-carrying vessels were available. Such merchants were sure to
be in touch or in communication with regional landlords who had rice
or other produce to dispose of—a good example being a Tsuruga mer
chant named Takashimaya Denzaemon, who was an agent for Maeda,
the daimyo of Kaga, in selling his rice or in procuring supplies from
other provinces. This connexion was of long standing, for a Takashi
maya had bought and transported arms and provisions when a Maeda
contingent was due to take part in the invasion of Korea. Similar serv
ices were performed in other baronies by agents: for example, Sumi-
nokura in Saga, Sumiyoshi in Hirano, Kamiya in Hakata. There were
few harbour towns in which a wealthy merchant did not perform such
functions or arrange their performance.
Rice from the province of Kaga or from Echizen had first to be sent
to Tsuruga, thence some twenty miles by land to the northern shore of
Lake Biwa, then by boat on the lake as far as Otsu, and finally down
the Yodo river to Osaka.1 An even more complicated journey was re
quired to bring to Yedo the Bakufu tax rice from northern Japan ( Mu-
tsu). It was first carried by sea to Choshi (in modern Chiba Prefec
ture), where it was transferred to river craft and taken upstream on
the Tonegawa for shipment on the Yedogawa, and thence by connect
ing waterways to Yedo itself.
Such slow and cumbrous transport was obviously inadequate to sup
ply the growing needs of Osaka and Yedo, and it has been described
here in detail only in order to show how urgent it was to find a way to
ensure safe and regular delivery of great quantities of rice and other
produce from distant points. An increase in production of food would
be of little value otherwise. The obvious answer was to improve and
develop transport by sea.
As early as 1619 a Sakai merchant had chartered a vessel of 250
koku to carry a mixed cargo ( cotton, rape-seed oil, sake, vinegar) from
Kishu to Yedo. Soon after that a group of Osaka merchants combined
to furnish a regular freight service to Yedo by specially designed craft.
By the end of the century they had a fleet of vessels of from 200 to 400
koku capacity. This business proved lucrative, and severe competition
from rivals followed. The shipowners’ position was very strong, since
1 The first direct shipment from Kaga to Osaka was a test cargo of 100 koku
in 1638.
lh a ra Saikaku
as the population of Yedo increased a steady flow of food from Osaka

became more than ever essential. But it still remained to ensure that
supplies, of rice in particular, should reach Osaka regularly.
The problem was solved by an elaborate organization of two annual
circuits of the main island of Japan, from two different ports on the
Japan Sea coast. One (called Higashimawari, or the Eastern Circuit)
was a voyage north-east along the coast of Dewa, through the Tsugaru
Straits, and thence south to Yedo. The other (called Nishimawari, or
the Western Circuit) was a voyage south-west along the Japan Sea
coastal route, then through the Straits of Shimonoseki, and on by the
Inland Sea to Osaka. Each of these voyages out and home, together
with the time spent in harbour during stormy seasons, occupied a
full year.
Thus the main problems of sea transport had been solved. Kaemp-
fer, visiting Japan in 1690, observed that the ports were full of ships,
that there were multitudes of people along the coasts, and such a noise
of oars and sails that one might suppose the inland parts of the coun
try to be deserted. Saikaku, in a more picturesque description of the
scene on the estuary of the Yodo river, writes of the small craft gliding
on the current “like willow leaves on autumn streams.”
4. Growing Markets
Once the problem of transport was solved, however awkwardly,
there was nothing to check an all-round increase in production except
a saturated market. This was far ahead at the end of the seventeenth
century, since populations were increasing and the standard of living
was rising, in urban centres particularly but generally throughout the

country.
One incentive to increased production was the demand of daimyos
for commodities which their own domains could not produce. Each
barony strove to increase its wealth by developing its resources and
becoming as far as possible self-supporting. Thus Fukushima in Iwa-
shiro was a centre of sericulture and sent to the market a large supply
of raw silk—a valuable product; but this was an exceptional case. In
general the principal product was rice, and it was sent, usually to Osaka,
for sale on the central rice market there. In default of a freely circu
lating and reliable currency, rice acted as a medium of exchange, and
it was in handling the amounts which flowed regularly onto the market
that the Osaka brokers made great fortunes.
The policy of most daimyos was backward in so far as they aimed
at economic independence by erecting barriers both physical and po
litical against intrusion from other domains. They did, however, on
balance contribute to an all-round increase of production; and in the
administration of their fiefs they paid special attention to economic
matters. It is significant of the trend of the times that the most enlight
ened daimyos employed as advisers scholars with a reputation for po
litical wisdom, and most of these scholars can be described as econo
mists. Indeed it may be said that of the eminent Neo-Confucianists of
the mid-century many were interested as much in commerce and agri
culture as in political issues. Kumazawa Banzan is perhaps the best
example of this school, and he did a great deal to organize the resources
of the Okayama fief.
The physical barriers between fiefs (the “seki,” or octroi stations)
were a hindrance to trade, and most of them had been abolished by
1600; but a number of daimyos still restricted passage through their
domains, thus slowing down commercial traffic. In general, however,
there was a growth of commercial activity throughout the country, and
Bakufu territory in particular was free from burdensome regulations
except where watch was kept for political suspects. Moreover, all the
important towns ( other than the castle towns) were under direct Ba
kufu jurisdiction and were governed with an eye for profit as well as for
peace.
Consequently the increase of production continued at a good pace,
and Osaka as a market for both collection and distribution spread in
size and grew in importance. The foundation of its prosperity was the
rice market, which was in constant activity. A daimyo needing money
or merchandise would send his surplus rice to his agent in Osaka, usu-
ally a merchant in good standing who would store it in a warehouse in
the daimyo s name. Such an agent was in charge of the property in
storage and kept custody of money or goods received from the sale of
rice at a price which was fixed by the wholesale rice merchants or
(later) by the Rice Exchange, which dealt in futures.
The function of this agent (known as a kuramoto) was one which
required a knowledge of the market and good relations with other
Osaka merchants. The warehouse did not belong to the daimyo, but to
the merchants who were licensed by the Bakufu to build and own prop
erty in the city. This is an important point to be borne in mind when
considering the nature of the mercantile community. It is sometimes
said that administration of the city and control of the activities of trade
associations were in the hands of a council composed of leading mer
chants. In normal circumstances this was true, but in all matters the
last word was with the two governors (machi-bugyo) appointed by
Yedo. The simple view that the Yedo government was unable to enforce
its decisions upon the rich merchants, and that therefore the feudal
power declined, is not based upon facts. W e have only to look at one
or two examples of the attitude of the Bakufu towards offenders.
In 1642 certain officials and merchants conspired to corner a market,
in disregard of the Bakufu’s known antagonism to monopolies. The pun
ishment was cruel. The conspirators’ children were executed, the mer
chants exiled, and their wealth confiscated. This and similar cases were
expressions of the general dislike felt by members of the warrior class
for combinations of merchants for the sake of profit. This feeling was
expressed in several edicts, notably one of 1657 setting forth a long list
of trades in which price agreements are forbidden.
Exception could not be taken to the requirements of the merchants
who had to deal with the property of a daimyo when it was shipped to
Osaka. A daimyo or his representative had to rely for a warehouse upon
a merchant from whom it was rented. He depended also upon the pur
chasers in Osaka of his rice or other produce for payment, either in
specie or preferably (because the freight on specie was prohibitive) by
bills of exchange which could be cashed in Yedo when he was in resi
dence there for attendance on the Shogun.
It may well be supposed that Osaka merchants, holding a virtual
monopoly as rice brokers or exchange brokers, made very great profits
and were among the leaders of the mercantile community. Rice, of
course, was the most important commodity, but once the position of
Osaka as a collecting centre was established, merchandise in the great
est variety poured into the city. There were, for example, among agri-
cultural products, cotton, dyestuffs, vegetable oil, and tea; manufac

tured goods such as textiles; and bulky cargoes such as timber and min
erals. All these commodities were handled by wholesale merchants
known as toiya.2* They usually had specialized functions, as shippers
at the point of origin, or as handlers at the point of arrival, and finally
as holders of quantities to be stored in warehouses if they were not to
be reshipped to another market.
It will be seen that the collection and distribution of goods required
a great number of merchants and intermediaries, known as nakagai
(middlemen), especially since in many cases they dealt only in one
article, or shipped to or from one particular market. This may seem
an excessive multiplication of functions, which indeed it was; but con
ditions were difficult, since the normal channels of trade proved inade
quate to meet the rapid expansion of the national economy. There was,
as we have observed, a great increase in the number of places—seaport
towns and castle towns—from which goods converged upon Osaka or
to which goods had to be sent in exchange. Distances were great, and
transport, though much improved, required careful planning. Moreover
questions of price constantly arose and were not easily settled until
exchanges were established where sellers and buyers could meet to make
their bargains.
The most important of these was the Rice Exchange at Dojima,*
where prices were fixed not only for the Home Provinces but also in
directly for the Yedo market, which was influenced by Osaka quota
tions. There were in addition to this most important market a number
of speculative exchanges in other commodities which could be kept in
storage and therefore admitted dealing in futures.
The handling of this great flow of merchandise required the serv
ices of special organs controlled by experienced men. It was therefore
natural that such organs should be developed from an already existing
system. The characteristic method of control of commerce and industry
under feudal rule was the formation of approved trade associations or
guilds. Such combinations already existed in a rudimentary form in
mediaeval Japan, and were known as “za”; but they lost their influence
with the formation (under Nobunaga) of the so-called “free” markets
2 In Yedo pronounced tonya. They were lineal descendants of the mediaeval

toiya, the agent of a manor.
8 The Dojima Exchange began as a licensed rice market in 1697. It dealt in
actual rice until about 1710, when it began to issue and accept warehouse notes, and
to deal in futures ( “nobem ai"). Ths kind of transaction was officially sanctioned
in 1733, when the Bakufu established its own rice storehouse in Osaka. There had
been riots early in 1733 owing to famine.
and guilds, called “rakuichi” and “rakuza.” After the seclusion edicts,
with the growth of domestic trade and industry, the need for direction
was felt, and associations called “nakama” (which may be translated as
"guilds”) were formed, and exercised a growing control over the activi
ties of their members, while protecting their interests.
For artisans the nakama was a craft guild. For merchants it was a
trade association, known as “kabunakama” when it was approved by the
Bakufu. The word “kabu” means a share, but the share was not trans
missible. The Bakufu at first opposed such associations, since it was
against monopolies, but later approved wider associations, for example
a kabunakama of exchange brokers that was recognized on payment of
a fee. The authorities saw that the kabunakama was formed not in re
straint of trade but to promote cooperation rather than competition
among its members. Some Japanese scholars regard these merchant
guilds as social organizations, almost religious in character. No doubt
they expressed certain ethical principles which a merchant should ob
serve, for the leading merchants agreed that honesty was the best policy;
but their motive was profit—an end with which regulated activity is not
incompatible.
The number of guilds grew rapidly towards the end of the century.
In Osaka there were at least twenty-four wholesale shippers of freight
to Yedo, and there were numerous guilds of dealers in separate com
modities, such as cotton, sugar, and paper, as well as guilds of merchants
dealing in the produce of special areas, usually regions at a distance
from Osaka, such as Satsuma Tonya and Matsumae Tonya. The Osaka
merchants in particular were organized on a large scale. In the aggre
gate they were exceedingly rich, and therefore powerful. But the Bakufu
kept a watchful eye upon them.
5. C apital Growth
It is clear that in the first decades of the eighteenth century the ac
tivities of the Osaka merchants had so increased in scope that they must
have accumulated immense capital funds. There is no exact evidence
of the amount of this accumulation, but there are some conjectures
which may be accepted as fair approximations of its order of magnitude.
It is estimated that merchandise to the value of 286,000 kan of silver
arrived in Osaka in 1714.4 The greater part of this amount was the value
of the annual arrival in Osaka of 4,000,000 bales of rice. Much of the
4 One kan is equivalent to 1,000 momme of 2 .1 2 drachms.

profit arising from this trade, whether from actual transactions of sale
and purchase or from speculation in futures, was available for invest
ment. Thus in 1704 the exchange broker Konoike had put money into
the purchase of farmland in Kawachi province and had extended this
operation by reclaiming new land along the Yamato river.
Koneike’s is an interesting case. He was agent (kuramoto) for over
a score of daimyos and was also the financial agent for the Bakufu in
Osaka. He was a samurai by birth, but became a commoner when he
started as a sak^-brewer. He then saw the benefit which would accrue
to him if he could be of service to daimyos who needed funds in Yedo
during their period of attendance, and accordingly he put himself at the
disposal of western daimyos by advancing funds or shipping goods on
credit.
In the Shotoku era (1711-15) the commercial community in Osaka
is said to have been composed as follows:
T o n y a ...................................................... 5,655
Nakagai .................................................. 8,765
Independents ........................................ 2,343
Purveyors to the C a stle ....................... 481
Agents for daim yos............................. 483
Of these the tonya, the nakagai, and the exchange brokers were the most
suitably placed to make loans at high interest, since they drew great
profit from financing the flow of merchandise throughout the country.
It is clear that this accumulated wealth put much power into the
hands of the great Osaka merchants and (in a less degree) their Yedo
counterparts. Most of the daimyos were in their debt, partly because
they were ignorant of financial matters and partly because prices con
tinued to rise while feudal revenues were fixed. Nor were the daimyos
the only debtors. With the rapidly increasing supply of consumption
goods there came inevitably a rise in the standard of living at every
social level, and the samurai who could not make ends meet on his fixed
stipend contracted debts to moneylenders or to retail traders. The
feeling of antagonism between the samurai and the merchant class
tended to spread, and there was little the Bakufu could do to remove it.
Thus the power of the great merchants remained unchallenged, and
they continued to thrive; but they knew that if they went too far they
would have to meet pressure from the Shogun's government. They had
indeed been warned in 1705, when the Bakufu confiscated the entire
fortune of the house of Yodoya, one of the wealthiest and most respected
merchant families in Osaka. The ground for this punishment was osten
tatious conduct unbecoming to a member of the trading class. It is true
that Yodoya had great possessions and lived in a grand style, but the
true reason for the severity of the Bakufu was no doubt the fact that a
number of important feudatories were deeply in debt to him and had
thereby lost the power of independent action.
Apart from such individual disasters the merchants continued to
flourish, and it was in conditions of prosperity that the first two decades
of the eighteenth century peacefully ebbed away. Production was still
rising, the chonin society was gay and extravagant, and it seemed as if
the life of Genroku (the era name for the years 1688 to 1704) would
continue its pleasant course. This phase of bourgeois culture calls for
some description, but first we must return to the study of political de
velopments following the installation of the fifth Shogun, Tsunayoshi,
in 1680.
C H A P T E R XI
THE SHOGUNATE, 1680-1716
1. Tsunayoshi, 1680-1709
S i n c e Tsunayoshi was much under the influence of his mother, it may

help to an understanding of some of his remarkable actions to preface
this chapter by an account of that remarkable lady. It is a fascinating
study, and it has the advantage of revealing some of the more intimate
aspects of an apparently rigid aristocratic society in which persons of
humble origin could rise to the highest places.
In contemporary documents she was described as the daughter of
one Honjo, a domestic servant of the Kampaku (Regent) Nijd; but in
fact she was the daughter of a greengrocer in Kyoto. When her father
died her mother took service in the Honjo family, where she gave birth
to a son by her employer. As a result of this connexion she was taken
into the Honjo family with her elder sister, who had married a servant
in the Ichijo household. The head of the Honjo family, Honjo Mune-
masa, was an assistant cook in the Nijd household, and was familiar
with the servants of other great Kyoto families. His father was a ronin,
at a time when the Bakufu was treating the ronin with severity, and he
had thought it prudent to set up in business as a maker of straw mats
(tatami). Being impoverished, he depended upon his children; and
fortunately for him, since the Nijo were closely related to the Rokujo
(another great Kyoto family), and the two young women became ac
quainted with a daughter of the Rokujo family, who was disposed to
help them. This daughter became first a priestess at Ise, and then the
concubine of Iemitsu, with the name of O-Man. When she went to
Yedo she took with her Honjo’s adopted daughter, who soon attracted
Iemitsu’s attention and at the age of twenty gave birth to the child who
was to become the Shogun Tsunayoshi.
After Iemitsu’s death Honjo’s daughter was granted the appellation
Keishoin, and when Tsunayoshi entered the castle at Yedo, she moved
into the inner palace apartments with him. In 1702 she was appointed
to the lower grade of the first Court rank—the highest possible for all
but members of the Imperial family—and lavish presents were given to
the Honjo family, Honjo himself receiving a fief of 50,000 koku.
Her influence upon Tsunayoshi was most powerful. Most of his
social policies were adopted upon her advice. The encouragement of
THE SHOGUNATE, 1680-1716 131
Shoguns, 1623-1716
IEM ITSU
(3rd Shogun)
1623-51
Ietsuna Tsunashige Tsunayoshi

( 4th Shogun) (LordofK ofu) (5th Shogun)
1651-1680 1680-1709
Ienobu
( 6th Shogun)
1709-1713
Ietsugu
(7th Shogun)
1713-1716
Chinese studies, the promotion of Buddhist worship, the laws protect

ing animals, all were her work.
Upon Ietsuna’s death in 1680 the choice of his successor was ( after
some disagreements) decided by Mitsukuni, the lord of Owari, and
Hotta Masatoshi, the Roju, in favour of Ietsuna’s younger half-brother,
Tsunayoshi. Tsunayoshi at once asserted his authority and made Hotta
Masatoshi the Tairo. He next showed his own quality by solving a dif
ficult problem of feudal discipline. He ordered an insubordinate vassal
of the daimyo of Takata in Echigo to commit suicide, and confiscated
the fief (of 250,000 koku) on the ground of misgovernment. This was
in 1681. His subsequent actions were no less firm and arbitrary, but
they tended to excesses which bear out the view that his character was
abnormal.
During his term of rule he confiscated the estates of more than
twenty daimyo and one hundred hatamoto, worth in all some 1,400,000
koku. He was determined to be an absolute ruler, and for this purpose
he decided to destroy the influence of a number of Fudai vassals who
had a virtual monopoly of important posts in the Bakufu. In the Palace
he rearranged offices so as to reduce the authority of the Roju and to
increase that of the Chamberlains (Soba-yonin). These changes were
made easy by the death of the Tairo (Masatoshi), who was murdered
in 1684 by an envious cousin. During Masatoshi’s lifetime, administra-
132 THE SHOGUNATE, 1680-1716
tion had been sound and beneficent, but no successor to the office of
Tairo was appointed, and Tsunayoshi thereafter exercised absolute
power.
But he had no taste and little capacity for those practical tasks of
government which involve considerations of finance and the preserva
tion of order in the realm by lawful and just measures. It was in the
domain of theory that he supposed himself to excel, though it must be
granted that it was his government which in 1683 revised the Buke Sho-
Hatto by adding an article ordering private disputes and farmers’ griev
ances to be referred to law officers, and in 1686 put an end to the riotous
kabukimono who had for long disturbed the peace of the capital.
He was a devoted follower of the school of Chu Hsi, and it was to
him that Neo-Confucian studies in Japan owed the foundation in 1680
of the Seido and other contributions to the official status of Confucian
ism which have been described in Chapter V II. He himself was an
earnest student and even tried to inculcate Confucian principles by
notices posted up throughout the country announcing rewards for vir
tuous behaviour. Indeed soon after his installation in 1680 he called
upon Hayashi Nobuatsu, the head of the Confucian college, to give
three lectures a month on the new Confucianism; and on New Year’s
Day of 1682 an assembly of daimyos and officials was given an exposi
tion of T he G reat Learning. This became an annual practice at the
Shogun’s court on the first day of the New Year. Tsunayoshi’s classical
fervour increased to such a point that in 1690 he himself addressed an
audience composed of the Roju and Bakufu officers on the same work;
and after that he lectured each month on the Four Books to daimyos,
hatamoto, Buddhist monks, and Shinto ritualists, to say nothing of vis
itors to Yedo from the Court in Kyoto. His own lectures were delivered
between 1692 and 1700, six times a month, their total reaching two
hundred and forty-four, according to his favourite Yanagisawa Yoshi-
yasu.
In addition to this he would, when visiting his vassals in their own
residences, first deliver an address himself and then listen to lectures
by his hosts or their retainers. His favourite works were T he Great
Learning (T a Hsueh) and T he Classic o f Filial Piety (H siao Ching).
Tsunayoshi's own claim to classical learning was by no means un
founded. He was genuinely interested in literature and the fine arts. He
employed as a teacher the eminent poet Kitamura Kigin (1618-1705),
an authority on the arcana of the Imperial Court, and he patronized the
leading painters of the Kyoto schools. One artist, Hanabusa Itcho
(1652-1724), offended him by a satirical picture and was sent into exile.
Tsunayoshi is often supposed to have been under the influence of
his favourite Yanagisawa Yoshiyasu, but there is little to support this
view. Yoshiyasu was the son of a small Bakufu officer, and being a gifted
youth he was taken into service by Tsunayoshi on his accession in 1680.
He was soon promoted and before long became a Chamberlain with a
lavish allowance of 10,000 koku. He grew so intimate with Tsunayoshi
and his mother that they visited him very frequently. He was rapidly
promoted in rank and given new honours and emoluments.
He is alleged to have procured good-looking girls and boys and No
actors for the Shogun, and this may well be true; but though as a com
panion he was very close to Tsunayoshi, he did not suggest lines of
policy, nor was Tsunayoshi a man to accept suggestions from subordi
nates. Tsunayoshi’s lavish treatment of Yoshiyasu was characteristic
of his mania, but Yoshiyasu was not a mere flatterer. He genuinely
shared Tsunayoshi’s literary taste, his interest in classical learning, and
even his religious beliefs.
Tsunayoshi seems to have entered upon his term of office in an

optimistic mood, for in 1682 he ordered his Commissioners and Censors
to take steps ( apart from normal judicial measures) to raise the stand
ard of morality among the people. The specific measures which he
recommended were sumptuary rules. They included a ban upon pros
titution, upon the employment of waitresses in teahouses, and similar
practices. In the following year he ordered the Governors of Nagasaki
to prohibit the importation of articles of luxury and to put a limit upon
the cost of embroideries containing gold thread and in general of rare
and expensive fabrics. There is little evidence to show that these em
bargoes were successful and good reason to suppose that they encour
aged smuggling.
Although Tsunayoshi’s policies were on the whole well-intentioned,
he went at times to such extremes of cruelty and sentimentality that he
must be regarded as a mentally unbalanced man. Under the influence
of his mother, who appears to have been afflicted with religious mania,
he spent great sums on building or enlarging sacred edifices of the Shin-
gon sect of Buddhism to please her and her spiritual advisers. His own
passion for learning grew year after year. He also endeavoured to prac
tise, and to oblige others to practise, the virtues recommended by the
sages of Buddhism and Confucianism, his most noteworthy action in
this field being the issue of charitable ordinances for the protection of
abandoned children and travellers overcome by sickness.
A Shingon monk having suggested that Tsunayoshi had no male heir
because he had taken life in a previous existence, he (or his mother)
decided that he must now devote himself to the protection of living
things. He had been born in the Year of the Dog. Therefore, his ad
visers said, he should pay special attention to the welfare of those
creatures. Accordingly, in 1687, orders protecting living things in gen
eral, but especially dogs, were issued day after day to the dismay of the
citizens. No doubt there were too many wild and hungry dogs roving
in the city and fouling its streets, and no doubt people were too ready
to dispose of them; but it was excessive if not insane to order the execu
tion of an apprentice for wounding a dog, and it was ludicrous folly to
insist that dogs should be addressed in honorific terms, such as Mr. or
Mrs. Dog (O Inu Sama). The city government was helpless. Unable
to solve the problem, at length it decided in 1695 to move the source of
trouble to a distance, by building shelters in the suburbs, where ( it is
said) in the next two years no less than 50,000 dogs were kept and fed
on rice and dried fish at the expense of taxpayers.
Despite Tsunayoshi’s obvious weaknesses and the distress they
caused to Yedo citizens, the nation at large does not seem to have suf
fered any serious harm from his erratic conduct of affairs. He interfered
from time to time, but his chief interest was in literature and the arts.
He liked to produce N5 plays in his palace apartments, and took leading
roles himself. For the latter part of his life as Shogun there is little of
political interest to record, probably because the executive officers of
the government performed their tasks competently and in an unobtru
sive manner. The only striking event of a political character was the
affair of the Forty-Seven Ronin, which the Bakufu handled well enough.
In finance the most important action was a “revision”—it may be
called a debasement—of the gold and silver currency in 1695.1 This
gave a profit to the Bakufu treasury and seems to have had no marked
ill effect upon the economy. That Tsunayoshi’s misgovemment cannot
have caused serious harm to the country is clear from the ample evidence
of prosperity in both urban and rural life during the era named Genroku
—from 1688 to 1704. The great capital sums accumulated by the first
three Shoguns had not been entirely spent, commerce was flourishing,
and capital funds were available for investment in the development of
farmland or in other productive enterprises.
The economy was still expanding, though at a slackening speed, and
the financial condition of the government was not unfavourable. Indeed
1 Arai Hakuseki, who endeavoured to reform the currency and to cut down ex
penditure in 1709, wrote in his memoirs that the “revision” of 1695 gave the Bakufu
a profit of five million ry5. Oritaku Shiba no Ki, VoL II, Section 1.
it was even improving until the end of the year 1703, when Yedo suf
fered a disaster, an earthquake that wrecked a great part of the city and
caused much loss of life. In the countryside there was also loss of life
and serious damage from the action of tidal waves along the Tokaido
littoral. Then, a few days after the earthquake, a fire beginning from
the Mito mansion in the Yotsuya ward of Yedo was spread by a hurri
cane and did further damage.
These were unhappy times for the country, particularly the eastern
provinces, since there were more earthquakes and conflagrations at the
end of 1707, when Fuji erupted, and much of the surrounding region
was deep in ashes from volcanic action which continued for several
days. There was little loss of life, but much arable land was devastated,
and great efforts were needed before it could be restored to cultivation.
A sum of 400,000 ryo was allotted for the removal of ashes. Not long
after these disasters there was trouble in Kyoto, where a fire destroyed
a wide area in the city; and this misfortune was followed in April 1708
by storm and flood which ruined the growing crops of the fertile Kinai.
Tsunayoshi had gone into retirement, leaving the conduct of affairs
to Yanagisawa. In the summer of 1708 he announced that he would
resign in favour of the Shogun-designate, his nephew Ienobu, the lord
of Kofu, who had been recommended by Mitsukuni of Mito. Tsuna
yoshi had not long to live. He was ill when the New Year’s reception
was held by Ienobu as his deputy, and he died a few days later.
It so happens that we have good evidence of conditions in Japan

under Tsunayoshi in Engelbert Kaempfer s description of his experi
ences in 1691 and 1692, when he visited the capital as a member of the
annual Dutch embassy from the trading settlement of Nagasaki.
Kaempfer gives a picture—he was a trained observer—of the towns
and villages through which he and his companions passed on the long
journey from Nagasaki to Osaka, thence to Kyoto, and along the Tokaido
to Yedo. They went by road first to Kokura, and crossed over in small
boats to Shimonoseki, there to transfer to a barge which with a fair
wind would reach Osaka in eight days. Travel by ship was somewhat
hazardous, because owing to the seclusion edicts no large seagoing
craft might be built; but by taking frequent shelter the voyage was
safely accomplished. From Osaka the journey was continued by land,
along the Tokaido after Kyoto.
Travel along the highways he describes as agreeable, the roads being
broad, well drained, and kept in good repair by villagers. His company
went on horseback or in palanquins. The villages along the highways,
he thought, were only thinly inhabited, but in the towns and cities he
was surprised by the great number of shops and the variety of their
wares. Of the life of the peasants he says: “Of household goods they
have but few, while it is generally their lot to have many children and
great poverty; yet with some small provision of rice, plants, and roots
they are content and happy.” He observes at the crossroads in each
town or large village notice boards used for publishing the orders and
edicts of the central government or of the feudal lord of the region.
He is vastly impressed by the great number ( “scarce credible”) of
people who daily travel on the roads. The Tokaido, the chief and most
frequented of the highways in Japan, “is on some days more crowded
than the public streets in any of the most populous towns of Europe.”
Of course the great barons passing to and from Yedo were escorted by
trains of hundreds, even thousands, of men, but apart from these the
roads were always thronged by ordinary citizens, mostly on business
but many on pilgrimages at certain seasons, making their way to some
sacred place like Ise, but always with an eye to enjoyment. Kaempfer
has much to say about the inns and eating houses along the roads, and
dwells at length upon the “numberless wenches” offering their services
to wayfarers. Altogether the picture he paints is one of bustling activity
and a great measure of prosperity. This is borne out by contemporary
Japanese descriptions of the years at the turn of the century, coinciding
with the rule of Tsunayoshi. These were still years of expanding trade
and production.
Kaempfer’s account of the reception of the Dutch embassy by Tsuna
yoshi is entertaining and throws some light on life in high military
society. On the visit of 1691 the party reached Odawara on March 11,
finding it a handsome town with an imposing castle. The inhabitants
were well dressed and of polite behaviour, except for small boys who
shouted insults at the strangers. They continued along the Tokaido
and, passing by the execution ground at Shinagawa ( “a very shocking
sight”), they rode into Yedo in the afternoon of March 13. They met,
as they rode along, the numerous trains of princes and great men at
Court, and ladies richly dressed. On both sides of the streets were mul
titudes of well-fumished shops kept by merchants and tradesmen of all
kinds. Their own little train attracted no attention in a city accustomed
to imposing cavalcades.
They were treated hospitably while waiting for an audience with
the Shogun, saw a fire that destroyed six hundred houses, and experi
enced a slight earthquake. The audience was fixed for March 29, the
official in charge of the arrangements being none other than Makino,
Bungo no Kami, one of Tsunayoshi’s favourites and formerly his tutor.
Passing through several gateways and observing numerous guards
posted along their route evidently for display and not for protection,
they entered the innermost Palace enclosure and were conducted up
stairways to a spacious waiting room, where they remained for some
time while the head of their mission was received in audience by the
“Emperor,” that is to say by the Shogun.
The audience was very brief, and Kaempfer was disappointed be
cause he had no opportunity to examine his surroundings closely. But
on its next visit, in 1692, the Dutch party saw a great deal. After the
formalities of obeisance paid to the Shogun by the Dutch ambassador,
all members of the mission entered the spacious hall of audience, where
Tsunayoshi and some of the ladies of the Court sat concealed behind
reed screens, through slits in which they could see the Hollanders
clearly. The great Councillors of State ( Roju) were present, and also
“gentlemen in attendance” (Soba-yonin, or Chamberlains).
After making their obeisance, the members of the mission were
welcomed in the Shogun’s name by Makino, who then asked them to
stand, to dance and sing, to converse with one another, and generally
to show how Westerners behaved. Kaempfer himself danced and sang,
much to the pleasure of the ladies, who cleverly enlarged the slits in
their screens so as to get a better view. This incident is drily recorded
in the official record, which gives a list of the presents brought by the
Dutch and says: “The Dutchmen sang and danced, and wrote some
words in their own language for the Shogun to see.” The same journal
tells us that a day or two later Tsunayoshi took part in a No performance
in his palace, dancing a role in “Yashima” and other plays.
It is clear that at this time there was no marked decline in Tsuna
yoshi’s health, for it is not a sign of disease to prefer plays to politics;
but he seems to have tired from about 1698, when Yanagisawa was made
equal to Tairo, and to have gradually withdrawn from official life in
order to devote himself to his studies and his No performances. Accord
ing to some accounts he was given to debauchery, but the evidence on
this point is scanty. It is best to assume simply that in the last ten years
of his life he suffered a slow deterioration of mind and body. He died
at the age of sixty-four, so that it can scarcely be said that he ruined his
health by dissipation.
Some writers say that under Tsunayoshi the Bakufu was weak and
incompetent, but there is little evidence to support this view. It is true
that the Shogun was no longer a military dictator like Iemitsu; but
Tsunayoshi’s government kept the feudatories in order by very drastic
methods; its financial policy was on the whole successful despite the
great strain of natural disasters, and it did not hesitate to deal firmly
with the great merchants in Yedo and Osaka. It approved, if it did not
initiate, important riparian works and great advances in the transport
of passengers and goods. Under Tsunayoshi’s guidance, relations be
tween the Bakufu and the Imperial Court were much improved. He
revived and furnished funds for the major Court ceremonies and several
other observances that had lapsed for a century or more, including the
annual festival of the Kamo shrine, which was almost as old as the city,
and had an historical connexion with the Court.
The fear inspired by Tsunayoshi’s methods is clearly shown in con
temporary records. The slightest mistake of a vassal was severely pun
ished. Officials tried to avoid accepting appointments for fear of making
a mistake which would end their careers. There was an active secret
police, watching the movements of visitors to the houses of daimyos or
of Roju. Tsunayoshi’s major political achievement was to strengthen
the authority of the central government, and his work for that purpose
is described by some historians as the Reforms of the eras Tenna (1681-
84) and Jokyo (1684-88). 2
2. len obu , 1709-13

The reign of lenobu, the former lord of Kofu, was brief and unevent
ful, but it witnessed a reaction against the license of the society over
which Tsunayoshi had presided. Ienobu’s task was to complete the
transition (begun under Ietsuna) from a predominantly militaristic to
a civil form of government. It was now more than a hundred years
since Sekigahara. The echoes of war had died away, and political
theory of a Confucian character had already gained much influence in
the ruling class, that is to say among Bakufu officials and the adminis
trators of the fiefs.
lenobu was a scholarly man of high character, anxious to govern
wisely, but his experience as a ruler of a fief did not fully qualify him
for his new task. It was natural that he should at times consult a man of
great learning and acknowledged loyalty, who had been his tutor for
many years. This was the scholar Arai Hakuseki, whom he employed
as an adviser. Opinions differ about the part played by Hakuseki in
the formation of policy, but owing to his previous employment by le
nobu he was in a good position to watch, if not to influence, the course
of events, and his memoirs furnish a valuable picture of life in official
circles as well as showing the ideals of members of the samurai class in
his youth.2
Hakuseld (1656-1725), a ronin through no fault of his own, was the
son of a samurai of modest rank but good repute in a small daimyo’s
domain. An infant prodigy, he studied hard and, as a young samurai
of good judgment ready if need be to use his sword, earned the respect
of his comrades. His early life was a hard one ( the details are given in
Section 5 of this chapter), and it was not until 1694 that he rose to any
prominence. In that year he succeeded in obtaining an appointment as
tutor to the daimyo of Kofu, an important fief held by a Tokugawa col
lateral, at that time Ienobu, who was to become the sixth Shogun.
Ienobu was a studious man, and he must have had great powers of
endurance, for according to Hakuseki’s account he listened patiently to
1,299 lectures on the Chinese classics over a period of nineteen years.
Hakuseki obtained this valuable appointment in a curious way. He was
earning a precarious livelihood in Yedo by teaching, when, thanks partly
to the recommendation of the philosopher Kinoshita Junan (who em
ployed him temporarily), he was summoned to the lord of Kofu’s Yedo
residence and within a day or so was lecturing to Ienobu on T he Great
Learning. At that time he was in his thirty-seventh year. He was given
an adequate stipend, and was now well established. Not long before
that he and his wife had only thirty cents in cash, a few quarts of rice,
and a manservant and a maid who refused to leave them.
Kofu listened to the lectures regularly. They lasted for two hours
each, and during that time Kofu and all others present sat motionless.
In addition to his lectures, Hakuseki wrote historical treatises for his
pupil’s instruction, the first being a history of the fiefs of over 10,000
koku. It was called Hankampu, and covered the years 1600-1680.
Shortly after his accession in 1709 Ienobu began to introduce re
forms. It was easy to make sure that the blunders of Tsunayoshi were
corrected, his ludicrous edicts withdrawn, and his wicked companions
dismissed; and since Tsunayoshi in his wiser decisions had promoted
the liberal movement begun under Ietsuna, Ienobu could here with
confidence follow his lead. In 1710 he issued a revised order to the
military houses (Buke Sho-Hatto), in which the style of language used
was improved and some new material was included. There were new2
2 These memoirs were published under the title Oritaku Shiha no Ki. A trans
lation by G. W . Knox contains some errors but is on the whole reliable. See Trans
actions o f th e Asiatic Society o f Jap an , Vol. X X X . Students who read the original
will be impressed by its clear style.
articles against bribery and corruption, aimed chiefly at the private
influence of the Chamberlains. There were also clauses stating that
popular feeling must be allowed expression and officials must not pre
vent complaints from reaching the proper quarter.
Ienobu also introduced reforms in the judicial system, abolishing
certain cruel punishments, increasing the efficiency of the law courts,
and insisting upon prompt decisions. On most of these points he was
furnished with written opinions by Hakuseki, who was able and willing
to lecture copiously on problems of government in accordance with
Neo-Confucian principles. Doubtless his opinions influenced the prac
tical decisions of the Bakufu officers, but he was not a policy-maker.
The main lines of policy were decided by the Shogun’s chief officers
—the Chamberlains (Soba-yonin), in particular a very able and experi
enced man, Manabe Akifusa (formerly a No actor), who had served in
important posts in Ienobu’s Kofu domain. Hakuseki was on good terms
with Manabe, and was sensible enough not to disagree with him, but to
devote himself to the study of specific problems, and to offering advice
on their solution.
One of Hakuseki’s contributions was in the practical field of eco
nomic reform. This was the first question upon which he was consulted.
There had been a disconcerting rise in prices, which he attributed to a
fall in the standard of the metallic currency coupled with a rise in its
quantity. He urged prompt action to put this right in a memorandum
to the government, and a new gold coin was issued, the amount in cir
culation being reduced by half. He also recommended steps to reduce
the outflow of silver, which was being shipped in quantity from Naga
saki in order to balance the import of foreign goods. For this purpose
he proposed to limit the total volume of foreign trade, though a more
rational solution would have been to increase exports other than silver.
But this would have been contrary to the Chinese principles of self
containment.
Other official tasks entrusted to Hakuseki were the redrafting of the
Buke Sho-Hatto and—of more significance—discussions with the ex-
Kampaku Konoe Motohiro, who came from Kyoto to Yedo to reach an
agreement on relations between the Imperial Court and the Bakufu,
which were already improving under Tsunayoshi. Hakuseki’s account
of the conversations with Konoe gives the impression that he took the
lead; but he was not free from vanity, and no doubt his actual role was
to listen and report, not to argue. It was agreed that younger sons of
an Emperor should be allowed to found new families (instead of enter
ing the Church), and that future imperial princesses should be allowed
to marry. The agreement was sealed, so to speak, by the betrothal of a
princess to an infant son of the Shogun. The Court also profited by new
grants from the Shogun. These arrangements seem to have been ex
pressions of a wish on the part of the Bakufu to be regarded as the su
preme organ of civil government rather than a despotic military head
quarters.
It may be asked why an official of modest rank in an advisory position
should concern himself with such issues when there were many political
and financial questions that needed attention. But although Hakuseki’s
situation did not entitle him to make policy, for this was the function
of the high officers of the Shogun, it was his business to suggest ways
of dealing with problems as they arose, always within limits laid down
by the Bakufu. His position resembled that of a modem civil servant,
who draws up documents on current questions for the consideration of
his political superiors. It is in that capacity that Hakuseki dealt with
such problems as currency reform.
Hakuseki was a remarkable man, of very strong character, high prin
ciples, and great learning, but he disclaimed any intention to make
decisions for his superiors. At the end of his memoirs he states clearly:
"Nowadays people talk as if everything was carried out on the sole de
cision of Manabe, even as if the government of the country was con
ducted by a person like me. But a person like me does not hold office
permitting the exercise of authority. Moreover Akifusa, under the
orders of the sixth Shogun, acted as an intermediary between the Sho
gun and the Roju, and after the sixth Shogun’s death Akifusa (in ac
cordance with his testament) took part in discussion of affairs of state
with the Roju.* When my opinion was asked it was at the suggestion of
Akifusa, presumably in accordance with the same orders. If there had
been any objection to this, surely the Roju could have put an end to it
by dismissing Akifusa.”
Hakuseki’s statement is of course true in form, but in substance it
needs some qualification, since once Tsunayoshi had passed over the
Roju and leaned upon his Chamberlains, the full powers of the Roju
were no longer exercised. It is true that Yanagisawa Yoshiyasu, who had
the power but not the office of Tairo, lost his place as a Chamberlain
upon Tsunayoshi’s death; but after his fall the Roju did not resume
their lost authority.* Nor did they recover it upon the accession of
Ienobu, for he brought with him from his Kofu fief a number of his
most trusted officials, among them Manabe Akifusa himself.
8 The Seventh Shogun being an infant.

* Hakuseki says: “All the Roju did was to pass on his [Yoshiyasu’s] instructions.”
142 THE SHOCUNATE, 1680-1716
Hakuseki’s contribution to the government was evident in the field
of theory rather than practice. A Confucianist by training and tempera
ment, he naturally approved of the adoption of classical Chinese prin
ciples, and he announced clearly that what the state needed was the
benign influence of Ritual and Music ( Reigaku, or in Chinese L i and
Yueh.) So baldly stated, such a proposition is hard to accept, but it
becomes intelligible when it is explained that L i means a code of be
haviour or, in a broader sense, fixed principles of conduct, and Yueh
stands for the elevating and refining influence of music ( and the arts in
general), in contrast to the hard realism of military rule. In pursuit of
these ideals Hakuseki paid much attention to Court ceremonies and to
such matters as the correct procedure for receiving embassies from
Korea.
He was respected by Ienobu, who treated him well, gave him a
stipend of 1,000 koku, and raised him to the rank of hatamoto in 1713.
By then he was in his fifty-seventh year and had already been employed
in the Bakufu for four years. He remained in employment after Ienobu
was succeeded by Ietsugu, and until Ietsugu’s death in 1716. Thus he
was in office for only eight years, and although during that period he
occupied no position of authority, he was trusted as an adviser and
much admired as a scholar. His views on history may have had some
influence on the mind of Ienobu, and he may have contributed to
policy-making in a general way, as for example when he pointed out
abuses which needed attention. In the government departments there
were many serious shortcomings, carried over from the days of Ietsuna
and Tsunayoshi, as is clear from a study of the Tokugawa Jikki, the of
ficial Tokugawa history. A purge was needed, and Hakuseki did not
hesitate to say so.
3. Ietsugu, 1713-16
Ietsugu was an infant when he became Shogun, and his life was
short. No events of importance took place in those few years, except
for a so-called “reform” of the coinage and some attempts to improve
the regulation of foreign trade at Nagasaki.
The currency problem was difficult, and no satisfactory solution was
found; but it needs some separate description, since it plagued the
government incessantly.
4. Currency Reform
Hakuseki’s account of the financial problems of the Bakufu sheds
an interesting light upon the incompetence and the dishonesty of the
officials of the Treasury. Deficits were so great that auditors were ap
pointed, and their investigations laid bare peculation on a large scale,
especially by one officer, the Finance Commissioner (Kanjo-Bugyo)
Hagiwara Shigehide, who made great profits by secret arrangements
with building contractors. By debasing the silver coinage he is said to
have made a profit of more than a quarter of a million ryo. He was
known to have been cheating for thirty years, but nobody denounced
him until Hakuseki took his pen and wrote accusations which could not
be disproved.
Some idea of the degradation of official morality towards the end
of the seventeenth century may be gained from an outline of the cur
rency problem as it developed from the early years of the Bakufu. The
coinage in the Keicho era ( ca. 1615) had consisted of gold pieces ( called
“koban”) containing 85.69 per cent of pure gold and 14.25 per cent of
pure silver, while the Keicho silver pieces contained over 80 per cent
of pure silver. By 1695 (Genroku 8) this was changed so that the Gen-
roku gold koban contained only 56 .4 per cent of gold and 43.19 per cent
of silver, while the silver pieces contained only 64.35 per cent of pure
silver.
This process of debasement reflects a progressive failure in the fi
nancial policy of the Bakufu. In tire days of Ieyasu and Hidetada there
had been a vast accumulation of capital derived from taxation, from
profits in foreign trade, from the yield of mines, and even from econ
omies in administration.
Under Iemitsu about half of this capital sum had been spent; under
the fourth Shogun (Ietsuna) income and expenditure no longer bal
anced. The great fire of Meireki caused cruel losses, and the cost of
relief and restoration was so heavy that the strain on the finances of the
Bakufu was borne only with difficulty. Yet the extravagances which
began in Iemitsu’s time increased rather than diminished, and annual
expenditure continued to rise—under Tsunayoshi in particular. Apart
from these avoidable losses, the output of the silver mines diminished,
and continued natural disasters, combined with embezzlement by dis
honest officials, ended in a complete breakdown. It was at this point
that in order to patch up the damage the first debasement of the coinage
took place in 1695, as an emergency measure. The immediate cause of
this action was an urgent need for funds to build the costly shrine and
carry out the customary funeral rites for a deceased Shogun—in this
case Ietsuna. It was Hagiwara Shigehide who proposed the debasement
to Tsunayoshi.
According to Hakuseki’s calculation the Bakufu made a profit of
more than five million ryo by this conversion. Meanwhile in 1695 the
Bakufu had called in the former gold and silver coins, but with little
success. The edict was repeated in following years (1696 to 1702), but
the response was poor. Hakuseki’s opinion was that more than half the
old issue was being secretly held. This was only an estimate, but there
is no doubt that the public had little confidence in the Bakufu’s coinage
policy; and this attitude of mistrust was reflected in the growth of
counterfeiting, for which there were over five hundred convictions a
few years after 1695.
By 1713 prices were again rising. Various proposals were made to
the Bakufu, among them plans for a new coinage submitted by Shige-
hide. These were rejected and Shigehide was removed from office, but
no further action was taken until late in the year, after the death of
Ienobu. Then a currency reform was proposed, which included with
drawal of the Genroku (1695) coins and a new issue.
It was urged that the people had no trust in the government’s policy,
by which the standard of purity of gold and silver had been lowered
and the ratio of value between gold and silver had been changed;
therefore there should be a return to the Keicho standards, which would
restore confidence and reduce prices. A new metallic currency was
accordingly introduced in 1714. It was of the same quality as the Keicho
currency, and its effect was beneficial. The price of rice in silver, which
had remained fairly stable from 1695 to 1710, rose rapidly from 1710
to 1713, and then as the new coins came into circulation, fell steeply to
a minimum in 1718, when it stood at a point lower than the 1695 figure.
The currency problem was closely related to the regulation of for
eign trade, since any adverse balance had to be met by the export of
precious metal. After the enforcement of the seclusion policy, private
foreign trade was forbidden and public foreign trade was limited to
exchange of goods with China and Holland ( or strictly speaking with
Dutch merchant ships) through the settlement at Hirado o r later at
Nagasaki.
This trade had continued without restriction for some years, and as
late as 1683-84 hundreds of junks from China arrived in Nagasaki,
where there was a thriving Chinese settlement on shore. In 1685, how
ever, the Bakufu placed a limit upon the total amount of foreign trade.
The reason for this restriction was, according to Japanese statements,
that the Ming policy of limiting foreign trade had been reversed by
the Manchu rulers, and Chinese vessels now began to enter Japanese
ports in increasing numbers, to the alarm of the Japanese government.
But the embargoes of the Bakufu were not observed by the Chinese,
and in 1688 a further ban on entries was issued, limiting the Chinese
to seventy-three vessels a year, and allowing only a specified small
number of Chinese traders to open premises on shore. But these meas
ures did not solve the problem. They merely encouraged smuggling
and other illicit transactions.
This was the situation which faced Ienobu’s government and which
the Bakufu hoped to rectify. But the Governors of Nagasaki complained
that the loss of trade was already causing great distress to the Japanese
population of Nagasaki, and they asked for relief in the shape of a
plentiful supply of copper for export, so as to redress the adverse bal
ance.
The position at the opening of the Shotoku era (1711-16) can now
be described in some detail, thanks to recent scrutiny of records kept
at Nagasaki.5 Full lists of cargoes are furnished, but for our purpose it
suffices to summarize the situation in terms of a plain balance sheet.
Trade in Nagasaki in 1711 was composed as follows: imports to the
value of 4,193 kan of silver; exports to the value of 2,918 kan of silver-
in other words, an adverse balance of 1,275 kan, which had to be re
dressed by a reduction in imports or by the shipment of silver or copper.
There were strong objections to any increase in the export of silver
and copper, partly because the output of the Japanese mines had been
falling off and partly because of currency needs. After much discussion
and the proposal of several unworkable plans, a new ordinance was
promulgated dealing with the question in all its aspects. It was an
elaborate document, but its most important provisions may be easily
summarized:
Two Commissioners of Foreign Trade to be appointed, to serve alter

nately for a year in Yedo and Nagasaki.
Thirty Chinese vessels and two Dutch vessels to be allowed entry each
year.
The Chinese ships to take cargoes up to a total value of 6,000 kan of
silver each year.
The Dutch ships to take cargo up to a total value of 3,000 kan of silver
each year.
At the same time there was to be made available for export each
year 3,000,000 kin of copper for the Chinese and 1,500,000 kin for the
Dutch. (The actual amount exported in 1711 was 1,797,694 kin, ap
proximately 1,000 tons.)
8 These records incidentally show that Hakuseki’s figures were unreliable, thus
confirming an impression that die great man was not always accurate. The source
is an article by T . Yamawald, in T d h ig ak u , No. 19 (1 9 5 9 ).
This trade was in quantity of no great importance, and at first sight
it seems as if it were not worth the trouble which it gave to both national
and local authorities. The earlier restrictions of about 1640 were part
of the seclusion policy, but those imposed by Tsunayoshi in 1688 were
of an economic character, designed to check the import of luxuries, and
the consequent loss of gold and silver. This was, or appeared to be, a
matter of some urgency in the light of shortages at home. The imports
were of no vital importance to the Japanese economy, since they con
sisted chiefly of silk yams and textiles, skins, sugar, medicines, and
books and paintings. Of these only the last three items might be re
garded as necessities. No doubt if a greater effort had been made the
value of exports could have been increased, but the attitude of the
Bakufu was still governed by prejudice against freedom of commerce.
The regulations of 1715 were inspired not only by a desire to make
economies but also by the isolationist ideas which were traditional in
China and had affected Japanese thought
Ienobu adopted the recommendations of Hakuseki, who made no
effort to restore the balance of trade by increasing exports, because he
believed that a country could be impoverished by sending its products
abroad; and as for purchases of foreign goods, he approved only of the
aforesaid medicines and books.5
5. Arai H akuseki
Hakuseki’s autobiography, Oritaku Shiba no Ki, deserves some

special attention, not only on account of its author’s achievements as a
scholar, but also because it illustrates very clearly the code of behaviour
of the best type of samurai of the day. By the middle of the seventeenth
century, town life and the lack of suitable employment had brought
about a sad deterioration in the behaviour of many members of the
lower ranks of the military class; but in the countryside remote from
urban influences the old, rigid standards were preserved. They are
well portrayed in the pages which Hakuseki devoted to the life of his
parents and to his own early experience as a youthful samurai.
His father, born in 1602, a wanderer in his youth in the confused
post-war society of Japan, was a ronin until at the age of thirty he en
tered the service of Tsuchiya, a daimyo of 21,000 koku in the province
of Kazusa. He had a fair position in Tsuchiya’s household, being pro
moted for good conduct and courage. Hakuseki records his own youth
ful memories of his father in the following terms:
“Father’s life followed a strict and uninterrupted routine. He awoke
at four in the morning, bathed in cold water and dressed his own hair.
In very cold weather Mother wished him to use warm water, but he
would not give the servants trouble. When he was past seventy, fire
was kept in the footwarmer at night, and he used hot water then for
Mother’s sake because it could be heated easily at that time.
“Father and Mother were both Buddhists, and after their bath put
on their special clothes and worshipped. . . . When they awoke before
dawn they sat up in bed and silently awaited the daybreak.”
Hakuseki relates the story told by his father of a remarkable sword
called the Dish-Cutter: ‘T h e sixteen-year-old son of an important of
ficer named Kato was shouting from an upstairs room in a quarrel with
a young samurai who was cleaning fish in the yard below. I had a room
on the same floor, and when I saw Kato rushing down I picked up my
sword and went down to see. Kato had struck the youth, but he was
not badly hurt and turned on Kato with his fish knife. So I cut him
down from the shoulder, my sword going right across his body and
splitting the dish. As he fell I said to Kato ‘Now finish him,’ wiped the
blood from my blade, and returned it to its scabbard and went home.
So when others came rushing up they called Kato’s sword the Dish-
Cutter! My sword had belonged to a man named Goto, who had it from
his brother who had cut a man’s head in two with it. He kept the skull
as a memento.”
Hakuseki described his father in simple language: “As I remember
father . . . he was short, large-boned, strongly built. He showed no
sign of emotion in his face. He did not laugh loudly or scold in an
angry voice. His words were few and his movements dignified. I never
saw him surprised or lacking in self-control. . . . When off duty he
swept his room, hung up an old picture, arranged a few flowers, and
sat silent all day, or painted, but in black and white, not in colour. . . .
At home he wore only carefully washed clothes, and when he went out
his dress was new and fine, but not extravagant or beyond his rank.
When he was past seventy he wore only one sword, not over a foot long,
and his servant followed bearing his long sword, because he thought
that a man should not wear a weapon which he could not handle. He
kept the short sword all his life, but put it away when he took the
tonsure.”
Some years after his father’s death, Hakuseki was told by a monk that
when his father was past eighty a drunken man came to the monastery
flourishing a sword. The monks were afraid, but Hakuseki’s father
came out, caught him by the arm, tripped him, and threw his sword
into the drain.
Hakuseki displayed great talent as a child and is said to have written
ideographs with skill at the age of three. By ten he wrote his father’s
letters, and at eleven he had fencing lessons and did well in matches
with other boys. He was a page in the Tsuchiya household, and there
he continued his studies with the aid of a friendly scholar who took
him through some Chinese classical works. Thereafter he was mostly
self-taught and continued his studies alongside his duties as a young
samurai. He was popular among his comrades, shared in their esca
pades, and was ready to use his sword when loyalty demanded.
He tells an interesting story of a youthful experience which illus
trates the attitude of the samurai towards the lower classes. He had
been placed under arrest for some minor offence, but planned to escape
in order to take part in a fight between two rival groups of young samu
rai. He prepared by putting on chain armour under his dress and
waited for a call. At length a member of his party came to tell him
that the affair had been settled and asked Hakuseki how he had pro
posed to break out of confinement. Hakuseki replied that he was
guarded only by an old man and woman, who had the key of the
gate. If they had refused to open he would have cut off their heads
and taken the key. He thought this a venial offence owing to the low
rank of the victims.
On Tsuchiya’s death his successor treated Hakuseki and his father
so contemptuously that they were obliged to resign. Hakuseki’s parents
were supported by a relative, but he himself was at a loss. He continued
his studies and refused to take employment, though short of funds. An
old friend of the family proposed that Hakuseki should marry the daugh
ter of a rich merchant who had social ambitions and would make over
a fortune to the girl. But Hakuseki refused this and similar offers, tell
ing his father (now a widower) that he could not forsake the samurai
path which his ancestors had trodden.
In 1682, at the age of twenty-six, he went to Yedo in search of a post,
which he found under Hotta Masatoshi, the Tairo. After Hotta’s min
der in 1684 he stayed in Yedo, looking for employment. But he found
no suitable post and, still pursuing his studies, lived in penury with his
wife and children. Fortunately he had attracted the attention of Kino-
shita Junan, a prominent scholar who had been given office in Yedo as
a Confucianist independent of the Hayashi family. Hakuseki became
the chief of Junan’s disciples, and this, as we have seen, led to Junan’s
recommending him as tutor for the young man who was to succeed to
the office of Shogun. This was Ienobu, the lord of Kofu, an important
Tokugawa domain. Hakuseki’s service from that time under Ienobu
and then under Ietsugu has already been described. From 1716 he was
independent and could devote himself to his own pursuits as a scholar,
a poet, a philosopher, and an historian. It was in this last capacity that
he showed his truest gift.
6. Arai H akuseki as an Historian

Hakuseki had a sense of the past and a rare analytic gift, qualities
which made him one of the greatest historians of Japan, despite his
inaccuracy in matters of detail.
Apart from the very full descriptive list of fiefs known as Hankampu,
which is a compilation rather than an original treatise, his most impor
tant historical works were Koshitsu (1716) and his masterpiece, Doku-
shi Yoron, which was the basis of his lectures to Ienobu in 1712.
Koshitsu (meaning “A Survey of Ancient Historical Writings”) is a
critical study of the earliest documentary sources, such as the eighth-
century Kojiki and Nihongi. In his preamble Hakuseki pays special
attention to linguistic problems and shows an awareness of the impor
tance of paleology in the interpretation of early texts. Koshitsu, though
a careful review of the written traditions of the “Age of the Gods,” is
in fact more valuable as an exposition of Hakuseki’s methods. In gen
eral he owes something to his precursor, the learned monk Jien (1155-
1225), whose Gukansho showed belief in an historical continuum; but
Hakuseki’s view of life was rationalistic rather than religious, as would
be expected of a Confucian scholar. There can be no doubt that he
introduced a new and advanced method of historical enquiry.
More immediately interesting than either Hankam pu or Koshitsu is
D okushi Yoron, a title which might be translated as “A Reading of His
tory.” It is a study of the history of Japan from the ninth to the end
of the sixteenth century, a survey in which Hakuseki relates the course
of events principally for the purpose of stating his own view of the
movement of history. He distinguishes phases—nine in which the Im
perial rule gives way to a developing warrior class, and five in which
at length the warrior class reaches its situation of supremacy under
Tokugawa rule. As might be expected, the general tenor of Hakusela's
interpretation, though condemning individuals, favours the leaders of
the feudal society. He traces the Throne’s gradual loss of power from
the days of the Fujiwara to the rise of the great captains, and implies
that this was inevitable because of the incompetence of the Imperial
rule. The point of interest here is less the correctness of Hakuseki’s
opinions—he distributes blame and praise in decided terms8—than the•
• It is an interesting exercise to compare his account of Ashikaga Takauji with

the Baishdron version.
picture of his attitude towards historical enquiry. He departed from
the annalistic convention of Chinese historical writing because he saw
history not as a series of discrete situations but as a continuous process
which could be described and explained on rational grounds in clear
language.
A word should be said here on Hakuseki’s relations with other his
torians. His was not an amiable character, and he showed signs of
jealousy. His relations with Hayashi Nobuatsu were strained, but he
owed something to the work of the official Hayashi school, using their
results freely. Late in life he was on friendly terms with the Mito his
torians, corresponding with Asaka Tampaku and Miyake Kanran (see
articles by Miyazaki Michio in Nihon Rekishi, Nos. 148 and 158).
The merits of Hakuseki as an historian were of course due to his
intense curiosity about the past, and in some measure to his specula
tion about the future. From all available sources—principally from the
Dutch at Deshima and a Sicilian missionary named Sidotti, who was
imprisoned for breaking the law by secretly entering Japan (1711)—he
learned a number of facts about the geography and history of Western
countries and the scientific knowledge which they possessed. He was
impressed by their secular learning, but he thought that their Christian
beliefs were so much nonsense and need not be regarded as a danger
to the state. He was therefore prepared for some relaxation of the seclu
sion policy, and he may be regarded as the first member of the official
class to see that Japan must enter into relations with the outside world.
The stiff martinet in his character was overcome by the seeker after
knowledge.
C H A P T E R XII
GENROKU
S t r i c t l y speaking Genroku is the name of the era lasting from
1688 to 1704; but it is commonly used to denote a pattern of life which

flourished in those years, when urban society in Japan had reached a
peak of material prosperity and a blossoming of the arts was enjoyed
by the citizens.
As we have seen in preceding chapters, there was a great increase
of production during the seventeenth century, indeed an all-round ex
pansion of the national economy; and in all the towns, but principally
in Yedo and Osaka, there came into prominence a very prosperous
bourgeoisie, so lavish in its expenditure that it called forth frequent
rebukes and economy edicts from the government. But it need not be
supposed that the citizens indulged only in disorderly pleasures, for
they developed high standards of taste in literature and the arts. While
departing from the ancient tradition of Court painting and of classical
romances, which were in an elevated style and often the work of Bud
dhist monks, the writers of popular books and the painters of popular
pictures were nevertheless men who followed a strict canon in portray
ing not the past but the decidedly contemporaneous life of the town.
These were the painters of “ukiyo-e,” the writers of sketches called
"ukiyo-zoshi,” who depicted the leading figures in the “floating world,”
the fugitive society ( ukiyo) composed of actors, dancers, singers, and
fashionable beauties. In the Genroku era the most prominent figures
were Chikamatsu Monzaemon, the great playwright (1658-1724); Ihara
Saikaku, the most gifted novelist (d. 1693); Hishikawa Moronobu (d.
1714), a founder of the ukiyo-e school of painting; and perhaps here
should be included the itinerant poet Matsuo Basho (1644-94), a great
master of the “haiku,” or seventeen-syllable poetic epigram.
Not all these were members of the trading class. Saikaku was the
son of an Osaka merchant, but Chikamatsu was the son of a provincial
samurai of modest standing and was brought up in Kyoto. Some of the
most successful painters belonged to the classical Kano school. These
included men like Morikage and Hanabusa Itcho, both of whom were
pupils of the distinguished Tan’yu, but departed from the strict canon
of Court painting and were expelled from the school for nonconformity.
It will be asked who were the patrons of these writers and artists,
and the answer is practically all but the poorest citizens, for most of
152 GENROKU
the work of novelists, painters, and playwrights was addressed to the

ordinary man and woman, who crowded the theatres and bought for a
few small coins pictures of actors and lovely ladies of a kind familiar to
modem collectors in the work of Utamaro and other late masters of the
colour print.
The growth of a numerous class of patrons of the arts in a society
hitherto regarded as beneath the notice of even the lowest rank of
samurai is a remarkable phenomenon in the social history of Japan.
It would be a mistake to regard it as a sign of the decadence of the
military class. It testifies rather to a widening of the horizon of the
city-dwelling samurai, and in the economic sphere it discloses his pov
erty and the pressure upon him to find suitable employment to eke out
his stipend.
The population of the two great cities, Kyoto and Yedo, was of the
order of half a million about a .d . 1700, while Osaka had about 350,000,
the figures in each case being exclusive of members of the military class.
In these three great centres, the townspeople had reached a compara
tively high degree of affluence and a definite standard of taste in judg
ing a picture, a novel, or a play. Their code of behaviour was within
certain limits strict, and lapses from it furnished the themes of the trag
edies upon which the theatres thrived. It is a curious fact that the moral
principles which the people sought to observe were of Confucian origin,
and life was regarded as a conflict between duty and emotion.
On a smaller scale, of course, these conditions were common in
urban life throughout the country. The Bakufu had to take note of
them, for the power of money in the feudal society, and especially of
great riches, had to be reduced or restrained if the military autocracy
was to survive. In practice this did not prove easy. The usual stream
of sumptuary rules was issued, but they were not easy to enforce. In
some flagrant cases the authorities took a strong line, as when they con
fiscated the property of Yodoya, the great Osaka rice merchant, who
was immensely rich and given to display. But in the Genroku era the
growing wealth, and consequently the growing power of the townsmen
caused frequent clashes between them and the samurai, whose incomes
declined while they continued to assert their superior social position.
This proud attitude was not difficult to sustain in Yedo, but in
Osaka, and even in Kyoto, there was little genuine respect for the mili
tary. It was an inevitable sequel of the expansion of the total economy
that the importance of the warrior class should seem to diminish, for
the process which enriched farmers and merchants raised the cost of
living to the disadvantage, even the dismay, of men on a fixed stipend.
GENROKU 153
The brief Genroku era was marked by several notable events which
included a great fire in Kyoto (1692); the debasement of metallic cur
rency (1695); a great fire in Yedo (1698); a great earthquake in the
Kanto in which 150,000 fives were lost (1703); and the first performance
of Chikamatsu’s tragedy L ov e Suicide at Sonezdki (1703).
Considered in retrospect the most attractive feature of this era is
the gaiety of colour and pattern in clothing and decoration which re
flected the mood of the times. It is an especially interesting aspect of
the social history of Japan that the rise of a prosperous class of shop
keepers and craftsmen was accompanied by a lively creative phase in
the arts. Perhaps at a later date an elderly Japanese gentleman in his
reminiscences might have observed that this was the age when Japan
savoured “la douceur de vivre.”
C H A P T E R XIII
A NEW REGIME
1. Y oshim unes Character
Y o s h i m u n e , who became Shogun in 1716, was the daimyo of Kii,
one of the three rich fiefs of the three collateral Tokugawa houses, the
Go-Sanke. In administering this domain of over 500,000 koku, he had
learned a great deal by coping with difficulties, for it was in financial
trouble owing to a succession of misfortunes, which included a debt
to the Bakufu, great outlays on rebuilding after disastrous fires, costly
entertaining of the Shogun, and in 1707 serious damage to the southern
shores of Kii by a tidal wave.
The experience which he gained by dealing with these problems was
of great value when at the age of thirty-three he took office in Yedo to
find similar trials awaiting him, though on a larger scale. He was well
equipped for mastering such difficulties, for robust is an epithet which
may properly be applied to his character, both physical and moral.
Unlike Ienobu, he had been brought up to a hard and vigorous country
life, and he had his own views on government. He was convinced that
reforms were necessary. He had, however, little trust in the ability of
Confucian scholars to solve practical questions, and one of his first steps
was to do away with most of the reforms which Hakuseki had recom
mended to Ienobu, and to appoint Muro Kyuso as a Confucian adviser
in the place of Hakuseki. Kyuso was known as a sensible, practical
philosopher, and a strong supporter of the Shogunate.
In official circles there was a not unnatural reaction against the
principles laid down by Hakuseki. His stress upon ceremonial was
displeasing to Yoshimune, who disliked punctilio; and his rival Haya-
shi Nobuatsu now restored the influence of the official Confucian col
lege. But Yoshimune did not show any marked prejudice, and he made
no attempt to revise the financial policy which Hakuseki had advised.
The effect of the new coinage introduced in 1714 was obviously bene
ficial, and he was wise enough not to propose any change. He did, how
ever, abolish most of the “reforms” which Hakuseki had recommended
to Ienobu. It is not surprising, therefore, that Yoshimune was regarded
with mixed feelings by members of the old regime. He entertained
Ienobu’s widow courteously in the Castle, and she wrote to her father,
A NEW REGIME 155
the Regent ( Sessho) Konoe Motohiro, in Kyoto telling him of this event.
But this missive was followed by an alarming story of fire and tempest
and a quite untrue account of political conditions in Yedo, which she
ascribed to the blunders of Yoshimune. Konoe, it will be recalled, had
been in close touch with Hakuseki when he visited Yedo while Ienobu
was Shogun, and was therefore no doubt inclined to take Hakuseki s
side. But the entries in his diary, based on his daughter’s letters and
other reports, though entertaining as gossip, show that the Imperial
Court was not well informed on affairs in the East and on the character
of the new Shogun.
2. Financial Problems
Yoshimune’s attention was soon directed to the finances of the Ba-
kufu. Their condition was deteriorating, although it did not reach a
critical point until about 1721; but he saw that economies were needed.
His plans for retrenchment included a reduction in the number of hata-
moto. With the lapse of time and the growth of families their numbers
were increasing, and he refused to recognize inheritance of the rank,
especially in cases of adoption. Similar restrictions were applied to the
creation of new Fudai vassals. Here, for instance, he would allow new
comers to hold their rank for one generation only. The number of go-
kenin was also swollen and needed reduction.
T okugaw a Yoshimune
156 A NEW REGIME
In all these cases of restriction the motive was not entirely financial.
It was political in that Yoshimune wished to have the support of a strong,
select body of retainers of proved loyalty. He had brought with him
from Kii some of his trusted retainers, but gave them no privileges.
Unlike his predecessors he had no favourites to protect. One of his
ablest men who had made and announced a decision without informing
the Bakufu Council was summoned to appear before the Council, re
buked, and obliged to apologize for his error. Yoshimune did not inter
fere. He was welcomed by the Fudai officers who had been overruled
by the Chamberlains and other favourites appointed by his predeces
sors, and he showed every sign of intending to govern directly. He
made no move to fill vacancies in the list of Roju, and for appointment
to other offices he examined candidates himself. He surprised his offi
cials by encouraging direct appeals, and he installed complaint boxes
(meyasubako) for that purpose.
In these and other ways he strengthened his personal authority. He
meant to be the sole ruler. His reading of the political situation con
vinced him that it had deteriorated largely because the traditional so
cial order was breaking down and the military class was losing its con
trol to the rising class of rich merchants and landowners. It was also,
he soon discovered, necessary without delay to examine and repair the
finances of the Bakufu. His own inclination and the need to make some
drastic changes combined to fill his mind with a determination to return
to the early days of Ieyasu’s rule, a determination that was in part car
ried out. This return to an earlier and successful system of government
came to be known as the Kyoho Reform, named after the Kyoho era
(1716-36). Yoshimune disliked the Confucianist elements in the poli
cies of his predecessors, and wished to revert to the principles upon
which the Tokugawa Bakufu had been based. He is often quoted as
saying that he wished "in all matters to obey the laws of Gongen Sama,”
but there is no written record to confirm this, or any other public an
nouncement of policy. “Gongen,” or the Avatar, it will be remembered,
is the posthumous name of Ieyasu.
As to concrete measures, he decided, like many oriental rulers before
him, that the general standard of living should be lowered; and accord
ingly he reduced his own expenditure and restricted that of the gov
ernment.
In 1722 he summoned the leading Bakufu officials and put before
them the exhausted condition of Bakufu finances. Poor harvests in 1720
and 1721 had caused a fall in tax revenue, and great expenditure had
been needed for repairs to the Oigawa embankment. For such reasons
A NEW REGIME 157
it had been necessary to call upon hatamoto and go-kenin to accept a
cut in their stipends. All officials must now make the greatest possible
efforts in their respective posts, and a special Finance Commissioner
was to be appointed.
Shortly after this conference the Bakufu issued an order to all dai-
myos stating that "regardless of shame” ( “go chijoku wo kaerimizu”)
it had been decided to call upon them to contribute 100 koku for each
10,000 koku of their revenue. In return their period of residence in
Yedo would be reduced by half, thus reducing their expenditure. This
contribution—it was called “agemai,” or offered rice—amounted to the
respectable sum of 1,750,000 koku. It was about half the total amount
of stipends payable to hatamoto and go-kenin, so that the urgent need
was met. Other measures were devised to reach a balance between in
come and expenditure, and Yoshimune paid special attention to the
salaries of his officials, with a view to encouraging good service.
His plans for increasing revenue were far-sighted. Since the chief
source of revenue was the tax upon agricultural produce, the area under
cultivation must be increased. Consequently a great scheme of devel
opment must be put in hand. An order was published throughout the
country to the effect that, whether in Tokugawa or private domains,
positive measures should be concerted by the competent authorities
and the farmers to bring new land under cultivation. Since most of these
schemes involved considerable capital expenditure on drainage or em
bankment, by implication the support of the wealthy merchants of the
cities was invited; and the Deputies in Bakufu territory were told that
they would be granted one-tenth of the tax accruing from newly devel
oped farmland.1
The chief development schemes undertaken or approved by the Ba
kufu under Yoshimune were as follows:
1722— An area in Shimosa, producing 50,000 koku.
1723— A large area in the Tamagawa basin, including the districts of
Mitaka, Koganei, and Kokubunji, which are now part of To
kyo city.
1727—Land in the Tamagawa and Arakawa basins, which by a joint
irrigation scheme was converted into rice fields producing
150,000 koku.
1 Students should note that the estimates of rice production on page 353 of Mur
doch's Volume III are much exaggerated. The figure of 60 million koku is fantastic.
The average annual consumption of an adult was one koku, and the population at
this time was of the order of 30 million. Allowing for storage, it is unlikely that the
annual production much exceeded 30 million koku. More land was brought under
cultivation after Yoshimune’s death, though not for rice alone.
158 A NEW REGIME
An improvement in the revenue of the Bakufu from land tax after about
1735 was due almost entirely to the opening up of new farmland in To-
kugawa domains.
Yoshimune was not alone in promoting the development of new
farmland. Most of the daimyos encouraged any plan that promised
to increase the product of their domains. There are no exact records
of the area brought under cultivation at this time, for (after Hide-
yoshis Kenchi) there was only one land survey purporting to cover the
whole country. That was in the Genroku era (around 1700), and it was
imperfect and unreliable. But while giving no details of separate fiefs,
it shows that there was an all-round increase in the area under culti
vation. The constant enlargement and improvement of irrigation works
testifies to such an increase, and in some domains specialists in irriga
tion practice were engaged.
Separate villages also carried out irrigation works on their own
account, especially in digging channels and in constructing ponds and
tanks or other reservoirs, thus furnishing a water supply for new fields.
They were able sometimes to avoid surveys or to deceive the surveyors
to their own advantage, and there is no doubt that many farmers of the
standing of nanushi (headmen) lived a very comfortable life, as can
be seen from account books recording the purchase of goods in great
variety.
It is pertinent here to make some observations on the accuracy of
land surveys in general. Anybody who has travelled through rural areas
in Japan must have been struck by the great variety in shape as well as
size of both wet and dry fields. Surveyors were instructed to measure
the length and width of each field, but rectangular fields were scarce.
Dry fields were often on a slope, following a contour, and many could
not be measured by a rod but only by guesswork. The shape of wet
fields was also frequently irregular, since they had to fit the pattern of
irrigation, to say nothing of boundaries between plots of different own
ership. It may be generally assumed that there was a very high factor
of error in estimating the area of irregularly shaped fields, and no doubt
the villages took advantage of these conditions in giving information
to the surveyors. In the Genroku survey alluded to above there was no
serious attempt to measure areas, and the yield was estimated by the
visual examination of a specimen plot at harvest time. Consequently
official statements of the value of land in terms of koku must be re
garded as indications of magnitude and not as accurate descriptions.
Among the remarkable features of Yoshimune’s method of govern-
A NEW REGIME 159
ment was his readiness to listen to complaints. One of the gravest
offences under the mediaeval law and until the first quarter of the
eighteenth century had been the “direct appeal” (jikiso) for justice to
the Shogun, which was punishable by death. In 1716 the Yedo govern
ment proclaimed that a great number of appeals and suggestions had
been addressed to high officials, and that upon examination not one of
them had been found of use. Indeed had they been adopted they would
have had undesirable results. Therefore, in the future, except when
opinions were asked for by the government, persons responsible for
such statements would be punished.
The true cause of this seemingly reactionary policy of the Bakufu
was the discovery of an organized business of bribery by which mer
chants and others persuaded officials to put their proposals before the
Roju.2 The reaction against this practice was extreme, since now, irre
spective of their nature, all kinds of prayers and claims were forbidden.
This was due to the generally old-fashioned attitude of the Roju, who
clung to their belief that policy should not be based on public opinion.
Nevertheless under Yoshimunes influence the proclamation of 1716
was reversed in 1719. Appeals and suggestions would now be exam
ined, and their originators would not be punished even if their views
turned out to be unsound.
The three junior Roju were ordered to adopt suggestions which
promised to be of use to the people in general, such as methods for
increasing the crops, or making good use of their earnings, or other
wise behaving as model citizens. Yoshimune was not afraid of direct
appeals. In the New Year celebrations of 1718, returning from worship
at a family shrine in Ueno, he was approached by a townsman carry
ing a petition. This offender was seized and bound by police officers,
and was about to be handed over to the magistrates for punishment
when Yoshimune stopped them, and ordered them in the future not to
arrest such persons but to see that their petitions were examined by the
municipal authorities. These incidents are trivial, but they show a
great change under Yoshimunes guidance in the attitude of the Ba
kufu towards social problems.
In his effort to cope with the financial stringency by which the gov
ernment was harassed Yoshimune resorted to measures that deserve
some detailed study, since they reveal weaknesses in the political sys
tem which he was striving to reform. The fault was doubtless not with
2 Even the austere Hakuseld was offered a bribe on one occasion at least.
160 A NEW REGIME
him, but with the permanent officials whose business it was to carry
out his policy.
As we have seen, one of his first cares was the problem of the liveli
hood of the warrior class, who were suffering from a rise in the cost of
living. To give effect to his wishes the civil servants resorted at once
to the traditional method of issuing edicts. These were designed to re
duce expenditure by enforcing thrift. Known as Economy Orders they
were of a kind that had been issued repeatedly and without effect since
the foundation of the Minamoto Bakufu in the Middle Ages, and in
deed since antiquity. Sometimes such injunctions had been attempts
to make samurai five according to their station; but these were intended
to check expenditure, which began to rise as life in the now flourishing
towns became more and more difficult for families on a fixed income.
In 1721 Yoshimune ordered all officials to reduce the normal ex
penditure of their departments, and even instructed them to state their
objections when they were instructed to carry out measures which
seemed to them too expensive. In 1722, while working on a full revi
sion of financial policy, he explained the government position to dai-
myo and hatamoto alike, calling upon them to reduce their standard
of living. In 1724 the Bakufu issued orders limiting private expendi
ture on ceremonies, clothing, household furnishings, and similar ob
jects. Such orders were repeated almost annually for the next twenty
years.
They are given in detail in the official collection of Bakufu Orders
( “O Furegaki”), which contains under the heading Economy Rules a
number of documents bearing dates from 1640 to 1743. They are worth
examination for the light which they throw on social changes that ac
companied the growth of a thriving bourgeoisie in the great cities and,
though on a lower scale, the more prosperous castle towns.
The collection styled “O Furegaki Shusei,” which has been well de
scribed as the records of a police state, contains under the heading of
Economy Orders a number of documents dated from 1640 onwards.
Those issued under Yoshimune s rule are very detailed, as the follow
ing extracts from the orders of 1724 will show:
—It has been repeatedly ordered by the Shogun that economy must
be observed in all such matters as the exchange of gifts and expensive
entertainments to celebrate weddings. Henceforward these rules are
to be obeyed as follows:
—Women’s dress has of recent years become more and more showy.
Hereafter even the wives of daimyos shall not use more than a small
A NEW REGIME 161
amount of gold-thread embroidery in their garments and shall not wear
dresses made of costly fabrics. Female servants are to wear simple
clothing appropriate to their position, and in every town the fixed price
of these articles must be publicly announced.
—Expensive lacquer ware is not to be bought, even by daimyos. The
chairs, chests, and workboxes of their wives are to be of plain black
lacquer, with no more than a crest as ornament.
—Nightdresses, coverlets, mattresses, and so forth are not to be of
fine embroidered fabrics.
—The number of palanquins at a wedding procession shall not ex
ceed ten.
These particulars will give a general idea of the trend of fashions and
of the failure of the Bakufu to enforce its sumptuary rules.
Apart from these public notices the Bakufu approached by word of
mouth daimyos of over 10,000 koku, requesting them to reduce their
outgoings. In 1729 a further public announcement was issued, press
ing for obedience of these edicts and conceding that, owing to a fall
in the price of rice, persons on a rice stipend were in difficulties. They
would therefore not be expected to pay more than 5 per cent interest
on debts contracted since 1702. At the same time the need for economy
in food, dress, and social intercourse was stressed as before.
It need scarcely be said that these rules were not obeyed. The indi
gent samurai could not afford luxuries, and the well-to-do townspeople
and farmers could not be induced to lead a simple life when they were
enjoying some prosperity after penurious years. The Economy Orders
were repeated again and again until as late as 1743, but of course to no
effect. They were the work of clerks afflicted with an itch to scribble,
and even if they had been issued by higher authority, they would have
failed, since the Bakufu could not direct industry and control prices by
mere fiat.
The currency problem has already been discussed, and we many now
turn to Yoshimune’s further efforts to restore the national economy.*
His policy so far had been one of contraction and retrenchment, but its
results were not satisfactory. Indeed by about 1722, when his currency
reform was showing signs of success, the general economic condition
was growing worse, thanks not so much to mistaken treatment as to
* It may be useful here to recall the several coinage changes. 1615—“Keicho” :

gold “koban”; 1695—"Genroku” : gold and silver content of coins reduced; 1714—
New issue: the return to Keicho standard, known as Shotoku issue ( Hakuseki’s plan);
1718—New currency order of Yoshimune, establishing currency on Shotoku basis for
gold and silver.
162 A NEW REGIME
storm damage to the crops over a very wide area in the summer of
1721. It was in the late autumn of this year that the Bakufu was obliged
to delay payment of stipends to hatamoto and go-kenin. The Treasury
could have scraped together enough to satisfy the poorest of these
hereditary Tokugawa retainers if it had not at the same time been
pressed to pay debts incurred by the Shogun Tsunayoshi and his suc
cessors for articles supplied to the Castle by purveyors of all kinds.
The merchants were so anxious for payment that they agreed to a re
duction of their claims by one-third, and the amount thus paid out was
as much as would have sufficed for the stipends of all the retainers in
question for a whole year. In addition to these outgoings the cost of
the Oigawa embankment and other development works proved almost
overwhelming.
At this point Yoshimune himself took a hand. He abolished the cus
tomary monthly rotation of duties among the Roju and appointed a spe
cial Finance Commissioner to take charge of financial policy, Mizuno
Tadayuki by name. He thus created an effective Treasury department
( the Kanjo-Kata), with special bureaux for estimates, accounting, audit
ing, and other branches of control. Its staff was gradually increased,
and by 1735 it was the largest government office.
Such was the system of financial administration. It remains to ex
amine its practical working. We have seen that the contribution ( age-
mai) of the daimyos of 100 koku in every 10,000 provided temporary
relief for half the year (1722). The next step was to find permanent
sources of additional revenue.
The revenue from new farmland in Bakufu domains was not of
course immediately available, and therefore the new source had to be
found either by increasing the tax upon the existing product of wet and
dry fields, or by more effective methods of collection.4 The latter course
was adopted, and the basis of assessment was raised by a piecemeal re
vision of the surveys. This naturally disclosed considerable increases
of cultivated area and product in certain areas, and therefore a greater
taxable capacity. Here Yoshimunes government showed good sense by
authorizing the collectors to make liberal allowance for poor crops due
to bad weather and other misfortunes suffered by the farmers. But in
1727 the Bakufu felt obliged to raise the tax from 40 per cent to 50 per
cent of the crop. This was an onerous impost, but again the Deputies*
* The various methods of calculating the rent or tax due, whether in kind
( “kem i") or by a fixed sum for a given period ( “jomen” ) are described in Thomas
C. Smith, T h e Agrarian Origins o f M odern Ja p a n (Stanford, Calif., 19 5 9 ), pp. 152ff.
17
c=J
A NEW REGIME 163
( Daikan) in Bakufu domains were ordered to adjust their demands to
local conditions.
Apart from increasing the production of rice, Yoshimune’s govern
ment took steps to encourage industrial production of cotton goods,
vegetable oils, and similar articles for consumption mainly in the towns.
These directly produced little more revenue, but they added to the gen
eral prosperity and, at the same time, permitted a small increase in for
eign trade. Thus, by exporting to China in addition to copper such
articles as seaslugs, shark fins, and other delicacies, together with lac
quer ware and similar products of Japanese craftsmen, the way was
prepared for increased imports from China. It should be noted, how
ever, that the most valuable export at this time was copper. The Dutch
merchants in Nagasaki were anxious to take great quantities for ship
ment in their own vessels, but the Japanese authorities restricted their
annual supply after Arai Hakuseki's report on foreign trade in 1714.
The orthodox doctrine in Japan was opposed to imports, which were
confined to such necessities as medicines and books—and sugar, then a
rare luxury. It should be added here that little reliance can be placed
upon statistics of the import trade of Nagasaki, since smuggling on a
large scale was regular and continuous.
Efforts to reduce the deficit in Bakufu finances began to show results
before 1730, when a small favourable balance of about 120,000 ryo in
gold was deposited in the treasure vault of Yedo Castle. As a sign that
there was now some money to spare, in 1728 Yoshimune made a cere
monial progress to the mausoleum of Ieyasu at Nikko, a costly act of
piety which had lapsed for want of funds sixty-five years before, in
Tsunayoshi’s day. Shortly afterwards Yoshimune cancelled the obliga
tion of the daimyos to make their annual contribution of 100 koku for
each 10,000 koku of their revenue.
This period of financial plain sailing did not last long. New diffi
culties arose, obstacles which could not be surmounted by the issue of
regulations. In 1730-31 the price of rice on the Dojima Exchange fell
to a very low level. Erratic price movements were in general to be ex
pected in a closed country depending upon good weather for its staple
food crop. In the early years of the eighteenth century, a fluctuating
metallic currency and a loose control of national finance, together with
frequent poor harvests, had driven the price upwards, and this condi
tion persisted until 1720-22, when it reached a peak of from 70 to 80
momme of silver per koku. But from 1723 a series of good harvests
164 A NEW REGIME
brought the price down to 40 momme, and by 1730-31 it reached the

minimum at 22—this of course at a time when the coinage was quite
free from debasement.
Such a steep fall, while gratifying to the individual consumer, caused
a grave disturbance of the national economy, in which rice figured as
a medium, or at least a standard, of exchange. The first to suffer from
the low price were the members of the military class who received their
stipends in rice, which they were accustomed to sell for cash, usually
through the medium of a fudasashi, or broker. The rural population
were also affected, since they depended (apart from their own con
sumption) upon the sale of all their surplus produce for cash to meet
current expenditure.
Then a year later—in the summer of 1732—great areas of standing
crops in western Japan were attacked by insect pests. Their ravages
caused a famine in which over two million suffered, and more than ten
thousand died of starvation in spite of the prompt supply of rice from
government storehouses to the suffering districts. The market price now
rose to such a height that the authorities were at a loss for remedies.
In some towns, including Yedo, there were serious riots in the early
days of 1733, stimulated by the anger of the citizens when they found
that speculators were trying to “comer” food. These were the first of
a kind of riot known as “uchikowashi,” or smashes, which were in later
years to become frequent and widespread. Similar violent disturbances
took place in other parts of the country, until a tolerably good harvest
in the autumn of 1733 brought new rice to the market in quantity and
at a fair price.
This change, however, did not relieve the anxiety of the govern
ment, for now the price went down to about 40 momme and, as before,
struck a blow at the daimyos and other members of the military class
who depended upon the sale of their rice for funds to support the ad
ministration of their domains and (a heavy load) the cost of annual
attendance in Yedo.
The storehouses in Osaka were now crammed with rice,® but the
brokers and their clients the speculators held off buying, so that the
price remained low. At length, in November 1735, the government had
to intervene, by fixing an official price, ordering Yedo merchants to buy
at not less than one ryo for 1 .4 koku, and Osaka merchants at not less
5 The Rice Exchange complained to the Bakufu at the end of 1731 that whereas
normally when the “new” rice came in, the stock of "old” rice in the warehouses was
rarely more than 150,000 sacks (h y 5 ), it had now increased to 600,000 in 1730 and
in the current year to 1,300,000. The daimyos rushed their supplies to the market,
eager to obtain cash for their current needs, even at a sacrifice.
A NEW REGIME 165
than 42 momme a koku. If lower prices were paid, the buyer would be
fined 10 momme for each koku. These regulations, which were compli
cated by the normal variations of kind and quality of rice, proved un
workable.
Consequently in the decade ending about 1745 the price of rice fluc
tuated wildly, and the Bakufu was obliged to make great efforts to reg
ulate its movements. Indeed the chief preoccupation of Yoshimune in
these years ( he retired in 1745 and died in 1751) was to find an effec
tive remedy for the evils brought about by the ups and downs of quo
tations on the Rice Exchange. So much did these matters demand the
attention of the government that Yoshimune was called by the irrever
ent citizens Kome Shogun or Kome Kubo—the Rice Shogun.
It has been necessary to describe these monetary acrobatics in what
may seem excessive detail because they combine to demonstrate that
the national economy was governed by rice, which was at the same time
the staple food and the basic medium of exchange. Consequently the
hazards of climate and disease dictated the action of the rulers in vital
political and social matters. So dominant was rice that a shortage had
the effect of a currency deflation. A state in which financial stability
is so lacking must obviously be difficult to govern, and indeed most of
the troubles which Yoshimune had to face were of financial origin and
of their nature insoluble in the contemporary framework of Japanese
society.
The foregoing statistics show clearly that during the decade follow
ing the year 1730 (in which revenue and expenditure balanced) the
efforts of the Shogun to keep the finances of the Bakufu upon a sound
and stable foundation ended in collapse. The cause of this collapse was
a resort to manipulation of the coinage. In 1714, as we have seen, the
gold currency was sound, but in 1736 the government reverted to a
debasement which eased the situation by stopping the fall in the price
of rice. Yet the problem was not solved. Still the samurai was caught
in a trap between receiving payment in rice which was cheap and buy
ing goods that were dear.
For an understanding of the subsequent course of Japanese history,
both political and economic, it is important to understand that the con
ditions of stability were a sound currency, a balance between revenue
and expenditure, and an adequate food supply. But these were rarely
present together in a country liable to damage by typhoons, cut off
from imported supplies, and divided into a number of separate juris
dictions over which the central government could exercise only a lim
ited control.
166 A NEW REGIME
In his efforts to increase the revenue of the Bakufu, Yoshimune

turned his attention to the yield of tax upon cultivated land, and ap
pointed two officials to increase the amount by rigorous methods of col
lection. One of these was Kamio Haruhide, a Roju celebrated for his
harsh methods, who is reported to have said: “Peasants are like sesame
seed. The more you squeeze them the more oil you get.”
The amount of tax collected from this source had fallen during the
ten years ended in 1736, doubtless owing to the resistance of the farm
ers. Now, thanks to the oppressive methods of Kamio and his colleagues,
by 1744 it had reached 1,800,000 koku from a low level of 1,320,000,
and the assessed product (kokudaka) of all Bakufu domains stood at
4,600,000 koku, the highest point reached under Tokugawa rule.6 But
this addition to Bakufu revenue was not permanent. The collection of
tax could not be maintained at so high a level. The collapse of the rice
markets, the fall in prices, the storms and the famines, combined to
diminish the financial strength of the Bakufu until by 1745 it had en
tered upon a slow decline. By about 1770 the annual tax collection
stood at from 1,100,000 and 1,200,000 koku.
3. Rural Society
The reasons for this decline are manifold, but there is no doubt that
it was due in part to a great change in the nature of rural society, which
had already in the early years of the eighteenth century begun to lose
its close organization on family lines and to break up into a number of
loosely connected elements. It is sometimes suggested that these rural
communities, or many of them, fell into a state of hopeless poverty
owing to misgovernment by the feudal authorities. But there is little
foundation for such views. It is true that there were seasons of famine
due to natural calamities, but there is nothing to show that ( apart from
such abnormal losses) the total agricultural product diminished. It is
hard to believe that the prosperity of town life and the development of
a remarkable urban culture was accompanied by a fall in the output of
the farms.
The truth is that the character of the rural economy had begun to
develop on new lines, thanks largely to the spread of a money economy*
* During the first twenty years of Yoshimune’s rule, rice production of all Bakufu
domains remained fairly stable at about 7,000,000 koku. From this about 2,500,000
koku should be deducted for the income of hatamoto, leaving an annual balance of
about 4,500,000 koku for storage in Bakufu granaries from 1716 to 1736. This came
from the land known as “kurairi-chi.”
A NEW REGIME 167
or, to put it in simpler terms, to an increase in the amount and the vari
ety of cash transactions. The evidence is clear in numerous records
written by the farmers themselves, including well-kept account books,
which clearly indicate a rise, not a fall, in production, and (it may be
added) a spread of education.
The well-to-do farmers, men of the nanushi class, had some knowl
edge of the Chinese classics. Many were familiar with the great an
thologies of Japanese poetry, and often haiku parties were given in their
houses. Most villagers knew verses of the great poet Basho, and some
had memories of him as he passed through on his pilgrimages towards
the end of the seventeenth century.
The change in the character of the economy was inevitably reflected
in the changing structure of the village. The family relationship be
tween the hon-byakusho (independent farmer) and his workers began
to break down. The group which had cultivated the land in a corporate
effort split into a number of small units no longer maintained by the
hon-byakusho but earning a living partly by farm work and partly by
day labour for merchants or artisans in the towns, or by the sale of
articles of handicraft made in the village from materials available on
the farms. The relationship of the workers with the hon-byakusho is no
longer that of a kinsman to the head of a family but that of a tenant
owing rent to a landlord. Such tenants were of necessity poor and were
bound to eke out a livelihood as hired labourers or by home industry.
Thus the villages now consisted of a few rich households and a large
number of poor peasants. It was these latter who suffered most from
natural calamities and who most frequently turned into vagrants and
nuisances.
It is difficult to see how this condition could have been remedied
by any simple political decree. It was a situation in which agricultural
production rose and yet brought poverty with it. There was a weak
ness in the control of the villages by the Bakufu and the daimyos, for
the members of the military class were no longer living upon the land
which provided their incomes and were therefore out of touch with the
peasants. They were influenced by the normal conservatism of feudal
thinking and had fixed ideas about such matters as assessment (koku-
daka) and tax. As the production of rice and other crops increased, the
revenue of the landlords also improved, but the well-to-do farmers de
vised ingenious methods of thwarting the efforts of the military to im
pose further levies upon them. It was only the poorest peasant who
found it hard to resist and was goaded to reprisals.
Thus the once peaceful village was at times disturbed by internal
168 A NEW REGIME
strife. Rich peasant was against poor peasant, especially in the matter
of public imposts, of which an uneven distribution bore heavily on the
weakest. Families which had large holdings claimed powers of deci
sion in matters of importance to the village as a whole, thus giving rise
to quarrels ending in violence. These were known as “komae sodo,” or
“lesser-family risings,” which were clashes within a village. More seri
ous were risings of “omae,” or “greater families”—that is to say, risings
led by the principal farmers in a number of villages and known by the
generic name of Hyakusho Ikki. These would include both rich and
poor peasants and were directed against extortionate fiscal methods of
daimyos or Bakufu officers. In some of these risings the poor peasants
displayed a desperate courage. They were serious matters and testi
fied to a basic fault in the agrarian system, but not to its inefficiency in
production, for there can be no doubt that even during these troubled
phases the total product was rising and so was the general standard of
living. What was at fault was the conservative outlook of the Bakufu
and the daimyos, who still imposed excessive taxation upon the farms
in an endeavour to meet their own increasing debts.
With regard to urban development, Yoshimune was generally inter
ested, but his particular care was devoted to improving the municipal
administration of Yedo. He introduced measures to prevent the spread
of fires, which were the curse of the city, called by the citizens with wry
humour the Flowers of Yedo (Yedo no Hana). He appointed municipal
officers of proved capacity and named as magistrates men of high char
acter. The wisdom of his choice is celebrated in a popular work of fic
tion known as O oka Seidan ( “The Judgments of Ooka”), based upon the
brilliant detection of crime by his Chief City Magistrate.
4. Yoshimune’s Scientific Interests
W e may now leave aside Yoshimune’s handling of economic issues

and turn back in time to examine other aspects of his rule. Though not
a scholar himself, he was a man of wide interests. He was fond of field
sports, and he enjoyed taking his military subjects on exhausting ma
noeuvres or great battues on the Kanto plains or the slopes of Mount
Fuji; but he also speculated a great deal about the world outside Japan,
and as early as 1720 he relaxed a ban on certain books from China which
had been first imposed by his predecessors out of fear of Christianity
almost a century before. The censorship upon imported books had been
so severe that in 1695 the officials at Nagasaki had been instructed by
Yedo to destroy a Chinese book, a guide to Peking in several volumes, be-
A NEW REGIME 169
cause it mentioned the tomb of a celebrated missionary, Father Ricci,
who had served the Chinese court as an adviser on astronomy until his
death in 1610. This ban did not extend to books in European languages,
since only a few specialists known to the authorities could read them;
but danger was seen in Chinese works because they might contain Chris
tian propaganda. In his announcements of 1720, Yoshimune, who was
interested in scientific ideas, decreed that books which did not contain
accounts of Christian teaching might be imported and circulated.
He was especially concerned to furnish Japan with a new and reli
able calendar, for apart from his own curiosity, it was according to Chi
nese practice the duty of a ruler to ensure the performance of his func
tions and those of his officers at correct times. Like the Romans the
Chinese believed in the influence of the heavenly bodies, and astrology
played an important part in shaping the conduct of both the sovereign
and his subjects. Yoshimune made enquiries of an assistant to the offi
cial astronomer and was told of one Nakane Jouemon Genkei, a Kyoto
silversmith, who could give good advice on making a correct calendar.
Genkei was summoned to Yedo and received by Yoshimune, who was
pleased with his speech and demeanour. Genkei was instructed to read
a recent Chinese book, but found that it was only an extract from a Chi
nese version of a complete Western work. He told Yoshimune that no
progress could be made so long as Chinese translations of Western
books were kept out of Japan for such absurd reasons as a mere men
tion in the text of something related to Christianity or Christians.
This was the principal reason why Yoshimune removed the prohi
bition of imported books. His interest in natural science was excep
tional for his day, and it turned |iis attention to foreign countries, so
that he followed Arai Hakuseki in feeling that Japan must enter into
relations with the world outside. It is clear from contemporary writings
that by the beginning of the eighteenth century many scholars in Japan
were already thirsting to learn more of the arts and sciences of Euro
pean countries than could be acquired by occasional contacts with visit
ing foreigners, such as the Dutch merchants from Deshima and learned
men who sometimes came with the Dutch missions to Yedo.
Yoshimune himself had in 1719 invited to Yedo an interpreter from
Nagasaki named Nishikawa Joken, who was known as a student of
astronomy. He had made a large terrestrial globe with the help of a
skilled mechanic from Kii, and had himself used a telescope imported
from Holland for observing the heavens. At his orders officials were
sent to ask the Dutch residents in Nagasaki questions about eclipses,
tides, the movements of celestial bodies, and so forth, but the Hoi-
170 A NEW REGIME
landers could not give him satisfactory answers. It was not until more
than twenty years later (1744) that Yoshimune had an observatory
built in Yedo.
By using apparatus of this kind his specialists discovered errors in
the existing calendar, and set about its reform, which was not com
pleted until after Yoshimune’s death. It was put into use in 1754, which
was the beginning of the era named Horeld, or Precious Calendar.
Yoshimune’s enquiring spirit led him to search for some means of

avoiding the misfortunes which arose from poor harvests due to natu
ral calamities. He saw that some alternative or supplementary food
stuff must be provided. The consumption of meat was very small, since
it was forbidden by Buddhist teaching; and fresh fish was a luxury which
few could afford. Therefore some nutritious vegetable product must be
cultivated. This was found in the sweet potato, which was proposed by
a Confucian teacher named Aoki Konyo in 1734, that is shortly after the
famine of 1732-33. The sweet potato ( “kansho”) was of southern origin
and was brought to Japan by way of the Luchu Islands. Aoki became
known as Kansho Sensei, or Doctor Potato. It is a curious coincidence
that at about the same time in England an effort was made to diversify
agriculture, and farmers were pressed to grow root crops by a noble
man who became known as Turnip Townshend. But the resemblance
between the two situations is only superficial, since England had a small
population (about seven and a half million) sustained in part by oce
anic trade, whereas Japan had a population of the order of 30 million
and was virtually closed to imports. When harvests were bad in Eng
land, it was possible to relieve distress by importing grain from the
Baltic; but no such remedy was available to Japan. A closer parallel
would be Scotland in the early eighteenth century, where it was said
with some poetic license that “half-starved spiders preyed on half-
starved flies.”
Aoki Konyo (1698-1769) was one of a number of scholars whom
Yoshimune ordered to study the Dutch language. This was a significant
act, for it showed that the government was in favour of a breach in the
exclusion policy, at least in its intellectual aspects. But it was a long
time before Dutch studies were seriously pursued. Yoshimune’s order
was issued in 1741, and Aoki worked on a dictionary which he did not
complete until 1758, after Yoshimune’s death. It was naturally imper
fect, but it was the herald of a growing interest in Western ideas, an
interest which soon spread over the whole country.
A NEW REGIME 171
5. Yoshimune and th e Vassals

Yoshimune was not satisfied with reforming the Bakufu itself. He
wished to extend his reforming influence to the domains of the great
barons. Here he met with some resistance from an unexpected quarter.
One of the three great collateral houses (the Go-Sanke), under the
leadership of Tokugawa Muneharu, the lord of Owari, opposed his
negative, conservative, and thrifty kind of government and called for
a more open and unrestricted policy. Life in the castle town of Nagoya
was gay and free, no doubt inspired by a feeling that Owari was senior
to Kii and that Yoshimune was behaving in a despotic fashion. In 1732
Yoshimune rebuked Muneharu for insubordination, but to no effect.
He therefore took strong measures, ordering Muneharu to stay under
house arrest. In 1733 he similarly rebuked Munenao, his successor as
lord of Kii, for misgovernment in his fief leading to financial troubles
and uprisings.
This action seems to have been dictated by anxiety concerning the
capacity of his own eldest son and putative successor, Ieshige. Desiring
to keep the succession in his own family, Yoshimune created two new
Tokugawa houses, his second son, Munetaka, being made the head of a
branch named Tayasu (after one of the Castle gates of Yedo) and his
fourth son, Munetada, being made the head of a branch named Hitotsu-
bashi, after another gate. Both resided within the Castle grounds.
These two new houses and a house of later foundation called Shimizu
were to ensure the Tokugawa succession and thus to strengthen the
foundations of the Tokugawa dynasty. The three new houses (known
as Go-Sankyo, or Three Noble Houses) also served as a check on the in
fluence of the Go-Sanke, who had shown a tendency to stand apart from,
if not actively to oppose, the Shogun in power. The three new houses
were granted less valuable estates than the Go-Sanke, but, owing to
their near relationship to the ruling house, it was they rather than the
Go-Sanke who furnished a successor when the Shogun had no direct
heir. Thus the eleventh Shogun Ienari was a member of the Tayasu
house.
Yoshimune retired in 1745, having held the office of Shogun for
thirty years. He remained in his apartments in the Castle as a guardian
of his son Ieshige until 1751, when he died at the age of sixty-eight.
There can be no doubt that Yoshimune was after Ieyasu the greatest
of the Tokugawa Shoguns. He has been described as conservative,
172 A NEW REGIME
even reactionary, and it is true that his ideal was to restore the disci
pline of the first decades of the Tokugawa Bakufu; but he dealt with
difficult problems in a rational and unprejudiced manner, without being
influenced by the conventions of strict feudal rule. His handling of
financial difficulties was sensible and positive, and if he failed here, it
was because of a fundamental weakness in the national economy. He
was quick to perceive the importance of developing new farmland and
in general in increasing production. As we have seen, he encouraged
learning and perceived the importance of knowledge of a kind which
could be obtained only by studying the achievements of Western peo
ples. He made the first breach in the policy of seclusion.
It cannot be said that he was popular, for his reforms were bound
to displease one class or another. He was blamed for misfortunes which
should have been attributed to natural forces beyond the control of a
Shogun. His last years were darkened by the current economic crises,
and he who had been hailed by the citizens on his accession was made
the subject of vulgar lampoons.
6. L eg al R eform
No authoritative code of law existed in the early days of Yoshimune,
when suits were judged in accordance with precedents furnished by
decisions of the City Commissioners (Machi-Bugyo) of Yedo. In 1717,
however, an official named Ooka Tadasuke recommended the codifica
tion of the law as it was then interpreted. Thanks to pressure from him
and to advice given by such prominent persons as Muro Kyuso, Yoshi-
mune agreed that a text of the laws should be drawn up, and an order
to establish a code of law was issued by him in 1720.
The document drawn up in compliance with this order was com
pleted in 1742. It was known as the Code of One Hundred Articles, or
O Sadam e G aki Hyakka-jo. It was slightly amended by Ienari and
became what was then known as the Kansei Code. Its punishments
were less severe than those laid down in previous orders, and it placed
limitations on the use of torture. There are several extant versions of
this document, some of which are spurious; but the best text is to be
found in the collection known as Tokugaw a Kinrei-Kd. The basis of
the code was a document drawn up in Ieyasu’s time, which in its later
forms contained additions or amendments made by the second and third
Shoguns. It may be regarded as a statement of the principles, social
and political, of the Shogun’s government rather than a penal code.
C H A P T E R XIV
THE B A K U F U IN D E C L I N E
1. Yoshimune’s Successors
Y o s h i m u n e was succeeded by two feeble and incompetent Shoguns

in turn. The ninth Shogun, Ieshige, succeeded his father in 1745 at the
age of thirty-five; and Ieharu, the tenth Shogun, Yoshimunes grandson
and his favourite, held the office from Ieshige’s demise in 1760 to 1786,
when he died at the age of sixty.
Ieshige was a sickly child, whose weakness as an adult brought him
the nickname of Shoben Kubo, or the Bed-Wetting Shogun. His health
was impaired by juvenile excesses. He stammered so badly that his
speech was incomprehensible. It had to be interpreted by his com
panion, a young samurai named Ooka Tadamitsu, who had grown up
with him and whose indispensable services were rewarded by frequent
promotion until, after Yoshimune’s death in 1751, he reached the rank
of Chamberlain ( Soba-yonin) with a stipend of 20,000 koku. This was
an important post, since owing to Ieshige’s handicaps the Chamberlain
in close attendance upon him exercised as his mouthpiece and deputy a
high degree of political power.
Ieshige despite his physical defects was not mentally deficient. He
wrote an essay on the game of chess; but he was quite unfitted for the
task of government, being dissipated and erratic. The Council of Elders
(Roju) had to depend upon Tadamitsu for an expression of the Sho
gun’s wishes. This awkward situation did not, however, prevent the
Elders from exercising their proper functions. After Yoshimune’s re
tirement (1745) the leading Fudai daimyos (such as Hotta Masasuke
and Matsudaira Takemoto) ostensibly governed on behalf of the Sho-
gun in the customary manner, although in fact Tadamitsu, by a tactful
use of his influence upon Ieshige, was able to exercise a ruler’s authority.
Thus the incapacity of Ieshige tended to put power into the hands of
the senior Chamberlain, where it continued to reside for many years.
In 1760 both Ieshige and his Chamberlain died, and Ieshige’s son
Ieharu took his place, being at that time forty years of age.
Ieharu as a boy had been Yoshimune’s favourite and would have
become Shogun upon Yoshimune’s retirement but for the Tokugawa
family rule of succession, which Yoshimune preferred not to disregard.
Ieharu was physically robust, but without strength of character. He
174 THE BAKUFU IN DECLINE
was intelligent, but so lacking in application that he could not bear to

listen to his advisers for more than a few moments. He was moreover
slovenly in his person, lazy, and untidy. In such circumstances the in
competence of a ruler has results graver than occasional administrative
blunders. It opens a way for the rise of ambitious and unscrupulous
characters, whose conduct of affairs is based on selfish motives. Events
under the rule of Ieshige and Ieharu amply illustrate this danger.
As we have seen, after the death of Yoshimune, government was in
the hands of the Chamberlains, who transmitted orders to the executive
body. These were Ooka Tadamitsu and a remarkable man named Ta-
numa Okitsugu. The office of Chamberlain had grown in political im
portance during the rule of Tsunayoshi, when Yanagisawa exercised
great power, and under Ienobu and Ietsugu such men as Manabe were
influential as advisers. Thus the authority held by Tadamitsu was cus
tomary and indeed essential in view of the incapacity of the sickly
Shogun; nor did he abuse the powers which he came to exercise as
Junior Elder (Wakadoshiyori), a post he held until his death in 1760.
Tanuma Okitsugu was a man of similar origin, but of much greater
ability and strength of mind. During the lifetime of Tadamitsu he
played no prominent part, but later he was able to dominate the political
scene by sheer force of character and by extremely dishonest or, let us
say, unconventional methods. His success calls for some scrutiny of
his career, which reveals a decline in the integrity as well as the compe
tence of the Bakufu after Yoshimune’s death.
2. T he Tanuma Regim e (1767-86)

Tanuma Okitsugu’s father was an ashigaru (foot soldier) in the
service of the Kishu branch of the Tokugawa family, who, when Yoshi
mune moved to Yedo as Shogun, was included in the company of hata-
moto and promoted to a modest office with a salary of 600 koku.
Okitsugu followed his father on the road to promotion. He first became
a page in the apartments of Ieshige at the age of sixteen. In the follow
ing year his father died, and he became head of the Tanuma family.
On Yoshimune’s death in 1751 he rose to the rank of Chamberlain in
the service of Ieshige, then Shogun—a remarkable success for a man of
of such humble origin. By 1760 he had become a favourite of the new
Shogun, Ieharu. Thereafter he made rapid progress. His talents were
recognized, and within a few years of his appointment he was granted
a stipend of 10,000 koku and thus ranked as a daimyo. By 1767 he had
risen to the rank of Senior Chamberlain and was promoted to the lord
THE BAKUFU IN DECLINE 175
ship of Sagara, holding a castle and a revenue of 20,000 koku, which
was soon raised to over 50,000 koku.
He now aimed even higher, for he coveted the most powerful office
under the Shogun, namely the presidency of the Council of Elders. This
post was then held by an important Tokugawa kinsman, Matsudaira
Takemoto, whose rank and integrity together were for a time an obsta
cle to rivals; but his death in 1779 gave Okitsugu an opportunity to
seize a monopoly of power.
The Roju in general were unable or unwilling to resist Okitsugu,
who dominated them, and he soon took Takemoto’s place. Thencefor
ward he exercised untrammelled authority for the best part of a decade.
He was a man of insatiable appetites. In his rise from humble origins
he had studied the weaknesses of his superiors and his colleagues, and
learned by experience how to play upon them. With this knowledge he
was able to satisfy his lust for power and his greed for possessions. He
married a woman related to a mistress of Ieharu, and through her he
was able to influence Court ladies. He knew that behind the curtain
they had power to shape policy in so far as it was determined in the
Shogun’s apartments. He took care to become well acquainted if not
intimate with some of them. Indeed he made a special effort to secure
as his own mistress a friend of leharu’s favourite, and through her he
bribed most of the ladies-in-waiting and the less exalted concubines.
W om en ’s hairstyles, ca. 1760
As to Tanuma’s relationship with Ieharu there is an interesting pas

sage in a nobleman’s diary ( Shtmmei-In Den G o Jik k i) suggesting that
Ieharu was not entirely deceived by Tanuma and that Tanuma had
some respect for leharu’s judgment. But Tanuma’s purpose was not to
bring direct influence to bear upon the Shogun. He had a lively appre
ciation of the power of money, and his purpose was to obtain that power
for himself through the accumulation of great wealth, partly by accept
ing bribes but principally by investment in profitable enterprises. He
made no attempt to conceal his approval of bribery. Indeed its habit
was far from uncommon in official circles before his day, and he differed
from most of his predecessors only in the scale of his exactions and in
the open way in which he resorted to such malpractices. He is alleged
to have said: “Gold and silver are treasures more precious than life. A
man whose wish to serve is so strong that he offers bribes for an ap
pointment shows thereby that his intentions are loyal. . . . I myself
go every day to the Palace, where I labour painfully for the country, my
mind never at rest. It is only when I return home and find presents
from many families piled up in the long gallery of my house that I feel
at ease.” His clients thronged at his gateway and grovelled before him
as they offered gifts. But in his household one thing of importance was
missing. In reply to a visitor who had said that Tanuma must possess
every kind of treasure, a bystander observed that what was undoubtedly
lacking was a weapon or a suit of armour stained with blood from the
battlefield.
Among the clients who brought bribes to Tanuma were important
people like Ii, the Lord of Hikone, who wanted an appointment as
Tairo (which he obtained), and Date, the Lord of Sendai, who desired
a Court title. Even the strict Matsudaira Sadanobu sought appointment
to the fourth Court rank and to that end made suitable offerings to
Tanuma. Less important posts could be obtained at fixed prices, such
as 2,000 ryo for the office of Nagasaki Bugyo, or 1,000 ryo for an appoint
ment as Censor (Metsuke). Among the presents designed to attract
Tanuma’s special attention was a large box said to contain a life-size
doll, which turned out to be a beautiful young girl richly attired.
Tanuma was not the only high officer who took bribes, for such im
portant functionaries as the Finance Commissioners were also open to
persuasion. In the light of such practices it will be asked what govern
ment was like while Tanuma was chief minister. History and tradition
tend to dwell upon his misdemeanours and attribute to them the faults of
the Bakufu during his lifetime. But he was a symptom rather than a
cause of those faults, for corruption was already rife after Yoshimune s
rule, though he had tried to arrest it; and in fact Tanuma did not pecu
late, but took positive steps to protect official funds and to reduce the
expenditure of the government while increasing its revenue by con
structive methods. During his term of office he found time and occasion
to encourage important riparian works and (in 1785) he sent a party
of officials to study conditions in Yezo (Hokkaido) and Karafuto (Sak
halin) with a view to their development. He also encouraged an in
crease of the Nagasaki trade, which had been reduced on the advice of
Arai Hakuseki; and for that purpose he stimulated the production of
copper for export.
In these and other ways Tanuma and his family were extremely
active, and the old, conventional view of Okitsugu as nothing more than
a greedy rascal is not held by modern Japanese historians. His term of
office was brief, for he became a Soba-yonin in 1767, a Roju in 1772, and
was deprived of his title and office in 1786, following the death of
Ieharu. Indeed his downfall was as sudden as his rise. The murder of
his son ( Okitomo) by a man named Sano Zenzaemon was a sign of the
growing antagonism which he had invited. This was in 1784. Shortly
after being deprived of his office in 1786—in the same month—grants of
land worth 20,000 koku were cancelled, and he was ordered to relinquish
his residence and his warehouses in Osaka within three days. He was
to stay in retirement and to convey such property as was left to him to
his grandson.
Having examined the political background as it appeared during the
rule of Ieshige and Ieharu—that is from 1745 to 1786—we may now turn
to the attitude of the country towards the Bakufu for evidence of its
decline in public esteem. For this purpose it is pertinent to cite the
main events, both social and political, of the period under review.
3. Anti-Bakufu Sentiment
There can be no doubt that in Tanuma’s day the Bakufu as an admin
istrative organ had reached a hazardous state of inefficiency and con
fusion. There were many who deplored its weaknesses and doubted its
stability. Some indeed, while not going so far as to plan its overthrow,
thought that the time was ripe for a restoration of Imperial rule, and
several worked for that end. Clearly the warrior spirit and the warrior
ethos, as represented by the Bakufu, were in decline.
It must be recognized, however, that the authority of the house of
Tokugawa as a central government, its power to coerce even the most
independent and mutinous daimyos, was not impaired by its administra
tive incompetence. Despite its weaknesses in matters of secondary im
portance it was a powerful, self-regulating organ of national scope. The
system of checks and balances formed by the strategic location of the
vassals, which had been worked out by the first three Tokugawa Sho
guns, was a permanent source of strength. No feudatory dared disobey
an order from Yedo, or he did so at the risk of losing his fief and even
his liberty. In fact it was easier for the Bakufu to handle obstreperous
barons than to suppress the risings of angry peasants. Despite its faults
the Bakufu was Leviathan. Moreover, it must be remembered, irrespec
tive of the guidance of the Bakufu, many of the great fiefs were ex
tremely well governed, and thus contributed, however unintentionally,
to the general stability of the Tokugawa regime.
Subject to these considerations, it is worth while to examine some of
the active forms of expression of sentiment hostile to the Bakufu during
the eighteenth century.
Seemingly as a reaction against the strict rule of Yoshimune, several
movements hostile to the Bakufu developed soon after his death. Most
remarkable among them was a school of thought encouraged by one
Takenouchi Shikibu, son of a country doctor and therefore not strictly
speaking a man of samurai rank. Leaving his home in Echigo he took
service in Kyoto in the house of an important Court noble, Tokudaiji
Kinshiro. There he studied the teaching of the Shinto sect called Suika
Shinto, and at the same time attended lectures on military science. He
soon came to hold views antagonistic to government and proclaimed the
Shinn6-Ron, the doctrine of loyalty to the Throne, which was to divide
the country in the nineteenth century. He contended that if the Court
were to make a serious effort the whole country would support it, and
his lectures attracted a number of Court nobles. News of this movement
came to the ears of the Emperor Momozono, and was seriously discussed
at his Court, but the heads of the senior noble families were against a
clash with the Bakufu. They informed the Kyoto Shoshi-dai of Shikibu’s
views, and he was speedily arrested and expelled from the city in 1759.
Shortly after this event a teacher of military science, one Yamagata
Daini, was reported to be plotting against the Bakufu. This man was
the son of a labourer in Kofu, and there had become a retainer of
Ooka Tadamitsu, whom he served well. But on the death of Tadamitsu
he made his way to Yedo, where he set up as a teacher of military
science in 1760. His teaching was hostile to the absolute rule of the
Bakufu, which depended upon force. He approved of the military vir
tues, but he was in favour of the “Kingly Way” (O do), that is to say of
Imperial rule. He attracted the attention of a senior retainer of the
daimyo of Kobata, one Yoshida Gemba, who discussed with him the
need of reforms in the administration of the fief. This aroused the op
position of some of Gemba’s colleagues, who accused him and Daini of
plotting a revolt. These matters came to the notice of the City Com
missioners, who also learned that a disciple of Daini, one Fujii Umon,
had openly used violent language in condemning the arbitrary methods
of the Bakufu. On investigation they found no evidence of a plot, but
Daini was condemned to death, and Umon sent to prison. The revenue
of the Oda family was reduced and Gemba with his associates was
punished. Takenouchi Shikibu was also interrogated, but there was no
evidence against him. He was banished to Hachijo because he had dis
obeyed an order to leave Kyoto.
These events have been related here in some detail bcause they
show that the leaders of the Bakufu were determined to suppress the
loyalist movement. Their nervousness was displayed by the erratic
handling of the problems with which they were confronted. It varied
from extreme severity to alarming weakness at a time when steadiness
was essential. Their lack of understanding is clearly shown by the
growth of serious rioting after an extremely harsh corvee had been im
posed upon the peasants in the country along the highway from Yedo to
Nikko, where the mausoleum of Ieyasu had been built.
4. Agrarian Riots
In ordinary times there was a regular flow of officials and pilgrims
between Yedo and Nikko, a distance of about one hundred miles. The
necessary porters and horses were furnished to officials by villages along
the road, in accordance with the customary levy known as “sukego”
(corvee). But for this very special occasion of the pilgrimage to Ieya-
su’s tomb, the Bakufu planned the procession on a grand scale. It was
to include all members of the Tokugawa family, Court nobles, the great
vassals, and their retinues. For their transport and lodging the peasants
in the area through which they passed were ordered to provide porters,
horses, and housing on a lavish scale or, if horses were not to be had,
cash payments at extortionate rates.
This levy was extended to peasants at a long distance from the
direct road to Nikko and became so onerous that towards the end of the
year 1764 there were agrarian risings on a large scale in the provinces of
Kotsuke and Musashi. The number of peasants taking part in this revolt
is said to have reached 200,000, which was of the same order as the
Shimabara uprising of 1637-38. Its origin and its size show that the
leaders of the Bakufu were ignorant of the state of feeling in the country
and incompetent to deal with the situation which their ignorance had
created. An effort to appease the rioters had some temporary success,
but by the end of the year tens of thousands swept through the country
side and attacked storehouses in Kumagai, smashing their contents. It
was nearly a month before the Bakufu could suppress this disorder in
the Kanto, the base and stronghold of the House of Tokugawa.
Subsequently agrarian rising occurred in other parts of Japan, caus

ing great anxiety to the government, whose endeavours to suppress or
prevent them met with little success. Rewards were offered to those
who would give warning of risings or mass absconsions planned by
farmers. At the same time, daimyos in whose territory such riots took
place were told that they might call for help from neighbouring domains,
but must not use firearms. Sometimes risings within a fief were con
cealed from the Bakufu, while attempts to conciliate the peasants were
made by the daimyo or his deputies; but this moderate action only en
couraged further insubordination and thus led to the use of force
against the rioters. There were, however, some domains in which there
was only a small military establishment, and they were obliged to appeal
for help to the nearest Tokugawa deputy (daikan).
In 1770 the Bakufu issued an order denouncing the conduct of the
peasantry and promising rewards ( including promotion to the rank of
samurai) to informants who would disclose the plans of the rioters.
Such facts reveal the incompetence of the Bakufu, its lack of decision,
and its shifts of policy. It was clear that some change of government
was needed, some strong central authority in determined hands.
C H A P T E R XV
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
AND S C IE N T IF IC K N O W LE D G E
1. Tanuma s Policy
T a n u m a O k i t s u g u * s hunger for bribes is so sensational that some

historians have been inclined to dwell upon it and to neglect his positive
contributions to the national economy, which were of the same nature
as those of Yoshimune. In fact Tanuma’s policy was not original but
led to a further development of measures planned by Yoshimune. Ta
numa’s action cannot be treated separately from the political situation
reached under Yoshimune, especially in its financial aspects. One of
the features of the Kyoho Reform (1716-36) was the trend of Bakufu
policy towards an increasing use of commercial capital. Furthermore,
it should be recalled, Yoshimune had already developed a kind of civil
service control of financial policy by his appointment of special officials
to deal with financial problems—the Kanjo-Kata.
Whereas in the capital there was a deplorable atmosphere of cor
ruption and debauchery in the Shogun’s entourage, in less elevated
circles there was much activity in trade and industry fostered by Ta
numa, and a new intellectual activity which, it may be argued, arose
from the discontent of thoughtful men who felt that the feudal society
was stagnant. Expressions of this feeling were various. Tanuma, be
sides encouraging productive industry, provided funds for bringing
new land under cultivation, thus continuing the policy favoured by
Yoshimune in (for example) promoting riparian works in order to
increase the area of irrigated land. After a great eruption of the volcanic
Mount Asama in 1783 had raised the bed of the Tonegawa, preventive
work on a great scale had to be undertaken. The cost of carrying it out
was borne by two millionaires, one from Yedo, one from Osaka; and
when it was completed a large share of the new cultivable area was to be
allotted to them. A series of misfortunes caused this enterprise to be
abandoned upon Tanuma’s resignation; but perhaps his boldest de
parture was to promote trade with Russia by developing the northern
territory of Japan—the Hokkaido and Sakhalin.
A plan for such an undertaking had been suggested by one Kudo
Heisuke, a physician in the Sendai fief who had studied the Dutch lan
guage and took a special interest in foreign countries. At this time Rus-
182 ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
sia was advancing across Siberia and Kamchatka to the coasts of

Chishima (the Kurile Islands), and certain Japanese traders from the
Matsumae fief (Hokkaido) were with the daimyos approval secretly
trading with Russians in the neighborhood of Kunashiri Island. This
fact came to the knowledge of Kudo through a ronin from Matsumae,
and in 1783 he submitted to the Roju a description of the Aka-ezo, the
Red Northern Islanders, that is to say the Russians. In this document
he pointed out that Russia was growing in strength in the northern
region. Her illicit trading must be stopped, but for that purpose it
would be prudent to trade openly with the Russians and to apply the
profits thus earned to the development of the whole region.
Kudo’s idea was taken up by Tanuma, who in 1785 sent a mission
under a Finance Commissioner to make investigations on the spot. One
party studied Chishima, another studied Sakhalin. Early in 1786 the
leader of the mission submitted to the Bakufu a plan for the develop
ment of the whole region. In his report he recommended developing as
farmland about one-tenth of the area of the principal island, which is
now known as the Hokkaido.
In general Tanuma’s contribution to economic growth was impor
tant. He added to the existing association of recognized brokers (kabu-
nakama) a guild consisting of new merchants in Yedo, Osaka, and other
centres. To these he granted special privileges, but in return he taxed
them heavily. This levy, at a time when production was rising, brought
in large sums to the Bakufu treasury. In 1766 a monopoly of copper
had been formed in Osaka, and following this similar exclusive privi
leges were granted to recognized dealers (kabunakama) in iron, brass,
lime, and other staple commodities. Special wholesale dealers ( tonya)
in important supplies such as oil, cotton seed, and sulphur were licensed,
and their profits were assured in return for a payment of tax. In fact the
levy on all these monopolies made a valuable contribution to the revenue
of the Bakufu. The tendency to form such special bodies was very
strong, and it is said that in the years about 1785 there were more than
one hundred kabunakama in Osaka alone.
The taxes paid were known as “myoga” and “unjo.” They were
nominally voluntary payments. If an individual townsman was granted
some privilege he paid “myoga-kin,” a thank-offering for an act of
grace by the government; while “unjo-kin” was a direct payment at
rates specified by the government. The direct tax ( unjo-kin) was levied
not only upon articles of commerce but also upon apparatus and under
takings, such as water wheels, ferries, wharves, the business of brothels,
and even upon the earnings of individual unlicensed prostitutes, the
furtive practitioners known as kakushi-baita.
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 183
For these purposes a special tax office was set up, and it may well be
imagined that the grant of licenses was usually dependent upon bribery
in this society of dishonest brokers and speculators.
2. Agrarian Distress
The close relationship between the Bakufu as represented by Ta-
numa and the rich merchants of Yedo and Osaka brought advantage to
the government, since a good share of the profits from the investment
of private capital in productive industry was absorbed by the Treasury.
The Bakufu did not interfere when merchant capital was invested in
agriculture, but here they were on unsafe ground, for the commercial
methods applied to purchasing the produce of the farms were obnox
ious to the villages. The merchants fixed the price they were willing to
pay at such a low level that the peasants for the most part found that
the more they produced, the less they earned in terms of cash. This
was an attack upon the class which was the main support of the feudal
society; and in the eighteenth century the peasants were not slow to
react against what they deemed to be unjust treatment by the ruling
class. There are records of uprisings early in the Tokugawa era, but
they grew frequent after 1704, and by then they had become endemic.
Some of the earliest were on a great scale, as for instance the rising of
84,000 farmers in 1739, against heavy taxation in the province of Iwaki.
They wrecked buildings and threatened the daimyo’s castle until their
demands were met. In other cases, however, the rising failed, and the
peasants were cruelly punished.
An interesting example is that of the fief of Kaminoyama in Dewa,
where dreadful conditions had resulted from failures of the harvests in
the two years preceding 1747. The requests of the peasants were
granted, and they were given a supply of rice. But this was not the end
of the matter, for shortly after the dispersal of the farmers, the leaders
were questioned under torture. The circumstances of the rising had
been reported to Yedo, and the Bakufu ordered the executions of the
leaders.
In the following decades similar uprisings recurred, nearly all due
to misery resulting from famine and plague. The Kurume uprising of
about 50,000 men was a protest against an unfair tax. The leaders were
punished, some put to death; but the tax was withdrawn. In 1764-65
came the disturbances in Musashi and Kotsuke already described
(Chapter XIV, Section 4 ). There had been serious riots in Hida in
1773, which, on orders from the Bakufu, were suppressed by troops
using firearms. Most cruel punishments were inflicted on the alleged
ringleaders, and spies were rewarded for their delations by permission

to take a surname and wear swords.
In 1781, certain merchants fixed standards of quality for silk and
cotton, and in the market towns of Musashi and Kotsuke they estab
lished trading stations where the product was examined and a certificate
of quality granted for a fee fixed in silver at so much for a unit of weight
But when the market for these articles opened at the end of the summer,
the usual buyers—the leading department stores like Echigoya and
Shirokiya—held back, saying that they were not prepared to buy at
prices which included the examination fees. They agreed to buy no silk
this year, but to sell only from stock.
This decision angered the villages in areas which depended upon
the sale of raw silk, and a number of their leaders led a crowd of over
three thousand peasants in an attack upon those who had set up the
examination stations. Their houses were smashed and set on fire, and
the rioters then marched to the castle town of Takasala, where they
appealed to the daimyo, Matsudaira Terutaka, to abolish the examina
tion fees. A few of them were wounded by the castle soldiers, who at
tacked them with bows and firearms, but the peasants were not checked.
They sent a deputation of six elders into the castle and pressed for a
judgment of their case by the Bakufu deputy (gundai), an officer of
good repute named Ina Tadataka.
Their claim was considered, and the examination stations were done
away with. This was a great triumph for the farmers and a demonstra
tion that action by the Bakufu to assist merchants at the expense of the
peasants would in future be resisted by force. But unfortunately for the
peasants they were presently exposed to greater dangers than the cupid
ity of traders, for especially in the decade 1770-79 the country was over
whelmed by natural disasters. In 1770-71 almost every province suf
fered from continued drought. In 1772 there was a great fire in Yedo
only less destructive than that of Meireki (1657), and in this year also
the farms suffered from disastrous floods.1
In 1773 there was a plague of sickness from which nearly 200,000
persons are said to have died. It spread to the northern provinces where
in the Sendai domain alone 300,000 are said to have died of disease or
starvation. Nor was this the end of disasters. In 1778 there were floods
in Kyoto and in parts of Kyushu, and an eruption of the volcano on
Oshima Island, followed by an eruption of Sakurajima, the volcano
near Kagoshima, in 1779. The great famine of Temmei began in 1783.
1 In the calendar this year was the ninth of Meiwa, i.e., Meiwa Kunen, which
the citizens with their sarcastic humour read “Meiwaku,” meaning "Consternation."
In the following year from spring to harvest rain was incessant, and
during that period an eruption of the volcano Asama caused great dev
astation. The famine spread to almost every province and continued
until 1786-87.
These calamities were attributed by many citizens to the bad gov
ernment of Tanuma and his son. Of course they were due to natural
phenomena rather than to mistaken policies. It is true, however, that
the Bakufu made no serious effort to control the price of food; but a
more serious aspect of the shortage was the failure of the authorities to
give help to the distressed regions. The seclusionist habit of the daimyos
was so strong that they for the most part refused to allow food to be
sent from their fiefs to their neighbours, even when they knew that not
far away peasants were dying of hunger.
A samurai residing in Shimotsuke province described conditions in
the following terms: “Although the shortages in the Kanto did not
amount to a great famine, the loss of life through starvation in the
northern provinces was dreadful. There was nothing to eat but horse
flesh or, when this ran short, dogs and cats. Once these were consumed,
people died of sheer starvation in great numbers. In some villages of
thirty, forty, or fifty households not one person survived, and nobody
could say who had died or when, for the corpses were unburied and had
been eaten by beasts and birds.”
There are also records, by no means incredible, of cannibalism. The
northern provinces were always in danger of famine, since their land
was of marginal utility and their climate severe. The famine of 1783,
as we have noted, lasted for about five years. It was one of the three
great famines in the history of Tokugawa Japan, the others being the
Kyoho famine of 1732-33 and the Tempo famine of 1832-36.
Such selfish policies as those just described contributed to the fre
quency of famines, especially in regions where normal climatic con
ditions were severe and harvests were precarious. When famine spread
and affected a great area its results were tragic; but food shortage in
even small areas tended to spread because the food problem was not
treated on a national scale. A striking example is furnished by the fam
ine of Temmei (1783). Though it had been serious even in the previous
year, the Tsugaru fief had sent 400,000 bags of rice for sale in the Yedo
and Osaka markets, and had forced the peasants to pay all land tax in
kind. This ruthless action resulted in a shortage of staple foods within
the clan. The daimyo’s chief officers were alarmed and borrowed 10,000
ryo from the Bakufu, intending to buy rice from neighbouring fiefs; but
this plan failed and villagers starved with money in their pockets.
Thus the agrarian system under the feudal regime as it was then
administered failed of its purpose and caused widespread discontent.
There had already been food riots ( “smashes”) in Yedo in 1733, but
during the Temmei famine the price of rice rose to such high levels
that the townsmen took to violent action in all the important urban
centres—Yedo, Kofu, Suruga, Kyoto, Nara, Fushimi, Sakai, and as far
west as Kyushu. In Yedo, where rioting lasted for three days, there was
a state of anarchy. The warehouses and residences of the rice dealers
were burned down, and special animosity was displayed against the
rich merchants who, under Tanuma’s protection, had bought up sup
plies of rice during the famines. There is no doubt that (quite apart
from storms and plagues) the rapid growth in an agrarian society of a
commercial economy which had been fostered by Tanuma weighed
heavily upon the peasants.2
This is a fact which is borne out by population statistics of the era.
They are meagre, it is true, but there is evidence enough to show that in
the century or so before 1720 the population was gradually rising,
whereas after that date for a century or more there was scarcely any
increase. This phenomenon is not easy to understand. It is only partly
explained as a result of deliberate abortion or infanticide during a long
period of rural distress. It is better regarded as a sequel of the famines
and epidemic diseases which visited the country so frequently during
the eighteenth century.
Some historians discern a social origin of these misfortunes, ascrib
ing them to the cruelty of feudal rule and the great gap between rich
and poor which was widened by the penetration of a commercial econ
omy into rural life. There is some truth in this, but no benevolent gov
ernment could have averted the natural calamities which were the
immediate causes of distress.
In considering population growth or decline in eighteenth-century
Japan it is important to recall that the available statistics were based
upon imperfect data. They do not include members of the warrior
class, and they could not record the numerous unregistered persons,
whether migrants or recent arrivals in a district. The separate fiefs re
ported their population, but the method of reckoning varied from place
to place, sometimes excluding children. Subject to these variables, the
movement of population may be regarded as shown with reasonable
2 A very full account of peasant uprisings in the Tokugawa era is given by Dr.
Hugh Borton in Transactions o f th e Asiatic Society o f Ja p a n (M ay 1 9 3 8 ), in which
he estimates the number of uprisings at over 1,000. Since that date new evidence has
become available, showing the total to be over 1,600, mosdy occurring after 1730.
accuracy in the figures of the national census conducted by the Bakufu
every six years from 1721. These show crude totals as follows:
Population Population
D ate in millions D ate in millions
1 7 2 1 .......... ............. 26.06 1768 .......... ............. 26.25
1726 .......... ............ 26.54 1774 .......... ............. 25.99
1732 .......... ............ 26.92 1780 .......... ............. 26.01
1744 .......... ............ 26.15 1786 .......... ............ 25.08
1750 .......... ............ 25.91 1792 .......... ............. 24.89
1756 .......... ............ 26.07 1798 .......... ............ 25.47
1762 .......... ............. 25.92
The fluctuations in these figures correspond fairly closely to cli

matic change until 1798, from which year there was a steady rise for
three decades. The fall from 26 million in 1780 to 25 million in 1786
and to less than 25 million in 1792 indicates that at least a million people
must have died of famine or pestilence within less than a decade.
3. T he Condition o f the Samurai

Any general observation on the samurai as a class is apt to be mis
leading, since they vary from the simple soldier on a small allowance
to the direct vassal of the Shogun, the Bannerman (Hatamoto) in re
ceipt of handsome emoluments. Since in times of peace most of these
men had no occupation, they created a social problem for the Bakufu.
Some description of the difficulties which arose from their unemployed
condition has been given in the chapters (III and V I) bearing upon
the ronin revolt of 1651. In the eighteenth century a great number of
the most capable members of this class had been absorbed into official
life in the capital or in the castle towns, and others had settled in cities
where they lived on their small stipends, or adjusted themselves to
urban life by working at trades such as making umbrellas or wooden
clogs or in clerical occupations. Some, for want of funds, went so far
as to adopt the son of a townsman in return for a cash payment, thus
conferring upon him the status of samurai. There was a recognized
scale of payment for these transactions—some twenty ryo to become an
ashigaru, and a thousand ryo or more for higher ranks.
The chronicles of those times, and especially the plays and novels,
naturally pay little attention to samurai living a quiet life and struggling
against penury. They prefer to depict the brawls and the debauches of
such picturesque if disorderly characters as Tamura Daikichi, a man of
hatamoto rank who kept a gambling house where bloodshed was fre
quent, and who when placed under arrest by the City Magistrates, es
caped, was captured in a remote village disguised as a monk, and put
to death in Yedo. Another such character was a samurai who drew his
sword on the attendant in a drinking shop, but was disarmed by blows
with an iron rod and forced to run away. It was not for his violence but
for his cowardice that he was tried and punished by exile.
These and similar episodes may give the impression that the samurai
had lost their prestige and that the authority of the warrior class was
waning; but this impression would not be true, for there were a number
of serious men who were scholars by temperament and, being members
of the governing class, were interested in political issues. They inherited
the tradition of the Neo-Confucianist philosophers, but they were living
in an age when among educated men a feeling of dissatisfaction was
growing throughout the country, and to some thinkers the seclusion
policy seemed to be preventing necessary change. It will be recalled
that even so conservative a scholar as Arai Hakuseki had sensed that
Japan must not lose touch with the outside world.
Another man of learning, Aoki Konyo, celebrated as the expert who
brought the sweet potato to Japan, by his encouragement of Dutch
language studies had led the way to further enquiries into the nature
of Western learning. With official approval he wrote several papers on
the Dutch language, and as well as these he had presented memorials
on current fiscal and other problems to the Shogun Yoshimune, who
favoured his activities. He also made efforts to improve the condition
of the hatamoto, although he himself was not a samurai by birth, but the
son of a wholesale fishmonger in Yedo. Unfortunately the Shogun died
before any action could be taken on these proposals, but Konyo con
tinued to press them and made a point of questioning the Dutch “Kapi-
tan” on the annual visit from the trading station at Deshima to Yedo.
He died in 1769 at the age of seventy-two.
4. Rangaku
Konyo’s encouragement of Dutch studies was approved by the Ba-
kufu, and he was promoted to the office of Chief Librarian ( Shomotsu-
Bugyo). His success in promoting “Rangaku,” or Dutch Studies, was
due less to his books than to his influence upon his pupils, chief among
whom was one Maeno Ryotaku, a physician in the Okudaira fief whose
contribution is much praised in a work called Rangaku K aitei ( Steps in
Dutch Studies) by a scholar named Otsuki Gentaku.
Maeno Ryotaku was sent by his daimyo to Nagasaki, where he con-
suited Japanese interpreters at Deshima. He made but little progress,
probably because the interpreters were not helpful. But his contribu
tion to Dutch studies was important, for he was a pioneer. He visited
Nagasaki twice, at his daimyo’s behest, and though he learned a vocabu
lary of a few hundred words he could not use it effectively. He did,
however, procure from the interpreters certain books which he struggled
to read with such aids as he could procure. He wrote several essays on
the Dutch language and on such studies as surveying, geography, and
astronomy. His labours were described in a work entitled Rangaku
K otohajim e (The Origin of Dutch Studies) by his friend Sugita Gem-
paku. He died in 1803 at the age of eighty.
Following Maeno and Sugita came a number of scholars who profited
by the experience of their predecessors, and became more successful
exponents of Dutch learning. Among them were the aforementioned
Otsuki Gentaku, bom in 1757, the son of a physician, and Hiraga Gen-
nai, perhaps the most remarkable of them alL These men lived in a
time of which it was said: “The wind of Holland blows throughout the
land [Oranda kaze seken wo fuldwataru].” The word “Rampeki” was
in common use. It meant “the Dutch Craze.” It was a craze which
affected such practical persons as Tanuma Okitsugu, who encouraged
Dutch studies, perhaps not so much as a policy as out of curiosity and
a desire for rare objects. But at the same time he was an acquisitive and
far-sighted man, always on the look-out to expand and diversify the
national economy.
Most of the scholars attracted by Dutch learning were specialists,
interested in medicine or astronomy or some other single branch of
study; but one of them was a polymath, who sought knowledge over a
wide range of subjects. This was Hiraga Gennai, a man whose influ
ence was felt in so many directions that his career deserves some sepa
rate notice.
5. Hiraga Gennai (1728-79)

He was the son of an ashigaru, whom he followed as herbalist for
Matsudaira Yoriyasu, daimyo of the Takamatsu fief in Sanuki province.
He was undoubtedly the most versatile and in some ways perhaps the
most gifted man of his day. In 1752, in his twenty-fourth year, he was
ordered by Yoriyasu to proceed to Nagasaki for study of the Dutch
language and of natural science. Yoriyasu was a collector of specimens
of all lands—birds, fish, plants, shells, precious stones—and kept a cata
logue which contained descriptions and drawings of these objects
under their names in Japanese, Chinese, and Dutch. Gennai, during his
stay in Nagasaki, was to gather knowledge which would be of use to
Yoriyasu.
He spent a year there, seemingly in desultory studies, and on his
return in 1753 he went to Yedo, where he worked under one Tamura
Enyu. He specialized in botany, but both he and Tamura were inter
ested in a more comprehensive study of production of commodities in
general, whether by agriculture or industry. This branch of learning
( named by them “Bussangaku,” or the science of production) deserves
some enquiry for the light it throws upon social and economic ideas
current during the eighteenth century in Japan. But first we should
continue an account of Gennai’s life, since he may be said to have domi
nated the “modem” intellectual scene in Japan, however briefly, at the
height of the fervent interest in ideas imported from Europe.
While engaged in his studies and other enterprises in Yedo, he con
tinued to receive his stipend from Takamatsu, but he wished to be re
lieved of his obligations as a retainer. He applied for indefinite leave
of absence, and this was granted, but he took offence at a not very oner
ous condition laid down by Yoriyasu, resigned his official post, and thus
became a ronin. Thereafter he was a disappointed man, devoting much
of his talent to fugitive literature of a satirical or scurrilous nature and
(under a pseudonym) a number of stage plays; but he continued to en
gage in serious studies, such as a work on the Glassification of Natural
Objects ( Butsurui Hinshitsu), issued in 1763, and an essay upon making
an asbestos cloth, issued in 1764.
His interests were almost universal. Apart from adding to his knowl
edge of scientific matters, he devoted some effort to painting in West
ern style, showing contrasts of light and shade which could not be
portrayed by conventional line drawing. He gave lessons in oil painting
to one Shiba Kokan, who had hitherto practised drawing in the Chinese
manner but was later to gain high reputation as an exponent of Western
principles of art.
In 1770 Gennai again visited Nagasaki, where he learned to construct
an electrical apparatus. He also saw specimens of Kyushu pottery and
suggested to the Bakufu that it should be specially made for export. In
1773 he wrote at the daimyo s request a report on the iron ore deposits
in the Sendai fief. In 1774 he wrote his Hohiron, a tract expressing his
contempt for modem society, and commenting upon the part played by
the haphazard and the irrational in human affairs. He was now a queru
lous and pessimistic figure. Late in the year 1779, through some mis
understanding or in a moment of frenzy, he attacked and killed one of
his followers. He was arrested and died in prison a few weeks later, at
the age of fifty-one.
His friend Sugita Gempaku was not allowed to take his body for
burial, since it was that of a criminal; but Gempaku was permitted to
take the clothes that Gennai had worn. These he buried in a cemetery
in Asakusa, erecting a stone on which he had carved an epitaph, saying
that Gennai was an exceptional man who liked remarkable things and
lived a remarkable life ended by a remarkable death. But this memorial
was destroyed by official order.
Bussangaku. This may be translated as the science of production.

Of course there were already in the eighteenth century important in
creases of production in both agriculture and industry, some natural
and some definitely planned; but what Gennai and his associates had in
mind was an all-round planned increase in the number and quantity of
articles produced.
Most of the scientific knowledge so far obtained from the Dutch had
been applied to medicine, and had stimulated studies of botany in par
ticular. It was the purpose of Gennai and his school to encourage the
production of a great variety of objects for similar purposes. They took
the line that the sciences depended upon products, as medicine de
pended upon herbs. This was a natural view, since they were not ac
quainted with scientific theories, and the provision of a quantity of
useful objects was in their minds the best way of improving the national
economy.
In 1757 Gennai’s colleague Tamura Enyu, who had travelled widely
in Japan to investigate the cultivation of subsidiary foodstuffs and medi
cinal herbs, opened in Yedo a display of important products. This was
in fact the earliest example of an exhibition in Japan, and its success
was due in part to the energetic support of Gennai. In 1762 Gennai
opened an exhibition of his own, consisting chiefly of medicinal items.
In this and other exhibitions during the decade the number of exhibits
reached 2,000, and they came from thirty provinces. In his work Butsu-
rui Hinshitsu of 1763 (cited above) some of the most important ex
hibits were described, with drawings and explanations.
It is clear from the nature of the exhibits and the statements of
Gennai that the significance of his Bussangaku is that it predicated a
planned increase of production and not a mere undirected effort. Gen
nai, it should be noted, was patronized for his European studies by Ta-
numa, who was in favour of a rapid increase in the output of both agri
culture and industry.
It is also possible that Gennai’s idea of making a complete catalogue

of objects was inspired by the philosophy of the Chu Hsi school, which
held that an understanding of universal reason was to be gained only by
investigating everything and ultimately collating the investigations.
This is the frame of mind that in the West led to science, but in the East
had to fight against sudden enlightenment or revealed religion.*
* See L . Carrington Goodrich, A Short History o f th e C hinese P eo p le ( New York,

19 5 9 ), p. 155.
C H A P T E R XVI
THE KANSEI REFORM
1. Matsudaira Sadanobu (1758-1829)
T h e n a m e of “reform” has been given by some historical writers to

certain phases of government which recurred at intervals during the
rule of the Tokugawa Shoguns from the last years of the eighteenth
century; but it is a misleading label, since it gives the impression that a
new and better form of government was introduced. What really took
place was the revival of an earlier and successful system which had
declined largely from economic rather than political causes. The model
was the so-called Kyoho government developed by Yoshimune in the
Kyoho era (1716-36).
Following its decline came what is known as the Kansei Reform in
1787. In that year the need for constructive measures was driven home
to the Bakufu by the repeated failures of the government to suppress
uprisings by both peasants and townspeople. The use of armed force
was occasionally successful in a limited area for a limited time, but it
was clear to thoughtful members of the warrior class that the causes of
revolt must be ascertained and dealt with in a peaceful manner, remem
bering that the risings were due to conditions which the people found
unbearable.
A reform movement which began late in 1787 was stimulated by in
tolerable hardships following upon season after season of poor harvests.
In the early summer of that year the price of rice increased to five or six
times the average level. The hungry poor rose in anger, and “smashing”
raids took place first in Osaka and then in smaller towns, as we have
already seen (in Chapter XV, Section 2 ). When the riots had subsided,
the question of future policy came before the Council of Elders, which
had appointed as its president in 1787 (the year after Tanumas fall)
the young daimyo of Shirakawa in Mutsu, Matsudaira Sadanobu.
Sadanobu was a grandson of Yoshimune and a son of the head of
the Tayasu branch of the Tokugawa family. He was adopted by the
House of Matsudaira, thus succeeding to the Shirakawa fief of 110,000
koku. Imbued with Neo-Confucian idealism, he devoted his energy to
the improvement of this domain, paying special attention to the revival
of villages ruined by successive calamities. At the height of the Temmei
famine (1783), which afflicted the northern provinces in particular, he
194 THE KANSEI REFORM
had promptly brought a great supply of rice to Shirakawa, with the

result that there were no deaths from hunger in his fief.
He played an important part in the choice of a successor to the Sho-
gun Ieharu, who died in 1786. Tanuma Olatsugu and certain Tokugawa
claimants intrigued against him, but they quarrelled among themselves,
and with Sadanobu’s support Ienari, of the Hitotsubashi line, succeeded
as eleventh Shogun in 1787. He was a minor, bom in 1773, and was
under tutelage until 1793. Tanuma was dismissed and disgraced, and
Sadanobu stated his wish to join the Council of Elders ( Roju). He sub
mitted a memorial explaining his desire to undertake a reform of the
Bakufu. His plan was approved by the Three Houses (Go-Sanke), but
met with opposition from some of the older ladies-in-waiting, who had
fallen under Tanuma’s spell, and from some of Tanuma’s supporters
among the Roju. It was not until the urgency of reform was brought
home to them by the riots in the summer of 1787 that they gave their
consent.
Sadanobu then presided over a select committee of the Roju and
introduced a number of remedial measures, in the control of finance,
in the selection and promotion of officers of state, and in the suppression
of bribery and other dishonest practices that had marked the Tanuma
regime. He was then in his thirtieth year. Besides presiding over the
Council of Elders he was appointed to the office of Hosa, or Adviser to
the Shogun, in which in practice he exercised the power of a Deputy or
Regent.
The offending officials were not dismissed, but put on their good
behaviour. Tanuma and his associates soon found the wind of reform
too bleak for their comfort and, as we have seen, were suitably punished.
The former Finance Commissioners (Kanjo-Bugyo) were heavily fined
for malpractices and reduced in rank. Certain subordinate officials
found guilty of theft, corruption, and malversation of funds were con
demned to death or banishment, while the merchants who had been
privy to their misdeeds were similarly dealt with. At the bottom of
the scale even small traders and rice brokers were included in the pur
suit, and at the top a number of political leaders of the highest rank
were deprived of office because of their relations with Tanuma, among
them the Tairo li and several Elders such as Abe and Mizuno.
Having seen how Sadanobu set about his business, let us now turn
to his character, since it accounts for much that happened while he was
in power. He was a man of great piety, and was regular in his devo
tions, calling upon the spirit of Ieyasu to help him to carry the heavy
burden of government. He was articulate, even eloquent. His object
21
THE KANSEI REFORM 195
was to restore the foundations of Bakufu government, the pattern being
that of the reforms commenced by Yoshimune, his grandfather. In Janu
ary 1788 he prayed at the Kichijo-In of Reiganjima in Yedo, offering
his own life as a sacrifice for one year in which there would be a good
supply of cheap rice so that the people need not suffer. He had already
displayed unusual capacity in the government of his own fief. He was,
moreover, a learned man, and had published a number of treatises on
politics, economics, and the arts, among them an essay on the nature
of government in which he expressed equalitarian views, such as “The
peasant working in the fields under a blazing sun is a man, no less than
a daimyo leading an easy, well-fed life.” He also declared that the do
main ruled by a daimyo was not his property, but belonged to the na
tion; and he observed that where there is distress, the people dare not
complain, but the ruler is responsible for their condition.
Sadanobu had a literary gift, and wrote copiously. A memoir which
he wrote under the title of Uge no H itogoto for the instruction of his
descendants has fortunately been preserved. It gives a most interesting
account of his official career and his personal views. It reveals him as
a man of high principles, whose attitude towards the people he gov
erned may perhaps best be described as tutorial. He was, as will be
seen from the account of his regime which follows, humourless and
without imagination. He was criticized in his day by an opponent to
his views who, in a memorial to the Shogun, described him as talented,
but narrow-minded, a man who meant to do good but only did harm.
2. Sadanobu s Policies
Sadanobu was in a strong position. Thanks to his family connex
ions and his acknowledged gifts, he was acceptable as a personal ad
viser to the Shogun Ienari, much as Hoshina Masayuld had served the
Shogun Ietsuna. He was in fact almost a Deputy Shogun, though he
took care not to behave in an arbitrary manner and was at pains to
consult the Elders and other influential persons. He was confronted
by many serious issues, but his first and most difficult task was to regu
late the finances of the Bakufu, not by manipulating currency but by a
genuine balance of revenue and expenditure.
The situation in 1787 was that the Treasury was almost empty, and
in 1788 a deficit seemed unavoidable. The decennial average of excess
of revenue over expenditure had fallen from about 250,000 ryo per
annum in 1772-80 to zero, and there was no gold or silver in the Treas
ury chest, which had held three million ryo in 1770. When this situa-
tion was revealed to the Roju, they were both surprised and alarmed,
for they were ignorant of financial matters. To meet the deficit, short
of borrowing from rich merchants, there was only one course to take.
The annual expenditure must be reduced. This was done, and by 1793
ordinary revenue was slightly in excess of ordinary expenditure. There
were, however, heavy items of extraordinary disbursement, for such
purposes as rebuilding palaces destroyed by fires in Kyoto. It seems
appropriate to observe here that the annual loss of property in Japan
through fire was immense.
To meet such demands an increase of revenue had been achieved
by reviving (1789) Yoshimune’s system of contribution by daimyos, and
making its rules more stringent. In general Sadanobu’s policy in eco
nomic matters was negative, for he was disposed to control and restrict
rather than to expand—a feature which is plainly revealed by a great
increase of severe measures against large commercial undertakings and
against moneylenders. The number of punishable economic actions
grew apace.
Perhaps the best, or at any rate the plainest, example of his actions
designed to put an end to extravagance is his treatment of the brokers
(fudasashi), whose business it was to advance money to samurai on
the security of their rice stipends. The fudasashi as a class made out
rageous profits and were notorious for their patronage of the most lux
urious establishments in the pleasure quarters of Yedo. They were the
most prominent and the most numerous of the great spendthrifts of the
day. The wealthiest among them were those who advanced money to
the Shogun’s direct retainers, the hatamoto and the go-kenin, on the
security of their rice stipends. These brokers drove a hard bargain.
They had already been checked by the Bakufu some years before, and
now Sadanobu struck a blow at them by reducing the rate of interest on
such advances and warning the fudasashi that they would be severely
punished if they disobeyed his order. The hatamoto took full advantage
of this protection, and in 1795 they rioted in the streets and treated the
brokers with such violence that the City Commissioners had to send a
daily patrol to the district where the hatamoto were creating disturb
ances. Thus the Bakufu found itself in the awkward position of having
to punish members of the principal military force serving the House of
Tokugawa and committed to preserving the peace.
Sadanobu was naturally unable to cure the essential defects of the
feudal system over which he presided. He had to attend to immediate
problems, and of these there were plenty. He must regulate prices and
in other ways succour persons or classes in distress. He must repair the
damaged finances of the Bakufu, and in general relieve the anxieties of
the people. On the whole his policy was conservative. He tried to make
the best use of existing institutions. In financial matters his chief object
was to reduce or check expenditure, to moderate the wild profit-making
of the past years, and in general to restrain the money economy which
was now dominant and to put in its place a land economy. In order to
carry out a policy of retrenchment, immediately after taking office he or
dered a reduction of current expenditure for three years, and after that,
within five years, a balance of revenue and expenditure was to be re
stored. In the Bakufu Treasury there had been over three million ryo
in gold and silver in 1770. By 1787 the chest was nearly empty, by 1790
it was being replenished.
His economic policy thus had some temporary success. He decided
upon some simple currency reforms, which appear to have been effec
tive. There was no social disturbance due to a shortage of food during
his term of office, that is from 1787 to the close of the century. Indeed
there were good harvests for a decade or more; and he dealt with spec
ulation on the rice market by supervising the leading Osaka rice mer
chants and where necessary punishing them severely. This was a tem
porarily effective measure, and he continued his efforts to keep prices
down. He provided against famine by ordering all daimyos to form a
reserve of rice by setting aside annually for five years fifty koku for
every 10,000 koku of their revenue.
He considered that the fundamental cause of high prices was a lack
of balance between production and consumption, which he thought
could be remedied by restraining commerce and encouraging agricul
ture by drainage, irrigation, afforestation, and other methods. He abol
ished or reduced the corv£es hitherto imposed upon peasants. These
were reasonable and beneficial measures, but he made a serious mistake
in his endeavour to check a fall in the population of villages and a flow
of villagers to the towns. He even tried to reduce the subsidiary work
of the farmers in growing tobacco, indigo, and other subsidiary crops.
It is very doubtful whether Sadanobu’s agrarian policy had any real
success. While he was announcing benefits, the tax-collectors were im
posing their levies without mercy.1 It is characteristic of Sadanobu’s
administration that its benevolent theories were rarely put into full
practice.
His edict of 1790 ordering peasants to return to the land was meant
to reduce the population of Yedo and increase the rural population. It
1 See the memorial of Shibano Kuriyama in K eizai Taiten, Vol. XXV I.

is doubtful whether this policy served any useful purpose. It was too
conservative. It was putting the clock back. Its chief interest is in the
light which it throws upon Sadanobu’s qualities as a statesman. Despite
his ideals and his hard work he was at the mercy of his theories and
lacked practical wisdom. In his attempt to go back to Ieyasu and Yo-
shimune he was in fact a reactionary in an era of inevitable change.
What is usually called the Kansei Reform was, it is true, a phase of
good government in intention, but essentially this was a period free
from the famines and other disasters which had marred the previous
decade. It was circumstances rather than policy which produced good
results.
While Sadanobu paid close attention to the purely monetary aspects
of the national economy, it is clear that he was blind to the importance
of developing its other features. He did little to encourage either pro
ductive industry or commercial enterprise. He seems to have supposed
that such action would lead to a rise in prices, which he was most anx
ious to prevent. He wrote an “Essay on Prices” ( B ukkaron), and the
Bakufu endeavoured to keep prices down by manipulating the market
for gold and silver to be used in coinage. This complex task had poor
success, and better results were obtained by regulating the rice market,
the basis of the economy. All attempts to “comer” the supply of rice
were forbidden under severe punishment.
In so far as the great efforts of Sadanobu were directed to perma
nent reform, his policy was not successful. It had some visible effect
for a few years between 1787 and 1794, but it was soon confounded in
a great river of events and left hardly any trace. Judged by direct re
sults it was a failure, but it cannot be dismissed as such, since it marked
an important stage in the history of the Bakufu, a different view of its
functions.
3. T he Bakufu and the Court

It will be recalled that in the seventeenth century the relations be
tween the Imperial Court and the Bakufu had been amicable, but that
Yoshimune, though respectful, did not pay much attention to the Throne.
In the years about 1760, however, there was a strong loyalist movement
which disturbed the Bakufu, and a number of conspirators who had
plotted a rising were punished in 1766. An underground movement
nevertheless continued, not so much for the purpose of restoring power
to the Imperial House as to ensure a reasonable income to the Emperor
and his nobles. In 1774 some stewards and Bakufu officials were severely
THE K A NS E l REFORM 199
punished for swindling the Court, and again in 1778 similar peculation
was laid bare by Sadanobu himself, who had visited Kyoto to discuss
the rebuilding of the Palace, which with a great part of the city had
been burned to the ground in a disastrous fire early in the year. In his
journal he gives a detailed account of his sojourn, of his discussions with
Court nobles, and of an audience with the Emperor, by whom he was
amiably received.
The relations between the Bakufu and the Court then seemed cor
dial, but they were soon to deteriorate, for there was a dispute as to
the powers of the Emperor after the retirement of Go-Momozono. The
new sovereign, K5kaku, had to apply to the Bakufu for permission to
grant ranks and titles to the abdicated emperor (1789). It would seem
that the Bakufu could not reasonably object to this act of piety, but in
fact Sadanobu let it be known that he could not approve. The Throne
and the Bakufu were thus at odds, but somehow or other the dispute
was patched up. Yet feelings at the Court remained hostile to the Ba
kufu, and Sadanobu not without reason suspected that a strong senti
ment against Yedo prevailed in Kyoto. It was encouraged by the zeal
of a young student from Yedo, one Takayama Masayuki, who publicly
venerated the Emperor while kneeling on the Sanjo bridge and facing
the Palace.
These episodes were of no great importance at the time, but they
make a significant prelude to the loyalist movement which, in due course
—in less than a century—was to destroy the Bakufu and revive the power
of the Throne.
4. Intellectual Trends
There was no end to Sadanobu's belief in the power of learning to
improve morals. He thought that the true remedy for the evils of the
day was to be found in the practice of Confucian teaching. He was
himself an enthusiastic seeker after truth and a convinced believer, so
that it was natural for him to choose a Confucian ethic as the basis of
the cultural policy which he intended to follow.
In that policy the most important feature was the renovation of the
Confucian college (the Shohei Gakumonjo) and the banning of any
other teaching than that which it prescribed. At that time the college
was in a poor condition, tom by dissensions and without strong direc
tion. Sadanobu was perturbed by this situation and set about clearing
up its disorder, notably in the first place by removing traces of the in
fluence of Tanuma and appointing new professors, exponents of the
Chu Hsi school who were scholars of high reputation in harmony with
the reform spirit which animated those days. A new President of the
college was appointed, a Matsudaira who was adopted into the Haya-
shi family and was named Jussai.
There was little room for academic freedom in Sadanobu’s scheme.
In 1790 an ordinance was issued prohibiting any other teaching than the
form of Chu Hsi doctrine in which he himself believed and which spread
widely to the detriment of other beliefs. The official school brought
great pressure to bear upon other schools, which they regarded, and
indeed persecuted, as unorthodox. One of the victims of this persecu
tion was the distinguished philosopher Ogyu Sorai. In so far as this
was Sadanobu’s work it is an instance of his nervous dread of the un
orthodox.
Yet he was not an obscurantist and was not a prejudiced believer in
the Chu Hsi philosophy. Indeed, although he tried to control and unify
thought for political purposes and did not listen to the protests of schol
ars, he never went out of his way to punish dissidents. His government
did, however, in 1790 issue orders for the censorship of certain publi
cations, such as lewd pictures and pornographic books, and to this list
were added works which ridiculed the government. In the following
year Santo Kyoden, a popular writer of comic works, was punished for
such an offence. More surprising was the punishment in 1791 of a
scholar named Hayashi Shihei for publishing a work on maritime de
fence called K aikoku H eidan, a theme of great importance at that time,
when Japan had neither a navy nor a merchant fleet useful for defence.
But Hayashi’s work was well timed, for a few months after his arrest
a mission from Russia arrived at Nemuro in Yezo (the northern island
now known as Hokkaido).
Sadanobu was aware of the truth of Hayashi’s charges, but did not
approve of disturbing statements. It was not wise to alarm the people.
It is one of the ironies of history that while these minor anxieties occu
pied the minds of the rulers of Japan, a more pressing danger than un
censored books seemed to threaten them in their foreign relations; for
in the north there was already trouble with Russians, and the Ainu living
on Kunashiri (the nearest of the Kurile Islands to Yezo) were in con
stant revolt. News of the appearance of foreign ships off the shores of
Japan gave the Bakufu real cause for anxiety. This was no time for
philosophical argument. The minds of thinking men had to be applied
to grave questions of national policy. How was the government to deal
with this undoubted threat to the national policy of seclusion? The
problems of reform, as they were seen by Sadanobu, had to give way
to solid realities.
In the summer of 1792 a Russian naval officer reached Nemuro in
a Russian vessel which was on an official mission to repatriate some
Japanese castaways and to propose the opening of diplomatic and com
mercial relations, proceeding to Yedo for that purpose. Nemuro was in
Japanese territory, being a harbour in the island Yezo, and therefore
by Japanese law the vessel had no right of entry. Sadanobu ordered
preparations for coastal defence, and in 1793 he inspected the coasts
of Izu and Sagami. In the following year he resigned his office as Re
gent, not because he felt that his policies had failed, but because his
critics blamed him for all the difficulties with which the government
was now confronted. He had incurred the ill will, the jealousy, of the
Shogun Ienari, who was anxious to direct the Bakufu and did in fact
continue to rule until 1837, thus holding office for fifty years.
Ienari contributed little to the prosperity of the state, for most of
his actions resulted in the failure of undertakings which Sadanobu had
planned in the national interest. Not satisfied with Sadanobu’s resigna
tion of the office of Regent, he went so far as to remove his name from
the list of Roju, a mean action which was inspired by the envy of Sada
nobu’s rivals or his enemies in the inner apartments of the Shogun’s
palace.
There was little sympathy for Sadanobu among the citizens. They
had tired of his attempts to dictate their behaviour and they disliked
his reforming zeal. Popular feeling was expressed in lampoons, in songs
and verses which played upon the names Tanuma and Shirakawa. They
said that they preferred a muddy pond ( numa) to a clear stream ( shi
rakawa). Less vulgar critics attacked him for what they saw as his
pretentious and inefficient character, but there can be little doubt that
on balance his administration was effective in clearing up the irregular
situation left by Tanuma and in preventing, or at least postponing, a
serious decline in the authority of the Bakufu. He was a conservative
man, and attempted no radical changes; but in the opinion of some Japa
nese scholars his efforts and those of his trusted colleague Matsudaira
Nobuaki (who took his place as Roju) combined to prolong the author
ity of the Bakufu for thirty years after the withdrawal of Tanuma.
5. T he Russian Approach
Russian expansion eastward across Asia goes back a long way, but
Russian geographers do not appear to have known much about Japan
until late in the seventeenth century. They had some information from
Dutch sources and from the descriptions of Atlasov, an explorer sent
to Kamchatka, who in 1700 reported to Moscow on the Kurile Islands
and their proximity to Japan. His knowledge was derived from a Japa
nese castaway named Dembei. This man and other survivors of a devas
tating storm at sea managed to reach Kamchatka, and Dembei was for
tunate in that he was taken into the care of Atlasov and sent on to
Moscow. There he was received in 1702 by Peter the Great, who dis
played a great interest in such particulars about Japan as Dembei could
convey to him. In that year he isued a decree ordering preparations for
intercourse with Japan. Thenceforward there were increasingly fre
quent Russian voyages from Kamchatka designed to reach Japanese
territory, while in Moscow studies of the Japanese language were begun.
Among the early voyages was one in 1721 from Okhotsk, under the
command of scientists commissioned to find a route to Japan by way of
the Kurile Islands. Such voyages continued at intervals until 1792, when
Lieutenant Adam Laxman, son of a professor of natural science at Irk
utsk, arrived as a member of an expedition sent by Catherine the Great
in a vessel named Ekaterina, which from Okhotsk had proceeded down
the Kurile Archipelago. It was this visit which caused alarm in Yedo
and hurried Sadanobu’s resignation.
Laxman was kindly treated by Japanese officials while waiting at
Nemuro for a reply from Yedo, for Japanese and Russians had been in
contact for several decades in Yezo and the neighbouring islands, and
their intercourse was friendly. He sent his letters of instruction to Yedo,
to show that he was under orders from his sovereign to proceed there
in order to open negotiations for trade and residence. He also was to
repatriate several Japanese castaways, including a remarkable man
named Kodayu, who was teaching Japanese in Irkutsk and had been
protected by a scholar in that city, Professor Eric Laxman, the father
of Adam Laxman.
Adam Laxman’s mission put Sadanobu in a quandary, which he re
solved in a manner familiar to harassed statesmen—by procrastination.
Laxman was given to understand that if he wished to be admitted to
Nagasaki, he must go there and like any other visitor ask for permis
sion to enter the harbour. Nagasaki was the only port in Japan where
foreign ships might call. Laxman was not satisfied with this response,
and sailed away to return to Russia. The Russian government was not
interested enough to put direct pressure upon Japan, but did not aban
don the idea of closer relations. A few years later another Russian vessel
appeared. This was in October 1804, when the warship N adexhda, car
rying an ambassador from the Tsar, entered Nagasaki harbour. The
ambassador, Vasilii Rezanov, was treated politely enough, but he met
nothing but delay and obstruction for several months. In March 1805
he was told that instructions had come from Yedo, and he must leave
forthwith. This he did.
At this time the political situation in Yedo was confused. Sadanobu
though out of office could still exert some influence as member of a group
of high officers of state that included Matsudaira Nobuaki and other
councillors. They were able for a time to control the incompetent Sho
gun Ienari, but soon after the turn of the century they began to lose
their authority, and while this change in the character of government
was taking place, the Bakufu received a severe shock from a critical
tension in the country’s relations with Russia which was produced by
the treatment of Rezanov.2 But the government’s reaction was entirely
negative. It did nothing but refuse the Russian requests.
The reason for this change of front was (rather than pressure from
the Dutch as is sometimes suggested) nothing but a complete loss of
the positive and active character which had been displayed by the Ba
kufu in the exercise of its power a decade before.
After Rezanov’s departure no Russian attempt was made to estab

lish a position on the main island of Japan, but there were frequent
raids on Yezo and the Kurile Islands inspired by Rezanov in a spirit of
vengeance for his humiliation in Nagasaki. He had made his way to
Alaska and thence to San Francisco, where he began preparations for
an expedition against Sakhalin. He engaged the services of two Rus
sian naval officers (Khostov and Davydov). In 1807 these two attacked
settlements in Sakhalin and Yezo and then, loaded with booty, sailed
for Okhotsk. They left a letter stating that they would return and
attack the Japanese settlements unless Japan and Russia came to terms.
They had of course no authority to make such statements, for the gov
ernment at Petersburg had no knowledge of their actions.
Their attacks were so flagrant that the Bakufu was bound to retaliate.
There were many opinions as to a suitable policy, and unaware that the
two officers had no authority for their raids, the Japanese decided that
they must prepare to resort to arms against Russia. But first their own
defences must be strengthened. They sent contingents to strategic
points in Yezo, reinforcements went to Etorofu, and the defences of
the northern shores of the main island were strengthened. Since the
two Russia officers had left word that they would return to Sakhalin*
* Rezanov lost interest in Japan when he saw fine prospects in California. He

hoped to make it a Russian possession and might well have succeeded, since there
would have been only feeble opposition from the Spanish colonists. But his health
failed and he died in 1807.
and Etorofu for an answer, a reply was drafted which stated that Japan
would not submit to threats and would fight if the Russians persisted
in sending ships to attack her territories.
Apart from these verbal skirmishes the position remained much as
before, until in the summer of 1811 a Russian cruiser, the Diana, drew
near the shore of Etorofu in order to fix its position. The captain, Va-
silii Golovnin, had no intention of clashing with the Japanese. He sent
an ensign ashore to make enquiries, and followed himself, to find the
ensign in conversation with Japanese soldiers. His innocent visit, how
ever, aroused the suspicions of the Japanese officers who had soon ap
peared on the beach and had asked questions about Khovstov and Da
vydov. Soon after this meeting Golovnin moved to an anchorage off
the shore of Kunashiri, near to a strongly garrisoned fortress. He went
ashore with several officers and spoke to some Japanese on the beach;
but after some conversation all pretence was suddenly dropped. Golov
nin and his men were captured, bound, and led away to another part
of the island. They were cruelly treated and ultimately imprisoned in
Hakodate. There they had been held in captivity for two years when
the Diana was brought to Hakodate and allowed to take them away.
The reason for this change of mind was a declaration by Russian offi
cials that Khostov and Davydov were acting against their orders. The
Russians at this time had proposed an exchange of prisoners.
Golovnin had gained the esteem and affection of his captors, and
when he left there was a festive farewell gathering in which Russians
and Japanese took part in great harmony. The Japanese crowded round
their one-time prisoners with gifts and kind words, and some were on
the verge of tears at parting. As the Diana was towed out the Japanese
and Russians exchanged thunderous cheers. Such behaviour was typi
cal of the intercourse between Japanese and Russians, which combined
fear and attraction. Golovnin’s was the last important attempt to estab
lish good relations with the Japanese in the Kuriles. This intercourse,
like a love affair with its quarrels and embraces, played an important
part in revealing to the Japanese their own weakness and in opening a
breach in the policy of seclusion.
In 1808, a year after the Diana sailed from Kronstadt, an English
frigate sailed into Nagasaki in search of Dutch prize, for at that time
Holland, ruled by a French king, was an enemy of Great Britain. This
was H.M.S. Phaeton, a crack vessel, one of the “Saucy Channel Four”
which did good service during the Napoleonic wars. Her captain, see
ing that there were no Dutch ships to make prize, decided to leave, but
first demanded a supply of food and threatened to bombard the har
bour if it was denied. The Governor of Nagasaki was ready to resist,
but it turned out that the defences were weak and the defenders mostly
absent or incompetent. Supplies were furnished. The intruder then
sailed out on a fair breeze, and the Governor committed suicide that
evening.
This episode shows clearly, as well as the inadequacy of the defences
of Nagasaki, the poor spirit of the defenders and the daimyos who were
responsible for its protection. It was not until after the Phaeton inci
dent that the harbour defences were strengthened and improved.
The visits of the Diana and the Phaeton were by no means the first
arrivals of foreign vessels ( other than Chinese and Dutch) at Japanese
ports after the seclusion edicts. An American merchant ship, the Eliza,
had arrived at Nagasaki in 1797 and returned annually until 1803, at
first bringing cargoes for the Dutch, since the Netherlands had at that
time no ships available.
This was a time when European maritime states were encouraging
voyages of exploration in all oceans. The British Admiralty in particu
lar sent suitable warships on peaceful surveying missions in the interests
of cartography. Broughton’s voyages in the North Pacific were of this
nature, and innocent of any hostile purpose; but the Japanese were not
aware of this and were so alarmed by reports of his visits to points in
Sakhalin from 1795 for a year or more that the Bakufu sent officers to
persuade him to leave.
Further breaches in the seclusion policy were made by the arrival
of English ships at Japanese ports—in 1817 and again in 1818 at Uraga,
in 1824 at Otsugahama in Hitachi, and off the Satsuma island of Taka-
rajima in the same year, when there was a fracas between the English
sailors and the islanders. This incident caused the issue in 1825 of a
new edict, known as the “ninen naku,” or “no second thought,” expul
sion order. Hitherto the occasional visits of foreign ships had not been
forcibly prevented when they came in search of water and fuel; but
now the local authorities were ordered to destroy any vessel that came
close in shore, and to arrest or kill any members of its crew that might
land. These sudden changes of attitude betrayed a lack of resolution
in the Bakufu. In fact they were evidence of the sheer loss of forceful
initiative which had overcome the Bakufu in those years. Its policy was
one of ease and comfort. It even withdrew from the direct government
of Yezo and returned the responsibility to the daimyo of Masumae.
6. Sumptuary Laws
In most periods of Japanese history one finds examples of sumptuary
legislation intended to promote economy and invariably failing to pro
duce the results desired. Sadanobu’s government issued some of the

most ridiculous laws of this kind. Whether Sadanobu himself was di
rectly responsible for these measures is not clear, but he was a solemn
and not very imaginative man and may well have approved of them.
He certainly was given to interfering in the daily life of the people, and
towards the end of his term of office he had lost all the popularity he
may have enjoyed.
His endeavour to regulate and reduce the expenditure of the towns
people was continuous. It took the usual form. He forbade the use of
barbers and hairdressers. He ordered the arrest of prostitutes in the
city, and had them sent to the Yoshiwara (the great Yedo brothel quar
ter) for a term of years. He ordered separate accommodations for men
and women in the city bath-houses, thus depriving the citizens of their
favourite resorts for social intercourse, the hairdresser’s shop and the
public bath-house. He forbade betting and gambling, thus depriving
gamblers of their livelihood and (it was said) driving them to robbery
as a trade.
Worse than these attacks upon the simple pleasures of the people,
the authorities had recourse to a system of spying, intended to secure
obedience to the rules. The spies would mix with the customers and
denounce them for some careless remark, or they would accept bribes
and thus make it necessary for more spies to keep a watch upon their
colleagues. In fact there were spies in all quarters of Yedo and also of
Osaka, and they employed as agents and listeners male servants in
brothels of the city. In the bath-house the spies themselves, disguised
by their nudity, would sit immersed in the hot water with the ordinary
customers, and would arrest one who made a remark critical of the
government.
The censorship of books was more severe than it had been in Yoshi-
mune’s day, as witness the case of Hayashi Shihei, who was placed un
der arrest for writing a book on the need for coastal defences, and the
punishment of the novelist Kydden for an improper book, and of the
colour-print artist Utamaro for painting “Spring pictures.”
All these were oppressive actions of a trivial kind, probably ordered
by busybodies of modest official standing; but on the whole the Bakufu
treated the citizens with moderation, partly no doubt because they re
called the serious “smashing” riots of 1787 in Yedo and Osaka.
C H A P T E R XVII
THE F U R T H E R D E C L I N E
OF THE BAK U FU
1. lenari and His Associates
T h e g o v e r n m e n t retained some measure of rational judgment

and probity so long as men like Sadanobu and Nobuaki were influ
ential; but in 1812 Nobuaki died, so that there was left in office no
statesman of sufficient authority to keep a check upon the Shogun
lenari and his disreputable companions.
Chief among these was Mizuno Tadanari, who now assumed the
actual direction of policy, in so far as affairs of state as distinct from
the Shogun’s appetities came under serious consideration by him. Tada
nari was an adopted son of Tadatomi, a partisan of Tanuma Okitsugu.
By flattering the Shogun and Hitotsubashi Harunari, and by gaining
the favour of the ladies of the Inner Apartments (O-oku—the Seraglio),
he was able to form a powerful group which conducted a government
by bribery not less flagrant than that of Tanuma’s day. At its most pros
perous it was joined by Tanuma’s son, Okimasa, who became a Junior
Elder (Wakadoshiyori) in 1822, and then a Chamberlain, until he re
tired to his father’s castle at Sagara in Totomi.
It was men of his type who assisted Tadanari in his work of influ
encing the Shogun; and lest their methods should prove insufficient,
Mizuno worked through the Seraglio, being himself a nephew of O-ume
no Kata, Ienari’s favourite concubine. Most of his partners had similar
connexions with the Seraglio, sometimes because they had offered as
concubines a daughter or a niece of their own.
The dimensions of the Seraglio and the extent to which it exerted a
malign influence upon the conduct of public affairs may be measured
by the number of its inhabitants. It is said to have included forty prin
cipal ladies ( “sobashitsu”) and as many as nine hundred female attend
ants ( “jochu”). lenari had one wife and twenty concubines, and is sup
posed to have fathered fifty-five children. The marriage of the girls
presented a difficult problem, and since their weddings were celebrated
in an extravagant fashion, the daimyos had to make frequent and hand
some contributions.
That Mizuno seemed to the ordinary man to repeat all the faults
ascribed to Tanuma is clear from some of the jibes current in Yedo, but
208 THE FURTHER DECLINE OF THE BAKUFU
Ienari depended upon him and he was safe from dismissal. Ienari him
self, an exhausted voluptuary, was guilty of the most extreme debauch
ery among all the Tokugawa Shoguns, indeed among all the leaders
since government by warriors began. Yet he was loaded with honours
by the Imperial Court, and his father ( Hitotsubashi Harunari) was given
the highest rank that could be conferred upon a subject.
As it may well be supposed, many of the daimyos followed the ex
ample of the Shogun and lived extravagantly, giving costly entertain
ments, spending large sums on bribes and presents, and on new build
ings. Their lavish habits naturally led to flourishing trade in the towns,
and raised the standard of living of the citizens to a point which it had
never reached before. The places of entertainment were crowded, the
theatres and the restaurants crammed with customers. The houses of ill
fame ( “akusho,” or “bad places,” as they were called) increased in num
ber, and even male prostitutes (known as “kagema”) appeared. There
were in the city of Yedo, it is said, no less than forty illicit quarters.
The government repeatedly issued edicts forbidding these places and
practices but to no avail.
Less reprehensible pleasure-seeking was, it appears, popular on such
a grand scale that some Confucian moralists were appalled by the great
audiences in the theatres of Yedo—numbering more than ten thousand
in all, every day. This does not seem excessive in a population of over
a million, but theatre-going was regarded as an indulgence, almost a
vice, by the ruling class, partly because it was against the sumptuary
rules and partly because some of the plays might travesty high life in
military circles.
The disapproval of the moralists did not stop the citizens' feverish
search for entertainment. It is difficult to explain this sudden increase
in spending, but there must have been a great flow of money due to
the release of savings and the minting of new currency. In 1798 the
Bakufu’s emergency reserve of gold and silver stood at over one million
ryo, and by 1830 it had fallen to 650,000 ryo. This indicates an abnor
mal consumption which could not be paid for out of normal revenue.
Furthermore the ordinary expenditure of the Bakufu for the decade
1822-31 showed a small favourable balance, as against a deficit in the
preceding decade. It is true that this was due to currency manipula
tion during those years, with the inevitable result of inflation and rising
prices. Yet although this seeming prosperity rested upon an extremely
shaky economic foundation, it continued for some years because there
were no serious calamities such as storms and plagues to reduce the
crops. Consequently the high prices of rice and other commodities re-
THE FURTHER DECLINE OF THE BAKUFU 209
S cen e in L u ch u gay quarter
mained steady, and there was no sign of disturbance in the markets of

a kind likely to bring about agrarian revolt or urban rioting. The future
looked bright. The country entered upon a period of wild spending.1
The reckless addiction to pleasure of this decade or so has been de
scribed by one Japanese historian as like dancing madly on a volcano.
There was perhaps some excuse for this rashness. The current freedom
from catastrophes and from violent price fluctuation no doubt created
a feeling of confidence. This was a brief spell of fine weather. The
towns were quiet, and there were few rural complaints. Indeed many
farmers profited by the wider extension of the money economy to their
sphere.
But these pleasant conditions were fugitive. The volcano did erupt,
for in the last years (1832-37) of Ienaris rule the miserable sequence
of disasters recurred. Famine and disease were followed by peasant
uprisings and “smashing” in the towns. The Bakufu was again in a pre
carious situation.
1 This period of prosperity is usually referred to in Japanese works as covering

the eras Bunka and Bunsei (1 8 0 4 -3 0 ).
2. Conditions in the F iefs

The political system developed by the Tokugawa Shoguns cannot
be described only in terms of the structure of the Bakufu. It must be
considered as an organic relationship between the Shogun and the fief,
a relationship which thanks to the skilful exercise of power by the Toku
gawa family was to survive without serious challenge for more than two
hundred years.
The number of fiefs was about two hundred and sixty, and of these
about two hundred were relatively small, with assessed revenues not
exceeding 100,000 koku. Fiefs of 30,000 koku or less accounted for half
this number of two hundred, and they were relatively weak, only with
difficulty maintaining their independence and nearly all insolvent. A
few, by careful administration, contrived to develop their resources,
but in general the small fiefs could not keep out of debt, and their weak
ness was a fruitful cause of discontent, often lending to riots.
Nor were the great fiefs free from such difficulties, for their indebt
edness tended to be proportionate to their size, and few of them had
resources which could be developed without borrowing. Moreover the
Fudai daimyos in particular were treated with a great lack of consider
ation by the Bakufu, often being moved from one province to another
for supposed reasons of political strategy. These movements were very
costly, as may be seen from the case of the Himeji fief, which was held
by Matsudaira Akinori, who in a series of reassignments ordered by the
Bakufu found himself transferred there in 1741 from his family’s fief in
Shirakawa in the far north. Already in debt, he attempted to raise funds
in Shirakawa before leaving. This was in 1742, and the inhabitants of
his fief opposed him, so that he could not make a move; and a few years
later, after a poor harvest, they rioted, and three thousand men marched
on the castle town.
There were similar troubles in other fiefs which had been trans
ferred to new daimyos. In one case the rioters were so threatening that
the daimyo called for help from the Governor of Osaka, who sent a
force to suppress them, but not before they had done great damage.
Such troubles as these rarely afflicted the Tozama daimyos, for the
Bakufu was careful not to antagonize them.
Whether Tozama or Fudai, the very large fiefs usually enjoyed fa
vourable economic conditions. They were able to develop their re
sources on a large scale, using their power to develop not only agri
culture but other forms of production within their boundaries. Those
which were virtually self-supporting could to some extent at least check
T able o f Tozama F iefsJ

in order of assessed
revenue (kokudaka)
Kaga (M a e d a )........................................................ 1,022,700
Satsuma (Shimazu) .............................................. 770,000
Sendai ( D a t e ) ........................................................ 625,600
Higo (H osokaw a).................................................. 540,000
Chikuzen (Kuroda) .............................................. 520,000
Aki (A sa n o )............................................................ 426,000
Choshu (Mori) ...................................................... 369,000
Hizen (Nabeshima) ............................................ 357,000
Inaba ( I k e d a ) ........................................................ 325,000
Ise (Todo) ............................................................ 323,000
Bizen (Ikeda) ........................................................ 315,000
the inflationary trend within their own borders. Such were the great
domains of Satsuma, Choshu, Kaga, and Owari.
Although the small Fudai daimyos were not powerful as vassals, it
was they and their adherents who furnished the Bakufu with officials
to hold the most important posts in the government, often on a heredi
tary basis.23
Conditions in the fiefs changed with the lapse of time, and perhaps
the most powerful agency of change was the effect of an expanding
economy, which faced the overlords and the vassals with new problems
that they were not well equipped to solve, for the founders of the feudal
society had legislated against change. In its origins the system over
which the Shogun presided was a strongly conservative feudal society
supported by a strict division of classes and a transmission of status
by heredity. In principle it adhered to established methods of govern
ment because it was hostile to change; but after the death of Iemitsu,
the third Shogun, in 1651, the maintenance of the old regime began to
prove inconsistent with a natural development of the country in an era
of peace.
The immediate causes of this change were the expansion of a money
economy towards the close of the seventeenth century, and consequent
changes in the character of rural as well as urban life. The urgent prob
lem before the Bakufu was how to reconcile these new conditions with
2 The actual product was in almost every case much higher than the “omote
daka,” or official assessment.
3 For some details of the allocation of fiefs and the treatment of Fudai daimyos
by the Bakufu, see Chapter V.
the maintenance of discipline in the warrior class; for the finances of

the Bakufu were showing a deficit, and the livelihood of the samurai
was endangered.
This indeed was the pattern, the trend which had been followed by
the government soon after its formation, once the great treasure accu
mulated by Ieyasu had been reduced by emergency payments. There
was an almost regular alternation between expansion and contraction
in the finances of the Bakufu and, it followed, of many of the daimyos,
at intervals of about ten years between, let us say, 1700 and 1820.
The fiefs varied in size and strength and in the nature of their prod
ucts, but they had one characteristic in common, and that was the finan
cial stringency which they had to face as the national economy devel
oped the use of currency at a great speed. All but the strongest were
forced to dispose of their rice at whatever price the brokers of Osaka
and Yedo were prepared to offer. The self-contained character of the
fiefs might have been preserved but for the rule of alternate attendance
(sankin kotai), which obliged them to maintain an establishment in
Yedo at great expense. To meet their obligations they could not pay
in rice, but must settle their bills in currency; and it was this necessity
that developed and hastened the use of money in the financial business
of all fiefs, and consequently throughout the country.
The welfare of the clan, the quality of its government, thus came
to depend upon its adjustment to the currency situation. This was well
enough in theory, but (the records show) all fiefs without exception
suffered from serious financial trouble, because their adjustment had
taken the easy form of contracting debts at high interest. This kind of
economic disturbance was of course accompanied by political dangers,
but the rulers of the fiefs took no positive steps to avert them, because
they could still depend upon feudal discipline and also upon military
strength to preserve a balance in case of internal commotion—an uneasy
balance, it is true; but the supremacy of the warrior class was unchal
lenged.
The financial troubles of the daimyos were inherent in the Toku-
gawa system of feudal overlordship, and indeed they were in some cases
apparent before the foundation of the Shogunate. The situation grew
worse during the following years, and by about 1700, less than a cen
tury after Ieyasu, it had become usual for expenditure to exceed reve
nue. Negative policies of retrenchment were not effective; but, as we
have seen, the best-administered fiefs opened up new land to cultiva
tion and encouraged an increase of local products for sale, being espe
cially fortunate if they had a monopoly of one of those products. These
efforts brought in more currency and were more useful than increasing
taxation within the fief. But it was rare for such measures to balance
the accounts of the daimyo, and there were few fiefs which did not re
sort to borrowing in order to supplement the money value of rice in
store.
The persons who dealt in the produce of the fiefs ( “kuramoto” or
“kakeya” in Osaka; “ryogae” or “tonya” in Yedo and Kyoto) were a
useful source of money income, and in the neighbourhood of most fiefs
there were usually wealthy merchants ready to do business.45 Still the
accounts did not balance, and many daimyos were driven to undigni
fied economies. They reduced the number of men in their service and
even went so far as to “borrow” from their retainers a proportion of
their stipends, and (it is said) to sell to prosperous farmers the right
to use a surname and to wear swords.®
For borrowing on a large scale the daimyo would even offer as
security a lien on the next year’s land tax ( in rice), and the “rice notes”
thus issued were regarded as currency in the market. But some dai
myos even gave notes without backing, though this was against the rules
of the Bakufu; and thus they caused confusion and alarm among lenders.
A celebrated case which excited the money market in Osaka was the
circulation of rice notes from the Kurume fief for nearly half a million
koku, an amount which it could not possibly supply. The Bakufu was
obliged to intervene with a guarantee, in order to settle the confusion
caused by this irresponsible act.
The way in which the indebtedness of the daimyos increased is well
illustrated by the case of the Toda family. Between 1750 and 1772 they
borrowed from an Osaka merchant sums amounting to 453 kan of silver
(about 50,000 oz. Troy), on which the interest by 1836 had amounted
to nearly 500,000 oz. Another example of the wealth derived from
moneylending is that of Masuya, the man of business of the Sendai
clan, of whom it was said in 1790 that Sendai belonged to him, and
Sendai’s rice was his rice. His prowess is related in a work entitled
M asuhei Yawa, or “Evening Tales of Masuhei.”®
Part of the financial burdens of the daimyo was shifted to the backs
of the unfortunate peasants. They were called upon to pay heavier taxes
or to pay taxes in advance. In addition they were squeezed directly or
4 The immensely rich Konoike Zenyemon was “kakeya” to at least five fiefs.
The kakeya were often treated as retainers and given rice stipends. Konoike received
in this way as much as 70,000 koku a year.
5 The right known as “myoji taito."
« K eizai Taiten, Vol. XIV.
indirectly by rich merchants, by landlords, by moneylenders, and rice

brokers. At times the pressure was unbearable, and they burst out in
riots of the kind already described. In the fiefs much depended upon
the degree of control, tight or loose, exercised by the daimyo, but in
any case in this period the agrarian rising (hyakusho ikki) was almost
chronic. It was most frequent in the small and middling fiefs, where
the power of enforcement was not enough to prevent rash ventures by
farmers with a grievance.
The policy of isolation pursued by most fiefs, by keeping them out

of the main stream of development in the rest of the country, naturally
resulted at times in a certain stagnation and even decay. At best it
gave rise to internal dissension and in extreme cases to armed conflicts.
Among the most flagrant examples of the weakness in the political struc
ture were the violent quarrels between leading families or branches of
families in some of the great fiefs. We have already seen a classic in
stance in the strife within the Sendai (D at6) fief in 1671; and during
the early years of the eighteenth century similar succession disputes
broke out into violence in other parts of the country.
Notable among them was one which almost destroyed the great do
main of Kaga, the richest in Japan, assessed at over one million koku.
So badly was it administered that by 1703 it was heavily in debt, owing
capital and interest amounting to over 22,000 kan of silver ( equivalent
to about 2,600,000 oz. Troy). The questions of policy raised by this
immense liability gave rise to violence of a degree hitherto unknown
under Tokugawa rule. Two main factions struggled for as long as thirty
years, and even after they came to terms there were riots in Kaga terri
tory, not without reason, since the total debt had risen (by 1767) to
more than 50,000 kan, and no way of dealing with this burden had been
devised. The dispute did nothing but reveal a rotten administration by
corrupt officials.
No description of the commercial undertakings of the Kaga fief
would be complete without reference to the remarkable smuggling
which was carried out by a merchant named Zeniya Gohei, who re
sided in the harbour town of Kanazawa and is said to have owned
(about 1850) two hundred vessels and to have a capital of three million
ryo. The administration of the fief, after turning a blind eye to his op
erations for some time, decided to confiscate all his possessions. He
was imprisoned, and died in gaol, while his sons and his manager were
crucified. The charge against him was that he had committed some
offence in regard to a small reclamation scheme, but this was obviously
a dishonest excuse. The exact truth is not known, but it is clear that the
clan authorities wished to lay their hands on his wealth, and were not
scrupulous in their choice of an excuse. Much of Zeniya’s trading was
quite legitimate, consisting of the carriage of goods to and from the
Hokkaido; but his enterprise shows that the desire to engage in foreign
trade was growing fast.
Zeniya’s case is of special interest, because it contradicts the view
of some writers that in the first half of the nineteenth century the rich
merchants exercised great political power. There is not much truth in
this; for, from the time of Yodoya onwards, the Bakufu never hesitated
to punish those of whom they disapproved.
Similar troubles to those of Kaga affected Akita and Kurume and
(among smaller clans) Tsushima, Koga, and Matsuyama in Dewa. This
last provides a striking example of misgovernment. The principal re
tainers fostered a revolt against the daimyo for his oppressive measures,
which included not only extortion from the taxpayers but also a forced
levy upon the retainers themselves. The daimyo issued rice notes in
excessive amounts and in general drove the economy of the fief to the
verge of collapse. The retainers were obliged to sell their possessions,
and famine was avoided only by calling upon a related clan for help.
Many more examples of such deterioration could be cited. What
caused it is not clear. It is probable that the system of fiefs designed
by the first three Tokugawa Shoguns was fundamentally unsound, since
it gave autonomy (qualified, it is true) to a large proportion of the
territory of the whole country. In theory every daimyo was a vassal
sworn to obey the Shogun, but in practice the Bakufu had no construc
tive policy and did not interfere in the affairs of a clan unless there
was evidence of danger to Bakufu interests or Bakufu prestige. The
key to Bakufu policy in this matter was a desire to keep the peace. Its
agents kept a watch upon the vassals in order to be able to deal with
symptoms of unrest or disobedience before they reached a stage where
drastic action would be called for.
But whatever the attitude of the Bakufu, it is clear that in many
fiefs there was an urgent need for reform, and in fact the years from
about 1750 onwards did see an improvement, due not to a special effort
at the behest of the Bakufu but as part of a general tendency which
characterized government under Yoshimune and continued for a cen
tury or more, interrupted unhappily by periods of depression or distress.
An examination of the history of some of the leading clans during the
eighteenth century shows that serious efforts to reform were made by
Akita, Yonezawa, Sendai, Aizu, Shirakawa, Matsushiro, Owari, Oka-
yama, Aki, Choshu, Matsue, Higo, Satsuma, and Kii (Kishu). These
were not all entirely successful, since success depended first upon the
natural resources of the fief and upon the good sense of the daimyo and
his senior retainers (the kashin), who were as a rule the effective ad
ministrators; but in general it may be said that the policy-makers were
capable men, inspired by Neo-Confucian ideals. In most fiefs there
were also thoughtful young samurai who felt that the system of which
they formed a part had reached a critical point, and some of them were
prepared for startling changes. This situation can be best explained by
concrete examples.
An interesting case, which incidentally throws light on the way in
which the great fiefs developed, is that of Yonezawa, the castle town of
the great Uesugi family. Originally it was the Aizu domain, worth
1.200.000 koku, but after the battle of Sekigahara it was reduced to
300.000 koku, and then in 1664 to 150,000 koku. Despite these reduc
tions the daimyo and his councillors continued on the former scale of
expenditure, and the fief became insolvent. Its burden of debt was
further increased by a reckless financial policy, and still further by
famines which ravaged the northern provinces in 1755.
At this stage the people of the fief rose in revolt and engaged in
"smashings” on the castle town. The government of the fief was one of
exceptional weakness, and by 1764 its situation had become so critical
that the daimyo (Uesugi Shigesada) decided that he must hand the
fief back to the Bakufu. On the advice of his father-in-law, the power
ful daimyo of Owari, he abandoned this project and resigned in favour
of his adopted son, Harunori, who in course of time made progress by
very determined action, which included the execution of certain Coun
cillors (Kar6) who had opposed him. Under his guidance and that of
his successors the fief prospered. Firm disciplinary methods were intro
duced to increase production all round and to maintain a high standard
of conduct among the samurai. Despite repeated blows from famine
and plague his improvements turned out to be permanent, and in 1830
Yonezawa was praised by the Bakufu as a model of good government.
An instructive example of reform measures in another clan is that
of Akita, where great efforts were made to improve the quality of its
administration and to encourage profit-making industries, such as the
manufacture of paper, pottery, and textiles, and the development of
mining, for which latter purpose, it will be recalled, the services of
Hiraga Gennai were obtained. To carry out these plans required a large
capital expenditure, but Akita had no reserve and was obliged to bor
row from wealthy merchants within the domain. With good fortune
most of the projects could probably have been thus carried out on a
satisfactory scale, but the desired reform was never accomplished, for
by 1832 Akita was in distress, this being the year of one of the three
great famines in Tokugawa history, the famine of the Tempo era (1830-
44). The debt of the Akita fief in 1828 had reached 460,000 ryo.
Of prosperous fiefs the most important were Kishu and Higo. These
were known as the Dragon7 and the Phoenix. Kishu was one of three
collateral houses of the Tokugawa—the Go-Sanke—and Hosokawa of
Higo was one of the most powerful families in the country.
The Kishu fief, after some of Yoshimune’s reforms about 1716, had
endeavoured to improve its finances by increasing production in agri
culture and manufactures, but by 1760 it found itself heavily in debt.
In an attempt to increase revenue it oppressed both peasants and
townspeople, causing serious riots. It then turned to borrowing on a
large scale to finance its developments. Here it found no great difficulty.
Thanks to its proximity to Kyoto and Osaka and its possession of rich
lands, it was able to raise capital, which it used partly for commercial
purposes and partly for developing its material resources, notably the
great Kumano forests. In the period from 1750 to 1800 it made great
profits and was thus in a strong position to deal with the expanding
monetary economy.
Higo had extensive domains, which included a portion of the adja
cent province of Bungo. Partly under the influence of Yoshimune’s
reforms its organization was already improved by about 1750. It had
one special advantage, in the quality of rice which it grew, for “Higo
mai” (Higo rice) was a standard of quality on the Osaka exchange.
Lake most fiefs it had overspent, especially in the early part of the cen
tury, and owing to its internal quarrels it lost the confidence of the
great merchants and moneylenders, to such a degree that Konoike
resigned his position as its agent (“kakeya”). This situation obliged
the daimyo (Hosokawa Shigekata) to revise and develop the economic
structure of his domain. He succeeded in restoring it to solvency and
to prosperity. These results were achieved partly by improving the
condition of the peasants, whom he assisted by loans and in other ways;
while samurai who had no employment were encouraged to work in
their homes at spinning and weaving.
To summarize the reforms in the fiefs of which the foregoing cases

are examples, it may be said that politically their special purpose was
7 Strictly speaking not a dragon, but the Kirin, another mythological monster.
to concentrate governing power in the hands of the daimyo, to improve

discipline, and to strengthen the daimyo s control of inhabitants of
every class. In the economic sphere their object was to increase and
diversify production, and by employing experts to develop existing in
dustries such as mining.
The reforms described above were concerned primarily with pro
tecting the fiefs against the financial dangers which increasingly
threatened them during the eighteenth century as the national economy
developed along lines that were not consistent with their independence.
In other words, strictly speaking these were not reforms but efforts to
restore previous strength by adjustment to new circumstances. It was
not until after this task had been completed that administrators could
turn to the kind of social and political reforms which were to occupy
the attention of some fiefs well after the turn of the century.
It will be seen that on balance the so-called Tempo Reform at
tempted by the Balcufu must be regarded as a failure, whereas by con
trast the contemporary reforms in a number of important fiefs were, at
least from the point of view of the reformers, to be regarded as fairly
successful. The failure of the Bakufu reforms may properly be ascribed
to the essential rigidity of the structure of Tokugawa government, and
of course to the decline upon which it had already entered in the
eighteenth century. Moreover it is clear that the strengthening of the
fiefs was bound to bring about a relative weakness in the authority of
the Bakufu.
3. Choshu and Satsuma
More interesting from an historical point of view than the clans dis
cussed above are the two great Tozama domains of western Japan,
Choshu and Satsuma, which were to play leading roles in the last days
of the Bakufu.
Choshu, covering the two provinces of Nagato and Suo, once gov
erned by the great Ouchi family and then by the Mori, had as a single
fief increased in size threefold since Sekigahara, and in the Tempo era
had an actual revenue close upon one million koku. Despite efforts to
economize (which included withholding part of the stipends of the
senior retainers) expenditure increased year by year. Loans from rich
merchants met the deficit for some time, but by 1840 the debt was
85,000 kan of silver, an immense sum. Attempts were made to divert a
large proportion of the earnings of farmers and traders into the clan
treasury, but this involved depriving them of profits not only from the
production of rice but also from the sale of such articles as paper, wax,
salt, and indigo, of which the daimyo assumed a monopoly.
This policy of the clan government angered farmers and traders to
such a degree that from about 1830 to 1837 there were almost continu
ous uprisings. That of 1831 was particularly violent and plunged the
domain into disturbance on a scale previously unknown. It was fol
lowed by certain measures of reform, although it cannot be said that
these were due to the uprisings; and indeed the word “reform” here is
somewhat misleading. Certainly the peasants had grievances, but the
conditions of which they complained were not due to maladministration
but rather to natural disasters that had plagued the country with famine
from 1832 to 1836. It is important to recognize these causes, since some
modern historians are inclined to take an ideological view of the risings
and to describe them as revolutionary.
On the simplest economic grounds the government of the fief could
not fail to recognize the danger of the situation. In 1840 the daimyo,
Mori Tadachika, selected an able samurai of middle rank, Murata Seifu,
to put things right. Under his guidance the clan monopolies of trade
were abolished, and monopoly rights on salt, sak£, cotton, and other
important products were sold to merchant guilds. Other financial
measures were introduced to encourage production, such as loans at
low interest to samurai, farmers, and traders. Advantage was taken of
the position of the fief at the entrance to the Inland Sea through the
Straits of Shimonoseki by providing berths and anchorages in Choshu
waters to vessels carrying goods from Echigo or Kyushu to Osaka.
Market fluctuations in Osaka were carefully watched, and goods were
shipped accordingly.
There was a division within the fief between a conservative party
which was in power and a progressive party consisting largely of sa
murai of medium rank; but the conservative party was not in principle
against the policy which Seifu had devised and followed. All parties
were united in pressing on a development of enterprises which would
increase the strength of the clan. This movement received a strong
impetus from the anti-Bakufu sentiment which traditionally pervaded
the Tozama fiefs and was particularly strong in Choshu. In fact Choshu
may be said to have led in this antagonism, though it should not be sup
posed that at this time Choshu or any fief planned the overthrow of the
Tokugawa government. What they all aimed at was the greatest pos
sible degree of independence in regard not only to the Bakufu but also
to other daimyos, and for that purpose it was necessary to develop both
the human and the material resources of each domain to the greatest
possible extent
The so-called Tempo Reform of Choshu was in fact not a political
or social movement but a phase of economic planning designed to in
crease production. In this respect the “reform” was successful, and the
wealth of the clan continued to grow. There were internal dissensions,
but on the whole the traditional discipline of the samurai was main
tained.
By mid-century the fief was in a strong position as to both military
preparation and the spirit of its fighting men. It might be supposed
that with a debt of 85,000 kan of silver its financial position was precari
ous, but Choshu had hidden resources of long standing. It held im
portant reserves and a sinking fund which could be used to balance
accounts when needed. This was the fruit of careful administration and
foresight; and it enabled its leaders to purchase modem military equip
ment on a large scale and so to play a decisive part in the stormy na
tional politics to follow.
Changes similar to those of Choshu took place in the other western
clans, notably in Satsuma, a powerful fief assessed at 770,000 koku. It
was rich, since it produced valuable commodities and also had a monop
oly of a profitable trade with the Luchu Islands. Yet by 1820 or there
abouts it was heavily in debt, partly because of contribution to public
works on behalf of the Bakufu, but mainly because of the free spending
of the daimyo, Shimazu Shigehide. Satsuma s example illustrates clearly
the operation of the rule of alternate attendance at the Shogun’s court,
which was devised to keep the daimyos under surveillance and to en
courage them to spend great sums in keeping up their style during their
residence in Yedo.
Shigehide’s extravagance had obliged the fief to raise loans in Osaka
and Yedo amounting to over 70,000 kan of silver, on which the interest
alone was greater than the total annual cost of administration of the fief.
Senior retainers had urged Shigehide to introduce thoroughgoing econ
omies, but without success, and their leader, Kabayama Hisagoto, was
obliged to commit suicide. Upon Shigehide’s retirement the clan suf
fered from internal quarrels, and the need for reform became urgent.
The debt had reached five million ryo, and there was no prospect of
repayment.* The great moneylenders refused further advances, and
8 The gold ry6 in the Tempo era had a purchasing power of the order of .7 5
koku of rice in Yedo.
Satsuma could no longer meet even its current obligations to the Balcufu
or—still more serious—to the retainers and even to the workmen, who
were kept waiting for their pay. The debts of the Satsuma establishment
in Yedo for several years had remained unpaid, and the clan could barely
find cash for travel expenses between Kagoshima and the capital.
In this difficult situation Shigehide called upon a Chamberlain named
Zusho Hirosato to carry out a complete reform of the finances of his
fief. Zusho s method of disposing of the problem was of an engaging
simplicity. He proposed to the creditors in Osaka a repayment of the
debt of five million ryo by annual instalments of twenty thousand ryo
over a period of two hundred and fifty years—in fact a cancellation of
the debt. This the creditors naturally scorned. Zusho thereupon, in a
convenient display of the warrior’s contempt for the merchant, took the
acknowledgements of debt presented to him and tore them to pieces,
which he burned. Thus Satsuma in effect declared itself bankrupt, and
was at last able to proceed with a reorganization of its finances without
regard to past liabilities. The creditors were helpless.
Satsuma continued to make great profits from trade with the Luchu
Islands, which strictly speaking was smuggling, since the Luchus sup
plied articles obtained by trade with China and other Asian markets.
The fief’s most lucrative business was the sale of sugar from the Luchus
and other islands south of Kyushu.®
It will be seen that the reforms in these great fiefs were not of a
liberal nature. They could in no sense be called anti-feudal. On the
contrary they were designed to strengthen the feudal character of each
domain in its conduct of economic and social affairs. It is true, how
ever, that most of the measures introduced for that purpose were asser
tions of autonomy, and to that extent were denials of the authority of
the Bakufu.
It will be noted that the departure from feudality had proceeded
farther in Choshu than in Satsuma, possibly because in Choshu the at
tempt to create monopolies had been defeated by popular sentiment,
and in 1831 by rioting, which had forced reforms upon the government
of the fief.
4. D om estic Problems o f the Bakufu

The man who was coming into power at this time was Mizuno Ta-
dakuni, soon to be chief adviser to the new Shogun, Ieyoshi. It was
8 The Satsuma men drove hard bargains. They bought sugar at the rate of three
“go” of rice for one kin of sugar, and sold the sugar in Osaka at four times that price.
evident to Mizuno that he could not safely proceed against persons of

high rank, though it was clear that dissatisfaction with the Bakufu was
spreading in the fiefs. He therefore decided to arrest only a few men
of less importance, among them Watanabe Kazan and Takano Naga-
hide, both samurai of good standing, accomplished scholars, and true
patriots. These two were cruelly punished and persecuted, and ended
by taking their own fives (in 1841 and 1850 respectively). Their his
tory shows clearly how strong a feeling was aroused among men of
probity by the obscurantist and erratic policy of the Bakufu.
A study of their fives leaves it in no doubt that quite apart from
foreign intrusions the end of the seclusion policy was already in sight
One of the arguments against seclusion, rarely used except by the
scholar Sakuma Zozan (1811-64) and a few others but perhaps the most
cogent of all, was the need to sustain the national economy, which had
always been subject to crisis because Japan could not import food in
time of famine. If we look at the history of Japan from 1840 backward
for a century or more, we can see it as a sequence of famines between
intervals of plenty—the Kyoho famine (1732-33), the Temmei famine
(1783-87), Tempo famine (1832-36). And in addition to these major
disasters there were numerous failures of the harvest in different parts of
the country, due to regional calamities such as floods, droughts, epidemic
disease, or insect pests.
The Tempo famine grew worse in 1833, and conditions were more
serious than just after the Temmei famine, when most fiefs had arranged
storage of supplies against emergency. Now the reserves were barely
sufficient to keep people alive for a short time. Peasants and townsmen
were aware of this position, and without delay they began risings and
“smashings” which were both violent and extensive. They spread from
Osaka to distant provinces, north, east, and west, attacking especially
merchants dealing in rice or cotton, some of whom were buying for
storage and not for resale. In a revolt starting in Kai province in 1836
the crowd of peasants marching along the highways was said to have
extended for over twenty miles.
It will be remembered that during the eighteenth century there had
been several so-called “reforms” that were in fact efforts to restore nor
mal conditions after periods of disaster. These continued into the nine
teenth century, the latest being the Tempo Reform attempted by Mi
zuno Tadakuni, who became the senior member of the Council of Elders
in 1841.
During the lifetime of the deplorable Shogun Ienari it was not pos
sible for Mizuno to take any independent political action, but he had
prepared himself for high office by much study, regarding Matsudaira
Sadanobu as a model statesman whose example he ought to follow. At
first his progress was slow, and he had to resort to bribery. His oppor
tunity, however, came after the death of Ienari in 1841, when Ienari s
son Ieyoshi, already titular Shogun, assumed the government. Ieyoshi,
whose term of office lasted until 1853, was no more than nominal ruler,
and the problems of administration were now largely in the hands of
Mizuno. The position which he had to face was one of great difficulty.
Whether through famine or misgovernment, the cities were seething
with unrest during the first decades of the century, and the citizens en
gaged frequently in riots which were the counterpart of the peasant
uprisings. Indeed it is not easy to distinguish peasant uprisings from
the revolts of townsmen, many of whom were refugees from deserted
villages. The day-labourers, the small shopkeepers, and the unemployed
vagrants joined in wrecking the houses of the moneylenders and rich
merchants in a dozen or more of the largest towns. In 1837 riots stimu
lated and organized by one Oshio Heihachiro broke out with violence
in Osaka. Their story is worth telling in some detail because it reveals
a current of feeling against the Bakufu and its officers which overflowed
throughout the country.
Oshio was a scholar who had held a post as police-court magistrate,
but sold his books to help the poor and planned with a score of his
friends to lead a great demonstration against the city authorities, whose
indifference angered him. They were to start fires in the town and raid
the houses of the rich. This they did with some success, for they de
stroyed a number of buildings. But the city authorities had got wind
of their intentions, and troops from the garrison of Osaka castle were
called out. Bitter fighting ensued, in which the rioters were overcome,
but not before thousands of houses and stores had been fired during a
struggle which lasted two days. Oshio escaped to the countryside, but
returned after a few days. His hiding place was discovered by the
police, whom he cheated of their capture by setting fire to the house
and committing suicide.
The failure of the wardens of one of the greatest Tokugawa castles
to prevent such an outbreak made them appear ridiculous to the citi
zens, who circulated malicious jibes about them. Attention was called
with particular glee to the two City Commissioners who led the attack
on Oshio’s partisans. They were on horseback, but fell off when their
mounts shied at the sound of gunfire. News of the rising and of such
incidents as these spread over the whole country and encouraged simi
lar revolts in other towns. For want of planning on a national scale, they
soon came to an end, but not before proof of the incapacity of the Ba-
kufu had been made clear to many patriots eager for reform, while the
townspeople for their part took note of these absurdities of the ruling
class.
A manifesto by Oshio referred to the high price of rice, but also
dwelt upon the oppressive treatment of the populace by the officials
whose habit it was to use force rather than persuasion. It also pointed
out that rice was shipped to Yedo, while people in Osaka were starv
ing, but none was sent to Kyoto, where the Emperor resided. It is worth
noting here that like Oshio most of the reformers were followers of the
Oyomei school of philosophy, which stood for independence of mind
and was frowned upon by the official Confucianists.
Oshio’s example was followed by reformers in other parts of Japan,
notably in the neighbourhood of Niigata by Ikuta Yorozu, a disciple of
the great scholar Hirata Atsutane, who was cordially disposed to West
ern learning.101 Yorozu’s rising took place in 1837, a time when famine
was widespread.
The measures of reform introduced by Mizuno Tadakuni were pre
ceded by certain changes made in the administration of some of the
most important fiefs. This movement was not specifically directed
against the Bakufu, but arose from the pressure of samurai of modest
rank who were dissatisfied with the policy of their elders, the senior
retainers (kashin). The best and one of the first examples of men of
this type—they were called “shishi,” or public-spirited men—is Fujita
Toko (1806-55), a samurai in the service of Tokugawa Nariaki, the
daimyo of Mito who held advanced views and carried out administrative
changes on the advice of Fujita and others from about 1832. It is said
that some of the reforms introduced by the Bakufu under Mizuno were
suggested to him by Nariaki. At about the same time similar reforms
were introduced, as we have seen, in their domains by the leading To-
zama daimyos, Satsuma, Choshu, Hizen, and Tosa, whe were (in com
mon with the Bakufu) alarmed by current trends in both domestic and
foreign affairs.11
The reforms in question were political, primarily economic rather
than social. They reaffirmed traditional principles, and they did not
relax normal restrictions upon the life of the fief. They aimed at re
trenchment. Taxation and other burdens were increased rather than
10 For a description of Hirata's beliefs, see Donald Keene’s T h e Ja p a n ese Dis

covery o f E u rop e ( London, 1 9 52).
11 A most valuable account of the part played by Tosa is in Professor Marius
Jansen’s Sakam oto R yom a and th e M eiji R estoration ( Princeton, N.J., 1 9 61).
THE FURTHER DECLINE OF THE BAKUFC 225
lightened, but the conduct of affairs was to fall into the hands of men of
the type of Fujita, who held that external dangers could be met only
by internal stability and firm decisions. This was in effect an attack
upon the Bakufu as well as a call for enlightened government in the
fiefs, in other words for government by men like Fujita himself.
Mizuno was not unsympathetic to the views of Fujita and his party,
but he could not tolerate the support openly given to them by Nariaki,
which amounted to an attack upon the Tokugawa government by the
head of one of the great Tokugawa houses. Nariaki was accordingly
ordered into domiciliary confinement by the Bakufu in 1844.
While these problems were occupying the attention of such reform
ers, Mizuno was faced with urgent and specific, rather than theoretical,
issues. At first his progress had been slow, but his opportunity came in
1841, when Ienari died at the age of sixty-nine. He was impressed by
news of the Opium War, in which English warships had easy victories.
In a letter to a friend he said that Japan must take note of this, and
consider the possibility of an attack by foreign warships. To meet such
dangers it was essential to put the government of Japan upon a firm
basis. This was the kind of reform which he envisaged and which is
known as the Tempo Reform.
He proceeded to subject to a strict discipline certain officers in the
Shoguns entourage and a number of women in the inner apartments,
dismissing nearly a thousand persons in all. His reform was undertaken
in the name of the Shogun Ieyoshi. It was much more drastic than its
predecessors and especially severe in its treatment of the cities. Like
most such reforms it began with an attempt to impose a rule of fru
gality and economy. The sumptuary orders issued for that purpose
were as usual disobeyed. Most of them were absurd. Female hair
dressers, for example, were forbidden under a penalty of one hundred
days in gaol for the coiffeuse and house arrest in manacles for the cli
ent. No doubt Mizuno issued some orders in general terms, and these
were carried out by men like the City Commissioner Torii Yozo accord
ing to their own fancy. Torii, a sinister character who hated foreigners
and foreign learning, employed spies and informers and was reviled by
the citizens, who not without justice described him as a viper and a
demon. Many delicacies were forbidden and even the Shogun was de
prived of some of his favourite dishes.
It would seem that the experience of governing a small fief was not
a good preparation for ruling a great nation. Mizuno had administered
Karatsu and Hamamatsu, but he had no understanding of the complex
relation between urban and rural societies. One of his first blunders
was an attempt to drive back to their villages peasants who had drifted
into the towns to escape from regions suffering from famine, particu
larly in the northern provinces. His efforts to control trade, far from
reducing and stabilizing prices, had the opposite result. He dissolved
the merchant guilds (kabunakama), hoping to break monopolies, but he
could not overcome the resistance of the great wholesale dealers and
was obliged to abandon his policy. His methods were too drastic, and
so disturbed the markets that prices rose and merchandise was not
forthcoming. These and similar decisions made by him aroused the
anger of crowds, who attacked his official residence. He was obliged
to resign in disgrace in 1844.
Tadakuni can scarcely be blamed for his failure to carry out the re
forms which he planned. Powerful interests, both political and finan
cial, were against him, and it is therefore pertinent to an enquiry into
the contemporary scene to examine some of the abuses which he en
deavoured to abolish. For this purpose the most revealing documents
are accounts of the Bakufu’s examination of the affairs of certain rich
merchants and their political connexions. Tadakuni’s own conduct was
investigated at the same time.
Among the most striking of these cases is that of Goto Sanuemon,
whose career affords ample justification for Tadakuni’s economy cam
paign. Goto was arrested and taken before the Hybjosho, the supreme
judicial organ of the Bakufu. A search of his house revealed that he
possessed immense quantities of gold and silver coins, and that his
household ( apart from his wife and children) included six concubines,
twenty maidservants, and thirty-two manservants. He was the son of
a peasant and had come to Yedo as a youth taking humble jobs and at
length finding employment in 1820 in the Mint. Thereafter he became
immensely rich, by methods easily conjectured, while his brother also,
being employed as a broker, made a great fortune.
Men of this kind belonged to the party of Torii Yozo, and had no
connexion with Tadakuni; but soon after their cases had been decided,
the official investigation was directed to the affairs of Tadakuni and his
satellites. The verdict of the court of enquiry was to the effect that his
misdeeds while in office must be punished. His revenues together with
buddings and other effects were-cQnfiscated save for a small sum to sup
port him while in domiciliary confinement; but the nature of his offence
was not specified, doubtless because his trial was not a judicial but a
political move.
In the following year (1845) Torii was similarly impeached. He
was accused of numerous offences, including the disclosure of official
secrets. He was clearly guilty of corruption and disloyalty. He was a
congenital xenophobe, and it was he who caused the persecution of
men like Watanabe Kazan and Takano Nagahide. The court which
tried Torii declared that his conduct deserved the severest punishment,
but was lenient enough to sentence him only to exile.
CHAPTER XVIII
BREACHES IN THE S E C L U S I O N
POLICY
1. T he Arrival o f Foreign Vessels
W e h a v e s e e n that in 1825 the Bakufu, stimulated by reports of

landings on Japanese soil by foreign seamen in search of water and
fuel, issued to all daimyos whose domains bordered on the sea an order
to drive away by gunfire any foreign ship approaching the coast, and
to arrest and kill any members of its crew who should come ashore.
This order did not prevent occasional visits to Japanese ports by vessels
bringing castaways for repatriation or attempting to trade, for in 1837
a small, unarmed vessel, the Morrison, chartered by American mission
aries, was fired upon at Uraga and again at Kagoshima, where she tried
to land some Japanese castaways. Nobody was hurt, but the Bakufu
policy was criticized in Japan as likely to cause reprisals by powerful
foreign ships; and it was subsequently relaxed, to such a point that in
1842 local authorities were instructed to supply foreign ships with food
and fuel and to “advise” them to go away.
Foreign warships were naturally not welcome, but they were not
tinned away. In 1845 H.M.S. Samarang (a surveying vessel) entered
Nagasaki harbour and was, according to its officers, treated with cour
tesy “by the gentlemen of Japan.” There was much fear of English war
ships after the news of the Opium War reached Japan. The defeat of
Chinese troops, the subsequent Treaty of Nanking (1842), and the com
pulsory opening of Canton and other ports to foreign trade were so
alarming that the Bakufu hastily endeavoured to improve coastal de
fences and to increase the efficiency of the seaboard garrisons. Two
companies of infantry and artillery were equipped and trained in West
ern fashion.
In 1844 the King of Holland sent to Japan a careful description of
the recent trend of international politics and advised the Japanese gov
ernment to abandon its policy of seclusion. But the Bakufu was stub
born. A French warship arriving in 1848 was not so well received as
H.M.S. Samarang, because it had called at the Luchu Islands, where its
captain had proposed a treaty to the King and had landed a mission
ary. Both these acts were highly displeasing to the Bakufu, but since
the Luchus were under the control of the daimyo of Satsuma, it was
BREACHES IN THE SECLUSION POLICY 229
left to him to deal with the situation at his discretion. He might have
made a pact with the French, for he was anxious to trade, but he con
fined himself to arranging one transaction, the purchase of arms and
machinery to be delivered at the Luchus. This was an offence against
the laws of 1639, being a definite breach in the seclusion policy, and
Satsuma's action testified to the weakness of the Bakufu.
2. T he Nature o f Seclusionism
The attitude of the Japanese government towards the pressure of
foreign countries desiring a right of entry into Japan for their nationals
raises a general question as to the nature of seclusionism in Asia. It has
been suggested that the Neo-Confucian doctrines of Chu Hsi influenced
the minds of high officials in Japan and disposed them to adopt a seclu-
sionist policy like that of the Ming dynasty in China; and it is no doubt
true that those doctrines were powerful in forming the political ideas
of the Shogun’s advisers for the better part of the century after the foun
dation of the Tokugawa government. But the example of the Ming pol
icy can only loosely be described as an important element in the growth
of the Sakoku, or Closed Country policy, adopted by Japan in 1639.
For one thing the Ming policy was not uniformly seclusionist. China
had never been entirely secluded or isolated. Her geographic situation,
with extended land frontiers and a coastline of great length, made com
plete isolation impossible in practice. Nor indeed did China forbid for
eign relations. On the contrary, she had regular if limited contacts with
other countries, either by trade or by tribute, overland with countries
of Central Asia and South-East Asia and ( after the Treaty of Nerchinsk
in 1689) relations with Russia which permitted trade and religious mis
sions to Peking.
It is true that after the great Ming voyages of 1405-33 China with
drew into seclusion and her people were forbidden to leave the country
or to communicate with foreigners. At first sight this appears to have
been a firm policy of closing the country like that of Japan in 1640.
But in practice these prohibitions were not obeyed. Indeed it would
have been impossible to close the land frontiers, nor would it have been
of any advantage to China. As for the maritime provinces, the edicts
prohibiting ships and men from leaving China were usually disregarded,
with the connivance of local officials. They led only to smuggling and
piracy. By contrast the Japanese seclusion laws were ruthlessly en
forced, and, as we have seen, they prevented both emigration and
immigration.
230 BREACHES IN THE SECLUSION POLICY
Obviously the reason why the seclusion laws of Japan were com
pletely enforced was that it was an island country with a firm central
government determined to preserve its own institutions and to resist
the pressure of Christian propaganda, which the Tokugawa rulers asso
ciated with plans of aggression by Portugal and Spain.
It seems at first sight that seclusion is most common in countries
which are difficult of access, either islands distant from a mainland or
territories which, like Nepal and Tibet, are in remote mountainous re
gions; but all states, great or small, are jealous of their separateness and
tend to limit the entry of foreigners. This is true of many parts of South-
East Asia and notably of Korea, which was seclusionist for fear of China,
and certainly not out of a wish to exclude the Chinese cultural influ
ence that was dominant among the literati. Korea’s experience of Mon
gol rule in the thirteenth century, and of Chinese and Japanese inva
sions in the sixteenth, was sufficient to account for her desire for political
isolation, and it was no doubt as a measure of protection that during the
Tokugawa era she sent regular embassies, which were received with
great ceremony by the Shogun’s government.
3. Anti-Seclusion Opinion
Although the pressure of Western countries was one cause of the
gradual relaxation of the edicts, no less important at this time was a
pressure from within, exerted principally by scholars, because it was
they who most desired to associate freely with men of learning from
abroad and to acquire knowledge of Western ideas in general and
Western science in particular. We have seen that the pursuit of Dutch
studies had already in the eighteenth century created a body of scholars
anxious for the opening of the country, chiefly because of their interest
in science, principally medicine but also astronomy and other branches
of learning. Every learned man who visited Japan under the employ
ment of the Dutch Factory at Deshima was plied with interminable
questions by Japanese thirsting for knowledge, from Kaempfer in 1691
to Siebold in 1823-29.
In the first decades of the nineteenth century these studies were
pursued so widely and with such enthusiasm that the Confucian scholars
took alarm and intrigued against advocates of the new learning, charg
ing them with subversive designs. The authorities not unnaturally were
inclined to suspect the advocates of change, some of whom openly
charged the government with ignorance and incompetence, and paid
the penalty of execution for their courage.
Among those who played a leading part in the introduction of scien
tific knowledge was a remarkable man named Sakuma Zozan (1811-
64), a samurai from a northern fief who devoted himself mainly to mili
tary science, including gunnery. As late as 1841 he began to enquire
closely into the question of national safety, and he presented a memo
rial on coastal defence which shows that he and men of his stamp were
alarmed by the weakness of their country. He was at first inclined to
take an isolationist line, but he gradually came round to admiring West
ern people for their enquiries into the real nature of the universe, and
he ended by believing in an international society. By then he was in
prison for an offence against the exclusion law, and there he was to
remain until 1862. Not long after his release he was murdered by anti-
foreign fanatics.
Other men of standing who were against the exclusion laws were
punished for making their opinions public, in particular a group of
scholars who formed a club and issued what the Bakufu regarded as a
seditious pamphlet, which was widely circulated. In 1838 the “Demon”
Torii recommended the arrest of its members, against whom he brought
false charges. The Shogun’s chief adviser, Mizuno Tadakuni, hesitated
to take direct action, knowing that they were in touch with important
persons in the powerful clans of Mito and Satsuma and even in the
Bakufu itself. But in the end a harsh policy prevailed.
Among the victims of this persecution was an important figure
already mentioned—Watanabe Noboru (known also by his pen name
as Kazan), a versatile poet and painter and a leader of opinion in fa
vour of learning from foreign countries. He was imprisoned on false
charges and condemned to death, but the sentence was commuted in
1840 to domiciliary confinement for life. He committed suicide in 1841.
The growing political and economic independence of the great fiefs
naturally diminished pro tanto the authority of the Bakufu and made
it difficult for Yedo to dictate a national policy in foreign relations as
well as in domestic affairs. At the same time, although the fiefs could
not follow closely the cultural trend of the great cities, they did come
under its influence. The study of Western ideas and institutions began
to penetrate learning in the fiefs and played an important part in form
ing public opinion. Thus, for example, as the Bakufu defence policy
was based largely upon foreign models, most of the daimyos followed
its lead. The daimyos of Satsuma, Hirado, and other clans were said
to be afflicted by “Rampeki,” or the Dutch Craze, and the government
of their domains took on certain foreign characteristics.
This development was not new, for, as we have already seen, such
Mission from th e L u ch u Islands to Satsuma
scholars as Maeno Ryotaku and Sugita Gempaku had held important

posts in their respective clans more than half a century before, and
most of the leading fiefs, more than fifty in all, had schools for the study
of Western medicine and military science, especially gunnery. These
studies became of urgent importance as the danger of foreign aggres
sion seemed to increase.
4. T he End o f Seclusion
The first half of the nineteenth century was a period of great mari
time expansion by the leading European powers and by the United
States of America. Notable among these activities was the develop
ment of whaling in the North Pacific Ocean by vessels based on San
Francisco. It was principally these vessels which were driven ashore
or put in at Japanese harbours for shelter or supplies; and reports of
ill-treatment of members of their crews began to reach America in the
1840s.
It was owing to a developing American interest in the Pacific trade
as well as to a desire to protect shipwrecked seamen that in 1845 Com-
modore James Biddle, acting under instructions from Washington, took

two warships into Yedo Bay and proposed the opening of trade rela
tions. To this demarche the Bakufu returned a flat refusal, and Biddle
withdrew; but it was now clear that preparation must be made to meet
further efforts by foreign governments to break into the seclusion of
Japan. The crucial issue was not however reached until the year 1853,
when (on July 8) Commodore Matthew Perry appeared with four war
ships in the harbour of Uraga. The Bakufu was prepared for his arrival,
having received word from the Luchus, where he had first called on
May 26, and where he had stayed for several weeks in practical occu
pation of the islands.
His mission was plain. He carried a letter from the President of the
United States and his own written statement that his government had
friendly intentions but was determined to secure good treatment for
distressed American seamen and facilities for navigation and trade. He
made no threat, but one was implied when he said that he expected a
favourable reply next year, when he would return with a larger force.
His strategic position was strong, for Yedo, the Shogun’s capital, was
vulnerable, not only by bombardment but also by blockade, since the
bulk of its food supply came from Osaka by sea and could easily have
been cut off by enemy action.1
The Bakufu was well aware of these dangers, and when Perry re
turned to Japan in February 1854 with a more powerful squadron, he
had little difficulty in negotiating a treaty despite the evasions and de
lays of the Japanese delegates. Though somewhat vain and overbear
ing, he was an able and impressive negotiator, showing great determi
nation. Signed on March 31 at Kanagawa, this treaty opened two ports
(Shimoda in Izu and Hakodate in Yezo) to limited trade, and provided
for American consular representation in Japan. It was followed by simi
lar agreements with Great Britain (October 1854), Russia (February
1855), and Holland (November 1855).
While the negotiations with Perry were in progress at Uraga and
elsewhere, the American officers on shore leave found the countryfolk
whom they encountered friendly, good-tempered, and much interested
in their strange visitors. There were very few unpleasant incidents and
no conspicuous anti-foreign sentiment, except what was expressed by
the surly looks of some samurai on guard duty. The Japanese negoti
ators, in intervals between sessions, showed great good temper and a
convivial spirit, stimulated at times by the strong liquors which were
among the gifts brought by the American mission. But what interested
them most were mechanical devices and lethal weapons, in particular
revolvers; and it is not surprising that after this visit the coastal de
fences at Shinagawa and other strategic points were rapidly strength
ened.
Political reactions to the Bakufu’s policy were, as might be expected,
various throughout the country; but in general, both in Yedo and in the
leading fiefs, it was felt to be essential to promote the study of foreign
countries. The Bakufu led the way when in 1855 a “school for foreign
studies,” the Yogakusho, was opened (at the foot of the Kudan H ill),
and in 1856 an office for the study of foreign documents was opened,
also in Yedo. It was styled Bansho Shirabedokoro. Teachers and can
didates for teaching posts were drawn not from Bakufu domains but
from those fiefs in which foreign studies had already been organized.
This was a period when village schools (terakoya) were opened or
enlarged in great numbers; and other evidence shows that in most fiefs
there was a remarkable growth of elementary education, approved by
the daimyo’s officers but usually initiated by the villagers themselves.
1 In fact during the ten days of Perry’s stay, the transport of rice from Osaka to
Kyoto was interrupted, by fear rather than by danger.
It was at this juncture, too, that the Bakufu, faced with an unprece
dented situation, felt obliged not only to consult the Go-Sanke and the
Tozama daimyos but also to ask the opinions of the Fudai daimyos and
the hatamoto. This new departure revealed the weakness of the Ba
kufu in its relations with both great and small vassals. Even more re
markable was the action of the Bakufu in reporting current events to
the Imperial Court and asking for advice and direction. This was a
significant step, for it betokened a change in the attitude of the military
society towards the Throne, a change which had been foreshadowed a
century before when the doctrine of loyalty to the Emperor had been
proclaimed in Kyoto by Yamagata Daini and others.
Now in many fiefs the same doctrine was professed by the leading
spirits, who stood for what was called Shinno or Sonno, reverence to
the Sovereign. Their motive was in part a desire to break the authority
of the Bakufu, and also at times no doubt to justify their own insubor
dination within the clan. The cry of Sonno was to play an important
part in the last years of the Bakufu, and it is therefore pertinent here
to retrace on broad lines the history of relations between the Shogun
and the Emperor.
It may be asked why the Shoguns did not abolish the Throne, which
depended upon them for its very existence. History gives the answer.
After having been forced to abdicate by Yoritomo in 1198, ex-Emperor
Go-Toba challenged the Hojo Regents in 1221. He was defeated and
banished, but a successor approved by the Regents was appointed.
Upon the defeat of the Kamakura government the idea of abolition
was proclaimed by some of Takauji’s generals, but Takauji himself
thought it wise to preserve the Imperial office, although he did not
hesitate to imprison and exile the Emperor Go-Daigo. Throughout
the war between the northern and southern Courts the monarchy was
fully recognized, and successive Ashikaga Shoguns, though at times
treating the Court with scant respect, admitted that they derived their
office from the Throne.
Nobunaga’s attitude towards the Emperor was one of great rever
ence, and more than once he found it prudent to claim that he was act
ing on behalf of His Majesty in his campaign or in his civil policy, as
when he stopped military operations against Koya-san at the Emperor’s
request in 1581. Hideyoshi paid great respect to the Emperor, enter
tained him in the Jurakudai and regarded himself not as a Shogun but
as a Regent carrying out the wishes of the Sovereign. The oath of loy
alty to the Toyotomi family signed by the daimyos in 1588 was sworn
in the Emperor’s presence. Ieyasu, while depriving the Throne of all
political power, made generous gifts to the Court and recognized its
importance as a fountain of honour. Iemitsu’s attitude towards the
Throne was less respectful than that of Ieyasu, but although he meant
to intimidate the Emperor by marching to Kyoto with a great army in
1634, he treated the Court liberally and showed no signs of wishing to
abolish the Imperial rule. Ienobu, who followed Tsunayoshi, took steps
to improve relations between the Court and the Bakufu, and made
handsome grants to the Emperor’s household.
The truth is that the tradition of reverence for the Sovereign was
still powerful in all ranks of society throughout the country, and no
Shogun dared to arouse the opposition which an overt act of disloyalty
would have aroused. It would not only have deprived him of support
but might also have provided a powerful rival with an excellent reason
for revolt.
5. Anti-Foreign Sentiment
The cry of “Sonno” called for an attitude rather than a policy,
although it was part of a movement hostile to the Bakufu. It gained
in importance when it was coupled with a call for positive action to
resist the pressure of foreign powers insisting upon a right of entry to
Japanese ports for their merchant ships. Now the cry was “Sonno Joi,”
which means “Revere the Sovereign, Expel the Barbarians.”
There is little to show that there had been in the past, or was at
that time, any widespread and genuine xenophobia in Japan. Indeed
the record of friendly feeling for foreigners is most creditable, from the
days of St. Francis Xavier (ca. 1550), who said “These people are the
delight of my heart” to those of the captain of H.M.S. Samarang, who
in 1845 praised “the refined and polished urbanity of the gentlemen of
Japan.”
The animosity of which the cry of Joi seemed to be an expression
was a feeling deliberately stimulated by the enemies of the Bakufu,
and it increased in force after the year 1854, when Perry’s warships
dropped anchor in Yedo Bay on his second visit. In all the great To-
zama fiefs any reason for opposing the ruling Tokugawa family was
gladly seized upon, and this was true also of the Mito fief, which was
governed by a member of the collateral branch traditionally hostile to
the Shoguns. Its leader at this time was Tokugawa Nariaki, who did
his best to embarrass the Bakufu and also to stir up feeling against it
at the Imperial Court. Fortunately, the President of the Council of the
Roju, a very able man named Abe Masahiro, persuaded the daimyos to
agree to the terms accepted by Perry in 1854.
Before long the anti-foreign party had more ground for complaint
than was afforded by the mere signature of a treaty, for in accordance
with the terms of the treaty of 1854 (known as the Kanagawa Treaty
from the name of the place where it was signed) the United States of
America sent a consular representative to Japan, Mr. Townsend Harris,
who arrived in an American warship in 1856. He was not at all wel
come, and the Japanese authorities begged him to go away, but he in
sisted on carrying out his mission. His instructions were to extend the
scope of the existing agreement (which was a simple treaty of friend
ship), and he carried with him a letter from the President, which he
intended to hand to the Shogun in person.
For some months he lived in discomfort at Shimoda, where he met
with the most baffling obstruction and made little progress, since, un
like Perry, he could make no threat of force. Fortunately for him, the
most influential member of the Council of State was a man who favoured
a policy of opening the country, Ii Kamon no Kami. Ii was opposed by
a powerful group led by the daimyo of Mito, Tokugawa Nariaki, a
somewhat two-faced nobleman whose ambition was to discredit and
overthrow the Bakufu. However Ii s position had lately improved, and
by 1858 he was able to carry out his own plans and to agree to what
Mr. Harris had requested in the name of the American government.
Mr. Harris had proposed, when at last he had access to the Sho
gun’s officers, a Convention opening Nagasaki to American ships, grant
ing rights of residence in the two ports of Shimoda and Hakodate, and
in other respects giving effect to the terms of the 1854 treaty. This im
portant approach was followed by an unprecedented step on Decem
ber 7, 1857, when Harris was received in Yedo Castle by the Shogun
in person. This was a concession which the Bakufu would not have
dared to grant, even under Perry’s most determined pressure; but con
ditions had changed in the last few years. Not only had the Bakufu
become able, if only momentarily, to reassert its authority, but also it
had received some serious warnings from the interpreters in Nagasaki,
who reported that a British squadron had attacked and burned Can
ton because the Chinese government had failed to carry out its treaty
obligations. The Dutch Commissioner in Japan (Donker Curtius) re
peated this warning and advised the Bakufu to put an end to the evasive
tactics of its officials.
There was no doubt about the incompetence of the Bakufu in its
conduct of foreign relations at this juncture, though it must be remem
bered that it was confronted by a most complicated and harassing sit
uation. A very able and far-sighted Tokugawa adherent, Katsu Awa,
wrote of this situation from his personal knowledge: “From the day
of Perry’s arrival for more than ten years our country was in a state of
indescribable confusion. The government was weak and irresolute,
without power of decision.” Fortunately, thanks to the influence of Ii
Kamon no Kami (who by that time had become Tairo), a treaty with
the United States was signed on July 29, 1858, aboard an American
warship at anchor in Yedo Bay, and it was followed shortly by similar
agreements with Great Britain, Holland, Russia, and France. They all
provided for extra-territorial jurisdiction and a fixed customs tariff, con
ditions which greatly limited the autonomy of Japan and in the long
run were to breed great animosity against the Western powers.
As was to be expected, the action of the Bakufu in giving way to
foreign pressure was violently criticized by the anti-foreign elements,
whose policy was summarized in the phrase “Joi,” or “Expel the Bar
barians.” Their motive was not entirely patriotic, for many of them
were aiming at destroying the Tolcugawa hegemony rather than at pro
tecting the country.
It was not only Mito and other great vassals who opposed the new
treaties, for the Shogun’s officers in Kyoto found that the Court could
not be persuaded to agree to them. There was a strong anti-foreign
feeling in the capital, coupled of course with its normal hostility to the
Bakufu, which Mito sedulously inflamed. He was a most intemperate
man, who when the Bakufu asked the opinions of the great vassals on
the proposals of Harris said that those who had negotiated with him
should be ordered to commit suicide, and Harris himself should be de
capitated.
This represented the extreme “Joi” attitude, for on that occasion
most of the daimyos consulted were, if not in favour of foreign inter
course, at least not firmly opposed. The attitude of the Throne was
ambiguous, but it raised no open objection to the 1858 treaties. They
were sanctioned and came into force in July 1859, when foreign diplo
matic envoys took up residence in Yedo. At the same time the new
port of Yokohama was opened to foreign trade and residence. Yet it
is clear that, despite the successes of the Bakufu in reaching a peaceful
agreement with the foreign powers, most members of the ruling class
throughout the country were opposed to its foreign policy. Ii Kamon
no Kami was therefore obliged to take steps to restore the government s
prestige and save its authority. He decided to promote a movement for
what was called “kobu gattai,” or the amalgamation of civil and mili
tary power, which, it was hoped, would arrest a growing antagonism
to the Bakufu not only among the great feudatories and the more active
young Court nobles, but also in the lower ranks of samurai and among
influential merchants and landholders.
At this stage there was no concerted movement among those who
wished for the downfall of the Bakufu, or at least for a severe reduction
of its powers, and indeed Shimazu, the leading Tozama daimyo, had
in 1856 arranged a marriage between his adopted daughter and the
Shogun. The parties to this agreement had different views on national
policy, but they felt that all the military houses should present a united
front to the Court. The Court, on the other hand, did what it could
to encourage dissension among the feudal leaders, and in this it was
successful. The Kobu-gattai movement failed, for the Bakufu had al
ready lost its primacy when it referred the question of Perry’s treaty to
the Emperor and asked the vassals for advice.
When the treaties came into force and the foreigners took up resi
dence in the open ports, the cry of Sonno Joi resounded throughout the
country, and a number of murderous assaults upon foreign merchants
or their servants were committed in or near Yokohama, usually by ronin.
In 1860 (when a Japanese mission had gone to Washington to ratify the
American treaty) there were frequent conspiracies against the Bakufu,
particularly in Kyoto. The Regent, Ii Kamon no Kami, took vigorous
steps against his enemies. Among them Mito ( Nariaki) was punished
by disgrace; and in revenge Ii was murdered by Mito and Satsuma
clansmen on a snowy morning in March 1860 as he, with his escort,
was about to pass through the Sakurada gate leading to the Yedo castle.
After Ii’s death the attack upon the Bakufu was continued by Sat
suma with the approval of the Court, and attacks upon foreigners grew
more frequent and serious. The secretary of the American Legation was
attacked in Yedo, and in 1861 the British Legation was attacked by Mito
samurai.
The weakness and indeed the bad faith of the Bakufu were revealed
when it was discovered after Ii’s death that, doubtless in a quandary,
it had agreed with the Court to fix a date for the expulsion of foreigners.
At that time—in June 1862—a diplomatic mission was in London asking
the government there to agree to deferring the opening of further ports,
owing to anti-foreign activities in Japan. In that same summer the Sho
gun, at the command of the Court, agreed to journey to Kyoto to consult
with the nobles as to the future government of Japan and the appro
priate time and method for expelling barbarians.
This journey, which took place in March 1863, was a further act of
submission and entirely without precedent in the relations between the
Shogun and the Throne. Hitherto no Shogun had visited Kyoto since
Iemitsu’s demonstration of force with 300,000 troops. The Bakufu had
always given orders to the Court through its deputies there. Now,
shortly after the Shogun’s arrival, the Court instructed the Bakufu that
all foreigners were to be expelled and all ports closed; but the Bakufu
pleaded that such action was premature and indeed dangerous. The
Court reluctantly withdrew its order, and the proponents of Joi were
of course enraged. Murderous assaults were common. The members
of foreign diplomatic missions and foreign residents in general were
in danger, and an Englishman riding along the highway was killed by
a Satsuma retainer near Yokohama. The British government, unable to
obtain satisfaction from the Bakufu since Satsuma remained obdurate,
ordered the bombardment of Kagoshima by British warships, and this
was carried out in August 1863.
It is convenient at this point, before concluding the tale of the dying

struggles of the Bakufu, to examine the reasons for its rapid decline.
First among these was the growing hostility of the Court, of the
great Western clans, and of needy samurai; but perhaps more impor
tant was a widespread discontent in the civil population, particularly
the middle-class merchants and farmers. The rich merchants of Yedo
and Osaka, such as Mitsui and Konoike, always kept a watchful eye
upon political trends, and they were not slow to notice signs of weak
ness in the Bakufu and to improve their relations with Satsuma, Cho-
shu, and other flourishing daimyos. But these changes of policy, though
important, were slow to operate. Much quicker was the growth of dis
content among farmers.
In the last decade of the Bakufu there were constant uprisings and
“smashings,” which were violent protests of peasants against landhold
ers. These were not organized attacks upon the Bakufu, but they stimu
lated antagonism to feudal rule not only among peasants but also among
samurai of the lower ranks. It cannot, however, be said, as is sometimes
suggested, that such risings had political aims, nor did they have any
direct political effect beyond underlining an already existing anti-feudal
feeling.
One notable uprising of this nature took place in 1853, when the
peasants of ninety villages in the Nambu domain, numbering in all
15,000 men, swarmed through the countryside proclaiming a doctrine
of equality. In 1859 there was a similar rising in Shinshu, where bands
of peasants from numerous villages proclaimed that an appeal to force
was now the law of the land. But such expressions of popular discon
tent were spontaneous outbreaks, without organization or continuity.
The position of the Bakufu now grew weaker day by day, and it lost
its control over the vassals when it relaxed the rule of alternate attend
ance. The great daimyos withdrew to their fiefs. The two most power-
ful Tozama chieftains, Satsuma and Chdshu, were in open revolt. In
June 1863 Choshu shore batteries fired upon an American vessel an
chored off Choshu territory, and the straits of Shimonoseki were closed
for more than a year, until in September 1864 a combined force of
American, British, French, and Dutch warships attacked the Choshu
defences and captured their guns. Choshu gave way, agreeing to pay
an indemnity; and it is much to the credit of the Choshu leaders that
most of the clansmen were soon on friendly terms with the foreigners.
The same is true of the Satsuma leaders after the bombardment of Ka
goshima. The truth is that both these clans were more antagonistic to
the Bakufu than to the foreigners, partly because they were confident
of their own strength in domestic affairs and partly because they saw
the futility of the exclusion policy.
At this time the two clans were at odds, and Shimazu had more con
trol over his refractory ronin than his Choshu rival. A majority of the
Choshu men atempted to “rescue” the Emperor from the Bakufu, by a
rising in Kyoto, where they had a large contingent. This rising was
checked late in 1864 by Bakufu troops with the assistance of Satsuma
and other clans. The Choshu leaders submitted and a settlement was
in sight, when the Bakufu, with its now usual rash judgment, decided
to destroy the Choshu clan entirely. In this attempt it failed disas
trously. Satsuma gave assistance to Choshu by furnishing war material,
and the Bakufu was placed in a most awkward position. The Shogun
led his troops as far as Osaka, but the loyal vassals were slow to re
spond to his summons. His force did not march again until July 1866,
and it was everywhere unsuccessful. This was a fatal blow to the Toku-
gawa regime, for the Shogun had now been defeated by a single To
zama vassal.
In August 1866 the Shogun Iemochi died in Osaka. His successor,
Hitotsubashi Keiki, took office and appealed for unity, while the Ba
kufu struggled to maintain its dwindling authority. But in the autumn
of 1867 he resigned, and a provisional government was formed in which
no member or adherent of the Tokugawa family was included.
There was a brief civil war in which the Shogun’s forces were de
feated without much trouble, and the whole country submitted to the
rule of the Emperor early in 1868. This was the end of the feudal so
ciety which Ieyasu had founded two and a half centuries before.
It was also the end of a millennium, during which the people of

Japan lived a sequestered but not isolated life, thanks to the surround
ing sea and to the distance separating their islands from the Asiatic
mainland. They could at will accept or reject the influence of China

and other parts of Asia, if need be by resort to arms, as they did to
repel an invasion of Mongols in 1281.
In these favourable circumstances they could apply their energies
to developing the natural resources of their country and improving its
government. Both of these tasks presented great difficulties, for during
the Middle Ages civil strife was endemic. Nevertheless, by the begin
ning of the seventeenth century, a substantial degree of political unity
had been achieved, and after 1615 the whole of Japan was at peace
under the government of the powerful warrior family of Tokugawa,
whose successive chieftains kept their feudal vassals under control and
established the rule of law.
The history of the subsequent era shows the country to be firmly,
and on the whole justly, governed, despite occasional disorder. There
is a continuous effort, both national and local, to increase the produc
tion of foodstuffs and other commodities, and population grows apace.
Manufacture vies with farming. Town life develops, transport is im
proved, and a prosperous merchant class tends to displace, or at least
to compete with, the military caste, whose poorer members fall into
distress if they cannot find civil employment. By the beginning of the
nineteenth century the authority of the central government is being
challenged by the great feudatories. Pressure from Western countries,
whose ships are now freely navigating in Eastern waters, gradually
breaks down the old policy of insulation, and by 1853 the feudal gov
ernment is obliged to agree to open ports to foreign ships. Japan has
now to enter the international society. The feudal hierarchy presently
collapses, and in 1867 the rule of the Throne is fully restored.
APPENDIX
APPENDIX
THE V IL L A G E AND THE FAMILY
Students o f sociology m ay find som e points o f interest in th e follow ing

details, w hich are supplem entary to th e accou nt o f village life given in
C h apter V III.
T h e peasant fam ily in th e Y edo period was of several kinds, b u t in its
legal asp ect th e basic unit w as the fam ily o f th e hon-byakusho. His fam ily
was rath er large, particularly in th e la ter period, consisting as it did o f lineal
and collateral relatives tog eth er w ith persons w ho w ere not related to them
b y a blood tie. T h e m ain household, thus com posed o f several fam ilies, m ight
easily consist o f about tw enty m em bers in all, exclusive o f young children.
I t was th ese fam ilies th a t cultivated th e soil, gathered th e harvest, and
paid th e tax. Consequently th e m ain household included a num ber o f persons
who w ere not blood relations b u t in fa c t th e servants o f th e head of th e house
hold. T h e y w ere described generically as genin (u n d erlin g s), and specifically
as nago, kam ado, hikan, or local variants o f those names. B u t th ey w ere not
m ere servants, fo r they w ere regarded as m em bers of th e fam ily. W ith all th e
other m em bers they form ed one large fam ily living under th e orders o f th e
head of the whole household—the p atriarch, h e m ight b e styled.
As th e fam ily o f the hon-byakusho increased in num bers, or as its holding
o f land increased, or as agricultural tech n iqu es developed, it b ecam e neces
sary, or a t least desirable, to reduce th e m ain fam ily (h o n ke) by dividing off
branches, w hich w ere given land and could form new , independent branch
fam ilies (b u n k e ). T h e branch fam ily, how ever, was not always ab le to
support itself independently, and som e o f its m em bers had to take outside
em ploym ent as day labourers. B ranch fam ilies m ight b e one or m ore in num
ber, according to th e scale of th e m ain fam ily, and several branches around
a nucleus form ed b y th e m ain fam ily would constitute a group w hich had the
character of an extended fam ily.
N ot only did a m ain fam ily and its b ranches subsist jointly, b u t there also
had to b e a real and not a nominal relationship betw een them all. I t had to
b e a close relationship because a corporate effort was essential in th e cultiva
tion o f the land th at th ey possessed, w hich depended on th e com m on use
of irrigation w ater, of untilled grassland, and o f m ale and fem ale labour in
th e busy seasons o f planting and harvest.
T h ere w ere im portant reasons why a m ain fam ily alone could not com
p lete th e farm ing processes. W h ile a t th e h ead o f a group consisting of
branch fam ilies under his control, the hon-byakusho also had to b e in d o se
touch w ith other hon-byakusho. Farm ers could not exist independently, and
it was th e various relationships betw een farm ers’ fam ilies th a t brought them
into a perm anent association—th e village.
T h e scope o f th e village increased, and changes took place in th e nature
o f th eir association, until the daimyos to whom they w ere su b ject constructed
a system of villages and fixed their boundaries. W ith in those boundaries th e
246 APPENDIX
hon-byakusho were the legally recognized members of the village. In prac

tice the members of one village frequently formed associations with the mem
bers of other villages, thus extending a community of interest over a wide area.
After the Genroku period, changes took place in the character of the
farmers and their villages. Some of the crops they grew were now articles of
commerce (either in their natural form or as the material of handicrafts)
which could be sold at a profit. Thus the land required a new kind of man
agement. The branch families held only small areas of land, but their earn
ings from this kind of handicraft were considerable, and they tended to cease
joint subsistence with the main household. Moreover, even without the land
which was theirs to cultivate, the able-bodied members could earn a living
as day labourers. Thus there developed a class of landless peasant. In such
circumstances the group of main family and branch families tends to split into
two parts, big farmers and small farmers; while the association of one main
household with another main household becomes loose with the passage of
time.
Within the family composed of persons related or not related to the head
by blood ties, an order of age and sex was established. There was, it is true,
also a rank or order dependent upon blood ties, but it did not take precedence
over other orders. The order within the family always expressed a feeling of
the relationship between parent and child (as, indeed, did the relationship
between main family and branch family). This was customary and tradi
tional rather than legal.
The Composition of the Village

The following is a much-abbreviated version of an official return of the
farmers, their families and property, made in Haraguchi Mura, a village in
Higo, in the year 1633 (in Dai Nihon Kinsei Shiryo I ) . The first entry is that
of the Shoya, or Headman.
Holder: m acoem on Assessed yield: 50.35 koku

Family (18 members in all):
Shoya (Magoemon) Two nago (Zenbei and Heizaemon)
1 wife 2 wives
2 sons 1 father
2 daughters 1 [illegible]
1 wife of son 1 nurse
1 female servant 1 daughter
1 male servant 1 son
Livestock: 2 oxen, 3 horses
15 buildings (measured in ken—1 ken = 6 ft.):
2 x 6 dwelling 2 x 4 food store
2 x 5 kamaya (kitchen) 2 x 5 storehouse
2 x 4 children 2 x 4 dwellings for nago (2)
134 x 4 shrine 134x3 kamaya (2)
2 x 4 stable 134x3 stables (2)
2 x 4 dwelling IS x 3 kariya? (lodging)
APPENDIX 247
Next come entries of similar particulars for the remaining families in the
village, beginning with that of the Shoya’s eldest son. And, finally, the return
is summarized by the signatories as follows:
Total yield...............................................................714.4 koku
Total persons............................. 209 (120 males, 89 females)
Classification of Male Members of the Village

Shoya (headmen).............................................. 2
Kimoiri (agent) ................................................ 1
Parents and grandparents of holders............... 19
Boys under 1 5 ..................................................... 27
Boys over 1 5 ...................................................... 11
Hayakusho (farmers) ........................................ 22
Nago ................................................................... 29
G enin................................................................... 6
Sakugo (servants).............................................. 3
Total m ales.................................................. 120
Horses: 44 Oxen: 22
Buildings (including storehouses and stables): 178
The total number of hon-byakusho families in this village was twenty-five.

This may be taken as an average size. A larger group in the same district was
Takehazama-machi (called a machi, or town, instead of a village because it
was strung along a highway). Its composition was as follows:
Total population:
Females ............................................ 242
M ales................................................ 287
529
Livestock:
Oxen ................................................ 62
Horses .............................................. 105
The adult males were:

Shoya................................................ 2
Hyakusho.......................................... 47
Nago ................................................ 67
G enin................................................ 63
The whole consisted of 49 holdings, ranging in assessed yield from 5 koku
to 34 koku. The total assessed yield was of the order of 1,000 koku.
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
The chief primary sources consulted in preparing this volume are:

Tokugawa Jikki.
Tokugawa Kinreiko, first series, Volumes I-V; and later series, Volumes I-IV.
O Furegaki, collections for the periods Horeki, Kampo, Temmei, Tempo.
A handy guide to sources is Shiryo ni Yoru Nihon no Ayumi. Useful mod
em works are:
Nthon Kinseishi, Volume II, by ltd Tasaburo.
Yedo Jidai (in Iwanami Shinsho) by Kitajima Masumoto.
Hansei by Kanai Madoka.
The relevant volumes of Tokutomi Soho’s magnum opus, Nihon Koku-
minshi, contain most useful primary and secondary source material and in
teresting, if dogmatic, commentary.
Murdoch’s Volume III, like all his work, is vigorous and pointed: but he
died before it was completed, and it was “revised and edited” by unqualified
hands. It is a pity that those who prepared for publication this volume of over
800 pages furnished it with a very poor index.
INDEX
A 1 4 6 ; organization of, 10, 14, 19,

2 5 - 2 7 ; relation to T hrone, 17—18,
A b e fam ily: Tadakatsu, 1 4 ; Tadaaki,
2 7 - 2 8 , 1 3 8 , 1 4 0 - 4 1 ,1 9 8 - 9 9 , 2 3 5 -
R oju ( 1 6 3 3 - 7 1 ) , 5 3 f., 5 6 , 6 3 ; Shi-
3 6 , 2 3 9 —40; and daim yos, 2 0 , 4 6 -
getsugu, 9 2 ; M asahiro, 2 3 6
5 4 p a ssim , 6 1 - 6 7 p a ssim , 1 5 7 ,
Adams, W ill, 5 , 1 0
2 1 0 - 1 8 , 2 4 1 ; adm inistrative sys
A g e m a i (o ffe re d ric e ), 1 5 7 ,1 6 2
tem , 2 1 - 2 4 ; social system under,
Agrarian risings, 1 0 6 , 16 8 , 180, 1 8 3 -
2 9 - 3 2 ; and peasants, 3 0 , 9 9 f., 106,
8 7 , 193, 2 4 0 ; Shim abara Revolt,
1 6 7 , 1 7 9 -8 0 , 1 8 3 -8 4 , 2 4 0 ; and
3 7 - 3 8 , 4 2 , 1 7 9 ; m entioned, 2 1 4 ,
anti-C hristianity m ovem ent, 4 0 -
2 1 9 , 2 2 2 f.
4 3 ; seclusion policy, 4 0 —41, 2 2 8 ,
A griculture: products, 9 6 , 1 0 9 , 120,
2 3 3 - 3 7 ; and ronin, 5 6 - 5 7 , 5 9 ; and
1 2 6 ; increase o f production in 17 th
nonconform ists, 7 8 - 8 1 ; th e ex
c ., 1 0 6 -1 0 , 11 5 ; developm ent un
panding econom y, 1 2 0 -2 9 ; and
der Yoshim une, 1 5 7 -5 8
m erchants, 1 2 7 -2 9 , 1 8 2 -8 4 ; finan
Akita fief, 2 1 6 - 1 7
cial problem s, 1 4 2 —44, 1 5 5 -6 6
“A lternate atten dan ce” system , 2 0 f.,
2 7 , 4 7 f., 5 8 ,2 1 2 , 2 4 0 p a ssim , 1 9 4 -9 7 , 2 0 8 ; M inam oto,
Animals, laws protectin g, 1 3 1 ,1 3 4 1 6 0 ; hostility tow ards, 1 7 7 -7 9 ,
A nti-Christian activities, 3 9 —44, 8 0 ; 2 3 1 , 2 3 6 —41 p a ss im ; dom estic
and Ieyasu , 5 , 7 , 1 3 ; ban on books, problem s of, 2 2 1 - 2 7 ; m entioned,
2 5 , 1 6 8 - 6 9 ; and Christian ronin, 8 , 1 6, 5 2
3 4 ; Shim abara R evolt, 3 7 - 3 8 , 4 2 , Bakufu Orders (O F u r e g a k i) , 1 6 0 -6 1
179. S e e a lso Seclusion policy Bansho Shirabedokoro, foreign docu
A nti-foreign sentim ent, 2 3 6 - 4 0 m ents office, 2 3 4
Aoki Konyo ( 1 6 9 8 - 1 7 6 9 ) , 1 7 0 , 1 8 8 Banzan, s e e Kum azawa Banzan
Arai H akuseki ( 1 6 5 6 - 1 7 2 5 ) : as his Banzui-In C h obei, 6 0 , 6 0 n.
torian, 1 4 , 1 3 9 , 1 4 9 -5 0 , 1 6 3 , 1 8 8 ; Basho, s e e M atsuo Basho
early career, 8 5 , 1 4 6 - 4 9 ; and cur Bid dle, Com m odore Jam es, 2 3 2 - 3 3
rency reform , 1 3 4 n ., 1 4 0 ,1 4 2 - 4 4 , Bribery, 1 5 9 ,1 7 5 - 7 6
1 5 4 {., and Ienobu, 1 3 8 -4 1 ; m en Buddhism , 7 0 , 7 2 ,1 3 1 , 1 3 3 ; and anti-
tioned, 1 4 5 n ., 1 5 9 n ., 1 6 9 , 1 7 7 ; Christianity m ovem ent, 4 2 , 4 4 ;
portrait, p l a t e 1 0 Am idist (Jo d o ) sects, 6 9 ; decline
Artisans, 6 , 2 9 , 3 0 - 3 1 of, 6 9 , 7 6 f., 8 2 ; Zen, 6 9 ff., 8 2 ;
Asaka Tam paku, 9 4 ,1 5 0 Ikko sects, 1 1 5 ; m entioned, 6, 15
Asano fam ily, 1 9 ,7 8 B u g y d (C om m issioners), 5 , 2 2 , 2 4 , 2 7
Ashikaga Shoguns, 1 5 , 7 2 ,1 1 3 ,2 3 5 Bu ke Sho-H atto (R u les for th e M ili
Astronom y, 1 6 9 -7 0 tary H o u ses), 1 6, 4 7 , 5 5 ; o f 1 615,
Atlasov, explorer, 2 0 1 - 2 7 -8 ; of 1631, 34; of 1635, 20, 27,
A z u m a K a g a m i, chronicles, 17 3 4 , 3 7 , 4 8 , 7 5 ; of 1 6 8 3 , 1 3 2 ; of
1 7 1 0 , 1 3 9 —40; sam ple clauses,
B pla te 6
Bakufu, 5 4 , 6 2 , 9 2 f., 1 1 3 , 1 5 2 ; foun Bushido, 13 n., 7 8
dations of, 3—4, 12, 16, 3 3 , 7 0 , 7 3 , B u ssa n g a ku (scien ce o f pro d u ction ),
1 1 1 ; foreign trade; 5 , 3 5 , 3 7 , 1 4 4 , 1 9 0 ,1 9 1 n.
252 INDEX
C D
Calendar reform, 169 f. Dai Nihon Shi, history, 94-95
Caron, Francois, 43 Daigaku Wakumon, treatise, 79, 79 n.
Censors (Metsuke), 23,48,176 Daikan (Deputies), 12 n., 23,52,101
Census (18th c.), 187 Daimyos, 3-7 passim, 24,46-52,124,
Chamberlains (Soba-ydnin), 22,131, 235; Fudai, 14, 24, 131, 155; and
140,174 Bakufu, 16, 19-20, 46-54 passim,
Chaya Shirojiro, 10 f. 61-67 passim, 157, 210-18, 241;
Chigyd-tori (recipients of land reve Tozama, 25-26, 43, 224,236
nue), 49-50 Daishojingi-Gumi (Pantheon Band),
Chikamatsu Monzaemon (1653- 59 f.
1724), 105,151,153 Dat6 family, 19, 47, 49, 68-67, 176,
China: trade with Japan, 5, 6 n., 35, 213 f.
37, 42, 45, 116, 144-45; influence Dat6Sodo (Disturbance), 66-67
on Japan, 8, 29, 38, 130-31, 242; Davydov, Russian officer, 203 f.
and anti-Christianity movement, Dembei, Japanese castaway, 202
38, 44, 168-69; Coxinga, 67-68; Deshima, 37,42,116
and Great Britain, 228, 235, 237; Dogs, protection of, 134
Ming policy of seclusion, 229 f. See Doi Toshikatsu, 14,18,22,26,29
also, Chu Hsi philosophy; Confu Dojima Exchange, 125 f., 126 n.,
cianism 163-65
Cho (measure of area = 2.45 acres), Dokushi Yoron, history, 149
96 f., 96 n. Dutch craze (Rampeki), 189,231
Chonin (townsmen), 117,129 Dutch studies, see Rangaku
Choshu fief, 218-20,240 f.
Christianity, see Anti-Christian activi E
ties Echigoyashop,115,184
Chu Hsi philosophy, 69-81 passim, Economy edicts, 151,160-61. See
84-86, 94,132,192, 200 also Sumptuary rules
Chu Shun-shui, 83,95 Elders, see Rdfu; Wakadoshiyori
Chugen (manservants), 59 England, see Great Britain
Cocks, Richard, 41 Escheatment, 3 -4,33,56
Code of One Hundred Articles, The, Exclusion policy, 35-39,231
4 n., 93,172 Exports, see Trade
Coinage, 5 n., 140,143,161 n., 164 f.,
198,220 n. F
Confucian college, 132,199-200 Family relationships, 88-90, 245—46
Confucianism: Neo-Confucian ethic, Famines, 185 f., 193,217,219,222
15, 69-93, 117-18, 216, 229 f.; Farms and farmers, 29, 96-100,108-
Wang Yang-ming ( 0 Yomei), 74, 9, 120, 166-68. See also Peasants
84, 86, 224; of the Analects, 80; Fiefs, 49-52,210-18. See also
Kogaku-Ha, 80 Daimyos
Copper, 145,163,177,182 Fields, wet and dry, 96,104-5,158
Corv6es, 64,100,197 Five Human Relations, 73, 76, 80 f.,
Cotton, 109,120,163 84
Council of Elders, see Roju Five-Man Groups (Gonin-gumi), 30,
Court, see Throne 30 n., 100-103
Coxinga, Chinese commander, 67-68 Forty-Seven Ronin affair, 92-93, 134
Currency: debasement, 134, 143, France, 228-29,238,241
153,165; reform, 134 n., 140,142- Franciscans, 40 n.
45, 161—62, 197; mentioned, 163, Fuchimai-tori (stipendiaries), 50 f.
208 Fudai, see Daimyos
INDEX 253
Fudasashi (brokers), 128,164,196 10, 71-82 passim, 85 f., 93; Gahd
Fujii Umon, 178-79 (1618-80), 74; Hoko (1644-
Fujita Toko (1806-55), 224 f. 1732), 74
FujiwaraSeika (1561-1617),70-71, Hayashi Nobuatsu, 132, 150, 154
82, 85 Hayashi Shihei, 200, 206
Fukushima Masanori, 25,33 Hidetada, Shogun (1616-23), 4, 6,
Fukuzawa Yukichi, 85,90 n. 17 {., 25, 92; anti-Christianity, 39,
43; mentioned, 7, 19 f., 143
G Hideyori, 6,9 f.
Gennai, see Hiraga Gennai Hideyoshi, 46, 116, 118, 235; and
Genroku era (1688-1704), 129, 134, Ieyasu, 9 ff., 16 f.; separation of
151-53 farmer and soldier, 29, 32, 51, 97-
Go-Kamon (Kinsmen), 19 98, 100; land surveys, 32, 97-98,
Go-kenin (unfeoffedsamurai),21, 101; mentioned, 18 f., 22, 55, 69,
61,155-57 82
Gold, 5,40,146. See also Coinage Higo fief, 217
Golovnin, Vasilii, 204 Hikan (farm labourers), 97,103 f.,
Go-Mizunoo, Emperor, 18, 27-28, 83 245
Go-Momozono, Emperor, 178,199 Hirado, port, 37, 40, 42
Gongen Sama, see Ieyasu Hiraga Gennai (1728-79), 189-92,
Gonin-gumi (Five-Man Groups), 30, 216, p l a t e 14
30 n., 100-103 Hirata Atsutane, 224
Gond (rich farmers), 98 Hishikawa Moronobu (d. 1714), 151
Go-Sanke (Three Houses), 19, 154, Hitotsubashi family, 171
171.194.217.235 Harunari, 207 f.
Goto Sanuemon, 226 Keika, Shogun (1866-67), 241
Goto Shozaburo, 10 f.
Hojo Regents, 8, 15, 235
Great Britain, 170, 237, 239 f.; ships
Hokkaido, 176, 181 f.
in Japan, 5, 45, 204-5, 228, 241;
Opium War, 225, 228; treaties with Holland, 42 f., 43 n., 228, 241; trade,
Japan,234, 238 5-6,38,45,144 f.; Dutch residents
Great Learning, The, 132,139 in Japan, 37, 116, 135-37, 169,
Guilds, 31,125-27,182,219,226 237; treaties with Japan, 234, 238
Gukansho, 94,149 Hon-byakushd (landholders), 100,
Gundai (officials),23,52,101 103, 107, 167, 245-47
Honcho Hennen-Roku, chronology,
H 74
Hagiwara Shigehide, 143 f. Honcho Tsugan, history, 74, 94
Haiku (17-syllable poem), 151, 167 Honda family: Masanobu (Sado no
Hakuseki, see Arai Hakuseki Kami), 10, 12-16, 99; Tadakatsu,
HanabusaItcho (1652-1724), 132, 12 n., 14; Masazumi, 14
151 Honjo Munemasa, 130
Handicrafts, 121 Honsa Roku, documents, 14-15
Hankampu, treatise, 139,149 Hoshina family, 19, 83
Harada Kai Munesuke, 65-66 Masayuki, 53-54, 62, 195
Harris, Townsend, 237 f. Hosokawa family, 6, 15, 19, 217
Hasegawa Fujihiro (Sahyoe) 39 f. Hotta family: Masamori, 53, 78, 92;
Hatake (dryfields),96,104-5,158 Masatoshi, 68,131-32, 148; Masa
Hatamoto (Bannermen),21,26,155, nobu, 106
157.196.235 Huang Tsung-hsi, 44, 44 n.
Hatamoto-yakko, 59-61 Hyojosho (Judicial Council), 18, 22-
Hayashi family: Razan (1583-1657), 23, 27, 226
254 INDEX
I J
Ieharu, Shogun (1760-86), 173-74 Jesuits, 40, 40 n.
Iemitsu, Shogun (1623-51), 4, 22, Jien, monk (1155-1225), 149
26-28,43,130 f.; and daimyos, 25, J ik is o (directappeal), 159
47, 49; and ju n sh i, 53, 92; and J in s e i (Humane Government), 80
ronin, 79; attitude towards Throne, Jis h a -B u g y o (Commissioners for
236; mentioned, 6, 143 Monasteries and Shrines), 22-23
Iemochi, Shogun (1858-66), 241 Jiz a m u r a i (yeoman farmers), 51, 100
Ienari, Shogun (1787-1837), 171 f., J o d a i (Governors), 23
194, 201, 203, 207-9 Joi, s e e Sonno Joi
Ienobu, Shogun (1709-13), 131, Jo k a - m a c h i (castle towns), 111-13
135, 138—48 p a ssim , 174, 236 Jokvo era (1684—88), reforms, 138
Ieshige, Shogun (1745-60), 171, Ju n sh i, 53, 92
173 f.
Ietsugu, Shogun (1713-16), 131, K
142,173 K a b u k im o n o (eccentrics), 58-60,
Ietsuna, Shogun (1651-80), 4, 53- 162
54, 63, 67 f., 131, 143 K abunakam a (merchant guilds),
Ieyasu, Shogun (1603-16),92f., 116, 127,182,226
179; his political aims, 3-8; his Kaempfer, Engelbert, 119, 123, 135-
methods, 8-18; his cipher, 9; his 37,230
battles, 9,11,16; as Gongen Sama, Kaga fief, 67, 214
10, 156; his character, 16-17; and Kaibara Ekken (1630-1714), 84,
anti-Christianity, 39-^10, 43; and 87-89, 108
daimyos, 46-47, 52; and Confu
K a ik o k u H e id a n , treatise, 200
cianism, 70-72, 82; attitude to
Kamio Haruhide, 166
wards Throne, 235-36; mentioned,
K an , coin, 127 n.
36, 64, 143; portrait, p l a t e 1
Ieyasu’s sons, 19; mentioned, 83, 86 Kanagawa Treaty (1854), 237
Ieyoshi, Shogun (1837-53), 221, Kanazawa, town, 116
K a n jo -B u g y o (Finance Commission
223
Igagoe (crossing Iga) encounter, 92 e r s ) ^ , 194
Ihara Saikaku (d. 1693), 114, 118- Kanjo-Kata (Treasury Department),
19,151; portrait, 123 162, 181
Ii Kamon no Kami, 237 ff. Kansei Code, 172
Ii Naomasa, 14 Kansei Reform (1787), 193-206
Ikeda family, 63,100 K a n sh o (sweet potato), 170, 188
Ikuta Yorozu, 224 Kanto (eight eastern provinces), 3,
Imai Sokun, 10 f. 46, 153, 179, 185
Imperial Court, s e e Throne K a sh in (family retainers), 50, 64
Imports, s e e Trade Katsu Awa, 4 n., 237-38
Ina Tadataka, 184 Keian no Furegaki, decree, 80, 99,
Ina Tadatsugu, 11-12, 52, 52 n. 160
Irrigation, 107 n., 158 Keicho era (ca. 1615), 143 f.
Iseya shop, 115 Keishoin, Tsunayoshi’s mother, 130-
Ishida Mitsunari, 10, 20 n. 31, 133
Ishigaya Sadakiyo, 57 Khovstov, Russian officer, 203 f.
Ishiyama Honganji, 115-16 K in (measure of weight = 1.6 lbs.
Itagald Katsushige, 12 Troy), 145
Itakura Shiginori, Roju (1665-77), Kinchu Kuge Sho-Hatto (Rules for
17,54, 63, 66 the Palace and the Court), 17-18
Ito Jinsai (1627-1705), 80, 84 Kinokuniya Banzaemon, 114
INDEX 255
Kinoshita Ju nan , 1 4, 1 3 9 , 1 4 8 M aeda fam ily, 19 f., 4 9 , 11 6 , 1 2 2
Kishu (K ii) fief, 5 1 , 2 1 7 M aeno Ryotaku, 1 8 8 -8 9 , 2 3 2
K itabatake Chikafusa, 9 4 n. M anabe Akifusa, 1 4 0 f., 1 7 4
K itajim a M asam oto, 81 M arkets, 4 , 1 2 3 - 2 7
Kitam ura Bungoro, 1 1 4 n. M arubashi Chuya, 5 4 - 5 6
Kitam ura K igin ( 1 6 1 8 - 1 7 0 5 ) , 1 3 2 Masuhei Yawa ("E v e n in g T a le s o f
Koban, coin, 5 n ., 1 4 3 M asuhei” ) , 2 1 3
Kobu-gattai m ovem ent, 2 3 8 - 3 9 M atsudaira fam ily, 19, 2 0 0
Kodayu, Jap an ese castaw ay, 2 0 2 Aldnori, 2 1 0
Kogaku-H a, bran ch o f Confucianism , Hideyasu, 9 2
80 N agato no Kam i, 18
Kokaku, E m peror, 1 9 9 N obuaki, 2 0 1 , 2 0 3
Koktt (m easure o f cap acity = 4 . 9 6 N obutsuna, 1 4, 5 3 , 6 2 f.
b u sh els), 9 6 N obuyuki, 7 9
Kokudaka (assessed re v en u e ), 5 0 , Sadam asa, 61
1 6 6 f., 211 Sadanobu, 1 7 6 ,1 9 3 - 2 0 3 , 2 0 6 ,2 2 3 ,
Konishi Yukinaga, 3 4 P L A T E 13
Konoe M otohiro, 1 4 0 ,1 5 4 - 5 5 Tadanori, 2 5
Konoike Zenyem on, 1 1 9 , 1 2 8 , 2 1 3 n ., T adateru, 2 5
217, 240 Tadayoshi, 9 2
Korea, 10, 16, 3 0 , 2 3 0 Takem oto, 1 7 3 ,1 7 5
Koshitsu, treatise, 1 4 9 T eru taka, 1 8 4
Kotsuke province, 1 7 9 ,1 8 3 f. Yoriyasu, 1 8 9 -9 0
Kudo Heisuke, 1 8 1 -8 2 M atsuo Basho ( 1 6 4 4 - 9 4 ) , 5 8 , 1 5 1 ,
Kum azawa Ban zan ( 1 6 1 9 - 9 1 ) , 7 7 , 167
7 9 - 8 0 ,8 4 ,8 6 ,1 0 5 - 6 ,1 2 4 Meiboku Sendai Hagi, play, 6 7
Kurairi-chi (storehouse la n d ), 5 0 , M eirekifire ( 1 6 5 7 ) ,6 1 - 6 2 , 1 1 4 ,1 4 3 ,
1 6 6 n. 184
Kuramai-tori (recip ients o f r ic e ), 5 0 M erchants, 6 , 2 7 , 3 1 , 1 2 5 -2 8 . See
Kurim e uprising, 1 8 3 also Guilds
Kuroda fief, 1 9 , 6 7 Metsuke (C e n so rs), 2 3 , 4 8 , 1 7 6
Kyoden, novelist, 2 0 6 Mikawa Monogatari, 1 3, 13 n.
Kyoho fam ine ( 1 7 3 2 - 3 3 ) , 1 8 5 , 2 2 2 M ikaw a province, 10 f.; bushi, 16
Kyoho R eform ( 1 7 1 6 - 3 6 ) , 1 5 6 ,1 8 1 , M ilitary Houses, Rules for, see Bu ke
193 Sho-H atto
Kyoto, 5 8 , 1 1 3 , 1 1 7 , 1 2 0 , 1 5 2 f. M inam oto Yoritom o, 6 , 8 , 2 3 5
Kyuchi (g ran ted la n d ), 5 0 M ito fief, 5 0 f., 2 3 6 - 3 9 passim
M itsui fam ily, 1 1 5 , 2 4 0
L
M itsukuni fam ily, 8 3 , 9 4 - 9 5 , 1 3 1 ,
L an d surveys, see Surveys 135
Laxm an, L ieu tenan t Adam, 2 0 2 M iyake Kanran, 9 4 , 1 5 0
Laxm an, E ric, 2 0 2 M iyazaki A ntei, 108
Love Suicide at Sonezaki ( 1 7 0 3 ) , M izuno fam ily, 1 9 4
153 Tadakuni, 2 2 1 - 2 6 , 2 3 1 , p l a t e 2 3
L u chu (R yu kyu ) Islands, 2 2 0 f., T adanari, 2 0 7 - 8
2 2 8 f., 2 3 2 - 3 3 Tadatom i, 2 0 7
Luzon, 5 , 3 5 , 41 Tadayuki, 1 6 2
Momozono, see Go-M om ozono
M M ori d a n , 7 0 n ., 2 1 9
Machi-Bugyd (C ity Com m issioners), M orikage, painter, 1 5 1 ; picture by,
2 2 f., 5 2 pla te 11
Machi-yakko (young tow nsm en), M unetada and M unetaka, creation of
5 9 -6 0 new Tokugaw a houses, 171
256 INDEX
M uro Kyuso ( 1 6 5 8 - 1 7 3 4 ) , 1 4 , 8 4 - O n -ly e Kyogen (N o b le Fam ily

8 5 , 154, 1 7 2 P la y s), 6 7
M usashi province, 1 7 9 , 1 8 3 f. O n -ly e Sodo (N o b le Fam ily D is
M yosho, Em press, 2 8 c o rd s ), 64
<5oka S e id a n ( “T h e Judgm ents of
N O oka” ) , 1 6 8
N abeshim a fief, 3 5 , 4 7 , 6 7 O oka Tadam itsu, 1 7 3 f., 1 7 8
N agasaki, 1 1 6 , 1 3 3 , 1 4 4 f., 1 7 6 ; and O ritaku S h ib a n o K i, Hakuseki’s auto
foreign trade, 2 5 , 4 0 , 4 3 , 4 5 , 2 3 7 ; biography, 1 4 6
m entioned, 5 , 1 7 6 O saka: population, 1 1 2 , 11 8 , 1 5 2 ; as
N a g o (farm w o rkers), 9 7 , 2 4 5 com m ercial cen tre, 1 1 4 -1 6 , 121,
Nagoya, port, 2 1 , 11 1 , 1 1 6 12 5 , 1 2 7 f.; in Genroku era, 1 5 1 ;
N akae T o ju ( 1 6 0 8 - 4 8 ) , 7 4 - 7 5 , 7 7 , revolts, 2 2 3 - 2 4 ; m entioned, 5
7 9 , 84 ff., 88 O saka C astle, fall of, 4 , 7 , 9 , 2 7 , 5 8 ;
N a k a g a i (m id d lem en ), 1 2 6 , 1 2 8 m entioned, 3 8 , 4 0 , 111
N a k a m a (g u ild s), 1 2 7 Oshio H eihachiro, 2 2 3 - 2 4
Nanking, T rea ty of ( 1 8 4 2 ) , 2 2 8 Otsuld G entaku, 1 8 8 f.
N a n u sh i (v illag e h ea d m a n ), 101, Ow ari fief, 5 0 f., 1 1 6
101 n ., 1 0 6 , 1 5 8 ,1 6 7
P
Naraya M ozaem on, 1 1 4 ,1 1 4 n.
N eo-Confucianism , 1 5, 6 9 - 8 5 , 2 1 6 , Paddy (w et field s), 9 6 , 1 0 4 - 5 ,1 5 8
2 2 9 f.; and Shinto, 8 5 - 8 7 ; its ethic, P aper industry, 1 0 9 , 121
8 7 - 9 3 , 1 1 7 -1 8 . S e e a ls o Chu Hsi Peasants: attitud e o f ruling class to
N ichiren (L o tu s ) sect, 3 9 wards, 1 5, 9 8 - 9 9 ; absconsions, 3 0 ,
N ijo fam ily, 1 3 0 1 0 0 ; taxes, 5 1 , 9 9 - 1 0 1 , 1 0 4 -5 ,
N o plays, 1 3 4 , 1 3 7 1 0 9 , 2 1 3 - 1 4 ; restrictions on, 9 9 ,
N o b e m a i (fu tu re s), 1 2 5 f., 1 2 6 n., 1 0 4 - 6 ; in c r e a s e in production,
128 1 0 7 - 9 ; fam ily, 2 4 5 - 4 6 ; m entioned,
N oble Fam ily D iscords (O n -ly e 6, 97, 110
S o d o ), 6 4 Perry, Com m odore M atthew , 2 3 3 -
N obunaga, s e e Oda N obunaga 34, 236, p l a t e 22
N o g y o Z en sh o , agricultural treatise, Population: in 1 7 0 0 , 1 0 7 ; o f castle
108 tow ns, 1 1 1 -1 2 ; of cities, 1 1 3 -1 5 ,
1 1 8 ; in 18th c ., 1 8 6 -8 7
O Portugal, 5 - 6 , 3 5 - 3 9 , 4 2 f., 4 5
O F u r e g a k i S h iisei, docum ents, 1 6 0 -
R
61
0 Yom ei (W a n g Y an g -m in g ), 7 4 , 8 4 , R a m p e k i (D u tch c ra z e ), 189, 231
86, 224 R a n g a k u (D u tch stu d ies), 1 7 0, 1 8 8 -
O ba n , coin, 5 n. 89, 230
Oda N obunaga, 1 1 ,1 5 ff., 4 6 , 6 9 , 8 2 , R ezanov, V asilii, 2 0 2 - 3
235 R ice, 3 , 4 n ., 1 2 0 -2 4 p a ssim , 2 1 7 ; a g e -
O -Fuku , nurse, 2 5 m a i (offered r ic e ), 5 0 , 1 0 4 -5 , 122;
Ogyu Sorai, 5 8 , 2 0 0 tax rice, 5 0 , 1 0 4 -5 , 1 2 2 ; produc
Oigaw a em bankm ent, 1 5 6 , 1 6 2 tion, 9 6 , 1 5 7 n ., 16 3 , 1 6 6 n .; m ar
O kubo fam ily, 13 n., 19 ket, 1 2 4 -2 5 , 1 6 3 -6 5 , 1 9 7 f., 2 1 2 ;
Hikozaem on, 1 3 -1 4 m entioned, 1 2 7
N agayasu, 1 1 -1 3 R ice brokers, 1 1 4 , 125
T adachika, 10, 1 2 -1 4 R ice E xch an ge, 1 2 5 f., 1 2 6 n., 1 6 3 -
T ad ayo, 1 3 - 1 4 65
Om ura fief, 3 5 , 5 0 R oju (C ou ncil o f E ld e rs), 2 2 f., 2 7 ,
O nna D a ig u k u ( “T h e G reater L earn 1 3 1 , 14 1 , 15 6 , 1 7 3 ,1 9 3
ing fo r W om en” ) , 8 7 - 8 8 R on in (m asterless sam u rai), 11, 3 2 -
INDEX 257
34, 53 f., 61, 63; conspiracy, 54- Shohei Gakumonjo, Confucian col
58, 79, 117; Forty-Seven affair, lege, 132, 199-200
92-93, 134 Shoheiko (Shohei Academy), 83
Rural communities, 30, 96, 98, 104, Shoshi Sho-Hatto (1635), decree, 75
108-9, 166-68. S e e a lso Villages S h o s h i-d a i (Deputies), 5, 24, 27
Russia, 181—82, 200, 205, 229; trea Shotoku era (1711-16), 128, 145
ties with Japan, 234, 238 S h o y a (headman), 14, 101, 101 n.,
R y o , unit of gold currency, 5 n. 246
Ryukyu Islands, s e e Luchu Islands Shumon-Aratame (Examination of
Sects), 42
S Silk, 5, 37, 124, 184
Sakai family, 5, 18 f. Silver, 5, 140, 145 f. S e e a lso Coin
Tadakatsu, Tairo (d. 1656), 14, age
22, 36, 53 f., 78 f., 81 S o b a -y o n in (Chamberlains), 22, 131,
Tadakiyo: Roju (1656-66), 54, 140,174
62-63, 67; Tairo (1666-80), Social orders, 6, 100
54, 62-63, 65, 68, 81 Sonno Joi, reverence to the Sover
Tadayo, 14, 22 eign, 235-39 p a ss im
Saikaku, s e e Ihara Saikaku Sotelho, Spanish missionary, 39-40
Sakhalin, 176, 181 f., 203 Spain, 6, 39, 42 f.
Sakuma Zoyan (1811-64), 222, 231 Stipendiaries ( fu c h im a i-to r i) , 50 f.
Sakura Sogoro, village headman, 106 Subinfeudation system, reform of, 51,
Samurai, 91, 128, 152; as class, 29, 98
31,49-50, 75-76,113,160,164 f., Suden, monk, 7, 10, 39, 70 f., 73
212; education of, 55, 81; in 18th Sugita Gempaku, 189, 191, 232
c., 188-89. S e e a lso G o -k e n in ; S u k e g o (corvee), 64,100,179
H a ta m o to ; R on in Suminokura Ryoi, 10 f.
S a n k in K o ta i (alternate
attendance), Sumptuary rules, 133, 151, 160-61,
20 f., 27, 47 f., 58,212,240 205-6
Santo Kyoden, writer, 200 Sumpu, town, 21, 58
Satsuma fief, 218, 220-21, 221 n., Surveys, land, 101,101 n., 104, 109,
228-29, 239 ff.; illustration, 232 f. 158; by Hideyoshi, 32, 97—98, 101
Seclusion policy, 127, 146, 150; Ex Sweet potato, 170, 188
clusion Orders, 35-39; nature of, Sword Hunt, Hideyoshi’s (1588), 29,
44 f., 229-30; opinion against, 51,100
230-32; end of, 232-36 T
S e ik y d Y o ro k u (“The Essentials of
Confucianism”), 78 T a H s u e h ( T h e G re a t L e a r n in g ),
Sekigahara, battle of, 3 f., 6, 10, 19, 132, 139
32 52 58 Tadanaga (Kunimatsu), Iemitsu’s
Sendai (Dat£) fief, 63, 65 f., 213 f. brother, 26
S e e a lso Dat6 family T a ir o (Great Elders), 22
Shimabara Revolt (1637-38), 37- Takano Nagehide, 222, 227
38,42,179 Takashimaya Denzaemon, 122
Shimai Soshitsu, 10 f. Takechiyo, s e e Iemitsu
Shimazu family, 19, 35, 47, 49, 70 n., Takeda Shingen, 12 n., 16
239; Shigehide, 220 Takenouchi Shikibu, 178 f.
S h in n o -R on (Loyalty to Throne), Tamura Daikichi, 187-88
178,235 Tamura Enyu, 190 f.
Shinto, 6, 70, 74, 80, 104; and Con T a n , measure, 96
fucianism, 85-87; Suika sect, 178; Tanaka Kyugu, 120
mentioned, 15, 76 Tanuma Okitsugu, 174-77, 181-86,
Shirolaya shop, 184 p a ss im , 189,191,194, 207
258 INDEX
T a r u b u n e, vessel, 114, 114 n. V

Tax rice, 50, 104—5, 122 Vassals, s e e D a im y o s ; H a ta m o to
Taxes: on peasants, 51, 99-101,104- Vendettas ( k a t a k i - u c h i) , 90, 92-93
5, 109, 213—14; land, 101, 158, Vermilion seal, 6 n., 35, 39 f., 43 n.,
102-63, 165; in fiefs, 112, 213; 48, p l a t e 3
on agricultural produce, 157; of Villages: mediaeval, 97-100; in 17th
guilds, 182 f. c., 100—104; class distinctions,
Tayasu house, 171 103-6; composition of, 245-46
Temmei famine (1783-87), 185 f.,
193, 222 W
Tempo famine (1830-34), 185, 217, W a k a d o s h iy o r i (Junior Elders), 23,
222 25, 27
Tempo Reform, 218, 220, 222, 225
Tenkai, monk, 10, 26, 71, 73 Wang Yang-ming, s e e O Yomei
Tennaera (1681—84) reforms, 138 Warrior class, 29, 31, 49-50, 75-70,
Throne, Imperial, 6 f., 83, 149-50, 113, 160, 164 f., 212. S e e a lso
Samurai
235-42 p a ss im ; and Bakufu, 17-
18, 27-28, 138, 140-41, 198-99, Watanabe Kazan (Noboru), 222,
235-36, 239-40; Loyalist move 227, 231; portrait by, p l a t e 15
ments, 178-79, 235 Western influence, 169-70,230,231-
32, 242. S e e a ls o b y cou n try
Tobacco, 109, 120
Toda family, 213 Y •
Toju, s e e Nakae Toju
Tokugawa family, 3-6, 17—19, 28, Y akko (underlings), 59-61
77, 88, 241 f. S e e a lso b y n a m e Yamada Nagamasa (d. 1633), 35-30
Tokugawa government, s e e Bakufu Yamaga Soko (1622-85), 13 n., 77-
Tokugawa houses, s e e Go-Sanke 80, 84, 91
Yamagata Daini, 178-79, 235
Tokugawa vassals, s e e D a im y o s
Torii Yozo, 225-27, 231 Yamazaki Ansai (1618-82),54,74 f.,
Towns: growth of, 111—13; people, 77, 84-87
58-61, 116-19; uprisings, 180, Yanagisawa Yoshiyasu, 132 f., 135,
141, 144 n., 174
209, 222 f.
Toyotomi family, 6,9 ,1 4 ,1 9 ,4 6 , 235 Yedo, 11, 20 f., 58, 117, 119; popu
lation, 113-15,152; disasters, 135,
Tozama (“Outside Lords”), s e e
153; Genroku era, 151; map, p l a t e
D a im y o s
Trade: domestic, 4 f., 107-8, 114; 7. S e e a lso “Alternate attendance”
system
foreign, 5,35, 37,45,144-46,163.
Yezo (Hokkaido), 176, 181 f.
S e e a lso Guilds
Yodoya family, 118, 128-29, 152
Traders, s e e Merchants
Yokohama, port, 238
Tsunayoshi, Shogun (1690-1709), 4,
Yoritomo, s e e Minamoto Yoritomo
130-38, 143, 162; mentioned, 68,
Yoshida Gemba, 178-79
83 Yoshimune, Shogun (1716—45), 154-
U 55, 168-73, 181; portrait, 155; fi
Uesugi family, 216 nancial problems, 155-66
U k iy o -e, school of painting, 151 Yoshimune’s sons, 171
United States, 205, 228, 232-34, 239, Yui Shosetsu, 34, 52-57, 61, 79 f.
241; treaties with Japan, 237 f.
Uprisings, s e e Agrarian risings; Z
Towns Zen Buddhism, 69 ff., 82
Utamaro, artist, 152, 206 Zeniya Gohei, 214-15

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A HISTORY OF JAPAN

CHARLES E. TUTTLE COMPANY

C opyright © 1963 by the B oard o f Trustees o f the

All rights reserved

No part o f this book m ay b e reproduced in any form

First Tuttle edition, 1974

I owe a great debt to my friends John Galvin and Stanley Smith,

I. THE NATURE OF THE TOKUGAWA GOVERNMENT 3

XII. GENROKU 151

Plates 1 -6 follow p. SO. Plates 7 -1 2 follow p. 98.

T h e keep of Hirosald C astle. T h e castle was b uilt in 1 6 0 0 b y Tsugaru

1. Tokugaw a Ieyasu ( 1 5 4 2 - 1 6 1 6 ) , first Tokugaw a Shogun.

2. T h e shrine at Nikko, erected in Ieyasu’s honour. H is body was carried

4. A typical Jap an ese m erchant ship, operating from N agasaki, in th e early

5. H im eji C astle (early seventeenth c e n tu ry ). Photograph furnished b y the

6. Clauses o f th e Bu ke Sh o-H atto, w hich was drafted b y the m onk Suden

7. Yedo in th e Tokugaw a period.

8. A w ealthy farm er’s house in a village outside M atsuyam a. T h e building

9. D etail of th e courtyard in th e sam e farm .

10. Arai H akuseki ( 1 6 5 6 - 1 7 2 5 ) , at the age of fifty-seven.

12. An evening scene by Ryogoku Bridge, by Okam ura M asanobua (c a .

13. M atsudaira Sadanobu ( 1 7 5 8 - 1 8 2 9 ) . T h e portrait is owned by the M a-

14. Hiraga Gennai (1728-79).

G eneral m ap o f Jap an , showing th e provinces xiv

1603-1618 Ieyasu (FirstShogun)

1. Ieyasu s Political Aims

1 Large areas of land belonging to monasteries were also confiscated.

tion at a given time, since the processes of confiscation and distribution

Total at 1690 ............................................ 14.68

* A rough estimate of the position in 1600, after Sekigahara, is as follows:

Total revenue from fiefs of 10,000 koku or m ore..........2 4 .5

7. Should it be learned that in a neighbouring fief there are men

It is an interesting feature of this ordinance that the comments on

This piece of legislation illustrates the determination of Ieyasu to

This determination, according to some writers (including Rai San­

During his last years he was treated as an idol, an object of worship,

Itagald Katsushige advised on the vital problems of agrarian policy—

7 Hikozaemon’s M ikaw a M onogatari is an interesting record of the relationship

3. Iey asu s Character

4. T he Shogun and the Throne

One of the first administrative orders of Hidetada on behalf of

It will be seen that although attention is paid to the dignity of the

5. T he Shogun and the Vassals

10 It took the place of Ishida Mitsunari’s castle of Sawayama.

gun, Iemitsu (1623-51). For the convenience of readers, however, it

HIDETADA AND IEMITSU

H i d g t a d a nominally succeeded to the office of Shogun in 1605,

lemitsu while in office showed considerable self-confidence, con­

some measure of amiability. According to the Abbot Tenkai he was

This is an interesting political document, recognizing the bitter truth

succession. He had at first intended to name his son by Hidetada's

T h e s o c i a l s y s t e m of the Tokugawa government was based

1 Gonin-gumi were groups of citizens or villagers who were entrusted with

2 Except for the "hinin," or "not men,” who were outcasts.

manual labourers—the porters, navvies, boatmen, palanquin bearers,

Although the ordinances of the Tokugawa Shoguns placed members

I e y a s u, as we have seen, was enthusiastic in the promotion of for­

This thriving and promising phase of expansion came to a surprising

1. It is strictly forbidden for any vessel without a valid license to

This determination, according to some writers (including Rai San

lemitsu while in office showed considerable self-confidence, con

I e y a s u, as we have seen, was enthusiastic in the promotion of for

O u r p u r p o s e here is not to enquire into metaphysics, but to ex

later developed a vocabulary of his own for the description of essen

B e f o r e entering upon a survey of rural life in the seventeenth cen

This is a hypothetical distribution, but it gives a fair picture of the ele

To understand the agrarian society of Tokugawa Japan it is neces

embankments, to supply post horses, and to render other services with

in one of his memoranda to the daimyo of Bizen: "Naturally the peas