Government of The United States of America vs. Purganan PDF

VOL.
389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 623

Government of the United States of America vs. Purganan
*
G.R. No. 148571. September 24, 2002.
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA, represented by the Philippine Department of
Justice, petitioner, vs. Hon. GUILLERMO G. PURGANAN,
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
42; and MARK B. JIMENEZ a.k.a. MARIO BATACAN
CRESPO, respondents.
Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Certiorari; Motions for

Reconsideration; As a general rule, a petition for certiorari before a
higher court will not prosper unless the inferior court has been
given, through a motion for reconsideration, a chance to correct the
errors imputed to it; Exceptions.—As a general rule, a petition for
certiorari before a higher court will not prosper unless the inferior
court has been given, through a motion for reconsideration, a
chance to correct the errors imputed to it. This rule, though, has
certain exceptions: (1) when the issue raised is purely of law, (2)
when public interest is involved, or (3) in case of urgency. As a
fourth exception, the Court has also ruled that the filing of a
motion for reconsideration before availment of the remedy of
certiorari is not a sine qua non, when the questions raised are the
same as those that have already been squarely argued and
exhaustively passed upon by the lower court. Aside from being of
this nature, the issues in the present case also involve pure
questions of law that are of public interest. Hence, a motion for
reconsideration may be dispensed with. Likewise, this Court has
allowed a direct invocation of its original jurisdiction to issue
writs of certiorari when there are special and important reasons
therefor.
International Law; Extradition; Treaties; A cardinal rule in
the interpretation of a treaty or a law is to ascertain and give effect
to its intent.—The substantive issues raised in this case require
an interpretation or construction of the treaty and the law on
extradition. A cardinal rule in the interpretation of a treaty or a
law is to ascertain and give effect to its intent. Since PD 1069 is
intended as a guide for the implementation of extradition treaties
to which the Philippines is a signatory, understanding certain
postulates of extradition will aid us in properly deciding the
issues raised here.
Same; Same; Postulates of Extradition; Extradition is a major
instrument for the suppression of crime.—Extradition treaties are
entered into for the purpose of suppressing crime by facilitating
the arrest and the
_______________
* EN BANC.
624
624 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
custodial transfer of a fugitive from one state to the other. With

the advent of easier and faster means of international travel, the
flight of affluent criminals from one country to another for the
purpose of committing crime and evading prosecution has become
more frequent. Accordingly, governments are adjusting their
methods of dealing with criminals and crimes that transcend
international boundaries. Today, “a majority of nations in the
world community have come to look upon extradition as the major
effective instrument of international co-operation in the
suppression of crime.” It is the only regular system that has been
devised to return fugitives to the jurisdiction of a court competent
to try them in accordance with municipal and international law.
Same; Same; Same; The requesting State will accord due
process to the accused.—An extradition treaty presupposes that
both parties thereto have examined, and that both accept and
trust, each other’s legal system and judicial process. More
pointedly, our duly authorized representative’s signature on an
extradition treaty signifies our confidence in the capacity and the
willingness of the other state to protect the basic rights of the
person sought to be extradited. That signature signifies our full
faith that the accused will be given, upon extradition to the
requesting state, all relevant and basic rights in the criminal
proceedings that will take place therein; otherwise, the treaty
would not have been signed, or would have been directly attacked
for its unconstitutionally.
Same; Same; Same; Extradition proceedings are sui generis.—
As pointed out in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, extradition
proceedings are not criminal in nature. In criminal proceedings,
the constitutional rights of the accused are at fore; in extradition
which is sui generis—in a class by itself—they are not. “An
extradition [proceeding] is sui generis. It is not a criminal
proceeding which will call into operation all the rights of an
accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. To begin with, the
process of extradition does not involve the determination of the
guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocence will be
adjudged in the court of the state where he will be extradited.
Hence, as a rule, constitutional rights that are only relevant to
determine the guilt or innocence of an accused cannot be invoked
by an extraditee x x x.
Same; Same; Same; The ultimate purpose of extradition
proceedings in court is only to determine whether the extradition
request complies with the Extradition Treaty, and whether the
person sought is extraditable.—Given the foregoing, it is evident
that the extradition court is not called upon to ascertain the guilt
or the innocence of the person sought to be extradited. Such
determination during the extradition proceedings will only result
in needless duplication and delay. Extradition is merely a
625
VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 625
measure of international judicial assistance through which a

person charged with or convicted of a crime is restored to a
jurisdiction with the best claim to try that person. It is not part of
the function of the assisting authorities to enter into questions
that are the prerogative of that jurisdiction. The ultimate purpose
of extradition proceedings in court is only to determine whether the
extradition request complies with the Extradition Treaty, and
whether the person sought is extraditable.
Same; Same; Same; Pacta Sunt Servanda; We are bound by
pacta sunt seruanda to comply in good faith with our obligations
under the Extradition Treaty.—Our executive branch of
government voluntarily entered into the Extradition Treaty, and
our legislative branch ratified it. Hence, the Treaty carries the
presumption that its implementation will serve the national
interest. Fulfilling our obligations under the Extradition Treaty
promotes comity with the requesting state. On the other hand,
failure to fulfill our obligations thereunder paints a bad image of
our country before the world community. Such failure would
discourage other states from entering into treaties with us,
particularly an extradition treaty that hinges on reciprocity.
Verily, we are bound by pacta sunt servanda to comply in good
faith with our obligations under the Treaty. This principle
requires that we deliver the accused to the requesting country if
the conditions precedent to extradition, as set forth in the Treaty,
are satisfied. In other words, “[t]he demanding government, when
it has done all that the treaty and the law require it to do, is
entitled to the delivery of the accused on the issue of the proper
warrant, and the other government is under obligation to make
the surrender.” Accordingly, the Philippines must be ready and in
a position to deliver the accused, should it be found proper.
Same; Same; Same; Persons to be extradited are presumed to
be flight risks.—Persons to be extradited are presumed to be flight
risks. This prima facie presumption finds reinforcement in the
experience of the executive branch: nothing short of confinement
can ensure that the accused will not flee the jurisdiction of the
requested state in order to thwart their extradition to the
requesting state.
Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Section 6 of PD 1069,
our Extradition Treaty, uses the word “immediate” to qualify the
arrest of the accused, a qualification would be rendered nugatory
by setting for hearing the issuance of the arrest warrant—arrest
subsequent to a hearing can no longer be considered
“immediate.”—It is significant to note that Section 6 of PD 1069,
our Extradition Law, uses the word “immediate” to qualify the
arrest of the accused. This qualification would be rendered
nugatory by setting for hearing the issuance of the arrest
warrant. Hearing entails
626
sending notices to the opposing parties, receiving facts and

arguments from them, and giving them time to prepare and
present such facts and arguments. Arrest subsequent to a hearing
can no longer be considered “immediate.” The law could not have
intended the word as a mere superfluity but, on the whole, as a
means of imparting a sense of urgency and swiftness in the
determination of whether a warrant of arrest should be issued.
Same; Same; Same; By using the phrase “if it appears,” the
law fur ther conveys that accuracy is not as important as speed at
such early stage.—By using the phrase “if it appears,” the law
further conveys that accuracy is not as important as speed at such
early stage. The trial court is not expected to make an exhaustive
determination to ferret out the true and actual situation,
immediately upon the filing of the petition. From the knowledge
and the material then available to it, the court is expected merely
to get a good first impression—a prima facie finding—sufficient to
make a speedy initial determination as regards the arrest and
detention of the accused.
Same; Same; Warrants of Arrest; Grave Abuse of Discretion; A
judge gravely abuses his discretion when he sets for hearing the
application for the issuance of an arrest warrant in an extradition
proceeding after having already determined from the petition itself
and its supporting documents that a prima facie finding exists.—
We stress that the prima facie existence of probable cause for
hearing the petition and, a priori, for issuing an arrest warrant
was already evident from the Petition itself and its supporting
documents. Hence, after having already determined therefrom
that a prima facie finding did exist, respondent judge gravely
abused his discretion when he set the matter for hearing upon
motion of Jimenez.
Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; The silence of the
Extradition Law and the Treaty leans to the more reasonable
interpretation that there is no intention to punctuate with a
hearing every little step in the entire proceedings.—Moreover, the
law specifies that the court sets a hearing upon receipt of the
answer or upon failure of the accused to answer after receiving
the summons. In connection with the matter of immediate arrest,
however, the word “hearing” is notably absent from the provision.
Evidently, had the holding of a hearing at that stage been
intended, the law could have easily so provided. It also bears
emphasizing at this point that extradition proceedings are
summary in nature. Hence, the silence of the Law and the Treaty
leans to the more reasonable interpretation that there is no
intention to punctuate with a hearing every little step in the
entire proceedings.
627
VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 627
Same; Same; Same; Proper Procedure in Extradition

Proceedings.— Since this is a matter of first impression, we deem
it wise to restate the proper procedure: Upon receipt of a petition
for extradition and its supporting documents, the judge must
study them and make, as soon as possible, a prima facie finding
whether (a) they are sufficient in form and substance, (b) they
show compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law, and (c) the
person sought is extraditable. At his discretion, the judge may
require the submission of further documentation or may
personally examine the affiants and witnesses of the petitioner. If,
in spite of this study and examination, no prima facie finding is
possible, the petition may be dismissed at the discretion of the
judge. On the other hand, if the presence of a prima facie case is
determined, then the magistrate must immediately issue a
warrant for the arrest of the extraditee, who is at the same time
summoned to answer the petition and to appear at scheduled
summary hearings. Prior to the issuance of the warrant, the judge
must not inform or notify the potential extraditee of the pendency
of the petition, lest the latter be given the opportunity to escape
and frustrate the proceedings. In our opinion, the foregoing
procedure will “best serve the ends of justice” in extradition cases.
Same; Same; Bail; Statutory Construction; As suggested by
the use of the word “conviction” in Art. III, Section 13 of the
Constitution, the constitutional provision on bail, as well as
Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a
person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine
criminal laws—it does not apply to extradition proceedings where
the presumption of innocence is not at issue.—We agree with
petitioner. As suggested by the use of the word “conviction,” the
constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well as Section 4
of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has
been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal
laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because
extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or
acquittal. Moreover, the constitutional right to bail “flows from
the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who
should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he
would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond
reasonable doubt.” It follows that the constitutional provision on
bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the
presumption of innocence is not at issue.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The provision in the Constitution
stating that the “right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended” does not
detract from the rule that the constitutional right to bail is
available only in criminal proceedings.—The provision in the
Constitution stating that the “right to bail shall not be impaired
even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is sus-
628

pended” does not detract from the rule that the constitutional
right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings. It must be
noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus finds application “only to persons judicially charged for
rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with
invasion.” Hence, the second sentence in the constitutional
provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in criminal
proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to
mean that the right is available even in extradition proceedings
that are not criminal in nature.
Same; Same; Same; Due Process; The detention of a potential
extraditee prior to the conclusion of the extradition proceedings
does not amount to a violation of his right to due process—while
the essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard, it does not
always call for a prior opportunity to be heard.—Contrary to his
contention, his detention prior to the conclusion of the extradition
proceedings does not amount to a violation of his right to due
process. We iterate the familiar doctrine that the essence of due
process is the opportunity to be heard but, at the same time, point
out that the doctrine does not always call for a prior opportunity
to be heard. Where the circumstances—such as those present in
an extradition case—call for it, a subsequent opportunity to be
heard is enough. In the present case, respondent will be given full
opportunity to be heard subsequently, when the extradition court
hears the Petition for Extradition. Hence, there is no violation of
his right to due process and fundamental fairness.
Same; Same; Same; In the absence of any provision—in the
Constitution, the law or the treaty—expressly guaranteeing the
right to bail in extradition proceedings, adopting the practice of
not granting them bail, as a general rule, would be a step towards
deterring fugitives from coming to the Philippines to hide from or
evade their prosecutors.—Too, we cannot allow our country to be a
haven for fugitives, cowards and weaklings who, instead of facing
the consequences of their actions, choose to run and hide. Hence,
it would not be good policy to increase the risk of violating our
treaty obligations if, through overprotection or excessively liberal
treatment, persons sought to be extradited are able to evade
arrest or escape from our custody. In the absence of any provision
—in the Constitution, the law or the treaty—expressly
guaranteeing the right to bail in extradition proceedings, adopting
the practice of not granting them bail, as a general rule, would be
a step towards deterring fugitives from coming to the Philippines
to hide from or evade their prosecutors.
Same; Same; Same; To best serve the ends of justice, the Court
holds that, after a potential extraditee has been arrested or placed
under the custody of the law, bail may be applied for and granted
as an exception,
629
VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 629
only upon a clear and convincing showing (1) that, once granted
bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the
community, and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian and
compelling circumstances including, as a matter of reciprocity,
those cited by the highest court in the requesting state when it
grants provisional liberty in extradition cases therein.—The rule,
we repeat, is that bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases.
However, the judiciary has the constitutional duty to curb grave
abuse of discretion and tyranny, as well as the power to
promulgate rules to protect and enforce constitutional rights.
Furthermore, we believe that the right to due process is broad
enough to induce the grant of basic fairness to extraditees.
Indeed, the right to due process extends to the “life, liberty or
property” of every person. It is “dynamic and resilient, adaptable
to every situation calling for its application.” Accordingly and to
best serve the ends of justice, we believe and so hold that, after a
potential extraditee has been arrested or placed under the custody
of the law, bail may be applied for and granted as an exception,
only upon a clear and convincing showing (1) that, once granted
bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the
community; and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian and
compelling circumstances including, as a matter of reciprocity,
those cited by the highest court in the requesting state when it
grants provisional liberty in extradition cases therein.
Same; Same; Same; Since the exception to the grant of bail in
extradition proceedings has no express or specific statutory basis,
and since it is derived essentially from general principles of justice
and fairness, the applicant bears the burden of proving the two-
tiered requirement with clarity, precision and emphatic
forcefulness.—Since this exception has no express or specific
statutory basis, and since it is derived essentially from general
principles of justice and fairness, the applicant bears the burden
of proving the above two-tiered requirement with clarity,
precision and emphatic forcefulness. The Court realizes that
extradition is basically an executive, not a judicial, responsibility
arising from the presidential power to conduct foreign relations.
In its barest concept, it partakes of the nature of police assistance
amongst states, which is not normally a judicial prerogative.
Hence, any intrusion by the courts into the exercise of this power
should be characterized by caution, so that the vital international
and bilateral interests of our country will not be unreasonably
impeded or compromised. In short, while this Court is ever
protective of “the sporting idea of fair play,” it also recognizes the
limits of its own prerogatives and the need to fulfill international
obligations.
Same; Same; Congress; The constituents of a potential
extraditee who elected him to Congress while a foreign country was
requesting his extradition were or should have been prepared for
the consequences of the extradi-
630
tion case against their representative, including his detention

pending the final resolution of the case—his election to public
office is not, by itself, a compelling reason to grant him bail.—
While his extradition was pending, Respondent Jimenez was
elected as a member of the House of Representatives. On that
basis, he claims that his detention will disenfranchise his Manila
district of 600,000 residents. We are not persuaded. In People v.
Jalosjos, the Court has already debunked the disenfranchisement
argument when it ruled thus: “When the voters of his district
elected the accused-appellant to Congress, they did so with full
awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action. They did so
with the knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative
results which he could accomplish within the confines of prison.
To give a more drastic illustration, if voters elect a person with
full knowledge that he is suffering from a terminal illness, they do
so knowing that at any time, he may no longer serve his full term
in office. x x x It must be noted that even before private
respondent ran for and won a congressional seat in Manila, it was
already of public knowledge that the United States was
requesting his extradition. Hence, his constituents were or should
have been prepared for the consequences of the extradition case
against their representative, including his detention pending the
final resolution of the case. Premises considered and in line with
Jalosjos, we are constrained to rule against his claim that his
election to public office is by itself a compelling reason to grant
him bail.
BELLOSILLO, J., Separate Opinion:

International Law; Extradition; Bail; It is settled that the
power to admit to bail exists in extradition proceedings, although
as a matter of policy it may only be granted under “exceptional
circumstances.”—The Government maintains that an extradition
court has no power to authorize bail in the absence of any law
conferring such power; and that the 1987 Constitution, as well as
the Rules of Court, as amended, applies only to persons arrested
and detained for violation of Philippine Laws, but not to
extradition proceedings in which courts do not render judgments
of conviction or acquittal. The argument is as ingenious as it is
fallacious. It is settled that the power to admit to bail exists in
extradition proceedings, although as a matter of policy it may only
be granted under “exceptional circumstances.” This,
quintessentially, has been the doctrine advocated in a cavalcade
of American cases starting with Wright v. Henkel, 190 US 40
(1902); and worth mentioning, of course, are Paretti v. United
States, 112 F.3d 1363 (1977), Bealieu v. Hartigan, 430 F. Supp.
915 (1977), and In re Kirby, et al, 106 F.3d 855 (1996); which are
also discussed extensively by Mr. Justice Puno.
631
VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 631
Same; Same; Same; There is neither logic nor persuasion to

the suggestion that bail should only be allowed in criminal cases,
or that class of cases where courts must “render judgments of
conviction or acquittal”—bail as a remedy is available where there
is deprivation of liberty prior or during trial.—Significantly, both
the extradition treaty between the United States and the
Philippines, and the Philippine Extradition Law (PD 1069)
contain no provision expressly withholding from the courts the
power to grant bail. Had the intention of the parties to the treaty
been to totally nullify the pre-existing power of the extradition
court on the matter of bail, they could have easily provided for it
in the treaty. But since they had not done so, it would be
reasonable to presume that they had not so intended. Indeed, the
treaty fails to even remotely suggest such judicial limitation
insisted upon by the Government. Truly, there is neither logic nor
persuasion to the suggestion that bail should only be allowed in
criminal cases, or that class of cases where courts must “render
judgments of conviction or acquittal.” Bail as a remedy is
available where there is deprivation of liberty prior or during
trial. In the 1909 case of United States v. Co Siaco, akin to the
situation confronting us but involving a deportation proceeding,
this Court allowed the potential deportee to post bail although a
deportation proceeding is not criminal in nature and there was
then no law providing for bail in deportation cases.
Same; Same; Same; We cannot curtail a citizen’s right to
freedom on speculations and fears where there exist reasonable
mechanisms appropriate to address them—the risk of flight does
not ipso facto call for denying his right to bail.—We cannot curtail
a citizen’s right to freedom on speculations and fears where there
exist reasonable mechanisms appropriate to address them. To my
mind, the risk of flight does not ipso facto call for denying his
right to bail. Trial judges must henceforth weigh carefully and
judiciously other methods to assure the presence of the accused
during the proceedings and right after, when he ought to be
deported already. Bail may be set at huge amounts or passports
cancelled and hold-departure orders issued or border patrols
heightened, in order that the extraditee may not flee from our
jurisdiction. In this regard, while I agree that it is the extraditee’s
burden to prove the least likelihood of flight, the extradition court
is also entitled to presume that the executive branch has done all
it can to forestall his sudden disappearance. The executive branch
cannot plead its helplessness and inutility to defeat the grant of
bail to the extraditee.
Same; Same; Same; To unduly sacrifice the civil liberties of an
individual by reason of an unfounded fear of being unable to fulfill
treaty obligations, would be to render impotent the ideals of the
dignity of the human person, thereby destroying something of what
is noble in our ways of life.—
632
In our society—and even in the United States, I am sure—

freedom from bodily restraint has always been at the core of the
civil liberties protected by the Constitution. To unduly sacrifice
the civil liberties of an individual by reason of an unfounded fear
of being unable to fulfill treaty obligations, would be to render
impotent the ideals of the dignity of the human person, thereby
destroying something of what is noble in our way of life.
Certainly, if civil liberties may be safely respected without
imminently or actually impairing faithful compliance with treaty
obligations, as in this case, then there is no valid reason for
disregarding them.
PUNO, J., Separate Opinion:

International Law; Extradition; Due Process; While the
Supreme Court is obliged to accord due respect to the state’s
interests to comply with its treaty obligations, it cannot also shirk
from its duty to protect the fundamental rights of its citizens—a
full and careful weighing of these warring interests is imperative;
It is my humble submission that the majority failed to allocate the
proper weight due to the constitutional rights of the private
respondent to life, liberty and to due process.—There can be no
disagreement that P.D. No. 1069 deserves an interpretation that
would blend with the purpose of the RP-US Extradition Treaty,
i.e., the minimization of flight risk and the facilitation of an
extraditee’s surrender to the requesting state. But this stance
should not be taken to mean that this Court can cast a blind eye
to the private respondent’s constitutional rights to life, liberty and
to due process. While this Court is obliged to accord due respect to
the state’s interests to comply with its treaty obligations, it cannot
also shirk from its duty to protect the fundamental rights of its
citizens. Thus, a full and careful weighing of these warring
interests is imperative as we did in its predecessor case Secretary
of Justice vs. Lantion. With due respect, it is my humble
submission that the majority failed to allocate the proper weight
due to the constitutional rights of the private respondent to life,
liberty and to due process. These rights are now conceded in the
civilized world as universal in character and it was never the
intent of the RP-US Extradition Treaty to trivialize their
significance.
Same; Same; Same; Where the extradition process has moved
away from the stage of evaluation to the stage where a formal
petition for extradition has been filed in court, the competing
interests of our government and of the potential extraditee have
developed new dimensions and they need to be rebalanced.—The
extradition process against the private respondent has, however,
moved away from the stage of evaluation of documents by the
executive officials of the Philippine government. A formal petition
for the extradition of the private respondent has now been filed
with our court of justice. With this development, the competing
interests of our govern-
633
VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 633
ment and of the private respondent have developed new

dimensions and they need to be rebalanced.
Satne; Same; Same; It is my humble submission that from the
moment the petition for extradition is filed before the extradition
court, a potential extraditee has the right to demand that he be
furnished a copy of the petition.—It is my humble submission that
from the moment the petition for extradition is filed before the
extradition court, a potential extraditee has the right to demand
that he be furnished a copy of the petition. This right inheres from
the duty imposed by P.D. No. 1069 to the extradition judge to
summon a potential extraditee to appear and answer the petition
“as soon as practicable.” It is a mandatory duty that should be
carried out by the extradition judge; the law does not give him
any discretion. This submission is in accord with our ruling in
Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion, where we held that: “P.D. No.
1069 which implements the RP-US Extradition Treaty provides
the time when an extraditee shall be furnished a copy of the
petition for extradition as well as the supporting papers, i.e., after
the filing of the extradition in the extradition court.”
Same; Same; Same; I submit that the decision whether to send
notice to an extraditee and hear him before ordering his arrest
should be left to the sound discretion of the extraditing judge.—I
submit that the decision whether to send notice to an extraditee
and hear him before ordering his arrest should be left to the
sound discretion of the extraditing judge. This is crystal clear
from section 6 of P.D. No. 1069 which provides: “x x x He may
issue a warrant for the immediate arrest of the accused which
may be served anywhere within the Philippines if it appears to the
presiding judge that the immediate arrest and temporary
detention of the accused will serve the ends of justice.” (Italics
supplied) Under this provision, the issuance of a warrant of arrest
is dependent on a big “if,” or to an all important condition—if it
will serve the ends of justice. The determination of whether a
warrant of arrest against an extraditee will serve the ends of
justice is certainly not a cut and dried duty. It involves the
appreciation of highly contentious facts, both objective and
subjective in nature. Their appreciation requires a judicial mind
honed in the law of evidence. The history of extradition will reveal
that, initially, the task of determining whether an extraditee
should be immediately arrested was given to the executive
authorities of the extraditing state. The matter, in other words,
was treated purely as an executive function but unfortunately,
the practice was given to abuses. Recognizing that certain human
rights are universal in nature and beyond violation, the task of
adjudging whether a potential extraditee should be immediately
arrested pending his extradition proceeding was transferred to
judges. The office of the judge was called upon to insure that
fundamental fairness is not denied to a potential extraditee.
634
The extraditing judge is not to act as a stamp pad but has to

exercise his sound discretion on whether to issue the warrant.
Same; Same; Same; The view that the extraditing judge has
no discretion to determine whether to notify and hear a potential
extraditee before ordering his arrest cuts too much on the freedom
of action of the extraditing judge.—Under our law on extradition,
P.D. No. 1069, section 6, the discretion of the extradition judge on
whether to order the arrest of the extraditee is guided by the
following consideration—whether the arrest will serve the ends of
justice. The grant of this judicial discretion will be rendered
naught if we subject the action of the extraditing judge to
unnecessary fetters. With due respect, the view that the
extraditing judge has no discretion to determine whether to notify
and hear a potential extraditee before ordering his arrest cuts too
much on the freedom of action of the extraditing judge. I submit
that we should give the extraditing judge more discretion on the
matter. If the extraditing judge feels that the notice and hearing
will allow an extraditee to flee, I have no doubt, he will
immediately order his arrest. If, however, he believes that notice
and hearing will not pose such danger and that he needs to hear
the parties to make a better determination on whether the
immediate arrest of an extraditee will serve the ends of justice, let
us not deny him the discretion to do so. The essence of discretion
is freedom of action and we negate that essence when we impose
needless limits on the judge’s freedom of action.
Same; Same; Same; We should not lay down the doctrine that
speed should be preferred to accuracy for speed breeds recklessness
and we cannot be reckless with our right to life and liberty.—
Prescinding from these premises, I cannot also subscribe to the
submission of the majority that the phrase “if it appears” in
section 6 of P.D. No. 1069 conveys the message that accuracy is
not as important as speed in issuing a warrant of arrest against a
potential extraditee. We are concerned here with the priceless
right to life and liberty, with the right to due process before one’s
liberty is taken away. We are not dealing with chattels. We
should not lay down the doctrine that speed should be preferred to
accuracy for speed breeds recklessness and we cannot be reckless
with our right to life and liberty.
Same; Same; Same; The petition for extradition may be in due
form but it does not establish sufficient factual basis to justify the
immediate issuance of warrant of arrest against the potential
extraditee.—Even a cursory reading of these documents will not
sustain the thesis of the majority that “it is evident that the
respondent could have already gotten an impression from these
records adequate for him to make an initial deter-
635
VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 635
mination of whether the accused was someone who should

immediately be arrested in order to best serve the ends of justice.”
The documents are evidence tending to prove the guilt of the
private respondent in regard to the cases filed against him in the
United States. They are not evidence, however, to prove that the
private respondent will flee the Philippine jurisdiction while his
extradition petition is being heard. In other words, the petition for
extradition may be in due form but it does not establish sufficient
factual basis to justify the immediate issuance of warrant of
arrest against the private respondent. The probability of his flight
from our jurisdiction is central to the question of whether he
should be arrested. In the absence of evidence establishing that
private respondent will flee, I cannot join the majority in holding
that the respondent extraditing judge gravely abused his
discretion in calling for a hearing so that the parties can adduce
evidence on the issue.
Same; Same; Same; The matter of whether there ought to be a
hearing before issuance of warrant of arrest is addressed to the
discretion of the extraditing judge.—Once more, I beg to disagree
from the reading of our law on extradition by the majority. The
law, it is true, did not provide that the extraditing judge must
hold a hearing before he issues a warrant of arrest. The call for a
hearing is not mandatory but neither is it prohibited. Ergo, the
matter of whether there ought to be a hearing before issuance of
warrant of arrest is addressed to the discretion of the extraditing
judge. The exercise of this discretion depends on the configuration
of the facts of each case.
Same; Same; Bail; Statutory Construction; The mere silence of
our extradition treaty with the United States and our extradition
law does not negate the right to bail of a potential extraditee; While
an extraditee may apply for bail, its grant depends on presentation
of clear and convincing evidence that the extraditee will not
frustrate the ends of justice by fleeing from our jurisdiction.—I
respectfully submit that a potential extraditee can hinge his right
to bail in our Constitution. The mere silence of our extradition
treaty with the United States and our extradition law (P.D. No.
1069) does not negate the right to bail of a potential extraditee.
Our adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as well
as international norms, customs and practices support an
extraditee’s right to bail. But while an extraditee may apply for
bail, its grant depends on presentation of clear and convincing
evidence that the extraditee will not frustrate the ends of justice
by fleeing from our jurisdiction.
636
Same; Same; Same; The right to bail inheres from the rights
to life, liberty and to due process.—The right to bail inheres from
the rights to life, liberty and to due process. Our Constitution
jealously guards every person’s right to life and liberty against
unwarranted state intrusion; indeed, no state action is permitted
to invade this forbidden zone except upon observance of due
process of law. Like the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the
right to bail gives flesh to the guarantee to liberty, without which,
the right to liberty can prove meaningless, and due process will
only be an empty slogan. However, unlike the privilege of habeas
corpus which is principally a remedy against illegal restraint on
liberty, the right to bail is available even when the reason for the
detention is lawful. The purpose of bail is to relieve a person the
rigors of prolonged imprisonment until the main case against him
is resolved, and at the same time, insure his attendance when
required by the authorities. It is the prospect of prolonged
detention, not the detention itself, which offends the
constitutional right to due process.
Same; Same; Same; The right of an extraditee to apply for bail
should be treated in light of our other treaty obligations, especially
those concerning the promotion and protection of human rights.—
The right of an extraditee to apply for bail should be treated in
light of our other treaty obligations, especially those concerning
the promotion and protection of human rights. Under the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, to which the Philippines is a
party, a treaty shall be interpreted “in their context and in the
light of its object and purpose,” taking into account the “relevant
rules of international law applicable in the relations between the
parties.” As members of the family of nations, the Philippines and
the United States have the responsibility to uphold fundamental
human rights, and the dignity and worth of the human person.
They are mandated to establish conditions under which justice
and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other
sources of international law can be maintained. Being signatories
to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, both
countries are committed to protect and promote the right of every
person to liberty and to due process, ensuring that those detained
or arrested can take proceedings before a court, in order that such
court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his detention,
and order his release if the detention, is not lawful. Although the
right to liberty is a relative right and may be suspended or
derogated in exceptional circumstances, it is a generally accepted
principle in international law that the presumption lies in favor of
the existence of the right, and the burden lies with the authorities
to justify the lawfulness of the arrest or detention. This
presumption creates an obligation on state authorities to make
effective remedies avail-
637
VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 637
able to every person under detention for the enjoyment of his

fundamental right to liberty.
Same; Same; Same; There is no customary rule of
international law prohibiting bail in extradition cases.—There is
no customary rule of international law prohibiting bail in
extradition cases. At present, there is no customary norm
prohibiting bail in extradition cases. On the contrary, most
countries, including Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom,
South Africa and Pakistan, among others, allow a potential
extraditee to be released on bail. Members of the European Union
have recently ratified the European Convention on Extradition,
which also provides a procedure for bail.
Same; Same; Same; Even the United States grants bail to an
extra-ditee, albeit in exceptional circumstances.—Even the United
States grants bail to an extraditee, albeit in exceptional
circumstances. In the United States, the ruling case law upholds
the right of a potential extraditee to apply for bail. The US
Supreme Court in the landmark case of Wright vs. Henckel,
recognized the authority of the circuit courts to receive application
for and grant bail in certain exceptional case, thus: “We are
unwilling to hold that the circuit court possess no power in
respect of admitting to bail other than as specifically vested by
statutes, or that, while bail should not be ordinarily granted in
cases of foreign extradition, those courts may not in any case, and
whatever the special circumstances, extend that relief.”
Same; Same; Same; While an extraditee may apply for bail, its
grant is discretionary depending on whether it will frustrate the
ends of justice.—While an extraditee may apply for bail, its grant
is discretionary depending on whether it will frustrate the ends of
justice. In extradition cases, the extradition court does not inquire
into the guilt or innocence of the accused. Neither does the court
measure the injury caused to the community, as the offense was
not committed within its jurisdiction. The court, therefore, cannot
base its decision to grant or deny bail on the gravity of the offense,
as it could in criminal cases. Rather, it should base its decision on
whether it will frustrate the ends of justice. The risk of flight of
an extraditee is an important factor to consider, in determining
whether his bail will frustrate justice. Whether or not a potential
extraditee is a flight risk is determined by two factors: (1) capacity
to flee; and (2) intent to flee. The combination of these two factors
determines the degree of risk that the trial court must assess and
weigh. While there is no mathematical formula to guide the court
in gauging the precise risk posed by a particular combination of
these two factors, it is commonsensical to assume that one
without the other would not result to any risk at all. For while
638
one has the capacity to flee, if he does not intend to flee, the fear
of flight would be for naught, and vice versa.
Same; Same; Same; The burden of proof to justify the arrest
and detention of the potential extraditee initially rests on the
petitioning executive authorities.—The burden of proof to justify
the arrest and detention of the potential extraditee initially rests
on the petitioning executive authorities. Under our extradition
treaty and law, a potential extraditee may be arrested and
detained under any of the following circumstances: (a) upon the
receipt of the request for the arrest of the potential extraditee and
even before the filing of the request for extradition; (b) upon the
filing of the petition for extradition before the extradition court; or
(c) during the hearing of the petition for extradition. In all the
above circumstances, the issuance of a warrant of arrest depends
on a showing that it will serve the ends of justice. Initially, it is
the burden of the petitioning executive authorities to prove that
the warrant against the extraditee will serve the ends of justice.
Same; Same; Same; After the warrant of arrest is issued, the
burden of proof on the right to be admitted to bail shifts on the
potential extraditee; The presumption of innocence, from which the
ordinary presumption in favor of granting bail emanates, is
inoperative in extradition cases.—After the warrant of arrest is
issued, the burden of proof on the right to be admitted to bail
shifts on the potential extraditee. In criminal cases, the
presumption lies in favor of granting bail. This is so because of
the constitutional presumption of innocence, which is not
overturned by the finding of probable cause upon which the
warrant of arrest against the accused was issued. However, the
presumption of innocence, from which the ordinary presumption
in favor of granting bail emanates, is inoperative in extradition
cases. The issuance of the warrant of arrest in extradition cases is
not based on the finding that the accused is probably guilty of the
offense for which he was charged in the requesting State. The
warrant is predicated on the finding that it will serve the ends of
justice. Once issued, it raises a presumption of the continuing
presence of the circumstances upon which the issuance of the
warrant was based. More often than not, this circumstance is the
probability that the extraditee will flee from the jurisdiction of the
extraditing court. The burden of proving admittance to bail is
thus shifted to the extraditee.
Same; Same; Same; In fairness to both parties, the case
should be remanded to the extradition court so that the proper
procedure and standard to determine the right to bail can be
complied with.—I respectfully submit that in fairness to both
parties, the case should be remanded to the extradition court so
that the proper procedure and standard to determine
639
VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 639
the right to bail can be complied with. I put no blame on the

extradition court nor to the parties in this regard for we are still
developing our jurisprudence on extradition.
Same; Same; Same; The Court should fashion out a higher
standard to govern the grant of bail to a possible extraditee.—With
humility, I submit that the Court should fashion out a higher
standard to govern the grant of bail to a possible extraditee. The
higher standard is demanded by the fact that our extradition
treaty obligates us to assure that an extraditee will not abscond
from our jurisdiction. Failure to comply with this obligation will
expose our country to international embarrassment. It will defeat
the purpose of extradition treaties, i.e., the suppression of crimes,
especially transnational crimes to which the Philippines is very
vulnerable. The standard, I propose, is the standard of clear and
convincing evidence which is higher than mere preponderance of
evidence but lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt. If this
new and stricter standard would be adopted, it ought to follow
that the parties should be given a chance to offer evidence to meet
the same. Contrary the claim of the majority, the voluminous
pleadings already filed by the parties are insufficient to resolve
the issue of whether the private respondent is entitled to bail.
These pleadings proffer legal arguments but not proof of facts.
The remand of the case at bar is therefore not a cop-out but is
proper and it will not delay the proceedings. The extradition court
can be ordered to finish the hearing on the limited issue of bail
within one (1) week. After all, extradition proceedings are
summary in nature.
VITUG, J., Separate Opinion:
International Law; Extradition; Bail; The edict in the Bill of

Rights granting to all persons, without distinction, the
fundamental right to bail, is clear—no statute or treaty can
abrogate or discard its language and its intent.—Treaty laws,
particularly those which are self-executing, have equal stature as
national statutes and, like all other municipal laws, are subject to
the parameters set forth in the Constitution. The Constitution,
being both a grant and a circumscription of government authority
by the sovereign people, presents the ultimate yardstick of power
and its limitation upon which an act of government is justly
measured. This instrument contains a rule for all agencies of the
government and any act in opposition thereto can only be struck
down as being invalid and without effect. When the great Charter
gives a mandate, the government can do no less than to accept it;
its rejection would be an act of betrayal. The edict in its Bill of
Rights granting to all persons, without distinction, the
fundamental right to bail, is clear. No statute or treaty can
abrogate or discard its language and its intent.
640
Same; Same; Same; The Eighth Amendment of the U.S.

Federal Constitution does not expressly provide for the grant of
bail—it recognizes merely by implication the right to bail by
simply disallowing excessive bail.—The draft ponencia would rely
heavily on foreign jurisprudence, notably American cases, to
belabor the point that the right to bail is extraneous to extradition
proceedings. The citation, particularly of the jurisprudence
obtaining in the United States, could be predicated on the Eighth
Amendment of the US Federal Constitution. This amendment
however, recognizes merely by implication the right to bail by
simply disallowing excessive bail; it does not expressly provide for
the grant of bail. Individual states have incorporated into their
own state constitutions various versions—some give it as a matter
of right and some do not—a fact which partially explains the lack
of uniformity in state jurisprudence on the matter. Where some
states provide for a constitutional right to bail, the same is almost
invariably viewed as affording a greater right than that provided
in the federal charter.
Same; Same; Same; Philippine courts need not really bother
borrowing from dicta in foreign jurisdictions—the absoluteness of
the constitutional grant under Section 13, Article III of the
Constitution precludes any need for further standards than those
explicitly expressed by it.—But Philippine courts need not really
bother borrowing from dicta in foreign jurisdictions. The
absoluteness of the constitutional grant under Section 13, Article
III of the Constitution precludes any need for further standards
than those explicitly expressed by it. Judicial discretion is
confined to the issue of whether or not the offense charged is a
capital crime and a determination of whether or not the evidence
of guilt is strong. The rule may appear to be too simplistic but it is
the correct approach. At all events, I would not be comfortable in
developing a “special circumstances” standard on the basis of
mere pro hac vice pronouncements from elsewhere. In Herras
Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons, this Court has expressed
unqualified acquiescence to the deeply ingrained policy of
restraint against unwarranted judicial adventurism that can
otherwise easily get out of hand.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Dissenting Opinion:
International Law; Extradition; Bail; We must consider the

implications of a ruling that in criminal proceedings, the
constitutional rights of the accused must be protected, but in a case
neither criminal nor civil, one which we call “sui generis,” basic
freedoms become irrelevant and non-available.—I submit that we
must consider the implications of a ruling that in criminal
proceedings, the constitutional rights of the accused must be
protected, but in a case neither criminal nor civil, one which we
call “sui
641
VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 641
generis,” basic freedoms become irrelevant and non-available. A

non-criminal proceeding, less onerous and repulsive to society
than prosecution for crime, and where the penalty is only to be
brought for trial before the court with jurisdiction, is stripped of
guarantees and protections given to hard-boiled recidivists
pending arrest and trial.
Same; Same; Same; I cannot see how compliance with the
requirements for notice and hearing and the ascertainment of
reasonable cause would hamper the suppression of crime.—The
majority opinion gives five (5) postulates of extradition. With all
due respect, I fail to see how compliance with these postulates
should result in a disregard for constitutional liberties. I agree
with the first postulate. It is a general proposition that
extradition is a major instrument for the suppression of crime and
the Philippines should cooperate in facilitating the arrest and
custodial transfer of a fugitive from one State to another.
However, I cannot see how compliance with the requirements for
notice and hearing and the ascertainment of reasonable cause
would hamper the suppression of crime. If they do, why should
they appear in our laws and in the decisions of this Court? Does
obedience to the dictates of due process and the prohibition
against unreasonable seizures mean any lesser determination to
eradicate crime? Effective extradition arrangements and
deterrence of flight abroad by felons are not incompatible with
fundamental liberties. The act of according due process and
reasonable seizures does not make the Philippines an isolationist
state. The employment of beneficial objectives to justify the
repression of far more worthy values is pejorative in nature, one
in which the Court should not engage.
Same; Same; Same; To say that all persons sought to be
extradited have a propensity to flee is too sweeping a statement to
be adopted as an axiom.—The fifth and last postulate uses the
underlying risk of flight. To say that all persons sought to be
extradited have a propensity to flee is too sweeping a statement to
be adopted as an axiom. In every criminal prosecution, the
prosecution can, with greater reason, argue that the accused will
escape and go into hiding. But never has the possibility of flight
sufficed to always require incarceration while court proceedings
are going on. The opposite practice is the one we have adopted.
The right to bail has been elevated into a constitutional
guarantee. Only for the most serious of offenses when evidence of
guilt is strong may an accused be denied freedom upon the
posting of bail prior to his conviction. In fact, the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, as amended, provide that any person in
custody who is not yet charged in court may apply for bail with
any court in the province, city, or municipality where he is held.
The respondent is not charged of any crime before our courts.
642
Same; Same; Same; I submit that it is a dangerous precedent

for the Supreme Court to rule that the prima facie existence of
probable cause for a warrant of arrest can be derived from a mere
reading of the petition for extradition and its supporting
documents.—I submit that it is a dangerous precedent for this
Court to rule that the prima facie existence of probable cause for a
warrant of arrest can be derived from a mere reading of the
petition for extradition and its supporting documents. The
determination of probable cause is effectively taken away from
the judge and transferred to the Department of Justice. Worse,
the determination could come directly from an office not equipped
to make it, namely the Department of Foreign Affairs. In either
case, the Constitution is infringed.
CARPIO, J., Concurring Opinion:
International Law; Extradition; Bail; Supreme Court; The

constitutional duty and power of the Supreme Court to protect and
enforce the fundamental rights of all persons in the country,
should include, to the extent that the Court can grant under its
power, the right of extraditees to avail of the same or similar
remedies that courts in the countries of our treaty partners have
accorded to their own extraditees.—I concur with the well-written
ponencia of Justice Panganiban. I write this concurring opinion to
afford extraditees in this country the right to bail, in carefully
limited exceptions, under the equity and rule making power of the
Court. It is the constitutional duty and power of the Court to
protect and enforce the fundamental rights of all persons in this
country. This should include, to the extent that the Court can
grant under its power, the right of extraditees in this country to
avail of the same or similar remedies that courts in the countries
of our treaty partners have accorded to their own extraditees.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Following the emerging trend in
the United States, and guided by our own experience in combating
transnational crimes including international terrorism, the
Supreme Court should rule that our extradition courts may, after
the arrest of the extraditee, grant the extraditee bail if he
establishes that he does not pose a flight risk or a danger to the
community, and there is no other special circumstance that would
warrant denial of bail.—Thus, following the emerging trend in
the United States, and guided by our own experience in
combating transnational crimes including international terrorism,
the Court should rule that our extradition courts may, after the
arrest of the extraditee, grant the extraditee bail if he establishes
that he does not pose a flight risk or a danger to the community,
and there is no other special circumstance that would warrant
denial of bail. The burden of proving he is entitled to bail rests on
the extraditee because by resisting the extradition to face a fair
643
VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 643
trial abroad, the extraditee is presumed to be a flight risk. This is

why courts have consistently held that the presumption is against
bail in extradition cases.
Same; Same; Same; State Witnesses; Witness Protection
Program; Under the Witness Protection, Security and Benefits Act,
the Certificate of Admission is essential to the discharge of the
accused and his utilization as a state witness.—For the same
reason, Jimenez’s claim that he is a state witness in the plunder
case against ex-President Joseph Estrada, and that “his flight
would strip him of (the) immunity he is entitled to,” cannot be
given credence. Under the Witness Protection, Security and
Benefits Act, the Certificate of Admission is essential to the
discharge of the accused and his utilization as a state witness.
Without the Certificate of Admission, Jimenez is not entitled to
immunity under the Program. The Department of Justice will
issue the Certificate of Admission only if it is satisfied with the
proposed testimony of the witness as disclosed in his sworn
statement. Since until now the Department of Justice has not
issued a Certificate of Admission to Jimenez, it could mean that
the Department is either not satisfied with what Jimenez is
bargaining to testify against ex-President Joseph Estrada, or that
Jimenez may not be the least guilty. Unless Jimenez presents to
the extradition court the Certificate of Admission, and this he has
not done, Jimenez’s claim of beings state witness against ex-
President Estrada is baseless and self-serving.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.

Certiorari.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Mario Luza Bautista for Mark Jimenez.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
In extradition proceedings, are prospective extraditees

entitled to notice and hearing before warrants for their
arrest can be issued? Equally important, are they entitled
to the right to bail and provisional liberty while the
extradition proceedings are pending? In general, the
answer to these two novel questions is “No.” The
explanation of and the reasons for, as well as the exceptions
to, this rule are laid out in this Decision.
644

The Case
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the

Rules of Court, seeking
1
to void and set aside
2
the Orders
dated May 23, 2001 and July 3, 2001 issued 3
by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 42. The first
assailed Order set for hearing petitioner’s application for
the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of Respondent
Mark B. Jimenez.
The second challenged Order, on the other hand,
directed the issuance of a warrant, but at the same time
granted bail to Jimenez. The dispositive portion of the
Order reads as follows:
“WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the [Court] finds

probable cause against respondent Mark Jimenez. Accordingly let
a Warrant for the arrest of the respondent be issued.
Consequently and taking into consideration Section 9, Rule 114 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, this Court fixes the
reasonable amount of bail for respondent’s temporary liberty at
ONE MILLION PESOS (Php 1,000,000.00), the same to be paid in
cash.
“Furthermore respondent is directed to immediately surrender
to this Court his passport and the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation is likewise directed to include the name of the
4
respondent in its Hold Departure List.”
Essentially, the Petition prays for the lifting of the bail
Order, the cancellation of the bond, and the taking of
Jimenez into legal custody.
The Facts
This Petition is really a sequel to GR No.

5
139465 entitled
Secretary of Justice v. Ralph C. Lantion.
_______________
1 Rollo, p. 74.
2 Id., pp. 122-125.
3 Presided by Judge Guillermo G. Purganan.
4 Order dated July 3, 2001, p. 4; Rollo, p. 125.
5 322 SCRA 160, January 18, 2000; and 343 SCRA 377, October 17,
2000.
645
VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 645

6
Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the
United States Government, through diplomatic channels,
sent to the Philippine Government Note Verbale No. 0522
dated June 16, 1999, supplemented by Note Nos. 0597,
0720 and 0809 and accompanied by duty authenticated
documents requesting the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez,
also known as Mario Batacan Crespo. Upon receipt of the
Notes and documents, the secretary of foreign affairs (SFA)
transmitted them to the secretary of justice (SOJ) for
appropriate action, pursuant to Section 5 of Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 1069, also known as the Extradition Law.
Upon learning of the request for his extradition,
Jimenez sought and was granted a Temporary Restraining
7
Order (TRO) by the RTC of Manila, Branch 25. The TRO
prohibited the Department of Justice (DOJ) from filing
with the RTC a petition for his extradition. The validity of
the TRO was, however, assailed by the SOJ in a Petition
before this Court in the said G.R. No. 139465. Initially, the
Court—by a vote of 9-6—dismissed the Petition. The SOJ
was ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the
extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant
the latter a reasonable period 8within which to file a
comment and supporting evidence.
Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by 9 the
SOJ, this Court issued its October 17, 2000 Resolution. By
an identical vote
_______________
6 Signed on November 13, 1994, and concurred in by the Philippine

Senate on November 29, 1995.
7 In Civil Case No. 99-94684.
8 The 40-page Decision (322 SCRA 160, January 18, 2000) was penned
by Justice Jose A. R. Melo with the concurrence of Justices Josue N.
Bellosillo, Jose C. Vitug, Santiago M. Kapunan, Leonardo A. Quisumbing,
Fidel P. Purisima, Arturo B. Buena, Consuelo Ynares-Santiago and
Sabino R. de Leon, Jr. Dissenting were Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr.;
and Justices Reynato S. Puno, Vicente V. Mendoza, Artemio V.
Panganiban, Bernardo P. Pardo and Minerva P. Reyes, with Justices Puno
and Panganiban writing separate Dissents.
9 Penned by Justice Puno and concurred in by Chief Justice Davide;
and Justices Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Reyes
and De Leon, Jr. Dissenting were Justices Bellosillo, Melo, Vitug, Kapu
646

of 9-6—after three justices changed their votes—it

reconsidered and reversed its earlier Decision. It held that
private respondent was bereft of the right to notice and
hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition
process. This Resolution has become final and executory.
Finding no more legal obstacle, the Government of the
United States of America, represented by the Philippine
DOJ, filed with the RTC on May 18, 2001, the appropriate
Petition for Extradition which was docketed as Extradition
Case No. 01192061. The Petition alleged, inter alia, that
Jimenez was the subject of an arrest warrant issued by the
United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida on April 15, 1999. The warrant had been issued in
connection with the following charges in Indictment No. 99-
00281 CR-SEITZ: (1) conspiracy to defraud the United
States and to commit certain offenses in violation of Title
18 US Code Section 371; (2) tax evasion, in violation of
Title 26 US Code Section 7201; (3) wire fraud, in violation
of Title 18 US Code Sections 1343 and 2; (4) false
statements, in violation of Title 18 US Code Sections 1001
and 2; and (5) illegal campaign contributions, in violation of
Title 2 US Code Sections 441b, 441f and 437g(d) and Title
18 US Code Section 2. In order to prevent the flight of
Jimenez, the Petition prayed for the issuance of an order
for his “immediate arrest” pursuant to Section 6 of PD No.
1069.
Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Respondent
Jimenez 10filed before it an “Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte
Motion,” which prayed that petitioner’s application for an
arrest warrant be set for hearing.
In its assailed May 23, 2001 Order, the RTC granted the
Motion of Jimenez and set the case for hearing on June 5,
2001. In that hearing, petitioner manifested its
reservations on the procedure adopted by the trial court
allowing the accused in an extradition case to be heard
prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
After the hearing, the court a quo required the parties to
submit their respective memoranda. In his Memorandum,
Jimenez sought
_______________
nan, Buena and Ynares-Santiago, with Justices Melo and Ynares-

Santiago writing separate Dissents (343 SCRA 377, October 17, 2000).
10 Annex “E” of the Petition.
647
VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 647

an alternative prayer: that in case a warrant should issue,

he be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000.
The alternative prayer of Jimenez was also set for
hearing on June 15, 2001. Thereafter, the court below
issued its questioned July 3, 2001 Order, directing the
issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail
11
for his
temporary liberty at one million pesos in cash. After he
had surrendered his passport and posted the required cash
bond, Jimenez was granted provisional 12
liberty via the
challenged Order dated13July 4, 2001.
Hence, this Petition.
Issues
Petitioner presents the following issues for the

consideration of this Court:
I.
“The public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction

or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in adopting a procedure of first hearing a potential
extraditee before issuing an arrest warrant under Section 6 of PD
No. 1069.
II.
“The public respondent acted without or in excess of

jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in granting the prayer for bail and in
allowing Jimenez to go on provisional liberty because:
‘1. An extradition court has no power to authorize bail, in the

absence of any law that provides for such power.
‘2. Section 13, Article III (right to bail clause) of the 1987
Philippine Constitution and Section 4, Rule 114 (Bail) of
the Rules of
_______________
11 Annex “M” of the Petition.

12 Annex “O” (certified true xerox copy) of the Petition.
13 The case was deemed submitted for resolution on July 3, 2002, upon
receipt by this Court of respondent’s Counter-Manifestation. Earlier, on
September 3, 2001, this Court received petitioner’s Memorandum signed
by Undersecretary Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez and State Counsel Claro
B. Flores. Filed on August 23, 2001, was private respondent’s
Memorandum signed by Attys. Mario Luza Bautista, Nick Emmanuel C.
Villaluz and Brigette M. da Costa of Poblador Bautista and Reyes.
648

Court, as amended, which [were] relied upon, cannot be

used as bases for allowing bail in extradition proceedings.
‘3. The presumption is against bail in extradition proceedings
or proceedings leading to extradition.
‘4. On the assumption that bail is available in extradition
proceedings or proceedings leading to extradition, bail is
not a matter of right but only of discretion upon clear
showing by the applicant of the existence of special
circumstances.
‘5. Assuming that bail is a matter of discretion in extradition
proceedings, the public respondent received no evidence of
‘special circumstances’ which may justify release on bail.
‘6. The risk that Jimenez will flee is high, and no special
circumstance exists that will engender a well-founded
belief that he will not flee.
‘7. The conditions attached to the grant of bail are ineffectual
and do not ensure compliance by the Philippines with its
obligations under the RP-US Extradition Treaty.
‘8. The Court of Appeals Resolution promulgated on May 10,
2001 in the case entitled ‘Eduardo T. Rodriguez, et al. vs.
The Hon. Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 17, Manila,’ CA-
G.R. SP No. 64589, relied upon by the public respondent
in granting bail, had been recalled before the issuance of
14
the subject bail orders.’ ”
In sum, the substantive questions that this Court will

address are: (1) whether Jimenez is entitled to notice and
hearing before a warrant for his arrest can be issued, and
(2) whether he is entitled to bail and to provisional liberty
while the extradition proceedings are pending.
Preliminarily, we shall take up the alleged prematurity of
the Petition for Certiorari arising from petitioner’s failure
to file a Motion for Reconsideration in the RTC and to seek
relief 15
in the Court of Appeals (CA), instead of in this
Court. We shall also preliminarily discuss five extradition
postulates that will guide us in disposing of the substantive
issues.
_______________
14 Petition, pp. 9-10; Rollo, pp. 10-11.

15 During the Oral Argument on August 14, 2001, the Court asked the
parties to discuss three issues: 1) the propriety of the filing of the Petition
in this case before this Court, 2) whether Mr. Mark Jimenez is entitled to
notice and hearing before the issuance of a warrant for his arrest, and 3)
whether the procedure followed by respondent judge in issuing the
warrant of arrest and granting bail was correct.
649
VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 649

The Court’s Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
Preliminary Matters
Alleged Prematurity of Present Petition
Petitioner submits the following justifications for not filing
a Motion for Reconsideration in the Extradition Court: “(1)
the issues were fully considered by such court after
requiring the parties to submit their respective memoranda
and position papers on the matter and thus, the filing of a
reconsideration motion would serve no useful purpose; (2)
the assailed orders are a patent nullity, absent factual and
legal basis therefor, and (3) the need for relief is extremely
urgent, as the passage of sufficient time would give
Jimenez ample opportunity to escape and avoid 16
extradition; and (4) the issues raised are purely of law.”
For resorting directly to this Court instead of the CA,
petitioner submits the following reasons: “(1) even if the
petition is lodged with the Court of Appeals and such
appellate court takes cognizance of the issues and decides
them, the parties would still bring the matter to this
Honorable Court to have the issues resolved once and for
all [and] to have a binding precedent that all lower courts
ought to 17follow; (2) the Honorable Court of Appeals had in
one case ruled on the issue by disallowing bail but the
court below refused to recognize the decision as a judicial
guide and all other courts might likewise adopt the same
attitude of refusal; and (3) there are pending issues on bail
both in the extradition courts and the Court of Appeals,
which, unless guided by the decision that this Honorable
Court will render in this case, would resolve to grant bail in
favor of the potential extraditees and would give them
opportunity to flee and thus, cause adverse effect on the
ability of the
_______________
16 Petition, p. 3; Rollo, p. 4.
17 Government of the United States of America, represented by the
Philippine Department of Justice v. The Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 47, and Nelson Marquez, CA-G.R. SP No. 61079, promulgated on
May 7, 2001.
650

Philippines to comply 18
with its obligations under existing
extradition treaties.”
As a general rule, a petition for certiorari before a higher
court will not prosper unless the inferior court has been
given, through a motion for reconsideration, a chance to
correct the errors imputed to it. This rule, though, has
certain exceptions: (1) when the issue raised is purely of
law, (2) 19
when public interest is involved, or (3) in case of
urgency. As a fourth exception, the Court has also ruled
that the filing of a motion for reconsideration before
availment of the remedy of certiorari is not a sine qua non,
when the questions raised are the same as those that have
already been squarely 20 argued and exhaustively passed
upon by the lower court. Aside from being of this nature,
the issues in the present case also involve pure questions of
law that are of public interest. Hence, a motion for
reconsideration may be dispensed with.
Likewise, this Court has allowed a direct invocation of
its original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari when
21
there are special22 and important reasons therefor. In
Fortich v. Corona we stated:
“[T]he Supreme Court has the full discretionary power to take

cognizance of the petition filed directly [before] it if compelling
reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised,
warrant. This has been the judicial policy to be observed and
which has been reiterated in subsequent cases, namely: Uy vs.
Contreras, et al., Torres vs. Arranz, Bercero vs. De Guzman, and,
Advincula vs. Legaspi, et al. As we have further stated in
Cuaresma:
‘x x x. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to

issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and
important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition.
This is established policy. x x x.’
_______________
18 Petition, pp. 3-4; Rollo, pp. 4-5.

19 Phil. Air Lines Employees Association v. Phil. Air Lines, Inc., 111
SCRA 215, 219, January 30, 1982; citing Central Bank v. Cloribel, 44
SCRA 307, April 11, 1972.
20 Progressive Development Corporation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 301
SCRA 637, January 22, 1999.
21 Malonzo v. Zamora, G.R. No. 137718, July 27, 1999, 311 SCRA 224,
citing cases.
22 289 SCRA 624, April 24, 1998, per Martinez, J.
651
VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 651

“Pursuant to said judicial policy, we resolve to take primary

jurisdiction over the present petition in the interest of speedy
justice and to avoid future litigations so as to promptly put an end
to the present controversy which, as correctly observed by
petitioners, has sparked national interest because of the
magnitude of the problem created by the issuance of the assailed
resolution. Moreover, x x x requiring the petitioners to file their
petition first with the Court of Appeals would only result in a
waste of time and money.
“That the Court has the power to set aside its own rules in the
higher interests of justice is well-entrenched in our jurisprudence.
23
We reiterate what we said in Piczon vs. Court of Appeals:
‘Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application,
which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than
promote substantial justice, must always be avoided. Time and again,
this Court has suspended its own rules and excepted a particular case
from their operation whenever the higher interests of justice so require.
In the instant petition, we forego a lengthy disquisition of the proper
procedure that should have been taken by the parties involved and
proceed directly to the merits of the case.’
24
In a number of other exceptional cases, we held as follows:
“This Court has original jurisdiction, concurrent with that of

Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals, over petitions for
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas
corpus, and we entertain direct resort to us in cases where special
and important reasons or exceptional and compelling
circumstances justify the same.”
In the interest of justice and to settle once and for all the
important issue of bail in extradition proceedings, we deem
it best to take cognizance of the present case. Such
proceedings constitute a
_______________
23 190 SCRA 31, 38, September 24, 1990, per Fernan, CJ.
24 Philippine National Bank v. Sayo, Jr., 292 SCRA 202, 232, July 9,
1999, per Davide, CJ, citing People v. Cuaresma, 172 SCRA 415, April 18,
1999; Defensor-Santiago v. Vasquez, 217 SCRA 633, January 27, 1993;
Manalo v. Gloria, 236 SCRA 130, September 1, 1994. See also Cruz v.
Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, 347 SCRA 128,
December 6, 2000; Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora, G.R. Nos.
142801-802, July 10, 2001, 360 SCRA 718.
652

matter of first impression over which there is, as yet, no

local jurisprudence to guide lower courts.
Five Postulates of Extradition

The substantive issues raised in this case require an
interpretation or construction of the treaty and the law on
extradition. A cardinal rule in the interpretation of a25 treaty
or a law is to ascertain and give effect to its intent. Since
PD 1069 is intended as a guide for the implementation of
extradition26
treaties to which the Philippines is a
signatory, understanding certain postulates of extradition
will aid us in properly deciding the issues raised here.
1. Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the Suppression of

Crime.
First, extradition treaties
27
are entered into for the purpose
of suppressing crime
28
by facilitating
29
the arrest and the
custodial transfer of a fugitive from one state to the
other.
With the advent of easier and faster means of
international travel, the flight of affluent criminals from
one country to another for the purpose of committing crime
and evading prosecution has become more frequent.
Accordingly, governments are adjusting their methods of
dealing with criminals and crimes that transcend
international boundaries.
_______________
25 Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1995 ed., p. 37, citing Macondray &

Co. v. Eustaquio, 64 Phil. 446, July 16, 1937; Roldan v. Villaroman, 69
Phil. 12, October 18, 1939; Torres v. Limjap, 56 Phil. 141, September 21,
1931; Manila Lodge No. 761 v. Court of Appeals, 73 SCRA 162, September
30, 1976; People v. Concepcion, 44 Phil. 126, November 29, 1922; Tanada
v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051, February 28, 1957; Salaysay v. Castro, 98 Phil.
364, January 31, 1956.
26 Last “Whereas” clause of PD 1069.
27 See “Whereas” clause of PD 1069 and preamble of the RP-US
Extradition Treaty.
28 Bassiouni, International Extradition, 1987 ed., p. 68.
29 In Rodriguez v. Comelec (259 SCRA 296, July 24, 1996), the Court
defined fugitive from justice as one who flees after conviction to avoid
punishment or who, after being charged, flees to avoid prosecution.
653
VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 653

Today, “a majority of nations in the world community have

come to look upon extradition as the major effective
instrument30
of international co-operation in the suppression
of crime.” It is the only regular system that has been
devised to return fugitives to the jurisdiction of a court
competent to try 31 them in accordance with municipal and
international law.
“An important practical effect x x x of the recognition of the

principle that criminals should be restored to a jurisdiction
competent to try and punish them is that the number of criminals
seeking refuge abroad will be reduced. For to the extent that
efficient means of detection and the threat of punishment play a
significant role in the deterrence of crime within the territorial
limits of a State, so the existence of effective extradition
arrangements and the consequent certainty of return to the locus
delicti commissi play a corresponding role in the deterrence of
flight abroad in order to escape the consequence of crime, x x x.
From an absence of extradition arrangements flight abroad by the
ingenious criminal receives direct encouragement and thus
32
indirectly does the commission of crime itself.”
33
In Secretary v. Lantion we explained:
“The Philippines also has a national interest to help in

suppressing crimes and one way to do it is to facilitate the
extradition of persons covered by treaties duly entered [intol by
our government. More and more, crimes are becoming the concern
of one world. Laws involving crimes and crime prevention are
undergoing universalization. One manifest purpose of this trend
towards globalization is to deny easy refuge to a criminal whose
activities threaten the peace and progress of civilized countries. It
is to the great interest of the Philippines to be part of this
irreversible movement in light of its vulnerability to crimes,
especially transnational crimes.”
Indeed, in this era of globalization, easier and faster

international travel, and an expanding ring of
international crimes and criminals, we cannot afford to be
an isolationist state. We need to
_______________
30 Bassiouni, supra, p. 21.
31 Id., p. 67.
32 Shearer, Extradition in International Law, 1971 ed., pp. 19-20.
33 Supra, p. 392, October 17, 2000, per Puno, J.
654

cooperate with other states in order to improve our chances

of suppressing crime in our own country.
2. The Requesting State Will Accord Due Process to the

Accused.
Second, an extradition treaty presupposes that both parties
thereto have examined, and that both accept and 34
trust,
each other’s legal system and judicial process. More
pointedly, our duly authorized representative’s signature
on an extradition treaty signifies our confidence in the
capacity and the willingness of the other state to protect 35
the basic rights of the person sought to be extradited.
That signature signifies our full faith that the accused will
be given, upon extradition to the requesting state, all
relevant and basic rights in the criminal proceedings that
will take place therein; otherwise, the treaty would not
have been signed, or would have been directly attacked for
its unconstitutionality.
3. The Proceedings Are Sui Generis.

36
Third, as pointed out in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion,
extradition proceedings are not criminal in nature. In
criminal proceedings, the constitutional rights of the
accused are at fore; in extradition which is sui generis—in a
class by itself—they are not.
“An extradition [proceeding] is sui generis. It is not a criminal

proceeding which will call into operation all the rights of an
accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. To begin with, the
process of extradition does not involve the determination of the
guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocence will be
adjudged in the court of the state where he will be extradited.
by an extraditee x x x.
x x x x x x x x x
“There are other differences between an extradition proceeding
and a criminal proceeding. An extradition proceeding is summary
in nature
_______________
34 Coquia, “On Implementation of the US-RP Extradition Treaty,” The Lawyers

Review, August 31, 2000, p. 4.
35 See Bassiouni, supra, p. 546; citing 221 US 508, 512 (1910).
36 Supra.
655
VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 655

while criminal proceedings involve a full-blown trial. In

contradistinction to a criminal proceeding, the rules of evidence in
an extradition proceeding allow admission of evidence under less
stringent standards. In terms of the quantum of evidence to be
satisfied, a criminal case requires proof beyond reasonable doubt
for conviction while a fugitive may be ordered extradited ‘upon
showing of the existence of a prima facie case.’ Finally, unlike in a
criminal case where judgment becomes executory upon being
rendered final, in an extradition proceeding, our courts may
adjudge an individual extraditable but the President has the final
discretion to extradite him. The United States adheres to a
similar practice whereby the Secretary of State exercises wide
discretion in balancing the equities of the case and the demands
of the nation’s foreign relations before making the ultimate
decision to extradite.”
Given the foregoing, it is evident that the extradition court

is not called upon to ascertain the guilt
37
or the innocence of
the person sought to be extradited. Such determination
during the extradition proceedings will only result in
needless duplication and delay. Extradition is merely a
measure of international judicial assistance through which
a person charged with or convicted of a crime is restored to
a jurisdiction with the best claim to try that person. It is
not part of the function of the assisting authorities to enter
into questions
38
that are the prerogative of that
jurisdiction. The ultimate purpose of extradition
proceedings in court is only to determine whether the
extradition request complies with the Extradition
39
Treaty,
and whether the person sought is extraditable.
4. Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith.

Fourth, our executive branch of government voluntarily
entered into the Extradition Treaty, and our legislative
branch ratified it. Hence, the Treaty carries the
presumption that its implementation will serve the
national interest.
Fulfilling our 40obligations under the Extradition Treaty
promotes comity with the requesting state. On the other
hand, failure to
_______________
37 Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, supra.

38 Shearer, Extradition in International Law, 1971 ed., p. 157.
39 Id., p. 545.
40 In line with the Philippine policy of cooperation and amity with all
nations set forth in Article II, Section 2, Constitution.
656

fulfill our obligations thereunder paints a bad image of our

country before the world community. Such failure would
discourage other states from entering into treaties with us,
particularly41 an extradition treaty that hinges on
reciprocity.
Verily, we are bound by pacta sunt servanda to comply
42
in good faith with our obligations under the Treaty. This
principle requires that we deliver the accused to the
requesting country if the conditions precedent to
extradition, as set forth in the Treaty, are satisfied. In
other words, “[tlhe demanding government, when it has
done all that the treaty and the law require it to do, is
entitled to the delivery of the accused on the issue of the
proper warrant, and the other government43
is under
obligation to make the surrender.” Accordingly, the
Philippines must be ready and in a position to deliver the
accused, should it be found proper.
5. There Is an Underlying Risk of Flight

Fifth, persons to be extradited are presumed to be flight
risks. This prima
44
facie presumption finds reinforcement in
the experience of the executive branch: nothing short of
confinement can ensure that the accused will not flee the
jurisdiction of the requested state in order to thwart their
extradition to the requesting state.
The present extradition case further validates the
premise that persons sought to be extradited have a
propensity to flee. Indeed, extradition hearings would not
even begin, if only the accused were willing to submit to
45
45
trial in the requesting country. Prior acts of herein
respondent—(1) leaving the requesting state right before
the conclusion of his indictment proceedings there; and (2)
re-
_______________
41 The United States District Court, District of Nevada, Las Vegas,

Nevada: “In the Matter of the Extradition of Charlie Atong Ang, a fugitive
from the country of the Philippines,” [the courtl has denied Mr. Ang’s
motion for bail, per petitioner’s Manifestation dated June 5, 2002.
42 Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, supra.
43 Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 62, March 23, 1903.
44 See footnote no. 41, Petition for Certiorari, p. 18; Rollo p. 19;
Manifestation dated June 5, 2002.
45 Persily, “International Extradition and the Right to Bail,” 34 Stan. J.
Int’l. L. 407 (Summer, 1998).
657
VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 657

maining in the requested state despite learning that the

requesting state is seeking his return and that the crimes
he is charged with are bailable—eloquently speak of his
aversion to the processes in the requesting state, as well as
his predisposition to avoid them at all cost. These
circumstances point to an ever-present, underlying high
risk of flight. He has demonstrated that he has the capacity
and the will to flee. Having fled once, what is there to stop
him, given sufficient opportunity, from fleeing a second
time?
First Substantive Issue:

Is Respondent Entitled to Notice and Hearing
Before the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest?
Petitioner contends that the procedure adopted by the RTC

—informing the accused, a fugitive from justice, that an
Extradition Petition has been filed against him, and that
petitioner is seeking his arrest—gives him notice to escape
and to avoid extradition. Moreover, petitioner pleads that
such procedure may set a dangerous precedent, in that
those sought to be extradited—including terrorists, mass
murderers and war criminals—may invoke it in future
extradition cases.
On the other hand, Respondent Jimenez argues that he
should not be hurriedly and arbitrarily deprived of his
constitutional right to liberty without due process. He
further asserts that there is as yet no specific law or rule
setting forth the procedure prior to the issuance of a
warrant of arrest, after the petition for extradition has
been filed in court; ergo, the formulation of that procedure
is within the discretion of the presiding judge.
Both parties cite Section 6 of PD 1069 in support of their
arguments. It states:
“SEC. 6. Issuance of Summons; Temporary Arrest; Hearing,

Service of Notices.—(1) Immediately upon receipt of the petition,
the presiding judge of the court shall, as soon as practicable,
summon the accused to appear and to answer the petition on the
day and hour fixed in the order. [H]e may issue a warrant for the
immediate arrest of the accused which may be served any where
within the Philippines if it appears to the presiding judge that the
immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused will, best
serve the ends of justice. Upon receipt of the answer, or should the
accused after having received the summons fail to answer within
the
658

time fixed, the presiding judge shall hear the case or set another
date for the hearing thereof.
“(2) The order and notice as well as a copy of the warrant of
arrest, if issued, shall be promptly served each upon the accused
and the attorney having charge of the case.” (Emphasis ours)
Does this provision sanction RTC Judge Purganan’s act of

immediately setting for hearing the issuance of a warrant
of arrest? We rule in the negative.
1. On the Basis of the Extradition Law

It is significant to note that Section 6 of PD 1069, our
Extradition Law, uses the word “immediate” to qualify the
arrest of the accused. This qualification would be rendered
nugatory by setting for hearing the issuance of the arrest
warrant.46
Hearing entails sending notices
47
to the opposing
48
parties, receiving facts and arguments from them, and
giving them time to prepare and present such facts and
arguments. Arrest subsequent to a hearing can no longer
be considered “immediate.” The law could not have
intended the word as a mere superfluity but, on the whole,
as a means of imparting a sense of urgency and swiftness
in the determination of whether a warrant of arrest should
be issued.
By using the phrase “if it appears,” the law further
conveys that accuracy is not as important as speed at such
early stage. The trial court is not expected to make an
exhaustive determination to ferret out the true and actual
situation, immediately upon the filing of the petition. From
the knowledge and the material then available to it, the
court is expected merely to get a good first impression—a
prima facie finding—sufficient to make a speedy initial
determination as regards the arrest and detention of the
accused.
Attached to the Petition for Extradition, with a
Certificate of Authentication among others, were the
following: (1) Annex “H”, the Affidavit executed on May 26,
1999 by Mr. Michael E. Sav-
_______________
46 Ibid.
47 39 CJS 875, citing People v. Blair, 33 NYS 2d 183, 190, 191; Amerada
Petroleum Corporation v. Hester, 109 P. 2d 820, 821, 188 Okl. 394.
48 Id.; citing Independent Life Ins. Co. v. Rodgers, 55 S.W. 2d 767, 165
Tenn. 447.
659
VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 659

age—trial attorney in the Campaign Financing Task Force

of the Criminal Division of the US Department of Justice;
(2) Annexes “H” to “G”, evidentiary Appendices of various
exhibits that constituted evidence of the crimes charged in
the Indictment, with Exhibits “1” to “120” (duly
authenticated exhibits that constituted evidence of the
crimes charged in the Indictment); (3) Annex “BB”, the
Exhibit “I” “Appendix of Witness [excerpts] Statements
Referenced in the Affidavit of Angela Byers” and enclosed
Statements in two volumes; (4) Annex “GG”, the Exhibit “J”
“Table of Contents for Supplemental Evidentiary
Appendix” with enclosed Exhibits “121” to “132”; and (5)
Annex “MM”, the Exhibit “L” “Appendix of Witness
[excerpts] Statements Referenced in the Affidavit 49of Betty
Steward” and enclosed Statements in two volumes.
It is evident that respondent judge could have already
gotten an impression from these records adequate for him
to make an initial determination of whether the accused
was someone who should immediately be arrested in order
to “best serve the ends of justice.” He could have
determined whether such facts and circumstances existed
as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to
believe that the extradition request was prima facie
meritorious. ‘In point of fact, he actually concluded from
these supporting documents that “probable cause” did
exist. In the second questioned Order, he stated:
“In the instant petition, the documents sent by the US

Government in support of [its] request for extradition of herein
respondent are enough to convince the Court of the existence of
probable cause to proceed with the hearing against the
50
extraditee.”
We stress that the prima facie existence of probable cause

for hearing the petition and, a priori, for issuing an arrest
warrant was already evident from the Petition itself and its
supporting documents. Hence, after having already
determined therefrom that a prima facie finding did exist,
respondent judge gravely abused
_______________
49 Petition for Extradition, pp. 2-3; Rollo pp. 49-50.

50 Order dated July 3, 2001, p. 3; Rollo, 124.
660

his discretion when 51

he set the matter for hearing upon
motion of Jimenez.
Moreover, the law specifies that the court sets a hearing
upon receipt of the answer or upon failure of the accused to
answer after receiving the summons. In connection with
the matter of immediate arrest, however, the word
“hearing” is notably absent from the provision. Evidently,
had the holding of a hearing at that stage been intended,
the law could have easily so provided. It also bears
emphasizing52
at this point that extradition proceedings are
summary in nature. Hence, the silence of the Law and the
Treaty leans to the more reasonable interpretation that
there is no intention to punctuate with a hearing every
little step in the entire proceedings.
“It is taken for granted that the contracting parties intend
something reasonable and something not inconsistent with
generally recognized principles of International Law, nor with
previous treaty obligations towards third States. If, therefore, the
meaning of a treaty is ambiguous, the reasonable meaning is to be
preferred to the unreasonable, the more reasonable to the less
53
reasonable x x x .”
Verily, as argued by petitioner, sending to persons sought

to be extradited a notice of the request for their arrest and
setting it for hearing at some future date would give them
ample opportunity to prepare and execute an escape.
Neither the Treaty nor the Law could have intended that
consequence, for the very purpose of both would have been
defeated by the escape of the accused from the requested
state.
_______________
51 In the questioned July 3, 2001 Order (p. 4; Rollo, p. 125), respondent

judge admitted that the Annexes of the Petition for Extradition had been
received by the court a quo on May 25, 2001; yet, in its Order dated May
23, 2001 (Rollo, p. 74), it already set for hearing the issuance of the
warrant of arrest.
52 See §9, PD 1069.
53 Bassiouni, International Extradition, supra, p. 87; citing 1 L.
Oppenheim, International Law, (8th ed., 1955), pp. 952-53.
661
VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 661

2. On the Basis of the Constitution

Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution, which is
invoked by Jimenez, does not require a notice or a hearing
before the issuance of a warrant of arrest. It provides:
“Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,

houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.”
To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest
warrants, the Constitution itself requires only the
examination—under oath or affirmation—of complainants
and the witnesses they may produce. There is no
requirement to notify and hear the accused before the
issuance of warrants
54
of arrest.
In Ho v. People and in all the cases cited therein, never
was a judge required to go to the extent of conducting a
hearing just for the purpose of personally determining
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. All
we required was that the “judge must have sufficient
supporting documents upon which to make his independent
judgment, or at the very least, upon which to verify the
findings
55
of the prosecutor as to the existence of probable
cause.” 56
In Webb v. De Leon, the Court categorically stated that
a judge was not supposed to conduct a hearing before
issuing a warrant of arrest:
“Again, we stress that before issuing warrants of arrest, judges

merely determine personally the probability, not the certainty of
guilt of an accused. In doing so, judges do not conduct a de novo
hearing to determine the existence of probable cause. They just
personally review the initial
_______________
54 280 SCRA 365, October 9, 1997.

55 Id., p. 381, per Panganiban, J.
56 247 SCRA 652, 680, per Puno, J.
662

determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if

it is supported by substantial evidence.”
At most, in cases of clear insufficiency of evidence on

record, judges merely
57
further examine complainants and
their witnesses. In the present case, validating the act of
respondent judge and instituting the practice of hearing
the accused and his witnesses at this early stage would be
discordant with the rationale for the entire system. If the
accused were allowed to be heard and necessarily to
present evidence during the prima facie determination for
the issuance of a warrant of arrest, what would stop him
from presenting his entire plethora of defenses at this stage
—if he so desires—in his effort to negate a prima facie
finding? Such a procedure could convert the determination
of a prima facie case into a full-blown trial of the entire
proceedings and possibly make trial of the main case
superfluous. This scenario is also anathema to the
summary nature of extraditions.
That the case under consideration is an extradition and
not a criminal action is not sufficient to justify the adoption
of a set of procedures more protective of the accused. If a
different procedure were called for at all, a more restrictive
one—not the opposite—would be justified in view of
respondent’s demonstrated predisposition to flee.
Since this is a matter of first impression, we deem it
wise to restate the proper procedure:
Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its
supporting documents, the judge must study them and
make, as soon as possible, a prima facie finding whether (a)
they are sufficient in form and substance, (b) they show
compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law, and (c)
the person sought is extraditable. At his discretion, the
judge may require the submission of further documentation
or may personally examine the affiants and witnesses of
the petitioner. If, in spite of this study and examination, no
prima
_______________
57 Ibid.; citing Allado v. Diokno, 233 SCRA 192, May 5, 1994.
663
VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 663

58
facie finding is possible, the petition may be dismissed at
the discretion of the judge.
On the other hand, if the presence of a prima facie case
is determined, then the magistrate must immediately issue
a warrant for the arrest of the extraditee, who is at the
same time summoned to answer the petition and to appear
at scheduled summary hearings. Prior to the issuance of
the warrant, the judge must not inform or notify the
potential extraditee of the pendency of the petition, lest the
latter be given the opportunity to escape and frustrate the
proceedings. In our opinion, the foregoing procedure will
“best serve the ends of justice” in extradition cases.
Second Substantive Issue:
Is Respondent Entitled to Bail?
Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution, is worded as

follows:
“Art. Ill, Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong,
shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to
bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.”
Respondent Mark B. Jimenez maintains that this

constitutional provision secures the right to bail of all
persons, including those sought to be extradited.
Supposedly, the only exceptions are the ones charged with
offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua, when evidence
of guilt is strong. He also
59
alleges the relevance to the
present case of Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court
_______________
58 Prima facie finding, not probable cause, is the more precise

terminology because an extradition case is not a criminal proceeding in
which the latter phrase is commonly used.
59 “SEC. 4. Bail, a matter of right; exception.—All persons in custody
shall be admitted to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or
released on recognizance as prescribed by law or this Rule (a) before or
after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b)
before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable
by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment.”
664

which, insofar as practicable and consistent with the

summary nature of extradition proceedings, shall also
apply according to Section 9 of PD 1069.
On the other hand, petitioner claims that there is no
provision in the Philippine Constitution granting the right
to bail to a person who is the subject of an extradition
request and arrest warrant.
Extradition Different from
Ordinary Criminal Proceedings
We agree with petitioner. As suggested by the use of the
word “conviction,” the constitutional provision on bail
quoted above, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules
of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and
detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does
not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition
courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail “flows from the
presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who
should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter
he would be entitled to acquittal,
60
unless his guilt be proved
beyond reasonable doubt.” It follows that the
constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like
extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at
issue.
The provision in the Constitution stating that the “right
to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus is suspended” does not detract from
the rule that the constitutional right to bail is available
only in criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
finds application “only to persons judicially charged for
rebellion or
61
offenses inherent in or directly connected with
invasion.” Hence, the second sentence in the
constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes the
right to bail in criminal proceedings for the aforementioned
offenses. It cannot be taken to
_______________
60 De la Camara v. Enage, 41 SCRA 1, 6, September 17, 1971, per

Fernando, J. (later CJ).
61 §18, Art. VII, Constitution.
665
VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 665

mean that the right is available even in extradition

proceedings that are not criminal in nature.
That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be
extradited are bailable in the United States is not an
argument to grant him one in the present case. To stress,
extradition proceedings are separate and distinct from the
trial for the offenses for which he is charged. He should
apply for bail before the courts trying the criminal cases
against him, not before the extradition court.
No Violation of Due Process

62
Respondent Jimenez cites the foreign case Paretti in
arguing that, constitutionally, “[n]o one shall be deprived of
x x x liberty x x x without due process of law.”
Contrary to his contention, his detention prior to the
conclusion of the extradition proceedings does not amount
to a violation of his right to due process. We iterate the
familiar doctrine that the63
essence of due process is the
opportunity to be heard but, at the same time, point out
that the doctrine does64 not always call for a prior
opportunity to be heard. Where the circumstances—such
as those present in an extradition case—call 65for it, a
subsequent opportunity to be heard is enough. In the
present case, respondent will be given full opportunity to
be heard subsequently, when the extradition court hears
the Petition for Extradition. Hence, there is no violation of
his right to due process and fundamental fairness.
Contrary to the contention of Jimenez, we find no
arbitrariness, either, in the immediate deprivation of his
liberty prior to his being heard. That his arrest and
detention will not be arbitrary is sufficiently ensured by (1)
the DOJ’s filing in court the Petition with its supporting
documents after a determination that the extradition
_______________
62 Paretti v. United States of America, 122 F. 3d. 758, May 6, 1997.

63 Garcia v. NLRC, G.R. No. 110494, November 18, 1996, 264 SCRA
261; Paat v. Court of Appeals, January 10, 1997, 266 SCRA 167.
64 See Central Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 220 SCRA
536, March 20, 1993.
65 Ibid. See also Busuego v. Court of Appeals, 304 SCRA 473, March 11,
1999.
666

request meets the requirements of the law and the relevant

treaty; (2) the extradition judge’s independent prima facie
determination that his arrest will best serve the ends of
justice before the issuance of a warrant for his arrest; and
(3) his opportunity, once he is under the court’s custody, to
apply for bail as an exception to the no-initial-bail rule.
It is also worth noting that before the US government
requested the extradition of respondent, proceedings had
already been conducted in that country. But because he left
the jurisdiction of the requesting state before those
proceedings could be completed, it was hindered from
continuing with the due processes prescribed under its
laws. His invocation of due process now has thus become
hollow. He already had that opportunity in the requesting
state; yet, instead of taking it, he ran away.
In this light, would it be proper and just for the
government to increase the risk of violating its treaty
obligations in order to accord Respondent Jimenez his
personal liberty in the span of time that it takes to resolve
the Petition for Extradition? His supposed immediate
deprivation of liberty without the due process that he had
previously shunned pales against the government’s interest
in fulfilling its Extradition Treaty obligations and in
cooperating with the world community in the suppression
of crime. Indeed, “[c]onstitutional liberties do not exist in a
vacuum; the due process rights accorded to individuals
must be carefully balanced
66
against exigent and palpable
government interests.”
Too, we cannot allow our country to be a haven for
fugitives, cowards and weaklings who, instead of facing the
consequences of their actions, choose to run and hide.
Hence, it would not be good policy to increase the risk of
violating our treaty obligations if, through overprotection
or excessively liberal treatment, persons sought to be
extradited are able to evade arrest or escape from our
custody. In the absence of any provision—in the
Constitution, the law or the treaty—expressly
guaranteeing the right to bail in extradition proceedings,
adopting the practice of not granting them bail, as a
general rule, would be a step towards deterring fugitives
_______________
66 Coquia, “On the Implementation of the US-RP Extradition Treaty,”

supra; citing Kelso v. US Department of State, 13 F Supp. 291 [DDC 1998].
667
VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 667

from coming to the Philippines to hide from or evade their
prosecutors.
The denial of bail as a matter of course in extradition
67
cases falls into place with and gives life to Article 14 of
the Treaty, since this practice would encourage the accused
to voluntarily surrender to the requesting state to cut short
their detention here. Likewise, their detention pending the
resolution of extradition proceedings would fall into place
with the emphasis of the Extradition Law on the summary
nature of extradition cases and the need for their speedy
disposition.
Exceptions to the “No Bail” Rule
The rule, we repeat, is that bail is not a matter of right in

extradition cases. However, the judiciary has68 the
constitutional duty to curb grave abuse of discretion and
tyranny, as well as the power to promulgate69
rules to
protect and enforce constitutional rights. Furthermore, we
believe that the right to due process is broad enough to
induce the grant of basic fairness to extraditees. Indeed,
the right to due process extends to the “life, liberty or
property” of every person. It is “dynamic and resilient, 70
adaptable to every situation calling for its application.”
Accordingly and to best serve the ends of justice, we
believe and so hold that, after a potential extraditee has
been arrested or placed under the custody of the law, bail
may be applied for and granted as an exception, only upon a
clear and convincing showing (1) that, once granted bail,
the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the
community; and (2) that there71 exist special, humanitarian
and compelling circumstances including, as a matter
_______________
67 It states: “If the person sought consents in writing to surrender to the

Requesting State, the Requested State may surrender the person as
expeditiously as possible without further proceedings.”
68 §1, Art. VIII, Constitution.
69 §5, Art. VIII, Constitution.
70 I.A. Cruz, Constitutional Law, 1998 ed., p. 98.
71 Private respondent argues that the following cases—In re Michell,
171 F. Rep. 289, June 30, 1909; United States v. Kirby, Brennan and Artt,
668

of reciprocity, those cited by the highest court in the
requesting state when it grants provisional liberty in
extradition cases therein.
Since this exception has no express or specific statutory
basis, and since it is derived essentially from general
principles of justice and fairness, the applicant bears the
burden of proving the above two-tiered requirement with
clarity, precision and emphatic forcefulness. The Court
realizes that extradition is basically an executive, not a
judicial, responsibility arising from the presidential power
to conduct foreign relations. In its barest concept, it
partakes of the nature of police assistance amongst states,
which is not normally a judicial prerogative. Hence, any
intrusion by the courts into the exercise of this power
should be characterized by caution, so that the vital
international and bilateral interests of our country will not
be unreasonably impeded or compromised. In short, while
this Court is ever protective of “the sporting idea of fair
play,” it also recognizes the limits of its own prerogatives
and the need to fulfill international obligations.
Along this line, Jimenez contends that there are special
circumstances that are compelling enough for the Court to
grant his request for provisional release on bail. We have
carefully examined these circumstances and shall now
discuss them.
1. Alleged Disenfranchisement
While his extradition was pending, Respondent Jimenez
was elected as a member of the House of Representatives.
On that basis, he claims that his detention will
disenfranchise his Manila district of 600,000
72
residents. We
are not persuaded. In People v. Jalosjos, the Court has
already debunked the disenfranchisement argument when
it ruled thus:
_______________
106 F. 3d. 855, February 27, 1997 and 158 F. 3d. 462, October 9, 1998,
Beaulieu v. Hartigan, 460 F. Supp. 915, March 14, 1977; and 554 F. 2d 1,
April 6, 1977—should be treated as examples of special circumstances. In
our view, however, they are not applicable to this case due to factual
differences. Hence we refrain from ruling on this argument of Jimenez.
72 324 SCRA 689, February 3, 2000, per Ynares-Santiago, J.
669
VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 669

“When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to

Congress, they did so with full awareness of the limitations on his
freedom of action. They did so with the knowledge that he could
achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish
within the confines of prison. To give a more drastic illustration, if
voters elect a person with full knowledge that he is suffering from
a terminal illness, they do so knowing that at any time, he may no
longer serve his full term in office.
“In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a
question of constitutional equal protection.
“The Constitution guarantees: ‘x x x nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of laws.’ This simply means that all
persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights
enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. The organs of government
may not show any undue favoritism or hostility to any person.
Neither partiality nor prejudice shall be displayed.
“Does being an elective official result in a substantial
distinction that allows different treatment? Is being a
Congressman a substantial differentiation which removes the
accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all persons
validly confined under law?
“The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by
public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly
[from] prison. The duties imposed by the ‘mandate of the people’
are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to
legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The
accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of
Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate,
charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to
function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its
members. Depending on the exigency of Government that has to
be addressed, the President or the Supreme Court can also be
deemed the highest for that particular duty. The Importance of a
function depends on the need for its exercise. The duty of a
mother to nurse her infant is most compelling under the law of
nature. A doctor with unique skills has the duty to save the lives
of those with a particular affliction. An elective governor has to
serve provincial constituents. A police officer must maintain peace
and order. Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner
into a different classification from those others who are validly
restrained by law.
“A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest[,] wittingly
or otherwise, insidious discriminations are made in favor of or
against groups or types of individuals.
“The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The
necessities imposed by public welfare may justify exercise of
government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups
may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded.
670

“We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman

is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The
functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions
which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their
freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and
confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to
73
all those belonging to the same class.”
It must be noted that even before private respondent ran

for and won a congressional seat in Manila, it was already
of public knowledge that the United States was requesting
his extradition. Hence, his constituents were or should
have been prepared for the consequences of the extradition
case against their representative, including his detention
pending the final resolution of the case. Premises
considered and in line with Jalosjos, we are constrained to
rule against his claim that his election to public office is by
itself a compelling reason to grant him bail.
2. Anticipated Delay
Respondent Jimenez further contends that because the
extradition proceedings are lengthy, it would be unfair to
confine him during the pendency of the case. Again we are
not convinced. We must emphasize that extradition cases
are summary in nature. They are resorted to merely to
determine whether the extradition petition and its annexes
conform to the Extradition Treaty, not to determine guilt or
innocence. Neither is it, as a rule, intended to address
issues relevant to the constitutional rights available to the
accused in a criminal action.
We are not overruling the possibility that petitioner
may, in bad faith, unduly delay the proceedings. This is
quite another matter that is not at issue here. Thus, any
further discussion of this point would be merely
anticipatory and academic.
However, if the delay is due to maneuverings of
respondent, with all the more reason would the grant of
bail not be justified. Giving premium to delay by
considering it as a special circumstance for the grant of bail
would be tantamount to giving him the power to grant bail
to himself. It would also encourage him to
_______________
73 Id., pp. 700-702.
671
VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 671

stretch out and unreasonably delay the extradition

proceedings even more. This we cannot allow.
3. Not a Flight Risk?

Jimenez further claims that he is not a flight risk. To
support this claim, he stresses that he learned of the
extradition request in June 1999; yet, he has not fled the
country. True, he has not actually fled during the
preliminary stages of the request for his extradition. Yet,
this fact cannot be taken to mean that he will not flee as
the process moves forward to its conclusion, as he hears the
footsteps of the requesting government inching closer and
closer. That he has not yet fled from the Philippines cannot
be taken to mean that he will stand his ground and still be
within reach of our government if and when it matters; that
is, upon the resolution of the Petition for Extradition.
In any event, it is settled that bail may be applied for
and granted by the trial court at anytime after the
applicant has been taken into custody and prior to
judgment, even after bail has been previously denied. In
the present case, the extradition court may continue
hearing evidence on the application for bail, which may be
granted in accordance with the guidelines in this Decision.
Brief Refutation of Dissents
The proposal to remand this case to the extradition court,

we believe, is totally unnecessary; in fact, it is a cop-out.
The parties—in particular, Respondent Jimenez—have
been given more than sufficient opportunity both by the
trial court and this Court to discuss fully and exhaustively
private respondent’s claim to bail. As already stated, the
RTC set for hearing not only petitioner’s application for an
arrest warrant, but also private respondent’s prayer for
temporary liberty. Thereafter required by the RTC were
memoranda on the arrest, then position papers on the
application for bail, both of which were separately filed by
the parties.
This Court has meticulously pored over the Petition the
Comment, the Reply, the lengthy Memoranda and the
Position Papers of both parties. Additionally, it has
patiently heard them in Oral Arguments, a procedure not
normally observed in the great major-
672

ity of cases in this Tribunal. Moreover, after the Memos

had been submitted, the parties—particularly the potential
extraditee—have bombarded this Court with additional
pleadings—entitled “Manifestations” by both parties and
“Counter-Manifestation” by private respondent—in which
the main topic was Mr. Jimenez’s plea for bail.
A remand would mean that this long, tedious process
would be repeated in its entirety. The trial court would
again hear factual and evidentiary matters. Be it noted,
however, that, in all his voluminous pleadings and verbal
propositions, private respondent has not asked for a
remand. Evidently, even he realizes that there is absolutely
no need to rehear factual matters. Indeed, the inadequacy
lies not in the factual presentation of Mr. Jimenez. Rather,
it lies in his legal arguments. Remanding the case will not
solve this utter lack of persuasion and strength in his legal
reasoning.
In short, this Court—as shown by this Decision and the
spirited Concurring, Separate and Dissenting Opinions
written by the learned justices themselves—has
exhaustively deliberated and carefully passed upon all
relevant questions in this case. Thus, a remand will not
serve any useful purpose; it will 74 only further delay these
already very delayed proceedings, which our Extradition
Law requires to be summary in character. What we need
now is prudent and deliberate speed, not unnecessary and
convoluted delay. What is needed is a firm decision on the
merits, not a circuitous cop-out.
Then, there is also the suggestion that this Court is
allegedly “disregarding basic freedoms when a case is one
of extradition.” We believe that this charge is not only
baseless, but also unfair. Suffice it to say that, in its length
and breath, this Decision has taken special cognizance of
the rights to due process and fundamental fairness of
potential extraditees.
_______________
74 The US request for extradition was dated June 16, 1999; and yet, to
date, more than three years later, the Petition for Extradition is still
languishing in the trial court.
673
VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 673

Summation
As we draw to a close, it is now time to summarize and

stress these ten points:
1. The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings is

to determine whether the request expressed in the
petition, supported by its annexes and the evidence
that may be adduced during the hearing of the
petition, complies with the Extradition Treaty and
Law; and whether the person sought is
extraditable. The proceedings are intended merely
to assist the requesting state in bringing the
accused—or the fugitive who has illegally escaped—
back to its territory, so that the criminal process
may proceed therein.
2. By entering into an extradition treaty, the
Philippines is deemed to have reposed its trust in
the reliability or soundness of the legal and judicial
system of its treaty partner; as well as in the ability
and the willingness of the latter to grant basic
rights to the accused in the pending criminal case
therein.
3. By nature then, extradition proceedings are not
equivalent to a criminal case in which guilt or
innocence is determined. Consequently, an
extradition case is not one in which the
constitutional rights of the accused are necessarily
available. It is more akin, if at all, to a court’s
request to police authorities for the arrest of the
accused who is at large or has escaped detention or
jumped bail. Having once escaped the jurisdiction of
the requesting state, the reasonable prima facie
presumption is that the person would escape again
if given the opportunity.
4. Immediately upon receipt of the petition for
extradition and its supporting documents, the judge
shall make a prima facie finding whether the
petition is sufficient in form and substance,
whether it complies with the Extradition Treaty
and Law, and whether the person sought is
extraditable. The magistrate has discretion to
require the petitioner to submit further
documentation, or to personally examine the
affiants or witnesses. If convinced that a prima
facie case exists, the judge immediately issues a
warrant for the arrest of the potential extraditee
and summons him or her to answer and to appear
at scheduled hearings on the petition.
674

5. After being taken into custody, potential

extraditees may apply for bail. Since the applicants
have a history of absconding, they have the burden
of showing that (a) there is no flight risk and no
danger to the community; and (b) there exist
special, humanitarian or compelling circumstances.
The grounds used by the highest court in the
requesting state for the grant of bail therein may be
considered, under the principle of reciprocity as a
special circumstance. In extradition cases, bail is
not a matter of right; it is subject to judicial
discretion in the context of the peculiar facts of each
case.
6. Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to
due process and to fundamental fairness. Due
process does not always call for a prior opportunity
to be heard. A subsequent opportunity is sufficient
due to the flight risk involved. Indeed, available
during the hearings on the petition and the answer
is the full chance to be heard and to enjoy
fundamental fairness that is compatible with the
summary nature of extradition.
7. This Court will always remain a protector of human
rights, a bastion of liberty, a bulwark of democracy
and the conscience of society. But it is also well
aware of the limitations of its authority and of the
need for respect for the prerogatives of the other co-
equal and co-independent organs of government.
8. We realize that extradition is essentially an
executive, not a judicial, responsibility arising out
of the presidential power to conduct foreign
relations and to implement treaties. Thus, the
Executive Department of government has broad
discretion in its duty and power of implementation.
9. On the other hand, courts merely perform oversight
functions and exercise review authority to prevent
or excise grave abuse and tyranny. They should not
allow contortions, delays and “over-due process”
every little step of the way, lest these summary
extradition proceedings become not only inutile but
also sources of international embarrassment due to
our inability to comply in good faith with a treaty
partner’s simple request to return a fugitive. Worse,
our country should not be converted into a dubious
haven where fugitives and escapees can
unreasonably delay, mummify, mock, frustrate,
checkmate and defeat the quest for bilateral justice
and international cooperation.
675
VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 675

10. At bottom, extradition proceedings should be

conducted with all deliberate speed to determine
compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law;
and, while safeguarding basic individual rights, to
avoid the legalistic contortions, delays and
technicalities that may negate that purpose.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed

RTC Order dated May 23, 2001 is hereby declared NULL
and VOID, while the challenged Order dated July 3,2001 is
SET ASIDE insofar as it granted bail to Respondent Mark
Jimenez. The bail bond posted by private respondent is
CANCELLED. The Regional Trial Court of Manila is
directed to conduct the extradition proceedings before it,
with all deliberate speed pursuant to the spirit and the
letter of our Extradition Treaty with the United States as
well as our Extradition Law. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Austria-Martinez, Corona and Carpio-Morales, JJ.,

concur.
Davide, Jr. (C.J.), And also in the concurring
opinion of Mr. Justice A.T. Carpio.
Bellosillo, J., See Separate Opinion.
Puno, J., Please see Separate Opinion.
Vitug, J., Please see Dissenting Opinion.
Mendoza, J., I concur and in addition join in the
separate concurring opinion of Carpio, J.
Quisumbing, J., Concur in Separate Opinion of J.
Puno.
Ynares-Santiago, J., Please see Dissenting Opinion.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., Am joining the Separate
Opinion of Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago.
Carpio-Morales, J., Please see Concurring Opinion.
Callejo, Sr., J., I also concur in the concurring
opinion of Mr. Justice Carpio.
676

SEPARATE OPINION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
While I do not absolutely disagree with the well-reasoned

ponencia of Mr. Justice Panganiban, I prefer nevertheless
to surf with the reflections of Mr. Justice Puno expressed in
his Separate Opinion which, in essence, espouse the
balancing of the duty of the State to faithfully comply with
its commitments under a treaty on one hand, and its
responsibility to protect the fundamental rights of its
citizens on the other.
I wish to express some concerns however, particularly
the crucial issue of whether a potential extraditee may
apply for and be released on bail during the pendency of
the extradition proceedings. This to me should not be
ignored. 1
In Northern PR Co. v. North Dakota, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter intoned: “The cardinal article of faith of our
civilization is the inviolable character of the individual.”
Thus, fundamental rights and civil liberties, although not
unlimited, occupy a place inferior to none in the hierarchy
of constitutional values. These are among the most
cherished privileges enjoyed by free men, of which it is the
sacred duty of the State to maintain and protect against
the erosion of possible encroachments, whether minute or
extensive, foreign or domestic.
It is lamentable however that the position taken by the
Government in the instant case amounts to an
unpardonable abdication of the duty of protection which it
owes to all within its territory under the expediency of a
treaty.
The Government maintains that an extradition court
has no power to authorize bail in the absence of any law
conferring such power; and that the 1987 Constitution, as
well as the Rules of Court, as amended, applies only to
persons arrested and detained for violation of Philippine
Laws, but not to extradition proceedings in which courts do
not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.
_______________
1 236 U.S. 585.
677
VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 677

The argument is as ingenious as it is fallacious. It is settled

that the power to admit to bail exists in extradition
proceedings, although as a matter of policy it may only be
granted under “exceptional circumstances.” This,
quintessentially, has been the doctrine advocated in a
cavalcade of American cases starting with Wright u.
Henkel, 190 US 40 (1902); and worth mentioning, of course,
are Paretti v. United States, 112 F.3d 1363 (1977), Bealieu
v. Hartigan, 430 F. Supp. 915 (1977), and In re Kirby, et al.,
106 F.3d 855 (1996); which are also discussed extensively
by Mr. Justice Puno.
Apart from these cases, there is likewise a considerable
number of authorities which support the general view that
the power to admit to bail is a necessary
2
incident of the
power to hear and determine cases. In other words, one of
the inherent powers of the judiciary with regard to
proceedings before it has been the admission of a prisoner
to bail where, in the exercise of his discretion, the judge
deems it advisable. A fortiori, even in the absence of
express statutory grant of authority to courts, judicial
power to admit to bail parties properly within their
jurisdiction must be deemed to exist. It must be mentioned,
however, that this authority is not absolute for the
Constitution, statutes and the Rules of Court render it
readily subject to limitations.
Significantly, both the extradition treaty between the
United States and the Philippines, and the Philippine
Extradition Law (PD 1069) contain no provision expressly
withholding from the courts the power to grant bail. Had
the intention of the parties to the treaty been to totally
nullify the pre-existing power of the extradition court on
the matter of bail, they could have easily provided for it in
the treaty. But since they had not done so, it would be
reasonable to presume that they had not so intended.
Indeed, the treaty fails to even remotely suggest such
judicial limitation insisted upon by the Government.
Truly, there is neither logic nor persuasion to the
suggestion that bail should only be allowed in criminal
cases, or that class of
_______________
2 United States v. Evans, 6 Cir., 1880, 2F. 147; In re Gannon, D.C. Pa.
1928, 27 F.2d 362; In re Chow Coo Pooi, 9 Cir., 25 F. 77; In re Ah Kee, 9
Cir., 1884, 21 F. 701; Whitfield v. Ranges, 8 Cir., 222 F. 745; Swing v.
United States, 6 Cir., 1917, 240 F. 241.
678

cases where courts must “render judgments of conviction or

acquittal.” Bail as a remedy is available where there is
deprivation of liberty prior or during
3
trial. In the 1909 case
of United States v. Co Siaco, akin to the situation
confronting us but involving a deportation proceeding, this
Court allowed the potential deportee to post bail although a
deportation proceeding is not criminal in nature and there
was then no law providing for bail in deportation cases—
x x x x we see no reason why bail should not be allowed in this

class of cases. As is said by the Supreme Court, the defendant has
committed no crime. In this particular case the defendant was
born in this country, has lived here for more than 35 years and is
now living here with his mother, a native of the Islands. There is
no reason to think that his being at large will be any menace to
the people in the locality where he resides, nor is there any reason
to believe that his attendance at court abide the judgment which
may be entered against him cannot be secured by the giving of
bail as in ordinary cases. To refuse him bail is to treat him as a
person is treated who has committed the most serious crime
known to the law, and while we do not intend to say that this is a
criminal proceeding, we do say that some of the machinery used
for making the investigation required by Act No. 702 is the
machinery of the criminal law, and to it are applicable those
provisions of General Orders No. 58, relating to bail.
Were we to adopt the view pressed upon us by the

Government, it would restrict the reciprocal operation of
the treaty, and create a striking lack of symmetry between
the rights of Filipinos subject of extradition and that of
American extraditees. Filipino citizens sought to be
extradited by the United States government will be
absolutely denied of the chance at provisional liberty
during the pendency of the extradition proceedings against
them; while American fugitives from justice sought to be
extradited by the Philippine government could always
exercise the right to petition for bail, and consequently,
enjoy better chances of avoiding the inconvenience of
incarceration during the pendency of the extradition
proceedings. Certainly, there is no warrant for the
discrimination. The Philippines and the United States
dealt with each other as equals. Their extradition treaty
discloses the intention that they shall stand on the same
footing. The governing principles should always be
reciprocity and equality.
_______________
3 12 Phil. 490.
679
VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 679

We cannot curtail a citizen’s right to freedom on

speculations and fears where there exist reasonable
mechanisms appropriate to address them. To my mind, the
risk of flight does not ipso facto call for denying his right to
bail. Trial judges must henceforth weigh carefully and
judiciously other methods to assure the presence of the
accused during the proceedings and right after, when he
ought to be deported already. Bail may be set at huge
amounts or passports cancelled and hold-departure orders
issued or border patrols heightened, in order that the
extraditee may not flee from our jurisdiction. In this
regard, while I agree that it is the extraditee’s burden to
prove the least likelihood of flight, the extradition court is
also entitled to presume that the executive branch has done
all it can to forestall his sudden disappearance. The
executive branch cannot plead its helplessness and inutility
to defeat the grant of bail to the extraditee.
In any event, all things being equal, the personal
circumstances of respondent Jimenez would negate any
idea of flight risk. He is a popular, even notorious, fellow
whose face is more frequently than others plastered in the
tri-media. His stature as representative for a congressional
district in Manila makes escape from Philippine
jurisdiction not only embarrassing for him but also
constitutive of the offense of abandonment of duty. His
family and business interests are said to be strategically
placed in this country. Indeed, where respondent Jimenez
has more to lose from flight, the possibility thereof appears
remote and speculative.
Equity especially tilts in favor of respondent4 Jimenez in
light of our ruling in Montana v. Ocampo where we
allowed bail to an elected senator of the country who was
charged with the capital offenses of murder and frustrated
murder. In resolving to grant bail in favor of Senator
Montano, this Court took special notice of the accused’s
official and social standing as senator from which we
concluded that flight was remote if not nil despite the
capital crimes he had to face. In the same breath,
respondent Jimenez is a duly elected Congressman with
personal circumstances that will not risk the ignominy of
flight, considering further the crimes he is charged with are
far less severe and ignoble, since most of them
_______________
4 L-6352, Reso. dated 29 January 1953, 49 O.G. 1855.
680

had something to do with election campaign contributions

than the seemingly serious indictment for murder and
frustrated murder against Senator Montano.
If we grant for the sake of argument that the possibility
of flight exists, still respondent Jimenez’ detention would
be unwarranted by law and the Constitution if the only
purpose of the confinement is to eliminate a rare odd of
danger that is by no means actual, present and
uncontrollable. After all the Government is not powerless
to deal with or prevent any threat by measures it has the
ways and means to implement. The thought eloquently
expressed by Mr. Justice Jackson of the United States
Supreme Court in connection with the application for bail
of ten (10) communists convicted by a lower court for
advocacy of a violent overthrow of the United States
Government is pertinent and elucidating in principle—
The Government’s alternative contention is that defendants, by

misbehavior after conviction, have forfeited their claim to bail.
Grave public danger is said to result from what they may be
expected to do, in addition to what they have done since their
conviction. If I assume that defendants are disposed to commit
every opportune disloyal act helpful to Communist countries, it is
still difficult to reconcile with traditional American law the jailing
of persons by the courts because of anticipated but as yet
uncommitted crimes. Imprisonment to protect society from
predicted but unconsummated offenses is so unprecedented in
this country and so fraught with danger of excesses and injustice
that I am loath to resort to it, even as a discretionary judicial
technique to supplement conviction of such offenses as those of
which defendants stand convicted x x x x If, however, I were to be
wrong on all of these abstract or theoretical matters of principle,
there is a very practical aspect of this application which must not
be overlooked or underestimated—that is the disastrous effect on
the reputation of American justice if I should now send these men
to jail and the full Court later decide that their conviction is
invalid. All experience with litigation teaches that existence of a
substantial question about a conviction implies a more than
negligible risk of reversal. Indeed this experience lies hack of our
rule permitting and practice of allowing bail where such questions
exist, to avoid the hazard of unjustifiably imprisoning persons
with consequent reproach to our system of justice x x x x Risks, of
course, are involved in either granting or refusing bail. I am not
naive enough to underestimate the troublemaking propensities of
the defendants. But, with the Department of Justice alert to the
dangers, the worst they can accomplish in the short time it will
take to end the litigation is preferable
681
VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 681

to the possibility of national embarrassment from a celebrated
case of unjustified imprisonment of Communist leaders. Under no
circumstances must we permit their symbolization of an evil force
in the world to be hallowed and glorified by any semblance of
martyrdom. The way to avoid that risk is not to jail these men
until it is finally decided that they should stay jailed.
If the commentary is not comparable with ours on the

issues presented, its underlying principle is of universal
application. If only to preserve our regime of civil liberties
and stem a precedent where bail is unscrupulously
disallowed, respondent Jimenez may be placed under the
surveillance of the authorities or their agents in such form
and manner as may be deemed adequate to insure that he
will be available anytime when the Government is ready to
extradite him, although the surveillance should be
reasonable and the question of reasonableness should be
submitted to the court a quo for remedial measures in case
of abuse. He may also be required to put up a bond with
sufficient surety or sureties to ensure that his extradition
is not thwarted.
In our society—and even in the United States, I am sure
—freedom from bodily restraint has always been at the
core of the civil liberties protected by the Constitution. To
unduly sacrifice the civil liberties of an individual by
reason of an unfounded fear of being unable to fulfill treaty
obligations, would be to render impotent the ideals of the
dignity of the human person, thereby destroying something
of what is noble in our way of life. Certainly, if civil
liberties may be safely respected without imminently or
actually impairing faithful compliance with treaty
obligations, as in this case, then there is no valid reason for
disregarding them.
I wish to emphasize, however, lest the best of my
intentions be misconstrued, that it is not my purpose here
to encourage, much less foment, dishonor of the treaty duly
entered into by our Government. By all means we have to
fulfill all our international commitments, for they are not
mere moral obligations to be enforced at the whims and
caprices of the State. They create legally binding
obligations founded on the generally accepted principle in
international law of pacta sunt servanda which has been
adopted as part of the law of our land. But, in so doing, we
must be ever conscious of the need to balance in one
equation our commitments
682

under the treaty, and the equally important right of the

individual to freedom from unnecessary restraint.
As the vast powers and enormous resources of both the
United States of America and the Republic of the
Philippines are marshalled against a puny individual that
is respondent Jimenez, he is certainly entitled to some
measure of protection to ensure that no unwarranted
intrusions or undue curtailment of his liberty is committed.
I vote to REMAND the petition to the court a quo to
ensure that proper safeguards are afforded respondent in
the course of the extradition proceedings.
SEPARATE OPINION
PUNO, J.:
This is a case of first impression involving not only the

state’s interest to comply with its extradition treaty with
the United States but also its equally imperative duty to
protect the constitutional rights of its citizens to liberty and
to due process. Our decision will affect important rights of
all our citizens facing extradition in foreign countries.
Personalities should not therefore bend our decision one
way or the other for the protection of the Bill of Rights
extends indifferently to all alike.
We begin with the unfudged facts. The records reveal
that when the private respondent learned of the filing of
the petition for extradition against him and before the
extradition court could issue any summons, he filed a
motion to be furnished a copy of the petition and to set for
hearing petitioner’s request for the issuance of warrant of
arrest. Alternatively, he prayed that he be allowed to post
bail for his temporary liberty. Respondent judge granted
private respondent’s motion. After hearing, he issued a
warrant for the arrest of private respondent but allowed
him to post bail.
Petitioner assails the orders of the respondent judge and
submits the following issues for resolution by this Court:
683
VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 683

“I.
The public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or

with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in adopting a procedure of first hearing a potential
extraditee before issuing an arrest-warrant under Section 6 of
P.D. No. 1069.
II.
The public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction

or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in granting, the prayer for bail and in allowing
Jimenez to go on provisional liberty because:
1. An extradition court has no power to authorize bail in the

absence of any law that provides for such power.
2. Section 13, Article III (right to bail clause) of the 1987
Constitution and section 4, Rule 114 (Bail) of the Rules of
Court, as amended, which were relied upon, cannot be
used as bases for allowing bail in extradition proceedings.
3. The presumption is against bail in extradition proceedings
or proceedings leading to extradition.
4. On the assumption that bail is available in extradition
proceedings or proceedings leading to extradition, bail is
not a matter of right but only of discretion upon clear
showing by the applicant of the existence of special
circumstances.
5. Assuming that bail is a matter of discretion in extradition
proceedings, the public respondent received no evidence of
‘special circumstances’ which may justify release on bail.
6. The risk that Jimenez will flee is high, and no special
circumstance exists that will engender a well-founded
belief that he will not flee.
7. The conditions attached to the grant of bail are ineffectual
and do not ensure compliance by the Philippines with its
obligations under the RP-US Extradition Treaty.
8. The Court of Appeals resolution promulgated on May 10,
2001 in the case entitled ‘Eduardo T. Rodriguez, et al. vs.
Hon. Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 17 Manila,’ CA-G.R.
SP No. 64589, relied upon by the public respondent in
granting bail, had been recalled before the issuance of the
subject bail orders.”
684

The substantive issues are shortlisted in the majority
opinion as follows: (1) whether or not the private
respondent is entitled to notice and hearing before a
warrant for his arrest can be issued; and (2) whether or not
he is entitled to post bail for his provisional liberty while
the extradition proceedings are pending.
With due respect, I offer the following views on the
issues as hewn in the majority opinion, viz.:
I. The right to notice and hearing of

private respondent as an extraditee.
The first issue demands a two-tiered analysis based on the
following questions:
(1) Can the private respondent, as potential extraditee,

demand as a matter of right, that he be furnished a
copy of the petition for extradition before the
summons and/or the warrant of arrest are issued by
the extraditing court?
(2) Can he demand a hearing for the purpose of
determining the necessity and propriety of the
issuance of a warrant for his arrest?
The majority opinion submits that neither P.D. No. 1069

nor the Constitution authorize respondent judge to give the
private respondent a copy of the petition for extradition
and immediately set for hearing the request for a warrant
of arrest against the latter.
I beg to disagree. There can be no disagreement that
P.D. No. 1069 deserves an interpretation that would blend
with the purpose of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, i.e., the
minimization of flight risk and the facilitation of an
extraditee’s surrender to the requesting state. But this
stance should not be taken to mean that this Court can cast
a blind eye to the private respondent’s constitutional rights
to life, liberty and to due process. While this Court is
obliged to accord due respect to the state’s interests to
comply with its treaty obligations, it cannot also shirk from
its duty to protect the fundamental rights of its citizens.
Thus, a full and careful weighing of these warring interests
is imperative as we did in its
685
VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 685

1
1
predecessor case Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion, With due
respect, it is my humble submission that the majority
failed to allocate the proper weight due to the
constitutional rights of the private respondent to life,
liberty and to due process. These rights are now conceded
in the civilized world as universal in character and it was
never the intent of the RP-US Extradition Treaty to
trivialize their significance.
It bears emphasis that this Court’s ruling in Secretary of
Justice vs. Lantion did not per se negate the constitutional
rights of a potential extraditee to liberty and due process. If
we rejected private respondent’s invocation of these rights
in said case, it was only because (1) the threat2
to his liberty
by provisional arrest has already passed; and (2) the
threat to his liberty upon the filing3 of the petition for
extradition was merely hypothetical. At that time, the
government of the United States has not requested for the
provisional arrest of the private respondent. Likewise, the
petition for extradition has not yet been filed before the
extradition court. Thus, after carefully balancing the
conflicting interests of the parties at the evaluation stage of
the extradition proceedings, we upheld the state’s interests
under its extradition treaty with the United States, viz.:
“To be sure, private respondent’s plea for due process deserves

serious consideration, involving as it does his primordial right to
liberty. His
_______________
1 343 SCRA 377 (2000).

2 Id., p. 389. “Both the RP-US Extradition Treaty and P.D. No. 1069 clearly
provide that private respondent may be provisionally arrested only pending
receipt of the request for extradition. Our DFA has long received the extradition
request from the United States and has turned it over to the DOJ. It is undisputed
that until today, the United States has not requested for private respondent’s
provisional arrest. Therefore, the threat to private respondent’s liberty has passed.
It is more imagined than real.”
3 Id., p. 390. “It is evident from the above provision that a warrant of arrest for
the temporary detention of the accused pending the extradition hearing may only
be issued by the presiding judge of the extradition court upon filing of the petition
for extradition. As the extradition is still in the evaluation stage of pertinent
documents and there is no certainty that a petition for extradition will be filed in
the appropriate extradition court, the threat to private respondent’s liberty is
merely hypothetical.”
686

plea to due process, however, collides with important state

interests which cannot also be ignored for they serve the interest
of the greater majority. The clash of rights demands a delicate
balancing of interests approach which is a ‘fundamental postulate
of constitutional law.’ The approach requires that we ‘take
conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests
observable in a given type of situation.’ These interests usually
consist in the exercise of the individual of his basic freedoms on
the one hand, and the government’s promotion of fundamental
public interests or policy objectives on the other.
In the case at bar, on one end of the balancing pole is the
private respondent’s claim to due process predicated on Section 1,
Article III of the Constitution, which provides that ‘No person
shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law. . .’ Without a bubble of doubt, procedural due process of
law lies at the foundation of a civilized society which accords
paramount importance to justice and fairness. It has to be
accorded the weight it deserves.
This brings us to the other end of the balancing pole. Petitioner
avers that the Court should give more weight to our national
commitment under the RP-US Extradition Treaty to expedite the
extradition of its laws. Petitioner also emphasized the need to
defer to the judgment of the Executive on matters relating to
foreign affairs in order not to weaken if not violate the principle of
separation of powers.
Considering that in the case at bar, the extradition proceeding
is only at its evaluation stage, the nature of the right being
claimed by private respondent is nebulous and the degree of
prejudice he will allegedly suffer is weak, we accord greater
weight to the interests espoused by the government thru the
4
petitioner Secretary of Justice.”
We stressed that the denial of the private respondent’s

privilege of notice and hearing during the evaluation stage
of the extradition proceeding is merely a soft restraint on
his right to due process, viz.:
“In tilting the balance in favor of the interests of the State, we

stress that it is not ruling that the private respondent has no
right to due process at all throughout the length and breadth of
the extrajudicial proceedings. Procedural due process requires a
determination of what process is due, when it is due, and the
degree of what is due. Stated otherwise, a prior determination
should be made as to whether procedural protections are
_______________
4 Id., pp. 390-391.
687
VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 687

not at all due and when they are due, which in turn depends on
the extent to which an individual will be condemned to suffer
5
grievous loss.”
The extradition process against the private respondent has,

however, moved away from the stage of evaluation of
documents by the executive officials of the Philippine
government. A formal petition for the extradition of the
private respondent has now been filed with our court of
justice. With this development, the competing interests of
our government and of the private respondent have
developed new dimensions and they need to be rebalanced.
I respectfully submit the following propositions, viz.:
(a) A potential extraditee has the right to be notified of the

filing of the petition for extradition.
It is my humble submission that from the moment the

petition for extradition is filed before the extradition court,
a potential extraditee has the right to demand that he be
furnished a copy of the petition. This right inheres from the
duty imposed by P.D. No. 1069 to the extradition judge to
summon a potential extraditee to appear and answer the
petition “as soon as practicable.” It is a mandatory duty
that should be carried out by the extradition judge; the law
does not give him any discretion.
This submission is in
6
accord with our ruling in Secretary
of Justice vs. Lantion, where we held that: “P.D. No. 1069
which implements the RP-US Extradition Treaty provides
the time when an extraditee shall be furnished a copy of
the petition for extradition as well as the supporting
papers, i.e., after the filing of the extradition in the
extradition court.”
(b) The need for a hearing to determine whether a warrant

of arrest should be issued against an extraditee is
addressed to the sound discretion of the extraditing
judge.
The majority opinion holds that the private respondent

extraditee is not entitled to notice and hearing before the
issuance of a
_______________
5 Id., pp. 392-393.

6 Supra note 1.
688

warrant of arrest. It relies on section 6 of P.D. No. 1069,

which provides:
“Sec. 6. Issuance of Summons; Temporary Arrest; Hearing; Service

of Notices.—(1) Immediately upon receipt of the petition, the
presiding judge of the court shall, as soon as practicable, summon
the accused to appear and to answer the petition on the day and
hour fixed in the order. [H]e may issue a warrant for the
immediate arrest of the accused which may be served anywhere
within the Philippines if it appears to the presiding judge that the
immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused will
serve the ends of justice. Upon receipt of the answer, or should the
accused after having received the summons fail to answer within
the time fixed, the presiding judge shall hear the case or set
another date for hearing thereof.
(2) The order and notice as well as a copy of the warrant of
arrest, if issued, shall be promptly served each upon the accused
and the attorney having charge of the accused.” (emphasis
supplied)
The majority interprets this provision as follows:
“It is significant to note that section 6 of PD 1069, our Extradition

Law, uses the word ‘immediate’ to qualify the arrest of the
accused. This qualification would be rendered nugatory by setting
for hearing the issuance of the arrest warrant. Hearing entails
sending notices to the opposing parties, receiving facts and
arguments from them, and giving them time to prepare and
present such facts and arguments. Arrest subsequent to hearing
can no longer be considered ‘immediate.’ The law could have
intended the word as a mere superfluity but, on the whole, as
means of imparting a sense of urgency and swiftness in the
determination of whether a warrant of arrest should issue.”
Clearly, the majority leans heavily on the use of the word

“immediate” which qualified the arrest of an extraditee. It
holds that “the qualification would be rendered nugatory by
setting for hearing the issuance of the arrest warrant.”
Again, I beg to disagree. I submit that the decision
whether to send notice to an extraditee and hear him
before ordering his arrest should be left to the sound
discretion of the extraditing judge. This is crystal clear
from section 6 of P.D. No. 1069 which provides:
“x x x He may issue a warrant for the immediate arrest of the

accused which may be served anywhere within the Philippines if
it appears
689
VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 689

to the presiding judge that the immediate arrest and temporary

detention of the accused will serve the ends of justice.” (Italics
supplied)
Under this provision, the issuance of a warrant of arrest is

dependent on a big “if,” or to an all important condition—if
it will serve the ends of justice. The determination of
whether a warrant of arrest against an extraditee will
serve the ends of justice is certainly not a cut and dried
duty. It involves the appreciation of highly contentious
facts, both objective and subjective in nature. Their
appreciation requires a judicial mind honed in the law of
evidence. The history of extradition will reveal that,
initially, the task of determining whether an extraditee
should be immediately arrested was given to the executive
authorities of the extraditing state. The matter, in other
words, was treated purely as an executive function but
unfortunately, the practice was given to abuses.
Recognizing that certain human rights are universal in
nature and beyond violation, the task of adjudging whether
a potential extraditee should be immediately arrested
pending his extradition proceeding was transferred to
judges. The office of the judge was called upon to insure
that fundamental fairness is not denied to a potential
extraditee. The extraditing judge is not to act as a stamp
pad but has to exercise his sound discretion on whether to
issue the warrant. Under our law on extradition, P.D. No.
1069, section 6, the discretion of the extradition judge on
whether to order the arrest of the extraditee is guided by
the following consideration—whether the arrest will serve
the ends of justice. The grant of this judicial discretion will
be rendered naught if we subject the action of the
extraditing judge to unnecessary fetters. With due respect,
the view that the extraditing judge has no discretion to
determine whether to notify and hear a potential extraditee
before ordering his arrest cuts too much on the freedom of
action of the extraditing judge. I submit that we should
give the extraditing judge more discretion on the matter. If
the extraditing judge feels that the notice and hearing will
allow an extraditee to flee, I have no doubt, he will
immediately order his arrest. If, however, he believes that
notice and hearing will not pose such danger and that he
needs to hear the parties to make a better determination
on whether the immediate arrest of an extraditee will serve
the ends of justice, let us not deny him the discretion to do
so. The essence of discretion is
690

freedom of action and we negate that essence when we

impose needless limits on the judge’s freedom of action.
Prescinding from these premises, I cannot also subscribe
to the submission of the majority that the phrase “if it
appears” in section 6 of P.D. No. 1069 conveys the message
that accuracy is not as important as speed in issuing a
warrant of arrest against a potential extraditee. We are
concerned here with the priceless right to life and liberty,
with the right to due process before one’s liberty is taken
away. We are not dealing with chattels. We should not lay
down the doctrine that speed should be preferred to
accuracy for speed breeds recklessness and we cannot be
reckless with our right to life and liberty.
I agree with the majority that the trial court should not
be expected to make an exhaustive determination of the
facts of the case before issuing a warrant of arrest. To be
sure, that is not expected of any judge, not even from a
judge of a criminal case. In the case at bar, however, the
extraditing judge ordered the hearing only to have a better
basis for determining whether the immediate arrest of the
private respondent will best serve the ends of justice. A
careful look at the petition for extradition will show that it
does not provide enough basis for the extraditing judge to
determine whether the immediate issuance of warrant of
arrest will serve the ends of justice. I quote the majority
opinion on the documents attached to the petition for
extradition, viz.:
“Attached to the Petition for Extradition, with a Certificate of

Authentication among others, were the following: (1) Annex “H”,
the Affidavit executed on May 26, 1999 by Mr. Michael E. Savage
—trial attorney in the Campaign Financing Task Force of the
Criminal Division of the US Department of Justice; (2) Annexes
“H” to “G”, evidentiary Appendices of various exhibits that
constituted evidence of the crimes charged in the Indictment, with
Exhibits “1” to “120” (duly authenticated exhibits that constituted
evidence of the crimes charged in the Indictment); (3) Annex “BB”,
the Exhibit “I” Appendix of Witness [excerpts] Statements
Referenced in the Affidavit of Angela Byers’ and enclosed
Statements in two volumes; (4) Annex “GG”, the Exhibit “J” Table
of Contents for Supplemental Evidentiary Appendix’ with
enclosed Exhibits “121” to “132”; and (5) Annex “MM”, the Exhibit
“L” Appendix of Witness [excerpts] Statements Referenced in the
Affidavit of Betty Steward’ and enclosed Statements in two
volumes.”
691
VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 691

Even a cursory reading of these documents will not sustain

the thesis of the majority that “it is evident that the
respondent could have already gotten an impression from
these records adequate for him to make an initial
determination of whether the accused was someone who
should immediately be arrested in order to best serve the
ends of justice.” The documents are evidence tending to
prove the guilt of the private respondent in regard to the
cases filed against him in the United States. They are not
evidence, however, to prove that the private respondent
will flee the Philippine jurisdiction while his extradition
petition is being heard. In other words, the petition for
extradition may be in due form but it does not establish
sufficient factual basis to justify the immediate issuance of
warrant of arrest against the private respondent. The
probability of his flight from our jurisdiction is central to
the question of whether he should be arrested. In the
absence of evidence establishing that private respondent
will flee, I cannot join the majority in holding that the
respondent extraditing judge gravely abused his discretion
in calling for a hearing so that the parties can adduce
evidence on the issue.
Likewise, the majority holds:
“Moreover, the law specifies the court’s setting a hearing upon

receipt of the answer or upon failure of the accused to answer
after receiving the summons. In connection with the matter of
immediate arrest, however, the word ‘hearing’ is notably absent
from the provision. Evidently, had the holding of a hearing at that
stage been intended, the law could have easily so provided. It also
bears emphasizing at this point that extradition proceedings are
summary in nature. Hence, the silence of the Law and the Treaty
leans to the more reasonable interpretation that there is no
intention to punctuate with a hearing every little step in the
entire proceedings.”
Once more, I beg to disagree from the reading of our law on

extradition by the majority. The law, it is true, did not
provide that the extraditing judge must hold a hearing
before he issues a warrant of arrest. The call for a hearing
is not mandatory but neither is it prohibited. Ergo, the
matter of whether there ought to be a hearing before
issuance of warrant of arrest is addressed to the discretion
of the extraditing judge. The exercise of this discretion
depends on the configuration of the facts of each case.
692

II. The right to bail of a potential extraditee during the

pendency of the petition for extradition.
I respectfully submit that a potential extraditee can hinge
his right to bail in our Constitution. The mere silence of our
extradition treaty with the Unites States and our
extradition law (P.D. No. 1069) does not negate the right to
bail of a potential extraditee. Our adherence to the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as
well as international norms, customs and practices support
an extraditee’s right to bail. But while an extraditee may
apply for bail, its grant depends on presentation of clear
and convincing evidence that the extraditee will not
frustrate the ends of justice by fleeing from our jurisdiction.
Again, I proffer the following propositions:
First. The right to bail inheres from the rights to life,
liberty and to due process.
Our Constitution jealously guards every person’s right
to life and liberty against unwarranted state intrusion;
indeed, no state action is permitted to invade this forbidden
7
zone except upon observance of due process of law. Like
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the right to bail
gives flesh to the guarantee to liberty, without which, the
right to liberty can prove meaningless, and due process will
only be an empty slogan.
However, unlike the privilege of habeas corpus which is8
principally a remedy against illegal restraint on liberty,
the right to bail is available even when the reason for the
detention is lawful. The purpose of bail is to relieve a
person the rigors of prolonged imprisonment until the main
case against him is resolved, and at the
_______________
7 1987 Constitution, Article III, section 1. “No person shall be deprived

of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any person
be denied the equal protection of the laws.”
8 The writ of habeas corpus is an order issued by a court directed to a
person detaining another, commanding him to produce the body of the
person whose liberty is being restrained at a designated time and place,
and asking him to show sufficient cause for the continued custody of the
person so detained. See Rule 102, Revised Rules of Court.
693
VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 693

same time, 9 insure his attendance when required by the

authorities. It is the prospect of prolonged detention, not
the detention itself, which offends the constitutional right
to due process. 10
In Teehankee vs. Rovira, this Court rejected the view
which limits the right to bail to persons charged with
criminal offenses. We ruled that the constitutional right to
bail applies to all persons, viz.:
“This constitutional mandate refers to all persons, not only to

persons against whom a complaint or information has already
been filed; it lays down the rule that all persons shall before
conviction be bailable except those charged with capital offense
and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Of course, only those
persons who have either been arrested, detained or otherwise
deprived of their liberty may have the occasion to seek the benefit
of said provision. But in order that a person can invoke this
constitutional precept, it is not necessary that he should wait
until a formal complaint or information is filed against him. From
the moment he is placed under arrest, detention or restraint by
officers of the law, be can claim this guarantee of Bill of Rights,
and this right he retains unless and until he is charged with a
capital offense and the evidence against him is strong. Indeed, if,
as admitted on all sides, the precept protects those already
charged under a formal complaint or information, there seems to
be no legal or just reason for denying its benefit to one against
whom the proper authorities may yet conclude that there exists no
sufficient evidence of guilt. To place the former in a more favored
position than the latter would be, to say the least, anomalous and
absurd. If there is presumption of innocence in favor of one already
formally charged with a criminal offense, a fortiori this
presumption should be induced in favor of one yet so charged
although arrested or detained.” (emphasis supplied)
11
In United States vs. Go-Siaco, this Court held that while
deportation proceedings are not criminal in nature, an
alien deportee may avail of the constitutional right to bail,
viz.:
“The order of deportation is not a punishment for a crime. It is not

a banishment, in the sense which that word is often applied to the
expulsion of citizen from his country by way of punishment. It is
but a method of
_______________
9 Paderanga vs. Court of Appeals, 247 SCRA 741 (1995), citing Almeda vs.
Villaluz, 66 SCRA 38 (1975).
10 75 Phil. 634 (1945).
11 12 Phil. 490 (1909).
694

enforcing the return to his own country of an alien who has not
complied with the conditions upon the performance of which the
Government of the nation, acting within its constitutional
authority and through the proper departments, has determined
that his continuing to reside here shall depend. He has not,
therefore, been deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law; and the provisions of the Constitution securing the
right of trial by jury and prohibiting unreasonable searches and
seizures, and cruel and unusual punishments, have no
application.
It will be seen that this declaration is not inconsistent with the
view that while the proceeding is not a trial or sentence of a crime
or offense, it may in so far use the machinery of the criminal law
as to admit of application the provisions in such law relating to
bail x x x.
x x x We see no reason why bail should not be allowed in this
class of cases. As is said by the Supreme Court, the defendant has
committed no crime x x x To refuse him bail is to treat him as a
person who has committed the most serious crime known to the
law, and while we do not intend to say that this is a criminal
proceeding, we do say that some of the machinery used for
making the investigation required by Act No. 702 is the
machinery of the criminal law x x x.”
12
This ruling is reiterated
13
in United States vs. Benito and in
Pagado vs. Aldanese.
The case of Ong Hee Sang, 14
et al. vs. Commissioner of
Immigration and Portugal is not a departure from our
previous rulings on the right to bail of a deportee. In said
case, the Court ruled that the grant or denial of an alien’s
application for bail lies within the discretion of the
Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation pursuant to
section 37 (9) (e) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940,
which states: “Any alien under arrest in a deportation
proceeding may be released under a bond or under such
other conditions
15
as may be imposed by the Commissioner of
Immigration.” The Court ratiocinated as follows:
“The right to bail guaranteed by the Constitution may not be

invoked in favor of petitioners-appellees considering that
deportation proceedings do not constitute a criminal action and
the order of deportation is
_______________
12 37 Phil. 53 (1917).
13 42 Phil. 415(1921).
14 114 Phil. 368 (1962).
15 Tiu Chuan Hai, et al. vs. Deportation Board, 104 Phil. 949 (1958).
695
VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 695

not a punishment for a crime, it being merely for the return to his
country of an alien who has broken the conditions upon which he
could continue to reside with our borders.”
The Court explained the difference of the Go Siaco case as

follows:
“The case of U.S. vs. Go Siaco is not in point because said case
was a proceeding brought under the provisions of Act No. 702
which falls, by provision of said law, under the jurisdiction of the
courts of justice. The case at bar is deportation proceeding under
the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, which expressly vests in
the Commissioner of Immigration the exclusive and full discretion
to determine whether an alien subject to deportation should or
should not be granted.”
It is apparent, therefore, that the ruling in the Ong Hee

Sang does not negate the right to bail. It merely meant
that the standard for granting or denying bail under the
Constitution is different in deportation proceedings. It is
different because there is a specific law which provides for
such standard in deportation proceedings, i.e.,
Commonwealth Act No. 613 or the Philippine Immigration
Act of 1940. Neither did the case preclude the grant of bail
on due process
16
grounds as in the case Mejoff vs. Director of
Prisons, where this Court held that while “temporary
detention is a necessary step in the process of exclusion
and expulsion of undesirable aliens and that pending
arrangements for his deportation, the Government has a
right to hold the undesirable alien under confinement for a
reasonable length of time, too long a detention
17
may justify
the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus” and entitle an
alien to be released on bail, viz.:
“The protection against deprivation of liberty without due process

of law and except for crimes committed against the laws of the
land is not limited to Philippine citizens but extends to all
residents, except enemy aliens, regardless of nationality x x x
Moreover, by its Constitution (Art. II, sec. 3), the Philippines
‘adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as
part of the law of the Nation.’ And in a resolution entitled
‘Universal Declaration of Human
_______________
16 90 Phil. 70 (1951).
17 Id., p. 72.
696

Rights’ and approved by the General Assembly of the United

Nations of which the Philippines is a member at its plenary
meeting on December 10, 1948, the right to life and liberty and all
other fundamental rights as applied to all human beings were
proclaimed. It was there resolved that ‘All human beings are born
free and equal in degree and rights’ (Art. 1); that ‘Everyone is
equal and is entitled to all the rights and freedom set forth in this
Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour,
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, nationality or
social origin, property, birth, or other status’ (Art. 2); that ‘Every
one has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national
tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by
the Constitution or by law’ (Art. 8); that ‘No one shall be subjected
18
to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile’ (Art. 9, etc.)”
It must be noted that the Mejoff case was decided when

C.A. No. 613 was already in effect. 19
Similarly, in Chirskoff
vs. Commission of Immigration the Court released the
alien deportee on bail because his prolonged detention
violates his right to liberty, viz.:
“[F]oreign nationals, not enemy, against whom no criminal

charges have been formally made or judicial order issued, may not
be indefinitely kept in detention; that in the ‘Universal
Declaration of Human Rights’ approved by the General Assembly
of the United Nations of which the Philippines is a member, the
right to life and liberty and all other fundamental rights as
applied to human beings were proclaimed; that the theory on
which the court is given power to act is that the warrant of
deportation, not having been executed, is functus officio and the
alien is being held without any authority of law; and that the
possibility that the petitioner might join or aid disloyal elements
if turned out at large does not justify prolonged detention, the
remedy in that case being to impose conditions in the order of
release and exact bail in reasonable amount with sufficient
sureties.”
20
In the case of Lao Gi vs. Court of Appeals, this Court
again held that although a deportation proceeding does not
partake of a criminal action, the constitutional right of a
person to due process should be protected therein, viz.:
_______________
18 Id., pp. 73-74.

19 90 Phil. 257 (1951).
20 180 SCRA 756 (1989).
697
VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 697

“Although a deportation proceeding does not partake of the nature

of a criminal action, however, considering that it is a harsh and
extraordinary administrative proceeding affecting the freedom and
liberty of a person, the constitutional right of such person to due
process shall not be denied. Thus, the provisions of the Rules of
Court of the Philippines particularly on criminal procedure are
applicable to deportation proceedings.
x x x x x x x x x
Before any charge should be filed in the CID a preliminary
investigation must be conducted to determine if there is sufficient
cause to charge respondent for deportation. The issuance of
warrants of arrest, arrests without a warrant and service of
warrant should be in accordance likewise with Rule 113 of the
1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure; search warrants issued by the
CID shall be governed by Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure; and so the matter of bail, motion to quash, trial, among
21
others.” (emphasis supplied).
There is no reason why an extraditee should be denied the

right to apply for bail. While an extradition proceeding is
not criminal in nature, it is a harsh and extraordinary
process. It may involve a restraint of liberty that under
some circumstances22
can be greater than in an ordinary
criminal case. For in extradition proceedings, the
extraditee will be transported and tried to 23
another
jurisdiction of which laws he may be unfamiliar.
Second. The right of an extraditee to apply for bail
should be treated in light of our other treaty obligations,
especially those24
concerning the promotion and protection of
human rights.
_______________
21 Id., pp. 762-763.

22 “A Recommended Approach to Bail in International Extradition
Cases,” 86 MICH, L. REV. 599, 607 (1987).
23 Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 296 (1978). The US Supreme Court
opined: “The extradition process involves an extended restraint of liberty
following arrest even more severe than that accompanying detention with
a single State. Extradition involves, at a minimum, administrative
processing in both the asylum State and the demanding State, and forced
transportation in between. It surely is a significant restraint on liberty.”
24 In Europe for instance, a State Party to an extradition treaty may
refuse extradition on the ground that the basic human rights of the
fugitives will be violated by the requesting state if he is extradited. The
primacy of human rights norms over extradition treaties arises from the
698

Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, to

which the Philippines is a party, a treaty shall be
interpreted “in
25
their context and in the light of its object
and purpose,” taking into account the “relevant rules of
international
26
law applicable in the relations between the
parties.”
As members of the family of nations, the Philippines and
the United States have the responsibility to uphold
fundamental human rights, and the dignity and worth of
the human person. They are mandated to establish
conditions under which justice and respect for the
obligations arising from treaties and27
other sources of
international law can be maintained.
Being signatories
28
to the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and 29the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, both countries are committed to
protect and promote the right of every person to liberty and
to due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested
can take proceedings before a court, in order that such
court may decide without delay on the lawfulness
_______________
notion of jus cogens—or those peremptory norms which the Vienna

Convention on the Law of Treaties acknowledges to be superior than any
treaty obligation because they form part of the ordre public of the
international community or of a particular region. See Article 53 of Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties; See also, J. Dugard and C. Wyngaert,
“Reconciling Extradition with Human Rights,” 92 AJIL 187-212 (1998).
25 Article 31(1), Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
26 Id., Art. 31 (3) (b).
27 Preamble, United Nations Charter. Concern for human rights is also
embodied in Article 13, par. 1 (b), Article 55 (c) and Article 62(2) of the
U.N. Charter.
28 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (hereinafter cited as
UDHR) was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on
December 10, 1948. Although not a treaty, the principles of freedom
contained in the UDHR have been generally regarded as customary,
hence, binding among the members of the international community. See
Mejoff vs. Director of Prisons, supra.
29 The UN General Assembly adopted the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (hereinafter cited as ICCPR) on December 16,
1966. The Philippines signed the convention on December 19, 1966 but
ratified it only on October 23, 1986. On the other hand, the United States
signed the convention on October 5, 1977 but ratified it only on June 8,
1992.
699
VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 699

of his detention,
30
and order his release if the detention, is
not lawful.
Although the right to liberty is a relative right and may
31
be suspended or derogated in exceptional circumstances,
it is a gener-
_______________
30 The UDHR provides that:
“Article 1. All human beings are born free and equal in degree and rights;
Article 2. Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedom set forth in this
Declaration without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, nationality or social origin, property, birth, or
other status;
x x x x x x x x x
Article 8. Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent
national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the
Constitution or by law;
Article 9. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile”
Similarly, Article 9 of the ICCPR provides:
“1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be
subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his
liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedures as
are established by law.
2. Anyone who is arrested shall be informed, at the time of arrest, of the
reasons for his arrest and shall be promptly informed of any charges
against him;
3. Anyone arrested or detained in a criminal charge shall be brought
promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise
judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within reasonable time or to
release.
4. Anyone who was deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be
entitled to take proceedings before a court, in order that such court may
decide without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order his
release if the detention is not lawful.
5. Anyone who has been a victim of unlawful arrest or detention shall have
an enforceable right to compensation.”
31 Absolute rights are those which may not be suspended or derogated

in any circumstance. Examples of “absolute” or “non-derogable” rights are
freedom from torture and arbitrary killing. On the other hand, “relative”
or “derogable” rights are those which may be suspended or dero
700

ally accepted principle in international law that the

presumption lies in favor of the existence of the right, and
the burden lies with the authorities to justify the
lawfulness of the arrest or detention. This presumption
creates an obligation on state authorities to make effective
remedies available to every person under detention for the
enjoyment of his fundamental right to liberty.
Third. There is no customary rule of international law
prohibiting bail in extradition cases.
At present, there is no customary norm prohibiting bail
in extradition cases. On the contrary, most countries,
including Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, South
Africa and Pakistan, among others, allow a potential
extraditee to be released on bail. Members of the European
Union have recently ratified the European Convention on
Extradition, which also provides a procedure for bail.
Fourth. Even the United States grants bail to an
extraditee, albeit in exceptional circumstances.
In the United States, the ruling case law upholds the
right of a potential extraditee to apply for bail. The US
Supreme32 Court in the landmark case of Wright vs.
Henckel, recognized the authority of the circuit courts to
receive application for and grant bail in certain exceptional
case, thus:
“We are unwilling to hold that the circuit court possess no power
in respect of admitting to bail other than as specifically vested by
statutes, or that, while bail should not be ordinarily granted in
cases of foreign extradition, those courts may not in any case, and
This dictum planted the seeds of the current federal

common law 33
on bail in international extradition
proceedings. It recognized the existence of the right to bail
based on “exceptional circum-
_______________
gated under circumstances such as the occurrence of public emergency

or commission of an offense.
32 190 US 40 (1902).
33 Persily, International Extradition and the Right to Bail, 34 Stan. J.
Int’l. L 407, 408 (1998).
701
VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 701

34
Stances” which the extraditee must prove. The following
are some of the instances, which were considered “special
circumstances” to warrant the grant of bail:
(a) age, background of defendant, 35

and lack of any
suitable facility to hold him;
(b) parity with other defendant on similar charge;
granting bail would promote harmony among
factions in x x x dispute, likelihood of delay, and
pending36constitutional challenge to the extradition
statute;
(c) need to participate 37
in litigation in which entire
fortune depended;
(d) likelihood of38 delay and bailable offense in seeking
extradition; and
(e) provisional arrest justifies grant of bail and 39
disparity of treatment of persons on same charge.
The trend in recent years is for courts to liberalize the bail

standard as they
40
place primary emphasis on the accused’s
risk of flight. The rationale of this
41
trend was succinctly
laid down in Beaulieu vs. Hartigan, to wit:
“In none of the cases dealing with the issue of bail in an

extradition setting was a district judge who granted bail
subsequently reversed by a reviewing court. Analysis of these
cases leads me to the conclusion that the ‘special circumstances’
doctrine of Wright, though still viable, must be viewed, in the
light of modern concepts of fundamental fairness, as providing a
district judge with flexibility and discretion in considering
whether bail should be granted in these extradition cases. The
standard scrutiny and concern exercised by a district judge should
be greater than in the typical bail situation, given the delicate
nature of international
_______________
34 The ordinary presumption in favor of granting bail is modified when a person

faces a warrant of extradition. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3146, 3184.
35 Hu Yau-Leung vs. Soscia, 649 F. 2d 914 (1981).
36 In re Kirby, et al., 106 F. 3d 855 (1996).
37 In re Mitchell, 171 F. 289 (1909).
38 In re Gannon, supra.
39 Hall, Bail in International Extradition, supra at 604.
40 Ibid.
41 430 F. Supp. 915 (1977).
702

relations. But one of the basic questions facing a district judge in

either situation is whether, under all circumstances, the
petitioner is likely to return to court when directed to do so.
Fundamentally, it is a judgment call by the district court based on
the totality of circumstances, including extremely important
consideration of the country’s treaty agreements with other
nations; a district judge should approach the bail situation in an
extradition case with an added degree of caution, given the
additional factor of an international treaty.”
Fifth. While an extraditee may apply for bail, its grant is

discretionary depending on whether it will frustrate the
ends of justice.
In extradition cases, the extradition court does not
inquire into the guilt or innocence of the accused. Neither
does the court measure the injury caused to the
community, as the offense was not committed within its
jurisdiction. The court, therefore, cannot base its decision
to grant or deny bail on the gravity of the offense, as it
could in criminal cases. Rather, it should base its decision
on whether it will frustrate the ends of justice. The risk of
flight of an extraditee is an important factor to consider, in
determining whether his bail will frustrate justice.
Whether or not a potential extraditee is a flight risk is
determined by two factors: (1) capacity to flee; and (2)
intent to flee. The combination of these two factors
determines the degree of risk that the trial court must
assess and weigh. While there is no mathematical formula
to guide the court in gauging the precise risk posed by a
particular combination of these two factors, it is
commonsensical to assume that one without the other
would not result to any risk at all. For while one has the
capacity to flee, if he does not intend to flee, the fear of
flight would be for naught, and vice versa.
Sixth. The burden of proof to justify the arrest and
detention of the potential extraditee initially rests on the
petitioning executive authorities.
Under our extradition treaty and law, a potential
extraditee may be arrested and detained under any of the
following circumstances: (a) upon the receipt of the request
for the arrest of the potential extraditee and even before
the filing of the request for extradition; (b) upon the filing
of the petition for extradition before
703
VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 703

the extradition court; or (c) during the hearing of the

petition for extradition.
In all the above circumstances, the issuance of a
warrant of arrest depends on a showing that it will serve
the ends of justice. Initially, it is the burden of the
petitioning executive authorities to prove that the warrant
against the extraditee will serve the ends of justice.
Seventh. After the warrant of arrest is issued, the
burden of proof on the right to be admitted to bail shifts on
the potential extraditee.
In criminal cases, the presumption lies in favor of
granting bail. This is so because of the constitutional
presumption of innocence, which is not overturned by the
finding of probable cause upon which the warrant of arrest
against the accused was issued.
However, the presumption of innocence, from which the
ordinary presumption in favor of granting bail emanates, is
inoperative in extradition cases. The issuance of the
warrant of arrest in extradition cases is not based on the
finding that the accused is probably guilty of the offense for
which he was charged in the requesting State. The warrant
is predicated on the finding that it will serve the ends of
justice. Once issued, it raises a presumption of the
continuing presence of the circumstances upon which the
issuance of the warrant was based. More often than not,
this circumstance is the probability that the extraditee will
flee from the jurisdiction of the extraditing court. The
burden of proving admittance to bail is thus shifted to the
extraditee.
It should be underscored that due process, which is the
basis of bail in extradition proceeding, merely grants the
potential extraditee the opportunity to avail of the remedy
of bail; it does not give him the right to demand that he be
released on bail under any circumstance. What the right to
due process prohibits is the outright denial of the remedy of
bail; it does not prohibit a reasonable denial of the
application for bail after carefully weighing all the
circumstances at hand.
704

III. There is need to remand the case at bar to the

extradition court in fairness to the parties.
I respectfully submit that in fairness to both parties, the
case should be remanded to the extradition court so that
the proper procedure and standard to determine the right
to bail can be complied with. I put no blame on the
extradition court nor to the parties in this regard for we are
still developing our jurisprudence on extradition. There is
need for remand for the following reasons, viz.:
First. As aforediscussed, the petitioner has the burden of
proof to show that the issuance of a warrant of arrest
against the private respondent will serve the ends of
justice. This burden of proof can not be satisfied by the
petitioner in the case at bar by merely relying on the
petition for extradition and its annexes. The petition and
its annexes do not prove that the private respondent is a
flight risk. They only show that he has been indicted in the
court of the United States.
Second. On the issue of whether the private respondent
is entitled to bail, the petitioner cannot rely on the
presumption against bail in extradition proceedings. The
presumption against bail in extradition proceedings, is
founded on the assumption that the extraditee is a fugitive
from justice.
42
Thus, it was explained in Beaulieu vs.
Hartigan, viz.:
“The vast majority of fugitives from justice in foreign countries

fled from those countries knowing that charges have been, or were
likely to be, brought against them. Thus the typical subject of an
extradition request has a demonstrated propensity to flee rather
than face charges and in general is likely to continue his flight if
43
released pending extradition.”
The presumption against bail therefore arises only when

the extraditee is a “fugitive from justice.” To avail of this
presumption, it
_______________
42 554 F.2d 1 (1977).

43 Persily, supra, p. 429, citing Reform of the Extradition Laws of the
United States: Hearings on H.R. 2643 Before the Subcommittee On Crime
of the House Committee On Judiciary, 98th Cong. 42-43 (1983).
705
VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 705

is a condition sine qua non that competent evidence be

proffered that the extraditee is a fugitive
44
from justice.
In Marquez, Jr. vs. COMELEC, we ruled that the term
fugitive from justice “includes not only those who flee after
conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those 45who,
after being charged, flee 46
to avoid prosecution.” In
Rodriguez vs. COMELEC, we clarified that this definition
indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling factor
that animates one’s flight from a particular jurisdiction.
And obviously, there can only be an intent to evade
prosecution or punishment when there is knowledge by the
fleeing subject of an already instituted47
indictment, or of a
promulgated judgment of conviction.”
From the records, it appears that the claim of the
petitioner that the private respondent is a fugitive from
justice is based on the following allegations: (a) that an
investigation for the charges against him was then on
going; and (b) that upon learning that he was about to be
charged, he fled from the United States. Thus, petitioner
alleged:
“Learning that an investigation involving his violations of United

States federal laws was about to be terminated and that he was
about to be charged, Jimenez fled the United States jurisdiction.
Under United States law, he is therefore a fugitive from justice. A
“fugitive from justice” is a person who commits a crime within a
state and withdraws himself from such jurisdiction (Ex Parte
Montoya, 135 P.2d 281, 282, 170 Or. 499). Because he has fled
once, there is a greater likelihood that he will flee to another
jurisdiction once more and frustrate extradition. Thus, he poses a
serious risk flight. The interest of justice will be best served if he
is arrested and detained pending extradition proceedings, which
48
after all, is summary in nature.
_______________
44 243 SCRA 538 (1995).

45 Id., p. 542, citing Philippine Law Dictionary, Third Edition, p. 300 by
F. B. Moreno; Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 671; King vs. Noe,
244 S.C. 344, 137 S.E. 2d 102, 103; Hughes vs. PFlanz, 138 F. 980; Tobin
vs. Casaus, 275 P. 2d 792.
46 259 SCRA 296 (1996).
47 Id., p. 307.
48 Petitioner’s Memorandum Re: Prayer for Jiminez’ Arrest, Rollo, p.
87.
706

It is clear, however, that the warrant of arrest in

connection with Indictment No. 99-00281-CR-SEITZ
against
49
the private respondent was issued on April 15,
1999. Private respondent claims that he was already in
the Philippines when the indictment against him was filed
and the warrant for his arrest was issued. During the oral
argument of the case at bar, the following exchange
between the counsels of the parties took place, viz.:

“USec It may be mentioned that the proposed
Gutierrez: extraditee stands charge (sic) of several charges
from the United States of America and a
warrant of arrest was issued against him and
he fled the jurisdiction of the United States of
America to evade prosecution and there would
again be another risk of plight (sic) and to
ensure the proposed extra-ditee will be present
during the extradition proceeding, therefore
this request on the part of the50petitioner for the
issuance of warrant of arrest.
x x x x x x x x x
Atty. The Honorable Counsel has declared
Bautista: gratuitously that Mr. Mark Jimenez is a
fugitive from the United States, left the United
States because of the indictment against him.
That is totally false. The petition itself says
that a warrant for the arrest of Mr. Jimenez
was issued in the United States in April 1999.
Mr. Jimenez was here in the Philippines on
May 1998 and he has not left the country since
then. So he left the United States long before, a
year before the warrant of arrest was issued, so
how can 51we say that he is a fugitive from
justice?”
j
That private respondent arrived in the country on May 10,

1998 is evidenced
52
by the records and is not contradicted by
the petitioner. On the other hand, petitioner’s claim that
private respondent knew of the ongoing investigation as
well as of the existence
_______________
49 Petition for Extradition, pp. 7-8; Rollo, pp. 54-55.

50 TSN June 5, 2001, pp. 11-15; Rollo, pp. 267-271.
51 Id., pp. 24-25; Id., pp. 280-281.
52 Sworn Statement, Rollo, p. 195.
707
VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 707

of the charges against him when he fled from the United

States is devoid of evidence. Therefore, it would be fatal for
the petitioner to rely alone on the presumption against bail
in extradition cases to justify the denial of bail of the
private respondent.
In Rodriguez, petitioner arrived in the Philippines on
June 25, 1985 and the complaint in Los Angeles was filed
on November 2, 1985. We ruled that “it was clearly
impossible for Rodriguez to have known about such felony
complaint and arrest warrant—much less conviction—to
speak of yet at such time.” We rejected the contention that
Rodriguez would have known the on-going investigation,
viz.:
“It is acknowledged that there was an attempt by the private

respondent to show Rodriguez’ intent to evade the law. This was
done by offering for admission a voluminous copy of an
investigation report on the alleged crimes committed which led to
the filing of the charges against petitioner. It was offered for the
sole purpose of establishing the fact that it was impossible for the
petitioner not to have known of said investigation due to its
magnitude. Unfortunately, such conclusion misleads because
investigations of this nature, no matter how extensive or
prolonged, are shrouded with utmost secrecy to afford law
enforcers the advantage of surprise and effect the arrest of those
53
who would be charged.”
Furthermore, we held that “the circumstantial fact that it

was seventeen (17) days after Rodriguez’ departure that
charges against him were filed cannot overturn the
presumption of good faith in his favor. The same suggests
nothing more than the sequence of events, which
transpired. A subjective fact as that of petitioner’s purpose
cannot be inferred from the objective data at hand in
absence of further proof to substantiate that claim.”
Third. In granting bail to the private respondent, the
standard used by the extraditing court is not clear. An
extradition proceeding is sui generis, hence, neither the
standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal
cases nor the standard of proof of preponderance of
evidence in civil cases can apply. Thus, in Lantion,54 we
explained:
_______________
53 Supra note 1, p. 308.

54 Ibid.
708

“We are not persuaded. An extradition proceeding is sui generis. It

is not a criminal proceeding which will call into operation all the
rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. To begin
with, the process of extradition does not involve the determination
of the guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocence will
be adjudged in the court of the state where he will be extradited.
by an extraditee especially by one whose extradition papers are
still undergoing evaluation. As held by the US Supreme Court in
United States v. Galanis:
‘An extradition proceeding is not a criminal prosecution, and the

constitutional safeguards that accompany a criminal trial in this country
do not shield an accused from extradition pursuant to a valid treaty.’
There are other differences between an extradition proceeding

in nature while a criminal proceeding involve a full blown trial. In
decision to extradite.”
With humility, I submit that the Court should fashion out a

higher standard to govern the grant of bail to a possible
extraditee. The higher standard is demanded by the fact
that our extradition treaty obligates us to assure that an
extraditee will not abscond from our jurisdiction. Failure to
comply with this obligation will expose our country to
international embarrassment. It will defeat the purpose of
extradition treaties, i.e., the suppression of crimes,
especially transnational crimes to which the Philippines is
very vulnerable. The standard, I propose, is the standard of
clear and convincing evidence which is higher than mere
preponderance of evidence but lower than proof beyond
reasonable doubt. If this new
709
VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 709

and stricter standard would be adopted, it ought to follow

that the parties should be given a chance to offer evidence
to meet the same. Contrary the claim of the majority, the
voluminous pleadings already filed by the parties
insufficient to resolve the issue of whether the private
respondent is entitled to bail. These pleadings proffer legal
arguments but not proof of facts. The remand of the case at
bar is therefore not a cop-out but is proper and it will not
delay the proceedings. The extradition court can be ordered
to finish the hearing on the limited issue of bail within one
(1) week. After all, extradition proceedings are summary in
nature.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, I offer the following views:

First. The filing of a petition for extradition does not per
se justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest against an
extraditee. The petition, in some instances, may not
contain sufficient allegations and proof on the issue of
whether the possible extraditee will escape from the
jurisdiction of the extraditing court.
Second. When the petition for extradition does not
provide sufficient basis for the arrest of the possible
extraditee or the grant of bail as in the case at bar, it is
discretionary for the extradition court to call for a hearing
to determine the issue.
Third. An extraditee has the right to apply for bail. The
right is rooted in the due process clause of the Constitution.
It cannot be denied simply because of the silence of our
extradition treaty and law on the matter. The availability
of the right to bail is buttressed by our other treaties
recognizing civil and political rights and by international
norms, customs and practices.
Fourth. The extraditee may apply for bail but its grant
depends on the discretion of the extraditing court. The
court must satisfy itself that the bail will not frustrate the
ends of justice.
Fifth. In deciding whether to grant bail or not to a
possible extraditee, the extraditing court must follow a
higher and stricter standard. The extraditee must prove by
clear and convincing evidence that he will not flee from the
jurisdiction of the extraditing court and will respect all its
processes. In fine, that he will not frustrate the ends of
justice.
710

As emphasized, the case at bar has entered a new stage

and the competing interests of the state and the rights of
the private respondent as an extraditee need to be
rebalanced on the scale of justice. These competing rights
and interests have to be rebalanced for they have developed
new dimensions and some facts may have to be accorded
greater or lesser weights to meet the more paramount
interest of our people. This paramount interest is always in
motion as it is affected by the inexorable changes wrought
in time both by man and machine.
In rebalancing these conflicting interests, we should
take care not to diminish to a disturbing degree an
extraditee’s fundamental rights to life, liberty and due
process. These rights have evolved as universal rights and
extradition treaties for all their utility were never meant to
disparage, let alone, derogate them to inutility.
Likewise, in rebalancing these interests, we should not
weaken the role of courts in tempering the harshness of
extradition proceedings. We should not therefore dilute the
discretionary power of courts to determine whether a
hearing should be called before ordering the immediate
arrest of a possible extraditee.
In counter-balance we should not be soft on extraditees
who are facing charges in countries where we have
extradition treaties. While rights are being universalized,
so too are crimes being internationalized. We should not
allow our country to be the sanctuary of criminals who
demand rights but deny the rights of others. Thus, there is
need to impose a higher and stricter standard before we
grant bail to potential extraditees.
We are in the difficult step by step process of developing
our jurisprudence in extradition. In Lantion, our first
extradition case, we held that an extraditee has no right to
demand examination of the documents of extradition while
the request for extradition is just being processed and
evaluated by the Departments of Foreign Affairs and
Justice. In the case at bar, our second extradition case, we
have the opportunity to impose a higher and stricter
standard that will govern a plea for bail of an extraditee. I
urge the Court to seize the rare opportunity for this can
well be our humble contribution to man’s relentless search
for elusive peace.
Prescinding from all these premises, I vote to remand
the case at bar to the extradition court so that it can follow
the proper proce-
711
VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 711

dure and higher standard in determining the right to bail

of the private respondent.
SEPARATE OPINION
VITUG, J.:
“The State values the dignity of every human person and

1
guarantees full respect for human rights.”
The proposal to curtail the right of an individual to seek

bail from the courts of law, acting in extradition cases, as
well as his right to notice and hearing before being
arrested, brings to mind the not so distant past of the
Spanish Inquisition and an uneasy realization that we
have yet to totally free ourselves from the grip of a dark
page in history.
My reservation on the draft ponencia is premised on the
following theses—first, it would ignore constitutional
safeguards to which all government action is defined, and
second, it would overstep constitutional restraints on
judicial power.
Treaty laws, particularly those which are self-executing,
have equal stature as national statutes and, like all other
municipal laws, are subject to the parameters set forth in
the Constitution. The Constitution, being both a grant and
a circumscription of government authority by the sovereign
people, presents the ultimate yardstick of power and its
limitation upon which an act of government is justly
measured. This instrument contains a rule for all agencies
of the government and any act in opposition thereto can2
only be struck down as being invalid and without effect.
When the great Charter gives a mandate, the government
can do no less than to accept it; its rejection would be an
act of betrayal. The edict in its Bill of Rights granting to all
persons, without distinction, the fundamental right to bail,
is clear. No statute or treaty can abrogate or discard its
language and its intent.
The draft ponencia would assume that the Constitution
confines the grant of provisional liberty to criminal cases,
and that it has no
_______________
1 Section II, Article II, 1987 Constitution.

2 Bernas, 1987 Constitution, 1st Edition, Bk. 2, p. 1.
712

application to extradition proceedings. This assumption

would have reason for being if it were solely in criminal
cases that a person could face an imminent threat of
deprivation of his right to life or liberty, for indeed, it is
this threat, rather than case nomenclature, that must be
the focus and it would be superficial to think otherwise.
While defying a neat definition, extradition has all the
earmarks of a criminal process—an extraditee would suffer
deprivations, be denied his freedom and restricted in his
movements, not much unlike a criminal indictee.
Extradition proceedings involve an extended restraint of
liberty following arrest, peculiar to an accused in a criminal
case, which can even be more severe than an accompanying
detention in a single state, for, at a minimum, it can mean
protracted proceedings in both the asylum state and the3
demanding state and a forced transportation
4
in between.
In Herras Teehankee vs. Rovira, the Court observed that
bail is constitutionally available to all persons, even those
against whom no formal charges are filed.
“Indeed, if, as admitted on all sides, the precept protects those

already charged under a formal complaint or information, there
seems no legal and just reason for denying its benefits to one
against whom the proper authorities may not even yet conclude
that there exists no sufficient evidence of guilt. To place the
former in a more favored position than the latter would be, to say
the least, anomalous and absurd. If there is a presumption of
innocence in favor of one already formally charged with criminal
offenses . . . a fortiori, this presumption should be indulged in
favor of one not yet so charged although arrested and detained.”
“x x x x x x x x x
“We reiterate now that under the Constitution, all persons,
without distinction, whether formally charged or not yet so
charged with any criminal offense, ‘shall before conviction be
bailable,’ the only exception being when charge is for a capital
offense and the court finds that the evidence of guilt is strong.”
Notably, our extradition law (P.D. 1069, paragraph 1,

Section 9 thereof), expressly provides that in the hearing of
the extradition
_______________
3 Jeffrey A. Hall, “A Recommended Approach to Bail in International

Extradition Cases,” Michigan Law Review, December 1987.
4 66 SCRA 38, 43.
713
VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 713

petition, the provisions of the Rules of Court, insofar as

practicable and not inconsistent with the summary nature
of the proceedings, shall apply. In this regard, Section 3,
Rule 114, of our Rules of Criminal Procedure is unequivocal
—
“All persons in custody shall, before final conviction, be entitled to

bail as a matter of right, except those charged with capital
offenses or an offense which, under the law at the time of its
commission and the time of the application for bail, is punished by
reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong.”
Nowhere in the Extradition Treaty with the United States

is the grant of bail mentioned but so also it is not
prohibited. This obscurity must not be held to negate the
right to bail; on the contrary, it should be viewed as
allowing, at the very least, the evident intendment and
spirit of the fundamental law to prevail.
A Constitution does not deal with details, but only
enunciates general tenets that are intended to apply to all
facts that 5 may come about and be brought within its
directions. Behind its conciseness is its encompassing
inclusiveness. It is not skin-deep; beneath that surface is
what gives it real life and meaning. It can truly be said
that the real essence of justice does not emanate from
quibbling over patchwork but proceeds from its gut
consciousness and dynamic 6
role as a brick in the ultimate
development of the edifice.
Resort to overly rigid procedures is being justified as a
need to keep in line with our treaty obligations. Verily,
comity in our relations with sovereign states is important,
but there are innate rights of individuals which no
government can negotiate or, let alone, bargain away.
Analogy between extradition, process and proceedings
where the right to bail is said to be unavailing, i.e.,
deportation proceedings and proceedings before a military
tribunal, would not at all be apropos. Deportation
proceedings are no more than inquiries and just involve the
simple fact of whether or not an alien has an authorized
entry within a named country or, if authorized, whether or
not he has complied with the conditions for a continued
stay
_______________
5 16th Am Jur 2d.

6 See the writer’s opinion in G.R. Nos. 146710-15.
714

thereat. A subject found to be illegally staying in a country
is merely transported back to his place of origin. Most
importantly, such a person is not considered to be under
judicial custody. Proceedings before a military tribunal,
upon the other hand, are confined to members of the
military organization who give consent to its jurisdiction.
The stringent proceedings before such tribunals place
emphasis on summary procedures, a speedy resolution of
the case being vital in maintaining
7
discipline, obedience
and fitness among the ranks that cannot obviously be
compromised in any sound military establishment.
The draft ponencia would rely heavily on foreign
jurisprudence, notably American cases, to belabor the point
that the right to bail is extraneous to extradition
proceedings. The citation, particularly of the jurisprudence
obtaining in the United States, could be predicated on the
Eighth Amendment of the US Federal Constitution. This
amendment however, recognizes merely by implication the
right to bail by simply disallowing excessive 8bail; it does
not expressly provide for the grant of bail. Individual
states have incorporated into their own state constitutions
various versions—some give it as a matter of right and
some do not—a fact which partially explains the lack of
uniformity in state jurisprudence on the matter. Where
some states provide for a constitutional right to bail, the
same is almost invariably viewed as affording 9
a greater
right than that provided in the federal charter.
In contrast, the Philippine Constitution strongly and
clearly mandates that, except for those charged with
offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of
guilt is strong, bail is an undeniable right of every person—
_______________
7 Reid vs. Covert, 354 U.S. 683, 694 (1969), cited in Bernas, Ibid. p. 370.
8 U.S. ex. re. Keating vs. Bensinger, D.C. Ill, 1971, 322 F. Supp. 784,
Mastrian vs. Redman, C.A. Minn. 1964, 326 F2d 708, certiorari denied 84
S.Ct. 1128, 376 U.S. 965, 11 L. Ed. 2d 982. The eighth Amendment of the
U.S. Federal Constitution merely provides—
“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishment inflicted.”
9 Ray vs. State, 679 N.E. 2d 1364 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).
715
VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 715

“All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by

reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall
not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas
10
corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.”
Thus, grappling in this jurisdiction with the compatibility

of the grant of bail in extradition proceedings with basic
constitutional guarantees has not been and should not be a
predicament. Absent any standard, except for the
constitutional limitation that the same be not excessive,
the grant of bail in the United States largely rests on
judicial discretion under the umbrella of judicial power.
11
And so it has been so regarded in Wright v. Henkel, the
primary case governing access to bail in United States
extradition proceedings, where the Court has held:
“We are unwilling to hold that the Circuit Courts possess no

power in respect of admitting bail other than as specifically vested
by statute or that, while bail should not ordinarily be granted in
cases of foreign extradition, those courts may not, in any case, and
Henkel, decided by the US Supreme Court in 1903, has

been criticized to have imposed an amorphous standard
and has resulted 12
in an incoherent and inconsistent
approach to bail. While the clamor for its re-examination
13
appears to be getting persistent by the day, it has
nevertheless become the forerunner in the judicially-
prescribed “special circumstances” standard in 14deciding
whether the bail should be granted or denied. These
“special circumstances” vary—from reasons of ill-health to
material prejudice—depending on the peculiarities of the
case.
_______________
10 Section 13, Article III, 1987 Philippine Constitution.

11 190 U.S. 40 (1903).
12 Jeffrey Hall, Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 M. Cherif Bassiouni, “International Extradition United States Law
and Practice,” Vol. II, November 1987, Oceana Publications, Inc., p. 535.
716
15
In In re Mitchel, to cite an example, the court there
caused the release of an extraditee who was charged with
larceny by the requesting state based on the assertion that
his continued detention rendered him incapable of
consulting with his counsel. The court was careful to
emphasize that it had become imperative for him to obtain
advice of counsel because his entire fortune depended upon
his doing so. The court then added that while he had
knowledge for a long
16
time of the extradition, he had made
no attempt to flee.
But Philippine courts need not really bother borrowing
from dicta in foreign jurisdictions. The absoluteness of the
constitutional grant under Section 13, Article III of the
Constitution precludes any need for further standards than
those explicitly expressed by it. Judicial discretion is
confined to the issue of whether or not the offense charged
is a capital crime and a determination of whether or not
the evidence of guilt is strong. The rule may appear to be
too simplistic but it is the correct approach. At all events, I
would not be comfortable in developing a “special
circumstances” standard on the basis of mere pro hac vice
pronouncements from 17
elsewhere. In Herras Teehankee vs.
Director of Prisons, this Court has expressed unqualified
acquiescence to the deeply ingrained policy of restraint
against unwarranted judicial adventurism that can
otherwise easily get out of hand.
Given the foregoing, the trial court did not err, let alone
commit a grave abuse of discretion, in the grant of bail to
the extraditee.
WHEREFORE, I vote to DENY the Petition.
DISSENTING OPINION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
With all due respect, I am disturbed by the majority

opinion’s disregard of basic freedoms when a case is one of
extradition. The majority opinion is too sweeping and
dogmatic for a case of first impression. I find the views on
the indiscriminate denial of funda-
_______________
15 171 F. 289 (S.D. N.Y. 1909), cited in Bassiouni, Ibid., at p. 535.

16 Ibid.
17 76 Phil. 756, 769.
717
VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 717

mental rights too open-ended and heedless of entrenched

jurisprudence on Bill of Rights protections.
The sheer novelty of the world’s only superpower asking
that a Filipino be brought before it to face criminal
prosecution seems to mesmerize policy makers and this
Court alike into depriving that citizen of constitutional
protections. The issue before the respondent court is a
fairly innocuous one—whether or not the petition for
extradition is meritorious. We are not concerned with the
guilt or innocence of the respondent. He is presumed
innocent of the crimes charged until he is convicted by a
foreign court. He is likewise presumed innocent of the
demands found in the request for his extradition. But the
majority opinion has chosen to adopt a presumption of
guilt. It presumes that the petition calling for the forcible
separation of the respondent from his homeland, family,
occupation, and friends is correct even before the merits are
ascertained. It presumes that he will flee.
A person convicted of a crime, except for the most
serious offenses, is allowed bail while an appeal is pending.
Respondent Jimenez has not been convicted of any crime.
His guilt or innocence is not in issue before the respondent
court. The only legal affront he has committed is his refusal
to leave the pleasures of life in his country and go to a place
where he fears the reception to him would be disagreeable
and much less pleasant. Eventually after trial in the
respondent court, respondent may be compelled to undergo
what he fears. But until that decision is rendered and
becomes executory, he must be presumed innocent of any
crime or any affront to law or treaty. There can be no
deprivation of basic rights and freedoms merely because
the case is one of extradition.
I submit that we must consider the implications of a
ruling that in criminal proceedings, the constitutional
rights of the accused must be protected, but in a case
neither criminal nor civil, one which we call “sui generis,”
basic freedoms become irrelevant and non-available. A non-
criminal proceeding, less onerous and repulsive to society
than prosecution for crime, and where the penalty is only
to be brought for trial before the court with jurisdiction, is
stripped of guarantees and protections given to hard-boiled
recidivists pending arrest and trial.
718

We have denied a prospective extraditee the right to be

informed before 1
trial of the nature and cause of the charges
against him. Due process is essential in all court
proceedings—criminal, civil, investigatory, administrative,
or even sui generis, a class the Court uses as an excuse to
justify deprivation
2
of that most elemental of rights, the
right of notice. The Court has ruled that respondent Mark
Jimenez or any other person sought to be extradited must
first be exposed to the indignity, expense, and anxiety of a
public denunciation in court before he may be informed of
what the requesting State has against him. The right to-
notice before trial is denied.
The majority opinion states that a prospective extraditee
is not entitled to notice and hearing before a warrant of
arrest can be issued against him. Worse, he is denied the
right to bail and provisional liberty while the extradition
proceedings are pending.
All the jurisprudence explaining the parameters of the
unreasonable3 searches and seizures provision of the
Constitution becomes inapplicable. The petition for
extradition and its attachments take the place of probable
cause. The right against unreasonable search and seizure
is available4 to all persons including those not charged with
any crime. But now, we create an unusual exception. It is
not available to one who may be seized, against his will for
possible extradition to a country where his innocence or
guilt will first be determined. Arrest and imprisonment will
become virtually certain in extradition proceedings. The
only thing required of the Court is to go over the request
for extradition and its supporting documents. Arrest is
virtually assured because of the absence of notice and
hearing. It is inconceivable that the officials of a requesting
State would be so dense or careless as to fail to include in
the request for extradition a prima facie showing that the
respondent deserves to be seized and forcibly brought to
the foreign country for trial. According to the majority
opinion, from the forwarded documents, we expect the trial
court to “merely x x x
_______________
1 Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, 343 SCRA 377 (2000).
2 Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 1 and Sec. 14(2); People v. Mencias, 46
SCRA 88 [1972].
3 Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 2.
4 Moncado v. Peoples Court, 80 Phil. 1.
719
VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 719

x x x x x x get a good first impression sufficient to make

a speedy initial determination as regards the arrest and
detention of the accused.” This novel doctrine justifying the
near certainty of automatic arrest and detention goes
against this Court’s decisions, too numerous to mention,
protecting citizens and aliens alike from unreasonable
arrests or seizures. Can we expect anything other than a
“good first impression” to arise from the mere reading of a
request for extradition?
In criminal prosecutions, the judge must personally
determine probable cause for the arrest. Facts and
circumstances must first be presented which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed
5
and the accused is probably
guilty of the offense. In the majority opinion, the request
for extradition by the foreign country takes the place of a
hearing for probable cause. After trial, it is possible that
the petition for extradition may be denied. Under the
majority opinion, the possibility of a judgment of denial
does not influence the immediate arrest and indefinite
detention of the respondent since notice and hearing before
arrest are not required. He must be jailed while the grant
or denial of the petition is being considered.
The majority opinion gives five (5) postulates of
extradition. With all due respect, I fail to see how
compliance with these postulates should result in a
disregard for constitutional liberties.
I agree with the first postulate. It is a general
proposition that extradition is a major instrument for the
suppression of crime and the Philippines should cooperate
in facilitating the arrest and custodial transfer of a fugitive
from one State to another. However, I cannot see how
compliance with the requirements for notice and hearing
and the ascertainment of reasonable cause would hamper
the suppression of crime. If they do, why should they
appear in our laws and in the decisions of this Court? Does
obedience to the dictates of due process and the prohibition
against unreasonable seizures mean any lesser
determination to eradicate crime? Effective extradition
arrangements and deterrence of flight abroad by felons
_______________
5 People v. Syjuco, 64 Phil. 667 (1937); Alvarez v. Court of First

Instance, 64 Phil. 33 (1937); U.S. v. Addison, 28 Phil. 566 (1914); Burgos v.
Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA 800 (1984).
720

are not incompatible with fundamental liberties. The act of

according due process and reasonable seizures does not
make the Philippines an isolationist state. The employment
of beneficial objectives to justify the repression of far more
worthy values is pejorative in nature, one in which the
Court should not engage.
The second postulate is based on the aphorism that the
two parties to an extradition treaty accept and trust each
other’s legal system and judicial processes. We trust the
fairness of the American system of justice, However, why
should we assume that it is a breach of trust which the
requesting country will look upon with disfavor if we accord
notice and hearing to the respondent before a warrant of
arrest is issued? If bail is allowed while the extradition
petition is pending before the trial court, does this signify a
lack of confidence on our part in the capacity and the
willingness of the other state to protect the basic rights of
the person sought to be extradited?
The Constitution of the United States provides that
“(t)he right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures shall not be violated and no warrants shall
issue, but on probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation and particularly describing the place 6to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.” The
offenses upon which the request for extradition is premised
are relatively light. Undoubtedly, bail will be given by the
American courts on the basis of a presumption of innocence
and the lack of gravity of the offenses. If the alleged
offenses themselves are bailable both here and in the
United States, I see no connection between the grant of the
right against unreasonable seizures or the right of bail and
the gratuitous assertion of the majority opinion that this is
an absence of trust and confidence in the American legal
system and judicial process.
The guarantees of the Philippine Bill of Rights are
derived from American sources. Why should we withhold
them out of a misplaced fear that their grant may be
interpreted as a lack of faith in the American judicial
system?
_______________
6 American Bill of Rights, Amendment No. IV of the U.S. Constitution.
721
VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 721

The third postulate states that extradition proceedings are

sui generis. It is a dogma pernicious in its consequences to
declare that a classification of sui generis lifts a court
proceeding beyond constitutional protections. The trial
before the respondent court is not criminal in nature. It is
less onerous than a criminal prosecution. Yet, the majority
opinion confers upon one accused of grave crimes far
greater rights than an extraditee whose guilt of lesser
offenses is not even in issue. Classifying a proceeding as sui
generis does not mean that procedural guarantees available
in criminal prosecutions, civil trials, or administrative
proceedings are thereby waived or become irrelevant. The
classification should not mean exemption from notice or
hearing for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. It cannot
result in non-entitlement to bail.
The process of extradition does not involve the
determination of the guilt of an accused. The majority
opinion states that extradition is merely a measure of
international judicial assistance to restore a person
charged with crime to the jurisdiction with the best claim
to try him. If so why should the person sought to be
extradited be imprisoned without bail while the grant of
assistance is pending? With more reason should
constitutional protections be given to him. The correctness
of a decision to forcibly remove a person from his
homeland, family, and friends should not be taken lightly.
In determining whether the extradition request complies
with the extradition treaty, the trial court should not be
encouraged by a postulate to act in a cavalier manner or
treat the proceedings as inconsequential in nature.
The majority opinion states as its fourth postulate that
compliance with treaties shall be in good faith. If the
respondent court grants bail to the respondent in
extradition proceedings, does this constitute a failure to
fulfill our obligations under the extradition treaty? I am
not aware of any treaty which requires the incarceration of
a respondent while the court determines whether or not he
falls under the treaty provisions. Why should the
furnishing of notice and the holding of a hearing for an
arrest warrant paint a bad picture of our country before the
world community? There should be a contrary impression
of adherence to fairness and justice. We cannot fault the
trial court for adopting procedural safeguards which help
insure the correctness of its decision. If compliance in good
faith with the treaty requires that the respondent be
722

immediately seized and confined in the national

penitentiary, why should an extradition trial still be held?
We might as well give full faith and credence to the request
for extradition and without any trial or hearing, place the
respondent in the next airplane leaving for the requesting
country. The discussion in the majority opinion of the
postulates of extradition implies that the implementation
of an extradition treaty rarely or never results in a refusal
to allow extradition and that the court proceedings do not
amount to anything more than a formality. Otherwise, why
should he languish in the penitentiary while his
extradition case is pending?
The fifth and last postulate uses the underlying risk of
flight. To say that all persons sought to be extradited have
a propensity to flee is too sweeping a statement to be
adopted as an axiom. In every criminal prosecution, the
prosecution can, with greater reason, argue that the
accused will escape and go into hiding. But never has the
possibility of flight sufficed to always require incarceration
while court proceedings are going on. The opposite practice
is the one we have adopted. The right to bail has been
elevated into a constitutional guarantee. Only for the most
serious of offenses when evidence of guilt is strong may an
accused be denied7
freedom upon the posting of bail prior to
his conviction. In fact, the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, as amended, provide that any person in custody
who is not yet charged in court may apply for bail with any
court8 in the province, city, or municipality where he is
held. The respondent is not charged of any crime before
our courts.
The five postulates of extradition outlined in the
majority opinion are motherhood statements over which
there can be no quarrel. However, these postulates should
be interpreted in a manner that preserves procedural
safeguards instead of being used to support the petitioner’s
intent to cut corners. Compliance with treaty obligations
does not mean unquestioning obedience to everything
stated in a petition for extradition. The allegations will still
be proved, refuted, and determined. Much less does it
result in in-
_______________

8 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 114, Sec. 17 (c).
723
VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 723

stant seizure without notice and bearing or incarceration

without any recourse to legal methods of gaming
provisional liberty.
Is the respondent entitled to notice and hearing before
the issuance of a warrant of arrest?
The majority opinion agrees with the Department of
Justice that the Regional Trial Court committed grave
abuse of discretion when it informed the respondent that
an extradition petition had been filed against him and that
petitioner was seeking his arrest. The opinion states that
the exercise of discretion by the judge is a notice to escape
and to avoid extradition.
The truth is that long before
9
January 18, 2000 when
G.R. No. 139465 was decided, respondent was fully aware
of the information which this Court now declares should
not have been given to him. Respondent could have fled but
he did not do so. Instead, he made himself more visible; he
ran for Congress and engaged in various civic activities
always in the public eye.
Paraphrasing the ruling in G.R. No. 139465 on the
motion for reconsideration, the threat of private
respondent’s flight from the Philippines
10
has passed. It is
more imagined than real at this time.
Petitioner states that the procedure requiring notice and
hearing will set a dangerous precedent. The Court agrees
that those sought to be extradited—including terrorists,
mass murderers and war criminals—may invoke it in
future extradition cases.
To lump up respondent Jimenez and all persons in
extradition proceedings with terrorists, mass murderers,
and war criminals is contrary to all rules of reasonable and
valid classification. Respondent is charged before the
district court of Florida with conspiracy to defraud,
attempted tax evasion, fraud through the use of radio—
television, false statements, and unlawful election
contributions. There is absolutely no indication of
terrorism, mass murder, or war crimes against him. He is
definitely not a candidate for confinement in the
Guantanamo Prison Compound. The fear of terrorists is not
reason to deprive all subjects of extradition proceedings
any and all constitutional protections. Methods of dealing
with terror-
_______________
9 328 SCRA 160 (2000).

10 343 SCRA 377, 389 (2000).
724

ists should not be used against suspected tax evaders or

violators of election laws. The fact that terrorists are
denied bail is not reason to deny this constitutional
guarantee to persons being tried for offenses where no
individual is a victim.
It is error to expect that all persons against whom
charges have been filed would voluntarily and cheerfully
submit to trial. There are procedural safeguards such as
preliminary investigation intended to secure a person
presumed innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive
prosecution, and to protect him from an open and public
accusation of crime, from the trouble, expense, and anxiety
of a public trial and 11also to protect the state from useless
and expensive trials. For both the State and the accused,
there could be sound reasons to oppose or avoid
prosecution.
If there is reason in some cases for the State not to
prosecute, there is greater reason for a prospective accused
to take all steps that would prevent his having to go before
a criminal court. We may assume that any fears of
oppressive prosecution in the mind of the private
respondent are unfounded and imagined. This should not
lead the Court to conclude that a natural aversion to
criminal prosecution is always based on ignoble or
indefensible reasons. Neither should a natural desire to
avoid unpleasant situations be used to deny basic rights
and privileges.
I submit that it is a dangerous precedent for this Court
to rule that the prima facie existence of probable cause for
a warrant of arrest can be derived from a mere reading of
the petition for extradition and its supporting documents.
The determination of probable cause is effectively taken
away from the judge and transferred to the Department of
Justice. Worse, the determination could come directly from
an office not equipped to make it, namely the Department
of Foreign Affairs. In either case, the Constitution is
infringed.
The majority opinion is overly influenced by the fear
that a person sought to be extradited would be tempted to
flee. Of course, it is natural for any person facing court
litigation of any kind to try to avoid it. An accused already
being tried in court or an appellant who appeals a
judgment of conviction has greater reason to flee if
_______________
11 Salonga v. Hon. Paño, et al., 134 SCRA 438 (1985).
725
VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 725

possible. Yet, this is not cause to deny him notice of

proceedings or the right of provisional liberty while his case
is pending. If bail is going to be denied respondent Jimenez,
it should be after a full hearing and with the application of
all constitutional guarantees.
The majority opinion states that under the Constitution
only the complainants and the 12
witnesses he may produce
are required to be examined. It overlooks that in this case
no complainant and no witness has been examined. A
warrant of arrest is ordered issued on the sole basis of
documents. There may be no requirement to notify and
hear the accused before a warrant of arrest is issued. But
neither is there any prohibition against the judge hearing
an accused before a warrant is issued; more so if he is
already in court and strongly opposes his being arrested
pending trial. In his search for the truth, the judge should
not be restrained in the exercise of sound discretion.
In this case, the petition has already been filed. The
respondent has submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the
trial court. The motion to have him arrested and detained
is an incident of the pending case. There is no need to take
him 13into custody in order to make him forthcoming for
trial. Mr. Jimenez appears to be more than willing and, in
fact, is already answering the request for extradition. He is
not before the court to answer for any crime. But he is
there. Strangely, the court would deny him provisional
liberty in a case not criminal in nature but which could
make him answer for alleged offenses in another country if
the court should decide against him. What cannot be
denied to him in the criminal prosecution is denied in a
case which may or may not lead to such prosecution.
The absence of logic behind the majority opinion’s denial
of basic rights becomes clearer when it comes to the issue
on the right to bail. The reason given for the denial of the
right to bail is not merely deceptive; it has dangerous
implications. It states that the constitutional provision on
bail applies only when a person has
_______________

13 Rule 113, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
defines arrest as “the taking of a person into custody in order that he may
be bound to answer for the commission of an offense.”
726

been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine

Criminal Law. The reasoning states, that ergo, the right to
bail does not exist in non-criminal prosecutions. The
absence of a constitutional provision on the right to bail of
a person subject to extradition is simply based on the fact
that the idea of incarcerating a person for something other
than crime never occurred to the framers of the
Constitution. There can be no forcible detention in non-
criminal situations. Incarceration for something not related
to crime would be arbitrary detention or illegal detention.
It could even be slavery or involuntary servitude. In all
these cases, the issue of bail does not arise. If we insist on
classifying extradition as a proceeding not covered by the
protections given to accused persons, we should rule that
bail is not provided because the respondent is not supposed
to be imprisoned. There is no need for bail because the
detention is illegal in cases not related to crime.
Extradition cases may not be criminal in nature. But they
assist and precede criminal prosecutions.
The petitioner twists the right to bail out of context
when it argues that the right available during criminal
prosecutions is irrelevant and should be disregarded when
the court action is non-criminal in nature and, therefore, it
is not available in civil, administrative, regulatory, and
extradition proceedings. The fallacy of the argument is
readily apparent.
I cannot go along with the proposition that a person who
tries to avoid criminal prosecution is always a criminal,
coward, or weakling who prefers to run and hide. There are
many reasons why people will fear trial in criminal cases.
It is not overprotection or excessively liberal treatment to
enforce constitutional guarantees in extradition cases. It is
fairness and adherence to the rule of law.
The judge has discretion on whether or not he should allow
bail. Heshould have a sound basis for the probability or
likelihood of flight.
The majority opinion starts by asking two questions. (1)
Are prospective extraditees entitled to notice and hearing
before warrants for their arrest are issued? and (2) Are
they entitled to bail and provisional liberty while
extradition proceedings are pending? The answer is a curt
“No”. By the brevity and terse nature of the answer, it
seems absolute and inflexible.
727
VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 727

14
Towards the end of the majority opinion, however, two
exceptions are allowed. First, the applicant is not a flight
risk. Second, there exist special and compelling
circumstances.
To my mind, the issues in this case should be framed
differently. On the first question, the present provisions of
law and decisions of this Court on arrests and seizures
should be assumed and followed. On the second question,
the Court should apply the same principles on the right to
bail found in the Constitution to persons facing trial for
extradition. Thus, all persons, except those where the
probability of flight is clear and present or the crimes for
which extradition is sought are heinous, shall before
judgment in the extradition proceedings, be bailable by
sufficient sureties or be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired
even where the requesting country is one with which the
Philippines 15
maintains strong ties. Excessive bail shall not
be required.
The majority
16
opinion cites my ponencia in People v.
Jalosjos, Jalosjos was already convicted and his appeal
was pending when he was re-elected. The crime of
statutory rape where a minor is involved is particularly
heinous. The evidence of guilt was not merely strong; it
was beyond reasonable doubt as found in our decision.
Disenfranchisement of constituents is not reason for his
release.
The case of Congressman Jimenez is an entirely
different one. Respondent has not even faced trial, as yet.
There can be no proof of strong evidence against him. All
we have are still accusations.
Respondent is not charged with heinous crimes. The
alleged tax evasion is at the stage of attempt. The
defraudation is part of a conspiracy. Perjury and illegal
election contributions are relatively not so serious offenses
as to support denial of the right to bail.
The respondent’s being a Congressman should be viewed
from the aspect of possibility of flight. Why should a person
run for Congress, campaign all over his district, and expose
himself regularly
_______________
14 Decision, p. 34.
15 See Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 13.
16 324 SCRA 689 (2000).
728

to newspaper media and television if he intends to flee the

country? There is a hold-order against him found in all
ports of exit and entry. When his constituents voted
Jimenez to Congress knowing fully well that an extradition
case was or could be filed against him, it was an expression
of confidence that he would not run away. Their faith may
be misplaced or proved wrong later, but today, it must be
taken at face value as against mere suppositions, fears, and
apprehensions. The rules on denial of bail where possibility
of flight is established must be followed.
The request for extradition comes from the United
States. In the course of the most perilous period in the life
of that nation, the American Supreme Court stated that
“the constitution is a law for rulers and people, equally in
war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its
protection all classes of men, at all times and under all
circumstances, x x x x x x x x x no doctrine involving
more pernicious consequences was ever invented by the
next of man than that its provisions can be suspended17
during any of the great exigencies of government.”
The extradition of respondent is not an exigency of
government. The provisions of the Bill of Rights of the two
States which entered into the treaty are fully applicable in
extradition. If a person is to be arrested and detained,
current laws and procedures for arrests and detentions
should be employed. The novelty of extradition cases in the
Philippines cannot result in any suspension or disregard of
basic liberties whether here or in the United States. The
mantle of constitutional protections should cover persons
covered by extradition requests.
I vote to dismiss the petition.
_______________
17 Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wallace 2 (1866); 71 U.S. 2; 18 L. Ed. 281.
729
VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 729

CONCURRING OPINION
CARPIO, J.:
I concur with the well-written ponencia of Justice

Panganiban. I write this concurring opinion to afford
extraditees in this country the right to bail, in carefully
limited exceptions, under the equity and rule making
power of the Court. It is the constitutional duty and power1
of the Court to protect and enforce the fundamental rights
of all persons in this country. This should include, to the
extent that the Court can grant under its power, the right
of extraditees in this country to avail of the same or similar
remedies that courts in the countries of our treaty partners
have accorded to their own extraditees.
The right to bail is a constitutional right available to an
accused in domestic criminal proceedings except in offenses
punishable by reclusion
2
perpetua or higher when evidence
of guilt is strong. An extraditee, however, cannot invoke
this constitutional right in international extradition
because extradition proceedings are not criminal
proceedings, Extradition proceedings are like deportation
and court martial proceedings where there is no
constitutional right to bail.
Thus, in the leading case 3
of Ong See Hang v.
Commissioner of Immigration, the Court held that:
“The right to bail guaranteed by the Constitution may not be

invoked in favor of petitioners-appellees, considering that
deportation proceedings do not constitute a criminal action. (Lao
Tang Bun v. Fabre, 81 Phil. 682; U.S. ex rel. Zapp, et al. v. District
Director of Immigration and Naturalization, supra) and the order
of deportation is not a punishment for a crime (U.S. v. Go-Siaco,
12 Phil. 490; Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32), it being merely for the
return to his country of an alien who has broken the
_______________
1 Section 5 (5), Article VIII of the Constitution provides as follows:

“The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:. (1) x x x (5) Promulgate
rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, x x x.”
2 Section 13, Article III of the Constitution.
3 4 SCRA 442 (1962).
730

conditions upon which he could continue to reside within our

borders (U.S. v. De los Santos, 33 Phil. 397, Lao Tang Bun v.
Fabre, supra).”
This was reiterated in several cases,

4
the most recent being
In Re Andrew Harvey v. Santiago, decided under the 1987
Constitution. Here, the Court ruled that:
“The denial by respondent Commissioner of petitioners’ release on

bail, also challenged by them, was in order because in deportation
proceedings, the right to bail is not a matter of right but a matter
of discretion on the part of the Commissioner of Immigration and
Deportation. Thus, Section 37(e) of the Philippine Immigration
Act of 1940 provides that “any alien under arrest in a deportation
proceeding may be released under bond or under such other
conditions as may be imposed by the Commissioner of
Immigration.” The use of the word “may” in said provision
indicates that the grant of bail is merely permissive and not
mandatory on the part of the Commissioner. The exercise of the
power is wholly discretionary (Ong Hee Sang vs. Commissioner of
Immigration, L-9700, February 28, 1962, 4 SCRA 442). “Neither
the Constitution nor Section 69 of the Revised Administrative
Code guarantees the right of aliens facing deportation to
provisional liberty on bail.” (Tiu Chun Hai, et al. vs. Deportation
Board, 104 Phil. 949 [1958]). As deportation proceedings do not
partake of the nature of a criminal action, the constitutional
guarantee to bail may not be invoked by aliens in said
proceedings (Ong Hee Sang vs. Commissioner of Immigration,
supra).”
5
In Commendador v. De Villa, involving the court martial
of military putschists against the Aquino Government, the
Court held that:
“We find that the right to bail invoked by the private respondents
in G.R. No(s). 95020 has traditionally not been recognized and is
not available in the military, as an exception to the general rule
embodied in the Bill of Rights. This much, was suggested in
Arula, where we observed that ‘the right to a speedy trial is given
more emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not
exist.’ ”
The justification for this exception was well explained by the
Solicitor General as follows:
_______________
4 162 SCRA 840 (1988).

5 200 SCRA 80 (1991).
731
VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 731

‘The unique structure of the military should be enough reason to exempt

military men from the constitutional coverage on the right to bail.
Aside from structural peculiarity, it is vital to note that mutinous
soldiers operate within the framework of democratic system, are allowed
the fiduciary use of firearms by the government for the discharge of their
duties and responsibilities and are paid out of revenues collected from the
people. All other insurgent elements carry out their activities outside of
and against the existing political system.
xxx
National security considerations should also impress upon this
Honorable Court that release on bail of respondents constitutes a
damaging precedent. Imagine a scenario of say 1,000 putschists roaming
the streets of the Metropolis on bail, or if the assailed July 25, 1990
Order were sustained, on “provisional” bail. The sheer number alone is
already discomforting. But, the truly disquieting thought is that they
could freely resume their heinous activity which could very well result in
the overthrow of duly constituted authorities, including this Honorable
Court, and replace the same with a system consonant with their own
concept of government and justice.’
The argument that denial from the military of the right to bail
would violate the equal protection clause is not acceptable. This
guaranty requires equal treatment only of persons or things
similarly situated and does not apply where the subject of the
treatment is substantially different from others. The accused
officers can complain if they are denied bail and other members of
the military are not. But they cannot say they have been
discriminated against because they are not allowed the same
right that is extended to civilians.”
6
Finally, in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, the Court,
speaking through Justice Reynato S. Puno, declared that:
“We are not persuaded. An extradition proceeding is sui generis. It

is not a criminal proceeding which will call into operation all the
rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. To begin
with, the process of extradition does not involve the determination
of the guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocence will
be adjudged in the court of the state where he will be extradited.
determine the guilt or innocence of an accused cannot be
_______________
6 343 SCRA 377 (2000).
732

invoked by an extraditee especially by one whose extradition

papers are still undergoing evaluation. As held by the US
Supreme Court in United States v. Galanis:
‘An extradition proceeding is not a criminal prosecution, and the
constitutional safeguards that accompany a criminal trial in this country
do not shield an accused from extradition pursuant to a valid treaty.’
There are other differences between an extradition proceeding

in nature while criminal proceedings involve a fullblown trial. In
decision to extradite.
As an extradition proceeding is not criminal in character and
the evaluation stage in an extradition proceeding is not akin to a
preliminary investigation, the due process safeguards in the latter
do not necessarily apply to the former. This we hold for the
procedural due process required by a given set of circumstances
“must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the
government function involved as well as the private interest that
has been affected by governmental action.” The concept of due
process is flexible for “not all situations calling for procedural
safeguards call for the same kind of procedure.”
Clearly, in this jurisdiction there is no constitutional or

statutory right to bail in non-criminal proceedings like in
extradition. This doctrine is so well-entrenched in this
jurisdiction that there is no need to belabor this point.
Courts in the countries of our treaty partners, however,
have allowed bail to extraditees in their own
733
VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 733

7
countries8 even in the absence of a constitutional or
statutory right to bail. This places our own citizens who
face extradition proceedings in this country at a
disadvantage in terms of available remedies. The United
States, for example, 9allows bail to extraditees when
“special circumstances” 10are present. Canada also allows
bail under a similar rule.
This situation calls for equality in treatment by
extending, in carefully limited exceptions, the right to bail
to those facing extradition proceedings in this country.
Nevertheless, we must insure that we do not cripple the
ability of our Executive Department to comply in good faith
with our treaty obligations under international law. This
requires a calibrated balancing, on the one hand, of the
State’s interest in cooperating with our treaty partners in
international criminal law enforcement, and on the other
hand, of the need to give our own citizens no lesser right
and protection than what our treaty partners so zealously
provide to their own citizens.
Thus,11
following the emerging trend in the United
States, and guided by our own experience in combating
transnational crimes including international terrorism, the
Court should rule that our extradition courts may, after the
arrest of the extraditee, grant the extraditee bail if he
establishes that he does not pose a flight risk
_______________
7 The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:

“Excessive bail shall not be required.” The excessive bail clause did not
establish a constitutional right to bail. In United States v. Salerno, 481
U.S. 739 (1987), attached as Annex “7”, Memorandum for Private
Respondent, the U.S. Supreme Court declared: “The Eighth Amendment
addresses pretrial release by providing merely that ‘[e]xcessive bail shall
not be required.’ This Clause, of course, says nothing about whether bail
shall be available at all.”
8 The U.S. Bail Reform Act of 1984 does not grant the right to bail in
extradition cases.
9 Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40 (1903), attached as Annex “2”,
Memorandum for Private Respondent.
10 Canada v. Pitman, 1986 WL602917 (Ont. H.C.), Supreme Court of
Ontario.
11 Parretti v. United States, 122 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 1997), attached as
Annex “5”, Memorandum for Private Respondent.
734

or a danger to the community, and there is no other special

circumstance that would warrant denial of bail. The
burden of proving he is entitled to bail rests on the
extraditee because by resisting the extradition to face a fair
trial abroad, the extraditee is presumed to be a flight risk.
This is why courts have consistently held12 that the
presumption is against bail in extradition cases.
The development of extradition law is still in its infancy
in this country. We are fortunate that the present
Constitution has empowered the Court to adopt rules to
protect and enforce the fundamental rights of the people. In
the United States, the grant of bail to extraditees is still
largely governed by the 1903 case of Wright u. Henkel, with
only the cryptic “special circumstances” as the standard
prescribed by the U.S. Supreme13
Court for extradition
courts in the U.S. to follow. The instant case provides the
opportunity for this Court to lay down a clear-cut guideline
for our own extradition courts to follow. This will insure
that our Executive Department can comply promptly with
extradition requests as required by the nature of our treaty
obligations while at the same time protecting the
fundamental rights of our citizens.
In essence, extradition is police assistance extended by a
state to arrest a person charged with a crime in another
state and surrender him to the authorities of that state.
The power to arrest by the assisting state 14
is legitimized by
a treaty, which 15has the force of a statute and forms part of
municipal law. The benefit of extradition is the mutual
assistance between states in criminal law en-
_______________
12 United States v. Lui Kin-Hong, 83 F.3d 523 (1st Cir. 1996), attached
as Annex “8”, Memorandum for Private Respondent.
13 U.S. lower courts have differed in their interpretation of the “special
circumstances” standard. See A Recommended Approach to Bail in
International Extradition Cases, Jeffrey A. Hall, Michigan Law Review,
December, 1987.
14 La Chemise Lacoste v. Fernandez, 129 SCRA 373 (1984); Ram Singh
v. Insular Collector of Customs, 38 Phil. 862. In Secretary of Justice v.
Lantion, 322 SCRA 160 (2000), the Court stated: “Accordingly, the
principle lex posterior derogat priori takes effect—a treaty may repeal a
statute and a statute may repeal treaty.”
15 Guerrero’s Transport Services, Inc. u. Blaylock Trans. Services
Employees Association-Kilusan, 71 SCRA 621 (1976).
735
VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 735

forcement across national boundaries. The assisting state
acts as an arresting agent and in some jurisdictions the
extradition process is mainly an executive function. Even
under our extradition treaties, the final decision whether to
extradite or not rests16with the President of the Philippines,
not with the courts. Thus, ordinarily an assisting state
does not grant bail to the extraditee whose recourse is to
apply for bail before the court of the state where he is
charged with a crime. The assisting state, however, for
equity considerations may choose to accord bail to the
extraditee. One equity consideration is to put extraditees in
one country in equal footing with extraditees in the country
of the treaty partner. Another equity consideration is to
grant the right to bail, in carefully limited exceptions, to
preserve and enforce fundamental rights.
This rule will not change the situation for extraditee
Mark B. Jimenez in the instant case because Jimenez has
failed to establish that he is not a flight risk. Having fled
the United States just as he was about to be indicted for
several serious crimes, Jimenez is presumed to be a flight
risk for extradition purposes in this country. Jimenez has
not successfully rebutted this presumption before the
extradition court. Jimenez has also refused to honor his
agreement with the U.S. Department of Justice, made in
August 1998 17through his U.S. counsel, to return to the
United States where he faces a maximum prison 18term of
not less than 100 years if convicted on all counts. Given
his resources, and the gravity of the charges against him,
Jimenez remains a serious flight risk.
The “special circumstances” that Jimenez has alleged do
not inspire confidence that he will not likely flee. Jimenez
claims that he has been admitted to the Witness Protection
Program which shows his lack of intent to flee. The
Department of Justice, however, has disowned issuing to
Jimenez a Certificate of Admission to the Witness
Protection Program. The Department of Justice should
know who have been admitted to the Witness Protection
Program be-
_______________
16 Paragraph 2, Article 2 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty.

17 Letter dated August 23, 2001 written by Mr. John E. Harris,
Director, Office of the International Affairs, U.S. Department of Justice,
addressed to Undersecretary Merceditas Gutierrez of the Philippine
Department of Justice, attached to Petitioner’s Memorandum.
18 Page 17, Petition for Certiorari.
736
cause the Department itself administers the Program.

Under the Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Act,
the issuance of the Certificate of Admission is the
19
operative
act that establishes admission to the Program. Unless he
can present a Certificate of Admission, Jimenez’s claim
should be rejected, and even taken as an act of
misrepresentation to the extradition court, in view of the
statement by the Department of Justice that 20
there is no
record of Jimenez’s admission to the Program.
For the same reason, Jimenez’s claim that he is a state
witness in the plunder case against ex-President Joseph
Estrada, and that “his flight 21
would strip him of (the)
immunity he is entitled to,” cannot be given credence.
Under the Witness Protection, Security and Benefits Act,
the Certificate of Admission is essential to the discharge
22
of
the accused and his utilization as a state witness. Without
the Certificate of Admission,23Jimenez is not entitled to
immunity under the Program. The Department of Justice
will issue the Certificate of Admission only if it is satisfied
with the proposed testimony of the witness as disclosed in
his sworn statement. Since until now the Department of
Justice has not issued a Certificate of Admission to
Jimenez, it could mean that the Department is either not
satisfied with what Jimenez is bargaining to testify against
ex-President Joseph Estrada, or that Jimenez may
_______________
19 Section 11 of R.A. No. 6981 provides as follows: “x x x If after said

examination of said person, his sworn statement and other relevant facts,
the Department is satisfied that the requirement of this Act and its
implementing rules are complied with, it may admit such person into the
Program and issue the corresponding certificate.”
20 Pages 28-29, Petitioner’s Memorandum.
21 Page 46, Memorandum for Private Respondent.
22 Section 12 of R.A. No. 6981 provides as follows: “The certificate of
admission into the Program by the Department shall be given full faith
and credit by the provincial or city prosecutor who is not required to
include the Witness in the criminal complaint or information and if
included therein, to petition the court for his discharge in order that he
can be utilized as a state Witness. x x x.”
23 Section 12 of R.A. No. 6981 provides that “[a]dmission into the
Program shall entitle such State Witness to immunity from criminal
prosecution for the offense or offenses in which his testimony will be given
or used x x x.”
737
VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 737

24
not be the least guilty. Unless Jimenez presents to the
extradition court the Certificate of Admission, and this he
has not done, Jimenez’s claim of beings state witness
against ex-President Estrada is baseless and self-serving.
Jimenez claims that the Department of Justice knows
his whereabouts because he is under 24-hour 25 PNP
protection. Jimenez asserts in his Sworn Statement that
the Department of Justice has provided him police
protection because he “was admitted into the Witness
Protection Program of the DOJ on 2 March 2001.” This is
patently false. The Department of Justice states that there
is no record of Jimenez’s admission to the Witness
Protection Program. Jimenez has not presented a
Certificate of Admission to the Program which under the
Witness Protection, Security and Benefits Act would entitle
him to the benefits, protection and immunities of the
Program.
That Jimenez enjoys the privilege of a 24-hour PNP
security detail does not establish that he is a state witness
under the Witness Protection Program. As a member of the
House of Representatives, Jimenez may have requested the
PNP to provide him a security detail for his own benefit
and protection. In such a case, the PNP security detail
takes instructions from Jimenez and not from the
Department of Justice. The 24-hour PNP security detail
would hardly be effective in preventing Jimenez from
fleeing the country.
The other “special circumstances” alleged by Jimenez,
like his seven children residing in the Philippines, and his
lack of visas to travel to other countries, deserve scant
consideration. Considering his age, Jimenez’s seven
children are all probably of age by now, and even if they
are all still minors, they would hardly become public
charges if left behind in the Philippines. The lack of visas
has never deterred the flight of fugitives from any country.
Besides, any Filipino can travel to any of our nine ASEAN
neighbors without need of a visa.
Accordingly, I vote to grant the petition.
_______________
24 Section 10, R.A. No. 6981.

25 Annex “A-1” of Private Respondent’s Comment.
738

Petition granted, RTC order dated May 23, 2001 declared

null and void. RTC order dated July 23, 2001 set aside.
Bail bond cancelled.
Notes.—In tilting the balance in favor of the interests of

the State, the Court stresses that it is not ruling that the
potential extraditee has no right to due process at all
throughout the length and breadth of the extrajudicial
proceedings. Procedural due process requires a
determination of what process is due, when it is due, and
the degree of what is due. Stated otherwise, a prior
determination should be made as to whether procedural
protections are at all due and when they are due, which in
turn depends on the extent to which an individual will be
“condemned to suffer grievous loss.” (Secretary of Justice vs.
Lantion, 343 SCRA 377 [2000])
A judge issuing a warrant for the provisional arrest of
an extraditee may rely on the request for provisional arrest
accompanied by facsimile copies of the outstanding warrant
of arrest issued by the requesting government, a summary
of the facts of the case against the extraditee, particulars of
his birth and address, and intention to request his
provisional arrest and the reason therefor. (Cuevas vs.
Munoz, 348 SCRA 542 [2000])
——o0o——
739
© Copyright 2020 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

Government of The United States of America vs. Purganan PDF

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Government of The United States of America vs. Purganan PDF

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Government of The United States of America vs. Purganan PDF

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

VOL.

389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 623

GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF

Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Certiorari; Motions for

624 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Government of the United States of America vs. Purganan

custodial transfer of a fugitive from one state to the other. With

VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 625

Government of the United States of America vs. Purganan

measure of international judicial assistance through which a

626 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Government of the United States of America vs. Purganan

sending notices to the opposing parties, receiving facts and

VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 627

Government of the United States of America vs. Purganan

Same; Same; Same; Proper Procedure in Extradition

628 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 629

Government of the United States of America vs. Purganan

630 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Government of the United States of America vs. Purganan

tion case against their representative, including his detention

BELLOSILLO, J., Separate Opinion:

VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 631

Government of the United States of America vs. Purganan

Same; Same; Same; There is neither logic nor persuasion to

632 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Government of the United States of America vs. Purganan

In our society—and even in the United States, I am sure—

PUNO, J., Separate Opinion:

VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 633

Government of the United States of America vs. Purganan

ment and of the private respondent have developed new

Government of the United States of America vs. Purganan

The extraditing judge is not to act as a stamp pad but has to

VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 635

Government of the United States of America vs. Purganan

mination of whether the accused was someone who should

636 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Government of the United States of America vs. Purganan

VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 637

Government of the United States of America vs. Purganan

able to every person under detention for the enjoyment of his

638 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Government of the United States of America vs. Purganan

VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 639

Government of the United States of America vs. Purganan

the right to bail can be complied with. I put no blame on the

VITUG, J., Separate Opinion:

International Law; Extradition; Bail; The edict in the Bill of

640 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Government of the United States of America vs. Purganan

Same; Same; Same; The Eighth Amendment of the U.S.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Dissenting Opinion:

International Law; Extradition; Bail; We must consider the

Government of the United States of America vs. Purganan

generis,” basic freedoms become irrelevant and non-available. A

642 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Government of the United States of America vs. Purganan