Narra Vs Redmont and Gamboa Vs Teves Case

SPECIAL THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 195580, January 28, 2015
NARRA NICKEL MINING AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., TESORO MINING AND DEVELOPMENT,
INC., AND MCARTHUR MINING, INC., Petitioners, v. REDMONT CONSOLIDATED MINES
CORP., Respondent.
RESOLUTION
VELASCO JR., J.:
Beforethe Court is the Motion for Reconsideration of its April 21, 2014 Decision, which denied the
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 jointly interposed by petitioners Narra Nickel and
Mining Development Corp. (Narra), Tesoro Mining and Development, Inc. (Tesoro), and McArthur
Mining Inc. (McArthur), and affirmed the October 1, 2010 Decision and February 15, 2011 Resolution
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 109703.
Very simply, the challenged Decision sustained the appellate court’s ruling that petitioners, being
foreign corporations,are not entitled to Mineral Production Sharing Agreements (MPSAs). In reaching
its conclusion, this Court upheld with approval the appellate court’s finding that there was doubt as to
petitioners’ nationality since a 100% Canadian-owned firm, MBMI Resources, Inc. (MBMI), effectively
owns60% of the common stocks of the petitioners by owning equity interest of petitioners’ other
majority corporate shareholders.
In a strongly worded Motion for Reconsideration dated June 5, 2014, petitioners-movants argued, in
the main, that the Court’s Decision was not in accord with law and logic.In its September 2, 2014
Comment, on the other hand, respondent Redmont Consolidated Mines Corp. (Redmont) countered
that petitioners’ motion for reconsideration is nothing but a rehash of their arguments and should,
thus, be denied outright for being pro-forma. Petitioners have interposed on September 30, 2014
their Reply to the respondent’s Comment.
After considering the parties’ positions, as articulated in their respective submissions, We resolve to
deny the motion for reconsideration.
I.
The case has not been rendered moot and academic
Petitioners have first off criticized the Court for resolving in its Decision a substantive issue, which, as
argued, has supposedly been rendered moot by the fact that petitioners’ applications for MPSAs had
already been converted to an application for a Financial Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA), as
petitioners have in fact been granted an FTAA. Further, the nationality issue, so petitioners presently
claim, had been rendered moribund by the fact that MBMI had already divested itself and sold all its
shareholdings in the petitioners, as well as in their corporate stockholders, to a Filipino corporation—
DMCI Mining Corporation (DMCI).
As a counterpoint, respondent Redmont avers that the present case has not been rendered moot by
the supposed issuance of an FTAA in petitioners’ favor as this FTAA was subsequently revoked by the
Office of the President (OP) and is currently a subject of a petition pending in the Court’s First
Division. Redmont likewise contends that the supposed sale of MBMI’s interest in the petitioners and
in their “holding companies” is a question of fact that is outside the Court’s province to verify in a
Rule 45 certiorari proceedings. In any case, assuming that the controversy has been rendered moot,
Redmont claims that its resolution on the merits is still justified by the fact that petitioners have
violated a constitutional provision, the violation is capable of repetition yet evading review, and the
present case involves a matter of public concern.
Indeed, as the Court clarified in its Decision, the conversion of the MPSA application to one for FTAAs
and the issuance by the OP of an FTAA in petitioners’ favor are irrelevant. The OP itself has already
cancelled and revoked the FTAA thus issued to petitioners. Petitioners curiously have omitted this
critical fact in their motion for reconsideration. Furthermore, the supposed sale by MBMI of its shares
in the petitioner-corporations and in their holding companies is not only a question of fact that this
Court is without authority to verify, it also does not negate any violation of the Constitutional
provisions previously committed before any such sale.
We can assume for the nonce that the controversy had indeed been rendered moot by these two
events. As this Court has time and again declared, the “moot and academic” principle is not a
magical formula that automatically dissuades courts in resolving a case.1 The Court may still take
cognizance of an otherwise moot and academic case, if it finds that (a) there is a grave violation of
the Constitution; (b) the situation is of exceptional character and paramount public interest is
involved; (c) the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar, and the public; and (d) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.2] The
Court’s April 21, 2014 Decision explained in some detail that all four (4) of the foregoing
circumstances are present in the case. If only to stress a point, we will do so again.
First, allowing the issuance of MPSAs to applicants that are owned and controlled by a 100% foreign-
owned corporation, albeit through an intricate web of corporate layering involving alleged Filipino
corporations, is tantamount to permitting a blatant violation of Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution. The Court simply cannot allow this breach and inhibit itself from resolving the
controversy on the facile pretext that the case had already been rendered academic.
Second, the elaborate corporate layering resorted to by petitioners so as to make it appear that there
is compliance with the minimum Filipino ownership in the Constitution is deftly exceptional in
character. More importantly, the case is of paramount public interest, as the corporate layering
employed by petitioners was evidently designed to circumvent the constitutional caveat allowing only
Filipino citizens and corporations 60%-owned by Filipino citizens to explore, develop, and use the
country’s natural resources.
Third, the facts of the case, involving as they do a web of corporate layering intended to go around
the Filipino ownership requirement in the Constitution and pertinent laws, require the establishment
of a definite principle that will ensure that the Constitutional provision reserving to Filipino citizens or
“corporations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens” be effectively
enforced and complied with. The case, therefore, is an opportunity to establish a controlling principle
that will “guide the bench, the bar, and the public.”
Lastly, the petitioners’ actions during the lifetime and existence of the instant case that gave rise to
the present controversy are capable of repetition yet evading review because, as shown by
petitioners’ actions, foreign corporations can easily utilize dummy Filipino corporations through
various schemes and stratagems to skirt the constitutional prohibition against foreign mining in
Philippine soil.
II.
The application of the Grandfather Rule is justified by the circumstances of the case to
determine the nationality of petitioners.
To petitioners, the Court’s application of the Grandfather Rule to determine their nationality is
erroneous and allegedly without basis in the Constitution, the Foreign Investments Act of 1991 (FIA),
the Philippine Mining Act of 1995,3 and the Rules issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC). These laws and rules supposedly espouse the application of the Control Test in verifying the
Philippine nationality of corporate entities for purposes of determining compliance with Sec. 2, Art.
XII of the Constitution that only “corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose
capital is owned by such [Filipino] citizens” may enjoy certain rights and privileges, like the
exploration and development of natural resources.
The application of the Grandfather Rule in the

present case does not eschew the Control Test.
Clearly, petitioners have misread, and failed to appreciate the clear import of, the Court’s April 21,
2014 Decision. Nowhere in that disposition did the Court foreclose the application of the Control Test
in determining which corporations may be considered as Philippine nationals. Instead, to borrow
Justice Leonen’s term, the Court used the Grandfather Rule as a “supplement” to the Control Test so
that the intent underlying the averted Sec.2, Art. XII of the Constitution be given effect. The
following excerpts of the April 21, 2014 Decision cannot be clearer: chanRoblesvi rt ualLaw lib rary
In ending, the “control test” is still the prevailing mode of determining whether or not a
corporation is a Filipino corporation, within the ambit of Sec. 2, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution,
entitled to undertake the exploration, development and utilization of the natural resources of the
Philippines. When in the mind of the Court, there is doubt, based on the attendant facts and
circumstances of the case, in the 60-40 Filipino equity ownership in the corporation, then it may
apply the “grandfather rule.”(emphasis supplied)
With that, the use of the Grandfather Rule as a “supplement” to the Control Test is not proscribed by
the Constitution or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995.
The Grandfather Rule implements the intent of

the Filipinization provisions of the Constitution.
To reiterate, Sec. 2, Art. XII of the Constitution reserves the exploration, development, and
utilization of natural resources to Filipino citizens and “corporations or associations at least sixty per
centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens.” Similarly, Section 3(aq) of the Philippine Mining
Act of 1995considers a “corporation xxx registered in accordance with law at least sixty per cent of
the capital of which is owned by citizens of the Philippines” as a person qualified to undertake a
mining operation. Consistent with this objective, the Grandfather Rule was originally conceived to
look into the citizenship of the individuals who ultimately own and control the shares of stock of a
corporation for purposes of determining compliance with the constitutional requirement of Filipino
ownership.It cannot, therefore, be denied that the framers of the Constitution have not foreclosed
the Grandfather Rule as a tool in verifying the nationality of corporations for purposes of ascertaining
their right to participate in nationalized or partly nationalized activities. The following excerpts from
the Record of the 1986 Constitutional Commission suggest as much: chanRoblesvi rtual Lawli bra ry
MR. NOLLEDO: In Sections 3, 9 and 15, the Committee stated local or Filipino equity and foreign
equity; namely, 60-40 in Section 3, 60-40 in Section 9, and 2/3-1/3 in Section 15.
MR. VILLEGAS: That is right.
x xxx
MR. NOLLEDO: Thank you.
With respect to an investment by one corporation in another corporation, say, a corporation with 60-
40 percent equity invests in another corporation which is permitted by the Corporation Code, does
the Committee adopt the grandfather rule?
MR. VILLEGAS: Yes, that is the understanding of the Committee.
As further defined by Dean Cesar Villanueva, the Grandfather Rule is “the method by which the
percentage of Filipino equity in a corporation engaged in nationalized and/or partly nationalized
areas of activities, provided for under the Constitution and other nationalization laws, is computed,
in cases where corporate shareholders are present, by attributing the nationality of the
second or even subsequent tier of ownership to determine the nationality of the corporate
shareholder.”4 Thus, to arrive at the actual Filipino ownership and control in a corporation, both the
direct and indirect shareholdings in the corporation are determined.
This concept of stock attribution inherent in the Grandfather Rule to determine the ultimate
ownership in a corporation is observed by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) in applying Section
127 (B)5 of the National Internal Revenue Code on taxes imposed on closely held corporations, in
relation to Section 96 of the Corporation Code6 on close corporations. Thus, in BIR Ruling No. 148-
10, Commissioner Kim Henares held: chanRoblesvirtual Lawli bra ry
In the case of a multi-tiered corporation, the stock attribution rule must be allowed to run
continuously along the chain of ownership until it finally reaches the individual
stockholders. This is in consonance with the “grandfather rule” adopted in the Philippines
under Section 96 of the Corporation Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 68) which provides that
notwithstanding the fact that all the issued stock of a corporation are held by not more than twenty
persons, among others, a corporation is nonetheless not to be deemed a close corporation when at
least two thirds of its voting stock or voting rights is owned or controlled by another corporation
which is not a close corporation.7
In SEC-OGC Opinion No. 10-31 dated December 9, 2010 (SEC Opinion 10-31),the SEC applied the
Grandfather Rule even if the corporation engaged in mining operation passes the 60-40 requirement
of the Control Test, viz:
chanRoblesvi rt ual Lawlib rary
You allege that the structure of MML’s ownership in PHILSAGA is as follows: (1) MML owns 40%
equity in MEDC, while the 60% is ostensibly owned by Philippine individual citizens who are actually
MML’s controlled nominees; (2) MEDC, in turn,owns 60% equity in MOHC, while MML owns the
remaining 40%; (3) Lastly, MOHC owns 60% of PHILSAGA, while MML owns the remaining 40%. You
provide the following figure to illustrate this structure: chanRoblesvirt ual Lawlib rary
xxxx
We note that the Constitution and the statute use the concept “Philippine citizens.” Article III, Section
1 of the Constitution provides who are Philippine citizens: x x x This enumeration is exhaustive. In
other words, there can be no other Philippine citizens other than those falling within the enumeration
provided by the Constitution. Obviously, only natural persons are susceptible of citizenship. Thus, for
purposes of the Constitutional and statutory restrictions on foreign participation in the exploitation of
mineral resources, a corporation investing in a mining joint venture can never be considered as a
Philippine citizen.
The Supreme Court En Banc confirms this [in]… Pedro R. Palting, vs. San Jose Petroleum [Inc.]. The
Court held that a corporation investing in another corporation engaged in a nationalized activity
cannot beconsidered as a citizen for purposes of the Constitutional provision restricting foreign
exploitation of natural resources:chanRoblesvirtual Lawlib rary
xxxx
Accordingly, we opine that we must look into the citizenship of the individual stockholders, i.e.
natural persons, of that investor-corporation in order to determine if the Constitutional and statutory
restrictions are complied with. If the shares of stock of the immediate investor corporation is in turn
held and controlled by another corporation, then we must look into the citizenship of the individual
stockholders of the latter corporation. In other words, if there are layers of intervening
corporations investing in a mining joint venture, we must delve into the citizenship of the
individual stockholders of each corporation. This is the strict application of the grandfather rule,
which the Commission has been consistently applying prior to the 1990s.
Indeed, the framers of the Constitution intended for the “grandfather rule” to apply in case
a 60%-40% Filipino-Foreign equity corporation invests in another corporation engaging in
an activity where the Constitution restricts foreign participation.
xxxx
Accordingly, under the structure you represented, the joint mining venture is 87.04 % foreign
owned, while it is only 12.96% owned by Philippine citizens. Thus, the constitutional requirement of
60% ownership by Philippine citizens is violated. (emphasis supplied)
Similarly, in the eponymous Redmont Consolidated Mines Corporation v. McArthur Mining Inc., et
al.,8 the SEC en banc applied the Grandfather Rule despite the fact that the subject corporations
ostensibly have satisfied the 60-40 Filipino equity requirement. The SEC en banc held that to attain
the Constitutional objective of reserving to Filipinos the utilization of natural
resources, one should not stop where the percentage of the capital stock is 60%. Thus: chanRoblesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry
[D]oubt, we believe, exists in the instant case because the foreign investor, MBMI,
provided practically all the funds of the remaining appellee-corporations. The records
disclose that: (1) Olympic Mines and Development Corporation (“OMDC”), a domestic corporation,
and MBMI subscribed to 6,663 and 3,331 shares, respectively, out of the authorized capital stock of
Madridejos; however, OMDC paid nothing for this subscription while MBMI paid P2,803,900.00 out of
its total subscription cost of P3,331,000.00; (2) Palawan Alpha South Resource Development Corp.
(“Palawan Alpha”), also a domestic corporation, and MBMI subscribed to 6,596 and 3,996 shares,
respectively, out of the authorized capital stock of Patricia Louise; however, Palawan Alpha paid
nothing for this subscription while MBMI paid P2,796,000.00 out of its total subscription cost of
P3,996,000.00; (3) OMDC and MBMI subscribed to 6,663 and 3,331 shares, respectively, out of the
authorized capital stock of Sara Marie; however, OMDC paid nothing for this subscription while MBMI
paid P2,794,000.00 out of its total subscription cost of P3,331,000.00; and (4) Falcon Ridge
Resources Management Corp. (“Falcon Ridge”), another domestic corporation, and MBMI subscribed
to 5,997 and 3,998 shares, respectively, out of the authorized capital stock of San Juanico; however,
Falcon Ridge paid nothing for this subscription while MBMI paid P2,500,000.00 out of its total
subscription cost of P3,998,000.00. Thus, pursuant to the afore-quoted DOJ Opinion, the Grandfather
Rule must be used.
xxxx
The avowed purpose of the Constitution is to place in the hands of Filipinos the
exploitation of our natural resources. Necessarily, therefore, the Rule interpreting the
constitutional provision should not diminish that right through the legal fiction of
corporate ownership and control. But the constitutional provision, as interpreted and practiced
via the 1967 SEC Rules, has favored foreigners contrary to the command of the Constitution.
Hence, the Grandfather Rule must be applied to accurately determine the actual
participation, both direct and indirect, of foreigners in a corporation engaged in a
nationalized activity or business.
The method employed in the Grandfather Rule of attributing the shareholdings of a given corporate
shareholder to the second or even the subsequent tier of ownership hews with the rule that
the “beneficial ownership” of corporations engaged in nationalized activities must reside in the
hands of Filipino citizens. Thus, even if the 60-40 Filipino equity requirement appears to have been
satisfied, the Department of Justice (DOJ), in its Opinion No. 144, S. of 1977, stated that an
agreement that may distort the actual economic or beneficial ownership of a mining
corporation may be struck down as violative of the constitutional requirement, viz: chanRoblesvi rt ual Lawlib rary
In this connection, you raise the following specific questions: chanRoblesvirt ualLaw lib rary
1. Can a Philippine corporation with 30% equity owned by foreigners enter into a mining service
contract with a foreign company granting the latter a share of not more than 40% from the proceeds
of the operations?
xxxx
By law, a mining lease may be granted only to a Filipino citizen, or to a corporation or

partnership registered with the [SEC] at least 60% of the capital of which is owned by
Filipino citizens and possessing x x x. The sixty percent Philippine equity requirement in
mineral resource exploitation x x x is intended to insure, among other purposes, the
conservation of indigenous natural resources, for Filipino posterity x x x. I think it is implicit
in this provision, even if it refers merely to ownership of stock in the corporation holding the mining
concession, that beneficial ownership of the right to dispose, exploit, utilize, and develop
natural resources shall pertain to Filipino citizens, and that the nationality requirement is
not satisfied unless Filipinos are the principal beneficiaries in the exploitation of the
country’s natural resources. This criterion of beneficial ownership is tacitly adopted in Section 44
of P.D. No. 463, above-quoted, which limits the service fee in service contracts to 40% of the
proceeds of the operation, thereby implying that the 60-40 benefit-sharing ration is derived from the
60-40 equity requirement in the Constitution.
xxxx
It is obvious that while payments to a service contractor may be justified as a service fee, and
therefore, properly deductible from gross proceeds, the service contract could be employed as a
means of going about or circumventing the constitutional limit on foreign equity
participation and the obvious constitutional policy to insure that Filipinos retain beneficial
ownership of our mineral resources. Thus, every service contract scheme has to be evaluated in
its entirety, on a case to case basis, to determine reasonableness of the total “service fee” x x x like
the options available to the contractor to become equity participant in the Philippine entity holding
the concession, or to acquire rights in the processing and marketing stages. x x x (emphasis
supplied)
The “beneficial ownership” requirement was subsequently used in tandem with the “situs of control”
to determine the nationality of a corporation in DOJ Opinion No. 84, S. of 1988, through the
Grandfather Rule, despite the fact that both the investee and investor corporations purportedly
satisfy the 60-40 Filipino equity requirement:9chan roblesv irt uallawl ibra ry
This refers to your request for opinion on whether or not there may be an investment in real estate
by a domestic corporation (the investing corporation) seventy percent (70%) of the capital stock of
which is owned by another domestic corporation with at least 60%-40% Filipino-Foreign Equity, while
the remaining thirty percent (30%) of the capital stock is owned by a foreign corporation.
xxxx
This Department has had the occasion to rule in several opinions that it is implicit in the
constitutional provisions, even if it refers merely to ownership of stock in the corporation holding the
land or natural resource concession, that the nationality requirement is not satisfied unless it
meets the criterion of beneficial ownership, i.e. Filipinos are the principal beneficiaries in
the exploration of natural resources (Op. No. 144, s. 1977; Op. No. 130, s. 1985), and that in
applying the same “the primordial consideration is situs of control, whether in a stock or
non-stock corporation” (Op. No. 178, s. 1974). As stated in the Register of Deeds vs. Ung Sui Si
Temple (97 Phil. 58), obviously to insure that corporations and associations allowed to acquire
agricultural land or to exploit natural resources “shall be controlled by Filipinos.” Accordingly, any
arrangement which attempts to defeat the constitutional purpose should be eschewed (Op.
No 130, s. 1985).
We are informed that in the registration of corporations with the [SEC], compliance with the sixty per
centum requirement is being monitored by SEC under the “Grandfather Rule” a method by which the
percentage of Filipino equity in corporations engaged in nationalized and/or partly nationalized areas
of activities provided for under the Constitution and other national laws is accurately computed, and
the diminution if said equity prevented (SEC Memo, S. 1976). The “Grandfather Rule” is applied
specifically in cases where the corporation has corporate stockholders with alien
stockholdings, otherwise, if the rule is not applied, the presence of such corporate
stockholders could diminish the effective control of Filipinos.
Applying the “Grandfather Rule” in the instant case, the result is as follows: xxx the total foreign
equity in the investing corporation is 58% while the Filipino equity is only 42%, in the investing
corporation, subject of your query, is disqualified from investing in real estate, which is a nationalized
activity, as it does not meet the 60%-40% Filipino-Foreign equity requirement under the
Constitution.
This pairing of the concepts “beneficial ownership” and the “situs of control” in determining what
constitutes “capital” has been adopted by this Court in Heirs of Gamboa v. Teves.10In its October 9,
2012 Resolution, the Court clarified, thus: chanRoblesvirtual Lawli bra ry
This is consistent with Section 3 of the FIA which provides that where 100% of the capital stock is
held by “a trustee of funds for pension or other employee retirement or separation benefits,” the
trustee is a Philippine national if “at least sixty percent (60%) of the fund will accrue to the benefit of
Philippine nationals.” Likewise, Section 1(b) of the Implementing Rules of the FIA provides that “for
stocks to be deemed owned and held by Philippine citizens or Philippine nationals, mere legal title is
not enough to meet the required Filipino equity. Full beneficial ownership of the stocks, coupled
with appropriate voting rights, is essential.” (emphasis supplied)
In emphasizing the twin requirements of “beneficial ownership” and “control” in determining

compliance with the required Filipino equity in Gamboa, the en banc Court explicitly cited with
approval the SEC en banc’s application in Redmont Consolidated Mines, Corp. v. McArthur Mining,
Inc., et al. of the Grandfather Rule, to wit: chanRoblesvirtual Lawlib ra ry
Significantly, the SEC en banc, which is the collegial body statutorily empowered to issue rules and
opinions on behalf of SEC, has adopted the Grandfather Rule in determining compliance with the
60-40 ownership requirement in favor of Filipino citizens mandated by the Constitution for certain
economic activities. This prevailing SEC ruling, which the SEC correctly adopted to thwart
any circumvention of the required Filipino “ownership and control,” is laid down in the 25
March 2010 SEC en banc ruling in Redmont Consolidated Mines, Corp. v. McArthur Mining, Inc., et al.
xxx(emphasis supplied)
Applying Gamboa, the Court, in Express Investments III Private Ltd. v. Bayantel Communications,
Inc.,11 denied the foreign creditors’ proposal to convert part of Bayantel’s debts to common shares of
the company at a rate of 77.7%. Supposedly, the conversion of the debts to common shares
by the foreign creditors would be done, both directly and indirectly, in order to meet the
control test principle under the FIA. Under the proposed structure, the foreign creditors would
own 40% of the outstanding capital stock of the telecommunications company on a direct basis,
while the remaining 40% of shares would be registered to a holding company that shall retain, on a
direct basis, the other 60% equity reserved for Filipino citizens. Nonetheless, the Court found the
proposal non-compliant with the Constitutional requirement of Filipino ownership as the
proposed structure would give more than 60% of the ownership of the common shares of Bayantel to
the foreign corporations, viz:chanRoblesvirt ualLawlib rary
In its Rehabilitation Plan, among the material financial commitments made by respondent Bayantel is
that its shareholders shall relinquish the agreed-upon amount of common stock[s] as payment to
Unsecured Creditors as per the Term Sheet. Evidently, the parties intend to convert the
unsustainable portion of respondent’s debt into common stocks, which have voting
rights. If we indulge petitioners on their proposal, the Omnibus Creditors which are
foreign corporations, shall have control over 77.7% of Bayantel, a public utility company.
This is precisely the scenario proscribed by the Filipinization provision of the
Constitution. Therefore, the Court of Appeals acted correctly in sustaining the 40% debt-to-equity
ceiling on conversion. (emphasis supplied)
As shown by the quoted legislative enactments, administrative rulings, opinions, and this Court’s
decisions, the Grandfather Rule not only finds basis, but more importantly, it implements the Filipino
equity requirement, in the Constitution.
Application of the Grandfather

Rule with the Control Test.
Admittedly, an ongoing quandary obtains as to the role of the Grandfather Rule in determining
compliance with the minimum Filipino equity requirement vis-à-vis the Control Test. This confusion
springs from the erroneous assumption that the use of one method forecloses the use of the other.
As exemplified by the above rulings, opinions, decisions and this Court’s April 21, 2014 Decision, the
Control Test can be, as it has been, applied jointly with the Grandfather Rule to determine the
observance of foreign ownership restriction in nationalized economic activities. The Control Test
and the Grandfather Rule are not, as it were, incompatible ownership-determinant methods that
can only be applied alternative to each other. Rather, these methods can, if appropriate, be
used cumulatively in the determination of the ownership and control of corporations
engaged in fully or partly nationalized activities, as the mining operation involved in this case
or the operation of public utilities as in Gamboa or Bayantel.
The Grandfather Rule, standing alone, should not be used to determine the Filipino ownership and
control in a corporation, as it could result in an otherwise foreign corporation rendered qualified to
perform nationalized or partly nationalized activities. Hence, it is only when the Control Test is
first complied with that the Grandfather Rule may be applied. Put in another manner, if the
subject corporation’s Filipino equity falls below the threshold 60%, the corporation is immediately
considered foreign-owned, in which case, the need to resort to the Grandfather Rule disappears.
On the other hand, a corporation that complies with the 60-40 Filipino to foreign equity
requirement can be considered a Filipino corporation if there is no doubt as to who has the
“beneficial ownership” and “control” of the corporation. In that instance, there is no need
for a dissection or further inquiry on the ownership of the corporate shareholders in both the
investing and investee corporation or the application of the Grandfather Rule.12As a corollary
rule, even if the 60-40 Filipino to foreign equity ratio is apparently met by the subject or investee
corporation, a resort to the Grandfather Rule is necessary if doubt exists as to the locus of
the “beneficial ownership” and “control.” In this case, a further investigation as to the
nationality of the personalities with the beneficial ownership and control of the corporate
shareholders in both the investing and investee corporations is necessary.
As explained in the April 21, 2012 Decision, the “doubt” that demands the application of the
Grandfather Rule in addition to or in tandem with the Control Test is not confined to, or more bluntly,
does not refer to the fact that the apparent Filipino ownership of the corporation’s equity falls below
the 60% threshold. Rather, “doubt” refers to various indicia that the “beneficial ownership”
and “control” of the corporation do not in fact reside in Filipino shareholders but in foreign
stakeholders. As provided in DOJ Opinion No. 165, Series of 1984, which applied the pertinent
provisions of the Anti-Dummy Law in relation to the minimum Filipino equity requirement in the
Constitution, “significant indicators of the dummy status” have been recognized in view of reports
“that some Filipino investors or businessmen are being utilized or [are] allowing themselves to be
used as dummies by foreign investors” specifically in joint ventures for national resource exploitation.
These indicators are: chanRoblesvirtual Lawl ibra ry
1. That the foreign investors provide practically all the funds for the joint investment undertaken by
these Filipino businessmen and their foreign partner; chanroble slaw
2. That the foreign investors undertake to provide practically all the technological support for the
joint venture;chanroble slaw
3. That the foreign investors, while being minority stockholders, manage the company and prepare
all economic viability studies.
Thus, In the Matter of the Petition for Revocation of the Certificate of Registration of Linear Works
Realty Development Corporation,13 the SEC held that when foreigners contribute more capital to
an enterprise, doubt exists as to the actual control and ownership of the subject
corporation even if the 60% Filipino equity threshold is met. Hence, the SEC in that one
ordered a further investigation, viz:
chanRoblesvirt ualLaw lib rary
x x x The [SEC Enforcement and Prosecution Department (EPD)] maintained that the basis for
determining the level of foreign participation is the number of shares subscribed, regardless of the
par value. Applying such an interpretation, the EPD rules that the foreign equity participation in
Linear works Realty Development Corporation amounts to 26.41% of the corporation’s capital stock
since the amount of shares subscribed by foreign nationals is 1,795 only out of the 6,795 shares.
Thus, the subject corporation is compliant with the 40% limit on foreign equity
participation. Accordingly, the EPD dismissed the complaint, and did not pursue any investigation
against the subject corporation.
xxxx
x x x [I]n this respect we find no error in the assailed order made by the EPD. The EPD did not err
when it did not take into account the par value of shares in determining compliance with the
constitutional and statutory restrictions on foreign equity. cralawred
However, we are aware that some unscrupulous individuals employ schemes to circumvent
the constitutional and statutory restrictions on foreign equity. In the present case, the fact
that the shares of the Japanese nationals have a greater par value but only have similar
rights to those held by Philippine citizens having much lower par value, is highly
suspicious. This is because a reasonable investor would expect to have greater control and
economic rights than other investors who invested less capital than him. Thus, it is
reasonable to suspect that there may be secret arrangements between the corporation and the
stockholders wherein the Japanese nationals who subscribed to the shares with greater par
value actually have greater control and economic rights contrary to the equality of shares
based on the articles of incorporation.
With this in mind, we find it proper for the EPD to investigate the subject corporation. The EPD is
advised to avail of the Commission’s subpoena powers in order to gather sufficient evidence, and file
the necessary complaint.
As will be discussed, even if at first glance the petitioners comply with the 60-40 Filipino to foreign
equity ratio, doubt exists in the present case that gives rise to a reasonable suspicion that the
Filipino shareholders do not actually have the requisite number of control and beneficial ownership in
petitioners Narra, Tesoro, and McArthur. Hence, a further investigation and dissection of the extent
of the ownership of the corporate shareholders through the Grandfather Rule is justified.
Parenthetically, it is advanced that the application of the Grandfather Rule is impractical as tracing
the shareholdings to the point when natural persons hold rights to the stocks may very well lead to
an investigation ad infinitum. Suffice it to say in this regard that, while the Grandfather Rule was
originally intended to trace the shareholdings to the point where natural persons hold the shares, the
SEC had already set up a limit as to the number of corporate layers the attribution of the nationality
of the corporate shareholders may be applied.
In a 1977 internal memorandum, the SEC suggested applying the Grandfather Rule on two (2) levels
of corporate relations for publicly-held corporations or where the shares are traded in the stock
exchanges, and to three (3) levels for closely held corporations or the shares of which are not traded
in the stock exchanges.14 These limits comply with the requirement in Palting v. San Jose Petroleum ,
Inc.15that the application of the Grandfather Rule cannot go beyond the level of what is reasonable.
A doubt exists as to the extent of control and

beneficial ownership of MBMI over the petitioners
and their investing corporate stockholders.
In the Decision subject of this recourse, the Court applied the Grandfather Rule to determine the
matter of true ownership and control over the petitioners as doubt exists as to the actual extent of
the participation of MBMI in the equity of the petitioners and their investing corporations.
We considered the following membership and control structures and like nuances: chanRoblesvirt ual Lawlib rary
Tesoro
Supposedly Filipino corporation Sara Marie Mining, Inc. (Sara Marie) holds 59.97% of the
10,000 common shares of petitioner Tesoro while the Canadian-owned company, MBMI, holds
39.98% of its shares.
Name Nationality Number of Amount Amount Paid

Shares Subscribed
Sara Marie Mining, Inc. Filipino 5,997 P5,997,000.00 P825,000.00
MBMI Resources, Inc.16 Canadian 3,998 P3,998,000.00 P1,878,174.60
Lauro L. Salazar Filipino 1 P1,000.00 P1,000.00
Fernando B. Esguerra Filipino 1 P1,000.00 P1,000.00
Manuel A. Agcaoili Filipino 1 P1,000.00 P1,000.00
Michael T. Mason American 1 P1,000.00 P1,000.00
Kenneth Cawkel Canadian 1 P1,000.00 P1,000.00
Total 10,000 P10,000,000.00 P2,708,174.60
In turn, the Filipino corporation Olympic Mines & Development Corp. (Olympic) holds 66.63% of Sara
Marie’s shares while the same Canadian company MBMI holds 33.31% of Sara Marie’s shares.
Nonetheless, it is admitted that Olympic did not pay a single peso for its shares. On the contrary,
MBMI paid for 99% of the paid-up capital of Sara Marie.

Shares Subscribed
Olympic Mines & Filipino 6,663 P6,663,000.00 P0.00
Development Corp.17
MBMI Resources, Inc. Canadian 3,331 P3,331,000.00 P2,794,000.00
Amanti Limson Filipino 1 P1,000.00 P1,000.00
Lauro Salazar Filipino 1 P1,000.00 P1,000.00
Emmanuel G. Hernando Filipino 1 P1,000.00 P1,000.00
Total 10,000 P10,000,000.00 P2,800,000.00
The fact that MBMI had practically provided all the funds in Sara Marie and Tesoro creates
serious doubt as to the true extent of its (MBMI) control and ownership over both Sara
Marie and Tesoro since, as observed by the SEC, “a reasonable investor would expect to have
greater control and economic rights than other investors who invested less capital than him.” The
application of the Grandfather Rule is clearly called for, and as shown below, the Filipinos’ control and
economic benefits in petitioner Tesoro (through Sara Marie) fall below the threshold 60%, viz: chanRoblesvi rtual Lawli bra ry
Filipino participation in petitioner Tesoro: 40.01%

66.67 (Filipino equity in Sara Marie) x59.97 (Sara Marie’s share in Tesoro) = 39.98%
100
39.98% + .03% (shares of individual Filipino shareholders [SHs] in Tesoro)

=40.01%
=====
Foreign participation in petitioner Tesoro: 59.99%
33.33 (Foreign equity in Sara Marie) x 59.97 (Sara Marie’s share in Tesoro) = 19.99%
100
19.99% + 39.98% (MBMI’s direct participation in Tesoro) + .02% (shares of foreign individual SHs in
Tesoro)
= 59.99%
=====
With only 40.01% Filipino ownership in petitioner Tesoro, as compared to 59.99% foreign ownership
of its shares, it is clear that petitioner Tesoro does not comply with the minimum Filipino equity
requirement imposed in Sec. 2, Art. XII of the Constitution. Hence, the appellate court’s observation
that Tesoro is a foreign corporation not entitled to an MPSA is apt.
McArthur
Petitioner McArthur follows the corporate layering structure of Tesoro, as 59.97% of its 10, 000
common shares is owned by supposedly Filipino Madridejos Mining Corporation (Madridejos), while
39.98% belonged to the Canadian MBMI.

Shares Subscribed
Madridejos Mining Corporation Filipino 5,997 P5,997,000.00 P825,000.00
MBMI Resources, Inc.[18 Canadian 3,998 P3,998,000.00 P1,878,174.60
Total 10,000 P10,000,000.00 P2,708,174.60
In turn, 66.63% of Madridejos’ shares were held by Olympic while 33.31% of its shares belonged to
MBMI. Yet again, Olympic did not contribute to the paid-up capital of Madridejos and it was MBMI
that provided 99.79% of the paid-up capital of Madridejos.

Shares Subscribed
Olympic Mines & Filipino 6,663 P6,663,000.00 P0.00
Development Corp.19
MBMI Resources, Inc. Canadian 3,331 P3,331,000.00 P2,803,900.00
Amanti Limson Filipino 1 P1,000.00 P1,000.00
Emmanuel G. Hernando Filipino 1 P1,000.00 P1,000.00
Total 10,000 P10,000,000.00 P2,809,900.00
Again, the fact that MBMI had practically provided all the funds in Madridejos and
McArthur creates serious doubt as to the true extent of its control and ownership of MBMI
over both Madridejos and McArthur. The application of the Grandfather Rule is clearly called for,
and as will be shown below, MBMI,along with the other foreign shareholders, breached the maximum
limit of 40% ownership in petitioner McArthur, rendering the petitioner disqualified to an MPSA:
chanRoblesvirtual Lawli bra ry
Filipino participation in petitioner McArthur: 40.01%
66.67 (Filipino equity in Madridejos) x 59.97 (Madridejos’ share in McArthur) = 39.98%

100
39.98% + .03% (shares of individual Filipino SHs in McArthur)

=40.01%
=====
Foreign participation in petitioner McArthur: 59.99%
33.33 (Foreign equity in Madridejos) x 59.97 (Madridejos’ share in McArthur) = 19.99%

100
19.99% + 39.98% (MBMI’s direct participation in McArthur) + .02% (shares of foreign individual SHs
in McArthur)
= 59.99%
=====
As with petitioner Tesoro, with only 40.01% Filipino ownership in petitioner McArthur, as compared to
59.99% foreign ownership of its shares, it is clear that petitioner McArthur does not comply with the
minimum Filipino equity requirement imposed in Sec. 2, Art. XII of the Constitution. Thus, the
appellate court did not err in holding that petitioner McArthur is a foreign corporation not entitled to
an MPSA.
Narra
As for petitioner Narra, 59.97% of its shares belonged to Patricia Louise Mining & Development
Corporation (PLMDC), while Canadian MBMI held 39.98% of its shares.

Shares Subscribed
Patricia Lousie Mining and Filipino 5,997 P5,997,000.00 P1,677,000.00
Development Corp.
Higinio C. Mendoza, Jr. Filipino 1 P1,000.00 P1,000.00
Henry E. Fernandez Filipino 1 P1,000.00 P1,000.00
Ma. Elena A. Bocalan Filipino 1 P1,000.00 P1,000.00
Robert L. McCurdy Canadian 1 P1,000.00 P1,000.00
Bayani H. Agabin Filipino 1 P1,000.00 P1,000.00
Total 10,000 P10,000,000.00 P2,800,000.00
PLMDC’s shares, in turn, were held by Palawan Alpha South Resources Development Corporation
(PASRDC), which subscribed to 65.96% of PLMDC’s shares, and the Canadian MBMI, which
subscribed to 33.96% of PLMDC’s shares.

Shares Subscribed
Palawan Alpha South Filipino 6,596 P6,596,000.00 P0
Resource Development Corp.
Higinio C. Mendoza, Jr. Filipino 1 P1,000.00 P1,000.00
Henry E. Fernandez Filipino 1 P1,000.00 P1,000.00
Ma. Elena A. Bocalan Filipino 1 P1,000.00 P1,000.00
Robert L. McCurdy Canadian 1 P1,000.00 P1,000.00
Bayani H. Agabin Filipino 1 P1,000.00 P1,000.00
Total 10,000 P10,000,000.00 P2,804,000.00
Yet again, PASRDC did not pay for any of its subscribed shares, while MBMI contributed 99.75% of
PLMDC’s paid-up capital. This fact creates serious doubt as to the true extent of MBMI’s
control and ownership over both PLMDC and Narra since “a reasonable investor would expect to
have greater control and economic rights than other investors who invested less capital than him.”
Thus, the application of the Grandfather Rule is justified. And as will be shown, it is clear that the
Filipino ownership in petitioner Narrafalls below the limit prescribed in both the Constitution and the
Philippine Mining Act of 1995.
Filipino participation in petitioner Narra: 39.64%
66.02 (Filipino equity in PLMDC) x 59.97 (PLMDC’s share in Narra) = 39.59%

100
39.59% + .05% (shares of individual Filipino SHs in McArthur)

=39.64%
====
Foreign participation in petitioner Narra: 60.36%
33.98 (Foreign equity in PLMDC) x 59.97 (PLMDC’s share in Narra) = 20.38%
100
20.38% + 39.96% (MBMI’s direct participation in Narra) + .02% (shares of foreign individual SHs in
McArthur)
= 60.36%
=====
With 60.36% foreign ownership in petitioner Narra, as compared to only 39.64% Filipino ownership
of its shares, it is clear that petitioner Narra does not comply with the minimum Filipino equity
requirement imposed in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. Hence, the appellate court did not
err in holding that petitioner McArthur is a foreign corporation not entitled to an MPSA.
It must be noted that the foregoing determination and computation of petitioners’ Filipino equity
composition was based on their common shareholdings, not preferred or redeemable shares.
Section 6 of the Corporation Code of the Philippines explicitly provides that “no share may be
deprived of voting rights except those classified as ‘preferred’ or ‘redeemable’ shares.” Further, as
Justice Leonen puts it, there is “no indication that any of the shares x x x do not have voting rights,
[thus] it must be assumed that all such shares have voting rights.”22 It cannot therefore be gainsaid
that the foregoing computation hewed with the pronouncements of Gamboa, as implemented by SEC
Memorandum Circular No. 8, Series of 2013, (SEC Memo No. 8)23Section 2 of which states: chanRoblesvi rt ual Lawlib rary
Section 2. All covered corporations shall, at all times, observe the constitutional or statutory
requirement. For purposes of determining compliance therewith, the required percentage of Filipino
ownership shall be applied to BOTH (a) the total outstanding shares of stock entitled to vote in the
election of directors; AND (b) the total number of outstanding shares of stock, whether or not
entitled to vote in the election of directors.
In fact, there is no indication that herein petitioners issued any other class of shares besides the
10,000 common shares. Neither is it suggested that the common shares were further divided into
voting or non-voting common shares. Hence, for purposes of this case, items a) and b) in SEC Memo
No. 8 both refer to the 10,000 common shares of each of the petitioners, and there is no need to
separately apply the 60-40 ratio to any segment or part of the said common shares.
III.
In mining disputes, the POA has jurisdiction to pass upon the nationality
of applications for MPSAs
Petitioners also scoffed at this Court’s decision to uphold the jurisdiction of the Panel of Arbitrators
(POA) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) since the POA’s
determination of petitioners’ nationalities is supposedly beyond its limited jurisdiction, as defined
in Gonzales v. Climax Mining Ltd.24 and Philex Mining Corp. v. Zaldivia.25 chanroble svirtuallaw lib rary
The April 21, 2014 Decision did not dilute, much less overturn, this Court’s pronouncements in
either Gonzales or Philex Mining that POA’s jurisdiction “is limited only to mining disputes which raise
questions of fact,” and not judicial questions cognizable by regular courts of justice. However, to
properly recognize and give effect to the jurisdiction vested in the POA by Section 77 of the Philippine
Mining Act of 1995,26 and in parallel with this Court’s ruling in Celestial Nickel Mining Exploration
Corporation v. Macroasia Corp.,27the Court has recognized in its Decision that in resolving disputes
“involving rights to mining areas” and “involving mineral agreements or permits,” the POA has
jurisdiction to make a preliminary finding of the required nationality of the corporate applicant in
order to determine its right to a mining area or a mineral agreement.
There is certainly nothing novel or aberrant in this approach. In ejectment and unlawful detainer
cases, where the subject of inquiry is possession de facto, the jurisdiction of the municipal trial courts
to make a preliminary adjudication regarding ownership of the real property involved is allowed, but
only for purposes of ruling on the determinative issue of material possession.
The present case arose from petitioners’ MPSA applications, in which they asserted their respective
rights to the mining areas each applied for. Since respondent Redmont, itself an applicant for
exploration permits over the same mining areas, filed petitions for the denial of petitioners’
applications, it should be clear that there exists a controversy between the parties and it is POA’s
jurisdiction to resolve the said dispute. POA’s ruling on Redmont’s assertion that petitioners are
foreign corporations not entitled to MPSA is but a necessary incident of its disposition of the mining
dispute presented before it, which is whether the petitioners are entitled to MPSAs.
Indeed, as the POA has jurisdiction to entertain “disputes involving rights to mining areas,” it
necessarily follows that the POA likewise wields the authority to pass upon the nationality issue
involving petitioners, since the resolution of this issue is essential and indispensable in the resolution
of the main issue, i.e., the determination of the petitioners’ right to the mining areas through MPSAs.
WHEREFORE, We DENY the motion for reconsideration WITH FINALITY. No further pleadings shall
be entertained. Let entry of judgment be made in due course.
SO ORDERED.
Peralta, Mendoza, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.

Leonen, J., I dissent. see separate opinion.
Endnotes:
1
Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on
Ancestral Domain (GRP), G.R. No. 183591, October 14, 2008, 568 SCRA 402, 460.
2David
v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, etc., May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 160; citing Province of
Batangas v. Romulo, G.R. No. 152774, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 736; Lacson v. Perez, 410 Phil. 78
(2001); Albaña v. Comelec, 478 Phil. 941 (2004); Chief Supt. Acop v. Guingona Jr., 433 Phil. 62
(2002); SANLAKAS v. Executive Secretary Reyes, 466 Phil. 482 (2004).
3
Republic Act No. (RA) 7942, effective April 14, 1995.
4
Villanueva, Cesar Lapuz, Philippine Corporate Law (2001), p. 54. Emphasis and italicization
supplied.
5
SEC. 127. Tax on Sale, Barter or Exchange of Shares of Stock Listed and Traded through
the Local Stock Exchange or through Initial Public Offering. —
(B) Tax on Shares of Stock Sold or Exchanged Through Initial Public Offering. — There shall be
levied, assessed and collected on every sale, barter, exchange or other disposition through initial
public offering of shares of stock in closely held corporations, as defined herein, a tax at the rates
provided hereunder based on the gross selling price or gross value in money of the shares of stock
sold, bartered, exchanged or otherwise disposed in accordance with the proportion of shares of stock
sold, bartered, exchanged or otherwise disposed to the total outstanding shares of stock after the
listing in the local stock exchange: chanRoblesvirt ual Lawlib rary
xxxx
For purposes of this Section, the term ‘closely held corporation’ means any corporation at least fifty
percent (50%) in value of the outstanding capital stock of all classes of stock entitled to vote is
owned directly or indirectly by or for not more than twenty (20) individuals.
For purposes of determining whether the corporation is a closely held corporation, insofar as such
determination is based on stock ownership, the following rules shall be applied: chanRoblesvirtual Lawli bra ry
(1) Stock not Owned by Individuals. — Stock owned directly or indirectly by or for a
corporation, partnership, estate or trust shall be considered as being owned
proportionately by its shareholders, partners or beneficiaries. x x x
6
Sec. 96. Definition and applicability of Title. –
A close corporation, within the meaning of this Code, is one whose articles of incorporation provide
that: (1) All the corporation’s issued stock of all classes, exclusive of treasury shares, shall be held of
record by not more than a specified number of persons, not exceeding twenty (20); (2) all the issued
stock of all classes shall be subject to one or more specified restrictions on transfer permitted by this
Title; and (3) The corporation shall not list in any stock exchange or make any public offering of any
of its stock of any class. Notwithstanding the foregoing, a corporation shall not be deemed a
close corporation when at least two-thirds (2/3) of its voting stock or voting rights is
owned or controlled by another corporation which is not a close corporation within the
meaning of this Code.
Any corporation may be incorporated as a close corporation, except mining or oil companies,
stock exchanges, banks, insurance companies, public utilities, educational institutions and
corporations declared to be vested with public interest in accordance with the provisions of this Code.
7
Dated December 17, 2010; emphasis supplied. See also BIR Ruling Nos. 072-97, July 2, 1997 and
055-81, March 23, 1981.
8
SEC En Banc Case No. 09-09-177, March 25, 2010.
9
Dated April 26, 1988.
10
G.R. No. 176579, October 9, 2012.
11
G.R. Nos. 175418-20, December 5, 2012.
12
See SEC-OGC Opinion No. 03-08 dated 15 January 2008.
13
SEC En Banc Case No. 07-10-205, November 25, 2010.
14
Villanueva, Cesar Lapuz. Philippine Corporate Law (2001), p. 54.
15
No. L-14441, December 17, 1966, 18 SCRA 924.
16
Emphasis supplied.
17
Emphasis supplied.
18
Emphasis supplied.
19
Emphasis supplied.
20
Emphasis supplied.
21
Emphasis supplied.
22
Dissenting Opinion, p. 41.
23Otherwise known as the “Guidelines on Compliance with the Filipino-Foreign Ownership

Requirements Prescribed in the Constitution and/or Existing Laws by Corporations Engaged in
Nationalized and Partly Nationalized Activities,” dated May 20, 2013 and Published on May 22, 2013.
24 492 Phil. 682 (2005).
25
150 Phil. 547 (1972).
26 Section 77 of RA 7942: chanRoblesvirtual Lawlib ra ry
Within thirty (30) days, after the submission of the case by the parties for the decision, the panel
shall have exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear and decide the following: chanRoblesvirtua lLawl ibra ry
(a) Disputes involving rights to mining areas;

(b) Disputes involving mineral agreements or permits.
27
565 Phil 466 (2007). The Court held: “The phrase ‘disputes involving rights to mining areas’ refers
to any adverse claim, protest, or opposition to an application for mineral agreement. The POA
therefore has the jurisdiction to resolve any adverse claim, protest, or opposition to a pending
application for a mineral agreement filed with the concerned Regional Office of the MGB. This is clear
from Secs. 38 and 41 of the DENR A 96-40 xxx.”
DISSENTING OPINION
LEONEN, J.:
I dissent from the majority’s Resolution denying with finality the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
petitioners. I maintain the positions I articulated in my Dissent to the April 21, 2014 Decision.
I welcome the majority’s statements clarifying the relative applicability of the Grandfather Rule in
relation to the Control Test. I particularly welcome the clarification that “it is only when the Control
Test is first complied with that the Grandfather Rule may be applied.”1 This is in line with the position
I articulated in my Dissent to the April 21, 2014 Decision that the Control Test should find priority in
application, with the Grandfather Rule being applicable only as a “supplement.”2 chanrob lesvi rtua llawli bra ry
However, I maintain that the Panel of Arbitrators of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR Panel of Arbitrators) never had jurisdiction to rule on the nationalities of petitioners
Narra Nickel Mining and Development Corp. (Narra), Tesoro Mining and Development, Inc. (Tesoro),
and McArthur Mining, Inc. (McArthur) and on the question of whether they should be qualified to hold
Mineral Production Sharing Agreements (MPSA). It is error for the majority to rule that petitioners
are foreign corporations proceeding from the actions of a body which never had jurisdiction and
competence to rule on the judicial question of nationality.
Likewise, I maintain that respondent Redmont Consolidated Mines Corp. (Redmont) engaged in
blatant forum shopping. This, the lack of jurisdiction and competence of the DENR Panel of
Arbitrators, and the error of proceeding from the acts of an incompetent body are sufficient grounds
for granting the Petition and should suffice as bases for granting the present Motion for
Reconsideration.
The DENR Panel of Arbitrators had no competence to rule on the

Petitions filed by Redmont
The jurisdiction of the DENR Panel of Arbitrators is spelled out in Section 77 of Republic Act No. 7942,
otherwise known as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 (the “Mining Act”): chanRoblesvirt ual Lawlib rary
Section 77. Panel of Arbitrators – . . . . Within thirty (30) working days, after the submission of the
case by the parties for decision, the panel shall have exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear and
decide on the following: chanRoblesvi rt ual Lawlib rary
(a) Disputes involving rights to mining areas;

(b) Disputes involving mineral agreements or permit;
(c) Disputes involving surface owners, occupants and claimholders/concessionaires; and
(d) Disputes pending before the Bureau and the Department at the date of the effectivity of this Act.
The April 21, 2014 Decision sustained the jurisdiction of the DENR Panel of Arbitrators, relying on
pronouncements made in Celestial Nickel Mining Exploration Corporation v. Macroasia Corp.3 which
construed the phrase “disputes involving rights to mining areas” as referring “to any adverse claim,
protest, or opposition to an application for mineral agreement.”4 chanroblesv irt uallawl ibra ry
However, the Decision interpreted Section 77 of the Mining Act in a manner that runs afoul of this
court’s pronouncements in its Decision penned by Associate Justice Dante Tinga in Gonzales v.
Climax Mining Ltd.5 and in its Decision penned by Associate Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Philex Mining
Corp. v. Zaldivia.6
chanroble svirtuallaw lib rary
As pointed out in my Dissent to the April 21, 2014 Decision, “Gonzales v. Climax Mining Ltd.,7 ruled
on the jurisdiction of the Panel of Arbitrators as follows:”
We now come to the meat of the case which revolves mainly around the question of jurisdiction by
the Panel of Arbitrators: Does the Panel of Arbitrators have jurisdiction over the complaint for
declaration of nullity and/or termination of the subject contracts on the ground of fraud, oppression
and violation of the Constitution? This issue may be distilled into the more basic question of
whether the Complaint raises a mining dispute or a judicial question.
A judicial question is a question that is proper for determination by the courts, as opposed
to a moot question or one properly decided by the executive or legislative branch. A judicial
question is raised when the determination of the question involves the exercise of a judicial function;
that is, the question involves the determination of what the law is and what the legal rights of the
parties are with respect to the matter in controversy.
On the other hand, a mining dispute is a dispute involving (a) rights to mining areas, (b) mineral
agreements, FTAAs, or permits, and (c) surface owners, occupants and claimholders/concessionaires.
Under Republic Act No. 7942 (otherwise known as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995), the Panel of
Arbitrators has exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear and decide these mining disputes. The Court
of Appeals, in its questioned decision, correctly stated that the Panel’s jurisdiction is limited only
to those mining disputes which raise questions of fact or matters requiring the application
of technological knowledge and experience. 8 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
Philex Mining Corp. v. Zaldivia9 settled what “questions of fact” are appropriate for resolution in a
mining dispute: chanRoblesvirtua lLawl ibra ry
We see nothing in [S]ections 61 and 73 of the Mining Law that indicates a legislative intent to confer
real judicial power upon the Director of Mines. The very terms of [S]ection 73 of the Mining Law, as
amended by Republic Act No. 4388, in requiring that the adverse claim must “state in full detail the
nature, boundaries and extent of the adverse claim” show that the conflicts to be decided by reason
of such adverse claim refer primarily to questions of fact. This is made even clearer by the
explanatory note to House Bill No. 2522, later to become Republic Act 4388, that “[S]ections 61 and
73 that refer to the overlapping of claims are amended to expedite resolutions of mining conflicts * *
*.” The controversies to be submitted and resolved by the Director of Mines under the
sections refer ther[e]fore only to the overlapping of claims and administrative matters
incidental thereto.10 (Emphasis supplied)
The DENR Panel of Arbitrators, as its name denotes, is an arbitral body. It is not a court of law. Its
competence rests in its capacity to resolve factual issues arising between parties with competing
mining claims and requiring the application of technical expertise.
In this case, Redmont has not even shown that it has a competing mining claim. It has asked only
that petitioners be declared as not qualified to enter into MPSAs.
By sustaining the jurisdiction of the DENR Panel of Arbitrators, the majority effectively diminishes (if
not totally abandons) the distinction made in Gonzales and Philex between “mining disputes” and
“judicial questions.” Per Gonzales and Philex, judicial questions are cognizable only by courts of
justice, not by the DENR Panel of Arbitrators.
The majority’s reference to Celestial takes out of context the pronouncements made therein. To
reiterate what I have stated in my Dissent to the April 21, 2014 Decision, “[t]he pronouncements
in Celestial cited by the ponencia were made to address the assertions of Celestial Nickel and Mining
Corporation (Celestial Nickel) and Blue Ridge Mineral Corporation (Blue Ridge) that the Panel of
Arbitrators had the power to cancel existing mineral agreements pursuant to Section 77 of the Mining
Act. . . . These pronouncements did not undo or abandon the distinction, clarified in Gonzales,
between judicial questions and mining disputes.”11 chanro blesvi rt uallawli bra ry
The crux of this case relates to a matter that is beyond the competence of the DENR Panel of
Arbitrators. It does not pertain to the intricacies and specifications of mining operations. Rather, it
pertains to the legal status of petitioners and the rights or inhibitions accruing to them on account of
their status. It pertains to a judicial question.
II
On the applicability of the Grandfather Rule
I maintain the position I elucidated in my Dissent to the April 21, 2014 Decision. The Control Test,
rather than the Grandfather Rule, finds priority application in reckoning the nationalities of
corporations engaged in nationalized economic activities.
The Grandfather Rule finds no basis in the text of the 1987 Constitution. It is true that the records of
the Constitutional Commission “indicate an affirmative reference to the Grandfather
Rule.”12 However, whatever references these records make to the Grandfather Rule is not indicative
of a consensus among all members of the Constitutional Commission. At most, these references are
advisory and not binding on this court.13 Ultimately, what is controlling is the text of the Constitution
itself. This text is silent on the precise means of reckoning foreign ownership.
In contrast, the Control Test is firmly enshrined by congressional dictum in a statute, specifically,
Republic Act No. 8179, otherwise known as the Foreign Investments Act (FIA). As this court has
pointed out, “[t]he FIA is the basic law governing foreign investments in the Philippines, irrespective
of the nature of business and area of investment.”14 chanroblesv irtuallawl ib rary
Section 3 (a) of the Foreign Investments Act defines a “Philippine national” as including “a
corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines of which at least sixty per cent (60%) of the
capital stock outstanding and entitled to vote is owned and held by citizens of the Philippines.” In my
Dissent to the April 21, 2014 Decision: chanRoblesvirtual Lawlib ra ry
This is a definition that is consistent with the first part of paragraph 7 of the 1967 SEC Rules, which
[originally articulated] the Control Test: “[s]hares belonging to corporations or partnerships at least
60 per cent of the capital of which is owned by Filipino citizens shall be considered as of Philippine
nationality.”15
The Control Test serves the rationale for nationalization of economic activities. It ensures effective
control by Filipinos and satisfies the requirement of beneficial ownership.
On the matter of control, my Dissent to the April 21, 2014 Decision explained that: chanRoblesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry
It is a matter of transitivity16 that if Filipino stockholders control a corporation which, in turn, controls
another corporation, then the Filipino stockholders control the latter corporation, albeit indirectly or
through the former corporation.
An illustration is apt.
Suppose that a corporation, “C”, is engaged in a nationalized activity requiring that 60% of its capital
be owned by Filipinos and that this 60% is owned by another corporation, “B”, while the remaining
40% is owned by stockholders, collectively referred to as “Y”. Y is composed entirely of foreign
nationals. As for B, 60% of its capital is owned by stockholders collectively referred to as “A”, while
the remaining 40% is owned by stockholders collectively referred to as “X”. The collective A, is
composed entirely of Philippine nationals, while the collective X is composed entirely of foreign
nationals. (N.b., in this illustration, capital is understood to mean “shares of stock entitled to vote in
the election of directors,” per the definition in Gamboa17). Thus: chanRoblesvirtual Lawlib ra ry
A: 60% X: 40%
B: 60% Y: 40%
By owning 60% of B’s capital, A controls B. Likewise, by owning 60% of C’s capital, B controls C.
From this, it follows, as a matter of transitivity, that A controls C; albeit indirectly, that is, through B.
This “control” holds true regardless of the aggregate foreign capital in B and C. As explained
in Gamboa, control by stockholders is a matter resting on the ability to vote in the election of
directors:chanRoblesvirt ual Lawlib rary
Indisputably, one of the rights of a stockholder is the right to participate in the control or
management of the corporation. This is exercised through his vote in the election of directors
because it is the board of directors that controls or manages the corporation.18
B will not be outvoted by Y in matters relating to C, while A will not be outvoted by X in matters
relating to B. Since all actions taken by B must necessarily be in conformity with the will of A,
anything that B does in relation to C is, in effect, in conformity with the will of A. No amount of
aggregating the foreign capital in B and C will enable X to outvote A, nor Y to outvote B.
In effect, A controls C, through B. Stated otherwise, the collective Filipinos in A, effectively control C,
through their control of B.19
From the definition of “beneficial owner or beneficial ownership” provided by the Implementing Rules
and Regulations (amended 2004) of Republic Act No. 8799, otherwise known as the Securities
Regulation Code, “there are two (2) ways through which one may be a beneficial owner of securities,
such as shares of stock: first, by having or sharing voting power; and second, by having or sharing
investment returns or power.”20 The Implementing Rules use “and/or”; thus, these are alternative
means which may or may not concur.
On the first — voting power — my Dissent to the April 21, 2014 Decision pointed out that: chanRoblesvirt ualLawl ibra ry
Voting power, as discussed previously, ultimately rests on the controlling stockholders of the
controlling investor corporation. To go back to the previous illustration, voting power ultimately rests
on A, it having the voting power in B which, in turn, has the voting power in C. 21
On the second — investment returns or power — the same Dissent pointed out that: chanRoblesvi rtual Lawli bra ry
As to investment returns or power, it is ultimately A which enjoys investment power. It controls B’s
investment decisions – including the disposition of securities held by B – and (again, through B)
controls C’s investment decisions.
Similarly, it is ultimately A which benefits from investment returns generated through C. Any income
generated by C redounds to B’s benefit, that is, through income obtained from C, B gains funds or
assets which it can use either to finance itself in respect of capital and/or operations. This is a direct
benefit to B, itself a Philippine national. This is also an indirect benefit to A, a collectivity of Philippine
nationals, as then, its business – B – not only becomes more viable as a going concern but also
becomes equipped to funnel income to A.
Moreover, beneficial ownership need not be direct. A controlling shareholder is deemed the indirect
beneficial owner of securities (e.g., shares) held by a corporation of which he or she is a controlling
shareholder. Thus, in the previous illustration, A, the controlling shareholder of B, is the indirect
beneficial owner of the shares in C to the extent that they are held by B.22
However, 60 percent equity ownership is but a minimum. It is in this regard that the Dissent to the
April 21, 2014 Decision recognized that the Grandfather Rule properly finds application as a
“supplement” to the Control Test: chanRoblesvirtual Lawlib ra ry
Bare ownership of 60% of a corporation’s shares would not suffice. What is necessary is such
ownership as will ensure control of a corporation.
In Gamboa, “[f]ull beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital stock, coupled with
60 percent of the voting rights, is required.”23With this in mind, the Grandfather Rule may be
used as a supplement to the Control Test, that is, as a further check to ensure that control
and beneficial ownership of a corporation is in fact lodged in Filipinos.
For instance, Department of Justice Opinion No. 165, series of 1984, identified the following
“significant indicators” or badges of “dummy status”: chanRoblesvirtual Lawlib rary
1. That the foreign investor provides practically all the funds for the joint investment
undertaken by Filipino businessmen and their foreign partner[;]
2. That the foreign investors undertake to provide practically all the technological support
for the joint venture[; and]
3. That the foreign investors, while being minority stockholders, manage the company and
prepare all economic viability studies.24
In instances where methods are employed to disable Filipinos from exercising control and reaping the
economic benefits of an enterprise, the ostensible control vested by ownership of 60% of a
corporation’s capital may be pierced. Then, the Grandfather Rule allows for a further, more exacting
examination of who actually controls and benefits from holding such capital.25
The majority’s Resolution denying the present Motion for Reconsideration recognizes that the
Grandfather Rule alone does not suffice for reckoning Filipino and foreign equity ownership in
corporations engaged in nationalized economic activities. The majority echoes the characterization of
the applicability of the Grandfather Rule as only supplementary26 and explains: chanRoblesvirtual Lawlib ra ry
The Grandfather Rule, standing alone, should not be used to determine the Filipino ownership and
control in a corporation, as it could result to an otherwise foreign corporation rendered qualified to
perform nationalized or partly nationalized activities. Hence, it is only when the Control Test is
first complied with that the Grandfather Rule may be applied. Put in another manner, if the
subject corporation’s Filipino equity falls below the threshold 60%, the corporation is immediately
considered foreign-owned, in which case, the need to resort to the Grandfather Rule disappears.
On the other hand, a corporation that complies with the 60-40 Filipino to foreign equity
requirement can be considered a Filipino corporation if there is no doubt as to who has the
“beneficial ownership” and “control” of the corporation. In that instance, there is no need
for a dissection or further inquiry on the ownership of the corporate shareholders in both the
investing and investee corporation or the application of the Grandfather Rule. As a corollary
rule, even if the 60-40 Filipino to foreign equity is apparently met by the subject or investee
corporation, a resort to the Grandfather Rule is necessary if doubt exists as to the locus of
the “beneficial ownership” and “control.”27
III
Proceeding from the actions of the DENR
Panel of Arbitrators is improper
Following the above-quoted portion in its discussion, the majority states that “[i]n this case, a further
investigation as to the nationality of the personalities with the beneficial ownership and control of the
corporate shareholders in both the investing and investee corporations is necessary.”28 chanroble svirtual lawlib rary
The majority then proceeds to an analysis of the equity structures of petitioners. The analysis notes
that 59.97% of Narra’s 10,000 shares29 is held by Patricia Louise Mining and Development
Corporation (Patricia Louise), 65.96% of whose shares is, in turn, held by Palawan Alpha South
Resources Development Corporation (PASRDC). It adds that 59.97% of Tesoro’s 10,000 common
shares is held by Sara Marie Mining, Inc. (Sara Marie), a Filipino corporation, 66.63% of whose
shares is, in turn, held by Olympic Mines and Development Corporation (Olympic), another Filipino
corporation. Finally, 59.97% of McArthur’s 10,000 common shares is held by Madridejos Mining
Corporation (Madridejos), a Filipino corporation, 66.63% of whose shares is, in turn, held by
Olympic.
The majority also notes that 39.98% of Narra’s shares is held by Canadian corporation MBMI
Resources, Inc. (MBMI), while 39.98% of Tesoro’s and McArthur’s common shares is held by
MBMI.30 It adds that in the case of the majority shareholder of Narra (i.e., Patricia Louise), 33.96%
of its shares is owned by MBMI, while in the cases of the respective majority shareholders of Tesoro
and McArthur (i.e., Sara Marie, and Madridejos, respectively), 33.31% of their shares is held by
MBMI.
The respective Filipino majority shareholders of Patricia Louise, Sara Marie, and Madridejos (i.e.,
PASRDC in the case of Patricia Louise, and Olympic in the cases of Sara Marie and Madridejos) did
not pay for shares. Instead, MBMI paid for their respective paid-up capital. The majority concludes,
applying the Grandfather Rule, that a foreign corporation — MBMI — breached the permissible
maximum of 40% foreign equity participation in the three (3) petitioner corporations and that
petitioners are foreign corporations not entitled to mineral production sharing agreements.
My Dissent to the April 21, 2014 Decision noted the inadequacy of relying merely on the
denomination of shares as common or preferred: chanRoblesvirt ual Lawlib rary
Proceeding from the findings of the Court of Appeals in its October 1, 2010 decision in CA-G.R. SP
No. 109703, it appears that at least 60% of equities in Narra, Tesoro, and McArthur is owned by
Philippine nationals. Per this initial analysis, Narra, Tesoro, and McArthur ostensibly satisfy the
requirements of the Control Test in order that they may be deemed Filipino corporations.
Attention must be drawn to how these findings fail to indicate which (fractional) portion of these
equities consist of “shares of stock entitled to vote in the election of directors” or, if there is even any
such portion of shares which are not entitled to vote. These findings fail to indicate any distinction
between common shares and preferred shares (not entitled to vote). Absent a basis for reckoning
non-voting shares, there is, thus, no basis for diminishing the 60% Filipino equity holding in Narra,
Tesoro, and McArthur and undermining their having ostensibly satisfied the requirements of the
Control Test in order to be deemed Filipino corporations qualified to enter into MPSAs. 31
It is the majority’s position that the mere reckoning of how shares are denominated — whether
common or preferred — suffices. I, however, proffer an analysis that requires looking into the actual
voting rights vested on each class of shares. While it is true that preferred shares are generally
viewed as non-voting shares, a conclusion that the preferred shares involved in this case are totally
bereft of voting rights is not warranted by a cursory consideration of how they are denominated.
The same Dissent conceded that a “more thorough consideration . . . could yield an entirely different
conclusion.”32 This is what the majority endeavors to embark on. However, it is improper to proceed,
as the majority does, from the action of a body without competence and jurisdiction as well as the
imprudent acts of forum shopping of Redmont, and, in the process, lend legitimacy to the DENR
Panel of Arbitrators’ and Redmont’s illicit actions: chanRoblesvirt ual Lawlib rary
Having made these observations, it should not be discounted that a more thorough consideration –
as has been intimated in the earlier disquisition regarding how 60% Filipino equity ownership is but a
minimum and how the Grandfather Rule may be applied to further examine actual Filipino ownership
– could yield an entirely different conclusion. In fact, Redmont has asserted that such a situation
avails.
However, the contingencies of this case must restrain the court’s consideration of
Redmont’s claims. Redmont sought relief from a body without jurisdiction – the Panel of
Arbitrators – and has engaged in blatant forum shopping. It has taken liberties with and
ran amok of rules that define fair play. It is, therefore, bound by its lapses and
indiscretions and must bear the consequences of its imprudence.33
IV
Redmont engaged in blatant forum shopping
It would be remiss of this court to overlook Redmont’s acts of forum shopping. To do so would enable
Redmont to profit from its own imprudence and for this court to countenance a manifest disrespect
for courts and quasi-judicial bodies. As extensively discussed in my Dissent to the April 21, 2014
Decision: chanRoblesvirtual Lawlib rary
Redmont has taken at least four (4) distinct routes all seeking substantially the same remedy.
Stripped of their verbosity and legalese, Redmont’s petitions before the DENR Panel of Arbitrators,
complaint before the Regional Trial Court, complaint before the Securities and Exchange Commission,
and petition before the Office of the President all seek to prevent Narra, Tesoro, and McArthur as well
as their co-respondents and/or co-defendants from engaging in mining operations. Moreover, these
are all grounded on the same cause (i.e., that they are disqualified from doing so because they fail to
satisfy the requisite Filipino equity ownership) and premised on the same facts or circumstances.
Redmont has created a situation where multiple tribunals must rule on the extent to which the
parties adverse to Redmont have met the requisite Filipino equity ownership. It is certainly possible
that conflicting decisions will be issued by the various tribunals over which Redmont’s various
applications for relief have been lodged. It is, thus, glaring that the very evil sought to be prevented
by the rule against forum shopping is being foisted by Redmont.
....
It strains credulity to accept that Redmont’s actions have not been willful. By filing petitions with the
DENR Panel of Arbitrators, Redmont started the entire series of events that have culminated in: first,
the present petition; second, the de-consolidated G.R. No. 205513; and third, at least one (1) more
petition filed with this court.34 chanroblesvi rt uallawl ibra ry
Following the adverse decision of the Panel of Arbitrators, Narra, Tesoro, and McArthur pursued
appeals before the Mines Adjudication Board. This is all but a logical consequence of the POA’s
adverse decision. While the appeal before the MAB was pending, Redmont filed a complaint with the
SEC and then filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court to enjoin the MAB from proceeding.
Redmont seems to have conveniently forgotten that it was its own actions that gave rise to the
proceedings before the MAB in the first place. Moreover, even as all these were pending and in
various stages of appeal and/or review, Redmont still filed a petition before the Office of the
President.
Consistent with Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the actions subject of these
consolidated petitions must be dismissed with prejudice.35
Apart from the Petition subject of the present Motion for Reconsideration, two (2) other cases
involving the same parties are now pending with this court. The first, G.R. No. 205513, relates to a
Complaint for Revocation of the certificates of registration of Narra, Tesoro, and McArthur filed by
Redmont with the Securities and Exchange Commission. G.R. No. 205513 was consolidated but later
de-consolidated with this case. The second is a case pending with this court’s First Division. This
relates to the Petition filed by Redmont with the Office of the President in which it sought the
cancellation of the financial or technical assistance agreement (FTAA) applications of Narra, Tesoro,
and McArthur.
That there are now three (3) simultaneously pending Petitions with this court is the result of
Redmont’s contemporaneously having sought remedies from: chanRoblesvirt ual Lawlib rary
1. The DENR Panel of Arbitrators;

2. The Securities and Exchange Commission;
3. The Regional Trial Court, Quezon City; and
4. The Office of the President.
While this and the two other cases pending with this court diverge as to the procedural routes they
have taken, they all boil down to the central issue of the nationalities of Narra, Tesoro and McArthur.
It is manifest that Redmont engaged in blatant forum shopping. The April 21, 2014 Decision
effectively rewarded Redmont’s abuse of court processes. Worse, maintaining the status quo of
having a multiplicity of cases reinforces the stance of leaving Redmont to reap the benefits of its
unconscionable scheme.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to grant the Motion for Reconsideration. I reiterate my vote to GRANT the
Petition for Review on Certiorari subject of G.R. No. 195580. The assailed Decision dated October 1,
2010 and the assailed Resolution dated February 15, 2011 of the Court of Appeals Seventh Division
in CA-G.R. SP No. 109703, which reversed and set aside the September 10, 2008 and July 1, 2009
Orders of the Mines Adjudication Board, should be SET ASIDE and DECLARED NULL AND VOID.
The September 10, 2008 Order of the Mines Adjudication Board dismissing the Petitions filed by
Redmont Consolidated Mines with the DENR Panel of Arbitrators must be REINSTATED.
Endnotes:
1
Narra Nickel v. Redmont, G.R. No. 195580, April 21, 2014, 12 [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Special Third
Division Resolution].
2
J. Leonen, dissenting opinion in Narra Nickel v. Redmont, G.R. No. 195580, April 21, 2014, [Per J.
Velasco, Jr., Third Division].
3
565 Phil. 466 (2007) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Second Division].
4
Id. at 499.
5
492 Phil. 682 (2005) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division].
6
150 Phil. 547 (1972) [Per J. J.B.L. Reyes, En Banc].
7
492 Phil. 682 (2005) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division].
8Id. at 692-693, as cited in J. Leonen, dissenting opinion in Narra Nickel v. Redmont, G.R. No.
195580, April 21, 2014, 10–11 [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Third Division].
9 150 Phil. 547 (1972) [Per J. Reyes, J.B.L, En Banc].
10
Id. at 553-554, as cited in J. Leonen, dissenting opinion in Narra Nickel v. Redmont, G.R. No.
195580, April 21, 2014, 11 [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Third Division].
11
J. Leonen, dissenting opinion in Narra Nickel v. Redmont, G.R. No. 195580, April 21, 2014, 11 [Per
J. Velasco, Jr., Third Division].
12
Id. at 34.
13
To reiterate what I stated in my dissent in Narra Nickel v. Redmont, G.R. No. 195580, April 21,
2014, 36 [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Third Division]: chanRoblesvi rtual Lawli bra ry
In the final analysis, the records of the Constitutional Commission do not bind this court. As Charles
P. Curtis, Jr. said on the role of history in constitutional exegesis: chanRoblesvirt ual Lawlib rary
The intention of the framers of the Constitution, even assuming we could discover what it was, when
it is not adequately expressed in the Constitution, that is to say, what they meant when they did not
say it, surely that has no binding force upon us. If we look behind or beyond what they set down in
the document, prying into what else they wrote and what they said, anything we may find is only
advisory. They may sit in at our councils. There is no reason why we should eavesdrop on theirs.
14Gamboa
v. Teves, G.R. No. 176579, October 9, 2012, 682 SCRA 397, 435 [Per J. Carpio, En Banc].
15
16
I.e., “([o]f a relation) such that, if it applies between successive members of a sequence, it must
also apply between any two members taken in order. For instance, if A is larger than B, and B is
larger than C, then A is larger than C”.
17Gamboa
v. Teves, G.R. No. 176579, June 28, 2011, 652 SCRA 690, 723 and 726 [Per J. Carpio, En
Banc] as cited in J. Leonen, dissenting opinion in Narra Nickel v. Redmont, G.R. No. 195580, April 21,
2014, [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Third Division].
18 Id. at 725.
19
20
Id. at 43–44.
21 Id. at 44.
22
Id.
23Gamboa v. Teves, G.R. No. 176579, June 28, 2011, 652 SCRA 690, 730 [Per J. Carpio, En Banc],
as cited in J. Leonen, dissenting opinion in Narra Nickel v. Redmont, G.R. No. 195580, April 21,
2014, 46 [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Third Division].
24
Sec. of Justice Op No. 165, s. 1984, as cited in J. Leonen, dissenting opinion in Narra Nickel v.
Redmont, G.R. No. 195580, April 21, 2014, 47 [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Third Division].
25
J. Leonen, dissenting opinion in Narra Nickel v. Redmont, G.R. No. 195580, April 21, 2014, 46–47
[Per J. Velasco, Jr., Third Division].
26 Id.
Narra Nickel v. Redmont, G.R. No. 195580, April 21, 2014, 12 [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Special Third
27
Division Resolution]. Emphasis and underscoring from the original, citation omitted.
28
Id.
29
The majority’s Resolution fails to specify if these are all common shares.
30
The majority’s Resolution also fails to specify if these are all common shares.
31J. Leonen, dissenting opinion in Narra Nickel v. Redmont, G.R. No. 195580, April 21, 2014, 47–48
[Per J. Velasco, Jr., Third Division].
32
Id. at 52.
33
Id.
34
Arising from Redmont’s Petition with the Office of the President.
35 Id. at 53-55. cralawred

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 195580, April 21, 2014
NARRA NICKEL MINING AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., TESORO MINING AND DEVELOPMENT,
INC., AND MCARTHUR MINING, INC., Petitioners, v. REDMONT CONSOLIDATED MINES
CORP., Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO JR., J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 filed by Narra Nickel and Mining
Development Corp. (Narra), Tesoro Mining and Development, Inc. (Tesoro), and McArthur Mining Inc.
(McArthur), which seeks to reverse the October 1, 2010 Decision1 and the February 15, 2011
Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA).
The Facts
Sometime in December 2006, respondent Redmont Consolidated Mines Corp. (Redmont), a domestic
corporation organized and existing under Philippine laws, took interest in mining and exploring
certain areas of the province of Palawan. After inquiring with the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR), it learned that the areas where it wanted to undertake exploration and
mining activities where already covered by Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA)
applications of petitioners Narra, Tesoro and McArthur.
Petitioner McArthur, through its predecessor–in–interest Sara Marie Mining, Inc. (SMMI), filed an
application for an MPSA and Exploration Permit (EP) with the Mines and Geo–Sciences Bureau (MGB),
Region IV–B, Office of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR). Subsequently, SMMI was issued MPSA–AMA–IVB–153 covering an area of over 1,782
hectares in Barangay Sumbiling, Municipality of Bataraza, Province of Palawan and EPA–IVB–44
which includes an area of 3,720 hectares in Barangay Malatagao, Bataraza, Palawan. The MPSA and
EP were then transferred to Madridejos Mining Corporation (MMC) and, on November 6, 2006,
assigned to petitioner McArthur.2
Petitioner Narra acquired its MPSA from Alpha Resources and Development Corporation and Patricia
Louise Mining & Development Corporation (PLMDC) which previously filed an application for an MPSA
with the MGB, Region IV–B, DENR on January 6, 1992. Through the said application, the DENR
issued MPSA–IV–1–12 covering an area of 3.277 hectares in barangays Calategas and San Isidro,
Municipality of Narra, Palawan. Subsequently, PLMDC conveyed, transferred and/or assigned its
rights and interests over the MPSA application in favor of Narra.
Another MPSA application of SMMI was filed with the DENR Region IV–B, labeled as MPSA–AMA–IVB–
154 (formerly EPA–IVB–47) over 3,402 hectares in Barangays Malinao and Princesa Urduja,
Municipality of Narra, Province of Palawan. SMMI subsequently conveyed, transferred and assigned
its rights and interest over the said MPSA application to Tesoro.
On January 2, 2007, Redmont filed before the Panel of Arbitrators (POA) of the DENR three (3)
separate petitions for the denial of petitioners’ applications for MPSA designated as AMA–IVB–153,
AMA–IVB–154 and MPSA IV–1–12.
In the petitions, Redmont alleged that at least 60% of the capital stock of McArthur, Tesoro and
Narra are owned and controlled by MBMI Resources, Inc. (MBMI), a 100% Canadian
corporation. Redmont reasoned that since MBMI is a considerable stockholder of petitioners, it was
the driving force behind petitioners’ filing of the MPSAs over the areas covered by applications since
it knows that it can only participate in mining activities through corporations which are deemed
Filipino citizens. Redmont argued that given that petitioners’ capital stocks were mostly owned by
MBMI, they were likewise disqualified from engaging in mining activities through MPSAs, which are
reserved only for Filipino citizens.
In their Answers, petitioners averred that they were qualified persons under Section 3(aq) of
Republic Act No. (RA) 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 which provided: chanRoblesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry
Sec. 3 Definition of Terms. As used in and for purposes of this Act, the following terms, whether in
singular or plural, shall mean: chanRoblesvirt ualLaw lib rary
xxxx
(aq) “Qualified person” means any citizen of the Philippines with capacity to contract, or a
corporation, partnership, association, or cooperative organized or authorized for the purpose of
engaging in mining, with technical and financial capability to undertake mineral resources
development and duly registered in accordance with law at least sixty per cent (60%) of the capital
of which is owned by citizens of the Philippines: Provided, That a legally organized foreign–owned
corporation shall be deemed a qualified person for purposes of granting an exploration permit,
financial or technical assistance agreement or mineral processing permit.
Additionally, they stated that their nationality as applicants is immaterial because they also applied
for Financial or Technical Assistance Agreements (FTAA) denominated as AFTA–IVB–09 for McArthur,
AFTA–IVB–08 for Tesoro and AFTA–IVB–07 for Narra, which are granted to foreign–owned
corporations. Nevertheless, they claimed that the issue on nationality should not be raised
since McArthur, Tesoro and Narra are in fact Philippine Nationals as 60% of their capital is
owned by citizens of the Philippines. They asserted that though MBMI owns 40% of the shares
of PLMC (which owns 5,997 shares of Narra),3 40% of the shares of MMC (which owns 5,997 shares
of McArthur)4 and 40% of the shares of SLMC (which, in turn, owns 5,997 shares of Tesoro),5 the
shares of MBMI will not make it the owner of at least 60% of the capital stock of each of
petitioners. They added that the best tool used in determining the nationality of a
corporation is the “control test,” embodied in Sec. 3 of RA 7042 or the Foreign
Investments Act of 1991. They also claimed that the POA of DENR did not have jurisdiction over
the issues in Redmont’s petition since they are not enumerated in Sec. 77 of RA 7942. Finally, they
stressed that Redmont has no personality to sue them because it has no pending claim or application
over the areas applied for by petitioners.
On December 14, 2007, the POA issued a Resolution disqualifying petitioners from gaining MPSAs. It
held:chanRoblesvirt ual Lawlib rary
[I]t is clearly established that respondents are not qualified applicants to engage in mining
activities. On the other hand, [Redmont] having filed its own applications for an EPA over the areas
earlier covered by the MPSA application of respondents may be considered if and when they are
qualified under the law. The violation of the requirements for the issuance and/or grant of permits
over mining areas is clearly established thus, there is reason to believe that the cancellation and/or
revocation of permits already issued under the premises is in order and open the areas covered to
other qualified applicants.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, the Panel of Arbitrators finds the Respondents, McArthur Mining Inc., Tesoro Mining
and Development, Inc., and Narra Nickel Mining and Development Corp. as, DISQUALIFIED for being
considered as Foreign Corporations. Their Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) are hereby
x x x DECLARED NULL AND VOID.6
The POA considered petitioners as foreign corporations being “effectively controlled” by MBMI, a
100% Canadian company and declared their MPSAs null and void. In the same Resolution, it gave
due course to Redmont’s EPAs. Thereafter, on February 7, 2008, the POA issued an Order7 denying
the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners.
Aggrieved by the Resolution and Order of the POA, McArthur and Tesoro filed a joint Notice of
Appeal8 and Memorandum of Appeal9 with the Mines Adjudication Board (MAB) while Narra
separately filed its Notice of Appeal10 and Memorandum of Appeal.11
In their respective memorandum, petitioners emphasized that they are qualified persons under the
law. Also, through a letter, they informed the MAB that they had their individual MPSA applications
converted to FTAAs. McArthur’s FTAA was denominated as AFTA–IVB–0912 on May 2007, while
Tesoro’s MPSA application was converted to AFTA–IVB–0813 on May 28, 2007, and Narra’s FTAA was
converted to AFTA–IVB–0714 on March 30, 2006.
Pending the resolution of the appeal filed by petitioners with the MAB, Redmont filed a
Complaint15 with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), seeking the revocation of the
certificates for registration of petitioners on the ground that they are foreign–owned or controlled
corporations engaged in mining in violation of Philippine laws. Thereafter, Redmont filed on
September 1, 2008 a Manifestation and Motion to Suspend Proceeding before the MAB praying for
the suspension of the proceedings on the appeals filed by McArthur, Tesoro and Narra.
Subsequently, on September 8, 2008, Redmont filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 92 (RTC) a Complaint16 for injunction with application for issuance of a temporary restraining
order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. 08–63379. Redmont
prayed for the deferral of the MAB proceedings pending the resolution of the Complaint before the
SEC.
But before the RTC can resolve Redmont’s Complaint and applications for injunctive reliefs, the MAB
issued an Order on September 10, 2008, finding the appeal meritorious. It held: chanRoblesvirt ualLaw lib rary
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Mines Adjudication Board hereby REVERSES and SETS
ASIDE the Resolution dated 14 December 2007 of the Panel of Arbitrators of Region IV–B
(MIMAROPA) in POA–DENR Case Nos. 2001–01, 2007–02 and 2007–03, and its Order dated 07
February 2008 denying the Motions for Reconsideration of the Appellants. The Petition filed by
Redmont Consolidated Mines Corporation on 02 January 2007 is hereby ordered DISMISSED.17
Belatedly, on September 16, 2008, the RTC issued an Order18 granting Redmont’s application for a
TRO and setting the case for hearing the prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction on
September 19, 2008.
Meanwhile, on September 22, 2008, Redmont filed a Motion for Reconsideration19 of the September
10, 2008 Order of the MAB. Subsequently, it filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration20 on
September 29, 2008.
Before the MAB could resolve Redmont’s Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration, Redmont filed before the RTC a Supplemental Complaint21 in Civil Case No. 08–
63379.
On October 6, 2008, the RTC issued an Order22 granting the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining the MAB from finally disposing of the appeals of petitioners and from resolving
Redmont’s Motion for Reconsideration and Supplement Motion for Reconsideration of the MAB’s
September 10, 2008 Resolution.
On July 1, 2009, however, the MAB issued a second Order denying Redmont’s Motion for
Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration and resolving the appeals filed by
petitioners.
Hence, the petition for review filed by Redmont before the CA, assailing the Orders issued by the
MAB. On October 1, 2010, the CA rendered a Decision, the dispositive of which reads: chanRoblesvirtual Lawlib rary
WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed Orders, dated September 10, 2008
and July 1, 2009 of the Mining Adjudication Board are reversed and set aside. The findings of the
Panel of Arbitrators of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources that respondents
McArthur, Tesoro and Narra are foreign corporations is upheld and, therefore, the rejection of their
applications for Mineral Product Sharing Agreement should be recommended to the Secretary of the
DENR.
With respect to the applications of respondents McArthur, Tesoro and Narra for Financial or Technical
Assistance Agreement (FTAA) or conversion of their MPSA applications to FTAA, the matter for its
rejection or approval is left for determination by the Secretary of the DENR and the President of the
Republic of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.23
In a Resolution dated February 15, 2011, the CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
petitioners.
After a careful review of the records, the CA found that there was doubt as to the nationality of
petitioners when it realized that petitioners had a common major investor, MBMI, a corporation
composed of 100% Canadians. Pursuant to the first sentence of paragraph 7 of Department of
Justice (DOJ) Opinion No. 020, Series of 2005, adopting the 1967 SEC Rules which implemented the
requirement of the Constitution and other laws pertaining to the exploitation of natural resources, the
CA used the “grandfather rule” to determine the nationality of petitioners. It provided: chanRoblesvirt ualLaw lib rary
Shares belonging to corporations or partnerships at least 60% of the capital of which is owned by
Filipino citizens shall be considered as of Philippine nationality, but if the percentage of Filipino
ownership in the corporation or partnership is less than 60%, only the number of shares
corresponding to such percentage shall be counted as of Philippine nationality. Thus, if
100,000 shares are registered in the name of a corporation or partnership at least 60% of the capital
stock or capital, respectively, of which belong to Filipino citizens, all of the shares shall be recorded
as owned by Filipinos. But if less than 60%, or say, 50% of the capital stock or capital of the
corporation or partnership, respectively, belongs to Filipino citizens, only 50,000 shares shall be
recorded as belonging to aliens.24 (emphasis supplied)
In determining the nationality of petitioners, the CA looked into their corporate structures and their
corresponding common shareholders. Using the grandfather rule, the CA discovered that MBMI in
effect owned majority of the common stocks of the petitioners as well as at least 60% equity interest
of other majority shareholders of petitioners through joint venture agreements. The CA found that
through a “web of corporate layering, it is clear that one common controlling investor in all mining
corporations involved x x x is MBMI.”25 Thus, it concluded that petitioners McArthur, Tesoro and
Narra are also in partnership with, or privies–in–interest of, MBMI.
Furthermore, the CA viewed the conversion of the MPSA applications of petitioners into FTAA
applications suspicious in nature and, as a consequence, it recommended the rejection of petitioners’
MPSA applications by the Secretary of the DENR.
With regard to the settlement of disputes over rights to mining areas, the CA pointed out that the
POA has jurisdiction over them and that it also has the power to determine the of nationality of
petitioners as a prerequisite of the Constitution prior the conferring of rights to “co–production, joint
venture or production–sharing agreements” of the state to mining rights. However, it also stated
that the POA’s jurisdiction is limited only to the resolution of the dispute and not on the approval or
rejection of the MPSAs. It stipulated that only the Secretary of the DENR is vested with the power to
approve or reject applications for MPSA.
Finally, the CA upheld the findings of the POA in its December 14, 2007 Resolution which considered
petitioners McArthur, Tesoro and Narra as foreign corporations. Nevertheless, the CA determined
that the POA’s declaration that the MPSAs of McArthur, Tesoro and Narra are void is highly improper.
While the petition was pending with the CA, Redmont filed with the Office of the President (OP) a
petition dated May 7, 2010 seeking the cancellation of petitioners’ FTAAs. The OP rendered a
Decision26 on April 6, 2011, wherein it canceled and revoked petitioners’ FTAAs for violating and
circumventing the “Constitution x x x[,] the Small Scale Mining Law and Environmental Compliance
Certificate as well as Sections 3 and 8 of the Foreign Investment Act and E.O. 584.”27 The OP, in
affirming the cancellation of the issued FTAAs, agreed with Redmont stating that petitioners
committed violations against the abovementioned laws and failed to submit evidence to negate
them. The Decision further quoted the December 14, 2007 Order of the POA focusing on the alleged
misrepresentation and claims made by petitioners of being domestic or Filipino corporations and the
admitted continued mining operation of PMDC using their locally secured Small Scale Mining Permit
inside the area earlier applied for an MPSA application which was eventually transferred to Narra. It
also agreed with the POA’s estimation that the filing of the FTAA applications by petitioners is a clear
admission that they are “not capable of conducting a large scale mining operation and that they need
the financial and technical assistance of a foreign entity in their operation, that is why they sought
the participation of MBMI Resources, Inc.”28 The Decision further quoted: chanRoblesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry
The filing of the FTAA application on June 15, 2007, during the pendency of the case only
demonstrate the violations and lack of qualification of the respondent corporations to engage in
mining. The filing of the FTAA application conversion which is allowed foreign corporation of the
earlier MPSA is an admission that indeed the respondent is not Filipino but rather of foreign
nationality who is disqualified under the laws. Corporate documents of MBMI Resources, Inc.
furnished its stockholders in their head office in Canada suggest that they are conducting operation
only through their local counterparts.29
The Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision was further denied by the OP in a Resolution30 dated
July 6, 2011. Petitioners then filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the OP’s Decision and
Resolution with the CA, docketed as CA–G.R. SP No. 120409. In the CA Decision dated February 29,
2012, the CA affirmed the Decision and Resolution of the OP. Thereafter, petitioners appealed the
same CA decision to this Court which is now pending with a different division.
Thus, the instant petition for review against the October 1, 2010 Decision of the CA. Petitioners put
forth the following errors of the CA:
chanRoblesvirt ual Lawlib rary
I.
The Court of Appeals erred when it did not dismiss the case for mootness despite the fact that the
subject matter of the controversy, the MPSA Applications, have already been converted into FTAA
applications and that the same have already been granted.
II.
The Court of Appeals erred when it did not dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction considering that
the Panel of Arbitrators has no jurisdiction to determine the nationality of Narra, Tesoro and
McArthur.
III.
The Court of Appeals erred when it did not dismiss the case on account of Redmont’s willful forum
shopping.
IV.
The Court of Appeals’ ruling that Narra, Tesoro and McArthur are foreign corporations based on the
“Grandfather Rule” is contrary to law, particularly the express mandate of the Foreign Investments
Act of 1991, as amended, and the FIA Rules.
V.
The Court of Appeals erred when it applied the exceptions to the res inter alios acta rule.
VI.
The Court of Appeals erred when it concluded that the conversion of the MPSA Applications into FTAA
Applications were of “suspicious nature” as the same is based on mere conjectures and surmises
without any shred of evidence to show the same.31
We find the petition to be without merit.
This case not moot and academic
The claim of petitioners that the CA erred in not rendering the instant case as moot is without merit.
Basically, a case is said to be moot and/or academic when it “ceases to present a justiciable
controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical
use or value.”32 Thus, the courts “generally decline jurisdiction over the case or dismiss it on the
ground of mootness.”33
The “mootness” principle, however, does accept certain exceptions and the mere raising of an issue
of “mootness” will not deter the courts from trying a case when there is a valid reason to do
so. In David v. Macapagal–Arroyo (David), the Court provided four instances where courts can
decide an otherwise moot case, thus: chanRoblesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry
1.) There is a grave violation of the Constitution;

2.) The exceptional character of the situation and paramount public interest is involved;
3.) When constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench,
the bar, and the public; and
4.) The case is capable of repetition yet evading review.34
All of the exceptions stated above are present in the instant case. We of this Court note that a grave
violation of the Constitution, specifically Section 2 of Article XII, is being committed by a foreign
corporation right under our country’s nose through a myriad of corporate layering under different,
allegedly, Filipino corporations. The intricate corporate layering utilized by the Canadian company,
MBMI, is of exceptional character and involves paramount public interest since it undeniably affects
the exploitation of our Country’s natural resources. The corresponding actions of petitioners during
the lifetime and existence of the instant case raise questions as what principle is to be applied to
cases with similar issues. No definite ruling on such principle has been pronounced by the Court;
hence, the disposition of the issues or errors in the instant case will serve as a guide “to the bench,
the bar and the public.”35 Finally, the instant case is capable of repetition yet evading review, since
the Canadian company, MBMI, can keep on utilizing dummy Filipino corporations through various
schemes of corporate layering and conversion of applications to skirt the constitutional prohibition
against foreign mining in Philippine soil.
Conversion of MPSA applications to FTAA applications
We shall discuss the first error in conjunction with the sixth error presented by petitioners since both
involve the conversion of MPSA applications to FTAA applications. Petitioners propound that the CA
erred in ruling against them since the questioned MPSA applications were already converted into
FTAA applications; thus, the issue on the prohibition relating to MPSA applications of foreign mining
corporations is academic. Also, petitioners would want us to correct the CA’s finding which deemed
the aforementioned conversions of applications as suspicious in nature, since it is based on mere
conjectures and surmises and not supported with evidence.
We disagree.
The CA’s analysis of the actions of petitioners after the case was filed against them by respondent is
on point. The changing of applications by petitioners from one type to another just because a case
was filed against them, in truth, would raise not a few sceptics’ eyebrows. What is the reason for
such conversion? Did the said conversion not stem from the case challenging their citizenship and to
have the case dismissed against them for being “moot”? It is quite obvious that it is petitioners’
strategy to have the case dismissed against them for being “moot.”
Consider the history of this case and how petitioners responded to every action done by the court or
appropriate government agency: on January 2, 2007, Redmont filed three separate petitions for
denial of the MPSA applications of petitioners before the POA. On June 15, 2007, petitioners filed a
conversion of their MPSA applications to FTAAs. The POA, in its December 14, 2007 Resolution,
observed this suspect change of applications while the case was pending before it and held: chanRoblesvi rt ual Lawlib rary
The filing of the Financial or Technical Assistance Agreement application is a clear admission that the
respondents are not capable of conducting a large scale mining operation and that they need the
financial and technical assistance of a foreign entity in their operation that is why they sought the
participation of MBMI Resources, Inc. The participation of MBMI in the corporation only proves the
fact that it is the Canadian company that will provide the finances and the resources to operate the
mining areas for the greater benefit and interest of the same and not the Filipino stockholders who
only have a less substantial financial stake in the corporation.
xxxx
x x x The filing of the FTAA application on June 15, 2007, during the pendency of the case only
demonstrate the violations and lack of qualification of the respondent corporations to engage in
mining. The filing of the FTAA application conversion which is allowed foreign corporation
of the earlier MPSA is an admission that indeed the respondent is not Filipino but rather of
foreign nationality who is disqualified under the laws. Corporate documents of MBMI
Resources, Inc. furnished its stockholders in their head office in Canada suggest that they are
conducting operation only through their local counterparts.36
On October 1, 2010, the CA rendered a Decision which partially granted the petition, reversing and
setting aside the September 10, 2008 and July 1, 2009 Orders of the MAB. In the said Decision, the
CA upheld the findings of the POA of the DENR that the herein petitioners are in fact foreign
corporations thus a recommendation of the rejection of their MPSA applications were recommended
to the Secretary of the DENR. With respect to the FTAA applications or conversion of the MPSA
applications to FTAAs, the CA deferred the matter for the determination of the Secretary of the DENR
and the President of the Republic of the Philippines.37
In their Motion for Reconsideration dated October 26, 2010, petitioners prayed for the dismissal of
the petition asserting that on April 5, 2010, then President Gloria Macapagal–Arroyo signed and
issued in their favor FTAA No. 05–2010–IVB, which rendered the petition moot and
academic. However, the CA, in a Resolution dated February 15, 2011 denied their motion for being a
mere “rehash of their claims and defenses.”38 Standing firm on its Decision, the CA affirmed the
ruling that petitioners are, in fact, foreign corporations. On April 5, 2011, petitioners elevated the
case to us via a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, questioning the Decision of the
CA. Interestingly, the OP rendered a Decision dated April 6, 2011, a day after this petition for review
was filed, cancelling and revoking the FTAAs, quoting the Order of the POA and stating that
petitioners are foreign corporations since they needed the financial strength of MBMI, Inc. in order to
conduct large scale mining operations. The OP Decision also based the cancellation on the
misrepresentation of facts and the violation of the “Small Scale Mining Law and Environmental
Compliance Certificate as well as Sections 3 and 8 of the Foreign Investment Act and E.O.
584.”39 On July 6, 2011, the OP issued a Resolution, denying the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
the petitioners.
Respondent Redmont, in its Comment dated October 10, 2011, made known to the Court the fact of
the OP’s Decision and Resolution. In their Reply, petitioners chose to ignore the OP Decision and
continued to reuse their old arguments claiming that they were granted FTAAs and, thus, the case
was moot. Petitioners filed a Manifestation and Submission dated October 19, 2012,40 wherein they
asserted that the present petition is moot since, in a remarkable turn of events, MBMI was able to
sell/assign all its shares/interest in the “holding companies” to DMCI Mining Corporation (DMCI), a
Filipino corporation and, in effect, making their respective corporations fully–Filipino owned.
Again, it is quite evident that petitioners have been trying to have this case dismissed for being
“moot.” Their final act, wherein MBMI was able to allegedly sell/assign all its shares and interest in
the petitioner “holding companies” to DMCI, only proves that they were in fact not Filipino
corporations from the start. The recent divesting of interest by MBMI will not change the stand of
this Court with respect to the nationality of petitioners prior the suspicious change in their corporate
structures. The new documents filed by petitioners are factual evidence that this Court has no power
to verify.
The only thing clear and proved in this Court is the fact that the OP declared that petitioner
corporations have violated several mining laws and made misrepresentations and falsehood in their
applications for FTAA which lead to the revocation of the said FTAAs, demonstrating that petitioners
are not beyond going against or around the law using shifty actions and strategies. Thus, in this
instance, we can say that their claim of mootness is moot in itself because their defense of
conversion of MPSAs to FTAAs has been discredited by the OP Decision.
Grandfather test
The main issue in this case is centered on the issue of petitioners’ nationality, whether Filipino or
foreign. In their previous petitions, they had been adamant in insisting that they were Filipino
corporations, until they submitted their Manifestation and Submission dated October 19, 2012 where
they stated the alleged change of corporate ownership to reflect their Filipino ownership. Thus, there
is a need to determine the nationality of petitioner corporations.
Basically, there are two acknowledged tests in determining the nationality of a corporation: the
control test and the grandfather rule. Paragraph 7 of DOJ Opinion No. 020, Series of 2005, adopting
the 1967 SEC Rules which implemented the requirement of the Constitution and other laws
pertaining to the controlling interests in enterprises engaged in the exploitation of natural resources
owned by Filipino citizens, provides:chanRoblesvi rtual Lawl ibra ry
Shares belonging to corporations or partnerships at least 60% of the capital of which is owned by
Filipino citizens shall be considered as of Philippine nationality, but if the percentage of Filipino
ownership in the corporation or partnership is less than 60%, only the number of shares
corresponding to such percentage shall be counted as of Philippine nationality. Thus, if 100,000
shares are registered in the name of a corporation or partnership at least 60% of the capital stock or
capital, respectively, of which belong to Filipino citizens, all of the shares shall be recorded as owned
by Filipinos. But if less than 60%, or say, 50% of the capital stock or capital of the corporation or
partnership, respectively, belongs to Filipino citizens, only 50,000 shares shall be counted as owned
by Filipinos and the other 50,000 shall be recorded as belonging to aliens.
The first part of paragraph 7, DOJ Opinion No. 020, stating “shares belonging to corporations or
partnerships at least 60% of the capital of which is owned by Filipino citizens shall be considered as
of Philippine nationality,” pertains to the control test or the liberal rule. On the other hand, the
second part of the DOJ Opinion which provides, “if the percentage of the Filipino ownership in the
corporation or partnership is less than 60%, only the number of shares corresponding to such
percentage shall be counted as Philippine nationality,” pertains to the stricter, more stringent
grandfather rule.
Prior to this recent change of events, petitioners were constant in advocating the application of the
“control test” under RA 7042, as amended by RA 8179, otherwise known as the Foreign Investments
Act (FIA), rather than using the stricter grandfather rule. The pertinent provision under Sec. 3 of the
FIA provides:chanRoblesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry
SECTION 3. Definitions. – As used in this Act: chanRoblesvirtual Lawlib ra ry
a.) The term Philippine national shall mean a citizen of the Philippines; or a domestic partnership or
association wholly owned by the citizens of the Philippines; a corporation organized under the laws of
the Philippines of which at least sixty percent (60%) of the capital stock outstanding and entitled to
vote is wholly owned by Filipinos or a trustee of funds for pension or other employee retirement or
separation benefits, where the trustee is a Philippine national and at least sixty percent (60%) of the
fund will accrue to the benefit of Philippine nationals: Provided, That were a corporation and its
non–Filipino stockholders own stocks in a Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
registered enterprise, at least sixty percent (60%) of the capital stock outstanding and
entitled to vote of each of both corporations must be owned and held by citizens of the
Philippines and at least sixty percent (60%) of the members of the Board of Directors, in
order that the corporation shall be considered a Philippine national. (emphasis supplied)
The grandfather rule, petitioners reasoned, has no leg to stand on in the instant case since the
definition of a “Philippine National” under Sec. 3 of the FIA does not provide for it. They further claim
that the grandfather rule “has been abandoned and is no longer the applicable rule.”41 They also
opined that the last portion of Sec. 3 of the FIA admits the application of a “corporate layering”
scheme of corporations. Petitioners claim that the clear and unambiguous wordings of the statute
preclude the court from construing it and prevent the court’s use of discretion in applying the law.
They said that the plain, literal meaning of the statute meant the application of the control test is
obligatory.
We disagree. “Corporate layering” is admittedly allowed by the FIA; but if it is used to circumvent
the Constitution and pertinent laws, then it becomes illegal. Further, the pronouncement of
petitioners that the grandfather rule has already been abandoned must be discredited for lack of
basis.
Art. XII, Sec. 2 of the Constitution provides: chanRobles virtua lLawl ibra ry
Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural
resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural
resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources
shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake
such activities, or it may enter into co–production, joint venture or production–sharing
agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum
of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding
twenty–five years, renewable for not more than twenty–five years, and under such terms and
conditions as may be provided by law.
xxxx
The President may enter into agreements with Foreign–owned corporations involving either technical
or financial assistance for large–scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals,
petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law,
based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such
agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local scientific and technical
resources. (emphasis supplied)
The emphasized portion of Sec. 2 which focuses on the State entering into different types of
agreements for the exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources with entities who
are deemed Filipino due to 60 percent ownership of capital is pertinent to this case, since the issues
are centered on the utilization of our country’s natural resources or specifically, mining. Thus, there
is a need to ascertain the nationality of petitioners since, as the Constitution so provides, such
agreements are only allowed corporations or associations “at least 60 percent of such capital is
owned by such citizens.” The deliberations in the Records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission
shed light on how a citizenship of a corporation will be determined: chanRoblesvi rtua lLa wlibra ry
Mr. BENNAGEN: Did I hear right that the Chairman’s interpretation of an independent national
economy is freedom from undue foreign control? What is the meaning of undue foreign control?
MR. VILLEGAS: Undue foreign control is foreign control which sacrifices national sovereignty and the
welfare of the Filipino in the economic sphere.
MR. BENNAGEN: Why does it have to be qualified still with the word “undue”? Why not simply
freedom from foreign control? I think that is the meaning of independence, because as phrased, it
still allows for foreign control.
MR. VILLEGAS: It will now depend on the interpretation because if, for example, we retain the
60/40 possibility in the cultivation of natural resources, 40 percent involves some control; not total
control, but some control.
MR. BENNAGEN: In any case, I think in due time we will propose some amendments.
MR. VILLEGAS: Yes. But we will be open to improvement of the phraseology.
Mr. BENNAGEN: Yes.
Thank you, Mr. Vice–President.
xxxx
MR. NOLLEDO: In Sections 3, 9 and 15, the Committee stated local or Filipino equity and foreign
equity; namely, 60–40 in Section 3, 60–40 in Section 9, and 2/3–1/3 in Section 15.
MR. NOLLEDO: In teaching law, we are always faced with the question: ‘Where do we base the
equity requirement, is it on the authorized capital stock, on the subscribed capital stock, or on the
paid–up capital stock of a corporation’? Will the Committee please enlighten me on this?
MR. VILLEGAS: We have just had a long discussion with the members of the team from the UP Law
Center who provided us with a draft. The phrase that is contained here which we adopted from the
UP draft is ‘60 percent of the voting stock.’
MR. NOLLEDO: That must be based on the subscribed capital stock, because unless declared
delinquent, unpaid capital stock shall be entitled to vote.
MR. NOLLEDO: Thank you.
With respect to an investment by one corporation in another corporation, say, a

corporation with 60–40 percent equity invests in another corporation which is permitted
by the Corporation Code, does the Committee adopt the grandfather rule?
MR. VILLEGAS: Yes, that is the understanding of the Committee.
MR. NOLLEDO: Therefore, we need additional Filipino capital?
MR. VILLEGAS: Yes.42 (emphasis supplied)
It is apparent that it is the intention of the framers of the Constitution to apply the grandfather rule
in cases where corporate layering is present. Elementary in statutory construction is when there is
conflict between the Constitution and a statute, the Constitution will prevail. In this instance,
specifically pertaining to the provisions under Art. XII of the Constitution on National Economy and
Patrimony, Sec. 3 of the FIA will have no place of application. As decreed by the honorable framers
of our Constitution, the grandfather rule prevails and must be applied.
Likewise, paragraph 7, DOJ Opinion No. 020, Series of 2005 provides: chanRoblesvi rtual Lawl ibra ry
The above–quoted SEC Rules provide for the manner of calculating the Filipino interest in a
corporation for purposes, among others, of determining compliance with nationality requirements
(the ‘Investee Corporation’). Such manner of computation is necessary since the shares in the
Investee Corporation may be owned both by individual stockholders (‘Investing Individuals’) and by
corporations and partnerships (‘Investing Corporation’). The said rules thus provide for the
determination of nationality depending on the ownership of the Investee Corporation and, in certain
instances, the Investing Corporation.
Under the above–quoted SEC Rules, there are two cases in determining the nationality of the
Investee Corporation. The first case is the ‘liberal rule’, later coined by the SEC as the Control Test
in its 30 May 1990 Opinion, and pertains to the portion in said Paragraph 7 of the 1967 SEC Rules
which states, ‘(s)hares belonging to corporations or partnerships at least 60% of the capital of which
is owned by Filipino citizens shall be considered as of Philippine nationality.’ Under the liberal Control
Test, there is no need to further trace the ownership of the 60% (or more) Filipino stockholdings of
the Investing Corporation since a corporation which is at least 60% Filipino–owned is considered as
Filipino.
The second case is the Strict Rule or the Grandfather Rule Proper and pertains to the portion in said
Paragraph 7 of the 1967 SEC Rules which states, “but if the percentage of Filipino ownership in the
corporation or partnership is less than 60%, only the number of shares corresponding to such
percentage shall be counted as of Philippine nationality.” Under the Strict Rule or Grandfather Rule
Proper, the combined totals in the Investing Corporation and the Investee Corporation must be
traced (i.e., “grandfathered”) to determine the total percentage of Filipino ownership.
Moreover, the ultimate Filipino ownership of the shares must first be traced to the level of the
Investing Corporation and added to the shares directly owned in the Investee Corporation x x x.
xxxx
In other words, based on the said SEC Rule and DOJ Opinion, the Grandfather Rule or the second
part of the SEC Rule applies only when the 60–40 Filipino–foreign equity ownership is in
doubt (i.e., in cases where the joint venture corporation with Filipino and foreign stockholders with
less than 60% Filipino stockholdings [or 59%] invests in other joint venture corporation which is
either 60–40% Filipino–alien or the 59% less Filipino). Stated differently, where the 60–40
Filipino–foreign equity ownership is not in doubt, the Grandfather Rule will not apply.
(emphasis supplied)
After a scrutiny of the evidence extant on record, the Court finds that this case calls for the
application of the grandfather rule since, as ruled by the POA and affirmed by the OP, doubt prevails
and persists in the corporate ownership of petitioners. Also, as found by the CA, doubt is present in
the 60–40 Filipino equity ownership of petitioners Narra, McArthur and Tesoro, since their common
investor, the 100% Canadian corporation––MBMI, funded them. However, petitioners also claim that
there is “doubt” only when the stockholdings of Filipinos are less than 60%.43
The assertion of petitioners that “doubt” only exists when the stockholdings are less than 60% fails
to convince this Court. DOJ Opinion No. 20, which petitioners quoted in their petition, only made an
example of an instance where “doubt” as to the ownership of the corporation exists. It would be
ludicrous to limit the application of the said word only to the instances where the stockholdings of
non–Filipino stockholders are more than 40% of the total stockholdings in a corporation. The
corporations interested in circumventing our laws would clearly strive to have “60% Filipino
Ownership” at face value. It would be senseless for these applying corporations to state in their
respective articles of incorporation that they have less than 60% Filipino stockholders since the
applications will be denied instantly. Thus, various corporate schemes and layerings are utilized to
circumvent the application of the Constitution.
Obviously, the instant case presents a situation which exhibits a scheme employed by stockholders to
circumvent the law, creating a cloud of doubt in the Court’s mind. To determine, therefore, the
actual participation, direct or indirect, of MBMI, the grandfather rule must be used.
McArthur Mining, Inc.
To establish the actual ownership, interest or participation of MBMI in each of petitioners’ corporate
structure, they have to be “grandfathered.”
As previously discussed, McArthur acquired its MPSA application from MMC, which acquired its
application from SMMI. McArthur has a capital stock of ten million pesos (PhP 10,000,000) divided
into 10,000 common shares at one thousand pesos (PhP 1,000) per share, subscribed to by the
following:44

Shares Subscribed
Madridejos Mining Filipino 5,997 PhP 5,997,000.00 PhP 825,000.00
Corporation
MBMI Resources, Inc. Canadian 3,998 PhP 3,998,000.00 PhP 1,878,174.60
Lauro L. Salazar Filipino 1 PhP 1,000.00 PhP 1,000.00
Fernando B. Esguerra Filipino 1 PhP 1,000.00 PhP 1,000.00
Manuel A. Agcaoili Filipino 1 PhP 1,000.00 PhP 1,000.00
Michael T. Mason American 1 PhP 1,000.00 PhP 1,000.00
Kenneth Cawkell Canadian 1 PhP 1,000.00 PhP 1,000.00
Total 10,000 PhP 10,000,000.00 PhP 2,708,174.60
(emphasis supplied)
Interestingly, looking at the corporate structure of MMC, we take note that it has a similar structure
and composition as McArthur. In fact, it would seem that MBMI is also a major investor and
“controls”45 MBMI and also, similar nominal shareholders were present, i.e. Fernando B. Esguerra
(Esguerra), Lauro L. Salazar (Salazar), Michael T. Mason (Mason) and Kenneth Cawkell (Cawkell): chanRoblesvirtua lLawl ib rary
Madridejos Mining Corporation

Shares Subscribed
Olympic Mines & Filipino 6,663 PhP 6,663,000.00 PhP 0
Development Corp.
Amanti Limson Filipino 1 PhP 1,000.00 PhP 1,000.00
Lauro Salazar Filipino 1 PhP 1,000.00 PhP 1,000.00
Emmanuel G. Hernando Filipino 1 PhP 1,000.00 PhP 1,000.00
Total 10,000 PhP 10,000,000.00 PhP 2,809,900.00
(emphasis supplied)
Noticeably, Olympic Mines & Development Corporation (Olympic) did not pay any amount with
respect to the number of shares they subscribed to in the corporation, which is quite absurd since
Olympic is the major stockholder in MMC. MBMI’s 2006 Annual Report sheds light on why Olympic
failed to pay any amount with respect to the number of shares it subscribed to. It states that
Olympic entered into joint venture agreements with several Philippine companies, wherein it holds
directly and indirectly a 60% effective equity interest in the Olympic Properties.46 Quoting the said
Annual report: chanRoblesvirtual Lawlib rary
On September 9, 2004, the Company and Olympic Mines & Development Corporation (“Olympic”)
entered into a series of agreements including a Property Purchase and Development Agreement (the
Transaction Documents) with respect to three nickel laterite properties in Palawan, Philippines (the
“Olympic Properties”). The Transaction Documents effectively establish a joint venture
between the Company and Olympic for purposes of developing the Olympic
Properties. The Company holds directly and indirectly an initial 60% interest in the joint
venture. Under certain circumstances and upon achieving certain milestones, the
Company may earn up to a 100% interest, subject to a 2.5% net revenue royalty.47 (emphasis
supplied)
Thus, as demonstrated in this first corporation, McArthur, when it is “grandfathered,” company

layering was utilized by MBMI to gain control over McArthur. It is apparent that MBMI has more than
60% or more equity interest in McArthur, making the latter a foreign corporation.
Tesoro Mining and Development, Inc.
Tesoro, which acquired its MPSA application from SMMI, has a capital stock of ten million pesos (PhP
10,000,000) divided into ten thousand (10,000) common shares at PhP 1,000 per share, as
demonstrated below: chanRoblesvi rtual La wlibra ry
Shares Subscribed
Sara Marie Mining, Inc. Filipino 5,997 PhP 5,997,000.00 PhP 825,000.00
Total 10,000 PhP 10,000,000.00 PhP 2,708,174.60
(emphasis supplied)
Except for the name “Sara Marie Mining, Inc.,” the table above shows exactly the same figures as the
corporate structure of petitioner McArthur, down to the last centavo. All the other shareholders are
the same: MBMI, Salazar, Esguerra, Agcaoili, Mason and Cawkell. The figures under “Nationality,”
“Number of Shares,” “Amount Subscribed,” and “Amount Paid” are exactly the same. Delving
deeper, we scrutinize SMMI’s corporate structure: chanRoblesvirtual Lawlib ra ry
Sara Marie Mining, Inc.

Shares Subscribed
Olympic Mines & Filipino 6,663 PhP 6,663,000.00 PhP 0
Development Corp.
Amanti Limson Filipino 1 PhP 1,000.00 PhP 1,000.00
Lauro Salazar Filipino 1 PhP 1,000.00 PhP 1,000.00
Emmanuel G. Hernando Filipino 1 PhP 1,000.00 PhP 1,000.00
Total 10,000 PhP 10,000,000.00 PhP 2,809,900.00
(emphasis supplied)
After subsequently studying SMMI’s corporate structure, it is not farfetched for us to spot the glaring
similarity between SMMI and MMC’s corporate structure. Again, the presence of identical
stockholders, namely: Olympic, MBMI, Amanti Limson (Limson), Esguerra, Salazar, Hernando, Mason
and Cawkell. The figures under the headings “Nationality,” “Number of Shares,” “Amount
Subscribed,” and “Amount Paid” are exactly the same except for the amount paid by MBMI which
now reflects the amount of two million seven hundred ninety four thousand pesos (PhP
2,794,000). Oddly, the total value of the amount paid is two million eight hundred nine thousand
nine hundred pesos (PhP 2,809,900).
Accordingly, after “grandfathering” petitioner Tesoro and factoring in Olympic’s participation in

SMMI’s corporate structure, it is clear that MBMI is in control of Tesoro and owns 60% or more equity
interest in Tesoro. This makes petitioner Tesoro a non–Filipino corporation and, thus, disqualifies it
to participate in the exploitation, utilization and development of our natural resources.
Narra Nickel Mining and Development Corporation
Moving on to the last petitioner, Narra, which is the transferee and assignee of PLMDC’s MPSA
application, whose corporate structure’s arrangement is similar to that of the first two petitioners
discussed. The capital stock of Narra is ten million pesos (PhP 10,000,000), which is divided into ten
thousand common shares (10,000) at one thousand pesos (PhP 1,000) per share, shown as
follows:
chanRoblesvirtual Lawlib rary
Shares Subscribed
Patricia Louise Mining & Filipino 5,997 PhP 5,997,000.00 PhP 1,677,000.00
Development Corp.
Higinio C. Mendoza, Jr. Filipino 1 PhP 1,000.00 PhP 1,000.00
Henry E. Fernandez Filipino 1 PhP 1,000.00 PhP 1,000.00
Ma. Elena A. Bocalan Filipino 1 PhP 1,000.00 PhP 1,000.00
Bayani H. Agabin Filipino 1 PhP 1,000.00 PhP 1,000.00
Robert L. McCurdy American 1 PhP 1,000.00 PhP 1,000.00
Total 10,000 PhP 10,000,000.00 PhP 2,800,000.00
(emphasis supplied)
Again, MBMI, along with other nominal stockholders, i.e., Mason, Agcaoili and Esguerra, is present in
this corporate structure.
Patricia Louise Mining & Development Corporation
Using the grandfather method, we further look and examine PLMDC’s corporate structure: chanRoblesvirtualLaw lib rary

Shares Subscribed
Palawan Alpha Filipino 6,596 PhP 6,596,000.00 PhP 0
South Resources
Development Corporation
Higinio C. Mendoza, Jr. Filipino 1 PhP 1,000.00 PhP 1,000.00
Henry E. Fernandez Filipino 1 PhP 1,000.00 PhP 1,000.00
Bayani H. Agabin Filipino 1 PhP 1,000.00 PhP 1,000.00
Total 10,000 PhP 10,000,000.00 PhP 2,708,174.60
(emphasis supplied)
Yet again, the usual players in petitioners’ corporate structures are present. Similarly, the amount of
money paid by the 2nd tier majority stock holder, in this case, Palawan Alpha South Resources and
Development Corp. (PASRDC), is zero.
Studying MBMI’s Summary of Significant Accounting Policies dated October 31, 2005 explains the
reason behind the intricate corporate layering that MBMI immersed itself in: chanRoblesvirt ual Lawlib rary
JOINT VENTURES The Company’s ownership interests in various mining ventures engaged
in the acquisition, exploration and development of mineral properties in
the Philippines is described as follows:
(a) Olympic Group

The Philippine companies holding the Olympic Property, and the ownership and interests therein, are
as follows: chanRoblesvirt ual Lawlib rary
Olympic– Philippines (the “Olympic Group”)

Sara Marie Mining Properties Ltd. (“Sara Marie”) 33.3%
Tesoro Mining & Development, Inc. (Tesoro) 60.0%
Pursuant to the Olympic joint venture agreement the Company holds directly and indirectly
an effective equity interest in the Olympic Property of 60.0%. Pursuant to a shareholders’
agreement, the Company exercises joint control over the companies in the Olympic Group.
(b) Alpha Group
The Philippine companies holding the Alpha Property, and the ownership interests therein, are as
follows:chanRoblesvirtual Lawlib rary
Alpha– Philippines (the “Alpha Group”)

Patricia Louise Mining Development Inc. (“Patricia”) 34.0%
Narra Nickel Mining & Development Corporation (Narra) 60.4%
Under a joint venture agreement the Company holds directly and indirectly an effective equity
interest in the Alpha Property of 60.4%. Pursuant to a shareholders’ agreement, the
Company exercises joint control over the companies in the Alpha Group.48 (emphasis
supplied)
Concluding from the above–stated facts, it is quite safe to say that petitioners McArthur, Tesoro and
Narra are not Filipino since MBMI, a 100% Canadian corporation, owns 60% or more of their equity
interests. Such conclusion is derived from grandfathering petitioners’ corporate owners, namely:
MMI, SMMI and PLMDC. Going further and adding to the picture, MBMI’s Summary of Significant
Accounting Policies statement––regarding the “joint venture” agreements that it entered into with
the “Olympic” and “Alpha” groups––involves SMMI, Tesoro, PLMDC and Narra. Noticeably, the
ownership of the “layered” corporations boils down to MBMI, Olympic or corporations under the
“Alpha” group wherein MBMI has joint venture agreements with, practically exercising majority
control over the corporations mentioned. In effect, whether looking at the capital structure or the
underlying relationships between and among the corporations, petitioners are NOT Filipino nationals
and must be considered foreign since 60% or more of their capital stocks or equity interests are
owned by MBMI.
Application of the res inter alios acta rule
Petitioners question the CA’s use of the exception of the res inter alios acta or the “admission by co–
partner or agent” rule and “admission by privies” under the Rules of Court in the instant case, by
pointing out that statements made by MBMI should not be admitted in this case since it is not a party
to the case and that it is not a “partner” of petitioners.
Secs. 29 and 31, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provide: chanRoblesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry
Sec. 29. Admission by co–partner or agent.– The act or declaration of a partner or agent of the
party within the scope of his authority and during the existence of the partnership or agency, may be
given in evidence against such party after the partnership or agency is shown by evidence other than
such act or declaration itself. The same rule applies to the act or declaration of a joint owner, joint
debtor, or other person jointly interested with the party.
Sec. 31. Admission by privies.– Where one derives title to property from another, the act,
declaration, or omission of the latter, while holding the title, in relation to the property, is evidence
against the former.
Petitioners claim that before the above–mentioned Rule can be applied to a case, “the partnership
relation must be shown, and that proof of the fact must be made by evidence other than the
admission itself.”49 Thus, petitioners assert that the CA erred in finding that a partnership
relationship exists between them and MBMI because, in fact, no such partnership exists.
Partnerships vs. joint venture agreements

Petitioners claim that the CA erred in applying Sec. 29, Rule 130 of the Rules by stating that “by
entering into a joint venture, MBMI have a joint interest” with Narra, Tesoro and McArthur. They
challenged the conclusion of the CA which pertains to the close characteristics of “partnerships” and
“joint venture agreements.” Further, they asserted that before this particular partnership can be
formed, it should have been formally reduced into writing since the capital involved is more than
three thousand pesos (PhP 3,000). Being that there is no evidence of written agreement to form a
partnership between petitioners and MBMI, no partnership was created.
We disagree.
A partnership is defined as two or more persons who bind themselves to contribute money, property,
or industry to a common fund with the intention of dividing the profits among themselves.50 On the
other hand, joint ventures have been deemed to be “akin” to partnerships since it is difficult to
distinguish between joint ventures and partnerships. Thus: chanRoblesvirt ual Lawlib rary
[T]he relations of the parties to a joint venture and the nature of their association are so similar and
closely akin to a partnership that it is ordinarily held that their rights, duties, and liabilities are to be
tested by rules which are closely analogous to and substantially the same, if not exactly the same, as
those which govern partnership. In fact, it has been said that the trend in the law has been to blur
the distinctions between a partnership and a joint venture, very little law being found applicable to
one that does not apply to the other.51
Though some claim that partnerships and joint ventures are totally different animals, there are very
few rules that differentiate one from the other; thus, joint ventures are deemed “akin” or similar to a
partnership. In fact, in joint venture agreements, rules and legal incidents governing partnerships
are applied.52
Accordingly, culled from the incidents and records of this case, it can be assumed that the
relationships entered between and among petitioners and MBMI are no simple “joint venture
agreements.” As a rule, corporations are prohibited from entering into partnership agreements;
consequently, corporations enter into joint venture agreements with other corporations or
partnerships for certain transactions in order to form “pseudo partnerships.” Obviously, as the
intricate web of “ventures” entered into by and among petitioners and MBMI was executed to
circumvent the legal prohibition against corporations entering into partnerships, then the relationship
created should be deemed as “partnerships,” and the laws on partnership should be applied. Thus, a
joint venture agreement between and among corporations may be seen as similar to partnerships
since the elements of partnership are present.
Considering that the relationships found between petitioners and MBMI are considered to be
partnerships, then the CA is justified in applying Sec. 29, Rule 130 of the Rules by stating that “by
entering into a joint venture, MBMI have a joint interest” with Narra, Tesoro and McArthur.
Panel of Arbitrators’ jurisdiction
We affirm the ruling of the CA in declaring that the POA has jurisdiction over the instant case. The
POA has jurisdiction to settle disputes over rights to mining areas which definitely involve the
petitions filed by Redmont against petitioners Narra, McArthur and Tesoro. Redmont, by filing its
petition against petitioners, is asserting the right of Filipinos over mining areas in the Philippines
against alleged foreign–owned mining corporations. Such claim constitutes a “dispute” found in Sec.
77 of RA 7942: chanRoblesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry
Within thirty (30) days, after the submission of the case by the parties for the decision, the panel
shall have exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear and decide the following: chanRoblesvirtua lLawl ibra ry
(a) Disputes involving rights to mining areas

(b) Disputes involving mineral agreements or permits
We held in Celestial Nickel Mining Exploration Corporation v. Macroasia Corp.:53
The phrase “disputes involving rights to mining areas” refers to any adverse claim, protest, or
opposition to an application for mineral agreement. The POA therefore has the jurisdiction to resolve
any adverse claim, protest, or opposition to a pending application for a mineral agreement filed with
the concerned Regional Office of the MGB. This is clear from Secs. 38 and 41 of the DENR AO 96–40,
which provide: chanRoblesvirt ual Lawlib rary
Sec. 38.
xxxx
Within thirty (30) calendar days from the last date of publication/posting/radio announcements, the
authorized officer(s) of the concerned office(s) shall issue a certification(s) that the
publication/posting/radio announcement have been complied with. Any adverse claim, protest,
opposition shall be filed directly, within thirty (30) calendar days from the last date of
publication/posting/radio announcement, with the concerned Regional Office or through
any concerned PENRO or CENRO for filing in the concerned Regional Office for purposes of
its resolution by the Panel of Arbitrators pursuant to the provisions of this Act and these
implementing rules and regulations. Upon final resolution of any adverse claim, protest or
opposition, the Panel of Arbitrators shall likewise issue a certification to that effect within
five (5) working days from the date of finality of resolution thereof. Where there is no
adverse claim, protest or opposition, the Panel of Arbitrators shall likewise issue a
Certification to that effect within five working days therefrom.
xxxx
No Mineral Agreement shall be approved unless the requirements under this Section are
fully complied with and any adverse claim/protest/opposition is finally resolved by the
Panel of Arbitrators.
Sec. 41.
xxxx
Within fifteen (15) working days form the receipt of the Certification issued by the Panel
of Arbitrators as provided in Section 38 hereof, the concerned Regional Director shall
initially evaluate the Mineral Agreement applications in areas outside Mineral
reservations. He/She shall thereafter endorse his/her findings to the Bureau for further
evaluation by the Director within fifteen (15) working days from receipt of forwarded
documents. Thereafter, the Director shall endorse the same to the secretary for
consideration/approval within fifteen working days from receipt of such endorsement.
In case of Mineral Agreement applications in areas with Mineral Reservations, within fifteen (15)
working days from receipt of the Certification issued by the Panel of Arbitrators as provided for in
Section 38 hereof, the same shall be evaluated and endorsed by the Director to the Secretary for
consideration/approval within fifteen days from receipt of such endorsement. (emphasis supplied)
It has been made clear from the aforecited provisions that the “disputes involving rights to mining
areas” under Sec. 77(a) specifically refer only to those disputes relative to the applications for a
mineral agreement or conferment of mining rights.
The jurisdiction of the POA over adverse claims, protest, or oppositions to a mining right application
is further elucidated by Secs. 219 and 43 of DENR AO 95–936, which read: chanRoblesvirtual Lawlib ra ry
Sec. 219. Filing of Adverse Claims/Conflicts/Oppositions.– Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections

28, 43 and 57 above, any adverse claim, protest or opposition specified in said sections may
also be filed directly with the Panel of Arbitrators within the concerned periods for filing such
claim, protest or opposition as specified in said Sections.
Sec. 43. Publication/Posting of Mineral Agreement.–
xxxx
The Regional Director or concerned Regional Director shall also cause the posting of the application
on the bulletin boards of the Bureau, concerned Regional office(s) and in the concerned province(s)
and municipality(ies), copy furnished the barangays where the proposed contract area is located
once a week for two (2) consecutive weeks in a language generally understood in the locality. After
forty–five (45) days from the last date of publication/posting has been made and no adverse claim,
protest or opposition was filed within the said forty–five (45) days, the concerned offices shall issue a
certification that publication/posting has been made and that no adverse claim, protest or opposition
of whatever nature has been filed. On the other hand, if there be any adverse claim, protest
or opposition, the same shall be filed within forty–five (45) days from the last date of
publication/posting, with the Regional Offices concerned, or through the Department’s
Community Environment and Natural Resources Officers (CENRO) or Provincial
Environment and Natural Resources Officers (PENRO), to be filed at the Regional Office for
resolution of the Panel of Arbitrators. However previously published valid and subsisting mining
claims are exempted from posted/posting required under this Section.
No mineral agreement shall be approved unless the requirements under this section are
fully complied with and any opposition/adverse claim is dealt with in writing by the
Director and resolved by the Panel of Arbitrators. (Emphasis supplied.)
It has been made clear from the aforecited provisions that the “disputes involving rights to mining
areas” under Sec. 77(a) specifically refer only to those disputes relative to the applications for a
mineral agreement or conferment of mining rights.
The jurisdiction of the POA over adverse claims, protest, or oppositions to a mining right application
is further elucidated by Secs. 219 and 43 of DENRO AO 95–936, which reads: chanRoblesvirtua lLaw lib rary
Sec. 219. Filing of Adverse Claims/Conflicts/Oppositions.– Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections

28, 43 and 57 above, any adverse claim, protest or opposition specified in said sections may also be
filed directly with the Panel of Arbitrators within the concerned periods for filing such claim, protest
or opposition as specified in said Sections.
Sec. 43. Publication/Posting of Mineral Agreement Application.–
xxxx
The Regional Director or concerned Regional Director shall also cause the posting of the application
on the bulletin boards of the Bureau, concerned Regional office(s) and in the concerned province(s)
and municipality(ies), copy furnished the barangays where the proposed contract area is located
once a week for two (2) consecutive weeks in a language generally understood in the locality. After
forty–five (45) days from the last date of publication/posting has been made and no adverse claim,
protest or opposition was filed within the said forty–five (45) days, the concerned offices shall issue a
certification that publication/posting has been made and that no adverse claim, protest or opposition
of whatever nature has been filed. On the other hand, if there be any adverse claim, protest
or opposition, the same shall be filed within forty–five (45) days from the last date of
publication/posting, with the Regional offices concerned, or through the Department’s
Community Environment and Natural Resources Officers (CENRO) or Provincial
Environment and Natural Resources Officers (PENRO), to be filed at the Regional Office for
resolution of the Panel of Arbitrators. However, previously published valid and subsisting mining
claims are exempted from posted/posting required under this Section.
No mineral agreement shall be approved unless the requirements under this section are
fully complied with and any opposition/adverse claim is dealt with in writing by the
Director and resolved by the Panel of Arbitrators. (Emphasis supplied.)
These provisions lead us to conclude that the power of the POA to resolve any adverse claim,
opposition, or protest relative to mining rights under Sec. 77(a) of RA 7942 is confined only to
adverse claims, conflicts and oppositions relating to applications for the grant of mineral
rights. POA’s jurisdiction is confined only to resolutions of such adverse claims, conflicts
and oppositions and it has no authority to approve or reject said applications. Such power
is vested in the DENR Secretary upon recommendation of the MGB Director. Clearly, POA’s
jurisdiction over “disputes involving rights to mining areas” has nothing to do with the
cancellation of existing mineral agreements. (emphasis ours)
Accordingly, as we enunciated in Celestial, the POA unquestionably has jurisdiction to resolve

disputes over MPSA applications subject of Redmont’s petitions. However, said jurisdiction does not
include either the approval or rejection of the MPSA applications, which is vested only upon the
Secretary of the DENR. Thus, the finding of the POA, with respect to the rejection of petitioners’
MPSA applications being that they are foreign corporation, is valid.
Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen, in his Dissent, asserts that it is the regular courts, not the POA,
that has jurisdiction over the MPSA applications of petitioners.
This postulation is incorrect.
It is basic that the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action.54
Sec. 19, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 or “The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980” reads: chanRoblesvirtua lLaw lib rary
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases.—Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction:
chanRoblesvi rtual Lawli bra ry
1. In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
On the other hand, the jurisdiction of POA is unequivocal from Sec. 77 of RA 7942: chanRoblesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry
Section 77. Panel of Arbitrators.—
x x x Within thirty (30) days, after the submission of the case by the parties for the decision, the
panel shall have exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear and decide the following: chanRoblesvirtual Lawlib rary
(c) Disputes involving rights to mining areas

(d) Disputes involving mineral agreements or permits
It is clear that POA has exclusive and original jurisdiction over any and all disputes involving rights to
mining areas. One such dispute is an MPSA application to which an adverse claim, protest or
opposition is filed by another interested applicant. In the case at bar, the dispute arose or originated
from MPSA applications where petitioners are asserting their rights to mining areas subject of their
respective MPSA applications. Since respondent filed 3 separate petitions for the denial of said
applications, then a controversy has developed between the parties and it is POA’s jurisdiction to
resolve said disputes.
Moreover, the jurisdiction of the RTC involves civil actions while what petitioners filed with the DENR
Regional Office or any concerned DENRE or CENRO are MPSA applications. Thus POA has jurisdiction.
Furthermore, the POA has jurisdiction over the MPSA applications under the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction. Euro–med Laboratories v. Province of Batangas55 elucidates: chanRoblesvirtual Lawlib ra ry
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction holds that if a case is such that its determination requires the
expertise, specialized training and knowledge of an administrative body, relief must first be obtained
in an administrative proceeding before resort to the courts is had even if the matter may well be
within their proper jurisdiction.Whatever may be the decision of the POA will eventually reach the
court system via a resort to the CA and to this Court as a last recourse.
Selling of MBMI’s shares to DMCI
As stated before, petitioners’ Manifestation and Submission dated October 19, 2012 would want us to
declare the instant petition moot and academic due to the transfer and conveyance of all the
shareholdings and interests of MBMI to DMCI, a corporation duly organized and existing under
Philippine laws and is at least 60% Philippine–owned.56 Petitioners reasoned that they now cannot
be considered as foreign–owned; the transfer of their shares supposedly cured the “defect” of their
previous nationality. They claimed that their current FTAA contract with the State should stand since
“even wholly–owned foreign corporations can enter into an FTAA with the State.”57 Petitioners stress
that there should no longer be any issue left as regards their qualification to enter into FTAA
contracts since they are qualified to engage in mining activities in the Philippines. Thus, whether the
“grandfather rule” or the “control test” is used, the nationalities of petitioners cannot be doubted
since it would pass both tests.
The sale of the MBMI shareholdings to DMCI does not have any bearing in the instant case and said
fact should be disregarded. The manifestation can no longer be considered by us since it is being
tackled in G.R. No. 202877 pending before this Court. Thus, the question of whether petitioners,
allegedly a Philippine–owned corporation due to the sale of MBMI’s shareholdings to DMCI, are
allowed to enter into FTAAs with the State is a non–issue in this case.
In ending, the “control test” is still the prevailing mode of determining whether or not a corporation
is a Filipino corporation, within the ambit of Sec. 2, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, entitled to
undertake the exploration, development and utilization of the natural resources of the
Philippines. When in the mind of the Court there is doubt, based on the attendant facts and
circumstances of the case, in the 60–40 Filipino–equity ownership in the corporation, then it may
apply the “grandfather rule.”
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Court of Appeals
Decision dated October 1, 2010 and Resolution dated February 15, 2011 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 176579 : October 9, 2012
HEIRS OF WILSON P. GAMBOA,* Petitioners, v. FINANCE SECRETARYMARGARITO B. TEVES,

FINANCE UNDERSECRETARYJOHN P. SEVILLA, AND COMMISSIONER RICARDO ABCEDE OF
THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT(PCGG) IN THEIR CAPACITIES
AS CHAIR AND MEMBERS, RESPECTIVELY, OF THE PRIVATIZATION COUNCIL, CHAIRMAN
ANTHONI SALIM OF FIRST PACIFIC CO., LTD. IN HIS CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF METRO
PACIFIC ASSET HOLDINGS INC., CHAIRMAN MANUEL V. PANGILINAN OF PHILIPPINE
LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY (PLDT) IN HIS CAPACITY AS MANAGING
DIRECTOR OF FIRST PACIFIC CO., LTD., PRESIDENT NAPOLEON L. NAZARENO OF
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, CHAIR FE BARIN OF THE SECURITIES
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, and PRESIDENT FRANCIS LIM OF THE PHILIPPINE STOCK
EXCHANGE, Respondents.
PABLITO V. SANIDAD and ARNO V. SANIDAD, Petitioner-in-Intervention.
RESOLUTION
CARPIO, J.:
This resolves the motions for reconsideration of the 28 June 2011 Decision filed by (1) the Philippine
Stock Exchange's (PSE) President, 1 (2) Manuel V. Pangilinan (Pangilinan),2 (3) Napoleon L.
Ï‚rÎ½ll Ï‚rÎ½l l
Nazareno (Nazareno ),3 and ( 4) the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)4 (collectively,
Ï‚rÎ½ ll Ï‚rÎ½ll
movants ).
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) initially filed a motion for reconsideration on behalfofthe
SEC,5 assailing the 28 June 2011 Decision. However, it subsequently filed a Consolidated Comment
Ï‚rÎ½ ll
on behalf of the State,6 declaring expressly that it agrees with the Court's definition of the term
Ï‚rÎ½ ll
"capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution. During the Oral Arguments on 26 June 2012,
the OSG reiterated its position consistent with the Court's 28 June 2011 Decision.
We deny the motions for reconsideration.
I.
Far-reaching implications of the legal issue justify
treatment of petition for declaratory relief as one for mandamus.
As we emphatically stated in the 28 June 2011 Decision, the interpretation of the term "capital" in
Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution has far-reaching implications to the national economy. In
fact, a resolution of this issue will determine whether Filipinos are masters, or second-class citizens,
in their own country. What is at stake here is whether Filipinos or foreigners will have effective
control of the Philippine national economy. Indeed, if ever there is a legal issue that has far-
reaching implications to the entire nation, and to future generations of Filipinos, it is the threshold
legal issue presented in this case.
Contrary to Pangilinans narrow view, the serious economic consequences resulting in the
interpretation of the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution undoubtedly demand
an immediate adjudication of this issue. Simply put, the far-reaching implications of this issue
justify the treatment of the petition as one for mandamus.7 Ï‚rÎ½ll
In Luzon Stevedoring Corp. v. Anti-Dummy Board,8 the Court deemed it wise and expedient to
Ï‚rÎ½ll
resolve the case although the petition for declaratory relief could be outrightly dismissed for being
procedurally defective. There, appellant admittedly had already committed a breach of the Public
Service Act in relation to the Anti-Dummy Law since it had been employing non- American aliens long
before the decision in a prior similar case. However, the main issue in Luzon Stevedoring was of
transcendental importance, involving the exercise or enjoyment of rights, franchises, privileges,
properties and businesses which only Filipinos and qualified corporations could exercise or enjoy
under the Constitution and the statutes. Moreover, the same issue could be raised by appellant in an
appropriate action. Thus, in Luzon Stevedoring the Court deemed it necessary to finally dispose of
the case for the guidance of all concerned, despite the apparent procedural flaw in the petition.
The circumstances surrounding the present case, such as the supposed procedural defect of the
petition and the pivotal legal issue involved, resemble those in Luzon Stevedoring. Consequently, in
the interest of substantial justice and faithful adherence to the Constitution, we opted to resolve this
case for the guidance of the public and all concerned parties.
II.
No change of any long-standing rule;
thus, no redefinition of the term "capital."
Movants contend that the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution has long been
settled and defined to refer to the total outstanding shares of stock, whether voting or non-voting. In
fact, movants claim that the SEC, which is the administrative agency tasked to enforce the 60-40
ownership requirement in favor of Filipino citizens in the Constitution and various statutes, has
consistently adopted this particular definition in its numerous opinions. Movants point out that with
the 28 June 2011 Decision, the Court in effect introduced a "new" definition or "midstream
redefinition"9 of the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution.
Ï‚rÎ½ll
This is egregious error.
For more than 75 years since the 1935 Constitution, the Court has not interpreted or defined the
term "capital" found in various economic provisions of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. There
has never been a judicial precedent interpreting the term "capital" in the 1935, 1973 and 1987
Constitutions, until now. Hence, it is patently wrong and utterly baseless to claim that the Court in
defining the term "capital" in its 28 June 2011 Decision modified, reversed, or set aside the
purported long-standing definition of the term "capital," which supposedly refers to the total
outstanding shares of stock, whether voting or non-voting. To repeat, until the present case there
has never been a Court ruling categorically defining the term "capital" found in the various economic
provisions of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Philippine Constitutions.
The opinions of the SEC, as well as of the Department of Justice (DOJ), on the definition of the term
"capital" as referring to both voting and non-voting shares (combined total of common and preferred
shares) are, in the first place, conflicting and inconsistent. There is no basis whatsoever to the claim
that the SEC and the DOJ have consistently and uniformly adopted a definition of the term "capital"
contrary to the definition that this Court adopted in its 28 June 2011 Decision.
In DOJ Opinion No. 130, s. 1985,10 dated 7 October 1985, the scope of the term "capital" in Section
Ï‚rÎ½l l
9, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution was raised, that is, whether the term "capital" includes "both
preferred and common stocks." The issue was raised in relation to a stock-swap transaction between
a Filipino and a Japanese corporation, both stockholders of a domestic corporation that owned lands
in the Philippines. Then Minister of Justice Estelito P. Mendoza ruled that the resulting ownership
structure of the corporation would be unconstitutional because 60% of the voting stock would be
owned by Japanese while Filipinos would own only 40% of the voting stock, although when the non-
voting stock is added, Filipinos would own 60% of the combined voting and non-voting stock. This
ownership structure is remarkably similar to the current ownership structure of PLDT.
Minister Mendoza ruled:
xxxx
Thus, the Filipino group still owns sixty (60%) of the entire subscribed capital stock (common and
preferred) while the Japanese investors control sixty percent (60%) of the common (voting) shares.
It is your position that x x x since Section 9, Article XIV of the Constitution uses the word
"capital," which is construed "to include both preferred and common shares" and "that
where the law does not distinguish, the courts shall not distinguish."
xxxx
In light of the foregoing jurisprudence, it is my opinion that the stock-swap transaction in

question may not be constitutionally upheld. While it may be ordinary corporate practice to
classify corporate shares into common voting shares and preferred non-voting shares, any
arrangement which attempts to defeat the constitutional purpose should be eschewed. Thus, the
resultant equity arrangement which would place ownership of 60%11 of the commonÏ‚rÎ½ll
(voting) shares in the Japanese group, while retaining 60% of the total percentage of
common and preferred shares in Filipino hands would amount to circumvention of the
principle of control by Philippine stockholders that is implicit in the 60% Philippine
nationality requirement in the Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)
In short, Minister Mendoza categorically rejected the theory that the term "capital" in Section 9,
Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution includes "both preferred and common stocks" treated as the
same class of shares regardless of differences in voting rights and privileges. Minister Mendoza
stressed that the 60-40 ownership requirement in favor of Filipino citizens in the Constitution is not
complied with unless the corporation "satisfies the criterion of beneficial ownership" and that in
applying the same "the primordial consideration is situs of control."
On the other hand, in Opinion No. 23-10 dated 18 August 2010, addressed to Castillo Laman Tan
Pantaleon & San Jose, then SEC General Counsel Vernette G. Umali-Paco applied the Voting Control
Test, that is, using only the voting stock to determine whether a corporation is a Philippine national.
The Opinion states:
Applying the foregoing, particularly the Control Test, MLRC is deemed as a Philippine national
because: (1) sixty percent (60%) of its outstanding capital stock entitled to vote is owned by a
Philippine national, the Trustee; and (2) at least sixty percent (60%) of the ERF will accrue to the
benefit of Philippine nationals. Still pursuant to the Control Test, MLRCs investment in 60% of
BFDCs outstanding capital stock entitled to vote shall be deemed as of Philippine
nationality, thereby qualifying BFDC to own private land.
Further, under, and for purposes of, the FIA, MLRC and BFDC are both Philippine nationals,
considering that: (1) sixty percent (60%) of their respective outstanding capital stock entitled to
vote is owned by a Philippine national (i.e., by the Trustee, in the case of MLRC; and by MLRC, in the
case of BFDC); and (2) at least 60% of their respective board of directors are Filipino citizens.
(Boldfacing and italicization supplied)
Clearly, these DOJ and SEC opinions are compatible with the Courts interpretation of the 60-40
ownership requirement in favor of Filipino citizens mandated by the Constitution for certain economic
activities. At the same time, these opinions highlight the conflicting, contradictory, and inconsistent
positions taken by the DOJ and the SEC on the definition of the term "capital" found in the economic
provisions of the Constitution.
The opinions issued by SEC legal officers do not have the force and effect of SEC rules and
regulations because only the SEC en banc can adopt rules and regulations. As expressly provided in
Section 4.6 of the Securities Regulation Code,12 the SEC cannot delegate to any of its individual
Ï‚rÎ½l l
Commissioner or staff the power to adopt any rule or regulation. Further, under Section 5.1 of the
same Code, it is the SEC as a collegial body, and not any of its legal officers, that is
empowered to issue opinions and approve rules and regulations. Thus:
4.6. The Commission may, for purposes of efficiency, delegate any of its functions to any department
or office of the Commission, an individual Commissioner or staff member of the
Commission except its review or appellate authority and its power to adopt, alter and
supplement any rule or regulation.
The Commission may review upon its own initiative or upon the petition of any interested party any
action of any department or office, individual Commissioner, or staff member of the Commission.
SEC. 5. Powers and Functions of the Commission.- 5.1. The Commission shall act with transparency
and shall have the powers and functions provided by this Code, Presidential Decree No. 902-A, the
Corporation Code, the Investment Houses Law, the Financing Company Act and other existing laws.
Pursuant thereto the Commission shall have, among others, the following powers and functions: chanroble svirtual lawlib rary
xxxx
(g) Prepare, approve, amend or repeal rules, regulations and orders, and
issue opinions and provide guidance on and supervise compliance with such rules,
regulations and orders;
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the act of the individual Commissioners or legal officers of the SEC in issuing opinions that
have the effect of SEC rules or regulations is ultra vires. Under Sections 4.6 and 5.1(g) of the Code,
only the SEC en banc can "issue opinions" that have the force and effect of rules or regulations.
Section 4.6 of the Code bars the SEC en banc from delegating to any individual Commissioner or staff
the power to adopt rules or regulations. In short, any opinion of individual Commissioners or
SEC legal officers does not constitute a rule or regulation of the SEC.
The SEC admits during the Oral Arguments that only the SEC en banc, and not any of its individual
commissioners or legal staff, is empowered to issue opinions which have the same binding effect as
SEC rules and regulations, thus:
JUSTICE CARPIO:
So, under the law, it is the Commission En Banc that can issue an
SEC Opinion, correct?
COMMISSIONER GAITE:13 Ï‚rÎ½ ll
Thats correct, Your Honor.
JUSTICE CARPIO:
Can the Commission En Banc delegate this function to an SEC officer?
COMMISSIONER GAITE:
Yes, Your Honor, we have delegated it to the General Counsel.
JUSTICE CARPIO:
It can be delegated. What cannot be delegated by the Commission En Banc to a commissioner or an

individual employee of the Commission?
COMMISSIONER GAITE:
Novel opinions that [have] to be decided by the En Banc...
JUSTICE CARPIO:
What cannot be delegated, among others, is the power to adopt or amend rules and regulations,
correct?
COMMISSIONER GAITE:
Thats correct, Your Honor.
JUSTICE CARPIO:
So, you combine the two (2), the SEC officer, if delegated that power, can issue an opinion but that
opinion does not constitute a rule or regulation, correct?
COMMISSIONER GAITE:
Correct, Your Honor.
JUSTICE CARPIO:
So, all of these opinions that you mentioned they are not rules and regulations, correct?
COMMISSIONER GAITE:
They are not rules and regulations.
JUSTICE CARPIO:
If they are not rules and regulations, they apply only to that particular situation and will not
constitute a precedent, correct?
COMMISSIONER GAITE:
Yes, Your Honor.14 (Emphasis supplied)

Ï‚rÎ½ ll
Significantly, the SEC en banc, which is the collegial body statutorily empowered to issue rules and
opinions on behalf of the SEC, has adopted even the Grandfather Rule in determining compliance
with the 60-40 ownership requirement in favor of Filipino citizens mandated by the Constitution for
certain economic activities. This prevailing SEC ruling, which the SEC correctly adopted to thwart any
circumvention of the required Filipino "ownership and control," is laid down in the 25 March 2010
SEC en banc ruling in Redmont Consolidated Mines, Corp. v. McArthur Mining, Inc., et al.,15 to wit:
Ï‚rÎ½ ll
The avowed purpose of the Constitution is to place in the hands of Filipinos the exploitation of our
natural resources. Necessarily, therefore, the Rule interpreting the constitutional provision
should not diminish that right through the legal fiction of corporate ownership and control.
But the constitutional provision, as interpreted and practiced via the 1967 SEC Rules, has favored
foreigners contrary to the command of the Constitution. Hence, the Grandfather Rule must be
applied to accurately determine the actual participation, both direct and indirect, of
foreigners in a corporation engaged in a nationalized activity or business.
Compliance with the constitutional limitation(s) on engaging in nationalized activities must be

determined by ascertaining if 60% of the investing corporations outstanding capital stock is owned
by "Filipino citizens", or as interpreted, by natural or individual Filipino citizens. If such investing
corporation is in turn owned to some extent by another investing corporation, the same process must
be observed. One must not stop until the citizenships of the individual or natural stockholders of
layer after layer of investing corporations have been established, the very essence of the Grandfather
Rule.
Lastly, it was the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution to adopt the Grandfather
Rule. In one of the discussions on what is now Article XII of the present Constitution, the framers
made the following exchange:
MR. NOLLEDO. In Sections 3, 9 and 15, the Committee stated local or Filipino equity and foreign
MR. VILLEGAS. That is right.
MR. NOLLEDO. In teaching law, we are always faced with the question: Where do we base the equity
requirement, is it on the authorized capital stock, on the subscribed capital stock, or on the paid-up
capital stock of a corporation? Will the Committee please enlighten me on this?
MR. VILLEGAS. We have just had a long discussion with the members of the team from the UP Law
Center who provided us a draft. The phrase that is contained here which we adopted from the UP
draft is 60 percent of voting stock.
MR. NOLLEDO. That must be based on the subscribed capital stock, because unless declared
MR. NOLLEDO. Thank you. With respect to an investment by one corporation in another corporation,
say, a corporation with 60-40 percent equity invests in another corporation which is permitted by the
Corporation Code, does the Committee adopt the grandfather rule?
MR. VILLEGAS. Yes, that is the understanding of the Committee.
MR. NOLLEDO. Therefore, we need additional Filipino capital?
MR. VILLEGAS. Yes. (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied; italicization in the original)
This SEC en banc ruling conforms to our 28 June 2011 Decision that the 60-40 ownership
requirement in favor of Filipino citizens in the Constitution to engage in certain economic activities
applies not only to voting control of the corporation, but also to the beneficial ownership of the
corporation. Thus, in our 28 June 2011 Decision we stated:
Mere legal title is insufficient to meet the 60 percent Filipinoowned "capital" required in the
Constitution. Full beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital stock,
coupled with 60 percent of the voting rights, is required. The legal and beneficial ownership of
60 percent of the outstanding capital stock must rest in the hands of Filipino nationals in accordance
with the constitutional mandate. Otherwise, the corporation is "considered as non-Philippine
national[s]." (Emphasis supplied)
Both the Voting Control Test and the Beneficial Ownership Test must be applied to determine
whether a corporation is a "Philippine national."
The interpretation by legal officers of the SEC of the term "capital," embodied in various opinions
which respondents relied upon, is merely preliminary and an opinion only of such officers. To repeat,
any such opinion does not constitute an SEC rule or regulation. In fact, many of these opinions
contain a disclaimer which expressly states: "x x x the foregoing opinion is based solely on facts
disclosed in your query and relevant only to the particular issue raised therein and shall not be
used in the nature of a standing rule binding upon the Commission in other cases whether
of similar or dissimilar circumstances."16 Thus, the opinions clearly make a caveat that they do
Ï‚rÎ½ll
not constitute binding precedents on any one, not even on the SEC itself.
Likewise, the opinions of the SEC en banc, as well as of the DOJ, interpreting the law are neither
conclusive nor controlling and thus, do not bind the Court. It is hornbook doctrine that any
interpretation of the law that administrative or quasi-judicial agencies make is only preliminary,
never conclusive on the Court. The power to make a final interpretation of the law, in this case the
term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, lies with this Court, not with any
other government entity.
In his motion for reconsideration, the PSE President cites the cases of National Telecommunications
Commission v. Court of Appeals17 and Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. National
Ï‚rÎ½ll
Telecommunications Commission18 in arguing that the Court has already defined the term "capital"
Ï‚rÎ½ ll
in Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.19 Ï‚rÎ½l l
The PSE President is grossly mistaken. In both cases of National Telecommunications v. Court of
Appeals20 and Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. National Telecommunications
Ï‚rÎ½ ll
Commission,21 the Court did not define the term "capital" as found in Section 11, Article XII of the
Ï‚rÎ½ ll
1987 Constitution. In fact, these two cases never mentioned, discussed or cited Section 11,
Article XII of the Constitution or any of its economic provisions, and thus cannot serve as
precedent in the interpretation of Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution. These two
cases dealt solely with the determination of the correct regulatory fees under Section 40(e) and (f) of
the Public Service Act, to wit:
(e) For annual reimbursement of the expenses incurred by the Commission in the supervision of
other public services and/or in the regulation or fixing of their rates, twenty centavos for each one
hundred pesos or fraction thereof, of the capital stock subscribed or paid, or if no shares have
been issued, of the capital invested, or of the property and equipment whichever is higher.
(f) For the issue or increase of capital stock, twenty centavos for each one hundred pesos or
fraction thereof, of the increased capital. (Emphasis supplied)
The Courts interpretation in these two cases of the terms "capital stock subscribed or paid," "capital
stock" and "capital" does not pertain to, and cannot control, the definition of the term "capital" as
used in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution, or any of the economic provisions of the
Constitution where the term "capital" is found. The definition of the term "capital" found in the
Constitution must not be taken out of context. A careful reading of these two cases reveals that the
terms "capital stock subscribed or paid," "capital stock" and "capital" were defined solely to
determine the basis for computing the supervision and regulation fees under Section 40(e) and (f) of
the Public Service Act.
III.
Filipinization of Public Utilities
The Preamble of the 1987 Constitution, as the prologue of the supreme law of the land, embodies the
ideals that the Constitution intends to achieve.22 The Preamble reads:
Ï‚rÎ½ ll
We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just and
humane society, and establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote
the common good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our
posterity, the blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of law and a regime of truth,
justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution. (Emphasis
supplied)
Consistent with these ideals, Section 19, Article II of the 1987 Constitution declares as State policy
the development of a national economy "effectively controlled" by Filipinos:
Section 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively
controlled by Filipinos.
Fortifying the State policy of a Filipino-controlled economy, the Constitution decrees:
Section 10. The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and planning agency, when
the national interest dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations
at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, or such higher percentage as
Congress may prescribe, certain areas of investments. The Congress shall enact measures that will
encourage the formation and operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.
In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the
State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.
The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national
jurisdiction and in accordance with its national goals and priorities.23 Ï‚rÎ½ ll
Under Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, Congress may "reserve to citizens of the
Philippines or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by
such citizens, or such higher percentage as Congress may prescribe, certain areas of investments."
Thus, in numerous laws Congress has reserved certain areas of investments to Filipino citizens or to
corporations at least sixty percent of the "capital" of which is owned by Filipino citizens. Some of
these laws are: (1) Regulation of Award of Government Contracts or R.A. No. 5183; (2) Philippine
Inventors Incentives Act or R.A. No. 3850; (3) Magna Carta for Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises
or R.A. No. 6977; (4) Philippine Overseas Shipping Development Act or R.A. No. 7471; (5) Domestic
Shipping Development Act of 2004 or R.A. No. 9295; (6) Philippine Technology Transfer Act of 2009
or R.A. No. 10055; and (7) Ship Mortgage Decree or P.D. No. 1521.
With respect to public utilities, the 1987 Constitution specifically ordains:
Section 11. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of
a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or
associations organized under the laws of the Philippines, at least sixty per centum of
whose capital is owned by such citizens; nor shall such franchise, certificate, or authorization be
exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years. Neither shall any such franchise or right
be granted except under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by
the Congress when the common good so requires. The State shall encourage equity participation in
public utilities by the general public. The participation of foreign investors in the governing body of
any public utility enterprise shall be limited to their proportionate share in its capital, and all the
executive and managing officers of such corporation or association must be citizens of the
Philippines. (Emphasis supplied)
This provision, which mandates the Filipinization of public utilities, requires that any form of
authorization for the operation of public utilities shall be granted only to "citizens of the Philippines or
to corporations or associations organized under the laws of the Philippines at least sixty per centum
of whose capital is owned by such citizens." "The provision is [an express] recognition of the
sensitive and vital position of public utilities both in the national economy and for national
security."24 Ï‚rÎ½ ll
The 1987 Constitution reserves the ownership and operation of public utilities exclusively to (1)
Filipino citizens, or (2) corporations or associations at least 60 percent of whose "capital" is owned by
Filipino citizens. Hence, in the case of individuals, only Filipino citizens can validly own and operate a
public utility. In the case of corporations or associations, at least 60 percent of their "capital" must be
owned by Filipino citizens. In other words, under Section 11, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution, to own and operate a public utility a corporations capital must at least be 60
percent owned by Philippine nationals.
IV.
Definition of "Philippine National"
Pursuant to the express mandate of Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, Congress
enacted Republic Act No. 7042 or the Foreign Investments Act of 1991 (FIA), as amended, which
defined a "Philippine national" as follows:
SEC. 3. Definitions. - As used in this Act: chanroblesvi rtua llawli bra ry
a. The term "Philippine national" shall mean a citizen of the Philippines; or a domestic partnership or
association wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines; or a corporation organized under the
laws of the Philippines of which at least sixty percent (60%) of the capital stock
outstanding and entitled to vote is owned and held by citizens of the Philippines; or a
corporation organized abroad and registered as doing business in the Philippines under the
Corporation Code of which one hundred percent (100%) of the capital stock outstanding and entitled
to vote is wholly owned by Filipinos or a trustee of funds for pension or other employee retirement or
fund will accrue to the benefit of Philippine nationals: Provided, That where a corporation and its non-
Filipino stockholders own stocks in a Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) registered
enterprise, at least sixty percent (60%) of the capital stock outstanding and entitled to vote of each
of both corporations must be owned and held by citizens of the Philippines and at least sixty percent
(60%) of the members of the Board of Directors of each of both corporations must be citizens of the
Philippines, in order that the corporation, shall be considered a "Philippine national." (Boldfacing,
italicization and underscoring supplied)
Thus, the FIA clearly and unequivocally defines a "Philippine national" as a Philippine citizen, or a
domestic corporation at least "60% of the capital stock outstanding and entitled to vote" is
owned by Philippine citizens.
The definition of a "Philippine national" in the FIA reiterated the meaning of such term as provided in
its predecessor statute, Executive Order No. 226 or the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987,25 whichÏ‚rÎ½ll
was issued by then President Corazon C. Aquino. Article 15 of this Code states:
Article 15. "Philippine national" shall mean a citizen of the Philippines or a diplomatic partnership or
association wholly-owned by citizens of the Philippines; or a corporation organized under the
laws of the Philippines of which at least sixty per cent (60%) of the capital stock
trustee of funds for pension or other employee retirement or separation benefits, where the trustee is
a Philippine national and at least sixty per cent (60%) of the fund will accrue to the benefit of
Philippine nationals: Provided, That where a corporation and its non-Filipino stockholders own stock
in a registered enterprise, at least sixty per cent (60%) of the capital stock outstanding and entitled
to vote of both corporations must be owned and held by the citizens of the Philippines and at least
sixty per cent (60%) of the members of the Board of Directors of both corporations must be citizens
of the Philippines in order that the corporation shall be considered a Philippine national. (Boldfacing,
Under Article 48(3)26 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987, "no corporation x x x which is not a
Ï‚rÎ½l l
Philippine national x x x shall do business
x x x in the Philippines x x x without first securing from the Board of Investments a written certificate
to the effect that such business or economic activity x x x would not conflict with the Constitution or
laws of the Philippines."27 Thus, a "non-Philippine national" cannot own and operate a reserved
Ï‚ rÎ½ ll
economic activity like a public utility. This means, of course, that only a "Philippine national" can own
and operate a public utility.
In turn, the definition of a "Philippine national" under Article 15 of the Omnibus Investments Code of
1987 was a reiteration of the meaning of such term as provided in Article 14 of the Omnibus
Investments Code of 1981,28 to wit: Ï‚rÎ½l l
Article 14. "Philippine national" shall mean a citizen of the Philippines; or a domestic partnership or
laws of the Philippines of which at least sixty per cent (60%) of the capital stock
trustee of funds for pension or other employee retirement or separation benefits, where the trustee is
a Philippine national and at least sixty per cent (60%) of the fund will accrue to the benefit of
Philippine nationals: Provided, That where a corporation and its non-Filipino stockholders own stock
in a registered enterprise, at least sixty per cent (60%) of the capital stock outstanding and entitled
to vote of both corporations must be owned and held by the citizens of the Philippines and at least
sixty per cent (60%) of the members of the Board of Directors of both corporations must be citizens
of the Philippines in order that the corporation shall be considered a Philippine national. (Boldfacing,
Under Article 69(3) of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1981, "no corporation x x x which is not a
Philippine national x x x shall do business x x x in the Philippines x x x without first securing a written
certificate from the Board of Investments to the effect that such business or economic activity x x x
would not conflict with the Constitution or laws of the Philippines."29 Thus, a "non-Philippine
Ï‚rÎ½ ll
national" cannot own and operate a reserved economic activity like a public utility. Again, this means
that only a "Philippine national" can own and operate a public utility.
Prior to the Omnibus Investments Code of 1981, Republic Act No. 518630 or the Investment Ï‚rÎ½ ll
Incentives Act, which took effect on 16 September 1967, contained a similar definition of a
"Philippine national," to wit:
(f) "Philippine National" shall mean a citizen of the Philippines; or a partnership or association wholly
owned by citizens of the Philippines; or a corporation organized under the laws of the
Philippines of which at least sixty per cent of the capital stock outstanding and entitled to
vote is owned and held by citizens of the Philippines; or a trustee of funds for pension or other
employee retirement or separation benefits, where the trustee is a Philippine National and at least
sixty per cent of the fund will accrue to the benefit of Philippine Nationals: Provided, That where a
corporation and its non-Filipino stockholders own stock in a registered enterprise, at least sixty per
cent of the capital stock outstanding and entitled to vote of both corporations must be owned and
held by the citizens of the Philippines and at least sixty per cent of the members of the Board of
Directors of both corporations must be citizens of the Philippines in order that the corporation shall
be considered a Philippine National. (Boldfacing, italicization and underscoring supplied)
Under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 5455 or the Foreign Business Regulations Act, which took effect
on 30 September 1968, if the investment in a domestic enterprise by non-Philippine nationals
exceeds 30% of its outstanding capital stock, such enterprise must obtain prior approval from the
Board of Investments before accepting such investment. Such approval shall not be granted if the
investment "would conflict with existing constitutional provisions and laws regulating the degree of
required ownership by Philippine nationals in the enterprise."31 A "non-Philippine national" cannot
Ï‚rÎ½l l
own and operate a reserved economic activity like a public utility. Again, this means that only a
"Philippine national" can own and operate a public utility.
The FIA, like all its predecessor statutes, clearly defines a "Philippine national" as a Filipino
citizen, or a domestic corporation "at least sixty percent (60%) of the capital stock
outstanding and entitled to vote" is owned by Filipino citizens. A domestic corporation is a
"Philippine national" only if at least 60% of its voting stock is owned by Filipino citizens. This
definition of a "Philippine national" is crucial in the present case because the FIA reiterates and
clarifies Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, which limits the ownership and operation of
public utilities to Filipino citizens or to corporations or associations at least 60% Filipino-owned.
The FIA is the basic law governing foreign investments in the Philippines, irrespective of the nature of
business and area of investment. The FIA spells out the procedures by which non-Philippine nationals
can invest in the Philippines. Among the key features of this law is the concept of a negative list or
the Foreign Investments Negative List.32 Section 8 of the law states:
Ï‚rÎ½ll
SEC. 8. List of Investment Areas Reserved to Philippine Nationals [Foreign Investment

Negative List]. - The Foreign Investment Negative List shall have two 2 component lists: A and B:
Ï‚rÎ½l l chanroblesvi rtua llawli bra ry
a. List A shall enumerate the areas of activities reserved to Philippine nationals by

mandate of the Constitution and specific laws.
b. List B shall contain the areas of activities and enterprises regulated pursuant to law: chanroblesv irt uallawl ibra ry
1. which are defense-related activities, requiring prior clearance and authorization from the
Department of National Defense [DND] to engage in such activity, such as the manufacture, repair,
storage and/or distribution of firearms, ammunition, lethal weapons, military ordinance, explosives,
pyrotechnics and similar materials; unless such manufacturing or repair activity is specifically
authorized, with a substantial export component, to a non-Philippine national by the Secretary of
National Defense; or
2. which have implications on public health and morals, such as the manufacture and distribution of
dangerous drugs; all forms of gambling; nightclubs, bars, beer houses, dance halls, sauna and steam
bathhouses and massage clinics. (Boldfacing, underscoring and italicization supplied)
Section 8 of the FIA enumerates the investment areas "reserved to Philippine nationals." Foreign
Investment Negative List A consists of "areas of activities reserved to Philippine nationals
by mandate of the Constitution and specific laws," where foreign equity participation in
any enterprise shall be limited to the maximum percentage expressly prescribed by the
Constitution and other specific laws. In short, to own and operate a public utility in the
Philippines one must be a "Philippine national" as defined in the FIA. The FIA is abundant
notice to foreign investors to what extent they can invest in public utilities in the
Philippines.
To repeat, among the areas of investment covered by the Foreign Investment Negative List A is the
ownership and operation of public utilities, which the Constitution expressly reserves to Filipino
citizens and to corporations at least 60% owned by Filipino citizens. In other words, Negative List
A of the FIA reserves the ownership and operation of public utilities only to "Philippine
nationals," defined in Section 3(a) of the FIA as "(1) a citizen of the Philippines; x x x or (3) a
corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines of which at least sixty percent
(60%) of the capital stock outstanding and entitled to vote is owned and held by citizens
of the Philippines; or (4) a corporation organized abroad and registered as doing business in the
Philippines under the Corporation Code of which one hundred percent (100%) of the capital stock
outstanding and entitled to vote is wholly owned by Filipinos or a trustee of funds for pension or
other employee retirement or separation benefits, where the trustee is a Philippine national and at
least sixty percent (60%) of the fund will accrue to the benefit of Philippine nationals."
Clearly, from the effectivity of the Investment Incentives Act of 1967 to the adoption of the Omnibus
Investments Code of 1981, to the enactment of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987, and to the
passage of the present Foreign Investments Act of 1991, or for more than four decades, the
statutory definition of the term "Philippine national" has been uniform and consistent: it
means a Filipino citizen, or a domestic corporation at least 60% of the voting stock is
owned by Filipinos. Likewise, these same statutes have uniformly and consistently
required that only "Philippine nationals" could own and operate public utilities in the
Philippines. The following exchange during the Oral Arguments is revealing:
JUSTICE CARPIO:
Counsel, I have some questions. You are aware of the Foreign Investments Act of 1991, x x x? And
the FIA of 1991 took effect in 1991, correct? Thats over twenty (20) years ago, correct?
COMMISSIONER GAITE:
JUSTICE CARPIO:
And Section 8 of the Foreign Investments Act of 1991 states that []only Philippine nationals can own
and operate public utilities[], correct?
COMMISSIONER GAITE:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE CARPIO:
And the same Foreign Investments Act of 1991 defines a "Philippine national" either as a citizen of
the Philippines, or if it is a corporation at least sixty percent (60%) of the voting stock is owned by
citizens of the Philippines, correct?
COMMISSIONER GAITE:
JUSTICE CARPIO:
And, you are also aware that under the predecessor law of the Foreign Investments Act of 1991, the
Omnibus Investments Act of 1987, the same provisions apply: x x x only Philippine nationals can own
and operate a public utility and the Philippine national, if it is a corporation, x x x sixty percent (60%)
of the capital stock of that corporation must be owned by citizens of the Philippines, correct?
COMMISSIONER GAITE:
JUSTICE CARPIO:
And even prior to the Omnibus Investments Act of 1987, under the Omnibus Investments Act of
1981, the same rules apply: x x x only a Philippine national can own and operate a public utility and
a Philippine national, if it is a corporation, sixty percent (60%) of its x x x voting stock, must be
owned by citizens of the Philippines, correct?
COMMISSIONER GAITE:
JUSTICE CARPIO:
And even prior to that, under [the]1967 Investments Incentives Act and the Foreign Company Act of
1968, the same rules applied, correct?
COMMISSIONER GAITE:
JUSTICE CARPIO:
So, for the last four (4) decades, x x x, the law has been very consistent only a Philippine national
can own and operate a public utility, and a Philippine national, if it is a corporation, x x x at least
sixty percent (60%) of the voting stock must be owned by citizens of the Philippines, correct?
COMMISSIONER GAITE:
Correct, Your Honor.33 (Emphasis supplied)

Ï‚rÎ½l l
Government agencies like the SEC cannot simply ignore Sections 3(a) and 8 of the FIA which
categorically prescribe that certain economic activities, like the ownership and operation of public
utilities, are reserved to corporations "at least sixty percent (60%) of the capital stock
outstanding and entitled to vote is owned and held by citizens of the Philippines." Foreign
Investment Negative List A refers to "activities reserved to Philippine nationals by mandate of the
Constitution and specific laws." The FIA is the basic statute regulating foreign investments in
the Philippines. Government agencies tasked with regulating or monitoring foreign investments, as
well as counsels of foreign investors, should start with the FIA in determining to what extent a
particular foreign investment is allowed in the Philippines. Foreign investors and their counsels who
ignore the FIA do so at their own peril. Foreign investors and their counsels who rely on opinions of
SEC legal officers that obviously contradict the FIA do so also at their own peril.
Occasional opinions of SEC legal officers that obviously contradict the FIA should immediately raise a
red flag. There are already numerous opinions of SEC legal officers that cite the definition of a
"Philippine national" in Section 3(a) of the FIA in determining whether a particular corporation is
qualified to own and operate a nationalized or partially nationalized business in the Philippines. This
shows that SEC legal officers are not only aware of, but also rely on and invoke, the provisions of the
FIA in ascertaining the eligibility of a corporation to engage in partially nationalized industries. The
following are some of such opinions:
1. Opinion of 23 March 1993, addressed to Mr. Francis F. How;
2. Opinion of 14 April 1993, addressed to Director Angeles T. Wong of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration;
3. Opinion of 23 November 1993, addressed to Messrs. Dominador Almeda and Renato S. Calma;
4. Opinion of 7 December 1993, addressed to Roco Bunag Kapunan Migallos & Jardeleza;
5. SEC Opinion No. 49-04, addressed to Romulo Mabanta Buenaventura Sayoc & De Los Angeles;
6. SEC-OGC Opinion No. 17-07, addressed to Mr. Reynaldo G. David; and
7. SEC-OGC Opinion No. 03-08, addressed to Attys. Ruby Rose J. Yusi and Rudyard S. Arbolado.
The SEC legal officers occasional but blatant disregard of the definition of the term "Philippine
national" in the FIA signifies their lack of integrity and competence in resolving issues on the 60-40
ownership requirement in favor of Filipino citizens in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution.
The PSE President argues that the term "Philippine national" defined in the FIA should be limited and
interpreted to refer to corporations seeking to avail of tax and fiscal incentives under investment
incentives laws and cannot be equated with the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution. Pangilinan similarly contends that the FIA and its predecessor statutes do not apply to
"companies which have not registered and obtained special incentives under the schemes established
by those laws."
Both are desperately grasping at straws. The FIA does not grant tax or fiscal incentives to any
enterprise. Tax and fiscal incentives to investments are granted separately under the Omnibus
Investments Code of 1987, not under the FIA. In fact, the FIA expressly repealed Articles 44 to 56 of
Book II of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987, which articles previously regulated foreign
investments in nationalized or partially nationalized industries.
The FIA is the applicable law regulating foreign investments in nationalized or partially nationalized
industries. There is nothing in the FIA, or even in the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 or its
predecessor statutes, that states, expressly or impliedly, that the FIA or its predecessor statutes do
not apply to enterprises not availing of tax and fiscal incentives under the Code. The FIA and its
predecessor statutes apply to investments in all domestic enterprises, whether or not such
enterprises enjoy tax and fiscal incentives under the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 or its
predecessor statutes. The reason is quite obvious mere non-availment of tax and fiscal
incentives by a non-Philippine national cannot exempt it from Section 11, Article XII of the
Constitution regulating foreign investments in public utilities. In fact, the Board of
Investments Primer on Investment Policies in the Philippines,34 which is given out to foreign
Ï‚rÎ½ ll
investors, provides:
PART III. FOREIGN INVESTMENTS WITHOUT INCENTIVES
Investors who do not seek incentives and/or whose chosen activities do not qualify for incentives,
(i.e., the activity is not listed in the IPP, and they are not exporting at least 70% of their production)
may go ahead and make the investments without seeking incentives. They only have to be guided
by the Foreign Investments Negative List (FINL).
The FINL clearly defines investment areas requiring at least 60% Filipino ownership. All other areas
outside of this list are fully open to foreign investors. (Emphasis supplied)
V.
Right to elect directors, coupled with beneficial ownership,
translates to effective control.
The 28 June 2011 Decision declares that the 60 percent Filipino ownership required by the
Constitution to engage in certain economic activities applies not only to voting control of the
corporation, but also to the beneficial ownership of the corporation. To repeat, we held:
Mere legal title is insufficient to meet the 60 percent Filipino-owned "capital" required in the
Constitution. Full beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital stock,
coupled with 60 percent of the voting rights, is required. The legal and beneficial ownership of
60 percent of the outstanding capital stock must rest in the hands of Filipino nationals in accordance
with the constitutional mandate. Otherwise, the corporation is "considered as non-Philippine
national[s]." (Emphasis supplied)
This is consistent with Section 3 of the FIA which provides that where 100% of the capital stock is
held by "a trustee of funds for pension or other employee retirement or separation benefits," the
trustee is a Philippine national if "at least sixty percent (60%) of the fund will accrue to the benefit of
Philippine nationals." Likewise, Section 1(b) of the Implementing Rules of the FIA provides that "for
stocks to be deemed owned and held by Philippine citizens or Philippine nationals, mere legal title is
not enough to meet the required Filipino equity. Full beneficial ownership of the stocks, coupled
with appropriate voting rights, is essential."
Since the constitutional requirement of at least 60 percent Filipino ownership applies not only to
voting control of the corporation but also to the beneficial ownership of the corporation, it is therefore
imperative that such requirement apply uniformly and across the board to all classes of shares,
regardless of nomenclature and category, comprising the capital of a corporation. Under the
Corporation Code, capital stock35 consists of all classes of shares issued to stockholders, that is,
Ï‚rÎ½ll
common shares as well as preferred shares, which may have different rights, privileges or
restrictions as stated in the articles of incorporation.36 Ï‚rÎ½l l
The Corporation Code allows denial of the right to vote to preferred and redeemable shares, but
disallows denial of the right to vote in specific corporate matters. Thus, common shares have the
right to vote in the election of directors, while preferred shares may be denied such right.
Nonetheless, preferred shares, even if denied the right to vote in the election of directors, are
entitled to vote on the following corporate matters: (1) amendment of articles of incorporation; (2)
increase and decrease of capital stock; (3) incurring, creating or increasing bonded indebtedness; (4)
sale, lease, mortgage or other disposition of substantially all corporate assets; (5) investment of
funds in another business or corporation or for a purpose other than the primary purpose for which
the corporation was organized; (6) adoption, amendment and repeal of by-laws; (7) merger and
consolidation; and (8) dissolution of corporation.37Ï‚rÎ½ll
Since a specific class of shares may have rights and privileges or restrictions different from the rest
of the shares in a corporation, the 60-40 ownership requirement in favor of Filipino citizens in Section
11, Article XII of the Constitution must apply not only to shares with voting rights but also to shares
without voting rights. Preferred shares, denied the right to vote in the election of directors, are
anyway still entitled to vote on the eight specific corporate matters mentioned above. Thus, if a
corporation, engaged in a partially nationalized industry, issues a mixture of common and
preferred non-voting shares, at least 60 percent of the common shares and at least 60
percent of the preferred non-voting shares must be owned by Filipinos. Of course, if a
corporation issues only a single class of shares, at least 60 percent of such shares must necessarily
be owned by Filipinos. In short, the 60-40 ownership requirement in favor of Filipino citizens
must apply separately to each class of shares, whether common, preferred non-voting,
preferred voting or any other class of shares. This uniform application of the 60-40 ownership
requirement in favor of Filipino citizens clearly breathes life to the constitutional command that the
ownership and operation of public utilities shall be reserved exclusively to corporations at least 60
percent of whose capital is Filipino-owned. Applying uniformly the 60-40 ownership requirement in
favor of Filipino citizens to each class of shares, regardless of differences in voting rights, privileges
and restrictions, guarantees effective Filipino control of public utilities, as mandated by the
Constitution.
Moreover, such uniform application to each class of shares insures that the "controlling interest" in
public utilities always lies in the hands of Filipino citizens. This addresses and extinguishes
Pangilinans worry that foreigners, owning most of the non-voting shares, will exercise greater control
over fundamental corporate matters requiring two-thirds or majority vote of all shareholders.
VI.
Intent of the framers of the Constitution
While Justice Velasco quoted in his Dissenting Opinion38 a portion of the deliberations of the
Ï‚rÎ½ ll
Constitutional Commission to support his claim that the term "capital" refers to the total outstanding
shares of stock, whether voting or non-voting, the following excerpts of the deliberations reveal
otherwise. It is clear from the following exchange that the term "capital" refers to controlling
interest of a corporation, thus:
equity; namely, 60-40 in Section 3, 60-40 in Section 9 and 2/3-1/3 in Section 15.
MR. NOLLEDO. In teaching law, we are always faced with this question: "Where do we base the
paid-up capital stock of a corporation"? Will the Committee please enlighten me on this?
Center who provided us a draft. The phrase that is contained here which we adopted from the
UP draft is "60 percent of voting stock."
MR. NOLLEDO. Thank you.
MR. VILLEGAS. Yes.39 Ï‚rÎ½ ll
xxxx
MR. AZCUNA. May I be clarified as to that portion that was accepted by the Committee.
MR. VILLEGAS. The portion accepted by the Committee is the deletion of the phrase "voting stock or
controlling interest."
MR. AZCUNA. Hence, without the Davide amendment, the committee report would read:
"corporations or associations at least sixty percent of whose CAPITAL is owned by such citizens."
MR. VILLEGAS. Yes.
MR. AZCUNA. So if the Davide amendment is lost, we are stuck with 60 percent of the capital to be
owned by citizens.
MR. AZCUNA. But the control can be with the foreigners even if they are the minority. Let
us say 40 percent of the capital is owned by them, but it is the voting capital, whereas, the
Filipinos own the nonvoting shares. So we can have a situation where the corporation is
controlled by foreigners despite being the minority because they have the voting capital.
That is the anomaly that would result here.
MR. BENGZON. No, the reason we eliminated the word "stock" as stated in the 1973 and 1935
Constitutions is that according to Commissioner Rodrigo, there are associations that do not have
stocks. That is why we say "CAPITAL."
MR. AZCUNA. We should not eliminate the phrase "controlling interest."
MR. BENGZON. In the case of stock corporations, it is assumed.40 (Boldfacing and underscoring
Ï‚rÎ½ ll
supplied)
Thus, 60 percent of the "capital" assumes, or should result in, a "controlling interest" in the
corporation.
The use of the term "capital" was intended to replace the word "stock" because associations without
stocks can operate public utilities as long as they meet the 60-40 ownership requirement in favor of
Filipino citizens prescribed in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution. However, this did not change
the intent of the framers of the Constitution to reserve exclusively to Philippine nationals the
"controlling interest" in public utilities.
During the drafting of the 1935 Constitution, economic protectionism was "the battle-cry of the
nationalists in the Convention."41 The same battle-cry resulted in the nationalization of the public
Ï‚rÎ½ll
utilities.42 This is also the same intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution who adopted the exact
Ï‚rÎ½ ll
formulation embodied in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions on foreign equity limitations in partially
nationalized industries.
The OSG, in its own behalf and as counsel for the State,43 agrees fully with the Courts interpretation
Ï‚rÎ½ll
of the term "capital." In its Consolidated Comment, the OSG explains that the deletion of the phrase
"controlling interest" and replacement of the word "stock" with the term "capital" were intended
specifically to extend the scope of the entities qualified to operate public utilities to include
associations without stocks. The framers omission of the phrase "controlling interest" did not mean
the inclusion of all shares of stock, whether voting or non-voting. The OSG reiterated essentially the
Courts declaration that the Constitution reserved exclusively to Philippine nationals the ownership
and operation of public utilities consistent with the States policy to "develop a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos."
As we held in our 28 June 2011 Decision, to construe broadly the term "capital" as the total
outstanding capital stock, treated as a single class regardless of the actual classification of shares,
grossly contravenes the intent and letter of the Constitution that the "State shall develop a self-
reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos." We illustrated the
glaring anomaly which would result in defining the term "capital" as the total outstanding capital
stock of a corporation, treated as a single class of shares regardless of the actual classification of
shares, to wit:
Let us assume that a corporation has 100 common shares owned by foreigners and 1,000,000 non-
voting preferred shares owned by Filipinos, with both classes of share having a par value of one peso
(P 1.00) per share. Under the broad definition of the term "capital," such corporation would be
considered compliant with the 40 percent constitutional limit on foreign equity of public utilities since
the overwhelming majority, or more than 99.999 percent, of the total outstanding capital stock is
Filipino owned. This is obviously absurd.
In the example given, only the foreigners holding the common shares have voting rights in the
election of directors, even if they hold only 100 shares. The foreigners, with a minuscule equity of
less than 0.001 percent, exercise control over the public utility. On the other hand, the Filipinos,
holding more than 99.999 percent of the equity, cannot vote in the election of directors and hence,
have no control over the public utility. This starkly circumvents the intent of the framers of the
Constitution, as well as the clear language of the Constitution, to place the control of public utilities in
the hands of Filipinos. x x x
Further, even if foreigners who own more than forty percent of the voting shares elect an all-Filipino
board of directors, this situation does not guarantee Filipino control and does not in any way cure the
violation of the Constitution. The independence of the Filipino board members so elected by such
foreign shareholders is highly doubtful. As the OSG pointed out, quoting Justice George Sutherlands
words in Humphreys Executor v. US,44 "x x x it is quite evident that one who holds his office only
Ï‚rÎ½ll
during the pleasure of another cannot be depended upon to maintain an attitude of independence
against the latters will." Allowing foreign shareholders to elect a controlling majority of the board,
even if all the directors are Filipinos, grossly circumvents the letter and intent of the Constitution and
defeats the very purpose of our nationalization laws.
VII.
Last sentence of Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution
The last sentence of Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution reads:
The participation of foreign investors in the governing body of any public utility enterprise shall be
limited to their proportionate share in its capital, and all the executive and managing officers of such
corporation or association must be citizens of the Philippines.
During the Oral Arguments, the OSG emphasized that there was never a question on the intent of the
framers of the Constitution to limit foreign ownership, and assure majority Filipino ownership and
control of public utilities. The OSG argued, "while the delegates disagreed as to the percentage
threshold to adopt, x x x the records show they clearly understood that Filipino control of the public
utility corporation can only be and is obtained only through the election of a majority of the members
of the board."
Indeed, the only point of contention during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission on 23
August 1986 was the extent of majority Filipino control of public utilities. This is evident from the
following exchange:
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Jamir is recognized.

MR. JAMIR. Madam President, my proposed amendment on lines 20 and 21 is to delete the phrase
"two thirds of whose voting stock or controlling interest," and instead substitute the words "SIXTY
PERCENT OF WHOSE CAPITAL" so that the sentence will read: "No franchise, certificate, or any other
form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the
Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the laws of the Philippines at least
SIXTY PERCENT OF WHOSE CAPITAL is owned by such citizens."
xxxx
THE PRESIDENT: Will Commissioner Jamir first explain?
MR. JAMIR. Yes, in this Article on National Economy and Patrimony, there were two previous sections
in which we fixed the Filipino equity to 60 percent as against 40 percent for foreigners. It is only in
this Section 15 with respect to public utilities that the committee proposal was increased to two-
thirds. I think it would be better to harmonize this provision by providing that even in the case of
public utilities, the minimum equity for Filipino citizens should be 60 percent.
MR. ROMULO. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Romulo is recognized.
MR. ROMULO. My reason for supporting the amendment is based on the discussions I have had with
representatives of the Filipino majority owners of the international record carriers, and the
subsequent memoranda they submitted to me. x x x
Their second point is that under the Corporation Code, the management and control of a corporation
is vested in the board of directors, not in the officers but in the board of directors. The officers are
only agents of the board. And they believe that with 60 percent of the equity, the Filipino majority
stockholders undeniably control the board. Only on important corporate acts can the 40-percent
foreign equity exercise a veto, x x x.
x x x x45 Ï‚rÎ½ll
MS. ROSARIO BRAID. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Rosario Braid is recognized.
MS. ROSARIO BRAID. Yes, in the interest of equal time, may I also read from a memorandum by the
spokesman of the Philippine Chamber of Communications on why they would like to maintain the
present equity, I am referring to the 66 2/3. They would prefer to have a 75-25 ratio but would settle
for 66 2/3. x x x
xxxx
THE PRESIDENT. Just to clarify, would Commissioner Rosario Braid support the proposal of two-thirds
rather than the 60 percent?
MS. ROSARIO BRAID. I have added a clause that will put management in the hands of Filipino
citizens.
x x x x46 Ï‚rÎ½ll
While they had differing views on the percentage of Filipino ownership of capital, it is clear that the
framers of the Constitution intended public utilities to be majority Filipino-owned and controlled. To
ensure that Filipinos control public utilities, the framers of the Constitution approved, as additional
safeguard, the inclusion of the last sentence of Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution
commanding that "[t]he participation of foreign investors in the governing body of any public utility
enterprise shall be limited to their proportionate share in its capital, and all the executive and
managing officers of such corporation or association must be citizens of the Philippines." In other
words, the last sentence of Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution mandates that (1) the
participation of foreign investors in the governing body of the corporation or association shall be
limited to their proportionate share in the capital of such entity; and (2) all officers of the corporation
or association must be Filipino citizens.
Commissioner Rosario Braid proposed the inclusion of the phrase requiring the managing officers of
the corporation or association to be Filipino citizens specifically to prevent management contracts,
which were designed primarily to circumvent the Filipinization of public utilities, and to assure Filipino
control of public utilities, thus:
MS. ROSARIO BRAID. x x x They also like to suggest that we amend this provision by adding a
phrase which states: "THE MANAGEMENT BODY OF EVERY CORPORATION OR ASSOCIATION SHALL
IN ALL CASES BE CONTROLLED BY CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES." I have with me their position
paper.
THE PRESIDENT. The Commissioner may proceed.
MS. ROSARIO BRAID. The three major international record carriers in the Philippines, which
Commissioner Romulo mentioned Philippine Global Communications, Eastern Telecommunications,
Globe Mackay Cable are 40-percent owned by foreign multinational companies and 60-percent owned
by their respective Filipino partners. All three, however, also have management contracts with these
foreign companies Philcom with RCA, ETPI with Cable and Wireless PLC, and GMCR with ITT. Up to
the present time, the general managers of these carriers are foreigners. While the foreigners in these
common carriers are only minority owners, the foreign multinationals are the ones managing and
controlling their operations by virtue of their management contracts and by virtue of their strength in
the governing bodies of these carriers.47Ï‚rÎ½l l
xxxx
MR. OPLE. I think a number of us have agreed to ask Commissioner Rosario Braid to propose an
amendment with respect to the operating management of public utilities, and in this amendment, we
are associated with Fr. Bernas, Commissioners Nieva and Rodrigo. Commissioner Rosario Braid will
state this amendment now.
Thank you.
MS. ROSARIO BRAID. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. This is still on Section 15.
MS. ROSARIO BRAID. Yes.
MR. VILLEGAS. Yes, Madam President.
xxxx
MS. ROSARIO BRAID. Madam President, I propose a new section to read: THE MANAGEMENT BODY
OF EVERY CORPORATION OR ASSOCIATION SHALL IN ALL CASES BE CONTROLLED BY CITIZENS OF
THE PHILIPPINES."
This will prevent management contracts and assure control by Filipino citizens. Will the
committee assure us that this amendment will insure that past activities such as management
contracts will no longer be possible under this amendment?
xxxx
FR. BERNAS. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Bernas is recognized.
FR. BERNAS. Will the committee accept a reformulation of the first part?
MR. BENGZON. Let us hear it.
FR. BERNAS. The reformulation will be essentially the formula of the 1973 Constitution which reads:
"THE PARTICIPATION OF FOREIGN INVESTORS IN THE GOVERNING BODY OF ANY PUBLIC UTILITY
ENTERPRISE SHALL BE LIMITED TO THEIR PROPORTIONATE SHARE IN THE CAPITAL THEREOF
AND..."
MR. VILLEGAS. "ALL THE EXECUTIVE AND MANAGING OFFICERS OF SUCH CORPORATIONS AND
ASSOCIATIONS MUST BE CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES."
MR. BENGZON. Will Commissioner Bernas read the whole thing again?
FR. BERNAS. "THE PARTICIPATION OF FOREIGN INVESTORS IN THE GOVERNING BODY OF ANY
PUBLIC UTILITY ENTERPRISE SHALL BE LIMITED TO THEIR PROPORTIONATE SHARE IN THE CAPITAL
THEREOF..." I do not have the rest of the copy.
MR. BENGZON. "AND ALL THE EXECUTIVE AND MANAGING OFFICERS OF SUCH CORPORATIONS OR
ASSOCIATIONS MUST BE CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES." Is that correct?
MR. VILLEGAS. Yes.
MR. BENGZON. Madam President, I think that was said in a more elegant language. We accept the
amendment. Is that all right with Commissioner Rosario Braid?
xxxx
MR. DE LOS REYES. The governing body refers to the board of directors and trustees.
MR. BENGZON. Yes, the governing body refers to the board of directors.
MR. REGALADO. It is accepted.
MR. RAMA. The body is now ready to vote, Madam President.
VOTING
xxxx
The results show 29 votes in favor and none against; so the proposed amendment is approved.
xxxx
THE PRESIDENT. All right. Can we proceed now to vote on Section 15?
MR. RAMA. Yes, Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Will the chairman of the committee please read Section 15?
MR. VILLEGAS. The entire Section 15, as amended, reads: "No franchise, certificate, or any other
form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the
Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the laws of the Philippines at least 60
PERCENT OF WHOSE CAPITAL is owned by such citizens." May I request Commissioner Bengzon to
please continue reading.
MR. BENGZON. "THE PARTICIPATION OF FOREIGN INVESTORS IN THE GOVERNING BODY OF ANY
THEREOF AND ALL THE EXECUTIVE AND MANAGING OFFICERS OF SUCH CORPORATIONS OR
MR. VILLEGAS. "NOR SHALL SUCH FRANCHISE, CERTIFICATE OR AUTHORIZATION BE EXCLUSIVE IN

CHARACTER OR FOR A PERIOD LONGER THAN TWENTY-FIVE YEARS RENEWABLE FOR NOT MORE
THAN TWENTY-FIVE YEARS. Neither shall any such franchise or right be granted except under the
condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by Congress when the common
good so requires. The State shall encourage equity participation in public utilities by the general
public."
VOTING
xxxx
The results show 29 votes in favor and 4 against; Section 15, as amended, is approved.48 (Emphasis Ï‚rÎ½ll
supplied)
The last sentence of Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, particularly the provision on the
limited participation of foreign investors in the governing body of public utilities, is a reiteration of the
last sentence of Section 5, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution,49 signifying its importance in Ï‚rÎ½l l
reserving ownership and control of public utilities to Filipino citizens.
VIII.
The undisputed facts
There is no dispute, and respondents do not claim the contrary, that (1) foreigners own 64.27% of
the common shares of PLDT, which class of shares exercises the sole right to vote in the election of
directors, and thus foreigners control PLDT; (2) Filipinos own only 35.73% of PLDTs common shares,
constituting a minority of the voting stock, and thus Filipinos do not control PLDT; (3) preferred
shares, 99.44% owned by Filipinos, have no voting rights; (4) preferred shares earn only 1/70 of the
dividends that common shares earn;50 (5) preferred shares have twice the par value of common
Ï‚rÎ½l l
shares; and (6) preferred shares constitute 77.85% of the authorized capital stock of PLDT and
common shares only 22.15%.
Despite the foregoing facts, the Court did not decide, and in fact refrained from ruling on the
question of whether PLDT violated the 60-40 ownership requirement in favor of Filipino citizens in
Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Such question indisputably calls for a presentation
and determination of evidence through a hearing, which is generally outside the province of the
Courts jurisdiction, but well within the SECs statutory powers. Thus, for obvious reasons, the Court
limited its decision on the purely legal and threshold issue on the definition of the term "capital" in
Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution and directed the SEC to apply such definition in
determining the exact percentage of foreign ownership in PLDT.
IX.
PLDT is not an indispensable party;
SEC is impleaded in this case.
In his petition, Gamboa prays, among others: chanrob lesvi rtua llawli bra ry
xxxx
5. For the Honorable Court to issue a declaratory relief that ownership of common or voting shares is
the sole basis in determining foreign equity in a public utility and that any other government rulings,
opinions, and regulations inconsistent with this declaratory relief be declared unconstitutional and a
violation of the intent and spirit of the 1987 Constitution;
6. For the Honorable Court to declare null and void all sales of common stocks to foreigners in excess
of 40 percent of the total subscribed common shareholdings; and
7. For the Honorable Court to direct the Securities and Exchange Commission and Philippine
Stock Exchange to require PLDT to make a public disclosure of all of its foreign
shareholdings and their actual and real beneficial owners.
Other relief(s) just and equitable are likewise prayed for. (Emphasis supplied)
As can be gleaned from his prayer, Gamboa clearly asks this Court to compel the SEC to perform its
statutory duty to investigate whether "the required percentage of ownership of the capital stock to be
owned by citizens of the Philippines has been complied with [by PLDT] as required by x x x the
Constitution."51 Such plea clearly negates SECs argument that it was not impleaded.
Ï‚rÎ½ll
Granting that only the SEC Chairman was impleaded in this case, the Court has ample powers to
order the SECs compliance with its directive contained in the 28 June 2011 Decision in view of the
far-reaching implications of this case. In Domingo v. Scheer,52 the Court dispensed with theÏ‚rÎ½ ll
amendment of the pleadings to implead the Bureau of Customs considering (1) the unique backdrop
of the case; (2) the utmost need to avoid further delays; and (3) the issue of public interest involved.
The Court held:
The Court may be curing the defect in this case by adding the BOC as party-petitioner. The petition
should not be dismissed because the second action would only be a repetition of the first.
In Salvador, et al., v. Court of Appeals, et al., we held that this Court has full powers, apart from that
power and authority which is inherent, to amend the processes, pleadings, proceedings and decisions
by substituting as party-plaintiff the real party-in-interest. The Court has the power to avoid
delay in the disposition of this case, to order its amendment as to implead the BOC as
party-respondent. Indeed, it may no longer be necessary to do so taking into account the
unique backdrop in this case, involving as it does an issue of public interest. After all, the
Office of the Solicitor General has represented the petitioner in the instant proceedings, as well as in
the appellate court, and maintained the validity of the deportation order and of the BOCs Omnibus
Resolution. It cannot, thus, be claimed by the State that the BOC was not afforded its day in court,
simply because only the petitioner, the Chairperson of the BOC, was the respondent in the CA, and
the petitioner in the instant recourse. In Alonso v. Villamor, we had the occasion to state:
There is nothing sacred about processes or pleadings, their forms or contents. Their sole
purpose is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending
parties. They were created, not to hinder and delay, but to facilitate and promote, the
administration of justice. They do not constitute the thing itself, which courts are always striving to
secure to litigants. They are designed as the means best adapted to obtain that thing. In other
words, they are a means to an end. When they lose the character of the one and become the other,
the administration of justice is at fault and courts are correspondingly remiss in the performance of
their obvious duty.53 (Emphasis supplied)
Ï‚rÎ½ll
In any event, the SEC has expressly manifested54 that it will abide by the Courts decision
Ï‚rÎ½ ll
and defer to the Courts definition of the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the
Constitution. Further, the SEC entered its special appearance in this case and argued
during the Oral Arguments, indicating its submission to the Courts jurisdiction. It is clear,
therefore, that there exists no legal impediment against the proper and immediate
implementation of the Courts directive to the SEC.
PLDT is an indispensable party only insofar as the other issues, particularly the factual questions, are
concerned. In other words, PLDT must be impleaded in order to fully resolve the issues on (1)
whether the sale of 111,415 PTIC shares to First Pacific violates the constitutional limit on foreign
ownership of PLDT; (2) whether the sale of common shares to foreigners exceeded the 40 percent
limit on foreign equity in PLDT; and (3) whether the total percentage of the PLDT common shares
with voting rights complies with the 60-40 ownership requirement in favor of Filipino citizens under
the Constitution for the ownership and operation of PLDT. These issues indisputably call for an
examination of the parties respective evidence, and thus are clearly within the jurisdiction of the
SEC. In short, PLDT must be impleaded, and must necessarily be heard, in the proceedings before
the SEC where the factual issues will be thoroughly threshed out and resolved.
Notably, the foregoing issues were left untouched by the Court. The Court did not rule on the
factual issues raised by Gamboa, except the single and purely legal issue on the definition of the
term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution. The Court confined the resolution of the
instant case to this threshold legal issue in deference to the fact-finding power of the SEC.
Needless to state, the Court can validly, properly, and fully dispose of the fundamental legal issue in
this case even without the participation of PLDT since defining the term "capital" in Section 11, Article
XII of the Constitution does not, in any way, depend on whether PLDT was impleaded. Simply put,
PLDT is not indispensable for a complete resolution of the purely legal question in this case. 55 In fact,
Ï‚rÎ½l l
the Court, by treating the petition as one for mandamus,56 merely directed the SEC to apply the
Ï‚rÎ½ ll
Courts definition of the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution in determining
whether PLDT committed any violation of the said constitutional provision. The dispositive portion
of the Courts ruling is addressed not to PLDT but solely to the SEC, which is the
administrative agency tasked to enforce the 60-40 ownership requirement in favor of
Filipino citizens in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution.
Since the Court limited its resolution on the purely legal issue on the definition of the term "capital"
in Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, and directed the SEC to investigate any violation
by PLDT of the 60-40 ownership requirement in favor of Filipino citizens under the
Constitution,57 there is no deprivation of PLDTs property or denial of PLDTs right to due process,
Ï‚rÎ½ll
contrary to Pangilinan and Nazarenos misimpression. Due process will be afforded to PLDT when it
presents proof to the SEC that it complies, as it claims here, with Section 11, Article XII of the
Constitution.
X.
Foreign Investments in the Philippines
Movants fear that the 28 June 2011 Decision would spell disaster to our economy, as it may result in
a sudden flight of existing foreign investors to "friendlier" countries and simultaneously deterring new
foreign investors to our country. In particular, the PSE claims that the 28 June 2011 Decision may
result in the following: (1) loss of more than P 630 billion in foreign investments in PSE-listed shares;
(2) massive decrease in foreign trading transactions; (3) lower PSE Composite Index; and (4) local
investors not investing in PSE-listed shares.58 Ï‚rÎ½ll
Dr. Bernardo M. Villegas, one of the amici curiae in the Oral Arguments, shared movants
apprehension. Without providing specific details, he pointed out the depressing state of the Philippine
economy compared to our neighboring countries which boast of growing economies. Further, Dr.
Villegas explained that the solution to our economic woes is for the government to "take-over"
strategic industries, such as the public utilities sector, thus:
JUSTICE CARPIO: chanroblesvi rtua llawlib rary
I would like also to get from you Dr. Villegas if you have additional information on whether this high
FDI59 countries in East Asia have allowed foreigners x x x control [of] their public utilities, so that we
Ï‚rÎ½ll
can compare apples with apples.
DR. VILLEGAS: chanroble svi rtual lawlib rary
Correct, but let me just make a comment. When these neighbors of ours find an industry strategic,
their solution is not to "Filipinize" or "Vietnamize" or "Singaporize." Their solution is to make sure
that those industries are in the hands of state enterprises. So, in these countries,
nationalization means the government takes over. And because their governments are
competent and honest enough to the public, that is the solution. x x x 60 (Emphasis supplied) Ï‚rÎ½ll
If government ownership of public utilities is the solution, then foreign investments in our public
utilities serve no purpose. Obviously, there can never be foreign investments in public utilities if, as
Dr. Villegas claims, the "solution is to make sure that those industries are in the hands of state
enterprises." Dr. Villegass argument that foreign investments in telecommunication companies like
PLDT are badly needed to save our ailing economy contradicts his own theory that the solution is for
government to take over these companies. Dr. Villegas is barking up the wrong tree since State
ownership of public utilities and foreign investments in such industries are diametrically opposed
concepts, which cannot possibly be reconciled.
In any event, the experience of our neighboring countries cannot be used as argument to decide the
present case differently for two reasons. First, the governments of our neighboring countries have, as
claimed by Dr. Villegas, taken over ownership and control of their strategic public utilities like the
telecommunications industry. Second, our Constitution has specific provisions limiting foreign
ownership in public utilities which the Court is sworn to uphold regardless of the experience of our
neighboring countries.
In our jurisdiction, the Constitution expressly reserves the ownership and operation of public utilities
to Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least 60 percent of whose capital belongs to
Filipinos. Following Dr. Villegass claim, the Philippines appears to be more liberal in allowing foreign
investors to own 40 percent of public utilities, unlike in other Asian countries whose governments
own and operate such industries.
XI.
Prospective Application of Sanctions
In its Motion for Partial Reconsideration, the SEC sought to clarify the reckoning period of the
application and imposition of appropriate sanctions against PLDT if found violating Section 11, Article
XII of the Constitution.
As discussed, the Court has directed the SEC to investigate and determine whether PLDT violated
Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution. Thus, there is no dispute that it is only after the SEC has
determined PLDTs violation, if any exists at the time of the commencement of the administrative
case or investigation, that the SEC may impose the statutory sanctions against PLDT. In other words,
once the 28 June 2011 Decision becomes final, the SEC shall impose the appropriate sanctions only if
it finds after due hearing that, at the start of the administrative case or investigation, there is an
existing violation of Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution. Under prevailing jurisprudence, public
utilities that fail to comply with the nationality requirement under Section 11, Article XII and the FIA
can cure their deficiencies prior to the start of the administrative case or investigation.61 Ï‚rÎ½ ll
XII.
Final Word
The Constitution expressly declares as State policy the development of an economy "effectively
controlled" by Filipinos. Consistent with such State policy, the Constitution explicitly reserves the
ownership and operation of public utilities to Philippine nationals, who are defined in the Foreign
Investments Act of 1991 as Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least 60 percent of
whose capital with voting rights belongs to Filipinos. The FIAs implementing rules explain that
"[f]or stocks to be deemed owned and held by Philippine citizens or Philippine nationals, mere legal
title is not enough to meet the required Filipino equity. Full beneficial ownership of the stocks,
coupled with appropriate voting rights is essential." In effect, the FIA clarifies, reiterates and
confirms the interpretation that the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
refers to shares with voting rights, as well as with full beneficial ownership. This is precisely
because the right to vote in the election of directors, coupled with full beneficial ownership of stocks,
translates to effective control of a corporation.
Any other construction of the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution contravenes
the letter and intent of the Constitution. Any other meaning of the term "capital" openly invites alien
domination of economic activities reserved exclusively to Philippine nationals. Therefore, respondents
interpretation will ultimately result in handing over effective control of our national economy to
foreigners in patent violation of the Constitution, making Filipinos second-class citizens in their own
country.
Filipinos have only to remind themselves of how this country was exploited under the Parity
Amendment, which gave Americans the same rights as Filipinos in the exploitation of natural
resources, and in the ownership and control of public utilities, in the Philippines. To do this the 1935
Constitution, which contained the same 60 percent Filipino ownership and control requirement as the
present 1987 Constitution, had to be amended to give Americans parity rights with Filipinos. There
was bitter opposition to the Parity Amendment62 and many Filipinos eagerly awaited its expiration.
Ï‚rÎ½l l
In late 1968, PLDT was one of the American-controlled public utilities that became Filipino-controlled
when the controlling American stockholders divested in anticipation of the expiration of the Parity
Amendment on 3 July 1974.63 No economic suicide happened when control of public utilities and
Ï‚rÎ½ll
mining corporations passed to Filipinos hands upon expiration of the Parity Amendment.
Movants interpretation of the term "capital" would bring us back to the same evils spawned by the
Parity Amendment, effectively giving foreigners parity rights with Filipinos, but this time
even without any amendment to the present Constitution. Worse, movants interpretation
opens up our national economy to effective control not only by Americans but also by all
foreigners, be they Indonesians, Malaysians or Chinese, even in the absence of reciprocal
treaty arrangements. At least the Parity Amendment, as implemented by the Laurel-Langley
Agreement, gave the capital-starved Filipinos theoretical parity the same rights as Americans to
exploit natural resources, and to own and control public utilities, in the United States of America.
Here, movants interpretation would effectively mean a unilateral opening up of our national
economy to all foreigners, without any reciprocal arrangements. That would mean that
Indonesians, Malaysians and Chinese nationals could effectively control our mining companies and
public utilities while Filipinos, even if they have the capital, could not control similar corporations in
these countries.
The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions have the same 60 percent Filipino ownership and control
requirement for public utilities like PLOT. Any deviation from this requirement necessitates an
amendment to the Constitution as exemplified by the Parity Amendment. This Court has no power to
amend the Constitution for its power and duty is only to faithfully apply and interpret the
Constitution.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the motions for reconsideration WITH FINALITY. No further pleadings
shall be entertained.Ï‚rÎ±l Î±Ï‰lÎ¹b rÎ±r
SO ORDERED.
JOSE C. MENDOZA
Associate Justice
Endnotes:
*The Heirs of Wilson P. Gamboa substituted petitioner Wilson P. Gamboa per Resolution dated 17
April 2012 which noted the Manifestation of Lauro Gamboa dated 12 April 2012.
1
Ï‚rÎ½ ll Rol/o(Vol.lll),pp.l431-1451. Dated II July2011.
2
Ï‚rÎ½ ll Id. at 1563-1613. Dated 14 July 2011.
3
Ï‚rÎ½ ll Id. at 1454-1537. Dated 15 July 2011.
4
Id. at 1669-1680. Through its Office of the General Counsel and Commissioner Manuel llubeiio B.
Ï‚rÎ½ ll
Gaite. In its Manifestation and Omnibus Motion dated 29 July 20 II, the SEC manifested that the
position of the OSG on the meaning of the term "capital" does not reflect the view of the SEC.
The SEC sought a partial re~onsideration praying that the statement on SEC's unlawful neglect of its
statutory duty be expunged and for clarification on the reckoning period of the imposition of any
sanctions against PLOT.
5
Id. at 1614-1627. Dated 13 July 2011. On behalfofthe SEC, by special appearance. The OSG
Ï‚rÎ½ ll
prayed that the Court's decision "be cured of its procedural defect which however should not prevail
over the substantive aspect of the Decision."
6
Ï‚rÎ½ ll I d. at 2102-2124. Filed on 15 December 20 II.
7
Salvacion v. Central Bank of the Philippines, 343 Phil. 539 (1997).
Ï‚rÎ½ ll
8
Ï‚rÎ½ ll 150-B Phil. 380 (1972).
9
Rollo (Vol. III), p. 1583.
Ï‚rÎ½ ll
10
Ï‚rÎ½ ll Addressed to Gov. Lilia Bautista of the Board of Investments.
11
Ï‚rÎ½ ll A typographical error in DOJ Opinion No. 130 where it states 80%.
12 Ï‚rÎ½ ll Republic Act No. 8799.
13General Counsel and Commissioner Manuel Huberto B. Gaite of the Securities and Exchange
Ï‚rÎ½ ll
Commission.
14
Ï‚rÎ½ ll TSN (Oral Arguments), 26 June 2012, pp. 81-83. Emphasis supplied.
15
Ï‚rÎ½ ll SEC En Banc Case No. 09-09-177, 25 March 2010.
16 SEC Opinion No. 49-04, Re: Corporations considered as Philippine Nationals, dated 22 December
Ï‚rÎ½ ll
2004, addressed to Romulo Mabanta Buenaventura Sayoc & De Los Angeles and signed by General
Counsel Vernette G. Umali-Paco; SEC-OGC Opinion No. 03-08, dated 15 January 2008, addressed to
Attys. Ruby Rose J. Yusi and Rudyard S. Arbolado and signed by General Counsel Vernette G. Umali-
Paco; SEC-OGC Opinion No. 09-09, dated 28 April 2009, addressed to Villaraza Cruz Marcelo
Angangco and signed by General Counsel Vernette G. Umali-Paco; SECOGC Opinion No. 08-10, dated
8 February 2010, addressed to Mr. Teodoro B. Quijano and signed by General Counsel Vernette G.
Umali-Paco; SEC-OGC Opinion No. 23-10, dated 18 August 2010, addressed to Castillo Laman Tan
Pantaleon and San Jose and signed by General Counsel Vernette G. Umali-Paco; SEC-OGC Opinion
No. 18-07, dated 28 November 2007, addressed to Mr. Rafael C. Bueno, Jr. and signed by General
Counsel Vernette G. Umali-Paco.
In SEC Opinion No. 32-03, dated 2 June 2003, addressed to National Telecommunications
Commissioner Armi Jane R. Borje, SEC General Counsel Vernette G. Umali-Paco stated: chanroble svirtual lawlib rary
In this light, it is imperative that we reiterate the policy of this Commission (SEC) in refraining from
rendering opinions that might prejudice or affect the outcome of a case, which is subject to present
litigation before the courts, or any other forum for that matter. The opinion, which may be rendered
thereon, would not be binding upon any party who would in all probability, if the opinion happens to
be adverse to his or its interest, take issue therewith and contest it before the proper venue. The
Commission, therefore, has to refrain from giving categorical answers to your query.
17
Ï‚rÎ½ ll 370 Phil. 538 (1999).
18
Ï‚rÎ½ ll G.R. No. 152685, 4 December 2007, 539 SCRA 365.
19
Rollo (Vol. III), pp. 1392-1393.
Ï‚rÎ½ ll
20
Ï‚rÎ½ ll Supra.
21
Ï‚rÎ½ ll Supra.
22
Ï‚rÎ½ ll De Leon, Hector S., TEXTBOOK ON THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION, 2005 Edition, pp. 32, 33.
23
Ï‚rÎ½ ll Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
24 Bernas, Joaquin G., S.J., THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES: A
Ï‚rÎ½ ll
COMMENTARY, 1996 Edition, p. 1044, citing Smith, Bell and Co. v. Natividad, 40 Phil. 136, 148
(1919); Luzon Stevedoring Corporation v. Anti-Dummy Board, 150-B Phil. 380, 403-404 (1972).
25 Ï‚rÎ½ ll Issued on 17 July 1987.
26
Articles 44 to 56 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 were later repealed by the Foreign
Ï‚rÎ½ ll
Investments Act of 1991. See infra, p. 26.
27
Article 48. Authority to Do Business. No alien, and no firm association, partnership, corporation or
Ï‚rÎ½ ll
any other form of business organization formed, organized, chartered or existing under any laws
other than those of the Philippines, or which is not a Philippine national, or more than forty percent
(40%) of the outstanding capital of which is owned or controlled by aliens shall do business or
engage in any economic activity in the Philippines or be registered, licensed, or permitted by the
Securities and Exchange Commission or by any other bureau, office, agency, political subdivision or
instrumentality of the government, to do business, or engage in any economic activity in the
Philippines without first securing a written certificate from the Board of Investments to the effect:
xxxx
(3) That such business or economic activity by the applicant would not conflict with the Constitution
or laws of the Philippines;
xxxx
28
Ï‚rÎ½ ll Presidential Decree No. 1789.
29
Article 69. Authority to Do Business. No alien, and no firm, association, partnership, corporation or
Ï‚rÎ½ ll
any other form of business organization formed, organized, chartered or existing under any laws
other than those of the Philippines, or which is not a Philippine national, or more than thirty (30%)
per cent of the outstanding capital of which is owned or controlled by aliens shall do business or
engage in any economic activity in the Philippines, or be registered, licensed, or permitted by the
Securities and Exchange Commission or by any other bureau, office, agency, political subdivision or
instrumentality of the government, to do business, or engage in any economic activity in the
Philippines, without first securing a written certificate from the Board of Investments to the effect:
xxxx
(3) That such business or economic activity by the applicant would not conflict with the Constitution
or laws of the Philippines;
xxxx
30 An Act Prescribing Incentives And Guarantees To Investments In The Philippines, Creating A Board
Ï‚rÎ½ ll
Of Investments, Appropriating The Necessary Funds Therefor And For Other Purposes.
31 Ï‚rÎ½ ll Section 3 of RA No. 5455 states:
Section 3. Permissible Investments. If an investment by a non-Philippine national in an enterprise not

registered under the Investment Incentives Act is such that the total participation by non-Philippine
nationals in the outstanding capital thereof shall exceed thirty per cent, the enterprise must obtain
prior authority from the Board of Investments, which authority shall be granted unless the proposed
investment
(a) Would conflict with existing constitutional provisions and laws regulating the degree of required
ownership by Philippine nationals in the enterprise; or
(b) Would pose a clear and present danger of promoting monopolies or combinations in restraint of
trade; or
(c) Would be made in an enterprise engaged in an area adequately being exploited by Philippine
nationals; or
(d) Would conflict or be inconsistent with the Investments Priorities Plan in force at the time the
investment is sought to be made; or
(e) Would not contribute to the sound and balanced development of the national economy on a self-
sustaining basis.
xxxx
32 Executive Order No. 858, Promulgating the Eighth Regular Foreign Investment Negative List,
Ï‚rÎ½ ll
signed on 5 February 2010, http://www.boi.gov.ph/pdf/laws/eo/EO%20858.pdf (accessed 17 August

2011).
33
Ï‚rÎ½ ll TSN (Oral Arguments), 26 June 2012, pp. 71-74.
34
Published by the Board of Investments. For on-line copy, see
Ï‚rÎ½ ll
http://www.fdi.net/documents/WorldBank/databases/philippines/primer.htm (accessed 3 September

2012)
35
Ï‚rÎ½ ll In his book, Fletcher explains:
The term "stock" has been used in the same sense as "capital stock" or "capital," and it has been
said that "tis primary meaning is capital, in whatever form it may be invested. More commonly, it is
now being used to designate shares of the stock in the hands of the individual shareholders, or the
certificates issued by the corporation to them. (Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private
Corporations, 1995 Revised Volume, Vol. 11, 5079, p. 13; citations omitted).
36
SECTION 137. Outstanding capital stock defined. - The term "outstanding capital stock" as used in
Ï‚rÎ½ ll
this Code, means the total shares of stock issued to subscribers or stockholders, whether or not fully
or partially paid, except treasury shares.
SEC. 6. Classification of shares. - The shares of stock of stock corporations may be divided into
classes or series of shares, or both, any of which classes or series of shares may have such rights,
privileges or restrictions as may be stated in the articles of incorporation: Provided, That no share
may be deprived of voting rights except those classified and issued as "preferred" or "redeemable"
shares, unless otherwise provided in this Code: Provided, further, That there shall always be a class
or series of shares which have complete voting rights. Any or all of the shares or series of shares
may have a par value or have no par value as may be provided for in the articles of incorporation:
Provided, however, That banks, trust companies, insurance companies, public utilities, and building
and loan associations shall not be permitted to issue no-par value shares of stock.
Preferred shares of stock issued by any corporation may be given preference in the distribution of the
assets of the corporation in case of liquidation and in the distribution of dividends, or such other
preferences as may be stated in the articles of incorporation which are not violative of the provisions
of this Code: Provided, That preferred shares of stock may be issued only with a stated par value.
The board of directors, where authorized in the articles of incorporation, may fix the terms and
conditions of preferred shares of stock or any series thereof: Provided, That such terms and
conditions shall be effective upon the filing of a certificate thereof with the Securities and Exchange
Commission.
Shares of capital stock issued without par value shall be deemed fully paid and non-assessable and
the holder of such shares shall not be liable to the corporation or to its creditors in respect thereto:
Provided; That shares without par value may not be issued for a consideration less than the value of
five (P 5.00) pesos per share: Provided, further, That the entire consideration received by the
corporation for its no-par value shares shall be treated as capital and shall not be available for
distribution as dividends.
A corporation may, furthermore, classify its shares for the purpose of insuring compliance with
constitutional or legal requirements.
Except as otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation and stated in the certificate of stock,
each share shall be equal in all respects to every other share.
xxxx
37
Ï‚rÎ½ ll Under Section 6 of the Corporation Code.
38
Ï‚rÎ½ ll Dissenting Opinion to the 28 June 2011 Decision.
39
Ï‚rÎ½ ll Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. III, pp. 255-256.
40
Ï‚rÎ½ ll Id. at 360.
41
Ï‚rÎ½ ll Aruego, Jose M., THE FRAMING OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION, Vol. II, 1936, p. 658.
42
Ï‚rÎ½ ll Id.
43
The OSG stated, "It must be stressed that when the OSG stated its concurrence with the
Ï‚rÎ½ ll
Honorable Courts ruling on the proper definition of capital, it did so, not on behalf of the SEC, its
individual client in this case. Rather, the OSG did so in the exercise of its discretion not only in its
capacity as statutory counsel of the SEC but as counsel for no less than the State itself."
44
Ï‚rÎ½ ll 295 U.S. 602, 55 S.Ct. 869, U.S. 1935 (27 May 1935).
45
Ï‚rÎ½ ll Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 3, pp. 650-651 (23 August 1986).
46
47
Ï‚rÎ½ ll Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 3, p. 652 (23 August 1986).
48
49
Ï‚rÎ½ ll Section 5, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution provides:
Section 5. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public
utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations
organized under the laws of the Philippines at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned
by such citizens, nor shall such franchise, certificate, or authorization be exclusive in character or for
a longer period than fifty years. Neither shall any such franchise or right be granted except under the
condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the National Assembly when
the public interest so requires. The State shall encourage equity participation in public utilities by the
general public. The participation of foreign investors in the governing body of any public
utility enterprise shall be limited to their proportionate share in the capital
thereof. (Emphasis supplied)
50 Ï‚rÎ½ ll For the year 2009.

51
SEC. 17. Grounds when articles of incorporation or amendment may be rejected or disapproved.
Ï‚rÎ½ll
The Securities and Exchange Commission may reject the articles of incorporation or disapprove any
amendment thereto if the same is not in compliance with the requirements of this Code:
Provided, That the Commission shall give the incorporators a reasonable time within which
to correct or modify the objectionable portions of the articles or amendment. The following
are grounds for such rejection or disapproval:
xxxx
(4) That the percentage of ownership of the capital stock to be owned by citizens of the
Philippines has not been complied with as required by existing laws or the Constitution.
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 5 of R.A. No. 8799 provides: chanroble svirtual lawlib rary
Section 5. Powers and Functions of the Commission. 5.1. The Commission shall act with transparency
and shall have the powers and functions provided by this Code, Presidential Decree No. 902-A, the
Corporation Code, the Investment Houses Law, the Financing Company Act and other existing laws.
Pursuant thereto the Commission shall have, among others, the following powers and functions: chanroble svirtual lawlib rary
(a) Have jurisdiction and supervision over all corporations, partnerships or associations who are the
grantees of primary franchises and/or a license or a permit issued by the Government;
xxxx
(c) Approve, reject, suspend, revoke or require amendments to registration statements, and
registration and licensing applications;
xxxx
(f) Impose sanctions for the violation of laws and the rules, regulations and orders, issued pursuant
thereto;
xxxx
(i) Issue cease and desist orders to prevent fraud or injury to the investing public;
xxxx
(m) Suspend, or revoke, after proper notice and hearing the franchise or certificate of registration of
corporations, partnership or associations, upon any of the grounds provided by law; and
(n) Exercise such other powers as may be provided by law as well as those which may be implied
from, or which are necessary or incidental to the carrying out of, the express powers granted the
Commission to achieve the objectives and purposes of these laws.
52
Ï‚rÎ½ ll 466 Phil. 235 (2004).
53 Ï‚rÎ½ ll Id. at 266-267.
54 In its Manifestation and Omnibus Motion dated 29 July 2011, the SEC stated: "The Commission
Ï‚rÎ½ ll
respectfully manifests that the position of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) on the meaning of
the term "capital" does not reflect the view of the Commission. The Commissions position has been
laid down in countless opinions that needs no reiteration. The Commission, however, would
submit to whatever would be the final decision of this Honorable Court on the meaning of
the term "capital." (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
In its Memorandum, the SEC stated: "In the event that this Honorable Court rules with finality on the
meaning of "capital", the SEC will yield to the Court and follow its interpretation."
55
In Lucman v. Malawi, 540 Phil. 289 (2006), the Court defined indispensable parties as parties
Ï‚rÎ½ ll
ininterest without whom there can be no final determination of an action.
56
Ï‚rÎ½ ll Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus. When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or
office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court,
alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent,
immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court, to do the act required to be done to
protect the rights of the petitioner and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of
the wrongful acts of the respondent.
xxxx
57 See Lucman v. Malawi, supra, where the Court referred to the Department of Interior and Local
Ï‚rÎ½ ll
Government (though not impleaded) for investigation and appropriate action the matter regarding
the withdrawals of deposits representing the concerned barangays Internal Revenue Allotments.
58 Rollo (Vol. III), pp. 1444-1445.

Ï‚rÎ½ ll
59
Ï‚rÎ½ ll Foreign Direct Investments.
60
Ï‚rÎ½ ll TSN (Oral Arguments), 26 June 2012, p. 117.
61See Halili v. Court of Appeals, 350 Phil. 906 (1998); United Church Board for World Ministries v.
Ï‚rÎ½ ll
Sebastian, 242 Phil. 848 (1988).
62 Urbano A. Zafra, The Laurel-Langley Agreement and the Philippine Economy, p. 43 (1973). See
Ï‚rÎ½ ll
also Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1 (1947).
63
See Hadi Salehi Esfahani, The Political Economy of the Philippines Telecommunications Sector,
Ï‚rÎ½ ll
World Bank Policy Research Department (1994).
DISSENTING OPINION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Before Us are separate motions for recon~ideration of the Court's June 28, 2011 Decision, 1 which
Ï‚rÎ½ ll
partially granted the petition for prohibition, injunction and declaratory relief interposed by Wilson P.
Gamboa (petitioner or Gamboa). Very simply, the Court held that the term "capital" appearing in
Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution refers only to common shares or shares of stock
entitled to vote in the election of the members of the board of directors of a public utility, and not to
the total outstanding capital stock.
Respondents Manuel V. Pangilinan (Pangilinan) and Napoleon L.Nazare no (Nazareno) separately

moved for reconsideration on procedural and substantive grounds, but reserved their main
arguments against the majority's holding on the meaning of "capital." The Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), which initially representL:d the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), also
requested recon~itkratiun even as it manifested agreement with the majority's construal ct' the
\Vord "capital." Unable to join the OSG's stand on the determinative issue of capital, the SEC sought
leave to join the fray on its mvn. fn its Jtdotion to Admit A1anifestation and Omnibus Motion, the SEC
stated that the OSGs position on said issue does not reflect its own and in fact diverges from what
the Commission has consistently adopted prior to this case. And because the decision in question has
a penalty component which it is tasked to impose, SEC requested clarification as to when the
reckoning period of application of the appropriate sanctions may be imposed on Philippine
Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) in case the SEC determines that it has violated
Sec. 11, Art. XII of the Constitution.
To the foregoing motions, the main petitioner, now deceased, filed his Comment and/or Opposition to
Motions for Reconsideration.
Acting on the various motions and comment, the Court conducted and heard the parties in oral
arguments on April 17 and June 26, 2012.
After considering the parties positions as articulated during the oral arguments and in their pleadings
and respective memoranda, I vote to grant reconsideration. This disposition is consistent with my
dissent, on procedural and substantive grounds, to the June 28, 2011 majority Decision.
Conspectus
The core issue is the meaning of the word "capital" in the opening sentence of Sec. 11, Art. XII of the
1987 Constitution which reads:
public utilities by the general public. The participation of foreign investors in the governing
body of any public utility enterprise shall be limited to their proportionate share in its
capital, and all the executive and managing officers of such corporation or association
must be citizens of the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied.)
For an easier comprehension of the two contrasting positions on the contentious meaning of the word
"capital," as found in the first sentence of the aforequoted provision, allow me to present a brief
comparative analysis showing the dissimilarities.
The majority, in the June 28, 2011 Decision, as reiterated in the draft resolution, is of the view that
the word "capital" in the first sentence of Sec. 11, Art. XII refers to common shares or voting
shares only; thus limiting foreign ownership of such shares to 40%. The rationale, as stated in the
basic ponencia, is that this interpretation ensures that control of the Board of Directors stays in the
hands of Filipinos, since foreigners can only own a maximum of 40% of said shares and, accordingly,
can only elect the equivalent percentage of directors. As a necessary corollary, Filipino stockholders
can always elect 60% of the Board of Directors which, to the majority, translates to control over the
corporation.
The opposite view is that the word "capital" in the first sentence refers to the entire capital stock of
the corporation or both voting and non-voting shares and NOT solely to common shares. From this
standpoint, 60% control over the capital stock or the stockholders owning both voting and non-voting
shares is assured to Filipinos and, as a consequence, over corporate matters voted upon and
decisions reached during stockholders meetings. On the other hand, the last sentence of Sec. 11, Art.
XII, with the word "capital" embedded in it, is the provision that ensures Filipino control over the
Board of Directors and its decisions.
To resolve the conflicting interpretations of the word "capital," the first sentence of Sec. 11, Art. XII
must be read and considered in conjunction with the last sentence of said Sec. 11 which prescribes
that "the participation of foreign investors in the governing body of any public utility enterprise shall
be limited to their proportionate share in its capital." After all, it is an established principle in
constitutional construction that provisions in the Constitution must be harmonized.
It has been made very clear during the oral arguments and even by the parties written submissions
that control by Filipinos over the public utility enterprise exists on three (3) levels, namely:
chanroble svirtual lawlib rary
1. Sixty percent (60%) control of Filipinos over the capital stock which covers both voting and non-
voting shares and inevitably over the stockholders. This level of control is embodied in the first
sentence of Sec. 11, Art. XII which reads:
whose capital is owned by such citizens x x x.
The word "capital" in the above provision refers to capital stock or both voting and non-voting
shares. Sixty percent (60%) control over the capital stock translates to control by Filipinos over
almost all decisions by the stockholders during stockholders meetings including ratification of the
decisions and acts of the Board of Directors. During said meetings, voting and even non-voting
shares are entitled to vote. The exercise by non-voting shares of voting rights over major corporate
decisions is expressly provided in Sec. 6 of the Corporation Code which reads:
Sec. 6. x x x x
Where the articles of incorporation provide for non-voting shares in the cases allowed by this Code,
the holders of such shares shall nevertheless be entitled to vote on the following matters:
1. Amendment of the articles of incorporation;
2. Adoption and amendment of by-laws;
3. Sale, lease, exchange, mortgage, pledge or other disposition of all or substantially all of the
corporate property;
4. Incurring, creating or increasing bonded indebtedness;
5. Increase or decrease of capital stock;
6. Merger or consolidation of the corporation with another corporation or other corporations;
7. Investment of corporate funds in another corporation or business in accordance with this Code;
and
8. Dissolution of the corporation.
Construing the word "capital" in the first sentence of Sec. 11, Art. XII of the Constitution as capital
stock would ensure Filipino control over the public utility with respect to major corporate decisions. If
we adopt the view espoused by Justice Carpio that the word "capital" means only common shares or
voting shares, then foreigners can own even up to 100% of the non-voting shares. In such a
situation, foreigners may very well exercise control over all major corporate decisions as their
ownership of the nonvoting shares remains unfettered by the 40% cap laid down in the first sentence
of Sec. 11, Art. XII. This will spawn an even greater anomaly because it would give the foreigners the
opportunity to acquire ownership of the net assets of the corporation upon its dissolution to include
what the Constitution enjoinsland ownership possibly through dummy corporations. With the view of
Justice Carpio, Filipinos will definitely lose control over major corporate decisions which are decided
by stockholders owning the majority of the non-voting shares.
2. Sixty percent (60%) control by Filipinos over the common shares or voting shares and necessarily
over the Board of Directors of the public utility. Control on this level is guaranteed by the last
sentence of Sec. 11, Art. XII which reads:
The participation of foreign investors in the governing body of any public utility enterprise
shall be limited to their proportionate share in its "capital" x x x.
In its ordinary signification, "participation" connotes "the action or state of taking part with others in
an activity."2 This participation in its decision-making function can only be the right to elect board
Ï‚rÎ½ll
directors. Hence, the last sentence of Sec. 11, Art. XII of the Constitution effectively
restricts the right of foreigners to elect directors to the board in proportion to the limit on
their total shareholdings. Since the first part of Sec. 11, Art. XII of the Constitution specifies a
40% limit of foreign ownership in the total capital of the public utility corporation, then the rights of
foreigners to be elected to the board of directors, is likewise limited to 40 percent. If the foreign
ownership of common shares is lower than 40%, the participation of foreigners is limited to their
proportionate share in the capital stock.
In the highly hypothetical public utility corporation with 100 common shares and 1,000,000 preferred
non-voting shares, or a total of 1,000,100 shares cited in the June 28, 2011 Decision, foreigners can
thus only own up to 400,040 shares of the corporation, consisting of the maximum 40 (out of the
100) voting shares and 400,000 non-voting shares. And, assuming a 10- member board, the
foreigners can elect only 4 members of the board using the 40 voting shares they are allowed to
own.
Following, in fine, the dictates of Sec. 11, Art. XII, as couched, the foreign shareholders
right to elect members of the governing board of a given public utility corporation is
proportional only to their right to hold a part of the total shareholdings of that entity. Since
foreigners can only own, in the maximum, up to 40% of the total shareholdings of the company,
then their voting entitlement as to the numerical composition of the board would depend
on the level of their shareholding in relation to the capital stock, but in no case shall it
exceed the 40% threshold.
Contrary to the view of Justice Carpio that the objective behind the first sentence of Sec. 11, Art. XII
is to ensure control of Filipinos over the Board of Directors by limiting foreign ownership of the
common shares or voting shares up to 40%, it is actually the first part of the aforequoted last
sentence of Sec. 11, Art. XII that limits the rights of foreigners to elect not more than 40%
of the board seats thus ensuring a clear majority in the Board of Directors to Filipinos. If we follow
the line of reasoning of Justice Carpio on the meaning of the word "capital" in the first sentence, then
there is no need for the framers of the Constitution to incorporate the last sentence in Sec. 11, Art.
XII on the 40% maximum participation of the foreigners in the Board of Directors. The last sentence
would be a useless redundancy, a situation doubtless unintended by the framers of the Constitution.
A construction that renders a part of the law or Constitution being construed superfluous is an
aberration,3 for it is at all times presumed that each word used in the law is intentional and has a
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particular and special role in the approximation of the policy sought to be attained, ut magis valeat
quam pereat.
3. The third level of control proceeds from the requirement tucked in the second part of the ultimate
sentence that "all the executive and managing officers of the corporation must be citizens of
the Philippines." This assures full Filipino control, at all times, over the management of the public
utility.
To summarize, the Constitution, as enacted, establishes not just one but a three-tiered control-
enhancing-and-locking mechanism in Sec. 11, Article XII to ensure that Filipinos will always have full
beneficial ownership and control of public utility corporations: chanroblesvi rt uallawl ibra ry
1. 40% ceiling on foreign ownership in the capital stock that ensures sixty percent (60%) Filipino
control over the capital stock which covers both voting and non-voting shares. As a consequence,
Filipino control over the stockholders is assured. (First sentence of Sec. 11, Art. XII). Thus,
foreigners can own only up to 40% of the capital stock.
2. 40% ceiling on the right of foreigners to elect board directors that guarantees sixty percent (60%)
Filipino control over the Board of Directors. (First part of last sentence of Sec. 11, Art. XII).
3. Reservation to Filipino citizens of the executive and managing officers, regardless of the level of
alien equity ownership to secure total Filipino control over the management of the public utility
enterprise (Second part of last sentence of Sec. 11, Art. XII). Thus, all executive and managing
officers must be Filipinos.
Discussion
Undoubtedly there is a clash of conflicting opinions as to what "capital" in the first sentence of Sec.
11, Art. XII means. The majority says it refers only to common or voting shares. The minority says it
includes both voting and non-voting shares. A resort to constitutional construction is unavoidable.
It is settled though that the "primary source from which to ascertain constitutional intent or purpose
is the language of the constitution itself."4 To this end, the words used by the Constitution
Ï‚rÎ½l l
should as much as possible be understood in their ordinary meaning as the Constitution is

not a lawyers document.5 This approach, otherwise known as the verba legis rule, should be
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applied save where technical terms are employed.6 Ï‚rÎ½l l
The plain meaning of "capital" in the first

sentence of Sec. 11, Art. XII of the Constitution
includes both voting and non-voting shares
J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration illustrates the verba legis rule. There, the
Court cautions against departing from the commonly understood meaning of ordinary words used in
the Constitution, viz.:
We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We do not of course
stop there, but that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which constitutional
provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained. They are to be given
their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed in which case the significance
thus attached to them prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being
essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the people's consciousness, its
language as much as possible should be understood in the sense they have in common
use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and
negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people
mean what they say. Thus, there are cases where the need for construction is reduced to a
minimum.7 (Emphasis supplied.)
Ï‚rÎ½l l
The primary reason for the verba legis approach, as pointed out by Fr. Joaquin Bernas during the
June 26, 2012 arguments, is that the people who ratified the Constitution voted on their
understanding of the word capital in its everyday meaning. Fr. Bernas elucidated thus:
x x x Over the years, from the 1935 to the 1973 and finally even under the 1987 Constitution, the
prevailing practice has been to base the 60-40 proportion on total outstanding capital stock, that is,
the combined total of common and non-voting preferred shares. This is what occasioned the case
under consideration.
What is the constitutional relevance of this continuing practice? I suggest that it is relevant for
determining what the people in the street voted for when they ratified the Constitution. When the
draft of a Constitution is presented to the people for ratification, what the people vote on
is not the debates in the constituent body but the text of the draft. Concretely, what the
electorate voted on was their understanding of the word capital in its everyday meaning
they encounter in daily life. We cannot attribute to the voters a jurists sophisticated meaning of
capital and its breakdown into common and preferred. What they vote on is what they see. Nor do
they vote on what the drafters saw as assumed meaning, to use Bengzons explanation. In the
language of the sophisticates, what voters in a plebiscite vote on is verba legis and not anima
legis about which trained jurists debate.
What then does it make of the contemporary understanding by SEC etc. Is the contemporary
understanding unconstitutional or constitutional? I hesitate to characterize it as constitutional or
unconstitutional. I would merely characterize it as popular. What I mean is it reflects the common
understanding of the ordinary populi, common but incomplete.8 (Emphasis supplied.) Ï‚rÎ½ll
"Capital" in the first sentence of Sec. 11, Art. XII must then be accorded a meaning accepted,
understood, and used by an ordinary person not versed in the technicalities of law. As defined in a
non-legal dictionary, capital stock or capital is ordinarily taken to mean "the outstanding shares of
a joint stock company considered as an aggregate"9 or "the ownership element of a corporation
Ï‚rÎ½l l
divided into shares and represented by certificates."10 Ï‚rÎ½ll
The term "capital" includes all the outstanding shares of a company that represent "the proprietary
claim in a business."11 It does not distinguish based on the voting feature of the stocks but
Ï‚rÎ½l l
refers to all shares, be they voting or non-voting. Neither is the term limited to the
management aspect of the corporation but clearly refers to the separate aspect of ownership of the
corporate shares thereby encompassing all shares representing the equity of the corporation.
This plain meaning, as understood, accepted, and used in ordinary parlance, hews with the definition
given by Black who equates capital to capital stock12 and defines it as "the total number of shares of
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stock that a corporation may issue under its charter or articles of incorporation, including both
common stock and preferred stock."13 This meaning is also reflected in legal commentaries on
Ï‚rÎ½ ll
the Corporation Code. The respected commentator Ruben E. Agpalo defines "capital" as the "money,
property or means contributed by stockholders for the business or enterprise for which the
corporation was formed and generally implies that such money or property or means have been
contributed in payment for stock issued to the contributors."14 Meanwhile, "capital stock" is "the
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aggregate of the shares actually subscribed [or] the amount subscribed and paid-in and upon
which the corporation is to conduct its operations, or the amount paid-in by its stockholders in
money, property or services with which it is to conduct its business."15 Ï‚ rÎ½ ll
This definition has been echoed by numerous other experts in the field of corporation law. Dean
Villanueva wrote, thus:
In defining the relationship between the corporation and its stockholders, the capital stock represents
the proportional standing of the stockholders with respect to the corporation and corporate matters,
such as their rights to vote and to receive dividends.
In financial terms, the capital stock of the corporation as reflected in the financial statement
of the corporation represents the financial or proprietary claims of the stockholders to the
net assets of the corporation upon dissolution. In addition, the capital stock represents the
totality of the portion of the corporations assets and receivables which are covered by the trust fund
doctrine and provide for the amount of assets and receivables of the corporation which are deemed
protected for the benefit of the corporate creditors and from which the corporation cannot declare
any dividends. 16 (Emphasis supplied.)
Ï‚rÎ½ll
Similarly, renowned author Hector S. de Leon defines "capital" and "capital stock" in the following
manner:
Capital is used broadly to indicate the entire property or assets of the corporation. It includes the
amount invested by the stockholders plus the undistributed earnings less losses and expenses. In the
strict sense, the term refers to that portion of the net assets paid by the stockholders as
consideration for the shares issued to them, which is utilized for the prosecution of the business of
the corporation. It includes all balances or instalments due the corporation for shares of stock sold by
it and all unpaid subscription for shares.
xxxx
The term is also used synonymously with the words "capital stock," as meaning the amount
subscribed and paid-in and upon which the corporation is to conduct its operation (11 Fletcher Cyc.
Corp., p. 15 [1986 ed.]) and it is immaterial how the stock is classified, whether as common
or preferred.17 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
Ï‚rÎ½ll
Hence, following the verba legis approach, I see no reason to stray away from what appears to be a
common and settled acceptation of the word "capital," given that, as used in the constitutional
provision in question, it stands unqualified by any restrictive or expansive word as to reasonably
justify a distinction or a delimitation of the meaning of the word. Ubi lex non distinguit nos
distinguere debemus, when the law does not distinguish, we must not distinguish.18 Using this plain
Ï‚rÎ½ll
meaning of "capital" within the context of Sec. 11, Art. XII, foreigners are entitled to own not more
than 40% of the outstanding capital stock, which would include both voting and non-voting
shares.
Extraneous aids to ferret out constitutional intent
When the seeming ambiguity on the meaning of "capital" cannot be threshed out by looking at the
language of the Constitution, then resort to extraneous aids has become imperative. The Court can
utilize the following extraneous aids, to wit: (1) proceedings of the convention; (2) changes in
phraseology; (3) history or realities existing at the time of the adoption of the Constitution; (4) prior
laws and judicial decisions; (5) contemporaneous construction; and (6) consequences of alternative
interpretations.19 I submit that all these aids of constitutional construction affirm that the only
Ï‚rÎ½l l
acceptable construction of "capital" in the first sentence of Sec. 11, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution
is that it refers to all shares of a corporation, both voting and non-voting.
Deliberations of the Constitutional Commission

of 1986 demonstrate that capital means both
voting and non-voting shares (1st extrinsic aid)
The proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution were
accurately recorded in the Records of the Constitutional Commission.
To bring to light the true meaning of the word "capital" in the first line of Sec. 11, Art. XII, one must
peruse, dissect and analyze the entire deliberations of the Constitutional Commission pertinent to the
article on national economy and patrimony, as quoted below:
August 13, 1986, Wednesday
PROPOSED RESOLUTION NO. 496
RESOLUTION TO INCORPORATE IN THE NEW CONSTITUTION AN ARTICLE ON NATIONAL ECONOMY

AND PATRIMONY
Be it resolved as it is hereby resolved by the Constitutional Commission in session assembled, To

incorporate the National Economy and Patrimony of the new Constitution, the following provisions:
ARTICLE____
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY
SECTION 1. The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy. x x x
xxxx
SEC. 3. x x x The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the
full control and supervision of the State. Such activities may be directly undertaken by the State, or
it may enter into co-production, joint venture, production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens
or corporations or associations at least sixty percent of whose voting stock or controlling
interest is owned by such citizens. x x x
xxxx
SEC. 9. The Congress shall reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at
least sixty per cent of whose voting stock or controlling interest is owned by such citizens or
such higher percentage as Congress may prescribe, certain areas of investments when the national
interest so dictates.
xxxx
SEC. 15. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public
organized under the laws of the Philippines at least two-thirds of whose voting stock or
controlling interest is owned by such citizens. Neither shall any such franchise or right be
granted except under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by
Congress when the common good so requires. The State shall encourage equity participation in
public utilities by the general public. (Origin of Sec. 11, Article XII)
xxxx
paid-up capital stock of a corporation?" Will the Committee please enlighten me on this?
Center who provided us a draft. The phrase that is contained here which we adopted from the UP
draft is "60 percent of voting stock."
MR. VILLEGAS. Yes.20 Ï‚rÎ½ ll
August 14, 1986, Thursday
MR. FOZ. Mr. Vice-President, in Sections 3 and 9, the provision on equity is both 60 percent, but I
notice that this is now different from the provision in the 1973 Constitution in that the basis for the
equity provision is voting stock or controlling interest instead of the usual capital percentage as
provided for in the 1973 Constitution. We would like to know what the difference would be between
the previous and the proposed provisions regarding equity interest.
MR. VILLEGAS. Commissioner Suarez will answer that.

MR. SUAREZ. Thank you.
As a matter of fact, this particular portion is still being reviewed by this Committee. In Section 1,
Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution, the wording is that the percentage should be based on the
capital which is owned by such citizens. In the proposed draft, this phrase was proposed: "voting
stock or controlling interest." This was a plan submitted by the UP Law Center.
Three days ago, we had an early morning breakfast conference with the members of the UP Law
Center and precisely, we were seeking clarification regarding the difference. We would have three
criteria to go by: One would be based on capital, which is capital stock of the corporation, authorized,
subscribed or paid up, as employed under the 1935 and the 1973 Constitution. The idea behind the
introduction of the phrase "voting stock or controlling interest" was precisely to avoid the
perpetration of dummies, Filipino dummies of multinationals. It is theoretically possible that a
situation may develop where these multinational interests would not really be only 40 percent but
will extend beyond that in the matter of voting because they could enter into what is known as a
voting trust or voting agreement with the rest of the stockholders and, therefore, notwithstanding
the fact that on record their capital extent is only up to 40-percent interest in the corporation,
actually, they would be managing and controlling the entire company. That is why the UP Law Center
members suggested that we utilize the words "voting interest" which would preclude multinational
control in the matter of voting, independent of the capital structure of the corporation. And then they
also added the phrase "controlling interest" which up to now they have not been able to successfully
define the exact meaning of. But they mentioned the situation where theoretically the board would
be controlled by these multinationals, such that instead of, say, three Filipino directors out of five,
there would be three foreign directors and, therefore, they would be controlling the management of
the company with foreign interest. That is why they volunteered to flesh out this particular portion
which was submitted by them, but up to now, they have not come up with a constructive rephrasing
of this portion. And as far as I am concerned, I am not speaking in behalf of the Committee, I would
feel more comfortable if we go back to the wording of the 1935 and the 1973 Constitution,
that is to say, the 60-40 percentage could be based on the capital stock of the corporation.
MR. FOZ. I understand that that was the same view of Dean Carale who does not agree with the
others on this panel at the UP Law Center regarding the percentage of the ratio.
MR. SUAREZ. That is right. Dean Carale shares my sentiment about this matter.
MR. BENGZON. I also share the sentiment of Commissioner Suarez in that respect. So there are
already two in the Committee who want to go back to the wording of the 1935 and the 1973
Constitution.21Ï‚rÎ½ll
August 15, 1986, Friday
MR. MAAMBONG. I ask that Commissioner Tres be recognized for an amendment on line 14.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Tres is recognized.
MR. TRES. Madam President, may I propose an amendment on line 14 of Section 3 by deleting
therefrom "whose voting stock and controlling interest." And in lieu thereof, insert the CAPITAL
so the line should read: "associations at least sixty percent of the CAPITAL is owned by
such citizens.
MR. VILLEGAS. We accept the amendment.
MR. TRES. Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT. The amendment of Commissioner Tres on line 14 has been accepted by the
Committee.
Is there any objection? (Silence) The Chair hears none; the amendment is approved.
xxxx
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Suarez is recognized.
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you, Madam President.

Two points actually are being raised by Commissioner Davides proposed amendment. One has
reference to the percentage of holdings and the other one is the basis for that percentage. Would the
body have any objection if we split it into two portions because there may be several Commissioners
who would be willing to accept the Commissioners proposal on capital stock in contradistinction to a
voting stock for controlling interest?
MR. VILLEGAS. The proposal has been accepted already.
MR. DAVIDE. Yes, but it was 60 percent.
MR. SUAREZ. So, it is now 60 percent as against wholly owned?
MR. DAVIDE. Yes.
MR. SUAREZ. Is the Commissioner not insisting on the voting capital stock because that was already
accepted by the Committee?
MR. DAVIDE. Would it mean that it would be 100-percent voting capital stock?
MR. SUAREZ. No, under the Commissioners proposal it is just "CAPITAL" not "stock."
MR. DAVIDE. No, I want it to be very clear. What is the alternative proposal of the
Committee? How shall it read?
MR. SUAREZ. It will only read something like: "the CAPITAL OF WHICH IS FULLY owned."
MR. VILLEGAS. Let me read lines 12 to 14 which state: chanroblesvi rtua llawli bra ry
enter into co-production, joint venture, production sharing agreements with Filipino citizens or
corporations or associations at least 60 percent of whose CAPITAL is owned by such citizens.
We are going back to the 1935 and 1973 formulations.
MR. DAVIDE. I cannot accept the proposal because the word CAPITAL should not really be the
guiding principle. It is the ownership of the corporation. It may be voting or not voting, but that is
not the guiding principle.
MR. SUAREZ. So, the Commissioner is insisting on the use of the term "CAPITAL STOCK"?
MR. DAVIDE. Yes, to be followed by the phrase "WHOLLY owned."
MR. SUAREZ. Yes, but we are only concentrating on the first point "CAPITAL STOCK" or merely
"CAPITAL."
MR. DAVIDE. CAPITAL STOCK?
MR. SUAREZ. Yes, it is "CAPITAL STOCK."
SUSPENSION OF SESSION
At 4:42 p.m., the session was resumed.
THE PRESIDENT. The session is resumed.
Commissioner Davide is to clarify his point.
MR. VILLEGAS. Yes, Commissioner Davide has accepted the word "CAPITAL" in place of "voting stock
or controlling interest." This is an amendment already accepted by the Committee.
We would like to call for a vote on 100-percent Filipino versus 60- percent Filipino.
MR. ALONTO. Is it 60 percent?

MR. VILLEGAS. Sixty percent, yes.
MR. GASCON. Madam President, shall we vote on the proposed amendment of Commissioner Davide
of "ONE HUNDRED PERCENT?"
MR. VILLEGAS. Yes.
MR. GASCON. Assuming that it is lost, that does not prejudice any other Commissioner to make any
recommendations on other percentages?
MR. VILLEGAS. I would suggest that we vote on "sixty," which is indicated in the committee report.
MR. GASCON. It is the amendment of Commissioner Davide that we should vote on, not the
committee report.
MR. VILLEGAS. Yes, it is all right.
MR. AZCUNA. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Azcuna is recognized.
MR. AZCUNA. May I be clarified as to that portion that was accepted by the Committee?
MR. VILLEGAS. Yes.
owned by citizens?
MR. AZCUNA. But the control can be with the foreigners even if they are the minority. Let us say 40
percent of the capital is owned by them, but it is the voting capital, whereas, the Filipinos own the
nonvoting shares. So we can have a situation where the corporation is controlled by foreigners
despite being the minority because they have the voting capital. That is the anomaly that would
result there.
Constitutions is that according to Commissioner Rodrigo, there are associations that do not have
stocks. That is why we say "CAPITAL."
MR. BENGZON. In the case of stock corporations, it is assumed.
MR. AZCUNA. Yes, but what I mean is that the control should be with the Filipinos.
MR. BENGZON. Yes, that is understood.
MR. AZCUNA. Yes, because if we just say "sixty percent of whose capital is owned by the Filipinos,"
the capital may be voting or nonvoting.
MR. BENGZON. That is correct.
MR. AZCUNA. My concern is the situation where there is a voting stock. It is a stock corporation.
What the Committee requires is that 60 percent of the capital should be owned by Filipinos. But that
would not assure control because that 60 percent may be non-voting.
MS. AQUINO. Madam President.

MR. ROMULO. May we vote on the percentage first?
THE PRESIDENT. Before we vote on this, we want to be clarified first.
MS. AQUINO. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Aquino is recognized.
MS. AQUINO. I would suggest that we vote on the Davide amendment which is 100-percent capital,
and if it is voted down, then we refer to the original draft which is "capital stock" not just "capital."
MR. AZCUNA. The phrase "controlling interest" is an important consideration.
THE PRESIDENT. Let us proceed to vote then.
MR. PADILLA. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. The Vice-President, Commissioner Padilla, is recognized.
MR. PADILLA. The Tres amendment has already been approved. The only one left is the Davide
amendment which is substituting the "sixty percent" to "WHOLLY owned by Filipinos." (The Tres
amendment deleted the phrase "whose voting stocks and controlling interest" and inserted the word
"capital." It approved the phrase "associations at least sixty percent of the CAPITAL is owned by such
citizens.)(see page 16)
Madam President, I am against the proposed amendment of Commissioner Davide because that is an
ideal situation where domestic capital is available for the exploration, development and utilization of
these natural resources, especially minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils. These are not only
risky business but they also involve substantial capital. Obviously, it is an ideal situation but it is not
practical. And if we adopt the 100-percent capital of Filipino citizens, I am afraid that these natural
resources, particularly these minerals and oil, et cetera, may remain hidden in our lands, or in other
offshore places without anyone being able to explore, develop or utilize them. If it were possible to
have a 100-percent Filipino capital, I would prefer that rather than the 60 percent, but if we adopt
the 100 percent, my fear is that we will never be able to explore, develop and utilize our natural
resources because we do not have the domestic resources for that.
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President, may I be allowed to react?
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. I am very glad that Commissioner Padilla emphasized minerals, petroleum and mineral
oils. The Commission has just approved the possible foreign entry into the development, exploration
and utilization of these minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils by virtue of the Jamir amendment.
I voted in favour of the Jamir amendment because it will eventually give way to vesting in exclusively
Filipino citizens and corporations wholly owned by Filipino citizens the right to utilize the other natural
resources. This means that as a matter of policy, natural resources should be utilized and exploited
only by Filipino citizens or corporations wholly owned by such citizens. But by virtue of the Jamir
amendment, since we feel that Filipino capital may not be enough for the development and utilization
of minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils, the President can enter into service contracts with
foreign corporations precisely for the development and utilization of such resources. And so, there is
nothing to fear that we will stagnate in the development of minerals, petroleum, and mineral oils
because we now allow service contracts. It is, therefore, with more reason that at this time we must
provide for a 100-percent Filipinization generally to all natural resources.
MR. VILLEGAS. I think we are ready to vote, Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. The Acting Floor Leader is recognized.
MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President, we ask that the matter be put to a vote.
THE PRESIDENT. Will Commissioner Davide please read lines 14 and 15 with his amendment.
MR. DAVIDE. Lines 14 and 15, Section 3, as amended, will read: "associations whose CAPITAL stock
is WHOLLY owned by such citizens."
VOTING
THE PRESIDENT. As many as are in favour of this proposed amendment of Commissioner Davide on
lines 14 and 15 of Section 3, please raise their hand. (Few Members raised their hand.)
As many as are against the amendment, please raise their hand. (Several Members raised their
hand.)
The results show 16 votes in favour and 22 against; the amendment is lost.
MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President, I ask that Commissioner Davide be recognized once more for
further amendments.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you, Madam President.
This is just an insertion of a new paragraph between lines 24 and 25 of Section 3 of the same page.
It will read as follows: THE GOVERNING AND MANAGING BOARDS OF SUCH CORPORATIONS SHALL
BE VESTED EXCLUSIVELY IN CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES.
MR. VILLEGAS. Which corporations is the Commissioner referring to?
MR. DAVIDE. This refers to corporations 60 percent of whose capital is owned by such citizens.
MR. VILLEGAS. Again the amendment will read
MR. DAVIDE. "THE GOVERNING AND MANAGING BODIES OF SUCH CORPORATIONS SHALL BE
VESTED EXCLUSIVELY IN CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES."
REV. RIGOS. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Rigos is recognized.
REV. RIGOS. I wonder if Commissioner Davide would agree to put that sentence immediately after
"citizens" on line 15.
MR. ROMULO. May I ask a question. Presumably, it is 60-40?
MR. DAVIDE. Yes.
MR. ROMULO. What about the 40 percent? Would they not be entitled to a proportionate seat in the
board?
MR. DAVIDE. Under my proposal, they should not be allowed to sit in the board.
MR. ROMULO. Then the Commissioner is really proposing 100 percent which is the opposite way?
MR. DAVIDE. Not necessarily, because if 40 percent of the capital stock will be owned by aliens who
may sit in the board, they can still exercise their right as ordinary stockholders and can submit the
necessary proposal for, say, a policy to be undertaken by the board.
MR. ROMULO. But that is part of the stockholders right to sit in the board of directors.
MR. DAVIDE. That may be allowed but this is a very unusual and abnormal situation so the
Constitution itself can prohibit them to sit in the board.
MR. ROMULO. But it would be pointless to allow them 40 percent when they cannot sit in the board
nor have a say in the management of the company. Likewise, that would be extraordinary because
both the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions allowed not only the 40 percent but commensurately they
were represented in the board and management only to the extent of their equity interest, which is
40 percent. The management of a company is lodged in the board; so if the 60 percent, which is
composed of Filipinos, controls the board, then the Filipino part has control of the company.
I think it is rather unfair to say: "You may have 40 percent of the company, but that is all. You
cannot manage, you cannot sit in the board." That would discourage investments. Then it is like
having a one hundredpercent ownership; I mean, either we allow a 60-40 with full rights to the 40
percent, limited as it is as to a minority, or we do not allow them at all. This means if it is allowed;
we cannot have it both ways.
MR. DAVIDE. The aliens cannot also have everything. While they may be given entry into
subscriptions of the capital stock of the corporation, it does not necessarily follow that they cannot be
deprived of the right of membership in the managing or in the governing board of a particular
corporation. But it will not totally deprive them of a say because they can still exercise the ordinary
rights of stockholders. They can submit their proposal and they can be heard.
MR. ROMULO. Yes, but they have no vote. That is like being represented in the Congress but not
being allowed to vote like our old resident Commissioners in the United States. They can be heard;
they can be seen but they cannot vote.
MR. DAVIDE. If that was allowed under that situation, why can we not do it now in respect to our
natural resources? This is a very critical and delicate issue.
MR. ROMULO. Precisely, we used to complain how unfair that was. One can be seen and heard but he
cannot vote.
MR. DAVIDE. We know that under the corporation law, we have the rights of the minority
stockholders. They can be heard. As a matter of fact, they can probably allow a proxy to vote for
them and, therefore, they still retain that specific prerogative to participate just like what we did in
the Article on Social Justice.
MR. ROMULO. That would encourage dummies if we give them proxies.
MR. DAVIDE. As a matter of fact, when it comes to encouraging dummies, by allowing 40-percent
ownership to come in we will expect the proliferation of corporations actually owned by aliens using
dummies.
MR. ROMULO. No, because 40 percent is a substantial and fair share and, therefore, the bona fide
foreign investor is satisfied with that proportion. He does not have to look for dummies. In fact, that
is what assures a genuine investment if we give a foreign investor the 40 percent and all the rights
that go with it. Otherwise, we are either discouraging the investment altogether or we are
encouraging circumvention. Let us be fair. If it is 60-40, then we give him the right, limited as to his
minority position.
MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President, the body would like to know the position of the Committee so
that we can put the matter to a vote.
MR. VILLEGAS. The Committee does not accept the amendment.
THE PRESIDENT. The Committee does not accept.
Will Commissioner Davide insist on his amendment?
MR. DAVIDE. We request a vote.
THE PRESIDENT. Will Commissioner Davide state his proposed amendment again?
MR. DAVIDE. The proposed amendment would be the insertion of a new paragraph to Section 3,
between lines 24 and 25, page 2, which reads: "THE GOVERNING AND MANAGING BODIES OF SUCH
CORPORATIONS SHALL BE VESTED EXCLUSIVELY IN CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES."
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Padilla is recognized.
MR. PADILLA. Madam President, may I just say that this Section 3 speaks of "co-production, joint
venture, production sharing agreements with Filipino citizens." If the foreign share of, say, 40
percent will not be represented in the board or in management, I wonder if there would be any
foreign investor who will accept putting capital but without any voice in management. I think that
might make the provision on "coproduction, joint venture and production sharing" illusory.
VOTING
THE PRESIDENT. If the Chair is not mistaken, that was the same point expressed by Commissioner
Romulo, a member of the Committee.
As many as are in favour of the Davide amendment, please raise their hand. (Few Members raised
their hand.)
As many as are against, please raise their hand. (Several Members raised their hand.)
As many as are abstaining, please raise their hand. (One Member raised his hand.)
xxxx
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Garcia is recognized.
MR. GARCIA. My amendment is on Section 3, the same item which Commissioner Davide
tried to amend. It is basically on the share of 60 percent. I would like to propose that we
raise the 60 percent to SEVENTY-FIVE PERCENT so the line would read: "SEVENTY-FIVE
PERCENT of whose CAPITAL is owned by such citizens."
THE PRESIDENT. What does the Committee say?
SUSPENSION OF SESSION
MR. VILLEGAS. The Committee insists on staying with the 60 percent 60-40.
Madam President, may we ask for a suspension of the session.
THE PRESIDENT. The session is suspended.
It was 5:07 p.m.
RESUMPTION OF SESSION
At 5:31 p.m., the session was resumed.
THE PRESIDENT. The session is resumed.
MR. SARMIENTO. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. The Acting Floor Leader, Commissioner Sarmiento, is recognized.
MR. SARMIENTO: Commissioner Garcia still has the floor. May I ask that he be recognized.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Garcia is recognized.
MR. GARCIA. Thank you very much, Madam President.
I would like to propose the following amendment on Section 3, line 14 on page 2. I propose to
change the word "sixty" to SEVENTY-FIVE. So, this will read: "or it may enter into co-production,
joint venture, production sharing agreements with Filipino citizens or corporations or associations at
least SEVENTY-FIVE percent of whose CAPITAL stock or controlling interest is owned by such
citizens."
MR. VILLEGAS. This is just a correction. I think Commissioner Azcuna is not insisting on the retention
of the phrase "controlling interest," so we will retain "CAPITAL" to go back really to the 1935 and
1973 formulations.
MR. BENNAGEN. May I suggest that we retain the phrase "controlling interest"?
MR. VILLEGAS. Yes, we will retain it. (The statement of Commissioner Villegas is possibly erroneous
considering his consistent statement, especially during the oral arguments, that the Constitutional
Commission rejected the UP Proposal to use the phrase "controlling interest.")
THE PRESIDENT. Are we now ready to vote?
MR. SARMIENTO. Yes, Madam President.
VOTING
THE PRESIDENT. As many as are in favour of the proposed amendment of Commissioner Garcia for
"SEVENTY-FIVE" percent, please raise their hand. (Few Members raised their hand.)
As many as are against the amendment, please raise their hand. (Several Members raised their
hand.)
As many as are abstaining, please raise their hand. (One Member raised his hand.)
The results show 16 votes in favour, 18 against and 1 abstention; the Garcia amendment is
lost.
MR. SARMIENTO. Madam President, may I ask that Commissioner Foz be recognized.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Foz is recognized.
MR. FOZ. After losing by only two votes, I suppose that this next proposal will finally get the vote of
the majority. The amendment is to provide for at least TWO-THIRDS.
MR. SUAREZ. It is equivalent to 66 2/3.
THE PRESIDENT. Will the Commissioner repeat?
MR. FOZ. I propose "TWO-THIRDS of whose CAPITAL is owned by such citizens." Madam
President, we are referring to the same provision to which the previous amendments have
been suggested. First, we called for a 100-percent ownership; and then, second, we called
for a 75-percent ownership by Filipino citizens.
So my proposal is to provide for at least TWO-THIRDS of the capital to be owned by Filipino citizens.
I would like to call the attention of the body that the same ratio or equity requirement is provided in
the case of public utilities. And if we are willing to provide such equity requirements in the case of
public utilities, we should at least likewise provide the same equity ratio in the case of natural
resources.
MR. VILLEGAS. Commissioner Romulo will respond.
MR. ROMULO. I just want to point out that there is an amendment here filed to also reduce the ratio
in Section 15 to 60-40.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Padilla is recognized.
MR. PADILLA. The 60 percent which appears in the committee report has been repeatedly upheld in
various votings. One proposal was whole 100 percent; another one was 75 percent and now it is 66
2/3 percent. Is not the decision of this Commission in voting to uphold the percentage in the
committee report already a decision on this issue?
MR. FOZ. Our amendment has been previously brought to the attention of the body.
MR. VILLEGAS. The Committee does not accept the Commissioners amendment. This has been
discussed fully and, with only one-third of the vote, it is like having nothing at all in decision-making.
It can be completely vetoed.
MR. RODRIGO. Madam President.

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Rodrigo is recognized.
MR. RODRIGO. This is an extraordinary suggestion. But considering the circumstances that the
proposals from the 100 percent to 75 percent lost, and now it went down to 66 2/3 percent, we
might go down to 65 percent next time. So I suggest that we vote between 66 2/3 and 60 percent.
Which does the body want? Then that should be the end of it; otherwise, this is ridiculous. After this,
if the 66 2/3 percent will lose, then somebody can say: "Well, how about 65 percent?"
THE PRESIDENT. The Chair was made to understand that Commissioner Foz proposal is the last
proposal on this particular line. Will Commissioner Foz restate his proposal?
MR. FOZ. My proposal is "TWO-THIRDS of whose CAPITAL or controlling interest is owned by such
citizens."
VOTING
THE PRESIDENT. We now put Commissioner Foz amendment to a vote.
As many as are in favour of the amendment of Commissioner Foz, please raise their hand. (Few
Members raised their hand.)
As many as are against, please raise their hand. (Several Members raised their hand.)
The results show 17 votes in favour, 20 against, and not abstention; the amendment is
lost.22
Ï‚rÎ½ll
xxxx
August 22, 1986, Friday
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Nolledo is recognized.
MR. NOLLEDO. Thank you, Madam President.
I would like to propound some questions to the chairman and members of the committee. I have
here a copy of the approved provisions on Article on the National Economy and Patrimony. On page
2, the first two lines are with respect to the Filipino and foreign equity and I said: "At least sixty
percent of whose capital or controlling interest is owned by such citizens."
I notice that this provision was amended by Commissioner Davide by changing "voting stocks" to
"CAPITAL," but I still notice that there appears the term "controlling interest" which seems to refer to
assocaitions other than corporations and it is merely 50 percent plus one percent which is less than
60 percent. Besides, the wordings may indicate that the 60 percent may be based not only on capital
but also on controlling interest; it could mean 60 percent or 51 percent.
Before I propound the final question, I would like to make a comment in relation to Section 15 since
they are related to each other. I notice that in Section 15, there still appears the phrase "voting stock
or controlling interest." The term "voting stocks" as the basis of the Filipino equity means that if 60
percent of the voting stocks belong to Filipinos, foreigners may now own more than 40 percent of the
capital as long as the 40 percent or the excess thereof will cover nonvoting stock. This is aside from
the fact that under the Corporation Code, even nonvoting shares can vote on certain instances.
Control over investments may cover aspects of management and participation in the fruits of
production or exploitation.
So, I hope the committee will consider favorably my recommendation that instead of using
"controlling interests," we just use "CAPITAL" uniformly in cases where foreign equity is permitted by
law, because the purpose is really to help the Filipinos in the exploitation of natural resources and in
the operation of public utilities. I know the committee, at its own instance, can make the
amendment.
What does the committee say?
MR. VILLEGAS. We completely agree with the Commissioners views. Actually, it was really an
oversight. We did decide on the word "CAPITAL." I think it was the opinion of the majority that the
phrase "controlling interest" is ambiguous.
So, we do accept the Commissioners proposal to eliminate the phrase "or controlling interest" in all
the provisions that talk about foreign participation.
MR. NOLLEDO. Not only in Section 3, but also with respect to Section 15.
Thank you very much.
MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Maambong is recognized.
MR. MAAMBONG. In view of the manifestation of the committee, I would like to be clarified on the
use of the word "CAPITAL."
MR. VILLEGAS. Yes, that was the word used in the 1973 and 1935 Constitutions.
MR. MAAMBONG. Let us delimit ourselves to that word "CAPITAL". In the Corporation Law,
if I remember correctly, we have three types of capital: the authorized capital stock, the
subscribed capital stock and the paid-up capital stock.
The authorized capital stock could be interpreted as the capital of the corporation itself because that
is the totality of the investment of the corporation as stated in the articles of incorporation. When we
refer to 60 percent, are we referring to the authorized capital stock or the paid-up capital stock since
the determinant as to who owns the corporation, as far as equity is concerned, is the subscription of
the person?
I think we should delimit ourselves also to what we mean by 60 percent. Are we referring to the
authorized capital stock or to the subscribed capital stock, because the determination, as I said, on
the controlling interest of a corporation is based on the subscribed capital stock? I would like a reply
on that.
MR. VILLEGAS. Commissioner Suarez, a member of the committee, would like to answer that.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Suarez is recognized.
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you, Madam President.
We stated this because there might be a misunderstanding regarding the interpretation of the term
"CAPITAL" as now used as the basis for the percentage of foreign investments in appropriate
instances and the interpretation attributed to the word is that it should be based on the paidup
capital. We eliminated the use the phrase "voting stock or controlling interest" because that is only
used in connection with the matter of voting. As a matter of fact, in the declaration of dividends for
private corporations, it is usually based on the paid-up capitalization.
So, what is really the dominant factor to be considered in matters of determining the 60-40
percentage should really be the paid-up capital of the corporation.
MR. MAAMBONG. I would like to get clarification on this. If I remember my corporation law correctly,
we usually use a determinant in order to find out what the ratio of ownership is, not really on the
paid-up capital stock but on the subscribed capital stock.
For example, if the whole authorized capital stock of the corporation is P 1 million, if the subscription
is 60 percent of P 1 million which is P 600,000, then that is supposed to be the determinant whether
there is a sharing of 60 percent of Filipinos or not. It is not really on the paid-up capital because once
a person subscribes to a capital stock then whether that capital stock is paid up or not, does not
really matter, as far as the books of the corporation are concerned. The subscribed capital stock is
supposed to be owned by the person who makes the subscription. There are so many laws on how to
collect the delinquency and so on.
I view of the Commissioners answer, I would like to know whether he is determined to put on the
record that in order to determine the 60-40 percent sharing, we have to determine whether we will
use a determinant which is the subscribed capital stock or the paid-up capital stock.
MR SUAREZ. We are principally concerned about the interpretation which would be attached to it;
that is, it should be limited to authorized capital stock, not to subscribed capital stock.
I will give the Commissioner an illustration of what he is explaining to the Commission.
MR. MAAMBONG. Yes, thank you.
MR. SUAREZ. Let us say the authorized capital stock is P 1 million. Under the present rules in the
Securities and Exchange Commission, at least 25 percent of that amount must be subscribed and at
least 25 percent of this subscribed capital must be paid up.
Now, let us discuss the basis of 60-40. To illustrate the matter further, let us say that 60 percent of
the subscriptions would be allocated to Filipinos and 40 percent of the subscribed capital would be
held by foreigners. Then we come to the paid-up capitalization. Under the present rules in the
Securities and Exchange Commission, a foreign corporation is supposed to subscribe to a 40-percent
share which must be fully paid up.
On the other hand, the 60 percent allocated to Filipinos need not be paid up. However, at least 25
percent of the subscription must be paid up for purposes of complying with the Corporation Law. We
can illustrate the matter further by saying that the compliance of 25 percent paid-up of the
subscribed capital would be fulfilled by the full payment of the 40 percent by the foreigners.
So, we have a situation where the Filipino percentage of 60 may not even comply with the 25-
percent requirement because of the totality due to the fully payment of the 40-percent of the foreign
investors, the payment of 25 percent paid-up on the subscription would have been considered
fulfilled. That is exactly what we are trying to avoid.
MR. MAAMBONG I appreciate very much the explanation but I wonder if the committee would
subscribe to that view because I will stick to my thinking that in the computation of the 60-40 ratio,
the basis should be on the subscription. If the subscription is being done by 60 percent Filipinos,
whether it is paid-up or not and the subscription is accepted by the corporation, I think that is the
proper determinant. If we base the 60-40 on the paid-up capital stock, we have a problem here
where the 40 percent is fully paid up and the 60 percent is not fully paid up this may be contrary to
the provisions of the Constitution. So I would like to ask for the proper advisement from the
Committee as to what should be the proper interpretation because this will cause havoc on the
interpretation of our Corporation Law.
MR. ROMULO. Madam President.
MR. ROMULO. We go by the established rule which I believe is uniformly held. It is based on the
subscribed capital. I know only of one possible exception and that is where the bylaws prohibit the
subscriber from voting. But that is a very rare provision in bylaws. Otherwise, my information and
belief is that it is based on the subscribed capital.
MR. MAAMBONG. It is, therefore, the understanding of this Member that the Commissioner is
somewhat revising the answer of Commissioner Suarez to that extent?
MR. ROMULO. No, I do not think we contradict each other. He is talking really of the instance where
the subscriber is a non-resident and, therefore, must fully pay. That is how I understand his position.
MR. MAAMBONG. My understanding is that in the computation of the 60-40 sharing under the
present formulation, the determinant is the paid-up capital stock to which I disagree.
MR. ROMULO. At least, from my point of view, it is the subscribed capital stock.
MR. MAAMBONG. Then that is clarified.23 Ï‚rÎ½ll
xxxx
August 23, 1986, Saturday
MS. ROSARIO BRAID. Madam President, I propose a new section to read: "THE MANAGEMENT BODY
OF EVERY CORPORATION OR ASSOCIATION SHALL IN ALL CASES BE CONTROLLED BY CITIZENS OF
THE PHILIPPINES."
This will prevent management contracts and assure control by Filipino citizens. Will the committee
assure us that this amendment will insure that past activities such as management contracts will no
longer be possible under this amendment?
MR. ROMULO. Madam President, if I may reply.
MR. ROMULO. May I ask the proponent to read the amendment again.
MS. ROSARIO BRAID. The amendment reads: "THE MANAGEMENT BODY OF EVERY CORPORATION
OR ASSOCIATION SHALL IN ALL CASES BE CONTROLLED BY CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES."
MR. DE LOS REYES. Madam President, will Commissioner Rosario Braid agree to a reformulation of
her amendment for it to be more comprehensive and all-embracing?
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner de los Reyes is recognized.
MR. DE LOS REYES. This is an amendment I submitted to the committee which reads: "MAJORITY OF
THE DIRECTORS OR TRUSTEES AND ALL THE EXECUTIVE AND MANAGING OFFICERS OF SUCH
CORPORATION OR ASSOCIATION MUST BE CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES."
This amendment is more direct because it refers to particular officers to be all-Filipino citizens.
MR. BENGZON. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Bengzon is recognized.
MR. BENGZON. The committee sitting out here accepts the amendment of Commissioner de los
Reyes which subsumes the amendment of Commissioner Rosario Braid.
THE PRESIDENT. So this will be a joint amendment now of Commissioners Rosario Braid, de los
Reyes and others.
MR. REGALADO. Madam President, I join in that amendment with the request that it will be the last
sentence of Section 15 because we intend to put an anterior amendment. However, that particular
sentence which subsumes also the proposal of Commissioner Rosario Braid can just be placed as the
last sentence of the article.
THE PRESIDENT. Is that acceptable to the committee?
MR. VILLEGAS. Yes, Madam President.
MS. ROSARIO BRAID. Thank you.
MR. RAMA, The body is now ready to vote on the amendment.
FR. BERNAS. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Bernas is recognized.
FR. BERNAS. Will the committee accept a reformulation of the first part?
MR. BENGZON. Let us hear it.
FR. BERNAS. The reformulation will be essentially the formula of the 1973 Constitution
which reads: "THE PARTICIPATION OF FOREIGN INVESTORS IN THE GOVERNING BODY OF
ANY PUBLIC UTILITY ENTERPRISE SHALL BE LIMITED TO THEIR PROPORTIONATE SHARE
IN THE CAPITAL THEREOF AND"
MR. VILLEGAS. "ALL THE EXECUTIVE AND MANAGING OFFICERS OF SUCH CORPORATIONS AND
MR. BENGZON. Will Commissioner Bernas read the whole thing again?
FR. BERNAS. "THE PARTICIPATION OF FOREIGN INVESTORS IN THE GOVERNING BODY OF ANY
THEREOF" I do not have the rest of the copy.
MR. BENGZON. "AND ALL THE EXECUTIVE AND MANAGING OFFICERS OF SUCH CORPORATIONS OR
ASSOCIATIONS MUST BE CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES." Is that correct?
MR. VILLEGAS. Yes.
MR. BENGZON. Madam President, I think that was said in a more elegant language. We accept the
amendment. Is that all right with Commissioner Rosario Braid?
THE PRESIDENT. The original authors of this amendment are Commissioners Rosario Braid, de los
Reyes, Regalado, Natividad, Guingona and Fr. Bernas.
MR. DE LOS REYES. The governing body refers to the board of directors and trustees.
MR. BENGZON. Yes, the governing body refers to the board of directors.
MR. REGALADO. It is accepted.
MR. RAMA. The body is now ready to vote, Madam President.
VOTING
THE PRESIDENT. As many as are in favour of this proposed amendment which should be the last
sentence of Section 15 and has been accepted by the committee, pleas raise their hand. (All
Members raised their hand.)
As many as are against, please raise their hand. (No Member raised his hand.)
The results show 29 votes in favour and none against; so the proposed amendment is
approved.24 Ï‚rÎ½ll
It can be concluded that the view advanced by Justice Carpio is incorrect as the deliberations easily
reveal that the intent of the framers was not to limit the definition of the word "capital" as
meaning voting shares/stocks.
The majority in the original decision reproduced the CONCOM deliberations held on August 13 and
August 15, 1986, but neglected to quote the other pertinent portions of the deliberations that would
have shed light on the true intent of the framers of the Constitution.
It is conceded that Proposed Resolution No. 496 on the language of what would be Art. XII of the
Constitution contained the phrase "voting stock or controlling interest," viz:
PROPOSED RESOLUTION NO. 496
RESOLUTION TO INCORPORATE IN THE NEW CONSTITUTION AN ARTICLE ON NATIONAL ECONOMY

AND PATRIMONY
Be it resolved as it is hereby resolved by the Constitutional Commission in session assembled, To

incorporate the National Economy and Patrimony of the new Constitution, the following provisions:
ARTICLE____
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY
xxxx
SEC. 15. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public
organized under the laws of the Philippines at least two-thirds of whose voting stock or
controlling interest is owned by such citizens. Neither shall any such franchise or right be
granted except under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by
Congress when the common good so requires. The State shall encourage equity participation in
public utilities by the general public.25 (This became Sec. 11, Art. XII)(Emphasis supplied.)
Ï‚rÎ½ ll
The aforequoted deliberations disclose that the Commission eventually and unequivocally
decided to use "capital," which refers to the capital stock of the corporation, "as was
employed in the 1935 and 1973 Constitution," instead of the proposed "voting stock or
controlling interest" as the basis for the percentage of ownership allowed to foreigners.
The following exchanges among Commissioners Foz, Suarez and Bengzon reflect this decision, but
the majority opinion in the June 28, 2011 Decision left their statements out:
MR. FOZ. Mr. Vice-President, in Sections 3 and 9,26 the provision on equity is both 60 percent,
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but I notice that this is now different from the provision in the 1973 Constitution in that the
basis for the equity provision is voting stock or controlling interest instead of the usual
capital percentage as provided for in the 1973 Constitution. We would like to know what the
difference would be between the previous and the proposed provisions regarding equity
interest.
xxxx
MR. SUAREZ. x x x As a matter of fact, this particular portion is still being reviewed x x x. In Section
1, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution, the wording is that the percentage should be based on
the capital which is owned by such citizens. In the proposed draft, this phrase was
proposed: "voting stock or controlling interest." This was a plan submitted by the UP Law
Center.
x x x We would have three criteria to go by: One would be based on capital, which is capital
stock of the corporation, authorized, subscribed or paid up, as employed under the 1935
and the 1973 Constitution. The idea behind the introduction of the phrase "voting stock or
controlling interest" was precisely to avoid the perpetration of dummies, Filipino dummies of
multinationals. It is theoretically possible that a situation may develop where these multinational
interests would not really be only 40 percent but will extend beyond that in the matter of voting
because they could enter into what is known as a voting trust or voting agreement with the rest of
the stockholders and, therefore, notwithstanding the fact that on record their capital extent is only up
to 40- percent interest in the corporation, actually, they would be managing and controlling the
entire company. That is why the UP Law Center members suggested that we utilize the words "voting
interest" which would preclude multinational control in the matter of voting, independent of the
capital structure of the corporation. And then they also added the phrase "controlling interest"
which up to now they have not been able to successfully define the exact meaning of. x x x And as
far as I am concerned, I am not speaking in behalf of the Committee, I would feel
more comfortable if we go back to the wording of the 1935 and the 1973 Constitution, that is
to say, the 60-40 percentage could be based on the capital stock of the corporation.
xxxx
MR. BENGZON. I also share the sentiment of Commissioner Suarez in that respect. So there are
already two in the Committee who want to go back to the wording of the 1935 and the 1973
Constitution.27
Ï‚rÎ½ll
In fact, in another portion of the CONCOM deliberations conveniently glossed over by the June 28,
2011 Decision, then Commissioner Davide strongly resisted the retention of the term "capital" as
used in the 1935 and 1973 Constitution on the ground that the term refers to both voting and
nonvoting. Eventually, however, he came around to accept the use of "CAPITAL" along with the
majority of the members of the Committee on Natural Economy and Patrimony in the afternoon
session held on August 15, 1986:
MR. TRES. x x x may I propose an amendment on line 14 of Section 3 by deleting therefrom

"whose voting stock and controlling interest." And in lieu thereof, insert the CAPITAL so
the line should read: "associations at least sixty percent of the CAPITAL is owned by such
citizens.
MR. VILLEGAS. We accept the amendment.
MR. TRES. Thank you.

THE PRESIDENT. The amendment of Commissioner Tres on line 14 has been accepted by the
Committee.
Is there any objection? (Silence) The Chair hears none; the amendment is approved.28 Ï‚rÎ½ll
xxxx
MR. SUAREZ. x x x Two points are being raised by Commissioner Davides proposed amendment. One
has reference to the percentage of holdings and the other one is the basis for the percentage x x x
x Is the Commissioner not insisting on the voting capital stock because that was already
accepted by the Committee?
MR. DAVIDE. Would it mean that it would be 100-percent voting capital stock?
MR. SUAREZ. No, under the Commissioners proposal it is just "CAPITAL" not "stock."
MR. DAVIDE. No, I want it to be very clear. What is the alternative proposal of the Committee? How
shall it read?
MR. SUAREZ. It will only read something like: "the CAPITAL OF WHICH IS FULLY owned."
MR. VILLEGAS. Let me read lines 12 to 14 which state:
enter into co-production, joint venture, production sharing agreements with Filipino citizens or
corporations or associations at least 60 percent of whose CAPITAL is owned by such citizens.
We are going back to the 1935 and 1973 formulations.
MR. DAVIDE. I cannot accept the proposal because the word CAPITAL should not really be
the guiding principle. It is the ownership of the corporation. It may be voting or not
voting, but that is not the guiding principle.
xxxx
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is to clarify his point.
MR. VILLEGAS. Yes, Commissioner Davide has accepted the word "CAPITAL" in place of
"voting stock or controlling interest." This is an amendment already accepted by the
Committee.29 Ï‚rÎ½ll
The above exchange precedes the clarifications made by then Commissioner Azcuna, which were
cited in the June 28, 2011 Decision. Moreover, the statements made subsequent to the portion
quoted in the June 28, 2011 Decision emphasize the CONCOMs awareness of the plain meaning of
the term "capital" without the qualification espoused in the majoritys decision:
MR. AZCUNA. May I be clarified as to [what] was accepted x x x.
MR. VILLEGAS. The portion accepted by the Committee is the deletion of the phrase "voting
stock or controlling interest."
MR. VILLEGAS. Yes.
MR. AZCUNA. So if the Davide amendment is lost, we are stuck with 60 percent of the
capital to be owned by citizens?
MR. AZCUNA. But the control can be with the foreigners even if they are the minority. Let us say 40
percent of the capital is owned by them, but it is the voting capital, whereas, the Filipinos own the
nonvoting shares. So we can have a situation where the corporation is controlled by foreigners
despite being the minority because they have the voting capital. That is the anomaly that would
result here.
Constitutions is that xxx there are associations that do not have stocks. That is why we say
"CAPITAL."
MR. BENGZON. In the case of stock corporation, it is assumed.
MR. AZCUNA. Yes, but what I mean is that the control should be with the Filipinos.
MR. BENGZON. Yes, that is understood.
MR. AZCUNA. Yes, because if we just say "sixty percent of whose capital is owned by the
Filipinos," the capital may be voting or non-voting.
MR. BENGZON. That is correct.30 Ï‚rÎ½ll
More importantly, on the very same August 15, 1986 session, Commissioner Azcuna no longer
insisted on retaining the delimiting phrase "controlling interest":
MR. GARCIA. Thank you very much, Madam President.
I would like to propose the following amendment on Section 3, line 14 on page 2. I propose to
change the word "sixty" to SEVENTY-FIVE. So, this will read: "or it may enter into co-production,
joint venture, production sharing agreements with Filipino citizens or corporations or associations at
least SEVENTY-FIVE percent of whose CAPITAL stock or controlling interest is owned by such
citizens."
MR. VILLEGAS. This is just a correction. I think Commissioner Azcuna is not insisting on the
retention of the phrase "controlling interest," so we will retain "CAPITAL" to go back really
to the 1935 and 1973 formulations.31 (Emphasis supplied.)
Ï‚rÎ½l l
The later deliberations held on August 22, 1986 further underscore the framers true intent to include
both voting and non-voting shares as coming within the pale of the word "capital." The UP Law
Center attempted to limit the scope of the word along the line then and now adopted by the majority,
but, as can be gleaned from the following discussion, the framers opted not to adopt the
proposal of the UP Law Center to add the more protectionist phrase "voting stock or
controlling interest":
MR. NOLLEDO. x x x I would like to propound some questions xxx. I have here a copy of the
approved provisions on Article on the National Economy and Patrimony. x x x
I notice that this provision was amended by Commissioner Davide by changing "voting stocks" to
"CAPITAL," but I still notice that there appears the term "controlling interest" x x x. Besides, the
wordings may indicate that the 60 percent may be based not only on capital but also on controlling
interest; it could mean 60 percent or 51 percent.
Before I propound the final question, I would like to make a comment in relation to Section 15 since
they are related to each other. I notice that in Section 15, there still appears the phrase "voting stock
or controlling interest." The term "voting stocks" as the basis of the Filipino equity means that if 60
percent of the voting stocks belong to Filipinos, foreigners may now own more than 40 percent of the
capital as long as the 40 percent or the excess thereof will cover nonvoting stock. This is aside from
the fact that under the Corporation Code, even nonvoting shares can vote on certain
instances. Control over investments may cover aspects of management and participation in
the fruits of production or exploitation.
So, I hope the committee will consider favorably my recommendation that instead of using
"controlling interests," we just use "CAPITAL" uniformly in cases where foreign equity is
permitted by law, because the purpose is really to help the Filipinos in the exploitation of
natural resources and in the operation of public utilities. x x x
What does the committee say?
MR. VILLEGAS. We completely agree with the Commissioners views. Actually, it was really an
oversight. We did decide on the word "CAPITAL." I think it was the opinion of the majority
that the phrase "controlling interest" is ambiguous.
So, we do accept the Commissioners proposal to eliminate the phrase "or controlling interest" in all
the provisions that talk about foreign participation.
MR. NOLLEDO. Not only in Section 3, but also with respect to Section 15.32 (Emphasis supplied.)
Ï‚rÎ½ll
In fact, on the very same day of deliberations, the Commissioners clarified that the proper and more
specific "interpretation" that should be attached to the word "capital" is that it refers to the
"subscribed capital," a corporate concept defined as "that portion of the authorized capital stock that
is covered by subscription agreements whether fully paid or not"33 and refers to both voting and
Ï‚rÎ½l l
non-voting shares:
MR. MAAMBONG. x x x I would like to be clarified on the use of the word "CAPITAL."
MR. VILLEGAS. Yes, that was the word used in the 1973 and the 1935 Constitutions.
MR. MAAMBONG. Let us delimit ourselves to that word "CAPITAL." In the Corporation Law, if I
remember correctly, we have three types of capital: the authorized capital stock, the subscribed
capital stock and the paid-up capital stock.
xxxx
I would like to get clarification on this. If I remember my corporation law correctly, we usually
use a determinant in order to find out what the ratio of ownership is, not really on the
paid-up capital stock but on the subscribe capital stock.
xxxx
x x x I would like to know whether (Commissioner Suarez) is determined to put on the record that in
order to determine the 60-40 percent sharing, we have to determine whether we will use a
determinant which is the subscribed capital stock or the paid-up capital stock.
MR. SUAREZ. We are principally concerned about the interpretation which would be
attached to it, that is, it should be limited to authorized capital stock, not to subscribed
capital stock.
I will give the Commissioner an illustration of what he is explaining to the Commission.
xxxx
Let us say authorized capital stock is P 1 million. Under the present rules in the [SEC], at least 25
percent of that amount must be subscribed and at least 25 percent of this subscribed capital must be
paid up.
Now, let us discuss the basis of 60-40. To illustrate the matter further, let us say that 60 percent of
the subscriptions would be allocated to Filipinos and 40 percent of the subscribed capital stock would
be held by foreigners. Then we come to the paid-up capitalization. Under the present rules in the
[SEC], a foreign corporation is supposed to subscribe to 40-percent share which must be fully paid
up.
On the other hand, the 60 percent allocated to Filipinos need not be paid up. However, at least 25
percent of the subscription must be paid up for purposes of complying with the Corporation Law. We
can illustrate the matter further by saying that the compliance of 25 percent paid-up of the
subscribed capital would be fulfilled by the full payment of the 40 percent by the foreigners.
So, we have a situation where the Filipino percentage of 60 may not even comply with the 25-
percent requirement because of the totality due to the full payment of the 40-percent of the foreign
investors, the payment of 25 percent paid-up on the subscription would have been considered
fulfilled. That is exactly what we are trying to avoid.
MR. MAAMBONG. I appreciate very much the explanation but I wonder if the committee would
subscribe to that view because I will stick to my thinking that in the computation of the 60-40 ratio,
the basis should be on the subscription. x x x
xxxx
MR. ROMULO. We go by the established rule which I believe is uniformly held. It is based on
the subscribed capital. x x x
xxxx
I do not think that we contradict each other. (Commisioner Suarez) is talking really of the instance
where the subscriber is a non-resident and, therefore, must fully pay. That is how I understand his
position.
MR. MAAMBONG. My understanding is that in the computation of the 60-40 sharing under the
present formulation, the determinant is the paid-up capital stock to which I disagree.
MR . ROMULO. At least, from my point of view, it is the subscribed capital stock."34 Ï‚rÎ½ ll
Clearly, while the concept of voting capital as the norm to determine the 60-40 Filipino-alien ratio
was initially debated upon as a result of the proposal to use "at least two-thirds of whose voting
stock or controlling interest is owned by such citizens,"35 in what would eventually be Sec. 11, Art.
Ï‚rÎ½ ll
XII of the Constitution, that proposal was eventually discarded. And nowhere in the records of the
CONCOM can it be deduced that the idea of full ownership of voting stocks presently parlayed by the
majority was earnestly, if at all, considered. In fact, the framers decided that the term "capital," as
used in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, should be properly interpreted as the "subscribed capital,"
which, again, does not distinguish stocks based on their board-membership voting features.
Indeed, the phrase "voting stock or controlling interest" was suggested for and in fact deliberated,
but was similarly dropped in the approved draft provisions on National Economy and Patrimony,
particularly in what would become Sections 236 and 10,37 Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
Ï‚rÎ½ ll Ï‚rÎ½ ll
However, the framers expressed preference to the formulation of the provision in question in the
1935 and 1973 Constitutions, both of which employed the word "capital" alone. This was very
apparent in the aforementioned deliberations and affirmed by amicus curiae Dr. Bernardo Villegas,
Chair of the Committee on the National Economy and Patrimony in charge of drafting Section 11 and
the rest of Article XII of the Constitution. During the June 26, 2012 oral arguments, Dr. Villegas
manifested that:
x x x Justice Abad was right. [If i]t was not in the minds of the Commissioners to define capital
broadly, these additional provisions would be meaningless. And it would have been really more or
less expressing some kind of a contradiction in terms. So, that is why I was pleasantly surprised that
one of the most pro-Filipino members of the Commission, Atty. Jose Suarez, who actually voted "NO"
to the entire Constitution has only said, was one of the first to insist, during one of the plenary
sessions that we should reject the UP Law Center recommendation. In his words, I quote "I
would feel more comfortable if we go back to the wording of the 1935 and 1970
Constitutions that is to say the 60-40 percentage could be based on the capital stock of the
corporation." The final motion was made by Commissioner Efren Tres, in the same plenary session
when he moved, "Madam President, may I propose an amendment on line 14 of Section 3 by
deleting therefrom whose voting stock and controlling interest and in lieu thereof, insert capital, so
the line should read: "associations of at least sixty percent (60%) of the capital is owned by such
citizens." After I accepted the amendment since I was the chairman of the National
Economy Committee, in the name of the Committee, the President of the Commission
asked for any objection. When no one objected, the President solemnly announced that the
amendment had been approved by the Plenary. It is clear, therefore, that in the minds of
the Commissioners the word "capital" in Section 11 of Article XII refers, not to voting
stock, but to total subscribed capital, both common and preferred.38 (Emphasis supplied.)
Ï‚rÎ½ ll
There was no change in phraseology from the 1935 and

1973 Constitutions, or a transitory provision that signals
such change, with respect to foreign ownership in public
utility corporations (2nd extrinsic aid)
If the framers wanted the word "capital" to mean voting capital stock, their terminology would have
certainly been unmistakably limiting as to leave no doubt about their intention. But the framers
consciously and purposely excluded restrictive phrases, such as "voting stocks" or "controlling
interest," in the approved final draft, the proposal of the UP Law Center, Commissioner Davide and
Commissioner Azcuna notwithstanding. Instead, they retained "capital" as "used in the 1935 and
1973 Constitutions."39 There was, therefore, a conscious design to avoid stringent words that would
Ï‚rÎ½ll
limit the meaning of "capital" in a sense insisted upon by the majority. Cassus omissus pro omisso
habendus esta person, object, or thing omitted must have been omitted intentionally. More
importantly, by using the word "capital," the intent of the framers of the Constitution was to
include all types of shares, whether voting or nonvoting, within the ambit of the word.
History or realities or circumstances prevailing during the

drafting of the Constitution validate the adoption of the plain
meaning of "Capital" (3rd extrinsic aid)
This plain, non-exclusive interpretation of "capital" also comes to light considering the economic
backdrop of the 1986 CONCOM when the country was still starting to rebuild the financial markets
and regain the foreign investors confidence following the changes caused by the toppling of the
Martial Law regime. As previously pointed out, the Court, in construing the Constitution, must take
into consideration the aims of its framers and the evils they wished to avoid and address. In Civil
Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,40 We held:Ï‚rÎ½ll
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision under
consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in
mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to
be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of the
times, and the condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The object is
to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the
particular provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to
construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and calculated to effect
that purpose. (Emphasis supplied.)
It is, thus, proper to revisit the circumstances prevailing during the drafting period. In an astute
observation of the economic realities in 1986, quoted by respondent Pangilinan, University of the
Philippines School of Economics Professor Dr. Emmanuel S. de Dios examined the nations dire need
for foreign investments and foreign exchange during the time when the framers deliberated on what
would eventually be the National Economy and Patrimony provisions of the Constitution:
The period immediately after the 1986 EDSA Revolution is well known to have witnessed
the countrys deepest economic crisis since the Second World War. Official data readily show
this period was characterised by the highest unemployment, highest interest rates, and largest
contractions in output the Philippine economy experienced in the postwar period. At the start of the
Aquino administration in 1986, total output had already contracted by more than seven percent
annually for two consecutive years (1984 and 1985), inflation was running at an average of 35
percent, unemployment more than 11 percent, and the currency devalued by 35 percent.
The proximate reason for this was the moratorium on foreigndebt payments the country
had called in late 1983, effectively cutting off the countrys access to international credit
markets (for a deeper contemporary analysis of what led to the debt crisis, see de Dios 1984 ). The
Ï‚rÎ½ ll
country therefore had to subsist only on its current earnings from exports, which meant
there was a critical shortage of foreign exchange. Imports especially of capital goods and
intermediate goods therefore had to be drastically curtailed x x x.
For the same reasons, obviously, new foreign investments were unlikely to be forthcoming. This is
recorded by Bautista 2003:158 , who writes:
Ï‚rÎ½l l
Long-term capital inflows have been rising at double-digit rates since 1980, except during 1986-
1990, a time of great political and economic uncertainty following the period of martial law
under President Marcos.
The foreign-exchange controls then effectively in place will have made importing inputs difficult for
new enterprises, particularly foreign investors (especially Japanese) interested in relocating some of
theirexport-oriented but import-dependent operations to the Philippines. x x x The same foreign-
exchange restrictions would have made the freedom to remit profits a dicey affairs. Finally, however,
the period was also characterised by extreme political uncertainty, which did not cease even after the
Marcos regime was toppled.41 x x x Ï‚rÎ½ ll
Surely, it was far from the minds of the framers to alienate and disenfranchise foreign investors by
imposing an indirect restriction that only exacerbates the dichotomy between management and
ownership without the actual guarantee of giving control and protection to the Filipino investors.
Instead, it can be fairly assumed that the framers intended to avoid further economic meltdown and
so chose to attract foreign investors by allowing them to 40% equity ownership of the entirety of the
corporate shareholdings but, wisely, imposing limits on their participation in the governing body to
ensure that the effective control and ultimate economic benefits still remained with the Filipino
shareholders.
Judicial decisions and prior laws use and/or treat

"capital" as "capital stock" (4th extrinsic aid)
That the term "capital" in Sec. 11, Art. XII is equivalent to "capital stock," which encompasses all
classes of shares regardless of their nomenclature or voting capacity, is easily determined by a
review of various laws passed prior to the ratification of the 1987 Constitution. In 1936, for instance,
the Public Service Act42 established the nationality requirement for corporations that may be granted
Ï‚rÎ½ ll
the authority to operate a "public service,"43 which include most of the present-day public utilities,
Ï‚rÎ½l l
by referring to the paid-up "capital stock" of a corporation, viz:
Sec. 16. Proceedings of the Commission, upon notice and hearing. The Commission shall have power,
upon proper notice and hearing in accordance with the rules and provisions of this Act, subject to the
limitations and exceptions mentioned and saving provisions to the contrary:
(a) To issue certificates which shall be known as certificates of public convenience, authorizing the
operation of public service within the Philippines whenever the Commission finds that the operation
of the public service proposed and the authorization to do business will promote the public interest in
a proper and suitable manner. Provided, That thereafter, certificates of public convenience and
certificates of public convenience and necessity will be granted only to citizens of the
Philippines or of the United States or to corporations, co-partnerships, associations or joint-
stock companies constituted and organized under the laws of the Philippines; Provided,
That sixty per centum of the stock or paid-up capital of any such corporations, co-
partnership, association or joint-stock company must belong entirely to citizens of the
Philippines or of the United States: Provided, further, That no such certificates shall be issued for a
period of more than fifty years. (Emphasis supplied.)
The heading of Sec. 2 of Commonwealth Act No. (CA) 108, or the Anti-Dummy Law, which was
approved on October 30, 1936, similarly conveys the idea that the term "capital" is equivalent to
"capital stock"44 :
Ï‚rÎ½ll
Section 2. Simulation of minimum capital stock In all cases in which a constitutional or

legal provision requires that, in order that a corporation or association may exercise or
enjoy a right, franchise or privilege, not less than a certain per centum of its capital must
be owned by citizens of the Philippines or of any other specific country, it shall be unlawful to
falsely simulate the existence of such minimum stock or capital as owned by such citizens, for the
purpose of evading said provision. The president or managers and directors or trustees of
corporations or associations convicted of a violation of this section shall be punished by imprisonment
of not less than five nor more than fifteen years, and by a fine not less than the value of the right,
franchise or privilege, enjoyed or acquired in violation of the provisions hereof but in no case less
than five thousand pesos.45 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
Ï‚rÎ½ll
Pursuant to these legislative acts and under the aegis of the Constitutional nationality requirement of
public utilities then in force, Congress granted various franchises upon the understanding that the
"capital stock" of the grantee is at least 60% Filipino. In 1964, Congress, via Republic Act No. (RA)
4147,46 granted Filipinas Orient Airway, Inc. a legislative franchise to operate an air carrier upon the
Ï‚rÎ½ll
understanding that its "capital stock" was 60% percent Filipino-owned. Section 14 of RA 4147,
provided:
Sec. 14. This franchise is granted with the understanding that the grantee is a corporation sixty
per cent of the capital stock of which is the bona fide property of citizens of the
Philippines and that the interest of such citizens in its capital stock or in the capital of the Company
with which it may merge shall at no time be allowed to fall below such percentage, under the penalty
of the cancellation of this franchise. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
The grant of a public utility franchise to Air Manila. Inc. to establish and maintain air transport in the
country a year later pursuant to RA 450147 contained exactly the same Filipino capitalization
Ï‚rÎ½l l
requirement imposed in RA 4147:
Sec. 14. This franchise is granted with the understanding that the grantee is a corporation, sixty per
cent of the capital stock of which is owned or the bona fide property of citizens of the
Philippines and that the interest of such citizens in its capital stock or in the capital of the company
with which it may merge shall at no time be allowed to fall below such percentage, under the penalty
of the cancellation of this franchise. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
In like manner, RA 5514,48 which granted a franchise to the Philippine Communications Satellite
Ï‚rÎ½ll
Corporation in 1969, required of the grantee to execute management contracts only with
corporations whose "capital or capital stock" are at least 60% Filipino:
Sec. 9. The grantee shall not lease, transfer, grant the usufruct of, sell or assign this franchise to any
person or entity, except any branch or instrumentality of the Government, without the previous
approval of the Congress of the Philippines: Provided, That the grantee may enter into management
contract with any person or entity, with the approval of the President of the Philippines: Provided,
further, That such person or entity with whom the grantee may enter into management contract shall
be a citizen of the Philippines and in case of an entity or a corporation, at least sixty per centum
of the capital or capital stock of which is owned by citizens of the Philippines. (Emphasis
supplied.)
In 1968, RA 5207,49 otherwise known as the "Atomic Energy Regulatory Act of 1968," considered a
Ï‚rÎ½l l
corporation sixty percent of whose capital stock as domestic:
Sec. 9. Citizenship Requirement. No license to acquire, own, or operate any atomic energy facility
shall be issued to an alien, or any corporation or other entity which is owned or controlled by an
alien, a foreign corporation, or a foreign government.
For purposes of this Act, a corporation or entity is not owned or controlled by an alien, a foreign
corporation of a foreign government if at least sixty percent (60%) of its capital stock is
owned by Filipino citizens. (Emphasis supplied.)
Anent pertinent judicial decisions, this Court has used the very same definition of capital as
equivalent to the entire capital stockholdings in a corporation in resolving various other issues.
In National Telecommunications Commission v. Court of Appeals,50 this Court, thus, held: Ï‚rÎ½ll
The term "capital" and other terms used to describe the capital structure of a corporation
are of universal acceptance, and their usages have long been established in jurisprudence.
Briefly, capital refers to the value of the property or assets of a corporation. The capital
subscribed is the total amount of the capital that persons (subscribers or shareholders)
have agreed to take and pay for, which need not necessarily be, and can be more than, the
par value of the shares. In fine, it is the amount that the corporation receives, inclusive of
the premiums if any, in consideration of the original issuance of the shares. In the case of
stock dividends, it is the amount that the corporation transfers from its surplus profit account to its
capital account. It is the same amount that can loosely be termed as the "trust fund" of the
corporation. The "Trust Fund" doctrine considers this subscribed capital as a trust fund for the
payment of the debts of the corporation, to which the creditors may look for satisfaction. Until the
liquidation of the corporation, no part of the subscribed capital may be returned or released to the
stockholder (except in the redemption of redeemable shares) without violating this principle. Thus,
dividends must never impair the subscribed capital; subscription commitments cannot be condoned
or remitted; nor can the corporation buy its own shares using the subscribed capital as the
consideration therefor.51 Ï‚rÎ½ ll
This is similar to the holding in Banco Filipino v. Monetary Board52 where the Court treated the
Ï‚rÎ½ll
term "capital" as including both common and preferred stock, which are usually deprived of voting
rights:
It is clear from the law that a solvent bank is one in which its assets exceed its liabilities. It is a basic
accounting principle that assets are composed of liabilities and capital. The term "assets" includes
capital and surplus" (Exley v. Harris, 267 p. 970, 973, 126 Kan., 302). On the other hand, the term
"capital" includes common and preferred stock, surplus reserves, surplus and undivided
profits. (Manual of Examination Procedures, Report of Examination on Department of Commercial
and Savings Banks, p. 3-C). If valuation reserves would be deducted from these items, the result
would merely be the networth or the unimpaired capital and surplus of the bank applying Sec. 5 of
RA 337 but not the total financial condition of the bank.
In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals,53 the Court alluded to the doctrine
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of equality of shares in resolving the issue therein and held that all shares comprise the capital stock
of a corporation:
A common stock represents the residual ownership interest in the corporation. It is a basic class of
stock ordinarily and usually issued without extraordinary rights or privileges and entitles the
shareholder to a pro rata division of profits. Preferred stocks are those which entitle the shareholder
to some priority on dividends and asset distribution. Both shares are part of the corporations
capital stock. Both stockholders are no different from ordinary investors who take on the
same investment risks. Preferred and common shareholders participate in the same
venture, willing to share in the profit and losses of the enterprise. Moreover, under the
doctrine of equality of shares --- all stocks issued by the corporation are presumed equal
with the same privileges and liabilities, provided that the Articles of Incorporation is silent on
such differences.54 (Emphasis supplied.)
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The SEC has reflected the popular contemporaneous

construction of capital in computing the nationality
requirement based on the total capital stock, not only
the voting stock, of a corporation (5th extrinsic aid)
The SEC has confirmed that, as an institution, it has always interpreted and applied the 40%
maximum foreign ownership limit for public utilities to the total capital stock, and not just its total
voting stock.
In its July 29, 2011 Manifestation and Omnibus Motion, the SEC reaffirmed its longstanding practice
and history of enforcement of the 40% maximum foreign ownership limit for public utilities, viz:
5. The Commission respectfully submits that it has always performed its duty under Section 17(4) of
the Corporation Code to enforce the foreign equity restrictions under Section 11, Article XII of the
Constitution on the ownership of public utilities.
xxxx
8. Thus, in determining compliance with the Constitutional restrictions on foreign equity,

the Commission consistently construed and applied the term "capital" in its commonly
accepted usage, that is the sum total of the shares subscribed irrespective of their
nomenclature and whether or not they are voting or non-voting (Emphasis supplied).
9. This commonly accepted usage of the term capital is based on persuasive authorities such as the
widely esteemed Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations, and doctrines from American
Jurisprudence. To illustrate, in its Opinion dated February 15, 1988 addresses to Gozon, Fernandez,
Defensor and Associates, the Commission discussed how the term capital is commonly used:
"Anent thereto, please be informed that the term capital as applied to corporations, refers to the
money, property or means contributed by stockholders as the form or basis for the business or
enterprise for which the corporation was formed and generally implies that such money or property
or means have been contributed in payment for stock issued to the contributors. (United Grocers,
Ltd. v. United States F. Supp. 834, cited in 11 Fletcher, Cyc. Corp., 1986, rev. vol., sec. 5080 at 18).
As further ruled by the court, capital of a corporation is the fund or other property, actually or
potentially in its possession, derived or to be derived from the sale by it of shares of its
stock or his exchange by it for property other than money. This fund includes not only money
or other property received by the corporation for shares of stock but all balances of purchase money,
or instalments, due the corporation for shares of stock sold by it, and all unpaid subscriptions for
shares." (Williams v. Brownstein, 1F. 2d 470, cited in 11 Fletcher, Cyc. Corp., 1058 rev. vol., sec.
5080, p. 21).
The term capital is also used synonymously with the words capital stock, as meaning the amount
subscribed and paidin and upon which the corporation is to conduct its operation. (11 Fletcher, Cyc.
Corp. 1986, rev. vol., sec. 5080 at 15). And, as held by the court in Haggard v. Lexington Utilities
Co., (260 Ky 251, 84 SW 2d 84, cited in 11 Fletcher, Cyc. Corp., 1958 rev. vol., sec. 5079 at 17),
The capital stock of a corporation is the amount paidin by its stockholders in money, property or
services with which it is to conduct its business, and it is immaterial how the stock is classified,
whether as common or preferred.
The Commission, in a previous opinion, ruled that the term capital denotes the sum total of the
shares subscribed and paid by the shareholders or served to be paid, irrespective of their
nomenclature. (Letter to Supreme Technotronics Corporation, dated April 14, 1987)." (Emphasis
ours)
10. Further, in adopting this common usage of the term capital, the Commission believed in good
faith and with sound reasons that it was consistent with the intent and purpose of the Constitution.
In an Opinion dated 27 December 1995 addressed to Joaquin Cunanan & Co. the Commission
observed that:
"To construe the 60-40% equity requirement as merely based on the voting shares, disregarding the
preferred non-voting share, not on the total outstanding subscribed capital stock, would give rise to a
situation where the actual foreign interest would not really be only 40% but may extend beyond that
because they could also own even the entire preferred non-voting shares. In this situation, Filipinos
may have the control in the operation of the corporation by way of voting rights, but have no
effective ownership of the corporate assets which includes lands, because the actual Filipino equity
constitutes only a minority of the entire outstanding capital stock. Therefore, in essence, the
company, although controlled by Filipinos, is beneficially owned by foreigners since the
actual ownership of at least 60% of the entire outstanding capital stocks would be in the
hands of foreigners. Allowing this situation would open the floodgates to circumvention of
the intent of the law to make the Filipinos the principal beneficiaries in the ownership of
alienable lands." (Emphasis ours)
11. The foregoing settled principles and esteemed authorities relied upon by the Commission show
that its interpretation of the term capital is reasonable.
12. And, it is well settled that courts must give due deference to an administrative agencys
reasonable interpretation of the statute it enforces.55 Ï‚rÎ½ll
It should be borne in mind that the SEC is the government agency invested with the jurisdiction to
determine at the first instance the observance by a public utility of the constitutional nationality
requirement prescribed vis-vis the ownership of public utilities56 and to interpret legislative acts, like
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the FIA. The rationale behind the doctrine of primary jurisdiction lies on the postulate that such
administrative agency has the "special knowledge, experience and tools to determine technical and
intricate matters of fact"57 Thus, the determination of the SEC is afforded great respect by other
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executive agencies, like the Department of Justice (DOJ),58 and by the courts.
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Verily, when asked as early as 1988 "Would it be legal for foreigners to own in a public utility entity
more than 40% of the common shares but not more than 40% of the total outstanding capital stock
which would include both common and non-voting preferred shares?" the SEC, citing Fletcher,
invariably answered in the affirmative, whether the poser was made in light of the present or
previous Constitutions:
The pertinent provision of the Philippine Constitution under Article XII, Section 7, reads in part
thus:chanroblesvi rtual lawlib rary
"No franchise, certificate, or any form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be
granted except to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations organized under the
laws of the Philippines at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. . ." x x x
The issue raised on your letter zeroes in on the meaning of the word "capital" as used in
the above constitutional provision. Anent thereto, please be informed that the term "capital" as
applied to corporations, refers to the money, property or means contributed by stockholders as the
form or basis for the business or enterprise for which the corporation was formed and generally
implies that such money or property or means have been contributed in payment for stock issued to
the contributors. (United Grocers, Ltd. v. United States F. Supp. 834, cited in 11 Fletcher, Cyc. Corp.,
1986, rev. vol., sec. 5080 at 18). As further ruled by the court, "capital of a corporation is the fund
or other property, actually or potentially in its possession, derived or to be derived from the sale by it
of shares of its stock or his exchange by it for property other than money. This fund includes not only
money or other property received by the corporation for shares of stock but all balances of purchase
money, or installments, due the corporation for shares of stock sold by it, and all unpaid
subscriptions for shares." (Williams v. Brownstein, 1F. 2d 470, cited in 11 Fletcher, Cyc. Corp., 1058
rev. vol., sec. 5080, p. 21).
The term "capital" is also used synonymously with the words "capital stock", as meaning the amount
subscribed and paid-in and upon which the corporation is to conduct its operation. (11 Fletcher, Cyc.
Corp. 1986, rev. vol., sec. 5080 at 15). And, as held by the court in Haggard v. Lexington Utilities
Co., (260 Ky 251, 84 SW 2d 84, cited in 11 Fletcher, Cyc. Corp., 1958 rev. vol., sec. 5079 at
17), "The capital stock of a corporation is the amount paid-in by its stockholders in money,
property or services with which it is to conduct its business, and it is immaterial how the
stock is classified, whether as common or preferred."
The Commission, in a previous opinion, ruled that the term capital denotes the sum total of the
shares subscribed and paid by the shareholders or served to be paid, irrespective of their
nomenclature. (Letter to Supreme Technotronics Corporation, dated April 14, 1987). Hence, your
query is answered in the affirmative.59 (Emphasis supplied.)
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As it were, the SEC has held on the same positive response long before the 1987 Constitution came
into effect, a matter of fact which has received due acknowledgment from this Court. In People v.
Quasha,60 a case decided under the 1935 Constitution, this Court narrated that in 1946 the SEC
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approved the incorporation of a common carrier, a public utility, where Filipinos, while not holding
the controlling vote, owned the majority of the capital, viz:
The essential facts are not in dispute. On November 4, 1946, the Pacific Airways Corporation
registered its articles of incorporation with the [SEC]. The articles were prepared and the registration
was effected by the accused, who was in fact the organizer of the corporation. The articles stated
that the primary purpose of the corporation was to carry on the business of a common carrier by air,
land, or water, that its capital stock was P 1,000,000, represented by 9,000 preferred and
100,000 common shares, each preferred share being of the par value of P 100 and entitled
to 1/3 vote and each common share, of the par value of P 1 and entitled to one vote; that
the amount of capital stock actually subscribed was P 200,000, and the names of the subscriber were
Arsenio Baylon, Eruin E. Shannahan, Albert W. Onstott, James Obannon, Denzel J. Cavin, and William
H. Quasha, the first being a Filipino and the other five all Americans; that Baylons subscription
was for 1,145 preferred shares, of the total value of P 114,500 and 6,500 common shares, of the
total par value of P 6,500, while the aggregate subscriptions of the American subscribers were for
200 preferred shares, of the total par value of P 20,000 and 59,000 common shares, of the total par
value of P 59,000; and that Baylon and the American subscribers had already paid 25 percent of their
respective subscriptions. Ostensibly the owner of, or subscriber to, 60.005 per cent of the
subscribed capital stock of the corporation, Baylon, did not have the controlling vote
because of the difference in voting power between the preferred shares and the common
shares. Still, with the capital structure as it was, the articles of incorporation were
accepted for registration and a certificate of incorporation was issued by the [SEC].
(Emphasis supplied.)
The SEC has, through the years, stood by this interpretation. In an Opinion dated November 21,
1989, the SEC held that the basis of the computation for the nationality requirement is the total
outstanding capital stock, to wit:
As to the basis of computation of the 60-40 percentage nationality requirement under existing laws
(whether it should be based on the number of shares or the aggregate amount in pesos of the par
value of the shares), the following definitions of corporate terms are worth mentioning.
"The term capital stock signifies the aggregate of the shares actually subscribed". (11 Fletcher, Cyc.
Corps. (1971 Rev. Vol.) sec. 5082, citing Goodnow v. American Writing Paper Co., 73 NJ Eq. 692, 69
A 1014 aff'g 72 NJ Eq. 645, 66 A, 607).
"Capital stock means the capital subscribed (the share capital)". (Ibid., emphasis supplied).
"In its primary sense a share of stock is simply one of the proportionate integers or units, the sum of
which constitutes the capital stock of corporation. (Fletcher, sec. 5083).
The equitable interest of the shareholder in the property of the corporation is represented by the
term stock, and the extent of his interest is described by the term shares. The expression shares of
stock when qualified by words indicating number and ownership expresses the extent of the owner's
interest in the corporate property (Ibid, Sec. 5083, emphasis supplied).
Likewise, in all provisions of the Corporation Code the stockholders right to vote and receive
dividends is always determined and based on the "outstanding capital stock", defined as follows: chanroblesv irt uallawl ibra ry
"SECTION 137. Outstanding capital stock defined. The term "outstanding capital stock" as used in
this Code, means the total shares of stock issued to subscribers or stockholders, whether or not fully
or partially paid (as long as there is a binding subscription agreement, except treasury shares."
The computation, therefore, should be based on the total outstanding capital stock, irrespective of
the amount of the par value of the shares.
Then came SEC-OGC Opinion No. 08-14 dated June 02, 2008: chanroblesvi rt uallawl ibra ry
The instant query now centers on whether both voting and nonvoting shares are included in the
computation of the required percentage of Filipino equity, As a rule, the 1987 Constitution does not
distinguish between voting and non-voting shares with regard to the computation of the percentage
interest by Filipinos and non-Filipinos in a company. In other words, non-voting shares should
be included in the computation of the foreign ownership limit for domestic
corporation. This was the rule applied [in SEC Opinion No. 04-30 x x x It was opined therein that
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the ownership of the shares of stock of a corporation is based on the total outstanding or
subscribed/issued capital stock regardless of whether they are classified as common voting shares or
preferred shares without voting rights. This is in line with the policy of the State to develop an
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos. x x x (Emphasis added.)
The SEC again echoed the same interpretation in an Opinion issued last April 19, 2011 wherein it
stated, thus:
This is, thus, the general rule, such that when the provision merely uses the term "capital" without
qualification (as in Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, which deals with equity structure
in a public utility company), the same should be interpreted to refer to the sum total of the
outstanding capital stock, irrespective of the nomenclature or classification as common, preferred,
voting or non-voting.61 Ï‚rÎ½ll
The above construal is in harmony with the letter and spirit of Sec. 11, Art. XII of the Constitution
and its counterpart provisions in the 1935 and 1973 Constitution and, thus, is entitled to respectful
consideration. As the Court declared in Philippine Global Communications, Inc. v. Relova:62 Ï‚rÎ½ ll
x x x As far back as In re Allen, (2 Phil. 630) a 1903 decision, Justice McDonough, as ponente, cited
this excerpt from the leading American case of Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, decided in 1891: "The
principle that the contemporaneous construction of a statute by the executive officers of
the government, whose duty it is to execute it, is entitled to great respect, and should
ordinarily control the construction of the statute by the courts, is so firmly embedded in our
jurisprudence that no authorities need be cited to support it. x x x There was a paraphrase by Justice
Malcolm of such a pronouncement in Molina v. Rafferty, (37 Phil. 545) a 1918 decision:" Courts will
and should respect the contemporaneous construction placed upon a statute by the executive officers
whose duty it is to enforce it, and unless such interpretation is clearly erroneous will ordinarily be
controlled thereby. (Ibid, 555) Since then, such a doctrine has been reiterated in numerous
decisions.63 (Emphasis supplied.)
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Laxamana v. Baltazar64 restates this long-standing dictum: "[w]here a statute has received a
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contemporaneous and practical interpretation and the statute as interpreted is re-enacted, the
practical interpretation is accorded greater weight than it ordinarily receives, and is regarded as
presumptively the correct interpretation of the law. The rule here is based upon the theory that the
legislature is acquainted with the contemporaneous interpretation of a statute, especially when made
by an administrative body or executive officers charged with the duty of administering or enforcing
the law, and therefore impliedly adopts the interpretation upon re-enactment."65 Hence, it can be
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safely assumed that the framers, in the course of deliberating the 1987 Constitution, knew of the
adverted SEC interpretation.
Parenthetically, it is immaterial whether the SEC opinion was rendered by the banc or by the SEC-
Office of the General Counsel (OGC) considering that the latter has been given the authority to issue
opinions on the laws that the SEC implements under SEC-EXS. Res. No. 106, Series of 2002.66 The Ï‚rÎ½ll
conferment does not violate Sec. 4.667 of the Securities and Regulation Code (SRC) that proscribes
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the non-delegation of the legislative rule making power of the SEC, which is in the nature of
subordinate legislation. As may be noted, the same Sec. 4.6 does not mention the SECs power to
issue interpretative "opinions and provide guidance on and supervise compliance with such
rules,"68 which is incidental to the SECs enforcement functions. A legislative rule and an
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interpretative rule are two different concepts and the distinction between the two is established in
administrative law.69 Hence, the various opinions issued by the SEC-OGC deserve as much respect
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as the opinions issued by the SEC en banc.
Nonetheless, the esteemed ponente posits that the SEC, contrary to its claim, has been less than
consistent in its construal of "capital." During the oral arguments, he drew attention to various SEC
Opinions, nine (9) to be precise, that purportedly consider "capital" as referring only to voting stocks.
Refuting this position, the SEC in its Memorandum dated July 25, 2012 explained in some detail
that the Commission has been consistent in applying the term "capital" to the total
outstanding capital stock, whether voting or non-voting. The SEC Opinions referred to by
Justice Carpio, which cited the provisions of the FIA, is not, however, pertinent or decisive of the
issue on the meaning of "capital." The said SEC Memorandum states:
During the oral arguments held on 26 June 2012, the SEC was directed to explain nine (9) of its
Opinions in relation to the definition of "capital" as used in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution,
namely: (1) Opinion dated 3 March 1993 for Mr. Francis F. How; (2) Opinion dated 14 April 1993 for
Director Angeles T. Wong; (3) Opinion dated 23 November 1993 for Mssrs. Dominador Almeda and
Renato S. Calma; (4) Opinion dated 7 December 1993 for Roco Bug Kapunan Migallos & Jardeleza
Law Offices; (5) Opinion dated 22 December 2004 for Romulo Mabanta Buenaventura Sayoc & De
Los Angeles; (6) Opinion dated 27 September 2007 for Reynaldo G. David; (7) Opinion dated 28
November 2007 for Santiago & Santiago law Offices; (8) Opinion dated 15 January 2008 for Attys.
Ruby Rose J. Yusi and Rudyard S. Arbolado; and (9) Opinion dated 18 August 2010 for Castillo
Laman Tan Pantaleon & San Jose.
xxxx
With due respect, the issue of whether "capital" refers to outstanding capital stock or only
voting stocks was never raised in the requests for these opinions. In fact, the definition of
"capital" could not have been a relevant and/or a material issue in some of these opinions because
the common and preferred shares involved have the same voting rights. Also, some Opinions
mentioned the FIA to emphasize that the said law mandates the application of the Control Test.
Moreover, these Opinions state they are based solely on the facts disclosed and relevant only to the
issues raised therein.
For one, the Opinion dated 3 March 1993 for Mr. Francis F. How does not discuss whether
"capital" refers to total outstanding capital stock or only voting stocks. Instead, it talks
about the application of the Control test in a mining corporation by looking into the nationality of its
investors. The FIA is not mentioned to provide a definition of "capital," but to explain the
nationality requirement pertinent to investors of a mining corporation.
The Opinion dated 14 April 1993 for Dir. Angeles T. Wong also does not define "capital" as
referring to total outstanding capital or only to voting shares, but talks about the
application of the Control Test x x x. The FIA is again mentioned only to explain the nationality
required of investors of a corporation engaged in overseas recruitment.
The Opinion dated 23 November 1993 for Mssrs. Dominador Almeda and Renato S.
Calma distinguishes between the nationality of a corporation as an investing entity and the
nationality of a corporation as an investee corporation. The FIA is mentioned only in the
discussion of the nationality of the investors of a corporation owning land in the
Philippines, composed of a trustee for pension or other employee retirement or separation benefits,
where the trustee is a Philippine national and at least sixty percent (60%) of the fund will accrue to
the benefit of Philippine nationals, and another domestic corporation which is 100% foreign owned.
Unlike the Decision rendered by this Honorable Court on 28 June 2011, the Opinion dated 07
December 1993 for Roco Bug Kapunan Migallos & Jardeleza does not parley on the issue of the
proper interpretation of "capital" because it is not a relevant and/or a material issue in
this opinion xxx. The FIA is mentioned only to explain the application of the control
test. Note, however, that manufacturing fertilizer is neither a nationalized or partly nationalized
activity, which is another reason why this Opinion has no relevance in this case.
The Opinion dated 22 December 2004 for Romulo Mabanta Buenaventura Sayoc & De Los Angeles
focuses on the nationality of the investors of a corporation that will acquire land wherein one of the
investors is a foundation. It confirms the view that the test for compliance with the
nationality requirement is based on the total outstanding capital stock irrespective of the
amount of the par value of shares. The FIA is used merely to justify the application of the Control
Test as adopted in the Department of Justice Opinion, No. 18, Series of 1989, dated 19 January
1989m viz
xxxx
The Opinion dated 27 September 2007 for Mr. Reynaldo G. David, likewise, does not discuss
whether "capital" refers to total outstanding capital stock or only to voting stocks, but
rather whether the Control Test is applicable in determining the nationality of the
proposed corporate bidder or buyer of PNOC-EDC shares. x x x The FIA was cited only to
emphasize that the said law mandates the application of the Control Test.
The Opinion dated 28 November 2007 for Santiago & Santiago Law Offices maintains and supports
the position of the Commission that Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution makes no
distinction between common and preferred shares, thus, both shares should be included in
the computation of the foreign equity cap for domestic corporations. Simply put, the total
outstanding capital stock, without regard to how the shares are classified, should be used as the
basis in determining the compliance by public utilities with the nationality requirement as provided
for in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution. Notably, all shares of the subject corporation,
Pilipinas First, have voting rights, whether common or preferred. Hence, the issue on whether
"capital" refers to total outstanding capital stock or only to voting stocks has no relevance in this
Opinion.
In the same way, the Opinion dated 15 January 2008 for Attys. Ruby Rose J. Yusi and Rudyard S.
Arbolada never discussed whether "capital" refers to outstanding capital stock or only to
voting stocks, but rather whether the Control Test is applicable or not. The FIA was used
merely to justify the application of the Control Test. More importantly, the term "capital" could not
have been relevant and/or material issue in this Opinion because the common and preferred shares
involved have the same voting rights.
The Opinion dated 18 August 2010 for Castillo Laman Tan Pantaleon & San Jose reiterates that the
test for compliance with the nationality requirement is based on the total outstanding
capital stock, irrespective of the amount of the par value of the shares. The FIA is
mentioned only to explain the application of the Control Test and the Grandfather Rule in a
corporation owning land in the Philippines by looking into the nationality of its investors. (Emphasis
supplied).70Ï‚rÎ½ll
In view of the foregoing, it is submitted that the long-established interpretation and mode of
computing by the SEC of the total capital stock strongly recognize the intent of the framers of the
Constitution to allow access to much-needed foreign investments confined to 40% of the capital
stock of public utilities.
Consequences of alternative interpretation: mischievous

effects of the construction proposed in the petition and
sustained in the June 28, 2011 Decision. (6th extrinsic aid)
Filipino shareholders will not

control the fundamental corporate
matters nor own the majority
economic benefits of the public
utility corporation.
Indeed, if the Court persists in adhering to the rationale underlying the majoritys original
interpretation of "capital" found in the first sentence of Section 11, Article XII, We may perhaps be
allowing Filipinos to direct and control the daily business of our public utilities, but would irrevocably
and injudiciously deprive them of effective "control" over the major and equally important
corporate decisions and the eventual beneficial ownership of the corporate assets that
could include, among others, claim over our soilour land. This undermines the clear textual
commitment under the Constitution that reserves ownership of disposable lands to Filipino citizens.
The interplay of the ensuing provisions of Article XII is unmistakable:
SECTION 2. All lands of the public domain x x x forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other
natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural
resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural
resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. x x x
xxxx
SECTION 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral
lands, and national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further classified by law
according to the uses which they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be
limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands
except by lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-
five years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area. Citizens of the Philippines may lease not
more than five hundred hectares, or acquire not more than twelve hectares thereof by purchase,
homestead or grant.
xxxx
SECTION 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or

conveyed except to individuals, corporations or associations qualified to acquire or hold
lands of the public domain. (Emphasis supplied.)
Consider the hypothetical case presented in the original ponencia: chanroble svirtual lawlib rary
Let us assume that a corporation has 100 common shares owned by foreigners and 1,000,000 non-
voting preferred shares owned by Filipinos, with both classes of share having a par value of one peso
(P 1.00) per share. Under the broad definition of the term "capital," such corporation would be
Albeit trying not to appear to, the majority actually finds fault in the wisdom of, or motive behind,
the provision in question through "highly unlikely scenarios of clinical extremes," to borrow
from Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC.71 It is submitted that the flip side of the ponencias
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hypothetical illustration, which will be exhaustively elucidated in this opinion, is more anomalous and
prejudicial to Filipino interests.
For instance, let us suppose that the authorized capital stock of a public utility corporation is divided
into 100 common shares and 1,000,000 non-voting preferred shares. Since, according to the Courts
June 28, 2011 Decision, the word "capital" in Sec. 11, Art. XII refers only to the voting shares, then
the 40% cap on foreign ownership applies only to the 100 common shares. Foreigners can, therefore,
own 100% of the 1,000,000 nonvoting preferred shares. But then again, the ponencia continues, at
least, the "control" rests with the Filipinos because the 60% Filipino-owned common shares will
necessarily ordain the majority in the governing body of the public utility corporation, the board of
directors/trustees. Hence, Filipinos are assured of control over the day-to-day activities of the public
utility corporation.
Let us, however, take this corporate scenario a little bit farther and consider the irresistible
implications of changes and circumstances that are inevitable and common in the business world.
Consider the simple matter of a possible investment of corporate funds in another corporation or
business, or a merger of the public utility corporation, or a possible dissolution of the public utility
corporation. Who has the "control" over these vital and important corporate matters? The
last paragraph of Sec. 6 of the Corporation Code provides:
Where the articles of incorporation provide for non-voting shares in the cases allowed by this
Code, the holders of such (non-voting) shares shall nevertheless be entitled to vote on the
following matters: chanroblesv irt uallawl ibra ry
corporate property;
and
8. Dissolution of the corporation."(Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
In our hypothetical case, all 1,000,100 (voting and non-voting) shares are entitled to vote in cases
involving fundamental and major changes in the corporate structure, such as those listed in Sec. 6 of
the Corporation Code. Hence, with only 60 out of the 1,000,100 shares in the hands of the Filipino
shareholders, control is definitely in the hands of the foreigners. The foreigners can opt to invest in
other businesses and corporations, increase its bonded indebtedness, and even dissolve the public
utility corporation against the interest of the Filipino holders of the majority voting shares. This
cannot plausibly be the constitutional intent.
Consider further a situation where the majority holders of the total outstanding capital stock, both
voting and non-voting, decide to dissolve our hypothetical public utility corporation. Who will
eventually acquire the beneficial ownership of the corporate assets upon dissolution and
liquidation? Note that Sec. 122 of the Corporation Code states:
Section 122. Corporate liquidation.Every corporation whose charter expires by its own limitation or is
annulled by forfeiture or otherwise, or whose corporate existence for other purposes is terminated in
any other manner, shall nevertheless be continued as a body corporate for three (3) years to
dispose of and convey its property and to distribute its assets, but not for the purpose of
continuing the business for which it was established.
At any time during said three (3) years, the corporation is authorized and empowered to convey all
of its property to trustees for the benefit of stockholders, members, creditors, and other persons
in interest. From and after any such conveyance by the corporation of its property in trust for the
benefit of its stockholders, members, creditors and others in interest, all interest which the
corporation had in the property terminates, the legal interest vests in the trustees, and the
beneficial interest in the stockholders, members , creditors or other persons in
interest. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
Clearly then, the bulk of the assets of our imaginary public utility corporation, which may include
private lands, will go to the beneficial ownership of the foreigners who can hold up to 40 out of the
100 common shares and the entire 1,000,000 preferred non-voting shares of the corporation. These
foreign shareholders will enjoy the bulk of the proceeds of the sale of the corporate lands, or worse,
exercise control over these lands behind the fade of corporations nominally owned by Filipino
shareholders. Bluntly, while the Constitution expressly prohibits the transfer of land to aliens, foreign
stockholders may resort to schemes or arrangements where such land will be conveyed to their
dummies or nominees. Is this not circumvention, if not an outright violation, of the fundamental
Constitutional tenet that only Filipinos can own Philippine land?
A construction of "capital" as referring to the total shareholdings of the company is an

acknowledgment of the existence of numerous corporate control-enhancing mechanisms, besides
ownership of voting rights, that limits the proportion between the separate and distinct concepts
of economic right to the cash flow of the corporation and the right to corporate control (hence,
they are also referred to as proportionality-limiting measures). This corporate reality is reflected in
SRC Rule 3(E) of the Amended Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of the SRC and Sec. 3(g)
of The Real Estate Investment Trust Act (REIT) of 2009,72 which both provide that control can
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exist regardless of ownership of voting shares. The SRC IRR states:
Control is the power to govern the financial and operating policies of an enterprise so as to
obtain benefits from its activities. Control is presumed to exist when the parent owns, directly or
indirectly through subsidiaries, more than one half of the voting power of an enterprise unless, in
exceptional circumstances, it can be clearly demonstrated that such ownership does not constitute
control. Control also exists even when the parent owns one half or less of the voting power
of an enterprise when there is:
i. Power over more than one half of the voting rights by virtue of an agreement with other
investors;
ii. Power to govern the financial and operating policies of the enterprise under a statute or
an agreement;
iii. Power to appoint or remove the majority of the members of the board of directors or
equivalent governing body;
iv. Power to cast the majority of votes at meetings of the board of directors or equivalent
governing body. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
As shown above, ownership of voting shares or power alone without economic control of the
company does not necessarily equate to corporate control. A shareholders agreement can
effectively clip the voting power of a shareholder holding voting shares. In the same way, a voting
right ceiling, which is "a restriction prohibiting shareholders to vote above a certain threshold
irrespective of the number of voting shares they hold,"73 can limit the control that may be exerted
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by a person who owns voting stocks but who does not have a substantial economic interest over the
company. So also does the use of financial derivatives with attached conditions to ensure the
acquisition of corporate control separately from the ownership of voting shares, or the use
of supermajority provisions in the bylaws and articles of incorporation or association. Indeed, there
are innumerable ways and means, both explicit and implicit, by which the control of a corporation
can be attained and retained even with very limited voting shares, i.e.., there are a number of ways
by which control can be disproportionately increased compared to ownership74 so long as economic
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rights over the majority of the assets and equity of the corporation are maintained.
Hence, if We follow the construction of "capital" in Sec. 11, Art. XII stated in the ponencia of June 28,
2011 and turn a blind eye to these realities of the business world, this Court may have veritably
put a limit on the foreign ownership of common shares but have indirectly allowed
foreigners to acquire greater economic right to the cash flow of public utility corporations,
which is a leverage to bargain for far greater control through the various enhancing mechanisms or
proportionality-limiting measures available in the business world.
In our extremely hypothetical public utility corporation with the equity structure as thus described,
since the majority recognized only the 100 common shares as the "capital" referred to in the
Constitution, the entire economic right to the cash flow arising from the 1,000,000 non-voting
preferred shares can be acquired by foreigners. With this economic power, the foreign holders of the
minority common shares will, as they easily can, bargain with the holders of the majority common
shares for more corporate control in order to protect their economic interest and reduce their
economic risk in the public utility corporation. For instance, they can easily demand the right to cast
the majority of votes during the meeting of the board of directors. After all, money commands
control.
The court cannot, and ought not, accept as correct a holding that routinely disregards legal and
practical considerations as significant as above indicated. Committing an error is bad enough,
persisting in it is worse.
Foreigners can be owners of fully

nationalized industries
Lest it be overlooked, "capital" is an oft-used term in the Constitution and various legislative acts
that regulate corporate entities. Hence, the meaning assigned to it within the context of a
constitutional provision limiting foreign ownership in corporations can affect corporations whose
ownership is reserved to Filipinos, or whose foreign equity is limited by law pursuant to Sec. 10, Art.
XII of the Constitution which states:
SECTION 10. The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and planning agency, when
the national interest dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, or such
higher percentage as Congress may prescribe, certain areas of investments. The Congress
shall enact measures that will encourage the formation and operation of enterprises
whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos. (Emphasis supplied).
For instance, Republic Act No. 7042, also known as the Foreign Investments Act of 199175 (FIA),
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provides for the formation of a Regular Foreign Investment Negative List (RFINL) covering
investment areas/activities that are partially or entirely reserved to Filipinos. The
8th RFINL76 provides that "No Foreign Equity" is allowed in the following areas of
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investments/activities:
1. Mass Media except recording (Article XVI, Section 1 of the Constitution and Presidential
Memorandum dated May 4, 1994);
2. Practice of all professions (Article XII, Section 14 of the Constitution and Section 1, RA 5181); 77 Ï‚rÎ½ll
3. Retail trade enterprises with paid-up capital of less than $2,500,000 (Section 5, RA 8762);
4. Cooperatives (Chapter III, Article 26, RA 6938);
5. Private Security Agencies (Section 4, RA 5487);
6. Small-scale Mining (Section 3, RA 7076)
7. Utilization of Marine Resources in archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone
as well as small scale utilization of natural resources in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons (Article XII,
Section 2 of the Constitution);
8. Ownership, operation and management of cockpits (Section 5, PD 449);
9. Manufacture, repair, stockpiling and/or distribution of nuclear weapons (Article II, Section 8 of the
Constitution);
10. Manufacture, repair, stockpiling and/or distribution of biological, chemical and radiological
weapons and anti-personnel mines (Various treaties to which the Philippines is a signatory and
conventions supported by the Philippines);
11. Manufacture of fire crackers and other pyrotechnic devices (Section 5, RA 7183).
If the construction of "capital," as espoused by the June 28, 2011 Decision, were to be sustained, the
reservation of the full ownership of corporations in the foregoing industries to Filipinos could easily be
negated by the simple expedience of issuing and making available non-voting shares to foreigners.
After all, these non-voting shares do not, following the June 28, 2011 Decision, form part of the
"capital" of these supposedly fully nationalized industries. Consequently, while Filipinos can occupy all
of the seats in the board of directors of corporations in fully nationalized industries, it is possible for
foreigners to own the majority of the equity of the corporations through "non-voting" shares, which
are nonetheless allowed to determine fundamental corporate matters recognized in Sec. 6 of the
Corporation Code. Filipinos may therefore be unwittingly deprived of the "effective" ownership of
corporations supposedly reserved to them by the Constitution and various laws.
The Foreign Investments Act of 1991 does

not qualify or restrict the meaning of "capital"
in Sec. 11, Art. XII of the Constitution.
Nonetheless, Justice Carpio parlays the thesis that the FIA, and its predecessors, the Investments
Incentives Act of 1967 ("1967 IIA"),78 Omnibus Investments Code of 1981 ("1981 OIC"),79 and the
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Omnibus Incentives Code of 1987 ("1987 OIC"),80 (collectively, "Investment Incentives Laws") more
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particularly their definition of the term "Philippine National," constitutes a good guide for ascertaining
the intent behind the use of the term "capital" in Sec. 11, Art. XIIthat it refers only to voting shares
of public utility corporations.
I cannot share this posture. The Constitution may only be amended through the procedure
outlined in the basic document itself.81 An amendment cannot, therefore, be made through
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the expedience of a legislative action that diagonally opposes the clear provisions of the
Constitution.
Indeed, the constitutional intent on the equity prescribed by Sec. 11, Art. XII cannot plausibly
be fleshed out by a look through the prism of economic statutes passed after the adoption
of the Constitution, such as the cited FIA, the Magna Carta for Micro, Small and Medium Industries
(Republic Act No. 6977) and other kindred laws envisaged to Filipinize certain areas of investment. It
should be the other way around. Surely, the definition of a "Philippine National" in the FIA, or for that
matter, the 1987 OIC82 could not have influenced the minds of the 1986 CONCOM or the people
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when they ratified the Constitution. As heretofore discussed, the primary source whence to ascertain
constitutional intent or purpose is the constitutional text, or, to be more precise, the language of the
provision itself,83 as inquiry on any controversy arising out of a constitutional provision ought to start
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and end as much as possible with the provision itself.84 Legislative enactments on commerce,
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trade and national economy must be so construed, when appropriate, to determine

whether the purpose underlying them is in accord with the policies and objectives laid out
in the Constitution. Surely, a law cannot validly broaden or restrict the thrust of a
constitutional provision unless expressly sanctioned by the Constitution itself. And the Court
may not read into the Constitution an intent or purpose that is not there. Any attempt to enlarge the
breadth of constitutional limitations beyond what its provision dictates should be stricken down.
In fact, it is obvious from the FIA itself that its framers deemed it necessary to qualify the term
"capital" with the phrase "stock outstanding and entitled to vote" in defining a "Philippine National" in
Sec. 3(a). This only supports the construal that the term "capital," standing alone as in Sec. 11, Art.
XII of the Constitution, applies to all shares, whether classified as voting or non-voting, and this is
the interpretation in harmony with the Constitution.
In passing the FIA, the legislature could not have plausibly intended to restrict the 40% foreign
ownership limit imposed by the Constitution on all capital stock to only voting stock. Precisely,
Congress enacted the FIA to liberalize the laws on foreign investments. Such intent is at once
apparent in the very title of the statute, i.e., "An Act to Promote Foreign Investments," and the
policy: "attract, promote and welcome productive investments from foreign individuals, partnerships,
corporations, and government,"85 expresses the same.
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The Senate, through then Senator Vicente Paterno, categorically stated that the FIA is aimed at
"liberalizing foreign investments"86 because "Filipino investment is not going to be enough [and] we
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need the support and the assistance of foreign investors x x x."87 The senator made clear that "the Ï‚rÎ½ll
term Philippine national" means either Filipino citizens or enterprises of which the
"total Filipino ownership" is 60 percent or greater, thus:
Senator Paterno. May I first say that the term "Philippine national" means either Filipino
citizens or enterprises of which the total Filipino ownership is 60 percent or greater. In
other words, we are not excluding foreign participation in domestic market enterprises with total
assets of less than P 25 million. We are merely limiting foreign participation to not more than 40
percent in this definition.88
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Even granting, arguendo, that the definition of a "Philippine National" in the FIA was lifted from the
Investment Incentives Laws issued in 1967, 1981, and 1987 that defined "Philippine National" as a
corporation 60% of whose voting stocks is owned by Filipino citizens, such definition does not limit or
qualify the nationality requirement prescribed for public utility corporations by Sec. 11, Art. XII of the
1987 Constitution. The latter does not refer to the definition of a "Philippine National." Instead, Sec.
11, Art. XII reiterates the use of the unqualified term "capital" in the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions. In fact, neither the 1973 Constitutional Convention nor the 1986 CONCOM alluded to
the Investment Incentives Laws in their deliberations on the nationality requirement of public utility
corporations. With the unequivocal rejection of the UP Law Center proposal to use the qualifying
"voting stock or controlling interest," the non-consideration of the Investment Incentives Laws means
that these laws are not pertinent to the issue of the Filipino-foreign capital ratio in public utility
corporations.
Besides, none of the Investment Incentives Laws defining a "Philippine National" has sought to
expand or modify the definition of "capital," as used in the Constitutions then existing. The definition
of a "Philippine National" in these laws was, to stress, only intended to identify the corporations
qualified for registration to avail of the incentives prescribed therein. The definition was not meant to
find context outside the scope of the various Investment Incentives Laws, much less to modify a
nationality requirement set by the then existing Constitution. This much is obvious in the very
heading of the first of these Investment Incentives Laws, 1967 IIA :
SECTION 3. Definition of Terms. - For purposes of this Act: chanroblesv irt uallawl ibra ry
xxxx
(f) "Philippine National" shall mean a citizen of the Philippines; or a partnership or association wholly
owned by citizens of the Philippines; or a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines of which at least sixty per cent of the capital stock outstanding and entitled to vote is
owned and held by citizens of the Philippines xxxx (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
Indeed, the definition of a "Philippine National" in the FIA cannot apply to the ownership structure of
enterprises applying for, and those granted, a franchise to operate as a public utility under Sec. 11,
Art. XII of the Constitution. As aptly observed by the SEC, the definition of a "Philippine National"
provided in the FIA refers only to a corporation that is permitted to invest in an enterprise as a
Philippine citizen (investorcorporation). The FIA does not prescribe the equity ownership
structure of the enterprise granted the franchise or the power to operate in a fully or
partially nationalized industry (investee-corporation). This is apparent from the FIA itself, which
also defines the act of an "investment" and "foreign investment":
Section 3. Definitions. As used in this Act: chanroblesvi rtual lawlib rary
a) The term "Philippine national" shall mean a citizen of the Philippines, or a domestic partnership or
association wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines; or a corporation organized under the laws of
the Philippines of which at least sixty percent [60%] of the capital stock outstanding and entitled to
vote is owned and held by citizens of the Philippines x x x
b) The term "investment" shall mean equity participation in any enterprise organized or existing
the laws of the Philippines;
c) The term "foreign investment" shall mean as equity investment made by a non-Philippine
national in the form of foreign exchange and/or other assets actually transferred to the Philippines
and duly registered with the Central Bank which shall assess and appraise the value of such assets
other than foreign exchange.
In fact, Sec. 7 of the FIA, as amended, allows aliens or non-Philippine nationals to own an enterprise
up to the extent provided by the Constitution, existing laws or the FINL:
Sec. 7. Foreign investments in domestic market enterprises. Non- Philippine nationals may own up
to one hundred percent [100%] of domestic market enterprises unless foreign ownership therein is
prohibited or limited by the Constitution and existing laws or the Foreign Investment Negative List
under Section 8 hereof. (Emphasis supplied.)
Hence, pursuant to the Eight Regular FINL, List A, the foreign "equity" is up to 40% in enterprises
engaged in the operation and management of public utilities while the remaining 60% of the
"equity" is reserved to Filipino citizens and "Philippine Nationals" as defined in Sec. 3(a) of the FIA.
Notably, the term "equity" refers to the "ownership interest in a business"89 or a "share in a
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publicly traded company,"90 and not to the "controlling" or "management" interest in a company. It
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necessarily includes all and every share in a corporation, whether voting or non-voting.
Again, We must recognize the distinction of the separate concepts of "ownership" and "control" in
modern corporate governance in order to realize the intent of the framers of our Constitution to
reserve for Filipinos the ultimate and all-encompassing control of public utility entities from their daily
administration to the acts of ownership enumerated in Sec. 6 of the Corporation Code.91 As Ï‚rÎ½ll
elucidated, by equating the word "capital" in Sec. 11, Art. XII to the limited aspect of the right to
control the composition of the board of directors, the Court could very well be depriving Filipinos of
the majority economic interest in the public utility corporation and, thus, the effective control and
ownership of such corporation.
The Court has no jurisdiction over PLDT and foreign

stockholders who are indispensable parties in interest
More importantly, this Court cannot apply a new doctrine adopted in a precedent-setting decision to
parties that have never been given the chance to present their own views on the substantive and
factual issues involved in the precedent-setting case.
To recall, the instant controversy arose out of an original petition filed in February 2007 for, among
others, declaratory relief on Sec. 11, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution "to clarify the intent of the
Constitutional Commission that crafted the 1987 Constitution to determine the very nature of such
limitation on foreign ownership."92 Ï‚rÎ½ ll
The petition impleaded the following personalities as the respondents: (1) Margarito B. Teves, then
Secretary of Finance and Chair of the Privatization Council; (2) John P. Sevilla, then undersecretary
for privatization of the Department of Finance; (3) Ricardo Abcede, commissioner of the Presidential
Commission on Good Government; (4) Anthoni Salim, chair of First Pacific Co. Ltd. and director of
Metro Pacific Asset Holdings, Inc. (MPAH); (5) Manuel V. Pangilinan, chairman of the board of PLDT;
(6) Napoleon L. Nazareno, the president of PLDT; (7) Fe Barin (Barin), then chair of the SEC; and (8)
Francis Lim (Lim), then president of the PSE.
Notably, neither PLDT itself nor any of its stockholders were named as respondents in the petition,
albeit it sought from the Court the following main reliefs:
5. x x x to issue a declaratory relief that ownership of common or voting shares is the sole basis in
determining foreign equity in a public utility and that any other government rulings, opinions, and
regulations inconsistent with this declaratory relief be declared as unconstitutional and a violation of
the intent and spirit of the 1987 Constitution;
6. x x x to declare null and void all sales of common stocks to foreigners in excess of 40 percent of
the total subscribed common shareholdings; and
7. x x x to direct the [SEC] and [PSE] to require PLDT to make a public disclosure of all of its foreign
shareholdings and their actual and real beneficial owners."
Clearly, the petition seeks a judgment that can adversely affect PLDT and its foreign shareholders. If
this Court were to accommodate the petitions prayer, as the majority did in the June 28, 2011
Decision and proposes to do presently, PLDT stands to lose its franchise, while the foreign
stockholders will be compelled to divest their voting shares in excess of 40% of PLDTs voting stock, if
any, even at a loss. It cannot, therefore, be gainsaid that PLDT and its foreign shareholders are
indispensable parties to the instant case under the terms of Secs. 2 and 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, which read:
Section 2. Parties in interest.Every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real
party in interest. All persons having an interest in the subject of the action and in obtaining the relief
demanded shall be joined as plaintiffs. All persons who claim an interest in the controversy or the
subject thereof adverse to the plaintiff, or who are necessary to a complete determination or
settlement of the questions involved therein, shall be joined as defendants.
xxxx
Section 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. Parties in interest without whom no final
determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants.
Yet, again, PLDT and its foreign shareholders have not been given notice of this petition to appear
before, much less heard by, this Court. Nonetheless, the majority has allowed such irregularity in
contravention of the settled jurisprudence that an action cannot proceed unless indispensable parties
are joined93 since the non-joinder of these indispensable parties deprives the court the jurisdiction to
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issue a decision binding on the indispensable parties that have not been joined or impleaded. In
other words, if an indispensable party is not impleaded, any personal judgment would have no
effectiveness94 as to them for the tribunals want of jurisdiction.
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In Arcelona v. Court of Appeals,95 We explained that the basic notions of due process require the
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observance of this rule that refuses the effectivity of a decision that was rendered despite the non-
joinder of indispensable parties:
Basic considerations of due process, however, impel a similar holding in cases involving jurisdiction
over the persons of indispensable parties which a court must acquire before it can validly pronounce
judgments personal to said defendants. Courts acquire jurisdiction over a party plaintiff upon the
filing of the complaint. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the person of a party defendant is
assured upon the service of summons in the manner required by law or otherwise by his voluntary
appearance. As a rule, if a defendant has not been summoned, the court acquires no jurisdiction over
his person, and a personal judgment rendered against such defendant is null and void. A decision
that is null and void for want of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court is not a decision in
the contemplation of law and, hence, it can never become final and executory.
Rule 3, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, defines indispensable parties as parties-in-interest without
whom there can be no final determination of an action. As such, they must be joined either as
plaintiffs or as defendants. The general rule with reference to the making of parties in a civil
action requires, of course, the joinder of all necessary parties where possible, and the
joinder of all indispensable parties under any and all conditions, their presence being a
sine qua non for the exercise of judicial power. It is precisely "when an indispensable
party is not before the court (that) the action should be dismissed." The absence of an
indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of
authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.96 Ï‚rÎ½l l
Hence, the June 28, 2011 Decision having been rendered in a case where the indispensable parties
have not been impleaded, much less summoned or heard, cannot be given any effect and is, thus,
null and void. Ergo, the assailed June 28, 2011 Decision is virtually a useless judgment, at least
insofar as it tends to penalize PLDT and its foreign stockholders. It cannot bind and affect PLDT and
the foreign stockholders or be enforced and executed against them. It is settled that courts of law
"should not render judgments which cannot be enforced by any process known to the
law,"97 hence, this Court should have refused to give cognizance to the petition.
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The ineffectivity caused by the non-joinder of the indispensable parties, the deprivation of their day
in court, and the denial of their right to due process, cannot be cured by the sophistic expedience of
naming PLDT in the fallo of the decision as a respondent. The dispositive portion of the June 28, 2011
Decision all the more only highlights the unenforceability of the majoritys disposition and serves as
an implied admission of this Courts lack of jurisdiction over the persons of PLDT and its foreign
stockholders when it did not directly order the latter to dispose the common shares in excess of the
40% limit. Instead, it took the circuitous route of ordering the SEC, in the fallo of the assailed
decision, "to apply this definition of the term capital in determining the extent of allowable ownership
in respondent PLDT and, if there is a violation of Sec. 11, Art. XII of the Constitution, to impose the
appropriate sanctions under the law."98 Ï‚rÎ½ll
Clearly, since PLDT and the foreign stockholders were not impleaded as indispensable
parties to the case, the majority would want to indirectly execute its decision which it
could not execute directly. The Court may be criticized for violating the very rules it
promulgated and for trenching the provisions of Sec. 5, Art. VIII of the Constitution, which
defines the powers and jurisdiction of this Court.
It is apropos to stress, as a reminder, that the Rules of Court is not a mere body of technical rules
that can be disregarded at will whenever convenient. It forms an integral part of the basic notion of
fair play as expressed in this Constitutional caveat: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law,"99 and obliges this Court, as well as other courts and tribunals,
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to hear a person first before rendering a judgment for or against him. As Daniel Webster explained,
"due process of law is more clearly intended the general law, a law which hears before it condemns;
which proceeds upon enquiry, and renders judgment only after trial."100 The principle of due process Ï‚ rÎ½ ll
of law "contemplates notice and opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered, affecting ones
person or property."101 Thus, this Court has stressed the strict observance of the following requisites
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of procedural due process in judicial proceedings in order to comply with this honored principle:
(1) There must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter
before it;
(2) Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property
which is the subject of the proceedings;
(3) The defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard; and
(4) Judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.102 Ï‚rÎ½l l
Apparently, not one of these requisites has been complied with before the June 28, 2011 Decision
was rendered. Instead, PLDT and its foreign stockholders were not given their day in court, even
when they stand to lose their properties, their shares, and even the franchise to operate as a public
utility. This stands counter to our discussion in Agabon v. NLRC,103 where We emphasized that the Ï‚rÎ½ll
principle of due process comports with the simplest notions of what is fair and just:
To be sure, the Due Process Clause in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution embodies a system of
rights based on moral principles so deeply imbedded in the traditions and feelings of our people as to
be deemed fundamental to a civilized society as conceived by our entire history. Due process is
that which comports with the deepest notions of what is fair and right and just. It is a
constitutional restraint on the legislative as well as on the executive and judicial powers of the
government provided by the Bill of Rights.104 Ï‚rÎ½l l
Parenthetically, the present petition partakes of a collateral attack on PLDTs franchise as a public
utility. Giving due course to the recourse is contrary to the Courts ruling in PLDT v. National
Telecommunications Commission,105 where We declared a franchise to be a property right that
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can only be questioned in a direct proceeding.106 Worse, the June 28, 2011 Decision facilitates and
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guarantees the success of that unlawful attack by allowing it to be undertaken in the absence of
PLDT.
The Philippine Government is barred by estoppel from

ordering foreign investors to divest voting shares
in public utilities in excess of the 40 percent cap
The Philippine governments act of pushing for and approving the sale of the PTIC shares, which is
equivalent to 12 million PLDT common shares, to foreign investors precludes it from asserting that
the purchase violates the Constitutional limit on foreign ownership of public utilities so that the
foreign investors must now divest the common PLDT shares bought. The elementary principle that a
person is prevented from going back on his own act or representation to the prejudice of another
who relied thereon107 finds application in the present case.
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Art. 1431 of the Civil Code provides that an "admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon
the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against a person relying thereon." This
rule is supported by Section 2(a) of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court on the burden of proof and
presumptions, which states:
Section 2. Conclusive presumptions. The following are instances of conclusive presumptions: chanroblesvi rtua llawli bra ry
(a) Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately led
another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation
arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it.
The government cannot plausibly hide behind the mantle of its general immunity to resist the
application of this equitable principle for "the rule on non-estoppel of the government is not designed
to perpetrate an injustice."108 Hence, this Court has allowed several exceptions to the rule on the
Ï‚rÎ½l l
governments non-estoppel. As succinctly explained in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of
Appeals:109 Ï‚rÎ½ll
The general rule is that the State cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors of its officials or
agents. However, like all general rules, this is also subject to exceptions, viz.:
"Estoppel against the public are little favored. They should not be invoked except in rare and unusual
circumstances and may not be invoked where they would operate to defeat the effective operation of
a policy adopted to protect the public. They must be applied with circumspection and should be
applied only in those special cases where the interests of justice clearly require it. Nevertheless, the
government must not be allowed to deal dishonorably or capriciously with its citizens, and
must not play an ignoble part or do a shabby thing; and subject to limitations . . ., the
doctrine of equitable estoppel may be invoked against public authorities as well as against
private individuals."
In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, the government, in its effort to recover ill-gotten wealth, tried to skirt
the application of estoppel against it by invoking a specific constitutional provision. The Court
countered:
"We agree with the statement that the State is immune from estoppel, but this concept is understood
to refer to acts and mistakes of its officials especially those which are irregular (Sharp International
Marketing vs. Court of Appeals, 201 SCRA 299; 306 1991 ; Republic v. Aquino, 120 SCRA 186 1983 ),
Ï‚rÎ½ ll Ï‚rÎ½ll
which peculiar circumstances are absent in the case at bar. Although the State's right of action to
recover ill-gotten wealth is not vulnerable to estoppel[;] it is non sequitur to suggest that a
contract, freely and in good faith executed between the parties thereto is susceptible to
disturbance ad infinitum. A different interpretation will lead to the absurd scenario of
permitting a party to unilaterally jettison a compromise agreement which is supposed to
have the authority of res judicata (Article 2037, New Civil Code), and like any other
contract, has the force of law between parties thereto (Article 1159, New Civil Code; Hernaez
vs. Kao, 17 SCRA 296 1966 ; 6 Padilla, Civil Code Annotated, 7th ed., 1987, p. 711; 3 Aquino, Civil
Ï‚ rÎ½ ll
Code, 1990 ed., p. 463) . . ."
The Court further declared that "(t)he real office of the equitable norm of estoppel is limited to
supply[ing] deficiency in the law, but it should not supplant positive law."110 (Emphasis supplied.)
Ï‚rÎ½ll
Similarly, in Ramos v. Central Bank of the Philippines,111 this Court berated the government for
Ï‚rÎ½l l
reneging on its representations and urged it to keep its word, viz:
Even in the absence of contract, the record plainly shows that the CB [Central Bank] made express
representations to petitioners herein that it would support the OBM [Overseas Bank of Manila], and
avoid its liquidation if the petitioners would execute (a) the Voting Trust Agreement turning over the
management of OBM to the CB or its nominees, and (b) mortgage or assign their properties to the
Central Bank to cover the overdraft balance of OBM. The petitioners having complied with these
conditions and parted with value to the profit of the CB (which thus acquired additional security for
its own advances), the CB may not now renege on its representations and liquidate the OBM, to the
detriment of its stockholders, depositors and other creditors, under the rule of promissory estoppel
(19 Am. Jur., pages 657-658; 28 Am. Jur. 2d, 656-657; Ed. Note, 115 ALR, 157).
"The broad general rule to the effect that a promise to do or not to do something in the future does
not work an estoppel must be qualified, since there are numerous cases in which an estoppel has
been predicated on promises or assurances as to future conduct. The doctrine of promissory estoppel
is by no means new, although the name has been adopted only in comparatively recent years.
According to that doctrine, an estoppel may arise from the making of a promise even though without
consideration, if it was intended that the promise should be relied upon and in fact it was relied upon,
and if a refusal to enforce it would be virtually to sanction the perpetration of fraud or would result in
other injustice. In this respect, the reliance by the promises is generally evidenced by action or
forbearance on his part, and the idea has been expressed that such action or forbearance would
reasonably have been expected by the promisor. Mere omission by the promisee to do whatever the
promisor promised to do has been held insufficient forbearance to give rise to a promissory
estoppel." (19 Am. Jur., loc. cit.)
The exception established in the foregoing cases is particularly appropriate presently since the
"indirect" sale of PLDT common shares to foreign investors partook of a propriety business
transaction of the government which was not undertaken as an incident to any of its governmental
functions. Accordingly, the government, by concluding the sale, has descended to the level of an
ordinary citizen and stripped itself of the vestiges of immunity that is available in the performance of
governmental acts.112 Ï‚rÎ½l l
Ergo, the government is vulnerable to, and cannot hold off, the application of the principle of
estoppel that the foreign investors can very well invoke in case they are compelled to divest the
voting shares they have previously acquired through the inducement of no less the government. In
other words, the government is precluded from penalizing these alien investors for an act performed
upon its guarantee, through its facilities, and with its imprimatur.
Under the "fair and equitable treatment" clause of our bilateral

investment treaties and fair trade agreements, foreign investors
have the right to rely on the same legal framework existing at the
time they made their investments
Not only is the government put in estoppel by its acts and representations during the sale of the PTIC
shares to MPAH, it is likewise bound by its guarantees in the Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) and
Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with other countries.
To date, the Philippines has concluded numerous BITs and FTAs to encourage and facilitate foreign
direct investments in the country. These BITs and FTAs invariably contain guarantees calculated to
ensure the safety and stability of these foreign investments. Foremost of these is the commitment to
give fair and equitable treatment (FET) to the foreign investors and investments in the country.
Take for instance the BIT concluded between the Philippines and China,113 Article 3(1) thereof Ï‚rÎ½l l
provides that "investments and activities associated with such investments of investors of either
Contracting Party shall be accorded equitable treatment and shall enjoy protection in the
territory of the other Contracting Party."114 The same assurance is in the Agreement on Investment Ï‚rÎ½l l
of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Between the Association of

Southeast Asian Nations and the Peoples Republic of China (ASEAN-China Investment
Agreement)115 where the Philippines assured Chinese investors that the country "shall accord to
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[them] fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security."116 In the same manner, the Ï‚rÎ½l l
Philippines agreed to "accord investments [made by Japanese investors] treatment in accordance

with international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and
security"117 in the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and Japan for Economic
Ï‚rÎ½ll
Partnership (JPEPA).118 Ï‚rÎ½ ll
Similar provisions are found in the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement (ACIA) 119 and the Ï‚rÎ½ ll
BITs concluded by the Philippines with, among others, the Argentine

Republic,120 Australia,121 Austria,122 Bangladesh,123 Belgium,124 Cambodia,125 Canada,126 Chile,127
Ï‚rÎ½ ll Ï‚ rÎ½ ll Ï‚rÎ½l l Ï‚rÎ½ll Ï‚rÎ½ll Ï‚rÎ½ll Ï‚rÎ½ ll Ï‚ rÎ½ ll
the Czech
Republic,128 Denmark,129 Finland,130 France,131 Germany,132 India,133 Indonesia,134 Iran,135 Italy,1
Ï‚rÎ½ ll Ï‚ rÎ½ ll Ï‚rÎ½l l Ï‚ rÎ½ ll Ï‚rÎ½l l Ï‚rÎ½ ll Ï‚rÎ½ ll Ï‚rÎ½ ll
36 Mongolia,137 Myanmar,138 Netherlands,139 Pakistan,140 Portuguese

Ï‚rÎ½ ll Ï‚rÎ½ ll Ï‚rÎ½ ll Ï‚rÎ½ ll Ï‚rÎ½l l
Republic,141 Romania,142 Russia,143 Saudi

Ï‚rÎ½ ll Ï‚rÎ½ ll Ï‚rÎ½ll
Arabia,144 Spain,145 Sweden,146 Switzerland,147 Thailand,148 Turkey,149 United Kingdom,150 and

Ï‚rÎ½l l Ï‚rÎ½ll Ï‚rÎ½l l Ï‚rÎ½ ll Ï‚rÎ½l l Ï‚rÎ½l l Ï‚rÎ½ ll
Vietnam.151 Ï‚rÎ½ll
Explaining the FET as a standard concordant with the rule of law, Professor Vandevelde wrote that it
requires the host county to treat foreign investments with consistency, security, non-discrimination
and reasonableness:
The thesis is that the awards issued to date implicitly have interpreted the fair and equitable
treatment standard as requiring treatment in accordance with the concept of the rule of law. That
is, the concept of legality is the unifying theory behind the fair and equitable treatment
standard.
xxxx
Thus, international arbitral awards interpreting the fair and equitable treatment standard have
incorporated the substantive and procedural principles of the rule of law into that standard. The fair
and equitable treatment standard in BITs has been interpreted as requiring that covered
investment or investors receive treatment that is reasonable, consistent, non-
discriminatory, transparent, and in accordance with due process. As will be seen, these
principles explain virtually all of the awards applying the fair and equitable treatment standard. No
award is inconsistent with this theory of the standard.
Understanding fair and equitable treatment as legality is consistent with the purposes of the BITs.
BITs essentially are instruments that impose legal restraints on the treatment of covered investments
and investors by host states. The very essence of a BIT is a partial subordination of the sovereign's
power to the legal constraints of the treaty. Further, individual BIT provisions are themselves a
reflection of the principles of the rule of law. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)152Ï‚rÎ½ll
On the requirement of consistency, the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID) explained in Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. The united Mexican
States153 that the host country must maintain a stable and predictable legal and business
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environment to accord a fair and equitable treatment to foreign investors.
153. The Arbitral Tribunal finds that the commitment of fair and equitable treatment included in
Article 4(1) of the Agreement is an expression and part of the bona fide principle recognized
in international law, although bad faith from the State is not required for its violation:
To the modern eye, what is unfair or inequitable need not equate with the outrageous or the
egregious. In particular, a State may treat foreign investment unfairly and inequitably without
necessarily acting in bad faith.
154. The Arbitral Tribunal considers that this provision of the Agreement, in light of the good faith
principle established by international law, requires the Contracting Parties to provide to
international investments treatment that does not affect the basic expectations that were
taken into account by the foreign investor to make the investment. The foreign investor
expects the host State to act in a consistent manner, free from ambiguity and totally
transparently in its relations with the foreign investor, so that it may know beforehand any
and all rules and regulations that will govern its investments, as well as the goals of the
relevant policies and administrative practices or directives, to be able to plan its
investment and comply with such regulations. Any and all State actions conforming to such
criteria should relate not only to the guidelines, directives or requirements issued, or the resolutions
approved thereunder, but also to the goals underlying such regulations. The foreign investor also
expects the host State to act consistently, i.e. without arbitrarily revoking any preexisting
decisions or permits issued by the State that were relied upon by the investor to assume
its commitments as well as to plan and launch its commercial and business activities. The
investor also expects the State to use the legal instruments that govern the actions of the
investor or the investment in conformity with the function usually assigned to
such instruments, and not to deprive the investor of its investment without the required
compensation. In fact, failure by the host State to comply with such pattern of conduct with respect
to the foreign investor or its investments affects the investors ability to measure the treatment and
protection awarded by the host State and to determine whether the actions of the host State conform
to the fair and equitable treatment principle. Therefore, compliance by the host State with such
pattern of conduct is closely related to the above-mentioned principle, to the actual
chances of enforcing such principle, and to excluding the possibility that state action be
characterized as arbitrary; i.e. as presenting insufficiencies that would be recognized "by any
reasonable and impartial man," or, although not in violation of specific regulations, as being contrary
to the law because: chanroblesvi rtua llawlib ra ry
...(it) shocks, or at least surprises, a sense of juridical propriety. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied added.)
The Philippines, therefore, cannot, without so much as a notice of policy shift, alter and
change the legal and business environment in which the foreign investments in the
country were made in the first place. These investors obviously made the decision to come in
after studying the countrys legal framework-its restrictions and incentivesand so, as a matter of
fairness, they must be accorded the right to expect that the same legal climate and the same
substantive set of rules will remain during the period of their investments.
The representation that foreigners can invest up to 40% of the entirety of the total stockholdings,
and not just the voting shares, of a public utility corporation is an implied covenant that the
Philippines cannot renege without violating the FET guarantee. Especially in this case where the
Philippines made specific commitments to countries like Japan and China that their investing
nationals can own up to 40% of the equity of a public utility like a telecommunications corporation.
In the table contained in Schedule 1(B), Annex 6 of the JPEPA, the Philippines categorically
represented that Japanese investors entry into the Philippine telecommunications industry,
specifically corporations offering "voice telephone services," is subject to only the following
requirements and conditions:
A. Franchise from Congress of the Philippines
B. Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity (CPCN) from the National Telecommunications
Commission
C. Foreign equity is permitted up to 40 percent.
D. x x x154 (Emphasis supplied.)

Ï‚rÎ½ ll
The same representation is made in the Philippines Schedule of Specific Commitments appended to
the ASEAN-China Agreement on Trade in Services.155 Ï‚rÎ½ ll
Further, as previously pointed out, it was the Philippine government that pushed for and approved
the sale of the 111,415 PTIC shares to MPAH, thereby indirectly transferring the ownership of
6.3 percent of the outstanding common shares of PLDT, to a foreign firm and so increasing the
foreign voting shareholding in PLDT. Hence, the presence of good faith may not be convincingly
argued in favour of the Philippine government in a suit for violation of its FET guarantee.
In fact, it has been held that a bona fide change in policy by a branch of government does not excuse
compliance with the FET obligations. In Occidental Exploration and Production Company
(OEPC) v. the Republic of Ecuador,156 the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
Ï‚rÎ½l l
(UNCITRAL) ruled that Ecuador violated the US/Ecuador BIT by denying OEPC fair and equitable
treatment when it failed to provide a predictable framework for its investment planning. Ruling thus,
the tribunal cited Ecuadors change in tax law and its tax authoritys unsatisfactory and vague
response to OEPCs consulta, viz:
183. x x x The stability of the legal and business framework is thus an essential element of fair and
equitable treatment.
184. The tribunal must note in this context that the framework under which the investment
was made and operates has been changed in an important manner by actions adopted by
[the Ecuadorian tax authority]. The clarifications that OEPC sought on the applicability of VAT by
means of "consulta" made to [the Ecuadorian tax authority] received a wholly unsatisfactory and
thoroughly vague answer. The tax law was changed without providing any clarity abut its
meaning and extend and the practice and regulations were also inconsistent with such
changes.
185. Various arbitral tribunals have recently insisted on the need for this stability. The tribunal
in Metalcad held that the Respondent "failed to ensure a transparent and predictable framework for
Metalcads business planning and investment. The totality of these circumstances demonstrate a lack
of orderly process and timely disposition in relation to an investor of a Party acting in the expectation
that it would be treated fairly and justly" x x x
186. It is quite clear from the record of this case and from the events discussed in this Final Award
that such requirements were not met by Ecuador. Moreover, this is an objective requirement
that does not depend on whether the Respondent has proceeded in good faith or not.
187. The Tribunal accordingly holds that the Respondent has breached its obligations to accord fair
and equitable treatment under Article II (3)
(a) of the Treaty. x x x
xxxx
191. The relevant question for international law in this discussion is not whether there is an
obligation to refund VAT, which is the point on which the parties have argued most intensely, but
rather whether the legal and business framework meets the requirements of stability and
predictability under international law. It was earlier concluded that there is not a VAT refund
obligation under international law, except in the specific case of the Andean Community Law, which
provides for the option of either compensation or refund, but there is certainly an obligation not
to alter the legal and business environment in which the investment has been made. In
this case it is the latter question that triggers a treatment that is not fair and equitable.
(Emphasis supplied.)
To maintain the FET guarantee contained in the various BITs and FTAs concluded by the country and
avert a deluge of investor suits before the ICSID, the UNCITRAL or other fora, any decision of this
court that tends to drastically alter the foreign investors basic expectations when they
made their investments, taking into account the consistent SEC Opinions and the executive and
legislative branches Specific Commitments, must be applied prospectively.
This Court cannot turn oblivious to the fact that if We diverge from the prospectivity rule and
implement the resolution on the present issue immediately and, without giving due deference to the
foreign investors rights to due process and the equal protection of the laws, compel the foreign
stockholders to divest their voting shares against their wishes at prices lower than the acquisition
costs, these foreign investors may very well shy away from Philippine stocks and avoid investing in
the Philippines. Not to mention, the validity of the franchise granted to PLDT and similarly situated
public utilities will be put under a cloud of doubt. Such uncertainty and the unfair treatment of
foreign investors who merely relied in good faith on the policies, rules and regulations of the PSE and
the SEC will likely upset the volatile capital market as it would have a negative impact on the value of
these companies that will discourage investors, both local and foreign, from purchasing their shares.
In which case, foreign direct investments (FDIs) in the country (which already lags behind our Asian
neighbors) will take a nosedive. Indeed, it cannot be gainsaid that a sudden and unexpected
deviation from the accepted and consistent construction of the term "capital" will create a domino
effect that may cripple our capital markets.
Therefore, in applying the new comprehensive interpretation of Sec. 11, Art. XII of the Constitution,
the current voting shares of the foreign investors in public utilities in excess of the 40% capital shall
be maintained and honored. Otherwise the due process guarantee under the Constitution and the
long established precepts of justice, equity and fair play would be impaired.
Prospective application of new laws or changes in interpretation
The June 28, 2011 Decision construed "capital" in the first sentence of Section 11, Article XII of the
Constitution as "full beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital stocks coupled with
60 percent of the voting rights." In the Resolution denying the motions for reconsideration, it further
amplified the scope of the word "capital" by clarifying that "the 60- 40 ownership requirement in
favor of Filipino citizens must apply separately to each class of shares whether common, preferred,
preferred voting or any other class of shares." This is a radical departure from the clear intent of the
framers of the 1987 Constitution and the long established interpretation ascribed to said word by the
Securities and Exchange Commissionthat "capital" in the first sentence of Sec. 11, Art. XII means
capital stock or BOTH voting and non-voting shares. The recent interpretation enunciated in the June
28, 2011 and in the Resolution at hand can only be applied PROSPECTIVELY. It cannot be applied
retroactively to corporations such as PLDT and its investors such as its shareholders who have all
along relied on the consistent reading of "capital" by SEC and the Philippine government to apply it to
a public utilitys total capital stock.
Lex prospicit, non respicit "laws have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided."157 As a
Ï‚rÎ½ ll
necessary corollary, judicial rulings should not be accorded retroactive effect since "judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part of the legal system of the
Philippines."158 It has been the constant holding of the Court that a judicial decision setting a new
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doctrine or principle ("precedent-setting decision") shall not retroactively apply to parties who relied
in good faith on the principles and doctrines standing prior to the promulgation thereof ("old
principles/doctrines"), especially when a retroactive application of the precedent-setting decision
would impair the rights and obligations of the parties. So it is that as early as 1940, the Court has
refused to apply the new doctrine of jus sanguinis to persons who relied in good faith on the principle
of jus soli adopted in Roa v. Collector of Customs.159 Similarly, in Co v. Court of Appeals,160 the
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Court sustained petitioner Cos bona fide reliance on the Minister of Justices Opinion dated December
15, 1981 that the delivery of a "rubber" check as guarantee for an obligation is not a punishable
offense despite the Courts pronouncement on September 21, 1987 in Que v. People that Batas
Pambansa Blg. (BP) 22 nonetheless covers a check issued to guarantee the payment of an obligation.
In so ruling, the Court quoted various decisions applying precedent-setting decisions prospectively.
We held:
Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of
the legal system of the Philippines," according to Article 8 of the Civil Code. "Laws shall
have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided," declares Article 4 of the same
Code, a declaration that is echoed by Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code: "Penal laws shall have a
retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal . .
."
xxxx
The principle of prospectivity has also been applied to judicial decisions which, "although
in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, . . . (this being)
the reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code, 'Judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system . . .' "
So did this Court hold, for example, in Peo. v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607, 611: chanroble svirtual lawlib rary
xxxx
So, too, did the Court rule in Spouses Gauvain and Bernardita Benzonan v. Court of Appeals, et
al. (G.R. No. 97973) and Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, et al. (G.R. No
97998), Jan. 27, 1992, 205 SCRA 515, 527-528: chanroblesv irt uallawl ibra ry
xxxx
A compelling rationalization of the prospectivity principle of judicial decisions is well set forth in the
oft-cited case of Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter States Bank, 308 US 371, 374 1940 . The Ï‚rÎ½ll
Chicot doctrine advocates the imperative necessity to take account of the actual existence of
a statute prior to its nullification, as an operative fact negating acceptance of "a principle
of absolute retroactive invalidity."
xxxx
Much earlier, in De Agbayani v. PNB, 38 SCRA 429 xxx the Court made substantially the same
observations
xxxx
Again, treating of the effect that should be given to its decision in Olaguer v. Military Commission No
34, declaring invalid criminal proceedings conducted during the martial law regime against civilians,
which had resulted in the conviction and incarceration of numerous persons this Court, in Tan vs.
Barrios, 190 SCRA 686, at p. 700, ruled as follows:
"In the interest of justice and consistency, we hold that Olaguer should, in principle, be
applied prospectively only to future cases and cases still ongoing or not yet final when that
decision was promulgated. x x x"
It would seem, then, that the weight of authority is decidedly in favor of the proposition that the
Courts decision of September 21, 1987 in Que v. People, 154 SCRA 160 (1987) i.e., that a check
issued merely to guarantee the performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg.
22 should not be given retrospective effect to the prejudice of the petitioner and other
persons similarly situated, who relied on the official opinion of the Minister of Justice that
such a check did not fall within the scope of B.P. Blg. 22. (Emphasis supplied).
Indeed, pursuant to the doctrine of prospectivity, new doctrines and principles must be applied only
to acts and events transpiring after the precedent-setting judicial decision, and not to those that
occurred and were caused by persons who relied on the "old" doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.
Not content with changing the rule in the middle of the game, the majority, in the June 28, 2011
Decision, went a little further by ordering respondent SEC Chairperson "to apply this definition of the
term capital in determining the extent of allowable foreign ownership in respondent Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Company, and if there is a violation of Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution,
to impose the appropriate sanctions under the law." This may be viewed as unreasonable and
arbitrary. The Court in the challenged June 28, 2011 Decision already made a finding that foreigners
hold 64.27% of the total number of PLDT common shares while Filipinos hold only 35.73%.161 In this Ï‚rÎ½ ll
factual setting, PLDT will, as clear as day, face sanctions since its present capital structure is
presently in breach of the rule on the 40% cap on foreign ownership of voting shares even without
need of a SEC investigation.
In answering the SECs query regarding the proper period of application and imposition of appropriate
sanctions against PLDT, Justice Carpio tersely stated that "once the 28 June 2011 Decision becomes
final, the SEC shall impose the appropriate sanctions only if it finds after due hearing that, at the
start of the administrative cases or investigation, there is an existing violation of Sec. 11, Art. XII of
the Constitution."162 As basis therefor, Justice Carpio cited Halili v. Court of Appeals163 and United
Ï‚rÎ½ll Ï‚rÎ½ ll
Church Board for World Ministries (UCBWM) v. Sebastian.164 However, these cases do not provide a
Ï‚rÎ½ll
jurisprudential foundation to this mandate that may very well deprive PLDT foreign shareholders of
their voting shares. In fact, UCBWM v. Sebastian respected the voluntary transfer in a will by an
American of his shares of stocks in a land-holding corporation. In the same manner, Halili v. Court of
Appeals sustained as valid the waiver by an alien of her right of inheritance over a piece of land in
favour of her son. Nowhere in these cases did this Court order the involuntary dispossession of
corporate stocks by alien stockholders. At most, these two cases only recognized the principle
validating the transfer of land to an alien who, after the transfer, subsequently becomes a Philippine
citizen or transfers the land to a Filipino citizen. They do not encompass the situation that will
eventually ensue after the investigation conducted by the SEC in accordance with the June 28, 2011
and the present resolution. They do not justify the compulsory deprivation of voting shares in public
utility corporations from foreign stockholders who had legally acquired these stocks in the first
instance.
The abrupt application of the construction of Sec. 11, Art. XII of the Constitution to foreigners
currently holding voting shares in a public utility corporation is not only constitutionally problematic;
it is likewise replete with pragmatic difficulties that could hinder the real-world translation of this
Courts Resolution. Although apparently benevolent, the majoritys concession to allow "public utilities
that fail to comply with the nationality requirement under Section 11, Article XII and the FIA
[to] cure their deficiencies prior to the start of the administrative case or
investigation"165 could indirectly occasion a compulsory deprivation of the public utilities foreign
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stockholders of their voting shares. Certainly, these public utilities must immediately pare down their
foreign-owned voting shares to avoid the imposable sanctions. This holds true especially for PLDT
whose 64.27% of its common voting shares are foreign-subscribed and held. PLDT is, therefore,
forced to immediately deprive, or at the very least, dilute the property rights of their foreign
stockholders before the commencement of the administrative proceedings, which would be a mere
farce considering the transparency of the public utility from the onset.
Even with the chance granted to the public utilities to remedy their supposed deficiency, the
nebulous time-frame given by the majority, i.e., "prior to the start of the administrative case or
investigation,"166 may very well prove too short for these public utilities to raise the necessary
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amount of money to increase the number of their authorized capital stock in order to dilute the
property rights of their foreign stockholders holding voting shares.167 Similarly, if they induce their
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foreign stockholders to transfer the excess voting shares to qualified Philippine nationals, this period
before the filing of the administrative may not be sufficient for these stockholders to find Philippine
nationals willing to purchase these voting shares at the market price. This Court cannot ignore the
fact that the voting shares of Philippine public utilities like PLDT are listed and sold at large in foreign
capital markets. Hence, foreigners who have previously purchased their voting shares in these
markets will not have a ready Philippine market to immediately transfer their shares. More than
likely, these foreign stockholders will be forced to sell their voting shares at a loss to the few
Philippine nationals with money to spare, or the public utility itself will be constrained to acquire
these voting shares to the prejudice of its retained earnings.168 Ï‚rÎ½ll
Whatever means the public utilities choose to employ in order to cut down the foreign stockholdings
of voting shares, it is necessary to determine who among the foreign stockholders of these public
utilities must bear the burden of unloading the voting shares or the dilution of their property rights.
In a situation like this, there is at present no settled rule on who should be deprived of their property
rights. Will it be the foreign stockholders who bought the latest issuances? Or the first foreign
stockholders of the public utility corporations? This issue cannot be realistically settled within the
time-frame given by the majority without raising more disputes. With these loose ends, the majority
cannot penalize the public utilities if they should fail to comply with the directive of complying with
the "nationality requirement under Section 11, Article XII and the FIA" within the unreasonably
nebulous and limited period "prior to the start of the administrative case or investigation."169 Ï‚rÎ½ ll
In the light of the new pronouncement of the Court that public utilities that fail to comply with the
nationality requirement under Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution CAN CURE THEIR
DEFICIENCIES prior to the start of the administrative case or investigation, I submit that affected
companies like PLDT should be given reasonable time to undertake the necessary measures to make
their respective capital structure compliant, and the SEC, as the regulatory authority, should come up
with the appropriate guidelines on the process and supervise the same. SEC should likewise adopt
the necessary rules and regulations to implement the prospective compliance by all affected
companies with the new ruling regarding the interpretation of the provision in question. Such rules
and regulations must respect the due process rights of all affected corporations and define a
reasonable period for them to comply with the June 28, 2011 Decision.
A final note.
Year in and year out, the governments trade managers attend economic summits courting
businessmen to invest in the country, doubtless promising them a playing field where the rules are
friendly as they are predictable. So it would appear odd if a branch of government would make
business life complicated for investors who are already here. Indeed, stability and predictability are
the key pillars on which our legal system must be founded and run to guarantee a business
environment conducive to the countrys sustainable economic growth. Hence, it behoves this Court to
respect the basic expectations taken into account by the investors at the time they made the
investments. In other words, it is the duty of this Court to stand guard against any untoward change
of the rules in the middle of the game.
I, therefore, vote to GRANT the motions for reconsideration and accordingly REVERSE and SET
ASIDE the June 28, 2011 Decision. The Court should declare that the word "capital" in the first
sentence of Section 11, Article Xll of the 1987 Constitution means the entire capital stock or both
voting and non-voting shares.
Since the June 28, 2011 Decision was however sustained, I submit that said decision should take
effect only on the date of its finality and should be applied prospectively.
PLDT should be given time to umkrtake the nec~ssary meast1res to make its capital structure
compliant, and th~ Securities and Exchange Commission should formulalc appropriate guidelines and
supervise the process. Said Commission should also adopt ruks and regulations to implement the
prospective compliance by all affected companies with the new ruling on the interpretation of Sec.
11, Art. XII of the Constitution. Such rules and regulations must respect the due process rights of all
affected corporations and provide a reasonable period for them to com pi y with the June 28, 2011
Decision. The rights of foreigners over the voting shares they presently own in excess of 40% of said
shares should, in the meantime, be respected.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 176579 : June 28, 2011]
WILSON P. GAMBOA, PETITIONER, VS. FINANCE SECRETARY MARGARITO B. TEVES,

FINANCE UNDERSECRETARY JOHN P. SEVILLA, AND COMMISSIONER RICARDO ABCEDE OF
THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG) IN THEIR CAPACITIES
AS CHAIR AND MEMBERS, RESPECTIVELY, OF THE PRIVATIZATION COUNCIL, CHAIRMAN
ANTHONI SALIM OF FIRST PACIFIC CO., LTD. IN HIS CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF METRO
PACIFIC ASSET HOLDINGS INC., CHAIRMAN MANUEL V. PANGILINAN OF PHILIPPINE
LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY (PLDT) IN HIS CAPACITY AS MANAGING
DIRECTOR OF FIRST PACIFIC CO., LTD., PRESIDENT NAPOLEON L. NAZARENO OF
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, CHAIR FE BARIN OF THE SECURITIES
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, AND PRESIDENT FRANCIS LIM OF THE PHILIPPINE STOCK
EXCHANGE, RESPONDENTS.
PABLITO V. SANIDAD AND ARNO V. SANIDAD, PETITIONERS-IN-INTERVENTION.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is an original petition for prohibition, injunction, declaratory relief and declaration of nullity of
the sale of shares of stock of Philippine Telecommunications Investment Corporation (PTIC) by the
government of the Republic of the Philippines to Metro Pacific Assets Holdings, Inc. (MPAH), an
affiliate of First Pacific Company Limited (First Pacific).
The Antecedents
The facts, according to petitioner Wilson P. Gamboa, a stockholder of Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Company (PLDT), are as follows:[1]
On 28 November 1928, the Philippine Legislature enacted Act No. 3436 which granted PLDT a
franchise and the right to engage in telecommunications business. In 1969, General Telephone and
Electronics Corporation (GTE), an American company and a major PLDT stockholder, sold 26 percent
of the outstanding common shares of PLDT to PTIC. In 1977, Prime Holdings, Inc. (PHI) was
incorporated by several persons, including Roland Gapud and Jose Campos, Jr. Subsequently, PHI
became the owner of 111,415 shares of stock of PTIC by virtue of three Deeds of Assignment
executed by PTIC stockholders Ramon Cojuangco and Luis Tirso Rivilla. In 1986, the 111,415 shares
of stock of PTIC held by PHI were sequestered by the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG). The 111,415 PTIC shares, which represent about 46.125 percent of the outstanding capital
stock of PTIC, were later declared by this Court to be owned by the Republic of the Philippines.[2]
In 1999, First Pacific, a Bermuda-registered, Hong Kong-based investment firm, acquired the
remaining 54 percent of the outstanding capital stock of PTIC. On 20 November 2006, the Inter-
Agency Privatization Council (IPC) of the Philippine Government announced that it would sell the
111,415 PTIC shares, or 46.125 percent of the outstanding capital stock of PTIC, through a public
bidding to be conducted on 4 December 2006. Subsequently, the public bidding was reset to 8
December 2006, and only two bidders, Parallax Venture Fund XXVII (Parallax) and Pan-Asia Presidio
Capital, submitted their bids. Parallax won with a bid of P25.6 billion or US$510 million.
Thereafter, First Pacific announced that it would exercise its right of first refusal as a PTIC
stockholder and buy the 111,415 PTIC shares by matching the bid price of Parallax. However, First
Pacific failed to do so by the 1 February 2007 deadline set by IPC and instead, yielded its right to
PTIC itself which was then given by IPC until 2 March 2007 to buy the PTIC shares. On 14 February
2007, First Pacific, through its subsidiary, MPAH, entered into a Conditional Sale and Purchase
Agreement of the 111,415 PTIC shares, or 46.125 percent of the outstanding capital stock of PTIC,
with the Philippine Government for the price of P25,217,556,000 or US$510,580,189. The sale was
completed on 28 February 2007.
Since PTIC is a stockholder of PLDT, the sale by the Philippine Government of 46.125 percent of PTIC
shares is actually an indirect sale of 12 million shares or about 6.3 percent of the outstanding
common shares of PLDT. With the sale, First Pacific's common shareholdings in PLDT
increased from 30.7 percent to 37 percent, thereby increasing the common shareholdings
of foreigners in PLDT to about 81.47 percent. This violates Section 11, Article XII of the 1987
Philippine Constitution which limits foreign ownership of the capital of a public utility to not more
than 40 percent.[3]
On the other hand, public respondents Finance Secretary Margarito B. Teves, Undersecretary John P.
Sevilla, and PCGG Commissioner Ricardo Abcede allege the following relevant facts:
On 9 November 1967, PTIC was incorporated and had since engaged in the business of investment
holdings. PTIC held 26,034,263 PLDT common shares, or 13.847 percent of the total PLDT
outstanding common shares. PHI, on the other hand, was incorporated in 1977, and became the
owner of 111,415 PTIC shares or 46.125 percent of the outstanding capital stock of PTIC by virtue of
three Deeds of Assignment executed by Ramon Cojuangco and Luis Tirso Rivilla. In 1986, the
111,415 PTIC shares held by PHI were sequestered by the PCGG, and subsequently declared by this
Court as part of the ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand Marcos. The sequestered PTIC
shares were reconveyed to the Republic of the Philippines in accordance with this Court's
decision[4] which became final and executory on 8 August 2006.
The Philippine Government decided to sell the 111,415 PTIC shares, which represent 6.4 percent of
the outstanding common shares of stock of PLDT, and designated the Inter-Agency Privatization
Council (IPC), composed of the Department of Finance and the PCGG, as the disposing entity. An
invitation to bid was published in seven different newspapers from 13 to 24 November 2006. On 20
November 2006, a pre-bid conference was held, and the original deadline for bidding scheduled on 4
December 2006 was reset to 8 December 2006. The extension was published in nine different
newspapers.
During the 8 December 2006 bidding, Parallax Capital Management LP emerged as the highest bidder
with a bid of P25,217,556,000. The government notified First Pacific, the majority owner of PTIC
shares, of the bidding results and gave First Pacific until 1 February 2007 to exercise its right of first
refusal in accordance with PTIC's Articles of Incorporation. First Pacific announced its intention to
match Parallax's bid.
On 31 January 2007, the House of Representatives (HR) Committee on Good Government conducted
a public hearing on the particulars of the then impending sale of the 111,415 PTIC shares.
Respondents Teves and Sevilla were among those who attended the public hearing. The HR
Committee Report No. 2270 concluded that: (a) the auction of the government's 111,415 PTIC
shares bore due diligence, transparency and conformity with existing legal procedures; and (b) First
Pacific's intended acquisition of the government's 111,415 PTIC shares resulting in First
Pacific's 100% ownership of PTIC will not violate the 40 percent constitutional limit on
foreign ownership of a public utility since PTIC holds only 13.847 percent of the total
outstanding common shares of PLDT.[5] On 28 February 2007, First Pacific completed the
acquisition of the 111,415 shares of stock of PTIC.
Respondent Manuel V. Pangilinan admits the following facts: (a) the IPC conducted a public bidding
for the sale of 111,415 PTIC shares or 46 percent of the outstanding capital stock of PTIC (the
remaining 54 percent of PTIC shares was already owned by First Pacific and its affiliates); (b)
Parallax offered the highest bid amounting to P25,217,556,000; (c) pursuant to the right of first
refusal in favor of PTIC and its shareholders granted in PTIC's Articles of Incorporation, MPAH, a First
Pacific affiliate, exercised its right of first refusal by matching the highest bid offered for PTIC shares
on 13 February 2007; and (d) on 28 February 2007, the sale was consummated when MPAH paid IPC
P25,217,556,000 and the government delivered the certificates for the 111,415 PTIC shares.
Respondent Pangilinan denies the other allegations of facts of petitioner.
On 28 February 2007, petitioner filed the instant petition for prohibition, injunction, declaratory relief,
and declaration of nullity of sale of the 111,415 PTIC shares. Petitioner claims, among others, that
the sale of the 111,415 PTIC shares would result in an increase in First Pacific's common
shareholdings in PLDT from 30.7 percent to 37 percent, and this, combined with Japanese NTT
DoCoMo's common shareholdings in PLDT, would result to a total foreign common shareholdings in
PLDT of 51.56 percent which is over the 40 percent constitutional limit.[6][ ]Petitioner asserts:
If and when the sale is completed, First Pacific's equity in PLDT will go up from 30.7 percent to 37.0
percent of its common - or voting- stockholdings, x x x. Hence, the consummation of the sale will put
the two largest foreign investors in PLDT - First Pacific and Japan's NTT DoCoMo, which is the world's
largest wireless telecommunications firm, owning 51.56 percent of PLDT common equity. x x x With
the completion of the sale, data culled from the official website of the New York Stock Exchange
(www.nyse.com) showed that those foreign entities, which own at least five percent of common
equity, will collectively own 81.47 percent of PLDT's common equity. x x x
x x x as the annual disclosure reports, also referred to as Form 20-K reports x x x which PLDT
submitted to the New York Stock Exchange for the period 2003-2005, revealed that First Pacific and
several other foreign entities breached the constitutional limit of 40 percent ownership as early as
2003. x x x"[7]
Petitioner raises the following issues: (1) whether the consummation of the then impending sale of
111,415 PTIC shares to First Pacific violates the constitutional limit on foreign ownership of a public
utility; (2) whether public respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing the sale of
the 111,415 PTIC shares to First Pacific; and (3) whether the sale of common shares to foreigners in
excess of 40 percent of the entire subscribed common capital stock violates the constitutional limit on
foreign ownership of a public utility.[8]
On 13 August 2007, Pablito V. Sanidad and Arno V. Sanidad filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and
Admit Attached Petition-in-Intervention. In the Resolution of 28 August 2007, the Court granted the
motion and noted the Petition-in-Intervention.
Petitioners-in-intervention "join petitioner Wilson Gamboa x x x in seeking, among others, to enjoin

and/or nullify the sale by respondents of the 111,415 PTIC shares to First Pacific or assignee."
Petitioners-in-intervention claim that, as PLDT subscribers, they have a "stake in the outcome of the
controversy x x x where the Philippine Government is completing the sale of government owned
assets in [PLDT], unquestionably a public utility, in violation of the nationality restrictions of the
Philippine Constitution."
The Issue
This Court is not a trier of facts. Factual questions such as those raised by petitioner,[9] which
indisputably demand a thorough examination of the evidence of the parties, are generally beyond
this Court's jurisdiction. Adhering to this well-settled principle, the Court shall confine the resolution
of the instant controversy solely on the threshold and purely legal issue of whether the term
"capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers to the total common shares only or to the
total outstanding capital stock (combined total of common and non-voting preferred shares) of PLDT,
a public utility.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is partly meritorious.
Petition for declaratory relief

treated as petition for mandamus
At the outset, petitioner is faced with a procedural barrier. Among the remedies petitioner seeks,
only the petition for prohibition is within the original jurisdiction of this court, which however is not
exclusive but is concurrent with the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals. The actions for
declaratory relief,[10] injunction, and annulment of sale are not embraced within the original
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. On this ground alone, the petition could have been dismissed
outright.
While direct resort to this Court may be justified in a petition for prohibition,[11] the Court shall
nevertheless refrain from discussing the grounds in support of the petition for prohibition since on 28
February 2007, the questioned sale was consummated when MPAH paid IPC P25,217,556,000 and
the government delivered the certificates for the 111,415 PTIC shares.
However, since the threshold and purely legal issue on the definition of the term "capital" in Section
11, Article XII of the Constitution has far-reaching implications to the national economy, the Court
treats the petition for declaratory relief as one for mandamus.[12]
In Salvacion v. Central Bank of the Philippines,[13] the Court treated the petition for declaratory relief
as one for mandamus considering the grave injustice that would result in the interpretation of a
banking law. In that case, which involved the crime of rape committed by a foreign tourist against a
Filipino minor and the execution of the final judgment in the civil case for damages on the tourist's
dollar deposit with a local bank, the Court declared Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960,
exempting foreign currency deposits from attachment, garnishment or any other order or process of
any court, inapplicable due to the peculiar circumstances of the case. The Court held that "injustice
would result especially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest like accused x x x" that would
"negate Article 10 of the Civil Code which provides that ìn case of doubt in the interpretation or
application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.'"
The Court therefore required respondents Central Bank of the Philippines, the local bank, and the
accused to comply with the writ of execution issued in the civil case for damages and to release the
dollar deposit of the accused to satisfy the judgment.
In Alliance of Government Workers v. Minister of Labor,[14] the Court similarly brushed aside the
procedural infirmity of the petition for declaratory relief and treated the same as one for mandamus.
In Alliance, the issue was whether the government unlawfully excluded petitioners, who were
government employees, from the enjoyment of rights to which they were entitled under the law.
Specifically, the question was: "Are the branches, agencies, subdivisions, and instrumentalities of the
Government, including government owned or controlled corporations included among the four
èmployers' under Presidential Decree No. 851 which are required to pay their employees x x x a
thirteenth (13th) month pay x x x ?" The Constitutional principle involved therein affected all
government employees, clearly justifying a relaxation of the technical rules of procedure, and
certainly requiring the interpretation of the assailed presidential decree.
In short, it is well-settled that this Court may treat a petition for declaratory relief as one for
mandamus if the issue involved has far-reaching implications. As this Court held in Salvacion:
The Court has no original and exclusive jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief. However,
exceptions to this rule have been recognized. Thus, where the petition has far-reaching
implications and raises questions that should be resolved, it may be treated as one for
mandamus.[15] (Emphasis supplied)
In the present case, petitioner seeks primarily the interpretation of the term "capital" in Section 11,
Article XII of the Constitution. He prays that this Court declare that the term "capital" refers to
common shares only, and that such shares constitute "the sole basis in determining foreign equity in
a public utility." Petitioner further asks this Court to declare any ruling inconsistent with such
interpretation unconstitutional.
The interpretation of the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution has far-reaching
implications to the national economy. In fact, a resolution of this issue will determine whether
Filipinos are masters, or second class citizens, in their own country. What is at stake here is whether
Filipinos or foreigners will have effective control of the national economy. Indeed, if ever there is a
legal issue that has far-reaching implications to the entire nation, and to future generations of
Filipinos, it is the threshhold legal issue presented in this case.
The Court first encountered the issue on the definition of the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII
of the Constitution in the case of Fernandez v. Cojuangco, docketed as G.R. No. 157360.[16] That
case involved the same public utility (PLDT) and substantially the same private respondents. Despite
the importance and novelty of the constitutional issue raised therein and despite the fact that the
petition involved a purely legal question, the Court declined to resolve the case on the merits, and
instead denied the same for disregarding the hierarchy of courts.[17] There, petitioner Fernandez
assailed on a pure question of law the Regional Trial Court's Decision of 21 February 2003 via a
petition for review under Rule 45. The Court's Resolution, denying the petition, became final on 21
December 2004.
The instant petition therefore presents the Court with another opportunity to finally settle this purely
legal issue which is of transcendental importance to the national economy and a fundamental
requirement to a faithful adherence to our Constitution. The Court must forthwith seize such
opportunity, not only for the benefit of the litigants, but more significantly for the benefit of the
entire Filipino people, to ensure, in the words of the Constitution, "a self-reliant and independent
national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos."[18] Besides, in the light of vague and
confusing positions taken by government agencies on this purely legal issue, present and future
foreign investors in this country deserve, as a matter of basic fairness, a categorical ruling from this
Court on the extent of their participation in the capital of public utilities and other nationalized
businesses.
Despite its far-reaching implications to the national economy, this purely legal issue has remained
unresolved for over 75 years since the 1935 Constitution. There is no reason for this Court to evade
this ever recurring fundamental issue and delay again defining the term "capital," which appears not
only in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution, but also in Section 2, Article XII on co-production
and joint venture agreements for the development of our natural resources,[19] in Section 7, Article
XII on ownership of private lands,[20] in Section 10, Article XII on the reservation of certain
investments to Filipino citizens,[21] in Section 4(2), Article XIV on the ownership of educational
institutions,[22] and in Section 11(2), Article XVI on the ownership of advertising companies.[23]
Petitioner has locus standi
There is no dispute that petitioner is a stockholder of PLDT. As such, he has the right to question the
subject sale, which he claims to violate the nationality requirement prescribed in Section 11, Article
XII of the Constitution. If the sale indeed violates the Constitution, then there is a possibility that
PLDT's franchise could be revoked, a dire consequence directly affecting petitioner's interest as a
stockholder.
More importantly, there is no question that the instant petition raises matters of transcendental
importance to the public. The fundamental and threshold legal issue in this case, involving the
national economy and the economic welfare of the Filipino people, far outweighs any perceived
impediment in the legal personality of the petitioner to bring this action.
In Chavez v. PCGG,[24] the Court upheld the right of a citizen to bring a suit on matters of
transcendental importance to the public, thus:
In TaÃ±ada v. Tuvera, the Court asserted that when the issue concerns a public right and the
object of mandamus is to obtain the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded
as the real parties in interest; and because it is sufficient that petitioner is a citizen and as
such is interested in the execution of the laws, he need not show that he has any legal or
special interest in the result of the action. In the aforesaid case, the petitioners sought to
enforce their right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right then recognized in Section 6,
Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, in connection with the rule that laws in order to be valid and
enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated. In ruling
for the petitioners' legal standing, the Court declared that the right they sought to be enforced ìs a
public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land.'
Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, while reiterating TaÃ±ada, further declared that `when a
mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal
interest is satisfied by the mere fact that petitioner is a citizen and, therefore, part of the
general `public' which possesses the right.'
Further, in Albano v. Reyes, we said that while expenditure of public funds may not have been
involved under the questioned contract for the development, management and operation of the
Manila International Container Terminal, `public interest [was] definitely involved considering
the important role [of the subject contract] . . . in the economic development of the
country and the magnitude of the financial consideration involved.' We concluded that, as a
consequence, the disclosure provision in the Constitution would constitute sufficient authority for
upholding the petitioner's standing. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, since the instant petition, brought by a citizen, involves matters of transcendental public
importance, the petitioner has the requisite locus standi.
Definition of the Term "Capital" in

Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
Section 11, Article XII (National Economy and Patrimony) of the 1987 Constitution mandates the
Filipinization of public utilities, to wit:
public utilities by the general public. The participation of foreign investors in the governing body of
any public utility enterprise shall be limited to their proportionate share in its capital, and all the
executive and managing officers of such corporation or association must be citizens of the
Philippines. (Emphasis supplied)
The above provision substantially reiterates Section 5, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution, thus:
associations organized under the laws of the Philippines at least sixty per centum of the
capital of which is owned by such citizens, nor shall such franchise, certificate, or authorization
be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years. Neither shall any such franchise or
right be granted except under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or
repeal by the National Assembly when the public interest so requires. The State shall encourage
equity participation in public utilities by the general public. The participation of foreign investors in
the governing body of any public utility enterprise shall be limited to their proportionate share in the
capital thereof. (Emphasis supplied)
The foregoing provision in the 1973 Constitution reproduced Section 8, Article XIV of the 1935
Constitution, viz:
other entities organized under the laws of the Philippines sixty per centum of the capital of
which is owned by citizens of the Philippines, nor shall such franchise, certificate, or
authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years. No franchise or right
shall be granted to any individual, firm, or corporation, except under the condition that it shall be
subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress when the public interest so requires.
(Emphasis supplied)
Father Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., a leading member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, reminds us
that the Filipinization provision in the 1987 Constitution is one of the products of the spirit of
nationalism which gripped the 1935 Constitutional Convention.[25] The 1987 Constitution "provides
for the Filipinization of public utilities by requiring that any form of authorization for the operation of
public utilities should be granted only to `citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations
organized under the laws of the Philippines at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by
such citizens.' The provision is [an express] recognition of the sensitive and vital position of
public utilities both in the national economy and for national security."[26] The evident
purpose of the citizenship requirement is to prevent aliens from assuming control of public utilities,
which may be inimical to the national interest.[27] This specific provision explicitly reserves to Filipino
citizens control of public utilities, pursuant to an overriding economic goal of the 1987 Constitution:
to "conserve and develop our patrimony"[28] and ensure "a self-reliant and independent national
economy effectively controlled by Filipinos."[29]
Any citizen or juridical entity desiring to operate a public utility must therefore meet the minimum
nationality requirement prescribed in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution. Hence, for a
corporation to be granted authority to operate a public utility, at least 60 percent of its "capital" must
be owned by Filipino citizens.
The crux of the controversy is the definition of the term "capital." Does the term "capital" in Section
11, Article XII of the Constitution refer to common shares or to the total outstanding capital stock
(combined total of common and non-voting preferred shares)?
Petitioner submits that the 40 percent foreign equity limitation in domestic public utilities refers only
to common shares because such shares are entitled to vote and it is through voting that control over
a corporation is exercised. Petitioner posits that the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the
Constitution refers to "the ownership of common capital stock subscribed and outstanding, which
class of shares alone, under the corporate set-up of PLDT, can vote and elect members of the board
of directors." It is undisputed that PLDT's non-voting preferred shares are held mostly by Filipino
citizens.[30] This arose from Presidential Decree No. 217,[31] issued on 16 June 1973 by then President
Ferdinand Marcos, requiring every applicant of a PLDT telephone line to subscribe to non-voting
preferred shares to pay for the investment cost of installing the telephone line.[32]
Petitioners-in-intervention basically reiterate petitioner's arguments and adopt petitioner's definition

of the term "capital."[33] Petitioners-in-intervention allege that "the approximate foreign ownership of
common capital stock of PLDT x x x already amounts to at least 63.54% of the total outstanding
common stock," which means that foreigners exercise significant control over PLDT, patently
violating the 40 percent foreign equity limitation in public utilities prescribed by the Constitution.
Respondents, on the other hand, do not offer any definition of the term "capital" in Section 11,
Article XII of the Constitution. More importantly, private respondents Nazareno and Pangilinan of
PLDT do not dispute that more than 40 percent of the common shares of PLDT are held by foreigners.
In particular, respondent Nazareno's Memorandum, consisting of 73 pages, harps mainly on the

procedural infirmities of the petition and the supposed violation of the due process rights of the
"affected foreign common shareholders." Respondent Nazareno does not deny petitioner's allegation
of foreigners' dominating the common shareholdings of PLDT. Nazareno stressed mainly that the
petition "seeks to divest foreign common shareholders purportedly exceeding 40% of the
total common shareholdings in PLDT of their ownership over their shares." Thus, "the
foreign natural and juridical PLDT shareholders must be impleaded in this suit so that they can be
heard."[34] Essentially, Nazareno invokes denial of due process on behalf of the foreign common
shareholders.
While Nazareno does not introduce any definition of the term "capital," he states that "among the
factual assertions that need to be established to counter petitioner's allegations is the
uniform interpretation by government agencies (such as the SEC), institutions and
corporations (such as the Philippine National Oil Company-Energy Development
Corporation or PNOC-EDC) of including both preferred shares and common shares in
"controlling interest" in view of testing compliance with the 40% constitutional limitation
on foreign ownership in public utilities."[35]
Similarly, respondent Manuel V. Pangilinan does not define the term "capital" in Section 11, Article
XII of the Constitution. Neither does he refute petitioner's claim of foreigners holding more than 40
percent of PLDT's common shares. Instead, respondent Pangilinan focuses on the procedural flaws of
the petition and the alleged violation of the due process rights of foreigners. Respondent Pangilinan
emphasizes in his Memorandum (1) the absence of this Court's jurisdiction over the petition; (2)
petitioner's lack of standing; (3) mootness of the petition; (4) non-availability of declaratory relief;
and (5) the denial of due process rights. Moreover, respondent Pangilinan alleges that the issue
should be whether "owners of shares in PLDT as well as owners of shares in companies holding
shares in PLDT may be required to relinquish their shares in PLDT and in those companies without
any law requiring them to surrender their shares and also without notice and trial."
Respondent Pangilinan further asserts that "Section 11, [Article XII of the Constitution]
imposes no nationality requirement on the shareholders of the utility company as a
condition for keeping their shares in the utility company." According to him, "Section 11 does
not authorize taking one person's property (the shareholder's stock in the utility company) on the
basis of another party's alleged failure to satisfy a requirement that is a condition only for that other
party's retention of another piece of property (the utility company being at least 60% Filipino-owned
to keep its franchise)."[36]
The OSG, representing public respondents Secretary Margarito Teves, Undersecretary John P. Sevilla,
Commissioner Ricardo Abcede, and Chairman Fe Barin, is likewise silent on the definition of the term
"capital." In its Memorandum[37] dated 24 September 2007, the OSG also limits its discussion on the
supposed procedural defects of the petition, i.e. lack of standing, lack of jurisdiction, non-inclusion of
interested parties, and lack of basis for injunction. The OSG does not present any definition or
interpretation of the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution. The OSG contends
that "the petition actually partakes of a collateral attack on PLDT's franchise as a public utility," which
in effect requires a "full-blown trial where all the parties in interest are given their day in court."[38]
Respondent Francisco Ed Lim, impleaded as President and Chief Executive Officer of the Philippine
Stock Exchange (PSE), does not also define the term "capital" and seeks the dismissal of the petition
on the following grounds: (1) failure to state a cause of action against Lim; (2) the PSE allegedly
implemented its rules and required all listed companies, including PLDT, to make proper and timely
disclosures; and (3) the reliefs prayed for in the petition would adversely impact the stock market.
In the earlier case of Fernandez v. Cojuangco, petitioner Fernandez who claimed to be a stockholder
of record of PLDT, contended that the term "capital" in the 1987 Constitution refers to shares entitled
to vote or the common shares. Fernandez explained thus:
The forty percent (40%) foreign equity limitation in public utilities prescribed by the Constitution
refers to ownership of shares of stock entitled to vote, i.e., common shares, considering that it is
through voting that control is being exercised. x x x
Obviously, the intent of the framers of the Constitution in imposing limitations and restrictions on
fully nationalized and partially nationalized activities is for Filipino nationals to be always in control of
the corporation undertaking said activities. Otherwise, if the Trial Court's ruling upholding
respondents' arguments were to be given credence, it would be possible for the ownership structure
of a public utility corporation to be divided into one percent (1%) common stocks and ninety-nine
percent (99%) preferred stocks. Following the Trial Court's ruling adopting respondents' arguments,
the common shares can be owned entirely by foreigners thus creating an absurd situation wherein
foreigners, who are supposed to be minority shareholders, control the public utility corporation.
xxxx
Thus, the 40% foreign ownership limitation should be interpreted to apply to both the beneficial
ownership and the controlling interest.
xxxx
Clearly, therefore, the forty percent (40%) foreign equity limitation in public utilities prescribed by
the Constitution refers to ownership of shares of stock entitled to vote, i.e., common shares.
Furthermore, ownership of record of shares will not suffice but it must be shown that the legal and
beneficial ownership rests in the hands of Filipino citizens. Consequently, in the case of petitioner
PLDT, since it is already admitted that the voting interests of foreigners which would gain entry to
petitioner PLDT by the acquisition of SMART shares through the Questioned Transactions is
equivalent to 82.99%, and the nominee arrangements between the foreign principals and the Filipino
owners is likewise admitted, there is, therefore, a violation of Section 11, Article XII of the
Constitution.
Parenthetically, the Opinions dated February 15, 1988 and April 14, 1987 cited by the Trial Court to
support the proposition that the meaning of the word "capital" as used in Section 11, Article XII of
the Constitution allegedly refers to the sum total of the shares subscribed and paid-in by the
shareholder and it allegedly is immaterial how the stock is classified, whether as common or
preferred, cannot stand in the face of a clear legislative policy as stated in the FIA which took effect
in 1991 or way after said opinions were rendered, and as clarified by the above-quoted Amendments.
In this regard, suffice it to state that as between the law and an opinion rendered by an
administrative agency, the law indubitably prevails. Moreover, said Opinions are merely advisory and
cannot prevail over the clear intent of the framers of the Constitution.
In the same vein, the SEC's construction of Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution is at best
merely advisory for it is the courts that finally determine what a law means.[39]
On the other hand, respondents therein, Antonio O. Cojuangco, Manuel V. Pangilinan, Carlos A.
Arellano, Helen Y. Dee, Magdangal B. Elma, Mariles Cacho-Romulo, Fr. Bienvenido F. Nebres, Ray C.
Espinosa, Napoleon L. Nazareno, Albert F. Del Rosario, and Orlando B. Vea, argued that the term
"capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution includes preferred shares since the Constitution
does not distinguish among classes of stock, thus:
16. The Constitution applies its foreign ownership limitation on the corporation's "capital," without
distinction as to classes of shares. x x x
In this connection, the Corporation Code - which was already in force at the time the present (1987)
Constitution was drafted - defined outstanding capital stock as follows:
Section 137. Outstanding capital stock defined. - The term "outstanding capital stock", as used in this
Code, means the total shares of stock issued under binding subscription agreements to subscribers or
stockholders, whether or not fully or partially paid, except treasury shares.
Section 137 of the Corporation Code also does not distinguish between common and preferred
shares, nor exclude either class of shares, in determining the outstanding capital stock (the "capital")
of a corporation. Consequently, petitioner's suggestion to reckon PLDT's foreign equity only on the
basis of PLDT's outstanding common shares is without legal basis. The language of the Constitution
should be understood in the sense it has in common use.
xxxx
17. But even assuming that resort to the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission is necessary,
there is nothing in the Record of the Constitutional Commission (Vol. III) - which petitioner
misleadingly cited in the Petition x x x - which supports petitioner's view that only common shares
should form the basis for computing a public utility's foreign equity.
xxxx
18. In addition, the SEC - the government agency primarily responsible for implementing the
Corporation Code, and which also has the responsibility of ensuring compliance with the
Constitution's foreign equity restrictions as regards nationalized activities x x x - has categorically
ruled that both common and preferred shares are properly considered in determining outstanding
capital stock and the nationality composition thereof.[40]
We agree with petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention. The term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII
of the Constitution refers only to shares of stock entitled to vote in the election of directors, and thus
in the present case only to common shares,[41] and not to the total outstanding capital stock
comprising both common and non-voting preferred shares.
The Corporation Code of the Philippines[42] classifies shares as common or preferred, thus:
Sec. 6. Classification of shares. - The shares of stock of stock corporations may be divided into
classes or series of shares, or both, any of which classes or series of shares may have such rights,
privileges or restrictions as may be stated in the articles of incorporation: Provided, That no share
may be deprived of voting rights except those classified and issued as "preferred" or
"redeemable" shares, unless otherwise provided in this Code: Provided, further, That there
shall always be a class or series of shares which have complete voting rights. Any or all of the shares
or series of shares may have a par value or have no par value as may be provided for in the articles
of incorporation: Provided, however, That banks, trust companies, insurance companies, public
utilities, and building and loan associations shall not be permitted to issue no-par value shares of
stock.
Preferred shares of stock issued by any corporation may be given preference in the distribution of the
assets of the corporation in case of liquidation and in the distribution of dividends, or such other
preferences as may be stated in the articles of incorporation which are not violative of the provisions
of this Code: Provided, That preferred shares of stock may be issued only with a stated par value.
The Board of Directors, where authorized in the articles of incorporation, may fix the terms and
conditions of preferred shares of stock or any series thereof: Provided, That such terms and
conditions shall be effective upon the filing of a certificate thereof with the Securities and Exchange
Commission.
Shares of capital stock issued without par value shall be deemed fully paid and non-assessable and
the holder of such shares shall not be liable to the corporation or to its creditors in respect thereto:
Provided; That shares without par value may not be issued for a consideration less than the value of
five (P5.00) pesos per share: Provided, further, That the entire consideration received by the
corporation for its no-par value shares shall be treated as capital and shall not be available for
distribution as dividends.
A corporation may, furthermore, classify its shares for the purpose of insuring compliance with
constitutional or legal requirements.
Except as otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation and stated in the certificate of stock,
each share shall be equal in all respects to every other share.
Where the articles of incorporation provide for non-voting shares in the cases allowed by this Code,
the holders of such shares shall nevertheless be entitled to vote on the following matters:

corporate property;
and
8. Dissolution of the corporation.
Except as provided in the immediately preceding paragraph, the vote necessary to approve a
particular corporate act as provided in this Code shall be deemed to refer only to stocks with voting
rights.
Indisputably, one of the rights of a stockholder is the right to participate in the control or
management of the corporation.[43] This is exercised through his vote in the election of directors
because it is the board of directors that controls or manages the corporation.[44] In the absence of
provisions in the articles of incorporation denying voting rights to preferred shares, preferred shares
have the same voting rights as common shares. However, preferred shareholders are often excluded
from any control, that is, deprived of the right to vote in the election of directors and on other
matters, on the theory that the preferred shareholders are merely investors in the corporation for
income in the same manner as bondholders.[45] In fact, under the Corporation Code only preferred or
redeemable shares can be deprived of the right to vote.[46] Common shares cannot be deprived of the
right to vote in any corporate meeting, and any provision in the articles of incorporation restricting
the right of common shareholders to vote is invalid.[47]
Considering that common shares have voting rights which translate to control, as opposed to
preferred shares which usually have no voting rights, the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of
the Constitution refers only to common shares. However, if the preferred shares also have the right
to vote in the election of directors, then the term "capital" shall include such preferred shares
because the right to participate in the control or management of the corporation is exercised through
the right to vote in the election of directors. In short, the term "capital" in Section 11, Article
XII of the Constitution refers only to shares of stock that can vote in the election of
directors.
This interpretation is consistent with the intent of the framers of the Constitution to place in the
hands of Filipino citizens the control and management of public utilities. As revealed in the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, "capital" refers to the voting stock or controlling
interest of a corporation, to wit:
equity; namely, 60-40 in Section 3, 60-40 in Section 9 and 2/3-1/3 in Section 15.
paid-up capital stock of a corporation"? Will the Committee please enlighten me on this?
Center who provided us a draft. The phrase that is contained here which we adopted from the
UP draft is "60 percent of voting stock."
MR. VILLEGAS. Yes.[48]
xxxx
MR. AZCUNA. May I be clarified as to that portion that was accepted by the Committee.
MR. VILLEGAS. Yes.
owned by citizens.
MR. AZCUNA. But the control can be with the foreigners even if they are the minority. Let
us say 40 percent of the capital is owned by them, but it is the voting capital, whereas, the
Filipinos own the nonvoting shares. So we can have a situation where the corporation is
controlled by foreigners despite being the minority because they have the voting capital.
That is the anomaly that would result here.
MR. BENGZON. No, the reason we eliminated the word "stock" as stated in the 1973 and
1935 Constitutions is that according to Commissioner Rodrigo, there are associations that
do not have stocks. That is why we say "CAPITAL."
MR. BENGZON. In the case of stock corporations, it is assumed.[49] (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, 60 percent of the "capital" assumes, or should result in, "controlling interest" in the
corporation. Reinforcing this interpretation of the term "capital," as referring to controlling interest or
shares entitled to vote, is the definition of a "Philippine national" in the Foreign Investments Act of
1991,[50] to wit:
SEC. 3. Definitions. - As used in this Act:
a. The term "Philippine national" shall mean a citizen of the Philippines; or a domestic partnership or
laws of the Philippines of which at least sixty percent (60%) of the capital stock
corporation organized abroad and registered as doing business in the Philippines under the
Corporation Code of which one hundred percent (100%) of the capital stock outstanding and entitled
to vote is wholly owned by Filipinos or a trustee of funds for pension or other employee retirement or
fund will accrue to the benefit of Philippine nationals: Provided, That where a corporation and its non-
Filipino stockholders own stocks in a Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) registered
enterprise, at least sixty percent (60%) of the capital stock outstanding and entitled to vote of each
of both corporations must be owned and held by citizens of the Philippines and at least sixty percent
(60%) of the members of the Board of Directors of each of both corporations must be citizens of the
Philippines, in order that the corporation, shall be considered a "Philippine national." (Emphasis
supplied)
In explaining the definition of a "Philippine national," the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the
Foreign Investments Act of 1991 provide:
b. "Philippine national" shall mean a citizen of the Philippines or a domestic partnership or association
wholly owned by the citizens of the Philippines; or a corporation organized under the laws of the
Philippines of which at least sixty percent [60%] of the capital stock outstanding and
entitled to vote is owned and held by citizens of the Philippines; or a trustee of funds for
pension or other employee retirement or separation benefits, where the trustee is a Philippine
national and at least sixty percent [60%] of the fund will accrue to the benefit of the Philippine
nationals; Provided, that where a corporation its non-Filipino stockholders own stocks in a Securities
and Exchange Commission [SEC] registered enterprise, at least sixty percent [60%] of the capital
stock outstanding and entitled to vote of both corporations must be owned and held by citizens of the
Philippines and at least sixty percent [60%] of the members of the Board of Directors of each of both
corporation must be citizens of the Philippines, in order that the corporation shall be considered a
Philippine national. The control test shall be applied for this purpose.
Compliance with the required Filipino ownership of a corporation shall be determined on

the basis of outstanding capital stock whether fully paid or not, but only such stocks which
are generally entitled to vote are considered.
For stocks to be deemed owned and held by Philippine citizens or Philippine nationals,
mere legal title is not enough to meet the required Filipino equity. Full beneficial
ownership of the stocks, coupled with appropriate voting rights is essential. Thus, stocks,
the voting rights of which have been assigned or transferred to aliens cannot be
considered held by Philippine citizens or Philippine nationals.
Individuals or juridical entities not meeting the aforementioned qualifications are

considered as non-Philippine nationals. (Emphasis supplied)
Mere legal title is insufficient to meet the 60 percent Filipino-owned "capital" required in the
Constitution. Full beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital stock, coupled with 60
percent of the voting rights, is required. The legal and beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the
outstanding capital stock must rest in the hands of Filipino nationals in accordance with the
constitutional mandate. Otherwise, the corporation is "considered as non-Philippine national[s]."
Under Section 10, Article XII of the Constitution, Congress may "reserve to citizens of the Philippines
or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such
citizens, or such higher percentage as Congress may prescribe, certain areas of investments." Thus,
in numerous laws Congress has reserved certain areas of investments to Filipino citizens or to
corporations at least sixty percent of the "capital" of which is owned by Filipino citizens. Some of
these laws are: (1) Regulation of Award of Government Contracts or R.A. No. 5183; (2) Philippine
Inventors Incentives Act or R.A. No. 3850; (3) Magna Carta for Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises
or R.A. No. 6977; (4) Philippine Overseas Shipping Development Act or R.A. No. 7471; (5) Domestic
Shipping Development Act of 2004 or R.A. No. 9295; (6) Philippine Technology Transfer Act of 2009
or R.A. No. 10055; and (7) Ship Mortgage Decree or P.D. No. 1521. Hence, the term "capital" in
Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution is also used in the same context in numerous
laws reserving certain areas of investments to Filipino citizens.
To construe broadly the term "capital" as the total outstanding capital stock, including both common
and non-voting preferred shares, grossly contravenes the intent and letter of the Constitution that
the "State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by
Filipinos." A broad definition unjustifiably disregards who owns the all-important voting stock, which
necessarily equates to control of the public utility.
We shall illustrate the glaring anomaly in giving a broad definition to the term "capital." Let us
assume that a corporation has 100 common shares owned by foreigners and 1,000,000 non-voting
preferred shares owned by Filipinos, with both classes of share having a par value of one peso
(P1.00) per share. Under the broad definition of the term "capital," such corporation would be
In the example given, only the foreigners holding the common shares have voting rights in the
election of directors, even if they hold only 100 shares. The foreigners, with a minuscule equity of
less than 0.001 percent, exercise control over the public utility. On the other hand, the Filipinos,
holding more than 99.999 percent of the equity, cannot vote in the election of directors and hence,
have no control over the public utility. This starkly circumvents the intent of the framers of the
Constitution, as well as the clear language of the Constitution, to place the control of public utilities in
the hands of Filipinos. It also renders illusory the State policy of an independent national
economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.
The example given is not theoretical but can be found in the real world, and in fact exists in the
present case.
Holders of PLDT preferred shares are explicitly denied of the right to vote in the election of directors.
PLDT's Articles of Incorporation expressly state that "the holders of Serial Preferred Stock shall
not be entitled to vote at any meeting of the stockholders for the election of directors or
for any other purpose or otherwise participate in any action taken by the corporation or its
stockholders, or to receive notice of any meeting of stockholders."[51]
On the other hand, holders of common shares are granted the exclusive right to vote in the election
of directors. PLDT's Articles of Incorporation[52] state that "each holder of Common Capital Stock shall
have one vote in respect of each share of such stock held by him on all matters voted upon by the
stockholders, and the holders of Common Capital Stock shall have the exclusive right to vote
for the election of directors and for all other purposes."[53]
In short, only holders of common shares can vote in the election of directors, meaning only common
shareholders exercise control over PLDT. Conversely, holders of preferred shares, who have no
voting rights in the election of directors, do not have any control over PLDT. In fact, under PLDT's
Articles of Incorporation, holders of common shares have voting rights for all purposes, while holders
of preferred shares have no voting right for any purpose whatsoever.
It must be stressed, and respondents do not dispute, that foreigners hold a majority of the
common shares of PLDT. In fact, based on PLDT's 2010 General Information Sheet (GIS),[54] which is
a document required to be submitted annually to the Securities and Exchange
Commission,[55] foreigners hold 120,046,690 common shares of PLDT whereas Filipinos hold only
66,750,622 common shares.[56] In other words, foreigners hold 64.27% of the total number of
PLDT's common shares, while Filipinos hold only 35.73%. Since holding a majority of the common
shares equates to control, it is clear that foreigners exercise control over PLDT. Such amount of
control unmistakably exceeds the allowable 40 percent limit on foreign ownership of public utilities
expressly mandated in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution.
Moreover, the Dividend Declarations of PLDT for 2009,[57] as submitted to the SEC, shows that per
share the SIP[58] preferred shares earn a pittance in dividends compared to the common shares.
PLDT declared dividends for the common shares at P70.00 per share, while the declared dividends for
the preferred shares amounted to a measly P1.00 per share.[59] So the preferred shares not only
cannot vote in the election of directors, they also have very little and obviously negligible dividend
earning capacity compared to common shares.
As shown in PLDT's 2010 GIS,[60] as submitted to the SEC, the par value of PLDT common shares is
P5.00 per share, whereas the par value of preferred shares is P10.00 per share. In other words,
preferred shares have twice the par value of common shares but cannot elect directors and have only
1/70 of the dividends of common shares. Moreover, 99.44% of the preferred shares are owned by
Filipinos while foreigners own only a minuscule 0.56% of the preferred shares.[61] Worse, preferred
shares constitute 77.85% of the authorized capital stock of PLDT while common shares constitute
only 22.15%.[62] This undeniably shows that beneficial interest in PLDT is not with the non-voting
preferred shares but with the common shares, blatantly violating the constitutional requirement of 60
percent Filipino control and Filipino beneficial ownership in a public utility.
The legal and beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital stock must rest in the
hands of Filipinos in accordance with the constitutional mandate. Full beneficial ownership of 60
percent of the outstanding capital stock, coupled with 60 percent of the voting rights, is
constitutionally required for the State's grant of authority to operate a public utility. The undisputed
fact that the PLDT preferred shares, 99.44% owned by Filipinos, are non-voting and earn only 1/70
of the dividends that PLDT common shares earn, grossly violates the constitutional requirement of 60
percent Filipino control and Filipino beneficial ownership of a public utility.
In short, Filipinos hold less than 60 percent of the voting stock, and earn less than 60
percent of the dividends, of PLDT. This directly contravenes the express command in Section 11,
Article XII of the Constitution that "[n]o franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for
the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to x x x corporations x x x organized under
the laws of the Philippines, at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such
citizens x x x."
To repeat, (1) foreigners own 64.27% of the common shares of PLDT, which class of shares exercises
the sole right to vote in the election of directors, and thus exercise control over PLDT; (2) Filipinos
own only 35.73% of PLDT's common shares, constituting a minority of the voting stock, and thus do
not exercise control over PLDT; (3) preferred shares, 99.44% owned by Filipinos, have no voting
rights; (4) preferred shares earn only 1/70 of the dividends that common shares earn;[63] (5)
preferred shares have twice the par value of common shares; and (6) preferred shares constitute
77.85% of the authorized capital stock of PLDT and common shares only 22.15%. This kind of
ownership and control of a public utility is a mockery of the Constitution.
Incidentally, the fact that PLDT common shares with a par value of P5.00 have a current stock
market value of P2,328.00 per share,[64] while PLDT preferred shares with a par value of P10.00 per
share have a current stock market value ranging from only P10.92 to P11.06 per share,[65] is a
glaring confirmation by the market that control and beneficial ownership of PLDT rest with the
common shares, not with the preferred shares.
Indisputably, construing the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution to include
both voting and non-voting shares will result in the abject surrender of our telecommunications
industry to foreigners, amounting to a clear abdication of the State's constitutional duty to limit
control of public utilities to Filipino citizens. Such an interpretation certainly runs counter to the
constitutional provision reserving certain areas of investment to Filipino citizens, such as the
exploitation of natural resources as well as the ownership of land, educational institutions and
advertising businesses. The Court should never open to foreign control what the Constitution has
expressly reserved to Filipinos for that would be a betrayal of the Constitution and of the national
interest. The Court must perform its solemn duty to defend and uphold the intent and letter of the
Constitution to ensure, in the words of the Constitution, "a self-reliant and independent national
economy effectively controlled by Filipinos."
Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution, like other provisions of the Constitution expressly
reserving to Filipinos specific areas of investment, such as the development of natural resources and
ownership of land, educational institutions and advertising business, is self-executing. There is no
need for legislation to implement these self-executing provisions of the Constitution. The rationale
why these constitutional provisions are self-executing was explained in Manila Prince Hotel v.
GSIS,[66] thus:
x x x Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a
constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-
executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-
executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the
fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been,
that --
. . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-
executing. . . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution
should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature
discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be
subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by
simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute. (Emphasis supplied)
In Manila Prince Hotel, even the Dissenting Opinion of then Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, later
Chief Justice, agreed that constitutional provisions are presumed to be self-executing. Justice Puno
stated:
Courts as a rule consider the provisions of the Constitution as self-executing, rather than as requiring
future legislation for their enforcement. The reason is not difficult to discern. For if they are not
treated as self-executing, the mandate of the fundamental law ratified by the sovereign
people can be easily ignored and nullified by Congress. Suffused with wisdom of the ages
is the unyielding rule that legislative actions may give breath to constitutional rights but
congressional inaction should not suffocate them.
Thus, we have treated as self-executing the provisions in the Bill of Rights on arrests, searches and
seizures, the rights of a person under custodial investigation, the rights of an accused, and the
privilege against self-incrimination. It is recognized that legislation is unnecessary to enable courts to
effectuate constitutional provisions guaranteeing the fundamental rights of life, liberty and the
protection of property. The same treatment is accorded to constitutional provisions forbidding the
taking or damaging of property for public use without just compensation. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, in numerous cases,[67] this Court, even in the absence of implementing legislation, applied
directly the provisions of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions limiting land ownership to Filipinos.
In Soriano v. Ong Hoo,[68] this Court ruled:
x x x As the Constitution is silent as to the effects or consequences of a sale by a citizen of his land
to an alien, and as both the citizen and the alien have violated the law, none of them should have a
recourse against the other, and it should only be the State that should be allowed to intervene and
determine what is to be done with the property subject of the violation. We have said that what the
State should do or could do in such matters is a matter of public policy, entirely beyond the scope of
judicial authority. (Dinglasan, et al. vs. Lee Bun Ting, et al., 6 G. R. No. L-5996, June 27,
1956.) While the legislature has not definitely decided what policy should be followed in
cases of violations against the constitutional prohibition, courts of justice cannot go
beyond by declaring the disposition to be null and void as violative of the Constitution. x x
x (Emphasis supplied)
To treat Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution as not self-executing would mean that since the
1935 Constitution, or over the last 75 years, not one of the constitutional provisions expressly
reserving specific areas of investments to corporations, at least 60 percent of the "capital" of which is
owned by Filipinos, was enforceable. In short, the framers of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions
miserably failed to effectively reserve to Filipinos specific areas of investment, like the operation by
corporations of public utilities, the exploitation by corporations of mineral resources, the ownership
by corporations of real estate, and the ownership of educational institutions. All the legislatures that
convened since 1935 also miserably failed to enact legislations to implement these vital constitutional
provisions that determine who will effectively control the national economy, Filipinos or foreigners.
This Court cannot allow such an absurd interpretation of the Constitution.
This Court has held that the SEC "has both regulatory and adjudicative functions."[69] Under its
regulatory functions, the SEC can be compelled by mandamus to perform its statutory duty when it
unlawfully neglects to perform the same. Under its adjudicative or quasi-judicial functions, the SEC
can be also be compelled by mandamus to hear and decide a possible violation of any law it
administers or enforces when it is mandated by law to investigate such violation.
Under Section 17(4)[70] of the Corporation Code, the SEC has the regulatory function to reject or
disapprove the Articles of Incorporation of any corporation where "the required percentage of
ownership of the capital stock to be owned by citizens of the Philippines has not been
complied with as required by existing laws or the Constitution." Thus, the SEC is the
government agency tasked with the statutory duty to enforce the nationality requirement prescribed
in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution on the ownership of public utilities. This Court, in a
petition for declaratory relief that is treated as a petition for mandamus as in the present case, can
direct the SEC to perform its statutory duty under the law, a duty that the SEC has apparently
unlawfully neglected to do based on the 2010 GIS that respondent PLDT submitted to the SEC.
Under Section 5(m) of the Securities Regulation Code,[71] the SEC is vested with the "power and
function" to "suspend or revoke, after proper notice and hearing, the franchise or certificate
of registration of corporations, partnerships or associations, upon any of the grounds
provided by law." The SEC is mandated under Section 5(d) of the same Code with the "power and
function" to "investigate x x x the activities of persons to ensure compliance" with the laws
and regulations that SEC administers or enforces. The GIS that all corporations are required to
submit to SEC annually should put the SEC on guard against violations of the nationality requirement
prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws. This Court can compel the SEC, in a petition for
declaratory relief that is treated as a petition for mandamus as in the present case, to hear and
decide a possible violation of Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution in view of the ownership
structure of PLDT's voting shares, as admitted by respondents and as stated in PLDT's 2010 GIS that
PLDT submitted to SEC.
WHEREFORE, we PARTLY GRANT the petition and rule that the term "capital" in Section 11, Article
XII of the 1987 Constitution refers only to shares of stock entitled to vote in the election of directors,
and thus in the present case only to common shares, and not to the total outstanding capital stock
(common and non-voting preferred shares). Respondent Chairperson of the Securities and Exchange
Commission is DIRECTED to apply this definition of the term "capital" in determining the extent of
allowable foreign ownership in respondent Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, and if there
is a violation of Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution, to impose the appropriate sanctions under
the law.
SO ORDERED.

Narra Vs Redmont and Gamboa Vs Teves Case

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SPECIAL THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 195580, January 28, 2015

VELASCO JR., J.:

The application of the Grandfather Rule in the

The Grandfather Rule implements the intent of

MR. VILLEGAS: That is right.

MR. NOLLEDO: Thank you.

MR. VILLEGAS: Yes, that is the understanding of the Committee.

By law, a mining lease may be granted only to a Filipino citizen, or to a corporation or

In emphasizing the twin requirements of “beneficial ownership” and “control” in determining

Application of the Grandfather

A doubt exists as to the extent of control and

Name Nationality Number of Amount Amount Paid

Name Nationality Number of Amount Amount Paid

Filipino participation in petitioner Tesoro: 40.01%

39.98% + .03% (shares of individual Filipino shareholders [SHs] in Tesoro)

Name Nationality Number of Amount Amount Paid

Name Nationality Number of Amount Amount Paid

Filipino participation in petitioner McArthur: 40.01%

66.67 (Filipino equity in Madridejos) x 59.97 (Madridejos’ share in McArthur) = 39.98%

39.98% + .03% (shares of individual Filipino SHs in McArthur)

Foreign participation in petitioner McArthur: 59.99%

33.33 (Foreign equity in Madridejos) x 59.97 (Madridejos’ share in McArthur) = 19.99%

Name Nationality Number of Amount Amount Paid

Name Nationality Number of Amount Amount Paid

Filipino participation in petitioner Narra: 39.64%

66.02 (Filipino equity in PLMDC) x 59.97 (PLMDC’s share in Narra) = 39.59%

39.59% + .05% (shares of individual Filipino SHs in McArthur)

Peralta, Mendoza, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.

23Otherwise known as the “Guidelines on Compliance with the Filipino-Foreign Ownership

24 492 Phil. 682 (2005).

26 Section 77 of RA 7942: chanRoblesvirtual Lawlib ra ry

(a) Disputes involving rights to mining areas;

The DENR Panel of Arbitrators had no competence to rule on the

(a) Disputes involving rights to mining areas;

On the applicability of the Grandfather Rule

Redmont engaged in blatant forum shopping

1. The DENR Panel of Arbitrators;

9 150 Phil. 547 (1972) [Per J. Reyes, J.B.L, En Banc].

35 Id. at 53-55. cralawred

G.R. No. 195580, April 21, 2014

VELASCO JR., J.:

We find the petition to be without merit.

This case not moot and academic

1.) There is a grave violation of the Constitution;

Conversion of MPSA applications to FTAA applications

SECTION 3. Definitions. – As used in this Act: chanRoblesvirtual Lawlib ra ry

MR. VILLEGAS: Yes. But we will be open to improvement of the phraseology.

Mr. BENNAGEN: Yes.

Thank you, Mr. Vice–President.

MR. VILLEGAS: That is right.

MR. VILLEGAS: That is right.

MR. NOLLEDO: Thank you.

With respect to an investment by one corporation in another corporation, say, a

MR. VILLEGAS: Yes, that is the understanding of the Committee.

MR. NOLLEDO: Therefore, we need additional Filipino capital?

MR. VILLEGAS: Yes.42 (emphasis supplied)

McArthur Mining, Inc.