Montallana, Kessey N. Atty.

Reyes
Problem Areas in Legal Ethics (Sun 8am-11am) November 16, 2017

1. CLETO DOCENA VS. ATTY. DOMINADOR Q. LIMON, A.C. No. 2387, Sept. 10, 1998

FACTS:

On April 15, 1982, a complaint for disbarment was filed by Cleto Docena against Atty.
Dominador Q. Limon, Sr., on grounds of malpractice, gross misconduct, and violation of
attorney's oath.

Respondent Atty. Limon was complainant's lawyer on appeal in Civil case for Forcible Entry.
Respondent required therein defendants-appellants Docena spouses to post a supersedeas bond in
the amount of P10,000.00 allegedly to stay the execution of the appealed decision. The Spouses
were able to produce the said amount and later on received a favorable decision on the appealed
case rendered by the then Court of First Instance of Eastern Samar. After receipt of said decision,
complainant went to the CFI to withdraw the supersedeas bond of P10,000.00, but he thereupon
discovered that no such bond was ever posted by respondent. When confronted, respondent
promised to restitute the amount, but was unable to do so despite repeated demands from the
Docena spouses.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT ATTY. LIMON SHOULD BE DISBARRED

RULING:

YES. The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that:

Canon 1.
Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Canon 16.
Canon 16.01 — A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received from the
client.

Respondent infringed and breached these rules. Verily, good moral character is not only a
condition precedent to admission to the legal profession, but it must also be possessed at all
times in order to maintain one's good standing in character that exclusive and honored fraternity.
By extorting money from his client through deceit and misrepresentation, respondent Limon has
reduced the law profession to a level so base, so low and dishonorable, and most contemptible.
He has sullied the integrity of his brethren in the law and has, indirectly, eroded the peoples'
confidence in the judicial system. By his reprehensible conduct, which is reflective of his
depraved character, respondent has made himself unworthy to remain in the Roll of Attorneys.
He should be disbarred.

2. SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. FRANCISCO R.

LLAMAS, RESPONDENT, A.C No. 4749, January 20, 2000

FACTS:
This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues filed against
respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas.

Complainant Soliman M. Santos alleged that Atty. Llamas, who for a number of years now, has
not indicated the proper PTR and IBP O.R. Nos. and data in his pleadings. If at all, he only
indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" but he has been using this for at least three years already. On the
other hand, respondent who is now of age, averred that he is only engaged in a limited practice of
law and under R.A. 7432, as a senior citizen, he is exempted from payment of income taxes and
included in this exemption is payment of the membership duties.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT ATTY. LLAMAS SHOULD BE SUSPENDED FOR NOT PAYING HIS
IBP DUES.

RULING:

YES. Respondent is guilty for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND

DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR.

CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE

COURT.

Respondent Atty. Francisco Llamas is suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year or
until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later.

3. LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR., REQUESTING EXEMPTION

FROM PAYMENT OF IBP DUES. B.M. NO. 1370, May 09, 2005

FACTS:

Petitioner sought exemption from payment of IBP dues in the amount of P12,035.00 as alleged
unpaid accountability for the years 1977-2005. He alleged that after being admitted to the
Philippine Bar in 1961, he became part of the Philippine Civil Service from July 1962 until 1986,
then migrated to, and worked in, the USA in December 1986 until his retirement in the year
2003. He maintained that he cannot be assessed IBP dues for the years that he was working in
the Philippine Civil Service since the Civil Service law prohibits the practice of one's profession
while in government service, and neither can he be assessed for the years when he was working
in the USA.

The IBP commented that membership in the IBP is not based on the actual practice of law; that a
lawyer continues to be included in the Roll of Attorneys as long as he continues to be a member
of the IBP; that one of the obligations of a member is the payment of annual dues as determined
by the IBP Board of Governors and duly approved by the Supreme Court as provided for in
Sections 9 and 10, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court; that the validity of imposing dues on the
IBP members has been upheld as necessary to defray the cost of an Integrated Bar Program; and
that the policy of the IBP Board of Governors of no exemption from payment of dues is but an
implementation of the Court's directives for all members of the IBP to help in defraying the cost
of integration of the bar.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF

HIS DUES DURING THE TIME THAT HE WAS INACTIVE IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW.

RULING:

No. A membership fee in the Bar association is an exaction for regulation, while tax purpose of a
tax is a revenue. If the judiciary has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it follows that as an
incident to regulation, it may impose a membership fee for that purpose. It would not be possible
to put on an integrated Bar program without means to defray the expenses. The doctrine of
implied powers necessarily carries with it the power to impose such exaction.

The only limitation upon the State's power to regulate the privilege of law is that the regulation
does not impose an unconstitutional burden. The public interest promoted by the integration of
the Bar far outweighs the slight inconvenience to a member resulting from his required payment
of the annual dues. Thus, payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in the IBP,
of which no one is exempt. This means that the compulsory nature of payment of dues subsists
for as long as one's membership in the IBP remains regardless of the lack of practice of, or the
type of practice, the member is engaged in.

There is nothing in the law or rules which allows exemption from payment of membership dues.
At most, as correctly observed by the IBP, he could have informed the Secretary of the
Integrated Bar of his intention to stay abroad before he left. In such case, his membership in the
IBP could have been terminated and his obligation to pay dues could have been discontinued.
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege,
and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the
lawyer's public responsibilities.

4. FERDINAND A. CRUZ, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. STANLEY CABRERA,

RESPONDENT, A.C. No. 5737, October 25, 2004

FACTS:

The complainant files an administrative charge against the respondent for misconduct in
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The complainant, a fourth year law student,
appears in court in his own behalf as he instituted a case against his neighbor who is represented
by the respondent as counsel. During a hearing, the respondent uttered remarks that the
complainant finds arrogant and misconduct in the performance of his duties as a lawyer. The
complaint was referred to the IBP commissioner who recommended suspension of respondent in
the practice of law for 3 months which was annulled by a resolution of the IBP Board
recommending dismissal of the case for lack of merit.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT THE MANNER OF THE RESPONDENT CONSTITUTES TO

MISCONDUCT.

RULING:
The court ruled that although the outburst of the respondent is uncalled for, it is not to such a
magnitude as to warrant his suspension in the practice of his profession. The court thereby
dismissed the case due to lack of merit.

5. ATTY. EVELYN J. MAGNO, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. OLIVIA VELASCO-

JACOBA, RESPONDENT, A.C. No. 6296, November 22, 2005

FACTS:

Atty. Evelyn J. Magno, President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Nueva Ecija
Chapter had a disagreement with her uncle, Lorenzo Inos, over a landscaping contract they had
entered into. During the conciliation/confrontation proceeding, Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba
appeared on the strength of a Special Power of Attorney signed by Lorenzo Inos. Atty. Magno
objected to Atty. Jacoba’s appearance in the conciliation but the latter interpose that Lorenzo
Inos is entitled to be represented by a lawyer inasmuch as complainant is herself a lawyer.

Complainant enumerated specific instances, with supporting documentation, tending to prove

that respondent had, in the course of the conciliation proceedings before the Punong Barangay,
acted as Inos Lorenzo’s counsel instead of as his attorney-in-fact.

Thus, this petition for willful violation of (a) Section 415 of the Local Government Code (LGC)
of 1991 and (b) Canon 4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT WILFULLY VIOLATED THE PROHIBITION

PROVIDED IN SEC. 415 OF THE LGC.

RULING:

Yes. Section 415 of the LGC of 1991[7], on the subject Katarungang Pambarangay, provides:

Section 415. Appearance of Parties in Person. - In all katarungang pambarangay proceedings, the
parties must appear in person without the assistance of the counsel or representative, except for
minors and incompetents who may be assisted by their next of kin who are not lawyers.

The above-quoted provision clearly requires the personal appearance of the parties in katarungan
pambarangay conciliation proceedings, unassisted by counsel or representative. The rationale
behind the personal appearance requirement is to enable the lupon to secure first hand and direct
information about the facts and issues,[8] the exception being in cases where minors or
incompetents are parties. There can be no quibbling that laymen of goodwill can easily agree to
conciliate and settle their disputes between themselves without what sometimes is the unsettling
assistance of lawyers whose presence could sometimes obfuscate and confuse issues.[9] Worse
still, the participation of lawyers with their penchant to use their analytical skills and legal
knowledge tend to prolong instead of expedite settlement of the case.

The prohibition against the presence of a lawyer in a barangay conciliation proceedings was not,
to be sure, lost on respondent. Her defense that the aforequoted Section 415 of the LGC does not
apply since complainant addressed her Sumbong to the barangay captain of Brgy. San Pascual
who thereafter proceeded to hear the same is specious at best. In this regard, suffice it to state
that complainant wrote her Sumbong with the end in view of availing herself of the benefits of
barangay justice. That she addressed her Sumbong to the barangay captain is really of little
moment since the latter chairs the Lupong Tagapamayapa.
6. NELIA A. ZIGA, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE RAMON A. AREJOLA,
RESPONDENT, A.M. No. MTJ-99-1203, June 10, 2003

FACTS:

This is a complaint filed by Nelia A. Ziga against Judge Ramon A. Arejola of the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC), Daet, Camarines Norte, for appearing as counsel in a land registration case
without permission from the Supreme Court and asking for attorney's fees for his legal services.

Nelia Arejola-Ziga and Judge Ramon Arejola are two of the heirs of Fabiana Arejola. By virtue
of inheritance, they and eight others became owners in fee simple of a 19,664 sq. m. land in
Calauag, Naga City owned by Fabiana. On January 23, 1995, while respondent was employed as
an attorney in the Public Attorney's Office (PAO) of Naga City, he filed in behalf of his co-heirs,
an application for registration of title of the lot, docketed as Land Registration Case No. 95-
142.[1] On June 9, 1997, respondent was appointed judge of the MTC of Daet, Camarines Norte.
He took his oath on August 1, 1997.

Despite his appointment, respondent Judge continued to appear in the land registration case. On
October 31, 1997, he was requested by the court hearing the land registration case to submit his
written authority from the Supreme Court to appear as counsel in the said case.[5] This order was
reiterated on June 15, 1998.[6]

In the present complaint, Nelia Arejola Ziga alleges that respondent should be disciplined for
appearing before a court as counsel without securing the permission of the Supreme Court and
for asking contingent attorney's fees and agent's commission amounting to 30% of the gross
selling price of the property subject of the land registration case.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT IS LIABLE FOR THE ILLEGAL PRACTICE OF

LAW.

RULING:

Yes. Under Rule 138, Section 35 of the Revised Rules of Court, judges are prohibited from
engaging in the private practice of law or giving professional advice to clients. This is reiterated
in Canon 5 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which enjoins members of the bench to regulate their
extra-judicial activities to minimize the risk of conflict with their judicial duties. Rule 5.07 of the
Code in particular states:

A judge shall not engage in the private practice of law. Unless prohibited by the Constitution or
law, a judge may engage in the practice of any other profession provided that such practice will
not conflict or tend to conflict with judicial functions.

These provisions are based on public policy for there is no question that the rights, duties,
privileges and functions of the office of an attorney-at-law are inherently incompatible with the
high official functions, duties, powers, discretion and privileges of a judge. It also aims to ensure
that judges give their full time and attention to their judicial duties, prevent them from extending
special favors to their own private interests and assure the public of their impartiality in the
performance of their functions. These objectives are dictated by a sense of moral decency and
desire to promote the public interest.
7. RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE BAR VICENTE D.
CHING, APPLICANT, B.M. No. 914, October 01, 1999

FACTS:

In 1998, Vicente Ching finished his law degree at the Saint Louis University in Baguio City. He
eventually passed the bar but he was advised that he needs to show proof that he is a Filipino
citizen before he be allowed to take his oath. Apparently, Ching’s father was a Chinese citizen
but his mother was a Filipino citizen. His parents were married before he was born in 1963.
Under the 1935 Constitution, a legitimate child, whose one parent is a foreigner, acquires the
foreign citizenship of the foreign parent. Ching maintained that he has always considered
himself as a Filipino; that he is a certified public accountant – a profession reserved for Filipinos;
that he even served as a councilor in a municipality in La Union.

The Solicitor-General commented on the case by saying that as a legitimate child of a Chinese
and a Filipino, Ching should have elected Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority;
that under prevailing jurisprudence, “upon reaching the age of majority” is construed as within 7
years after reaching the age of majority (in his case 21 years old because he was born in 1964
while the 1935 Constitution was in place).
Ching did elect Filipino citizenship but he only did so when he was preparing for the bar in 1998
or 14 years after reaching the age of majority. Nevertheless, the Solicitor-General recommended
that the rule be relaxed due to the special circumstance of Ching.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT CHING SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO TAKE THE LAWYER’S OATH.

RULING:

No. Unfortunately, he belatedly elected Filipino citizenship. The Supreme Court cannot agree
with the recommendation of the Solicitor-General. Fourteen years had lapsed and it’s way
beyond the allowable 7 year period. The Supreme Court even noted that the period is originally 3
years but it was extended to 7 years. (It seems it can’t be extended any further). Ching’s special
circumstances can’t be considered. It is not enough that he considered all his life that he is a
Filipino; that he is a professional and a public officer (was) serving this country. The rules for
citizenship are in place. Further, Ching didn’t give any explanation why he belatedly chose to
elect Filipino citizenship (but I guess it’s simply because he never thought he’s Chinese not until
he applied to take the bar). The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is
certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an
affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil
registry. Ching’s unreasonable and unexplained delay in making his election cannot be simply
glossed over.

8. PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW, BENJAMIN M.

DACANAY, PETITIONER, B.M. No. 1678, December 17, 2007

FACTS:

Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated
to Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied
for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada's free medical aid program. His application was
approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.

On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-
Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship.[1] On that day, he took
his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto,
Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume his law practice.

ISSUE:

WHETHER PETITIONER DACANAY LOST HIS MEMBERSHIP IN THE PHILIPPINE BAR

WHEN HE GAVE UP HIS PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP IN MAY 2004.

RULING:

No. The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be
limited to Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by law.[15] Since Filipino citizenship is a
requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the Philippine bar
and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other words, the loss of
Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The
practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners.[16]

The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of

another country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because "all
Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their
Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225]."[17] Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who
becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he
reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225. Although he is also deemed never to have terminated
his membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law practice accrues.

Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and he
reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions "(he) shall apply with the proper
authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice."[18] Stated otherwise, before a
lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his law practice, he
must first secure from this Court the authority to do so, conditioned on:

(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;

(b) the payment of professional tax;

(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this is
especially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioner's knowledge of Philippine laws and
update him of legal developments and

(d) the retaking of the lawyer's oath which will not only remind him of his duties and
responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to maintain
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.

Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the Philippine
bar.

9. ROMULO M. VILLA vs. JUNEL ANTHONY AMA, MICHAEL FREDERICK

MUSNGI and CRISANTO SARUCA, JR., Bar Matter No. 674, June 14, 2005
FACTS:

On april 15, 2005,junel anthony d. Ama filed a petition for admission in the bar as successful
passers of the 1992 bar exam.the said petitioner together with the other member of the aguila
legis fraternity of ateneo de manila university was implicated and criminally charged with the
death of jose villa.an amended information for serious physical injury was filed in mtc caloocan
city against the petitioner and another case of homicide in rtc caloocan city.on april 16, 1993,the
father of the victim filed a petition praying that the petitioner be disallowed from taking lawyer¶s
oath and signing the roll of attorneys pending final judgment of the case filed against him.on
february 8, 1996, the MTC acquitted him while the rtc rendered a guilty decision through
conspiracy.the RTC decision was appealed in the ca and the latter set aside the lower court’s
decision rendering a guilty decision on slight physical injury under art.266 of rpc.he was ordered
to pay a 30 thousand pesos jointly with the other accused as indemnity.instead of serving the 20
day imprisonment,he apply for probation of rtc caloocan which granted him and terminating the
case.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT VILLA IS ALLOWED TO TAKE THE LAWYER’S OATH AND SIGN
THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS.

RULING:

YES. The court granted the petition of junel Anthony D. Ama. He is hereby allowed to take the
lawyer’s oath and sign the roll of attorneys.the crime for which the petitioner was convicted was
a light offense and cannot be considered as grave violation of the moral sentiment of the people
and certainly not a crime involving moral turpitude.

10. ARTEMIO ENDAYA, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. WILFREDO OCA,

RESPONDENT, A.C. No. 3967, September 03, 2003

FACTS:

This case unfolded with a verified Complaint filed on January 12, 1993 by complainant Artemio
Endaya against respondent Atty.Wilfredo Oca for violation of the lawyer's oath and what
complainant termed as "professional delinquency or infidelity."

Respondent was assigned to handle the case of unlawful detainer for the complainant. The
respondent failed numerously to submit the required pleadings and memorandum before the
courts. Thus, complainant confronted respondent with the adverse decision but the latter denied
receipt of a copy thereof. Upon inquiry with the Branch Clerk of Court, however, complainant
found out that respondent received his copy back on September 14, 1992.

Having lost the unlawful detainer case, on January 12, 1993 complainant filed the present
administrative complaint against the respondent for professional delinquency consisting of his
failure to file the required pleadings in behalf of the complainant and his spouse. Complainant
contends that due to respondent's inaction he lost the opportunity to present his cause and
ultimately the case itself.

The Office of the Bar Confidant found respondent negligent in handling the case of complainant
and his wife and recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for one month.
ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT SHOULD BE SUSPENDED FOR HIS

MISCONDUCT.

RULING:

YES. The lawyer's oath embodies the fundamental principles that guide every member of the
legal fraternity. From it springs the lawyer's duties and responsibilities that any infringement
thereof can cause his disbarment, suspension or other disciplinary action.[35]

Found in the oath is the duty of a lawyer to protect and safeguard the interest of his client.
Specifically, it requires a lawyer to conduct himself "to the best of his knowledge and discretion
with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients."[36] This duty is further stressed in
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates that "(A) lawyer shall
serve his client with competence and diligence."

In this case, evidence abound that respondent failed to demonstrate the required diligence in
handling the case of complainant and his spouse. As found by the Office of the Bar
Confidant,[37] after appearing at the second preliminary conference before the MCTC,
respondent had not been heard of again until he commented on the complaint in this case.
Without disputing this fact, respondent reasons out that his appearance at the conference was for
the sole purpose of obtaining leave of court to file an amended answer and that when he failed to
obtain it because of complainant's fault he asked the court that he be relieved as counsel.[38] The
explanation has undertones of dishonesty for complainant had engaged respondent for the entire
case and not for just one incident. The alternative conclusion is that respondent did not know his
procedure for under the Rules on Summary Procedure[39] the amended answer is a prohibited
pleading.