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The Essential Ideas of Islamic Philosophy

A Brief Survey
By
Prof. Mashhad Al-Allaf
The Edwin Mellen Press, USA, 2006
ISBN: 0-7734-5848-4, HC, 345 pp.
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Al-Kindī’s Natural Philosophy

The simultaneous existence of matter, motion, and time

Al-Kindī proved the impossibility of the existence of an actual infinite

body by asserting that bodies are quantitative objects, and then by proving
that any quantitative thing could not have infinity in actuality.
Time and motion are quantitative; thus, it is impossible for both to be
infinite in actuality. Therefore, they are finite and time has a beginning.
Let us now follow al-Kindī’s proof that motion and time are finite:

If there is a body, then there must of necessity either be

motion or not be motion. If there is a body and there was no
motion, then either there would be no motion at all, or it would
not be, though it would be possible for it to be. If there were no
motion at all, then motion would not be an existent. However,
since a body exists, motion is an existent, and this is an
impossible contradiction and it is not possible for there to be no
motion at all, if a body exists. If, furthermore, when there is an
existing body, it is possible that there is existing motion, then
motion necessarily exists in some bodies, for what is possible is
that which exists in some possessors of its substance; as the (art
of) writing which may be affirmed as a possibility for
Mu ammad, though it is not in him in actuality, since it does
exist in some human substance, i.e., in another man. Motion,
therefore, necessarily exists in some bodies, and exists in a simple
body, existing necessarily in a simple body; accordingly a body
exists and motion exists.
Now it has been said that there may not be motion when a
body exists. Accordingly, there will be motion when body exists,
and there will not be motion when body exists, and this is an
absurdity and an impossible contradiction, and it is not possible
for there to be a body and not motion; thus, when there is a body
there is motion necessarily.50

50 Al-Kindī, Al-Kindī’s metaphysics (trans. Ivry), p. 71.

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Premises in support of al-Kindī’s argument

Al-Kindī, before presenting his arguments, starts by offering a few

premises and conclusions of previous mathematical demonstrations that
are clear. These demonstrations need no further proof:

1. The actual body of the universe is finite, and it is quantitatively

finite.
2. Things that are predicated of a finite object are necessarily
finite, such as place, time, motion, and quantity.
3. If there is motion, there is of necessity, a body. (We will return
to this statement later, when we see how al-Kindī proves it.)
4. Motion is not only spatial (from place to place), but may also
be of different kinds, such as change (internal motion—
chemical or biological), alteration, and the change of an
object’s substance (generation or corruption).
5. Every change or motion counts from the duration of the body;
thus, every change and motion is temporal.
6. It is not necessary for the whole to be in motion to say that the
whole body moves. The motion of some of the parts (and the
possibility of other parts moving) is enough of an indication
that the whole exists in motion.

The structure of al-Kindī’s argument on motion

Now let us go back to the section on al-Kindī’s natural philosophy to

examine and reconstruct his argument on motion. He says that

1. The existence of a body has one of these two possibilities: It

exists with motion, or, it exists without motion.
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2. Al-Kindī thinks that if a body exists, then it must, of necessity,

exist with motion. The movement from nonexistence to
existence is motion.
3. Now, if we take the second possibility and claim that a body
exists without motion, then we have to clarify further:

Either there would be no motion at all; or it would not be, though it

would be possible for it to be. Al-Kindī disproves the premise that there
would be no motion at all.

1. If a body exists and there is no motion at all, then that means

that motion does not exist.
2. However, since a body exists, motion is an existent too.
(According to premise number 2, motion is one of the things
predicated of the finite body.)
3. Therefore, to say that there is a body (an actual existent body)
with no motion at all is an impossible contradiction.
(According to premise number 4, motion is of many different
kinds.)
4. Therefore, it is impossible for a body to exist and be without
motion at all.

Clarification

The very concept of an actual, finite, existing body means, by

definition, an object with motion. For example, a wooden chair came into
existence by the act of a carpenter who made it out of various material
things; it came into existence through motion. The coming into being itself
is motion.
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A newborn baby (as an actual finite being) came into existence in a

process (motion) of being born and growing up, and thus existence
(coming into being), by definition, is motion.
Al-Kindī disproves the premise that motion would not be, though it
would be possible for it to be.

1. If we claim that a body exists with the possibility of being in

motion or not being in motion, then, its motion is possible to
be and not to be.
2. Al-Kindī says: “when there is an existing body, it is possible
that there is existing motion, then motion necessarily exists in
some bodies.”51
3. However, “that which is possible is that which exists in some
possessors of its substance.”52 For example, “writing may be
affirmed as a possibility for Mu ammad, though it is not in
him in actuality, since it does exist in some human substance,
i.e., in another man.”53
4. Motion, therefore, necessarily exists in some bodies, and exists
in the whole body.
5. Therefore, motion exists necessarily in the whole body;
accordingly, a body exists and motion exists.
6. Therefore, it is impossible for a body to exist and motion not to
exist.

51 Ibid., p. 71.

52 Ibid.

53 Ibid.
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7. Therefore, as al-Kindī says, “when there is a body there is

motion necessarily.”54

This last conclusion will be added to premise number 3 in the section

entitled “Premises supporting al-Kindī’s arguments.” Thus, number 3 will
read as a modified premise-proof statement of the simultaneous existence
of matter and motion as follows:
If there is motion, there is of necessity a body, and when there is a
body there is motion necessarily.
Remember that al-Kindī is not only trying to prove that an actual
finite quantitative body necessarily has a finite motion; he is also trying to
prove that matter and motion simultaneously coexist.

Is it possible for a body with no motion to start moving?

Al-Kindī did not stop at the previous proof; he went further to raise
certain difficulties regarding matter and motion. He says “It is sometimes
assumed that it is possible for the body of the universe to have been at rest
originally, to have the possibility to move, and then to have moved.”55
Al-Kindī thinks that this opinion is necessarily false. His argument is
that if the body of the universe was at rest originally and then moved, then
either (A) the body of the universe would have to be generated from
nothing, or (B) it is eternal.56
Al-Kindī disproves A, that the universe is generated from nothing, in
the following eight arguments:

54 Ibid.

55 Ibid., pp. 71–72.

56 Ibid.
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1. If the universe is generated from nothing, then its “becoming,”

or its coming to be, is prior to motion.
2. But, according to premise number 4, on the previous
classification of motion, generation is one of the species of
motion.
3. However, becoming a body is not prior to motion, since motion
is the essence of “becoming” (according to premise number 4
and modified premise number 3 above).
4. Therefore, the generation of a body can never precede motion.
5. It was said, however, that the universe was originally without
motion.
6. Thus it was, and no motion existed, and it was not, and no
motion existed, and this is an impossible contradiction.
7. Therefore, it is impossible, if a body is generated from nothing,
for it to be prior to motion.
8. Therefore, the assumption that the universe originally existed
in a motionless state and then started moving is contradictory
and necessarily false.

Al-Kindī disproves B, that the universe is eternal, having rested and

then moved, with these arguments:

1. If the body of the universe is eternal, having rested and then

moved, then the body of the universe, which is eternal, will
have moved from actual rest to actual movement.
2. However, that which is eternal does not move.
3. Therefore, the body of the universe is moving and not moving,
and this is an impossible contradiction.
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4. Therefore, it is not possible for the body of the universe to be

eternal, to be resting in actuality, and then to move beyond
infinity in actuality.
5. Motion, therefore, exists in the body of the universe, which,
accordingly, is never prior to motion. A motionless universe is
impossible.

Al-Kindī concludes from previous arguments:

Thus if there is motion there is, necessarily, a body, while if

there is a body there is, necessarily, motion.
It has been explained previously that time is not prior to
motion; nor, of necessity, is time prior to a body, since there is no
time other than through motion, and since there is no body
unless there is motion and no motion unless there is a body. Nor
does a body exist without duration, since duration is that in
which its being is, i.e., that in which the body exists; and there is
no duration of a body unless there is motion, since a body always
occurs with motion, as has been explained. The motion of the
body counts the duration of the body, which is always a
concomitant of the body, which is (also) always a concomitant of
the body. A body, therefore, is never prior to time; and thus a
body, motion, and time are never prior to one another.57

When al-Kindī’s account of natural philosophy is placed in its

historical context, i.e., the ninth century, it is clear that he presents an
advanced philosophy of time, motion, and matter.
Al-Kindī offers another account to prove the impossibility of a static,
motionless universe; saying that another account “shall add to the skill of
investigators of this approach.”58 However, we are not going to examine
these arguments for two reasons: first, what we presented is sufficient to

57 Ibid., pp. 72–73.

58 Ibid., p. 73.
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serve our purpose, and second, according to modern science and the first
principle of Newton’s physics (the principle of inertia), matter is in a
constant state of motion.

Al-Kindī’s Cosmos between Aristotle and the Qur’an

Why does al-Kindī overemphasize the relation of matter and motion

within a finite universe? We can offer two reasons:
1. Qur’anic concepts. The Qur’an presents a cosmos in which
everything is in a constant state of motion: the earth, the moon, the sun,
the stars, the heavens—the whole universe. God says in the Qur’an:

And a sign for them is the night. We withdraw therefrom the

day, and behold they are in darkness. And the sun runs on its
fixed course for a term (appointed). That is the decree of the All-
Mighty, the All-Knowing. And the moon, we have measured for it
mansions (to traverse) till it returns like the old dried curved date
stalk. It is not for the sun to overtake the moon, nor does the
night outstrip the day. They all float each in an orbit. (Qur’an
36:37–40)

2. Aristotelian physics is static. The Aristotelian cosmos is based on

Aristotle’s main principle of physics, which states that everything exists in
a static state, and does not move until it is forced to move by something
else or an agent. This principle left two difficulties that burdened the
medieval philosophers.
First, in physics, it had a negative impact on the development of
physics in the Middle Ages. Ar-Rāzī criticized this principle, as we will see
later.
Second, in metaphysics, it led to the introduction of unnecessary
agents (forty-seven of them, or fifty-five, as Aristotle mentioned in his
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Metaphysics 1074a 5–15) and metaphysical entities as auxiliary forces in

order to initiate motion in the first place.
This point led Aristotle himself to some inconsistencies regarding his
first cause (which is pure form) and its relation to the motion of physical
bodies: specifically, the need for intermediate intellects to transfer the
force of motion from the pure form to the material objects, in the
sublunary region, by an unjustified chain of intellect that goes gradually
through forty-seven or fifty-five minds until it reaches earth.
Al-Kindī probably thought that Aristotle’s concept of mathematical
infinity is problematic in metaphysics and leads to self-contradiction in
regard to the eternity of the world. In other words, Aristotle said that
actual infinity is impossible, however, the actual world is eternal (infinite).
If Aristotle was not consistent in his philosophy, why did al-Kindī admire
him?
Al-Kindī’s admiration was probably based on Aristotle’s work in logic,
and this is what al-Ghazālī warns philosophers and other people about: the
clarity of the philosophers in logic does not necessarily guarantee their
correctness in other fields, especially in metaphysics.

Al-Kindī disproves the eternity of time

It is impossible for time to be infinite in actuality, either in the past, or

in the future. Al-Kindī offers another argument to disprove the eternity of
the world based on the concept of time, as follows:

Before every temporal segment there is (another) segment,

until we reach a temporal segment before which there is no
segment, i.e., a segmented duration before which there is no
segmented duration. It cannot be otherwise—if it were possible,
and after every segment of time there was a segment, infinitely,
then we would never reach a given time—for the duration from
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past infinity to this given time would be equal to the duration

from this given time regressing in time to infinity; and if (the
duration) from infinity to a definite time was known, then (the
duration) from this known time to temporal infinity would be
known, and then the infinite is finite, and this is an impossible
contradiction.59

The structure of the argument that time is finite (in its past)

1. Before every period of time there is another, until we reach a

period of time before which there is no period of time and this
is the end of regression.
2. Al-Kindī thinks that it cannot be otherwise, i.e., one cannot go
back in regression to infinity (actual infinity is impossible).
3. Now if one were to think it possible, and before every period of
time there is another to infinity, then one should also think
that after every segment of time there was a segment, infinitely,
and thus we would never reach a given time.
4. Why would we never reach a given time? Because the duration
from past infinity to this given time would be equal to the
duration from this given time regressing in time to infinity.

--►--------------------►---------------------X--------------------

duration from past infinity to n1 (FN) n1 (a given time)

--◄--------------------◄---------------------X--------------------

duration from n1 to past infinity (NF) n1 (a given time)

duration from F to n1 = duration from n1 to F, or simply: FN = NF

59 Ibid., p. 74.
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5. But if the duration from infinity to a definite time (n1) were

known (finite), then the duration from this known time to
temporal infinity (F) would be known (finite) too.
6. Thus, the infinite is finite, and this is an impossible
contradiction.
7. Therefore, time cannot have an actual infinity in its past.
8. Therefore, time is actually finite.
9. Since time is nothing more than numbers counting motion,
motion is finite too.
10. And since finite motion cannot exist unless it is a motion of a
finite body, then the body is finite too.

Al-Kindī also makes the argument that time is actually finite in its
past, and the world is not eternal:

Furthermore, if a definite time cannot be reached until a

time before it is reached, nor that before it until a time before it is
reached, and so to infinity; and the infinite can neither be
traversed nor brought to an end; then the temporally infinite can
never be traversed so as to reach a definite time. However, its
termination at a definite time exists, and time is not an infinite
segment, but rather is finite necessarily, and therefore the
duration of a body is not infinite, and it is not possible for a body
to be without duration.
Thus, the being of a body does not have infinity; the being of
a body is, rather, finite, and it is impossible for a body to be
eternal.60

Time is actually finite (in its future)—the world is not eternal

The structure of the argument in al-Kindī’s language follows:61

60 Ibid., pp. 74–75.

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1. It is impossible for future time to have infinity in actuality.

Why?
2. It is impossible for the duration from past time to a
definite time to have infinity [according to a previous proof].
3. Times are consecutive, one time after another time; when
a time is added to a finite, definite time, the sum of the definite
time and its addition is definite too [according to axiom number 5
in our section entitled “Al-Kindī’s argument against the eternity
of the world”].
4. If, however, the sum was not definite, then something
quantitatively definite would have been added to something else
quantitatively definite, and the result would be something
quantitatively infinite assembled by them [but this contradicts
axiom number 4].
5. Time is a continuous quantity, i.e., it has a division
common to its past and future. Its common division is the
present, which is the last limit of past time and the first limit of
future time.
6. Every definite time has two limits: a first limit and last
limit. If two definite times are continuous through one limit
common to them both, then the remaining limit of each one of
them is definite and knowable [according to the previous proof
above in our section entitled “Premises in support of al-Kindī’s
argument”].
7. It has, however, been said that the sum of the two times
will be indefinite; it will then be both not limited by any termini
and limited by termini, and this is an impossible contradiction.
8. It is thus impossible, if a definite time is added to a
definite time, for the sum to be indefinite; and whenever a
definite time is added to a definite time, all of it is definitely
limited, to its last segment.
9. It is, therefore, impossible for future time to have infinity
in actuality.

In summary, body and motion are finite, they are not eternal. They
have a beginning in time, and they came into existence at a certain time,
and will perish at a certain time. Thus, they are created, and therefore, the

61 Ibid., p. 75. Numbers added.

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world, as a constitution of objects in their motion, is created as well, and is

created in time since time is the count of motion.
Someone might raise the question that the fact that the world has a
beginning in time does not mean it is created by God; it might have just
come into existence by itself. To this question, al-Kindī has the following
answer, which I discuss under the proofs of the existence of God.

Proofs of the Existence of God (the One God)

Al-Kindī presents three kinds of proof for the existence of God:

1. the proof of essence and generation of the universe,

2. the proof of unity and multiplicity, and
3. the proof of design.

My discussion focuses on the first proof of essence and generation,

because it represents a new aspect of Islamic philosophy. This argument is
related to Islamic scholastic theology (cilm al-kalām), in that it shares
terminology such as cause, effect, and generation. In this argument, al-
Kindī tries to show that the universe cannot be caused by itself. In other
words, the universe cannot generate its own existence.
The second argument of unity and multiplicity focuses more on
proving that the cause is one than in proving its existence.

Al-Kindī’s proof of essence and generation (al-māhiyya wa’l-

udūth)

It is impossible for a thing to be the cause of the generation of its

essence.