United States Society on Dams

Routine Instrumented and Visual

Monitoring of Dams Based on
Potential Failure Modes Analysis

March 2013
 United States Society on Dams

Routine Instrumented and Visual

Monitoring of Dams Based on
Potential Failure Modes Analysis

March 2013

Prepared by the USSD Committee on Monitoring of Dams and Their Foundations

 U.S. Society on Dams
Vision
To be the nation's leading organization of professionals dedicated to advancing the
role of dams for the benefit of society.

Mission — USSD is dedicated to:

· Advancing the knowledge of dam engineering, construction, planning,
operation, performance, rehabilitation, decommissioning, maintenance,
security and safety;
· Fostering dam technology for socially, environmentally and financially
sustainable water resources systems;
· Providing public awareness of the role of dams in the management of the
nation's water resources;
· Enhancing practices to meet current and future challenges on dams; and
· Representing the United States as an active member of the International
Commission on Large Dams (ICOLD).

The information contained in this report regarding commercial products or firms may not be used for
advertising or promotional purposes and may not be construed as an endorsement of any product or firm by
the United States Society on Dams. USSD accepts no responsibility for the statements made or the opinions
expressed in this publication.

Copyright © 2013 U. S. Society on Dams

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ISBN 978-1-884575-59-4

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 FOREWORD
The importance of monitoring programs for dam safety is widely accepted. There are
many historical cases of dam failures where early warning signs of failure might have
been detected if a good dam safety monitoring program had been in place. A monitoring
program can provide information that is needed for a solid understanding of the on-going
performance of a dam. Monitoring programs, including instrumentation and visual
inspection, provide dam owners with knowledge that a dam is performing as expected,
and the ability to detect a change in performance. This knowledge and ability is critical
because the dam owner is directly responsible for the consequences of a dam failure.
Therefore, a good dam safety monitoring program should be a key part of every dam
owner’s risk management program.

This paper is part of a series of White Papers by the USSD Committee on Monitoring of
Dams and Their Foundations to address important topics with respect to the development
and successful implementation of dam safety monitoring programs:

 Why Include Instrumentation in Dam Monitoring Programs?

 Routine Instrumented and Visual Monitoring of Dams Based on Potential Failure
Modes Analysis
 Development of a Dam Safety Instrumentation Program
 Operation and Maintenace of an Instrumentation Program
 Instrumentation Data Collection, Management and Analysis

While each of the above White Papers addresses its topic in a “stand-alone” manner,
there are interrelationships between these papers. Readers of this paper may find it
beneficial to refer to one or more of the other White Papers for a broader understanding
and perspective with respect to dam safety monitoring programs.

This series of White Papers primarily addresses the programmatic aspects of

instrumentation for dam safety monitoring rather than technological advances in
instruments. These papers should provide dam owners, large and small, with basic
information to evaluate or implement an adequate dam safety monitoring program. These
programs become more and more critical as our nation’s dams (and other infrastructure)
reach and extend beyond their design lives.

The Lead Author for this White Paper was Jay N. Stateler (Bureau of Reclamation,
Denver, Colorado). The co-author was Manoshree Sundaram (MWH, Chicago, Illinois).
The Lead Reviewer was Christopher Hill (Metropolitan Water District of Southern
California). The Publication Review Committee (PRC) was headed by USSD Board
Member Keith A. Ferguson (HDR Engineering, Inc., Denver, Colorado), with PRC
members David D. Moore (Grant County Public Utility District, Ephrata, Washington),
Kim de Rubertis (Consultant, Cashmere, Washington), and Wayne Edwards (Consultant,
Novato, California). The work of these individuals, as well as the other members of the
USSD Committee on Monitoring of Dams and Their Foundations that provided input
regarding this paper, is acknowledged and appreciated.

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS
1.0 INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................1

2.0 BACKGROUND CONCERNING POTENTIAL FAILURE MODES

ANALYSIS WORK.................................................................................................1

3.0 PFMA AS RELATED TO ROUTINE INSTRUMENTATION AND VISUAL

MONITORING PROGRAMS .................................................................................3

4.0 PFM – MONITORING RELATIONSHIP FOR VARIOUS POTENTIAL

FAILURE MODES ..................................................................................................4
4.1 PFM – Monitoring Relationship for Seepage-Related Potential Failure
Modes for Embankment Dams Under Normal Operating Conditions and Flood
Loading Condition ...................................................................................................5
4.2 PFM – Monitoring Relationship for Earthquake-Related Potential
Failure Modes for Embankment Dams ....................................................................7
4.3 PFM – Monitoring Relationship for Concrete Dam Potential Failure
Modes Under Normal, Flood, and Earthquake Loading Conditions .......................9
4.4 PFM – Monitoring Relationship for Flood-Related Potential Failure
Modes Associated with Spillway Failure ..............................................................12

5.0 SURVEILLANCE/MONITORING DATA RELATIONSHIP WITH

IDENTIFYING AND EVALUATING POTENTIAL FAILURE MODES .........13

6.0 CONCLUDING REMARKS .................................................................................14

7.0 REFERENCES ......................................................................................................14

APPENDIX A ....................................................................................................................16

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 1.0 INTRODUCTION
Potential Failure Modes Analysis (PFMA) and similar processes have become a
fundamental part of dam safety program efforts for many organizations in the United
States and around the world. In the PFMA process, the credible threats to the safety of a
dam (the potential failure modes) are identified considering all loading conditions, so that
appropriate responses can be formulated to address those threats. Responses could
involve dam modification, further investigation/analysis of the matter, restrictions in
reservoir operation, and/or improved emergency action planning, but in many instances
the response is simply development and implementation of a dam safety monitoring and
surveillance program aimed at specifically addressing the threats identified during the
PFMA effort.

The goal of the PFMA process is to reduce the potential for failure of the dam, and the
resulting adverse consequences due to the identified threats. Adverse consequences could
involve uncontrolled reservoir releases or dam failure, which could result in loss of life
and substantial property damage.

Routine dam safety surveillance and monitoring methods/programs using instrumented

and visual monitoring methods are critical to the PFMA process in two basic ways: (1) to
help in identifying potential dam safety threats (the potential failure modes), and (2) to
detect the possible initiation/progression of a potential failure mode so that timely actions
can be taken to prevent failure. This paper will describe the relationship between the
PFMA process and instrumented and visual monitoring of dams.

2.0 BACKGROUND CONCERNING

POTENTIAL FAILURE MODES ANALYSIS WORK
In one form or another, the concept of delineating potential failure modes for dams has
been around for a number of years. The “Federal Guidelines for Dam Safety Glossary of
Terms,” defines a potential failure mode (PFM) as:

“[a] physically plausible process for dam failure resulting from an existing
inadequacy or defect related to a natural foundation condition, the dam or
appurtenant structures design, the construction, the materials incorporated, the
operations and maintenance, or aging process, which can lead to an uncontrolled
release of the reservoir.” (FEMA, 2004).

It is believed that the first effort to directly tie instrumented and visual monitoring efforts
to potential failure modes was by the U. S. Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation) in the
early 1990s. Reclamation’s Dam Safety Office was concerned about the effectiveness and
efficiency of its dam instrumentation program and initiated a study effort in this area. The
study team quickly recognized that to assess the effectiveness of a project’s
instrumentation and visual surveillance program they needed to determine the intended
purpose of the monitoring program. The team concluded that for existing dams,

1
monitoring efforts should be directed towards the identified potential failure modes for
the structure.

Reclamation developed the “Performance Parameter Process,” which involves the

following three basic steps:

1. Identify the most likely potential failure modes for the dam and associated
structures.

2. Identify the key monitoring parameters that will provide the best indication
of the possible development of each of the identified potential failure
modes, and define an instrumentation and visual monitoring program to
gather the necessary information and data.

3. Define the ranges of expected performance relative to the instrumentation

and visual monitoring program, and define the action to be taken in the
event of unexpected performance.

The Performance Parameter Process (Process) and the reports developed from use of the
Process were intended to address the following question: “What should be done to
properly look after the dam in the future, from a dam safety perspective, given what we
know today?” Beginning in 1994, Reclamation developed Performance Parameters
Technical Memoranda (PPTMs), and over the course of the next five years, a PPTM was
developed for the majority of Reclamation dams.

Beginning in 2000, Reclamation started preparing Comprehensive Facility Review (CFR)

Reports, which included delineation or updating of a dam’s potential failure modes and
future monitoring program, along with records review and evaluation, a site exam, and a
risk analysis for the dam. The CFR process has been adjusted in various ways since its
inception, but the basic work concerning definition of potential failure modes and
definition of an appropriate monitoring program in light of the identified potential failure
modes, has remained consistent over time.

In 2002, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) initiated efforts that led to
the development of the Potential Failure Modes Analysis (PFMA) program. The PFMA
process is used to identify the potential failure modes at each component of a project, and
the project as a whole, under static (normal), flood, and earthquake loading conditions,
and to assess those potential failure modes to determine if they are sufficiently likely to
warrant new or continued monitoring/surveillance efforts, or to possibly warrant new
remediation or repair efforts. The PFMA procedure begins with review of the existing
information on the project, including design reports, analyses, rehabilitation reports, soils
information, past inspection reports, construction photographs, construction
documentation, etc. The PFMA includes a site visit followed by discussion of available
information. The discussion is informal and involves a team of individuals with
knowledge of the project’s features and operation, as well as individuals with expertise in
a variety of areas including civil, geotechnical, mechanical, controls systems and

2
hydraulics engineering, geology, and operations and maintenance of the specific project.
First-hand input is received from field and operating personnel for the dam. Potential
failure modes (PFMs) are then identified and prioritized based on their significance in
terms of the need for awareness, monitoring and surveillance, analyses and investigation,
operational changes, structural repairs, and/or modifications. In all respects, the process
currently used in the PFMA process by FERC parallels the basic process currently used
by Reclamation in their CFR work to carry out potential failure mode evaluations.

The PFMA process can help to:

 Enhance the dam safety visual surveillance/inspection process and the

instrumented monitoring program by helping to focus on the most critical
areas of concern unique to the dam under consideration.
 Identify PFMs not covered by commonly used analytical methods (e.g. slope
stability and seismic analyses), such as seepage-related potential failure
modes.
 Identify PFMs associated with possible misoperation, or other human
oversights or errors.
 Identify shortcomings and oversights in data, information, or analyses
necessary to evaluate dam safety and each PFM.
 Identify the most effective dam safety risk reduction measures.
 Document the results of the process for guidance regarding future dam safety
inspections and future monitoring of the project.

3.0 PFMA AS RELATED TO ROUTINE INSTRUMENTATION

AND VISUAL MONITORING PROGRAMS
The potential failure mode discussions that occur during the PFMA process include a
focused discussion of potential problems by a multidisciplinary team of engineers and
operators that leads to a greatly improved understanding of the events that could occur at
a dam that could lead to its failure. This understanding then allows an assessment of
efforts that could be undertaken to:

(1) Reduce the potential for development of the identified potential failure
modes.

(2) Improve the detection capability with respect to initiation/early

development of any of the identified potential failure modes.

A dam’s routine instrumentation and visual monitoring program directly relates to item
(2) listed above. Focused monitoring can detect a developing problem at an early stage so
that steps can be taken to avert a dam failure. Alternatively, timely detection can enable a
timely evacuation that can reduce loss of life in the event dam failure cannot be averted.
(ASCE 2000)

3
Data from instrumented and visual monitoring programs can also be used to better
understand the potential for development of a potential failure mode. If a previously
unrecognized potential failure mode is identified in the PFMA process, information
associated with having a full understanding of the potential failure mode may be lacking.
Instrumented and visual monitoring programs may result in information that improves the
understanding of the potential risks associated with a potential failure mode. In some
instances, the level of concern about the potential failure mode may be greatly reduced
when monitoring data are available concerning key parameters related to the potential
failure mode.

Outcomes of the PFMA as related to surveillance and monitoring can include:

 Identification of enhancements to the surveillance and monitoring programs,

and tailoring of existing programs to focus monitoring efforts on early
identification of the initiation/development of PFMs;
 Identification of gaps in data, information and analyses, that may prevent
characterization of the significance of a PFM; and
 Identification of risk reduction opportunities applicable to the surveillance and
monitoring programs, operations, etc.

The PFMA process also educates all parties involved with the dam’s performance and
operations regarding the dam’s instrumentation and monitoring program, and how this
program is critical in the identification of specific symptoms, behaviors, or evidence of
conditions that might warn of an initiating or developing failure. In addition, the
importance of “general health monitoring” for the dam is emphasized. “General health
monitoring” includes high value, relatively low cost activities, such as drain flow
monitoring at concrete dams, surveying of settlement and deflection monitoring
monuments at both embankment and concrete dams, etc., which provide valuable
diagnostic information about key aspects of the dam’s performance at relatively low cost.

If not already available, documentation of the project’s visual and instrumented

monitoring program should be developed for each project as a result of the PFMA
process. This would include documentation of visual surveillance requirements and
procedures; details of the instruments installed and their purpose(s); instrumentation
monitoring procedures; reporting requirements; expected ranges which may be
established for some of the features; and procedures to be used to address results that fall
outside those expected ranges.

4.0 PFM – MONITORING RELATIONSHIP FOR VARIOUS

POTENTIAL FAILURE MODES
Up to this point, the discussion of the relationship between potential failure modes and
monitoring programs at dams has been general. To better illustrate this relationship, four
categories of potential failure modes will now be explored, including specific discussion
concerning surveillance and monitoring that may be appropriate with respect to the
potential failure modes (PFMs). It is hoped that through the use of these examples, the

4
process associated with developing effective surveillance and monitoring programs will
be illustrated.

The four categories of potential failure modes explored herein are as follows:

 Seepage-related potential failure modes for embankment dams under

normal and flood loading conditions;
 Earthquake-related potential failure modes for embankment dams;
 Potential failure modes for concrete dams under all loading conditions;
and
 Flood-related potential failure modes associated with spillway failure.

4.1 PFM – Monitoring Relationship for Seepage-Related Potential Failure

Modes for Embankment Dams Under Normal Operating Conditions and
Flood Loading Conditions

Failure due to seepage-related problems accounts for roughly half of embankment dam
failures historically (Foster et al., 2000). Seepage-related issues can arise due to poor
designs; poor construction practices; inappropriate drilling methods; a lack of protective
filter zones; poor compaction of embankment materials adjacent to conduits or
instrumentation installations; animal burrows; roots of woody vegetation in the
embankment; embankment cracking due to excessive settlements, and others. A wide
variety of potential failure modes relate to poorly controlled seepage.

Table 1 below shows some monitoring considerations associated with one seepage-
related potential failure mode, for illustration purposes. Table A1 in Appendix A provides
similar information for a number of other common seepage-related potential failure
modes for embankment dams. Tables 1 and A1 are intended only as examples of
monitoring activities that might be undertaken to address the potential failure modes. The
monitoring program developed for a seepage-related potential failure mode for a dam
needs to be site-specific for the issues and circumstances for that dam and damsite, and
therefore could be significantly different than what is indicated in Tables 1 and A1.
Additionally, the specific circumstances of a dam and damsite will also need to be
considered when determining the appropriate monitoring frequencies.

5
 Table 1.
Monitoring Considerations Regarding a Seepage-Related Potential Failure Mode
for an Embankment Dam
(See Table A1 in the Appendix for information regarding some other seepage-
related potential failure modes for embankment dams.)
Potential Failure Monitoring Considerations
Mode (PFM)
Seepage-related failure  Perform regular visual inspections of the dam and dam
due to breaching, site that include inspection of: (1) the downstream slope
caused by flow and toe area of the dam embankment, looking for
through the dam animal burrows, sinkholes, depressions, areas of unusual
embankment that or excessive settlements, new or increased seepage,
erodes and transports changes at existing wet areas, and any evidence of
embankment material material being transported (such as turbid or discolored
and exits at the water, sediment deposits along flow paths, etc.); (2) the
downstream slope of dam crest, looking for animal burrows, sinkholes,
the dam or into the toe depressions, and areas of unusual settlement; (3) the
drain system upstream slope, looking for signs of animal burrows,
sinkholes, depressions, and areas of unusual settlements;
and (4) the reservoir water surface, looking for
whirlpools. Photographic documentation should occur
when unusual/unexpected conditions are observed.
 Regularly monitor toe drain flows and seepage flows
associated with flow through the dam embankment,
looking for increased flows, and particularly looking for
any evidence of material being transported by the flow.
 Regularly monitor water pressures or levels from
piezometers and observation wells in the dam
embankment and foundation, looking for increasing or
decreasing trends, or any otherwise anomalous data.
 During a major flood event, when reservoir levels are
unusually high, perform frequent visual and instrumented
monitoring as described above.
 Occasionally perform camera inspections of the toe drain
system to ensure its integrity.

In general, monitoring water pressures and subsurface water levels at a damsite provides
valuable information towards understanding seepage patterns at the site. However, it is
important to understand that these data are associated with discrete points and most likely
the monitoring locations will not happen to be right along, or in close proximity to, the
flow path of a developing seepage-related problem. Consequently, regular visual
inspections combined with monitoring of all seepage flows and drain flows, provide more
valuable monitoring information and data regarding the possible initiation/development
of seepage-related potential failure modes. This monitoring, in conjunction with

6
monitoring of water pressures and subsurface water levels, will help detect changes at all
areas of the site, and not just at a limited number of monitored points where water
pressure monitoring instruments happen to be located. It also is worth noting that drilling
in embankment dams can possibly result in hydraulic fracturing of materials, if not done
carefully, with proper equipment, methods, and controls. Consequently such drilling to
install instruments such as piezometers or observation wells in or beneath embankment
dams should only be carried out when the risks and benefits of the work are carefully and
fully assessed, and appropriate steps are taken so that hydraulic fracturing of materials is
avoided.

4.2 PFM – Monitoring Relationship for Earthquake-Related Potential Failure

Modes for Embankment Dams

Embankment dams subjected to earthquake shaking historically have shown a wide range
of responses from rare cases of rapid catastrophic failure to no damage (Seed et al.,
1977). It is important to regularly collect and maintain baseline information including
instrumentation readings, visual observations, survey information, etc. so that a prompt
assessment of earthquake-related changes and damage to the dam can be effectively made
after the earthquake.

Table 2 below shows some monitoring considerations associated with one earthquake-
related potential failure mode for embankment dams, for illustration purposes. Table A2
in Appendix A provides similar information for a number of other earthquake-related
potential failure modes for embankment dams. Again, as has been indicated previously,
these tables are intended only as examples of monitoring activities that might be
undertaken, and the specific circumstances at a damsite need to be considered so that an
appropriate, customized monitoring program is provided for any particular potential
failure mode for any particular dam. The specific circumstances of a dam and damsite
will also need to be considered when determining the appropriate monitoring frequencies
(which are not specified in Tables 2 and A2).

7
 Table 2.
Monitoring Considerations Regarding an Earthquake-Related Potential Failure
Mode for an Embankment Dam
(See Table A2 in the Appendix for information regarding some other earthquake-
related potential failure modes for embankment dams.)
Potential Failure Monitoring Considerations
Mode (PFM)
Seepage-related  Periodically obtain readings at all seepage and drain flow
failure in the monitoring locations, to maintain baseline information to
aftermath of an use for comparison purposes in the aftermath of significant
earthquake due to the seismic shaking at the damsite.
formation of a  In the aftermath of significant seismic shaking at the
transverse crack in damsite, perform an immediate visual inspection of the
the dam, where dam that includes inspection of: (1) the downstream slope
seepage flows through and toe area of the dam embankment, and downstream
the crack and areas, looking for signs of new seepage or wet areas,
eventually erodes a changes at existing seepage/wet areas, and any evidence
breach in the dam. that material may be being transported with any seepage
flows (such as discolored or turbid water, sediment
deposits, etc.); (2) the dam crest, looking for sinkholes,
depressions, longitudinal cracks, horizontal displacements,
and, in particular, for evidence of transverse cracks; (3) the
upstream slope for signs of sinkholes, depressions, and
areas of unusual or excessive settlements or deformations;
and (4) the reservoir water surface for whirlpools.
 In the aftermath of significant seismic shaking at the
damsite, promptly obtain readings at all seepage and drain
flow monitoring locations and evaluate the data for
changed conditions from normal historical performance. [It
may be appropriate to automate the monitoring of some of
these installations, and consideration might be given to
employing a seismic trigger that results in frequent readings
following significant seismic shaking.]
 Consider whether seismic monitoring equipment with
telemetry would be appropriate for the damsite.

Whether the seismic shaking at a damsite is “significant,” warranting an inspection of the

dam, can be determined in various ways, including using guidance information from
ICOLD Bulletin 62 (1988): “an earthquake occurs or one has been reported to have
occurred with Richter magnitude of 4.0 or greater within a 25 km radius, 5.0 or greater
within 50 km, 6.0 or greater within 80 km, 7.0 or greater within 125 km, or 8.0 or greater
within a 200 km radius from the site.” Other criteria include using a measured or
estimated peak ground acceleration at the damsite (e.g. inspect if 0.05g or greater), and
using customized fragility values developed for the dam in conjunction with measured or
estimated peak ground acceleration information. If seismic shaking is felt at the damsite,

8
then such seismic shaking should always be viewed to be “significant,” warranting a
prompt inspection of the dam.

A prompt response, when warranted in the aftermath of an earthquake, is imperative to

facilitate quick detection of changed conditions at the damsite. This will allow immediate
emergency evacuations of the reservoir and/or the downstream population-at-risk. Where
the risk of earthquake-related dam failure is significant and seismic events are prevalent,
automated and/or remote detection capabilities may be appropriate. Clearly such
capabilities must be designed to operate during and following a seismic event and still
deliver the required information to personnel responsible for monitoring of the project.

Several key concepts emerge when thinking about a dam safety monitoring program
associated with potential failure under earthquake loading conditions:

1. The routine monitoring program often involves obtaining and maintaining a

good baseline of “pre-earthquake” conditions, so that whenever an earthquake
may occur, sufficient information is available for comparison to post-event
conditions to determine what changes that may have occurred as a result of
the earthquake.

2. Nothing can be done during the seismic event to prevent dam failure.
Hopefully earthquake-related issues with the dam have been recognized and
addressed through the PFMA process prior to the occurrence of the
earthquake. In a highly seismic area, development of a post-earthquake
recovery plan might be appropriate.

3. It may be appropriate to consider installing seismic monitoring equipment

with telemetry at the damsite. Such equipment would be helpful in
determining the intensity of shaking at the site and thus whether a post-
earthquake inspection is warranted, and the relative urgency of such an
inspection for prioritizing an organizations’s post-earthquake response when a
number of facilities may have potentially been affected by the earthquake.
Also the information obtained from strong motion recordings can be helpful in
evaluating the validity of the assumptions used in dynamic analysis work done
for the dam. (Ik-Soo et al., 2009)

4.3 PFM – Monitoring Relationship for Concrete Dam Potential Failure Modes
Under Normal, Flood, and Earthquake Loading Conditions

The majority of failures of concrete dams are caused by problems in their foundations
(CETS, 1983). Foundation deficiencies that can cause foundation-related failures at
concrete dams include weak bedding planes, foliation, low-strength layers in the
foundation, shear zones, solution cavities, and weak contacts between different rock
units. Weaknesses in the foundations of concrete structures should be treated during the
design and construction of the project. However, one of the valuable aspects of the
PFMA process is the ability to identify gaps in available information and analyses,

9
particularly with respect to older dams. Construction photographs can indicate areas of
weakness in the foundation, and can be quite valuable.

Another important category of potential failure modes for concrete dams is the potential
for sliding or separation along lift lines within the dam. Flood and/or earthquake loads
can add sufficient driving force to transform a marginally stable condition under normal
loading conditions into a dam failure.

For many concrete dam failure modes, one failure mechanism can translate into three
potential failure modes; one mode for static (normal) loading, a second mode under flood
loading, and a third mode under earthquake loading.

Table 3 below shows some monitoring considerations associated with one concrete dam
potential failure mode, for illustration purposes. Table A3 in Appendix A provides
similar information for a number of other potential failure modes for concrete dams.
Again, these tables are intended only as examples of monitoring activities that might be
undertaken, and the specific circumstances at a damsite need to be considered so that an
appropriate, customized monitoring program is provided for any particular potential
failure mode for any particular dam. The specific circumstances of a dam and damsite
will also need to be considered when determining the appropriate monitoring frequencies
which are not specified here.

Table 3.
Monitoring Considerations for a Concrete Dam Potential Failure Mode
(See Table A3 in the Appendix for information regarding some other concrete dam
potential failure modes)
Potential Failure Monitoring Considerations
Mode (PFM)
Loss of abutment  Regularly monitor foundation drain flows from abutment
support, due to areas, looking for unusual increases or decreases in flows.
movement of a block  Regularly monitor water pressures from abutment
or wedge of abutment piezometers, looking for unusual increases or decreases in
rock that leads to water levels.
overstressing and  Regularly monitor foundation uplift pressures to make
failure of the dam’s sure that pressures near the abutments are within expected
concrete and sudden performance limits.
dam failure. This  Regularly monitor abutment seepage flows, looking for
potential failure mode unusual increases or decreases from historical patterns.
could conceivably  Regularly visually inspect the downstream face of the
initiate under normal dam and the gallery walls, floors, and ceilings for
operating conditions, evidence of new cracks or significant changes at existing
but the greatest cracks.
concerns exist in the  Provide scribe marks in gallery wall and floor locations at
event of seismic each joint between blocks in the dam that can be visually
shaking or additional inspected for evidence of relative offsets. Regularly
reservoir loads in a inspect the scribe marks for such offsets.

10
 Table 3.
Monitoring Considerations for a Concrete Dam Potential Failure Mode
(See Table A3 in the Appendix for information regarding some other concrete dam
potential failure modes)
Potential Failure Monitoring Considerations
Mode (PFM)
flood that may be  Periodically perform surveys of structural measurement
sufficient to lead to points on the dam, looking for evidence of unusual
initiation of movement settlements or deflections, and to maintain baseline
of the rock block or survey information to use for comparison purposes in the
wedge and consequent aftermath of an earthquake or major flood event.
dam failure.  Regularly monitor gate operations and gate testing results
for difficulties in operation which may be caused by dam
deformations resulting from foundation movements,
misalignment and/or movement of monoliths.
 In the aftermath of significant seismic shaking at the
damsite, perform an immediate visual inspection of the
dam (looking for changed cracking conditions) and scribe
marks (looking for offsets), and promptly obtain readings
of the foundation drain flows, abutment piezometers,
foundation uplift pressures, and abutment seepage flows.
Perform a survey of the structural measurement points if
appropriate.
 During a major flood event, perform frequent
instrumented monitoring of foundation drain flows,
abutment piezometers, foundation uplift pressures, and
abutment seepage flows, and perform frequent visual
monitoring for possible scribe mark offsets and changed
crack conditions at the dam. Perform a survey of the
structural measurement points at the conclusion of the
flood event, as appropriate.

As seen in Tables 3 and A3, the potential failure modes for concrete dams can relate to
possibly unidentified foundation weaknesses (e.g., sliding planes, blocks or wedges of
abutment rock that could displace, faults in the foundation that could be active, etc.)
which may pose a threat to dam safety. Monitoring to address such PFMs includes
vigilant visual surveillance programs, documentation of observations to create a historic
log of responses during various loading conditions, measurement point surveys, water
pressure data, seepage data, and flow records and performance monitoring information
regarding foundation drains. Re-evaluation of the dam’s stability based on postulated
conditions may be required to provide a sense of the predicted response of the dam, and
to identify the need to address potential shortcomings.

Regular observations during high reservoir levels and following the passage of a flood
event provide knowledge of the response of the dam under these conditions.

11
Documentation of observations provides a sense of the dam’s ability to safely withstand
extreme loading conditions.

4.4 PFM – Monitoring Relationship for Flood-Related Potential Failure Modes

Associated with Spillway Failure

Spillway erosion failure historically has been shown to be the root cause of nearly half of
the embankment dam failures that have occurred during flood events (ASCE/USCOLD,
1975). A number of potential failure modes can be identified relative to this failure mode
category.

Table 4 below shows some monitoring considerations associated with one spillway-
related potential failure mode, for illustration purposes. Table A4 in Appendix A provides
similar information for a number of other spillway-related potential failure modes. Again,
these tables are intended only as examples of monitoring activities that might be
undertaken, and the specific circumstances at a damsite need to be considered so that an
appropriate, customized monitoring program is provided for any particular potential
failure mode for any particular dam. The specific circumstances of a dam and damsite
will also need to be considered when determining the appropriate monitoring frequencies,
which are not specified here.

Table 4.
Monitoring Considerations Regarding a Flood-Related Potential Failure Mode
Associated with Spillway Failure
(See Table A4 in the Appendix for information regarding some other flood-related
potential failure modes associated with spillway failure)
Potential Failure Monitoring Considerations
Mode (PFM)
Spillway flow surfaces  Perform routine visual inspections of the flow surfaces
have flaws such that for offsets at joints, areas of deteriorated concrete, and
when subjected to other imperfections in the flow surfaces that could give
large flows, cavitation rise to this PFM when large discharges through the
or stagnation results, spillway are made during a flood event. Also observe for
leading to structural debris that needs to be removed from the spillway.
damage to the spillway  Perform routine visual inspections in the spillway gallery
and initiating a to identify anomalies, displacements, etc. which may
headward erosion contribute to or be indicative of irregular flow surfaces.
process that eventually  Perform close surveillance during spillway discharges for
reaches the reservoir evidence of unusual flow patterns that could indicate
and results in problems with flow surfaces (such as rooster tails,
uncontrolled reservoir obvious flow irregularities at joints, etc.) to (1) document
releases performance for future analysis of this PFM, and (2)
detect indications that this PFM may have initiated and
could develop to the point that spillway failure is possible
(for dam failure warning reasons). Surveillance efforts
should include photographs and videos.

12
 Table 4.
Monitoring Considerations Regarding a Flood-Related Potential Failure Mode
Associated with Spillway Failure
(See Table A4 in the Appendix for information regarding some other flood-related
potential failure modes associated with spillway failure)
Potential Failure Monitoring Considerations
Mode (PFM)
 Perform a careful post-flood inspection to assess damage
to the spillway that may have occurred (to determine if a
re-evaluation of the risks associated with this PFM is
warranted).

For this category of potential failure modes, several key concepts emerge when thinking
about a dam safety monitoring program:

1. The routine monitoring program often involves obtaining and maintaining a

good baseline of pre-flood conditions, so that when a flood event occurs,
sufficient information is available for comparison to post-event conditions to
determine what changes may have occurred during the flood event.

2. Careful monitoring during small flood events can identify performance

problems that could result in potential threats to dam safety during a large
event. Such “full-scale prototype testing” can provide a unique opportunity to
obtain valuable information if advance preparations have been made to
document performance during small flood events.

3. Nothing can be done during the flood event to prevent spillway failure.
(Hopefully problems with the spillway have been recognized and addressed
through the PFMA process prior to the occurrence of the large flood event.)
During the flood event, the monitoring work involves documenting
performance and being in a position to recognize when spillway failure may
be imminent such that timely warnings can be issued and evacuation initiated
for people located downstream of the dam.

5.0 SURVEILLANCE/MONITORING DATA RELATIONSHIP

WITH IDENTIFYING AND EVALUATING
POTENTIAL FAILURE MODES
The information provided in the previous four sections focused on detection of the
possible initiation/development of identified potential failure modes, or detection of
conditions that might make such initiation/development more likely. As noted previously,
another role of instrumented monitoring and visual surveillance is to evaluate the
significance and probability of a particular potential failure mode and its related risk.
Information from instrumented and visual monitoring programs can improve the
understanding of the potential risks associated with a potential failure mode.

13
Tables 1 through 4 and Tables A1 through A4 provide a good sense of monitoring
information that may be central to a better understanding of the various potential failure
modes listed. In some cases, instrumentation data will not help identify potential failure
modes. In others, the availability or lack of availability of particular monitoring data can
have a big impact on PFMA conclusions. Often, some but not all desired monitoring
information may be available, and the PFMA team may find that the available
information: (1) is sufficient to reach important conclusions about the potential failure
mode, (2) is insufficient for reaching any conclusions, or (3) is useful, but important
issues remain unresolved. A possible outcome from the PFMA process may be that more
performance monitoring information/data are needed and the situation will need to be re-
visited when sufficient new data become available.

6.0 CONCLUDING REMARKS

Routine dam safety surveillance and monitoring methods/programs using instrumented
and visual monitoring methods are important to the PFMA process in two basic ways:
(1) to help in identifying potential dam safety threats during the PFMA work itself, and
(2) as an output of the PFMA, monitoring can provide timely detection of the
initiation/progression of potential failure modes so that timely actions can be taken to
prevent dam failure, or allow timely evacuation so that loss of life is minimized.

The quality of the surveillance and monitoring efforts will determine the extent to which
the potential benefits are achieved. With clear focus on the ultimate goals of the PFMA
activity, appropriate expertise and experience, and a willingness to be creative and
unconventional in approach when necessary, the benefits expected from the surveillance
and monitoring program should be achievable and an effective surveillance and
monitoring program can be developed and implemented.

7.0 REFERENCES
ASCE/USCOLD (1975), “Lessons from Dam Incidents, USA,” Prepared by the
Committee on Failures and Accidents to Large Dams, Jacob F. Redlinger, Chairman,
United States Committee on Large Dams, and American Society of Civil Engineers,
1975.

ASCE/USCOLD (1988), “Lessons from Dam Incidents, USA-II”, United States

Committee on Large Dams and American Society of Civil Engineers, 1988.

ASCE (2000), “Guidelines for Instrumentation and Measurements for Monitoring Dam
Performance”, Reston Virginia, 2000.

CETS (1983), “Safety of Existing Dams: Evaluation and Improvement,” Commission on

Engineering and Technical Systems, Report Prepared by Committee on the Safety of
Existing Dams, National Research Council, 1983.

14
FEMA (2004), “The Federal Guidelines for Dam Safety: Glossary of Terms,” prepared
by the Interagency Committee on Dam Safety, FEMA 148.
http://www.ferc.gov/industries/hydropower/safety/guidelines/fema-148.pdf

FERC (2005), “Engineering Guidelines for the Evaluation of Hydropower Projects –

Chapter 14, Dam Safety Performance Monitoring Program.”
http://www.ferc.gov/industries/hydropower/safety/guidelines/eng-guide/chap14.pdf

FERC (2008), “Appendix J – Dam Safety Surveillance and Monitoring Plan Outline;
Appendix K – Dam Safety Surveillance and Monitoring Report Outline,” prepared as part
of Engineering Guidelines for the Evaluation of Hydropower Projects, Chapter 14.
http://www.ferc.gov/industries/hydropower/safety/guidelines/eng-guide/appendices-j-
k.pdf

Foster, Mark; Fell, Robin; and Spannagle, M. (2000), “The Statistics of Embankment
Dam Failures and Accidents,” Canadian Geotechnical Journal, 2000.

ICOLD (1988), “Inspection of Dams – Following Earthquake – Guidelines,” Bulletin 62,

1988.

Ik-Soo, Ha, and Oh Byung-Hyunh (2009), “Inverse Calculation of Shearwave Velocity of

Rockfill Zone Using Microearthquake Records”, United States Society on Dams 29th
Annual Conference, Nashville, Tennessee, April 2009.

Seed, H. Bolton, F.I.Makdisi, P. de Alba (1977), “The Performance of Earth Dams

During Earthquakes”, College of Engineering, University of California, Berkeley,
California, Earthquake Engineering Research Center Report No. UCB/EERC-77/20,
August, 1977.

Stateler, Jay N., Von Thun, L., Scott, Gregg, and Boernge, Jim (1995), “Development of
Performance Parameters for Dam Safety Monitoring,” Proceedings of the 1995 Annual
Conference of the Association of State Dam Safety Officials, September 1995.

15
 APPENDIX A
ADDITIONAL EXAMPLE TABLES RELATING POTENTIAL FAILURE
MODES AND MONITORING CONSIDERATIONS

The tables included in this appendix are intended only as examples of monitoring
activities that might be undertaken with respect to the indicated potential failure modes,
and the specific circumstances at a damsite need to be considered so that an appropriate,
customized monitoring program is provided for any particular potential failure mode for
any particular dam. The specific circumstances of a dam and damsite will also need to be
considered when determining the appropriate monitoring frequencies (which are not
specified in the tables included in this appendix). The tables included in this appendix
supplement the information provided previously in Tables 1, 2, 3, and 4.

Important Note: The tables included in this appendix may appear to be daunting in
terms of the volume of information presented, and also can be seen to have numerous
instances of repeated material in the “Monitoring Considerations” column (since similar
information can apply to a number of different potential failure modes). However, the
intent of this appendix is to give the reader the opportunity to access information
regarding the particular potential failure mode (or potential failure modes) of current
interest to the reader, as opposed to providing a write-up that is intended to be read from
beginning to end. To effectively meet the reader’s needs with respect to a particular
potential failure mode, the information provided must be complete, tailored specifically
to that potential failure mode, and not rely on the reader having also read information
provided regarding other potential failure modes in this appendix. With this intent and
understanding in mind, it is hoped that this appendix might be seen as more in the vein of
an encyclopedia than a novel, and is found to provide a useful resource for potential
failure mode-specific discussions to meet the reader’s needs as they might arise both now
and in the future.

Table A1.
(Supplements information previously provided in Table 1)
Monitoring Considerations Regarding Seepage-Related Potential Failure Modes
for Embankment Dams Under Normal Operating Conditions and Flood Loading
Conditions
Potential Failure Monitoring Considerations
Mode (PFM)
Seepage-related failure  Perform regular visual inspections of the dam and
due to breaching, damsite that include inspection of: (1) the downstream
caused by flow toe area, areas downstream of the dam, and
through the dam downstream abutment areas, looking for sinkholes,
foundation or dam depressions, signs of new seepage or wet areas, changes
abutments that erodes at existing seepage/wet areas, and any evidence that
and transports material may be being transported with any seepage flows
foundation or abutment (such as discolored or turbid water, sediment deposits,
material and exits in etc.); (2) the upstream and downstream slopes and the
areas downstream of dam crest, looking for sinkholes, depressions, and areas

16
 Table A1.
(Supplements information previously provided in Table 1)
Monitoring Considerations Regarding Seepage-Related Potential Failure Modes
for Embankment Dams Under Normal Operating Conditions and Flood Loading
Conditions
Potential Failure Monitoring Considerations
Mode (PFM)
the dam or at of unusual settlement or deflection (e.g. deformed
downstream abutment guardrails); and (3) of the reservoir water surface,
areas looking for whirlpools. Photographic documentation
should occur when unusual/unexpected conditions are
or observed.
 Regularly monitor seepage flows associated with flow
Seepage-related failure exiting in downstream or abutment areas looking for
due to breaching, increased flows that are out of line with historical
caused by flow behavior, and particularly looking for any evidence of
through the dam possible material transport by the flow (such as
embankment and into discolored or turbid water, sediment deposits along flow
the dam foundation or paths, behind weirs, in weir boxes, etc.).
dam abutments that  Regularly monitor water pressures from piezometers and
erodes and transports observation wells located in the dam foundation and areas
embankment material downstream of the dam, looking for increasing or
and exits in areas decreasing trends, or any otherwise anomalous data.
downstream of the dam  During a major flood event, when reservoir levels are
or at downstream unusually high, perform frequent visual and instrumented
abutment areas monitoring as described above.
Seepage-related failure  Perform regular visual inspections of the dam and
due to breaching, damsite in the vicinity of the alignment of the outlet
caused by flow works that include inspection of: (1) the downstream
through the dam slope and toe area of the dam embankment, and areas
embankment or downstream of the outlet works discharge structure,
foundation along the looking for animal burrows, sinkholes, depressions, areas
alignment of the of unusual settlements, signs of new seepage or wet areas,
outlet works that changes at existing seepage/wet areas, and any evidence
erodes and transports that material may be being transported with any seepage
embankment or flows (such as discolored or turbid water, sediment
foundation material and deposits, etc.); (2) the dam crest and upstream slope,
exits in the general looking for animal burrows, sinkholes, depressions, and
vicinity of the areas of unusual settlement or deflection (e.g. deformed
downstream end of the guardrails); and (3) the reservoir water surface, looking
outlet works for whirlpools. Photographic documentation should occur
when unusual/unexpected conditions are observed.
 Regularly monitor toe drain flows and seepage flows
associated with flow through the dam embankment or
foundation in the vicinity of the outlet works discharge
structure, looking for increased flows or decreased flows

17
 Table A1.
(Supplements information previously provided in Table 1)
Monitoring Considerations Regarding Seepage-Related Potential Failure Modes
for Embankment Dams Under Normal Operating Conditions and Flood Loading
Conditions
Potential Failure Monitoring Considerations
Mode (PFM)
that are out of line with historical behavior, and
particularly looking for any evidence of possible material
transport by the flow (such as discolored or turbid water,
sediment deposits along flow paths, behind weirs, in weir
boxes, etc.).
 Regularly monitor water pressures from piezometers and
observation wells located in the dam embankment and
foundation in the vicinity of the outlet works, looking for
anomalous data that are inconsistent with historical
performance.
 During a major flood event, when reservoir levels are
unusually high, perform frequent visual and instrumented
monitoring as described above.
Seepage-related failure  Perform regular visual inspections of flow discharged
due to breaching, from the outlet works, looking for any evidence of
caused by flow possible material transport by the flow (such as
through the dam discolored or turbid water, sediment deposits along flow
embankment or paths, etc.).
foundation that exits  Perform regular visual inspections of the dam and
into the outlet works damsite in the vicinity of the alignment of the outlet
through cracks, joint works that include inspection of: (1) of the dam crest,
openings, etc. and upstream slope, and downstream slope, looking for
erodes and transports sinkholes, depressions, and areas of unusual settlements,
embankment or and (2) the reservoir water surface, looking for
foundation material whirlpools. Photographic documentation should occur
into and through the when unusual/unexpected conditions are observed.
outlet works  Regularly monitor water pressures from piezometers and
observation wells located in the dam embankment and
foundation in the vicinity of the outlet works, looking for
anomalous data that are inconsistent with historical
performance.
 During a major flood event, when reservoir levels are
unusually high, perform frequent visual and instrumented
monitoring as described above.
 Occasionally perform camera inspections or dive
inspections of the interior of the outlet works, looking for
evidence of cracks, deterioration, joint openings,
settlement/collapse, blockage, etc. and any evidence of
seepage water entering the outlet works conduit.

18
 Table A1.
(Supplements information previously provided in Table 1)
Monitoring Considerations Regarding Seepage-Related Potential Failure Modes
for Embankment Dams Under Normal Operating Conditions and Flood Loading
Conditions
Potential Failure Monitoring Considerations
Mode (PFM)
Seepage-related failure  Perform regular visual inspections of the dam in the
due to breaching, vicinity of the alignment of the outlet works that include
caused by pressurized inspection of: (1) the downstream slope and toe area of
flow exiting from the the dam embankment, and areas downstream of the
outlet works conduit outlet works discharge structure, looking for sinkholes,
that erodes and depressions, areas of unusual settlements, signs of new
transports embankment seepage or wet areas, changes at existing seepage/wet
or foundation material areas, and any evidence that material may be being
along the alignment of transported with any seepage flows (such as discolored or
the outlet works and turbid water, sediment deposits, etc.), and (2) of the dam
exits in the general crest and upstream slope of the dam, looking for
vicinity of the sinkholes, depressions, and areas of unusual settlements.
downstream end of the Photographic documentation should occur when
outlet works unusual/unexpected conditions are observed.
 Regularly monitor toe drain flows and seepage flows
associated with flow through the dam embankment or
foundation in the vicinity of the outlet works discharge
structure, looking for increased flows that are out of line
with historical behavior, and particularly looking for any
evidence of possible material transport by the flow (such
as discolored or turbid water, sediment deposits along
flow paths, behind weirs, in weir boxes, etc.).
 Regularly monitor water pressures from piezometers and
observation wells located in the dam embankment and
foundation in the vicinity of the outlet works, looking for
increasing or decreasing trends, or any otherwise
anomalous data.
 During a major flood event, when reservoir levels are
unusually high, perform frequent visual and instrumented
monitoring as described above.
 Occasionally perform camera inspections or dive
inspections of the interior of the outlet works, looking for
evidence of cracks, deterioration, joint openings,
settlement/collapse, blockage, etc. and any evidence of
seepage water entering or exiting the outlet works
conduit.

19
 Table A2.
(Supplements information previously provided in Table 2)
Monitoring Considerations Regarding Earthquake-Related Potential Failure
Modes for Embankment Dams
Potential Failure Monitoring Considerations
Mode (PFM)
Seepage-related  Periodically obtain readings at all seepage and drain flow
failure in the monitoring locations, and at all piezometers and
aftermath of an observation wells, to maintain baseline information to use
earthquake due to any for comparison purposes in the aftermath of an
of the potential failure earthquake.
modes identified  Periodically perform surveys of the embankment
under normal measurement points on the dam, to maintain baseline
operating conditions. survey information to use for comparison purposes in the
Seismic shaking may aftermath of an earthquake.
lead to  Immediately after significant seismic shaking at the
disruption/damage that damsite, inspect the dam including: (1) the downstream
results in potential slope and toe area of the dam embankment,
failure mode initiation. downstream areas, and abutment areas looking for
signs of sinkholes, depressions, new seepage or wet areas,
changes at existing seepage/wet areas, and any evidence
that material may be being transported with any seepage
flows (such as discolored or turbid water, sediment
deposits, etc.); (2) the downstream channel area for
unusual quantities of flow that may be due to
underseepage exiting into the channel, and for evidence
of material transport by underseepage that may exit into
the channel; (3) all areas of the dam embankment for
cracks, sinkholes, and areas of unusual or excessive
settlements or deformations; (4) the reservoir water
surface for whirlpools, and (5) of discharges from the
outlet works, looking for evidence of material transport
with the discharges.
 Immediately after significant seismic shaking at the
damsite, promptly obtain readings at all seepage and
drain flow monitoring locations and evaluate the data for
changes from normal performance. Obtain water pressure
data from piezometers and observation wells, and
evaluate the data for changes. It may be appropriate to
automate the monitoring of some of the flow and water
pressure monitoring instruments, and consideration might
be given to employing a seismic trigger that results in
frequent readings following significant seismic shaking.
Survey the embankment measurement points at the dam.
 Consider whether seismic monitoring equipment with
telemetry would be appropriate for the damsite.

20
 Table A2.
(Supplements information previously provided in Table 2)
Monitoring Considerations Regarding Earthquake-Related Potential Failure
Modes for Embankment Dams
Potential Failure Monitoring Considerations
Mode (PFM)
Seepage-related  Periodically obtain readings at all seepage and drain flow
failure in the monitoring locations located proximate to the outlet
aftermath of an works, and at all piezometers and observation wells
earthquake due located proximate to the outlet works, to maintain
damage to the outlet baseline information to use for comparison purposes in
works such that the aftermath of an earthquake.
pressurized water  In the aftermath of significant seismic shaking at the
escapes, erodes damsite, perform an immediate visual inspection of the
embankment material dam in the vicinity of the outlet works that includes
along the outlet works, inspection of: (1) the downstream slope and toe area of
and eventually results the dam embankment in the vicinity of the outlet
in a dam breach works, looking for signs of new seepage or wet areas,
changes at existing seepage/wet areas, and any evidence
that material may be being transported with any seepage
flows (such as discolored or turbid water, sediment
deposits, etc.); (2) the dam crest, looking for sinkholes,
depressions, longitudinal cracks, and transverse cracks;
(3) the upstream slope for signs of sinkholes,
depressions, and areas of unusual or excessive settlements
or deformations; (4) the reservoir water surface for
whirlpools.
 Immediately after significant seismic shaking at the
damsite, promptly obtain readings at all seepage and
drain flow monitoring locations located proximate to the
outlet works, and evaluate the data for changed
conditions from normal historical performance. Also,
obtain water pressure data from piezometers and
observation wells located proximate to the outlet works,
and evaluate the data for changed conditions from normal
historical performance. [It may be appropriate to
automate the monitoring of some of the flow and water
pressure monitoring instruments, and consideration might
be given to employing a seismic trigger that results in
frequent readings following significant seismic shaking.]
 Consider whether seismic monitoring equipment with
telemetry would be appropriate for the damsite.
Earthquake-related  In the aftermath of significant seismic shaking at the
damage to the outlet damsite, perform an immediate visual inspection of the
works intake outlet works discharge amount, looking for unusually
structure, and the high discharges, and of the outlet works intake structure,

21
 Table A2.
(Supplements information previously provided in Table 2)
Monitoring Considerations Regarding Earthquake-Related Potential Failure
Modes for Embankment Dams
Potential Failure Monitoring Considerations
Mode (PFM)
control gates located looking for evidence of dam to the structure. Consider
there, such that whether providing telemetered downstream discharge
uncontrolled reservoir information and/or video camera feeds from the damsite
releases occur through are appropriate.
the damaged outlet  Consider whether seismic monitoring equipment with
works telemetry would be appropriate for the damsite.
 In the aftermath of significant seismic shaking at the
damsite, test operate the outlet works to determine if they
have been damaged.
 In the aftermath of significant seismic shaking at the
damsite, perform a survey of structural measurement
points on the outlet works intake structure to assess
deformations/damage.
Earthquake-induced  All that can be done relative to this failure mechanism,
liquefaction of that involves essentially “immediate” dam failure in the
foundation and/or aftermath of an earthquake, is to promptly detect failure
embankment of the dam, and immediately proceed with downstream
materials, that results evacuations in accordance with the Emergency Action
in dam instability, and Plan. If significant dam deformations have occurred, but
consequent overtopping little or no dam overtopping is currently occurring, efforts
and breaching can be made to quickly evacuate the reservoir (to the
extent possible), as well as proceeding with downstream
OR evacuations.
 Consider whether seismic monitoring equipment with
Earthquake-caused telemetry would be appropriate for the damsite.
dam deformations  In the aftermath of significant seismic shaking at the
resulting in damsite, if no reservoir overtopping is evident, an
overtopping of the evaluation should be made to determine if the reservoir is
dam embankment, being released through foundation discontinuities,
and consequent erosion seepage paths through partially liquefied strata, damaged
and breaching of the outlet works structures, etc.
dam embankment  In the aftermath of significant seismic shaking at the
damsite, seepage and flow measurements and visual
observations along the downstream toe and downstream
area should be performed to assess possible changes due
to the seismic shaking.

22
 Table A3.
(Supplements information previously provided in Table 3)
Monitoring Considerations for Concrete Dam Potential Failure Modes Under
Normal, Flood, and Earthquake Loading Conditions
Potential Failure Monitoring Considerations
Mode (PFM)
Blockage of  Regularly monitor foundation drain flows, looking for
foundation drain unusual increases or decreases in flows.
holes due to calcite or  Regularly monitor foundation uplift pressures to make
iron sludge buildup sure that pressures are within expected performance
leads to an increase in limits.
uplift pressures in the  Provide scribe marks (or employ other methods) in
foundation, that gallery wall and floor locations at each joint between
ultimately leads to blocks in the dam that can be visually inspected for
sliding failure in the evidence of relative offsets. Regularly inspect scribe
foundation or at the marks for such offsets.
dam/foundation  Inspect foundation drain outfalls, looking for visual
contact. Alternatively, evidence of clogging, blockage, sludge buildup, etc. that
the situation may be needs to be addressed.
marginally stable under  Survey structural measurement points on the dam,
normal operating looking for evidence of unusual downstream deflections
conditions, but seismic and to maintain baseline survey information to use for
shaking or additional comparison purposes after an earthquake or major flood
reservoir loads in a event.
flood lead to sliding  Institute and maintain a regular foundation drain cleaning
failure in the program to prevent clogging or blockage of foundation
foundation or at the drains.
dam/foundation
 In the aftermath of significant seismic shaking at the
contact.
damsite, perform an immediate visual inspection of the
scribe marks (looking for new offsets), and promptly
obtain readings of the foundation drain flows and
foundation uplift pressures. Perform a survey of the
structural measurement points.
 During a major flood event, perform frequent
instrumented monitoring of foundation drain flows and
foundation uplift pressures, and frequent visual
monitoring for possible scribe mark offsets. Perform a
survey of the structural measurement points at the
conclusion of the flood event.
Sliding failure at the  Regularly visually inspect the downstream face of the
dam/foundation dam and the gallery walls, floors, and ceilings for
contact due to poor evidence of new cracks or significant changes at existing
bonding of the dam’s cracks.
concrete to the  Provide scribe marks in gallery wall and floor locations at
foundation rock, and each contraction joint that can be visually inspected for
insufficient keying at evidence of relative offsets. Regularly inspect the scribe

23
 Table A3.
(Supplements information previously provided in Table 3)
Monitoring Considerations for Concrete Dam Potential Failure Modes Under
Normal, Flood, and Earthquake Loading Conditions
Potential Failure Monitoring Considerations
Mode (PFM)
this contact. This marks for such offsets.
potential failure mode  Periodically perform surveys of structural measurement
could conceivably points on the dam, looking for evidence of unusual
initiate under normal downstream deflections and to maintain baseline survey
operating conditions, information to use for comparison purposes in the
but the greatest aftermath of an earthquake or major flood event.
concerns exist in the  In the aftermath of significant seismic shaking at the
event of seismic damsite, perform an immediate visual inspection of the
shaking or additional scribe marks (looking for new offsets), perform a prompt
reservoir loads in a inspection of the galleries and downstream face of the
flood, that may be dam (looking for changed cracking conditions), and
sufficient to lead to promptly obtain readings of the foundation drain flows
slide initiation and and foundation uplift pressures. Perform a survey of the
consequent dam failure. structural measurement points.
 During a major flood event, perform frequent visual
monitoring for possible scribe mark offsets, and for
evidence of changed crack conditions in the galleries and
at the downstream face of the dam. Perform a survey of
the structural measurement points at the conclusion of the
flood event.
Sliding failure  Regularly visually inspect the downstream face of the
between lift lines in dam and the gallery walls, floors, and ceilings for
the dam due to evidence of new cracks or significant changes at existing
disbonded lift lines, cracks.
and insufficient  Regularly visually inspect the downstream face of the
keying between lift dam for significant changes in historic patterns of lift line
lines. This potential seepage.
failure mode could  Provide scribe marks in gallery wall and floor locations at
conceivably initiate each contraction joint that can be visually inspected for
under normal operating evidence of relative offsets. Regularly inspect the scribe
conditions, but the marks for such offsets.
greatest concerns exist  Periodically perform surveys of structural measurement
in the event of seismic points on the dam, looking for evidence of unusual
shaking or additional downstream deflections and to maintain baseline survey
reservoir loads in a information to use for comparison purposes in the
flood, that may be aftermath of an earthquake or major flood event.
sufficient to lead to  Periodically inspect galleries, where possible, for signs of
slide initiation and cracking, wetness, flow, displacement, etc.
consequent dam failure.  In the aftermath of significant seismic shaking at the
damsite, perform an immediate visual inspection of the

24
 Table A3.
(Supplements information previously provided in Table 3)
Monitoring Considerations for Concrete Dam Potential Failure Modes Under
Normal, Flood, and Earthquake Loading Conditions
Potential Failure Monitoring Considerations
Mode (PFM)
scribe marks, and perform a prompt inspection of the
galleries and downstream face of the dam (looking for
changed cracking conditions). Perform a survey of the
structural measurement points if appropriate.
 During a major flood event, perform frequent visual
monitoring for possible scribe mark offsets, and for
evidence of changed crack conditions in the galleries and
at the downstream face of the dam. Perform a survey of
the structural measurement points at the conclusion of the
flood event, as appropriate.
Loss of foundation  Periodically perform surveys of structural measurement
support and points on the dam to maintain baseline survey
overstressing of the information to use for comparison purposes in the
dam’s concrete, leading aftermath of an earthquake.
to sudden dam failure,  Periodically perform dive inspections of the upstream and
due to offsets downstream faces to observe and document the condition
occurring along a of the foundation to structure interface.
fault in the dam  In the aftermath of significant seismic shaking at the
foundation damsite, perform an immediate visual inspection of the
dam (looking for changed cracking conditions) and scribe
marks (looking for offsets), and promptly obtain
regarding all seepage and drain flows, and all water
pressure monitoring instruments at the damsite. Perform a
survey of the structural measurement points if
appropriate.

Corrosion of  Regularly visually inspect portions of the tendon anchor

upstream foundation system that can be viewed.
anchor tendons leads  Regularly visually inspect the downstream face of the
to loss of pre-stress dam and the gallery walls, floors, and ceilings for
force. Sliding evidence of new cracks or significant changes at existing
instability results under cracks.
normal, flood or  Provide scribe marks in gallery wall and floor locations at
earthquake loading each contraction joint that can be visually inspected for
conditions. evidence of relative offsets. Regularly inspect the scribe
marks for such offsets.
 Periodically perform surveys of structural measurement
points on the dam, looking for evidence of unusual
downstream deflections and to maintain baseline survey
information to use for comparison purposes in the

25
 Table A3.
(Supplements information previously provided in Table 3)
Monitoring Considerations for Concrete Dam Potential Failure Modes Under
Normal, Flood, and Earthquake Loading Conditions
Potential Failure Monitoring Considerations
Mode (PFM)
aftermath of an earthquake or major flood event.
 In the aftermath of significant seismic shaking at the
damsite, perform an immediate visual inspection of the
scribe marks (looking for new offsets), and perform a
prompt inspection of the galleries and downstream face of
the dam (looking for changed cracking conditions).
Perform a survey of the structural measurement points.
 During a major flood event, perform frequent visual
monitoring for possible scribe mark offsets, and for
evidence of changed crack conditions in the galleries and
at the downstream face of the dam. Perform a survey of
the structural measurement points at the conclusion of the
flood event.

26
 Table A4.
(Supplements information previously provided in Table 4)
Monitoring Considerations Regarding Flood-Related Potential Failure Modes
Associated with Spillway Failure

Potential Failure Monitoring Considerations

Mode (PFM)
Erosion of the  Perform close surveillance during spillway discharges
downstream channel for evidence of significant (unexpected) erosion of the
that leads to downstream channel (such as turbid water, unusual flow
undermining of the patterns, etc.) to: (1) document performance for future
foundation of the analysis of this PFM, and (2) detect indications that
spillway crest spillway failure may be imminent (for dam failure
structure, which warning reasons). Surveillance efforts should include
results in its failure and photographs and videos.
uncontrolled reservoir  Perform a careful post-flood inspection to assess the
releases amount of erosion that actually occurred in the
downstream channel, and allow comparison with what
was expected (to determine if a re-evaluation of the risks
associated with this PFM is warranted).
Overtopping of  Perform close surveillance during spillway discharges
spillway walls that for evidence of flows overtopping the spillway walls to:
results in erosion of (1) document performance for future analysis of this
material along the PFM, and (2) detect indications that spillway failure may
walls, loss of wall be imminent (for dam failure warning reasons).
stability, and Surveillance efforts should include photographs and
headward erosion videos.
along the spillway  Perform a careful post-flood inspection to assess the
alignment until the amount of erosion that actually occurred due to flows
reservoir is reached and overtopping the walls (to determine if a re-evaluation of
uncontrolled reservoir the risks associated with this PFM is warranted).
releases occur
Spillway discharges  Perform close surveillance during spillway discharges for
come in contact of the evidence of possible development of this PFM (such as
toe of the dam, cause flow coming in contact with the toe of the dam, turbid
erosion of the dam, water, evidence of oversteepened and/or eroded
eventually leading to a embankment material, etc.) to (1) document performance
dam breach for future analysis of this PFM, and (2) detect indications
that dam failure due to breaching may be imminent (for
dam failure warning reasons). Surveillance efforts should
include photographs and videos.
 Perform a careful post-flood inspection to assess the
amount of erosion that actually occurred at the toe of the
dam (to determine if a re-evaluation of the risks
associated with this PFM is warranted).

27
 Table A4.
(Supplements information previously provided in Table 4)
Monitoring Considerations Regarding Flood-Related Potential Failure Modes
Associated with Spillway Failure

Potential Failure Monitoring Considerations

Mode (PFM)
Material is eroded  Perform routine visual inspections of spillway underdrain
from beneath a flows, foundation drain flows from areas beneath the
spillway floor slab by spillway, and other seepage flows occurring proximate to
seepage flow such that the spillway for evidence of material transport by the
when large spillway flow.
flows occur, the floor  Perform periodic sounding of spillway floor slabs to
slab fails due to check for hollow or drummy sounds that could indicate
inadequate voids beneath the floor slabs.
foundation support  Perform periodic dive inspections in the spillway stilling
and initiates a basin, looking for evidence of erosion beneath the
headward erosion spillway floor slabs.
process along the  Periodically use ground penetrating radar to check for
spillway alignment that voids beneath the floor slabs.
eventually reaches the  Perform close surveillance during spillway discharges for
reservoir and results in evidence of unusual flow patterns (such as rooster tails,
uncontrolled reservoir obvious flow irregularities at joints, etc.) that could
releases indicate problems with flow surfaces (possibly due to
structural failure of floor slabs) to detect indications that
this PFM may have initiated and could develop to the
point that spillway failure is possible (for dam failure
warning reasons). Surveillance should include
photographs and videos.
 Perform a careful post-flood inspection to look for
evidence of structural distress/failure of flood slabs (such
as cracks that appear to be structural in nature) that may
be due to inadequate foundation support, to determine if
further investigation for possible voids beneath the floor
slabs is warranted.

28
United States Society on Dams
1616 Seventeenth Street, #483
Denver, Colorado 80202
Phone: 303-628-5430
Fax: 303-628-5431
E-mail: [email protected]
Internet: www.ussdams.org