Umbrella Abstract
Umbrella Abstract
Prevention Services.
Abstract—Defending against distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks in the Internet is a
fundamental problem. However, recent industrial interviews with over 100 security experts from
more than ten industry segments indicate that DDoS problems have not been fully addressed.
The reasons are twofold. On one hand, many academic proposals that are provably secure
witness little real-world deployment. On the other hand, the operation model for existing DDoS-
prevention service providers (e.g., Cloudflare, Akamai) is privacy invasive for large
organizations (e.g., government). In this, we present Umbrella, a new DDoS defense mechanism
enabling Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to offer readily deployable and privacypreserving
DDoS prevention services to their customers. At its core, Umbrella develops a multi-layered
defense architecture to defend against a wide spectrum of DDoS attacks. In particular, the flood
throttling layer stops amplification-based DDoS attacks; the congestion resolving layer, aiming
to prevent sophisticated attacks that cannot be easily filtered, enforces congestion accountability
to ensure that legitimate flows are guaranteed to receive their fair shares regardless of attackers’
strategies; and finally the user-specific layer allows DDoS victims to enforce selfdesired traffic
control policies that best satisfy their business requirements. Based on Linux implementation, we
demonstrate that Umbrella is capable to deal with large scale attacks involving millions of attack
flows, meanwhile imposing negligible packet processing overhead. Further, our physical testbed
experiments and large scale simulations prove that Umbrella is effective to mitigate various
DDoS attacks.
Index Terms—DDoS Attacks, Privacy-Preserving, ISPs, Immediate Deployability.
Existing System:
Despite such effort, recent industrial interviews with over 100 security engineers from over ten
industry segments that are vulnerable to DDoS attacks indicate DDoS attacks have not been fully
addressed. First, since most of the academic proposals incur significant deployment overhead
(e.g., requiring software/hardware upgrades from a large number of Autonomous Systems (AS)
that are unrelated to the DDoS victim, changing the client network stack such as inserting new
packet headers), few of them have ever been deployed in the Internet. Second, existing security-
service providers are not cures for DDoS attacks for all types of customer segments. In
particular, a prerequisite of using their security services is that a destination site must redirect its
network traffic to these service providers. Cloudflare, for instance, will terminate all user Secure
Sockets Layer (SSL) connections to the destination at Cloudflare’s network edge, and then send
back user requests (after applying their secret sauce filtering) to the destination server using new
connections. Although this operation model is acceptable for small websites (e.g., personal
blogs), it is privacy invasive for some large organizations like government, hosting companies
and medical foundations.
Disadvantages:
1. They rely on their Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to block attack traffic
Proposed system:
Propose Umbrella, a new DDoS defense mechanism focusing on enabling ISPs to offer readily
deployable and privacy-preserving DDoS prevention services to their customers. The design of
Umbrella is lessoned from real-world DDoS attacks that intentionally disconnect the victim from
the public Internet by overwhelming the victim’s inter-connecting links with its ISPs. Thus,
Umbrella proposes to protect the victim by allowing its ISPs to throttle attack traffic, preventing
any undesired traffic from reaching the victim. Compared with previous approaches requiring
Internet-wide AS cooperation, Umbrella simply needs independent deployment at the victim’s
direct ISPs to provide immediate DDoS defense. Further, unlike existing security-service
providers, an ISP does not need to terminate the victim’s connections. Instead, the ISP still
operates on network layer as usual to completely preserve the victim’s application layer privacy.
Third, Umbrella is lightweight since it requires no software and hardware upgrades at both the
Internet core and clients. Finally, Umbrella is performance friendly because it is overhead-free
during normal scenarios by staying completely idle and imposes negligible packet processing
overhead during attack mitigation.
Advantages:
First, unlike the vast majority of academic DDoS prevention proposals which require extensive
Internet core and client network-stack change, Umbrella only requires lightweight upgrades from
business-related entities (i.e., the potential DDoS victim itself and its direct ISPs), yielding
instant deployability in the current Internet architecture.
Second, compared with the existing deployable industrial DDoS mitigation services, Umbrella,
through our novel multilayer defense architecture, offers both privacy-preserving and complete
DDoS prevention that can deal with a wide spectrum of attacks, and meanwhile offer victim-
customizable defense.
. Modules:
Flood throttling layer:
Umbrella defends against the amplification-based attacks that exploit various network protocols
(e.g., Simple Service Discovery Protocol (SSDP), Network Time Protocol (NTP)). Although
such attacks may involve extremely high volume of traffic (e.g., hundreds of gigabit per second),
they can be effectively detected via static filters and therefore stopped.
Congestion resolving layer:
Umbrella defends against more sophisticated attacks in which adversaries may adopt various
strategies.Umbrella brings out a key concept congestion accountability to selectively punish
users who keep injecting packets in case of severe congestive losses.
User specific layer:
allows the victim to enforce self-interested traffic policing rules that are most suitable for their
business logic.
Software Requirements