People Vs Supat
People Vs Supat
People Vs Supat
Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence > Year 2018 > June 2018 Decisions > G.R.
No. 217027, June 06, 2018 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
NARCISO SUPAT Y RADOC ALIAS "ISOY", Accused-Appellant.:
G.R. No. 217027, June 06, 2018 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. NARCISO SUPAT Y RADOC ALIAS "ISOY", Accused-Appellant.
SECOND DIVISION
DECISION
CAGUIOA, J.:
The Facts
Narciso was charged in two (2) separate Informations dated October 24, 2005,
before the RTC, docketed as Crim. Case Nos. 5434-SPL and 5435-SPL. In Crim.
Case No. 5434-SPL, Narciso was charged with the crime of illegal sale of dangerous
drugs, the accusatory portion of the Information reading as follows:
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
In Crim. Case No. 5435-SPL, Narciso was charged with the crime of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs. The Information there pertinently states:
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
Upon his arraignment, Narciso pleaded not guilty to the foregoing charges.7 During
the pre-trial, the identity of Narciso and the jurisdiction of the trial court over his
person were admitted.8
During the trial, Narciso admitted the existence and due execution of the following
documents:
5. Conclusion; and
On the other hand, the evidence for the defense was summarized by the CA as
follows:
On November 24, 2011, the RTC rendered judgment12 finding Narciso guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for the crimes of (1) violation of Section 5 of RA 9165, sentencing
him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine in the amount of
P500,000.00 and to pay the costs; and (2) violation of Section 11 of RA 9165,
sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from twelve
(12) years and one (1) day as minimum to fifteen (15) years as maximum and to
pay a fine in the amount of P300,000.00.13
The trial court gave full credence to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses on
the reason that, as police officers, they are presumed to have regularly performed
their duties and official functions. The RTC held that there is no evidence to show
that the police officers were motivated by any reason other than to accomplish their
mission to curb drug abuse. The RTC further ruled that Narciso's denial is a feeble
defense which cannot stand against the positive testimony of the prosecution
witnesses and the presumption of regularity enjoyed by the arresting officers.14
Aggrieved, Narciso appealed15 his case to the CA claiming that the identity of the
seized drugs was not proven in violation of Section 21 of RA 9165. Narciso argued
that the trial court failed to consider the following irregularities in the conduct of the
buy-bust operation: (1) no inventory of the seized items was conducted in the
presence of representatives from media, Department of Justice (DOJ), and elective
official; and (2) no photographs of the seized items were taken.16 Narciso further
claimed that there were gaps in the chain of custody of the seized items because
there was no information on what happened after the seized drugs were marked at
the police station and the prosecution did not present the forensic chemist who
examined the seized drugs.17
The CA further held that the failure of the apprehending police officers to comply
with the procedural requirements of Section 21(1), Article II of RA 9165, is not fatal
to the prosecution's cause, provided that the integrity and evidentiary value of the
subject drugs were preserved, as in this case.22 The CA also noted that the fact that
the buy-bust team did not mark and photograph the seized drugs immediately after
Narciso's arrest does not make the seizure and custody invalid or void because the
implementing rules allow the marking, photographing and inventory of the seized
items at the place of the operation or nearest police station, whichever is
practicable.23
Moreover, the CA stressed that the defense never objected to the failure of the
apprehending officers to strictly comply with the procedure in Section 21 of RA
9165; thus, whatever justifiable reasons the apprehending police officers might
have therefor will remain unknown.24 Narciso bears the burden of showing that the
evidence was tampered with to overcome the presumption of regularity of official
functions.25
Narciso and the OSG filed their respective manifestations dated September 11,
2015 and September 23, 2015 stating that they will no longer file supplemental
briefs.28
Issue
Whether or not Narciso's guilt for violation of Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165, was
proven beyond reasonable doubt.
After a review of the records, the Court resolves to acquit Narciso as the
prosecution utterly failed to prove that the buy-bust team complied with the
mandatory requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 and to establish the unbroken
chain of custody of the seized drugs.
In this case, Narciso was charged with illegal sale and illegal possession of
dangerous drugs, respectively defined and penalized under Sections 5 and 11,
Article II of RA 9165. To sustain a conviction for illegal possession of dangerous
drugs the following elements must be established: (a) the accused was in
possession of an item or object identified as a prohibited drug; (b) such possession
was not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed
the said drug.29 On the other hand, for a successful prosecution of the offense of
illegal sale of drugs, the following elements must be proven: (1) the transaction or
sale took place; (2) the corpus delicti or the illicit drug was presented as evidence;
and (3) the buyer and the seller were identified.30
In both cases, the confiscated drug constitutes the very corpus delicti of the
offense31 and the fact of its existence is vital to sustain a judgment of
conviction.32 It is essential, therefore, that the identity and integrity of the seized
drugs be established with moral certainty.33 The prosecution must prove, beyond
reasonable doubt, that the substance seized from the accused is exactly the same
substance offered in court as proof of the crime. Each link to the chain of custody
must be accounted for.34
This resonates even more in buy-bust operations because "by the very nature of
anti-narcotics operations, the need for entrapment procedures, the use of shady
characters as informants, the ease with which sticks of marijuana or grams of
heroin can be planted in pockets or hands of unsuspecting provincial hicks, and the
secrecy that inevitably shrouds all drug deals, the possibility of abuse is great."35
In this regard, Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 lays down the procedures that the
buy-bust team must strictly follow to preserve the identity and integrity of the
confiscated drugs and/or paraphernalia:
SECTION 21. x x x
(a)
Parsed, the above provisions impose the following requirements in the manner of
handling and inventory, time, witnesses, and of place after the arrest of the
accused and seizure of the dangerous drugs:
All the above requirements must be strictly complied with for a successful
prosecution of the crimes of illegal sale and/or illegal possession of dangerous
drugs under RA 9165. To be sure, case law states that the procedure enshrined in
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 is a matter of substantive law, and cannot be
brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality; or worse, ignored as an
impediment to the conviction of illegal drug suspects.37 For indeed, however noble
the purpose or necessary the exigencies of the campaign against illegal drugs may
be, it is still a governmental action that must always be executed within the
boundaries of law.38
In the present case, the buy-bust team committed several and patent procedural
lapses in the conduct of the seizure, initial custody, and handling of the seized drug
- which thus created reasonable doubt as to the identity and integrity of the drugs
and, consequently, reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused.
The buy-bust team failed to comply with the mandatory requirements under
Section 21.
The phrase "immediately after seizure and confiscation" means that the physical
inventory and photographing of the drugs were intended by the law to be made
immediately after, or at the place of apprehension. And only if this is not
practicable that the IRR allows the inventory and photographing at the nearest
police station or the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team. This also
means that the three required witnesses should already be physically present at the
time of apprehension - a requirement that can easily be complied with by the buy-
bust team considering that the buy-bust operation is, by its nature, a planned
activity. In other words, the buy-bust team has enough time and opportunity to
bring with them said witnesses.
Moreover, while the IRR allows alternative places for the conduct of the inventory
and photographing of the seized drugs, the requirement of having the three
required witnesses to be physically present at the time or near the place of
apprehension is not dispensed with. The reason is simple: it is at the time of arrest
- or at the time of the drugs' "seizure and confiscation" - that the presence of the
three witnesses is most needed, as it is their presence at the time of seizure and
confiscation that would insulate against the police practice of planting evidence.
Here, the buy-bust team utterly failed to comply with the foregoing requirements.
To start with, no photographs of the seized drugs were taken at the place of seizure
or at the police station where the inventory was conducted. To be sure, the taking
of photographs of the seized drugs is not a menial requirement that can be easily
dispensed with. Photographs provide credible proof of the state or condition of the
illegal drugs and/or paraphernalia recovered from the place of apprehension to
ensure that the identity and integrity of the recovered items are preserved.
More importantly, there was no compliance with the three-witness rule. Based on
the narrations of PO3 Rivera39 and SPO4 Dela Peña,40 not one of the witnesses
required under Section 21 was present at the time the plastic sachets were
allegedly seized from Narciso or during the inventory of the recovered drugs at the
police station. Moreover, while the Certification of Inventory41 dated October 8,
2005 shows the signature of a certain Arturo L. Hatulan, an elected official, the
prosecution failed to present him as witness to testify thereon or to clarify whether
he was also present at the time the drugs were allegedly recovered from Narciso. In
any event, the buybust team still lacked two witnesses - representatives from the
DOJ and media and offered no explanation as to their absence. Their submissions,
in fact, do not indicate that they even exerted genuine effort to secure the presence
of the required witnesses at the time of apprehension.
The presence of the witnesses from the DOJ, media, and from public elective office
is necessary to protect and guard against the possibility of planting, contamination,
or loss of the seized drug. The presence of the three witnesses must be secured not
only during the inventory but, more importantly, at the time of the warrantless
arrest. It is at this point in which the presence of the three witnesses is most
needed, as it is their presence at the time of seizure and confiscation that would
belie any doubt as to the source, identity, and integrity of the seized drug. The
pronouncement of the Court in People v. Mendoza,42 is enlightening:
x x x Without the insulatingpresence of the representative from the
media or the Department of Justice, or any elected public official
during the seizure and marking of the sachets of shabu, the evils of
switching, "planting" or contamination of the evidence that had tainted
the buy-busts conducted under the regime of RA No. 6425 (Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972) again reared their ugly heads as to negate the
integrity and credibility of the seizure and confiscation of the sachets
of shabu that were evidence herein of the corpus delicti, and thus
adversely affected the trustworthiness of the incrimination of the
accused. Indeed, the insulating presence of such witnesses would have
preserved an unbroken chain of custody.43 (Emphasis supplied)
The practice of police operatives of not bringing to the intended place of arrest the
three witnesses, when they could easily do so - and "calling them in" to the place of
inventory to "witness" the inventory and photographing of the drugs only after the
buy-bust operation has already been finished - does not achieve the purpose of the
law in having these witnesses prevent or insulate against the planting of drugs.
To restate, the presence of the three witnesses at the time of seizure and
confiscation of the drugs must be secured and complied with at the time of the buy-
bust arrest; such that they are required to be at or near the intended place of the
arrest so that they can be ready to witness the inventory and photographing of the
seized and confiscated drugs "immediately after seizure and confiscation."
Following the IRR of RA 9165, the courts may allow a deviation from the mandatory
requirements of Section 21 in exceptional cases, where the following requisites are
present: (1) the existence of justifiable grounds to allow departure from
the rule on strict compliance; and (2) the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
team.44 If these elements are present, the seizure and custody of the confiscated
drug shall not be rendered void and invalid regardless of the noncompliance with
the mandatory requirements of Section 21. It has also been emphasized that the
State bears the burden of proving the justifiable cause.45Thus, for the said saving
clause to apply, the prosecution must first recognize the lapse or lapses on the part
of the buy-bust team and justify or explain the same.46
The first requirement for the saving clause to apply is for the prosecution to
recognize the lapses in the prescribed procedures and then provide a suitable
explanation for noncompliance.
Here, the prosecution did not even concede that there were lapses in the conduct of
the buy-bust operation. Also, no explanation was offered as to the absence of the
three (3) witnesses at the place and time of seizure, or as to the failure to
photograph the confiscated items immediately after seizure or during inventory in
the presence of the insulating witnesses. It must be noted that the requirements
under Section 21 are not unknown to the buy bust team, who are presumed to be
knowledgeable of the law demanding the preservation of the links in the chain of
custody.47 They are dutybound to fully comply with the requirements thereof, and if
their compliance is not full, they should at least have the readiness to explain the
reason for the step or steps omitted from such compliance.48
Verily, it was error on the part of the CA to put the blame on the accused for the
prosecution's failure to prove justifiable cause. The prosecution has the positive
duty to prove compliance with the procedure set forth in Section 21 of RA 9165,
and must have the initiative to not only acknowledge but also justify any perceived
deviations from the said procedure during the proceedings before the trial
court.49 The existence of justifiable cause must be proven as a fact, because the
Court cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even exist.50
The prosecution failed to establish the chain of custody of the seized drugs.
In People v. Alviz,51 the Court held that the integrity and evidentiary value of seized
items are properly preserved for as long as the chain of custody of the same is duly
established.
b.
In this case, gaps exist in the chain of custody of the seized items which creates
reasonable doubt as to the identity and integrity thereof.
First, the confiscated items were not marked immediately upon seizure. In People
v. Gonzales,52 the Court explained that:
Notably in this case, three (3) plastic sachets were recovered from Narciso: (1)
sachet bought by PO3 Rivera and (2) sachets confiscated by PO3 Ame; but the
markings were made not in the place of seizure and not by the police officer who
recovered the seized drugs.
Second, SPO4 Dela Peña testified that he was the one who made the Request for
Laboratory Examination.54 However, the Request for Laboratory Examination dated
October 8, 2005 was not subscribed by him but by Police Superintendent Sergio A.
Dimandal.55 Also, contrary to the findings of the trial court, SPO4 Dela Peña's
testimony is not clear as to who actually delivered the drugs together with the
request to the crime laboratory for forensic examination.56
Third, the Request for Laboratory Examination,57 with its accompanying specimen,
was received from a certain PO2 Corpus by a certain PO1 Legaspi R.B. on October
8, 2005 at 9:15 p.m.; but the records are bereft of any evidence as to how
the seized items were passed on and placed in the hands of PO2 Corpus
and PO1 Legaspi R.B., or how the integrity of said items was preserved
while they remained in their custody. Moreover, no other testimony was
offered to explain how the seized drugs were turned over to PSI Donna
Villa Huelgas, the forensic chemist who conducted the examination.
Fourth, the Court does not see from the records the details on how the specimen
was handled from the time it was submitted for laboratory examination up to time
it was formally offered to the court. Forensic Chemist PSI Huelgas did not testify on
how she handled the seized item during examination and before it was transferred
to the court which testimony is required to ensure that that there was no change in
the condition of the seized drug and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to
have possession while in her custody. In this case, instead of the forensic chemist
turning over the substance to the court and testifying, the parties merely stipulated
on the existence and due execution of the Chemistry Report No. D-1127-05, Final
Chemistry Report No. D-1127-05, Chemistry Report findings and conclusions, and
the name and signature of PSI Huelgas. However, these stipulations do not prove
how the drugs were handled by said chemist.
As a method of authenticating
evidence, the chain of custody
rule requires that the admission
of an exhibit be preceded by
evidence sufficient to support a
finding that the matter in
question is what the proponent
claims it to be. It would
include testimony about
every link in the chain, from
the moment the item was
picked up to the time it is
offered into evidence, in
such a way that every
person who touched the
exhibit would describe how
and from whom it was
received, where it was and
what happened to it while in
the witness' possession, the
condition in which it was
received and the condition in
which it was delivered to the
next link in the chain. These
witnesses would then
describe the precautions
taken to ensure that there
had been no change in the
condition of the item and no
opportunity for someone not
in the chain to have
possession of the
same.60 (Emphasis supplied)
In turn, the importance of establishing the chain of custody in drugs cases was
explained in Mallillin v. People61:
As in Sanchez, the Court finds that while the parties indeed made the stipulations in
question, such stipulations do not relate to or do not cover the specific manner by
which the seized items were handled while in their possession. Further, they do not
indicate how such items were subsequently turned over to the next responsible
party.
As the seized drugs themselves are the corpus delicti of the crimes charged, it is of
utmost importance that there be no doubt or uncertainty as to their identity and
integrity. The State, and no other party, has the responsibility to explain the lapses
in the procedures taken to preserve the chain of custody of the dangerous drugs.
Without the explanation by the State, the evidence of the corpus delicti is
unreliable, and the acquittal of the accused should follow on the ground that his
guilt has not been shown beyond reasonable doubt.63
Here, the reliance of the RTC and CA on the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty despite the lapses in the procedures undertaken by the
buy-bust team is fundamentally unsound because the lapses themselves are
affirmative proofs of irregularity.66 The presumption of regularity in the
performance of duty cannot overcome the stronger presumption of innocence in
favor of the accused.67 Otherwise, a mere rule of evidence will defeat the
constitutionally enshrined right to be presumed innocent.68 This Court, in People v.
Catalan,69 had already warned the lower courts against this pitfall:
V. SPECIFIC RULES
xxxx
The Court has ruled in People v. Zheng Bai Hui72 that it will not presume to set an a
prioribasis on what detailed acts police authorities might credibly undertake and
carry out in their entrapment operations. However, given the police operational
procedures and the fact that buy-bust is a planned operation, it strains credulity
why the buy-bust team could not have ensured the presence of the required
witnesses pursuant to Section 21 or at the very least marked, photographed and
inventoried the seized items according to the procedures in their own operations
manual.
All told, the prosecution failed to prove the corpus delicti of the offenses of sale and
possession of illegal drugs due to the multiple unexplained breaches of procedure
committed by the buy-bust team in the seizure, custody, and handling of the seized
drugs. In other words, the prosecution was not able to overcome the presumption
of innocence of accused-appellant Narciso.
As a reminder, the Court exhorts the prosecutors to diligently discharge their onus
to prove compliance with the provisions of Section 21 of RA 9165, as amended, and
its IRR, which is fundamental in preserving the integrity and evidentiary value of
the corpus delicti. To the mind of the Court, the procedure outlined in Section
21 is straightforward and easy to comply with. In the presentation of evidence
to prove compliance therewith, the prosecutors are enjoined to recognize any
deviation from the prescribed procedure and provide the explanation therefor as
dictated by available evidence. Compliance with Section 21 being integral to every
conviction, the appellate court, this Court included, is at liberty to review the
records of the case to satisfy itself that the required proof has been adduced by the
prosecution whether the accused has raised, before the trial or appellate court, any
issue of non-compliance. If deviations are observed and no justifiable reasons are
provided, the conviction must be overturned, and the innocence of the accused
affirmed.73
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated August 14, 2014 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05461 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accused-appellant Narciso Supat y Radoc is hereby ACQUITTED for failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He is ordered
immediately RELEASED from detention, unless he is confined for any other lawful
cause.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections,
Muntinlupa City, for immediate implementation. The Director of the Bureau of
Corrections is directed to report to this Court, within five (5) days from receipt of
this Decision, the action he has taken. A copy shall also be furnished to the Director
General of Philippine National Police for his information.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Senior Associate Justice, (Chairperson), Perlas-Bernabe, and Reyes, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
Peralta, J., pls. see separate concurring opinion.
Endnotes:
1
CA rollo, pp. 95-97.
2
Id. at 83-93. Penned by Associate Justice Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo
and concurred in by Associate Justices Amy C. Lazaro-Javier and
Zenaida T. Galapate-Laguilles.
3
Records (Crim. Case No. 5435-SPL), pp. 164-168. Penned by Judge
Francisco Dizon Paño.
4
AN ACT INSTITUTING THE COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS
ACT OF 2002, REPEALING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425, OTHERWISE
KNOWN AS THE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 1972, AS AMENDED,
PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES (2002).
5
Records (Crim. Case No. 5434-SPL), p. 1.
6
Records (Crim. Case No. 5435-SPL), p. 1.
7
Id. at 21.
8
Id. at 38.
9
CA rollo, pp. 85-86.
10
Id. at 86.
11
Id. at 86-87.
12
Supra note 3.
13
Id. at 168.
14
Id. at 167.
15
Id. at 170.
16
CA rollo, p. 45.
17
Id. at 42-43.
18
Supra note 2.
19
Id. at 88-89.
20
Id. at 89.
21
Id. at 91.
22
Id. at 90.
23
Id.
24
Id. at 91.
25
Id. at 91-92.
26
Id. at 95-97.
27
Rollo, pp. 17-18.
28
Id. at 21-25, 26-32.
29
People v. Paz, G.R. No. 229512, January 31, 2018, p. 7.
30
People v. Bartolini, 791 Phil. 626, 633-634 (2016).
31
People v. Sagana, G.R. No. 208471, August 2, 2017, p. 8.
32
Derilo v. People, 784 Phil. 679, 686 (2016).
33
See People v. Alvaro, G.R. No. 225596, January 10, 2018, p. 6.
34
See People v. Viterbo, 739 Phil. 593, 601 (2014).
35
People v. Saragena, G.R. No. 210677, August 23, 2017, p. 7.
36
AN ACT TO FURTHER STRENGTHEN THE ANTI-DRUG CAMPAIGN OF
THE GOVERNMENT, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTION 21 OF
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE
"COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002."
38
Id.
39
See TSN, March 17, 2008, pp. 3-4.
40
See TSN, February 17, 2009, pp. 9-15.
41
Exh. records (Crim. Case No. 5434-SPL), p. 16.
42
736 Phil. 749 (2014).
43
Id. at 764.
44
RA 9165, Sec. 21(1) as implemented by its IRR.
45
People v. Beran, 724 Phil. 788, 822 (2014).
People v. Reyes, G.R. No. 199271, October 19, 2016, 806 SCRA 513,
46
536.
47
People v. Geronimo, G.R. No. 180447, August 23, 2017, p. 8.
48
Id.
49
People v. Ramos, G.R. No. 233744, February 28, 2018, pp. 9-10.
50
People v. Mamangon, G.R. No. 229102, January 29, 2018, p. 7,
citing People v. De Guzman, 630 Phil. 637, 649 (2010).
51
703 Phil. 58, 73 (2013).
52
708 Phil. 121 (2013).
53
Id. at 130-131.
54
TSN, February 17, 2009, p. 13.
55
Exh. "C," records (Crim. Case No. 5434-SPL), p. 14.
56
See TSN, February 17,2009, pp. 13-14.
57
Exh. "C," records (Crim. Case No. 5434-SPL), p. 14.
58
590 Phil. 214 (2008).
59
Id. at 225.
60
Id. at 237-238.
61
576 Phil. 576 (2008).
62
Id. at 588-589.
63
People v. Gonzales, supra note 52, at 123.
64
1987 CONSTITUTION, Art. III, Sec. 14(2). "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved x x x."
65
People v. Belocura, 693 Phil. 476, 503-504 (2012).
66
See People v. Mendoza, supra note 42, at 770.
67
Id.
68
See People v. Catalan, 699 Phil. 603, 621 (2012).
69
Id.
70
Id. at 621.
72
393 Phil. 68, 133 (2000).
73
See People v. Jugo, G.R. No. 231792, January 29, 2018, p. 10.