Nevada Army National Guard Report

National Guard Bureau
Office of Complex Investigations

Report of Assessment of the
Aviation Related Assets within
the 991st Troop Command
Nevada Army National Guard
DRAFT
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
August 28, 2019
FOIA Responsive Record

Released by National Guard Bureau
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National Guard Bureau Office of Complex Investigations
Report of Assessment: NV1906
Table of Contents
Executive Summary ................................................................................. 3
Summarized Findings and Recommendations .......................................... 7
III. Background …………………………………………………………………………. 7
IV. Action Plan …………………………………………………………………………. 9
V. Lines of Effort:
A. Command Climate/Culture ………………………………………………. 11
B. Full Time Support Management and Administration ……………. 29
C. Command Support Programs (MEO/EEO/SAPR) ………….………. 44
VI. Assessment Team's Comments …………………………………………….. 56
Appendix A: OCI Command Climate Survey 2/238th
Appendix B: OCI Command Climate Survey 1/189th
Appendix C: OCI Command Climate Survey 3/140th
Appendix D: OCI Command Climate Survey HHC, 991st TC

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recent Aviation Resource Management Surveys (ARMS) indicate the units are
well prepared for their upcoming deployments.

Many of the issues of misconduct identified by the leadership were
confirmed by the Assessment team. There are instances of misconduct and
poor treatment of subordinates which appear to arise primarily from the
technician/full-time workforce within the Army Aviation Support Facility North
Hangar (AASF North Hangar) at the E-7 equivalent level and below. The team
noted a lack of adequate full-time senior Non-Commissioned Officer oversight
within the AASF and the absence of properly functioning equal opportunity and
SAPR processes within the NVNG generally.
Allegations of technician misconduct are inappropriately handled

through military administrative processes instead of being addressed by the
AASF supervisory chain under applicable technician policy regulations, civilian
equal employment opportunity (EEO) procedures, and the collective bargaining
agreement. This practice may lead to unintended consequences and problems.
The command climate surveys and personnel interviews identified

distrust between the NVNG senior leadership and the aviation related assets of
the 991st TC. This conflict stems from a perception that the Land Component
Commander’s (LCC) withholding policy and distrust of aviation leadership
improperly restricts the aviation leadership’s authority to identify and address
low level misconduct/ performance issues at the lowest levels. The elimination
of a battalion level structure also impedes the efficient and effective
administration of the aviation related assets within the 991st TC and
unnecessarily limits officer and NCO aviation career development
opportunities.
The team’s findings and recommendations for each line of effort are
summarized below. A full discussion and listing of each of the findings and
recommendations can be found in the corresponding chapter for the lines of
effort.

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III. Background
Following a series of detailed complaints of harassment, bullying, and

subordinate maltreatment within the 991st TC, TAG requested assistance from
NGB-JA/OCI to provide a detailed assessment of specific aviation related units.
Specifically, TAG requested that the assessment team review:
a. Recent allegations that discrimination, hazing, bullying, and

maltreatment of subordinates permeate the aviation community
within the 991st TC.
b. The general culture within the aviation units of the 991st.
c. The degree to which the supervision and management of the full-time

personnel within these units complies with applicable policies,
procedures and best practices.
d. The degree to which the personnel in these units understand the

EEO/ MEO complaint process and if the unit is following the correct
procedure.
The assessment was not intended to investigate the recent allegations

but to assess the overarching issues related to these individual complaints in
order to identify areas of concern that could be addressed by the TAG in order
to improve the overall health and readiness of the affected units.
In November 2011, the NVNG realigned branch immaterial aviation

battalion level force structure into a 0-6 level command position as the 991st
TC. This realignment was intended to simplify command and control for the
LCC by providing a second brigade level command within the NVNG. This
realignment resulted in the elimination of the force structure associated with
an aviation battalion level staffing element for the aviation units.
The 991st TC is currently composed of the 3rd Battalion, 140th Aviation

Regiment (3/140th, Lakota) in Las Vegas; and the 2nd Battalion, 238th Aviation
Regiment (2/238th, Blackhawk) and B Company, 1st Battalion, 189th Aviation
Regiment (1/189th Chinook) in Reno/Stead. These units are supported by an
Army Aviation Support Facility (AASF) in the Reno/Stead location and a
Limited Army Aviation Support Facility (LAASF) in Las Vegas.1 The AASF is
split into two separate hangars: the north hangar supports 2/238th and the
1
The 991st TC also contains an Operational Support Aviation (OSA) fixed-wing detachment. However, the NVNG
leadership did not request an assessment of this unit.
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The units participated in the DEOMI survey at the following approximate

rates: 3/140th (63.9%), 2/238th (66.2%), 1/189th (37.8%), and the HHC 991st
TC (85.0%). The results of the survey, detailed in appendices A-D, reiterated
issues that had been raised in the previous surveys conducted by the units;
and provided additional information regarding groups where additional
leadership attention is warranted.
The team did not investigate specific allegations of sexual assault, hostile
work environment, sexual harassment, other EO matters, or other misconduct
in general. However, the team interviewed individual complainants and
discussed their reporting/complaint processing experiences. During the
course of these interviews, additional and insightful information regarding the
organization, its operating standards, and unique challenges became apparent.
Based on TAG’s request and the information gathered from the NVNG,
the team developed three primary lines of effort (LOE) for the assessment:
A. Command Climate/Culture;
B. Management and Administration of the Full-time Support Personnel;

and
C. Command Support Programs to include Military Equal Opportunity
(MEO), Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO), and Sexual Assault Prevention
and Response (SAPR)
These lines of effort are discussed in separate chapters in the following

assessment. Each chapter contains sections regarding analysis, full findings
and recommendations for each line of effort.

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LINE OF EFFORT A:
Command Climate/Culture

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individual supervisors. The relatively recent replacement of the detachment
leadership team was a positive step forward.
2/238th: 91% of respondents indicate a high degree of trust in their

unit’s leadership team at the immediate supervisory level. Over 94% responded
favorably to the question “My immediate supervisor treats me fairly.” Another
88% responded favorably to questions pertaining to the unit’s senior leadership
team. Specifically, 81% of women, 81% of minorities, 83% of enlisted, and 85%
of junior enlisted responded favorably to questions concerning their senior
leadership. Over 97% indicate a high degree of respect for their M-Day chain of
command and leadership. This corresponds with the information obtained
during the individual interviews of unit members. The unit members relayed a
high degree of confidence in their unit leadership and individual supervisors.
These survey results are inconsistent with the findings of

abuse/maltreatment of subordinates and a hostile work environment
discussed hereinafter.
1/189th: 94% of respondents indicates that they had a high degree of

trust in their unit’s leadership team at the immediate supervisory level. Over
93% responded favorably to the question “My immediate supervisor treats me
fairly.” Another 94% responded favorably to questions pertaining to the unit’s
senior leadership team. Specifically, 100% of minorities, 96% of enlisted, and
96% of junior enlisted responded favorably to questions concerning their senior
leadership.2 All respondents indicate a high degree of respect for their M-Day
chain of command and leadership. This corresponds with the information
obtained during the individual interviews of unit members.
HHC, 991st TC: The results for this element contrasted significantly from
the results for the individual aviation units. Only 79% of respondents indicate
a high degree of trust in their unit’s leadership team at the immediate
supervisory level. 85% responded favorably to the question: “My immediate
supervisor treats me fairly.” Another 88% responded favorably to questions
pertaining to the unit’s senior leadership team. Specifically, 78% of minorities,
88% of women, 77% of enlisted, and only 65% of junior enlisted responded
favorably to questions concerning their senior leadership. Only 85% indicate a
high degree of respect for their M-Day chain of command and leadership. The
information obtained during the individual interviews of unit members did not
reveal this level of distrust with the unit leadership.
2
Due to the low number of female unit members, the survey did not include
data regarding the female response to this inquiry.
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ii. Allegations of Misconduct: Hazing, Bullying, Maltreatment:
Army Regulation 600-20, Army Command Policy, paragraph 4-19(a)

clearly defines both hazing and bullying as two separate concepts:
(1) Hazing. Any conduct whereby a service member or members

regardless of service, rank, or position, and without proper authority, recklessly
or intentionally causes a service member to suffer or be exposed to any activity
that is cruel, abusive, humiliating, oppressive, demeaning, or harmful. Soliciting
or coercing another to participate in any such activity is also considered hazing.
Hazing need not involve physical contact among or between military members or
employees; it can be verbal or psychological in nature. Likewise, it need not be
committed in the physical presence of the victim; it may be accomplished through
written or phone messages, text messages, email, social media, or any other
virtual or electronic medium. Actual or implied consent to acts of hazing does not
eliminate the culpability of the perpetrator. Without outside intervention, hazing
conduct typically stops at an identified end-point.
(2) Bullying. Bullying is any conduct whereby a service member or

members, regardless of service, rank, or position, intends to exclude or reject
another service member through cruel, abusive, humiliating, oppressive,
demeaning, or harmful behavior, which results in diminishing the other
Servicemember’s dignity, position, or status. Absent outside intervention,
bullying will typically continue without any identifiable end-point. Bullying may
include an abuse of authority. Bullying tactics include, but are not limited to,
making threats, spreading rumors, social isolation, and attacking someone
physically, verbally, or through the use of electronic media.3
Hazing may occur when otherwise authorized or permissible conduct

crosses the line into impermissible conduct. Bullying is always committed with
the intent to exclude or reject another from inclusion in a group. This intent
element poses significant impediments to a successful charge of violating AR
600-20 by bullying as it is frequently difficult to show that the conduct, albeit
extreme, was done with the intent to “exclude” or “reject” the recipient.
Nevada Revised Statute (NRS) section 412.494 defines “maltreatment” of

a subordinate as:
Any person subject to this chapter who is guilty of cruelty toward, or

oppression or maltreatment of, any person subject to his orders shall
be punished as a court-martial may direct.
3
The DEOMI initiated survey uses the definitions of hazing and bullying set forth in Deputy Secretary of Defense
Memorandum, "Hazing and Bullying Prevention and Response in the Armed Forces," dated 23 December 2015.

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iii. Discrimination/Hostile Environment:
The glossary to CNGBI 9600.01, 27 Sep 2015, defines the terms

“unlawful discrimination,” “gender discrimination,” and “hostile work
environment”6 as:
Unlawful discrimination: Unfair or unequal treatment of an individual or

group on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or sexual orientation, national
origin, age (40 or older), disability, reprisal, or genetic information. It may take
the form of a hostile work environment.
Sexual harassment: Any unwelcome conduct that is based on sex

or sexual orientation, including unwelcome advances for sex or physical
contact, requests for favors involving sex or other verbal or physical
conduct of that nature, particularly when submission to such conduct is
made directly or indirectly as a term or condition of employment, or when
submission to or rejection of such conduct is used as a basis for an
employment decision affecting the person. The conduct must be pervasive
or severe enough to significantly and adversely alter the conditions of the
victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment. The
behavior in question is evaluated from the standpoint of a reasonable
person, taking into account the particular context in which it occurred.
Unless the conduct is very severe, a single incident or group of isolated
incidents will not be regarded as discriminatory
Hostile work environment: Discriminatory conduct or behavior in

the workplace that is unwelcome and offensive to an employee or group of
employees based on race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy) or
sexual orientation, national origin, age (40 or older), disability or genetic
information. The conduct or behavior must be pervasive and constitute a
pattern rather than consist of one or two isolated incidents. The pattern of
behavior has to be of a degree severe enough to cause disruption beyond a
reasonable degree in the work of the targeted employee such as when the
employee becomes disturbed because of intimidation or due to fear of loss
of employment. The complainant must have reason to believe that such
behavior patterns are likely to continue indefinitely. Offensive conduct may
include, but is not limited to, offensive jokes, slurs, epithets or name
calling, physical assaults or threats, intimidation, ridicule or mockery,
insults or put-downs, offensive objects or pictures, and interference with
work performance. The harasser can be the victim’s supervisor, a
supervisor in another area, an agent of the employer, a co-worker, or a
non-employee. The victim does not have to be the person harassed, but
can be anyone affected by the offensive conduct. The discrimination may
occur without economic injury to, or discharge of, the victim.
6
See also AR 600-20, paragraphs 6-2(c) and 7-6(b)
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89% of females indicated that they felt that sexual harassment was not
occurring. Within the written comments to the survey, there were indications
that name calling and sexist comments were used within the unit.
On the other hand, the in-person interviews provide an indication that

there are concerns regarding perceived sexual harassment within this unit that
may rise to the level of a hostile work environment. As previously discussed,
there are indications that both junior and senior level NCOs within this unit
engaged in a long-standing practice of maltreating subordinates. Although
there are indications within the material considered by the assessment team
that the unit NCOs maltreated both male and female subordinates, there are
also indications that they focused their abuse on female members because of
their gender.
Some of the particular information indicating a hostile work environment

may exist within the AASF (North Hanger) and 2/238th is that there are
accounts that NCOs would make open comments such as “female soldiers
should be doing the cleaning as that is their purpose in life;” female soldiers
would be told that they were being “cunts” if they complained about their
working conditions or treatment; telling female soldiers: “I am not arguing with
you, you’re a female, it’s pointless;” and stating in front of other members
words to the effect of “you have to talk to an aircraft like it’s a woman, nicely,
otherwise it breaks down.”
Under the definition as stated in CNGBI 9600.01, a reasonable observer

could conclude that such comments constitute sexual harassment; that they
had a severely demoralizing effect on the female members of the unit; and that
the comments were part of an ongoing pervasive pattern of abuse of
subordinates.
1/189th: Due to the low number of female respondents, this unit’s

DEOMI survey contained limited information pertaining to the female unit
members’ perspectives on sexual harassment and discrimination. However,
the overall EO/EEO climate data as reflected in the table at page 5 of the
survey indicates that there is a perception across most categories that
discrimination occurs within the unit. Specifically, only 76% of minorities and
79% of majority participants responded favorably to questions pertaining to
discrimination within the unit.
These results do not correlate to the information obtained during the in-
person interviews. Other than a known complaint of gender based
discrimination there were no indications from the interviews of any systemic
concerns of non-gender based discrimination occurring within the NVNG
elements of the 1/189th.

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HHC, 991st TC: The DEOMI survey revealed a mild perception that
discrimination may be occurring within this unit. This perception was most
prevalent within the minority, male, and officer population subgroups of
respondents. Only 72% of the participants overall responded favorably to
questions regarding discrimination within the unit. Nearly 88% of female
participants responded favorably to questions regarding sexual harassment
within the unit.
iv. Allegations of Reprisal:
Under the EEOC’s broad view of reprisal, any adverse treatment that
is based upon a retaliatory motive and is reasonably likely to deter the
charging party or others from engaging in protected activity, states a claim.
Retaliation (a.k.a. “reprisal”) means treating employees badly because they
complained about discrimination on the job, filed a discrimination charge or
complaint, or participated in any manner in an employment discrimination
proceeding.
Thus, to assert a claim of reprisal, the Federal employee need only

allege sufficient facts to show a prima-facie claim of reprisal under the
EEOC’s standard. 7
Across the board, the unit level DEOMI surveys indicated a moderate
degree of concern regarding the perception of retaliation/reprisal. The
following percentile responded favorably to questions asserting that
retaliation/reprisal were not a concern in the unit: 3/140th 84%; 1/189th 84%;
7
See Lindsey v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05980410 (November
4, 1999) (citing EEOC Compliance Manual, No. 915.003 (May 20, 1998)). The EEOC’s
elements of a reprisal claim are:
1) he or she engaged in a protected EEO activity (this need not be an actual EEO
complaint);
(2) the agency was aware of the protected EEO activity;
(3) subsequently, he or she was subjected to adverse treatment by the agency;
and,
(4) a nexus exists between the protected activity and the adverse treatment.
Although NG-PAM 600-22, Investigating Military Discrimination Complaints, paragraph F7-A

defines the elements of a retaliation as necessitating either command action or withholding of
a favorable action by the command; the EEOC has recognized that retaliation can include
treatment by co-workers that management was either aware of or should have been aware of
and failed to take action.

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Additionally, the lack of Aviation battalion level staffing impedes the
professional development/career advancement of both aviation officers and
non-commissioned officers. The state leadership informed the team that they
are aware of this impact on officer/NCO career progression and professional
development. As a result, NVNG senior leadership is considering approaching
the California National Guard to develop a cooperative arrangement under
which NVNG mid-career aviators could rotate to developmental assignments
with the larger CANG aviation structure. However, this plan is still in the
developmental phase and has not been implemented to date.
The lack of an aviation battalion level structure also impedes the efficient
resourcing of aviation related procurements which may not otherwise be
replicated in other procurement channels. For example, many personnel
expressed concerns that the units were unable to procure the appropriate flight
gear/suits and batteries for their night vision goggles necessary to conduct safe
flight operations. Many expressed concerns that this unnecessarily impedes
their ability to adequately prepare for their upcoming deployments.
Based on the in-person interviews, it is clear that senior state leadership

is aware of the structurally related detrimental impacts on the aviation units
within the 991st TC and is actively working to address the situation. Several
leaders indicated an immediate recognition that aviation battalion staff level
structure needs to be reinstated into the 991st TC.
ii. “Us vs. Them”:
Both the written comments to the DEOMI survey and the in-person
interviews reveal a significant level of friction between the 991st HHC/aviation
related units and elements of the NVNG leadership team. This friction seems to
stem from several sources:
1. The LCC’s Withholding Policy:
As discussed in greater detail in the next Line of Effort, the LCC issued a
notification and disciplinary withholding policy that effectively removed
investigatory and disciplinary authority from subordinate commanders for
certain misconduct and all technician related allegations. Aviation related units
have a relatively high concentration of technicians and a large percentage of
the alleged misconduct is occurring in a technician status; therefore, it is
perceived that the withholding policy is having a disproportionately negative
impact on the ability of aviation related commanders to address allegations of
misconduct at their level. This significantly frustrates the detachment
command level leadership/AASF management as they perceive that they have
little to no visibility or control over the disposition of relatively low-level
allegations of misconduct.
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and under NRS §412.494 for those within 2/238th who have engaged in the
pattern of abusive behavior.
4. Establish a dedicated AGR senior NCO position within the AASF/LAASF

to assist the facility managers in the direct oversight and management of the
NCO/technician workforce. Increase frequency of senior leader/senior NCO
visitation and interaction with the aviation related units and AASF/LAASF.
5. Cease the practice of direct communication between staff members of

senior state leadership and unit level personnel. All communications regarding
working conditions at the unit level should be directed to the appropriate
channel of redress (unit level chain of command, labor relations, MEO/EEO
programs, SAPR, or IG).
6. Immediately modify or discontinue use of the LCC’s notification and

withholding policy, particularly as it pertains to allegations of technician
misconduct.
7. NVNG senior leadership should review the 991st TC commander’s denial

of the conditional release request submitted by an aviator within the 1/189th
(NVNG).

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LINE OF EFFORT B:
Management and Administration of
the Full-time Support Personnel

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AR 15-6 does not provide the subject the right to review all the material
in an AR 15-6 Investigation and an opportunity to rebut the allegations before
the determination of adverse action (in the actions taken, technician letters of
reprimand were issued).13
A review of AR 15-6 investigations conducted regarding allegations of

technician misconduct revealed that the resulting reports of investigation did
not comply with due process requirements for an investigation used to address
adverse actions involving a technician.
There were no opportunities for representation, no opportunity to review

all evidence used for the adverse action with an opportunity to respond before a
decision was rendered, and no information provided regarding appellate
rights.14 In some instances it was not clear that bargaining unit members were
informed of their Weingarten Rights or their rights to representation.
Due to a lack of properly functioning command support programs and

the LCC’s withholding policy, notification of misconduct was not properly
routed through the chain of command or chain of supervision for resolution.
This has engendered an atmosphere of suspicion, rumor, and a lack of trust in
the investigation process and the command from complainants, witnesses,
subjects, service members, subordinate commanders and the LCC.
Interviews with pertinent staff members regarding the organizational

processing of these allegations of misconduct which crossed technician and
military status revealed confusion regarding the appropriate response
Massey v. Department of the Army, 120 M.S.P.R. 226, ¶¶ 8-10 (2013) (reversing the action on due process grounds
when the oral reply was never heard because of conflicting interpretations of the agency’s instructions on the
deadline for the oral reply, which could have meant either make the reply by that date, or make the appointment by
that date). Hodges v. U.S. Postal Service, 118 M.S.P.R. 591, ¶ 6 (2012) (reversing the agency’s action because the
deciding official did not consider the employee’s response); Alford v. Department of Defense, 118 M.S.P.R. 556, ¶¶
5-7 (2012) (same). See Stone v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 179 F.3d 1368, 1376-77 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(discussing the right to a meaningful opportunity to reply).
13
The agency is required to state the reasons for the proposed adverse action in sufficient detail to allow the
employee to make an informed reply. Plath v. Department of Justice, 12 M.S.P.R. 421, 424 (1982). But, nothing in
law or regulation requires that an agency affix a label to a charge of misconduct. If an agency so chooses, it may
simply describe actions that constitute misbehavior in a narrative form, and have its discipline sustained if the
efficiency of the service suffers because of the misconduct. But, if an agency chooses to label an act of misconduct,
then it is bound to prove the elements that make up the legal definition of that charge, if there are any. Otero v. U.S.
Postal Service, 73 M.S.P.R. 198, 202 (1997). See, e.g., Ludlum v. Department of Justice, 278 F.3d 1280, 1283-84
(Fed. Cir. 2002) (explaining that “[l]ack of candor and falsification are different, although related, forms of
misconduct, and the latter is not a necessary element of the former”); King v. Nazelrod, 43 F.3d 663, 665 (Fed. Cir.
1994) (explaining that if an agency charges an employee with “theft,” the agency may be required to prove the
“intent to permanently deprive the owner of possession and use of the property”)
14 See TPR 752, Discipline and Adverse Action, August 27, 2010. 4-2. Procedures
All adverse actions may have the following steps: 1. Proposed action letter (mandatory); 2. Technician’s response (responses may
be made by or on behalf of the technician at the technician’s option, but are not required); 3. Original decision letter (mandatory);
4. Technician’s appeal (Appeals may be made by or on behalf of the technician, at the technician’s option, but are not required);
and 5. Final decision letter (mandatory if technician appeals).
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procedures. There was a general erroneous belief that once an AR 15-6
investigation was initiated that concurrent investigations or other investigatory
methods were prohibited.
There is no evidence, other than reference to the ability to obtain

Employee Assistance Program referral that technicians were informed of any
potential grievance or appeal rights they had to the TAG, to the MSPB or
EEOC.
c. Best Practices: Using TPRs for Non- Disciplinary and Disciplinary

Actions for Technician Misconduct
Since 2017, several major legal changes have affected the full time
National Guard force which directly affect the way the Adjutants Generals
manage the full-time force through his or her commanders, managers, and
supervisors.
The most dramatic change was that Congress granted limited oversight
by non-military federal administrative agencies over technicians.
Specifically, Congress in NDAA 2016 amended 32 U.S.C. § 709 granting

limited MSPB and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)15
rights to National Guard technicians to file administrative complaints unless
the issue occurred when the technician was in a “military pay status” or the
issue regarded “fitness for duty in the reserve components.”16
In addition, Congress made the Adjutants Generals the “sole defendant”

for any “administrative complaint” before the MSPB or EEOC. Congress also
required that the state National Guard shall “defend” the action, and if there is
a settlement or judgment, that settlement or judgement will be “paid from its
appropriated funds.”17
Therefore, it is now imperative that the NVNG maintain and implement

proper standards for discipline for misconduct required for the federal civilian
workforce. This includes ensuring that supervisors and managers have the
ability to maintain conduct standards; to investigate allegations of misconduct
within the proper channels; and to enforce discipline in accordance with TPR
715 and 752 for dual status military technicians (technicians). Otherwise, a
state’s National Guard’s operations and maintenance budget can be at risk
from the costs of administrative litigation, potential settlements, and
judgments at the MSPB or EEOC.
The practical effect of the LCC’s withholding policy is that the

supervisors within the AASF and LAASF are limited to oral counseling sessions.
15
32 U.S.C. § 709(f)(5)
16
32 U.S.C. §709(f)(4)
17
10 U.S.C. § 10508 (3)(A) through (E)
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Oral counseling is not considered sufficient discipline in accordance with
Merits System Principles.
Before using discipline, supervisors should ensure that their employees

understand the rules. It is possible that misbehaving employees would have
complied with agency requirements if they had understood what was required.
However, not every workplace rule must be specified. For example,

supervisors should be able to assume that employee knows they are not
permitted to report for work under the influence of illegal substances.
Supervisors should be able to assume that employees know they are not
permitted to be discourteous to colleagues in the workplace.18 When an
employee is aware—or should reasonably be aware—of management’s
expectations, and chooses to violate those expectations, discipline may be
necessary to modify the employee’s behavior.
Before management takes a form of discipline involving a letter of

reprimand, a suspension, a reduction in grade,
pay, or a removal, a federal employee is entitled to a certain process.
This is often referred to as “due process” (because it is a process due to
employees) or “procedural rights” (because employees have a right to these
procedures).
The first formal procedural right is the employee’s right to be notified of

what the employee is being charged with having done and what disciplinary
action management is considering imposing. The employee is then provided an
opportunity to explain to the deciding official either why the charges are not
accurate, or why the proposed punishment is not appropriate. The employee
has a right to be represented in this process, either by an attorney, a union
officer, or another person authorized by the employee.
The agency official who will decide what action to ultimately take (the
deciding official) then has a responsibility to consider the reply of the employee,
any evidence supplied by the employee, and the evidence upon which the
proposing official based his recommendation.
18
See TPR 752, Table D-1. Penalty Guide. Item 10a. Discourtesy (Non-discriminatory). The Board stated in Coons
v. Department of the Navy, 15 M.S.P.R. 1 (1983), the standards of conduct are largely a matter of common sense
and cover an area which employees are presumed to know. There is no legal requirement upon an agency to
describe in detail all potentially proscribed employee conduct and related discipline. See Brown v. Federal Aviation
Administration, 15 M.S.P.R. 224 (1983), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 735 F.2d 543 (Fed. Cir.
1984). (1983).

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Evidence cannot be considered unless the employee was informed of it
and given an opportunity to rebut it.
In the Federal civil service, the charges underlying an adverse action for
misconduct must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence—it must be
more likely than not that the employee did what the employee has been
charged with doing.19
Any investigative method or process may be used provided that the

technician’s “Weingarten Rights” are not violated. 20
If the deciding official finds that a preponderance of the evidence

supports the charges, there is another decision the official must make—the
appropriate penalty.
TPR 752 has a table of penalties that guides deciding officials in

determining what penalty is likely to be appropriate.
Furthermore, there is generally a scale to the recommended penalty. For

example, if a NVNG technician reports to duty under the influence of alcohol,
the penalty for a first offense may range from a reprimand to removal,
depending upon how much the intoxication interfered with the maintenance of
discipline, how much it affected the individual’s ability to perform assigned
duties, and whether the safety of personnel or property was placed in danger.
As with any well-drafted table of penalties, these tables warn the reader
that the table is only guidance and supervisors must exercise their own
judgment. “Ideally, selection should be made of the least severe penalty
necessary to correct misconduct and to discourage repetition. However, it is
important to note that the supervisor retains full authority to set penalties as
he/she deems appropriate based on the particular circumstances and
specifications of the offense.” Thus, the table is only a guide, and a penalty
outside the table’s recommended range may be used when the situation
warrants it.
A deciding official may implement the level of discipline recommended in

the notice of proposed action, or a lesser penalty. However, a greater penalty
may not be used unless the employee was notified that the greater penalty was
19
For an agency’s action taken for conduct to be sustained before the MSPB, the agency must establish that there is a
“degree of relevant evidence that a reasonable person, considering the record as a whole, would accept as sufficient
to find that a contested fact is more likely to be true than untrue.” 5 CFR § 1201.56.
20
TPR 752 Glossary, Section II, Terms , Weingarten rights: Refers to the right of a bargaining unit employee to be
represented by the union when (1) the employee is examined in an investigation conducted by one or more
representatives; (2) the employee reasonably believes disciplinary action against him or her may result; and (3) the
employee requests union representation.
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under consideration and was provided the opportunity to provide arguments
against that greater penalty.
When a deciding official reaches a decision to implement discipline, the

military technician general will be provided the opportunity to grieve or appeal
the decision and the penalty. An employee (who meets the legal definition of an
employee at 5 U.S.C. § 7511) may have a statutory right to appeal a
suspension of more than 14 days, a change to a lower grade, or a removal for
cause to the Merit Systems Protection Board, if the misconduct did not occur
while the technician was in a military pay status or did not concern fitness for
duty in the reserve components.
If the employee is a member of a collective bargaining unit, the collective

bargaining agreement (CBA) may provide further options, such as a grievance
which may lead to an arbitration, depending upon the content of the CBA as
agreed to by the bargaining unit and agency management. However, once an
employee selects one avenue for redress, the employee cannot later make use of
the other.
The LCC’s notification and withdrawal policy does not provide for any of
the above statutory or regulatory requirements for managing and/or
disciplining technicians.
d. Best Practice: Investigating Allegations of Technician Misconduct

Using TPRs:
AR 15-6, paragraphs (1)-(5), provides that AR 15-6 procedures may be

made applicable to investigations authorized by another regulation or directive,
but in the case of a conflict between another regulation and AR 15-6, the
provisions of the specific regulations should apply.21
Under that provision, in matters where investigations of technician

misconduct are being considered, the NVNG is required to adhere to the
requirements of TPR 752 for “due process” because that is the more specific
regulation or directive regarding investigation of misconduct by a technician.
TPR 752 allows a supervisor to conduct a rapid management directed

inquiry into allegations of misconduct. This informal investigative process
allows a supervisor/manager to quickly gather the information necessary to
determine the validity of an allegation of misconduct. Under this process, there
is no need for a formal appointment memorandum for an investigating officer
nor any requirement for a formal written report of investigation prior to
21
In case of a conflict between the provisions of this regulation, when made applicable to an investigation or board
that is authorized by another regulation or directive, and the provisions of the specific regulation or directive
authorizing the investigation or board, the latter will govern. AR 15-6, para. 1-5
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presentations need to be updated with the latest guidance. Additionally, the
HRO should also include guidance on how to counsel/document both
performance and conduct related issues for technicians and T5s. The
curriculum would also benefit from an enhanced discussion of how technician
supervisors can quickly act under the TPRs and management directed inquiry
process to address command climate concerns such as
hazing/bullying/maltreatment/reprisal/and/or hostile work environments.
The team was also informed that the NVNG recently

terminated/suspended the requirement for unit leadership to attend the
“Company Commander’s Course.” This course is uniquely designed to inform
and educate the detachment/company leadership teams on regarding the wide
variety of issues that unit level leadership teams will face during command. It
is our understanding that the NVNG leadership team has recognized the
importance of this course and is working to re-institute the course as early as
August 2019. A review of the proposed course curriculum identified a critical
omission of a discussion of civilian personnel management and the proper
methods that M-Day commanders should take in coordinating discipline for
those in their command who are also technicians and/or T5s. Additionally, the
course does not place an appropriate emphasis on the role the leadership team
plays in ensuring a positive command climate and the
investigatory/disciplinary options at the command’s disposal to
address/prevent abusive workplace behavior.
Supervisors, managers, and commanders lack the necessary knowledge

regarding essential changes which have affected the technician workforce and
their own responsibilities to ensure compliance with those changes as required
by the merits system principles. This has resulted in a deterioration in the
Organization Processes in the 991st TC that extends to command support
programs MEO/EEO and SAPR programs.
f. Initiation of Flags Under AR 600-8-2:
During the interviews, many personnel expressed concern regarding the

manner and mechanism by which the command was imposing Flags under AR
600-8-2 for personnel who were either subjects and/or witnesses to AR 15-6
investigations. The team did not verify this practice nor obtain data to either
confirm or deny these concerns. Other than what was stated in the interviews,
there is no indication that the command is actually flagging witnesses rather
than subjects or personnel for whom the investigation may potentially result in
disciplinary or adverse administrative action. Flagging witnesses is not merited
under AR 600-8-2, paragraph 2-1(e), unless it becomes apparent during the
course of the investigation that they may potentially be subject to disciplinary
or adverse action.

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Additionally, many expressed concerns that personnel were not being
properly counseled under AR 600-8-2, paragraph 2-6 upon the initiation of a
Flag. Numerous unit level personnel indicated that they had been flagged but
had not received the required counseling/notification under paragraph 2-6.
The team does not have sufficient data to confirm these concerns.
From the information gathered, it appears the NVNG has a consistent

practice of flagging technicians under AR 600-8-2 for investigations related to
conduct that occurs in a technician status. Although it is not clear that AR
600-8-2 was intended to allow or require commands to initiate a Flag for
technician related conduct, the regulation does allow/require NG commanders
to initiated Flags for M-Day personnel who are being investigated for off-duty
misconduct that has a punishable service nexus. Therefore, to the extent that
technician conduct could be considered off duty misconduct with a service
nexus, it may be appropriate to initiate a Flag under those circumstances.
Under the standard set forth in paragraph 2-1(e), the requirement to

initiate a Flag is not limited to the initiation of an AR 15-6 investigation but
also extends to any military or civilian investigation or inquiry. This clearly
encompasses management directed inquiries conducted within the AASF for
allegations of technician misconduct.
g. Re-Alignment of AASF/LAASF Workforce to AGR:
The current practice of manning the AASF/LAASF workforce with

technicians is rooted in the long history of the NG technician program and a
recognition that the technician program has unique characteristics that
facilitate the longevity of maintenance personnel in particular. When coupled
with a perceived limitation on the use of AGRs to conduct equipment/aircraft
maintenance, this results in a primarily technician workforce within the
AASF/LAASF, both within the NVNG and nationally.
However, the perceived limitation on using AGRs to maintain either

equipment or aircraft is not supported by either current law or policy. AR
135-18, The Active Guard Reserve Program, dated 29 Sep 17, clearly
envisions that AGRs can be used to maintain both aircraft and
equipment. Specifically, paragraph 1.6 provides:
“Objectives: The objective of the AGR Program is to provide selected

officers, warrant officers, and enlisted Soldiers to administer;
instruct; organize; recruit and train as needed to meet the full-time
support and readiness requirements for ARNGUS, ARNG, and
USAR projects, programs, and missions. This includes but is not
limited to the maintenance of supplies, equipment, aircraft; and
the performance of other coordinating functions as required on a
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particular, the MEO/EEO and SAPR portions should be revised. Additionally,
emphasis should be placed on preventing abusive command climates as well as
the proper methods of managing, counseling, investigating, and disciplining
technicians.
6. Require 100% attendance for technician supervisor training and

increase the frequency of training with mobile training to occur throughout the
state to ensure 100% participation and increase participation to include AGR
and M-Day Senior Leaders, commanders, and NCOs.
7. The NVNG should conduct an assessment of the viability/desirability

of realigning some or all of the technician workforce within the AASF/LAASF to
AGR status.

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LINE OF EFFORT C:
Command Support Programs-
MEO/EEO and SAPR

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Under these regulations, TAG, in the MEO context, is required to
establish the State’s Discrimination Complaint Program and is to act as the
state’s final arbiter. The final determination of any formal MEO complaint
rests with CNGB, who has delegated this authority to NGB-EO-CMA.
The SEEM serves as TAG’s central point of contact and manager for all
complaints of discrimination arising within the State’s National Guard, and
must have direct access to TAG. In accordance with CNGBI 9601.01, the
SEEM is to:
 Monitor and track the progress of all open and closed MEO complaints
 Timely coordinate and notify NGB-EO-CMA of all complaints, both formal
and informal so the complaints can be tracked and accounted for.
 Ensure no fewer than two EO counselors/professionals in each unit (the
Army refers to these EO personnel as Equal Opportunity Leaders (EOLs)
and/or Equal Opportunity Advisors (EOAs)23.
 Provide EO professionals adequate resources to accomplish their fact-
finding and resolutions responsibilities
 Require that MEO training is provided to MEO professionals IAW NGB,
Army, Air Force, and DOD rules, regulations, and policies.
Under this paradigm, complaints are to be received and processed at the

lowest level by EO counselors in coordination with the SEEM and NGB-EO-
CMA.
Commanders, Supervisors, and Managers are to:
 Investigate and process all complaints IAW the procedures in CNGBI

9601.01 and CNGBM 9601.01
 Brief unit members and employees annually about their right to file
discrimination complaints
 Disseminate information on how to file complaints, and the time limits
for such filing and processing of the complaint
 Permanently post required information on easily accessible bulletin
boards for all applicable personnel to review
 Take action to end unlawful discrimination or sexual harassment when a
formal complaint is substantiated
 Carry out personnel actions fairly and offer all members an equal
opportunity to advance in the organization
 Allow personnel with the collateral MEO duties, whether civilian or
military, sufficient duty time to perform their MEO functions
23
See NGR 600-21, “Equal Opportunity Program in the Army National Guard,” 22 May 2017
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 Allow complainants and their representatives reasonable amounts of

duty time during both fact-finding and investigatory phases of the
complaint process to pursue the complaint
 Promote the use of Alternative Dispute Resolution to resolve disputes
under his/her jurisdiction
b. NVNG’s Failure to Properly Implement MEO or EEO Processes:
The team interviewed the SEEM to discuss the states complaint process
and to determine if the state is following established processes outlined in
CNGBI/M 9601.01. Based on the information the team discovered throughout
the assessment, it was clear that a number of processes and procedures were
not being followed.
The assessment revealed that the SEEM is disregarding all of the

processing provisions of NGR 600-21 and CNGBI/M 9601.01. Instead of
directing complaints of discrimination to the unit level EO counselors for intake
and processing, the SEEM conducts all of the intake, processing, and
resolution of complaints at her level. This results in a lack of visibility or
awareness of EO issues at the unit EO counselor/command level.
Commanders are not appropriately provided the opportunity to resolve
complaints IAW with proper regulations, nor do they have the visibility of
complaints that are handled by JFHQ.
In effect the SEEM has created an informal MEO process that is not
based on either law or policy. The SEEM has also disregarded the regulatory
obligation to issue a state NG level regulation establishing a civilian EEO
complaint process for technicians and Title 5s employees.
The SEEM inappropriately advised the LCC and CoS to investigate all
discrimination complaints (civilian or military) through the AR 15-6 process at
the LCC/CoS level., ignoring both the clearly delineated process outlined in
CNGBM 9601.01 and the federal sector EEO processing requirements under 29
CFR 1614.
The SEEM justified the use of the AR 15-6 process because most
complaints involved conduct occurring in both a technician and M-Day status.
However, this practice is directly contrary to the investigatory requirements of
CNGBM 9601.01; Department of Defense Instruction 1400.25, Volume 1614;
and 29 CFR 1614.
This does not justify the failure to inform a technician that they may be
able to file an EEO complaint for actions occurring as a technician and MEO
complaint concerning M-Day conduct.
The failure to inform technician complainants of their EEOC rights and

the failure to have an established EEO process are potentially violations of the
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merits system principles, prohibited personnel practice, and violations of the
requirements of EEOC Management Directive 110.24
Recently revised 10 U.S.C. § 1050825 requires the Adjutants Generals to

be considered “the Head of the Agency” for any “administrative complaint”
before the EEOC and the “sole defendant” in any administrative action
pertaining to that complaint. The statute also requires the use of state NG
appropriated funds to satisfy any settlement or judgment. As such, it is
imperative that TAG publish a civilian EEO complaint process as required by
CNGBN 9600 and diligently follow the process therein.
The lack of a civilian EEO complaint process at the state level coupled
with the practice of using AR 15-6 to investigate civilian complaints also runs
the risk that the EEOC will indefinitely toll the statute of limitations for filing a
complaint. This could also lead to indefinite and significant liability for the
NVNG.
The SEEM routinely disregards the requirement to notify NGB-EO-CMA

of each complaint and to obtain a tracking number before returning it to the
unit level EO counselor for processing. Failure to follow this process results in
inadequate NGB oversight/visibility of complaints and impedes resolution at
the lowest level, both of which are DOD regulatory requirements for the
National Guard MEO program.
Unit level EO counselor positions are either vacant or the incumbents are
improperly trained. In fact, some EO counselors did not know they had been
identified as an EO counselor and displayed no knowledge of either the MEO or
EEO processing requirements or EEO/MEO principles in general. Unit
personnel were unable to identify their EO/EOA or the SEEM.
24
5 U.S.C. § 2301(b)(2) reads: “Federal personnel management should be implemented with the following merits
system principles: (2) All employees and applicants for employment should receive fair and equitable treatment in
all aspects of personnel management without regard to political affiliation, race, color, religion, national origin, sex,
marital status, age, or handicapping condition, and with proper regard for their privacy and constitutional rights;” 5
U.S.C. §2302 (b) reads: “Any employee who has authority to take, direct others to take, recommend, or approve any
personnel action, shall not, with respect to such authority--(1)discriminate for or against any employee or applicant
for employment--(A)on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, as prohibited under section
717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-16);” “[W]hen an aggrieved individual seeks EEO counseling,
the EEO Counselor begins their role of educator and must ensure that the aggrieved individual understands his/her
rights and responsibilities in the EEO process…” EEOC MD 110, Chapter 2, Section III, Roles and Responsibilities
of an EEO Counselor; “Depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case, an aggrieved person may have
options other than the Part 1614 procedure available in pursuit of a discrimination claim. The individual, in some
cases, may have to elect the process s/he wishes to pursue… As such, EEO Counselors must be familiar with these
procedures and be able to identify such cases when the aggrieved person first seeks counseling.” EEOC MD 110,
Chapter 2, Section IV B. Initial Interview Session
25
10 U.S.C. § 10508 (3)(A) through (E)

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There was no visible information posted on bulletin boards or high traffic
areas explaining the MEO process and contact information of MEO
professionals.
c. Training:
The unit training records indicate that annual required training is being
regularly conducted. However, persons providing the training are not identified
as the unit’s EO counselor/EOA and many are not officially trained to provide
the training. The training reference materials were based on programs and
policies pertaining primarily to the Active Component which do not directly
apply to the non-federalized National Guard.26 The result is that the vast
majority of the unit personnel interviewed were unaware of the process of filing
a complaint of discrimination.
2. SARC/SAPR:
The SAPR program is separate and apart from matters of sexual

harassment and EO. It is imperative to define the differences in order to
ensure the complainant is directed to proper channels and that appropriate
procedures are followed. Leaders at all levels should have a clear
understanding of the SA reporting process and subordinate leaders and SMs
should have a general understanding of the process and/or be able to identify
their unit POC. The success of the SAPR program depends largely on the
SARC’s knowledge and ability to handle reports, provide training, and
mentor/monitor unit personnel assigned as SHARP or VA reps at the unit level.
a. The current SARC has been in position since OCT 2010. He is a Title
5 employee. The SARC does not conduct the case management group (CMG)
meetings as required per DoDI 6495.0227. During the interview of the SARC,
he stated that he did not conduct, nor co-chair, the required monthly CMG
meetings.28 Instead, he would place phone calls to the stakeholders he
identified as having an interest in the investigation.
The SARC
26
The training material the team reviewed referenced AR 600-20, Army Command Policy which does not apply to
the non-federalized National Guard and the materials gave a timeline of 60 days to file an MEO complaint using a
DA Form 7279-R, IAW CNGBM 9601.01, a service member has 180 days to file a request for resolution and files
an NGB Form 333. Other timelines in the training materials for the commanders are also incorrect and do not
reflect the requirements of CNGBM 9601.01, but appear to coincide with AR 600-20, Chapter 6, the Equal
Opportunity Program in the Army for the USAR, but Chapter 6 specifically does not apply to the non-federalized
National Guard as stated in the application section of AR 600-20 which reads as follows: “Chapters 6 and 7 and
appendixes E and F apply to Army National Guard Soldiers when on Active Duty Title 10 for 30 days or more, and
in all other cases, Army National Guard Soldiers are governed by NGR 600-21 and NGR 600-22” [NGR 600-22 was
rescinded and replaced by CNGBI/M 9601.01].
27
DoDI 6495.02, March 28, 2013, Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Program Procedures
Incorporating Change 3, May 24, 2017
28
IAW CNGBI 1300.01, Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program, dated 16 July 2016
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c. The NVNG is not in compliance with the MEO complaint
processing/investigatory requirements of CNGBM 9601.01 and NGR 600-21.
d. Unit level EO Counselors/EOA/EOLs positions are inadequately

identified, staffed, and trained.
e. The EEO/MEO training materials need to be updated to comply with

current regulations and policy.
f. Complaints of discrimination by the SEEM are not communicated to

TAG, NGB EO or to the EEOC as required by law and regulations.
g. Because of the SEEM’s actions, there is inadequate command

involvement in the MEO/EEO process and commanders lack the opportunities
to resolve personnel issues at the lowest level.
2. SAPR/SARC:
a. The SARC’s ability to conduct the program IAW required regulations,

policies, and procedures remains uncertain. The SARC repeatedly
demonstrates a willingness to circumvent requirements or a failure to follow
established guidelines. The SARC does not comply with DoDI 6495.02 in
processing reports of sexual assault.
b. The SARC does not provide the installation commander and the
immediate commander of the sexual assault victim (if a civilian victim, then the
immediate commander of alleged military offender) with information regarding
all Unrestricted Reports within 24 hours.
c. The SARC does not feel supported by the SHARP leadership and thus is
less willing to seek guidance or support from higher and receives less oversight.
d. POCs for VA, SHARP, and EO are not appropriately identified. The unit
level personnel do not know the few personnel that are qualified or trained.
e. Required training is not conducted to standard. The SARC should

engage himself personally in the training effort. Unit level personnel are now
doing the training ad hoc. The training is not frequent or robust enough to
ensure Soldiers are receiving and retaining the information necessary.
f. The SARC does not appropriately track the number of open cases or
their statuses.

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b. Reinstate the required monthly case management group meetings
(CMGs). The CMGs provide necessary and current information regarding all
open cases of sexual assault to the TAG and senior leadership and ensure
cases are resolved in a timely and effective manner.
c. Appoint an alternate SARC. Ensure wide dissemination of the alternate

SARCs name and contact information to the lowest level. Ensure the
SARC/alternate SARC or VA provide the installation commander and the
immediate commander of the sexual assault victim (if a civilian victim, then the
immediate commander of alleged military offender) with information regarding
all Unrestricted Reports within 24 hours of an Unrestricted Report of sexual
assault as required
d. Schedule a follow up state assistance visit with the NGB SHARP

coordinator to discuss the SARC’s program, implementation of new policies,
and a way forward to improve and maintain a robust SHARP program.
e. Immediately identify and train POCs for VA, SHARP, and EO down to
the unit level. Ensure newly appointed POCs names and contact information
are posted in all unit areas and disseminated to the lowest level.
f. Schedule, compile, and administer required training to standard by

coordinating with senior leadership and unit commanders to ensure frequent
and robust training is readily available and provided to the units as needed.

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V. Assessment Team’s Comments
Overall, the assessment identified key deficiencies in the manner in

which the NVNG and subordinate command elements investigate and address
allegations of technician misconduct and allegations of discrimination. These
deficiencies should be immediately addressed in order to ensure that the
proper command support programs are in place.
The assessment also identified that the command climate and confidence
in unit leadership within the assessed units are favorable. However, there are
significant concerns regarding the technician working environment within the
AASF North Hangar and to a lesser extent the 2/238th when the corresponding
technicians perform their M-Day service.
Statement on Handling of Federal Records. This document is a federal

record and must be maintained in accordance with applicable DoD, Army or
Air Force records retention policies and procedures. This record is also subject
to the Privacy Act of 1974 and will be handled accordingly.

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National Guard Bureau

Office of Complex Investigations

FOIA Responsive Record

Executive Summary ................................................................................. 3

Summarized Findings and Recommendations .......................................... 7

III. Background …………………………………………………………………………. 7

IV. Action Plan …………………………………………………………………………. 9

A. Command Climate/Culture ………………………………………………. 11

B. Full Time Support Management and Administration ……………. 29

C. Command Support Programs (MEO/EEO/SAPR) ………….………. 44

VI. Assessment Team's Comments …………………………………………….. 56

Appendix A: OCI Command Climate Survey 2/238th

Appendix B: OCI Command Climate Survey 1/189th

Appendix C: OCI Command Climate Survey 3/140th

Appendix D: OCI Command Climate Survey HHC, 991st TC

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOIA Responsive Record

Allegations of technician misconduct are inappropriately handled

The command climate surveys and personnel interviews identified

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOIA Responsive Record

Following a series of detailed complaints of harassment, bullying, and

a. Recent allegations that discrimination, hazing, bullying, and

b. The general culture within the aviation units of the 991st.

c. The degree to which the supervision and management of the full-time

d. The degree to which the personnel in these units understand the

The assessment was not intended to investigate the recent allegations

In November 2011, the NVNG realigned branch immaterial aviation

The 991st TC is currently composed of the 3rd Battalion, 140th Aviation

FOIA Responsive Record

The units participated in the DEOMI survey at the following approximate

B. Management and Administration of the Full-time Support Personnel;

These lines of effort are discussed in separate chapters in the following

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOIA Responsive Record

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOIA Responsive Record

2/238th: 91% of respondents indicate a high degree of trust in their

These survey results are inconsistent with the findings of

1/189th: 94% of respondents indicates that they had a high degree of

FOIA Responsive Record

Army Regulation 600-20, Army Command Policy, paragraph 4-19(a)

(1) Hazing. Any conduct whereby a service member or members

(2) Bullying. Bullying is any conduct whereby a service member or

Hazing may occur when otherwise authorized or permissible conduct

Nevada Revised Statute (NRS) section 412.494 defines “maltreatment” of

Any person subject to this chapter who is guilty of cruelty toward, or

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOIA Responsive Record

The glossary to CNGBI 9600.01, 27 Sep 2015, defines the terms

Unlawful discrimination: Unfair or unequal treatment of an individual or

Sexual harassment: Any unwelcome conduct that is based on sex

Hostile work environment: Discriminatory conduct or behavior in

FOIA Responsive Record

On the other hand, the in-person interviews provide an indication that

Some of the particular information indicating a hostile work environment

Under the definition as stated in CNGBI 9600.01, a reasonable observer

1/189th: Due to the low number of female respondents, this unit’s

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY