8.12 Palisoc Vs Tamondong
8.12 Palisoc Vs Tamondong
8.12 Palisoc Vs Tamondong
Facts:
The present is an original petition presented in this court for the writ of mandamus to compel the
respondent judge to take jurisdiction of and to decide a certain election protest, which he had heretofore
dismissed, for the reason that he had no jurisdiction in the premises.
Ruling: No.
; MOTION OF PROTEST, MANNER OF SERVICE; GENERAL RULE. — The Courts of First Instance in election
protest cases are courts of special jurisdiction, and the legislature has full power and authority to provide
the various steps and methods by which said courts acquire jurisdiction. Service of notice, petition, or any
other initial paper in a contested election case, is a matter regulated by statute and the general rule is,
that the statutory requirements must be strictly complied with and that the return of the officer must
show such compliance before the court acquires jurisdiction.
Personal Notes:
-Notice should not exceed 20 days from the time of the filing of the same (case at bar exceed)
- said notice shall be served by the sheriff: Case at bar (Yes served by sheriff base on the agreement):
Per aggreement: (a) that the notice of protest was served upon Enrico Velasquez, Feliciano Tamondong,
and Emiliano Barlaan by persons who were neither the sheriff nor deputy sheriff, and (b) that the notice
of the motion of protest was served upon Feliciano Tamondong, Emiliano Barlaan, and Alejandro Ferrer
by a delegate of the sheriff on the 14th day of July, 1922, and upon Enrico Velasquez, and Alejandro Ferrer,
appeared for himself or by an attorney in court until the 20th day of July, 1922)
Book:
The General Rule is that Statutory requirements by which courts or tribunals acquire jurisdiction to hear
and decide particular actions must be strictly complied with before the courts or tribunals can have
authority to proceed. Hence, Statutes prescribing the various steps and methods to be taken for
acquicition of jurisdiction by the courts or tribunals over certain matters are considered mandatory.
From an examination of the first Election Law, adopted in January, 1907 (Act No. 1582), as well as all of
the amendments thereto (Acts Nos. 2170, 2657, and 2711), it will be found that they provided that "All
proceedings under this section (section 27, Act No. 1582), shall be upon motion with notice of not to
exceed twenty days," but said various acts contained no provision concerning the method of giving such
notice. That provision of law continued in force, and all of the amendments from January 9, 1907, to
March 9, 1922, when the amendment above quoted was made. The first paragraph of section 45 of Act
No. 3030 provided that: "Proceedings for the judicial contest of an election shall be upon motion with
notice of not to exceed twenty days, etc." Paragraph 2, however, of said section provides that said notice
shall be served by the sheriff. The fact that the Legislature permitted the original method of giving notice
to remain in force for a period of more than fifteen years, and then amended it by providing the person
by whom the notice shall be given, is, in our judgment, very significant. The Legislature permitted the
original provisions to continue for a time sufficient to enable it to determine whether it was wise or not.
The Legislature evidently believed that the method of giving notice under the former laws was not
satisfactory, and therefore amended the law as above indicated.
It might be argued, however, that inasmuch as the respondents or protestees were notified by the sheriff
of the said motion of protest on the 14th and 15th days of July (as per agreement), that the court thereby
acquired jurisdiction. It will be remembered, however, that the motion of protest was presented on the
19th day of June, 1922, and that the law requires that the notice of said motion shall be given within a
period "not to exceed twenty days to all registered candidates voted for" from the time of the filing of the
motion of protest. Counting twenty days from the 19th day of June 1922, it will be seen that the twenty
days within which the notice should have been given, expired on the 10th day of July. Therefore, the
notice give on the 14th and 15th days of July was not given within the twenty days required by the law.
(Par. 1, section 45, Act No. 3030.)
We have held in numerous decisions that if the notice of the motion of protest is not given within a period
of twenty days from the time of the filing of the same, the court acquired no jurisdiction to hear and
determine said motion. The service of the notice of protest upon all of the registered candidates voted
for, as required by law, is one of the steps necessary to give the court jurisdiction to proceed. (Navarro v.
Veloso, 23 Phil., 625; Topacio v. Paredes, 23 Phil., 238; Navarro v. Jimenez, 23 Phil., 557; Ocampo v. Mina
and Arejola, 41 Phil., 880, 884, 885.)
From all of the foregoing it clearly appears that the protestees were not served with the notice of the
motion of protest in the manner prescribed, nor within the period required by the law; and, inasmuch as
a compliance with the law in both regards is necessary to give the court jurisdiction, it must follow that
the court did not acquire jurisdiction in the premises, and it therefore committed no error in dismissing
the protest. Therefore the petition herein is hereby denied, with costs. So ordered.