023 Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan

8/8/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 369
394 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan
*
G.R. No. 148560. November 19, 2001.
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

(Third Division) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
Constitutional Law; Anti-Plunder Law (R.A. 7080); Statutes;

Statutory Construction; The whole gamut of legal concepts
pertaining to the validity of legislation is predicated on the basic
principle that a legislative measure is presumed to be in harmony
with the Constitution.—Preliminarily, the whole gamut of legal
concepts pertaining to the validity of legislation is predicated on
the basic principle that a legislative measure is presumed to be in
harmony with the Constitution. Courts invariably train their
sights on this fundamental rule whenever a legislative act is
under a constitutional attack, for it is the postulate of
constitutional adjudication. This strong predilection for
constitutionality takes its bearings on the idea that it is forbidden
for one branch of the government to encroach upon the duties and
powers of another. Thus it has been said that the presumption is
based on the deference the judicial branch accords to its
coordinate branch—the legislature. If there is any reasonable
basis upon which the legislation may firmly rest, the courts must
assume that the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and
edges of its plenary powers, and has passed the law with full
knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is
right and advancing the welfare of the majority. Hence, in
determining whether the acts of the legislature are in tune with
the fundamental law, courts should proceed with judicial restraint
and act with caution and forbearance. Every intendment of the
law must be adjudged by the courts in favor of its
constitutionality, invalidity being a measure of last resort. In
construing therefore the provisions of a statute, courts must first
ascertain whether an interpretation is fairly possible to sidestep
the question of constitutionality.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Criminal Law; As it is written, the
Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined
central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016c6fc3a11dad92c213003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/221
parameters which would enable the accused to determine the

nature of his violation; As long as the law affords some
comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are
subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its
penalties, its validity will be sustained.—As it is written, the
Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined
parameters which would enable the accused to determine the
nature of his violation. Section 2 is sufficiently explicit in its
description of the acts, conduct and condi-
______________
* EN BANC.
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VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 395
tions required or forbidden, and prescribes the elements of the

crime with reasonable certainty and particularity. x x x As long as
the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would
inform those who are subject to it what conduct would render
them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. It must
sufficiently guide the judge in its application; the counsel, in
defending one charged with its violation; and more importantly,
the accused, in identifying the realm of the proscribed conduct.
Indeed, it can be understood with little difficulty that what the
assailed statute punishes is the act of a public officer in amassing
or accumulating ill-gotten wealth of at least P50,000,000.00
through a series or combination of acts enumerated in Sec. 1, par.
(d), of the Plunder Law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; “Void for Vagueness” Doctrine; A
statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general
terms are used therein, or because of the employment of terms
without defining them; much less do we have to define every word
we use.—Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to
provide for the statutory definition of the terms “combination” and
“series” in the key phrase “a combination or series of overt or
criminal acts” foundinSec.1,par.(d),andSec.2,and the word
“pattern” in Sec. 4. These omissions, according to petitioner,
render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly
vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence, violative of
his fundamental right to due process. The rationalization seems

to us to be pure sophistry. A statute is not rendered uncertain and
void merely because general terms are used therein, or because of
the employment of terms without defining them; much less do we
have to define every word we use. Besides, there is no positive
constitutional or statutory command requiring the legislature to
define each and every word in an enactment. Congress is not
restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability to
so define the words employed in a statute will not necessarily
result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the
legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole
act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; It is a well-settled principle of legal
hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their
natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification, unless
it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or special
legal meaning to those words.—It is a well-settled principle of
legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in
their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification,
unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or
special legal meaning to those words. The intention of the
lawmakers—
396
who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers—to

use statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed.
Thus, Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary contains the following
commonly accepted definition of the words “combination” and
“series:” Combination—the result or product of combining; the act
or process of combining. To combine is to bring into such close
relationship as to obscure individual characters. Series—a
number of things or events of the same class coming one after
another in spatial and temporal succession.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases;
“Combination,” Explained.—Thus when the Plunder Law speaks
of “combination,” it is referring to at least two (2) acts falling
under different categories of enumeration provided in Sec. 1, par.
(d), e.g., raids on the public treasury in Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1),
and fraudulent conveyance of assets belonging to the National
Government under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (3).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; “Series,” Explained.—On

the other hand, to constitute a “series” there must be two (2) or
more overt or criminal acts falling under the same category of
enumeration found in Sec. 1, par. (d), say, misappropriation,
malversation and raids on the public treasury, all of which fall
under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1). Verily, had the legislature
intended a technical or distinctive meaning for “combination” and
“series,” it would have taken greater pains in specifically
providing for it in the law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; “Pattern,” Explained.—As
for “pat-tern,” we agree with the observations of the
Sandiganbayan that this term
issufficientlydefinedinSec.4,inrelationtoSec.1,par.(d),andSec.2.—
As for “pattern,” we agree with the observations of the
Sandiganbayan that this term is sufficiently defined in Sec. 4, in
relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2—xxxx under Sec. 1 (d) of the
law, a ‘pattern’ consists of at least a combination or series of overt
or criminal acts enumerated in subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. 1 (d).
Secondly, pursuant to Sec. 2 of the law, the pattern of overt or
criminal acts is directed towards a common purpose or goal which
is to enable the public officer to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-
gotten wealth. And thirdly, there must either be an ‘overall
unlawful scheme’ or ‘conspiracy’ to achieve said common goal. As
commonly understood, the term ‘overall unlawful scheme’
indicates a ‘general plan of action or method’ which the principal
accused and public officer and others conniving with him follow to
achieve the aforesaid common goal. In the alternative, if there is no
such overall scheme or where the schemes or methods used by
multiple accused vary, the overt or criminal acts must form part of
a conspiracy to attain a common goal.
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VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 397
Same; Same; Criminal Law; “Void for Vagueness” Doctrine;

Words and Phrases; The “void-for-vagueness” doctrine has been
formulated in various ways, but is most commonly stated to the
effect that a statute establishing a criminal offense must define the
offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary
intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the
statute—it can only be invoked against that specie of legislation
that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified
either by a saving clause or by construction.—It cannot plausibly
be contended that the law does not give a fair warning and
sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize. Under the

circumstances, petitioner ’s reliance on the “void-for-vagueness”
doctrine is manifestly misplaced. The doctrine has been
formulated in various ways, but is most commonly stated to the
effect that a statute establishing a criminal offense must define
the offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary
intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the
statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of legislation
that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified
either by a saving clause or by construction.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Due Process; When a statute lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application, the
statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects—it
violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the
parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid, and, it
leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its
provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle.—A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In
such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two
(2) respects—it violates due process for failure to accord persons,
especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to
avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying
out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle. But the doctrine does not apply as against
legislations that are merely couched in imprecise language but
which nonetheless specify a standard though defectively phrased;
or to those that are apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable to
certain types of activities. The first may be “saved” by proper
construction, while no challenge may be mounted as against the
second whenever directed against such activities. With more
reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked where the assailed statute
is clear and free from ambiguity, as in this case.
398
Same; Same; Same; Same; The test in determining whether a

criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language
conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct
when measured by common understanding and practice; The
“vagueness” doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of
certainty for the statute to be upheld—not absolute precision or
mathematical exactitude.—The test in determining whether a

criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language
conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed
conduct when measured by common understanding and practice.
It must be stressed, however, that the “vagueness” doctrine
merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to
be upheld—not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as
petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous
specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the
statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid
merely because it might have been more explicit in its wordings or
detailed in its provisions, especially where, because of the nature
of the act, it would be impossible to provide all the details in
advance as in all other statutes.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Overbreadth Doctrine; Facial
Challenges; The allegations that the Plunder Law is vague and
overbroad do not justify a facial review of its validity.—Moreover,
we agree with, hence we adopt, the observations of Mr. Justice
Vicente V. Mendoza during the deliberations of the Court that the
allegations that the Plunder Law is vague and overbroad do not
justify a facial review of its validity—The void-forvagueness
doctrine states that “a statute which either forbids or requires the
doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application, violates the first essential of due process of law.” The
overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that “a
governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which
sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of
protected freedoms.” A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a
vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible
“chilling effect” upon protected speech. The theory is that “[w]hen
statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent
construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the
statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all
society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to
justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no
requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that
his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with
narrow specificity.” The possible harm to society in permitting
some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the
possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred
and perceived grievances left to fester
399
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 399
because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes. This

rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have
general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and,
if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may
well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful
conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances
as in the area of free speech. The overbreadth and vagueness
doctrines then have special application only to free speech cases.
They are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction;
Ambiguity, where none exists, cannot be created by dissecting parts
and words in the statute to furnish support to critics who cavil at
the want of scientific precision in the law; It will take more than
nitpicking to overturn the wellentrenched presumption of
constitutionality and validity of the Plunder Law.—In light of the
foregoing disquisition, it is evident that the purported ambiguity
of the Plunder Law, so tenaciously claimed and argued at length
by petitioner, is more imagined than real. Ambiguity, where none
exists, cannot be created by dissecting parts and words in the
statute to furnish support to critics who cavil at the want of
scientific precision in the law. Every provision of the law should
be construed in relation and with reference to every other part. To
be sure, it will take more than nitpicking to overturn the well-
entrenched presumption of constitutionality and validity of the
Plunder Law. A fortiori, petitioner cannot feign ignorance of what
the Plunder Law is all about. Being one of the Senators who voted
for its passage, petitioner must be aware that the law was
extensively deliberated upon by the Senate and its appropriate
committees by reason of which he even registered his affirmative
vote with full knowledge of its legal implications and sound
constitutional anchorage.
Criminal Law; Anti-Plunder Law; Presumption of Innocence;
“Reasonable Doubt” Standard; In a criminal prosecution for
plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always has in his favor
the presumption of innocence which is guaranteed by the Bill of
Rights, and unless the State succeeds in demonstrating by proof
beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused is
entitled to an acquittal—the use of the “reasonable doubt”
standard is indispensable to command the respect and confidence
of the community in the application of criminal law.—The
running fault in this reasoning is obvious even to the simplistic
mind. In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes,
the accused always has in his favor the presumption of innocence
which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State
succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that
culpability lies, the accused is entitled to an acquittal. The use of

the “reasonable doubt” standard is indispensable to com-
400
mand the respect and confidence of the community in the

application of criminal law. It is critical that the moral force of
criminal law be not diluted by a standard of proof that leaves
people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned. It is
also important in our free society that every individual going
about his ordinary affairs has confidence that his government
cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense without
convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost certainty.
This “reasonable doubt” standard has acquired such exalted
stature in the realm of constitutional law as it gives life to the
Due Process Clause which protects the accused against conviction
except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary
to constitute the crime with which he is charged.
Same; Same; Under Sec. 4 of the Plunder Law, what the
prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a
number of acts sufficient to form a combination or series which
would constitute a pattern and involving an amount of at least
P50,000,000.00.—The thesis that Sec. 4 does away with proof of
each and every component of the crime suffers from a dismal
misconception of the import of that provision. What the
prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a
number of acts sufficient to form a combination or series which
would constitute a pattern and involving an amount of at least
P50,000,000.00. There is no need to prove each and every other
act alleged in the Information to have been committed by the
accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. To
illustrate, supposing that the accused is charged in an
Information for plunder with having committed fifty (50) raids on
the public treasury. The prosecution need not prove all these fifty
(50) raids, it being sufficient to prove by pattern at least two (2) of
the raids beyond reasonable doubt provided only that they
amounted to at least P50,000,000.00.
Same; Same; A reading of Sec. 2 in conjunction with Sec. 4 of
the Plunder Law brings the logical conclusion that “pattern of
overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy” inheres in the very acts of accumulating, acquiring or
amassing hidden wealth—such pattern arises where the

prosecution is able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate
acts as defined in Sec. 1, par. (d).—AreadingofSec.2 in conjunction
with Sec. 4, brings us to the logical conclusion that “pattern of
conspiracy” inheres in the very acts of accumulating, acquiring or
amassing hidden wealth. Stated otherwise, such pattern arises
where the prosecution is able to prove beyond reasonable doubt
the predicate acts as defined in Sec. 1, par. (d). Pattern is merely
a by-product of the proof of the predicate acts. This conclusion is
consistent with reason and common sense.
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VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 401
There would be no other explanation for a combination or series of

overt or criminal acts to stash P50,000,000.00 or more, than “a
scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten
wealth.” The prosecution is therefore not required to make a
deliberate and conscious effort to prove pattern as it necessarily
follows with the establishment of a series or combination of the
predicate acts.
Same; Same; All the essential elements of plunder can be
culled and understood from its definition in Sec. 2, in relation to
Sec. 1, par. (d), and “pattern” is not one of them; Being a purely
procedural measure, Sec. 4 does not define or establish any
substantive right in favor of the accused but only operates in
furtherance of a remedy, it is only a means to an end, an aid to
substantive law.—We do not subscribe to petitioner’s stand.
Primarily, all the essential elements of plunder can be culled and
understood from its definition in Sec. 2, in relation to Sec. 1, par.
(d), and “pattern” is not one of them. Moreover, the epigraph and
opening clause of Sec. 4 is clear and unequivocal: SEC. 4. Rule of
Evidence.—For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder xxxx
It purports to do no more than prescribe a rule of procedure for
the prosecution of a criminal case for plunder. Being a purely
procedural measure, Sec. 4 does not define or establish any
substantive right in favor of the accused but only operates in
furtherance of a remedy. It is only a means to an end, an aid to
substantive law. Indubitably, even without invoking Sec. 4, a
conviction for plunder may be had, for what is crucial for the
prosecution is to present sufficient evidence to engender that
moral certitude exacted by the fundamental law to prove the guilt
of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, even granting for
the sake of argument that Sec. 4 is flawed and vitiated for the
reasons advanced by petitioner, it may simply be severed from the
rest of the provisions without necessarily resulting in the demise
of the law; after all, the existing rules on evidence can supplant
Sec. 4 more than enough.
Same; Same; Plunder is a malum in se which requires proof of
criminal intent.—As regards the third issue, again we agree with
Justice Mendoza that plunder is a malum in se which requires
proof of criminal intent. Thus, he says, in his Concurring Opinion
—x x x Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in se
the element of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for
plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended information alleges
that the crime of plunder was committed “willfully, unlawfully
and criminally.” It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part of
petitioner.
Same; Same; Constitutional Law; Death Penalty Law (R.A.
7659); It is now too late in the day to resurrect the issue of the
constitutionality of R.A. 7659, the same having been eternally
consigned by People v. Echega-
402
ray, 267 SCRA 682 (1997), to the archives of jurisprudential

history.—To clinch, petitioner likewise assails the validity of RA
7659, the amendatory law of RA 7080, on constitutional grounds.
Suffice it to say, however, that it is now too late in the day for him
to resurrect this long dead issue, the same having been eternally
consigned by People vs. Echegaray to the archives of
jurisprudential history. The declaration of this Court therein that
RA 7659 is constitutionally valid stands as a declaration of the
State, and becomes, by necessary effect, assimilated in the
Constitution now as an integral part of it.
Same; Same; Public Officers; Graft and Corruption; The
Plunder Law is especially designed to disentangle those ghastly
tissues of grandscale corruption which, if left unchecked, will
spread like a malignant tumor and ultimately consume the moral
and institutional fiber of our nation.—Our nation has been racked
by scandals of corruption and obscene profligacy of officials in
high places which have shaken its very foundation. The anatomy
of graft and corruption has become more elaborate in the corridors
of time as unscrupulous people relentlessly contrive more and
more ingenious ways to bilk the coffers of the government. Drastic
and radical measures are imperative to fight the increasingly

sophisticated, extraordinarily methodical and economically
catastrophic looting of the national treasury. Such is the Plunder
Law, especially designed to disentangle those ghastly tissues of
grand-scale corruption which, if left unchecked, will spread like a
malignant tumor and ultimately consume the moral and
institutional fiber of our nation. The Plunder Law, indeed, is a
living testament to the will of the legislature to ultimately
eradicate this scourge and thus secure society against the avarice
and other venalities in public office.
MENDOZA, J., Concurring in the Judgment:
Constitutional Law; Judicial Review; What footnote 4 of U.S.

v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152, 82 L. Ed. 1234, 1241
(1938), posits is a double standard of judicial review—strict
scrutiny for laws dealing with freedom of the mind or restricting
the political process, and deferential or rational basis standard of
review for economic legislation.—What footnote 4oftheCarolene
Products case posits is a double standard of judicial review: strict
scrutiny for laws dealing with freedom of the mind or restricting
the political process, and deferential or rational basis standard of
review for economic legislation. As Justice (later Chief Justice)
Fernando explained in Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Ass’n v.
The City Mayor, this simply means that “if the liberty involved
were freedom of the mind or the person, the standard for the
validity of governmental acts is much
403
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 403
more rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects
what are at the most rights of property, the permissible scope of
regulatory measures is wider.”
Same; Same; Strict scrutiny is used today to test the validity
of laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or race and
facial challenges are allowed for this purpose.—Hence, strict
scrutiny is used today to test the validity of laws dealing with the
regulation of speech, gender, or race and facial challenges are
allowed for this purpose. But criminal statutes, like the Anti-
Plunder Law, while subject to strict construction, are not subject
to strict scrutiny. The two (i.e., strict construction and strict
scrutiny) are not the same. The rule of strict construction is a rule
of legal hermeneutics which deals with the parsing of statutes to
determine the intent of the legislature. On the other hand, strict

scrutiny is a standard of judicial review for determining the
quality and the amount of governmental interest brought to
justify the regulation of fundamental freedoms. It is set opposite
such terms as “deferential review” and “intermediate review.”
Same; Same; Under deferential review, laws are upheld if they
rationally further a legitimate governmental interest, without
courts seriously inquiring into the substantiality of such interest
and examining the alternative means by which the objectives could
be achieved.—Thus, under deferential review, laws are upheld if
they rationally further a legitimate governmental interest,
without courts seriously inquiring into the substantiality of such
interest and examining the alternative means by which the
objectives could be achieved. Under intermediate review, the
substantiality of the governmental interest is seriously looked
into and the availability of less restrictive alternatives are
considered. Under strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of
compelling, rather than substantial, governmental interest and on
the absence of less restrictive means for achieving that interest.
Same; Same; “Void for Vagueness” Doctrine; Overbreadth
Doctrine; Facial Challenges; Words and Phrases; The void-for-
vagueness doctrine states that “a statute which either forbids or
requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to
its application, violates the first essential of due process of law”;
The overbreadth doctrine decrees that “a governmental purpose
may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly
and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.—Nor do
allegations that the Anti-Plunder Law is vague and overbroad
justify a facial review of its validity. The void-for-vagueness
doctrine states that “a statute which either forbids or requires the
doing of an act in terms so vague that men of
404
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and

differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due
process of law.” The over-breadth doctrine, on the other hand,
decrees that “a governmental purpose may not be achieved by
means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the
area of protected freedoms.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A facial challenge is

allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is
overbroad because of possible “chilling effect” upon protected
speech, the theory being that “[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe
speech and no readily apparent construction suggests itself as a
vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the
transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected
expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad
statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack
demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a
statute drawn with narrow specificity.—
Afacialchallengeisallowedtobemadetoavague statute and to one
which is overbroad because of possible “chilling effect” upon
protected speech. The theory is that “[w]hen statutes regulate or
proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests
itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single
prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of
constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing
attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the
person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could
not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity.” The
possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to
go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected
speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to
fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad
statutes.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The overbreadth and
vagueness doctrines have special application only to free speech
cases—they are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes.—
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes
have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very
existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone,
the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against
socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law
cannot take chances as in the area of free speech. The
overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special
application only to free speech cases. They are inapt for testing
the validity of penal statutes. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it,
in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, “we have not recognized
an ‘overbreadth’ doctrine outside the limited context of the First
Amendment.” In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, the Court ruled that
“claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases
involving
405
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 405
statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken

words” and, again, that “overbreadth claims, if entertained at all,
have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws
that are sought to be applied to protected conduct.” For this
reason, it has been held that “a facial challenge to a legislative act
is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the
challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists
under which the Act would be valid.” As for the vagueness
doctrine, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its
face only if it is vague in all its possible applications. “A plaintiff
who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot
complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of
others.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The doctrines of
strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools
developed for testing “on their faces” statutes in free speech cases
or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment Cases.—
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and
vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing “on their
faces” statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in
American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to
do service when what is involved is a criminal statute. With
respect to such statute, the established rule is that “one to whom
application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to
attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be
taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its
application might be unconstitutional.” As has been pointed out,
“vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context, like
overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation, while
statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are
invalidated [only] ‘as applied’ to a particular defendant.”
Consequently, there is no basis for petitioner’s claim that this
Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its entirety.
Anti-Plunder Law; Statutory Construction; Words and
Phrases; Resort to the deliberations in Congress will readily reveal
that the word “combination” includes at least two different overt or
criminal acts listed in R.A. No. 7080, such as misappropriation
(§1(d)(1)) and taking undue advantage of official position (§1(d)
(6)), while on the other hand, “series” is used when the offender
commits the same overt or criminal act more than once.—Thus,
resort to the deliberations in Congress will readily reveal that the
word “combination” includes at least two different overt or
criminal acts listed in R.A. No. 7080, such as misappropriation
(§1(d)(1)) and taking undue advantage of official position (§1(d)
(6)). On the other hand, “series” is used when the offender

commits the same overt or criminal act more than once. There is
no plunder if only one act is proven, even if the ill-gotten wealth
406
acquired thereby amounts to or exceeds the figure fixed by the

law for the offense (now P50,000,000.00). The overt or criminal
acts need not be joined or separated in space or time, since the
law does not make such a qualification. It is enough that the
prosecution proves that a public officer, by himself or in
connivance with others, amasses wealth amounting to at least
P50 million by committing two or more overt or criminal acts.
Same; Same; Same; A “pattern of overt or criminal acts” is
required in §4 to prove “an unlawful scheme or conspiracy,” and in
such a case, it is not necessary to prove each and every criminal act
done in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy so long as those
proven show a pattern indicating the scheme or conspiracy.—A
“pattern of overt or criminal acts” is required in §4toprove“an
unlawful scheme or conspiracy.” In such a case, it is not necessary
to prove each and every criminal act done in furtherance of the
scheme or conspiracy so long as those proven show a pattern
indicating the scheme or conspiracy. In other words, when
conspiracy is charged, there must be more than a combination or
series of two or more acts. There must be several acts showing a
pattern which is “indicative of the overall scheme or conspiracy.”
As Senate President Salonga explained, if there are 150
constitutive crimes charged, it is not necessary to prove beyond
reasonable doubt all of them. If a pattern can be shown by
proving, for example, 10 criminal acts, then that would be
sufficient to secure conviction. The State is thereby enabled by
this device to deal with several acts constituting separate crimes
as just one crime of plunder by allowing their prosecution by
means of a single information because there is a common purpose
for committing them, namely, that of “amassing, accumulating or
acquiring wealth through such overt or criminal acts.” The
pattern is the organizing principle that defines what otherwise
would be discreet criminal acts into the single crime of plunder.
Same; Same; Same; As applied to petitioner, the Anti-Plunder
Law presents only problems of statutory construction, not
vagueness or overbreadth.—As thus applied to petitioner, the
Anti-Plunder Law presents only problems of statutory
construction, not vagueness or overbreadth. In Primicias v.

Fugoso, an ordinance of the City of Manila, prohibiting the
holding of parades and assemblies in streets and public places
unless a permit was first secured from the city mayor and
penalizing its violation, was construed to mean that it gave the
city mayor only the power to specify the streets and public places
which can be used for the purpose but not the power to ban
absolutely the use of such places. A constitutional doubt was thus
resolved through a limiting construction given to the ordinance.
407
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 407
Same; Same; Same; “Void for Vagueness” Doctrine; Where the

ambiguity is not latent and the legislative intention is discoverable
with the aid of the canons of construction, the “void for vagueness”
doctrine has no application.—Where, therefore, the ambiguity is
not latent and the legislative intention is discoverable with the
aid of the canons of construction, the “void for vagueness” doctrine
has no application.
Same; Criminal Law; Crimes Mala In Se and Mala Prohibita;
Plunder is a malum in se, requiring proof of mens rea.—Plunder is
a malum in se, requiring proof of criminal intent. Precisely
because the constitutive crimes are mala in se, the element of
mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is
noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the crime
of plunder was committed “willfully, unlawfully and criminally.”
It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner.
Same; Same; Same; The application of mitigating and
extenuating circumstances in the Revised Penal Code to
prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder Law indicates quite clearly
that mens rea is an element of plunder since the degree of
responsibility of the offender is determined by his criminal intent.
—The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in
the Revised Penal Code to prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder
Law indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element of plunder
since the degree of responsibility of the offender is determined by
his criminal intent. It is true that §2 refers to “any person who
participates with the said public officer in the commission of an
offense contributing to the crime of plunder.” There is no reason
to believe, however, that it does not apply as well to the public
officer as principal in the crime. As Justice Holmes said: “We
agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws
with what they omit, but there is no canon against using common
sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean.”
Same; Same; Same; Any doubt as to whether the crime of
plunder is a malum in se must be deemed to have been resolved in
the affirmative by the decision of Congress in 1993 to include it
among the heinous crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to
death, the legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is
a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se.—Finally, any
doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must be
deemed to have been resolved in the affirmative by the decision of
Congress in 1993 to include it among the heinous crimes
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Other heinous crimes
are punished with death as a straight penalty in R.A. No. 7659.
Referring to these groups of heinous crimes, this Court held in
People v. Echegaray: x x x The legislative declaration in R.A. No.
7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that
408
it is a malum in se. For when the acts punished are inherently

immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se and it does not
matter that such acts are punished in a special law, especially
since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala
in se. Indeed, it would be absurd to treat prosecutions for plunder
as though they are mere prosecutions for violations of the
Bouncing Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of an ordinance against
jaywalking, without regard to the inherent wrongness of the acts.
Same; Same; Complex Crimes; Obviously, the legislature
views plunder as a crime as serious as robbery with homicide or
rape with homicide by punishing it with the same penalty.—But
this is also the case whenever other special complex crimes are
created out of two or more existing crimes. For example, robbery
with violence against or intimidation of persons under Art. 294,
par. 5 of the Revised Penal Code is punished with prision
correccional in its maximum period (4 years, 2 months, and 1 day)
to prision mayor in its medium period (6 years and 1 day to 8
years). Homicide under Art. 249 of the same Code is punished
with reclusion temporal (12 years and 1 day to 20 years). But
when the two crimes are committed on the same occasion, the law
treats them as a special complex crime of robbery with homicide
and provides the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for its
commission. Again, the penalty for simple rape under Art. 266-B
of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua, while that for

homicide under Art. 249 it is reclusion temporal (12 years and 1
day to 20 years). Yet, when committed on the same occasion, the
two are treated as one special complex crime of rape with
homicide and punished with a heavier penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death. Obviously, the legislature views plunder as a
crime as serious as robbery with homicide or rape with homicide
by punishing it with the same penalty.
PANGANIBAN, J., Separate Concurring Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Criminal Law; Anti-Plunder Law;

Statutory Construction; Simple statutory construction, not a
declaration of unconstitutionality, is the key to the allegedly vague
words of the Anti-Plunder Law.—Indeed, simple statutory
construction, not a declaration of unconstitutionality, is the key to
the allegedly vague words of the Anti-Plunder Law. And the most
basic rule in statutory construction is to ascertain the meaning of
a term from the legislative proceedings. Verily, in the judicial
review of a law’s meaning, the legislative intent is paramount.
Pleadings and Practice; Transcripts of Stenographic Notes;
Most of us in the legal profession are all too familiar with the
vagaries of stenographic note-taking, especially in courtrooms and
legislative halls—often,
409
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 409
transcripts of stenographic notes have portrayed lawyers,

witnesses, legislators and judges as blithering idiots, spouting
utterly nonsensical jargon and plain inanities in the course of a
proceeding.—Most of us in the legal profession are all too familiar
with the vagaries of stenographic note-taking, especially in
courtrooms and legislative halls. Too often, lawyers, parties-
litigants and even judges find themselves at the mercy of
stenographers who are unfamiliar with certain legal terms; or
who cannot hear well enough or take notes fast enough; or who
simply get confused, particularly when two or more persons
happen to be speaking at the same time. Often, transcripts of
stenographic notes have portrayed lawyers, witnesses, legislators
and judges as blithering idiots, spouting utterly nonsensical
jargon and plain inanities in the course of a proceeding. The
Record in question is no exception.
Criminal Law; Anti-Plunder Law; It goes without saying that

the legislature is well within its powers to provide higher penalties
in view of the grave evils sought to be prevented by R.A. 7080.—
Here, Mr. Justice Mendoza is referring to special complex crimes
like rape with homicide or robbery with homicide. During the
Oral Argument, he asked whether petitioner’s counsel was in fact
suggesting that such special complex crimes—a very important
part of the Revised Penal Code and well-entrenched in our penal
system—were violative of due process and the constitutional
guarantees against cruel and unusual punishment and should
also be struck down. It goes without saying that the legislature is
well within its powers to provide higher penalties in view of the
grave evils sought to be prevented by RA 7080.
Same; Same; Constitutional Law; Overbreadth Doctrine; A
statute may be said to be overbroad where it operates to inhibit the
exercise of individual freedoms affirmatively guaranteed by the
Constitution, such as the freedom of speech or religion.—In
connection with the foregoing discussion, petitioner also charges
that RA 7080 suffers from “overbreadth.” I believe petitioner
misconstrues the concept. In the very recent case People v. Dela
Piedra, this Court held: “A statute may be said to be overbroad
where it operates to inhibit the exercise of individual freedoms
affirmatively guaranteed by the Constitution, such as the freedom
of speech or religion. A generally worded statute, when construed
to punish conduct which cannot be constitutionally punished, is
unconstitutionally vague to the extent that it fails to give
adequate warning of the boundary between the constitutionally
permissible and the constitutionally impermissible applications of
the statute.
410
Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Judicial Review;

The power to construe law is essentially judicial—to declare what
the law shall be is a legislative power, but to declare what the law
is or has been is judicial.—At all events, let me stress that the
power to construe law is essentially judicial. To declare what the
law shall be is a legislative power, but to declare what the law is
or has been is judicial. Statutes enacted by Congress cannot be
expected to spell out with mathematical precision how the law
should be interpreted under any an all given situations. The
application of the law will depend on the facts and circumstances
as adduced by evidence which will then be considered, weighed
and evaluated by the courts. Indeed, it is the constitutionally

mandated function of the courts to interpret, construe and apply
the law as would give flesh and blood to the true meaning of
legislative enactments.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A law is not a mere composition,
but an end to be achieved; and its general purpose is a more
important aid to its meaning than any rule that grammar may lay
down.—A statute should be construed in the light of the objective
to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed and
should be given such construction as will advance the purpose,
suppress the mischief or evil, and secure the benefits intended. A
law is not a mere composition, but an end to be achieved; and its
general purpose is a more important aid to its meaning than any
rule that grammar may lay down. A construction should be
rejected if it gives to the language used in a statute a meaning
that does not accomplish the purpose for which the statute was
enacted and that tends to defeat the ends that are sought to be
attained by its enactment.
Same; Same; Same; “Void for Vagueness” Doctrine; To this
date, the Supreme Court has not declared any penal law
unconstitutional on the ground of ambiguity.—Against the
foregoing backdrop, I believe petitioner’s heavy reliance on the
void-for-vagueness concept cannot prevail, considering that such
concept, while mentioned in passing in Nazario and other cases,
has yet to find direct application in our jurisdiction. To this date,
the Court has not declared any penal law unconstitutional on the
ground of ambiguity. On the other hand, the constitutionality of
certain penal statutes has been upheld in several cases,
notwithstanding allegations of ambiguity in the provisions of law.
In Caram Resources Corp. v. Contreras and People v. Morato, the
Court upheld the validity of BP 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) and
PD 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms), respectively, despite
constitutional challenges grounded on alleged ambiguity.
411
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 411
Same; Same; The prosecution’s burden of proving the crime of

plunder is, in actuality, much greater than in an ordinary
criminal case—the prosecution, in establishing a pattern of overt
or criminal acts, must necessarily show a combination or series of
acts within the purview of Section I (d) of the law, and these acts
must still be proven beyond reasonable doubt.—Nevertheless, it
should be emphasized that the indicative pattern must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt. To my mind, this means that the

prosecution’s burden of proving the crime of plunder is, in
actuality, much greater than in an ordinary criminal case. The
prosecution, in establishing a pattern of overt or criminal acts,
must necessarily show a combination or series of acts within the
purview of Section 1(d) of the law. These acts which constitute the
combination or series must still be proven beyond reasonable
doubt. On top of that, the prosecution must establish beyond
reasonable doubt such pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative
of the overall scheme or conspiracy, as well as all the other
elements thereof.
Same; Same; Regardless of whether plunder is classified as
mala prohibita or in se, it is the prerogative of the legislature—
which is undeniably vested with the authority—to determine
whether certain acts are criminal irrespective of the actual intent
of the perpetrator.—While I simply cannot agree that the Anti-
Plunder Law eliminated mens rea from the component crimes of
plunder, my bottom-line position still is: regardless of whether
plunder is classified as mala prohibita or in se, it is the
prerogative of the legislature—which is undeniably vested with
the authority—to determine whether certain acts are criminal
irrespective of the actual intent of the perpetrator.
Same; Same; I join the view that when we speak of plunder,
we are referring essentially to two or more instances of mala in se
constituting one malum prohibitum.—Without being facetious,
may I say that, unlike the act of discharging a gun, the acts
mentioned in Section 1(d)—bribery, conversion, fraudulent
conveyance, unjust enrichment and the like—cannot be
committed sans criminal intent. And thus, I finally arrive at a
point of agreement with petitioner: that the acts enumerated in
Section l(d) are by their nature mala in se, and most of them are
in fact defined and penalized as such by the Revised Penal Code.
Having said that, I join the view that when we speak of plunder,
we are referring essentially to two or more instances of mala in se
constituting one malum prohibitum. Thus, there should be no
difficulty if each of the predicate acts be proven beyond reasonable
doubt as mala in se,evenifthedefenseoflackofintentbe taken away
as the solicitor general has suggested. In brief, the matter of
classification is not really significant, contrary to what petitioner
would
412
have us believe. The key, obviously, is whether the same burden

of proof—proof beyond reasonable doubt—would apply.
KAPUNAN, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Statutory Construction; While every law

enacted by Congress enjoys a presumption of constitutionality, and
the presumption prevails in the absence of contrary evidence, when
a constitutionally protected right of an individual is in danger of
being trampled upon by a criminal statute, such law must be
struck down for being void.—Every law enacted by Congress
enjoys a presumption of constitutionality, and the presumption
prevails in the absence of contrary evidence. A criminal statute is
generally valid if it does not violate constitutional guarantees of
individual rights. Conversely, when a constitutionally protected
right of an individual is in danger of being trampled upon by a
criminal statute, such lawmustbestruckdownforbeingvoid.
Same; Same; “Void for Vagueness” Doctrine; Due Process; The
“void-for-vagueness” doctrine is rooted in the basic concept of
fairness as well as the due process clause of the Constitution.—One
of the fundamental requirements imposed by the Constitution
upon criminal statutes is that pertaining to clarity and
definiteness. Statutes, particularly penal laws, that fall short of
this requirement have been declared unconstitutional for being
vague. This “void-for-vagueness” doctrine is rooted in the basic
concept of fairness as well as the due process clause of the
Constitution. The Constitution guarantees both substantive and
procedural due process as well as the right of the accused to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. A
criminal statute should not be so vague and uncertain that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess as to its meaning and
differ as to its application.
Same; Same; Same; Three distinct considerations for the
Vagueness Doctrine.—There are three distinct considerations for
the vagueness doctrine. First, the doctrine is designed to ensure
that individuals are properly warned ex ante of the criminal
consequences of their conduct. This “fair notice” rationale was
articulated in United States v. Harriss: The constitutional
requirement of definiteness is violated by a criminal statute that
fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his
contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute. The underlying
principle is that no man shall be held criminally responsible for
conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be
proscribed. Second, and viewed as more important, the doctrine is
intended to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory law
enforcement. Vague laws are invariably “standardless”
413
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 413
and as such, they afford too great an opportunity for criminal

enforcement to be left to the unfettered discretion of police officers
and prosecutors. Third, vague laws fail to provide sufficient
guidance to judges who are charged with interpreting statutes.
Where a statute is too vague to provide sufficient guidance, the
judiciary is arguably placed in the position of usurping the proper
function of the legislature by “making the law” rather than
interpreting it.
Same; Same; Same; Overbreadth Doctrine; The doctrine of
over-breadth applies generally to statutes that infringe upon
freedom of speech while the “void-for-vagueness” doctrine applies
to criminal laws, not merely those that regulate speech or other
fundamental constitutional rights.—A view has been proffered
that “vagueness and overbreadth doctrines are not applicable to
penal laws.” These two concepts, while related, are distinct from
each other. On one hand, the doctrine of overbreadth applies
generally to statutes that infringe upon freedom of speech. On the
other hand, the “void-for-vagueness” doctrine applies to criminal
laws, not merely those that regulate speech or other fundamental
constitutional rights. The fact that a particular criminal statute
does not infringe upon free speech does not mean that a facial
challenge to the statute on vagueness grounds cannot succeed.
Same; Same; Same; Anti-Plunder Law; Words and Phrases;
Even men steeped in the knowledge of the law are in a quandary
as to what constitutes plunder.—I respectfully disagree with the
majority that “ascertainable standards and well-defined
parameters” are provided in the law to resolve these basic
questions. Even men steeped in the knowledge of the law are in a
quandary as to what constitutes plunder. The Presiding Justice of
the Sandiganbayan, Justice Francis Garchitorena, admitted that
the justices of said court “have been quarrelling with each other
in finding ways to determine what [they] understand by plunder.”
Senator Neptali Gonzales also noted during the deliberations of
Senate Bill No. 733 that the definition of plunder under the law is
vague. He bluntly declared: “I am afraid that it might be faulted
for being violative of the due process clause and the right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation of an accused.
Fr. Bernas, for his part, pointed to several problematical portions
of the law that were left unclarified. He posed the question: “How
can you have a ‘series’ of criminal acts if the elements that are
supposed to constitute the series are not proved to be criminal?”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; To my mind, resort to the

dictionary meaning of the terms “combination” and “series” as well
as recourse to the deliberations of the lawmakers only serve to
prove that R.A. No. 7080
414
failed to satisfy the strict requirements of the Constitution on

clarity and definiteness.—To my mind, resort to the dictionary
meaning of the terms “combination” and “series” as well as
recourse to the deliberations of the lawmakers only serve to prove
that R.A. No. 7080 failed to satisfy the strict requirements of the
Constitution on clarity and definiteness. Note that the key
element to the crime of plunder is that the public officer, by
himself or in conspiracy with others, amasses, accumulates, or
acquires “ill-gotten wealth” through a “combination or series of
overt or criminal acts” as described in Section 1(d) of the law.
Senator Gonzales, during the deliberations in the Senate, already
raised serious concern over the lack of a statutory definition of
what constitutes “combination” or “series,” consequently,
expressing his fears that Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080 might be
violative of due process.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The deliberations of the
Bicameral Conference Committee and of the Senate cited by the
majority, consisting mostly of unfinished sentences, offer very little
help in clarifying the nebulous concept of plunder.—The
deliberations of the Bicameral Conference Committee and of the
Senate cited by the majority, consisting mostly of unfinished
sentences, offer very little help in clarifying the nebulous concept
of plunder. All that they indicate is that Congress seemingly
intended to hold liable for plunder a person who: (1) commits at
least two counts of any one of the acts mentioned in Section 1(d) of
R.A. No. 7080, in which case, such person commits plunder by a
series of overt criminal acts; or (2) commits at least one count of at
least two of the acts mentioned in Section 1(d), in which case,
such person commits plunder by a combination of overt criminal
acts. Said discussions hardly provide a window as to the exact
nature of this crime.
Anti-Plunder Law; Complex Crimes; The argument that
higher penalties may be imposed where two or more distinct
criminal acts are combined and are regarded as special complex
crimes, i.e., rape with homicide, does not justify the imposition of
the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death in case plunder is

committed.—The argument that higher penalties may be imposed
where two or more distinct criminal acts are combined and are
regarded as special complex crimes, i.e., rape with homicide, does
not justify the imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua
todeathincase plunder is committed. Taken singly, rape is
punishable by reclusion perpetua; and homicide, by reclusion
temporal. Hence, the increase in the penalty imposed when these
two are considered together as a special complex crime is not too
far from the penalties imposed for each of the single offenses. In
contrast, as shown by the examples above, there are instances
where the component crimes of plunder, if taken separately,
415
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 415
would result in the imposition of correctional penalties only; but

when considered as forming part of a series or combination of acts
constituting plunder, could be punishable by reclusion perpetua to
death. The disproportionate increase in the penalty is certainly
violative of substantive due process and constitute a cruel and
inhuman punishment.
Same; Section 1 taken in relation to Section 4 suggests that
there is something to plunder beyond simply the number of acts
involved and that a grand scheme to amass, accumulate or acquire
ill-gotten wealth is contemplated by R.A. No. 7080.—Granting
arguendo that, as asserted by the majority, “combination” and
“series” simplistically mean the commission of two or more of the
acts enumerated in Section 1(d), still, this interpretation does not
cure the vagueness of R.A. No. 7080. In construing the definition
of “plunder,” Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080 must not be read in
isolation but rather, must be interpreted in relation to the other
provisions of said law. It is a basic rule of statutory construction
that to ascertain the meaning of a law, the same must be read in
its entirety. Section 1 taken in relation to Section 4 suggests that
there is something to plunder beyond simply the number of acts
involved and that a grand scheme to amass, accumulate or
acquire ill-gotten wealth is contemplated by R.A. No. 7080.
Sections 1 and 2 pertain only to the nature and quantitative
means or acts by which a public officer, by himself or in
connivance with other persons, “amasses, accumulates or acquires
ill-gotten wealth.” Section 4, on the other hand, requires the
presence of elements other than those enumerated in Section 2 to
establish that the crime of plunder has been committed because it
speaks of the necessity to establish beyond reasonable doubt a

“pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall
unlawful scheme or conspiracy.”
Same; That pattern is an essential element of the crime of
plunder is evident from a reading of the assailed law in its entirety
—without the existence of a “pattern of overt or criminal acts
indicative of the overall scheme or conspiracy” to acquire ill-gotten
wealth, a person committing several or even all of the acts
enumerated in Section 1(d) cannot be convicted for plunder, but
may be convicted only for the specific crimes committed under the
pertinent provisions of the Revised Penal Code or other laws.—
That pattern is an essential element of the crime of plunder is
evident from a reading of the assailed law in its entirety. It is that
which would distinguish plunder from isolated criminal acts
punishable under the Revised Penal Code and other laws, for
without the existence a “pattern of overt or criminal acts
indicative of the overall scheme or conspiracy” to acquire ill-
gotten wealth, a person committing several or even all of the acts
enumerated in Section 1(d) cannot be convicted for plunder, but
416
may be convicted only for the specific crimes committed under the
pertinent provisions of the Revised Penal Code or other laws.
Same; Section 4 is not merely a rule of evidence or a rule of
procedure—it is of substantive character because it spells out a
distinctive element of the crime which has to be established.—For
this reason, I do not agree that Section 4 is merely a rule of
evidence or a rule of procedure. It does not become such simply
because its caption states that it is, although its wording indicates
otherwise. On the contrary, it is of substantive character because
it spells out a distinctive element of the crime which has to be
established, i.e., an overall unlawful “scheme or conspiracy”
indicated by a “pattern of overt or criminal acts” or means or
similar schemes “to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten
wealth.”
Same; A careful reading of the law would unavoidably compel
a conclusion that there should be a connecting link among the
“means or schemes” comprising a “series or combination” for the
purpose of acquiring or amassing “ill-gotten wealth.”—But that
obviously is not the definition of the crime of plunder under R.A.
7080. There is something more. A careful reading of the law
would unavoidably compel a conclusion that there should be a

connecting link among the “means or schemes” comprising a
“series or combination” for the purpose of acquiring or amassing
“ill-gotten wealth.” The bond or link is an “overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy mentioned in Section 4. The law
contemplates a combination or series of criminal acts in plunder
done by the accused “in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to
amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth.” It does not
postulate acts committed randomly, separately or independently
or sporadically. Otherwise stated, if the legislature intended to
define plunder as the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth in the
manner espoused by the majority, the use in R.A. 7080 of such
words and phrases as “combination” and “series of overt or
criminal acts” xxx “in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy” is
absolutely pointless and meaningless.
Same; Conspiracy; A person who conspires with the accused in
the commission of only one of the component crimes may be
prosecuted as co-principal for the component crime, or as co-
principal for the crime of plunder, depending on the interpretation
of the prosecutor; The unfettered discretion effectively bestowed on
law enforcers by Section 2 of R.A. 7080 in determining the liability
of the participants in the commission of one or more of the
component crimes for plunder undeniably poses the danger of
arbitrary enforcement of the law.—Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080
states that “[a]ny person who participated with the said public
officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of
plunder shall likewise be
417
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 417
punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the

degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and
extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal
Code, shall be considered by the court.” Both parties share the
view that the law as it is worded makes it possible for a person
who participates in the commission of only one of the component
crimes constituting plunder to be liable as co-conspirator for
plunder, not merely the component crime in which he
participated. While petitioner concedes that it is easy to ascertain
the penalty for an accomplice or accessory under R.A. No. 7080,
such is not the case with respect to a co-principal of the accused.
In other words, a person who conspires with the accused in the
commission of only one of the component crimes may be
prosecuted as co-principal for the component crime, or as co-

principal for the crime of plunder, depending on the
interpretation of the prosecutor. The unfettered discretion
effectively bestowed on law enforcers by the aforequoted clause in
determining the liability of the participants in the commission of
one or more of the component crimes of a charge for plunder
undeniably poses the danger of arbitrary enforcement of the law.
Same; Statutory Construction; Judicial Legislation; It
certainly would not be feasible for the Court to interpret each and
every ambiguous provision without falling into the trap of judicial
legislation.—The Solicitor General enjoins the Court to rectify the
deficiencies in the law by judicial construction. However, it
certainly would not be feasible for the Court to interpret each and
every ambiguous provision without falling into the trap of judicial
legislation. A statute should be construed to avoid constitutional
question only when an alternative interpretation is possible from
its language. Borrowing from the opinion of the court in
Northwestern, the law “may be a poorly drafted statute; but
rewriting it is a job for Congress, if it so inclined, and not for this
Court.” But where the law as the one in question is void on its
face for its patent ambiguity in that it lacks comprehensible
standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, the Court
cannot breathe life to it through the guise of construction.
Same; Criminal Law; The law, in effect, penalizes the accused
on the basis of a proven scheme or conspiracy to commit plunder
without the necessity of establishing beyond reasonable doubt each
and every criminal act done by the accused in the crime of plunder.
—By its language, Section 4 eliminates proof of each and every
component criminal act of plunder by the accused and limits itself
to establishing just the pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative
of unlawful scheme or conspiracy. The law, in effect, penalizes the
accused on the basis of a proven scheme or conspiracy to commit
plunder without the necessity of establishing beyond reasonable
418
doubt each and every criminal act done by the accused in the
crime of plunder.ToquoteFr.Bernasagain:“How can you have a
‘series’ of criminal acts if the elements that are supposed to
constitute the series are not proved to be criminal?”
Same; Same; Crimes Mala in Se and Mala Prohibita; Since

the acts enumerated in Section 1(d) are mostly defined and
penalized by the Revised Penal Code, and as such, they are by
nature mala in se crime, of which intent is an essential element,
accordingly, with more reason that criminal intent must be
established in plunder.—The acts enumerated in Section 1(d) are
mostly defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code, e.g.
malversation, estafa, bribery and other crimes committed by
public officers. As such, they are by nature mala in se crimes.
Since intent is an essential element of these crimes, then, with
more reason that criminal intent be established in plunder which,
under R.A. No. 7659, is one of the heinous crimes as pronounced
in one of its whereas clauses.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Crimes “Mala in Se”
and “Mala Prohibita,” Distinguished; The fact that the acts
enumerated in Section 1(d) of R.A. 7080 were made criminal by
special law does not necessarily make the same mala prohibita
where criminal intent is not essential, although the term refers
generally to acts made criminal by special laws.—The fact that
the acts enumerated in Section 1(d) of R.A. 7080 were made
criminal by special law does not necessarily make the same mala
prohibita where criminal intent is not essential, although the
term refers generally to acts made criminal by special laws. For
there is a marked difference between the two. According to a well-
known author on criminal law: There is a distinction between
crimes which are mala in se, or wrongful from their nature, such
as theft, rape, homicide, etc., and those that are mala prohibita,
or wrong merely because prohibited by statute, such as illegal
possession of firearms. Crimes mala in se are those so serious in
their effects on society as to call for almost unanimous
condemnation of its members; while crimes mala prohibita are
violations of mere rules of convenience designed to secure a more
orderly regulation of the affairs of society. (Bouvier’s Law
Dictionary, Rawle’s3rdRevision)(1)Inactsmala in se, the intent
governs; but in those mala prohibit the only inquiry is, has the
law been violated? (People vs. Kibler, 106 N.Y., 321, cited in the
case of U.S. vs. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 132) Criminal intent is not
necessary where the acts are prohibited for reasons of public
policy, as in illegal possession of firearms. (People vs. Conosa,
C.A., 45 O.G. 3953)
419
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 419
Same; Same; Mens rea is a substantive due process

requirement under the Constitution, and this is a limitation on
police power.—Mens rea is a substantive due process requirement
under the Constitution, and this is a limitation on police power.
Additionally, lack of mens rea or a clarifying scienter requirement
aggravates the vagueness of a statute.
Same; Estoppel; The rule on estoppel applies to questions of
fact, not of law.—The case at bar has been subject to controversy
principally due to the personalities involved herein. The fact that
one of petitioner’scounsels was a co-sponsor of the Plunder Law
and petitioner himself voted for its passage when he was still a
Senator would not in any put him in estoppel to question its
constitutionality. The rule on estoppel applies to questions of fact,
not of law. Moreover, estoppel should be resorted to only as a
means of preventing injustice. To hold that petitioner is estopped
from questioning the validity of R.A. No. 7080 because he had
earlier voted for its passage would result in injustice not only to
him, but to all others who may be held liable under this statute.
Same; Due Process; “Void for Vagueness” Doctrine; Where the
law, such as R.A. 7080, is so indefinite that the line between
innocent and condemned conduct becomes a matter of guesswork,
the indefiniteness runs afoul of due process concepts which require
that persons be given full notice of what to avoid, and that the
discretion of law enforcement officials, with the attendant dangers
of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, be limited by explicit
legislative standards.—Undoubtedly, the reason behind the
enactment of R.A. 7080 is commendable. It was a response to the
felt need at the time that existing laws were inadequate to
penalize the nature and magnitude of corruption that
characterized a “previous regime.” However, where the law, such
as R.A. 7080, is so indefinite that the line between innocent and
condemned conduct becomes a matter of guesswork, the
indefiniteness runs afoul of due process concepts which require
that persons be given full notice of what to avoid, and that the
discretion of law enforcement officials, with the attendant dangers
of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, be limited by explicit
legislative standards. It obfuscates the mind to ponder that such
an ambiguous law as R.A. No. 7080 would put on the balance the
life and liberty of the accused against whom all the resources of
the State are arrayed. It could be used as a tool against political
enemies and a weapon of hate and revenge by whoever wields the
levers of power.
420

PARDO, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Criminal Procedure; Multiplicity of Offenses; I vote to grant

the petition on the second ground raised therein, that is,
multiplicity of offenses charged in the amended information.—
With due respect, I vote to grant the petition on the second
ground raised therein, that is, multiplicity of offenses charged in
the amended information. Consequently, the resolution of the
Sandiganbayan must be set aside, and the case remanded to the
Ombudsman for the amendment of the information to charge only
a single offense.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Due Process; “Void for Vagueness” Doctrine; Substantive due

process requires that a criminal statute should not be vague and
uncertain; The doctrine of constitutional uncertainty is also based
on the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation.—Substantive due process dictates that there
should be no arbitrariness, unreasonableness or ambiguity in any
law which deprives a person of his life or liberty. The trial and
other procedures leading to conviction may be fair and proper.
But if the law itself is not reasonable legislation, due process is
violated. Thus, an accused may not be sentenced to suffer the
lethal injection or life imprisonment for an offense understood
only after judicial construction takes over where Congress left off,
and interpretation supplies its meaning. The Constitution
guarantees both substantive and procedural due process as well
as the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him. Substantive due process requires
that a criminal statute should not be vague and uncertain. More
explicitly—That the terms of a penal statute . . . must be
sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what
conduct on their part will render them liable to penalties, is a
well-recognized requirement, consonant alike with ordinary
notions of fair play and the settled rules of law. And a statute
which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so
vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at
its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first
essential of due process. The doctrine of constitutional
uncertainty is also based on the right of the accused to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation. Fundamental
fairness dictates that a person cannot be sent to jail for a crime
that he cannot with reasonable certainty know he was
committing. Statutes defining crimes run afoul of the due process
clause if they fail to give adequate guidance to those who would be
law-abiding, to advise defendants of the nature of the offense with
which they are charged or to guide courts trying those who are
accused. In short, laws which create
421
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 421
crime ought to be so explicit that all men subject to their penalties

may know what acts it is their duty to avoid.
Same; Same; Overbreadth Doctrine; The doctrines of
overbreadth and void-for-vagueness in Constitutional Law were
developed in the context of freedom of speech and of the press but
they apply equally, if not more so, to capital offenses.—The
doctrines of overbreadth and void-for-vagueness in Constitutional
Law were developed in the context of freedom of speech and of the
press. However, they apply equally, if not more so, to capital
offenses. In the present case, what the law seeks to protect or
regulate involves the deprivation of life itself and not merely the
regulation of expression.
Same; Same; Same; A statute is vague or overbroad, in
violation of the due process clause, where its language does not
convey sufficiently definite warning to the average person as to the
prohibited conduct.—In its early formulation, the overbreadth
doctrine states that a governmental purpose to control or prevent
activities constitutionally subject to regulation may not be
achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and
thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. A statute,
especially one involving criminal prosecution, must be definite to
be valid. A statute is vague or overbroad, in violation of the due
process clause, where its language does not convey sufficiently
definite warning to the average person as to the prohibited
conduct. A statute is unconstitutionally vague if people of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning.
Same; Criminal Law; Anti-Plunder Law; Crimes Mala in Se
and Mala Prohibita; In malversation or bribery under the Revised
Penal Code, the criminal intent is an important element of the
criminal acts, but under the Plunder Law, it is enough that the
acts are committed, thus, even if the accused can prove lack of
criminal intent with respect to crimes mala in se, this will not
exonerate him under the crime mala prohibita, a violation of
substantive due process and the standards of fair play because
mens rea is a constitutional guarantee under the due process
clause.—In the crime of plunder, it is enough that the acts
defining malversation or bribery are described. The court then
proceeds to determine whether the acts fall under the prohibitory

terms of the law. Criminal intent no longer has to be proved. The
criminal intent to commit the crime is not required to be proved.
The desire to benefit particular persons does not have to spring
from criminal intent under the special law creating the crime of
plunder. In malversation or bribery under the Revised Penal
Code, the criminal intent is an important element of the criminal
acts. Under the Plunder Law, it is enough that the acts are
committed. Thus, even if the accused
422
can prove lack of criminal intent with respect to crimes mala in

se, this will not exonerate him under the crime mala prohibita.
This violates substantive due process and the standards of fair
play because mens rea is a constitutional guarantee under the due
process clause.
Same; Same; Same; I agree with petitioner’s concern over the
danger that the trial court may allow the specifications of details
in an information to validate a statute inherently void for
vagueness—an information cannot rise higher than the statute
upon which it is based; It is the statute, not the accusation under
it, that prescribes the rule to govern conduct and warns against
transgression.—I agree with petitioner’s concern over the danger
that the trial court may allow the specifications of details in an
information to validate a statute inherently void for vagueness.
An information cannot rise higher than the statute upon which it
is based. Not even the construction by the Sandiganbayan of a
vague or ambiguous provision can supply the missing ingredients
of the Plunder Law. The right of an accused to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him is most often
exemplified in the care with which a complaint or information
should be drafted. However, the clarity and particularity required
of an information should also be present in the law upon which
the charges are based. If the penal law is vague, any particularity
in the information will come from the prosecutor. The prosecution
takes over the role of Congress. The fact that the details of the
charges are specified in the Information will not cure the statute
of its constitutional infirmity. If on its face the challenged
provision is repugnant to the due process clause, specification of
details of the offense intended to be charged would not serve to
validate it. In other words, it is the statute, not the accusation
under it, that prescribes the rule to govern conduct and warns
against transgression. No one may be required at peril of life,

liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal
statutes. All are entitled to be informed as to what the State
commands or forbids.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Bill of Rights; As a basic premise, we

have to accept that even a person accused of a crime possesses
inviolable rights founded on the Constitution which even the
welfare of the society as a whole cannot override—the rights
guaranteed to him by the Constitution are not subject to political
bargaining or to the calculus of social interest.—As a basic
premise, we have to accept that even a person accused of a crime
possesses inviolable rights founded on the Constitution which
even the welfare of the society as a whole cannot override. The
rights guaranteed to him by the Constitution are not subject to
political bargaining or to the
423
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 423
calculus of social interest. Thus, no matter how socially-relevant

the purpose of a law is, it must be nullified if it tramples upon the
basic rights of the accused. Enshrined in our Constitution is the
ultimate guaranty that “no person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law.” This provision in
the Bill of Rights serves as a protection of the Filipino people
against any form of arbitrariness on the part of the government,
whether committed by the legislature, the executive or the
judiciary. Any government act that militates against the ordinary
norms of justice and fair play is considered an infraction of the
due process; and this is true whether the denial involves violation
merely of the procedure prescribed by law or affects the very
validity of the law itself.
Criminal Law; Anti-Plunder Law; Albeit the legislature did
not directly lower the degree of proof required in the crime of
plunder, it nevertheless lessened the burden of the prosecution by
dispensing with proof of the essential elements of plunder.—R.A.
No. 7080, as amended, is unconstitutional. Albeit the legislature
did not directly lower the degree of proof required in the crime of
plunder from proof beyond reasonable doubt to mere
preponderance of or substantial evidence, it nevertheless lessened
the burden of the prosecution by dispensing with proof of the

essential elements of plunder.
Same; Same; When Section 4 of R.A. No. 7080 mandates that
it shall not be necessary for the prosecution to prove each and every
criminal act done by the accused, the legislature, in effect,
rendered the enumerated “criminal acts” under Section 1(d) merely
as means and not as essential elements of plunder.—When Section
4 of R.A. No. 7080 mandates that it shall not be necessary for the
prosecution to prove each and every criminal act done by the
accused, the legislature, in effect, rendered the enumerated
“criminal acts” under Section 1 (d) merely as means and not as
essential elements of plunder. This is constitutionally infirmed
and repugnant to the basic idea of justice and fair play. As a
matter of due process, the prosecution is required to prove beyond
reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime with
which the defendant is charged. The State may not specify a
lesser burden of proof for an element of a crime. With more
reason, it should not be allowed to go around the principle by
characterizing an essential element of plunder merely as a
“means” of committing the crime. For the result is the reduction of
the burden of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt.
Same; Same; Due Process; Providing a rule of evidence which
does not require proof beyond reasonable doubt to establish every
fact necessary to constitute the crime is a clear infringement of due
process.—Providing a
424
rule of evidence which does not require proof beyond reasonable

doubt to establish every fact necessary to constitute the crime is a
clear infringement of due process. While the principles of the law
of evidence are the same whether applied on civil or criminal
trials, they are more strictly observed in criminal cases. Thus,
while the legislature of a state has the power to prescribe new or
alter existing rules of evidence, or to prescribe methods of proof,
the same must not violate constitutional requirements or deprive
any person of his constitutional rights. Unfortunately, under R.A.
No. 7080, the State did not only specify a lesser burden of proof to
sustain an element of the crime; it even dispensed with proof by
not considering the specific “criminal acts” as essential elements.
That it was the clear intention of the legislature is evident from

the Senate deliberation.
Same; Same; I believe that R.A. No. 7080 should have
provided a cutoff period after which a succeeding act may no
longer be attached to the prior act for the purpose of establishing a
pattern.—Indeed, Congress left much to be desired. I am at a
quandary on how many delictual acts are
necessarytogiverisetoa“pattern of overt or criminal acts” in the
crime of plunder. If there is no numerical standard, then, how
should the existence of “pattern” be ascertained? Should it be by
proximity of time or of relationship? May an act committed two
decades after the prior criminal act be linked with the latter for
the purpose of establishing a pattern? It must be remembered
that plunder, being a continuous offense, the “pattern of overt or
criminal acts” can extend indefinitely, i.e., as long as the
succeeding criminal acts may be linked to the initial criminal act.
This will expose the person concerned to criminal prosecution ad
infinitum. Surely, it will undermine the purpose of the statute of
limitations, i.e., to discourage prosecution based on facts obscured
by the passage of time, and to encourage law enforcement officials
to investigate suspected criminal activity promptly. All these
undesirable consequences arise from the fact that the plunder law
fails to provide a period within which the next criminal act must
be committed for the purpose of establishing a pattern. I believe
R.A. No. 7080 should have provided a cut-off period after which a
succeeding act may no longer be attached to the prior act for the
purpose of establishing a pattern. In reiteration, the RICO law
defines “pattern” as requiring at least two acts of racketeering
activity... the last of which occurred within ten years . . . after the
commission of the prior act of racket-eering activity. Such
limitation prevents a subsequent racketeering activity, separated
by more than a decade from the prior act of racketeering, from
being appended to the latter for the purpose of coming up with a
pattern. We do not have the same safeguard under our law.
425
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 425
Same; Same; A statute that does not provide adequate

standards for adjudication, by which guilt or innocence may be
determined, should be struck down.—Lastly, the terms
“combination” and “series” are likewise vague. Hence, on the basis
of the law, a conviction of an accused cannot be sustained. A
statute that does not provide adequate standards for adjudication,
by which guilt or innocence may be determined, should be struck
down. Crimes must be defined in a statute with appropriate

certainty and definiteness. The standards of certainty in a statute
prescribing punishment for offenses are higher than in those
depending primarily on civil sanctions for their enforcement. A
penal statute should therefore be clear and unambiguous. It
should explicitly establish the elements of the crime which it
creates and provide some reasonably ascertainable standards of
guilt. It should not admit of such a double meaning that a citizen
may act on one conception of its requirements and the courts on
another.
Same; Same; Considering that without plurality of overt or
criminal acts, there can be no crime of plunder, due process of law
demands that the terms “combination” and “series” be defined with
exactitude in the law itself—no one may be required, at the peril of
life, liberty or property to guess at, or speculate as to, the meaning
of a penal statute.—Considering that without plurality of overt or
criminal acts, there can be no crime of plunder, due process of law
demands that the terms “combination” and “series” be defined
with exactitude in the law itself. Equating these terms with mere
“plurality” or “two or more,” is inaccurate and speculative. For
one, a “series” is a group of usually three or more things or events
standing or succeeding in order and having like relationship to
each other. The Special Prosecution Division Panel defines it as
“at least three of the acts enumerated under Section 1(d) thereof.”
But it can very well be interpreted as only one act repeated at
least three times. And the Office of the Solicitor General, invoking
the deliberations of the House of Representatives, contends
differently. It defines the term series as a “repetition” or
pertaining to “two or more.” The disparity in the Prosecution and
OSG’s positions clearly shows how imprecise the term “series” is.
This should not be countenanced. Crimes are not to be created by
inference. No one may be required, at the peril of life, liberty or
property to guess at, or speculate as to, the meaning of a penal
statute. An accused, regardless of who he is, is entitled to be tried
only under a clear and valid law.
Same; Same; Judicial Legislation; Precision must be the
characteristic of penal legislation—for the Court to define what is
a crime is to go beyond the so-called positive role in the protection
of civil liberties or promotion of public interests; A statute which is
so vague as to permit the infliction of capital punishment on acts
already punished with lesser penal-
426

ties by clearly formulated law is unconstitutional.—On the

argument that this Court may clarify the vague terms or explain
the limits of the over-broad provisions of R.A. No. 7080, I should
emphasize that this Court has no power to legislate. Precision
must be the characteristic of penal legislation. For the Court to
define what is a crime is to go beyond the so-called positive role in
the protection of civil liberties or promotion of public interests. As
stated by Justice Frankfurter, the Court should be wary of
judicial attempts to impose justice on the community; to deprive it
of the wisdom that comes from self-inflicted wounds and the
strengths that grow with the burden of responsibility. A statute
which is so vague as to permit the infliction of capital punishment
on acts already punished with lesser penalties by clearly
formulated law is unconstitutional. The vagueness cannot be
cured by judicial construction.
PETITION to declare Republic Act No. 7080 (An Act

Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder) as amended
by RA No. 7659 unconstitutional.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Agabin, Verzola, Hermoso & Layaoen Law Offices
and Jose B. Flaminiano for petitioner.
Saguisag, Carao & Associates and Fortun, Narvasa &
Salazar for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for the People.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
JOHN STUART MILL, in his essay On Liberty, unleashes

the full fury of his pen in defense of the rights of the
individual from the vast powers of the State and the
inroads of societal pressure. But even as he draws a
sacrosanct line demarcating the limits on individuality
beyond which the State cannot tread—asserting that
“individual spontaneity” must be allowed to flourish with
very little regard to social interference—he veritably
acknowledges that the exercise of rights and liberties is
imbued with a civic obligation, which society is justified in
enforcing at all cost, against those who would endeavor to
withhold fulfillment. Thus he says—
The sole end for which mankind is warranted, individually or

collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their
number, is
427
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 427

self-protection. The only purpose for which power can be

rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community,
against his will, is to prevent harm to others.
Parallel to individual liberty is the natural and illimitable

right of the State to self-preservation. With the end of
maintaining the integrity and cohesiveness of the body
politic, it behooves the State to formulate a system of laws
that would compel obeisance to its collective wisdom and
inflict punishment for non-observance.
The movement from Mill’s individual liberalism to
unsystematic collectivism wrought changes in the social
order, carrying with it a new formulation of fundamental
rights and duties more attuned to the imperatives of
contemporary socio-political ideologies. In the process, the
web of rights and State impositions became tangled and
obscured, enmeshed in threads of multiple shades and
colors, the skein irregular and broken. Antagonism, often
outright collision, between the law as the expression of the
will of the State, and the zealous attempts by its members
to preserve their individuality and dignity, inevitably
followed. It is when individual rights are pitted against
State authority that judicial conscience is put to its
severest test.
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking
official to be prosecuted under RA 7080 1
(An Act Defining
and Penalizing
2
the Crime of Plunder), as amended by RA
7659, wishes to impress upon us that the assailed law is so
defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct
line which divides the valid from the constitutionally
infirm. He therefore makes a stringent call for this Court to
subject the Plunder Law to the crucible of constitutionality
mainly because, according to him, (a) it suffers from the
vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the “reasonable
doubt” standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it
abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already
punishable under The Revised Penal Code, all of which are
purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights of
the accused to due process and to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him.
______________
1 Approved 12 July 1991 and took effect 8 of October 1991.

2 Approved 13 December 1993 and took effect 31 December 1993.
428

Specifically, the provisions of the Plunder Law claimed by

petitioner to have transgressed constitutional boundaries
are Secs. 1, par. (d), 2 and 4 which are reproduced
hereunder:
Section 1. x x x x (d)“Ill-gotten wealth” means any asset, property,

business, enterprise or material possession of any person within
the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or
indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates
and/or business associates by any combination or series of the
following means or similar schemes:
(1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or

malversation of public funds or raids on the public
treasury;
(2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift,
share, percentage, kickbacks or any other form of
pecuniary benefit from any person and/or entity in
connection with any government contract or project or by
reason of the office or position of the public office
concerned;
(3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of
assets belonging to the National Government or any of its
subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, or government
owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;
(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly
any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or
participation including the promise of future employment
in any business enterprise or undertaking;
(5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial
monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation
of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular
persons or special interests; or
(6) By taking advantage of official position, authority,
relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich
himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage
and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of
the Philippines.
Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties.—Any public

officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family,
relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates
or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth

through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in
Section 1 (d) hereof, in the aggregate amount or total value of at least
fifty million pesos (P50.000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and
shall be
429
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 429

punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who

participatedwith the said public officer in the commission of an
offense contributing tothe crime of plunder shall likewise be
punished for such offense. In theimposition of penalties, the
degree of participation and the attendance ofmitigating and
extenuating circumstances as provided by the RevisedPenal Code
shall be considered by the court. The court shall declare anyand
all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and
assetsincluding the properties and shares of stocks derived from
the deposit orinvestment thereof forfeited in favor of the State
(italics supplied).
Section 4. Rule of Evidence.—For purposes of establishing the
crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every
criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or
conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it
being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of
conspiracy (italics supplied).
On 4 April 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman filed before

the Sandiganbayan eight (8) separate Informations,
docketed as: (a) Crim. Case No. 26558, for violation of RA
7080, as amended by RA 7659; (b) Crim. Cases Nos. 26559
to 26562, inclusive, for violation of Secs. 3, par. (a), 3, par.
(a), 3, par. (e) and 3, par. (e), of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act), respectively; (c) Crim. Case No.
26563, for violation of Sec. 7, par. (d), of RA 6713 (The Code
of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees); (d) Crim. Case No. 26564, for Perjury (Art. 183
of The Revised Penal Code); and, (e) Crim. Case No. 26565,
for Illegal Use Of An Alias (CA No. 142, as amended by RA
6085).
On 11 April 2001 petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for
the remand of the case to the Ombudsman for preliminary
investigation with respect to specification “d” of the charges
in the Information in Crim. Case No. 26558; and, for
reconsideration/reinvestigation of the offenses under
specifications “a,”“b,” and “c” to give the accused an

opportunity to file counter-affidavits and other documents
necessary to prove lack of probable cause. Noticeably, the
grounds raised were only lack of preliminary investigation,
reconsideration/reinvestigation of offenses, and opportunity
to prove lack of probable cause. The purported ambiguity of
the charges and the vagueness of the law under which they
are charged were never raised in that Omnibus Motion
thus indicating the explicitness and comprehensibility of
the Plunder Law.
430

On 25 April 2001 the Sandiganbayan, Third Division,

issued a Resolution in Crim. Case No. 26558 finding that “a
probable cause for the offense of PLUNDER exists to justify
the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused.” On
25 June 2001 petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was
denied by the Sandiganbayan.
On 14 June 2001 petitioner moved to quash the
Information in Crim. Case No. 26558 on the ground that
the facts alleged therein did not constitute an indictable
offense since the law on which it was based was
unconstitutional for vagueness, and that the Amended
Information for Plunder charged more than one (1) offense.
On 21 June 2001 the Government filed its Opposition to the
Motion to Quash,
andfive(5)dayslateroron26June2001petitioner submitted
his Reply to the Opposition. On9July2001the
Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s Motion to Quash.
As concisely delineated by this Court during the oral
arguments on 18 September 2001, the issues for resolution
in the instant petition for certiorari are: (a) The Plunder
Law is unconstitutional for being vague; (b) The Plunder
Law requires less evidence for proving the predicate crimes
of plunder and therefore violates the rights of the accused
to due process; and, (c) Whether Plunder as defined in RA
7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within
the power of Congress to so classify it.
Preliminarily, the whole gamut of legal concepts
pertaining to the validity of legislation is predicated on the
basic principle that a legislative measure
3
is presumed to be
in harmony with the Constitution. Courts invariably train
their sights on this fundamental rule whenever a
legislative act is under a constitutional attack, for it is the
postulate of constitutional adjudication. This strong

predilection for constitutionality takes its bearings on the
idea that it is forbidden for one branch of the government
to encroach upon the duties and powers of another. Thus it
has been said that the presumption is based on the
deference the judicial branch accords to its coordinate
branch—the legislature.
______________
3 Lim v. Pacquing, et al., G.R. No. 115044, 27 January 1995, 240 SCRA
644.
431
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 431

If there is any reasonable basis upon which the legislation

may firmly rest, the courts must assume that the
legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its
plenary powers, and has passed the law with full
knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting
what is right and advancing the welfare of the majority.
Hence, in determining whether the acts of the legislature
are in tune with the fundamental law, courts should
proceed with judicial restraint and act with caution and
forbearance. Every intendment of the law must be
adjudged by the courts in favor of its constitutionality,
invalidity being a measure of last resort. In construing
therefore the provisions of a statute, courts must first
ascertain whether an interpretation is fairly possible to
sidestep the question of constitutionality. 4
In La Union Credit Cooperative, Inc. v. Yaranon we
held that as long as there is some basis for the decision of
the court, the constitutionality of the challenged law will
not be touched and the case will be decided on other
available grounds. Yet the force of the presumption is not
sufficient to catapult a fundamentally deficient law into the
safe environs of constitutionality. Of course, where the law
clearly and palpably transgresses the hallowed domain of
the organic law, it must be struck down on sight lest the
positive commands of the fundamental law be unduly
eroded.
Verily, the onerous task of rebutting the presumption
weighs heavily on the party challenging the validity of the
statute. He must demonstrate beyond any tinge of doubt
that there is indeed an infringement of the constitution, for
absent such a showing, there can be no finding of

unconstitutionality. A doubt, even if well-founded, will
hardly suffice.5As tersely put by Justice Malcolm, “To doubt
is to sustain.” And petitioner has miserably failed in the
instant case to discharge his burden and overcome the
presumption of constitutionality of the Plunder Law.
As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable
standards and well-defined parameters which would enable
the accused to determine the nature of his violation.
Section 2 is sufficiently explicit in its description of the
acts, conduct and conditions
______________
4 G.R. No. 87001, 4 December 1989, 179 SCRA 828.

5 Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385, 414 (1925).
432

required or forbidden, and prescribes the elements of the

crime with reasonable certainty and particularity. Thus—
1. That the offender is a public officer who acts by

himself or in connivance with members of his
family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity,
business associates, subordinates or other persons;
2. That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-
gotten wealth through a combination or series of
the following overt or criminal acts: (a) through
misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or
treasury; (b) by receiving, directly or indirectly, any
commission, gift, share, percentage, kickback or any
other form of pecuniary benefits from any person
and/or entity in connection with any government
contract or project or by reason of the office or
position of the public officer; (c) by the illegal or
fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets
belonging to the National Government or any of its
subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities of
Government owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries; (d) by obtaining, receiving or
accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock,
equity or any other form of interest or participation
including the promise of future employment in any
business enterprise or undertaking; (e) by

establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial
monopolies or other combinations and/or
implementation of decrees and orders intended to
benefit particular persons or special interests; or (f)
by taking advantage of official position, authority,
relationship, connection or influence to unjustly
enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to
the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and
the Republic of the Philippines; and,
3. That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-
gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or acquired is
at least P50,000,000.00.
As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or

rule that would inform those who are subject to it what
conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its
validity will be sustained. It must sufficiently guide the
judge in its application; the counsel, in defending one
charged with its violation; and more importantly, the
accused, in identifying the realm of the proscribed conduct.
Indeed, it can be understood with little difficulty that what
the assailed statute punishes is the act of a public officer in
amassing or accumulating ill-gotten wealth of at least
P50,000,000.00 through a series or combination of acts
enumerated in Sec. 1, par. (d), of the Plunder Law.
433
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 433

In fact, the amended Information itself closely tracks the

language of the law, indicating with reasonable certainty
the various elements of the offense which petitioner is
alleged to have committed:
“The undersigned Ombudsman, Prosecutor and OIC-Director,

EPIB, Office of the Ombudsman, hereby accuses former
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Joseph Ejercito Estrada, a.k.a. ‘ASIONG SALONGA’ and a.k.a.
‘JOSE VELARDE.’ together with Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada, Charlie
‘Atong’ Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro,
JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr.
Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and John DOES & Jane Does, of
the crime of Plunder, defined and penalized under R.A. No. 7080,
as amended by Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 7659, committed as follows:
That during the period from June, 1998 to January 2001, in

the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A PRESIDENT
OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by himself
AND/OR in CONNIV-ANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-accused,
WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY
AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES,
SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING
UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION,
AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION, OR
INFLUENCE, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
criminally amass, accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF.
DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate
amount or TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN
MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE
HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN
CENTAVOS (P4,097,804,173.17), more or less, THEREBY
UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT
THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO
PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
through ANY OR A combination OR A series of overt OR criminal
acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS, described as follows:
(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL

INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE
HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00), MORE
OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT,
SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY
BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in connection with co-accused
CHARLIE ‘ATONG’ AND, Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte,
Edward Serapio, AND JOHN DOES
434

AND JANE DOES, in consideration OF TOLERATION OR

PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING;
(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating, converting OR
misusing DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR THEIR PERSONAL
gain and benefit, public funds in the amount of ONE HUNDRED
THIRTY MILLION PESOS (P130,000,000.00), more or less representing
a portion of the TWO HUNDRED MILLION PESOS (P200,000,000.00)
tobacco excise tax share allocated for the province of Ilocos Sur under
R.A. No. 7171, by himself and/or in connivance with co-accused Charlie
‘Atong’ Ang, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr.
Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES & JANE
DOES; (italic supplied).
(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN
AND BENEFIT, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) TO
PURCHASE 351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCKS, MORE OR LESS, and
the Social Security System (SSS), 329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK,
MORE OR LESS, OF THE BELLE CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT
OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO MILLION
NINE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVEN
PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (P1,102,965,607.50) AND MORE OR
LESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR MILLION SIX HUNDRED
TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS
(P744,612,450.00), RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS
ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE
HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS
AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (P1,847,578,057.50); AND BY COLLECTING
OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF
AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES,
COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID
PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE
HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS (P189,700,000.00) MORE OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE
CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE
EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME ‘JOSE
VELARDE;’
(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS,
SHARES, PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS, OR ANY FORM OF
PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND
JANE DOES, in the amount of MORE OR LESS THREE BILLION TWO
HUNDRED THIRTY THREE MILLION
435
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 435

ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY

THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (P3,233,104,173.17)
AND DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER HIS ACCOUNT NAME ‘JOSE
VELARDE’ AT THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK.”
We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or

ambiguous—as there is obviously none—that will confuse
petitioner in his defense. Although subject to proof, these
factual assertions clearly show that the elements of the
crime are easily understood and provide adequate contrast
between the innocent and the prohibited acts. Upon such
unequivocal assertions, petitioner is completely informed of
the accusations against him as to enable him to prepare for

an intelligent defense.
Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to
provide for the statutory definition of the terms
“combination” and “series” in the key phrase “a
combination or series of overt or criminal acts” found in
Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2, and the word “pattern” in Sec. 4.
These omissions, according to petitioner, render the
Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly
vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him,
hence, violative of his fundamental right to due process.
The rationalization seems to us to be pure sophistry. A
statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because
general terms are used therein, or because 6
of the
employment of terms without defining them; much less do
we have to define every word we use. Besides, there is no
positive constitutional or statutory command requiring the
legislature to define each and every word in an enactment.
Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its
will, and its inability to so define the words employed in a
statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or
ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear,
or at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is
distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law.
______________
6 C.J.S. 68, p. 113; People v. Ring, 70 P.2d 281, 26 Cal. App. 2d Supp.
768.
436

Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal

hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in
their natural,7
plain and ordinary acceptation and
signification, unless it is evident that the legislature
intended
8
a technical or special legal meaning to those
words. The intention of the lawmakers—who are,
ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers—to
use statutory phraseology in such a manner is always
presumed. Thus, Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary
contains the following commonly accepted definition of the
words “combination” and “series:”
Combination—the result or product of combining; the act or

process of combining. To combine is to bring into such close
relationship as to obscure individual characters.
Series—a number of things or events of the same class coming
one after another in spatial and temporal succession.
That Congress intended the words “combination” and “se

ries” to be understood in their popular meanings is
pristinely evident from the legislative deliberations on the
bill which eventually became RA 7080 or the Plunder Law:
DELIBERATIONS OF THE BICAMERAL COMMITTEE

ON JUSTICE, 7 May 1991
REP. I am just intrigued again by our definition of
ISIDRO: plunder. We say THROUGH A COMBINATION
OR SERIES OF OVERT OR CRIMINAL ACTS
AS MENTIONED IN SECTION ONE HEREOF.
Now when we say combination, we actually
mean to say, if there are two or more means, we
mean to say that number one and two or
number one and something else are included,
how about a series of the same act? For
example, through misappropriation, conversion,
misuse, will these be included also?
REP. Yeah, because we say a series.
GARCIA:
REP. Series.
ISIDRO:
REP. Yeah, we include series.
GARCIA:
______________
7 Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104988, 18 June

1996, 257 SCRA 430, 448.
8 PLDT v. Eastern Telecommunications Phil., Inc., G.R. No. 943774, 27
August 1992, 213 SCRA 16, 26.
437
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 437

REP.
ISIDRO: But we say we begin with a combination.
REP.
GARCIA: Yes.
REP. When we say combination, it seems that—

ISIDRO:
REP.
GARCIA: Two.
REP. Not only two but we seem to mean that two of
ISIDRO: the enumerated means not twice of one
enumeration.
REP.
GARCIA: No, no, not twice.
REP.
ISIDRO: Not twice?
REP. Yes. Combination is not twice—but
GARCIA: combination, two acts.
REP. So in other words, that’s it. When we say
ISIDRO: combination, we mean, two different acts. It
cannot be a repetition of the same act.
REP.
GARCIA: That be referred to series, yeah.
REP. No, no. Supposing one act is repeated, so there
ISIDRO: are two.
REP.
GARCIA: A series.
REP. That’s not series. Its a combination. Because
ISIDRO: when we say combination or series, we seem to
say that two or more, di ba?
REP. Yes, this distinguishes it really from ordinary
GARCIA: crimes. That is why, I said, that is a very good
suggestion because if it is only one act, it may
fall under ordinary crime but we have here a
combination or series of overt or criminal acts.
Soxxxx
REP.
GARCIA: Series. One after the other eh di . . . .
SEN. TANADA: So that would fall under the term
“series?”
REP. Series, oo.
GARCIA:
REP. Now, if it is a combination, ano, two
ISIDRO: misappropriations . . . .
REP. Its not . . . Two misappropriations will not be
GARCIA: combination. Series.
REP.
ISIDRO: So, it is not a combination?
REP. Yes.
GARCIA:
REP.
ISIDRO: When you say combination, two different?
REP.
GARCIA: Yes.
SEN.
TANADA: Two different.
438

REP.
ISIDRO: Two different acts.
REP.
GARCIA: For example, ha . . .
REP.
ISIDRO: Now a series, meaning, repetition . . .
DELIBERATIONS ON SENATE BILL NO. 733, 6 June
1989
SENATOR In line with our interpellations that
MACEDA: sometimes “one” or maybe even “two” acts
may already result in such a big amount, on
line 25, would the Sponsor consider deleting
the words “a series of overt or,” to read,
therefore: “or conspiracy COMMITTED by
criminal acts such as.” Remove the idea of
necessitating “a series.” Anyway, the
criminal acts areintheplural.
SENATOR That would mean a combination of two or
TANADA: more of the acts mentioned in this.
THE
PRESIDENT: Probably two or more would be . . . .
SENATOR Yes, because “a series” implies several or
MACEDA: many; two or more.
SENATOR
TANADA: Accepted, Mr. President x x x x.
THE If there is only one, then he has to be prosec
PRESIDENT: uted under the particular crime. But when
we say “acts of plunder” there should be, at
least, two or more.
SENATOR In other words, that is already covered by
ROMULO: existing laws, Mr. President.
Thus when the Plunder Law speaks of “combination,” it is

referring to at least two (2) acts falling under different
categories of enumeration provided in Sec. 1, par. (d), e.g.,
raids on the public treasury in Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1),
and fraudulent conveyance of assets belonging to the
National Government under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (3).
On the other hand, to constitute a “serie s”, there must
be two (2) or more overt or criminal acts falling under the
same category of enumeration found in Sec. 1, par. (d), say,
misappropriation, malversation and raids on the public
treasury, all of which fall under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1).
Verily, had the legislature intended a technical or
distinctive meaning for “combination” and “series,” it would
have taken greater pains in specifically providing for it in
the law.
439
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 439

As for “pattern,”9
we agree with the observations of the
Sandiganbayan that this term is sufficiently defined in
Sec. 4, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2—
xxxx under Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a ‘pattern’ consists of at least a

combination or series of overt or criminal acts enumerated in
subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. 1 (d). Secondly, pursuant to Sec. 2 of
the law, the pattern of overt or criminal acts is directed towards a
common purpose or goal which is to enable the public officer to
amass, accumulate or acquire illgotten wealth. And thirdly, there
must either be an ‘overall unlawful scheme’ or ‘conspiracy’ to
achieve said common goal. As commonly understood, the term
‘overall unlawful scheme’ indicates a ‘general plan of action or
method’ which the principal accused and public officer and others
conniving with him follow to achieve the aforesaid common goal.
In the alternative, if there is no such overall scheme or where the
schemes or methods used by multiple accused vary, the overt or
criminal acts must form part of a conspiracy to attain a common
goal.
Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does

not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what it
seeks to penalize. Under the circumstances, petitioner’s
reliance on the “void-forvagueness” doctrine is manifestly
misplaced. The doctrine has been formulated in various
ways, but is most commonly stated to the effect that a

statute establishing a criminal offense must define the
offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary
intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by
the statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of
legislation that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which
cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by
construction.
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its
application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to
the Constitution in two (2) respects—it violates due process
for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted
by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law
enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions
and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Govern-
______________
9 Resolution of 9 July 2001.
440

10
ment muscle. But the doctrine does not apply as against
legislations that are merely couched in imprecise language
but which nonetheless specify a standard though
defectively phrased; or to those that are apparently
ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain types of
activities. The first may be “saved” by proper construction,
while no challenge may be mounted as against 11
the second
whenever directed against such activities. With more
reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked where the assailed
statute is clear and free from ambiguity, as in this case.
The test in determining whether a criminal statute is
void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a
sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct 12
when measured by common understanding and practice.
It must be stressed, however, that the “vagueness” doctrine
merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the
statute to be upheld—not absolute precision or
mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest.
Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is
permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute
are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid
merely because it might have been more explicit in its

wordings or detailed in its provisions, especially where,
because of the nature of the act, it would be impossible to
provide all the details in advance as in all other statutes.
Moreover, we agree with, hence we adopt, the
observations of Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza during the
deliberations of the Court that the allegations that the
Plunder Law is vague and over-broad do not justify a facial
review of its validity—
The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that “a statute which

either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as 13to its application, violates the first essential
of due process of law.” The over-
______________
10 See People v. Nazario, No. L-44143, 31 August 1988, 165 SCRA 186, 195-196.
11 Ibid.
12 State v. Hill, 189 Kan 403, 369 P2d 365, 91 ALR2d 750.
13 Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 70 L.Ed. 328 (1926) cited
in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Ass’n. v. City Mayor, 20 SCRA 849,
867 (1967).
441
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 441

breadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that “a governmental

purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily
14
broadly and thereby invade the area of protected
freedoms.”
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and
to one which is overbroad because of possible “chilling effect” upon
protected speech. The theory is that “[w]hen statutes regulate or
proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests
itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single
prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of
constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing
attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the
person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could 15
not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity.”
Thepossibleharmto society in permitting some unprotected speech
to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the
protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived
grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of
overly broad statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal

statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very
existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone,
the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against
socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law
cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.
The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special
application only to free speech cases. They are inapt for testing
the validity of penal statutes. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it,
in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, “we have not recognized
an ‘overbreadth’
16
doctrine outside the limited
17
context of the First
Amendment.” In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, the Court ruled that
“claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases
involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only
spoken words” and, again, that “overbreadth claims, if
entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against
ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected
conduct.” For this reason, it has been held that “a facial challenge
to a legislative act is the most diffi-
______________
14 NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307, 12, 2 L.Ed. 325, 338 (1958); Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 5 L.Ed.2d 231 (1960).
15 Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521, 31 L. Ed.2d 408, 413 (1972) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
16 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 95 L.Ed2d 697, 707 (1987); see
also People v. De la Piedra, G.R. No. 121777, 24 January 2001, 350 SCRA 163.
17 413 U.S. 601, 612-613, 37 L.Ed. 2d 830, 840-841 (1973).
442

cult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must

establish that no18 set of circumstances exists under which the Act
would be valid.” As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a
litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all
its possible applications. “A plaintiff who engages in some conduct
that is clearly proscribed cannot complain19
of the vagueness of the
law as applied to the conduct of others.”
vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing “on their
faces” statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in
American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to
do service when what is involved is a criminal statute. With
respect to such statute, the established rule is that “one to whom
application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to

attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be
taken as applying to other persons or other
20
situations in which its
application might be unconstitutional.” As has been pointed out,
“vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context, like
overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation, while
statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are 21
invalidated [only] ‘as applied’ to a particular defendant.”
Consequently, there is no basis for petitioner’s claim that this
Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its entirety.
Indeed, “on its face” invalidation of statutes results in striking
them down entirely on the ground that they might be applied to
parties not
22
before the Court whose activities are constitutionally
protected. It constitutes a departure from the case and
controversy requirement of the Constitution and permits
decisions to be made without concrete factual set-
______________
18 United States v. Salerno, supra.

19 Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489,
494-95, 71 L.Ed.2d 362, 369 (1982).
20 United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21, 4 L.Ed.2d 524, 529 (1960). The
paradigmatic case is Yazoo & Mississippi Valley RR. v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 226
U.S. 217, 57 L.Ed. 193 (1912).
21 G. Gunther & K. Sullivan, Constitutional Law 1299 (2001).
22 Id. at 1328. See also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As Applied and Facial
Challenges, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1321 (2000) arguing that, in an important sense, as
applied challenges are the basic building blocks of constitutional adjudication and
that determinations that statutes are facially invalid properly occur only as logical
outgrowths of ruling on whether statutes may be applied to particular litigants on
particular facts.
443
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 443

23
tings and in sterile abstract contexts. 24But, as the U.S. Supreme
Court pointed out in Younger v. Harris
[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies,

and requiring correction of these deficiencies before the statute is put
into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The
combination of the relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact on
the legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the speculative
and amorphous nature of the required lineby-line analysis of detailed
statutes, ...ordinarilyresultsinakind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory
for deciding constitutional questions, whichever way they might be

decided.
For these reasons, “on its face” invalidation of statutes has

been described as “manifestly strong 25
medicine,” to be employed26
“sparingly and only a last resort,” and is generally disfavored.
In determining the constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its
provisions which are alleged to have been violated in a case must
be examined27
in the light of the conduct with which the defendant
is charged.
In light of the foregoing disquisition, it is evident that the

purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law, so tenaciously
claimed and argued at length by petitioner, is more
imagined than real. Ambiguity, where none exists, cannot
be created by dissecting parts and words in the statute to
furnish support to critics who cavil at the
______________
23 Constitution, Art. VIII, §1 and 5. Compare Angara v. Electoral

Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 158 (1936); “[T]he power of judicial review is
limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full
opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to be
constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt
at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and
to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.”
24 401 U.S. 37, 52-53, 27 L.Ed.2d 669, 680 (1971). Accord, United States
v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 14 L.Ed.2d 524 (1960); Board of Trustees, State
Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 106 L.Ed.2d 388 (1989).
25 Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. at 613, 37 L.Ed.2d at 841; National
Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 580 (1998).
26 FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 223, 107 L.Ed.2d 603 (1990);
Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, G.R. No.
135385, 6 December 2000, 347 SCRA 128 (Mendoza, J., Separate
Opinion).
27 United States v. National Dairy Prod. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32-33, 9
L.Ed.2d 561, 656-6 (1963).
444

want of scientific precision in the law. Every provision of

the law should be construed in relation and with reference
to every other part. To be sure, it will take more than
nitpicking to overturn the well-entrenched presumption of
constitutionality and validity of the Plunder Law. A

fortiori, petitioner cannot feign ignorance of what the
Plunder Law is all about. Being one of the Senators who
voted for its passage, petitioner must be aware that the law
was extensively deliberated upon by the Senate and its
appropriate committees by reason of which he even
registered his affirmative vote with full knowledge of its
legal implications and sound constitutional anchorage.
28
The parallel case of Gallego v. Sandiganbayan must be
mentioned if only to illustrate and emphasize the point
that courts are loathed to declare a statute void for
uncertainty unless the law itself is so imperfect and
deficient in its details, and is susceptible of no reasonable
construction that will support and give it effect. In that
case, petitioners Gallego and Agoncillo challenged the
constitutionality of Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act for being vague. Petitioners posited,
among others, that the term “unwarranted” is highly
imprecise and elastic with no common law meaning or
settled definition by prior judicial or administrative
precedents; that, for its vagueness, Sec. 3, par. (e), violates
due process in that it does not give fair warning or
sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize. Petitioners
further argued that the Information charged them with
three (3) distinct offenses, to wit: (a) giving of
“unwarranted” benefits through manifest partiality; (b)
giving of “unwarranted” benefits through evident bad faith;
and, (c) giving of “unwarranted” benefits through gross
inexcusable negligence while in the discharge of their
official function and that their right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against them was
violated because they were left to guess which of the three
(3) offenses, if not all, they were being charged and
prosecuted.
In dismissing the petition, this Court held that Sec. 3,
par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act does
not suffer from the constitutional defect of vagueness. The
phrases “manifest partial-
______________
28 G.R. No. 57841, 30 July 1982, 115 SCRA 793.
445
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 445

ity,”“evident bad faith,” and “gross and inexcusable

negligence” merely describe the different modes by which
the offense penalized in Sec. 3, par. (e), of the statute may
be committed, and the use of all these phrases in the same
Information does not mean that the indictment charges
three (3) distinct offenses.
The word ‘unwarranted’ is not uncertain. It seems lacking

adequate or official support; unjustified; unauthorized (Webster,
Third International Dictionary, p. 2514); or without justification
or adequate reason (Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. US Dept. of
Justice, C.D. Pa., 405 F. Supp. 8, 12, cited in Words and Phrases,
Permanent Edition, Vol. 43-A 1978, Cumulative Annual Pocket
Part, p. 19).
The assailed provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act consider a corrupt practice and make unlawful the act of the
public officer in:
x x x or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or

preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence, x x x (Section 3 [e], Rep. Act 3019, as amended).
It is not at all difficult to comprehend that what the

aforequoted penal provisions penalize is the act of a public officer,
in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial
functions, in giving any private party benefits, advantage or
preference which is unjustified, unauthorized or without
justification or adequate reason, through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
In other words, this Court found that there was nothing

vague or ambiguous in the use of the term “unwarranted”
in Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, which was understood in its primary and general
acceptation. Consequently, in that case, petitioners’
objection thereto was held inadequate to declare the section
unconstitutional.
On the second issue, petitioner advances the highly
stretched theory that Sec. 4 of the Plunder Law
circumvents the immutable obligation of the prosecution to
prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts
constituting the crime of plunder when it requires only
proof of a pattern of overt or criminal acts showing
unlawful scheme or conspiracy—
446
SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence.—For purposes of establishing the crime

of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every
conspiracy.
The running fault in this reasoning is obvious even to the

simplistic mind. In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in
all other crimes, the accused always has in his favor the
presumption of innocence which is guaranteed by the Bill
of Rights, and unless the State succeeds in demonstrating
by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability29lies, the
accused is entitled to an acquittal. The
useofthe“reasonable doubt” standard is indispensable to
command the respect and confidence of the community in
the application of criminal law. It is critical that the moral
force of criminal law be not diluted by a standard of proof
that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are
being condemned. It is also important in our free society
that every individual going about his ordinary affairs has
confidence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty
of a criminal offense without convincing a proper factfinder
of his guilt with utmost certainty. This “reasonable doubt”
standard has acquired such exalted stature in the realm of
constitutional law as it gives life to the Due Process Clause
which protects the accused against conviction except upon
proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary 30
to
constitute the crime with which he is charged. The
following exchanges between Rep. Rodolfo Albano and Rep.
Pablo Garcia on this score during the deliberations in the
floor of the House of Representatives are elucidating—
______________
29 People v. Ganguso, G.R. No. 115430, 23 November 1995, 250 SCRA

268, 274-275.
30 People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 94187, 4 November 1992, 215 SCRA 349,
360.
447
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 447

DELIBERATIONS OF THE HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES ON RA 7080, 9 October 1990
MR. ALBANO: Now, Mr. Speaker, it is also elementary in
our criminal law that what is alleged in the information
must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. If we will
prove only one act and find him guilty of the other acts
enumerated in the information, does that not work
against the right of the accused especially so if the
amount committed, say, by falsification is less than
P100 million, but the totality of the crime committed is
Pl00 million since there is malversation, bribery,
falsification of public document, coercion, theft?
MR. GARCIA: Mr. Speaker, not everything alleged in the
information needs to be proved beyond reasonable
doubt.Whatisre-quired to be proved beyond reasonable
doubt is every element of the crime charged. For
example, Mr. Speaker, there is an enumeration of the
things taken by the robber in the informa-tion—three
pairs of pants, pieces of jewelry. These need not be proved
beyond reasonable doubt, but these will not prevent the
conviction of a crime for which he was charged just
because, say, instead of 3 pairs of diamond earrings the
prosecution proved
two.Now,whatisrequiredtobeprovedbeyondreason-able
doubt is the element of the offense.
MR. ALBANO: I am aware of that, Mr. Speaker, but
considering that in the crime of plunder the totality of
the amount is very important, I feel that such a series of
overt criminal acts has to be taken singly. For instance,
in the act of bribery, he was able to accumulate only
P50,000 and in the crime of extortion, he was only able
to accumulate P1 million. Now, when we add the totality
of the other acts as required under this bill through the
interpretation on the rule of evidence, it is just one
single act, so how can we now convict him?
MR. GARCIA: With due respect, Mr. Speaker, for purposes
of proving an essential element of the crime, there is a
need to prove that element beyond reasonable doubt. For
example, one essential element of the crime is that the
amount involved is P100 million. Now, in a series of
defalcations and other acts of corruption in the
enumeration the total amount would be P110 or P120
million, but there are certain acts that could not be
proved, so, we will sum up the amounts involved in
those transactions which were proved. Now, if the
amount involved
448

in these transactions, proved beyond reasonable doubt,

is P100 million, then there is a crime of plunder (italics
supplied).
It is thus plain from the foregoing that the legislature did

not in any manner refashion the standard quantum of
proof in the crime of plunder. The burden still remains
with the prosecution to prove beyond any iota of doubt
every fact or element necessary to constitute the crime.
The thesis that Sec. 4 does away with proof of each and
every component of the crime suffers from a dismal
misconception of the import of that provision. What the
prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only
a number of acts sufficient to form a combination or series
which would constitute a pattern and involving an amount
of at least P50,000,000.00. There is no need to prove each
and every other act alleged in the Information to have been
committed by the accused in furtherance of the overall
unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or
acquire ill-gotten wealth. To illustrate, supposing that the
accused is charged in an Information for plunder with
having committed fifty (50) raids on the public treasury.
The prosecution need not prove all these fifty (50) raids, it
being sufficient to prove by pattern at least two (2) of the
raids beyond reasonable doubt provided31
only that they
amounted to at least P50,000,000.00.
A reading of Sec. 2 in conjunction with Sec. 4, brings us
to the logical conclusion that “pattern of overt or criminal
acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy” inheres in the very acts of accumulating,
acquiring or amassing hidden wealth. Stated otherwise,
such pattern arises where the prosecution is able to prove
beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts as defined in
Sec. 1, par. (d). Pattern is merely a by-product of the proof
of the predi-
______________
31 Then Senate President Jovito R. Salonga construed in brief the

provision, thuswise: “If there are let’s say 150 crimes all in all, criminal
acts, whether bribery, misappropriation, malversation, extortion, you need
not prove all those beyond reasonable doubt. If you can prove by pattern,
let’s say 10, but each must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, you do not
have to prove 150 crimes. That’s the meaning of this (Deliberations of
Committee on Constitutional Amendments and Revision of Laws, 15

November 1988, cited in the Sandiganbayan Resolution of 9 July 2001).
449
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 449

cate acts. This conclusion is consistent with reason and

common sense. There would be no other explanation for a
combination or series of overt or criminal acts to stash
P50,000,000.00 or more, than “a scheme or conspiracy to
amass, accumulate or acquire ill gotten wealth.” The
prosecution is therefore not required to make a deliberate
and conscious effort to prove pattern as it necessarily
follows with the establishment of a series or combination of
the predicate acts.
Relative to petitioner’s contentions on the purported
defect of Sec. 4 is his submission that “pattern” is “a very
important element of the crime of plunder;”
andthatSec.4is“two pronged, (as) it contains a rule of
evidence and a substantive element of the crime,” such that
without it the accused cannot be convicted of plunder—
JUSTICE In other words, cannot an accused be conv

BELLOSILLO: icted under the plunder law without
applying Section 4 on the Rule of Evidence
if there is proof beyond reasonable doubt
of the commission of the acts complained
of?
ATTY. In that case he can be convicted of
AGABIN: individual crimes enumerated in the
Revised Penal Code, but not plunder.
JUSTICE In other words, if all the elements of the
BELLOSILLO: crime are proved beyond reasonable doubt
without applying Section 4, can you not
have a conviction under the Plunder Law?
ATTY.
AGABIN: Not a conviction for plunder, your Honor.
JUSTICE Can you not disregard the application of
BELLOSILLO: Sec. 4 in convicting an accused charged for
violation of the Plunder Law?
ATTY. Well, your Honor, in the first place Section
AGABIN: 4 lays
downasubstantiveelementofthelawxxxx
JUSTICE What I said is—do we have to avail of
BELLOSILLO: Section 4 when there is proof beyond
reasonable doubt on the acts charged

constituting plunder?
ATTY. Yes, your Honor, because Section 4 is two
AGABIN: pronged, it contains a rule of evidence and
it contains a substantive element of the
crime of plunder. So, there is no way by
which we can avoid Section 4.
450

JUSTICE But there is proof beyond reasonable doubt

BELLOSILLO: insofar as the predicate crimes charged
are concerned that you do not have to go
that far by applying Section 4?
ATTY. Your Honor, our thinking is that Section 4
AGABIN: contains a very important element of the
crime of plunder and that cannot
32
be
avoided by the prosecution.
We do not subscribe to petitioner’s stand. Primarily, all the

essential elements of plunder can be culled and understood
from its definition in Sec. 2, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d),
and “pattern” is not one of them. Moreover, the epigraph
and opening clause of Sec. 4 is clear and unequivocal:

of plunder x x x x
It purports to do no more than prescribe a rule of procedure

for the prosecution of a criminal case for plunder. Being a
purely procedural measure, Sec. 4 does not define or
establish any substantive right in favor of the accused but
only operates in furtherance of a remedy. It is only a means
to an end, an aid to substantive law. Indubitably, even
without invoking Sec. 4, a conviction for plunder may be
had, for what is crucial for the prosecution is to present
sufficient evidence to engender that moral certitude
exacted by the fundamental law to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, even granting for
the sake of argument that Sec. 4 is flawed and vitiated for
the reasons advanced by petitioner, it may simply be
severed from the rest of the provisions without necessarily
resulting in the demise of the law; after all, the existing
rules on evidence can supplant Sec. 4 more than enough.
Besides, Sec. 7 of RA 7080 provides for a separability

clause—
Sec. 7. Separability of Provisions.—If any provisions of this Act or

the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held
invalid, the remaining provisions of this Act and the application of
such provisions to other persons or circumstances shall not be
affected thereby.
______________
32 TSN, 18 September 2001, pp. 115-121.
451
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 451

Implicit in the foregoing section is that to avoid the whole

act from being declared invalid as a result of the nullity of
some of its provisions, assuming that to be the case
although it is not really so, all the provisions thereof should
accordingly be treated independently of each other,
especially if by doing so, the objectives of the statute can
best be achieved.
As regards the third issue, again we agree with Justice
Mendoza that plunder is a malum in se which requires
proof of criminal intent. Thus, he says, in his Concurring
Opinion—
x x x Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the

element of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder.
It is noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the
crime of plunder was committed “willfully, unlawfully and
criminally.” It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part of
petitioner.
In support of his contention that the statute eliminates the
requirement of mens rea and that is the reason he claims the
statute is void, petitioner cites the following remarks of Senator
Tañada made during the deliberation on S.B. No. 733:
SENATOR TAÑADA . . . And the evidence that will be required to

convict him would not be evidence for each and every individual criminal
act but only evidence sufficient to establish the conspiracy or scheme to
33
commit this crime of plunder.
However, Senator Tañada was discussing §4 as shown by the

succeeding portion of the transcript quoted by petitioner:
SENATOR ROMULO: And, Mr. President, the Gentleman feels that it is

contained in Section 4, Rule of Evidence, which, in the Gentleman’s view,
would provide for a speedier and faster process of attending to this kind
of cases?
34
SENATOR TAÑADA: Yes, Mr. President . . .
Senator Tañada was only saying that where the charge is

conspiracy to commit plunder, the prosecution need not prove
each and every criminal act done to further the scheme or
conspiracy, it being enough if it proves beyond reasonable doubt a
pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy. As far as the acts constituting
______________
33 4 Record of the Senate 1316, 5 June 1989.

34 Ibid.
452

the pattern are concerned, however, the elements of the crime

must be proved and the requisite mens rea must be shown.
Indeed, §2 provides that—
Any person who participated with the said public officer in the
commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall
likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the
degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating
circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be
considered by the court.
The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in

the Revised Penal Code to prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder
Law indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element of plunder
since the degree of responsibility of the offender is determined by
his criminal intent. It is true that §2 refers to “any person who
participates with the said public officer in the commission of an
offense contributing to the crime of plunder.” There is no reason
to believe, however, that it does not apply as well to the public
officer as principal in the crime. As Justice Holmes said: “We
agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws
with what they omit, but there is no canon against using common 35
sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean.”
Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a
malum in se must be deemed to have been resolved in the
affirmative by the decision of Congress in 1993 to include it
among the heinous crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to

death. Other heinous crimes are punished with death as a
straight penalty in R.A. No. 7659. Referring to these36 groups of
heinous crimes, this Court held in People v. Echegaray:
The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are, by
their very nature, despicable, either because life was callously taken or
the victim is treated like an animal and utterly dehumanized as to
completely disrupt the normal course of his or her growth as a human
being . . . . Seen in this light, the capital crimes of kidnapping and serious
illegal detention for ransom resulting in the death of the victim or the
victim is raped, tortured, or subjected to dehumanizing acts; destructive
arson resulting in death; and drug offenses involving minors or resulting
in the death of the victim in the case of other crimes; as well as murder,
rape, parricide, infanticide, kidnapping and serious illegal detention,
where the victim is detained for more than three days or serious physical
injuries
______________
35 Roschen v. Ward, 279 U.S. 337, 339, 73 L.Ed. 722, 728 (1929).
36 267 SCRA 682, 721-2 (1997) (emphasis added).
453
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 453

were inflicted on the victim or threats to kill him were made or the victim
is a minor, robbery with homicide, rape or intentional mutilation,
destructive arson, and carnapping where the owner, driver or occupant of
the carnapped vehicle is killed or raped, which are penalized by reclusion
perpetua to death, are clearly heinous by their very nature.
There are crimes, however, in which the abomination lies in the
significance and implications of the subject criminal acts in the scheme of
the larger socio-political and economic context in which the state finds
itself to be struggling to develop and provide for its poor and
underprivileged masses. Reeling from decades of corrupt tyrannical rule
that bankrupted the govermment and impoverished the population, the
Philippine Government must muster the political will to dismantle the
culture of corruption, dishonesty, greed and syndicated criminality that
so deeply entrenched itself in the structures of society and the psyche of
the populace. [With the government] terribly lacking the money to
provide even the most basic services to its people, any form of
misappropriation or misapplication of government funds translates to an
actual threat to the very existence of government, and in turn, the very
survival of the people it governs over. Viewed in this context, no less
heinous are the effects and repercussions of crimes like qualified bribery,
destructive arson resulting in death, and drug offenses involving
government officials, employees or officers, that their perpetrators must

not be allowed to cause further destruction and damage to society.
The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a

heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se. For when the acts
punished are
37
inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are
mala in se and it does not matter that such acts are punished in
a special law, especially since in the case of plunder the predicate
crimes are mainly mala in se. Indeed, it would be absurd to treat
prosecutions for plunder as though they are mere prosecutions for
violations of the Bouncing Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of an
ordinance against jaywalking, without regard to the inherent
wrongness of the acts.
To clinch, petitioner likewise assails the validity of RA

7659, the amendatory law of RA 7080, on constitutional
grounds. Suffice it to say, however, that it is now too late in
the day for him to resurrect
______________
37 Black’s Law Dictionary 959 (1990); Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA

324, 338 (1986).
454

this long dead issue, the same having 38

been eternally
consigned by People vs. Echegaray to the archives of
jurisprudential history. The declaration of this Court
therein that RA 7659 is constitutionally valid stands as a
declaration of the State, and becomes, by necessary effect,
assimilated in the Constitution now as an integral part of
it.
Our nation has been racked by scandals of corruption
and obscene profligacy of officials in high places which have
shaken its very foundation. The anatomy of graft and
corruption has become more elaborate in the corridors of
time as unscrupulous people relentlessly contrive more and
more ingenious ways to bilk the coffers of the government.
Drastic and radical measures are imperative to fight the
increasingly sophisticated, extraordinarily methodical and
economically catastrophic looting of the national treasury.
Such is the Plunder Law, especially designed to
disentangle those ghastly tissues of grand-scale corruption
which, if left unchecked, will spread like a malignant tumor
and ultimately consume the moral and institutional fiber of

our nation. The Plunder Law, indeed, is a living testament
to the will of the legislature to ultimately eradicate this
scourge and thus secure society against the avarice and
other venalities in public office.
These are times that try men’s souls. In the checkered
history of this nation, few issues of national importance can
equal the amount of interest and passion generated by
petitioner’s ignominious fall from the highest office, and his
eventual prosecution and trial under a virginal statute.
This continuing saga has driven a wedge of dissension
among our people that may linger for a long time. Only by
responding to the clarion call for patriotism, to rise above
factionalism and prejudices, shall we emerge triumphant in
the midst of ferment.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA
7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as amended by
RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the
petition to declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED
for lack of merit.
______________
38 G.R. No. 117472, 7 February 1997, 267 SCRA 682.
455
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 455

SO ORDERED.
Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Davide, Jr., J., I also concur with Justice Mendoza.
Melo, J., I also join in the separate concurring
opinion of Justice Mendoza.
Puno, J., I concur and I also join the opinion of
J.Mendoza.
Vitug, J., I concur and likewise join the concurring
opinion of Justice Mendoza.
Kapunan, J., See dissenting opinion.
Mendoza, J., Please see concurring opinion.
Panganiban, J., Please see separate concurring
opinion.
Quisumbing, J., I join in the concurring opinion of
Justice Mendoza.
Pardo, J., See Separate Dissenting Opinion.
Ynares-Santiago, J., See dissenting opinion.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., Please see my dissenting

opinion.
Carpio, J., No part. I was one of complainants
before Om-budsman.
MENDOZA, J., Concurring in the judgment:
Before I explain my vote, I think it necessary to restate the

basic facts.
456

Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was President of the

Philippines until January 20, 2001 when he was forced to
vacate the presidency by people power and then Vice
President
1
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo succeeded him in
office. He was charged, in eight cases filed with the
Sandiganbayan, with various offenses committed while in
office, among them plunder, for allegedly having amassed
ill-gotten wealth in the amount of P4.1 billion, more or less.
He moved to quash the information for plunder on the
ground that R.A. No. 7080, otherwise called the Anti-
Plunder Law, is unconstitutional and that the information
charges more than one offense.
In its resolution dated July 9, 2001, the Sandiganbayan
denied petitioner’s motion, along with those filed by his co-
accused, Edward Serapio, and his son, Jose “Jinggoy”
Estrada. Petitioner brought this petition for certiorari and
prohibition under Rule 65 to set aside the Sandiganbayan’s
resolution principally on the ground that the Anti-Plunder
Law is void for being vague and overbroad. We gave due
course to the petition and required respondents to file
comments and later heard the parties in oral arguments on
September 18, 2001 and on their memoranda filed on
September 28, 2001 to consider the constitutional claims of
petitioner.
I. THE ANTI-PLUNDER LAW
The Anti-Plunder Law (R.A. No. 7080) was enacted by

Congress on July 12, 1991 pursuant to the constitutional
mandate that “the State shall maintain honesty and
integrity in the public service and take positive2
and
effective measures against graft and corruption.” Section 2
of the statute provides:
Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties.—Any public officer

who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family,
relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates,
subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires
ill-gotten wealth through a combi-
______________
1 See Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. No. 146710, March 2, 2001, 353 SCRA 452;
Estrada v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 146715, March 2, 2001, 353 SCRA 452.
2 CONST., ART II, §27.
457
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 457

nation or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section

l(d) hereof in the aggregate amount or total value of at least Fifty
million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of
plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any
person who participated with the said public officer in the
commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder
shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of
penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of
mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the
Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the court. The court
shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and
other incomes and assets including the properties and shares of
stocks derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in
favor of the State. (As amended by Sec. 12, R.A. No. 7659).
The term “ill-gotten wealth” is defined in §1(d) as follows:
“Ill-gotten wealth” means any asset, property, business enterprise

or material possession of any person within the purview of Section
Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through
dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business
associates by any combination or series of the following means or
similar schemes:
1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or

treasury.
2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift,
reason of the office or position of the public officer

concerned;
‘3) By the ‘illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of
assets belonging to the National Government or any of its
subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities or government-
owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.
4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly
any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or
participation including the promise of future employment
in any business enterprise or undertaking;
5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial
monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation
of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular
persons or special interests; or
458

6) By taking undue advantage of official position, authority,

relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich
himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage
and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of
the Philippines.
Section 4 of the said law states:
Rule of Evidence.—For purposes of establishing the crime of

plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every
conspiracy.
II. ANTI-PLUNDER LAW NOT TO BE JUDGED

“ON ITS FACE”
The amended information against petitioner charges

violations of §2, in relation to §1(d)(1)(2), of the statute. It
reads:
AMENDED INFORMATION
The undersigned Ombudsman Prosecutor and OIC-Director,

EPIB, Office of the Ombudsman, hereby accuses former President
of the Republic of the Philippines, Joseph Ejercito Estrada a.k.a

“Asiong Salonga” and a.k.a “Jose Velarde,” together with Jose
“Jinggoy” Estrada, Charlie “Atong” Ang, Edward Serapio,
Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, John Doe a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan
or Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas,
and John Does & Jane Does, of the crime of plunder, defined and
penalized under R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Sec. 12 of R.A. No.
7659, committed as follows:
That during the period from June, 1998 to January, 2001, in the
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
Joseph Ejercito Estrada, then a public officer, being then the President of
the Republic of the Philippines, by himself and/or in
connivance/conspiracy with his co-accused, who are members of his
family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates,
subordinates and/or other persons, by taking undue advantage of his
official position, authority, relationship, connection, or influence, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and
acquire by himself, directly or indirectly, ill-gotten wealth in the
aggregate amount or total value of four billion ninety seven million eight
hundred four thousand one hundred seventy three pesos
459
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 459

and seventeen centavos [P4,097,804,173.17], more or less, thereby

unjustly enriching himself or themselves at the expense and to the
damage of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines,
through any or a combination or a series of overt or criminal acts, or
similar schemes or means, described as follows:
(a) by receiving or collecting, directly or indirectly, on several
instances, money in the aggregate amount of five hundred forty-five
million pesos (P545,000,000.00), more or less, from illegal gambling in
the form of gift, share, percentage, kickback or any form of pecuniary
benefit, by himself and/or in connivance with co-accused Charlie “Atong”
Ang, Jose “Jinggoy” Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, and
John Does and Jane Does, in consideration of toleration or protection of
illegal gambling;
(b) by diverting, receiving, misappropriating, converting or misusing
directly or indirectly, for his or their personal gain and benefit, public
funds in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS
[P130,000,000.00], more or less, representing a portion of the two
hundred million pesos [P200,000,000.00] tobacco excise tax share
allocated for the Province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171, by himself
and/or in connivance with co-accused Charlie “Atong” Ang, Alma Alfaro,
John Doe a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan or Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, and
Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and other John Does and Jane Does;
(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, for his personal gain and
benefit, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) to purchase
351,878,000 shares of stocks, more or less, and the Social Security
System (SSS), 329,855,000 shares of stocks, more or less, of the Belle
Corporation in the amount of more or less one billion one hundred two
million nine hundred sixty five thousand six hundred seven pesos and
fifty centavos (P1,102,965,607.50] and more or less seven hundred forty
four million six hundred twelve thousand and four hundred fifty pesos
[P744,612,450.00], respectively, or a total of more or less one billion eight
hundred forty seven million five hundred seventy eight thousand fifty
seven pesos and fifty centavos [P1,847,578,057.50]; and by collecting or
receiving, directly or indirectly, by himself and/or in connivance with
John Does and Jane Does, commissions or percentages by reason of said
purchases of shares of stock in the amount of one hundred eighty nine
million seven hundred thousand pesos [P189,700,000.00], more or less,
from the Belle Corporation which became part of the deposit in the
Equitable-PCI Bank under the account name “Jose Velarde”;
460

(d) by unjustly enriching himself from commissions, gifts, shares,

percentages, kickbacks, or any form of pecuniary benefits, in connivance
with John Does and Jane Does, in the amount of more or less three
billion two hundred thirty three million one hundred four thousand one
hundred seventy three pesos and seventeen centavos [P3,233,104,173.17]
and depositing the same under his account name “Jose Velarde” at the
Equitable-PCI Bank.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Manila for Quezon City, Philippines, 18 April 2001
But, although this is a prosecution under §2, in relation to

§1(d)(1)(2), what we are seeing here is a wholesale attack
on the validity of the entire statute. Petitioner makes little
effort to show the alleged invalidity of the statute as
applied to him. His focus is instead on the statute as a
whole as he attacks “on their face” not only §§1(d)(1)(2) of
the statute but also its other provisions which deal with
plunder committed by illegal or fraudulent disposition of
government assets (§1(d)(3)), acquisition of interest in
business (§1(d)(4)), and establishment of monopolies and
combinations or implementation of decrees intended to
benefit particular persons or special interests (§1(d)(5)).
These other provisions of the statute are irrelevant to

this case. What relevance do questions regarding the
establishment of monopolies and combinations, or the
ownership of stocks in a business enterprise, or the illegal
or fraudulent dispositions of government property have to
the criminal prosecution of petitioner when they are not
even mentioned in the amended information filed against
him? Why should it be important to inquire whether the
phrase “overt act” in §1(d) and §2 means the same thing as
the phrase “criminal act” as used in the same provisions
when the acts imputed to petitioner in the amended
information are criminal acts? Had the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code been subjected to this kind of line-by-
line scrutiny whenever a portion thereof was involved in a
case, it is doubtful if we would have the jurisprudence on
penal law that we have today. The prosecution of crimes
would certainly have been hampered, if not stultified. We
should not even attempt to assume the power we are asked
to exercise. “The delicate power of pronouncing an Act of
Congress unconstitutional is not to be exercised with
reference to hypothetical cases .... In
461
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 461

determining the sufficiency of the notice a statute must of

necessity be examined in the3 light of the conduct with
which a defendant is charged.”
Nonetheless, it is contended that because these
provisions are void for being vague and overbroad, the
entire statute, including the part under which petitioner is
being prosecuted, is also void. And if the entire statute is
void, there is no law under which he can be prosecuted for
plunder. Nullum crimen sine lege, nullum poena sine lege.
Two justifications are advanced for this facial challenge
to the validity of the entire statute. The first is that the
statute comes within the specific prohibitions of the
Constitution and, for this reason, it must be given strict
scrutiny and the normal presumption of constitutionality
should not be applied to it nor the4 usual judicial deference
given to the judgment of Congress. The second justification
given for the facial attack5 on the Anti-Plunder Law is that
it is vague and overbroad.
We find no basis for such claims either in the rulings of
this Court or of those of the U.S. Supreme Court, from
which petitioner’s counsel purports to draw for his
conclusions. We consider first the claim that the statute

must be subjected to strict scrutiny.
A. Test of Strict Scrutiny Not Applicable to Penal Statutes

6
Petitioner cites the dictum in Ople v. Torres that “when
the integrity of a fundamental right is at stake, this Court
will give the challenged law, administrative order, rule or
regulation stricter scrutiny” and that “It will not do for
authorities to invoke the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties.” As will presently be shown,
“strict scrutiny,” as used in that decision, is not the same
thing as the “strict scrutiny” urged by petitioner. Much less
did this Court rule that because of the need to give
______________
L.Ed.2d 561, 565-6 (1963) (internal quotation marks omitted).
4 Memorandum for the Petitioner, pp. 4-7.
5 Id., at 11-66.
6 293 SCRA 161, 166 (1998).
462

“stricter scrutiny” to laws abridging fundamental freedoms,

it will not give such laws the presumption of validity.
Petitioner likewise cites “the most celebrated footnote in
[American] constitutional law,” i.e. footnote7 4 of the opinion
in United States v. Carolene Products Co., in which it was
stated:
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of

constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within
a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first
ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to
be embraced within the Fourteenth.
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which
restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected
to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected
to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions
of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of
legislation.
Nor need we inquire whether similar considerations enter into
the review of statutes directed at particular religious, or national,
or racial minorities: whether prejudice against discrete and
insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends

seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may
call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.
Again, it should be noted that what the U.S. Supreme

Court said is that “there may be narrower scope for the
operation of the presumption of constitutionality” for
legislation which comes within the first ten amendments to
the American Federal Constitution compared to legislation
covered by the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause. The American Court did not say that such
legislation is not to be presumed constitutional, much less
that it is presumptively invalid, but only that a “narrower
scope” will be given for the presumption of constitutionality
in respect of such statutes. There is, therefore, no warrant
for petitioner’s contention that “the presumption of
constitutionality of a legislative act is applicable only
where the Supreme Court deals with facts regarding
ordinary economic affairs, not where the 8
interpretation of
the text of the Constitution is involved.”
______________
7 304 U.S. 144, 152, 82 L.Ed. 1234, 1241 (1938) (cases cited omitted).
8 Memorandum for the Petitioner, p. 5.
463
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 463

What footnote 4 of the Carolene Products case posits is a

double standard of judicial review: strict scrutiny for laws
dealing with freedom of the mind or restricting the political
process, and deferential or rational basis standard of
review for economic legislation. As Justice (later Chief
Justice) Fernando explained in Malate9
Hotel and Motel
Operators Ass’n v. The City Mayor, this simply means that
“if the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the
person, the standard for the validity of governmental acts
is much more rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty
curtailed affects what are at the most rights of property,
the permissible scope of regulatory measures is wider.”
Hence, strict scrutiny is used today to test the validity of
laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or race
and facial challenges are allowed for this purpose. But
criminal statutes, like the Anti-Plunder Law, while subject
to strict construction, are not subject to strict scrutiny. The

two (i.e., strict construction and strict scrutiny) are not the
same. The rule of strict construction is a rule of legal
hermeneutics which deals with the parsing of statutes to
determine the intent of the legislature. On the other hand,
strict scrutiny is a standard of judicial review for
determining the quality and the amount of governmental
interest brought to justify the regulation of fundamental
freedoms. It is set opposite such terms as “deferential
review” and “intermediate review.”
Thus, under deferential review, laws are upheld if they
rationally further a legitimate governmental interest,
without courts seriously inquiring into the substantiality of
such interest and examining the alternative means by
which the objectives could be achieved. Under intermediate
review, the substantiality of the governmental interest is
seriously looked into and the availability of less restrictive
alternatives are considered. Under strict scrutiny, the focus
is on the presence of compelling, rather than substantial,
governmental interest and on the 10absence of less restrictive
means for achieving that interest.
______________
9 20 SCRA 849 865 (1967).

10 Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 UNIV. OF CHI. L.
REV. 46, 50-53 (1987).
464

Considering these degrees of strictness in the review of

statutes, how many criminal laws can survive the test of
strict scrutiny to which petitioner proposes to subject
them? How many can pass muster if, as petitioner would
have it, such statutes are not to be presumed
constitutional? Above all, what will happen to the State’s
ability to deal with the problem of crimes, and, in
particular, with the problem of crimes and corruption in
government, if criminal laws are to be upheld only if it is
shown that there is a compelling governmental interest for
making certain conduct criminal and if there is no other
means less restrictive than that contained in the law for
achieving such governmental interest?
B. Vagueness and Overbreadth Doctrines, as Grounds for

Facial Challenge, Not Applicable to Penal Laws
Nor do allegations that the Anti-Plunder Law is vague and
overbroad justify a facial review of its validity. The void-
forvagueness doctrine states that “a statute which either
forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at
its meaning and differ as to its application,
11
violates the
first essential of due process of law.” The overbreadth
doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that “a governmental
purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly12
and thereby invade the area of
protected freedoms.”
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague
statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible
“chilling effect” upon protected speech. The theory is that
“[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no
readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle
for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the
transcendent value to all society of constitutionally
protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks
on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the
person making the
______________
11 Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 70 L.Ed. 328
(1926) cited in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Ass’nv.City
Mayor, 20 SCRA 849, 867 (1967).
12 NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307, 12 L.Ed.2d 325, 338 (1958);
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 5 L.Ed.2d 231 (1960).
465
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 465

attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not 13

be
regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity.” The
possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected
speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility
that the protected speech of others may be deterred and
perceived grievances left to fester because of possible
inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal
statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from
their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for
this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from

enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area
of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area
of free speech.
The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have
special application only to free speech cases. They are inapt
for testing the validity of penal statutes. As the U.S.
Supreme Court put it, in an opinion by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, “we have not recognized an ‘overbreadth’
doctrine outside
14
the limited context15 of the First
Amendment.” In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, the Court ruled
that “claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in
cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to
regulate only spoken words” and, again, that “overbreadth
claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when
invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to
be applied to protected conduct.” For this reason, it has
been held that “a facial challenge to a legislative Act is . . .
the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the
challenger must establish that no set of circumstances
16
exists under which the Act would be valid.” As for the
vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant may challenge
a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible
applications. “A plaintiff who engages in
______________
13 Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521, 31 L.Ed.2d 408, 413 (1972)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
14 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 95 L.Ed.2d 697, 707
(1987). See also People v. De la Piedra, G.R. No. 121777, Jan. 24, 2001,
350 SCRA 163.
15 413 U.S. 601, 612-613, 37 L.Ed.2d 830, 840-841 (1973).
16 United States v. Salerno, supra.
466

some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of

the vagueness
17
of the law as applied to the conduct of
others.”
vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing “on
their faces” statutes in free speech cases or, as they are
called in American law, First Amendment cases. They
cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a
criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the

established rule is that “one to whom application of a
statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the
statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken
as applying to other persons or other situations
18
in which its
application might be unconstitutional.” As has been
pointed out, “vagueness challenges in the First Amendment
context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce
facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter
of due process typically are
19
invalidated [only] ‘as applied’ to
a particular defendant.” Consequently, there is no basis
for petitioner’s claim that this Court review the Anti-
Plunder Law on its face and in its entirety.
C. Anti-Plunder Law Should be Construed “As Applied”

Indeed, “on its face” invalidation of statutes results in
striking them down entirely on the ground that they might
be applied to parties not before
20
the Court whose activities
are constitutionally protected. It constitutes a departure
from the case and controversy requirement of the
Constitution and permits decisions to be
______________
17 Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455

U.S. 489, 494-495, 71 L.Ed.2d 362, 369 (1982).
18 United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21, 4 L.Ed.2d 524, 529 (1960).
The paradigmatic case is Yazoo and Mississippi Valley R.R. v. Jackson
Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217, 57 L.Ed. 193 (1912).
19 K. SULLIVAN & G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1299
(14th ed., 2001).
20 Id. at 1328. See also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As Applied and Facial
Challenges, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1321 (2000), arguing that, in an
important sense, as applied challenges are the basic building blocks of
constitutional adjudication and that determination that statutes are
facially invalid properly occur only as logical outgrowths of rulings on
whether statutes may be applied to particular litigants on particular facts.
467
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 467

made without concrete

21
factual settings and in sterile
abstract contexts. But, as
22
the U.S. Supreme Court pointed
out in Younger v. Harris:
[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its

deficiencies, and requiring correction of these deficiencies before
the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task
for the judiciary. The combination of the relative remoteness of
the controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief
sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of
the required line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes,... ordinarily
results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding
constitutional questions, whichever way they might be decided.
This is the reason “on its face” invalidation of statutes has

been described as “manifestly strong medicine,” 23
to be
employed “sparingly 24and only as a last resort,” and is
generally disfavored. In determining the constitutionality
of a statute, therefore, its provisions which are alleged to
have been violated in a case must be examined in the 25
light
of the conduct with which the defendant is charged.
______________
21 CONST., ART. VIII, §§1 and 5, Compare Angara v. Electoral

Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 158 (1936): “[T]he power of judicial review is
limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full
opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the
constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt
at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and
to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.”
22 401 U.S. 37, 52-53, 27 L.Ed.2d 669,680 (1971). Accord, United States
v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 4 L.Ed.2d 524 (1960); Board of Trustees, State
Univ. of N.Y v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 106 L.Ed.2d 388 (1989).
23 Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. at 613, 37 L.Ed.2d at 841; National
Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 580 (1998).
24 FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 223, 107 L.Ed.2d 603 (1990);
Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, G.R. No.
135385, Dec. 6, 2000, 347 SCRA 128 (Mendoza, J., Separate Opinion).
L.Ed.2d 561, 565-6 (1963).
468

This brings me to the question whether, as applied, §2, in

relation to §1(d)(1)(2), of the Anti-Plunder Law is void on
the ground of vagueness and overbreadth.
III. ANTI-PLUNDER LAW NEITHER VAGUE NOR

OVERBROAD
As earlier noted, the case against petitioner Joseph Ejercito

Estrada in the Sandiganbayan is for violation of §2, in
relation to §1(d)(1)(2), of the Anti-Plunder Law, which, so
far as pertinent, provide:
SEC. 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties.—Any public

officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his
family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates,
ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or
criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof in the aggregate
amount or total value of at least Fifty million pesos
(P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall
be punished by reclusion perpetua todeath....
SEC. 1. Definition of Terms.—...
(d) “Ill-gotten wealth” means any asset, property, business
enterprise or material possession of any person within the
purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or
indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates
and/or business associates by any combination or series of the

treasury.
2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift,
reason of the office or position of the public officer
concerned;
The charge is that in violation of these provisions, during

the period June 1998 to January 2001, petitioner, then the
President of the Philippines, willfully, unlawfully, and
criminally amassed wealth in the total amount of
P4,097,804,173.17, more or less, through “a combination or
series of overt or criminal acts,” to wit: (1) by receiving or
collecting the total amount of P545,000,000.00, more or
less, from illegal gambling by himself and/or in connivance
with his co-f
469
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 469

accused named therein, in exchange for protection of illegal

gambling; (2) by misappropriating, converting, or misusing,
by himself or in connivance with his co-accused named
therein, public funds amounting to P130,000,000.00, more
or less, representing a portion of the share of the Province
of Ilocos Sur in the tobacco excise tax; (3) by ordering the
GSIS and the SSS to buy shares of stocks of the Belle
Corp., worth P1,102,965,607.50 and P744,612,450.00
respectively, or the total amount of P1,847,578,057.50, for
which he received as commission the amount of
P189,700,000.00, more or less, from Belle Corp.; (4) by
unjustly enriching himself from commissions, gifts, shares,
percentages, and kickbacks in the amount of
P3,233,104,173.17, which he deposited in the Equitable-
PCI Bank under the name of “Jose Velarde.”
Anyone reading the law in relation to this charge cannot
possibly be mistaken as to what petitioner is accused of in
Criminal Case No. 26558 of the Sandiganbayan. But,
repeatedly, petitioner complains that the law is vague and
deprives him of due process. He26 invokes the ruling in
Connalty v. General Constr. Co. that “a statute which
either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so
vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application,
violates the first essential of due process of law.” He does
this by questioning not only §2, in relation to §1(d)(1)(2), as
applied to him, but also other provisions of the Anti-
Plunder Law not involved in this case. In 55 out of 84 pages
of discussion in his Memorandum, petitioner tries to show
why on their face these provisions are vague and over-
broad by asking questions regarding the meaning of some
words and phrases in the statute, to wit:
1. Whether “series” means two, three, or four overt or

criminal acts listed in §1(d) in view of the alleged
divergence of interpretation given to this word by
the Ombudsman, the Solicitor General, and the
Sandiganbayan, and whether the acts in a series
should be directly related to each other;
2. Whether “combination” includes two or more acts or
at least twoofthe“means or similar schemes”
mentioned in §1(d);
______________
26 269 U.S. 385, 391, 70 L.Ed. 328 (1926) cited in Ermita-Malate Hotel
and Motel Operators Ass’n. v. City Mayor, 20 SCRA 849,867 (1967)
470

3. Whether “pattern” as used in §1(d) must be related

to the word “pattern” in §4 which requires that it be
“indicative of an overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy”;
4. Whether “overt” means the same thing as
“criminal”;
5. Whether “misuse of public funds” is the same as
“illegal use of public property or technical
malversation”;
6. Whether “raids on the public treasury” refers to
raids on the National Treasury or the treasury of a
province or municipality;
7. Whether the receipt or acceptance of a gift,
commission, kickback, or pecuniary benefits in
connection with a government contract or by reason
of his office, as used in §1(d)(2), is the same as
bribery in the Revised Penal Code or those which
are considered corrupt practices of public officers;
8. Whether “illegal or fraudulent conveyance or
disposition of assets belonging to the National
Government,” as used in §1(d)(3), refers to technical
malversation or illegal use of public funds or
property in the Revised Penal Code;
9. Whether mere ownership of stocks in a private
corporation, such as a family firm engaged in
fishing, is prohibited under §1(d)(4);
10. Whether the phrase “monopolies or other
combinations in restraint of trade” in §1(d)(5)
means the same thing as “monopolies and
combinations in restraint of trade” in the Revised
Penal Code because the latter contemplates
monopolies and combinations established by any
person, not necessarily a public officer; and
11. Whether under §1(d)(5) it is the public officer who
intends to confer benefit on a particular person by
implementing a decree or it is the decree that is
intended to benefit the particular person and the
public officer simply implements it.
Many more questions of27 this tenor are asked in the

memorandum of petitioner as well as in the dissent of MR.
JUSTICE KAPUNAN. Not only are they irrelevant to this
case, as already pointed out. It is also evident from their
examination that what they present are simply questions
of statutory construction to be
______________
27 Memorandum for the Petitioner, pp. 11-66.
471
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 471

resolved on a case-to-case basis. Consider, for example, the

following words and phrases in §1(d) and §2:
A. “Combination or series of overt or criminal acts”

Petitioner contends that the phrase “combination or series
of overt, or criminal acts” in §1(d) and §2 should state how
many acts are needed in order to have a “combination” or a
“serie s.” It is not really required that this be specified.
Petitioner, as well as MR. JUSTICE KAPUNAN, cites the
following remarks of Senators Gonzales and Tañada during
the discussion of S. No. 733 in the Senate:
SENATOR GONZALES. To commit the offense of plunder, as

defined in this Act while constituting a single offense, it must
consist of a series of overt or criminal acts, such as bribery,
extortion, malversation of public funds, and illegal exaction, and
graft or corrupt practices act and like offenses. Now, Mr.
President, I think, this provision, by itself, will be vague. I am
afraid that it might be faulted for being violative of the due
process clause and the right to be informed of the nature and
cause of accusation of an accused. Because, what is meant by
“series of overt or criminal acts”? I mean, would 2, 3, 4 or 5
constitute a series? During the period of amendments, can we
establish a minimum of overt acts like, for example, robbery in
band? The law defines what is robbery in band by the number of
participants therein.
In this particular case, probably, we can statutorily provide for
the definition of “series” so that two, for example, would that be
already a series? Or, three, what would be the basis for such a
determination?
SENATOR TAÑADA. I think, Mr. President, that would be
called for, this being a penal legislation, we should be very clear
as to what it encompasses; otherwise, we may contravene the

constitutional
28
provision on the right of the accused to due
process.
But, as the later discussion in the Senate shows, the

senators in the end reached a consensus as to the meaning
of the phrase so that an enumeration of the number of acts
needed was no longer proposed. Thus, the record shows:
______________
28 4 RECORD OF THE SENATE 1310, June 5, 1989.
472

SENATOR MACEDA. In line with our interpellations that

sometimes “one” or maybe even “two” acts may already
result in such a big amount, on line 25, would the
Sponsor consider deleting the words “a series of overt
or.” To read, therefore: “or conspiracy COMMITTED by
criminal acts such.” Remove the idea of necessitating “a
series.” Anyway, the criminal acts are in the plural.
SENATOR TAÑADA. That would mean a combination of
two or more of the acts mentioned in this.
THE PRESIDENT. Probably, two or more would be . . .
SENATOR MACEDA. Yes, because “aseries” implies
several or many; two or more.
SENATOR TAÑADA: Accepted, Mr. President.
. ...
THE PRESIDENT: If there is only one, then he has to be
prosecuted under the particular crime. But when we say
“acts of plunder” there should be, at least, two or more.
SENATOR ROMULO: In other words, 29that is already
covered by existing laws, Mr. President.
Indeed, the record shows that no amendment to S. No. 733

was proposed to this effect. To the contrary, Senators
Gonzales and Tañada voted in favor of the bill on its third
and final reading on July 25, 1989. The ordinary meaning
of the term “combination” as the “union of two things or
acts” was adopted, although in the case of “series,” the
senators agreed that a repetition of two or more times of
the same thing or act would suffice, thus departing from
the ordinary meaning of the word as “a group of usually
three or more things or events standing or succeeding in
order and having a like relationship to each other,” or “a

spatial or temporal succession of persons or things,” or “a
group that has or admits 30
an order of arrangement
exhibiting progression.”
In the Bicameral Conference Committee on Justice
meeting held on May 7, 1991, the same meanings were
given to the words “combination” and “series.”
Representative Garcia explained that a
______________

30 WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2073
(1993).
473
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 473

combination is composed of two or more of the overt or

criminal acts enumerated in §1(d), while a series is a
repetition of any of the same overt or criminal acts. Thus:
REP. ISIDRO: I am just intrigued again by our definition of

plunder. We say, THROUGH A COMBINATION OR SERIES OF
OVERT OR CRIMINAL ACTS AS MENTIONED IN SECTION
ONE HEREOF. Now when we say combination, we actually mean
to say, if there are two or more means, we mean to say that
number one and two or number one and something else are
included, how about a series of the same act? For example,
through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, will these be
included also?
....
REP. ISIDRO: When we say combination, it seems that—
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): Two.
REP. ISIDRO: Not only two but we seem to mean that two
of the enumerated means not twice of one enumeration.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): No, no, not twice.
REP. ISIDRO: Not twice?
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): Yes, combination is not
twice—but combination, two acts.
REP. ISIDRO: So in other words, that’s it. When we say
combination, we mean, two different acts. It can not be a
repetition of the same act.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): That be referred to
series. Yeah.
REP. ISIDRO: No, no. Supposing one act is repeated, so

there are two.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): A series.
REP. ISIDRO: That’s not [a] series. It’s a combination.
Because when we say combination or series, we seem to
say that two or more, ‘di ba?
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): Yes, this distinguishes
it, really, from ordinary crimes. That is why, I said, that
is a very good suggestion because if it is only one act, it
may fall under ordinary crime but we have here a
combination or series of overt or criminal acts. So . . .
...
REP. ISIDRO: When you say “combination,” two different?
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): Yes.
474

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. TAÑADA): Two different . . . .

REP. ISIDRO: Two different acts.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): For example, ha 31. . .
REP. ISIDRO: Now a series, meaning, repetition . . .
Thus, resort to the deliberations in Congress will readily

reveal that the word “combination” includes at least two
different overt or criminal acts listed in R.A. No. 7080, such
as misappropriation (§1(d)(1)) and taking undue advantage
of official position (§1(d)(6)). On the other hand, “series” is
used when the offender commits the same overt or criminal
act more than once. There is no plunder if only one act is
proven, even if the ill-gotten wealth acquired thereby
amounts to or exceeds the figure fixed by the law for the
offense (now P50,000,000.00). The overt or criminal acts
need not be joined or separated in space or time, since the
law does not make such a qualification. It is enough that
the prosecution proves that a public officer, by himself or in
connivance with others, amasses wealth amounting to at
least P50 million by committing two or more overt or
criminal acts.
Petitioner also contends that the phrase “series of acts
or transactions” is the subject of conflicting decisions of
various Circuit Courts of Appeals in the United Sates. It
turns out that the decisions concerned a phrase in Rule 8(b)
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides:
(b) Joinder of Defendants: Two or more defendants may be

charged in the same indictment or information if they are alleged
to have participated in the same act or transaction or in the same
series of acts or transactions constituting an offense or offenses.
Such defendants may be charged in one or more counts together
or separately and all of the defendants need not be charged on
each count. (Emphasis added)
The fact that there is a conflict in the rulings of the various

courts does not mean that Rule 8(b) is void for being vague
but only that the U.S. Supreme Court should step in, for
one of its essential functions is to assure the uniform
interpretation of federal laws.
______________
31 Deliberations of the Joint Conference Committee on Justice held on

May 7, 1991.
475
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 475

We have a similar provision in Rule 3, §6 of the 1997 Code

of Civil Procedure. It reads:
SEC. 6. Permissive joinder of parties.—All persons in whom or

against whom any right to relief in respect to or arising out of the
same transaction or series of transactions is alleged to exist,
whether jointly, severally, or in the alternative, may, except as
otherwise provided in these Rules, join as plaintiffs or be joined as
defendants in one complaint, where any question of law or fact
common to all such plaintiffs or to all such defendants may arise
in the action; but the court may make such orders as may be just
to prevent any plaintiff or defendant from being embarrassed or
put to expense in connection with any proceedings in which he
may have no interest. (Emphasis added)
This provision has been in our Rules of Court since 1940

but it has never been thought of as vague. It will not do,
therefore, to cite the conflict of opinions in the United
States as evidence of the vagueness of the phrase when we
do not have any conflict in this country.
B. “Pattern of overt or criminal acts”

Petitioner contends that it is not enough that there be at
least
twoactstoconstituteeitheracombinationorseriesbecause§4
also mentions “a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative

of the overall scheme or conspiracy,” and “pattern” means
“an arrangement or order of things or activity.”
A “pattern of overt or criminal acts” is required in
§4toprove “an unlawful scheme or conspiracy.” In such a
case, it is not necessary to prove each and every criminal
act done in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy so long
as those proven show a pattern indicating the scheme or
conspiracy. In other words, when conspiracy is charged,
there must be more than a combination or series of two or
more acts. There must be several acts showing a pattern
which is “indicative of the overall scheme or conspiracy.” As
Senate President Salonga explained, if there are 150
constitutive crimes charged, it is not necessary to prove
beyond reasonable doubt all of f
476

them. If a pattern can be shown by proving, for example, 10

criminal acts,
32
then that would be sufficient to secure
conviction.
The State is thereby enabled by this device to deal with
several acts constituting separate crimes as just one crime
of plunder by allowing their prosecution by means of a
single information because there is a common purpose for
committing them, namely, that of “amassing, accumulating
or acquiring wealth through such overt or criminal acts.”
The pattern is the organizing principle that defines what
otherwise would be discreet criminal acts into the single
crime of plunder.
As thus applied to petitioner, the Anti-Plunder Law
presents only problems of statutory construction,33 not
vagueness or overbreadth. In Primicias v. Fugoso, an
ordinance of the City of Manila, prohibiting the holding of
parades and assemblies in streets and public places unless
a permit was first secured from the city mayor and
penalizing its violation, was construed to mean that it gave
the city mayor only the power to specify the streets and
public places which can be used for the purpose but not the
power to ban absolutely the use of such places. A
constitutional doubt was thus resolved through a limiting
construction given to the ordinance.
Nor is the alleged difference of opinion among the
Ombudsman, the Solicitor General, and the
Sandiganbayan as to the number of acts or crimes needed
to constitute plunder proof of the vagueness of the statute

and, therefore, a ground for its invalidation. For sometime
it was thought that under Art. 134 of the Revised Penal
Code convictions can be had for the complex crime of
rebellion with murder, arson, and other common crimes.
The question was finally resolved in 1956 when this Court
held that there is no such complex crime34 because the
common crimes were absorbed in rebellion. The point is
that Art. 134 gave rise to a difference of opinion that nearly
split the legal profession at the time, but no one thought
Art. 134 to be vague and, therefore, void.
______________
32 Deliberations of the Conference Committee on Constitutional

Amendments and Revision of Laws held on Nov. 15, 1988.
33 80 Phil. 71 (1948).
34 People v. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515 (1956); People v. Geronimo,100
Phil. 90 (1956).
477
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 477

Where, therefore, the ambiguity is not latent and the

legislative intention is discoverable with the aid of the
canons of construction, the void for vagueness doctrine has
no application. 35
In Connally v. General Constr. Co. the test of
vagueness was formulated as follows:
[A] statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in

terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the
first essential of due process of law.
Holmes’s test was that of the viewpoint of the bad man. In

The Path of the Law, Holmes said:
If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it
as a bad man, who cares only for the material consequences which
such knowledge enables him to predict, not as a good one, who
finds his reasons for conduct, whether inside
36
the law or outside of
it, in the vaguer sanctions of conscience.
Whether from the point of view of a man of common

intelligence or from that of a bad man, there can be no
mistaking the meaning of the Anti-Plunder Law as applied

to petitioner.
IV. PLUNDER A COMPLEX CRIME REQUIRING

PROOF OF MENS REA
Petitioner argues that, in enacting the statute in question,

Congress eliminated the element of mens rea, or the
scienter, thus reducing the burden of evidence
37
required for
proving the crimes which are mala in se.
There are two points raised in this contention. First is
the question whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se
or a malum prohibitum. Forifitisamalum prohibitum, as
the Ombudsman
______________
35 269 U.S. 385, 391, 70 L.Ed. 328 (1926) cited in Ermita-Malate Hotel
and Motel Operators Ass’n. v. City Mayor, 20 SCRA 849, 867 (1967).
36 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV.
457, 459 (1897).
37 “Memorandum for the Petitioner, p. 32.
478

38
and the Solicitor General say it is, then there is really a
constitutional problem because the predicate crimes are
mainly mala in se.
A. Plunder A Malum In Se Requiring Proof of Mens Rea

Plunder is a malum in se, requiring proof of criminal
intent. Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala
in se the element of mens rea must be proven in a
prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended
information alleges that the crime of plunder was
committed “willfully, unlawfully and criminally.” It thus
alleges guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner.
In support of his contention that the statute eliminates
the requirement of mens rea and that is the reason he
claims the statute is void, petitioner cites the following
remarks of Senator Tañada made during the deliberation
on S. No. 733:
SENATOR TAÑADA....Andtheevidencethatwillberequiredto
convict him would not be evidence for each and every individual
criminal act but only evidence sufficient to establish

39
the
conspiracy or scheme to commit this crime of plunder.
However, Senator Tañada was discussing §4 as shown by

the succeeding portion of the transcript quoted by
petitioner:
SENATOR ROMULO: And, Mr. President, the Gentleman feels

that it is contained in Section 4, Rule of Evidence, which, in the
Gentleman’s view, would provide for a speedier and faster process
of attending to this kind of cases? 40
SENATOR TAÑADA. Yes, Mr. President . . .
Senator Tañada was only saying that where the charge is

conspiracy to commit plunder, the prosecution need not
prove each and every criminal act done to further the
scheme or conspiracy, it being enough if it proves beyond
reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts
indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. As
far as the acts constituting the pattern are con-
______________
38 See Memorandum for the Respondents, pp. 79-88.

40 Id.
479
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 479

cerned, however, the elements of the crime must be proved

and the requisite mens rea must be shown.
Indeed, §2 provides that—
Any person who participated with the said public officer in the
commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder
shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of
mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the
Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the court.
The application of mitigating and extenuating

circumstances in the Revised Penal Code to prosecutions
under the Anti-Plunder Law indicates quite clearly that
mens rea is an element of plunder since the degree of
responsibility of the offender is determined by his criminal
intent. It is true that §2 refers to “any person who
participates with the said public officers in the commission

of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder.” There is
no reason to believe, however, that it does not apply as well
to the public officer as principal in the crime. As Justice
Holmes said: “We agree to all the generalities about not
supplying criminal laws with what they omit, but there is
no canon against using common sense 41
in construing laws
as saying what they obviously mean.”
Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is
a malum in se must be deemed to have been resolved in the
affirmative by the decision of Congress in 1993 to include it
among the heinous crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua
to death. Other heinous crimes are punished with death as
a straight penalty in R.A. No. 7659. Referring to these
groups of 42heinous crimes, this Court held in People v.
Echegaray:
The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that
are, by their very nature, despicable, either because life was
callously taken or the victim is treated like an animal and utterly
dehumanized as to completely disrupt the normal course of his or
her growth as a human being . . . . Seen in this light, the capital
crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom
resulting in the death of the victim or the
______________
41 Roschen v. Ward, 279 U.S. 337, 339, 73 L.Ed. 722, 728 (1929).
42 267 SCRA 682, 721-2 (1997) (emphasis added).
480

victim is raped, tortured, or subjected to dehumanizing acts;

destructive arson resulting in death; and drug offenses involving
minors or resulting in the death of the victim in the case of other
crimes; as well as murder, rape, parricide, infanticide, kidnapping
and serious illegal detention, where the victim is detained for
more than three days or serious physical injuries were inflicted on
the victim or threats to kill him were made or the victim is a
minor, robbery with homicide, rape or intentional mutilation,
destructive arson, and carnapping where the owner, driver or
occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed or raped, which are
penalized by reclusion perpetua to death, are clearly heinous by
their very nature.
There are crimes, however, in which the abomination lies in the
significance and implications of the subject criminal acts in the
scheme of the larger socio-political and economic context in which

the state finds itself to be struggling to develop and provide for its
poor and underprivileged masses. Reeling from decades of corrupt
tyrannical rule that bankrupted the government and
impoverished the population, the Philippine Government must
muster the political will to dismantle the culture of corruption,
dishonesty, greed and syndicated criminality that so deeply
entrenched itself in the structures of society and the psyche of the
populace. [With the government] terribly lacking the money to
provide even the most basic services to its people, any form of
misappropriation or misapplication of government funds
translates to an actual threat to the very existence of government,
and in turn, the very survival of the people it governs over.
Viewed in this context, no less heinous are the effects and
repercussions of crimes like qualified bribery, destructive arson
resulting in death, and drug offenses involving government
officials, employees or officers, that their perpetrators must not be
allowed to cause further destruction and damage to society.
The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is

a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se. For when
the acts punished are inherently
43
immoral or inherently
wrong, they are mala in se and it does not matter that
such acts are punished in a special law, especially since in
the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in
se. Indeed, it would be absurd to treat prosecutions for
plunder as though they are mere prosecutions for violations
of the Bouncing Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of an ordi-
______________
43 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 959 (1990); Lozano v. Martinez,146

SCRA 324, 338 (1986).
481
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 481

nance against jaywalking, without regard to the inherent

wrongness of the acts.
B. The Penalty for Plunder

The second question is whether under the statute the
prosecution is relieved of the duty of proving beyond
reasonable doubt the guilt of the defendant. It is contended
that, in enacting the Anti-Plunder Law, Congress simply
combined several existing crimes into a single one but the
penalty which it provided for the commission of the crime is

grossly disproportionate to the crimes combined while the
quantum of proof required to prove each predicate crime is
greatly reduced.
We have already explained why, contrary to
petitioner’scontention, the quantum of proof required to
prove the predicate crimes in plunder is the same as that
required were they separately prosecuted. We, therefore,
limit this discussion to petitioner’s claim that the penalty
provided in the Anti-Plunder Law is grossly
disproportionate to the penalties imposed for the predicate
crimes. Petitioner cites the following examples:
For example, please consider the following ‘combination’ or ‘series’

of overt or criminal acts (assuming the P50 M minimum has been
acquired) in light of the penalties laid down in the Penal Code:
a. One act of indirect bribery (penalized under Art. 211 of the Revised
Penal Code with prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods),
- combined with
one act of fraud against the public treasury (penalized under Art. 213
of the Revised Penal Code with prision correccional in its medium period
to prision mayor in its minimum period,
-equals–
plunder (punished by reclusion perpetua to death plus forfeiture of

assets under R.A. 7080)
b. One act of prohibited transaction (penalized under Art. 215 of the
Revised Penal Code with prision correccional in its minimum period or a
fine ranging from P200 to P1,000 or both),
482

- combined with
one act of establishing a commercial monopoly (penalized under Art. 186

of Revised Penal Code with prision correccional in its minimum period or
a fine ranging from P200 to P6,000, or both),
-equals-
plunder (punished by reclusion perpetua to death, and forfeiture of

assets under R.A. 7080.
c. One act of possession of prohibited interest by a public officer

(penalized with prision correccional in its minimum period or a fine of
P200 to P1,000, or both under Art. 216 of the Revised Penal Code),
- combined with
one act of combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade (penalized

under Art. 186 of the Revised Penal Code with prision correccional in its
minimum period, or a fine of P200 to P1,000, or both,
-equals-
plunder, punished by reclusion perpetua to death, and forfeiture of

44
assets)
But this is also the case whenever other special complex

crimes are created out of two or more existing crimes. For
example, robbery with violence against or intimidation of
persons under Art. 294, par. 5 of the Revised Penal Code is
punished with prision correccional in its maximum period
(4 years, 2 months, and 1 day) to prision mayor in its
medium period (6 years and 1 day to 8 years). Homicide
under Art. 249 of the same Code is punished with reclusion
temporal (12 years and 1 day to 20 years). But when the
two crimes are committed on the same occasion, the law
treats them as a special complex crime of robbery with
homicide and provides the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death for its commission. Again, the penalty for simple
rape under Art. 266-B of the Revised Penal Code is
reclusion perpetua, while that for homicide under Art. 249
it is reclusion temporal (12 years and 1 day to 20 years).
Yet, when committed on the same occasion, the two are
______________
44 Memorandum for the Petitioner, pp. 62-63 (emphasis in the original).
483
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 483

treated as one special complex crime of rape with homicide

and punished with a heavier penalty of reclusion perpetua
to death. Obviously, the legislature views plunder as a
crime as serious as robbery with homicide or rape with
homicide by punishing it with the same penalty. As the
explanatory note accompanying S. No. 733 explains:
Plunder, a term chosen from other equally apt terminologies like

kleptocracy and economic treason, punishes the use of high office
for personal enrichment, committed thru a series of acts done not
in the public eye but in stealth and secrecy over a period of time,
that may involve so many persons, here and abroad, and which
touch so many states and territorial units. The acts and/or
omissions sought to be penalized do not involve simple cases of
malversation of public funds, bribery, extortion, theft and graft
but constitute the plunder of an entire nation resulting in
material damage to the national economy. The above-described
crime does not yet exist in Philippine statute books. Thus, the
need to come up with a legislation as a safeguard against the
possible recurrence of the depravities of the previous regime and
as a deterrent to those with similar inclination to succumb to the
corrupting influences of power.
Many other examples drawn from the Revised Penal Code

and from special laws may be cited to show that, when
special complex crimes are created out of existing crimes,
the penalty for the new crime is heavier.
———————
To recapitulate, had R.A. No. 7080 been a law regulating

speech, I would have no hesitation examining it on its face
on the chance that some of its provisions—even though not
here before us—are void. For then the risk that some state
interest might be jeopardized, i.e., the interest in the free
flow of information or the prevention of “chill” on the
freedom of expression, would trump any marginal interest
in security.
But the Anti-Plunder Law is not a regulation of speech.
It is a criminal statute designed to combat graft and
corruption, especially those committed by highly-placed
public officials. As conduct and not speech is its object, the
Court cannot take chances by examining other provisions
not before it without risking vital inter-
484

ests of society. Accordingly, such statute must be examined

only “as applied” to the defendant and, if found valid as to
him, the statute as a whole should not be declared
unconstitutional for overbreadth or vagueness of its other
provisions. Doing so, I come to the following conclusions:
1. That the validity of R.A. No. 7080, otherwise known

as the Anti-Plunder Law, cannot be determined by
applying the test of strict scrutiny in free speech
cases without disastrous consequences to the
State’s effort to prosecute crimes and that, contrary
to petitioner’s contention, the statute must be
presumed to be constitutional;
2. That in determining the constitutionality of the
Anti-Plunder Law, its provisions must be
considered in light of the particular acts alleged to
have been committed by petitioner;
3. That, as applied to petitioner, the statute is neither
vague nor overbroad;
4. That, contrary to the contention of the Ombudsman
and the Solicitor General, the crime of plunder is a
malum in se and not a malum prohibitum and the
burden of proving each and every predicate crime is
on the prosecution.
For these reasons, I respectfully submit that R.A. No. 7080

is valid and that, therefore, the petition should be
dismissed.
SEPARATE OPINION
(Concurring)
PANGANIBAN, J.:
In his Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of

Court, former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada seeks the
annulment of the Sandiganbayan Resolution dated July 9,
2001, which denied his Motion to Quash. He further prays
to prohibit the anti-graft court from conducting the trial of
petitioner in Criminal Case No. 26558, on the ground that
the statute under which he has been charged—the Anti-
Plunder Law or Republic Act (RA) 7080—is
unconstitutional.
In sum, he submits three main arguments to support his
thesis, as follows:
485
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 485

1. “RA 7080 is vague and overbroad on its face and 1

suffers from structural deficiency and ambiguity.”
2. “RA 7080 reduces the standard of proof necessary
for criminal conviction, and dispenses with proof
beyond reasonable doubt of each and every criminal2
act done in furtherance of the crime of plunder.”
3. “RA 7080 has been admitted by respondent to be
malum prohibita which deprives petitioner 3
of a
basic defense in violation of due process.”
I have read former President Estrada’s Petition, Reply,

Memorandum and other pleadings and listened carefully to
his Oral Argument. However, I cannot agree with his thesis
for the following reasons:
(1) RA 7080 is not vague or overbroad. Quite the

contrary, it is clear and specific especially on what
it seeks to prohibit and to penalize.
(2) The Anti-Plunder Law does not lessen the degree of
proof necessary to convict its violator—in this case,
petitioner.
(3) Congress has the constitutional power to enact laws
that are mala prohibita and, in exercising such
power, does not violate due process of law.
First Issue: “Void for Vagueness” Not Applicable
In the main, petitioner attacks RA 7080 for being allegedly

vague and ambiguous, for “wanting in its essential terms,”
and for failing to “define what degree of participation
means as [it] relates to the person or persons charged with
having participated
4
with a public officer in the commission
of plunder.”
______________
1 Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 11.

2 Ibid., p. 66.
3 Id., p. 76.
4 Petitioner’s Memorandum, p. 16.
486

5
5
In Dans v. People,
6
reiterated recently in Sajul v.
Sandiganbayan, this Court debunked the “void for
vagueness” challenge to the constitutionality of Section 3(g)
of the Anti-Graft Law (RA 3019, as amended) and laid
down the test to determine whether a statute is vague. It
has decreed that as long as a penal law can answer the
basic query “What is the violation?,” it is constitutional.
“Anything beyond this, the ‘hows’ and the ‘whys,’ are
evidentiary matters which the law cannot possibly disclose
in view of the uniqueness of every case x x x.”
Elements of Plunder
The Anti-Plunder Law more than adequately answers the
question “What is the violation?” Indeed, to answer this
question, any law student—using basic knowledge of
criminal law—will refer to the elements of the crime, which
in this case are plainly and certainly spelled out in a
straightforward manner in Sections 2 and 1(d) thereof.
Those elements are:
1. The offender is a public officer acting by himself or

in connivance with members of his family, relatives
by affinity or consanguinity, business associates,
subordinates or other persons.
2. The offender amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-
gotten wealth.
3. The aggregate amount or total value of the ill-
gotten wealth so amassed, accumulated or acquired
is at least fifty million pesos (P50,000,000).
4. Such ill-gotten wealth—defined as any asset,
property, business enterprise or material possession
of any of the aforesaid persons (the persons within
the purview of Section 2, RA 7080)—has been
acquired directly or indirectly through dummies,
nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business
associates by any combination or series of the
______________
5 285 SCRA 504, January 29, 1998, per Francisco, J.

6 GR No. 135294, November 20, 2000, 345 SCRA 248 per Kapunan, J.
487
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 487

(i) through misappropriation, conversion, misuse or

treasury;
(ii) by receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission,
gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any other form
of pecuniary benefit from any person and/or entity
in connection with any government contract or
project or by reason of the office or position of the
public officer concerned;
(iii) by the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or
disposition of assets belonging to the national
government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or
instrumentalities or government-owned or
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;
(iv) by obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or
indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other
form of interest or participation including the
promise of future employment in any business
enterprise or undertaking;
(v) by establishing agricultural, industrial or
commercial monopolies or other combination and/or
benefit particular persons or special interests; or
(vi) by taking undue advantage of official position,
authority, relationship, connection or influence to
unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the
expense and to the damage and prejudice of the7
Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.
Petitioner argues that, notwithstanding the above-detailed

statement of the elements of the crime, there is still
vagueness because of the absence of definitions of the
terms combination, series and8
pattern in the text of the law.
Citing People v. Nazario, petitioner adds that “a statute
or act may be said to be vague when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application.”
I say, however, that in that very case cited by petitioner,
the Court cautioned that “the act (or law) must be utterly
vague on its face.” When it can be “clarified either by a
saving clause or by construction,” the law cannot be decreed
as invalid. In other words, the absence of statutory
definitions of words used in a statute will not
______________
7 §1(d), RA 7080, as amended.

8 165 SCRA 186, August 31,1988, per Sarmiento, J.
488

render the law “void for vagueness,” if the meanings of

such words can9 be determined through the judicial function
of construction.
Solution: Simple Statutory Construction

Indeed, simple statutory construction, not a declaration of
unconstitutionality, is the key to the allegedly vague words
of the Anti-Plunder Law. And the most basic rule in
statutory construction is to ascertain the meaning of a term
from the legislative proceedings. Verily, in the judicial
review of 10a law’s meaning, the legislative intent is
paramount.
Pervading the deliberations of the Bicameral Conference
Committee on Justice held on May 7, 1991 was the common
understanding of combination as a joining or combining of
at least two dissimilar things or acts, and series as a 11
repetition or recurrence of the same thing at least twice.
As a matter of fact, the same understanding of those terms
also prevailed during the Senate deliberations on Senate
12
Bill No. 733 (Plunder) earlier held on June 6, 1989. The
Records of those deliberations speak for themselves.
It is true that during the deliberations in the Senate, the
late Senator Neptali A. Gonzales initially raised concerns
over the alleged vagueness in the use of the terms
combination and series.
13
I respectfully submit, however,
that the reliance of petitioner on such concerns is
misplaced. That portion of the interpellations, evincing the
late senator’s reservations on the matter,
14
had taken place
during the session of June 5, 1989. And the clarificatory
remarks of Senate President Jovito R. Salonga and
Senators Wig-
______________
9 “Construction is the means by which the Court clarifies the doubt to

arrive at the true intent of the law.” Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1990
ed., p. 44; see also Caltex v. Palomar, 18 SCRA 247, September 29, 1966.
10 See People v. Purisima, 86 SCRA 542, November 20, 1978.
11 These deliberations are quoted in the Comment, pp. 14-15.
12 Record of the Senate, Vol. IV, No. 141, June 6, 1989, at p. 1399;
quoted in the Comment, p. 16.

14 RecordsoftheSenate,Vol.IV,No.140,June5,1989,atp.1310.
489
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 489

berto Tañada, Alberto Romulo and Ernesto Maceda, which

threw light on the matters 15
in doubt, happened the
following day, June 6, 1989. In brief, the misgivings voiced
by Senator Gonzales as to the use of the two terms were
adequately addressed, answered and disposed of the
following day.
Thus, Senate Bill No. 733, defining and penalizing
plunder, was passed and approved on third reading on July
25, 1989, with 19 affirmative votes (including those of
Senators Gonzales, Tañada, Maceda, and petitioner
himself) sans any negative vote or abstention. Indeed, some
of the sharpest legal minds in the country voted to approve
the bill, even though it was bereft of statutory definitions.
Likewise, it would certainly be inconceivable for Senator
Gonzales to have voted for the approval of the Bill had he
believed that it was vague to the point of constitutional
infirmity; or at the very least, if he believed that his earlier
reservations or apprehensions were not fully satisfied.
At this juncture, may I call attention to the Record16of the
Joint Conference Meeting held on May 177, 1991. The
portion thereof relied upon by petitioner features the
exchanges involving Repre-
______________
15 See discussion of Senate Bill No. 733 on June 6, 1989.

16 Record of the Joint Conference Meeting—Committee on Justice and
Committee on Constitutional Amendments (S. No. 733 & H. No. 22752),
May 7, 1991, pp. 40-43.
17 The relevant portions of the Record are as follows:
“REP. ISIDRO. I am just intrigued again by our definition of plunder. We say,

THROUGH A COMBINATION OR SERIES OF OVERT OR CRIMINAL ACTS AS
MENTIONED IN SECTION ONE HEREOF. Now when we say combination, we
actually mean to say, if there are two or more means, we mean to say that number
one and two or number one and something else are included, how about a series of
the same act? For example, through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, will
these be included also?
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA). Yeah, because we say series.

REP. ISIDRO. Series.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA). Yeah, we include series.

REP. ISIDRO. But we say we begin with a combination.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA). Yes.
REP. ISIDRO. When we say combination, it seem that—
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA). Two.
REP. ISIDRO. Not only two but we seem to mean that two of the
enumerated means not twice of one enumeration.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA). No, no, not twice.
490

sentatives Garcia and Isidro and Senator Tañada on the

meanings of the terms combination and series. The quoted
part of the Record
______________
REP. ISIDRO. Not twice?

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA). Yes. Combination is not twice—
but combination, two acts.
REP. ISIDRO. So in other words, that’s it. When we say
combination, we mean, two different acts. It can not be a repetition of
the same act.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA). That be referred to series. Yeah.
REP. ISIDRO. No, no. Supposing one act is repeated, so there are
two.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA). A series.
REP. ISIDRO. That’s not series. It’s a combination. Because when
we say combination or series, we seem to say that two or more, ‘di ba?
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA). Yes. This distinguishes it really
the ordinary—That’s why I said, that’s a very good suggestion, because
if it’s only one act, it may fall under ordinary crime. But we have here a
combination or series, overt or criminal acts.
REP. ISIDRO. I know what you are talking about. For example,
through misappropriation, conversion, misuse or malversation of public
funds who raids the public treasury, now, for example,
misappropriation, if there are a series of . . . . .
REP.ISIDRO. ...Ifthereareaseriesofmisappropriations?
THE CHAIRMAN. (REP. GARCIA P.) Yes.
REP. ISIDRO. So, these constitute illegal wealth.
THE CHAIRMAN. (REP. GARCIA P.) Yes, yes.
REP. ISIDRO. Ill-gotten
THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. TAÑADA) Ill-gotten wealth.
THE CHAIRMAN. (REP. GARCIA P.) Series. One after the other eh
di. . .
THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. TAÑADA), So, that would fall under the
term ‘series’?
THE CHAIRMAN. (REP. GARCIA P.) Series, oo.
REP. ISIDRO. Now, if it is combination, ano, two misappropriations
...
THE CHAIRMAN. (REP. GARCIA P.) It’s not, . . two
misappropriations will not be combination. Series.
REP. ISIDRO. So, it is not a combination?
REP. ISIDRO. When you say ‘combination,’ two different?
THE CHAIRMAN. (REP. TAÑADA.) Two different.
REP. ISIDRO. Two different acts.
THE CHAIRMAN. (REP. GARCIA P.) For example, ha . . .
REP. ISIDRO. Now series, meaning, repetition . . .
THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. TAÑADA) Yes.
REP.ISIDRO.Withthat...
THE CHAIRMAN. (REP. GARCIA P.) Thank you.
THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. TAÑADA) So, it could be a series of any of
the acts mentioned in paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 5 of Section 2 (2), or . . 1 (d)
rather, or
491
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 491

would suggest that, somehow, particularly towards the end

of the meeting, the discussion among the legislators
seemed to have degenerated into a clutch of unfinished
sentences and unintelligible phrases. Still, I believe that
the deliberations did not actually sound the way they were
subsequently transcribed or as they now appear on the
Record. Even more reluctant am I to agree with petitioner
that the apparent tenor of the deliberations evinced “a
dearth of focus to render precise the definition of the
terms,” or that the Committee members themselves were
not clear on the meanings of the terms in question.
Most of us in the legal profession are all too familiar
with the vagaries of stenographic note-taking, especially in
courtrooms and legislative halls. Too often, lawyers,
parties-litigants and even judges find themselves at the
mercy of stenographers who are unfamiliar with certain
legal terms; or who cannot hear well enough or take notes
fast enough; or who simply get confused, particularly when
two or more persons happen to be speaking at the same
time. Often, transcripts of stenographic notes have

portrayed lawyers, witnesses, legislators and judges as
blithering idiots, spouting utterly nonsensical jargon and
plain inanities in the course of a proceeding. The Record in
question is no exception.
Rather than believe that the distinguished lawmakers
went about their business uttering senseless half-sentences
to one another, I think that these learned and intelligent
legislators of both chambers knew what they were talking
about, spoke their minds,
______________
combination of any of the acts mentioned in paragraph 1 alone, or

paragraph 2 alone or paragraph 3 or paragraph 4.
THE CHAIRMAN. (REP. GARCIA P.) I think combination maybe..
which one? Series?
THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. TAÑADA) Series or combination.
REP. ISIDRO. Which one, combination or series or series or
combination?
THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. TAÑADA) Okay, Ngayon doon sa
definition, ano, Section 2, definition, doon sa portion ng . . . Saan iyon?
As mentioned, as described . . .
THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. TAÑADA).. better than ‘mentioned’.Yes.
THE CHAIRMAN. (REP. GARCIA P.) Okay?
REP. ISIDRO. Very good.
THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. TAÑADA) Oo, marami pong salamat.
THE CHAIRMAN. (REP. GARCIA P.) Maraming salamat po.
The meeting was adjourned at 1:33 p.m.”
492

and understood each other well, for the Record itself does
not indicate the contrary. Neither does it show any details
or minutiae that would indicate that they abandoned their
earlier common understanding of the terms combination
and series.
Specific Number or Percentage Not Always Necessary

Regrettably, I shall also have to take issue with
petitioner’sdisquisition to the effect that “when penal laws
enacted by Congress make reference to a term or concept
requiring a quantitative definition, these laws are so
crafted as to specifically state the exact number or
percentage necessary to constitute the elements of a crime,”
followed by a recitation of the minimum number of

malefactors mentioned in the statutory definitions of band,
conspiracy, illegal recruitment by syndicate, large-scale
illegal recruitment, organized/syndicated crime group, and
swindling by a syndicate. Thus, he insinuates that, because
RA 7080 has failed to specify precisely the minimum
number of malefactors needed for an offense to be properly
classified as plunder, the law is vague or has somehow
failed to meet the standard for penal laws.
The aforequoted discourse would appear to be
incongruous, if not totally misleading. As pointed out
during the Oral Argument on September 18, 2001, the
crime of plunder can be committed by a public officer acting
alone. Section 2 of RA 7080 reads as follows: “Definition of
the Crime of Plunder; Penalties.—Any public officer who, by
himself or in connivance with x x x.” Thus, the insistence
on a mathematical specification or precise quantification is
essentially without basis. And lest anyone believe that the
Anti-Plunder Law is unusual in this respect, let me just
recall that the RICO law, to which petitioner made
repeated references in his Amended 18
Petition, can likewise
be violated by a single individual.
______________
18 H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell, (1999) 492 US 229, 106 L Ed 2d 195,

109 S Ct 2893, at p. 211: “One evident textual problem with the
suggestion that predicates form a RICO pattern only if they are indicative
of an organized crime perpetrator—in either a traditional or functional
sense—is that it would seem to require proof that the racketeering acts
were the work of an association or group, rather than of an individual
493
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 493

Not Oppressive or Arbitrary

Neither can it be said that RA 7080 is oppressive or
arbitrary for imposing a more severe penalty on a
combination or series of the offenses enumerated in Section
l(d) of the law, than would otherwise be imposed if the said
offenses were taken separately. As Mr. Justice Mendoza
lucidly pointed out in his interpellation during the Oral
Argument, the Anti-Plunder Law is merely employing a
familiar technique or feature of penal statutes, when it puts
together what would otherwise be various combinations of
traditional offenses already proscribed by existing laws and

attaching thereto higher or more severe penalties than
those prescribed for the same offenses taken separately.
Here, Mr. Justice Mendoza is referring to special
complex crimes like rape with homicide or robbery with
homicide. During the Oral Argument, he asked whether
petitioner’s counsel was in fact suggesting that such special
complex crimes—a very important part of the Revised
Penal Code and well-entrenched in our penal system—were
violative of due process and the constitutional guarantees
against cruel and unusual punishment and should also be
struck down. It goes without saying that the legislature is
well within its powers to provide higher penalties in view of
the grave evils sought to be prevented by RA 7080.
Innocent Acts Not Penalized by RA 7080

Petitioner insists that innocent acts are in effect
criminalized by RA 7080, because it allegedly penalizes
combinations or series of acts coming within the purview of
the means or similar schemes
______________
acting alone. RICO’s language supplies no grounds to believe that

Congress meant to impose such a limit on the scope of the Act. A second
indication from the text that Congress intended no organized crime
limitation is that no such restriction is explicitly stated. In those titles of
OCCA (the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970) where Congress did
intend to limit the new law’s application to the context of organized crime,
it said so.”
494

enumerated under items 4 and 5 of Section l(d) of the law,

which reads as follows:
“4. By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or

forms of interest or participation including the
“5. By establishing agricultural, industrial or
commercial monopolies or other combinations
and/or implementation of decrees and orders
intended to benefit particular persons or special

interests.”
That such contention “deserves scant attention” is an

understatement of the extreme sort. The claim of “innocent
acts” is possible only because items 4 and 5 have been
taken completely out of context and read in isolation
instead of in relation to the other provisions of the same
law, particularly Section 2. The above-enumerated acts,
means or similar schemes must be understood as having
reference to or connection with the acquisition of ill-gotten
wealth by a public officer, by himself or in connivance with
others. Those acts are therefore not innocent acts. Neither
are those prohibitions new or unfamiliar. The proscribed
acts under item 4, for instance, may to some extent be
traced back to some of the prohibitions in RA 3019 (the
Anti-Graft Law). Section 3, the pertinent part of such law,
reads as follows:
“SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers.—In addition to acts

or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law,
the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public
officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
“(a) xxx xxx xxx

“(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift,
present, share, percentage, or benefit, for himself or for
any other person, in connection with any contract or
transaction between the Government and any other party
wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to
intervene under the law.
“(c) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift,
present or other pecuniary or material benefit, for himself
or for another, from any person for whom the public
officer, in any manner or capacity, has secured or
obtained, or will secure or obtain, any Government permit
or license, in
495
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 495

consideration for the help given or to be given, without

prejudice to Section Thirteen of this Act.
“(d) Accepting or having any member of his family accept
employment in a private enterprise which has pending official
business with him during the pendency thereof or within one year
after its termination.
xxx xxx xxx
“(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest
in any business, contract or transaction in connection with which
he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in which he
is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having any
interest.
xxx xxx xxx.”
On the other hand, the prohibited acts under item 5 have

antecedents in the Revised Penal Code’s interdiction
against monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade.
Clearly, the acts dealt with in Items 4 and 5 of Section 1(d)
are in no wise the innocent or innocuous deeds that
petitioner would have us mistake them for.
RA 7080 Not Suffering from Overbreadth

In connection with the foregoing discussion, petitioner also
charges that RA 7080 suffers from “overbreadth.” I believe
petitioner misconstrues
19
the concept. In the very recent case
People v. Dela Piedra, this Court held:
“A statute may be said to be overbroad where it operates to

inhibit the exercise of individual freedoms affirmatively
guaranteed by the Constitution, such as the freedom of speech or
religion. A generally worded statute, when construed to punish
conduct which cannot be constitutionally punished, is
unconstitutionally vague to the extent that it fails to give
adequate warning of the boundary between the constitutionally
permissible and the constitutionally impermissible applications of
the statute.
“In Blo Umpar Adiong vs. Commission on Elections, for
instance, we struck down as void for overbreadth provisions
prohibiting the posting of election propaganda in any place—
including private vehicles—other than in the common poster
areas sanctioned by the COMELEC. We held that the challenged
provisions not only deprived the owner of the vehicle the
______________
19 GR No. 121777, January 24, 2001, 350 SCRA 163 per Kapunan, J.
496

use of his property but also deprived the citizen of his right to free
speech and information. The prohibition in Adiong, therefore, was
so broad that it covered even constitutionally guaranteed rights
and, hence, void for over-breadth. In the present case, however,
appellant did not even specify what constitutionally protected
freedoms are embraced by the definition of ‘recruitment and
placement’ that would render the same constitutionally
overbroad.” (Italics supplied)
Similarly, in the instant case, petitioner has not identified

which of his constitutionally protected freedoms, if any, are
allegedly being violated by the Anti-Plunder Law. As Mr.
Justice Mendoza pointed out to petitioner’s counsel during
the Oral Argument, specious and even frivolous is the
contention that RA 7080 infringes on the constitutional
right of petitioner by depriving him of his liberty pending
trial and by paving the way for his possible conviction
because, following that line of argument, the entire Revised
Penal Code would be reckoned to be an infringement of
constitutional rights.
“Pattern of Overt or Criminal Acts”

Petitioner, in line with his “void for vagueness” attack on
RA 7080, faults the statute for failing to provide a
definition of the phrase a pattern of overt or criminal acts
indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy used
in Section 4 of the law. This definition is crucial since,
according to him, such pattern is an essential element of
the crime of plunder.
A plain reading of the law easily debunks this
contention. First, contrary to petitioner’s suggestions, such
pattern of overt or criminal acts and so on is not and should
not be deemed an essential or substantive element of the
crime of plunder. It is possible to give full force and effect
to RA 7080 without applying Section 4—an accused can be
charged and convicted under the Anti-Plunder Law without
resorting to that specific provision. After all, the heading
and the text of Section 4, which I quote below, leave no
room for doubt that it is not substantive in nature:
“SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence.—For purposes of establishing the

crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and
every
497
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 497


conspiracy.” (Boldface supplied)
As Mr. Chief Justice Davide very astutely pointed out

during the Oral Argument, Section 2 in relation to Section
l(d) deals with how the crime of plunder is committed.
Hence, these two sections constitute the substantive
elements, whereas Section 4 deals with how the crime is
proved and is therefore not substantive, but merely
procedural. It may be disregarded or discarded if found
defective or deficient, without impairing the rest of the
statute.
Actually, the root of this problem may be traced to an
observation made by Rep. Pablo Garcia, chair of the House
Committee on Justice, 20
that RA 7080 had been patterned
after the RICO Law. Petitioner apparently seized on this
statement and on21 the assertions in H.J. Inc. v.
Northwestern Bell and other cases that a pattern of
racketeering is a “key requirement” in the RICO Law and a
“necessary element” of violations thereof. He then used
these as the springboard for his vagueness attacks on RA
7080. However, his reliance on the RICO law is essentially
misplaced. Respondent Sandiganbayan correctly held that
the said legislation was essentially different from our Anti-
Plunder Law, as it pointed out in its Resolution of July 9,
2001, which I quote:
“Accused Joseph E. Estrada claims that the Anti-Plunder Law

does not define ‘pattern of overt or criminal acts’ indicative of the
overall scheme or conspiracy, thereby giving prosecutors and
judges unlimited discretion to determine the nature and extent of
evidence that would show ‘pattern.’” (Motion to Quash dated June
7, 2001, p. 13) The Court disagrees with this contention.
“x x x. According to the sponsors of the Anti-Plunder Law in
Congress, the said law is similar to the U.S. RICO (Deliberations
of the House of Representatives Committee on Revision of Law
and Justice, May 24,
______________
20 The Racketeer-Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 USC

§§1961-1968 [18 USCS §§1961-1968] which is Title IX of the Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970 (OCCA).
21 Supra.
498

1990). However, the similarities extend only insofar as both laws

penalize with severe penalties the commission by a single accused
or multiple accused of a pattern of overt or criminal acts as one
continuing crime. However,thelegislative policies and
objectives as well as the nature of the crimes penalized
respectively by the RICO and the Anti-Plunder Law are
different.” (Boldface and italics supplied)
Indeed, a careful reading of RICO vis-à-vis RA 7080 can

lead to no other conclusion than that the crimes being
penalized are completely different in nature and character,
and that the legislative objectives and policies involved are
quite dissimilar.
In the case of RICO, legislative concern focused on the
threat of continued racketeering activity, and that was why
pattern was imbued with such importance. “Congress 22was
concerned in RICO with long-term criminal conduct,” as
the following quote indicates:
“RICO’s legislative history reveals Congress’ intent that to prove

a pattern of racketeering activity a plaintiff or prosecutor must
show that the racketeering predicates are related, and that 23
they
amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity.
xxx xxx xxx
“What a plaintiff or prosecutor must prove is continuity of
racketeering activity, or its threat, simpliciter. This may be done
in a variety of ways, thus making it difficult to formulate in the
abstract any general test for continuity. We can, however, begin to
delineate the requirement.
“‘Continuity’ is both a closed and open-ended concept, referring
either to a closed period of repeated conduct, or to past conduct
that by its nature projects into the future with a threat of
repetition. xxx. It is, in either case, centrally a temporal concept—
and particularly so in the RICO context, where what must be
continuous, RICO’s predicate acts or offenses, and the
relationship these predicates must bear one to another, are
distinct requirements. A party alleging a RICO violation may
demonstrate continuity over a closed period by proving a series of
related predicates extending over a substantial period of time.
Predicate acts extending over a few weeks or months and
threatening no future criminal conduct do not satisfy this
requirement. Congress was concerned in RICO with long-term
criminal conduct. Often a RICO action will be brought before
continuity
______________
22 Ibid., at p. 209.
23 Id., at p. 208.
499
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 499

can be established in this way. In such cases, liability

24
depends on
whether the threat of continuity is demonstrated.” (italics and
underscoring supplied)
However, in RA 7080, precisely because of the sheer

magnitude of the crimes in question and their extremely
deleterious effects on society, the legislative sentiment of
great urgency—the necessity of immediate deterrence of
such crimes—was incompatible with the RICO concept of
“pattern” as connoting either continuity over a substantial
period of time or25 threat of continuity or repetition. The
legislative intent and policy of RA 7080 centered on
imposing a heavy penalty in order to achieve a strong, if
not permanent, deterrent effect—the sooner the better. The
following Senate deliberations are instructive:
______________
24 Id., at p. 209.
25 The relevant portion of the sponsorship speech of Senator Tañada
reads as follows:
“It cannot be seriously disputed that much of our economic woes and the nation’s
anguish are directly attributable to the despoliation of the National Treasury by
some public officials who have held the levers of power.
“It is sad to state, Mr. President, that there is presently no statute that either
effectively discourages or adequately penalizes this predatory act which reached
unprecedented heights and which had been developed by its practitioners to a high
level of sophistication during the past dictatorial regime.
“For, while it is true that we have laws defining and penalizing graft and
corruption in government and providing for the forfeiture of unexplained wealth
acquired by public officials, it has become increasingly evident that these
legislations x x x no longer suffice to deter massive looting of the national wealth;
otherwise, this country would not have been raided and despoiled by the powers
that be at that time.
“Indeed, there is a need to define plunder, and provide for its separate
punishment as proposed in Senate Bill No. 733; because, plunder involves not just
plain thievery but economic depredation which affects not just private parties or
personal interest but the nation as a whole. And, therefore. Mr. President, it is a
crime against national interest which must be stopped and if possible stopped
permanently.”
500

“Senator Paterno. Mr. President, [I’m] not too clear yet on the
reason for trying to define a crime of plunder. Could I get some
further clarification?
“Senator Tañada. Yes, Mr. President.
“Because of our experience in the former regime, we feel that
there is a need for Congress to pass the legislation which would
cover a crime of this magnitude. While it is true, we already have
the Anti-Graft Law. But that does not directly deal with plunder.
That covers only the corrupt practices of public officials as well as
their spouses and relatives within the civil degree, and the Anti-
Graft law as presently worded would not adequately or
sufficiently address the problems that we experienced during the
past regime.
“Senator Paterno. May I try to give the Gentleman, Mr.
President, my understanding of the bill?
“Senator Tañada. Yes.
“Senator Paterno. I envision that this bill or this kind of
plunder would cover a discovered interconnection of certain acts,
particularly, violations of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
when, after the different acts are looked at, a scheme or
conspiracy can be detected, such scheme or conspiracy
consummated by the different criminal acts or violations of Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, such that the scheme or
conspiracy becomes a sin, as a large scheme to defraud the public
or rob the public treasury. It is parang robo and banda. It is
considered as that. And, the bill seeks to define or says that P100
million is that level at which ay talagang sobra na, dapat nang
parusahan ng husto. Would it be a correct interpretation or
assessment of the intent of the bill?
“Senator Tañada. Yes, Mr. President. xxxxx.
“Senator Paterno. Would the Author not agree that this crime
of plunder should be considered a heinous crime, Mr. President?
“Senator Tañada. Yes, Mr. President. That is why, the penalty
imposed under this bill is life imprisonment, and permanent
disqualification from holding public office.
“Senator Paterno. I would really ask, Mr. President, whether
the Author would not consider that this is a heinous crime which,
for compelling reasons, namely to try and dampen the graft and
corruption, Congress should provide the death penalty for the
crime of plunder.
501
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 501

“Senator Tañada. I personally would have some problem with

that, Mr. President, because I am against the restoration of death
penalty in our criminal code. I would submit that to this Body.
“Senator Paterno. I respect the ministerial attitude and the
respect for human life of the author, Mr. President, but I just feel
that graft and corruption is such a large problem in our society
that, perhaps, it is necessary for this Congress to express itself
that this crime of plunder is a heinous26 crime which should be
levied the death penalty, Mr. President.”
Thus, it is clear and unarguable that “pattern,” a key

requirement or necessary element of RICO, is in no wise an
essential element of RA 7080.
This conclusion is further bolstered by the fact that
pattern, in the RICO law context, is nowhere to be found in
the language of RA 7080 or in the deliberations of
Congress. Indeed, the legislators were well aware of the
RICO Act; hence, they could have opted to adopt its
concepts, terms and definitions and installed pattern in the
RICO sense as an essential element of the crime of plunder,
if that were their intent. At the very least, they would not
have relegated the term pattern to a procedural provision
such as Section 4.
Second, to answer petitioner’s contention directly, the
Anti-Plunder Law does in fact provide sufficient basis to
get at the meaning of the term pattern as used in Section 4.
This meaning is brought out in the disquisition of
Respondent Sandiganbayan in its challenged Resolution,
reproduced hereunder:
“The term ‘pattern’ xxxissufficientlydefinedintheAnti-Plunder

Law, specifically through Section 4 x x x, read in relation to
Section 1(d)
andSection2ofthesamelaw.Firstly,underSection1(d)xxx,apattern
consists of at least a combination or a series of overt or criminal
acts enumerated in subsections (1) to (6) of Section 1(d). Secondly,
pursuant to Section 2 of the law, the ‘pattern’ of overt or criminal
acts is directed towards a common purpose or goal which is to
enable a public officer to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten
wealth; and [t]hirdly, there must either be an ‘overall unlawful
scheme’ or ‘conspiracy’ to achieve said common goal. As commonly
understood, the term ‘overall unlawful scheme’ indicates ‘a
general plan of action or method’ which the principal accused
______________
26 Record of the Senate, Vol. IV, No. 140, June 5, 1989, at pp. 1314-1315.
502

and public officer and others conniving with him follow to achieve
the aforesaid common goal. In the alternative, if there is no such
overall scheme or where the schemes or methods used by multiple
accused vary, the overt or criminal acts must form part of a
conspiracy to attain said common goal.
“Parenthetically, it can be said that the existence of a pattern
indicating an overall scheme or a single conspiracy would serve as
the link that will tie the overt or criminal acts into one continuing
crime of plunder. A conspiracy exists when two or more persons
come into an agreement concerning the commission of a felony
and decide to commit it. (Art. 8, Revised Penal Code). To use an
analogy made by U.S. courts in connection with RICO violations,
a pattern may be likened to a wheel with spokes (the overt or
criminal acts which may be committed by a single or multiple
accused), meeting at a common center (the acquisition or
accumulation of ill-gotten wealth by a public officer) and with the
rim (the over-all unlawful scheme or conspiracy) of the wheel
enclosing the spokes. In this case, the information charges only
one count of [the] crime of plunder, considering the prosecution’s
allegation in the amended information that the series or
combination of overt or criminal27 acts charged form part of a
conspiracy among all the accused.”
Judiciary Empowered to Construe and Apply the Law

At all events, let me stress that the power to construe law
is essentially judicial. To declare what the law shall be is a
legislative power,
28
but to declare what the law is or has
been is judicial. Statutes enacted by Congress cannot be
expected to spell out with mathematical precision how the
law should be interpreted under any an all given
situations. The application of the law will depend on the
facts and circumstances as adduced by evidence which will
then be considered, weighed and evaluated by the courts.
Indeed, it is the constitutionally mandated function of the
courts to interpret, construe and apply the law as would
give flesh and blood to the true meaning of legislative
enactments.
Moreover, a statute should be construed in the light of
the objective to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be
suppressed and
______________
27 On pp. 19-20 of the Resolution.

28 Foote v. Nickerson, 54 L.R.A. 554.
503
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 503

should be given such construction as will advance the

purpose, suppress29 the mischief or evil, and secure the
benefits intended. A law is not a mere composition, but an
end to be achieved; and its general purpose is a more
important aid 30to its meaning than any rule that grammar
may lay down. A construction should be rejected if it gives
to the language used in a statute a meaning that does not
accomplish the purpose for which the statute was enacted
and that tends to defeat 31the ends that are sought to be
attained by its enactment.
As can be gleaned from the legislative deliberations, the
Plunder Law was enacted to curb the “despoliation of the
National Treasury by some public officials who have held
the levers of power” and to penalize “this predatory act
which has reached unprecedented heights and has been
developed by its practitioners to a high level of
sophistication during the past dictatorial regime.” Viewed
broadly, “plunder involves not just plain thievery but
economic depredation which affects not just private parties
or personal interests but the nation as a whole.” Invariably,
plunder partakes of thenatureof“a crime against national
interest which32 must be stopped, and if possible, stopped
permanently.”
No Patent and Clear Conflict with Constitution

Against the foregoing backdrop, I believe petitioner’s heavy
reliance on the void-for-vagueness concept cannot prevail,
considering that such concept, while mentioned in passing
in Nazario and other cases, has yet to find direct
application in our jurisdiction. To this date, the Court has
not declared any penal law unconstitu-
______________
29 Intia Jr. v. Commission on Audit, 306 SCRA 593, April 30, 1999;
Paat v. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 167, January 10, 1997.
30 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. S.C. Johnson and Son, Inc., 309
SCRA 87, June 25, 1999.
31 De Guia v. Commission on Elections, 208 SCRA 420, May 6, 1992.

32 Quoted portions are excerpts from Senator Tañada’s speech
sponsoring Senate Bill No. 733, Records of the Senate, June 5, 1989.
504

33
tional on the ground of ambiguity. On the other hand, the
constitutionality of certain penal statutes has been upheld
in several cases, notwithstanding allegations of ambiguity
in the provisions
34
of law. In Caram35
Resources Corp. v.
Contreras and People v. Morato, the Court upheld the
validity of BP 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) and PD 1866
(Illegal Possession of Firearms), respectively, despite
constitutional challenges grounded on alleged ambiguity.
Similarly, the cases cited by petitioner involving U.S.
federal court decisions relative to the RICO Law did not at
all arrive at a finding of unconstitutionality of the
questioned statute. To repeat, reference to these U.S. cases
is utterly misplaced, considering the substantial differences
in the nature, policies and objectives between the RICO
Law and the Anti-Plunder Law. Verily, “the RICO Law
does not create a new type of substantive crime since any
acts which are punishable under the RICO Law also are 36
punishable under existing federal and state statutes.”
Moreover, the main purpose of the RICO Law is “to seek37
the
eradication of organized crime in the United States.”
On the other hand, the Plunder Law creates an entirely
new crime that may consist of both (a) criminal acts already
punished by the Revised Penal Code or special laws and (b)
acts that may not be punishable by previously existing
laws. Furthermore, unlike in the RICO Law, the
motivation behind the enactment of the Anti-Plunder Law
is “the need to for a penal law that can adequately
______________
33 During the Oral Argument, petitioner contended that Yu Cong Eng v.

Trinidad [271 US 500 (1926)] declared the Bookkeeping Act
unconstitutional for its alleged vagueness. This is incorrect. The reason
for its unconstitutionality was the violation of the equal protection clause.
Likewise, Adiong v. Comelec (207 SCRA 712, March 31, 1992) decreed as
void a mere Comelec Resolution, not a statute. Finally, Santiago v.
Comelec (270 SCRA 106, March 19, 1997) declared a portion of RA 6735
unconstitutional because of undue delegation of legislative powers, not
because of vagueness.
34 237 SCRA 724, October 26, 1994.

35 224 SCRA 361, July 5, 1993.
36 Jeff Atkinson, “Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization,” 18
U.S.C. 1961-1968; “Broadest of the Criminal Statutes,” 69 Journal of
Criminal Law and Criminology 1 (1978), p. 1.
37 Ibid., at p. 2.
505
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 505

cope with the nature

38
and magnitude of the corruption of the
previous regime” in accordance with the constitutional
duty of the State “to take positive
39
and effective measures
against graft and corruption.
In sum, the law must be proven to be clearly and
unequivocally repugnant to the Constitution before this
Court may declare its unconstitutionality. To strike down
the law, there must be a clear showing that what the 40
fundamental law prohibits, the statute allows to be done.
To justify the nullification of the law, there must be a clear,
unequivocal breach of the 41Constitution; not a doubtful,
argumentative implication. Of some terms in the law
which are easily clarified by judicial construction,
petitioner has, at best, managed merely to point out alleged
ambiguities. Far from establishing, by clear and
unmistakable terms, any patent and glaring conflict with
the Constitution, the constitutional challenge to the Anti-
Plunder law must fail. For just as the accused is entitled to
the presumption of innocence in the absence of proof beyond
reasonable doubt, so must a law be accorded the
presumption of constitutionality without the same requisite
quantum of proof.
Second Issue: Quantum of Evidence Not Lowered by

RA 7080
I will now tackle petitioner’s impassioned asseverations

that the Anti-Plunder Law violates the due process clause
and the constitutional presumption of innocence.
Section 4 of RA 7080 provides that, for purposes of
establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary
to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in
furtherance of the
______________
38 Senator Angara’s vote explaining proposed Senate Bill No. 733;

Records of the Senate, June 5, 1989.
39 Ibid.; see also Article II (Declaration of Principles and State Policies),
Section 27 of the 1987 Constitution.
40 Morfe v. Mutuc, 22 SCRA 424, January 31, 1968; Salas v. Jarencio,
46 SCRA 734, August 30, 1972.
41 Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 269 SCRA 402, March 12, 1997;
Francisco v. Permskul, 173 SCRA 324, May 12, 1989.
506

scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-

gotten wealth. This is because it would be sufficient to
establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or
criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy.
Hence, petitioner now concludes that the Anti-Plunder
Law “eliminates proof of each and every component
criminal act of plunder by the accused and limits itself to
establishing just the pattern of overt or criminal acts
indicative of unlawful scheme or conspiracy.” He thus
claims that the statute penalizes the accused on the basis
of a proven scheme or conspiracy to commit plunder,
without the necessity of establishing beyond reasonable
doubt each and every criminal act done by the accused.
From these premises, he precipitately, albeit inaccurately,
concludes that RA 7080 has ipso facto lowered the quantum
of evidence required to secure a conviction under the
challenged law. This is clearly erroneous.
First, petitioner’s allegation as to the meaning and
implications of Section 4 can hardly be taken seriously,
because it runs counter to certain basic common sense
presumptions that apply to the process of interpreting
statutes: that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it
will be presumed that the legislature intended to enact a
valid, sensible and just law; that the law-making
42
body
intended right and justice to prevail; and that the
legislature aimed to impart to its enactments such meaning
as would render them operative and effective and prevent
persons from eluding or defeating them.
Second, petitioner’s allegation is contradicted by the
legislative Records that manifest the real intent behind
Section 4, as well as the true meaning and purpose of the
provision therein. This intent is carefully expressed by the
words of Senate President Salonga:
“Senate Pres. Salonga. Is that, if there are let’s say 150 crimes all
in all, criminal acts, whether bribery, misappropriation,
malversation, extortion, you need not prove all of those beyond
reasonable doubt. If you can prove by pattern, let’s say 10, but each
must be proved beyond reasonable
______________
42 See Article 10, Civil Code.
507
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 507

doubt,43 you do not have to prove 150 crimes. That’s the meaning of
this.” (italics supplied)
All told, the above explanation is in consonance with what

is often perceived to be the reality with respect to the crime
of plunder—that “the actual extent of the crime may not, in
its breadth and entirety, be discovered, by reason of the
‘stealth and secrecy’ in which it is committed and the
involvement of ‘so many persons here and abroad and [the 44
fact that it] touches so many states and territorial units.’”
Hence, establishing a pattern indicative of the overall
unlawful scheme becomes relevant and important.
Proof of Pattern Beyond Reasonable Doubt

Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that the indicative
pattern must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. To my
mind, this means that the prosecution’s burden of proving
the crime of plunder is, in actuality, much greater than in
an ordinary criminal case. The prosecution, in establishing
a pattern of overt or criminal acts, must necessarily show a
combination or series of acts within the purview of Section
1(d) of the law.
These acts which constitute the combination or series
must still be proven beyond reasonable doubt. On top of
that, the prosecution must establish beyond reasonable
doubt such pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of
the overall scheme or conspiracy, as well as all the other
elements thereof.
Thus, Respondent Sandiganbayan was correct in its
ratiocinationonthatpoint:
“The accused misread the import and meaning of the above-

quoted provision (Sec. 4). The latter did not lower the quantum of
evidence necessary to prove all the elements of plunder, which
still remains proof beyond reasonable doubt. For a clearer

understanding of the import of Section 4 of
______________
43 Deliberations of the Committee on Constitutional Amendments and Revision

of Laws, November 15, 1988; cited in the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan (Third
Division) dated July 9, 2001.
44 Comment, p. 29, citing the House deliberations on House Bill No. 22572,
October 9, 1990.
508

the Anti-Plunder Law, quoted hereunder are pertinent portions of

the legislative deliberations on the subject:
‘MR. ALBANO. Now, Mr. Speaker, it is also elementary in our criminal

law that what is alleged in the information must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt. If we will prove only one act and find him guilty of the
other acts enumerated in the information, does that not work against the
right of the accused especially so if the amount committed, say, by
falsification is less than P100 million, but the totality of the crime
committed is P100 million since there is malversation, bribery,
falsification of public document, coercion, theft?
‘MR. GARCIA (P). Mr. Speaker, not everything alleged in the
information needs to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. What is
required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is every element of the
crime charged. For example, Mr. Speaker, there is an enumeration of the
things taken by the robber in the information—three pairs of pants,
pieces of jewelry. These need not be proved beyond reasonable doubt, but
these will not prevent the conviction of a crime for which he was charged
just because, say, instead of 3 pairs of diamond earrings the prosecution
proved only two. Now, what is required to be proved beyond reasonable
doubt is the element of the offense.
‘MR. ALBANO. I am aware of that, Mr. Speaker, but considering that
in the crime of plunder the totality of the amount is very important, I feel
that such a series of overt (or) criminal acts has to be taken singly. For
instance, in the act of bribery, he was able to accumulate only P50,000
and in the crime of extortion, he was only able to accumulate P1 million.
Now, when we add the totality of the other acts as required under this
bill through the interpretation on the rule of evidence, it is just one single
act, so how can we now convict him?
‘MR. GARCIA (P). With due respect, Mr. Speaker, for purposes of
proving an essential element of the crime, there is a need to prove that
element beyond reasonable doubt. For example, one essential element of
the crime is that the amount involved is P100 million. Now, in a series of
defalcations and other acts of corruption and in the enumeration the total
amount would be P110 or P120 million, but there are certain acts that
could not be proved, so, we will sum up the amounts involved in these
transactions which were proved. Now, if the amount involved in these
transactions, proved beyond reasonable doubt, is P100 million, then there
is a crime of plunder.’ (Deliberations of House of Representatives on RA
7080, dated October 9, 1990).’
509
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 509

xxx xxx xxx

“According to the Explanatory Note of Senate Bill No. 733, the
crime of plunder, which is a ‘term chosen from other equally apt
terminologies like kleptocracy and economic treason, punishes the
use of high office for personal enrichment, committed through a
series [or combination] of acts done not in the public eye but in
stealth or secrecy over a period of time, that may involve so many
persons, here and abroad, and which touch so many states and
territorial units.’ For this reason, it would be unreasonable to
require the prosecution to prove all the overt and criminal acts
committed by the accused as part of an ‘over-all unlawful scheme
or conspiracy’ to amass ill-gotten wealth as long as all the
elements of the crime of plunder have been proven beyond
reasonable doubt, such as, the combination of series of overt or
criminal acts committed by a public officer alone or in connivance
with other persons to accumulate ill-gotten wealth in the amount
of at least Fifty Million Pesos.
“The statutory language does not evince an intent to do away
with the constitutional presumption of guilt nor to lower the
quantum of proof needed to establish 45
each and every element or
ingredient of the crime of plunder.”
In connection with the foregoing, I emphasize that there is

no basis for petitioner’s concern that the conspiracy to
defraud, which is not punishable under the Revised Penal
Code, may have been criminalized under RA 7080. The
Anti-Plunder Law treats conspiracy as merely a mode of
incurring criminal liability, but does not criminalize or
penalize it per se.
In sum, it is clear that petitioner has misunderstood the
import of Section 4. Apropos the foregoing, I maintain that,
between an interpretation that produces questionable or
absurd results and one that gives life to the law, the choice
for this Court is too obvious to require much elucidation or
debate.
Even granting arguendo that Section 4 of the Anti-

Plunder law suffers from some constitutional infirmity, the
statute may nonetheless survive the challenge of
constitutionality in its entirety. Considering that this
provision pertains only to a rule on evidence or to a
procedural matter that does not bear upon or form any part
______________
45 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) dated July 9, 2001,

pp. 28-30.
510

of the elements of the crime of plunder, the Court may

declare the same unconstitutional and strike it off the
statute without necessarily affecting the essence of the
legislative enactment. For even without the assailed
provision, the law can still stand as a valid penal statute
inasmuch as the elements of the crime, as well as the
penalties therein, may still be clearly identified or
sufficiently derived from the remaining valid portions of
the law. This finds greater significance when one considers
that Section 7 of the law provides for a separability clause
declaring the validity, the independence and the
applicability of the other remaining provisions, should any
other provision of the law be held invalid or
unconstitutional.
Third Issue: The Constitutional Power of Congress to

Enact Mala Prohibita Laws
Petitioner maintains that RA 7080 “eliminated the element

of mens rea from crimes which are mala in se and
converted these crimes which are components of plunder
into mala prohibita, thereby rendering it easier to prove”
since, allegedly, “the prosecution need not prove criminal
intent.”
This asseveration is anchored upon the postulate (a very
erroneous one, as already discussed above) that the Anti-
Plunder Law exempts the prosecution from proving beyond
reasonable doubt the component acts constituting plunder,
including the element of criminal intent. It thus concludes
that RA 7080 violates the due process and the equal
protection clauses of the Constitution.
While I simply cannot agree that the Anti-Plunder Law

eliminated mens rea from the component crimes of plunder,
my bottomline position still is: regardless of whether
plunder is classified as mala prohibita or in se, it is the
prerogative of the legislature—which is undeniably vested
with the authority—to determine whether certain acts are
criminal irrespective of the actual intent of the perpetrator.
511
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 511

The Power of the Legislature to Penalize Certain Acts

Jurisprudence 46
dating as far back as United States v. Siy
Cong Bieng has consistently recognized and upheld “the
power of the legislature, on grounds of public policy and
compelled by necessity, ‘the great master of things,’ to
forbid in a limited class of cases the doing of certain acts,
and to make their commission criminal without regard to
the intent
47
of the doer.” Even earlier, in United States v. Go
Chico, Justice Moreland wrote that the legislature may
enact criminal laws that penalize certain acts, like the
“discharge of a loaded gun,” without regard for the criminal
intent of the wrongdoer. In his words:
“In the opinion of this Court it is not necessary that the appellant
should have acted with criminal intent. In many crimes, made
such by statutory enactment, the intention of the person who
commits the crime is entirely immaterial. This is necessarily so. If
it were not, the statute as a deterrent influence would be
substantially worthless. It would be impossible of execution. In
many cases the act complained of is itself that which produces the
pernicious effect which the statute seeks to avoid. In those cases
the pernicious effect is produced with precisely the same force and
result whether the intention of the person performing the act is
good or bad. The case at bar is a perfect illustration of this. The
display of a flag or emblem used, particularly within a recent
period, by the enemies of the Government tends to incite
resistance to governmental functions and insurrection against
governmental authority just as effectively if made in the best of
good faith as if made with the most corrupt intent. The display
itself, without the intervention of any other factor, is the evil. It is
quite different from that large class of crimes, made such by the
common law or by statute, in which the injurious effect upon the
public depends upon the corrupt intention of the person
perpetrating the act. If A discharges a loaded gun and kills B, the
interest which society has in the act depends, not upon B’s death,
but upon the intention with which A consummated the act. If the
gun were discharged intentionally, with the purpose of
accomplishing the death of B, then society has been injured and
its security
______________
46 30 Phil. 577, March 31, 1915, per Carson, J; see also USv.Ah Chong, 15 Phil.
488, March 19, 1910 and Caram Resources Corp. v. Contreras, supra.
47 14 Phil. 128, September 15, 1909, per Moreland, J.
512

violated; but if the gun was discharged accidentally on the part of

A, the society, strictly speaking, has no concern in the matter,
even though the death of B results. The reason for this is that A
does not become a danger to society and its institutions until he
becomes a person with a corrupt mind. The mere discharge of the
gun and the death of B do not of themselves make him so. With
those two facts must go the corrupt intent to kill. In the case at
bar, however, the evil to society and to the Government does not
depend upon the state of mind of the one who displays the banner,
but upon the effect which that display has upon the public mind.
In the one case the public is affected by the intention of the actor;
in the other by the act itself.”
Without being facetious, may I say that, unlike the act of

discharging a gun, the acts mentioned in Section 1(d)—
bribery, conversion, fraudulent conveyance, unjust
enrichment and the like—cannot be committed sans
criminal intent. And thus, I finally arrive at a point of
agreement with petitioner: that the acts enumerated in
Section 1(d) are by their nature mala in se, and most of
them are in fact defined and penalized as such by the
Revised Penal Code. Having said that, I join the view that
when we speak of plunder, we are referring essentially to
two or more instances of mala in se constituting one malum
prohibitum. Thus, there should be no difficulty if each of
the predicate acts be proven beyond reasonable doubt as
mala in se, even if the defense of lack of intent be taken
away as the solicitor general has suggested.
In brief, the matter of classification is not really
significant, contrary to what petitioner would have us
believe. The key, obviously, is whether the same burden of
proof—proof beyond reasonable doubt—would apply.
Furthermore, I also concur in the opinion of the solicitor

general: if it is conceded that the legislature possesses the
requisite power and authority to declare, by legal fiat, that
acts not inherently criminal in nature are punishable as
offenses under special laws, then with more reason can it
punish as offenses under special laws those acts that are
already inherently criminal. “This is so because the greater
(power to punish not inherently criminal acts) includes
513
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 513

the lesser (power to punish inherently

48
criminal acts). In eo
plus sit, semper inest et minus.”
Epilogue
“The constitutionality of laws is presumed. To justify nullification

of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not a doubtful or argumentative implication; a law
shall not be declared invalid unless the conflict with the
Constitution is clear beyond a reasonable doubt. The presumption
is always
49
in favor of constitutionalityxxx. To doubt is to sustain.’
xxx.”
A law should not be overturned on the basis of speculation

or conjecture that it is unconstitutionally vague. Everyone
is duty-bound to adopt a reasonable interpretation that will
uphold a statute, carry out its purpose and render
harmonious all its parts. Indeed, the constitutionality of a
statute must be sustained if, as in this case, a ground
therefor can possibly be found. For the unbending teaching
is that a law cannot be declared invalid, unless the conflict
with the Constitution is shown to be clearly beyond
reasonable doubt.
To lend color and vividness to the otherwise boring
legalese that has been used to dissect RA 7080, the parties
to this case laced their arguments with interesting little
stories. Thus, petitioner opened his Oral Argument with an
admittedly apocryphal account of a befuddled student of
law who could not make heads or tails of the meanings of
series, combination and pattern.
On the other hand, the solicitor general compares
petitioner with Hans Christian Andersen’s fabled tailors
who tried to fool the emperor into walking around naked by
making him believe that anyone who did not see the
invisible garment, which they had supposedly sewn for
him, was “too stupid and incompetent to appreciate its
quality.” This is no doubt a parody of the alleged
______________
48 Respondent’s Memorandum, pp. 84-85. The solicitor general cites

illegal recruitment as an example of a malum in se crime, which the law
penalizes as malum prohibitum; that is, to punish it severely without
regard to the intent of the culprit.
49 Virata v. Sandiganbayan, 202 SCRA 680, 698-699, October 15, 1991,
per Davide, J.(nowCJ).
514

vagueness of RA 7080, which is purportedly “invisible only

to anyone 50
who is too dull or dense to appreciate its
quality.”
I do not begrudge petitioner (or his lawyers) for
exhausting every known and knowable legal tactic to
exculpate himself from the clutches of the law. Neither do I
blame the Solicitor General, as the Republic’s counsel, for
belittling the attempt of petitioner to shortcut his difficult
legal dilemmas. However, this Court has a pressing legal
duty to discharge: to render justice though the heavens
may fall.
By the Court’s Decision, petitioner is now given the
occasion to face squarely and on the merits the plunder
charges hurled at him by the Ombudsman. He may now
use this opportunity to show the courts and the Filipino
people that he is indeed innocent of the heinous crime of
plunder—to do so, not by resorting to mere legalisms, but
by showing the sheer falsity of the wrongdoings attributed
to him.
I think that, given his repeated claims of innocence,
petitioner owes that opportunity to himself, his family, and
the teeming masses he claims to love. In short, the Court
has rendered its judgment, and the heavens have not
fallen. Quite the contrary, petitioner is now accorded the
opportunity to prove his clear conscience and inculpability.
WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the Petition and to
uphold the constitutionality of RA 7080.
DISSENTING OPINION
KAPUNAN, J.:
The primary duty of the Court is to render justice. The

resolution of the issues brought before it must be grounded
on law, justice and the basic tenets, of due process,
unswayed by the passions of the day or the clamor of the
multitudes, guided only by its members’ honest conscience,
clean hearts and their unsullied conviction to do what is
right under the law.
______________
50 Solicitor General’s Comment, pp. 1-2.
515
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 515

The issues posed by the instant petition are quite difficult.

The task of the Court to resolve the same is made more
daunting because the case involves a former President of
the Republic who, in the eyes of certain sectors of society,
deserves to be punished. But the mandate of the Court is to
decide these issues solely on the basis of law and due
process, and regardless of the personalities involved. For
indeed, the rule of law and the right to due process are
immutable principles that should apply to all, even to those
we hate. As Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., a noted
constitutionalist, aptly puts it—
x x x the greater disaster would be if the Supreme Court should

heed the clamor for conviction and convict Estrada even under an
unconstitutional law but of the belief that Estrada deserves to be
punished.
1
That would be tantamount to a rule of men and not of
law.
The Basic Facts

The petition before us questions the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 7080 (R.A. No. 7080 or
2
Plunder Law), as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, entitled “An 3
Act
Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder.” This
original petition for certiorari and prohibition against
Respondent Third Division of the Sandiganbayan filed by

petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada assails Respondent
court’s Resolution, dated July 9, 2001, denying his Motion
to Quash the information against him in Criminal Case No.
26558 for Plunder. Petitioner likewise prays that the
Sandiganbayan be prohibited and enjoined from proceeding
with his arraignment and trial in Criminal Case No. 26558
due to the unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7080.
On the heels of the finality of the joint decision of this
Court in G.R. No. 146710 (Estrada vs. Desierto, et al.) and
in G.R. No.
______________
1 Joaquin G. Bemas, S.J., Prejudging the Supreme Court, in his column

“Sounding Board,” Today, September 26, 2001, p. 6.
2 An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes,
amending for that purpose the Revised Penal Code and Other Special
Penal Laws, namely: Dangerous Drugs Act, Crime of Plunder, and Anti-
Carnapping Act (1993).
3 87 O.G. 38, pp. 5488-5490 (1991).
516

146738 (Estrada vs. Macapagal-Arroyo), promulgated on

April 3, 2001, 356 SCRA 108, upholding the
constitutionality of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo’s
assumption of office as President of the Republic of the
Philippines and declaring that the former President Joseph
Ejercito Estrada no longer enjoyed immunity from suit, the
Ombudsman filed eight (8) Informations against Estrada.
These cases were Criminal Case No. 26558 (for Plunder);
Criminal Case No. 26559 (for Violation of Sec. 3[a]) of
Republic Act No. 3019); Criminal Case No. 26560 (for
Violation of Sec. 3[a] of R.A. 3019); Criminal Case No.
26561 (for Violation of Sec. 3[e] of R.A. 3019); Criminal
Case No. 26562 (for Violation of Sec. 3[e] of R.A. No. 3019);
Criminal Case No. 26563 (for Violation of Sec. 7[d] of R.A.
No. 6713); Criminal Case No. 26564 (for Perjury); and
Criminal Case No. 26565 (for Illegal Use of Alias).
The aforementioned informations were raffled to the five
divisions of the Sandiganbayan. Criminal Case No. 26558
was raffled to the Third Division of said court. The
amended information against petitioner charging violations
of Section 2, in relation to Section (d) (1) (2) of the statute

reads:
That during the period from June, 1998 to January, 2001, in the
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, by himself and in conspiracy
with his co-accused, business associates and persons heretofore
named, by taking advantage of his official position, authority,
connection or influence as President of the Republic of the
Philippines, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
criminally amass, accumulate and acquire ill-gotten wealth, and
unjustly enrich himself in the aggregate amount of
P4,097,804,173.17, more or less, through a combination and series
of overt and criminal acts, described as follows:
(a) by receiving, collecting, directly or indirectly, on many

instances, so-called “jueteng money” from gambling
operators in connivance with co-accused Jose ‘Jinggoy’
Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte and Edward Serapio, as
witnessed by Gov. Luis ‘Chavit’ Singson, among other
witnesses, in the aggregate amount of FIVE HUNDRED
FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P545,000.000.00), more
or less, in consideration of their protection from arrest or
interference by law enforcers in their illegal “jueteng”
activities; and
(b) by misappropriating, converting and misusing for his gain
and benefit public fund in the amount of ONE HUNDRED
THIRTY
517
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 517

MILLION PESOS (P130,000,000.00), more or less,

representing a portion of One Hundred Seventy Million
Pesos (P170,000,000.00) tobacco excise tax share allocated
for the Province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171, in
conspiracy with co-accused Charlie ‘Atong’ Ang, Alma
Alfaro, Eleuterio Tan a.k.a. Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr.
Uy, and Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, as witnessed by Gov.
Luis ‘Chavit’ Singson, among other witnesses; and
(c) by directing, ordering and compelling the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS) and the Social Security
System (SSS) to purchase and buy a combined total of
681,733,000 shares of stock of the Belle Corporation in the
aggregate gross value of One Billion Eight Hundred Forty-
Seven Million Five Hundred Seventy Eight Thousand
Pesos and Fifty Centavos(P1,847,578,057.50), for the

purpose of collecting for his personal gain and benefit, as
in fact he did collect and receive the sum of ONE
HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN
HUNDRED THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS
(P189,757,000.00) as commission for said stock purchase;
and
(d) by unjustly enriching himself in the amount of THREE
BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE MILLION
ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED
SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN
CENTAVOS (P3,233,104,173.17) comprising his
unexplained wealth acquired, accumulated and amassed
by him under his account name “Jose Velarde” with
Equitable PCI Bank:
to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the

Republic of the Philippines.
4
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On April 16 and 17, 2001, the Ombudsman filed an Ex-

Parte Manifestation to Withdraw Information in Criminal
Case Nos. 26559, 26560, 26561, 26562 and 26563.
Petitioner registered his objection to the Ombudsman’s
motion to withdraw. The divisions of the Sandiganbayan to
which said cases were assigned granted the withdrawal of
the informations, save for that in Criminal Case No. 26561.
At present, the Order of the First Division of the
Sandiganbayan denying the
Ombudsman’smotiontowithdrawinCriminal Case No.
26561 is still under reconsideration.
______________
4 Annex “C” of Petition.
518

In Criminal Case No. 26558, petitioner filed on April 11,

2001 an Omnibus Motion for the remand of the case to the
Office of the Ombudsman for: (1) the conduct of a
preliminary investigation as regards specification “d” of the
accusations in the information in said case; and (2)
reconsideration/reinvestigation of the offenses in
specifications “a,”“b” and “c” to enable petitioner to file his

counter-affidavits as well as other necessary documents.
On April 25, 2001, the Third Division of the
Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution finding that:
(p)robable cause for the offense of PLUNDER exists to justify

issuance of warrants of arrest of accused former President Joseph
Ejercito Estrada, Mayor Jose “Jinggoy” Estrada, Charlie “Atong”
Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, John
Doe a.k.a Eleuterio Tan or
EleuterioRamonTanorMr.UyandJaneDoea.k.a.DeliaRajas.
Subsequently, on May 31, 2001, the Third Division of the

Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying
petitioner’sOmnibusMotion.
On June 15, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of said Resolution but the same was
denied in a Resolution of June 25, 2001.
Meanwhile, on June 14, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion
to Quash the information in Criminal Case No. 26558,
invoking the following grounds: (1) the facts charged do not
constitute an indictable offense as R.A. No. 7080, the
statute on which it is based, is unconstitutional; and (2) the
information charges more than one offense.
The People of the Philippines filed an Opposition thereto
on June 21, 2001. Petitioner filed his Reply to the
Opposition on June 28, 2001.
On July 9, 2001, the Third Division of the
Sandiganbayan issued its Resolution denying
petitioner’smotiontoquash.
Petitioner thus filed the instant petition for certiorari
and prohibition, claiming that the Sandiganbayan
committed grave abuse of discretion in denying his motion
to quash the information in Criminal Case No. 26558.
Petitioner argues that R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional on
the following grounds:
519
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 519

I. IT VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE FOR

ITS VAGUENESS
II. IT VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
OF THE ACCUSED TO KNOW THE NATURE
AND CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION AGAINST
HIM
III. IT VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE AND

THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF
INNOCENCE BY LOWERING THE QUANTUM
OF EVIDENCE NECESSARY FOR PROVING THE
COMPONENT ELEMENTS OF PLUNDER
IV. IT IS BEYOND THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWER
OF THE LEGISLATURE TO DELIMIT THE
REASONABLE DOUBT STANDARD AND TO
ABOLISH THE ELEMENT OF MENS REA IN
MALA IN SE CRIMES BY CONVERTING THESE
TO MALA PROHIBITA, IN VIOLATION OF THE
DUE PROCESS 5 CONCEPT OF CRIMINAL
RESPONSIBILITY.
The provisions of law involved

Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080 provides:
Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties.—Any public officer

who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family,
relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates,
ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or
criminal acts as described in Section 1(d) hereof in the aggregate
amount or total value of at least Fifty million pesos
(P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall
be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who
participated with the said public officer in the commission of an
offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be
punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the
degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and
extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal
Code, shall be considered by the court. The court shall declare any
and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes
and assets including the properties and shares of stocks derived
from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the
State. (As amended by Sec. 12, RA No. 7659.)
______________
5 Amended Petition, p. 8.
520

Section 1(d) of the same law defines “ill-gotten wealth” as

“any asset, property, business enterprise or material
possession of any person within the purview of Section Two
(2)” hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through
dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates, and/or business
associates by any combination or series of the following
means or similar schemes:
1. Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse or

treasury;
2. By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission,
3. By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or
Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or
4. By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or
5. By establishing agricultural, industrial or
commercial monopolies or other combination and/or
benefit particular persons or special interests; or
6. By taking undue advantage of official position,
expense and to the damage and prejudice of the6
On the other hand, Section 4 states:
Rule of Evidence—For purposes of establishing the crime of

plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every
conspiracy.
______________
6 Section l(d).
521
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 521

Petitioner’s theory
Petitioner asserts that R.A. No. 7080 is vague and
overbroad on its7 face, and suffers from structural deficiency
and ambiguity. In sum, he maintains that the law does not
afford an ordinary person reasonable notice that his
actuation will constitute a criminal offense. More
particularly, petitioner argues that the terms
“combination” and “serie s” are not clearly defined, citing
that in a number of cases, the United States (U.S.) federal
courts in deciding cases under the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO law), after which the
Plunder Law was patterned, have given 8 different
interpretations to “series of acts or transactions.”
______________

8 Amended Petition., pp. 13-17; Memorandum for Petitioner, pp. 16-24.
According to petitioners:
a. While American federal courts in the First Circuit in the U.S. have defined
“series of acts or transactions” for purposes of Rule 8(b) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure to refer only to “joint criminal enterprise”
[U.S. v. Turkette (1980, CA 1 Mass. 632 F 2d 896)] under a common scheme
[U.S. v. J. Tirocchi & Sons. Inc. (1960 DC RI) 187 F. Supp. 778], the courts
in the Second Circuit insist that “series of acts and transactions” should
mean that there should be “connection between the offenses” [U.S. v.
Charney (1962, SD BY) 211 F. Supp. 904] or “direct relationship between
counts” [U.S. v. Haim (1963 SD NY), 218 F. Supp. 922] or “substantial
identity of facts and participants” [U.S. v. Olin Corp. (1979, WD NY), 465
S. Supp. 1120].
b. Still on the U.S. Federal courts, the courts in the Third Circuit define
“series of acts” following the “direct relationship between acts” standard of
the Second Circuit; for example, U.S. v. Stafford (1974, ED Pa.), 382 F.
Supp. 1401) using “factual relationship between acts”; U.S. v. Slawik
(1975, DC Del.) 408 F. Supp. 190, using “connection between charges”; U.S.
v. Cohen (1978, ED Pa.) 444 F. Supp. 1314, using “direct relationship
between offenses”; and U.S. v. Serubo (1978, ED Pa.) 460 F. Supp. 689),
using “direct relationship between offenses”, but the federal courts in the
Fourth Circuit follow the “common scheme” standard, as in Rakes v. U.S.

(169 F2d 730).
c. The Sixth Circuit courts define “series” to mean “common scheme” (e.g.
U.S. v. Russo (480 F2d 1228) and so do the courts in
522

In addition, he terms “raid on the public

treasury,”“receiving or accepting a
gift,”“commission,”“kickbacks,”“illegal or fraudulent
conveyance or disposition of assets,”“monopolies or other
combinations,”“special interests,”“taking undue advantage
of official position,”“unjustly enrich” 9all suffer from
overbreadth which is a form of vagueness.
In arguing that the law on plunder is vague and
impermissibly broad, petitioner points out that the terms
“combination” and ‘series” used in the phrase “any
combination or series of the following means or similar
schemes” are not defined under the statute. The use of
these terms in the law allegedly raises several questions as
to their meaning and import.
Petitioner posits the following queries: “Does it
(referring to the term “serie s”) mean two, three, four, of
the overt or criminal acts listed in Section 1(d)? Would it
mean two or more related enterprises falling under at least
two of the means or ‘similar schemes’ listed in the law, or
just a joint criminal enterprise? Would it require
substantial identity of facts and participants, or merely a
common pattern of action? Would it imply close connection
between acts, or a direct relationship between the charges?
Does the term mean a factual relationship between
10
acts or
merely a common plan among conspirators?”
______________
the Seventh Circuit (e.g. U.S. v. Scott, (1969, CA 7 Ill.) (413 F2d 932),
and Eighth Circuit Courts (e.g. Haggard v. U.S. (1966, CA 8 Mo.) 369 F2d
968), but the courts in the Fifth Circuit follow the “close connection
between acts” standard, (e.g. U.S. v. Laca (1974 CA 5 Tex) 593 F2d 615) or
“substantial identity of facts and partici-pants” (e.g. U.S. v. Levine (1977
CA 5 Fla.) 546 F2d 658; U.S. v. Marionneaux (1975 CA 5 La.) 514 F2d
1244) together with federal courts in the Ninth Circuit (e.g. U.S. v. Ford
(1980 CA 9 Cal.) 632 F2d 1354) and those in the District of Columbia
Circuit (U.S. v. Jackson (1977) 562 F2d 789; U.S. v. Bachman, (1958 DC
Dist. Col.) 164 F. Suppl. 898). [Amended Petition, pp. 14-16; Memorandum
for Petitioner, pp. 20-22.]
9 Amended Petition, pp. 18-19; Memorandum for Petitioner, pp. 34-45.
10 Id., at 13-14; Id., at 19.
523
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 523

The term “combination” is allegedly equally equivocal.

According to petitioner, it is not clear from the law if said
term covers time, place, manner of commission, or the
principal characters. Thus petitioner asks: “Does it
(referring to the term “combination”)include any two or
more acts, whether legal or illegal, or does the law require
that the combination must include at least two of the
‘means or similar schemes’ laid down in R.A. 7080? Does it
cover transactions that have occurred in the same place or
area, or in different places, no matter how far apart? Does
‘combination’ include any two or more overt acts, no matter
how far apart in time, or does it contemplate acts
committed within a short period of time? Does the
‘combination’ cover the modus operandi of11the crimes, or
merely the evidence to be used at the trial?”
It is also argued that the phrase “pattern of overt or
criminal acts indicative of the overall scheme or
conspiracy” adds to the vagueness of the law because
“pattern” is not defined therein and is not included in the
definition of the crime of plunder12
even though it is an
essential element of said crime.
Petitioner also maintains that the Plunder Law violates
the due process clause and the constitutional presumption
of innocence by lowering the quantum of evidence
necessary for proving the component elements of plunder
because Section 4 does not require that each and every
criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the
scheme or conspiracy be proved, “it being sufficient to
establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or
criminal acts13
indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy.”
Finally, petitioner alleges that it is beyond the power of
Congress to delimit the reasonable doubt standard and to
abolish the element of mens rea in mala in se crimes by
converting these to mala prohibita, thereby making it
easier for the prosecution to prove malversation, bribery,
estafa and other crimes committed by public14
officers since
criminal intent need not be established.
______________
11 Id., at 16-17; Id., at 23.

12 Id., at 25-34.
13 Id., at 27-31; Id., at 66-76.
14 Id., at 27-35; Id., at 76-83.
524

Considering the infringement to the constitutionally-

guaranteed right to due process of an accused, petitioner
contends that R.A. No. 7080 cannot be accorded any
presumption of constitutional validity.
Respondents’ theory
On the other hand, Respondents argue that the “particular
elements constituting the crime of plunder” are stated with
“definiteness and certainty,” as follows:
(1) There is a public officer who acts by himself or in

connivance with members of his family, relatives by
affinity or consanguinity, business associates,
subordinates or other persons;
(2) There is an amassing, accumulating or acquiring of
ill-gotten wealth;
(3) The total amount of ill-gotten wealth so amassed,
accumulated or acquired is at least Fifty Million
Pesos (P50,000,000.00); and
(4) The ill-gotten wealth, which is defined as any asset,
property, business enterprise or material possession
of any person within the purview of Section Two (2)
of R.A. No. 7080, was acquired by him directly or
indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents,
subordinates, and/or business associates by any
combination or series of the means 15
or similar
schemes enumerated in Section 1(d).
Moreover, Respondents maintain that assuming that there

is some vagueness in the law, it need not be declared
unconstitutional
16
but may be clarified by judicial
construction. Respondents further add that the ordinary
import of the terms “combination” and “series” should
prevail, as can be gleaned from the deliberations of the
Congress in the course of its passage of the law. According
to respondents, “series of overt criminal acts” simply mean

a repetition of at least two of any of those enumerated acts
found in Section 1(d) of R.A. 7080. And “combination”
means a product of combining of at least one of any of those
enumerated acts described in Section 1(d) with at least one
of any of the other acts so enumerated. Respondents score
petitioner for arguing on the basis of fed-
______________
15 Comment, pp. 11-13; Memorandum for Respondents, pp. 30-32.

16 Ibid.; Id., at 49-50.
525
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 525

eral courts’ decisions on the RICO law, citing that the U.S.
courts have consistently rejected
17
the contention that said
law is void for being vague.
Respondents deny that the Plunder Law dispenses with
the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt. While
there may be no necessity to prove each and every other act
done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme to acquire
ill-gotten wealth, it is still necessary for the prosecution to
prove beyond reasonable doubt the pattern of overt or
criminal acts indicative of the overall scheme or conspiracy, 18
as well as all the other elements of the offense of plunder.
Respondents also point out that conspiracy itself is not
punishable under the Plunder Law, which deals19 with
conspiracy as a means of incurring criminal liability.
Respondents likewise contend that it is within the
inherent powers and wisdom of the legislature to determine
which acts are mala prohibita in the same way that it can
declare punishable
20
an act which is inherently not criminal
in nature.
In conclusion, Respondents assert that petitioner has
failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality of
R.A. No. 7080.
Petitioner’s Reply
Petitioner, in his Reply to Comment, draws attention to
Section 4, arguing that the provision states the “most
important element, which is the common thread that ties
the component acts together: “a pattern of overt or criminal
acts indicative
21
of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy and raises the following questions:
(a) Reference is made to a “pattern of overt or criminal

acts.” The disjunctive “or” is used. Will a pattern of
acts, which are overt but not criminal in
themselves, be indicative of an overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy?
______________
17 Id., at 13-25; Id., at 58-59.

18 Id., at 28-33; Id., at 70-77.
19 Id., at 33-34.
20 Comment, pp. 37-42; Memorandum for Respondents, pp. 82-84.
21 ReplytoComment,p.12.
526

(b) Under what specific facts or circumstances will a

“pattern” be “indicative” of the overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy?
(c) Under what specific facts or circumstances will the
required “pattern” or “scheme” even be said to be
present or to exist?
(d) When is 22there an “unlawful scheme or
conspiracy?”
Issues raised in the oral arguments

Oral arguments were heard on September 18, 2001. At said
hearing, the Court defined the issues for resolution as
follows:
1) WHETHER R.A. NO. 7080 IS

UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING VAGUE;
2) WHETHER R.A. NO. 7080 REQUIRES LESS
EVIDENCE FOR PROVING THE PREDICATE
CRIMES OF PLUNDER AND THEREFORE
VIOLATES THE RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO
DUE PROCESS; and
3) WHETHER PLUNDER AS DEFINED IN R.A. NO.
7080 IS A MALUM PROHIBITUM AND IF SO,
WHETHER IT IS WITHIN THE POWER 23
OF
CONGRESS TO SO CLASSIFY THE SAME.
Thereafter, both parties filed their respective memoranda

in which they discussed the points which they raised in
their earlier pleadings and during the hearing.
I believe that there is merit in the petition.
A penal statute which violates constitutional guarantees of

individual rights is void.
Every law enacted 24
by Congress enjoys a presumption of
constitutionality, and the presumption
25
prevails in the
absence of contrary evidence. A criminal statute is
generally valid if it does 26not violate constitutional
guarantees of individual rights. Conversely,
______________
22 Id., at 14-15.
23 TSN, Hearing on oral arguments, September 18, 2001, pp. 2-3.
24 Tan vs. People, 290 SCRA 117 (1998); see also Padilla vs. Court of
Appeals, 269 SCRA 402 (1997).
25 Morfe vs. Mutuc, 22 SCRA 424 (1968).
26 State v. Vogel, 467 N.W.2d 86 (1991).
527
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 527

when a constitutionally protected right of an individual is

in danger of being trampled upon by a criminal 27
statute,
such law must be struck down for being void.
One of the fundamental requirements imposed by the
Constitution upon criminal statutes is that pertaining to
clarity and definiteness. Statutes, particularly penal laws,
that fall short of this requirement have been declared
unconstitutional for being vague. This “void-for-vagueness”
doctrine is rooted in the basic concept of fairness as well as
the due process clause of the Constitution.
The Constitution guarantees
28
both substantive and
procedural due process as well as the right of the accused
to be informed
29
of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him. A criminal
______________
27 See Id.
28 ART. III, Sections 1, 12 and 14.
In Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. vs. City

Mayor of Manila (20 SCRA 849 [1967]), the Court expounded on the
concept of due process as follows:
x x x What then is the standard of due process which must exist both as a
procedural and a substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance, or any
governmental action for that matter, from the imputation of legal infirmity
sufficient to spell its doom? It is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason,
obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and
unfairness avoided. To satisfy the due process requirement, official action, to
paraphrase Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds of reason and result in sheer
oppression. Due process is thus hostile to any official action marred by lack of
reasonableness. Correctly it has been identified as freedom from arbitrariness. It
is the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play. It exacts fealty ‘to those
strivings for justice’ and judges the act of officialdom of whatever branch ‘in the
light of reason drawn from considerations of fairness that reflect [democratic]
traditions of legal and political thought.’ Itisnotanarrowor ‘technical conception
with fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances,’ decisions based on
such a clause requiring a ‘close and perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles
of our society.” Questions of due process are not to be treated narrowly or
pedantically in slavery to form or phrases (at pp. 860-861).
29 ART. III, Section 14.
528

statute should not be so vague and uncertain that “men of

common intelligence must necessarily 30
guess as to its
meaning and differ as to its application.
There are three distinct considerations for the
vagueness doctrine. First, the doctrine is designed to
ensure that individuals are properly warned ex ante of the
criminal consequences of their conduct. This “fair notice”
31
rationale was articulated in United States v. Harriss:
The constitutional requirement of definiteness is violated by a

criminal statute that fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence
fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the
statute. The underlying principle is that no man shall be held
criminally responsible for conduct
32
which he could not reasonably
understand to be proscribed.
Second, and viewed as more important, the doctrine is

intended to 33prevent arbitrary and discriminatory law
enforcement. Vague laws are invariably “standardless”
and as such, they afford too great an opportunity for
criminal enforcement to be left to34 the unfettered discretion

of police officers and prosecutors. Third, vague laws fail to
provide sufficient guidance to judges who are charged with
interpreting statutes. Where a statute is too vague to
provide sufficient guidance, the judiciary is arguably placed
in the position of usurping the proper function of the
legislature
35
by “making the law” rather than interpreting
it.
While the dictum that laws be clear and definite does
not require Congress to spell out with mathematical
certainty the standards36
to which an individual must
conform his conduct, it is necessary that statutes provide
37
reasonable standards to guide prospective conduct. And
where a statute imposes criminal sanctions,
______________
30 People v. Nazario, 165 SCRA 186 (1988).

31 347 U.S. 612 (1954).
32 Id., at 617.
33 Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983).
34 Ibid.
35 See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
36 Ibid.
37 Kolender, supra.
529
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 529

38
the standard of certainty is higher. The penalty imposable
on the person found guilty of39 violating R.A. No. 7080 is
reclusion perpetua to death. Given such penalty, the
standard of clarity and definiteness required of 40R.A. No.
7080 is unarguably higher than that of other laws.
Void-for-vagueness doctrine applies to criminal laws.

A view has been proffered that “vagueness and41overbreadth
doctrines are not applicable to penal laws.” These42 two
concepts, while related, are distinct from each other. On
one hand, the doctrine of overbreadth applies generally
43
to
statutes that infringe upon freedom of speech. On the
other hand, the “void-for-vagueness” doctrine applies to
criminal laws, not merely those that regulate
44
speech or
other fundamental constitutional rights. The fact that a
particular criminal statute does not infringe upon free
speech does not mean that a facial challenge

45
to the statute
on vagueness grounds cannot succeed.
As earlier intimated, the “vagueness doctrine” is
anchored on the constitutionally-enshrined right to due
process of law. Thus, as in this case that the “life, liberty
and property” of petitioner is involved, the Court should
not hesitate to look into whether a criminal statute has
sufficiently complied with the elementary
______________
38 Ibid.
39 Section 2.
40 See FCC v. American Broadcasting Co., 347 US 284 (1954).
41 See Concurring Opinion of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, pp. 10-12.
42 RELATIONS BETWEEN VAGUENESS AND OVERBREADTH—
THE VOID FOR VAGUE DOCTRINE, American Constitutional Law (2nd)
(1998), p. 1033 citing Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939). See also
Springfield Armory, Inc. v. City of Columbus, 29 F.3d 250, 1994 FED App
239P (6th Cir. 1994); Connally v. General Construction Company, 269 U.S.
385 (1926); Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 1957); Kolender v.
Lawson, supra.
43 THE OVERBREADTH DOCTRINE, Treatise on Constitutional Law
—Substance and Procedure, Vol. IV (1992), pp. 25-31; 36-37.
44 See Note 42.
45 Springfield Armory, Inc. v. City of Columbus, supra.
530

requirements of definiteness and clarity. It is an erroneous

argument that the Court cannot apply the vagueness
doctrine to penal laws. Such stance is tantamount to saying
that no criminal law can be challenged however repugnant
it is to the constitutional right to due process.
While admittedly, penal statutes are worded in
reasonably general terms to accomplish the legislature’s
objective of protecting the public from socially harmful
conduct, this should not prevent a vagueness challenge in
cases where a penal statute is so indeterminate as to cause
the average person to guess at its meaning and application.
For if a statute infringing upon freedom of speech may be
challenged for being vague because such right is considered
as fundamental, with more reason should a vagueness
challenge with respect to a penal statute be allowed since
the latter involve deprivation of liberty, and even of life
which, inarguably, are rights as important as, if not more

than, free speech. 46
It has been incorrectly suggested that petitioner cannot
mount a “facial challenge” to the Plunder Law, and that
“facial” or “on its face” 47
challenges seek the total 48
invalidation of a statute. Citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma,
it is also opined that “claims of facial overbreadth have
been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their
terms, seek to regulate only spoken words” and that
“overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been
curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that
are sought to be applied to protected conduct.”
Forthisreason,itisarguedfurther that “on its face
invalidation of statutes has been described as ‘manifestly
strong medicine,’ to be employed ‘sparingly and only as
alastresort.’” A reading of Broadrick, however, shows that
the doctrine involved therein was the doctrine of
overbreadth. Its ap-
______________
46 See Concurring Opinion of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, pp. 10-12.

47 RELATIONS BETWEEN VAGUENESS AND OVERBREADTH—
THE VOID FOR VAGUE DOCTRINE, American Constitutional Law (2nd)
[1998], p. 1033 citing Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 [1939]. See also
Springfield Armory, Inc. v. City of Columbus, 29 F.3d 250, 1994 FED App
239P [6th Cir. 1994]; Connally v. General Construction Company, 269 U.S.
385 [1926]; Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 [1957]; Kolender v.
Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 [1953].
48 413 U.S. 601 [1973].
531
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 531

plication to the present case is thus doubtful considering

that the thrust at hand is to determine whether the
Plunder Law can survive the vagueness challenge mounted
by petitioner. A noted authority on constitutional law,
Professor Lockhart, explained that “the Court will resolve
them (vagueness challenges) in ways different from the 49
approaches it has fashioned50in the law of over-breadth.”
Thus, in at least two cases, the U.S. courts allowed the
facial challenges to vague criminal statutes even if these
did not implicate free speech 51
In Kolender v. Lawson, petitioners assailed the
constitutionality of a California criminal statute which
required persons who loiter or wander on the streets to

provide a credible and reasonable identification and to
account for their presence when requested by a peace
officer under circumstances that would justify a valid stop.
The U.S. Supreme Court held that said statute was
unconstitutionally vague on its face within the meaning of
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
because it encourages arbitrary enforcement by failing to
clarify what is contemplated by the requirement that a
suspect provide a “credible52 and reasonable identification.”
Springfield vs. Oklahoma on the other hand involved a
challenge to a Columbus city ordinance banning certain
assault weapons. The court therein stated that a criminal
statute may be facially invalid even if it has some
conceivable application. It went on to rule that the assailed
ordinance’s definition of “assault weapon” was
unconstitutionally vague, because it was “fundamentally
irrational and impossible to apply consistently by the
buying public, the sportsman, 53
the law enforcement officer,
the prosecutor or the judge.”
It is incorrect to state that petitioner has made “little
effort to show the alleged invalidity of the statute as
applied to him, as he
______________
49 VAGUENESS AND OVERBREADTH, AN OVERVIEW, Lockhart et

al. Constitutional Law, Cases-Comments-Questions [6th Ed, 1986], p. 740.
50 Springfield v. Oklahoma, supra; Kolender v. Lawson, supra.
51 Supra.
52 Supra.
53 At p. 253.
532

allegedly “attacks ‘on their face’ not only §§1(d)(1) and (2) of
R.A. 7080 under which he is charged, but also its other
provisions which deal with plunder committed by illegal or
fraudulent disposition of government assets (§1(d)(3)),
acquisition of interest in business (§1(d)(4)), and
establishment of monopolies and combinations or
implementation of decrees intended to54 benefit particular
persons or special interests (§ 1(d)(5)).” Notably, much of
petitioner’sarguments dealt with the vagueness of the key
phrases “combination or series” and “pattern of overt or
criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or

conspiracy” whichgointotheverynatureof the crime for
which he is charged.
Taking into consideration that the Plunder Law is a
penal statute that imposes the supreme penalty of death,
and that petitioner in this case clearly has standing to
question its validity inasmuch as he has been charged
thereunder and that he has been for sometime now
painfully deprived of his liberty, it behooves this Court to
address the challenge on the validity of R.A. No. 7080.
Men steeped in law find difficulty in understanding

plunder.
The basic question that arises, therefore, is whether the
clauses in Section 2—
combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in

Section 1(d) hereof
and Section 1(d), which provides—
x x x byanycombinationorseriesofthefollowingmeansorsimilar
schemes:
1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of

public funds or raids on the public treasury;
xxx
6) By taking undue advantage of official position, authority,
relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or
themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the
______________
54 See Concurring Opinion of Justice Mendoza, p. 5.
533
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 533

as qualified by Section 4 which also speaks of the “scheme

or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten
wealth” and of “apattern of overt or criminal acts indicative
of the overall unlawfulscheme or conspiracy,” are clear
enough that a person “of commonintelligence” need not
guess at their meaning and differ as to theirapplication.
The above raise several difficult questions of meaning
which go to the very essence of the offense, such as:
a. How many acts would constitute a “combination or

series?”
b. Must the acts alleged to constitute the “combination
or series” be similar in nature? Note that Section
1(d) speaks of “similar schemes” while Section 4
speaks of “the scheme” and of “a pattern of overt or
criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy;”
c. Must the “combination or series” of “overt or
criminal acts” involving the aggregate amount of at
least P50 million be conceived as such a scheme or
a “pattern of overt or criminal acts” from inception
by the accused?
d. What would constitute a “pattern”? What linkage
must there be between and among the acts to
constitute a “pattern”? Need there be a linkage as
to the persons who conspire with one another, and a
linkage as to all the acts between and among them?
e. When Section 4 speaks of “indicative of the overall
unlawful scheme or conspiracy,” would this mean
that the “scheme” or “conspiracy” should have been
conceived or decided upon in its entirety, and by all
of the participants?
f. When committed in connivance “with members of
his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity,
business associates, subordinates or other persons”
or through “dummies, nominees, agents,
subordinates and/or business associates”, would
such fact be part of the “pattern of overt or criminal
acts” and of the “overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy” such that all of those who are alleged to
have participated in the crime of plunder must have
participated in each and every act allegedly
constituting the crime of plunder? And as in
conspiracy, conspired together from inception to
commit the offense?
g. Within what time frame must the acts be
committed so as to constitute a “combination or
series”?
534

I respectfully disagree with the majority that

“ascertainable standards
55
and well-defined parameters” are
provided in the law to resolve these basic questions.
Even men steeped in the knowledge of the law are in a
quandary as to what constitutes plunder. The Presiding
Justice of the Sandiganbayan, Justice Francis
Garchitorena, admitted that the justices of said court “have
been quarrelling with each other in finding 56 ways to
determine what [they] understand by plunder.” Senator
Neptali Gonzales also noted during the deliberations of
Senate Bill No. 733 that the definition of plunder under the
law is vague. He bluntly declared: “I am afraid that it
might be faulted for being violative of the due process
clause and the right to be informed
57
of the nature and cause
of the accusation of an accused. Fr. Bernas, for his part,
pointed to several problematical portions of the law that
were left unclarified. He posed the question: “How can you
have a ‘series’ of criminal acts if the elements that are
supposed 58to constitute the series are not proved to be
criminal?”
______________
55 See Decision, p. 8.
56 The transcript of Stenographic Notes of the Hearing in Criminal
Case No. 26561 on June 13, 2001, p. 16 reads:
PJ Garchitorena:
xxx
But you see, I will provoke you. Forgive us for provoking you, but we ourselves
have been quarrelling with each other in finding ways to determine what we
understand by plunder.
xxx
57 Infra.
58 In his column on the April 25, 2001 issue of Today, Fr. Bernas stated:
xxx
One question that has come up is whether a public official can commit more
than one crime of plunder during his or her incumbency. There are those who hold
that the law describes only one crime and that it cannot be split into several
offenses. This would mean that the prosecution must weave a web of offenses out
of the six ways of illegally amassing wealth and show how the various acts reveal
a combination or series of means or schemes which reveal a pattern of criminality.
My understanding is that under such a read-
535
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 535
The meanings of “combination” and “series” as used in R.A.

No. 7080 are not clear
Although the law has no statutory definition of
“combination” or “series”, the majority is of the view that
resort can be had to the ordinary meaning of these terms.
Thus, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary gives
the meaning of “combination”: “the result or product or
product of combining: a union 59or aggregate made of
combining one thing with another.”
______________
ing the six ways of amassing wealth should not be seen as separate from each
other but must be shown to be parts of one combination or scheme. The
interrelationship of the separate acts must be shown. An alternate reading of the
law, which is perhaps easier to prove but harsher on the accused, is that each one
of the six ways of amassing wealth can constitute plunder if the total take adds up
to the required P75 million.
xxx
There is another provision in the law which I find intriguing. It says: “For
purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove
each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or
conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to
establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt criminal acts indicative of the
overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.” Is this an indication that there is only one
crime of plunder under the statute?
Fr. Bernas also discussed the vagueness of “combination” or “series” in

the July 1, 2001 issue of Today:
Taken individually, the elements that are supposed to constitute the series can be
well understood. But now the Estrada lawyers are asking when precisely these
elements constitute a “combination or series”. The question is important because
of an intriguing provision in the plunder law: “For purposes of establishing the
crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act
done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass,
accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond
reasonable doubt a pattern of overt criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy.” How can you have a “series of criminal acts if the elements
that are supposed to constitute the series are not proved to be criminal?
59 Decision, p. 13.
536
In the context of R.A. No. 7080, “combination” as suggested

by the Solicitor General means that at least two of the
enumerated acts found in Section 1(d), i.e., one of any of the
enumerated acts, combined with another act falling under
any other of the enumerated means may constitute the
crime of plunder. With respect to the term “series,” the
majority states that it has been understood as pertaining to
“two or more
60
overt or criminal acts falling under the same
category” as gleaned from the deliberations on the law in
the House of Representatives and the Senate.
Further, the import of “combination”
61
or “series” can be
ascertained, the majority insists, from the following
deliberations in the Bicameral Conference Committee on
May 7, 1991:
REP. ISIDRO: I am just intrigued again by our definition of

plunder. We say, THROUGH A COMBINATION OR
SERIES OF OVERT OR CRIMINAL ACTS AS
MENTIONED IN SECTION ONE HEREOF. Now when
we say combination, we actually mean to say, if there
are two or more means, we mean to say that number one
and two or number one and something else are included,
how about a series of the same act? For example,
through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, will these
be included also?
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): Yeah, because we say
series.
REP. ISIDRO: Series.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): Yeah, we include
series.
REP. ISIDRO: But we say we begin with a combination.
THE CHAIRMAN: (REP. GARCIA): Yes.
REP. ISIDRO: When we say combination, it seems that—
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): Two.
REP. ISIDRO: Not only two but we seem to mean that two
of the enumerated means not twice of one enumeration.
THE CHAIRMAN: (REP. GARCIA): No, no, not twice.
REP. ISIDRO: Not twice?
______________
60 Id., at 15.
61 Decision, pp. 13-15.
537
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 537

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): Yes. Combination is

not twice—but combination, two acts.
REP. ISIDRO: So in other words, that’s it. When we say
combination, we mean two different acts. It can not be a
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): That be referred to
series. Yeah.
REP. ISIDRO: No, no. Supposing one act is repeated, so
there are two.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): A series.
REP. ISIDRO: That’s not series. It’s a combination.
Because when we say combination or series, we seem to
say that two or more, ‘di ba?
THE CHAIRMAN: (REP. GARCIA): Yes, This
distinguishes it, really, from the ordinary crimes. That is
why, I said, that is a very good suggestion because if it is
only one act, it may fall under ordinary crime but we
have here a combination or series of overt or criminal
acts. So . . .
HON. ISIDRO: I know what you are talking about. For
example, through misappropriation, conversion, misuse
or malversation of public funds who raids the public
treasury, now, for example, misappropriation, if there
are a series of misappropriations?
xxx
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): Series. One after the
other eh di...
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN TAÑADA): So that would fall
under term “series”?
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): Series, oo.
REP. ISIDRO: Now, if it is combination, ano, two
misappropriations. . .
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): It’s not . . . two
REP. ISIDRO: So, it is not a combination?
REP. ISIDRO: When you say “combination,” two different?
538


THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. TAÑADA): Two different.

REP. ISIDRO: Two different acts.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): For example, ha 62. . .
REP. ISIDRO: Now a series, meaning, repetition . . .
The following63 deliberations in the Senate are pointed to by

the majority to show that the words “combination” and
“serie s” are given their ordinary meaning:
Senator Maceda. In line of our interpellations that

sometimes “one” or maybe even “two” acts may already
result in such a big amount, on line 25, would the
Sponsor consider deleting the words “a series of overt
or.” To read, therefore: “or conspiracy COMMITTED by
criminal acts such as.” Remove the idea of necessitating
“a series.” Anyway, the criminal acts are in the plural.
Senator Tañada. That would mean a combination of two or
more of the acts mentioned in this.
The President. Probably, two or more would be....
Senator Maceda. Yes, because ‘a series’ implies several or
many’ two or more.
Senator Tañada. Accepted, Mr. President.
xxx
The President. If there is only one, then he has to be
prosecuted under the particular crime. But when we say
‘acts of plunder’ there should be, at least, two or more.
Senator Romulo. In other words, 64
that is already covered
by existing laws, Mr. President.
______________
62 RECORD OF THE JOINT CONFERENCE MEETING COMMITTEE

ON JUSTICE AND COMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENTS (S. No. 733 & H. No. 22752), May 7, 1991, pp. 39-40.
63 Decision, p. 14.
64 RECORDS OF THE SENATE, June 6, 1989, pp. 92-93.
539
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 539

To my mind, resort to the dictionary meaning of the terms

“combination” and “series” as well as recourse to the
deliberations of the lawmakers only serve to prove that
R.A. No. 7080 failed to satisfy the strict requirements of
the Constitution on clarity and definiteness. Note that the
key element to the crime of plunder is that the public
officer, by himself or in conspiracy with others, amasses,

accumulates, or acquires “ill-gotten wealth” through a
“combination or series of overt or criminal acts” as
described in Section 1(d) of the law. Senator Gonzales,
during the deliberations in the Senate, already raised
serious concern over the lack of a statutory definition of
what constitutes “combination” or “series,” consequently,
expressing his fears that Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080 might
be violative of due process:
Senator Gonzales. To commit the offense of plunder, as defined in

this Act and while constituting a single offense, it must consist of
a series of overt or criminal acts, such as bribery, extortion,
malversation of public funds, swindling, illegal exaction, and graft
or corrupt practices act and like offenses. Now, Mr. President, I
think, this provision, by itself will be vague. I am afraid
that it might be faulted for being violative of the due
process clause and the right to be informed of the nature
and cause of accusation of an accused.Because,whatis meant
by “series of overt or criminal acts”? I mean, would 2, 3, 4 or 5
constitute a series? During the period of amendments, can we
establish a minimum of overt acts like, for example, robbery in
band? The law defines what is robbery in band by the number of
participants therein. In this particular case probably, we can
statutorily provide for the definition of “series” so that two, for
example, would that be already a65series? Or, three, what would be
the basis for such determination? (Emphasis supplied.)
The point raised by Senator Gonzales is crucial and well-

taken. I share petitioner’s observation that when penal
laws enacted by Congress make reference to a term or
concept requiring a quantitative definition, these laws are
so crafted as to specifically state the exact number or
percentage necessary to constitute the elements of a crime.
To cite a few:
______________
65 RECORDS OF THE SENATE, June 5, 1989, pp. 34.
540

“Band”—“Whenever more than three armed malefactors shall

have acted together in the commission of an offense, it shall be
deemed to have been 66

committed by a band.” (Article 14[6],
Revised Penal Code)
“Conspiracy”—“A conspiracy exists when two or more persons
come to an agreement concerning the commission of 67
a felony and
decide to commit it.” (Article 8, Revised Penal Code)
“Illegal Recruitment by a Syndicate”—“Illegal recruitment is
deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of
three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with
one another in carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction,
enterprise or scheme x x x.” (Section 38, Labor Code)
“Large-scale Illegal Recruitment”—“Illegal recruitment is
deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or
more persons individually or as a group.” (Section 38, Labor Code)
“Organized/Syndicated Crime Group”—“[M]eans a group of two
or more persons collaborating, confederating or mutually helping
one another for purposes of gain in the68commission of any crime.”
(Article 62 (1)(1a), Revised Penal Code)
“Swindling by a Syndicate”—“xxxiftheswindling (estafa) is
committed by a syndicate consisting of five or more persons
formed with the intention of carrying out the unlawful or illegal
act, transaction,
69
enterprise orschemexxx.” (Section 1, P.D. No.
1689)
The deliberations of the Bicameral Conference Committee

and of the Senate cited by the majority, consisting mostly
of unfinished sentences, offer very little help in clarifying
the nebulous concept of plunder. All that they indicate is
that Congress seemingly intended to hold liable for plunder
a person who: (1) commits at least two counts of any one of
the acts mentioned in Section 1(d) of R.A. No. 7080, in
which case, such person commits plunder by a series of
overt criminal acts; or (2) commits at least one count of at
least two of the acts mentioned in Section 1(d), in which
case, such person commits plunder by a combination of
overt criminal acts. Said
______________
66 ReplytoComment,p.33.
67 Ibid.
68 Id.
69 Id.
541
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 541

discussions hardly provide a window as to the exact nature

of this crime.
A closer look at the exchange between Representatives
Garcia and Isidro and Senator Tañada would imply that
initially,70 combination was intended to mean “two or more
means,” i.e., “number71 one and two or number one and
something else x x x,” “twoofthe
72
enumerated means
73
not
twice of one enumeration,” two different 74acts.” Series
would refer to “a repetition of the same act.” However, the
distinction was again lost as can be gleaned from the
following:
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA) Yes. Combination is not

twice—but combination, two acts.
REP. ISIDRO. So in other words, that’s it. When we say
combination, we mean, two different acts. It can not be a
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA). That be referred to
series, Yeah.
REP. ISIDRO. No, no. Supposing one act is repeated, so
there are two.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA). A series.
REP. ISIDRO. That’s not series. It’s a combination. Because
when we say combination or series, we seem to say that
two or more, ‘di ba?
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA). Yes. This distinguishes
it really the ordinary—That’s why I said, that’s a very
good suggestion, because if its’ only one act, it may fall
under ordinary crime. But we have here a combination
or series,75 of overt or criminal acts” (Emphasis
supplied).
xxx
______________
70 RECORD OF THE JOINT CONFERENCE MEETING COMMITTEE

ON JUSTICE AND COMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENTS (S. No. 733 & H. No. 22752), May 7, 1991, p. 40.
71 Ibid.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id., at 40-41.
542

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA P.) Series. One after the

other eh di...
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. TAÑADA) So, that would fall
under the term “series”?
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA P) Series, oo.
REP. ISIDRO. Now, if it is combination, ano, two
misappropriations
...
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA) It’s not... two
REP. ISIDRO. So, it is not a combination?
REP. ISIDRO. When we say “combination,” two different?
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA P.) Yes.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. TAÑADA) Two different.
REP. ISIDRO. Two different acts.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA P.) For example, ha . . .
REP. ISIDRO. Now a series, meaning, repetition . . .
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. TAÑADA) Yes.
REP. ISIDRO. With that . . .
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA P.) Thank you.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. TAÑADA) So, it could be a series
of any of the acts mentioned in paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 5 of
Section 2 (d), or... 1(d) rather, or a combination of any of
the acts mentioned in paragraph 1 alone, or paragraph 2
alone or paragraph 3 or paragraph 4.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA P.) I think combination
maybe... which one? Series?
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. TAÑADA) Series or combination.
REP. ISIDRO. Which one, combination or series or series or
combination?
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. TAÑADA) Okay. Ngayon doon sa
definition, ano, Section 2, definition, doon sa portion ng .
. . Saan iyon? As mentioned, as described . . .
543
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 543

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA P.) Described. I think

that is . . .
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. TAÑADA) . . . better than
“mentioned.” Yes.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA P.) Okey?
REP. ISIDRO. Very good.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. TAÑADA) Oo, marami pong
salamat.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA P.) Maraming salamat

po. 76
The meeting was adjourned at 1:33 p.m.” (Emphasis
supplied.)
The aforequoted deliberations, especially the latter part

thereof, would show a dearth of focus to render precise the
definition of the terms. Phrases were uttered but were left
unfinished. The examples cited were not very definite.
Unfortunately, the deliberations were apparently
adjourned without the Committee members themselves
being clear on the concept of series and combination.
Moreover, if “combination” as used in the law simply
refers to the amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-
gotten wealth amounting to at least P50 Million through at
least two of the means enumerated in Section 1(d), and
“series,” to at least two counts of one of the modes under
said section, the accused could be meted out the death
penalty for acts which, if taken separately, i.e., not
considered as part of the combination or series, would
ordinarily result in the imposition of correctional penalties
only. If such interpretation would be adopted, the Plunder
law would be so oppressive and arbitrary as to violate due
process and the constitutional
77
guarantees against cruel or
inhuman punishment. The
______________
76 Id., at 42-43.
77 Article III of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process
of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
xxx
Sec. 19(1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed unless, for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for
it. Any death penalty al-
544

penalty would be blatantly disproportionate to the offense.

Petitioner’s examples illustrate this absurdity:
a. One act of indirect bribery (penalized under Art. 211 of the

Revised Penal Code with prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods),
combined with –
one act of fraud against the public treasury (penalized under

Art. 213 of the Revised Penal Code with prision correccional in its
medium period to prision mayor in its minimum period).
equals
Plunder (punished by reclusion perpetua to death plus

forfeiture of assets under R.A. 7080)
b. One act of prohibited transaction (penalized under Art. 215
of the Revised Penal Code with prision correctional in its
minimum period or a fine ranging from P200 to P1,000 or both).
combined with
one act of establishing a commercial monopoly (penalized

under Art. 186 of Revised Penal Code with prision correccional in
its minimum or a fine ranging from P200 to P6,000, or both.
equals
Plunder (punished by reclusion perpetua to death, and

forfeiture of assets under R.A. 7080).
c. One act of possession of prohibited interest by a public officer
(penalized with prision correccional in its minimum period or a
fine of P200 to P1,000, or both under Art. 216 of the Revised
Penal Code).
combined with –
one act of combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade

(penalized under Art. 186 of the Revised Penal Code with prision
correccional in its minimum period, or a fine of P200 to P1,000, or
both),
equals –
plunder (punished 78
by reclusion perpetua to death, and
forfeiture of assets).
______________
ready imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. (Emphasis

supplied.)
78 Reply to Comment, pp. 16-18; Memorandum for Petitioner, pp. 62-63.
545
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 545

The argument that higher penalties may be imposed where

two or more distinct criminal acts are combined and are
regarded as special complex crimes, i.e., rape with
homicide, does not justify the imposition of the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death in case plunder is committed. 79
Taken singly, rape is punishable by80 reclusion perpetua;
and homicide, by reclusion temporal. Hence, the increase
in the penalty imposed when these two are considered
together as a special complex crime is not too far from the
penalties imposed for each of the single offenses. In
contrast, as shown by the examples above, there are
instances where the component crimes of plunder, if taken
separately, would result in the imposition of correctional
penalties only; but when considered as forming part of a
series or combination of acts constituting plunder, could be
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. The
disproportionate increase in the penalty is certainly
violative of substantive due process and constitute a cruel
and inhuman punishment.
It may also be pointed out that the definition of “ill-
gotten wealth” in Section 1(d) has reference to the
acquisition of property (by the accused himself or in
connivance with others) “by any combination or series” of
the “means” or “similar schemes” enumerated therein,
which include the following:
xxx
4. By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any
shares of stock, equity or any other forms of interest or
participation including the promise of future employment or any
business enterprise or undertakings;
5. By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial
monopolies or other combination and/or implementation of
decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or
special interests;
xxx
The above-mentioned acts are not, by any stretch of the

imagination, criminal or illegal acts. They involve the
exercise of the right to liberty and property guaranteed by
Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution which provides
that “No person shall be
______________
79 Article 335, Revised Penal Code.

80 Article 249, Revised Penal Code.
546

deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of

law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of
the laws.” Receiving or accepting any shares of stock is not
per se objectionable. It is in pursuance of civil liberty, which
includes “the right of the citizen to be free to use his
faculties in all lawful ways; x x x to earn his livelihood by
any lawful calling; to pursue any avocation, and/or that
purpose, to enter into all contracts which may be proper,
necessary and essential to 81his carrying out these purposes
to a successful conclusion. Nor is there any impropriety,
immorality or illegality in establishing agricultural,
industrial or commercial monopolies or other combination
and/or implementation of decrees and orders even if they
are intended to benefit particular persons or special
interests. The phrases “particular persons” 82
and “special
interests” may well refer 83
to the
84
poor, the85
indigenous86
cultural87 communities, labor, farmers, fisherfolk,
women, or those connected with 88education, science and
technology, arts, culture and sports.
In contrast, the monopolies and combinations described
in Article 186 of the Revised Penal Code are punishable
because, as specifically defined therein, they are “on
restraint of trade or commerce or to prevent by artificial
means of free competition in the market, or the object is “to
alter the price” of any merchandise “by spreading false
rumors,” or to manipulate market prices in restraint of
trade. There are no similar elements of monopolies or
combinations as described in the Plunder Law to make the
acts wrongful.
If, as interpreted by the Solicitor General, “series”
means a “repetition” or pertains to “two or more” acts, and
“combination as defined in the Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary is
______________
81 Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660 (1919).

82 See Article XIII, Section 1 and 2, Constitution.
83 Id., at Section 6.

88 See Article XIV, Constitution.
547
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 547

“the result
89
or product of combining one thing with
another,” then, the commission of two or more acts falling
under paragraphs (4) and (5) of Section 1(d) would make
innocent acts protected by the Constitution as criminal,
and punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.
R.A. No. 7080 does not define “pattern,” an essential

element of the crime of plunder.
Granting arguendo that, as asserted by the majority,
“combination” and “series” simplistically mean the
commission 90of two or more of the acts enumerated in
Section 1(d), still, this interpretation does not cure the
vagueness of R.A. No. 7080. In construing the definition of
“plunder,” Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080 must not be read in
isolation but rather, must be interpreted in relation to the
other provisions of said law. It is a basic rule of statutory
construction that to ascertain the meaning
91
of a law, the
same must be read in its entirety. Section 1 taken in
relation to Section 4 suggests that there is something to
plunder beyond simply the number of acts involved and
that a grand scheme to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-
gotten wealth is contemplated by R.A. No. 7080. Sections 1
and 2 pertain only to the nature and quantitative means or
acts by which a public officer, by himself or in connivance
with other persons, “amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-
gotten wealth.” Section 4, on the other hand, requires the
presence of elements other than those enumerated in
Section 2 to establish that the crime of plunder has been
committed because it speaks of the necessity to establish
beyond reasonable doubt a “pattern of overt or criminal
conspiracy.”
Clearly, it will not suffice that the “illegal wealth”
amassed is at least Fifty Million Pesos and that this was
acquired by any two or more of the acts described in
Section 1(d); it is necessary that these acts constitute a
“combination or series” of acts done in furtherance
______________
89 Comment, p. 13.
91 Alpha Investigation and Security Agency, Inc. vs. NLRC, 272 SCRA
653 (1997).
548

of “the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or

acquire illgotten wealth,” and which constitute “a pattern
of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall scheme or
conspiracy.”
That pattern is an essential element of the crime of
plunder is evident from a reading of the assailed law in its
entirety. It is that which would distinguish plunder from
isolated criminal acts punishable under the Revised Penal
Code and other laws, for without the existence a “pattern of
overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall scheme or
conspiracy” to acquire ill-gotten wealth, a person
committing several or even all of the acts enumerated in
Section 1(d) cannot be convicted for plunder, but may be
convicted only for the specific crimes committed under the
pertinent provisions of the Revised Penal Code or other
laws.
For this reason, I do not agree that Section 4 is merely a
rule of evidence or a rule of procedure. It does not become
such simply because its caption states that it is, although
its wording indicates otherwise. On the contrary, it is of
substantive character because it spells out a distinctive
element of the crime which has to be established, i.e., an
overall unlawful “scheme or conspiracy” indicated by a
“pattern of overt or criminal acts” or means or similar
schemes “to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten
wealth.”
The meaning of the phrase “pattern of overt or criminal
conspiracy,” however, escapes me. As in “combination” and
“serie s,” R.A. No. 7080 does not provide a definition of
“pattern” as well as “overall unlawful scheme.” Reference to
the legislative history of R.A. No. 7080 for guidance as to
the meanings of these concepts would be unavailing, since
the records of the deliberations in Congress are silent as to
what the lawmakers mean by these terms.
Resort to the dictionary meanings of “pattern” and
“scheme” is, in this case, wholly inadequate. These words
are defined as:
92
92
pattern: an arrangement or order93
of things or activity.
scheme: design; project; plot.
______________
92 11 Oxford English Dictionary 357 (2d ed 1989).

93 Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, p. 2029 (1976).
549
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 549

At most, what the use of these terms signifies is that while

multiplicity of the acts (at least two or more) is necessary,
this is not sufficient to constitute plunder. As stated
earlier, without the element of “pattern” indicative of an
“overall unlawful scheme,” the acts merely constitute
isolated or disconnected criminal offenses punishable by
the Revised Penal Code or other special laws.
The commission of two or more of the acts falling under
Section 1(d) is no guarantee that they fall into a “pattern”
or “any arrangement or order.” It is not the number of acts
but the relationship that they bear to each other or to some
external organizing principle that renders them “ordered”
or “arranged”:
A pattern is an arrangement or order of things, or activity, and

the mere fact that there are a number of predicates is no
guarantee that they fall into an arrangement or order. It is not
the number of predicates but the relationship that they bear to
each other or to some external
94
organizing principle that renders
them ‘ordered’ or ‘arranged”
In any event, it is hardly possible that two predicate acts

can form a pattern:
The implication is that while two acts are necessary, they may not
be sufficient. Indeed, in common
95
parlance, two of anything will
not generally form a ‘pattern.’
96
In H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co. et al.
(hereinafter referred to as Northwestern), the U.S. Court
reiterated the foregoing doctrine:
x x x Nor can we agree with those courts that have suggested97that

a pattern is established merely by proving two predicate acts.
Respondents’ metaphorical illustration of “pattern” as a

wheel with spokes (the overt or criminal acts of the
accused) meeting at a
______________
94 H.J. Inc. et al. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., et al., 492 US 229
(1989).
95 Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
96 Supra.
97 Id., at 236.
550

common center (the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth) and

with a rim (the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy) of
the wheel enclosing the spokes, is off tangent. Their
position that two spokes suffice to make a wheel, even
without regard to the relationship the spokes bear to each
other clearly demonstrates the absurdity of their view, for
how can a wheel with only two spokes which are disjointed
function properly?
That “pattern” is an amorphous concept even term is
reasonably defined is precisely the point of the incisive
concurring opinion of Justice Antonin Scalia in
Northwestern where he invited a constitutional 98challenge to
the RICO law on “void-for-vagueness” ground. The RICO
law is a federal statute in the United States that provides
for both civil and criminal penalties for violation therefor.
It incorporates by reference twenty-four99separate federal
crimes and eight types of state felonies. One of the key
elements of a RICO violation is that the offender
100
is engaged
in a “pattern of racketeering activity.” The RICO law
defines the phrase “pattern
______________
98 Justice Scalia was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justices

O’Connor and Kennedy.
99 Atkinson, Jeff. “RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT
ORGANIZATIONS,”§§1961-68:Broadest of the Federal Criminal Statutes,
69 JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW AND CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1978).
100 18 U.S.C.§ 1962 (1970):
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income
derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or
through collection of an unlawful debt in which such person has
participated as a principal within the meaning of section 2, title 18,
United States Code, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of

such income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest
in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged
in, or the activities of which effect, interstate or foreign commerce. A
purchase of securities on the open market for purposes of investment, and
without the intention of controlling or participating in the control of the
issuer, or of assisting another to do so, shall not be unlawful under this
subsection if the securities of the issuer held by the purchaser, the
members of his immediate family, and his or their accomplices in any
pattern or racketeering activity or the collection of an unlawful debt after
such purchase do not amount in the aggregate to one percent of the out-
551
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 551

of racketeering activity” as requiring “at least two acts of

racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the
effective date of 18 USCS § 1961, and within ten years
(excluding any period of imprisonment) after the 101
commission of a prior act of racketeering activity.
Incidentally, the Solicitor General claims that R.A. No.
7080 is an entirely different law from the RICO law. The
deliberations in Congress reveal otherwise. As observed by
Rep. Pablo Garcia, Chairman of the House of
Representatives Committee on 102
Justice, R.A. No. 7080 was
patterned after the RICO law.
In Northwestern, conceding that “[the U.S. Congress]
has done nothing . . . further to illuminate RICO’s key
requirement of a pattern of racketeering,” the U.S.
Supreme Court, through Justice William J. Brennan, Jr.,
undertook the task of developing a meaningful concept 103 of
“pattern” within the existing statutory framework.
Relying heavily on legislative history, the US Supreme
Court in that case construed 104
“pattern” as requiring
“continuity plus relationship.” The US Supreme Court
formulated the
______________
standing securities of any one class, and do not confer, either in lawor in
fact, the power to elect one or more directors of the issuer.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of
racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire
or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any
enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate
or foreign commerce.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with

any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or
foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the
conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering
activity or collection of unlawful debt.
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the
provisions of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section.
101 Id., at § 1961(5).
102 See RECORDS JOINT CONFERENCE COMMITTEE MEETING,
May 7, 1991, p. 12.
103 Northwestern, supra.
104 Id., at 329:
RICO’s legislative history reveals Congress’ intent that to prove a
pattern of racketeering activity a plaintiff or prosecutor must show that
the racketeering predicates are related, and that they
552

“relationship requirement” in this wise: “Criminal conduct

forms a pattern if it embraces criminal acts that have the
same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or
methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by
distinguishing
105
characteristics and are not isolated
events.” Continuity is clarified as “both a closed and
open-ended concept, referring either to a closed period of
repeated conduct, or to past conduct that by its106 nature
projects into the future with a threat of repetition.”
In his separate concurring opinion, Justice Scalia
rejected the majority’s formulation. The “talismanic
phrase” of “continuity plus relationship” is, as put by
Justice Scalia, about as helpful as advising the courts that
“life is a fountain.” He writes:
xxxThus,when§1961(5) says that a pattern “requires at least two

acts of racketeering activity” it is describing what is needful but
not sufficient. (If that were not the case, the concept of “pattern”
would have been unnecessary, and the statute could simply have
attached liability to “multiple acts of racketeering activity”). But
what that something more is, is beyond me. As I have suggested,
it is also beyond the Court. Today’s opinion has added nothing to
improve our prior guidance, which has created a kaleidoscope of
Circuit positions, except to clarify that RICO may in addition be
violated when there is a “threat of continuity.” It seems to me this
increases rather than removes the vagueness. There is no reason

to believe that the Court of Appeals will be any more unified in
the future, than they have in the past, regarding the content of
this law.
That situation is bad enough with respect to any statute, but it
is intolerable with respect to RICO. For it is not only true, as
Justice Marshall commented in Sedima, S.P.R.L. vs. Imrex Co.,
473 U.S. 479 x x x, that our interpretation of RICO has “quite
simply revolutionize[d] private litigation” and “validate[d] the
federalization of broad areas of state common law of frauds,”
xxxsothatclarityandpredictabilityinRICO’s civil applications are
particularly important; but it is also true that RICO, since it has
criminal applications as well, must, even in its civil applications,
possess the degree of certainty required for criminal laws x x x.
No constitutional challenge to this law has been raised in the
present case, and so that issue is not before us. That the highest
court in the land has been
______________
amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity. Citing 116 Cong Rec
18940 (1970).
105 Id., at 240.
106 Id., at 241.
553
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 553

unable to derive from this statute anything more than

today’smeager107
guidance bodes ill for the day when that challenge
is presented.
It bears noting that in Northwestern 108

the constitutionality of
the RICO law was not challenged. After Northwestern,
the U.S. Supreme Court has so far declined the opportunity
to hear cases in which the void-for-vagueness
109
challenge to
the pattern requirement was raised.
Admittedly, at the district courts level,110
the state
statutes (referred to as Little RICOS) have so far
successfully survived constitutional challenge on void-for-
vagueness ground. However, it must be underscored that,
unlike R.A. No. 7080, these state anti-racketeering laws
have invariably provided for a reasonably clear,
______________
107 Separate Concurring Opinion, pp. 255-256.

108 The issue involved in this case was whether Northwestern Bell
Telephone Co., Inc. was liable under the RICO Law for bribing the
members of the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission to approve rates
for the company in excess of a fair and reasonable amount. The U.S.
Supreme Court reversed the District Court of Minnesota and held that (1)
to prove a “pattern of racketeering activity” within the meaning of RICO,
it must be shown that the predicate acts of racketeering activity are
related and that they amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal
activity; (2) it is not only by proof of multiple schemes that continuity of
criminal activity may be shown; (3) a pattern of racketeering activity may
be shown regardless of whether the racketeering activities are
characteristic of “organized crime”; and (4) remand was necessary
because, under the facts alleged, it might be possible to prove that the
defendants’ actions satisfied the requirements of relatedness and
continuity and they thus constituted a “pattern of racketeering activity”.
109 See United States v. Masters, 924 F.2d 1362 (7th Cir.), cert. denied
11 S. Ct. 2019 (1991); United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084 (3rd Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 11 S.Ct. 2009-11 (1991); United States v. Angiulo, 897
F.2d 1169 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 130 (1990). All cases cited in
Moran, Christopher, infra.
110 Bauerschmidt, Joseph E., Mother of Mercy—Is this the End of
RICO?—Justice Scalia Invites Constitutional Void-for-Vagueness
Challenge to RICO “Pattern,” 65 NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
1106(1990).
554

comprehensive
111
and understandable definition of
“pattern.” For instance, in one state, the pattern
requirement specifies that the
______________
111 Moran, Christopher. Is the “Darling” in Danger? “Void for

Vagueness”—The Constitutionality of the RICO Pattern Requirement, 36
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW 1697 (1991) citing:
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-17-103(3): “Pattern of racketeering activity” means

engaging in at least two acts of racketeering activity which are related to the
conduct of the enterprise, if at least one of such acts occurred in this state after
July 1, 1981, and if the last of such acts occurred within ten years (excluding any
period of imprisonment) after a prior act of racketeering activity.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-394(e) (West 1985): “Pattern of racketeering
activity” means engaging in at least two incidents of racketeering activity that
have the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims or methods of
commission or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics,

including a nexus to the same enterprise, and are not isolated incidents, provided
at least one of such incidents occurred after the effective date of this act and that
the last of such incidents occurred within five years after a prior incident of
racketeering conduct.
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-14-3(8) (Supp. 1991): “Pattern of racketeering activity”
means engaging in at least two incidents of racketeering activity that have the
same or similar intents, results, accomplices, victims, or methods of commission or
otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated
incidents, provided at least one of such incidents occurred after July 1, 1980, and
that the last of such incidents occurred within four years, excluding any periods of
imprisonment, after the commission of a prior incident of racketeering activity.
IDAHO CODE § 18-7803(d) (1987): “Pattern of racketeering activity” means
engaging in at least two (2) incidents of racketeering conduct that have the same
or similar intents, results, accomplices, victims, or methods of commission, or
incidents, provided at least one (1) of such incidents occurred after the effective
date of this act and that the last of such incidents occurred within five (5) years
after a prior incident of racketeering conduct.
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-6-1 (West 1986): “Pattern of racketeering activity”
means engaging in at least two (2) incidents of racketeering activity that have the
same or similar intent, result, accom-
555
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 555

related predicate acts must have, among others, the same

or similar purpose, result, principal, victims or methods of
commission
______________
plice, victim, or method of commission, or that are otherwise interrelated by

distinguishing characteristics [sic] that are not isolated incidents. However, the
incidents are a pattern of racketeering activity only if at least one (1) of the
incidents occurred after August 31, 1980, and if the last of the incidents occurred
within five (5) years after a prior incident of racketeering activity.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:1352 (C) (West Supp. 1992): “Pattern of drug
racketeering activity” means engaging in at least two incidents of drug
racketeering activity that have the same or similar intents, results, principals,
victims, or methods of commission or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing
characteristics and are not isolated incidents, provided at least one of such occurs
after a prior incident of drug racketeering activity.
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-43-3(d) (Supp 1989): “Pattern of racketeering activity”
means engaging in at least two (2) incidents of racketeering conduct that have the
same or similar intents, results, accomplices, victims, or methods of commission or

incidents, provided at least one (1) of such incidents occurred after the effective
date of this chapter and that the last of such incidents occurred within five (5)
years after a prior incident of racketeering conduct.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75D-3(b) (1990): “Pattern of racketeering activity means
engaging in at least two incidents of racketeering activity that have the same or
similar purposes, results, accomplices, victims or methods of commission or
and unrelated incidents, provided at least one of such incidents occurred after
October 1, 1986, and that at least one other of such incidents occurred within a
four-year period of time of the other, excluding any periods of imprisonment, after
the commission of a prior incident of racketeering activity.
OR. REV. STAT. § 166.715(4) (1990): “Pattern of racketeering activity” means
engaging in at least two incidents of racketeering activity that have the same or
similar intents, results, accomplices, victims, or methods of commission or
otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics, including a nexus to
the same enterprise, and are not isolated incidents, provided at least one of such in
cidents occurred after November 1, 1981, and that the last of such
556

112
and must be connected with “organized crime. In four
others, their pattern requirement provides that two or
more predicate acts should be related to the affairs of the
enterprise, are not isolated, are not closely related to each
other and connected in point of time and place, and if they 113
are too closely related, they will be treated as a single act.
In two other states, pattern requirements provide
______________
incidents occurred within five years after a prior incident of racketeering activity.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-12-203(6) (1991): “Pattern of racketeering activity”
means engaging in at least two (2) incidents of racketeering activity that have the
same or similar intents, results, accomplices, victims or methods of commission or
incidents; provided, that at least one (1) of such incidents occurred after July 1,
1986, and that the last of such incidents occurred within two (2) years after a prior
incident of racketeering conduct.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.82.010(15) (1988): “Pattern of criminal
profiteering activity” means engaging in at least three acts of criminal
profiteering, one of which occurred after July 1, 1985, and the last of which
occurred within five years, excluding any period of imprisonment, after the
commission of the earliest act of criminal profiteering. In order to constitute a
pattern, the three acts must have the same or similar intent, results, accomplices,
principals, victims or methods of commission, or be otherwise interrelated by

distinguishing characteristics including a nexus to the same enterprise, and must
not be isolated events.
112 Id., citing.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.2(b) (West 1988): “Pattern of criminal profiteering

activity” means engaging in at least to incidents of criminal profiteering, as
defined by this act, which meet the following requirements: (1) Have the same or
similar purpose, result, principals, victims or methods of commission, or are
otherwise interrelated by distinguishing characteristics[;] (2) Are not isolated
events[; and] (3) Were committed as criminal activity of organized crime.
113 Id., citing:
DEL. CODE ANN. Tit 11. § 1502(5) (1987): “Pattern of racketeering activity” shall
mean 2 or more incidents of conduct: a. That: 1. Constitute racketeering activity;
2. Are related to the affairs of the enterprise; 3. Are not so closely related to each
other and connected in point of time and place that they constitute a single event;
and b.
557
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 557

that if the acts are not related to a common scheme, plan or

purpose, a pattern may still exist if the participants have
the mental
______________
Where: 1. At least 1 of the incidents of conduct occurred after July 9, 1986; 2. The
last incident of conduct occurred within 10 years after a prior occasion of conduct.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2923.31(E) (Anderson Supp. 1991): “Pattern of
corrupt activity” means two or more incidents of corrupt activity, whether or not
there has been a prior conviction, that are related to the affairs of the same
enterprise, are not isolated, and are not so closely related to each other and
connected in time and place that they constitute a single event. At least one of the
incidents forming the pattern shall occur on or after January 1, 1986. Unless any
incident was an aggravated murder or murder, the last incidents forming the
pattern shall occur within six years after the commission of any prior incident
forming the pattern, excluding any period of imprisonment served by any person
engaging in the corrupt activity.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1402(5) (West Supp. 1992): Pattern of
racketeering activity” means two or more occasions of conduct: a. that include each
of the following: (1) constitute racketeering activity, (2) are related to the affairs of
the enterprise, (3) are not isolated, (4) are not so closely related to each other and
connected in point of time and place that they constitute a single event, and b.
where each of the following is present: (1) at least one of the occasions of conduct
occurred after November 1, 1988, (2) the last of the occasions of conduct occurred
within three (3) years, excluding any period of imprisonment served by the person
engaging in the conduct, of a prior occasion of conduct.. .
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 946.82(3) (West Supp. 1991): “Pattern of racketeering
activity” means engaging in at least 3 incidents of racketeering activity that the
same or similar intents, results, accomplices, victims or methods of commission or
otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics, provided at least one
of the incidents occurred after April 27, 1982 and that the last of the incidents
occurred within 7 years after the first incident of racketeering activity. Acts
occurring at the same time and place which may form the basis for crimes
punishable under more than one statutory provision may count for only one
incident of racketeering activity.
558

capacity required for the predicate

114
acts and are associated
with the criminal enterprise.
All the foregoing state statutes require that the
predicate acts be related and that the acts occur within a
specified time frame.
Clearly, “pattern” has been statutorily defined and
interpreted in countless ways by circuit courts in the
United States. Their divergent conclusions have functioned
115
effectively to create variant criminal offenses. This
confusion has come about notwithstanding that almost all
these state laws have respectively statutorily defined
“pattern.” In sharp contrast, R.A. No. 7080, as earlier
pointed out, lacks such crucial definition. As to what
constitutes
______________
114 Id., citing:
MINN. STAT. ANN. §609.902(6) (West Supp. 1992): “Pattern of criminal activity”
means conduct consisting constituting three or more criminal acts that: (1) were
committed within ten years of the commencement of the criminal proceedings; (2)
are neither isolated incidents, nor so closely related and connected in point of time
or circumstance of commission as to constitute a single criminal offense; and (3)
were either: (i) related to one another through a common scheme or plan or shared
criminal purpose or (ii) committed, solicited, requested, importuned, or
intentionally aided by persons acting with the mental culpability required for the
commission of the criminal acts and associated with or in an enterprise involved in
these activities.
N.Y. PENAL LAW §460.10(4) (McKinney 1989): “Pattern of criminal activity”

means conduct engaged in by persons charged in an enterprise corruption count
constituting three or more criminal acts that: (a) were committed within ten years
of the commencement of the criminal action; (b) are neither isolated incidents, nor
so closely related and connected in point in time or circumstance of commission as
to constitute a criminal offense or criminal transaction . . .; and (c) are either: (i)
related to one another through a common scheme or plan or (ii) were committed,
solicited, requested, importuned or intentionally aided by persons acting with the
mental culpability required for the commission thereof and associated with or in
the criminal enterprise.
115 Luskin, Robert D. Behold, The Day of Judgment: Is the RICO

Pattern Requirement Void for Vagueness?64ST.JOHN’S LAW REVIEW
779 (1990).
559
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 559

pattern within the meaning of R.A. No. 7080 is left to the

ad hoc interpretation of prosecutors and judges. Neither
the text of R.A. No. 7080 nor legislative history afford any
guidance as to what factors may be considered in order to
prove beyond reasonable doubt “pattern of overt or criminal
conspiracy.”
Be that as it may, it is glaringly fallacious to argue that
“se ries” simply means a “repetition” or “pertaining to two
or more” and “combination” is the “result or product or
product of combining.” Whether two or more or at least
three acts are involved, the majority would interpret the
phrase “combinations’ or “serie s” only in terms of number
of acts committed. They entirely overlook or ignore Section
4 which requires “a pattern of overt of criminal acts
indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy” to
convict.
If the elements of the offense are as what the majority
has suggested, the crime of plunder could have been
defined in the following manner:
Where a public official, by himself or in conspiracy with others,

amasses or acquires money or property by committing two or
more acts in violation of Section 3 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act (R.A. 3019), or Articles 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215,
216 and 217 of the Revised Penal Code, he shall be guilty of the
crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to
death.
The above would be a straightforward and objective

definition of the crime of plunder. However, this would
render meaningless the core phrases “a combination or
series of “overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall
unlawful scheme or conspiracy,” or the phrase “any
combination or series of the following means or similar
schemes” or “a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative
of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.”
But that obviously is not the definition of the crime of
plunder under R.A. 7080. There is something more. A
careful reading of the law would unavoidably compel a
conclusion that there should be a connecting link among
the “means or schemes” comprising a “series or
combination” for the purpose of acquiring or amassing
“illgotten wealth.” The bond or link is an “overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy mentioned in Section 4. The law
contemplates a combi-
560

nation or series of criminal acts in plunder done by the

accused “in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to
amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth.” It does not
postulate acts committed randomly, separately or
independently or sporadically. Otherwise stated, if the
legislature intended to define plunder as the acquisition of
ill-gotten wealth in the manner espoused by the majority,
the use in R.A. 7080 of such words and phrases as
“combination” and “series of overt or criminal acts” xxx “in
furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy” is absolutely
pointless and meaningless.
R.A. No, 7080 makes it possible for a person conspiring with

the accused in committing one of the acts constituting the
charge of plunder to be convicted for the same crime.
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080 states that “[a]ny person who
participated with the said public officer in the commission
of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall
likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of
mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by
the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the court.”
Both parties share the view that the law as it is worded
makes it possible for a person who participates in the
commission of only one of the component crimes
constituting plunder to be liable as co-conspirator for

plunder, not116merely the component crime in which he
participated. While petitioner concedes that it is easy to
ascertain the penalty for an accomplice or accessory under
R.A. No. 7080, such is not 117
the case with respect to a co-
principal of the accused. In other words, a person who
conspires with the accused in the commission of only one of
the component crimes may be prosecuted as co-principal for
the component crime, or as co-principal for the crime of
plunder, depending on the interpretation of the prosecutor.
The unfettered discretion effectively bestowed on law
enforcers by the aforequoted clause in determining the
liability of the participants in the commission of one or
______________
116 Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 47; TSN, Oral Arguments,

September 18, 2001, see pp. 224-233.
561
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 561

more of the component crimes of a charge for plunder

undeniably
118
poses the danger of arbitrary enforcement of
the law.
R.A. No. 7080 does not clearly state the prescriptive period
of the crime of plunder.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 7080 provides that the crime
punishable under said Act shall prescribe in twenty (20)
years. Considering that the law was designed to cover a
“combination or series of overt or criminal acts,” or “a
pattern of overt or criminal acts,” from what time shall the
period of prescription be reckoned? From the first, second,
third or last act of the series of pattern? What shall be the
time gap between two succeeding acts? If the last act of a
series or combination was committed twenty or more years
after the next preceding one, would not the crime have
prescribed, thereby resulting in the total extinction of
criminal liability under Article 89(b) of the Revised Penal
Code? In antithesis, the RICO law affords more clarity and
definiteness in describing “pattern of racketeering activity”
as “at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which
occurred within ten years (excluding any period of
imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of
119
119
racketeering activity.” The U.S. state statutes similarly
provide specific time frames within which racketeering acts
are committed.
The Solicitor General enjoins the Court to rectify the
deficiencies in the law by judicial construction. However, it
certainly would not be feasible for the Court to interpret
each and every ambiguous provision without falling into
the trap of judicial legislation. A statute should be
construed to avoid constitutional question only when an 120
alternative interpretation is possible from its language.
121
Borrowing from 122
the opinion of the court in
Northwestern, the law “may be a poorly drafted statute;
but rewriting it is a job for Congress, if it so inclined, and
not for this Court.” But where the
______________
118 See Kolender v. Lawson, supra.

119 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (5).
120 See U.S. v. Batchelder, 442 US 114, 60 L.Ed 2d 755, 99 S Ct 2198
(1979).
121 Through Justice Brennan.
122 Supra.
562

law as the one in question is void on its face for its patent
ambiguity in that it lacks comprehensible standards that
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application, the Court cannot
breathe life to it through the guise of construction.
R.A No. 7080 effectively eliminates mens rea or criminal

intent as an element of the crime of plunder.
Section 4 provides that for the purpose of establishing the
crime of plunder, “it shall not be necessary to prove each
and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance
of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or
acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish
beyond reasonable a pattern of overt or criminal acts
indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.”
The majority would interpret this section to mean that
the prosecution has the burden of “showing a combination
or series resulting in the crime of plunder.” And, once the
minimum requirements for a combination or a series of
acts are met, there is no necessity for the prosecution to

prove each and every other act done by the accused in
furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy 123
to amass,
accumulate, or acquire ill-gotten wealth.
By its language, Section 4 eliminates proof of each and
every component criminal act of plunder by the accused
and limits itself to establishing just the pattern of overt or
criminal acts indicative of unlawful scheme or conspiracy.
The law, in effect, penalizes the accused on the basis of a
proven scheme or conspiracy to commit plunder without
the necessity of establishing beyond reasonable doubt each
and every criminal act done by the accused in the crime of
plunder. To quote Fr. Bernas again: “How can you have a
‘series’ of criminal acts if the elements that are supposed
124
to
constitute the series are not proved to be criminal?”
Moreover, by doing away with proof beyond reasonable
doubt of each and every criminal act done by the accused in
the furtherance
______________

124 Today, July 1, 2001 issue.
563
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 563

of the scheme or conspiracy to acquire ill-gotten wealth, it

being sufficient just to prove a pattern of overt or criminal
conspiracy, the Plunder Law effectively eliminated the
mens rea or criminal intent as an element of the crime.
Because of this, it is easier to convict for plunder and
sentence the accused to death than to convict him for each
of the component crimes otherwise punishable under the
Revised Penal Code and other laws which are bailable
offenses. The resultant absurdity strikes at the very heart
of the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal
protection.
Plunder is a malum in se
The acts enumerated in Section 1(d) are mostly defined and
penalized by the Revised Penal Code, e.g. malversation,
estafa, bribery and other crimes committed by public
officers. As such, they are by nature mala in se crimes.
Since intent is an essential element of these crimes, then,
with more reason that criminal intent be established in

plunder125
which, under R.A. No. 7659, is one of the heinous
126
crimes as pronounced in one of its whereas clauses.
The fact that the acts enumerated in Section 1(d) of R.A.
7080 were made criminal by special law does not
necessarily make the same mala prohibita where criminal
intent is not essential, although the term refers generally
to acts made criminal by special laws. For there is a
marked difference between the two. According to a well-
known author on criminal law:
There is a distinction between crimes which are mala in se, or

wrongful from their nature, such as theft, rape, homicide, etc.,
and those that are mala prohibita, or wrong merely because
prohibited by statute, such as illegal possession of firearms.
______________
125 In People vs. Echegaray (267 SCRA 682) the word “heinous” was
traced to the early Spartans’ word “haineus” which means hateful and
abominable. In turn, the word came from the Greek prefix “haton”
indicating acts so hateful or shockingly evil. (at 715)
126 WHEREAS, the crimes punishable by death under this Act are
heinous for being grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by
reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and
perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and
norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society.
564

Crimes mala in se are those so serious in their effects on society

as to call for almost unanimous condemnation of its members;
while crimes mala prohibita are violations of mere rules of
convenience designed to secure a more orderly regulation of the
affairs of society. (Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, Rawle’s 3rd Revision)
(1) In acts mala in se, the intent governs; but in those mala prohibit the
only inquiry is, has the law been violated? (People vs. Kibler, 106 N.Y.,
321, cited in the case of U.S. vs. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 132)
Criminal intent is not necessary where the acts are prohibited

for reasons of public policy, as in illegal possession of firearms.
(People vs. Conosa, C.A., 45 O.G. 3953)
(2) The term mala in se refers generally to felonies defined and penalized
by the Revised Penal Code. When the acts are inherently immoral, they
are mala in se, even if punished by special laws. On the other hand, there
are crimes in the Revised Penal Code which were originally defined and
penalized by special laws. Among them are possession and use of opium,
127
malversation, brigandage, and libel.
The component acts constituting plunder, a heinous crime,

being inherently wrongful and immoral, are patently mala
in se, even if punished by a special law and accordingly,
criminal intent must clearly be established together with
the other elements of the crime; otherwise, no crime is
committed. By eliminating mens rea, R.A. 7080 does not
require the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt
the component acts constituting plunder and imposes a
lesser burden of proof on the prosecution, thus paving the
way for the imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua
to death on the accused, in plain violation of the due
process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.
Evidently, the authority of the legislature to omit the
element of scienter in the proof of a crime refers to
regulatory measures in the exercise of police power, where
the emphasis of the law is to secure a more orderly
regulations of the offense of society, rather than the
punishment of the crimes. So that in mala prohibita
prosecutions, the element of criminal intent is a
requirement for conviction and must be provided in the
special
______________
127 Reyes, Luis B. THE REVISED PENAL CODE, Book One (13th ed.),
p. 56.
565
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 565

law penalizing what are traditionally 128

mala in se crimes. As
correctly pointed out by petitioner, citing U.S. Supreme
Court decisions,
129
the Smith Act was ruled to require “intent”
to advocate
130
and held to require
131
knowledge of illegal
advocacy. And in another case, and ordinance making
illegal the possession of obscene books was declared
unconstitutional for lack of scienter requirement.
Mens rea is a substantive due process requirement under
the Constitution, and this is a limitation on police power.
Additionally, lack of mens rea or a clarifying scienter
requirement aggravates the vagueness of a statute.
132
132
In Morisette v. U.S. the U.S. Supreme Court
underscored the stultifying effect of eliminating mens rea,
thus:
The Government asks us by a feat of construction radically to

change the weights and balances in the scales of justice. The
purpose and obvious effect of doing away with the requirement of
a guilty intent is to ease the prosecution’s party to conviction, to
strip the defendant of such benefit as he derived at common law
from innocence of evil purpose, and to circumscribe the freedom
heretofore allowed juries. Such a manifest impairment of the
immunities of the individual should not be extended to common
law crimes on judicial initiative.
In the same breath, Justice Florenz Regalado expresses

serious doubts as to the authority of the legislature to
complex mala in se crimes with mala prohibita, saying:
x x x although there has been a tendency to penalize crimes under

special laws with penalties “borrowed” from the Code, there is
still the question of legislative authority to consolidate crimes
punished under different statutes. Worse, where one is punished
under the Code and the other by the special law, both of these
contingencies had not been contemplated when133
the concept of a
delito complejo was engrafted into the Code.
______________

129 Dennis v. U.S., 314 U.S. 494 (1951).
130 Scales v. U.S., 203 (1961).
131 Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
132 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
133 Regalado, Florenz, CRIMINAL LAW CONSPECTUS (2001 ED.),
161-162.
566

Petitioner is not estopped from questioning the

constitutionality of R.A. No. 7080
The case at bar has been subject to controversy principally
due to the personalities134involved herein. The fact that one
of petitioner’s
135
counsels was a co-sponsor of the Plunder
Law and petitioner himself voted for its passage when he
was still a Senator would not in any put him in estoppel to

question its constitutionality. The
136
rule on estoppel applies
to questions of fact, not of law. Moreover, estoppel should
137
be resorted to only as a means of preventing injustice. To
hold that petitioner is estopped from questioning the
validity of R.A. No. 7080 because he had earlier voted for
its passage would result in injustice not only to him, but to
all others who 138
may be held liable under this statute. In
People vs. Vera, citing the U.S. case of Attorney General v.
Perkins, the Court held:
x x x Theideaseemstobethatthepeopleareestoppedquestioning the
validity of a law enacted by their representatives; that to an
accusation by the people of Michigan of usurpation upon their
government, a statute enacted by the people of Michigan is an
adequate statute relied on in justification is unconstitutional, it is
a statute only in form, and lacks the force of law, and is of no
more saving effect to justify action under it, it had never been
enacted, the constitution is the supreme law, and to its139behests
the courts, the legislature, and the people must bow. x x x
The Court should not sanction the use of an equitable

remedy to defeat the ends of justice by permitting a person
to be deprived of his life and liberty under an invalid law.
Undoubtedly, the reason behind the enactment of R.A.
7080 is commendable. It was a response to the felt need at
the time that existing laws were inadequate to penalize the
nature and magni-
______________
134 Atty. Rene A.V. Saguisag.

135 Senate Bill No. 733.
136 Tañada and Macapagal vs. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1093.
137 Commercial National Bank v. Rowe, 666 So. 2d 1312 (1996).
138 65 Phil. 56 (1937).
139 Id., at 90.
567
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 567

140
tude of corruption that characterized a “previous regime.”
However, where the law, such as R.A. 7080, is so indefinite
that the line between innocent and condemned conduct
becomes a matter of guesswork, the indefiniteness runs
afoul of due process concepts which require that persons be

given full notice of what to avoid, and that the discretion of
law enforcement officials, with the attendant dangers of
arbitrary and discriminatory 141enforcement, be limited by
explicit legislative standards. It obfuscates the mind to
ponder that such an ambiguous law as R.A. No. 7080 would
put on the balance the life and liberty of the accused
against whom all the resources of the State are arrayed. It
could be used as a tool against political enemies and a
weapon of hate and revenge by whoever wields the levers of
power.
I submit that the charge against petitioner in the
Amended Information in Criminal Case No. 26558 does not
constitute “plunder” under R.A. No. 7080, as amended by
R.A. No. 7659. If at all, the acts charged may constitute
offenses punishable under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) or the Revised Penal Code.
Hence, the information charging petitioner with plunder
must be quashed. Such quashal, however, should be
without prejudice to the filing of new informations for acts
under R.A. No. 3019, of the Revised Penal Code and other
laws. Double jeopardy would not bar the filing of the same
because the dismissal of the case142is made with the express
consent of the petitioner-accused.
In view of the foregoing, I vote to GRANT the petition.
______________
140 See Explanatory Note, Senate Bill No. 733, Records of the Senate,
June 1, 1989, pp. 1-2.
141 See Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
142 One of the reliefs sought in the Prayer contained in the Petition (at
p. 37) and in Petitioner’s Memorandum (at p. 84) is for the quashal of the
Information in Criminal case No. 26558 for being null and void.
Double jeopardy attaches only when all of the following circumstances
are present: (1) upon a valid indictment; (2) before a competent court; (3)
after arraignment; (4) when a valid plea has been entered; and (5) when
the accused was acquitted or convicted or the case was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused (Tecson
vs. Sandiganbayan, 318 SCRA 80, 89 [1999]).
568

SEPARATE DISSENTING OPINION
PARDO, J.:
With due respect, I vote to grant the petition on the second

ground raised therein, that is, multiplicity
1
of offenses
charged in the amended information. Consequently, the
resolution of the Sandiganbayan must be set aside, and the
case remanded to the Ombudsman for the amendment of
the information to charge only a single offense.
In my view, it is unnecessary2 to rule on the
unconstitutionality of the entire law, R.A. No. 7080, as
amended by R.A. No. 7659, although I share the opinion of3
the dissenting justices in the case of People v. Echagaray,
that the heinous crime law is unconstitutional. Hence, the
amendments to the plunder law prescribing the death
penalty therefor are unconstitutional. I am of the view that
the plunder law penalizes acts that are mala in se, and
consequently, the charges must be the specific acts alleged
to be in violation of the law, committed with malice and
criminal intent. At any rate, I venture the view that
Section 4, R.A. No. 7080, must be interpreted as requiring
proof beyond reasonable doubt of all the elements of
plunder as prescribed in the law, including the elements of
the component crimes, otherwise, the section will be
unconstitutional.
______________
1 Petition, Annex “B”, Motion to Quash, Ground II.

2 “The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although
properly presented by the record if the case can be disposed of on some
other ground.” (Laurel v. Garcia, 187 SCRA 797,813 [1990], citing Siler v.
Louisville and Nashville R. Co., 312 U.S. 175 [1909]; Railroad
Commission v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 [1941]; Lalican v. Vergara, 342
Phil. 485, 498; 276 SCRA 518 [1997]; Mirasol v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
128448, February 1, 2001, 351 SCRA 44.
3 335 Phil. 343; 267 SCRA 682 [1997].
569
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 569

DISSENTING OPINION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
It is an ancient maxim in law that in times of frenzy and

excitement, when the desire to do justice is tarnished by
anger and vengeance, there is always the danger that vital
protections accorded an accused may be taken away.
The Plunder Law and its amendment were enacted to
meet a national problem demanding especially immediate
and effective attention. By its very nature, the law
deserved or required legislative drafting of the highest
order of clarity and precision.
Substantive due process dictates that there should be no
arbitrariness, unreasonableness or ambiguity in any law
which deprives a person of his life or liberty. The trial and
other procedures leading to conviction may be fair and
proper. But if the law itself is not reasonable legislation,
due process is violated. Thus, an accused may not be
sentenced to suffer the lethal injection or life imprisonment
for an offense understood only after judicial construction
takes over where Congress left off, and interpretation
supplies its meaning.
The Constitution guarantees
1
both substantive and
procedural due process as well as the right of the accused
to be informed 2
of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him. Substantive due process requires that 3
a
criminal statute should not be vague and uncertain. More
explicitly—
That the terms of a penal statute . . . must be sufficiently explicit

to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part
will render them liable to penalties, is a well-recognized
requirement, consonant alike with ordinary notions of fair play
and the settled rules of law. And a statute which either forbids or
requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as4 to its application, violates the first essential of due
process.
______________
1 Constitution, Article III, Sections 1, 12 & 14.

2 Constitution, Article III, Section 14.
3 People v. Nazario, 165 SCRA 186, 195 [1988].
4 Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 [1926].
570

The doctrine of constitutional uncertainty is also based on

the right of the accused to5
be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation. Fundamental fairness dictates
that a person cannot be sent to jail for a crime that he6
cannot with reasonable certainty know he was committing.
Statutes defining crimes run afoul of the due process clause
if they fail to give adequate guidance to those who would be
law-abiding, to advise defendants of the nature of the
offense with which they are 7 charged or to guide courts
trying those who are accused. In short, laws which create
crime ought to be so explicit that all men subject to 8their
penalties may know what acts it is their duty to avoid.
A reading of the Plunder Law immediately shows that it
is phrased in a manner not susceptible to ready or clear
understanding. In the desire to cover under one single
offense of plunder every conceivable criminal activity
committed by a high government official in the course of
his duties, Congress has come out with a law unduly vague,
uncertain and broad.
The doctrines of overbreadth and void-for-vagueness in
Constitutional Law were developed in the context of
freedom of speech and of the press. However, they apply
equally, if not more so, to capital offenses. In the present
case, what the law seeks to protect or regulate involves the
deprivation of life itself and not merely the regulation of
expression.
In its early formulation, the overbreadth doctrine states
that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities
constitutionally subject to regulation may not be achieved
by means which sweep unnecessarily 9 broadly and thereby
invade the area of protected freedoms.
A statute, especially one involving criminal prosecution,
must be definite to be valid. A statute is vague or
overbroad, in violation of
______________
5 Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500 [1926].

6 People v. Nazario, supra; Scull v. Commonwealth, 359 U.S. 344, 353.
7 Musser v. Utah,333 U.S. 95 ; 92 LEd. 562.
8 U.S. v. Brewer, 139 U.S. 278, 35 L Ed. 190, 193
9 National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP)

v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288.
571
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 571

the due process clause, where its language does not convey
sufficiently definite warning to the average person as to the
prohibited conduct. A statute is unconstitutionally vague if
people of 10common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning.
It is not only prosecutors and judges who are concerned.
The need for definiteness applies with greater force to the
accused and those in positions where opportunities for
them to commit the proscribed offense are present. They
must understand exactly what prohibited activity will be
punished by capital punishment. Sadly, even the record of
deliberations in Congress cited in the motion to quash
shows that even the members of the Senate who are
illustrious lawyers found the Plunder Law vague.
Under Section 1 of R.A. 7080 and Section 12 of R.A.
7659, the acquisition of at least P50,000,000.00 of ill-gotten
wealth is punished by reclusion perpetua to death, if
committed as follows:

treasury;
2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission,
3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or
Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or
4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or
5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or

intended to benefit particular persons or special
interests; or
6) By taking undue advantage of official position,
unjustly enrich himself or themselves
______________
10 U.S. v. Petrillo,332U.S.1;U.S. v. Spector, 343 U.S. 169; U.S. v. Darby,

312 U.S. 100.
572

at the expense and to the damage and prejudice 11

of the
The crimes of malversation of public funds and bribery,
which appear to be included among the modes of
committing plunder, have acquired well-defined meanings
under our present penal statutes. The accused immediately
knows how to defend and justify his actions. The
prosecution understands the quantum and nature of the
evidence he has to produce in court. The Judge can apply
the law with straight and positive judgment because there
is no vagueness about it.
The Sandiganbayan, however, has ruled that the
Plunder Law does not make any reference to any specific
provision of laws other than R.A. 7080, as amended. It is an
entirely new offense where malversation or bribery become
“generic terms” according to the court. And since “generic”
refers to an entire group or class of related matters, the
discretion given to the prosecutor and the judge
figuratively runs riot.
Under the same paragraph of the Plunder Law,
malversation is lumped with “misuse of public funds.”
Misuse can be as innocuous as error or it can be as severe
as corruption or embezzlement. The terms
“abuse,”“distortion,”“misapplication,”“mismanagement,”
“poor stewardship,”“malpractice,”“debasement,” or “breach
of trust,” all conceivably fall under the generic term
“misuse.” Exactly when does an administrative offense of
misuse become the capital crime of plunder? What degree

of misuse is contemplated under the law?
A penal law violates due process where inherently vague12
statutory language permits selective law enforcement.
Under the Plunder Law, a crusading public officer who
steps on too many important toes in the course of his
campaign could be prosecuted for a capital offense, while
for exactly the same acts, an official who tries to please
everybody can be charged whether administratively or for a
much lighter offense.
______________
11 Republic Act No. 7080, Section 1 (d).

12 Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566.
573
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 573

For instance, direct bribery under Article 210 of the

Revised Penal Code is punished with prision mayor in its
medium or minimum periods, prision correccional in its
medium period, or prision mayor in its 13 minimum period,
depending on the manner of com-mission. Indirect bribery
under Article 211 is punished with prision
14
correccional in
its medium and maximum periods. Under the Plunder
Law, the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. The
voidfor-vagueness infirmity becomes all the more apparent
if the proscribed activity is “misuse of public funds.” The
prosecutor is given broad powers of selective law
enforcement. For “misuse,” exactly the same acts could be
punished with death under the Plunder Law, or mere
dismissal with prejudice to future government employment
under the Civil Service Law.
______________
13 “Any public officer who shall agree to perform an act constituting a

crime, in connection with the performance of his official duties, in
consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present received by such officer,
personally or through the mediation of another, shall suffer the penalty of
prision mayor in its medium and minimum periods and a fine of not less
than three times the value of the gift, in addition to the penalty
corresponding to the crime agreed upon, if the same shall have been
committed.
“If the gift was accepted by the officer in consideration of the execution
of an act which does not constitute a crime, and the officer executed said
act, he shall suffer the same penalty provided in the preceding paragraph;
and if said act shall not have been accomplished, the officer shall suffer
the penalties of prision correccional in its medium period and a fine of not
less than twice the value of such gift.
“If the object for which the gift was received or promised was to make
the public officer refrain from doing something which it was his official
duty to do, he shall suffer the penalties of prision correccional in its
maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of not
less than three times the value of such gift.
“In addition to the penalties provided in the preceding paragraphs, the
culprit shall suffer the penalty of special temporary disqualification.
“The provisions contained in the preceding paragraphs shall be made
applicable to assessors, arbitrators, appraisal and claim commissioners,
experts or any other persons performing public duties.”
14 “The penalties of prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods, suspension and public censure shall be imposed upon any public
officer who shall accept gifts offered to him by reason of his office.”
574

The provision in the Plunder Law on “implementation of

decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons
or special interests” also calls for more specific elucidation.
If the only person benefited is himself, does that fall under
“particular person?” Decrees and orders issued by a top
government official may be intended to benefit certain
segments of society such as farmers, manufacturers,
residents of a geographical area and the like. If in the
process a close relative acquires P50,000,000.00 because of
development in that sector solely because of the decree and
without lifting a finger, is that plunder? The vagueness can
be better appreciated by referring to petitioner’s arguments
that the element of mens rea in mala in se crimes has been
abolished and the offenses have been converted to mala
prohibita. If the guilty intent is eliminated, even innocent
acts can be plunder. The law was not drafted for petitioner
alone. It applies to all public officers.
As petitioner has stated, what Congress did in enacting
the Plunder Law was to take out the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code on malversation, estafa, bribery, and
other crimes committed by public officers, mix these with
special laws on graft and corruption and together with a
couple of non-criminal acts, combine them into a special

law and call it “plunder.”
Early in the history of this Court, it ruled that in acts
mala in se, the criminal intent governs. But in those acts
mala prohibita,
15
the only inquiry is: has the law been
violated? Acts constituting malversation, estafa, and
bribery are mala in se. The courts must inquire into the
criminal intent, the evil nature or wrongful disposition
behind the criminal acts. In mala prohibita crimes, there is
a violation of a prohibitory law and the inquiry is,
therefore, has the law been violated?
In the crime of plunder, it is enough that the acts
defining malversation or bribery are described. The court
then proceeds to determine whether the acts fall under the
prohibitory terms of the law. Criminal intent no longer has
to be proved. The criminal intent to commit the crime is not
required to be proved. The desire to benefit particular
persons does not have to spring from criminal intent under
the special law creating the crime of plunder. In mal-
______________
15 U.S v. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 134 [1909].
575
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 575

versation or bribery under the Revised Penal Code, the

criminal intent is an important element of the criminal
acts. Under the Plunder Law, it is enough that the acts are
committed.
Thus, even if the accused can prove lack of criminal
intent with respect to crimes mala in se, this will not
exonerate him under the crime mala prohibita. This
violates substantive due process and the standards of fair
play because mens rea is a constitutional guarantee under
the due process clause. Indeed, as 16
stated by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Morisette v. U.S.:
The Government asks us by a feat of construction radically to

change the weights and balances in the scales of justice. The
purpose and obvious effect of doing away with the requirement of a
guilty intent is to ease the prosecution’s party to conviction, to strip
the defendant of such benefit as he derived at common law from
innocence of evil purpose, and to circumscribe the freedom
heretofore allowed juries. Such a manifest impairment of the
immunities of the individual should not be extended to common

law crimes on judicial initiative. (Emphasis ours)
By grafting several felonies, some mala in se and some

mala prohibita, to constitute the crime of plunder and by
doing away with the standard of proof beyond reasonable
doubt for the component elements, the State would
practically be given the judicial imprimatur to impose the
extreme penalty of death on the basis of proof only of the
overall pattern of overt or criminal acts showing unlawful
scheme or conspiracy. This attempt of Congress to tip the
scales of criminal justice in favor of the state by doing away
with the element of mens rea and to pave the way for the
accused to be convicted by depriving him of the defense of
criminal intent as to mala in se components of plunder will
be anathema to substantive due process which insures
“respect for those personal immunities which are so rooted
in the traditions and conscience
17
of our people as to be
ranked as fundamental.”
Equally disagreeable is the provision of the Plunder Law
which does away with the requirement that each and every
component of the criminal act of plunder be proved and
instead limits itself to
______________
16 342 U.S. 246.

17 Rochin v. California, 324 U.S. 165, 168.
576

proving only a pattern of overt 18

acts indicative of the
unlawful scheme or conspiracy. In effect, the law seeks to
penalize the accused only on the basis of a proven scheme
or conspiracy, and does away with the rights of the accused
insofar as the component crimes are concerned. In other
words, R.A. No. 7080 circumvents the obligation of the
prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt every fact,
necessary to constitute the crime of plunder, because the
law requires merely proof of a pattern of overt acts showing
an unlawful scheme or conspiracy. What aggravates
matters on this point is that under controlling case law,
conspiracy to19 defraud is not punishable under the Revised
Penal Code. Cutting corners on the burden of proof is
unconstitutional because the standard of reasonable doubt
is part of the due process safeguard accorded an accused.

The due process clause protects the accused against
conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of
every fact necessary
20
to constitute the crime with which he
is charged.
Under R.A. 7659, plunder is a heinous crime punishable
by death. It is described as grievous, odious and hateful
because of its inherent or magnified wickedness,
viciousness, atrocity, and perversity. There can be no
quarrel with the legislative objective of reducing the
upsurge of such crimes which affect sustainable economic
development and undermine the people’s faith in
Government and the latter’s ability to maintain peace and
order. Nevertheless, due process commands that even
though the governmental purpose is legitimate and
substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means so
vague and broad that they infringe on life or stifle liberty
when the end can be more narrowly achieved through
existing penal statutes.
______________
18 Republic Act No. 7080, “Section 4. Rule of Evidence.—For purposes of

establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each
and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme
or conspiracy to amass, accumulate of acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being
sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt criminal
acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.”
19 U.S. v. Lim Buanco, 14 Phil. 472 [1910]; U.S. v. Remigio, 39 Phil. 599
[1919].
20 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364.
577
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 577

Where the statute has an overbroad sweep just as when it

is vague, the
21
hazard of loss or impairment of life or liberty
is critical.
The problem of vagueness is reduced or eliminated if the
different schemes mentioned in the law as used in the
acquisition of illgotten wealth are prosecuted under
existing penal law. The offenses are by their nature distinct
and separate from each other and have acquired
established meanings.
Thus, the acts of misappropriation or malversation may
be prosecuted as separate offenses. So may the receipt of
commissions, gifts, or kickbacks by higher officials in

connection with government contracts. The four other
methods or schemes mentioned in the law may be the
objects of separate penal statutes.
When the law creates a new crime of plunder through a
combination or series of overt or criminal acts, the courts
have to supply missing elements if conviction is to be
achieved.
Bribery is punished as plunder under the law only when
there is a combination or series of criminal acts. But when
do certain acts constitute a combination or series? Does the
Plunder law provide that two or three acts of one crime of
bribery constitute a combination or series which qualify
bribery into plunder? Or does bribery have to be conjoined
with the separate offense of malversation to become a
combination? Or with malversation and fraudulent
conveyance or disposition of public assets or one of the
other means or schemes before it becomes a series?
I find it difficult to accept the wide discretion given to
the prosecution by the Plunder Law. An elective official
who is a political threat may be charged for plunder as one
single offense punishable by death while one in the good
graces of the powers-that-be is charged only under the
Revised Penal Code.
The confusion generated by a vague law is exemplified
in the informations filed against petitioner in this case.
Petitioner was charged with eight crimes, namely: [1]
plunder; [2] violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019; [3]
violation of Section 3 (a) of R.A. 3019;
______________
21 See Keyshian v. Board of Regents of the University of the State of New

York, 385 U.S. 589; and Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479.
578

[4] another violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019; [5]

violation of Section 3 (c) of R.A. 3019; [6] violation of
Section 7 (d) of R.A. 6713; [7] perjury; [8] illegal use of
alias.
Only twelve days later, the prosecution withdrew five (5)
of the informations which it consolidated into only one
offense of plunder. The prosecution was not clear about the
steps to take in instances where the words “combination” or
“series” may or may not apply. It could not understand the

coverage of the law as acts repetitive of the same offense or
acts constituting one crime lumped up with other crimes or
both criminal and non-criminal acts punished as one new
offense of plunder.
In the following exchange during the deliberations on
Senate Bill No. 733, Senators Neptali Gonzales and
Wigberto Ta ñada voiced serious doubts on the
constitutionality of the definition of plunder, thus:
Senator Gonzales:
To commit the offense of plunder, as defined in this
act, and while constituting a single offense, it must
consist of a series of overt or criminal acts, such as
bribery, extortion, malversation of public funds,
swindling, falsification of public documents, coercion,
theft, fraud, and illegal exaction and graft or corrupt
practices and like offenses. Now, Mr. President, I think
this provision, by itself will be vague. I am afraid that
it may be faulted for being violative of the due process
clause and the right to be informed of the nature and
cause of accusation of an accused. Because what is
meant by “series of overt or criminal acts?” I mean,
would 2, 4, or 5 constitute a series? During the period
of amendments, can we establish a minimum of overt
acts like, for example, robbery in band? The law
defines what is robbery in band by the number of
participants therein. In this particular case, probably,
we can statutorily provide for the definition of “series”
so that two, for example, would that alr eady be a
series? Or, three, what would be the basis for such
determination?
Senator Tañada:
I think, Mr. President, that would be called for, this
being a penal legislation, we should be very clear as to
what it encom-
579
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 579

passes; otherwise, we may contravene the constitutional

provision on the 22right of accused to due process.
(Emphasis ours)
The foregoing concerns to statutorily provide for the

definition of “series” or “combination” have, however, not
been addressed and the terms were left undefined. The law,
as presently crafted, does not specify whether a “series”
means two, three, four or even more of the overt or criminal
acts listed in Section 1 (d) of R.A. 7080.
Even more difficult to accept is when the trial court has
to supply the missing elements, in effect taking over
corrective or punitive legislation from Congress. The
attempts of the Sandiganbayan in the questioned
Resolution do not clarify. They instead serve to confuse and
increase the ambiguity even more.
The Sandiganbayan interprets the words “combination”
and “series” of overt or criminal acts through terms found
in American decisions like “pattern,”“conspiracy,”“over-all
unlawful scheme,” or “general plan of action or method.”
The above definitions are not found in the Plunder Law.
The use of such phrases as “over-all scheme” or “general
plan” indicates that the Sandiganbayan is expanding the
coverage of the law through the use of ambiguous phrases
capable of dual or multiple applications. When do two or
three acts of the same offense of malversation constitute a
“pattern,”“a general plan of action,” or an “over-all
scheme?” Would one malversation in the first week of a
public officer’s tenure and another similar act six (6) years
later become a “combination,” a “pattern,” or a “general
plan of action?”
I agree with petitioner’s concern over the danger that
the trial court may allow the specifications of details in an
information to validate a statute inherently void for
vagueness. An information cannot rise higher than the
statute upon which it is based. Not even the construction
by the Sandiganbayan of a vague or ambiguous provision
can supply the missing ingredients of the Plunder Law.
The right of an accused to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him is most often
exemplified in the care
______________
22 Record of the Senate, June 5, 1989, Vol. IV, No. 140, p. 1310.
580

with which a complaint or information should be drafted.

However, the clarity and particularity required of an
information should also be present in the law upon which
the charges are based. If the penal law is vague, any
particularity in the information will come from the
prosecutor. The prosecution takes over the role of Congress.
The fact that the details of the charges are specified in
the Information will not cure the statute of its
constitutional infirmity. If on its face the challenged
provision is repugnant to the due process clause,
specification of details of the offense
23
intended to be charged
would not serve to validate it. In other words, it is the
statute, not the accusation under it, that prescribes the
rule to govern conduct and warns against transgression. No
one may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to
speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes. All are
entitled24to be informed as to what the State commands or
forbids.
Definiteness is a due process requirement. It is
especially important in its application to penal statutes.
Vagueness and unintelligibility will invariably lead to
arbitrary government action. The purpose of the due
process clause is to exclude everything that is25arbitrary and
capricious affecting the rights of the citizen. Congress, in
exercising its power to declare what acts constitute a crime,
must inform the citizen with reasonable precision what
acts it intends to prohibit so that he may have a certain
understandable 26
rule of conduct and know what acts it is his
duty to avoid.
The questioned statutes were enacted purportedly in the
interest of justice, public peace and order, and the rule of
law. These purposes are not served by R.A. Nos. 7080 and
7659. These statutes allow the prosecutors and the courts
arbitrary and too broad discretionary powers in their
enforcement. Fair, equal and impartial justice would be
denied.
______________
23 Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939).

24 Ibid., p. 453.
25 Nebbia v. New York, 291 SCRA U.S. 502.
26 Musser v. Utah, supra; Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399; United
States v. Brewer, supra.
581
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 581
For all the foregoing reasons, I vote to grant the petition

and nullify the Plunder Law for being unconstitutional.
DISSENTING OPINION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
At times when speaking against popular views can subject

a member of this Court to all sorts of unfair criticism and
pressure from the media, the lure not to wield the judicial
pen is at its crest. Nevertheless, I cannot relent to such
enticement. Silence under such circumstances may mean
not only weakness, but also insensibility to the legal
consequence of a constitutional adjudication bound to affect
not only the litigants, but the citizenry as well. Indeed, the
core issue in this case is highly significant, the resolution of
which is inevitably historical. Thus, today, I prefer to take
a stand and, therefore, dissent from the majority opinion.
It is beyond
1
dispute that Republic Act No. 7080 (R.A.
No. 7080), entitled “An Act Penalizing the Crime of
Plunder,” is controversial and far-reaching. Nonetheless, it
is my view that it is also vague and fuzzy, inexact and
sweeping. This brings us to the query—may R.A. No. 7080
be enforced as valid and its shortcomings supplied by
judicial interpretation? My answer, to be explained later, is
“NO.”
As a basic premise, we have to accept that even a person
accused of a crime possesses inviolable rights founded on
the Constitution which even the welfare of the society as a
whole cannot override. The rights guaranteed to him by the
Constitution are not subject to political bargaining or to the
calculus of social interest. Thus, no matter how socially-
relevant the purpose of a law is, it must be nullified if it
tramples upon the basic rights of the accused.
Enshrined in our Constitution is the ultimate guaranty
that “no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due
______________
1 As amended by Republic Act No. 7659—“An Act to Impose the Death

Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending for that Purpose the
Revised Penal Code, other Special Penal Laws and for other Purpose
(1993).
582

2
process of law.” This provision in the Bill of Rights serves
as a protection of the Filipino people against any form of
arbitrariness on the part of the government, whether
committed by the legislature, the executive or the judiciary.
Any government act that militates against the ordinary
norms of justice and fair play is considered an infraction of
the due process; and this is true whether the denial
involves violation merely of the procedure prescribed
3
by
law or affects the very validity of the law itself.
The same Due Process Clause protects an accused
against conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable
doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with
which he is charged.
4
The reason for this was enunciated in
In Re Winship: “[t]he accused during a criminal
prosecution has at stake interest of immense importance,
both because of the possibility that he may lose his liberty
(or life) upon conviction and because of the certainty that
he would be stigmatized by the conviction. ” In view
thereof, any attempt on the part of the legislature to
diminish the requirement of proof in criminal cases should
be discouraged.
R.A. No. 7080, as amended, is unconstitutional. Albeit the

legislature did not directly lower the degree of proof
required in the crime of plunder from proof beyond
reasonable doubt to mere preponderance of or substantial
evidence, it nevertheless lessened the burden of the
prosecution by dispensing with proof of the essential
elements of plunder. Let me quote the offending provision:

of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every
conspiracy to amass, accumulate, or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it
conspiracy.
______________
2 Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

3 Cruz, Constitutional Law, 1995 Ed. p. 95.
4 397 U.S. 358, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 25 L. Ed. 2nd 368.
583
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 583

In every criminal prosecution, the law recognizes certain

elements as material or essential. Calling a particular fact
an “essential element” carries certain legal consequences.
In this case, the consequence that matters is that the
Sandiganbayan5
cannot convict the accused unless it
unanimously finds that the prosecution has proved beyond
reasonable doubt each element of the crime of plunder.
What factual elements must be proved beyond reasonable
doubt to constitute the crime of plunder?
Ordinarily, the factual elements that make up a crime
are specified in the law that defines it. Under R.A. No
7080, as amended, the essential elements of the crime of
plunder are: a) that the offender is a public officer; b) that
he amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth
through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts
described in Section 1 (d), to wit:

treasury;
2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission,
gift, share, percentage, kickbacks, or any other form
3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or
Government or any of its subdivision, agencies or
4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly, or
______________
5 Section 1 (b) Rule XVIII, Revised Rules of the Sandiganbayan

“The unanimous vote of three Justices in a division shall be necessary
for the rendition of a judgment or order. In the event that three Justices
do not reach a unanimous vote, the Presiding Justice shall designate by

raffle two justices from among the other members of the Sandiganbayan
to sit temporarily with them forming a special division of five Justices,
and the vote of a majority of such special division shall be necessary for
the rendition of a judgment or order.
584

5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or

intended to benefit particular person or special
interests; or
6) By taking undue advantage of official position,
authority, relationship, connection, or influence to
expense and to the damage and prejudice of the
and c) that the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-

gotten wealth 6 is at least Fifty Million Pesos
(P50,000,000.00).
Does the phrase “combination or series of overt or
criminal acts described in Section 1(d)” mean that the
“criminal acts” merely constitute the means to commit
plunder? Or does it mean that those “criminal acts,” are
essential elements of plunder?
When Section 4 of R.A. No. 7080 mandates that it shall
not be necessary for the prosecution to prove each and
every criminal act done by the accused, the legislature, in
effect, rendered the enumerated “criminal acts” under
Section 1 (d) merely as means and not as essential
elements of plunder. This is constitutionally infirmed7
and
repugnant to the basic idea of justice and fair play. As a
matter of due process, the prosecution is required to prove
beyond reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute
the crime with which the defendant is charged. The State
may not8
specify a lesser burden of proof for an element of a
crime. With more reason, it should not be allowed to go
around the principle by characterizing an essential element
of plunder merely as a “means” of committing the crime.
For the result is the reduction of the burden of the
______________
6 Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080.

7 It is an elementary principle of criminal jurisprudence, a principle
firmly embedded in the organic law of every free state and vindicated by
statutory guarantee as well as by innumerable judicial decisions, that
every criminal, however hideous his alleged crime, or however, debauched
and fiendish his character, may require that the elements of that crime
shall be clearly and indisputably defined by law, and that his commission
of and relationship to the alleged offense shall be established by legal
evidence delivered in his presence. (Rice, The Law of Evidence on
Evidence, Vol. 3, p. 421.
8 29 Am Jur 2d Section 168, p. 192. In Re Winship, 397 US 358, 25 L Ed
2d 368; State v. Krantz, 498 US 938, 112 L Ed 2d 306.
585
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 585

prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond

reasonable doubt.
Let me elucidate on the vices that come with Section 4.
First, treating the specific “criminal acts” merely as
means to commit the greater crime of plunder, in effect,
allows the imposition of the death penalty even if the
Justices of the Sandiganbayan did not “unanimously” find
that the accused are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
those “criminal acts.” The three Justices need only agree
that the accused committed at least two of the criminal
acts, even if not proved by evidence beyond reasonable
doubt. They do not have to agree unanimously on which
two.
Let us consider the present case against former
President Joseph Ejercito Estrada. The accusatory portion
of the information in Criminal Case No. 26558 charges Mr.
Estrada and others of willfully, unlawfully and criminally
amassing, accumulating and acquiring ill-gotten wealth in
the aggregate amount of P4,097,804,173.17 more or less,
through a combination and series of overt and criminal acts
described as follows:
“a) by receiving, collecting, directly or indirectly, on

many instances, so called “jueteng money” from
gambling operators in connivance with co-accused
Jose “Jinggoy” Estrada, Yolanda Ricaforte and
Edward Serapio, as witnessed by Gov. Luis Chavit
Singson, among other witnesses, in the aggregate
amount of FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE
MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00), more or less,
in consideration of their protection from arrest or

interference by law enforcers in their illegal
“jueteng” activities; and
b) by misappropriating, converting and misusing his
gain and benefit public fund in the amount of ONE
HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS
(P130,000,000.00), more or less, representing a
portion of the One Hundred Seventy Million Pesos
(P170,000,000.00) tobacco excise tax share allocated
for the Province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171,
in conspiracy with co-accused Charlie “Atong” Ang,
Alma Alfaro, Eleuterio Tan a.k.a Eleuterio Ramos
Tan or Mr. Uy., and Jane Doe a.k.a Delia Rajas as
witnesses by Gov. Luis “Chavit” Singson, among
other witnesses; and
c) by directing, ordering and compelling the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and
the Social Security System (SSS) to purchase and
buy a combined total of P681,733,000. shares of
stock of Belle Corporation in the aggregate value of
One Billion Eight Hundred Forty Seven Million
Five Hundred Seventy Eight Thousand Fifty Seven
Pesos
586

and Fifty Centavos (P1,847,578,057.50), for the

purpose of collecting for his personal gain and
benefit, as in fact he did collect and receive the sum
of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION
SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P189,700,000.00), as commission from said stock
purchase; and
d) by unjustly enriching himself in the amount of
THREE BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY
THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR
THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE
PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS
(P3,233,104,173.17) comprising his unexplained
wealth, acquired, accumulated and amassed by him
under his account name “Jose Velarde” with
Equitable PCI Bank.”
Since it is not necessary to prove each criminal act, the

inevitable conclusion is that Mr. Estrada may be convicted
of the crime of plunder without the Justices of the
Sandiganbayan “unanimously” deciding which two of the
four criminal acts have actually been committed. In short,
all that R.A. No. 7080 requires is that each Justice must be
convinced of the existence of a “combination or series.” As
to which criminal acts constitute a combination or series,
the Justices need not be in full agreement. Surely, this
would cover-up a wide disagreement among them about
just what the accused actually did or did not do. Stated
differently, even if the Justices are not unified in their
determination on what criminal acts were actually
committed by the accused, which need not be proved under
the law, still, they could convict him of plunder.
Considering that what R.A. No. 7080 punishes is the
plurality of criminal acts indicative of the grand scheme or
conspiracy to amass ill-gotten wealth, it is imperative to
focus upon the individual “criminal acts” in order to assure
the guilt of the accused of plunder.
Second, R.A. No. 7080 lumps up into one new offense of
plunder six (6) distinct crimes which by themselves are
currently punishable under separate statutes or provisions
of law. The six (6) separate crimes become mere “means or
similar schemes” to commit the single offense of plunder. It
bears emphasis that each of the separate offenses is a
crime mala in se. The commission of any offense mala in se
is inherently accompanied by a guilty mind or a crimi-
587
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 587

9
nal intent. Unfortunately, R.A. No. 7080 converted the six
mala in se offenses into one crime which is mala prohibita
wherein the intent becomes insignificant. Upon the
commission of the proscribed act,10
without proof of intent,
the law is considered violated. Consequently, even acts
recklessly committed (i.e. without intent) can be punished
by death.
Third, Section 4 mandates that it shall not be necessary
for the prosecution to prove each and every criminal act
done by the accused x x x it being sufficient to prove beyond
reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts. By its
own terminology, Section 4 requires that the “pattern” be
proved by evidence beyond reasonable doubt. Initially, we
must disassociate the specific “criminal acts” from the
“pattern of criminal acts.” These two phrases do not refer to

one and the same thing. Pattern, as defined 11in the
dictionary, means an established mode of behavior. In the
crime of plunder, the existence of a “pattern” can only be
inferred from the specific “criminal acts” done by the
accused. Several queries may be raised to determine the
existence of a “pattern.” Are these criminal acts related or
tied to one another? Is the subsequent criminal act a mere
continuation of the prior criminal act? Do these criminal
acts complement one another as to bring about a single
result? Inevitably, one must focus first on each criminal act
to ascertain the relationship or connection it bears with the
other criminal acts, and from there determine whether a
certain “pattern” exists. But how could “pattern” be proved
beyond reasonable doubt when in the first place the specific
“criminal acts” from which such pattern may be inferred
are not even required to be proved?
And fourth, plunder is a very serious offense. What is at
stake under the law is not only the liberty of the accused
but his life and property as well. Thus, it will be extremely
unjust to lessen the prosecution’s burden of proof to such a
degree not commensurate to what the accused stands to
suffer. If a person will lose his life,
______________
9 In U.S. vs. Ah Chong, 15 Phil. 488 (1910), it was held that the crime
must be the product of a free, intelligent, and intentional act.
10 U.S. vs. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 134 (1909-1910).
11 Webster, Third New International Dictionary, Unabridged, 1993, p.
1657.
588

justice requires that every fact on which his guilt may be

inferred must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Providing a rule of evidence which does not require proof
beyond reasonable doubt to establish every fact necessary
to constitute the crime is a clear infringement of due
process. While the principles of the law of evidence are the
same whether applied on civil or criminal 12
trials, they are
more strictly observed in criminal cases. Thus, while the
legislature of a state has the power to prescribe new or
alter existing rules of evidence, or to prescribe methods of

proof, the same must not violate constitutional
requirements
13
or deprive any person of his constitutional
rights. Unfortunately, under R.A. No. 7080, the State did
not only specify a lesser burden of proof to sustain an
element of the crime; it even dispensed with proof by not
considering the specific “criminal acts” as essential
elements. That it was the clear intention of the legislature
is evident from the Senate deliberation, thus:
“Senator Guingona. Since it is a series or a scheme, what

amount of evidence will, therefore, be required? Must there be a
pattern of the criminal acts? Must there be a series of briberies,
for example? Or, can there be only one?
Senator Tañada. Under Section 4 of the bill, Mr. President, it
is provided that:
“For purposes of establishing the OFFENSE, of plunder, it
shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done
by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to
amass, accumulate, or acquire ill-gotten wealth . . . But, there
must be enough evidence “sufficient to establish beyond
reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts of the overall
unlawful scheme or conspiracy.”
So, that is the quantum of evidence that would be required
under this proposal measure.
______________
12 Harris and Wilshere’s Criminal Law, Seventeenth Division, 1943, pp.

513-514.
13 Burgett v. Texas, 389 US 109, 19 L Ed 2d 319, 88 Ct 258; 29 Am Jur
6.
589
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 589

Senator 14 Guingona. That is sufficient to establish the prima

facie case.
xxx xxx
Senator Romulo. That, perhaps, is a good provision of the
bill. But, may I ask, Mr. President, what is in this bill that would
insure that there would be a speedier process by which this crime
of plunder would readily and immediately processed and
convicted or acquitted than is now existing in present laws?
Senator Tañada.Yes,xxx.
Now, on the second point, Mr. President, I believe that what

could make faster and speedier prosecutions of these grafters
would be a change that will be authorized in this bill, at least, in
the filing of information against the perpetrators. Under the
existing criminal procedure, as I said earlier, there can only be
one offense charged per information. So, if there is going to be a
series of overt or criminal acts committed by the grafter, then that
would necessitate the filing of so many informations against him.
Now, if this bill becomes a law, then that means that there can be
only one information filed against the alleged grafter. And the
evidence that will be required to convict him would not be
evidence for each and every individual criminal act but only
evidence sufficient to establish
15
the conspiracy or scheme to
commit this crime of plunder.
xxx xxx
Senator Guingona. May I just be clarified Mr. President. In
this Section 4, a pattern of the criminal acts is all that is required.
Would this pattern of criminal acts be also sufficient to establish a
prima facie case?
Senator Tañada. Mr. President, under Section 4, it would not
only be sufficient to establish a prima facie case. It would be
sufficient to establish guilt as long as the evidence, necessary
16
to
establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt is presented.”
In dispensing with proof of each criminal act, the clear

objective of Congress is to render it less difficult for the
prosecution to prove the crime of plunder. While this
presupposes a noble intention, I do not think there is a
sufficient justification. I, too, have the strong
______________
14 Records of the Senate, June 5, 1989, Vol. IV, No. 140, p. 1314.
15 Records of the Senate, Vol. IV, No. 140, p. 1316.
16 Records of the Senate, June 16, 1989, Vol. IV, No. 141, p. 1403.
590

desire to eliminate the sickness of corruption pervading in

the Philippine government, but more than anything else, I
believe there are certain principles which must be
maintained if we want to preserve fairness in our criminal
justice system. If the prosecution is not mandated to prove
the specific “criminal acts,” then how can it establish the
existence of the requisite “combination or series” by proof

beyond reasonable doubt?
II
Another valid constitutional objection to R.A. No. 7080 is

the vagueness of the term “pattern.” As stated by Mr.
Justice Kapunan, in his Dissent, the concept of “pattern of
overt or criminal acts” embodied in the law was derived by
Congress from the RICO (Racketeer 17
Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations) statute. I am, therefore,
constrained to refer to US law and jurisprudence. “Pattern”
as defined in the RICO statute means “as requiring at least
two acts of racketeering activity . . . . the last of which
occurred within ten years .... after
18
the commission of the
prior act of racketeering activity.
Mr. Justice Kapunan observed that unlike the RICO
law, the law on plunder does not specify a) the number of
criminal acts necessary before there could be a “pattern,”
as well as b) the period within which the succeeding
criminal acts should be committed. These failures render
the law void for its vagueness and broadness.
Indeed, Congress left much to be desired. I am at a
quandary on how many delictual acts are necessary to give
rise to a “pattern of overt or criminal acts” in the crime of
plunder. If there is no numerical standard, then, how
should the existence of “pattern” be ascertained? Should it
be by proximity of time or of relationship? May an act
committed two decades after the prior criminal act be
linked with the latter for the purpose of establishing a
pattern?
______________
17 See Records Joint Conference Committee Meeting, May 7, 1991, p.

12. Representative Pablo Garcia, Chairman of the House of
Representatives Committee on Justice, observed that R.A. No. 7080 was
patterned after the RICO law.
18 Rotella v. Wood, United States Supreme Court, February 23, 2000.
591
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 591

It must be remembered that plunder, being a continuous

offense, the “pattern of overt or criminal acts” can extend
indefinitely, i.e., as long as the succeeding criminal acts

may be linked to the initial criminal act. This will expose
the person concerned to criminal prosecution ad infinitum.
Surely, it will undermine the purpose of the statute of
limitations, i.e., to discourage prosecution based on facts
obscured by the passage of time, and to encourage law
enforcement officials19
to investigate suspected criminal
activity promptly. All these undesirable consequences
arise from the fact that the plunder law fails to provide a
period within which the next criminal act must be
committed for the purpose of establishing a pattern. I
believe R.A. No. 7080 should have provided a cut-off period
after which a succeeding act may no longer be attached to
the prior act for the purpose of establishing a pattern. In
reiteration, the RICO law defines “pattern” as requiring at
least two acts of racketeering activity . . . the last of which
occurred within ten years . . . after the commission of the
prior act of racketeering activity. Such limitation prevents
a subsequent racketeering activity, separated by more than
a decade from the prior act of racketeering, from being
appended to the latter for the purpose of coming up with a
pattern. We do not have the same safeguard under our20 law.
Significantly, in Sedima, S.P.R.L v. Imrex Co., the
United States Supreme Court expressed dismay that
Congress has failed to properly define the term “pattern” at
all but has simply required that a “pattern” includes at
least two acts of racketeering activity. The Court concluded
that “pattern” involves something more than two acts, and
after examining RICO’s legislative history, settled on
“continuity plus relationship” as the additional
requirement. 21
Years later, in H.C. Inc. v. The Northwestern Bell Tel.,
the U.S. Supreme Court conceded that “the continuity plus
relationship” means different things to different circuits.
Nevertheless, it held firm to the Sedima requirement that
“in order to establish a pattern, the government has to
show “that the racketeering predicates are related, and
that they amount to or pose a threat of continued
______________
19 Toussie vs. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 115 (1970).

20 473 U.S. 479, 105 S. Ct. 3275, 87 L. Ed. 2d 346 (1985).
21 492 U.S. 229, 109 S. Ct. 2893, 106 L. Ed. 2d 195 (1989).
fs
592

criminal activity.” Justice Scalia, in a concurring opinion in

which three other justices joined, derided the “relationship”
requirement as not “much more helpful [to the lower
courts] than telling them to look for a “pattern”—which is
what the statute already says.” As for the continuity
requirement, Justice Scalia said: “Today’s opinion has
added nothing to improve our prior guidance, which has
created a kaleidoscope of circuit positions, except to clarify
that RICO may in addition be violated when there is a
‘threat of continuity’. It seems to me this increases rather
than removes the vagueness. There is no reason to believe
that the Court of Appeals will be any more unified in the
future, than they have in the past, regarding the content of
this law.”
Aware of the ambiguities present in the RICO law the
drafters of the New York “Organized Crime Control Act ” (a
progeny of RICO) now more specifically define “pattern of
criminal activity” as conduct engaged in by persons
charged in an enterprise corruption count constituting
three or more criminal acts that (a) were committed within
ten years from the commencement of the criminal action;
(b) are neither isolated incidents, nor so closely related and
connected in point of time or circumstance of commission as
to constitute a criminal offense or criminal transaction, as
those terms are defined in section 40.10 of the criminal
procedure law; and (c) are either: (i) related to one another
through a common scheme or plan or (ii) were committed,
solicited, requested, importuned or intentionally aided by
persons acting with the mental culpability required for the
commission22 thereof and associated with or in the criminal
enterprise.
If the term “pattern” as defined in the RICO law is
continuously subjected to constitutional attacks because of
its alleged vagueness, how much more the term “pattern”
in R.A. No. 7080 which does not carry with it any limiting
definition and can only be read in context. Indeed, there is
no doubt that the invalidity of the law based on vagueness
is not merely debatable—it is manifest. Thus, this Court
should declare R.A. No. 7080 unconstitutional.
______________
22 The People of the State of New York v. Capaldo, et al., 151 Misc. 2d
114 (1991).
593
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 593

III
Lastly, the terms “combination” and “serie s” are likewise

vague. Hence, on the basis of the law, a conviction of an
accused cannot be sustained. A statute that does not
provide adequate standards for adjudication, by which guilt
23
or innocence may be determined, should be struck down.
Crimes must be defined 24in a statute with appropriate
certainty and definiteness. The standards of certainty in a
statute prescribing punishment for offenses are higher
than in those depending
25
primarily on civil sanctions for
their enforcement. A penal
26
statute should therefore be
clear and unambiguous. It should explicitly
27
establish the
elements of the crime which it creates and28 provide some
reasonably ascertainable standards of guilt. It should not
admit of such a double meaning that a citizen
______________
23 21 Am Jur §349, p. 399.

24 22 C.J.S. §24 (2) p. 62; Pierce v. United States, 314 US 306; 86 L. Ed
226.
“The constitutional vice in a vague or indefinite statute is the injustice
to accused in placing him on trial for an offense as to the nature of which
he is given no fair notice. (American Communications Association C.I.O. v.
Douds, N.Y. 70 S. Ct. 674, 339 U.S. 382, 94 L. Ed 1391) In determining
whether a statute meets the requirement of certainty, the test is whether
the language conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the pro-scribed
conduct when measured by a common understanding and practices. Penal
statutes affecting public officers and employees and public funds or
property will be held invalid where the prohibited conduct is not
sufficiently defined. (Jordan v. De George III, 341 U.S. 223, 95 L. Ed. 886;
Winters v. People of State of New York, 333 U.S. 507; 92 L. Ed 840) The
requirement of statutory specificity has the dual purpose of giving
adequate notice of acts which are forbidden and of informing accused of
the nature of offense charged so that he may defend himself. (Amsel v.
Brooks, 106 A. 2d 152, 141 Conn. 288; 67 S. Ct. 125, 348 U.S. 880,91 L.
Ed. 693)”.
25 Winters v. People of State of New York, 333 US 507; 92 L. Ed. 840
—“A penal statute must set up ascertainable standards so that men of
common intelligence are not required to guess at its meaning, either as to
persons within the scope of the act or as to the applicable tests to

ascertain guilt.”
26 Sullivan v. United States, 332 U.S. 689; 92 L. Ed. 297.
27 United States v. Dettra Flag Co. D.C. Pa., 86 F. Supp. 84.
28 Winters v. People of State of New York, supra.
594

may act on one conception

29
of its requirements and the
courts on another.
I agree with the observation of Mr. Justice Kapunan
that “resort to the dictionary meaning of the terms
‘combination’ and ‘series’ as well as recourse to the
deliberations of the lawmakers only serve to prove that
R.A. No. 7080 failed to satisfy the requirement of the
Constitution on clarity and definiteness.” The deliberations
of our law-makers, as quoted verbatim in Justice
Kapunan’sDissent, indeed, failed to30 shed light on what
constitute “combination” and “series.”
I believe this is fatal.
The essence of the law on plunder lies in the phrase
“combination or series of overt or criminal acts.” As can be
gleaned from the Record of the Senate, the determining
factor of R.A. 7080 is the plurality of the overt acts or
criminal acts under a grand scheme or conspiracy to amass
ill-gotten wealth. Thus, even if the amassed wealth equals
or exceeds fifty million pesos, a person cannot be
______________
29 State v. Tsutomu Ikeda, 143 P. 2d 880, followed in State v. Waller,

143 P. 2d 884.
30 “Senator Gonzales. To commit the offense of plunder, as defined in
this Act and while constituting a single offense, it must consist of a series
of overt or criminal acts, such as bribery, extortion, malversation of public
funds, swindling, falsification of public documents, coercion, theft, fraud
and illegal exaction, and graft or corrupt practices act and like offenses.
Now, Mr. President, I think, this provision, by itself, will be vague. I am
afraid that it might be faulted for being violative of the due process clause
and the right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation of an
accused. Because, what is meant by “series of overt or criminal acts”?I
mean, would 2, 3, 4 or 5 constitute a series? During the period of
amendments, can we establish a minimum of overt acts like, for example,
robbery in band? The law defines what is robbery in band by the number
of participants therein. In this particular case, probably, we can
statutorily provide for the definition of “series” so that two, for example,
would that already be a series? Or, three, what would be the basis for such
a determination?” (Record of the Senate, June 5, 1989, Vol. IV, No. 140, p.
1310).
595
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 595

prosecuted for
31
the crime of plunder if there is only a single
criminal act.
______________
31 “Senator Paterno. Mr. President, not too clear yet on the reason for
trying to define a crime of plunder. Could I get some further clarification?
Senator Tañada. Yes, Mr. President.
Because of our experience in the former regime, we feel that there is a
need for Congress to pass the legislation which would cover a crime of this
magnitude. While it is true, we already have the Anti-Graft Law. But that
does not directly deal with plunder. That covers only the corrupt practices
of public officials as well as their spouses and relatives within the civil
degree, and the Anti-Graft law as presently worded would not adequately
or sufficiently address the problems that we experienced during the past
regime.
Senator Paterno. May I try to give the Gentleman, Mr. President, my
understanding of the bill?
Senator Tañada. Yes.
Senator Paterno. I envision that this bill or this kind of plunder would
cover a discovered interconnection of certain acts, particularly, violations
of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act when, after the different acts are
looked at, a scheme of conspiracy can be detected, such scheme or
conspiracy consummated by the different criminal acts or violations of
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, such that the scheme or conspiracy
becomes a sin, as a large scheme to defraud the public or rob the public
treasury. It is parang robo and banda. It is considered as that. And, the
bill seeks to define or says that P100 million is that level at which ay
talagang sobra na dapat nang parusahan ng husto. Would it be a correct
interpretation or assessment of the intent of the bill?
Senator Tañada. Yes, Mr. President. The fact that under existing law,
there can be only one offense charged in the information, that makes it
very cumbersome and difficult to go after these grafters if we would not
come out with this bill. That is what is happening now; because of that
rule that there can be only one offense charged per information, then we
are having difficulty in charging all the public officials who would seem to
have committed these corrupt practices. With this bill, we could come out
with just one information, and that would cover all the series of criminal
acts that may have been committed by him.
xxx xxx
Senator Romulo. To follow up the interpolations of Senator Paterno and
Maceda, this crime of plunder as envisioned here contemplates of a series
or a scheme as responded by the distinguished Sponsor.
596

Considering that without plurality of overt or criminal acts,

there can be no crime of plunder, due process of law
demands that the terms “combination” and “series” be
defined with exactitude in the law itself. Equating these
terms with mere “plurality” or “two or more,” is inaccurate
and speculative. For one, a “se ries” is a group of usually
three or more things or events standing or succeeding 32
in
order and having like relationship to each other. The
Special Prosecution Division Panel defines it as “at least 33
three of the acts enumerated under Section 1(d) thereof.”
But it can very well be interpreted as only one act repeated
at least three times. And the Office of the Solicitor General,
invoking the deliberations of the House of Representatives,
contends differently. It defines the term 34
series as a
“repetition” or pertaining to “two or more.” The disparity
in the Prosecution and OSG’s positions clearly shows how
imprecise the term “series” is.
This should not be 35
countenanced. Crimes are not to be
created by inference. No one may be required, at the peril
of life, liberty or property to guess at, or speculate as to, the
meaning of a penal
______________
Senator Tañada. That is correct, Mr. President. (Record of Senate, June 5, 1989,
Vol. IV, No. 140, p. 1315)
xxx xxx
Senator Romulo. Mr. President, I was going to suggest prior to Senator Maceda
that on line 24: “SHALL THROUGH ONE overt or criminal actOR....” I was just
thinking of one which is really not a “series.”
The President. If there is only one, then he has to be prosecuted under the
particular crime. But when we say “acts of plunder” there should be, at least, two
or more. (Record of the Senate, June 6, 1989, Vol. IV, No. 141, p. 1399).
32 Tarsia v. Nick’s Laundry & Linen Supply Co., 399 P. 2d 28, 29, 239
Or. 562; Words and Phrases, 38A p. 441.
For purposes of Rule permitting government to charge several

defendants under one indictment if they have participated in same
“series” of acts or transactions, a “series” is something more than mere
“similar” acts.
33 Opposition to the Motion to Quash of Accused Joseph Estrada dated
June 21, 2001, p. 9.
34 Comment to the Amended Petition dated July 16, 2001, p. 14.
35 United States v. Laub, 385 US 475, 17 L Ed 2d 526, 87 S Ct 574.
597
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 597

36
statute. An accused, regardless of who he is, is entitled to
be tried only under a clear and valid law.
Respondents argue that the vagueness of R.A. No. 7080,
as amended, is cured when the Information clearly
specified the acts constituting the crime of plunder. I do not
agree. It is the statute and not the accusation under it that
prescribes the
37
rule to govern conduct and warns against
aggression. If on its face, a statute is repugnant to the due
process clause on account of vagueness, specification in the
Information of the details of the 38offense intended to be
charged will not serve to validate it.
On the argument that this Court may clarify the vague
terms or explain the limits of the overbroad provisions of
R.A. No. 7080, I should emphasize that this Court has no
power to legislate.
Precision must be the characteristic of penal legislation.
For the Court to define what is a crime is to go beyond the
so-called positive role in the protection of civil liberties or
promotion of public interests. As stated by Justice
Frankfurter, the Court should be wary of judicial attempts
to impose justice on the community; to deprive it of the
wisdom that comes from self-inflicted wounds and 39
the
strengths that grow with the burden of responsibility.
A statute which is so vague as to permit the infliction of
capital punishment on acts already punished with lesser
penalties by clearly formulated law is unconstitutional. The
vagueness cannot be cured by judicial construction.
Also, not to be glossed over is the fact that R.A. 7080, as
amended, is a novel law. Hence, there is greater need for
precision of terms. The requirement that law creating a
crime must be sufficiently explicit to inform those subject
to it, what conduct on their part will render them liable to
its penalties, has particular force when applied to statutes
creating new offenses. For that reason,
______________
36 State v. Nelson,95N.W.2d678.
37 22 C.J.S. §24 (2); People v. Bevilacqua, 170 N.Y. S. 2d 423; Lanzetta
v. State of New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 59 S Ct 618, 83 L. Ed. 888; United
States v. DeCadena, D.C. 105 F. Supp. 202.
38 21 Am Jur § 17 p. 129.
39 Tresolini and Shapiro, American Constitutional Law, 3rd Edition, p.
23.
598

those statutes may not be generally understood,

40
or may be
subject of generally accepted construction.
Today, I recall what James Madison remarked in
presenting the Bill of Rights to the United States Congress
in 1789: “if they (Bill of Rights) are incorporated into the
Constitution, independent tribunals of justice will consider
themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of those
rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark against every
assumption of power in the legislative or executive; and
they will be naturally led to resist every encroachment
upon rights expressly stipulated
41
for in the Constitution by
the declaration of rights.” Time did not render his
foreboding stale. Indeed, in every constitutional democracy,
the judiciary has become the vanguard of these rights.
Now, it behooves this Court to strike an unconstitutional
law. The result, I concede, may not be politically desirable
and acceptable, nevertheless, I am fully convinced that it is
constitutionally correct.
To recapitulate, R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional
because it violates the DUE PROCESS CLAUSE of the
Constitution. The vagueness of its terms and its
incorporation of a rule of evidence that reduces the burden
of the prosecution in proving the crime of plunder tramples
upon the basic constitutional rights of the accused.
In fine, I can only stress that the one on trial here is not
Mr. Estrada, but R.A. No. 7080. The issue before this Court
is not the guilt or innocence of the accused, but the
constitutionality of the law. I vote to grant the petition, not
because I favor Mr. Estrada, but because I look beyond
today and I see that this law can pose a serious threat to
the life, liberty and property of anyone who may come
under its unconstitutional provisions. As a member of this
Court, my duty is to see to it that the law conforms to the
Constitution and no other. I simply cannot, in good

conscience, fortify a law that is patently unconstitutional.
WHEREFORE, I vote to grant the petition.
______________
40 State v. Evans, 245 P. 2d 788, 73 Idaho 50.

41 Abraham, Perry, Freedom and the Court, 1998, p. 25.
599
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 599

Petition dismissed, R.A. No. 7080, as amended by R.A. No.

7659 declared constitutional.
Notes.—Courts exist for interpreting the law, not for

enacting it, and to allow otherwise would be violative of the
principle of separation of powers, inasmuch as the sole
function of the courts is to apply or interpret the laws,
particularly where gaps or lacunae exist or where
ambiguities becloud issues, but it will not arrogate unto
itself the task of legislating. (Pagpalain Haulers, Inc. vs.
Trajanao, 310 SCRA 354 [1999])
Even though the government’s purposes are legitimate
and substantial, they cannnot be pursued by means that
broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties, when the end
can be more narrowly achieved. (ABS-CBN Broadcasting
Corporation vs. Commission on Elections, 323 SCRA 811
[2000])
——o0o——
600
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8/8/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 369

394 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

Constitutional Law; Anti-Plunder Law (R.A. 7080); Statutes;

parameters which would enable the accused to determine the

VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 395

Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan

tions required or forbidden, and prescribes the elements of the

his fundamental right to due process. The rationalization seems

396 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan

who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers—to

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; “Series,” Explained.—On

VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 397

Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan

Same; Same; Criminal Law; “Void for Vagueness” Doctrine;

sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize. Under the

398 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan

Same; Same; Same; Same; The test in determining whether a

mathematical exactitude.—The test in determining whether a

VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 399

Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan

because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes. This

culpability lies, the accused is entitled to an acquittal. The use of

400 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan

mand the respect and confidence of the community in the

amassing hidden wealth—such pattern arises where the

VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 401

Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan

There would be no other explanation for a combination or series of

402 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan

ray, 267 SCRA 682 (1997), to the archives of jurisprudential

and radical measures are imperative to fight the increasingly

MENDOZA, J., Concurring in the Judgment:

Constitutional Law; Judicial Review; What footnote 4 of U.S.

VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 403

Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan

determine the intent of the legislature. On the other hand, strict

404 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan

common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A facial challenge is

VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 405

Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan

statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken

(6)). On the other hand, “series” is used when the offender

406 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan

acquired thereby amounts to or exceeds the figure fixed by the

construction, not vagueness or overbreadth. In Primicias v.

VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 407

Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan

Same; Same; Same; “Void for Vagueness” Doctrine; Where the

408 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan

it is a malum in se. For when the acts punished are inherently

of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua, while that for