G.R. No. 210615. July 26, 2017.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ABENIR

BRUSOLA y BARAGWA, accused-appellant.
Criminal Law; Parricide; Elements of.—Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Article 246. Parricide.—Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be
guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. The
trial court appreciated the evidence presented by the parties, considered the credibility of
their respective witnesses, and found that all the elements of the crime of parricide were
sufficiently proved by the prosecution. There was no dispute as to the relationship between
the accused-appellant and the victim. As for the act of killing, the trial court held: With
respect to the killing by the accused of his wife, their daughter Joanne clearly testified that
she suddenly saw her father hit the head of her mother with a small mallet. Joanne’s
straightforward and candid narration of the incident is regarded as positive and credible
evidence, sufficient to convict the accused. Well-settled is the rule that it is un-
_______________

* SECOND DIVISION.

142
142 SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Brusola
natural for a relative, in this case the accused’s own child, who is interested in
vindicating the crime, to accuse somebody else other than the real culprit. For her to do so is
to let the guilty go free. Where there is nothing to indicate that witnesses were actuated by
improper motives on the witness stand, their positive declarations made under solemn oath
deserve full faith and credence.
Same; Same; Mitigating Circumstances; Penalties; Where there are mitigating
circumstances in a parricide case, the proper penalty to be imposed is reclusion perpetua.—
The trial court properly sentenced accused-appellant Abenir to the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. As appreciated by the Court of Appeals, where there are mitigating circumstances
in a parricide case, the proper penalty to be imposed is reclusion perpetual. In People v. Sales,
658 SCRA 367 (2011), this Court explained: As regards the penalty, parricide is punishable
by reclusion perpetua to death . . . the presence of only one mitigating circumstance, which
is, voluntary surrender, with no aggravating circumstance, is sufficient for the imposition
of reclusion perpetua as the proper prison term. Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code provides
in part as follows: Art. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties.— . . . In all cases
in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the following
rules shall be observed in the application thereof: . . . . 3. When the commission of the act is
attended by some mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating circumstance, the
lesser penalty shall be applied. . . . . The crime of parricide is punishable by the indivisible
penalties of reclusion perpetua to death. With one mitigating circumstance, which is
voluntary surrender, and no aggravating circumstance, the imposition of the lesser penalty
of reclusion perpetua and not the penalty of death on appellant was thus proper.
Same; Same; Penalties; Considering that the penalty for parricide consists of two (2)
indivisible penalties — reclusion perpetua to death — Rule 63, and not Rule 64, is
applicable.—Considering that the penalty for parricide consists of two (2) indivisible
penalties — reclusion perpetua to death — Rule 63, and not Rule 64, is applicable. Thus, the
penalty of reclusion perpetua was properly imposed.
Same; Same; The promise of forever is not an authority for the other to own one’s spouse.—
The promise of forever is not an authority for the other to own one’s spouse. If anything, it is
an obligation to

143
VOL. 833, JULY 26, 2017 143
People vs. Brusola
love and cherish despite his or her imperfections. To be driven to anger, rage, or murder
due to jealousy is not a manifestation of this sacred understanding. One who professes love
should act better than this. The accused-appellant was never entitled to hurt, maim, or kill
his spouse, no matter the reasons. He committed a crime. He must suffer its consequences.

APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney’s Office for accused-appellant.
LEONEN, J.:

There is never any justification for a husband to hit his wife with a maso (mallet).
This resolves the appeal1 to the Court of Appeals’ July 17, 2013 Decision,2 affirming
the February 4, 2010 Decision3 of Branch 206, Regional Trial Court, Muntinlupa City,
which found Abenir Brusola (Abenir) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of parricide
under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code. The trial court imposed the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and ordered him to pay the children of the deceased the amount
of P50,000.00 as indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.4
_______________

1 The appeal was filed under Rules of Court, Rule 124, Sec. 13(c).
2 Rollo, pp. 2-11. The Decision, docketed as C.A.-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04419, was penned by Associate
Justice Melchor Q.C. Sadang and concurred in by Associate Justices Celia C. Librea-Leagogo and Franchito
N. Diamante of the Fifteenth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
3 CA Rollo, pp. 15-27. The Decision, docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-650, was penned by Judge Patria
A. Manalastas-De Leon of Branch 206, Regional Trial Court, Muntinlupa City.
4 Id., at pp. 26-27.

144
144 SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Brusola
In the Information dated July 14, 2006, accused-appellant Abenir was charged
with the killing of his wife, Delia Brusola (Delia), as follows:
That on or about the 12th day of July 2006, in the City of Muntinlupa, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, being the husband
of complainant DELIA BRUSOLA y RAMILO, now deceased, with intent to kill and with the
use of ball hammer (maso), did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously hit his
said wife, DELIA BRUSOLA y RAMILO with the said ball hammer on her head, thereby
causing fatal injury to the latter which
directly caused her death.
Contrary to Law.5

On August 1, 2006, accused-appellant Abenir was arraigned and pleaded not

guilty. After pretrial, trial on the merits ensued.6
The prosecution’s version of the events was as follows:
Abenir and Delia’s children, Joanne, Abegail, and Kristofer,7 testified that they,
together with their parents and other sister Jessica, were at home on July 12, 2006,
at around 6:45 p.m. Their house was a one (1)-storey building and had an open sala,
a kitchen, and one (1) bedroom. Kristofer was asleep in the bedroom. Joanne was
eating with her back turned to her father, who was preparing for work. Jessica,
Abegail, and Delia were watching the television, with Delia seated on the floor near
the toilet. Joanne would occasionally glance at her father and noticed that he seemed
restless. Suddenly, Joanne saw Abenir hit Delia on the head with a maso. A second
blow hit the cement wall. Joanne yelled, “Tay!” and tried to pacify Abenir, asking why
he did it. Abenir
_______________

5 Id., at p. 15.
6 Id.
7 Id., at pp. 16-20.

145
VOL. 833, JULY 26, 2017 145
People vs. Brusola
said he saw a man in the bathroom with Delia. Joanne looked in the bathroom but
saw no one. Kristofer was awoken. When he emerged from the bedroom, he saw his
father still holding the maso while his sisters Joanne and Abigail were attending to
Delia, who was on the floor and had blood on her head. Kristofer held Abenir. Delia
was rushed to the hospital by their neighbors. Joanne lost consciousness but arose
when their neighbors massaged her head. Abenir was brought to the police station.
The next day, their neighbor Joy Tabarno informed the Brusola siblings that Delia
had passed away.8 Dr. Joseph Palmero, a medico-legal officer of the Philippine
National Police Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame, testified on the cause of Delia’s
death.9
The defense’s version of the events, as testified by Abenir, is as follows:
Abenir worked in Saudi Arabia as a mason, a steel man, and a pipe fitter from
1986 until he returned in 1992, when his sister informed him that Delia had a
paramour. He and his family lived in Muntinlupa City while he worked for the Makati
Development Corporation until 2001, when he moved them to Batangas where Delia’s
family could take care of them, considering that he was often at work. Sometime in
September 2002, at around 2:00 a.m., he was on his way to their house in Batangas
when he saw his brother-in-law on the road. When his brother-in-law saw him, he
ran inside Abenir’s house and reemerged with a shirtless man. When Abenir went
inside, he asked Delia why she was still awake and who the shirtless man was. Delia
just nagged him so he slept as he was very tired. The following day, he went to the
store, and some men mocked him. Abenir later asked Delia about the shirtless man
again. Delia responded by throwing a
_______________

8 Rollo, p. 4.
9 Id., at pp. 4-5.

146
146 SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Brusola
glass at him. Thus, Abenir went back to Alabang in 2006 to avoid mockery and a fight
with his brother-in-law.10
On the night of July 12, 2006, Abenir came home at around 7:00 p.m. or 8:00 p.m.
Two (2) of his children were asleep and one (1) was watching the television. While
Abenir was preparing things, Delia went outside. She appeared to be waiting for
somebody. After taking a bath, she fixed her face. When Abenir asked if Delia was
going somewhere, she said it was none of his business. Abenir went to the bathroom
for his personal effects. While inside, he heard people talking outside and looked out
through a crack in the plywood wall. He saw a man and a woman kiss and identified
the woman as Delia, who told the man, “Huwag muna ngayon, nandiyan pa siya.”
The man embraced her, and groped her breast and private parts. Abenir picked up
the maso, went outside, and approached them, who were surprised to see him. Abenir
attacked the man who used Delia as a shield and pushed her toward Abenir, causing
them to stumble on the ground. Delia went inside while Abenir chased the man. After
a failed pursuit, he returned to the house where Joanne hugged him and inquired
what happened. Abenir answered that Delia was having an affair. He noticed that
Kristofer was carrying Delia whose head was bleeding. He instructed his children to
take her to the hospital. He informed Joanne that he would surrender and asked his
children to call the barangay officials and the police. He voluntarily went with the
officers to the police station where he learned that Delia was hit on the head. He
asserted that he planned to attack the man whom he saw was with his wife but
accidentally hit Delia instead.11
In the Decision12 dated February 4, 2010, the trial court found Abenir guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The dispositive portion read:
_______________

10 Id., at pp. 5-6.

11 Id., at p. 6.
12 CA Rollo, pp. 15-27.

147
VOL. 833, JULY 26, 2017 147
People vs. Brusola
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Abenir Brusola y Baragwa GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide defined and penalized under Article 246 of the
Revised Penal Code, and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. The accused is likewise ordered to pay the children of the deceased, Delia
Brusola y Ramilo, the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
In the service of his sentence, the accused shall be credited with the period of his
preventive imprisonment.
SO ORDERED.13

Abenir appealed the trial court Decision to the Court of Appeals.14 He argued that
there was inconsistency between the testimonies of Joanne and Abegail.15 Moreover,
Joanne, the prosecution’s lone eyewitness to the attack, purportedly had ill motive
against him since he had opposed her plans of early marriage.16 Further, in imposing
the penalty of reclusion perpetua, the trial court did not consider the mitigating
circumstances of passion, obfuscation, and voluntary surrender.17
The Court of Appeals found no merit in Abenir’s arguments. Thus, in the
Decision18 dated July 17, 2013, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s findings:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The
Decision, dated February 4, 2010, of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch
206, in Criminal Case No. 06-650, is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.19
_______________

13 Id., at pp. 26-27.

14 Id., at pp. 34-45.
15 Id., at p. 41.
16 Id.
17 Id., at p. 43.
18 Rollo, pp. 2-11.
19 Id., at p. 11.
 148
148 SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Brusola
Abenir filed a Notice of Appeal. In compliance with its Resolution20 dated August
23, 2013 which gave due course to accused-appellant Abenir’s notice of appeal, the
Court of Appeals elevated the records of this case to this Court. In the
Resolution21 dated March 10, 2014, this Court directed both the Office of the Solicitor
General and the Public Attorney’s Office to file their respective supplemental briefs.
Both parties filed their respective manifestations that they would not be filing
supplemental briefs.22
After considering the parties’ arguments and the records of this case, this Court
resolves to dismiss accused-appellant Abenir’s appeal for failing to show reversible
error in the assailed decision.
Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Article 246. Parricide.—Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be
guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.

The trial court appreciated the evidence presented by the parties, considered the
credibility of their respective witnesses, and found that all the elements of the crime
of parricide were sufficiently proved by the prosecution. There was no dispute as to
the relationship between the accused-appellant and the victim.23 As for the act of
killing, the trial court held:
With respect to the killing by the accused of his wife, their daughter Joanne clearly
testified that she suddenly saw her father hit the head of her mother with
_______________

20 Id., at p. 1.
21 Id., at p. 17.
22 Id., at pp. 20-22, OSG Manifestation submitted on May 22, 2014; id., at pp. 23-25, PAO
Manifestation submitted on May 30, 2014.
23 CA Rollo, p. 24.

149
VOL. 833, JULY 26, 2017 149
People vs. Brusola
a small mallet. Joanne’s straightforward and candid narration of the incident is regarded as
positive and credible evidence, sufficient to convict the accused. Well-settled is the rule that
it is unnatural for a relative, in this case the accused’s own child, who is interested in
vindicating the crime, to accuse somebody else other than the real culprit. For her to do so is
to let the guilty go free. Where there is nothing to indicate that witnesses were actuated by
improper motives on the witness stand, their positive declarations made under solemn oath
deserve full faith and credence.24 (Citations omitted)
 Thus, this Court quotes with approval the Court of Appeals’ Decision:
It is hornbook doctrine that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses
and their testimonies are entitled to the highest respect. Having seen and heard the
witnesses and observed their behavior and manner of testifying, the trial court is deemed to
have been in a better position to weigh the evidence. The reason for this is that trial courts
have the unique opportunity to observe the witnesses first hand and note their demeanor,
conduct, and attitude under grilling examination. Thus, the trial court’s evaluation shall be
binding on the appellate court unless it is shown that certain facts of substance and value
have been plainly overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied. There is no reason to deviate
from the rule.
The alleged inconsistency in the testimonies of Joanne and Abigail does not affect the
credibility of
either witness. What Abigail [and] Joanne were actually doing at the precise moment that
appellant struck his wife with a maso is absolutely insignificant and unsubstantial to merit
consideration . . . Inconsistencies that refer only to minor details do not weaken the credibility
of witnesses but are rather signs that the witnesses were not rehearsed.
_______________

24 Id., at pp. 24-25.

150
150 SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Brusola
What is important is that the prosecution witnesses were consistent on the principal
occurrence and the identity of the accused. Thus, Joanne narrated in a direct and forthright
manner how she saw appellant hit her mother with a maso on the head and her testimony is
supported by the physical evidence of the injury sustained by the victim. While Abigail and
Kristofer did not actually see appellant in the act of hitting their mother, nevertheless, they
saw appellant holding the murder weapon and their mother fallen on the floor with a bloodied
head immediately after the criminal act was committed . . .
The alleged ill motive of Joanne is hardly worthy of consideration and belief. Joanne and
her siblings had lost their mother and they also stood to lose their father to prison, leaving
them virtual orphans. Assuming that appellant had previously disapproved of Joanne’s early
marriage, such would not have been a sufficient motive for her to wrongly accuse her own
father of a heinous crime . . .25 (Citations omitted)

Moreover, the trial court properly sentenced accused-appellant Abenir to the

penalty of reclusion perpetua. As appreciated by the Court of Appeals, where there
are mitigating circumstances in a parricide case, the proper penalty to be imposed
is reclusion perpetual.26 In People v. Sales,27 this Court explained:
As regards the penalty, parricide is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death . . . the
presence of only one mitigating circumstance, which is, voluntary surrender, with no
aggravating circumstance, is sufficient for the imposition of reclusion perpetua as the proper
prison
_______________

25 Rollo, pp. 8-9.

26 See People v. Arnante, 439 Phil. 754; 391 SCRA 155 (2002) [Per J. Vitug, First Division]; People v.
Joyno, 364 Phil. 305; 304 SCRA 655 (1999) [Per J. Gonzaga-Reyes, En Banc].
27 674 Phil. 150; 658 SCRA 367 (2011) [Per J. Del Castillo, First Division].

151
VOL. 833, JULY 26, 2017 151
People vs. Brusola
term. Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code provides in part as follows:
Art. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties.— . . .
In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties,
the following rules shall be observed in the application thereof:
....
3. When the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and
there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
....
The crime of parricide is punishable by the indivisible penalties of reclusion perpetua to
death. With one mitigating circumstance, which is voluntary surrender, and no aggravating
circumstance, the imposition of the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua and not the penalty
of death on appellant was thus proper.28 (Citation omitted)

Accused-appellant Abenir cited People v. Genosa29 to support the imposition of a

lower penalty in light of the mitigating circumstance.30 True, this Court
in Genosa applied Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, instead of Article 63, to
determine the penalty for parricide:
The penalty for parricide imposed by Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion
perpetua to death. Since two mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance have
been found to have attended the commission of the offense, the penalty shall be lowered by
one (1) degree, pursuant to Article 64 of paragraph 5
_______________

28 Id., at p. 166; pp. 381-382.

29 464 Phil. 680; 419 SCRA 537 (2004) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].
30 CA Rollo, pp. 76-77, Brief for the Accused-appellant.

152
152 SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Brusola
of the same Code. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period is imposable,
considering that two mitigating circumstances are to be taken into account in reducing the
penalty by one degree, and no other modifying circumstances were shown to have attended
the commission of the offense. Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the
penalty shall be within the range of that which is next lower in degree — prisión mayor —
and the maximum shall be within the range of the medium period of reclusion temporal.
Considering all the circumstances of the instant case, we deem it just and proper to impose
the penalty of prisión mayor in its minimum period, or six (6) years and one (1) day in prison
as minimum; to reclusion temporal in its medium period, or 14 years 8 months and 1 day as
maximum. Noting that appellant has already served the minimum period, she may now apply
for and be released from detention on parole.31 (Citations omitted)

However, there is no basis to apply Article 64 to the crime of parricide. Articles 63

and 64 of the Revised Penal Code provide:
Article 63. Rules for the Application of Indivisible Penalties.—In all cases in which the
law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any
mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed.
In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties,
the following rules shall be observed in the application thereof:
1. When in the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating circumstance,
the greater penalty shall be applied.
2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of
the deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
_______________

31 People v. Genosa, supra note 29 at pp. 746-747; pp. 593-594.

153
VOL. 833, JULY 26, 2017 153
People vs. Brusola
3. When the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and there
is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
4. When both mitigating and aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the
act, the courts shall reasonably allow them to offset one another in consideration of
their number and importance, for the purpose of applying the penalty in accordance
with the preceding rules, according to the result of such compensation.
Article 64. Rules for the Application of Penalties Which Contain Three Periods.—In
cases in which the penalties prescribed by law contain three periods, whether it be a single
divisible penalty or composed of three different penalties, each one of which forms a period
in accordance with the provisions of Articles 76 and 77, the courts shall observe for the
application of the penalty the following rules, according to whether there are or are not
mitigating or aggravating circumstances:
1. When there are neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, they shall impose
the penalty prescribed by law in its medium period.
 2. When only a mitigating circumstance is present in the commission of the act, they shall
impose the penalty in its minimum period.
3. When only an aggravating circumstance is present in the commission of the act, they
shall impose the penalty in its maximum period.
4. When both mitigating and aggravating circumstances are present, the court shall
reasonably offset those of one class against the other according to their relative weight.
5. When there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating
circumstances

154
154 SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Brusola
are present, the court shall impose the penalty next lower to that prescribed by law, in
the period that it may deem applicable, according to the number and nature of such
circumstances.
6. Whatever may be the number and nature of the aggravating circumstances, the courts
shall not impose a greater penalty than that prescribed by law, in its maximum period.
7. Within the limits of each period, the courts shall determine the extent of the penalty
according to the number and nature of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances
and the greater or lesser extent of the evil produced by the crime.

Considering that the penalty for parricide consists of two (2) indivisible penalties
— reclusion perpetua to death — Rule 63, and not Rule 64, is applicable. Thus, the
penalty of reclusion perpetua was properly imposed.
In line with current jurisprudence,32 the civil indemnity and the moral damages
awarded to the victim’s children are increased to P75,000.00 each and P75,000.00 as
exemplary damages is added.
The promise of forever is not an authority for the other to own one’s spouse. If
anything, it is an obligation to love and cherish despite his or her imperfections. To
be driven to anger, rage, or murder due to jealousy is not a manifestation of this
sacred understanding. One who professes love should act better than this. The
accused-appellant was never entitled to hurt, maim, or kill his spouse, no matter the
reasons. He committed a crime. He must suffer its consequences.
WHEREFORE, this Court ADOPTS the findings of fact and conclusions of law of
the Court of Appeals in its July 17,
_______________

32 People v. Jugueta, G.R. No. 202124, April 5, 2016, 788 SCRA 331 [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].

155
VOL. 833, JULY 26, 2017 155
People vs. Brusola
2013 Decision in C.A.-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04419. Accused-appellant Abenir
Brusola y Baragwa is GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of parricide under Article
246 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and is sentenced to reclusion
perpetua. The assailed decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the
heirs of the victim are entitled to P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral
damages, and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages. The award of damages shall earn
interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of the
judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson), Peralta, Mendoza and Martires, JJ., concur.
Judgment affirmed with modification.
Notes.—In the case of Parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the relationship
between the accused and the deceased would be the marriage certificate. In this case,
the testimony of the accused that he was married to the victim, in itself, is ample
proof of such relationship as the testimony can be taken as an admission against
penal interest. (People vs. Dela Cruz, 612 SCRA 364 [2010])
Under Article 246 of the Revised Penal, the crime of parricide is punishable
by reclusion perpetua to death; Nonetheless, in view of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9346
prohibiting the imposition of death penalty, the courts a quo correctly sentenced the
accused-appellant to reclusion perpetua; It must be emphasized, however, that the
accused-appellant shall not be eligible for parole pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No.
9346. (People vs. Gamez, 708 SCRA 625 [2013])

——o0o——
© Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.