662 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Melendrez vs. Decena

*
Adm. Case No. 2104. August 24, 1989.

NARCISO MELENDREZ and ERLINDA DALMAN,

complainants, vs. ATTY. REYNERIO I. DECENA,
respondent.

Attorneys; Disbarment; Due Process; No violation of

respondent’s right to confront the complainants and their
witnesses against him.—We do not think respondent’s right to
confront the complainants and their witnesses against him has
been violated. Respondent in fact cross-examined complainant
Narciso Melendrez and some of the witnesses which complainants
had presented earlier. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, the
record of the proceedings shows that respondent had all the
opportunity to cross-examine the other witnesses of the
complainants (those whose affidavits were attached to
complainants’ position paper) had he wanted to, but had forfeited
such opportunity by asking for numerous continuances which
indicated a clear attempt on his part to delay the investigation
proceedings. Respondent had in fact requested a total of twenty
three (23) resettings during the investigation proceedings; he had
eight (8) under Fiscal Almonte and fifteen (15) under Fiscal
Jamero. There were also instances where respondent asked for
postponement and at the same time reset the hearing to a specific
date of his choice on which neither he nor his counsel would
appear. That attitude of respondent eventually led the hearing
officer to declare his (respondent’s) right to cross-examine the
complainants and their witnesses as having been waived in his
order of 17 December 1986. Respondent can not now claim that he
had been deprived below of the opportunity to confront the
complainants and their witnesses.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Court agrees with the findings and
conclusions of the Solicitor General.—After carefully going
through the record of the proceedings as well as the evidence
presented by both parties, we agree with the findings and
conclusions of the Solicitor General.
Same; Same; Respondent’s acts imply something immoral in
themselves regardless of whether they are punishable by law and
that these acts constitute moral turpitude being contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty and good morals.—We agree with the Solicitor
General that the

_______________

* EN BANC.
 663

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Melendrez vs. Decena

acts of respondent “imply something immoral in themselves

regardless of whether they are punishable by law” and that these
acts constitute moral turpitude, being “contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty or good morals.” The standard required from
members of the Bar is not, of course, satisfied by conduct which
merely avoids collision with our criminal law. Even so,
respondent’s conduct, in fact, may be penalizable under at least
one penal statute—the anti-usury law.
Same; Same; Compromise; Respondent is presumed to be
aware of the rule that lawyers cannot without special authority
compromise their clients’ litigation or receive anything in
discharge of a client’s claim but the full amount in cash.—The
second charge against respondent relates to acts done in his
professional capacity, that is, done at a time when he was counsel
for the complainants in a criminal case for estafa against accused
Reynaldo Pineda. There are two (2) aspects to this charge: the
first is that respondent Decena effected a compromise agreement
concerning the civil liability of accused Reynaldo Pineda without
the consent and approval of the complainants; the second is that,
having received the amount of P500.00 as an advance payment on
this “settlement,” he failed to inform complainants of that
advance payment and moreover, did not turn over the P500.00 to
the complainants. The facts show that respondent “settled” the
estafa case amicably for P2,000.00 without the knowledge and
consent of complainants. Respondent informed complainants of
the amicable “settlement” and of the P500.00 advance payment
only after petitioner Narciso Melendrez had confronted him about
these matters. And respondent never did turn over to
complainants the P500.00. Respondent is presumed to be aware of
the rule that lawyers cannot “without special authority,
compromise their clients’ litigation or receive anything in
discharge of a client’s claim, but the full amount in cash.”
Respondent’s failure to turn over to complainants the amount
given by accused Pineda as partial “settlement” of the estafa case
underscores his lack of honesty and candor in dealing with his
clients.
Same; Same; Gross misconduct on the part of a lawyer
although not related to the discharge of professional duties as a
member of the Bar which puts his moral character in serious
doubt renders him unfit to continue in the practice of law.—
Generally, a lawyer should not be suspended or disbarred for
misconduct committed in his personal or non-professional
capacity. Where, however, misconduct outside his professional
dealings becomes so patent and so gross as to demonstrate moral
unfitness to remain in the legal profession, the Court must
suspend or strike out the lawyer’s name from the Roll of Attor-
 664

664 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Melendrez vs. Decena

neys. The nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that

he shall be a person of good moral character. This qualification is
not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law;
its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the
practice of law, in the exercise of privileges of members of the Bar.
Gross misconduct on the part of a lawyer, although not related to
the discharge of professional duties as a member of the Bar,
which puts his moral character in serious doubt, renders him
unfit to continue in the practice of law.
Same; Same; Same; Court compelled to the conviction that
respondent has lost that good moral character which is
indispensable for continued membership in the Bar.—In the
instant case, the exploitative deception exercised by respondent
attorney upon the complainants in his private transactions with
them, and the exacting of unconscionable rates of interest,
considered together with the acts of professional misconduct
committed by respondent attorney, compel this Court to the
conviction that he has lost that good moral character which is
indispensable for continued membership in the Bar.

ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court.

Malpractice and Breach of Trust.

The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:
1
In a sworn complaint dated 25 September 1979, the
spouses Erlinda Dalman and Narciso Melendrez charged
Reynerio I. Decena, a member of the Philippine Bar, with
malpractice and breach of trust. The complainant spouses
alleged, among others, that respondent had, by means of
fraud and deceit, taken advantage of their precarious
financial situation and his knowledge of the law to their
prejudice, succeeded in divesting them of their only
residential lot in Pagadian City; that respondent, who was
their counsel in an estafa case against one Reynaldo

_______________

1 The complaint was originally filed on 29 August 1979 with the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines (Zamboanga del Sur Chapter) and was
referred to this Court on 17 November 1979.

665
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Melendrez vs. Decena

Pineda, had compromised that case without their

authority.
In his answer dated 18 March 1980, respondent denied
all the charges levelled against him and prayed for the
dismissal of the complaint.
By resolution dated 14 April 1980, the administrative
complaint was referred to the Office of the Solicitor General
for investigation, report and recommendation.
Accordingly, the Solicitor General forthwith deputized
the City Fiscal of Pagadian City, Jorge T. Almonte, to
conduct the necessary investigation, with instructions to
submit thereafter this report and recommendation thereon.
Fiscal Almonte held several hearings on the administrative
case until 15 July 1982, when he requested the Solicitor
General to release him from the duty of investigating the
case.
On 10 September 1982, the Solicitor General granted
Fiscal Almonte’s request and in his stead appointed the
Provincial Fiscal of Zamboanga del Sur, Pedro S. Jamero,
who resumed hearings on 15 June 1983.
Respondent filed with this Court on 9 June 1987, a
motion seeking to inhibit Fiscal Jamero from hearing the
case followed by an urgent motion for indefinite
postponement of the investigation. Both motions were
denied by the Court in a Resolution dated 21 September
1987 with instructions to the Solicitor General to complete
the investigation of the administrative case and to render
his report and recommendation thereon within thirty (30)
days from notice.
On 19 July 1988, the Solicitor
2
General submitted his
Report and Recommendation dated 21 June 1988. In his
Report, after setting out the facts and proceedings held in
the present case, the Solicitor General presented the
following:

“FINDINGS

Complainants allege that on August 5, 1975, they obtained from

respondent a loan of P4,000.00. This loan was secured by a real
estate mortgage (Annex C, Complainants’ Complaint, p. 16,
records). In the said Real Estate Mortgage document, however, it
was made to appear

_______________

2 Rollo, p. 94; Report and Recommendation, pp. 42-59.

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666 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Melendrez vs. Decena
 that the amount borrowed by complainants was P5,000.00.
Confronted by this discrepancy, respondent assured complainants
that said document was a mere formality, and upon such
assurance, complainants signed the same. The document was
brought by complainant Narciso Melendres to a Notary Public for
notarization. After the same was notarized, he gave the document
to respondent. Despite the assurance, respondent exacted from
complainants P500.00 a month as payment for what is beyond
dispute usurious interest on the P5,000.00 loan. Complainants
religiously paid the obviously usurious interest for three months:
September, October and November, 1975. Then they stopped
paying due to financial reverses. In view of their failure to pay
said amounts as interest, respondent prepared a new document
on May 7, 1976, a Real Estate Mortgage (Annex D, Complaint, p.
18, records) over the same lot 3125-C, replacing the former real
estate mortgage dated August 5, 1975, but this time the sum
indicated in said new contract of mortgage is P10,000.00,
purportedly with interest at 19% per annum. In this new Real
Estate Mortgage, a special power of attorney in favor of
respondent was inserted, authorizing him to sell the mortgaged
property at public auction in the event complainants fail to pay
their obligation on or before May 30, 1976. Without explaining the
provisions of the new contract to complainants, respondent
insisted that complainants sign the same, again upon the
assurance that the document was a mere formality. Unsuspecting
of the motive of respondent, complainants signed the document.
Complainants Narciso Melendres again brought the same
document to a Notary Public for notarization. After the document
was notarized, he brought the same to respondent without getting
a copy of it.
Complainants, relying on the assurance of the respondent that
the second Real Estate Mortgage was but a formality, neither
bothered to ask from respondent the status of their lot nor tried to
pay their obligation. For their failure to pay the obligation, the
respondent on October 12, 1976, applied for the extrajudicial
foreclosure of the second real estate mortgage (Exhibit 16,
Respondent’s Position Paper). All the requirements of Act No.
3135, as amended, re extrajudicial sale of mortgage were
ostensibly complied with by respondent. Hence, finally, title was
transferred to him, and on June 20, 1979, respondent sold the
involved property to Trinidad Ylanan for P12,000.00.
When informed of the above by one Salud Australlado on the
first week of March 1979 (see Sworn Statement of complainant
Narciso Melendres, p. 6, Folder No. 2 of case), and not having
known the legal implications of the provisions of the second Real
Estate Mortgage

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Melendrez vs. Decena

which they had executed, complainants could not believe that title
to their lot had already been transferred to respondent and that
respondent had already sold the same to a third person.
 Upon learning of the sale in March, 1979, complainants tried to
raise the amount of P10,000.00 and went to respondent’s house on
May 30, 1979 to pay their obligation, hoping that they could
redeem their property, although three years had already lapsed
from the date of the mortgage.
Respondent did not accept the proffered P10,000.00, but
instead gave complainants a sheet of paper (Annex B,
Complainants’ Position Paper), which indicated that the total
indebtedness had soared to P20,400.00. The computation was
made in respondent’s own handwriting. Complainants went home
with shattered hopes and with grief in their hearts. Hence, the
instant complaint for disbarment against respondent filed on
October 5, 1979.
Respondent DENIES all the allegations of complainants. He
maintains that what appears on the two documents allegedly
executed by complainants, i.e., that they obtained a loan of
P5,000.00 on August 5, 1975 and another P10,000.00 on May 7,
1976, is allegedly the truth, and claims that he in truth delivered
the alleged amount of P5,000.00 to complainants and not
P4,000.00. With respect to the second loan, respondent claims
that he delivered to complainants P8,000.00, plus the P2,000.00
loan previously extended [to] complainants [by] one Regino
Villanueva, which loan had been indorsed to respondent for
collection, thus making a total of P10,000.00, as appearing on said
document. Respondent denies that he exacted usurious interest of
10% a month or P500.00 from complainants. He asserts that the
fact that complainants were able to secure a loan from the Insular
Bank of Asia and America (IBAA) only proves the truth of his
allegation that the title of the property, at the time complainants
obtained a loan from IBAA on April 1976, was clear of any
encumbrance, since complainants had already paid the original
loan of P5,000.00 obtained from respondent; that complainants
knew fully well all the conditions of said mortgage; and that his
acquisition of the property in question was in accordance with
their contract and the law on the matter. Thus, he denies that he
has violated any right of the complainants.
After weighing the evidence of both complainants and
respondent, we find against respondent.
While complainants are correct in their claim that they
actually obtained an actual cash of P4,000.00, they are only partly
correct in the claim that out of the P10,000.00 appearing in the
second Real Estate Mortgage, P6,000.00 was applied to interest
considering that

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668 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Melendrez vs. Decena

not all the P6,000.00 but only P4,000.00 was applied to

interest, computed as follows: the first loan of P5,000.00 was
supposedly due on August 31, 1975. Complainants paid 10%
monthly interest or P500.00 on September 30, 1975, October 31,
1975 and November 30, 1975. Consequently, beginning December
31, 1975 up to May 31, 1976 (the date of the execution of the
second Real Estate Mortgage) a total of six (6) months lapsed. Six
(6) months at P500.00 equals P3,000.00, which amount plus the
P2,000.00 complainants’ loan to one Engr. Villanueva (indorsed to
respondent for collection) totals P5,000.00. Adding this amount to
the previous P5,000.00 indicated loan secured by the first
mortgage results in P10,000.00, the amount appearing in the
second Real Estate Mortgage.
Section 7, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides:

‘SEC. 7. Evidence of written agreements.—When the terms of an

agreement have been reduced to writing, it is to be considered as
containing all such terms, and, therefore, there can be, as between the
parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of the terms of the
agreement other than the contents of the writing, except in the following
cases:

(a) Where a mistake or imperfection of the writing, or its failure to

express the true intent and agreement of the parties, or the
validity of the agreement is put in issue by the pleadings;
(b) Where there is an intrinsic ambiguity in the writing.
The term “agreement” includes wills.’

There is no dispute that the two documents denominated Real

Estate Mortgages covering the supposed original loan of
P5,000.00 and the inflated P10,000.00, respectively, were
voluntarily signed by the complainants. The general rule is that
when the parties have reduced their agreement to writing, it is
presumed that they have made the writing the only repository
and memorial of the truth, and whatever is not found in the
writing must be understood to have been waived and abandoned.
However, the rule is not absolute as it admits of some
exceptions, as aforequoted. One of the exceptions, that is, failure
to express the true intent and agreement of the parties, applies in
this case. From the facts obtaining in the case, it is clear that the
complainants were induced to sign the Real Estate Mortgage
documents by the false and fraudulent representations of
respondent that each of the successive documents was a mere
formality.
While it may be true that complainants are not at all illiterate,
respondent, being a lawyer, should have at least explained to
complainants the legal implications of the provisions of the real
estate

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Melendrez vs. Decena

mortgage, particularly the provision appointing him as the

complainants’ attorney-in-fact in the event of default in payments
on the part of complainants. While it may be conceded that it is
presumed that in practice the notary public apprises
complainants of the legal implications of the contract, it is of
common knowledge that most notaries public do not go through
the desired practice. Respondent at least could have informed the
complainants by sending a demand letter to them to pay their
obligation as otherwise he would proceed to sell the lot at public
auction as per their contract. This respondent failed to do, despite
the fact that he knew fully well that complainants were trying
their best to raise money to be able to pay their obligation to him,
as shown by the loan obtained by complainants from the IBAA on
April 8, 1976. In this connection, it may be stated that
complainants, per advice of respondent himself, returned the
proceeds of the IBAA loan to the bank immediately on April 30,
1976, considering that the net proceeds of the loan from said bank
was only P4,300.00 and not enough to pay the indicated loan from
respondent of P5,000.00, which per computation of respondent
would already have earned interest of P2,500.00 for five (5)
months (December 1975 to April, 1976).
Respondent claims that complainants had paid him the
original loan of P5,000.00, and that this was the reason why
complainants were able to mortgage the lot to the bank free from
any encumbrance. This claim is incorrect. The reason why the
title (T-2684) was free from any encumbrance was simply because
of the fact that the first Real Estate Mortgage for the indicated
loan of P5,000.00 (the actual amount was only P4,000.00) had not
been annotated at the back of the title (see Annex B, p. 14, rec.).
Respondent also denies that complainants offered to him the
amount of P10,000.00 as payment of the loan, alleging that if the
offer were true, he could have readily accepted the same since he
sold the lot for almost the same amount, for only P12,000.00, a
difference of a few thousand pesos. Respondent’s denial is
specious.
Indeed, complainants made the offer, but respondent refused
the same for the simple reason that the offer was made on May
30, 1979, three (3) years after the execution of the mortgage on
May 31, 1976. With this lapse of time, respondent demanded
obviously the payment of the accumulated substantial interest for
three years, as shown by his own computation in his own
handwriting on a sheet of paper (Annex C, Complainants’ Position
Paper, Folder No. 2).
In view of all the foregoing, the observation made by the
Hearing Officer is worth quoting:

670

670 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Melendrez vs. Decena

‘In the humble opinion of the undersigned the pivotal question with
respect to this particular charge is whose version is to be believed. Is it
the version of the complainants or the version of the respondent.
In resolving this issue the possible motive on the part of the
complainants in filing the present complaint against the respondent must
be carefully examined and considered. At the beginning there was a
harmonious relationship between the complainants and the respondent
so much so that respondent was even engaged as counsel of the
complainants and it is but human nature that when respondent extended
a loan to the complainants the latter would be grateful to the former.
However, in the case at bar, complainants filed a complaint against the
respondent in spite of the great disparity between the status of the
complainants and the respondent. Admittedly, respondent is in a better
position financially, socially and intellectually. To the mind of the
undersigned, complainants were only compelled to file the above—
entitled complaint against the respondent because they felt that they are
so aggrieved of what the respondent has done to them. It is for this
reason therefore that the under-signed is inclined to believe the version
of the complainants rather than of the respondent. In addition thereto,
the respondent as a lawyer could really see to it that the transaction
between the complainants and himself on papers appear legal and in
order. Besides, there is ample evidence in the records of this case that
respondent is actually engaged in lending money at least in a limited way
and that the interest at the rate of ten per cent a month is but common
among money lenders during the time of the transactions in question.’

Going now into the second charge, complainants alleged that

respondent, who was their counsel (private prosecutor) in
Criminal Case No. 734, for estafa, against accused Reynaldo
Pineda, compromised the case with the accused without their
consent and received the amount of P500.00 as advance payment
for the amicable settlement, without however, giving to the
complainants the said amount nor informing them of said
settlement and payment.
Again, respondent denies the allegation and claims that the
amicable settlement was with the consent of complainant wife
Erlinda Dalman Melendre[z].
We are inclined to believe the version of the complainants.
It is admitted that complainants were not interested in putting
the accused Reynaldo Pineda to jail but rather in merely
recovering

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Melendrez vs. Decena

their money of P2,000.00. At this stage, relationship between

complainants and respondent was not yet strained, and
respondent, as counsel of the complainants in this case, knew that
complainants were merely interested in said recovery. Knowing
this, respondent on his own volition talked to accused and tried to
settle the case amicably for P2,000.00. He accepted the amount of
P500.00 as advance payment, being then the only amount carried
by the accused Pineda. A receipt was signed by both respondent
and accused Pineda (Annex M, p. 34, record). However,
respondent did not inform complainants about this advance
payment, perhaps because he was still waiting for the completion
of the payment of P2,000.00 before turning over the whole amount
to complainants.
At any rate, complainants saw accused Pineda give the above-
mentioned P500.00 to respondent, but they were ashamed then to
ask directly of respondent what the money was all about.
On June 27, 1979, barely a month after May 30, 1979, when
the complainants had already lost their trust and respect and/or
confidence in respondent upon knowing what happened to their
lot and, more so, upon respondent’s refusal to accept the
P10,000.00 offered by complainants to redeem the same, Narciso
Melendre[z] saw the accused Pineda on his way home and
confronted him on the P500.00 that had been given to respondent.
Accused then showed complainant Melendres the receipt (Annex
M, id.) showing that the P500.00 was an advance payment for the
supposed settlement/dismissal of the case filed by complainants
against him.
Sensing or feeling that respondent was fooling them,
complainants then filed a motion before the court which was
trying the criminal case and relieved respondent as their counsel.
The Investigating Fiscal, who heard the case and saw the
demeanor of the witnesses in testifying, had this to say:

‘With respect to the second charge, the fact that respondent received
P500.00 from Reynaldo Pineda is duly established. Both the
complainants and the respondent agreed that the said amount was given
to the respondent in connection with a criminal case wherein the
complainants were the private offended parties: that Reynaldo Pineda is
the accused and that the respondent is the private prosecutor of the said
case. The pivotal issue in this particular charge is whether the
respondent received the amount of P500.00 from Reynaldo Pineda as an
advance payment of an amicable settlement entered into by the
complainants and the accused or the respondent received said amount
from the accused without the knowledge and consent of

672

672 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Melendrez vs. Decena

the complainants. If it is true as alleged by the respondent that he only

received it for and in behalf of the complainants as advance payment of
an amicable settlement why is it that the same was questioned by the
complainants? Why is it that it was not the complainants who signed the
receipt for the said amount? How come that as soon as complainants
knew that the said amount was given to the respondent, the former filed
a motion in court to relieve respondent as their counsel on the ground
that they have lost faith and confidence on him? If it is really true that
complainants have knowledge and have consented to this amicable
settlement they should be grateful to the efforts of their private
prosecutor, yet the fact is that they resented the same and went to the
extent of disqualifying the respondent as their private prosecutor.
Reynaldo Pineda himself executed an affidavit belying the claim of the
respondent.’

Clearly, the complained acts as described and levelled against

respondent Decena are contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or
good morals for which he may be suspended. The moral turpitude
for which an attorney may be disbarred may consist of misconduct
in either his professional or non-professional attitude (Royong v.
Oblena, 7 SCRA 859). The complained acts of respondent imply
something immoral in themselves, regardless of the fact whether
they are punishable by law. The doing of the act itself, and not its
prohibition by statute, fixes the moral turpitude (Bartos vs. U.S.
Dist. Court for District of Nebraska [C.C.C. Neb] 19F [2d] 722).

A parting comment.

All the above is not to say that complainants themselves are

faultless.
 Complainants should likewise be blamed for trusting the
respondent too much. They did not bother to keep a copy of the
documents they executed and considering that they admitted they
did not understand the contents of the documents, they did not
bother to have them explained by another lawyer or by any
knowledgeable person in their locality. Likewise, for a period of
three years, they did not bother to ask for respondent the status
of their lot and/or their obligation to him. Their complacency or
apathy amounting almost to negligence contributed to the
expedient loss of their property thru the legal manuevers
employed by respondent. Hence, respondent’s liability merits
mitigation.” (Italics supplied)

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Melendrez vs. Decena

and made the following recommendation:

“WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that Atty.

Reynerio I. Decena be 3suspended from the practice of law for a
period of five (5) years.”

The Office of the Solicitor General, through Fiscals

Almonte and Jamero, held several hearings during the
investigation of the present administrative case: City Fiscal
Jorge T. Almonte was able to hold 4
six (6) actual hearings
out of twenty-five (25) resettings while 5only five (5) actual
hearings, out of forty (40) resettings, were held under
Provincial Fiscal Pedro S. Jamero. In those hearings, the
complainants presented a number of witnesses who, after
their direct testimony, were cross-examined by the counsel
for respondent; complainant Narciso Melendrez also
testified and was accordingly cross-examined. Considering
the long delay incurred in the investigation of the
administrative case and having been pressed by the
Solicitor General immediately to complete the
investigation, Fiscal Jamero pro-

_______________

3 Id., pp. 52-53.

4 December 22, 1980; January 9, 1981; January 24, 1981; February 7,
1981; February 21, 1981; February 28, 1981; March 7, 1981; March 26 &
27, 1981; April 9 & 10, 1981; April 27 & 28, 1981; May 12, 1981; May 13,
1981; July 2, 1981; July 3, 1981; August 17 & 19, 1981; October 5 & 8,
1981; October 7 to 8, 1981; November 23 to 26, 1981; February 22 to 26,
1982; February 22, 1982; February 23, 1982; February 24, 1982; April 29
& 30, 1982; June 10 to 11, 1982; and June 28 to 29, 1982 (Total—25).
5 June 15, 1983; November, 1983; December 12, 1983; February 24,
1984; March 1, 1984; April 17, 1984; May 9 & 16, 1984; June 20 to 21,
1984; July 16, 1984; September 5, 1984; October 3, 1984; October 22, 1984;
December 27, 1984; February 18, 1985; March 13, 1985; April 29, 1985;
May 9, 1985; May 28 to 29, 1985; July 17, 1985; September 27, 1985;
October 10, 1985; November 13, 1985; January 27, 1986; February 20,
1986; October 16, 1986; November 7, 1986; November 11, 1986; December
17, 1986; December 24, 1986; January 9, 1987; February 26, 1987; March
26, 1987; April 24, 1987; May 18, 1987; June 8, 1987; October 16, 1987;
October 21, 1987; October 26, 1987; and October 28, 1987 (Total—40).

674

674 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Melendrez vs. Decena

posed a change of procedure, from trial-type proceedings to

requiring the parties to submit their respective position
papers. The complainants immediately filed their position
paper which consisted of their separate sworn statements,
(that of Narciso Melendrez was in a question and answer
form), their documentary exhibits and an affidavit of one
Jeorge G. Santos. Respondent also filed his counter-
affidavit and affidavits of his witnesses, with several
annexes in support thereof. In the hearing of 28 October
1987, which had been set for the cross-examination of the
complainants and their witnesses by respondent, the
complainants refused to submit themselves to cross-
examination on the ground that the order of the hearing
officer dated 17 December 1986 declaring respondent’s
right of cross examination as having been waived, had
become final and executory. Respondent questions now the
evidentiary value of the complainants’ position paper, not
having passed through any cross-examination and argues
that the non-submission of the complainants and their
witnesses to cross-examination constitutes a denial of his
right to due process.
We do not think respondent’s right to confront the
complainants and their witnesses against him has been
violated. Respondent in fact cross-examined complainant
Narciso Melendrez and some of the witnesses which
complainants had presented earlier. As pointed out by the
Solicitor General, the record of the proceedings shows that
respondent had all the opportunity to cross-examine the
other witnesses of the complainants (those whose affidavits
were attached to complainants’ position paper) had he
wanted to, but had forfeited such opportunity by asking for
numerous continuances which indicated a clear attempt on
his part to delay the investigation proceedings. Respondent
had in fact requested a total of twenty three (23) resettings
during the investigation proceedings: he had eight (8)
under Fiscal Almonte and fifteen (15) under Fiscal Jamero.
There were also instances where respondent asked for
postponement and at the same time reset the hearing to a
specific date of his choice on which neither he nor his
counsel would appear. That attitude of respondent
eventually led the hearing officer to declare his
(respondent’s) right to cross-examine the complainants and
their witnesses as having been
675
 VOL. 176, AUGUST 24, 1989 675
Melendrez vs. Decena

waived in his order of 17 December 1986. Respondent can

not now claim that he had been deprived below of the
opportunity to confront the complainants and their
witnesses.
After carefully going through the record of the
proceedings as well as the evidence presented by both
parties, we agree with the findings and conclusions of the
Solicitor General.
The following acts of respondent:

1. making it appear on the 5 August 1975 real estate

mortgage that the amount loaned to complainants
was P5,000.00 instead of P4,000.00;
2. exacting grossly unreasonable and usurious
interest;
3. making it appear in the second real estate mortgage
of 7 May 1976 that the loan extended to
complainants had escalated to P10,000.00;
4. failing to inform complainants of the import of the
real mortgage documents and inducing them to sign
those documents with assurances that they were
merely for purposes of “formality”;
5. failing to demand or refraining from demanding
payment from complainants before effecting
extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgaged property;
and
6. failing to inform or refraining from informing
complainants that the real estate mortgage had
already been foreclosed and that complainants had
a right to redeem the foreclosed property within a
certain period of time.

constitute deception and dishonesty and conduct

unbecoming a member of the Bar. We agree with the
Solicitor General that the acts of respondent “imply
something immoral in themselves regardless of whether
they are punishable by law” and that these acts constitute
moral turpitude, being “contrary to justice, honesty,
modesty or good morals.” The standard required from
members of the Bar is not, of course, satisfied by conduct
which merely avoids collision with our criminal law. Even
so, respondent’s conduct, in fact, may be penalizable under
at least one penal statute—the anti-usury law.
The second charge against respondent relates to acts
done in his professional capacity, that is, done at a time
when he was counsel for the complainants in a criminal
case for estafa against accused Reynaldo Pineda. There are
two (2) aspects to this charge: the first is that respondent
Decena effected a compro-
676
676 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Melendrez vs. Decena

mise agreement concerning the civil liability of accused

Reynaldo Pineda without the consent and approval of the
complainants; the second is that, having received the
amount of P500.00 as an advance payment on this
“settlement,” he failed to inform complainants of that
advance payment and moreover, did not turn over the
P500.00 to the complainants. The facts show that
respondent “settled” the estafa case amicably for P2,000.00
without the knowledge and consent of complainants.
Respondent informed complainants of the amicable
“settlement” and of the P500.00 advance payment only
after petitioner Narciso Melendrez had confronted him
about these matters. And respondent never did turn over to
complainants the P500.00. Respondent is presumed to be
aware of the rule that lawyers cannot “without special
authority, compromise their clients’ litigation or receive
anything in discharge
6
of a client’s claim, but the full
amount in cash.” Respondent’s failure to turn over to
complainants the amount given by accused Pineda as
partial “settlement” of the estafa case underscores his lack
of honesty and candor in dealing with his clients.
Generally, a lawyer should not be suspended or
disbarred for misconduct committed in his personal or non-
professional capacity. Where, however, misconduct outside
his professional dealings becomes so patent and so gross as
to demonstrate moral unfitness to remain in the legal
profession, the Court must suspend or 7strike out the
lawyer’s name from the Roll of Attorneys. The nature of
the office of an attorney at law requires that he shall be a
person of good moral character. This qualification is not
only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of
law; its continued possession is also essential for remaining
in the practice of law, in the exercise of privileges of
members of the Bar. Gross misconduct on the part of a
lawyer, although not related to the discharge of
professional duties as a member of the Bar, which puts his
moral character in serious doubt,
8
renders him unfit to
continue in the practice of law.

_______________

6 Section 23, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.

7 Manolo v. Gan, 93 Phil. 202 (1953).
8 Caballero v. Deipairan, 60 SCRA 136 (1974); Balinon v. De Leon, 94
Phil. 277 (1954).

677

VOL. 176, AUGUST 24, 1989 677

Melendrez vs. Decena
 In the instant case, the exploitative deception exercised by
respondent attorney upon the complainants in his private
transactions with them, and the exacting of unconscionable
rates of interest, considered together with the acts of
professional misconduct committed by respondent attorney,
compel this Court to the conviction that he has lost that
good moral character which is indispensable for continued
membership in the Bar.
WHEREFORE, respondent Reynerio I. Decena is hereby
DISBARRED and his name shall be stricken from the Roll
of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Resolution be FURNISHED
each to the Bar Confidant and spread on the personal
records of respondent attorney, and to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines.

          Fernan, (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera,

Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla,
Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortés, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and
Regalado, JJ., concur.

Respondent disbarred.

Notes.—Attorney who allowed his client’s case to be

compromised and consented to the final dismissal of the
case but the sum due his client was to be paid not in cash
but in installments without any security, constitutes an
error of judgment. (Solidum vs. Sta. Maria, 133 SCRA
587.)
It is the duty of a lawyer to safeguard her client’s
interest. (Tolentino vs. Mangapit, 124 SCRA 741.)

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678

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