People Vs Supat

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Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence

Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence > Year 2018 > June 2018 Decisions > G.R.
No. 217027, June 06, 2018 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
NARCISO SUPAT Y RADOC ALIAS "ISOY", Accused-Appellant.:

G.R. No. 217027, June 06, 2018 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. NARCISO SUPAT Y RADOC ALIAS "ISOY", Accused-Appellant.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 217027, June 06, 2018

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NARCISO SUPAT Y RADOC


ALIAS "ISOY", Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

CAGUIOA, J.:

Before the Court is an ordinary appeal1 filed by accused-appellant Narciso Supat y


Radoc alias "Isoy" (Narciso) assailing the Decision2dated August 14, 2014 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05461, which affirmed the
Decision3 dated November 24, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro,
Laguna, Branch 93 (RTC), in Crim. Case Nos. 5434-SPL and 5435-SPL, finding
Narciso guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sections 5 and 11, Article II of
Republic Act No. (RA) 9165,4 otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002."

The Facts

Narciso was charged in two (2) separate Informations dated October 24, 2005,
before the RTC, docketed as Crim. Case Nos. 5434-SPL and 5435-SPL. In Crim.
Case No. 5434-SPL, Narciso was charged with the crime of illegal sale of dangerous
drugs, the accusatory portion of the Information reading as follows:

That on or about October 8, 2005, in the Municipality of San Pedro,


Province of Laguna, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court the said accused without any legal authority, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, pass and deliver to a
police poseur-buyer in consideration of one (1) piece one hundred
peso bill, one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet of
METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE, commonly known as "shabu",
a dangerous drug, weighing zero point three (0.03) gram.

CONTRARY TO LAW.5

In Crim. Case No. 5435-SPL, Narciso was charged with the crime of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs. The Information there pertinently states:

That on or about October 8, 2005, in the Municipality of San Pedro,


Province of Laguna, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court the said accused without authority of the law, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his
possession, custody and control two (2) small heat-sealed transparent
plastic sachets containing methamphetamine hydrochloride, commonly
known as "shabu", a dangerous drug, with a total weight of zero point
seventy one (0.71) gram.

CONTRARY TO LAW.6

Upon his arraignment, Narciso pleaded not guilty to the foregoing charges.7 During
the pre-trial, the identity of Narciso and the jurisdiction of the trial court over his
person were admitted.8

Version of the Prosecution

The Prosecution presented as witnesses PO3 Alexander Rivera y Amata (PO3


Rivera), SPO4 Melchor Dela Peña y Peruel (SPO4 Dela Peña) and SPO1 Alejandro
Ame y Dimandal (SPO1 Ame). Their testimonies, as summarized by the CA, are as
follows:

On 8 October 2005, a civilian informant and a Barangay Tanod of San


Antonio, San Pedro, Laguna arrived at the Municipal Police Station and
reported to the Intelligence Section Chief [SPO4 Dela Peña] the illegal
drug activities of [Narciso]. SPO4 [Dela] Peña immediately formed a
team comprised of himself, [PO3 Rivera], [SPO1 Ame] and PO2
Rommel Bautista. The team conducted a surveillance operation at
Holiday Hills, Narra Road, San Antonio, San Pedro, Laguna. The
surveillance confirmed that [Narciso] was indeed involved in illegal
drug activities. A briefing was conducted where PO3 Rivera was
designated as the poseurbuyer for the buy-bust operation and was
given a marked P100.00 bill to be used as buy-bust money. It was
agreed that the pre-arranged signal would be the giving of a ring to
SPO4 [Dela] Peña's mobile phone.

PO3 Rivera and the civilian informant proceeded to the house of


[Narciso] while the rest of the team positioned themselves along Narra
Road and waited for PO3 Rivera's call. The informant introduced PO3
Rivera to [Narciso] as a customer. PO3 Rivera handed the P100.00
marked bill to [Narciso], and the latter, in turn, handed PO3 Rivera a
plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance. After receiving
the sachet, PO3 Rivera gave SPO4 [Dela] Peña's phone a ring. The rest
of the team immediately entered [Narciso's] house and arrested
[Narciso]. SPO1 Ame recovered from [Narciso] the buy-bust money
and two (2) more sachets containing the same white crystalline
substance after conducting a search on his person. The seized items
were handed to SPO4 [Dela] Peña and were taken to the police
station, together with [Narciso]. The sachet bought by PO3 Rivera
from [Narciso] was marked by SPO4 [Dela] Peña as "NS-B", while the
two (2) other sachets confiscated by SPO1 Ame from [Narciso's]
possession were marked as "NS-P". An inventory of these seized items
was conducted. Afterward[s], SPO4 [Dela] Peña transferred the
custody of the seized sachets to the crime laboratory for examination.
Forensic Chemist Police Senior Inspector (PSI) Donna Villa Hue[l]gas
conducted the laboratory examination on the specimens delivered by
SPO4 [Dela] Peña. The white crystalline substance contained in the
seized plastic sachets was determined to be methamphetamine
hydrochloride, also known as shabu.9

During the trial, Narciso admitted the existence and due execution of the following
documents:

1. Laboratory Request for Examination dated October 8, 2005;

2. Chemistry Report No. D-1127-05;

3. Final Chemistry Report No. D-1127-05;

4. Chemistry Report Findings;

5. Conclusion; and

6. Name and signature of Donna Huelgas.10


Version of the Defense

On the other hand, the evidence for the defense was summarized by the CA as
follows:

On 8 October 2005, at around 10:00 a.m., [Narciso] was at home


watching television (TV) with his brother Christopher Supat and a
neighbor named Violy. [Narciso] noticed five (5) men entering their
compound and eventually their house. He recognized the faces of the
two (2) men as the Barangay Tanods, and he learned later that the
three (3) other men were police officers. Upon entering the house, the
group arrested and handcuffed [Narciso]. His house was searched and
when they found nothing, he was left inside the house handcuffed.
After fifteen (15) to thirty (30) minutes, the police officers returned
and showed him two (2) plastic sachets containing shabu allegedly
recovered from his person. Thereafter, [Narciso] was brought to the
police station.

To corroborate the foregoing account, the defense presented the


testimony of Kurt Pilacan, who was twelve (12) years old when the
incident happened. [He testified that] [a]t around 1:00 p.m., he was
also watching TV at the house of [Narciso], together with five or six
children. While watching TV, he heard a gunshot and a group of five
(5) men entered the house of [Narciso]. The latter was immediately
handcuffed. The men searched the house and found a cellphone and
pieces of jewelry. They left the house and upon their return, they
showed to [Narciso] illegal drugs placed in a plastic sachet.11

The Ruling of the RTC

On November 24, 2011, the RTC rendered judgment12 finding Narciso guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for the crimes of (1) violation of Section 5 of RA 9165, sentencing
him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine in the amount of
P500,000.00 and to pay the costs; and (2) violation of Section 11 of RA 9165,
sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from twelve
(12) years and one (1) day as minimum to fifteen (15) years as maximum and to
pay a fine in the amount of P300,000.00.13

The trial court gave full credence to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses on
the reason that, as police officers, they are presumed to have regularly performed
their duties and official functions. The RTC held that there is no evidence to show
that the police officers were motivated by any reason other than to accomplish their
mission to curb drug abuse. The RTC further ruled that Narciso's denial is a feeble
defense which cannot stand against the positive testimony of the prosecution
witnesses and the presumption of regularity enjoyed by the arresting officers.14
Aggrieved, Narciso appealed15 his case to the CA claiming that the identity of the
seized drugs was not proven in violation of Section 21 of RA 9165. Narciso argued
that the trial court failed to consider the following irregularities in the conduct of the
buy-bust operation: (1) no inventory of the seized items was conducted in the
presence of representatives from media, Department of Justice (DOJ), and elective
official; and (2) no photographs of the seized items were taken.16 Narciso further
claimed that there were gaps in the chain of custody of the seized items because
there was no information on what happened after the seized drugs were marked at
the police station and the prosecution did not present the forensic chemist who
examined the seized drugs.17

The Ruling of the CA

In the questioned Decision,18 the CA affirmed Narciso's conviction. The CA held


that, contrary to Narciso's claim, the prosecution was able to prove the corpus
delicti of the crimes charged and all the other elements of illegal sale and illegal
possession of drugs.19The CA found that the chain of custody of the seized drugs
from the time they were recovered from Narciso until they were presented in court
for verification was preserved;20 and it is of no moment that the forensic chemist
was not presented as witness because Narciso already admitted the existence and
due execution of the specimens submitted for laboratory examination, the Request
for Laboratory Examination, and the Final Chemistry Report No. D-1127-05.21

The CA further held that the failure of the apprehending police officers to comply
with the procedural requirements of Section 21(1), Article II of RA 9165, is not fatal
to the prosecution's cause, provided that the integrity and evidentiary value of the
subject drugs were preserved, as in this case.22 The CA also noted that the fact that
the buy-bust team did not mark and photograph the seized drugs immediately after
Narciso's arrest does not make the seizure and custody invalid or void because the
implementing rules allow the marking, photographing and inventory of the seized
items at the place of the operation or nearest police station, whichever is
practicable.23

Moreover, the CA stressed that the defense never objected to the failure of the
apprehending officers to strictly comply with the procedure in Section 21 of RA
9165; thus, whatever justifiable reasons the apprehending police officers might
have therefor will remain unknown.24 Narciso bears the burden of showing that the
evidence was tampered with to overcome the presumption of regularity of official
functions.25

Undaunted, Narciso filed his Notice of Appeal26 of the CA Decision on September 9,


2014.
On June 22, 2015, the Court issued a Resolution27 requiring the parties to file their
respective supplemental briefs within thirty (30) days from notice.

Narciso and the OSG filed their respective manifestations dated September 11,
2015 and September 23, 2015 stating that they will no longer file supplemental
briefs.28

Issue

Whether or not Narciso's guilt for violation of Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165, was
proven beyond reasonable doubt.

The Court's Ruling

The appeal is meritorious.

After a review of the records, the Court resolves to acquit Narciso as the
prosecution utterly failed to prove that the buy-bust team complied with the
mandatory requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 and to establish the unbroken
chain of custody of the seized drugs.

In this case, Narciso was charged with illegal sale and illegal possession of
dangerous drugs, respectively defined and penalized under Sections 5 and 11,
Article II of RA 9165. To sustain a conviction for illegal possession of dangerous
drugs the following elements must be established: (a) the accused was in
possession of an item or object identified as a prohibited drug; (b) such possession
was not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed
the said drug.29 On the other hand, for a successful prosecution of the offense of
illegal sale of drugs, the following elements must be proven: (1) the transaction or
sale took place; (2) the corpus delicti or the illicit drug was presented as evidence;
and (3) the buyer and the seller were identified.30

In both cases, the confiscated drug constitutes the very corpus delicti of the
offense31 and the fact of its existence is vital to sustain a judgment of
conviction.32 It is essential, therefore, that the identity and integrity of the seized
drugs be established with moral certainty.33 The prosecution must prove, beyond
reasonable doubt, that the substance seized from the accused is exactly the same
substance offered in court as proof of the crime. Each link to the chain of custody
must be accounted for.34

This resonates even more in buy-bust operations because "by the very nature of
anti-narcotics operations, the need for entrapment procedures, the use of shady
characters as informants, the ease with which sticks of marijuana or grams of
heroin can be planted in pockets or hands of unsuspecting provincial hicks, and the
secrecy that inevitably shrouds all drug deals, the possibility of abuse is great."35
In this regard, Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 lays down the procedures that the
buy-bust team must strictly follow to preserve the identity and integrity of the
confiscated drugs and/or paraphernalia:

SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or


Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs,
Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA
shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant
sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential
chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory
equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper
disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of


the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence
of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department
of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall he
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof;

(2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of


dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled
precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, the same
shall be submitted to the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative
and quantitative examination;

(3) A certification of the forensic laboratory examination results, which


shall be done under oath by the forensic laboratory examiner, shall be
issued within twenty-four (24) hours after the receipt of the subject
item/s: Provided, That when the volume of the dangerous drugs, plant
sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and essential
chemicals does not allow the completion of testing within the time
frame, a partial laboratory examination report shall be provisionally
issued stating therein the quantities of dangerous drugs still to be
examined by the forensic laboratory: Provided, however, That a final
certification shall be issued on the completed forensic laboratory
examination on the same within the next twenty-four (24) hours[.]
(Emphasis supplied)
The requirements of paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of RA 9165.

RA 9165 was amended by RA 1064036 which imposed less stringent requirements in


the procedure. The amendment was approved on July 15, 2014. As the alleged
crimes in this case were committed on October 8, 2005, the afore-quoted version of
Section 21 is applicable.

Relevantly, Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of


RA 9165 (IRR) filled in the details as to place of inventory and photographing of the
seized items and added a saving clause in case of non-compliance with the
requirements under justifiable grounds, thus:

SECTION 21. x x x

(a)

The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the


drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or
the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and
the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a
copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and
photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search
warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the
nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is
practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further,
that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable
grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of
the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of
and custody over said items[.] (Emphasis supplied)

Parsed, the above provisions impose the following requirements in the manner of
handling and inventory, time, witnesses, and of place after the arrest of the
accused and seizure of the dangerous drugs:

1. The initial custody requirements must be done immediately after


seizure or confiscation;

2. The physical inventory and photographing must be done in the


presence of:

a. the accused or his representative or counsel;


b. a representative from the media;

c. a representative from the DOJ; and

d. any elected public official.

3. The conduct of the physical inventory and photograph shall be done


at the:

a. place where the search warrant is served; or

b. nearest police station; or

c. nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is


practicable, in case of warrantless seizure.

All the above requirements must be strictly complied with for a successful
prosecution of the crimes of illegal sale and/or illegal possession of dangerous
drugs under RA 9165. To be sure, case law states that the procedure enshrined in
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 is a matter of substantive law, and cannot be
brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality; or worse, ignored as an
impediment to the conviction of illegal drug suspects.37 For indeed, however noble
the purpose or necessary the exigencies of the campaign against illegal drugs may
be, it is still a governmental action that must always be executed within the
boundaries of law.38

In the present case, the buy-bust team committed several and patent procedural
lapses in the conduct of the seizure, initial custody, and handling of the seized drug
- which thus created reasonable doubt as to the identity and integrity of the drugs
and, consequently, reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused.

The buy-bust team failed to comply with the mandatory requirements under
Section 21.

Section 21(1) of RA 9165 plainly requires the apprehending team to conduct a


physical inventory of the seized items and the photographing of the
same immediately afterseizure and confiscation. Further, the inventory must
be done in the presence ofthe accused, his counsel, or representative, a
representative of the DOJ, the media, and an elected public official, who
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.

The phrase "immediately after seizure and confiscation" means that the physical
inventory and photographing of the drugs were intended by the law to be made
immediately after, or at the place of apprehension. And only if this is not
practicable that the IRR allows the inventory and photographing at the nearest
police station or the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team. This also
means that the three required witnesses should already be physically present at the
time of apprehension - a requirement that can easily be complied with by the buy-
bust team considering that the buy-bust operation is, by its nature, a planned
activity. In other words, the buy-bust team has enough time and opportunity to
bring with them said witnesses.

Moreover, while the IRR allows alternative places for the conduct of the inventory
and photographing of the seized drugs, the requirement of having the three
required witnesses to be physically present at the time or near the place of
apprehension is not dispensed with. The reason is simple: it is at the time of arrest
- or at the time of the drugs' "seizure and confiscation" - that the presence of the
three witnesses is most needed, as it is their presence at the time of seizure and
confiscation that would insulate against the police practice of planting evidence.

Here, the buy-bust team utterly failed to comply with the foregoing requirements.

To start with, no photographs of the seized drugs were taken at the place of seizure
or at the police station where the inventory was conducted. To be sure, the taking
of photographs of the seized drugs is not a menial requirement that can be easily
dispensed with. Photographs provide credible proof of the state or condition of the
illegal drugs and/or paraphernalia recovered from the place of apprehension to
ensure that the identity and integrity of the recovered items are preserved.

More importantly, there was no compliance with the three-witness rule. Based on
the narrations of PO3 Rivera39 and SPO4 Dela Peña,40 not one of the witnesses
required under Section 21 was present at the time the plastic sachets were
allegedly seized from Narciso or during the inventory of the recovered drugs at the
police station. Moreover, while the Certification of Inventory41 dated October 8,
2005 shows the signature of a certain Arturo L. Hatulan, an elected official, the
prosecution failed to present him as witness to testify thereon or to clarify whether
he was also present at the time the drugs were allegedly recovered from Narciso. In
any event, the buybust team still lacked two witnesses - representatives from the
DOJ and media and offered no explanation as to their absence. Their submissions,
in fact, do not indicate that they even exerted genuine effort to secure the presence
of the required witnesses at the time of apprehension.

The presence of the witnesses from the DOJ, media, and from public elective office
is necessary to protect and guard against the possibility of planting, contamination,
or loss of the seized drug. The presence of the three witnesses must be secured not
only during the inventory but, more importantly, at the time of the warrantless
arrest. It is at this point in which the presence of the three witnesses is most
needed, as it is their presence at the time of seizure and confiscation that would
belie any doubt as to the source, identity, and integrity of the seized drug. The
pronouncement of the Court in People v. Mendoza,42 is enlightening:
x x x Without the insulatingpresence of the representative from the
media or the Department of Justice, or any elected public official
during the seizure and marking of the sachets of shabu, the evils of
switching, "planting" or contamination of the evidence that had tainted
the buy-busts conducted under the regime of RA No. 6425 (Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972) again reared their ugly heads as to negate the
integrity and credibility of the seizure and confiscation of the sachets
of shabu that were evidence herein of the corpus delicti, and thus
adversely affected the trustworthiness of the incrimination of the
accused. Indeed, the insulating presence of such witnesses would have
preserved an unbroken chain of custody.43 (Emphasis supplied)

The practice of police operatives of not bringing to the intended place of arrest the
three witnesses, when they could easily do so - and "calling them in" to the place of
inventory to "witness" the inventory and photographing of the drugs only after the
buy-bust operation has already been finished - does not achieve the purpose of the
law in having these witnesses prevent or insulate against the planting of drugs.

To restate, the presence of the three witnesses at the time of seizure and
confiscation of the drugs must be secured and complied with at the time of the buy-
bust arrest; such that they are required to be at or near the intended place of the
arrest so that they can be ready to witness the inventory and photographing of the
seized and confiscated drugs "immediately after seizure and confiscation."

The saving clause does not apply to this case.

Following the IRR of RA 9165, the courts may allow a deviation from the mandatory
requirements of Section 21 in exceptional cases, where the following requisites are
present: (1) the existence of justifiable grounds to allow departure from
the rule on strict compliance; and (2) the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
team.44 If these elements are present, the seizure and custody of the confiscated
drug shall not be rendered void and invalid regardless of the noncompliance with
the mandatory requirements of Section 21. It has also been emphasized that the
State bears the burden of proving the justifiable cause.45Thus, for the said saving
clause to apply, the prosecution must first recognize the lapse or lapses on the part
of the buy-bust team and justify or explain the same.46

In the present case, the prosecution failed to satisfy both requirements.

The prosecution failed to prove justifiable ground for noncompliance.

The first requirement for the saving clause to apply is for the prosecution to
recognize the lapses in the prescribed procedures and then provide a suitable
explanation for noncompliance.
Here, the prosecution did not even concede that there were lapses in the conduct of
the buy-bust operation. Also, no explanation was offered as to the absence of the
three (3) witnesses at the place and time of seizure, or as to the failure to
photograph the confiscated items immediately after seizure or during inventory in
the presence of the insulating witnesses. It must be noted that the requirements
under Section 21 are not unknown to the buy bust team, who are presumed to be
knowledgeable of the law demanding the preservation of the links in the chain of
custody.47 They are dutybound to fully comply with the requirements thereof, and if
their compliance is not full, they should at least have the readiness to explain the
reason for the step or steps omitted from such compliance.48

Verily, it was error on the part of the CA to put the blame on the accused for the
prosecution's failure to prove justifiable cause. The prosecution has the positive
duty to prove compliance with the procedure set forth in Section 21 of RA 9165,
and must have the initiative to not only acknowledge but also justify any perceived
deviations from the said procedure during the proceedings before the trial
court.49 The existence of justifiable cause must be proven as a fact, because the
Court cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even exist.50

The prosecution failed to establish the chain of custody of the seized drugs.

In People v. Alviz,51 the Court held that the integrity and evidentiary value of seized
items are properly preserved for as long as the chain of custody of the same is duly
established.

Chain of custody is defined in Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation


No. 1, Series of 2002:

b.

"Chain of Custody" means the duly recorded authorized


movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled
chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory
equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation
to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to
presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements
and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of
the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date
and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of
safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition[.]
(Emphasis supplied)

In this case, gaps exist in the chain of custody of the seized items which creates
reasonable doubt as to the identity and integrity thereof.
First, the confiscated items were not marked immediately upon seizure. In People
v. Gonzales,52 the Court explained that:

The first stage in the chain of custody is the marking of


the dangerous drugs or related items. Marking, which is
the affixing on the dangerous drugs or related items by
the apprehending officer or the poseur-buyer of his
initials or signature or other identifying signs, should be
made in the presence of the apprehended violator
immediately upon arrest. The importance of the prompt
marking cannot be denied, because succeeding handlers
of the dangerous drugs or related items will use the
marking as reference. Also, the marking operates to
set apart as evidence the dangerous drugs or
related items from other material from the moment
they are confiscated until they are disposed of at
the close of the criminal proceedings, thereby
forestalling switching, planting or contamination of
evidence. In short, the marking immediately upon
confiscation or recovery of the dangerous drugs or
related items is indispensable in the preservation of
their integrity and evidentiary value.53(Emphasis
supplied)

Notably in this case, three (3) plastic sachets were recovered from Narciso: (1)
sachet bought by PO3 Rivera and (2) sachets confiscated by PO3 Ame; but the
markings were made not in the place of seizure and not by the police officer who
recovered the seized drugs.

Second, SPO4 Dela Peña testified that he was the one who made the Request for
Laboratory Examination.54 However, the Request for Laboratory Examination dated
October 8, 2005 was not subscribed by him but by Police Superintendent Sergio A.
Dimandal.55 Also, contrary to the findings of the trial court, SPO4 Dela Peña's
testimony is not clear as to who actually delivered the drugs together with the
request to the crime laboratory for forensic examination.56

Third, the Request for Laboratory Examination,57 with its accompanying specimen,
was received from a certain PO2 Corpus by a certain PO1 Legaspi R.B. on October
8, 2005 at 9:15 p.m.; but the records are bereft of any evidence as to how
the seized items were passed on and placed in the hands of PO2 Corpus
and PO1 Legaspi R.B., or how the integrity of said items was preserved
while they remained in their custody. Moreover, no other testimony was
offered to explain how the seized drugs were turned over to PSI Donna
Villa Huelgas, the forensic chemist who conducted the examination.
Fourth, the Court does not see from the records the details on how the specimen
was handled from the time it was submitted for laboratory examination up to time
it was formally offered to the court. Forensic Chemist PSI Huelgas did not testify on
how she handled the seized item during examination and before it was transferred
to the court which testimony is required to ensure that that there was no change in
the condition of the seized drug and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to
have possession while in her custody. In this case, instead of the forensic chemist
turning over the substance to the court and testifying, the parties merely stipulated
on the existence and due execution of the Chemistry Report No. D-1127-05, Final
Chemistry Report No. D-1127-05, Chemistry Report findings and conclusions, and
the name and signature of PSI Huelgas. However, these stipulations do not prove
how the drugs were handled by said chemist.

The Court's ruling in People v. Sanchez58(Sanchez) lends guidance. In Sanchez, the


trial court dispensed with the testimony of the forensic chemist therein after the
parties stipulated that "the items allegedly confiscated from the accused were
submitted to the crime laboratory for examination and the findings were put into
writing."59 As a result, only the sole testimony of the poseur-buyer was presented
to attest to the chain of custody of the seized items therein. The Court held:

x x x [The sole testimony presented by the prosecution]


failed to disclose the identities of the desk officer and the
investigator to whom the custody of the drugs was given,
and how the latter handled these materials. No reference
was ever made to the person who submitted the seized
specimen to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination.
Likewise, no one testified on how the specimen was
handled after the chemical analysis by the forensic
chemist. While we are aware that the RTC's Order of
August 6, 2003 dispensed with the testimony of the
forensic chemist because of the stipulations of the
parties, we view the stipulation to be confined to
the handling of the specimen at the forensic
laboratory and to the analytical results
obtained. The stipulation does not cover the
manner the specimen was handled before it came
to the possession of the forensic chemist and after
it left his possession. To be sure, personnel within the
police hierarchy (as SPO2 Sevilla's testimony casually
mentions) must have handled the drugs but evidence of
how this was done, i.e., how it was managed, stored,
preserved, labeled and recorded from the time of its
seizure, to its receipt by the forensic laboratory, up until
it was presented in court and subsequently destroyed - is
absent from the evidence adduced during the trial. x x x
The recent case of Lopez v. People is particularly
instructive on how we expect the chain of custody or
"movement" of the seized evidence to be maintained and
why this must be shown by evidence:

As a method of authenticating
evidence, the chain of custody
rule requires that the admission
of an exhibit be preceded by
evidence sufficient to support a
finding that the matter in
question is what the proponent
claims it to be. It would
include testimony about
every link in the chain, from
the moment the item was
picked up to the time it is
offered into evidence, in
such a way that every
person who touched the
exhibit would describe how
and from whom it was
received, where it was and
what happened to it while in
the witness' possession, the
condition in which it was
received and the condition in
which it was delivered to the
next link in the chain. These
witnesses would then
describe the precautions
taken to ensure that there
had been no change in the
condition of the item and no
opportunity for someone not
in the chain to have
possession of the
same.60 (Emphasis supplied)

In turn, the importance of establishing the chain of custody in drugs cases was
explained in Mallillin v. People61:

A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that they


are not readily identifiable as in fact they are subject to
scientific analysis to determine their composition and
nature. The Court cannot reluctantly close its eyes to the
likelihood or at least the possibility, that at any of the
links in the chain of custody over the same there could
have been tampering, alteration or substitution of
substances from other cases - by accident or otherwise -
in which similar evidence was seized or in which similar
evidence was submitted for laboratory testing. Hence, in
authenticating the same, a standard more stringent than
that applied to cases involving objects which are readily
identifiable must be applied, a more exacting standard
that entails a chain of custody of the item with sufficient
completeness if only to render it improbable that the
original item has either been exchanged with another or
been contaminated or tampered with.62

As in Sanchez, the Court finds that while the parties indeed made the stipulations in
question, such stipulations do not relate to or do not cover the specific manner by
which the seized items were handled while in their possession. Further, they do not
indicate how such items were subsequently turned over to the next responsible
party.

As the seized drugs themselves are the corpus delicti of the crimes charged, it is of
utmost importance that there be no doubt or uncertainty as to their identity and
integrity. The State, and no other party, has the responsibility to explain the lapses
in the procedures taken to preserve the chain of custody of the dangerous drugs.
Without the explanation by the State, the evidence of the corpus delicti is
unreliable, and the acquittal of the accused should follow on the ground that his
guilt has not been shown beyond reasonable doubt.63

The presumption of innocence of the accused vis-a-vis the presumption of


regularity in performance of official duties.

The right of the accused to be presumed innocent until proven guilty is a


constitutionally protected right.64 The burden lies with the prosecution to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt by establishing each and every element of the crime
charged in the information as to warrant a finding of guilt for that crime or for any
other crime necessarily included therein.65

Here, the reliance of the RTC and CA on the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty despite the lapses in the procedures undertaken by the
buy-bust team is fundamentally unsound because the lapses themselves are
affirmative proofs of irregularity.66 The presumption of regularity in the
performance of duty cannot overcome the stronger presumption of innocence in
favor of the accused.67 Otherwise, a mere rule of evidence will defeat the
constitutionally enshrined right to be presumed innocent.68 This Court, in People v.
Catalan,69 had already warned the lower courts against this pitfall:

Both lower courts favored the members of the buy-bust


team with the presumption of regularity in the
performance of their duty, mainly because the accused
did not show that they had ill motive behind his
entrapment.

We hold that both lower courts committed gross error in


relying on the presumption of regularity.

Presuming that the members of the buy-bust team


regularly performed their duty was patently bereft of any
factual and legal basis. We remind the lower courts
that the presumption of regularity in the
performance of duty could not prevail over the
stronger presumption of innocence favoring the
accused. Otherwise, the constitutional guarantee of
the accused being presumed innocent would be
held subordinate to a mere rule of evidence
allocating the burden of evidence. Where, like here,
the proof adduced against the accused has not even
overcome the presumption of innocence, the presumption
of regularity in the performance of duty could not be a
factor to adjudge the accused guilty of the crime charged.

Moreover, the regularity of the performance of their


duty could not be properly presumed in favor of the
policemen because the records were replete with
indicia of their serious lapses. As a rule, a presumed
fact like the regularity of performance by a police
officer must be inferred only from an established
basic fact, not plucked out from thin air. To say it
differently, it is the established basic fact that triggers the
presumed fact of regular performance. Where there is any
hint of irregularity committed by the police officers in
arresting the accused and thereafter, several of which we
have earlier noted, there can be no presumption of
regularity of performance in their favor.70(Emphasis
supplied)

In this case, the presumption of regularity cannot stand because of the


buy-bust team's blatant disregard of the established procedures under
Section 21 of RA 9165.What further militates against according the apprehending
officers in this case the presumption of regularity is the fact that even the pertinent
internal anti-drug operation procedures then in force were not followed. Under the
1999 Philippine National Police Drug Enforcement Manual,71 the conduct of buy-bust
operations requires the following:

ANTI-DRUG OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES

V. SPECIFIC RULES

xxxx

B. Conduct of Operation: (As far as practicable, all


operations must be officer led)

1. Buy-Bust Operation - in the conduct of buy-bust


operation, the following are the procedures to be
observed:

a. Record time of jump-off in unit's logbook;

b. Alertness and security shall at all times be


observed[;]

c. Actual and timely coordination with the


nearest PNP territorial units must be made;

d. Area security and dragnet or pursuit


operation must be provided[;]

e. Use of necessary and reasonable force only


in case of suspect's resistance:

f. If buy-bust money is dusted with ultra violet


powder make sure that suspect ge[t] hold of
the same and his palm/s contaminated with
the powder before giving the pre-arranged
signal and arresting the suspects;
g. In pre-positioning of the team members, the
designated arresting elements must clearly and
actually observe the negotiation/transaction
between suspect and the poseur-buyer;

h. Arrest suspect in a defensive manner


anticipating possible resistance with the use of
deadly weapons which maybe concealed in his
body, vehicle or in a place within arms[']
reach;

i. After lawful arrest, search the body and


vehicle, if any, of the suspect for other
concealed evidence or deadly weapon;

j. Appraise suspect of his constitutional rights


loudly and clearly after having been secured
with handcuffs;

k. Take actual inventory of the seized


evidence by means of weighing and/or
physical counting, as the case may be;

l. Prepare a detailed receipt of the


confiscated evidence for issuance to the
possessor (suspect) thereof;

m. The seizing officer (normally the


poseur-buyer) and the evidence custodian
must mark the evidence with their initials
and also indicate the date, time and place the
evidence was confiscated/seized;

n. Take photographs of the evidence while


in the process of taking the inventory,
especially during weighing, and if possible
under existing conditions, the registered
weight of the evidence on the scale must
be focused by the camera; and

o. Only the evidence custodian shall secure


and preserve the evidence in an evidence bag
or in appropriate container and thereafter
deliver the same to the PNP CLG for laboratory
examination. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

The Court has ruled in People v. Zheng Bai Hui72 that it will not presume to set an a
prioribasis on what detailed acts police authorities might credibly undertake and
carry out in their entrapment operations. However, given the police operational
procedures and the fact that buy-bust is a planned operation, it strains credulity
why the buy-bust team could not have ensured the presence of the required
witnesses pursuant to Section 21 or at the very least marked, photographed and
inventoried the seized items according to the procedures in their own operations
manual.

All told, the prosecution failed to prove the corpus delicti of the offenses of sale and
possession of illegal drugs due to the multiple unexplained breaches of procedure
committed by the buy-bust team in the seizure, custody, and handling of the seized
drugs. In other words, the prosecution was not able to overcome the presumption
of innocence of accused-appellant Narciso.

As a reminder, the Court exhorts the prosecutors to diligently discharge their onus
to prove compliance with the provisions of Section 21 of RA 9165, as amended, and
its IRR, which is fundamental in preserving the integrity and evidentiary value of
the corpus delicti. To the mind of the Court, the procedure outlined in Section
21 is straightforward and easy to comply with. In the presentation of evidence
to prove compliance therewith, the prosecutors are enjoined to recognize any
deviation from the prescribed procedure and provide the explanation therefor as
dictated by available evidence. Compliance with Section 21 being integral to every
conviction, the appellate court, this Court included, is at liberty to review the
records of the case to satisfy itself that the required proof has been adduced by the
prosecution whether the accused has raised, before the trial or appellate court, any
issue of non-compliance. If deviations are observed and no justifiable reasons are
provided, the conviction must be overturned, and the innocence of the accused
affirmed.73

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated August 14, 2014 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05461 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accused-appellant Narciso Supat y Radoc is hereby ACQUITTED for failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He is ordered
immediately RELEASED from detention, unless he is confined for any other lawful
cause.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections,
Muntinlupa City, for immediate implementation. The Director of the Bureau of
Corrections is directed to report to this Court, within five (5) days from receipt of
this Decision, the action he has taken. A copy shall also be furnished to the Director
General of Philippine National Police for his information.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, Senior Associate Justice, (Chairperson), Perlas-Bernabe, and Reyes, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
Peralta, J., pls. see separate concurring opinion.

Endnotes:

1
CA rollo, pp. 95-97.

2
Id. at 83-93. Penned by Associate Justice Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo
and concurred in by Associate Justices Amy C. Lazaro-Javier and
Zenaida T. Galapate-Laguilles.

3
Records (Crim. Case No. 5435-SPL), pp. 164-168. Penned by Judge
Francisco Dizon Paño.

4
AN ACT INSTITUTING THE COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS
ACT OF 2002, REPEALING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425, OTHERWISE
KNOWN AS THE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 1972, AS AMENDED,
PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES (2002).

5
Records (Crim. Case No. 5434-SPL), p. 1.

6
Records (Crim. Case No. 5435-SPL), p. 1.

7
Id. at 21.

8
Id. at 38.

9
CA rollo, pp. 85-86.

10
Id. at 86.
11
Id. at 86-87.

12
Supra note 3.

13
Id. at 168.

14
Id. at 167.

15
Id. at 170.

16
CA rollo, p. 45.

17
Id. at 42-43.

18
Supra note 2.

19
Id. at 88-89.

20
Id. at 89.

21
Id. at 91.

22
Id. at 90.

23
Id.

24
Id. at 91.

25
Id. at 91-92.

26
Id. at 95-97.

27
Rollo, pp. 17-18.

28
Id. at 21-25, 26-32.

29
People v. Paz, G.R. No. 229512, January 31, 2018, p. 7.

30
People v. Bartolini, 791 Phil. 626, 633-634 (2016).

31
People v. Sagana, G.R. No. 208471, August 2, 2017, p. 8.

32
Derilo v. People, 784 Phil. 679, 686 (2016).
33
See People v. Alvaro, G.R. No. 225596, January 10, 2018, p. 6.

34
See People v. Viterbo, 739 Phil. 593, 601 (2014).

35
People v. Saragena, G.R. No. 210677, August 23, 2017, p. 7.

36
AN ACT TO FURTHER STRENGTHEN THE ANTI-DRUG CAMPAIGN OF
THE GOVERNMENT, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTION 21 OF
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE
"COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002."

Gamboa v. People, 799 Phil. 584, 597 (2016), citing People v.


37

Umipang, 686 Phil. 1024, 1038-1039 (2012).

38
Id.

39
See TSN, March 17, 2008, pp. 3-4.

40
See TSN, February 17, 2009, pp. 9-15.

41
Exh. records (Crim. Case No. 5434-SPL), p. 16.

42
736 Phil. 749 (2014).

43
Id. at 764.

44
RA 9165, Sec. 21(1) as implemented by its IRR.

45
People v. Beran, 724 Phil. 788, 822 (2014).

People v. Reyes, G.R. No. 199271, October 19, 2016, 806 SCRA 513,
46

536.

47
People v. Geronimo, G.R. No. 180447, August 23, 2017, p. 8.

48
Id.

49
People v. Ramos, G.R. No. 233744, February 28, 2018, pp. 9-10.

50
People v. Mamangon, G.R. No. 229102, January 29, 2018, p. 7,
citing People v. De Guzman, 630 Phil. 637, 649 (2010).

51
703 Phil. 58, 73 (2013).
52
708 Phil. 121 (2013).

53
Id. at 130-131.

54
TSN, February 17, 2009, p. 13.

55
Exh. "C," records (Crim. Case No. 5434-SPL), p. 14.

56
See TSN, February 17,2009, pp. 13-14.

57
Exh. "C," records (Crim. Case No. 5434-SPL), p. 14.

58
590 Phil. 214 (2008).

59
Id. at 225.

60
Id. at 237-238.

61
576 Phil. 576 (2008).

62
Id. at 588-589.

63
People v. Gonzales, supra note 52, at 123.

64
1987 CONSTITUTION, Art. III, Sec. 14(2). "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved x x x."

65
People v. Belocura, 693 Phil. 476, 503-504 (2012).

66
See People v. Mendoza, supra note 42, at 770.

67
Id.

68
See People v. Catalan, 699 Phil. 603, 621 (2012).

69
Id.

70
Id. at 621.

PNPM-D-O-3-1-99 [NG], the precursor anti-illegal drug operations


71

manual prior to the 2010 and 2014 AIDSOTF Manual.

72
393 Phil. 68, 133 (2000).
73
See People v. Jugo, G.R. No. 231792, January 29, 2018, p. 10.

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