THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 208749. November 26, 2014.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANECITO ESTIBAL y CALUNGSAG, accused-appellant.

Facts:

This is a rape case on automatic review to the Supreme Court committed by the accused Calungsag against her
13 year old daughter, AAA. According to the information, the accused raped his daughter on February 5, 2009.
Apparently, BBB, the wife of the accused and mother of AAA, together with the latter, complained to Police Officer 3
Fretzie S. Cobardo (PO3 Cobardo), the officer assigned at the Philippine National Police (PNP) Women and Children
Protection Center of Taguig City. It was she who investigated the above incident and took down the sworn statement of
AAA late in the evening of February 5, 2009. Members of the Barangay Security Force Michael Estudillo (Estudillo) and
Ronillo Perlas (Perlas) arrested the accused. She testified in the trial court. AAA did not, on account her not appearing
despite several subpoenas issued by the court; BBB and AAA manifested their desistance, saying that AAA had already
forgiven her father.

The trial court convicted the accused, ruling that the testimony of PO3 Cobardo was part of res gestae.

On appeal to the CA, the accused-appellant maintained that due to the absence of AAA's testimony, the prosecution
failed to establish the circumstances proving beyond reasonable doubt that he raped his daughter; that the testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses PO3 Cobardo and others, not being themselves victims or witnesses to the "startling
occurrence" of rape, cannot create the hearsay exception of res gestae [literally, "things done’.

The CA nonetheless convicted the accused on the basis of res gestae.

ISSUE: Without the res gestae exception, the evidence of the prosecution would consist mainly of hearsay statements by
PO3 Cobardo, BSF Estudillo and BSF Perlas all reiterating what AAA allegedly told them. The same question, whether res
gestae as an exception to the hearsay rule must be appreciated from the factual circumstances of the case, is now
before this Court in this automatic review.

Ruling:

ACCUSED IS ACQUITTED

In essence, the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule provides that the declarations must have been "voluntarily
and spontaneously made so nearly contemporaneous as to be in the presence of the transaction which they illustrate
and explain, and were made under such circumstances as necessarily to exclude the idea of design or deliberation."

AAA's statements to the barangay tanod and the police do not qualify as part of res gestae in view of the missing
element of spontaneity and the lapse of an appreciable time between the rape and the declarations which afforded
her sufficient opportunity for reflection.

In People v. Manhuyod, Jr., 51 the Court stressed that in appreciating res gestae the element of spontaneity
is critical. Although it was acknowledged that there is no hard and fast rule to establish it, the Court cited a number of
factors to consider, already mentioned in Dianos. The review of the facts below constrains this Court to take a view
opposite that of the RTC and the CA.

There is no doubt, however, that there was nothing spontaneous, unreflected or instinctive about the declarations
which AAA made to the barangay tanodand later that night to the police. Her statements were in fact a re-telling of
what she had already confessed to her mother earlier that afternoon; this time however, her story to thetanods and the
police was in clear, conscious pursuit of a newly formed resolve, exhorted by her mother, to see her father finally
exposed and put behind bars. AAA made her declarations to the authorities precisely because she was seeking their help
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to punish the accused-appellant. There was then nothing spontaneous about her so-called res gestae narrations, even as
it is remarkable to note that while AAA was giving her said statements to the police, her father was already being held in
detention, and the investigation was conducted exactly to determine if there was a basis to hold him for trial for rape.

Res gestae speaks of a quick continuum of related happenings, starting with the occurrence of a startling event which
triggered it and including any spontaneous declaration made by a witness, participant or spectator relative to the said
occurrence. The cases this Court has cited invariably reiterate that the statement must be an unreflected reaction of the
declarant, undesigned and free of deliberation. In other words, the declarant is spontaneously moved merely to express
his instinctive reaction concerning the startling occurrence, and not to pursue a purpose or design already formed in his
mind. In People v. Sanchez, 53 the Court belabored to explain that startling events "speak for themselves, giving out their
fullest meaning through the unprompted language of the participants:" 54 DCcAIS

Res gestae means the "things done." It "refers to those exclamations and statements made by either the participants,
victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or immediately after the commission of the crime, when
the circumstances are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the
excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false
statement." A spontaneous exclamation is defined as "a statement or exclamation made immediately after some
exciting occasion by a participant or spectator and asserting the circumstances of that occasion as it is observed by him.
The admissibility of such exclamation is based on our experience that, under certain external circumstances of physical
or mental shock, a stress of nervous excitement may be produced in a spectator which stills the reflective faculties and
removes their control, so that the utterance which then occurs is a spontaneous and sincere response to the actual
sensations and perceptions already produced by the external shock. Since this utterance is made under the immediate
and uncontrolled domination of the senses, rather than reason and reflection, and during the brief period when
consideration of self-interest could not have been fully brought to bear,' the utterance may be taken as expressing the
real belief of the speaker as to the facts just observed by him." In a manner of speaking, the spontaneity of the
declaration is such that the declaration itself may be regarded as the event speaking through the declarant rather than
the declarant speaking for himself. Or, stated differently, ". . . the events speak for themselves, giving out their fullest
meaning through the unprompted language of the participants. The spontaneous character of the language is assumed
to preclude the probability of its premeditation or fabrication. Its utterance on the spur of the moment is regarded, with
a good deal of reason, as a guarantee of its truth. 55 (Citations omitted)

The RTC and the CA held that the inculpatory statements of AAA to the barangay tanod and the police are part of the res
gestae occurrence of the rape. This is error. It is obvious that AAA had by then undergone a serious deliberation,
prodded by her mother, whose own outrage as the betrayed wife and grieving mother so emboldened AAA that she
finally resolved to emerge from her fear of her father. Here then lies the crux of the matter: AAA had clearly ceased to
act unthinkingly under the immediate influence of her shocking rape by her father, and was now led by another
powerful compulsion, a new-found resolve to punish her father. aIAcCH

Hearsay evidence is accorded no probative value for the reason that the original declarant was not placed under oath
or affirmation, nor subjected to cross-examination by the defense, except in a few instances as where the statement
is considered part of the res gestae.

This Court has a situation where the incriminatory statements allegedly made by AAA were conveyed to the trial court
not by AAA herself but by PO3 Cobardo, BSF Estudillo and BSF Perlas. In particular, PO3 Cobardo made a summation of
what she claims was AAA's narration of her ordeal, along with her own observations of her demeanor during the
investigation. But unless the prosecution succeeded in invoking res gestae, their testimonies must be dismissed as
hearsay, since AAA's statements were not subjected to cross-examination consistent with the constitutional right of the
accused-appellant to confront the evidence against him.

||| (People v. Estibal y Calungsag, G.R. No. 208749, November 26, 2014)

When inculpatory facts are susceptible of two or more interpretations, one of which is consistent with the innocence
of the accused, the evidence does not fulfill or hurdle the test of moral certainty required for conviction.
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It is well-settled, to the point of being elementary, that when inculpatory facts are susceptible to two or more
interpretations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused, the evidence does not fulfill or hurdle the
test of moral certainty required for conviction . 61 A forced application of the res gestae exception below results if the
Court says that AAA's incriminatory statements were spontaneous and thus part of a startling occurrence. It produces an
outright denial of the right of the accused-appellant to be presumed innocent unless proven guilty, not to mention that
he was also denied his right to confront the complainant.