8 Laude v. Ginez-Jabalde

2/10/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 775
G.R. No. 217456. November 24, 2015.*

MARILOU S. LAUDE and MESEHILDA S. LAUDE, petitioners,
vs. HON. ROLINE M. GINEZ-JABALDE, Presiding Judge, Branch
74, Regional Trial Court of the City of Olongapo; HON. PAQUITO
N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON. ALBERT F. DEL
ROSARIO, Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs; HON.
GEN. GREGORIO PIO P. CATAPANG, Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines; HON. EMILIE FE DELOS SANTOS,
Chief City Prose-
_______________
* EN BANC.

409
VOL. 775, NOVEMBER 24, 2015 409

Laude vs. Ginez-Jabalde
cutor of Olongapo City; and L/CPL JOSEPH SCOTT

PEMBERTON, respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Motions; Notice of Hearing; Rule 15,

Section 4 of the Rules of Court clearly makes it a mandatory rule that the
adverse party be given notice of hearing on the motion at least three (3)
days prior.—Rule 15, Section 4 of the Rules of Court clearly makes it a
mandatory rule that the adverse party be given notice of hearing on the
motion at least three days prior. Failure to comply with this notice
requirement renders the motion defective consistent with protecting the
adverse party’s right to procedural due process.
Same; Same; Same; Same; While the general rule is that a motion that
fails to comply with the requirements of Rule 15 is a mere scrap of paper, an
exception may be made and the motion may still be acted upon by the court,
provided doing so will neither cause prejudice to the other party nor violate
his or her due process rights.—While the general rule is that a motion that
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001702abee6ac7fdf9a23003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/29
fails to comply with the requirements of Rule 15 is a mere scrap of paper, an

exception may be made and the motion may still be acted upon by the court,
provided doing so will neither cause prejudice to the other party nor violate
his or her due process rights. The adverse party must be given time to study
the motion in order to enable him or her to prepare properly and engage the
arguments of the movant. In this case, the general rule must apply because
Pemberton was not given sufficient time to study petitioners’ Motion,
thereby depriving him of his right to procedural due process.
International Law; Parties; International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights; Under treaty law, the Philippines, as a State Party, is
obligated to comply with its obligations under the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights.—There is no need to discuss whether this
provision has attained customary status, since under treaty law, the
Philippines, as a State Party, is obligated to comply with its obligations
under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. However,
petitioners went too far in their interpretation, ignoring completely the
nature of the obligation contemplated by the provision in an attempt to
justify their failure to comply with a domestic procedural rule aimed to
protect a human right in a proceeding, albeit that of the adverse party. On
March 29,

410
410 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

2004, the United Nations Human Rights Committee issued General

Comment No. 31, which pertained to the nature of the general legal
obligations imposed by the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights on State Parties.
Same; Same; Same; Human rights are not a monopoly of petitioners.
The accused also enjoys the protection of these rights.—The obligation
contemplated by Article 2, paragraph (3) is for the State Party to establish a
system of accessible and effective remedies through judicial and
administrative mechanisms. The present trial of Pemberton, to which
petitioner, Marilou S. Laude, is included as a private complainant, indicates
that there is a legal system of redress for violated rights. That petitioners
chose to act on their own, in total disregard of the mechanism for criminal
proceedings established by this court, should not be tolerated under the
guise of a claim to justice. This is especially in light of petitioners’ decision
to furnish the accused in the case a copy of her Motion only during the
hearing. Upholding human rights pertaining to access to justice cannot be
eschewed to rectify an important procedural deficiency that was not difficult
to comply with. Human rights are not a monopoly of petitioners. The

accused also enjoys the protection of these rights.
Parties; Real Party-in-Interest; In Jimenez v. Sorongon, 687 SCRA 151
(2012), the Supreme Court (SC) held that in criminal cases, the People is
the real party-in-interest, which means allowing a private complainant to
pursue a criminal action on his own is a rare exception.—The conformity
of the Public Prosecutor to the Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed Forces
of the Philippines to Surrender Custody of Accused to the Olongapo City
Jail is not a mere “superfluity.” In Jimenez v. Sorongon, 687 SCRA 151
(2012), this court held that in criminal cases, the People is the real party-in-
interest, which means allowing a private complainant to pursue a criminal
action on his own is a rare exception.
Judicial Review; The constitutionality of an official act may be the
subject of judicial review, provided the matter is not raised collaterally.—
The constitutionality of an official act may be the subject of judicial review,
provided the matter is not raised collaterally. In Planters Products, Inc. v.
Fertiphil Corporation, 548 SCRA 485 (2008): Judicial review of official
acts on the ground of unconstitutionality may be sought or availed of
through any of the actions cognizable by

411
VOL. 775, NOVEMBER 24, 2015 411

courts of justice, not necessarily in a suit for declaratory relief. . . The

constitutional issue, however, (a) must be properly raised and presented in
the case, and (b) its resolution is necessary to a determination of the case,
i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota presented.
(Emphasis supplied, citation omitted) The constitutionality of the Visiting
Forces Agreement is not the lis mota of this Petition. Petitioners started their
Petition with a claim that their right to access to justice was violated, but
ended it with a prayer for a declaration of the Visiting Forces Agreement’s
unconstitutionality. They attempt to create the connection between the two
by asserting that the Visiting Forces Agreement prevents the transfer of
Pemberton to Olongapo City Jail, which allegedly is tantamount to the
impairment of this court’s authority.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
H. Harry L. Roque, Jr., Romel R. Bagares, Gilbert T. Andres
and Charlene E. Latorre for petitioners.
Virginia Lacsa Suarez collaborating counsel for private
complainant.
Rowena Garcia-Flores for respondent Joseph Scott Pemberton.
LEONEN, J.:

Failure to meet the three-day notice rule for filing motions and to
obtain the concurrence of the Public Prosecutor to move for an
interlocutory relief in a criminal prosecution cannot be excused by
general exhortations of human rights. This Petition fails to show any
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court judge.
Furthermore, the accused, while undergoing trial and before
conviction, is already detained in the Philippines in compliance with
the obligations contained in the Agreement Between the
Government of the

412

United States of America and the Government of the Republic of

the Philippines Regarding the Treatment of United States Armed
Forces Visiting the Philippines (Visiting Forces Agreement).
This is a Petition for Certiorari1 under Rule 65, with prayer for
the issuance of a writ of mandatory injunction filed by Marilou S.
Laude and Mesehilda S. Laude (petitioners).
On October 11, 2014, Jeffrey “Jennifer” Laude (Jennifer) was
killed at the Celzone Lodge on Ramon Magsaysay Drive in
Olongapo City allegedly by 19-year-old US Marine L/CPL Joseph
Scott Pemberton (Pemberton).2 On October 15, 2014, a Complaint
for murder was filed by Jennifer’s sibling, Marilou S. Laude, against
Pemberton before the Olongapo City Office of the City Prosecutor.3
On October 22, 2014, Pemberton was detained in Camp Aguinaldo,
the general headquarters of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.4
On December 15, 2014, the Public Prosecutor filed an
Information for murder against Pemberton before the Regional Trial
Court in Olongapo City.5 The case was docketed as Case No. 865-
14, and was raffled to Branch 74.6 A warrant of arrest against
Pemberton was issued on December 16, 2014.7 Pemberton
surrendered personally to Judge Roline M. Ginez-Jabalde8
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 3-36.

2 Id., at p. 11.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id., at p. 12.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Petitioners spelled Judge Roline M. Ginez-Jabalde’s name as “Jinez-Jabalde” in
their Petition. In the Order (id., at pp. 58-59) dated December 23, 2014, Judge Ginez-
Jabalde affixed her signature above her name with “Ginez-Jabalde” as her surname.
“Ginez-Jabalde” shall be used in this Decision.

413
VOL. 775, NOVEMBER 24, 2015 413

(Judge Ginez-Jabalde) on December 19, 2014, and he was then

arraigned.9
On the same day, Marilou S. Laude filed an Urgent Motion to
Compel the Armed Forces of the Philippines to Surrender Custody
of Accused to the Olongapo City Jail and a Motion to Allow Media
Coverage.10 “The [M]otion was [scheduled] for hearing on
December 22, 2014, at 2 p.m.”11 According to petitioners, they were
only able to serve the Motion on Pemberton’s counsel through
registered mail.12 In any case, they claim to have also “furnished a
copy of the [M]otion personally . . . at the hearing of the
[M]otion.”13
On December 23, 2014, Judge Ginez-Jabalde denied petitioners’
Urgent Motion for lack of merit, the dispositive portion of which
reads:14

Wherefore, the . . . UrgentMotion [sic] to Compel the
Armed Forces of the Philippines to Surrender Custody of
Accused to the Olongapo City Jail [is] denied for utter lack of
merit.15 (Emphasis in the original)

Petitioners received a copy of the Order on January 5, 2015.16 On
January 9, 2015, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration.17 On
February 18, 2015, Judge Ginez-Jabalde issued an Order18 denying
petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.
_______________
9 Id., at p. 12.
10 Id., at p. 13.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id., at p. 14.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id., at pp. 60-80.
18 Id., at p. 81.

414

In a Resolution19 dated April 21, 2015, respondents were re-

quired to file their Comment on the Petition. On June 5, 2015, public
respondents, as represented by the Office of the Solicitor General,
filed their (First) Motion for Extension of Time to File Comment20
for 60 days. On the same day, Pemberton posted his Motion for
Additional Time to File Comment21 for 10 days. Pemberton filed his
Comment by counsel on June 16, 2015,22 while public respondents,
through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed their Comment on
September 23, 2015.23
Petitioners argue that “[r]espondent Judge committed grave
abuse of discretion tantamount to an excess or absence of
jurisdiction when she dismissed the Urgent Motion to Compel the
Armed Forces of the Philippines to Surrender Custody o[f] Accused
to the Olongapo City Jail [based] on mere technicalities[.]”24 In
particular, they argue that the three-day rule on motions under Rule
15, Section 425 of the 1997 Rules of Court is not absolute, and
should be liberally interpreted when a case is attended by exigent
circumstances.26
_______________
19 Id., at p. 134.
20 Id., at pp. 86-88.
21 Id., at pp. 126-129.
22 Id., at pp. 92-124.
23 Id., at pp. 155-167.
24 Id., at p. 15, Petition.
25 Rules of Court, Rule 15, Sec. 4 provides:
SECTION 4. Hearing of Motion.—Except for motions which the court may act
upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every written motion shall be
set for hearing by the applicant.
Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof
shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least
three (3) days before the date of hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the
hearing on shorter notice.
26 Rollo, pp. 61-67, Marilou S. Laude’s Motion for Reconsideration.

415
VOL. 775, NOVEMBER 24, 2015 415

Petitioners advance that the rationale behind the three-day notice

rule is satisfied when there is an opportunity to be heard, which was
present in this case since Pemberton’s counsel and the Public
Prosecutor were present in the hearing of the two Motions filed by
petitioners.27 Petitioners allege that the court noted their attendance,
and were able to make comments during the December 22, 2014
Motion hearing.28 They assert that the rights of Pemberton were not
compromised in any way.29
Petitioners also aver that the three-day notice rule should be
liberally applied due to the timing of the arrest and arraignment.30
“The Urgent Motion was set for hearing on December 22, 2014[.]”31
This date preceded a series of legal holidays beginning on December
24, 2014, where all the courts and government offices suspended
their work.32 Petitioners point out that a “murder trial is under a
distinctly special circumstance in that paragraph 6, Article V of the
Visiting Forces Agreement . . . provides for [a] one-year trial
period[,] after which the United States shall be relieved of any
obligations under said paragraph[.]”33 Petitioners had to file and set
the Motion hearing at the earliest possible date.34
Petitioners further argue that Judge Ginez-Jabalde should not
have dismissed the Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of
the Philippines to Surrender Custody of Accused to the Olongapo
City Jail “considering that the Urgent Motion raised issues that are
of transcendental importance and of primordial public interest.”35
Petitioners aver that under in-
_______________
27 Id., at pp. 17-19, Petition.

28 Id., at p. 19.
29 Id.
30 Id., at pp. 20-22.
31 Id., at p. 21.
32 Id.
33 Id., at pp. 21-22.
34 Id., at p. 22.
35 Id., at p. 24.

416

ternational human rights law, in particular the International

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the United Nations
Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and
Abuse of Power, they have the right to access to justice,36 which is
“distinct from the power of the Public Prosecutors to prosecute [the]
criminal case.”37
Furthermore, petitioners advance that Philippine authorities
ought to “have primary jurisdiction over [r]espondent Pemberton’s
person while [he] is being tried [in] a Philippine Court[,]”38 in
accordance with Article V, paragraph (3)(b) of the Visiting Forces
Agreement,39 which states:

3. In cases where the right to exercise jurisdiction is
concurrent, the following rules shall apply:
(a) Philippine authorities shall have the primary
right to exercise jurisdiction over all offenses
committed by United States personnel . . . (Emphasis
and underscoring in the original)40

Petitioners argue that the custody of Pemberton must be ordered
transferred to the Olongapo City Jail, considering that the crime
involved is murder, which is non-bailable.41 They aver that it is
unconstitutional to refuse to put him “in the custody of Philippine
jail authorities[,]” as such refusal “undermines the Constitutional
Powers of [the Court] to hear a jurisdictional matter brought before
it”42 and to promulgate rules for the practice of law.43 Petitioners
argue that even
_______________
36 Id., at pp. 24-26.

37 Id., at p. 27.
38 Id., at p. 28.
39 Id., at pp. 28-29.
40 Id., at p. 29.
41 Id.
42 Id., at p. 31.
43 Id., at p. 32.

417
VOL. 775, NOVEMBER 24, 2015 417

though the Visiting Forces Agreement gives the United States the
“sole discretion” to decide whether to surrender custody of an
accused American military personnel to the Philippine authorities,
“the rule is that . . . the Court [still] has control over any proceeding
involving a jurisdictional matter brought before it, even if it may
well involve the country’s relations with another foreign power.”44
As for the nonconformity of the Public Prosecutor, petitioners
argue that the Public Prosecutor’s refusal to sign the Urgent Motion
to Compel the Armed Forces of the Philippines to Surrender
Custody of Accused to the Olongapo City Jail rendered the
requirement for conformity superfluous.45 Petitioners allege that the
Public Prosecutor’s act is contrary to Department of Justice
Secretary Leila M. De Lima’s (Secretary De Lima) position on the
matter.46 They quote Secretary De Lima as having said the following
statement in a news article dated December 17, 2014:

“The Philippines will now insist on the custody (of
Pemberton) now that the (case) is filed in court and especially
since the warrant of arrest has been issued,” De Lima told
reporters in an ambush interview.47
Petitioners also quoted Secretary De Lima as having stated in

another news article dated December 18, 2014 the following:

Justice Secretary Leila De Lima stressed that Pemberton
should be under the custody of Philippine authorities,
following the filing of charges.
_______________
44 Id.
45 Id., at pp. 22-23.
46 Id., at p. 23.
47 Id., citing De Lima will insist on Pemberton custody, The Daily Tribune,
December 17, 2014 <http://www.tribune.net.ph/headlines/de-lima-will-insist-on-
pemberton-custody> (visited November 16, 2015).

418

“There is also a provision in the Visiting Forces Agreement

that, in cases of extraordinary circumstances, the Philippine
government can insist on the custody and for me, there are
enough such circumstances, such as cruelty and treachery, that
justified the filing of the murder and not homicide,” De Lima
said.48

The contrary manifestations made by Secretary De Lima,
according to petitioners, meant that “[t]he conformity of the Public
Prosecutor . . . is a mere superfluity”49 and was meant “to deny
[p]etitioners’ ‘quest for justice[.]’”50
Due to the nature of the case, petitioners pray in this Petition that
procedural requirements be set aside.51
In his Comment dated June 16, 2015, Pemberton argues that
Judge Ginez-Jabalde did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
denying the Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of the
Philippines to Surrender Custody of Accused to the Olongapo City
Jail since petitioners violated the three-day notice rule and failed to
secure the conformity of the Public Prosecutor assigned to the
case.52 He claims that he “was not given an opportunity to be
heard”53 on petitioners’ Motion.
In his counterstatement of facts, Pemberton avers that he
voluntarily surrendered to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 74, on
December 19, 2014.54 On the same day, Marilou S. Laude filed an
Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of the Philippines to
Surrender Custody of the Accused to the
48 Id., citing No more Pemberton custody talks for PH and US,
says DFA, Asian Journal, December 18, 2014
<http://asianjournal.com/news/no-more-pemberton-custody-talks-
for-ph-and-us-says-dfa/> (visited November 16, 2015).
_______________
49 Id., at p. 22.
50 Id., at p. 24.
51 Id., at p. 28.
52 Id., at p. 97, Joseph Scott Pemberton’s Comment.
53 Id.
54 Id., at p. 93.

419
VOL. 775, NOVEMBER 24, 2015 419

Olongapo City Jail, and setting the Motion hearing for December
22, 2015, but did not obtain the Public Prosecutor’s conformity.55
Marilou S. Laude also failed to personally serve a copy of the
Urgent Motion on Pemberton at least three days prior to the hearing
thereof.56
Pemberton further avers that on December 22, 2014, Judge
Ginez-Jabalde heard the Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed
Forces of the Philippines to Surrender Custody of the Accused to the
Olongapo City Jail and a Motion to Suspend the Proceedings.57
Counsel for Pemberton was in court to attend the hearing for the
Motion to Suspend the Proceedings, but did not have knowledge of
the Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of the Philippines to
Surrender Custody of the Accused to the Olongapo City Jail filed by
Marilou S. Laude.58 Counsel for Pemberton received a copy of the
Urgent Motion only “a few minutes”59 before it was to be heard.60
On December 23, 2014, Judge Ginez-Jabalde denied Marilou S.
Laude’s Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of the
Philippines to Surrender Custody of the Accused to the Olongapo
City Jail for being devoid of merit.61 Marilou S. Laude filed a
Motion for Reconsideration on January 9, 2015,62 without
conformity of the Public Prosecutor.63 On January 20, 2015,
Pemberton filed his Ad Cautelam Opposition [To Private
Complainant’s Motion for Reconsideration], arguing that Judge
Ginez-Jabalde correctly denied Marilou S. Laude’s Urgent Motion
due to the latter’s “failure to comply with set-
_______________
55 Id., at pp. 93-94.

56 Id.
57 Id., at p. 94.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id., at p. 60, Marilou S. Laude’s Motion for Reconsideration.
63 Id., at p. 94, Joseph Scott Pemberton’s Comment.

420

tled procedure regarding hearing of motions[.]”64 Pemberton

further argues that the custody over him “rightfully remain[ed] with
the [United States] authorities. . . .” He cites Section 6 of the
Visiting Forces Agreement, which provides that the “custody of any
United States personnel over whom the Philippines is to exercise
jurisdiction shall immediately reside with United States military
authorities, if they so request, from the commission of the offense,
until completion of all judicial proceedings.”65
Pemberton further argues in his Comment that the presence of his
counsel during the Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of
the Philippines to Surrender Custody of the Accused to the
Olongapo City Jail hearing did “not equate to an opportunity to be
heard as to satisfy the purpose of the three-day notice rule.”66 Citing
Preysler, Jr. v. Manila Southcoast Development Corporation,67
Cabrera v. Ng,68 and Jehan Shipping Corporation v. National Food
Authority,69 Pemberton avers that an opposing party is given
opportunity to be heard when he is “afforded sufficient time to study
the motion and to meaningfully oppose and controvert the same.”70
Even though his counsel was able to orally comment on the Urgent
Motion,71 Pemberton was deprived of any meaningful opportunity to
study and oppose it,72 having been furnished a copy a few minutes
before the hearing.73 Marilou S. Laude also failed
_______________
64 Id.
65 Id., at p. 95.
66 Id., at p. 97.
67 635 Phil. 598; 621 SCRA 636 (2010) [Per J. Carpio, Second Division].
68 G.R. No. 201601, March 12, 2014, 719 SCRA 199 [Per J. Reyes, First
Division].
69 514 Phil. 166; 477 SCRA 781 (2005) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
70 Rollo, p. 98, Joseph Scott Pemberton’s Comment.
71 Id., at pp. 99-100.
72 Id., at p. 99.
73 Id.

421
VOL. 775, NOVEMBER 24, 2015 421

to provide “justifiable reason for . . . failure to comply with the

three-day notice that would warrant a liberal construction of the
74
rules.”
Pemberton likewise argues that Marilou S. Laude, being only the
private complainant, lacks the legal personality to file the Urgent
Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of the Philippines to Surrender
Custody of Accused to the Olongapo City Jail and the subsequent
Motion for Reconsideration “without the conformity of the Public
Prosecutor.”75 Quoting Rule 110, Section 576 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, Pemberton states that the Public Prosecutor’s
lack of consent “rendered the Urgent Motion a mere scrap of
paper.”77 He adds that the defect is “not a mere technicality[.]”78
Pemberton also argues that Marilou S. Laude cannot rely on the
alleged statements of Secretary De Lima for the following reasons:79
First, Secretary De Lima did not direct the Olongapo City Office of
the City Prosecutor to give its approval to the Urgent Motion and
Motion for Reconsideration;80 second, Secretary De Lima did not
state that the Public Prosecutor should insist on turning over the
custody of Pemberton
_______________
74 Id., at p. 100.
75 Id., at p. 101.
76 Rules of Court, Rule 110, Sec. 5 provides:
SECTION 5. Who Must Prosecute Criminal Actions.—All criminal actions
commenced by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction and
control of the prosecutor. However, in Municipal Trial Courts or Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts when the prosecutor assigned thereto or to the case is not available, the
offended party, any peace officer, or public officer charged with the enforcement of
the law violated may prosecute the case. This authority shall cease upon actual
intervention of the prosecutor or upon elevation of the case to the Regional Trial
Court.
77 Rollo, p. 101, Joseph Scott Pemberton’s Comment.
78 Id.
79 Id., at p. 103.
80 Id.

422

to the Philippine authorities.81 Neither was there any such order

from Secretary De Lima.82 Petitioners’ claims are, therefore, without
legal basis.83
According to Pemberton, petitioners’ use of the “‘right to access

to justice’ under international law did not excuse [p]etitioner
Marilou [S. Laude] from securing the authority and conformity of
the Public Prosecutor[.]”84 He argues that both the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the United Nations
Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and
Abuse of Power “refer to national or domestic legislation in
affording [victims] access to justice.”85 The Rules of Court and
jurisprudence have established procedures for criminal proceedings,
and these require Marilou S. Laude “to obtain authority and consent
from the Public Prosecutor”86 before filing a Motion in the ongoing
criminal proceeding.87
As for the issue of custody under the Visiting Forces Agreement,
Pemberton argues that there is a difference between “jurisdiction”
and “custody.”88 He avers that jurisdiction is “the power and
authority of a court to try, hear[,] and decide a case.”89 Pemberton
does not dispute that “Philippine authorities have the primary right
to exercise jurisdiction over offenses committed by [a] United States
personnel[,] [which is] why the case is being tried [in] a Philippine
court.”90 However, custody “pertains to [the] actual physical control
over the per-
_______________
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id., at p. 104.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id., at p. 108.
89 Id., at p. 109.
90 Id.

423
VOL. 775, NOVEMBER 24, 2015 423

son of the accused[,]”91 and under the Visiting Forces

Agreement, Pemberton argues that custody shall reside with the
United States Military authorities, since the Visiting Forces
Agreement expressly provides that “[t]he custody of any United
States personnel . . . shall immediately reside with [the] United
States military authorities . . . from the commission of the offense

until completion of all judicial proceedings.”92
Public respondents advance that Judge Ginez-Jabalde did not
commit grave abuse of discretion when she denied the Urgent
Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of the Philippines to Surrender
Custody of Accused to the Olongapo City Jail.93 Public respondents,
through their Comment filed by the Office of the Solicitor General,
argue that “[p]etitioners are not real parties-in-interest[.]”94 They
claim that “the real party-in-interest is the People [of the
Philippines], represented by the public prosecutor in the lower court
and by the Office of the Solicitor General . . . in the Court of
Appeals and in the Supreme Court.”95 While public respondents
recognize that petitioners may intervene as private offended parties,
“the active conduct of . . . trial [in a criminal case] is properly the
duty of the public prosecutor.”96 The nonconformity of the Public
Prosecutor in petitioners’ Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed
Forces of the Philippines to Surrender Custody of Accused to the
Olongapo City Jail is fatal in light of its nature pertaining to the
place of Pemberton’s confinement.97 The issue of confinement of an
accused pertains to the criminal aspect of the case and “involves the
right to prosecute[,] which [is lodged] exclusively to the People[.]”98
_______________
91 Id.
92 Id., at p. 110.
93 Id., at p. 160, Hon. Roline M. Ginez-Jabalde, et al.’s Comment.
94 Id., at p. 157.
95 Id., at p. 158.
96 Id.
97 Id., at p. 159.
98 Id.

424

Referring to Rule 110, Section 5 of the Rules of Court, public

respondents aver that the requirement for motions to be “filed in the
name of and under the authority of the public prosecutor”99 is not a
mere technical requirement, but is part of “the essential, inherent,
and exclusive power of the State to prosecute criminals[.]”100 Public
respondents counter petitioners’ claim that the Public Prosecutor’s
approval is superfluous given the alleged position of Secretary De
Lima in the newspaper articles. Citing Feria v. Court of Appeals,

public respondents argue that newspaper articles are “hearsay
evidence, twice removed”101 and are “inadmissible” for having no
probative value, “whether objected to or not.”102
As for the three-day notice rule under the Rules of Court, public
respondents argue that petitioners’ failure to comply cannot be
excused in light of the rule’s purpose, that is, for the Motion’s
adverse party not to be surprised, granting one sufficient time to
study the Motion and be able to meet the arguments contained in
it.103
Public respondents argue that while the Visiting Forces
Agreement “grants primary jurisdiction to Philippine authorities”104
in this case, Pemberton’s handover specifically to the Olongapo City
Jail is unnecessary.105 The Visiting Forces Agreement does not
specify the place of an accused American personnel’s confinement.
The issue of custody is thus “best left to the discretion of the trial
court.”106 According to public respondents, for so long as the present
arrangement neither renders it difficult for Pemberton to appear in
court when he
_______________
99 Id., at p. 160.
100 Id.
101 Id., at p. 161; see also Feria v. Court of Appeals, 382 Phil. 412, 423; 325
SCRA 525, 536 (2000) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].
102 Id., at p. 161, Hon. Roline M. Ginez-Jabalde, et al.’s Comment.
103 Id.
104 Id., at p. 162.
105 Id.
106 Id.

425
VOL. 775, NOVEMBER 24, 2015 425

is required nor impairs Judge Ginez-Jabalde’s authority to try the

case, the trial court may validly decide for Pemberton to remain
where he currently is.107
Lastly, public respondents maintain that petitioners are not
entitled to a mandatory injunction since they have no “clear and
unmistakable right to the transfer of [respondent Pemberton] from
Camp Aguinaldo to the Olongapo City Jail.”108 They underscore that
“petitioners are private offended parties[,] not the real party-in-

interest in [this] criminal case[.]”109
We dismiss the Petition.

I

The failure of petitioners to comply with the three-day notice rule
is unjustified.
Rule 15, Section 4 of the Rules of Court clearly makes it a
mandatory rule that the adverse party be given notice of hearing on
the motion at least three days prior.
Failure to comply with this notice requirement renders the
motion defective consistent with protecting the adverse party’s right
to procedural due process.110 In Jehan Shipping Corporation:111
As an integral component of procedural due process, the

three-day notice required by the Rules is not intended for the
benefit of the movant. Rather, the requirement is for the
purpose of avoiding surprises that may be sprung upon the
adverse party, who must be given time to study and meet the
arguments
_______________
107 Id., at p. 164.

108 Id., at p. 165.
109 Id.
110 See Jehan Shipping Corporation v. National Food Authority, supra note 69 at
pp. 173-174; p. 788.
111 Id.

426

in the motion before a resolution by the court. Principles

of natural justice demand that the right of a party should not
be affected without giving it an opportunity to be heard.112
(Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

While the general rule is that a motion that fails to comply with
the requirements of Rule 15 is a mere scrap of paper, an exception
may be made and the motion may still be acted upon by the court,
provided doing so will neither cause prejudice to the other party nor
violate his or her due process rights.113 The adverse party must be
given time to study the motion in order to enable him or her to
prepare properly and engage the arguments of the movant.114 In this
case, the general rule must apply because Pemberton was not given
sufficient time to study petitioners’ Motion, thereby depriving him
of his right to procedural due process.
Petitioners admit that they personally furnished Pemberton a
copy of the Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of the
Philippines to Surrender Custody of Accused to the Olongapo City
Jail only during the hearing.115 They attempt to elude the
consequences of this belated notice by arguing that they also served
a copy of the Motion by registered mail on Pemberton’s counsel.116
They also attempt to underscore the urgency of the Motion by
making a reference to the Christmas season and the “series of legal
holidays”117 where courts would be closed.118 To compound their
obfuscation, petitioners claim that the hearing held on December 22,
_______________
112 Id., at pp. 173-174; pp. 788-789.

113 See Anama v. Court of Appeals, 680 Phil. 305, 313; 644 SCRA 293, 301
(2012) [Per J. Mendoza, Third Division].
114 See Jehan Shipping Corporation v. National Food Authority, supra note 69 at
pp. 173-174; pp. 788-789.
115 Rollo, p. 13, Petition.
116 Id.
117 Id., at p. 21.
118 Id.

427
VOL. 775, NOVEMBER 24, 2015 427

2014, attended by Pemberton’s counsel sufficiently satisfied the

rationale of the three-day notice rule.
These circumstances taken together do not cure the Motion’s
deficiencies. Even granting that Pemberton’s counsel was able to
comment on the motion orally during the hearing, which incidentally
was set for another incident,119 it cannot be said that Pemberton was
able to study and prepare for his counterarguments to the issues
raised in the Motion. Judge Ginez-Jabalde was correct to deny the
Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of the Philippines to
Surrender Custody of Accused to the Olongapo City Jail based on
noncompliance of procedural rules. To rule otherwise would be to

prejudice Pemberton’s rights as an accused.

II

Petitioners also argue that the Urgent Motion to Compel the
Armed Forces of the Philippines to Surrender Custody of Accused to
the Olongapo City Jail is an assertion of their right to access to
justice as recognized by international law and the 1987 Constitution.
They justify the separate filing of the Motion as a right granted by
Article 2, paragraph (3) of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights,120 independent of “the power of the Public
Prosecutors to prosecute [a] criminal case.”121
Article 2, paragraph (3) of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights states:
3. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes:
_______________
119 Id., at p. 94, Joseph Scott Pemberton’s Comment. The hearing scheduled for
December 22, 2014 was for Joseph Scott Pemberton’s Motion to Suspend the
Proceedings.
120 Id., at pp. 24-25, Petition.
121 Id., at p. 24.

428

(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms

as herein recognized are violated shall have an effective
remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been
committed by persons acting in an official capacity;
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy
shall have his right thereto determined by competent judicial,
administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other
competent authority provided for by the legal system of the
State, and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy;
(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce
such remedies when granted.122

There is no need to discuss whether this provision has attained
customary status, since under treaty law, the Philippines, as a State
Party,123 is obligated to comply with its obligations under the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.124 However,

petitioners went too far in their interpretation, ignoring completely
the nature of the obligation contemplated by the provision in an
attempt to justify their failure to comply with a domestic procedural
rule aimed to protect a human right in a proceeding, albeit that of the
adverse party.
_______________
122 United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights,
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
<http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx> (visited November
16, 2015).
123 United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, 4. International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
<https://treaties.un.org/pages/viewdetails.aspx? chapter=4&src=treaty&mtdsg_no=iv-
4&lang=en> (visited November 16, 2015).
124 United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights,
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
<http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx> (visited November
16, 2015): The ICCPR provides in its Preamble that “[t]he States Parties to the
present Covenant . . . [a]gree upon” the mandates in Articles 1-53 of the Convention.

429
VOL. 775, NOVEMBER 24, 2015 429

On March 29, 2004, the United Nations Human Rights

Committee issued General Comment No. 31,125 which pertained to
the nature of the general legal obligations imposed by the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights on State Parties.
On Article 2, paragraph (3), the General Comment states:

15. Article 2, paragraph 3, requires that in addition to
effective protection of Covenant rights[,] States Parties must
ensure that individuals also have accessible and effective
remedies to vindicate those rights. Such remedies should be
appropriately adapted so as to take account of the special
vulnerability of certain categories of person, including in
particular children. The Committee attaches importance to
States Parties’ establishing appropriate judicial and
administrative mechanisms for addressing claims of rights
violations under domestic law. The Committee notes that the
enjoyment of the rights recognized under the Covenant can be
effectively assured by the judiciary in many different ways,

including direct applicability of the Covenant, application of
comparable constitutional or other provisions of law, or the
interpretive effect of the Covenant in the application of
national law. Administrative mechanisms are particularly
required to give effect to the general obligation to investigate
allegations of violations promptly, thoroughly and effectively
through independent and impartial bodies. National human
rights institutions, endowed with appropriate powers, can
contribute to this end. A failure by a State Party to investigate
allegations of violations could in and of itself give rise to a
separate breach of the Covenant. Cessation of an ongoing
violation is an essential element of the right to an effective
remedy.
_______________
125 Human Rights Committee, Eightieth session, General Comment No. 31, The
Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant
Adopted on 29 March 2004 (2187th meeting), CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13
<https://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/gencomm/hrcom31.html> (visited November 16,
2015).

430

16. Article 2, paragraph 3, requires that States Parties

make reparation to individuals whose Covenant rights have
been violated. Without reparation to individuals whose
Covenant rights have been violated, the obligation to provide
an effective remedy, which is central to the efficacy of Article
2, paragraph 3, is not discharged. In addition to the explicit
reparation required by Articles 9, paragraph 5, and 14,
paragraph 6, the Committee considers that the Covenant
generally entails appropriate compensation. The Committee
notes that, where appropriate, reparation can involve
restitution, rehabilitation and measures of satisfaction, such as
public apologies, public memorials, guarantees of non-
repetition and changes in relevant laws and practices, as well
as bringing to justice the perpetrators of human rights
violations.126 (Emphasis supplied)

The obligation contemplated by Article 2, paragraph (3) is for the

State Party to establish a system of accessible and effective remedies
through judicial and administrative mechanisms. The present trial of
Pemberton, to which petitioner, Marilou S. Laude, is included as a
private complainant, indicates that there is a legal system of redress
for violated rights. That petitioners chose to act on their own, in total
disregard of the mechanism for criminal proceedings established by
this court, should not be tolerated under the guise of a claim to
justice. This is especially in light of petitioners’ decision to furnish
the accused in the case a copy of her Motion only during the
hearing. Upholding human rights pertaining to access to justice
cannot be eschewed to rectify an important procedural deficiency
that was not difficult to comply with. Human rights are not a
monopoly of petitioners. The accused also enjoys the protection of
these rights.
_______________
126 Id.

431
VOL. 775, NOVEMBER 24, 2015 431

III

The conformity of the Public Prosecutor to the Urgent Motion to
Compel the Armed Forces of the Philippines to Surrender Custody
of Accused to the Olongapo City Jail is not a mere “superfluity.”127
In Jimenez v. Sorongon,128 this court held that in criminal cases, the
People is the real party-in-interest, which means allowing a private
complainant to pursue a criminal action on his own is a rare
exception:129

Procedural law basically mandates that “[a]ll criminal
actions commenced by complaint or by information shall be
prosecuted under the direction and control of a public
prosecutor.” In appeals of criminal cases before the CA and
before this Court, the OSG is the appellate counsel of the
People. . . .
....
The People is the real party-in-interest in a criminal case
and only the OSG can represent the People in criminal
proceedings pending in the CA or in this Court. This ruling
has been repeatedly stressed in several cases and continues

to be the controlling doctrine.
While there may be rare occasions when the offended
party may be allowed to pursue the criminal action on his
own behalf (as when there is a denial of due process), this
exceptional circumstance does not apply in the present case.
In this case, the petitioner has no legal personality to assail
the dismissal of the criminal case since the main issue raised
by the petitioner involved the criminal aspect of the case, i.e.,
the existence of probable cause. The petitioner did not appeal
to protect his alleged pecuniary
_______________
127 Rollo, p. 22. (Petition)

128 G.R. No. 178607, December 5, 2012, 687 SCRA 151 [Per J. Brion, Second
Division].
129 Id., at p. 160.

432

interest as an offended party of the crime, but to cause the

reinstatement of the criminal action against the respondents. This
involves the right to prosecute which pertains exclusively to the
People, as represented by the OSG.130 (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)
In this case, petitioners have not shown why the Motion may be
allowed to fall under the exception. The alleged grave abuse of
discretion of the Public Prosecutor was neither clearly pleaded nor
argued. The duty and authority to prosecute the criminal aspects of
this case, including the custody issue, are duly lodged in the Public
Prosecutor. Her refusal to give her conforme to the Motion is an act
well within the bounds of her position. That petitioners used as bases
newspaper articles for claiming that the Public Prosecutor acted
contrary to the position of Secretary De Lima cannot be given
weight. Public respondents are correct in asserting that the proper
remedy would have been for petitioners to have the act reversed by
Secretary De Lima through proper legal venues.

IV

Finally, petitioners argue that the Visiting Forces Agreement

should be declared “unconstitutional insofar as it impairs the . . .
power of the Supreme Court[.]”131 They advance this argument in
the context of their Motion to place Pemberton under the custody of
Philippine authorities while the case is being tried,132 with their
prayer in this Petition phrased thus:

(b) Declare the VFA unconstitutional insofar as it impairs
the constitutional power of the Supreme Court to promulgate
rules for practice before it, including the Rules of Criminal
Procedure[.]133
_______________
130 Id., at pp. 159-161.

131 Rollo, p. 33.
132 Id., at p. 28.
133 Id., at p. 33.

433
VOL. 775, NOVEMBER 24, 2015 433

The constitutionality of an official act may be the subject of

judicial review, provided the matter is not raised collaterally. In
Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation:134

Judicial review of official acts on the ground of
unconstitutionality may be sought or availed of through any of
the actions cognizable by courts of justice, not necessarily in a
suit for declaratory relief . . . The constitutional issue,
however, (a) must be properly raised and presented in the
case, and (b) its resolution is necessary to a determination of
the case, i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be the very
lis mota presented.135 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
The constitutionality of the Visiting Forces Agreement is not the

lis mota of this Petition. Petitioners started their Petition with a
claim that their right to access to justice was violated, but ended it
with a prayer for a declaration of the Visiting Forces Agreement’s
unconstitutionality. They attempt to create the connection between
the two by asserting that the Visiting Forces Agreement prevents the
transfer of Pemberton to Olongapo City Jail, which allegedly is
tantamount to the impairment of this court’s authority.
First, this Petition is not the proper venue to rule on the issue of
whether the Visiting Forces Agreement transgresses the judicial
authority of this court to promulgate rules pertaining to criminal
cases. Second, the issues of criminal jurisdiction and custody during
trial as contained in the Visiting Forces Agreement were discussed
in Nicolas v. Secretary Romulo, et al.:136
_______________
134 572 Phil. 270; 548 SCRA 485 (2008) [Per J. R. T. Reyes, Third Division].
135 Id., at p. 291; p. 506.
136 598 Phil. 262; 578 SCRA 438 (2009) [Per J. Azcuna, En Banc].

434

The VFA being a valid and binding agreement, the parties

are required as a matter of international law to abide by its
terms and provisions.
The VFA provides that in cases of offenses committed by
the members of the US Armed Forces in the Philippines, the
following rules apply:

Article V
Criminal Jurisdiction
x x x x x x x x x
6. The custody of any United States personnel over
whom the Philippines is to exercise jurisdiction shall
immediately reside with United States military
authorities, if they so request, from the commission of
the offense until completion of all judicial proceedings.
United States military authorities shall, upon formal
notification by the Philippine authorities and without
delay, make such personnel available to those
authorities in time for any investigative or judicial
proceedings relating to the offense with which the
person has been charged. In extraordinary cases, the
Philippine Government shall present its position to the
United States Government regarding custody, which the
United States Government shall take into full account.
In the event Philippine judicial proceedings are not
completed within one year, the United States shall be
relieved of any obligations under this paragraph. The
one year period will not include the time necessary to

appeal. Also, the one year period will not include any
time during which scheduled trial procedures are
delayed because United States authorities, after timely
notification by Philippine authorities to arrange for the
presence of the accused, fail to do so.
Petitioners contend that these undertakings violate another
provision of the Constitution, namely, that providing for the
exclusive power of this Court to adopt rules

435
VOL. 775, NOVEMBER 24, 2015 435

of procedure for all courts in the Philippines. (Art. VIII,

Sec. 5[5]) They argue that to allow the transfer of custody of
an accused to a foreign power is to provide for a different rule
of procedure for that accused, which also violates the equal
protection clause of the Constitution. (Art. III, Sec. 1. [sic])
Again, this Court finds no violation of the Constitution.
The equal protection clause is not violated, because there
is a substantial basis for a different treatment of a member
of a foreign military armed forces allowed to enter our
territory and all other accused.
The rule in international law is that a foreign armed forces
allowed to enter one’s territory is immune from local
jurisdiction, except to the extent agreed upon. The Status of
Forces Agreements involving foreign military units around the
world vary in terms and conditions, according to the situation
of the parties involved, and reflect their bargaining power. But
the principle remains, i.e., the receiving State can exercise
jurisdiction over the forces of the sending State only to the
extent agreed upon by the parties.
As a result, the situation involved is not one in which the
power of this Court to adopt rules of procedure is curtailed
or violated, but rather one in which, as is normally
encountered around the world, the laws (including rules of
procedure) of one State do not extend or apply — except to
the extent agreed upon — to subjects of another State due to
the recognition of extraterritorial immunity given to such
bodies as visiting foreign armed forces.
Nothing in the Constitution prohibits such agreements
recognizing immunity from jurisdiction or some aspects of
jurisdiction (such as custody), in relation to long-recognized
subjects of such immunity like Heads of State, diplomats and
members of the armed forces contingents of a foreign State

al-

436

lowed to enter another State’s territory. On the contrary,

the Constitution states that the Philippines adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of
the law of the land. (Art. II, Sec. 2)
Applying, however, the provisions of VFA, the Court finds
that there is a different treatment when it comes to detention
as against custody. The moment the accused has to be
detained, e.g., after conviction, the rule that governs is the
following provision of the VFA:
Article V
Criminal Jurisdiction
x x x x x x x x x
Sec. 10. The confinement or detention by
Philippine authorities of United States personnel shall
be carried out in facilities agreed on by appropriate
Philippines and United States authorities. United States
personnel serving sentences in the Philippines shall
have the right to visits and material assistance.
It is clear that the parties to the VFA recognized the
difference between custody during the trial and
detention after conviction, because they provided for a
specific arrangement to cover detention. And this
specific arrangement clearly states not only that the
detention shall be carried out in facilities agreed on by
authorities of both parties, but also that the detention
shall be “by Philippine authorities.”137 (Emphasis
supplied, citations omitted)

In any case, Pemberton is confined, while undergoing trial, in
Camp Aguinaldo, which by petitioners’ own description is the
“General Head Quarters of the Armed Forces of the Philip
_______________
137 Id., at pp. 285-287; pp. 462-464.


pines[.]”138 Their claim that the detention facility is under the
“control, supervision[,] and jurisdiction of American military
authorities”139 is not substantiated.

V

Petitioners’ prayer for the issuance of a writ of mandatory
injunction to compel public respondents to turn over the custody of
Pemberton “from American military authorities to the OLONGAPO
CITY JAIL”140 is likewise denied for lack of merit. In Semirara
Coal Corporation v. HGL Development Corporation:141
It is likewise established that a writ of mandatory

injunction is granted upon a showing that (a) the invasion of
the right is material and substantial; (b) the right of
complainant is clear and unmistakable; and (c) there is an
urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to prevent
serious damage.142 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
Nowhere in their Petition did petitioners discuss the basis for

their claim that they are entitled to the sought writ, let alone mention
it in their arguments. This court cannot consider the issuance of a
writ of mandatory injunction or a temporary restraining order
without any legal and factual basis.
Besides, considering the extent of the scope of this court’s power
to issue a temporary restraining order, prayers for the issuance of a
writ of mandatory injunction is usually unnecessary.
_______________
138 Rollo, p. 11.

139 Id.
140 Id., at p. 33.
141 539 Phil. 532; 510 SCRA 479 (2006) [Per J. Quisumbing, Third Division].
142 Id., at p. 545; p. 493.

438

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari

is DISMISSED for lack of grave abuse of discretion resulting in
lack or excess of jurisdiction. The prayer for the issuance of a writ of

mandatory injunction is likewise DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno (CJ.), Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta,

Bersamin, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza and Reyes,
JJ., concur.
Carpio, J., On Official Leave.
Perlas-Bernabe, J., On leave.
Jardeleza, J., On Official Leave.
Petition dismissed.
Notes.—A motion without a notice of hearing is considered pro

forma. (Layug vs. Commission on Elections, 667 SCRA 135 [2012])
The fact that the notice of hearing was published in a newspaper
of general circulation and notice thereof was served upon the State
will not change the nature of the proceedings taken. (Republic vs.
Uy, 703 SCRA 425 [2013])

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2/10/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 775

G.R. No. 217456. November 24, 2015.*

VOL. 775, NOVEMBER 24, 2015 409

cutor of Olongapo City; and L/CPL JOSEPH SCOTT

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Motions; Notice of Hearing; Rule 15,

fails to comply with the requirements of Rule 15 is a mere scrap of paper, an

410 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

2004, the United Nations Human Rights Committee issued General

to comply with. Human rights are not a monopoly of petitioners. The

VOL. 775, NOVEMBER 24, 2015 411

courts of justice, not necessarily in a suit for declaratory relief. . . The

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

Rowena Garcia-Flores for respondent Joseph Scott Pemberton.

412 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

United States of America and the Government of the Republic of

1 Rollo, pp. 3-36.

VOL. 775, NOVEMBER 24, 2015 413

(Judge Ginez-Jabalde) on December 19, 2014, and he was then

414 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

In a Resolution19 dated April 21, 2015, respondents were re-

VOL. 775, NOVEMBER 24, 2015 415

Petitioners advance that the rationale behind the three-day notice

27 Id., at pp. 17-19, Petition.

416 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

ternational human rights law, in particular the International

36 Id., at pp. 24-26.

VOL. 775, NOVEMBER 24, 2015 417

Petitioners also quoted Secretary De Lima as having stated in

418 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

“There is also a provision in the Visiting Forces Agreement

VOL. 775, NOVEMBER 24, 2015 419

55 Id., at pp. 93-94.

420 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

tled procedure regarding hearing of motions[.]”64 Pemberton

VOL. 775, NOVEMBER 24, 2015 421

to provide “justiﬁable reason for . . . failure to comply with the

422 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

to the Philippine authorities.81 Neither was there any such order

According to Pemberton, petitioners’ use of the “‘right to access

VOL. 775, NOVEMBER 24, 2015 423

son of the accused[,]”91 and under the Visiting Forces

States military authorities . . . from the commission of the offense

424 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Referring to Rule 110, Section 5 of the Rules of Court, public

Lima in the newspaper articles. Citing Feria v. Court of Appeals,

VOL. 775, NOVEMBER 24, 2015 425

is required nor impairs Judge Ginez-Jabalde’s authority to try the

“petitioners are private offended parties[,] not the real party-in-

As an integral component of procedural due process, the

107 Id., at p. 164.

426 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

in the motion before a resolution by the court. Principles

112 Id., at pp. 173-174; pp. 788-789.

VOL. 775, NOVEMBER 24, 2015 427

2014, attended by Pemberton’s counsel sufﬁciently satisﬁed the

noncompliance of procedural rules. To rule otherwise would be to

428 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.124 However,

VOL. 775, NOVEMBER 24, 2015 429