SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED is sufficient that it be proved that the land is leased

City of Baguio vs. Marcos to withdraw it from the operation of Rep. Act 931
No. L-26100. February 28, 1969. and place it beyond the reach of a petition for
reopening.
CITY OF BAGUIO, REFORESTATION
ADMINISTRATION, FRANCISCO G. JOAQUIN, SR., Same; Same; Publication; When reopening need
FRANCISCO G. JOAQUIN, JR., and TERESITA J. not be published.—The subject matter of the
BUCHHOLZ, petitioners, vs. HON. PIO R. MARCOS, petition for reopening was already embraced in the
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Baguio, cadastral proceedings filed by the Director of
BELONG LUTES, and the HONORABLE COURT OF Lands. Consequently, the Baguio cadastral court
APPEALS, respondents. already acquired jurisdiction over the said
property. The petition, therefore, need not be
Torrens system; Cadastral proceedings; Limitation published. The power of the cadastral court over
on right of claimant; Lease of portions of land petitions to reopen, as in this case, is not
claimed.—The case at bar involves a special jurisdictionally tainted by want of publication.
statute, Rep. Act 931, which allows a petition for
reopening on lands “about to be declared” or Constitutional law; Issue of constitutionality; May
already “declared land of the public domain” by be entertained by courts when raised before
virtue of judicial proceedings. Such right, however, them.—Well-entrenched in constitutional law is
is made to cover limited cases, i.e., “only with the precept that constitutional questions will not
respect to such of said parcels of land as have not be entertained by courts unless they are
been alienated, reserved, leased, granted, or “specifically raised, insisted upon and adequately
otherwise provisionally or permanently disposed of argued.” At any rate, it cannot be seriously
by the Government.” The lessee’s right is thus disputed that ,the subject of Rep. Act 931 is
impliedly recognized by Rep. Act 931. This statutory expressed in its title.
phrase steers the present case clear from the
impact of the precept forged by Leyva vs. Jandoc, Same; Same; Statutory construction; Object of
(L-16965, Feb. 28, 1962) case. So it is, that if the interpretation.—The true object of all
land subject of a petition to reopen has already interpretation is to ascertain the meaning and will
been leased by the government, that petition can of the law-making body, to the end that it may be
no longer prosper. enforced. In varying language, “the purpose of all
rules or maxims” in interpretation “is to discover
Same; Same; Same; Parties; Where private the true intention of the law.” (82 C.J.S. 526) They
petitioners in the case at bar have personality to are only valuable when they subserve this
intervene in the reopening proceeding.—The right purpose.” In fact, “the spirit or intention of a
of private petitioners to oppose a reopening statute prevails over the letter thereof”. A statute
petition here becomes the more patent when the “should be construed according to its spirit and
Supreme Court takes into consideration their reason, disregard. as as far as necessary, the letter
averment that they have introduced improvements of the law.” By this, the Supreme Court does not
on the land affected. It would seem that lessees, “correct the act of the Legislature ture, but rather x
insofar as Rep. Act 931 is concerned, come within x x carry out and give due course to” its true in-
the purview of those who, according to Rule 143 of tent. .
the Rules Court, may intervene in an action. For,
they are persons who have “legal interest in the Same; Same; Same; Title of act may be resorted in
matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the ascertainment of congressional will.—When
the parties.” In the event herein private petitioners engaged the task of construing an obscure
are able to show that they, are legitimate lessses, expression the law (82 C.J.S. 731) or where exact or
then their lease will continue. And this, because it literal rendering of the words would not carry out
1
the legislative intent, the title thereof may be proceedings under Republic Act 931. Private
resorted to in the ascertainment of congressional petitioners specifically question the ruling of the
will. Reason therefor is that the title of the law may Court of Appeals that they have no personality to
properly be regarded as an index of or clue or oppose reopening. The three-pronged contentions
guide to legislative intention. (82 C.J.S. 734) This is of all the petitioners are: (1) the reopening petition
especially true in this jurisdiction. For the reason was filed outside the 40-year period next preceding
that by specific constitutional precept, “no bill the approval of Republic Act 931; (2) said petition
which may be enacted into law shall embrace more was not published; and (3) private petitioners, as
than one subject which shall be expressed in the lessees of the public land in question, have court
title of the bill.” (Sec. 21 [1], Art. VI, Const.) In such standing under Republic Act 931. The facts follow:
case, courts “are compelled by the Constitution to On April 12, 1912, the cadastral proceedings sought
consider both the body and the title in order to to be reopened, Civil Reservation Case No. 1, GLRO
arrive at the legislative intention.” (37 A.L.R. 952) Record No. 211, Baguio Townsite, were instituted
by the Director of Lands in the Court of First
Same; Same; Same; Title of Rep. Act 931 authorizes Instance of Baguio. It is not disputed that the land
court proceedings of claims to parcels of land here involved (described in Plan Psu-186187) was
declared public land.—The title now under scrutiny amongst those declared public lands by final
possesses the strength of clarity and positiveness. decision rendered in that case on November 13,
It recites that it authorizes court proceedings of 1922.
claims to parcels of land declared public land “by
virtue of judicial decisions rendered within the On July 25, 1961, respondent Belong Lutes
forty years next preceding the approval of this Act.” petitioned the cadastral court to reopen said Civil
That title is written “in capital letters"—by Reservation Case No. 1 as to the parcel of land he
Congress itself; such kind of a title then “is not to claims. His prayer was that the land be registered
be classed with words or titles used by compilers of in his name upon the grounds that: (1) he and his
statutes” because “it is the legislature speaking.” predecessors have been in actual, open, adverse,
Accordingly, it is not hard to come to a deduction peaceful and continuous possession and cultivation
that the phrase last quoted from Rep. Act 931—"by of the land since Spanish times, or before July 26,
virtue of judicial decisions rendered"—was but 1894, paying the taxes thereon; and (2) his
inadvertently omitted from the body. Parting from predecessors were illiterate Igorots without
this premise, there is, at bottom, no contradiction personal notice of the cadastral proceedings
between title and body. Therefore, by that statute, aforestated and were not able to file their claim to
the petition of respondent to reopen Civil the land in question within the statutory period.
Reservation Case No. 1, GLRO Record No. 211 of
the cadastral court of Baguio, comes within the 40- On December 18, 1961, private petitioners
year period. Francisco G. Joaquin, Sr., Francisco G. Joaquin, Jr.,
and Teresita J. Buchholz registered opposition to
ORIGINAL PETITION in the Supreme Court. the reopening. Ground: They are tree farm lessees
Certiorari. upon agreements executed by the Bureau of
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Forestry in their favor for 15,395.65 square meters
1st Assistant City Fiscal Dionisio C. Claridad, on March 16, 1959, for 12,108 square meters on
Augusto Tobias and Feria, Feria, Lugtu & La’O for July 24, 1959, and for 14,771 square meters on July
petitioners. 17, 1959, respectively.
Bernardo C. Ronquillo for respondents.
SANCHEZ, J.: On May 5, 1962, the City of Baguio likewise
opposed reopening.
Petitioners attack the jurisdiction of the Court of
First Instance of Baguio to reopen cadastral
2
On May 8, 1962, upon Lutes’ opposition, the
cadastral court denied private petitioners’ right to Then came the judgment of the Court of Appeals of
intervene in the case because of a final declaratory September 30, 1965. The court held that
relief judgment dated March 9, 1962 in Yaranon vs. petitioners were not bound by the declaratory
Castrillo [Civil Case 946, Court of First Instance of judgment heretofore stated. Nevertheless, the
Baguio] which declared that such tree farm leases appellate court ruled that as lessees, private
were null and void. petitioners had no right to oppose the reopening of
the cadastral case. Petitioners moved to
On May 18,1962, private petitioners moved to reconsider. It was thwarted on May 6, 1966.
reconsider. They averred that said declaratory
relief judgment did not bind them, for they were Petitioners now seek redress from this Court. On
not parties to that action. July 6, 1966, respondents moved to dismiss the
On September 14, 1962, the cadastral court petition before us. On August 5, 1966, petitioners
reversed its own ruling of May 8, 1962, allowed opposed. On August 12, 1966, we gave due course.
petitioners to crossexamine the witnesses of
respondent Lutes. 1. Do private petitioners have personality to appear
in the reopening proceedings?
On October 16, 1962, Lutes replied to and moved First, to the controlling statute, Republic Act 931,
to dismiss private petitioners’ opposition to his effective June 20, 1953.
reopening petition. On October 25, 1962, private
petitioners’ rejoinder was filed. The title of the Act reads—
“AN ACT TO AUTHORIZE THE FILING IN THE PROPER
On August 5, 1963, the cadastral court dismissed COURT, UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS, OF CERTAIN
private petitioners’ opposition to the reopening. A CLAIMS OF TITLE TO PARCELS OF LAND THAT HAVE
motion to reconsider was rejected by the court on BEEN DECLARED PUBLIC LAND, BY VIRTUE OF
November 5, 1963. JUDICIAL DECISIONS RENDERED WITHIN THE FORTY
On January 6, 1964, it was the turn of the City of YEARS NEXT PRECEDING THE APPROVAL OF THIS
Baguio to lodge a motion to dismiss the petition to ACT."
reopen. This motion was adopted as its own by the
Reforestation Administration. They maintained the Section 1 thereof provides—
position that the declaratory judgment in Civil Case
946 was not binding on those not parties thereto. “SECTION 1. All persons claiming title to parcels of
Respondent Lutes opposed on February 24, 1964. land that have been the object of cadastral
On April 6, 1964, private petitioners reiterated proceedings, who at the time of the survey were in
their motion to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds. actual possession of the same, but for some
justifiable reason had been unable to file their
On September 17, 1964, the court denied for lack claim in the proper court during the time limit
of merit the City’s motion as well as the April 6, established by law, in case such parcels of land, on
1964 motion to dismiss made by private account of their failure to file such claims, have
petitioners. been, or are about to be declared land of the public
On November 13, 1964, all the petitioners went to domain, by virtue of judicial proceedings instituted
the Court of Appeals on certiorari, prohibition, and within the forty years next preceding the approval
mandamus with preliminary injunction. They there of this Act, are hereby granted the right within five
questioned the cadastral court’s jurisdiction over years after the date on which this Act shall take
the petition to reopen and the latter’s order of effect, to petition for a reopening of the judicial
August 5, 1963 dismissing private petitioners’ proceedings under the provisions of Act Numbered
opposition. The appellate court issued a writ of Twenty-two hundred and fifty-nine, as amended,
preliminary injunction upon a P500-bond. only with respect to such of said parcels of land as
3
have not been alienated, reserved, leased, granted, Government." The lessee’s right is thus impliedly
or otherwise provisionally or permanently disposed recognized by R.A. 931. This statutory phrase steers
of by the Government, and the competent Court of the present case clear from the impact of the
First Instance, upon receiving such petition, shall precept forged by Leyvs. So it-is, that if the land
notify the Government through the Solicitor subject of a petition to reopen has already been
General, and if after hearing the parties, said court leased by the government, that petition can no
shall find that all conditions herein established longer prosper.
have been complied with, and that all taxes,
interests and penalties thereof have been paid This was the holding in Director of Lands vs.
from the time when land tax should have been Benitez, L-21368, March 31, 1966. The reopening
collected until the day when the motion is petition there filed was opposed by the Director of
presented, it shall order said judicial proceedings Lands in behalf of 62 lessees of public land holding
reopened as if no action has been taken on such revocable permits issued by the government. We
parcels." struck down the petition in that case because the
public land, subject-matter of the suit, had already
We concede that in Leyva vs. Jandoc, L-16965, been leased by the government to private persons.
February 28, 1962, a land registration case where
oppositors were “foreshore lessees of public land”, Of course, the Benitez ruling came about not by
a principle was hammered out that although representations of the lessees alone, but through
Section 34, Land Registration Act, “apparently the Director of Lands. But we may well scale the
authorizes any person claiming any kind of interest heights of injustice or abet violations of R.A. 931 if
to file an opposition to an application for we entertain the view that only the Director of
registration, x x x nevertheless x x x the opposition Lands can here properly oppose the reopening
must be based on a right of dominion or some petition. Suppose the lands office fails to do so?
other real right independent of, and not at all Will legitimate lessees be left at the mercy of
subordinate to, the rights of the Government." The government officials? Should the cadastral court
opposition, according to the Leyva decision, “must close its eyes to the fact of lease that may be
necessarily be predicated upon the property in proved by the lessees themselves, and which is
question being part of the public domain.” Leyva enough to bar the reopening petition? R.A. 931
thus pronounced that “it is incumbent upon the could not have intended that this situation should
duly authorized representatives of the Government happen. The point is that, with the fact of lease, no
to represent its interests as well as private claims question of ownership need be inquired into
intrinsically dependent upon it.” pursuant to R.A. 931. From this standpoint, lessees
have sufficient legal interest in the proceedings.
But the Leyva case concerned an ordinary land
registration proceeding under the provisions of the The right of private petitioners to oppose a
Land Registration Act. Normally and logically, reopening petition here becomes the more patent
lessees cannot there present issues of ownership. when we take stock of their averment that they
The case at bar, however, stands on a different have introduced improvements on the land
footing. It involves a special statute, R.A. 931, affected. It would seem to us that lessees, insofar
which allows a petition for reopening on lands as R.A. 931 is concerned, come within the purview
“about to be declared” or already “declared land of of those who, according to the Rules of Court, may
the public domain” by virtue of judicial intervene in an action. For, they are persons who
proceedings. Such right, however, is made to cover have “legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in
limited cases, i.e., “only with respect to such of said the success of either of the parties." In the event
parcels of land as have not been alienated, herein private petitioners are able to show that
reserved, leased, granted, or otherwise they are legitimate lessees, then their lease will
provisionally or permanently disposed of by the continue. And this, because it is sufficient that it be
4
proven that the land is leased to withdraw it from cadastral proceedings upon the application of
the operation of Republic Act 931 and place it respondent Lutes?
beyond the reach of a petition for reopening. The facts are: The cadastral proceedings sought to
In line with the Court of Appeals’ conclusion, not be reopened were instituted on April 12, 1912.
disputed by respondent Lutes herein, the cadastral Final decision was rendered on November 13,
court should have ruled on the validity of private 1922. Lutes filed the petition to reopen on July 25,
petitioners’ tree farm leases—on the merits. 1961.
Because there is need for Lutes’ right to reopen
and petitioners’ right to continue as lessees to be It will be noted that the title of R.A. 931, heretofore
threshed out in that court. transcribed, authorizes “the filing in the proper
court, under certain conditions, of certain claims of
We, accordingly, hold that private petitioners, who title to parcels of land that have been declared
aver that they are lessees, have the necessary public land, by virtue of judicial decisions rendered
personality to intervene in and oppose respondent within the forty years next preceding the approval
Lutes’ petition for reopening. of this Act.” The body of the statute, however, in its
Section 1, speaks of parcels of land that “have
2. Petitioners next contend that the reopening been, or are about to be declared land of the public
petition below, filed under R.A. 931, should have domain, by virtue of judicial proceedings instituted
been published in accordance with the Cadastral within the forty years next preceding the approval
Act, of this Act.” There thus appears to be a seeming
inconsistency between title and body.
To resolve this contention, we need but refer to a
very recent decision of this Court in De Castro vs. It must be stressed at this point that R.A. 931 is not
Marcos, supra, involving exactly the same set of under siege on constitutional grounds. No charge
facts bearing upon the question. We there held, has been made here or in the courts below that the
after a discussion of law and jurisprudence, that: statute offends the constitutional injunction that
“In sum, the subject matter of the petition for the subject of legislation must be expressed in the
reopening—a parcel of land claimed by respondent title thereof. Well-entrenched in constitutional law
Akia—was already embraced in the cadastral is the precept that constitutional questions will not
proceedings filed by the Director of Lands. be entertained by courts unless they are
Consequently, the Baguio cadastral court already “specifically raised, insisted upon and adequately
acquired jurisdiction over the said property. The argued." At any rate, it cannot be seriously
petition, therefore, need not be published.” We disputed that the subject of R.A. 931 is expressed in
find no reason to break away from such conclusion. its title.
Respondent Lutes attached to the record a certified
true copy of the November 13, 1922 decision in the This narrows our problem down to one of legal
Baguio Townsite Reservation case to show, hermeneutics.
amongst others, that the land here involved was
part of that case. Petitioners do not take issue with Many are the principles evolved in the
respondent Lutes on this point of fact. interpretation of laws. It is thus not difficult to stray
away from the true path of construction, unless we
We here reiterate our ruling in De Castro, supra, constantly bear in mind the goal we seek. The
that the power of the cadastral court below over office of statutory interpretation, let us not for a
petitions to reopen, as in this case, is not moment forget, is to determine legislative intent.
jurisdictionally tainted by want of publication. In the words of a well-known authority, "[t]he true
object of all interpretation is to ascertain the
3. A question of transcendental importance is this: meaning and will of the law-making body, to the
Does the cadastral court have power to reopen the end that it may be enforced." In varying language,
5
“the purpose of all rules or maxims” in used the very same language in the body thereof
interpretation “is to discover the true intention of and in its title. We attach meaning to this
the law." They “are only valuable when they circumstance. Had the legislature meant to shake
subserve this purpose. “In fact, “the spirit or off any legal effects that the title of the statute
intention of a statute prevails over the letter might have, it had a chance to do so in the
thereof."A statute “should be construed according reenactment of the law. Congress could have
to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as altered with great facility the wording of the title of
necessary, the letter of the law. "By this, we do not R.A. 931. The fact is that it did not.
“correct the act of the Legislature, but rather x x x
carry out and give due course to” its true Intent. It has been observed that “in modern practice the
title is adopted by the Legislature, more thoroughly
It should be certain by now that when engaged in read than the act itself, and in many states is the
the task of construing an obscure expression in the subject of constitutional regulation."The
law or where exact or literal rendering of the words constitutional injunction that the subject of the
would not carry out the legislative intent, the title statute must be expressed in the title of the bill,
thereof may be resorted to in the ascertainment of breathes the spirit of command because “the
congressional will. Reason therefor is that the title Constitution does not exact of Congress the
of the law may properly be regarded as an index of obligation to read during its deliberations the
or clue or guide to legislative intention.This is entire text of the bill."Reliance, therefore, may be
especially true in this jurisdiction. For the reason placed on the title of a bill, which, while not an
that by specific constitutional precept, "[n]o bill enacting part, no doubt “is in some sort a part of
which may be enacted into law shall embrace more the act, although only a formal part."These
than one subject which shall be expressed in the considerations are all the more valid here because
title of the bill. In such case, courts “are compelled R.A. 931 was passed without benefit of
by the Constitution to consider both the body and congressional debate in the House from which it
the title in order to arrive at the legislative originated as House Bill 1410,27 and in the Senate.
intention."
The title now under scrutiny possesses the strength
With the foregoing guideposts on hand, let us go of clarity and positiveness. It recites that it
back to the situation that confronts us. We take authorizes court proceedings of claims to parcels of
another look at the title of R.A. 931, viz: “AN ACT land declared public land “by virtue of judicial
TO AUTHORIZE THE FILING IN THE PROPER COURT, decisions rendered within the forty years next
UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS, OF CERTAIN CLAIMS preceding the approval of this Act.” That title is
OF TITLE TO PARCELS OF LAND THAT HAVE BEEN written “in capital letters"—by Congress itself; such
DECLARED PUBLIC LAND, BY VIRTUE OF JUDICIAL kind of a title then “is not to be classed with words
DECISIONS RENDERED WITHIN THE F O R T Y YEARS or titles used by compilers of statutes” because “it
NEXT PRECEDING THE APPROVAL OF THIS ACT." is the legislature speaking. “Accordingly, it is not
Readily to be noted is that the title is not merely hard to come to a deduction that the phrase last
composed of catchwords. It expresses in language quoted from R.A. 931—"by virtue of judicial
clear the very substance of the law itself. From this, decisions rendered"—was but inadvertently
it is easy to see that Congress intended to give omitted from the body. Parting from this premise,
some effect to the title of R.A. 931. there is, at bottom, no contradiction between title
and-body. In line with views herein stated, the title
To be carefully noted is that the same imperfection belongs to that type of titles which should be
in the language of R.A. 931 aforesaid—from which regarded as part of the rules or provisions
surfaces a seeming inconsistency between the title expressed in the body. At the very least, the words
and the body—attended Commonwealth Act 276, “by virtue of judicial decisions rendered” in the title
the present statute’s predecessor. That prior law of the law stand in equal importance to the phrase
6
in Section 1 thereof, “by virtue of judicial
proceedings instituted.” The sum of all the foregoing is that, as we now
view Republic Act 931, claims of title that may be
Given the fact then that there are two phrases to filed thereunder embrace those parcels of land that
consider, the choice of construction we must give have been declared public land “by virtue of
to the statute does not need such reflection. We judicial decisions rendered within the forty years
lean towards a liberal view. And this, because of next preceding the approval of this Act.” Therefore,
the principle long accepted that remedial by that statute, the July 25, 1961 petition of
legislation should receive the blessings of liberal respondent Belong Lutes to reopen Civil
construction. And, there should be no quibbling as Reservation Case No. 1, GLRO Record No. 211 of
to the f act that R.A. 931 is a piece of remedial the cadastral court of Baguio, the decision on
legislation. In essence, it provides a mode of relief which was rendered on November 13, 1922, comes
to landowners who, before the Act, had no legal within the 40-year period.
means of perfecting their titles. This is plainly
evident from the explanatory note thereof, which FOR THE REASONS GIVEN, the petition for
reads: certiorari is hereby granted; the cadastral court’s
orders of August 5, 1963, November 5, 1963 and
“This bill is intended to give an opportunity to any September 17, 1964 are hereby declared null and
person or claimant who has any interest in any void and the cadastral court is hereby directed to
parcel of land which has been declared as public admit petitioners’ oppositions and proceed
land in cadastral proceeding for failure of said accordingly. No costs. So ordered.
person or claimant to present his claim within the
time prescribed by law. Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar,
There are many meritorious cases wherein Fernando. Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.
claimants to certain parcels of land have not had Concepcion, C.J., Castro and Capistrano, JJ., did
the opportunity to answer or appear at the hearing not take part.
of cases affecting .their claims in the corresponding Petition granted; cadastral court’s orders declared
cadastral proceedings for lack of sufficient notice or null and void and same court directed to admit
for other reasons and circumstances which are petitioners’ oppositions and proceed accordingly.
beyond their control. Under C.A. No. 276, said _______________
persons or claimants have no more legal remedy as
the effectivity of said Act expired in 1940. © Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All
rights reserved. City of Baguio vs. Marcos, 27 SCRA
This measure seeks to remedy the lack of any 342, No. L-26100 February 28, 1969
existing law within said persons or claimants with
meritorious claims or interests in parcels of land
may seek justice and protection.

This bill proposes to give said persons or claimants

In fine, we say that lingual imperfections in the